Chapter One

1.1. The Subject Matter of International Relations(IR)

IR is the shorthand name for the academic subject of international relations. It can be defined as the study of relationships and interactions between countries, including the activities and policies of national governments, international organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and multinational corporations (MNCs). It can be both a theoretical subject and a practical or policy subject, and academic approaches to it can be either empirical or normative or both. It is often considered a branch of political science, but it is also a subject studied by historians (international or diplomatic history), and economists (international economics). As well, it is a field of legal studies (public international law) and an area of philosophy (international ethics). From that broader perspective IR clearly is an interdisciplinary inquiry. Aspects of international relations, and in particular war and diplomacy, have been scrutinized and remarked upon at least since the time of the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, but IR only became a proper academic discipline in the early twentieth century.

The main reason why we should study IR is the fact that the entire population of the world is divided into separate political communities, or independent states, which profoundly affect the way people live. An independent nation or **state** may be defined as an unambiguous and bordered territory, with a permanent population, under the jurisdiction of supreme government that is constitutionally separate from all foreign governments: a **sovereign state**. Together, those states form an international state system that is global in extent. At the present time, there are almost 200 independent states. With very few isolated exceptions, everybody on earth not only lives in one of those countries but is also a citizen of one of them and very rarely of more than one. So virtually every man, woman, and child on earth is connected to a particular state, and via that state to the state system which affects their lives in important ways of which they may not be fully aware.

States are independent of each other, at least legally: they have sovereignty. But that does not mean they are isolated or insulated from each other. On the contrary, they adjoin each other and

affect each other and must therefore somehow find ways to coexist and to deal with each other. In other words, they form an international state system, which is a core subject of IR. Furthermore, states are usually embedded in international markets that affect the policies of their governments and the wealth and welfare of their citizens. That requires that they enter into relations with each other. Complete isolation is usually not an option. When states are isolated and cut off from the state system, either by their own government or by foreign powers, the people usually suffer as a result. That has been the situation at various times recently with regard to Burma (officially, the Union of Myanmar), Libya, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Like most other social systems, the state system can have both advantages and disadvantages for the states involved and their people. IR is the study of the nature and consequences of these international relations.

The state system is a distinctive way of organizing political life on earth and has deep historical roots. There have been state systems at different times and places in different parts of the world, in for example ancient India, ancient Greece, and Renaissance Italy. However, the subject of IR conventionally dates back to the early modern era (sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) in Europe, when sovereign states based on adjacent territories were initially established. Ever since the eighteenth century, relations between such independent states have been labelled ‘international relations’. Initially the state system was European, later it was Western. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, the state system was expanded to encompass the entire territory of the earth. The world of states is basically a territorial world; it is a way of politically organizing populated territory, a distinctive kind of territorial political organization, based on numerous different governments that are legally independent of each other. The only large territory that is not a state is Antarctica, and it is administered by a consortium of states. Today, IR is the study of the global state system from various scholarly perspectives.

There are at least five basic social values that states are usually expected to uphold: security, freedom, order, justice, and welfare. These are social values that are so fundamental to human well-being that they must be protected or ensured in some way. That could be by social organizations other than the state, e.g., by families, clans, ethnic or religious organizations, villages, or cities. In the modern era, however, the state has usually been involved as the leading

institution in that regard: it is expected to ensure these basic values. For example, people generally assume the state to underwrite the value of security, which involves the protection of citizens from internal and external threat. That is a fundamental concern or interest of states. However, the very existence of independent states affects the value of security; we live in a world of many states, almost all of which are armed at least to some degree and some of which are major military powers. Thus, states can both defend and threaten people's security, and that paradox of the state system is usually referred to as the '**security dilemma**'. In other words, just like any other human organization, states present problems as well as provide solutions.

Most states are likely to be friendly, non-threatening, and peace-loving. But some states may be hostile and aggressive and there is no world government to constrain them. That poses a basic and age-old problem of state systems: **national security**. To deal with that problem, most states possess armed forces. Military power is usually considered a necessity so that states can coexist and deal with each other without being intimidated or subjugated. Unarmed states are extremely rare in the history of the state system. That is a basic fact of the state system of which we should never lose sight. Many states also enter into alliances with other states to increase their national security. To ensure that no one great power succeeds in achieving a hegemonic position of overall domination, based on intimidation, coercion, or the outright use of force, it is also necessary to construct and maintain a balance of military power. Security is obviously one of the most fundamental values of international relations. That approach to the study of world politics is typical of **realist theories** of IR (Morgenthau 1960). It operates on the assumption that relations of states can best be characterized as a world in which armed states are competing rivals and periodically go to war with each other.

The second basic value that states are usually expected to uphold is freedom, both personal freedom and national freedom or independence. A fundamental reason for having states and putting up with the burdens that governments place on citizens, such as taxes or obligations of military service, is the condition of national freedom or independence that states exist to foster. We cannot be free unless our country is free too: that was made very clear to millions of Czech, Polish, Danish, Norwegian, Belgian, Dutch, and French citizens, as well as citizens of other countries which were invaded and occupied by Nazi Germany during the Second World War.

Even if our country is free we may still not be free personally, but at least then the problem of our freedom is in our own hands. War threatens and sometimes destroys freedom. Peace fosters freedom. Peace also makes progressive international change possible, that is, the creation of a better world. Peace and progressive change are obviously among the most fundamental values of international relations. That approach to the study of world politics is typical of **liberal theories** of IR . It operates on the assumption that international relations can be best characterized as a world in which states cooperate with each other to maintain peace and freedom and to pursue progressive change.

The third and fourth basic values that states are usually expected to uphold are order and justice. States have a common interest in establishing and maintaining international order so that they can coexist and interact on a basis of stability, certainty, and predictability. To that end, states are expected to uphold international law: to keep their treaty commitments and to observe the rules, conventions, and customs of the international legal order. They are also expected to follow accepted practices of diplomacy and to support international organizations. International law, diplomatic relations, and international organizations can only exist and operate successfully if these expectations are generally met by most states most of the time. States are also expected to uphold human rights. Today, there is an elaborate international legal framework of human rights —civil, political, social, and economic—which has been developed since the end of the Second World War. Order and justice are obviously among the most fundamental values of international relations. That approach to the study of world politics is typical of **International Society theories** of IR (Bull 1995). It operates on the assumption that international relations can best be characterized as a world in which states are socially responsible actors and have a common interest in preserving international order and promoting international justice.

The final basic value that states are usually expected to uphold is the population's socioeconomic wealth and welfare. People expect their government to adopt appropriate policies to encourage high employment, low inflation, steady investment, the uninterrupted flow of trade and commerce, and so forth. Because national economies are rarely isolated from each other, most people also expect that the state will respond to the international economic system in such a way as to enhance or at least defend and maintain the national standard of living.

Most states nowadays try to frame and implement economic policies that can maintain the stability of the international economy upon which they are all increasingly dependent. That usually involves economic policies that can deal adequately with international markets, with the economic policies of other states, with foreign investment, with foreign exchange rates, with international trade, with international transportation and communications, and with other international economic relations that affect national wealth and welfare. Economic interdependence, meaning a high degree of mutual economic dependence among countries, is a striking feature of the contemporary state system. Some people consider that to be a good thing because it may increase overall freedom and wealth by expanding the global marketplace, thereby increasing participation, specialization, efficiency, and productivity. Other people consider it to be a bad thing because it may promote overall inequality by allowing rich and powerful countries, or countries with financial or technological advantages, to dominate poor and weak countries which lack those advantages. Still others consider national protectionism as preferable to economic interdependence as the best way to respond to financial and economic crises which periodically disrupt the world economy. But either way, wealth and welfare obviously are among the most fundamental values of international relations. That approach to the study of world politics is typical of IPE (International Political Economy) theories of IR (Gilpin 1987). It operates on the assumption that international relations can best be characterized as a fundamentally socioeconomic world and not merely a political and military world.

Most people usually take these basic values (security, freedom, order and justice, and welfare) for granted. They only become aware of them when something goes wrong—for example, during a war or a depression, when things begin to get beyond the control of individual states. On those learning occasions, people wake up to the larger circumstances of their lives which in normal times are a silent or invisible background. At those moments they are likely to become sharply aware of what they take for granted, and of how important these values really are in their everyday lives. We become aware of national security when a foreign power rattles its sabre, or international terrorists engage in hostile actions against our country or one of our allies. We become aware of national independence and our freedom as citizens when peace is no longer guaranteed. We become aware of international order and justice when some states, especially

major powers, abuse, exploit, denounce, or disregard international law, or trample on human rights. We become aware of national welfare and our own personal socioeconomic well-being when foreign countries or international investors use their economic clout to jeopardize our standard of living.

There were significant moments of heightened awareness of these major values during the twentieth century. The First World War made it dreadfully clear to most people just how devastatingly destructive of lives and living conditions modern mechanized warfare between major powers can be, and just how important it is to reduce the risk of war between great powers. Such recognition led to the first major developments of IR thought which tried to find effective legal institutions—e.g., the Covenant of the League of Nations—to prevent great-power war.

The Second World War not only underlined the reality of the dangers of great-power war, but also revealed how important it is to prevent any great power from getting out of control and how unwise it is to pursue a policy of appeasement—which was adopted by Britain and France with regard to Nazi Germany just prior to the war, with disastrous consequences for everybody, including the German people.

There were also moments of heightened awareness of the fundamental importance of these values after the Second World War. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 brought home to many people the dangers of nuclear war. The anti-colonial movements of the 1950s and 1960s in Asia and Africa, and the secessionist movements in the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia at the end of the Cold War, made it clear how important self-determination and political independence continue to be. The Gulf War of 1990–1 and the conflicts in the Balkans, particularly in Bosnia (1992–5) and Kosovo (1999), were a reminder of the importance of international order and respect for human rights. The attacks on New York and Washington (2001) awakened many people in the United States and elsewhere to the dangers of international terrorism.

The Great Depression brought home to many people around the world how their economic livelihood could be adversely affected, in some cases destroyed, by market conditions, not only at home but also in other countries . The global inflation of the 1970s and early 1980s, caused by

a sudden dramatic increase in oil prices by the OPEC cartel of oil-exporting countries, was a reminder of how the interconnectedness of the global economy can be a threat to national and personal welfare anywhere in the world. For example, the oil shock of the 1970s made it abundantly clear to countless American, European, and Japanese motorists—among others—that the economic policies of Middle East and other major oil-producing countries could suddenly raise the price of gas or petrol at the pump and lower their standard of living. The global financial crisis of the early twenty first century recalled the lessons of the Great Depression and underlined the huge extent to which it was a global episode and not merely a Western crisis.

For a long time, there has been a basic assumption that life inside properly organized and well-managed states is better than life outside states or without states at all. For example, the Jews spent well over half a century trying to get a state of their own, Israel, in which they could be secure. As long as states and the state system manage to maintain the foregoing core values, that assumption holds. That has generally been the case for developed countries, especially the states of Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and some others. That gives rise to more conventional IR theories which regard the state system as a valuable core institution of modern life. The traditional IR theories tend to adopt that positive view. **They recognize the significance of these basic values** even if they disagree about which ones are most important—e.g., **realists emphasize the importance of security and order; liberals emphasize freedom and justice; and IPE scholars emphasize economic equality and welfare .**

But if states are not successful in that regard, the state system can be easily understood in the opposite light: not as upholding basic social conditions and values, but rather as undermining them. More than a few states fail to ensure any of them. That is the case with regard to many states in the non-Western world, especially sub-Saharan Africa. The plight of countless men, women, and children in those countries puts into question the credibility and perhaps even the legitimacy of the state system. It promotes a corresponding assumption that the international system fosters or at least tolerates human suffering, and that the system should be changed so that people everywhere can flourish, and not just those in the developed countries of the world. That gives rise to more critical IR theories which regard the state and the state system as a less beneficial and more problematic institution.

To sum up thus far: states and the system of states are territory-based social organizations which exist primarily to establish, maintain, and defend basic social conditions and values, including, particularly, security, freedom, order, justice, and welfare. These are the main reasons for having states. Many states, and certainly all developed countries, uphold these conditions and values at least to minimal standards and often at a higher level. Indeed, they have been so successful in so doing for the past several centuries that standards have steadily increased and are now higher than ever. These countries set the international standard for the entire world. But many states and most underdeveloped countries fail to meet even minimal standards, and as a consequence their presence in the contemporary state system raises serious questions, not only about those states, but also about the state system of which they are an important part. The state system may produce adverse and harmful socioeconomic conditions in some countries. That has provoked a debate in IR between traditional theorists who by and large view the existing state system in positive terms, and radical theorists who by and large view it in negative terms.

Traditionally, the study of IR has focused on questions of war and peace— the subfield of **international security** studies. The movements of armies and of diplomats, the crafting of treaties and alliances, the development and deployment of military capabilities—these are the subjects that dominated the study of IR in the past, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, and they continue to hold a central position in the field. Since the Cold War, regional conflicts and ethnic violence have received more attention, while interdisciplinary peace studies programs and feminist scholarship have sought to broaden concepts of “security” further.

Theoretical knowledge accumulates by a repeated cycle of generalizing and then testing. For a given puzzle, various theories can explain the result (though none perfectly) as a case of a more general principle. Each theory also logically predicts other outcomes, and these can be tested empirically. A laboratory science, controlling all but one variable, can test theoretical predictions efficiently. IR does not have this luxury, because many variables operate simultaneously. Thus, it is especially important to think critically about IR events and consider several different theoretical explanations before deciding which (if any) provides the best explanation.

1.2. Evolution and the development of International Relations

International relations is a vague and widely used term with two main meanings. The first meaning of term pertains to interactions among states and between states and state- based actors across state boundaries. In this sense, the term can be compared with another widely used term: international politics. However, international relations is wider than international politics which also includes non-state actors along with social, economic, cultural aspects and so on. Thus, the second term is included in the first. Indeed, international politics is usually seen as one of the most important sub-fields of international relations. This first meaning of the term 'international' relations was coined by Jeremy Bentham – it makes it first appearance in his 1789 book Principles of Morals and Legislation.

The second meaning of the term – International Relations (IR) – denotes a separate field of academic inquiry, distinct from other social sciences like Economics, Law, Sociology etc. This second meaning of the term (IR) effectively originated in 1919 with the establishment of the first chair in the field at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. This second meaning of the term, then, has the first as its object of scholarly scrutiny. IR has, since its origins in the wake of the First World War, developed several theoretical perspectives in order to identify and explain the recurring patterns of international relations – most notably the causes of war and the preconditions for peace. Many contemporary universities offer courses and degrees in IR; these offerings often cohabit Departments of Political Science together with close academic relations such as Political Theory, Comparative Politics, Public Policy or International Political Economy and now a days in civics.

These two meanings are abstract and conventional. In practice, they overlap; it is often hard to tell where one ends and the other begins. This section, "The Development of International Relations" is a case in point. It draws on academic perspectives to present a simple overview of international relations through modern history. If it draws heavily – some might say excessively – on Western events, this has a simple explanation: Conventions of the IR discipline singles out the territorial state as the dominant actor in international relations. Since the territorial state is largely a Western invention the attention of this chapter is biased towards Western events.

1.2.1. Pre-State Relations

Convention identifies territorial states as the major actors of international politics. And as the nature of states has evolved through the ages, so has the nature of international relations. Where “states” or “nations” do not exist, it is hard to identify macro-political affairs that deserve to be denoted as “international relations”.

Before the age of the modern state, it is difficult to find much evidence of “international relations”. Before the age of modern states, macro-political order was imposed by other social formations, such as cities or empires. In Europe, Asia Minor, the Middle East and the north coast of Africa, order and unity were long imposed by the Roman Empire. However, as soon as the Roman Empire began to divide and split in rivaling parts during the course of the fourth century AD, it is possible to distinguish the first foreshadowing of international relations in the macro-political affairs of the West – especially in the fragmented, impoverished western territories that bordered the Atlantic rim.

1.2.2. The Decline and Fall of Rome

During the fourth century, the politics of the Roman Empire was disintegrating in corruption and increasing disorder. Processes of political deliberation were increasingly overridden by brute force. The empire divided. Armies gained influence. Generals fought each other, sometimes recruiting bands of barbarians to fight for them. As the Empire was increasingly weakened from within, it faced a sudden wave of great migrations (380-450) from without. The eastern half of the Empire survived. The western half, however, collapsed. Western cities faltered. Western industry and commerce decayed. The vast, western territories of the Empire sank back into economic poverty, political fragmentation, and social disorder.

The Eastern half of the old Roman Empire retained the basic institutions of Rome. From its splendid capital in Byzants, the East Roman Empire managed to maintain political unity by virtue of Orthodox religion and authoritarian politics. Byzants secured the survival of the eastern

Empire partly by repelling the barbarian onslaught by armed force, and partly by deflecting it by diplomacy. Throughout the Middle Ages, Byzants remained the major European city. But the Byzantine Empire closed itself defensively off from the rest of the world, and took no leadership in European events. Thus, it was not from Byzantine politics that the first, significant features of international relations emerged.

The Western half of the Roman Empire, by contrast, unraveled under the impact of the great migrations of the fourth and fifth centuries. Communications halted. Production and trade choked. Two centuries afterwards, Europe had no coherent existence. The area had unraveled into a great jumble of tribes, military raiders, villages, manors, monasteries and trading towns. And if this fragmented area retained any social unity at all during the "Dark Ages" of the seventh and eighth centuries, this was due to the remembrances of a common imperial past which glazed the territory with the collective memory of Roman law and a thin veneer of Christian institutions. Kingdoms rose under exceptionally strong rulers, but fell apart again under weaker ones. Yet, it was here, in this unpromising and chaotic congeries of the Christian civilization of the Far West, that the most significant **institutions of international relations emerged**. But slowly.

1.2.3. The Role of the Church

Some institutions emerged during the fifth and sixth century to provide some measure of unity and order in the impoverished and fragmented west. The first of these was the Christian Church. It maintained, against all odds, the rudiments of a common Western identity through the Dark Ages. It kept the Christian religion alive. It conserved the remnants of the Roman civilization. It preserved the light of religion, learning and literacy – indeed, it spread the light to the northwestern peripheries.

A second force for unity was the German and Frankish kingdoms. They rose and fell during the early middle Ages and, over time, they united the central and western regions of the Continent. One of these was built by a German king, Clovis (466-511). He conquered most of Western Europe and imposed upon it a political unity–which unraveled as his sons quarreled about their inheritance soon after his death. Another great kingdom was built by the Frankish king Carolus

Magnus (or Charlemagne, 768- 814). This kingdom also unraveled soon after the death of its king – when it was weakened by waves of destructive migrations.

In some places Magyar, Viking and Arab assaults destroyed the order which Charlemagne had created. In other places foreign onslaughts stimulated the growth of defensive institutions. In England, Alfred the Great (871-899) organized a successful defense against the Viking invasions and won the allegiance of the Anglo-Saxons. In Germany, local counts and dukes repulsed the infringements of foreign attacks in the late 800s; and in the early 900s they elected themselves a king, Henry I (919-936), whose son, Otto I, repressed domestic rebellions and defeated the Magyars once and for all. In France, political stability was similarly rebuilt, and in the late 900s, the great lords of France chose Hugh Capet (987-996) as their king, and became his vassals. Hugh seized the old Carolingian crown, gave it to his own family and thus founded the Capetian dynasty.

1.2.4. The Rise of Monarchs and Nobles

From the point of view of economic history, feudalism has often been portrayed as a distinct mode of production. From the point of view of international relations, it makes good sense also to see feudalism as a distinct mode of protection – as a way in which new, powerful rulers tried to impose order and stability on their realms by granting extant knights large land grants (“fiefs”), thus creating a supreme class of specialized warriors (“vassals”).

Legally, the members of this class were liegemen or vassals of kings and lords; but in practice, they were given privileges and fiscal bases large enough to ignore royal orders. Parts of Europe fell under the influence of armored knights who assumed the authority to govern all those who lived on their fiefdom. They administered justice, collected taxes, gathered agricultural produce, claimed labor service and demanded military service from the residents. And in the process they evolved from a military elite to a social elite. They called themselves nobiles in the Roman fashion and appropriated various late imperial titles such as comes (count) and dux (duke).

At this time, before the advent of the modern state, Europe was not yet a state system, and international relations did not really exist. Monarchic states were intertwined with other social formations – with empires, cities, and city-states (republics, bishoprics and principalities) – in shifting arrangements among emperors, monarchs, nobles, clerics and towns. Around 1000 AD, however, important economic and social changes occurred, after which the larger-scale, territorial states emerged as a superior way of organizing men, money and military might.

1.2.5. The Age of the Territorial State

To understand International Relations, it is necessary to appreciate the nature of the modern territorial state. Also, it is important to note that this kind of state is a Western creation; that the modern state originated in Europe and subsequently spread to other parts of the globe. This fact gives the study of international relations a Western bias. It naturally directs a historical discussion of the early development of international relations towards European affairs.

The "modern state" refers to an internationally recognized unit, controlled by some kind of government that exercises control over a distinct territory and the group of people that live on it. A state, then, possesses four key characteristics: (1) a **territory**, (2) a **people** that inhabit the territory, (3) **political institutions** that maintain some measure of order and are (4) **recognized by other states**. The first three features are common enough; they are found in various social formations at different times and in many parts of the globe. The fourth feature, however, is more peculiarly Western. For it endows each state with legal standing as a juridically equal actor in a larger, international society of states.

This formal recognition of each state by all the others is a peculiar Western practice which evolved at a particular time in Western history, and it had particular implications for interstate relations. These implications conferred upon the state its distinct attributes as a Western and modern phenomenon. Also, they indicate the distinct properties that mark a system of interacting states.

One of these properties involves a distinction between two levels of human interaction: On one level is the interaction among individual men – this is the level of the commonwealth (which is a society among individuals) where social order is maintained by central institutions of political authority. On the other level is interaction among commonwealths – this is the level of international society, where no central authority exists. This distinction emerged at the end of the Middle Ages, and evolved, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, into a defining conception in International Relations. It contrasts with the medieval notion that the international society, too, was a commonwealth of sorts (a more embracing society among men).

Thus emerges also the second property of International Relations: the absence of a central authority. Renaissance scholars like Francesco Guicciardini and Giovanni Botero noted this property. Alberico Gentili was quite explicit about this in his Three Books on the Law of War [1598]: there exists no jurisdiction above the state. Therefore, disputes will routinely arise between them. And they will be solved either through negotiation or through war. Renaissance authors increasingly referred to this situation of general lawlessness as a "**state of nature**". Today, the situation is more commonly referred to as "**anarchy**". The modern system of sovereign states is said to be "anarchic" in nature. In an anarchic system, the most effective mechanism for maintaining order is a "balance of power" – as Guicciardini, Botero, Gentili and other observers of Renaissance politics were among the first to note.

1.2.6. The Arrival of States

As the feudal order was undermined by the advent of trade and of urban centers, a diverse plurality of social formations evolved: city-states evolved in northern Italy; city-leagues emerged in the German Empire and along the Baltic coast; monarchic states emerged along the Atlantic rim. In the longer run, no social formation could compete with these Atlantic monarchies in terms of efficiency and might. They emerged as dominant macro-political actors of the Western world, and they soon carried their dominance far beyond the West. Stimulated by new economic dynamics, new means of production, new ways of trade and finance, and by new patterns of authority and power, the monarchic territorial states established themselves as the most effective social formations of the new age.

It is a much-overlooked fact that when the territorial states emerged along the north- Atlantic rim, they did not really appear one after the other; they appeared together. The first territorial states of Europe – Portugal, Spain, France and England foremost among them – evolved hand in hand and soon constituted a unique, interrelated interstate system.

These states all had roots far back in Western history. But their decisive consolidation was marked by the Italian Wars (1492-1527/56). These wars, in which the royal houses of Habsburg and Valois fought for dominance over Italy, involved the final destruction of the city-states system and the emergence of Spain and France as territorial states. They also involved the emergence of several new, characteristically modern innovations, which gave the territorial states a leg up on competing social formations. The most significant of these were associated inventions like the compass, gunpowder and the printing press.

The compass made it possible to navigate across the world oceans out of the sight of land. The compass, together with other new technologies of navigation, provided decisive preconditions for the wave of Western expeditions and discoveries of the second half of the fifteenth century – climaxing in Columbus crossing the Atlantic from Spain to the Americas in 1492. Expeditions of conquest and settlement – such as the Hernán Cortés' conquest of the Aztec empire in 1519, and Francisco Pizarro's conquest of the Inca empire followed such discoveries in 1533. Such expeditions became all the more efficient when Western ships were equipped with guns and cannons.

Gunpowder revolutionized international relations. On the one hand, it marked the advent of Western expansion and colonialism; for when guns were mounted on ocean- going ships, Western adventurers were enabled to blast their way along the Asian and American coasts and conquer foreign land on behalf of European rulers. On the other hand, gunpowder hastened the fall of feudalism and fuelled qualitative changes in the relationships among Western states. Gunpowder weapons obviously made wars more deadly and dangerous; but they also distributed the dangers more evenly: Even the most ordinary footman could, if he were given a handgun, kill the most noble of knights. As a result, the relative costs of war were radically altered, and the

role of the old aristocracy was greatly reduced – in warfare as in more general social terms. One implication of this downgrading of the mounted knight was the relative upgrading of foot soldiers – organized in massive armies and divided into the three specialized military branches of cavalry, infantry and artillery. Another implication was the upgrading of the prince – the centralization of military power in the hands of the monarch, and the concentration of political power in the hands of the European kings and their splendid courts. The introduction of movable typeface reinforced all other changes. Once introduced around 1450, the new technology of print spread across Europe and the world like wildfire. It affected the development of states and of interstate relations.

On the one hand, the advent of print strengthened the rising power of the state. All over the Western world, print stimulated the advent of official state languages – print vernaculars, which imposed standardized vocabularies and grammars on official communication. This development marked the beginning of the linguistic unification of many countries. It also marked a new phase in the consolidation of states, for a common print vernacular provided an important base for the evolution of national identities and, in turn, of the potent political doctrine of nationalism.

On the other hand, print weakened the traditional authority of the Church. Print was used to collect and systematize all types of knowledge – in tables, charts, maps and practical handbooks of all kinds. As these texts spread in wider and wider circles, they challenged the Church – partly because many maps and navigational charts were so obviously at odds with the official Church vision of the earth and the heavens; and partly because they broke the Church monopoly of learning. As local laymen printed their practical texts in local languages, they crowded out Latin as the divine and universal language of learning. As local churchmen printed and spread their sermons and breviaries, they made visible the deep differences of doctrine among Europe's many local congregations. This necessitated the intervention of the pope's theologians to mediate among the differences and create a unified, central and official Church doctrine. But such interventions were met with protests, conflict and open revolt. The climax of this was reached during the Reformation – which was **triggered by Martin Luther** nailing up his 95 theses on the church door in Wittenberg in 1517, and by his theses being printed and widely distributed across all of Europe.

During the course of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, then, international relations were affected by a complex blend of technological, economic, moral and symbolic forces. They gave the Western world some of its most characteristic features – most notably a worldwide web of economic relations centered on a European system of strong territorial states led by powerful Christian monarchs. Each monarch presided over institutions that maintained order in civil society, the population perceiving the king as legitimate through a rich blend of religious, linguistic, and symbolic factors.

The rise in monarchic power was purchased at the expense of local authorities. Local princes and land-owning noblemen resisted the centralization of monarchic power with protests, rebellions and war. The century was littered with local rebellions and civil strife. Yet the monarchs consolidated their power. By 1600, the states of Europe had evolved a set of distinct characteristics. First, it was territorial in nature; the state represented a distinct area of the surface of the earth. Second, its territory supported a distinct population – a population that was increasingly unified by religion and language and a distinct set of cultural values and symbols, all of which contributed to their common identity. Third, the population obeyed a common, central authority – a monarch and his court-based, administrative apparatus. This authority had evolved around the two basic functions: of raising military forces and of paying for them. Thus, the two basic pillars of the early modern state were the military institutions, which administered the monarch's armed forces on the one hand, and the fiscal institutions, which collected taxes and tolls for the royal coffers on the other.

States had long possessed **internal sovereignty** – each state had a domestic center of legitimate authority – as Jean Bodin had tried to explain in his Six Books of the Commonwealth (1575).

However, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Western states also developed a notion of **external sovereignty**; i.e., they evolved a principle of mutual recognition of the inviolable nature of each other's territory (and thereby of each other's internal sovereignty). This notion of external sovereignty highlighted the territorial nature of the state: the state was not merely territorial in nature – its territory was circumscribed by a boundary which was impenetrable in principle, defended by military might in practice and justified in law. The state was generally accepted as a self-contained and self-supported unit. An emerging codex of law justified its right

to self-defense. And it was assumed to have an interest and a moral code all its own – a **ragion di stato** or a **raison d'etat**, as noted by political thinkers in Italy and France respectively.

HIstory of IR as a Field of Study

Foundations of the discipline of IR: although old enough, as a separate discipline it is dated back to I WW with the established of a Chair of IR at the University of Wales at Aberystwyth in 1919 and until then the discipline was shared by a number of older disciplines like Law, philosophy, economics, politics and diplomatic history.

• Study initially focused on war/security – in the crude sense of the term and peace was talked about thru collective security – idealistic thinking or utopian thinking – emergence of idealism/liberalism – argued for replacement of secret diplomacy, end of autocratic rule, and notions of democracy

• Normative character of the discipline emerged as a reaction to the War – realism as a counter force to idealism due to failure of collective security and the start of II WW

• Preoccupation with war and security remained but other issues were also taken up for discussion

• IR hence no more concerned with relations between nation-states; it is much more and includes:

1) relationships – in terms of economic interdependence, third world debt and dependence, international trade, inequality, new forms of political identity and citizenship, international regimes, international society of states, the nature of anarchy, regional economic associations, balance of power, democratization, post-cold war security and the like;
2) Actors – in terms of nation-states, transnational corporations, INGOs, social movements etc.

3) Empirical issues – like globalization and fragmentation, human rights, intervention and sovereignty, aid, refugees, ethnicity, women's issues, environmental conservation, aids, drugs, organized crimes etc and

4) Philosophical issues – such as questions of epistemology, ontology and methodology, gender perspectives, inter-paradigm debates, ethics and foreign policy and the like.

• Today, it is difficult to say where the discipline begins and where it ends.

1.3. International Regimes

Achieving good outcomes is not simple in IR. Because of the contradictory interpretations that parties to a conflict usually have, it is difficult to resolve conflicts without a third party to arbitrate or an overall framework to set common expectations for all parties. These considerations underlie the creation of International Organizations (IOs).

An **international regime** is a set of rules, norms, and procedures around which the expectations of actors converge in a certain issue area (whether arms control, international trade, or Antarctic exploration). The convergence of expectations means that participants in the international system have similar ideas about what rules will govern their mutual participation: each expects to play by the same rules. (This meaning of regime is not the same as that referring to the domestic governments of states, especially governments considered illegitimate, as in *regime change.)*

Regimes can help solve collective goods problems by increasing transparency— because everyone knows what everyone else is doing, cheating is riskier. The current revolution in information technologies is strengthening regimes particularly in this aspect. Also, with better international communication, states can identify conflicts and negotiate solutions through regimes more effectively.

The most common conception of regimes combines elements of realism and liberalism. States are seen as autonomous units maximizing their own interests in an anarchic context. Regimes do not play a role in issues in which states can realize their interests directly through unilateral applications of leverage. Rather, regimes come into existence to overcome collective goods dilemmas by coordinating the behaviors of individual states. Although states continue to seek

their own interests, they create frameworks to coordinate their actions with those of other states if and when such coordination is necessary to realize self-interest (that is, in collective goods dilemmas).

Regimes do not substitute for the basic calculations of costs and benefits by states; they just open up new possibilities with more favorable benefit-cost ratios. Regimes do not constrain states, except in a very narrow and short-term sense. Rather, they facilitate and empower national governments faced with issues in which collective goods or coordination problems would otherwise prevent these governments from achieving their ends. Regimes can be seen as ***intervening variables*** between the basic causal forces at work in IR—for realists, the relative power of state actors—and the outcomes such as international cooperation (or lack thereof). For realists in particular, regimes do not negate the effects of power; more often, they codify and normalize existing power relations in accordance with the dominance principle. For example, the nuclear nonproliferation regime protects the status quo in which only a few states have nuclear weapons.

Because regimes depend on state power for their enforcement, some IR scholars argue that regimes are most effective when power in the international system is most concentrated—when there is a hegemon to keep order. Yet, regimes do not always decline with the power of hegemons that created them. Rather, they may take on a life of their own. Although hegemony may be crucial in *establishing* regimes, it is not necessary for *maintaining* them. Once actors' expectations converge around the rules embodied in a regime, the actors realize that the regime serves their own interests. Working through the regime becomes a habit, and national leaders may not seriously consider breaking out of the established rules. This persistence of regimes was demonstrated in the 1970s, when U.S. power declined following the decades of U.S. hegemony since 1945. The international economic regimes adjusted somewhat and survived.

In part, the survival of regimes rests on their embedding in permanent *institutions* such as the UN, NATO, and the International Monetary Fund. These institutions become the tangible manifestation of shared expectations as well as the machinery for coordinating international actions based on those expectations. In international security affairs, the UN and other IOs

provide a stable framework for resolving disputes. International Political Economy (IPE) is even more institutionalized, again because of the heavier volume of activity and the wealth that can be realized from cooperation.

Institutions gain greater stability and weight than do no institutionalized regimes. With a staff and headquarters, an international institution can actively promote adherence to the rules in its area of political or economic life. These bureaucracies, however, can also promote policies not intended by the states that created the institutions (a problem noted by constructivist scholars).

Liberal institutionalism also places high value on international law. The culmination of liberal institutionalism to date is the European Union (EU) , After centuries of devastating wars, European states now enjoy a stable peace among themselves with strong international institutions to bind them.