

The COMPLETE PROSE *of*
T. S. Eliot

THE CRITICAL EDITION

VOLUME I: *Apprentice Years, 1905–1918*

Edited by JEWEL SPEARS BROOKER and

RONALD SCHUCHARD

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GENERAL EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

I. THE SCOPE AND STATE OF T. S. ELIOT'S PROSE, 1965-2014

As one of the most prolific prose masters of his age, T. S. Eliot published several volumes of essays that have had an immeasurable impact on literature, culture, and the humanities worldwide. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, more than seven hundred pieces of Eliot's prose remain uncollected or unpublished, and there are no critical editions of the work published in his lifetime. The situation is partly due to Eliot's own reticence. He was highly selective about the works that he wished to preserve, declaring that he could never bear to reread his prose writings without "acute embarrassment." In midcareer, in a letter to John Hayward, who was collecting and preserving much of his work, he confessed:

I have had to write at one time or another a lot of junk in periodicals the greater portion of which ought never to be reprinted. If any of this came to light, you would have to decide; but I wouldn't expect you to collect it yourself: you could take it in general that what I have not published in books by the time of my death I don't consider worth publishing. F[aber]. & F[aber] might be tempted, and your job would be to say no. (15 Feb 1938)

Over twenty years later, when the scholar A. C. Partridge approached him about collecting and editing his prose, he was less adamant, but felt that such a project was premature:

It is not for me to have an opinion as to whether the undertaking of such a task is justified by the value of my prose writings, but on the whole it seems to me an enterprise which would be more suitable after my death than during my life time, especially as I hope that I shall continue for some years to produce both prose and verse. It may be that there are some of my uncollected contributions to periodicals which are worth preserving, but I feel that it is premature to consider any definitive collection of my prose writings. (1 Apr 1959)

He would soon begin discussions about publishing his doctoral dissertation on F. H. Bradley, but he seems to have given no thought to the future of the

large number of unpublished addresses, broadcast scripts, and other prose items that had been accumulating in the forty-three years since his student days at Harvard and Oxford. The many uncollected items listed in the successive editions of Donald Gallup's *T. S. Eliot: A Bibliography* (1953, 1969), a major resource for the present edition, were available for scholars to consult, but his unpublished prose remained restricted and inaccessible after his death. Thus, most critical assessments of Eliot's work and thought have drawn primarily on the small percentage of essays that he gradually collected and put forth as a personal canon during his lifetime.

However severe he was about the collection of his own critical writings, as a critic Eliot had always recognized the necessity of having access to "every scrap" that a major author had written. As he asserted in a 1927 essay on Baudelaire, whose writings he had been studying steadily since 1919:

It is now becoming understood that Baudelaire is one of the few poets who wrote nothing, either prose or verse that is negligible. To understand Baudelaire you must read the whole of Baudelaire. And nothing that he wrote is without importance. He was a great poet; he was a great critic. And he was also a man with a profound attitude toward life, for the study of which we need every scrap of his writing. ("Poet and Saint . . .," 1927)

Determined to become involved in the intellectual life and cultural milieu of Great Britain and Europe, Eliot entered into dialogue with allies and antagonists in numerous fields, writing widely on poetry, fiction, drama, literary criticism, philosophy, religion, humanism, cultural theory, education, economics, world politics, and other topics of intellectual and social import. He addressed such issues more informally in his "A Commentary" for each issue of the *Criterion*, for which he sought to bring the best international writers into an intellectual community. And as a publisher who prepared book reports and blurbs for the books he brought to the Faber list, he wrote and lectured on matters that affected the larger world of publishing. After his death, the late Valerie Eliot worked devotedly as the steward of her husband's papers to compile, to preserve, and to transcribe them for posterity, always with the long view of seeing a comprehensive and annotated collection of his prose. To her, our honorary editor-in-chief, the editors of this multivolume edition are indebted for the privilege of continuing her determination "to bring all of Tom together." In collecting, editing, and annotating Eliot's *Complete Prose*, we aim to restore Eliot's full voice in

the public domain, and to bring back into hearing the voices of those with whom he aimed to resolve the problems and dilemmas of his time. To this end, we are presenting an electronic edition that is comprehensive in its inclusion of published and unpublished works, chronological in its arrangement of them, and accurate in the presentation of edited texts.

Eliot began writing stories for the *Smith Academy Record* as a schoolboy in 1905 and literary reviews for the *Harvard Advocate* as an undergraduate in 1909. By 1916, after completing his postgraduate studies and dissertation, he was free to find his stride as a reviewer and critic. Those essays that he wished to preserve he collected in four separate volumes, including *The Sacred Wood* (1920), *For Lancelot Andrewes* (1928), *Selected Essays* (1932, 1934, 1951), and *On Poetry and Poets* (1957). He sanctioned an edition of his 1916 doctoral dissertation and two related essays, published as *Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley* (1964). He had planned a fifth collection of essays, *To Criticize the Critic*, reaching back to include two from 1917 (“Reflections on *Vers Libre*” and *Ezra Pound: His Metric and Poetry*), but he became ill and died before he could personally make final choices and write a planned retrospective review of his sociological writings. That final collection, chosen and edited by Valerie Eliot and Faber editors, was published posthumously in 1965.

There were four smaller interim collections. *Homage to John Dryden* (1924) and *John Dryden: The Poet The Dramatist The Critic* (1932) contained, respectively, newly collected essays and broadcasts. *Elizabethan Essays* (1934) and *Essays Ancient and Modern* (1936) contained previously collected essays, though the former added one and the latter, which was issued after *For Lancelot Andrewes* went out of print, dropped three essays from that volume and added five. Most of these essays were absorbed into the third English edition of *Selected Essays* (1951), while some were discarded from his personal canon. These successive volumes, comprising seventy-six separate essays written from 1917 to 1961, were arranged non-chronologically in groups of related subjects.

Over the course of Eliot’s career, these collections were complemented by slimmer volumes of literary and cultural criticism prepared for named series of university lectures: the Norton Lectures at Harvard, published as *The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism* (1933); the Page-Barbour Lectures at Virginia: *After Strange Gods* (1934); and the Boutwell Lectures at Cambridge: *The Idea of a Christian Society* (1939). A fourth collection, comprising thematic essays and broadcasts, was published as *Notes towards the*

Definition of Culture (1948). His Clark Lectures at Cambridge in 1926 and his Turnbull Lectures at the Johns Hopkins University in 1933 were published posthumously as *The Varieties of Metaphysical Poetry* (1993). The above volumes constituted the small percentage of Eliot's collected prose before the commissioning of this "complete" edition.

II. THE STATUS OF THE ENGLISH AND AMERICAN EDITIONS

Eliot's influence as a critic has been so monumental that readers have rarely thought to question the stability and reliability of his texts, or the solidity and permanence of his critical canon. Volumes such as *The Sacred Wood*, *Selected Essays*, and *The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism* have been so central to Eliot studies that critics have had little cause to turn their attention to the construction, production, and transmission of the English and American editions of his work between 1920 and 1965. The general assumption has been that the American-born Eliot, as an English editor and publisher, must always have been in full control of the selection and publication of his own prose collections. Many would be astonished to discover otherwise—that American editions of Eliot's prose became corrupted, and that they continue to be used for scholarly purposes despite their unreliable textual character. But it is now known that Eliot's prose was as vulnerable to the anarchic state of international publishing as that of any of his contemporaries. His volumes also show the effects and consequences of unjust copyright laws, ungoverned editorial practices, and the breakdown of communication between English and American publishers.

When Alfred Knopf published *The Sacred Wood* in America, he used imported first-edition sheets from Algernon Methuen in England, thereby forfeiting American copyright. Thereafter, Eliot's copyrights were secured by American publishers, but he never again enjoyed identical English and American texts in editions of his prose. The textual problems stem from what was meant to be a copyright solution, the International Copyright Act of 1891. Better known as the Chace Act, the first American congressional legislation grudgingly provided limited protection to foreign copyright holders against piracy and the indiscriminate reprinting and sale of their books by American publishers. The act set up an onerous process of formal registration, strict publication dates, and other stipulations that could be met with perseverance, but its supporters, to get the bill passed, had also to make concessions to printers' unions and printing firms in the form of manufacturing clauses: these required foreign books to be printed from type set in the United States in

order for the publisher to secure American copyright. Methuen relinquished copyright of *The Sacred Wood* in America rather than conform, but there were greater consequences to come. Eliot's corrected English proofs or galleys were thereafter reset, reformatted, and redesigned by his subsequent American publishers; as in-house editors felt free to take liberties with those received proofs, making unauthorized and unreported alterations, deletions, and omissions, Eliot essentially lost control of the American editions of his work.

Deeply conscious of the isolationist stance of the Chace Act, and often uncertain about the copyright status of his essays and prose collections, Eliot described the situation in the *Criterion* as "a matter which touches closely anyone who publishes a book, or even a periodical article in Great Britain" (July 1927). As a strong supporter of the movement for copyright reform, he told his readers that "the present American Copyright Law is a flagrant injustice to British and still more to Irish writers, and one of the first particulars to which 'International Intellectual Co-operation' should be directed." But his active concern did not make him immune from future violation, as the treatment of a single canonical text demonstrates. His English publisher Faber and Faber and his new American publisher Harcourt Brace agreed to publish *Selected Essays 1917-1932* simultaneously on 15 September 1932, just as Eliot sailed to America to take up his appointment as the Norton Lecturer at Harvard for the academic year. After receiving corrected proofs from England, Harcourt Brace, complying with American copyright provisions, completely redesigned the book, with different binding, typography, page layout, punctuation, and spelling conventions. The numerous textual errors and inconsistencies in the two editions began in the dated title—there were no essays earlier than 1919—and in the misdating of seven separate essays on the contents page, notably "Tradition and the Individual Talent" (1917 for 1919). These were actually Eliot's unchecked errors of memory, and though all were eventually corrected in the third English edition (1951), two essays remain misdated in the current American edition (1950)—"The Humanism of Irving Babbitt" (1928, not 1927) and "Second Thoughts about Humanism" (1929, not 1928). There were other oversights and liberties with Eliot's titles in the table of contents: the special punctuation of "Rhetoric" in "'Rhetoric' and Poetic Drama" was dropped; the erroneous "The Elizabethan Dramatists" displaced "Four Elizabethan Dramatists"; the original "Hamlet and his Problems," as titled in *The Sacred Wood*, supplanted Eliot's shortened "Hamlet," and "Christopher Marlowe" was reduced to "Marlowe" in the text—all conflicting titles and

dates that regularly appear in scholarship with erroneous chronology and quotations from silently altered texts.

More serious problems awaited. In July 1934 Eliot published an unsigned review-essay in the *Times Literary Supplement* titled “John Marston,” prompting Faber and Faber, with Eliot’s sanction, to bring out a thematic volume titled *Elizabethan Essays*, comprising the Marston essay and the ten others on Elizabethan literature that made up section III of *Selected Essays*. Harcourt Brace chose not to publish an American edition, fearing that it would conflict with sales of their *Selected Essays*. In the same month that *Elizabethan Essays* appeared (October), Faber brought out a second English edition of *Selected Essays*, dropping the dates from the title, correcting errors, and adding Eliot’s recent essay on Marston. In fact, Harcourt Brace was not aware of this second edition until 1936, when Eliot and Donald Brace were discussing the difficulties of preparing joint editions of *Essays Ancient and Modern*, difficulties created by the absence of an American edition of *Elizabethan Essays*, which made separate prefaces necessary. In correspondence on the matter, Eliot informed Brace that there was “one essay in *Elizabethan Essays* which is not in *Selected Essays* unless you have kept your edition up to date, but I don’t suppose you have sold enough to reprint. It is an essay on John Marston and I think it appears in our second edition of *Selected Essays*.” Brace responded in surprise, protesting the costs of adding the Marston essay to the American edition:

I didn’t know that there had been any changes in your edition since the original issue. To add the Marston essay in our edition would involve some difficulty and expense because we have plates, and to insert the essay would involve renumbering the subsequent pages, which could only be accomplished by patching and soldering.

“It doesn’t matter to me,” Eliot replied, “whether you add the Marston to *Selected Essays* or not, but if you ever wish to do so in order to bring the volume into conformity with the [second] English edition I will send you a copy.” As Brace showed no interest, the matter was dropped, and thus for seventeen years English readers enjoyed a revised text and a bonus essay unknown to American readers.

After Eliot received the Nobel Prize in 1948, both publishers planned to bring out expanded editions of *Selected Essays*, with Harcourt Brace taking the lead and including four new essays selected by Eliot for both editions. The second American, or “new edition,” issued by the firm in October 1950,

preceded the third English edition by eleven months; the preface for the American edition was simply redated for the English edition. Writing the preface in July 1950, Eliot was wholly unaware that two distinctly different editions were in preparation, and he was later baffled by how the discrepancies could have occurred. Faber and Faber based theirs on the second English edition of 1934, which had been reprinted six times by 1949; Harcourt Brace took the plates of their 1932 edition and added the four new essays. However, overlooking Eliot's revised contents page, they not only published an unrevised text but omitted the essay on Marston. Hence, for more than sixty years American scholars have been reading a grossly hybrid volume. The similar plight of other American volumes of Eliot's prose, particularly *The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism*, is described in the introductions and textual notes for those volumes. Accordingly, no American editions of his collected essays have been used as copy-texts for this edition.

III. EDITORIAL PROCEDURES AND PRINCIPLES: PUBLISHED PROSE

Criteria for Inclusion

Eliot's uncollected prose makes up the vast majority of the writings published in his lifetime and spans the period from his stories in the *Smith Academy Record* in 1905 to his final autobiographical note for the *Harvard College Class of 1910: Fifty-fifth Anniversary Report*, contributed in late December 1964, shortly before his death on 4 January 1965. These writings include hundreds of reviews and essays contributed to periodicals; commentaries in the *Criterion*; letters to the press (printed here and in the *Letters*; in each place they appear in different contexts of personal letters and public prose, thereby inviting separate readings and annotation); lectures and addresses published separately in wrappers or in boards; introductions, prefaces, and forewords to books and to translations of his works in foreign languages; testimonials and other contributions to domestic and foreign newspapers; and public broadcasts published or excerpted in the *Listener*. Among his own letters to the press are those of which he was a signatory with one or more others. As his role in their authorship is uncertain, these signed letters, which began in 1927 and increased in number in later decades, will be included in a separate section, "Letters and Documents with Multiple Authorship."

Chronology

With a few exceptions, the editors have arranged the majority of Eliot's unpublished and published prose writings in the original order of

composition or publication to allow the reader to follow closely his developing patterns of thought as he immersed himself in intellectual journalism and literary criticism from year to year, decade to decade. The primary volumes of collected essays, together with their prefaces and introductions, have been disassembled and their contents returned to chronological order alongside the uncollected and unpublished prose.

Less than 10 percent of Eliot's prose writings underwent textual changes when they were reprinted or collected; most pieces were never revisited after their first publication in periodical and other forms. Some reviews and essays, however, particularly those included in *The Sacred Wood*, were combined and revised by Eliot as new essays: successively published reviews of books on Ben Jonson in November 1919, on Philip Massinger in May-June 1920, and on Swinburne and others in the two-part "The Perfect Critic" in July 1920. The original reviews were redacted as such and included in the volume under the first title of each pair. He collapsed three other reviews published between September and December 1919 under the title "Imperfect Critics" for the volume. Moreover, "Eeldrop and Appleplex" and "Tradition and the Individual Talent," originally published in two separate parts months apart, have been combined into a single piece. In such uncharacteristic cases, we have sacrificed adherence to chronology in order to present the complete texts, but not without indicating the separate chronological positions and titles and recording significant textual changes.

A few other considerations have led us to relax the chronological order of publication in specific instances, including Eliot's doctoral dissertation on F. H. Bradley, a draft of which was completed and approved in 1916 but not edited and published until 1964. The editors have placed this lengthy work neither intrusively into the published reviews of 1916, nor awkwardly out of context in 1964, but logically at the end of the graduate essays of 1913-15, essays that led to and were organically drawn upon for the dissertation. In presenting a corrected, re-edited, and more readable critical text in that position, the editors have drawn upon the original dissertation typescript, the proofs and correspondence of the suppressed first printing (1963), and the proofs and text of the 1964 edition.

The three volumes of university lectures described above—*The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism*, *After Strange Gods*, *The Idea of a Christian Society*—as well as *Notes towards the Definition of Culture*, have been kept intact and edited as the coherent, self-contained works that they were intended to be; however, when individual lectures were

published separately, the publication data and any alterations are recorded in the textual notes. The Clark Lectures (1926) and Turnbull Lectures (1933), edited and published together posthumously as *The Varieties of Metaphysical Poetry* (1993), have also been kept intact, each re-edited and included separately and chronologically in respective volumes. The dates of composition of individual reviews, essays, and lectures are given when they are known.

Standardization of Formats

Eliot's prose in little magazines and periodicals appears under a variety of house styles: the divergent formats, typography, spacing, and indents for paragraphs and set-off quotations have all been standardized. As the bibliographical descriptions and kinds of information provided for books under review also varied considerably from periodical to periodical, these descriptions have been standardized in the heading, as have the descriptions and dates of the periodicals in which the reviews first appeared. Unsigned reviews and essays are indicated as such in the heading or in an initial note; all opening and closing signatures—signed or initialed—and pseudonyms are placed at the right margin at the end of the text.

Titles

Before 1919, many of Eliot's reviews were untitled; thereafter, most were titled unless they appeared as part of a "Commentary" in the *Criterion*. Since many reviews were given their titles by the editors of the periodicals in which they appeared, and since Eliot and his editors occasionally changed the titles of those essays that he chose to collect in book form, the editors have provided Eliot's final title ("Hamlet"), with the first and American titles ("Hamlet and his Problems") given in the notes. Titles of reviews, and titles under which Eliot's letters to editors of periodicals and newspapers appeared, were presumably supplied by his editors but are retained for ease of recognition.

Prose Transcription Errors

Under pressure to meet deadlines, Eliot frequently made transcription errors when quoting passages of prose from other authors. His editors were often inattentive to these matters, and frequently did not arrange for him to read proof. Thus, the editors of the present edition have silently restored dropped words, supplied missing ellipses, added overlooked italics and

quotation marks, and placed capitals made from lowercase letters in brackets. More substantial alterations are indicated in the textual notes. Eliot often provided selected page numbers for prose quotations in parentheses in the texts; when he did not do so, the editors have supplied missing numbers in brackets in the texts and in parentheses in the notes.

Misquotations of Poetry

When minor transcription errors occur in lines or passages of poetry quoted directly from a volume under review, they are silently corrected. However, some of Eliot's misquotations are more slips of memory than mistranscriptions. Such misquotations are preserved in the text and corrected in the notes. In some instances, the misquotations affect the commentary, and in every instance, it is of interest to observe how Eliot held certain passages of poetry, especially from Dante and Shakespeare, in memory and summoned them spontaneously for unchecked use. Frank Kermode, editor of Eliot's *Selected Prose* (London: Faber and Faber, 1975), took pains to point out such misquotations in Eliot's collected essays, "not from pedantry, but from a conviction that in the poet Eliot misquotation is sometimes creative" (307).

American / English Punctuation Practice

From 1909 through the preface to the second edition (1928) of *The Sacred Wood*, all of Eliot's prose was printed in what is now called American punctuation style, with double inverted commas for quotations, punctuation inside quotation marks. English periodicals such as the *Egoist*, the *Athenaeum*, the *Nation*, the *New Statesmen*, the *Bookman*, the *Spectator*, *TLS*, and others that printed Eliot's work used this common style. From the publication of *For Lancelot Andrewes* in 1928, however, all of the Faber editions of his collected essays were printed in English punctuation style, with single inverted commas, punctuation outside (inconsistently so). In editing *The Criterion*, Eliot followed the American style from 1922 to 1926, when it shifted to English style, with punctuation inconsistently inside and outside quotations. Many English periodicals, particularly those published jointly in America, continued to use the American style, and Eliot continued to publish unreprinted essays in American periodicals. Moreover, the American editions of his work systematically converted the Faber editions to American style. In an attempt to achieve uniformity and minimize error, the editors of this edition, in consultation with the publishers, and the Eliot Estate,

follow the American style throughout. The earlier Faber policy of italicizing all set-off quotations in Eliot's texts has not been followed.

Translations

A number of Eliot's essays and prefaces were commissioned by a foreign audience, translated, and published only in foreign translation. The translation and the English original are both included when possible. If the original English text has not been recovered, an English translation is provided. When an English text first published in translation was revised before publication in English, the substantive alterations are noted.

Annotations

Eliot's works were translated into thirty-eight languages in his lifetime, and his writings continue to attract a worldwide readership. In annotating this edition, the editors aim to serve scholars, students, and modern readers who come to Eliot's prose from numerous languages, backgrounds, and fields of interest—not only in literary criticism but in economics, education, philosophy, politics, theology, cultural theory, popular culture, and other disciplines. Eliot was reluctant to collect much of his prose because he felt that many of his remarks, originally composed under the pressure of deadlines, would need qualification, clarification, and correction. We have attempted to create notes that will enhance and clarify his highly referential prose, and have been mindful of both the immediate and the larger intellectual context of his writings: we draw upon his correspondence; where no source is shown, it may be assumed that the original letter or carbon copy is in the collection of the Eliot Estate or at the Faber and Faber archive. When it is helpful, we make cross-references to earlier and later comments. We have attempted to identify every specific literary and nonliterary allusion; to trace all references to newspapers, periodicals, and other documents; and to identify the books and editions that he employed. As part of our larger aim to illuminate the breadth of Eliot's learning and the depths of recall that inform and enrich the texture of his critical prose, we have noted relevant inscriptions and markings in his personal copies. Eliot's own notes are indicated with an asterisk (*) after the superscript number; notes that include textual variants are indicated with a dagger (†) after the superscript.

IV. EDITORIAL PROCEDURES AND PRINCIPLES: UNPUBLISHED PROSE

Much of Eliot's prose was written not for publication but for reading or broadcasting to specific audiences on particular occasions: philosophical essays for postgraduate seminars, tutorials, and philosophical societies at Harvard, Oxford, and Cambridge; addresses as president of the Alliance Française, London Library, Virgil Society, Books Across the Sea, Académie Septentrionale, and other organizations; responses as recipient of honorary degrees, medals, and other honors; remarks at the opening of exhibitions and conferences; and appeals in aid of civic and charitable causes. Eliot chose to put these items aside as ephemeral materials in the life of a man of letters. Because of the scholarly interest and biographical richness that they contain, they are included, with thanks to Mrs. Eliot, in this edition. More than one hundred unpublished items, all of which are identified as such, are incorporated chronologically into the individual volumes of the *Complete Prose*. The first is an undergraduate essay, "The Defects of Kipling," written at Harvard in March 1909, and the last a telegram, "Tribute to John F. Kennedy," read by Jacqueline Kennedy at the groundbreaking ceremony for the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington, D.C., on 25 November 1964.

The early philosophical essays exist in pencil or ink manuscripts and in typescripts with holograph emendations. After Eliot left graduate school, he composed nearly all of his work on a typewriter, with frequent typeovers (xxxxx) and holograph corrections and insertions. On some occasions, his first wife, Vivien, or a secretary, typed his drafts. The BBC usually retyped his broadcast scripts, which often contain last-minute emendations. In editing the large variety of Eliot's unpublished writings, we attempt to present texts that are as accurate, clear, and readable as possible, with a minimum of emendation. To distinguish them from published writings, the editors have preserved some of the physical characteristics of the manuscripts (such as underlinings), choosing not to regularize them as published items lest they lose all the visual character of their composition. The unpublished texts are introduced by headnotes that provide the occasion, date, place, and context of their preparation and presentation. The location and physical description of the manuscripts are given in the textual notes, together with editorial notation of substantial alterations and deletions made by Eliot himself.

Eliot's unpublished texts are edited according to the following additional principles:

False starts and insignificant deletions are excised, but ~~strikeouts~~, when illuminating or clarifying, are retained or given in notes. Typed or holograph underlinings for emphasis have been retained; occasional red ribbon color changes, an alternate method of emphasizing words and phrases, are represented in bold; underlined titles and foreign words are italicized; unpunctuated or misspelled titles of books, plays, and poems are corrected and standardized.

Abbreviated titles, names, and places are expanded, as are ampersands, but his occasional use of cf., i.e., e.g., sc., passim, etc., have been retained, unitalicized.

Obvious typographical errors have been silently corrected; readings of illegible words are followed by a bracketed question mark [?]; most compound adjectives (seventeenth-century poetry) are hyphenated, consistent with his ordinary practice.

Eliot's variant spellings—British, American, period (to-day), alternate (behoves)—are retained; opening and / or closing inverted commas (quotation marks) have been supplied where Eliot has overlooked them; inconsistent placement of punctuation inside and outside inverted commas is standardized; missing accents and diacriticals are supplied.

When the volume and/or page numbers for a quotation are given by Eliot in the margin or in the text, the numbers are placed in parentheses at the end of the quotation or in the notes; when editorially supplied, they are placed in brackets.

Clearly superfluous or unintended punctuation (commas before parentheses), and some unintended double punctuation (;–) have been deleted or corrected. Where the omission of punctuation causes confusion, it has been supplied; when, in Eliot's hand, the use of a semicolon or colon is unclear, the editors have interpreted the punctuation in terms of clarity and grammatical structure.

Eliot's substantive marginal comments related to the text but not part of the body of the text are quoted and noted where they occur. When Eliot makes marginal statements with lines drawn for insertion in the text during the process of composition, they are identified in the notes. When it is clear that Eliot has made insertions from the margin or an appended page *after* the body of the text was drafted or completed, as in his essay on "A Neglected

Aspect of Chapman” in volume 2, they are introduced into the text with a bracketed and italicized phrase, [*insertion:*] or [*appended insertion:*], with the end of the insertion similarly indicated [*end insertion*]. His occasional notes and outlines on the verso of a page are recorded in the textual notes.

V. FUTURE EDITIONS

The contents of this edition, which are presented in eight separate volumes, are enhanced by the inclusion of more than two hundred published items that are not recorded in the Gallup bibliography. As extensive as our collection efforts have been, we are confident that fugitive items will be found, and we encourage readers to submit them for inclusion in the edition, which is managed and maintained by Johns Hopkins University Press. A future digital platform will ensure that *The Complete Prose of T. S. Eliot* is a living edition, with the capacity to include newly discovered prose items, to correct errors, and to provide more illustrations and digital innovations for readers than would be possible in a print edition. To place Eliot’s primary prose before scholars and readers expeditiously, the editors include only those writings in this first edition. Eventually, however, a wide range of secondary prose materials will be available, including (1) additional juvenilia; (2) “Foreign Exchanges,” Eliot’s monthly articles for *Lloyds Bank Monthly*, 1923-25; (3) unpublished personal notes and notes from student classes; (4) additional interviews; (5) unpublished book reports for Faber and Faber; (6) blurbs and endorsements; (7) outlines of informal talks; and (8) Eliot’s translations of works by other authors, primarily for publication in the *Criterion*. As additional resources become accessible, we envision a website that contains both an increasingly comprehensive and accurate critical edition and an invaluable repository of prose materials for researchers and readers in a new digital age of Eliot studies.

APPRENTICE YEARS, 1905-1918

Introduction

“The token that a philosophy is true,” T. S. Eliot argued in a 1914 student essay, “is the fact that it brings us to the exact point from which we started.” Three decades later, in the final lines of his last major poem, *Four Quartets*, he echoes the idea: “And the end of all our exploring / Will be to arrive where we started / And know the place for the first time.” This volume, the first to assemble Eliot’s early prose, much of it previously unpublished and none of it previously collected and edited, returns readers to the beginning of Eliot’s intellectual life, enabling them to experience the depth and range of the prose from his years as a student and literary journalist.

The material here included is from the most formative period in Eliot’s life. In the spring of 1905, he was sixteen and in his last year of day school in St. Louis; at the end of 1918, he was thirty and established in London as a poet and essayist. In between, he spent almost a decade at the world’s premier institutions—Harvard and Oxford Universities, the Sorbonne—and in cultural centers that were both sordid and fascinating—Boston, Paris, and London. In 1914 and 1915, he wrote a doctoral dissertation on idealist philosophy, and then abandoned a promising career in philosophy for a precarious one in literature. These tumultuous years took him from the cocoon of a loving family to a world in which he struggled to create his own circle of friends, occasionally bonding, as with Conrad Aiken at Harvard, Jean Verdenal in Paris, and Ezra Pound in London. These years include his precipitous and disillusioning marriage to Vivien (Vivienne) Haigh-Wood, severe economic distress, and alienation from family and country. Between 1915 and 1918, living in a city ravaged by war, he supported himself as a teacher and journalist, slowly emerging as a respected man of letters. He published his first book, *Prufrock and Other Observations*, in 1917, and in the following two years, composed the poems that were to appear in his second, *Ara Vos Prec* (*Ara Vos Prec*), published in 1919. Beginning with essays related to his credentials in philosophy and then with reviews and articles on literary topics, he launched himself as a prose writer. By the end of 1918, he had come a long way from St. Louis, but it is to St. Louis, his first world, that he must be returned.

I. SMITH ACADEMY

Eliot began his intellectual odyssey at The Lockwood School, a primary school in St. Louis, where from the age of seven to nine he was a day student. In his last year at Mrs. Lockwood's, he wrote and illustrated in pencil several issues of "Fireside, A Weekly Magazine" consisting of "Fiction, Gossip, Theatre, Jokes."¹ From 1898 to 1905, between the ages of ten and sixteen, he attended Smith Academy, which had been founded by his grandfather William Greenleaf Eliot to prepare boys for Washington University. The photograph of the fifth-year classical studies students in 1903-04 shows twelve uniformly attired, uniformly serious boys standing with their teacher on the steps of the handsome brick academy building. In a 1953 address at Washington University, Eliot reflected that the "most important part of my education" occurred at Smith, where one was taught "what I consider the essentials: Latin and Greek, together with Greek and Roman history, English and American history, elementary mathematics, French and German. Also English . . . in those days still called *Rhetoric*" (*TCC* 45). His reading at Smith, which ranged from Homer to Kipling, included many writers whose names would appear in his mature writing. In a 1905 letter to the headmaster of Milton Academy, his mother said that his reading at Smith included "practically all of Shakespeare," much of which he retains "in memory." The letter encloses in Eliot's hand a partial list of his Smith courses and textbooks (*LI* 4). In the address at Washington University, Eliot recalled a number of his teachers by name, singling out his English teacher Roger Conant Hatch. "My memories," he added, "are on the whole happy ones . . . so far as I am educated, I must pay my first tribute to Smith Academy."² Academically, Eliot did well at Smith, winning the Latin Prize in 1904 and serving as associate editor of the yearbook, the *Anvil*, in 1905. In the spring of 1905, he passed his preliminary exams for Harvard University in all subjects except physics. On Graduation Day in June, he recited "Standing upon the shore of all we know," a moment that he remembered for decades and recalled in his Washington University address.

Eliot composed his first poems and stories for the *Smith Academy Record*, founded during his first year at the school. The inaugural issue led with an essay on Rudyard Kipling, "the most powerful and original writer in current English literature." The anonymous author, presumably a teacher, reviews Kipling's work and mentions his recent life-threatening illness. The issue also includes a sonnet expressing relief at his recovery.³ Eliot, then ten years old, would have appreciated the essay, for he had referred to parodies of

“The White Man’s Burden” in “Fireside,” and was later to remark that “Danny Deevee” is a poem “I knew by heart when I was ten, and which I have never forgotten.”⁴ His childhood interest was enhanced by Kipling’s connection to Gloucester, where the Eliot family summered beginning in 1893. In 1894 and 1895, Mr. and Mrs. Kipling, who were then living in Vermont, spent part of their summer in Gloucester doing research for *Captains Courageous*, his 1897 novel about Gloucester seamen. Eliot, who likely read it soon after it appeared, later recalled the response of local fishermen to the novel.⁵ The enthusiasm for Kipling at Smith anchored Eliot’s lifelong interest in his work, leading to his first essay in literary criticism, a variety of tributes over the years, and decades later, a personal anthology, *A Choice of Kipling’s Verse* (1941).

In 1905, his last year at Smith Academy, Eliot published two poems and three brief stories in the *Record*. The stories, “The Birds of Prey,” “A Tale of a Whale,” and “The Man Who Was King,” are the first surviving examples of his prose. The first, a war sketch, describes a fallen soldier who is being eyed by a vulture. Just as he is giving up hope, his rescuers arrive and scare away the scavenger. The second, a fantasy of shipwreck and survival in the South Pacific, shows the influence of summers in Gloucester and the tales of Robert Louis Stevenson, whose stories Eliot would discuss in his undergraduate essay, “The Defects of Kipling.” The third, a story within a story, frames the tale of a shipwrecked mariner who is washed up on the shore of an island. The natives, who have never seen a white man, instantly crown him king, but when they discover that he has no magical powers, they rebel, and he escapes to Tahiti. The title, “The Man Who Was King,” echoes that of Kipling’s “The Man Who Would Be King” (1888), and the plot structure, a version of the nineteenth-century paradigm of the “white rajah,” parallels Kipling’s.

II. MILTON ACADEMY AND HARVARD UNIVERSITY (A.B.)

Following his graduation from Smith Academy in June 1905, Eliot was sent to Milton Academy in Massachusetts for an additional year of study before proceeding to Harvard University. Because of his grounding at Smith, he was allowed to take “a somewhat miscellaneous course” (*LI* 4) in classical and modern language and literature, and in the spring of 1906, he retook the Harvard entrance exam in physics, receiving an A. He lived in Forbes House, with a matron, two masters, and twenty-one students, all shown in the house photograph in the fall of 1905. He formed an enduring

friendship with one of his housemates, Scofield Thayer, who later edited *The Dial*, which published both *The Waste Land* and Eliot's "London Letters."

Eliot entered Harvard University as a freshman in October 1906 and received an A.B. degree in June 1909 and an M.A. in February 1911. His writing from this period includes an analysis of Kipling's fiction, written in spring 1909 for an English class, and a dozen pieces published in the *Harvard Advocate*. The latter includes six poems, two book reviews, an opinion piece, and an essay, most published in his last two years when he was on the *Advocate* board. The opinion piece, which introduces two contrasting essays in the May 1909 issue, is particularly revealing in regard to Eliot's undergraduate experience. The essays describe two types of Harvard students—the "sport" who is primarily interested in having fun and making contacts, and the "grind" who is primarily interested in studying. For decades to come, Eliot was to associate this contrast, redubbed the "idler" and the "dabbler," with the Harvard "free elective system," which he claimed shaped students intellectually and socially.

The free elective system, instituted in 1869 by Eliot's kinsman, President Charles W. Eliot, was basically a smorgasbord approach to education, defended as a means of making the curriculum more liberal and more responsive to contemporary life. Only one course was required of freshmen (either French or German; Eliot chose German), and there was no mentoring. As President Eliot said in his inaugural address, "the young man of nineteen or twenty ought to know what he likes best and is most fit for."⁶ On 3 February 1929, in a letter to his mother, Eliot expressed lingering bitterness over the lack of structure and guidance:

I was one of the victims of the "elective system." I have always regretted that as an undergraduate I did not stick to Latin and Greek, and some mathematics, and leave alone all the things I dabbled in year after year. . . . I was so interested in many things that I did nothing thoroughly, and was always thinking about new subjects that I wanted to study, instead of following out any one. (*L4* 411)

In 1950, Eliot expanded his critique in a series of lectures on education at the University of Chicago, contrasting the "idler" and the "dabbler."

By passing examinations in a certain number of wholly unrelated subjects [the idler] could, in three or four years, obtain . . . the diploma of

bachelor of arts. The only limitation was that you could not follow two courses in the same year if their lecture hours coincided.

He recalled a classmate whose principle for choosing courses was that they “all fall on Tuesdays and Thursdays . . . thus, he was free to spend four days a week in New York.” “Dabblers,” on the other hand, included “young men, like myself, with a good deal of ill-regulated curiosity in out-of-the-way subjects, who took . . . a perverse interest in dabbling” (*TCC* 79-80). This contrast dominated social and intellectual life at Harvard, resulting in the formation of clubs and literary magazines that reflected the interests of the respective groups. The *Advocate* was the sanctuary for the “grinds” / “dabblers.” Eliot began contributing in his first year, and in his third, 1909, he joined the editorial board. Both he and fellow board member Conrad Aiken appear in the 1910 *Advocate* photograph.

Eliot dabbled in what he had already come to enjoy, which was language and literature. His one surviving undergraduate essay is from a 1908-1909 English course taught by Charles Townsend Copeland. According to Eliot’s cousin, Frederick May Eliot, who was also a student in the class, Professor Copeland was unusually strict, and he and Tom Eliot were out of step from the beginning. At the first class, in discovering that there were two Eliots on the roll, Copeland asked Frederick if he were related to the other Eliot. Frederick said that Tom was his cousin, and at the next meeting, Copeland called the roll by asking for “Mr. F. M. Eliot and his cousin.”⁷ Eliot’s essay, “The Defects of Kipling,” is his earliest piece of literary criticism. As Copeland was to say and Eliot later was to concede, the essay is “unduly harsh.” It displays, moreover, the self-consciousness of the novice:

As the novelty of certain innovations dies away, as the school of literature of which Mr. Kipling is the most illustrious representative, the exotic school, passes with all its blemishes exaggerated more and more into the hands of less brilliant practitioners, so Kipling’s fame is fading, and his unique charm is diminished.

That is the first sentence, and as Copeland says, it is quite “mouth-filling.” That said, the essay demonstrates familiarity with a range of stories by both Kipling and Stevenson, and the style improves as he goes along. The essay survives in two versions, the second a revision based on Copeland’s response to the first.

Eliot's contributions to the *Advocate* include two prose genres in which he was to distinguish himself—the book review and the essay. The reviews of Van Wyck Brooks's *The Wine of the Puritans* and James Huneker's *Egoists* are slight; the essay "Gentlemen and Seamen" is more substantial. It is a meditation on the virtues of New Englanders of previous generations, farmers and sailors from small towns who maintained, "in the conflict with misfortune, a gentlemanly dignity." When asked in 1950 for permission to reprint his *Advocate* prose, Eliot allowed only "Gentlemen and Seamen," saying that it "is not without interest."⁸

III. HARVARD UNIVERSITY (M.A.) AND PARIS

Eliot's M.A. courses at Harvard were concentrated in literature and art—Chaucer, Renaissance Drama, Romantic Poetry, History of Allegory, and Florentine Painting. In addition, he took Philosophy of History from George Santayana and Literary Criticism in France from Irving Babbitt. As an undergraduate, he had taken Santayana's History of Modern Philosophy and George Herbert Palmer's History of Ancient Philosophy. Palmer introduced him to Aristotle and Santayana to modern idealism, the two foci of his philosophical essays and his doctoral thesis. Babbitt and Santayana, conservatives who emphasized the timeless and universal, were strong critics of the free elective system, a position already espoused by Eliot. Santayana—European, Catholic, aesthetic—was an anomaly in the liberal and largely Unitarian philosophy department and had a limited (but important) effect on Eliot. Babbitt, however, had a deep and lasting effect, for his ideas recur as elements in much of Eliot's future prose. Babbitt's enthusiasm for Buddhism, moreover, probably led Eliot to study Eastern religion; and his lectures on the masters of French criticism and his critique of Bergson's *Creative Evolution* were instrumental in Eliot's decision, against his parents' wishes, to spend the following year in France.

During his year in Paris, 1910-11, Eliot attended five (possibly more) of Bergson's weekly lectures at the Collège de France in January and February 1911, read his major works, and as he was later to recall, experienced "a temporary conversion to Bergsonism."⁹ Bergson was then at the height of his fame, and like William James, Eliot was intrigued by his attempt to reconcile Darwinism with humanism in *Matière et mémoire* (1896) and *L'Évolution créatrice* (1907). Eliot, however, was soon to reject Bergsonism, and in 1913, in an important address before the Harvard Philosophical Club, discussed below, he presented a stinging critique of Bergson's idealism. Bergson,

nevertheless, was to remain a reference point in his prose and probably contributed to his decision at the end of his year in France to enter the doctoral program in philosophy at Harvard.

IV. HARVARD UNIVERSITY PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT (PH.D.)

The most significant cache of previously unpublished prose by Eliot stems from his graduate studies in philosophy at Harvard and Oxford Universities. Thirteen essays survive from his work at Harvard between the fall of 1911 and the spring of 1914, and twelve from his work at Oxford between October 1914 and June 1915. The essential context for the Harvard essays is the attempt of late nineteenth-century intellectuals in Europe and America to come to terms with Darwin's *On the Origin of Species* (1859), the implications of which supported both materialism and atheism. In Europe, the attempt to apply Darwinian principles to the humanities, essentially to reclassify them as science, resulted in a quest for lost origins in religion, psychology, and sociology. Max Müller, Andrew Lang, E. B. Tylor, James G. Frazer, and William Robertson Smith published impressive tomes on the origin and evolution of religion. Émile Durkheim and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl produced works on the evolution of social and psychological structures, including those of primitive religion and the primitive mind. The focus on science also stimulated new work in philosophy, including Bergson's *L'Évolution créatrice*. All of these works reflect the Darwinian principles of development over time and movement from lower to higher forms through natural selection. The desire to rescue religion led to the establishment in 1885 of the prestigious Gifford Lectures, endowed by the jurist Adam Lord Gifford to encourage the most advanced thinkers of the day to "treat theology as a science . . . without reference to or reliance upon any . . . so-called miraculous revelation."¹⁰ The list of Gifford lecturers, from Müller and Frazer to William James, Josiah Royce, and Henri Bergson, is a who's who of significant figures in the human sciences. Most of the prewar lecturers are discussed in Eliot's philosophical essays, and several were among his teachers.

In America, the Harvard Philosophy Department was in the forefront of the challenge posed by Darwin. In the decade before Eliot entered the doctoral program, the department was at the pinnacle of its prestige, primarily due to the eminence of two philosophers, William James and Josiah Royce. James tended to argue from science and Royce from logic, and from these opposite perspectives, both presented coherent responses to the crisis, which

at Harvard included not only the concern with religion but, more generally, with consciousness and morality. The department as a whole tended toward idealism, and the critical idealism of Kant and the neo-idealism of British figures such as F. H. Bradley were central in the curriculum.¹¹ In formulating Pragmatism as the “*attitude of looking away from first things, principles, ‘categories,’ supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences,*” James tried to mediate between idealism and realism.¹² “The oppression of dogmatic theology was remote from him, who lived in the atmosphere of Unitarian Harvard,” Eliot noted in 1917, “but the oppression of idealistic philosophy and the oppression of scientific materialism were very real to him.” James died in 1910, a year before Eliot entered the program, but his work remained a significant presence in the department in the prewar years and is cited frequently in Eliot’s unpublished essays and doctoral thesis.

Royce, thirteen years younger than James, joined the department thirteen years later. He and James were neighbors and friends who were responsive to each other’s ideas, a fact that proved to be a source of strength for the department. James tended toward psychological theories and Royce toward metaphysical ones; James was more interested in religious experience and Royce in a philosophical defense of Christianity. Several of Royce’s major publications deal with religion—*The Religious Aspect of Philosophy* (1885), *The Conception of God* (1887), *The Sources of Religious Insight* (1912), and *The Problem of Christianity* (1913). In his Gifford Lectures, published as *The World and the Individual* (1899-1901), he addressed the issue that was always at the core of his thought: the attempt to connect the finite and the infinite, the individual and the Absolute. “The essence of this doctrine of Evolution,” he claimed, “lies in the fact that it recognizes the continuity of man’s life with that of an extra-human realm whose existence is hinted to us by our experience of Nature.”¹³

Eliot entered the doctoral program in October 1911. A typical course load was three in one semester and two in the other, with one each year including graduate research in a “seminary.” In his first year, Eliot took Sanskrit with Charles R. Lanman (two terms), ethics (Theory of Morals) with Palmer, and Greek philosophy with special reference to Plato with James H. Woods, an Orientalist who was to become a mentor and friend. He also took Experimental Psychology with Herbert S. Langfeld and Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz with G. P. Adams. Eliot’s essays from this work have not survived, but his writings over the next several years include

considerations of materials encountered here, especially the writings of Plato, Descartes, and Leibniz.

In his second year, 1912-13, Eliot was appointed an assistant in philosophy and began “teaching freshmen what they didn’t want to know and what I didn’t know myself” (*LI* 70). He continued his work in Eastern religion, taking a yearlong course in Pali from Lanman and Philosophical Sanskrit from Woods. He also took Advanced Logic from Karl Schmidt, a seminary in psychology (Mind and Body) from one of the department’s most distinguished members, Hugo Münsterberg, and two courses from Charles M. Bakewell, a visiting professor from Yale, the first on Kant and the second a seminary in metaphysics (The Nature of Reality). In addition, he audited a seminary in metaphysics from Rudolf Eucken, a visiting professor from the University of Jena in Germany. The four surviving essays from this year include three from the Kant course and one, [Degrees of Reality], from the seminary on metaphysics (or possibly from Münsterberg’s seminary on psychological dualism). These papers are all studies of idealism and of thinkers central for the department and for Eliot’s future work, most significantly Kant, but also Bradley, Royce, and James. In addition, they all consider one of the department’s central concerns, the conflict between science and religion, materialism and idealism. Eliot’s first two papers for the Bakewell seminar are related to Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* and the third to his *Critique of Practical Reason*. The first, “Report on the Kantian Categories,” dated 27 March 1913, is a comparison of Kant’s theory of the categories with those of Plato and Aristotle, and of his critical idealism with the absolute idealism of Plato and the realism of Aristotle. Eliot claims that although Plato and Kant have in common a recognition that epistemology converges with metaphysics, Kant goes beyond Plato, and his categories “possess objective validity and in no wise tend toward subjectivism.”

The second Kant paper, “Report on the Relation of Kant’s Criticism to Agnosticism,” dated 24 April, deals with the conflict between critical idealism and scientific materialism. Eliot compares Kant’s idealism to the agnosticism of Herbert Spencer and T. H. Huxley, and concludes that it is less dogmatic because it “questions the question,” whereas agnosticism “doubts the answer,” and, moreover, agnosticism maintains that “science . . . can adequately explain life.” In claiming that the noumenon or thing-in-itself is unknowable, Kant seems to deny the possibility of knowledge and thus to be an agnostic himself, a conclusion Eliot rejects. This essay contains Eliot’s first in-depth engagement with Bradley, on whom he was to write

his doctoral thesis, and Harold H. Joachim, under whose guidance he was to finish it. He considers Bradley and Joachim as representatives of skepticism and argues that their position, though superior to that of Spencer and Huxley, is only partially satisfactory. Bradley's Absolute has some of the "visual features of German Idealism, but none of the *Gemüth*," which Eliot describes as "the pathetic primitive human *Credo* in ultimate explanation . . . which haunts us like the prayers of childhood."

In the third Kant paper, dated 25 May, "Report on the Ethics of Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*," Eliot insists on the relativity of knowledge. He concludes that

the attempt to reduce ethics to a logical science (as well as the modern attempt to reduce it to a biological science) must end in partial failure. Not that Kant's conclusions are invalid, or his arguments false. The vice is simply the creation of absolute distinctions whose distinctions are purely relative.

"Where ethics is worked out as a science," he insists, "it simply ceases to be ethics." In these three papers, Eliot begins to grapple with departmental orthodoxy in an attempt to find his own voice. He rejects Darwinism but is unable to accept either realism or idealism without reservation, insisting on the relativity of distinctions, claiming that all things are true or false "only to a certain point."

The fourth paper from spring 1913, [Degrees of Reality], deals with a doctrine accepted by all idealists and central to understanding Kant, Bradley, Royce, and James. Eliot accepts this doctrine himself, arguing that "in any perception or judgment there is . . . a process from the less real . . . to the more real." The idea that there are degrees of reality means that the line between the illusory and the real is not absolute, and thus Eliot claims that nothing is totally illusory, and that anything that can be a "point of attention," including thoughts, hallucinations, and falsehoods, is to some extent real. Eliot supports his argument in part by referring to the "theory of bears" contained in an 1884 article by James, "What Is an Emotion?" James speculates on the relation of perception, feeling, and physical change that makes up the emotion that a person might associate with bears. He considers the child's imaginary bear, the hunter's bear, the zoologist's bear, and the philosopher's bear. All are real but possess different degrees of reality. Eliot considers this doctrine in greater detail in chapter V of his dissertation, and in fact, he there repeats part of this essay.

In 1913-14, his final year in the Department, Eliot served as president of the Harvard Philosophical Club, in which capacity he gave two formal lectures, both of which survive, both related to Bergson. His courses for the year included three seminars: metaphysics (The Nature of Reality) with R. F. A. Hornlé, ethics (History of Ethics) with Ralph Barton Perry, and a yearlong capstone seminary in logic (Scientific Method) with Royce. Two papers written for Perry and five for Royce have survived. During this year, Eliot also attended lectures by distinguished visitors, the Japanese scholar Masaharu Anesaki and Bertrand Russell. Eliot took voluminous notes on Anesaki's lectures, "Schools of the Religious and Philosophical Thought of Japan, as compared with those of India and China." In March and April, Eliot attended Russell's short course in symbolic logic and his Lowell Lectures, "Our Knowledge of the External World."¹⁴

Russell's presence in the department was noteworthy, because he was the inspiration behind the New Realists, a group of thinkers who opposed the departmental orthodoxy, namely, the preference for idealism and the resistance to science. Although not entirely convinced by idealism, Eliot leaned in that direction. He had come to admire Bradley, whose *Appearance and Reality* he had purchased in June 1913, and he was taking a seminar in scientific methodology with Royce, the department's leading idealist. On the other side, he was attending Russell's lectures and postlecture teas and taking a course from Perry, one of the Neo-Realists. *The New Realism* (1912), he was later to recall, caused "a considerable stir" in American universities. The authors

were animated by a missionary zeal against the Hegelian Idealism which was the orthodox doctrine of the philosophical departments . . . at the time; . . . The Six Realists were un-Teutonised, and on the whole anti-religious, . . . and they professed considerable respect for Mr. Bertrand Russell and his Cambridge friends.¹⁵

Eliot was himself fascinated with Russell, and in his poem "Mr. Apollinax," he created a satiric portrait of the brilliant visitor as a charming and possibly dangerous mixture of Apollo and Dionysius.

Eliot gave his first lecture for the Harvard Philosophical Club, [Inconsistencies in Bergson's Idealism], in December 1913. The entire speech is devoted to a reconsideration of Bergson, whose books he had read in the spring of 1911; in the light of his work of the previous two years, specifically his study of Kant and his comparative study of agnosticism, pragmatism,

and idealism, Eliot now argues that Bergson's attempt in *Creative Evolution* and *Matter and Memory* to occupy a middle ground between idealism and realism involves him in numerous contradictions. In rejecting natural selection and positing the *élan vital* as the force behind evolution, Bergson is not on middle ground, but on the high ground of idealism tending toward mysticism. In regard to epistemology, Bergson challenges Kant's division of what one can know into phenomena and noumena, the latter essentially unknowable. He maintains that intuition, a form of pre- or nonintellectual apprehension, overcomes Kant's dualism. While acknowledging that both analysis and intuition are of practical use, Eliot insists that "it is no more possible that truth should be gained by these means than that a man should ever catch sight of himself with his eyes closed." Eliot also challenges Bergson's understanding of space and time. The reference point, again, is Kant, who according to Bergson had blurred the distinction between space and time. Bergson separates them and posits the immediate data of consciousness as existing in the *durée réelle*. Eliot deals at length with the inadequacy of Bergson's concept of space and emphatically rejects his concept of duration: "we cannot rest at the *durée réelle*. It is simply not final." Eliot's second address for the Club, [The Relationship between Politics and Metaphysics], was given at the end of his final term at Harvard and is discussed below.

Eliot's course with Perry was in the history of ethics, and his two surviving papers are partially exercises in historical description. Eliot came to this course as a skeptic, having reached the position in his course on Kant's ethics that "where ethics is worked out as a science, it simply ceases to be ethics." In [The Ethics of Satisfaction in Tucker's *The Light of Nature Pursued*], he surveys the magnum opus of the eighteenth-century moralist Abraham Tucker. The title of Tucker's seven-volume work alludes to Locke's distinction between innate knowledge, that which is imprinted on the mind by nature, and acquired knowledge; his primary term in ethics, "satisfaction," is also from Locke. Tucker defines "satisfaction" as "that vivifying ingredient which gives life and vigour to our motives." Eliot faults this definition as both hedonistic and subjectivist, arguing that it ignores the moral and aesthetic dimensions. Aesthetic judgments are reduced to judgments of enjoyment, and moral judgments to "probable consequence."

The second paper for Perry, [Self-realisation and Pleasure in the Ethics of Green and Sidgwick], considers two major principles in ethics, the first held by the idealist Thomas Hill Green and the other by the utilitarian Henry Sidgwick. Both were interested in an issue that had been raised by

Kant—in Eliot’s words, “how to . . . justify the presence of moral judgments in a purely natural world.” Green found justification in “self-realisation” as the ultimate ethical aim, a position also held by Palmer and Perry, and a weak version of which was held by Münsterberg and Royce. Sidgwick, on the other hand, held that justification was related to the amount of pleasure or happiness generated. Eliot argues that both Green and Sidgwick are mistaken in that they tend to think of ethics as a normative science, whereas it is actually descriptive. They forget that “ethics is concerned not with rectification of existing morals but with their interpretation, and that being moral for this or that reason is very different from performing this or that act because it is moral.” Eliot’s conclusion is that neither theory actually explains morals, in part because “the world is more real than any particular meaning we assign to it.”

Eliot’s interest in interpretation is at the center of arguably his most important surviving Harvard paper, “The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual.” It was written for Royce’s seminary in logic, a course that, according to Kuklick, was “the core of the graduate curriculum.”¹⁶ The class, Royce said, dealt with “no theories of my own. . . . Anyone who has a rational method of doing anything, especially a scientific method,—is invited to tell us about it.”¹⁷ One student, Harry Costello, was designated as class secretary, and at each meeting, he summarized the papers that were read and recorded the exchanges between Royce and his students. Each student was required to present one long paper and four short ones. Eliot’s long paper was on 9 December 1913; his four short pieces, which also dealt with the nature of interpretation, were presented at intervals during the spring term 1914.

For his long paper, “The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual,” Eliot chose the question that the department had been preoccupied with for decades, the conflict between science and religion. By focusing on the role played by interpretation, Eliot carves out a position of his own. He begins by stating his questions: “On what terms is a science of religion possible? Can it be treated wholly according to the methods of sociology? And are these methods ever wholly scientific?” As Costello accurately says, Eliot’s paper concerned “theories about comparative religion and in how far they were description and in how far interpretation.”¹⁸ Eliot refers to Müller, Tylor, Lang, Frazer, Jane Harrison, Lévy-Bruhl, and, primarily, Durkheim in his attempt to illustrate the difference between description and interpretation. He argues that these terms are confused in most anthropological and sociological work and that what is called science in these fields is actually interpretation. “What

seemed to one generation fact is from the point of view of the next a rejected interpretation." Eliot protests against the use of the phrase "evolution of religion," saying that "evolution" is a term that describes a value-free relation between organic tendency and environment. In social and religious progress, there can be no value-free descriptions. Eliot's conclusion is "that primitive reality . . . cannot . . . be put together out of the abstractions of social psychology which are torn from our sophisticated and conscious life." A decade later, in the introduction to his mother's *Savonarola: A Dramatic Poem* (1926), he summarized his paper from memory:

Some years ago, in a paper on *The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual*, I made an humble attempt to show that in many cases no interpretation of a rite could explain its origin. For the meaning of the series of acts is to the performers themselves an interpretation; the same ritual remaining practically unchanged may assume different meanings for different generations of performers; and the rite may even have originated before "meaning" meant anything at all.

In a footnote, Eliot added that Royce, "for whose eye the paper in question was intended," was also deeply interested in the "problem of interpretation." The meditation on language commenced in this paper was to remain at the heart of Eliot's work, culminating in *Four Quartets*.

At the end of his Harvard period, in the spring of 1914, Eliot gave his second address before the Harvard Philosophical Club, [The Relationship between Politics and Metaphysics]. He begins with an overview of the philosophical landscape in 1914, striking for its witty and self-confident assessment of department icons James and Royce, and of the international celebrities Bergson, Russell, and Bernard Bosanquet.

This is a time of philosophies which lend themselves . . . with great facility to emotional consequences. A time of what a pragmatist friend of mine has called lyric philosophies. James's philosophical writings constitute an emotional attitude more than a body of dogma; the neo-realistic movement appears . . . a spontaneous outburst of feeling, a song without words; and we observe Mr. Bertrand Russell directing with passionate enthusiasm his unearthly ballet of bloodless alphabets. Professor Bosanquet is the prophet who has put off his shoes and talks with the Absolute in a burning bush; to Professor Royce we owe the resuscitation of Christianity by the method of last aid to the dead. And the

landscape is decorated with Bergsonians in various degrees of recovery from intellect.

Eliot does not describe lapsing Bergsonians as thinkers who are *recovering* intellect, but as “intellectual drunkards” who are recovering *from* intellect. His speech includes a withering analysis of *A Preface to Politics*, a book by former classmate Walter Lippmann, who uses Bergson’s metaphysics to impart heft to his political theory, namely, socialism. Lippmann “commits the two great modern fallacies: the fallacy of Progress, which is the Bergsonian fallacy, and the fallacy of the Relativity of Knowledge, which is the Pragmatic fallacy.” Eliot’s conclusion is that “any attempt to found politics on a metaphysical basis must be . . . fallacious.” In what can be seen as a declaration of independence from family and from departmental orthodoxy, Eliot associates Bergson’s theory of progress and James’s Pragmatism with Unitarianism and with idealism. He ends by undercutting both Bergsonism and Unitarianism: “I do not . . . deprecate the alcoholic or stimulant value of the idea of Progress. I belong to a church,” and here he quotes a famous Unitarian clergyman, “of which one of the tenets refers to the Progress of mankind ‘onward and upward forever.’”

V. IN TRANSITION: MARBURG AND LONDON

Early in 1914, Eliot decided to complete his philosophical education in Europe. He received from Harvard a Sheldon Travelling Fellowship on 31 March and decided to use it at Merton College, Oxford University, where he could work with Bradley’s disciple Joachim. Eliot had read Joachim’s *The Nature of Truth* in the spring of the previous year, and in “Report on the Relation of Kant’s Criticism to Agnosticism,” he had listed Bradley and Joachim as exemplars of the skeptical imagination. Bradley, in poor health and a recluse, was also at Merton, and since Eliot was writing his dissertation on *Appearance and Reality*, Merton seemed to be a perfect choice. He embarked for the old world with two specific goals: reading Aristotle with Joachim, and completing the dissertation under his supervision.

Eliot decided that before proceeding to Oxford, he would stop in Germany for a summer school at the University of Marburg. He was drawn to Germany not only by Kant, Hegel, and the venerable idealist tradition, but by the presence of Rudolf Eucken, who had been a visiting professor at Harvard in 1912-13. Eliot, who audited Eucken’s course in metaphysics in autumn 1912, had been so impressed by one of his aphorisms—*es gibt keine*

Privatwahrheiten—that he quoted it at least three times in his philosophic work.¹⁹ On 25 July, comfortably settled with the family of a German pastor, he writes to Aiken that he spends the days eating German food and walking and the evenings reading Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen*. As one of several indications that his mind was at least partially on his coming work at Oxford, he encloses drafts of poems that contain allusions to *Appearance and Reality*.

Appearances appearances he said
I have searched the world through dialectic ways . . .
And always find the same unvaried
Interminable intolerable maze. (*LI* 50)

The pastoral interlude was short-lived. On 1 August, just before classes were to begin, Germany declared war on Russia, and two days later, on France. The German universities were closed, and foreign students from noncombatant countries were expelled. American students were detained for two weeks. Eliot left Frankfurt on 16 August, and upon arrival in London, as he wrote to his brother, he was met by the American press. "I was interviewed by a reporter when I got here, but had nothing interesting to give him even had I been willing to communicate it" (*LI* 59). The reporter was from the *New York Times*, where the following item appeared on 27 August.

German Universities Shut.

Russian Students Held at Magdeburg; Americans Reach London.

London, Aug. 26.—T. S. Eliot of St. Louis, a student in the Summer School of Magdeburg [Marburg] University, arrived in London today with a number of students from Freiburg and other German universities which have been closed on account of the war.

"The German officials," said Mr. Eliot, "showed the students much consideration and helped us in every way, but traffic was interrupted by the military operations and there were few trains. Consequently foreigners are getting out of Germany slowly.

"The Russian men students have been detained and the Russian woman students at Magdeburg are being cared for in a convent.

"It is unlikely that any of the German universities will open this Fall, as virtually all the German students and likewise the professors are subject to military duty. Conditions are too unsettled for the few foreign students whose countries are not fighting Germany."²⁰

Eliot remained in London for more than a month and found that he much preferred the chaos and noisiness of cities teeming with refugees to the peace and quiet of college towns.

"I find it quite possible to work in this atmosphere. The noises of a city so large as London don't distract one much; they become attached to the city and depersonalise themselves. No doubt it will take me some time to become used to the quiet of Oxford" (*LI* 60).

The main work he did in London was epistolary—reporting to his family and friends in America the stimulating effect of living in a bustling city. He also continued to prepare for his work at Oxford by "plugging away at Hüsserl, . . . terribly hard, but very interesting," and more on target, by "going through most of the *Metaphysics* for the first time in Greek" (*LI* 65). He also established contacts that would be indispensable when he settled in London in 1915 and began his career in literary journalism. The most important of these, Ezra Pound and Bertrand Russell, are discussed in the context of his journalistic prose.

VI. MERTON COLLEGE, OXFORD UNIVERSITY

On 6 October, Eliot went up to Oxford, and on the fifteenth, he matriculated at the university. He was at Oxford for three terms—Michaelmas, from 5 October to 5 December 1914; Hilary, from mid-January to mid-March 1915; and Trinity, from 22 May to 10 July 1915. Of the approximately twenty-four essays he wrote during this year, eleven have survived, as has the text of a lecture presented in March 1915 to the Moral Sciences Club in Cambridge. At the end of each term, in keeping with his fellowship agreement, he described his activities to Dean L. B. R. Briggs, the chairman of the committee on Sheldon Fellowships at Harvard.

Eliot's complete program of study for the Michaelmas term is given in the headnote to the first Oxford essay, [Objects: Content, Objectivity, and Existence]. Since there were eight weeks in term, Eliot presumably wrote eight essays. Even without the missing two, however, there is considerable coherence among the others. The six undated essays are links in a chain, with most beginning by pointing to the one previous and ending by pointing to the next, thereby indicating the sequence. All six are related to questions considered in his doctoral thesis, and substantial portions of these essays are included there. By mid-December, he had completed a rough draft.

The first and second Oxford papers return to subjects that Eliot had explored in the Harvard essays of spring 1913. His first topic is the nature

and definition of objects; his second is degrees of truth and reality. In these essays for Joachim, as in his earlier work, Eliot attempts to walk the high wire between idealism and realism or, more specifically, in this incarnation of his argument, between Bradley and the Neo-Realists, including their progenitors Russell and Moore. In the first essay, [Objects: Content, Objectivity, and Existence], he defines an object as “anything which can be given a name” and maintains that every object existing in the external world has “an ideal element” and “every ideal object has an element of reality.” Here, as elsewhere, he analyzes objects into real and ideal, lower and higher. He anticipates his later papers with a brief discussion of the relation of objects to points of view. This seems to lead him into solipsism, but he denies the implication, maintaining that solipsism is self-contradictory, “because if A is to know only his own world, there must be another world to contrast it with; and there is none.”

Eliot’s second paper, [Objects: Real, Unreal, Ideal, and Imaginary], considers “philosophical realism,” maintaining that its theories of objects run counter to both common sense and science. He faults “Russell and his American disciples” for their atomic view of objects, taking particular aim at the position Russell had outlined in his Lowell Lectures at Harvard in the spring of 1914. “Mr. Russell seems to think that the judgment ‘this is red’ does not imply the existence of anything beyond red.” Eliot protests, claiming that “Sensation implies an object; an object implies a world.” To support his claim that it is “only in a world of social intercourse that objects can come into being and maintain their existence,” Eliot discusses several Bradleian doctrines, including degrees of reality and the role of immediate experience in the generation of objects.

The third and fourth Oxford papers move beyond the Harvard work by focusing on major Bradleian topics: “points of view” and “finite centres.” In the third essay, [Finite Centres and Points of View], Eliot distinguishes between these two terms, both related to consciousness and to the construction of objects. A point of view is the “set of terms and relations” that constitutes a world for an individual, a world of objects. A finite center is a center of consciousness, a momentary and impervious center of feeling. Individual finite centers differ because they “contain different objects.” Eliot contends that objects are at the same time essentially public and essentially private, related both to a common world and one that is unique. As in the previous essay, he rejects solipsism—“There is a common world . . . the ‘outside world’ and the individual’s world are

constantly rearranging themselves in every new context.” Moreover, he rejects the reduction of consciousness to physiology, on the one hand, or to values, on the other—“there is no element of pure content, or of pure objectivity.”

In the fourth essay, [‘The Privacy of Points of View’], Eliot continues his attempt to explain the relation of subject to object, of finite centers to points of view. He takes up the problem of definition, concluding that perhaps the concept of definition itself is not viable in metaphysics. To illustrate the difficulties, he turns to the distinction between knowing and acting in the work of J. A. Smith, whose lectures on logic he was attending. These concepts, he concludes, are so organically related that they cannot be defined without distortion.

In the fifth essay, [‘Definition and Judgment in Bradley and his Critics’], Eliot continues his consideration of definition, comparing and contrasting Bradley and his critics, primarily Russell and Moore. As a prelude to discussing Bradley’s theory of judgment, he discounts Russell’s definition of definition, as a symbol that “is identical in meaning with a more complicated symbol previously used,” and shows that “much we ordinarily call definition will not fall under this account.” Eliot accepts Bradley’s theory of judgment as superior, but maintains that once judgment has been turned into a “thing” by being defined, it can always be shown to be contradictory. He concludes that one of Bradley’s contributions is that he shows that any theory can be reduced to nonsense. “Thus it is simply a question at what point you have recourse to faith.”

In “The validity of artificial distinctions,” the last of the essays leading to his dissertation, Eliot holds that “artificial distinctions,” which he also refers to as “vicious abstractions,” are essential if one is to philosophize at all, but at the same time, “in metaphysics all distinctions are in a sense equally artificial.” As in other essays, he emphasizes faith as a factor in the construction and evaluation of philosophical positions. In his 1913 paper, “Report on the Relation of Kant’s Criticism to Agnosticism,” he had emphasized faith as an element in epistemology: “in order to know, we must begin with faith, that is to say, the conception of an external relation, a real which is ‘outside of ourselves.’” And in the essay under discussion: You “cannot prove your result . . . It can only be maintained by faith, a faith which, like all faith, should be seasoned with a skilful sauce of scepticism.” He concludes by saying that the “positive merit” of Bradley’s *Appearance and Reality* is

that it unfolds no positive result whatever. . . . when a philosopher pretends to emerge with some “positive result”, . . . some discovery which informs us that anything is anything else than what we supposed it to be before we began to philosophise,— then the philosopher is simply pulling out of his pocket what he put there himself. The token that a philosophy is true is . . . the fact that it brings us to the exact point from which we started.

The sauce of skepticism that simmers throughout Bradley’s work is carried over to Eliot’s dissertation and his writing of the next decade and beyond. It is pervasive in Joachim’s writing as well. In 1913, in comparing skepticism and agnosticism, Eliot had concluded his comments on Joachim by remarking that because

Ultimate truth remains inaccessible; . . . it only remains for Mr. Joachim to shatter what little Bradley has left standing, by urging upon us that we have no right to affirm . . . that there is truth at all.²¹

Joachim was the real director of Eliot’s dissertation. Royce, the titular director, was an ocean away and in his last illness. Joachim excelled in Eliot’s two areas of interest—Bradley and Aristotle. He was, as Eliot remarks in the preface to his thesis, the disciple of Bradley “closest to the master.” According to Brand Blanshard, a fellow student, Joachim was “Bradley’s most competent exponent” and a virtuoso in Greek. Students claimed “that if you started any sentence in the *Nichomachean Ethics* of Aristotle, Joachim could complete it for you, of course in Greek.”²² “With respect to Aristotle,” Eliot said, he was “almost a genius” (*LI* 91). Joachim met with Eliot weekly to go over each essay in turn, and because most English and European students were serving as soldiers, he and Eliot often worked one to one. In the reports to Dean Briggs, Eliot refers several times to Joachim’s scholarly excellence and tutorial solicitude. Joachim taught him, he later recalled, “that good writing is impossible without clear and distinct ideas.”²³ In criticizing “those weekly essays” leading into the thesis, Eliot said in the preface, Joachim imparted “an understanding of what I wanted to say and of how to say it.”

The autumn 1914 term at Oxford turned out to be a watershed for Eliot, turning him away from academia, away from philosophy, and away from small-town life and small-town people. He had finished a draft of his dissertation but was deeply dissatisfied with it, and, moreover, he had become

disillusioned with philosophy itself. In addition, he was mentally and physically exhausted. A few weeks after finishing the term, he wrote to Professor Woods, who had become a confidant: "I had great difficulty, even agony, with the first draft, owing to my attempt to reach a positive conclusion" (*LI* 91). He wrote in a similar vein to Norbert Wiener:

I took a piece of fairly technical philosophy for my thesis, and my relativism made me see so many sides to questions that I became hopelessly involved, and wrote a thesis perfectly unintelligible to anyone but myself. (*LI* 89)

He explained that he was going to recast it, making the final version "entirely destructive. I shall attack first 'Reality' second 'Idea' . . . and then try to show sufficient reason for attempting to get along without any theory of judgment whatsoever" (*LI* 89).

The title of the thesis evolved as Eliot worked through the final stages. In March 1916, when he submitted his paperwork to Harvard, it was "The Nature of Objects, with reference to the philosophy of F. H. Bradley" (*LI* 147). In April, when it was finally mailed to America, it had morphed into "Experience and the Objects of Knowledge in the philosophy of F. H. Bradley." When it appeared in print in 1964, it was *Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley*.²⁴ In regard to content, Eliot collects the strands of the argument begun in 1913 in the Kant essays and concluded in the sequence of papers written for Joachim in autumn 1914. He begins by examining Bradley's concept of "immediate experience," which in the structure of Bradley's epistemology is part of a triad that also includes analytical and transcendent experience. Eliot had explored versions of this process in Bergson, Kant, James, and Royce. In the dissertation, he expresses doubts regarding the concept of immediate experience and rejects altogether the theory of the Absolute. In the penultimate paragraph of his last thesis essay, "The validity of artificial distinctions," he says that "with certain reservations" he accepts Bradley's conclusions in *Appearance and Reality*, and then, he writes in the margin: "I cannot see my way to the admission that 'Reality is spiritual.'" This is an unambiguous rejection of Bradley's closing words in *Appearance and Reality*: "We may fairly close this work then by insisting that Reality is spiritual. . . . Outside of spirit there is not, and there cannot be, any reality" (552). In his letter to Wiener, Eliot says that Bradley's Absolute "does not exist for me, but I cannot say

that it does not exist for Mr. Bradley. And Mr. Bradley may say that the Absolute is implied *for me in* my thought—and who is to be the referee?” (LI 88).

In the remainder of the dissertation, Eliot struggles with the nature of objects (are they real, ideal, hybrid?; are they material, spiritual, psychological?), and as he explained to Woods, he agonized because he was simply unable to make up his mind. He endorses the doctrine of degrees of reality, an idea that leads Bradley to certitude about the Absolute, but leads Eliot to relativism. One should not, he tells Wiener, “pursue any theory to a conclusion”; one should “avoid complete consistency.”

[O]ne has got to neglect some aspects of the situation, and what relativism does . . . is to neglect *consciously* where realism protests that there is nothing to neglect, and idealism that it has neglected nothing. . . . For *me*, as for Santayana, philosophy is chiefly literary criticism and conversation about life. (LI 88)

Eliot’s conclusion, after investing four years in the study of philosophy, is that it made the ordinary experience of everyday “appear as strange as Bottom in his ass’s head.”

all philosophising is a perversion of reality: for, in a sense, no philosophic theory makes any difference to practice. . . . almost every philosophy seems to begin as a revolt of common sense against some other theory, and ends—as it becomes more developed and approaches completeness—by itself becoming equally preposterous—to everyone but its author. (LI 87)

Eliot would finish his work at Oxford, submit his dissertation, and follow through on his commitment to Harvard and his promises to his family, but as his essays and letters make abundantly clear, he would then turn to pastures new.

Eliot’s disillusionment about his vocation was matched by unhappiness about his life in Oxford. He went to London for the Christmas break, and on New Year’s Eve, 1914, he wrote to Aiken:

Oxford is all very well, but I come back to London with great relief. . . . As you know, I hate university towns and university people, who are the same everywhere, with pregnant wives, sprawling children, many books, and hideous pictures on the walls. (LI 81)

In mid-January 1915, nevertheless, Eliot returned to Oxford to resume his courses and his work with Joachim, henceforth to be focused on Greek philosophy.²⁵ “I am now writing papers on Plato,” he wrote to Woods in January, “and shall later write on Aristotle” (*LI* 91).

Before turning to the essays on Greek philosophy, however, Eliot wrote a lecture, “The Relativity of the Moral Judgment,” for presentation on 12 March at a meeting of the Moral Sciences Club in Cambridge. The lecture, which was given at Russell’s invitation and in his rooms at Trinity College, is more closely related to the papers leading to the dissertation than it is to those that were to follow. For one thing, Eliot continues to stake out an intermediate position between idealism and realism, between what James calls the “tender-minded” and the “tough-minded” thinker.²⁶ This was evident to the club secretary, who recorded in the minutes that Eliot’s talk was an attempt to articulate a “compromise between an absolute idealist position & a relativist view” in ethics.²⁷ A second point is that his argument supports relativism, the position he was claiming as his own by the time he finished the dissertation. A final point is that the lecture builds on his 1914 Harvard essay, [Self-realisation and Pleasure in the Ethics of Green and Sidgwick].

Eliot begins his lecture by noting, as he had in earlier work, the weakness of both realism and idealism:

to reduce the world to a set of formulae is to let it slip through our fingers in a fine dust; but to fly into an emotional orgy or retire into a sunlit stupor is to let the world slip through our fingers in a thin smoke. Between the two extremes is found the subject-matter of conversation, upon which intelligence feeds.

He denounces the “violence of our rushes from pole to pole” and insists that ethics should mediate between mind and body, judgment and feeling. He unambiguously associates himself with relativism: “As a relativist, . . . I am not in a position even to desire to refute anybody; all that I have . . . the right to attempt, is . . . what seems to me the sensible, or *honnête* view.” Regarding Green and Sidgwick, Eliot argues that in judging ethical values by consequences, they “cheapen and discredit” intrinsic values. He rejects the goal-oriented ethics of both thinkers:

[H]ow close the resemblance between Green and Sidgwick! Pleasure, or utility! Or self-realisation, are all personal filling for the scheme of ethics, and as such belong not to ethics but to moral exhortation.

Perhaps in deference to his former teacher and host, Eliot concludes by appearing to accept materialism, which he says

is exactly as satisfactory as idealism . . . But . . . as the material universe seems to outlive the delights and agonies of the soul, and as materialism has received more than a fair amount of abuse, I am not unwilling, with mental reservations, to give it my political support.

This is hardly an endorsement, for as the last sentence shows, Eliot is a master equivocator—"not unwilling," "with mental reservations," "political support."

Only one of Eliot's papers from Hilary Term has survived, and only four from Trinity. These papers are for the most part brief technical discussions of issues raised by ancient texts. Most are sprinkled with quotations from the original Greek, and some, notably the essay on Εἶδος, include an analysis of Greek grammar. These essays are related to Eliot's earlier work in that they take his preoccupation with the distinction between idealism and realism, first broached in March 1913 in "Report on the Kantian Categories," to its classical roots in Plato and Aristotle.

In the first paper, [Εἶδος in the Early Socratic and Late Platonic Dialogues], Eliot analyzes the ancient Greek term Εἶδος (form) as used in Plato, and then proceeds to compare and contrast its meaning in the earlier dialogues associated with Socrates and the later ones associated with Plato himself. In the first paper on Aristotle, [Thought and Reality in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*], "thought" and "reality" are roughly parallel to idealism and realism or to mind and matter. "Though Aristotle denies the reality of a world of forms contrasted with a material world, he yet affirms in effect that the real world is the world as thought." In [Matter and Form in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*], similarly, the terms "matter" and "form" are again ancient versions of the antithesis represented by moderns such as Russell and Bradley. As in his earlier essays, Eliot refuses to take sides, suggesting that both are essential, because they are united in a tension that holds the universe together.

Eliot's last two surviving graduate essays focus on two theories in Aristotle's texts—causality and change—that have remained central in philosophical and scientific discourse for over two thousand years. In [Causality in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*], Eliot explores Aristotle's analysis of causes into various types—efficient and final, material and formal. Viewing cause as dynamic, as based in sequence, he argues that motion can only be understood in relation to

forms that are static. The underlying topic here is the relation of the temporal and the timeless, a distinction that he will apply to literary history in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” and will explore in depth in *Burnt Norton*.

In the final paper, [The Nature of Change in Aristotle’s *De generatione et corruptione*], Eliot takes up one of Aristotle’s scientific texts. The topic of growth and decay pertains primarily to the organic world, but in a special sense, that of coming-to-be and vanishing, it applies to the immaterial and spiritual world as well. In both worlds, the issue is inseparable from change (in quantity, quality, and place) and motion. In this paper on Aristotle, longer and more intricately argued than the others, Eliot considers Aristotle’s view that generation does not happen in a vacuum, that it is always out of something, and attempts to describe the type of change that occurs in various cases, such as the generation of animal life or the generation of a house or of a work of art. Eliot also argues that change, such as that from a piece of bronze or wood into a statue of a bull, always involves relation to form, to something that is itself unchanging.

VII. IN TRANSITION: OXFORD TO LONDON

Throughout the spring of 1915, Eliot agonized over his future. He was torn between a sense of obligation to philosophy at Harvard, represented by his parents and Professor Woods, and a longing to begin a new life in London. In early February, he wrote to Aiken:

I do not know my own plans for the future. Day before yesterday came a telegram from Harvard, notifying me of my renomination to my fellowship. But I do not know what I should do with it if I had it. Oxford I do not enjoy . . . If I could be allowed to stay in London and work at the Museum I should be content.

Although he doubted that he could “ever come to like England,” he couldn’t stand the thought of going home.

I dread returning to Cambridge, and the nausea of factory whistles at seven and twelve o’clock . . . and the college bell, and the people in Cambridge whom one fights against and who absorb one all the same. (*L1* 95)

Clearly, it was more than vocation that troubled him; it was life:

I don't know . . . whether I want to get married, and have a family, and live in America all my life, and . . . conceal my opinions and forfeit my independence for the sake of my children's future; or save my money and retire at fifty to a table on the boulevard, regarding the world placidly through the fumes of an aperitif at 5 p.m.—How thin either life seems! (LI 95-96)

To letters from Woods urging him to accept the fellowship, Eliot replied that he was “still hesitating.” The reason, he said, was “the feeling that it is time to take my degree, if I can, and start my *métier*.” Several times in his letter of 2 March, he inquired if there weren't “equally deserving” students (LI 97).

Another factor in Eliot's vocational meditations was an increasing appreciation of art. In a letter to Wiener discussing “reality,” Eliot wrote that “the beauty of a work of art is . . . more real to me than its ultimate . . . physical constituents” (LI 88). And in his letters to Ezra Pound, whom he had met the previous September, he not only discussed poetry in some detail but also made it clear that he intended to continue working on his own poems. The biggest element in the change in his commitments, however, was his marriage at the end of Trinity Term. In late April, he wrote to his cousin Eleanor Hinkley that his social life in Oxford had quickened with the good weather. He had been to “two dancing parties” and had taken London girls to dinner and, more important, had met an English girl named “Vivien” (LI 105). The relationship culminated on 26 June, when he married Vivien Haigh-Wood at the Hampstead Register Office.

Eliot's vocational plans were instantly clarified by his precipitous marriage. Two days later, on 28 June, Pound wrote to Henry Ware Eliot Sr. praising his son's poetry and explaining that it was possible for a poet to earn his living in London, offering as evidence the fact that he himself had done so (LI 107-12). Eliot seems to have accepted Pound as his agent, for in a letter to his brother Henry one week later, he included a long list of instructions from Pound on contacts to be made and duties to be executed. On 10 July, Eliot asked Professor Woods to withdraw his application for an assistantship at Harvard, because “I wish now to remain in London and engage in literary work” (LI 117).

Eliot moved quickly to tie up the loose ends of his work in philosophy. On 24 July, he sailed to America to meet with his parents at Gloucester and Professors Palmer and Perry at Harvard. He left the United States on 21

August, planning to return in September to finish his degree. The return, however, had to be postponed—Vivien was ill, and he did “not wish to expose her to . . . winter in a foreign country” (*LI* 127). He arranged to return for his *viva* on 1 April 1916, but because of wartime complications, the crossing was delayed, and he dropped the plan. He sent the dissertation anyway, and on 23 June, Woods informed him that it had been accepted “without the least hesitation” (*LI* 156). He responded gratefully, saying, “I shall try to justify its acceptance by passing a good examination when I come. I do not know at all when that can be” (*LI* 167). In fact, it would never be. Years later, in a letter to his mother (3 February 1929), he reflected on this turning point in his life.

I am sure that I should have made a very poor professor of Philosophy, because, after my first enthusiasm, I found modern philosophy to be nothing more than a logomachy . . . on the other hand, I learnt all that I know about writing prose from studying the works of F. H. Bradley, and from the criticism I had from H. H. Joachim while at Oxford; and my study of philosophy has been of great advantage to me in directions in which I never expected it to be. So one never knows what to regret and what to be glad of! (*L4* 411–12)

Henceforth, he would make his way as a man of letters in London, moving painfully but rapidly to the center of the literary world, first as a journalist and critic and, within a few years, as a poet.

VIII. LONDON: 1915–1918

Between 1915 and 1918, Eliot published not only his first volume of poetry, *Prufrock and Other Observations*, but also more than eighty prose items, ranging from brief reviews to lengthy articles on philosophy and literature. He developed this résumé in the context of acute personal distress. The most urgent issue Eliot faced as he began life in London was financial. Heretofore, he had been supported by his family, and he would continue to receive help from them for several years. In letters to his father, he repeatedly conveys anxiety about his precarious financial situation and the related issue of his wife’s undiagnosed but debilitating illness. In September 1915, after he returned from Gloucester, Eliot was assisted financially by Bertrand Russell, who offered the Eliots free use of one of the two bedrooms in his London flat. They moved out in December, after which Russell, who was a pacifist, offered Eliot income from war-related debenture bonds. Russell was also

indispensable, as discussed below, in launching Eliot's career as a prose writer.

Immediately after his marriage, Eliot began an attempt to establish financial viability. In a letter to Mrs. Jack Gardner in July, he explains that although he expects eventually to support himself by writing, he is presently "looking for a position in some London school, . . . for it takes time to attain independence in a literary life" (*LI* 116). In the fall, he began teaching French, math, history, drawing, and swimming at the Wycombe Grammar School in Buckinghamshire. At the end of the term, he moved closer in, to Highgate Junior School, where he taught the same subjects, plus Latin and baseball. These day positions, which were exhausting and poorly paid, left no time or energy for writing. In October 1916, Eliot began the more satisfying work of giving Extension courses on literature to adults. This work continued for more than two years, and although he was paid a mere pittance, he was at least reading books (listed in his syllabuses) that were to nourish his writing. He applied first to the Oxford Delegacy, which accepted him, and then to the Cambridge Syndicate, which postponed a decision, pending further information about his work at Oxford. Eliot did not follow up on the Cambridge application, but with the Oxford lectures secured, he left his junior school post at Christmas. His first Extension course, sponsored by the Oxford Extension Board, consisted of weekly lectures in Yorkshire on social and religious problems in modern French literature, beginning with Rousseau. While preparing these lectures, he applied to the University of London for similar work and was given a three-year tutorial class on literary topics for working people at Southall, Middlesex. His class met for two hours on Monday evenings during the autumn and winter of each year. With the exception of one lecture on Emerson, his classes were on English literature, namely, Elizabethan drama and Victorian poetry and prose. These materials, which immediately took their place in his prose, contributed substantially to his burgeoning literary career. Eliot gave one other series of lectures, beginning on 28 September 1917. Sponsored by the London County Council, it consisted of twenty-five weekly lectures on Victorian prose and poetry. On 19 March 1917, in the hope of preserving "some energy for writing," he took a position at Lloyds bank, "less wearing than schoolmastering, though (so far) even less remunerative" (*LI* 190).

In building the case that he should live in London, Eliot told his family that he had friends who would help him get his footing as a writer. Of these connections, Russell was paramount. On 3 October 1915, unbeknownst to Eliot,

Russell initiated a correspondence with Charlotte Eliot. “Dear Madam,” he began, “I am venturing to write to you, because your son has been consulting me on the subject of his prospects.” He assures her of her son’s brilliance and of her “thoroughly nice” daughter-in-law’s desire to be helpful (*LI* 129). In November, Russell told Ottoline Morrell that he loved Eliot “as if he were my son,”²⁸ and in December wrote to Mrs. Eliot that “I have an affection for him which has made it a happiness to be able to help him.” He says that he is introducing him to “philosophical people in London” and that Eliot can reasonably hope for a “distinguished philosophical career” (*LI* 134-35). As one of England’s most famous intellectuals, Russell was in a position to act on his charitable impulses. He introduced Eliot to members of the editorial boards at *The International Journal of Ethics*, *The Monist*, and *The New Statesman*. An astonishing forty-eight of the approximately eighty prose items that Eliot published between 1916 and 1918 appeared in these three journals, and of these, his longest and most substantial articles. These pieces were focused on philosophy and the social sciences, areas to which Eliot brought credentials gained in his work at Harvard and Oxford.

Russell first introduced Eliot to Sydney Waterlow, a statesman who was a member of the editorial committee of the *International Journal of Ethics*. On 11 October, Eliot reported to Russell:

I wrote to Waterlow as you suggested, and he asked me to dine with him last Sunday evening. The consequences were so gratifying . . . He has given me Balfour’s book to review and will let me have two thousand words on it. I was quite unprepared for such an important review, but of course snapped at it, and took on another book too. He gives me a month for the Balfour. (*LI* 130)

No wonder Eliot was surprised. Waterlow had entrusted him with *Theism and Humanism*, the Gifford Lectures of one of England’s greatest scholar statesmen. Arthur J. Balfour had served as prime minister from 1902 to 1905, First Lord of the Admiralty in 1915, and was now foreign secretary. On 18 November, Eliot told his mother that he had delivered the review to Waterlow, who “found it a bit too long, but seems pleased. . . . Russell was in town . . . so I showed it to him, and he liked it very much” (*LI* 131-32). Eliot went on to write fifteen reviews for the journal between 1916 and 1918—seven in 1916 and four each in 1917 and 1918. With few exceptions, he was given major works, all related to the conflict between religion and science and to its implications for ethics.

The editor of the *International Journal of Ethics*, Philip Jourdain, was also the editor of the *Monist*, another important philosophical journal. Pleased with the review of Balfour's Gifford Lectures, Jourdain welcomed Russell's suggestion that Eliot be accepted at the *Monist*. On 17 January 1916, Eliot expressed his gratitude to Russell.

Thank you very much for putting me in for Jourdain's work—your efforts have been inexhaustible, and I shall do my best to justify them with Jourdain as well as Waterlow. I wrote to him at once . . . If Jourdain is willing to take something from me, . . . I should find it worth while aside from the money, as an introduction. (*LI* 142)

A mathematician and Russell's former student, Jourdain suggested that Eliot write a major essay on the eighteenth-century mathematician and philosopher, G. W. Leibniz. Even though Eliot had studied Leibniz at Harvard and discussed him in his dissertation, this was a daunting assignment. To Eliot's dismay, Jourdain requested a sequel: "Jourdain wants another article on Leibniz . . . by July 15." Eliot had left his Leibniz books in America, including the important one written by Russell himself. Jourdain offered to lend him not only Russell's book, but any others that he needed (*LI* 155). In October, the *Monist* published both Leibniz essays in the same issue—the first, nearly 10,000 words, an analysis of Leibniz's monadism, and the second, about 4,000 words, a comparative study of Leibniz and Bradley. Eliot went on to write a dozen pieces for the *Monist*—two in 1916 and five each in 1917 and 1918. In September, he told his mother that he was getting on very well with Jourdain: "I have only to suggest an article and he clamours for it, and any book I . . . want to review he will send for" (*LI* 163).

Of the three journals to which Russell introduced Eliot, *The New Statesman* published the greatest number of his reviews and articles between 1916 and 1918, twenty in all. The situation with this periodical was different in kind from that with the *International Journal of Ethics* and the *Monist*. For one thing, the editor, J. C. Squire, was a poet and critic, not a philosopher, and unlike Waterlow and Jourdain, he was not personally close to Russell. For another, *The New Statesman* was not a "philosophical journal" but a general humanities journal. Because it published in a broader spectrum of subjects—literature, religion, politics, history, and biography—it presented Eliot with a better chance of writing about his core interests. Russell had opened the door in philosophy, but no one of his stature and influence had helped in literature. In 1916, Eliot had only

three reviews on literary topics, and they were in a newspaper to which Waterlow had given him an introduction, the *Manchester Guardian*. Pound was enthusiastic but not well connected. Although helpful in publishing poetry in little magazines, he was useless in placing prose in established journals.

Eliot's pieces in *The New Statesman* ranged widely, beginning with an omnibus review of ten books on agricultural economics in India. As time passed, however, Eliot was given books on more appealing subjects, including education, the war, and American politics. Most significantly, he was given the opportunity to write a few long essays on literary topics, and in contributing articles such as "Reflections on *Vers Libre*" and "The Borderline of Prose," he quickly established public credibility in literature. "Reflections on *Vers Libre*" draws heavily on his Extension lectures on Elizabethan drama, with quotations from *The Duchess of Malfi* and, with equal ease, from poems by contemporary poets. Quoting unidentified passages by T. E. Hulme and by Pound, he says, "the charm of these lines could not be without the constant suggestion and the skilful evasion of iambic pentameter." In an allusion to *Hamlet*, which is subtle and powerful, he concludes:

The ghost of some simple metre should lurk behind the arras in even the "freest" verse; to advance menacingly as we doze, and withdraw as we rouse. Or, freedom is only truly freedom when it appears against the background of an artificial limitation.

One wonders what Professor Copeland would say of such sentences as "There is no escape from metre; there is only mastery." This is not a "mouth-filling sentence," but a tantalizing morsel. Anticipating his even greater essay, "Tradition and the Individual Talent," Eliot says, "In an ideal state of society one might imagine the good New growing naturally out of the good Old, without the need for polemic and theory; this would be a society with a living tradition." His style is elegant, ironic, and authoritative, displaying his inheritance from Bradley and Joachim, who were his masters not only in philosophy but also in prose.

During 1915 and 1916, Eliot was forced to straddle philosophy and literature. Russell was trying to recruit him for philosophy, and in this effort, he gained the support of the most significant people in Eliot's life—his wife and his parents. He wrote Mrs. Eliot that Vivien was successfully weaning Eliot away from "the people who call themselves 'vorticists,' and in that I think her influence is wholly to be applauded" (*LI* 130). Mrs. Eliot thanked

him for trying “to confirm my son in his choice of Philosophy as a life work. . . . I have absolute faith in his Philosophy but not in the *vers libres*” (LI 153). Between 1916 and 1918, however, Eliot was steadily moving toward a career in literature. Starting with three brief reviews in 1916, he published fourteen literary pieces in 1917 and eighteen in 1918. In philosophy and the social sciences, the trajectory was reversed. There was also a shift from established journals to “little magazines.” The little magazine in which he published by far the greatest number of prose items—twenty-three in 1917 and 1918—was *The Egoist*.

The Egoist: An Individualist Review was conceived in 1913 when the feminist Dora Marsden, editor of the *New Freewoman*, accepted the suggestion of Ezra Pound that she change its name and make it an outlet for radically new work. The *New Freewoman* benefactress Harriet Shaw Weaver was appointed as main editor and Pound as literary editor. In the five years during which it was published (1914-1919), it included as assistant editors H. D., Richard Aldington, and Eliot himself, who took over in 1917 when Aldington went into the army. *The Egoist* provided a platform for avant-garde movements, including Imagism and Vorticism, and published iconic modernists, including Pound, Eliot, Joyce, and Wyndham Lewis. Famously, it serialized *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* and ran installments of *Ulysses*. On 13 May, Eliot told his mother,

I am going to undertake a “contributing editor” job with a monthly paper called *The Egoist* . . . It will not . . . bring in much money, . . . but it will add to my notoriety. At present it is run mostly by old maids, and I may be a beneficial influence. (LI 198-99)

In June, the Egoist LTD press published *Prufrock and Other Observations*, a landmark not only for Eliot but also for English and American poetry.

Most of Eliot’s publications in *The Egoist* have an edginess that is missing in his philosophical papers. Some are extremely brief; two, serving as fillers and provocations, are pseudonymous letters to the editor, and three are reviews signed with the pseudonym “Apteryx.” He wrote three major “reflections” on contemporary poetry and numerous reviews of the work of his growing circle of friends—Pound, Lewis, Yeats, and Joyce, whom he would meet in 1920. These *Egoist* contributions can easily be seen through the prism of literary politics, but they should also be seen as incisive meditations on literary art. For instance, in “The Noh and the Image,” a review of Pound’s edition of Ernest Fenollosa’s work on the classical theater of

Japan, Eliot builds his praise of Imagism on a fine theoretical insight regarding translation:

Translation is valuable by a double power of fertilizing a literature: by importing new elements which may be assimilated, and by restoring the essentials which have been forgotten in traditional literary method. There occurs, in the process, a happy fusion between the spirit of the original and the mind of the translator; the result is not exoticism but rejuvenation.

One of Eliot's strongest essays in this period was a piece on Henry James composed for a special memorial issue of *The Egoist* in January 1918. Although mildly provocative, it is nevertheless a compelling and compendious account of James's strengths as a novelist. Moreover, it contains insights that can be traced to Eliot's work in philosophy: James's "critical genius comes out most tellingly in his mastery over, his baffling escape from, Ideas." While working on this essay on James's intelligence, Eliot told his mother, "I take a great deal of pleasure in *The Egoist*; struggling as it is, it is known to some of the most intelligent people, and it stands for something which needs to be kept going" (*LI* 223). Later in the year, when Pound organized a memorial issue on James for *The Little Review*, Eliot allowed this essay to be printed again along with a new one on "The Hawthorne Aspect" of James's fiction.

Eliot was grateful for Pound's assistance at *The Egoist* and elsewhere. He reciprocated in part by writing nearly 9,000 words on Pound for distribution with copies of the American edition of *Lustra*. Although his efforts on Eliot's behalf were an open secret, Pound told his patron John Quinn that *Ezra Pound: His Metric and His Poetry* "should NOT be signed by Eliot, just now when I am booming his work." Thus, it appeared anonymously, published by Knopf. The essay begins with an examination of *A Lume Spento* and Pound's early poetry, and then moves to a discussion of his translations, his work on the Noh drama, and polemical pieces such as the Imagist manifesto.

In 1917, Pound took still another literary post, becoming foreign editor of the American magazine, *The Little Review*, founded in 1914 in Chicago by Margaret Anderson. Over the course of its fifteen-year existence, *The Little Review* proved itself to be one of the most outrageous of the little magazines. During the war years, it was an anarchist publication and flamboyantly avant-garde: in September 1916, as a protest against the poor quality

of submissions, it published an issue with blank pages. Its most significant contribution to modernism was the serialization of episodes of *Ulysses*, beginning in 1918 and continuing until it was forced to stop because of obscenity charges. Eliot published some poems and a few prose pieces in *The Little Review*, and among these, two of special interest. "The Hawthorne Aspect," mentioned above, is a worthy sequel to his memorial essay on James. More unusual is a two-part fictional dialogue between Eeldrop and Appleplex, two intriguing characters with an intellectual interest in murder. Eliot had mixed feelings about the story, which he characterized as "crude stuff," and about *The Little Review* itself (*LI* 373). Nevertheless, he recommended it to his cousin Eleanor: there is "a good deal about it that is offensively aggressive, but it will keep one's brain active" (*LI* 260). In 1922, he shared his qualms with Quinn:

the trouble with the *Little Review* at its best was that its second-rate stuff was so appallingly bad; and my theory is that the best of the most advanced writing of our time . . . will really appear to better advantage among the really respectable and serious writers of the older type than among their own third-rate and vulgar imitators. (*LI* 750)

By the end of 1918, Eliot had become an integral part of literary London. He had made the transition from philosophy to literature and had managed by piecing together several jobs to support himself and his wife. He had a growing circle of powerful literary friends, including Leonard and Virginia Woolf, who were preparing to publish his *Poems* at the Hogarth Press, and in the following year, Bruce Richmond, editor of *Times Literary Supplement*, would invite him to become a contributor to the world's most prestigious review.

Despite his achievements, however, Eliot's three years in wartime London had been surreal, leaving not only him but London dazed and shattered. For Eliot, the catalogue of nightmares included descending bombs, maimed or slain friends, grinding poverty, a failed marriage, and a chronically ill wife. He was himself ill, and his doctors were insisting that he give up writing for the next six months or more. In Christmas letters to his mother, he describes their holiday nuts and oranges, but writing separately, Vivien tells of the influenza pandemic and Tom's fear of madness. Three days into the New Year, Eliot's father wrote to his brother in Oregon, expressing relief that "My Tom is getting along now and has been advanced at the bank so that

he is independent of me" (*LI* 314). Four days later, as his son learned in a cable, Mr. Eliot, who seemed to be suffering only from deafness, was dead. The kaleidoscope was loaded; the material for the century's most memorable poem, *The Waste Land*, was now in place, on call, in the memories and in the bones of T. S. Eliot.

NOTES

1. "Fireside" will eventually be added to the online edition of Eliot's work.
2. "American Literature and the American Language" (1953), rpt. in *TCC*.
3. *Smith Academy Record* 1 (Apr 1899), [3]-8.
4. "T. S. Eliot: A Personal Anthology," BBC broadcast, with selection and introduction of poems by Eliot, read by John Laurie, 13 Nov 1947 [Houghton: bMS Am 1691 (47)].
5. Preface, James B. Connolly, *Fishermen of the Banks* (London: Faber & Gwyer, 1928), viii.
6. Charles William Eliot, "Inaugural Address as President of Harvard College, October 19, 1869," *Educational Reform: Essays and Addresses* (New York: Century, 1898), 12.
7. Qtd. by H. W. H. Powel, from his conversations with Dr. Frederick May Eliot, 23 Dec 1954. In Powel, *Notes on the Life of T. S. Eliot 1888-1910* (M.A. Thesis, English Department, Brown University, May 1954), 54.
8. Letter to Donald Hall, 1 June 1950.
9. *A Sermon, Preached in Magdalene College Chapel* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1948), 5.
10. From the official "Gifford Lectures" website.
11. Bruce Kuklick, *The Rise of American Philosophy: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1860-1930* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1977), xxi.
12. James, *Pragmatism* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1907), 76-77; James's italics.
13. Royce, *The World and the Individual* (New York: Macmillan, 1901), 242.
14. TSE's notes on the lectures by Anesaki and by Russell are in the Houghton Library.
15. "Views and Reviews," *New English Weekly*, 7 (6 June 1935), 151.
16. Kuklick, 249-50.
17. Qtd. by John Clendenning, *The Life and Thought of Josiah Royce* (Madison: U Wisconsin P, 1985), 378.
18. *Josiah Royce's Seminar, 1913-1914 as Recorded in the Notebooks of Harry T. Costello*, ed. Grover Smith (New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1963), 77.
19. *es gibt keine Privatwahrheiten*: there are no private truths; qtd. in [Degrees of Reality], "The validity of artificial distinctions," and the conclusion of the dissertation (63; 190; 377).
20. *The New York Times* (27 Aug 1914), 4. TSE was a student at the University of Marburg, founded in 1527, not at the University of Magdeburg, which did not exist until 1993.
21. Joachim, *The Nature of Truth* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1906), §41, p. 113.
22. "Eliot at Oxford," *The Southern Review*, 21 (Oct 1985), 892.
23. Obituary letter to *The Times* (4 Aug 1938), 12.
24. The technical details regarding the various versions are given in the textual notes to *Knowledge and Experience*.

25. TSE's courses for Hilary Term are given in the headnote to [Εἶδος in the Early Socratic and Late Platonic Dialogues], and for Trinity Term, in the headnote to [Thought and Reality in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*].

26. *Pragmatism*, 12-13.

27. The minutes are in the Cambridge University Library.

28. Qtd. in Ray Monk, *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude* (New York: Free Press, 1996),

444.

ABBREVIATIONS

PUBLISHED WORKS BY T. S. ELIOT

<i>ASG</i>	<i>After Strange Gods</i> (London: Faber & Faber, 1934)
<i>AVP</i>	<i>Ara Vos Prec</i> (London: The Ovid Press, 1920)
<i>CPP</i>	<i>The Complete Poems and Plays of T. S. Eliot</i> (London: Faber & Faber, 1969)
<i>EAM</i>	<i>Essays Ancient and Modern</i> (London: Faber & Faber, 1936)
<i>EE</i>	<i>Elizabethan Essays</i> (London: Faber & Faber, 1934)
<i>FLA</i>	<i>For Lancelot Andrewes: Essays on Style and Order</i> (London: Faber & Gwyer, 1928)
<i>HJD</i>	<i>Homage to John Dryden: Three Essays on Poetry of the Seventeenth Century</i> (London: The Hogarth Press, 1924)
<i>ICS</i>	<i>The Idea of a Christian Society</i> (London: Faber & Faber, 1939)
<i>IMH</i>	<i>Inventions of the March Hare: Poems 1909-1917</i> , ed. Christopher Ricks (London: Faber & Faber, 1996)
<i>KE</i>	<i>Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley</i> (London: Faber & Faber, 1964)
<i>L1</i>	<i>The Letters of T. S. Eliot</i> , Vol. 1: 1898-1922, revised edition, ed. Valerie Eliot and Hugh Haughton (London: Faber & Faber, 2009)
<i>L2</i>	<i>The Letters of T. S. Eliot</i> , Vol. 2: 1923-1925, ed. Valerie Eliot and Hugh Haughton (London: Faber & Faber, 2009)
<i>L3</i>	<i>The Letters of T. S. Eliot</i> , Vol. 3: 1926-1927, ed. Valerie Eliot and John Haffenden (London: Faber & Faber, 2012)
<i>L4</i>	<i>The Letters of T. S. Eliot</i> , Vol. 4: 1928-1929, ed. Valerie Eliot and John Haffenden (London: Faber & Faber, 2013)
<i>NDC</i>	<i>Notes towards the Definition of Culture</i> (London: Faber & Faber, 1948)
<i>OPP</i>	<i>On Poetry and Poets</i> (London: Faber & Faber, 1957)
<i>SE</i>	<i>Selected Essays</i> , 3rd ed. (London: Faber & Faber, 1951)
<i>SW</i>	<i>The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry and Criticism</i> (London: Methuen, 1920)
<i>TCC</i>	<i>To Criticize the Critic</i> (London: Faber & Faber 1965)

- UPUC* *The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism*, 2nd ed.
(London: Faber & Faber 1964)
- VMP* *The Varieties of Metaphysical Poetry*, ed. Ronald Schuchard
(London: Faber & Faber, 1993; New York: Harcourt, Brace,
1994)
- WLF* *The Waste Land: A Facsimile and Transcript of the Original
Drafts*, ed. Valerie Eliot (London: Faber & Faber, 1971;
New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1971)

PERIODICALS

- IJE* *The International Journal of Ethics*
- NS* *The New Statesman*
- PAS* *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*
- TLS* *Times Literary Supplement*

OTHER WORKS

- Annahmen* Alexis Meinong, *Über Annahmen*, 2nd rev. ed.. (Leipzig:
Barth, 1910)
- A&R* F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical
Essay*, 2nd ed., 5th impression (London: Swan
Sonnenschein; New York: Macmillan, 1908)
- CE* Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, trans. Arthur Mitchell
(New York: Henry Holt, 1911)
- CE2* F. H. Bradley, *Collected Essays*, Vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon,
1935)
- CEPL* Bertrand Russell, *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of
Leibniz* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1900)
- Contemporary
Reviews* *T. S. Eliot: The Contemporary Reviews*, ed. Jewel
Spears Brooker (Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
2004)
- DC1* *The Inferno of Dante*, Temple Classics Edition, trans. John
Aitken Carlyle (London: J. M. Dent, 1909)
- DC2* *The Purgatorio of Dante*, Temple Classics Edition, trans.
Thomas Okey (London: J. M. Dent, 1910)
- DC3* *The Paradiso of Dante*, Temple Classics Edition, trans.
Philip H. Wicksteed (London: J. M. Dent, 1910)
- DI* Henri Bergson, *Essai sur les données immédiates de la
conscience* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1889)

<i>EC</i>	Henri Bergson, <i>L'Évolution créatrice</i> (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1907)
<i>EP/JQ</i>	<i>The Selected Letters of Ezra Pound to John Quinn, 1915-1924</i> , ed. Timothy Materer (Durham and London: Duke UP, 1991)
<i>Essentials</i>	Bernard Bosanquet, <i>The Essentials of Logic</i> (London: Macmillan, 1895)
<i>ETR</i>	F. H. Bradley, <i>Essays on Truth and Reality</i> (Oxford: Clarendon, 1914)
<i>Gallup</i>	Donald Gallup, <i>T. S. Eliot: A Bibliography</i> , revised and extended edition (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969)
<i>JRS</i>	<i>Josiah Royce's Seminar, 1913-1914, as recorded in the Notebooks of Harry T. Costello</i> , ed. Grover Smith (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 1963)
<i>Manual</i>	George Frederick Stout, <i>A Manual of Psychology</i> (London: University Correspondence College Press, 1899)
<i>M&M</i>	Henri Bergson, <i>Matière et mémoire: Essai sur la relation du corps à l'esprit</i> (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1907)
<i>NR</i>	<i>The New Realism: Cooperative Studies in Philosophy</i> , ed. Edwin B. Holt (New York: Macmillan, 1912)
<i>PKE</i>	<i>The Philosophy of Kant as Contained in Extracts from his Own Writings</i> , new edition; trans. John Watson (Glasgow: Maclehose, 1908)
<i>PL</i>	F. H. Bradley, <i>The Principles of Logic</i> (New York: G. E. Stechert, 1912; a reprint of the London edition, 1883)
<i>Problems</i>	Bertrand Russell, <i>Problems of Philosophy</i> (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1912)
<i>TFW</i>	Henri Bergson, <i>Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness</i> , trans. F. L. Pogson (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1910)
<i>ÜEW</i>	Alexis Meinong, <i>Über die Erfahrungsgrundlagen unseres Wissens</i> (Berlin: Springer, 1906)

ARCHIVAL COLLECTIONS

Beinecke	The Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University
Berg	Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection of English and American Literature, New York Public Library

BL	British Library, London
Carbondale	Morris Library, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
Cornell	Department of Rare Books, Olin Library, Cornell University
Harvard	University Archives, Harvard University
Houghton	The Houghton Library, Harvard University
King's	Modern Archive Center, King's College, Cambridge
NYPL	Manuscripts Division, New York Public Library
Texas	The Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, University of Texas at Austin
UW-M	University Archives, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

PART I

Juvenilia and
Undergraduate
Writing

The Birds of Prey

Smith Academy Record, 8 (Jan 1905) [1]-2

A vulture who was sunning himself on the top of a tree suddenly flapped his wings and, after a few preliminary circles, started off to the southward. A hungry bird of prey does not fly about for exercise, and this one seemed to have a very definite destination. There were others flying in the same direction. As they progressed there came more and more, until they made rather a formidable appearance.

At length they arrived at a few low hills, from which smoke was rising. There had been a great battle, and here and there the fight was still kept up. The dead lay scattered about in great heaps, which were already black with the countless scavengers who had scented them from afar.

Near the little stream, almost choked by corpses, lay a body which was not more than two-thirds dead, as yet. He had painfully dragged himself there in search of water, and now lay propped against the trunk of a tree. A few yards away two of the black ghouls were ripping open the man who had fought next to him.

A bird lit in the tree over his head. The two looked at each other a few moments, and the man knew that the harpy above him was waiting for him to die. The knowledge of this made him feel weaker, and he sank back helplessly. At each sign of ebbing strength, the vulture drew nearer, though watching with a wary eye. The soldier tried to grasp his gun and raise it, but sharp pains shot through his arm as he did so, and he dropped it feebly.

Meanwhile, the tormentor sat solemnly by, not moving a feather. He seemed in no haste, but appeared like a faithful attendant. The soldier wondered drearily how long he would have to wait before he felt those sharp talons in his breast. He had seen his comrades devoured by vultures before, and he pictured himself in the same condition.

Suddenly, he heard the great creature over him give a hoarse cry, and saw him rise into the air. At the relief from the great strain, the soldier lost consciousness, and when he came to himself, it was to find that he was in the carriage of the rescuing hospital corps.

T. E. '05

A Tale of a Whale

Smith Academy Record, 8 (Apr 1905) [1]-3

It was in '71, I remember, that I was on the whaling ship *Parallel Opipedon*, in the South Pacific. One day after a prolonged spell of bad luck, we happened to be becalmed off Tanzatatapoo Island. We lay motionless for several days and although the mizzen top-gallant shrouds had been repeatedly belayed to the fore staysail, and the flying-jib-boom cleared, and lashed to the monkey rail, we made no progress whatever. It was a very hot and sultry day, and the captain was pacing the quarter-deck, fanning himself. The watch were amusing themselves holystoning the deck, while the rest of the crew were eating ice cream in the fore chains.

Suddenly the lookout in the fore-top sighted a whale off the port-bow. The jolly-boat, the gig, and the cutter immediately set off for the great creature. The gig arrived first, and from my position in the bow, I at once let fly a harpoon at the animal. The effect was remarkable. The whale dashed around and rushing at us from behind, deftly pushed his tail under the boat, which rose seventy-three feet in the air. It was smashed to bits, but myself and two others of its crew landed safely on the whale's back. The latter at once started off with such velocity that the ship and the boats were soon left behind.

There we stayed, rather worse off than Jonah, for the monster might take it into his head at any moment to dive to the bottom, and leave us floundering in the water. He, however, remained on the surface, and for three days and nights carried us about at his will. After the first few hours we got used to it and began to enjoy ourselves. We did not lack for food, as the flying fish flew by in such numbers at night that we merely had to stand and let them hit against us. As to cooking them, it is well known that the flesh of whales is saturated with that oil that is so valuable. We simply cut out and burnt large chunks of the meat by which we fried the fish. Then for desert we often had jelly-fish and sponge cake, made out of the sponges which grew on the bottom of the great animal.

On the fourth day the whale died. I do not know whether it was because of the loss of flesh we used as food, or from indigestion, as he had the day before swallowed a large whale-boat whole. At any rate we were free from

the danger of sinking. Yet there was small chance of reaching land, as he now drifted about according to the winds.

Toward the evening of the next day the wind fell, and we took the opportunity for a swim. As I was paddling around I observed a great mass of floating wreckage. I swam up to it, and noticed several masts and a whole mainsail. At this moment I thought of an idea which I communicated to my companions.

With great exertion we dragged several of the spars on the back of our friend before nightfall. Next morning we set to work and dug a hole in the middle of the whale's back. Into this we set one of the largest spars, and lashed it firmly to the spine. We then spread the sail on spars and hoisted it up the mast. It is true that in a high wind two of us had to hold the mast steady, which looked rather undignified. But we got ahead at about three knots an hour, and after an uneventful voyage arrived in Honolulu in three months.

T. E. '05

The Man Who Was King¹

Smith Academy Record, 8 (June 1905) [1]-3

Cap'n Jimmy Magruder, retired A. B. mariner, and at present engaged in lobster-trawling and skippering summer visitors, is famous in his own country for his genius at telling stories of his adventures at sea. There is one in particular of his brief experience as a king, of which he is particularly fond. I have heard him tell it many times, and always with different and more wonderful incidents. The main facts, however, which he includes in every edition, are like this.

One cruise he was on a sealing vessel in Polynesia. The ship, an old one, went to pieces in a storm, about latitude 22 degrees, south. I never could find out any thing certain about this shipwreck, but it is certain that after the boat went down the captain found himself clinging to a spar, with nothing in sight but a low-lying island about half a mile away, and the reef, boiling with breakers, on which the ship had split. To this island he slowly made his way, holding onto the gaff, and was finally flung half-drowned upon the long sandy beach.

This island, he found out afterwards, was Matahiva, in the Paumotu group. Not long after the captain was there, the French got hold of it and built a post there. They educated the natives to wear clothes on Sunday and go to church, so that now they are quite civilized and uninteresting. But till the day when the captain was thrown on the beach, a white man had never been there, which was the reason he was received with so much honor.²

The captain crept into a dense thicket of tari-bushes and fell sound asleep. It was several hours before he awoke, to find himself in a rather unusual position. He was being borne on a kind of a litter by two of the islanders, and formed a part of a procession. First marched along the path two natives, who seemed to be priests, by their having more clothes than the rest, and carrying bowls filled with smoking incense, which had a most unpleasant odor. Next came the two men with the litter and after that a little mob of men beating bhghons (a sort of cross between tin pan and gong) and chanting monotonously.

The captain of course did not understand all this, but learned it afterwards. It appears that the king had just died, and that while they were casting about for a new one, somebody discovered the captain asleep on the shore. As he was

strangely dressed and moreover, of a whitish color, they straightaway concluded that the gods had dropped him down for the purpose of ruling over them, and were now triumphantly bearing him to the village to inaugurate him.

The captain soon found out that instead of being about to be roasted for the consumption of his hosts, he had attained a position of greater importance than he had ever aspired to reach. He succeeded to all the possessions of the late monarch, including the royal palace, which was about the size of a large woodshed, and was considered something remarkable by his subjects; the royal harem, and the royal fishing boat, which was at least two feet longer than any other on the island. Life consisted of fishing, bathing, feasting, and getting drunk on wine made of the madu-nut.

He ruled in this way for several months, and would have stayed there until the end of his life, had not a rebellion arisen. The cause was this, the former king had been in the custom of performing magic at the public festivals, such as breathing fire, holding a red-hot iron, or vanishing into the air on an endless rope, thereby earning great respect and admiration of his subjects. The captain could do none of these things: at feasts he only got drunk, which was not a remarkable enough feat to excite applause. Of this plot against him he was informed by a trusty slave, who crept into his palace in the night. No time could be lost. He at once went down to the shore and stocking his boat with provisions, set out without delay. His objective point was Tahiti, which is about three hundred miles away. Having a fair breeze, and good weather all the way, he reached Tahiti in about two weeks from the time of setting out.

T. E. '05

NOTES

1. The title and plot of this story echo "The Man Who Would Be King" (1888) by Rudyard Kipling, on whose stories TSE was to write an undergraduate essay in 1909.
2. This scenario—a white European in a remote settlement where he is received by non-whites as a deity—is central in Joseph Conrad's *Lord Jim* (1900) and *Heart of Darkness* (1902).

The Defects of Kipling¹

As the novelty of certain innovations dies away, as the school of literature of which Mr. Kipling is the most illustrious representative, the exotic school, passes with all its blemishes exaggerated more and more into the hands of less brilliant practitioners, so Kipling's fame is fading, and his unique charm is diminished.² He himself has made little effort to increase his reputation in his own special province of literature, the Anglo-Indian Orient, and in his late writings has turned to other subjects. This may well be the part of wisdom. For the popularity of his work was due not more to his emphatic and vigorous style, his unquestioned technical merits, than to the unfamiliarity and picturesqueness of his background. Now that a score of writers can boast of an acquaintance with the equator, we are no longer so entranced by the Kiplingesque as we were when cobras had first learned to talk, and bears to bring up small boys "by hand."³ We are at ease with the Oogly; the China Sea, even with the Kyber Pass.⁴

Local color, especially in outlandish and unknown places, is always a dangerous literary tool; the author who makes much use of it is liable to become a slave to brilliant landscape and description. He is liable to overestimate its importance, to subordinate characterisation and action to background; and under the influence of strange scenery to exaggerate the strangeness of his men and women. The reader in his turn is deceived; what is so unusual, he imagines, must be true. Accordingly, this kind of story, narrative in unfamiliar setting, is easier than other, because strangeness is easier than truth.

Yet truth and strangeness of setting is a possible combination, and a story is often all the better for it. If you lay your plot in Hindustan or Africa, and still create men whose title to existence rests on more than violent action, then you have achieved a genuine triumph. Such a triumph is Stevenson's "Ebb-Tide."⁵ The man who equalled Kipling in narrative and in vivid description of tropical scenery, combined with these qualities fine analysis of character, justice of proportion, and the power to seize the moral significance of a situation. Compare the "Ebb-Tide" with most of Kipling's Oriental stories, and you will see how much more control has Stevenson over his material.⁶

The real reason for Mr. Kipling's failure,⁷ not the Oriental obsession, which was merely a result, is as evident in the early stories of diplomatic life at Simla, as in his more highly decorated work.⁸ After all, there is one fatal weakness penetrating and marring almost everything to which Kipling sets his hand; accounting for several of the minor blemishes; it is his restless and straining immaturity. Nothing is so pathetic in literature as the immaturity which the practised brain cannot shake off, nor the practised hand conceal. Always more anxious for the appearance of life than for life itself, the appearance of truth more than truth, Mr. Kipling has maintained the pose of a man of the world, a pose of the young and egotistic. He has seen everything and done everything. The discursive observer of life, the cosmopolitan like Kipling, often misconstrues that intimacy with sailors, barmen, whores, stokers, thieves, all people of squalid and strange professions—he thinks that such acquaintance gives one a knowledge of life. To the properly equipped it will. Most men will gain from such observation only delight in superficial phenomena, the bizarre and the brutal. In *The Light that Failed* and in *Kim*, as in many of the shorter stories, there are characters and events which are bizarre and brutal.⁹ Mr. Kipling was always more anxious to be striking than to be convincing.¹⁰

So, even in the earlier work, the middle-class-society tales of which I spoke, one cannot feel perfect confidence, and nowhere am I sure that Kipling is solicitous for accuracy.¹¹ And if these cynical Simla stories are not trustworthy, their only excuse is that they are always interesting, and always effective.

What is the reason that Kipling's stories never lack interest? Surely the vigor which galvanizes every character into action; almost into reality. Aside from Kipling's incontestably brilliant technique, it is the most admirable quality in his work, this vast energy. Not so profound or so tragic as Balzac, Kipling approaches that novelist in this respect. The energy and the daring of his characterisation make his people interesting.¹²

Some critics have said that the giving interest to the commonplace constitutes Kipling's greatest merit. But to make the commonplace interesting in a legitimate way needs insight. When Kipling tries he distorts it. I have often heard that the British soldier of Kipling is not in the least like reality, and I have heard from the lips of Gloucester longshoremen that *Captains Courageous* is quite incorrect, the product of three weeks lounging about the wharves.¹³ The true masters of realism conquer it by grasping the vital fact, searching the soul of it for truth and beauty. There Kipling fails.

Mr. Kipling can do much; his bell buoys and artillery discourse eloquently, and his animals are up to almost anything. He roams from Greenland to the South Seas in search of effects—always finding them, too.¹⁴ One of his most effective tools is the supernatural. The lurid horror and grimy setting of the “End of the Passage” make one of the most striking tales of fear that I have ever read; the hideousness of tropical heat has never been more vividly expressed. Yet when one halts after reading, to analyze the causes of the vivid emotions which one has felt, it is found that the whole effect is due to certain nightmares, the impression of which is adroitly intensified by vague allusions.¹⁵ The story is a masterpiece of workmanship. Still, it no longer affects me as at first. I am no enemy to the supernatural and the abnormal in literature; I admire immensely such things as the Opium-Eater, and Childe Roland, and Aurélia.¹⁶ The distinction is just this: such visions have the appearance of sincerity (sincerity by self-deception or by the purpose in writing), but Kipling is merely trying another effect—and he is successful.¹⁷ If one were sure that Kipling is really convinced that a man could be metamorphosed into a beast, or that a Berserk could be reincarnated into a bank clerk—but no, he is trying a hoax at the reader’s expense. Hast any philosophy in thee, shepherd?¹⁸ only the philosophy of popularity.

Perhaps the best thing which Kipling has done, least marred by the faults upon which I have insisted, is that Indian idyll called “Without Benefit of Clergy.”¹⁹ More sincere, I think, more restrained and tender, less ambitious than most of his tales, it does not expose that lack of taste, the result of immaturity, which has always been a fatal defect. No tremendous impression is intended; yet there exists in any language no more touching idyll of illicit love told with such ingenuous simplicity.²⁰ The characters are natural; the background is not overdone. The story of an Englishman drawn more and more out of his normal life by a liaison entered into thoughtlessly and lightly, then broken by death as if it had not been, and all the delight and all the desolation of it to be concealed from the world in which he moved and worked—it is very poignant and very true, and will live, I think, when the rest is forgotten, or preserved chiefly for curiosity and technical instruction.

In looking back over what I have just written, I feel that I have probably overestimated the faults of Kipling’s work, in the effort to bring them clearly forward; that is because I consider them vital defects, which have never been sufficiently emphasized. Hidden among Kipling’s many

volumes there are unpretentious stories which do not show these faults; “Muhammed Din,” for example, a charming picture of childhood.²¹ But, in the general impression of Kipling, do not the faults outweigh the virtues?

NOTES

1. “The Defects of Kipling,” in TSE’s hand, dated 2 Mar 1909, was written for English 12 (spring 1909), taught by Charles Townsend Copeland, whose marginal comments and grade of “B+” are included on the essay itself. It was found in Copeland’s papers by his biographer, J. Donald Adams, who revealed the discovery to TSE in Jan 1958 and was granted permission to include seven paragraphs in his *Copey of Harvard* (Boston, 1960). After rereading the essay, TSE wrote to Adams that “it was rather odd to find that my handwriting . . . seemed so similar to that of Mr. Copeland himself,” to which Adams replied: “perhaps you had forgotten that it was Copeland’s practice to have you write down his comments in your own hand?” Stating that he was “not very much impressed by my own essay which is, as Copeland remarked, unduly harsh,” TSE added that Copeland’s comments “seem to me very sensible and worth quoting in full.” According to Adams, Copeland required that “each piece of original work” should be accompanied by “a brief piece of translation, from whatever language the student might choose” (152-53). He informed TSE that his essay was accompanied by a translation, “presumably submitted at the same time,” of Mallarmé’s “Frisson d’ hiver” (“Winter”) and by a revised version of the essay itself, here printed following the original essay; TSE’s translation has been mislaid. The original essay, edited by Christopher Ricks, was published in Jan 2001 in *Essays in Criticism*.

2. Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936), the first Englishman to be awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature (1907), was born in Bombay. Educated in England, he returned to India and began a distinguished career as a writer (*Plain Tales from the Hills*, 1888; *Barrack-Room Ballads*, 1892; *The Light that Failed*, 1890; *Kim*, 1901; *The Jungle Book*, 1894; *Captains Courageous*, 1897; and *Just So Stories*, 1902). For TSE, this essay initiated a lifelong engagement with Kipling’s work, resulting in *Criterion* “Commentaries,” several essays, and an introduction to *A Choice of Kipling’s Verse* (1941). Professor Copeland instructs TSE to substitute “able” for “brilliant” in the first sentence and to write in the margin: “A mouth-filling sentence.” See facsimiles, which are illustrations 8 and 9.

3. In *The Jungle Book*, an abandoned child, Mowgli, is raised by wolves with the help of a bear. In “Rikki-Tikki-Tavi” (*The Jungle Book*), the villains are a pair of king cobras. The phrase “by hand” was popularized by Charles Dickens in *Great Expectations* (1861). In the opening of chapter 2, the orphan Pip says: “My sister, Mrs. Joe Gargery . . . had established a great reputation with . . . the neighbors because she had brought me up ‘by hand.’ . . . knowing her to have a hard and heavy hand, and to be much in the habit of laying it upon her husband as well as upon me, I supposed that Joe Gargery and I were both brought up by hand.”

4. The river “Oogly” (Cockney aspirate of Hoogly / Hoogli / Hugli) comes off the Ganges and flows from Calcutta into the Bay of Bengal. It figures in several poems, including “The Ladies” (“I was a young un at ‘Oogly”), and in stories, including “The City of Dreadful Night.” The Khyber Pass between Afghanistan and what was to become Pakistan is the gate into the Indian subcontinent, site of most of Kipling’s early stories and poems. The China Sea is that part

of the western Pacific that borders the Asian mainland. Of TSE's opening paragraph, Copeland remarks: "a harsh statement with some elements of truth." As this essay was written for an undergraduate course, the editors have retained TSE's occasional lapses in spelling: *Kyber*, *galvinizes*, *incontestibly*, and *Muhammed*.

5. "The Ebb-Tide: A Trio and a Quartette" (1893), written by the Scottish novelist Robert Louis Stevenson (1850-94) in collaboration with Lloyd Osbourne, is the tale of three destitute characters—a Yankee skipper, an Oxford intellectual, and a London clerk—tossed together by fortune on a beach in Tahiti.

6. Copeland's marginal comment: "But see also how much less impulse, how much less passion, and in that particular story, after the first half, how little illusion of reality."

7. Copeland asks TSE to underline "failure" and to write "to do what" above it.

8. As a young reporter, Kipling spent much time in Simla (present-day Shimla), a small settlement in the Himalayan foothills and the summer capital of Imperial India. This resort inspired many of the stories in *Plain Tales from the Hills*.

9. *The Light that Failed*, Kipling's first novel, deals with war-torn Sudan, and *Kim*, his most acclaimed, with religion and espionage in the Himalayas.

10. Copeland's marginal query: "Don't you suppose that he expects to convince by striking?"

11. Copeland's marginal comment: "Youthful rashness is not likely to be one of your attributes, at least till you are middle-aged."

12. Honoré de Balzac (1799-1850). To accompany his application for admission to Milton Academy in Apr 1905, TSE made a hand-list of courses taken and books read at Smith Academy in 1904-05, including in French "*Five Tales of Balzac*" (L1 6), evidently a school edition (untraced) of Balzac's *Droll Stories*, *Les Contes drolatiques*. Copeland's marginal reprimand: "little connexion between this paragraph and the preceding. Don't fall back into the gnomic style of last October."

13. During the summers of 1894 and 1895, Kipling and his family, then living in Vermont, spent several weeks in Gloucester soaking up atmosphere and researching for *Captains Courageous* (1897), a tale in which a man washed overboard from a transatlantic steamer is rescued by Gloucester fishermen. TSE, who spent his youthful summers at Gloucester, long remembered having heard fishermen discussing the novel. In a *Criterion* "Commentary" (Oct 1926), he praised Kipling as "the greatest master of the short story in English," but added that "Gloucester fishermen have been able to detect inaccuracies" in *Captains Courageous*. In his preface to James B. Connolly's *Fishermen of the Banks* (London: Faber & Gwyer, 1928), he recommended *Captains Courageous* and again recalled Gloucester sailors: most of these "true narratives . . . can—or could a few years ago—be learnt by word of mouth from the men between trips, as they lounged at the corner of Main Street and Duncan Street in Gloucester" (viii).

14. Copeland's comment regarding the phrase "always finding them, too": "an awkward tacking on construction"; "strike 'too,' substitute 'moreover.'"

15. "At the End of the Passage" (1891): a ghost story about a man afflicted with such intolerable nightmares that he tries to avoid sleep.

16. Thomas De Quincey's *Confessions of an English Opium-Eater* (1821, 1856) is a first-person account of the highs and lows of opium addiction. Childe Roland, hero of the eleventh-century *Song of Roland* and an old Scottish ballad, was also the protagonist of Robert Browning's dreamlike quest narrative, "Childe Roland to the Dark Tower Came" (1855). TSE probably

encountered Gérard de Nerval's hallucinatory tale *Aurélia* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1855) in the American edition of Arthur Symons's *The Symbolist Movement in Literature* (1899), which he discovered in Dec 1908, less than three months before writing this essay. Symons describes *Aurélia* as a "narrative of madness, unique as madness itself" (16).

17. Copeland tells TSE: add the parentheses, substitute "illusion" for "self-deception," and write in the margin: "don't use this special trick of repetition too often."

18. Shakespeare, *As You Like It* (III.ii): Touchstone, in repartee with Corin, turns to a new subject after mockingly comparing the life of a shepherd to that of the Court. In Mar 1905, while TSE was still a student at Smith Academy, his mother wrote to the headmaster of Milton Academy: "He has read practically all of Shakespeare . . . and retains much in memory" (L1 4).

19. "Without Benefit of Clergy" appeared in *The Courting of Dinah Shadd and Other Stories* (1890).

20. Copeland points to "exists . . . touching" and admonishes: "Don't write so."

21. "The Story of Muhammad Din" (1888) explores the relationship of an Anglo-Indian reporter with an Indian servant and his son, "a chubby little eccentricity" named Muhammad Din.

TEXTUAL NOTES

1. Location: Harvard University Archives: HUG 4298.65; blue ink holograph with title page: "Thomas Eliot / English 12 / March 2, 1909 / Defects of Kipling"; seven numbered pages: lined, no watermark, 19.5 x 27 cm. Marginal comments by Copeland inscribed in red in TSE's hand.

2. Copeland's summative comments, in TSE's hand:

"As usual you lean to the unduly harsh. Your opinion of Kipling's faults would carry more weight if you could appreciate without any niggling qualifications such masterpieces as the 'End of the Passage,' the 'Incarnation of Krishna Mulvaney,' and best of all perhaps 'The Man who would be King.'

Kipling is no favorite of mine—I am a pianola that often resents the music it plays—but we should all be heartily grateful for the mere vital energy of this immature middle aged man, in a feeble era of literature.

Altho' it is a great pleasure to see that you can at last swing a long sentence, swing several, each growing out of the one before, you must now be on your guard against becoming pompous, orotund, and voluminous.

C[harles]. T[ownsend]. C[opeland] E[liot]."

3. In 1935, TSE was approached by James Le B. Boyle, secretary of the *Harvard Advocate*, about a projected memorial issue on Copeland. On 17 Apr, he responded: "I don't feel that my conscience calls upon me to provide a leaf for Copey's garland. I did take one course from him, from which I think I learnt nothing. At any rate I have always regretted that I did not employ the time otherwise. I wish him well, but I never got on with him, and have literally nothing to say about him." In his 1958 letter to Copeland's biographer, TSE recalled "I was not one of his real following and I never really hit it off with him. I don't really think, to be quite candid, that the course was very profitable to me. I say this with regret because I know

that so many men have found it of very great value. He was certainly a strange and interesting figure, but I have racked my brains in vain to think of anything that I could offer of value. I think the difficulty was that I could not learn to write English according to the methods by which Copeland taught it." TSE softened his youthful censure of Kipling himself, admitting he was now "a warm admirer." He contextualized the tone of the undergraduate essay by noting that "a large part of [Kipling's] work . . . was still uncertain at the date of this essay" (qtd. in Adams, 153-54).

Some of Mr. Kipling's Defects¹

As the novelty of certain innovations dies away, as the school of literature of which Mr. Kipling is the most illustrious representative, the exotic school, passes with its blemishes exaggerated, more and more into the hands of less able practitioners, so Kipling's fame is fading, and his unique charm is diminished. Kipling himself has made little effort to increase his reputation in his own special province of literature, the Anglo-Indian Orient, and in his late writings has turned to other subjects. This may well be the wiser part. The popularity of his work was due not more to his emphatic and vigorous style, his unquestioned technical brilliance, than to the unfamiliarity and picturesqueness of his background. Now that a score of writers can boast of a familiarity with the equator, we are no longer so spellbound by the Kiplingesque. We are not awed by the Oogly; the China sea, or the Kyber pass.²

Local color is always a dangerous tool, dangerous in proportion to its remoteness from our knowledge and observation; the colorist is liable to become infatuated by brilliant landscape and description. He is liable to overestimate its importance, to subordinate characterisation and action to background; and under the influence of strange scenery to exaggerate the strangeness of his men and women. And the reader also is deceived; what is so unusual, he argues (unconsciously perhaps), must be true. True to the setting, but not always true to humanity.

Yet truth and strangeness of setting have a possible conjunction; and a story is often all the better for it. If you lay your plot in Hindustan or Africa, and still create men whose title to existence rests on more than violent action, whose world is more than a tropical phantasmagory, then you have achieved a genuine triumph. Such is Stevenson's "Ebb-Tide." In this story vivid description of tropical scenery is united with fine analysis of character, justice of proportion, and the power to seize the moral significance of a situation. Compare the "Ebb-Tide" with most of Kipling's Oriental stories, and see how much more control had Stevenson over his material.

The real reason for the dissatisfaction which I cannot but feel with Mr. Kipling's work is not the Oriental obsession, which was merely an accident, but a weakness as evident in the early stories of diplomatic life at Simla, as

in his more highly decorated work. There is one fatal weakness marring almost everything to which Kipling sets his hand; accounting for several minor blemishes; it is a restless immaturity. Always more anxious for the appearance of life than for life itself, the appearance of truth rather than truth, Mr. Kipling has maintained successfully the pose of a man of the world, a pose of the young and egotistic. He has seen everything and done everything. The discursive observer of life, the cosmopolitan like Kipling, often misconsidars that intimacy with sailors, barmen, stokers, thieves, all the world of Argot—he thinks that such acquaintance gives the knowledge of life. To the properly equipped it will; most men will gain from such observation only the delight in superficial phenomena, the bizarre and the brutal. In *The Light that Failed* and in *Kim*, as in many of the shorter stories, there are characters and events which are bizarre and brutal. Kipling is striking rather than convincing.

So, even in the earlier work, the middle-class society tales of which I spoke, one cannot feel perfect confidence. One can never be sure of Mr. Kipling's accuracy. And if these Simla stories are not trustworthy, their only excuse is that they are always interesting, and always effective.

What is the reason that Kipling's stories never lack interest? Surely the vigor which galvanizes every character into action, almost into reality. Aside from Kipling's incontestably brilliant technique, it is the most admirable quality in his work, this vast energy. Kipling, not so profound or so tragic as Balzac, approaches that novelist in this respect. His people are justified by the energy and the daring of his characterisation.

These people are always interesting; they are not always real. I have often heard that the British soldier of Kipling is not in the least like reality, and I have heard from the lips of Gloucester longshoremen that *Captains Courageous* is quite incorrect, the product of three weeks lounging about the wharves. The true masters of realism conquer it by grasping the vital fact, searching its soul for truth and beauty. And Kipling fails.

Mr. Kipling can do much; his bellbouys and artillery are eloquent, and his animals are up to almost anything. He roams from Greenland to the South Seas seeking and finding effects. One of his best tools is the supernatural. The lurid horror and grimy setting of the "End of the Passage" make one of the most striking tales of fear that I have ever read; the hideousness of tropical heat has never been more vividly expressed. Yet when one halts after reading to analyze the causes for the vivid emotions which one has felt, it is found that the whole effect is due to certain nightmares, the impression

of which is adroitly intensified by vague allusions. The story is a masterpiece of workmanship. Still, it no longer affects me as at first. I am no enemy to the supernatural and the abnormal in literature—I admire immensely such things as the “Opium-Eater” and “Childe Roland,” and *Aurélia*. Such visions have the appearance of sincerity—by illusion or by the purpose in writing—but Kipling is merely trying another effect.

Perhaps the best thing which he has done, least marred by the faults upon which I have insisted is that Indian idyll called “Without Benefit of Clergy.” More restrained and less ambitious than most of his tales, it does not expose the lack of taste which has always been a fatal defect. It is a fine idyll of illicit love. I confess to a strong admiration for this story of an Englishman drawn more and more out of his normal life by a liaison undertaken thoughtlessly and lightly, to be effaced utterly by death—with the anguish of concealment from the world in which he lived—a story which will remain, I think, when most of Kipling’s work is forgotten or preserved chiefly for curiosity and technical instruction.

In looking over what I have just written, I feel that I have overestimated the faults of Kipling’s work, in the effort to throw them into clear relief; that is because I consider them vital defects, which have never been sufficiently emphasized. Hidden among Kipling’s many volumes there are unpretentious stories which are free from these faults; “Muhammed Din” for example, a charming picture of childhood. But in the general impression of Kipling, do not the faults outweigh the virtues?

NOTES

1. “Some of Mr. Kipling’s Defects” is the typed revision of “The Defects of Kipling.” Both were submitted to Professor Copeland, who retained them among his papers. This essay may be the first instance of typewritten work from TSE’s hand.

2. Misspellings uncorrected in the revision are allowed to stand: *Kyber*, *galvinized*, and *Muhammed*.

TEXTUAL NOTE

Location: Harvard University Archives: HUG 4298.65; typescript, with title page:

“Thomas Eliot / English 12 / ‘Defects of Kipling’ / Rewritten”; five unnumbered pages: no watermark; ink emendations in TSE’s hand.

A review of *The Wine of the Puritans: A Study of Present-Day America*, by Van Wyck Brooks.

London: Sisley's, 1909. Pp. viii + 144.

The Harvard Advocate, 87 (7 May 1909) [80]

We are glad of the opportunity to review a book by a former *Advocate* editor—Mr. Van Wyck Brooks, of the board of 1908.¹ This is a book which probably will chiefly interest one class of Americans (a class, however, of some importance): the Americans retained to their native country by business relations or socialities or by a sense of duty—the last reason implying a real sacrifice—while their hearts are always in Europe. To these, double-dealers with themselves, people of divided allegiance except in times of emotional crisis, Mr. Brooks's treatise will come as a definition of their discontent. But he should find a larger audience than this class alone. The reasons for the failure of American life (at present)—social, political, in education and in art—are surgically exposed; with an unusual acuteness of distinction and refinement of taste; and the more sensitive of us may find ourselves shivering under the operation. For the book is a confession of national weaknesses; if one take it rightly, a wholesome revelation. With wise restraint, the author has attempted but little constructive or prophetic criticism. He merely ends with the expressed hope, "I think that a day will come when the names of Denver and Sioux City will have a traditional and antique dignity like Damascus and Perugia—and when it will not seem to us grotesque that they have" [142].

One thing more. Mr. Brooks has handled successfully a difficult form—the dialogue; never allowing it to degenerate into soliloquy, and often rendering a slight difference in the point of view, a shift of personality; maintaining that shuttlecock action which is the virtue of conversation, but which is seldom perceptible in dialogue as a literary form.²

T. S. E.

NOTES

1. *The Wine of the Puritans* was the first book by Van Wyck Brooks (1886-1963), who graduated from Harvard in 1908. TSE, now in his third year and on the editorial board of the *Advocate*, had in his first year been encouraged by Brooks to submit poems. In 1920, he was to recall the year when "I was a Freshman at Harvard and you were a prominent man of letters

there" (*LI* 485). TSE would later remember him "as having a good deal of personal charm, as being very dapper and neatly dressed, and giving the appearance, to a humble freshman, of being rather English" (to Allan S. Kaplan, 16 Oct 1956). Brooks, who began his career as a radical, attempted without success in 1920 to secure from TSE a review for a liberal New York weekly, *The Freeman* (*LI* 485).

2. Brooks presents his argument as a dialogue on art between two young Americans living in Italy, one of whom, Charles Graeling, is a thinly disguised self-portrait. Brooks had introduced Graeling as his alter ego in an undergraduate essay written at Harvard more than a year earlier.

The Point of View¹

The Harvard Advocate, 87 (20 May 1909) 82

This week we are printing two articles presenting the opposite sides of an ancient controversy—that between the sport and the grind. The discussion, though never final, is always interesting, when it is the attempt of each to justify himself without injustice to the opponent. No one need hope to settle the dispute. But if all prejudice and misunderstanding are cleared away, it is possible for each partisan, while retaining his own opinions, to see that there is much reason in the other man's contention and after all that's the best excuse for most arguments; for each side to acknowledge sympathetically the right of the other to his own point of view. And in this case the divergence—in ideals—may be not so great as is thought.

NOTE

1. Unsigned editorial, attributed to TSE in the *Advocate* index. For this issue, W. C. Greene (class of 1911), a fellow member of the Board of Editors, and H. E. Porter (class of 1909) defended opposite types of students. In "The Importance of Being a Grind," Greene praises "the man who is deeply interested in scholarly pursuits" as "the type . . . worthy of emulating" (96). In "The Importance of Being a Sport," Porter responds that he would prefer to have "half" the grind's "soul-life . . . and twice his social life," declaring that the "sport is as necessary as the grind to preserve that equilibrium which makes this a University and not a cloister. . . . we need the grind, and we should love him for his beautiful brain" (97-98).

Gentlemen and Seamen

The Harvard Advocate, 87 (25 May 1909) 115-16

Those of us who can claim any New England ancestors may congratulate ourselves that we are their descendants, and at the same time rejoice that we are not their contemporaries. Their sombre faces, with an inflexible contraction of the lips, as they have been stiffened and conventionalized in oils by forgotten artists, suggest natures difficult and unyielding, as the consequence of religious principle and of interminable struggle against the narrow resources of New England. The men of whom I am thinking are the patriarchs of the smaller towns, rather than the merchants of Boston, whom affluence often left more genial than the never prosperous countryfolk. But the representative New Englander is not exclusively a city man by descent, and has quite as much reason for taking pride in his rustic ancestors.

One notable characteristic of those hardy folk is the success with which they supported, in the conflict with misfortune, a gentlemanly dignity. Tradesmen and farmers, most of them, by descent, they were farmers in America; yet here they founded and maintained successfully a plebeian aristocracy, without the training of generations, and under adverse fates. Any task which necessity compelled them to undertake, in their hands became honorable; no privation and hardship lowered their pride or social position. So they were found as merchants and tradesmen, as farmers and printers, according to circumstance, without losing a jot of their dignity. There were many sacrifices. Straitened means confined noble ambitions, and their passion for education was not always gratified. In one of those white clapboard houses which look so tranquil in their decay lived a boy of good family, a hundred years ago, whom lack of means thwarted from his ambition the college education. So, at the age of fifteen, he killed himself.

But most of our New Englanders were stronger, and turned to what vocation they could find; the farm, the printing-press—a hundred years ago there were many local presses—or to the sea. The merchant marine was not the least important career in which New Englanders found distinction. They were the men who carried American commerce to the Levant, to India, to China; who from the Revolution till after 1812 made America an ocean power in war and in peace. They built the fine old ships which we know only from

contemporaneous engravings. How stirring are those antique woodcuts. The "*Ajax*," two hundred ton brig, entering Algiers under full sail with a thundering salvo from the city; the ensign very large, triumphantly shaking out its thirteen stars from the end of a yard-arm. Or the "*Poor Richard*," off the coast of Africa repelling pirates; the native feluccas very small in contrast; or the "*Samuel Adams*," passing a sea-serpent in the Bay of Biscay. Built and manned and commanded, every one of the boats, by Yankee seamen; and for them was built the handsome old custom house at Salem, now slumbering in proud uselessness.

Go to Salem and see a town that flourished a hundred years ago in the hightide of New England's naval energy.¹ It seems now to be always in dignified mourning for its former grandeur, for the ships which do not leave and the ships which do not return. One feels that noisy mirth is a profanation there, the town is so populous with ghosts. Where is the China fleet now? the clumsy barks that sailed to every part of the world? Every day, a hundred years ago, the crow'snest watched for another homecomer bending past Baker's Island. Of the freights which the boats carried in are left only the shawls, the ginger-jars, the carved ivory which the captains brought back from the Orient, the gifts which their descendants are proud to display. From New Brunswick to Florida to-day lounge the coasters, manned with the Irish and the "bluenose";² the mackerel fleet splits out to the banks under Irish skippers, and the cargoes of the world are borne in steamers owned in Europe. The sea trade of the Yankees is gone.

The captains who handled the old fleet were just the sort of aristocratic plebeians of whom I spoke. Very young, at fourteen or fifteen years, they would enter the service, at the bottom of the nautical *cursus honorum*.³ They often rose quickly; there were many like the youth who sailed a bark from his father's Portsmouth ship-yard to Savannah for lading, thence to London, where he sold ship and cargo at a good profit; and this when he was aged nineteen. His log-book, kept in a neat small hand, shows that he was an able and a conscientious navigator. Such were the men who handled the shipping of New England.

Though we must regret the commerce which has fallen to Germany and to England, we must regret still more the virtues of the old skippers. Thrown from youth among the roughest adventures, with the crudest companions, they emerged at the end as good gentlemen, often, as the more fortunate college-bred. Of these yeomen ancestors we are apt to think as the infantry whom the drums beat to Charlestown, or as the gunners who raked the

“*Hornet*,” rather than as the founders of commerce or the pioneers of education. But that is half of their importance. We may well mourn for the enterprise which sent American shipping round the world, and started the printing press in many small communities. Nowadays we are thankful that more congenial occupation is open to the industrious gentleman, however needy, than was possible to some of our New England forbears. If along with greater luxury, with more generosity and geniality than was theirs, we have preserved the spirit of our old plebeian aristocracy, we should give them the grace of recognition.⁴

T. S. ELIOT.

NOTES

1. For this article TSE may have drawn upon a visit to the Marine Room of the Peabody Museum in Salem, with its models of Salem ships, portraits of seamen, and their logbooks and chronicles, and may have read Ralph D. Paine’s *The Ships and Sailors of Old Salem* (1908), with its romantic adventures of teenaged sailors.

2. bluenose: Nova Scotians, especially those characterized by moral toughness.

3. *cursus honorum*: career ladder.

4. On 1 June 1950 TSE wrote to Donald Hall, editor of the *Advocate*, in response to his request to reprint TSE’s prose contributions in *The Harvard Advocate Anthology* (1951): “I imagine no editor of that paper ever contributed less to its pages than I did, and I still wonder how I was elected on such a scanty output. . . . I think the one called Gentlemen and Seamen is not without interest, even though the interest may not be wholly flattering to myself, and I have no objection to your printing it, but I can see no point in reprinting two brief reviews, and I will ask you not to do so.”

A review of *Egoists, A Book of Supermen*,
by James Huneker.

New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909. Pp. 372.

The Harvard Advocate, 88 (5 Oct 1909) 16

Now that Arthur Symons is no longer active in English letters, Mr. James Huneker alone represents modernity in criticism.¹ Few critics are possessed of so much erudition, yet there are few so determined to consider subjects only of the most modern interest. In fact, he is far too alert to be an American; in his style and in his temper he is French. Then, too, he is a musician; plays himself, and has written an interesting life of Chopin; has written also a volume on contemporary European drama, and can speak intelligently of art. All of this, in an American (or English) critic of literature, is quite unusual.²

Mr. Huneker's style may impress us as unpardonably hasty, crammed, staccato; a notebook and journalistic style. But (among American writers, still further distinction) a style it decidedly is, and shares with that of Mr. Henry James (from which, we need not add, it differs in almost every other respect) what I should call a conversational quality; not conversational in admitting the slipshod and maladroit, or a meagre vocabulary, but by a certain informality, abandoning all the ordinary rhetorical hoaxes for securing attention. In the matter of English style, by the way, his criticism, in *Overtones*, of the later Henry James is illuminating.³

Except in a detailed review, analysis of any of the articles which make up this book would be impossible. Mr. Huneker's book titles are a little noisy, and in this case vague and unsatisfactory. But the *Egoists* are all men—French and German—of highly individual, some of perverse and lunary, genius. Particularly good is the critique of Huysmans, the genius of faith, also the note on Francis Poictevin, a forgotten literary specialist.⁴

T. S. E.

NOTES

1. James Huneker (1857-1921), arts critic for the *New York Sun* (1902-17), was the author of *Chopin: The Man and his Music* (1900), *Overtones: A Book of Temperaments* (1904), and *Iconoclasts: A Book of Dramatists* (1905). The English critic Arthur Symons (1865-1945) wrote *The Symbolist*

Movement in Literature (1899), the American edition (1908) of which had a profound influence on TSE. Having suffered a breakdown in 1908, Symons was institutionalized for two years and wrote no further significant criticism until 1916. His *Romantic Movement in English Poetry* (1909) was written before his illness.

2. On 4 Jan 1952 TSE wrote to Huneker's biographer, Arnold T. Schwab, that he had never met or had any correspondence with Huneker. "I remember reading some of his . . . essays in my undergraduate days, which I found . . . highly stimulating because of the number of foreign authors, artists, and composers whom he was able to mention, and whom I had then never heard of. Later . . . the parade of names came to seem rather tiresome. But I think his work may have performed a useful service for others as well as myself, in bringing to their attention the names of distinguished contemporaries . . . of the previous generation, in the various arts."

3. Huneker illustrates the distinctive style of Henry James (1843-1916) by describing his portrayal of Turgenev in *Partial Portraits* (1888): "a picture of the great, gentle Russian writer is slowly built up by strokes like smoke. There is much of his troubled melancholy, some of his humor, and, rare for Mr. James, distinct allusions to Turgénieff's attitude in the presence of the American-born novelist's work" (*Overtones* 142).

4. Huneker traces the spiritual fluctuations of the French novelist Joris-Karl Huysmans (1848-1907) from the decadence and Satanism of *À rebours* (1884) and *Là-Bas* (1891) to the struggle and conversion of *En route* (1895) and *L'Oblat* (1903). He also describes the contributions to poetics of Huysmans's confidant, the French symbolist prose poet Francis Poictevin (1854-1904).

PART II

Graduate Essays
and Ph.D. Thesis

Report on the Kantian Categories

“Report on the Kantian Categories,” dated 27 Mar 1913, is the first of three essays that Eliot wrote for “Philosophy 15: The Kantian Philosophy” (Harvard University, spring 1913). This graduate seminar on Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was one of two that Eliot took from Professor Charles Montague Bakewell (1867-1957) of Yale University, who was at Harvard on a visiting appointment.¹

There are perhaps three chief types in the history of the category, three distinct uses of the term:

1. the Platonic: the metaphysical and epistemological problems are equal and inseparable.
(neo-Platonic: methodological and only provisionally metaphysical).
2. the Aristotelian: the category as an adequate account of an external reality.
3. the Kantian: an epistemological scepticism, grounded on certain practical postulates, arrives at a metaphysical system which is contingent upon the variabilities of these postulates.

The point here taken is, that while the Aristotelian problem is quite different from the Kantian, and the employment of categories so unrelated that direct comparison is impossible, the Platonic problem is similar to that of Kant, in so far at least that both Plato and Kant recognise as of fundamental importance the fact that metaphysics and epistemology coincide as one and the same problem. Only, the historical position of Kant made it necessary for him to start out from a much more sophisticated account of “immediate experience.” The world was divided for him into concept and percept, ideas and matter of fact. Now probably for Plato matter of fact was much more ideal, and idea much more real, than for Kant or for us; an affective difference which can with difficulty be elucidated and hardly proved, but which can be made more and more plausible, as a basis for drawing distinctions, between the two types of category.

For there is for Plato, in the first place, no possible addition to the matter of experience, of a ground of experience beyond this experience itself and beyond any conception we can form of this experience. The modern inquiry springs from the assertion of the exteriority of the matter of our experience

to ourselves; and, in the next moment, shifting its point of discrimination, assumes that this first distinction moves of itself to a second distinction, a distinction between this sort of externality and another reality more external. For when the first externality has been explained, we forget the limitation which applied to this use of the word “external”; consciousness shifts its viewpoint, absorbs the external; but by its own necessity posits the external again. [As if from a relation A, X – having found the relation, say $Ar_1 X$, we should then subsume X under A , and posit another X . $(Ar_1 X) = A. (Ar_1 X), X^2$ to be found].² The attempted solution of the artificial problem creates the issue between modern realism and idealism.

Now for Plato the distinction between the idea and the flux is not the internality-externality distinction of the concept-percept relation. Hence the category plays a very different role. The problem for Plato, I believe, consists not in the attempt to harmonise an ideal and a real world, but in the attempt to answer the question: how is it that the idea and the flux are (as we know them to be) the same thing? We must, in order to understand this attitude, set aside our questions of consciousness and its object, which for Plato had not arisen. (And we must, incidentally, admit I think that the $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ is merely provisional—the only ultimate reality for us being our conception of the complete world order).³ The same problem (the identity of the flux and the idea) arises (in a less acute and vital form) for any immanence monism; but is more complex for Plato, because he declines to submit himself to the facile condensations of pure mysticism. Accordingly idea and flux are made relative to each other, but are relative also to our (more or less stable) point of view, from which there are inevitably degrees of reality, leading up to the Idea of the Good, which is, however, identical with all the other degrees, being at once a goal and an immanent concrete universal.

The category, then, as set forth in the *Sophist*, for example, is both a metaphysical reality and an epistemological tool.⁴ Hence Hume’s problem is not here applicable⁵—nor, on the other hand, are the logical problems of Aristotle. Since the idea and the flux (for “pure perception” is for Plato an hypothetical abstract limit) are not connected by any of (Kant’s) three categories of relation, but are only different aspects, the question of analytic and synthetic judgment does not arise. For it is not correct to say that the “world of sense” is deduced from the ideas, nor that the ideas are deduced from the world of sense, since each is the other, and in relation to the other. Metaphysical knowledge does not arrive at one from the other, but comprehends both at once.

The five categories of the *Sophist* (τῶν εἰδῶν μεγίστων λεγομένων)⁶ are then not a statement of all possible predicates of individuals, but rather a statement of the most essential characteristics which subsist in both reality and thought. The process from flux to idea is a process of existence or of knowledge, according as you look at it, but in either case it is not quite describable as a logical process. It is in these two processes that logic is generated (and life is a continual alternation of the processes) but formal deduction cannot anticipate; the form of logic is clearly articulated in the process, but the movement from one state of reality to another remains to the last a mystery.

In Aristotle's logic the situation of the categories is, I believe, much easier to grasp. In one way are they much more analogous to Kant's than are Plato's: they form a list of possible predicates of an individual, a list of the ways of thinking reality; and the starting point is logical method in grasping exteriority. Of course the problem is much more simple, inasmuch as the relation of categories to real predicates is that of simple correspondence. The idea of an external world independent (in the most realistic sense) of cognition, a world the relations of cognition to which must be explained, was as foreign to Aristotle as it was to Plato; his external world was what we should call the world of our ideas; the exteriority was purely the practical one. Consequently, since no separation has been affected, no reconstruction is necessary. The structure of logic, if not identical with the structure of nature, is adequate for handling nature.

On the other hand, the question of grades of reality, representing different points of view not to be logically derived from each other, did not present itself to Aristotle. There was only one grade. Accordingly his categories are the categories of definition of the individual on this one grade; that is, the ways of relating the individual to other individuals. They present therefore rather a piecemeal effect, and cannot be given metaphysical validity unless these forms of relationship of individuals to each other can be shown to possess an essential relationship among themselves and in the construction of reality as a whole. It is in this way that Kant's categories have more in common with those of Plato than with those of Aristotle; for they are forms with which the world must comply to be a world at all; while Aristotle's are merely forms descriptive of objects in the world as it is given.

The initial peculiarity of Kant's deduction of the categories is, then, the situation of the problem as handed on to him: a situation which determines the critical approach, though—significantly—the situation itself is altered in

the process. At the beginning is assumed (1) a distinction of subject and object in knowing, founded upon experience, which is assumed to hold for any aspect in which the relation subject-object may come to be viewed. We have then to postulate a complete independence of consciousness and its object. (It is yet premature to define "independence" in order to ask: how are they related?) In other words, in order to break into the problem, from Kant's point of view, you must first set up the Thing, and criticise it afterward.

(2) Kant postulates for his starting point a sharp distinction between concept and percept. "All our knowledge begins with experience."⁷ What is wanted of course is a definition of experience which shall successfully exclude all that does not "originate *from* experience."⁸ But "experience" here means I suppose the complex given in time from which a priori and a posteriori elements may be separated out, and is a larger term than percept. Inasmuch as in experience there is always an a priori and an a posteriori, the distinction is perfectly valid, though metaphysically quite provisional. It is then only necessary to point out that any definition of "experience" must be more or less arbitrary.

There is another distinction which Kant establishes early; not quite so fundamental perhaps as the three just enumerated (subject-object, concept-percept, a priori-a posteriori) but also fruitful in difficulties: the distinction between pure general logic and transcendental logic. Even from our assumed starting point, this distinction is hard to uphold. Distinction between form and content, it may be argued, cannot from any point of view be made complete without being made arbitrary; and whether it is possible to think of particulars and universals without a content is open to question. It does not appear that general logic, even admitted that it adds nothing new, can, as Caird points out, give more than the statement $A = A$; and in this case transcendental logic is not sufficiently explained as general logic and the complex of a priori sensibility received from the Transcendental Aesthetic.⁹ If "space and time . . . are the conditions without which the mind could not be receptive of impressions,"¹⁰ is "pure conception" possible? Space and time will be in one aspect conditions of general logic as well; and general logic would thus enter bodily into transcendental logic; thus a new structure arises to be accounted for.

The problem which gives rise to these classifications is of course the accounting for a priori synthetic judgment. Whether we can or cannot obtain the twelve forms of judgment, prior to transcendental logic, one may at least

affirm that in transcendental logic they are prior to any particular determination.¹¹ For any part of perception can be taken up only when these judgments are already possible; only in judgment can we know at all. But as “judgment . . . is the indirect knowledge of an object,” consisting in the predication of one conception of another conception (which second may be directly related to a particular perception or class of perception), so it has to deal only with conceptions, and conceptions must be possible predicates in judgments.¹² If, therefore, we can give the possible forms of “unity in judgments” we shall have, not the categories, but their empirical consequences.¹³ From the form of judgments, then (the only form under which we find thinking to be possible), we are able to draw an empirical deduction of the categories. Thus, the hypothetical judgment implies causality, but this is not an adequate explanation: it shows only a constant relation of the category to experience. What we want to show is, how, having the category, we can relate it to objects a priori. And this, Kant could say, is just what Aristotle failed to do; so that his categories have only logical, and not metaphysical validity.

Kant has shown that the categories relate to objects in judgment a posteriori; it remains to show that they relate a priori; and that it is “the same function which gives unity to various ideas in a *judgment* also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various ideas in a *perception*.”¹⁴ It remains to show that the categorical judgment has not only a constant relation to the logical judgment, but that it is not derived therefrom, and that on the other hand, the forms of logical judgment can be derived from the categories. It can be shown, Kant thinks, that the categories are of “central origin,” but that if they were “a mere fiction of the brain,” experience would be impossible, and “conceptions which make experience possible are for that very reason necessary.”¹⁵

It is here, I think, that one of the chief difficulties of the Kantian category makes its appearance. Plato’s categories need to exhibit only a certain connective efficiency between the grades of his metaphysical system; they are due to the demand for a common ground upon which the different grades shall be thinkable; they are not categories of knowledge in the sense of being projected outward by inner necessity. Rather, we accept them simply—*ταὐτόν, θάτερον, κίνησις, στάσις*—as characters of a world of which we are part.¹⁶ And for Aristotle, the empirical deduction is sufficient. But when Kant deduces the notion of cause, as not given “in experience,” he starts a train of reasoning which seriously affects the equilibrium in his three sets of postulates.

One starts provisionally from a naïf Humean subjectivism. As the relation of internal and external world becomes more clearly defined, the importance of the distinction recedes. We have first defined experience so that causality will not be included in it, but as the organisation of the perceiving subject becomes more clearly articulated, the subject becomes, more and more, part of an objective order, and the distinctions first established remain valid only for the (illusory) original relation. It becomes simply a matter of emphasis whether the categories are “applied to” objects or “received by” the subjects.

And also, the difference between concept and percept becomes indefinitely “nuanced.” Space is a (pure) percept, and causality and plurality are concepts, inasmuch as space is known directly and causality and plurality are inferred from relations between objects. But now in order to account for the perceived relations between (empirical) perceptions, we are forced to attribute them to ultimately the same faculty which relates conceptions, by the intermediary of imagination—which, as Caird declares, puts in its appearance abruptly.¹⁷ But surely unless we were conscious of relations, we should hardly be conscious of terms, and perception ultimately is reducible to the same fundamental synthesis as conception; there remains only the residue of external stimulus in each case, a residuum which becomes more and more visionary.

I have said that the result of categorising was to objectify the subjective, but to weigh the balance in one direction is to weigh it in the other as well. The synthesis of apprehension and of reproduction is not (it is hardly needful to remark) a mere fitting together of given parts. On the contrary, in the possibility of parts is implied the necessity of a previous unity. The transcendental apperception clearly possesses logical priority, being implied in any combination whatever, but itself implies no prior composition. We are then to revert to the Cartesian ego, the “I think,” an “act of spontaneity.”¹⁸ Only, the recession proceeds much farther than with Descartes. Just as the categories, acquiring objectivity as they acquire solidity, may appear indifferently as a function of the world or as a function of the self, so the “subjective unity of consciousness” divorced from the contingent empirical unity, becomes prior to both self and world, and is, in a sense, either completely subjective or completely objective.

This is not necessarily acceptance of the Schopenhauerian interpretation, but it is I think a sufficient defense of Kant against subjectivism.¹⁹ The difficulty lies simply in the paradox of the inevitable circularity of

metaphysical thinking, and the conscientious devotion of Kant to his problem as first stated. The categories appear at first to give an adequate account of the relation of cognition to the thing-in-itself, and from the standpoint which we use in the categories, the thing-in-itself is a necessary postulate. But as soon as we pass, by way of synthesis in apperception, imagination and recognition, to the objective unity of self-consciousness, we lose the thing-in-itself; the distinction of concept and percept are ultimately transcended (for as soon as we attempt to handle either metaphysically, it takes on characteristics formerly considered the differentiae of the other); and the categories themselves alter their character.

Let me consider for a moment another objection which may appear fine-spun, but which I think relevant to the assignment of a final position to the categories. To what degree are the categories applicable in a metaphysic? If, that is, we accept them as valid in experience, we must accept them as applicable not only to objects (“we cannot *think* of an object without categories”),²⁰ but to “conceptions” too. We are here in face of an infinite regress, dealing with interpenetrating systems; so we handle the world, just like any object, through categories, and can arrive at a metaphysical construction which will be part of another system, bearing just the necessary and systematic relation to that which we have been handling as the world system, as the perception does to the object. Hence we can know neither an object, nor our own ideas, nor the world, except as phenomena; and our knowledge is itself a phenomenon—as known.

This may appear an irreverent burlesque of Kant’s thought; my intention has been merely to defend the assertion that the categories obtain methodological, and not literal, value; that starting from the postulates of ordinary experience (so far as these can be settled upon), they occupy an unassailable position, but promise consequences which if followed out threaten to distort their significance. Accordingly, the transcendental unity of apperception and the thing-in-itself are in a sense to be regarded as pragmatic postulates—but from the opposite point of view.²¹ The thing-in-itself is necessary from the point of view from which we start. It is necessary if we are to have categories at all; consequently it must remain an essential moment in any metaphysical system which we may construct on this critical basis.

On the other hand, as we proceed to *préciser* the thing-in-itself in its relation to the categories, it obviously becomes a vanishing goal. And this movement is concomitant with the movement in the other direction, that toward the transcendental unity of apperception. Both movements are, I believe,

inevitable consequences of the theory of categories. At the same time we must admit, I think, that they explain in only the outward direction or, at least, that the explanation in one direction is of different *portée* from the explanation in the other.

It is obvious that the categories imply the transcendental unity of apperception. It is equally obvious that that latter should imply the former. The two processes, however, are not tantamount.²² For in the proposition

x is not conceivable without y²³

x and y are not necessarily the same x and y as in the proposition
y is not conceivable without x.

Our terms may perhaps not exist in the same universe. Postulating x,y follows—but this obtains in the universe of x.

(x implies y) need not imply {y implies (x implies y)}.

because in the one case you mean “y from point of view of x.”

in the other case you mean “y from point of view of y.”

This is equivalent to saying that maintaining the one relation you have epistemology; maintaining both (i.e., that $x=x$ and $y=y$ in all cases) you have a metaphysic.

One can argue this perhaps more clearly in the problem of the relation of the categories to the thing-in-itself. Given a relation $\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}$, whose $\mathbf{a}$ = consciousness and $\mathbf{b}$ = its hypothetical object (thing-in-itself), you can readily find the relation $\mathbf{r}_1$ (categories) between $\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}$. But this is on the basis of experience, and can simply ignore the possibility that $\mathbf{a}$ and $\mathbf{b}$ may be concomitant variables (so to speak) and only $\mathbf{r}$ constant. At this point the situation is no longer expressible in symbols. For $\mathbf{a} \mathbf{r}_1 \mathbf{b}$ is true only when another relation $\mathbf{a} \mathbf{r}_2 \mathbf{b}$ is held to be true by $\mathbf{a}$ (the naïf practical realism). In other words, the $\mathbf{a}$ which asserts “ $\mathbf{a} \mathbf{r}_1 \mathbf{b}$ ” is not exactly the same $\mathbf{a}$ as the $\mathbf{a}$ in the proposition: that $\mathbf{a}$ asserts “ $\mathbf{a} \mathbf{r}_2 \mathbf{b}$ ”. Thus, in order that consciousness’ theory about action may hold, its theory in action (which is incompatible with the former) must hold also.²⁴

Applying this view to the thing-in-itself, $\mathbf{b}$, we obtain the following conclusions: given $\mathbf{a} \mathbf{r}_x \mathbf{b}$ (only so much about $\mathbf{a}$ and $\mathbf{b}$ being known as is necessary for the relation), we obtain, by finding $\mathbf{a} \mathbf{r}_1 \mathbf{b}$ and solving for $\mathbf{b}$ from our knowledge of $\mathbf{r}_1$ and our (assumed) knowledge of $\mathbf{a}$, not the same total result which we obtain by assuming $\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}$ as we did at first and finding $\mathbf{r}_1$. We postulate subject-object and find the relation. But the relation by being found changes subject and object. Assuming the existence of objects, we find valid categories; but assuming the categories, we find the object

changed. E.g., the statement “in the categories, therefore, nature as a system of necessary laws (*natura formaliter spectata*) has its ground and origin”²⁵ is obviously derived by the movement from $\mathbf{ar}_1$ to find $\mathbf{b}$, and is in no wise implied in the previous part of the argument which moves from $\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}$ to find $\mathbf{r}_1$.

To sum up, finally, the situation and rôle of the categories:

1. Postulating $\mathbf{a}$ and $\mathbf{b}$ (as we must do), the categories possess objective validity and in no wise tend toward subjectivism.
2. Postulating the categories (as we must do), the transcendental unity of apperception follows, and tends to absorb the thing-in-itself.
3. If we accept the categories as method, then the whole argument is (from this point of view) valid, but the ultimate reality of the transcendental unity of apperception and of the thing-in-itself lies outside of our universe, and does not enter into the discussion.
4. If we accept the categories as possessing objective validity in any other sense than as a permanent relation between $\mathbf{a}$ and $\mathbf{b}$ in our universe—if we grant them absolute validity, we are led into a dogmatic metaphysics, and out of epistemology.
5. From the point of view of method (but not from point of view of metaphysic), the transcendental deduction is completely valid, i.e. the movement $\underbrace{\mathbf{a} \mathbf{r}_1 \text{ to } \mathbf{b}}_{\text{practical use and practical validity}}$ has, equally with the (incompatible) movement $\underbrace{\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b} \text{ to } \mathbf{r}_1}_{\text{practical use and practical validity}}$, practical use and practical validity, but the two must (as method) check each other.²⁶

NOTES

1. The text for the seminar was *The Philosophy of Kant as Contained in Extracts from his Own Writings*, new ed., trans. John Watson (Glasgow: Maclehose, 1908). Watson's text, hereafter cited in the notes as *PKE*, consists of selections from Kant's three *Critiques* (*Pure Reason*, *Practical Reason*, and *Judgment*), “all the passages that seem to be essential to the understanding of his philosophy” (vi). TSE's annotated copy, signed “T. S. Eliot / March 3 1913,” is in the Houghton Library.

2. In the square brackets, TSE restates the preceding sentences in symbolic terms. In nonspecialist language: if it may be discovered that the external world of which anyone is conscious has no demonstrable reality except as an ingredient of the very consciousness by which it is entertained, then—as an alternative to solipsism—another external world may be posited in thought by which to explain the relation that consciousness has to the first. Thus it is that objectivity seems to be preserved. This, however, is no solution to the artificial problem of how

best to demonstrate the reality of a world that is external to consciousness; it only repeats the problem. Note by J. C. Marler.

3. ψυχή: soul.

4. Plato's discussion of the categories appears in his late dialogue (ca. 360 BC), the *Sophist* (5.2-5).

5. In *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* (1748), David Hume (1711-76) argues that causality is not the perception of any "necessary connection" between one thing or event and another but is, instead, a belief founded upon the "constant conjunction" that may be noticed among some objects of human experience—that is, upon the repeated association of certain objects of experience with one another. In the opening pages of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant argues, *contra* Hume, that in relation to experience, causality is a priori and that it is a concept of the understanding without which human experience is not possible.

6. τῶν εἰδῶν μεγίστων λεγομένων: of the forms called greatest. The five categories which Plato's Stranger calls the "greatest" are Motion, Rest, Sameness, Difference, and Being (*Sophist* 25b-e).

7. *Critique of Pure Reason*, PKE 7.

8. *Critique of Pure Reason*, PKE 8.

9. Edward Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, 2 vols (Glasgow: Maclehose, 1889), I.335-38. Caird (1835-1908), along with F. H. Bradley and T. H. Green, was one of the first generation of British idealists. In reaction against the radical empiricism of John Stuart Mill, they attempted to integrate Kant's critical idealism into British empiricism.

10. *Critique of Pure Reason*, PKE 49.

11. Kant argues in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (PKE 51-52) that every perception falls into one or more of twelve categories or forms of judgment, expounded in four triads: (1) Quantity (Unity, Plurality, Totality), (2) Quality (Reality, Negation, and Limitation), (3) Relation (Inherence and Subsistence, Causality and Dependence, Community), and (4) Modality (Possibility/Impossibility, Existence/Nonexistence, Necessity/Contingency).

12. *Critique of Pure Reason*, PKE 47.

13. *Critique of Pure Reason*, PKE 48.

14. *Critique of Pure Reason*, PKE 51.

15. *Critique of Pure Reason*, PKE 55.

16. ταὐτόν, ἕτερον, κίνησις, στάσις: Same, Other, Motion, Rest. Of the five greatest forms enumerated in the *Sophist* (254b-e), TSE omits the fifth, τὸ ὄν (Being).

17. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant* I.314-15.

18. *Critique of Pure Reason*, PKE 65.

19. In *The World as Will and Representation* (1818), Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) appropriates for an explanation of the ego Kant's division of the world into phenomena and noumena, arguing that the self has two aspects: the phenomenal as it appears in perception and the noumenal, a self-in-itself that is manifested through the will.

20. *Critique of Pure Reason*, PKE 82.

21. In Kant, the "transcendental unity of apperception" refers to the ego (*"das Ich, der ich denke"*) that unifies the raw data of the senses into a coherent whole. He uses the term "transcendental" to indicate the ego as an a priori condition for experiencing the world.

22. Bakewell has written "Why?" in the left margin beside this sentence.

23. Boldface of symbolic letters added by editors.

24. In nonspecialist language: “For ‘**a** has the relation of **r₁** to **b**’ is true only when another relation ‘a has relation **r₂** to **b**’ is held to be true by us.” Strictly considered, such formulas as “**a r₂ b**” are not relations; they express propositional functions in which a relation is asserted. The subject of the assertion is the *referent*. That to which the subject is said to have a relation is the *relatum*. About this, see the second chapter of Russell’s *Principles of Mathematics* (1903). Note by J. C. Marler.

25. *Critique of Pure Reason*, PKE 81. *natura formaliter spectata*: nature having been formally examined.

26. On the last page of the essay, Bakewell has inscribed:

You omit reference to the tables of the Stoics and of Mill.

You would do well to note your references.

You seem to confuse the thing-in-itself with the object of experience.

TEXTUAL NOTES

1. Location: Hayward Bequest (King’s): P2 (a); ink holograph: fourteen numbered pages: unruled, vertical red line left margin; watermark: Linen Led, 20.5 x 26.8 cm, perforations on left edge, hole-punched (2); title page in TSE’s hand: “T. S. Eliot / Report on the Kantian Categories / Philosophy 15 / March 27 / 1913.”

2. On the title page, Bakewell has entered a grade (A) and commented: “Excellent. Comparison of Aristotle and Plato and Kant I think on whole sound. But if you give full weight to the essential object-mindedness of Greek and subject-mindedness of modern, Plato and Kant come closer together. Plato’s ‘Essential form of the Good’ is sort of objective rendering of the ‘Transcendental Unity of Apperception’ (vv.v.) And the difference of Plato’s angle of vision inevitable before rise of notion of self-cause.”

Report on the Relation of Kant's Criticism to Agnosticism

"Report on the Relation of Kant's Criticism to Agnosticism," dated 24 Apr 1913, is the second of three essays that Eliot submitted to Professor Bakewell for Philosophy 15.

In distinction from any dogmatic point of view, there are three others possible.¹

1. the sceptical (Hume, Bradley, Joachim, Balfour)²
2. the agnostic (Spencer, Huxley)³
3. the critical (Kant)⁴

Now it is true that from the critical one may pass (abruptly or insensibly) to the sceptical or agnostic, but that such a transition is illegitimate and is in point of fact not latent in the criticism of Kant, it is the purpose of this paper to maintain.

We may find profit in first distinguishing the sceptical from the agnostic attitude. They spring I believe from very different antecedents. Neither appears to follow directly (in history) upon the critical; the natural movement of the human mind is from the critical to the dogmatic. And agnosticism, in the nineteenth century, has been consequent not upon metaphysical dogma so much as upon scientific dogma. Both Spencer and Huxley, that is to say, were scientists, and remained scientists. Agnosticism, I take this to imply, contains a residuum of scientific dogma, enough, at least, so that our attitude toward our ignorance is in relation with our attitude toward what we use as knowledge. Absolute agnosticism is practically unknown. Which statement discovers to us a radical difference between agnosticism and scepticism: the one may be universal, the other cannot. Scepticism questions our arguments, agnosticism makes definite assertions in regard to our ignorance and knowledge. In other words, agnosticism is itself a dogma; for in order to make these positive assertions in regard to the limits of our knowledge, we must place absolute credence in a certain limited body of truth and "matter-of-fact."^{5*}

One may well object, here, that (mutatis mutandis) the Absolute of Mr. Bradley presents very striking analogies to the Unknowable of Spencer; but

it is equally true that *prima facie* this Absolute is a dogma rather than a *scepsis*.⁶ Closer study, however, reveals I believe the fact that the two are arrived at by very different disciplines. Spencer's theory of knowledge (in spite of passages in the best tradition of English doubt) is after all a pretty crude one. True, both Spencer and Huxley reject a crude materialism (as does everyone else!—in metaphysics), but insofar as they insist that any science or total group of sciences can adequately explain life (even “for our purposes”), they hardly escape the most fatal (though not indeed the most obvious) affliction of this point of view.⁷ For although Spencer's critical examination of the elementary conceptions of the scientific explanation of the world appears to leave them in a most equivocal situation, yet inasmuch as they are assumed to be adequate, not only for certain purposes, but for all our purposes, thus far they become dogma. The confusion between practical truth-value and fixed realistic truth-relation betrays Spencer into the assignment of greater inclusiveness to his symbols than they actually denote.

That our knowledge is, in its relation, real, though limited, is the upshot of Spencer's argument. A naïf realism (for, as Mr. Balfour has shown, so far as Spencer's realism comes to anything, this is what it comes to) which tacitly asserts and implicitly denies a correspondence theory of truth is arrested at just the point at which any theory becomes completely transmogrified.⁸ To accept this sort of alteration (where we alteration find),⁹ and to account for it, is just the task of metaphysics. But Spencer stops short of metaphysics. He forgets that any knowledge, upon his own provisional basis, is self-contradictory. Only by such an oversight, by positing this knowledge downright, are we able to conclude with a confession of positive ignorance. For ignorance and knowledge are relative, and unless we indeed possess some certain knowledge we have no right to assert any certain ignorance. Spencer's Unknowable is simply the after-image of what he thinks he knows—his agnosticism, the conclave of his dogma.

Of scepticism, both antecedents and consequences are of a very different order. Scepticism, as I said, appears to mark the end, not of scientific dogma (which it simply disdains) but of metaphysical dogma. The philosophies of Locke and Berkeley, for example, were half sceptical, half dogmatic, followed [by] a complete scepticism in Hume. After Hegel, Bradley.¹⁰ (Balfour is more detached, extra-philosophic). But the germ of scepticism is quickened always by the soil of system (rich in contradictions). As the system decomposes, the doubts push through; and the decay is so general and

fructifying that we are no longer sure enough of anything to draw the line between knowledge and ignorance. For Bradley the only recourse is an Absolute which maintains some of the visual features of German Idealism, but none of the *Gemüth*, which represents in fact only the pathetic primitive human *Credo* in ultimate explanation and ultimate reality which haunts us like the prayers of childhood.¹¹ This Absolute is mystical, because desperate. Ultimate truth remains inaccessible; and it only remains for Mr. Joachim to shatter what little Bradley has left standing, by urging upon us that we have no right to affirm (though he still affirms it!) that there is truth at all. If it is, what is it?¹²

In all these three “types of behaviour,” scepticism, agnosticism, and criticism, the common character is limitation. On what basis, and with what consequences, does critical limitation differ from the two others?

The most significant passage in this connection is perhaps that on the ground for division of objects into phenomena and noumena; although any final opinion must rest upon our interpretation of Kant’s use of “experience” throughout the whole *Critique*. The questions to be raised are: in what sense can we be said to be ignorant of transcendental knowledge? in what sense is there knowledge at all? Now, if we conclude that the laws and assumptions which “make experience possible” are laws over experience, the transition from epistemology to an ontology is facile; if we conclude that the laws are laws in experience (a part of experience) then we must be conscious of giving to the word “experience” a somewhat different significance in two different contexts; then the laws are separated out of experience and are good only so long as we maintain a certain balance. The transition from epistemology to ontology, in the latter case, is impossible. The choice depends on our interpretation of the statement “the pure conceptions of understanding can never be employed transcendently, but only empirically.”¹³

By “empirical” use of categories, I understand not merely “experimental” use but that use in regard to which the world arrived at through the categories is constituted as experience. That is to say, even “transcendental” use of categories is in a sense empirical, but is not “use in experience” in this sense: the objects reached are, ex hypothesi, not in experience at all; and the result is, just because it is experience, invalid. Experience is by definition essentially relative; for it is a complex relation so organic that, taken as a whole, no element can be separated or wholly distinguished from the rest; while

on the other hand it likewise implies, from an internal point of view, very certain reactions and independences. It is simply in this sense then, that the transcendental use is use outside of experience: Experience always presents an internal and an external aspect, which are indissoluble but which contradict each other. The transcendental must consist of one aspect only; hence it is outside of experience.

If, however, experience does consist essentially of these two aspects, we face a signal difficulty in the process of the "Die Eintheilung der Gegenstände in Phaenomena und Noumena, und der Welt in eine Sinnen-und Verstandeswelt, kann daher in positiver Bedeutung gar nicht zugelassen werden, obgleich Begriffe allerdings die Eintheilung in sinnliche und intellectuelle zulassen."¹⁴ This statement, completely I believe in accord with the whole latter part of the *Analytic*, is yet either difficult to reconcile with the *Aesthetic*, or qualifies it very significantly; for hereby the distinction of percept and concept, and of subject and object, remains valid only within the relation complex which we call experience.

Such an admission not only emphasizes the distinction between transcendental and experiential world, but lays upon experience a limitation which is of the highest importance. "Experience" we use in two senses. We mean either the (hypothetical) total complex of our world (imagined as from without), a complex which includes experience in the more limited sense of the "objects of experience" plus the experience relation itself, which in turn includes, besides "experience" at any moment, certain subsistents (categories, theories, assumptions) which are not, at that moment, experienced at all; though (if we may know them at all!) always capable of becoming experienced (objects of experience). But the moment any of these subsistents (e.g., categories) becomes an object of experience, it at once alters its character, by coming into a new and totally different relation. Transcendentalism, then, would not be merely the application to objects outside of experience of hypotheses good only in experience, but would be an application of such hypotheses to objects considered in just that aspect in which they are not objects. As for objects—there are objects only in experience! The distinction, then, is not between different types of objects, but between different types of relations.

In experience, the primitive relation describable as "awareness" persists, sophisticate with hypothesis the situation as we will. A situation, totally conceived, is always somehow determined, but this determination cannot

be wholly expressed in terms of one element in the situation; inasmuch as the isolation necessary to make definition possible alters the situation, and any expression which we can give is a new determination—of a new situation.

If, then, experience is so inherently evasive and protean, what right can we claim to categorise at all, what right to make a start? From the individual experience, in fact, we should have neither right nor need. It is only in a social life that we do become conscious of a body of experience, that is to say, of experience in which are found persistence and order. Experience is in relation to practical interest, and this interest is a much more stable and definable thing in the experience of the group than in the experience of the individual. In truth, [it] is definable only in the experience of the group. The experience thus *encadrée* is only an approximation, it is true;¹⁵ a nebula which cannot be rigidly defined; still, it is quite possible, “empirically” to separate out subsistent categories which shall remain indefinitely valid; and in a sense, eternally valid: that is to say, all “explanation” of experience must, in some sense, assume (in order to explain at all) its own external validity.

Categories are absolute in this way: all conceivable experience must be in relation to the categories in order to be experience at all. On the other hand, we must not forget that this absolute validity is purely internal, for the categories are themselves part of experience in the larger sense; and not only limit experience, but may equally well be conceived as constituted by experience. They are themselves, as known, phenomenal, and hence have validity just to the same degree and in the same way as the experience which they make possible. They cannot, that is, be said to limit experience as a whole; from the outside, they simply articulate the order inside the complex as we find it, ourselves within it.

If this interpretation be correct, the situation of the noumenon cannot be exactly that attributed to it by idealism, realism, or agnosticism. Knowledge is only knowledge at all when “taken internally.” If you contemplate knower and known from the outside, what you find is not simply knower and known, but a peculiar complex of existents, and knowledge fades into ontology. Hence, in order to know, we must begin with faith, that is to say, the conception of an external relation, a real which is “outside of ourselves,” and just that which possesses this externality to the highest degree is the world of “Gegenstände.”¹⁶ “Wenn man von den Sinnen abgeht” our categories give us only the “Einheit des Denkens.”¹⁷ They would give “knowledge,” if we conceived of these transcendental realities as possessing the same external

reality as the world of objects. That, they do not, by definition. The phenomenal is the real, for us.

Now the world of objects itself, so far as it is "explained," becomes phenomenal. Hence a complete explanation would be entirely in terms of appearances. But such a (complete) explanation would not be an explanation of anything; it would be (absolute) zero. Consequently what we know is only relations, but we must postulate terms. Thus the "Begriff eines Noumeni" remains "unvermeidlich."¹⁸ Yet "der stolze Name einer Ontologie . . . mußdem bescheidenen einer bloßen Analytik des reinen Verstandes, Platz machen."¹⁹

In opposition to realism, Kant maintains that we have no knowledge of an external world, because the world so far as known is no longer external; in opposition to idealism, that any conception of a total world is illegitimate. His position, however, is equally hostile to agnosticism and scepticism. The sceptic questions the validity of any particular knowledge, but he does not impugn the concept of knowledge; while the work of Kant goes to prove that there is no such thing as knowledge at all, in this sense. The agnostic, like the sceptic, clings to the illusions of knowledge. And the *procédé* by which Spencer comes to the conclusion that the Unknowable is unknowable, is, in spite of obvious resemblances, very different from that of Kant, and very much less profound.²⁰ For it is one thing to demonstrate that a problem is insoluble, and a very different thing to demonstrate that it is one which we have no right to raise.

The only good reason, I think, for treating Kant as an agnostic springs from what seems to be a defect rather than an error in the development of his system. By definition, Kant has erected an impassable barrier between the empirical and the transcendental. The very conspicuousness of this barrier arouses the impatience to break through it. Now I believe that all this pain was quite unnecessary. Have we the right to begin with experience as a world of *Gegenstände*? What absolute distinction do we find between God and a table, as objects of experience? I do not mean that we know the one as genuinely as the other (that depends upon our definitions!) but that both are hypotheses, in themselves (as noumena) neither true nor false, but for us, true or false in direct relation to their proximity to our action in the particular complex of our social experience. In this way the difference between empirical and transcendental would be by an indefinite number of degrees. The distinction between the metaphysical and the practical is so far from being self-evident that it simply cannot be drawn—except practically.

Such a qualification of the standpoint of the *Kritik* would no doubt give it a more relativistic complexion than even my foregoing interpretation describes. The noumenon would not be a thing-in-itself, for in itself it could be neither true nor false. It would however be true—in relation to appearance. The nucleus of empirical reality would appear much less stable than it is for Kant; since all questions are practical, and all questions metaphysical. And this qualification would likewise imply that we have no claim to any absolute starting-point, for each possible starting point is made possible only by previous hypothesis.^{21*} But hypothesis is not identical with ignorance: it simply means that truth is a much more complex situation than we suppose. Agnosticism doubts the answer. Criticism questions the question.

NOTES

1. TSE launches his report by alluding to the assault on dogmatism in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in which Kant defines dogmatism as “the preconception that progress in metaphysics may be made without a previous criticism of pure reason,” i.e., as the attempt to use reason “without any previous criticism of its own powers.” He defines “pure reason” as reason “unmixed with anything empirical.” *PKE* 6, 7, 9.

2. TSE studied the British skeptics David Hume, F. H. Bradley (1846-1924), Harold H. Joachim (1868-1938), and Arthur J. Balfour (1848-1930) at Harvard between 1912 and 1914. He read Hume’s *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* (1748), Bradley’s *Appearance and Reality* (1893), Joachim’s *The Nature of Truth* (1906), and probably Balfour’s *A Defence of Philosophic Doubt* (1879) in another seminar with Professor Bakewell (The Nature of Reality) in 1912-13. TSE revisited Hume, Bradley, and Balfour in his 1913-14 seminar with Josiah Royce and wrote his thesis on Bradley.

3. TSE’s representative agnostics are the Social Darwinists—Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) and T. H. Huxley (1825-95). Spencer’s *A System of Synthetic Philosophy* (10 vols, 1862-97) and Huxley’s *Evolution and Ethics* (1894) presented their positions regarding the existence of the nonmaterial world. Spencer dismissed the transcendent as the “Unknowable,” and Huxley described his position as “agnostic.” Spencer was included in the Royce seminar discussions, and he and Huxley are listed in the syllabus for TSE’s 1917 Extension course on Victorian literature.

4. TSE’s third category refers to Kant’s project of criticizing reason itself. Unlike the skeptic and the agnostic, Kant focused not on the truth or falsity of conclusions but on the process of reasoning.

5*. TSE’s note: “I do not refer to more popular forms of agnosticism, which consist purely in an arbitrary (and indefensible) limitation of inquiry.”

6. Spencer’s “knowable” includes that which can be perceived and tested; his “Unknowable” includes all that cannot be known empirically. Bradley’s “Absolute” is more comprehensive, for it includes everything that exists, even feelings and concepts. The Absolute is a dogma in that it asserts belief, whereas the Unknowable is a *sceptis* in that it asserts doubt. See “The Absolute and its Appearances,” *Appearance and Reality*, chap. 26.

7. Spencer frequently uses "for our purposes" to indicate that the scope of his interest is limited to the evolving world of nature. Huxley, similarly, defines knowledge as the scientifically verifiable.

8. TSE refers to Balfour's critique of Spencer in *A Defence of Philosophic Doubt* (London: Macmillan, 1879), chapter XI ("Mr. Spencer's Proof of Realism"): it was Spencer's "singular ill fortune to have failed with entire completeness in all the objects which a man may propose to himself in constructing a theory of the external world. . . . It was reserved for Mr. Spencer to elaborate a theory which can pretend to justify the assumption neither of the man of science nor of the theologian, and which will satisfy the requirements neither of the ordinary man nor of the philosopher" (240-41).

9. An allusion to Shakespeare's Sonnet 116: "Let me not to the marriage of true minds / Admit impediments. Love is not love / Which alters when it alteration finds."

10. The genealogy that TSE alludes to moves from French Rationalism (Descartes) to British Empiricism (John Locke, 1632-1704; George Berkeley, 1685-1753), to German Critical Idealism (Kant) to German Absolute Idealism (G. W. F. Hegel, 1770-1831) to British Neo-Idealism (Bradley and Caird).

11. *Gemüth* (more commonly spelled *Gemüt*), refers variously to mind, soul, and spirit. It is a key term in German idealism, used with different shades of meaning in the writings of Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel. *Gemüt* has no exact equivalent in English.

12. Joachim, *The Nature of Truth* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1906), §41, p. 113. On the title page of his signed copy, TSE wrote: "I believe I bought this copy while at Harvard writing my thesis for the Ph.D., and took it to Oxford with me in 1914." In 1914, he chose Joachim as his tutor at Merton College.

13. *Critique of Pure Reason*, PKE 130.

14. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781) edited by Benno Erdmann (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1900), §311. Translation: "The positive division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and of the world into a sensible and intelligible world, is therefore quite inadmissible. Certainly, the distinction of conceptions as sensuous and intellectual is legitimate" (PKE 133). When TSE quotes the *Critique of Pure Reason* in German, he uses the above edition, which, along with *Kritik der Urtheilskraft* (*Critique of Judgment*), he owned. Both are signed "T. S. Eliot / 1913" on the title pages.

15. *encadrée*: framed.

16. *Gegenstände*: objects.

17. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, §311. *Wenn . . . abgeht*: If abstraction is made from sense; *Einheit des Denkens*: unity of thought. Translations from PKE 133.

18. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, §311-12. *Begriff eines Noumeni*: conception of a noumenon; *unvermeidlich*: indispensable. Translations from PKE 133.

19. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, §247. *der stolze . . . Platz machen*: for the proud name of Ontology . . . must be substituted the more modest claims of an Analytic of Pure Understanding. Translation from PKE 131.

20. *procédé*: process, method.

21*. TSE's note: "I disclaim any panpsychistic implications!"

TEXTUAL NOTES

1. Location: Hayward Bequest (King's): P2(b); ink holograph: twelve numbered pages: unruled, vertical red line left margin; watermark: Linen Led, 20.5 x 26.8 cm, perforations on left edge, hole-punched (2); title page in TSE's hand: "Philosophy 15 / Report on the Relation of Kant's Criticism to Agnosticism. / T. S. Eliot / April 24 / 1913."

2. On a small punched note inserted between pages 1 and 2, Bakewell assigns a grade of "A" and adds: "A very interesting and possible interpretation—"

Report on the Ethics of Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*¹

"Report on the Ethics of Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*," dated 25 May 1913, is Eliot's third and final essay for "Philosophy 15: The Kantian Philosophy."

The validity of the ethics of practical reason rests on: (1) the possibility of an absolute distinction between practical and speculative reason, and (2) the possibility of an escape from the paradoxes of practical morality into an absolute realm of pure law.

The first of these two conditions is simply the question whether there is any other than a provisional distinction between the objects of practical and speculative reason. If it could be shown that this distinction is no other than relative, then the material and mechanical system would no longer maintain its speculative priority, and the objects of both types of reason would preserve absolute guarantee neither of one type nor the other. That is to say, the noumena of pure reason would have to be considered as objects of practical faith, and the objects of practical reason as to some degree already speculatively existent.

Such a breaking-down of distinctions is, according to a possible interpretation, already latent in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. For these the hypothesis of a world of real *Gegenstände*, with which Kant begins, is virtually refuted by its sequels.² The thing, clearly, always dissolves upon analysis into a term with relations; and each term, and each relation, is further soluble into a new term with relations. Hence the thing is in some sort an object of faith only; or rather, is a different thing in different relations, always a factor, and always, by hypothesis, unknown. So that the question whether the thing exists or not is of no absolute meaning; in order to answer it, we must first decide at what point we choose to draw a line between the subjective and objective elements in experience; and it is on this basis (arbitrary, if you like, but practical) that we distinguish between "genuine" and "illusory" experience.

We find the situation, and do not, in any meaningful sense, create it, and the only criterion of judgment for any new hypothesis (hypothesis adding to the situation something which is not, at that moment, given to us in the

situation)—the only criterion is: does it work? (not precisely in the pragmatic sense, for we never know wholly what our purposes are)—but does it make the situation more consistent, and give it more meaning for us? If so, the new objects introduced by the hypothesis become real, and in the degree to which we are able (as individuals or as social beings) to yield faith. But, as there is nothing in our knowledge which we cannot conceive under the form of hypothesis, it is obvious that the distinction between an object directly experienced and one inferred is a relative distinction; since, in order to account for our direct knowledge, we have to mediate it.

In this event it is evident that the distinction between perceptual and inferential knowledge is equally relative. “Pure” perception being only an abstract limit, inference always enters into knowledge; but as inference always implies some direct perception in regard to which inference is made, perception is also an omnipresent limit. It will follow that the distinction between one type of object of attention and another, though real, is only practical, and that there is, in fact, an infinite gradation of objects, from the best known object of direct perception, to the least known object in untried theories. The law of gravity, for example, is, as an hypothesis, pretty well founded; as an object, then, the question whether it is directly perceived or indirectly inferred is a question which you may answer in either way according as you put it; and the apple which falls is likewise perception or hypothesis.

The object, then, considered from an external point of view, is simply part of an organic complex, and you cannot say, except from a practical point of view, upon postulates, whether it “exists” or not. For, on the other hand, it certainly always does exist in some relations, and we cannot know just what these relations are, completely—for investigation changes the relation. All that you know is hypothesis and perception in relation (a relation which is, in a sense, unknowable); we have a certain system of reactions (which is from another point of view hypothetical) which a certain hypothesis justifies. And of course this hypothesis is in turn a reaction which needs another hypothesis. Beyond some point (practically determined), we are able to ignore hypothesis; only it is perhaps well to remember that every existent implies an explanation: that is, at any moment we find the implication of a non-existent. And the question whether any entity is experience or hypothesis can only be practically decided; there is no absolute distinction between the two; and yet it is only in some aspect as experience that any entity can be conceived as real.

Now to return for a moment to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, it is obvious that the thing is merely an object of faith, but faith of such a sort as to be practically unavoidable.^{3*} What then is the object of practical reason? It is an object of faith also; it is necessary for the explanation of a certain order; but this order is subjective, volitional; the other external and inevitable. Here is the only difference of validity between two objects of faith. Is the difference between the two worlds absolute, and is each in its way absolutely real? Here is the crux of the matter. If one be reducible to the other, we get either idealism or naturalism; if the two be absolutely divorced, we can hardly avoid scepticism or agnosticism; if they be relative to each other, and neither be wholly clear and sharp in its outlines, we can construct a philosophy which will perhaps be more possible to live by than the foregoing.

We may question, first, the absolute validity of the categories for determining the objective world. In admitting, I mean to say, that if there were an objective world of definite outlines and definite types of content, such as Kant assumes, then the categories would have absolute applicability; and that if there were categories so sharp and departmental as Kant assumes, then the objective order would have to conform to them; in making these admissions, I say, I believe we are doing Kant ample justice and honor. I should make these admissions, and then assert that categorical determination of experience is true only to a certain point; that this point is not the point of discrimination between the objective and subjective order; and that even if it were, it is not a fixed point, but variable, and that no absolute line of division between subjective and objective order can be found. It is this which makes possible naturalism and idealism, which are simply the reduction, on the one hand, of the moral to the mechanical, and on the other, of the mechanical to the moral—satisfying different types of mind, and attaching no significance to the fact that in the process, either moral or mechanical, ultimately both are disfigured more completely than Glaucon of the sea.⁴ Both naturalism and idealism must assert that the one or the other order is absolute: which is, I think, a greater error than to assert with Kant that both are absolute.

I rest, of course, on the belief that the subject-object relation is a function of the two variables, subject and object. To define the mechanical in terms of the moral is to define the moral in terms of the mechanical, and vice versa; the point at which x is resolved into y and that at which y is resolved into x are the same, and this is the point of meaninglessness. In order to remain in the world of meaning we must preserve the dualism, but

remembering that its terms are variable, and can be completely defined only at infinity.

An indication of this point of view is the fact that it is only with a certain limitation of interest that causality and necessity are valid; and even in the “objective” world these laws dissolve before our analysis; for they are meaningful only with a view to what I (as an individual or as a social member) am going to do next. A totality of causes is of course the effect itself, or freedom. But freedom is subject to the same alteration: complete freedom is identity of effect and cause, and consequently is necessity, for volition implies a difference between cause and effect.

Nor can the difference between subjective and objective order be defined as a difference between subjective attention to noumena, by the practical reason, and objective attention to phenomena, by the pure reason. The distinction between phenomena and noumena is a valid distinction, a necessity of thought, but I cannot admit that [one] can talk of any but the noumenal in relation to the phenomenal and the phenomenal in relation to the noumenal. It is quite possible to deduce this assertion from the *Critique of Pure Reason*, I believe, without disputing any of Kant’s conclusions there. Granted that the practical reason must think of itself as being in relation with a noumenal God, does not the speculative reason make virtually the same assumptions in regard to its object? It assumes always that a noumenal object is “there,” and is any greater claim put forward on behalf of God or freedom? If necessity is phenomenal, is not freedom also? And are not both necessity and freedom “objects” just as are “Gegenstände”?

There appears to me to be a slight equivocation in Kant’s description of God. God and freedom, so far as we “know” them, are phenomena; so far as they are hypotheses, or explanations of what we know, they are noumenal. Kant is so careful to avoid anthropomorphic determinations of divinity, that he reduces it to pure *Ursache*, and reverence, worship, et cetera, become simply “Achtung für sein Gebot.”⁵ In short, we have assurance of God’s existence, only by mercilessly plucking him of all the qualities which constitute a God, and reducing him to a mere term; whether God or not, it is all one. And I cannot see that our “pure practical” knowledge of such a God differs at all from our speculative assumption of noumena “behind” physical existence, except in so far as we assign priority to the material order. And this priority appears to me almost (in some sense) accidental. From our point of view the natural undoubtedly appears to precede the volitional (teleological). In this sense a relative naturalism would be defensible. But it does not

explain the moral. For it does not explain itself. Accordingly God is quite as real as anything else! Not this God or that God—but at any moment some God. Kant is right in affirming that the existence of God is necessary for moral explanation. He errs, I think, only in making him an object only of practical reason, and in trying to separate him from phenomenal attributes.

The three postulates of practical reason Kant finds to be necessary conditions of the categorical imperative. It remains to ask how we come by the categorical imperative, and to inquire into its significance as pure formal law.

If, as I have argued above, the distinction between the moral and mechanical world is not absolute, then there is no necessity for a “type of practical reason.” The “moral” and the “mechanical” are meaningless except in relationship to each other; they are two aspects under which we regard our experience; to ask “how” they fit in or melt into each other is futile and unnecessary, inasmuch as such an explanation would demand a third point of view; as it is, the attempt to *précis* the question implies already *a parti pris*⁶ for the one point of view or the other. Granted then that they do interpenetrate, and that either alone is meaningless, it must follow that the categorical imperative is either quite illusory, or that it is not so “pure” as it pretends to be.

In a relative world nothing can be completely illusory: it is the latter interpretation then that I accept. It is true that the moral law is a necessary assumption for human activity; but it is necessary exactly in the same way as is the belief in God or in freedom or in immortality, and I cannot see that it in any way can claim logical precedence over them. We find it quite as necessary to posit freedom for the performance of any act involving choice, as we do for the acts which are more specifically moral. Of course we can draw no line between the moral and the non-moral action; the attempt to do so is characteristically Kantian. Indeed if, as I urge, we can draw no line between the necessary and the free, if there be simply two (irreducible) aspects, the sanctity of both necessity and freedom, moral and natural, rather evaporates. Kant's permanent virtue is, however, to have seen that the twofold aspect is irreducible; his oversight is neglecting the fact that this dualism is of very vague outline.

In the first place, the categorical imperative is never completely categorical; the categorical is the limit of the imperative, but it is a limit placed at infinity. There is always a hypothetical aspect. In order that any imperative may be binding, one must first accept it; and this acceptance is an act (in

itself and at the moment) extra- or non-moral, an act for which the hedonist and the materialist find their appropriate and partial explanations. This aspect is irreducible. On the other hand, the hypothetical itself contains an insoluble categorical element; and as the non-moral has always a moral aspect, one may extend the statement to say that the categorical, as well as the hypothetical, is of indefinite, or (in a sense) infinite applicability in both directions.

For take an act regarded even by the agent as sinful. Here there are two points of view operating at once. One may say truly that if the agent regarded his act as wholly bad (sinful), he would not perform it. In regarding it as bad, he is perhaps recognizing a categorical imperative, but in recognizing it as good—for him (as he must do if he is to perform it), he acknowledges another categorical imperative, for his act implies the statement, that this act, for any one placed in exactly the same situation as he, is a good act, is the best act performable. And, as the same situation never recurs, one may say that the categorical imperative is always, or that it is never, operative. Such a *reductio ad absurdum* will appear frivolous and flippant. But it is the best way, I believe, of showing that only in μετρίότης (τὸ καίριον, τὸ πρέπον!) is there meaning.⁷ And μετρίότης has no meaning for me unless it is an unstable equilibrium, unless there is always a possibility of excess, demanding the check of good sense.

What then is the value of the categorical imperative? It is, of course, simply a regulative principle; in a sense, a transcendental illusion. It has partial value as explaining how we do act, and partial value as explaining how we should act. It will not explain any system of values that is ever actually found in human history. In one sense, it is true, the “good will” is the only direct value. But it is soon seen that the good will is an indirect value also: a world without contingent goods is not a good world. And a world of only contingent goods is not a good world. Particular goods may be good in reference to the good will, and the good will itself is good only in reference to particular goods. And as good, it must be a particular good will. Hence we may say that any member of a manifold may be chosen as the good end, and the rest as contingent goods. And the categorical imperative has meaning only in relation to such an arbitrarily chosen goal.^{8*}

The same strictures which apply to Kant’s good will can be made to apply to his realm of ends. I regard it as not only inexact but dangerous (Protestant! a French Rationalist would say) to regard humanity (either as a group or as

a total of individuals) as more than a provisionally postulated end. It all depends on one's interpretation! We must admit that there are ends in various senses. In one aspect, holiness is the end. But holiness is, as Kant shows, impossible for a finite will; [it is] an infinite goal. But if a goal is never to be reached, it is not a goal at all—from another aspect; for unless there are other values, you can at no moment say there are any values. And these values are in this light the real ones. Then the “infinite goal” is reduced to a means. Thus the situation is altered, and we find ourselves in eternal vacillation. So, if humanity is the end (absolutely), the idea of the *Summum Bonum* is only a means.⁹ And unless the *Summum Bonum* is the end, humanity is meaningless. In point of fact, values are found in different systems, no one of which is satisfactory alone. Thus all values are if you like illusory, and all real. It is a long way from Aristotle *über* Kant.¹⁰

Our final criticism of Kant's ethics is simply this, that the attempt to reduce ethics to a logical science (as well as the modern attempt to reduce it to a biological science) must end in partial failure. Not that Kant's conclusions are invalid, or his arguments false. The vice is simply the creation of absolute distinctions whose distinctions are purely relative, or perhaps one might say more precisely “relatively absolute.” I do not say that there is any absolute distinction between that which is and that which is not subject matter for science. No science is completely scientific, and ethics is to some extent a science. But the differences are so wide that for practical purposes one may distinguish the sciences from the non-sciences. Where ethics is worked out as a science, it simply ceases to be ethics. The subjective element of [a] volitional postulate is necessary. Kant's ethics critically covers all actions good and bad. And unless ethics can give a clue to what I should do, and what I should not, in concrete experience, I cannot see that it deserves the name. All ethical questions, and the existence of God, and freedom, depend ultimately on a vague entity (felt rather than seen) known variously as common sense, or faith, or response to environment; but surely not determinable.¹¹

NOTES

1. The *Critique of Practical Reason* is included in the main text for the course, *PKE*.

2. *Gegenstände*: objects.

3*. TSE's note: “Not that the thing is everywhere present in ‘immediate experience.’ The world of the savage (and in a certain sense, of everyone but the philosopher) is a world of ‘that's’-in-relation. As the syntax of certain very primitive tribes shows.”

4. For Glaucón (Plato's *Republic*), read Glaucus. In the *Metamorphosis*, Ovid tells of a fisherman who is changed into a sea-god by eating an herb (XIII.898-968). Dante alludes to this radical transformation in *Paradiso* I.67-69 to illustrate the "transhumanization" he experienced in seeing Beatrice and preparing to enter Paradise: "Gazing on her such I became within, as was Glaucus, tasting of the grass that made him the sea-fellow of the other gods" (DC3 7).

5. *Ursache*: cause; *Achtung für sein Gebot*: respect for his law.

6. *parti pris*: partiality, bias.

7. μετρίότης : moderation, lack of excess; τὸ καίριον, τὸ πρέπον: that which is timely, that which is fitting / seemly.

8*. TSE's note: "Of course a good may be 'arbitrarily chosen' metaphysically, and not at all arbitrarily from a practical point of view."

9. *summum bonum*: the supreme good from which all others are derived.

10. *über*: via.

11. Professor Bakewell's comment at the end of the paper: "The great error of Kant's rigorous separations is clearly felt by you. The treatment however of perceptual and inferential knowledge appears rather farfetched. The two are relative terms because they are both knowledge and neither can deny place to the other. There seems to me a more fundamental difference than you allow. You give scant attention to the Will."

TEXTUAL NOTE

Location: Hayward Bequest (King's College): P2(c); ink holograph: thirteen numbered pages: unruled, vertical red line left margin; watermark: Linen Led, 20.5 × 26.8 cm, perforations on left edge, hole-punched (2); title page in TSE's hand: "Report on the Ethics of Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* / T. S. Eliot / May 25, 1913 / Philosophy 15" with grade (A-) added by Bakewell.

[Degrees of Reality]

[Degrees of Reality] was written at Harvard University for either Charles Montague Bakewell's "Seminary in Metaphysics: The Nature of Reality" (Philosophy 20c) or Hugo Münsterberg's "Seminary in Psychology: Mind and Body" (Philosophy 20b), both of which Eliot took in the spring of 1913. The prominence of Bradley's metaphysics suggests that the essay may have been written for "The Nature of Reality," whereas the focus on psychological states suggests that it may have been written for "Mind and Body."

First: I do not intend to draw any absolute distinction between perception, image and judgment, between real and unreal, between real and ideal, or between true and false, or between truth and fact. The sense in which I do draw these distinctions will, I hope, be developed in the course of the article.

We may lay it down at the start that all objects as such are real and equally real. There are I believe degrees of reality, but no degrees of *Gegenständlichkeit*.¹ The question then is: in experience how far and on what assumptions do we treat all *Gegenstände* as equal terms of reality? What in each case is the characteristic that puts the various objects of attention on a level? An electron, the Balkan League, the categories, Russian dances, the concept of *Gestaltsqualität*, a table, are all objects, and accordingly we think of them as equally real. There is accordingly an element of identity among the various classes of objects. This element of identity must be independent of the definitions of the objects. What is ordinarily meant by similarity (and therefore ultimately, by identity) is usually to be found by inspection of the definitions as such; in the case of greater degree of similarity, by simple inspection of the definitions which have been formulated independently; in the case of less degree of similarity, by formation of a special definition by abstraction. But here we say simply that the element common to all objects is the element of objectivity. Note that objectivity and reality are not the same meanings. Note that here we abstract from everything about an object which could localise it either in a subjective or objective world; that is, objective and subjective are not terms strictly in opposition. What I mean by the

element of objectivity is the capacity of anything to be, or to be the fringe of, a point of attention. Now obviously the subjective is also objective in this sense, for it is capable of being the intended object of attention; and the objective is not objective in the usual sense, for it is not contrasted with the subject: the direction toward a point of attention (which is actually of course only an abstraction) is neither subjective nor objective. What we have is only an attitude toward objects which is defined on retrospection to be the recognition of an identity, and of course is only on retrospection known as an attitude at all.

Such would be the primitive attitude toward objects. But it is only an abstraction; I do not mean to imply that as such it is ever the attitude of any being. What it implies is an absence, or a temporary suspension, of interest. Interest is selective attention, and is the first evidence of degrees of reality. Interest^{2*} is implied (in illusion) in attention, and in any determination of a point of attention into an object.

My theory is this: that in any perception or judgment there is (in a sense) a process from the less real to the more real. That ordinarily we live among various such processes which more or less neutralise each other, so that we have the effect of a stable reality, but that when we philosophise, we are committed to the reduction of all such processes to one. That such a process is in a sense subjective, but that the subjective is in a sense perfectly objective, and that both ultimately coincide.

I will ask first: what is it that is given in perception? The perception? No, because this is the total complex; it is something which is in a sense given only to the outside observer. The percept? But you can define percept only so that it is either (1) the object or (2) the object from the point of view of an outsider. If the object is given, which object is it? What is perceived cannot be a psychological state, and on the other hand we cannot say that it is the real object. For this involves, in the first place, a perfectly arbitrary definition of object; furthermore, it leads you straight to subjectivism; and finally it allows of no explanation for error. There are frequent cases in which one cannot say that what is perceived is the object; for what we as outsider or in retrospect define as the object is not that which was defined by the percipient. Nor will it do to say that what is given in perception is an experience; for what is experienced is never itself an experience, although the "experience" is more real than the object.

Let us go for a moment into the theory of bears.³ The child is terrified by the hallucination. The problem is complicated by the point of view which

we take, and what we assume as “perceived” from either point of view. The child “thinks it sees” a bear. But this is true only in some sense. For on the other hand it does not think at all. As a matter of fact it has instituted no judgment of comparison. Mr. Givler seems to have assumed that the child saw a cinematograph bear.⁴ But it may have been much more, or much less. I could cite instances from Pierre Janet’s hystericals in which touch and weight were experienced as well.⁵ But I do not think that the ordinary child, frightened by a bogey, sees nearly as much as Mr. Givler under the same conditions. I am not prepared to support the James-Lange Theory, but I do not see any logical or other priority of image over fear, or vice-versa.⁶ There is certainly the fear, and the tendency, as Lipps says, for such an emotion to objectify itself (*VFWD* 70).⁷ You cannot abstract the emotion from the object, or vice-versa; but what criterion have you for saying that the child “sees,” or does not see, a bear? Absolutely none. The child’s meaning “bear” is certainly continuous in a sense with our meaning bear. What we mean, so far as we can say what we mean, by saying that the child’s bear is not real is that it exists in a certain context and not in others, and that these others are required by the collective or social meaning which has grown up with the term bear. But you have no absolute criterion for saying that the child has not seen a bear and the child has no criterion for saying that it has. The child does not know just what it has perceived, any more than we do, or just what it means when it says bear, any more than we do. I shall return to this point later.

To sum up, then, the child and the observer both have perceptions, but they don’t know what it is that they perceive. My first point is that the child’s judgment is not false; my second is that the adult’s judgment is truer than the child’s. For obviously no perception can involve complete falsity, inasmuch as we cannot distinguish between the false and the true objects of perception; for the false “means” the true. This leads to the question of denoting, meaning, and context. Before dealing with this question, however, I ought to say something of the identity of perception and judgment.

For purely logical purposes, the distinction can perhaps be upheld. You can, that is, confine yourself to express statements of assertion; you consider the judgment in a strictly typical form.⁸ But for the theory of knowledge, this restriction will not stand for a moment. Unless you formulate your definition so that it will be a purely verbal one, from which the meaning of judgment has wholly evaporated, you cannot formulate it so as to exclude perception. The distinction amounts only to the difference between

immediate and mediate knowledge, and this difference is clearly relative: for the immediate as such is contradictory, and the mediate as such is contradictory. And immediate and mediate knowledge both enter into perception and judgment as well. If perception is to have any meaning whatever, we must be able to abstract an impression and an inference. This abstraction is not an analysis, for in that case we should merely get another impression to analyse. If judgment on the other hand is to have any meaning, we must be able to abstract an impression from which the judgment is an inference. For the majority of our judgments, and not only our analytic judgments of perception, are not formal inferences at all.⁹

Thus, we never really know the origins of our perceptions or judgments. There are two aspects between which I can find no preference. (1) At the moment of perception or judgment, the mind is the object or the judgment, and object is only real or unreal, and judgment only true or false, in relation to a subsequent perception or judgment, and so on. (2) The alternative truth or falsity is implied in the presentation itself, and the presentation of an image constitutes its own claim to reality. In criticism of the latter statement, we may say that the image is not that image until it has received in some way attribution to reality. I doubt whether a pure image exists: for if we take an image out of context, we simply attribute it to reality in the same way as an ordinary perception. Or else all our experience is only images; in which case a judgment simply tells us that image A is image B and not image C.

The object then is always real but we do not know what the object is. The ultimate object for both idealism and neo-realism is the total situation or, in idealistic terms, the perfect individual; and ordinarily we are not interested in the total situation. We are interested in the more or less stable object of a more or less stable subject; that is to say, abstractions from reality are concretions in appearance. But it is the fact that these objects are only more or less stable that gives us degrees of reality: it is, in a sense, one unstable object that is the child's real bear, the adult's illusory bear, and Mr. Givler's chiaroscuro bear. The adult's is more "real," in my sense, than the child's. Mr. Givler's, if you please, more real than the adult's, and mine, as I like to think, more real than Mr. Givler's. Each view seems to me nearer to being a self-consistent, self-containing whole, than the last.

This assertion may be developed by the distinction of denoting, meaning, and context. I consider these to be three distinct moments in the situation. At either moment, of course, it is not known just what is denoted,

meant, or found in context, but we have a clearer notion of what we mean than of what we find in context, and of what we denote than of what we mean. What we denote in perception or judgment I take to be at least the point of attention, and furthermore the literal meaning so far as anything can be taken to have a literal meaning. You may say for example that in $2 + 2 = 4$, you denote the truth “as it stands”* (*not that I should admit that $2 + 2 = 4$ is more than relatively true, or in a certain sense “true” at all),¹⁰ that your meaning is the use you make of this statement, its relevancy and teleology; and the context is ultimately the whole of reality. It is of course more or less arbitrary and optional at what points you may make these divisions. For the meaning is part of the denotation and the context part of the meaning.¹¹

“Degrees of reality” means simply the process of recognition of this fact, the logical process of reality according to Plato and his Marburg interpreters.¹² This process is manifest in any judgment. In the statement this is A or B is A, you have a process which cannot be described simply in terms of knowledge. In saying that the that is not simply a that, but is a what, you have posited the that to deny it, to assert that the truth is something more complete. I do not say that this process is wholly contained inside the judgment, in the relation of actual subject, predicate, and copula. The grammatical form is only a reflection of a larger action, in regard to which there is no duration within the predication itself. The original point of attention may be conceived of as outside the judgment itself, and the whole judgment or perception is predicated about this point. In the assertion “the sky is blue” a process takes place during which a hypothetical point of attention is rejected and “the blue sky” substituted for it. The word sky is perhaps the bridge between the two points, but the process is really continuous and unanalysable. The meaning of a judgment is not always in exact correspondence to the form of expression.

The activity involved in judgment is thus a transition from a mere point of attention to a situation which has greater reality and individuality, the assertion of a new reality in the face of a content already present. In an analytic judgment, we substitute for this content a that of which to predicate qualities. The substitution in question may be different in different types of judgment: for a comparative judgment the datum may be (in abstraction) a feeling of difference or identity. But this original datum is of course an abstraction, and I do not pretend that this process exhausts the nature of the judgment. For I hold also to the definition that judgment is the predication of an ideal content of reality. But the operation forms a single indivisible moment.

We come then to the formation of philosophical systems and the relation of real and ideal. Here we face two continuous processes. For the process toward greater reality is at the same time a process away from reality. There is a sense in which we all in philosophising start from the same datum [which is] experience. Well and good. But it is only from the outside that this is true: for as I tried to show above, as soon as we have defined experience, we have passed from experience into theory. With our first judgments many men will agree; with our superstructure fewer, and we build a pyramid of opinion such as we sometimes see at the circus, a number of men securely on the ground, the next (fewer in number) less securely on the shoulders of the others, and finally only the author at the dizzy top. In short, our process of conviction is the process of others' doubt, and what seems ultimate Reality to the builder seems ultimate delusion to the critic.

The explanation I find in the fact that no positive distinction can be drawn between the real and the ideal. The distinction is only a practical one, in experience. A thing is real as experienced, ideal as predicated of reality. But we may "mean" the real or the ideal in varying degrees. Our experience and our judgments about our experience are continuous, and in referring to the specific things experienced, our meaning may be closer to or remoter from the experience itself; we may refer to the experience, or we may refer to what we have taken the experience to mean. Now when we define an experience, we tend to substitute the definition for the experience, and then experience the definition. The original experience may of course have been a definition, but the act of experiencing is quite another thing from the act of defining. The distinction between reality and ideality then amounts to the distinction between the point of attention and the act of attention.

Hence in the logical process of a philosophic system, you have a succession, or rather, one continuous substitution. You start, or pretend to start, from experience—an experience which is already saturated with theory and definition—and organise it. Each step in organisation gives you a greater degree of reality—the process carries itself on toward completion. Reality has altered during the process, but it has not altered, or not in the same way, for your neighbour; so from his standpoint your theory is "real" only as the child's bear is real. For his attention is not upon the same object. You think of the reality in terms of your system; he thinks of your system in terms of his reality.

In short, there has occurred to your system just what is bound to occur in a world in which subject and predicate are not one. Metaphysical systems are condemned [to] ascend like a rocket and come down like a stick. The struggle of life is to eat your cake and have it too: to go up on your Jacob's ladder of reality and stay on the ground at the same time.¹³ I have tried to suggest how reality changes in the process; I have not shown what is equally true: that we hold to our primitive view of reality at the same time. If we have good long legs, the attempt to keep one foot on sea and one on shore does not become embarrassing until the boat is well under way. As social human beings, our interest is to hold various criteria of reality in various contexts and not try to be consistent; our divers interests offset each other and produce an effect of stability. But as philosophers, our aim is, consistency at any price. And the completely consistent philosopher would not return: he would be absorbed, if a realist, into his ultimate simples, if an idealist, into the absolute. And in either case he wouldn't have anything to talk about.

What we ordinarily refer to as experience or reality, what provides the criterion for our truth, is simply the sphere of balance of collective meaning. How we came to hit upon just this compromise-reality is perhaps an unanswerable question, and does not in any case form part of the present problem. What is here germane is the fact that in whichever direction you go, searching for pure experience or for pure theory, for the absolutely concrete or the absolutely abstract, your journey ends at one point where individual differences are merged and the processes [of] abstraction and concretion are one. The crudest experience and the abstrusest theory end in identity, and this identity I call the absolute. If you choose to call it nothing, I will not dispute the point. But whichever it is, it is both beginning and end. Thus the double process is accounted for.

I remember a statement of Eucken's to this effect: *es gibt keine Privatwahrheiten*.¹⁴ I don't remember the context; and of course the statement couldn't have been absolutely false. But I should reverse the decision, and say: all significant truths are private truths: as they become public, they cease to become truths; they become facts, or at best, part of the public character, or at worst, catchwords. Degree of truth is degree of individuality, and the ultimate individual is the absolute.

There is one question which I would gladly pass over, because I do not think it quite in context here, and because it presents inextricable difficulties from any point of view. But someone may ask "Do you affirm that reality

is experience?" I reply, that I do, but that I do not know what experience is, for it is not a what at all. I would not say that it is thought, or feeling, or any other abstraction from our conscious life. Nor would I say that it is consciousness, for I am not at all clear in my mind as to what the word consciousness means.

NOTES

1. *Gegenstand*: object. *Gegenständlichkeit*: objecthood, objectivity. *Gestaltsqualität*: quality of having a shape or form.

2*. TSE's marginal notation: "Interest I do not attempt to define. It is a function of the subjective-objective situation."

3. In an example he uses again in his dissertation, TSE alludes to William James's speculations about a child's perception of a bear to illustrate the relation of perception, feeling, and physical change. In "What Is an Emotion?" (*Mind* 9 [Apr 1884], 188-205), James argues "that *bodily changes follow the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion*. Common sense says . . . we meet a bear, are frightened and run . . . The hypothesis here . . . defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between . . . Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in form . . . We might then see the bear, and judge it best to run . . . but we could not actually *feel* afraid" (189-90).

4. Robert Chenault Givler (1884-1975), a fellow student in this seminar, and TSE were in six courses together between 1911 and 1914. In the spring of 1913, both were in Münsterberg's seminar on "Mind and Body" and Bakewell's on "The Nature of Reality."

5. In *L'État mental des hystériques* (1892), translated as *The Mental State of Hystericals* (New York, 1901), the French psychologist Pierre Janet (1859-1947) recounts case studies in which the patient is able to "hear bells, songs, . . . see flowers, birds, smell odours, taste various things, raise imaginary weights." There exists "in his consciousness all the phenomena which generally correspond with the real impressions made on the different senses" (232). In corroboration of his concept of emotion, Janet cites James's essay, concurring that "Emotion is not a simple phenomenon; . . . it is an ensemble of a great number of elementary phenomena, a state of complex consciousness" (204). Since 1902 Janet had been Professor of Psychology at the Collège de France in Paris, where TSE may have encountered his work in 1910-11. After returning to Harvard, TSE made extensive notes (Houghton) on Janet's *Névroses et idées fixes* (1898) and *Les Obsessions et la psychasthénie* (1903) and later included Janet's speculations on hallucination in his dissertation.

6. The theory of emotion developed independently by American philosopher William James (1842-1910) in 1884 and Danish physiologist Carl Lange (1834-1900) in 1885 became known as the James-Lange theory in 1890. The theory holds that bodily action precedes emotion and that the general causes of emotion are physiological. TSE refers to the James-Lange theory in chapter 5 of his dissertation.

7. The German psychologist Theodor Lipps (1851-1914) was the author of *Vom Fühlen, Wollen und Denken* [Of Sensing, Willing, Reasoning] (Leipzig: Barth, 1907). TSE's attribution

to Lipps of the tendency of such an emotion as fear to objectify itself is not a quotation, but a summarizing inference from his larger discussion of *Einfühlung* (empathy). Lipps, discussed at length in TSE's dissertation, argued that feeling is an essential part of knowing. As TSE suggests, Lipps maintained that the process of *Einfühlung*, in which the subject feels himself into an object, tends to objectify the feeling and, reciprocally, to grant subjectivity to the object.

8. TSE inserts above the end of this sentence: "Cf. Bradley, *Logic*, p. ?" In *The Principles of Logic* (1883), Bradley carefully distinguishes perception, a mental image or idea received through the senses, and judgment, a mental operation that qualifies and evaluates what has been received. Judgment "is the act which refers an ideal content (recognized as such) to a reality beyond the act" (14-15). TSE's copy was a 1912 anastatic reprint (New York: G. E. Stechert) of the 1883 edition.

9. In the left margin, between paragraphs, partially concealed by binding, TSE writes: "See Russell on Meinong," referring to a series of essays by Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) on the Austrian philosopher Alexius Meinong (1853-1920): "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions (I), (II), and (III)," *Mind* 13 (1904), 204-19, 336-54, and 509-24, respectively.

10. TSE's asterisks. Possibly an allusion to the Underground Man's refusal to be bullied by mathematics in Dostoevsky's *Letters from the Underworld* (1864): "Twice two makes four . . . is a formula which wears an impertinent air as, meeting you on the road, . . . it spits in your face, . . . but I beg leave to say . . . twice two makes five is not without its attractions" (trans. C. J. Hogarth [London: Dent, 1913], 40).

11. In the left margin, TSE writes "Pragmatism" over an insertion arrow pointing to the space between paragraphs.

12. The two leaders of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism, Hermann Cohen, author of *Platon's Ideenlehre und die Mathematik* [Mathematics and Theory of Platonic Ideals] (1878), and his student Paul Natorp, author of *Platos Ideenlehre* (1903), developed the interrelation of Plato's philosophy with mathematics and science. In July 1914 TSE began his Sheldon Traveling Fellowship by enrolling in the summer program directed by Natorp at Marburg University, where he remained until the outbreak of war forced his departure for England.

13. Genesis 28:12: "And [Jacob] dreamed, and behold a ladder set up on the earth, and the top of it reached to heaven: and behold the angels of God ascending and descending on it."

14. *es gibt keine Privatwahrheiten*: there are no private truths. Rudolf Eucken (1846-1926), a Nobel laureate in Literature (1908) and Professor of Metaphysics at Jena University, was a visiting professor at Harvard in 1912-13. In autumn 1912 TSE audited his "Seminary on the Philosophy of Religion" (Philosophy 20h). Like Josiah Royce and others, Eucken worked to rescue religion from the battering it was receiving from the biological and social sciences. In *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion* (1901) (*The Truth of Religion*, trans. W. T. Jones. New York: Putnam's, 1911), Eucken argued that "Truth . . . is never a private possession" (122-23). TSE, who may be remembering the saying from class, quoted it in other graduate papers and in his dissertation. See 190; 377.

TEXTUAL NOTES

1. Location: Hayward Bequest (King's): P5; untitled pencil holograph, no date; fifteen numbered pages plus brief fragment, accompanied by five and one-fourth pages of drafts: ruled

white paper, vertical red line left margin; watermark: Shawmut Mills, 19.8 x 26.2 cm. Archival title page: "T.S. ELIOT / DEGREES OF REALITY / (MS. HARVARD 1913)."

2. Dating: of the six courses in which both TSE and Givler were students together, only two, both in spring 1913, focused on the material discussed in this essay.

3. A fragment in TSE's hand, marked as a fifteenth page by the archivist, is included with this paper: "Truth and Reality are provisionally teleological, and individual purposes will vary. Hence the real and the true in experience is limited by interest. Ultimately, of course, all purposes are one and are no longer purposes."

[Inconsistencies in Bergson's Idealism]

[Inconsistencies in Bergson's Idealism] is evidently the reading text of an address to the Harvard Philosophical Club presented during the academic year (1913-14) in which Eliot served as its president. It was probably given on 19 Dec 1913, the day reserved during autumn term for papers by members.¹

The text of this paper is the *Données immédiates*, the first, third, [and] fourth chapters of *Matière et Mémoire*, and the passage on Ideal genesis of matter in the *Creative Evolution*.² The attempt is to show certain inconsistencies in Bergson's position, and is based on the conviction that the idealistic is here the more fundamental. The points on which I here raise objections are

in *Données immédiates*:³ The antithesis of extrinsic and intrinsic multiplicity. If this antithesis breaks down we get a doctrine essentially absolutistic as well as idealistic.

in *Matière et Mémoire*: The attempt to occupy a middle ground between idealism and realism. The nature of matter and in *Creative Evolution*, its relation to consciousness.

[In] *Données immédiates*, Bergson suggests that "the difficulties of the problem there involved may result from our calling by the same name intensities of very different nature, the intensity of a sentiment and that of a sensation."⁴ Let me trace out the distinction which he thus establishes. "Pure intensity," he now says, "is reduced to a certain quality or nuance which colors a greater or smaller mass of psychic states, or, a greater or less number of simple states which colors the fundamental emotion."⁵ He goes on to show that a strong passion is one which modifies "la nuance de mille perceptions ou souvenirs"; and in the same phrase ridicules the supposition that "un certain désir a passé par des grandeurs successives: comme si l'on pouvait [encore] parler de grandeur là où il n'y a ni multiplicité ni espace" (*DI* 7).⁶ He continues, "the progressive modifications which come to pass in the confused mass of coexistent psychic facts (*faits*). But this is a change of quality, rather than of magnitude."⁷ I note in passing, that there may be a change of quality here concerned, but that all that has yet been shown is a change of number.

Bergson proceeds with instances of qualitative increase. The pleasure of hope is constituted by the multitudes of possibilities, the most of which

possession will be compelled to reject, in order that any shall be realised. "Let us try," he says, "to analyze the elements of a growing intensity of joy or sorrow, in the exceptional cases in which no physical symptom is present."⁸ He does not attempt to show, in the first place, that there are such cases. "There are," he says, "several characteristic forms of joy, purely interior, successive stages which correspond to qualitative modifications of the mass of our psychological states."⁹ His means of distinguishing, however, between one and another, is still numerical: "although we do not count them explicitly," he says, "nous savons bien si notre joie pénètre toutes nos impressions de la journée, par exemple, ou si quelques-unes y échappent" (*DI* 8).¹⁰

Follows an interesting and important examination of the aesthetics of the spectacle of a dance.¹¹ The explanation here is a substitution not essentially different from hypnosis. In the process of this substitution—i.e. the musician's and dancer's personality being substituted for the observer's—"there are phases, which correspond less to variations of degree than to differences of state or nature."¹² But cannot also these differences of state or nature be expressed musically? Yes. We distinguish, Bergson says, besides degrees of intensity, "degrees of profundity or of elevation." In analyzing this last concept, we see that the sentiments and thoughts which the artist suggests to us express and resume a more or less considerable part of his history. Most emotions are "grosses de mille sensations, sentiments ou idées qui les pénètrent" (*DI* 13).¹³ And "the artist would introduce us into an emotion rich, personal, new . . . The barrier raised by time and space between his consciousness and ours,"¹⁴ is overcome by his choosing "for the exterior manifestations of his sentiment, those which our body will imitate mechanically."¹⁵ This whole passage is a very remarkable one, but it seems to me to come very close [to] psycho-physical explanation. And when Bergson goes on to instance a moral emotion, in which no physical element is supposed to enter, the "intensité croissante de la pitié" "consists in a qualitative progress, a passage from disgust to fear, fear to sympathy, from sympathy to humility."¹⁶ But if this is all, I cannot see why a sentiment should become more intense by simply becoming different.

Through the discussion of representative sensations, and of psycho-physiology in the rest of this first chapter, I shall not follow. He seems to me to demonstrate sufficiently that sensation is not measurable. My investigation of this part of his work is solely with this question in mind: is sensation ever pure from extension? We may deny that sensation is measurable

and still answer this question in the negative.¹⁷ The conclusion, at all events, of this chapter is to distinguish as at the beginning, the two kinds of intensity: (1) so-called—the cause is judged greater by a qualitative change in the effect; (2) the greater or less multiplicity of simple (sic) psychic facts divined in the fundamental emotion.¹⁸ Now, I ask, what does Bergson mean by speaking of the “confusion of quality and quantity,”¹⁹ when he has himself, so far as he has explained intensity, explained it in numerical terms?

This problem is intimately bound up with that which is in fact discussed in the next chapter:²⁰ the distinction of time of juxtaposition and time of permeation. I shall admit his proof of the spatiality of number: what I shall question is whether there are two species—*bien différentes*—of multiplicity;²¹ or only one, the space type. Let me then postpone for a little the discussion of space, and direct attention for the moment upon the question of interpenetrative multiplicity. Bergson has said himself, “One should not admit definitively two forms of the homogeneous, time and space, without examining whether one be not reducible to the other”—and should we not be equally cautious when we fall in with two forms of the heterogeneous?²²

You remember the instance which Bergson has chosen to show this qualitative way of perceiving number. I hear a bell toll in the distance, and listening abstractedly, I am aware that it has struck four—not by counting, but because four strokes is a quality, different from three, five, and the rest.²³ In order to imagine the strokes numerically, he says, we must set them up in space.²⁴ “Hence, two kinds of multiplicity: that of material objects, which forms a number immediately, and that of facts of consciousness, which can only take the aspect of a number by the intermediary of some symbolic representation, in which, necessarily, space intervenes.”²⁵

Is this definition, however, consistent with conclusions arrived at elsewhere? The realism of *Matière et Mémoire* and *Creative Evolution*, which is a realism of primary qualities, reduces these material objects, which form a number immediately, to a single movement without intervals. We are asked in the last book and in the recent essay on *La perception du changement*,²⁶ to try to think of movements, without things which move. But this is just the permeation which we are here told is the character of mental, not of external states. And this would go to show that the numerical way of thinking is at least as original a mental characteristic as the interpenetrative.

To leave a point which it would perhaps be possible to make too much of, let me select a passage where Bergson seems to me to give away his case. "We must admit," he says, "two kinds of multiplicity . . . the first, only contains number *en puissance*," etc.²⁷ Now if it is conceded to contain number *en puissance* how can it be said, as in the preceding sentence, that "la multiplicité des états de conscience, envisagée dans sa pureté originelle, ne présente aucune ressemblance avec la multiplicité distincte qui forme un nombre" (*DI* 91)?²⁸ The difference would appear to consist—and this is what I think—in the fact that in the case of mental states, we are dealing with fluctuating relations always more or less internal. You can abstract from the physical world particular characters, and thus constitute external relations; you can do the same with mental life; but, in the latter case, it is impossible to deny that the relation thus constituted is incomplete: it will not work as well for mental states as for physical objects. If this be true, I cannot recognize, as does Bergson here, any essential difference between the nature of the physical world, for science, and the world of introspection. Number exists in the latter as in the former. We have seen that he has himself here made use of number, in his description.

At this point we enter upon the question of the nature of space—[a] question so capital in the philosophy of Bergson. If relations even in the physical world (I do not say, in the world of scientific inquiry) are still internal, how are we to regard homogeneous space and time; what provision shall we make for them in our metaphysics, and how account for their genesis? In the first place, I think that the Bergsonian space is very largely a borrowing from Berkeley.²⁹ It is certain that when Bergson speaks of idealism he speaks of Berkeley—this point is essential to *Matière et Mémoire*; when he refutes idealism, it is Berkeley that he refutes. And it is to be suspected that a man whom he has taken such pains to put down, has had a very considerable influence in forming his own philosophy.

The Berkeleyan space, I believe, as adopted by Bergson becomes, on the one hand, extension; and Bergson's space is the Berkeleyan pure space; for Berkeley non-existent; for Bergson the homogeneous medium spread out by our understanding as a substratum for extrinsic relations. For Berkeley, I say, this space is non-existent; for Bergson it cannot be so summarily disposed of—it both exists, and not exists. Bergson is obscure on this point, and certainly appears to contradict himself; but the meaning is sufficiently plain. Space is, as Bradley might say, not illusion, but appearance;³⁰ I shall attempt to suggest presently in what way it may be related to reality.

Now the perceived space of Berkeley, and the extension of Bergson, are alike qualitative, not quantitative; as Berkeley would say, an idea;^{31*} Berkeley and Bergson alike dispose of infinities, and of quantities by reduction to qualities. Every distinct extension, for Berkeley, is a distinct idea; and for Bergson, analysis of reality gives you the complex in exchange for the simple, several qualities (Berkeley's ideas) instead of one. What is immediately given to the *durée réelle* is a qualitative heterogeneity, from which qualities are later sorted out.

This is the point at which Berkeley comes to the aid. In these early chapters Bergson's argument has attempted to show that, in the order of knowledge, the permeative is prior to the spatial; he has said nothing to imply that it is prior in the order of nature. He appears to assume, throughout the *Données immédiates*, that the stream of consciousness is a grade of reality above pure space, but there he brings no argument forward to invalidate the realistic claims for space time. "We know," he says, "two realities of different order, one heterogeneous, that of sensible qualities, the other homogeneous, which is space."³² Throughout the *Données immédiates* Bergson seems to vacillate between acceptance and rejection of space. It is this hesitation, I think, which vitiates his conclusions in regard to freedom of the will; in reality, the superficial personality is just as free (or the reverse) as the more profound, and certainly much more rational.

The only recourse, I think, is to take the one step which divides Bergson from Berkeley, and declare that extrinsic relations are from the point of view of reality, intrinsic as well. The necessity for this step is evinced most distinctly toward the end of *Matière et Mémoire*. Here, you observe, Bergson has thrown space overboard entirely: "What is given, what is real, is something intermediate between divided extension and pure inextension."³³ Homogeneous space, then, and consequently any extrinsic relations given by analysis, will be simply the reflection of intellect; and the result of analysis of such relations is to give only the indications of the possible activities of intelligence. Homogeneous space can be only an extrinsic relation set up inside an intrinsic relation. It is perfectly real; and in another aspect an inferior grade of reality. Space, quantity, are, in fact, quality, from the point of view of reality; this is essentially the conclusion of Berkeley, I think, and the inevitable conclusion of *Matière et Mémoire*.

We are, however, involved from this moment in difficulties; difficulties started up by Bergson's palpable realism. We see that quantity is reduced to

quality; but on the other hand quality does not remain purely qualitative. The confusion has arisen, he says, from our

supposing that the qualities of things are reduced to unextended sensations affecting a consciousness, in such a way that these qualities only represent, like so many symbols, homogeneous and calculable changes taking place in space; in this way you are compelled to imagine between these sensations and these changes an incomprehensible correspondence.³⁴

Sensations, it would appear, are never completely unextended. And I have had occasion to conclude that the completely spatialized multiplicity is in a sense the goal of, and is in a sense not essentially different from, the interpenetrative. How can this, then, be that which is most real? It has none of the marks of a final reality; but this is what we are asked to regard as the fundamental self in *Données immédiates*, and as the fundamental world in *Matière et Mémoire*. This dilemma, accordingly, appears to expose what is the most critical point in the philosophy of Bergson. And the problem of relations in this connection seems to me capital. For they must either be thought of in the end completely internal, in which case you have a final point of view—the absolute—or they are already partly externalised—in which case I see no means of stopping short of a thoroughgoing realism.

Some of the citations already given illustrate in part Bergson's "fundamental reality." Bear in mind that in *Données immédiates* its nature is psychological. In *Matière et Mémoire* Bergson attempts to define reality in such a way as to admit of the genesis of consciousness from it. It is given as movement, but not yet as movement in space; you remember his asking us to think of movement without a that which moves: pure movement. Now here, apparently, is his explanation of the genesis of consciousness. "Concrete movement" (I do not know just what is implied here by "concrete"), "capable, like consciousness, to prolong its past into its present, capable, in repeating itself, of engendering sensible qualities, must be already 'quelque chose de la conscience,' already 'quelque chose de la sensation.'"³⁵ The whole passage from which this phrase is taken is a difficult one, and I as yet do not see my way clear. How, for example, can this pure motion be extended, if it is pure motion; and if it is partly extended, are we not obliged to think of something besides pure motion? Moreover, we cannot figure to ourselves pure motion, inasmuch as motion is never perceived by us apart from extension.

I have suggested that Bergson's motion is influenced by that of Berkeley. With this exception: for Berkeley motion is an idea—it presupposes a consciousness. But Bergson wishes to make consciousness also motion; and motion, therefore, something more than an idea. What however is the motion of the flying arrow?³⁶ If I construe Bergson rightly, he would preserve to the motion something *in se*. It is not the space traversed. It is not, I think, only our perception of the motion; for that gives only a quality relative to a consciousness. It is also what the consciousness of the arrow would be if it were conscious of its flight; and this I cannot conceive as more than awareness of changing spatial relations, resistances, etc. And sometimes, in instancing the movement of one's arm, Bergson would almost appear to identify movement with the sense of muscular effort.³⁷

Let me call your attention, in this connection, to a statement which appears to give the lie direct to realism.

That all reality has a relationship (*parenté*) an analogy, a rapport with consciousness, this is what we concede to idealism by calling things 'images'. No philosophical doctrine, provided it be self-consistent, can escape from this conclusion. But if one reunited all the states of consciousness, past, present, and possible, of all conscious beings, one would only thus have exhausted, we think, a very small part of material reality—because images overflow perception on every side.³⁸

I do not think that idealism always puts forth the claim for which it is here held responsible. There is however another aspect to which I should like for a moment to attend.

A thing, we admit, is an image; but when, for Bergson, is it a thing? In *Creative Evolution* we are told that "it is the same inversion of the same movement which creates at the same time (*à la fois*) the intellectuality of the mind (*esprit*) and the materiality of things."³⁹ From the same book we find that there are properly, no things, only movements in a homogeneous medium. Which is the reality, the movement as we perceive it cut up into objects, or in its homogeneous flux?

Here is still another aspect to be accounted for. M. Bergson has tended in recent writings (e.g. an essay on Consciousness in the *Hibbert Journal*)⁴⁰ to lay more emphasis on the doctrine first brought forward clearly in the *Creative Evolution*. Reality, though I should judge one at bottom,⁴¹ divides itself into a Cartesian dichotomy—the way up, consciousness, and the way down, matter.⁴² I shall try to suggest, presently, the possibility of Bergson's

consciousness bearing more than one interpretation. Here, the important point is the almost Manichaean struggle between life and matter. Matter is running down. This statement has interesting analogies in some modern theories of degeneration of energy. One may ask however just how ultimate this antagonism is meant to be. I call attention to the positiveness of the images in this recent article. For instance, spirit is compared to an underground river burrowing its way through solid rock.⁴³ Language almost as forceful is used in the *Creative Evolution*; as in the remarkable discussion of the formation of the eye.⁴⁴ The formation of organic matter, you remember, is there dependent upon just this almost positive resistance of matter. Is this dichotomy, finally, consistent with the attempt in *Matière et Mémoire* to resolve the antinomy of the *inétendue-étendue*, *qualité-quantité*, *liberté-nécessité*?⁴⁵

Let us review briefly the doctrine of tension there presented.

If one imagines on one side an extension (*étendue*) really divided into corpuscles, let me say; on the other a consciousness with sensations in themselves inextensive which would come to project themselves into space, one would evidently find nothing in common between this matter and this consciousness, between body and soul. But this opposition of perception and matter is the artificial work of an understanding which decomposes and recomposes according to its habits or its laws: it is not given to immediate intuition. What is given is not inextensive sensations: how should they ever succeed in regaining space, localize themselves (*y choisir un lieu*), coordinate themselves, finally, construct an universal experience.⁴⁶

"What is real" (I have quoted this above) "is something intermediate between divided extension and pure inextension (*inétendue*); it is what we have called the extensive."⁴⁷ This is I think substantially in accord with *Données immédiates*, but cannot be made to accord with this later phrase from *Creative Evolution*: "Life is, primarily (*avant tout*) a tendency to act upon brute matter—*une tendance à agir sur la matière brute*."⁴⁸

My case, however, rests not so much with this apparent contradiction, but with the aspect which the intermediate reality of the first two books must assume: idealistic or realistic, the "idea of tension."⁴⁹ With the plausibility of this concept, and the meaning we give to the term motion, rests, I think, the whole of Bergson's claim to mediate between idealism and realism.

In *Matière et Mémoire*, then, we do not have the resistant medium of *Creative Evolution*.

Precisely because we have eliminated the elements, atoms, or what not, with which . . . movements would be associated (*que ces mouvements auraient pour siège*) there can be no question here of a movement which is the accident of a mobile, of the abstract movement which mechanics studies and which is, *au fond*, only the common measure of concrete movements. How could this abstract movement . . . set up (*fonder*) real changes?⁵⁰

Bergson concludes—I have already given his words⁵¹—that concrete movement capable of prolonging its past into present is already *quelque chose de la conscience*. I see here latent possibilities for materialism; it is true, a materialism on an immaterial foundation—but the tension, reality remains as obscure as ever.

The last part of *Matière et Mémoire*—Chapter iv and Conclusion—is a very remarkable and provocative, indeed tantalizing, piece of writing. I find one of the most interesting and most important parts of Bergson's work; and I ask permission to recapitulate its chief conclusions before going on. "Material extension," he says, "does not resemble that *étendue multiple* with which geometry is concerned; it resembles much more the undivided extension of our representation."⁵² But of course it is not only that . . . "Now matter," he says, "such as we seize it in a concrete perception which occupies always a certain *durée, dérive en grande partie de la mémoire*."⁵³ The rest of the paragraph is so important that I must quote it whole.

What is the exact difference between the heterogeneous qualities which succeed each other in our concrete perception and the homogeneous changes which science sets behind these perceptions in space? The first are discontinuous and cannot be deduced one from another; the second on the contrary lend themselves to calculation. But no matter how well (*pour qu'ils s'y prêtent*) they lend themselves to it, there is no need to make pure quantity out of them: one might as well annihilate them (*autant vaudrait les réduire au néant*). It suffices that their heterogeneity be sufficiently diluted, in some sort, in order to become, from one point of view, practically negligible. Now, if every concrete perception, however short it be supposed, is already the synthesis by memory, of an

infinity of 'pure perceptions' which succeed each other, must one not think that the heterogeneity of sensible qualities is explained by (*tient à*) their contraction in our memory; the relative homogeneity of the objective changes to their natural relaxation? And could not the intervals between quantity and quality be diminished by considerations of tension, as also by considerations of extension the distance between them the *étendue* and the *inétendue*?⁵⁴

I do not think one could find a more significant passage in the whole of Bergson's work than this. But I wish to complete the resumption of the chapter before passing comment.

The rest may be summed up briefly as follows:

- A. "Pure intuition . . . gives us an undivided continuity."⁵⁵ This is the real.
- B. The "*travail utilitaire*" of the "*esprit* . . . consists in a kind of refraction of pure duration across space."⁵⁶
- C. "One might disengage oneself from space without quitting (*sans sortir de*) the *étendue*, and this would be undoubtedly (*il y aurait bien là*) a return to the immediate, since we perceive *pour tout de bon l'étendue*."⁵⁷

Then follow the well known axioms of motion.

- i. Every movement is absolutely indivisible.⁵⁸ It is not necessary to review this argument.
- ii. There are real movements.⁵⁹ If not nothing would change. But there is change. This is taken for granted.
- iii. Every division of matter into independent bodies with absolutely determined contours is an artificial division.⁶⁰
- iv. "Real movement is rather the 'transport' of a state than of a thing."⁶¹

This is important. There are six or eight pages here in which Bergson argues for the existence of motion independent of consciousness.⁶² How is it that we seize in perception at one and the same time a state of consciousness and a reality independent of us? We perceive in the quality itself something which transcends (*dépasse*) sensation. But do we? Bergson appeals to the motions revealed by physics as the basis of matter. His assertions of universal motion rest largely upon these physical theories. And just in making this appeal to science he seems to me to throw up his case against

science. Return to the immediate, he says; science gives only abstractions. But when science gives motion, he accepts it.

Likewise, Bergson fails to my mind to deduce consciousness from motion. Thus, he reduces consciousness to a matter of rhythm. "The whole of history," he says "could it not be held in a very short time for a consciousness more *tendue* than ours, which would assist at the development of humanity in contracting it, so to speak, into the great phases of its evolution?"⁶³ He does not add, what seems inevitable, that it would then be a different history—inasmuch [as] the only nature to which he had led us to expect this concentration to be applicable is the nature of complete (or approximate) juxtaposition. "To perceive is to condense enormous periods of an infinitely diluted existence into a few moments, more differentiated, of a more intense life. *Percevoir signifie immobiliser*!"⁶⁴—then how can our perception be identical with the object, which, in itself, is pure motion? Where again, is the reality—in the consciousness or in that which is perceived? Where is the one reality to subsume both of these, and can we or can we not know it?

"Is matter anything but an image"? he asks again at the close. Yes, he says, and the union is given in pure perception; "pure perception would really form part of matter as we understand it."⁶⁵ But, "*percevoir signifie immobiliser*," and to what extent do we "understand" matter, when its reality is change of state, and perception immobilises. Motion is reality, is the last word of *Matière et Mémoire*, but this question remains unanswered: what is motion, apart from consciousness on the one hand, and from space on the other? The motion will be logically prior to consciousness, but will be also prior to space.

Let me recall some of the qualifications which Bergson's consciousness will have to fulfill. It will not be in the beginning any particular consciousness, because it is matter which is the principle of individuation, and matter is created by intelligence. But in that case it cannot be any particular motion, any particular change of state which gives rise to consciousness. Bergson distinguishes between the individual consciousness and the absolute consciousness. "What," he says, "is the principle which has only to *se détendre* in order to *s'étendre*? . . . *Faute d'un meilleur mot*, we call it consciousness."⁶⁶ But not this diminished consciousness which functions in each of us.

Our consciousness *à nous* is that of a certain living being, in a certain point of space; . . . In order to coincide with its principle, our consciousness must detach itself from the *tout fait* and attach itself to the *se faisant*.⁶⁷

This is intuition. Here is another utterance in regard to the Absolute.

If we will try thus to see for the sake of seeing, . . . then the Absolute reveals itself very near to us, and in a certain measure, in us. . . . infinitely more concentrated and more *ramassé sur lui-même, il dure*.⁶⁸

And this is a self-sufficient reality.

This long pastiche of summary and quotation has had two ends in view. First, a formulation of the difficulties involved in Bergson's idea of tension; second, a formulation of a possible position to which the contradictions point.

First, then, I repeat that the crux of the *affaire Bergson* seems to me to be in his attempt to invest with the title of reality this middle territory which is neither space nor non-space. This recalls the first part of this paper. I have seen reason to believe that this territory cannot be regarded as *selbstständig*.⁶⁹ For we have seen that the deeper ego yet holds external relations *en puissance*, and that its multiplicity, expressed necessarily in terms of numbers, is meaningless if the terms be not interpreted as to some extent external to each other. In short, the two kinds of multiplicity appeared to me not essentially different. Further on, I attempted to outline what seemed to me the proper significance of his theory of space. To this I shall return presently. Next, I took up the realistic side of the doctrine, and tried to show its inconsistencies; it appeared to me (1) inconsistent with his view of space, and (2) unsatisfactory in its account of consciousness. Motion appeared to be perhaps relative to consciousness, but consciousness was certainly relative to motion. I emphasize the self-sufficiency of motion as a critical point. The problem of matter is important in its obscurity. Finally, we have seen consciousness appear in more than one rôle: as half of the dichotomy, and also as potentially absolute. Of all these debatable points the question of space and extension seems to me to call most for elucidation.

Certainly, if the concept of extension is to hold, Bergson's philosophy must stand as a kind of pluralism, and a kind of realism as well. This is the one side of the case, and this is the side I have chiefly emphasized, because it is the side which I am interested to oppose. But there are many other statements—some I have quoted—which intimate a much more monistic point of view. Such are all those which speak of a single force, a single current. Sometimes a current opposed to matter, sometimes a current of which matter is but an eddy. These passages do nothing to render more intelligible the *durée réelle* of permeative heterogeneous qualities, but they do

something to render it nugatory. When all is said, Bergson has by no means proved what is essential for this pluralism: how these qualities can exist without a consciousness to perceive them; or how “pure” movement can generate quality, or anything but pure movement, except to a consciousness capable of immobilizing it: thus movement would perhaps generate the static. But, whatever conclusion we come to, we cannot rest at the *durée réelle*. It is simply not final.

Yet there are, as I have here intimated, suggestions—more than suggestions, of leading toward an absolute; suggestions which have often led Bergson's critics to call him mystic. With this appellation I am not disposed to quarrel; though, as at present elaborated in Bergson, it is rather a weakling mysticism, not altogether outside of the Maeterlinckian tradition.⁷⁰ To come down to the actual statements, we find them to divide chiefly into two sorts. One tends toward an absolute which sees eternity in a single moment. I have quoted the passage “par certains côtés, infiniment plus ramassé sur lui-même, il dure.”⁷¹ What is this image *ramassé*? Is it the infinitely quickened rhythm of consciousness, which would, Bergson tells us, be able to seize the whole of history in a single perception? This is possible, but it is hardly likely. It would, in the first place, remain a subject-object relation, and hence not a complete reality; and in the second place, would still be relative with regard to the future.

In *Creative Evolution* consciousness is mostly represented as progressive; it is not altogether clear, however, to what extent and in what way matter is necessary to consciousness' evolution. At the end of the third chapter, we are shown a progress, whether endless or not, toward greater and greater organisation.⁷² I am not sure that this is entirely consistent with the statement that eternal creation of novelty is the vocation of life. And both these doctrines, while they are quite in the spirit of the day, and contribute largely to Bergson's popularity, are perhaps inconsistent with the doctrine which I seem to discern at the helm of Bergson's progress.

I shall ask you then for the moment to consider Bergson in the light of neo-Platonism, and to inquire what of new he has brought to that movement, and what of old in it he has translated. First, I believe that if one looks closely, one will find that the theory of duration, which promised to abolish the “timeless” and eternal, has only reinaugurated it in a new form. Consider the *durée* whose moments interpenetrate. It is only as the moments do not wholly interpenetrate, that we can be said to have a change at all. The change is relative to a consciousness which distinguishes within the stream

elements which it can—if only to the slightest extent—contrast; and contrast seems to me to that extent externalisation. Now if externalisation is spatialisation, the *durée réelle* is impossible except on a middle ground. There must be passage of states, but there must be real states to pass. As Bergson says, complete spatialisation gives you timelessness. But let the states more and more fuse into one another, approximate nearer and nearer to one state, and the limit will only be a single eternal present, timelessness of another sort.

Consider this again in the case of memory. Bergson has emphasized the fact that the progress of human consciousness has been toward homogeneous space, for the greater possibilities of action. He has not in his discussion of memory specifically stated what seems to me obvious, if the first conclusion be true: the acquisition of his second kind of memory, the continuous type, is only another triumph in spatialisation. He concedes, you remember, that the whole of past experience may be latent in the animals. The differentia is the power of visualisation of this experience, and what is visualisation but spatialisation?^{73*} The future is ideal construction, and is spatial also.

Not that the animals would live in this timeless world of which I have spoken. His present is, as Bergson would say, of a certain thickness, *épaisseur*; and the content of his consciousness is made for him by the relations set up by physical needs. He lives in a dream world of interpenetrative states, but a world for which space is presupposed.

If Bergson, then, had begun his philosophy with the duration of pure identity which I have suggested, the descent into the world of plurality and externality would appear not as a quickening, but as an arrest. Reversing the apparent conclusions of his theory, time would be the child of space; the formula being $\text{time} = \frac{\text{eternity}}{\text{space}}$ And this I call neo-Platonism.

Matter, also, as in neo-Platonism, would be both real and unreal. Unreal, inasmuch as it is only an element of the externalisation of consciousness to itself; if you cease to think of externality, you cease to think of matter; and in the absolute, which is the point of completely internalised relation, it would of course cease to exist.

In such a system—Bergson Resartus—science in the narrower sense of the word would of course find short shrift.⁷⁴ Science is externalisation. If it can externalize in a satisfactory manner, its externalisation is to that extent true; but never absolutely true, for since the possibilities of externalisation are infinite, science can never be complete, though perhaps significantly so for our purposes. Memory also, that power of using everything that is apposite

in one's past experience to bear on the present moment, is, from this point of view, a futile attempt to emulate the completed infinite by a sequential infinite; though a tool of tremendous effect in practical life, as, for example, in the brain of a Napoleon. These things are of practical use, but, as for what Parmenides would call truth, it is no more possible that truth should be gained by these means than that a man should ever catch sight of himself with his eyes closed.⁷⁵ Finally, nothing essentially new can ever happen; the absolute, as Bradley says, bears buds and flowers and fruit at once;⁷⁶ time gives the *menue monnaie* ad infinitum.⁷⁷ In the absolute, A is already so completely B, and B so completely A, that there is nothing to say about either. . . This is my interpretation of Bergson. I trust that you will agree with me, in the belief that whether my arguments be cogent and my conclusions justified, or no, the question of space is the heart of the problem.

Note. Here are two quotations from *Données immédiates* to illustrate the Bergsonian logic.

We arrive naturally at this symbolic representation (i.e. spatial representation of time) by this fact alone (*par ce seul fait*) that, in a series of identical terms, each term takes for our consciousness a double aspect: one always identical with itself, since we think of the identity of the exterior object, the other specific, because the addition of this term provokes a new organisation of the whole (*ensemble*).⁷⁸

If we reach the point of (*aboutissons à*) distinguishing two forms of multiplicity, two forms of duration, it is evident that each of the facts (*faits*) of consciousness, taken by itself, will have to take on a different aspect according as one considers it mingled with (*au sein de*) a distinct or a confused multiplicity; in the time-quality in which [it] is produced, or in the time-quantity in which it projects itself."⁷⁹

NOTES

1. Dating: see textual note 2.

2. TSE's primary texts for this paper, all by Henri Bergson (1859-1941), are *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1889), abbreviated *DI* by TSE in the text, translated as *Time and Free Will*; *Matière et mémoire: Essai sur la relation du corps à l'esprit* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1896), abbreviated *M&M*, translated as *Matter and Memory*; and *L'Évolution créatrice* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1907), abbreviated *EC*, translated as *Creative Evolution*.

3. TSE here began an outline, but crossed out "A." before "The antithesis of extrinsic . . . idealistic" and on the following line crossed out "B. The inconsistencies of the *durée réelle*: can it contain qualitative multiplicity?"

4. “Peut-être la difficulté du problème tient-elle surtout à ce que nous appelons du même nom et nous représentons de la même manière des intensités de nature très différente, l’intensité d’un sentiment, par exemple, et celle d’une sensation ou d’un effort” (*DI* 5).

When TSE translates Bergson or quotes from an English translation, the editors supply the French original in a note; when he quotes the French, they give the English from the translation he used. See textual note 3.

5. “L’intensité pure . . . se réduit ici à une certaine qualité ou nuance dont se colore une masse plus ou moins considérable d’états psychiques, ou, si l’on aime mieux, au plus ou moins grand nombre d’états simples qui pénètrent l’émotion fondamentale” (*DI* 6). All parentheses and underlining (used here and throughout this speech for emphasis) are by TSE.

6. “the shade of a thousand perceptions or memories”; “such and such a desire has gone up a scale of magnitudes, as though it were permissible still to speak of magnitude where there is neither multiplicity nor space.” *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*, trans. F. L. Pogson (London: Allen & Unwin, 1910), 9; hereafter abbreviated *TFW*.

7. “les modifications progressives survenues dans la masse confuse des faits psychiques coexistants. Mais c’est là un changement de qualité, plutôt que de grandeur” (*DI* 7).

8. “Essayons de démêler en quoi consiste une intensité croissante de joie ou de tristesse, dans les cas exceptionnels où aucun symptôme physique n’intervient” (*DI* 7).

9. “Ainsi, il y a plusieurs formes caractéristiques de la joie purement intérieure, autant d’étapes successives qui correspondent à des modifications qualitatives de la masse de nos états psychologiques” (*DI* 8; TSE’s emphasis in quotation in text).

10. “we know very well whether, for example, our joy pervades all the impressions which we receive in the course of the day or whether any escape from its influence” (*TFW* 10-11).

11. At this point, TSE writes and then strikes through: “One may notice, incidentally, that his aesthetic—here—is dominantly psycho-physical.”

12. “Il y a donc des phases distinctes dans le progrès d’un sentiment esthétique, comme dans l’état d’hypnose; et ces phases correspondent moins à des variations de degré qu’à des différences d’état ou de nature” (*DI* 13).

13. “thousands of sensations, feelings or ideas which pervade them” (*TFW* 4).

14. “Pourtant l’artiste vise à nous introduire dans cette émotion si riche, si personnelle, si nouvelle . . . Ainsi tombera la barrière que le temps et l’espace interposaient entre sa conscience et la nôtre” (*DI* 13-14).

15. “Il fixera donc, parmi les manifestations extérieures de son sentiment, celles que notre corps imitera machinalement . . .” (*DI* 13).

16. “the increasing intensity of pity”: “L’intensité croissante de la pitié consiste donc dans un progrès qualitatif, dans un passage du dégoût à la crainte, de la crainte à la sympathie, et de la sympathie elle-même à l’humilité” (*DI* 15).

17. In a marginal notation beside his question regarding sensation and extension, TSE refers to *DI* 21-22. The passage dealing with extension (*étendue*): “L’attention n’est pas un phénomène purement physiologique; mais on ne saurait nier que des mouvements l’accompagnent. Ces mouvements ne sont ni la cause ni le résultat du phénomène; ils en font partie, ils l’expriment en étendue.” *Trans*: “Attention is not a purely physiological phenomenon, but we cannot deny that it is accompanied by movements. These movements are neither the cause nor the result of the phenomenon; they are part of it, they express it in terms of space” (*TFW* 27).

18. "This chapter": chapter one, "De l'intensité des états psychologiques" (*DI* 1-55). TSE loosely translates the following: "Dans le premier cas, la perception de l'intensité consiste dans une certaine évaluation de la grandeur de la cause par une certaine qualité de l'effet . . . Dans le second, nous appelons intensité la multiplicité plus ou moins considérable de faits psychiques simples que nous devinons au sein de l'état fondamental" (*DI* 54).

19. "Cette seconde question est autrement importante que la première. Car si la confusion de la qualité avec la quantité se limitait à chacun des faits de conscience pris isolément, elle créerait des obscurités . . . plutôt que des problèmes" (*DI* 55). *Trans*: "This second question is even more important than the first. For, if the confusion of quality with quantity were confined to each of the phenomena of consciousness taken separately, it would give rise to obscurities . . . rather than to problems" (*TFW* 74).

20. Chapter two: "De la multiplicité des états de conscience: L'Idée de durée" (*DI* 57-106).

21. "Distinguons donc, pour conclure, deux formes de la multiplicité, deux appréciations bien différentes de la durée, deux aspects de la vie consciente" (*DI* 96). *Trans*: "We should therefore distinguish two forms of multiplicity, two very different ways of regarding duration, two aspects of conscious life" (*TFW* 128).

22. This sentence, with its enclosed quotation, is imported from the margin above this paragraph. "De toute manière, on ne saurait admettre définitivement deux formes de l'homogène, temps et espace, sans rechercher d'abord si l'une d'elles ne serait pas réductible à l'autre" (*DI* 74-75).

23. "Bref, le nombre des coups frappés a été perçu comme qualité, et non comme quantité" (*DI* 96).

24. TSE summarizes Bergson's argument that sounds (i.e., sensations) occur in space (i.e., have extension): "Reste à savoir, il est vrai, si ce milieu est du temps ou de l'espace. Mais un moment du temps . . . ne saurait se conserver pour s'ajouter à d'autres. Si les sons se dissocient, c'est qu'ils laissent entre eux des intervalles vides. Si on les compte, c'est que les intervalles demeurent entre les sons qui passent: comment ces intervalles demeureraient-ils, s'ils étaient durée pure, et non pas espace? C'est donc bien dans l'espace que s'effectue l'opération" (*DI* 66). *Trans*: "The question now is, whether this medium is time or space. But a moment of time . . . cannot persist in order to be added to others. If the sounds are separated, they must leave empty intervals between them. If we count them, the intervals must remain though the sounds disappear: how could these intervals remain, if they were pure duration and not space? It is in space, therefore, that the operation takes place" (*TFW* 87).

25. "D'où résulte enfin qu'il y a deux espèces de multiplicité: celle des objets matériels, qui forme un nombre immédiatement, et celle des faits de conscience, qui ne saurait prendre l'aspect d'un nombre sans l'intermédiaire de quelque représentation symbolique, où intervient nécessairement l'espace" (*DI* 66).

26. On 26-27 May 1911, Bergson delivered two lectures at Oxford University (published as *La Perception du changement*, Clarendon Press, 1911) summarizing his basic principles for the general reader.

27. "Bref, il faudrait admettre deux espèces de multiplicité, . . . deux conceptions, l'une qualitative et l'autre quantitative, de la différence entre le même et l'autre. Tantôt cette multiplicité, cette distinction, cette hétérogénéité ne contiennent le nombre qu'en puissance, comme dirait Aristote" (*DI* 91). *Trans*: "In short, we must admit two kinds of multiplicity, . . . two conceptions,

the one qualitative and the other quantitative, of the difference between *same* and other. Sometimes this multiplicity . . . contains only potentiality, as Aristotle would have said" (*TFW* 121).

28. "the multiplicity of conscious states, regarded in its original purity, is not at all like the discreet multiplicity which goes to form a number" (*TFW* 121). In the margin, TSE reminds himself: "translate."

29. Berkeley developed his philosophy of space in *An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision* (1709) and in *A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710). He maintained that space is an idea and thus has to do with quality rather than quantity.

30. In *Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay* (2nd ed., 1897), Bradley argues that space is an appearance which is always part of a larger reality: "We . . . do not know what space means; . . . certainly we cannot say that it is more than appearance. . . . Space, to be space, must have space outside itself. It forever disappears into a whole, which proves never to be more than one side of a relation to something beyond" (32). TSE's copy of *Appearance and Reality*, with his bookplate, is the 5th impression, 2nd ed. revised, published in London by Swan Sonnenschein in 1908.

31*. TSE's note: "Berkeley's and Bergson's motion have this in common." In the margin, TSE cites sections 123-31 of Berkeley's *A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*. In section 124, Berkeley writes: "Every particular finite extension, which may possibly be the object of our thought, is an *idea* existing only in the mind, and consequently each part thereof must be perceived."

32. "[N]ous connaissons deux réalités d'ordre différent, l'une hétérogène, celle des qualités sensibles, l'autre homogène, qui est l'espace" (*DI* 74).

33. "Ce qui est donné, ce qui est réel, c'est quelque chose d'intermédiaire entre l'étendue divisée et l'inétendu pur" (*M&M* 274).

34. "Supposez en effet que les qualités des choses se réduisent à des sensations inextensives affectant une conscience, en sorte que ces qualités représentent seulement, comme autant de symboles, des changements homogènes et calculables s'accomplissant dans l'espace, vous devrez imaginer entre ces sensations et ces changements une incompréhensible correspondance" (*M&M* 275).

35. "Une seule hypothèse reste donc possible, c'est que le mouvement concret, capable, comme la conscience, de prolonger son passé dans son présent, capable, en se répétant, d'engendrer les qualités sensibles, soit déjà quelque chose de la conscience, déjà quelque chose de la sensation" (*M&M* 276).

36. In the discussion of motion in chapter four of *Creative Evolution*, Bergson uses the arrow paradox of the Greek philosopher Zeno of Elea (ca. 490-ca. 430 BC): at any instant, a flying arrow occupies a space equal to itself and thus at any instant it has no motion. TSE's annotated copy of *Creative Evolution*, translated by Arthur Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt, 1911), is in the Houghton Library. Reference to this translation in the notes is given as *CE*.

37. "It is enough to point out that [Zeno's arguments] all consist in applying the movement to the line traversed, and supposing that what is true of the line is true of the movement. . . . But the possibility of applying the movement *to* the line traversed exists only for an observer who, keeping outside the movement and seeing at every instant the possibility of a stop, tries to reconstruct the real movement with these possible immobilities. The absurdity vanishes as soon

as we adopt by thought the continuity of the real movement, a continuity of which every one of us is conscious whenever he lifts an arm or advances a step" (*CE* 327).

38. "Que toute réalité ait une parenté, une analogie, un rapport enfin avec la conscience, c'est ce que nous concédions à l'idéalisme par cela même que nous appelions les choses des «images». Aucune doctrine philosophique, pourvu qu'elle s'entende avec elle-même, ne peut d'ailleurs échapper à cette conclusion. Mais si l'on réunissait tous les états de conscience, passés, présents et possibles, de tous les êtres conscients, on n'aurait épuisé par là, selon nous, qu'une très petite partie de la réalité matérielle, parce que les images débordent la perception de toutes parts" (*M&M* 256).

39. "Cette adaptation se serait d'ailleurs effectuée tout naturellement, parce que c'est la même inversion du même mouvement qui crée à la fois l'intellectualité de l'esprit et la matérialité des choses" (*EC* 225).

40. On 29 May 1911, two days after giving his Oxford lectures, "La Perception du changement," Bergson gave the Huxley Memorial Lecture at the University of Birmingham, published in English as "Life and Consciousness" in the *Hibbert Journal*, 10 (Oct 1911), 24-44.

41. TSE here adds and then strikes through "(Mr. Vincent Crummles's pony was a good pony at bottom though not on top.)" At the beginning of chapter 23 of Dickens's *Nicholas Nickleby*, the actor-manager Crummles describes his theatrical pony, who tends to lie down when pulling a four-wheeled carriage, requiring a kick to move on: "He's a good pony at bottom," said Mr. Crummles, turning to Nicholas. 'He might have been at bottom, but he certainly was not at top, seeing that his coat was of the roughest and most ill-favoured kind.'"

42. Heraclitus: "The way up and the way down are one and the same." TSE later used this as an epigraph to "Burnt Norton." In Descartes, however, the way up and the way down are not one and the same.

43. Defining spirit as a "*spiritual* force," Bergson writes metaphorically of the obstacles that this force encounters: "The spectacle of the evolution of life from its very beginning down to man suggests to us the image of a current of consciousness which flows down into matter as into a tunnel, which endeavours to advance, which makes efforts on every side, thus digging galleries most of which are stopped by a rock that is too hard, but which, in one direction at least, proves possible to follow to the end and break out into the light once more. This direction is the line of evolution resulting in man" ("Life and Consciousness," *Hibbert Journal*, 40).

44. Bergson discusses the formation of the eye of molluscs and vertebrates in the first two chapters of *Creative Evolution*, refuting the theories of mechanism and finality in arriving at his theory of the *élan vital*, the vital impulse, which is the source of efficient causation by which life acts on its resistant environment in the evolutionary process.

45. "Mais si l'on envisage ainsi les rapports de l'étendu à l'inétendu, de la qualité à la quantité, on aura moins de peine à comprendre la troisième et dernière opposition, celle de la liberté à la nécessité" (*M&M* 277).

46. "Si l'on imagine d'un côté une étendue réellement divisée en corpuscules, par exemple, de l'autre une conscience avec des sensations par elles-mêmes inextensives qui viendraient se projeter dans l'espace, on ne trouvera évidemment rien de commun entre cette matière et cette conscience, entre le corps et l'esprit. Mais cette opposition de la perception et de la matière est l'œuvre artificielle d'un entendement qui décompose et recompose selon ses habitudes ou ses lois: elle n'est pas donnée à l'intuition immédiate. Ce qui est donné, ce ne sont pas des sensations inextensives:

comment iraient-elles rejoindre l'espace, y choisir un lieu, s'y coordonner enfin pour construire une expérience universelle?" (*M&M* 273-74).

47. See note 33, above. "Ce qui est donné, ce qui est réel, c'est quelque chose d'intermédiaire entre l'étendue divisée et l'inétendu pur; c'est ce que nous avons appelé l'extensif" (*M&M* 274; TSE's emphasis).

48. "Que si maintenant on nous demandait pourquoi et comment elle y est impliquée, nous répondrions que la vie est, avant tout, une tendance à agir sur la matière brute" (*EC* 105).

49. "Ainsi, par l'idée de tension nous avons cherché à lever l'opposition de la qualité à la quantité, comme par l'idée d'extension celle de l'inétendu à l'étendu" (*M&M* 277).

50. "Mais justement parce que nous avons éliminé les éléments, atomes ou autres, que ces mouvements auraient pour siège, il ne peut plus être question ici du mouvement qui est l'accident d'un mobile, du mouvement abstrait que la mécanique étudie et qui n'est, au fond, que la commune mesure des mouvements concrets. Comment ce mouvement abstrait, qui devient immobilité quand on change de point de repère, pourrait-il fonder des changements réels, c'est-à-dire sentis?" (*M&M* 276).

51. See note 35, above (*M&M* 276).

52. "L'étendue matérielle n'est plus, ne peut plus être cette étendue multiple dont parle le géomètre; elle ressemble bien plutôt à l'extension indivisée de notre représentation" (*M&M* 200).

53. "La mémoire n'est donc à aucun degré une émanation de la matière; bien au contraire, la matière, telle que nous la saisissons dans une perception concrète qui occupe toujours une certaine durée, dérive en grande partie de la mémoire" (*M&M* 200-01).

54. "Or, où est au juste la différence entre les qualités hétérogènes qui se succèdent dans notre perception concrète et les changements homogènes que la science met derrière ces perceptions dans l'espace? Les premières sont discontinues et ne peuvent se déduire les unes des autres; les seconds au contraire se prêtent au calcul. Mais pour qu'ils s'y prêtent, point n'est besoin d'en faire des quantités pures: autant vaudrait les réduire au néant. Il suffit que leur hétérogénéité soit assez diluée, en quelque sorte, pour devenir, à notre point de vue, pratiquement négligeable. Or, si toute perception concrète, si courte qu'on la suppose, est déjà la synthèse, par la mémoire, d'une infinité de «perceptions pures» qui se succèdent, ne doit-on pas penser que l'hétérogénéité des qualités sensibles tient à leur contraction dans notre mémoire, l'homogénéité relative des changements objectifs à leur relâchement naturel? Et l'intervalle de la quantité ne pourrait-il pas alors être diminué par des considérations de tension, comme par celles d'extension la distance de l'étendu à l'inétendu?" (*M&M* 201).

55. "L'intuition pure, extérieure ou interne, est celle d'une continuité indivisée" (*M&M* 201-02).

56. "Nous avons tenté autrefois l'application de cette méthode au problème de la conscience, et il nous a paru que le travail utilitaire de l'esprit, en ce qui concerne la perception de notre vie intérieure, consistait dans une espèce de réfraction de la durée pure à travers l'espace" (*M&M* 204; TSE's emphasis within quotation).

57. "On pourrait donc... se dégager de l'espace sans sortir de l'étendue, et il y aurait bien là un retour à l'immédiat, puisque nous percevons pour tout de bon l'étendue, tandis que nous ne faisons que concevoir l'espace à la manière d'un schème" (*M&M* 206).

58. "Tout mouvement, en tant que passage d'un repos à un repos, est absolument indivisible" (*M&M* 207).

59. "Il y a des mouvements réels" (*M&M* 213).

60. "Toute division de la matière en corps indépendants aux contours absolument déterminés est une division artificielle" (*M&M* 218).

61. "Le mouvement réel est plutôt le transport d'un état que d'une chose" (*M&M* 225).

62. TSE refers to section IV, "Le mouvement réel est plutôt le transport d'un état que d'une chose" (*M&M* 225-33). Of mechanism, Bergson says: "elle rend encore inintelligible le processus par lequel nous saisissons dans notre perception, tout à la fois, un état de notre conscience et une réalité indépendante de nous" (*M&M* 227). "C'est dire que nous saisissons, dans l'acte de la perception, quelque chose qui dépasse la perception même" (*M&M* 232). "Le mouvement que la mécanique étudie n'est qu'une abstraction ou un symbole, une commune mesure, un dénominateur commun permettant de comparer entre eux tous les mouvements réels" (*M&M* 225-26).

63. "Et l'histoire tout entière ne tiendrait-elle pas en un temps très court pour une conscience plus tendue que la nôtre, qui assisterait au développement de l'humanité en le contractant, pour ainsi dire, dans les grandes phases de son évolution?" (*M&M* 231).

64. "To perceive means to immobilize." "Percevoir consiste donc, en somme, à condenser des périodes énormes d'une existence infiniment diluée en quelques moments plus différenciés d'une vie plus intense, et à résumer ainsi une très longue histoire. Percevoir signifie immobiliser" (*M&M* 231-32).

65. "Mais y a-t-il là autre chose qu'une image? . . . Or, nous l'avons montré, la perception pure . . . ferait véritablement partie de la matière telle que nous l'entendons" (*M&M* 249).

66. "Quel est donc le principe qui n'a qu'à se détendre pour s'étendre . . . ? Faute d'un meilleur mot, nous l'avons appelé conscience" (*EC* 258). "se détendre pour s'étendre": to relax itself in order to understand (or hear) itself. "Faute d'un meilleur mot": for lack of a better word.

67. "Notre conscience à nous est la conscience d'un certain être vivant, placé en un certain point de l'espace; . . . Pour que notre conscience coïncidât avec quelque chose de son principe, il faudrait qu'elle se détachât du tout fait et s'attachât au se faisant" (*EC* 258).

68. "gathered up in itself, it *endures*" (*CE* 315). "Il faut tâcher ici de voir pour voir, et non plus de voir pour agir. Alors l'Absolu se révèle très près de nous et, dans une certaine mesure, en nous. . . . Il vit avec nous. Comme nous, mais, par certains côtés, infiniment plus concentré et plus ramassé sur lui-même, il dure" (*EC* 323).

69. *selbstständig*: self-sufficient, independent. *en puissance*: in potential.

70. The Belgian poet and dramatist Maurice Maeterlinck (1862-1949) was part of a mystical tradition associated with belief in a transcendental unity of mind and the divinity of nature, extending from Jan van Ruysbroeck to Novalis to Ralph Waldo Emerson. Maeterlinck translated *L'Ornement des noces spirituelles de Ruysbroeck l'Admirable* (1891), which TSE owned in the Nouvelle Édition, 1900, signed "T. S. Eliot / 1909." TSE had read "Maeterlinck as a Mystic" in Symons's *The Symbolist Movement in Literature* (1908).

71. See note 68 (*EC* 323). "Like us, but in certain aspects infinitely more concentrated and gathered up in itself, it endures" (*CE* 315).

72. "Mais la difficulté naît de ce qu'on se représente, statiquement, des particules matérielles toutes faites, juxtaposées les unes aux autres, et, statiquement aussi, une cause extérieure qui plaquerait sur elles une organisation savante. En réalité la vie est un mouvement, la matérialité est le mouvement inverse . . . il en résulte entre eux un *modus vivendi*, qui est précisément l'organisation" (*EC* 271).

73*. TSE's note: "I suggest very tentatively that higher animals may possess memory such as that we experience with a reminiscent odor, which we cannot associate with any place."

74. To support his position that Bergsonism is Neo-Platonism in new clothes, TSE alludes to Thomas Carlyle's philosophical satire *Sartor Resartus* (1833-34) (Latin title: "the tailor re-tailored.")

75. The Greek philosopher Parmenides of Elea (b. ca. 514 BC) defined Truth as an unchanging, ungenerated whole, in contrast to Seeming, defined as the changing world of appearances.

76. Bradley: "The Absolute has no seasons, but all at once bears its leaves, fruit, and blossoms. Like our globe it always, and it never, has summer and winter" (*A&R* 442).

77. *menue monnaie*: small change (*EC* 343).

78. "Mais nous arrivons naturellement à cette représentation symbolique par ce seul fait que, dans une série de termes identiques, chaque terme prend pour notre conscience un double aspect: l'un toujours identique à lui-même, puisque nous songeons à l'identité de l'objet extérieur, l'autre spécifique, parce que l'addition de ce terme provoque une nouvelle organisation de l'ensemble" (*DI* 93).

79. "Si nous aboutissons à distinguer deux formes de la multiplicité, deux formes de la durée, il est évident que chacun des faits de conscience, pris à part, devra revêtir un aspect différent selon qu'on le considère au sein d'une multiplicité distincte ou d'une multiplicité confuse, dans le temps-qualité où il se produit, ou dans le temps-quantité où il se projette" (*DI* 97).

TEXTUAL NOTES

1. Location: Harvard University (Houghton): bMS Am 1691 (132); holograph in black ink, with corrections in pencil: twenty-eight pages, numbered 1-27 (two consecutive pages numbered 16); ruled three-hole blue notebook paper, no watermark, 26 x 20 cm; in binder; blank front and back fly-leaves, 26.6 x 20 cm, watermark: Efficiency Bond. Title page contains a typed, asterisk-bordered, paste-on title, "DRAFT OF A PAPER ON BERGSON / by T. S. Eliot / 1910-1911."

2. Date: The anonymously assigned date was based on the assumption that TSE wrote the essay when studying at the Sorbonne in 1910-11 and attending Bergson's weekly lectures (five in all) at the Collège de France in Jan and Feb 1911. "I was certainly very much under [Bergson's] influence during the year 1910-11," when I both attended his lectures and gave close study to the books he had then written," TSE explained in a letter to Shiv Kumar of 21 Jan 1953, "but I passed into a different phase soon afterward." Internal evidence shows that the paper was written after TSE had passed into the "different phase," in 1913 or 1914. His disenchantment with Bergson's thought is evident in the text; his contrast of Bergson's Absolute with that of Bradley, whose philosophy he began studying early in 1913 and used in his Kant seminar that spring, precludes composition before 1913; and his handwriting, strikingly different from the spiky hand of his Paris period, is consistent with that of 1913-14. Moreover, the text is not that of an essay but of a speech, containing personal notations for use in a public presentation (frequent underlining to indicate emphasis) and second-person phrases ("you will recall," "you remember"), indicating interaction with an audience. A comparison of the content of this talk and of [The Relationship between Politics and Metaphysics] indicates that this is the first of the two presentations given in 1913-14 to the Harvard Philosophical Club.

3. TSE's quotations from Bergson in his speech, which he characterizes as a "long pastiche of summary and quotation," are a mixture of French and English (his own translations and those from authorized editions). Although he does not always use quotation marks, he consistently identifies his sources by giving Bergson's titles and page numbers in the margins. When he has signaled that he is quoting and has identified his source, the editors have enclosed the passage in quotation marks.

[The Relationship between Politics and Metaphysics]

[The Relationship between Politics and Metaphysics] is evidently the reading text of a second address to the Harvard Philosophical Club, given in spring 1914 when Eliot served as club president.

I have no learning in political economy, and with political theory as such the present paper has nothing to do. I am not concerned to advocate any particular theory of government. But the critic of human affairs may justly concern himself with the varieties of emotional attitude toward government and its forms; and when these attitudes pretend to a metaphysic, or claim affinities with some philosophy in vogue or out, he is brought face to face with a problem in which metaphysical competence is more pertinent than political; for the problem of the relation between metaphysics and political theory is itself a metaphysical problem. So the question I would lay before you is this: what need and what right has politics to a metaphysic; and when a political theory has such philosophical affiliations, of what sort is the relationship; is it logical or purely emotional? May the same generalisations lie at the basis of both structures?

This is a time of philosophies which lend themselves, or at least offer themselves, with great facility to emotional consequences. A time of what a pragmatist friend of mine has called lyric philosophies. James's philosophical writings constitute an emotional attitude more than a body of dogma;¹ the neo-realistic movement appears to the uninitiated, at least, a spontaneous outburst of feeling, a song without words;² and we observe Mr. Bertrand Russell directing with passionate enthusiasm his unearthly ballet of bloodless alphabets.³ Professor Bosanquet is the prophet who has put off his shoes and talks with the Absolute in a burning bush;⁴ to Professor Royce we owe the resuscitation of Christianity by the method of last aid to the dead.⁵ And the landscape is decorated with Bergsonians in various degrees of recovery from intellect.

The present, furthermore, is a time of lively agitation of political theory. Radicalism is become conventional. Socialism has settled down on Beacon Street;⁶ but no radical is so radical as to be a conservative. Where are the conservatives? They have all gone into hiding. All the old ladies with cozy shares of telephone stock, all the clergymen of subsidised goodness—now

socialists waiting not for the millennium, but for the minimum wage which shall abolish prostitution; all our millionaires are socialistic theorists who will dispose of their incomes—later—according to their own theories. And there are of course books and books with theories to account for the present misery—biological, sociological, economic—causes, and to hymn the coming liberation and the fundamental goodness of man. All this is natural enough. What interests me is not the uncritical character of this cerebration, but its uncritical attempt to be critical, its feeling of the need for law at the same that it denies law; its demand for a philosophy of the lawless, an intellectual justification for anti-intellectualism, a metaphysical justification of its blind enthusiasm. Whole theories of knowledge are directed into political platforms, and biological theory is diverted into ethics.

These thoughts have crystallised themselves around a volume which I have lately been reading by an able contemporary of my own, whom I regret not having known while in college. Mr. Walter Lippmann's *A Preface to Politics* is a notable contribution to the contemporary literature of social enthusiasm.⁷ Mr. Lippmann is a student of philosophy and a keen critic of the present situation. He presents his book as a preface and not a programme; with much that he says I find myself in warm sympathy. It is a much better book than I was led to expect from the captious review in the *Nation*.⁸ And because I liked the book and yet found it at last the symbol for philosophical and political chaos, I think it worthy of some detailed attention.

Mr. Lippmann is a pragmatist, and a social radical. He believes in change, and in adapting ourselves to it. He does not, indeed, make clear just what it is that is changing or in just what our adaptations are to consist. But when we have dissociated his Bergsonian metaphysic from his political enthusiasm, and inquired just what, if any, would be the social inferences from the metaphysic and the postulates for the enthusiasm, I think that we will find that the relation between the politics and the philosophy is only emotional, and at least in some sense illegitimate.

First, the notion of change, a metaphysical idea. What place has this in politics? "Life" he says "is an irreversible process and for that reason its future can never be a repetition of the past" (314). This insight we owe to Bergson. "The application of it to politics is not difficult because politics is one of the interests of life." And a little lower he says "The future is explained by the economic and social institutions which were present at its birth" (314). Now I am not here concerned with refuting Bergson; and his doctrine of

change can be put in so inoffensive a form that no one would trouble to deny it; but is the application to politics so easy after all?

What I mean is this: the change of which Bergson speaks is a continuous *élan*; it is I believe ultimately biological in meaning. It is certainly not teleology: if you like, super-teleological, but certainly a change in which—if I have read *Creative Evolution* aright—purposes and ideals do not as such enter. Or take for example the description of doubt in *Time and Free Will*. Recall the diagram.⁹ Is it not clear that choice is here explained by reducing the whole process to a purely naturalistic basis, in which the conscious mental effort of the agent is reduced to an epiphenomenon? For this important question (from the standpoint of ethics) is neglected: how do we have the illusion of making a choice, and is this illusion wholly without consequence? Now if you apply Bergsonian change to political action, you will I think get just such a naturalistic explanation: politics with the politics left out. Mind, I do not for the moment claim that the naturalistic account is wrong. There is at least a sense in which it is right. But I claim that to apply it to politics is simply to dissolve politics, and to give absolutely no clue as to how we should conduct ourselves as political animals.

Mr. Lippmann might simply indicate to me, I suppose, the fact of change—which no one would deny—inconstant change of ideals, purposes, meanings, attitudes. I admit this. I admit, if you like, that politics and ethics are abstractions from this change, but then, if you do not abstract, you can have no politics or ethics.

Here then we are confronted with a sharp contrast of viewpoint between metaphysics and politics. Life proceeds by an *élan*, but we proceed only by specific intentions. Very true, you will say, but these intentions are only manifestations of the *élan*; what they really mean is not theology but vitalism. Well! Without an intention—more or less clear—I should never go to the polls or indeed perform a moral act. If the intention is an illusion, then the whole of politics is illusion. What I am concerned with is the intention as such.

Not wholly. I recognise, with Mr. Lippmann, an aspect of social change which must simply be accepted and to which in a sense our plans must simply be adapted. I recognise that the context is always asserting its relevancy, asserting that it is really part of the meaning, and must be taken account of. “We are just beginning to see,” says Mr. Lippmann, “how creeds are made. . . . Political philosophy at once appears as a human invention in a particular crisis—an instrument to fit a need. The pretension to finality falls away.”

"This," says Mr. Lippmann, "is a great emancipation" (208-09). It does not strike me as a great emancipation; it strikes me as a tedious truism. What pretension to finality does Plato make for his theory that Mr. Lippmann does not make for his, or that any man who uses his mind to theorise must not make? He goes on to say of Plato: "His constructions, his formal creeds, his law-making and social arrangements are local and temporary—for us they can have only an antiquarian interest" (210). It is easy to say that in this case Mr. Lippmann's opinions about Plato have only an antiquarian interest. But there are two more important alternative conclusions that could be drawn from the statement. One is that the past has no relevancy whatever. Life is an irreversible process. Is not any system an anomaly? For life is in continuous change, and system can change only by jerks.

I am not so prejudiced as to credit Mr. Lippmann with Bergsonism in this form—a Bergsonian of the extreme left. He is far too acute an observer. But I would ask: to what extent ought this programme follow from the application of speculative Bergsonism to politics? At what point, indeed, does a philosophy cease to be purely speculative, and become applied? It is a question of the utmost moment not only for politics but for religion. It can be answered not precisely, but I believe approximately. Begin, for example, at the extreme metaphysical end of Bergsonism. You have complete change at every instant. There are not even instants. Begin at the same time at the world of ordinary experience. From this end you have first some relative changes—you do not define [them] precisely. But in the process of definition you find change more and more universally (that is, if you are a Bergsonian). At the same time, you remember, you are descending the scale from the metaphysical world into a world of only relative change. Is either process lower than the other, and what point is the point of truth and reality? In a prudent obscurity, I believe, lies the success of the flowing philosophy. You must legislate for each (approximate) grade on its own terms of reality. The consistent Bergsonian would, I believe, as I [am] biased, be a consistent naturalist. And the consistent naturalist would, I think, have no ethics to offer at all. Nor, what is more to the point, would he be able to attack yours. The theologian can always reply to Euhemerus: what you say may be true, but is unimportant, for if a god is a god now, I care nothing as to his origins,¹⁰ and the force of your argument rests upon what is a non sequitur.

What I have said needs qualification. The ethics of Mr. Santayana, for example, have literally no dependence upon his metaphysics.¹¹ It might follow, I think, equally well from the metaphysics of Professor Royce, if you are

willing to abstract the closely woven Roycean philosophy to that extent. Similarly, it would be an interesting experiment in philosophical virtuosity to deduce the Roycean ethics from a materialistic system. But as a matter of fact you never find a pure ethics or a pure metaphysics in this sense; for every system—or at least every noteworthy system—is shot through with the personality of its author, and this binds the various branches of his thought together with indissoluble and impalpable bonds. It is, in short, the personality of the author that makes the system true and prevents it from being more than relatively true.

Thus I am unable utterly to condemn the attempt to spin out from the Bergsonian canonical texts a Bergsonian ethic: for all speculation tends to embody itself and form a living organism of practice, and all practice strives toward self-consciousness in speculation. But such an ethic, I believe, must be rooted in the soil independently; [it] cannot simply be grafted on the parent stem. In the end, I believe, all ethics come down to one, and that the Nicomachean;¹² they vary simply in feeling, tone. The Bergsonian ethics would have many doctrines to distinguish it; it would talk of tension, creative impulse, the *poussée formidable* beyond good and evil¹³—this however would be but theory, “conversation,” talk about human nature, and not human nature itself.

And this same universal morality is, I am convinced, at the term of all theorising. We all want the same thing—the only question is how to get it. Our greatest mistake is often in thinking that our adversary wants something different. The forms in which we mold our wants are constantly changing, partly because human laws never quite fit human needs, partly because human desires never quite adapt themselves to human laws. Mr. Lippmann, I believe, wants very much the same Utopia that I do—when we want Utopia at all. And he has found out for himself, and publishes with delightful triumph, what the seven sages knew already, that no machine is ever adequate to weave chaos into order. Thus he has fallen into the most dangerous of dogmas—the dogma that we must do without dogmas. Accordingly he commits the two great modern fallacies: the fallacy of Progress, which is the Bergsonian fallacy, and the fallacy of the Relativity of Knowledge, which is the Pragmatic fallacy.¹⁴

I am not, as I said, here concerned with the philosophic value of naturalism or of vitalism. Life may go on with relentless monotony or increasing self-satisfaction. But from the point of view of social activity, we may assert that it does neither. From this point of view, that protean abstraction,

“Life,” does not enter into question at all. The theory of progress, consequently, as a biological generalisation, is a very different thing from the striving for progress in this or that direction. The two songs cannot be sung to the same tune: the word progress carries two different meanings.

I do not plan to deprecate the alcoholic or stimulant value of the idea of Progress. I belong to a church of which one of the tenets refers to the Progress of mankind “onward and upward forever.”¹⁵ I do not understand what this phrase means, but I acknowledge its value for enthusiasm; and however we may distrust enthusiasm or enthusiasts, we must not fail to provide for them. So long as people use the concept of Progress as an incentive to endeavour, they enjoy a harmless stimulant. For we are all always agreed that present conditions are bad, and the man who does not want to improve them is morally dead. But as soon as a man makes of Progress something independent of human need and human meaning, something upon which these rather are dependent—then he is losing his hold upon social reality; he is become an intellectual drunkard.

For Progress, thus accepted, becomes simple change. Now it is one thing to accept change, another to abandon ourselves to it. It is one thing to confess that all our theories, purposes, reasons are founded on “irrational” or infrarational impulses or conations; it is another thing to deny the reasons and hypostasise the impulses. This is to fall from tact into dogma: the dogma that all intellectual formulations are dogmatic and pernicious. Hear Mr. Lippmann quote Nietzsche: “the falseness of an opinion is not for us any objection to it . . . The question is, how far an opinion is life-furthering, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps species-rearing.”¹⁶ I see here chiefly a dogma, a dogma about an abstraction called Life. “What Nietzsche has done here is . . .” (says Mr. Lippmann) “to cut under the abstract and final pretensions of creeds” (235). It is not so: what Nietzsche has done is to have built another creed. And I think that perhaps Nietzsche is the most vicious intellectualist of any of us; for having seen that intellectual formulation rests upon something which itself defies formulation, he has endeavoured to formulate the defiance. The man who pulls up a rose bush to peep at the roots need not wonder if the roses wither.

By this light-hearted devotion to change and impulse Mr. Lippmann establishes his socialism. Socialism, it appears, is a tendency. “It seems like topsy-turvyland,” says Mr. Lippmann, “to make reason serve the irrational. Yet that is just what it has always done, and ought always do” (235; TSE’s emphasis). Here are two errors. The first is this: the irrational here spoken

of is not the irrational as such, the irrational in contrast to the rational: it is the sub-rational. Consequently we face not topsy-turvyland but a truism. And in this case the ought is meaningless. For this is, apparently, just what reason always does of necessity, and if the most exaggerated rationalism is but the offspring of impulse of psychological necessity, it is difficult to see why impulse should bear any offspring by moral necessity. And if we look closer, the further question arises, what need then for the rational at all, if the irrational knows so well what it wants?

To our author, at any rate, it seems that if the irrational does not know what it wants, well, you will get nothing by interrogating the rational. If there is anything certain about that, poor thing, it is that it is always wrong. Let us see what the history of socialism [reveals], according to Mr. Lippmann. We begin with Rousseau. "Jean-Jacques is [in fact] a supreme case . . . of the way in which formal creeds bolster up passionate wants. . . . What shall we call an idea, objectively untrue, but practically of the highest importance?" (226) It would have occurred to me at this point to stop and ask: what did Jean-Jacques really want? But we go on to Marx.¹⁷ "Marx embalmed his thinking in the language of the Hegelian school" (213). Marx thought that he had made socialism scientific. His scientific socialism "crowds three heavy volumes, so elaborate and difficult that socialists rarely read them. . . . For all the parade of learning and dialectic is an after-thought" (214). Here is the real socialist's progress: "a man was dissatisfied, he wanted a new condition of life, he embraced a theory that would justify his hopes and his discontent." There you are! The whole socialist propaganda is an epiphenomenon. "[S]ocialism as a living force is a product of the will—a will to beauty, order, neighborliness, not infrequently a will to health" (215). But if socialism can be so defined—then I leave it to Mr. Lippmann to show that any political creed—Aristotle, Disraeli, and Mr. Elihu Root—is a product of the will to ugliness and bad plumbing.¹⁸

Mr. Lippmann admires Georges Sorel, whose doctrine of the "Social Myth" is familiar to most of us by hearsay.¹⁹ M. Sorel is to me a signal example of the same confusion of political and metaphysical thought: a curious mixture of criticism and *naïveté*. For M. Sorel, as you know, a myth is as good as a mile. History consists of results obtained through illusions; "the Christian myth," says Mr. Lippmann, is valuable "for its power of incarnating human desire" (231). The French Revolution and William James's "romantic cosmology" are equally myths.²⁰ But if M. Sorel were a little more philosophic, I think that his theory would stultify itself, and his politics would

come down to ordinary politics. That is to say, I do not understand how M. Sorel avoids seeing that his theory of myths is itself a myth; that the aspirations and impulses which his myth bodies forth will inevitably be reinterpreted by history. It may be true that man does not live by bread alone, but by making fictions and swallowing them alive and whole. This seems to reduce the high cost of living by eliminating living. It isn't the conscious myth that is the myth in question. It is "the myth about myth"; this is a real live myth, and the General Strike myth is, for its author, as dead as a doornail.

Yet M. Sorel, as an historian, is not wrong. Here is a point which I should wish to emphasise all through the present discussion: the errors in question are not simple error, but are formed by the compounding of theories belonging to different planes. As I have been assured in regard to some most indigestible dishes: they were composed of the simplest ingredients. It *is* true that purpose differs from result; we can see the alteration of intention by history. No municipal improvement league instituted Greek art; we should have had poetry without the Newdigate Prize;²¹ and Rousseau could hardly have predicted *À rebours* or the *Confessions of a Young Man*.²² But can we foresee the future any better for foreseeing nothing?

Mr. Lippmann would set his socialism upon the foundation of this philosophic-historical relativism. Yet why should this prudent reserve win us over? *Credo, quia*²³—I suppose that some people are the more convinced of the reality of spirits, simply because these shy creatures lurk in cabinets, play banjos, tap tables, and converse only through planchettes and mediums. Still, I decline to accept socialism until I know what it is; and Mr. Lippmann, as well as M. Sorel, affects far too much philosophic reticence to put it into words. We are told that it has "aspirations," that it is a "will" to certain pleasant generalisations, that it "convey[s] an impulse" (229-30). "Impulses generate purpose."²⁴ Then shall we have no other purpose than to obey impulse?

Yet hear Mr. Lippmann on the other side. "It is to Marx's everlasting credit that he set the intellectual standard of socialism on the most vigorous intellectual basis he could find. . . . The politics of reconstruction require a nation vastly better educated, a nation freed from its slovenly ways of thinking, stimulated by wider interests, and jacked up constantly by the sharpest kind of criticism" (303, 305). How true! And yet Mr. Lippmann, who is now telling us to purge and live cleanly, tried to persuade us, not to slovenly thinking, but to no thinking.

When this author is describing fact or criticising human affairs, he is apt to be right; when he philosophises, he is not wholly wrong. When he stirs the two ingredients together in his witches cauldron, a foul vapour rises, and the voice of socialism hails us. I have no objection to raise here against his being a Bergsonian if he chooses; but he shows many keen insights which seem fatal to his Bergsonian applications. For example, he tells us “human nature in all its profounder aspects changes very little in the few generations since our Western wisdom has come to be recorded. . . . Wisdom remains; theory passes” (210). Does this seem consistent with the Bergsonian “life is an irreversible process” and [make] “any return to the imagined glories of other days an idle dream”? (313) (Putting aside the question whether any dream can be idle to the supporter of M. Sorel’s mythos). Or is this consistent with the supine acceptance of change in the statement that “Once people have questioned an authority their faith has lost its naïveté” (313). Statements of the former sort would appear to indicate that socialism is simply what we had always wanted and not known it—the latter statements would go to show that socialism is merely the formulation of some inevitable blind force against which we cannot strive.

I believe, however, that these two tendencies in the political thought of Mr. Lippmann, and in much of the political thought of the present time, are both implicit in Bergsonism and Pragmatism, and that in this way Mr. Lippmann gives a true interpretation thereof. On one hand you have the pure voluntarism of Nietzsche, the cry that we must not and cannot be determined by creeds, formulae, prohibitions. [Men’s] “intention is to be free. Their desire is for a full and expressive life” (318). The other side—indeed the alter ego—of this expansion is a complete determinism—a determination by impulse. We will first, formulate later. What bound Marx with his followers was not a doctrine—for they did not read his book—but a common purpose. We are not told what this purpose was. Marx himself willed first, Hegelised afterwards. This is the intellect epiphenomenon.

The question is of course just what is free and what is bound. Complete freedom, or complete determination for a human being, is unthinkable. Neither Mr. Lippmann, nor, so far as I can see, Bergson or James or Schiller,²⁵ has formed a clear conception of what the word human implies. Mr. Lippmann quotes Nietzsche, “every impulse is imperious” (235), and in the next breath says himself that dogmas are instruments of human purpose. I should like to point out that the “imperious impulse” is not a human purpose at all; that you cannot thinkably have purpose without a rational end,

or human purpose without some intelligible organisation of impulses. So I feel at the bottom of Bergsonism and Pragmatism (as I am convinced in the case of Nietzsche) a fundamental pessimism and despair.

I do not mean philosophical pessimism. On behalf of philosophical pessimism I could say a good deal, and I think it lends itself to cheerfulness and social order quite as well as any other philosophic mood: for its application in ethics and politics may be exactly the reverse of its speculative doctrine. It may urge that human meaning and cosmic meaning are incommensurable, and that too great emphasis upon the meaning of divine purpose may belittle and stultify human purpose: for materialism is always the *Doppelgänger* of idealism. But Bergsonism and Pragmatism are pessimistic just by their confusion (a confusion which becomes more evident in the avowedly social applications of such authors as Mr. Lippmann) of human and cosmic activity. Bergson, on the one hand, emphasises the reality of a fluid psychological world of aspect and nuance, where purposes and intentions are replaced by pure feeling. By the seduction of his style we come to believe that the Bergsonian world is the only world, and that we have been living among shadows. It is not so. Bergson is the sweet Siren of adventurous philosophes,²⁶ and our world of social values is at least as real as his.

The error of Pragmatism is, I believe, exactly the reverse. The two philosophies seem to me at bottom very different. Bergson denies human values; for Pragmatism man is the measure of all things. The latter is a "practical" philosophy. You choose a point of view because you like it. You form certain plans because they express your character. Certain things are true because they are what you need; others, because they are what you want. Yet the two philosophies, like all antithetical philosophies, tend to meet. For they both reduce the world to illusion. For Bergson history is a vitalistic process in which human purposes do not exist; for Pragmatism, a chaotic process in which human purposes are illusory. For if all meaning is human meaning, then there is no meaning. If you observe only human standards, what standard have you? History, if it is to be interpreted at all, must be interpreted from a point of view which puts itself outside the process. Pragmatism has perhaps seized the right view of the relation of philosophy in human life. Pragmatism needs to be supplemented by a theory of the relation of human life to the world. And with this completion it would I think cease to be Pragmatism. Philosophy is to fit a need. On the other hand we cannot tell what this need is unless we philosophise.

Mr. Lippmann, who is I think representative of the most intelligent radical thought of the day, combines Bergson and James. The two together provide complete satisfaction for contemporary “need.” For they give us two forms of escape from reality as we know it in ordinary experience, a reality in which we find a constant friction between the mechanical and the volitional. One exalts mechanism, the other impulse. It amounts to the same thing. But popular philosophy never follows a theory to the bitter end; it prefers to vacillate. Hence we find that for Mr. Lippmann reality is sometimes change, sometimes the needs of human nature—which he admits has not much changed. And he has either so much faith in human nature, or so much faith that there is no such thing, that he can propose to do away with immorality by offering the people a “moral equivalent.” There is no conflict of good men and bad men. The moral fervor of the North (before the Civil War) came “when the economic interests of the South collided with those of the North.” All that the abolitionists did was to give “an ideal sanction” to these northern “economic interests” (154). On the other hand, we are told, “there is nothing so bad but it can masquerade as moral. Conquerors have gone forth with the blessing of popes” (163). We need to be enlightened as to the exact relevance of moral issues, for we knew already that

Lo naturale e sempre senza errore
 Ma l'altre puote errar per male obbieto
 O per troppo o per Poco di vigore.²⁷

But I fear I have divagated too much in a paper already hopelessly loose and unconnected. I asked at the beginning: what relationship can exist between politics and metaphysics? And I tried to show by illustrations from a clever book that any attempt to found politics on a metaphysical basis must be confusing and fallacious. I do not say that there cannot be a philosophy of politics. And I do not say that our philosophy should not colour our politics. For our attitudes in both should be the expression of our personality, and the greater the personality the closer will be the bond. This bond must remain indefinable. For my own part I can see that there is some relation between my metaphysical and political creeds. And I can see that every metaphysical system tends to expand itself into laws for every branch of behaviour; and that my political creed may tend to expand itself into a complete philosophy. But neither—and here I think is one sign of the weakness of socialism—can recline on the other for support and verification.

The extent to which the politician may philosophise, and the philosopher determine his ballot by his system, can only be determined (as ultimately all questions are determined) by good taste. And I should like to quote in support of my position, and as a final criticism of Mr. Lippmann's brilliant book, some words by the most distinguished of living American statesmen, Elihu Root:

[Religion, the philosophy of morals, the teaching of history, the experience of every human life, point to the same conclusion—that in the practical conduct of life the most difficult and the most necessary virtue is self-restraint. It is the first lesson of childhood; it is the quality for which great monarchs are most highly praised; the man who has it not is feared and shunned; it is needed most where power is greatest; it is needed more by men acting in a mass than by individuals, because men in the mass are more irresponsible and difficult of control than individuals. The makers of our constitution, wise and earnest students of history and of life, discerned the great truth that self-restraint is the supreme necessity and the supreme virtue of a democracy.]²⁸

NOTES

1. James began his career at Harvard in the natural sciences, as instructor in comparative anatomy, but migrated to the social sciences, where, as professor of psychology, he wrote the influential essay, "What Is an Emotion?" and expounded a theory of truth as that which is ultimately emotionally satisfying.

2. TSE alludes to the piano series *Song without Words* (*Lieder ohne Worte*) (1829-45) by the Romantic composer Felix Mendelssohn and to the Neo-Realist movement in philosophy, led by Harvard professor E. B. Holt, which attempted to counter the prevailing idealism by emancipating "metaphysics from epistemology" (*The New Realism* 32).

3. Russell, a major inspiration for the Neo-Realists, arrived as a celebrity at Harvard in Mar 1914, where he taught courses in symbolic logic and theory of knowledge. In his *Autobiography*, he described TSE, who audited his courses, as highly intelligent but insufficiently passionate (I.348; II.61), and Eliot caricatured Russell as witty and energetic in "Mr. Apollinax." Russell's lectures used the symbolic alphabet developed in *Principia Mathematica* (1910), of which TSE was later to admit that "it gave me a sense of pleasure and power manipulating these curious little figures" (Qtd. Brand Blanshard, "Eliot in Memory," *Yale Review* [Summer 1965]: 635-40). TSE appropriates Bradley's criticism of Hegel's "unearthly ballet of bloodless categories" (*PL* 533) for his own critique of Russell.

4. Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923), professor of philosophy at Oxford and St. Andrews, and Bradley were the principle proponents of British idealism. Bradley approached the Absolute primarily through experience, whereas Bosanquet approached it primarily through logic, broadly defined in *The Principle of Individuality and Value* (London: Macmillan, 1912) as the "supreme law or nature of experience" (340). TSE alludes to the burning bush in which God manifested himself to Moses at Horeb (Exodus 3:2).


5. Josiah Royce (1855-1916), professor of philosophy at Harvard, addressed the late nineteenth-century assault on Christianity by extending the insights of post-Kantian idealism. In a series of works from *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy* (1885) to *The Problem of Christianity* (1913), he attempted to reconcile Christian thought with modern science and philosophy.

6. Arriving at Harvard in 1906, TSE would have witnessed the rapid transformation of Boston's Beacon Street from a neighborhood of single-family mansions into apartment blocks and row houses.

7. Walter Lippmann (1889-1974), a member of TSE's class of 1910 at Harvard and an assistant in philosophy (1909-10), published his first book, *A Preface to Politics* (New York: Mitchell Kennerley), in 1913. He went on to become a prominent journalist and social philosopher, twice winning the Pulitzer Prize.

8. The anonymous reviewer in the *New York Nation* (11 Sept 1913) concluded that "one can easily pardon [Lippmann's] rather juvenile and cocksure pronouncements on such things as art, morals, and religion, with the feeling that he will probably outgrow most of them" (24).

9.



Bergson's diagram of the operation by which the will makes its choice between the equal possibility of two contrary actions is described in Pogson's translation of *Time and Free Will* as a "Geometrical (and thereby deceptive) representation of the process of coming to a decision" (175). Bergson states that common sense "will picture a self which, after having traversed a series M O of conscious states, when it reaches the point O finds before it two directions O X and O Y, equally open. These directions thus become *things*, real paths into which the highroad of consciousness leads, and it depends only on the self which of them is entered upon. In short, the continuous and living activity of this self, in which we have distinguished, by abstraction only, two opposite directions, is replaced by these directions themselves, transformed into indifferent inert things awaiting our choice" (176-77).

10. In his travel fantasy, *Sacred Scripture*, the Greek writer Euhemerus (ca. 300-ca. 260 BC) elaborated the theory that the Greek gods originated as deifications of kings and conquerors.

11. In *The Life of Reason* (1905-06), the Spanish-born Harvard professor George Santayana (1863-1952) bases his ethics on the evolution of human cognition in harmony with the development of social institutions. As an undergraduate, TSE took Santayana's *History of Modern Philosophy* and as a graduate student, his *Philosophy of History*.

12. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle relates ethics to moral virtue and magnanimity of character. The Greek text of TSE's copy, edited by John Burnet, is heavily annotated, as are his copies of John A. Stewart's two-volume *Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle* and Alexander Grant's two-volume *The Ethics of Aristotle*.

13. The *poussée formidable* (formidable thrust) is one of the recurring phrases, like *élan vital* (vital impetus), with which Bergson characterizes the original impetus of the life force in the relentless evolutionary process.

14. See textual note 3 for the outline that TSE has written on the verso of this page of his manuscript.

15. The Unitarian minister and transcendentalist James Freeman Clarke (1810-88) delineated the five points of Unitarianism in “The Five Points of Calvinism and the Five Points of the New Theology,” a sermon collected in his *Vexed Questions in Theology* (Boston: George H. Ellis, 1886). Clarke’s five points—“the fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of man, the leadership of Jesus, salvation by character, and the continuity of human development in all worlds, or, the progress of mankind onward and upward forever” (10-16)—became the mainstream Unitarian affirmation of belief.

16. Lippmann’s citation (233-34) is from Nietzsche’s *Beyond Good and Evil*.

17. In evaluating Lippmann’s genealogy of socialism, TSE suggests that the movement that claims descent from the political theorist Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78) via the social scientist and revolutionary Karl Marx (1818-83) is an “epiphenomenon” of Rousseau’s Romanticism. TSE’s understanding of Rousseau grew out of his work in “Literary Criticism in France with Special Reference to the Nineteenth-Century,” a yearlong course (1909-10) taught by Professor Irving Babbitt.

18. Aristotle, whose social and political policy in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is based on practical rather than theoretical concerns, heads TSE’s catalog of independent thinkers. Benjamin Disraeli, 1st Earl of Beaconsfield (1804-81), British Prime Minister (1868; 1874-80) under Victoria, attempted to effect social and political change through literature, dramatizing the division between the rich and the poor in *Sybil* (1845), subtitled *The Two Nations*. The American statesman Elihu Root (1845-1937), who served in the cabinets of Presidents William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, and in the Senate (1909-15), attempted to effect change through international arbitration.

19. The French philosopher and syndicalist Georges Sorel (1847-1922) elaborated his theory of the social myths and the General Strike in *Réflexions sur la violence* (1908). See 558.

20. Lippmann quotes the term from Santayana, who said of James’s Pragmatism in “The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy” (1911), collected in *Winds of Doctrine* (New York: Scribner’s, 1913): “The force of William James’s new theology, or romantic cosmology, lies only in this: that it has broken the spell of the genteel tradition, and enticed faith in a new direction, which on second thoughts may prove no less alluring than the old” (210-11).

21. The Newdigate Prize for the best composition in English verse by an undergraduate at Oxford had been established by Sir Roger Newdigate (1719-1806) in 1806. Winners included Matthew Arnold (1843), Oscar Wilde (1878), and more recently William Greene (1912) and Maurice Roy Ridley (1913).

22. In *À rebours* [Against the Grain] (1884), Huysmans recounts the exotic practices and perverse pleasures of the wealthy aesthete Duc Jean Floressas des Esseintes in his search for an elusive ideal; in the *Confessions of a Young Man* (1886), the Irishman George Moore (1852-1933) provides a fictionalized account of his dissolute life in Paris as he attempts to become a painter, and later in London as he attempts to become a writer.

23. An allusion to “Credo quia absurdum est” (“I believe because it is absurd”), a variation of Tertullian’s “Et mortuus est dei filius; credibile prorsus est, quia ineptum est” [The Son of God died; it is immediately credible, precisely because it is inadequate] (*De carne Christi* 5.4).

24. TSE constructs this phrase from Lippmann’s statement, “If Machiavelli is a symbol of the political theorist making reason an instrument of purpose, we may take Sorel as a self-conscious representative of the impulses which generate purpose” (232).

25. In essays collected in *Humanism* (1903, 1912), the German-British thinker F. C. S. Schiller (1864-1937), a Tutor at Oxford since 1897, developed his humanistic pragmatism, based largely on the philosophy of James.

26. Here TSE strikes through an illustration from *Purgatorio* XIX.20: “che i marinari per mezzo mar dismago” (*read*: in mezzo), where Dante has a vision of the Siren: “I am,” she sang, “I am the sweet Siren, who / leads mariners astray in mid-sea, so full am I / of pleasantness to hear.” (*DC2* 230-31).

27. *Purgatorio* XVII.94-96, misquoted from memory: “Lo natural è sempre senza errore, / ma l’altro puote errar per malo obbietto, / o per poco o per troppo di vigore.” *Trans*: “The natural is always without error; but the / other may err through an evil object, or / through too little or too much vigour” (*DC2* 208-09). TSE has marked lines 91-96 in the left margin and 94-96 in the right in the Italian text of his copy (Houghton).

28. TSE provides only the page number (81), not the title of the book or the passage with which he concluded his talk. The editorially supplied passage is from the final paragraph (81-82) of Root’s Stafford Little Lectures at Princeton, published in June 1913 as *Experiments in Government and the Essentials of the Constitution* (Princeton UP).

TEXTUAL NOTES

1. Location: Harvard University (Houghton): bMS Am 1691 (25); untitled ink holograph, no date; twenty-four numbered pages, ruled, light-blue lines, vertical red line left margin; watermark: Shawmut Mills, 19.8 x 26.0 cm. Archival note: “A handwritten manuscript by T.S. Eliot which might be entitled THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICS AND METAPHYSICS. . . . The manuscript was given by him to his sister Ada Eliot (Mrs. Alfred D.) Sheffield, who left it to Eliot House [Harvard].”

2. Dating: In the year of his presidency of the Philosophical Club, TSE gave two lectures, one in December 1913 and the other in spring 1914. Of the two Harvard manuscripts that can be identified as lectures, [Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism] is more likely to have been presented first, based on its content and on coherence with [The Relationship between Politics and Metaphysics]. The latter draws on Lippmann’s *A Preface to Politics*, published in May 1913 and reviewed in the *Nation* in Sept, a review that Eliot cites in the text.

3. Diagram from verso of page 9:

The tyranny of Progress.—the future.

“vital organisation.”

Biologism. (Goodness.)

The tyranny of Relativism.

Truth—Historicism

Truth for Need.

(Need for truth!)

Conclusion:

Practical Nature P[rogress]. and P[ragmatism].

their functions qualitatively different.

Enthusiasm.

Taste.

The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual¹

"The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual" was written for Josiah Royce's 1913-14 "Philosophy 20C: Seminary in Logic." Each student was expected to present one long paper and several "notes" (as Royce referred to the shorter papers) related to the overall topic for the year, "A Comparative Study of Various Types of Scientific Method." Eliot read the following "long paper" on 9 Dec 1913.²

Two questions to discuss: causality and interpretation of meaning.

On what terms is a science of religion possible? Can it be treated wholly according to the methods of sociology? And are these methods ever wholly "scientific." My discussion of these methods will be based mainly on Durkheim's *Règles* and "Représentations Collectives" and partly upon Lévy-Bruhl's *Fonctions mentales*.³

Science of Religion must be distinguished from Philosophy of Religion. In the latter, the investigator ranges his "facts" according to a definition of religion. This definition is never arrived at by a generalisation from the facts; because the facts are never just those facts until we have the definition. In the work of such older men as Max Müller, scientific definition is confused with philosophic interpretation: thus he says, "Religion consists in the perception of the infinite under such manifestations as are able to influence the moral character of men."⁴ This is not a generalisation and cannot serve as a definition. I shall want to show presently that the same confusion between definition and interpretation is present in contemporary, professedly more scientific work, and that in fine no "scientific" definition of religion is possible.

I should like also at the outset to protest against the use of the expression "Evolution of Religion." The word evolution I believe is currently used with deplorable looseness. The sorts of fact, as I understand it, which can properly be described in terms of evolution are those in which a continuous relation between organic tendency and environment can be expressed more or less quantitatively, according to a standard of value. We have the right to take human value as the standard for natural evolution, but what standard have we for religion or society? In the words of Durkheim, the facts are

particular societies which are born, develop, die, independently from each other . . . a people which replaces another is not simply a

prolongation of this other with some new characters; it is something other; it has some added properties, some less; it constitutes a new individuality and all these distinct individualities, being heterogeneous, cannot fuse (*se fondre*) into one continuous series, nor, above all, into a single series (*une série unique*).⁵

Furthermore, as Durkheim might have indicated, there is a difference between natural and social evolution in that in the former we are able practically to neglect all values that are internal to the process, and consider the process from the point of view of our value, which is for our purposes conceived of as outside the process (such a definition, of course, declines to consider vitalism seriously). While to some extent in a social progress, and to a very great extent in religious progress, the internal values are part of the external description.

This brings us to the question all important for this field of inquiry: what do we mean by description? As an introduction to this question I shall take up another type of investigation. For the Max Müller type, as we have seen, a special religious sense or faculty; an intuition of something or other, is a postulate. For a more modern group, religion is a practical, though imperfect or mistaken, adaptation to environment, [a] more or less consciously rational inventing of theories to account for experience. Tylor's animism is of course the classic of this type of explanation:

[T]he ancient savage philosophers (sic) probably made their first step by the obvious inference that every man has two things belonging to him, namely, a life and a phantom (I.428).

Even in healthy waking life, the savage or barbarian had never learnt to make that rigid distinction between subjective and objective, between imagination and reality, to enforce which is one of the main results of scientific education (I.445).⁶

What a curious assumption! We are asked to refer the supernatural to an inference from observation; we are given an hypothesis which owes its *vraisemblance* to the fact that we feel that this is what we should do were we in the savage's place. The question to be kept in mind is: what part is fact and what part interpretation? Another example of this point of view is Andrew Lang: one of the theories with which Lang is particularly associated is that of High Gods of Low Races.

The Supreme Being (Fuegian) is a *Wesen*, Being, *Vui*; we have hardly a term for our immortal existence so undefined. . . . In the original conception he is a powerful intelligence who was from the first (187).

[T]he first advances in culture *necessarily* introduce religious degeneration (252).

[T]wo chief sources of Religion, (1) the belief, how attained we know not, in a powerful, moral, eternal, omniscient Father and Judge of men; (2) the belief (probably developed out of experiences normal and supernormal) in somewhat of man which may survive the grave (301).⁷


Lang saw religious degeneration just as Spencer saw social degeneration in the passage from monogamy to polygamy.⁸ Now this latter transition, according to Durkheim, is that from a monogamy due wholly to circumstances and not to any perception of moral value to a polygamy which different circumstances favoured. Similarly, when traces of interpretation have been removed, the interpretation of Unkulunkulu and other "high gods," becomes more and more problematic.⁹

In short, the postulate of this form of description is, in the words of M. Lévy-Bruhl, the uniformity of mind. It involves a quite crude notion of causality and a very defective theory of knowledge. Whether the theories of the Durkheim school quite supersede the methods of Tylor, Lang, and Frazer, and how far they are valid, is a question I shall take up directly. We have enough material in mind, however, to be able first to draw some distinction between a fact and an interpretation.

A fact is a point of attention which has only one aspect or [can be treated] under a certain definite aspect which places it in a system.¹⁰ Whether this oneness of aspect is due to the nature of the fact or to an abstraction which we make for our own ends is a question for metaphysics, quite indifferent for methodology. The question for method is simply: when have I a fact, or rather a type of fact, which can be sufficiently abstracted from (1) my individual (or irrelevant) interpretation and from (2) other types into which it may melt and elude me. In the more exact sciences this question has only a metaphysical interest, here its interest is wholly practical and relevant to our conclusions.

In the first place, in rejecting the explanations which I have criticised, we are not to go so far as to say crassly that they are wrong. This would be to

avoid the whole problem. The progress of the study of religion in the last ten or twenty years has not been simply one from error to truth. It has been a progress in the statement of the problem.



Between these circles there may of course be fluctuations. Thus we may say positively enough for practice, e.g., that Euhemerus, and Max Müller (in his theory of solar myths), were wrong.¹¹

This diagram is properly of epistemological rather than of scientific application, for with my definition of fact in mind (as a point of attention with only one aspect), it is needful only while we refuse to accept the point of attention as pinned down to one aspect; that is, so long as the subject matter of our science is still fluid. Now this is just the situation in the science of religion. Why do we reject Tylor's or Lang's view? Not, I think, chiefly because of negative proof: the proof is rather positive; proof can only be proof in relation to assumptions. But because we no longer accept the assumptions, we demand a different standpoint; in short, a different science. What seemed to one generation fact is from the point of view of the next a rejected interpretation. And an interpretation as such is neither true nor false; but truth and falsity are relative to a level of interpretation (when we say interpretation we are apt to mean the true interpretation on that level of interpretation).

What then are the facts at present? Any theory which attributes the genesis of religious thought to the operation of logical reasoning or even quasi-logical quasi-reasoning in the group as in the individual is bound to be unsatisfactory. The difference is of course only in degree, but the consequences are great. For of course to explain the actions even of an individual, adult and civilised, by his reasons or by the reasons which would have

appealed to him had he acted by reasoning, is an abstraction at best. I do not deny that it is a justifiable abstraction, and for certain purposes the arriving at an action by these processes may be regarded as a fact. But this sort of explanation becomes doubly defective when it is in point to account for the operation of primitive mind, and group consciousness. This inadequacy is what Lévy-Bruhl is at the pains to point out in his book. He has not, I think, brought out clearly that the difference in adequacy of explanation is one of degree, and he appears to me to draw the distinction between primitive and civilised mental process altogether too clearly. Nor does he make a long enough excursion into the theory of knowledge to question the ultimate adequacy of explanation altogether, or the particular adequacy of the type of explanation which he proposes himself.

Keeping in mind the a priori insufficiency of the analogy of mental process in the individual to explain mental process in the group, we find that M. Durkheim offers us a theory which pretends to do justice to both. This is the theory of "collective and individual representations."¹² Taking as his point of departure the relation of the individual mind and body, M. Durkheim argues that the relation of group mind to individual mind is of the same nature. Just as not all of mental activity, he argues, can be accounted for in psychophysical terms, so the mental life of a social group cannot be accounted for in terms of the mental life of the individuals therein included. Arguing on the basis that there is a science of psychology distinct from or not purely psychophysical, he claims a similar detachment for sociology. He believes, in short, that the "facts" of the social life obtain sufficient clearness and precision to be traced historically, and joined logically, without the interpolation at any time of facts from the life of the individual.

Such a science, again, we may say in any case, would be a matter of degree: we should expect it to be much more successful for the lower than for the developed society—just as the other type of explanation failed by applying to the lower, analogies from the higher. But in any case its practical success depends on its ability to define a fact, and for the answer to this question we are referred to Durkheim's *Règles de la méthode sociologique*. The facts consist in "des manières d'agir, de penser et de sentir, extérieures à l'individu, et qui sont douées d'un pouvoir de coercition en vertu duquel ils s'imposent à lui" (8). Further, "il y a certains courants d'opinion qui nous poussent, avec une intensité inégale, suivant les temps et les pays, l'un au mariage, par

exemple, un autre au suicide ou à une natalité plus ou moins forte,” etc. (13).¹³ And he sums up by this definition: “Any mode of action (*manière de faire*), fixed or not, which is susceptible of exercising on the individual an exterior (*sic*) constraint, is a social fact”; or else, “which is general in the extent of a given society, while having an existence of its own (*propre*), independent of its individual manifestations.”¹⁴

We are still, I believe, at this point very far from having a firm grasp on fact. In his chapter II on the observation of social fact, Durkheim lays down the rules: consider social facts like things, and systematically set aside all preconceptions.¹⁵ With these rules in mind, he censures Comte and Spencer, and the economy of Mill,¹⁶ with a contrast between the logical necessity of the enchainment of our ideas in explanation and the real “laws of nature”;¹⁷ and with criticism which would, I think, apply to the theories as of Tylor above cited, and the abstract primary emotions of McDougall.¹⁸ But we are still far from fact, and must ask: when we have “*écarté toutes les prénotions*,” just what is left? Durkheim criticises a certain criminologist (Garofalo) for having chronicled the history, not of every type of act that has been punished, but only of certain ones which offend the mean and stable part (*la partie moyenne et immuable*) of the moral sense.¹⁹ But the question is, according to Durkheim’s standards, just what is the subject matter in this case? For there is a difference between the history of crime and the history of what has been considered criminal. And the question is much more involved in the case of religion, which cannot, in primitive races at least, be defined wholly satisfactorily by external impression.

How far is it workable to regard a religion as a form of social behavior? This definition is accepted by Marett,²⁰ and is quite in line with the tendencies of Durkheim. Compare King:

In some way or other nearly all (discussions of religious phenomena) are one-sided on account of the failure to take account of the implications of the reaction as the fundamental psychic unit. Thus the accounts that we receive of the religious practices of the natural (*sic*) races usually go no farther than descriptions of the overt activities, with perhaps their objective significance to the people concerned. Now, the interpretations by the people themselves are not of direct psychological value. They are facts, *also*, as we said above, that need explanation.²¹


But I confess that I do not know what “social behavior” is. If we are to explain the social fact at all, it must be in terms of behavior. Yet the phrase is most equivocal. The behavior of individuals traceable to social causes is social behavior in one sense. Thus statistical methods can be applied to suicide, and “causes” assigned for variations. But in just what sense is the relaxation of religious restraint in the nineteenth century instanced by Durkheim the cause of any particular suicide—and where are we to draw the line between social and personal causes? And such suicide is social behavior in a rather different sense from the participation say of a social group in a spring or harvest festival.

I say that we must treat the subject in terms of social behavior, because in the scientific explanation the purposes of the people examined can never be taken on faith. Purpose explains nothing internally; we must however take it into account from an external point of view, as part of the fact. We must translate it into behavior, that is, into as nearly mechanical terms as we can. In other words, conscious purpose melts into behavior, and behavior into mechanism.²²

Behavior, then, is only a half-way stage. For if you take a purely external point of view, then it is not behavior but mechanism, and social phenomena (and ultimately, I believe, all phenomena) simply cease to exist when regarded steadfastly in this light. You must take into account the internal meaning: what is a religious phenomenon, for example, which has not a religious meaning for the participants? And yet how are we to define this meaning? What, in short, is the scientific status of a description which is the description of the meaning of other agents, and, in the case of religious and other social phenomena, a meaning which hovers between the social and the individual?

The statement of this question sets us a little further on the way of distinction between description and interpretation in the science of religion. The norm for the alternatives of truth and error lies at the point of behavior. But there seems no way of determining this point, which is as far in the direction of description (and away from interpretation) as we can go and still have religious facts to describe. Furthermore, our terms for describing the behavior of one epoch may give only a false interpretation for another.

For instance, the word worship may describe to an uncertain degree of primitiveness; beyond that it will be an increasingly dubious interpretation.



Also, what is the fact of P ? It is the actual ritual in a complex which includes [the] previous stage's interpretation of the ritual of the preceding stage, and so on back indefinitely. Now the only part of the fact which can be handled scientifically, historically is the ritual. Of this archaeology of the act Miss Harrison is one of our most proficient exponents.²³ We can come to conclusions as to what men did at one period and another, and can to some extent see the development of one form out of another. But one has only to open the contents table of one of her extraordinarily documented books to perceive how her "fact" melts into interpretation, and interpretation into metaphysics. What we can ever have, at best, is a continuous change of ritual in one direction. We can have enough cross-sections to interpret a process; if not a purpose,^{24*} at least a function of a continuous change. This would seem to be such, and we need to be reminded how far it is from a history of belief and feeling. So far as there is an external order in ritual and creed and in artistic and literary expression, this order can be reconstructed and cannot be impugned. But the "facts" which can be thus arranged are decidedly limited, and consist historically in a certain order—we never know any too exactly of what the order is.

This historical investigation, and the comparative work, are what give us such results as we can be said to get. Of the second sort of labour J. G. Frazer is unquestionably the greatest master. No one has done more to make manifest the similarities and identities underlying the customs of races very remote in every way from each other. Just as through the historical mode of research, certain fixed relations can be found which are not

relative to the observer; but the nature of the entities between which the relations obtain is never completely known. I have not the smallest competence to criticise Dr. Frazer's erudition, and his ability to manipulate this erudition I can only admire. But I cannot subscribe for instance to the interpretation with which he ends his volume on *The Dying God*. He is accounting for the magical rites of spring festivals:

[The general explanation which we have been led to adopt of these and many similar ceremonies is that they are, or were in their origin, magical rites intended to ensure the revival of nature in spring. The means by which they were supposed to effect this end were imitation and sympathy. Led astray by his ignorance of the true causes of things, primitive man believed that in order to produce the great phenomena of nature on which his life depended he had only to imitate them, and that immediately by a secret sympathy or mystic influence the little drama which he acted in forest glade or mountain dell, on desert plain or wind-swept shore, would be taken up and repeated by mightier actors on a vaster stage. He fancied that by masquerading in leaves and flowers he helped the bare earth to clothe herself with verdure, and that by playing the death and burial of winter he drove that gloomy season away, and made smooth the path for the footsteps of returning spring.]²⁵

No method, historical or comparative, will give such results as this. No comparison of custom will give us any hint as to purpose, and purposes we cannot compare. Upon this point I follow Durkheim: "When we undertake to explain a social phenomenon, we must seek separately the efficient cause which produces it and the function which it fulfills . . . All questions of intention are . . . too subjective to be treated scientifically."²⁶

We must return for a moment to Miss Harrison and her friends: Professor Gilbert Murray, Mr. Cornford, and Mr. Cook, to criticise their interpretation.²⁷ For them (inspired by Lévy-Bruhl and influenced by Bergson), the god is a "projection" from the group via the totem;²⁸ group consciousness gives religious practice, the god separates himself, becomes an "object of knowledge" and by becoming an object of belief finally ceases to be believed in. The theory has much to recommend it, but so far as it is a theory of religious origin and not of metaphysics, I think that its merit is largely negative. Instead of explaining, it tells us (in contrast with Frazer's) that no explanation is called for. As a positive theory claiming truth, it is interpretation, mythology, and is likely to be eventually superseded. The Durkheim-school

method has the singular merit of putting us on guard against itself. For Lévy-Bruhl's theory of the pre-logical consciousness, with its law of participation, is ultimately only a reminder that ultimately there is nothing to explain. That primitive reality not only cannot really be put together out of the abstractions of social psychology which are torn from our sophisticated and conscious life, but that it certainly could not be known by living it, for then we should have another task of interpretation.

And lastly, that primitive sociology, and comparative religions, have a task so far as I know unique among sciences: that of interpreting into one language an indefinite variety of languages. History deals in one sense with a greater variety, in that it deals with individuals—but these differences it is obliged to neglect; and it is not concerned with the differences of mind in so significant a sense as is sociology. Now in interpreting *mana* and *orenda*, the investigator must put himself in a very different attitude from that which he takes in considering serpent and tree worship for example.²⁹ We may link such different phases of religion together by an historical continuity of behavior, but we must not forget that the two religious attitudes, as such, have nothing in common.

But what, I shall be asked, have you brought forward to show that the science of religion cannot be the study of "religious behavior," or on the other hand, that the nexus of historical and comparative relations alone is not what we were seeking for? I admit that I have no better methods to substitute, but I am sure that neither of these gives us what we are looking for. I do not think that any definition of religious behavior can be satisfactory, and yet you must assume, if you are to make a start at all, that all these phenomena have a common meaning; you must postulate your own attitude and interpret your so-called facts into it, and how can this be science? And yet there is the material, and there must be a science of it. But if you take only the relations, is this anything more than a chronicle? You cannot assert a causal relation; you cannot describe them in terms of practical need; you cannot dissolve the imaginative and emotive element in any invariable terms. The advance in knowledge, in this field, is not so much an accumulation of new facts, as a transmutation of the questions we put to these facts.³⁰

NOTES

1. In the introduction to Charlotte Eliot's *Savonarola: A Dramatic Poem* (London: R. Cobden-Sanderson, 1926), TSE recalled this essay and assigned it a title: "The rôle played by

interpretation has often been neglected in the theory of knowledge. . . . Some years ago, in a paper on *The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual*, I made an humble attempt to show that in many cases *no* interpretation of a rite could explain its origin. For the meaning of the series of acts is to the performers themselves an interpretation; the same ritual remaining practically unchanged may assume different meanings for different generations of performers; and the rite may even have originated before ‘meaning’ meant anything at all. The persons concerned may believe that the ritual is performed in order to induce a fall of rain; but this innocent belief throws no light on the genesis of their behaviour.” In a footnote, TSE added: “The problem of interpretation was of great interest to that extraordinary philosopher Josiah Royce, for whose eye the paper . . . was intended” (2.771–72; 2.775, n. 3).

2. The class notes for the seminar were published in 1963 as *Josiah Royce’s Seminar, 1913-1914: As recorded in the Notebooks of Harry T. Costello*, hereafter abbreviated *JRS*. According to Costello, Royce’s designated student secretary, Eliot’s paper explored “theories about comparative religion and in how far they were description and in how far interpretation” (77). In an appendix, Costello adds that Eliot “had been reading Durkheim, Jane Harrison, and Frazer, and wanted to know what is ‘interpretation’ as opposed to ‘description’? His year’s work circled around this question of the truth of interpretations. He had been reading Francis Herbert Bradley, and said no simple statement was absolutely true” (*JRS* 193-94).

3. Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), Professor of Letters at the University of Paris, *Les Règles de la méthode sociologique* (Paris: Alcan, 1895) and “Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives,” *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, 6 (Mai 1898): 273-302; Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857-1939), Professor of Modern Philosophy at the Sorbonne, *Les Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures* (Paris: Alcan, 1910).

4. Max Müller (1823-1900), *Natural Religion* (London: Longmans, Green, 1889), 188. Müller, a German philologist and professor of comparative theology at All Souls, Oxford, wrote numerous volumes on primitive religion, including *Origin and Growth of Religion as Illustrated by the Religions of India* (1878).

5. The French from which TSE translates is given in this and subsequent notes. “Ce qui existe, ce qui seul est donné à l’observation, ce sont des sociétés particulières qui naissent, se développent, meurent indépendamment les unes des autres. . . . Un peuple qui en remplace un autre n’est pas simplement un prolongement de ce dernier avec quelques caractères nouveaux; il est autre, il a des propriétés en plus, d’autres en moins; il constitue une individualité nouvelle et toutes ces individualités distinctes, étant hétérogènes, ne peuvent pas se fondre en une même série continue, ni surtout en une série unique” (*Les Règles* 26).

6. E. B. Tylor (1832-1917), *Primitive Culture*, 2 vols (1871); 3rd edition, revised (London: John Murray, 1891). Tylor associated animism, or the attribution of conscious life to objects and natural phenomena, with the earliest stage in religious evolution. His work, based on the application of Darwin’s theories to the development of mind, resulted in this landmark study in social anthropology and was a major influence on Frazer.

7. Andrew Lang (1844-1912), *The Making of Religion*, 3rd edition (London: Longmans, Green, 1909). *Fuegian* (parenthetically added by TSE): the religion of the Fuegian tribe of Tierra del Fuego. *Vui*: a nonhuman spirit that has never been a ghost; he may be represented as a man, “but the native will always maintain that he was something different, and deny to him the fleshly body of a man” (197-98). Underlining by TSE.

8. In *The Native Tribes of Central Australia* (1899), the English educator Baldwin Spencer (1860-1929) and his Australian co-author F. J. Gillen (1855-1912) described primitive Australian marriage customs, based on extensive fieldwork with the Aborigines.

9. *Unkulunkulu*, one of Lang's "high gods," is the mythical First Ancestor in the Zulu religion.

10. In chapter 3 of his dissertation, TSE writes: "A fact . . . is a point of attention which has only one aspect, or which can be treated under one aspect. A fact, then, is an ideal construction, and has its existence within a more or less variable sphere of practical or scientific interest" (284).

11. Euhemerus held that gods were deifications of heroes, and Müller, in his "Essay on Comparative Mythology" (1856) and in *Natural Religion* (1889), argued that they were personifications of natural phenomena. Müller and his disciple George W. Cox pushed the solar myth theory to such extravagant lengths that it fell into disrepute.

12. Durkheim's concept of "collective representations," described here as outlined in "Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives" (1898), was to be a guiding principle in *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* (1912). See TSE's second review of *Elementary Forms* (672, n. 4).

13. *Trans*: "the ways of acting, thinking, and feeling, external to the individual, which are endowed with a power of coercion by virtue of which they impose themselves upon the individual." "There are certain currents of opinion which push us, with varying degrees of intensity depending on the time and place, in the direction of marriage, for example, or suicide, or towards higher or lower birth rates."

14. "*Est fait social toute manière de faire, fixée ou non, susceptible d'exercer sur l'individu une contrainte extérieure; ou bien encore, qui est générale dans l'étendue d'une société donnée tout en ayant une existence propre, indépendante de ses manifestations individuelles*" (italics in original; *Les Règles* 19).

15. "La première règle et la plus fondamentale est de *considérer les faits sociaux comme des choses*" (*Les Règles* 20); "*Il faut écarter systématiquement toutes les prénotions*" (italics in original; *Les Règles* 40).

16. Durkheim, who viewed sociology as science, chastises the positivists Auguste Comte (1798-1857) and Herbert Spencer, and the utilitarian John Stuart Mill (1806-73) for failing to treat "social facts as things" ("*les faits sociaux comme des choses*") (italics in original), not as ideas or impressions.

17. "Mais cette nécessité toute logique ne ressemble en rien à celle que présentent les vraies lois de la nature. Celles-ci expriment les rapports suivant lesquels les faits s'enchaînent réellement, non la manière dont il est bon qu'ils s'enchaînent" (*Les Règles* 34).

18. In *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (1908), the British scholar William McDougall (1871-1938) sets forth his account of the primary emotions underlying religious experience. TSE took a short course from McDougall at Oxford in 1915 (*LI* 107).

19. Durkheim chastises Raffaele Garofalo (1851-1934), who, in spite of maintaining in his *Criminologie* (1888) that criminology is a social science, fails to use scientific methods: "pour constituer cette notion, il ne compare pas indistinctement tous les actes qui, dans les différents types sociaux, ont été réprimés par des peines régulières, mais seulement certains d'entre eux, à savoir ceux qui offensent la partie moyenne et immuable du sens moral" (*Les Règles* 49-50). *Trans*: "in building this theory, he does not compare all actions which have been repressed by

regular punishment, but only certain ones, those which offend the normal and unchangeable part of the moral sense.”

20. In the preface to *The Threshold of Religion* (London: Methuen, 1909), British ethnologist R. R. Marett (1866-1943) announces: “I hold that religion in its psychological aspect is, fundamentally, a mode of social behaviour” (x-xi).

21. Irving King (1874-1927), *The Development of Religion: A Study in Anthropology and Social Psychology* (New York: Macmillan, 1910), 22. TSE’s parentheses.

22. At this point, TSE writes and then strikes out the following paragraph: “It is one thing to talk about behavior of individuals, another about the behavior of a group. For in the latter case the difficulty of discriminating between psychical and physical is still present and is aggravated by a new element. Among the purely social facts, of which Durkheim talks, the individual facts are still ingredients, as the physical facts are still ingredients in the individual. And the question is, whether these forms of social behavior can be interpreted, or even described, without reference to the individual fact, and whether we are able to conceive of a chain of causality and a formulation of law in regard to these facts without using language which can have meaning only when applied to the individual.”

23. The “Cambridge Ritualist” Jane Ellen Harrison (1850-1928) had explored the origins of ritual in her *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* (1903), *Ancient Art and Ritual* (1912), and *Themis: A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion* (1912).

24*. Here TSE inserts a marginal notation: “‘purpose’ in process is simply an interpretation, not a description.”

25. The Scottish anthropologist J. G. Frazer (1854-1941) wrote *The Golden Bough*, a twelve-volume encyclopedia of comparative mythology (1890-1915). TSE gives only the page number (266) of *The Dying God* (*The Golden Bough*, Part III, 3rd edition, 1911) on which Frazer gives his account of the “magical rites of spring festivals.” At the beginning or end of the quotation (editorially supplied), TSE exclaims, “This volume appeared as recently as 1911!”

26. “*Quand donc on entreprend d’expliquer un phénomène social, il faut rechercher séparément la cause efficiente qui le produit et la fonction qu’il remplit . . .* Toutes ces questions d’intention sont, d’ailleurs, trop subjectives pour pouvoir être traitées scientifiquement” (*Les Règles* 117-18; italics in original).

27. Harrison’s fellow “Cambridge Ritualists,” who held that the origin of myth lay in ritual, included the classical scholars Gilbert Murray (1866-1957), who became Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford in 1908 after the publication of his *The Rise of the Greek Epic* (1907); Francis McDonald Cornford (1874-1943), author of *From Religion to Philosophy* (1900), whose *The Origin of Attic Comedy* (1914) became an important work for TSE; and Arthur Bernard Cook (1868-1952), whose first volume of *Zeus: A Study in Ancient Religion* appeared in Dec 1914.

28. TSE here cites Harrison’s *Themis: A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion* (Cambridge UP, 1912), specifically her account of how the god Kournos arises for the Kouretes: “Strong emotion collectively experienced begets this illusion of objective reality; each worshipper is conscious of something in his emotion not himself, stronger than himself. He does not know it is the force of collective suggestion, he calls it a god. . . . One element in the making of a god we have seen to be the projection of collective emotion, the reaction of man on his fellow man” (46-49).

29. Harrison's explanation of *orenda* and *mana*: "Almost all savages have some word by which they express a force or power which seems to them uncanny, something which arrests their attention and rouses in them a feeling of awe. . . . A man's *orenda* is his power to do things, almost his personality, yet remaining impersonal. A man who hunts well has much *orenda*."

The *mana* of the Melanesians is very like *orenda*, but seems to be somewhat more specialized. All men do not possess *mana*, though it seems mainly to originate in personal human beings. . . . A man's social position depends mainly on the amount of *mana* he has." Harrison cautions, however, that "any attempt to distinguish between the *mana*, *orenda* and the like is evidently precarious, since we are liable to be misled by the emphasis on special usages of the word" (*Themis* 66-67).

30. TSE began an additional paragraph, but marked it out, ending at this point. The deleted portion: "History and comparison give us a constant relation of contiguity between groups of facts however the interpretation varies. These relations of course can never be wholly fixed . . ." When TSE finished reading the paper, he and Royce had a brief exchange, recorded by Costello (*JRS* 76-78), on the problematics of interpretation. On the verso of page 14 of the manuscript, TSE notes part of Royce's response: "Royce / Interpretation / Communication between individual and social mind whenever the politician interrogates the public mind."


TEXTUAL NOTE

Location: Hayward Bequest (King's): P4(b); pencil holograph: fourteen pages, numbered 1-14 in TSE's hand; the verso of page 14 bears a response from Royce in TSE's hand; twelve unruled leaves of brown paper, no watermark, 21.2 × 27.5 cm; and two of unruled yellow paper, watermark: Minnesota Bond, 21.2 × 27.5 cm; plus three additional unruled light blue leaves of insertions, numbered according to the leaf they follow: 2A [formerly 11A], 3A [formerly 18], and 8A [formerly 15]; watermark: Persian Bond, 14.2 × 22.9 cm. The seventeen leaves also have smaller secondary numbers below or beside their primary page numbers, evidently from the pagination of an earlier draft, in this sequence: 29, 12, 11A, 14, 18, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 15, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27. TSE indicated in a letter in Feb 1949 to Grover Smith that he did not believe that this manuscript on the "methodology of anthropology," found among the papers given to John Hayward, had survived.

Communication and Inspection

On 16 Dec 1913, Eliot gave the first of four short presentations for Professor Royce's seminar. He titled it "Communication and Inspection" and, according to Costello, resumed the argument about interpretation outlined the previous week in his long paper. Costello summarizes the basic question as: "what is the status of a supposed fact which includes as part of itself a belief or a meaning? How can we be sure we are correctly interpreting the mental life of a savage when the savage could not verify our interpretation if we could present it to him, because he could not understand it" (*JRS* 85).

Communication and Inspection:



Described content and expressed content fuse, but the attitude of Correspondent toward them is different.

Description can be considered in the aspect of expression, and expression considered as description. How far are you going to accept description and how far shift the centre of gravity of identity.

When two peoples or two religious parties "understand" each other better, they use I suppose both each other's descriptions and each other's expressions.

A fact implies identity.

Communication seems to imply an identity in different contexts.

What is a fact which includes a belief?

In different cases, does that which is interpreted exist to a greater or less degree apart from interpretation?

You do interpret another's description into terms of your own description: when the point of identity is different from the two points of view.

Two peoples or sects may discover that they both mean the same thing. But religion and its scientific interpreter will never meet in this birth.

Description-expression is not simple expression; for the latter can be handled on our basis of truth-error directly; the former involves the interpretation of another level—How far are we to say “this is error”—“this is true”—“this is neither truth nor error.”

TEXTUAL NOTE

Location: Hayward Bequest (King's): T. S. Eliot: Philosophical Essays and Notes, P4(c); archivally titled [Communication and Interpretation]; pencil holograph, titled “Communication and Inspection,” some words overwritten in ink, one sheet of yellow paper; watermark: Minnesota Bond, 21.2 x 27.5 cm.

Description and Explanation

On 24 Feb 1914, Eliot presented the second of four short papers for Professor Royce's seminar. Costello records the title as "Description and Explanation," briefly summarizes the argument, and paraphrases the exchange that ensued between Royce and Eliot (*JRS* 118-21).

Explication by reference of a case to a law

by reference of an illusion to a reality

by reference of an effect to a cause

by metaphysical interpretation

Description, unless otiose, is always more than description, for it involves a change of point of view; and explanation never really explains, because it involves the maintenance of one point of view (an act of will, so to speak) and this maintenance is impossible.

There can be in the end no merely particular existences. Yet existence as presented is always, in theory, merely particular. With given facts, we can do one of two things; we can either interpret them by reference to a ground or cause, or we can endeavour to hold them before the attention and describe them as given. This distinction I believe valid, though relative, and not to be pressed too closely. Now the conscious attempt to describe is a more sophisticated operation than the attempt to explain; and in the primitive consciousness the fact (phenomenon), which we treat, is not given. For the primitive, it may be said with a certain degree of truth, there are no facts. There is appearance, but not observation; and the ground or cause which has the least affinity to the appearance has often perhaps for this reason the most cogency to the primitive mind; it is not sought to relate the two as one type of reality to another, but to find a reality with an empathetic potency, so to speak, of producing an appearance of the sort; the kinship of cause and effect, and ground and consequence, is thus not external, mechanistic, but internal and volitional, a kinship of references, not of common character. The cause is most likely an agent which would be apt to will such an effect. The assertion that such and such phenomena are due to will is in one way or another

perhaps the most primitive and perhaps as well the most ultimate form of explanation that we know and use.

The progress of science is to some extent an advance through progressive dissatisfaction, and the difference is one of degree. Any stage of explanation, I believe, depends upon the maintenance of a particular point of view; and an animistic explanation is possible so long as we can maintain (by what is in a sense an act of will) this internality which makes the subjective and volitional more real to us than anything else. I am, accordingly, saying nothing blasphemously heterodox if I assert that it cannot be wholly true that any explanation is wholly wrong.

The explanation by reference of case to law or of consequence to ground is of course the perception of relation of particulars to a universal. The explanation by volition easily passes over into this, because the will tends to become a universal; a cause which is the cause only of this one particular effect is recognised to be no explanation, and becomes part of a total nexus to be explained. If the will, on the one hand, is the particular volition, it does not explain: if it tends to be universalised, it is more and more set over against and contrasted with the indefinite possibilities of effect. The particular reverts to the particular, and ceases to be adequately subsumed by the will.

Ordinarily, we have explanation in time through cause and effect, and of course, I make the explanation reciprocal, of cause by effect as well as of effect by cause, and so arriving at the conception of a self-contained nexus in which cause and effect are replaced by ground and consequence, and ground and consequence tend to melt into each other. We also have explanation by subsumption, which *prima facie* involves a different point of view from that of cause and effect. Yet so far as cause and effect really can be said to explain (and hence to be really causal), it is not simply cause and effect, but tends to become a relation of particular to universal. "The flying buttress was rendered necessary both by the hypertrophy of glass windows and the stone roof"; "the walls collapsed because of the weight of the roof"; "I took cold because I sat in a draft", state not only a sequence but a general principle.

Explanation through reference to a universal principle may pass into description in the following way. The particular is at first recognised as a case of the law, and this expansion of meaning, this process of self-transcendence of the particular, the felt transition, is explanation. On the other hand, we return to the particular and find more in it than is subsumed under that law; or if the particular can be felt to have no other aspect than what the law

covers, we have simply described it, for in stating the particular, we have already stated the universal, and the independent statement of the universal does not give us that transition to a higher degree of reality which is explanation. So that when we regard the case and the law, not internally, in the act of transition, but as two related realities, we find that we have merely complicated the problem by presenting a more complex whole to be explained. We become so habituated to think of the case and its law together, that we no longer feel the illumination of transition, and have only the impulse toward a new transition in a different direction. We could remain satisfied with one field of explanation only so long as we regarded the case as only a case of that law; and we have seen that, in order to be a case at all, it must be much more. Ultimately, of course, it enters into a non-relational experience, and proximately any phenomenon is not simply that phenomenon, but enters into various irreducible fields of explanation. I mean, of course, that there is ultimately no such thing as “matter of fact.”

There is another order of explanation than those mentioned—that of the explanation of illusion, either in the way of practical hallucination or in a metaphysical sense. This is a problem of cognition rather than of scientific method, but the principle involved is the same. In no case and in no theory of knowledge is illusion ever ultimately explained, for the explanation implies a paradox. You must confine yourself to a limited point of view, according to which, in passing from illusion to reality, the illusion disappears, and yet remains in the status of an unreal object—a class of objects. I may remark in passing, which has proved intractable to so-called “scientific” *Gegenstandsforschungen*, for the reason that it involves the maintenance in consciousness of two points of view at the same time.¹ In order to treat the illusion scientifically, you must treat it as real, and so you arrive, as before, only at a new complex to be explained; you have achieved nothing better than a description.

If the footing of explanation is so unsteady, that of description is no better. For even to be description, it involves a change of point of view, and so is explanation. The hypothetical limiting case of description would be pure contemplation which does not alter its object, and that for a finite consciousness is out of the question. To have significant description, you must arrange data in a new whole, in an order which was not strictly given in the data as data. Take any simple object you will, give an account of it, and you will find that you have given a valuation and an interpretation. If you did describe the thing as it really is, the whole truth about it, you would not be

describing, you would be presenting: described and description would be identical.

There are degrees in everything. In general one can say that description is the function of science, explanation (or interpretation) of metaphysics. This statement is only relatively true. But relatively, metaphysics involves personality more than does science—and explanation is explanation comprehended by a point of view. For those who are metaphysically inclined, I would intimate that in the Absolute, explanation and description meet. But with us, I do not see why the scientist (or the metaphysician) should trouble himself as to whether he is describing or explaining. Qua scientist, he has nothing to do with the matter. For his own consciousness, he will find that he does both: he never remains at one point of view. This suggests a monadology, differing from Leibniz in that the centres are points of view and not consciousnesses.² Leibniz, I think, starts from the wrong end, and conceiving his monads on the analogy of physical organisms, forgets the fact, and denudes them of physical reality, while retaining the implication.

NOTES

1. *Gegenstandsforschungen*: studies of objects.

2. The theory that reality consists of simple substances or monads, expounded by the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716) in *La Monadologie* (1714), is discussed in TSE's 1916 *Monist* essays, "The Development of Leibniz's Monadism" and "Leibniz's Monads and Bradley's Finite Centres." See 440; 462.

TEXTUAL NOTE

Location: Hayward Bequest (King's): T. S. Eliot: Philosophical Essays and Notes, P4(d); untitled and undated pencil holograph, six leaves of yellow paper numbered 2-6; watermark: Minnesota Bond, 21.2 x 27.5 cm.

Cause as ideal construction

Eliot was absent for the meeting of Royce's seminar on 17 Mar 1914. His paper, "Cause as ideal construction," was read to the group by a fellow student, Narendra Nath Sen Gupta. The ensuing discussion by Royce and other participants is briefly summarized in Costello's notebook (*JRS* 135, 137-38).

Cause and because
Cause and chance
Cause and function
Cause and volition



Causality is one of those puzzles which can be explained away but not explained: and to explain away is to dispose of only from a particular limited point of view. I agree thoroughly with Mr. Russell when he speaks of cause as a superstition:¹ I only question whether we could live without superstitions. I am apt to stoop to pick up a pin, and Mr. Russell may say that I do so because I am superstitious.

I should connect causality with what M. Lévy-Bruhl calls the law of participation.² Participation accounts for a number of pre-logical mental processes, the general nature of which is the feeling of an indefinable community of nature between objects and beings of the most diverse sorts. Thus animism, totemism, mystical phenomena, various myths of origin, etc. Any attribution of force or volition is due to participation. M. Lévy-Bruhl says that we have not yet—and perhaps never will—supercede participation. Now in the case of causality I suggest that there may be a double participation: between the cause and the effect, and between the objects and ourselves.

There is thus a close relation between the experience of cause and the experience of volition. Volition is not strictly speaking a real object of attention, but only an intended object. In any act of will we feel a relation between ourselves and the consequence which is not describable, because in order to describe, we must put ourselves outside, and putting ourselves outside, volition disappears. What we mean when we talk about will is some thing meant to be internal, described from a point of view external, but really existing only from a point of view internal-external: that is, by participation. What I mean is that we have direct knowledge neither of our

own nor of others' will; a simple man could no more have will than could a machine. We have will by an interpretation of our own behavior and of others. Will is not something which merely happens, but is an ideal construction.

Now in will, we feel our volition causing a consequence. Causation is thus implied in will, but on the other hand, I believe, will is implied in causation. There is a participation between cause and effect, and this participation is not observed, but felt. The cause is active, and activity is internal to it. No object qua object possesses activity, but only as it is felt to possess a reality beyond its objectivity: an activity [in] which it participates with us, and there is then a double participation, between cause and effect, and between self and object.

I suppose (as an hypothesis) that in the development of objectivity the aspects of volition and cause become more and more clearly distinguished. Accordingly it will be more and more clearly observed that the cause cannot be an object but an event. Thus we say loosely that one billiard ball knocks another into a pocket; more exactly, that the cause was the motion communicated by the other. Objects become more and more sharply separated from each other, and cease to participate, and the cause is an event into which the object enters. Volition and causality being now distinct, the ideality of both is perhaps more clearly apparent. "Cause is invariable event."³ Fact and ideality separate: in the primitive mind, I have urged before, there is nothing strictly fact and nothing strictly ideal.⁴ We now analyse a sequence of phenomena and an ideal interpretation; the phenomena then appear to be the reality and the causation mere illusion. But quality—"content," "material," "aspect"—cannot change without the objects changing. The phenomena which are strictly phenomena and only described are not the same as those which were causally connected. Objectification annihilates causality. Causation in specific cases is connected, because of a participation between those facts and that universal connection. That universal connection is good for those facts, and those facts are those facts only in participation with that universal. But they are really something more than those facts, and as they pass over into another aspect, the causal relation (if cause observe the name relation) disappears. As we substitute for entities in whose being we participate, such as merely denote, we destroy causality. Instead of causality, implication.

We may now call attention to one point in connection with the cause and the because. We may say, if we like, that q follows because of p, and this

usage will do no great harm, if we see that it does not mean that *p* is the cause of *q*. The reference here is to the process of mental apprehension. Because we apprehend *p*, we apprehend *q*. Suppose I stop to ask whether I posted a certain letter. I suddenly remember stopping to see that it was stamped before I put it in the box, and am satisfied. Now is the idea of looking at the stamp at a certain time and place the cause of the idea that I posted the letter? Considered as objects, the two ideas are no more related causally than two bricks. Nor are they merely associated. Objectively, they may imply one another; but they are lived through, and the one precipitates the other. A proposition implies, an act causes.

Necessity and freedom, according to the above account, are the same thing, so far as freedom means voluntary action and not chance. Necessity I take to be hypothetical and not categorical, and thus to be relative to imperfect knowledge. It is participated in and not observed.

Similarly I cannot feel that chance is any more ultimate than necessity, will, or causality. Chance, that is, is, like necessity, hypothetical and not categorical, and occurs at the intersection of different systems involving different interests and values. The throw of a die is chance because of the irrelevance (to us) of the physical antecedents of each throw to the number which turns up,⁵ and I do not suppose that we can rest until our universe is entirely consistent. I do not see that chance is opposed to cause; we even think of chance as the cause; but it does seem to me to be a description only of an ignorance.

According to the report of causality here suggested, we will talk of cause and effect whenever a phenomenon or a group of phenomena is thought of as lived through and not as contemplated. Whenever we desire to explain, we will think of a reality which causes the appearance, but as soon as we have clearly formulated it, it turns out to be itself appearance. From this point of view, we are phenomenologists.

NOTES

1. In "On the Notion of Cause," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, New Series, 13 (1912-1913), 1-26, Russell argues that "the word 'cause' is so inextricably bound up with misleading associations as to make its complete extrusion from the philosophical vocabulary desirable" (1). TSE was in Russell's seminar when the above paper was written and had recently heard his Lowell Lectures, published as *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914).

2. TSE discussed Lévy-Bruhl's "law of participation" in "The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual," in a 1916 review of C. C. J. Webb's *Group Theories of Religion and the Individual*, and in his 1926 introduction to Charlotte Eliot's *Savonarola*. See 114-15; 417; 2.775, n.4.

3. Not a quotation; rather, apparently, TSE's summary of the argument.
4. See "The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual" (106).
5. An allusion to Stéphane Mallarmé's "Un coup de dés jamais n'abolira le hasard" (1897) ("A Throw of the Dice Will Never Abolish Chance").

TEXTUAL NOTE

Location: Harvard University (Houghton): bMS Am 1691.14 (18), archivally titled [Causality]; undated pencil holograph, four unruled yellow leaves, 2-4 numbered; watermark: Minnesota Bond, 21.2 x 27.5 cm.

Suggestions toward a Theory of Objects, followed by a note on the subject-matter of psychology, in illustration¹

On 5 May 1914, Eliot read “Suggestions toward a Theory of Objects,” his fourth and final paper for Royce’s seminar. A record of the day’s proceedings, including a summary of Eliot’s presentation, is included in Costello’s notebook (*JRS* 173-77).²

I consider the classification of the types of object entirely an empirical affair. The object as such is quite independent of the subject—that is, the object as object, not the object as “object.” We have simply to look about and discover what objects there are.

Distinction between classification of objects and the Kantian problem of knowledge.³ Kant’s categories cover only things, and the categories are themselves objects (classes).⁴ Kant’s problem is no more closely related to mine than the analysis of things into their material constituents is to his. According to the point of view of the theory of objects, we do not explain, we only describe: an explanation, that is, is always for purposes of practice. Much is explanation in epistemology which is not so in the theory of objects. For instance, the epistemologist may explain things as bundles of sense-data; but for us, this is simply the substitution of one group of objects for another. We incline to think, in such a substitution, that we have found something more real than was first given us. But whether this alteration of objects is a discovery about the same thing is a matter of degree, and depends upon the practical use that we can make of the discovery. If a coat is made up of threads, or if it is made up of sense-data, the coat and the threads and the sense-data are equally real. Yet we may ask whether the reals are all real in the same way, and whether we can handle all types of reals upon the same level. This question is the starting point for this theory.

We may begin by thinking of the world as quite wild and chaotic and contradictory, full of all sorts of object both positive and negative. We may take **things** as the primitive type of object.⁵ An unreal thing, of course, is still a real object. All the higher objects, I believe, may be founded upon things—even the objects of the epistemologist, out of which he constructs his things, for the knowledge is subsequent to the knowledge of things: things are the first objects known to be such. This priority, however, must be

understood to be only relative, inasmuch as the points of view of knowing and of being constantly shift before our attention, like the staircase in the illusion:⁶ from one point of view, that is, things are prior in reality, and from another, they are prior only in knowledge—according as we consider knowing as knowing or knowing as an activity. The point of view here taken will be (provisionally of course) that of knowing as knowing, and the higher objects will be held to be “founded” upon things.

I repeat, then, that we do not begin in knowledge with sense-data, but that sense-data are derivative from things. The ultimate elements of knowledge, in this way, would be rather the individual constituents of matter. In any case the sense-datum is an object of a very different sort from a sense-datum [sic]. Consequently it is meaningless to say that this or that is what is “immediately” given without stating the field of objectivity with which one is concerned. Putting data together to make a chair involves an **interpretation**, a **translation** from one type to another, and is, from the point of view here taken, illegitimate.

We have here an indication of what I mean by a type of object. Things form one type, sense-data another. Universals and relations may form another type. I think that higher objects, such as these mentioned, are understood only **by reference to things**: i.e. we “explain” sense-data by physics and physiology, although the sense-datum is just as good an object as the thing; similarly we can explain universals and relations [as] the extension of terms related, although they again are just as good objects as anything else, and the only alternative, it seems to me (in the case of relations) is that which Mr. Bradley has made us acquainted with, and which involves us in the endless regress.⁷ But this way of accounting for higher objects in terms of things must not be understood as implying any dependence of higher upon lower; the question of dependence or independence is here meaningless.

Causality I should hold to be one of the most interesting of the founded objects, and I do not think that any[one] ought to call himself a realist who decries causality as a superstition.⁸ It has simply that sort of elusiveness which characterises founded objects—they slip between our fingers when we wish to examine them closely, but are none the less real and objective for all that. By far the largest groups of higher objects, I should say, will [be] those of mental and social objects. Consciousness, for example, is real, and its “activity” is in some sense a fact; but it does not, I hold, exist as an object for science, and to speak of it as active (or indeed, from a scientific point of view, as existent at all) involves an **interpretation**, an **alteration of type**.

An object, or a group of objects, provides subject-matter for science just so far as it may be treated as a thing, or as a group of things. Now when you regard ideas as things, for example, you introduce yourself to far more difficulties than when you treat relations as things. An idea is in fact a sort of relation. So far as ideas are objects, they tend to become things, and we may say in a certain sense that if there were no things, but only ideas, then ideas would be things. All ideas are a social product and are in a sense (that is, as objects, not simply as ideas) an interpretation of behaviour (one's own and others'). You can, for certain purposes, define ideas as the fulfilment of purpose, but for my present purpose, purpose is itself an idea. Ideas are not found, but founded. An idea differs from a sign in this: that a sign is not object *qua* sign in the same sense in which that to which it refers, or that with which it refers (the mark or sound) is real. Ideas differ from signs in that they lack this reality of the same type as that to which they refer, the relatum. An idea is not an x which means something, it is simply and barely the meaning, and it demands some effort of abstraction to realise that the meaning is not itself a thing, for in manipulating the word "meaning" (or "reference"), we tend always to substitute (a) a thing which means or (b) a thing which is meant.

I am inclined at present to treat imaginary and unreal objects (including such as the round square) as types of founded or higher objects, but I have no further certainty as to how they ought to be treated. Hallucinations are founded objects from two points of view: for the person deluded, hallucination is supposedly a thing, whereas it is really (for him) an object founded upon a thing; and *qua* hallucination, i.e. for a person not deluded, the hallucination is an object in the same way as an idea; i.e. it is founded upon (a) the real perceived world, [and] (b) upon the nervous system of the invalid.

Tentative table of objects: Things

universals and relations

classes

space and time

causality

"mental" objects: ideas, feelings, emotions, will, desire, signs,
consciousness, the self, the soul, etc.

imaginary and negative objects.

"social" objects: institutions, religions, etc.
facts.

The important questions with regard to these different objects relate to alterations of type, such as I referred to in connection with sense-data. (cf. also the quotations from Stout and Witasek, p. 57 of the following).⁹ Many of the vexed points in ethics turn upon such alterations: e.g., do we desire pleasure, or a thing, or a fact? Upon my view, this is not a real disjunction, but each may be true in its own way. It may be permissible, notice, to reduce higher objects to lower, as when we take relations in extension, or when we treat consciousness as negligible in physiology; but whether it is permissible to treat higher objects **as if** they were lower (things) is another problem, and the question can be decided, so far as I can see, only by the success of the working of the attempt. How far the so-called social sciences are sciences at all, how far, that is, their objects can be handled as things and the higher object causality superposed upon them, this is a question which would demand careful investigation. The degree of emancipation from the thing-foundations which such social objects may attain, and the degree to which they may reach practical thinghood themselves, is in my opinion wholly for observation to decide.

I am inclined to think that there are no objects for psychology, although the objects which psychology handles surely exist; my contention is that these objects can[not] be freed¹⁰ from their *inferiora* sufficiently to be manipulated scientifically as independent entities. I have no case against psychophysics. But this science is, I think, a branch of physiology, and reduces one type of object to another, instead of presenting a parallelism. Its business is to resolve the psychical into its physiological *inferiora*.¹¹

NOTES

1. The illustration from psychology, recorded in detail by Costello (*JRS* 173-75), is missing from the draft and revised typescript. See note 11.

2. Costello's summary: "The paper was along the line of Meinong's proposed *Gegenstandstheorie*. It was not to be considered an attempt to make a list of metaphysical categories; it wished to find empirically what sorts of objects there were, and to suggest the fallacies which might arise in attempting to reduce these sorts to one another" (*JRS* 176-77).

3. This distinction is emphasized in Costello's account of TSE's remarks in the seminar: "Classification of *Gegenstände höherer Ordnung*, different types of objects. Not metaphysical categories—empirical. A theory of their relations metaphysical. Not Kantian categories" (*JRS* 173).

4. See TSE's 1913 essay, "Report on the Kantian Categories" (29).

5. TSE used red ribbon for emphasis, in this edition printed in bold.

6. TSE may be alluding to Marcel Duchamp's 1912 painting, *Nu descendant un escalier* (*Nude Descending a Staircase*), which was covered extensively by the press when it appeared as part of the International Exhibition of Modern Art in New York in Feb 1913.

7. According to Costello, TSE added: "Ideas like relations are not things; cf. the first chapter of Bradley's *Logic*" (*JRS* 173). Remarking that although ideas exist "within my head," Bradley insists that they are "as stubborn a fact as any outward object. . . ideas are phenomena" (*PL* 2). Ideas, he further maintains, exist because of relations to more fundamental objects: "the idea . . . must be the idea of something in space or time. It must have the character of particularity, . . . and endless relation" (*PL* 72).

8. TSE's previous presentation, "Cause as ideal construction," discusses Russell's position that cause is a superstition.

9. The "following" refers to the missing note on psychology, in which, as summarized by Costello (*JRS* 173), TSE gives two illustrations, the first from *A Manual of Psychology* (London: University Correspondence College Press, 1899) by G. F. Stout (1860-1944): "If I perceive a triangle, my perception is not triangular,—it is not made up of lines and angles" (58). TSE's second illustration, in his own translation, is from *Grundlinien der Psychologie* (Leipzig: Meiner, 1908) by Stephan Witasek (1870-1915): "a stone die is hard and cold, grey and heavy and angular: the presentation thereof, the thought or memory of the die, has none of these characteristics, and cannot have them—it merely itself contains, over again, the presentation of hard and cold and so on. . . . My *inner picture* . . . of the tree . . . is known only to myself" (3). TSE quotes and discusses both passages in chapter 3 of his dissertation (283).

10. TSE may have inadvertently dropped part of a word here, for both the context and the syntax call for "cannot be freed."

11. Costello's summary outlines the "note on the subject-matter of psychology" promised in the subtitle. "Various theories were criticized, most favorably that of Lipps, to the effect that sensation is an intermediary between subject and object and inseparable from both, and this intermediary is the subject-matter of psychology" (*JRS* 177). TSE's note, as recorded by Costello:

Subject-matter of psychology. Prichard: two types of psychology, mental content and psychological process. Content is in one context, object in another—Wodehouse, Witasek, Höfler. When you consider a sensation of red as cognitive, you know the object; later you turn to "red," a uniquely determined one. Object is presented to consciousness but [is] not a presentation. A red object, otherwise known than by the quality red, is in an order. We sense a red spot. Stout says an object belongs to psychology as known to an individual mind. But then can we study it as related to a mind? Cigar known to smoker, known to psychology, and known to psychology as known to smoker. Alexander: [in] conational psychology, including affection [the] sensum [is] non-mental. Do away with presentation. Difficulty, again, in constructing a thing out of sensations: object and quality not distinct yet not same. Best theory that of Lipps, *Inhalt und Gegenstand*: Things given. We are conscious of thing. Self and its objects form one whole. Get psychological objects by turning in direction of Self (*Ich*). Mental states are relations which in one reference are external. Properties not things but experience with respect to a point of attention. (Cf. Ward: All from a certain point of view.) *Ich, Empfinden, Empfundene*. Color is a relation between myself and object but not separate, and makes up both. Can't be separated from both. Natural science is to get terms and relations belonging to a system. Appearance in relation to self would demand a whole universe of sciences. Lipps has mind essentially related to world. Abstract self and world along with it.

Descriptive psychology deals with objects which are probably not independent of *inferiora* (things) to which they refer. The idea is a constructed interpretation of behavior, no person with *one* idea. Behavior of other people and our own calls for ideas to interpret it. Idea can't be handled as a thing: disappears in two ways—physiological concomitants and things. No consciousness as an object: no such thing; consciousness is amateur metaphysics. Any philosophy which tries to interpret one type of object in terms of others is metaphysics and not description. In description one type of object is just as real and self-dependent as another (*JRS* 174-75, brackets in Costello).

The presentation was followed immediately by an exchange with Royce (175-76). TSE returns to the above-mentioned psychologists/philosophers in his Oxford essays and in "The Psychologist's Treatment of Knowledge," chapter 3 of his dissertation (282-83).

TEXTUAL NOTES

1. Location: Harvard University (Houghton); bMS Am 1691.14 (22); undated typescript (elite) with black/red ribbon; red used for emphasis; two pencil corrections in final paragraph; five unruled leaves, 2-5 numbered; watermark: Marcus Ward's, 20.3 x 26.7 cm.
2. TSE's five-page draft of this paper—titled "Classification of types of object,—a priori or empirical?"—is at King's, P4(f).

[The Ethics of Satisfaction in Tucker's *The Light of Nature Pursued*]¹

[The Ethics of Satisfaction in Tucker's *The Light of Nature Pursued*] was written at Harvard in spring 1914 for "Philosophy 20d: Seminary in Ethics" taught by Professor Ralph Barton Perry. The content for the course is described as "the history of ethics."

"The life of a man devoted to study and retirement, to the investigation of metaphysical truth, and the practice of religious duties, can indeed hardly be expected to afford much in the detail to amuse or interest the public: And the uniform regularity of the life of the author of the 'Light of Nature' was certainly interrupted by few extraordinary occurrences" [I.iv]. These are the prefatory words of his grandson, Sir St. John Mildmay, who writes the introduction to *The Light of Nature*. Tucker was born in London in 1705, the son of a wealthy merchant; went to Oxford, studied French, Italian, music, mathematics, and metaphysics, as well as Latin and Greek. Subsequently he read law for some length of time, but having an independent fortune, devoted himself for the most of his life to the care of the estate of Betchworth Castle, which he had purchased.² The rest of his life, after his twenty-second year, he passed with his family as a country gentleman.

Mr. Tucker seems to have been as methodical in his manner of life as he was loose in his literary style. He always rose early in the morning, says his biographer, to pursue his literary labours. After breakfast he turned again to the pursuit for two or three hours, and passed the remainder of the morning in some moral exercise. In the winter he passed some months in town; and "when no inducement presented itself, he would sometimes walk from Great James Street, where he resided, to St. Paul's or to the Bank, to see, as he would good-humouredly observe, what it was o'clock" [I.xviii]. Without commenting upon Mr. Tucker's sense of humour, one may say a good deal for his virtues both public and domestic. After the death of his wife, he collected all the correspondence that had passed between them at periods when they were accidentally separated, and transcribed them twice over under the title of the "Picture of Artless Love."³

Tucker's style has all the virtues and the faults of a man of intellectual interests but no great intellectual power, a man whose provincial garrulity

and discursiveness had never been chastened by direct contact with first-rate minds. I do not know what men of note he came in contact with; he was acquainted I suppose with most of the philosophical literature of the time; [he] refers to Hartley, but always (so far as I have read) in connection with physiological hypotheses; to Berkeley with complete contempt (Berkeley's ethical theories he does not mention); to Hume (so far as I have read) not at all; to Wollaston once; and everywhere, of course, to Locke, whom he follows almost always and whom he dissents from only with the most elaborate apologies and explanations.⁴

The Light of Nature Pursued, his chief work, he began about 1756; he published four octavo volumes in 1765. The work is very diffuse and incoherent: discourses of psychology, ethics, practical morality and ethics, theology, homiletics, cosmology, logic, physiology; and one of the longest chapters is a whimsical account of a vision in which he is transported into the vehicular state, through which he is conducted by the soul of John Locke, and which discloses a cosmological scheme which appears intended as a sort of Platonic myth.⁵

The book however has merits and points of interest quite apart from its curiosity. Tucker is a thoroughgoing psychological and ethical hedonist. His chapter on Pleasure is in the middle of volume II, while his chapter on Satisfaction is in the middle of volume I; while there are two chapters on Motives in volume II and another in volume I—but I will do my best to piece the parts together.

"Pleasure seems at first sight to bid the fairest for being that ingredient which gives weight to our motives, and we find by experience in multitudes of instances that it proves a sufficient inducement with us to act" (I.97). But, he says "if we understand the term as it is commonly understood, we shall find pleasure often insufficient to perform the office of a motive, for we do many things against our liking. . . . Therefore Mr. Locke has fixed upon the term Satisfaction as being more extensive." The term satisfaction expresses "that vivifying ingredient which gives life and vigour to our motives" (I.98). We are often, it is true, moved by present uneasiness alone, but Tucker denies that this is a distinct principle. There is however a real and sensible difference between pleasure and absence of pain, and a difference between one pleasure and another. There are greater and less pleasures, and more and less intense (I.102). But satisfaction is "pleasure taken in the largest sense, as comprising every complacence of mind together with the avoidance of pain or uneasiness" (II.227), and this is the summum

bonum. Knowledge is good by directing us “to choose the things that are most useful”; useful things are good, by ministering to our wants and desires. But the goodness of satisfaction is ultimate. We can give no reason, but can raise no objection (II.231).

This *summum bonum*, however, is one in species only, containing a multitude of individuals. The term satisfaction, we note, Tucker uses not altogether clearly. He prefers “satisfaction” to pleasure because pleasures are usually opposed to business and duty, although in the performance of these we experience complacency and well-being. But I am not sure that the two terms are not ordinarily synonymous. Satisfaction cannot continue without a continual application of satisfactory causes, so that we give the *Summum Bonum* another name: Happiness, the aggregate of satisfaction, while satisfaction is of a single moment (II.233).

The relation of satisfaction or pleasure to happiness is a purely prudential one. We indulge in pleasures so far as they do not conflict with happiness, and the happiness which I contrast with pleasure may be of a greater or less span of time. Thus I deny myself the momentary pleasure of an indigestible dish because of the subsequent unhappiness of dyspepsia; but though I arrange my several acts with reference to the happiness of a few years, yet if my happiness at the end of that time be endangered thereby, I am not pursuing the right course. Tucker does not carry this discussion out to the point of enquiring whether it is the happiness of the greater part of our life that we should seek, or the happiness of the later part. Nor is he consistent in his devotion to happiness as an end. “Let every man,” he says, “study to gratify himself in whatever suits his taste and inclination, for they vary infinitely . . . it is the first rule of happiness to procure the gratification of our desires” and “desire of itself renders objects satisfactory which would otherwise have been indifferent” (II.236). But the interest of our desires sometimes renders self-denial necessary, though it is curious to note that Tucker thinks that satiety and change of taste are not in the mind, but in the bodily and mental organs. If the glutton could keep on eating forever, he would be forever happy; but Tucker is here inconsistent, I think, in giving among the reasons for the impossibility of such satisfaction, not only physical disgust, but the solicitation of other desires (II.238). Our business is to harmonise our desires: (1) to each other, (2) to circumstances. This is the use of the understanding, to discriminate which of our desires are strongest and which are most attainable. The business of the moralist is to teach you “to forbear wanting what you cannot have,” or what would prove harmful to you (II.242).

Happiness, however, is seldom directly aimed at, because we cannot see so far. "Present satisfaction," says Tucker, "is the end we constantly have in view on proceeding to action" (I.108). Present satisfaction he defines as that of "the moment next immediately ensuing." I am not sure just how much or what Tucker means by this. He advances the doctrine in support of Locke, and in controversion of the doctrine that the good, the greater good, understood and apprehended as such, determines the will (I.128). We seek always, he says, to provide for the next ensuing perception. "In all action there are three things to be considered, the prospect or expectation, the action itself, and the perception to be introduced thereby." The "prospect" appears to mean, not that which is expected, but the expectation of it, inasmuch as it "has no other value than as it directs us what action to pursue" (I.109). The value of the action also is only in procuring the perception. On the other hand, the "present satisfaction" may be the satisfaction in an object which is still future—or, I should think, the satisfaction in a satisfaction which is still future: "distant good does often operate by the uneasy want we have of it," so that "we pursue the object of our desire through the flowery meads of delight, or the thorny paths of trouble and self-denial" (I.129). Note, however, that here he is speaking of the object and not of the satisfaction which he declares to be the end.

There is here included a long inquiry into the possibility of uneasiness as our motive. I can pass over this point briefly. Tucker dissents from Locke, and asserts that we often act when there is no uneasiness: "satisfaction and uneasiness often beget and introduce each other" (I.131).

So much for the outline of Tucker's hedonism. In regard to the scale of values, "Nature gives us at first none other pleasures besides those of sensation and appetite." "In certain internal sensations," Tucker says, "perhaps may consist all the pleasures of imagination and reflection which we feel in seasons of joy, or hope, or desire, or other agreeable situations of mind" (II.141). Our pleasures take their rise from sensation alone, and the higher pleasures may be traced back to the more primitive. Differences in taste depend upon the constitution and disposition of our machine, upon education, or custom, or habit. There are, Tucker admits, finer and grosser tastes, but the best ("if not the truest," in parenthesis) taste "is that which gives a man the strongest and fullest relish of objects and employments lying within his power and suited to his situation and circumstances in life" (I.145).

There is (absolutely) no objective criterion for aesthetic value; everything is to be explained by circumstances. There are four principal sources

from whence the efficacy of beauty derives: composition, succession, translation, and expression. Composition is symmetry, proportion, and order. Succession is rhythm and novelty. Translation, of which I shall speak presently, means here simply that we ascribe intrinsic value to an object which has had instrumental value. Expression means apparently expressiveness in a human being, or representation in an object. I am not concerned with an analysis of Tucker's aesthetics, which are brief though interesting; only I wish to point out his main conclusion, that aesthetic value can always be analysed into immediate values of sense, or translated values of use, and that he is consistently utilitarian in this respect.

As flowers are none the less beautiful when they spring from manure (Tucker uses the simile himself), so the higher pleasures are not limited by their origins. "Though there be one original cause of desire between the two sexes, many subordinate desires of conversation, or other intercourse, branch out from thence, which have not a visible connection with the principal root" (II.154). Practices which were at first incidental or instrumental we come to value for their own sake. The original end drops out of view when the instrument comes to claim our whole attention; or that which promotes a desire is itself desired finally independently of the original object. This is translation. As an account of divergence of interest it may perhaps serve, but it seems utterly unable to account for any pleasures being superior to others: the pleasure by translation might so far as that goes be even inferior to the original. Any calculus of pleasure must concede some recognition to civilisation. Now for Tucker the only criteria are (1) subjective [and] (2) prudential. I have certain desires to organise, and certain limitations to struggle with. Civilisation, for Tucker, produces a complication of interests, but I cannot see that it produces any refinement. That anything should come to be valued is a pure accident of history, and it is valuable, only so long as it is valued. In other words, he appears guilty of psychologism, in confusing the genetic with the structural standpoint.

As for the hedonistic calculus, Tucker does not allow its possibility.⁶ "Our tastes varying as much as our faces, make us very bad judges of one another's enjoyments, for we take for granted that everybody must be pleased with what we like ourselves" (II.158). He confesses that we hardly judge much better of our own pleasures than of others. We commit mistakes in computing the value of a series of pleasures, taken collectively, even more than singly, for we cannot tell how many little pleasures are equal to a great one. "Therefore we are forced to take our pleasures in the lump," guessing at

them (II.160). "Gentler delights" are upon the whole more satisfactory than more robust, and pleasure is frequently in the pursuit, rather than in the attainment.

It is not easy to see, on the basis of Tucker's explicit statements, how he makes any preference between one sort of life and another, provided two men are equally prudent in their conduct. No way of life can be morally better than another; it can only be more successful. The question of selfish and altruistic motives is equally evasive. Tucker evidently looks to found his system on the wants and appetites of the individual organism, but is vaguely aware that with conscious selfishness and generosity he is concerned with something very different. His is surely not the naïf view of Gay, for he nowhere makes the sharp distinction between the interest of the self and the interest of others;⁷ the fact is, I think, not that he answers the question in a crude way but that he has never really raised it. The issue of selfish and generous impulses would appear if anywhere in the chapter on Sympathy, but all that this contains is observations on the phenomena of imitation, and warning against its excess—no hint that any modification of the doctrine of satisfaction is needed.

The relation of moral obligation to satisfaction is much as one would expect. "Some men," he says, "carry [rules] a great deal too far by supposing them to imply something valuable contained in the exercise of a rule without reference to anything further" (II.254). If Regulus did right, it was apparently because he would have been less happy had he done otherwise.⁸ I cannot find that Tucker falls back upon future reward and punishment here, and I think that he was too sure of his doctrine to attempt such a subterfuge. When he treats of benevolence, however, he involves himself in some difficulty. Benevolence, he admits, must bear upon the agent's happiness, in order to be worth our practice; but this does not, he thinks, contradict the fact that a benevolent act must carry nothing of self in view: "for it has been made evident upon several occasions . . . that our ultimate end is very rarely our ultimate point of view, but we have divers principles . . . which occupy our thoughts from time to time as we proceed." A wise man performs a good office "because he likes it, because he judges it right" (II.373). There follow five good reasons for the utility of benevolence, which are of course beside the point if meant to apply to any particular benevolent act. And the issue in general is this: if we are working for the Good, the principle of translation may hold, and we may rightly give a coin to a beggar without stopping to consider whether he will dispose of it as judiciously as we; but if the

good is our own satisfaction, then a benevolent act will be good not because it is benevolent, but in proportion to the satisfaction we take, and this satisfaction may be

- (1) in the consequences to the object
- (2) in the performance of the act
- (3) in the contemplation of our own merit.

In the more psychological portions of the book, Tucker of course follows Locke as closely as he can. The most interesting parts are those relating to motives and causes of action. In regard to the relation of body and mind, Tucker has some rather confused theories which I have not been able to unravel. Action, however, is impossible without ideal causes. When a painter draws a picture, he has the idea which he wishes to realise; but other ideal causes are necessary: he “must have an idea of his canvas, his pallet, his brushes, his colours; he must know where they lie, what they will do, and how to handle them; and must receive fresh information continually from his eyes, his hands, and his reflection, or he will make but bungling work” (I.64). Without entering into a nice disquisition of what motions are of our own operation and what purely mechanical, he says, “we may justly conclude that in all voluntary actions the mind must have a discernment, if not of the very act she performs, yet of some bodily motion or other distant consequence effected thereby: and for the most part we take continual direction from our senses, our judgment, and our experience . . . which justifies me in ranking ideas among the causes of action” (I.74-75). Now “many ideas pass in review before us which have no share at all in our actions: and many serve us for a guidance in our conduct which yet did not prompt us to pursue it” (I.77-78), but some of them do, and these are motives. A motive is defined as “the prospect of some end actually in view of the mind at the time of action and urging to attain it” (I.85); and not a reason alleged in justification of conduct. We may have several motives at the same time, and for this and other reasons it is very difficult for us to know our real motives (I.87). At the moment of operation we seldom attend to our motive, and our ultimate motive is very frequently out of sight (I.88); I may travel to a town for some pleasure I expect to find there; but the desire to reach the destination is the motive to choose the fastest train, and so on; while on the way many incidental motives distract me. An impulse is a momentary and unreflective motive, due to imagination rather than understanding (I.92). Exactly the same motive, perhaps, may never occur to two

different persons or to one person twice; they are fluctuating and varying compound ideas.

Of these compound ideas satisfaction is the “vivifying ingredient which gives them their vigour and activity” (II.49). But there are three principal parts to a motive (II.50):

$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{“some action apprehended possible,} \\ \text{some consequence, perception, or end, to} \\ \text{be attained . . .} \\ \text{the satisfaction expected therein.”} \end{array} \right.$	$\left. \vphantom{\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{“some action apprehended possible,} \\ \text{some consequence, perception, or end, to} \\ \text{be attained . . .} \\ \text{the satisfaction expected therein.”} \end{array} \right\}} \right\}$	<p>these three parts are judgments <u>of existence</u>.</p>
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We undertake no action unless we consider it possible, unless we have a present idea of the future and, unless we want it. “For the most part we proceed upon some design more or less remote, and then our motive contains several ends of action one within another” (II.54).

Now satisfaction is “always the same in kind how much soever it may vary in degree”; it is a state of mind, “and whatever possesses that quality in equal degree, whether meats and drinks, or diversion, or gain, or acquisition of power . . . fills [the mind] with the same content and complacence” (II.55). The chief varieties of Satisfaction are Pleasure, Use, Honour, and Necessity. We “have [or should have] a few leading aims that shape the general course of our lives, such as the attainment of some art or science,” and the majority of our motives come to us by translation from these ruling passions.

The body and mind are so closely associated (II.92), that habits and passions which apparently are largely physical dispositions and sensations (“impulse of external objects, and mechanical play of our organs”), as well as action of the mind (either by design or through trains) introduce motive (II.84).⁹

How far a motive can be merely presented and how far it is an act I am not sure. We have seen that three judgments are involved in every motive. Now a judgment occurs only when two ideas are brought together in the mind, and the judgment is “a distinct idea from the roots whereout it grows” (I.274), for many things occur to our view without arousing judgment. “[J]udgment is an act of reflection . . . done upon the ideas after their entrance” (I.275). Yet Tucker says that it is an act of the mind’s “perceptive faculty, wherein the mind remains purely passive, and only receives what some other agent strikes upon her.” I do not profess to understand this explanation, even when Tucker says that the active agent is “the mental organ”

(I.276). Perhaps he means only that the judgment is necessarily from the point of view of the subject, but is not given as sense-data as simple ideas are. And apparently there are none, or very few, analytic judgments of sense, for even “colours . . . are not distinguished from one another by the sight alone,” but “by an act of reflection” (I.284).

Tucker does not discuss judgments of value, but I should suppose that aesthetic judgment would necessarily be reduced to a judgment of enjoyment, and moral judgment to judgment of probable consequence. But I do not think that he had the intention to construct a system. It must be remembered that for Tucker virtues are matters of experience and not of principle, and depend, in their immediate practice, upon imagination rather than understanding. Yet he evidently wishes every virtue to remain upon as firm a basis as ever, and to retain all the sanctity with which moral imperative could invest it. The value of the moral attitudes which we reach by translation is equivocal, and we do not know whether the feeling of moral value is justified or illusory. This, I think, is the chief defect in Tucker’s theory: his mediocrity of imagination, as well as his lack of method, conceal from him the fact that we cannot value anything without judging it valuable. I have no objection to his explaining moral goodness in non-moral terms, and there is much that is sound in this reduction. But any theory which resolves difference of interest into difference of environment or other accident leaves the world an unexplained chaos. Moral values may be built upon as purely mechanistic a foundation as you please, but they must form a system valid for society as a whole. Tucker’s theory, on this side, is completely subjectivistic.

If this aspect be considered, as it may, as a defect, rather than a real element in the structure, I think that there is little to object to in his doctrine of satisfaction. We are all hedonists from one point of view, and Tucker is only wrong in limiting himself to that one viewpoint.

NOTES

1. The English moralist Abraham Tucker (1705-74) published the first four volumes of *The Light of Nature Pursued* under the pseudonym “Edward Search” in 1765; the remaining three volumes appeared posthumously in 1778. A revised second edition (seven volumes) was issued under Tucker’s name in 1805 (London: R. Fauler and T. Payne), together with “Some Account of the Life of the Author” by his grandson, Sir H. P. St. John Mildmay (1764-1808). TSE used the first three volumes of the 1805 edition. Tucker’s title refers to a central term in the epistemology of Locke, explained in *An Essay concerning Human Understanding* (1690) (London: T. Longman, 1796): “There is a . . . difference between an innate law, and a law of nature; between something

imprinted on our minds . . . , and something that we . . . may attain to the knowledge of, by the use . . . of our natural faculties. And I think they equally forsake the truth who, running into . . . extremes, either affirm an innate law, or deny that there is a law knowable by the light of nature, i.e., without the help of positive revelation" (I.iii.13).

2. Mildmay: "In 1727 he purchased Betchworth Castle, near Dorking, . . . formerly part of the extensive possessions of the Earl of Arundell" (I.ix).

3. Tucker married Dorothy Barker of East Betchworth in 1736; she died in 1754, leaving two daughters. The two transcriptions of the letters, never published, were either lost or destroyed: "One copy he gave to Mr. Barker, his father-in-law, and the other he kept, and frequently read over to his daughters" (I.x). In *The Light of Nature*, Tucker refers to his wife as "Euridice" and to his daughters as "Serena" and "Sparkle."

4. Of his contemporaries David Hartley (1705-57) and George Berkeley, Tucker says: "The doctors Hartley and Berkeley would not allow the mind an efficient cause of her own actions" (I.80), and "these two gentlemen represent the mind as an idle insignificant thing, never acting at all, but always gaping and staring at what passes" (I.53). In the first two volumes, Tucker fails to mention Hume and refers only once to the English moral philosopher William Wollaston (1659-1724), author of *The Religion of Nature Delineated* (1722). In a chapter on Reason, he writes: "Man has been incompletely defined a rational animal, he is rather, to use Mr. Wollaston's words, sensitivo-rational, therefore must regard both parts of his constitution: for one can do nothing without the other" (II.220). Regarding his occasional dissent from Locke, Tucker explains: "But how high a veneration soever I may have for Mr. Locke, it does not rise to an implicit faith, leaving me at liberty to dissent from him . . . ; and as this happens very seldom, . . . it assures me that . . . I am not drawn by the influence of a great name but by the force of conviction. . . . But I am never better pleased than when a difference, seemingly wide at first, lessens . . . and at length vanishes upon a nearer inspection . . . because then I find my judgment tallied with his, even before I knew of it myself" (I.xlv-xlvi).

5. After developing his theory of the perceptivity and activity of the spirit after death in chapters entitled "Vehicular State" and "Mundane Soul," Tucker constructs his imaginative otherworld journey with Locke in the final chapter, "The Vision" (III.428-645).

6. The "hedonistic calculus" is the theory of Jeremy Bentham that the value of an activity is determined by calculating the amount of pleasure it generates. In *The Rationale of Reward* (London: Robert Heward, 1830), he maintains that "value . . . is exactly in proportion to the pleasure [that the activities] yield" (206).

7. The English moral philosopher John Gay (1699-1745), author of *Dissertation concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality* (1731), held the view that ethics required service to others.

8. Tucker follows the preceding sentence with the example of Regulus: "as when they place the wisdom of Regulus's choice of a certain and cruel death rather than breaking faith with his enemies, in the sole act of conformity to the rules of fidelity abstracted from consequences. If Regulus did right, it must be not for any value in the naked act but upon supposition that he acted more for his own happiness in the sequel than he could have done by any breach of faith, for we can hardly think he acted more for his present ease" (II.254-55). Marcus Atilius Regulus (d. ca. 250 BC) was a Roman general, who, when captured by the Carthaginians, agreed to return to Rome to seek peace through an exchange of prisoners. After advising the Roman

Senate against accepting the Punic terms, he resisted pleas to break his promise; he returned to Carthage, where he was tortured and killed.

9. TSE paraphrases part of Tucker's sentence: "for when [the mind] turns her notice upon an idea . . . this occasions it to lead in a train of its associates, and often awakens a desire that would have lain dormant without such attention" (II.84). Tucker devotes chapter 10 (I.244-71) to "trains," which he defines as a "regular succession of idea all bearing a reference to some one purpose retained in view" (I.246-47).

TEXTUAL NOTES

1. Location: Eliot Estate; untitled and undated pencil holograph: sixteen numbered pages: unruled yellow sheets; watermark: Minnesota Bond; 21.2 x 27.5 cm.

2. Dating: the Minnesota Bond on which this essay was written was first used for the last two pages of "The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual," presented in Royce's seminar on 9 Dec 1913, and subsequently for the full text of other essays in the spring of 1914, when he took Perry's "Philosophy 20d: Seminary in Ethics."

3. On verso of page two, TSE has a rough sketch of Utilitarian ethics: "Utilitarianism: Pleasure / (motives) / Satisfaction / (trains and translations) / Ultimate Good / (sympathy and altruism) / The Will / (judgment) / Egoism." The capitalized words are given in a parallel list; the words in parentheses follow and are indented. On trains, see note 9; on translations, see 140.

[Self-realisation and Pleasure in the Ethics of Green and Sidgwick]

[Self-realisation and Pleasure in the Ethics of Green and Sidgwick] was written at Harvard in spring 1914 for “Philosophy 20d: Seminary in Ethics” taught by Professor Ralph Barton Perry.

The object of this paper is to compare the self-realisation ethics of Green with the utilitarian ethics of Sidgwick; to consider the criticisms which each has passed upon the other, and to estimate the score on both sides.¹ As the theory of Green pretends to be solidly established upon the Green metaphysic, and as Sidgwick says it isn't, it will be well first to devote some attention to this metaphysic and to Sidgwick's comments thereupon.² This will cast light both upon Green's attitude in ethics and upon Sidgwick's attitude toward Green, inasmuch as there is involved, I think, a serious confusion of thought upon the part of the one and the other. The question with which Green occupies himself throughout the *Prolegomena* is, as Caird points out, an adaptation of the problem of Kant: how to count for and justify the presence of moral judgments in a purely natural world.³ There are two orders, equally real and laying equal claims to absolute validity. How can man be both part of a mechanism and a moral agent at the same time? Out of this obvious dilemma, which I presume most of us will admit, Green fashions his double-sided universe, mechanical on one side, spiritual on the other; satisfying the intellect and edifying the emotions. I wish to point out that the consequence of this diplomacy is a consistent materialism, and that upon this basis some of the ethics appears as mere verbiage, while much can be retained and is valuable. As a failure to perceive this aspect of Green's metaphysics makes Sidgwick's criticisms frequently misfire, and as the materialistic interpretation of Green provides the standpoint for comparison, which shows weaknesses in Sidgwick's system, I shall insist upon the statement for a moment.⁴

It should be evident, in the first place, that the mental plays little or no part in the actual world of Green. He uses the words **mental** and **spiritual**, indeed, with the gracious ease of mid-Victorian idealism, but the mental is in fact not an active element in the world which we know, but rather an aspect under which the world as a whole may be contemplated.⁵ It is not your

mind or mine which is mental as such, so to speak, but the divine mind expressing itself through these individual minds; which are indeed only “mental” by delegation. It is easy but not necessary to be deceived by Green’s language: he speaks always of relations as the “work of the mind,” but of course does not mean the individual mind. For the latter would show, to Green, only relations. Relations, Green urges everywhere, are the very essence of reality, though relations are emphatically the work of the mind. The very word reality is a word in strictness meaningless for Green, as the distinction between real and unreal exists only for an imperfect intelligence. It is a distinction, Green says, “between one particular reality and another; not between a real, as such or as a whole, and an unreal, as such or as a whole” (27). But as a matter of fact a “particular reality” would be an anomaly in Green’s system, which adopts internal relations. So Green does not succeed in disposing of unreal objects. The point made here is that there is no distinction of mentality between the real and the unreal, inasmuch as the work of the mind is just as real as anything else. The idea of a hundred thalers differs from the so-called reality of them only in that the relations are different.⁶ There is nothing specifically mental about either. Nowhere in the world of Green will you find anything mental to contrast with anything non-mental; and whether you say that everything is mental or that nothing is mental, it is all one.

In saying that Green’s system is materialistic, then, we do not mean a Democritan materialism but relations instead of atoms.⁷ Relations and appearances, he insists, are as real as anything else, and we must seek the real, he tells us again, in a “uniform law of change” (31).⁸ I only mean that the world as a natural order forms a consistent whole in which consciousness counts for nothing. The world as a series of events is completely determined, and in a certain sense, from this point of view consciousness is determined too; though it is perhaps more correct to say that from this point of view consciousness does not exist; it is represented by brain process. Consciousness, that is to say, is not an existent entity or activity; it is itself, rather, a point of view. I should call attention to this question, because if my interpretation is correct, Green has not maintained his naturalism consistently throughout his ethics. He is guilty of serious equivocation, I think, in the use of the dangerous word **consciousness**; an equivocation which has given rise to difficulties which Sidgwick sets his finger upon, without, however, resolving them. Sidgwick complains at a consciousness which can be at once the “function of an animal organism” and “an eternal consciousness

limiting itself and making the animal organism its vehicle.”⁹ How can these be the same consciousness, he asks? Now I think that Green quite lays himself open to this criticism. He is using the word consciousness, all through, as if consciousness could be an object, although he insists that it is just because consciousness cannot be an object that it is an eternal non-natural principle. How consciousness can be either a function or an eternal principle, I cannot possibly conceive, and I do not think that Green could either. For the more clearly and persistently one tries to imagine consciousness as a function of an organism, the more surely consciousness evaporates altogether and leaves only the organism. As consciousness is only a point of view and not an object, so the presence or absence of it is only to be pragmatically determined, and it is present simply where it is expedient to consider it present. It depends upon the attitude we take, and for the naturalistic attitude it simply cannot exist. And from this point of view, then, I am ready to maintain that it does not exist.

On the other hand, the eternal consciousness is no better off. Why need the unifying principle in the world, Sidgwick asks, be self-conscious?¹⁰ I should say that it not only need not be, but cannot be, in any intelligible sense. For a consciousness which is merely object cannot be, and the same objection applies to a consciousness which is merely subject. I am not sure how far the question is capable of being argued, but to me the phrase eternal consciousness is unintelligible. It must I suppose be a function of the world as a whole, and must be a consciousness of the world as whole, because the world not as a whole is simply the creation of limited points of view; and is accordingly the world conscious of itself. And the eternal consciousness limiting itself means only that the world is conscious in parts as well as on the whole. The term consciousness, in short, cannot be divided into the two aspects which gave pause to Sidgwick, for consciousness exists only by having **both** references. So far as we can bind both together into one object, we have something which we can talk about under the name of consciousness, but neither of the two is itself consciousness. Here I think lies the most important difficulty in Green’s system. You abstract one aspect of consciousness and talk about it as if it were the whole: and in this way get a thorough materialism, on the one hand, and on the other an ethical idealism which turns out to be meaningless.

Green’s philosophy, like most others, is built upon facts which everyone can acknowledge; but he proceeds in the familiar way by throwing a rope in the air and clambering up it; and it is not until he has disappeared from

view that we break the spell and realise that the magician was on the ground the whole time. He is right in insisting upon the two aspects, the natural and the moral; it is only by an abuse of transcendental dialectic that he can reduce the world to the one or the other. This is not due to the fact that he exaggerates the distinction; it is due to the fact that he muddles the distinction once made. He is emphatic, for example, in the assertion that that which knows cannot itself be an object, that it cannot be in time (89); to distinguish a succession we must ourselves be out of the succession (92). This seems to me true, but it leads me to quite different conclusions. If consciousness is eternal and immutable and not a part of the same process as that which is known, this means only that knowing, as such, cannot be analysed into anything simpler; that it is out of time merely because it is nothing at all. Knowing as such, that is, consists simply in the presentation of objects and facts, but not presented *to* anything; but a large part of knowing consists in knowing that we know, in knowing a relation between oneself and a fact or object, a relation which is ultimately physical, but which for practical purposes may still be regarded by "knowing." By reason of this complexity of any real knowledge, it is possible for Green to speak of the activity of consciousness—an "activity not in time" (93). But as consciousness cannot be merely a function of an organism, because as a function it would not be conscious; so on the other hand, it cannot be consciousness unless it is the instrument of some organism.

It is important to consider the arguments for the actuality of the eternal consciousness, inasmuch as it is upon this rock that Green founds his self-realisation theory, and in comparing his theory with that of Sidgwick, it is seriously to be considered whether this ethical theory is wholly dependent upon this form of metaphysic. Now I find myself quite unable to extract any system of ethics whatever out of the eternal consciousness, and I am glad to find that Sidgwick shares my incapacity. I admit that something more than the purely naturalistic view of the type to which Green refers is needful, but I do not find this something more in an eternal consciousness realising itself through finite consciousness. I can follow Green, however, much further than does Sidgwick. I can agree that the moral difference is "between that *feeling* of self, implied in all pleasure and pain, and that distinguishing presentation of self, as at once the subject of feelings and other than them, which properly constitutes self-consciousness," and furthermore that this "consciousness of objects which is also that of self . . . is . . . the common basis which unites desire, understanding, and will with each

other" (133). But to say that this self-consciousness distinguishes the moral from the natural **from its own point of view**, that is, so far as acts concern **it** in practice as moral or non-moral, is one thing, and to say that the distinction is absolute, that the process through which activity passes from the natural to the moral is absolutely a non-natural process—this is a very different thing. "The self," Green says, "is not something apart from feelings, desires and thoughts, but that which unites them, or which they become as united" (113). This seems to me an important concession. For the unity is not really due to any cause; it simply happens. The eternal consciousness, Sidgwick is at pains to point out, is expressly denied to be a cause,¹¹ though Green sometimes uses language which tempts [one] to think that it is. It is equally possible to look upon consciousness as the cause or as the effect of a peculiar grouping of entities, though really I suppose that it is neither, but is the group itself. So that I do not see how Green can avoid saying that **any** such group can be regarded as having two aspects: the external, from which it is purely mechanical, and the internal, from which it is self-conscious and volitional. Green is mistaken, that is, even from his own principles, in assuming that you can abstract from the point of view and make absolute statements about the material and the spiritual; for to talk about the absolutely spiritual or the absolutely mechanical is absolute nonsense. The spiritual, I insist, can only be the point of view of a finite self struggling for changes which have moral value in a natural world of which this self is itself a part. The spiritual is in nature, if you like; but only in the sense that there are the two aspects which are aspects of the same thing, although there is no thing of which they are aspects; and they are essentially partial aspects; so that a spiritual aspect of the whole of nature—which Green also refers to as God—appears to me stuff and nonsense. But here again we must be on guard against overstatement. Both the spiritual and the mechanical are terms referring to actual directions (as well as being the directions themselves) which our reflection takes. Only, we find these terms, when considered by themselves, to be riddled with contradiction, and in general I find it more convenient not to consider them as actual. For if we do, we are in danger of falling into the errors which Sidgwick has criticised; of treating consciousness as something **active** in the material world, booming a bigger, better and busier universe. From the absolute point of view, we must remember, Green's consciousness is completely inactive: or rather, the question whether it is active or not indicates a misunderstanding.

With the absolute consciousness off our minds, we may turn to see what we can make of Green's ethics without it. There is really a good deal left: what is really valuable in the first book of the *Prolegomena* is the insistence that the mechanical and the moral are two aspects which are irreducible within the world as we know it: whether they can ultimately be unified, as Green attempts to do, is ethically of little importance. The rest may be resolved into two issues: the relation of the moral world of desire and will to the natural world of instinct, and the final aim of the moral life—for Green, self-realisation. Green's conclusions upon the first of these two issues I accept; into his theory of realisation, where he comes particularly into conflict with Sidgwick, I cannot follow him. The first I should like to dwell upon for a moment, because it is here, if anywhere, that Green's ethics shows a decided superiority over that of Sidgwick.

The whole difference between the natural and the moral worlds is a change of point of view, a change which is in a sense continuous, and in a sense abrupt, and never complete. Without assuming any absolute consciousness, and without assuming that the mechanical order is absolutely real either, we may say that the moral world is built up on the non-moral, the conscious on the non-conscious, though without admitting that motives may be reduced to impulses, or to anything else than what they are, so long as we consider them as motives at all. "The transition from mere want to consciousness of a wanted object, from the impulse to satisfy the want to an effort for realisation of the idea of the wanted object, implies the presence of the want to a subject which distinguishes itself from it and is constant throughout successive stages of the want" [98]. Now it is by no means necessary to introduce an abstract or absolute spiritual principle to account for this novelty, for it is equally spontaneous and inexplicable in any case. In some sense we can trace its genesis, but the why is finally absent. The transition from want to desire, and from desire to will is one that we all know, but cannot explain; and the passage to the point at which an agent may be held to be morally responsible and an act imputable is equally familiar and equally mysterious.

The perception of a world and the perception of a self, we may say with Green, develop *pari passu*:¹² we cannot be said to have a real world in knowledge until we have a real self which knows. In a sense this is true, but Green overworks it. It is equally true that the world is the same world whether we are conscious of it as a world or not, and the self is the same self, and is already there, whether we are self-conscious or not. When we say

then that it is the assumption that there is a self that constitutes the self, and on the other hand, that the belief in a self implies that the self was already there before we were aware of it, we are presenting two sides of the same fact. This is because such words as “world” or “self” denote objects which are by no means simple, but of very high type, not susceptible of the precision and stability demanded of objects of science. Toward objects of this type, there are two points of view which seem to me mistaken. One is to hypostasise them, to treat them as more real, or as manifestations of a higher reality, than such objects as bricks and tin cans. To this tendency, Green himself supplies the correction in urging, as he does, that nothing is any more real than anything else, and that the term **real** is indeed unnecessary. The other tendency, equally unphilosophic and more prevalent, is to explain all such objects away. With the pretensions of experimental psychology, I am not here concerned. But if it denies the existence of such things as the soul or the will, if it attempts to explain desire or motive by something which is not in consciousness at all, then it leaves outside of its subject-matter the most important part, and perhaps the whole, of what is really mental. The moral life cannot be “explained” in terms of objects of lower type; nor, on the other hand, are we set free from such objects. For if, on the one hand, we must conceive of the material order as prior to the moral, on the other hand, within our knowledge, it is only, according to Green, for self-consciousness that a material or mechanical order exists at all.

We may however think of the moral world as built upon the material, and to the latter as in a sense the more solid, even though we cannot admit that it would be altogether the same without this superstructure. The process of this construction is one of objectification: a larger and larger part of reality (for want of a better word) is turned into objects, and we may think, in rather mythological language, of a consciousness gradually realising itself by the effort of making itself its own objects; so that the term of the process would be an infinite consciousness contemplating the whole world. This consummation, I say, one might imagine, and it seems to approximate to Green’s view, on the purely cognitive side. But I cannot see the advantage of going so far, and there are certainly grave dangers. For we tend to think of the process as somehow purposeful, of this consciousness as somehow active in its own realisation. And this to give the metaphysics of the process an ethical complexion—which ultimately brings us round again to a stoical naturalism. And this, I think, is the error of Green. The assumption that

morality is itself moral—we may put it thus—leads to the conclusion that nothing is moral.

The moral world, we may say again, simply is, and that's all. That it cannot be explained as the product of "natural forces" (whatever that may mean). To speak of it as a growth is perhaps to trace a development but not to explain an effect. And to call it supernatural, as Green rightly says, is to

run the risk of misleading and being misled, for we suggest a relation between it and nature of a kind which really has no place except **within** nature, as a relation of phenomenon to phenomenon. We convey the notion that it is above or beyond or before nature, that it is a cause of which nature is the effect, a substance of which the changing modes constitute nature; while in truth all the relations so expressed are relations which, indeed, but for the non-natural self-conscious subject would not exist, but which are not predicable of it. (61)

And Green is right, I think, on the other hand, in insisting that the want is not a part of the motive: "The motive in every imputable act for which the agent is conscious on reflection that he is answerable, is a desire for personal good in some form or other" (103). I should like to call attention to this passage, because it shows how near Green is at times to utilitarianism; and shows I think that in avoiding one fallacy Green slips into another. Moral action is as little to be explained by anything ahead as by anything behind. I shall return to this point presently. Here let me stop and ask: whether or to what extent Green's account of the origin of the moral sentiments is more or less satisfactory than Sidgwick's.

It is obvious that Green's theory is *prima facie* superior to ordinary hedonism. The distinction between the satisfaction of a want or impulse, a mere tropism, and the gaining of an end which a self-conscious agent proposes to itself is so important for ethics that we may say that any theory which disregards it is not concerned with ethics at all. But I doubt whether a thoroughgoing non-qualitative hedonism has ever really been held, and much is implicit in ordinary utilitarianism which is expressly stated by Green. The one starts from the side of the pleasures, the other from the side of the self which enjoys those pleasures. The difference is that Green will tell you that the moral world is itself better than the natural; the utilitarian only that it affords more pleasure. It will appear however that what the one says, the other says backward—for I do not think we can deny that on the whole the more developed person is capable of, and *ceteris paribus* will have more

pleasure than the lower.¹³ Certainly self-consciousness brings with it a much greater capacity for pleasure as well as for pain, and the utilitarian can well admit that it is not until we have a moral world that we have pleasure. I feel that at this point the utilitarians have sometimes unnecessarily weakened their own case. Even for a utilitarian, pushpin need not be as good as poetry; for the self which is capable of enjoying poetry is capable of more enjoyment, because more self-conscious, than the self which is capable only of pushpin.¹⁴ In this light, then, Green's theory is simply utilitarian jabberwocky, and indeed it is possible that by holding Green up to the looking glass, we may get a better utilitarianism than is found in any utilitarian treatises.¹⁵

The question as to whether pleasure is the only object of desire (*Prolegomena*, 180), or indeed whether pleasure can be desired at all, seems to me to involve a crass misunderstanding. It is as if you should ask a confirmed smoker whether he would prefer pleasure to a seventy-five cent cigar. Anything that can have a name, I should say, can be desired; and I see no reason why we cannot desire objects of different type. If this be the case, we may make the distinction between pleasure as the **explicit** object of desire, and pleasure as an **interpretation** of the desire. The first question is merely: does the proposition "I desire pleasure" have meaning? the second is: does the proposition "I desire such and such an object or fact" **mean** that I desire the pleasure attaching to such an event? Green seems to think, as does also Sidgwick, that pleasure may be the object. But to attack the one sort of pleasure is not to defeat the other, and Green, showing that we desire objects, tilts at windmills.¹⁶ And he lays himself open to exactly the same sort of misinterpretation. "When the idea of which the realisation is sought is not that of enjoying any pleasure," he says, "the fact that self-satisfaction is sought in the effort to realise the idea of the desired object does not make pleasure the object of the desire" (180). Well! if one may seek the object and self-satisfaction, I see no reason why one should not seek the object and pleasure. Pleasure is as plausible an **interpretation** as self-satisfaction.

We are now in a position to criticise Green's criticism of the doctrine of the Good as the greatest possible sum of pleasures. Here again, almost all the objections which Green opposes to Sidgwick seem to carry equally well against himself. "We cannot avoid the conclusion," he says, "that the 'Summum Bonum' which the Utilitarian contemplates is not a sum of pleasures, but a certain state of existence; a state in which all human beings, or

all beings of whose consciousness he supposes himself to take account, shall live as pleasantly as possible for them, without one gaining pleasure at the expense of another" (442). This suggests Sidgwick's statement that Green "fails to see that the Utilitarian's Ultimate Good is not like his own Utopia which we may come nearer to or imitate, but a kind of existence which is continually being realised in some degree."¹⁷ Here you see Sidgwick makes the same sort of blunder as does Green, for this statement is as true of Green's theory as it is of Sidgwick's. Green's objection to Sidgwick is not that the theory is not true so far as it goes. There is pleasure he admits in all realisation of capacity. Green's objection is that the theory is so "abstract and indefinite" [*Prolegomena*, 443]. I cannot see that it is in the slightest degree more indefinite than his own. He objects that the increase of pleasure is not what has been the great incentive to the betterment of society. And "a man who interprets the recognised virtues and excellences as having been arrived at with a view to the increase of pleasure, who holds them to be valuable only as means to that end, has not the clue to guide him in cases where it is no longer enough to follow the 'law of opinion' or social expectation, but where it behoves him to act in the higher spirit of those virtues and excellences—a spirit which he must interpret for himself" (446). The utilitarian, incidentally, does not hold that the recognised virtues "have been arrived at with a view to the increase of pleasure," and this is certainly a very different thing from saying that they are valuable only to that end. Green goes on to say very sensibly that a man should be governed "by the conviction that the recognised virtues and excellences are ends in themselves" but throws this advantage away in the next clause by the surprising statement that he should do so "because in them the human spirit in some measure fulfils its divine vocation, attains something of the perfection which it lies in it to attain" (447). This is simply to say that the virtues are **not** ends in themselves, and puts him back in the same boat with Sidgwick where we find Green sitting on the gunwale and accusing Sidgwick of tipping the boat. And we may ask also whether self-realisation has been the great "incentive to the betterment of society,"¹⁸ whether St. Francis, let us say, would have been any more keen about explaining his life by self-realisation than by the pursuit for pleasure.¹⁹ Green here confuses motive with reason.

Then is there any reason why it should be meaningless to speak of a "greatest possible sum of pleasures"? "The sum of pleasures," Green

complains, “plainly admits of indefinite increase, with the continued existence of sentient beings capable of pleasure.” But with self-realisation also, Green observes that the greatest possible sum of pleasures is an end which is not only unattainable but “from the nature of the case can never be more nearly approached” [441]. This seems a quibble. What we desire is the greatest sum of pleasures which is possible, and this, though in a sense contradictory, is not impossible or unreasonable as an object of desire. For we do not have, for the purpose in hand, to define the conditions which make possibility. We think of “pleasures” as objects, and hence as capable of being summed, and the fact that they are not objects to [the] extent of being enjoyable as a sum does not make a “sum of pleasures” meaningless, though it does mean that a sum of pleasures cannot ever be real. We desire a sum of pleasures in the sense that we cannot conceive of taking pleasure in a single object or a very limited field of activity, and consequently, desire a variety of objects. Pleasure and “sum of pleasure” are equally possible objects of desire, but they are not objects of the same order, and this is the real significance of Green’s statement that the one does not follow from the other. In “sum of pleasure,” we have a value which is not strictly pleasure. “Not pleasure but fulness of life,” in Pater’s phrase;²⁰ although the value of fulness of life be definable only in terms of pleasure. Yet “sum of pleasure” may have value in a purely utilitarian universe; whereas **pleasure** has absolute value, **sum of pleasures** has instrumental value.

Just how much pleasure is possible will of course depend upon extraneous circumstances, ultimately perhaps biological, but in any case incapable of measurement, since the subject which enjoys is constantly in change. But this change in the subject is something which we cannot take account of in our calculations. For practical purposes, we are obliged to objectify the pleasure, and neglect subjective alterations. Consequently “the greatest possible sum of pleasures” is in a way meaningless, since the amount of pleasure possible is simply the amount which we do get; the subject being what he is, and in the conditions in which he finds himself, no other amount of pleasure is possible. This, I take it, is the sense of Green’s argument (which Sidgwick rather blindly protests) to the effect that it is a priori impossible that anyone should be mistaken in the imagination of pleasure, or “that anything else would be a greater pleasure or pain *to him at the time* than that which, being what he is and under the given circumstances, he

looks forward to as a greatest pleasure or pain.”²¹ This objection strikes me as too rigorous. For we can to a certain extent detach the objectified pleasure or pain from the subject; enough so that in many cases we can assume that the subject remains the same, and is simply in error as to that in which he would find pleasure, when we think that the subject which expresses the opinion is merely a phase of a more permanent body of tastes which we can safely predict will reassert itself by the time indicated. These questions can only be settled pragmatically. I think that Sidgwick as well as Green has missed the point in this matter.

As to the hedonistic calculus, I am again with Sidgwick, against Green, and the former’s complaint that Green’s criticism involves quite as much obscurity, uncertainty, and ambiguity as the hedonistic calculus seems to me to be justified:²²

the uncertainties on Green’s view seem to me indefinitely greater,—both more complex and more fundamental,—if a wider conception of the end as the complete realisation of capabilities is taken. . . . What criterion does Green offer for preferring one sort of realisation to another? I find none whatever; and if the comparison of quantities of pleasure is difficult and doubtful, the comparison of different realisations of capabilities seems to me indefinitely more difficult and doubtful.²³

Sidgwick has himself, I think, urged the objection to the hedonistic calculus as forcibly as need be; but I do not think that he has really exposed the valid reasons for retaining it. It is true, as Green seems to ignore, that we do consciously apply the calculus in everyday life, and the theory has a practical origin. So far as a man’s life is organised, he is apt to know what sort of activity will give him pleasure, and in what degree; and I think that for practical purposes we can remember and anticipate pleasure, because the pleasure is as much a qualification of the object as of the subject.

Now *prima facie* Green is committed to a calculus of self-realisation, which is just as difficult [as] and more bizarre than a calculus of pleasure. But this is surely not what Green has in mind. It is evident that self-realisation is no more moral in itself than is happiness. There is no obligation to self-realisation, and moral obliquity must be for Green as for Sidgwick merely ignorance. But for Green it is hardly true to say that we are to aim at self-realisation; rather, I suspect, we are to aim simply at doing what is right and

the self-realisation follows. Morality is self-realisation. But there are serious difficulties: for either the end of morality or the morality becomes purely incidental. Are we to aim at moral goodness for its own sake? Otherwise, we are not really good, but if so, we are deceived. Our only recourse is to say that the morality and the realisation are two sides of the same shield. But how justify this arbitrary definition of realisation? Does not an Alcibiades or a Borgia realise himself?²⁴ Perhaps Madame Caillaux realised herself.²⁵ Here, at any rate, is a point at which Green is more formalistic than is Sidgwick, for apparently he declares: be good, and you will realise yourself; whereas Sidgwick only says: be good, and you will be doing what on the whole reason tells us will in the long run produce the most happiness. "Both are faiths, and both are wrong!"²⁶ or at least, we may question the amount of happiness or the amount of self-realisation in a world of moral angels.

The errors of both theories are I think at bottom the same. Both argue from concomitance to cause. We cannot think that the most moral act in any case will ultimately produce anything but good, and if it does not produce good, we feel that it is not moral, so that in specific cases we sometimes set aside a rule with the conviction that we are doing the right thing.

An act may be right because it produces happiness, but if we perform the act with one eye on the happiness and not on the rightness, it is not altogether a moral act. And yet if we are totally indifferent to others' happiness, we become worthy of something like moral aversion. The fact is that it is not always moral to be moral. I am sorry, but I find that the morality of Common Sense—the only real morality—is thoroughly inconsistent and paradoxical; the real world is quite mad, and it is the self-appointed task of ethics and metaphysics to organise it. It is from this point of view that I wish to criticise Green and Sidgwick.

It is possible to argue, if you like, that the meaning of morality is its leading to happiness, or what not, but this does not mean that an act is moral because it leads to happiness. For the argument is then simply circular: you argue that an act is moral because it leads to happiness (or self-realisation, as the case may be), and that another act leads to happiness because it is moral. Both Green and Sidgwick forget, I think, that ethics is concerned not with rectification of existing morals but with their interpretation, and that being moral for this or that reason is very different from performing this or that act because it is moral. Our reasons for being moral are not

moral reasons. The neglect of this fact leads Green and Sidgwick to the implicit conclusion that devotion to happiness or to self-realisation is itself a duty—which would, they fail to see, be again a phenomenon for ethics to explain. They both tend to think of ethics as a normative science, when it is really descriptive, and they introduce a disturbing moral order into the unmoral domain of ethics.

There are two pursuits which may be confused under the name of ethics. There is the biological interest, interpreting moral phenomena in terms of natural value; there is what is now usually known as ethics, interpreting morals by ultimate value, so that morals retains its force but is transmuted. Strictly speaking, neither of these presumes to tell us why an act is moral; they simply tell us why morality is rational. On the other hand, an ethical theory (and this is what makes trouble) is in practice an extension as well as an interpretation. As soon as we find that the rational justification of morality is happiness (or what not), it becomes moral to perform an act because it leads to happiness, or because we think it leads to happiness.

I perform X because it is moral

I pursue Morality because it leads to happiness

but

I perform X because it leads to happiness is not necessarily moral

without adding

I pursue happiness because it is moral.

or in other words

Should we –	{	(To) aim at happiness	(not moral)
		(To) aim to aim at those objects which produce happiness	(moral).

This is to say that a sort of hierarchy of types develops. Now this is the only practical difference between Green and Sidgwick. As purely descriptive theories, there is not a pin to choose; as descriptions there is no difference between happiness and self-realisation. The difference (so far as there is any) is motor; in the different attitudes they excite as imperfectly apprehended. The two terms meet eventually in meaning though not in what they mean

to mean. They are in a sense exactly the same, and yet not quite the same, because they mean to be different, and to say that they are the same is to interpret them.²⁷ Yet how interesting and how delightful that men should be able to say the same thing in two such different ways! Really, it is perhaps more important than if they had disagreed.

The distinction between interpretation (description) and extension (normative) in ethics is less simple than I have made it appear. For we cannot wholly discriminate what we mean from the meaning of our words and deeds. The former is extension, the latter description. The former gives something which really seems more nearly what we had in mind than what we thought we had in mind. The latter is so remote that it is not even thought that we might or should have had it in mind. When you can say "Oh yes! I beg pardon—that is what I meant," you have extension. But the difference is perhaps one of degree only, and extension tends to complete itself in interpretation.

For these reasons I accept both theories, and both provisionally. To me, neither explains morals at all. I think of morals as built upon a mechanical order, but not itself mechanical; neither explaining, nor explained by, the other. It tends, we will say, toward ethical system, but as a matter of fact simply is. My attitude is somewhat pragmatic. The world is more real than any particular meaning which we assign to it.

NOTES

1. The political theorist and religious thinker Thomas Hill Green (1836-82) read Hegel with Benjamin Jowett at Balliol College, Oxford. In 1874, in his introduction to Hume's *A Treatise on Human Nature* (1739-40), he attacked the empiricist principle that nothing is real but sensation and established himself as the leader of a new British idealism. As Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford, he taught both Bosanquet and Bradley. Green died prematurely, leaving his *Prolegomena to Ethics* unfinished. The manuscript was edited by A. C. Bradley, brother of the philosopher, and published by Clarendon, Oxford, in 1883. TSE's signed and annotated copy of the fifth edition (Clarendon, 1906) is in the Houghton.

The utilitarian Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) graduated from Trinity College, Cambridge and was immediately elected to a lectureship there. In 1874, he published *The Methods of Ethics* (6th ed., 1901), which established his reputation, and in 1883 was elected the Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy.

2. Sidgwick's commentary on the metaphysics of Green appears in his posthumously published *Lectures on the Ethics of T. H. Green, Mr. Herbert Spencer and J. Martineau* (London: Macmillan, 1902) and in *Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant* (London: Macmillan, 1905), 209-66.

3. In his introduction to the *Prolegomena*, Caird remarks: “The problem from which Green, like Kant, starts, is the apparent opposition between the ordinary conception of the world, as a system of causally connected objects in space and time, which is presupposed by physical science, and what seem to be the fundamental ideas of morality and religion, the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality” (iii).

4. Green’s critique of the utilitarian ethics proposed by Sidgwick in *The Methods of Ethics*, based on the second edition of 1877, appears in Books III and IV of the *Prolegomena*.

5. TSE uses both underlining and red ribbon for emphasis; in this edition, the red print is in bold.

6. Thalers (or talers) were silver coins used in certain Germanic countries between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries.

7. The atomist philosopher Democritus (ca. 460-ca. 370 BC) developed a mechanistic view of the natural world in which every material phenomenon is seen as a product of the collision of atoms, a view that equated reality with the constituents of matter. Green maintained that to be real is to be related to other things, and that relations are the work of the mind.

8. “The demand for unalterableness in what we believe to be real, when once we are off the track of seeking it in a uniform law of change, leads us to suppose that the ‘reality of things’ is only reached when we have penetrated to atoms which in all change of their motion and distribution remain intrinsically the same” (31).

9. *Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant* 245. See also *The Ethics of Green, Spencer, and Martineau* 34-36.

10. *The Philosophy of Kant* 231-33.

11. Sidgwick explores “the difficulty of conceiving the eternal subject, according to Green’s view of it, as a cause of which anything in the world is the effect” in *The Philosophy of Kant* 247-49.

12. *pari passu*: simultaneously, equally.

13. *ceteris paribus*: other things being equal.

14. TSE alludes here, as in his essay on Tucker’s *Light of Nature Pursued* (145, n. 6), to Bentham’s comparison between poetry and push-pin: “Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry. If the game of push-pin furnish more pleasure, it is more valuable than either. Everybody can play at push-pin; poetry and music are relished only by a few. . . . If poetry and music deserve to be preferred before a game of push-pin, it must be because they are calculated to gratify those individuals who are most difficult to be pleased” (*The Rationale of Reward* 206-07).

15. In Lewis Carroll’s *Through the Looking-Glass* (1871), Alice discovers a book with looking-glass poetry, “Jabberwocky,” which she must hold up to a mirror to read.

16. In Miguel de Cervantes’s *Don Quixote* (1605, 1615), the hero tilts at windmills, which he supposes to be giants.

17. *The Ethics of Green, Spencer, and Martineau* 113.

18. Not a quotation from texts here discussed; possibly a summarizing phrase.

19. After an early life spent in the pursuit of pleasure, St. Francis of Assisi (1181-1226) had in 1224 a vision of a six-winged angel on a cross, from whom he received the stigmata.

20. In the philosophical novel by Walter Pater (1839-94), *Marius the Epicurean* (1885), which Eliot first read at Milton Academy in his 1906 Macmillan edition, the narrator says, “Really, to the phase of reflection through which Marius was then passing, the charge of ‘hedonism,’ whatever its true weight might be, was not properly applicable at all. Not pleasure, but fulness of life, and ‘insight’ as conducting to that fulness—energy, variety, and choice of experience, including noble pain and sorrow even . . . from these the ‘new Cyrenaicism’ of Marius took its criterion of values” (114-15).

21. Sidgwick quotes this passage from Green’s *Prolegomena to Ethics* [411-12] in *The Ethics of Green, Spencer, and Martineau* as illustrative of “the curious want of distinction in Green’s mind between ‘good in prospect’ and ‘good in fruition.’” He responds to the passage: “There are probably experiences of the man’s own . . . to show that imagination, in the state of desire, exaggerates the expected pleasure; which is continually found, when attainment comes, to be less . . . than it was expected to be” (121-22).

22. The typescript ends here; the rest of the essay was written in ink. See textual note 1.

23. *The Ethics of Green, Spencer, and Martineau* 107.

24. The Athenian general Alcibiades (ca. 450-404 BC), whose military successes were accompanied by atrocities, illicit amours, treacherous deceptions, and destructive policies for both Athens and Sparta, was exiled and murdered. Rodrigo Borgia (1431-1503), who fathered at least four illegitimate children after his ordination, was elected Pope Alexander VI in 1492 by a corrupt conclave and conducted papal business for personal gain.

25. Henriette Caillaux (1874-1943), wife of France’s Minister of Finance, Joseph Caillaux, assassinated his severest critic, Gaston Calmette, editor of *Le Figaro*, on 16 Mar 1914. At her trial, which dominated the papers when TSE was writing this essay, her attorney persuaded the jury, which acquitted her on 28 July, that hers was not an act of premeditated murder but a crime of passion.

26. Not a quotation; possibly a summarizing phrase.

27. Here TSE strikes through “For one who saw as God sees there would be no difference between the two theories.”

TEXTUAL NOTES

1. Location: Harvard University (Houghton): bMS Am 1691.14 (31), archivally titled [Ethics of Green and Sidgwick]; undated and untitled, eighteen white unruled leaves: 1-14 (half of page) typed on black/red ribbon, with red-ribbon emphases; pencil and ink emendations; from 14 (mid-page)-18: AMS black ink with pencil emendations; leaves numbered in type (2-14) and ink (15-18); pencil notes on the verso of leaves 1, 5, 18, as below; watermark: Marcus Ward’s, 20.3 x 26.6 cm. Paper first used for “Suggestions toward a Theory of Objects” for Royce’s seminar, 5 May 1914; last used in letter to Eleanor Hinkley on 7 July 1914 while crossing the Atlantic.

2. TSE’s preliminary notes for the essay are in pencil on a single page (recto/verso) of yellow Minnesota Bond used for [The Ethics of Satisfaction in Tucker’s *The Light of Nature Pursued*] and the last two pages of “The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual”; in the Hayward Bequest: Philosophical Essays. MS Notes. Part I, King’s P4(g); TSE’s notes, with headings “Crit. of Green’s Metaphysics” and “Crit. of Green’s Ethics,” include page references to Sidgwick’s *Lectures on the Philosophy of Kant* and *The Ethics of T. H. Green, Herbert Spencer, and J. Martineau*.

3. Pencil notes on verso of page one:

Green's criticism of doctrine of Good as sense of pleasure

Sidgwick's criticism of this

self-realisation vs. happiness

hedonism just as possible as idealism

to desire { happiness is not simply to want what you want.
pleasure is not simply to want what you want.

hedonistic calculus perfectly sensible thing.

neither theory really "ethical"

morality consists in { self realisation but self-realisation } not moral
pursuit of happiness but pursuit of happiness }

morality simply is, like the world

why this is not intuitionism.

from concomitance to cause

psychological & logical desire of objects

end of morality becomes itself moral

Should one { aim at happiness, or
aim to aim at the sort of object which produces happiness } ?

4. Notes on verso of page five:

Green's metaphysic purely naturalistic

Consciousness not action

Neither notion of consciousness as "function" nor

that of consciousness as "eternal principle" valid.

No relation between the absolute consciousness and moral action.

Self-realisation { natural } psychological { of all organisms
moral / ethical } and { of moral beings when moral.

5. Notes on verso of page eighteen:

Foundation of Sidgwick's Ethics

Ought not is not the contradictory of ought.

[Objects: Content, Objectivity, and Existence]

Eliot was a student at Merton College, Oxford University, for three terms in 1914-15.

For the 1914 Michaelmas term (5 Oct-5 Dec), he attended three sets of lectures:

(1) John A. Smith, *Logic*; (2) R. G. Collingwood, Aristotle's *De anima*; and

(3) Harold H. Joachim, Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. He also attended a weekly discussion class with Smith and a small reading class with Joachim, both on Aristotle.

In addition, TSE had a weekly tutorial with Joachim that focused on Bradley and his critics, primarily Russell and the Neo-Realists, and required a weekly essay. In a letter to Harvard Dean L. B. R. Briggs, Eliot described his essays as "dealing with some of the questions considered in the thesis which I hope to present for the degree of Ph.D. at Harvard," adding that he and Joachim discussed these essays "always in detail"

(*LI* 92). [Objects: Content, Objectivity, and Existence] is the first of six essays to have survived from this tutorial.

An object is anything which may be given a name, substantive, and enter into a proposition. It is anything upon which attention may be directed. This amounts to the same thing, for it is obvious that attention involves naming. Object is a wider term than either thing, term, proposition, fact; and among objects, thing is different from the others and is the type to which the others tend to assimilate themselves. The hypothetical characteristics of the thing are roughly perceptual existence in space and time, and independence of its relations, and of being known. Also externality: it is mechanical. Obviously these conditions are fulfilled in our experience only relatively; obviously every object which persists in space and time has in its identity an ideal element; and (as I claim) every ideal object has an element of reality as well; but nevertheless, some are ordinarily taken as more real than others. This is the case because the first objects we are aware of as such are objects of perception, which are perceived, let us say, through categories of the existence of which we are not at the time aware, but which may, by reflexion, themselves be made into objects—higher objects. Now from the ordinary point of view, it is possible to handle lower objects without being aware of the higher, but not vice versa; it is possible only to handle the higher as the extension of the lower. To the reflective mind, this complete induction is not possible; we become aware that we have at least as much to do with ideal as with real—that it is quite as real, and to certain types of consciousness, it is capable of appearing much

more real—e.g. to the mystic. But within the span of the ordinary consciousness, the sense particulars never disappear; the real world is built up upon the moment of perception, and it is understood that real and ideal, perception and cognition, are abstractions, legitimate enough, but relative and unsubstantial.

There is a point of view from which it is said that the sciences are mutilated and imperfect parts of reality, the creations of a valuation which takes their objects out of their complete context in which alone they are wholly real. With this view I am largely in sympathy. But there is another point of view, obtained by standing this one upon its head, which I find equally necessary to insist upon. From this point of view, it may be suggested that the absolute is the one thing in the world which isn't real. Reality is the one thing which doesn't exist. The sciences present attenuated positions of reality; yet this presentation is an attempt and a partially successful attempt to constitute reality, and so far as they are true, so far their objects are real. The real, from this point of view, is found in mechanism: from the other point of view, it is found more nearly by feeling. The effect from this view point is to turn reality into sets of objects, and this effort finds two difficulties: (1) These scientific theories, if each is presented as a final account of its own group of objects, may conflict with each other: the mental sciences, e.g., anthropology, economics, psychology, may conflict with the vital (physiology), these with the physical. (2) They are obliged to affirm that the existences which they abstract as objects exist just so, as objects, quite apart from the limited universe of discourse in which they are known as objects. That this should be so is inconveniently enough inconceivable. All that we have a right to say is that there is an (ideal) point of identity between the object *qua* known and the object absolutely, with respect to which the content may vary indefinitely: the amount of our ignorance and possible error is practically unlimited. We cannot tell what and how much in the object will be altered when its relation to us (when knowing it) is severed. But we can say that a large part of the meaning of the word object will undergo alteration. It is quite gratuitous to assume that the object need be object to some other consciousness, when it ceases to be object of mine. But in passing out of consciousness, it ceases to be object, though it does not cease to be real. So far as it is real, so far as it has reality apart from its relations, thus far it must maintain a certain internality, must exist that is for itself. But it is truest to say that it resumes the place in the whole from which it is isolated. And a special science is in this way, on the one hand, an abstraction

from reality, and on the other hand, a constituting of reality, since it gives us what is relatively more real.

Now bearing in mind (1) the fact that each science has its own group of objects, and (2) the fact that it is in the knowing (I am careful not to say by the knowing) that the object becomes object. I may proceed to outline the relation of point of view to object. A point of view cannot be said to be identical with an individual human mind, or with any cross-section of a mind. It is the total state during which the object or group of objects present to that consciousness remains totally identical, and may vary in extent according to the interest involved, which dictates how far the identity need go to be considered total. The discrimination of these points of view has a certain value inasmuch as we are apt, when we have passed from one point of view to another, let us say, more critical point of view, to forget that the first retains its own rights and is not absorbed.^{1*}

An object X is known in a point of view A. Now so long as this point of view is maintained, the object is identical with the point of view; it is not perceived; only by comparing it with the same object in another context are we aware of it as an object. It is the same object because it is different. The world is built up by this comparison of points of view. The lower objects—those which are known to common sense and to science, are those from which the point of view may most easily be abstracted, and those in deference to which formal truth and error apply. With regard to the later formed higher objects, difficulties arise. The variations of meaning to which they are subject [are] far greater. Words get their meaning in use, and it is by the success or failure of their use in bringing about results that we gauge the identity. Human identity is closest at the bottom, where meanings lie closest to the similar physical constitution of different individuals. The world of a man of genius is more exact and more complete than that of a labourer; but, particularly where a system of metaphysics has been constructed, how far can we say it is the same world? We are not to say that there is one real world to which the system corresponds, for so far as the system is complete and exact, it is the real world. But it is not the same world as that of the plowboy or the jellyfish, except for the metaphysician who is inside of his own system. This is the case because the systematiser takes into account every point of view except his own, and this does not form part of his metaphysic: it is lived and not apprehended.

Such a view is likely to call forth the charge of solipsism. Is this not, it will be said, simply the assertion that we cannot know any world but our own? I

admit that one cannot know any world but one's own, but not in the sense in which solipsism would make the claim. For A never intends his own world: A intends simply the world. For B, the system which A constructs is not the world, but A's world:—unless of course it happens also to be B's world. We may say

A is never aware of any but A's world
but A is never aware of A's world.

We must remember that for there to be an object at all, one point of view must come to be aware of at least one other, and this means that B is quite as aware of A's objects as of his own; only not aware of them *simpliciter*, but as always qualified by their being A's.² Of course it is conceivable that B and A should apprehend the same object, and in effect they usually do, but of course if these worlds were identical in every respect, A and B would be identical in every respect. Solipsism is self-contradictory, because if A is to know only his own world, there must be another world to contrast it with: and there is none. If A knew only his own world, he would have to know that he knew only his own world.

This discussion should be amplified by a more minute examination of the question of degrees of truth, and an examination of real, unreal, ideal, and imaginary objects.

NOTES

1*. TSE's marginal notation: "An atomic point of view is never found, for there would be no ideal identity."

2. *simpliciter*: in or by itself, simply.

TEXTUAL NOTE

Location: Harvard University (Houghton): bMs Am 1691.14 (21), archivally titled [On objects]; an undated, untitled pencil holograph, slight corrections and revisions; six unruled sheets, numbered 2-6 in upper right corner; watermark: Lion Brand / Croxley Manifest Bank / London; 20.0 x 25.8 cm.

[Objects: Real, Unreal, Ideal, and Imaginary]

[Objects: Real, Unreal, Ideal, and Imaginary] is the second of six surviving essays that Eliot wrote for his 1914 Michaelmas tutorial with Professor Joachim.

I have endeavoured to distinguish within the object three aspects: content, objectivity, and existence.¹ These are not, however, strictly parallel aspects; as in some contexts, one and two fall together, and in others two and three. I will discuss the latter case first.

It is not the view of common sense, or of science, or of anything but philosophical realism, that the object is obliged to exist just so, as object, apart from and irrelevant to being known as object. It is admitted that for the consciousness occupied with practical or scientific interest, the object is independent of that interest: i.e., in the sense that it is meaningless to say that it is dependent. The subject is not aware of the object as dependent because he is not aware of it as object, and not aware of himself as subject; it is simply it, and my three aspects represent two ways of analysing it afterwards. So far as I know anything, I simply know it, and there is no me for it to be related to, either in dependence or independence. I am aware of it as object, in a sense, but not yet aware that it is an object; for in becoming aware that it is an object, I become aware that I am a subject, and its objectivity is relative to a subject. Hence we come to feel, and rightly, that when and so far as the object is outside of knowledge, it is not object; for an essential part of the meaning of that word seems to have evaporated. Yet we have in no wise gained the right to say that the object has passed out of existence altogether; it has not, certainly, passed out of existence outside of our experience in the same way in which an object passes out of existence within our experience; it has not disappeared in such a way as to leave a gap in our knowledge within experience, or to falsify this knowledge. If it is non-existent, at least its non-existence is continuous with its existence. It may continue to exist, so far as we can tell, in any or all of three ways: it may exist for another consciousness, it may be implicit in what is now before our attention through its relations, or it may exist for itself. Beyond these, I see no other ways, and one [content] and three [existence] are ultimately dependent upon two [objectivity]; for evidently if I admit that if an object which has been my object may continue to exist as the object of a consciousness which

is completely isolated from my own, I might as well admit at once that the object itself is independent. For the identity of an object within our own single current of experience is an ideal identity among differences of content, and the identity of an object within two currents of experience must be ideal too. Two consciousnesses must mean the same object or there can be no identity; and if the other consciousness is that of the object itself, then again some consciousness must be aware of the identity. And in either case, if there is to be any identity there for me, I must myself ultimately be aware of it. So that finally the only reason for asserting that an object exists when we are not aware of it is that it is continuous with the moment of perception. And even then we feel that the object has become strangely transmuted. For as it passes out of our vision, it resumes its place in reality from which it was for the moment detached; its influence upon us becomes more and more indirect, though it may influence a great number of minds besides our own; it is in the end completely absorbed by its relations. Yet though we can no longer say that it exists, we are still less justified in saying that it does not exist. While strictly the objectivity and the existence have disappeared at the same time, we yet find a certain looseness and vagueness which makes acceptable the distinction. The intension of existence and objectivity falls apart. There is something, we feel, which is independent of the more or less definite immediate subject, and this something is not the object qua object, for its objectivity is comprehended by its being a point of attention for a subject.

And from the subject side also, the object appears in a unity which soon falls apart. If we cease to give heed to what it may be outside of experience, and analyse the phenomenon, we find that the content of feeling detaches itself and leaves of the object the bare intention of objectivity. I do not speak merely of the difficulty of primary and secondary qualities, though I have that in mind too.² But when we abstract from the object its meaning in a continued time, an articulated system, the expansion which gives it a greater and greater unity because a greater and greater diversity, and [we] make the attempt (as I think a futile attempt) to grasp the object of a single moment, psychological content comes to the foreground at the expense of objectivity. It becomes less and less possible to distinguish the irrelevant, to set aside or discount the conditions which are due to physiological accident rather than to the nature of the object in question. An object, I believe, is what it turns out to be.³ Not that there is any moment at which what is presented as a mere mass of psychological data is suddenly transmogrified

into an object, though psychologists may find it interesting to imagine so. Rather, the object is present in the simplest sensation; we may speak if we like of a red sensation of an object or of a sensation of a red object, but not of a red sensation *simpliciter*.⁴ I cannot conceive of any consciousness, no matter how primitive or undeveloped, for which a sensation might be no more than “given.” Such a sensation is the merest abstraction. I can nowhere find content which is content for a subject and yet not content of an object. A mere presentation which should be a presentation to me and yet not a presentation of anything is to my mind inconceivable.

Equally objectionable appears to me a variety of “content” which at first sight is proof against these arguments: I mean the theory of Mach accepted by Russell and his American disciples.⁵ The “neutral entities” of this theory, which are supposed to be mental or physical according to their context, are not properly speaking psychological content at all, and so cannot be a case of content without object. The theory as presented by Russell differs slightly from that of the others, in that the apprehending consciousness is something (as I understand it) primitive and simple, to which sense-data appear, and which proceeds to build a world out of them founded upon analytic judgments of sense, or primitive propositions. Mr. Russell seems to think that the judgment “this is red” does not imply the existence of anything beyond red; or rather, the red is the this, and the meaning of the two terms is coextensive;⁶ and so long as he maintains this doctrine, I suppose that he cannot be argued with; though I think that it can be shown to be inconsistent with his own theory of “acquaintance.”⁷ As a matter of fact, his theory at times demands that sensation should be wholly content—for we know sensations in an immediate way which is wholly denied to objects, and we construct objects out of sensations—and at times, as above, demands that the sensation should be wholly object. Each of these views I believe to be false alone, and both to be false together.

In its transatlantic form, this theory does not posit consciousness at the start, but finds it in certain combinations and selections of the neutral entities.⁸ In this form, the view presents the difficulty that if it is to be true, we will have a very awkward time explaining how we came to know so much about it. For that which is previous to either content or object can only be that which we call “immediate experience”—something which is essentially incapable of definition, and of which it is meaningless to say that it is either one or many. It is certainly neutral, but what ground have we for speaking of it as “entities”? What analogy or resemblance does it bear to sensation?

It is in feeling that we find immediate experience, if anywhere, but feeling is far from being the same as the sensation with which the psychologist has made us familiar; it is not feeling as the feeling of this or that particular sense, an articulate sensation the existence of which presupposes a whole world. Professor Holt indeed reduces it to “nervous shock.”⁹ Very well. But nervous shock is not sensation or sense-datum. It is simply (as thus used) the physiologist’s term for what we have called immediate experience.

Sensation implies an object; an object implies a world. But it is only in the course of experience that we know what the object is; only in the course of experience that we discover that it was to that particular object that the sensation pointed, or the experience pointed. Hence our knowledge undergoes a continual process of readjustment: we find ourselves in contact with a content which from the very beginning points at an object of which it asserts itself to be part, but which never fully redeems its promise. Hence the element in the experience which we shall credit to the side of the subject, and that which we may accredit to the object, remains undetermined and subject to indefinite revision at the hands of circumstance; and hence the futility of the realist’s claim (sc. Dr. Nunn) on behalf of the “objectivity” of secondary qualities.¹⁰ Not only secondary but tertiary qualities may be as objective as you please—it is a question for casuistry to decide.

This problem of the relation of content, object, and existence, may now be discussed in a more metaphysical aspect by attempting to define the term “point of view.”

NOTES

1. See preceding essay, [Objects: Content, Objectivity, and Existence].
2. Here TSE strikes through “The difficulty is that all the experienced characters of the object, except the bald fact of being an object, everything that serves to distinguish it from every other object, both the qualities which may be linked to the nervous system of the observer under the name of sensations, and the ideal relations which make it constant and identifiable, these may be accounted for in terms of feeling and behaviour. The identity is present . . .”
3. Sequence: This sentence is repeated at the beginning of TSE’s next essay, [Finite Centres and Points of View].
4. *simpliciter*: in and of itself.
5. In the spring of 1914, Russell gave his Lowell Lectures at Harvard, sponsored by his Neo-Realist admirers in the Philosophy Department and attended by TSE. Published as *Our Knowledge of the External World*, the lectures include an exposition of the theory of sensation outlined by Ernst Mach (1838-1916) in *Die Analyse der Empfindungen und das Verhältnis des Physischen zum Psychischen* (1886). TSE probably knew Mach’s work in the translation by C. M.

Williams that Sydney Waterlow had revised from the fifth German edition, published in English as *The Analysis of Sensations and the Relation of the Physical to the Psychical* (1914).

6. Russell maintains in *Our Knowledge of the External World* (Chicago: Open Court, 1914) that “This is red” is an atomic proposition (53), i.e., that it is logically independent of all other propositions and thus that its truth or falsity does not necessitate the truth or falsity of any other proposition.

7. On 6 Mar 1911, Russell read his “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description” before the Aristotelian Society (*PAS*, 9 [1910-11], 108-28). Knowledge by acquaintance is knowledge obtained without any intermediary between the knower and known; knowledge by description, conversely, is knowledge obtained by means of a description or an intermediary. The main example of knowledge by acquaintance is sense-data.

8. The American realists, led by Edwin B. Holt (1873-1946), maintained in *The New Realism* (New York: Macmillan, 1912), that “consciousness is the group of (neutral) entities to which a nervous system, both at one moment and in the course of its life, responds” (373).

9. In “The Place of Illusory Experience in a Realistic World,” Holt connects consciousness with jolts to the nervous system (*New Realism* 303-73).

10. Thomas Percy Nunn (1870-1944), professor of education at the University of London and a member of the Aristotelian Society, evaluates competing epistemological claims in *The Aim and Achievements of Scientific Method* (London: Macmillan, 1907).

TEXTUAL NOTE

Location: Harvard University (Houghton): bMS Am 1691.14 (24), archivally titled [On objects]; an undated, untitled typescript (elite), with a few ink revisions; five sheets, 2-5 numbered in upper right corner; watermark: Lion Brand / “Croxley Manifest Bank” / London; 20.0 x 25.8 cm.

[Finite Centres and Points of View]

[Finite Centres and Points of View] is the third of six surviving essays that Eliot wrote in the 1914 Michaelmas term for his tutorial with Joachim.

It was contended in the preceding paper that the object is what it turns out to be;¹ that it is only in a world of social intercourse that objects can come into being and maintain their existence; and that the real meaning of the object is dependent upon both feeling and action. The object is in a sense essentially public, and yet the way in which it appears to each consciousness is not indifferent to it. It has something not captured in any of the points of view from which it is recognised, and yet it seems to be nothing over and above its appearance at these points of view. On the one hand, it seems to be merely the converging of various points of view, and on the other, the points of view seem to be nothing but differently coloured sectors of the same object.

The finite centre, or the point of view (the difference in the use of the two terms will I hope transpire in the course of the paper), is a modified reincarnation of the monad.² It is true that the monads have no windows, that the finite centres, so long as they last, are impervious, but not that the finite centre is a soul, not that the whole of reality is simply the sum of these centres. They are not ultimate except in the sense that we cannot conceive of reality except as appearing through and to them. But their nature is best explained by disposing of certain possible misconceptions.

In the first place, we may say with conviction that there is nothing hidden or obscure about these points of view. They are not, certainly, mental in the sense in which the supposed subject matter of psychology is mental. Each point of view is itself a world, and in it there is no ingredient which can be set off and called mental; and on the other hand, the whole of it is mental through and through. The “mind” simply is its world, the world considered in its progress toward clearness and completion. The “point of view” is simply this particular set of terms and relations, and is no more hidden than a chair or table. Only, it is not the abstract object, the meaning of the name, though that is in a sense present too. It is the object set in a context which may be implicit as the state of the mind’s body, or explicit as memory. But the implicit is not to be conceived as the hidden or the “psychical”; it is

merely the incomplete. So far as a point of view is a point of view, it will present an articulated world; so far as it remains on the level of feeling, it will be merely a concern of the biologist, and its existence for itself may be neglected. Not that this ideal is ever attained by the finite centre; in so doing, it would cease to be finite. But so far as it presents a world to itself, that world has nothing private about it. The private is only the unreal.

Why then is a finite centre exclusive? Not so far as it is mere feeling; for “mere feeling,” if there were such a thing, would not exist for itself at all. It is exclusive in the sense that each world, so far as it is, is the only world, and the others are imperfect appreciations of it. We must say that there cannot be two or more worlds. The different finite centres have identities of meaning; but the one world is not this bare identity, stripped of content; it is the identity with a supposititious complete content; and some seem to approach this ideal more closely than others. We do not get a world at all without the act of meaning, and we cannot mean our world, *i.e.*, we cannot mean it as our world, unless we have first meant it *simpliciter*. And orders may actually differ as much as you please; they may be so mad and strange as apparently to have nothing in common, yet so far as we can even think of them together, we must assume, and the two must assume that they aimed at the same object. In this way, only, a finite centre is exclusive, in that you cannot go in or out with impunity. You cannot, without completely abandoning your own point of view, completely understand that of another. I do not say that a point of view may not be transcended, or that two points of view may not melt into each other; but in this transformation the ingredients have ceased to exist.

The finite centre is exclusive, but it has nothing mysterious about it. And we cannot admit that the centres are exclusive in the way of differences of structure. This is simply inconceivable. It is essential, as I said before, that one should mean the world, if one is to mean a world. And it is impossible that two centres should mean the world and yet be utterly different in structure. One has only to think what this would mean: a bare identity and a complete diversity, and nothing in the world to weld the two into one. If one centre took notice of the other, it could do so only as an object in its own world; it would have not the ghost of a reason for guessing that a centre was there. Even this supposition, however, is too great a concession. For we have tacitly assumed an identity, which is, so far as it goes, an identity of structure; a body, let us say, enters into the two worlds and is enough to bind them together. Nor can we even conceive the possibility of the existence of

centres of feeling which lack all relation to ours; the predication of existence to such centres has become absolutely empty. Experience, we may say at the start, must be all of a piece, however intricate the pattern, and however incompletely the pattern, be represented by the fragment which we hold in our hand.

Differences, accordingly, are not of structure, but ultimately of objects alone. So far as our worlds differ, it is because (both being confessedly incomplete), they contain different objects. And the apparent fact that we can think of the same things, and yet disagree, does not affect this certainty. We may each be thinking of the object under the aspect of true but incomplete descriptions; or we may really have been thinking of different things, or one of us may not have been thinking at all—and this is ordinary error. And whether we have erred in one of these ways or another, it is only in the further struggle to understand each other that these facts appear.

The mind, then, is nothing more than the system of objects which appears before it; and only by an extension of the term can we speak of “individual minds”; the phrase is properly a contradiction.

Can we know that sensations of different finite centres are as much like one another as we assume? I think that we do know this; and furthermore that all differences between finite centres are (so to speak) accidental. For these differences must in the end be reducible to differences among the objects presented (objects, as I claim, by no means essentially private) or to differences in the physical basis. And if anyone entertain the possibility of any other difference, I can only inquire the meaning of a difference which makes no difference. For the only difference can be that of the physical structure which accounts for the sensations, or in the actions which issue from them (and a difference of sensation, of course, implies both these differences).³

For there is a common world which is the community of action, though this world only is a world by its appearance in finite centres. And there is no element of pure content, or of pure objectivity in the world as it appears to the individual which you can tear off and exhibit; for the “outside world” and the individual’s world are constantly rearranging themselves in every new context. It is true that some of the elements seem much more stable than others, and the least stable are values, but values are not ultimately more subjective, or more “dependent upon consciousness” than anything else, and in the end the value judgment differs not at all from any other judgment. From the single point of view, that is, the work of art simply is beautiful,

and the tiger simply is terrible, and there are no “emotions” present. I do not say that this attitude is either possible or proper in practice. It seems a frigid intellectualisation of aesthetic experience, and certainly is no explanation of it; for in this reduction to physiology, on the one hand, and objective values on the other, the whole meaning and being of aesthetic experience seem to have vanished. And yet I insist that to talk of the indisputability of taste is a greater error still.

It is in this intersection of point of view that complex or higher objects appear. These are taken over into the individual’s world and treated as lower objects. One of these is judgment.⁴

NOTES

1. See note 3, previous essay, [Objects: Real, Unreal, Ideal, and Imaginary]: “An object, I believe, is what it turns out to be.”

2. The finite center is explored in Bradley’s *Appearance and Reality* and in his essay “What Is the Real Julius Caesar,” where it is defined as “an immediate experience of itself and of the Universe in one.” In the same essay: “A soul is a finite centre viewed as an object existing in time with a before and after of itself” (*Essays on Truth and Reality* [Oxford: Clarendon, 1914], 410, 414). In Leibniz, the “monad” is the unit that remains the same through change of substance. See TSE’s essay “Leibniz’s Monads and Bradley’s Finite Centers” (462).

3. End of typescript; remainder of essay from pencil holograph.

4. TSE’s discussion of judgment occurs in the penultimate Michaelmas essay, [Definition and Judgment in Bradley and his Critics].

TEXTUAL NOTE

Location: Harvard Library (Harvard): bMS Am 1691.14 (23), archivally titled [On objects]; five undated, untitled sheets, six pages: four in typescript, double-spaced, 2-4 numbered in upper right corner; watermark: Lion Brand / “Croxley Manifest Bank” / London; 20.0 x 25.8 cm; one page pencil holograph, written on both sides, with side one numbered page 5 and side two numbered page 6 in upper right corner. The pencil holograph is part of a draft for the typescript. The first half of page 5, included in the typescript, is marked out on the holograph.

[The Privacy of Points of View]

[The Privacy of Points of View] is the fourth of six surviving essays that Eliot wrote in the 1914 Michaelmas term for his tutorial with Joachim.

I should like first to make another attempt to explain the “privacy” of “points of view” and the relation of object (point of view, system of terms and relations) to subject. All objects, I asserted before, are essentially public;¹ but likewise each object exists only in relation to a subject, the development of subject and object being *pari passu*. These two statements appear at first inconsistent. The difficulty arises, I think, from the ambiguity of the word knowledge: there is a stricter, more limited sense, in which knowledge is mere apprehension of objective truth and reality, and the wider sense in which it is conceived as an organic system. In the second sense, one can speak of knowledge as an activity; in the first, one cannot. The first sense is that emphasised by most realism (cf. Prichard, Russell), the second that of idealism.² But surely it is never actually possible to dispense with either. On the one hand, knowledge cannot, qua knowledge, be an activity. The object is there, and is merely apprehended; its being so and so is independent of the mind, for in this aspect, there is no mind. This is knowledge as pure contemplation. Clearly, it is never actualised in real knowing—and yet never exorcised. Suppose that the whole of metaphysical truth were present to the mind—then there would be no mind for it to be present to, for either there would be something in the mind irrelevant to the matter in hand, which is *ex hypothesi* impossible, or the mind would contemplate itself—which, in my opinion, is a meaningless phrase, if meant to be taken literally. The goal of this type of knowledge is absorption in the object, but it is a goal which is the suicide of knowledge.

The antithesis lies between knowledge as contemplation and knowledge as activity, an antithesis which is transcended in every moment of actual knowing, for it is evident that neither as pure contemplation nor as pure activity would knowledge be knowledge. I like Professor Smith’s division into knowing and acting, but the distinctions of metaphysics are shadows which we must not try to grasp in the hand:³ for actual knowing is an action, and action, to deserve the name (rather than the humble name of “behaviour”) must be intelligent action, involving will, and hence contemplation.

This is not to depreciate the distinction, which seems to me one of the highest importance. For what I mean by the point of view is the world as contemplated, and this is not the object as that which it proves itself to be in continued and orderly experience, but the object in an abstract and never-quite-actual sense. And in this sense, there is no subject present: the subject, like the object, is a construction in time. It is by the intersection of knowing and acting that we get real objects and real subjects.

To speak of one point of view transcending itself, or two fusing together to form a third, is confused and misleading. For the points of view as such consist only of terms in relation, of public objects, and it is properly only of states of feeling that one can speak as I have spoken. But to apprehend new objects means to act in a new way; to act differently is to feel differently, and feeling is ultimately not my feeling, for it is always either infra- or supra-rational. (It is feeling that I divide into knowing and acting, and to intrude feeling itself into the division, and talk of “knowing, acting (willing), and feeling” is nonsense.⁴ “Sensation” is merely a stunted and degenerate feeling. Feeling is something very real indeed metaphysically, but can have no standing as the subject matter of an empirical science). The incursion of every new object is felt, and the feeling irradiates and coalesces with the previous feeling.

To return to the distinction of knowing and acting. Real knowing, I believe, is not something which can be studied atomically, for as soon as you get down to the “simplest case” of knowing, it turns out thus stripped naked to be not knowledge at all. You can profitably study knowledge in rudimentary, but not in simple forms. In ordinary knowing this distinction between the contemplative and the active aspects can be safely ignored: in metaphysics it must be taken account of. For the attempt of the metaphysician aims to construct a world which shall be entirely object—a world which tends to be a world real for thought but not for action. Each individual lives potentially in two worlds—one of his objects, the other of his actions; two worlds which supplement each other, which indeed strive toward identity, which endeavour to accommodate themselves to each other, but never with complete success. On the other hand, so far as they endeavour to isolate themselves from each other, it is likewise never with complete success. This interdependence is especially evident in the sphere of value. A value is something which arises from the intersection of the spheres of acting and knowing. On one side, it is simply a mode of action; on the other side, it is an adjective of the object, quite as “independent of consciousness” as

redness or squareness. And the fact that valuation is an activity as well as an apprehension does not make “tastes” any the less disputable, or any the more a matter of caprice instead of knowledge, for we struggle unceasingly to elaborate a common world of contemplation as well as a common world of action. No one can impose his values upon a neighbor, nor take over his neighbor’s values for himself; but we must, so to speak, pretend that we can and do. Values become real values in one of two contrasted ways: by being shared by the community, or by absorbing more and more of the attention of the individual. And here again, in the case of value, is something which remains real only by a compromise between two tendencies. For a value may gain in extension until there is no meaning in speaking of it as a value at all, rather than a mode of “behaviour,” and it may gain in intension until it loses all meaning as a value by being cut off from all possibility of action.^{5*}

I do not mean that this interaction, or interpenetration, of acting and knowing which characterises value is present only in values which are identified as such, and absent from objects to which no conscious value attaches. Valuation is everywhere present; every object, even every metaphysical theory, has its use. It is an inevitable paradox of the situation that we should appear to reach the real by stripping it of values, and yet that Reality itself should be a value, the ultimate value.

Not only is value, but also are most of the other vaguer and more elusive of our objects counted among the borderline cases of acting and knowing. Ideas are such composite existences. Thus the fault of most (perhaps all) definitions of “idea” is that they emphasise one aspect to the exclusion of the other (e.g., Royce: “realisation of a purpose” / James: “a ‘leading-to’ an object.”)⁶

It is such objects as these to which I have previously referred as “higher objects.”⁷ Obviously, the distinction is only a provisional one. But I cannot think it of no importance. Distinctions cannot be neglected merely because they ultimately disappear. Now the question to which this distinction of types of object is relevant is that of definition, interpretation, and the validity of metaphysical systems. I will only suggest the sort of problem to which I refer, as I wish to take it up again more minutely in considering the nature of judgment.⁸ What I mean is this: if an object is a thing, it can only be defined by analysis into things. If it is an activity, it is defined in terms of purpose. (Thus an ordinary artifact is defined in terms of its material and final causes). Whereas, however, in ordinary definitions, we can separate

the knowing and acting elements without doing grave injustice to the whole: in the case of objects which are acting and knowing in so organic a way as, e.g. idea, causality, judgment, categories, it becomes questionable whether you can effect such an analysis as is involved in definition without seriously altering their nature. One is thus tempted to ask whether in metaphysics definition can find a place.

NOTES

1. See the second sentence of the preceding essay, [Finite Centres and Points of View]: "The object is in a sense essentially public."

2. In Kant's *Theory of Knowledge* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1909), H. A. Prichard (1871-1947) rejected Kant's epistemology, arguing that "Knowledge is *sui generis* and therefore a 'theory' of knowledge is impossible. Knowledge is knowledge, and any attempt to state it in terms of something else must end in describing something which is not knowledge" (247). In one of many marginal notes in his own copy, TSE described Prichard as "decidedly neo-realistic" (82).

3. John A. Smith (1863-1939), whose lectures on logic TSE was attending when he wrote this essay, was Waynflete Professor of Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy at Oxford. In *Knowing and Acting* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1910), he maintained that knowing and acting are not opposites but complements, "the systole and diastole of being," both essential for "successful living" (24, 16). "Every action presupposes knowledge. . . . And, on the other hand, knowing presupposes acting: in order to know there must first be something to know, and for this to be it must have been enacted" (22).

4. TSE here describes Smith's refusal to allow feeling equal standing with knowing and action. In *Knowing and Acting*, Smith says: "I disallow the claim of feeling to stand on a level with doing and knowing. . . . both terms must be taken very widely—doing as including wishing, willing, intending, &c., and knowing as including sensation, perception, judgment, reasoning, insight, &c." (16). TSE's quotation marks refer to Smith's concepts, not to a particular phrase.

5*. TSE's note: "This seems to me to mark the weakness of a certain type of aesthetic theory. Cf. Schopenhauer."

6. In his Gifford Lectures, *The World and the Individual: The Four Historical Conceptions of Being* (New York: Macmillan, 1900), Royce says that "the state or complex of states called the idea presents to consciousness the expressed although in general the incomplete fulfillment of a purpose. . . this purpose, when viewed as fulfilled through the state called the idea, is the internal meaning of the idea" (25).

In *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (London: Longmans, Green, 1912), James distinguishes between ideas and objects: "The perceptual object is not an idea within me . . . but [something] . . . *there, outside*" (19).

7. See the last paragraph of TSE's preceding paper, [Finite Centres and Points of View].

8. TSE turns to a consideration of judgment in his next paper, [Definition and Judgment in Bradley and his Critics].

TEXTUAL NOTE

Location: Harvard University (Houghton): bMs Am 1691.14 (25), archivally titled [Object and point of view]; an undated, untitled ink holograph, five sheets, light revisions, pages 2-5 numbered in upper right corner; watermark: Lion Brand / "Croxley Manifest Bank" / London, 20.0 x 25.8 cm.

[Definition and Judgment in Bradley and his Critics]

[Definition and Judgment in Bradley and his Critics] is the fifth of six surviving essays that Eliot wrote in the 1914 Michaelmas term for his tutorial with Joachim.

The difficulties of definition are occasioned by the fact that every definition is relative to a point of view, and it is only when and where differences of point of view are negligible that we can be said to have an adequate definition. I refer to Mr. Russell's definition of definition: definition signifies that a symbol just introduced is identical in meaning with a more complicated symbol previously used.¹ It is obvious that much that we ordinarily call definition will not fall under this account. It is only applicable in the abstract world in which all terms are taken in extension (cf. $R=ab(a+b)$), such definitions not being asserted and not being true or false. In this world of symbols, all objects are of the same type; in the real world, objects are of different types so far as they are in practice treated as being such. You cannot, that is, without an arbitrary fiat, treat the relations as the extension of the *relata*, or concepts as propositional functions. I propose that what we actually get is different types of objects. Everything that is, in so far as it is for us, is on one side experience, on the other side object, and these two aspects can never be reduced to one. Now in the case of those existences which, in being experienced, do not for practical purposes depend upon the apprehension of a lower type of object upon which they are based, which we may (again only for practical purposes) consider only as object; it is evident that this doubleness of aspect may be neglected. And it is obvious also that only the thing, or to put it more metaphysically, the individual, fulfils this condition. This concept, then, is primitive and indispensable; though it is obvious that even the concept may be stripped down to the intention of objectivity, inasmuch as every other aspect of the thing may be resolved into experience; and the intention itself may, though not without an alteration of the same sort which we express in a general way by saying that experiencing makes a difference to the object, be resolved into the intending, or psychological attention.

Now it is clear that no object either of sense or other apprehension ever does completely fulfil the condition of objectivity or thingness. We have the concept, and fit various experiences to it; and nothing can be said to be dependent or independent except according to context. In the world as

we know it, however, we may distinguish (in a purely relative way, of course) different levels of objectivity, according as the *inferiora* are negligible in the account or not. That is, according to the degree to which the *inferiora* are felt to differ from the superior object which is analysed into them. This difference, I suppose, must be found out simply by acquaintance.

These observations are prefatory to classifying judgment as an object, and the level of objectivity of the idea used in judgment. I contest the assertion that the idea is a sign, or that the idea is identical with the concept. The sign, I should say, has a kind of objectivity which the idea has not. And I should dispute the assertion that the logical and the psychological are parts of the same idea. When Mr. Bradley asserts that a sign differs from another existence in having besides existence and content, meaning, I agree;² but I should not admit that these three characters are found in the same way in the idea. For in the idea, existence and meaning fall together—that is, the existence is nothing over and above the meaning. It is just the separate existence, the fact that a sign might be interpreted as other, or simply not recognised as a sign, that makes it a sign. Take some of the examples given. A flower the sign or symbol of an emotion; the fox the symbol of cunning. The meaning of the sign consists of a part of the content (original in the case of the fox, acquired in the case of the flower), “cut off” and “considered apart.” Does an idea refer to reality as a fox refers to cunning? The quality to which fox or flower refers is heterogeneous to fox or flower. Fox or flower may be the sign of a reality, and yet exist independent of that which it is the sign of; but the idea has nothing to be cut off from; it is the meaning. In order for idea to be sign in the sense in which fox is, we should have to have an idea of the idea, and in order that this second idea should be an idea, etc.

An idea, or ideal content, in the sense in which Mr. Bradley uses it in his account of judgment, has nothing to do with psychology.³ In one passage, he appears to maintain that it does have such a particular existence, in perhaps confusing it with image (which also, I think, has nothing to do with psychology: but that is not quite the same problem).⁴ Nor on the other hand is it identical with concept, as Mr. Moore seems to hold.⁵ It is a reference or intention of reality. It is a superior object, in that it means reality, while to make it it, to make it an object, we mean its meaning, its *Sinn*, not its *Bedeutung*.⁶ Yet we are not to suppose that the meaning from the point of view of the idea in experience is an object apart from the idea as object, to which the latter is related (I hope to be able to offer evidence that the relation of an object of one type to an object of another type is extra-logical

and is not a relation at all).⁷ It is however continuous with the so-called psychological idea in this way: it means to be of reality, but the reality which it is of is the particular reality of the person who has the idea. Consequently, for his point of view, from the observer's point of view, it is a purely non-psychical (and in this sense non-mental) existence; for the observer's point of view, from the observer's point of view, it is a particular existence (hence claimed by psychology), because it is the idea of a particular world, not of the world; of the world as content, not as object. In this way, the idea is both particular and universal; but these are two different aspects, not two different parts, of the same thing, and of course there is no thing beyond the aspects.

Now to say that judgment is the predication of an ideal content of reality is not properly speaking a definition but an interpretation. Definition must be into *inferiora*, interpretation into *superiora*. Not that in contrast with such an interpretation a true definition would be possible or desirable. Modern experimental psychology of the thought processes is, I think, an example of the futility of the attempt to define judgment in psychological terms. But interpretation, which philosophy essentially is, involves the use of the concept of value.

Now with regard to the consideration of the behaviour of different types of object, it is evident that by taking such an account of judgment and reading it as if the objects were lower objects, we can invariably reduce it to nonsense, just as, for example, the correspondence theory of knowledge may be reduced, and precisely as Mr. Bradley himself reduces relations.⁸ Thus it is simply a question at what point you have recourse to faith. For this theory of judgment is open to the same objections. For in the sense in which judgment is an activity, how can it be knowledge? As knowing minds, we do not judge. And if we actively unite an idea to reality, on the one hand, the idea is real, and the real to which we unite it is largely ideal. But on the other hand, to lay down that we shall form no theory of judgment is to shirk the question or locate our difficulties elsewhere. If there is no reason why one should have a theory of judgment, yet there is no reason why one should not. Nothing is contradictory until it has been made a thing, and everything can be made a thing, and everything is contradictory.

NOTES

1. "A definition is a declaration that a newly-introduced symbol . . . is to mean the same as a certain other combination of symbols of which the meaning is already known." Russell and Alfred North Whitehead, *Principia Mathematica*, vol 1 (Cambridge UP, 1910), 11. Brand

Blanshard, who vacationed with TSE during the 1914 Dec recess, recalled “Eliot’s figure as he sat at the dining room table each morning with a huge volume of . . . *Principia Mathematica* propped open before him. He had a certain facility in dealing with its kind of symbols; he said that manipulating them gave him a curious sense of power” (“Eliot at Oxford,” *Southern Review*, 54 [1985], 893).

2. “A sign is any fact that has a meaning, and meaning consists of a part of the content (original or acquired), cut off, fixed by the mind, and considered apart from the existence of the sign.” *The Principles of Logic* (New York: G. E. Stechert, 1912), 4. In his annotated copy of this anastatic reprint of the 1883 first edition, TSE marked this passage and added a long marginal note. He quotes and discusses the passage in chapter 2 of his dissertation, where most of this paragraph is repeated and where the marginal comment is included in an editorial note (280, n. 30).

3. “Judgment is primarily logical . . . ; the relation of the ideal content to reality must be there or not there. Belief, on the other hand, is primarily psychological” (*Principles of Logic* 19).

4. “If ‘all’ signifies a number of individual facts, the judgment is concerned with actual particulars” (*Principles of Logic* 81).

5. G. E. Moore, “The Nature of Judgment,” *Mind*, 8 (Apr 1899): “A proposition [or judgment] is composed not of words, nor yet of thoughts, but of concepts” (179). Moore (1873-1958) was one of the founders of the analytic tradition in philosophy. In *My Philosophical Development* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), Russell wrote: “It was towards the end of 1898 that Moore and I rebelled against both Kant and Hegel. Moore led the way, but I followed closely in his footsteps . . . the first published account of the new philosophy was Moore’s article in *Mind* on ‘The Nature of Judgment’” (57).

6. In “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” (*Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, New Series 100 [1892]: 25-50), Gottlob Frege proposed the distinction between *Sinn*, usually translated as “sense,” and *Bedeutung*, usually translated as “reference.”

7. TSE may be referring to another essay in the Michaelmas sequence, now lost, or perhaps to the work he intended to do in his thesis.

8. In chapter 3 (“Relation and Quality”) of *Appearance and Reality*, Bradley both concedes that we live in a world of relations and maintains that relations are self-contradictory and unintelligible. He summarizes: “a relational way of thought—any one that moves by the machinery of terms and relations—must give appearance, and not truth” (28).

TEXTUAL NOTE

Location: Harvard University (Houghton): bMS Am 1691.14 (26), archivally titled [On definition]; an untitled, undated typescript (elite); four leaves, 2-4 numbered; watermark: Lion Brand / “Croxley Manifest Bank” / London; 20.0 x 25.8 cm.

The validity of artificial distinctions

“The validity of artificial distinctions” is the last of six surviving essays that Eliot wrote in the 1914 Michaelmas term for his tutorial with Joachim.

I should like to offer a few remarks upon the validity of the artificial distinctions used in philosophy. I shall defend these distinctions, for I hold that artificial distinctions are necessary; believing that in metaphysics all distinctions are in a sense equally artificial, but that some are truer than others.

Any name I take to be an example of identity in diversity: the meaning of a name always goes beyond and binds together the contexts in which it has been used. While on the one hand, it finds meaning only in use, and while its meaning in use is never complete, but is always being enriched by new application, yet there is always present an element in the meaning which is something different from any sum of uses. On the one hand, it appears to be this identity which holds together the differences, and on the other, the different experiences seem to be all that is. These remarks, I know, are the merest commonplace. But it is easily forgotten that the meaning of a name is not simply present or absent. Rather, it disappears like a gas-balloon into the sky: the person who let the toy escape, and who continues to fix his eye upon it, can still see it long after it has become impossible for a random eye to find. To the philosopher who has been manipulating names in common use, the meaning remains the same, while the critic exclaims that it has been completely and unscrupulously altered. And I conceive that any philosophic explanation which involves the taking over of a term or terms from daily use and disposing the rest of reality according to them—and this is a procedure which enters inevitably into every philosophic progress—is an explanation which is lamentably deficient. You not only cannot prove your result; you cannot within the rights of your own conscience impose it upon your neighbour. It can only be maintained by faith, a faith which, like all faith, should be seasoned with a skilful sauce of scepticism. And scepticism too is a faith, a high and difficult one.

What I have illustrated as occurring to the name is really a feature of all experience: there is something given, and there is always an ideal construction. Experience is through and through practical, and experience is through and through theoretical. It is surely dangerous exaggeration to suppose that

there ever was a stage in the history of human or of animal activity when that activity was purely practical, or even "immersed in practice"; and I do not think that the error is turned into truth by adding the qualification "mainly" or "preponderatingly" practical. Every ideal construction is in a sense unwarranted. In every experience there is an ideal element which looks forward to use for its verification, and whose looking forward is its meaning. And a theory which pretended to rest in the present would be without meaning whatever.

There is one very obvious sense in which philosophic theories have their use, a sense to which pragmatism has called more than sufficient attention. Every theory exercises the influence which art and religion exercise. Aesthetically, they present an expression of personality, an artistic whole, which influences by being contemplated; and to every philosophy is allied a more or less intended, more or less legitimate moral tendency—if not several tendencies. But a little inspection will show, I think, that this sort of "use" is here irrelevant, and is not the proper continuation of the looking-forward tendency which is present in any act or judgment. When we speak of the use of so-and-so's system, we are not thinking of it as true. For if we believe a theory of reality, it is meaningless to assign it a use. Why? Because when or so far as we believe in a system, we are inside it: there is no "theory," for the theory is the reality. The use I speak of is the use of each step as we advance. The theory of judgment which we devise, for example, is not verified by turning round to inspect the world which we have left and to count the steps of our progress. The backward glance may yield regrets for our adventurousness, or may even change us to salt, but can bring out no information.¹ Our theory of judgment is justifiable only by the system we build upon it. We ascend a dizzy precipice, and the ledges crumble underneath; to return is disaster, to proceed offers at least the chance of triumph. This further development of the system is the use of the theory of judgment. The theory apprehends, or aims to apprehend, a reality; and upon that reality we build.

I have said that this progress of metaphysics, which consists in the continual looking-forward and verification of theories, is only a farther-going and more conscious pursuit of the same sort of activity which is going on at every moment. The world is not simply there, for metaphysics to play upon; it is itself metaphysical, and meditating upon its own nature, spins itself out of its own belly. It swarms with inchoate theories which ultimately perhaps mean the same thing—at the point where all meanings are lost. The vast

majority of these theories never reach articulate expression, but are reabsorbed into practice. Considering this process from the point of view of language, we may say that words, rising to the surface in the form of bubbles, distend to a greater or less size and subside. It is only at moments and within limited spheres determined by particular purposes that we attempt to think clearly and consistently, to harmonise our meanings and pursue them to the precipice of intelligibility.

All of these meanings take wing from a comparatively small circle of conscious interest where meaning is perfectly clear—that is, clear enough; there is a wider circle where the meanings do not consciously appear, but into which they can be interpreted without doing violence; and there is a widest circle within which the meaning approximates, without ever quite reaching, the zero point. In ethical theory, for example, “self-realisation” and “pleasure” or “satisfaction” are possible accounts of human conduct only because they do bear a strong resemblance to motives which we have imputed to our own or to others’ actions, or to the motives which were consciously before our minds.² There is a “psychology of desire” and a good deal of futile discussion as to the ultimate object of desire: whether we “can” desire pleasure, or whether we desire only the object, or a “fact,” or a “state.” Well! it seems to me that we can and do desire all or any of these, in their various senses; but to single out one, and explain the rest in terms of that, is hardly wiser than trying to cram both feet into one shoe. And yet all philosophising, so far as it explains at all, does just this, and is right to do this: for so far as the result can be used (not in the pragmatist sense, but in the sense explained above), it is real, and its statement true. The extension of meaning (on the one hand extension of the meaning of names, and on the other hand extension of the being of facts) is, it must be insisted, not a falsification; it is imprudent, but so is a balloon ascension; though our balloon finally collapse, we have taken a certain number of observations while in the air; and it will be only to the eyes of the vulgar that our descent appear a disaster.

The true reason, I think, for the failure of all philosophic flights, is not that they venture too far, but that they venture alone. The eye of the *honnête homme* on the ground does not follow them. The philosopher tells of the phenomena of his atmosphere, but what reason has the ground-dweller for believing that these statements are made about his world? Meanings will not stretch so far as to build a ladder between your heaven and my earth. As a system extends, it becomes more tenuous. I agree that truth is forward and not behind. But in the work of any one, or any group of pioneers, the

advance toward articulateness and completeness is invariably attended by a loss of density and richness.^{3*} You cannot attain mobility without abandoning a certain amount of *matériel*. It is significant, I think, that the soundest philosophies are those which appear to spring from the genius of a race, rather than from the mind of an isolated individual (though I do not contest the individual's right, once he has begun his philosophising, to pull down the curtain and close his eyes). And what is more, the greatest philosophies have themselves something of this density and richness, and consequently are themselves subject-matter for study almost as difficult and inexhaustible as the world itself. For this reason the difficulties presented by a great philosopher are very different from those presented by a small one; a very different attitude is necessary for the appreciation of Hegel or Aristotle than for the understanding of the Grazer *Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie* (to take a work which I understand not at all).⁴ Not that the latter sort are without value. I recollect a word of Eucken's: "es gibt keine Privatwahrheiten."⁵ In a sense, I think, all significant truths are private truths; they must be made mine before they can be true for me. As they become common, they become either inarticulate (in gaining in density) or they become insignificant. $2 + 2 = 4$. But is this a truth at all?

It is on these grounds that I defend the division into faculties of knowing and acting.⁶ The use of such distinctions I admit to be entirely relative and largely negative. They can in no wise pretend to be ultimate; they find their justification, as every theory finds its justification, in the refutation of other theories and the detection of error; and they find their nemesis, as every theory finds its nemesis, in the mistaken belief that we know more about these abstractions than about anything else, that we know them in an immediate and complete way in which we know nothing else. What excuse, it will be said, can we have for resolving value into a peculiar combination of acting and knowing, when either acting or knowing, taken by itself, seems to contain value as an ingredient? The general defense of such a procedure is that thereby some other theory is made untenable by us. We assume, not that we know the meaning of knowing and of acting, but that we know them: they for the moment have no meanings, but other things mean these two in various proportions. We have shown that value is not a fundamental feature of the universe, and that to a certain extent other features may be treated as if they were. We have shown that there is legitimate excuse for regarding certain curious objects as indefinable, because, when we make the attempt to define them, we find that they retain an unfathomable

element of activity which will not be reduced to objectivity; and we maintain that, within the universe of discourse of this argument, it is irrelevant if acting, considered by itself, prove to be infinitely complex. For the activity which is present in judgment or in value, or rather the activity which is analysed out of it, is ideal activity, the knowing is ideal knowing; whereas the knowing and acting which are themselves analysed are real knowing and acting. And I do not consider that this division provides any definition of judgment or value. You can only define the way in which you intend to use a term; and I am not here concerned with what I mean by judgment or value, but with what judgment or value mean—which is a very different thing.

It may be asked whether it is possible to construct a philosophy without making any assumption of constant terms into which the rest are resolved, or whether, even if such assumptions are made, they may not be sufficiently qualified later. I believe that *Appearance and Reality*, with certain reservations satisfied this ideal.^{7*} Nevertheless, I must pursue this admission with the charge that the positive merit of the book in a sense is that it unfolds no positive result whatever. I say merit: I mean that when a philosopher pretends to emerge with some “positive result” which can be formulated, which declares triumphantly that reality is this or that, some discovery which informs us that anything is anything else than what we supposed it to be before we began to philosophise,—then the philosopher is simply pulling out of his pocket what he put there himself. The token that a philosophy is true is, I think, the fact that it brings us to the exact point from which we started. We shall be enriched, I trust, by our experience on the Grand Tour, but we shall not have been allowed to convey any material treasures through the Custom House. And the wisdom which we shall have acquired will not be part of the argument which brings us to the conclusion; it is not part of the book, but is written in pencil on the fly-leaf. For the point to which we return should be the same, but somehow is not, but is a higher stage of reality; and even though degrees of reality be all accounted for in our theory, yet if our theory were literally true, reality would not have changed while we have been theorising. This change which our thinking has operated somehow falls outside our theory of change. But at this point it is wise to stop.

There is still the other side of the matter, for I must return to the defense of vicious abstractions. We must recognise a sense in which, while all systems lead us back to the point from which we started, yet as the experience of the trip is what we are out for, the choice of the route is all important. It

may seem a trivial waste of breath to dispute about the true definition of judgment, when apparently it is all one in the end and makes no difference in the meantime. In reality our whole view of life is at stake in the finest shred of logic that we chop. And in this progress we cannot help but take hold of what elements in our world seem to us the most stable, analyse everything else into these, and proclaim our discovery of the truth. Does it seem to you that will is the self-realisation of an idea? I for my part cannot help feeling that I know quite as much about will as I do about self-realisation, if I know anything about either.

NOTES

1. When Lot and his family were told to flee Sodom and Gomorrah and not to look back, his wife looked back and was changed into a pillar of salt (Genesis 19).

2. In spring 1914, at Harvard, TSE wrote two essays on ethical theory, the first dealing with the ethics of “satisfaction” in Abraham Tucker, and the second with the ethics of “self-realisation” in Green and “pleasure” in Sidgwick (136; 147).

3*. TSE’s marginal notation: “It is this contrast between the tenuous and the dense which is the contrast between thought and reality.”

4. In 1904, Alexius Meinong edited *Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie* (Leipzig: Barth), a volume representing the work of the psychological laboratory at the Grazer School in Graz, Austria. Meinong, whose theory of objects TSE refers to in his dissertation, contributed the opening essay, “Über Gegenstandstheorie.”

5. *es gibt keine Privatwahrheiten*: there are no private truths. TSE uses Eucken’s aphorism in [Degrees of Reality] and also in the conclusion of his dissertation (63; 377).

6. TSE discusses the knowledge/action dichotomy in [The Privacy of Points of View] (179–80).

7*. In a marginal notation, TSE states: “e.g., I cannot see my way to the admission that ‘Reality is spiritual.’” The reference is to Bradley’s closing words in *Appearance and Reality*: “We may fairly close this work then by insisting that Reality is spiritual. . . . Outside of spirit there is not, and there cannot be, any reality, and, the more that anything is spiritual, so much the more is it veritably real” (552).

TEXTUAL NOTE

Location: Harvard University (Houghton): bMS Am 1691.14 (27); an undated typescript (elite) with title and revisions in black ink; seven sheets, with 2-7 numbered in upper right corner; watermark: Lion Brand / “Croxley Manifest Bank” / London; 20.0 x 25.8 cm.

[*Eĩdos* in the Early Socratic and Late Platonic Dialogues]

In Jan 1915, Eliot resumed his philosophical studies at Oxford. According to his report to Dean Briggs of Harvard, in this “second term” (Hilary term, mid-Jan to mid-Mar), “I attended two courses of lectures, one by Mr. H. H. Joachim, my tutor, and one by Professor J. A. Smith” (*LI* 118). As in the Michaelmas term, Joachim’s lectures were on the *Nicomachean Ethics* and Smith’s lectures, “The Concept of Value,” were on logic. Further, Eliot reports, “I attended a small class reading a text of Plotinus [*Enneads*] with Professor J. A. Stewart.” He also continued his weekly tutorial with Joachim, now focused on Plato’s dialogues and Aristotle’s *Post-Analytics*, and “once a week brought Mr. Joachim papers on the philosophy of Plato” (*LI* 118). “I am now writing papers on Plato,” he explained to Woods on 28 Jan, “and shall later write on Aristotle” (*LI* 91). Of the six to eight essays on Plato, only the one on *Eĩdos* has survived.

Eĩdos appears to me to have several distinguishable meanings, though I am by no means sure that I can identify them invariably in their existences.¹ There is (1) *eĩdos* as sort or kind, used loosely, and sometimes interchangeably with *gėnos*,² (2) *eĩdos* as the Pythagorean form, or as class concept, [and] (3) as categories or as primitive ideas in a deductive universal science.

Of the first use I should cite *Phaedo* (79a6) *eĩdh tōn ōntōn, tō mēn ōratōn, tō dē aĩdēs*,³ where the *eĩdos* is not of the *ōratōn*⁴ but is the *ōratōn*; for certainly we do not have a form of forms or a form of the formless (of the formlessness, that is to say). *gėnos* is I think used to express similar indeterminate differences.

In such passages as *Sophist* (235b) *duo eĩdh [kathorān] tēs mimētikēs*⁵ and *Sophist* (266d); in the latter of which *gėnos* represents the same distinction as *eĩdos* in the first; the two terms appear to be used interchangeably. I am not certain in my mind as to the degree of precision intended in this passage, or in a number of other passages. Though *eĩdos* and *gėnos*, and *eĩdos* and *ĩdēa* seem to be equivalent in certain contexts, *ĩdēa* and *gėnos* apparently never are interchanged, and the term *eĩdos* appears to have the greater latitude of meaning.

At any rate, the first pair, with the phrase *autō tō*⁶—is I think more frequent in the earlier dialogues including the *Republic* and the latter pair in the later. It seems to me, rightly or wrongly, that the notion of *χωρισμός*⁷ is much more prominent, not only in the *Phaedo*, but in all the dialogues through the *Republic*, than in the later dialogues. The form, I feel, hovers

between magical formula and scientific method. It is difficult to say how far the passage 101c is an anticipation of Plato's own theory of ἀριθμοὶ ἀσύμβλητοι⁸ or of the modern theory of number; but I should say that there is here no theory of the genesis of number or of a "hierarchy" of forms. There is still something mystical about the relation of τὰ καλὰ to τῷ καλῷ or αὐτῷ τῷ καλῷ;⁹ the relation is not quite thoroughly a logical one, and the εἶδος or ἰδέα is not a "universal." It seems to have a real as well as logical existence. It is not even certain whether a class is not a member of itself, "odd" predicable of "oddness" (103a), and this I suppose to be the question settled later by the participation of forms in each other. And the use to which the whole argument is put, the demonstration of the immortality of the soul (a demonstration made in good faith, as I think) seems to point to the conclusion that the discussion is not so much logical as ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.¹⁰ It is true that in the course of the proof we get some important passages on methodology, but these seem to me more Socratic than Platonic, and deal with the τι ἱκανόν¹¹ rather than with the foundations of logic. The theory was becoming logical; but I do not think that the εἶδος can be said to have sprung full-born a logical entity.

I cannot help thinking that the passage at the end of Book VI [of the *Sophist*] marks a great advance over the theories of the *Phaedo*, though no rupture; this passage is still much closer to the Socratic theory than is the system of the Sophists. The view of the place of hypothesis seems distinctly a development beyond that of *Phaedo* (101d-e), and the conception of ultimate logical (mathematical) principles finds emphasis. The importance of the passage seems to lie in the emphasis upon the Good, as the common nature, I suppose, underlying all Types of Order. This is the thought present in the criticism of Anaxagoras in the *Phaedo*, the thought that any explanation must be ultimately a teleological one, in the sense of value if not of purpose; and in the conception of order that of teleology (cf. the "rational will" of Royce) appears to have been closely implicated.¹² The *Republic* passage is only a generalisation of the doctrine of the *Phaedo*; the real explanation of anything is to exhibit it as an instance of a type of order; and knowledge comprises both the elucidation of each type in its instances and the discovery of the principles which direct and unite the various types. Thus, while an uneducated person will only be able to say that he likes or dislikes a picture, the ordinary person will be able to account for his opinion by classifying it among his other likes or dislikes, and an artist can at once recognise in it its proper order, which will be distinguishable from the

picture itself, though no detail in the picture will be irrelevant to it. This case of the work of art, in which the type of order is identical with its (only) instance, is however obviously not what Plato has in mind, which is more the abstract than the concrete universal. ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἰοῦσα καὶ ἄνευ τῶν περὶ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων, αὐτοῖς εἶδεσι διαυτῶν τὴν μέθοδον ποιουμένη.¹³ These εἶδη are still the forms, here with reference to a complete deductive system. In a complete metaphysical knowledge, the images would not be abandoned, but image and εἶδος would become identified as in the work of art. But this is I think far from Plato's theory, which tends to be somewhat thin and lacking in substance, though I think that in the later dialogues it clothes itself in more flesh.

Burnet holds that the Pythagorean forms find no place in the later dialogues, being supplanted by the categories of the Sophists, which are mentioned either as εἶδη or γένη. I have not observed such an abrupt break. While the earliest εἶδος seems to me to have but a quasi-logical existence, I should have supposed it continuous with the five categories, and should not have thought that Plato's criticism of the "doctrine of forms" indicated a repudiation of the views of his master.¹⁴ The aim throughout seems to me to be the discovery of types of order which would make the world wholly intelligible, and while the later dialogues work upon the foundations of this logic with more exactness and profundity, and elaborate a theory of knowledge, the problem of the relation of the αἰδές and ὁρατόν¹⁵ does not appear solved.

NOTES

1. εἶδος: form.

2. γένος: kind.

3. Plato, *Phaedo*, 79a6. *Trans*: two kinds of existences, one visible, the other invisible. TSE's quotations from the Greek are from his copy of Plato's works: *Platonis opera*, 6 vols, ed. John Burnet (Oxford: Clarendon, 1900-07). Burnet (1863-1928), best known for his editions of and commentaries on Plato, was a fellow at Merton College from 1890 to 1915. TSE's copy of Plotinus's *Enneades*, ed. Ricardus Volkmann (Leipzig: Teubner (1883), has numerous annotations showing parallels with Plato (King's).

4. ὁρατόν: visible.

5. δύο καθορᾶν εἶδη τῆς μιμητικῆς: to recognize two forms of imitation.

6. αὐτὸ τὸ: the [thing] itself, as in "the magnitude itself" (αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος).

7. χωρισμός: separation.

8. ἀριθμοὶ ἀσύμβλητοι: irrational numbers.

9. "τὰ καλὰ" to "τῶ καλῶ" or "αὐτῶ τῶ καλῶ": "the beautiful things" to "the beautiful" or "the beautiful itself."

10. ἐν τοῖς λόγοις: in the words; idiomatically: conversational.

11. τι ἰκανόν: something sufficient.

12. In his chapter on “Optimism, Pessimism, and the Moral Order” in *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy* (1892), Royce contrasts the capricious “irrational will” of Schopenhauer to a more trustworthy “rational will,” defined as a will that goes beyond self-consciousness and is ultimately associated with the divine.

13. *Trans*: “[In respect of the fourth and last section of the divided line, the soul] passes out of hypotheses, and goes up to a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of images as in the former case, but proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves.” *Republic*, VI, 510b, in *The Dialogues of Plato*, vol 3, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon, 1908).

14. εἶδη: ideas; γένη: kinds. The subject of TSE’s essay, the distinction between the meaning of εἶδος in the early Socratic dialogues and the later mature ones, is explored at length in Burnet’s *Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato* (London: Macmillan, 1914), 154-69. TSE’s signed (“T. S. Eliot / 1914”) and annotated copy is in his library, along with Burnet’s *Early Greek Philosophy* (1908) and his edition of Aristotle’s *Ethics* (1900).

15. αἰδές: the invisible; ὁρατόν: the visible. These terms from *Phaedo* 79a-c are discussed by Burnet in his edition of Plato’s *Phaedo* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1911).

TEXTUAL NOTE

Location: Harvard University (Houghton): bMS Am 1691.14 (20), archivally titled “Eidos”; undated and untitled holograph in black ink: four numbered pages: unruled white paper; watermark: Lion Brand / “Crowley Manifest Bank” / London; 20.2 x 25.9 cm.

The Relativity of the Moral Judgment

At the end of the Hilary term in 1915, Eliot read “The Relativity of the Moral Judgment” at a meeting of the Moral Sciences Club held on 12 Mar in Russell’s rooms at Cambridge.

The attempt to defend a naturalistic or biological attitude in ethics exposes one, I am well aware, to an attack from two quarters: from those who adopt a thoroughgoing rationalism, and from those who seek for truth in the immediate revelations of intuition.¹ Indeed I hesitate for another reason to take the name of naturalism; the reason [being] that I do not wish to league myself with those who find in biological utility the criterion for all moral value. I do not assert that value is mere feeling, and I do not deny that we can and do reason about our actions within certain limits. Let me consequently ask you to consider the view which I am about to propose as an idealism *à rebours*,² and to consider its materialistic tone as a difference only of emphasis.

Historically, too, the differences between materialism and idealism come to little more than this. Yet, although while the primogeniture in the case will always remain in doubt, an impartial observer, inspecting the philosophical activities of the last several generations, is impelled to remark that one has been robbed, beaten, and dispossessed, while the other has flourished in the emoluments and appanages of his brother. The coat of materialism, turned and trimmed, has adorned the back of idealism of a Sunday; and materialism has had to shuffle about in a few gaudy trinkets of very doubtful value bestowed upon him by the natural sciences. However, idealism, having sold his mess of pottage for a birth-right, is perhaps beginning to show signs of inanition; and it is possible too that materialism, toughened by an age of lusty beggary, will fall upon his brother and leave him naked. With one coat and two backs, it seems there is nothing for it but turn and turn about.³

The task of philosophy, it appears to me, is largely one of simplification: to disentangle the riddling oracles of the world, to paragraph and punctuate them and insert the emphases; a work of great but certainly of only relative value, our pride in which must ever be corrected by the reflection that what is explained outlasts any of its explanations; explanations which it generates,

sustains, and to which it allows that scant measure of validity which they possess. Hence, an inevitable inadequacy in one direction or another: to reduce the world to a set of formulae is to let it slip through our fingers in a fine dust; but to fly into an emotional orgy or retire into a sunlit stupor is to let the world slip through our fingers in a thin smoke. Between the two extremes is found the subject-matter of conversation, upon which intelligence feeds. Philosophy, as I apprehend it, is a hybrid compound of the three, science, orgy, and conversation; though I fear that we are apt to overlook the third in the violence of our rushes from pole to pole. Every philosophy compounds them in its own proportions. Much of idealism, which is the philosophy of the historically minded, consists in an attempt to take the delicate and evasive truths of historical and literary criticism, truths which are the intuitive apprehension of a trained mind and a trained taste, and dragoon them into the goose-step of dialectic; while on the other hand, the more tough-minded philosopher sometimes presents the aspect of an elderly German mathematician learning to dance.⁴ But there are all sorts of ways of setting the world in order; from the relative precision of physics to the relative confusion of theology; and if, as I concede to idealism, each science manufactures its own objects, yet metaphysics is at liberty to manufacture its own objects too. As a relativist (to use Dr. Wiener's word),⁵ I am not in a position even to desire to refute anybody; all that I have the desire and the right to attempt, is to indicate what seems to me the sensible, or *honnête* view.

The difference, then, between the view which I urge and idealism is that while the idealist, on ascending into heaven, pulls his ladder up after him, I prefer to return to lay my head upon a stone.⁶ Idealism, or those forms of it with which I am acquainted, insist repeatedly that reality lies ahead and not behind, and that absolute truth, reality, and value meet at one point. In doing this it emphasises, as I think rightly, the continuity of all reality. An essential principle of idealism is the faith that spirit or consciousness is not something alien or wholly inexplicable in the material world, but that it was there the whole time, and its explicit appearance merely the natural unfolding of promise like the unfolding of a flower. Idealism insists that if you look closely you will be forced to recognise that the sharp contrasts of mind and matter, of existence and value, of mechanism and purpose are differences which are thought only, differences introduced by the mind for practical purposes, which are true certainly, but present truth historically rather than scientifically, as a moment in the history of the mind. In a work

like *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, for example, you find the author at the greatest pains to defend the mechanistic conception, until suddenly he stands the whole structure on its head, a procedure, to say the least, disconcerting to one's semi-circular canals.⁷ This labour of identification has been carried on with the greatest skill by various philosophers, and I have no desire to minimise its value. I only suggest that it cuts both ways, and if the two worlds are one, and the one which they are is represented perhaps more adequately by the one than by the other; then which one the representative shall be, each man may choose for himself. And in spite of the irresistible current of dialectic, I find myself always returning to the feeling (for I do not dignify it by any more honourable name) that what we call the physical universe represents something much more real and permanent than all our structures of thought; and though I see the faquir throw his rope into the sky and clamber up, yet I know that when his spell is off I shall find him at ease upon the ground. I am aware that my physical world is not absolute, in the sense in which sense-data or the absolute are so; but just for that reason, I have more confidence in it. If it is said that my world is a construction out of sense-data, I can only say that for that reason I know more about it; and if on the other hand it is criticised on the ground of its manifest incompleteness, I may admit that spirituality is very real indeed, but that it seems to me more spiritual when treated as value than when treated as existence; and that to assert that mind is mechanical [is] a materialism, as it seems to me, much more cramping and depressing than my own.

All these very general, and I fear very random, remarks are intended to ward off erroneous anticipation of what I mean by naturalistic ethics. It is very much like idealistic ethics, except that it does not use quite the same catch-words, and does not go so far or pretend to such close consistency. I do not mean to guide conduct wholly by cheap phrases torn from Spencerian biology. I do not maintain that biology can "explain" value. But I believe that any system of values is built up on feelings, and that as our feeling changes, so will that which is valuable always be something else. Our feelings being given, we build a system of values of which we demand a certain amount of consistency, and within which we do not need at every step to make the appeal to feeling. And to a certain extent we can speak with Plato of true and false pleasures.⁸ But nothing can guard our system against a change of feeling which we cannot say finally is due to increased knowledge and experience, but is purely and simply a change, and is to be explained, if at all, in terms of biology and physiology. To these sciences, and to the physical

universe, the feeling is relative, just as value is relative to feeling. The feeling looks forward to the value, and backward to the physical change.

Let us say then that the value judgment presents three aspects or moments. It is an expression of feeling. Second, it is a judgment which is true or false, and is simply perceived to be such. Third comes the interpretation: it explains why a judgment is true or false, though not how we come to attach the value to this subject; it states the meaning of the judgment, a meaning of which we were not aware at the time of judging; it constructs a system into which it requires all our judgments to fit. But whatever the formula of the system may be, whether self-realisation, or pleasure, or what other form of the absolute we may choose, it is obvious that no theory will tell us why we take more pleasure in one activity than in another, why we realise ourselves more completely in one way than in another. Nor, if we take as our criterion of moral action the goodness of the consequences, will we be able wholly to explain or dispose of moral value by analysing it into value of another sort.

First, then, to consider the role which feeling plays in moral value. I do not maintain that in a moral judgment what we judge about is our feeling; this view, whether it has ever been held or not, has certainly been satisfactorily refuted; and I would even put the statement in a more general form and say that in no judgment of value (even in judgments of artistic value, in which our feelings might seem to be more directly in question) is the judgment about a feeling. Not only is it not made about the feeling of the judge, it is not made about the feeling of anyone or of any group of people. Nevertheless, what it expresses, though this is not necessarily the feeling of the judge, is necessarily somebody's feeling, and a feeling for which there is ultimately no reason. It is apparent enough, I think, that the judgment cannot be about either of these feelings; the reason why it cannot is not so evident, and is not quite the same in the two cases. But the reason in general is this, that feeling cannot enter into the judgment, just because it is the ground of the judgment, or rather its material. I do not make this judgment because I have this feeling, if it is meant by this that I am first aware of this feeling and infer the judgment from it; this would be to take the feeling as the reason and justification for the judgment. The feeling and the judgment stand not only not in the relation of antecedent and consequent, or cause and effect, but are in this sense identical. The feeling is the judgment. For this reason it cannot cause the judgment, or explain why the judgment is right or wrong.

It is not, of course, in all cases of value judgment that this fact is significant; there are cases in which the one or the other aspect is negligible. These are the two cases in which the judgment is true and the cases in which it is false, and these two cases may seem to a superficial view, but only to a superficial view, to exhaust the possibilities. As a matter of fact, they are only limiting cases which are never quite actual. While no moral judgment can be absolutely true or false, nevertheless they are frequently so for practical purposes. Now it is apparent that in many cases, when accounting for an erroneous (or what we consider an erroneous) judgment, we say that the person was misled by feeling. If anyone thinks that all erroneous value judgments are due to erroneous inference, I will not contest the point now, because I wish to avoid if possible the question of truth and error in general. Notwithstanding this quite tenable view, I think that most people will agree that there are cases in which the judgment involves no inference whatever, but is merely the expression of feeling; as "he is a bad man" can frequently, perhaps most often, be interpreted to mean "I don't like him." Now even if we have come to this erroneous conclusion by inference, say by the construction we have put upon certain of the man's actions, yet we often attribute the squint in the inference to the emotional bias. I do not assert that we cannot make an erroneous value judgment purely or mainly in consequence of an error in reasoning which involves no emotional attitude toward the man whatever; I only assert that there are these other cases. And if this is admitted I think that it ought to follow that the judgment is in these cases epiphenomenal; and even if we protest that the judgment was not really a judgment, yet I think that we must concede that it bears no *prima facie* evidence of its spuriousness.

Here two objections will be raised. It will be said that whatever the conditions of a wholly false judgment, we must prove separately that they hold of the true judgment as well; because the feeling we have when we make an intelligent true judgment is specifically different from that which we have when we make a false one, and because in the case of the true judgment, the judgment dictates the feeling, and not the feeling the judgment: if indeed the presence of the feeling in a true judgment be not entirely irrelevant and adventitious. Furthermore, that although no judgment of value which is actually made be absolutely true, yet such truth as it possesses is quite independent of feeling, and owing entirely to the accuracy and extent of our perception of a truth lying wholly outside of our physical constitution.

I am not insensible to the force of such objections, and I wish to point out that the view against which they are directed is not one which I hold. I do not hold that every judgment of value is a spontaneous and irrational ebullition of feeling, quite without reference to other judgments past and future, a mere chemical effervescence. That feeling may be educated, and indeed that in many cases the judgment may be said to dictate the feeling, I do not deny; I do not deny that in many cases, perhaps the majority, of our value judgments, immediate feeling, the feeling of the judge, is quite negligible; I only hold fast to the belief that at least every judgment of value looks to some judgment which was a feeling.

Let us take first the case of a value judgment in which the feeling, if there is any, is the contradictory of the feeling which, if any, the judgment asserts. I may make a judgment about the iniquity of some public action; and make it with a sneer of malignant pleasure; but the judgment may be none the less true, and it will not be an expression, much less an assertion of feeling. I might be criticised for my failure to feel, but few would say that because of this defect I had failed as well to judge. Only let us be careful not to over-interpret. I assert a value, [and] at the same time, deny that it is a value to me. I assert it as part of an already objectified system of values which probably is that held by the majority of my neighbours, and this system is founded upon somebody's feelings. Not that I admit for a moment that I am judging about either the feelings or the opinions of my neighbours. But I certainly make a judgment which is or would be felt by someone, or follows or would follow from somebody's feeling. It may be said that this is irrelevant to its truth-value. But at least I think that everyone should agree that where a value is agreed upon, somebody at some time had the feeling. We can all agree, I think, that whatever has had intrinsic value in the world has been valued by someone.

The second admission which I am prepared to make is that, of many of the values in one individual's own system, we perceive the value by an inference from other accepted values; they are derivative, and we can quite justly say that we first perceive their value intellectually, and the feeling follows. And if there are some cases in which the valuation may be said to precede the feeling, why should not the value everywhere be independent of the feeling? or rather, always cause the feeling? I admit that we may in such cases be justified in speaking of the judgment or the perception as anterior, but only in the same sense as that in which, as I hold, we are justified in speaking of the feeling as ultimately anterior. The feeling is nearer to the physical

foundation than the judgment is; and in these other cases the judgment is nearer to the system of value than the feeling is: but in both cases, I repeat, the judgment and the feeling are identical; not in the sense of being parts or aspects of a whole which can be given some other name, but as literally identical. That a value judgment is often arrived at because it is seen to cohere with some system of values already accepted is a fact which I am not anxious to deny, because the denial would deny the possibility of any education of taste or morals; but I do maintain that the system must end in feeling, and that it began in feeling. In this instance the feeling was due to a theory, but the theory itself was dependent upon sense for its data.

It may be said that what I have called judgment or feeling is really, in the cases in which the valuation is not arrived at by a process of thought, direct perception. I simply see that the judgment is true; and, again, my sensations are quite negligible. Well! So far as this is more than a change of name—for I cannot see that there is any token in the experience to suggest one interpretation rather than the other—it means that the feeling is to be cut off at a certain point. Perception, I suppose, unites judgment and sensation, and to say that values are merely perceived, and that the sensation in its physical aspect is indifferent, is to divide the sensation through the centre and leave two mutilated fragments writhing in the air. There is feeling in the perception which is not the feeling of anybody, and there is sensation in the body which is not the sensation of anything. Although the perception may be, and as I myself believe, is, the foundation of the system of values, yet it bears upon itself no mark of absolute validity, and in fact has to be tested and corrected by examination both forward and back. In fact the perception is an abstraction. I do not mean a vicious abstraction, for if we disregarded it altogether we would fall into a still more vicious concretion; but when it is so abstracted as to lead us into intuitionism, it has brought us to moral chaos, to a relativism which is just the reverse of that which I advocate. That the theory contains an important truth I shall point out presently. But if it maintains that we can ever be quite sure that an act is right or wrong without knowing either its antecedents or its consequents, I consider it to be palpably absurd; and so long as it does not maintain this, I cannot see that it differs from my own view.

Immediatism may be presented in another form, with emphasis upon the feeling. We may say, and I think with considerable truth, that the feeling in a true value judgment is specifically different from that in a false judgment; that some feelings are in fact right and some are wrong. Such an

answer is really identical with that propounded by Plato in the *Philebus*, where he speaks with apparent paradox of true and false pleasures.⁹ But one might go on to say that my theory demands a neutral basis of feeling which should be essentially neither true nor false. If the truth or falsity is latent in the feeling, then in whatever fashion the feeling may have arisen, its truth or falsity will be predetermined from all eternity. So, I agree, in a sense it will: but it will be none the less relative. Upon the view which I advocate, the feeling must be true or false, because it is identical with the judgment, and the feeling will [be] true or false so far and in the same context as the judgment is. It is true or false in a narrower sense than that in which it is neither true nor false: it is true or false with reference to a system into which it is supposed to fit. Every moral judgment, of course, pretends to be consistent with other moral judgments which are admitted to be true, and none of these others has any better claim to acceptance (a negative criterion) than its consistency with others; we reject the single judgment when it conflicts with the apperception's mass of the system, and I think it naturally follows that when a single new judgment appears to us to outweigh the system, the reason is that we recognise in it implicit a new system of judgments into which it is capable of expanding. Or else we say that the judgment is mere feeling, prejudice, or folly. I have sketched this process consciously in an artificially intellectual form, for purposes of presentation. The truth or falsity is already there in the feeling; but both truth and falsity may be there: for the truth is relative to the system into which we attempt to fit the judgment, and for this system we can give no guarantee but our faith. And if this is the case, I do not see why it should be denied that there is a tenable view, though relative, which regards the feeling as neither true nor false; for otherwise, it escapes the sciences altogether.

We have reached so far the conclusion that the value judgment is not a statement about a feeling, for the reason that it is a feeling, and that it is not a statement about somebody else's feeling; that the feeling may sometimes be said to be the result of an intellectual insight and that sometimes the insight may be said to spring from the feeling; but that ultimately we have no better criterion for rightness than what each one feels to be right; and the feelings of the individual are determined by a variety of considerations, sociological, anthropological, psychological, physiological. I should like to say something about the way in which values of one type may arise from another, or from something which cannot with much significance be called value at all. For some naturalistic philosophers, and others not professedly

naturalists, have set forward theories which denied the existence of the higher values—those in fact which are the most truly values—together, and announced that all value is reducible to terms of economic value, or to biological “values” (which are not valuation) under the name of “desires” or “satisfactions.” Any such attempt to discover a homogeneous or atomic value seems to me futile. Any value, I agree, must be instrumental in the sense that it must fit into a system of value which if completed would be able to measure and rank values of every value-category. But besides this, it has an intrinsic value, a peculiar flavour as of pineapple which attaches to it and cannot be wholly explained. We can explain why this particular agent had this particular dream of tasting pineapple, or we can corroborate by saying that we tasted of the same bit of fruit, but why this fruit should have this taste is a question we cannot answer.

We can trace the origin and development of the moral ideas. It is the business of descriptive ethics to follow the slow expansion of primitive desires into the various systems of values, indicating the bypaths of prejudice and the blind alleys of taboo and superstition, noting the categories or the general form into which value articulates itself; the various genres of art, the various satisfactions of religion, the subordinate moral values, as benevolence, sympathy, or self-sacrifice. It can show too the causes for the assertion of particular virtues and vices at particular times, the adaptation to particular needs, or the submission to particular compulsions. It can show the gradual approximation to an identical morality for all men. But it cannot explain the meaning of the sort of thrill which I have at the sight of a new and satisfying work of art, or a perfect response to a new moral situation; and this thrill is the intrinsic value. The next moment may show that I was wrong; time, which as the Hindoo Sage observes, is hard to beat, may reconstruct every value; but at the moment and for that consciousness, the value was there, and remains inexplicable.

As I have already said, it is not necessary that this thrill should appear with every value judgment, just as some parts of a work of architecture have much less intrinsic importance than others. Yet if no one had ever experienced the passions, if no one were able to sympathise with and understand them, then the whole structure would be impossible. It is so in art as well. There is a superstructure: art plays an important social role; it is capable of absorbing and turning to its own uses material of which the intrinsic value lies in other spheres; but art rests upon a sensuous basis of form. Our enjoyment of it is magnified by knowledge technical and historical, and we often

pass judgments of value upon works of art which are true though we feel no thrill; for keenness of emotional response is not the sole criterion. But unless we are capable of such strong and immediate feeling, our criticism and appreciation of criticism will obtain only secondary utility. Of the necessity of a constant refreshment of truth at the source of feeling, such movements as Cubism are a healthy reminder.

I feel that there is ground for belief that no form of value could occur alone in the world; for we demand always that each value and each category of value should accommodate itself to the others with which we are acquainted. Moral value is not instrumental value; but we demand of moral value that in the long run it should serve other values as well, and even the humblest. Only in a world of fundamental and pressing needs, the appetites, health, security, comfort, could moral values find a place; among goods which are more important though less valuable, which are the soil wherefrom moral value springs and which it returns to enrich. It would be the task of a longer and better essay than this to show how value expressing at first simply a certain permanence of need and desire, objectifies itself and develops into unexpected forms. I only wish to suggest the possibility that some values may be higher than others, and yet require in their justification that they should also serve the lower interest; and to serve in this sense is to drill and to render more efficient. For when a morality cuts loose from these interests, and proposes to reside in some celestial sphere in the contemplation of its own intrinsic merits, we pronounce it febrile or unbalanced.

It is largely as a protest against such cloistered virtue, I suppose,¹⁰ that here arise those theories which place the criterion of the rightness of an act in the consequences; theories which place the worth in a definite kind of consequence, such as the hedonistic theories, pleasure and self-realisation, or those which do not stipulate the type of value to be fulfilled. To these theories I will now turn; but I will ask leave first to outline my own attitude. I believe that the intrinsic moral value is most typically exposed in the assertion that an act is right or wrong. In the act, the consequences, the performance, and the attitude of the mind or will all find their place; whereas, though we say rightly of will that it has intrinsic moral value, yet the will is only actual in the act, and the effects, unless they have been produced by a will, have no moral value. We do not judge the morality of the act by regarding either the will or the effects alone, for the will and the effects are constituents in the act. Sometimes, it is true, the will or the effect, or both, shrivels, and the result is taboo, right or wrong in a vacuum, and of which examples

may be found among the Polynesians and Anglo-Saxons. So, on the other hand, the best possible act would be that in which the agent was fully aware of all the consequences, and willed them all. In any event the consequences must have value, or there will be no act; and the value of the act, and the value of the will, vary as the value of the consequences. In the hypothetical complete moral act just mentioned, we should in every moral judgment will the Good; and we should will all the actual consequences because we saw exactly how they fitted into this final aim. But the state of our knowledge, and therefore of our morality, being what it is, and no forwarder than it is, “to will the Good” (ἀπλῶς) is a phrase without very much meaning.¹¹ I am far from wishing to say that the notion is false; so far as it has any meaning, it seems to me to be true; but I can attach very little meaning to it. What I will to do, seems good to me, and the particular act which I will is good in a particular but indefinite context. The phrase “to will the good” is the correct blank form for filling out telegrams to Mars; but we don’t telegraph to Mars. On the plane of reality upon which we live, will and act and consequence are not thus separable. If we consider things as they are, we cannot admit that mere will is good in any sense. If a man’s conduct is constantly followed by consequences most disagreeable to other people and most advantageous to his own pocket, we are inclined to suspect that he is not willing the good; our only criterion, therefore, is the consequences; these, so to speak, are the cash value of his morality. So far as we do business for cash only (and that is a very large part of our trade), we resolve the moral goodness into the goodness of the consequences. Nevertheless this method of estimation is no more satisfactory, taken quite alone, than mere inspection of the act, or of the will; and in practice we use, I think, several tests to supplement each other. But let us examine the theory more closely.

It is said, then, that the best action under any circumstances—the one which it is our duty to perform—is that of which the consequences upon the whole, or the total consequences (I am not sure that this is quite the same thing) will be the best. I suppose that by the statement that it is our duty to perform this action is meant also that it is the most moral action. Further, I do not suppose that by the “best effects” is meant simply the “most moral” effects, but the best absolutely: a total in which values of all sorts are expected to be commensurable. But in the first place, within the limits of our own experience, do we find such a criterion sufficient? An uncompromising moralist, for example, might affirm that a lie is always wrong. True, this assertion implies that if we knew all the consequences, we

should see that upon the whole they are bad. But are not the total consequences often a matter of faith? And how do we know that the causal connection runs in one direction rather than the other? My hypothetical uncompromising moralist will say that because the act is always wrong, it will produce upon the whole an excess of evil over good, and we do not refute him by merely turning his statement upside down and saying that because the act produces an excess of evil over good, it is bad. In the end, I admit, the two will coincide, but as a guide to conduct, is it safe to take our formulation of what we expect to be the consequences? How can we tell whether a lie will in a particular case do more harm by weakening our character than good in some other way?

This is not the strongest argument one could desire, for I admit that in many cases the results open to our inspection are an adequate guide, but furthermore the argument is fortified by the following. We are forced to admit that in the end the best act is that which has the best consequences: and this means that in the end all values are commensurable. But this “in the end” is, I fear, “in at the death” of all value.¹² To the end of time, value will be endlessly refracted through endless personalities. Am I to perform the act which I think will have the best consequences? But unless the act is referred to consequences with values which we all have in common, which is not possible in every case, there is no escape from subjectivism: the values of consequences by which we judge the act will be as relative as the intrinsic value which we attribute to the act on inspection. My act will hardly earn the description of “right” merely because the historian of a hundred years hence decides that it had on the whole better consequences than any other which lay in my power to perform; and as for my own point of view, it is constantly in change, and there is no “end.” But if the end is narrowed to those nearer consequences alone which come within my view, they are frequently immediately apprehended, and properly form part of the act itself; and thus we come round again to direct perception of the rightness of the act.

There are other, as I think, less justifiable forms of the doctrine which remove intrinsic good from the sphere of our inspection. Utilitarian or self-realisation theories virtually deny that any good can bear about it the visible sign of grace in the eyes of both; the value which appears with all the manifest stigmata of intrinsic value is yet a disappointment and a cheat.¹³ Both revolve in a squirrel cage of tantalised hope or disillusioned suspicion—or would do so if ethics had the slightest direct application to conduct. It is

not on the ground of their consequences or on any point of fact that these theories fail to satisfy me, but because I cannot help feeling that they cheapen and discredit the only intrinsic values with which we actually come into contact. They do effect a schematism of our life of interests, it is true, but a schematism which engages and maintains adhesion by a surreptitious introduction of content, making them rather a substitute for instead of an explanation of morals. If they remain quite clear of content, they are indiscernable: how close the resemblance between Green and Sidgwick!¹⁴ Pleasure, or utility! or self-realisation, are all personal fillings for the scheme of ethics, and as such belong not to ethics but to moral exhortation.

I do not mean that what are called descriptive and normative ethics can be completely divorced. The historical point of view does not exclude, but requires the concept of value; to describe morals without to some extent valuing is to describe a shadow. If we wish to make a skeleton hierarchy of value, we will take into consideration what the best individuals, and the best societies have valued, and this selection involves valuation. The skeleton itself will only give those predicates which have obtained a certain permanence, but its necessity is only relative, and (as in the case of the uniformity of nature) its permanence is only a postulate; nothing can guarantee us that tomorrow a new value may not upset our system from crown to foot. As a matter of fact, our systems are in course of change even from day to day. Yet the values at which we clutch are genuine, our morality is a serious matter; our ideals are operative—while they last.

I do not wish you to think that I advocate a philosophy of flux. To the best of my conviction, it is the business of philosophy to struggle against the flux, though the philosophy which overestimates its powers will always receive its due retribution. The flux finds its way into philosophy in various forms, as the Absolute of Mr. Bradley, as the immediate experience of James, as the sense-data of Mr. Russell.¹⁵ But to my thinking, there are two ways of handling it to which philosophy always returns: mysticism and materialism. Idealism was an attempt, I think, and a partially successful attempt, to unite the two; and the two spring afresh from the union to pursue their father and their prey.¹⁶ The most successful attempt that has ever been made, perhaps the only attempt, to organise history (including of course the history of value) into an intelligible process has been the philosophy of Hegel; its failure is even more instructive than its success; and as you may have suspected at moments that the writer of this paper is himself an Hegelian, I should like to dwell for a paragraph upon my motives for rejecting this philosophy.¹⁷

It is obvious that the Hegelian form of relativism is not altogether without legitimate foundation. While everything is in course of change, yet it is not mere change unintelligible from the point of view of our interests and desires. Our desires are not mere desires, but lay some claim to permanence and cohesion. An idea which makes its appearance in the *Republic*, and dominates nineteenth-century idealism, [is] the idea that any judgment of value or of truth is the germ of a complete organic growth, a germ which at once demands its own expansion.¹⁸ It does indeed appear as if every judgment demanded an intelligible and unified world, as if every valuation implied a world in which every part and aspect and moment should have its proper label of value. But what if this should be only an audacious claim, and if there should be some strange power capable of resistance to the omnivorousness of mind? And again, as Hegel well saw, a change of mind is not merely a change of mind, but is also to some degree a judgment upon the past, and every stage in our progress is a self-consciousness of the preceding, an understanding of the judgment which at the time it was made, was an activity and therefore could not be conscious of itself. Hence, in the moral and emotional and intellectual development of a human being, the past is never discharged or disbanded; it is taken up and understood: and this understanding, this interpretation of it, we must assume to be what it meant confusedly at the time. This is the reason why, in the *Republic*, the *φρόνιμος* is represented as leading, not only the best, but the happiest, most pleasurable life: the pleasure understood and rated and organised is the real pleasure.¹⁹ We strive above all things in life for coherence. When we find ourselves simply abandoning a value for another, there is pain: it is pain and helplessness to feel that we are merely shifting from one satisfaction to another, aiming in no direction, at the impulsion of a power which we cannot understand: pain, I should rather say, so far as we are intelligent creatures; so far as we are Bergsonians, contentment. When we feel that the present is actually an expansion of what was implicit in the past, we rejoice; self-realisation, though it is not the end of spiritual life, can be regarded as its law. It is a law of mind, but how can we say that it is a law of nature as well?

It is natural and inevitable that we should go on to apply this law to social history as well as to the individual. The historian's business is not only to describe but to explain; to articulate the seemingly confused mass of data into an intelligible whole, so far as he can do this without forcing it into the narrow compass of perverse theory. We may develop this notion by saying

that what mind really understands—the only thing that it really understands—the only thing, therefore, that is intelligible, the only thing therefore that is real, is mind. The historian therefore shows that mind takes the always new data, new situations, which are inexhaustibly presented to it (for I do not seriously accuse this philosophy of trying to anticipate history), and fashions a whole which is a new instance, a new embodiment, of eternal principles which only in these instances are actual. Consequently the mind, by reflecting on its own past values, brings forth for itself a set or system of values which supersedes, once and for all, preceding systems; though it will itself inevitably be superseded in its turn. Not that this system will be identical in all the finite minds of the same time; but their divergences will be so far as they are not mind; so far, that is, as they are nothing at all. Hence, from this point of view, it will not be literally true to say that values are absolute, or to say that they are relative.

I do not ignore the great merits and even truth of this theory, as I have understood it, or misunderstood it, to the best of my ability. It is a permanent achievement, in any sense in which it is right to speak of permanent achievements. But the charge which idealists level against exact sciences may fairly be directed against themselves: the theory does not correspond to anything actual. Mind in this pure and defecated state is a figment; and true as these laws may be of mind, they are not true of the world as I experience it, at least, for this world contains many things besides mind, and it does not even contain mind unadulterated. Applied to the actual world, the programme simply will not work. The progress of which it speaks is the progress which would take place, if mind had its own way. History is largely a mere chronicle without meaning; and facts in the long run overpower theory; though without the theory, or without incipient theories, we could hardly say that there were even facts; and certainly facts which were impotent of generating theory would be completely irrelevant to our lives. Values and ideals are not altogether commensurable, except to the blindest prejudice; and in short, we must attribute much of what happens about us just to the interference of those “data” (or to forces beyond those data) which come in so patly to be worked up into the finished product of mind.

Hence we call up once more the ghost of materialism, which as it seemed in Oxford had lain so long and so flat. For chance is merely absence of explanation, and a gigantic hand organ of atoms, grinding out predictable variations on the same tune, will fill the vast silences which idealism leaves empty. I do not say that materialism is more satisfactory; I believe that it is exactly

as satisfactory as idealism, neither more nor less. But as the mind cannot long remain in such a state of balance, then as the material universe seems to outlive the delights and agonies of the soul, and as materialism has received more than a fair amount of abuse, I am not unwilling, with mental reservations, to give it my political support.

The relativism which I hold in ethics is then in the nature of a compromise. I tried to point out at the beginning in what way it is relatively possible to regard the judgment of value as an epiphenomenon of feeling: and advancing to the next point of view, I stated the belief that any system of values rests upon feeling, though the superstructure may appear free. It follows, as the complement of this belief, that the feeling which does not value is as much an abstraction as the value which is not felt. I went on to express a belief that in value judgments we do come into direct contact with intrinsic values, though we cannot admit that these bear face-evidence of genuineness. We proceed in the attempt to organise a world of values of all sorts; and in the end the one completely objective system would be that of an absolute mind purified from finitude; but we have reason to believe that there is not the slightest prospect of this end being realised. So we come to think of every system of values as transitory, and its historical revival as an accident of time. There is progress to a certain extent, and to a certain extent change, and to a certain extent there is mechanical repetition. Our lives cannot be wholly coherent; our values cannot be wholly commensurate. And while there is transcendence, there is also mere alteration. But for spirit, the escape from the struggle against matter would be death.

The Problem of the Supremely Attainable Good is not a new one. I like to think of the ancient Chinese philosopher, Ye Bo the wise. As he lay upon his death-bed, we are told there came to him his disciples, begging him for a last word as a lamp to light their feet on the path to perfection. And he said: O my children, you will meet in the world subtle disputants of the One and the Many, ready-witted men who will confuse your minds and sadden your hearts. Be ye not discouraged thereat, but work out your salvation with diligence: and know this, that the perfect wisdom is to know what you want, and get it.

Whereupon he passed at once into the first trance, and from the first he rose to the second, and from the second to the third, and so on up to the eighth, and from the eighth he passed directly into the highest paranirvana. And forthwith all the *devas* and *mahadevas*, the *suras* and *asuras*, the *nagas* and *pretyas*, who were seated about crosslegged in the air, lifted up their

voices in songs of melodious praise, extolling the uses of divine philosophy.²⁰ But whether the historian who has preserved this scene for us confined himself to chronicle, or exercised his right of interpretation, I do not know.

NOTES

1. On 2 Mar, TSE wrote to Woods that he was working on a paper for the Moral Sciences Club at Cambridge. "As I have chosen an ethical topic I feel some fear of rough treatment at the hands of Moore and his disciples" (*L1* 97-98). In this talk, TSE resumes discussion of the ethical theories first broached in his 1914 Harvard essay, [Self-realisation and Pleasure in the Ethics of Green and Sidgwick]. His presentation is described in the club minutes for 12 Mar: TSE "read a paper entitled The Relativity of the Moral Judgment in which he attempted to compromise between an absolute idealist position & a relativist view. In the course of the discussion which followed it became evident that he regarded value as in some sense dependent upon the feeling of a particular subject at a particular moment & in some sense not" (Cambridge University Library).

2. *à rebours*: against the grain.

3. An extended hybrid allusion to the stories in Genesis of Jacob and of Esau, who sold his birthright for a mess of pottage, and more obliquely, of Joseph and his coat of many colors.

4. TSE alludes to James's contrast between the "tender-minded" (rationalists, idealists, religious believers) and the "tough-minded" (empiricists, materialists, the irreligious) in *Pragmatism* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1907), 12-13.

5. Norbert Wiener (1894-1964) who had received his Ph.D. from Harvard at the age of eighteen, was now a Sheldon Fellow (1914-15) studying with Russell at Cambridge and may have been in the audience. In late 1914, he sent TSE a copy of his essay, "Relativism," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, 11 (8 Oct 1914). TSE returned the essay on 6 Jan 1915 with a long letter discussing realist and idealist concepts of relativism, the topic explored in the present talk (*L1* 86-89). Writing in Apr and May 1953, after reading Wiener's autobiography, *Ex-Prodigy: My Childhood and Youth*, TSE referred to him as "my old chum," recalling that "in 1912-13 or so, I considered that Norbert had the only mind in the Philosophical School at Harvard equal, and possibly superior to my own" (postcard to Frank Morley; Berg).

6. In Genesis 28, Jacob uses a stone for his pillow while dreaming of the ladder to heaven; in *Symposium* 210a-211b, Plato describes ascending a ladder of love, first attracted by a beautiful body, then rising to an appreciation of beautiful souls, laws, knowledge, and ultimately to Beauty itself. While preparing this talk, TSE was writing weekly essays on Plato's *Dialogues* for his tutorial with Joachim.

7. Bosanquet's Gifford Lectures for 1911 were published as *The Principle of Individuality and Value* (1912).

8. In the *Philebus*. See note 9.

9. In the *Philebus* (36c3-44a11), Theophrastus attempts to refute Plato's distinction between true and false pleasures by arguing that a "false" pleasure would not be a pleasure, and thus all pleasures must be "true." Plato argues, conversely, that pleasures, however deeply felt, can be false in the sense that they are not what they seem to be, and that false pleasures have no place in the good life.

10. Milton, in *Areopagitica* (1644): "I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue." On 27 Feb 1915, three weeks before giving this talk, TSE borrowed *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas* (2 vols, 1908) by Edward Alexander Westermarck from the Merton College Library. TSE also refers to Westermarck's work in the Clark Lectures (2.000).

11. "To will the Good" is not an expression that occurs in Plato. TSE, who was writing weekly essays on Plato and reading the commentary of Paul Shorey, may have acquired the expression from Shorey's *The Unity of Plato's Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1903): "Wrongdoing is involuntary (1) because all men will the good or what they deem the good; (2) because no man who knows the right will do the wrong, if we take knowledge in the highest sense" (9).

12. TSE strikes out the following sentence: "Certainly, in our actual valuation, we do measure disparate values together, to some extent."

13. The phrase "a disappointment and a cheat" points to Bradley: "There are finite souls . . . to whom, on the whole, life has proved a disappointment and cheat" (*A&R* 549); "without morality, all religion is a cheat and all morality a self-deception" (*A&R* 510) and "the sensuous curtain is a deception and a cheat, if it hides some colourless movement of atoms, some spectral woof of impalpable abstractions" (*PL* 533).

14. Sidgwick, author of *The Methods of Ethics* (1874), was a utilitarian who associated the good with that which produces the greatest amount of pleasure for one's self and others. Green, author of *Prolegomena to Ethics* (1899), associated the good with self-realization and with societies in which self-realized persons are integrated into a social whole. In 1914, TSE wrote a comparative essay on the two ethicists (147).

15. In Bradley, the Absolute, described in "The Absolute and its Appearances" (*A&R* 455-510), is the ultimate, unconditioned reality as it is in itself, not distorted by projection through the mechanisms of thought. In James, "immediate experience" is preconceptional experience: "'Pure experience' is the name which I gave to the immediate flux of life which furnishes the material to our later reflection with its conceptual categories. . . . Immediate experience has to be broken up into subjects and qualities, terms and relations, to be understood as truth at all" (*Essays in Radical Empiricism* 93, 98). In James, as in Bradley, "immediate experience" is a stage in consciousness. In Russell, immediacy is associated with "sense-data": "Let us give the name of 'sense-data' to the things that are immediately known in sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on" (*The Problems of Philosophy* [London: Williams and Norgate, 1912], 17). TSE, who read this paper in Russell's presence, discusses all three philosophers' concepts in his dissertation.

16. An allusion to Shelley's "Adonais" (XXXI): "And his own thoughts, along that rugged way / Pursued, like raging hounds, their father and their prey."

17. In his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* (*Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*, 1837), Hegel attempts to show that world history is the outworking of *Geist* or spirit. TSE's signed and annotated copy, trans. by J. Sibree (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1905), is in the Houghton Library.

18. Plato makes it clear in Book 2 of the *Republic* that he is arguing from the whole to the individual, not from the part or the individual to a larger organism. The nearest justification for TSE's claim is perhaps in *Republic* 2.369A: "And if we imagine the State in process of creation,

we shall see the justice and injustice of the State in process of creation also” (Trans. Benjamin Jowett. Oxford: Clarendon, 1908).

19. See the *Republic* 6.482D-E and, especially, 9.582A-583B: “. . . the wise man (ὁ φρόνιμος) speaks with authority when he approves of his own life” (Trans. Jowett).

20. The last words spoken by the Buddha, “Work out your salvation with diligence,” are here appropriated, perhaps in parody of contemporary interpreters of Eastern philosophy and their disciples, as the last words of a fictional Confucian sage, Ye Bo. His name may be a reversal of that of the semilegendary “Bo Yi,” to whom Confucius refers in *Analects* 5.23. TSE, who studied Buddhism and Confucianism with Charles Rockwell Lanman at Harvard in 1911-13, extends Buddha’s seven trances to eight for Ye Bo on the path to paranirvana. In “A Cooking Egg” (1919), TSE mocks the pseudo-Buddhism of Madam Helena Blavatsky, who “will instruct me / In the Seven Sacred Trances,” and in *The Cocktail Party* (1949), he retrieves Buddha’s “work out your salvation with diligence” for the psychiatrist Sir Henry Harcourt-Reilly, who thrice uses it to conclude his sessions with patients.

TEXTUAL NOTE

Location: Houghton Library, Harvard University, bMS Am 1691.14 (32), archivally titled [Ethics]; an undated, untitled typescript (elite), with a few pencil revisions; twenty-one sheets, numbered 2-21 top center; watermark: Lion Brand / “Croxley Manifest Bank” / London; 29.2 x 25.8 cm.

[Thought and Reality in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*]

Eliot continued his Oxford studies in the Trinity term (22 May to 10 July) 1915. In July, he submitted a brief report to Dean Briggs: "In the last term, I continued attendance at lectures by Mr. Joachim and Professor Smith, completed the reading of the text [Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*] with Mr. Joachim, and brought Mr. Joachim weekly papers on the philosophy of Aristotle" (LI 118). The lecture courses by Joachim and Smith, on Aristotle and on logic, respectively, were continuations from the previous two terms. Of the six to eight weekly papers on Aristotle written for Joachim, four have survived, the first of which is [Thought and Reality in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*].¹

As the philosophy of Aristotle is a compromise between different, and (I think) inconsistent tendencies, between empiricism and Platonic idealism, between scientific abstractness and absolutism, the delimitation of the subject matter of metaphysics is attended by a certain risk. The line of demarcation from physics, on the one hand, and from logic on the other, is very difficult to determine; not only because they appear continuous, but because certain implications of the metaphysics seem to reduce these two sciences to the level of working fiction.

The rejection of mathematics is a more obvious delimitation of the subject, and is I think quite justified, though I do not feel confidence in the formulation—περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν οὐ χωριστὰ δ' ἴσως, ἀλλ' ὥς ἐν ὕλῃ.² For I do not understand in what way metaphysics can be said to deal with "separable" subjects, if mathematics does not, unless it be assumed that mathematics is limited to quantity and measurement. I suppose, however, Aristotle to mean that number has to be applied to some particular class of events or some particular class of objects in order to be "true," and that there is no relation between number in general and reality in general; whereas the categories, for instance, condition every possible experience. Number, in other words, and geometry, are merely descriptive; they tell nothing of the nature of the world which they describe. Number may be the order, but is not the structure, of the world. Physics, in Aristotle's use, deals with some matters which we should consider part of pure mathematics—[such] as infinity or the continuum—and some matters which we should deal with in either metaphysics or physics, [such] as time. τὰ γὰρ φυσικὰ χωρίζουσιν, ἥττον ὄντα χωριστὰ τῶν μαθηματικῶν.³ The difference is in degree: both mathematics and physics are adjectival, but the concept of motion is less separable from the concept of

body than is number. Now the concept of body—or the more general concept of “thing”—cannot be put to the test by any several science; and the only way to analyse it is to analyse our own meaning. From the side of physics, then, the task of philosophy is to analyse and arrange these simple concepts. It would be, indeed, as much the business of philosophy to explain the concepts of motion, time, change, space and show their relation to substance; and there is a suggestion of this in the categories; but the chief labour of the metaphysician has to do with the concept of substance.

From the side of logic, also, we are reminded that first philosophy concerns itself with the interpretation of words: the analysis of concepts—the meaning of predication. Much of the logic falls outside of metaphysics, in that it is concerned with truth as an instrument, with the process in itself, indifferent to its ultimate relation to reality; but the logic is much more than a manual of scientific method: it is concerned also with this relation of truth and reality; the nature of definition and the theory of judgment are of the greatest importance for *Prima Philosophia*. These are indeed metaphysical questions: the logician is occupied with the formal connection of ideas, the metaphysician with the ultimate meanings of words and their connections: the doctrine of the categories is as much the property of the metaphysician as of the logician. It is very difficult, however, to draw a line anywhere between the logic and the metaphysics, as the naturalists' scientific method finds its way into the metaphysics, and the implications of the metaphysics, on the other hand, do not allow a purely formal logic to stand. The correspondence theory of judgment demands an “external” reality; but the metaphysics leads one to the conclusion that truth and reality are identical; that the test of the real is intelligibility. The theory of correspondence is indeed self-destroying, for the assumption that to every distinction in words corresponds a real twofoldness in the object leads to the substitution of distinctions for differences. Thus Aristotle, like Plato (but less consistently) comes to search for reality by the analysis of grammar (the identity of the two systems is, however, concealed by discussion of matters on the borderline of physics, objects which could as such find no ultimate place in reality). Though Aristotle denies the reality of a world of forms contrasted with a material world, he yet affirms in effect that the real world is the world as thought (in spite of E.iv).⁴

As the predication of an attribute of a subject is Aristotle's typical judgment, so the problem of metaphysics is the nature of substance and its predicates. This would be the statement of the relation and dependence of

everything in the world, in a timeless form; substance would be ultimately one. Reality would be analysed into a judgment. But in this statement the temporal and spatial (i.e., non-intelligible) aspects would disappear; the four causes would shrink to the formal cause alone: the world would be pure form defecated of particularity. It would be the task of Aristotelian metaphysics to show (or suggest) how this ideal system is realised in space and time. But in the actual accomplishment of Aristotle, empiricist theory of cognition, methodological theory of knowledge, and Platonist metaphysics do not cohere. The classifications of science cannot remain unchanged from the point of view of Reality; but we receive no hint to the effect that these are to be considered as working fictions.

It is only the persistent faith in a difference between thought and reality which prevents Aristotle from explicitly handling metaphysics as the investigation into the ultimate meaning of thought as expressed in the forms of language. He conducts himself as if he were analysing things and not ideas (though in the very attempt to analyse the concept “thing” he has abandoned the realists’ reality). Hence he fails to see that philosophy is not at all an empirical science, that its ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἴτια⁵ are not discovered in practice and justified by their working, but that the nature of the answer we get is determined by the way in which we ask the question. The attempt to find being unconditioned, that is, to find reality in a completely intelligible form, can only end in an Absolutism; but such a conclusion is (on the other side) antipathetic to the spirit of Aristotle. The actual result is thus a confusion of ends and methods.

NOTES

1. TSE took detailed notes on Joachim’s lectures on Aristotle, and in Jan and Apr 1915, he sent typed copies to Professor Woods at Harvard. TSE’s holograph notes on Aristotle are in the Houghton Library.

2. *Trans*: “[some parts of mathematics] deal with things which are immovable but presumably do not exist separately, but as embodied in matter.” *Metaphysics* VI (E) 1026a15, trans. W. D. Ross, vol 8 of *The Works of Aristotle*, ed. J. A. Smith and W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon, 1908). TSE’s signed (“T. S. Eliot / 1912”) and heavily annotated copy of this edition is used for translations from the *Metaphysics* in this and subsequent notes.

3. *Trans*: “for they [those who subscribe to the theory of separate substantial forms] separate natural things, which are less separable than such as are mathematical.” *The Physics or Physical Auscultation of Aristotle* II.ii.194a1, trans. Thomas Taylor (London, 1806).

In quoting the Greek, TSE probably used Carl Prantl’s widely admired edition: *Aristotelis physica* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1879). He does not quote from Taylor or from any other translation of the *Physics*.

4. TSE does not identify the passages in *Metaphysics* E.iv that undermine his interpretation of the relation of thought to reality.

5. ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἰτίαι: principles and causes. *Metaphysics* VI (E) i.1025b1.

TEXTUAL NOTE

Location: Harvard University (Houghton): bMS Am 1691.14 (30), archivally titled [Aristotle: definition of metaphysics]; an untitled, undated holograph essay in black ink with pencil emendations, four unruled white leaves, leaves 2-4 numbered; watermark: Excelsior Fine / British Make; 20.3 x 26.1 cm.

[Matter and Form in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*]

[Matter and Form in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*] is the second surviving essay of the six to eight on Aristotle that Eliot wrote for Joachim during the Trinity term 1915.

It is frequently supposed that Aristotle's use of ὕλη¹ involves him in contradiction. On the one hand, he speaks of τὸ ὑποκείμενον as οὐσία or of ὕλη as οὐσία² (1042a32: ὅτι δ' ἐστὶν οὐσία καὶ ἡ ὕλη, δηλόν)³ [and] elsewhere explains that whereas everything else is predicated of substance, substance is predicated of matter. So Zeller (I.375):

he asks the question where we ought to look for the substance of things, in the form or in the matter, or in the composite whole produced by the combination of both. But his answer is far from satisfactory. He admits that matter cannot properly be termed substance; yet on the other hand, he does not venture altogether to deprive it of this title, since it is the substratum of all being, the permanent amid change.⁴

This seems to me a thorough misunderstanding. Various passages may be put together in such a way as to present obvious verbal inconsistencies. Probably the doctrine cannot be interpreted into the language of modern philosophy without the use of the concept of degrees of reality, reducing all substance to an ultimate one, in which matter and form would at last be completely unified. And as the theory stands, we may accuse Aristotle of incompleteness, if we like, but not of inconsistency.

The ὕλη of Aristotle is not to be identified with "matter" in the colloquial or the pseudo-scientific sense, although it may be said to include this. Admitted that the matter of Aristotle is usually the matter of physical objects, yet the nature of matter is not conceivable merely on analogy of touch and sight. The analysis of matter and form corresponds to the logical division into genus and species.

1024: οὗ γὰρ ἡ διαφορὰ καὶ ἡ ποιότης ἐστὶ, τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὃ λέγομεν ὕλην.⁵

1038: ἡ μὲν γὰρ φωνὴ γένος, καὶ ὕλη, αἱ δὲ διαφοραὶ τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐκ ταύτης ποιοῦσιν.⁶

1036: ὕλη νοητὴ δὲ ἢ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπάρχουσα μὴ ἢ αἰσθητὰ οἷον τὰ μαθηματικά.⁷

And 1045a34: ἔστι δὲ τῆς ὕλης ἢ μὲν νοητὴ ἢ δ' αἰσθητή, καὶ ἀεὶ τοῦ λόγου τὸ μὲν ὕλη τὸ δὲ ἐνέργεια ἐστίν.⁸

πρώτη ὕλη⁹ would thus be in a way the first genus, identical with the most general and poorest concept; indefinable (1036a: ἢ δ' ὕλη ἄγνωστος καθ' αὐτήν)¹⁰ as genus or as matter real only in its *infima species*.¹¹

There are doubtless difficulties in the way of this identification. For although at times Aristotle speaks of the ὕλη of mathematics, elsewhere the matter of physical objects appears to exhaust the meaning. 1044b: οὐδὲ παντὸς ὕλη ἐστίν ἀλλ' ὅσων γένεσις ἐστὶ καὶ μεταβολὴ εἰς ἀλλήλα.¹² This ὕλη of course is only actual in and through the change. While we may conceive the mathematical *genera* as being ὕλη of the species, perhaps this use is only κατ' ἀναλογίαν¹³ inasmuch as in mathematics there are properly no individuals, therefore no συμβεβηκότα¹⁴ (1027a13: ὥστε ἢ ὕλη ἐστὶ αἰτία ἢ ἐνδεχομένη παρὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἄλλως τοῦ συμβεβηκότος)¹⁵ and also no γένεσις καὶ μεταβολή.¹⁶

Nevertheless, I think we may conclude that from the two passages 1036a9 [and] 1045a34 that although the “matter” of mathematics is only an abstraction, the analogy, at least, is an exact one; for it is only in defect of particularity that mathematics differs: it does not demand or use the succession of data upon which the real world is based. In 1038a9, the αἰσθητὰ μὴ ἢ αἰσθητὰ¹⁷ are, I take it, introduced merely to indicate that the matter of mathematical objects is not the particular lines and ciphers but the genus (e.g., 1045a: σχῆμα)¹⁸ of the differentia (ἐπίπεδον).¹⁹ On the other hand, an objection occurs which seems to apply equally to aesthetic and noetic matter: if the matter is the genus (i.e., something which is as such abstract and actual only in its species), yet it appears also to be the source of particularity; that which distinguishes the form as this circle:

1036a2: τοῦ δὲ συνόλου (“concrete thing,” Ross) ἤδη, οἷον κύκλου τουδὶ, καὶ τῶν καθ' ἑκαστὰ τινος ἢ αἰσθητοῦ ἢ νοητοῦ (λέγω δὲ νοητοὺς μὲν οἷον τοὺς μαθηματικούς, αἰσθητοὺς δὲ οἷον τοὺς χαλκοῦς καὶ τοὺς ξυλίνους), τούτων δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν ὀρισμός, ἀλλὰ μετὰ νοήσεως ἢ αἰσθήσεως γνωρίζονται, ἀπελθόντες δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἐντελεχείας οὗ δῆλον πότερον εἰσὶν ἢ οὐκ εἰσὶν· ἀλλ' ἀεὶ λέγονται καὶ γνωρίζονται τῷ καθόλου λόγῳ.²⁰

Apparently the only existents which have no matter are the simples or indefinables τὸ τόδε, τὸ ποιόν, τὸ ποσόν (1045b).²¹ But τὸ τόδε is “individual

substance" (Ross),²² and as we do not find within the finite or at least within the terrestrial range of inquiry any complete individual substance, we may say that, within our experience, it is always matter which confers particularity; or that particularity is not without matter; as all the substances which we know are analysable into form and matter.

The difficulty lies in conceiving how the matter, which as genus is more abstract than the species, can be the same matter which contributes the particularity of τὰ καθ' ἑκάστω. ²³ That Aristotle intended them to be the same, I feel sure; that he succeeded in identifying them, I am inclined to doubt. He fails, that is to say, in accounting for the existence of particulars: for it is not to either the form or the matter alone that their existence is due, though Aristotle appears to attribute it now to one and now to the other. Hence the doubleness of meaning of the word οὐσία (Δ 8), κατὰ δύο τρόπους τὴν οὐσίαν λέγεσθαι:²⁴ it is either the ὑποκείμενον or the μορφή,²⁵ according as we consider the one or the other as that which is responsible for the particular. For ὕλη is distinguishable only as that which has no distinction.²⁶ It is ἡ καθ' αὐτὴν μήτε τί μήτε ποσὸν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν λέγεται οἷς ὥριστα τὸ ὄν. ἔστι γὰρ τι καθ' οὗ κατηγορεῖται τούτων ἑκάστων.²⁷ It is, it is true, τόδε τι οὕσα τῷ φαίνεσθαι (1070a 10),²⁸ but what is perceived is not matter in general, which is ἀόριστος,²⁹ not πρώτη ὕλη,³⁰ but the proximate matter of this object, and ἡ ἐσχάτη ὕλη καὶ ἡ μορφή ταὐτὸ καὶ ἓν, δυνάμει, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ (1045b18).³¹ If μορφή is not identical with εἶδος,³² the difficulty is merely evaded; if it is, then the responsibility for particularity is laid upon εἶδος. On the one hand, it is matter which distinguishes one individual from another within the same species; on the other hand, what we apprehend is not the matter but the form.³³

Ordinarily when we think of the "material" of any physical object, we think of some particular form or forms which takes on a new, relatively accidental and impermanent form. The material of a statue is bronze, or wood, or stone. But qua material, it is simply that which is capable of becoming a statue: it is the genus of statue, which exists only in the species bronze statue, wooden statue, marble statue, etc. Unless we conceive the material under the aspect of already actual form, the genus is identical with the matter; for the problem is not that of the progress of one actuality to another, which is inconceivable, but of potentiality to actuality. And yet the problem only arises when there is a genesis of time, because in imperishable substances it is meaningless to separate the form and matter. Matter, to be matter, must have been actually something else, though we can find no

actual matter which is without form. Nevertheless, the process is always from the matter to the form, and not from one actuality to another.

I do not think that this dilemma indicates a contradiction in Aristotle's thought; though it may express an incompleteness at least in his exposition. Neither matter nor form in the abstract is sufficient to explain the this-here-now, which is the beginning and support of our knowledge. But neither matter nor form in this sense is actual. The distinction between matter and form, it is implied, is overcome in any full actuality. The distinction between the bronze and the statue only holds good because we can think of the bronze as potentially some other reality than this statue; and we can think of the matter in the bronze as realised in some other way than this bronze; similarly we can think of the statue as realised out of some other matter; although (one may go on to say) when one recognises with the artist that the conception varies with the medium in which it is worked out, the separation of form and matter becomes impossible. Still, one does not acknowledge that the actualisation in this form is the end of this bronze; or that such actualisation is more than accidental and impermanent. Nevertheless, it seems clearly implied that the explanation of anything is found not in what it was, but in what it becomes. Human body, qua human, is explained by the soul, but as the *σύνολον* has other aspects than this, i.e. as it is analysable into parts, the forms of which are not parts of the form of the whole, and are explained by their relations toward each other, this *σύνολον οὐσία* is not identical with the *οὐσία* (1035b22).³⁴ The form in this way is the substance; but not the form abstracted from the matter. In the case of generable substances, in which the form is realised in an indefinite number of individuals, we may say that the form, distinguishable from or even contrasted with the matter, is the substance, but not abstracted from the matter.

The ultimate unity of form and matter is, however, not a point which concerns this paper: what does concern it is Aristotle's conviction of the insufficiency of a thoroughgoing materialistic hypothesis in metaphysics. The hypothesis of matter necessitates the idea of matter potentially in some other form; and in Aristotle's world as a whole, this suggestion is forbidden by the conception of *ἑσχατὴ ὕλη*.³⁵ (1069b25: to different forms different *ὕλη*).³⁶ In the end, any matter is realised in the form for which it is fit, and this fitness is Aristotle's teleology.

Finally, how is *ὕλη* as *ὑποκείμενον* and *οὐσία*,³⁷ and how (if *ὕλη* is genus) is *οὐσία* predicated of it? Evidently *ὕλη* in this sense is identical with the

“that,” is the ultimate subject of all predicates. And Aristotle is led to suggest (1017b25) that this may be the substance of anything, though he does not go on to conclude that substance as ὑποκείμενον and substance as ὕλη³⁸ are ultimately the same thing, in whichever direction we go. But it is not a contradiction, though perhaps a defect, in his doctrine that he should leave us with two definitions of substance. It is perhaps an unfortunate complication for him to suggest that substance is predicated of τὸ ὑποκείμενον,³⁹ and yet what should actuality be predicated of, if not of potentiality? What is real? That which is capable of being real.

NOTES

1. ὕλη: matter.

2. τὸ ὑποκείμενον as οὐσία or of ὕλη as οὐσία: the substratum as substance or of matter as substance.

3. ὅτι δ' ἐστὶν οὐσία καὶ ἡ ὕλη, δῆλον: But clearly, matter is also substance. *Metaphysics* VIII (H) i.1042a32. Translations from the *Metaphysics* are from Ross.

4. Eduard Zeller (1814-1908), *Aristotle and the Early Peripatetics*, 2 vols, trans. B. J. C. Costelloe and J. H. Muirhead (London: Longmans, 1897), I. 374-75. TSE owned and annotated both volumes, the first signed “T. S. Eliot / 1915” and the second “T. S. Eliot”.

5. *Trans*: for that to which the differentia or quality belongs is the substratum, which we call matter. *Metaphysics* V (Δ) x.1024b8.

6. *Trans*: for the voice is genus and matter, but its differentiae make the species, i.e., the letters, out of it. *Metaphysics* VII (Z) xii.1038a6.

7. *Trans*: intelligible matter being that which is present in perceptible things not qua perceptible, i.e., the objects of geometry. *Metaphysics* VII (Z) x.1036a11.

8. *Trans*: Of matter some is intelligible, some perceptible, and in a formula there is always an element of matter as well as one of actuality, e.g., the circle is a “plane figure.” *Metaphysics* VIII (H) vi.1045a34.

9. πρώτη ὕλη: prime matter.

10. ἡ δ' ὕλη ἀγνώστος καθ' αὐτήν: But matter is unknowable in itself. *Metaphysics* VII (Z) vi.1036a9.

11. *infima species*: the lowest species in a classification or logical division.

12. *Trans*: Nor has everything matter, but only those things which come to be and change into one another. *Metaphysics* VIII (H), v.1044b26.

13. κατ' ἀναλογίαν: by analogy.

14. συμβεβηκότα: contingencies, accidents.

15. *Trans*: The matter, therefore, which is capable of being otherwise than as it usually is, must be the cause of the accidental. *Metaphysics* VI (E), iii.1027a13-15.

16. γένεσις καὶ μεταβολή: generation and change.

17. αἰσθητὰ μὴ ἢ αἰσθητά: perceptible things not as perceptible. TSE refers here to the “intelligible matter” abstracted from sensible things as the subject of geometry. See *Metaphysics*

VII (Z) x.1036a11: νοητὴ δὲ ἢ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπάρχουσα μὴ ἢ αἰσθητὰ: “the intelligible [matter] being that which is present in perceptible things notqua perceptible.”

18. σχῆμα: figure.

19. ἐπίπεδον: plane.

20. *Trans*: But when we come to the concrete thing (“concrete thing,” Ross), e.g., *this* circle, one of the individual circles, whether perceptible or intelligible (I mean by intelligible circles the mathematical, and by perceptible circles those of bronze and of wood),—of these there is not definition, but they are known by the aid of intuitive thinking or of perception; and when they pass out of this complete realization it is not clear whether they exist or not; but they are always stated and recognized by means of the universal formula. *Metaphysics* VII (Z) x.1036a2-8. TSE did not have Greek characters on his typewriter and entered the Greek by hand in black ink. This passage, not yet copied to the typescript, is from the overlapping draft. See textual note 2.

21. τὸ τὸδε, τὸ ποιόν, τὸ ποσόν: the “this” quality, quantity. *Metaphysics* VIII (H) vi.1045b2. Regarding “the ‘this’”: in Greek, the use of the definite article converts the word that follows into a noun. Thus: “this” is any individual that may be indicated as the object of an ostensive definition.

22. Ross is the translator of the *Metaphysics*. The parenthetical in the pencil draft (page 3) is: “(‘concrete thing,’ Ross).”

23. τὰ καθ’ ἑκαστά: things taken singularly, individual things.

24. συμβαίνει δὴ κατὰ δύο τρόπους τὴν οὐσίαν λέγεσθαι: it follows, then, that “substance” has two senses. *Metaphysics* V (Δ) viii.1017b23.

25. the ὑποκείμενον or the μορφή: the substratum or the form (or shape).

26. The typescript to this point is a revision of a pencil draft. After the first two words of the next sentence (“It is”), the typescript ends. The remainder of the essay here printed is taken from the unrevised draft (pages 4, 5, unnumbered page 6) that overlaps the typescript. See textual note 2.

27. *Trans*: “[Matter is] that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a certain quantity nor assigned to any other of the categories by which being is determined.” *Metaphysics* VII (Z) iii.1029a20.

28. τὸδε τι οὖσα τῷ φαίνεσθαι: [matter] is a “this” in appearance. *Metaphysics* XII (Λ) iv.1070a10.

29. ἀόριστος: indefinite.

30. πρώτη ὕλη: prime matter.

31. *Trans*: “The proximate matter and the form are one and the same thing, the one potentially, and the other actually.” *Metaphysics* VIII (H) vi.1045b18.

32. μορφή: shape. εἶδος: form.

33. The following paragraph is from the verso of page 5 of the pencil draft.

34. σύνολον: composite. σύνολον οὐσία: composite substance. οὐσία: substance.

35. ἐσχάτη ὕλη: proximate matter. TSE has in mind *Metaphysics* VIII (H) vi.1045b18-19: ἢ ἐσχάτη ὕλη καὶ ἡ μορφή ταῦτο καὶ ἓν . . . : “the proximate matter and the form are one and the same . . .”

36. πάντα δ’ ὕλην ἔχει ὅσα μεταβάλλει, ἀλλ’ ἐτέραν: Now all things that change have matter, but different matter. *Metaphysics* XII (L) 2.1069b24-25.

37. ὕλη as ὑποκείμενον and οὐσία: matter as substratum and substance.

38. substance as ὑποκείμενον and substance as ὕλη: substance as substratum and substance as matter.

39. τὸ ὑποκείμενον: the substratum.

TEXTUAL NOTES

1. Location: Harvard University (Houghton): bMS Am 1691.14 (28), archivally titled [On Matter]; an untitled, undated essay in two parts: (1) a typescript (elite) with Greek characters entered by hand in black ink; three unruled white leaves, 2 and 3 numbered top center; watermark: Excelsior Fine / British Make; 20.3 x 26.1 cm; and (2) a holograph draft in pencil on double-punched, ruled blue paper, four leaves, the first three numbered 3-5 (with text on verso of 5), and a final unnumbered leaf; 20.4 cm x 25.3 cm.

2. The first three pages are the first part of a typed revision of the draft. As TSE typed from the draft, he entered the Greek characters in ink and discarded the draft of the pages that he had typed, i.e., the first two pages of the pencil holograph. The version here printed consists of his typescript supplemented by his unrevised holograph draft. Because the typescript and the draft overlap, it has been possible to print a complete essay (1st part revised and typed by TSE; 2nd part, his unrevised draft).

The overlapping page of typescript and pencil draft read as follows:

“form as this circle. 1036a2: τοῦ δὲ συνόλου (“concrete thing,” Ross) ἤδη, οἷον κύκλου τουδὶ, καὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστά τινος ἢ αἰσθητοῦ ἢ νοητοῦ (λέγω δὲ νοητοὺς μὲν οἷον τοὺς μαθηματικούς, αἰσθητοὺς δὲ οἷον τοὺς χαλκοὺς καὶ τοὺς ξυλίνους), τούτων δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρισμός, ἀλλὰ μετὰ νοήσεως ἢ αἰσθήσεως γνωρίζονται, ἀπελθόντες δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἐντελεχείας οὐ δῆλον πότερον εἰσὶν ἢ οὐκ εἰσὶν. ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ λέγονται καὶ γνωρίζονται τῷ καθόλου λόγῳ.”⁴⁰ Apparently the only existents which have no matter are the simples, or indefinables (1045b: τὸ τόδε, τὸ ποιόν, τὸ ποσόν).⁴¹ But τὸ τόδε is “individual substance”; and also it is a matter of great difficulty to discover where “individual substance” may be found (within the terrestrial region of inquiry). We may say that every “thing” contains matter.

The difficulty lies in conceiving how the matter, which as genus is more abstract than the species, can be the same matter which contributes the particularity of τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα.⁴² That Aristotle intended them to be the same I am inclined to believe; that he succeeded in identifying them I am inclined to doubt. The difficulty is found primarily in his conception of the source of particularity: whether this lies in the form or in the matter: and the problem of the relation of the particular to the individual, for which Aristotle elaborates no explanation. This involves a corresponding doubt in the account of substance (Δ 8) κατὰ δύο τρόπους τὴν οὐσίαν λέγεσθαι: it is either the ὑποκείμενον or the μορφή according as we consider the one or the other as that which yields the particular. On the one hand, ὕλη is distinguishable only by being that which has no distinction. “It is . . .”⁴³

40. For translation, see note 20.

41. See note 21.

42. See note 23.

43. See note 26.

[Causality in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*]

[Causality in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*] is the third surviving essay of the six to eight on Aristotle that Eliot wrote for Joachim during the 1915 Trinity term.

I suggested in the preceding paper that the distinction between matter and form held good only so far as we were compelled to consider any substance under a temporal aspect.¹ Where we can think of the matter under another form (and this means thinking of it as existing at another time), under a form either prior, as the form of bronze is prior to the form of statue, or different, as the form of one statue is different from that of another; only in the cases of substances which have had a history, which are generated and are perishable, is there any meaning in the distinction drawn between matter and form. Consequently, when form without matter is spoken of, it may be meant in either of two ways: as the form of a complex substance abstracted from the matter, or as a simple substance which is form without matter. In the former case the form is universal or abstract; in the latter case it is individual and concrete.

Now as the analysis into matter and form is a temporary instrument for handling temporal reality, so the efficient and final causes as well as the material and formal have their being with regard to perishable substance only, and are gradually taken up and included within the substance as we approach nearer and nearer to the real. Their relation is indeed analogous to that of matter and of form: they are the dynamic categories of cause, as the former are the static. As in illustrating the distinction of matter and form, so the simplest and most immediate cases of efficient cause and end are those of human activity. In questioning the possibility of completely external cause, in investigating the relation of agent and patient and in passing from lower to higher grades of reality, we are led to find the real to be that which is its own source of movement and its own source of value. Whether Aristotle makes this conception, or that of a whole in which form and matter shall be completely one, intelligible, is an unanswerable question. But in discussing his use of the concepts of efficient and final cause, it must be remembered that what is described is a process which is not completely apprehensible at any one level of experience; and that the most that Aristotle can do—and

the most that he does—is to indicate what the relation of things to the two causes is on various levels of reality—without being able to state precisely in any instance what the relation is.

The efficient cause is primarily the motion which terminated in this result, or the motion which originated the motion which is this result: whether the object is itself a movement, or the end of motion, the cause is a motion which is distinct. But it is, of course, movement inhering in a substance; so we speak more loosely of the one substance as the efficient cause of the other, the sculptor *qua* sculptor, or the father *qua* father. Evidently, the cause and the effect cannot be completely heterogeneous from each other; agent and patient must be alike in some respect. The relation may be further generalised beyond that of particular cause to particular effect: not only the physician, but the science of medicine, is the cause of health. Three grades or types, at least, may be distinguished: mechanical causation, as the influence of one body in space upon another or of one element upon another; self causation, as a man is the cause of his own actions; and the causation of any result by the art or science rather than by the individual man through which it operates. Clearly in any *σύνθεσις* the *δύναμις*² in the elements brought together is as much responsible for the result as the motive force which unites them. They are already cognate. So far as the operation is merely one of particular upon particular, we can distinguish an efficient cause which in no way fills the role of formal cause; but such operation can hardly be called causal in any sense. For as particulars, the two are isolated and independent; their union to produce the result is inexplicable and indeed meaningless; the relation of cause and effect will be reduced to one of antecedent and consequent, will be, that is to say, described only and in no wise explained. But Cause is essentially explanation: it exhibits the ground of the effect and the ground cannot lie in mere temporal and spatial compresence. Hence we cannot discover the cause without generalising from the observed cases of sequence to the forms underlying or expressing the full reality of the particular antecedent and the particular consequent. Just as no existent is intelligible merely as a this-here-now, but can be understood, if understood at all, only in terms of timeless relationships; so although cause, it may be always based upon a sequence which is merely given to perception, yet this sequence cannot be understood unless under a form which presents both in a timeless form.

To this conclusion, I think, leads Aristotle's consideration of the relation between the active and the passive factors. In the cases which he instances in the passages in which he enumerates the four causes, he is not concerned

with causation of particulars by particulars. When we inquire the efficient cause of the statue, we do not answer: the chisel, or the hand, but the artist, qua artist; i.e., as an embodiment of the art itself. Nor can we explain why this father begets this son, nor, strictly speaking, why the Athenians were attacked; we explain these events merely by stating the formula of paternity or revenge. It is in this way that formal and efficient causes come to be recognised as identical. As anything may be defined by its proximate cause (that is, by showing how it is made), the proximate cause, like the proximate matter, is identical with the effect.

The final cause, like the efficient, starts from a separateness in time which it proceeds to refute. The οὐ ἕνεκα³ which in human action is the purpose is in nature the end. But this end cannot be something heterogeneous from the means by which it is reached. I do not think that there is any evidence of the idea of universal progress in the thought of Aristotle; so far as there is progress toward a goal, it is always a particular goal. The final cause is thus on exactly the same footing as the efficient: this particular movement toward this particular end cannot be accounted for except by the use of the concept of fitness. The use of this concept in natural history does not accuse Aristotle of any tendency toward vitalism; it is simply a recognition of the postulate that the various parts of nature shall be accommodated to each other, so that, as in a machine, any part shall be explainable by the way in which it contributes to the whole. Now on the one hand, the nature of the part is simply its relation to the rest, so that its definition will be by the final cause as proximate cause, and on the other hand, its end is simply to be what it is. When the means is a part of the whole to which it is a means, when, that is to say, the valuation becomes a matter of degree instead of a contrast between valued and valueless, then the τέλος of anything is its value, just as its value consists in its τέλος.⁴ On one side, the end of a thing is identical with itself, or with its form, and formal cause and final cause unite; and on the other side, the nature of anything in the universe can be known only by discovering what part it plays, what it does.

NOTES

1. [Matter and Form in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*].
2. σύνθεσις: synthesis, compound; δύναμις: potency, potentiality.
3. οὐ ἕνεκα: that for the sake of which, purpose, end.
4. τέλος: end.

TEXTUAL NOTE

Location: Harvard University (Houghton): bMS AM 1691.14 (29), archivally titled [Matter and Form]; an untitled, undated typescript (elite) with black ink emendations; five unruled white leaves, 2-5 numbered; watermark: Excelsior Fine / British Make; 20.3 x 26.1 cm.

[Change in Aristotle's *De generatione et corruptione*]¹

Of the six to eight essays on Aristotle that Eliot wrote for Joachim during the 1915 Trinity term, [Change in Aristotle's *De generatione et corruptione*] is the last of four to have survived.

γένεσις is one of the two species of μεταβολή, of which the other species is κίνησις.² The specific difference between γένεσις and the three kinds of κίνησις together is this, that in all κίνησις there is a permanent substratum, a σύνολον³ (with one exception) of form and matter, which remains the same throughout the change. In any change of quality (τὰ πάθη τῶν ἀπτῶν),⁴ one can actually point to the thing which becomes hot or cold, white or black; in any change of place, the object can (perhaps) be handled and observed to be the same; in any change of size, an identity is recognised by perception. But γένεσις or φθορά⁵ is thoroughgoing change, almost in the Bergsonian sense. While (in modern terms) κίνησις involves only external relations, in γένεσις a complete alteration of the εἶδος takes place.

This distinction, so clear in principle, is with great difficulty preserved in application. It is impossible, and indeed a priori impossible, to set one's finger upon an instance where γένεσις is to be observed separable from some other kind of change. For whenever a change is observable, an αἰσθητὸν ὑποκείμενον⁶ is present, and γένεσις is that kind of change which takes place when we confess a gap: where we apprehend an identity, but are unable to trace a process. Where are γενέσεις to be found? ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ.⁷ It does not matter whether we assume that the γένεσις was instantaneous or occupied a period of time: it does not matter, that is, whether we find a moment without the phenomenon of αὕξησις or of φορά,⁸ of nutrition or of the combination of particles. There is a novelty—this man—the existence of which neither spatial movement nor nutrition is adequate to explain. This novelty is γένεσις.

Aristotle insists that this γένεσις is never actually the production of something out of nothing—an hypothesis exceedingly offensive to reason, but indeed so far as there is γένεσις at all, this is what it is. There is always a continuity of material, and what such continuity amounts to is a continuity of appearances. Were there an identity of material, it would be an identity abstractible in thought; but the material in γένεσις is unformed; material,

therefore, which is incapable of preserving identity. It will have no character which is not present to perception; and what is present is the continuity of the appearances.

No γένεσις is out of a vacuum; γένεσις is always ἐκ τινος.⁹ It is always of a composite—the bronze globe comes into being, but not bronze (at the same γένεσις) or sphericity. But as a matter of fact the coming to be of the bronze sphere is not in the strictest sense a γένεσις, or (if we make γένεσις a matter of degree) it embodies a low degree of generation. If we carve or mold a bull, the motion is in fact φθορά of particles of bronze or wood. Aristotle also speaks of a house as generated. It would seem that Aristotle uses generation in a wider and a narrower sense: the wider sense comprising every case in which a concrete substantive comes into being (the generation, we might almost say, of bacon out of pig), the narrower sense applying only to organic generation and the passing of one element into another. If the concept of γένεσις depended merely on the latter assumption, it would be unimportant; if it were restricted to the former, it would be merely a name for the explicable but unexplained. We are forced to the conclusion that in organic generation we have only a more typical case, or a case in which the concept of γένεσις is of more practical importance than when we handle artefacts or simple changes (the simplest change—change in place); and to the conclusion that in fact the two ultimate concepts of change are γένεσις and κίνησις κατὰ τόπον.¹⁰ Between these two poles every actual change is located: and no change can be found which is not at the same time a γένεσις and a change in place. φθορά, of course, is a γένεσις which differs merely in the direction of interest; for there is no destruction which is not the generation of something else, and no generation which is not by destruction of a prior existent. Qualitative change, if carried far enough, becomes a change in the substance; and change in size, examined carefully, on one side is accretion or diminution of particles, and on the other is part of the phenomenon of γένεσις. I do not mean that any one of the four changes can be analysed away; the four are indeed categories of change; but they are not isolated from each other: they form one whole. No change can be found which is wholly accounted for by any one of the categories.¹¹

It seems that there is no particular class of phenomena to which we can point as a complete or unique exemplification of genesis. This appears in the classification to which Aristotle holds the concept properly to apply: it is only κατ' ἀναλογίαν,¹² I think, that both organic reproduction and the metamorphosis of elements can be called genesis. In the first case, (1034a21),

reproduction is from something of the same sort, and there is a continuity which is quite lacking in the change from element to element. What holds them together cannot be in either case the ὅλη: ¹³ in the elements what persists in the sequence is a quality, coldness or dryness; in generation the form of the parent and the offspring is the same. So far as the form is different (as the form cold and dry differs from dry and hot), the process is complete change; and for such thoroughgoing novelty there is no place, inasmuch as the change of elements, as well as reproduction, is cyclical. We are not told under what conditions the change from one element to another takes place. But it is evident that each element, while it exists, must have something more to it than the merely perceptible characters. What is required is a form which is only fully apprehended when we have followed the whole cycle of change. The τέλος ¹⁴ is thus the whole, and no one of the four elements alone is quite actual, just as the planet is not completely actual at any one point in its orbit.

The analogy between generation and the movement of the spheres becomes very close. As for the further question of genesis as reproduction, it will appear, I think, looking at the problem in this way, that the process is only a development of what is identical in its main lines with the mutations of the elements: a development, however, which is very much more complicated by the notion of φθορά and the introduction of points of value. In change of elements, one element may be said to be destroyed in forming another; but a man, in being destroyed, does not generate another man; nor can I think this to mean that tissues, or the elements, are what is generated. Properly speaking, nothing is generated at the death of a man: we can only pursue the analogy in a looser way, by saying that as the function of τὸ ζῶον ¹⁵ is reproduction, in this function his nature is used up, and that mortality is not an accidental concomitant, but essentially part of the same character as the faculty of generation. It is because we ourselves must perish that we are endowed with generative power, and the one nature would be meaningless without the other. As for the decomposition of the body after death, it is a case only of ἀλλοίωσις or φθορά of the substrate; before death, φθίσις. ¹⁶

In the life of an animal, especially in the life of a human being, we have points of value. In the cycle of elements, no one phase can be considered the τέλος of any other, but the adult man is in a sense the τέλος of childhood. Strictly speaking, I think, the τέλος and the form of man is the whole process of γένεσις, αὔξησις, φθίσις, φθορά. ¹⁷ Looked at as a whole, no part of a life

can be without intrinsic value, and final value can attach to the whole life. So that even in the case of a movement which is an organic change from less to more value, or less to more reality, from childhood to maturity; the reality, the true form, is the whole. In reproduction, in the life of man, as in the change from one element to another, the reality is the complete cycle. In this way the cycle of elements would be something more real than the round of death and birth, and the circling of the stars yet a nearer approximation to the divine reality.

The phenomenon of αὔξησις¹⁸ is apparently more closely related to γένεσις than is either of the other motions. But, I think, the four changes imply each other, and will be found each to be an abstraction from the same whole. A change in place, a change in quality, a change in degree of development, a change in kind (coming to be) are in the end the same change: not that each abstraction qua abstraction is identical with the rest, but that each when examined reveals its abstractness and claims completion by the rest.

Zeller says that all the other kinds of change may be reduced to change κατὰ τόπον.¹⁹ This statement does not seem to me justified. The φορὰ of the heavens is indeed nearer to the divine than is the genesis of elements or reproductions; but this holds only of such substances as have ὅλη τοπικὴ²⁰ alone. It cannot mean that biological change is resolvable into a change in place, because of the thoroughgoing differences of nature. In astronomy, the φορὰ is a complete account of the process; but φορὰ, of no matter what, cannot account for the changes in organic substance. Change which more deeply affects the nature of the thing, implies that the thing as handled is more abstract; but the process, could we grasp it as a whole, is no less real; and is not to be explained by simplification into one of its aspects. For it is not simply an addition of other kinds of change which makes the difference; but a development of the simple motion in the perishable world. The first change is really all form; and change in place, on the earth, is really only an abstraction from this.

It is obvious that (setting aside for the moment the case of the elements) any instance of γένεσις is likewise an instance of αὔξησις. Nothing actually comes into being without growth, and there is no point in the process at which we can say that one occurs without the other. The concepts remain distinct: αὔξησις is of a μέγεθος²¹ already in existence; γένεσις ἐκ δυνάμει οὐσίας, εἰς ἐντελέχειαν οὐσίαν.²² Growth means the conservation of something already in existence (321a23) which changes only in respect to ποσόν.²³ ποσόν is not, strictly speaking, generated (322a16), but that which has

ποσόν is generated (σὰρξ ποσὴ). σὰρξ is said *simpliciter* to be nourished, σὰρξ ποσὴ is increased.²⁴

NOTES

1. TSE owned and annotated Aristotle's *De coelo, et De generatione et corruptione* in the edition of Carl Prantl (Leipzig: Teubner, 1881).

2. γένεσις: generation, coming-to-be; μεταβολή: change; κίνησις: change (in quantity, quality, or place), motion, movement. Aristotle's study of motion is found in the *Physics*, and his treatment of the motion of heavenly bodies is in *De coelo*.

3. σύνολον: substratum.

4. τὰ πάθη τῶν ἀπτῶν: change of quality.

5. φθορά: corruption, passing-away.

6. αἰσθητὸν ὑποκείμενον: TSE's construction for "sensible subject." Compare Aristotle in *De anima* III.ii.426b8-9: "ἐκάστη μὲν οὖν αἴσθησις τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ": "that is, each sense is of a sensible subject." On the flyleaf of his heavily annotated copy of the Teubner edition (Leipzig: Wilhelm Biehl and Otto Apelt, 1911) of *De anima*, TSE inscribed: "Copy used in 1914-15 with notes made during R. G. Collingwood's *explication de texte*, and extracts from Pacius' commentary on the *De anima*, which Joachim made me read" (King's).

7. ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ: man begets man. *Metaphysics* VII (Z) vii.1032a26, trans. Ross.

8. φορά: locomotion.

9. ἐκ τίνος: out of something.

10. κίνησις κατὰ τόπον: change of place.

11. At this point, TSE strikes out an entire paragraph: "I do not mean that this is Aristotle's own conclusion. I do not know what his conclusion is. The question is complicated by his theories of astronomy and of the dependence of the change of γένεσις upon the change of φορά in celestial bodies. [here TSE switches from pencil to ink]. One would expect to trace a development from change in place; the only strictly mechanical change, through qualitative change and growth, up to generation; a development from less toward greater reality. It is therefore disconcerting to find that the movement of celestial bodies in their orbits is the nearest temporal approximation to the divine movement, and that γένεσις and φθορά are only reflections of stellar motion. We do not know in what way the equinoxes affect the process of generation: we are reduced to mysticism or mythology. The process of generation is cyclical, and spring and autumn occur according to the position of the earth on its orbit. But we should like to believe that in Aristotle's philosophy [of] generation and destruction, we have a higher degree of reality; that ὕλη is the lowest degree of reality; for it is impossible to reconcile the notion of a ὕλη capable merely of change in place with the higher actualisation of the divine motion."

12. κατ' ἀναλογίαν: by analogy.

13. ὕλη: matter.

14. τέλος: end.

15. τὸ ζῶον: the living thing.

16. ἀλλοιωσις: alteration, change of quality; φορά: locomotion; φθίσις: decay, diminution.

17. γένεσις, αὔξησις, φθίσις, φθορά: generation, growth, decay, passing-away.

18. αὔξησις: growth.

19. κατὰ τόπον: in respect of place. Zeller, *Aristotle and the Early Peripatetics* I.423.

20. ὕλη τοπική: matter for change of place. *Metaphysics* VIII (H) i.1042b6; IX (Θ) viii.1050b21.

21. μέγεθος: magnitude. *De generatione et corruptione* I.iv.320a24.

22. This amalgam of words, which may be translated “generation from potential substance into actual substance,” is similar to the language of Aristotle in *De anima* II (B) v.417b2-7: “οὐκ ἔστι δ’ ἀπλοῦν οὐδὲ τὸ πάσχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν φθορά τις ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τὸ δὲ ζωτηρία μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος καὶ ὁμοίου οὕτως ὡς δύνάμεις ἔχει πρὸς ἐντελέχειαν· θεωροῦν γὰρ γίνεται τὸ ἔχον τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὅπερ ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι (εἰς αὐτὸ γὰρ ἢ ἐπίδοσις καὶ εἰς ἐντελέχειαν) ἢ ἕτερον γένος ἀλλοιωσεως.” *Trans*: To suffer or be acted upon, too, is a term of more than one meaning. Sometimes it means a sort of destruction by the contrary, sometimes it is rather a preservation of what is potentially existent by what is actually existent and like it, so far as likeness holds of potentiality when compared with actuality. For it is by exercise of knowledge that the possessor of knowledge becomes such in actuality: and this either is no qualitative change (for the thing develops into its own nature and actuality), or else is qualitative change of a different sort. *De anima*, trans. R. D. Hicks (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1907).

It also reflects the words of Aristotle in *De generatione et corruptione* I. iii.317b18-20: “ὁ δὲ καὶ τούτων διωρισμένων ἔχει θαυμαστὴν ἀπορίαν, πάλιν ἐπαναποδιστέον, πῶς ἔστιν ἀπλῇ γένεσις, εἴτεκ δυνάμει ὄντος οὕσα εἴτε καὶ πῶς ἄλλως.” *Trans*: These distinctions may be taken as established: but even then it is extraordinarily difficult to see how there can be ‘unqualified coming-to-be’ (whether we suppose it to occur out of what potentially ‘is,’ or in some other way), and we must recall this problem for further examination.

23. ποσόν: quantity.

24. σὰρξ ποσὴ: in Aristotle, ποσὴ σὰρξ: flesh of some quantity, so-much flesh. *De generatione et corruptione* I.v.322a26. *simpliciter*: simply.

TEXTUAL NOTES

1. Location: Harvard University (Houghton): bMS Am 1691.14 (19), archivally titled [On Change]; an undated holograph essay and partial revision thereof, in black ink and pencil, with pencil emendations throughout; ruled, left-side double-punched paper, 20.4 x 25.4 cm., torn from binder. First draft: seven sheets, 1 unnumbered, 2 numbered, 3 missing, 4-8 numbered; revised draft: three sheets, 1 unnumbered, 2-3 numbered.

2. First draft of three pages that were replaced by revision:

γένεσις and κίνησις are the two species of μεταβολή. The specific difference between γένεσις and the three kinds of κίνησις together is this, that in all κίνησις there is a permanent substrate, a σύνολον of form and matter, which persists throughout a specific change. In any change of quality (τὰ πάθη τῶν ἀπτῶν), one can point to the thing which becomes hot or cold, white or black; in any change of place, in any change of size, the object can be observed to be the same. But γένεσις or φθορά is (at least at first sight) thoroughgoing change, the actualization of a new substance. While (in modern terms) κίνησις involves external or only partly internal relations, in γένεσις a new εἶδος appears.²⁵ We may come, however, to inquire how radical this difference ultimately is.

One might at first be inclined to arrange the μεταβολαί²⁶ in order of less to greater complexity and importance; and according to some such arrangement, φθορά would be either the lowest

or the highest in rank. I do not think that either valuation would be an accurate account: on the one hand, γένεσις has a profounder relation to substance, and on the other hand, all of the changes, including γένεσις upon the earth, appear to be derived from the motion of the sun, and to be more remote from the divine than the celestial motions.

I am inclined to believe that the priority of celestial (circular) motion, and the simplicity of the celestial bodies is (or was) a tenable hypothesis: that is to say, that the one motion which exhausts the nature of the stars is the same which in the realm of perishable substance is split up into four forms which imply and demand each other for its own completion. If we grant that the sun and stars are eternal and indestructible individuals gifted with a single and complete (circular) motion, then their reality will not be what each is at any moment in time, but what they are at every moment of time. To have ὅλη τοπικὴ alone can only mean to have ὅλη the form of which is simply this movement in the orbit: we cannot really think of it at rest without thinking of it under some other form. Now this simple φορὰ accounts for the planet in a way in which no one of the four changes will account for any substance. This sufficiency is explained by the fact that the φορὰ here includes all the rest: there is no change omitted that the planet might have. The change of position is, in the most general sense, a change of quality, as the change in place is, virtually, a qualification of the nature of the object changed; an increase; and a change in substance. But if we consider the real planet to be the whole process, then these forms at once fall together, under the head of that change on earth, which the whole most resembles.

If terrestrial change is conceived on this analogy, it is evident that anyone will imply all the rest. Nevertheless, it is easier to see how the more organic imply the less, than vice versa. γένεσις is always out of something previously existent; organic genesis requires change in place of elements; and organic αὔξεισις (τροφή) includes ἀλλοιώσις.²⁷ And of course every substance that comes into being exhibits the other forms of change as well: the animal changes with respect to ποσόν, ποιόν, and ποῦ.²⁸ Everything, so far as it is real,²⁹

25. εἶδος: form. This sentence is marked in pencil brackets by TSE for use in revised draft.

26. μεταβολαί: changes.

27. αὔξεισις: growth, maturation; τροφή: nutrition, nourishment; ἀλλοιώσις: alteration, change of quality.

28. ποσόν: quantity; ποιόν: quality; ποῦ: location.

29. The partial draft ends here in mid-sentence, a sentence completed at the top of page 4 of the longer draft: "Everything, so far as it is real, will succeed in uniting all the species of change."

KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF F. H. BRADLEY

T. S. Eliot

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KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF F. H. BRADLEY¹

Preface²

From October 1911 until June 1914 I was a student in the Harvard Graduate School as a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. This degree was to be attained in three stages: at the end of the second year by Preliminary Examinations in which one was tested in all the branches of philosophy which one had studied, and in the ability to translate French and German philosophical work into English; later by the presentation of a dissertation on a subject approved by the heads of the department; and finally a *viva*, in which the aspirant defended his thesis and was again tested for his command of logic, psychology, and the history of philosophy.

The dissertation, which is here published for the first time, was prepared during those years and during a year in which, thanks to the award of a Sheldon Travelling Fellowship by Harvard University, I was at Merton College as a pupil of Harold Joachim, the disciple of Bradley who was closest to the master. To Harold Joachim I owe a great deal: the discipline of a close study of the Greek text of the *Posterior Analytics*, and, through his criticism of my weekly papers, an understanding of what I wanted to say and of how to say it.³ On going down from Oxford in 1915 I made the decision to stay in England, and had to seek a source of livelihood. From the autumn of 1915 until the end of 1916, I earned my living as a schoolmaster. I did not, however, abandon immediately the intention of fulfilling the conditions for the doctor's degree. Harvard had made it possible for me to go to Oxford for a year; and this return at least I owed to Harvard. So, amongst my other labours, I completed the first draft of my dissertation, and despatched it across the Atlantic for the judgment of the Harvard Department of Philosophy. In April 1916, when this work was completed, I was a junior master at the Highgate Junior School.⁴

So much for the origins of this study of the theory of knowledge according to the philosophy of Francis Herbert Bradley. I did not return to Harvard to complete the requirements for the doctor's degree, and I did not see that University again for seventeen years after I had left it. Nor did I give any further thought to this dissertation after learning that it had been officially

approved. A few years ago Professor Hugh Kenner of California in his book *The Invisible Poet* drew attention to it in a chapter on my debt to Bradley.⁵ My curiosity, however, was first stimulated by a visit from Professor Anne Bolgan of the University of Alaska, who had read the script in the Harvard University archives, and had obtained, with my permission, a photostatic copy. She had also seen there the carbon copy of a letter to me from Professor J. H. Woods written shortly after my dissertation had been presented, in which he said that Josiah Royce, the *doyen* of American philosophers, had spoken of it “as the work of an expert.”⁶ Mr. William Jackson, curator of the Houghton Library at Harvard, supplied me with a photostatic copy of the text (the original typescript being, of course, the property of the University).

To Professor Bolgan, who has made a close study of this essay, I am deeply indebted. She has read the present text and made important corrections and suggestions; she has most painstakingly edited the text. We have endeavoured, however, only to remove such errors and blemishes as appear to have been due to carelessness or haste. She has also checked my references (as far as is now possible) and has prepared a select bibliography, the index, and valuable notes.⁷

I wish also to thank Mr. Peter Heath of the University of St. Andrews, for translating the passages quoted from German authors.⁸

Forty-six years after my academic philosophising came to an end, I find myself unable to think in the terminology of this essay. Indeed, I do not pretend to understand it. As philosophising, it may appear to most modern philosophers to be quaintly antiquated. I can present this book only as a curiosity of biographical interest, which shows, as my wife observed at once, how closely my own prose style was formed on that of Bradley and how little it has changed in all these years. It was she who urged me to publish it; and to her I dedicate it.

There is evidently a page or so missing from chapter VI: the gap occurs after the last sentence of the paragraph which here ends at the top of page 146.⁹ What may at first appear more serious is the loss of one or several pages of the conclusion of the essay. The last page of the typescript ends with an unfinished sentence: *For if all objectivity and all knowledge is relative . . .* I have omitted this exasperating clause: it is suitable that a dissertation on the work of Francis Herbert Bradley should end with the words ‘the Absolute’. Mr. Jackson tells me that these pages were missing when the script came

into his care. This does not seem to me to matter: the argument, for what it is worth, is there.

But at Professor Bolgan's suggestion I have appended, as partial compensation for the loss of the concluding page or pages, two essays which I wrote in 1916, and which appeared in *The Monist*, a philosophical periodical published in Chicago.¹⁰ It was Philip Jourdain, the British correspondent of that journal (to whom, I remember, I had been introduced by Bertrand Russell) who kindly commissioned these articles. They appeared in a number devoted to the celebration of the bi-centenary of the death of Leibniz.

The original title of this dissertation was *Experience and the Objects of Knowledge in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley* with the sub-title *A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for candidates for the doctorate of philosophy in philosophy at Harvard University*.¹¹

T. S. E.

NOTES

1. In Mar 1916, TSE sent Professor James Haughton Woods (1864-1935) of the Harvard University Department of Philosophy a form confirming his intention to submit his Ph.D. dissertation under the title "The Nature of Objects, with Reference to the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley" (*LI* 147). In Apr, he mailed the thesis itself, retitled "Experience and the Objects of Knowledge in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley," and in June, Woods reported that it had been approved (*LI* 156). In 1964, it was published with the revised title, above. See 382, textual note 1.

2. The first version of TSE's preface was dated June 1962 in the first printing (Jan 1963; 172 pages, withdrawn); the final version, undated in the first published edition (Jan 1964, 216 pages), is dated Mar 1963 on the revised draft of the typescript. See 382-85, textual note 2.

3. Joachim, whose epistemology TSE discussed at Harvard in Apr 1913 in his "Report on the Relation of Kant's Criticism to Agnosticism" (40), supervised his study of Bradley and Aristotle at Merton College in 1914-15. For his tutorial with Joachim during the 1914 Michaelmas term, TSE submitted eight papers "dealing with . . . the questions considered in the thesis I hope to present for the degree of Ph.D. at Harvard" (*LI* 92), of which six survived. In Jan 1915, he reported to Professor Woods that he had finished a rough draft: "I had great difficulty, even agony, with the first draft, owing to my attempt to reach a positive conclusion." Regarding plans for revision, TSE added, "I find that I take so much keener enjoyment in criticism than in construction that I propose making a virtue of a vice and recasting my thesis with a mind to this limitation" (*LI* 91-92). Of the weekly papers submitted to Joachim in 1915, one on Plato survived from the Hilary term, and four on Aristotle from the Trinity term.

4. The following clause was deleted from this sentence in the final proofs: "-where a small boy in the lowest form, who had heard that the 'American master' wrote poetry, submitted for my consideration a small sheaf of manuscript verse entitled *Best Poems of Betjeman*."

5. Hugh Kenner (1923-2003), *The Invisible Poet: T. S. Eliot* (New York: McDowell, Obolensky, 1959).

6. An excerpt from Woods's letter with the comment by Royce is in textual note 1 (382).

7. TSE had met and interviewed Anne C. Bolgan (1924-92) in London in Aug 1961 after she had written her doctoral dissertation on his thesis and published an article on it that impressed him. She was writing a lengthy introductory essay, with the expressed hope that he would eventually publish the thesis and use her introduction. TSE decided to publish it with his own preface, but he invited her to read proofs and acknowledged her extended role in preparing the final text. See 382, textual note 2.

8. On 2 May 1962, TSE commissioned Peter Heath to translate the German passages in the text of the dissertation. On 23 May, Heath returned his translations, which replaced the German (moved to the notes) in the text. He also provided translations of individual German words for parenthetical inclusion in the text. "I confess I am not wholly satisfied myself," he wrote to TSE, "particularly with the rendering of isolated words, like *erlebt* [315], which defy translation even in a context; so I am glad you are retaining the German as well in these cases. With that in view, I have tried to maintain a consistent usage throughout, i.e., the best all-purpose rendering, even where the English context might in one place or another have called for something a trifle more specific or exact."

9. The reference is to page 146 of the 1964 edition of *KE*. Here, see 366, n. 6.

10. The missing material between 186 and misnumbered 187 in the original typescript was removed before the final numbering of pages was made. Bolgan believed that TSE may have removed the missing material there and at the end of the thesis for use in his Leibniz essays for the *Monist*, which he was writing in early May 1916 (immediately after submitting the thesis), because the argument being formulated in this part of the thesis was identical to the argument he went on to develop in the two essays, "The Development of Leibniz's Monadism" and "Leibniz's Monads and Bradley's Finite Centres." She persuaded him to append both essays to the revised edition (440; 462).

11. In his initial preface of June 1962, TSE wrote: "I am not now in a position to check every reference: but I can at least indicate which editions of Bradley's chief works I used in writing this essay. *Appearance and Reality*, the second edition, fifth impression, published in 1908." In his correction of unbound proofs, he struck through the edition information and wrote in the margin: "I have altered the pagination as far as I can to that of 1946." The editors of the present edition have restored TSE's original sources.

TSE added to that preface in holograph a final paragraph: "If any reader detects slips which I have overlooked, I only ask him to bear in mind that the typist may be responsible: for I myself, forty-six years ago, typed the script from which this book has been set up". He was probably assisted by Vivien Eliot, for in Mar 1916, he wrote to Russell, "She finished the typing this afternoon before going to the dentist" (*LI* 134).

Chapter I

On Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience¹

It is not my intention in the present paper to cover the whole field of epistemology, or even to hint at the existence of many questions of which my subject seems to demand some discussion. The formation of general ideas, the theory of judgment and inference, probability and the validity of knowledge, fall outside the scope of my attempt. And the problem of error will seem to receive very slight treatment. In the present chapter I wish to take up Bradley's doctrine of "immediate experience" as the starting point of knowledge. Then the rest of the essay will occupy itself with the development of subject and object out of immediate experience, with the question of independence, and with the precise meaning of the term "objectivity."

Bradley uses the term "experience" and the term "feeling" almost interchangeably, both in *Appearance* and in the essay "On Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience" which is the most important *locus* for my present chapter.^{2*} In the use of these terms we must observe the greatest caution. We must be on guard, in the first place, against identifying experience with consciousness, or against considering experience as the adjective of a subject. We must not confuse immediate experience with sensation, we must not think of it as a sort of panorama passing before a reviewer, and we must avoid thinking of it as the content or substance of a mind. And "feeling", we must remember, is a term of very wide application, so that in some of its quite legitimate uses it is certainly not identical with "experience." We must accustom ourselves to "feeling" which is not the feeling of psychologists, though it is in a way continuous with psychological feeling. And when we are told that feeling is "the immediate unity of a finite psychical centre," we are not to understand that feeling is merely the feeling *of* a mind or consciousness.

It means for me, first, the general condition before distinctions and relations have been developed, and where as yet neither any subject nor object exists. And it means, in the second place, anything which is present at any stage of mental life, in so far as that is only present and simply is. In this latter sense we may say that everything actual, no matter what,

must be felt; but we do not call it feeling except so far as we take it as failing to be more. (*ACR* 459)

Keeping these quotations in mind, we turn at once to the words with which the whole theory is summed up in the essay to which I have referred. Experience, we are told,

is not a stage which shows itself at the beginning and then disappears, but it remains at the bottom throughout as fundamental. And, further, remaining, it contains within itself every development which in a sense transcends it. Nor does it merely contain all developments, but in its own way it acts to some extent as their judge. (*ETR* 161)

In these words we have expressed the whole difference between Bradley's view of experience and those of certain other contemporary philosophers. For, in the first place, immediate experience is not at any stage of consciousness merely a presentation which can be isolated from other elements also present or subsequent in consciousness. It is not "sense-data" or sensations, it is not a stream of feeling which, as merely felt, is an attribute of the subject side only and must in some way be "related" to an external world. And it is not, lastly, more pure or more immediate in the animal or the infant mind than in the mind of the mathematician engaged upon a problem. Whether there is a stage at which experience is merely immediate, Bradley says, we have agreed to leave doubtful.³ But here, I feel sure, he has understated his case, and we may assert positively that there is indeed no such stage. This point is worthy of some elucidation.

We are forced, in building up our theory of knowledge, to postulate something given upon which knowledge is founded. And we are forced to a certain extent to consider this construction as something which takes place in time. We think, on the one hand, of material presented to our notice at every moment, and of the whole situation in knowing as a complex with this datum as one of the constituents. And we think also of the development of consciousness in biological evolution as a development of knowledge. And if there is any problem of knowledge at all, neither of these points of view is irrelevant. But we are apt to confuse the two: from the genetic point of view, all of the stages are actualities, whereas the various steps in knowing described in an actual piece of knowing in the mind of an adult man are abstractions, not known as separate objects of attention. They all exist at the same time; there is no priority in our experience of one element or another.

When we turn to inspect a lower stage of mind, child or animal, or our own when it is least active, we do not find one or another of these elements into which we analyse the developed consciousness, but we find them all at a lower stage. We do not find feeling without thought, or presentation without reflection: we find both feeling and thought, presentation, redintegration and abstraction, all at a lower stage. And if this is the case, such study of primitive consciousness seems futile; for we find in our own knowing exactly the same constituents, in a clearer and more apprehensible form.

But on the other hand, if all the same constituents were present in every case of knowing, if none were omitted in error, or if none had any temporal precedence over another, all analyses of knowing would be equally tenable. There would be no practical difference: for when there are no bones, anybody can carve a goose. If we did not think that at some moments our consciousness is nearer to "pure" experience than at others, if we did not think of "sense-datum" as prior to "object," if we did not feel that "act" or "content," or "immanent" and "transcendent" object were not as independent of each other, as capable of entering into different contexts as a table and a chair, the fact of their difference would be a perfect example of useless knowledge. In the philosophy of Bradley we shall find this difficulty in an aggravated form, although a form no more fatal, I think, than the form which it may take in any other philosophy. There is immediate experience, contrasted with ideal construction; which is prior, and in some sense, certainly, prior in time, to the ideal construction. But we go on to find that no actual experience could be merely immediate, for if it were, we should certainly know nothing about it; and also that the line between the experienced, or the given, and the constructed can nowhere be clearly drawn. Then we discover that the difference in no instance holds good outside of a relative and fluctuating point of view. Experience alone is real, but everything can be experienced. And although immediate experience is the foundation and the goal of our knowing, yet no experience is only immediate. There is no absolute point of view from which real and ideal can be finally separated and labeled. All of our terms turn out to be unreal abstractions; but we can defend them, and give them a kind of reality and validity (the only validity which they can possess or can need) by showing that they express the theory of knowledge which is implicit in all our practical activity. And therefore we allow ourselves to hold both that a lower stage of mere feeling is irrelevant and that knowledge is based upon and developed out of feeling.

We may say, then, on turning our attention to lower levels of being, that what we find is not a subtraction, but a general impoverishment. The animal may be as Mr. Bradley says “immersed in practice”;⁴ but this is by no means the same thing as immersion in feeling. The animal acts; and any feeling which is acted upon so far goes beyond mere presentation. No stage can be so low as to be mere feeling; and on the other hand man surely feels more than the animal. There is no greater mistake than to think that feeling and thought are exclusive—that those beings which think most and best are not also those capable of the most feeling.

Although there is no stage of life which is more nearly immediate experience than another, and although we are unacquainted with any element in our experience which we can single out as immediate; although we cannot know immediate experience directly as an object, we can yet arrive at it by inference, and even conclude that it is the starting point of our knowing, since it is only in immediate experience that knowledge and its object are one. The fact that we can to a certain extent make an object of it, while at the same time it is not an object among others, not a term which can be in relation to anything else: this throws our explanation into the greatest embarrassment. We are forced to use terms drawn out of it, to handle it as an adjective of either subject or object side, as *my* experience, or as the experienced world. The monistic account is apt to take the first course, pluralism the second. But whether we say “the total world is my experience”⁵ or that experience “is made of *that*, of just what appears, of space, of intensity, of flatness, brownness, heaviness, or what not,”⁶ we have been in either case guilty of importing meanings which hold good only *within* experience. We have no right, except in the most provisional way, to speak of *my* experience, since the I is a construction out of experience, an abstraction from it; and the *thats*, the browns and hards and flats, are equally ideal constructions from experience, as ideal as atoms. An *élan vital* or “flux” is equally abstracted from experience, for it is only in departing from immediate experience that we are aware of such a process. In short, we can only discuss experience from one side and then from the other, correcting these partial views. This preface is necessary if we are to understand Bradley’s use of such terms as “feeling,” “psychical” or “spiritual,” all of which seem to emphasize the subject side of experience.

The real, we are told, is felt. “[T]o find reality, we must betake ourselves to feeling. It is the real, which there appears, which is the subject of all

predicates" (*A&R* 252). We must be careful not to identify reality with feeling, either *my* feeling, or collective feeling, or an impersonal current of feeling. Feeling is to be taken "as a sort of confusion, and as a nebula which would grow distinct on closer scrutiny" (*A&R* 473). That of which it is a confusion, and into which it can be analysed, is

speaking broadly . . . two great modes, perception and thought on the one side, and will and desire on the other side. Then there is the aesthetic attitude . . . and . . . pleasure and pain. . . . It [feeling] is first the general state of the total soul not yet at all differentiated into any of the preceding special aspects. And again it is any particular state so far as internally that has undistinguished unity.⁷ (*A&R* 458)

Thus immediate experience seems to be in one aspect a condition of the conscious subject. The real appears in feeling, and feeling is "the general state of the total soul" though we find elsewhere that the soul is itself not real. And even this statement does not tell us that feeling is reality, or even that feeling is real. Feeling is not a "consistent aspect of reality" (*A&R* 459) although reality is that which "we encounter in feeling or perception."⁸

The reasons for denying that feeling is consistently real are briefly as follows. *Mere* feeling is something which could find no place in a world of objects. It is, in a sense, an abstraction from any actual situation. We have, or seem to have, at the start a "confusion" of feeling, out of which subject and object emerge. We stand before a beautiful painting, and if we are sufficiently carried away, our feeling is a whole which is not, in a sense, *our* feeling, since the painting, which is an object independent of us, is quite as truly a constituent as our consciousness or our soul. The feeling is neither here nor anywhere: the painting is in the room, and my "feelings" about the picture are in my "mind." If this whole of feeling were complete and satisfactory it would not expand into object, and subject with feelings about the object; there would, in fact, be no consciousness. But in order that it should be feeling at all, it must be conscious, but so far as it is conscious it ceases to be merely feeling. Feeling therefore is an aspect, and an inconsistent aspect, in knowing; it is not a separate and isolable phase. On the one hand, feeling is an abstraction from anything actual; on the other hand, the objects into which feeling is differentiated have a kind of union which they do not themselves account for; they fuse into each other and stand out upon a background which is merely felt, and from which they are continually requiring supplementation. In order that these developments—thought,

will, pleasure and pain, objects—may be possible, feeling must have been given; and when these developments have arrived, feeling has expanded and altered so as to include them. “At every moment my state, whatever else it is, is a whole of which I am immediately aware. It is an experienced non-relational unity of many in one” (*ETR* 175). This is what we mean by saying that feeling is self-transcendent.

Now it is easy to fall into the error of imagining that this self-transcendence of feeling is an event only in the history of souls, and not in the history of the external world. It is hard to disabuse ourselves of the prejudice that feeling is something subjective and private, and that it affects only what feels, not what is felt. The reason for this is not far to seek. Feeling itself is properly speaking neither subjective nor objective, but its development into an articulate whole of terms and relations seems to affect the conscious subject, but not the objects of which the subject is conscious. I have the familiar sensation of red, which develops into a bull in a field; and this may well be an important event to me, affecting my course across the field, without making any impression upon the bull. The only reality which feelings can have, it is thought, is in a consciousness; we do not think of the external world as dependent upon feeling, unless we go so far as to say that it is dependent upon being felt—unless, that is, we think of it as the adjective of some transcendental self. On one side the history of the world is the history of my experience, on the other my experience itself is largely ideal, and requires the existence of much which falls outside of itself. Experience is certainly more real than anything else, but any experience demands reference to something real which lies outside of *that* experience.

We may express the difficulty briefly in this way. In feeling the subject and the object are one. The object becomes an object by its felt continuity with other feelings which fall outside of the finite centre, and the subject becomes a subject by its felt continuity with a core of feeling which is not related to the object. But the point at which a line may be drawn is always a question for partial and practical interests to decide. Everything, from one point of view, is subjective; and everything, from another point of view, is objective; and there is no *absolute* point of view from which a decision may be pronounced. Hence any history of the process must be only relatively true: it must be a history of the object side, postulating the subject, or a history of the subject side, postulating the object side. For feeling, in which the two are one, has no history; it is, as such, outside of time altogether, inasmuch as there is no further point of view from which it can

be inspected. In time, there are the two sides, subject and object, neither of which is really stable, independent, the measure of the other. In order to consider how the one came to be as it is, we are forced to attribute an artificial absoluteness to the other. We observe, first, the development of mind in an environment which *ex hypothesi* is not dependent upon mind; and second, in order to conceive the development of the world, in the science of geology, let us say, we have to present it as it would have looked had we, with *our* bodies and our nervous systems, been there to see it. To say that the world really was as we describe it, a million years ago, is a statement which overlooks the development of mind. To say that mind, in its beginnings in child or aborigine or animal, really was as we describe it, is to commit oneself to a relative truth of the same sort. In the same way in our theory of knowledge, when we leave the moment of immediate experience, we are forced to present our account either as the history of mind in its environment, or as the history of the world as it appears to mind.

What I have said is in defence of the use of the word "feeling." In describing immediate experience, we must use terms which offer a surreptitious suggestion of subject or object. If we say presentation, we think of a subject to which the presentation is present as an object. And if we say feeling, we think of it as the feeling of a subject about an object. And this is only to make of feeling another kind of object, a kind of object which will be discussed in a later chapter. Nevertheless we can arrive at this metaphysical use of the term feeling in its psychological and current use, and show that "feelings," which are real objects in a world of objects, are different from other objects, are feelings, because of their participation in the nature of feeling in this other sense. The feeling which is an object is feeling shrunk and impoverished, though in a sense expanded and developed as well: shrunk because it is now the object of consciousness, narrower instead of wider than consciousness; expanded because in becoming an object it has developed relations which lead it beyond itself.

Although I speak of "feelings" as shrunk and impoverished, I do not admit that every feeling was at any stage the whole content of consciousness. The majority of feelings have never succeeded in invading our minds to such an extent as completely to fill it; they have from first to last some objectivity. I do not mean that they are any the less intense for this, or that they disappear under attention. A toothache, or a violent passion, is not necessarily diminished by our knowledge of its causes, its character, its importance or insignificance. To say that one part of the mind suffers and another part

reflects upon the suffering is perhaps to talk in fictions. But we know that those highly-organised beings who are able to objectify their passions, and as passive spectators to contemplate their joys and torments, are also those who suffer and enjoy the most keenly. And most of us are able to give name to some of our feelings, to recognise in a vague way love and hate, envy and admiration, when they arise in our own minds. This naming of feelings, while it may give a very imperfect clue to their nature, is nevertheless of the greatest importance. It is obvious that we can no more explain a passion to a person who has never experienced it than we can explain light to the blind. But it should be obvious also that we can explain the passion equally well: it is no more "subjective," because some persons have never experienced it, than light is subjective because the blind cannot see. We can explain it by its relations; by its effect upon the heart-beat, its toxic alterations of the system, by its effects in conduct and social intercourse. Without these relations, which give the feeling its *whatness*, the feeling could not be said to exist. Over and above all relations, it is true, the feeling must be a *that*, merely there; although strictly speaking not anywhere or at any time. But this aspect of mere existence does not distinguish feeling specifically from any other object. No object is exhausted by its relations, and this aspect of mere existence, in all objects as well as feelings, is what we call immediate experience. This aspect of immediacy, of bare existence, is a character of even the most restricted feelings, though they may be at every moment the object of consciousness as well.

We find our feelings, accordingly, on the one side to be of the same nature as immediate experience, and on the other to present no radical difference from other objects. We do not call the furniture of our rooms "feelings" (unless we mean the mere presence of appearances in our mind) and our ordinary speech declares that two people may share the same feeling as well as regard the same object. Yet we persist in believing that about feelings there is something private, that we cannot "know" them from the outside; although we are compelled to admit that often an observer understands a feeling better than does the person who experiences it. So far as feelings are objects at all, they exist on the same footing as other objects: they are equally public, they are equally independent of consciousness, they are known and are themselves not knowing. And so far as feelings are merely felt, they are neither subjective nor objective. Let us assume, for the moment, that my experience may consist of one single feeling, and that there is one object before me which I either love or hate. Adhering to my own point of view,

in which the feeling is *merely* felt (i.e., I am not conscious of it), the feeling cannot be subjective, for it cannot be said to exist at all. For whom will my feeling be subjective? For the dispassionate observer, who seeing the same object without the same feeling, subtracts my feeling from the object, to make of it a separate and independent entity existing in my mind. In other words, what is subjective is the whole world—the whole world as it is for me—which, because it is (for me) the whole world, cannot be contrasted with anything else “objective”; and equally truly nothing is subjective. There is no reason, so long as the one feeling lasts and pervades consciousness, why I should cut off part of the total content and call it the object, reserving the rest to myself under the name of feeling. It is only in social behaviour, in the conflict and readjustment of finite centres, that feelings and things are torn apart. And after this separation they leave dim and drifting edges, and tend to coalesce.

We must maintain, then, that in any cognition there is never more than a practical separation between the object and that which apprehends it. The object stands out, if you will, against a background of experience; and although it has relations which fall outside of our experience, it is likewise an abstraction from experience, continually capable of subtraction or addition.

The object before me is unstable and it moves so as to satisfy me; . . . I insist that, in addition to other influences (whose working I admit), the object is moved also by that which is only felt. There are connexions of content now actually present in feeling, and these are able to jar with the object before me. And they are able further to correct that object by supplementation from themselves. (*ETR* 170)

With the status of the feeling become objective, I shall be occupied in a later chapter; it is here only necessary to insist on the validity of the continuous transition by which feeling becomes object and object becomes feeling. One important case of this transition is sense-deception. The resolution of contradictions of sense may be found in a process of assimilation of feeling to a new object, or in assimilation of object to feeling. In the case of the stick in water, for example, the real object for the psychologist may include not only the “real” stick but an instance of refraction. That the object in the illusion is quite as real as the “real” object is a truth to which the New Realism has well called attention.⁹ The new object and the false, we may add, are continuous, and the new object has been constructed by

adding to the old object elements which were first experienced and not contemplated.

We are not here concerned with the absolute objective criterion for the permanence and independence of any special class of objects; it is enough if we can make clear that we have no immediate distinction between object and feeling. It may accordingly be said that the real situation is an experience which can never be wholly defined as an object nor wholly enjoyed as a feeling, but in which any of the observed constituents may take on the one or the other aspect. The further question is this: to what extent can we say that identity persists in such a change: to what extent may we say that the felt feeling and the observed feeling are the *same*? With the general question of identity we are not here concerned. But between the special case of identity of which I speak and identity in the usual sense, there is a striking difference. The latter is identity of objects (points of attention). This case is not the identity of two feelings both objectified. It is the identity of something which is an object with something which is not. When the difference is noted the very statement of the question will I think provide the answer. There is, between the felt and the objectified feeling, a continuity which is not interrupted by any objective difference; and so far as there is no perceived difference we may assume the two to be the same.

This rather subtle question, which really belongs to a later part of the discussion, is worth some little detail here. In considering how far feeling may be an object (and may be known), we may ask whether our conclusions will have a bearing upon experimental psychology. We may say that if psychology sets up a sharp factual line of demarcation between processes and things, and yet proposes to investigate the former as objects of science, it is committed to a contradiction.^{10*} Introspection can give us only terms, and not processes. In the same way as the mathematical representation of motion is and is not the same as the motion represented, so the object in psychology is and is not the same as the process. And it is only when psychology pretends to deal with something more "subjective" or more philosophic than the subject-matter of any other science that its pretensions lead it astray.

Yet to say that we have no knowledge of the process, of feeling and the transition from the merely felt to the objectified would be even more a vagary. The transition is not saltatory. It is neither wholly unconscious nor capricious, but is more or less a willed change. The attention to the feeling presupposes that there is such an object present, and that the attention has

not manufactured the object (*ETR* 162 ff.). So that in attending to a sensation or feeling any change of which we are aware besides the change felt in attending may be attributed to the sensation or feeling and held to be independent of the attention; and if we are aware of no other change than the attention, we may consider that any other change is meaningless.

The more fundamental aspect of the question, however, is this:

In any emotion one part of that emotion consists already of objects, of perceptions and ideas before my mind. And, the whole emotion being one, the special group of feeling is united with these objects before my mind, united with them integrally and directly though not objectively. . . . For when the object-part of our emotion is enlarged by further perception or idea, the agreement or disagreement with what is felt is not merely general and suffused, but is located through the object in one special felt group. And this special connexion and continuity with the object explains, I think, how we are able further to transform what is observed by the addition of elements from what is felt. There are features in feeling (this is the point) which already in a sense belong to and are one with their object, since the emotion contains and unites both its aspects. (*ETR* 169)

The error, then, would consist in any sharp division between enjoyment and contemplation, either in general or at any particular moment, or in treating the distinction of feeling and object as a possible *scientific* distinction. Science may make the distinction between feeling of object and object of feeling, but it cannot make a distinction between feeling and object as such. And now we are in a better position to inquire into the situation (in order not to say relation) of feeling, thought and object in experience. It will be recognised, first, that experience is non-relational. Relations can hold only between terms, and these terms can exist only against the background of an experience which is not itself a term. The objectified feeling of psychology does not exist apart from the rest of feeling which is merely felt, no matter how negligible that rest of feeling may appear. But within experience we always find relations, and in this sense we may say that non-relational experience does not exist. These relations, however, are not experience, and while they are experienced and therefore real, they are not real as relations. Yet, just as relations, they seem to be essential to reality. In this way a contradiction has "broken out." "Feeling has a content, and this content is not consistent within itself" (*AC&R* 459). This situation

it is which prompts us to pass on by new construction to a larger felt whole in which the same puzzling terms and relations appear. No experience is self-consistent, because of the ideal aspects with which it is shot through. Yet these ideal aspects are likewise real, and themselves issue from a felt background.

We may now go on to consider the place of consciousness in experience. In order to understand Bradley's answer to this problem, we must keep in mind two different and apparently contradictory aspects of the situation. Experience, we have been told, is not co-extensive with consciousness, but is wider. "There is an immediate feeling, a knowing and being in one, with which knowledge begins" (*ETR* 159). Feeling is more than either object or subject, since in a way it includes both. On the other hand, we must remember that the conscious subject, as a construction, falls partly outside of any whole of feeling: "the finite content is necessarily determined from the outside" (*A&R* 460). We must therefore expect to find consciousness to be both something immediately given and something which would not be in the immediate experience unless it also extended beyond it. Consciousness is not an entity, but an aspect, and an inconsistent aspect, of reality. Experience, we may assert, both begins and ends in something which is not conscious. And that this "not conscious" is not what we call "unconscious" should be sufficiently obvious. For what we term unconscious is simply an element *in* experience which arises in *contrast* to other elements in experience. It refers either to certain supposed mental entities which guide or influence our conscious actions. And I need not point out that this use of the term is of very doubtful value. Undoubtedly our mental life is directed by many influences of which we are not conscious, and undoubtedly there is no clear line to be drawn between that of which we are conscious and that which as "feeling" melts imperceptibly into a physiological background. But so far as this fringe is contrasted with that which is actually conscious, it is merely an object in our world like any other. And the "unconscious" conceived merely as external objects is only the unfeeling; it is the other side of experience and not the whole. The unconscious, in short, denotes something within experience, as the conscious does, and neither of these terms will represent the whole.

At the beginning, then, consciousness and its object are one. So far we are in agreement with at least two schools of contemporary philosophy.^{11*} We can say with James, "The instant field of the present is . . . only virtually or potentially either object or subject."¹² Confining ourselves to this instant

field (which we must remember is only an abstraction) we grant that no division can be found between an awareness and that of which it is aware. We cannot allow Mr. Russell's supposition of a "consciousness" which might merely exist for a moment and experience a sensation of red. The "red" would simply be a "neutral entity" which might be taken as mental or physical according to context, but where there is no context there is neither mental nor physical.¹³ What James calls the context is that of which Bradley speaks when he says that the finite content is "determined from the outside." This determination from the outside is unending. In the first place, there is my present physical constitution, which determines the experience without being an element in it, and there is my whole past, conceived either as the history of my body or as the sequence of my conscious experiences, so far as I can detach them from the objects in the experience, and consider them only as adjectives of myself. And secondly, there are the nature and the connections of the object, which fall outside of the present moment of experience, and are discovered on closer scrutiny. As we develop subject and object side, they seem to approximate independence, for the object is certainly independent of this knower, and the knower independent of any particular object: on the one side we get souls or selves, on the other the physical universe. That objects are dependent upon consciousness, or consciousness upon objects, we most resolutely deny. Consciousness, we shall find, is reducible to relations between objects, and objects we shall find to be reducible to relations between different states of consciousness; and neither point of view is more nearly ultimate than the other. But if we attempt to put the world together again, after having divided it into consciousness and objects, we are condemned to failure. We cannot create experience out of entities which are independent of experience. Nor could we be conscious at all unless these ideal connections somehow entered into the experience, breaking up its immediate unity. Yet the original unity—the "neutral entity"—though transcended, remains, and is never analysed away. In our perception of the red flower, the original mere red, in which awareness and aware are one, persists.

We can assert much more than seems implied in the last sentence. It is not merely "in my experience" that the moment of identity is essential. My existence is dependent upon my experience of red in the flower, and the existence of the flower is dependent upon its unity in feeling (as red) with me. Whatever relations the flower may afterwards be discovered to have, its nature must be such that its being under these conditions experienced as

red will be essential to the whole account of it. The real flower, we can say, will be the sum of its effects—its actual effects upon other entities—and this sum must form a system, must somehow hang together. And if we attribute to the flower any other reality besides these effects, which are actual only in experiences, we are thrown back upon what it is for itself—i.e., upon its experience of itself. And here we only face the old difficulties of subject and object over again in the form of pan-psychism. To carry the problem to this point may be possible. Neither attacking nor defending the pan-psychist view, I consider it negligible. For if the existence of subject or object is always relative, then the point to which we elaborate this relativity is a matter of indifference.

Thus we are led to the conclusion that the only independent reality is immediate experience or feeling. And we have seen that to think of feeling as subjective, as the mere adjective of a subject, is only a common prejudice. So far as it is feeling and nothing more, it is self-sufficient and demands no further supplementation. “My” feeling is certainly in a sense mine. But this is because and in so far as I *am* the feeling. I do not in consequence know (in the sense of understand) my own feeling better than does an outsider. If it be objected that I must have a feeling in order to understand it, the same may be said of every other object in the world.

Immediate experience, we have seen, is a timeless unity which is not as such present either *anywhere* or to *anyone*. It is only in the world of objects that we have time and space and selves. By the failure of any experience to be merely immediate, by its lack of harmony and cohesion, we find ourselves as conscious souls in a world of objects. We are led to the conception of an all-inclusive experience outside of which nothing shall fall. If anyone object that mere experience at the beginning and complete experience at the end are hypothetical limits, I can say not a word in refutation for this would be just the reverse side of what opinions I hold. And if anyone assert that immediate experience, at either the beginning or end of our journey, is annihilation and utter night, I cordially agree. That Mr. Bradley himself would accept this interpretation of his “positive non-distinguished non-relational whole” is not to be presumed (*ETR* 188). But the ultimate nature of the Absolute does not come within the scope of the present paper. It is with some of the intermediate steps that the following chapters are concerned.

NOTES

1. The title of TSE's chapter is the same as the title of the essay by Bradley that he takes for his starting point: "On Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience."

2*. TSE's note: "In *Essays on Truth and Reality*." (Oxford: Clarendon, 1914), hereafter abbreviated *ETR*. He uses his own heavily annotated copy of Bradley's *Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay*, 2nd edition (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1908), hereafter abbreviated *A&R*.

3. "Whether there is a stage where experience is merely immediate I have agreed to leave doubtful" (*ETR* 175).

4. "The early soul-life . . . is immersed in practice. It is wholly directed to the satisfaction of its appetite, first for food and then for the continuation of its species." *Principles of Logic* (New York: G. E. Stechert, 1912), 459; hereafter abbreviated *PL*. TSE's copy of this anastatic reprint of the 1883 first edition contains his bookplate and numerous marginal comments.

5. "My experience is essential to the world," Bradley writes, "but the world is not, except in one aspect, my experience. . . . But it is less misleading to assert, conversely, that the total world is my experience" (*A&R* 526).

6. William James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1912), 27.

7. This passage is marked in TSE's copy.

8. "The real is that which is known in presentation or intuitive knowledge. It is what we encounter in feeling or perception" (*PL* 44).

9. New Realism: See TSE's 1914 essay, ["Objects: Real, Unreal, Ideal, and Imaginary"], (173, n. 8), and his 1918 review "New Philosophers" (731, n. 2).

10*. TSE's note: "See Joachim, ['Psychical Process,'] *Mind*, 18 (1909), [65-83], and G. E. Moore and Dawes Hicks in *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1909-10, on the subject-matter of psychology." Moore, "The Subject-Matter of Psychology," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (hereafter *PAS*), N.S. 10 (1909-10), 36-62; G. Dawes Hicks, "The Relation of Subject and Object from the Point of View of Psychological Development," *PAS*, N.S. 8 (1907-08), 160-214; and "Mr. G. E. Moore on 'The Subject-Matter of Psychology,'" *PAS*, N.S. 10 (1909-10), 232-88.

11*. TSE's note: "And in opposition to Russell and Moore."

12. *Essays in Radical Empiricism* 23.

13. TSE discussed Russell's theory of sensation, outlined in *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914), in his 1914 Oxford essay, ["Objects: Real, Unreal, Ideal, and Imaginary"] (173, nn. 5, 6).

Chapter II

On the Distinction of “Real” and “Ideal”

The conclusion of the preceding chapter has been that reality as we may know it, the ultimate criterion which gives meaning to our judgments of existence, is so far as it appears at all, our experience, yet an experience which only to a certain extent—from a certain necessary but untenable point of view—is “ours.” As a development and in support of this conclusion, we are driven to question the status of those elements within experience which exist only by virtue of their reference to other elements which are, in that reference, real, and we shall come to the conclusion that the apparently fundamental separation between the real and the ideal is but tentative and provisional, a moment in a process. This conclusion is nothing new; it is no novelty even in the essay which I shall chiefly quote, that on “Floating Ideas and the Imaginary”;^{1*} it is familiar to students of Hegel. I can only plead that I seem to find it constantly neglected or misinterpreted. Accordingly, after a general statement of the theory, I shall attempt to make the position clearer by criticism of such systems as would do without this theory, and shall try to show its full importance in the thought of Mr. Bradley. Afterwards I shall attempt to point out some undeveloped consequences for the theory of objects, in regard to unreal and imaginary objects, “intended” objects, and process (act) as object. The whole discussion, needless to say, is bound up very closely with that of perception and judgment, which will immediately follow.

The theory, in its general terms, is stated in *Appearance*, chapter XXIV.²

There is a view which takes, or attempts to take, sense-perception as the one known reality. And there is a view which endeavours, on the other side, to consider appearance in time as something indifferent. . . . We have seen that the separation of the real into idea and existence is a division admissible only within the world of appearance. . . . In order to be fact at all, each presentation must exhibit ideality. . . . But the union in all perception of thought with sense, the co-presence everywhere in all appearances of fact with ideality—this is the one foundation of truth” (*A&R* 377-79).

And further, "when an idea qualifies the universe, how can it be excluded from reality?" (*AE&R* 395).

The ordinary view of the relation of real and ideal I take to be this. We are given in "experience" something called fact which is real because independent, and independent because real. This fact is not necessarily fact of sense perception, or of physical reality, but the fact may be itself an idea from an external point of view, an idea placed in reality. And the objection that a fact is always an objective, and not simply a *that*, does not in the popular view militate against its independence. The fact may appear with its fullest development of definition, with innumerable stipulations of relationship, yet we "apprehend" it as independent, and proceed to erect between it and its percipient an abstraction called thought, the existence of which is its reference to reality. And popular epistemology then asks us to accept the elaborated and sophisticated object as "real," and yet to maintain the proviso that all the positive qualifications which make it just what it is are products of the "activity of thought." In other words, the popular theory of knowledge, from which our philosophies spring, is realistic and nominalistic at the same time. That this is a just description, I think there will be little question; and whatever direction our solutions take, I doubt whether we ever wholly escape the crude antithesis.

Now there are several ways in which this difficulty is escaped or evaded. The simplest is that of sensation and thought, or, as in the Kantian philosophy, the distinction between an external reality from which we receive material, and the formative activity of consciousness. This distinction—ultimately that between activity and passivity—will serve to classify a vast number of systems, both idealistic and realistic;³ for I am not satisfied merely that the distinction should be finally transcended, but wish to enquire into its validity as a starting point. So that a conational psychology such as that of Mr. Alexander, or of Lipps—any psychology which deals with "processes" as its subject-matter—will fall into a class with such an idealism as was recently advocated by Professor Adams.^{4*} And the second attitude is that of psychologists such as Stout, who would make a sharp distinction between content and object, and between psychical and physical object.^{5*} This I believe is the more usual attitude in psychology. And again there is the view of those who would reduce everything to object and immediate apprehension, reducing the "activity" of thought to a minimum, as Meinong, Russell, or Miss Wodehouse.⁶

These views it will be necessary to criticise, but without some elaboration of the point of view from which these criticisms will be made, what I have to say may appear inconsequent and negative. The common complaint, accordingly, lodged against all these views, is that it does not matter from what point of view or with what data you start, you will, if you do not stop arbitrarily, come to one conclusion; and whether or no psychology has the right to stop, whether psychology is independent of metaphysics, will be one of the questions involved. And, according to this view, activity and passivity, immediacy and mediation, acquaintance and description, will be transcended in the process of completion of our knowledge. In the words of Mr. Bosanquet,

We shall . . . meet, with uncompromising resistance, the attempt to take any form of immediateness, understood as excluding mediation, for an absolute and reliable datum, whether in the form of an object of simple apprehension, called by the name of fact, or in the form of an indeterminate creative impulse called by the name of life, or in the form of a subject of experience, impervious and isolated, called by the name of "self."^{7*}

The first point to be made is that the difference between real and ideal is in a sense an ideal difference. It is created within a limited sphere of meaning and recognisable only within that sphere. If we would recognise a difference between reality and its attributes, we must have become aware of the fact of error, and of alterations of content in relation to the same intended object. We become aware that we have intended a reality, that we have, within our experience, delimited a field as real; that we have brought this field into relation with ourselves: and in error and in alterations of content, we come to consider meaning as another reality beside that which it intends. This discovery must be qualified in two ways. First, the reality which we have intended is an ideal construction. It is not reality as a whole, but the radiation from a particular and indefinable point; a field of quite uncertain extent, assumed and selected. And second, the idea with which this reality is qualified is itself real, though of a reality which we cannot possibly define; for, though its existence as a fact is another thing from its meaning, yet its meaning is inextricably involved in its existence as a fact. The idea is something real, or it could not be even ideal; and on the other hand the reality to which it refers is an ideal reality, cut off, in a sense, and isolated; for the attribution of an idea to reality as such is not within our power. On the other hand, the reality intended tends to identify itself with

the content of the idea; and on the other hand, this content pretends to identify itself with reality. Without the ideal aspect of the real, the distinction would be impossible. And unless the idea were itself real, it would be unable to relate itself to reality.

But how, it will be said, will these statements be reconciled with the previous assertions that reality is experience? You have first defined reality as experience, and have then declared experience to be indefinable: you now pretend that we have always before us an ideal fragment which we call reality, and of which we predicate the ideal. Are not the two statements hopelessly at variance? If the first statement about reality is true, how can the second reality be real in any sense; and have we not rather a wholly imaginary world of imaginary predications completely cut off, as far as our knowledge and acquaintance goes, from the reality upon which you have insisted?

In order to reply to this objection, in which the whole realistic position is implied, it will be necessary to dispose of a difficult prejudice. The real and the ideal (including the unreal) are not two separate groups of objects. Nor, as we shall see, can they be distinguished as object and "process" or "act." Neither the absolute real nor the absolute ideal can as such enter into discourse; it is only when two entities "take of each other," so to speak, that either of them can be real or ideal. Reality is simply that which is intended and the ideal is that which intends; and ultimately—for we have no reason to stop—the intending is the totality of intending, and the intended is the whole of reality. This whole of reality, of course, will as discussed present both real and ideal aspects; but this differentiation in what should be simple will fall outside of our metaphysics. It is inclusive with reference to our system, and that is all that we require.^{8*}

The division of real and ideal into two groups of objects is an action of a natural and inevitable tendency. As we shall later urge, an object is simply that to which we attend, and we cannot attend to process or idea without making it to that extent an object. But, just as no object is wholly object, so we can, by constant correction and discretion, to some degree handle idea without reducing it wholly to object. In the first place, we must remember that the distinction of real and ideal is one that does not arise until the ideal is recognised as having a reality of its own, apart (in a sense) from its meaning; and yet as preserving its identity in this new aspect. Without the "*Mitmensch*" (fellow man) and our introjections, the question of ideality would never arise. It is easy to mistake the issue here, and to say that the

idea is simply not recognised. We can imagine a solitary autochthon, yet gifted with reason and, if you like, with some power of expression, making judgments, quite unaware of their ideal relation to the reality intended. And for this hermit, as a centre of experience, these judgments will simply not come into question—the question as to their existence will be one to which there is no answer, either affirmative or negative. And this is everywhere the case, that until the ideal is recognised as real, it is not even ideal. And I use the word “recognise” with this in view: the idea as idea (as meaning) is neither existent nor nonexistent, and could we consistently keep to this internal view, it would not be real. It will be said, I know, that the externality of the idea is implied in its internality. But this implication exists only for a point of view which contains both points of view.

With these considerations in mind, let us return to the discussion of the relation of Reality as subject, to reality as the fragment to which predicates are assigned.^{9*} In any case of judgment or perception something is assumed to be real, and this something is a background of indefinite extent continuous with the content which is asserted of it. The background has ideal characteristics which are rather felt than predicated, and which are capable of indefinite transmutation in a more and more inclusive view. This provisional reality has, on the one hand, the character of an ideal construction, for it is a sphere in which our ideal activity has been exercising itself; and on the other hand, it is apart from the particular idea at the moment and under the aspect of predication. It is, in contrast with that idea, *accepted*; and the ideal aspect of it is for the occasion negligible, in contrast with the particular idea with which we are engaged. Thus, of course, an idea may justly be predicated of an ideal world; and our interpretation of the character of Ivanhoe may qualify the assumed reality of the story just as truly as the story itself, as a story, qualifies reality.¹⁰ The ideal world of the story qualifies reality—in what way, we are ultimately in ignorance—and through this world our conception of the character of Ivanhoe is attached to reality. The question of imaginary and unreal objects belongs to a later part of the discussion. There is however one objection likely to be raised at this point, related to that question. The objection is this: the assertion that reality is always the subject is in apparent conflict with the fact of judgments in which reality is a predicate. In the judgment “X is real,” is reality the subject? The answer is this: In this judgment the subject is not a presentation which we call real or leave in the void. It is already largely placed and determined. It is already predicated of a world which has two spheres, and the

question is: through which of the two it shall be related to the whole. The titular subject is already real, and the adjectival reality is only the assertion of one sphere in which it belongs. Yet in the course of the assertion, the nature of the subject has altered. If the reality which we assert is the reality of ghosts, then the ghost as potential subject, previous to the judgment, is not the same ghost as that with which we emerge. The latter is a real ghost; and how can we say that the content of a real ghost is not different from that of an imagined or merely presented ghost? The subject, then, cannot have been the ghost, and the predicate cannot have been reality; for, on the one hand, the subject of a judgment cannot be altered by the judgment, and on the other hand, the predicate must add something to our knowledge—and we knew already that the ghost was in some sense real.

With the connection between the predication inside the proposition and the predication referring to the subject outside the judgment, I shall be concerned later. I must call attention here, however, to the fact that the idea which is predicated of reality is not the content of a single word. The statement that ghosts are real is not, as we have seen, the predicating ghosts of reality. An idea is never given in a single word ("only in the sentence does the word first acquire actual life and being")^{11*} when that word is an element in a judgment and not in itself the expression of a judgment. The fact that words are always used in the expression of ideas, and are remembered and placed by attachment to a more or less indefinite group of ideas in which they have been used, may lead us to regard ideas as the meaning of words. Now there is a decided difference.

(The isolated substantive name lacks the positing therein of a subject, and hence it cannot be presented here, at the locus of perception, as a living source of multifarious activity. . . . It will be seen that the meanings of isolated words must be so presented, as if nothing in perception corresponded to them; they are founded purely on the articulate sounds we make, and in this alone possess a basis for their existence.)^{12*}

A word, it is true, may mean or stand for, an idea. But there will never obtain an identity between the meaning of the word as concept, and the meaning of the word as idea. As an idea it is predicated of reality, assigned a place in a system—more or less complete—which is assumed as real. But the concept—greenness, or triangularity—does not as such qualify reality at all. It is, in itself, neither real nor unreal. The meaning of a concept always exceeds the idea, and is of virtually indefinite extension. When we predicate

the reality of ghosts, for example, we qualify reality, an ideal reality abstracted from the whole, by the idea of *real* ghosts; and this idea includes, on one side, much more than the word or concept ghost. The ghost conceived as real is a special kind of content with characteristics continuous with those of the fragment of reality in which he is set; the idea, from one point of view apart from the world and attached to it, yet contains already the character of the world, a world, as I said before, which shows by the very fact that that idea can be attached to it that it is somehow prepared for the reception of that idea.

In this way I make the distinction between concept and idea. The idea is the total content which we mean about reality in any particular presentation. It is not purely or even primarily psychological, for its meaning is essential (and meaning, as I shall have occasion to consider later, does not as such form an object for psychology); and furthermore, its meaning partially coincides with the reality which it intends. Nor is the idea purely a logical entity, since it always, in the end, comes to occupy a particular place in a real world. The concept, on the other hand, while it may in a sense—loosely, as I think—be called ideal, is not to be confounded with the ideality of the idea, and indeed in contrast with the idea had much better be called real.^{13*} The concept, in the first place, is extra-mental; it exceeds all actual and possible content, or definition. Nothing can secure you against the possibility that new experience may add to the meaning by extending the use. And properly speaking, a concept cannot be defined at all, for to define it is to restrict it to a definite circle of ideas. So far as it is thus identified with these ideas, it ceases to be a concept; so far as it is present and practical, it is used to stand for a (not wholly definite) group of ideas. In this way we come mistakenly to identify the concept with one or several of its related ideas—to consider it as appearance as well as reality. And it is true that reality exists only through its appearances. It is only in some sense in ideas that concepts exist; and, in a sense, the pointing of the ideas at the concept constitutes the reality of the concept; its reality consists of the self-transcendence of ideas.

I am not confident that these definitions are valid ones, but they attempt to avoid Bradley's confusion of concepts with ideas, and Moore's confusion of ideas with concepts. Moore's criticisms of the passages in Bradley have however a certain force. "Now to Mr. Bradley's argument that 'the idea in judgment is the universal meaning,' I have nothing to add." But he says further,

I shall in future use the term “concept” for what Mr. Bradley calls a “universal meaning”; since the term “idea” is plainly full of ambiguities, whereas “concept” and its German equivalent *Begriff* have been more nearly appropriated to the use in question.

This concept he substitutes for idea in such a use as the following:

... that the “idea used in judgment” is not a part of the content of our ideas, nor produced by any action of our minds, and that hence truth and falsehood are not dependent on the relation of *our* ideas to reality

where the idea used in judgment is properly an idea and not a concept.¹⁴ Both Bradley and Moore make but one distinction—that between a *psychical* idea and a *logical* idea. Russell makes a similar distinction:

[In] the sense in which it denotes the *object* of an act of thought, whiteness is an “idea.” Hence, if the ambiguity is not guarded against, we may come to think that whiteness is an “Idea” in the other sense, i.e. an act of thought; and thus we come to think that whiteness is mental.¹⁵

Bosanquet hardly differs: “Idea’ has two principal meanings. (*a*) A psychical presentation and (*b*) An identical reference.”¹⁶

It should be immediately evident that the idea in Bradley’s judgment is a very different thing from the concept in Moore’s. We do not in judgment, certainly, simply predicate of reality the content, or part of the content, of a so-called “mental state.” So far we are all in accord. In “Caesar crossed the Rubicon,” the idea is just as “external” as the reality of which it is predicated.¹⁷ But the idea in question is not a concept, but something of indefinite complexity. Caesar’s crossing the Rubicon (the objective) has, as we consider it, elements which attach it more and more in one way or another to the real. The movement is not simply the movement of an idea toward reality; but the real comes to join itself, by presenting ideal aspects which are also real, to the self-realising idea. The idea was never at any moment of the process detached and “floating.” In being an idea at all, it must mean to be real; it is no more mental than the reality to which it is attached; its ideality consists in its meaning, and cannot be considered as a quality or mark by which it may be distinguished from the real. Hence, in the judgment above instanced, the idea is the whole reality meant—and I shall try to show later, the whole meaning is ultimately the whole of reality.

It is at once apparent that neither of the definitions used by Bosanquet is adequate for idea in this sense. This is rather what idealists are accustomed to call "ideal content." Content is as equivocal a word as any, but I cannot see that any distinction is introduced by using "ideal content" instead of idea. The idea predicated of reality is not part of any "content"^{18*} nor is it composed of simpler ideas. It is meaningless, I think, to speak of the "content" of the idea: is the content anything but the idea itself? for so far as the content is discrepant with the idea, I cannot see that it is the content of *that* idea.

There are here several issues:

1. the relation of idea to mental content
2. the relation of idea to image
3. the relation of idea to concept and speech
4. the relation of idea to identical reference

Let us consider the last question first. I wish to distinguish idea from 3 and from 4, and 3 and 4 from each other. Fixed reference is thus manipulated by Bosanquet:

the idea, as used in judgment, is a general signification, or in other words, a fixed reference. And because fixed, it is limited; limited to portions of content which serve as indices of the reference, and are compatible with psychical accompaniments that vary with the series of images.¹⁹

The essence of an idea, for Bosanquet, seems to be that it should refer to something (the identity which two people mean to mean when they say "Saint Paul's Cathedral" is the idea). What, in this case, is the idea? It is hardly the actual object meant—the object is that to which the idea refers. It is not the word or sound "Cathedral," nor is it the intention of the two people to refer to the same thing; it is the fact of their reference to the same thing. And "the content of this reference is the object of our thought" (*Essentials* 75). Now the idea, in this sense, can hardly be the idea which is predicated of reality. It is a "concrete habit or tendency", a "selective rule", and again it is a thing ("mental unit or image") which stands for something else.^{20*}

The idea predicated of reality cannot be either a "mental presentation" or a conation, nor can it be simply a meaning—for a meaning always means to be something more than a meaning. It is not certainly a compound of simpler elements. Bradley is clear on this point:

We may say . . . that all (judgments) have but one (idea). We take an ideal content, a complex totality of qualities and relations, and we then introduce divisions and distinctions, and we call these products separate ideas with relations between them. And this is quite unobjectionable. But what is objectionable, is our then proceeding to deny that the whole before our mind is a single idea. . . . The relations between the ideas are themselves ideal. . . . And the whole in which they subsist is ideal, and so one idea.²¹ (*PL* 12)

There is here a fixed reference in the sense that the idea aims to be (though any expression one can use will remain a metaphor) a reality, and the latter, as real, is independent of its relations. The fixity of the reference is not the character of fixity of meaning which the words have in language, nor is its fixity due to a composition of these fixities. It is not as if I took a number of sentence elements which have each an identity of reference and compounded them into a whole which has an identity by virtue of the ingredient identities. The idea, though largely dependent for its existence upon the forms of its expression, must yet not be confused with these forms. The idea is that reality which I intend, and the identity is only the assumption of *one* world; it is not the characteristic of it as idea, but as world.

The idea, and its predication of reality, may exist previous to the articulation of language. It is not true that language is simply a development of our ideas; it is a development of reality as well. The idea is developed from within, as language shows a richness of content and intricacy of connections which it assumes to have been really there, but which are as well an enrichment of the reality grasped. Wherever there is an appreciation of a presentation and a relating of it to the subject's world, there is an idea and a judgment: and this is practically universal. The sea-anemone which accepts or rejects a proffered morsel is thereby relating an idea to the sea-anemone's world. The fixity is simply this reference to a definite place in the world—a world which is built up from the subject's point of view. This, for the subject, is the only world, but it is not a solipsistic world, for it is not contrasted with any other possible world.

These remarks have been directed against such an interpretation of Bosanquet's definition as would infer that the idea, as idea, detached from its reality, need mean the same thing for various subjects. "Saint Paul's" might retain its full fixity of meaning for me if everyone else meant by the same term, let us say "Notre-Dame." There would, of course, be contradiction

in my world which I should have to rectify in one way or another; but the social consilience goes toward the construction of our world and not toward the definition of idea.

It is in this sense, then, that idea involves identical reference. The inquiry brings us consequently to the relation of idea to its articulated content and to the concept. The idea in predication is not necessarily of definite extent; it may be extended or narrowed or analysed. We are familiar with the objection "but you imply much more than this"—or "but you mean no more than—," and sometimes are immediately aware of an expansion or contraction of our idea. And again the idea may be analysed into component ideas. In the example which Bradley has given, we may first have an idea *wolf-eating-lamb*, and from this we separate the ideas, let us say, of wolf, of lamb, and perhaps further, of *eating* (*PL* 12-13). And this fact would at first seem to controvert what I have said, above,²² for we seem to have an idea for each word. I should reiterate the distinction between word as concept and word as idea. There may be, in a sense, degrees of ideality and conceptuality. In all judgment, even of the simplest sort, there is involved recognition. The actual idea judged, it is true, is unique, or the judgment would not be made, but the judgment is made only through universal connections. In the cruder perception, *wolf-eating-lamb*, these connections are few and indistinct; in the developed knowledge, we notice elements in this one idea which can be isolated through their relation to elements in other judgments, and which attain the status of ideas by bringing these relations with them to the particular case, so that the result is that a complex of connections is present in the particular perception or judgment, and besides being evoked by the idea itself to become an idea and be judged about. And for this idea, the one word (*wolf*, if you like) may stand. Yet it is a mutilation of connections to say that the one word stands for this "idea." For it does so only by virtue of its close connection with a number of more primary ideas. The *wolf* has become a reality perceived or judged, on a higher plane, as *wolf-eating-lamb* was in cruder knowledge; and this evolution of the idea can go on to the degree of abstraction upon which we find it practicable to live. This, then, is an idea "of higher order," composed out of lower ideas and capable of entering as an ingredient in more particular ideas which are predicated of reality. The ideas of higher order are themselves less frequently predicated, for obvious reasons; their existence usually implies their assumption as ideal elements of reality (*Kraftcentra*).²³ And these ideas of higher order, in their turn upon a higher plane, may be elements,

rather felt than judged, in judgments of higher order, which in their own way are like the primitive judgments attributing a total situation to reality.^{24*}

We have marked briefly the steps in the development of general ideas. And we find that the generality of an idea is a matter of degree; every perception involves some degree of recognition and the operation of a universal. Accordingly we must now ask, what is the difference between such a general idea and a concept? I define concept²⁵ as that which a word denotes, and idea (or general idea) as that to which a word refers in reality, this reference being contingent. And a concept, as I have said, is a thing-in-itself; it can be suggested, rather than defined, through more and more general ideas, but is at no point to be identified with these ideas. The concept it is of which the word is properly the sign or symbol. I am in partial agreement with Sigwart:

Words are generally held to be the signs of CONCEPTS. But a Concept in the logical sense is a work of art, produced by a conscious elaboration of our ideas in which its characteristics are analysed and its definition fixed, and it is the work of logic to help us to attain to the ideal state in which words represent such Concepts.²⁶

Of course I should be unwilling to admit that a concept is a "work of art" or that it is in any way *created* by thought, or that greenness, triangularity, or to the right of, is "*produced* by a conscious elaboration of our ideas." There is no meaning, so far as I can see, in saying either that the concept is created or that it is "eternal." In a sense, concepts are omnipresent, and in a sense, they are never known at all. We have, in the simplest case in which a concept appears, an intuitive knowledge of it (if one likes to talk of intuition), and on the other hand, as I say, beyond intuitive "knowledge," we know the concept only through ideas—through its appearances. And we must not confuse the development of the language with development in concepts; for it would, I think, be more apt to say that the development of language is the history of our exploration of the world of concepts. The goal of language is in this sense unattainable, for it is simply that of a complete vocabulary of concepts, each independent of the rest; and all of which, by their various combinations, would give complete and final knowledge—which would, of course, be knowledge without a knower.

If this be true, how are we to estimate Mr. Moore's assertion that "a proposition is composed of concepts"? He accepts Bradley's statement that the idea in judgment is the universal meaning; but we have interpreted this

universal meaning and Bosanquet's "fixed" or "identical" reference as an ideal reality in the form of universal connections; and not as the concept. Mr. Moore postulates the ultimate vocabulary of which I have spoken. Once given this vocabulary of concepts, it would be quite true to say, as Moore does say, "the world is formed of concepts. These are the only objects of knowledge. A thing becomes intelligible first when it is analysed into its constituent concepts."²⁷ For it is true that the concept is reality and the idea appearance, and I should almost agree that the concept is the only object of knowledge. But I defy Mr. Moore to show a case of a concept which is actually known; and if he presents cases of such, I am certain that he has taken the shadow for the substance, the idea for the concept. It is true that existence (for which we substitute here *reality*) is itself a concept and true that we can define reality only by a reference to truth—for this only means that our only criterion for the degree of reality of a given appearance is the criterion of consistency and inclusiveness; it certainly does not mean that because reality is a concept, it is known. What collateral can Mr. Moore put up on behalf of such "knowledge"?

We have thus seen in what way an idea is an identical reference and in what way it is related to the concept: the idea may precede the articulate thought, and likewise the concept may be said as an existent to precede thought, although its existence is not known of until late in the development of language. I turn accordingly to consider the relation of idea to image and mental presentation, and to the aspect of idea as a mental sign or symbol. And here I find serious difficulties with Mr. Bradley's views, difficulties which may be due to my own obtuseness, but in which I seem to find my objection supported by the objections of Mr. Moore and Mr. Hoernlé. "For logical purposes ideas are symbols, and they are nothing but symbols" (Bradley, *PL* 3). A symbol has

(i) existence, and (ii) content.²⁸ . . . [B]y a sign we understand any sort of fact which is used with a meaning.^{29*} The meaning may be part of the original content, or it may have been discovered and even added by a further extension. . . . A sign is any fact that has a meaning, and meaning consists of a part of the content (original or acquired), cut off, fixed by the mind, and considered apart from the existence of the sign.^{30*} (*PL* 3-4)

In what sense is an idea a sign? This seems a most treacherous statement. A sign has its existence beside its content, and it is just this separate existence—the

fact that the sign might be misinterpreted or simply not recognised as a sign at all, which makes it a sign and not an identity. Take some of the examples of sign which Bradley mentions [*PL* 3-10].³¹ A flower may become the sign or symbol of an emotion; the fox is the symbol of cunning. The meaning of these signs consists in a "part of the content (original [let us concede in the case of the fox,] or acquired [in the case of the flower]) cut off . . . and considered apart."³² Now does an idea refer to reality as fox refers to cunning? The quality to which the fox or the flower refers is something known or knowable otherwise than through the fox or the flower. And this is the case even when the sign is not fox in general, but as, let us say, when a withered flower is the sign of a particular moment in our history. The flower may be the only reminder we have of this moment, but it is in fact because of its essential heterogeneity with the event that it is able to replace itself and us with it, in the past. A flower may be the sign of an idea, but how can an idea be the *sign* of a reality? Such a view would surely lead us to a representational theory of knowledge.

The idea certainly has a sort of existence apart from the reality to which it refers, but the apartness is of a special sort and may easily be misunderstood. There may or may not be a mental content beside the meaning, but Mr. Hoernlé is certainly right in holding the meaning to be no part of this content:

We have nothing to qualify reality with except the contents of our minds, our imagery, which we "divorce" and "cut loose" from its existence in the mind so as to weave a garment for reality out of it.³³

The meaning is the idea, and the idea may be continuous with or in a sense dependent upon "mental content," but so far as it is idea, is distinct therefrom. We must ask then (1) in what way idea is not that which it means, and (2) in what way it is not the "mental" images and conditions.

The contrast between meaning and reality is not so apparent when the reality intended is a present sense perception, as in some other cases. In memory, for example, or anticipation, there may be the consciousness of an intended reality and of a present meaning which are not co-existent in time. The reality is there, and the "mental state" here. And inasmuch as this present state may omit the greater part of what was present to the reality which is remembered, and may likewise add or distort, we are accustomed to form in imagination the notion of a perfect idea of the past experience identical in content with the experience itself, and differing only in that it

is present as a memory instead of past as an experience. The effort of memory, in this case, would be to identify itself with the past experience, and the completion of the process would be hallucination. This I suppose is the natural view—based upon comparison of cases of greater and less success in recollection—but it is simply a tissue of contradiction. It assumes, in the first place, that memory is always of images, whereas it is frequently of objectives, which may tend, it is true, to reinstate the imaginal conditions of the experience, but which may be independent of these conditions both for appearance and for certitude. And it may assume, in the second place, a reinstatement of objects in a way which implies a point of view which was never actual. What we attend to in perception is one group of objects; what we attend to in memory is a different group: not, as in perception, the object as in itself it really is, but its image. Not that there are two distinct entities, the object and its image—the difference is not one of physical objects, but of intended objects. In perception we intend the object; in recollection we intend a complex which is composed of image and feeling. We do not intend to remember simply the object, but the object as we remember it. And this new object is much more *the experience* than *the past object*, for we try to remember how we felt toward the past object.

It will be said: this feeling-object which we intend is simply a moment in the reinstatement of the total situation, the consummation of which operation would be the presence of the object as object and of the feeling as feeling. To recall feeling, we are often told, is merely to live it over; it cannot be known or remembered, but only felt. And to this objection we can retort that hallucination is not the satisfaction and consummation of memory, but its disease. And so far as the feeling is merely felt, so far as the situation is merely lived over again, it is not a case of memory at all. We are attempting to recall, let us say, a public address which we have heard. If memory were simply a restoration of the past, we might expect to recall first the words or fragment of the sentences which the speaker uttered, rather than the sense which we extracted therefrom. For these sounds which he uttered take precedence in time of the meaning; the meaning, to use Meinong's phrase, is a *zeitverteilter Gegenstand*,³⁴ and the fact that we recall the meaning, in most cases, before we recall the actual words, would imply that the past presents itself in a different time-order than that of the objective time in which the events are held to have taken place. Now in most cases the meaning is what we want; if we had to live through the whole speech again to re-extract the meaning, we should find it very

inconvenient. And the meaning can hardly be said to exist in time as the spoken words exist. Furthermore, the meaning intended in attention to the speaker is not the same as the meaning intended in recollection. In hearing we aim at the meaning of the speaker—in memory we aim at the meaning which we drew from his words. And the same distinction holds good, though it is less apparent, even with the speaker's words: for we intend in the one case the words as spoken, in relation to the speaker, and we intend in the other the words as we heard them. And the words in this aspect were never an actual object of perception; they have their existence only in memory. The past which we aim at is the experience of an ideal individual, who should have been both internal and external to ourselves, who should have both known and experienced the past to which *in a very loose sense* our memory may be said to "refer."

In short, it appears that the past in the sense in which it is supposed to be recalled, in popular psychology, simply never existed; the past lived over is not memory, and the past remembered was never lived. But it will again be objected, if there is not a partial identity, and the possibility of degrees of identity, between the idea and an objective past reality, how is the idea to be distinguished from an idea of imagination? And it may be answered that there is an identity—not the sort of identity which we find between two objects, but that which can be found between two aspects. The past as lived and the past as remembered are in fact one and the same in intention, although in fact there is no reason to say either that they are the same or different. In order to make either statement, one would have to show a point of fact to which both refer, or one to which one refers and the other does not; and this identical viewpoint does not occur. You either live the past, and then it is present, or you remember it, and then it is not the same past as you once lived: the difference is not between two objects, but between two points of view. Two points of view may intend the same thing without there being any "thing" which is the same. The sameness is a function of the two points of view. But there may, as we have seen, be a certain amount of discrepancy without any impeachment of memory, as when we "remember" as the statement of a speaker what is actually a present inference from what we heard.^{35*}

The identity in question is an ideal identity, a relation which exists only in relation with other (in fact, with all the other) identities in the series: it is an identity supported, if you like the phrase, by the will. You have a past experience and a present memory and, if these were all that existed, even

they would not exist, for they would constitute two utterly disparate worlds. But you have also an experience *b* and a memory *B*, and so on, and when you have the two alphabets given, and only then, you have some standard for comparison. The reference of each memory is not given separately, but you are, in a sense, given the whole series first. You cannot say simply "*A* is identical with *a*," but you say "*A* is identical with *a*, with regard to the identity of *B* with *b*" and vice versa.³⁶

The idea, if the foregoing remarks have any cogency, is not a glass through which we descry a past reality, but the idea of a past reality is itself the object, an object which is not past in the sense of a past object of experience, and which is not present in the sense of a present object. It may appear a paradoxical statement, but it is not altogether untrue to say that the object of a memory is the memory itself: meaning only that we must distinguish between the object of the memory and the object of our attention when we remember. In memory, consequently, there is no more divorce between idea and reality than in any other kind of apprehension; the reality is our memory of a past experience, the idea is the reality in so far as we find the idea satisfactory; and when the idea fails to satisfy, we identify it with some other reality of memory or imagination. And the more or less figurative expression "some other reality" must not mislead us: the operation consists simply in recognising the idea for what it already is. How much this qualification explains is a question which introduces us to the dangerous problem of error, and this problem I shall have to postpone till I have gathered in several other floating embarrassments. I should like now to offer some remarks on the relation of idea and reality when the reality is an anticipated event and when it is an imaginary event or object.

It is obvious that an image located in the future cannot intend the real event, and the theory which possessed some plausibility in the case of memory cannot here apply. In remembering, we have seen, we have a memory which with respect to other memories refers to a particular reality. In the case of an idea located in the future, there is no such correspondence to be found, for the anticipated event may never realise itself. Ideas of anticipation, accordingly, occupy a place between ideas of memory and ideas of imagination. Such ideas may vary in two ways: in the degree of their realisation, and in the degree of their connection with the present. This connection, again, may vary in two ways: the idea may be associated with the present, and spring therefrom, either in virtue of its probability or in virtue of its interest. And here is a line of demarcation between anticipation and

imagination: a purely imaginary event can never really be set in the future, for such a disposition of ideas implies a continuity with the real existence of the subject, and a "future" which has not such continuity is no future at all, but might as well be called past. An author can imagine, if you like, what "might" happen to his characters in the sequel, but such events are either such as the author can imagine himself making to happen, or such as he imagines the characters themselves as anticipating or such as he accepts or rejects. And if I present to myself the figure of a centaur or dryad as existing "in the future," I do one of two things. I either throw myself direct into a visionary world, which I proceed to qualify by the term "future," or I qualify present reality and the idea of centaur so as to make the latter to me a real possibility. And the imaginary here mentioned is not as future imaginary; it is the real future of an imaginary present. An anticipated idea, then, cannot be wholly imaginary, and on the other hand, it cannot essentially refer to an event which becomes actual. These observations seem so obvious that I must apologise for offering them.

As to the degree of realisation, it is not in principle involved. For we have seen that the degree of "identity" between the memory and its intended real experience is not a question; and here, from the point of view of the idea, we are concerned only with possibility and interest. Though the difference of principle between ideas of the future and ideas of imagination is clear, yet the difference of fact is often hard to determine. We must of course consider an idea as possible, but we may so consider it with a greater or less degree of evidence, as we are moved by interest (including, of course, fear) or by knowledge: an idea which may appear to an outsider a pure imagination, possesses fatality for one crazed by fear or passion. It has frequently been said that we never desire what we think absolutely inapprehensible: it is however true that some of our sharpest agonies are those in which the object of desire is regarded as both possible and imaginary, in which in fact the *aspro martiro*³⁷ is due to the irony of the contrast: the mistress exists as possessed in the real world of anticipation of the disappointed lover, while present reality is forcing itself in upon him with the conviction that this possession is imaginary. Images of future satisfaction to which we looked forward with confidence, we are constantly compelled to consign to the limbo of imagination; and we frequently forget that they were not imaginary in their genesis. The principle of the idea of anticipation, in short, I take to be this. The present as experience is, as we have seen (Chapter I), indefinable and in this sense unknown, but its character, and

ultimately its existence depend upon the internal qualification of real by ideal; and in this sense the present is ideal construction, and an ideal construction in which ideal constructions of the past and future are integral. These ideas do not qualify a real past and future, for there is no real past or future for them to qualify; past and future are as such themselves ideal constructions. Ideas of the past are true, not by correspondence with a real past, but by their coherence with each other and ultimately with the present moment; an idea of the past is true, we have found, by virtue of relations among ideas. Similarly, an idea of the future is not applied to the real complex which shall represent the realisation or falsification of this idea. The present of ideal construction, the present of meaning and not simply of psychical or physical process, is really a span which includes my present ideas of past and future. The reality of the future is a present reality, and it is this present future-reality of which our ideas of anticipation are predicated, and with which they are identified. "She must weep or she will die" is a statement *not* about the *real future* (which would be a contradiction) but about the [*present*] *future*.³⁸ We are not to say that one of these ideas is realised and the other left floating "like Mahomet's coffin";³⁹ there is really but one idea, and that is predicated of a present future with which it is identical. The reality is immanent to the idea, or else the idea is not the idea of that reality.

If the last statement is true at all, it is true of the ideas of imagination as well as of any other. I shall state very briefly what I take to be the principle here involved, leaving the full discussion of the existence of unreal objects to a later chapter, in connection with the theories of Meinong.⁴⁰ If I figure to myself the character of a personage of fiction, it is not true to say that there is no real object to which the idea means to "correspond." The distinction between real and unreal is practically useful but metaphysically baseless and indefensible. The character of fiction is imperfectly real because it is imperfectly ideal. And the round square, so far as it is idea (and I do not mean image) is also real. It is not unreal, for there is no reality to which it should correspond and does not. If there were to be such a reality, one would have to have an idea of it—and this idea which you call unreal is the only idea of it which you can present. The detailed discussion of this point I shall take up in connection with the problem of content, object, act, and presentation.⁴¹ The complete idea is the reality, and it is not until the idea realises itself, and thus becomes really ideal, that we can really trace its ideal connections. When the poet says

I lived with shadows for my company

she is announcing at once the defect and the superiority of the world she lived in.⁴² The defect, in that it was vaguer, less of an idea, than the world of others; the superiority, in that the shadows pointed toward a reality, which, if it had been realised, would have been in some respects a higher type of reality than that of the ordinary world⁴³—compared to which the ordinary world would be less real, and which the ordinary world might be said to “mean.”

The question in what sense an idea is “meaning” may now be resolved. I accept Bradley’s definition of a judgment as the predication of an idea of reality, and I agree that this idea is one whole. And in the article to which I have frequently referred (“Floating Ideas”), he has laid down the general doctrine of the relation of real and ideal. But I maintain that for metaphysical purposes at least (*PL* 3), the notion of idea as symbol is quite inadequate. An idea is not a symbol as a fox is of cunning, or an anchor of hope. You cannot so isolate existence and meaning, in the case of ideas. And to say that an idea is an identical reference is only partially true. There is, however, a sense in which it may be said that idea is meaning. We may say, in one way, that every idea means itself; its ideality consists in its “pointing toward” its realisation, or (we have found it to be the same thing) toward its own idealisation. Hence an idea, as contrasted with reality, is something which cannot be grasped—for it can only be described in terms of that reality—in which case you have the reality and not the idea; or it must be described in terms of some other reality—in which case it has lost its meaning, and is no longer the same idea. The existence of idea, then, in contrast with the real, is only in the process, eluding our pains; for as soon as you touch it, you find that the whole world resolves itself into ideas—or into reals. The idea is, as idea, Act; and how far Act can be made an object, together with its relation to content, presentation, and object (*Inhalt*, *Vorstellung*,^{44*} *Gegenstand*) will form the subject of the ensuing chapter.

NOTES

1*. TSE’s note: “Reprinted in [*Essays on*] *Truth and Reality*.” He notes parenthetically in the text that his main reference point for this chapter, Bradley’s “On Floating Ideas and the Imaginary,” first appeared in *Mind*, 15 (1906), [445-72].

2. The chapter on “Degrees of Truth and Reality” (XXIV) is the most heavily annotated in TSE’s copy of *A&R*.

3. TSE discussed this distinction in his 1913 Harvard essay, "Report on the Relation of Kant's Criticism to Agnosticism."

4*. TSE's note: "[George P. Adams, "Mind as Form and as Activity,"] *Philos[ophical] Rev[iew]*, 22 (265-83)], 1913." Adams (1882-1961) was professor of philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. TSE knew the work of Samuel Alexander (1859-1938), professor of philosophy at the University of Manchester and recent president of the Aristotelian Society (1908-11), from his essays on psychology in *Mind*, *PAS*, and the *International Journal of Ethics*, hereafter abbreviated *IJE*. He had discussed Lipps, known for his theory of empathy (*Einfühlung*), in his 1913 Harvard essay [Degrees of Reality] (57).

5*. TSE's note: "See his controversy with Mr. Joseph." H. W. B. Joseph (1867-1943), a fellow of New College and author of *Introduction to Logic* (1906), had published "The Psychological Explanation of the Development of the Perception of External Objects" in two successive issues of *Mind*, 19 (1910), provoking a "Reply to Mr. Joseph" by the editor G. F. Stout and Joseph's counterreply in *Mind*, 20 (1911), 1-14, 161-80, respectively.

6. TSE discussed Meinong in his 1913 Harvard essay [Degrees of Reality] (57) and his 1914 Oxford essay, "The validity of artificial distinctions" (187). The centrality of Meinong in TSE's thinking is evident from the fact that in his 1935 report for his Harvard class, he recalled the title of his dissertation as "Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie considered in Relation to Bradley's Theory of Knowledge." In [Degrees of Reality], TSE discussed Meinong and Russell comparatively. Helen Marion Wodehouse (1880-1964), lecturer in philosophy in the University of Birmingham, wrote *The Presentation of Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1910), hereafter abbreviated *Presentation*.

7*. TSE's note: "[Bosanquet,] *The Prin[ciple] of Indiv[iduality] and Value*, 13." Quotation marks enclosing "self" added by TSE.

8*. TSE's note: "Wherever the idea can be merely *one aspect* [italics mine] of a single presentation, there we can say that the ideal content exists, and is an actual event" (*A&R* 398). This sentence is underlined and its page heavily annotated in TSE's copy.

9*. TSE's note: "It would be impossible that any man should have a world, the various provinces of which were quite rationally connected, or appeared always in system. . . . He means, from time to time, by reality some one region of the Real, which habitually he fails to distinguish and define" (*A&R* 367). This passage is marked in TSE's copy.

10. Wilfred of Ivanhoe is the protagonist of Sir Walter Scott's historical novel *Ivanhoe* (1819).

11*. TSE's note: "See [Wilhelm] Jerusalem, *Die Urtheilsfunction* [Vienna and Leipzig: Braumüller, 1895], 28: 'Das Wort, . . . gewinne erst im Satze wirkliches Leben und Sein . . . ' and *passim*, for relation of word to idea."

12*. TSE's note: "[Gustav] Gerber, *Die Sprache und das Erkennen* [Berlin: R. Gaertners Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1884], 102-03, is clear as to the unrepresentability (*Unvorstellbarkeit*) of the word: 'Es fehlt dem isolierten nomen substantivum dies, dass in ihm ein Subjekt gesetzt ist, und so kann es nicht hier, an dem wahrgenommenen Orte, vorgestellt werden als lebendige Quelle mehrfacher Thätigkeit, . . . Man sieht, dass die Bedeutungen der isolierten Wörter so vorgestellt werden müssen, wie ihnen in der Wahrnehmung nichts entspricht; sie gründen sich lediglich auf unsere Sprachlaute und haben nur an diesen den Boden für ihr Dasein.'—I fail to find, however, a clear distinction between concept and idea, on the one hand, and idea and image on the other." English translation by Heath.

13*. TSE’s note: “Professor [R. F. Alfred] Hoernlé (‘Image, Idea, and Meaning,’ [*Mind*, 16 (1907)], 90) makes the following distinction between the real and the ideal: ‘1. In the first place, the contrast between idea and reality is taken to be a contrast between present reality and something which in some sense or another is “not present.” Thus the past and the future are usually said to be “ideal” as against the reality of present experience; and again in volition we have the opposition between my present state and an idea of change, the “realization” of which would satisfy me. 2. Secondly, reality as contrasted with idea, is more particularly identified with sense perception.’—But I do not find this classification adequate; and it makes no place for the concept.” Hoernlé (1880-1943), visiting Harvard from the University of Durham, taught a seminar in metaphysics (autumn 1913), which TSE attended; he remained at Harvard as an assistant professor (1914-20) and served on TSE’s dissertation committee.

14. Moore, “The Nature of Judgment,” *Mind*, 8 (1899), 177. TSE discussed Moore in [Definition and Judgment in Bradley and his Critics], a paper written for Joachim in 1914 (183).

15. *The Problems of Philosophy* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1912), 154-55; hereafter abbreviated *Problems*.

16. *The Essentials of Logic: Being Ten Lectures on Judgment and Inference* (London: Macmillan, 1895), 74; hereafter abbreviated *Essentials*. TSE also owned the 1910 edition (ordered 16 Jan 1914; signed copy in Houghton).

17. In “On Appearance, Error, and Contradiction,” Bradley examines the contention that a particular fact is real and can serve as a test of absolute truth: “‘Caesar crossed the Rubicon,’ we say, ‘or not’; but this ‘either-or’ is only true if you are confined to a single world of events. If there are various worlds, it may also be true that Caesar never saw the Rubicon nor indeed existed at all. And, with this, obviously our truth has ceased to be absolute” (*ETR* 261-62).

18*. TSE’s note: “Bosanquet, *Logic [or the Morphology of Knowledge]*, I [2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 1911], 44: ‘I . . . shall follow Mr. Bradley in using “idea” for a fixed content or logical meaning, not for the psychical images which pass through the mind and never recur . . .’” Underlined in TSE’s annotated copy.

19. *Logic* I.69; underlined in TSE’s copy: “the idea, as used in judgment” and “a fixed reference.”

20*. TSE’s note: “Mr. Bosanquet says (*Essentials* 79), ‘Mere mental facts, occurrences in my mental history, taken as such, cannot enter into judgment.’ But I should ask whether the so-called mental facts are mental at all, and whether they do not enter into judgment just as do any other ‘non-mental’ facts.”

21. TSE’s parentheses.

22. TSE here refers in parentheses to his argument earlier in this chapter that “the idea which is predicated of reality is not the content of a single word” (263).

23. *Kraftcentra*: a portmanteau word constructed from *Kraft* (force) and *Zentrum* (center), concepts transported by TSE from physics to describe a center or field of force in metaphysics. For example, “duty” is an ideal element that exists because we assume that it does, an assumption that gives it the power to make us act dutifully, thus becoming a *Kraftzentrum*.

24*. TSE’s note: “These levels of idea and judgment correspond, of course, to the levels of experience referred to in the essay of Bradley, used above (‘On Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience’).” “Above” refers to the previous chapter.

25. TSE refers in parenthesis to definitions given earlier in this chapter in the paragraph beginning: “In this way I make the distinction between concept and idea” (264).

26. Christoph von Sigwart (1830-1904), *Logic: The Judgment, Concept, and Inference*, 2nd ed., trans. Helen Dendy (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1895), I.42.

27. "The Nature of Judgment," 182.

28. Bradley's next sentence is: "In other words we perceive both *that* it is and *what* it is." TSE has underlined "existence" and "what it is" and inscribed in the margin: "Content=what it is. But what existence has an idea?"

29*. In a marginal notation, TSE underlined "meaning" and drew a line connecting it to a marginal query: "But have they necessarily a content over & above the meaning."

30*. In a marginal notation, TSE inserted "P.4" after the ellipsis and before this sentence to indicate the full-page break in the quotation. He marked this sentence in his copy and inscribed in the margin: "But the meaning of an idea is its existence: the meaning is its existence (as a founded object); whereas the symbol has existence of primary sort, apart from its meaning, though this existence is not strictly speaking its existence as symbol. The symbol, strictly, differs from the idea in being a divided intended object."

31. TSE's first draft of this discussion is in his 1914 Oxford paper, [Definition and Judgment in Bradley and his Critics] (183). Several passages, including most of this paragraph, are reused with little or no revision.

32. In repeating the previous quotation from *PL* 4, TSE expands Bradley's parenthetical statement.

33. "Image, Idea, and Meaning," 74.

34. *zeitverteilter Gegenstand* is from Meinong's *Über die Erfahrungsgrundlagen unseres Wissens* (Berlin: Springer, 1906), 68; hereafter *ÜEW*: "Nicht nur Bewegung ist ein zeitverteilter Gegenstand, sondern auch Ruhe; nicht nur Veränderung, sondern auch Beharrung." Trans: Not only movement is a subject that extends over time, but rest does as well. Not only change, but also the maintaining of a state (*viz.*, extends over time). Translation by Thomas Austenfeld.

35*. TSE's note: "My remarks on the memory-image are I think thoroughly in accord with the conclusions of [E. B.] Titchener; but for me differences are essential which for Titchener appear to be only accidental (*A Text-book of Psychology*, Part II [New York: Macmillan, 1910], 418-19): 'Is it not something of a paradox that the memory-image should be thus variable and instable? At first thought, yes: because we are ready to accept, from popular psychology, the notion that an image is a memory-image of itself, in its own right; and if that were the case, the image must of necessity copy or reproduce the perception. On reflection, no: because the image is, after all, made into a memory-image by the feeling of familiarity. So there is no reason in the world why it should copy the original experience. All it has to do—if we may ourselves talk a popular psychology—is to mean that experience (the meaning is given as the context of associated ideas and attitude) and to be recognised as meaning it. Suppose for a moment that memory-images were just weaker copies of the earlier perceptions, and nothing less or more: our mental life would, so far as we can imagine it, be an inextricable confusion of photographically accurate records. It is in reality, because the image breaks up, because nervous impressions are telescoped, short-circuited, interchanged, suppressed, that memory, as we have memory, is at all possible. The remark has often been made that, if we did not forget, we could not remember. That is true. But we may go further and say that, if the mental image could not decay [cf. Hobbes] it could not either be the conscious vehicle of memory.'

My claim is that it is a bad metaphor to speak of the change from percept to memory-image as a decay. There is an alteration, not only in fullness and order, but in content. There are two essentially different points of view.” TSE’s bracketed insertion refers to the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes.

36. In TSE’s submitted typescript, the capital “A” in both instances is missing. Bolgan wrote to TSE on 20 Mar 1963 that “the capital letter A is clearly what is called for” but that she would leave it blank, in case he disagreed. In the margin of the letter, he authorized the insertion, but it was not made, leading Bolgan to add a note saying that she had inserted the letters (*KE* 171).

37. Dante, *Inferno* XVI, 6: “sotto la pioggia dell’aspro martiro”; *trans*: “beneath the rain of the sharp torment” (*DCI* 168-69). TSE marked this line in his copy and used it as the epigraph to his 1914 poem “The Burnt Dancer” (*IMH* 62).

38. From the opening stanza of Tennyson’s “Home They Brought her Warrior Dead,” in *The Princess* (1847): “Home they brought her warrior dead; / She nor swoon’d, nor utter’d cry. / All her maidens, watching, said, / ‘She must weep or she will die.” This sentence contains an obvious slip that creates a contradiction: “. . . a statement not about the real future . . . but about the *real future*.” When Bolgan pointed this out to TSE, he told Peter du Sautoy “to retain the sentence,” adding that “a note from Miss B. would be desirable.” Her note: “this sentence makes sense if we alter the final phrase to read: ‘but about the present future’” (*KE* 171).

39. In “On Floating Ideas and the Imaginary,” Bradley writes: “The idea never floats, like Mahomet’s coffin, between both worlds, or somehow hangs nowhere” (*ETR* 40).

40. Chapters IV and V.

41. Bradley uses the example of the “round square” in his discussion of the principle of contradiction (*PL* 119-20). TSE discusses content, object, and presentation in chapter III.

42. From Elizabeth Barrett Browning; *read*: “I lived with visions for my company,” Sonnet XXVI, *Sonnets from the Portuguese* (1850), a volume that TSE assigned in his 1916 tutorial course in Modern English Literature.

43. As corrected by TSE in proof from: “in some respects, higher type of reality than the ordinary world.”

44*. TSE’s note: “Should I apologise for the fact that my use of ‘idea’ does not correspond with that of any author with whom I am acquainted? I have tried to show in the foregoing that *idea* should not be used indifferently with *concept* or with *image*, and *presentation* has a rather different use from either.”

Chapter III

The Psychologist's Treatment of Knowledge

The conclusion derived from the two preceding sections has been that within the whole which is experience and is reality, there is a distinction of real and ideal (within which is included the distinction of real and unreal): a distinction which turns out to be appearance and not real, inasmuch as the real is largely ideal, and the ideal is also real; a distinction, however, which in a sense supports reality.^{1*} For it is by this distinction that the word reality contains any meaning. We have found that reality is in a sense dependent upon thought, upon a relative point of view, for its existence; for ultimately the world is completely real or completely ideal, and ideality and reality turn out to be the same. And we found that the ideal can never be set over against the real absolutely, but tends to run, either forward or back, into the real which it intends, or the real out of which it may be said to be made: for both these reals are after all nothing but itself at another stage of development. It will be evident that the problem of error, in such a theory, becomes a very clamorous one. To approach this problem we must examine more narrowly the various moments of the process of apprehending an object: and inquire whether the distinction of real and ideal, as we have found its general principle, corresponds to the distinction of object and act, or of object and presentation. The nature of mental "activity" and the operation of categories must be discussed. And the question, much agitated in recent years of the subject-matter of psychology, must be agitated again.^{2*}

The distinction between real and ideal in psychology takes several forms. On the one hand, it may be said, is external reality, and on the other mental content, which is ideal in so far as it intends that reality and has reality of its own as well; and which, under the aspect of that reality of its own, can be studied by the psychologist. Or we may deny the possibility of a valid distinction between content and external reality, and distinguish only between object and act or conation. Or we may deny activity to consciousness altogether, and assemble existents in one complex or another. Or we may say that reality consists of elements of sensation, the rest being ideal construction. Or there is the view of Mr. Bradley, for whom everything is

in a way psychical, and for whom therefore the distinction between object and act is not identical with that between an internal and an external reality but is reducible to the problem of knowing one's own mind.

The questions involved are these: in an act of apprehension is there a part which is strictly mental and a part which is strictly external? and even if the distinction can be made, can it be made sharply enough to give us a class of objects which can form a separate science, psychology? and the ultimate question is: is there a problem of the possibility of knowledge as well as that of the morphology and structure of knowledge?

There are two terms of psychology, which imply unexamined assumptions, and one of which at least has undergone the fire of recent realism: "mental content," and "psychical process." The first is an assumption still of the majority of psychologists. The presentation of an external object may or may not "agree" with that object, but in the cases where we assume a complete agreement or identity, the presentation is like a point at which the circumferences of two circles are in contact: the one point may be taken twice over in two diverging contexts. Thus Miss Wodehouse declares that content has one context, while object has another.³ The one is continuous with mental history, the other with external or physical. And Witasek states the theory in a more extreme way (which Miss Wodehouse would probably not accept) when he says:

a stone die is hard and cold, grey and heavy and angular: the presentation thereof, the thought or memory of the die, has none of these characteristics, and cannot have them—it merely itself contains, over again, the presentation of hard and cold and so on. . . . My *inner picture* [italics mine] . . . of the tree . . . is known only to myself.^{4*}

Höfler is saying the same thing when he makes the distinction: "Physical phenomena are presented as spatial, and indeed in extended fashion, as located at a place; all mental phenomena are *unspatial*."^{5*} Stout says: "If I perceive a triangle, my perception is not triangular,—it is not made up of lines and angles."⁶ And the same view is implied by Titchener, when he says: "The psychologist seeks, first of all, to analyse *mental experience* [italics mine] into its simplest components."⁷

This assumption that references or meanings can be handled in the same way as the objects to which they refer, an assumption which so far as I can find, it is hardly thought necessary to defend, is an assumption which I believe to have very slight foundation.^{8*}

I wish to consider several typical instances of the theory, and point out the untenable postulates upon which it rests. I would then discuss certain ambiguities in the position of Mr. Bradley in this matter, and sketch a theory which appears to me more consistent with his metaphysical views. And first I should like to offer a tentative definition of Fact. A fact, I would submit, is a point of attention which has only one aspect, or which can be treated under one aspect. A fact, then, is an ideal construction, and has its existence within a more or less variable sphere of practical or scientific interest. It is not a judgment simply, but an objective asserted ("it is a fact that"); it contains an internal judging and an external recognising of the validity of the judgment. Thus when I say "Velásquez painted this portrait of Philip II," there is as yet no fact expressed;⁹ when I say "it is a fact that Velásquez etc.," or "it is true that—" or "I know that—," I am concerned with fact. There is a sphere of historical Reality which is taken for granted, a sphere existing in such a way that the judgment referred to must be either right or wrong, and this sphere we will call "matter of fact." And if this judgment is made upon the ground of internal evidence, there may be as well a sphere of aesthetic values taken for granted. Facts are not merely found in the world and laid together like bricks, but every fact has in a sense its place prepared for it before it arrives, and without the implication of a system in which it belongs the fact is not a fact at all. The ideality essential to fact means a particular point of view, and means the exclusion of other aspects of the same point of attention. There is a sense, then, in which any science—natural or social—is *a priori*: in that it satisfies the needs of a particular point of view, a point of view which may be said to be more original than any of the facts that are referred to that science. The development of a science would thus be rather organic than mechanical; there is a fitness of the various facts for each other, with that instinctive selection and exclusion which is a characteristic of human personality at its highest. Thus the character of a science, like the character of a man, may be said both to be already present at the moment of conception, and on the other hand, to develop at every moment into something new and unforeseen. But it will have, from its crudest beginnings, a character to which (though it may belie all our verbal definitions) it will always remain consistent.

Accordingly we may well look, without seeking to formulate narrowly, for the traits of psychology's maturity in the features of infancy. And I have been unable to discover, in the first place, that any scientific individuality is possible as "reference or meaning," or that you can conjure up one by the

magic word "presentation." The presentation, I shall argue, is identical with the object from the point of view of the experiencing subject, and from this point of view you have, in metaphysics, no appeal. If we come to find anything more real (as common sense tells us that we must), our criterion will not be an arbitrary division of experience and an arbitrary neglect of the individual, but a theory of degrees of reality. And it is only this arbitrary division which gives us the puzzles of immanent and transcendent object, of unreal and imaginary.

"Whatever constituents of our total experience at any moment," says Stout, "directly determine the nature of the object as it is perceived or thought of at that moment, belong to the cognitive side of our nature, and are called *presentations*" (*Manual* 57). I do not know in the first place exactly what limits Mr. Stout feels justified in setting to the "total experience at any moment"; for this definition would surely not exclude physiological process or logical category. Does he mean the "content of consciousness"? But a so-called content of consciousness is not, any more than the world of knowledge, a mere collection of entities in which being and being known is identical; so far as they refer to their objects they are not themselves known, and so far as they are made objects of knowledge they no longer refer to objects.^{10*} The sensation of red, as cognitive, is not a presentation, but awareness of a red object, an object which is not in any case mental. What do we mean when we turn our attention from a red object to a sensation red? We are, I think, simply diverting attention from a variously determined object to a uniquely determined one. The so-called real object is in Mr. Stout's words "circumscribed and directed by a plexus of visual and other presentations" (*Manual* 60). He should either say, I think, that the object *is* this plexus, or admit that even a single sensation circumscribes and directs an object. I cannot see why two or more sensations should give us the object when one does not. For Mr. Stout admits that the object may really be presented.

We may say, if we choose, that the object itself is *presented*, but we must not say that it is a presentation; and when we say that it is presented, it is better to say that it is presented *to* consciousness, than that it is presented *in* consciousness.¹¹

I fail to discern the difference; even if consciousness could have perceptions both outside and inside, I do not know how it would succeed in distinguishing one kind from the other. The difference is simply this: a "red

object" is an object which is otherwise known than by the quality red; it is an object which has been given a determined place in an order. The sensation is an object which has not yet thus been placed. It is incorrect, then, to say that we can have sensations of redness; redness is a concept; or to say that we have sensations of red. The sensation is of a red *something*, a red spot or area. And the discovery that the cause of the sensation is a pathological irritation does not affect the objectivity of the sensation in the least. The red "that" was there, and the fact that the object cannot be further defined and verified does not make it any the less object.

The distinction between object and presentation can be made, as we have seen, in another way: the perception of a triangle, says Stout, is not triangular; the idea of a stone, says Witasek, is not hard and grey. This statement I believe to be in a sense false, and in a sense mere juggling with words. You argue that because idea and object are different, the idea cannot have the physical qualities of the object, and the fact that the idea cannot have these qualities goes to show that there is an "idea" different from the object. The confusion of course is between reference and existence: the idea is conceived to have an existence apart from its object. This existence, as I have attempted to show in the preceding chapter, is simply the fact of its reference. This fact (which is an objective) cannot be said to be triangular or grey (though it may be hard)—but the fact thus isolated is not the idea; the fact of the reference of the idea must not lead us to speak of the idea as a fact; the idea is only matter of fact. And indeed we may say that the idea is an *abstraction from itself*—for the whole idea is (and yet cannot be) the reality, the idea, and the fact of reference of the idea.

When we say, then that the idea or the perception of a triangle is not triangular, we mean only the fatuity, that the fact of reference is not triangular. And as I have attempted to show in the preceding chapter, the idea (and the perception) is always in a sense identical with the reality which it intends. There can be for a perception, as we have seen, an indeterminate object; there can as well be a mistaken object, and in this way, when the same perception seems to be transferred from one object to another, we are tempted to say that the perception exists and is an object itself apart from any intended object. We have all had the experience of remarking a large bird in the distance, and discovering that it is a small insect a foot or two away. Here we say was a perception which has attached to two different objects. It is not so. There are two different perceptions, the second more consistent with a "world," but no more closely attached to an object

presented *to* consciousness than is the first. There cannot, that is, be a perception of an object if the object perceived is not really there. And when you attempt to consider this "presentation" apart from any prejudice as to the nature of reality, you are committed to a contradiction. You must treat the perception either as an illusion or as true. Apart from one or the other of these two points of view the perception simply does not exist. Any attempt to separate percept from object merely doubles the object. A perception cannot be an object for psychology in the sense in which Mr. Stout would have it, because it involves two irresolvable points of view.

I confess that I am confused rather than enlightened by Mr. Stout's rejoinder to Mr. Prichard. He says:

For Psychology, the *esse* of the facts with which it deals is *percipi* in the sense that it considers things only in so far as they are at any moment known, or in so far as they come to be known . . . to an individual mind, and so enter into further relations both to the knowing mind, and to each other.¹²

The fallacy of this statement, if I read it rightly, is as follows. The *esse* of no fact can be *percipi*. Now is psychology really considering "things only in so far as they are at any moment known . . . to an individual mind"? For so far as they are known to an individual mind, they *are* simply, and that's an end of it. And if as psychologists, we inquire into the nature of things as known to another individual mind, we are doing much more than we think: we are abstracting from them one kind of reality which they had for this mind, and substituting therefor another kind—namely, their reality as related to this mind. In Mr. Stout's well-known instance, the man enjoying a cigar, there are, following out his definition, three cigars present:

1. The cigar known to the smoker.
2. The (cigar known to the smoker) as known to the psychologist.
3. The cigar known to the psychologist, in the role of private citizen.¹³

Now if we content ourselves with being psychologists and not epistemologists, we have no warrant for identifying these three cigars. And Mr. Stout not only insists upon the different points of view (the experiences of individual minds) but holds the inconsistent belief that psychology can exhibit the construction of the external world—that it can first abstract wholly from reality, and then piece reality together out of the abstractions.

Again, Mr. Stout's beliefs in regard to the nature of sensations are far from clear. In the reply to Mr. Prichard he says:

What we [himself and Dr. Ward] refer to when we speak of sensation is something apprehended as distinct from the act of apprehension. . . . Sensations . . . are . . . objects or, as Ward would say, "presentations."¹⁴

This seems clear enough, though we may be disconcerted in referring back to the preceding page to find that a presentation, as the word is used by Dr. Ward, is "whatever is known *qua* known, whether directly or indirectly" [240]. There is an ambiguity about the phrase "known *qua* known." It may mean: 1. from the point of view of the knower; 2. from the point of view of an observer regarding the knower in the act of knowing. Now on turning to Stout's article "Are Presentations Mental or Physical? A Reply to Professor Alexander" (a year later than the reply to Prichard),¹⁵ we find stated on page 245: "Sensations . . . cannot be merely objects if they are capable of entering into the constitution of properly subjective states." And on page 246: "Can Retentiveness be explained if Presentations are Physical?" And referring to the *Manual*, we find that "It is better to restrict the term *sensation* to the special form of consciousness which accompanies the actual operation of the stimulus" (119). I do not know what a "special form of consciousness" is; the phrase is at best hardly luminous. And when I find the author in one and the same article ["Are Presentations Mental or Physical"] stating that a sensation is an object (241), and later suggesting (242) that an (external) object may be made up of sensations, as a plant is of root, stem, leaves, etc., I conclude that I know neither what is sensation nor what is object.

The confusion results, I think, not so much from there not being several realities to correspond to the several terms, as from the use of terms in a plural marriage to mean several things indifferently: and to the fact that there are not distinct classes of *objects* to correspond to the several (real) distinctions. The former difficulty is peculiar to Mr. Stout; the latter is a general difficulty of the subject-matter, and is apparent in a psychologist of a very different school, Professor Alexander. Mr. Alexander is equally certain that a field of the psychical may be sharply distinguished from the non-psychical, though he draws the line elsewhere. In several remarkable articles, and notably that "On Sensations and Images," he has maintained a conational psychology: "mind consist[s] of conations, affection being treated as a modality of conation."¹⁶ And in the article just cited: "The

sentence is mental, but it is held not to vary in quality. The *sensum*, which I shall commonly call sensation, is non-mental.”¹⁷ “Similarly, “the imaging is mental, the image physical.”¹⁸ In the attention to a green object, the object of our attention “may be merely the sensation green” (1).

In contrast to the theory of Mr. Stout, such a view has manifest conveniences. It enables us, in the first place, to do away with the equivocal “presentation” which we have found such a source of embarrassment. Where Stout vacillates between feeling and object, the two are here sharply discriminated. The difficulties of unreal objects, of presentations which present nothing, are apparently avoided. Yet I think that the ultimate objections are much the same after all. In the first place, consider the status of sensation. Mr. Alexander appears to assume, like almost everybody else, that we may have a consciousness which is in the strictest sense the consciousness of a sensation, and of nothing else. I have argued (*supra* 285) that a “sensation of colour” is a loose expression for a perception of a coloured something, and when we think of a colour, it is of a thing not otherwise conditioned than by that colour that we think. Similarly, in the case of a cutaneous pain-sensation, it is of an object conditioned only by that pain-sensation that we think. The sensation, I maintain, is always a way of being conscious of an object, and as we become conscious of this consciousness, it may result in an added determination either of the object or of the self. Hence, on my view, a consciousness of red is on the one hand a red consciousness and on the other hand the consciousness of a red object.

Otherwise, I think, Mr. Alexander will find the same difficulty in constructing an object out of sensations as does Mr. Stout. A sensation is certainly an object in the sense that it is the object to which it refers; but when we are aware of an object, the sensations through which we come into contact with it do not persist alongside it as independent objects, as on the ultra-objective theory I should expect them to. We seem to find a fallacy which can be attacked thus: *The object of attention and the qualities or conditions of this object cannot be equally objective from the point of view for which they exist as such.*

In a sensation, that is, there are two verbal moments, the -ing and the -ed, which can be discriminated when together but cannot be treated apart. The evidence that they can be discriminated for certain practical purposes is simply this, that when we speak of a sensation, in our quotidian vocabulary we can with perfect propriety have *emphasis* on either the active or the objective aspect, never meaning wholly one or the other in isolation.

Sensation-in-itself is in the language of Bradley “feeling” or experience as more original than consciousness; but sensation in itself is not as such capable of being an object of attention (Chapter I). Sensation and perception, on the theory I have just outlined, are different in concept but in existence different only in degree. Sensation as known always involves some degree of crude perception:¹⁹ the moment we speak of “having a sensation,” we have stepped into the theory of knowledge, have posited a self and consequently an external world; it is still sensation, however, in that it is rather a feeling of a peculiar relation than a characterisation of either subject or object.

The situation of the separate sensations, then, with regard to the developed object, is this: the sensations cannot be objects on the same plane as the developed object, since it is to this object, and not as before, to themselves (as by the vagueness of their reference they may loosely be said to do) that they refer. They are the ways of being conscious—the *content*—of this object, and in a sense the total experience may be said to be, on a higher plane, a fuller sensation of a remoter object (and so on). In other words, there is a constant transcendence of object into reference, and the absolutely objective is nowhere found. This, I think, furnishes a pertinent criticism of Mr. Alexander. In a world so objective as that of Mr. Alexander, one cannot have a genuine object presented to one.

Fully realise that perceiving a thing means that mind and the thing are together in the same sense as the table and the floor are together, and you understand that the imagination of the table means that the mind and the table are together; but the table in its imagined form, with imperfections and added elements.²⁰

I do not see how they can be together unless it is admitted that the object is only the compound of sensations—a position which may lead to Berkeley,²¹ and certainly leads to nominalism:

a thing as perceived contains besides sensory elements other elements present to the mind only in ideal form. . . . But the ideal elements are themselves objective and non-mental. They exhibit their true relation to the sensory elements in the course of the perceptual process itself.²²

I do not think that we ought to say that a thing is made up of sensory elements and ideas, as a pastry is made up of the right ingredients and good cooking. I do not think that it is true that we can or do attend to both sorts

of elements at the same time in the same way. It is true, if you like, that the ideal elements are non-mental, but their relation with the real elements is one of mutual reference and implication; and in a world composed solely of objects, I can find no room for implication. The picture which certain masses of colour "imply" is just as "objective" as the colour-sensations, but not objective in the same way; the cognition of the picture means a transition to a different plane of reality. The colour-masses have thus transcended themselves, and ceased to be simply objects.

This introduces us to Mr. Alexander's theory of the subject-matter of psychology. Over against sensation the properly mental element is conation. "The subject, as given in enjoyment and therefore in the only form in which it enters into psychology, is nothing but the continuous tissue of its acts of conation or attention" ("Foundations" 243). Psychology "will describe how differently it *feels* or *is enjoyed* when we sense or perceive or will or the like" (248). Now my difficulty, as I have already said, is in understanding what is left²³ when you abstract from a mental state its reference; or what comes to the same thing, what reference is left when you have only the reference.

In watching a ball which one is trying to catch, the perceptive conation whose object is the approaching ball is that complex of visual and anticipatory tactual conations which issue in movements of the eyes and more particularly of the hands. (248)

I cannot find anything here, once the non-mental or objective elements are abstracted, upon which I can lay my finger. I can see material for psychophysics, but Mr. Alexander insists that psycho-physics is a different field (248-52). I can only understand conation, so far as we may be said to be conscious of it at the moment, and Mr. Alexander's conation goes far beyond this point, inasmuch as it is everywhere present—the subject in psychology is a "continuous tissue" of its acts of conation.

There is no reason for regarding conation as ultimate even from a psychological point of view, unless we are ready to accept a psychology of faculty. And I can see no reason for making will more original than thought. "[T]he act of judgment is maintained to be literally an act of will" ("Foundations" 263). The proposition which is the *cognitum* of the judgment is the object willed. It is as possible to state will in intellectual terms, and to say (what I do not believe to be any truer) that will is the self-realisation of an idea. The conation, I am ready to admit, exists, but only in a certain

context: only with on one side a self to which the conation is attached (but which is never identified with that conation) and on the other side with a real world (real from the point of view of this self, which is all the reality required) which the conation intends. For in willing (and in desiring [Messer]²⁴ which is another form of conation), some reality is already posited; and in desire the object desired is recognised as somehow real (Bradley). Thus it cannot be wholly true that “it is in willing that objects . . . become known *as* real” (“Foundations” 265). And in this relation the conation ceases to be merely a conation.

I cannot help thinking that Mr. Alexander’s collation tends to find its full reality in physiological process, much as its author may himself deprecate this conclusion.”There is,” he says, “good reason for believing that these differences [in conation] are really of a spatial character, really are differences *of the locality and direction of the physiological processes* [italics mine], and that the locality and direction are actually enjoyed” (“Foundations” 252).²⁵ If what we “enjoy” is the physiological process, then either this process is the object of the enjoyment—which is impossible, as the enjoyment refers to an entity of which we are conscious; or the process *is* the enjoyment—in which case nothing remains surely but to study the process itself. And the tendency toward physiology becomes still more natural if we mean to treat affections “as a modality of conation.”²⁶ The necessity for so considering them appears only when we have made conation so substantial as to isolate it from the intended reality, and the consequence is to make the tertiary qualities aesthetic, and entirely subjective. Now I am prepared to argue that affections are just as objective *if* objectivity is to be absolute and not in any sense a matter of degree—as are sensations. Why should anger be any less objective than pain-sensation? Can we not contemplate our affections as well as our sensations? And if it be said that affections are essentially *wahrnehmungsfuchtig* (perceptually elusive), in contrast to sensation, I reply that it appears to me everywhere a matter of degree. And finally I seem to discover that Mr. Alexander, like Mr. Stout, instead of recognising everywhere differences of degree, has erected sharp bounds and everywhere transgressed them. One of the bounds is this: “we contemplate objects, we enjoy our states.”²⁷ We are then told that “the fundamental fact of experience informs us that mind is but one thing together with external things” (4) and on the next page that panpsychism overlooks “the fundamental difference of mind and things

which is expressed by saying that the one is enjoyed and the others contemplated" (5).

An equally interesting and more satisfactory demarcation of the field of psychology is that of Lipps ("Inhalt und Gegenstand").²⁸ In this essay, in which I find very little to question, Lipps makes the claim that things, and not merely sensations, are given to us.

A person who sees things . . . is not seeing sensations, or presentations, or perceptions, or experiences" (512); "sensation . . . is a determination of myself. . . . At the same time the sensing is . . . also, in a manner, a determination of (for example) the blue or red. (513)

There is a relative distinction into "1. Myself; 2. My sensing; 3. That which is sensed, or the content of sensation." What we are conscious of is *object* ("To think something, or think of something, is to have something as an object");^{29*} an object which is conditioned by our knowledge of it, because it is *our* object; but which is real, and not mere *Erscheinung* (appearance)—which is, *qua* our object, independent of us. The sensation is at once a *Bestimmung* (determination) of the object and of the *Ich* (the self), a relation between the two which conditions whichever you direct your attention toward.

The *Ich* and its objects then form metaphysically one whole, a whole from which we can abstract in either direction. Qualities in relation to external points of attention give us the realities of practice and natural science; in relation to (*in Beziehung auf*) the *Ich* they give the subject-matter of psychology. Mental states, Lipps insists, have no independent existence: there are simply relations which in our reference constitute the external or objective and in another reference constitute the psychical. *Eigenschaften* (characteristics) in themselves are not objects, not capable of being made a point of attention; they can only be experienced with respect to a point of attention. While normative science—logic, ethics, aesthetics—is "lyrisch," psychology is "episch"—gives not *Ausdruck* (expression), but *Bericht* (report). Normative science is the expression of the *ueberindividuelles Ich*, which is in a sense the realisation of the limited *Ich*:

(The "supra-individual self") is in us, but we are not identical with it. Indeed, so far as we are not, we *ought* to be so. This *ought* is the call, which is an expression both of the *presence* of this self in us, and of our own *limitations*.^{30*}

As for empirical psychology,

it does not, indeed, replace the processes in consciousness, which experience declares to 'belong' to the soul, by other conscious processes. But to the occurrence of such processes it adds a variety of determinations, which are of another nature, and so cannot figure in immediate experience: such as stimuli, associations, memory-traces, capacities, character-traits and dispositions. It thereby creates, upon causal principles, a world of the mentally or psychically real, which absolutely transcends, and is thus wholly beyond comparison with, what is given in the immediate experience of the self.^{31*}

This theory has a certain resemblance to that of Ward for whom the subject-matter of psychology does not consist in any particular group of entities, but in the "whole choir of heaven and earth" from a certain point of view.³² But there are aspects of Lipps' theory which leads us toward the conclusion that this point of view does not exist. Can *Empfinden* (sensing) be turned inside out and applied to the *Ich* in the same way as to the thing? I am inclined to think that there is a confusion here. I cannot see why, on the ground of the threefold division *Ich* – *Empfinden* – *Empfundene* (self – sensing – sensed) and the characterisation, which seems to me admirable, of *Empfinden* as a *Bestimmung* (determination) of both *Ich* and object, any further determination of the status of sensation should be necessary. This one situation is that which it always occupies. I am not, in experience of a colour, treating the sensation as a qualification of the blue or red any more than of myself. However I express myself, I mean only that the sensation is there as a relation between myself and the object, a relation which is internal and goes to make up both self and object. And if you propose to detach this sensation any further from the object and make it a determination solely of the self, then you put it in an entirely false situation. Lipps has already said that the object is really given to us, and the *Ich* really given to us, and that the sensations are not separate objects which stand between us and the object. Now the aim of natural science, I suppose, is simply to dispose of the various appearances which are found to be determinations of the *Ich* and of the real object so far as they are found to have the relation to the subject which they were supposed to have only to the thing—or rather, so far as they are found to have relations and to be distinguishable in thought from the thing. The goal of science, consequently, would be a system of terms in relation, of terms the nature of each of which would be

constituted by its place in the system; which would be completely definable by their position, and which would have no characteristics which could be isolated from the system. Every empirical discipline, of course, uses terms the explanation of which would fall outside of that system in which they are explanatory; terms which we require a fresh point of view to analyse.

The attitude of science, then, involves the constitution of a larger and larger limbo of appearance—a larger field of reality which is referred to the subjective side of experience. Economics is appearance for the biologist, biology for the chemist. Similarly, social psychology is appearance to the individual psychologist. It is when we ask what the simple terms of individual psychology are that I am at a loss.

For the relation of appearances (the appearances which condition both self and object) to an ultimate external reality is not the province of any one science to decide, inasmuch as fields of discourse are objective or subjective in different contexts, and as things are non-mental in various ways, so they can be mental in various ways, and if the subject-matter of psychology is to be appearance in relation to the self, we have not one science, but a whole universe of sciences, corresponding to the self as found expressed in the structure of social civilisation, in its works of science, in the laws of thought, in image or in sensation.

I think, then, that Lipps has been deceived into conclusions which are inconsistent with his own admirable division of mental and physical, by the tacit assumption that in the sciences other than psychology, we abstract from the psychical aspect. The psychical aspect, he has shown himself, is always present: wherever there is the *Ich*, there is a continuity between the *Ich* and its object; not only in the case of perception, but in every case of knowledge. In science we have only abstracted from *one or several spheres of mental reality*—and from physical reality at the same time. We have then done in every science what Lipps asks us to do specially in the case of psychology—considered a field of reality as a condition and expression of the self.

What, if this be true, has Lipps in mind as the field of psychology? Simply, I think, the old chimera, “states of consciousness,” meanings torn from their reference. You have first a mind essentially related to a world. In order to study the mind, you abstract it from the world—but abstract the world with it, and double the world to get a *real* world. You then assert that the first world simply exists as presentation, and that reference is to *your*

world, and not to the subject's. And all this comes from the fallacy of treating a difference of aspects as a difference of things.

We meet, however, with definitions which make no distinction between mental and non-mental. Thus Miss Wodehouse's content is as objective as object (*Presentation* 13); psychology does not expand the contents of the object but limits them "because it is interested in their shape" (20). This is an important, and radically different, definition, of the subject-matter of psychology; the external world and the mental world are of exactly the same stuff, and are *ultimately identical, but as experienced are both fragments*. The world examined by the psychologist is the world which is the content of consciousness in relation to the various elements in the constitution of the subject which condition it; and these elements, I should suppose, may be either that part of the external world which has previously been content of that consciousness, or the physiological and psycho-physical conditions. On the one hand the content is continuous with the whole external universe (*Presentation* 21), and on the other hand with the history of that subject. In the latter relation, it is the subject-matter of psychology: psychology, accordingly, deals rather with the personal than with the "psychical."

This division would seem to give us two clear groups of objects. But I am not convinced that the connections of content may not be reduced to connections of the real world on the one hand and to physiological connections on the other. Memory content must be considered as connected according to the reality remembered and *in the same way as the reality remembered*: that is, the laws which hold of the reality hold of the memory connections in their reference; the laws of the physical world hold of ideas of that world so far as those ideas are real ideas. And so far as those ideas are not real, as from being a specification they are merely a tendency, and from a tendency merely an undifferentiated feeling, the idea is dissolved into physiological conditions. So far as the idea is real, we have seen above, it is not idea; and so far as it is not real, it is not idea. This is equally true of ideas of imagination or of ideas of memory. It is not true that the ideas of a great poet are in any sense arbitrary: certainly in the sense in which imagination is capricious, the ideas of a lunatic or an imbecile are more "imaginative" than those of a poet. In really great imaginative work, the connections are felt to be bound by as logical necessity as any connections to be found anywhere; the apparent irrelevance is due to the fact that terms are used with more or other than their normal meaning, and to those who do not

thoroughly penetrate their significance, the relation between the aesthetic expansion and the objects expressed is not visible.

But it is no wise true that the connections of content are subjective and peculiarly subject-matter for psychology. They are personal, if you like, but a work of imagination is never simply personal. So far as we consider it as *only* personal—i.e. significant only to the author—we explain it not as imagination but as the product of pathological conditions. Thus we are tempted to explain a poem of Mallarmé as we explain dreams, as due to morbid physiological activity. And if it is said that this radical separation would do away with all criticism, we may point out that criticism—involving the circumstances under which a work was produced—is other than psychology in that it includes at every point a reference to a real world with which the other is compared: a procedure which in psychology is inadmissible.

It is sufficient for the purpose of this chapter to have argued that a “psychological event” can not be torn from its context and be set in a context of other purely psychological events: the problem of the relation of an idea to the real world from the point of view of epistemology must be taken up later. The theory of the idea which I have proposed, and which I believe to be substantially in harmony with Mr. Bradley’s metaphysics, implies to this point only that the idea, as you try to grasp it as an object, either identifies itself with the reality or melts back in the other direction into a different reality, the reality of its physiological basis. Ideas in relation with the nervous system, on the one hand, and with the intended reality, on the other, may have a certain existence in epistemology, but have no pretension to a purely “psychological” existence. And here I find myself in conflict with much that Mr. Bradley has had to say on the subject of psychology, especially in his articles on “Active Attention,” on the “Definition of Will,” and on a “Defence of Phenomenalism in Psychology.”³³ The first two articles are explanatory—they substitute for data of immediacy universal connections; we may therefore inquire what these data are. The last article defends a view very similar to those which I have been attacking.

“Psychology,” says Bradley,

is to be concerned with psychical events, and such an event is whatever is immediately experienced, either as a whole or as an integral aspect of a whole, and is not for the purpose in hand taken otherwise than as an adjective happening to and qualifying a particular soul. These facts are events because they happen in time, each with a place in the order of the

“real world” in general . . . [T]he meaning of one soul or subject . . . must be fixed arbitrarily.

. . . You can only explain events . . . by the laws of their happening, and it does not matter for your purpose, so long as these laws work, whether they possess ultimate truth or are more or less fictitious and false.³⁴

The difficulty which I find with such a definition lies in the definition of event. Psychological event, it is said, is immediately experienced (distinct from experience). And the question I raise is whether in our conscious life anything is immediately experienced except experience itself. And in the second place the event taken as happening to that particular soul is not the same event from the point of view of that soul, for from the latter point of view the event does not “qualify” the soul, but qualifies external reality. And if from another point of view, then what is the event? Till you have “the laws of their happening,” how can you be said to have the event? An event, I should suppose, is a *what*—a *that* somehow interpreted, for you must single out some one aspect, you must occupy some point of view not internal to the event, before there is anything of which there can be a law.

Mr. Bradley’s position involves a parallelism between knowledge as the reality which it intends and knowledge as event in the soul.

To say that ideas and judgments do not happen at a certain time, and that in this sense they fail to be occurrences, seems clearly contrary to fact. . . . [T]he idea or the judgment . . . is assuredly a psychological event. . . . A truth, we may say, is no truth at all unless it happens in a soul and is thus an event which appears in time.³⁵

This seems to me to involve a confusion of the psychological point of view with the metaphysical. From the latter standpoint, this statement is correct; from the former, it seems palpably false. A truth as truth must of course *appear* independent of the soul as experienced in the perception of that truth, and its oneness with the soul (as truth) is a matter of metaphysical unity and not relative to its happening “in” a soul. A truth as such is quite independent of finite soul, and we may say that it is the finitude of truth which constitutes the finite soul. So far, then, as it is an event, it is not a truth or a judgment at all. And so far as we are conscious of it as an event it is not in the same sense the “truth” that we are conscious of. In knowledge, then, the event of knowledge is not something that enters into consciousness.

It is certainly not from the point of view of the subject that the idea or judgment is an event, and from the subject's viewpoint the only laws of happening are the laws of the world of which he is conscious, while from the outsider's point of view, the only laws are laws which lie beyond the consciousness of the subject. But, it will be said, the subject is conscious of previous ideas and judgments as events in his own career: if he were conscious of them merely as realities apprehended, he would not be aware of his past at all, for it would not be *his* past, but the past of the world. We are constantly passing, that is to say, from the judgment as reality to the judgment as a qualification of oneself—a view which my own account of memory is obliged to support. I again offer, however, the theory of identity there presented, and emphasise the fact that memory is an elaborate and artificial product, which can be treated from the point of view of psychophysics as subject to law—though only so far as it is not memory—which serves a practical need, and does not pretend to give anything which was ever as such actual. As in memory of an external reality we may have an image which refers to a reality, so in recollection of our own judgment we assert an objective (*that* we judged so and so), an assertion which refers to the judgment as an event but which constitutes it as an event in the act of assertion. For a reference, as I have suggested in several passages, does not everywhere imply the existence of that to which it refers, outside of the reference itself.

Let us say, then, that in memory and in the observation of the actions of others, we have reference to events which are never as such actual. Have we not here a consistent enough point of view to determine a subject-matter? I would offer two objections. In the first place, these events as psychic phenomena have no laws. For internally, their relations among themselves are determined only by the real world from the point of view of the subject, and externally by the real world from somebody else's point of view;³⁶ while their mid-way reality is at once greater and less than such as science can grasp. And in the second place the soul is not something definite to which phenomena can be attached all on the same plane, but varies with the meaning which each phenomenon has for it. In order to know what a particular event is, you must know the soul to which it occurs, and the soul exists only in the events which occur to it; so that the soul is, in fact, the whole world of its experience at any moment, while both soul and event transcend that moment. The soul is its whole past so far as that past enters into the present, and it is the past as implied in the present. "But at any one

time . . . the soul is the present *datum* of psychical fact, plus its actual past and its conditional future" (*A&R* 311).³⁷ But I cannot feel satisfied with the statement that "The soul . . . *is* the dispositions which it has acquired."³⁸ "In saying that the soul has a disposition of a certain kind, we take the present and past psychical facts as the subject, and we predicate of this subject other psychical facts, which we think it may become" (*A&R* 312). Now I question whether it is ever a "psychical" fact which we take as the subject in a disposition. Men are avaricious, generous, vicious, or self-sacrificing, and these qualities I suppose are dispositions. But avarice and generosity are not psychical events but social interpretations of behaviour, behaviour involving the whole organism. What is in the mind of the avaricious or generous man is not avarice or generosity, but a real world qualified in a certain way, and these qualifications are interpreted or introspected as subjective, conditioned by a disposition. But to be "subjective" is not to be mental, and to be a disposition is ultimately to be a disposition of the whole organism—so that I can see no difference between psychical and physical disposition. For disposition must rest upon something which is actual and this must be a physical structure.

What then as to the doctrine of Mr. Bradley, that an emotion can be attended to?³⁹ I believe this doctrine to be correct. For on the theory which I have outlined above, pleasure as pure feeling is an abstraction, and in reality is always partially objective: the emotion is really part of the object, and is ultimately just as objective. Hence when the object, or complex of objects, is recalled, the pleasure is recalled in the same way, and is naturally recalled on the object side rather than on the subject side: though it tends to instate itself as an active pleasure.^{40*}

As to the theory of attention and the theory of will,^{41*} I think that they illustrate in detail the objections that I have raised in general. Will, we are told, is the self-realisation of an idea; and this explanation I protest against as metaphysics and not psychology. I cannot feel, with regard to an explanation of a faculty which explains it by reference to something which falls outside of consciousness, that such is a psychological explanation. Mr. Bradley is concerned with will only in operation: "With will taken in its full sense I agree that psychology cannot concern itself" (i.e., will as "standing tendency").⁴² And with will as I am aware of will, I cannot concede that this definition has anything to do. "[B]ecause I am aware of the idea as itself making the change . . . I am aware also that this change is the work of myself."⁴³ But the idea has to be my idea. "Provided . . . that the idea has

remained qualified in my mind as the act of another, it cannot in its proper character and as such realise itself in my person."⁴⁴ The fact that the idea has to be my idea seems to give away the whole case; for so far as it is *my* idea it is already willed.

So far as will is not felt, I cannot see any reason for using the concept at all; and so far as it is felt, it requires no explanation and can find none. Mr. Bradley's account might be a true account of what goes on when we think that there is will; but in order to be a true account it would have to justify its point of view. Ideas, as I have claimed, are not objects, but occupy a half-way stage between existence and meaning. From a purely external point of view there is no will; and to find will in any phenomenon requires a certain empathy; we observe a man's actions and place ourselves partly but not wholly in his position; or we act, and place ourselves partly in the position of an outsider. And this doubleness of aspect is in fact the justification for the use of the term. Another person, and in its degree another *thing*, is not for us simply an object; there is always, I believe, a felt continuity between the object and oneself. The only error lies in regarding this community as due to the common possession of a character which belongs to both subject and object as such, and belongs to each independently. This character is then treated as a thing. But will is not a character of consciousness purely, and it is not at all a character of things as such; it arises only in a conflict, and is in the primitive mind cognised as a character of object as naturally as of subject; so that it is only by a certain degree of abstraction that we come to think of ourselves as willing and of objects as moved by "forces"—an expression which simply indicates the degree of objectification which we have succeeded in establishing. For these reasons I am inclined to regard will as indefinable and as offering no problem. If we are to have a psychology we must postulate a faculty of will, though we hold will to be finally mere appearance. And such psychology, I think, will be not a scientific but a philosophical discipline. For science deals with objects or with the relations of objects; and will, we have said, belongs to a place half-way between object and subject.

Attention likewise belongs in the class of half-objects. "Popular psychology," says Titchener, "regards attention, indifferently, as faculty and as manifestation of faculty."⁴⁵ Here, I suggest, popular psychology is right, for popular psychology (in this sense) is the only psychology that there is. And I believe that Bradley's theory of attention, like Titchener's, is merely an attempt to reduce attention to something else without knowing what that

something is. What can we have, in an account of attention, but a description of physiological conditions and a description of the realities apprehended? And there is only attention, I submit, when the conditions and the reality apprehended are confused. That this interfusion is everywhere found does not alter the case. For it is only as felt that the two are confused, and when we turn this feeling into an object the two elements fall apart: "We cannot attend to several disconnected objects at once; we organise them into a single object."⁴⁶ This I believe to be true, but what does it mean? That the world, so far as it is a world at all, tends to organise itself into an articulate whole. The real is the organised. And this statement is metaphysics, so if it comes to us as a novelty it is not psychology. From a psychological point of view, things perceived are connected so far as they are perceived to be connected. If we contemplate several objects, and recognise them as disconnected, they *are* disconnected except for metaphysics, and that is the complete statement of the case. "But is there then," says Mr. Joseph,

no such thing as psychology? . . . [I]f I were asked what it really is, I should say, not a science, but a collection of more or less detached inquiries, of the results of which philosophy must take account. There are for example inquiries into "double personality" and kindred puzzles, which must affect any theory of the real nature of the individual soul or self; there are experiments about association-time, reaction-time, etc., which help to explain why one man's mind works quicker than another's, but no more throw light on the nature of thinking than the determination of the duration of the crotchet explains the beauty of music; there are more definitely psycho-physical investigations, e.g. into brain-localisation which may have therapeutic value; and of course any facts about the relation of what is mental to what is cerebral are important to a theory of the soul, as of a knower belonging somehow to the same whole with the known.⁴⁷

I can subscribe to most of this statement. There is certainly an important field for psycho-physics and the study of behaviour, and there are even certain processes where introspection is not without value. But this knowledge, I insist, is knowledge either of physiology, biology, or of the external world, and implies both a real known external world and a real nervous system: for we are not to say that there is a mental content which is mental. There is, in this sense, nothing mental, and there is certainly no such thing as consciousness if consciousness is to be an object or something independent

of the objects which it has. There are simply "points of view," objects, and half-objects. Science deals only with objects; psychology, in the sense of rational or faculty psychology, may deal with half-objects, and metaphysics alone with the subject, or point of view.

NOTES

1*. TSE's note: "Mr. Bradley does not commit himself to the assertion that non-relational experience is impossible, but it is implicit in his position. This, of course, is not in conflict with the other assertion that all experience is in the end non-relational."

2*. TSE's note: "I refer to the articles in *Mind* by Bradley, Prichard, Joseph, Stout, and Joachim; to the articles in the *Proc. Arist. Soc.* and in the *British Journal of Psychology* by Alexander; and articles in the *Proc. Arist. Soc.* by Stout, [George Dawes] Hicks, and [Benjamin] Dumville. I shall also refer to writings of Meinong, [August] Messer, and Lipps (especially the latter's *Inhalt und Gegenstand*)."

3. TSE refers to the second chapter, "Content and Object," in *Presentation*: "The content is all of the object that at present appears: it is the present expression of the object's character" (14).

4*. TSE's note: "Ein steinerner Würfel ist hart und kalt, grau und schwer und eckig; die Vorstellung von ihm, der Gedanke, die Erinnerung an ihn, hat nichts von diesen Eigenschaften, und kann nichts davon haben—sie enthält nur selber wiederum die Vorstellung von hart und kalt und anderem. . . . [M]ein *inneres* Bild [*italics mine*] vom Baume . . . das kenne ich allein." Stephan Witasek (1870-1915), *Grundlinien der Psychologie* (Leipzig: Meiner, 1908), 3. Translation by Heath.

5*. TSE's note: "Physische Erscheinungen werden als räumlich und zwar 1. als ausgedehnt, 2. als an einem Orte befindlich vorgestellt; alle psychischen Erscheinungen sind *unräumlich*." Alois Höfler (1853-1922), *Psychologie* (Vienna and Prague: Verlag von F. Tempsky, 1897), 4. Translation by Heath.

6. *A Manual of Psychology* (London: University Correspondence College Press, 1899), 58; hereafter abbreviated *Manual* and cited in the text.

7. Edward Bradford Titchener (1867-1927), *A Text-book of Psychology*, Part I (New York: Macmillan, 1909), 37.

8*. TSE's note: "As I am in this discussion particularly indebted to Mr. Prichard I will ask permission to quote at some length from *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, 125-26: '[T]he tendency to think that the only object or, at least, the only direct object of the mind is something mental still requires explanation. It seems due to a tendency to treat self-consciousness as similar to consciousness of the world. When in reflection we turn our attention away from the world to the activity by which we come to know it, we tend to think of our knowledge of the world as a reality to be apprehended similar to the world which we apprehended prior to reflection. We thereby implicitly treat this knowledge as something which, like the world, merely *is* and is not the knowledge of any thing; in other words, we imply that, so far from being knowledge, i.e. the knowing of a reality, it is precisely that which we distinguish from knowledge, viz., a reality to be known, although—since knowledge must be mental—we imply that it is a reality of the special kind called mental. But if the knowledge upon which we reflect is thus treated as consisting in a mental reality which merely *is*, it is implied that in this knowledge the world is not, at any rate

directly, object of the mind, for *ex hypothesi* a reality which merely *is* and is not the knowledge of anything has no object. . . . The root of the mistake lies in the initial supposition—which, it may be noted, *seems to underlie the whole treatment of knowledge by empirical psychology* [italics mine] that knowledge can be treated as a reality to be apprehended, in the way in which any reality which is not knowledge is a reality to be apprehended.”

9. Diego Velázquez (Velázquez) (1599-1660) painted numerous portraits of Philip IV (1605-65) (not Philip II, 1527-98) after he was made painter to the king in 1623.

10*. TSE's note: "As has been ably pointed out by Mr. Prichard and I believe by Professor [John] Cook Wilson." Wilson (1849-1915), professor of logic at New College, Oxford, was the founder of "Oxford Realism."

11. *Analytic Psychology*, I (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1896), 47.

12. Stout, "Mr. Prichard's Criticism of Psychology," *Mind*, 16 (1907), 239.

13. Stout's sustained description of the sensations of a man preparing to smoke a cigar appears in the opening pages of *Manual* (1-3).

14. "Mr. Prichard's Criticism of Psychology," 241. The English psychologist James Ward (1843-1925), a frequent contributor to *Mind*, wrote the influential article "Psychology" in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 9th ed., vol 20 (New York: Henry G. Allen, 1889).

15. *PAS*, N.S. 9 (1908-09), 226-47.

16. Alexander, "Mental Activity in Willing and in Ideas," *PAS*, N.S. 9 (1908-09), 6.

17. "On Sensations and Images," *PAS*, N.S. 10 (1909-10), 7.

18. "On Sensations and Images," 13. TSE's quotation is a contraction of the following sentences: "The imaging of an external or physical thing is of course mental. What is here maintained is that the image itself is non-mental, or external, or I am prepared to say physical."

19. As corrected by TSE in proof from "as known is always some."

20. "On Sensations and Images," 15.

21. Berkeley, author of *A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* (1710), maintained that material things, such as stones and tables, are collections of ideas or sensations.

22. Alexander, "Foundations and a Sketch-plan of a Conational Psychology," *The British Journal of Psychology*, 9 (1911), 239-67; here 253; hereafter abbreviated as "Foundations."

23. Here TSE cancels a parenthetical insertion: "(the White Queen would say 'the dog's temper!')," alluding to chapter 9 of Lewis Carroll's *Through the Looking-Glass* (1871), but misremembering that it was the Red Queen who says "the dog's temper would remain."

24. August Messer (1867-1937), *Psychologie* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1914). See chapter 20, "Streben und Wollen" ["Desiring and Willing"], 310-25, where Messer argues that desiring is more or less instinctual, whereas willing endorses particular acts of desiring, depending on one's judgment.

25. TSE's brackets.

26. Alexander, "Mental Activity in Willing and in Ideas," *PAS*, 9 (1909), 6.

27. Alexander, "The Method of Metaphysics; and the Categories," *Mind*, 21 (1912), 1-20; TSE's "quotation" is a paraphrase of Alexander's statement: "I propose to say that the mind is enjoyed and its objects contemplated" (3).

28. Lipps, "Inhalt und Gegenstand; Psychologie und Logik," *Sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-philologischen und der historischen Klasse der K. B. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu München* (1905), 511-669.

29*. TSE's note quotes Lipps: "Wer Dinge sieht . . . sieht nicht Empfindungen oder Vorstellungen oder Perzeptionen oder experiences' (512); 'die Empfindung . . . eine Bestimmung meiner ist . . . Zugleich ist das Empfinden . . . in gewissem Sinne auch eine Bestimmung des Blau oder Rot' (513); '1. Ich; 2. mein Empfinden; 3. das Empfundene oder der Empfindungsinhalt' (514); 'Etwas denken, an etwas denken, dies heisst etwas zum Gegenstande haben' (520)." Numbers and parenthesis inserted by TSE; alteration of Lipps by TSE: "nämlich ich, mein Empfinden, und das Empfundene oder der Empfindungsinhalt" (514). Translation by Heath.

30*. TSE's note: "(The 'ueberindividuelles ich') 'ist in uns, aber wir sind es doch nicht. Eben, soweit wir es nicht sind, sollen wir es sein. Dies Sollen ist die Forderung; und diese ist der Ausdruck zugleich für das Dasein jenes Ich in uns, und für unsere Schranke'" (Lipps, "Inhalt und Gegenstand," 663). Translation by Heath.

31*. TSE's note: "As for empirical psychology: 'Sie ersetzt freilich nicht die Bewusstseins-erlebnisse, die nach Aussage jener Erfahrung an der Seele 'haften,' durch andere Bewusstseins-erlebnisse. Aber sie fügt zu dem Haben von Bewusstseins-erlebnissen allerlei Bestimmungen, die nichts dergleichen sind, und darum in der unmittelbaren Erfahrung nicht vorkommen können. So die Reize, die Assoziationen, die Gedächtnisspuren, die Anlagen, Charaktereigenschaften, Dispositionen. Sie baut so dem Kausalgesetze gemäss eine Welt des seelischen oder des psychischen Realen auf, die dem in der unmittelbaren Erfahrung Gegebenen absolut transzendent, ja damit völlig unvergleichlich ist'" (Lipps, 654). Translation by Heath.

32. TSE misquotes the phrase from Ward as given in Stout: "the whole choir of heaven and furniture of earth" (*Manual* 12); from Ward's "Psychology," *Encyclopedia Britannica* (9th ed.), vol. 20, 38.

33. "On Active Attention," *Mind*, 9 (1902), 1-30; rpt. *Collected Essays* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1935), 2.408-43; hereafter *CE*; "The Definition of Will (I)," *Mind*, 11 (1902), 437-69. *CE* 2.476-514; "The Definition of Will (II)," *Mind*, 12 (1903), 145-76. *CE* 2.515-51; "The Definition of Will (III)," *Mind*, 13 (1904), 1-37. *CE* 2.552-94; and "A Defence of Phenomenalism in Psychology," *Mind*, 9 (1900), 26-45. *CE* 2.364-86.

34. "Defence of Phenomenalism," 28, 35.

35. "Defence of Phenomenalism," 30-31.

36. This clause was corrected as printed here by TSE in proofs; however, his correction was one of several not incorporated into the 1964 text, resulting in a confusing repetition of phrases: "For internally, their relations among themselves are determined only by the real world from the point of view of the subject, and externally by the real world from the point of view of the subject, and externally by the real world from somebody else's point of view."

37. This passage is marked in TSE's copy of *A&R*.

38. "Defence of Phenomenalism," 29.

39. "Defence of Phenomenalism," 41, 44.

40*. TSE's note: "Cf. T. P. Nunn, ["Are Secondary Qualities Independent of Perception?"] *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, [N.S. 10] (1909-10), 192." Nunn was the author of *The Aims and Achievements of Scientific Method: An Epistemological Essay* (1907).

41*. TSE's note: "[Bradley], 'Active Attention,' *Mind*, 1902, No. 41. 'Definition of Will' [I, II, and III], *Mind*, Nos. 44, 46, 49."

42. TSE quotes in the first instance from "The Definition of Will (I)," 444, and in parentheses from "The Definition of Will (III)," 23: "The real essence of a disposition I make no

attempt to explain, but in and for psychology it is a standing tendency or individual law. Given, that is, one of two connected elements . . . a disposition is the tendency for the other element to appear in consequence."

43. "The Definition of Will (II)," 150.

44. "The Definition of Will (I)," 455.

45. *Lectures on the Elementary Psychology of Feeling and Attention* (New York: Macmillan, 1908), 181.

46. Bradley, "On Active Attention," 21: TSE's "quotation" is a paraphrase of Bradley's statement that "to attend to a plurality is always to attend to it as one object, and it is not possible to have really several objects of attention at once."

47. Joseph, "The Psychological Explanation of the Development of the Perception of External Objects (III). (Reply to Prof. Stout)," *Mind*, 20 (1911), 161-80; here 178-79.

Chapter IV

The Epistemologist's Theory of Knowledge

“And there can be really no such science as the theory of cognition.”
(*A&R*76)

It has been the conclusion of the foregoing chapter that no distinct province of mental objects exists as the field of psychology; that no definition can anywhere be found to throw the mental on one side and the physical on the other; that we can never construct the external world from the mental, for the external is already implied in the mental. The difference between mental and real, or in the excellent terms of Mr. Alexander between the personal and the objective, is one of practical convenience and varies at every moment; so that the terms content and presentation do not stand for objects of a science but for aspects of an object. We go on to ask, naturally, whether the terms with which the epistemologist deals are any more substantial. The distinctions of *immanent* and *transcendent* object, the terms *real* and *unreal* object, *a priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge, *phenomenon* and *reality*; *passive apprehension* and the *activity of consciousness*; these are all terms which have a certain significance in practical knowledge. But whether thought has more than a practical validity, whether there is any reality for thought to reach and whether thought reaches it—the absolute validity of knowledge—is the problem of the theory of knowledge. There are evidently three divisions of the question: the problem of the genesis of knowledge, of the structure of knowledge, and of the possibility of knowledge. It is, I believe, the position of all sound idealism, and I believe is the position of Mr. Bradley, that the only real problem is the second. For it may be said, in criticism of the first problem, that it does not deal with objects of *knowledge*, and in criticism of the third, that there are no *objects* of knowledge, when the object is treated as a hard and fast reality.

The present chapter is to consider the claims of the third problem, and I will only touch very briefly on the question of the “growth of knowledge.” While the problem is by no means a negligible one, it can never occupy a place of priority in the theory of knowledge, and the reason is simply this. We are all agreed that the knowledge of the world possessed by man is

superior to that possessed by the ape, and that the knowledge of the European is superior to that of the savage, but there remains in this knowledge a *somehow* which is not resolved unless by a theory which is not the outcome of any "genetic" research. There is recognised in the history which we consider a growth, but it is a growth of "knowledge" only in the vague or practical sense of the world. In evolution or in the development of the child there is a systematic alteration of values, with an outer expansion and an inner elaboration of content, which we find to be continuous with the values and the content of our own experience. But this alteration is a growth of knowledge only if knowledge is already assumed; and if we make no assumptions about the validity of our own knowledge, the growth which we trace is not the growth of knowledge at all, but is the history only of adaptation, if you like, to environment. And in such an account, of course, our knowledge of the environment to which we see the organism adapting itself is taken not as absolute but as relative: we assume only a system of relations such that our knowledge will not be falsified on the plane on which it is knowledge. Nothing, then, is so far known as to the nature of knowledge.

The basis of structural psychology, as we have seen, resolves itself into physiology; and while physiology is by no means irrelevant to the problem of knowledge, its contribution is always indirect. Knowledge being given, physiology can suggest the limitations and give some of the conditions of truth and error; it gives us the background against which knowledge is set and into which it tends to fade. And we are obliged to believe that in a final account the knowledge which we think to possess and the conditions of it will be necessary to explain and complete each other. Meanwhile physiology gives an account, not of our knowledge as knowledge, but under some other aspect. And so long as we have no ultimate and complete knowledge, the study of these aspects will remain relevant to epistemology. The intended object is ultimate reality. But in knowing as we experience it, the aspect which is knowing is continuous with the other aspects and can never be definitely separated from them at any point. So far as it is knowing, there is no problem and, if there be a problem—of which I am very doubtful—it is constituted by the relation of knowing to the other aspects. Epistemology, therefore, is simply the process by which what is at first knowledge is absorbed into another aspect: knowing becomes known, an activity becomes an object, and the process can be repeated *ad infinitum*.

It is claimed, however, that epistemology occupies a position of unique authority and constitutes a distinct science apart from psychology, physiology, logic, or biology. Epistemology makes the claim of both scientific certainty and metaphysical ultimacy. And it is, I believe, to be repudiated by both scientist and metaphysician; by the first because the external criteria of his science do not concern him, and by the second because he is engaged in the construction of a system, and must place himself at an external point of view from which the wholly internal aspect of knowledge disappears. In a metaphysic such as Mr. Bradley's, certainly, there can be no place for a theory of knowledge, for the terms which such a discipline must use have not the requisite substantiality. The problem, it may be remarked, has two parts which are not infrequently confused: the problem of the knowledge of the objects or truths which we do know, and the problem of knowledge in general. In the first we assume the existence of knowledge and inquire into its conditions; in the second we assume nothing and inquire into the possibility of knowledge. And the fact that the two are perhaps never treated wholly independently must not lead us to think that they are not two independent problems. In epistemology we attempt to describe a relation between the knower and the known, to give a description which shall leave both as we find them—which shall, that is, describe an experience which shall still be recognisable after the description; but we ask also the very different question of the validity and meaning of the noetic experience, and this question can only be answered in terms which leave the original experience unrecognisable.

The philosopher who attempts to answer either of these questions must, I believe, be either a dualistic realist or a "criticist" (which is ultimately the same thing) for I do not propose to classify Kant as anything but a dualistic realist. He assumes that there is a real world, a world of realities of one sort or at most two; he then inquires how we come to know this world. And as a result of this sharp and quite dogmatic division he burdens himself with all the trouble of unreal and imaginary objects, and with the problem of error. I shall first state briefly the criticism of such a "real world" from the point of view of *Appearance and Reality*, and elucidate it further by criticism of such analyses of the act of knowledge as those of Meinong and Messer.

There is a dilemma which may be said to be given at the start. Either the external world is presented always as it is, and is never more or other than what is given; or else there is a describable relation between our knowing

and that which is known. And if we accept the first alternative, it is said, we are left with no real world at all, for anything and everything incongruous and inconsistent will be equally real, and in no significant sense will it constitute a "world." We are then to assume one real world independent of our knowledge of it, surround consciousness with an opaque veil of "subjectivity" and ask in what form and in what way reality penetrates this integument. We assume no acquaintance with objects except as presented, but the epistemologist makes it his task to prove that there is a relation between knowledge and its object which is not simply that of knowledge.

Mr. Russell gives a list of five theories of knowledge which is suggestive.

1. [K]nowledge does not differ from what is known . . .
2. We may admit the distinction of content and object, but hold that the latter is merely immanent.
3. We may hold that the object is immanent when false, transcendent when true.
4. We may hold that when a judgment is false there is no object; but when true, there is a transcendent object.
5. We may hold that the object is always transcendent.¹

The first of these is that which Mr. Russell attributes to idealism, though to what idealism he refers I am unable to discover. I contend that every one of these accounts is ultimately meaningless, owing to the confusion of the practical with the metaphysical points of view. The last four all accept the distinction of content and object, though upon what grounds I am at a loss to say. "When we consider the presentation of something simple, say redness, it is evident that the presentation and the object are distinct" (514). But in the first place (Chapter III)² it is not quite correct to say that redness is a presentation, and furthermore I cannot find any evidence offered for the distinctness of presentation and object. But:

[T]he content of a presentation exists when the presentation exists, but the object need not exist—it may be self-contradictory, it may be something which happens not to be a fact, such as a golden mountain, it may be essentially incapable of existence, as for instance equality, it may be physical, not psychical, or it may be something which did exist or will exist, but does not exist at present. What is called the existence of an object in presentation is really not existence at all: it may be called pseudo-existence. . . . [T]he content tends to be ignored in favour of the

object; there are no natural designations for contents, which have to be named and distinguished by their objects.³

Such a theory of content and object is evidently based upon the assumption of a world of real and independent objects: it assumes that the typical case of apprehension is that of a physical object; it forces our apprehension of "ideal" objects into the same mould, and it ends in the paradox that we may refer to an object when no object is present. It appears to assume also that there may be objects which are—in fact that the typical object is—merely existent, and do not to some extent subsist as well.

I wish to recall the criticism which I directed upon "content" in the preceding chapter. From the argument there offered it would appear that the golden mountain is as real and objective as any thing else. If it were merely content, the content would be the object, and we should have to account for our error in mistaking the one for the other. But it could not be even content unless it intended to be object. So far as the idea "golden mountain" is a real idea, so far is it a real object. I will not, however, pursue these comments farther until I have outlined the view of a "real world" which these four theories mentioned by Mr. Russell seem to over look. There is a real world, corresponding to that intended by these theories, which is neither identical with Bradley's Reality nor incompatible with it. And I may be at some pains to suggest what is essentially indefinable, what this real world is; why it is tempting as a starting-point for epistemology, why it is unreal inside a metaphysical system, yet presupposed by every system. I have agreed heartily to the views of Professor Alexander and Dr. Nunn in regard to the reality of all objects. But it is evident that in practice this doctrine is hopelessly untrue. We are forced to assume that some objects are real and others simply unreal; it is only in refined practice that we find degree of reality to any extent useful, and we never, I think, dispense with the blunt "real" and "unreal" altogether. For without the unreal, as without the element of negation, you cannot have a world of finite experience at all. Such a world involves selection and emphasis, and we cannot too frequently be told that the world of practice is supported by interest and valuation. But our interests and our values, we shall be told, vary from moment to moment. So does the real world, according to that fragment of it which happens to be the focus of our attention. Against the background of practical reality that is, are various systems both social and scientific, which are so to speak lived together in a coherence which cannot be formulated.

The process by which this world is constructed has of course two aspects. On the one hand the selection of certain experiences as real and the rejection of others builds up the world, and on the other hand the assumption of a real world gives a standard for such choice; the external world is thus doubly supported in its externality. Thus the distinction between that content which is merely personal and that which is objective is *not* a distinction between two classes of object absolutely, but a distinction valid only so long as we support one point of view—that of practical interest in the difference. There is a real world, if you like, which is full of contradictions, and it is our attempt to organise this world which gives the belief in a completely organised world, an hypothesis which we proceed to treat as an actuality—whence the question how and how far we come into contact with this world of absolute order.

The principle involved in the question of immanent and transcendent objects I believe to be this: a reality intended need not be in itself actual, though its actuality be presupposed in the reality of the intention. We intend, from our divers limited points of view, a single real world, and we forget that metaphysically this real world is only real so far as it finds realisation through these points of view. It is not my purpose at this point to expound the doctrine of points of view, which will belong properly under the head of Solipsism,⁴ but only to sketch the outlines of the position from which Epistemology is criticised. I repeat then that the objective world is only actual in one or other point of view, but that each point of view intends to be, not a point of view, but the world one and impersonal, and in this double aspect, according to which reality is on the one hand given and on the other hand merely symbolised, I find what may be called in a way the transcendence of the object and the justification for the distinction between content and object. But it must be remarked that such a distinction has only practical validity, and does not hold where a particular content has not been already selected as real. It is not true to say that some objects are immanent and some transcendent by virtue of any characteristic which can be found in them *as objects*, for all objects are equally immanent and equally transcendent. The criterion of reality, therefore, is to be found, not in the relation of the object to the subject, but in the directness with which the object is relatable to the intended world—for it is not always the same sphere of reality to which we refer our objects. So that the reality of the object does not lie in the object itself, but in the extent of the relations which the object possesses without significant falsification of itself. These

relations are all different points of view upon the object—i.e. they relate different aspects to a single point of reference: in this process of relation the object itself is altered, for what was at first the object pure and simple becomes the object under a single aspect. And a point of view, it may here be remarked, need not be considered as identical with one human consciousness; so that we may be said to move from one point of view to another when we determine an object by another relation. If this be true, then the movement between one “finite centre” and another will not differ in kind from that inside of one consciousness, and will consist in the constitution of a real world by ideal references of many aspects.

In this case, the “real world” of epistemology (to be distinguished from the Reality of metaphysics) will be an essentially indefinite world of identical references of an indefinite number of points of view, particularly those of other civilised adults with whom we come in contact, but quite possibly extending to all finite centres with which we can establish an identical reference. In the light of this view, and recalling the account of idea which I have laboured to express in the first three chapters, several of the distinctions of Meinong appear to me elaborate superfluities. I would choose as an example his distinction of *Inhalt* (content) and *Gegenstand* (object) with reference to *Pseudoexistenz* (pseudoexistence). It is meaningless, Meinong says, to speak of an object as existent only “in der Vorstellung” (“in presentation”).

An Object that exists only “in my presentation,” simply does not exist at all. . . : We may now summarise as follows: existence, for the knower, is, viewed from the standpoint of the Object, a pseudo-existence, and it remains only to establish what, in such cases, the actual existent is, which is thus in the strict sense perceived.^{5*}

We must clearly distinguish, he says, the *Inhalt* of a *Vorstellung* (presentation) from its *Gegenstand*.

If I think first of red and then of green, it naturally cannot be the same, or a precisely similar presentation, whereby I first apprehend the one object and then the other. But that which respectively distinguishes these two presentations, so that the first is appropriated to the one object and the second to the other, is their content. Clearly, the object apprehended in a presentation [would not necessarily exist, but the content by which it is apprehended would]. The latter is a constituent of the

presentation, and cannot be absent, or the presentation itself would be absent too.^{6*}

A good deal depends, of course, on the use of the word *Vorstellung* and I have been unable to find—admitting, however, that I find Meinong an exceedingly difficult author—that the meaning of this very obscure word is anywhere defined; and I have occasion to complain, indeed, that just those words are taken for granted which have the most need of new or revised definitions. What, in the quotation just given, is the difference of *Vorstellung* but the difference of object? Both *Vorstellung* and *Inhalt* seem here identical with object. For the “idea” here in question is not a logical idea, not the idea which we predicate of reality; the idea in this sense would be for Meinong identical with the object, since there is no question of predicating the *Vorstellung* of red of the real red. The idea here is the psychologist’s idea, which is for the psychologist an aspect of the object in mental context. I have already protested against amputating this aspect for the purpose of a “special science”; but to graft the member on again after it is dead seems to me even more gratuitous. In the sense in which there are two ideas (red and green), there are not at the same time two objects, for we have substituted the ideas for the objects. And when we proceed to talk of the “content” of an idea, we are simply making a devious return to the object. It is not true, I have contended, to say that an idea has an object, for idea *is* (not *has*) a reference to an object. So far as the idea is real it is the object, so far as the idea is unreal the object is unreal or indeterminate.

The distinction between idea and content of idea may be accounted for perhaps in connection with Meinong’s analysis of *Ausdruck* (expression) and *Bedeutung* (meaning).^{7*}

Thus anyone who utters, say, the word “sun,” normally gives *expression* also, whether he wants to or not, to the fact that a certain presentation, either of perception or imagination, is occurring in him. The nature of this presentation is determined initially by what is presented therein, namely its object, and this object is in fact what is meant by the word “sun.”^{8*}

It would appear from this passage that we express the idea, but mean the object. This being admitted, it is well to ask whether the object, in the case of an unreal object, is merely the content of the idea: and we find, I think, the psychologist’s error of treating two points of view as if they were one.

The idea in question refers merely to the judgment made by the hearer to the effect that the speaker has “an idea of” certain objects; but the object apprehended by the hearer is an object which from the point of view of the speaker does not exist. The speaker can only mean; and even if he means his own “state of consciousness,” what is really active is a meaning which is not meant. The idea, furthermore, which is apprehended is only a half-object: it exists, that is, as an object only by our half putting ourselves in the place of the speaker and half contemplating him as an object. The distinction, consequently, between *Ausdruck* and *Bedeutung* must not be drawn too closely.⁹ For no expression is even expression unless we attribute it meaning, and meaning cannot be merely contemplated, but must be *erlebt* (experienced).¹⁰ Hence even in the case of error—*Pseudoexistenz*—the object must be transcendent or there is no object at all: and in this I am in accord with Mr. Russell.

The occasion for the distinction of immanent and transcendent objects is obviously the fact of error. No object can, we find, be merely immanent, for the reason that so far as an object is an object, it will have relations which transcend it, transcend the perception; relations which constitute it, but which ultimately transform and absorb it. The poorer an object is in relations, the less it is object; and the limiting case of pseudoexistence is an object with no relations—this would be the only purely imaginary object, and would of course not be an object at all, but a feeling, which as such, would have its relations of another sort. Mr. Russell's declaration that all objects are transcendent, however, seems to provoke only new difficulties.

It is not maintained, of course, that the object must *exist*; that would be to maintain that a certain specific proposition must hold of the object, whereas all that seems essential is that there should *be* such an object; and the assertion of being, if not analytic, is yet more nearly so than any other assertion.¹¹

The content, Mr. Russell tells us, implies the object and the relation of the content to object. This seems very much like my theorem, that “a reality intended need not be itself actual, though its actuality be presupposed in the reality of the intention” (312), but it leaves to the transcendence of the object, as Mr. Russell states it, only a formal value, through its insinuation of the distinction between existence and being, a distinction which implies that Mr. Russell means no more by transcendence than Meinong does by immanence. So that Mr. Russell's theory appears to end in bankruptcy,

inasmuch as we are left without a criterion for either truth or judgment or reality of object.

Meinong's theory of perception is complicated, as I suggested above, by the division which he draws between real and ideal objects, between *inferiora* and *superiora*. Mr. Russell classifies *superiora* as follows: relations (including likeness, differences, and the complexes formed of terms related by a relation), and the kind of objects (which we may call plurals) of which numbers other than 0 and 1 can be asserted. The difficulty which I find with this account is that it would seem possible for virtually any object to be either inferior or superior: a melody, for example, is superior and composed of tones as its *inferiora*; but the simple tone is composed of vibrations, and is in fact as absolutely a "zeitverteilter Gegenstand" as is the melody. Furthermore, it is by no means clear what the relation of a *superius* to its *inferiora* is. A melody, as Mr. Russell observes, is not a fifth note; what is added is the relation—but "rightly related" to the constituents! Now it may be asked whether a relation to its terms¹² is apprehended as an object in the same way as the object, and whether in any complex there are two *superiora*—the relation uniting, and the whole complex. And finally I would ask (and this is the only essential question) whether the division really corresponds to the objects with which we actually come into contact.

It is only with great trepidation that I venture to interpret so obscure an author as Alexis von Meinong. But I am interested to note my own impression that the ideal object (which is always an object of higher order) tends to the foreground of certainty, while the real object drops into the obscurity of a noumenon. So, toward the end of the book *Über die Erfahrungsgrundlagen* (*On the Empirical Foundation of Our Knowledge*), the author is apparently more and more cautious in attributing characters to the real object. The object O is divided into o ("das Dingmoment," the factor of thinghood) and o' ("die Gesamtheit der 'im äusseren Aspekte gegebenen Eigenschaften,'" the totality of characteristics presented to outward view) (93).

In respect of o, the chalk is hardly to be distinguished from the inkstand; to be sure, the perceptual presentation of the former offers us one o' for the purpose, and that of the latter another: but these are precisely those sensible qualities, for whose real presence we have no evidence.^{13*} The phenomenal determinations o'₁ and o'₂ are paralleled, in fact, by

noumenal determinations $\bar{o}'_1$ and $\bar{o}'_2$, of which it is evident, indeed, that the very same relations of comparison hold between them as between the o 's; wherein lies implicit at the same time a claim in any case self-evident, namely that the substantial factor o , guaranteed to us by the good evidence already validated, does not exist, as it were, in unnatural, or indeed impossible, isolation, but that the existent does in fact consist of things having characteristics.^{14*}

This is, if you like, knowledge of an external reality, but it is knowledge of a very critical sort indeed. The *superiora* become *Erkenntnisinstrument* (instruments of knowledge), and while the "aspects" furnish evidence, not for themselves but for the objects (or perceptions?) of which they are aspects, yet it is the aspect which is presented. The thing is known, but only through appearances which exist as references to the thing, and do not necessarily give evidence for their own existence. This seems to me essentially the position of the critical philosophy: the thing is known through its appearances, but as soon as the distinction is made appearance and thing fall apart, and appearance replaces thing as a point of attention.

The distinction between inferior and superior objects, on the whole, strikes me as thoroughly critical. To treat things, not as moments of objectivity, but as ultimate lumps which can be grasped after all relations^{15*} have been stripped away, seems to be the attempt of both Meinong and Kant. To treat ideal relations as "superior" objects, somehow built upon the real objects, and in a sense dependent upon them is a step toward making relations into categories.¹⁶ For it appears (unless I misinterpret) that the ideal relations are more certainly known than the real, being (in Meinong's sense) *a priori*, and the objects of "inner perception" are more certainly known than those of outer perception.

Thus in dealing with ideal objects, there is no need at all to disclaim the influence of subjectivity; but so far as the evidence is not still to seek, this leads merely to a sort of selection among the equally available *superiora*, whose totality the intrinsically limited intellect cannot attempt to assess. But this subjectivity in no way compromises the validity of what we are able to know *a priori*, once we obtain it. Thus things-in-themselves are like, unlike, etc.^{17*}

But it would appear that this likeness among objects is a matter of inference and not of direct acquaintance. We do not know reality in substance,

we know it in relation: we know, that is, a relation among content which cannot be falsified when carried over to the thing, inasmuch as the content is only content with reference to the thing, so that the relation is not directly known of the content as such. The profoundest obscurity enfolds the notion of *Adäquatheit* (adequateness), an ideal relation between the object of the idea and reality (*Annahmen* 263). If *Wirklichkeit* (actuality) is real, then in the apprehension of an ideal object (cf. *Annahmen* 265), I do not see what the relation of *Adäquatheit* between the ideal object apprehended and the “real” ideal object can be, for there cannot be two sets of ideal objects, and the ideal relation between the ideal object apprehended and the real object can be nothing more than a relation of identity. In this case the *Adäquatheit* must be between the real content of an idea and a real complex, which would mean that in knowledge we do not apprehend relations but a specific case of relation, and that the complex of terms related is not ideal but real, and that the relation of aspect to thing is always a real relation.

We are here in full cry after the familiar *ignis fatuus* of epistemology,¹⁸ the search for terms, which persist in dissolving into relations. The reliance upon “inner perception” is I think only another case of retreat to a relation as more secure than a thing. It is evidently the conclusion of the preceding chapter that there is properly no such thing as internal perception, and that in any case it provides no more certain knowledge than outer perception, but perhaps less, and certainly later. There is surely no more evidence in memory^{19*} than in perception, whether it be the memory of a feeling, desire, or perception. To pass from the subject to the content of a perception is not in general to pass from the less to the more certain. For as we have seen, every perception has an object, and whether that object is “real” or not depends simply on the number and kind of relations which, in a particular context, we may for practical purposes demand: reality is a convention. To fall back on the content is simply to assert a quasi-object: there was an experience, as if . . . To make an object of the content is to attend to something quite as uncertain in evidence as any other object. The content objectified, that is, is something which was never as such experienced; because the I which attends to the content is a wider, more developed I than the I which first experienced the content. So that the content is not in any exact sense a part of the self, and is subject to exactly the same conditions of evidence as any other object. There will be, then, evidence for object and evidence for content, but not necessarily stronger for one than

for the other, and in most cases, I am inclined to believe, stronger for object than for content.

I have already raised objections to the drawing and quartering of reality into real and ideal objects: this objection I should now like to amplify. I seem to find here some confusion as to just what is implied by the word *object*: and I cannot but feel that the distinction of real and ideal, inferior and superior objects, is a clumsy substitute for the notion of degrees of truth and reality. It is admitted (Russell) that the division between objects and objectives is not altogether sharp (cf. "black-board" and "the blackness of the board").²⁰ May we not then fairly inquire whether there can be found a single case of an object which cannot be treated as an objective? or indeed of an objective which cannot be treated as an object? Even the perception of the familiar epistemologist's table can be treated as the assertion *that* certain experiences are given—the table being only the condensed aspect of the objective asserted. And as Meinong affirms that a perception is also an *Existenzurteil* (existential judgment), so any judgment involves as well the perception of the judgment (i.e., the perception of its correctness).

The object has not yet been exactly defined. An object is as such a point of attention, and thus anything and everything to which we may be said to direct attention is an object.

But the objects among which we live are much more than this; here we have abstracted from everything about a thing which could localise it either in a "subjective" or in an "objective" world. The element of objectivity is the capacity of anything to be, or to be considered as (the distinction will explain itself later) a point of attention, but the point of attention is of course only an abstraction. It is only as the point of attention becomes qualified—becomes a *what*—that it is even a *that*; a number of characteristics, none of which is essential to its objectivity, and none of which is objective in the sense of being an object, nevertheless constitute *its* objectivity; its *thatness* is in direct ratio to its *whatness*. And the thing, in order to be a thing even, must be capable of entering into a kind of existence in which it is not a thing. I do not argue that a thing ceases to be a thing when it ceases to be a point of attention: this is I believe supposed to be the point of view of subjective idealism. For I do not recognise the validity of the question. There is an identity which persists, an identity due to which the objectivity is not annihilated, but rendered meaningless. The thing does not cease to exist, it exists in other ways, ways which are not thinghood, but can only be expressed or suggested in terms of thinghood. And without the

potentiality of these other forms of existence the thing would not even be a thing: *existence*, I mean to say, *is not identical with thinghood*. The world is not made up of things, nor of things and "other things"; but existence is capable of appearing more or less under the aspect of thinghood. The account which I offer is, I know, anything but lucid! I can only plead in excuse that the point is one of the most difficult in the theory of knowledge. But one of the consequences, which will perhaps go to make the matter more intelligible, is that there are no objects of strictly lower order, and no objects of strictly higher order. What Meinong has in mind are two aspects of existence which when contemplated, are both objects, but so far as they are objects, are of the same order. The only alternative, I insist, is to assume that the lower objects alone are objects, and the higher, categories, that only "real" things exist, and that in point of fact there are no real things, but only things in themselves, i.e. hypothetical limits. And from this point of view Meinong has, as I intimated, only a step to take to Kant.

The whole question is, as Mr. Russell suggests, closely bound up with the theory of time. Meinong maintains that the objects of lower order may be directly perceived. But it is surely evident that so far as an object has meaning it is not an object of this sort. For meaning involves relations; at least (we need) the relation of identity through which a universality of function is recognised through a diversity of situation.^{21*}

And I do not see how you can make the distinction between *superiora* and *inferiora* at all unless you claim the existence and the perceptibility of *inferiora* apart from *superiora*. Surely the whole construction falls to the ground once you admit their inseparability. For in this case there not only is no logical priority, but the one is so dependent for its existence upon the other that the two are only discriminated aspects of the same moment of objectivity, and we may say that in a sense neither of the two is the object we know.

The "object which we know" is however only a certain aspect. We encounter a difficulty in the fact that we are forced to use the same term "object" for more than one aspect. For it is clear that the slightest consideration of the nature of an object analyses ideal from real elements. Any description must bring to light elements which subsist rather than exist, and some elements are chosen as existents simply with reference to others that do not: none can be said to be in itself purely existent. You cannot get a world of real things by joining together a number of subsistents with a number of existents, for it turns out that there is nothing in the world

which is wholly in time—there are, that is, no pure *thats*. No object, it is implied, is merely an object; for the real presence of ideal elements in the simplest and most objective of objects implies a kinship between that object and all other objects in which that idea element is exemplified; the mere identity of an object with itself constitutes a relation between that object and all other objects. So that the curious dualism of Mr. Russell (*Problems* 155 ff.) which has much in common with obvious, though I can hardly think correct, interpretations of Plato, will not hold good of a world which is always partially in time, but never wholly in time, with respect to any of its elements.

What constitutes a real object, accordingly, is the practical need or occasion. We may treat, that is, an object of attention as a term or as a complex as occasion demands, and it is only a question of practice to what point, under analysis, it remains the same object. And it will always be a question on your hands just what it is that persists in time. Ordinarily there is no difficulty, for the object is not *bestimmt*;²² it fluctuates as occasion demands, and as elements in it are treated as real or as ideal, but as the terms are analysed into relations, it appears finally that nothing is in time except time itself. This point of view, however, is of course only a limit, and is never reached.

So much for the “existence” of “real” objects. It will be said on the other side that there are objects which are purely ideal: relations, such as identity and difference, and the objects of pure mathematics. To this also I must object. We *intend* ideal objects, just as we *intend* real ones, and in practice the difference in intention is difference in reality. But I do not see how, in a critical examination of first principles, such a distinction can maintain itself absolutely. The objection is as follows. The existent and the subsistent are two aspects of reality which are intended but never actually grasped, and the difference between them is not the difference between two classes of object, for *in so far as* they are objects they are of the same sort; the difference is *extra-objective*. What for example do we attend to when we make an object of the relation “difference”? So far as it is an object, it is not a relation; it is something corresponding to that relation in the world of objects: not as a correspondence of two separate entities, but by continuous transition. And this *object* is subject to all the difficulties of the existent object in reversed order. As a relation it is a relation of terms; as an object it is a simple term or a complex of terms again related. It will not do to say that the relation is apprehended in a case of itself; that the relation

difference is grasped through the difference of a specific content, red and green. For this is to admit that the true object is the complex (*a*) red-different-from-green, or (*b*) difference-of-green-from-red. (*a*) and (*b*) are evidently the same object in one sense and different objects in another. The practical attention is in the same direction, but there is a difference of emphasis: one cannot say absolutely that the objects are the same. So far as we regard it as the same (*a*) will represent the tendency in the direction of existence, and (*b*) the tendency in the direction of subsistence: but red-and-green on the one hand and difference on the other will never be actualised. We do not need to refute the protest that difference is not different, and that whiteness is not white, in order to reach this conclusion. For we mean only that neither subsistence nor existence can be real, and that what is intended in the act of attending to an object is always something real.

The last point needs some elucidation. An abstraction, it is here argued, is not merely *as such* an object of attention. The abstraction has an individual existence, though not independent of that from which it is abstracted, and it is this individual existence which is the object so far as there is an object. If there is given in primary experience a real object *A* from which we abstract the superior ideal object *a*, then *a* is at once something more and something less than *A*. It is less in that it is intended to be merely a subsistent aspect of *A*, and more in that it has an existence of its own, with conditions to a large degree independent of *A*. And in this way it is also in a sense less than itself, in that being a subsistent, it is limited as well by conditions of existence. This leads to the consideration of the relation of symbol to that which it symbolises.^{23*}

I mean here by symbol both what Mr. Peirce calls by that name and what he calls an eicon; excluding the index.²⁴ Symbol, I mean, in the sense of the real (or rather objective) end of a continuity which terminates at one end in an *intended existent* or *subsistent* and at the other end in an object (*erfassbar*, apprehensible) which must have both existent and subsistent aspects. Now in any use of a word which symbolises an abstraction, the actual object of attention, I submit, is exceedingly variable: there is not simply one determinate object in various contexts, but the object varies with the context. Thus, in any use of an abstract term, we may distinguish between the logical meaning, which is an intended object, and the real meaning, which is a part of the experience and not an object real or intended. For the intended object we always substitute to perhaps a greater or a less degree the present symbol. It must be emphasised, however, that there is properly

speaking, no relation between the symbol and that which it symbolises, because they are continuous. The reality without the symbol would never be known, and we cannot say that it would even exist (or subsist); but on the other hand the symbol furnishes proof of the reality, inasmuch as without the reality it would not be that symbol: i.e. there would be an identity left which would for our purposes be irrelevant. The word "relation" would not be the word "relation" without the reality "relation" which is not in itself an object; for no word can exist without a meaning, and if the word "relation" did not have the meaning "relation," it would have to have some other meaning. You cannot, that is to say, determine two realities, the word and its meaning: the word (here the existent) is continuous with the meaning (here subsistent). It consequently transpires that neither the word alone (for there is no word alone) is the object, nor²⁵ the logical meaning (which is an abstraction and cannot be grasped without the word), nor the total of word and meaning, for there is no total; word and meaning being continuous, and the continuity not an object.^{26*}

The (true) object, then, is never a mere universal, nor a mere particular, nor a complex composed of universals and particulars. It was known, I should suppose, by Plato, that universals and particulars cannot be in any meaningful sense related, inasmuch as they are not separate existences. And so I cannot find any more satisfaction in the account of Mr. Russell than in that of Meinong. For Mr. Russell, as for Meinong, universals or particulars may be known by direct acquaintance. But whereas for Meinong both seem to be treated as direct objects, Russell's acquaintance certainly refers to another kind of knowledge than that of objects. Thus acquaintance is defined as "direct cognitive relation to that object."^{27*} The cognitive relation here is presentation. Sense-data, universals, and perhaps the self are thus known. Now whatever may be said of universals, neither sense-data nor the self are known primitively by what is commonly called presentation, i.e. presentation as an object: for we are surely somehow "acquainted" with sense-data and the self in the practical apprehensions of objects long before we make objects (presentations) of the sense-data themselves.

The theory of Meinong starts from the postulate of the reality of objects—everything that is real is an object. Mr. Russell starts apparently from the reality of universals and sense-data, and from these elements late in the order of knowledge^{28*} he builds up the external world. "We have acquaintance," says Mr. Russell, in a passage which strikingly recalls Locke,

in sensation with the data of the outer senses,^{29*} and in introspection with the data of what may be called the inner sense—thoughts, feelings, desires, etc. . . . In addition to our acquaintance with particular existing things, we also have acquaintance with what we shall call *universals*, that is to say, general ideas, such as *whiteness*, *diversity*, *brotherhood*, and so on. (*Problems* 80-81)

Inasmuch as we are stated not to be acquainted with physical objects (82), it may be inferred that we are not acquainted with anything in its character of *object*, but only in the felt whole of experience; with the interesting consequence that objects are not directly known but inferred, and that anything which is named is so far not among our acquaintance. And here again we encounter an interesting rapprochement of realism to Kantianism. The entities (to use as non-committal a term as possible) which we know (by acquaintance) are not objects but means by which we apprehend objects, while the object is directly quite beyond the span of our knowledge. There are, on this interpretation, “no such things” as objects; there are only experiences.

All names of places—London, England, Europe, the Earth, the Solar System—similarly involve, when used, descriptions which start from some one or more particulars with which we are acquainted. I suspect that even the Universe, as considered by metaphysics, involves such a connection with particulars.^{30*} In logic, on the contrary, where we are concerned not merely with what does exist, but with whatever might or could exist or be, no reference to actual particulars is involved. (*Problems* 88)

In making a statement about something known only by description, Mr. Russell says, we may *intend* to make the statements about the *object* itself—but we never do so (88). To know an object is simply to know that there is that object: we know only an objective which asserts an existence; and to say that we have direct acquaintance with that objective is not to make the object any more real.

Apparently another person may be an intended object, but can be a real object only to the person himself—and a person is not an object to himself, because he is directly acquainted with himself, and acquaintance is not a subject-object relation.^{31*} The world thus appears as an ideal construction of descriptions linked to the physiological and to the logical system.

What then is the relation of universals and particulars in the world of objects? "A thing, of the every-day sort, is constituted by a bundle of sensible qualities belonging to various senses, but supposed all to co-exist in one continuous portion of space."^{32*} It is apparently by a sort of projection of sense-data (not, it must be remembered, themselves objects) that we obtain the reality (or the illusion?) of a thing. This is, incidentally, very near to Berkeley, nearer certainly than Mr. Russell's interpretation of Berkeley.^{33*} But it is, from a slightly different point of view, very near to Kant. You have the data of sense united by logic, and this determination of the manifold is for a subject, since the data of sense are real only in acquaintance, and acquaintance means the enjoyment by a subject. It would appear that the thing, which is always an object of higher order (as there are properly no objects of lower order for Mr. Russell), is a logical construction, composed of two sorts of material, sense-data and universals, both of which are if you like objective, but hardly objective in the same sense in which objects are objective. Consequently, on this interpretation of Mr. Russell's theory, one cannot say with Meinong that objects are either existent or subsistent, or are compounds of both ingredients, for the only entities which are purely existent are those of sense and introspection, and the only entities which are purely subsistent are universals.^{34*}

It is interesting to note, furthermore, how uncertain the *evidence* for the existence of objects becomes when we begin by assuming them absolutely, and on this theory. The only things that we know by acquaintance "are neither true nor false" (*Problems* 178): sense-data, universals, and the objects of inner perception.^{35*} The latter, as I intimated, are so far as known by acquaintance not objects—so far as they are objects they are subject to all the conditions of outer perceptions. The universals also are assuredly neither true nor false, inasmuch as you do not have falsehood without an existence proposition.

Whiteness and brotherhood are, it is true, *a priori* (in the sense defined by Meinong, which is ultimately the sense of Kant as well) but they are not knowledge, nor are they known. We *experience* universals, and we *experience* particulars, but knowledge is always of *objects*, in which both are elements. And this is as true of the objects of mathematics, I submit, as of anything else: the actual object is always composed of existent and of subsistent elements, and is defined (practically) as an existent or as a subsistent object by the tendency of its use. Numbers, considered as merely subsistent, have no true or false combinations, for they are not known. They are

simply *erlebt* (experienced) in the contemplation of objects to which they apply; $2 \text{ plus } 2 = 4$ is thus neither true nor false; but when we add four real objects together, we know (as objects), that two of the objects with two of the objects makes four objects, and we experience by acquaintance the $2 \text{ plus } 2 = 4$. We can of course abstract the numbers simply and determine them by a moment of objectivity; but what we have then is not the number in itself but an object corresponding to it. For how should objects apply to objects, as numbers apply to things? Numbers are not objects; nor, as I shall try to point out later, is number strictly a category.

The question, then, from the point of view of Mr. Russell's philosophy, is how we proceed from acquaintance with entities which are neither real nor unreal to a knowledge of real objects which is true or false. "We agreed provisionally that physical objects cannot be quite like our sense-data, but may be regarded as *causing* our sensations" (*Problems* 47). Space, moreover, is an *assumption* (48-49). Time consists in an order of before and after, but we cannot apparently be sure that the time-order which events seem to have is "the same as the time-order which they do have" (51). In regard to the characters of objects, secondary qualities are not characters of physical objects (56), but in an experience of red and blue, we may "reasonably presume" (53) that a difference in the object corresponds to the difference of red and blue.

Thus we find that, although the *relations* of physical objects have all sorts of knowable properties, derived from their correspondence with the relations of sense-data, the physical objects themselves remain unknown in their intrinsic nature, so far at least as can be discovered by means of the senses. (54)

This seems very near to *Funktionsbegriff* (functional conception). The thing, if it *is* any more than a function of these relations is the merest assumption of popular prejudice. And these difficulties of a dualistic realism come from the standpoint of epistemology—of assuming that there is a real world outside of our knowledge and asking how we may know it.

Another difficulty of this point of view is the problem of time in knowledge and in reality. Knowledge of a universal, if a universal could be an object, would be knowledge of an object which is not in time, and the knowledge consequently would be out of time. For we attend to something, and if our attention is a temporal process the object can hardly fail to persist in time. But on the other hand, if existent objects are wholly in

time, the very persistence of our attention upon them will involve the holding together of various moments of sensation by a common meaning, and that meaning will not be within the time to which it refers. I have tried to indicate one way of escape from this dilemma, in asserting the relativity of the subsistent and the existent, and pointing out the fact that a real object always has existent and subsistent elements. And this is substantially the conclusion of Mr. Russell from one point of view, if as several passages imply the object is a sort of projection composed of universals and particulars known by acquaintance. But there is a further difficulty in the apprehension of these composite entities:

And as with space, the qualitative content—which is not merely temporal, and apart from which the terms related would have no character—presents an insoluble problem. How to combine this in unity with the time which it fills, and again how to establish each aspect apart, are both beyond our resources. And time so far, like space, has turned out to be appearance (Bradley, *A&R* 40).

Just what is the meaning of simultaneity of perceiving and perceived? When I perceive an object, is there any meaning in the statement that the object is “there” at the same time that my perception is “there”? If we make this assertion, and affirm that the object is composed of sense-data which are strictly in time and universals (relations) which are not in time, we face the question: what time is it that the object exists in? “It must not be supposed,” says Mr. Russell, “that the various states of different physical objects have the same time-order as the sense-data which constitute the perceptions of those objects” (*Problems* 52). We thus have two time-orders which are not reducible to each other, or the possibility of a continuum of various time-orders from the immediate order of experience *sensa* to the object itself, which, so far as it is *that* object, is not in time at all. And reality seems to fluctuate between these two impossible limits. Impossible, because on the one hand that which is purely in time cannot be said to exist at all. To exist it must be a *what*, and to be a *what* is to have (internal) ideal relations to other *whats*, relations which are not in time. And on the other hand, the object of perception cannot be consistent with itself as an object, because so far as it is that object, it is timeless; and so far as it changes, it never was that object, but a remoter object which is capable of persisting through the two states of itself: any object which is wholly real is independent of time, and after any noticed change that which it was previously is to be regarded

as an appearance. The time-order then will vary according to what we take as the object—the “real” sun, for example, or the perceived sun. The two are, if you like, the same sense-data in different relations, and for two objects to exist at the same time means an alliance by the same ideal relation. What does it mean to say that my character and the ten o’clock train, or the reputation of Herbert Spencer and his volume which lies on my table, or my table and the electrons exist at the same time? There is no exact meaning, and the statement has meaning only so far as we refer both to a single world, in which we vaguely feel that they are reconciled by experience; they are held together, that is, by a feeling of their *identical reference*, though that to which they refer does not exist.

This explanation (if it deserve the name) is the only escape that I can find from the time difficulty in perception. There is no time difficulty, because perception isn’t in time; but there are several time-orders, and the collision occurs only when we arbitrarily assume that one is real and that there is a separate order of perception which must somehow correspond to it. But in a dualistic realism, the time difficulty appears very serious indeed, and real time seems to be as much an inference as is real space. So here again I suspect that we approach very close to criticism. For the real time and real space are demanded only by the way the problem has been set: a real (physical) world is assumed, then when we come to ask how we know this world, it appears that all we are sure of is certain data and forms of immediate experience, out of which the physical world is constructed—as a consequence of which the “objectivity” of the external world becomes otiose or meaningless.

NOTES

1. “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions (III),” *Mind*, 13 (1904), 509-24; here 512-13.

2. TSE refers to his discussion of Stout’s analysis of redness in chapter III (285, 289).

3. Russell, “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions (I),” *Mind*, 13 (1904), 204-19; here 207.

4. See chapter VI.

5*. TSE’s note: “[E]in Objekt, das nur “in meiner Vorstellung” existiert, eigentlich gar nicht existiert. . . : Man kann jetzt kurz sagen: die Existenz, die er erkennt, ist, vom Standpunkte der Objekte besehen, eine Pseudoexistenz, und es bleibt nur festzustellen, was in solchen Fällen das wirklich Existente, das also im strengen Sinne Wahrgenommene ist” (Meinong, *ÜEW* 56). Translation by Heath.

6*. TSE’s note: “Denke ich das eine Mal an Rot, das andere Mal an Grün, so kann es natürlich nicht dieselbe resp. eine genau gleiche Vorstellung sein, vermöge deren ich einmal diesen, einmal jenen Gegenstand erfasse. Das aber, worin diese beiden Vorstellungen jedenfalls

verschieden sind, wodurch die eine diesem, die andere jenem Gegenstande zugeordnet ist, das ist ihr Inhalt. Bekanntlich muss der Gegenstand, den eine Vorstellung erfaßt, durchaus nicht existieren; um so gewisser aber der Inhalt, durch den sie ihn erfaßt. Er ist ein Stück an der Vorstellung, das nicht fehlen kann, ohne daß die Vorstellung selbst fehlt' ([Meinong, *ÜEW*] 57)." Translation by Heath, with bracketed editorial correction of his translation: "cannot possibly exist, but still less, then, can the content, whereby it is apprehended."

7*. TSE's note: "See *Ü[ber] Annahmen*, [zweite, umgearbeitete] Aufl[age], 24ff."; (Leipzig: Barth, 1910); hereafter abbreviated *Annahmen*.

8*. TSE's note: "'Wer also etwa das Wort 'Sonne' ausspricht, bringt dadurch normalerweise, gleichviel ob er es auch will oder nicht, zum *Ausdruck*, dass sich eine bestimmte Vorstellung, es kann natürlich so gut Wahrnehmungs- wie Einbildungsvorstellung sein, in ihm zuträgt. Was für eine Vorstellung das ist, bestimmt sich zunächst nach dem, was durch sie vorgestellt wird, also ihrem Gegenstande, und dieser Gegenstand ist eben das, was das Wort 'Sonne' bedeutet' ([Meinong, *Annahmen*] 25)." Translation by Heath.

9. "not" was inserted by TSE in proof.

10. See 242, n. 8.

11. "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions (III)," 515.

12. Editorial deletion of inadvertent repetition, "whether the relations": "Now it may be asked whether a relation to its terms, whether the relations is apprehended . . ."

13*. TSE's note: "'Die Kreide unterscheidet sich vom Tintenfaß schwerlich in betreff des o: dafür bietet uns die Wahrnehmungsvorstellung der ersteren freilich ein o', die des letzteren ein o'₂: aber das sind ja eben jene sensiblen Qualitäten, für deren Dasein wir keine Evidenz haben.'" (Meinong, *ÜEW* 93). Translation by Heath.

14*. TSE's note: "'Den phänomenalen Bestimmungen o'₁, o'₂ etc. stehen vielmehr noumenale Bestimmungen $\bar{o}_1$, $\bar{o}_2$ etc. gegenüber, von denen eben evident ist, dass zwischen ihnen die nämlichen Vergleichungsrelationen gelten wie zwischen den o', worin zugleich die allerdings sehr selbstverständliche Behauptung beschlossen liegt, dass das substantielle Moment o, das uns durch die bereits geltend gemachte gute Evidenz gesichert ist, nicht etwa in unnatürlicher oder eigentlich unmöglicher Isoliertheit existiert, sondern dass das Existierende doch jedenfalls Dinge mit Eigenschaften sind' ([Meinong, *ÜEW*] 94)." Translation by Heath.

15*. TSE's note: "'For a thing to exist it must possess identity. . . . And, further, this identity is ideal'" (Bradley, *A&R* 72).

16. Russell, "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions (I)," 207ff.

17*. TSE's note: "'So wird man in betreff idealer Gegenstände den Einfluß der Subjektivität durchaus nicht in Abrede zu stellen brauchen: diese führt aber, soweit die Evidenz nicht ausbleibt, nur zu einer Art Auswahl unter den gleichsam verfügbaren Superioren, deren Gesamtheit der durch seine Natur begrenzte Intellekt zu ermessen gar nicht versuchen kann. Aber die Gültigkeit dessen, was wir, so wie wir einmal beschaffen sind, a priori zu erkennen vermögen, wird durch diese Subjektivität in keiner Weise in Frage gestellt. Die Dinge an sich sind also gleich, ungleich etc.'" (Meinong, *ÜEW* 99-100). Translation by Heath.

18. *ignis fatuus*: deceptive hope, delusion (lit. foolish fire).

19*. TSE's note: "Bradley, ['Some Remarks on Memory and Inference,'] *Mind*, [8] (1899), [145-66], here 160: 'Our justification for regarding memory as in general accurate is briefly this, that by taking such a course we are best able to order and harmonise our world. There is in the

end no other actual or possible criterion of fact and truth, and the search for a final fact and for an absolute datum is everywhere the pursuit of a mere *ignis fatuus*.”

20. Russell, “Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions (II)”: “He [Meinong] points out that the division between objects and Objectives is not as sharp as might be supposed. ‘Black’ is an object of presentation, but ‘the blackness of the board’ is an object of thought, and so is ‘the black,’ (i.e. ‘that which is black’)” (352).

21*. TSE’s note: “For a thing to exist it must possess identity; and identity seems a possession with a character at best doubtful. If it is merely ideal, the thing itself can hardly be real. . . . And this identical content is called ideal because it transcends given existence. Existence is given only in presentation; and, on the other hand, the thing is a thing only if its existence goes beyond the now, and extends into the past’ ([Bradley,] *A&R* 72-73).”

22. *bestimmt*: determined, certain.

23*. TSE’s note: “No abstraction (whatever its origin) is in the end defensible. For they are, none of them, quite true, and with each the amount of possible error must remain unknown. The truth asserted is not, and cannot be, taken as real by itself. The background is ignored because it is assumed to make no difference . . . But an assumption of this kind obviously goes beyond our knowledge’ (*A&R* 540).” TSE has marked this passage in his copy and inscribed a marginal note: “This does for Mr. Russell.”

24. American philosopher Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914), “The Icon, Index, and Symbols,” *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, Vol II, Bk. II.156-73, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1932).

25. Corrected from “for” by TSE in proof.

26*. TSE’s note: “The following passage appears to have some appropriateness: ‘We must attach some meaning to the words we use, if we are to speak significantly and not utter mere noise; and the meaning we attach to our words must be something with which we are acquainted. Thus when, for example, we make a statement about Julius Caesar, it is plain that Julius Caesar himself is not before our minds, since we are not acquainted with him. We have in mind some *description* of Julius Caesar: . . . “the founder of the Roman Empire,” or, perhaps, merely “the man whose name was Julius Caesar.” (In this last description, *Julius Caesar* is a noise or shape with which we are acquainted.) Thus our statement does not mean quite what it seems to mean, but means something involving, instead of Julius Caesar, some description of him composed wholly of particulars and universals with which we are acquainted.’ Russell, *Problems* 91-92. But I find the notion of acquaintance completely unsatisfactory.”

27*. TSE’s note: “[Russell], ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,’ *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, [11] (1910-11),” 108-28; here 108.

28*. TSE’s note: “Cf ‘. . . [L]a mentalité des sociétés inférieures . . . comporte bien des représentations abstraites, et des représentations générales; mais ni cette abstraction, ni cette généralité ne sont celles de nos concepts.’ Lévy-Bruhl, *Les Fonctions mentales*, p. 137.” In 1913, TSE discussed Lévy-Bruhl’s *Les Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures* in “The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual” (106), and in 1916, more briefly, in reviews for the *New Statesman* (417; 418, n. 6; 430).

29*. TSE’s note: “Cf. [R. L.] Nettleship [1846-92], [*Philosophical Lectures and*] *Remains [of R. L. Nettleship]*, ed. A. C. Bradley and G. R. Benson, Vol I [(London: Macmillan, 1897)], 176-77.”

30*. TSE's note: "Cf. the idealistic doctrine of the essential connection of the universe with the moment of perception."

31*. TSE's note: "It is true that in the article cited on page 323, acquaintance is defined as 'direct cognitive relation to that object.' But the whole account of acquaintance, both in this article and in the *Problems* seems to me to point directly to enjoyment and not to contemplation, and I cannot help feeling that one of the obscurities of Mr. Russell's position lies in treating as objects what are at the same time meant not to be objects."

32*. TSE's note: "[Russell], 'Relations of Universals and Particulars,' *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, [12] (1911-12), [1-24], 7."

33*. TSE's note: "Cf. [Berkeley]: 'The ideas of sight and touch make two species, entirely distinct and heterogeneous' . . . (*Prin[ciples] of Human Knowledge*, ¶ XLIV) with [Russell] 'If we talk of *one* space we substitute for the perceived sense data a collection of pieces of matter having whatever qualities the science of the moment may prescribe.' '[Relations of] Universals and Particulars.' p.7." TSE's "quotation" from Russell is a paraphrase of the following passage: "If, on the other hand, we consider what may be called 'real' space, i.e. the inferred space containing the 'real' objects which we suppose to be the causes of our perceptions, then we no longer know what is the nature of the qualities, if any, which exist in this 'real' space, and it is natural to replace the bundle of qualities by a collection of pieces of matter having whatever characteristics the science of the moment may prescribe" (7-8).

34*. TSE's note: "It is true that Mr. Russell speaks elsewhere as if we were directly acquainted with things. (*Problems* 211): '[we may know] by means of *acquaintance* with the complex fact itself, which may (in a large sense) be called perception, though it is by no means confined to objects of the senses.' But I do not see how, according to the passage quoted earlier, we can be directly acquainted with anything that is strictly true or false of the real world."

35*. TSE's note: "Cf. Locke's *Essay [concerning Human Understanding]*, Bk. II, Ch. I, Para. 19, 'Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind.'"

Chapter V

The Epistemologist's Theory of Knowledge (*continued*)

I should now like to discuss some points in connection with unreal objects, and the theories of Meinong and Russell, indicating the realistic assumptions which underlie their solutions, and which alone create the problem. This will serve as an introduction to the larger question of denoting, meaning, and context.

There are two questions here involved: that of the existence of unreal objects, and that of the truth or falsity of statements about unreal objects. And again, in the case of unreal objects, there are objects of hallucination, objects of imagination, and objects denoted, but apparently neither believed in nor assumed (the round square). It is chiefly with the last that these two authors are engaged. With regard to all of these types of object I would recall what I have said of the relations of real and ideal, and would urge the following contention: the problem is wholly factitious, and owes its origin to the false assumption of epistemology—the assumption that there is one world of external reality which is consistent and complete: an assumption which is not only ungrounded but in some sense certainly false. Reality contains irreducible contradictions and irreconcilable points of view. How this statement is consistent with a monistic metaphysic I shall endeavour to show in another place.

I wish to touch upon the facts of visual hallucination first because, while the problem is essentially the same as that dealt with by Meinong and Russell, it appears in a more readily apprehensible form, and because it has by some been reduced to a different explanation from that of unreal objects in judgment, whereas I believe the hallucination to be in virtually the same position as the round square; both are non-existent, and both are intended objects. Both assert their reality, though perhaps in a difference of degree. Professor Holt says (*The New Realism*) in stating the claim of an hypothetical opponent:

not the distorted image as such, but the distorted image which *asserts itself to be*, or which *the realist asserts to be* the real object,— . . . this is the crux for realism.¹

This appears to involve a *petitio principii*: it is not admitted that there is a "distorted image as such." In the case of the stick in water (which is quite distinct from the phenomena of hallucination), there is if you please "distorted image as such"; if, that is, you abstract the stick under normal conditions and choose to call that the stick. But here you have only a case of completion of partial aspects of the same object; you say, for example, that it is one and the same object which you intend under two aspects, and the two aspects, when added together, give an object which is essentially continuous with each aspect in its meaning. And this, I think, constitutes the difference between so-called sense illusion and hallucination: the difference of direction of self completion of the object as first presented. In this sense the assertion of Professor Holt is essentially correct; if it is interpreted as meaning that there is nothing in the immediate presentation of the object to determine its reality or unreality; it is I believe mistaken so far as it means that there is in an absolute sense a given object which is not internally related to its own completion. And the degree to which this claim (as it may be called) is realised without practical falsification of the first presentation is the degree of truth of the first presentation. The stick under water is continuous with the stick out of water, in a way in which an hallucination is not; for the latter can complete itself only backward, i.e., the experience has its relations in the direction of neural process, not in the direction which the image intends. It is by this capacity of indefinite self-completion, and not by any ear-marks, that we judge the reality of a presentation; but without this capacity, or the claim, we could not have even a presentation.

The reality of an hallucination is not, in the first place, judged merely by vividness or precision. Vividness, in the ordinary sense, is no more a condition of hallucination than is the liveliness of an idea the condition of belief. An hallucination simply cannot be as vivid as a normal waking impression without fulfilling all the conditions of such impression. There is no question of mere brightness of mental image, in the way in which a well made photograph is brighter than a short exposure. For brightness in this sense is a wholly objective matter; when we look at a dim photograph our impression is as precise and clear as when we examine a very sharp photograph. You cannot, that is, define the strength of an hallucination by the supposed objective clearness of a presentation which is really "there;" you cannot say that the hallucination has all the characteristics of a reality except the third dimension, for example. Such an explanation leaves us wondering why we

do not have the hallucination of reality—as well as the “illusion”—when we contemplate a picture. And it is perhaps in point to offer this one remark on tridimensionality. Three dimensions exist wherever three dimensions are implied. Now in the contemplation of a picture our attitude may I think be analysed into two: we contemplate the reality referred to by the lines and tones, and, we contemplate the lines and tones themselves. A picture is analogous to any of the common figures of optical illusion; the meaning (or reference) of the picture corresponds to the illusory direction of the lines, and the actual arrangements of paint to the “real” directions. In point of fact the apparent direction of the lines is just as objective as the real direction; the apparent direction is the “meaning” of the figure. So the tridimensionality of the picture is just as real as the onedimensionality of the surface: so far as it is a picture, so far as it refers to three dimensions, it has three dimensions. An hallucination, also, has three dimensions, for the point of view of the hallucinated is the *only* point of view; whereas in the case of a picture there is another point of view which is recognised at the same time. An hallucination is therefore wholly unlike a picture, in that there is one point of view from which it is real, and another from which it does not exist at all; though from the point of view of an outsider, it may be what I have previously denominated an intended half-object; i.e., we intend something which from our point of view is wholly inexistent. In order to acknowledge the existence of hallucinations, we have partially to concede their truth.^{2*}

No comparison with normal experience, according to the considerations above, can give an account of the plausibility of an hallucination, for so far as it exists it has all the features of the real world, and it exists so far as it is believed in. The principle upon which I insist is of course the unity and continuity of feeling and objectivity, the fact that, as dwelt upon in the first chapter, the two are only discriminated aspects in the whole of experience. Take, for instance, a child frightened by a bogey. The child “thinks it sees” a bear. The meaning of this phrase is by no means self-evident, for we have, I believe, no criterion for saying that the child does or does not see a bear. Such an illusion may be much more, or much less, than a cinematograph bear; Pierre Janet gives examples, from among his hystericals, of the sensation of touch and weight as well.³ But in a commonplace hallucination (cf. William James in his cabin),⁴ the moment of perception is usually I believe very slight indeed, though—and this is an important point—we can never say that it is altogether absent. In the case of the frightened child,

I am not prepared to support the James-Lange theory, but I do not see any priority of image over emotion, or vice versa. There is, if you like, a tendency for emotion to objectify itself,^{5*} but the implication is surely mutual, for feeling and image react upon one another inextricably, and the two aspects are so closely related, that you cannot say that the relation is casual.

It is therefore not altogether true or altogether false to say that the child sees a bear.⁶ For to take one group of relations of the word "bear," and say that this group and no other shall constitute the meaning, is not only unwarranted but impossible. The child does not know just what it means when it says "bear," nor do we know what it means; it does not know just what it has perceived when it has been frightened by a "bear," nor do we know what it has perceived. For as the difference between real bear and illusory bear is a difference of fullness of relations, and is *not* the sort of difference which subsists between two classes of objects, so the one word must cover both reality and error. The only case in which it is possible in any sense to say that a perception is "mistaken" is when there is actually before us an object closely enough resembling the object of the erroneous perception to justify our saying that it was this object which we perceived and from which we made false inferences; so that the degree of error which we recognise is in inverse ratio to the degree of similarity between the first and the second perception. The error is thus error because we are able in practice to assume that it was the true object that we perceived the whole time. In practice, that is to say, you can credit the possibility of a false inference from a truly apprehended premiss; but in theory you cannot say that the premiss is truly apprehended in one case and not in the other, for you have no right to say that it is the same premiss. The premiss (here the perception from which we infer) is only *that* premiss with reference to what follows, and in this sense, every inference is a true inference. For in metaphysics there is no concatenation of inferences, but there is a starting-point which expands itself and can neither be arrested nor analysed, for the process is not one simply of addition, but of inner development, so that the starting-point itself is altered, and you cannot say absolutely what the starting-point was. When we take these facts into consideration, we find that it is only relatively that we can declare an erroneous object to have been inferred from a true perception. The real object was "there," and in a practical sense it was that to which the perception referred, but the solution, in which we account for a true and a false perception by summing them up under an identical reference, is essentially a *practical* solution, inasmuch as it involves

an *interpretation* of a point of view which we do not accept, that of the error, and an interpretation is essentially unverifiable.

The error is an error then, because we compare it to a cognate reality. It differs from hallucination in that in the latter case there is no cognate reality. The difference is of course of degree only, for we do compare the differences of an identity with respect to hallucination: the room as it really is versus the room plus the spectre, and the fact that it is the same room gives us warrant for affirming error. We only say that an object is unreal with respect to something else which we declare to have been affirmed at the same time and which continues to be real, while the other does not. Now an hallucination has a greater degree of substantiality than an error, because of its greater independence; there is, strictly speaking, nothing to contrast it with except its own unreality. An hallucination, therefore, is not a "mistake," for it is not attached to the real world in the direction of objectivity; it cannot be interpreted as referring to any object which is actually "there." It is attached to the real world, but its real relations are in the direction of physiological foundation, and this involves a much more radical change of point of view than mere error.

We have seen that the hallucination does not differ from the real object by defect of any specific qualities (weight, solidity, internality, etc.) for such a question belongs wholly to another dimension. It does not differ by contrast with some other (real) object which we are said (really) to intend. Reality, we find, is not to be defined by anything in the immediate content.^{7*} There is a common form of reconciliation, however, which possesses a high degree of persuasiveness, and which does indeed explain unreal objects of perception in a limited way. The error, the hallucination, and the reality, will all be equally real in themselves, and perhaps ultimately harmonious; but we are in practice concerned only with a very restricted field of reality, a field no more real from the absolute point of view than any of the fragments which we exclude from it. We assume a complex $a-b-c-d$, and we exclude $x-B$ fragments of a different alphabet, because we prefer the alphabet of which we have the more letters. The so-called hallucination is real and true when properly understood; when stating an error we really meant a truth. It is only because we have arbitrarily separated one portion of reality from the rest, a separation necessary for experience from finite centres, that we are obliged to relegate the rest to unreality. The world as we are acquainted with it from this limited point of view is an artificial construction, and, our point of view not being large enough to grasp the whole, we

consider the rest simply as the debris of our own slight structure. This is perhaps a doctrine of certain idealisms; and it is, so far as I understand, the doctrine of Professor Holt, who says "The . . . content (i.e., an image) simply is, and is in itself neither true nor false" (*NR* 357; TSE's parenthetical). The idealist [Bradley] asserts,

We have at first A, which possesses the qualities *c* and *b*, inconsistent adjectives which collide; and we go on to produce harmony by making a distinction within this subject. That was really not mere A, but either a complex within A, or (rather here) a wider whole in which A is included. The real subject is A + D; and this subject contains the contradiction made harmless by division, since A is *c* and D is *b*. (*A&R* 192-93)

These two statements seem to me substantially the same. One asserts that the content simply is; the other that the transmuted content is the same content as the first. Both assert, I believe, in the case of hallucination, that there is a real object present which is interpreted in two different ways, true or false. But we have seen that there is no choice but whether the object be real or nonexistent. If the real subject is not A but A + D, yet on the other hand the subject to which both *c* and *b* referred is A simply, and (for an idealist at least) the quality which refers to a different subject is a different quality; while for Professor Holt there is in illusory experience a real contradiction, and yet "by reality we seem to mean the thing most remote from contradiction" (*NR* 366).

No account of error in terms of "dissolution" can ultimately satisfy, though its only justification is its ultimacy. Such an account is ostensibly idealistic, since its criterion is coherence, and ultimate coherence is postulated, so that no purely "unreal" objects are to be left over, as in a realistic world; but it is compelled to make assumptions of simple correspondence. "Let us suppose the reality to be X (*a b c d e f g . . .*), and that we are able only to get partial views of this reality" (*A&R* 193). But in metaphysics it is only by a euphemism that such a partial view is a view of *that* object, rather than a complete view of a different object; and the self-completion of the view involves the affirmation of another reality to which the reality apprehended fails to conform. You may say that the partial view or the hallucination implies its own self-contradiction and transcendence. But in the "transcendence" of error, I insist, the error, as a real object, is not got rid of. An object is not transcended, though a point of view is; and it is only as we consider the hallucination not as an object, but as an element in a point of

view, that it can be said to be “transcended,” “transmuted,” or “dissolved.” Such a theory as that here outlined by Mr. Bradley or by Professor Holt appears unsatisfactory in that the unreality is merely pushed back and not done away with. What we thought was the object was not the object. But we have seen that an object is an object so far as it is thought to be so. The alteration from error to truth is not a change in the object, but a change in the whole situation, and the object, so far as it is an object, must be admitted to persist as a real object in history. The illusion which I have lived through is no more unreal than is Julius Caesar unreal because he is dead. If the world is as essentially connected as idealists would often have us think, the unreal object must still persist and influence reality.^{8*}

The situation in regard to hallucinations and in regard to erroneous judgments is not essentially different. The one asserts the existence of an unreal object, and the other the subsistence of an unreal objective; and the line between object and objective, and between existence and subsistence, cannot as we have seen be sharply drawn. Something is asserted to be, which is not; though in order to assert the being of an object we must in some way perceive it.

The problem of error cannot be solved by an enlarged scheme of relations. . . . For there is a positive sense and a specific character which marks each appearance, and this will still fall outside. (*A&R* 195)

We can thus approach to no solution so long as we regard the world as made up of objects.

We must conclude then that the difference between hallucination and reality is not the difference between an unreal object and a real one. All objects are real, and the unreality is not of them *qua* objects, but because of certain other relations into which (in their reality otherwise than as objects) they fail to enter. An hallucination, we are constantly tempted to forget, is not an object, but a sphere of reality; its existence is internal as well as external. The contradictions which we have to reconcile are not two objects, for objects in themselves cannot contradict each other (this is in agreement, I believe, with Mr. Holt) but two points of view, although I should maintain (as against Mr. Holt) that the object is inseparable from the point of view.^{9*} The hallucination is a whole world of feeling, and the object is simply that world so far as objectified. You cannot, therefore, compare the two objects directly, but only through the media of the two points of view of error and truth (though the two viewpoints are in themselves as

objective as you please). We are unable to say, however, that one point of view is right and the other wrong, for we thus imply an element of identity, or of identical reference; the assertion of one point of view against another must be made from a third point of view, which somehow contains the first and second. And yet it must be noticed (for I see no way to avoid this hair-splitting) that it is only from the third point of view that the first two are therein contained. For as soon as we have realised that we have reached a third point of view, we are already at a fourth, in which the first and second reassert themselves once more. So that it is only so long as we can support a particular point of view (and this involves not recognising it as such) that we can believe that the contradiction between truth and error is superseded. To this matter I shall recur later. The chief result that I would emphasise here is that an hallucination involves much more than the assertion of contradictory objects; it involves a change in the subject as well. The *I* who saw the ghost is not the *I* who had the attack of indigestion. In a change of viewpoint, there is some sense at least a total change, and I shall ask in another place just what sort of identity persists.

With imaginary objects we come to a class which is frequently, under the name of assumptions, distinguished sharply from objects of belief, both true and erroneous. I cannot feel that this distinction is needed. On the basis of the previous discussion, it should appear that any object is real in so far as it is attended to, and that when we assert an error or hallucination, we attend not to the object itself but to the experience. When I think of the golden mountain, I think of something which is to that extent real, i.e., what we call its unreality will appear from subsequent relations and not from the immediate presentations. There is, upon this view, nothing which we may call mere presentation. When we speak of presentation (see my third chapter), we refer to something which was never actually presented, the "content"; what is presented is really the object, and this is not presented as a presentation, but as real. Undoubtedly it will be objected that we do think of objects as unreal. To this point I shall recur later; here I shall only recall what was said about the object of hallucination; in referring to a past hallucination the direct object is an experience, the indirect object the hallucinatory object. As the imaginary object does not differ essentially from this indirect object, I shall pass to it through a consideration of the object of a past hallucination.

I said that the direct object is an erroneous experience. But this is a real object only to a slight extent, and at the first analysis appears to be an

intended object. For it splits into two parts, like other psychological objects: the physiological part and the real part. On the one hand we intend what “really went on”; if it is certain “ideas” in the “mind,” then these ideas (Chapter II) dissolve into the physiological process; and nothing “went on” which cannot be described by the neurologist. On the other hand we intend the object intended by the patient, and this is on our part a true case of assumption as far as it is successful. When we intend an intention, that is to say, we intend something which is real in our world in combination with something which is not real in our world. But the experience as a whole *is* real in our world; other men’s experiences are realities with which we come into contact, and which are continually influencing us. Here then, we have cases in which an assumption forms part of a reality: in which an assumption is real not simply as a real assumption (i.e., the fact that we made the assumption is true), but we have to make the assumption in order to apprehend an object which we know to be real. In cases like this we seem to confront a feature of the assumption neglected by Meinong. For the object of the hallucination is not assumed in the way in which objects which we do not know to exist are assumed; the object here is known not to exist. We cannot intend the intention of an object without intending the object itself; this is what I have called the indirect object when the direct object is an experience. And where the experience is an assumption and not an hallucination the matter is still further complicated. Another man “assumes” the golden mountain; I intend this experience as an object. I ought theoretically to be able to assume the assumption without committing myself to any attitude toward the golden mountain on my own account; but I find that I am obliged to make an indirect object of the mountain, intend it not only *through* the intention of the assumption, but directly. This immediacy holds true even if the object is something of which I know nothing, and the name of which has no meaning for me. I still *intend* the same object. Here again, in order to apprehend a reality (someone’s making an assumption), I am forced to make an assumption myself. According to the account which I have given of psychology, in fact, we make assumptions in the apprehension of a large number of real objects.

I infer from these facts that assumption is not a simple act, but that the term may be made to cover every act from acceptance to rejection; and that the apprehension of an object known to be imaginary does not differ essentially from the apprehension of any other object, unless we have hocus-pocussed an external reality to which ideas are to “conform.” Can we, in

reading a novel, simply assume the characters and the situations? On the contrary, I seem to find that we either accept them as real (with hallucination as the limiting case), or consider them as *meanings*, as a criticism of reality from the author's point of view. Actually, I think that if we did not vacillate between these two extremes (one of which alone would give the "photographic" novel and the other the arid "pièce à thèse") a novel would mean very little to us. The characters and the situations are all "imaginary," but is there any one act which so apprehends them, cut off and "floating"? In order to be imaginary, they must be contrasted with something which is real. There must, furthermore, be specific points of resemblance and difference: for the type of reality with which the imaginary object is contrasted must be a type to which the latter pretends to belong. Now so far as merely the imaginary object intends such a reality and falls short, it is not an object of any kind real or imaginary, but falls under what I have said previously of "mere idea." If the character in fiction is an imaginary object, it must be by virtue of something more than its being imaginary, i.e. merely intending to be a reality which it is not. It must be, as I said, contrasted with this reality; to be contrasted it must be more than a pure reference; it must have in fact another aspect in which it has a reality of its own distinct from its reference. The fiction is thus more than a fiction: it is a *real* fiction.

We thus analyse the intended object of fiction into its reference and its reality. The reality in its turn is not a simple object but an intended object, for it includes everything from the antecedents of the character in the author's mind, to the symbols which express the character on paper. We may mean the character as a presentation to the author's mind; but a figure in fiction may and often does have an existence for us distinct from what is merely our interpretation of what the author "had in mind." Frequently we feel more confidence in our own interpretation of the character than in any account of the genesis and meaning which the author may give himself. This is not always mere accident; no really "vital" character in fiction is altogether a conscious construction of the author. On the contrary, it may be a sort of parasitic growth upon the author's personality, developing by internal necessity as much as by external addition. So that we come to feel that the point of view from which the author criticises is not wholly internal to the point of view from which he created the character. Of course this difference should not be insisted upon, for the author may shift from a creative to a critical point of view and back at any moment.^{10*} Now a character which is "lived through," which is real to us not merely by suggesting

“that sort of person” but by its independent cogency, is to the extent of its success real. Treating it as imaginary involves a change of viewpoint. Besides this reality, the character has other relations which are inconsistent with reality. It belongs in other contexts, has relations which are incompatible with its reality. Its unreality, therefore, is not in itself, but in relations extending far beyond itself; its reality is its reference, and its unreality as that to which it refers is its reality as an “imaginary” object. And, on the other hand, as an imaginary object it is just as real as anything; it is as a real object that it is imaginary.

An imaginary object has thus two main aspects: its intention to be real and its reality as an intention. As the former it is limited by its paucity of relations; as the latter it exists by virtue of its relations. There is, strictly speaking, no imaginary objective: we attend to a complex which comprehends two points of view—a real object with few relations and an intended object which consists of its relations. When we speak of the character as a fiction we mean a relation between an object real from one point of view and certain entities (ultimately physical) which are real from another point of view. The imaginary object, it will follow, is a highly complex ideal construction. It exists as such only from a third point of view which includes the two just mentioned; but these two also are in the closest dependence upon one another. For the real relations of the intended object (the mental and physical conditions which attended the genesis and realisation of that character of fiction) would not be such as they are without the intention to realise a fiction.

At this point I must introduce another complication. The author himself may attend to his fiction not merely as an intended reality (i.e., he may not be and in reality I suppose never is conscious of his fiction from the point of view from which it is real). He may be conscious of the continual *va-et-vient* of ideas in the process of realisation; the intended reality shifts and changes as he deserts one outcome for another; and he may be conscious furthermore of the effort to express felt emotions and abstract ideas by “clothing them in flesh and blood.” So that I do not believe that the author in process of composition is ever, in practice, occupied with a single point of view; or that in practice any moment ever exists when one point of view is in exclusive possession. But the “imaginary object” has all these relations and in fact *is* these relations.

Finally, I do not see any possibility of saying that the imaginary object either subsists or exists. For when we think of the character in fiction, we go

on to think of some aspect in the complex. Becky Sharp exists in the time-order of *Vanity Fair*, but this time-order does not itself exist. Becky exists as an event in the life of Thackeray,¹¹ and as an event in the life of every reader in the same way that every real person exists as an event in the life of every other real person with whom he comes in contact. But the object denoted by the word Becky does not exist, for it is simply the identical reference of several points of view.

If the evidence which I have offered has any relevance, it should appear that assumption or entertainment is by no means a simple act like acceptance or rejection. The object is not a simple object. There is a simple object which is real in the same way in which an hallucination is real, but this object is only part of the object of the assumption. The chief advantage which this theory pretends to offer over Meinong's is its greater consistency with Bradley's views on floating ideas. The *Annahme*, as I understand it, is such a floating idea.¹² If reality is all of a piece, as the epistemologist believes, then the imaginary must be cut off and floating "like Mahomet's coffin" between earth and sky.¹³ In the theory which I outline, the distinction of objective and subjective, external reality and mental, is unnecessary. Whatever is gathered together in consciousness equally is, and is real or unreal only in relation.

A third class of objects is that of unreal objects. These differ from the two foregoing in that they are neither believed in nor partially believed in, but are intended objects of "denoting phrases which denote nothing." In the other two classes there always is an object, although in the case of assumptions the object dissolves into entities which are not themselves objects but do not fail to exist. We might say that in an assumption the object is real, but is not an object, and that in the intention of an unreal object, the object is an object but is not real.^{14*} The question is, in the words of Mr. Russell, whether "any grammatically correct denoting phrase stands for an *object*."¹⁵

The difficulty with Meinong's view, according to Mr. Russell, is that such an object may infringe the law of contradiction. The present King of France will both exist and not exist, the round square will be round and not round. The fallacy of this criticism lies, I believe, in treating existence as being for metaphysics as well as for formal logic, a simple predicate.^{16*} To say that the present King of France both exists and not exists is no more false than to say that my typewriter both exists and not exists inasmuch as it now exists for me who am looking at it, and not for Mr. Russell who is

looking at something else. In other words, in asserting existence of any object, we denote existence but do not mean it; and yet, we do mean to denote, and this meaning to denote is an essential part of the denoting.

The difficulty is greatly enhanced by the fact that in the use of any phrase we cannot always be sure to what extent we are meaning the denotation or meaning the meaning, and how far we are denoting the denotation or denoting the meaning. For practical purposes the phrase "the present King of France" denotes a real object but has no meaning; but this will not do for us, because any denoting phrase which can be used in a proposition means to have meaning, and is therefore not meaningless, and also a phrase cannot denote without likewise having meaning. While we may say, according to Mr. Russell, that

(1) "The present King of France" is a denoting phrase,

we may not say

(2) "The present King of France is bald."

It is possible, however, to deny the admissibility of the first of the two propositions, for it implies the partial maintenance of two points of view. I do not see how we can refer to the meaning of a phrase without referring also to its denotation.

Proposition (1) is about "the present King," but would not be a proposition unless we assumed at one moment the existence of the present King. For if we *know* that "the present King" denotes nothing, then it isn't denoting; and if we say that it means to denote, then we have transported ourselves to a point of view internal to the meaning, and actually mention the present King of France. In logic, perhaps, but not in metaphysic, a denoting phrase may denote nothing. Somehow, obscurely, the object denoted is acknowledged existence. It is non-existent according to the practical standards which recognise no degrees between existence and non-existence; but for metaphysics, it cannot be denied practical reality without being admitted to some more attenuated but (if you like) equally real reality.

And notice that the contrast is not at all that between the solid reality and the idea. This is to confuse denotation with meaning. "Chimæras do not exist."^{17*} This proposition does not say: Ideal chimeras do not exist. The chimeras to which existence is denied are not the chimeras "in my head" but the real chimeras. But surely, it will be objected, we do not say: Real chimeras are unreal! Yet that is, in my opinion, just what, from the

point of view of metaphysics, we do say, and any other statement would be meaningless. The explanation so far as there is one, is simply this. The phrase, "real chimeras" can be taken in two ways: (1) the chimeras which are actually experienced; (2) chimeras which are "real." The word "real" has in (1) meaning, and in (2) denotation. On the other hand, in order to have meaning in (1), it must denote something which in experience is actually judged to be real in sense (2), and in order to have denotation in (2), it must have meaning in actual experience. By substituting alternately, we get

Chimeras such as are experienced, are not real.

Real chimeras (i.e., such as would satisfy all the conditions of reality) are not experienced—not met with in experience.

Here by denying the predication of denotation of meaning and vice versa we seem to escape contradiction. But the evasion is only momentary. For the phrase "chimeras such as are experienced" denotes real chimeras, and the phrase "real chimeras"^{18*} means chimeras which are actually experienced. Can we say that the non-existent chimeras are real chimeras in denotation and imaginary chimeras in meaning? We have some idea of that to which we deny existence, and the idea, we have seen above, is so far as it is ideal as well the reality which it intends, and we must say similarly of the denoting phrase, that so far as it denotes it denotes a real object.

What has been said of the status of ideas, in a previous chapter, will thus apply to a certain extent to denoting phrases. In each there is the moment of objectivity, so that it implies its own fulfilment in reality, as an object of practical experience. Idea and phrase both denote realities, but the realities which they denote are, so far as idea or phrase denotes, identical with the idea or the phrase. It is a mistake, I think, to treat the word as something which barely points to the object, a sign-post which you leave behind on the road. The word "chimera" or the idea "chimera" is the beginning of the reality chimera and is absolutely continuous with it, and the "present King of France" is already partially real. The phrase directs your attention to an object but the object is an object because it is also *that* object, because the mere hypothetical moment of objectivity is qualified by the characters of the phrase, which are real properties at once of the phrase and of the object. Just as the idea refers to itself, so the denoting phrase denotes itself. But just as an idea is not a thing, and our difficulties arise from trying to treat it as a thing, so a denoting phrase is not a thing. It is not simply *that*, for a mere

that (which is in fact only a theoretical limit) does not refer to something else; reference is a kind of activity, original or delegated. Like an idea, a word or phrase has existence outside of its objectivity, and a denoting phrase in particular resembles an idea in having an existence which straddles so to speak two moments of objectivity; the one moment being simply those marks or sounds which denote, and the other the object denoted.

This is the only way that I can discover to get over the metaphysical difficulties of unreal objects: to a very large extent we are not dealing with objects at all, and it is only when we try to press an exact meaning that we find language forcing untenable theories upon us. The denoting phrase is not an object, and existence is a complex notion. What we denote when we *denote the denoting phrase* is not the phrase as such, for that is an activity rather than an object, but rather the tendency toward objectification in the direction toward us; that is, the “word,” the written sign, or the *vox et praeterea nihil*.¹⁹ But this object itself is an abstraction and not real, for when you have stripped it of its power, its reference, it is no longer that object, but something quite unrelated to the denoting. It would thus appear that in denoting, the object is no more than a moment of objectivity, and that in thinking of a denoting phrase we mean an object which dissolves into two sub-objects and a relation. And this analysis is a falsification, for one object cannot, as we have said, refer to another without being more than an object, and the sub-objects, abstracted from the reference, disappear.

The usefulness of this account will not be at first evident but it may go a little way toward solving the difficulties raised by other explanations. The difficulty of Meinong’s theory that there are unreal objects is, as Mr. Russell points out, the fact that such objects violate the law of contradiction; and the difficulty of Mr. Russell’s theory is the contradiction of phrases denoting which yet denote nothing—a pure mystery. The position of Meinong is untenable, I think, only so long as we assume that although objects may exist in various ways, they can exist only in one degree. While it is true that the round square is both square and round, it is not true to say that it is both round and not round, although square may imply, in other contexts, not-round. This is to confuse two planes of reality; so far as the object exists at all it is both square and round, but the squareness and roundness which it has are the squareness and roundness of that degree of reality; the object is not present upon that level of reality upon which square and round are contradictory, though it is none the less, *qua* object, real. Objects

exist for us in two ways: As we *intend* an object, the intended object is so far real, and as we experience an object, it realises itself, and comes to require a certain degree of fullness of relations before it considers itself an object. The ordinary objects (by which we set our standard of reality for the intended objects denoted by the symbols which denote those ordinary or usual objects) are objects of the second sort. But we are accustomed to handle and use them by symbols which merely denote them; we forget that their reality is as much in their meaning as in their denotation, and we take it for granted that they simply are. Nor is this belief error—the matter is much more complicated than that! *As* objects, it is true that they simply are: but unfortunately, in order to be objects, they must be much more; they must be continuous with experience, and continuous with it in a rich and full way. Now commonly we do not treat unreal objects as objects *simpliciter*: the common-sense solution is to treat our “real” objects *simpliciter*, and our unreal or imaginary objects as more immediately continuous with experience. Yet when we come to *préciser* we find ourselves reversing the procedure, for we discover that it was just this continuity with experience, this fullness of relation, which gave us what we call our real objects, and just the discontinuity, the mere intention, which gave us our unreal objects. The “unreal” object, *qua* object, is just the bare intention, the object-moment; whereas the “real” object *is* real because it has so much to draw upon; because if removed it would, we feel, leave so much more of a void in our experience. And yet this unlimited credit is not the object itself; for it is not as such objective. So we are forced to conclude that one object is more real than another—more of an object—by virtue of non-object relations.^{20*} Both real object and unreal object are, *qua* objects, equally real; when, both, so to speak, are at the fovea. It is only when we cease to consider either simply as an object, that one appears to be real and the other unreal.

We may say, then, that the unreal object, although it exists, does not violate the law of contradiction.^{21*} While it is, broadly speaking, true that the present King of France both exists and does not exist, it is not true in the same sense; for “exists,” as we have seen, is not a simple predicate. I suppose that it will be objected, to this assertion, that any judgment of existence would be rendered a tautology, for it could no more than declare that an object has the sort of existence that it has. Such an objection would in my opinion hold good only if the sorts of existence were cut off from each other like inches along a yard-stick. When we say exists, we mean a degree

of existence to be determined by the context, and when we state the subject, we do not need to know the precise degree of reality which it is to have. In other words, a substantive in isolation is not yet even a substantive, for its degree of quality is quite unknown. Which states no more than that a substantive in complete isolation does not exist; for it would be a symbol that symbolised nothing, and hence would not be a symbol at all, but another reality (i.e., certain marks on paper, etc.).

It is essential to the doctrine which I have sketched that the symbol or sign be not arbitrarily amputated from the object which it symbolises, as for practical purposes, it is isolated (see 312). No symbol, I maintain, is ever a mere symbol, but is continuous with that which it symbolises. Without words, no objects. The object, purely experienced and not denominated, is not yet an object, because it is only a bundle of particular perceptions; in order to be an object it must present identity in difference throughout a span of time. Now of course I do not pretend that there are no objects for the higher animals, or even for the lower; the difference is in one aspect only of degree. But we may say that in any knowledge prior to speech, the object is not so much an identity recognised as such as it is a similar way of acting; the identity is rather lived out than known. What we are here concerned with is the explicit recognition of an object as such, and I do not believe that this occurs without the beginnings of speech. We may say if we like that the dog sees the cat and knows it as a cat, though it does not know its name, and I have no objection to this way of speaking loosely. But when we ask in what this knowledge consists, we can only point to a form of behaviour. Our only way of showing that we are attending to an object^{22*} is to show that it and ourselves are independent entities, and to do this we must have names. So that the point at which behaviour changes into mental life is essentially indefinite; it is a question of interpretation whether an expression which is repeated at the approach of the same object (as a cat may have a peculiar way of acting at the approach of a dog) is behaviour or language. In either case, I insist, it is continuous with the object; in the first case because we have no object (except from the point of view of the observer, which must not be confused with that of the patient under examination), and in the second case because it is language which gives us objects rather than mere "passions." Or at least we have no objects without language.

I know that it will be objected that I am here confusing the genetic with the structural standpoint; and in reply I can only urge, that I have found

the two organically related, and that I cannot admit that metaphysics may analyse and find truth in one part of the analysis, discarding the other. The object, you will say, is now known as independent of the word, though like[ly] enough without words we might not have come to know objects. It is true, I reply, that when we mean an object with a word we mean the object and not the word, and we might mean the same object by a different word, though I think that you quite underestimate the closeness with which particular words are woven into our reality. But the object which we denote in this sense is the object *qua* object, and not the bundle of experiences which the object means. The object *qua* object would not exist without this bundle of experiences, but the bundle would not be a bundle unless it were held together by the moment of objectivity which is realised in the name. I am very far from meaning that it is the act of naming which makes the object, for the activity does not proceed from one side more than from another. Objects cannot arise without names, and names never spring up without objects, ready to be applied to the first objects to which they seem appropriate. Nor do I mean that the object did not exist until it was known, but only that it has not the character of objectivity until it is known as an object.

The name is not the object, certainly. We may say more truly that it is a category through which one grasps the object (if anyone has a taste for categories), but even this will not state the case correctly, if the category is conceived as something subjective, contrasted with the object. I should prefer to speak of the name as the moment of denotation; it is not that which is denoted, obviously, or merely a convenient means for denoting something which exists in complete independence of the name. It denotes an object which is not itself, and yet, when we ask just what this object is which is denoted, we have nothing to point to but the name. We do not denote any qualities of the object, as such; we do not, that is, denote any definition which could be given of the object; we denote not its *whatness* but its *thatness*. And we must not forget that even "that" is a name; if I ask you to what you refer, you may simply point to the object and say "that"; you mean, if you like, a certain bundle of perceptions, but unless what you mean has this name "that," it is not an object. The simplest thing that a thing can be is to be "that," is to be merely object; and we are not denoting "that," and it is not object, until we have these two words at our disposal. Try to think of what anything would be if you refrained from naming it altogether, and it will dissolve into sensations which are not objects; and it

will not be that particular object which it is, until you have found the right name for it.

This relationship of thing and name has interesting aspects on the other side. If we cannot say that we have that object until we have that name, since each name is a different way of organizing a set of experiences, so on the other hand we have not really got that name until we have the right object. It is evident that a name is not a name unless it is the name of something, that the feeling of a meaning, if ever so faint, will just make the difference between a name and a mere *Laut-complex*.²³ Now just as an object which we cannot name is as yet only the adumbration of that object, so the name of which the object is not as yet distinct is only the adumbration of that name; we sometimes find ourselves guilty of using very specific names when for all that we know the name is equivalent merely to "object." Yet the name implies particularity. As we may fancy, if we like, objects wandering about waiting to be met with and be named (like the animals in the Garden of Eden), so we may fancy names wandering about in our heads waiting for objects. But such is an hypothetical limit which is never reached. Now as imaginary objects and imaginary spheres of reality are not "in our heads," any more than the "real" world is, names may be names of real objects in imaginary spheres. The "present King of France" is not the name for anything in the "real" world—but in the real world the "present King of France" is not a name at all. Supposing that there were such a real world cut off from all imaginary worlds, "the present King of France" would be a mere noise—in the real world.

This, however, is a digression. Though we cannot say that we have either name or object (to recur to the beginning of the last paragraph) until we have the complete object for that name or the complete name for that object, yet the point at which this mystic marriage occurs is not exactly determinable. This should make a little clearer my observations on the child's imaginary bear [334]. The child means "bear," we may say, without really knowing what bear means; yet so far as it has reacted to the bogey in the same way as it would to a real bear, the name "bear" in the child's mind has a real bear to back it up. The name has terminated in an experience, and as even the word "chimera" terminates in an experience in so far as the word is admitted to have a meaning, and not merely itself to *be*, the word has a real object.

The discussion of real and unreal objects will proceed with eternal fruitlessness so long as we maintain the belief that there is one consistent world

of the real and that the rest is illusory. Nor do we advance a step farther by affirming that everything is real, for this alteration merely crams all the unreality into thought which was formerly in perception, and in nowise resolves the question. The whole difficulty, I believe, arises from taking existence as a simple concept. Whereas, I have tried to show, we can never extricate the denotation of "real" from its meaning. The process of development of a real world, as we are apt to forget in our theories, works in two directions; we have not first a real world to which we add our imaginings, nor have we a real world out of which we select *our* "real" world, but the real and the unreal develop side by side. If we think of the world not as ready made—the world, that is, of meaning for us—but as constructed, or constructing itself (for I am careful not to talk of the creative activity of mind, a phrase meaningless in metaphysics) at every moment, and never more than an approximate construction, a construction essentially practical in its nature: then the difficulties of real and unreal disappear. Theories of knowledge usually assume that there is one consistent real world, in which everything is real and equally real, and that it is our business to find it. They do this largely, I suppose, because common sense does the same thing, not realising that the denotations of real and unreal may hold good for a practical point of view and not for a metaphysical. While the real world of epistemology is hard and fast, its *whatness* and its *thatness* inseparably geminated, the real world of practice is essentially vague, unprecise, swarming with what are, from a metaphysical point of view, insoluble contradictions. We forget that what has grown up from a purely practical attitude cannot be explained by a purely theoretical. The real and the unreal are, from the outside point of view which we attempt to take as epistemologists, equally real, and our consequent troubles are due to the fact that these contrasts arose and have their meaning, only from the internal point of view which we have abandoned in seeking an explanation.

We can never, I mean, wholly explain the practical world from a theoretical point of view, because this world is what it is by reason of the practical point of view and the world which we try to explain is a world spread out upon a table—simply *there*! The plight into which we put ourselves is however inevitable, for the theoretical point of view is the inevitable outgrowth of the practical. We arrive at objects, as I have tried to show, by meaning objects; sensations organise themselves around a (logical) point of attention and the world of feeling is transmogrified into a world of self and object. We thus have an object which is constituted by the denoting,

though what we denote has an existence as an object only because it is also not an object, for *qua* object it is merely the denoting, the projection of shadow of the intention; as *real* object it is not object, but a whole of experiences which cluster round the point of denotation.^{24*} Now in practice do we use the complex meaning or only the denotation? I do not see any final answer to this question. For a theoretical account of the practical attitude would be a description from an outside point of view; and a "practical" account would give merely the theory of our practice. A theory of practice or a practice of theory would be equally beside the mark: the first inevitably would reduce everything to meaning and the second would reduce everything to denoting. So far as objects are objects, we always intend to denote them, of course; but in practice, they are only objects partially or occasionally, and we cannot decide to what extent.

Practice, and this is the difficulty (though all our difficulties are perhaps one in different forms), is shot through with theory, and theory with practice. The hypothetical transition from sensation to subject-object, which I have attempted to outline, is a speculative activity. The assumption of a real world is a theory; nothing, in fact, is merely found. And the distinction between theory and practice can nowhere be positively drawn; whether we are setting up an assumption "for our own ends" or purely from the love of speculation, is everywhere matter for a relative distinction. In general we may say, nevertheless, that the sharper and more complete the lines, the more theoretical the account; and in this way, when we attempt to define practice we get a theory, and a theory may incorporate itself into our practice. Hence our theory will be found full of practical motives and practical consequences, and our practice will be found to be largely based upon speculation.

To return, after this long digression, to our objects, I conclude that we can never give an exact description or explanation of the relations of the real and the unreal. For we have no difficulty with the matter at all until we begin to think (yet this thinking was forced upon us originally by the practical difficulties of illusion). Practically, as I said before, we use "real" in two senses, and thus skip, within the practical, between practical and theoretical points of view. "Chimeras do not exist." A theoretical account of this might be, I said, "real chimeras are not real." This might be the theoretical account of what we really say, or the theory which we practice, or the theoretical account of the theory that we practice. Or we might give either of the alternatives which I offered earlier. But in every judgment there arises

the contrast between reality and unreality.^{25*} A contrast which from a point of view (outside the sphere of interest of that judgment) is unjustified in the form in which it presents itself, and always means something different. But in the end these accounts are simply interpretations which have greater or less utility. "Chimeras do not exist." If we understand this it needs no explanation, if not we can find none. "The King of France is bald." This is true or false or meaningless according to its context and bearing. That the theory needs working out in great detail I cannot see. It would be tying knots in the east wind. We have secured, I think, a general principle, and have seen why it neither demands nor admits complete elaboration.

What I have been saying may seem to have no direct bearing upon the metaphysics of Mr. Bradley, but the whole position taken here throughout the discussion of the epistemological attitude has been in support of this metaphysic. For from this point of view the problem of knowledge does not exist; the distinction between inner and outer, which makes the epistemologist's capital, cannot stand. We have seen that the word "idea" does not refer to something ("thing") which intervenes between the object and the percipient, but is a stage in the process of realisation of a world. The object so far as there is an object is presented to the knower without mediation of category or other psychological apparatus. Knowledge, that is to say, cannot be defined in terms of anything else; and so far as there is any problem, it has its origin in the fact that knowing is not simply knowing, but has another aspect. And why this is, I have to some extent attempted to show. We tend to think of objects—of things—as being objects under any and every condition: if they are not objects when they are not known, then the only alternative, we think, is that they disappear altogether. But we have seen that even within experience objects could not be objects unless they were much more; and their objectivity, their being denoted, is only a moment of their reality; a moment which we say metaphorically is supported by an act of the will, although I should never admit that the situation was due to the subject side any more than to the object side, or that the notion of activity was ultimately possible in any sense.

The real world, if the real world means the world of real objects, is thus something with which we are in immediate contact, and indeed quite real—as real as you like—though varying and unprecise. Its "relation" to the knower is however not here in question, inasmuch as knowledge is not a relation. The real world is not inside or outside; it is not presented in consciousness or to consciousness as a particular grouping of entities, for as

presented it is not in or to consciousness at all: it simply is. There is no meaning, I think, in saying that in knowing consciousness is either active or passive, or that there is an "awareness" beyond the mere psycho-physiological phenomena of attention; or that consciousness "is" its object or is different from its object. But knowing, we have found, is only part of a larger process of experience, and the point at which we have real knowing is never precisely determinable. There is always, in our experience, a real world "external" in a restricted sense, for there is always, in any existence worthy of us, a real object of attention, and so far as there is, the object is directly known but not directly experienced; for the object, to be an object, is always meant to be something more than its abstracted qualities, and to be directly known cannot be directly experienced.^{26*}

But the object as object cannot be self-supporting. Its objectivity is merely externality, and nothing in reality can be merely external, but must possess being "for" itself. Yet to mean it as an object means to mean it as more than an object, as something *ultimately* real. And in this way every object leads us far beyond itself to an ultimate reality: this is the justification for our metaphysics.

The objects which are apprehended by every finite centre are as apprehended real. The question arises, how the worlds of these various centres may be said to form one world; inasmuch as there is no "objective" criterion for reality in the sense of an external solid world to which our individual presentations should conform. The real world, I have insisted, consists in the common meaning and "identical reference" of various finite centres. This leads to a question, cardinal in the philosophy of Mr. Bradley; the question of finite centres and solipsism.

NOTES

1. Holt, "The Place of Illusory Experience in a Realistic World," *The New Realism* 303-73; here 306; hereafter abbreviated *NR*. Several of the contributors had been TSE's teachers at Harvard.

2*. TSE's note: "This paragraph is only the detailed examination of a point which falls under the general doctrine here stated [by Bradley]: 'Error is without any question a dangerous subject, and the chief difficulty is as follows. We cannot, on the one hand, accept anything between non-existence and reality, while, on the other hand, error obstinately refuses to be either. It persistently attempts to maintain a third position, which appears nowhere to exist, and yet somehow is occupied. In false appearance there is something attributed to the real which does not belong to it. But if the appearance is not real, then it is not false appearance because it is nothing. On the other hand, if it is false, it must therefore be true reality, for it is something which is. And this dilemma at first sight seems insoluble. Or, to put it otherwise, an appearance,

which is, must fall somewhere. But error, because it is false, cannot belong to the Absolute; and, again, it cannot appertain to the finite subject, because that, with all its contents, cannot fall outside the Absolute; at least, if it did, it would be nothing. And so error has no home, it has no place in existence; and yet, for all that, it exists. And for this reason it has occasioned much doubt and difficulty" (*A&R* 186). This passage is marked in TSE's copy.

3. An earlier version of this paragraph can be found in [Degrees of Reality], an essay written at Harvard in spring 1913, much of which is repeated here verbatim (58–59). On Janet, see n. 5 of that essay; on the James-Lange theory, see n. 6; and on Lipps, see n. 7 (64–65).

4. On 7 July 1898, James set out for Putman Camp, his rustic retreat in the Adirondacks, to plan his forthcoming Gifford Lectures, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902). After hiking in with friends, he had on the night of his arrival an experience which became well-known in the Harvard Philosophy Department. As described to his wife two days later: "I entered a state of spiritual alertness of the most vital description. The influence of Nature, the wholesomeness of the people around me . . . the thought of you and the children . . . the problem of the Edinburgh lectures, all fermented within me till it became a regular Walpurgis nacht [*sic*]. . . and it seemed as if the Gods of all the nature-mythologies were holding an indescribable meeting in my breast with the moral Gods of the inner life." *The Letters of William James*, vol II (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1920), 76.

5*. TSE's note: "Cf. Lipps, *Vom Fühlen, Wollen, und Denken*, p. 70." See TSE's 1913 Harvard essay [Degrees of Reality] (65, n. 7).

6. For James on the child's perception of a bear, see [Degrees of Reality] (64, n. 3).

7*. TSE's note: "See Nettleship, [*Philosophical Lectures and*] *Remains*, I, p. 188: '[T]here is no way of testing the truth or falsehood of an experience except by going beyond it.'"

8*. TSE's note: "Cf. Joachim, *Nature of Truth*, 144–45: 'For precisely that feature in error, which at the time robs it of its sting for the erring person (viz. his untroubled confidence in the truth of his judgement), constitutes the distinctive character of error and its power for mischief. And this feature is never annulled and never converted into an element of the fuller knowledge. The triumphant development of astronomy has neither annulled nor absorbed the persecution of Galileo.'"

9*. TSE's note: "Though two points of view may intend the same object. See later" (340).

10*. TSE's note: "The combination of criticism and creation is found perhaps in such writers as Molière and Stendhal: whilst the characters of Balzac and Dostoevsky are much more nearly lived through simply."

11. Becky Sharp is a character in *Vanity Fair* (1848) by William Makepeace Thackeray (1811–63).

12. Meinong, *Über Annahmen*.

13. Mahomet's coffin: Bradley, "On Floating Ideas and the Imaginary" (*ETR* 40). See 281, n. 39.

14*. TSE's note: "Making a sharp distinction between the object of the assumption and the object of the belief which is one of the points of view entering into the assumption."

15. "On Denoting," *Mind*, 14 (1905), 479–93; here 482. Russell states that Meinong's theory regards any grammatically correct phrase as standing for an object. Thus "the present King of France," "the round square," etc., are assumed to be genuine objects.

16*. TSE's note: "From the point of view taken in this paper, of course, any simple judgment of existence will always be partially false. But this is not precisely the argument used here."

17*. TSE's note: "[Bradley,] *Principles of Logic*, 115." "Let us take such a denial as 'Chimæras are non-existent.' . . . It is the quality of harbouring chimæras which is denied of the nature of things . . . because, if chimæras existed, we should have to alter our view of the world."

18*. TSE's note: "Making a sharp distinction between the object of the assumption and the object of the belief which is one of the points of view entering into the assumption."

19. *vox et praeterea nihil*: a voice and nothing more; fine words without weight.

20*. TSE's note: "Ultimately, it must be remembered, there are not even relations."

21*. TSE's note: "And I am tempted, by the way, to regard as a dead letter a law which cannot be violated. Is not this law as useless as the vermiform appendix?"

22*. TSE's note: "This is not to say that the *phenomena* of attention are not observable among animals, but that such phenomena need not be in every aspect interpreted as those of *attention*."

23. *Laut-complex* (*Lautkomplex*): combination of sounds, the meaning of which is not understood.

24*. TSE's note: "Not always, or even usually, a 'bundle of sensations.' All the associations and ideal relations are here meant."

25*. TSE's note: "So that we may not too perversely say that judgment is the predication of an ideal content of Unreality."

26*. TSE's note: "Sugar is obviously not mere whiteness, mere hardness, and mere sweetness; for its reality lies somehow in its unity. But if, on the other hand, we inquire what there can be in the thing beside its several qualities, we are baffled once more. We can discover no real unity existing outside these qualities, or, again, existing within them" (Bradley, *A&R* 19).

Chapter VI

Solipsism

It should be evident why the conclusions already reached demand an examination of Solipsism; but I will briefly recount them. We have seen that there is no other object than that which appears, and its appearance as an object gives it, in an absolute sense, all that objectively it could possibly mean. If you are willing to make the abstraction of a world appearing to one finite centre alone, then we may say that nothing in this world is false or erroneous, but is what it is and as it is. And outside of the objectivity of objects appearing to finite centres, there is no objectivity at all, for we have found that objectivity and thinghood are aspects under which reality appears; true but partial aspects; and that the reality of a “thing” (we are here painfully hampered by language) is in no wise limited to its thinghood. But beyond the objective worlds of a number of finite centres, each having its own objects, there is no objective world. Thus we confront the question: how do we yoke our divers worlds to draw together? how can we issue from the circle described about each point of view? and since I can know no point of view but my own, how can I know that there are other points of view, or admitting their existence, how can I take any account of them?^{1*}

Solipsism has been one of the dramatic properties of most philosophical entertainers. Yet we cannot discard it without recognising that it rests upon a truth.

[T]hough my experience is not the whole world, yet that world appears in my experience, and, so far as it exists there, it *is* my state of mind. . . . And so, in the end, to know the Universe, we must fall back upon our personal experience and sensation. (*AE&R* 260)

This doctrine I should like to develop in something of detail, with regard to real objects. And in doing this I must summon in the theory of points of view upon which I have relied before. Obviously, by the conclusions at which I have arrived, it is true to say that the real world is real because and in so far as it appears to a finite centre, and yet it has in each appearance to mean to be more—to be real, that is, only so far as it is not an appearance to

a finite centre. From a point of view completely detached, reality would contain nothing but finite centres and their several presentations; but from the point of view of each centre, there is an objective world upon which several points of view are trained, and to which they all refer. And it is just the confusion of these two truths which gives the stuffed solipsism of the philosophers. I have tried to show that there can be no truth or error without a presentation and discrimination of two points of view; that the external world is a construction by the selection and combination of various presentations to various viewpoints: and that the selection which makes reality is in turn made possible by the belief in reality: unless we assumed the existence of a world of truth we could not explain the genesis of error, and unless we had presentations of error as well as of truth we could not make that construction which is the real world. But taking the various experience-centres as real, we may inquire, with reference to this manifold, in what consists the reality of the one world which they all suppose.

Every finite centre, we may lay down, intends an "objective" world; and the genesis of this intention is an obscure and difficult matter. We cannot say anything on the subject which will be more than an interpretation; but I offer this as a provisional account, admitting that any account that expresses itself as a temporal sequence can be only very provisional indeed. The first objects, we may say, with which we come into contact are half-objects,^{2*} they are other finite centres, not attended to directly as objects, but are interpretations of recognised resistances and felt divergences. We come to interpret our own experience as the attention to a world of objects, as we feel obscurely an identity between the experiences of other centres and our own. And it is this identity which gradually shapes itself into the external world. There are two (or more) worlds each continuous with a self, and yet running in the other direction—*somehow*—into an identity. Thus in adjusting our behaviour to that of others and in co-operating with them we come to intend an identical world.

We ask then naturally, in what the identity consists, beyond the "identical reference." Yet while the question is natural, I cannot admit that it is legitimate. And I should like to recall various passages in which I have spoken of "identical reference," especially in connection with memory.³ It appeared there that an element of identity might be present, without our being able to isolate it as an actuality. The relation found to obtain between an experience and our recollection of it was not a relation of mere resemblance, but involved a common reference to a third reality, which was

known simply as *the* reality which both intended. A reference to an identity, it was laid down, *is* the identity, in the sense in which a word *is* that which it denotes. An identity is intended, and it could not have been intended, we say, unless it was there; but its being “there” consists simply in the intention, and has no other meaning. What do we mean when we say that two people see “the same” object? We think loosely that the identity consists in the fact that when one looks at the object from the same angle as the other, the two images before the two minds are the same. We compare two prints of the same negative and find them identical. But there is evidently a difference between the two cases (a difference which is ultimately, however, one of degree) in that the difference between the two points of view is a difference, if we choose to consider it so, of two whole worlds; the identity is of two realities which cannot possibly be set side by side and compared. All identity is ideal . . . “in this sense that it involves the self-transcendence of that which is identical” (*A&R* 586).⁴ And this fact, that identity in the content of two minds is an identity of ideal meaning may cause us to ask if even in the simplest case of comparison the identity is not equally ideal. All identities which two objects may present, though simply of colour or of form, involve a self-transcendence on the part of the particulars. This means, of course, only that we have no knowledge of mere particulars. But it means also that the identity between one man’s world and another’s does not consist, as we readily are led to believe, in one world which is the world of right perception, and which is, apart from being known, exactly what it is when we know it.

This fact, furthermore, ought to be self-evident. Identity, we have learned, is nowhere bare identity, but must be identity in diversity. If we are hit on the head with the same club, the club is only “the same” because it has appeared in two different contexts. There are two different experiences, and the sameness is quite ideal. We do, of course, partially put ourselves at the point of view of the man who hit us, and partially at each other’s points of view; and it is the interweaving of these viewpoints which gives us the objective club. There is no one club, no one world, without a diversity of points of view for it to be one to. The “real” turns out everywhere to be ideal—but is none the less real for that. Point to anything as “independent” of a finite centre, and you find that what is independent is merely the moment of objectivity—and this is ideal.

When I say that there is one world because one world is intended, I have still stated only half of the case; for any explanation in terms of “because”

(a term made necessary by the weakness of human conceiving) can be only misleading unless we turn it about the other way as well. Let us say, therefore, that we are able to intend one world because our points of view are essentially akin.^{5*} For it is not as if the isolated individuals had contributed each a share and entered into partnership to provide a public world. The selves, on the contrary, find themselves from the start in common dependence upon one indifferent Nature. Nature assumes, inevitably, a different aspect to each point of view; no two finite centres, we may say, apprehend the same Nature, yet each centre has pressed upon it the fact that from the one Nature, it with all its neighbours sprang. To claim that this is inconsistent with the isolation of our monads is to confuse the genetic and the structural standpoints. My mind, that is, I must treat as both absolute and derived; absolute, in that it is a point of view from which I cannot possibly escape (to which indeed I am bound so closely that the word escape is without meaning); derived, in that I am able, by virtue of the continuity of mind with the non-mental, to trace in some way its origin, with that of other minds, from an indifferent material. Biologically, we see minds in a common medium, and treating minds thus as objects, we conclude their content to be similar just as we find their physical structure and their environment similar. And from this point of view we talk about the one "external" world and the various "mental contents" referring to it. For minds may be intended objects; and their objectivity is continuous with their subjectivity, the mental continuous with the merely mechanistic. But we must remember that no view is original or ultimate: when we inquire into the real world, however, we mean the world from the viewpoints of finite centres as subjects only; we mean the real world for us now, not from the point of view of some further developed mind tracing its ancestors and the world they lived in.

The world, we may insist, is neither one nor many except as that one or many has meaning in experience, and it is either one or many according as we contemplate it altogether as an object, talking still, if you will, of minds, but meaning rather the phenomena which mind presents to an observer: or as we treat the world as finite centres and their experiences. From the first point of view the world is *a priori* one; from the second point of view the world is *a priori* many; and I am convinced that this is the only form in which monism or pluralism can appear. And the two views are so far from antagonistic as to be complementary. The self, we find, seems to depend upon a world which in turn depends upon it; and nowhere, I repeat, can we

find anything original or ultimate. And the self depends as well upon other selves; it is not given as a direct experience, but is an interpretation of experience by interaction with other selves (see *AE&R* 248). The self is a construction, and yet the⁶

[...]

The doctrine of finite centres appears in an interesting light when compared with the theories of Leibniz, with which it has very striking affinities. Compare, for example, the celebrated paragraph of the *Monadology*, ¶57:

And as the same town, looked at from various sides, appears quite different and becomes as it were numerous in aspects; even so, as a result of the infinite number of simple substances, it is as if there were so many different universes, which, nevertheless, are nothing but aspects [*perspectivement*] . . . of a single universe, according to the special point of view of each Monad.⁷

It is easy to raise objections to Leibniz's form of statement, but I think that his aim becomes more intelligible in the light of our "finite centres." Leibniz appears to have made the error, it is true, of identifying a point of view with a felt unit, or self.^{8*} And for Leibniz the internal view of the world was ultimate. But the assertion that "the monads have no windows"⁹ in no wise entangles him in solipsism, for it means (or may be taken to mean) what Mr. Bradley means in saying that our knowledge of other finite centres is only through physical appearance within our own world. When an event occurs within my world it occurs to me, but I would not be I apart from the event; it is from the beginning coloured by my personality, as my personality is coloured by it. A theory of internal relations is thus implicit; and perhaps a recognition of the continuity of terms and relations contributed to the doctrine of monads. If anything could appear as really acting upon and altering the self, the latter would take the place merely of one object among others, and so far as it is subject, we can conceive it as having aspects, but not relations. And when we qualify our world by the recognition of another's, it is not his world as it is in reality, but his world as it affects us that enters into our world. We arrive at the belief in other finite selves in a sense by inference, though on the other hand it is assumed that these other selves exist, or they could not be phenomenally represented in our world. To say that I can know only my own states, accordingly, is in no wise the foundation of solipsism, unless it were possible that I should know my states as my states, and as nothing else, which would be a palpable

contradiction. What I know is my own state simply as the real aspect (knowledge as object) seems to take precedence of the ideal aspect (knowledge as meaning). The statement that "monads have no windows," therefore, means only that the objectivity of one's world is ideal; and that the reality is experience.

And the pre-established harmony is unnecessary if we recognise that the monads are not wholly distinct, and that the subjective self is continuous with the self as object. A monad was for Leibniz, I believe, something real in the way in which a physical organism is real: he imagined the monads, that is, on this analogy, and identified the monad with the phenomenal soul. Now for Bradley the finite centre, (or what I call the point of view), is not identical with the soul. We may think provisionally of finite centres as the units of soul life; units, however, whose limits cannot be drawn with any precision. For we vary by passing from one point of view to another or, as I have tried to suggest, by occupying more than one point of view at the same time, an attitude which gives us our assumptions, our half-objects, our figments of imagination; we vary by self-transcendence. The point of view (or finite centre) has for its object one consistent world, and accordingly no finite centre can be self-sufficient, for the life of a soul does not consist in the contemplation of one consistent world but in the painful task of unifying (to a greater or less extent) jarring and incompatible ones, and passing, when possible, from two or more discordant viewpoints to a higher which shall somehow include and transmute them. The soul is so far from being a monad that we have not only to interpret other souls to ourselves but to interpret ourselves to ourselves. Wherever a point of view may be distinguished, I say, there a point of view is. And whereas we may change our point of view, it is better not to say that the point of view has changed. For if there is a noticeable change, you have no identity of which to predicate the change. The point of view, we may say, is as such purely ideal; it can hardly be said to possess existence.

The doctrine here set forth must not however be construed as a psychological atomism, or anything of that sort; the finite centres (as I understand the matter) are not all of one size or shape, but vary with the context. Thus, while one soul may experience within itself many finite centres, the soul itself may be considered in a loose sense as a finite centre. The more of a personality it is, the more harmonious and self-contained, the more definitely it is said to possess a "point of view," a point of view toward the social world. Wherever, in short, there is a unity of consciousness, this unity may

be spoken of as a finite centre. Yet neither the term “soul” nor the term “self” is ever identical with the term “finite centre.” “Then from immediate experience” (at any level) “the self emerges, and is set apart by a distinction” (*A&R* 524). To realise that a point of view is a point of view is already to have transcended it: what was merely a picture in two dimensions (if you please) becomes a real landscape with an infinity of aspects as the “what” disengages itself from the “that.” The “what” continues to be recognised as a true qualification of the “that,” but is as well a qualification of the apprehending consciousness, and the real object results from the abstraction and comparison of the various points of view.

What constitutes the difference, therefore, between two points of view, is the difference which each is capable of making to the other. There could be no such thing, we may say, as a single finite centre, for every experience implies the existence of something independent of the experience, something capable, therefore, of being experienced differently, and the recognition of this fact is already the transition to another point of view. Treating the experience as the reality, we may say that “Finite centres of feeling, while they last, are . . . not directly pervious to one another” (*A&R* 524). So far as experiences go, we may be said in a sense to live each in a different world. But “world,” in this sense, is not the world with which solipsism is concerned; each centre of experience is unique, but is unique only with reference to a common meaning. Two points of view, in consequence, can be said to differ only so far as they intend the same object, though the object, we have seen, is only such with reference to a point of view.

Two points of view take cognisance of each other, I suppose, by each making a half-object of the other. Strictly speaking, a point of view taking note of another is no longer the same, but a third centre of feeling; yet it is something different from a centre of feeling: more properly a self, a “construction based on, and itself transcending, immediate experience” (*A&R* 524). Everywhere, we must constantly remind ourselves, the difference is one of degree; and when one finite centre affects another merely as an alteration in its experience, and is not consciously recognised as another centre, we can hardly say that there is a self. And inasmuch as the finite centre is an experience, while the self is one aspect in that experience, and again contains and harmonises several experiences, we may say that the self is both less and more than such a centre, and is ideal. For this reason it is more correct to say that a self passes from one point of view to another, than to say that one point of view takes cognisance of another. But a finite centre

may be made an intended object by a self, and thus enter into another finite centre, though not as such. Thus we may continue to say that finite centres are impervious. Identity we find to be everywhere ideal, while finite centres are real. When we ask what, finally, in the finite centre is the common property of several finite centres, intending the same object, the answer is: nothing—“really,” everything—“ideally,” and in practice there may be a greater or less amount of community. We may schematise it crudely thus:

In Theory	Really	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} a \text{ All unique, but} \\ b \text{ All may be an intended object in another} \\ \text{finite centre.} \end{array} \right.$
	Ideally	$c \text{ The intended object in each centre is public. Whatever is made an object is public.}$
In Practice	Really	$d \text{ Two finite centres may be judged from a third point of view to resemble each other.}$
	Ideally	$e \text{ As much is public as is not discernibly different.}$

Note that in (d) the resemblance is predicated on the ground of behaviour; it is predicated not of the centres as such, but inferred from ideal identity of object when we observe two organisms behaving in the same way toward what from our point of view is the same object for each. Similarly we may infer the resemblance of a centre of feeling in another self to one of our own, though the two experiences as such have no relation to each other, not even the relation of difference.

The reflection of the world in finite centres, of a world which is real only as it appears in those centres, is a form of monadism which, as we find, by no means implies a “pluralistic universe.” These centres are not things, and to speak of them as “independent” or “isolated” is more misleading than illuminating. When we speak of such isolated centres we mean always souls. A centre of experience, however, is always “below, or else wider than and above, the distinction” of self and not-self (*A&R* 529). A soul, or a self (though the two terms are not everywhere equivalent (see 524n)¹⁰ is always the creature of “an intellectual construction” (524); it is never simply

given, but depends upon a transcendence of immediacy. And a doctrine of solipsism would have to show that myself and my states were immediately given, and other selves inferred. But just because what is given is not myself but my world, the question is meaningless. The process of the genesis of the self and of other selves is ultimately perhaps unknowable, since there is no “because” which we can assign. There are reasons for believing that externality was recognised as force or as spirit before it was apprehended in the form of objects; as the primitive life, furthermore, is immersed in practice and incapable of the degree of speculative interest necessary for the constitution of an object. On the other hand we may say that we know other finite centres only through the mediation of objects.

The immediate experiences of finite beings cannot, as such, come together. . . . A direct connection between souls we cannot say is impossible, but, on the other hand, we find no good reason for supposing it to exist. . . . We may assume then that souls do not influence each other, except through their bodies. (*AE&R* 342-43).

The issue here hangs only on the exact meaning which we are to attribute to the word “knowledge.” We become acquainted with the existence of other souls, we may say, through the influence which they exert upon the content of our experience, but we only become acquainted with that content as content through the postulation of foreign activities influencing it, so that we are led to distinguish a “what” and a “that.” But the question at what point either becomes explicit is essentially unanswerable. We can only say that the self, the other selves, and the objects do in this process become more precise, and clear. And we can say that we have no knowledge of other souls except through their bodies, because it is only thus that we can enter into their world.

On the other hand, as we need to be reminded, we have no direct (immediate) knowledge of anything: the “immediately given” is the bag of gold at the end of the rainbow. Knowledge is invariably a matter of degree: you cannot put your finger upon even the simplest datum and say “this we know.” In the growth and construction of the world we live in, there is no one stage, and no one aspect, which you can take as the foundation. Radical empiricists assume that we have an “immediate” knowledge of a mysterious flux, and criticists assume that we know sense-data, or universals, immediately, as we do not know objects or other selves. But where we are first interested in knowing, there is the first thing known; and in this way we may

say (if we choose to employ this language) that that of which we have immediate knowledge is the external world, for without externality there is no knowledge. The platform of knowing, in fact, is the assertion of something to be known, something independent of me so far as that knowing is concerned. No absolute assertion about the object's dependence or independence is made or implied. Hence if the object is only my state, both object and I must be strangely transmuted, for I only know myself in contrast to a world. And it will be equally true to say that I am only a state of my objects. But, it will be objected, if knowledge of objects belongs to a world which is admittedly a construction, should not we return to the primitive experience to find reality? Or are you not tacitly affirming that the world in which we find ourselves now is the real world, and is the process of which you speak not a process in knowledge rather than a process in reality? This question introduces us to the relation of thought and reality, and the doctrine of degrees of truth, with which I intend to close.

NOTES

1*. TSE's note: "The controversy between Brunetière and France is rather instructive, showing a muddling of the question by two men who are not philosophers, but have each his own personal solution in practice."

2*. TSE's note: "But of course they are not apprehended as such. There is a felt conflict and difference between centres, and this breaks up the unity of our expression."

3. See 272–73.

4. This passage is underlined in TSE's copy.

5*. TSE's note: "the foundation of it all is this, that no phase in a particular consciousness is merely a phase of the apparent subject, but it is always and essentially a member of a further whole of experience, which passes through and unites the states of many consciousnesses, but is not exhausted in any, nor in all of them, as states, taken together. It is true that my state of mind is mine, and yours is yours; but not only do I experience in mine what you experience in yours—that would be consistent with the total independence of the two minds—but I experience it differently from you, in such a way that there is a systematic relation between the two contents experienced, and neither is intelligible or complete without the other." (*The Principle of Individuality and Value* 315).

6. Page 186 of the original typescript ends with this dangling phrase, and page 187 begins with the sentence that opens the following paragraph. The intervening material, which may have been used in two Leibniz essays for the *Monist*, has been lost.

7. Leibniz, *The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings*, trans. Robert Latta (Oxford: Clarendon, 1898), 248. TSE published two essays on Leibniz in 1916 (440; 462).

8*. TSE's note: "Finite centres of feeling, while they last, are (so far as we know) not directly pervious to one another. But . . . a self is not the same as such a centre of experience" (Bradley, *A&R* 524). See "Leibniz's Monads and Bradley's Finite Centres" (462).

9. *The Monadology*, §7: “The Monads have no windows, through which anything could come in or out” (Latta 219).

10. Bradley’s note on page 524 is marked in TSE’s copy of *A&R*. “These terms must not be taken as everywhere equivalent. There certainly is no self or soul without a centre of feeling. But there may be centres of feeling which are not selves, and again not souls. . . . Possibly also some selves are too fleeting to be called souls, while almost certainly there are souls which are not properly selves. The latter term should not be used at all where there is in no sense a distinction of self from non-self. And it can hardly be used in the same sense.”

Chapter VII

Conclusion

The task of this concluding chapter is merely to weave together the conclusions of the other chapters and present them if possible as a coherent whole; and to touch as well upon certain consequences which have not as yet appeared. We may draw, I believe, certain inferences as to the nature of reality which will forbid us to accept either an idealistic or a realistic philosophy at its full value. But I believe that all of the conclusions that I have reached are in substantial agreement with *Appearance and Reality*, though I have been compelled to reject certain theories, logical and psychological, which appear in the *Principles* [of *Logic*] and elsewhere. Out of absolute idealism we retain what I consider its most important doctrines, Degrees of Truth and Reality and the Internality of Relations; we reject the reliance upon “consciousness” or “the work of the mind” as a principle of explanation. With regard to objects, I have reached the conclusion that all objects are non-mental; and with regard to mental activity, I conclude that we find only physiological activity or logical activity, both independent of, and more fundamental than what we call the activity of mind. But the materialism, which (as exemplified particularly in the work of Mr. Bosanquet) from one point of view may very justly be said to lie at the basis of idealism, presents only one aspect of the situation. If the aim of my examination of structural psychology was to demonstrate that the more accurately and scientifically one pursues the traces of mentality in the “mind” of the individual, the less one finds; so on the other hand my examination of the epistemologist’s world has been an attempt to prove that the more closely one scrutinizes the “external world,” and the more eagerly and positively one plucks at it, the less there is to see and touch. Cut off a “mental” and a “physical” world, dissect and classify the phenomena of each: the mental resolves into a curious and intricate mechanism, and the physical reveals itself as a mental construct. If you will find the mechanical anywhere, you will find it in the workings of mind; and to inspect living mind, you must look nowhere but in the world outside. Such is the general doctrine to which my theory of objects points.

There are other conclusions bound up with this doctrine. As to the problem of knowledge, we have found that it does not exist. Knowledge,

that is to say, is not a relation, and cannot be explained by any analysis. We do not say, however, that in knowing, the “mind” comes into immediate and direct contact with the object, for we find that such an assertion has no great meaning, for there is no “mind” for the object to be brought into contact with, and with the physical organism the object known may or may not be in direct contact. And to say that the object is dependent on or independent of the knower—this again I think is a statement of no great importance, though of the two alternatives I think that it is perhaps truer to say that the object is independent. For *qua* known, the object is simply there, and has no relation to the knower whatever, and the knower, *qua* knower, is not a part of the world which he knows: he does not exist.

This bare and hypothetical knowledge, I admit, is only a part of what serves our use. We do not, in point of fact, simply know: we make tentative and hardly formulated theories of knowledge in practice, theories which go to make up our real knowledge. And again there is much in that which we call knowledge which is not knowing in what narrowly speaking is the only legitimate sense. It is these two disturbing factors which complicate and indeed create the problem. The point is worthy of great elaboration, and even in so sketchy a discussion as the present may occupy us for several moments. What I mean is this. Theoretically, that which we know is merely spread out before us for pure contemplation, and the subject, the I, or the self, is no more consciously present than is the inter-cellular action. But I do not say that such a condition is or was ever realised in practice; indeed, such knowledge would hardly be of any profit. The real situation is rather that we have, as I have tried to show in the first chapter, a felt whole in which there are moments of knowledge: the objects are constantly shifting, and new transpositions of objectivity and feeling constantly developing. We perceive an object, we will say, and then perceive it in a special relation to our body. In our practical relations with objects we find it convenient and even essential to consider the object’s relation to ourself as itself an object; in many cases this is what is important. This self may be primarily the body, but the body is in felt continuity with the spiritual self. And in cases where the presence of the self is an important part in the meaning of the knowledge, a sort of theory of knowledge is at work. It is this sort of knowing, I presume, that induces us to think of knowing as a relation. There is a relation between the object and the self: a relation which is theoretical and not merely actual, in the sense that the self as a term capable of relation with other terms is a construction. And this self which is objectified

and related is continuous and felt to be continuous with the self which is subject and not an element in that which is known. As it is metaphysics which has produced the self, so it is epistemology, we may say, which has produced knowledge. It is perhaps epistemology (though I offer this only as a suggestion, and to make clearer the sort of thing that I mean) that has given us the fine arts; for what was at first expression and behaviour may have developed under the complications of self-consciousness, as we became aware of ourselves as reacting aesthetically to the object.

In any case, we are constantly developing and rectifying our perceptions by comparison with other perceptions; we are constantly on the lookout for error, and our recognition and allowances for error already nominate us as epistemologists; for this means that we have a tentative working theory of our relation to the external world. It is thus, to a certain extent, a theory of knowledge that gives us an external world, but a theory which cannot hold beyond a certain range of practice. Theory and practice are, we find, inextricable: for without theory we should not have our present practice, and without the practice in which it finds its application the theory would be meaningless.

No theory of knowledge, consequently, can establish itself on a firm foundation by defining the sort of relation that knowing is, for knowing is not a relation; in order to give any account of knowing we must bring in the terms which are related, and these terms are only provisionally definable. We can only define the thing as known and the knower as knowing, and yet both things and knower imply a transcendence of these limitations, a transcendence which has no end. And it is only so far as our knowledge is invalid or incomplete that research into the nature of knowing can bear any fruit, for when we believe our knowledge to be correct and sufficient we can do no more than describe the physical relations between our body and the object apprehended. In any analysis of knowledge, knowing is assumed; we can to a certain extent explain false knowing in terms of true knowing, but we cannot explain true knowing in terms of anything else.

While we cannot, it thus appears, "know knowing," what we can do is to describe in a general way the process of transition and development which takes place when there is an organism which is a part of the world and yet is capable to a certain degree of contemplating the world. Knowing, we have said, is inextricably intertwined with processes which are not knowing; knowing, furthermore, is only an aspect in a continuous reality. We can to a certain extent describe the rise and decay of objects. And this is not

because the object is essentially dependent upon consciousness, for I do not know what such a phrase would mean: but because consciousness and its object are both only evanescent aspects in reality. When we think what knowing really means in our experience, [we find] how essentially relative its meaning is, for it can never escape from the ultimate limits of its own meaning; and even when it consciously intends to be unconditionally true, that unconditionality is within these bounds and no statement can claim to be true except when it has meaning. So that while we make no attempt to explain knowledge, we can I think offer a limited insight into its nature by indicating the fringe through which it passes into something else, and by indicating the stages of the process which we call degrees of truth.

My first step, in accordance with this plan, was to attempt to suggest the reality out of which subject and object are sorted, and upon which as background they have their meaning. Our first step is to discover what experience is not, and why it is essentially indefinable. We saw that within experience there presented themselves the two aspects of ideality and reality, but that this distinction did not correspond to a division among objects: for a thing is real or ideal only in relation. We found that what we call the "real" in experience is largely ideal, and that what we call "ideal" is largely real, and that Reality itself would not be reality without its appearances. The ideal and the real, the mental and the non-mental, the active and the passive, these are terms which apply only to *appearance*; which take their meaning from narrow and practical contexts.

In seeking for the object of knowledge, then, we need no investigation into the process of knowing or the nature of an external world. It is not true that we deny the existence of an external world, for anyone who pursues this path of inquiry will come to the conclusion that this question is ultimately meaningless. But demanding at the start what it is that we know for most certain (and this method deserves the name of empiricism as much as anything does), we find that we are certain of everything, relatively, and of nothing, positively, and that no knowledge will survive analysis. The virtue of metaphysical analysis is in showing the destructibility of everything, since analysis gives us something equally real, and for some purposes more real, than that which is analysed. In analysing knowledge, we merely educe the fact that knowledge is composed of ingredients which are themselves neither known nor cognitive, but which melt into the whole which we call experience.^{1*} The analysis of the object, from this point of view, reveals the fact that in asking what the object is we merely turn in a circle. The object

is not its qualities, for these are simply enjoyed with respect to the object; the object as such, it transpires, is merely the point of *attention*; that which an electron, a Balkan league, my table, whiteness, have in common as objects is just the *moment of objectivity*. The objecthood of an object, it appears, is the fact that we intend it as an object: it is the attending that makes the object, and yet we may say with equal truth that if there were no object we could not attend. The fact that an object is an object, in this light, appears to be the least fact about it, and its reality is due to the experiences which cluster around it: an object is real, we may say, in proportion to its relations outside of its objectivity.

I should be asked, no doubt, whether an object ceases to be an object on ceasing to be known. This question I feel justified in refusing to answer, since I cannot feel that anyone who understands what I have meant by objectivity will ask it. For practical purposes, undoubtedly, we may think of objects as objects when they are not objects to anyone, or I may think of an object as an object when it is the object of your attention and not of mine: but in general to think of an object is (not to *think* of it as my object, but) to make an object of it. The object, I mean to say, is none the less *real* when I am not attending to it, but it is no longer object. For all that "object" means is a connection of certain experiences with a moment of objectivity, of experiences which would not exist as what they are unless connected in *that way* with *that* point of attention (moment of objectivity), and of a point of attention which would not be without those qualities, for those qualities essentially refer to it, and *it* is only the fact of their intended reference. The object is a complex of experiences with a reference, and the reference itself is an experience. But we cannot say that it is *my* experience, for I am only I in relation to objects. The object thus resolves itself into experience. But this by no means implies that the object does not persist outside of my experience, or that another subject may not know the same object. For in making this last statement we have so shifted the stage properties that "object" no longer means exactly the same thing. This should have been made clear by the discussion of solipsism. Wherever I intend an object, there an object is; wherever two people intend the same object, there an identical object is; and wherever we together intend the existence of an object outside of our knowledge, there an object does exist outside of our knowledge; but we must not forget that in all three of these cases we have theory as well as practice. From one point of view we know that the object exists; but from another point of view this is mere hypothesis: we have a

certain latitude, that is, as to what we shall take for granted, and we may put ourselves at the individual or the social point of view, as we please; but we must not forget that unless we make allowance at the start for the equality of their claims to validity we shall be left with a most uncomfortable hiatus, for we can never deduce the one from the other.

It is difficult to tell when we are assigning to a word only such precision and *portée* as is justified in practice, and when we are going beyond use into pure speculation which will make no difference to our practice. We may easily be overawed by language, and attribute to it more philosophic prestige than it really deserves. The word "object" means a certain type of experience and the theories involved in that experience: theories which lose their meaning beyond a certain point. The only way in which we can handle reality intellectually is to turn it into objects, and the justification of this operation is that the world we live in has been built in this way. At the same time we are forced to admit that the construction is not always completely successful. While we can to a certain extent treat relations as if they were terms, we find with such entities as ideas that to treat them so is almost a step backward rather than a step forward, inasmuch as we can only apprehend their reality by putting ourselves in the place of an obscure world and abandoning a clear and scientific one. There is left psycho-physics and rational psychology. There have developed, I mean to say, certain objects which I have denominated half-objects, having much of the character of objects without being wholly apprehensible. Their nature is that they do not belong to any point of view, but depend for their existence upon our apprehending two points of view at once, and pursuing neither. Thus the "mental" would have no place in a "real" world such as the scientist intends, and the real world would consist in the relations of points whose entire existence was relation: whose reality consisted in their external relations. And it is obvious that such a view is in its way quite as tenable as any other: a theory which reduces reality to mathematical relations of simples is continuous with our ordinary tendency toward objectification, and hence is not less "true" in the usual sense, than any other; inasmuch as objectification is the creation of a new world, and the assertion that the two worlds are the same is an act of faith, only to be contrasted with another act of faith to the effect that the two are not the same.

The fundamental difficulty is this. When we attend to an object we do not know precisely what it is that we denote or that we mean. In any case of ocular error this fact is patent, and is more than suggested by the discussions

of the *Theaetetus*.² When I mistake one object for another, I can say loosely that the real object was the object which I “really” saw, and upon the sight of which I made a mistaken inference. But you never can tell at precisely what point the mistake occurred; how much that is to say was received unaltered from without and how much was constructed from within. We have come upon this *impasse* in theorising upon bears:³ [so] far as the object is experienced as *that* object so far it *is* that object, and the rectification is a matter of further experience, through which the illusory object and the real object are bound together in an (ideal) identity of meaning in a practical world. It is, in fact, this real world, which is not metaphysically the real world, that unites the false and the true in a common reference, and thus makes the false false and the true true. Now there is precisely the same difficulty when we explain an appearance by a reality: when we appear only to be revealing the reality of the appearance we may be said to be only presenting another appearance, and the greater the dissimilarity that we find between the two the more certainly our construction falls apart into two worlds.

The object of attention, in the first place, has not certain definite limits: its “that” and its “what” exhibit a degree of looseness in practice. The object can be the same object though its description more or less vary, and the same description can preserve itself through an indefinite variation of the attention. We never can say, actually, to exactly what we are attending; it is never the hypothetical point and it is to a large extent the ideal synthesis of data by meaning which constitutes the point of attention. I look at a bottle, and the point to which I attend is the bottle; though not necessarily the real bottle, for there may be perhaps no real bottle there; so that we may say the real point of attention is the intended object. In this sense, attention is the intention to attend. The attention is not in practice attention to a point, but to a *that* which is a *that* because it has a single meaning. A *that* which we did not qualify as a *what* would not be even a mere *that*. On the other hand the two aspects of the real object, the *thatness* and the *whatness*, are always distinct because of their difference in meaning; so that we say, in different senses, that we attend to the object which is *that* and *what*, and that we attend literally to the *that* alone. Inasmuch as the *that* is the point of reference of its common qualities, its persistence depends upon our recognition of the community of meaning of the qualities, and this community of meaning is ultimately practical. It is ultimately in every case a question of practice how far any group of qualities constitutes one object,

and metaphysics depends upon our ability and good-will to grasp appearance and reality as one. And this limitation is as true of one sort of metaphysic as of another.

Regarding the matter from this light, we must to a certain extent put our theories to the pragmatic test. An account of reality, or of any field of it, which has the appearance of going to the point of substituting a new type of objects for the old will be a true theory and not merely a new world, if it is capable of making an actual practical difference in our attitude toward the old, or toward some already accepted object, so that there may be an identity uniting differences of quality. It is obvious that it is this felt identity between appearance and reality that will constitute explanation, and that the identity is a fragile and insecure thing. Adhering to a strictly common-sense view (which may be defined, I presume, as that which insists on the reality of the more primary objects), the theories of speculative physics seem perhaps as chimerical and uncalled-for as those of metaphysics. There is however considerable difference. A science is such because it is able to deal with objects which are all of one type; and the aim of each science is to reduce reality (so far as reality comes within the purview of that science) to one type of object, and the ultimate type of object I should suppose (acknowledging my incompetence to speak) to be points in mathematical relation. But physical theories (so far as I can pretend to be informed, from popular accounts) are apt to end in mystery, inasmuch as the final object is often not an object at all; if the ultimate is some kind of energy or motion it is not an object but at most a half-object, since it possesses some internality. At this point a theory would become metaphysical, passing from one type of object to another; and two types can only be held together by an act of faith.

It is not within my present purpose or capacity to schematise the various types of object and their relations. Chapters II and III were devoted to one of the most important classes, that of the half-objects of psychology. Chapter IV endeavoured to set forth the ideality of all objects, and the relativity of the distinction between “real” objects and “ideal” objects; finally, [it dealt] with the difference between real and unreal objects, and the analysis of imaginary objects and assumptions. The fifth chapter was engaged upon the object as the object of one and as the object of several knowers, the resolution, on the one hand, of the object into experience, and its maintenance as identical reference. We have thus distinguished broadly several types; things, half-objects, double objects, and objects of reference.

Half-objects are such as exist, like ideas, only from an internal-external point of view; double objects are such as exist as objects from two points of view, like mental images, hallucinations and objects in fiction, which have a reality in their own space and time, and a different reality in our space and time.^{4*} Objects of reference are such as unreal objects, where the reality of the object consists in barely more than the object's being intended (and perhaps "sensations" and categories, which are supposed to be enjoyed and not contemplated, belong in this class: for the being of such objects consists in their not being objects). All these types, and "universals" and "particulars" as well, may be reduced, in a certain aspect, to things;^{5*} for things are the lowest order, so to speak; and on the other hand the thing is analysable into intended objects (qualities) and the intention (or moment of objectivity). But every transformation of type involves a leap which science cannot take, and which metaphysics must take. It involves an *interpretation*, a transmigration from one world to another, and such a pilgrimage involves an act of faith.

In a transformation of object-type there is a change of point of view; in a metaphysical theory there is an attempt to bind together all points of view in one.

And this, I think, should show us why the notion of truth, literal truth, has so little direct application to philosophic theory. A philosophy can and must be worked out with the greatest rigour and discipline in the details, but can ultimately be founded on nothing but faith: and this is the reason, I suspect, why the novelties in philosophy are only in elaboration, and never in fundamentals. There are two uses of the word truth, as we are apt to forget in philosophising: the truth or error of the metaphysician does not concern the historian in any literal sense. The historian sets out in search of truth from a different gate. And of course the only real truth is the whole truth. I have called attention to the real world (Chapter V) as the felt background against which we project our theories, and with reference to which our speculations have their use. We all recognise the world as the same "that"; it is when we attempt to describe it that our worlds fall apart, for as we have seen, the same "that" can only persist through a limited range of *whatness*. But just as we all admit the world to be the same world, though we cannot specify in precisely what respects, for there are no precise respects, so we feel that there are truths valid for this world, though we do not know what these truths are; and it is with this sort that the refined and subtilised common sense which is Critical Taste occupies itself. The

true critic is a scrupulous avoider of formulae; he refrains from statements which pretend to be literally true; he finds fact nowhere and approximation always. His truths are truths of experience rather than of calculation.

Even these lived truths are partial and fragmentary, for the finest tact after all can give us only an interpretation, and every interpretation, along perhaps with some utterly contradictory interpretation, has to be taken up and reinterpreted by every thinking mind and by every civilisation. This is the significance of the late Samuel Butler's epigram to the effect that the whole duty of man was to serve both God and Mammon: for both God and Mammon are interpretations of the world and have to be reinterpreted.⁶ It is this sort of interpretation (which formally consists I believe in transformations of object-type) that the historian, the literary critic, and the metaphysician are engaged with. Yet the difference between interpretation and description remains probably a question of degree. When the objects dealt with are close enough to the physical foundations of our existence to be in practice identical for all individuals, so that only one point of view is involved, we get truths which are equally true for everyone; and to what extent differences of opinion are tenable, and how deep into the body of a science these differences may sink, are questions which each science must work out for itself. And if you wish to say that only those truths which can be demonstrated can be called true, I will acquiesce, for I am as good a materialist as anybody;^{7*} but though materialist, I would point out what a little way such truths bring us. For materialism itself is only an interpretation, and we cannot assert that all the types of object which we meet are reducible to this one type of thing. Any assertion about the *world*, or any *ultimate* statement about any *object in* the world, will inevitably be an interpretation. It is a valuation and an assignment of meaning. The things of which we are collectively certain, we may say our common formulae, are certainly not true. What makes a real world is difference of opinion.^{8*} I remember a phrase of Eucken's, a phrase which had a certain *entrain*⁹ about it: *es gibt keine Privatwahrheiten* (there are no private truths).¹⁰ I do not recall the context, and am not concerned with the meaning which the phrase had there; but I should reverse the decision, and say: All significant truths are private truths. As they become public they cease to become truths; they become facts, or at best, part of the public character; or at worst, catchwords.

If these reflections are meant to be taken seriously, I shall be told, what excuse is there for a philosophy of the absolute? a philosophy which

transforms objects to the drastic extent of transforming them all into one, and then declaring that this is no object at all? Such a question, though natural, would show I think a complete ignorance of the nature of the "dialectic process." The fact that we can think only in terms of things does not compel us to the conclusion that reality consists of things. We have found from the first that the thing is thoroughly relative, that it exists only in a context of experience, of experience with which it is continuous. From first to last reality is experience, but experience would not (so far as we know) be possible without attention and the moment of objectivity. We are able to distinguish a growth in clearness of the object, a detachment and independence which it seems to have in greater degree in relation to the higher forms of life: so that we can say, from our point of view, that subject and object emerge from a state of feeling. We can I think say this truly from our point of view. At the same time we must remember that in saying anything about types of consciousness different from our own, we are making statements about worlds which are different from ours, though continuous. Truth on our level is a different thing from truth for the jellyfish, and there must certainly be analogies for truth and error in jellyfish life. So that what in one aspect is a development of the real world is from another aspect a new world. And yet the statement that there is such a development will be true so far as it goes.

And we have the right to say that the world is a construction. Not to say that it is *my* construction, for in that way "I" am as much "my" construction as the world is; but to use the word as best we can without implying any active agent: the world is a construction out of finite centres. Any particular datum can be certain only with regard to what is built upon it, not in itself: and every experience contains the principle of its own self-transcendence. Every experience is a paradox in that it means to be absolute, and yet is relative; in that it somehow always goes beyond itself and yet never escapes itself. The simple error of mistaking one man for another illustrates this well enough. There is an ideal identity which persists between experiences and rectifies our judgments; and it is this identity, together with the transcendence, which gives us degrees of truth. This theory simply asserts that a reality, a *that*, may persist under different conditions of *what-ness*, though the *that* be indefinable, i.e. though we do not know what *that* it is that has persisted. We never know, in any assertion, just what, or how much, we are asserting.^{11*} We denote a *that* which as like as not turns out not to be the *that* that we thought it was; it continues to be the same *that*

but with very different qualities: and the truth in question is found by continually analysing the given and widening its relations. Knowledge means a greater control over the material, and this control can only be given by increasing and developing the content. Whether we say that this is a new world or not is a matter of practical convenience. But we do *intend* it to be the same, and we feel that it is the reality which we failed at first to grasp. The cruder and vaguer, or more limited, is somehow contained and explained in the wider and more precise, and this feeling of identity is all that is needed for the postulation of identity.^{12*} No judgment is limited to the matter in hand: you affirm that something is something else; and in the simple analytic judgment of sense you posit a “that” to deny it. The judgment which you make is true only within the range of your experience; for it is the use you make of it that determines its meaning. And furthermore no judgment is true until you understand it; and you never wholly understand it, because “understanding” experience means merely knowing how to use it; so that what we actually know of a judgment is not its truth but its utility (and truth never *is* utility). That at which we aim is the real as such; and the real as such is not an object.

Thus the process toward the theoretical goal returns upon itself. We aim at a real thing: but everything is real as experience, and as thing everything is ideal. When we define an experience we substitute the definition for the experience, and then experience the definition; though the original experience may have been itself a definition: but the experiencing is quite another thing from the defining. You start, or pretend to start, from experience—from any experience—and build your theory. You begin with truths which everyone will accept, perhaps, and you find connections which no one else has discovered. In the process, reality has changed, in one sense; for the world of your theory is certainly a very different world from the world from which you began. To the builder of the system, the identity binding together the appearance and the reality is evident; to anyone outside of the system it is not evident. To the builder the process is the process of reality, for thought and reality are one; to a critic, the process is perhaps only the process of the builder’s thought. From the critic’s standpoint the metaphysician’s world may be real only as the child’s bogey is real. The one thinks of reality in terms of his system; the other thinks of the system in terms of the indefinite social reality. There occurs, in short, just what is sure to occur in a world in which subject and predicate are not one. Metaphysical systems are condemned to go up like a rocket and come down like a stick. The question can always be

asked of the closest-woven theory: is this the reality of *my* world of appearance? And if I do not recognise the identity, then it is not. It will not do to say that my denial reasserts, unless I see that it does. For a metaphysics to be accepted, good-will is essential. Two men must *intend* the same object, and *both* men must admit that the object intended is the same.

We are forced to the assumption that truth is one, and to the assumption that reality is one. But dissension rises when we ask the question: what one? Our system has pretended to be about the world of those who do not accept it as much as about the world of those who do. And the world, as we have seen, exists only as it is found in the experiences of finite centres, experiences so mad and strange that they will be boiled away before you boil them down to one homogeneous mass. Thus calamity menaces our theory whether it be a theory of coherence or of correspondence. If of correspondence, where can you say that there exists the world to correspond? For such a world would be susceptible to all the criticisms which we have directed against the objects within the world. And if of coherence, it serves us no better; for what is it that coheres? ideas, we shall be told, and not realities; and the whole structure is a faquir's show for a penny.

In part, I believe, these objections are trivial and in part mistaken. The notion of correspondence, as applied here, exhibits merely a case of the seduction of psychology. There is not question of correspondence (I have tried to show), there is no mere "idea," except ideally in practice, when we find an "objective" world because we have other people's "ideas" which clash and conflict with our own. How can the notion of correspondence apply in metaphysics until we have a social metaphysical background as we have a social background for our non-metaphysical theories? And this will never be. So long as our descriptions and explanations can vary so greatly and yet make so little practical difference, how can we say that our theories have that intended identical reference which is the objective criterion for truth and error? And on the other hand our theories make all the difference in the world, because the truth has to be *my* truth before it can be true at all. This is because an "objective" truth is a relative truth: all that we care about is how it works; it makes no difference whether a thing really is green or blue, so long as everyone behaves toward it on the belief that it is green or blue. But a metaphysical doctrine pretends to be "*true*" simply, and none of our pragmatic tests will apply. The notion of correspondence will not do, for it has no meaning here. The notion of consistency fails in the same way, if it is not merely "ideas" that we are examining, but reality. The Absolute,

we find, does not fall within any of the classes of objects: it is neither real nor unreal nor imaginary. But I do not think that supersubtle defence is necessary. A metaphysic may be accepted or rejected without our assuming that from the practical point of view it is either true or false. The point is that the world of practical verification has no definite frontiers, and that it is the business of philosophy to keep the frontiers open. If I have insisted on the practical (pragmatic?) in the constitution and meaning of objects, it is because the practical is a practical metaphysic. And this emphasis upon practice—upon the relativity and the instrumentality of knowledge—is what impels us toward the Absolute.¹³

NOTES

1*. TSE's note: "For while the This cannot be brought into the unity of knowledge, it is unquestionably a part of reality. And so the failure of knowledge to bring it into unity with itself involves that the part of the object which is brought into unity with the subject is only an abstraction from the full object The result is that we know objects, so to speak, from the outside. . . ." [J. M. E. McTaggart, *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic* [Cambridge: UP, 1896], 222." McTaggart was a leading British idealist and a formative influence on Russell, who first accepted and then strongly reacted against idealism.

2. Plato's *Theaetetus* (ca. 359 BC) is a dialogue on the nature of knowledge—as perception, as true judgment, and as true judgment with an account. In the sixth objection ("covered eye") to knowledge as perception, it is argued that seeing an object with one eye and not seeing it with the other creates the contradictory case of knowing the object and not knowing it.

3. See 334ff.

4*. TSE's note: "This depends, of course, upon the continuity of symbol and symbolised."

5*. TSE's note: "These can of course be double half-objects as well."

6. "It is all very well for mischievous writers to maintain that we cannot serve God and Mammon," writes Samuel Butler (1835-1902). "Granted that it is not easy, but nothing that is worth doing ever is easy. Easy or difficult, . . . not only has the thing got to be done, but it is exactly in doing it that the whole duty of man consists." *The Notebooks of Samuel Butler*, ed. Henry Festing Jones (New York: Mitchell Kennerley, 1913), 24. "No man can serve two masters . . . Ye cannot serve God and mammon" (Matthew 6:24; Luke 16:13).

7*. TSE's note: "For how instructive and how amusing to observe in each case the conflict of sensation with imported and foreign experience. Perhaps no truth after all could be half so rich and half so true as the result of this wild discord—to one who sees from the centre" (Bradley, *A&R* 194).

8*. TSE's note: "The materialism advocated is in substance, I think, the materialism of Mr. Bosanquet."

9. *entrain*: heartiness, spirit.

10. TSE quoted Eucken's aphorism from *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion* (87) in his 1913 Harvard essay [Degrees of Reality] and his 1914 Oxford essay, "The validity of artificial distinctions," both of which overlap with this chapter of his thesis (63; 190).

11*. TSE's note: "No judgement is ever entirely severed from a larger background of meaning, though the background may be relatively obscure except at that portion of itself which is thrown into relief and formulated as *this* judgement." (Joachim, *The Nature of Truth*, 113). This passage is marked in TSE's copy.

12*. TSE's note: "The sciences of botany, of the physiology of the senses, of the physical conditions of colour, &c.—these may be said to absorb and to preserve the 'truth' of such judgements as 'this tree is green'" (*The Nature of Truth* 112-13).

13. The typescript continues with a sentence fragment—"For if all objectivity and all knowledge is relative"—which TSE states in the antepenultimate paragraph of the preface that he chose to omit from the published version (240).

KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE: TEXTUAL NOTES

1. Location of original typescript (1916): Harvard University (Houghton): MS Am 1432.1; bound dissertation; title: "Experience and the Objects of Knowledge, in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley. / A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of candidates for the doctorate of philosophy at Harvard University"; signed and dated: "Thomas Stearns Eliot. / Apr 1916"; 229 leaves: textual pages numbered 1-219 by hand; binding error: page 98 bound in after page 61; textual page(s) missing between pages 186 and 187; final textual page(s) after page 219 missing; misnumbering errors: page 128 followed by page 130: no break in textual continuity; page between 177 and 178 is unnumbered; title page and inserted chapter title pages I-VII unnumbered; watermark: British Bond; 20.2 x 26.3 cm.

Inside cover, library plate: Harvard College Library / the gift of Department of Philosophy; loosely inserted (previously pasted) letter of 23 June 1916 (carbon) from Professor James H. Woods to TSE:

The Division of Philosophy has accepted your thesis without the least hesitation. Professor Royce regards it as the work of an expert. Professor Hoernlé has written a criticism which I will send you later. Meantime, we will keep the manuscript here. I hope that we can arrange some time which will make it more convenient for you to take the rest of the examination. In any case, please let us be assured that your interest in Philosophy is as strong as before. [rpt. *LI* 156]

A second loosely inserted letter, dated 23 Apr 1938 (carbon) to TSE from Ruth Allen, Secretary, Department of Philosophy:

Thank you for your note about the thesis. I am very sorry to have to report that I cannot supply the missing page. It must have been lost in the twenty years during which the thesis was in Professor Woods' house. I should have explained to you it only reached this office after his death. Professor Woods, as you may know, was a charming philosopher who lived up to the philosophic tradition of vagueness and absent-mindedness; hence it would be quite to be expected that a page might disappear permanently among the confusion of his papers. I feel sure that the page disappeared before the thesis came to this office, since I have been very careful of it since its arrival, though I had not checked to see if any pages were missing.

2. Genesis and correction of the 1964 edition: After meeting Dr. Anne C. Bolgan in Aug 1961 and reading her essay on his thesis, TSE agreed to support her application to work with

Richard Wollheim on Bradley at University College, London. She proposed writing a critical study which she hoped could serve as an introduction to the dissertation. He decided, however, to accept the suggestion of Valerie Eliot that he should edit the work himself. In Jan 1962, just before leaving for a trip to Boston, New York, and the Caribbean, he gave a photostatic copy of the 1916 typescript to Peter du Sautoy for publication at Faber and Faber. On 1 Feb, uneasy about the fact that the surviving typescript was an unrevised draft, TSE wrote from Barbados to Mr. du Sautoy “a business letter which I ought to have written long ago.”

I do not know whether that philosophical essay of mine (on Bradley, I don't remember what name we give it) has been set up or not: I ought to have stipulated that I should have galley Proof—but the fact is that I did not read it through—there will certainly be minor corrections to be made. . . . Anyway I don't want the book to be any further forward than galley proof when we return.

TSE returned in late Mar to find galley proofs waiting. They had been set directly from the photostatic copy of the draft that he and his first wife, Vivien, had hastily typed in 1915-16, with all its typographical errors, word omissions, incomplete citations, and unchecked quotations. The draft had been submitted to his dissertation committee at Harvard and, based on the quality of its content, provisionally accepted, with the understanding that it would be corrected and polished after his defense and discussions with committee members. TSE did not return for the defense. The typescript of the draft was never officially submitted to the university; it remained in the possession of Professor Woods until his death in Jan 1935.

With the galley proofs in hand, TSE commissioned Peter Heath to translate the German passages for inclusion in the text. In June 1962, TSE received unbound proofs, on which he made a few corrections and emendations in a once-over before bound proofs were issued. On 19 Sept, Bolgan arrived in London to begin her work and was informed by TSE that he had “written a preface explaining the circumstances of its composition and my reason for publishing it at the present time.” Shocked by this news, she nevertheless expressed pleasure over the forthcoming publication and refocused her study for the academic year in London. As the person most familiar with the thesis, she was kept in the loop. Faber sent her a copy of the bound proofs and asked her to scrutinize the text in relation to the misnumbered and missing pages in the original, which she did in Nov. In going through the proofs, she found “some forty errors” that she assumed Faber proofreaders had caught. “I would like to assure myself on this point,” she wrote to TSE on 15 Jan 1963: “It may be that I am intruding here, and if so, please disregard this note.” When she subsequently received an advance copy of the printed book and discovered that the errors had not been corrected, she sent to TSE on 17 Jan a list of sixty-three errors.

There are at least another 63 that I would have recommended, had the matter come to my attention earlier. My feeling is that the extraordinary historical importance of this essay makes it worthy of considerably more editorial attention than it seems to have received.

When du Sautoy saw that the errors involved forty-two pages of text, he determined immediately that the edition, scheduled for publication on 22 Feb 1963 (with half of the 5,000 copies already bound), had to be reprinted. In reporting the “disaster” to the American publisher, Robert Giroux, he wrote on 22 Jan that TSE was “terribly distressed” over his careless proofreading and had agreed to forego royalties to cover the costs to both firms: “our own proof reader did

of course read the book previously, but I suppose that the nature of the text was too baffling to make it easy to pick up mistakes."

To ensure that all corrections were made, du Sautoy asked Bolgan to assist with the revised printing. She agreed, writing to TSE on 10 Feb 1963 that she was sending an even larger number of corrections and that she had

(with your permission via Mr. Du Sautoy) undertaken to render your highly unconventional use of punctuation in this essay more consistent with generally accepted practice. Your obvious prejudice against the comma, your addiction to the semi-colon, and your seeming unwillingness to accord to every sentence its minimal rights—that is, a subject and a completed verb—have all undergone rigorous disciplinary measures.

These measures, she explained, required corrected punctuation, revised sentence structures, and "interpretive emendation. In acting upon the offending usage, however, I have been scrupulous in avoiding any interpolation or excisions which might in any way alter your meaning."

TSE, who in 1963 was ill and exhausted, claimed that he no longer understood the dissertation himself and wrote in the margin of Bolgan's letter an emphatic "NO." Nevertheless, he went over her list, marked some items for response, and added some new corrections to her copy of the text; at the same time, he insisted that he did not want extensive corrections. Peter du Sautoy supported TSE; he wrote on 12 Feb that while Bolgan had made "some changes that do help the sense, . . . she seems to take the view that there is an accepted canon of punctuation accepted throughout the world, which of course is not true." Recognizing, however, that her work on the thesis was "rather impressive," he suggested that "perhaps we ought not to be too hard on her for . . . her strait-jacketed views on punctuation." He suggested taking a middle course between two extremes, making some corrections and allowing her to make notes about other problems. "It is not really your object, I take it," continued du Sautoy to TSE, "to present now a fully edited version of the thesis, but simply a readable version that other people can work on later." TSE agreed. Too ill to receive any visitors on business matters, he wrote politely to Dr. Bolgan on 23 Feb:

I very highly appreciate the care with which you have corrected my faulty text, and if I do not accept all of your suggestions, it is for the reason that I want to tamper with the text of 1916 as little as possible. I therefore shall not alter the punctuation to that which your standards or even mine would approve to-day. I only wish to correct those errors which are due to carelessness and haste.

He then revised the preface to state that he offers the text in this form "only as a curiosity of biographical interest," and he revised the blurb to state that notes and a bibliography have been added "in order that certain difficulties in the original script may be lessened." Bolgan replied on 20 Mar that she agreed with his decision but urged correction of some specific oversights. When the reprinting got under way, TSE and Mrs. Eliot went on another holiday to Bermuda. On 18 Apr du Sautoy wrote that the text had been revised: "I am terribly sorry that you had to worry about it before you went away, but hope that when you come back you will not be given too much trouble by having to cast an eye over the corrected version."

Bolgan's copy of the proofs, incorporating TSE's corrections, was used to set the corrected printing, but in fact most of her corrections and those of TSE were not incorporated. When on 26 July du Sautoy asked TSE if he would like a further review to see what corrections of his and hers had been made, he, in failing health and growing indifference, replied in the margin again, "NO." Over the summer, Bolgan, who had returned to New York at the end of Mar, created the index and bibliography, added the two essays on Leibniz from the *Monist*, and read proofs. Because some of TSE's proof corrections had not been incorporated, she added textual notes to cover for the missing corrections. Evidently, Bolgan was also exhausted by the long ordeal, for she too declined to read final revised proofs. The editors of the present volume acknowledge with gratitude her dedication and conscientious work, exercised in good faith over many months, in order to present a more correct and readable text.

3. Location of printed copies (1964 edition): first printing (1963), withdrawn: Faber and Faber archive (PDS 9 / 208): three bound copies in dust jackets; dedication: "To My Wife / who urged me to publish this essay"; copy 1: "Mr. Eliot's corrections" written on front of dust jacket in red biro; free front endpaper: "My corrected copy / From which, with Miss Bolgan's additional references, if any, / I shd like the new printing to be set up"; TSE's footnote numbers not yet replaced by asterisks; copy 2: marked "Punctuation" in red biro on front of dust jacket; this copy contains Bolgan's punctuation, stylistic, and reference suggestions and incorporates in her hand all of TSE's proof corrections from copy 1; copy 3: Bolgan's proof copy for inserting textual references, corrections of quotations and citations, etc.

4. Location of proof copies: (1) a set of unbound corrected proofs in TSE's hand; preface dated "June 1962" with holograph emendations and additions (see 242, n. 11); holograph alteration of page reference numbers from TSE's 1908 edition of *Appearance and Reality* to Valerie Eliot's 1946 edition (Oxford: Clarendon); (2) a bound proof copy inscribed by TSE: "In this copy Miss Bolgan has entered her proof corrections"; TSE has also added some of his own corrections in this copy; (3) an advance copy of the printed volume, inscribed by TSE to Valerie Eliot on 12 Feb 1963, otherwise unmarked. TSE's copy of Bradley's *Essays on Truth and Reality*, 3rd edition (Oxford: Clarendon, 1950), contains a section of proofs (pp. 65-80) from chapter III, "The Psychologist's Treatment of Knowledge"; also tipped in is Bolgan's four-page letter of 17 Jan 1963 outlining the 63 corrections and recommendations she thinks should be incorporated into the proofs, some of which TSE has marked "x" and "?"

Finally, on 31 Jan 1964, 5,040 copies of the first published edition of *Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley* appeared. Even then, the text remained compromised, with errors in typography, spelling, quotation, citation, and punctuation. The edition stands, nevertheless, as an interim document that will continue to receive scholarly scrutiny; it has served Eliot studies for nearly five decades as "a readable version that other people can work on later."

In working on the 1964 edition, the editors of this volume have aimed to bring the text closer to the corrected state that TSE would have provided had he returned to defend and revise it in 1916 or in a more vigorous period of his publishing life. They have re-edited the text using all of the documentary materials described above, respecting TSE's expressed wish that only errors due to "carelessness and haste" be corrected. All of his proof corrections have been made, together with the corrections and recommendations that he accepted from Bolgan. The original editions and pagination of his secondary materials have been restored, abbreviated citations

have been expanded, and word omissions inserted in brackets. All quotations in the text have been checked and corrected. TSE's notes, altered to asterisks in the 1964 edition, have been numbered and marked with an asterisk. His English spellings in the dissertation, altered in the 1964 edition (e.g., "recognise" to "recognize," "civilisation" to "civilization"), have been restored. Missing punctuation has been silently but sparingly supplied: (a) when needed to clarify sentence structure (e.g., to avoid blurring the subject and object) and (b) when needed to set off long introductory adverbial clauses and to identify other nonrestrictive elements, consistent with his practice throughout the thesis as a whole.

PART III

Early Journalism:
Reviews and Essays

What India Is Thinking About To-day

An unsigned omnibus review of ten books on India,
in order of mention:

Indian Thought Past and Present, by Robert Watson Frazer
London: T. F. Unwin, 1915. Pp. 339.

Agricultural Industries in India, 2nd ed., by Seedick R. Sayani
Madras: G. A. Natesan, [1909]. Pp. vii + 128.

Lift Irrigation, 2nd ed., by Alfred Chatterton
Madras: G. A. Natesan, 1912. Pp. iv + 354.

Indian Industrial and Economic Problems,
by Vaman Govind Kale
Madras: G. A. Natesan, 1912. Pp. ii + 286.

The Rise and Growth of Bombay Municipal Government,
by Dinshaw Edulji Wacha
Madras: G. A. Natesan, 1913. Pp. viii + 455.

Village Government in British India, by John Matthai
Preface by Sidney Webb
London: T. F. Unwin, 1915. Pp. xix + 211.

The Making of British India: 1756-1858, by Ramsay Muir
Manchester: University Press, 1915. Pp. xiv + 398.

Essays on Indian Economics: A Collection of Essays and Speeches,
2nd ed., by Mahadev Govind Ranade
Madras: G. A. Natesan, 1906. Pp. iii + 353.

Speeches and Writings of Dadabhai Naoroji, 2nd ed.

Madras: G. A. Natesan, [1910]. Pp. vi + 216.

Speeches and Writings of Gopal Krishna Gokhale

Madras: G. A. Natesan, 1908.

The New Statesman, 6 (18 Dec 1915) 258¹

Why is it that so many cultivated British officials in India persist in ignoring what the young and educated Indians of to-day are thinking, and occupy themselves by preference, when they write about India, with a perpetual rehash of what they imagine to be the philosophy of the Vedas? Indians complain, not unnaturally, of the assumption that there is nothing else in the Indian mind, or that what else it holds is beneath the Englishman's notice. We should consider it both incongruous and presumptuous if the title of "British Thought" were given to an analysis of the most ancient British Literature. Yet it apparently seems to Mr. R. W. Frazer quite natural to give the title *Indian Thought* to his nicely printed and well-illustrated account, not of the interests and achievements of Indian thinkers and writers during the past half-century in the various realms of knowledge and literature, but exclusively of the Vedas and the Upanishads, and their various philosophical interpretations.² Why should these speculations on "the problem of the Universe"—in the case of India only—monopolise the word "thought"? No one would suppose from Mr. Frazer's book, or could infer from the excellent illustrations that are its best feature, that Indians ever thought about economics or politics, or any branch of physical science, or had any controversies about commerce or currency, art or industry; or that both the Hindoos and the Parsees had shown extraordinary originality and constructive power, alike in educational institutions, in such manufacturing industries as the cotton mills of Ahmedabad and Bombay, and in the really remarkable enterprises of the Tatas.³

We do not find this exclusive absorption in philosophical speculation in what is written by Indians themselves. Works on industrial development, and on the application to India of the economic principles worked out in Britain and America, and are now appearing one after another. We take up the little volume by Mr. Sayani, not because it is a first-rate work, but because

it has got to a second edition, and as being the sharpest possible contrast to Mr. Frazer's representation on Indian Thought.⁴ Here we have an extremely practical survey of *Agricultural Industries in India*, giving concise information about a large number of agricultural products, old and new, from the sugar cane to India-rubber—not forgetting “agriculture, floriculture and sericulture”—with a quite interesting discussion of the methods by which the total product of India may be increased. In this connection may be noticed, too, the new and enlarged edition of Mr. Alfred Chatterton's work on *Lift Irrigation*, which may not seem to the metaphysicians to be “thought,” but which is, at any rate, finding Indian purchasers in whom it provokes thought.⁵ A wider range is covered by the essays on *Indian Industrial and Economic Problems* by Professor V. G. Kale, of that remarkable creation of “Indian Thought,” the Fergusson College, Poona.⁶ Here we have both the problem of labour and the problem of currency dealt with as they concern India in a way to give our British economists food for reflection; whilst there is much on “Imperial Preference” and the economic position of India within the British Empire to give a new vision to our “economic Imperialists” who so commonly omit India from their schemes.

But India is thinking of more than agriculture and economics. We suggest that Mr. Wacha's book describing *The Rise and Growth of Bombay Municipal Government* from 1782 down to the present day, written with moderation and impartiality, and in an interesting style, is well worth the attention of students either of Local Government or of the thought of India—none the less valuable because of Mr. Wacha's long and honourable career both in the world of commerce and on the Municipal Council that he describes.⁷ Local Government, indeed, is commanding increased attention in India from those aspirants after autonomy who recognise that local administration is necessarily destined to play a large part in the development of their country. Mr. John Matthai's volume on *Village Government in British India*, to which Mr. Sidney Webb has contributed a suggestive preface, presents us with an extremely interesting account of the indigenous local governing machinery of rural India, apart from that imposed by the British administration.⁸ This is a good piece of research, based on a minute study of the official records of the past century. Mr. Matthai shows us that there is quite a large amount of “extra legal” administration by village “panchayats” or committees—not caste “panchayats”—covering police, sanitation, education, local public works, poor relief, etc., which is apt to pass unnoticed by those who have regard only to statutes and ordinances. How little

this indigenous village government impressed itself on the British rulers of India may be inferred from the absence of any mention of it in the very valuable selection from the despatches of the East India Company and other documents which Professor Ramsay Muir has just published with admirable introductions and notes.⁹ This is a new way of studying Indian history, which throws a flood of light on the difficulties and perplexities of the men who built up British rule, and also on their lack of sympathetic imagination.

We may add, in conclusion, that no small part of Indian thought now goes into the speeches and public movements of the leaders of modern India, and has its influence on the minds of the young men through the popular biographies and editions of their essays and public addresses. The lives and collected speeches of such men as the late Mr. Justice Ranade, the late Mr. Justice Kashinath Trimbak Telang, Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, Dr. Rash Behari Ghose, and the late G. K. Gokhale,¹⁰ which Messrs. Natesan & Co., the well-known publishers of Madras, have issued, give us a vision of quite another range of Indian thought than that to be deduced from the ancient philosophies. These works, issued by Indian publishers, in modest form and at prices suited to the narrow means of Indian students, ought to find their way, more freely than is now the case, into those public libraries of this country and the United States in which there is any attempt to represent the mind of India.

NOTES

1. On 7 Sept 1916, TSE, who had been introduced to the *NS* by Russell, wrote to Professor Woods about his "Fleet Street journalism": "I am doing considerable reviewing for the *Westminster Gazette*—all sorts of things from Durkheim and Boutroux down to *Village Government in India*. . . I got hold of their Indian books by telling them that I was a student of Sanskrit and Pali—whereupon they gave me several books on contemporary Indian politics. I have been doing some work for the *New Statesman* as well" (*LI* 167). No review by TSE of books on India appeared in the *Westminster Gazette*, but *Village Government in India* is among those here reviewed. This is the first of twenty reviews contributed to the *NS* between 1915 and 1918.

2. Robert Watson Frazer (1854-1921), lecturer in Tamil at University College, London, was known for his *British India* (1896).

3. Jamsetjee Nasarwanji Tata (1839-1904), the industrialist and philanthropist who founded the great mercantile firm Tata, Sons, and Co., and his son Sir Ratan Tata (1871-1918), a political ally of Gandhi, worked for economic independence from Britain and supported education and the arts.

4. Seedick R. Sayani, an employee of the Nizam of Hyderabad and a member of the Agriculture Commission set up by the British governor of India.

5. The engineer and developer Alfred Chatterton (1866-1958), known for his *Industrial Evolution in India* (1912), was director of Industries and Commerce in Mysore and a member of the Indian Industrial Commission (1916-1918).

6. Fergusson College, founded in 1885 by pioneers of the Indian National Congress and named for benefactor Sir James Fergusson, governor of Bombay, educated many of India's political and intellectual leaders. The economist and historian Vaman Govind Kale (1876-1946) was professor of economics at Fergusson.

7. Sir Dinshaw Edulji Wacha (1844-1936), a co-founder of the Indian National Congress, wrote *The Life and Work of J. N. Tata* (1914).

8. John Matthai (1886-1959), vakil in the Madras High Court, was working on his D.Phil. in economics at the London School of Economics. The economist and socialist Sidney Webb (1859-1947), a leader of the Fabian Society, co-founded the London School of Economics, where he was professor of public administration and adviser to Matthai.

9. Ramsay Muir (1872-1941), author of *The Making of British India* (1917), was professor of history at the University of Manchester.

10. The speeches and writings of these political leaders and scholars, grew out of their attempt to secure independence from Britain. Several, including Mahadev Govind Ranade (1842-1901), president of the Indian National Congress, and G. K. (Gopal Krishna) Gokhale (1866-1915), founder of the Servants of India, inspired and mentored Gandhi. Dadabhai Naoroji (1825-1917), a co-founder of the Indian National Congress, wrote *Poverty and Un-British Rule in India* (1901), highlighting the drain of Indian wealth into Britain. Kashinath Trimbak Telang (1850-93) and Rash Behari Ghose (1845-1921) were High Court judges whose opinions helped to shape the independence movement.

A review of *Theism and Humanism*,
by Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour

London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1915. Pp. xv + 274.¹

The International Journal of Ethics, 26 (Jan 1916) 284-89

This brilliant book, all the more remarkable for the circumstances under which it appears,² would be a noteworthy philosophical event at anytime. Mr. Balfour begins by saying that he does not pretend to construct or outline a metaphysical system. While in substance a protest against the aesthetics, the ethics, and the epistemology of "Naturalism" (by which the author means the natural selection of primitive Darwinism), the book neither discusses nor mentions by name any system of metaphysics. What Mr. Balfour wishes to refute is not the philosophy of any philosopher past or contemporary, but the popular philosophy which is frequently based upon the biological discoveries of the nineteenth century. The argument is briefly as follows.

We find ourselves compelled to believe in some things as *beautiful*, in some actions and feelings as *good*, and in some judgments as *true*. In aesthetics and ethics, it is admitted, no particular valuation need be universally accepted; nevertheless all men are agreed that something is beautiful and something good, though as to what is beautiful or good there is room for dispute. In knowledge, however, certain truths are accepted "in practice" by all men, together with certain assumptions which, independently of experience and often in the face of experience, science is compelled to make. The progress of science has often been guided by beliefs of the greatest heuristic value, for which nevertheless there was no justification in the state of scientific knowledge at the time. Thus, in practice, we cannot help believing in the existence of an external world, and in the regularity of nature; and every step in the progress of science rests upon assumptions as yet unverified and perhaps incapable of verification. If anything is beautiful, if anything is good, if anything is true, we cannot account for its beauty, its goodness, or its truth by its origin. And by its origin Mr. Balfour means the description which psychology, anthropology, biology or physics may give of its history. And if science is unable to explain the existence of value and

of truth, we must find for them an origin "congruous with their character." This origin theism alone (or the belief in a conscious purpose or design) can provide. For "Value is lost . . . if design be absent" (44).

It is evident that whatever Mr. Balfour's modesty may protest, his argument suggests an aesthetics, an ethics, and a theory of knowledge. He attempts, it is true, to limit the scope of his inquiry by starting "from premises which are practically accepted by both parties to the controversy" (25). But in general it may be questioned whether in any philosophical dispute such premises can be found. Nor does Mr. Balfour himself adhere very strictly to this procedure. In his discussion of art, for example, he admits that he is "not appealing to all men, but . . . to those only who, when they explicitly face the problem, become deeply conscious of the incongruity between our feelings of beauty and a materialistic account of their origin" [70]. Upon this incongruity he bases his argument from aesthetics. If the incongruity be not only not obvious to many of those who explicitly face the problem, but obvious chiefly to those who have not faced the problem, is there in this part of the discussion any accepted premise left?

I fail to find any such premise, or any such incongruity, in art. We may agree with Mr. Balfour that our enjoyment of beauty is not independent of our world outlook (expressed or implicit), but we need not admit that aesthetic rapture is dependent upon any particular theory about the world. That the materialist and the theist will enjoy art in very different ways is quite probable; that they interpret this experience differently is certain. That the experience and its interpretation are not completely distinguishable may be admitted. In a sense, indeed, art is dependent upon world outlook; in the sense, namely, that our interest in art cannot be isolated from the other interests of life, among them interests of philosophy and religion. But to say that any one type of philosophy is hostile to art or to morals is manifestly unfair; it is truer to say that the type of mind which leans toward one type of philosophy will manifest its peculiarity in its tastes in art, and its tastes in morality, as well. But no philosophy can force us not to feel or value at all. A distorted puritanism, indeed, is as fatal to values in art, an orgiastic mysticism as fatal to values in morals, as any materialism can be. If Mr. Balfour is matching a popular materialism against an enlightened theism, it is not a fair fight; if he matches a popular materialism against a popular theism, the struggle is of no interest; and if a philosophic materialism against a philosophic theism, then the evidence fails to show any advantage to one side more than the other.

In other words, Mr. Balfour seems to confuse the issue. It lies not between a theory (naturalistic) and a value, but between two theories about a value. So far as we can distinguish the enjoyment of art from our theory about it, there is no reason why the Naturalist and the Theist should not be equally sensitive; when they value different things they will be valuing on grounds not purely aesthetic. When the claim is made that a theory robs art of all value, the statement means "robs it of a value which was never an *aesthetic* value,"³ i.e., robs us of a belief which gives us pleasure, and to which we are really more attached than we are to art. If Mr. Balfour can show, indeed, that the naturalist is compelled to isolate art from all values of belief; if the naturalist is compelled to say: "the enjoyment of art means nothing but a particular stimulation of the nerves; it is unrelated to my interests and unaffected by my beliefs"; then, truly, aesthetic value is lost. But if aesthetic value and world outlook are both of "natural origin," they need not be isolated from each other. I see no reason why a man's enjoyment of art, or appreciation of history, should be atrophied by a naturalistic philosophy or stimulated by a theistic one. The naturalist can freely admit that his enjoyment of beauty is coloured by his peculiar philosophy; it may be none the less intense and discriminating. If the majority of lovers of art, as Mr. Balfour claims, have not been materialists, this is partly because the majority of lovers of art have held no explicit philosophic theory. And if the case lies between articulate creeds, not popular catchwords, ought not Mr. Balfour to take a census, among his philosophic acquaintance, to discover whether the theologians manifest, on the whole, a truer taste and keener appreciation than his friends of naturalistic tendencies?

The whole issue, in Mr. Balfour's discussion of aesthetics and ethics, seems to owe its origin to a confusion between aesthetic and ethical values (i.e., feelings) and the values of the beliefs about these feelings. Admitted that the emotional experience and our beliefs about it are inseparable; that our feelings toward a painting are largely dependent upon our knowledge and our beliefs about the world; or even that our dimmest consciousness of enjoying a work of art and our effort to understand this enjoyment is an inchoate aesthetic; nevertheless the feeling and the belief are different things in different categories of value. We enjoy the feeling, and we cannot rest content unless we can justify it by exhibiting its relation to the other parts of our life. Having made this attempt, we then enjoy the theory we have made. For Mr. Balfour, the belief is the important thing. He is not

content with beauty, nor can it be for him beauty, unless it is ultimately (and not, as every one might concede, in a certain sense) a “revelation from spirit to spirit” [90]. He is not content with “the highest loyalties, the most devoted love, the most limitless self-abnegation” if he is forced to acknowledge that they are the “useless excesses of a world-system” [125]. If anyone values these qualities so lightly that an argument can disturb his love for them, there is nothing to be said. But at least he may be charged with a misunderstanding of the attitude of naturalism toward value.

To explain history, natural or human, by “natural selection,” and to estimate aesthetics or morals by “survival value” would obviously not destroy all value, although, in substituting some values for others, it might destroy those we prize most highly. On the other hand, the morality of “loyalty, love, and self-abnegation” which we prize cannot afford to disregard the ethics of survival; for, if we are to defend any morality which seems to make for the destruction of the species or not to further its survival, we can do so only on the ground that we find it good in itself, i.e., that we like it, certainly not with a view to some divine event in which there will be no species to participate. Mr. Balfour’s ethics are a sort of Tennysonian naturalism.⁴ If we find the explanation of history in a divine purpose, as yet but partially fulfilled, then we may feel sure that the best will survive; and between saying this, and saying that what survives is best, there is in practice very little to choose.

The fact is, no philosophy can render morality either more or less secure than we actually find it to be. A philosophy may advance one or another hypothesis as to the origin of values, it may attempt to show that the majority of mankind are mistaken in what they value. All it can do is to propose an impartial explanation, or to substitute one set of values for another; but show that nothing is valuable it cannot. The only way to make a value negligible is to point to something of greater value; the only way to make it more valuable is to value it more—not to search for something of higher value to which it points. Therefore Mr. Balfour’s attempt may even belittle rather than enhance aesthetic and moral value. To many people, I know, the moral law will seem worthier of “reverential obedience” if conceived as the injunction of Jehovah.⁵ To others, it may seem worthy of at least equal reverence if it lead to a state of affairs which we should value more than our present condition—whatever be its ultimate origin and meaning. To still others, it may seem worthy of reverence for its own sake: i.e., because they like it.

Finally, the thoroughgoing naturalist would hardly venture to say that value has any origin or cause. In strictness, no reason can be given why anything should be valued, except an appeal to another, accepted, value. Our actions, perhaps, may be conceived as the “product of non-moral agents” but their morality may not. Our art may be the result of “material agents.” Our emotions may be reducible to subject-matter for physiology. But physiology gives no cause for emotions—it gives causes for operations, upon which, for us, emotions supervene. Consciousness, for the naturalist, is an epiphenomenon and not in Mr. Balfour’s sense an effect. We do not say that appetite in the animal is the cause of love in man. We do not say that morality is due to chance; chance in so wide a sense means nothing; we do not call it an accident, unless we know of some world, exactly similar to our own in every other respect, in which moral value is wanting.

The latter part of Mr. Balfour’s book, that which deals with the origin of truth, is by no means the least interesting, although we have less space to devote to it. But the objections to be raised are fundamentally the same. Certain beliefs, the author asserts, are necessary assumptions. If they are the product of mechanical forces, our foundation for belief is destroyed. We cannot get on without them. Evolution cannot explain their truth. If they are true (and for their truth there is a strong “intuitive probability”), some other origin for them must be found. Something must direct our belief, and this something must be of the nature of a divine power.

Mr. Balfour’s view of the relation of true belief to truth is open to the same criticism as his account of the relation of value to belief about value. So far as anything is true, our apprehension of the truth can surely have no cause other than the truth itself, and no science can claim, as the author makes science claim, that “all premises, all conclusions, and all the logical links by which they are connected must be regarded as natural products” (255).

When a statement is false we look for causes of error. But a creature incapable of truth could be incapable of error as well. Even if we are such creatures—the products of material agents—our “truth” is not invalidated by the fact that we have no standards by which to criticise it. If a belief is inevitable, we can hardly hope to find a cause. That we should be unable to account for such beliefs is indeed natural, if we are “products of material agents,” for it is natural that the product of a mechanical process should not understand the process. Nevertheless, though the beliefs be inevitable, it may be equally

inevitable to believe that to a fuller intelligence they might be known to be of natural origin.

As a matter of fact, we cannot afford to pass uncriticised any of the beliefs which, Mr. Balfour says, have that “highest degree of probability” which is “inevitability” [216]. He instances the belief in an external world. But is this belief actually held by any but philosophers? The truth of such a belief is limited by the meaning which the terms have in practice. The existence of an external world hardly seems to be a “probability” at all; it is either something which only a madman would doubt, or something which only a philosopher would assert. Do we know in the first place what we mean by an “external world?”

At all events, Mr. Balfour’s position is a tenable one, and every tenable position ought for the sake of the philosophic spirit to be maintained. The book is unsatisfactory, not because he fails to make his own case persuasive, but because he fails to make his attack convincing. If we formulate the claims of naturalism as Mr. Balfour does, we grant that he has demolished a very unsubstantial fabric; and this formulation, it is to be anticipated, the majority of Mr. Balfour’s readers will accept.

T. STEARNS ELIOT / LONDON, ENGLAND.

NOTES

1. Early in Oct 1915, Russell introduced TSE to Sidney Waterlow, a member of the editorial committee of the *IJE*, who subsequently invited him to review Balfour’s *Theism and Humanism*. On 11 Oct, TSE wrote to Russell: “He will let me have two thousand words . . . I was quite unprepared for such an important review, but of course snapped it up” (*LI* 130). Balfour, a distinguished statesman, was secondarily a philosopher interested in the conflict between Christianity and Darwinism. TSE had read Balfour’s *A Defence of Philosophic Doubt* (1879) at Harvard and in his “Report on the Relation of Kant’s Criticism to Agnosticism” had discussed Balfour as an example of the modern skeptic (40).

2. *Theism and Humanism* originated as the 1914 Gifford Lectures, established by Adam Lord Gifford in 1887 to promote the discussion of “natural theology,” by which he meant theology based on observation of the natural world and supported by reason apart from revelation. Several of TSE’s mentors—William James, Royce, Bergson, Bosanquet, and Frazer—lectured in the Gifford series.

3. This is not a quotation from Balfour, but a restatement by TSE of the claim he is examining. Similarly, in the following sentence, the quotation marks indicate a distinction in logic, i.e., a hypothetical followed by its implication for aesthetics.

4. An allusion to the concluding stanza of Tennyson’s *In Memoriam*, pointing to “One God, one law, one element, / And one far-off divine event, / To which the whole creation moves.”

5. Balfour: "If the most we can say for morality . . . is that it is the product of non-moral, and ultimately of material agents, guided . . . by selection, and thereafter left to . . . chance, a sense of humour . . . should prevent us wasting fine language on the . . . reverential obedience owed it by mankind" (128).

A review of *The Philosophy of Nietzsche*, by A. Wolf

London: Constable, 1915. Pp. 116.¹

The International Journal of Ethics, 26 (Apr 1916) 426-27

Nietzsche is one of those writers whose philosophy evaporates when detached from its literary qualities, and whose literature owes its charm not alone to the personality and wisdom of the man, but to a claim to scientific truth. Such authors have always a peculiar influence over the large semi-philosophical public, who are spared the austere effort of criticism required by either metaphysics or literature, by either Spinoza or Stendhal; who enjoy the luxury of confounding, and avoid the task of combining, different interests.²

If Nietzsche is a philosopher of this hybrid kind, it is instructive to view the result when a professional philosopher of the competence of Dr. Wolf attempts an introduction to his philosophy, omitting all detail of Nietzsche's career, and with little reference to his extra-philosophic interests. In this short series of lectures, interestingly, if rather carelessly written, Dr. Wolf has given us an admirable piece of simplification; in one hundred and sixteen pages he has presented an excellent outline of all that is strictly philosophic in Nietzsche's writings.

The first twenty-one pages are taken up with a discussion of Nietzsche's views on war. Dr. Wolf, naturally, is concerned to show that Nietzsche maintained no philosophy of militarism. This contention he easily proves by quotation. What he does not show, and what, from the title of the book, we might call upon him to show, is that Nietzsche had *any* philosophic view upon the subject, or did anything beyond voicing all the conflicting judgments which occur to every thoughtful person. It is not sufficient that Nietzsche had "no perverted taste for unnecessary cruelty or slaughter" (21). If this is all that Dr. Wolf can say for him, we do not find, at least on the subject of war, that "the broad outlines of Nietzsche's thought . . . are clear enough to the careful reader" (41), for there were simply no broad outlines at all.

We leave Chapter IV (Nietzsche's Theory of Knowledge) with the suspicion that the simplification has simplified the philosophy away. Dr. Wolf

assures us that Nietzsche had a theory of knowledge. "The main point . . . , I take it, is to bring out the human 'perspective' involved in all human 'knowledge'—somewhat as Kant and others had done before him, only more so" (53). Nietzsche is "inclined to suspect" the validity of all "human knowledge" (45). He holds it "beyond the range of possibilities for an instrument to criticize properly its own fitness" (44). Sometimes he holds that the mind alters things; sometimes that there is no other nature than that we know. Sometimes truth is docile and pragmatist; sometimes hostile and to be avoided. Dr. Wolf has well summarised these views, but hardly convinces us that they form a "theory of knowledge."

In treating Nietzsche's theory of the universe, Dr. Wolf is more successful. Correctly, we think, he holds Nietzsche's view of nature to be essentially Schopenhauerian. It is not clear as to how nearly Nietzsche comes to making will (to power) or the various centres of will, *ultimate* reality; nor is it clear exactly what his argument against Schopenhauer is.³ And even in so brief a discussion we should have liked to see Nietzsche's views on evolution and change compared with those of Bergson and James,⁴ and to hear more of his attitude toward Darwinism, and something of his affinities with Butler.

In spite of Dr. Wolf's sympathetic treatment, one does not receive the impression that Nietzsche held any consistent moral policy in regard to the cosmic flux. Nor does the last chapter (Theory of Conduct) help us very much, though here again we find an excellent summary. The world-will is creative (65) like Bergson's, but, more sincerely than Bergson's, is without sense or promise. Sometimes the world appears malleable in the hands of humanity. Sometimes the will is conceived as something quite unconscious, and consciousness as epiphenomenal. Dr. Wolf's conclusion that Nietzsche "quite consistently, decided in favour of a limited freedom of the will" (87) is not altogether convincing.

The last two chapters are the best of the book, though we regret the omission of any account of Nietzsche's views on art, with the interesting pessimism with respect to the future of art evinced in *Human, All-Too-Human*.⁵

T. STEARNS ELIOT / LONDON, ENGLAND.⁶

NOTES

1. On 18 Nov 1915, TSE wrote to his mother that he had finished the book on Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) by A. Wolf (1876-1948), Fellow of University College, London, "and am

now reading some of Nietzsche's works which I had not read before and which I ought to read anyhow before my examinations. The book I am to review is rather slight and unsatisfactory—it is neither a guide to Nietzsche's works for beginners nor a commentary for advanced students" (LI 132).

2. TSE read the *Ethics* (1677) of the Dutch rationalist Benedictus Spinoza (1632-77) at Harvard, and in a note to his dissertation praised the combination of "criticism and creation" found in the work of French novelist Stendhal (Marie-Henri Beyle) (1783-1842) (355, n. 10).

3. Schopenhauer, whose *The World as Will and Idea* (*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, 1818, 1844) TSE had studied at Harvard, argued that Will is a metaphysical force and that the "will to live" is the basic factor in evolution. Although influenced by Schopenhauer, Nietzsche assigned priority to the "will to power," insisting in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (*Also Sprach Zarathustra*, 1883-85) that it drives all human behavior.

4. Bergson was among those who challenged the position of Charles Darwin (1809-82) that natural selection is the force driving evolution, maintaining in *L'Évolution créatrice* (1907) that the *élan vital*, not natural selection, is at the heart of evolution. William James, whose work TSE used in his graduate essays, rejected Darwin's determinism, arguing in *The Will to Believe* (1897) and *Pragmatism* (1907) that reasoned choice is an element in change. Butler incorporated a critique of Darwinism in his notebooks and fiction, including *The Way of All Flesh* (1903).

5. In *Human, All-Too-Human: A Book for Free Spirits* (*Menschliches, Allzumenschliches: Ein Buch für freie Geister*, 1878), Nietzsche maintained that art results more from discipline than inspiration. His pessimism about the source and future of art was in part a response to Richard Wagner, who believed in genius and in a future in which all the arts would reach a crescendo in Wagnerian opera.

6. "I am glad to hear you like the Nietzsche review," TSE wrote to Russell on 7 June. "It seemed to me inferior at the time" (LI 155).

Thomas Hardy

A review of *Thomas Hardy: A Study of the Wessex Novels*,

by H. C. Duffin

Manchester: University Press, 1916. Pp. vi + 218.

The Manchester Guardian, 803 (23 June 1916) 3

This is an excellent book of its kind. It resembles, in form, a doctor's thesis at an American university, and in substance a good set of Extension lectures. The youth of the writer, intimated by Dr. Herford's prefatory testimonial, is indicated by the conscientious conventionality of the table of contents.¹ Part I deals with the art of Hardy. Under this heading are grouped chapters on character, plot, use of the marvelous, nature and the lower animals, humour, style, and development. This part can be passed over rapidly; we are frankly bored when Mr. Duffin tabulates the novels in order of (1) gloom, (2) style, (3) character, (4) greatness, and (5) maturity; or when he indulges in the exercise of expounding the difference between the realist, the typical, and the universal. The second part is concerned with the philosophy of Hardy, and has chapters on Hardy's irony, views of God, nature, man, women, society, and pessimism. This part is much better than the first. Mr. Duffin is not, it is true, a critic. In spite of his wide acquaintance with comparative literature, his study is not really comparative. Of the value of Hardy's ideas he fails to give a just estimate. The gift of detachment, the faculty of seizing upon the essential strength and weakness of his authors, are denied him. The "Philosophy of Hardy" presents no account of Hardy's philosophy, and does not even succeed in showing that he has any. What Mr. Duffin does succeed in presenting is an admirable appreciation of certain of Hardy's characters, and an analysis of Michael Henchard which is worth reading.² The chapter devoted to *Jude the Obscure* is one of the best, although Mr. Duffin is inclined to expend too much space upon retelling the story; the chapter on *Tess* is also good. Mr. Duffin is right, no doubt, in objecting to the scene in the latter book where "it is early morning at the farm, and Tess has knocked at Clare's door to awaken him and has then returned to her room to dress. When, a few moments later, he meets her on the landing, he says peremptorily: 'Now, Miss Flirt, before you go down. It is a

fortnight since I spoke, and this won't do any longer. . . ." [164] etc.³ Such a speech is certainly inappropriate to Angel Clare. Mr. Duffin is also right in objecting to the slaughter of Sue Bridehead's children in *Jude*.⁴ This is a horror nearer to Cyril Tourneur than to Sophocles, and hints at a faint infection of decadence.⁵ Mr. Duffin has not drawn this conclusion, nor is the drawing of conclusions and generalizations his peculiar province.

The style of the book is exuberant and immature, the criticisms of Hardy's style not altogether felicitous. Mr. Duffin's enthusiasm atones for many faults. Most of his praise of *Jude* and *The Mayor of Casterbridge* is just enough, but to rank Hardy with Fielding and Thackeray as the greatest masters of the English novel is the privilege of such enthusiasm.⁶

T. S. E.

NOTES

1. H. C. Duffin (1884-1974) was twenty-five years old when he published this book on the novelist and poet Thomas Hardy (1840-1928). His supervisor at the University of Manchester, C. H. Herford (1853-1931), contributed a preface saying that "a young writer, who has lived for years in intimate companionship with [Hardy's] works . . . and who gives his impressions with absolute . . . sincerity, may well have something fresh and stimulating to say" (v).

2. Michael Henchard is the dissolute protagonist of *The Mayor of Casterbridge* (1886), which TSE later referred to as Hardy's "finest novel as a whole" (*ASG* 56).

3. The scene occurs in chapter 29 of *Tess of the d'Urbervilles* (1891).

4. Duffin sees the violence in Hardy's last novel, *Jude the Obscure* (1895), as going beyond the logical and probable limits in horror: "Hardy does not convince us that this ghastly catastrophe was inevitable. Something less awful would have satisfied more. It is Hardy's parallel to the gouging out of Gloucester's eyes" (197).

5. In Cyril Tourneur (1930), TSE was to say of the Jacobean dramatist (1575-1626) that *The Revenger's Tragedy* expresses "an intense and unique and horrible vision of life," and that its characters seem "to be spectres projected from the poet's inner world of nightmare, some horror beyond words" (*SE* 189-90).

6. In his introduction, Duffin claims that "Amid the incalculable hosts of modern novelists," only Hardy and George Meredith are equal to Henry Fielding (1707-54) and William M. Thackeray and expresses a "sense of irritation" that Meredith is often ranked above Hardy (1-2).

An American Critic

An unsigned review of *Aristocracy and Justice*,
by Paul Elmer More. *Shelburne Essays*, 9th ser.

London: Constable, 1915. Pp. x + 244.¹

The New Statesman, 7 (24 June 1916) 284

The *Shelburne Essays*, of which this book is the ninth volume, stand for much more than the scattered criticisms which most of them contain. Mr. More is not, strictly speaking, a political thinker, nor is he, in the strictest sense, a literary critic. His taste is too comprehensive, his learning too impartial; his praise expresses approval rather than sympathy. One does not find those flashes of insight which arise in the comments of one creative artist upon another. Pure aesthetic appreciation one never finds. Nor, on the other hand, is Mr. More a “psychologist”; he seldom evinces that passionate curiosity in individual men which, together with a complete detachment from all theory, all faith, all moral judgment, go to make the peculiar talent of Ste. Beuve;² nor the patient, minute analysis of another American—Mr. W. C. Brownell.³ If he possessed these qualities: a special interest in economies and politics, an overpowering aesthetic appreciation, or a detached curiosity in the individual, Mr. More would not be what he is—one of the most interesting *moralists* of the present time.

The book consists largely of an indictment of Socialism, and of the general tendency of which Mr. More conceives Socialism to be one manifestation. To those readers who are not already familiar with the *Shelburne Essays*, the eight essays in this volume will appear to have their connection only in Mr. More’s mind, and not in the subject matter. They will find that what Mr. More really stands for is not a particular political creed, but a view of life, and they will find perhaps their own political views pilloried alongside of views on subjects with which they have never meddled. These subjects have their relation, however, from the point of view of the moralist. If one wishes to grasp Mr. More’s point of view, one can omit, on a first reading, his chapter on “Property and Law” and his chapter on “The Paradox of Oxford.” One should read “Natural Aristocracy,” “Justice,” and, less carefully, “Disraeli and Conservatism” and “The New Morality,” the latter especially for American

readers, though it deals with a tendency which the author holds to be world-wide.

Mr. More develops the thesis of his last book—*The Drift of Romanticism*.⁴ The present age is a period of drift, license, and irresponsible emotionality. Since the time of Rousseau, men's attitude toward life has vacillated between two points of view which are really complementary and which flourish in the same soil; on the one hand materialism and utilitarianism, tending toward brutality; on the other hand sentimentalism, humanitarianism. In art, these two tendencies find their expression in realism and romanticism; in refusing to refine upon Nature, or in refusing to handle it at all. In politics, the complementary tendencies are despotism and democracy. Both sides of the contrast—in art, in philosophy, in politics, in morals—are the expression of impatience against all restraint, against the unavoidable limitations of life and the necessary limitations of civilisation, are expressions of belief in the undisciplined imagination and emotions. The view of the world which Mr. More sets up in opposition is not one to flatter the over-bold or hearten the over-timid. His humanism is based upon the belief that Nature is generally unfavourable to man; that nothing is more fragile than civilisation, nothing harder to mend after the slightest fracture. At the bottom of man's heart there is always the beast, resentful of restraints of civilised society, ready to spring out at the instant this restraint relaxes. Nature, even human nature, is impatient of civilisation—which is something more precious than comfort, or physical health, or popular education, or even life and liberty. As a matter of fact, the human soul—*l'anima semplicetta*—is neither good nor bad; but in order to be good, in order to be human, requires discipline: *Onde convenne legge per fren porre . . .*⁵

The fundamental beliefs of an intellectual conservatism, that man requires an askesis, a *formula* to be imposed upon him from above; that society must develop out of itself a class of leaders who shall discipline it; distrust of the promises of the future and conviction that the future, if there is to be any, must be built upon the wisdom of the past—this is what we find in all of Mr. More's writings. The two essays particularly mentioned are concerned with the expression of this intellectual conservatism in politics. What he maintains to be the distinction of the conservative is the distrust in undisciplined human nature, coupled with the faith in imagination. This is not "the imagination in its purely aesthetic function . . . but the imagination in its power of grasping in a single, firm vision . . . the long course of human history and of distinguishing what is essential therein

from what is ephemeral.”⁶ Burke, and in a less degree Disraeli, possessed this power of imagination.⁷

Whatever our reaction upon Mr. More’s book, it must be admitted that his philosophy is much more akin to intellectual revolution than is most of what passes current for liberal thought in America; if, as may be asserted, the only real revolutions are revolutions in ideas. Mr. More preaches, rather than argues; and when one disagrees with him, he has always the merit of being irritating.

NOTES

1. After a brief career teaching classics and Sanskrit at Harvard, Paul Elmer More (1864-1937) became a full-time scholar and journalist. As a proponent of the New Humanism, he combined an interest in contemporary life and Greek philosophy. The *Shelburne Essays* (1904-21), named for a village in Maine to which he retreated for two years of reflection, is an eleven-volume collection of reviews and articles, many written in his capacity as editor of *The Nation* (1909-14). This and the following review (Sarolea’s *The French Renaissance*), were completed before 7 June, when TSE wrote to Russell that he had “not yet heard from the *N. Statesman* as to whether they want the reviews I sent them” (*L1* 155).

2. TSE read Charles Augustin Sainte-Beuve (1804-69) at Harvard in 1909 in Irving Babbitt’s course “Literary Criticism in France.” Sainte-Beuve was known for his biographical and psychological profiles of contemporaries, collected in *Critiques et portraits littéraires* (5 vols, 1832-39).

3. W. C. Brownell (1851-1928), known for his critical assessments as an editor at Scribner’s, wrote *Victorian Prose Masters* (1901) and *American Prose Masters* (1909).

4. *The Drift of Romanticism* (1913) was the eighth volume in the Shelburne series.

5. Dante, *Purgatorio* XVI.88: *l’anima semplicetta*: the simple soul; XVI.94: *Onde convenne legge per fren porre*: Wherefore ‘twas needful to put law as a curb (*DC2* 196-97). The opening line (“Issues from the hand of God the simple soul”) of TSE’s “Animula” (1929) is a loose translation of XVI.85-88.

6. From “Natural Aristocracy” (36), which precedes “Justice,” the second of two essays TSE recommends for careful reading on More’s intellectual conservatism.

7. More claims in “Natural Aristocracy” that the historical imagination is epitomized in *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790) by the British statesman and philosopher Edmund Burke (1729-97). In “Disraeli and Conservatism,” More discusses the political imagination in Disraeli’s novels.

An unsigned review of *The French Renaissance*, by Charles Sarolea

London: Allen & Unwin, 1916. Pp. 302.¹

The New Statesman, 7 (1 July 1916) 309-10

The title of this book is misleading. There is no reason why Dr. Sarolea should not publish a volume of essays on various figures of French history and letters from Montaigne to Raymond Poincaré; but they are not sufficiently bound together by the panegyric on the French genius which forms the introduction and the close. “The French Renaissance” apparently refers to contemporary France, but one finds essays on Pascal, Madame de Maintenon, Rousseau, Mirabeau, Robespierre, Marie Antoinette.² The historical essays are too slight to demand mention, except the rather interesting “Napoleon as a Socialist”; the literary studies are platitudinous. We do not know how the news that Bergson was the father of Pragmatism will be received in America: but the essay on Bergson and the essay on Maeterlinck are quite worth reading.³

NOTES

1. Charles Sarolea (1870-1953), professor of French at the University of Edinburgh, was a citizen of Belgium, ravaged by Germany in the opening months of WWI. In the introduction and conclusion, he deplores what he considers to be the late nineteenth-century tendency to glorify everything German and depreciate everything French, and within this frame, he sketches a series of portraits of French cultural heroes, past and present.

2. Sarolea moves from essayist Michel de Montaigne (1533-92) to French president Raymond Poincaré (1860-1934). His catalog of iconic figures, many associated with the Revolution, includes the mathematician Blaise Pascal (1623-62); the second wife of Louis XIV, Madame de Maintenon (1635-1719); Rousseau; the statesman Honoré Gabriel Riqueti, comte de Mirabeau (1749-91); the revolutionist Maximilien Robespierre (1758-94); and Queen Marie Antoinette (1755-93).

3. Though Sarolea recognizes James’s “famous book,” he asserts that in the genealogy of Pragmatism James and Bergson “came directly or indirectly under the influence of Pascal’s genius” and that Pascal is “really the Father of Modern Pragmatism” (71), before later declaring Bergson “the father of Pragmatism” (299). The Belgian poet Maurice Maeterlinck wrote in French and won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1911.

Mr. Doughty's Epic

An unsigned review of *The Titans*, by Charles M. Doughty

London: Duckworth, 1916. Pp. 161.¹

The Manchester Guardian, 829 (24 July 1916) 3

This is an epic dealing with the creation of the world, the battle of the Titans against gods, their defeat and their final subjugation in the service of man. One does not find fault with Mr. Doughty for writing an epic. No literary genre, once established, is ever outworn. But mythology is dangerous literary material. It should either be a mythology in which the author more or less believes or a mythology in which some people once believed. A mythology cannot be created for literary purposes out of whole cloth; it must be the work of a race. Mr. Doughty's mythology is neither Greek nor Hebraic nor Scandinavian; hence it lacks outline, it lacks tradition, and it lacks concreteness.

The theme suggests Milton and Keats. But Milton and Keats at their best communicate a feeling, the one of titanic revolt, the other of titanic silence and despondency.² When they fail, they suggest Mr. Doughty. Mr. Doughty's Titans have bulk without meaning. When Dante says "mi parve veder molte alte torri" an image arises;³ one feels the reality of immense bodies with something like human spirits in them. The Titans of this poem have violence, but no passions.

Leaned to time-fretted cliffs;
Is entered weariness, in each marble corse: [10]

In *Hyperion* the weariness is made actual; here it is stated. One does not know quite why such creatures should be weary at all, unless from the boredom of their inactivity. One cannot understand them. Not being human, they have not even the reality of definite abstractions. Bios and Kratos in *Prometheus Bound* succeed because they are boldly and intentionally abstract, and as such produce their effect by contrast with a passionate suffering human being.⁴ Aeschylus was a master of effects of abstract and concrete; he never fell into the error of the vague.

As for Mr. Doughty's style, one is puzzled; one wonders whether he was himself quite sure what he wanted to do. He aims at the ruggedness of the

Saxon tongue. If he were thoroughly and consistently Anglo-Saxon he might arrive at giving a total impression, even employing, as he does, many words of which one does not know the meaning. But there are heavy Latinisms too. One turns from the harsh

From the mount's knees, up to his frozen breast;
Eotens and rime-giants strive mainly and sweat. [70]

to

The adamantine Elements;
Couched indivisible particles . . .
Shall his *mathêsis*, through unerring thought,
Discern . . . [159-60]

with a touch of Browning at the end.

One can enjoy a style of excess—Sir Thomas Browne, or Lyly, or Mr. Wyndham Lewis, or Browning—if it is excess in a peculiar and exclusive direction.⁵ Mr. Doughty's style is not archaic; it is not the style of any time or the style of any intelligible pose; it is eccentric, but not personal. Thus it recalls several writers without being imitative of them. It recalls especially Blake; not the Blake of extraordinary creations of phrase springing at a leap from the unconscious, but the Blake of such verse as *America*.⁶

NOTES

1. Charles M. Doughty (1843-1926), English poet, Arabist, and travel writer, was known for *Travels in Arabia Deserta* (2 vols, 1888), and for his epic poem, *The Dawn in Britain* (6 vols, 1906).

2. *Paradise Lost* (1674) by John Milton (1608-74) and *Hyperion* (1820) by John Keats (1795-1821).

3. *Inferno*, XXXI.20: "I seemed to see many lofty towers" (*DCI* 348-49).

4. In *Prometheus Bound* (ca. 460 BC), by Aeschylus (525-456 BC), Bia (TSE: Bios) and Kratos (Power and Might) chain the Titan Prometheus to a craggy mountain summit for defying Zeus's will by bringing fire, reason, and other gifts to men. Prometheus, himself an immortal, is only symbolically a man, placed by Zeus on the same plane with mortals for his punishment.

5. TSE alludes to the rough syntax of Robert Browning (1812-89), the Latinized eloquence of Sir Thomas Browne (1605-82), the euphuistic wit of John Lyly (1554-1606), and the histrionic style of Wyndham Lewis (1882-1957), whose few essays he saw in Lewis's Vorticist periodical, *Blast* (1914-15) and whose novel *Tarr* he began to read in the *Egoist* in Apr 1916.

6. In *America a Prophecy* (1793), William Blake (1757-1827) combines revolutionary historical figures with personal mythological characters to create a unique visionary philosophy.

Mr. Leacock Serious¹

A review of *Essays and Literary Studies*, by Stephen Leacock

New York: John Lane, 1916. Pp. 310.

The New Statesman, 7 (29 July 1916) 404-05

Although Mr. Leacock employs many Americanisms which may sound slipshod to an English ear, he succeeds, as most writers of his continent fail, in being amusing and at the same time conveying some hard, important, and unpopular truths. The truths are universal; the humour is American, and may not appeal to English readers. It gains its effect often by a trick of comic simplicity and bluntness (such as the author himself remarks in American humorists) rather than by a sudden penetration to the intrinsic absurdity of its subject matter. Thus, in ridiculing modern superstitiousness, he illustrates by reference to Nadir the Nameless, the Hindoo astrologer:

By the waiting clients Nadir is understood to be in consultation with the twin fates, Isis and Osiris. In reality Nadir is frying potatoes. Presently he will come out from behind the curtain and announce that Osiris has spoken (that is, the potatoes are now finished and on the back of the stove) and that he is prepared to reveal hidden treasure at 40 cents a revelation.²

The humour of this episode is not found in the eternal comedy of the mountebank: it lies in the fact that Nadir is frying potatoes. We are not led to insight, through laughter; we are told of our superstition, then allowed to relax our minds in mirth. The great weakness of American humour is that it usually stands at most for the hearty laugh; the reader of *Candide* or *Pickwick Papers* cannot wholly escape from exercise of intellect or feelings;³ in America the hearty laugh triumphs. But Mr. Leacock, unlike most American humorists, has a sharp and serious meaning to insert between the roars.

One could hardly read this book and be merely amused. In the essays entitled "The Apology of a Professor," "The Lot of the Schoolmaster," and especially "Literature and Education in America," Mr. Leacock has exposed some of the essential faults of American education, some of the reasons for the insolvency of American literature. He draws a truthful picture of the American graduate student, the prospective Doctor of Philosophy: his

specialisation in knowledge, his expansion in ignorance, his laborious dullness, his years of labour and his crowning achievement—the Thesis.⁴

Now it is not to be thought that this post-graduate work upon the preparation of a thesis, this so-called original scholarship, is difficult. It is pretentious, plausible, esoteric, cryptographic, occult, if you will, but difficult it is not. [83]

This labour is fatal to the development of intellectual powers. It crushes originality, it kills style. Few, very few, of these “original contributions” are well written or even readable. At the other end of the scale, a product of the same social conditions, stands the “American Reporter, tireless in his activity, omnipresent, omnivorous, and omni-ignorant” (89). The reporter writes no better than the Ph.D. Of this scandal of a continent the causes are first commercialism, and second, according to Mr. Leacock,

American civilisation with its public school and the dead level of its elementary instruction, with its simple code of republicanism and its ignorance of the glamour and mystery of monarchy, with its bread and work for all and its universal hope of the betterment of personal fortune, contains in itself an atmosphere in which the flower of literature cannot live. [94]

In the American scene Mr. Leacock finds material for ridicule. But his criticism, as the quotation above will show, is more than “horse-sense”; his diversions conceal a positive and formidable point of view. He upholds the classical, the Oxford education: Latin and Greek as “the starting point for a general knowledge of the literature, the history, and the philosophy of all ages” (76). His attitude is austere, pessimistic, almost mediaevalist. He believes in discipline, form, restraint; in a real contrast of good and evil not to be obscured by talk about “social evolution”; he believes furthermore in the importance of imagination. And he sees in the chaos of American life only an advanced stage of a disease which menaces Europe; the philosophy of comfort without ideals, the cheap and easy utilitarianism of popular education and the dead level. There are a few writers in America who share Mr. Leacock's views.

Other essays in the volume show that Mr. Leacock is by no means blind to the merits of American literature. His essay on O. Henry should be an introduction in England for an author who is here still unappreciated and unknown.⁵

NOTES

1. Stephen Leacock (1869-1944), a Canadian political scientist and essayist at McGill University, had achieved wide recognition as a humorist and critic of university education.
2. Nadir the Nameless is a satiric character in Leacock's essay, "The Devil and the Deep Sea." "Anyone can be a Nadir the Nameless who cares to stain his face blue with thimbleberry juice, wrap a red turban round his forehead, and cut the rate of revelation to 35 cents. Such is the credulity of the age which has repudiated the Devil as too difficult for belief" (48).
3. *Candide* (1759) is a philosophical novel by Voltaire (1694-1778) and *The Pickwick Papers* (1836-37) a satirical novel by Charles Dickens.
4. In Apr 1916, two months before writing this review, TSE had mailed his own doctoral thesis to the Harvard Philosophy Department.
5. O. Henry (1862-1910), a popular and prolific American writer known for stories about everyday life, typically with surprise endings.

An unsigned review of *Social Adaptation: A Study in the Development of the Doctrine of Adaptation as a Theory of Social Progress*, by L. M. Bristol

Cambridge: Harvard UP; London: Humphrey Milford, 1915. Pp. xii + 356.¹

The New Statesman, 7 (29 July 1916) 405

Professor Bristol's method is historical. After an introductory discussion of the pioneers of sociology, Comte and Spencer, and an examination of several different methods, the author proceeds to summarise almost every subsequent writer of any importance who has touched upon sociological problems.² Dr. Bristol uses a classification of Professor T. N. Carver's; treating the various sociologists under the heads of passive material, passive spiritual, active material, and active spiritual adaptation.³

In the first division he includes the theorists of biological adaptation: Lamarck, Darwin, Weismann, de Vries, Mendel.⁴ The reader will find the book a useful compendium of the more important contemporary theories. The space devoted to Ward, Patten and Carver is perhaps excessive, but the analysis is not uncritical.⁵ The author's own social ideals are stated in the conclusion: he calls his theory "social-personalism." It is an attempt to harmonise "self-development" with "social efficiency," the "supreme worth of the individual" with the "social goal of functioning in a more inclusive unity," a unity which shall end by embracing the whole of humanity [325-26].

NOTES

1. L. M. Bristol (1872-1953), professor of sociology at the University of Florida, studied at Harvard under T. N. Carver (1865-1961). *Social Adaptation*, with a preface by Carver, originated as Bristol's doctoral dissertation (1913). In the academic year 1913-14, Carver was a guest lecturer and TSE a student in Josiah Royce's seminar.

2. Both Carver and Bristol start with the evolutionary theories of Comte, who maintained that societies evolve through three stages—the theological, the philosophical, and the scientific. Spencer, who coined the term "survival of the fittest," was one of the earliest advocates of what would come to be called Social Darwinism.

3. Bristol's study is built on the Darwinian categories outlined in Carver's *Sociology and Social Progress* (1905). Carver argued that social progress depends on adaptation and that the

goal of education and of moral codes should be facilitating changes that strengthen social groups in their struggle for survival.

4. The scientists listed here were all discussed in Royce's seminar, with Darwin as the principal reference point. Jean Baptiste de Lamarck (1744-1829), a French naturalist, claimed that physical characteristics acquired in the process of adaptation could be transmitted to offspring. The German embryologist August Weismann (1834-1914) maintained that characteristics could be transmitted through germ cells. Hugo de Vries (1848-1935), a Dutch geneticist, suggested in *The Mutation Theory* (1901-03) that suddenly appearing variations or genetic leaps are an element in evolution. The Moravian botanist Johann Gregor Mendel (1822-84) argued in *Experiments in Plant Hybridization* (1865) that individual characteristics of organisms are transmitted independently of one another.

5. Lester Frank Ward (1841-1913), author of *Dynamic Sociology* (1883), maintained that the social sciences should use the evolutionary theories developed in the physical sciences. The economist Simon N. Patten (1852-1922) argued in *The Theory of Social Forces* (1896) that economies evolve from structures based on pain to ones based on pleasure.

An unsigned first review of *Group Theories of Religion and the Individual*, by Clement C. J. Webb

London: Allen & Unwin, 1916. Pp. 208.¹

The New Statesman, 7 (29 July 1916) 405-06

This book has a greater importance than even the name of Mr. C. C. J. Webb upon its cover would lead us to assign it. It represents the resistance of the orthodoxy, the brains, and the scholarship of Oxford to a new heresy in religion. Mr. Webb is an Aristotelian; his religion is based upon Aquinas, and brought up to Bosanquet and Royce.² The writers whom he attacks are students of anthropology and sociology, nourished upon Spencer and Comte;³ those in Cambridge—Miss Harrison, Mr. Cornford⁴—are touched with the infection of Bergsonism. Mr. Webb stands for the humane tradition; his opponents, for the novelties of science. This is a chapter in the history of classicism and romanticism.

The actual content of the book consists of an examination of two works: Durkheim's *Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*⁵ and Lévy-Bruhl's earlier *Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*.⁶ Mr. Webb objects strongly to Lévy-Bruhl's theory of a "prelogical mentality." Undoubtedly M. Lévy-Bruhl has made too much of this distinction between the mind of savagery and the mind of civilisation. But the exaggeration can be more or less discounted from his own writings. The mind of the savage is not a different type; it is merely a mind, to use M. Lévy-Bruhl's own words, "differently oriented." The "law of participation"—the union of the worshipper with his god, the identity of the individual and his totem—is not confined to primitive societies; nor, on the other hand, is the primitive mind indifferent to the law of contradiction.⁷ And the theory of "collective representations," which Mr. Webb criticizes at some length, is obviously overworked.⁸ Both these doctrines Mr. Webb subjects to an acute examination. In more fundamental criticism Mr. Webb is not so successful. This is due to the fact that he vacillates between criticism of the sociological theories on their own merits and criticism of what he construes to be their tendency for religion and philosophy. He deprecates, and justly, a tendency to reduce religion to feeling, a tendency to underestimate the value of the individual (the mystical

heresy), and a tendency to regard religion as essentially a feature of primitive society, destined to disappear in a world of positive science.

All of these tendencies are undoubtedly present, but in a latent form, and if made explicit are not altogether compatible. Mr. Webb's book is therefore not an introduction to the work of the sociologists mentioned, but an original polemic in an important struggle.

NOTES

1. This book originated as the 1914 Wilde Lectures at Oxford by The German embryologist Clement C. J. Webb (1865-1954), fellow of Magdalen College. TSE wrote two different reviews of this book, the second of which appeared in the *IJE* in Oct 1916 (430). This, the first, was attributed to him in Henry Ware Eliot's catalog (Houghton): bMS Am 1691.14 (67), 5. Gallup listed it as C26 in the first edition of his bibliography (1953) and stated erroneously that it was merely reprinted in the *IJE* in Oct 1916. In the second edition (1969), he dropped, without explanation, the listing of this first review and included the second as C30.

2. In the *Summa theologiae* (1266-73), Thomas Aquinas (1225-74) explored the relationship between reason, which seeks knowledge from evidence, and faith, which seeks understanding through revelation. Bosanquet and Royce were Neo-Idealists who also attempted to reconcile faith with reason. Webb's book concludes with comments on Royce's *The Problem of Christianity* (1913) and Bosanquet's *The Value and Destiny of the Individual* (1913).

3. In 1948, in a sermon given at Magdalen College, Cambridge, TSE was to recall: "Herbert Spencer's generalized theory of evolution was in my childhood environment regarded as the key to the mystery of the universe."

4. The work of Harrison and Cornford in Greek mythology was shaped by post-Darwinian work in the social sciences. In "The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual," TSE referred specifically to Harrison's *Themis* (1912) and more generally to works with a similar evolutionary thesis, such as Cornford's *From Religion to Philosophy* (1912). See 106.

5. TSE had used Durkheim's *Les Règles de la méthode sociologique* (1895) in "The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual" and reviewed the English translation (1916) of *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* (1912) twice—in Aug 1916 and Jan 1918 (106; 420; 670).

6. Lévy-Bruhl's *Les Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures* (1910) was the first of six books elaborating his concept of mind as it evolved from primitive to modern. In "The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual," TSE had criticized Lévy-Bruhl's sharp distinction in *Les Fonctions* between the prelogical primitive mind and the scientific modern mind. He later reiterated his reservations in the introduction to Charlotte Eliot's *Savonarola* (1926): "M. Lévy-Bruhl . . . invents an elaborate 'prelogism' to account for the savage's identification of himself with his totem, where it is not certain that the savage, except so far as he had mental processes similar to our own, had any mental processes at all" (2.775, n. 4).

7. Webb devotes chapter 2, "The Laws of Participation and Contradiction," and chapter 6, "The Theory of Prelogical Mentality," to a critique of Lévy-Bruhl. The "law of participation," which inclines a subject to merge with the object, and the "law of contradiction," which inclines a subject to withdraw and analyze the object, were discussed in TSE's "The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual" and reappeared in his second review of Webb's book (106; 430).

8. Lévy-Bruhl took the theory of “collective representations” from Durkheim, who outlined it in *Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives* (1898), discussed at length in “The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual.” “Collective representations,” which Webb refers to as “group theories,” refers to the ways in which a group, in contrast to individuals within that group, conceives of itself.

Durkheim

An unsigned first review of *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life: A Study in Religious Sociology*, by Émile Durkheim. Trans. Joseph Ward Swain

London: Allen & Unwin, 1916. Pp. xi + 456.¹

The Westminster Gazette. 48 (19 Aug 1916) 2; rpt.

Saturday Westminster Gazette, 48 (19 Aug 1916) 14

This is exactly the sort of book which is worth translating. A scholarly book, it has already made its impression among scholars; and both interest of subject and exposition of the theories advanced recommend it to a wider public. Embodying several articles first published in M. Durkheim's *L'Année Sociologique*, it yet shows modifications of the earlier views; and presents what appears to be the author's final word on the theory of religion. M. Durkheim is known as the leader of a school of thought whose influence has spread during the last ten years. In Paris, MM. Lévy-Bruhl, Hubert, Mauss, Hamelin, and others,² and in England notably Miss Jane Harrison, Mr. Cornford, and Mr. A. B. Cook, bear witness to the fertility of Professor Durkheim's ideas.³ His present volume, well translated, though with less literary finish than the original, ought to be read not only by specialists, but by everyone who is interested in the history and in the future of religion.

M. Durkheim's argument may be unravelled into three strands. There is first an examination of the facts of primitive religion (based chiefly upon the researches of Spencer and Gillen, and Howitt, into Australian society), in which the author is concerned with the meaning of totemism and the periodic festivals of the Australians.⁴ This argument, which may be considered upon its own merits, attempts to provide a more satisfactory interpretation of these phenomena than those put forward by earlier anthropologists, especially Max Müller, Lang, and Frazer.⁵ Max Müller's view, which was mainly based upon Sanskrit philology, and which examined primitive religion mainly through its myths, saw in the primitive pantheon a personification of the larger forces of nature, and found in the primitive mind, a sentiment of awe and wonder at these forces, a fundamental intuition of the

“infinite.” M. Durkheim does not attribute the origin of religion to wonder or speculation, and sees in mythology only the attempt of the savage to rationalise and justify his own religious practices, in regard to the true origin of which he is as much in the dark as the scientific investigator. The second type of explanation which M. Durkheim criticises is that of “animism”—the classic example of which is Tylor’s dreaming aborigine who finds that his soul in sleep can part company with his body and roam the forests, and who comes to invest the objects about him with a separable soul like that which he attributes to himself.⁶ The idea of the soul, according to M. Durkheim, is derivative. The true beginning of religion he finds in the “group consciousness.” He shows how this group consciousness accounts for totemism. The second strand of his argument traces the development of the categories: space, time, number, cause, etc., out of the group consciousness. This line of argument, which is of interest chiefly to technical philosophers, is inadequately developed and may be neglected in so brief a discussion as the present. The third strand of argument takes up the ultimate function and destiny of religion in our own civilisation. The doctrine of group consciousness is the basis of the whole theory.

On one side the consciousness of man is limited by the individual’s needs and activities. The individual marries and begets; hunts and fishes, builds and labours, and these are interests of a purely individual consciousness. The instinct for association and community with other men is not merely defensive or economic, nor is the community an accident of common descent. It is a religious instinct. For the savage or the civilised man, a solely individual existence would be intolerable; he feels the need of recreating and sustaining his strength by periodic refuge in another consciousness which is supra-individual. Totemism is the organization of the group, and the religious festival is its expression. “[B]y uttering the same cry, pronouncing the same word, or performing the same gesture in regard to some object . . . [individuals] become and feel themselves to be in unison” [230]. Collective sentiments find expression spontaneously in a material emblem. Durkheim, following Strehlow, thinks that each group took as its insignia the animal or plant that was the commonest in the vicinity where it had the habit of meeting.⁷ The totem is more than an heraldic crest. The cockatoo men are cockatoos; they partake in a common nature from which other men are excluded, a common nature which it is the function of the religious festival to arouse.

The life of Australian society corresponds more closely than any other to this distinction between individual economic existence, of low intensity, and a collective existence which finds expression in the wildest religious excitement. For the greater part of the year the Australian clan dissipates into its constituent families, which wander about and seek their sustenance where they can. At regular intervals the families reassemble at a determined spot, to participate in the "corroboree".⁸ Then "a sort of electricity is formed by their collecting which quickly transports them to an extraordinary degree of exaltation" [215]. The wildest orgies take place; with every stimulant of noise, torchlight, strange masks, and drink, the savage seems to himself to have become a new being. Hence the savage lives in two worlds, the one commonplace, practical, a world of drudgery, the other sacred, intense, a world into which he escapes at regular intervals, a world in which he is released from the fetters of individuality.

In Australian religion M. Durkheim finds the essential elements of all religion. For M. Durkheim *communion*, not worship, is the fundamental sentiment. He goes on to trace the origin of the idea of the soul, the beginnings of sacrifice, asceticism (gain of power through suffering), and the evolution of gods. While he makes the cult, not the myth, the essential of religion, he yet sees in totemism the genesis of scientific explanation, in imitative ceremonies the genesis of the notion of cause ("like produces like"), and in the magical *mana*, *orenda*, or *wakanda* the germ of the idea of force.⁹

In his conclusion M. Durkheim permits himself some speculation on the future of religion. The religious side of man's nature can never disappear:

In all its forms, its object is to raise man above himself and to make him lead a life superior to that which he would lead, if he followed only his own individual whims: beliefs express this life in representations; rites organise it and regulate its working. . . . The believer who has communicated with his god is not merely a man who sees new truths . . . he is a man who is *stronger*. [414, 416]

But there are two attitudes essential to religion. "The one is turned towards action, which it demands and regulates; the other is turned towards thought, which it enriches and organizes" [428]. Beyond the bounds of science, which is forever incomplete, there lies the province for faith "when the practical exigencies and the vital necessities which we feel without distinctly conceiving them push thought in advance" [431]. At present we are going through a stage of transition, of moral mediocrity. But "[a] day will come when our societies will know again those hours of creative

effervescence, in the course of which new ideas arise and new formulae are found which serve for a while as a guide to humanity" [427-28]. There is a suggestion of Bergsonism in these last words, although M. Durkheim is not in accord with the detailed views of Bergson. It is impossible in a short review to offer much criticism of a book so important and so well-filled with original ideas; it is enough if the reviewer can provoke interest in what is perhaps the most significant, and is one of the most fascinating, of books on the subject of religion which have been published during the present century.

NOTES

1. TSE used Durkheim's *Les Règles de la méthode sociologique* (1895) in his Harvard essay, "The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual" and referred to *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* (1912) in reviews (July and Oct 1916) of Webb's *Group Theories of Religion and the Individual*. His second review of Swain's English translation appeared in Jan 1918 (106; 417; 670).

2. In 1898, Durkheim founded the journal *L'Année Sociologique* to facilitate the publication of his work and that of his circle, which came to be known as the *L'Année Sociologique* group and included Lévy-Bruhl, Henri Hubert (1872-1927), and Marcel Mauss (1872-1950). Hubert and Mauss co-authored the landmark *Essai sur la nature et la fonction du sacrifice* (1899). Octave Hamelin (1856-1907), professor of philosophy at the Sorbonne, was a French Neo-Idealist and personal friend of Durkheim.

3. Cook, a reader in classics at Cambridge from 1908, was part of the circle that included Harrison and Cornford. In 1914, he published the first volume of *Zeus: A Study in Ancient Religion* (3 vols, 1914-25).

4. The art connoisseur and anthropologist Sir Walter Baldwin Spencer (1860-1929), professor at the University of Melbourne, and his collaborator Francis James Gillen (1855-1912), Australian son of Irish immigrants, wrote *The Native Tribes of Central Australia* (1899) and *The Northern Tribes of Central Australia* (2 vols, 1904). They held the controversial view that Aborigines were "survivals" from an early stage of evolution, a view that influenced Durkheim and other European anthropologists. The English naturalist Alfred William Howitt (1830-1908) settled in Australia and became an authority on Aboriginal culture, which he described in *The Native Tribes of South-East Australia* (1904).

5. The theories of religious origins associated with Müller, Lang, and Frazer are discussed at length in TSE's seminar paper, "The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual" (106).

6. In his chapter on "Animism" in *Primitive Culture*, discussed by TSE in "The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual," Tylor relates the "doctrine of souls" to the souls of dreamers and visionaries in primitive cultures, describing how the "ghost-soul" is capable of "independently possessing the personal consciousness and volition of its corporeal owner, past or present; capable of leaving the body far behind, to flash swiftly from place to place; . . . able to enter into, possess, and act in the bodies of other men, of animals, and even of things" (*Primitive Culture* I.429).

7. Carl Strehlow (1871-1922), a Lutheran missionary linguist, worked among the Aborigines in Australia and translated the Bible into the Dieri language, in the process compiling dictionaries and textbooks. His encyclopedic *Die Aranda-und Loritja-Stämme in Zentral-Australien* (7 vols, 1907-20) influenced Frazer and Durkheim.

8. *corroboree* [in Swain's translation: *corrobbori*]: a ceremonial tribal gathering, held at night by firelight or moonlight, and "distinguished from the real religious ceremonies by the fact that it is open to women and uninitiated persons" (Durkheim 215).

9. Durkheim discusses various terms used by primitive peoples to mean the "pre-eminent power to which all the others have the relation of derived forms." *Wakan*, the term used by the American Sioux, "is not a definite and definable power, the power of doing this or that; it is Power in an absolute sense, with no epithet or determination of any sort. . . . Among the [American] Iroquois . . . the word *orenda* is the exact equivalent of the *wakan* of the Sioux. . . . [A]mong these peoples [Melanesians], we find, under the name of *mana*, an idea which is the exact equivalent of the *wakan* of the Sioux and the *orenda* of the Iroquois" (193-94). See TSE's "The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual" for Harrison's definitions of *orenda* and *mana* (119, n. 29).

Bergson

A review of *A Study in the Philosophy of Bergson*,

by G. W. Cunningham

New York: Longmans, Green, 1916. Pp. xii + 212.¹

The Westminster Gazette, 48 (29 Sept 1916) 3-4

It is evidence of the fecundity of Bergson's thought that, while almost all other professional philosophers are in very marked disagreement with him, very few agree among themselves as to what is fundamentally wrong. And most of Bergson's opponents have found occasion, at some point or other, to admit that they are under obligation to him. An estimate of Bergson must be an estimate of his effect upon his adversaries. With all respect to such excellent books as Dr. Wildon Carr's,² therefore, we may say that Professor Cunningham's *Study in the Philosophy of Bergson* is interesting just because it is not a commentary, but an examination of Bergson's leading ideas from the point of view of a modified Hegelianism.

The book, however, is not a polemic. Mr. Cunningham succeeds with admirable tact in steering a course between adulation and disparagement. The author belongs to a very different school of thought, and urges his own views, but with entire absence of contentiousness. His criticism of Bergson's equivocations and contradictions is wholly fair-minded. And he has confined himself, with admirable concision, to what are Bergson's fundamental problems: the relation of intellect and intuition, and the problems of finalism and duration. The defect of the book is that inevitable to any systematic examination of Bergson's philosophy: it extracts what may be fitted into the outline of another system, and neglects the many pregnant *aperçus* which make the reading of Bergson a delight. But it is instructive to notice to what extent two very different philosophies can be reduced to a common language, when a sympathetic Hegelian approaches the thought of Bergson. When one holds, as does Mr. Cunningham, that "Thought is a process of interpretation whereby experience is unified and organized. It is the life of mind which finds expression in conscious experience as a totality" [91]—one needs great patience and sympathy to discover anything of value in

Bergsonism. Complete understanding is, perhaps, impossible, but the result is all the more interesting.

Mr. Cunningham, in his introduction, has some excellent observations on the study of the history of philosophy, which are peculiarly pertinent to Bergson. "I fancy," he says, that

it would be rather difficult to point out any current philosophical problem which was not in some genuine sense a problem for Plato and Aristotle. Certainly it is true that, when we pass Descartes, we find ourselves in direct contact with thinkers whose problems are identical with ours; in fact, it was largely they who created our problems for us. [6]

No philosopher seems to suffer more from neglect of previous philosophers than does Bergson. If, as Bergson says, consciousness is directed towards the past, then Bergson is the most unconscious of philosophers. He shows no sign (as Mr. Cunningham observes) of having studied Hegel. He has at least failed to appreciate Plato and Aristotle. This, besides having to endure the accusation of scientists that he knows nothing of modern mathematics! He insists, in his brief comment of Greek philosophy (in *Creative Evolution*), that "a solid framework remains, and this framework marks out the main lines of a metaphysic which is, we believe, the natural metaphysic of the human intellect" [CE 326].³ Again, with Spinoza and Leibniz, "if we leave out of the two doctrines what breathes life into them, . . . we have before us the very picture of Platonism and Aristotelianism seen through Cartesian mechanism" [CE 347]. Hence Bergson presents his philosophy as something foreshadowed only by occasional intuitions of his predecessors.

Mr. Cunningham devotes considerable attention to the confusion, or rather the two different views, to be found in Bergson's use of the terms "intellect" and "intelligence":

According to one view of intelligence which Bergson holds, its [i.e., intellect's] fundamental function, indeed, its only function, is to deal with the static and the dead, in a word, with matter: when it attempts to seize the mobile and the vital it needs must arrest their mobility and duration and so misses their real nature. This conception of intelligence is the one which first catches the attention of the student of the new philosophy, because it is the conception which the author explicitly holds and continually emphasizes. [41]

The ideal of all science, according to M. Bergson, is mathematics, and mathematics, it is remembered, is essentially spatial, deals only with the reversible or with what can be repeated, is incapable of handling novelty and spontaneity. Upon the other view of intellect, which is frequently overlooked, Bergson

conceives of the relation between intelligence and intuition not as that of antagonism, but rather as that of subsumption; intuition involves intellectual activity and transcends it, if at all, only as a more comprehensive and concrete form of the same sort of knowledge. From this point of view, “there is no essential difference between the intellect and this intuition itself.” [CE 360]. [61]

This difficulty in Bergson’s statements has never been better put.

NOTES

1. The Neo-Idealist G. W. Cunningham (1881-1968), professor of philosophy at Middlebury College (1908-17), was the author of *Thought and Reality in Hegel’s System* (1910). Attribution by Keith Crook, *Yeats-Eliot Review* (Fall 1995): 89-92.

2. H. Wildon Carr (1857-1931) published two studies with similar titles: *Henri Bergson: The Philosophy of Change* (1912) and *The Philosophy of Change: A Study of the Fundamental Principle of the Philosophy of Bergson* (1914). The first was included on the reading list for TSE’s 1916 Extension course in Modern French Literature (471).

3. TSE quotes from *Creative Evolution* (1911), Arthur Mitchell’s authorized translation of *L’Évolution créatrice* (1907), a text discussed in his 1913 Harvard paper [Inconsistencies in Bergson’s Idealism] (67).

A review of *Conscience and Christ: Six Lectures on Christian Ethics*, by Hastings Rashdall

London: Duckworth; New York: Scribner's, 1916. Pp. xx + 313.¹

The International Journal of Ethics, 27 (Oct 1916) III-12

There is no one better qualified than Canon Rashdall for the task which he has set himself. What is the relation of conscience to authority? When must conscience appeal to the teaching of Jesus for justification, and how far is the teaching of Jesus justified by appeal to conscience? Dr. Rashdall is distinguished both as a Christian and as a moral philosopher. In this volume of lectures (delivered at Oberlin College in 1913) he succeeds in arbitrating between the claims of theology and ethics, not without exacting considerable sacrifices from both sides.

The reader who is interested in the technical defences of Dr. Rashdall's theory of conscience will already be familiar with them. It is enough to say that he believes in "the existence and validity of an objective Morality" [10] and in a power in us of "distinguishing between right and wrong" [7]. And moral judgments come from the intellectual part of our nature. It is to such a conscience that Jesus addresses himself. Now it follows almost inevitably, if one holds a theory of conscience similar to Dr. Rashdall's, that conscience will consist in the usual structure of prejudices of the enlightened middle classes. To this middle-class conscience the teaching of Jesus is gradually assimilated. In the second lecture Dr. Rashdall disposes of eschatology. He is anxious to show that the moral teaching of Jesus can be valued quite independently of eschatological considerations, though his argument is diverted by his desire to deal a death blow to modernist pessimism in passing. He admits that Jesus sometimes emphasised "the unimportance of worldly goods . . . to an extent which would require some correction before it could be literally applied to the case of those who do not believe that the world is just coming to an end" (63).

Dr. Rashdall pursues his reconciliation through the rest of the book. Thus we learn that Christ was not ascetic, that he did not consider celibacy superior to marriage, that monasticism was not improbably an imitation of paganism, that Christ was not a socialist, and did not disapprove of private

property (Lecture IV). All that is anarchic, or unsafe or disconcerting in what Jesus said and did is either denied, or boiled away by the “principle of development” (Lecture V) [195].

When we come to the interesting lecture on “Christian Ethics and Other Systems” we find Dr. Rashdall taking up a position hardly different from Unitarianism.² But Dr. Rashdall has an argument of his own. He proceeds, I believe, first to assimilate Christ’s teaching to his own morality, then makes Christ the representative of this morality, then leads us to concede that Jesus will be best followed “in a society which actually recognizes His unique position” (277). For Canon Rashdall, “the following of Christ is made easier by thinking of Him . . . as the Being in whom that union of God and Man after which all ethical Religion aspires is most fully accomplished” [284-85]. Certain saints found the following of Christ very hard, but modern methods have facilitated everything. Yet I am not sure, after reading modern theology, that the pale Galilean has conquered.³

T. STEARNS ELIOT / LONDON, ENGLAND.

NOTES

1. In the autumn of 1913, the moral philosopher Hastings Rashdall (1858-1924), a fellow of New College, Oxford, and canon residentiary of Hereford, gave the Haskell Lectures in the Theological Seminary of Oberlin College (Ohio). On 21 Nov, after completing his Haskell Lectures, he gave a lecture for the Harvard Philosophical Club, of which TSE was president. To counter the classic utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill, which associated the good with happiness, Rashdall proposed ideal utilitarianism, arguing in *The Theory of Good and Evil* (1907) that the good must take into account higher intrinsic values.

2. Unitarianism, like ideal utilitarianism, emphasizes the inseparability of reason and ethics. Taking its name from the belief that God exists in one person rather than three, Unitarianism honors Jesus as teacher and moral exemplar. TSE’s family included distinguished Unitarian clergymen, notably his grandfather William Greenleaf Eliot.

3. An allusion to Algernon Charles Swinburne’s “Hymn to Proserpine,” which represents a noble Roman pagan speaking to Christ after the Emperor Constantine in the Edict of Milan (313 AD) forbade the persecution of Christians. The epigraph is “*Vicisti, Galilae*” (Thou hast conquered, O Galilean), and the poem contains the couplet: “Thou hast conquered, O pale Galilean; the world has grown grey from thy breath; / We have drunken of things Lethean, and fed on the fullness of death” (lines 35-36).

Second review of *Group Theories of Religion and the Individual*, by Clement C. J. Webb

London: Allen & Unwin, 1916. Pp. 208.¹

The International Journal of Ethics, 27 (Oct 1916) 115-17

In 1914 Mr. Clement Webb delivered a course of lectures at Oxford on certain sociological theories of religion. In their present form they are still lectures. They contain a most interesting commentary for anyone who is reading the works of Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl; and they constitute a very able polemic. There was needed just such an attack upon the theories of these men from just such an antagonist as Mr. Webb. It is as a polemic that the book must be read; not as an exposition or a detailed criticism. On the one side, we should have ranged all the varieties of contemporary thought represented by Bergson, Sorel, and in philosophy of religion, Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl, Cornford, Harrison;² on the other, the Oxford tradition headed by Mr. Webb. Mr. Webb's assault is forceful, but rather scattered. He turns too suddenly from criticism of special theories to criticism of general tendency, and from criticism of M. Lévy-Bruhl to criticism of M. Durkheim, who does not hold quite the same views. And sometimes where he has felt an antipathy, he has failed to elaborate a refutation; so that one is left in doubt as to whether he has quite understood M. Durkheim's point of view.

When we examine Mr. Webb's objections one by one, we find that they may be summed up in two classes: one religious, the other philosophical. He objects on religious grounds, because he believes that the tendency of the group theory is to reduce all religion to illusion, to "objectifications of feeling."³ He objects on philosophical grounds, because the theory of the "social origin of the categories" seems to invalidate all human knowledge.⁴ These two classes of objection should be kept quite distinct. A theory is hardly likely to be thoroughly positivist and pragmatist at the same time. So that one is led to a restatement of the positions of both the two sociologists in question.

First M. Lévy-Bruhl. In his book on *Les Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*, this author distinguishes sharply between a pre-logical and a logical mentality. The former is that of the Bororo of Brazil who has a

parrot for his totem. Now, according to M. Lévy-Bruhl, this is not merely the *adoption* of parrot as an heraldic emblem, nor a merely mythological kinship or participation in qualities; nor is the savage *deluded* into thinking that he is a parrot. In practical life, the Bororo never confuses himself with a parrot, nor is he so sophisticated as to think that black is white. But he is capable of a state of mind into which we cannot put ourselves, in which he *is* a parrot, while being at the same time a man.⁵ In other words, the mystical mentality, though at a low level, plays a much greater part in the daily life of the savage than in that of the civilised man. M. Lévy-Bruhl goes on to insist quite rightly upon a side of the primitive mind which has been neglected by older anthropologists, such as Frazer, and produces a theory which has much in common with the analyses of mythology recently made by disciples of Freud.⁶ It is true that he exaggerates the difference between the mind of the savage and the mind of the civilised man, and that, as Mr. Webb points out, his contrast between “contradiction” and “participation” is misleading [23-24]. But it is also true that the growth of the scientific spirit has been unfavourable to mysticism, and that mysticism has had an obscurantist effect in science. The contrast is a sound one. Lévy-Bruhl maintains that a sharp differentiation of function is necessary, without abandoning either of two essential attitudes of the human mind. This is the “empiricism” to which Mr. Webb objects [137]. His objection is, at bottom, the objection of the theologian—neither mystic nor scientist. It is the struggle between the theologian and the mystic, rather than that between the believer in religion and the scientist, which is here represented.

When Mr. Webb turns to deal with Durkheim, he confuses genuine issues with misinterpretation. He is at his best in picking to pieces M. Durkheim’s “definition” of religion. People who are tempted to define religion should read Chapter III.⁷ In criticising the theory of “collective representations” he is not so felicitous.⁸ Not that there is not much to be said against this theory. M. Durkheim talks far too much about “society”; everything is ascribed to its influence. And Mr. Webb has our sympathy in his stand for the rights of “individual” religion, though we may not sympathise with his demand for the personality of God or with his demand for individual immortality. But his statement that “For them [sociologists] Religion, because it is a ‘collective representation,’ misrepresents the world” [169] is quite unfair to the author in question. According to Durkheim (in the conclusion to his *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*), science is no more “individual” than religion. Its faith does not differ essentially from religious faith. “In all

social life, in fact, science rests upon opinion" (p. 438, English trans.). The function of religion is to help us to live and act, the believer is *stronger* than the unbeliever.⁹ The view of both religion and science is pragmatic. We wish that Mr. Webb had attacked on this issue. Whoever wishes to understand just what the issue is should read Mr. Webb's last two chapters, then M. Durkheim's last chapter.¹⁰ Then he ought to realise that the struggle of "liberal" against "orthodox" faith is out of date. The present conflict is far more momentous than that.

T. STEARNS ELIOT / LONDON, ENGLAND.

NOTES

1. The title in the *IJE* headnote is given erroneously as *Group Theories of Religion and the Religion of the Individual*. TSE's first review of this book appeared in July 1916 in the *NS* (417).

2. These thinkers were exploring the implications of Darwin's theories in their own fields. In philosophy, Bergson spiritualized evolution in *L'Évolution créatrice* (1907) by arguing that it was directed by a creative, nonmechanical, and unifying force, the *élan vital*. In political theory, Sorel in *Réflexions sur la violence* (1908) based syndicalism on evolutionary theories, arguing that myths about the future were essential for social progress. In sociology, Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl, and in religion, Cornford and Harrison, built their work on Darwinian assumptions of change and survival over time.

3. The phrase "objectifications of feeling" is TSE's, not Webb's. "A 'group theory' of religion, which ascribes . . . a genuinely objective reality only to what the individual experiences when un-influenced by the 'collective representations' which he possesses as a member of a group . . . is unable to account for individual religion and must in the end see in it an illusion" (179-80).

4. Webb refutes Durkheim's claim "to reconcile the empiricists and the 'apriorists' by his theory of the social origin of the categories" (160).

5. Lévy-Bruhl, *Les Fonctions* (77). TSE discussed his reservations about Lévy-Bruhl's distinction between the prelogical and the logical mentality in "The Interpretation of Primitive Ritual." and in his first review of *Group Theories of Religion* (106; 417).

6. Frazer and the older anthropologists, mostly English and Scottish, tended to neglect mental differences between primitive and modern peoples; in contrast, their successors emphasized that mind itself was in the process of evolving. The latter, mostly French and German, but including the Cambridge Ritualists, were influenced by Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), who analyzed the primitive mind in *Totem and Taboo: Resemblances between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics* (1913).

7. Webb quotes and then translates and examines Durkheim's definition: "M. Durkheim . . . himself gives us a definition of Religion . . . which does not mention le sacré at all. It is this: 'Les phénomènes dits religieux consistent en croyances obligatoires connexes, de pratiques définies qui se rapportent à des objets donnés dans ces croyances.' 'The phenomena which we call religious are those which consist in obligatory beliefs connected with definite practices relating to objects given in these beliefs'" (46-47). In chapter 3, Webb argues that Durkheim's group theory of obligation is "at most an account of the history of its development, and not an explanation of its nature" (59).

8. Durkheim's theory of "collective representations" or group consciousness is outlined in "Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives" (1898).

9. TSE paraphrases sentences from Durkheim's conclusion: "the real function of religion . . . is to make us act, to aid us to live. The believer who has communicated with his god is not merely a man who sees new truths of which the unbeliever is ignorant; he is a man who is *stronger*" (416).

10. Webb's last two chapters deal with the significance of religion for the individual; Durkheim's last chapter deals with the social origin and human meaning of religion.

First review of *Religion and Science: A Philosophical Essay*, by John Theodore Merz

Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons,
1915. Pp. xi + 192.¹

The International Journal of Ethics, 27 (Oct 1916) 125-26

The learned historian of European thought has in this book three ideas. (1) Science deals only with an “external” world, which is a development of the world of common sense “with a still greater restriction of fundamental data” (107) out of an earlier and larger reality. (2) Science describes and explains, its terms consist of “spatial data and their connections” [67]. Interpretation, i.e. the assignment of value and meaning, is reserved for religion. (3) Personality is that which is most real. The highest experience which we can have is the feeling of absolute dependence (Schleiermacher) which we trace to the influence of a Higher Power.²

Mr. Merz decides, first, that the external world is a construction, that conceptual thought abstracts and selects. The products of this selection are subject and object, “an altered and fuller conception of reality,” space, time, causality [124]. These entities are carved out of a “primordial stream of thought” [95] which apparently antedates thinking, which is a reality wider (though it is said to be less full) than the external world. This internal possession is the earlier and truer aspect of our personality—a period (as well as an aspect) when we looked upon everything as merely “internal happenings” [170]. We entertained this hypothesis in our infancy, and our age sees the belief justified.

But though this is the earlier and truer aspect of our personality, contact with other personalities leads us out of it. The first external object that the baby apprehends is its mother, not perhaps in her earlier and truer aspect, but as an influence, a spiritual pressure. Throughout our life we remain animists—the most real things are other personalities. The awareness of a group of personalities gives us law and morality. The awareness of a supreme spiritual pressure gives us religion.

So far many of the orthodox idealistic phrases have answered the roll-call. One is, however, accustomed to find among idealists a clearer distinction

between the point of view of genetic psychology and that of metaphysics. This is a form of anti-intellectualism which suggests Bergson. And idealists usually distinguish between immediate experience (which seems to correspond to Mr. Merz's primordial consciousness) and the personality which is largely ideal construction. Mind, the author says, is as much an abstraction as is matter. "[T]he totality of any experience . . . is of more importance, being more truly real, than the particles into which we . . . dissect it" (74). Is personality equivalent to this totality of experience, or is it only a (very fiery) particle?³

The phrases "stream of thought" and "firmament of consciousness" recur many times. Those who feel that not only their own creed but religion itself stands in need of defence, should not neglect the aid which this book offers them.

T. STEARNS ELIOT / LONDON, ENGLAND.

NOTES

1. The British chemist and intellectual historian John Theodore Merz (1840-1922) was the author of *Leibniz* (1884), which TSE used in his dissertation. His *Religion and Science* was to be reviewed again by TSE in the *Monist* in Apr 1918.

2. Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), German idealist known for his religious empiricism, argued in *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers* (1799) that religious beliefs emerge out of religious experience. In contrast to Kant, who associated religion with knowledge and morality, Schleiermacher associated it with intuition and feeling. TSE paraphrases Merz: "the greatest check of all that we experience as we increase in mental development is, as Schleiermacher put it, a feeling of absolute dependence. . . . The experience of this spiritual pressure . . . we trace to the influence of a Higher Power" (175-76).

3. Lord Byron: "John Keats . . . kill'd off by one critique . . . 'Tis strange the mind, that very fiery particle, / Should let itself be snuff'd out by an Article" (*Don Juan* XI.60).

A review of *The Ultimate Belief*, by A. Clutton-Brock

London: Constable, 1916. Pp. viii + 107.¹

The International Journal of Ethics, 27 (Oct 1916) 127

“Our whole society suffers from a lack of values” [106]. This is Mr. Clutton-Brock’s thesis. The strength of German society is based upon a definite system of values. “The German boy is given a reason why he should be good and why he should love knowledge. He is told that he must do everything to increase the glory and power of Germany. That is bad philosophy, but it is philosophy” (11). The book is therefore a plea for a system of values which shall be superior to the German—and for a system of education based upon these values.

Mr. Clutton-Brock is a student of Croce, but his philosophical apparatus is unpretentious.² The merit of the book does not lie in an original theory of value, but in acute comments upon education. Boys should be taught to respect the values of truth, beauty and goodness for their own sake. They often admire wrong-doing because it appears disinterested. “[S]ince they are not taught to do what is right for its own sake, they make their escape by doing what is wrong for its own sake” (47). They should be so disciplined as to separate goodness from a code of rewards and punishments. “[T]his appeal to his self-interest (i.e. in reward and punishment) must not be confused with an appeal to his moral sense” [50].³ Similarly, boys should not merely be taught habits of veracity, they should be taught intellectual honesty—the love of truth for its own sake. They should learn *why* knowledge is valuable, apart from purely practical success, the pursuit of which may fail to excite the more independent. And the third, the aesthetic activity, is no less important. For the boy whose childhood has been empty of beauty, the boy who has never learned the *detached* curiosity for beauty, the sexual instinct when it is aroused may mean the only possible escape from a prosaic world. Hence a danger which may be followed by a still greater disaster, the passage from a period of violent excitement into a maturity of commonplace. We must learn to love always, to exercise those disinterested passions of the spirit which are inexhaustible and permanently satisfying.

The philosophical foundation of the book is adequate to its purpose. Its tone is modest; its thought is not daring, but its commonsense is sound.

T. STEARNS ELIOT / LONDON, ENGLAND.

NOTES

1. A. Clutton-Brock (1868-1924), an English writer on philosophical and cultural issues for the general reader, wrote *The Ultimate Belief* in the context of WWI, on which he had already published two books: *Are We to Punish Germany, If We Can* (1915) and *More Thoughts on the War* (1915). In the preface, he writes that “this war . . . has convinced me that we in England need to teach ourselves first, and then our children, a true and coherent philosophy, if we are to withstand that false and coherent philosophy which now possesses the mind of Germany and to which she owes her fanatical power” (vi). Clutton-Brock became one of TSE’s least appreciative reviewers.

2. Clutton-Brock concludes his “Introduction” by acknowledging that he has “learnt much . . . about aesthetics” from the Italian statesman and idealist Benedetto Croce (1866-1952), author of *Estetica come scienza dell’espressione e linguistica generale* (1902) and *Breviario di estetica* (1913). In response to a question about Croce’s influence on English critical taste, TSE said in a letter of 14 Nov 1963: “I, myself, have never looked at any of Croce’s voluminous work which, for some reason or other, has quite failed to appeal to me. . . . I seem to remember that Croce and other Italian philosophers were taken seriously . . . during the first world war when German philosophy was out of favour at Oxford and the Italians had to serve in their stead.”

3. TSE’s parenthetical.

A review of *Philosophy & War*, by Émile Boutroux
Trans. Fred Rothwell

London: Constable, 1916. Pp. xii + 212.¹

The International Journal of Ethics, 27 (Oct 1916) 128

There are a few critical reflections upon German philosophy which should have been made long ago. Without the war, they might not have attracted so large an audience, but one regrets that Professor Boutroux buried them in a volume of commonplace patriotism. In his attacks upon everything else that is German, M. Boutroux is merely the average French (or English) university official; but in all that he says about philosophy he is the *honnête homme qui ne se pique de rien*.² Consequently, his chapters headed “German Science” and “The Evolution of German Thought” are much the best. He deprecates, quite rightly, the lack of humanism in German scholarship. “German science makes a religion of competence” (5). Its aim is specialisation, laborious precision of detail, research jobbed out among a swarm of students—and nowhere the synthesis of a controlling mind. The true scientists will “think as men, whilst working as specialists” [4]. They will respect the word of Descartes (and of Boileau as well): *le bon sens*.³ Good sense is the link connecting thought with reality.

In both philosophy and science, the Germans have proved themselves incapable of observing the limitations of good sense. In philosophy, they fly either to intellectualism (as Hegel), or to radical voluntarism (as Fichte), or “to a union of these two doctrines” (83).⁴ The pure intellect, dedicated to abstractions, becomes sophistical and immoral; the pure will “takes itself as an end, and wills simply in order to will” [85]. Such is the fatality of monism. In the philosophy of Aristotle, on the other hand, we find a god who is intelligence and goodness, apart from whom is material force which he permeates with desire and thought (200).

It is a pity that M. Boutroux did not amplify this comparison of German philosophy with Greek philosophy and the Greek spirit.⁵ All that he says upon this subject is admirable. His condemnation of German politics, German warfare, the German nation, suffers from his application of his philosophical conclusions without further contact with evidence. And he comes

very near to glorifying war for its own sake (139, 151).⁶ His chapters on this war, and on the virtues of his nation, reveal all the conventional attitudes.

T. STEARNS ELIOT / LONDON, ENGLAND.

NOTES

1. Émile Boutroux (1845-1921), professor of philosophy at the Sorbonne, was the author of *The Philosophy of Fichte* (1902), *Science and Religion in Contemporary Philosophy* (1908), and other works. Boutroux, whose preface is dated Christmas Eve 1915, wrote from the double perspective of an intellectual historian and a French patriot. "It is to remain French that we are fighting; it is from our national soul that we obtain the strength needed to adapt ourselves to present circumstances" (151).

2. *Trans*: the honest man who does not agitate himself without reason. TSE partially quotes "Le vrai honnête homme est celui qui ne se pique de rien" from *Maximes* (1665), 203, by François de La Rochefoucauld, to whom he referred a year earlier in "The *Boston Evening Transcript*" (written in Oct 1915).

3. Boutroux praises René Descartes (1596-1650) as a thinker who balanced metaphysics and science, pointing out that the *Discours de la méthode* (1637) begins with the words: "Le bon sens." "The object of this famous introduction to scientific research is to prove that the same good sense governs both the practical life of the average man and the loftiest speculations of the mathematician, the physicist, and the philosopher" (4-5). The neoclassical critic Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux (1636-1711), not mentioned in *Philosophy & War*, uses "le bon sens" frequently in *L'Art poétique* (1674).

4. Boutroux examines the relation between German philosophy and German militarism, focusing especially on the idealism of Johann G. Fichte (1762-1814) and Hegel.

5. As the author of several books on Greek thought, including *Socrates: Founder of Moral Science* (1883), Boutroux contrasts the German tendency to see truth in extremes to the Greek principle that truth becomes error when not kept within bounds (viii).

6. Boutroux argues that "war everywhere calls forth in the nation, and will continue to do so, a new outburst of life. It directs our activities . . . along important channels; it inculcates habits and teaches lessons which have not only a military, but largely a human import" (151).

The Development of Leibniz's Monadism

The Monist, 26 (Oct 1916) [534]-56¹

The study of the *Monadology* may be comprised in three stages. In the first we isolate the work; with no other aid than the philosophical counters which itself employs, we attempt to draw its fantastic world around us and find it real.² Perhaps we supplement it by searching in other works of Leibniz for elucidations of points which are not clear; but in any case we take the *Monadology* as a creed and test our possibilities of belief. No philosophy can be understood without this preliminary effort to accept it on its own terms; but its true value can never be extracted solely in that way. The perfected or the summarised form of any system is the starting point, not the terminus of study. We must effect a radical restatement, find in it motives and problems which are ours, giving it the dignity of a place in the history of science when we withdraw from it the sanctity of a religion. In losing the consistency of a closed system, it gains the consistency of reason, is attached to something larger than itself. Russell and Couturat have accomplished this revaluation for Leibniz.³ But beside the leading motive, the reason of a philosophy, there are other strata both below and above: prejudices, traditions, suggestions, motives which imperfectly assimilate to the central motive, all of which combine to give to the system the form which it has. The present essay is merely a preface to the investigation of these forces.

There are influences of suggestion, influences of tradition, personal influences, and, moreover, there is more than one conscious interest. Among influences of the first sort upon Leibniz (none of them of the highest importance), I should class a variety of authors whose contributions to Leibniz are more verbal than profound. Leibniz's reading was wide beyond any point of selection, and he appears to have derived some entertainment from such philosophers as Giordano Bruno, Maimonides, and the Averrhoists.^{4*}

Bruno is a classic example of influence in the most superficial sense. It is not certain, nor is it important, at what period Leibniz became acquainted with Bruno's works. For the probability that Leibniz was struck by the figurative language, that Bruno may have been in the background when Leibniz

wrote some of his more imaginative passages, there is evidence enough. For the probability that Bruno affected Leibniz's thought, there is no evidence whatever. What we have is a statement which bears strong superficial resemblances to the statement of Leibniz; the arguments, such as they are, the steps which lead up to the statement, are not similar. Leibniz's arguments are sufficiently strong not to demand support from the fact that there were monadologists before Leibniz. To his imagination, we may concede plagiarism. But it is with the sources of his thought, not with the sources of his imagery, that we are concerned.

The other sources mentioned may be dismissed in the same way. It is interesting, perhaps, but not valuable, to observe that Leibniz read with appreciation a book by Maimonides. And though he never couples the names of Spinoza and Maimonides together, the notes which he made upon this book single out just the points of resemblance to the *Theologico-Politicus*—the first work of Spinoza that he read.⁵ He was interested in Hebrew and Arabic studies. Bossuet sends to him for a translation of the Talmud. He announces to Bossuet a translation of the Koran.⁶ A dialogue of 1676 shows that he knew, through Maimonides, the doctrines of the Averrhoists and of a certain Jewish sect, the Motekallem.⁷ In 1687, while traveling in Bavaria, he undertook some study of the Kabbala,⁸ and perhaps noticed the theory of emanation from an infinite being which consists in an indivisible point—and the microcosm is said to be a familiar idea in Jewish philosophy. These studies, rather shallow it is true, illustrate Leibniz's insatiable curiosity toward every sort of theological hocus-pocus. Monadism was probably a satisfaction of this side of Leibniz's mind, as well as the outcome of his logical and metaphysical thought.

Of influences of suggestion, there is only one which may have been of the first importance—the influence of Plato, to be treated later. The main influences which directed Leibniz are of three kinds: the scholastic Aristotelian tradition in which he was brought up, the very early stimulus of a personal teacher toward a mathematical conception of the universe, and Leibniz's temporary adhesion to atomism. His chief motives, more or less corresponding to this classification, were theological, logical and physical.

Merz expresses the conventional opinion in saying that the *De principio individui* "bears testimony to the young author's extensive knowledge of scholastic learning as well as to his dexterity in handling their dialectic methods."^{9*} Incompetent to impugn the scholastic erudition of young Leibniz, a perusal of this document impels me to exclaim with Kabitz, "as

if the copious citation of passages from scholastic compendia proved any 'astonishing' learning on the part of Leibniz; as if he could not obtain these quotations just as well second-hand!"^{10*} The treatise is very short and very dull. Two or three passages in it are often quoted. "Pono igitur: omne individuum sua tota Entitate individuatur"; and "Sed si omnis intellectus creatus tolleretur, illa Relatio periret, et tamen res individuarentur, E.[rgo] tunc seipsis."¹¹ The principle of individuation is not mental, nor is it negative. Though Leibniz documents this work with such names as Ockham, Scotus, Aquinas, Suarez, Molina, Zabarella,¹² what the thesis shows is not extent of learning or originality of thought. It shows that there was a certain body of inheritance which pointed in a certain direction. It shows a scholastic point of view from which Leibniz never really escaped, and which he never wholly rejected.^{13*} In the light of these quotations is to be interpreted not only monadism, but the materialistic atomism which for a time engaged his attention. At this early period, and indeed throughout his life, there is little evidence of direct adaptations from Aristotle. But here as always one finds the acceptance of the problem of substance, transmitted from Aristotle through the form which the school had given it. In some ways diametrically in opposition with Aristotle, this scholastic view of substance which Leibniz held is yet an Aristotelian inheritance. This point is of capital importance.

It appears that Leibniz abandoned his study of the philosophers of the church when he felt called, at a very early age, to the mechanical view of nature.^{14*} But there was never a complete renunciation, and Leibniz, who seldom spoke ill of a dead philosopher, always praises the schoolmen. The change was a transition and not an apostasy. In 1663, at Jena, while pursuing his studies in jurisprudence, he fell under the influence of Weigel. Weigel was acquainted with the work of Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo.¹⁵ Kabitx says that "the fundamental conception of Leibniz's system (according to which the universe is a harmonic, mathematico-logical related whole . . . became a firm conviction with Leibniz through Weigel, before he was acquainted with the work of Hobbes."^{16*} Bisterfeld of Leyden is another mathematician admired by Leibniz in his youth, and his influence is supposed to be visible in the *Arte Combinatoria*.¹⁷ The idea of a harmony of a universe of individual substances is present in other writings of Leibniz's adolescence.

Leibniz's scholastic training in metaphysics under Thomasius was followed by that period in which, as he says, "when I had freed myself from

the yoke of Aristotle [by which he means the attenuated scholasticism of his day], I took to the void and the atoms, for that is the view which best satisfies the imagination."^{18*} This may have been about 1666.^{19*} It is easy to see from the *De principio individui* (written, according to his own chronology, when he had already fallen under the influence of Gassendi) that this liberation was merely a development of extreme nominalism in the currents of his time.²⁰ In 1676, he can still write, "Ego magis magisque persuasus sum de corporibus insecabilibus . . . simplicissima esse debent ac proinde sphærica," but goes on to say "Nullus enim locus est tam parvus quin fingi possit esse in eo sphæram ipso minorem. Ponamus hoc ita esse, nullus erit locus assignabilis vacuus. Et tamen Mundus erit plenus, unde intelligitur quantitatem inassignabilem esse aliquid."^{21*} The atomism survives in 1676, although the void is abandoned, and the influence of his mathematical work is visible (this was just at the end of the period in Paris, when he was corresponding with Newton through the medium of Oldenburg). In this year occurred also his visit to London and to the Hague.²²

In the next period of his life, when he had for some years been occupied chiefly with mathematical matters, falls the elaboration of his argument against Descartes' theory of matter—Descartes, who had been partly responsible for Leibniz's tendency toward a mechanical view. The unsatisfactory character of the views of Descartes and of Gassendi had, it is true, been pointed out by Leibniz several years before.²³ In this later period, besides physics and pure mathematics, a third scientific interest may be noted. He refers often to Swammerdam, Leeuwenhoek, and Malpighi,²⁴ and it is evident that he felt a genuine enthusiasm for the progress of biology, aside from the support which certain theories lent to his doctrine of preformation. But as his interest in biology is apparently subsequent to the observable beginnings of monadism, these theories were rather a confirmation than a stimulus.

To these philosophical and scientific occupations must be joined another which was no less important. This is his perfectly genuine passion for theology. Developed perhaps out of his early training, this theology, in a mind which never lost an interest it had once taken up, remained a powerful influence throughout his life. His solicitude for the orthodoxy of his philosophy was not merely policy or timidity; his theological disputations are not merely a cover for logical problems. Leibniz's theological motive is responsible for much of the psychology of his monads; it took deep root in

his system, though not altogether without disturbance of the soil. The only two interpretations of Leibniz which are of any importance, that of Dillmann and the superior interpretation of Russell and Couturat, minimize the significance of this motive.^{25*}

“Ma métaphysique est toute mathématique, pour dire ainsi, ou la pourroit devenir,” Leibniz writes to the Marquis de l’Hôpital (Dec. 27, 1694).²⁶ And Russell says in speaking of the subject-object relation, “the whole doctrine depends, throughout, upon this purely logical tenet” (*CEPL* 49). Strictly speaking, this assertion is perfectly justified. For a historical account, it is insufficient. Leibniz puts his problems into logical form, and often converts them slyly into logical problems, but his prejudices are not always prejudices of logic. The value of Leibniz’s logic is to a certain extent separable from the value of his philosophy. The view of the nature of substance with which he starts is due to a logical problem. But there is no logical descent from pluralism to the view that the ego is substance. Leibniz’s view of substance is derived from Aristotle, but his *theory* of substance is quite different: it is Aristotle’s theory filtered through scholasticism and tinctured by atomism and theology.

When we father the problem of substance upon Aristotle, we must remember that it was a problem which he never succeeded in resolving, or pretended to have resolved. The chief inheritance of modern philosophy from his doctrine is the proposition that “substance is that which is not predicated of a subject, but of which all else is predicated” (*Metaphysica* Z 1029a 8-9).²⁷ Aristotle recognizes that there are various senses in which we may use the term, and various substances beside the sensible substances, which have matter. In one sense the composite of form and matter (e.g., animals and plants) is substance, in another sense substance is “the form by which the matter is some definite thing” (1041b 8). And again the substratum (1028b 36-37) is that of which everything is predicated. Matter certainly is not substance, because matter *qua* matter has neither limit nor the potency of limit by separation (see Δ 1017b 1-8). And again the universal is more substantial than the particulars (H1042a 13-15). Wherever Aristotle pursues the concept of substance, it eludes him. These tentative definitions, assumed for dialectic purposes, are abandoned in favor of that of 1041b 27-31. This bears, it is true, very striking resemblances to the substance of Leibniz. As to the meaning of form and the relation of formal to efficient and final cause, Aristotle remains difficult and vague, while for Leibniz the formal and efficient causes in the case of substance are identical.

There is another and very serious difficulty in the theory of Aristotle. From one of Aristotle's points of view, only the individual should be real; from the other, only the specific. The form is always ἀτομόν (indivisible); thought analyzes and resynthesizes its constituents to give the λόγος τοῦ τι ἦν εἶναι (the reason for a thing being what it is). Of the subject either the whole or a part of the definition can be affirmed: thus we can define Socrates *qua* man as ζῶον δίπουν λογικόν (a rational two-footed animal). But predications of particular individuals belong to the attributive, not to the definitory type of judgment. In this type of judgment, the predicate affirmed, although it belongs to the subject, is not a constituent of the subject's essential nature. As the essential nature of Socrates is man, anything which is not contained in the form of man in general will be attributive only and not definitory, inasmuch as it might have been otherwise. For Aristotle, not all predicates are contained in their subjects. Hence there can be no definition of individuals of a species (1039b 27-30). The substance must be individual, in order to be the subject; it must be a "this." But the "this" cannot be composed of universals, because no number of "suches" will constitute a "this," and on the other hand, it cannot be composed of other substances. We thus get two opposed views: the substance is the form of the species, in which case it breaks loose from the concrete thing and gives rise to the same difficulties which Aristotle censured in Plato; or the substance is the individual thing, in which case there is no definition and no knowledge. One view is in harmony with Aristotle's methodology, the other with his theory of elementary cognition.^{28*}

Aristotle is here betrayed by his representation theory—the exact correspondence between constituents of propositions and constituents of things; although in other contexts he is an epistemological monist. The same incoherence appears in his account of the soul. Is the substance the compound of matter and form, or the form alone?

It was the Aristotelian problem of substance, affected by scholasticism, that Leibniz took upon his shoulders at the beginning of his career. Later in life he observes that he has been re-reading Aristotle, and that he finds much of value in him. The extent of his acquaintance with the text may be left in doubt. It is probable that he had little or no direct knowledge, that he abandoned the study of the history of philosophy almost altogether for some years, and the fresh approach to Aristotle did not produce much effect upon his subsequent work. The interest lies in Leibniz's saturation with the Aristotelian tradition—in spite of a momentary peevishness against the

degenerate scholasticism in which he had been brought up—and in the compound to which the contact of this training with the speculations of contemporary science gave rise. To this particular problem, the drawing of parallels and the estimating of borrowings—conscious and unconscious—are irrelevant. Nor are we here concerned with the question whether “this seemingly fantastic system could be deduced from a few simple premisses” (*CEPL* viii). The question is the actual genesis of the system. If, at the age of fifteen, Leibniz inclined to the view that substances are particular individuals and that relations exist only in the mind; if we can see that his transition to atomic materialism follows quite easily from this; if we find that his further development depended upon the way in which his scientific researches and his theological prejudices—largely an inheritance from his early training—played into each other; then we shall conclude that his metaphysics and his scientific achievements—logical and mathematical—are two different values.

What is curious about Leibniz’s mind is the existence of two distinct currents. As a scientist he has a clear and consistent development. Every step is justified and coherent from this point of view alone. His metaphysics is carefully built upon his scientific evolution. On the other side is a strong devotion to theology. His study of Descartes marks a stage in the development of both. Descartes’ theory of matter and Descartes’ theory of self-consciousness both had their effect upon him. And it is always the same mind working, clear and cold, the mind of a doctor of the church. He is nearer to the Middle Ages, nearer to Greece, and yet nearer to us, than are men like Fichte and Hegel.

We have seen that there is a very great difference between the Aristotelian theory of substance and the nominalism deriving from it with which Leibniz starts. Both in the *Metaphysics* and in the *De anima*, it is true, Aristotle leaves the answer somewhat ambiguous. When he discusses the substance of organic beings, we are apt to think that each individual is a substance—that the form of each body is an individual—one form for Socrates, and another for Callias. It is difficult to avoid this conclusion, but in general, for Aristotle as well as for Plato, whatever was merely individual was perishable and incapable of being a subject of knowledge.²⁹ But if we say, with Burnet, that “Plato found reality, whether intelligible or sensible, in the combination of matter and form and not in either separately,” and take the same view of Aristotle, yet we cannot say that they found it in each individual as a world apart.^{30*} This is an instance of the differences between Leibniz and

the Greeks. In Leibniz we find the genesis of a psychological point of view; ideas tend to become particular mental facts, attributes of particular substances. If the form or principle of Aristotle were different in each man, this form would be Leibniz's soul. For the Greek, the human was the typically human, individual differences were not of scientific interest; for the modern philosopher, individual differences were of absorbing importance.

We may now trace the two currents which are imperfectly united in the monad. Leibniz approaches the problem of substance primarily as a physicist. "Leibniz does not begin with the problem, what is the substance of the body, what is its origin, but from this: how the principle of the body itself may be conceived."^{31*} To those readers—there are still a few—who know Leibniz only through the *Monadology*, the steps to the conclusion will remain unknown. Unless we appreciate the original question, we shall be unable to understand his solution of the problem of body and soul, and of the problem of our knowledge of external objects. He never asked the question, "do physical bodies exist?" but always, "what is the principle which makes physical bodies intelligible?" The answer is found in his reaction to Cartesianism. And at this point, while the problem of energy was engaging his attention, he read some of the dialogues of Plato, and was confirmed in his conclusions especially by certain parts of the *Sophist*. What we get is, on the one hand, an explanation of the principle of matter, and on the other, an idealistic metaphysic, largely influenced by Descartes, based upon self-consciousness. The latter aspect has of course been more exploited than the former.

Leibniz's account of physical matter is a much more scientific, but in some respects much cruder, explanation than Aristotle's. For Aristotle's account is fundamentally a relativistic one, i.e., "matter" has various meanings in relation to shifting points of view which form a series but are not themselves defined. There are meanings in various contexts, but no absolute meaning; and the series of points of view, the series of contexts, has no absolute meaning either. One misses the whole point of Aristotle's theory if one regards matter as a "thing." It is—whether as primitive matter, as the four elements, or as any compounds (I mean σύνθεσεις (syntheses, compositions) not μίξεις (mixtures) of any degree of complexity—formed out of these, one side of a contrast in the mind (or imposed upon the mind), though this mind is no more absolutely definable than matter itself. (Hence Aristotle is neither an idealist, in the modern sense, nor a pragmatist.)

Materia prima is not simply negative nor is it positive in any apprehensible way.³² It is simply the furthest possible extension of meaning of a concept which has arisen out of practical complexes. The next stage in the conception of matter, it will be recollected, is that of a subject possessing two out of two pairs of opposites (wet-dry, hot-cold). The *materia prima* is not *actual*, because it has no predicates; the smallest number of predicates which an actual existent can have is two. That is, whatever is merely hot, or merely dry, is not a substance but is identical with the quality itself; but whatever is hot and wet, or cold and dry, is a substance different from its predicates. These elements—the possible combinations of four qualities—are capable of transmutation into one another in a cycle which occurs in the exchange of qualities (the hot-dry becomes hot-wet, the hot-wet becomes wet-cold, etc.). The third stage of matter is that of the stable compounds of the four elements held together in various proportions. This progress is not a chemical theory in the modern sense; it is a series of points of view. The formal cause is therefore identical with the thing itself, and whether the form is there is a question of what we regard as the thing. The lump of marble is a *σωρός* (pile, heap) of higher compounds of the four elements—or it is a statue. One must keep in mind the two apparently inconsistent propositions: (1) there are no forms of individuals,^{33*} (2) the form and the matter compose one whole.

Aristotle is too keen a metaphysician to start from a naive view of matter or from a one-sided spiritualism. To a certain extent Leibniz keeps this middle ground too. But his metaphysics tends to fall apart, as the result of his inherited nominalism and the fissure between his scientific and his theological interests. Starting as a physicist, Leibniz naturally assumes that matter is not a relative term, but that it is (if it exists at all, of which he has no doubt) something absolute. The substantiality of matter consists then (after his defection from Cartesianism) in the concept of force. Force is not conceived as something behind matter, which could be actual without matter. But neither is it a “form” in quite the Aristotelian sense. The “real and animated point” of the *Système nouveau* is from an Aristotelian point of view merely another individual, or a form of an individual.³⁴ It is purely and simply a physical explanation. It involves no theory of knowledge, because it does not take into account the point of view of an observer; it is a contrast not between matter and form, but between a particular substance and its states.

Leibniz's distinction between *materia prima* and *materia secunda* (of bodies) is superficially Aristotelian. But it is really only a distinction between two ways in which matter may be considered for the purposes of the physicist. It is a distinction of uses and not of contexts. "Matter" is not a relative term. The ancient distinction between matter and form does not correspond to the modern distinction, since Descartes, of matter and spirit. And the dichotomy is as strongly marked in Leibniz as in Descartes. His solution of the difficulty marks the wide gulf that separates modern from ancient philosophy. For Aristotle matter and form were always relative, but never identical. For Leibniz matter and spirit are absolute reals, but are really (as for Spinoza) the same thing. The difference for Leibniz is that between internal and external aspects. *Materia prima* is not a stage, it is an external aspect, and even for physics he finds this aspect insufficient. He is therefore led gradually into a metaphysical conception. But from this metaphysical account of the nature of the physical universe to his doctrine of souls, there is really no legitimate inference.

The theory of forces, as the substances of which material changes are the states, is not the theory of the soul which derives from his more theological interest. It is, as we have said, simply an analysis of the physical universe. Had Leibniz been quite consistent, he would have gone on to explain organic and conscious activity on a strictly physical basis. This he did accomplish in some measure. His doctrine of expression is an account of perception consistent with a purely physical and mathematical point of view.^{35*} But his transmigration of human souls^{36*} is muddled by the identification of soul, in the sense of personality, with the animated point; of the core of feeling of the self with the force of which it is predicated. From his physical point of view he cannot arrive at self-consciousness, so that his doctrine of force has two grounds—the theory of dynamics and the *feeling* of activity. If we refuse to consider self-consciousness a simple and single act, if making an object of oneself merely means the detachment and observation of particular states by other states, then the "force" slips out of our hands altogether. It remains "internal," it is true, in contrast with primary matter, but its internality is not a character of self-consciousness. And in this event the whole theory becomes completely naturalistic. Something is the subject, but it is not the *I* which I know, or which anybody knows. And there then remains no reason why we should longer maintain a plurality of subjects. Force becomes one. Against such a conclusion Leibniz was set, (1) because

it ceases to have any value for physics, and (2) because it interferes with our claim for personal immortality. Theology and physics join forces (so to speak) to rob metaphysics of its due.

Hence two curious difficulties arise. An animated force, a monad, tends to become an animated atom. The monad exerts its activity at a point in space and time. Artifacts, as for Aristotle, are merely groups of monads without a dominant monad. Organic bodies are groups with a dominant monad. In the latter case, in the case of a human being, in what sense is my body *mine*, since it is also the bodies of other monads? The dominant monad should be the form of the body, instead of which it bears a strong resemblance to a larger or more powerful cell, and the soul would have to be located, like Descartes', in a particular place. Russell, in contrasting Leibniz's two conflicting theories, says of the second view: "in this other theory, mind and body together make one substance, making a true unity" (*CEPL* 150). So they ought to do. If the mind cannot make the body into a *unum per se*, instead of a mere aggregate, the original physical theory has advanced to a point at which mind and body fall apart. The second view appears to descend from Aristotle.^{37*} The first appears to descend from atomism. From neither philosophy does Leibniz ever shake himself quite free.

There is, from the physical side, a sense in which the monad is truly immortal. Force is indestructible, and will continue in various manifestations. But force in this sense is entirely impersonal. We cannot conceive of its persistence except by associating it with particular particles of matter. Leibniz is led by his difficulties almost to the point of either denying the existence of matter altogether, or else setting up a sort of matter which will be something real besides monads.

The second objection is connected with the generation and destruction of life. For Aristotle some account of generation and destruction is rendered possible by his provisional distinction between efficient and formal causes. Aristotle was not embarrassed by a belief in personal immortality, and his philosophy confines itself with fair success to an examination of the actual, the present life. But Leibniz's force is indestructible in a different sense from Aristotle's form.^{38*} It persists in time as a particular existence. "[T]he monad which is myself must have previously existed"; it must have been "one of the monads composing the body either of father or mother" (*CEPL* 154). This theory has the disadvantages of practically denying the independence of mind from body and of separating monadhood from selfhood. It substitutes biological behavior for conscious activity.

Commencing with an analysis of the nature of matter, Leibniz is led to the view of a universe consisting of centers of force. From this point of view the human soul is merely one of these forces, and its activity should be reducible to physical laws. Under the influence of an Aristotelian doctrine of substance, he comes to conclusions which are not at all Aristotelian, by his nominalistic assumption that substances are particulars. From a materialistic atomism he is led to a spiritualistic atomism. In this he shows again an important difference between the ancient and the modern world. It is illustrated in the prejudice of Aristotle against the differences between individuals of the same species which he ascribes to the perverse and unaccountable influence of matter. To the Greek, this variety of points of view would seem a positive evil; as a theory of knowledge, it would seem a refuge of skepticism; to Leibniz and the modern world, it enhances the interest of life. And yet the view of Leibniz comes, *via* nominalism, out of Aristotle himself.

From the point of view of physics, we have a consistent explanation which represents a great advance upon crude materialism. But it is difficult to retain the separate forces unless we conceive of matter as a positive principle of individuation. Not that the doctrine of activity and passivity is wholly unsatisfactory.^{39*} Its effect is to reduce causality to function. And but for the Aristotelian influence, it might possibly have done so. Instead of monads, we might then have had atomic particulars. But Leibniz sometimes confuses the mathematico-physical and the historical points of view. It is true that the future of the monad should be theoretically predictable. But Leibniz leaves the basis of prediction uncertain. Without recourse to mysticism, the reasons why a monad should pass from the unconscious to the conscious state, why a monad composing the body of father or mother should suddenly be elected to domination over a new body of monads, remain unsolved. We have seen that the notion of soul or spirit is not to be reached by the theory of monads as an explanation of the principle of matter. If it is part of Leibniz's inheritance, we may inquire just what Aristotle's view of the soul was.

Leibniz's theory of soul is, like that of Descartes, derived from scholasticism. It is very remote from that of either Plato [and] Aristotle or Plotinus.⁴⁰ For the Greeks, even for Plotinus, the soul is a substance in a sense which does not include personal immortality. For Aristotle, there is no continuity between the stages of soul, between vegetable, animal, and human life. And the definition of monads as "points of view" is, so far as I can see, entirely modern.

For Aristotle, according to his own explicit statement, there is no “soul” in general. As the species of figure to figure in general, so are the souls of various species of animal to “soul” in general.^{41*} In the higher grades of soul, the same functions persist, but in a form altered by the nature of the whole. The organs of different species are related by analogy—as root is to plant, so mouth is to animal, but mouth is not a development of root. The *De anima* is not so much a psychological as a biological treatise. We find in the animal the τροφή (nourishment) and αὔξεις (growth) of the plant, but completely altered in the addition of a new faculty—αἴσθησις (perception). And these faculties are not sharp dividing lines, but in the ascending scale are used more and more loosely.^{42*} The natural species are immutable, and the difference does not consist in addition or subtraction of faculty.

There is a suggestion, but only a suggestion, of the doctrine of Aristotle in the three classes of monads. Even the lowest class of monad has appetition.^{43*} The second has feeling (sentiment) which is something more than αἴσθησις (perception) and includes φαντασία (imagination) and perhaps διάνοια (thought). The soul of man only has self-consciousness, a knowledge of eternal and necessary truths,—νοῦς (mind). It seems very probable that this scheme was suggested by Aristotle,^{44*} but there is a profound difference. The classification of Aristotle is on the basis of biological functions. These are functions of the organism as a whole, a complex substance. Plants are not ζῷα (animals) and have no appetition. Aristotle makes much of the distinction between beings which are attached to a single place and those which move about. For Leibniz the distinction is not biological, but psychological, and is everywhere a difference of degree. The lower monads, if they had clearer perceptions, would rise in the scale. It is not a limitation of the body, but a limitation of the nature of the monad itself which establishes differences. For Leibniz the series is a continuum; for Aristotle it is not. For Leibniz desire characterizes mind; for Aristotle desire is always of the complex organism; the function of mind is solely the apprehension of the eternal and necessary truths and principles.

There is another point upon which Leibniz may have drawn his inspiration from Aristotle, and that is the “common sense.” “The ideas which are said to come from more than one sense, like those of space, figure, motion, rest, are rather from common-sense, that is from the mind itself, for they are ideas of the pure understanding, but they are related to the external, and the senses make us perceive them” (*CEPL* 162). Leibniz’s theory appears to be a transition between Aristotle and Kant. What Aristotle says is this:

"The above [i.e., color, sound, etc.] are called qualities which belong to the respective senses; the perceptions common to all are motion, rest, number, figure, magnitude. These are not *propria* of any, but are common to all."^{45*} Whereas Leibniz stuffs these *κοινά* (common qualities) into the mind, Aristotle goes no farther than to say that they are perceived *κατὰ συμβεβηκός* (accidentally) by all the senses. There is not, as is sometimes thought, a "common sense" which apprehends them, as the eye perceives color.^{46*} What is interesting in the present context is the cautious empiricism of Aristotle's theory, contrasted with the more daring but less sound speculations of Leibniz.

The question of the relation of mind to matter is handled by Leibniz differently from either Aristotle or Spinoza. I am inclined to think that it was conceived quite independently of Spinoza. Leibniz attacks Spinoza fiercely on the ground of Spinoza's naturalism, and for his disbelief in free-will and immortality. He perceives, quite correctly, that Spinoza's view of the relation of mind and body leads to a materialistic epiphenomenalism. "With Spinoza the reason does not possess ideas, it is an idea."^{47*} He insists that the mind and the body are not the same thing, any more than the principle of action and the principle of passion are the same thing. But he inclines to believe that the difference between mind and matter is a difference of degree, that in all created monads there is materiality. (There seems to be a relation between *materia prima* of monads and *materia prima* of matter.) Now this suggests the Aristotelian relativity of matter and form; for Aristotle the higher substances are more "formed," the percentage of crude matter seems to decrease. There is no matter and no form in an absolute sense (except the form of God, who is rather a disturbing factor). But whereas for Aristotle matter exists only in contrast with form, and formed matter may be the matter for a higher form, for Leibniz matter really exists independently of spirit, but is really spirit.

Leibniz's use of the term "entelechy" is not identical with that of Aristotle. The monad is called entelechy apparently because it is complete in itself, complete in the sense of self-sufficient; while the entelechy of Aristotle is the *completion* or actuality of something. In the *De anima* the soul is called the first entelechy of body. To be strictly consistent, Aristotle should perhaps have held that soul is the second entelechy, since he maintains that it is only actual when it energizes; but he is merely trying to distinguish between the form and its operation.^{48*} Entelechy means that the body would not be a human body without the soul. It is difficult, it is true, not to think of the

soul as something added to the body (as to Galatea) or else to identify soul with the (living) body.⁴⁹ Soul is to body as cutting is to the axe: realizing itself in its actions, and not completely real when abstracted from what it does. In the light of Aristotle's elaborate critique of earlier theories of the soul, his view is seen as an attempt to get away from the abstractions of materialism or of spiritualism with which we begin. For Aristotle reality is here and now; and the true nature of mind is found in the activity which it exercises. Attempt to analyze the mind, as a thing, and it is nothing. It is an operation. Aristotle's psychology, therefore, starts with psycho-physics, and ascends to speculative reason. It is only then that we perceive what mind is, and in retrospect find that it was present in the simplest sensation.

The word *entelechy* as used by Leibniz loses the meaning which it had for Aristotle. It becomes figurative and unimportant. Leibniz appears at first less a dichotomist than either Aristotle or Descartes. In effect, the breach between mind and matter becomes far wider than in the system of Aristotle. In order that mind may persist at all times as something distinct from the body, appeal is made to the subconscious, a parallelism even more mystifying than that of Spinoza. With Leibniz the relation of mind and matter is closer, the relation of body and soul more remote, than with Aristotle. The weakness in Leibniz's theory of body and soul may be due to two causes. On the one hand, his theological bias made separation of body and soul essential; and on the other hand, it was necessary, for his more strictly philosophical argument, that the monads should persist after the compound substances, the bodies, which are their points of view.⁵⁰ It is required both by his theory of substance, and by his demand for a mathematical metaphysic. The causal series which is the monad should apparently have no last term.^{51*} Perception (in Leibniz's general statement of expression) requires that every series should be similar both to every other series and to the series of series.^{52*} The same theory which demands unconscious perception seems to demand also a series which shall not terminate in time. Supposing that the destruction of individual monads shall leave the total, as an infinite number, undiminished; nevertheless, the monad as a substance will have to shut up shop, and we shall be left with a number of relations relating nothing. Some sort of persistence is necessary for the system, though not the personal immortality which Leibniz is interested in supporting. It is evident that with the

possibility of changes of "point of view," the meaning of prediction becomes hopelessly attenuated. Every moment will see a new universe. At every moment, there will be a new series of series; but continuity makes necessary a point of view from which there shall be a permanent series of series of series.

Leibniz's theory of mind and matter, of body and soul, is in some ways the subtlest that has ever been devised. Matter is an arrested moment of mind, "mind without memory."^{53*} By state is not meant feeling, but the monad at any instant of time."^{54*} In many ways, it is superior to that of Aristotle. When he turns to preformation, to the *vinculum substantiale*,⁵⁵ to the immortality of the soul, we feel a certain repulsion; for with all the curious fables of the *Timaeus* or the *Physics* and Aristotle's *History of Animals*, we know that Aristotle and Plato were somehow more secure, better balanced, and less superstitious than the man who was in power of intellect their equal.

There are two other points in monadism which direct attention to the Greeks. These are the theory of innate ideas and the theory of substance as force expressed in the *Sophist*. So far as the question of indebtedness goes, I think that the answer is clear enough. The views which Leibniz held were forced upon him by his own premises. He undoubtedly read Plato at a time when his own theory was not yet crystallized, but he cannot be said to have borrowed. He may be given full credit for having restored to life in a new form the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle. The monad is a reincarnation of the form which is the formal cause of Aristotle. But it is also more and less. The outstanding difference is that he sets out from an investigation of *physical* force, and his monads tend to become atomic centers of force, particular existences. Hence a tendency to psychologism, to maintain that ideas always find their home in particular minds, that they have a psychological as well as a logical existence. Leibniz on this side opened the way for modern idealism. To his anticipations of modern logic of a school opposed to absolute idealism, it is unnecessary for me to point. No philosophy contains more various possibilities of development; no philosophy unites more various influences. That he did not always unite them successfully—that he never quite reconciled modern physics, medieval theology, and Greek substance, is not to be reproved when we consider the magnitude of his task and the magnitude of his accomplishment.

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NOTES

1. This and the succeeding essay, “Leibniz’s Monads and Bradley’s Finite Centres,” are TSE’s first for the *Monist*. Russell introduced TSE to its English editor Philip Jourdain, who in turn introduced him to its American editor Paul Carus. The two essays, offshoots of TSE’s doctoral work, were reprinted, with editorial emendations, as an appendix to *Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley* (1964), from which the text in this edition is taken. The translations of Latin and Greek quotations in the 1964 edition, provided by Faber editors Peter du Sautoy and Giles de la Mare, are retained.

2. In contrast to Spinoza, who maintained that there is only one substance in the universe, Leibniz argued that there are an infinite number of monads (“units”), created and maintained in existence by God. In 1714, he outlined his theory in a brief treatise to which his editors assigned the title *The Monadology*. TSE alludes to the “Preface” to Russell’s *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz* (1900), which refers to the *The Monadology* as “a kind of fantastic fairy tale, coherent perhaps, but wholly arbitrary” (CEPL vii).

3. Russell drew attention to the part played in Leibniz’s monadism by mathematical logic. Leibniz had held that every proposition is of the subject-predicate form and that the concept of the subject contains the concept of the predicate. Russell rejected this thesis on the grounds that arguments that depend on the properties of relations cannot be recast in subject-predicate form. In 1901, the philosopher and logician Louis Couturat (1868-1914) published *La Logique de Leibniz*, a work leading to a revival of interest in monadism in France. Couturat admired both Leibniz and Russell, and in *L’Algèbre de la Logique* (1905), he explained and defended Russell’s mathematical logic.

4*. TSE’s note: “For Bruno, see H[ermann] Brunnhofer: *Giordano Bruno’s Lehre vom Kleinsten [als die Quelle der Prästabilierten Harmonie von Leibnitz]* (Leipzig: Rauert & Rocco, 1890)]. For Maimonides, see Foucher de Careil: *Leibniz, la philosophie juive [et la cabale]* (Paris: August Durand, 1861)]; [Salomon] Rubin: [*Die*] *Erkenntnistheorie Maimons [in ihrem Verhältnis zu Cartesius, Leibnitz, Hume und Kant]* (Bern: Steiger & Cie, 1897)].”

The Italian philosopher Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) was an early supporter of Copernicanism. Concurrently with writing the present essay, TSE was reviewing Boutling’s biography of Bruno for *NS*. Maimonides (1138-1204) wrote the *Mishneh Torah*, a fourteen-volume compendium of Jewish law that established his reputation as a chief rabbinic authority. His *Guide for the Perplexed* (1190), an attempt to harmonize secular knowledge and religious insight, influenced Spinoza, Leibniz, and Newton. The Averrhoists were disciples of the Spanish Islamic thinker Averroes (1126-98), a major Aristotelian scholar.

5. Leibniz’s notes document his careful reading of Maimonides’s *Guide for the Perplexed* and Spinoza’s *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (1670), a work in which the arguments are connected by agreement or opposition with those of Maimonides on the same topic. As the grandson of the leader of the Sephardic community in Amsterdam, Spinoza had been given daily lessons in Hebrew, the Bible, and Jewish philosophy, including the writings of Maimonides.

6. Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet (1627-1704), one of Leibniz’s many correspondents, was a French theologian and the court preacher for King Louis XIV.

7. Maimonides begins his *Guide for the Perplexed* by refuting the propositions of the Motekallamin (TSE: Motekallem), an Islamic sect holding that all religious principles had to be confirmed by philosophy.

8. The Kabbala (Hebrew: tradition), in contrast to the Torah, consists of mystical wisdom transmitted orally. It includes elements of Gnosticism, Neo-Platonism, and Neopythagoreanism.

9*. TSE's note: "Merz, p. 15." Theodore Merz, *Leibniz* (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1884). *De principio individui* [On the Principle of Individuation] (1663), a dissertation on the classic scholastic question of whether individual things exist, was Leibniz's first publication, written at the age of seventeen.

10*. TSE's note: "[Willy] Kabitz [1876-1942], *Die Philosophie des jungen Leibniz* [Naumburg: Druck von Lippert & Co., 1908], p. 50." "Als ob das viele Zitieren von Stellen aus den Kompendien der Scholastiker irgendetwas für Leibniz 'erstaunliche' Belesenheit bewiese, als ob er diese Zitate nicht auch aus zweiter Hand bekommen konnte." English translation above by TSE (in *Monist*).

11. *Trans.* de Sautoy and de la Mare in a note: (1) "I propose therefore that every individual thing is made individual by its own whole being." (2) "But if every intellect in creation were taken away, that relationship would perish; even so, things would be made individual, and in that event, therefore, by themselves." *Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui*, in *Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz*, ed. C. I. Gerhardt, vol. 4 (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1880), 18, 26.

12. From his reading at Oxford of Aristotle and the scholastic commentaries, TSE was familiar with these schoolmen. The Franciscans William of Ockham (ca. 1285-1349) of England and Duns Scotus (ca. 1266-1308) of Scotland wrote extensively on Aristotle; the Dominican Thomas Aquinas included commentaries on Aristotle in the *Summa theologiae* (1266-73). The Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suárez (1548-1617) wrote the first systematic treatise on scholastic metaphysics, *Disputationes metaphysicae* (1597), a work that influenced Descartes and Leibniz. Luis de Molina (1535-1600), also a Spanish Jesuit, wrote commentaries on both Aristotle and Aquinas. The Italian Aristotelian Jacopo Zabarella (1532-89) wrote commentaries on the *Posterior Analytics* (1582) and also *De rebus naturalibus* [On the Nature of Things] (1590), a collection of thirty treatises on Aristotelian natural philosophy.

13*. TSE's note: "[Deisirei] Nolen, *Quid Leibnizius Aristoteli debuerit* [Paris: Germer Ballière Bibliopola, 1875], p. 27, quotes Leibniz as follows: 'Mea doctrina de substantia composita videtur esse ipsa doctrina scholae peripateticae. Nisi quod illa monades non agnovit.'" *Trans.*: "(My doctrine of substance seems to be derived from the doctrine of substance of the peripatetic school, except that the latter was ignorant of monads.)"

14*. TSE's note: "Merz, p. 15." Merz recounts Leibniz's memory that "at the age of fifteen, [he] decided to give up the belief of the schoolmen in the substantiality of forms, and to adopt the mechanical view of nature."

15. Erhard Weigel (1625-99), professor of mathematics at Jena University, emphasized the transformational work of figures such as Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-15), whose *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium* [On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres] (1543) established the heliocentric view of the universe, Johannes Kepler (1571-1630), who developed the foundational laws of planetary motion, and Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), who founded modern mechanics.

16*. TSE's note: "Kabitz, op. cit., [pp. 11-12]." TSE's text above paraphrases Kabitz: "**Die Grundkonzeption des Systems, nach welcher das Universum ein harmonisches, mathematisch-logisch gegliedertes Gauze ist, Metaphysik und Mathematik daher als die grundlegenden Wissenschaften und die demonstrative Methode als die eigentlich wissenschaftliche Methode zu betrachten sind**, war ihm durch Weigel zur festen Überzeugung

geworden, ehe er Hobbes kennen lernte" (Kabitz's emphasis). Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was a materialist who argued that all phenomena result from matter in motion, an idea that influenced Leibniz, whose physics involved the mathematical interaction of moving parts in a mechanistic universe.

17. J. H. Bisterfeld (1605-55) was a Dutch Neopythagorean whose metaphysics included a notion of universal harmony, and whose logic included the idea of an *ars combinatoria* (art of combinations), which could be used to produce a universal language. As words were made up of a few letters, so concepts could be understood as consisting of a relatively small number of simple concepts. The young Leibniz was fascinated by Bisterfeld's work and, as a student at the University of Altdorf, wrote his *Dissertatio de arte combinatoria*, [Dissertation on the Art of Combination] (1666), a work that points to the logical calculus that would occupy him for much of the rest of his life. *Arte Combinatoria*: in *Monist, Ars combinatoria*.

18*. TSE's note: "Latta, p. 300." *The New System*, in *The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings*, trans. with notes by Robert Latta (Oxford: Clarendon, 1898). Bracketed definition by TSE. Jacob Thomasius (1622-84), Leibniz's main teacher at Leipzig, instilled in him a respect for scholastic philosophy and supervised his thesis, *De principio individui* (*On the Principle of Individuation*).

19*. TSE's note: "See Kabitz, p. 53."

20. The philosopher Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655) held an atomist theory of matter, which Leibniz drew on in formulating his theory of monads. Leibniz knew Gassendi's main work, the posthumously published *Syntagma philosophicum* [Philosophical Treatise] (1658).

21*. TSE's note: "Couturat, 1903, p. 10." *Opuscles et fragments inédits de Leibniz*, ed. Couturat (Paris: Alcan). *Trans*: "(I am more and more convinced about indivisible particles . . . they must be very simple and therefore spherical. . . . For there is no place so small that it would be impossible to imagine in it a sphere smaller than itself. We therefore propose the following: no assignable place shall be empty. And yet the Universe shall be full, from which it is understood that an unassignable quantity is still something.')

22. The German scientist Henry Oldenburg (1618-77), sent to England on a diplomatic mission, remained to become Secretary of the Royal Society. In that capacity, he knew Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) and maintained an extensive correspondence with Spinoza and Leibniz. Beginning in 1672, Leibniz spent four years in Paris, where he gained access to the unpublished manuscripts of Pascal and Descartes. In 1673, Oldenburg arranged for Leibniz to visit London to present his work before the Royal Society.

23. As an empiricist, Gassendi objected to the rationalism of Descartes. In their public dispute, he assailed Descartes's ontological argument and undermined the *cogito*. Leibniz's critique of Descartes's view of substance (matter as extension) occurs in the *Discours de métaphysique* (1686).

24. By exploiting the research potential of the microscope, the Dutch biologist Jan Swammerdam (1637-80) demonstrated that the stages of the life of an insect are different forms (pre-forms) of the same animal. The biologist Anthonie van Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723) further extended the capabilities of the microscope, and the Italian physician Marcello Malpighi (1628-94) used it to advance his studies of embryology.

25*. TSE's note: "[Eduard Dillmann (fl. 1891)], *Eine neue Darstellung der Leibnizischen Monadenlehre* [Leipzig: O. R. Reisland, 1891]."

26. *Leibnizens mathematische Schriften. Erste Abtheilung*, vol. 1, ed. Carl Immanuel Gerhardt (Berlin: A. Ascher, 1849), 258. Leibniz to de l'Hôpital, 27 Nov 1694. ("My metaphysic is entirely mathematical, so to speak, or could become that.") The French mathematician Guillaume de l'Hôpital (1661-1704) wrote the first textbook on infinitesimal calculus.

27. In *Monist: Metaphysics*.

28*. TSE's note: "In *Posterior Analytics* Book II (Chap. XIX) 100a15-17, we are told how the knowledge of the universals arises through experience of particulars. 'First principles' are arrived at by induction. What is not made clear is the status of the particulars after scientific knowledge is established."

29. In the *Symposium*, Plato records a dialogue between Socrates and Callias. Aristotle alludes to this in his discussion of substance in *Metaphysics* XII, posing the question of how Socrates and Callias are identical and how different. He claims that although they share the same specific form (human), they differ because of their particular forms (their individual embodiment, and their individual souls) (1034a 5-8). He further argues that their differentiating features are coincidental to their specific forms (1058b 8-12).

30*. TSE's note: "*Greek Philosophy*, pp. 331-32." TSE's signed copy of Burnet's *Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato* (1914) is heavily annotated.

31*. TSE's note: "Dillmann, p. 63." "Leibniz geht also nicht von dem Probleme aus, was dem Körper zu Grunde liege, wie er entstehe, sondern von demjenigen, wie das Prinzip des Körpers selbst zu denken sei."

32. In *The Monadology*, Leibniz discusses matter as either *materia prima* or *materia secunda*. As Latta explains in his introduction, "Every actual material body is *materia secunda*, from which *materia prima* is merely a mental abstraction. Every complete substance is *materia prima* + Entelechy, i.e., passivity + activity" (96).

33*. TSE's note: "Except of course eternal and unique individuals, like the moon, which is the only individual of its species. And for later theology, the angels."

34. In 1695, Leibniz explained his theory of motion in the *Système nouveau*, which dealt with the relationship of substances to the preestablished harmony between the body and the soul.

35*. TSE's note: "See letter to Arnauld, 6 Oct. 1687." *Discourse on Metaphysics, Correspondence with Arnauld, and Monadology*, trans. George R. Montgomery (Chicago: Open Court, 1902), 211. Antoine Arnauld (1612-94), philosopher and mathematician, was a leading Roman Catholic intellectual in the Jansenist group of Port-Royal.

36*. TSE's note: "Leibniz of course explicitly repudiates any 'transmigration' of monads. But when he comes to the human soul, its adventures seem to be tantamount to this."

37*. TSE's note: "Leibniz actually says (letter to Arnauld, July 14, 1686): 'The soul is nevertheless the form of its body'" (*Discourse on Metaphysics, Correspondence with Arnauld*, 134).

38*. TSE's note: "Aristotle and Plato, I am inclined to believe, owe their success in navigating between the particular and the universal, the concrete and the abstract, largely to the fact that 'forms,' 'species,' had to the Greek mind not exactly the same meaning as for us. They were concrete without being particular."

39*. TSE's note: "There are implicitly two views of activity and passivity. According to one, causality is a useful way of treating natural phenomena. According to the other, there

is true activity in clear perception, true passivity in confused. This illustrates the mixture of motives.”

40. The Roman philosopher Plotinus (ca. 205-70) was the founder of Neoplatonism.

41*. TSE's note: “*De anima*, Book II, 414*b*, 20ff.”

42*. TSE's note: “Compare Book II, 413*b*, 12-13; 414*a*, 31ff.; and Book III, 432*a*, 15ff. Motion, according to 413*b*, 13, is not a fourth species of the soul besides *θρεπτικόν*, *αἰσθητικόν*, *διανοητικόν* (the principles of growth, perception, and thought).”

43*. TSE's note: “*Monadology*, ¶19.” Appetition is defined in ¶15: “The activity of the internal principle which produces change or passage from one perception to another may be called Appetition” (Latta 226). ¶19: “If we are to give the name of Soul to everything which has perceptions and desires [*appétits*] in the general sense which I have explained, then all simple substances or created Monads might be called souls” (230).

44*. TSE's note: “And, in passing, it seems possible that the theory of Leibniz may have supplied a hint for the romantic evolutionism of Diderot.”

45*. TSE's note: “*De anima*, Book II, 418*a*, 17ff.” TSE's bracketed insertion.

46*. TSE's note: “Zabarella, probably the greatest of all Aristotelian commentators, is very positive on this point.”

47*. TSE's note: “See Foucher de Careil: *Réfutation inédite de Spinoza par Leibniz*.” Originally published in Paris by Émile Brière in 1854, Leibniz's unedited papers were reissued under Foucher de Careil's name as *Leibniz, Descartes, et Spinoza avec un rapport par M. V. Cousin* (Paris: Librairie philosophique de Ladrangé, 1862). This is the issue of Foucher de Careil's treatment of Leibniz that Victor Cousin presented to the French Academy and that TSE was to use. “Puis, en outre, chez Spinoza, la raison est une idée, elle n'a pas des idées” (63).

48*. TSE's note: “See *De anima*, 412*a*, 28, where *δυνάμει ζῶν ἔχοντος* means having ‘the potentiality of functioning,’ not ‘the potentiality of soul.’ The above distinction between form and operation was pointed out by Zabarella.”

49. TSE alludes to the myth of Galatea, the statue carved by Pygmalion of Cyprus. As retold in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, Pygmalion falls in love with a statue he has made, and in answer to his prayers Venus brings the statue to life.

50. In the *Monist*: “On the one hand his theological bias made separation of body and soul essential; and on the other hand it was necessary, from his more strictly philosophical substances, the monads should persist after the compound substances, the bodies, which are their points of view.” Bolgan wrote to du Sautoy on 3 July 1963 suggesting a clarification, after which TSE revised the sentence.

51*. TSE's note: “See Russell: ‘Recent work on the philosophy of Leibniz,’ *Mind*, Vol. XII (1903), pp. 199-200.”

52*. TSE's note: “Russell, ‘Recent Work,’ 199.”

53*. TSE's note: “Quoted from *Theoria motus abstracti*, 1671, by Latta [*The Monadology*], p. 230n. Compare the Bergsonian theory of matter as consciousness ‘running down.’”

54*. TSE's note: “Compare ‘only indivisible monads and their different states are absolutely real.’ This is a translation by Russell (*CEPL* 263) of a statement by Leibniz in a letter to Arnauld (Sept 1687): “Il n'y a que les substances indivisibles et leur differens estats qui soyent absolument reels.” Russell's source is *Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz*, vol 2, ed. Carl I. Gerhardt (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1879), 119.

55. *vinculum substantiale*: substantial bond or chain. In Leibniz, only monads are real; everything else is composed of them. A plurality of monads constitutes a corporeal substance only if they are united by a *vinculum substantiale*; otherwise, they would be mere appearances. Russell criticized this theory.

Leibniz's Monads and Bradley's Finite Centres

The Monist, 26 (Oct 1916) [566]-76¹

No philosopher is more fantastic than Leibniz in presentation, few have been less intelligently interpreted. At first sight, none is less satisfactory. Yet Leibniz remains to the end disquieting and dangerous. He represents no one tradition, no one civilisation; he is allied to no social or literary tendency; his thought cannot be summed up or placed. Spinoza represents a definite emotional attitude; suggestive as he is, his value can be rated. Descartes is a classic, and is dead. *Candide* is a classic: Voltaire was a wise man, and not dangerous. Rousseau is not a classic, nor was he a wise man; he has proved an eternal source of mischief and inspiration. Reviewing the strange opinions, almost childish in *naïveté*, of birth and death, of body and soul, of the relation between vegetable and animal, of activity and passivity—together with the pitiful efforts at orthodoxy and the cautious ethics of this German diplomat, together with his extraordinary facility of scientific insight, one is disconcerted at the end. His orthodoxy is more alarming than others' revolution, his fantastic guesses more enduring than others' rationality.

Beside the work of Russell and of Couturat, I have found only one author of assistance in attempting to appreciate the thought of Leibniz.² In Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, I seemed to find features strikingly similar to those of monadism. So that re-reading Leibniz I cannot help thinking that he was the first to express, perhaps half unconsciously, one of those fundamental varieties of view which perpetually recur as novelties. With his motives, logical and otherwise, I am not here concerned. I only wish to point out, and leave for consideration, certain analogies.

That monadism begins with Leibniz I think will be conceded. It is characteristic of the man that everything about his monads, except the one essential point which makes them his own, he may have borrowed from an author with whom he was certainly acquainted. Bruno's theory has everything in common with that of Leibniz except this one point. A kind of pre-established harmony, the continuity of animal and vegetable and of organic and inorganic, the representation of the whole in the part, even the words *monadum monas* (the monad of monads): these points of identity one finds.^{3*} But the monad of Bruno has this difference: it has windows.

And it is just the impenetrability of the Leibnizian monads which constitutes their originality and which seems to justify our finding a likeness between Leibniz and Bradley. In any case, there is no philosopher with whom the problem of sources is less important than with Leibniz. The fact that he could receive stimulation from such various sources and remain so independent of the thought of his own time^{4*} indicates both the robustness and the sensitiveness of genius. He has studied Thomas, and probably with great care the *Metaphysics* and the *De anima*, but he is not an Aristotelian; he was probably profoundly struck by the passage *Sophistes* 247e, but anyone who has read his panegyric of the *Phaedo*^{5*} will probably agree that his praise is more the approval of posterity than the interpretation of discipleship. Leibniz's originality is in direct, not inverse ratio to his erudition.

More than multiplicity of influences, perhaps the multiplicity of motives and the very occasional reasons for some of Leibniz's writings, make him a bewildering and sometimes ludicrous writer. The complication of his interests in physics, his interests in logic, and his equally genuine interest in theology, make his views a jungle of apparent contradictions and irrelevancies. His theory of physical energy, for example, leads to an unsound metaphysical theory of activity, and his solicitude for the preservation of human immortality leads to a view which is only an excrescence upon monadism,^{6*} and which is in every way less valuable than Aristotle's. Thus there are features of the theory which are inessential. When we confine our attention to the resemblances between Leibniz's and Bradley's views, we will find I think that they cover everything essential. These are (1) complete isolation of monads from each other; (2) sceptical theory of knowledge, relativistic theory of space, time, and relations, a form of anti-intellectualism in both writers; from which follows (3) the indestructibility of the monads; (4) the important doctrine of "expression."^{7*} Certain distinctions of Bradley's, as the (relative) distinction between finite centres and selves, are also implicit in Leibniz. The relation of soul and body, the possibility of pan-psychism, the knowledge of soul by soul, are problems which come to closely similar solutions in the two philosophies.

I suggest that from the "pluralism" of Leibniz, there is only a step to the "absolute zero" of Bradley, and that Bradley's Absolute dissolves at a touch into its constituents.

In the first place, Leibniz's theory of degrees of perfection among monads approximates to a theory of degrees of reality. Mr. Russell has pointed out how easy a step it would have been for Leibniz to have made reality the

subject of all predicates.⁸ The world consists of simple substances and their states. The subject is never, even from a timeless point of view, merely equivalent to the sum of its states; it is incapable of exhaustion by any addition of predicates. The question with which Leibniz attempted to cope in his first thesis, and the question which he was never able satisfactorily to settle, was what makes a real subject, what the principle of individuation is. Nowhere in the correspondence with Arnould do we find a trustworthy mark of differentiation between substantial and accidental unities. If everything which can have predicates, everything which can be an object of attention is a substance, the whole theory falls to the ground; but if this is not the case, we shall either be obliged to make reality the subject of all predicates, or we shall be forced to distinguish, as do some idealists, between judgments and pseudo-judgments, and the logical basis for monadism fails. If we cannot find by inspection an obvious and indubitable token of difference between the substantial and the accidental, we shall in the end find substantiality only in reality itself; or, what comes to the same thing, we shall find degrees of substantiality everywhere. In the latter case substance becomes relative to finite and changing points of view, and in the end, again we must seek refuge in the one substance, or resign ourselves to find no refuge at all.

This omnipresence of substance, in degree, comes very near at times to being Leibniz's true doctrine. "One thing expresses another, in my use of the term," he says, "when there is a constant and regulated relation between what can be said of the one and of the other. . . . Expression is common to all forms, and is a class of which ordinary perception, animal feeling, and intellectual knowledge are species. . . . Now, such expression is found everywhere, because all substances sympathize with one another and receive some proportional change corresponding to the slightest motion which occurs in the whole universe"; and further in the same letter "you object that I admit substantial forms only in the case of animated bodies—a position which I do not, however, remember to have taken."^{9*} We remark also that the lowest monads are in no very significant sense persistent: "The result from a moral or practical standpoint is the same as if we said that they perished in each case, and we can indeed say it from the physical standpoint in the same way that we say bodies perish in their dissolution."^{10*} The permanence of these monads seems to assert itself in order to save a theory.

There is indeed a point of view, necessary even in the severest monism, from which everything, so far as it is an object, so far as it can be assigned

predicates, is equally real. But if we recognize the relativity of the point of view for which reality is merely the fact of being an object from that point of view, then the only criterion of reality will be completeness and cohesion. Suppose that some of the objects from a point of view are not direct objects (things), but other points of view, then there is no phenomenal test of their reality, *qua* points of view. So far as we cannot treat them as things, the only objective criterion of the reality will be their perfection. In any system in which degrees of reality play a part, reality may be defined in terms of value, and value in terms of reality.

Leibniz does not succeed in establishing the reality of several substances. On the other hand, just as Leibniz's pluralism is ultimately based upon faith, so Bradley's universe, actual only in finite centres, is only by an act of faith unified. Upon inspection, it falls away into the isolated finite experiences out of which it is put together. Like monads, they aim at being one; each expanded to completion, to the full reality latent within it, would be identical with the whole universe. But in so doing it would lose the actuality, the here and now, which is essential to the small reality which it actually achieves. The Absolute responds only to an imaginary demand of thought, and satisfies only an imaginary demand of feeling. Pretending to be something which makes finite centres cohere, it turns out to be merely the assertion that they do. And this assertion is only true so far as we here and now find it to be so.

It is as difficult for Bradley as for Leibniz to maintain that there is any world at all, to find any objects for these mirrors to mirror. The world of both is ideal construction. The distinction between "ideal" and "real" is present to Leibniz as well as to Bradley. The former's theory of space is, like the latter's, relativistic, even qualitative.^{11*} Relations are the work of the mind.^{12*} Time exists only from finite points of view. Nothing is real, except experience present in finite centres. The world, for Bradley, is simply the *intending* of a world by several souls or centres.

The world is such that we can make the same intellectual construction. We can, more or less, set up a scheme, in which everyone has a place, a system constant and orderly, and in which the relations apprehended by each percipient coincide. . . . [*A&R* 344]. Our inner worlds, I may be told, are divided from each other, but the outer world of experience is common to all; and it is by standing on this basis that we are able to communicate. Such a statement would be incorrect. My external sensations

are no less private to myself than are my thoughts or my feelings. In either case my experience falls within my own circle, a circle closed on the outside; and with all its elements alike, every sphere is opaque to the others which surround it. With regard to communicability, there is in fact not any difference of kind, but only of degree. . . . [I]t is not true that our physical experiences have unity, in any sense which is inapplicable to the worlds we call internal. . . . In brief, regarded as existence which appears in a soul, the whole world for each is peculiar and private to that soul. . . . No experience can lie open to inspection from outside; no direct guarantee of identity is possible. . . . That real identity of ideal content, by which all souls live and move, cannot work in common save by the paths of external appearance. (*AE&R* 346-47)¹³

Perhaps this is only a statement of a usual idealistic position, but never has it been put in a form so extreme. A writer to whose words Mr. Bradley would probably subscribe, Professor Bosanquet, formulates the orthodox view: "[N]o phase in a particular consciousness is merely a phase of the apparent subject, but it is always and essentially a member of a further whole of experience, which passes through and unites the states of many consciousnesses."^{14*} This view Mr. Bradley also holds. But he more often emphasizes the other aspect. Each finite centre is, "while it lasts," the whole world. The world of practice, the world of objects, is constructed out of the ideal identities intended by various souls.

For Bradley, I take it, an object is a common intention of several souls, cut out (as in a sense are the souls themselves) from immediate experience. The genesis of the common world can only be described by admitted fictions, since in the end there is no question of its origin in time: on the one hand, our experiences are similar because they are of the same objects, and on the other hand, the objects are only "intellectual constructions" out of various and quite independent experiences. So, on the one hand, my experience is in principle essentially public. My emotions may be better understood by others than by myself; as my oculist knows my eyes. And on the other hand, everything, the whole world, is private to myself. Internal and external are thus not adjectives applied to different contents within the same world; they are different points of view.

I will pass now to another consideration. Is the finite centre or the soul the counterpart to the monad? It is very difficult to keep the meanings of "soul," "finite centre," and "self" quite distinct. All are more or less

provisional and relative. A self is an ideal and largely a practical construction, one's own self as much as that of others. Myself "remains intimately one thing with that finite centre within which my Universe appears. Other selves on the contrary are for me ideal objects" (*ETR* 418). The self is a construction in space and time. It is an object among others, a self among others, and could not exist save in a common world. The soul (as in the passage quoted at length) is almost the same as finite centre. The soul, considered as finite centre,^{15*} cannot be acted upon by other entities, since a finite centre is a universe in itself.

If you confine your attention to the soul as a soul, then every possible experience is no more than what happens in and to this soul. You have to do with psychical events which qualify the soul, and in the end these events, so far as you are true to your idea, are merely states of the soul. Such a conception is for certain purposes legitimate and necessary. . . . (*ETR* 415).

Change, accordingly, cannot be due to any agency outside of these states themselves; it can only be "in every state of a substance, some element or quality in virtue of which that state is not permanent, but tends to pass into the next state. This element is what Leibniz means by activity" (Russell, *CEPL* 45).

The soul only differs from the finite centre in being considered as something not identical with its states. The finite centre, so far as I can pretend to understand it, is immediate experience. It is not in time, though we are more or less forced to think of it under temporal conditions.

It comes to itself as all the world and not as one world among others. And it has properly no duration through which it lasts. It can contain a lapse and a before and after, but these are subordinate. (*ETR* 410).

The finite centre in a sense contains its own past and future. "It has, or it contains, a character, and on that character its past and future depend" (*ETR* 411). This is more clearly the case with the soul. But it would be untrue to go on and declare that the soul "bears traces" of everything that happens to it. It would be a mistake to go on, holding this view of the soul, and distinguish between various grades of soul according to faculty. This would be to confuse the soul which is a whole world, to which nothing comes except as its own attribute and adjective, with the soul which can be described by its way of acting upon an environment. In this way, Leibniz thrusts himself

into a nest of difficulties. The concepts of centre, of soul, and of self and personality must be kept distinct. The point of view from which each soul is a world in itself must not be confused with the point of view from which each soul is only the function of a physical organism, a unity perhaps only partial, capable of alteration, development, having a history and a structure, a beginning and apparently an end. And yet these two souls are the same. And if the two points of view are irreconcilable, yet on the other hand, neither would exist without the other, and they melt into each other by a process which we cannot grasp. If we insist upon thinking of the soul as something *wholly* isolated, as *merely* a substance with states, then it is hopeless to attempt to arrive at the conception of other souls. For if there are other souls, we must think of our own soul as more intimately attached to its own body than to the rest of its environment; we detach and idealize some of its states. We thus pass to the point of view from which the soul is the entelechy of its body. It is this transition from one point of view to another which is known to Mr. Bradley's readers as transcendence. It is the failure to deal adequately with transcendence, or even to recognize the true nature of the problem, which makes Leibniz appear so fantastic, and puts him sometimes to such awkward shifts.

Thus Leibniz, while he makes the soul the entelechy of the body, is forced to have recourse to the theory of the dominant monad. Now I contend that if one recognizes two points of view, which are irreconcilable and yet melt into each other, this theory is quite superfluous. It is really an attempt to preserve the reality of the external world at the same time that it is denied, which is perhaps the attempt of all pan-psychism: to substitute for two concepts which have at least a relative validity in practice—consciousness and matter—one which is less useful and consequently less significant—animated matter. So far as my body is merely an adjective of my soul, I suppose that it needs no outside explanation; and so far as it possesses an independent reality it is quite unnecessary to say that this is because it is compounded of elements which are adjectives of other souls or monads. Leibniz has here done no more than to add to the concepts of psychical and physical a third and otiose concept.

The monad in fact combines, or attempts to combine, several points of view in one. Because Leibniz tries to run these different aspects together, and at the same time refuses to recognize that the independence and isolation of the monads is only a relative and partial aspect, he lets himself in for the most

unnecessary of his mysteries—the pre-established harmony. Bradley turns the Absolute to account for the same purpose. “The one Absolute” knows itself and realizes itself in and through finite centres. “For rejecting a higher experience,” Mr. Bradley says, “in which appearances are transformed, I can find no reason” (*ETR* 413). But what we do know is that we are able to pass from one point of view to another, that we are compelled to do so, and that the different aspects more or less hang together. For rejecting a higher experience there may be no reason. But that this higher experience explains the lower is at least open to doubt.

Mr. Bradley's monadism is in some ways a great advance beyond Leibniz's. Its technical excellence is impeccable. It unquestionably presents clearness where in Leibniz we find confusion. I am not sure that the ultimate puzzle is any more frankly faced, or that divine intervention plays any smaller part. Mr. Bradley is a much more skillful, a much more finished philosopher than Leibniz. He has the melancholy grace, the languid mastery, of the late product. He has expounded one type of philosophy with such consummate ability that it will probably not survive him. In Leibniz there are possibilities. He has the permanence of the pre-Socratics, of all imperfect things.

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NOTES

1. Bradley defines the “finite centre” in “What Is the Real Julius Caesar” as “an immediate experience of itself and of the Universe in one” (*ETR* 410). TSE refers to finite centres in his dissertation and later in the notes to *The Waste Land*. This is his second essay on Leibniz in the Oct issue of the *Monist*.

2. For the critique by Russell and Couturat, see “The Development of Leibniz's Monadism” (456, n. 3).

3*. TSE's note: “See H. Brunnhofer, *Giordano Bruno's Lehre vom Kleinsten als die Quelle der Prästabilirten Harmonie von Leibnitz* (Leipzig, 1890), pp. 59-63, for quotations, e.g., from *De Triplici Minimo* [1591]: ‘Deus est monadum monas.’ Also from *Spaccio della bestia trionfante* [*Expulsion of the Triumphant Beast*, 1584]: ‘In ogni uomo, in ciascuno individuo si contempla un mondo, un universo.’ Brunnhofer even traces the window metaphor back to the Song of Solomon: ‘Despiciens per fenestras.’” Brunnhofer's quotation from Song of Solomon 2:9 (“looking through the windows”) is from the Vulgate (fifth-century Latin translation by Jerome). For TSE on Bruno and Brunnhofer, see 456, n. 4.

4*. TSE's note: “At least he affirms his independence. In 1679, he writes to Malebranche that as when he began to meditate, he was not imbued with Cartesian opinions, he was led to ‘entrer dans l'intérieur des choses par une autre porte et découvrir des nouveaux pays.’ [‘to enter through another gate into the interior of things and to discover new lands’]. He is also inclined to speak rather slightly of Spinoza. See E[mil] Wendt, *Die Entwicklung der Leibnizischen*

Monadenlehre bis zum Jahre 1695 (Berlin, 1886). The germs of monadism appear as early as 1663.” The letter to Nicolas Malebranche is in *Fragments de philosophie cartésienne*, ed. Victor Cousin (Paris: Charpentier, 1845), 384.

5*. TSE’s note: “*Discourse on Metaphysics*, Chapter XXVI.”

6*. TSE’s note: “It leads Leibniz almost to the admission that persistence in the case of the lower types of monad is meaningless. Compare *Discourse*, XXXIV.”

7*. TSE’s note: “See Letter to Arnauld, Oct. 6, 1687.” *Discourse on Metaphysics*, 211.

8. For Russell on Leibniz’s subject-predicate paradigm, see 456, n. 3.

9*. TSE’s note: “To Arnauld, Oct. 6, 1687.” *Discourse on Metaphysics*, 212, 224.

10*. TSE’s note: “*Discourse on Metaphysics*, Chapter XXXIV.” (58).

11*. TSE’s note: “*Appearance*, p. 36; Letter to Arnauld, April 30, 1687.” Bradley: “Space is not a mere relation. For any space must consist of extended parts, and these parts clearly are spaces” (*A&R* 36). Leibniz: *Discourse on Metaphysics*, 180-99. The letter to Arnauld contains no topically distinct treatment of “space.”

12*. TSE’s note: “And as regards space and time, Leibniz always endeavoured to reduce them to attributes of the substances in them. . . . Thus Leibniz is forced . . . to the Kantian theory that relations, though veritable, are the work of the mind.” Russell, [*CEPL*] 14.”

13. TSE marked this passage in his copy of *A&R*, discussed it in his dissertation (363), and quoted it in a note to line 412 of *The Waste Land*.

14*. TSE’s note: “[Bosanquet], *Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 315.”

15*. TSE’s note: “A soul is a finite centre viewed as an object existing in time with a before and after of itself” (Bradley, *ETR* 414).

Syllabus of a Course of Six Lectures on Modern French Literature

Oxford: Frederick Hall, 1916.¹

LECTURE I

THE ORIGINS: WHAT IS ROMANTICISM?

Contemporary intellectual movements in France must be understood as in large measure a reaction against the “romanticist” attitude of the nineteenth century. During the nineteenth century several conflicting tendencies were manifested, but they may all be traced to a common source. The germs of all these tendencies are found in Rousseau.

Short sketch of Rousseau’s life.

His public career consisted in a struggle against

- (1) *Authority* in matters of religion.
- (2) *Aristocracy* and *privilege* in government

His main tendencies were

- (1) Exaltation of the *personal* and *individual* above the *typical*.
 - (2) Emphasis upon *feeling* rather than *thought*.
 - (3) Humanitarianism: belief in the fundamental goodness of human nature.
 - (4) Depreciation of *form* in art, and glorification of *spontaneity*.
- His great faults were
- (1) Intense egotism.
 - (2) Insincerity.

Romanticism stands for *excess* in any direction. It splits up into two directions: escape from the world of fact, and devotion to brute fact. The two great currents of the nineteenth century—vague emotionality and the apotheosis of science (realism) alike spring from Rousseau.

LECTURE II

THE REACTION AGAINST ROMANTICISM

The beginning of the twentieth century has witnessed a return to the ideals of classicism. These may roughly be characterized as *form* and *restraint* in

art, *discipline* and *authority* in religion, *centralization* in government (either as socialism or monarchy). The classicist point of view has been defined as essentially a belief in Original Sin—the necessity for austere discipline.

It must be remembered that the French mind is highly theoretic—directed by theories—and that no theory ever remains merely a theory of art, or a theory of religion, or a theory of politics. Any theory which commences in one of these spheres inevitably extends to the others. It is therefore difficult to separate these various threads for purposes of exposition.

The present-day movement is partly a return to the ideals of the seventeenth century. A classicist in art and literature will therefore be likely to adhere to a monarchical form of government, and to the Catholic Church. But there are many cross-currents. Our best procedure is to sketch briefly the relation of politics, literature and religion, and then consider the work of a few representatives of these three interests.

- A. Politics: General feeling of dissatisfaction with the Third Republic, crystallising since the Dreyfus trial. Hence two currents: one toward syndicalism, more radical than nineteenth-century socialism, the other toward monarchy. Both currents express revolt against the same state of affairs, and consequently tend to meet. *Nationalism* is an independent movement, but tends to associate itself with monarchism.
- B. Religion: Neo-Catholicism is partly a political movement, associated with monarchism, and partly a reaction against the sceptical scientific view of the nineteenth century. It is very strongly marked in socialistic writers as well. It must not be confused with modernism, which is a purely intellectual movement.
- C. Literature: Movement away from both realism and purely personal expression of emotion. Growing devotion to form, finding expression in new forms. Disapproval of dilettantism and aestheticism. Expression of the new political and religious attitudes in literature.

We shall consider men of letters only as they represent political, religious, or philosophical tendencies.

LECTURE III**MAURICE BARRÈS AND THE ROMANCE OF NATIONALISM**

Barrès illustrates the transition between the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries.

His two phases:

- (1) Begins as an exponent of egotistic aestheticism in the "nineties", comparable to J. K. Huysmans and Oscar Wilde. His early novels. Novels of Italy. *Bérénice*.
- (2) His entrance into politics as a deputy. In his later novels he returns to the scenes of his childhood—Lorraine. Becomes the champion of the irreconcilables of Alsace-Lorraine. Barrès's later novels: *Les Bastions de l'Est*; *Colette Baudoche*.

These novels illustrate two features of nationalism: growing spirit of revenge against Germany, and the cult of the soil—the local, as contrasted with the Parisian spirit—which has been taken up by many modern writers.

While the gulf that separated France from Germany always widened, French writers turned more and more to England. Evidences of the Anglophile sentiment in French letters.

LECTURE IV**ROYALISM AND SOCIALISM**

Besides the loyal band of traditional royalists there are several intellectuals who have been led to the royalist position largely as a protest against all the conditions in art and society which seemed to be due to the Revolution.

The two most noteworthy of these men are Pierre Lasserre and Charles Maurras.

Characteristics of their work:

Their reaction fundamentally sound, but marked by extreme violence and intolerance.

Contemporary socialism has much in common with royalism. Growth of proletariat, as contrasted with bourgeois socialism. Causes of this: conservative and compromise character of official socialism.

A peasant journalist: Charles Péguy.

Sketch of his life. Celebrity due to his death on the battle-field.

His relations with [Jean] Jaurès. Foundation of the *Cahiers de la quinzaine*.

His writings and literary style.

Péguy illustrates nationalism and neo-Catholicism as well as socialism; and the fusion of nationalism and Catholicism in his *Jeanne d'Arc*.

A more violent reaction against bourgeois socialism is found in Georges Sorel, the initiator of syndicalism.

His philosophic creed.

His theory of the general strike.

His development toward royalism.

Both of these men—Péguy and Sorel—were strongly influenced by Bergson.

LECTURE V

THE RETURN TO THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

Reaction against the positivism of Taine and the scepticism of Renan, the two chief intellectual leaders of the nineteenth century. Tendency of the French intellectual to return to orthodox Christianity.

Modernism is merely a compromise between the point of view of historical criticism—inherited from Renan—and orthodoxy.

This return to the Church is illustrated in authors of all types.

Among poets by—Francis Jammes. Sentimental Christianity, really romanticist.

And especially by—Paul Claudel. Claudel is also nationalist. His Christianity is that of mediaeval philosophy. The national and the Christian sentiments are the mainspring of his poems and his poetical dramas. Claudel a writer of great force and great influence, but often falls into rhetoric and verbiage.

Contrast between the Catholicism of twentieth-century men of letters and that of the nineteenth century. It is more social and political, less individualistic and ascetic.

LECTURE VI**BEFORE AND AFTER THE WAR: QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE**

The philosophy of 1910.

Henri Bergson was then the most noticed figure in Paris. The leading idea of his philosophy. Comparison with Maeterlinck: the two men have in common

- (1) The use of science against science.
- (2) Mysticism.
- (3) Optimism.

Influence of Bergson upon some of the men already mentioned. Is this influence good or bad? Whether it is likely to persist.

Summary of contemporary tendencies. Influence of the war.

Forecast of French thought after the war.

BOOKS:

Barrès: Novels: For the first period. *Le Jardin de Bérénice* (3s. 3d. net).

For the later period, *Colette Baudoche*, *La Colline inspirée* (each 3s. 3d. net).

Political writings: *Scènes et doctrines du nationalisme* (3s. 3d. net); *La Patrie française* (6d. net). *Pages choisies* (2s.).

Bergson: *Introduction to Metaphysics* (2s. net).

Claudel: *Art poétique* (3s. 3d. net); *The Tidings Brought to Mary* (Chatto & Windus, 6s. net; French text, 3s. 3d. net); *The East I Know* (H. Milford, 2s. 6d. net; French text, 3s. 3d. net).

Lasserre: *Le Romantisme français* (3s. 3d. net).

Lemaître, [Jules]: *Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Heinemann, 10s. net).

Loisy, [Alfred F.]: *The Gospel and the Church* (1s. 6d. net); *War and Religion* (1s. 6d. net).

Maeterlinck: *Wisdom and Destiny*, *The Life of the Bee* (Allen & Unwin, 2s. 6d. net each).

Maurras: *L'Avenir de l'intelligence*, *La Politique religieuse* (each 3s. 3d. net).

Péguy: *Œuvres choisies, 1900-1910* (3s. 3d. net); *Le Mystère de la charité de Jeanne d'Arc* (3s. 3d. net); *Notre Patrie* (3s. net).

Rousseau: *The Social Contract* (Everyman's Library, 1s. 3d. net); *Confessions* (3s. net, in French 2s. 10d. net); *De l'origine de l'inégalité* (in French, 2s. net).

Sabatier, Paul: *Modernism* (5s. net); *Disestablishment in France* (3s. 6d. net); *France To-day: Its Religious Orientation* (6s. net).

Sorel: *Reflections on Violence* (Allen & Unwin, 7s. 6d. net; French text, 4s. 6d. net).

RECOMMENDED FOR SPECIAL SUBJECTS:

For Rousseau: Lord Morley, *Rousseau*, 2 vols.; Frederika Macdonald, *Rousseau*.

For the influence of Rousseau and the ideas of the Revolution outside of France, such books as [H. N.] Brailsford's *Shelley, Godwin and their Circle* (Home University Library, 1s. 3d. net) or [Sydney] Waterlow's *Shelley* (People's Books, 6d. net).

For the leading ideas of the nineteenth century: [Ernest] Renan, *Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse* (Nelson, 1s. 3d. net); Taine, *Introduction à l'histoire de la littérature anglaise* (D. C. Heath & Co.); Babbitt, *Masters of Modern French Criticism* (Constable); [Paul] Bourget, *Essais de psychologie contemporaine* (2 vols., 3s. 3d. net each).

For exposition and criticism of contemporary ideas (neo-classicism, neo-Catholicism, etc.): various works of Ferdinand Brunetière, Émile Faguet, and Jules Lemaître will be referred to in the course of the lectures, and especially Anatole France, *La Vie littéraire* (4 vols., 3s. 3d. each).

For contemporary literature: Amy Lowell, *Six French Poets*; Jacques Rivière, *Études* (3s. 3d. net); Henri Ghéon, *Nos directions* (3s. 3d. net); Ezra Pound, *The Approach to Paris*.

For Bergson: H. Wildon Carr, *Bergson* (People's Books, 6d. net).

For recent publications of French men of letters in connexion with the war: Loisy's *War and Religion* and Barrès' *Pages Choisies*, mentioned above, and Romain Rolland, *Above the Battle* (2s. 6d. net); André Suarès, *Péguy, Nous et eux* (3s. each); Lasserre, *Le Germanisme et l'esprit humain* (1s. 3d.).

The best short history of French literature is G. L. Strachey's *Landmarks in French Literature* (Home University Library, 1s. 3d. net).

T. STEARNS ELIOT, M.A. (HARVARD)

NOTE

1. From Oct 1916 through the autumn and winter of 1918-19, TSE gave a series of Extension lectures and courses under the auspices of the Oxford University Extension Delegacy, the London County Council, and the University of London Extension Board. For the first course, he offered Oxford a choice of six topics on French literature, one of which, "Modern French Literature," was chosen by a local committee in Ilkley, near Bradford, Yorkshire. Commuting by train, TSE presented his lectures at the Literary and Scientific Society between 3 Oct and 12 Dec 1916. The average attendance at the lectures was fifty-eight, with an average of fifteen staying for discussion. In a letter to Professor Woods, TSE explained that the lectures were "on Social,

Philosophical and Religious Problems in Contemporary France (the syllabus is given as 'Literature' and the course is advertised as 'Contemporary France,' but that is what it really is. If I can establish myself in this Oxford Extension Lecturing I shall abandon teaching, and shall also have a clear six months a year for whatever else I wish to do" (*LI* 167).

The names included in this and subsequent syllabuses are not identified here or there, but are included in the biographical index. The full context of these lectures, including correspondence, class reports, statistical information, and critical commentary, may be found in Ronald Schuchard, *Eliot's Dark Angel* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999).

Syllabus for a Tutorial Class in Modern English Literature

London: University of London Press, 1916.¹

I. TENNYSON

Survey of the Romantic Period. Influences upon Tennyson. Temper of his time. His personality. Early verse (1830-1842). Technique. Read: *Lady of Shalott*, *Lotos-Eaters*, *Mariana*, *Morte d'Arthur*, *Ulysses*, *Locksley Hall*, *The Two Voices*, *The Palace of Art*

Tennyson's longer poems. Tennyson's scientific interests. Politics. Moral teaching. Religious views. Relations with his contemporaries. Read: *Maud*, *In Memoriam*, *Idylls of the King*.

II. BROWNING

Contrast with Tennyson. His personality. Influences upon him. Early verse. Read: *Pauline*.

Dramatic qualities of Browning. Characterisation. Range of emotion. His mature technique. Read: *Dramatic Lyrics*, *Dramatic Romances*, *Dramatis Personae*, *Men and Women*.

Browning's residence and study in Italy. His thought. Moral ideas. Examination of *Sordello* and *The Ring and the Book*. Read: *The Ring and the Book* (especially I, V, VI, VII, X).

The dramas. Survey of Browning's later work. Read: *Pippa Passes*, *A Blot on the 'Scutcheon*.

III. ELIZABETH BARRETT BROWNING

Quality of her genius. Marriage and correspondence. Social interests. Read: *Rime of the Duchess May*, *Lady Geraldine's Courtship*, *The Lost Bower*, *The Cry of the Children*, *The Dead Pan*, *A Musical Instrument*, *Sonnets from the Portuguese*.

IV. CARLYLE

Life and personality. Carlyle and Jane Welsh. Carlyle and Froude. Early influences. Study in Germany. Style. Read: *Sartor Resartus*, *John Sterling*.

Carlyle as moralist and social reformer. Relation to Chartism. His political views. Read: *Chartism, Past and Present*, *Heroes and Hero Worship*.

Carlyle as historian and critic. Historical methods. Comparison with Macaulay. Read: *French Revolution*.

V. JOHN HENRY NEWMAN

His temperament, with regard to his change in religious attachment. Relation to the Oxford Movement. Reasons for joining the Church of Rome. His thought. Style. Read: *Apologia, Idea of a University*.

VI. DICKENS

Reasons for his greatness. Comparison with earlier novelists and humorists. Development of his work. Plot and situation. Examination of some of his characters. Influence, especially in Russia. Read: *Pickwick Papers, David Copperfield, Bleak House*.

VII. THACKERAY

Contrast with Dickens. Education. Influences upon his style. Satire and sentiment. Characterisation. The historical novel. The novel of society. Comparison with other novelists' handling of similar material. Read: *Esmond, Vanity Fair, Pendennis*.

Thackeray as critic and essayist. Read: *English Humourists, The Four Georges, Roundabout Papers, Poems*.

VIII. GEORGE ELIOT

Life and personality. Her philosophy of life: moral views. The tragic spirit. Examination of a few of her characters. Eliot, Thackeray, and Dickens as representative of their age. Read: *Scenes of Clerical Life, Romola, Mill on the Floss*.

IX. MATTHEW ARNOLD

Prose: Survey of literary criticism in England. French influence upon Arnold. Arnold as a guide to taste. Importance of the *Essays in Criticism*.

Arnold as a moralist. His view of society. Comparison with Carlyle and Emerson. Attitude toward Christianity. Read: *Essays in Criticism, Culture and Anarchy*.

Poetry: The elegiac spirit. Technique. Quality of emotion. Classical tastes. Restraint. Read: *Scholar Gipsy, Rugby Chapel, Dover Beach, Sonnets, Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse, Heine's Grave, Tristram and Iseult, Empedocles on Etna*.

X. MINOR NOVELISTS

Disraeli: Relation of his novels to his political life. Read: *Coningsby*.

[Thomas Love] Peacock: Satire and wit. Peacock as a precursor of Meredith. Read: *Nightmare Abbey, Headlong Hall*

Charles Reade: The historical novel. The novel of social reform: Read: *Peg Woffington*, or *The Cloister and the Hearth*, *It is Never Too Late to Mend*.

Trollope: The novel of country society. Compared with Jane Austen. Read: *Barchester Towers*.

XI. THE BRONTËS

Work of the three sisters compared. Comparison with Jane Austen and George Eliot. Read: *Jane Eyre*, *Wuthering Heights*, *Shirley*.

XII. GEORGE BORROW

Unique position of Borrow in literature. His eccentric personality. The novel of gipsy life. His relation to the "picaresque" novel. Unevenness of composition. Read: *Lavengro*, *The Romany Rye*, *The Bible in Spain*.

XIII. RUSKIN

Life and personality. Ruskin's work as an art critic. His emphasis upon moral values in art. Survey of art criticism in England. Ruskin's greatness and limitations as a critic. Admiration for the painting of Turner. Read: *Stones of Venice*, *Modern Painters* (selections), *Lectures on Art* (selections).

Ruskin as a stylist. Unevenness and extraordinary brilliance of his writing. W. C. Brownell on Ruskin's style.

Ruskin as a moralist and social reformer. Compared to Carlyle. Read: *Unto This Last*, *Crown of Wild Olive*, *Munera Pulveris*.

XIV. EDWARD FITZGERALD

Isolation. Scholarship. Merit as a translator. Comparison of the two versions of *Omar Khayyám*. His prose works. Letters. Read: *The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyám*, *Euphranor*.

XV. GEORGE MEREDITH

Influences. Originality and difficulty of his style. Meredith as a critic and essayist. Read: *Essay on Comedy*.

Meredith as a poet. Verse technique. His sonnet sequence compared with Mrs. Browning's and others. Read: *Modern Love*, *Love in the Valley*.

Meredith as a novelist. Wit and epigram. Brilliance of dialogue. Irony. Portraits of women. Read: *Richard Feverel*, *Beauchamp's Career*, *The Amazing Marriage*.

XVI. RETROSPECT

View of earlier and later Victorian literature.

SUPPLEMENTARY READING

Benson, A. C., *Ruskin: A Study in Personality*

Bradley, A. C., *Commentary on Tennyson's "In Memoriam"*

Brooke, Stopford A., *Four Poets: Clough, Arnold, Rossetti, Morris*

- Brookfield, Jane Octavia, ed., *A Collection of Letters of W. M. Thackeray*, 1847-55
- Brownell, W. C., *Victorian Prose Masters*
- Browning, R. W. B., ed., *The Letters of Robert Browning and Elizabeth Barrett Barrett*, 1845-46
- Cadman, S. P., *The Three Religious Leaders of Oxford and Their Movements*
- Carlyle, Alexander, ed., *New Letters and Memorials of Jane Welsh Carlyle*
- Chesterton, G. K., *Charles Dickens*
- Chesterton, G. K., *The Victorian Age in Literature* (Home University Library)
- Duff, David, *An Exposition of Browning's "Sordello"*
- Forster, John, *The Life of Charles Dickens*
- Froude, J. A., *Thomas Carlyle; My Relations with Carlyle*
- Gosse, Edmund, *Robert Browning, Personalia*
- Hallam, Lord Tennyson, *The Life and Works of Alfred, Lord Tennyson; Tennyson and his Friends*
- Hobson, J. A., *John Ruskin, Social Reformer*
- Hogarth, G., and Mary Dickens, eds., *The Letters of Charles Dickens*
- Jones, Sir Henry, *Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher*
- Le Gallienne, Richard, *George Meredith: Some Characteristics*
- Mayer, S. R. T., ed., *Letters of Elizabeth Barrett Browning to R. H. Horne*
- Meredith, W. M., ed., *Letters of George Meredith*
- Meynell, Wilfred, *Cardinal Newman*
- Norton, Charles E., ed., *Letters of Carlyle; The Correspondence of Thomas Carlyle and Ralph Waldo Emerson*, 1834-72
- Orr, Alexandra L., *A Handbook to the Works of Robert Browning*
- Robertson, J. M., *Modern Humanists: Sociological Studies of Carlyle, Mill, Emerson, Arnold, Ruskin and Spencer*
- Shorter, C. K., *The Brontës*
- Symons, Arthur, *An Introduction to the Study of Browning*
- Trevelyan, G. M., *The Poetry and Philosophy of George Meredith*
- Trollope, Anthony, *Thackeray*
- Walling, Robert A. J., *George Borrow: The Man and His Work*
- Ward, W. P., *The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman*
- Wright, Thomas, *The Life of Edward Fitzgerald*
- Wright, W. A., ed., *Letters of Edward Fitzgerald*
- The *English Men of Letters* is the best series of biography

T. S. ELIOT, M.A.

NOTE

1. While TSE was preparing his Yorkshire lectures, he applied to the University of London Extension Board for additional work. On 19 Oct 1916, the Joint Committee for the Promotion of Higher Education for Working People approved his application, and he immediately began the first year of a three-year Tutorial Class at Southall, Middlesex. His syllabus covered sixteen subjects, and his class met for two hours on Monday evenings for twenty-four weeks during the autumn and winter of each year. Reminiscing for the Jubilee Celebrations of the Tutorial Classes in 1959, TSE wrote to chairman Harold C. Shearman on 2 Oct: "I was working in a bank during the day-time, and reviewing for two or three periodicals at night-time. The transport between Southall and Marylebone, where I lived, was sometimes interrupted too by the primitive airraids which took place during that war . . . But I was happy in my classes and I must admit that I learnt more about English literature than my class did, in as much as I had to read a good many books which I ought to have read but had not read, in order to take my pupils over the ground properly."

Charles Péguy

An unsigned review of *Avec Charles Péguy, de la Lorraine à la Marne* (août-septembre, 1914), par Victor Boudon.

Préface de Maurice Barrès. *Ouvrage renfermant des lettres inédites du lieut. Ch. Péguy et du capt. Cl. Casimir-Périer*

Paris: Hachette et Cie, 1916. Pp. xviii + 195.¹

The New Statesman, 8 (7 Oct 1916), 19-20

Charles Péguy, the French poet and publicist, was one of the most illustrious of the dead who have fallen in this war. In an article published in these columns some months since, M. Pierre Chavannes explained how great was the hold that this sociable, yet in a manner solitary, Catholic Democrat had over the best youth of France; and we need not describe his career again here.² But it was not until his death that the full significance of Péguy and his life was realised, that he was seen as a national, a symbolical figure, the incarnation of the rejuvenated French spirit. In this country he was not well known, though a few of the younger writers read and admired him. A literature is now collecting around his legend. André Suarès' book on Péguy is known.³ It is also known that a German review devoted an issue to Péguy.⁴ But perhaps there is a special significance in M. Boudon's book. It is a book of reminiscences of a man who had already, somehow, become a popular personality, important to people who know about him but have no estimate of Péguy as a writer. M. Boudon had at one time been secretary to Francis de Pressensé in the *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme*.⁵ But he is not a man of letters. He writes to Barrès: "I knew that Péguy edited the *Cahiers de la Quinzaine*. I had read a few of their pamphlets, at the time of the *Affaire*, but nothing since then." Péguy was merely his officer. "He was my lieutenant. We had hardly exchanged words. And then our acquaintance was so brief; so overwhelmed with fatigue and events! I did indeed promise myself, given the chance, that I would question him and listen to him!"⁶

His memoir gives merely impressions upon the retina of a private soldier, a retina across which passes, at the end of every few pages, merely a small

dusty figure, a lieutenant with eye-glasses. M. Barrès reflects that M. Boudon nevertheless knew a Péguy “truer, finer, more eternal than the one with whom we had to do, and his testimony presents us with the Charles Péguy of eternity” [ix].⁷

Who is this Péguy of eternity? In M. Boudon’s simple account we meet “a small officer in a black cape, with a military bearing, an energetic face, a blond beard, a sly look behind his glasses and a subtle smile.”⁸ This small officer turns up no more often than a small officer should do, hardly more often than his captain, Captain Guérin.⁹ He is called *le pion* by his men,¹⁰ is very popular, shows himself very active and efficient: knows how to keep discipline with *bonhomie*, understands his men, jokes with them; from one of them, M. Boudon himself, he begs an apple: a model little officer. Towards the end of the book he becomes dustier, but the eyeglasses remain, the activity, the encouragement; the enthusiasm becomes rage; a man of forty years, but ripe, as he had said of Bernard-Lazare, for death at forty years.¹¹ We see him in the retreat. Finally, when a stand is made, when the German troops are folded back towards Neufmontiers and Chaucouin, when the French take the offensive, Péguy appears again, standing up, binoculars in hand, directing the fire of his men. At Villeroy, near Meaux, about 25 kilos. from Paris, he was killed; death was supposed to have been instantaneous—a bullet through the head.

This may not give the impression of an unusually interesting book; nor of a figure for eternity; but merely of an officer like another. But the book is more than interesting, it is impressive. It is like the account of the death of a friend, it is the more impressive because it contains no “appreciation” of Jeanne d’Arc (Péguy’s Saint);¹² no estimate of Péguy’s social and political influence, of his “contribution,” his originality, his tendency; no reference to any of these things which can and will be disputed.¹³ Nothing very unusual about his behaviour; nothing to remark except that it was what one would have expected of Péguy. Nothing to remark about the letters but that they are what we should have expected of Péguy; we are glad to have them.

The book is the confirmation of the man. Of other French men of letters who have died in the war, one only regrets that their careers were cut short; but Péguy’s value is not that of a man of letters. In the world of letters, Remy de Gourmont’s death is perhaps more notable.¹⁴ But it is not so important. Péguy was the only man of letters whose death was as important as his life. His work hardly demands, perhaps would not bear, close analysis. There

may be passages in his verse which are pure poetry; there are certainly passages in his prose which are of the best prose; there is a criticism of *Polyeucte* which is perhaps the best thing on *Polyeucte* ever written.¹⁵ There is not a great deal, certainly, of the finest verse; and his prose is not marked, as a rule, by excess of subtlety. One would hardly call him a “thinker.” His style even is questionable. It is not a style to think in; it is too emphatic, too insistent. His sentences a dozen pages long convey an emotion, but thought is submerged. But two things are certain: His style is not decadent. And it is a style with an *entrain* which compels one to lock step, which invites one to imitate the trick which is not really a “trick.” And one writes of Péguy, not a critique, but an *oraison funèbre*.¹⁶

For there have been finer poets, more subtle thinkers, than Péguy. But there was no one who had just what Péguy had. Emphatically, he was not *fumiste*.¹⁷ There is not a trace of affectation about him. And in Paris which had seen the termination of an epoch, which had seen Renan, which knew de Gourmont and Anatole France, which was surfeited with criticism, Paris given up to radical and reactionary movements which were largely movements for the sake of moving, Péguy represented something which was real and solid.¹⁸ He stood for a real re-creation, a return to the sources, the peasant soil, which was not obscurantist; a peasant genius educated but unspoilt. Péguy is a witness to the eternal fertility of the French soil; in the best sense, a man of the people, as *de Joinville* and *du Bellay* were of the French people;¹⁹ of the people of Paris as well, not a mere provincial. He was not primarily a writer of this or that review, redactor of this or that journal. He was a man of the people—more than Hugo, of whom he wrote so well.²⁰ Péguy on the Marne is an essential part of this Péguy.

NOTES

1. TSE wrote to Conrad Aiken on 21 Aug that he was doing “a long review on Charles Péguy” (L1 158); its publication coincided with the beginning on 3 Oct of TSE’s Oxford Extension lectures on Modern French Literature, in which Péguy (1873-1914) was a central figure. The syllabus includes *Notre patrie* (1905), *Le Mystère de la charité de Jeanne d’Arc* (1910), and *Oeuvres choisies, 1900-1910* (1911). Péguy, founding editor of *Les Cahiers de la quinzaine* (1900-1910), was recommended to TSE by his tutor, Péguy’s friend Alain-Fournier, during his year at the Sorbonne. Péguy was killed at the battle of the Marne in Sept 1914. Victor Boudon (1887-1979), a soldier who witnessed his death, draws on Péguy’s unpublished correspondence with fellow soldier Claude Casimir-Périer (1880-1915), son of Jean Casimir-Périer, president of the Republic (1894-95). The novelist Maurice Barrès (1862-1923) was a nationalist who, despite public disagreements with Péguy, praised him as a fallen hero.

2. Pierre Chavannes (1887-1920) wrote on Péguy's career and his importance to France in "French Writers Killed in the War," *NS*, 5 (21 Aug 1915), stating that Péguy "greatly influenced the intellectual flower of the university men, not merely because he was a powerful writer, but because he was a superbly honest man, filled with a passion for independence, frank to the point of roughness, and always going uncompromisingly for what he believed to be the truth" (470).

3. The poet and journalist André Suarès (1868-1948) was Péguy's collaborator in the *Cahiers*. With André Gide, Paul Claudel, and Paul Valéry, he was a leading editor for the *Nouvelle Revue Française*. His *Péguy* (1915) and *Nous et eux* (1915), the first volume of his *Commentaires sur la guerre des Boches* (5 vols, 1915-16), were on the reading list for TSE's course.

4. The Oct 1914 issue of left-wing periodical *Die Aktion*, with a cover drawing by Austrian artist Egon Schiele, paid tribute to Péguy.

5. Before the war, Boudon was a commercial traveler and active member of the leftist *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme*. The pacifist journalist Francis de Pressensé (1853-1914) was president of that organization from 1903 to 1914.

6. Here and below, TSE translates Boudon's account of his relationship with Péguy, as told to Barrès (ix). *Cahiers de la quinzaine* exercised a strong influence on French intellectual life, especially in regard to the Dreyfus *Affaire*. In a case tainted by anti-Semitism, Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish artillery officer, was convicted of treason in 1894. In 1899, the case was reopened and Dreyfus was exonerated.

7. Barrès fought Péguy over the Dreyfus case, but after members of the Right and Left banded together to form the government of *L'Union sacrée*, he praised Péguy for his contribution to national unity. Barrès's patriotic articles for *L'Echo de Paris* were collected as *L'Âme française et la guerre* (1915-20), of which the first volume, *L'Union sacrée*, covered the political situation from the eve of war to the battle of the Marne. An anti-Semite, he nevertheless paid homage in 1917 to the Jews who died for France. His works were the focus of TSE's third lecture, "Maurice Barrès and the Romance of Nationalism" (473).

8. TSE translates directly from Boudon's memoir (4).

9. On 5 Sept, the first day of the battle of the Marne, Captain Pierre Guérin (1882-1914), ranking officer of the infantry regiment, gave the command to advance on the German lines; he and Péguy fell that day. Before the German armies retreated on 12 Sept, 250,000 Frenchmen had died, but Paris had been saved.

10. *le pion*: a pawn, but here slang for junior schoolmaster. *Pour nous tous il est le "Maître d'école," le "Pion"* (13).

11. The Jewish political journalist Bernard-Lazare (1865-1903) was among the strongest supporters of Dreyfus. The author of *L'Antisémitisme: Son histoire et causes* (1894), he was admired by Péguy, who portrayed him in *Notre jeunesse* (1910) as a leader who had "[a] perpetual tremor, a perpetual vibration. All that is needed to die at 40." (Trans. A. Aronowicz, in part II of *Jews and Christians on Time and Eternity: Charles Péguy's Portrait of Bernard-Lazare* [Stanford UP, 1998], 55).

12. As a native of Orléans, Péguy developed a lifelong interest in the peasant-soldier-martyr Jeanne d'Arc (1412-1431; beatified 1909; canonized 1920), who in 1428 was inspired to save the city from English siege and to secure the crowning of Charles VII. She became for Péguy a symbol of France and a spiritual guide, inspiring him to write *Jeanne d'Arc* (1897), a long play that he reworked in prose and verse into *Le Mystère de la charité de Jeanne d'Arc* (1910).

13. TSE addressed these aspects of Péguy's legacy in his fourth lecture, "Royalism and Socialism": "Péguy illustrates nationalism and neo-Catholicism as well as socialism; and the fusion of nationalism and Catholicism in his *Jeanne d'Arc*" (479).

14. The poet and critic Remy de Gourmont (1858-1915) died in the second year of the war, not from combat wounds, but from lupus.

15. Péguy considered Pierre Corneille's *Polyeucte* (1641) as one of the most important works in French literature. His most sustained discussion of the tragedy, a continuous point of reference in his prose, is in *Victor-Marie, comte Hugo* (1911), which first appeared in the *Cahiers* of 23 Oct 1910, while TSE was studying at the Sorbonne. See *Ouvres en prose complètes*, III: 221-26, 296-303, 306-11, et passim.

16. *entrain*: heartiness, spirit. *oraison funèbre*: funeral prayer.

17. *fumiste*: a joker, a phony.

18. Ernest Renan (1823-92), professor of Hebrew at the Collège de France, attempted to integrate the social sciences into Christian and Jewish studies. His *La Vie de Jésus* (1863) and his *Histoire du peuple d'Israël* (1887-95) were broadly influential in cultural and religious studies. Anatole France (1844-1924), whose criticism appeared in the daily *Le Temps*, dominated French letters for several decades before the war.

19. Jean de Joinville (ca. 1224-1317) wrote the *Histoire de Saint-Louis* (1309), a chronicle of King Louis IX, whom he accompanied on the seventh crusade (1248-54). Poet, critic, and Latinist Joachim du Bellay (ca. 1522-60), a member of the Pléiade, wrote the *Défense et illustration de la langue française* (1549), which described the literary possibilities of the French language.

20. Péguy's *Victor-Marie, comte Hugo* praises the romantic writer Victor Hugo (1802-85) for his republicanism and his sympathetic treatment of the downtrodden in novels such as *Les Misérables* (1862).

Mr. Lee Masters

A review of *Songs and Satires*, by Edgar Lee Masters

London: T. Werner Laurie, 1916. Pp. viii + 172.¹

The Manchester Guardian, 906 (9 Oct 1916) 3

Everyone has read and admired the *Spoon River Anthology*: almost no one can say precisely what he thinks of it. The present volume ought to clear up some of these hesitations. Very little of it is quite in the *Spoon River* vein, and much of it is in quite conventional vein. Whether the ballads of Launcelot were written before or after *Spoon River* is really a matter of indifference;² the fact that Mr. Masters has published them now is evidence of a certain sincerity; he is not trying to force or exploit his style, nor to advertise his idiosyncrasies *à tout propos*. Some of the verse in this volume is as good as *Spoon River*, and the book as a whole offers hints toward a criticism of Mr. Masters's hitherto baffling talent.

It is clear that Mr. Masters needs to set himself one particular problem in order to bring his gifts to focus. This problem is not necessarily the epitaph. But he must have a personage, and this personage must be detached from himself in order to give his peculiar meditative irony its opportunity: it must not appear as an element in a supposed autobiographic situation, or the incisive comment tends to dissolve in sentiment. Mr. Masters sometimes fails in a situation ("Arabel") because he does not fix before you the contact and cross-contact of souls, the breath and scent of the room. His mind is reflective, not evocative; the *Spoon River* epigraphy is terse rather than concentrated. In descriptive passages—

The windows are begrimed with dust and beer.
A child half clothed, with legs as thin as spindles,
Carries a basket with some bits of coal.³

—we have a vision from the moral emotions, not an immediate application of all the senses. But there is one long poem in the book which fulfils Mr. Masters's necessary conditions. It is about the American agitator Bryan.⁴ We should cherish any volume of Mr. Masters which contained another study as good as this.

But suppose you were giving a lecture on the constitution,
 And you got mixed on your dates,
 And the audience rotten-egged you, . . .
 But suppose you could just change your clothes,
 And lecture to the same audience
 On the religious nature of Washington,
 And be applauded and make money—
 You'd do it, wouldn't you?

Bryan had been advised—

“You'd better go back to Lincoln and study
 Science, history, philosophy,
 And read Flaubert's Madam something-or-other,
 And quit this village religious stuff.
 You're head of the party before you are ready,
 And a leader should lead with thought.”

It is the best criticism of Bryan that has ever been written.

T. S. E.

NOTES

1. Edgar Lee Masters (1868-1950) leaped into prominence as an American poet with the publication of *The Spoon River Anthology* (1915), a collection of 244 poems written as the personal epitaphs on the tombstones of the named dead who lie in a cemetery in Spoon River, a fictional composite of the small communities of Petersburg and Lewistown, Illinois, where Masters grew up. Following its commercial success in America (New York: Macmillan), *Songs and Satires* was published in this English edition.

2. “The Death of Sir Launcelot” and “Ballad of Launcelot and Elaine” first appeared in *Songs and Satires*.

3. From “The Loop” in *Songs and Satires* (36).

4. “The Cocked Hat,” from which TSE quotes, is a character sketch of William Jennings Bryan (1860-1925), noted orator, head of the Democratic Party, and Secretary of State under Woodrow Wilson, who is quoted in the poem's epigraph: “Would that some one would knock Mr. Bryan into a cocked hat.” The first quoted passage (15) refers to Bryan's oratorical performances and the second (13) to his conflict with Clarence Darrow, who speaks the words in quotation marks, regarding the teaching of evolution.

Giordano Bruno

An unsigned review of *Giordano Bruno: His Life, Thought, and Martyrdom*, by William Boulting

London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1914. Pp. viii + 315.

The New Statesman, 8 (21 Oct 1916) 68

Giordano Bruno is the Benvenuto Cellini of philosophy. The comparison may seem far-fetched, in view of the sanctity with which martyrdom has invested Bruno's name, but a study of Mr. Boulting's biography gives it some justification.¹ Bruno's life is more interesting than his work is important. A violent, somewhat undisciplined temperament, a life of varied wandering, a spectacular death, and a series of romantically attractive writings provide excellent material—of which Mr. Boulting has made the most. Bruno's philosophy was not very clearly thought out, and its permanent value is slight, but the personality and career of the man are of enduring interest.

Bruno's wanderings are traced in full detail. He was born at Nola, near Naples, in 1548. From Naples to Genoa he drifted, from Genoa to Geneva, from Geneva to Toulouse and Paris, from Paris to England, from England to Germany, and back to Italy to face the Inquisition. Everywhere in his writings he leaves fragments of his life. Some of his most entertaining reminiscences are of Oxford and London. It was in 1583 that he crossed from Calais, and he went directly to Oxford, announcing himself by superb self-advertisement. Of Oxford his impression was not favourable. He had come to a citadel of Aristotelianism to carry on his war against Aristotle, and the dons were not well pleased. The irascible Italian writes that the fellows and tutors "knew much more about beer than about Greek" [85]. He says further "the happy country is ruled by a constellation of pedants" [87]. His anti-Aristotelian lectures were suppressed. Returning to London, Bruno took shelter with the French Ambassador. He was not a man to make friends; he despised the English and refused to learn their language; and his overpowering conceit was quick to take offence. "England can boast a common people," he wrote, "which will yield to none other in disrespect, outlandishness, boorishness, savagery and bad bringing up" [103]. In the *Ash Wednesday*

Supper, a refutation of Aristotle's *Physics*, Bruno introduces some amusing bits of autobiography, which Mr. Boulting does not scamp.² Bruno starts out one evening with John Florio (the translator of Montaigne) for the house of Fulke Greville.³ They proceed by water.

Yelling "Oars" we wasted as much time as it would have taken to go by land and do a trifle of business on the way. At length two boatmen answered from afar and slowly, slowly drew in. After much question and reply as to whence, where, why, how and when, they brought the prow to the foot of the stairs. [109]

These boatmen, like some more modern carriers, refuse to go beyond their station; the voyagers scramble ashore, attempt to make their way in the dark, get covered with London mud, are hustled by street roughs at Charing Cross, and arrive at Greville's house to find the company at supper. We do not know whether Philip Sidney was there, but he might have been. In the Italianate Court of Elizabeth, Bruno was well received; after he had removed to Germany he thought more kindly of England, and went so far as to praise the climate; but his philosophy made very little impression.

The book is learned and painstakingly exact. It is weakest in its account of Bruno's philosophy; as the method is strictly chronological, there is no systematic exposition, and the author extols rather than expounds. Mr. Boulting is undoubtedly right in asserting that Bruno contributed nothing to Leibniz, but his statement that the *Monadology* is "far more patently and extravagantly unsound" than Bruno's theory of monads is certainly to be deprecated [235]. And we read that Bruno "was instructed in the mathematics of his time" (26) while on page 235 we are told that Bruno "was by no means abreast with the mathematics of his own day." Nevertheless, this is, on the whole, the best book on Bruno in English; the philosopher should find it useful for reference, and everyone should find it a fascinating picture of sixteenth-century society and a sixteenth-century humanist.

NOTES

1. The Florentine goldsmith and soldier Benvenuto Cellini (1500-71) is best known for his racy and self-glorifying autobiography, posthumously published as *La vita* (1728). William Boulting (b. 1842), the author of several biographies of Italian Renaissance figures, presents Bruno as an equivalent master of self-promotion.

2. In *The Ash Wednesday Supper* (*La cena de le ceneri*, 1584), Bruno mocked the Oxford Aristotelians as knowing more about beer than about Greek.

3. While serving as a spy in the court of Elizabeth I (1533-1603), Bruno came to know the Anglo-Italian linguist, John Florio (1553-1625), who later served as the royal tutor at the court of James I. Fulke Greville, Lord Brooke (1554-1628), a poet and member of Elizabeth's court, was a friend of the soldier-poet Sir Philip Sidney (1554-86), whose biography he wrote after Sidney fell in battle.

Classics in English

A review of *The Poets' Translation Series I-VI*

London: The Egoist Ltd., 1915, 1916.

Poetry: A Magazine of Verse, 9 (Nov 1916) 101-04

The translators of this series have an opportunity which most of them have neglected. H. D. is the exception.¹

Gilbert Murray has struck at Greek scholarship and done no good to English verse. Euripides for the working-man, at a shilling the play, in the style of fifty years ago—an ideal of socialism and popular education—Greek without tears.² The only result can be still greater neglect of Greek in our schools. Why study Greek when an *adequate* translation can always be had, cheap and easy scholarship for the busy man? There are translations for the scholar—the splendid Oxford Aristotle—but these do not pretend to be literature.³ And what is scholarship is an introduction and commentary for the original, what is literature is enrichment of English by contact with Greek, a criticism of one language by another, a fertilisation. But there is no substitute, no *adequate* translation.

Some of these translators have fallen into the abyss of Murray. Mr. Aldington's *Anyte* is good, but hardly ever steps aside from the path of Mackail.⁴ There is no use in merely multiplying translations of Greek epigrams which after all belong rather to the art of epigraphy than to literature. The Greeks, like the Italians, put intelligence upon monuments. If our tombstone artists could study Greek—but this is a divagation.

H. D. is a poet. She has at least avoided the traditional jargon prescribed for translators: she has turned Euripides into English verse which can be taken seriously, verse of our own time, as modern as was Swinburne's when it appeared.⁵ Her verse is a perversion of the opposite extreme. Swinburne is too fluid, H. D. too abrupt. The participle becomes an indicative; most of the "I saw" and "I heard" drop out; the chorus becomes an independent poem. Her type of verse makes her task the more difficult. It relies upon a succession of images; and the images of the Greek tragedian were made up of stock phrases rearranged. Thus she is compelled sometimes to lose contact with the original in avoiding clichés:

A flash—
 Achilles passed along the beach . . .
 Achilles had strapped the wind
 About his ankles. [4]

Euripides says only that the women saw Achilles swift-running, swift as the wind. It would be impossible to find equivalents for *swift as the wind* and *swift-running* and escape redundancy. This sort of improvement is permissible, but only marks time: it does not *enrich* English from Greek. And in a few cases, where Euripides' style is merely bald, the alteration is not an improvement. "I keep the memory of the assembled army" becomes "My mind is graven with ships" [8] with obvious loss of dignity. And in the translation—

There is no power but in base men,
 Nor any man whom the gods do not hate— [14]

the meaning is completely perverted; Euripides has made the characteristic remark, that men should not strive to be illustrious (in "virtue" in the Greek sense) lest they bring down on themselves the *invidia* of the gods. Again,

And each man is marked for toil,
 Much labour is his fate,
 Nor is there any new hurt
 That may be added to the race. [16]

is not only a similar mistranslation, but fails to rise quite to what is the emotional crisis of the play.

Still, it is a great deal to have translations that one can read, translations into the language of contemporary verse, even if H. D.'s monotonously short lines with excess of stops and defect of connectives are sometimes tiring to eye and ear. And often she does succeed in bringing something out of the Greek language to the English, in an immediate contact which gives life to both, the contact which makes it possible for the modern language perpetually to draw sustenance from the dead:

May no child of mine,
 Nor any child of my child
 Ever fashion such a tale
 As the Phrygians shall murmur,

As they stoop at their distaffs
 Whispering with Lydians,
 Splendid with weight of gold . . . [10-11]

The translations of Sappho and Leonidas do not deserve mention.⁶ Some of the Latin poetry of the Renaissance which Mr. Aldington gives us is translated for the first time, and some may be found in Mr. Pound's *Spirit of Romance*.⁷ Mr. Flint has done a service in translating the *Mosella*, but is not a "boat propelled with oars" the same thing as a row-boat?⁸

T. S. ELIOT

NOTES

1. The American Imagist poet H. D. (1886-1961) and her husband, the English poet Richard Aldington (1892-1962), were co-editors of the *Egoist* and organizers of the Poets' Translation Series, a set of six translations of Greek and Latin classics, each issued in 1915 as a numbered pamphlet by the *Egoist*: No. 1: *The Poems of Anyte of Tegea*, trans. Aldington; No. 2: *Poems and Fragments of Sappho*, trans. Edward Storer; No. 3: *Choruses from Iphigeneia in Aulis*, trans. H. D.; No. 4: *Latin Poems of the Renaissance*, trans. Aldington; No. 5: *Poems of Leonidas of Tarentum*, trans. James Whitall; No. 6: *The Mosella of Decimus Magnus Ausonius*, trans. F. S. Flint. This first set of translations in the series was followed by a second in 1919.

2. Murray began translating the plays of Euripides (ca. 480-406 BC) into English rhyming verse with *The Bacchae* (1902), *The Hippolytus* (1902), *The Electra* (1905), *The Trojan Women* (1905), and *Medea* (1906), all of which were produced by Harley Granville-Barker at the Court Theatre and contributed to the revival of Attic drama in England. TSE, who studied Euripides in Greek at Harvard, was to continue his criticism of Murray's translations in "Euripides and Professor Murray" (1920).

3. TSE refers to Edward Poste's *The Logic of Science: A Translation of the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle* (Oxford, 1850). His copy of the 1870 edition, signed "T. S. Eliot 1914" and used in his studies at Oxford, is in the Brenchly Collection, Merton College.

4. The Scottish classicist J. W. Mackail (1859-1945) had translated the Arcadian poet Anyte (fl. 3rd century BC) in his *Select Epigrams from the Greek Anthology* (1890), owned by TSE in the 1907 reprint.

5. Some critics maintained that Algernon Charles Swinburne (1837-1909) modeled his *Erechtheus: A Tragedy* (1876) on *Erechtheus*, a lost play by Euripides, but he insisted that it was modeled on Aeschylus. H. D. wrote in her introduction: "A literal, word-for-word version . . . of Euripides would be useless and supererogatory; a rhymed, languidly Swinburnian verse form is an insult and a barbarism" (1).

6. Sappho (ca. 610-ca. 570 BC): Greek lyric poet; Leonidas (fl. 3rd century BC): Greek lyric poet who lived in Italy.

7. Aldington in *Latin Poems of the Renaissance* and American poet Ezra Pound (1885-1972) in *The Spirit of Romance* (1910) include translations from classical poets. TSE's copy of *The Spirit of Romance* is at King's College.

8. In *Mosella*, Ausonius (ca. 310-ca. 395), a poet and rhetorician from Burdigala (Bordeaux), describes the beauty and human activity on the waterways. Poet-critic F. S. Flint (1885-1960) translates the line from *Mosella* as “How pleasant, too, is the sight of the games when the oar-driven boats race one another” (10).

Autour d'une traduction d'Euripide¹

An unpublished review of a translation by H. D. of Euripides' *Choruses from Iphigeneia in Aulis*, No. 3 in the Poets' Translation Series London: Egoist Press, 1915; reviewed in "Classics in English" (493). The Poets' Translation Series, initiated and edited by Aldington, included six titles in the first series and six in the second. H. D.'s translation appeared in the first and was reissued in the second, together with choruses from Euripides' *Hippolytus*. Superscript numbers in the French text mark the place of editorial notes in the English translation by John Morgenstern.

Dans une critique de la belle traduction qu'a faite H. D. de quelques vers d'Euripide, j'ai signalé ce qui me semble être deux buts différents, deux catégories mêmes, que peut suivre la traduction. Cette différence capitale répond à une distinction plus profonde, distinction entre deux attitudes de l'esprit envers la littérature, et surtout la poésie, dite classique.

Évidemment, la littérature moderne, en devenant cosmopolite, a éprouvé un certain affaiblissement d'impulsion centrale. Au lieu de se nourrir des littératures étrangères, au lieu de faire de véritables emprunts, nous faisons une espèce de foire une vile marchandise où chacune des nations apporte à vendre des nouveautés peu durables, et d'où elles rentrent avec d'autres nouveautés qui ne servent également à rien. On va au théâtre pour voir une représentation de quelque pièce suédoise, espagnole, portugaise, irlandaise, brésilienne; chez soi on se repose des fatigues de la journée en lisant un roman du dernier russe, tchèque, serbe (parce que les Slaves tiennent l'estrade à présent): c'est à dire que nous nous délassons par des œuvres d'art des races dont nous ne connaissons ni l'histoire, ni les mœurs, ni les traditions, et dans la mentalité desquelles nous ne sommes guère préparés à nous insinuer. Il est même arrivé que nous nous intéressons à chose inouïe—de la même sorte que dans les chefs-d'œuvre grecs, qu'une représentation théâtrale (scrupuleusement exacte, selon le dernier progrès de l'archéologie) d'Aeschyle nous chatouille presque au même degré que les excentricités des contemporains. Plus scandaleux encore, nos propres classiques anglais . . . et Shakespeare ! . . . ne faisant plus partie intégrale de notre littérature moderne, retrouvent une existence pénible sous les efforts de l'archéologie qui les parent en offrande au goût exotique. Entre Shakespeare et M. un tel, qui dépeint si bien la vie des boulevards, il n'y a rien de commun. Convenu:

quand nous sommes las des actualités, des actualités actuelles, des actualités actuellement actuelles de 1916, allons voir ce qu'étaient les actualités de 1600. Mais c'est simplement insulter un cadavre.

Il y a certainement des retranchements à faire. Un commerce vif entre les nations est énormément utile, même nécessaire, s'il ne soit que bien avisé. Mais pour tirer profit des littératures étrangères, il faut qu'on ait quelques idées intelligentes sur sa propre littérature. De tous ceux qui se raffolent de Dostoevski, combien en sont préparés à faire la moindre analyse, à reconnaître ce qu'il s'y trouve d'universelle, de commun à tous les chefs-d'œuvre de n'importe quel pays ou quelle époque?² et combien qui savent distinguer entre ce qu'y est éternellement humain et ce qu'y est éternellement russe, entre ce qu'y est éternellement russe et ce qu'y est particulièrement russe, et qui savent mettre le doigt sur ce qui est dû au génie de Dostoevski, ou ce qui est de l'excentricité de Dostoevski? À part un nombre très restreint, les lecteurs et les assistants de spectacles aiment mieux rester dans un rêve narcotique et laisser flotter des images singulières devant leurs yeux entr'ouverts.

Et ce groupe restreint, de quoi se compose-t-il? Les plus importants qui s'y rassemblent sont eux-mêmes des professionnels. Ce sont eux qui savent s'appropriier, assimiler, d'une littérature étrangère des éléments qui puissent féconder la littérature indigène. Or, dans cette œuvre d'enrichissement, les traductions jouent un rôle qui est assez important. Mais la valeur de la traduction, c'est la combinaison juste de la fidélité avec l'originalité. Fidèle, parce qu'autrement le traducteur n'apportera que des excentricités; il aurait mieux fait un poème original que de se donner un vernis faux: original, parce que dans le cerveau du traducteur doit s'opérer cette fusion de l'esprit de deux langues qui est la force vivifiante. Ce qu'il apporte doit être étranger, mais non étrange, quelque chose qui est neuf mais à laquelle nous avons droit. Ces limites de fidélité et originalité peuvent varier: on ne réclame pas le même don d'originalité d'un simple érudit que d'un vrai poète, ou la même fidélité d'un poète que d'un érudit; mais dans l'un et dans l'autre cas, il faut que tous les deux qualités y entrent. Passons outre, bien entendu, ces traductions faites pour la seule valeur du continu, traductions d'ouvrages scientifiques, qui ne trouvent aucune place dans notre discussion.

J'ai remarqué dans les traductions de H. D., toutes les soustractions faites, une valeur originelle. Il faut nommer aussi des traductions faites de nos jours qui auront je crois une place permanente dans notre littérature, les traductions provençales et chinoises de M. Ezra Pound.³ Ce n'est pas la chinoiserie, et l'exotisme n'y est pour rien. Nous lui savons gré.

En résumant les bienfaits et les dangers de la traduction, il faut constater deux faits. L'un, c'est que la valeur d'une traduction ne peut être que plus ou moins celle du texte: les deux valeurs ne s'équivalent jamais. Par conséquent, il peut nous arriver à conclure que les littératures qui valent le plus, en traduction, pour une génération ou une autre, ne seront pas nécessairement celles qui ont la plus grande valeur intrinsèque. De ce fait que la littérature chinoise, par moyen des traductions de M. Pound, a apporté des aliments solides à notre langue, il ne s'ensuit pas que la langue chinoise vaut la peine d'être étudiée par tous les gens lettrés. Évidemment. Mais de là nous sommes amenés à une conclusion plus singulière. La littérature grecque, la langue grecque est celle qui peut nous rapporter le plus de bienfaits indiscutables. Dans nos lycées, dans nos universités, la déchéance de la langue grecque est un crime contre la civilisation. Nous nous tenons là. Toutefois, il se peut que la poésie grecque ait très peu de valeur directe pour l'inspiration de notre poésie actuelle. J'avoue que, au delà de quelques morceaux tirés un peu partout, des pages entières d'Homère, des passages de Sophocle et d'Eschyle, et quelques vers de l'anthologie, la poésie grecque m'émeut peu. Ces clichés insistants, cette redondance, cette verbosité extrême, ces moralités fanées, toute la solennité de l'édifice athénienne m'assomme. Les marbres du Parthénon me laissent froid. Je ne suis ni Winckelmann, ni Goethe,⁴ je suis borné par mon époque, comme eux par la leur. Mais gardons-nous de confondre deux points de vue distincts. Tout homme cultivé devrait être capable, devrait faire le long apprentissage qui le rendrait capable de se rattacher à ce monde antique. Le plaisir qu'on y trouve, ce n'est pas un plaisir simple, c'est un plaisir historique, ce qui vaut beaucoup plus. L'esprit historique, c'est le fondement de la culture, et étant aussi le moyen de nous connaître nous-mêmes, de connaître notre état d'âme à nous, de savoir ce que nous pensons, c'est également, mais accessoirement, essentiel au bon goût. Si le Parthénon me ravit ou non, si les vers du poète me transportent ou non, peu importe. La Grèce est là. Ce sont les morts qui parlent. C'est l'aperçu d'Auguste Comte (homme qui vaut bien tous nos réformateurs) que nous devons admettre la solidarité entre les morts, les vivants, et ceux qui vivront après nous.⁵ Dorénavant, occasion de distinguer entre ce que la Grèce est pour l'humanité et ce qu'elle est, pour nous autres professionnels de 1916, honnêtes gens de lettres qui faisons notre métier. Ne nous façonnons pas des fétiches, ne nous déchoyons pas dans la superstition ou l'indifférence, mais tâchons de soutenir et de rétablir chaque jour la vie commune de nous et de nos ancêtres.

On a Translation of Euripides

In a review of H. D.'s fine translation of some lines from Euripides, I indicated what seemed to me to be two different results, two categories even, which translation might produce. The fundamental difference between them speaks to a more profound distinction, a distinction between two attitudes towards literature, and especially poetry, called classic.

Obviously, modern literature, in becoming cosmopolitan, experienced a certain weakening of its central impulse. Instead of nourishing itself on foreign literatures, instead of truly borrowing, we have a kind of market of vile wares to which each nation brings short-lived novelties to trade, and from which they return with equally useless novelties. One goes to the theater to see a performance of some Swedish, Spanish, Portuguese, Irish, Brazilian play; at home, one escapes the tiring reality of daily life by reading a novel by the latest Russian, Czech, Serbian (because the Slavs are still in at present): that is to say, in order to relax, we turn to masterpieces by unknown artists, whose history, customs, traditions, and mentalities are unknown to us, and hardly any of which we are prepared to learn. It might even be said that the extraordinary speaks to us—such that the Greek masterpieces, a stage performance (scrupulously exact, according to the most recent breakthroughs in archaeology) of Aeschylus, for example, whispers to us with almost the same impact as the eccentricities of our contemporaries. Yet more scandalous, our own English classics . . . and Shakespeare! . . . no longer being an integral part of our modern literature, find a painful existence as archeology tries to adorn them as an offering to exotic taste. Between Shakespeare and Mr. so-and-so, who depicts so well life on the boulevards, there is nothing in common. Agreed: when we are tired of current affairs, current current affairs, current affairs currently current in 1916, let us go see what affairs were current in 1600. But to do so would be simply to insult a cadaver.

There are certainly exceptions to be made. A lively commerce between nations is enormously useful, even necessary, if it only be well informed. But in order to turn a profit from foreign literatures, one has to have intelligent ideas about one's own literature. Of all those who rave about Dostoevski, how many are prepared to analyse his work to the slightest degree, to recognise in it what is universal, what is common to all great

works of art, from whatever country or age?² And how many are capable of distinguishing between what is eternally human in it and what is eternally Russian, and what is eternally Russian and what is particularly Russian, and who can put their finger on what is due to Dostoevski's genius, and what is due to Dostoevski's eccentricities? Apart from a limited few, readers and audience members prefer to sit back into a narcotic trance, allowing curious images to float before their half-opened eyes.

And these limited few, who are they? Of those belonging to this group, the majority of them are themselves professionals. It is they who know how to appropriate, to assimilate, elements from foreign literatures which can fertilize indigenous literature. Now, in this work of enrichment, translations play a significant role. But the value of translation lies in the exact combination of fidelity and originality. Faithful, because otherwise the translator will produce only eccentricities; he would do better to write an original poem than to devote himself to a false veneer: original, because the fusion of the minds of two languages, the vivifying force, takes place within the translator's mind. What he produces must be foreign, but not strange, something that is new, but to which we have rightful claim. These limits of fidelity and originality can vary: one does not demand the same originality from a mere scholar as one does from a true poet, or the same fidelity from a poet as from the scholar; but in both cases, both qualities must be present. Let us disregard, of course, translations made solely to convey information, translations of scientific works, which have no place in our discussion.

I noticed in H. D.'s translations, all subtractions made, an original value. It is also necessary to name translations done in our time that will have, I believe, a permanent place in our literature, Ezra Pound's Provençal and Chinese translations.³ This is not *chinoiserie*, and exoticism is there for no reason. We are grateful to him.

To summarise the benefits and the dangers of translation, we must observe two facts. First, the value of a translation is greater or lesser than the value of the original text: the two values are never equal. As a result, we must conclude that the literature that is most valuable, in translation, for one generation or another will not necessarily be those that have the greatest intrinsic value. From the fact that Chinese literature, by way of Mr. Pound's translations, brought substantial nourishment to our language, it does not follow that the Chinese language should be studied by all men of letters. Obviously. But from here we arrive at a more remarkable conclusion. Greek literature,

Greek language can inarguably bring us the most benefits. The decline of Greek instruction in our schools, in our universities, is a crime against civilisation. We cling to that. Nevertheless, it may be that Greek poetry has the least direct value for the inspiration of contemporary poetry. I confess that, beyond some passages here and there, entire pages of Homer, passages of Sophocles and Aeschylus, and some lines from the anthology, Greek poetry hardly moves me. With its intrusive clichés, redundancies, extreme verbosity, and outmoded morality, the whole solemnity of the Athenian edifice bores me stiff. The marbles of the Pantheon leave me cold. I am neither Winckelmann nor Goethe,⁴ I am limited by my era, as they were by theirs. But let us keep ourselves from confusing two distinct points of view. Every cultivated man ought to be able, ought to learn the necessary lessons such that he is able, to reconnect with this ancient world. The pleasure one finds there is not a simple pleasure, it is a historical pleasure, which is far more valuable. The historical mind is the foundation of culture, and also being the means by which we know ourselves, know our own state of mind, know what we think, it is equally, yet secondarily, essential to good taste. Whether the Parthenon delights me or not, whether the poet's lines transport me or not, does not matter. Greece is there. It is the dead who speak. It was the idea of Auguste Comte (a man worth all our reformers put together) that we must admit the solidarity between the dead, the living, and those who will live after us.⁵ From then on, we could distinguish between what Greece means for humanity and what Greece is, for us professionals in 1916, decent men of letters doing our job. Do not mold fetishes for us, do not degrade us with superstition or indifference, but do try to uphold and reestablish each day the communal life we share with our ancestors.

NOTES

1. *Iphigeneia in Aulis* (408-406 BC) is the last extant play of Euripides.

2. TSE was introduced to the novels of Dostoevski by his French tutor Alain-Fournier; he later recalled that in the winter of 1910-11, he read *Crime and Punishment* (1866), *The Idiot* (1868), and *The Brothers Karamazov* (1879-80) in French translation (letter to J. C. Pope, 8 Mar 1946). TSE probably saw a dramatization of *The Brothers Karamazov* on 11 Apr 1911 at the Théâtre des Arts in Paris (*LI* 26n.).

3. Pound's Provençal translations, mostly of Arnaut Daniel's poetry, appeared in various clusters, the first in *The Spirit of Romance* (1910); other translations of Arnaut's *canzos* were printed in *The New Age* (1911-12) as "I Gather the Limbs of Osiris," and translations intended to be sung appeared in *Hesternae Rosae* (1913). Pound's Chinese work, based on the notes of Ernest Fenollosa and focused on the poetry of Rihaku [Li Po], appeared in *Cathay* (1915).

4. In his monumental work of 1764, translated as *The History of Ancient Art Among the Greeks*, Johann J. Winckelmann (1717-68) inspired a classical revival throughout Germany and much of Europe. His admirers included the German poet Johann Wolfgang Goethe (1749-1832), who in 1805 edited *Winckelmann and His Age*, depicting him as a model in his own search for classical humanism.

5. TSE's position is consistent with Jean Finot's discussion of Comte's *Système de politique positive* (1851-54) in *The Science of Happiness*, trans. Mary Safford (New York; London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1914): "Man owes all that he is to the vanished generations. This debt he must, in turn, repay to those that will follow. He does not imagine himself without the dead who have disappeared, the living who surround him or those who will come after him. He has sacred debts to the dead, and duties to the living. This solidarity between the dead and the living, and between the living themselves, is thrust upon him in his every act and in his every thought" (295).

TEXTUAL NOTE

Location: Berg Collection, New York Public Library: included among manuscripts for TSE's *Poems 1920* as "Miscellaneous material not included in *Collected Works*"; undated typescript (elite), four sheets, with holograph emendations in ink; no watermark; 20.3 x 26.0 cm. Date: Internal evidence suggests late 1916, shortly after the appearance in Nov of "Classics in English" (493), referred to in the opening paragraph; corroborated by the reference to "nous autres professionnels de 1916" in the closing paragraph.

An unsigned review of *With Americans of Past and Present Days*, by J. J. Jusserand

London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1916. Pp. xi+350.¹

The New Statesman, 8 (11 Nov 1916), 141

For thirteen years M. Jusserand has been French Ambassador in Washington. His *Literary History of the English People* is well known in England, and the present volume of scattered essays also deserves recognition here. Three papers deal with the rôle of the French contingent in the War of Independence; the rest are addresses delivered in America on Lincoln, on Franklin, on H. H. Furness (the Shakespearean scholar), and one on the prospect of universal peace.²

The three first essays contain interesting material from unpublished documents, letters and journals of some of Rochambeau's aides.³ Few Americans, and perhaps fewer English, appreciate the chivalry of the French enthusiasts for freedom who took part in the American Revolution. M. Jusserand points out that France was at the time distinctly Anglomaniac, and that the spirit which led a French army to America was not hatred of England, but passion for a political ideal as expressed by Turgot, "an experiment of the utmost importance is about to begin, and should succeed" [13].⁴ Even by Washington himself, the disinterestedness of the French was not at once accepted without suspicion, and under the influence of old English prejudice, many leading Americans were opposed to a French alliance.⁵

The last paper in the book, "From War to Peace," was delivered in 1910 before the American Society for the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, and has received no alteration in the light of recent events.⁶ M. Jusserand looks forward to a time when public opinion will render impossible even those grounds for waging war ("to defend their own country," and "to drive out of their friends' land the enemies that have invaded it") for which Sir Thomas More declared armament to be necessary [344-45].⁷

NOTES

1. The literary critic and statesman J. J. Jusserand (1855-1932), ambassador to Washington (1902-25), translated *Piers Plowman* into French and wrote books on pre-Shakespearean English literature. His *Histoire littéraire du peuple anglais* (3 vols, 1893, 1904, 1909) was admired in England, and his *With Americans of Past and Present Days* was awarded the Pulitzer Prize in History.

2. As ambassador, Jusserand participated in events commemorating national figures such as Benjamin Franklin (1706-90) and Abraham Lincoln (1809-65). In the book here reviewed, he includes speeches from the Franklin bicentennial in 1906 and the Lincoln centenary in 1909. A scholar of the English Renaissance, he includes his memorial lecture for H. H. Furness (1833-1912), editor of the *New Variorum Shakespeare*, published over four decades beginning in the 1870s.

3. Jean-Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, comte de Rochambeau (1725-1807), aristocrat and soldier, was sent to America to assist in the Revolution. In the summer of 1781, he and George Washington joined forces for the siege of Yorktown and the Battle of the Chesapeake, and on 22 Sept, they joined with Marquis de Lafayette's troops and forced the surrender of Lord Cornwallis.

4. The economist A. R. J. Turgot (1727-81) wrote *Réflexions sur la formation et la distribution des richesses* (1769-70), translated as *Reflections on the Formation and Distribution of Wealth* (London, 1795), a classic text supporting *laissez-faire* economics.

5. As commander of the Continental Army in the American Revolutionary War (1775-83), George Washington (1732-99) coordinated military arrangements with America's French supporters.

6. As ambassador to the United States during WWI, Jusserand made the case for American military support of the Allies. At the time this review was written, the United States had not yet entered the war.

7. In *Utopia* (1516), Renaissance humanist Sir Thomas More (1478-1535) argued that although nations should try to avoid war, they should be armed in the event either of the conditions cited by Jusserand should occur. More's reflections on *jus ad bellum* remain a reference point in discussions of just war.

An unsigned review of *The Reef of Stars: A Romance of the Tropics*, by H. de Vere Stacpoole

London: Hutchinson, 1916. Pp. viii + 312.¹

The Saturday Westminster Gazette, 48 (9 Dec 1916), 20²

Whose was the huge misshapen hand, apparently encased in a woollen glove, which rose suddenly out of the hatchway?³ No matter how seasoned the reader may be in treasure-hunting, he will experience several new shudders from Mr. H. de Vere Stacpoole's new novel. There are all of the usual stage properties, and some original ones too. The story opens on the beach at Sydney, and conducts us up a New Guinea river. There the heroine is discovered in a Dyak village. The description of Macquart, gone mad over the gold which he cannot take away, is extremely well done, and leaves us in a state of complete exhaustion.

NOTES

1. The Irish writer H. de Vere Stacpoole (1863-1951) served as a ship's doctor for more than forty years and wrote numerous novels that drew on his experience in the South Pacific, the best-known being *The Blue Lagoon* (1908).

2. On 7 Sept 1916, TSE wrote to Professor Woods: "I am doing considerable reviewing for the *Westminster Gazette*—all sorts of things . . . even H. de Vere Stacpoole's novels" (LI 167). This is the only review of a Stacpoole novel in the *Saturday Westminster Gazette*. Attributed to TSE online by George Simmers, it may actually have been by Vivien Eliot. Writing to his mother the day before he wrote to Woods, TSE said: "The *Westminster* have given [me] some novels to do. . . the editress told me that she could read and review six novels in an evening! And encouraged me to do the same. Vivien can do some of them for me" (LI 163-64).

3. The hand that "seemed covered by a black woollen glove" appeared to be that of an "enormous ape," but Macquart knew it to be "of the creature akin to man that . . . inhabits the forests of Dutch New Guinea. He was in fact like a great ruffian man gone to neglect in the primeval woods, his humanity clinging to him like a shame" (266).

First review of *Elements of Folk Psychology: Outlines of a Psychological History of the Development of Mankind*, by Wilhelm Wundt. Trans. Edward Leroy Schaub

London: Allen & Unwin; New York: Macmillan, 1916. Pp. xxiii + 532.¹

The International Journal of Ethics, 27 (Jan 1917) 252-54

This book of Wundt's will probably remain as a classic of its kind. One thinks of Wundt as one of a half-dozen or so of the founders of modern psychology; and this is as much the case in *Völkerpsychologie* as in individual psychology. But a book which can be thought of dispassionately as a classic almost upon its appearance—the German edition is of 1912—is already, in a sense, out of date. And Wundt's book really marks the end, rather than the beginning, of an epoch; his Folk Psychology is too near to philosophy, to the philosophy of history, to be valued apart from Wundt. Undoubtedly he has made great and permanent contributions to the science of language, to the study of myths, and to the study of the primitive mind. But the present volume, in which there is far less detailed examination, but a more synoptic view than in the three-volume work—this book defines the limits of the Folk Psychology much more clearly than did its predecessor.²

It is Wundt's philosophy of history. When he objects to Hegel's "logical schematism" imposed upon history,³ we feel that in some measure he has been compelled to impose a schematism of his own [521]. He defines his purpose as to understand in regard to mankind "not merely the genesis of the particular organs (of society) but primarily their co-operation and the correlation of their functions";⁴ and also "In addition to the problem of the relations of the separate processes to one another . . . we must . . . face also the broader question as to whether or not mental development is at all subject to law" [xiii]. Wundt divides the stages of culture into four: (1) primitive, including prehistoric man and Bushmen, Negritos and Vedda's; (2) totemic, including two very different groups, the Australians and the Iroquois, and on its indefinite borders the Polynesian; (3) what he calls the "age of heroes and gods," the beginnings of ballad and epic; (4) the "development to humanity," fostered by world empires and world religions. It will be observed that this

method of division is partly one of stages of culture and partly one of periods of time, which tends to cast suspicion upon its scientific value; and further that the scheme involves a philosophic teleology. "[A] philosophy of history," Wundt says,

cannot dispense with principles that are in a certain sense external to history itself. Yet the function of such a philosophy would appear to consist in considering historical life from the point of view of the purposes that come to realisation within it, and of the values that are created on the various levels of historical culture. Such a teleology of history. . . must be preceded by a causal investigation, which begins, here as everywhere, by entirely ignoring purposes and values. . . . [T]he direct approach to a philosophy of history which aims, not to acquire a knowledge of reality from *a priori* concepts but, conversely, to derive ideas from reality, is a *psychological account of the development of mankind*. [521-22]

But even Hegel would hardly be accused of *acquiring* "a knowledge of reality from *a priori* concepts"; he pretended to find these concepts in history. And is Wundt's concept of humanity any less *a priori*? If the concept is to be of value in folk-psychology it must be heuristic, and so far we fail to see that it has justified itself. What, exactly, are the permanent factors which permit us to regard the "development to humanity" as the thread to string our historical and geographical account of man upon? For Wundt, the conception of humanity appears to be in reality only a way of rounding up the various societies which he discusses. In the earlier sections, we find consideration of the social and religious organisation, marriage, art, music, the development of forms. But we do not find any connected "psychological" account of the development of man. The first part of the work is descriptive anthropology, the last part is philosophy of history. We find nothing of the influence of the sexual instinct, for instance, upon religion and myth. Mysticism is not even included in the index. The treatment of primitive art quite neglects its aesthetic value. We cannot here attempt to criticise the particular theories—e.g., the origin of totemism—set forth. But why, among much matter about religious cults, is there so little about religious feelings? It is with the external features of development that Wundt is concerned. We think furthermore that progress in this science will be found in a less ambitious synthesis, and will be closely dependent upon advance in individual psychology, such as that of psycho-analysis.

T. STEARNS ELIOT / LONDON, ENGLAND.

NOTES

1. Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), known as the founder of experimental psychology, was a German physiologist and philosopher who tried to construct a scientific history of human consciousness. The book here translated was published in German as *Elemente der Völkerpsychologie: Grundlinien einer psychologischen Entwicklungsgeschichte der Menschheit* (Leipzig: Barth, 1912). TSE reviewed this translation for the *Monist* in Jan 1918 (673).

2. *Völkerpsychologie: Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetze von Sprache, Mythos und Sitte*. 3 vols (Leipzig: Kröner, 1900, 1904, 1911).

3. Hegel outlined his philosophy of history in *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte* (1837). TSE's annotated student copy, translated by J. Sibree, is in the Houghton: *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1905), signed "T. S. Eliot / Apley Court."

4. TSE's parenthetical.

Autobiographical Note

Harvard College Class of 1910, Third Report

Cambridge, MA: Crimson Printing Co., Mar 1917. 108-09.¹

Thomas Stearns Eliot

During 1910-1911 I was studying in Paris. In the autumn of 1911 I returned to Harvard, and spent the next three years in the Graduate School in the department of philosophy. During 1913-1914 I was an assistant in the department. In 1914 I secured an appointment as Sheldon travelling fellow. During the following summer I was in Germany, and the year of 1914-1915 I spent at Merton College, Oxford. Since then I have been teaching, first at High Wycombe, Bucks, and now at Highgate School, London. I have also been engaged in literary work. I have been a contributor to the *Catholic Anthology* (Elkin Matthews, London, 1915); have written several reviews in the *International Journal of Ethics*; have been a contributor to *Blast* (London, 1915), to *Others* (New York), and to *Poetry* (Chicago).² Member: The Aristotelian Society, London.³

NOTES

1. Before the third report, no personal entries were made by class members. In the first report (Apr 1911), TSE is listed as having received his A.B. in June 1909, "as of 1910," as an editor of the *Harvard Advocate*, and as a member of Digamma, Signet, and the Memorial Society; his home address is given "care of H. W. Eliot, 4446 Westminister Pl., St. Louis, MO; his occupation is not given. His present address is "care of Credit Lyonnais, 19 Bvd. des Italiens." In the second report (Apr 1914), TSE's degrees (A.B., 1909, A.M., 1911), home and present address (Cambridge, MA) and occupation ("student, Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences; also assistant in Philosophy at Harvard University") are all listed.

2. TSE had published eight reviews in the *IJE* and twelve poems in various venues. Eight appeared in three issues of Harriet Monroe's *Poetry*, including "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock" (June 1915); two in the second number of Wyndham Lewis's *Blast*—"Preludes" and "Rhapsody on a Windy Night" (July 1915); and one, "Portrait of a Lady," in Alfred Kreymborg's *Others* (Sept 1915). Four poems, selected from *Poetry* and *Others*, plus "Hysteria," appeared in Ezra Pound's *Catholic Anthology* (Nov 1915).

3. TSE drew on the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* in his dissertation and joined the society in 1915. On 3 Dec, Bertrand Russell wrote to TSE's mother, "I am glad he is joining the Aristotelian Society" (*L1* 134), and on 7 Sept 1916 TSE wrote to Professor J. H. Woods that because of his wife's health he was "able to attend but very few meetings, much less read the papers beforehand, but I hope to pay more attention to it this year" (*L1* 167).

Reflections on *Vers Libre*

The New Statesman, 8 (3 Mar 1917) 518-19

Ceux qui possèdent leur vers libre y tiennent: on n'abandonne que le vers libre.— Duhamel et Vildrac¹

A Lady, renowned in her small circle for the accuracy of her stop-press information of literature, complains to me of a growing pococurantism. “Since the Russians came in I can read nothing else. I have finished Dostoevski, and I do not know what to do.” I suggested that the great Russian was an admirer of Dickens, and that she also might find that author readable. “But Dickens is a sentimentalist; Dostoevski is a realist.” I reflected on the amours of Sonia and Raskolnikov, but forbore to press the point, and I proposed *It Is Never Too Late To Mend*.² “But one cannot read the Victorians at all!” While I was extracting the virtues of the proposition that Dostoevski is a Christian, while Charles Reade is merely pious, she added that she could no longer read any verse but *vers libre*.

It is assumed that *vers libre* exists. It is assumed that *vers libre* is a school; that it consists of certain theories; that its group or groups of theorists will either revolutionise or demoralise poetry if their attack upon the iambic pentameter meets with any success. *Vers libre* does not exist, and it is time that this preposterous fiction followed the *élan vital* and the eighty thousand Russians into oblivion.³

When a theory of art passes it is usually found that a groat's worth of art has been bought with a million of advertisement.⁴ The theory which sold the wares may be quite false, or it may be confused and incapable of elucidation, or it may never have existed. A mythical revolution will have taken place and produced a few works of art which perhaps would be even better if still less of the revolutionary theories clung to them. In modern society such revolutions are almost inevitable. An artist happens upon a method, perhaps quite unreflectingly, which is new in the sense that it is essentially different from that of the second-rate people about him, and different in everything but essentials from that of any of his great predecessors. The novelty meets with neglect; neglect provokes attack; and attack demands a theory. In an ideal state of society one might imagine the good New growing

naturally out of the good Old, without the need for polemic and theory; this would be a society with a living tradition. In a sluggish society, as actual societies are, tradition is ever lapsing into superstition, and the violent stimulus of novelty is required. This is bad for the artist and his school, who may become circumscribed by their theory and narrowed by their polemic; but the artist can always console himself for his errors in his old age by considering that if he had not fought nothing would have been accomplished.

Vers libre has not even the excuse of a polemic; it is a battle-cry of freedom, and there is no freedom in art. And as the so-called *vers libre* which is good is anything but "free," it can better be defended under some other label. Particular types of *vers libre* may be supported on the choice of content, or on the method of handling the content. I am aware that many writers of *vers libre* have introduced such innovations, and that the novelty of their choice and manipulation of material is confused—if not in their own minds, in the minds of many of their readers—with the novelty of the form. But I am not here concerned with imagism, which is a theory about the use of material; I am only concerned with the theory of the verse-form in which imagism is cast. If *vers libre* is a genuine verse-form it will have a positive definition. And I can define it only in negatives: (1) absence of pattern, (2) absence of rhyme, (3) absence of metre.

The third of these qualities is easily disposed of. What sort of a line that would be which would not scan at all I cannot say. Even in the popular American magazines, whose verse columns are now largely given over to *vers libre*, the lines are usually explicable in terms of prosody. Any line can be divided into feet and accents. The simpler metres are a repetition of one combination, perhaps a long and a short, or a short and a long syllable, five times repeated. There is, however, no reason why, within the single line, there should be any repetition; why there should not be lines (as there are) divisible only into feet of different types. How can the grammatical exercise of scansion make a line of this sort more intelligible? Only by isolating elements which occur in other lines, and the sole purpose of doing this is the production of a similar effect elsewhere. But repetition of effect is a question of pattern.

Scansion tells us very little. It is probably that there is not much to be gained by an elaborate system of prosody, by the erudite complexities of Swinburnian metre. With Swinburne, once the trick is perceived and the scholarship appreciated, the effect is somewhat diminished. When the unexpectedness, due to the unfamiliarity of the metres to English ears, wears off

and is understood, one ceases to look for what one does not find in Swinburne; the inexplicable line with the music which can never be recaptured in other words. Swinburne mastered his technique, which is a great deal, but he did not master it to the extent of being able to take liberties with it, which is everything. If anything promising for English poetry is hidden in the metres of Swinburne, it probably lies far beyond the point to which Swinburne has developed them. But the most interesting verse which has yet been written in our language has been done either by taking a very simple form, like the iambic pentameter, and constantly withdrawing from it, or taking no form at all, and constantly approximating to a very simple one. It is this contrast between fixity and flux, this unperceived evasion of monotony, which is the very life of verse.

I have in mind two passages of contemporary verse which would be called *vers libre*. Both of them I quote because of their beauty:

Once, in finesse of fiddles found I ecstasy,
In the flash of gold heels on the hard pavement.
Now see I
That warmth's the very stuff of poesy.
Oh, God, make small
The old star-eaten blanket of the sky,
That I may fold it round me and in comfort lie.⁵

This is a complete poem. The other is part of a much longer poem.

There shut up in his castle, Tairiran's,
She who had nor ears nor tongue save in her hands,
Gone—ah, gone—untouched, unreachable!
She who could never live save through one person,
She who could never speak save to one person,
And all the rest of her a shifting change,
A broken bundle of mirrors . . .!⁶

It is obvious that the charm of these lines could not be, without the constant suggestion and the skilful evasion of iambic pentameter.

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, and especially in the verse of John Webster, who was in some ways a more cunning technician than Shakespeare, one finds the same constant evasion and recognition of regularity.⁷ Webster is much freer than Shakespeare, and that his fault is not negligence is evidenced by the fact that it is often at moments of the highest

intensity that his verse acquires this freedom. That there is also carelessness I do not deny, but the irregularity of carelessness can be at once detected from the irregularity of deliberation. (In the *White Devil* Brachiano dying, and Cornelia mad, deliberately rupture the bonds of pentameter.)

I recover, like a spent taper, for a flash,
And instantly go out.⁸

Cover her face; mine eyes dazzle; she died young.⁹

You have cause to love me, I did enter you in my heart
Before you would vouchsafe to call for the keys.¹⁰

This is a vain poetry: but I pray you tell me
If there were proposed me, wisdom, riches, and beauty,
In three several young men, which should I choose?¹¹

These are not lines of carelessness. The irregularity is further enhanced by the use of short lines and the breaking up of lines in dialogue, which alters the quantities. And there are many lines in the drama of this time which are spoilt by regular accentuation.

I loved this woman in spite of my heart. (*The Changeling* [V.iii]).¹²

I would have these herbs grow up in his grave. (*The White Devil* [V.iv])

Whether the spirit of greatness or of woman. . . . (*The Duchess of Malfi* [I.i])

The general charge of decadence cannot be preferred. Tourneur and Shirley, who I think will be conceded to have touched nearly the bottom of the decline of tragedy, are much more regular than Webster or Middleton. Tourneur will polish off a fair line of iambics even at the cost of amputating a preposition from its substantive, and in *The Atheist's Tragedy* he has a final "of" in two lines out of five together.¹³

We may therefore formulate as follows: the ghost of some simple metre should lurk behind the arras in even the "freest" verse; to advance menacingly as we doze, and withdraw as we rouse.¹⁴ Or, freedom is only truly freedom when it appears against the background of an artificial limitation.

Not to have perceived the simple truth that *some* artificial limitation is necessary except in moments of the first intensity is, I believe, a capital

error of even so distinguished a talent as that of Mr. E. L. Masters. The *Spoon River Anthology* is not material of the first intensity; it is reflective, not immediate; its author is a moralist, rather than an observer. His material is so near to the material of Crabbe that one wonders why he should have used a different form.¹⁵ Crabbe is, on the whole, the more intense of the two; he is keen, direct, and unsparing. His material is prosaic, not in the sense that it would have been better done in prose, but in the sense of requiring a simple and rather rigid verse-form, and this Crabbe has given it. Mr. Masters requires a more rigid verse-form than either of the two contemporary poets quoted above, and his epitaphs suffer from the lack of it.

So much for metre. There is no escape from metre; there is only mastery. But while there obviously is escape from rhyme, the *vers libristes* are by no means the first out of the cave.

The boughs of the trees
are twisted
by many bafflings;
twisted are
the small-leafed boughs.

But the shadow of them
is not the shadow of the mast head
nor of the torn sails.¹⁶

. . . .

When the white dawn first
Through the rough fir-planks
Of my hut, by the chestnuts,
Up at the valley-head,
Came breaking, Goddess!
I sprang up, I threw round me
My dappled fawn-skin. . . .¹⁷

Except for the more human touch in the second of these extracts a hasty observer would hardly realise that the first is by a contemporary, and the second by Matthew Arnold.

I do not minimise the services of modern poets in exploiting the possibilities of rhymeless verse. They prove the strength of a Movement, the utility of a Theory. What neither Blake nor Arnold could do alone is being done in our time. "Blank verse" is the only accepted rhymeless verse in

English—the inevitable iambic pentameter. The English ear is (or was) more sensitive to the music of the verse and less dependent upon the recurrence of identical sounds in this metre than in any other. There is no campaign against rhyme. But it is possible that excessive devotion to rhyme has thickened the modern ear. The rejection of rhyme is not a leap at facility; on the contrary, it imposes a much severer strain upon the language. When the comforting echo of rhyme is removed, success or failure in the choice of words, in the sentence structure, in the order, is at once more apparent. Rhyme removed, the poet is at once held up to the standards of prose. Rhyme removed, much ethereal music leaps up from the word, music which has hitherto chirped unnoticed in the expanse of prose. And rhyme forbidden, many Shagpats were unwigged.¹⁸

And this liberation from rhyme might be as well a liberation *of* rhyme. Freed from its exacting task of supporting lame verse, it could be applied with greater effect where it is most needed. There are often passages in an unrhymed poem where rhyme is wanted for some special effect, for a sudden tightening-up, for a cumulative insistence, or for an abrupt change of mood. But formal rhymed verse will certainly not lose its place. We only need the coming of a Satirist—no man of genius is rarer—to prove that the heroic couplet has lost none of its edge since Dryden and Pope laid it down.¹⁹ As for the sonnet I am not so sure. But the decay of intricate formal patterns has nothing to do with the advent of *vers libre*. It had set in long before. Only in a closely-knit and homogenous society, where many men are at work on the same problems, such a society as those which produced the Greek chorus, the Elizabethan lyric, and the Troubadour canzone, will the development of such forms ever be carried to perfection. And as for *vers libre*, we conclude that it is not defined by absence of pattern or absence of rhyme, for other verse is without these; that it is not defined by non-existence of metre, since even the *worst* verse can be scanned; and we conclude that the division between Conservative Verse and *Vers Libre* does not exist, for there is only good verse, bad verse, and chaos.

T. S. ELIOT²⁰

NOTES

1. In *Notes sur la technique poétique* (Paris, 1910), the French poets Georges Duhamel (1884-1966) and Charles Vildrac (1882-1971) published a collection of aphorisms by themselves and others on *vers libre*, symbolism, and other verse techniques. TSE's epigraph appears as a single

statement in a sequence (13). *Trans*: Those who have mastered their *vers libre* cling to it: we lose nothing but freedom in verse.

2. Charles Dickens (1812-70) wrote novels about the urban poor. Sonia and Raskolnikov are characters in Dostoevsky's *Crime and Punishment* (1866). Charles Reade (1814-84) was known for *It Is Never Too Late to Mend* (1856), a popular novel written to inspire prison reform and included in TSE's 1916 Extension course in Modern English Literature (478).

3. *élan vital*: in Bergson, the vital impulse directing evolution.

4. TSE alludes to Robert Greene's *Groats-Worth of Witte, bought with a million of Repentance*. "Describing the follie of youth, the falsehood of makeshift flatterers, the miserie of the negligent, and mischiefs of deceiving Courtesans" (1592).

5. "The Embankment" (1909) is one of eight published poems by the poet and philosopher T. E. Hulme (1883-1917). TSE discovered Hulme's poems in *Ripostes* (1912) by Pound, who had attached "The Complete Poetical Works of T. E. Hulme" as an appendix to his own book. TSE discussed Hulme's poems in his Oxford Extension courses and declared in "The Function of Criticism" (1923) that the "poems of T. E. Hulme only needed to be read aloud to have immediate effect" (2.465).

6. Pound, "Near Perigord," III, from *Lustra* (1916).

7. John Webster (ca. 1580-ca. 1632) is known for *The White Devil* (1612) and *The Duchess of Malfi* (ca. 1613).

8. *The White Devil* V.vi.

9. *The Duchess of Malfi* IV.ii.

10. *The Duchess of Malfi* III.ii.

11. *The Duchess of Malfi* III.ii.

12. *The Changeling* (ca. 1623) is a tragedy by English dramatists Thomas Middleton (1580-1627) and William Rowley (ca. 1585-ca. 1626).

13. Cyril Tourneur wrote *The Atheist's Tragedy* (1611), in which D'Amville, speaking to Sebastian (III.ii), states that he is "Content to countenance the freedom of / Your spirit when 'tis worthily employed. / 'A God's name, give behavior the full scope / Of generous liberty, but let it not / Disperse and spend itself in courses of / Unbounded licence" (from TSE's Mermaid edition of *Webster & Tourneur* [London: Vizetelly, 1888], 295). James Shirley (1596-1666) wrote more than thirty plays, of which five, including *The Traitor* (1631) and *The Cardinal* (1641), are tragedies.

14. An allusion to *Hamlet* III.iv, where the ghost of Hamlet's father reappears after Hamlet has slain Polonius behind the arras.

15. In the *Spoon River Anthology*, discussed by TSE in a review of *Songs and Satires* in the *Manchester Guardian*, Masters uses free-verse monologues (488). In *The Borough* (1810), George Crabbe (1754-1832) presents the stories of residents of a small English borough in a series of letters in heroic couplets.

16. From "Hermes of the Ways" (II), included in *Sea Garden* (1916), H. D.'s first book.

17. "The Strayed Reveller" (ll. 24-30) is the title poem in an 1849 collection by Matthew Arnold (1822-88).

18. An allusion to the first novel of George Meredith (1828-1909), *The Shaving of Shagpat* (1856), an Oriental romance in the style of the *Arabian Nights*. The tyrant Shagpat loses his power when his hair is shaved off by a Persian barber.

19. John Dryden (1631-1700) and Alexander Pope (1688-1744) perfected the heroic couplet and used it in their satires, including *Absalom and Achitophel* (1681) and *The Rape of the Lock* (1714), respectively.

20. "My article in the *New Statesman* was a great success," TSE wrote to his mother on 21 Mar, "and I shall probably be able to get articles in very often" (*LI* 181).

Diderot¹

An unsigned review of *Diderot's Early Philosophical Works*

Trans. and ed. Margaret Jourdain

Chicago: Open Court Pub., 1916. Pp. 246.²

The New Statesman, 8 (17 Mar 1917) 572-73

In all the active and restless eighteenth century, perhaps the most restless and active intelligence was that of Diderot. Yet his immortality is hardly more than the echo of a name. To the curious in literature much lesser names are almost as well known: Évremonde, Condillac, Chamfort, Lespinasse.³ It is not the mere bulk of the man's work which is forbidding. Voltaire's fifty or sixty volumes have not crushed him: *Candide* represents him to the many, and personal attraction draws a few readers to the rest of his writings.⁴ But Diderot is not fairly represented by the *Neveu de Rameau*, and his personality has not that simplicity which attracts all sceptical or destructive minds to Voltaire. The truth is that his personality is not important; that he created no masterpiece in any genre; that his genius was essentially diffuse. Wherever the intellect of the century stirred, Diderot dropped a grain into the ferment; his was one of those minds which provide *leading ideas*, ideas which prepare an environment, ideas which force the scientist to look in certain directions, which force the artist to develop certain forms. For Biblical criticism, for physiology, for biology, psychology, evolution, for aesthetics and new literary genres, Diderot supplied such ideas. Yet he made no scientific discovery, and he left no literary masterpiece.

To select "philosophic writings" from Diderot is, therefore, a little difficult. Possibly this is why Miss Jourdain has confined her selections to the early works: she has chosen the *Philosophic Thoughts*, the *Letter on the Blind*, and the *Letter on the Deaf and Dumb*. On any other principle of selection, the later *Entretien avec la maréchale* is an incomparably more brilliant and witty exposition of Diderot's religious views than the *Philosophic Thoughts*. But as the "Thoughts" were chosen, it seems a pity that the "Supplement" to them was omitted; however unpleasant to the English reader, it certainly

casts some light on Diderot's attitude in morals. And one regrets also that so competent an editor could not have included the *Entretien avec d'Alembert*.⁵ But Miss Jourdain has done a most useful piece of work in presenting a good translation of three of Diderot's essays with careful introduction, appendices, and notes. The translation is as good as that of Mrs. Tollemache, the apparatus is more adequate, and the selection, though smaller, is more important.⁶

The two "Letters" are, in substance, rather unsystematic applications of the sensationalistic psychology of the eighteenth century. One observes, as in every writer of Diderot's time, the vast influence of Locke.⁷ As an exposition of sensationalism, the letters are inferior to the systematic treatise of Condillac.⁸ They contain some acute observations of the behaviour of a blind man and a deaf mute, their means of communication with the world, and their interpretation of this world to themselves. Diderot's point of view is summed up in the words:

As to me it has always been very clear that the state of our organs and our senses has a great influence on our metaphysics and our morality, and that those ideas which seem purely intellectual are closely dependent on the conformation of our bodies, I put some questions to the blind man about the virtues and vices. [80]

And he finds, on questioning the blind man, that "Modesty he makes no great account of" [81].

Diderot gives himself a wide field. The second essay runs into observations on language, literary criticism, music, the relation of the arts to one another. The first contains a famous refutation, from the lips of the blind man, of the argument from design. He suggests how such a world as ours might have evolved without Divine control, and exclaims:

What is this world . . . but a complex, subject to cycles of change, all of which show a continual tendency to destruction; a rapid succession of beings that appear one by one, flourish and disappear; a merely transitory symmetry and momentary appearance of order? [113-14].

This is not an unknown voice but it is a voice which was beginning to be heard more loudly in the eighteenth century. It is heard from the *promeneur solitaire*; it is the voice of emotional scientific naturalism, which cried a century later: *O abîme, tu es le dieu unique!*⁹ Rousseau's accents were the

more emotional, Diderot's the more scientific; but whoever wishes to understand how the nineteenth century sprang from the eighteenth, must read Diderot as well as Rousseau.

As to defects in the translation, we have to turn to the original to discover that on page 168 ("carried the tidings of his death to her husband"), *his* refers to *husband*, the French being *annonça la mort à son époux*.¹⁰

NOTES

1. Denis Diderot (1713-84), philosopher, dramatist, and critic, is best known for his *Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts, et des métiers* (28 vols, 1751-80), co-edited with Jean d'Alembert and Louis de Jaucourt. The *Encyclopédie*, which includes articles by leading thinkers of the day, reflects the philosophical skepticism derived from Locke and Descartes.

2. Margaret Jourdain (1876-1951), translator and historian of English furniture and decorative arts, was the sister of Philip Jourdain, editor of the *Monist* and head of Open Court's London office from 1912 to 1919.

3. Charles de Saint-Évremonde (ca. 1614-1703), soldier, man of letters, and moralist, wrote letters, essays, and comedies, all collected in *Œuvres mêlées* (1705). Exiled for hostility to the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659), he died in England and is buried in Westminster Abbey.

Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1715-80), a member of Diderot's circle, wrote *Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines* (1746). He was the exponent of a radically empiricist epistemology known as "sensationalism." Whereas Locke rejected "innate ideas," Condillac went further and rejected "innate abilities" as well.

Nicolas Chamfort (ca. 1741-94), journalist and playwright, is known for his *Maximes et pensées* (1803), usually classed with those of La Rochefoucauld in French literary history. His admirers included John Stuart Mill and Sainte-Beuve.

Julie de Lespinasse (1732-76) presided over a glittering salon in prerevolutionary France, attended by intellectuals such as Nicolas de Condorcet and Jean d'Alembert. Sainte-Beuve discussed her *Lettres* (2 vols, 1809) in his Monday chats.

4. In *Candide* (1759), Voltaire satirizes the optimistic creed of Leibniz: "All is for the best in this best of all possible worlds." *Le Neveu de Rameau* (1805) [Rameau's Nephew], a philosophical satire, holds an analogous place in Diderot's corpus.

5. TSE laments that Jourdain's selection from Diderot's early writings—*Philosophic Thoughts* (1746), *Letter on the Blind* (1749), and *Letter on the Deaf and Dumb* (1751)—does not include later and finer work such as the conversation between Diderot and d'Alembert (*Entretien avec d'Alembert*) (1769, pub. 1830).

6. Beatrix Tollemache (1840-1926) translated Diderot's *Thoughts on Art and Style* (1893).

7. In *An Essay concerning Human Understanding* (1690), Locke established modern empiricism by rejecting the doctrine of "innate ideas." His work was a major reference point for Diderot and his circle.

8. Condillac's *Traité des sensations* (1754) [Treatise on Sensations] claims that perception involves unconscious inferences from what is given in sensation.

9. TSE alludes to Rousseau's *Les Réveries d'un promeneur solitaire* (1782) [*Reveries of a Solitary Walker*] and quotes from Renan's *Prière sur l'Acropole* (1865). *Trans*: O abyss, you are the one true god.

10. The sentence from which TSE quotes: "The way in which another woman carried the tidings of his death to her husband, who was still uncertain of his fate, is another example of a gesture unapproached in its vigour by the spoken word."

An unsigned review of *Union Portraits*, by Gamaliel Bradford

New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1916. Pp. xx + 330.¹

The New Statesman, 9 (21 Apr 1917) 69

In this volume there are nine portraits of Union leaders in the American Civil War—Sherman, McClellan, Hooker, Meade, Thomas, the generals; Stanton, Seward, Sumner, the Cabinet Ministers; and Bowles, the journalist.² Mr. Bradford has chosen his material with admirable discretion; the portraits are short, and bring out the important traits most skillfully. In sparing purely biographical or historical matter, the author attains a most effective economy, but thereby supposes some familiarity on the part of his reader with the general period. Those two rejected heroes, McClellan and Hooker, receive a slight rehabilitation at his hands, but in the main he treats his models without mercy.³ They accordingly become more interesting. It is made strikingly evident that these men were not stern, self-controlled Puritans; several were men of most passionate, ungovernable disposition, unashamed in rages and tears; several were men in whom were mixed greatness and vanity, devotion and pusillanimity; and the whole group, in their energy and their mixture of motives, are not unworthy of comparison with figures of the French Revolution.

One regrets the omission of certain figures—of Phil Sheridan, of Franz Sigel,⁴ of some of the antebellum abolitionists—or rather one hopes for their inclusion in a later volume. The writing is good, except for a few personal appeals to the reader (“Hooker did mean things and made false statements. So have you” [40].), which will jar upon the English ear.

NOTES

1. The American biographer Gamaliel Bradford (1863–1932) had developed his method of “psychography,” the isolation of his subjects’ essential traits at key moments in their lives, in writing *Lee the American* (1912), *Confederate Portraits* (1914), and *Portraits of Women* (1916). TSE sent this review to J. C. Squire, literary editor of the *NS*, on 29 Mar.

2. Union Generals of the Civil War (1861–65): William Tecumseh Sherman (1820–91); George Brinton McClellan (1826–85); Joseph Hooker (1814–79); George Gordon Meade (1815–72); George Henry Thomas (1816–70); Abraham Lincoln’s cabinet ministers: Edwin McMasters

Stanton (1814-69), Secretary of War; William Henry Seward (1801-72), Secretary of State; Charles Sumner (1811-74), chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Senate's leading opponent of slavery; and journalist Samuel Bowles (1826-78), editor of the *Springfield Republican* (Massachusetts), which supported the antislavery agenda during the war.

3. Lincoln removed McClellan as general-in-chief of the Union Army for his battlefield failures and accepted the resignation of Hooker following his defeat by Robert E. Lee at the Battle of Chancellorsville. Lincoln then appointed Meade for the Gettysburg campaign.

4. General Philip H. Sheridan (1831-88) led the Cavalry Corp of the Army of the Potomac, defeated Confederate forces in the Shenandoah Valley, and was instrumental in forcing the surrender of General Robert E. Lee at Appomattox. The German military officer Franz Sigel (1824-1902) had fled Germany as minister of war after the failed Revolution of 1848 against Prussia. After immigrating to St. Louis, he became an abolitionist and was commissioned brigadier general at the beginning of the war, serving in the Battle of Pea Ridge and the Second Battle of Bull Run before he was defeated at the Battle of New Market and resigned his commission.

Eeldrop and Appleplex

The Little Review, 4 (May 1917) 7-11; (Sept 1917) 16-19¹

I

Eeldrop and Appleplex rented two small rooms in a disreputable part of town. Here they sometimes came at nightfall, here they sometimes slept, and after they had slept, they cooked oatmeal and departed in the morning for destinations unknown to each other. They sometimes slept, more often they talked, or looked out of the window.

They had chosen the rooms and the neighborhood with great care. There are evil neighborhoods of noise and evil neighborhoods of silence, and Eeldrop and Appleplex preferred the latter, as being the more evil. It was a shady street, its windows were heavily curtained; and over it hung the cloud of a respectability which has something to conceal. Yet it had the advantage of more riotous neighborhoods near by, and Eeldrop and Appleplex commanded from their windows the entrance of a police station across the way. This alone possessed an irresistible appeal in their eyes. From time to time the silence of the street was broken; whenever a malefactor was apprehended, a wave of excitement curled into the street and broke upon the doors of the police station. Then the inhabitants of the street would linger in dressing-gowns, upon their doorsteps: then alien visitors would linger in the street, in caps: long after the center of misery had been engulfed in his cell. Then Eeldrop and Appleplex would break off their discourse, and rush out to mingle with the mob. Each pursued his own line of inquiry. Appleplex, who had the gift of an extraordinary address with the lower classes of both sexes, questioned the onlookers, and usually extracted full and inconsistent histories: Eeldrop preserved a more passive demeanor, listened to the conversation of the people among themselves, registered in his mind their oaths, their redundancy of phrase, their various manners of spitting, and the cries of the victim from the hall of justice within. When the crowd dispersed, Eeldrop and Appleplex returned to their rooms: Appleplex entered the results of his inquiries into large note-books, filed according to the nature of the case, from A (adultery) to Y (yeggmen). Eeldrop smoked reflectively. It may be added that Eeldrop was a sceptic, with a taste for

mysticism, and Appleplex a materialist with a leaning toward scepticism; that Eeldrop was learned in theology, and that Appleplex studied the physical and biological sciences.

There was a common motive which led Eeldrop and Appleplex thus to separate themselves from time to time, from the fields of their daily employments and their ordinarily social activities. Both were endeavoring to escape not the commonplace, respectable or even the domestic, but the too well pigeon-holed, too taken-for-granted, too highly systematized areas, and—in the language of those whom they sought to avoid—they wished “to apprehend the human soul in its concrete individuality.”

“Why,” said Eeldrop, “was that fat Spaniard, who sat at the table with us this evening, and listened to our conversation with occasional curiosity, why was he himself for a moment an object of interest to us? He wore his napkin tucked into his chin, he made unpleasant noises while eating, and while not eating, his way of crumbling bread between fat fingers made me extremely nervous: he wore a waistcoat *café au lait*, and black boots with brown tops. He was oppressively gross and vulgar; he belonged to a type, he could easily be classified in any town of provincial Spain. Yet under the circumstances—when we had been discussing marriage, and he suddenly leaned forward and exclaimed: “I was married once myself”—we were able to detach him from his classification and regard him for a moment as an unique being, a soul, however insignificant, with a history of its own, once for all. It is these moments which we prize, and which alone are revealing. For any vital truth is incapable of being applied to another case: the essential is unique. Perhaps that is why it is so neglected: because it is useless. What we learned about that Spaniard is incapable of being applied to any other Spaniard, or even recalled in words. With the decline of orthodox theology and its admirable theory of the soul, the unique importance of events has vanished. A man is only important as he is classed. Hence there is no tragedy, or no appreciation of tragedy, which is the same thing. We had been talking of young Bistwick, who three months ago married his mother’s housemaid and now is aware of the fact. Who appreciates the truth of the matter? Not the relatives, for they are only moved by affection, by regard for Bistwick’s interests, and chiefly by their collective feeling of family disgrace. Not the generous-minded and thoughtful outsider, who regards it merely as evidence for the necessity of divorce law reform. Bistwick is classed among the unhappily married. But what Bistwick feels when he wakes up in the morning, which is the great important fact, no detached outsider

conceives. The awful importance of the ruin of a life is overlooked. Men are only allowed to be happy or miserable in classes. In Gopsum Street a man murders his mistress. The important fact is that for the man the act is eternal, and that for the brief space he has to live, he is already dead. He is already in a different world from ours. He has crossed the frontier. The important fact is that something is done which cannot be undone—a possibility which none of us realize until we face it ourselves. For the man's neighbors the important fact is what the man killed her with? And at precisely what time? And who found the body? For the "enlightened public" the case is merely evidence for the Drink question, or Unemployment, or some other category of things to be reformed. But the mediaeval world, insisting on the eternity of punishment, expressed something nearer the truth.

"What you say," replied Appleplex, "commands my measured adherence. I should think, in the case of the Spaniard, and in the many other interesting cases which have come under our attention at the door of the police station, what we grasp in that moment of pure observation on which we pride ourselves, is not alien to the principle of classification, but deeper. We could, if we liked, make excellent comment upon the nature of provincial Spaniards, or of destitution (as misery is called by the philanthropists), or on homes for working girls. But such is not our intention. We aim at experience in the particular centers in which alone it is evil. We avoid classification. We do not deny it. But when a man is classified something is lost. The majority of mankind live on paper currency: they use terms which are merely good for so much reality, they never see actual coinage."

"I should go even further than that," said Eeldrop. "The majority not only have no language to express anything save generalized man; they are for the most part unaware of themselves as anything but generalized men. They are first of all government officials, or pillars of the church, or trade unionists, or poets, or unemployed; this cataloguing is not only satisfactory to other people for practical purposes, it is sufficient to themselves for their 'life of the spirit.' Many are not quite real at any moment. When Wolstrip married, I am sure he said to himself: 'Now I am consummating the union of two of the best families in Philadelphia.'"

"The question is," said Appleplex, "what is to be our philosophy. This must be settled at once. Mrs. Howexden recommends me to read Bergson. He writes very entertainingly on the structure of the eye of the frog."

"Not at all," interrupted his friend. "Our philosophy is quite irrelevant. The essential is, that our philosophy should spring from our point of view

and not return upon itself to explain our point of view. A philosophy about intuition is somewhat less likely to be intuitive than any other. We must avoid having a platform."

"But at least," said Appleplex, "we are . . ."

"Individualists. No!! nor anti-intellectualists. These also are labels. The 'individualist' is a member of a mob as fully as any other man: and the mob of individualists is the most unpleasing, because it has the least character. Nietzsche was a mob-man, just as Bergson is an intellectualist. We cannot escape the label, but let it be one which carries no distinction, and arouses no self-consciousness. Sufficient that we should find simple labels, and not further exploit them. I am, I confess to you, in private life, a bank-clerk . . ."

"And should, according to your own view, have a wife, three children, and a vegetable garden in a suburb," said Appleplex.

"Such is precisely the case," returned Eeldrop, "but I had not thought it necessary to mention this biographical detail. As it is Saturday night, I shall return to my suburb. Tomorrow will be spent in that garden . . ."

"I shall pay my call on Mrs. Howexden," murmured Appleplex.²

II

The suburban evening was grey and yellow on Sunday; the gardens of the small houses to left and right were rank with ivy and tall grass and lilac bushes; the tropical South London verdure was dusty above and moldy below; the tepid air swarmed with flies. Eeldrop, at the window, welcomed the smoky smell of lilac, the gramophones, the choir of the Baptist chapel, and the sight of three small girls playing cards on the steps of the police station.

"On such a night as this," said Eeldrop, "I often think of Scheherazade, and wonder what has become of her."

Appleplex rose without speaking and turned to the files which contained the documents for his "Survey of Contemporary Society." He removed the file marked *London* from between the files *Barcelona* and *Boston* where it had been misplaced, and turned over the papers rapidly. "The lady you mention," he rejoined at last, "whom I have listed not under S. but as Edith, alias Scheherazade, has left but few evidences in my possession. Here is an old laundry account which she left for you to pay, a check drawn by her and marked 'R/D,' a letter from her mother in Honolulu (on ruled paper), a poem written on a restaurant bill—'To Atthis'—and a letter by herself, on Lady Equistep's best notepaper, containing some damaging but entertain-

ing information about Lady Equistep. Then there are my own few observations on two sheets of foolscap.”

“Edith,” murmured Eeldrop, who had not been attending to this catalogue, “I wonder what has become of her. ‘Not pleasure, but fulness of life . . . to burn ever with a hard gem-like flame,’ those were her words. What curiosity and passion for experience! Perhaps that flame has burnt itself out by now.”

“You ought to inform yourself better,” said Appleplex severely, “Edith dines sometimes with Mrs. Howexden, who tells me that her passion for experience has taken her to a Russian pianist in Bayswater. She is also said to be present often at the Anarchist Tea Rooms, and can usually be found in the evening at the Café de l’Orangerie.”

“Well,” replied Eeldrop, “I confess that I prefer to wonder what has become of her. I do not like to think of her future. Scheherazade grown old! I see her grown very plump, full-bosomed, with blond hair, living in a small flat with a maid, walking in the Park with a Pekinese, motoring with a Jewish stock-broker. With a fierce appetite for food and drink, when all other appetite is gone, all other appetite gone except the insatiable increasing appetite of vanity; rolling on two wide legs, rolling in motorcars, rolling toward a diabetic end in a seaside watering place.”

“Just now you saw that bright flame burning itself out,” said Appleplex, “now you see it guttering thickly, which proves that your vision was founded on imagination, not on feeling. And the passion for experience—have you remained so impregnably Pre-Raphaelite as to believe in that? What real person, with the genuine resources of instinct, has ever believed in the passion for experience? The passion for experience is a criticism of the sincere, a creed only of the histrionic. The passionate person is passionate about this or that, perhaps about the least significant things, but not about experience. But Marius, des Esseintes, Edith . . .”

“But consider,” said Eeldrop, attentive only to the facts of Edith’s history, and perhaps missing the point of Appleplex’s remarks, “her unusual career. The daughter of a piano tuner in Honolulu, she secured a scholarship at the University of California, where she graduated with Honors in Social Ethics. She then married a celebrated billiard professional in San Francisco, after an acquaintance of twelve hours, lived with him for two days, joined a musical comedy chorus, and was divorced in Nevada. She turned up several years later in Paris and was known to all the Americans and English at the Café du Dome as Mrs. Short. She reappeared in London as Mrs. Griffiths,

published a small volume of verse, and was accepted in several circles known to us. And now, as I still insist, she has disappeared from society altogether."

"The memory of Scheherazade," said Appleplex, "is to me that of Bird's custard and prunes in a Bloomsbury boarding house. It is not my intention to represent Edith as merely disreputable. Neither is she a tragic figure. I want to know why she misses. I cannot altogether analyze her 'into a combination of known elements' but I fail to touch anything definitely unanalyzable."

"Is Edith, in spite of her romantic past, pursuing steadily some hidden purpose of her own? Are her migrations and eccentricities the sign of some unguessed consistency? I find in her a quantity of shrewd observation, an excellent fund of criticism, but I cannot connect them into any peculiar vision. Her sarcasm at the expense of her friends is delightful, but I doubt whether it is more than an attempt to mold herself from outside, by the impact of hostilities, to emphasize her isolation. Everyone says of her, 'How perfectly impenetrable!' I suspect that within there is only the confusion of a dusty garret."

"I test people," said Eeldrop, "by the way in which I imagine them as waking up in the morning. I am not drawing upon memory when I imagine Edith waking to a room strewn with clothes, papers, cosmetics, letters and a few books, the smell of *Violettes de Parme* and stale tobacco. The sunlight beating in through broken blinds, and broken blinds keeping out the sun until Edith can compel herself to attend to another day. Yet the vision does not give me much pain. I think of her as an artist without the slightest artistic power."

"The artistic temperament—" began Appleplex.

"No, not that." Eeldrop snatched away the opportunity. "I mean that what holds the artist together is the work which he does; separate him from his work and he either disintegrates or solidifies. There is no interest in the artist apart from his work. And there are, as you said, those people who provide material for the artist. Now Edith's poem 'To Atthis' proves beyond the shadow of a doubt that she is not an artist. On the other hand I have often thought of her, as I thought this evening, as presenting possibilities for poetic purposes. But the people who can be material for art must have in them something unconscious, something which they do not fully realize or understand. Edith, in spite of what is called her impenetrable mask, presents herself too well. I cannot use her; she uses herself too

fully. Partly for the same reason, I think, she fails to be an artist: she does not live at all upon instinct. The artist is part of him a drifter, at the mercy of impressions, and another part of him allows this to happen for the sake of making use of the unhappy creature. But in Edith the division is merely the rational, the cold and detached part of the artist, itself divided. Her material, her experience, that is, is already a mental product, already digested by reason. Hence Edith (I only at this moment arrive at understanding) is really the most orderly person in existence, and the most rational. Nothing ever happens to her; everything that happens is her own doing."

"And hence also," continued Appleplex, catching up the thread, "Edith is the least detached of all persons, since to be detached is to be detached from one's self, to stand by and criticize coldly one's own passions and vicissitudes. But in Edith the critic is coaching the combatant."

"Edith is not unhappy."

"She is dissatisfied, perhaps."

"But again I say, she is not tragic: she is too rational. And in her career there is no progression, no decline or degeneration. Her condition is once and for always. There is and will be no catastrophe."

"But I am tired. I still wonder what Edith and Mrs. Howexden have in common. This invites the consideration (you may not perceive the connection) of Sets and Society, a subject which we can pursue tomorrow night."

Appleplex looked a little embarrassed. "I am dining with Mrs. Howexden," he said. "But I will reflect upon the topic before I see you again."³

T. S. ELIOT

NOTES

1. Except for his stories in the *Smith Academy Record* (1905), this is TSE's only piece of prose fiction. "On the Eve: A Dialogue" (1925), published under TSE's name, was actually written by Vivien Eliot, with slight assistance from her husband (2.572). "Eeldrop and Appleplex," solicited by Pound for his premiere number as the foreign editor of the *Little Review*, was TSE's first contribution to that magazine. Founded by Margaret C. Anderson in Chicago in 1914, the *Little Review* incorporated its manifesto into its subtitle—"A Magazine of the Arts / Making No Compromise with the Public Taste." As a publisher of experimental writers, including Joyce, it endured repeated censorship until it closed in 1929. As this story was written for an American audience and never reprinted in an English periodical, the text printed here has been edited to conform to American usage.

2. Part I of this story ended here, with the announcement: "(Next chapter in June number)"; Part II, however, had not been completed as of 23 Sept, when TSE wrote to Pound, who was pressuring him: "Forgive me . . . Weaver on my path . . . & Appleplex on the brain" (*LI* 220). Although TSE's name was given correctly in the heading of Part I, it was given as "T. H. Eliot"

in the heading of Part II. The contents on the cover page of the issue for Part II give a subtitle for the story: "The Passion for Experience."

3. On 29 May 1964, in response to a letter from Jackson Bryer, Valerie Eliot confirmed on TSE's behalf that Pound had originally solicited the piece: "Mr. Eliot thinks that he may at that time have had some idea of continuing the dialogue and does not know why it remained a single fragment. On re-reading the fragment some years later it seemed to him an inferior piece of work and he never cared to reprint it." "I have been thinking of Eeldrop & Appleplex again," TSE wrote to co-editor Jane Heap on 3 Oct 1923, in reply to her query about expansion. "If I have time I may do a few this winter. But concentration, not diffusion, is marked out for me" (UW-M). When Margaret Anderson proposed to reprint it in *The Little Review Anthology* (1953), TSE objected to its inclusion. As it was out of copyright, however, it was included, without Anderson's knowledge, by the publisher's editor, Gorham Munson. TSE refused Gorham's courtesy payment on grounds that acceptance could be construed as authorization. Pound wrote to Anderson: "Mr Elyump allus threataded Axshun if anybuddy reprinted Eeldrop but praps he wunt never found out yu dunnit. It has entertained several readers unborn at date of initial pubctn." She replied: "Eliot was always wonderful to the L.R. –the least I could have done for him would have been to respect his wishes. I'm sorry that Munson didn't see fit to tell me." See *Pound / The Little Review: The Letters of Ezra Pound to Margaret Anderson*, ed. Thomas L. Scott and Melvin J. Friedman (New York: New Directions, 1988), 303-04, 322-23.

President Wilson

An unsigned review of *President Wilson, His Problems and His Policy: An English View*, by H. Wilson Harris

London: Headley Brothers, 1917. Pp. 278.¹

The New Statesman, 9 (12 May 1917) 140

Mr. Harris's book is a book of the moment, and it has the kind of merits which a book of the moment ought to have. Written for the British reader, it will provide him in the space of an hour or two with the sediment of information which would be likely to remain in the mind of an average American after a dozen years of newspaper scanning. Very wisely, Mr. Harris has not attempted any character-study or portrait of the President, but has contented himself with a rapid cinematograph view of those public events in which Woodrow Wilson is "featured."² Except that the Tariff receives a lesser place than that which it holds in the mind of the American newspaper reader, the proportions preserved are about the same—as is shown by the length at which the Presidential Election is described.³ As a digest of newspaper information, the book is compact, well-planned and agreeable; if it does not really enable the English reader to understand American politics, it at least enables him to understand them as well as most Americans do, and a more analytic or profounder explanation is not within the book's province.

The easiest part of Mr. Harris's task must have been the preparation of the chapter on President Wilson's activities as President of Princeton University. Here is an episode in the President's career which ought to interest all of his admirers, as in this period took place a struggle in which Mr. Wilson was certainly right and was certainly defeated.⁴ If in dealing with the Mexican situation Mr. Harris leaves an impression of complete bewilderment as to whether the President was right or wrong, that is not Mr. Harris's fault, for it is precisely the impression left upon the majority of Americans by the events themselves.⁵ There are other passages in the book where we should have been grateful for a little more light, and where the truth is more nearly accessible; when we hear that the strike at the Rockefeller mines in Colorado in 1914 was settled by Mr. Wilson, we should like to

know how, and, more precisely, what the issues were;⁶ and we should have liked some conjecture as to the effect of Tariff Reform upon industry and the cost of living. On the other hand, the American party system—that system most difficult for a European to grasp—has received most adequate treatment at Mr. Harris's hands; he has summarised its history very neatly in a couple of pages; and yet, from the complexity of the subject, and its impossibility of comprehension in such a book, the system remains unexplained.

There are several peculiarities of American politics which the European reader must keep constantly in mind. The first is that American parties are very far from presenting a gentle gradation from Right to Left. In each of the two parties there is a Conservative and a Radical element. Mr. Harris mentions this fact, but without advancing the explanation, which is to a great extent one of space and of time. The space element means that men carry their politics, or their father's politics, to remote parts of the country, where widely different circumstances and interests develop a different political outlook under the same name; the time element means that the growth of the country has been so rapid that tradition and actual issues often fail to form an organic whole. This element is responsible for both odd archaisms and crude novelties, and for the absence of any clear political philosophies. Furthermore, the issue of one party to-day may be the issue of another party to-morrow. In the large industrial city of St. Louis, the chief Republican organ is the *Globe Democrat*, and the Democratic journal is the *Republican*. These names are merely accidental survivals of the original meanings, but they serve to indicate the confusion. Mr. Harris points out that the Democratic party is traditionally opposed to centralisation, but that no President has done more to strengthen the central Government than Mr. Wilson. This is one of the anomalies. But President Wilson has simply done what was inevitable under the circumstances, and cannot be accused of betraying his party. And when we look at the last Election map, and see the solid black block in the North-east which represents the Republican vote, we may wonder whether the doctrine of decentralisation may not next be adopted, as a measure of self-protection against a Southern and Western majority, by that party which thought that it had killed the doctrine in 1865. Another instance of stealing the Republicans' clothes is National Defence, a more recent policy of the President's.⁷ At the last Election the Republicans were so thoroughly dished that the only vital issue was Wilson himself.

A second fact which is most important in party politics, and which Mr. Harris barely mentions, is Race. The strongest anti-English elements are the Irish and the German; but the Irishman is almost uniformly a Democrat and the German a Republican. Men have sometimes voted the Republican ticket because they distrusted the Irish, or because they hated the Southerners, and the South is steadfastly Democratic. Not only in party politics, but in labour troubles, Race must not be overlooked. There is a vast difference between a strike of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and a strike of the illiterate, unskilled, almost unorganised South European mill hands in a factory town like Lawrence, Massachusetts.⁸ So far as class distinctions go, there is considerable actual democracy—but the existence of large undigested lumps of foreign races (and the lowest classes of these races) suggests that a not impossible future division will be one of *caste*.

Such considerations fall, of course, outside of Mr. Harris's purview, but they are suggested by the material which he provides, and the reader must remember that Mr. Harris has attempted only an outline sketch of journalistic facts. Even if he cannot make clear to us such riddles as the Mexican imbroglio or the Monroe Doctrine, his data are worth having.⁹ He devotes several chapters to foreign policy and the war. The book was written and set up before America's final decision, but few critics of President Wilson will deny that the Speech of April 2nd was the consummation, not the denial, of his policy throughout the last two years.¹⁰

Friends of an Anglo-American Alliance will be interested to know that Wilson's reforms at Princeton University were largely upon English lines, and that his theory of the relation of President and Cabinet has looked toward English models.

NOTES

1. TSE wrote to his mother after this review appeared: "As my proof had been sent to Ireland by mistake, it was not revised, and the form did not quite satisfy me. I often make substantial alterations in the proof" (*LI* 198). H. Wilson Harris (1883-1955), a journalist for the *London Daily News*, supported President Wilson's Fourteen Points and the League of Nations, and attended the peace conference in Paris as a diplomatic correspondent, later writing *The Peace in the Making* (1919).

2. Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) was educated at Princeton University, returned as a faculty member in 1890, and served as president from 1902 to 1910, when he became governor of New Jersey. In 1912, he was elected to the first of two terms as president of the United States. Under his leadership, the United States maintained neutrality in WWI until Apr 1917.

3. The loss of revenue from relaxed tariffs under the Underwood Tariff Act of 1913 led to the levying of a federal income tax for the first time.

4. Despite his success in curricular, pedagogical, and general education reforms at Princeton, Wilson's attempt to dissolve exclusive clubs was defeated by intense opposition and financial threats from alumni.

5. During the Mexican Revolution that began in 1910, before the beginning of his term of office, Wilson endeavored largely to maintain a policy of abstention, in the belief that aggressive intervention would lead to war, inevitable annexation, and the alienation of other republics in Latin America.

6. In 1914, a dispute at the Standard Oil Company's mines over recognition of union officials and the employment of nonunion labor forced Wilson to send federal troops to restore order before the matter was settled by his Commission of Investigation.

7. In a move to increase U.S. military preparedness, on 3 June 1916 Wilson signed the National Defense Act, which established the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) to prepare secondary school and college students for service and which brought the states' militias under federal control as the "National Guard," which he had the power to mobilize.

8. The threatened strike in 1916 of the four U.S. railway unions (brotherhoods) over their demand for an eight-hour day and other concessions was settled in their favor by Wilson legislation. The 1912 strike in Lawrence over a mill owner's decision to lower the wages of immigrant textile workers when a shortened workweek went into effect preceded Wilson's term, but a year later, the union collapsed and the workers' gains disappeared.

9. The Monroe Doctrine was the U.S. foreign policy proclaimed by President James Monroe in 1823 to restrain European powers from interfering in the Western Hemisphere. In extension of the doctrine, Wilson created a Pan-American alliance with Latin America, a move that shaped his policy against intervention in the Mexican War of Independence from Spain (1910-21).

10. Harris's book was published in the first week of Apr 1917, just as President Wilson delivered his speech, in a special session of Congress held on 2 Apr, calling for a declaration of war against Germany. In Feb 1917, TSE had written to his mother that he supported "with full sympathy" Wilson's decision to break off diplomatic relations with Germany (*LI* 175). He subsequently supported the declaration of war (*LI* 192) and Wilson's peace plan, only to become disillusioned by his diplomatic failures at the Versailles Peace Conference (*LI* 404).

The Borderline of Prose

The New Statesman, 9 (19 May 1917) 157-59

In the days when prosperous middle-class chimney-pieces were decorated with overmantels and flanked by tall jars of pampas grass; when knowing amateurs began to talk of Outamaro and Toyakuni;¹ in the days when Mrs. Pennell's friends found source of laughter in feeding peacocks with sponge-cake soaked in absinthe; when Mr. George Moore was wearing a sugarloaf hat with a flat brim;² then, or perhaps a little later; in the age of music-halls and cabmen's shelters; in the long-forgotten 'Nineties when sins were still scarlet, there appeared a little book called *Pastels in Prose*. It was mostly, if not altogether, translations from the French—from Ephraim Mikhaël, Judith Gautier, Mallarmé, and many less-remembered names. This book introduced to the English reader the Prose-Poem.³

It was after the time when Gautier had written the *Symphonie en blanc majeur*, and Whistler had painted symphonies in various colours, and programme music was not unknown.⁴ So that several serious critics took alarm at the confusion of the genres, cried out upon an age of decadence and charlatanism. Charlatanism, no doubt, still exists; but decadence is far decayed; and it is now a little late to assume this motherly perturbation. Time has left us many things, but among those it has taken away we may hope to count *À rebours*,⁵ and the *Divagations*, and the writings of miscellaneous prose poets. They may eventually find refuge in that repository of indiscretions—the North Room of the British Museum—but to the general public they are no great loss.⁶ A considerable body of poetry has been proved worth saving; the rest is already forgotten; Dorian Gray has fled to Germany, where a cigarette has been named after him;^{7*} and the 'Nineties' aesthetic eccentricities may now be ignored.

But in our times the cycles of change recur very quickly. I have remarked recently a recrudescence of the poem in prose—not only in France, but in England; not only in England, but in America; perhaps not only in America, England, and France, for the tide of civilisation may now have carried it in the wake of Strindberg and Ibsen to the shores of Japan.⁸ It is noticeable that poetry which looks like prose, and prose which sounds like poetry, are assured of a certain degree of odium and success. Why should this be so? I

know that the difference between poetry and prose is a topic for school debating societies, but I am not aware that the debating societies have arrived at a solution. Do the present signs show that poetry and prose form a medium of infinite gradations, or is it that we are searching for new ways of expression? There are doubtless many empirical generalisations which one may draw from a study of existing poetry and prose, but after much reflection I conclude that the only absolute distinction to be drawn is that poetry is written in verse, and prose is written in prose; or, in other words, that there is prose rhythm and verse rhythm. And any other essential difference is still to seek.

When I refer to recent prose poetry I am not thinking of either Paul Fort or Walt Mason. The former, I know, is the King of Poets; and the latter, I am informed, commands the highest rates of payment. Nor have I in mind Claudel.⁹ These writers may have done prose poems; but, on the other hand, what they have done is possibly neither prose nor poetry.^{10*} If I am thinking of one writer more than another, it is of a poet who has done interesting work in what is unfairly called *vers libre*, who has distinguished himself by a genuine passion for the Hellenic, and even more for the Sicilian, a poet of whom I have lately seen some prose poems—Mr. Richard Aldington.¹¹

Now, reverting for a moment to the 'Nineties, it must be observed that the prose poetry of this epoch was probably based upon the work of a man much greater than any poet then living—and that is Arthur Rimbaud. Few people in England have heard of the *Illuminations*, and most of them perhaps believe that the title indicates a supposed divine insight, instead of meaning simply "Picture-book illustrations." Rimbaud, who I suspect is responsible for everything that is good in Verlaine, wrote his prose poems between 1872 and 1875.¹² They are short prose pieces, as obscure as *Kubla Khan* or *Christabel* and of a similar inspiration.¹³ They are amazingly convincing, and their prose is good French prose. Their curious precision, their perfect cogency in the choice and juxtaposition of images, their evident sincerity (as if rising immediately and unreflectingly from the core of the man's feeling), these qualities give them a position unique in French literature, and in English nearer to Coleridge and Blake than to anyone else. Beside the prose of Rimbaud, the laboured opacity of Mallarmé fades colourless and dead.

The *Illuminations* attain their effect by an instant and simple impression, a unity all the more convincing because of the apparent incongruity

of images. They find their proper expression in prose because they seem to have come to their author already clothed in that form; just as Dante's account of the Aristotelian soul is right in verse, because it seems to have come to the author in that form;¹⁴ and Dante is not "prosaic," nor would Rimbaud be more "poetic" if he had put his visions into verse. Just here is the problem. Mr. Aldington's prose poems, delicately handled, yet seem to hesitate between two media. They are more truly "prose poems" than those of Rimbaud, which were, in form, pure prose. There is a prose arbitrariness and a verse arbitrariness; whichever we are writing, there are moments when we simply have to conform to the limitations of the medium we have chosen; there is a verse monotone and a prose monotone, and success in either verse or prose consists in the most skilful variations of music, all the while we never allow this ground-monotone to become entirely inaudible. Mr. Aldington seems to me to be avoiding the limitations of either poetry or prose; to use either when he wishes; and so to lose the necessary articulation of the rhythm:

For my sake Eos in a cloudless sky gliding from the many-isled sea must be more tender and more thrilling; for my sake the scent of ripe apples in the dim-gold autumn must be keener and more odorous; for my sake the music of Pindar and Theocritus must be more stately, more flower-like, more melancholy sweet; for my sake the ecstasy of love must be sharper, wilder; for my sake you must be more beautiful, more alert, more delicate.¹⁵

I submit that, if this is read as prose, it is found jerky and fatiguing, because there is a verse rhythm in it; and that, if read as verse, it will be found worrying, because of the presence of prose rhythms.

"For my sake Eos in a cloudless sky gliding from the many-isled sea"—is verse, but what immediately follows—"must be more tender and more thrilling"—is prose (aside from the fact that "thrilling" is a word more suitable to prose than to poetry). And so one finds oneself constantly *trying* to read the prose poem as prose or as verse—and failing in both attempts. And then one goes on to imagine how it would have been done in verse or in prose—which is what a writer ought never to allow us to do. He should never let us question for a moment that his form is the inevitable form for his content. This inevitableness is the important thing. The moment we think of poetry as prose, or of prose as poetry, the artist's success is lost. Often, indeed, we derive a peculiar pleasure from seeing something done

well in one form which we had thought necessarily confined to the other. We admire Pope because he has sometimes given impeccable and inevitable verse form to the “prosaic,” and so has made (whatever the nineteenth century may have said) permanent poetry. We admire several prose writers because they have given impeccable and inevitable prose form to what we had supposed limited to verse. There could be no prose equivalent for *The Rape of the Lock*. There could be no verse equivalent for *Madame Bovary* or *Bubu de Montparnasse*.¹⁶

We infer that to call prose “poetic” or verse “prosaic” does not mean that the prose is aspiring to verse or that the verse would be any less contemptible in prose. Let me take, for instance, some example of prose which would be called poetic:

We know that gentians grow on the Alps, and olives on the Apennines; but we do not enough conceive for ourselves that variegated mosaic of the world’s surface which a bird sees in its migration, that difference between the district of the gentian and of the olive which the stork and the swallow see far off, as they lean upon the sirocco wind.¹⁷

This is “poetic” enough; but it is pure prose. And here is a passage which no one would think of transcribing into verse; but which is equally poetic:

In him I took leave of my first college, Trinity, which was so dear to me, and which held on its foundation so many who have been kind to me both when I was a boy, and all through my Oxford life. Trinity had never been unkind to me. There used to be much snap-dragon growing on the walls opposite my freshman’s rooms there, and I had for years taken it as an emblem of my own perpetual residence even unto death in my University.¹⁸

And lastly, here is a passage from an author whom I should not hesitate to classify with Ruskin and Newman as a master of the English language; a passage which occurs in a work entitled *Principles of Logic*, and therefore not likely to be found by seekers of the poetic, but which owes its merit to somewhat the same quality which the others have:

That the glory of this world in the end is appearance leaves the world more glorious, if we can feel it is a show of some fuller splendour; but the sensuous curtain is a deception and a cheat, if it hides some colourless movement of atoms, some spectral woof of impalpable abstractions, or unearthly ballet of bloodless categories.¹⁹

I have purposely avoided Pater's "Mona Lisa"—because I am not sure that it is good prose.²⁰

By "poetic" we often refer vaguely to a quality which may be equally desirable in poetry or prose, but which may not always be desirable in either.

This is so obvious as not to seem to be worth the stating. But the consequences are not always drawn. "All the arts *approach* the condition of music."²¹ Yes! but not by being less themselves. Mallarmé, when we do not know what he is talking about, is not necessarily so musical as Dante discussing theology or astronomy in a very intelligent way. The titles used by Gautier or Whistler should not be taken too seriously, or made into a theory of aesthetics. We are not to say that poetry is nearer to music than prose, and that therefore *a fortiori* prose approaches the condition of poetry. The distinction between poetry and prose must be a technical distinction; and future refinement of both poetry and prose can only draw the distinction more clearly. And I cannot help thinking that Mr. Aldington's prose poems (and I allow them great merit) fail exactly because they seek to evade the technical distinction between two forms. Both verse and prose still conceal unexplored possibilities, but whatever one writes must be definitely and by inner necessity either one or the other.

T. S. ELIOT

NOTES

1. The first part of this sentence contains a catalog of cultural markers of the 1890s: gilt overmantel mirrors, jars of pampas grass, and all things Japanese. Japonism, which began with aesthetes such as Dante G. Rossetti and James McNeill Whistler, had spread by the 1890s into the larger Victorian culture. Among the most popular Japanese artists were the printmakers Kitagawa Utamaro (1753-1806) (TSE uses the romanized spelling) and Utagawa Toyokuni (1769-1825) (also spelled Toyakuni), whose woodblock color prints, or *Ukiyo-ye* ("Mirror of the Passing World"), depicted actors, courtesans, and beautiful women from teahouses.

2. Elizabeth Robins Pennell (1855-1936) was an American writer who moved in London literary and artistic circles. In her memoir, *Nights: Rome & Venice in the Aesthetic Eighties, London & Paris in the Fighting Nineties* (London: Lippincott, 1916), she recalls the gaiety of the English group present in a Parisian café for Henry Harland's "experiment of feeding a peacock on cake steeped in absinthe . . . it struck us, in our deplorable frivolity, as humorous at the time . . . the cake stuck, a conspicuous lump, in the peacock's conspicuous throat . . . But the peacock . . . reeled away to swallow the lump and, I hope, to sleep off his debauch" (265). The Irish writer George Moore originally planned to become an artist and spent the 1870s in Paris among bohemian artists and writers, as recounted in his *Confessions of a Young Man* (1886).

3. *Pastels in Prose*, a collection of prose poems translated by Stuart Merrill (New York: Harper, 1890), included Éphraïm Mikhaël (1866-1890), who died of tuberculosis at age twenty-

four but whose poems were among the foundations of the French symbolist movement; the poet and historical novelist Judith Gautier (1845-1917), daughter of Théophile Gautier; and Stéphane Mallarmé (1842-98), leader of the French symbolists, who published his prose poems in *Divagations* (1897).

4. The prose poem of Théophile Gautier (1811-72), "Symphonie en blanc majeur," first appeared in the *Revue de deux mondes* in 1849 and from 1852 in his *Émaux et camées*. Introduced to Gautier's poetry in 1917 by Pound, TSE possessed a copy of the *Édition définitive* (Paris: Bibliothèque-Charpentier, 1916). The American artist James McNeill Whistler (1834-1903), a key figure in British aestheticism, painted *Symphony in White*, Nos. I, II, III from 1862 to 1867 and *Symphony in Blue and Pink* in 1868.

5. Huysmans's novel *À rebours* (1884) catalogs the extravagant tastes, habits, and inner life of its reclusive aesthete, Des Esseintes (104, n. 22).

6. In the 1830s, the British Museum Library established in the North Library the segregated, locked, and highly restrictive "Private Case" collection of erotic and pornographic literature, having determined that young men should not be allowed to read or share improper books, especially those with illustrations. As the collection grew, applications were scrutinized for purpose and qualification, access was limited to research specialists, and books were read under supervision near the issue desk. Not until the mid-1960s were the shelf marks included in the General Catalogue.

7*. TSE's note: "This was in 1910. Possibly the name has been altered." Dorian Gray is the main character in Oscar Wilde's novel, *The Picture of Dorian Gray* (1891).

8. The plays of the Swede August Strindberg (1849-1912) and the Norwegian Henrik Ibsen (1828-1906) were part of the vanguard of Western literature and culture invading Japan at the end of the nineteenth century.

9. In July 1912, the symbolist poet Paul Fort (1872-1960) had been elected "Prince of Poets" in Paris by his peers, as much for service to poetry as for achievement. A founder of the Théâtre d'Art and of the literary review *Vers et Prose*, he published thirty volumes, all entitled *Ballades françaises* (1897-1924), in which he printed his stanzas as prose paragraphs. The American journalist Walt Mason (1862-1939) published prose poems daily for the *Emporia Gazette* (Kansas), whose editor deemed him "the poet laureate of American democracy." Author of such volumes as *Rhymes on the Range* (1910) and *Walt Mason's Business Prose Poems* (1911), he was read in more than 200 newspapers in the United States and Canada. The French poet and diplomat Paul Claudel (1868-1955) published a collection of sixty-two prose poems in *Connaissance de l'Est* (*The East I Knew*, 1914), written while he was a vice-consul in the Far East from 1890 to 1905. Introduced to the work by Alain-Fournier in Paris in 1910, TSE included it on the reading list for his Extension course on Modern French Literature, where he described Claudel as "a writer of great force and great influence," but one who "often falls into rhetoric and verbiage" (474).

10*. TSE's note: "Except certainly Claudel's *Connaissance de l'Est*. There is no doubt that this is very fine prose."

11. Two prose poems by Aldington, "Thanatos" and "Hermes-of-the-Dead," had appeared in the *Little Review*, vol 3 (Mar 1917), 10-11, followed by an editorial announcement that the poems "were sent to us from the trenches" (17). They appeared later the same year in a limited edition of his *The Love of Myrrine and Konallis and Other Prose Poems*. In May, after Aldington had departed for military service, TSE replaced him as assistant editor of the *Egoist* (L1 179).

12. In 1871, the symbolist poet Paul Verlaine (1844-96) initiated a sexual liaison with the younger poet Arthur Rimbaud (1854-91). Abandoning his wife and child, Verlaine fled with Rimbaud to London, where Rimbaud wrote a series of prose poems, some using the content of his absinthe-induced visions. In 1886, more than a decade after their relationship had ended, Verlaine published and introduced Rimbaud's *Illuminations*, making him famous. TSE owned copies of Rimbaud's *Œuvres* (Paris: Mercure de France, 1909) and Verlaine's *Choix de poésies* (Paris: Bibliothèque-Charpentier, 1908).

13. Drug-related visions informed a few poems of Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834), including his dreamlike fragments of 1816, "Kubla Khan" and "Christabel."

14. Marco Lombardo's discourse on the soul, marked in TSE's copy (Houghton), is in *Purgatorio* XVI.85-96: "From his hands who fondly loves her ere she is in being, there issues, after the fashion of a little child that sports, now weeping, now laughing, the simple, tender soul, who knoweth naught save that, sprung from a joyous maker, willingly she turneth to that which delights her. First she tastes the savour of a trifling good; there she is beguiled and runneth after it, if guide or curb turn not her love aside. Wherefore 'twas needful to put law as a curb, needful to have a ruler who might discern at least the tower of the true city" (*DC2* 197). This passage is paraphrased in the opening lines of TSE's "Animula."

15. Aldington, "Hermes-of-the-Dead": fifth of seven verse paragraphs.

16. Pope's mock-epic *The Rape of the Lock* (1714) first appeared anonymously in *Lintot's Miscellany* in 1712. The French novelists Gustave Flaubert (1821-80) and Charles-Louis Phillipe (1874-1909) published, respectively, *Madame Bovary* in 1857 and *Bubu de Montparnasse* in 1901. In a preface to Laurence Vail's translation of the latter (Paris: Crosby, 1932), TSE recalled: "it was in the year 1910, that I first read *Bubu de Montparnasse*, when I came first to Paris. Read at an impressionable age, . . . the book has always been for me . . . a symbol of the Paris of that time. . . . to me *Bubu* stood for Paris as some of Dickens' novels stand for London" (vii-viii).

17. The Victorian critic John Ruskin (1819-1900) includes this description in "The Nature of Gothic" in *The Stones of Venice* (vol 2, 1853), 156.

18. John Henry Cardinal Newman (1801-90), English churchman and leader of the Oxford Movement, concludes chapter four of his intellectual biography *Apologia pro Vita Sua* (1864) with a description of parting from his friends and his undergraduate tutor, Dr. Ogle.

19. Bradley, *The Principles of Logic* (1883), Book III.ii, Chapter IV, 533, in TSE's edition.

20. In the "Lionardo da Vinci" chapter of *Studies in the History of the Renaissance* (1873), which was renamed in the second and later editions *The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry* (1873), Pater gives his "impressions" of *La Giocanda* ("Mona Lisa"). TSE's marked copy of the 1873 edition is at King's.

21. Pater's declaration in "The School of Giorgione" chapter of *The Renaissance*: "All art constantly aspires towards the condition of music."

James Joyce and His Critics: Some Classified Comments¹

The Egoist, 4 (June 1917) 74

CAUTION: It is very difficult to know quite what to say about this new book by Mr. Joyce—*Literary World* [London].

DRAINS: Mr. Joyce is a clever novelist, but we feel he would be really at his best in a treatise on drains—*Everyman* [London].

CLEAN-MINDEDNESS: This pseudo-autobiography of Stephen Dedalus, a weakling and a dreamer, makes fascinating reading . . . No clean-minded person could possibly allow it to remain within reach of his wife, his sons or daughters.—*Irish Book Lover* [Dublin].

OPPORTUNITIES OF DUBLIN: If one must accuse Mr. Joyce of anything, it is that he too wilfully ignores the opportunities which Dublin offers even to a Stephen Dedalus. . . . He has undoubtedly failed to bring out the undeniable superiority of many features of life in the capital He is as blind to the charm of its situation as to the stirrings of literary and civic consciousness which give an interest and zest to social and political intercourse.—*New Ireland* [Dublin].

BEAUTY: There is much in the book to offend a good many varieties of readers, and little compensating beauty.—*New York Globe*.

The most obvious thing about the book is its beauty.—*New Witness* [London].

STYLE: It is possible that the author intends to write a sequel to the story. If so, he might acquire a firmer, more coherent and more lucid style by a study of Flaubert, Daudet, Thackeray and Thomas Hardy.²—*Rochester* (New York) *Post-Express*.

The occasional lucid intervals in which one glimpses imminent setting forth of social elements and forces in Dublin, only to be disappointed, are similar to the eye or ear which appears in futurist portraits, but proves the more bewildering because no other recognizable feature is to be discerned among the chaos.—*Bellman* (U.S.A. [Minneapolis]).

[Editor's Note: In the sentence quoted above, "lucid intervals" is to be parsed with "are similar" and "eye or ear" with "proves." The adjective "recognizable" is apparently pleonastic.]³

REALISM: It is a ruthless, relentless essay in realism.—*Southport Guardian* [England].

To put the literary form of rude language in a book makes some authors feel realistic.—*Manchester Weekly Times*.

Mr. Joyce aims at being realistic, but his method is too chaotic to produce the effect of realism.—*Rochester* (New York) *Post-Express*.

Its realism will displease many.—*Birmingham Post*.

Mr. Joyce is unsparing in his realism, and his violent contrasts—the brothel, the confessional—jar on one's finer feelings.—*Irish Book Lover*.

The description of life in a Jesuit school, and later in a Dublin college, strikes one as being absolutely true to life—but what a life!—*Everyman*.

WISDOM: Is it even wise, from a worldly point of view—mercenary, if you will—to dissipate one's talents on a book which can only attain a limited circulation?—*Irish Book Lover*.

ADVANTAGES OF IRISH EDUCATION: One boy from Clongowes School is not a replica of all the other boys. I will reintroduce Mr. Wells to half a dozen Irish “old boys” of whom five—Sir Arthur Conan Doyle is one—were educated at Roman Catholic schools and have nevertheless become most conventional citizens of the Empire.⁴—*Sphere* [London].

COMPARISON WITH OTHER IRISH AUTHORS: The book is not within a hundred miles of being as fine a work of art as *Limehouse Nights*, the work of another young Irishman.⁵—*Sphere*.

There are a good many talented young Irish writers to-day, and it will take a fellow of exceptional literary stature to tower above Lord Dunsany, for example, or James Stephens.⁶—*New York Globe*.

IMAGINATION: He shows an astonishingly un-Celtic absence of imagination and humour.—*Bellman* (U.S.A.).

RELIGION: The irreverent treatment of religion in the story must be condemned.—*Rochester* (New York) *Post-Express*.

TRUTH: It is an accident that Mr. Joyce's book should have Dublin as its background.—*Freeman's Journal* (Dublin).

He is justified, in so far as too many Dubliners are of the calibre described in this and the preceding volume.—*New Ireland*.

NOTES

1. “Eliot is doing a June *Egoist* on ‘What the fools have said of Joyce,’” Pound wrote to John Quinn on 17 May. “I don't know that that is the title, but it's the subject” (*EP/JQ* 116). TSE was appointed assistant editor of the *Egoist* in June, simultaneously with its publication of *Prufrock*

and Other Observations. The *Egoist* had serialized *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, the first novel by James Joyce (1882-1941), from Feb 1914 to Sept 1915. Since no English publisher would accept it, it was first published in America by B. W. Huebsch in Dec 1916, making it possible for the *Egoist* to print it from American sheets. Patricia Hutchins erroneously attributed this piece to Pound when she printed it in her *James Joyce's World* (London: Methuen, 1957), 111-12.

No attempt has been made to trace the dates or accuracy of the review snippets, evidently provided by the *Egoist's* clipping service.

2. Alphonse Daudet (1840-97), a member of Flaubert's circle and author of *Fromont jeune et Risler aîné* (1874).

3. TSE's bracketed aside.

4. The science fiction writer H. G. Wells (1866-1946) was known at this time for novels of middle-class life, such as *The History of Mr. Polly* (1910); Arthur Conan Doyle (1859-1930), creator and chronicler of Sherlock Holmes, entered the Jesuit preparatory school, Hodder Place, Stonyhurst, at age nine and later attended Stonyhurst College.

5. *Limehouse Nights* (1916), by the English (not Irish) author Thomas Burke (1886-1945), is a collection of stories dealing with life in the poverty-stricken Limehouse district of London.

6. Edward Plunkett (1878-1957), 18th Baron of Dunsany, wrote more than eighty novels and plays. James Stephens (1882-1950), a member of Joyce's circle, wrote three novels, of which the most popular was *Crock of Gold* (1912).

To the Editor of *The Nation*¹

The Nation, 21 (23 June 1917) 299

Sir—I enclose herewith an extract from a letter lately received from a young officer which I hope may interest some of your readers. I may add that the officer in question entered the Army directly from a public school, and began his service in the trenches before he was nineteen.²—Yours, etc.,

T. S. ELIOT

18, Crawford Mansions, Crawford Street, W. 1.

June 17th, 1917.

“June 8th, 1917.

“DEAR —, —There is rather a good article in *The Nation* this last week called ‘On Leave.’³ You should read it. I have often heard it said that the curious thing about those who have been to the front is their complete indifference. They appear to be practically untouched by what they have seen and gone through, they talk of war in a callous and humorous way, they even joke about its horrors. The impression one has from them is that it is, on the whole, a dreary and unpleasant business, with its anxious moments and its bright moments, but not nearly such a hell as one really knows it to be.

“In the case of the vast majority, however, this is an attitude, a screen—I speak of educated, thinking men—and it is not granted to many who have not shared the same experiences to see behind this screen. The reason for this, as the article points out, is the practical impossibility of the uninitiated to realize or imagine even dimly the actual conditions of war. And a man who has been through it and seen and taken part to the unspeakable tragedies that are the ordinary routine, feels that he has something, possesses something, which others can never possess.

“It is morally impossible for him to talk seriously of these things to people who cannot even approach comprehension. It is hideously exasperating to hear people talking the glib commonplaces about the war and distributing cheap sympathy to its victims.

“Perhaps you are tempted to give them a picture of a leprous earth, scattered with the swollen and blackening corpses of hundreds of young men. The appalling stench of rotting carrion mingled with the sickening smell of

exploded lyddite and ammonal. Mud like porridge, trenches like shallow and sloping cracks in the porridge—porridge that stinks in the sun. Swarms of flies and bluebottles clustering on pits of offal. Wounded men lying in the shell holes among the decaying corpses: helpless under the scorching sun and bitter nights, under repeated shelling. Men with bowels dropping out, lungs shot away, with blinded, smashed faces, or limbs blown into space. Men screaming and gibbering. Wounded men hanging in agony on the barbed wire, until a friendly spout of liquid fire shrivels them up like a fly in a candle. But these are only words, and probably only convey a fraction of their meaning to their hearers. They shudder, and it is forgotten. . . .

“I need hardly say that on a great number of men war does not produce this effect; of these the old regular officer is a type—blunt, kindly, jolly good fellows—who have never stopped to think in their lives.”

NOTES

1. This letter, one of a series from the trenches published in the *Nation*, was printed under the editorial title “WAR.”

2. The letter enclosed by TSE was from his brother-in-law, Maurice Haigh-Wood (1896–1980), who had attended Sandhurst Military Academy, where at age nineteen he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the 2nd Battalion, Manchester Regiment, Lincolnshire, on 11 May 1915. Invalided home in Sept 1916, he wrote to TSE from Lincolnshire before returning to the war. In a letter to his mother of 18 Nov 1915, TSE described Haigh-Wood’s experiences on the Western Front: “It seems very strange that a boy of nineteen should have such experiences—often twelve hours alone in his ‘dug-out’ in the trenches, and at night, when he cannot sleep, occupying himself by shooting rats with a revolver. What he tells about rats and vermin is incredible—Northern France is swarming, and the rats are as big as cats” (*LI* 132).

3. In the *Nation* of 2 June 1917, H. M. Tomlinson describes the unreality of London as seen by a soldier on leave from the front: “The greatest evil of war—this is what staggers you when you come home, feeling you know the worst of it—is the unconscious indifference to war’s obscene blasphemy against life of the men and women who have the assurance that they will never be called to experience it” (220–21).

The Letters of J. B. Yeats¹

A review of *Passages from the Letters of John Butler Yeats*

Selected by Ezra Pound

Dundrum: Cuala Press, 1917. Pp. [iv] + 60.

The Egoist, 4 (July 1917) 89-90

If the usual person asks the usual question about the decay of letter-writing, he is met with the usual vague and unsatisfactory answer referring him to telephones, rapid transit, and the rush of modern life. The lack of leisure is deplored; lack of leisure being an excuse for laziness. What lack of leisure really means in modern life is that an able writer like D. H. Lawrence lacks time to write one good novel in ten years, but will find time to write five or ten bad ones in that period;² that no one has time to write good letters for the pleasure of one friend, but that Mr. S. P. B. Mais has time to write garrulous and hasty epistolary novels for the subscribers to the *Times* Book Club.³ Mr. J. B. Yeats is a highly civilized man; and he has the kingdom of leisure within him. Leisure for Mr. Yeats means writing well even when not writing for publication: writing with dignity and ease and reserve. And letter-writing for him means the grace and urbanity of the talker and the depth of the solitary; it means a resolute return to a few important issues, not ceaseless loquacity about novelties.

Mr. Pound, in one of his most charming prefaces, fears that he has by selection lost the personality of the writer.⁴ But the personality of Mr. Yeats survives the test. It is a severe test too, which few letter-writers could pass; for none of the selections owes anything to trivial personal gossip or contemporaneity; and though Mr. Yeats deals mostly with eternal things, never obtruding himself into his reflections, he never drops into the dead Epictetian sententiousness.⁵ Even in selections (for these are selections from letters, not selected letters) he is always the solitary man talking for one listener. Perhaps New York, encircling the writer with loneliness, has done him a service.⁶ Mr. Yeats could do New York a service, if New York would listen, but America will probably succeed in shutting its ears, as it always can, to what it does not care to hear. There are many criticisms of America, and at the present time, when the dust of Social Reconstruction, Empire Resources

Development, and other Reform is in our eyes, when England seems drifting toward Americanization, it is well to hear what Mr. Yeats has to say:

The philosophical world in America is just now possessed by the theory of service. Man exists to serve is their idea, and it is an idea so easy to understand, and so amicable and attractive, that it appeals to a Democracy that is at once shallow-minded and sentimental.

The idea of service recognizes only two types of men: he who would rule and he who would be ruled. I hotly and fiercely contend that there is another type, *the man who does not want to rule or to be ruled*, and *that this is the man who writes the poetry*, the other sort doing the rhetoric. [14]

No American of those I have met or heard has ever felt the inward and innermost essence of poetry, because it is not among the American opportunities to live the solitary life, they all frequent the highways and high roads. It is implicitly and even *explicitly* an offence to steal away into by-ways and thickets. [19]

The Americans are the most idealistic and imaginative people in the world, and the most prosaic, because, like Wordsworth, the most prosaic of poets, they believe in happiness, and happiness to them as to Wordsworth means *mens sana in corpore sano*;⁷ every one efficient in the tasks of modern life, the least heroic of doctrines. [31]⁸

"In America they make war on solitude" [47], Mr. Yeats says, and solitude to him is the most precious of gifts or curses, because it is indispensable to poetry. "Democracy *devours* its poets and artists" [9]. Against democracy, Mr. Yeats sets up the ideal—or rather the instinct—of liberty, known to [the] English, unknown to the social French, Germans, and Americans. Ideals and noble theories, he says with profound truth, are "the enemy plucking the unit man . . . out of his sublime solitude to place him in this or that fraternity" [3].

I will write again of the solitary man. First of all, alone among men, he is himself and only himself. The companionable man is himself and someone else, seeking expression through the medium of prose or action, thinking of other people and therefore always leaning towards compromise and for that reason working in a spirit of insincerity. Poetry is the voice of the solitary, as resonant and as pure and lonely as the song of the lark at sunrise. [39]

It is only in England, Mr. Yeats thinks, that in the modern world poetry is possible. He is, perhaps, something more than fair to the Englishman, but in the atmosphere of New York this is intelligible. The solitude of most Englishmen is only the solitude of the semi-detached villa. It is true, however, that English villas have names, and American villas only numbers. And the Englishman is usually content to keep his platitudes as Lares and Penates,⁹ while the American would share them with his neighbours in a civic spirit. But Mr. Yeats's detachment is more than English; if we wished to pigeon-hole it conveniently we should call it Irish: but it is Mr. Yeats himself. He differs from the usual Englishman in his dislike for the edifying, in his preference of vision to exhortation. He is able, accordingly, to upset some of the established English valuations of their poets.

Again I have been reading Matthew Arnold. He is a true poet and only incidentally a teacher. Walt Whitman is a teacher in every line he wrote. [18]¹⁰

When I read Aeschylus I feel that here is a man who understands. I do not feel this when I read Shelley. Shelley leaves me cold because he leaves me uninformed. His "fine" things tell me so little. . . . In Shelley poetry is the essential, at least it is often so; so that there is lassitude and a lack of intensity. In Aeschylus the poetry is always accidental and incidental, and truth the essential. [21-22]

Browning always a companionable man, a sublime showman with a voice of titanic volume. . . . There are times in the life of every man when he is visited by the solitary spirit; so it happens that occasionally Browning sang melodious syllables. Coleridge was solitary . . . hence that personal charm. . . . [41]

Sometimes indeed the soul in Carlyle escapes from its bondage, but it has become a whimpering ghost, yet by its forlorn solitariness a manifest soul . . . he imprisoned his soul in that dungeon of self-hatred which is Puritanism. [45]

[Bunyan] would have called Hamlet "Mr. Facing Both-ways," and Juliet "Mistress Bold Face" or "Carnality," and Romeo "Mr. Lovelorn," and Macbeth "Mr. Henpecked" etc., finding where he could epithets to belittle and degrade the temple of human nature and all its altars. . . . This servile stamp was all over Wordsworth, and Shelley showed the scar in his efforts to escape. [54-55]

The substance of poetry, Mr. Yeats says, is "Truth seen in passion" [22]. To most readers this will fall into memory—for it is an easy phrase to remember—along with something said by Matthew Arnold, or Wordsworth, or Professor Saintsbury;¹¹ but Mr. Yeats means what he says. He is quite literal, too, when he says: "In every great poet is a Herbert Spencer" [21], or

[a poet] does not seek the original, *but the truth*; and to his dismay and consternation, it may be, he finds the original, thereby to incur hostility and misunderstanding. [9]

Mr. Yeats understands poetry better than anyone I have ever known who was not a poet, and better than most of those who have the reputation of poets. This last quotation, in fact, is a thought which takes very deep roots; it strikes through the tangle of literature direct to the subsoil of the greatest—to Shakespeare and Dante and Aeschylus. Ordinary writers of verse either deal in imagination or in "ideas"; they escape from one to the other, but neither one nor the other nor both together is truth in the sense of poetic truth. Only old ideas "part and parcel of the personality" [24] are of use to the poet. (This is worth repeating to our American contemporaries who study Freud.)¹²

I said at the beginning that Mr. Yeats was civilized: I meant that he possessed a classic sense in art—and the classic sense is merely the devotion to truth, not decoration or personal eccentricities; the sense of values—and at the same time is wholly free from Puritanism. He has wisdom but is not didactic. His letters can be read many times, and there are very few nineteenth-century letter-writers of whom one would hazard such a statement. One can say of him what he says of the solitary man:

the solitary has charm whereas the companionable compels his followers. When the companionable says I am your friend and will help you; or to a girl that he loves her, his voice does not penetrate so deeply and so touchingly as when the solitary speaks. [42-43]

T. S. ELIOT

NOTES

1. The Irish painter John Butler Yeats (1839-1922), father of poet William Butler Yeats and painter Jack Butler Yeats, was also a distinguished letter-writer and essayist. The volume here reviewed includes letters written between 1911 and 1916. In 1918, his *Essays Irish and American* appeared, and in 1920, *Further Letters of John Butler Yeats*. In 1944, several years after the death

of the poet son, TSE arranged for Faber and Faber to publish *John Butler Yeats: Letters to his Son W. B. Yeats and Others, 1869-1922*.

2. At this time D. H. Lawrence (1885-1930) had published *The White Peacock* (1911), *Sons and Lovers* (1913), and *The Rainbow* (1915).

3. S. P. B. Mais (1885-1975), an English novelist, travel writer, broadcaster, and educational reformer, wrote more than 200 books. His first novel, the epistolary *April's Lonely Soldier* (1916), was reviewed briefly in the *Saturday Westminster Gazette* of 14 Oct 1916. The review may have been written by TSE (who wrote a few unsigned reviews for the paper), thus accounting for his familiar reference to Mais and the novel here and in "Verse Pleasant and Unpleasant" (1918). The reviewer concluded that the novel "will either evoke strong approval or that intense irritation which is pleasant and rare enough to make a book worth reading" (17).

4. In the "Editor's Note," Pound explains: "In making a selection from them my great fear is not that I shall leave out something . . . but that I shall lose the personality of the author; that by snatching at salient thoughts I shall seem to show him as hurried, or even sententious"[i].

5. In his classes for young men, the Stoic philosopher Epictetus (ca. 55-135), who worked in both Rome and Greece, tended to be repetitious and moralistic. His ethical admonitions were recorded by his pupil Flavius Arrian in the *Enchiridion*.

6. Yeats accompanied his daughter Lily on a trip to New York in 1908 and remained there for the rest of his life.

7. Juvenal, *Satire X*: "a healthy mind in a healthy body."

8. Yeats alludes to the concept of happiness developed by William Wordsworth (1770-1850) in such poems as the "Character of the Happy Warrior" (1806), whose hero possesses traits that make him capable of performing "the tasks of real life" in an exemplary way, one "Whom neither shape of danger can dismay / Nor thought of tender happiness betray."

9. In Roman mythology, Lares and Penates were domestic deities protective of the household.

10. The American poet Walt Whitman (1819-92) and, below, the English authors Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792-1822), Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881), and John Bunyan (1628-88).

11. The critic George Saintsbury (1845-1933), professor emeritus at the University of Edinburgh, was known for his histories and editions of French and English literature, including *Minor Poets of the Caroline Period*.

12. Freud was at this time known in English for *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex* (1910), and *Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious* (1916).

A review of *Mens Creatrix: An Essay*,
by William Temple

London: Macmillan, 1917. Pp. xiii + 367.¹

The International Journal of Ethics, 27 (July 1917) 542-43

Mr. Temple wishes to demonstrate that philosophy, art, morality, education and politics all aim at a completion which they never of themselves reach, and that they find this completion in Christianity. He supplies accordingly a metaphysics, an aesthetics, a social and individual ethics, and a theology.

This is a vast undertaking. As might be expected, Mr. Temple has not exactly shown us that all roads of human speculation lead to the Anglican Communion, but has shown, with great charm of style and lucidity of dialectic, how particular types of metaphysics, aesthetics, and ethics may be made to form a symmetrical whole with Christian theology. His book is thus a compendious *Summa*.² He does not demonstrate that any form of philosophy leads to Christianity; he takes a particular type, absolute idealism, and shows that the idealistic absolute is a failure unless it can be identified with a personal Deity. Influenced by Mr. Bradley, he yet rejects his Absolute as unmoral and unmeaning.³ Similarly, he declares that the work of art points to "a perfect grasp of the entire Universe in all its extent of space and time by an Eternal Mind" to whom the whole history of the society of finite minds is present in the "moment eternal" of perfect intuition [126]. In discussing the nature of the State, Mr. Temple asserts that "the nations . . . need some society that may include themselves, whose basis shall be a common purpose . . . arising out of loyalty to an all-inclusive Kingdom and a common Master" [252]. And the problem of evil is stated in the form "What is the good of evil?" [262]. As for our struggle with sin we are told however that "the issue lies with Him, not with us" [290]. Unless He calls forth from our own hearts the response to His own love, we are helpless.

There is much that is suggestive, and even cogent, in the course of the argument. But to agree with the author we must not only concede that "Intellect and Imagination, Science and Art, would reach their culmination in the apprehension and contemplation of the supreme principle of the universe

adequately embodied or incarnate" [161] but that this culmination is found in Christianity. And might it not be maintained that religion, however poor our lives would be without it, is only one form of satisfaction among others, rather than the culminating satisfaction of all satisfactions?

Mr. Temple says many wise things, by the way, especially in his chapter on Education.⁴

T. S. ELIOT

NOTES

1. William Temple (1881-1944), educator and churchman, presently rector of St. James's, Piccadilly, and editor of *Challenge*, rose to become Archbishop of Canterbury (1942-44). *Mens Creatrix* (*The Creative Mind*) was his first major theological treatise.

2. A reference to the *Summa theologiae* by Thomas Aquinas.

3. Bradley resists identification of God and the Absolute. "We may say that God is not God, till he has become all in all, and that a God which is all in all is not the God of religion. God is but an aspect, and that must mean but an appearance, of the Absolute" (*A&R* 448).

4. Temple, whose father had been headmaster of Rugby School, was known as a teacher and served as president of the Worker's Educational Association (1909-24). He defended the study of the humanities against the rising insistence on specialization: "The aim of education is primarily spiritual, and there are three . . . primary aims . . . Goodness, Truth and Beauty . . . [cultivated as] ends in themselves" (241).

A review of *Religion and Philosophy*,
by R. G. Collingwood

London: Macmillan, 1917. Pp. xviii + 219.¹

The International Journal of Ethics, 27 (July 1917) 543

Mr. Collingwood has conceived a task very similar to that of Mr. Temple (*Mens Creatrix*)—the necessary completion of philosophy in religion.² He holds, however, that philosophy and religion are in reality the same thing; for even a materialistic philosophy, firmly held, may be a man's religion. He proposes then "to treat the Christian creed not as dogma but as a critical solution of a philosophical problem" [xiii].

Mr. Collingwood is successful at least to this extent, that granted the historical facts of Christianity, a most efficient philosophy can be built upon them. It is true that history and philosophy, as Mr. Collingwood contends, are interdependent. But philosophy depends upon the whole course of history, not upon any particular signal and unique facts; and its freedom of interpretation is limited only by its obligation to exclude nothing. Religion, on the other hand, or at least the Christian religion, depends upon one important fact. Philosophy may show, if it can, the meaning of the statement that Jesus was the son of God. But Christianity—orthodox Christianity—must base itself upon a unique fact: that Jesus was born of a virgin: a proposition which is either true or false, its terms having a fixed meaning. It seems therefore insufficient to claim, what seems to be the extent of Mr. Collingwood's historical demands, that Jesus was an historical person.

Mr. Collingwood attacks the problem of evil by conceiving of God "not as imposing his will on the world from without, but as himself sharing in all the experiences of other minds" [125]. "God is the absolute good will" [142]. Mr. Collingwood admits that the universe is a totality only *in posse*. One is tempted to ask whether the omnipotence and absolute good will of God are also *in posse*.³

The philosophical interpretation of the Incarnation, of the Atonement, and of Miracle, are extremely well handled.

T. S. ELIOT

NOTES

1. R. G. Collingwood (1889-1943), known as a philosopher, wrote his first book, here reviewed, in theology. TSE had attended his lectures at Oxford (Pembroke College) on Aristotle's *De anima* and taken detailed notes for J. H. Woods (*L1* 67, 83). On the flyleaf of his copy of *De anima* (King's), TSE wrote: "Used in 1914-15 with notes made during R. G. Collingwood's *explication de texte*." On 7 Feb 1929, TSE wrote to Edward Dahlberg, "the only man I know who is any good in Oxford is Collingwood" (*L4* 425).

2. TSE's review of *Mens Creatrix* is printed on the same page in the *IJE* as this review of *Religion and Philosophy*.

3. *in posse*: in potentiality.

A review of *Reflections on Violence*, by Georges Sorel
Trans. with an intro. and bibliography, by T. E. Hulme

London: George Allen & Unwin, 1916. Pp. xvi + 299.¹

The Monist, 27 (July 1917) 478-79²

Sorel's book is exceedingly difficult to discuss in a short review. Its substance is a very acute and disillusioned commentary upon nineteenth-century socialism, and upon the politics of the French democracy for the last twenty-five years. It contains also two elements which must not be confused, Sorel's own political propaganda (if he would allow it to be so called) and his philosophy of history formed under the influence of Renan and Bergson.³ And it expresses that violent and bitter reaction against romanticism which is one of the most interesting phenomena of our time. As an historical document, Sorel's *Reflections*, gives, more than any other book that I am acquainted with, an insight into what Henri Ghéon calls "our directions."⁴

Doubtless many readers will be disposed to consider the book under its first aspect only. But the study of Sorel's political observations requires an accurate knowledge of government and parliamentary activities since the Dreyfus trial, and does not in itself make the work of importance to the English and American public.⁵ What Sorel wants is not a political, but a *social* form. One must remember that his creed does not spring from the sight of wrongs to be redressed, abuses to be cured, liberties to be seized. He hates the middle classes, he hates middle-class democracy and middle-class socialism: but he does not hate these things as a champion of the rights of the people, he hates them as a middle-class intellectual hates. And the proletarian general strike is merely the instrument with which he hopes to destroy these abominations, not a weapon by which the lower classes are to obtain political or economic advantages. His motive forces are ideas and feelings which never occur to the mind of the proletariat, but which are highly characteristic of the present-day intellectual. At the back of his mind is a scepticism which springs from Renan, but which is much more terrible than Renan's. For with Renan and Sainte-Beuve scepticism was still a satisfying point of view, almost an esthetic pose.⁶ And for many of the artists of the eighties and nineties the pessimism of decadence fulfilled

their craving for an attitude. But the scepticism of the present, the scepticism of Sorel, is a torturing vacuity which has developed the craving for belief.

And thus Sorel, disgusted with modern civilization, hopes “that a new culture might spring from the struggle of the revolutionary trades unions against the employers and the State” [37]. He sees that new political disturbances will not evoke this culture. He is representative of the present generation, sick with its own knowledge of history, with the dissolving outlines of liberal thought, with humanitarianism. He longs for a narrow, intolerant, *creative* society with sharp divisions.⁷ He longs for the pessimistic, classical view.⁸ And this longing is healthy. But to realize his desire he must betake himself to very devious ways. His Bergsonian “myth” (the proletarian strike) is not a Utopia but “expressions of a determination to act” [32]. The historian knows that man is not rational, that “lofty moral convictions” do not depend upon reasoning but upon a “state of war in which men voluntarily participate and which finds expression in well-defined myths” [243]. It is not surprising that Sorel has become a Royalist.

Mr. Hulme is also a contemporary. The footnotes to his introduction should be read.⁹

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NOTES

1. *Réflexions sur la violence* (1908) is the basic text of syndicalism, the militant trade union movement that started in France in the 1890s and aimed to transfer the control of the means of production to unions. Sorel argued that the central weapon in this effort should be the General Strike, which he envisioned as a total work stoppage that would bring down capitalism. Hulme first published his translation without the preface (New York, 1914). In 1915, he published the preface as an article in the *New Age* (Oct), and in 1916, he published the preface and text together in the edition here reviewed. TSE's signed copy, inscribed “May 1916 / For the ‘Monist,’” contains a note added decades later: “This was my first introduction to the work of Hulme, as well as to that of Sorel”. He had forgotten that he read Sorel at Harvard in 1913 or 1914 and had mentioned his work in a Harvard address on the relationship between politics and metaphysics (96). TSE included lectures on Sorel in his 1916 Extension course on Modern French Literature and listed Hulme's translation of Bergson's *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1912) on the reading list (476).

2. In addition to commissioning the two signed articles for the Leibniz number of the *Monist*, Philip Jourdain invited TSE to review Sorel's *Reflections on Violence* and Merz's *Religion and Science*. These pieces were written before 25 July 1916, when Jourdain wrote to Paul Carus that three days earlier he had sent the Leibniz essays and reviews “by Eliot (η) of books by Merz and Sorel” (Carbondale). Jourdain had his reviewers sign with the Greek letter of their surnames; Eliot, however, was assigned an eta instead of an epsilon. TSE's reviews went unrecorded until

the files of the *Monist* were opened and his contributions were identified by Elizabeth Eames and Alan Cohn in *PBSA*, 30 (1976). In the flyleaf inscription, TSE recalled that Sydney Waterlow “gave me books to review,” misremembering that he had received the book from Jourdain. He had been introduced to both Waterlow and Jourdain by Russell and received books to review from both—Waterlow primarily for the *IJE* and Jourdain primarily for the *Monist*.

3. As Hulme points out in his preface, Sorel distinguishes between ideology and the working-class movement itself (v) and insists that syndicalism should incorporate both. In constructing his “myth” of the General Strike, Sorel draws on the “intellectualist philosophy” of Renan and the vitalist thought of Bergson but argues that theory must be grounded in action and that “the intellectualist philosophy is entirely unable to explain the great movements of history” (26).

4. The French poet and critic Henri Ghéon (1875-1944) published his antiromantic *Nos directions: réalisme et poésie, notes sur le drame poétique, du classicisme, sur le vers libre* in 1911, and TSE included it among the books he recommended in his 1916 course on Modern French Literature (476).

5. Sorel uses the treason trial of Alfred Dreyfus (1859-1935), who was wrongly convicted and eventually exonerated, as an example of corrupt state-sponsored political prosecution (117).

6. Renan’s skepticism emerged as a result of historical and philological research while training for the priesthood, as described in his *Souvenirs d’enfance et de jeunesse* (1883), which TSE placed on the reading list for his course in Modern French Literature. “Modernism,” TSE explained in his syllabus, “is merely a compromise between the point of view of historical criticism—inherited from Renan—and orthodoxy” (474). Sainte-Beuve’s skepticism, long in conflict with an emotional desire for faith, led him to disillusionment during the years that he was writing his history of the heretical seventeenth-century Jansenist movement, as described in his five-volume *Port-Royal* (1840-59). Sainte-Beuve and the younger Renan moved in the same intellectual circles and defended each other against attacks by French clericals.

7. Sorel maintained that the proletariat should use the creative power of “violence” to overcome the economic power of “force” used by the bourgeoisie. The double marginal strokes that TSE made in his copy highlight Sorel’s distinction: “the object of force is to impose a certain social order in which the minority governs, while violence tends to the destruction of that order. The middle class have used force since the beginning of modern times, while the proletariat now reacts against the middle class and against the State by violence” (195).

8. Sorel disparages the Greek mind as too optimistic: “Greek philosophy did not produce any great moral result, simply because it was . . . very optimistic. Socrates was at times optimistic to an almost unbearable degree.” TSE marks this passage with a question mark and writes in the margin: “How does S[orel] account for this surprising difference of outlook between Gr[ee]k tragedy & Gr[ee]k philosophy?” (7).

9. In the process of explaining Sorel’s antiromantic views in his “Translator’s Preface” and expository footnotes, Hulme outlines the position he himself had espoused in “Romanticism and Classicism.” In the preface, he maintains that “romanticism and classical pessimism differ in their antithetical conception of the nature of man. For the one, man is by nature good, and for the other, by nature bad. All Romanticism springs from Rousseau.” In contrast to Rousseau, Sorel is “classical, pessimistic.” In a passage underlined by TSE, Hulme adds that the classical view is “that man is by nature bad . . . and can consequently only accomplish anything of value by disciplines, ethical, heroic, or political. In other words, it believes in Original Sin. We may define Romantics, then, as

all who do not believe in the Fall of Man” (viii-ix). To this analysis, Hulme appends two long footnotes, both marked in the margin by TSE. The first insists that the classical view “is by no means identical with materialism; rather it is characteristic of the religious attitude—cf. Pascal’s *Pensées*. Romanticism confuses both human and divine things by not clearly separating them. The main thing with which it can be reproached is that it blurs the clear outlines of human relations—whether in political thought or in the treatment of sex in literature—by introducing into them the Perfection that properly belongs only to the non-human” (ix). The second long footnote supports his discussion of the neoclassical, antihumanistic attitude by outlining the evolution of psychology in art, which had enabled contemporaries to appreciate the abstract art of Byzantine, Asian, and primitive cultures (ix-x).

A review of *The Study of Religions*, by Stanley A. Cook

London: A. and C. Black, 1914. Pp. xxiv + 439.¹

The Monist, 27 (July 1917) 480

Mr. Cook is very long-winded, but in spite of dryness and abstractness of style he has written a valuable book. Much thought has evidently gone into it, and its defects are due to a difficult manner of exposition, not to poverty of the ideas. This is not an "Introduction" of the type of Jevons's book;² it gives no data for the beginner, nor, as one is apt to expect from the title, does it deal chiefly with primitive religion. It is rather the comments of a scholar—Mr. Cook is a recognized authority in his field—on the aims and methods of his study. He has a great deal to say, and much that is extremely good, on the evolution of religion—as is indicated by several chapter headings: Survivals, The Environment and Change, Development and Continuity. "The Doctrine of Survivals," Mr. Cook says, "is entirely inadequate when it forgets that we are human beings and do not accept beliefs and practices merely because they happen to lie within our reach. The Doctrine of Survivals, is, in fact, a very handy and cheap explanation of some one else's beliefs and practices—hardly of our own!" [xiii]. Survivals are not simply "left behind," they are subconsciously selected [131]. Mr. Cook warns very wisely against arguing from the part to the whole, against constructing a hypothetical system into which every survival must fit. He warns also against confusing the evolution of beliefs with the evolution of environments, in judging apparent retrogressions. On the critical attitude, on the acceptance of data, Mr. Cook has some excellent observations, and on the historical versus the religious importance of critical revisions. He holds that the present is a time of religious unrest, though like most of us, he cannot point to any definite theology for the future. His conclusion is as follows: "The unbiased student of religions can hardly escape the conviction that the Supreme Power, whom we call God, while enabling man to work out, within limits, his own career, desires the furtherance of those aims and ideals which are for the advance of mankind" [427].

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NOTES

1. Stanley A. Cook (1873-1949) was lecturer in Hebrew and Comparative Religion at Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. This appears to be the first of a “batch of reviews” sent to Jordain before 13 May (*LI* 198).

2. Frank Byron Jevons (1858-1936), English classicist and anthropologist, was the author of *An Introduction to the Study of Comparative Religion* (1908).

The Noh and the Image

A review of *'Noh' or Accomplishment: A Study of the Classical Stage of Japan*, by Ernest Fenollosa and Ezra Pound

London: Macmillan, 1916. Pp. viii + 268.¹

The Egoist, 4 (Aug 1917) 102-03

I hope that in a few years we shall have another edition of these plays, an edition of Fenollosa's notes separately, and an edition of the plays separately. Then the importance of the plays as literature, and in their present translation as English literature, will be more evident. This edition is necessarily, and in the best sense, a textbook; it has, therefore, excited reviewers to dwell on its informative character, rather than on its intrinsic value: they have made the book appear a service to literature, like a good doctor's thesis, rather than as literature itself.

Translation is valuable by a double power of fertilizing a literature: by importing new elements which may be assimilated, and by restoring the essentials which have been forgotten in traditional literary method. There occurs, in the process, a happy fusion between the spirit of the original and the mind of the translator; the result is not exoticism but rejuvenation. I have no direct knowledge of how much in these Noh plays is Noh, and how much is Fenollosa, and how much is Pound. But I think that I have found a test, which so far as it goes is trustworthy. I find that when the writing is most like Mr. Pound, it also presents the appearance of being most faithful to the original. The first play, for instance, which is one of the least interesting, is the one which is most remote from the idiom of Mr. Pound. The *Times*, in a serious review of the book, found in the following passage a "not unpleasant reminder" of *The Well of the Saints*:

Tsure. I say they were very fine prayers. I will not come back without a struggle.

Shite. I've a sad heart to see you looking up to Buddha, you who left me alone, I diving in the black rivers of hell. Will soft prayers be a comfort to you . . .?²

The semi-comic “fine,” the infinitive after “I’ve a sad heart,” and the Celtic present participle serve here only as a distraction. One feels that the original is not rendered because the translation is not English. I have no prejudice against the Irish drama, although I think that a large part of its popularity is due to tricks of idiom, just as I suspect that the reputation of Irish girls for beauty is due to their being called “colleens.” But I should not read the Epistles of St. Paul in the language of Robert Burns, and I prefer the Noh in English.³ And Mr. Pound has no need of these accessories, for when he translates into English (and the Irish lapses are only occasional) he not only produces very fine poetry, but seems to bring us much nearer to the Japanese.

The ghosts of the dead lovers who were never united:

Tangled, we are entangled. Whose fault was it, dear? tangled up as the grass patterns are tangled in this coarse cloth, or as the little Mushi that lives on and chirrups in dried seaweed. We do not know where are to-day our tears in the undergrowth of this eternal wilderness. We neither wake nor sleep, and passing our nights in a sorrow which is in the end a vision, what are these scenes of spring to us? this thinking in sleep of some one who has no thought of you, is it more than a dream? and yet surely it is the natural way of love. In our hearts there is much and in our bodies nothing, and we do nothing at all, and only the waters of the river of tears flow quickly.⁴

Here, I believe, has occurred that happy fusion of original and translator of which I spoke. And most of the translation is quite as good. Furthermore, I observe that although the Celtic suggestion is offensive, an occasional suggestion of Mr. Pound’s other sources—of his Provençal mood, or his Anglo-Saxon mood—give rather an added charm.

Anglo-Saxon, almost alliterative verse:

There is nothing here but this cave in the field’s midst.
To-day’s wind moves in the pines;
A wild place, unlit, and unfilled.⁵

Slightly Provençal echo:

“She whom I left in the city?” thought Narihira.
But in the long tale, Monogatari . . .⁶

But I set out to discuss the Noh and the Image. Mr. Pound remarks that the plays are at their best an image (63), and therein consists their unity. But

the unity of the image is surely the unity of *Prometheus*,⁷ if not to any great extent that of any other Greek drama; it is also the unity of certain cantos of Dante. The peculiarity of the Noh is that the focus of interest, and centre of construction, is the scene *on the stage*. In reading *Hamlet*, for instance, there is a perfectly clear image of a frosty night, at the beginning; in *Macbeth* there is a clear image of the castle at nightfall where the swallows breed. We imagine these, however, as they would be in reality; in reading the Noh, we have not so much help from our imagination, for the image we wish to form is the image on the stage. But in seeing the Noh, I imagine we have more help *for* our imagination. The note on *Awoi No Uye* tells us that

Awoi, her struggles, sickness, and death are represented by a red, flowered kimono, folded once length-wise, and laid at the front edge of the stage.⁸

The English stage is merely a substitute for the reality we imagine; but the red kimono is not a substitute in this sense; it is itself important. The more symbolical drama is, the more we need the actual stage. The European stage does not stimulate the imagination; the Japanese does. And as every gesture is of great importance, so we need to remember that the text is not the play.

In general, we may say that the less “realistic” literature is, the more visual it must be. In reading *Pride and Prejudice* or *The Wings of the Dove* we hardly need to visualize at all; in reading Dante we need to visualize all the time.⁹ Dreams, to be real, must be seen.

When we speak of the Noh as dreamlike, we do not imply any attenuation of emotion, nor imply that the emotions of dreams are essentially different from the emotions of waking. The emotions are very few, and are the same over all the world; love and battle are the themes of Noh; but the ways of approaching these emotions are diverse. The Japanese method is inverse to that with which we are familiar. The phantom-psychology of Orestes and Macbeth is as good as that of Awoi;¹⁰ but the method of making the ghost real is different. In the former cases the ghost is given in the mind of the possessed; in the latter case the mind of the sufferer is inferred from the reality of the ghost. The ghost is enacted, the dreaming or feverish Awoi is represented by the “red kimono.” In fact, it is only ghosts that are actual; the world of active passions is observed through the veil of another world. But these passions are just as real, though we see them in retrospect, as in *Kagekiyo*, or

by inference, as in *Kakitsubata*. Kagekiyo, the old blind hermit, dreams of the exploits of his youth:

He thought, how easy this killing. He rushed with his spearhaft gripped under his arm. He cried out, "I am Kagekiyo of the Heike." He rushed on to take them. He pierced through the helmet vizards of Miyanoya. Miyanoya fled twice, and again; and Kagekiyo cried: "You shall not escape me!" He leaped and wrenched off his helmet. "Eya!" The vizard broke and remained in his hand, and Miyanoya still fled afar, and afar, and he looked back, crying in terror, "How terrible, how heavy your arm!" And Kagekiyo called at him, "How tough the shaft of your neck is!" And they both laughed out over the battle, and went off each his own way.¹¹

Then the chorus, in a lament almost Greek:

These were the deeds of old, but oh, to tell them! to be telling them over now in his wretched condition.

There is nothing tenuous about this.

The "image" character of Noh makes the play brief. It also prevents rhetoric. And another consequence is that the dialogue is never conversation. (Perhaps this is another objection to making the personages talk like Irish peasants.) Nevertheless the plays are real plays, with real personalities. We do not forget "Changeful Tsunemasa, full of the universal unstillness," who was "loved by the Emperor when he was a boy, but was killed in the old days at the battle of the West Seas."¹² He is as permanent as the youthful Theaetetus. Kumasaka is as real. So are the ghost lovers, with as fine a strangeness in their way as any lovers of Webster or Ford:¹³

Kiri, hatari, cho, cho,
Kiri, hatari, cho, cho,
The cricket sews on at his old rags,
With all the new grass in the field; sho,
Churr, isho, like the whirr of a loom: churr.¹⁴

in their cricket song—a remarkable triumph of translator's skill: it is certainly English, and it is certainly new in English.

T. S. E.

NOTES

1. The American orientalist Ernest Fenollosa (1853-1908) went to Japan in 1878, taught at the University of Tokyo, helped found the Tokyo Fine Arts Academy and the Imperial Museum, and contributed to the revival of Noh drama. After his death, Mrs. Fenollosa named Pound the executor of her husband's papers. In editing the present collection, Pound introduced Fenollosa: "He went to Japan as a professor of economics. He ended as Imperial Commissioner of Arts. He had unearthed treasure that no Japanese had heard of. . . . When he died suddenly in England the Japanese government sent a warship for his body, and the priests buried him within the sacred enclosure at Miidera. These facts speak for themselves" (3). "The vision and the plan are Fenollosa's," Pound states in his editorial note. "In the prose I have had but the part of literary executor; in the plays my work has been that of translator who has found all the heavy work done for him and who has had but the pleasure of arranging beauty into the words" (v).

2. The first short play is *Sotoba Komachi*; it is the second play, *Kayoi Komachi*, by a Minoru, that here (30) bears the translation imprint of Pound, who notes that the "crux" of the play "is that Shosho [Shite] would not accept Buddhism, and thus his spirit and Ono's [Tsure's] are kept apart" (27). The anonymous reviewer in *TLS* (25 Jan 1917) compared the language of the play to John Millington Synge's *The Well of the Saints* (1905): "By cutting out the 'pillow-words' and other verbal conventions of the original and stressing the romantic aspect of the scene the translator has made his ragged peasants, who are really disguised aristocrats of a previous existence, into something not unlike Mr. Synge's divine savages. Change the deities and you will not be unpleasantly reminded of 'The Well of the Saints'" (41).

3. Robert Burns (1759-96) wrote in Scots, a dialect of English. His popular first book, *Poems, Chiefly in the Scottish Dialect*, was published in 1786.

4. Spoken by Shite to Tsure in *Nishikigi* (132), a two-act play by Zeami Motokiyo (ca. 1364-ca. 1443), the playwright who wrote nearly one-third of existing Noh plays.

5. The concluding lines of *Nishikigi*, spoken by the chorus (149).

6. Spoken by the chorus in *Kakitsubata*, a one-act play by Motokiyo (216). In the introduction, Pound says, "In the play a certain priest . . . meets with the spirit of one of Narihira's ladies who has identified herself with the Iris, that is to say, the flowers are the thoughts or the body of her spirit. She tells him of her past and of Narihira's, and how the music of Gobusaki will lift a man's soul into paradise. She then returns to her heaven" (207).

7. Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound* (ca. 430 BC).

8. The note, as Fenollosa explains in his introduction to *Awoi No Uye*, comes "from Mrs. Fenollosa's diary" (193).

9. Jane Austen (1775-1817), *Pride and Prejudice* (1813); Henry James, *The Wings of the Dove* (1902). TSE said in "Dante" (1929): "Dante's is a *visual* imagination . . . visual in the sense that he lived in an age in which men still saw visions."

10. Aeschylus's *The Oresteia* (ca. 458 BC) and Shakespeare's *Macbeth* (ca. 1604), like the Noh plays, include on-stage ghosts.

11. In *Kagekiyo*, a one-act play by Motokiyo, the chorus speaks these words, which are followed by the choral lament (187-88).

12. In the anonymous *Tsunemasa*, the "Changeful Tsunemasa" is so described by the chorus (93) and a priest (92), respectively. In the Foreword to the play, Pound describes it as a "Noh of spirits . . . It is all at high tension, but it is a psychological tension, the tension of the séance. The

excitement and triumph are the nervous excitement and triumph of a successful ritual. The spirit is invoked and appears" (91).

13. In Plato's *Theaetetus* (360 BC), the gifted Theaetetus of Athens (417-369 BC), fatally wounded in battle, is brought home from Corinth. In "The New Elizabethans and the Old" (1919), TSE remarks: "At the beginning of the *Theaetetus*, Plato gives the whole effect, the tone, of youthful promise slain in battle. . . . The mood of regret over youth (untimely nipped) has been . . . perfectly expressed by Plato" (2.10).

In *Kumasaka*, a play in two acts by Ujinobu, the ghost of Kumasaka "makes reparation for his brigandage by protecting the country. He comes back to praise the bravery of the young man who had killed him in single combat" (67).

John Ford (ca. 1586-ca. 1640) and Webster include numerous lovers in their plays, including Panthea and her beloved in Ford's *The Broken Heart* (1633) and the lowborn lover of the Duchess in Webster's *The Duchess of Malfi* (1613-14).

14. When Shite and Tsure, the long-dead ghost lovers of *Nishikigi*, have finally been united, the chorus, "*mimicking the sound of crickets*," sings of their reunion (144).

M. Bourget's Last Novel

An unsigned review of *Lazarine*, by Paul Bourget

Paris: *Plon-Nourrit et Cie*, 1917. Pp. viii + 304.¹

The New Statesman, 9 (25 Aug 1917) 500-01

M. Bourget's novel is methodically laid out, into three parts: *Les Personnages*, *La Tragedie*, and *Le Dénouement*. One looks for a close-woven, inevitable tragic drama, and the construction is indeed very careful; yet the *Tragedie* does not follow necessarily from the *Personnages*, nor the *Dénouement* from the *Tragedie*. The persons are Robert Graffeteau, a mercantile aristocrat, a young and successful banker, now Captain, decorated for gallantry, invalided at Hyères. His divorced wife, Thérèse, a syren, a degenerate, an opium-smoker, thoroughly corrupt and odiously fascinating. Her lover, de Faverolles, a titled *embusqué*, a weak voluptuary further debauched by his mistress. Lazarine Emery, a virgin of country-family antecedents; and her father, a retired colonel with a taste for country life *à l'anglaise*. There is also the elder sister of Lazarine, who offers epistolary sympathy and advice; and a blinded officer, a friend of Graffeteau, whose steadfast Catholicism presents a contrast with the scepticism of the hero. The Emerys are ignorant of Graffeteau's past; he knows that they, as fervent Christians, would regard his legal divorce as invalid; yet he cannot deprive himself of the society of Lazarine. At this point Thérèse appears; hating her husband, but jealous and still desiring him, she goes straight to the house of the Emerys, and lays the facts, decidedly perverted to present Robert in the most unfavourable light, before Lazarine. Having blocked Robert's progress in this direction, she attempts, in a midnight assignation, to seduce him. Robert comes only in the hope of extracting from her a letter to Lazarine withdrawing the grosser allegations against him; but he finds himself gradually paralysed by the physical fascination of his former wife. She uses very potent perfumes. As he feels himself on the verge of surrender, he spies a revolver on her table. He seizes it; she smiles confidently, and in the last stage of despair he shoots her dead.

The secrecy of the meeting prevents any suspicion from falling upon Robert; and he is now free, in the eyes of the Church as well as in the eyes

of the law, to marry whom he pleases. But he is a murderer, a dishonour to the Army. He returns to the trenches and is killed in action. Lazarine, who has divined the truth of the mysterious death of Thérèse, yet does not reprobate her lover; she learns with joy that he has at the end recanted his free-thinking and died in the Faith; and she thinks of him thereafter as her eternal *fiancé*.

Propaganda need not spoil a novel, and *Lazarine* is not a spoilt novel. We may be bored by Duchatel, the pious blinded officer, but we can put up with him. And Lazarine's sister on the subject of marriage is very sound: "de vraies fiançailles . . . ce n'est pas une ivresse de cœur . . . C'est le don mutuel de toute une vie, de toute cette effrayante longueur de la vie" [41].² In the struggle between the desire for happiness and the fact of marriage which is something more than merely a Christian dogma, M. Bourget has really found what is most sincere and moving in his book. The novel is not spoilt by M. Bourget's views. It is uninteresting simply because it is the natural result of M. Bourget's literary method.

Probably the best book that M. Bourget ever wrote was his *Essais de psychologie contemporaine*.³ These studies of the writers of the '70's and '80's were precise, without being dogmatic; they were solid without the heaviness of Taine or Brunetière, for they manifested M. Bourget's talent of analysis in company with the talent of curiosity.⁴ He was independent and solitary; he was interested in his subjects; his voyage was a voyage of discovery.

What has since happened to M. Bourget, in fact, has been the disappearance of the sense of curiosity. Curiosity is suppleness, it is tolerance, it is the source of unbiased judgment as well as of enthusiasm and feeling. M. Bourget has gratified his taste for analysis; and his interest in analysis exceeds his interest in the material for analysis. With such anatomists as Racine and Stendhal, life has an interest to which analysis is never quite adequate; there is always something unexplored.⁵ But where once the desire to understand and explain outweighs curiosity, the author restricts himself more and more; he confines himself to analysing what he has put together; his characters become easily exhausted, because the writer can extract no more than he has deliberately put in. M. Bourget is not interested in his characters at any particular moment; hence when he dissects their feelings for us, he can tell us little that we do not know already, and at times hardly escapes platitude.

Of Thérèse, when she wants to seduce Robert:

Et alors c'était une lassitude, un écœurement, une nausée de son existence, si terne, si morne dans son apparente fantaisie! [185]⁶

Of Robert, after he has killed Thérèse;

Les actes d'extrême violence, même prémédités, laissent toujours celui qui les a commis étonné devant leur accomplissement. [215]⁷

There are pages of this. It is all a little beside the point. And after all, however carefully M. Bourget evolves his consequences, they are never quite convincing—neither the murder, nor Robert's attitude or Lazarine's attitude afterwards—because we are never made to understand particular feelings at particular moments. It would be a mistake to say that M. Bourget's method simplifies too much, for one cannot be too simple; his method generalises to such an extent that all sense of movement is lost; a paralysis from which even a pistol-shot cannot arouse us.

NOTES

1. The early naturalistic and psychological novels of Paul Bourget (1852-1935) drew upon his long visit to England and Ireland and culminated in *Le Disciple* (1889), in which he portrays the destruction of a pupil who applies to life the naturalistic literary theories of his master. Subsequent novels reflect Bourget's gradual shift from agnosticism to Catholicism, from liberalism to religious conservatism, as in *Un divorce* (1904), in which he defends the dogmatic Catholic position, any breach of which entails disaster for characters there and in later novels.

2. *Trans*: a true betrothal . . . is not an intoxication of the heart. . . . It is the mutual gift of an entire life, of the whole terrifying length of that life.

3. Bourget's two-volume collection of essays (1883, 1885), in which he developed his analysis and theory of decadence, included studies of Baudelaire, Renan, Flaubert, Taine, and Stendhal, among others. TSE included the collection on his reading list in his 1916 Extension course on Modern French Literature (476).

4. Literary historian Hippolyte Taine (1828-93), author of *Histoire de la littérature anglaise* (1864) and *La Philosophie de l'art* (1865-69), applied Darwinian theories of determinism to literary study, with an emphasis on "race, milieu, et moment." Similarly, Ferdinand Brunetière (1849-1906), author of *L'Évolution des genres dans l'histoire de la littérature* (1890), interpreted the history of literature in evolutionary terms.

5. The neoclassicist Jean Racine (1639-99), author of tragedies such as *Bérénice* (1670) and *Iphigénie* (1674), is known for his experiments with psychological theater, and Stendhal, author of *Le Rouge et le Noir* (1830) and *La Chartreuse de Parme* (1839), for his psychological realism.

6. *Trans*: And then it is a weariness, a disgust, a nauseous sensation about his very existence, so dreary, so dismal, as it manifested itself in her imagination.

7. *Trans*: Acts of extreme violence, even when premeditated, always leave the perpetrator shocked by his deeds.

Reflections on Contemporary Poetry, I

A review, in part, of *Strange Meetings*, by Harold Monro

London: Poetry Bookshop, 1917. Pp. 63.¹

The Egoist, 4 (Sept 1917) 118-19

One of the ways by which contemporary verse has tried to escape the rhetorical, the abstract, the moralizing, to recover (for that is its purpose) the accents of direct speech, is to concentrate its attention upon trivial or accidental or commonplace objects. This tendency is common to a very great variety of poets; what is less noticed is the divergence of form which it takes. To be concrete, if perhaps facile in generalization, I may divide the tendency into its English and its American currents. With the American the effect is more usually an arrest at the object in view; the American poet is fearful of betraying any reaction beyond that revealed in the choice and arrangement; the effect is of an ingenious if sometimes perverse visual imagination in complete detachment from any other faculty. The Russian influence may here count for something; the Russian novel, with its curious trick of fastening upon accidental properties of a critical situation, and letting these in turn fasten upon the attention to such an extent as to replace the emotion which gave them their importance.

This is the preoccupation of the accidental; the English tendency is rather to be preoccupied with the trivial. In this difference the American shows his too quick susceptibility to foreign influence; the Englishman his imperviousness. For contemporary English verse has borrowed little from foreign sources; it is almost politically English; the Georgian poets insist upon the English countryside, and are even positively patriotic. When, therefore, they turn to the common object, to the animal or flower or hearthrug, it is in the mood, not of Dostoevski but of Wordsworth. Because of this Wordsworthian strain I have called their attention trivial (not invidiously) rather than accidental. Both methods or manners, the Wordsworth and the Dostoevski, may be distinguished from another which is more universal: it is universally human to attach the strongest emotions to definite tokens. Only, while with the Russian the emotion dissolves in a mass of sensational detail, and while with Wordsworth the

emotion is of the object and not of human life, with certain poets the emotion is definitely human, merely seizing the object in order to express itself. When Donne says:

Whoever comes to shroud me, do not harm,
Nor question much,
That subtle wreath of hair, which crowns my arm;

or when he uses the same idea again, perhaps more effectively:

When my grave is broke up again . . .
And he that digs it, spies
A bracelet of bright hair about the bone,

the feeling and the material symbol preserve exactly their proper proportions.² A poet of morbidly keen sensibilities but weak will might become absorbed in the hair to the exclusion of the original association which made it significant; a poet of imaginative or reflective power more than emotional power would endow the hair with ghostly or moralistic meaning. Donne sees the thing as it is.

When Wordsworth, however, fixes his attention upon:

the meanest flower that blows³

his attitude is utterly different. His daffodil emphasizes the importance of the flower for its own sake, not because of association with passions specifically human.

In the Georgian poets we observe the same attitude.⁴ The emotion is derived from the object, and such emotions must either be vague (as in Wordsworth) or, if more definite, pleasing. Thus, it is not unworthy of notice how often the word *little* occurs; and how this word is used, not merely as a necessary piece of information, but with a caress, a conscious delight:

Just now the lilac is in bloom
All before my little room. . . .

And under that Almighty Fin
The littlest fish may enter in. . . .

Making everything afraid,
Wrinkling up his little face . . . (i.e. the hare).

The little black cat with bright green eyes. . . .

And his little frame grew stout

And his little legs grew strong. . . .⁵

A typical example of this type of poetry, and one of the most charming, is a short lyric of Mr. Davies:

Sweet Chance, that led my steps abroad,

Beyond the town, where wild flowers grow—

A rainbow and a cuckoo, Lord,

How rich and great the times are now! . . .

A rainbow and a cuckoo's song

May never come together again;

May never come

This side the tomb.⁶

There is just the suggestion of a moral or philosophical conclusion (hinting at the law of probability) which divides the mood from the Elizabethan, and allies it to Wordsworth. In another poem, Mr. Davies approaches this master still more closely ("The Kingfisher"):

Nay, lovely Bird, thou art not vain;

Thou hast no proud, ambitious mind. . . .

The Georgian Love of Nature is on the whole less vague than Wordsworth's, and has less philosophy behind it: for Wordsworth had a philosophy, though ill apprehended from foreign teachers;⁷ the Georgian plays more delicately with his subject, and in his style has often more in common with Stevenson.⁸ On the other hand, not having abstractions to fall back upon, the modern poet, when he diverts his attention from birds, fields, and villages, is subject to lapses of rhetoric from which Wordsworth, with his complete innocence of other emotions than those in which he specialized, is comparatively free. Thus Rupert Brooke, after a number of lines which show a really amazing felicity and command of language, in "The Fish," descends to:

O world of lips, O world of laughter,

Where hope is fleet and thought flies after . . .

retrieved happily by another fine passage at the end. And another poem is completely spoilt by such adjectives as "crying-sweet," "scattering-bright."⁹

Mr. Harold Monro has a vocabulary less rich, less astonishing, than Brooke's, but at the same time less rhetorical. He is one of those (for he is to be associated to the Georgian poets) who has the most consistently pursued one direction. He is less literary, often more natural; he is also less a Little-Englander, and deserves a public not purely insular. Often he employs the same tone of infantile simplicity:

The stars must make an awful noise
In whirling round the sky . . .¹⁰

but the total effect of his last volume is not one of prettiness. That he knows how to handle the pretty mood is attested by an earlier poem, "Milk for the Cat," which escapes insipidity by its extraordinary cleverness;¹¹ he can reflect in an almost Emersonian mood ("Often we must entertain"),¹² but his consistent effort has been to express the strangeness of the familiar objects and "meetings":

How did you enter that body? Why are you here?
At once, when I had seen your eyes appear
Over the brim of earth, they were looking for me.¹³

It is a limited genre; but it is a legitimate bypath of poetry. It has been done best, perhaps, by Henri Bataille.¹⁴ Only in something harder can great passion be expressed; the vague is a more dangerous path for poetry than the arid. Perhaps it is one sign of this weakness that I cannot select any poems from this book as of particular excellence; but the book as a whole makes a more complete impression than any but a very few of recent years.

T. S. E.

NOTES

1. The Georgian poet Harold Monro (1879-1932), editor of the *Poetry Review* (1911), was the proprietor of London's Poetry Bookshop, a haven for younger poets.

2. From "The Funeral" and "The Relic," respectively, by the English poet John Donne (1573-1631).

3. From the closing lines of "Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood" (1807): "Thanks to the human heart by which we live, / Thanks to its tenderness, its joys, and fears, / To me the meanest flower that blows can give / Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears."

4. The poets and poems that TSE cites below appeared in the first two volumes (1911-12, 1913-15) of *Georgian Poetry*, ed. Edward Marsh (London: Poetry Bookshop, 1912, 1915). From 1912 to 1922, Marsh collaborated with Monro in bringing out five volumes of *Georgian Poetry*.

5. The first two passages, by Rupert Brooke (1887-1915), are from "The Old Vicarage, Grantchester" and "Heaven"; the others, successively, are from James Stephens, "The Snare"; Monro, "Milk for the Cat"; and Ralph Hodgson (1871-1962), "The Bull."

6. From "A Great Time" by the Welsh poet William H. Davies (1871-1940).

7. Wordsworth was influenced by several European thinkers, including Rousseau and Kant.

8. TSE discussed Stevenson's fiction in his undergraduate essay on Kipling (8) and included an entire session on Stevenson's work in his 1917 Extension course on Modern English Literature, the reading list of which included both *A Child's Garden of Verses* (1885) and collected *Poems* [*The Poems and Ballads of Robert Louis Stevenson*] (1913) (590).

9. From "Beauty and Beauty": "Where Beauty and Beauty meet / All naked, fair to fair, / The earth is crying-sweet, / And scattering-bright the air."

10. From *Strange Meetings*, XI, 11.

11. From *Children of Love* (London: Poetry Bookshop, 1914), 18-19; the poem, a line of which was cited above (see note 5), had also appeared in *Georgian Poetry*, 1913-1915.

12. From *Strange Meetings*, V, 7.

13. From *Strange Meetings*, XVI, 14.

14. The French playwright Henry (Félix-Henri) Bataille (1872-1922) published three volumes of poetry. In *La Chambre blanche* (1895) and *Le Beau Voyage* (1904), he develops his theme of modern pain. In the more brutal *La Divine Tragédie* (1916), he represents the strangeness of the objects, smells, and morbidity of WWI.

A Forgotten Utopia

An unsigned review of *Christianopolis: An Ideal State of the Seventeenth Century*. Trans. from the Latin of Johann Valentin Andreae by Felix Emil Held

New York: Oxford UP, 1916. Pp. x + 287.¹

The New Statesman, 9 (1 Sept 1917) 523-24

Towards the end of the sixteenth century there was born in Germany one Johann Valentin Andreae. At the age of fifteen he was admitted to the University of Tübingen where, says his editor, he “perfected himself” in Latin, Greek, Hebrew, French, Spanish, Italian, and English [12]. He also read widely in contemporary history and literature; not the least of his interests was the study of mathematics. It is not surprising that a youth of such attainments should have won successively the positions of Diakonus in Vaihingen, Dekan and Spezialsuperintendent in Calw, Hofprediger and Consistorial-Rat in Stuttgart.² In the midst of the duties incumbent upon so important an official, Andreae yet found time for certain *Schriften*, mostly in Latin, one of which is here translated and edited. We deplore the absence, in Professor Held’s scholarly introduction, of more personal detail; the lives of seventeenth-century men of learning sometimes reveal very entertaining unconventionalities, but perhaps in Andreae’s case such detail is missing. Dr. Held is chiefly concerned with the mutual influence of Andreae’s and other Utopias; he is naturally concerned to show that his author experienced the minimum and exerted the maximum. He makes out, indeed, a very good case; and we are quite ready to believe that he confutes all preceding commentators, W. Hossbach, von Mohl, Guhrauer, Sigwart, Hüllemann, Glöckler, Gussmann, Voigt, Prÿs, Brÿgel and C. Vogt.³ In the course of tracing the labyrinths of possible acquaintanceships which may have connected Andreae with Bacon, More, and Gott (the author of *Nova Solyma*), Dr. Held turns the bones of many humanists.⁴ Their very names are delightful! How might Bacon have known of Andreae? First, Bacon corresponded with Sir Henry Wotton. Sir Henry was much abroad, and knew German so well as to be always mistaken for a

German in Vienna.⁵ Second, Andreae visited Geneva, and Isaac Casaubon lived in Geneva; Casaubon knew the Wottons and corresponded with Bacon. Third, Andreae entered Tübingen in the same year as Georg Weckherlin, who became Milton's secretary; and Weckherlin dedicated a poem to "Heinrich Wotton, *engelländiscen rittern*," the Wotton who knew Casaubon and corresponded with Bacon. And Weckherlin was a friend of Benjamin von Buwinckhausen, Stadthalter of Alençon; Andreae conducted von Buwinckhausen's funeral services.⁶ Lastly, there is Sir Toby Matthew, who, having espoused the Catholic faith, lived mostly out of England, travelled in Germany as well as France and Italy, and wrote constantly to Bacon, keeping him informed of literary and scientific affairs.⁷ All this is a little confusing, but introduces us to several worthies whom we should be glad to look up at the British Museum, and Dr. Held convinces us that "it would seem almost impossible that Bacon should *not* have heard of [Andreae's works] through one or the other of their mutual acquaintances" [54],⁸ though it is not proved that any one of these men actually did know Andreae.

There is certainly a strong generic resemblance between all the ideal states of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and it seems quite likely that *Christianopolis* is a link and not merely an offshoot; also it is possible that

the principles of a general reformation in education and the plan of a "college" as outlined in the *Christianopolis* and other works of Andreae, were an important factor through J. A. Comenius, Samuel Hartlib, John Dury, and their associates, in the founding of the Royal Society of London. [15]⁹

As for the merits of the work itself, it must be confessed that this is less entertaining than Professor Held's learned introduction. The beginning is similar to that of *The New Atlantis*. The author takes ship on the vessel "Phantasy" and is wrecked on the island Caphar Salama. He is the sole survivor. While he is drying his undershirt, he is accosted by a watchman, who volunteers kindly to lead him to the happy city, at the sight of which in the distance the traveller is wonderstruck, and exclaims:

I shall evade neither the bath, the razor, nor the brush, that, being washed, scraped, and cleansed, I may be admitted to the pure abodes of truth and goodness. [144-45]

The aspect of the city, as seen in the plan and view which form Andreae's frontispiece, is sufficiently pleasing; for it consists of a perfect square, with spatulate turrets at the corners. In the exact centre is a high tower, not unlike that of the Y.M.C.A. in Tottenham Court Road, designated as the *Templum cum Prytaneo*, in a small square around it is the College; a larger square outside this is the Botanic Garden; surrounding this in turn are the Allotments (*Hortuli Civium*); arid in successive squares the dwellings, mills and shops of the four hundred householders.

The method of Andreae's chapters, which are short, varies but little. He begins with exact description, enumeration and measurement, and ends with a moral reflection. We turn to a chapter on "The Drug Supply House," expecting a prototype of Boots's. The chapter begins: "Outside the gate now, stands the pharmacy, and no place in the world has a more carefully selected collection" [198]. But by the end of the page Andreae has not told us how the citizens are supplied with drugs; he has got on to saying:

There is more vexation and irksome labour in the foolishness with which men wear out their powers, than in those things which can raise them aloft and admit them to a contemplation of our earth. [198-99]

For the rest, Andreae is a strong Lutheran and in most matters inclined to conservatism, often with a good deal of reason. We learn that in the perfect city "[t]he married women make use of the knowledge which they acquired while in college" and that "[i]t is a rare thing among them, and not at all considered a manly act, for the husband to beat his wife" [260, 261]. But what perhaps attracts our attention most in a Utopia is the political organisation, and here Andreae (German though he was) has foreshadowed one of the most modern of our instruments of government. His chapter ii [is] entitled "The Triumvirate."

[T]he triumvirate is the safest form of government, when it admits only the best in the state and those most experienced in public affairs, since one must work up through all steps of virtue to it. Each one of the leaders does his own duty, yet not without the knowledge of the others; all consult together in matters that concern the safety of the state. Each has a senate, but on fixed days they all meet together that decision in the most important matters may be reached with common consent. [174]

This is a very out-of-the-way book and well worth reading.

NOTES

1. The Lutheran theologian Johann Valentin Andreae (1586-1654) was a reformer of educational, social, and religious institutions in Germany. In furtherance of his utopian goals, he headed charitable projects, reformed colleges, and founded the *Christliche Gottliebende Gesellschaft* (Christian God-loving Society). In *Reipublicae Christianopolitanae descriptio* (1619), here translated, he describes a utopian community of scholar-craftsmen as seen through the eyes of a naïve young traveler. This translation originated as the doctoral thesis of Felix Emil Held (1880-1944), associate professor of German at Miami University, Ohio.

2. Between 1614 and 1639, Andreae rose through the ecclesiastical ranks in these German towns as minister, dean and chief pastor, and court chaplain and consistory adviser.

3. Held's catalog includes the important nineteenth-century social scientists who published on Andreae and/or utopianism: Peter W. H. Hossbach (1784-1846), Robert von Mohl (1799-1875), G. E. Guhrauer (1809-54), Christoph von Sigwart, Carl Hüllemann (b. 1842), Johann Philipp Glöckler (1819-89), Wilhelm Gussmann (1854-1935), Joseph Prÿs (1889-1956), Julius Brÿgel (1841-1912), Andreas Voigt (1860-1940), and Carl Vogt (1817-95). The *Logic* (2 vols, 1895) of Professor Sigwart of the University of Tübingen was a major influence on Bosanquet, Bradley, W. James, and Russell and is quoted with approval in TSE's dissertation (269).

4. In *Utopia* (1516), Sir Thomas More describes an imaginary island run, according to the ideals of the English humanists, where poverty, crime, and injustice do not exist. A century later, the statesman and essayist Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626) penned *The New Atlantis* (1627), an unfinished fantasy of a voyage to the island of "Bensalem." The utopian romance *Nova Solyma: The Ideal City or, Jerusalem Regained*, written anonymously during the reign of Charles I, was retrieved from obscurity by Walter Begley in 1902 and attributed variously to Milton or to his contemporary Samuel Gott (1613-71).

5. Sir Henry Wotton (1568-1639), diplomat and poet, served as ambassador to Venice. Isaac Casaubon (1554-1614), French Huguenot classical scholar reputed to be the most learned man of his age, worked in Geneva, Paris, and London, where he was befriended by Wotton and Lancelot Andrewes. After Milton lost his sight, around 1652, the German poet Georg Rodolf Weckherlin (1584-1653) became his secretary. The poem dedicated to Wotton is ode number 44 in Karl Goedeke's edition of Weckherlin's *Gedichte* [Poems] (Leipzig, 1873).

6. Benjamin von Buwinckhausen (1571-1635), a diplomat and member of Andreae's circle.

7. Sir Toby Matthew (1577-1655), a courtier and diplomat under James I and Charles I.

8. TSE's brackets.

9. Johann Amos Comenius (1592-1670) was a Czech educational reformer and religious leader; Samuel Hartlib (ca. 1600-62), an English educational reformer and advocate of universal education; and John Dury (1596-1680), a Scottish clergyman and advocate of the union of Lutheran and Reformed (Presbyterian) churches. The Royal Society, established in 1660 and partially modeled on the scientific society in Bacon's *New Atlantis*, is the oldest scientific society in the world.

William James on Immortality

An unsigned review of *Human Immortality: Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine*, by William James

London: J. M. Dent, 1917. Pp. 80; London: Constable, 1917. Pp. 128.

The New Statesman, 9 (8 Sept 1917) 547

These two editions are convenient reprints of the Ingersoll Lecture of 1898.¹ A considerable number of philosophers, scientists, and men of letters have taken their turn as Ingersoll Lecturer; few have succeeded in contributing anything very important to an obscure problem; yet the series has the interest, in retrospect, of a comparative study of points of view. William James's is one of the small number that have any individual interest, and the interest which it has is due chiefly to its place in the development of James's thought, and the light which it casts upon his philosophic attitude.

The place of the lecture among James's works, it must be admitted, is not a very important one. The sub-title of the lecture is characteristic of an attitude very frequent in James: the union of sceptical and destructive habits of mind with positive enthusiasm for freedom in philosophy and thought. His own personal feeling about immortality, he admits frankly, "has never been of the keenest order" [13], but he had great curiosity, and a curiously charming willingness to believe anything that seemed preposterous to the ordinary scientific mind. He hated oppression in any form; the oppression of dogmatic theology was remote from him, who lived in the atmosphere of Unitarian Harvard; but the oppression of idealistic philosophy and the oppression of scientific materialism were very real to him. Many of James's ideas may be due rather to his antipathy to other people's narrow convictions than to convictions of his own; as when, in a footnote to this lecture, he suggests a notion which he repeats elsewhere more emphatically, that "there might be many minds [*sc.* divine] behind the scenes as well as one" [70].²

Philosophically, the footnotes, though they are chiefly citations, contain several suggestions which are more provocative than the lecture itself. They show that James was already struggling toward the philosophy barely outlined at his death, the "Radical Empiricism" which he considered more

important than his Pragmatism.³ Note 3 observes, for example, that the point of view taken in the lecture has been “the ordinary dualistic point of view,” but that:

An absolute phenomenism, not believing such a dualism (of mind and matter) to be ultimate, may possibly end by solving some of the problems that are insoluble when propounded in dualistic terms. [62]⁴

The two points made and elaborated in the body of the lecture are the “transmission” theory of psycho-physics,⁵ [and] the futility of the objection to immortality as an appalling and tiresome multiplication of souls. On the latter point, James is characteristically democratic, genially drawing a picture of a future life which includes animals and savages and our primitive ancestors. The former point, the theory that the absolute dependence of mind upon brain is only the dependence of the workman on his tool, the theory that the function of the brain is not to generate consciousness but to “limit” it, has since been made familiar by Bergson’s *Matter and Memory*, and had already been developed by F. C. S. Schiller.⁶ There are difficulties in the theory which James does not quite face: the greatest of these perhaps is that we do not clearly conceive what it is, according to the theory, that is “transmitted”; what “consciousness” is, apart from its actualisation through the brain into thoughts and words and acts. Thus James compares consciousness to the air which is shaped by the vocal cords into “my personal voice”; and later he says that after death the “sphere of being” that *supplied* the consciousness would still be intact [27-28]. Personal immortality always tends to evaporate in this way. It would be easy to pick the lecture to pieces; its binding fluid is its attack upon dogmatic disbelief, not any constructive theory. But James has an exceptional quality of always leaving his reader with the feeling that the world is full of possibilities—in a philosopher, a rare and valuable quality; and what seems scepticism or inconsistency or vagueness in others, James has the knack of communicating as a sense of sincere adventurousness.

NOTES

1. The Ingersoll Lectures on Human Immortality at the Harvard University Divinity School were established by President Charles W. Eliot in 1896. The 1897 lecture, originally published in 1898, was given by James. Because the Constable reprint is accessible only in a few rare book collections, the Dent edition is used for the pagination of quotations in this review.

2. TSE’s bracketed insertion: *sc: silicet*, namely. James’s text: “The Absolute Mind of transcendental Idealism is one integral Unit, one single World-mind. For the purposes of my lecture, however, there might be many minds behind the scenes as well as one.”

3. In the preface to the posthumously assembled *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (1912), James's colleague and biographer Ralph Barton Perry claims that, by the time of his death in 1910, James had moved beyond Pragmatism.

4. TSE's parenthetical insertion.

5. James challenges the materialistic position that the brain is the source and end of consciousness and thus that immortality is impossible. Building on contemporary theories of brain dynamics, he defends the "possibility of a mental life after the brain's death" and suggests as a mechanism the "transmission through the brain of portions of a preexisting larger consciousness" (5).

6. In *Matter and Memory* (1896), Bergson distinguished between the brain and human consciousness. In *Humanism* (1903, 1912), Schiller formulated a pragmatic humanism as an alternative to the extremes of metaphysics and naturalism. Like James, whose work influenced him, Schiller retained the possibility that the soul could be immortal.

An unsigned review of *A Defence of Idealism: Some Questions and Conclusions*, by May Sinclair

New York: Macmillan, 1917. Pp. xxi + 355.¹

The New Statesman, 9 (22 Sept 1917) 596

Miss Sinclair's book has all the charm which the fresh and interested mind of an outsider, turned upon the achievements of a technical art or science, can give. She approaches philosophy somewhat as Samuel Butler approached biology; perhaps partly for this reason, her essay on Butler is the most successful in the book.² She considers in turn the constructions of Vitalism, Pragmatism, Neo-Realism, and the "New Mysticism" of Evelyn Underhill and others.³ At her best in criticising the spirit of philosophies, rather than in attacking their technical defences, Miss Sinclair writes very much to the point in discussing Butler, Pragmatism and Mysticism; she comes off very well in her discussion of the animism of Mr. McDougall, which she treats sympathetically;⁴ she is at her weakest in her analysis of the New Realism. We may instance the fact that she consistently refers to the *Principles of Mathematics* as the *Principia Mathematica*; to the latter work she makes no reference at all.⁵

At times the author appears to impose her prejudices rather than to unfold an argument. She objects to both Bradley's and Russell's logic as "thin," without adducing any very satisfactory reasons why a logic ought to be "thick."⁶ (Mr. E. B. Holt's realistic logic is certainly thick enough.)⁷ She objects to the Idealism "of Balliol" for the same reason.⁸ Her accord with Hegel is contained in the statement that Ultimate Reality must be Spirit—where definitions of both Reality and Spirit are much to seek. The same lack of definition is found in her use of the word "Consciousness," her examination of the realistic theory of illusions of sense. We have the right (and the desire) to hear from her about the relation of Existence to Value. But it is to be hoped that she will write more such essays; the book displays critical clairvoyance, and it is both intelligent and interestingly written; in fact, it is one of the most interesting books of philosophy that have appeared for several years.

NOTES

1. "I have been trying to read May Sinclair's *Defence of Idealism* for the *Statesman* and Jordain," TSE wrote to his mother on 12 Sept, "She is better known as a novelist. . . . I have met her several times" (LI 216). May Sinclair (1863-1946) was one of the first to appreciate modernist poetry. In Dec 1917, she wrote a substantial review of *Prufrock and Other Observations* (*Contemporary Reviews*, 10-13), which TSE described in a Jan 1918 letter to his mother as "very flattering" (LI 248).

2. The first essay in Sinclair's book is "The Pan-Psychism of Samuel Butler." An admirer of Darwin, Butler developed "Pan-Psychism" as a scientifically grounded alternative to Christianity.

3. Sinclair has chapters on Bergson's Vitalism, James's Pragmatism, Holt's Neo-Realism, and the New Mysticism of Evelyn Underhill (1875-1941), whose *Mysticism* (1911) TSE had read at Harvard in 1913-14.

4. In *Body and Mind: A History and a Defense of Animism* (1911), William McDougall maintained that animism, defined as the belief in a nonmaterial and spiritual animating principle, is the foundation of all religion, ancient and modern.

5. In *The Principles of Mathematics* (1903), Russell argues that mathematics is a branch of logic; in the *Principia Mathematica* (3 vols, 1910), Russell and Whitehead examine the foundations of mathematics.

6. The Absolute of Bradley "holds its thin prestige of Godhead or of cosmic unity at the cost of all god-like or cosmic attributes; . . . [it] is the most flagrant instance of an empty, impotent, adjectival abstraction" (132). The Absolute of Hegel, however, is an "Absolute Spirit which is God. An Absolute as thick, as concrete as the universe itself" (201). "The Logic of Hegel has a thickness you could cut with a knife, and beside it the Logic of Mr. Russell has the consistency of fine dust or of a thin gruel" (236).

7. Holt was the editor and main author of *The New Realism* (1912), a rebuttal of the Neo-Idealism of Bradley and Royce. TSE discussed the New Realists in his graduate essays and dissertation (90; 173, n. 8; 731, n. 2).

8. The Idealism of Balliol College, Oxford, was established in the 1860s and 1870s, primarily by T. H. Green, who combined Greek and German idealism with various strands of British idealism. In 1914, TSE wrote a long paper on the ethics of Green and H. Sidgwick (147).

A Course of Twenty-Five Lectures on Victorian Literature
(London, 1917).¹

1. Introductory—The Social Framework.

THE MAKERS OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY IDEAS

2. History and Criticism—Thomas Carlyle.
3. A Contrast in Ideas—John Stuart Mill and Matthew Arnold.
4. The Influence of Science—Darwinism in T. H. Huxley and Herbert Spencer.
5. Art and Economics—John Ruskin and William Morris.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH POETRY

6. Characteristics of Victorian Verse—Some Comparisons.
7. Tennyson as a Representative of his Age.
8. Robert and Elizabeth Browning—Poets of Love and Life.
9. Browning and his Men and Women.
10. Three Poets of Doubt—Matthew Arnold, Edward Fitzgerald, James Thomson.
11. Philosophy in Poetry—George Meredith.
12. The Pre-Raphaelite Movement—D. G. Rossetti and William Morris.
13. A Poet of Liberty—A. C. Swinburne.
14. Poets of Religious Faith—Christina Rossetti, Francis Thompson, Lionel Johnson.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH FICTION

15. General Survey.
16. The Brontës and their Special Significance in the History of the Novel.
17. Charles Dickens and his Social Types.
18. Thackeray and Social Satire.
19. Kingsley, Reade, and the Novel of Social Reform.
20. George Eliot.
21. George Meredith—A Critic as Novelist.
22. Thomas Hardy and Realism.

BYWAYS OF VICTORIAN LITERATURE

- 23. The Gipsy Pateran—George Borrow, Richard Jeffries, and others.
- 24. Aestheticism—Walter Pater and Oscar Wilde.
- 25. The Laureates of Nonsense—Edward Lear, Lewis Carroll, and the Makers of Light Verse.

T. G. ELIOT

NOTE

1. On 19 Mar 1917, near the end of his first-year tutorial for the University of London Extension Board, and having resigned his position at the Highgate Junior School, TSE had gone to work for Lloyds Bank—"as a stop-gap," he told Professor Woods. "Literature and journalistic work is not in great demand, nor is lecturing or teaching, except school teaching, which I refuse to return to—it is altogether too exhausting" (*LI* 188). He planned to continue his tutorial class at Southall in the autumn, and to further supplement his income, he arranged to give a course on Victorian literature for the London County Council's Evening Lectures on English Literature. The course of twenty-five lectures was given on Friday evenings from 7 to 9 at the County Secondary School, High Street, Sydenham, beginning 28 Sept. The published syllabus, which misprints the lecturer as "T. G. Eliot," lists only the subjects of the lectures.

Syllabus for a Tutorial Class in Modern English Literature, Second Year's Work

London: University of London Press, 1917.¹

MODERN ENGLISH LITERATURE

I. EMERSON

Characteristics of New England literature of the time. Emerson's relation to English men of letters. The society in which he lived. Religious and philosophical environment: Unitarianism and Transcendentalism.

Emerson's style as an essayist. His aloofness; contrast with Carlyle, Arnold, and Ruskin. Quality of his thought. Read: *Essays*, *Nature*, and *The Conduct of Life*.

Emerson as a poet. Read *Selected Poems*. Suggested Reading: Thoreau, *Walden*; Hawthorne, *The Scarlet Letter*; chapter in *Great Writers of America*, in the "Home University Library."

II. WILLIAM MORRIS

Original impulse and meaning of "Pre-Raphaelitism." His relation to Ruskin. Morris's life and personality. His place as a poet; obligations to Tennyson. His mediaevalism. Morris as a ballad writer and as a writer of narrative verse. Read: Selections from the *Defence of Guenevere* and from the *Earthly Paradise*.

Morris's attitude towards art. His experiments; beginnings of the arts and crafts movement. Read: *Hopes and Fears for Art, Architecture, Industry, and Wealth. Signs of Change*.

Morris as a prose writer. His prose romances. Read: *The Roots of the Mountains. The Glittering Plain*.

Morris's social philosophy. Communism. Comparison with Ruskin. His original contribution towards social progress. Read: *News from Nowhere, A Dream of John Ball*.

III. DANTE GABRIEL ROSSETTI

Transition of the mediaeval movement in literature from Ruskin to Rossetti. Rossetti the individualist, and detached artist. Temperament. His use of ballad form. Read: *The Blessed Damozel, The White Ship*.

Rossetti as poet and painter. His aesthetic creed. Read: *The House of Life*.

IV. SWINBURNE

The pure romantic. Relation to Pre-Raphaelitism. "Paganism." His early attitude. His championship of liberty. Merits and faults of his poetry. Read: Selections from *Poems and Ballads*, *Atalanta in Calydon*, selections from *Songs Before Sunrise*.

Swinburne as prose writer. Comparison with Shelley, as a poet.

V. WALTER PATER

The pure aesthete: "art for art's sake." Qualities of his style; its elaborate-ness. His works of imagination, his criticism, and his gospel of life. His influence. His enthusiasm for art at the opposite pole from Ruskin's, though both react against industrialism. Read: *Studies in the Renaissance* (especially the Conclusion), *Imaginary Portraits*.

VI. SAMUEL BUTLER

A solitary figure, neglected until he received the enthusiastic praise of Shaw. His eccentric career. Versatility: Butler is important for his theories of Evolution, his social satires, his novels, and for his ideas on all subjects as found in his *Note-Books*. Complete independence of mind. No political, social, or literary movement to forward. Short sketch of his theory of Evolution, opposed to Darwinism. Read: *Life and Habit*.

Butler's social satires. His influence upon Shaw. His wit. His philosophy of life. Read: *Erewhon*.

Butler as a novelist. Read: *The Way of All Flesh*.

Butler's criticism of art, science, literature, life. His greatness as a satirist. Read: Selections from the *Note-Books*. Also suggested: Bernard Shaw's *Cashel Byron's Profession*, *An Unsocial Socialist*; Gilbert Cannan's *Satire*.

VII. ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON

A dilettante of letters. His reputation as a prose writer. Influence of Meredith. Characteristics of his generation: Stevenson and Henley. His style, and rank as a novelist. The novel of adventure: a predecessor of the seven-penny, but better written: comparison with the popular novels of a previous generation. Stevenson and the short story. Read: *Treasure Island*, *Kidnapped*, *Markheim*.

Stevenson as an essayist and letter writer. His philosophy of life. Read: *Vailima Letters*, *Travels with a Donkey*, *Virginibus Puerisque*.

Stevenson as a poet. Read: *A Child's Garden*, collected Poems.

VIII. THE "NINETIES"

Characteristics of the group of the "Yellow Book." Influence of Walter Pater. Their attitude toward life. Some personalities: Wilde, Ernest Dowson, Lionel Johnson, Aubrey Beardsley, Francis Thompson, W. B. Yeats, and Bernard Shaw (in his earlier phase). The "Celtic Movement": Yeats, Synge, A. E., Fiona Macleod. Read: Oscar Wilde: *Intentions, The Importance of Being Ernest, The Ballad of Reading Gaol*. Selected poems of Dowson, Johnson, Thompson, Symons, Yeats, Davidson. Synge: *The Playboy of the Western World*.

IX. THOMAS HARDY

Hardy's conception of tragedy: comparison with Greek tragedy. Importance of the local background of his novels: studies of the effect of circumstance and environment upon character. Relation of man to the world: necessity and chance. The naturalistic attitude in modern fiction and verse. Hardy's philosophy as seen in his poems. Read: *Poems* (Selections).

Hardy as a prose master. Irony, and absence of humour. His style. Relation of plot to character. Analysis of some leading characters. Read: *Jude the Obscure, The Return of the Native, The Mayor of Casterbridge*.

X. CONCLUSION

Comparison of the later part of the nineteenth century with the earlier. Growth of the naturalistic attitude: influence of science. Development of Socialism. Aestheticism. Changes in religious outlook. Different ideals in prose fiction: continental influence. Different ideals in poetry.

SUPPLEMENTARY READING

On Emerson: Oliver Wendell Holmes, *Life of Emerson*; Charles E. Norton, ed. *The Correspondence of Thomas Carlyle and Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1834-72*; Emerson's *Journal* (10 vols) is well worth reading parts of, to obtain a more intimate knowledge of the man.

William Morris: J. W. Mackail, *The Life of William Morris; William Morris and His Circle*; Holbrook Jackson, *William Morris: Craftsman, Socialist*. The best short and comprehensive account of Morris and his work, by a sympathetic critic and disciple, is A. Clutton-Brock's *William Morris*, in the "Home University Library."

Rossetti: William Sharp, *Dante Gabriel Rossetti: A Record and a Study*; A. C. Benson, *Rossetti*; W. M. Rossetti, *Dante Gabriel Rossetti: His Family Letters*.

Swinburne: Edward Thomas, *Algernon Charles Swinburne: A Critical Study*.

Walter Pater: Ferris Greenslet, *Walter Pater*; A. C. Benson, *Walter Pater*; Thomas Wright, *The Life of Walter Pater*.

Samuel Butler: Gilbert Cannan, *Samuel Butler: A Critical Study*.

Stevenson: Walter Raleigh, *Robert Louis Stevenson*.

Wilde: Arthur Ransome, *Oscar Wilde: A Critical Study*.

The Celtic Movement: W. B. Yeats, *Synge and the Ireland of his Time; Poetry and Ireland*; F. L. Bickley, *J. M. Synge and the Irish Dramatic Movement*; Lady Augusta Gregory, *Our Irish Theatre*.

Hardy: H. C. Duffin, *Thomas Hardy: A Study of the Wessex Novels*.

SUGGESTIONS FOR PAPERS

Subjects will be proposed in connection with each lecture, but it is also suggested that those who are specially interested in any particular aspect or phase of later Victorian literature should plan three or more papers on related subjects. In this way writers could be studied who are not directly dealt with in lectures, and reading could be concentrated. Such work might result in papers which could profitably be read before the class. The following are suggested:

Emerson and his Circle (the point of view of Emerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne, etc.).

Socialism in Literature (the various forms of socialism expressed by Ruskin, Morris, Shaw, and others).

"Art for art's sake" (a valuation of this attitude, as shown by Pater, Wilde, Whistler, Arthur Symonds).

Mediaeval influence in poetry and prose (either the mediaeval ideal as expressed by Carlyle, Ruskin, Morris, or mediaeval themes and manners in the verse of Morris, Rossetti, and the Irish poets).

Naturalism (the materialistic view of John Davidson and the fatalism of Hardy).

The Celtic Revival (Yeats, Synge, A. E., and others: nationalism and literature: definition of the Celtic spirit).

The Drama (Shaw, Wilde, Synge, and the Abbey Theatre in Dublin, the influence of Ibsen).

T. S. ELIOT, M.A.

NOTE

1. Concurrent with his lectures on Victorian literature for the London County Council, TSE began the second year of his Southall tutorial in Oct 1917. He wrote to his mother that "they want

me to start with Emerson, go on to Samuel Butler and William Morris, then the Pre-Raphaelites, and so on" (*LI* 216). After the publication of his syllabus, TSE learned that the war, illness, and other misfortunes had reduced the number of students to fifteen; only twelve remained at the beginning of the second term. "I am very busy with my lectures," he wrote to his father, "as I give one on Fridays and one on Mondays, I have hardly finished one before I begin to think of the next. But they cost me far less in effort and time than they used to; I only make a couple of pages of notes now, and I can talk away for an hour or more. . . . The feeling of power which you get by speaking from very brief notes is pleasant. I remember that the first lecture I gave, in Yorkshire, I had written all out and tried to memorise, and when I came to deliver it I found that I had quite enough for two hours talk!" (*LI* 228).

Reflections on Contemporary Poetry [II]

A review of *The Closed Door* (*Portes fermées*), by Jean de Bosschère, with illustrations by the author. Trans. F. S. Flint.

Intro. May Sinclair

London: John Lane, 1917. Pp. xii + 131.

John Davidson: A Story of the Relation of his Ideas to his Poetry,
by Hayim Fineman

Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1916. Pp. 51.

The Egoist, 4 (Oct 1917) 133-34

There is a certain odd resemblance, quite superficial, between some of the poems of Mr. Harold Monro and the *Closed Door* of M. Jean de Bosschère.¹ In Mr. Monro's poems we find a constant slight distortion, a sudden emphasis upon the apparently trivial, which appears at first to be something new and foreign. Mr. Monro arrives at a degree of consistency in a charming flirtation with obscure, semi-philosophic sentiments; he could, for instance, create a pretty fairyland where domestic furniture plays pranks when one's back is turned. With M. de Bosschère there are none of these sidelong glances; he is directly in front of his object; it occupies the fovea. One could elaborate an amusing contrast between "Homère Mare habite sa maison de planches" and Mr. Monro's "Every Thing."² Both poets are concerned with this thesis: the intimacy of the relationship between a man and his personal property. Mr. Monro speaks characteristically in the first person; he states the theory bluntly and reflectively:

Since man has been articulate . . .
He has not understood the little cries
And foreign conversations of the small
Delightful creatures that have followed him
Not far behind;

like an Anglo-Saxon on his first visit to the Continent. His utensils are provided with adjectives which connect them with human emotions—"The

gentle Bed," "The old impetuous Gas," "My independent Pencil," "You, my well-trampled Boots." He reflects on a general situation; de Bosschère concentrates on a single instance. Homère Mare departs:

Pendant quatre saisons Homère voyage
Et dans chaque ville il est un autre personnage;³

lending his house to Pierre, who

a les yeux clairs de l'autruche
Et le cœur moins mystérieux que l'addition.⁴

Homère Mare

n'est pas un prophète ni un critique.
Chaque matin il met lui-même le feu dans l'âtre.
Tout le jour
Il est l'époux du feu,
L'aimé des flammes.⁵

And here neither "*époux*" nor "*aimé*" have any sentimental associations. Before Homère sets upon his travels

Tout est encore Homère
Et Homère est tout cela.⁶

There is no pretence in the poem of a quasi-human relationship. Even when Homère returns to find that

Le feu sourit aux yeux de Pierre, et chante.
Les potiches regardent cet ami aux yeux clairs
Comme des amis se regardent quand il y a trop d'hommes.⁷

M. de Bosschère never employs his thoughts and images in decorating ordinary human sentiments.

M. de Bosschère is in fact almost a pure intellectual; leaving, as if disdainfully, our emotions to form as they will around the situation which his brain has selected. The important thing is not how we are to feel about it, but how it is. De Bosschère's austerity is terrifying. A poet is not a pure intellectual by virtue of any amount of meditation or abstractness or moralizing; the abstract thought of nearly all poets is mediocre enough, and often second-hand. It is better to go to the *De anima* than to the *Purgatorio* for a theory of the soul.⁸ A poet like M. de Bosschère is an intellectual by his obstinate

refusal to adulterate his poetic emotions with human emotions. Instead of refining ordinary human emotion (and I do not mean tepid human emotion, but human however intense—in the crude living state), he aims direct at emotions of art. He thereby limits the number of his readers, and leaves the majority groping for a clue which does not exist. The effect is sometimes an intense frigidity which I find altogether admirable. As might be expected, M. de Bosschère demands a good deal of his reader; and at moments I have felt that his demands exceed my powers of response. In “*La Vieille*,” for example—

Mais cette femme-ci
Est un signe de tous les âges aussi.
Elle est une perle taillée dans une vitrine du British,
Un hameçon palustre,
Et à la fois le délire du Ballet Russe,
La chair sans plus les pensées qui les lacèrent,
[La chair dans le succulent désert d'elle-même]
Un trépané qui mange une pêche,
L'amour noir et sans lyrisme des belles bêtes.⁹

—I feel uncertain; the arrangement does not seem altogether wilful, at all events there is no hoax; but I am not able to follow the development of these images into a logical structure. And in “Ulysses” one does seem a little at the mercy of M. de Bosschère’s caprice. When Ulysses has built his wall

La foule regarde le mur
Il n’y a pas de fenêtres.
“Ulysse n’a pas le droit de se mettre au tombeau.”
Le jeune Franklin s’accroche aux branches du sycomore,
Se hisse, et regarde par dessus le mur.¹⁰

I have not yet been able to assimilate *le jeune Franklin*.

There are places where M. de Bosschère’s method escapes me, and places where he seems to abandon his method or make unworthy use of it, as in “Au Collège.” But in “Gridale” and “Doutes” the author has employed his method with complete success. Gridale is perhaps a child of the nineteenth century; he has not loved the world nor the world him; but he is more than a seedy Lara or an indigent Juan *aux enfers*;¹¹ and his wooden leg is new. He is peculiarly alive in the schoolroom:

Puis on lui charge de montrer le latin à des collégiens.
 Ils n'ont jamais réclamé l'aide de Dieu,
 Ils ignorent qu'il y a un Dieu assis, coi, sur sa chaise cassée;
 Mais ils ont peur, ils craignent ses yeux
 Et sa jambe de bois. . . .
 Une grande clameur s'élève,–
 Les livres volent,–
 Gridale tombe,–
 Du sang passe entre ses lèvres.¹²

I am not sure that M. de Bosschère is as substantial as Jules Romains, or even Henri Franck;¹³ but to ignore him would be a manifest witness of critical decrepitude.

The first serious attempt to estimate the value of John Davidson has come from the University of Pennsylvania.¹⁴ In avoiding the sort of thesis subject which demands merely detective manipulation of small facts, Mr. Fineman tends to the only alternative in University criticism—aerial generalization, as when he says that realism

either became symbolism, and this appealed to an age of increased intensity of commercial production because of the nerve-irritation that symbolic methods of double interpretation and aroused expectancy involved and implied . . . [3]

which is the Symbolist Movement after it has been boiled down in an American University. This, however, is dictated by Mr. (or Dr.) Fineman's conscience; for elsewhere an acute intelligence struggles through his dialect. Mr. Fineman, it is true, is occupied with Davidson's "ideas" rather than with his poetry (which is a very small part of Davidson's verse); and he forces himself to take these ideas as seriously as Davidson did; but he allows many just comments to appear:

desire for propaganda . . . lust for dissemination of doctrine [this is a lamentable abuse of the word "lust"] and . . . passion for scientific detail. . . . He moreover lacked the power of sustained thought. . . . He could interpret well perhaps only one human passion—the search for truth. . . . His attitude towards love was semi-metaphysical from the outset. . . . [47]¹⁵

He observes intelligently:

The poet who composes on the basis of an ethical system that is strange to most of his contemporaries must however either take it for granted that his readers are of the few who have already attained the new point of view and proceed calmly with his work; or, if he wants to appeal to a wider circle, he must pause to denounce the past. . . . If he follows the latter alternative he becomes either a propagandist . . . [39-40]

The truth is that Davidson was a violent Scotch preacher with an occasional passionate flash of exact vision. Mr. Fineman really understands Davidson's weaknesses, though he feels obliged to say:

The poet's point of view, chastened by a philosophical understanding of natural processes [how does an understanding of natural processes chasten the poet's point of view?] enables him to realize the ultimate significance of the details that he employs. . . . [46]¹⁶

Mr. Fineman is probably right in referring to the *Ballad of a Nun* as "an outburst of hysteria" [18].

Davidson, Mr. Fineman says, "proceeds to erect a new dwelling-place for the imagination on the basis of things that are real to modern man" [24]. This is really Davidson's cardinal sin, as well as his virtue; he too often is interested in the dwelling-place rather than in the tenant, who is the same through all ages; I doubt whether Villon would have taken the electron so seriously. Still, there is Dante's astronomy . . . but that was not a very recent theory.¹⁷ A careful study of the nineteenth-century poetry based on "things real to modern man" would be interesting, beginning with Princess Ida and her fluid haze of light;¹⁸ perhaps Mr. Fineman will do it, after studying the method involved in such an extended piece of criticism, say, as Sainte-Beuve's *Life of Chateaubriand*.¹⁹

T. S. E.

NOTES

1. The Belgian Symbolist poet and illustrator Jean de Bosschère (1878-1953), at this time living in London, had been introduced to the American and English public in the *Little Review* (Nov 1916) as "the most 'modern' writer Paris can boast, not excepting Apollinaire," in the word that comes from Ezra Pound" (11). Pound's translation of de Bosschère's illustrated *12 Occupations* (1916) prompted Flint to translate and Sinclair to write the introduction for the volume here reviewed. TSE reviewed Monro's *Strange Meetings* in the previous issue (Sept) of the *Egoist*.

2. Throughout the review TSE quotes from de Bosschère's French text, which faces Flint's English translation ("Homer Marsh Dwells in his House of Planks"); Monro's "Every Thing," quoted in the following lines, is poem number X in *Strange Meetings* (78-80).

3. "For four seasons Homer travels, / And in each town he is another person" (36).

4. "has the bright eyes of the ostrich / And a heart no more mysterious than a column of figures" (34).

5. "is neither a prophet nor a critic. / Each morning, he lights the fire on the hearth himself. / The whole day long / He is the husband of the fire, / The loved of the flames" (33).

6. "[His house, his fire, his tobacco] / Are all Homer still, / And Homer is all these" (35).

7. "The fire smiles into Peter's eyes, and sings. / The pots gaze at this friend with the bright eyes / As friends gaze one at the other where there are too many men" (39).

8. In Dante's *Purgatorio* (XVI.85-93), Marco Lombardo outlines his theory of the soul, which is based on Aristotle's *De anima*.

9. From "The Old Woman" (the bracketed line was dropped in TSE's transcription): "But this woman here / Is a sign of all the ages also: / She is a carved pearl in a British Museum showcase, / A palustral fish-hook, / And at the same time the delirium of the Russian Ballet, / Flesh without the thoughts that tear it, / Flesh in the succulent desert of itself, / A trepanned man eating a peach, / The black, unlyrical love of beautiful beasts" (129, [130]).

10. From "Ulysse bâtit son lit" ("Ulysses Builds his Bed"): "The crowd looks at the wall / There are no windows in it. / 'Ulysses has no right to entomb himself.' / Young Franklin clutches the branches of the sycamore, / Hoists himself, and looks over the wall" (55).

11. TSE alludes to the Byronic hero introduced in *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* I and II (1812) and thereafter developed in *Lara* (1814), *Childe Harold* III and IV (1816, 1818), and *Don Juan* (unfinished at Byron's death in 1824). "I have not loved the world, nor the world me" is the opening line of two stanzas (CXIII, CXIV) of *Childe Harold* IV. The Byronic hero was further developed by Baudelaire in "Don Juan aux enfers" from *Les Fleurs du mal* (1857).

12. "And they set him to teach Latin to schoolboys. / They had never asked God's aid; / They did not know that there is a God sitting quietly on his broken chair; / But they were afraid; they feared his eyes / And his wooden leg. . . . A great clamour broke out, - / Books flew, - / Gridale fell, - / Blood flowed from his lips (69, [71]).

13. Jules Romains (1885-1972), founder of the French Unanimism literary movement, as expressed in his universalist poems, *La Vie unanime* (1908), was made known to TSE through Pound, who had championed him since reviewing his *Odes et prières* in *Poetry* (Aug 1913) and who was presently writing about Romains for a series in the *Little Review* entitled "A Study of French Poets" (1918). Through Pound's efforts, Romains became French editor of the *Little Review* in Sept 1918. The untimely death of the promising French poet Henri Franck (1888-1912), whose *La Danse devant l'arche* appeared in 1912, had been announced in *Poetry* in Dec 1912.

14. This study of the Scottish poet John Davidson (1857-1909) originated as the doctoral thesis (1916) of Hayim Fineman (1884-1959) at the University of Pennsylvania. Fineman went on to teach at Temple University and to become a prominent Zionist. Davidson had been a favorite of the young TSE, who especially admired Davidson's "Thirty Bob a Week," and later testified to its importance in his development: "Now I admire other poems of Davidson very much indeed. . . . but it is *Thirty Bob a Week* which made a terrific impact on me . . . I think it prepared me for initiation into the work of some of the French symbolists, such as Laforgue, whom I came across shortly after. But *Thirty Bob a Week* has a very important place in the development of my own poetic technique" (*Saltire Review*, 4 [Summer 1957], 57).

15. TSE's bracketed comment.

16. TSE's bracketed question.

17. TSE brings Dante and lyric poet François Villon (1431-63?) to bear on Davidson's attempt to incorporate scientific detail ("passionate molecules") into his work, which Fineman praises. (34).

18. In *The Princess* (1847), by Alfred, Lord Tennyson (1809-92), Lady Psyche, an assistant to Princess Ida, begins a lecture on injustice in women's history with the line "This world was once a fluid haze of light."

19. In *Chateaubriand et son groupe littéraire sous l'Empire* (2 vols, 1860), Sainte-Beuve maintains that Chateaubriand was the first major critic to recognize that the romantic egotism of such writers as Hugo and the excessive naturalism of novelists such as Balzac would lead literature into decadence.

A review of *A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*,
by Cardinal Mercier and other professors of the Higher
Institute of Philosophy, Louvain. Vol. I. Trans. T. L.
Parker and S. A. Parker. Preface by P. Coffey

London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1916. Pp. xxvi + 573.¹

The International Journal of Ethics, 28 (Oct 1917) 137-38

This work, which will be complete in two volumes, is in large part an abridgment of the well-known Louvain philosophical series, six volumes of which had appeared before the beginning of the war. The present work includes, besides a prefatory introduction to philosophy, Cosmology (by D. Nys), Psychology, Criteriology (Epistemology), and Ontology by Cardinal Mercier.² The second volume will contain Natural Theology, Logic, Ethics, and History of Philosophy.

No student of contemporary philosophy can afford to neglect the neo-scholastic movement since 1879. Great efforts have been made to bring the teaching of Aquinas up to date, and, as in Walker's *Theories of Knowledge*, the non-Romanist philosopher will find his colleagues recognised and dealt with.³ The *Manual* is decorated with four physiological plates, and Evolution receives five pages. Physical theories, which are divided into dynamism, represented by Leibniz, Kant, Boscovich and others, and energism, represented by Ostwald, Mach, Duhem and others, are discussed at greater length.⁴ The reader who wishes to see how a modern philosopher is handled should turn to page 381 for a refutation of Kant.⁵ While the book should benefit especially those who have been accustomed to underrate Aristotle, it should be in the hands of all philosophers who do not know the larger, but incomplete work. The translation appears to be good, and the book is very well printed.

T. S. E.

NOTES

1. Cardinal Désiré-Joseph Mercier (1851-1926), professor of theology at the University of Louvain in Belgium, was the leader of the late nineteenth-century revival of the study of Thomas Aquinas (Neo-Scholasticism) in Europe. In 1882, as professor of Thomistic philosophy at the

university, he founded the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, a center for studies of Aquinas in relation to modern philosophy and science; he was the founding editor of the *Revue Néo-Scholastique* and the editor of the Louvain series on Neo-Scholasticism. The second volume of the *Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy* appeared in 1917. Peter Coffey (1876-1943), professor of logic and metaphysics at Maynooth College, Ireland, was the author of *Epistemology; or, The Theory of Knowledge* (2 vols, 1917), which TSE reviewed for the *NS* in December.

2. The Neo-Thomist Désiré Nys (1859-1927), professor of cosmology at the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie and author of *Cosmologie* (Louvain, 1903), was a close associate of Cardinal Mercier.

3. L. J. Walker (1877-1958) was the author of *Theories of Knowledge: Absolutism, Pragmatism, Realism* (1910).

4. Dynamism, as developed by Leibniz and extended by Kant, explains the material world in terms of active forces with no extension but with action at a distance. The Jesuit philosopher-physicist R. J. Bosovich (1711-87) supported dynamism in *Theoria philosophiae naturalis* (1763). Energism, the theory that energy, made up of quantity and intensity, is the all-encompassing reality, was proposed by the German chemist Wilhelm Ostwald (1853-1932), author of *L'Énergie* (1910), and supported by the Austrian physicist Ernst Mach (1838-1916). The French physicist Pierre Maurice Duhem (1861-1916), whose main contributions were in the fields of thermodynamics, also held to a dynamic conception of the universe.

5. Mercier analyzes Kant's defense of *a priori truth*, focusing on his argument that "in all knowledge, . . . there are elements that are neither particular nor contingent but universal and necessary, namely *time* and *space*." In several brief paragraphs, Mercier refutes Kant's position, concluding "that time and space . . . are actually furnished by experience" (381-83).

A review of “The Meaning of ‘the Universe,’ ” by Charles E. Hooper. *Mind*, 26 (Apr 1917), 129-45.¹

The Monist, 27 (Oct 1917), 635-37

C. E. Hooper publishes “The Meaning of ‘the Universe’ ” (*Mind*, April 1917), the first installment of an article of massive appearance. The definition is as follows: the *Universe* means the totality of real thought-objects (or object-matters) considered under four related aspects: (1) space, (2) time, (3) the variety in unity of natural characters, i.e., real thought-objects as particulars having natures of their own, but natures agreeing in various specific and generic respects with the natures of other particulars, (4) unity in variety of natural causation. Time and space are both objective. Mr. Hooper goes on to define thought-object, reality, and aspect. A thought-object is apparently an *intended* object, whether or not a reality corresponds to the intention (e.g., Kant’s *noumenon*). Reality is contrasted not with appearance but with “mental figment,” and includes subsistent as well as existent objects. It is difficult to tell how far the term “thought-object” has an idealistic bias in Mr. Hooper’s mind, but reality, at all events, seems to be merely a sum or system of objects which are severally real. The universe is thus a real thought which contains all other real thought-objects in their manifold relations. *Symbolic* entities (ideas, signs) are comprehended, but whether *per se* or only as reflected upon (made objects of thought) is not stated. It would seem that imaginary or inconceivable thought-objects, such as Meinong’s pets, the golden mountain, and the round square, are to have no place in the universe, but are discarded as “figments.”² While the universe contains finite thought-objects and symbols, it does so only in fact, not in nature. Of the four modes or aspects, space and time may be classed together as *coincidentals*, while the systems of natural characters and natural causation may be termed *co-essentials*. On the other hand space and nature may be classed together as static, time and causation as dynamic. We find some difficulty in understanding how Mr. Hooper accounts for the universe’s being known at all. “The universe cannot, like a finite object, be actually related to some fellow object. It is as related to the mind or system of subjective ideas that we know all that is possible to know about it” [141-42]. But the “mind” if

genuinely symbolic is a thought-object: and if the universe cannot be related to a finite object which is part of itself, we do not know how it can be related to the mind. But criticism of so substantial an article should be deferred until its completion in succeeding issues.

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NOTES

1. TSE reviewed three articles from *Mind*, 26 (Apr 1917), of which this is the first, for the Oct issue of *The Monist*. Charles E. Hooper was a founder and secretary (1899-1913) of the English Rationalist Press Association, formed in 1899 to promote publications that support rationalism and free inquiry in the humanities. His books include *The Anatomy of Knowledge* (1906) and *Common Sense* (1913).

2. In *Über Gegenstandstheorie* (1904) [Theory of Objects], Meinong defines an object as anything toward which a mental act can be directed. Since impossible things like unicorns, golden mountains, and round squares can be imagined, they must have some sort of being. Meinong's theory of objects is discussed in chapter 4 of TSE's dissertation (313 ff.).

A review of “Lotze, Bradley, and Bosanquet,”
by Agnes Cuming. *Mind*, 26 (Apr 1917), 162-70.¹

The Monist, 27 (Oct 1917) 635-37

Agnes Cuming (“Lotze, Bradley, and Bosanquet,” *Mind*, April 1917) declares Lotze’s logic to be a partial revolt against the intellectualism of Hegel.² Our intelligent experience, according to Lotze, is only a small part of the real world and thought is only a small part of our intelligent experience. Thought is a tool, a substitute for adequate perceptive intuition. Bradley’s and Bosanquet’s logic are similar in so far as each is influenced by Lotze. They hold an almost identical definition of “idea,” and agree in their theories of judgment. Bradley however arrives at reality ontologically and Bosanquet epistemologically. “Knowledge for Bosanquet is the system of reality progressively demonstrated before our eyes. . . . In this emphasis on System as the postulate of knowledge . . . Bosanquet is in advance of Bradley” [166]. Lotze insists on feeling as a criterion, and is thus very far from Bosanquet with his conception of system, but he admits the essential of Bosanquet’s position, which is the inadequacy of feeling. Lotze is a dualist: he divides sharply the feeling which supplies the material from thought, exercising a formal activity upon it. In Bradley the dualism becomes a gloomy scepticism; thought and its object are forever sundered. But Bosanquet bridges the gulf. In both Bosanquet and Bradley the separation of thought and reality is inherited from Lotze with his idea of the “scaffold” of thought [164]. The only possible criterion of knowledge is immanent—a criticism of a lower from a higher point of view. Miss Cuming considers that Bosanquet has improved upon both Lotze and Bradley; the direction which she believes to be progress seems to be almost a return to more orthodox Hegelianism.

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NOTES

1. Agnes Cuming (1890-1962), educated at Oxford in philosophy, was a senior assistant in the Bodleian Library at the time she wrote this article. In 1929, she became the first librarian of University College Hull (Yorkshire).

2. Rudolf Hermann Lotze (1817-81) was a transitional thinker connecting the German idealism of Hegel and the British idealism of Bradley and Bosanquet. His *Logic, in Three Books: of Thought, of Investigation, and of Knowledge* (1874) and his *Metaphysic, in Three Books: Ontology, Cosmology, and Psychology* (1879), edited and (with others) translated into English by Bosanquet, was published in 1884 (Oxford UP).

A review of “Schopenhauer and Individuality,” by
Bertram M. Laing. *Mind*, 26 (Apr 1917), 171-87.¹

The Monist, 27 (Oct 1917), 635-37

In the same number, B. M. Laing (“Schopenhauer and Individuality”) considers that Schopenhauer fails to appreciate the metaphysical claims of individuality. He dethrones reason, making it a mere temporary organ of the will. He interprets Kant in such a way as to make Kant assert that the mind creates the world of things, instead of merely conditioning it. This perversion of the Kantian doctrine leads Schopenhauer to hold (in contrast to Kant) that the world of space and time is an illusion. Hence he is unable to conserve individuality, and tends to confuse individuality with (temporal and spatial) individuation. Schopenhauer’s monism is a mere prejudice against multiplicity, and his will a pure abstraction. Furthermore, he confuses the will with bodily wants and cravings. Schopenhauer exposes himself on every side to such destructive criticism, but while Mr. Laing seizes upon some of his weakest points in his interpretation of Kant, the view of individuality which Schopenhauer represents, and which is more abiding than Schopenhauer, cannot be said to be demolished.

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NOTE

1. Bertram M. Laing (1887-1960), lecturer in philosophy at the University of Sheffield, was at this time the author of articles on Nietzsche. In referring to the “same number” in the opening sentence, TSE reminds the reader that this is his third review of articles in the Apr issue of *Mind*.

Reflections on Contemporary Poetry [III]

A review of *The New Poetry: An Anthology*,

ed. Harriet Monroe and Alice Corbin Henderson

New York: Macmillan, 1917. Pp. xxxi + 404.¹

The Egoist, 4 (Nov 1917) 151

Each of us, even the most gifted, can find room in his brain for hardly more than two or three new ideas, or ideas so perfectly assimilated as to be original; for an idea is a speciality, and no one has time for more than a few. With these, or with one, say, hexagonal or octagonal idea, each sets to work and industriously and obliviously begins building cells; not rebelling against the square or the circle, but occasionally coming into collision with some other Bee which has rectangular or circular ideas. All the ideas, beliefs, modes of feeling and behaviour which we have not time or inclination to investigate for ourselves we take second-hand and sometimes call Tradition.^{2*} We cannot change much; the point is to do a good job where we can. In literature especially, the innovations which we can consciously and collectively aim to introduce are few, and mostly technical. The main thing is to be quite certain what these are.

The title of Miss Monroe's anthology, and her interesting and admirable introduction, and the inspection of the forces she has mustered, lead me to wonder whether a whole generation can arise together and insurrect, as this introduction leads me to believe that it has insurrected. Perhaps the word is invidious, but there is certainly a hit at the Victorian Age *in toto*. And the struggle is one in which much more appears to be involved than technical form (many of the poets included adhere closely to conventional forms): "The new poetry strives for a concrete and immediate realization of life; it would discard the theory, the abstraction, the remoteness, found in all classics not of the first order" [vi]. There is the demand for a "style like speech . . . like a cry from the heart."³

Certainly if a spontaneous revolution is possible, if it is possible for a whole generation, and not merely an isolated individual here and there, to arise as one man to wring the neck of rhetoric, one would expect, as is indeed the case, that the various volunteers should come variously armed. Among

these forces we find Mr. Masfield, provided with his marline-spike, and Mr. Gibson, with a knitting-needle, and every description of weapon between the two.⁴ It may be possible to assemble such incongruous allies in a common cause; it is possible that once assembled they appear only to march up the hill and down again; it is also possible that among a whole petrified host a few Davids may be found.⁵ But not to pursue a tedious metaphor, I find a certain discrepancy between the introduction to the book and the contents. The Introduction, which makes many excellent points which are worth making, is cut large, but not large enough to cover everybody; it is made so large that it obscures rather than exploits the distinct technical triumphs of certain poets and the distinct individuality of certain among these. This, I am sure, is due to no lack of understanding on the editors' part as to what has been accomplished; it is due rather to a generous desire to recruit forces. The result is, however, that there are three several criticisms to be passed: one on the Introduction, one on the merits of a number of individual poems of importance, and one on the anthology as an anthology. As to the last point, the book has emphatically permanent value. An anthology of contemporary verse can be a document of great importance for future generations. It ought not to contain many good poems, but a few; and it ought to embalm a great many bad poems (but bad in a significant way) which would otherwise perish. Bad poems, from this point of view, need to be as carefully chosen as good; Miss Monroe and Mrs. Henderson have chosen wisely. Most anthologies exhibit only the vices of a particular sect; and the badness of a poem is immeasurably heightened, the reader's vision clarified and his mind instructed, when bad poems of totally different types are set off against each other.

The resultant impression is a unique picture of a very chaotic world indeed; a world prevailingly *Yanqui*, but all the more interesting for that.⁶ One thinks of Henry James asking his way of an Italian mill-hand in the streets of Salem.⁷

There are certain poems which have been much admired, which I have not been able to admire; among these the poems of Mr. Vachel Lindsay. I cannot take "The Congo" seriously. Yet I am sure that they are rightly included, and provide one among several American types the contrast of which is entertaining. For example, there is the New England of Mr. Frost: from a cosmopolitan point of view it is a little belated; but considered at closer range it is not quite the New England of the previous generation, or quite of anybody but Mr. Frost, and it is not a New England of ghosts; Mr.

Frost has done something on his own. Then there is the rural Middle-West of Mr. Masters. Selection is unfair to Masters, but the selection is well made. And there is the hard Semitic bitterness of Mr. Bodenheim, who has not all the qualities of a poet, but some of them in an exceptionally high degree.⁸ There are others whose merits are less purely national. Skipwith Cannéll is represented by what I believe are his two best poems, "The Red Bridge" and "The King," brilliant *tours de force*, perhaps in their success a definition of the author's talent. Miss Lowell's "City of Falling Leaves" has given me great pleasure by its precision of image and its skill in workmanship. Mrs. Henderson's work has very considerable merits which I had previously overlooked. H.D. is well represented, more fairly than Aldington, whose "Via Sistina" is a regretted absentee. Fletcher is pretty well covered. The "Goodly Fere" of Mr. Pound was, I suppose, inevitable, but I should have preferred the "Canzon of Incense."⁹ Of English poets, Mr. Hueffer is well illustrated by the only good poem I have met with on the subject of the war; Harold Monro is at his best in the "Strange Companion"; Lawrence, a poet of quite peculiar genius and peculiar faults, comes off badly; and Rupert Brooke is not absent.¹⁰ On the whole, the selections are remarkably well made.

But as for the escape from rhetoric—there is a great push at the door, and some cases of suffocation. But what is rhetoric? The test seems unsatisfactory. There is rhetoric even among the new poets. Furthermore, I am inclined to believe that Tennyson's verse is a "cry from the heart"—only it is the heart of Tennyson, Latitudinarian, Whig, Laureate. The style of William Morris is a "style like speech," only it is the speech of Morris, and therefore rather poor stuff. The *Idylls of the King* sound often like Tennyson talking to Queen Victoria in heaven; and *The Earthly Paradise* like an idealized Morris talking to an idealized Burne-Jones.¹¹ The writers in *The New Poetry* who have avoided rhetoric, and there is, after all, a larger number than there could have been in an anthology of the last generation, have done so chiefly by the exercise, in greater or less degree, of intelligence, of which an important function is the discernment of exactly what, and how much, we feel in any given situation.

T. S. E.

NOTES

1. Harriet Monroe (1860-1936) and Alice Corbin Henderson (1881-1949) were editors of *Poetry: A Magazine of Verse* (Chicago), founded by Monroe in Oct 1912. TSE's "Portrait of a Lady" is included in the anthology. Monroe had asked him for permission to include "The Love

Song of J. Alfred Prufrock,” first published in *Poetry* in June 1915, but he declined on grounds that he did not want it to be reprinted before it appeared in a book (*LI* 148).

2*. TSE’s note: “For an authoritative condemnation of theories attaching extreme importance to tradition as a criterion of truth, see Pope Gregory XVI’s encyclical *Singulari nos* (July 15, 1834), and the Vatican Council canon of 1870, *Si quis dixerit . . . anathema sit.*”

3. Monroe quotes from Yeats’s criticism of Victorian rhetoric in his lecture on “Contemporary Lyric Poets,” delivered at the *Poetry Banquet* in his honor in Chicago on 1 Mar 1914: “We were weary of all this. We wanted to get rid not only of rhetoric but of poetic diction. We tried to strip away everything that was artificial, to get a style like speech, as simple as the simplest prose, like a cry of the heart” (ix).

4. Published in the third year of WWI and containing numerous war poems, the anthology is reviewed by TSE as part of a mock-epic battle between the Victorians and variously armed new poets. John Masefield (1878-1967), in his youth an apprenticed seaman, is represented by poems from his *Salt Water Ballads* (1902); Wilfred Gibson (1878-1962), who was known for his war poetry, was represented by poems from Georgian anthologies and from his *Battle and Other Poems* (1916).

5. The Biblical hero David, armed with five stones and a sling, felled the giant Goliath with a shot to his head (I Samuel 17).

6. Yanqui: Spanish spelling of Yankee.

7. In chapter 8, part 2, of *The American Scene* (1907), Henry James recalls his visit to Concord and Salem. In need of directions, he looks for an “indigenous spirit,” encountering instead an Italian mill-hand. “So, inevitably, at Salem, when . . . I asked my way to the House of the Seven Gables, the young man I had overtaken . . . stared at me as a remorseless Italian . . . On that spot . . . I confess, it was a particular shock to me to be . . . so ‘put off’” by the young man’s “frank ignorance of the monument I named.”

8. TSE’s examples of American regionalists include the midwesterners Vachel Lindsay (1879-1931) author of *The Congo and Other Poems* (1915), and Edgar Lee Masters, author of the *Spoon River Anthology* (1915). The seven poems of Robert Frost (1874-1963), taken from *A Boy’s Will* (1913) and *North of Boston* (1914), depict rural New England; and the six poems of Maxwell Bodenheim (1893-1954), including “The Old Jew,” depict the city of Chicago.

9. TSE’s examples of more cosmopolitan American work, mostly Imagist, include two poems by Skipwith Cannell (1887-1957), both of which had appeared in *Others: An Anthology of New Verse* (1916); “The City of Falling Leaves” and other poems by Amy Lowell (1874-1925) from *A Dome of Many-Coloured Glass* (1912) and *Sword Blades and Poppy Seed* (1914); and ten poems by Alice Corbin Henderson from *The Spinning Woman from the Sky* (1914). The seven poems by H.D. were selected from *Sea Garden* (1916) and the four by Aldington were from *Images* (1915), a collection that also included his “In the Via Sistina.” The four by John Gould Fletcher (1886-1950) were selected from *Irradiations* (1916) and *Goblins and Pagodas* (1916), and the twenty by Pound, who was the foreign correspondent of *Poetry*, included his popular “Ballad of the Goodly Fere,” which had been published in 1909 in the *English Review*.

10. TSE’s catalog concludes with English poets: Ford Madox Hueffer (after the war: Ford Madox Ford, 1873-1939), whose “Antwerp I-IV,” was taken from his *Antwerp* (1915); Harold Monro, whose “The Strange Companion” had appeared in his *Children of Love* (1914); Lawrence,

whose five poems in the anthology are from *Amores* (1916); and Brooke, represented by six pieces from his *Collected Poems* (1916).

11. The Victorians, representing the old guard in Miss Monroe's revolution, include Tennyson, William Morris (1834-96) and Sir Edward Burne-Jones (1833-98). As Poet Laureate for nearly half a century (1850-92) and Queen Victoria's favorite poet, Tennyson was Victorian-in-Chief in the battle of the poets. His *Idylls of the King* (1856-85), a cycle of twelve narrative poems on the legend of King Arthur, is often read as an allegory of Victorian ideals. As leaders in the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood, the multitalented Morris—painter, designer, poet—and his fellow artist Burne-Jones created works typifying high Victorian style in the decorative arts. Morris's multivolume *The Earthly Paradise* (1868-70) is a collection of verse narratives told by a group of fourteenth-century Norwegian wanderers, who, in their fruitless search for the land of eternal youth, land on the shores of "a nameless city in a distant sea." There follows a series of banquets at which one of the Norsemen tells a medieval tale and one of the hosts responds with a classical tale.

Pseudonymous letters for *The Egoist*¹

The Egoist, 4 (Dec 1917) 165

We invite critical comment from our readers, and we regret that lack of space prevents us from printing more than excerpts from the following letters:

Your writer on “Elizabethan Classicists” struck me, if I may say so without offence, as straining with youthful zeal after original opinions. His attempted rehabilitation of Ovid merely shows that the true taste for the Classics has gone out with the old classical curriculum; and as for his belittling of Milton—well, I do not believe that he could get a single one of the living Masters of criticism (Mr. Edmund Gosse, for example, or Sir Sidney Colvin) to even entertain such views.²

J. A. D. Spence / Thridlingston Grammar School.

... I have, I pride myself, kept abreast of the times in literature; at least, if I have not, the times have moved very speedily indeed. I was therefore surprised, in what was otherwise an intelligent review (so far as I can judge, without having read the authors mentioned), to find Rupert Brooke dismissed abruptly with the words “He is not absent.”³ Brooke’s early poems exhibit a youthful exuberance of passion and an occasional coarseness of utterance, which offended finer tastes; but these were but dross which, as his last sonnets show, was purged away (if I may be permitted this word) in the fire of the Great Ordeal which is proving the well-spring of a Renaissance of English poetry.

Helen B. Trundlett / Batton, Kent.

... There was a serious and instructive article on Constantinople by a Mr. Symons which I greatly enjoyed. It is good for us to keep our minds open and liberal by contemplation of foreign ways, and though the *danse du ventre* is repellant to the British imagination, we ought to know that these things exist. I cannot speak so pleasantly of Mr. Lewis’s...⁴

Charles James Grimble / The Vicarage, Leays.

... The philosophical articles interest me enormously; though they make me reflect that much water has flowed under many bridges since the days of my dear old Oxford tutor, Thomas Hill Green. And I am accustomed

to more documentation; I like to know where writers get their ideas from. . . .⁵

Charles Augustus Conybeare / The Carlton Club, Liverpool.

. . . Is not Mr. Lewis's objection to the Grin really a slur upon the cheery philosophy of our brave boys in the trenches, which has been so happily caught by the witty pen of Capt. Bairnsfather? And we all know that a little nonsense now and then . . .⁶

Muriel A. Schwarz / 60 Alexandra Gardens, Hampstead, N.W.

NOTES

1. As filler for the Dec issue, TSE composed these whimsical "extracts," purportedly from letters written by readers of recent articles in the *Egoist*.

2. In the Oct issue, in the second of his three-part essay on "Elizabethan Classicists," Pound praises Arthur Golding's 1567 translation of *Metamorphoses* by Ovid (43 BC-17 AD) and rails against Milton, asserting that "we have long since fallen under the blight of the Miltonic or noise tradition, to a stilted dialect in translating the classics, a dialect which imitates the idiom of the ancients rather than seeking their meaning" (135). Pound continues in part 3 (Nov 1917) with an assault on Milton's character and his Latinization of English verse: "I am leaving apart all my disgust with what he has to say, his asinine bigotry, his beastly hebraism, the coarseness of his mentality, I am dealing with a technical matter" (154). The literary and art critics Edmund Gosse (1849-1928) and Sidney Colvin (1845-1927) had recently retired as, respectively, librarian of the House of Lords, and keeper of prints and drawings at the British Museum.

3. In the previous issue, TSE had reviewed *The New Poetry* ("Reflections on Contemporary Poetry [III]"), remarking of Brooke only that he "is not absent" in the anthology.

4. In "Notes Taken in Constantinople and Sofia," in the Nov issue, Symons graphically describes a *danse du ventre* by a handsome Turkish girl: "then the arms quivered to the fingers and the breasts leapt; then a writhing of the loins; then a sort of wavelike movement sent up in turn from each leg . . . at times she crossed a small section of the stage, wriggling her feet almost imperceptibly, while several thrills followed each other" (154). The closing ellipsis refers to the final chapter and epilogue of the serialized novel *Tarr* (152-53) by Wyndham Lewis.

5. The extract refers to the philosophical and psychophysical chapters from Dora Marsden's *Lingual Psychology*, serialized in the *Egoist* from July 1916. Green was Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford and a central figure in TSE's graduate education at Harvard and Oxford.

6. In the epilogue to *Tarr*, written for the serialized version in the *Egoist*, Lewis states that English artists should appeal to their fellow-citizens: "That the maudlin and the self-defensive Grin should be dropped" and "That the Englishman should become ashamed of his Grin as he is at present ashamed of solemnity. That he should cease to be ashamed of his 'feelings': then he would automatically become less proud of his Grin" (153). The war cartoonist Captain Bruce Bairnsfather (1887-1959) and his fellow officer-comedian Captain Arthur Eliot had opened their popular musical comedy, *The Better 'Ole*, in London's Oxford Music Hall in Aug 1917.

Turgenev

A review of *Turgenev*, by Edward Garnett

Foreword by Joseph Conrad

London: Collins, 1917. Pp. xiv + 206.¹

The Egoist, 4 (Dec 1917) 167

The cosmopolitan is not a popular type. The *Conversations with Eckermann*, though Sainte-Beuve hardly judges Goethe by anything else, are not much read; and it is in these, rather than in his better-read works, that Goethe most nearly approaches an ideal that he has been credited with realizing.² Turgenev, much more cosmopolitan than Goethe, is the least exploited of the Russian novelists; this book is perhaps the first serious study of him in English. The book has both the merits and defects of pioneer work. As the first book on the subject, it contains just the necessary information; taking up the novels one by one and sketching their genesis and accounting for the ideas which went into them. As is natural, Mr. Garnett is a little too conscious of Turgenev's "critics and detractors";³ these have been mostly detractors rather than critics, and the chapter on them can be skipped. The rest of the book is very good: it enables a reader of Turgenev to see the novels in relation to each other, and the relation of the characters in different novels. It invites us (and its concise brevity is an added provocation) to consider the work of Turgenev as a single work, the art of Turgenev as steady and laborious construction, not a series of scattered inspirations.

Mr. Garnett has probably been impelled by the consciousness that this is the first book on the subject to impose certain limitations on his task. "The discussion of technical beauties," he says, "is not only a thankless business, but tends to defeat its own object. It is better to seek to appreciate the spirit of a master, and to dwell on his human value rather than on his aesthetic originality" [22-23]. But a patient examination of an artist's method and form (not by haphazard detection of "technical beauties") is exactly the surest way to his "human value"; is exactly the business of the critic. Not that Mr. Garnett evades the duty of analysis; his appreciation of detail is keen; but he leaves us without attempting to settle the relation of Turgenev's

literary form to his human position as an incarnation of European culture.

Henry James, in one of his charming conversational portraits, says of Turgenev that

he carried about with him the air of feeling all the variety of life, of knowing strange and far-off things, of having an horizon in which the Parisian horizon . . . easily lost itself . . . He was not all there, as the phrase is; he had something behind, in reserve.⁴

And this was after Turgenev had had many years of Paris. Turgenev was, in fact, a perfect example of the benefits of transplantation; there was nothing lost by it; he understood at once how to take Paris, how to make use of it. A position which for a smaller man may be merely a compromise, or a means of disappearance, was for Turgenev (who knew how to maintain the rôle of foreigner with integrity) a source of authority, in addressing either Russian or European; authority but also isolation. He has a position which he literally made for himself, and indeed almost may be said to have invented. It is not a position of popular appeal, as he neither aped French writing nor exploited the Russian backwater. He used Russian material naturally, with the simplicity of genius turning to what its feelings know best; he recognized, in practice at least, that a writer's art must be racial—which means, in plain words, that it must be based on the accumulated sensations of the first twenty-one years. But he combined in the highest degree the insight into the universal sameness of men and women with appreciation of the importance of their superficial variations. He saw these variations—the Russian variations—as the artist and not as the showman.

This grasp on the uniformity of human nature and this interest in its variations made Turgenev cosmopolitan and made him a critic. He did not acquire these two qualities in Paris, he brought them with him. Turgenev's peculiarly critical genius made the *conte*, not the novel, his proper form. All his books are elaborated *contes*, and the form is already *given* in the *Sportsman's Sketches*.⁵ Turgenev could not get lost in a character, could not become possessed by the illusion that any particular creation was, for the time being, the centre of the universe. His detail, therefore, is not that of exaggeration of the trivial in an abnormally stimulated consciousness, but is really a way of setting the balance right. Hence the importance of the frequent interruptions of external nature, an interruption which always comes to correct the seriousness of life with the seriousness of art.

The lightning never ceased for an instant; it was what is called among the peasants a *sparrow night*.⁶

Some of Turgenev's personages are concretions of Russian provincialism, or Russian vanity, or Russian laziness or weakness or stupidity, some like Sanin and Maria Nikolaevna are general human types;⁷ they are all the perfect outlines of *conte* figures; often the outline is drawn for you in the first page or two (Panshin, for instance).⁸ They are never unreal or abstract, but simply the essential. I am not sure that the method of Turgenev—this perfect proportion, this vigilant but never theoretic intelligence, this austere art of omission—is not that which in the end proves most satisfying to the civilized mind.

T. S. E.

NOTES

1. Edward Garnett (1868-1937) was an influential editor and critic: he brought Joseph Conrad (1857-1924) and Ford Madox Ford together for their first collaboration on *The Inheritors* for Heinemann; he placed Lawrence's *Sons and Lovers* at Duckworth; and he rejected Joyce's *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* for that firm. In writing this book on Ivan Turgenev (1818-83) in English, he was indebted to his wife, Constance Garnett, the translator of Turgenev and other Russian writers.

2. TSE alludes to the nineteenth-century ideal of cosmopolitanism, championed by Sainte-Beuve against what some considered the narrow nationalistic focus of the early Romantics. The ideal was consistent with the theory of *Weltliteratur* [World Literature] outlined by Goethe, who praised cosmopolitanism in his conversations with Johann P. Eckermann (*Gespräche mit Goethe*, 1836, 1848). In Oct 1862, Sainte-Beuve devoted two of his "Causeries du lundi" ["Monday chats"] to Goethe's conversations with Eckermann ("Entretiens de Goethe et d'Eckermann"). TSE owned two volumes of the conversations (*LI* 487), and in a June 1930 letter to Paul Elmer More, confessed, "I am completely blind to the poetry of Goethe, except a few lyrics. The only Goethe whom I cherish and have found useful is the Goethe of Eckermann" (Princeton).

3. "Critics and Detractors" is the title of the first chapter.

4. *Partial Portraits* (London: Macmillan, 1888), 304. TSE has altered the syntax of the quotation: "It was this air that he carried about with him . . ."

5. Turgenev's two-volume collection of *contes* [stories], *A Sportsman's Sketches* (1852), was first translated under this title by Constance Garnett in 1895.

6. Turgenev, *The Torrents of Spring* (1871), trans. Constance Garnett (London: Heinemann, 1906), 277. TSE had a reprint (1912) of this edition, signed and dated "T. S. Eliot / 1915."

7. In *The Torrents of Spring*, the youthful Sanin is seduced by Maria Nikolaevna, "huntress of men," whom Garnett describes as "one of the most triumphant feminine portraits in the whole range of fiction. The spectator feels that this woman in her ruthless charm is the incarnation of a cruel principle in Nature . . . Her spirit's essence, in all its hard, merciless joy of conquest, is

disclosed by Turgenev in his rapid, yet exhaustive glances at her disdainful treatment of her many lovers, and of her cynical log of a husband" (174).

8. In Turgenev's *A House of Gentlefolk* (1859), Vladimir Panshin is portrayed in the opening page of chapter four as the paragon of the worldly young official and *arriviste* from Petersburg.

Unsigned reviews of poetry by Alan Seeger, Guy Rawlence, Joseph Campbell, and Edward Thomas¹

The Egoist, 4 (Dec 1917) 172-73

Poems, by Alan Seeger. With an introduction by William Archer.
London: Constable, 1917. Pp. xlvii + 174.²

Seeger's poems are not unworthy of the attention they have attracted. The book has not much to offer to the small public which wants nothing twice over, but it has a good deal to give to the public which will take what it likes in any amount. Seeger was serious about his work and spent pains over it. The work is well done, and so much out of date as to be almost a positive quantity. It is high-flown, heavily decorated and solemn, but the solemnity is thoroughgoing, not a mere literary formality. Alan Seeger, as one who knew him can attest, lived his whole life on this plane, with impeccable poetic dignity; everything about him was in keeping. Hence, if his vision seems theatrical, it is sincere. His "Paris" is the Paris of Puccini and Charpentier.³

And painters with big, serious eyes go rapt in dreams, fantastic shapes
In corduroys and Spanish capes and locks uncut and flowing ties. [48]

He lived in Paris: a New Englander, he managed to see Paris in this way.

Seeger is certainly not Georgian, hardly even Victorian; he goes back to the early Keats; and what is still more extraordinary, to the Coleridge of the "Ode to France," with a touch of the eighteenth century, the odes of Collins and Gray.⁴ It is a strange and pleasant literary sensation.

There is a power whose inspiration fills
Nature's fair fabric, sun- and star-inwrought . . .⁵

Covent Garden, and Others, by Guy Rawlence. London: T. Fisher Unwin, [1917]. Pp. 40.⁶

I do not think that Mr. Rawlence has quite recognized all the difficulties of *vers libre*. One is annoyed with him for not having rewritten the small

book before printing it; but one's annoyance is a testimony that something might be expected of him; that he might be better than nine out of ten contemporaries. His verse is often monotonous; he escapes from stiffness such as

... wondrous alchemy ...
 ... The heedless years have fled...⁷

into *gaucherie*

But of course the contrast isn't rare...⁸

or a vague tailing-off

How often have I wondered—times and times.⁹

He has used the word *realize* three times.¹⁰ But the poems are by no means insipid; they are intelligent; *Covent Garden* needs some merciless surgery, but the material is there.

Earth of Cualann, by Joseph Campbell. With twenty-one designs by the author. Dublin: Maunsell, 1917. Pp. [viii] + 62.¹¹

Mr. Campbell is one of the half-dozen or so of writers who are responsible for there being any contemporary poetry. He has established his own style of *vers libre*. There is not in this volume great range, but there is a fine finish. The stuff is Irish, with a peculiar bitter flavour, a dourness, of Mr. Campbell's own. He uses Gaelic names with effect, but none of the poems is simply a whoop from the peat-bog. Sometimes there is an abstract phrase as good as Whitman's good ones. "Antiphon" is very successful; the "Raven's Rock" has imagination. . . .

Who is the boy on horseback?
No stranger to this glen.
Through snowdrifts they hunted me,
As the lame wolf is hunted. . . .

Who is the proud, bearded man?
Shorn by a woman of kingship,
Thus far have I led you,
But set no mark to your journey. [60-61]

It is the best of recent books of verse.

The Tenth Muse, by Edward Thomas. London: Martin Secker [1917]. Pp. i-viii + 142.¹²

The influence of women upon English poets does not seem a very promising subject, but the late Edward Thomas in this little book did it with taste and without exaggeration. Thomas knew English poetry very well; he was distinctly a “literary” man; a man with a taste for books, rather than a critic in the serious French way. Still, this volume is a much more interesting study than it at first appears to be. There is a charming biographical notice by John Freeman; Thomas’s own preface is not exciting. He takes the poets conscientiously from Chaucer to Shelley, and he has not very much to say about the early ones; his Donne is inadequate, and of Marvell he fails to mention one of the finest love-poems in the language. When he comes to Burns, to Byron, to Keats and to Shelley, he is at his best; his Landor is hardly appreciative.¹³ Thomas was evidently a very nice man, and one who was more interested (as Mr. Freeman half suggests) in the “human” side of poets than in their technique, more interested in poets than in poetry. But in his own competence he writes well; shrewdly and pointedly, and without reference to a sentimental or lubricious public; and without any pretentious generalizations.

NOTES

1. “Unsigned, but almost certainly by T. S. Eliot” (Gallup 200).
2. New Yorker Alan Seeger (1888-1916) entered Harvard College as a classmate of TSE in 1906 and became an editor and contributor to the *Harvard Monthly*. After graduation in 1910, he spent two years in New York before moving to Paris to live a bohemian life in the Latin Quarter. Three weeks after the outbreak of war, he joined the French Foreign Legion and served on the Western Front until his death on the Somme on 4 July 1916. In the introduction, the Scottish theater critic and war commentator William Archer (1856-1924) describes Seeger’s death: “charging up to the German trenches, on the field of Belloy-en-Santerre, his ‘escouade’ of the Foreign Legion was caught in a deadly flurry of machine-gun fire, and he fell, with most of his colleagues, on the blood-stained but reconquered soil” (xi).
3. In his most popular opera, *La Bohème* (1896), the Italian composer Giacomo Puccini (1858-1924) featured love affairs between Parisian courtesans and starving artists in bohemian Paris at Christmastime. The French composer Gustave Charpentier (1860-1956), whose *verismo* style resembles that of Puccini, was best known for his opera *Louise* (1900), which portrayed Parisian working-class life through the story of Louise and Julien, a seamstress and an artist. In Archer’s view, Seeger’s Paris “did not belong to the working-day world, but was like Bagdad or Samarcand, a city of Arabian Nights” (xxii).
4. William Collins (1721-59) wrote “Ode to Evening,” “How Sleep the Brave,” and other quiet, melancholy odes on natural subjects, collected in *Odes on Several Descriptive and Allegoric Subjects*

(1746). Thomas Gray (1716-71), like Collins a forerunner of Romanticism, wrote "Ode on a Distant Prospect of Eton College" and the often anthologized "Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard" (1751).

5. The opening lines of Seeger's "An Ode to Natural Beauty" (3).

6. English poet Guy Rawlence (1888-1971) wrote *The Romantic Road* (1914) and other works.

7. The first line is from "Sunset in Italy" (17): "Changed by the sunset's wondrous alchemy"; the second from "Chance" (13): "And that was all, the heedless years have fled."

8. From the last stanza of "Covent Garden" (10).

9. The last line of "Chance" (13).

10. In "Owl" (14): "They made me realize"; in "A Philosophy" (20): "But realize that it lies within our power"; and in "Books" (26): "I don't suppose they ever realize."

11. After the publication of his first volume of poems, *The Rushlight* (1906), the poet and playwright Joseph Campbell (Seosamh Mac Cathmhaoil, 1879-1944) moved from Dublin to London to serve as secretary of the Irish Texts Society. He became associated with T. E. Hulme's Imagist group in 1909, the year in which he published his best-known book of verse, *The Mountainy Singer*. A devotee of Whitman, Campbell was known among the Imagists for the booming declamation of his poems in the Soho restaurant where they gathered.

12. The poet and critic Edward Thomas (1878-1917) fell in France during the Battle of Arras. This volume of criticism, first published in 1912 by Martin Secker, was reissued after Thomas's death, together with "Edward Thomas: A Memoir" by his friend the poet and critic John Freeman (1880-1929).

13. Thomas's survey of English poetry begins with Geoffrey Chaucer (ca. 1343-1400), nods to seventeenth-century poets, such as Andrew Marvell (1621-78) and Donne, and concludes with the Romantics, including Burns, Shelley, Keats, Walter Savage Landor (1775-1864), and George Gordon, Lord Byron (1788-1824).

A Contemporary Thomist

An unsigned review of *Epistemology; or the Theory of Knowledge*, by P. Coffey. 2 vols.

London: Longmans, Green, 1917.¹ Pp. xiv + 374; vii + 376.

The New Statesman, 10 (29 Dec 1917) 312, 314

The library of the New Scholasticism becomes voluminous and formidable, and Father Coffey has written the longest and most detailed treatise of the Theory of Knowledge that has yet come out of his school. It is a handsome and impressive book; it is thorough; and so far as an outsider can judge, quite sound in its interpretation of the tradition. The Theory of Knowledge has been now pretty well covered, so far as English readers are concerned, by the writings of Rickaby, the manuals of Cardinal Mercier, both the longer and the shorter, and by this work of Father Coffey.² The present book shows less familiarity with non-scholastic contemporary philosophy than Father Rickaby's; it is not garnished, like Cardinal Mercier's, with physiological plates; but there are certain sides of the problem, such as the Kantian criticism, which are here treated more fully than by either of the other works mentioned. And the productions of the three men together afford some basis for an attempt to determine the value and significance of modern Catholic thought.

The non-Catholic reader will be unable to avoid a tribute of grave respect to the only Church which can even pretend to maintain a philosophy of its own, a philosophy, as we are increasingly aware, which is succeeding in establishing a claim to be taken quite seriously; on the other hand, the non-Catholic reader of philosophy will by his previous reading be ill prepared for the Scholastic philosophic ideals. Those who have read philosophy with complete detachment from any schools have trained themselves to look for just those aspects of any author which are most personal; have followed with keenest interest his doubts, his prejudices, his hesitations, his confessions, here and there, of failure; have sought always for the peculiar flavour of the man's thought in the man's own words. Every significant philosopher is a man who has had one insight, or two or three, which no one before him has had; one new insight which excuses a hundred new errors. In reading

Aristotle, for instance, we are in touch with a mind that regarded the world quite freshly and independently; when we read him carefully, we discover the world again with him, and find him halting, stumbling, too intent on the truth, at any moment, to be always consistent; sometimes at a dead stop in the face of insuperable difficulties. In the work of the School (and this seems far more true of the modern school than of the mediaeval), we are not conscious of the pioneer spirit. The wilderness is already conquered; it remains only to make the conquest secure, to render the country habitable and fortify it against attack.

Father Coffey's chief enemy is Kant; and against Kant he erects a very powerful barricade.³ When he turns from this discredited philosopher to deal with contemporaries, he is much less successful. His references to contemporaries are infrequent; he overlooks Russell who has insisted that philosophy must proceed from the simple, if it can be found, to the complex; and Bradley, who has insisted that the simple cannot be found. These two writers between them have nearly laid metaphysics in the grave; but there is no reference to either of them in these pages.⁴ Father Coffey handles Pragmatism boldly, and with effect. Pragmatism is perhaps the school of thought which has paid least attention to its defences; and Father Coffey takes full advantage of its difficulties; yet it is possible that he has missed the point. This is not to accuse him of having approached Pragmatism "unsympathetically"—sympathy has been much overrated—it is that he has attacked its weaker sides rather than the central idea which is what makes Pragmatism possible at all. The conception of "utility" has been very loosely used by pragmatists. And of course we can always accuse the pragmatist of believing his own doctrine in a sense which is not pragmatic but absolute—in other words, of eating his cake and having it too. But the essential doctrine of Pragmatism is that Truth is not a simple idea; that the "truth" of any particular proposition *means* a number of other things, its consistency with other "truths," its influence upon our behaviour, its success in leading to a desired end. The error of Pragmatism has often been to treat certain other concepts, like "usefulness" or "success," as if they had the absoluteness denied to truth. Father Coffey seems to approach a kind of Pragmatism himself in discussing the proposition "two plus two is four." The "Divine mind," he says, does not apprehend reality "by comparing abstract, quantitative concepts," but it

sees all reality (including human minds) to be such that the human representation of an aspect of reality by the human judgment "two and two

must be four” is for the human mind the *right and proper* representation of that aspect of reality. (II.226)⁵

It would seem therefore that the truths of mathematics are not true absolutely, but are true merely in the sense that they are right and proper for the human mind.

The theory of our grounds for belief in an external world is ably handled and the notion of Cause there employed is provocative of disagreement. But Father Coffey is not an antagonist to be measured within the limits of a review.

NOTES

1. Peter Coffey was a member of Cardinal Mercier’s circle at Louvain and a contributor to Mercier’s *Manual of Modern Scholasticism*, reviewed by TSE for the *IJE* in Oct (601).

2. Joseph Rickaby, SJ (1845-1932), English priest, philosopher, and assistant master of Pope’s Hall (later Campion Hall), Oxford. TSE signed his copy of Rickaby’s *Scholasticism* (1908) and assigned it for three meetings on his 1913 syllabus for Philosophy A at Harvard. See appendix (777).

3. Coffey’s case against Kant, essentially a refutation of the concept of a priori truth, is outlined in Chapter XXI, “Kant’s Theory of Sense Perception, Space and Time” (II.184-204), and is congruous with the position of Mercier and others at Louvain (601-02, n. 5).

4. In his recently completed dissertation, TSE had analyzed the attack on metaphysics by Bradley in *Appearance and Reality* (1893) and by Russell in *The Problems of Philosophy* (1912).

5. TSE’s italics.

Ezra Pound: His Metric and Poetry

New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1917. Pp. 31.¹

I

"All talk on modern poetry, by people who know," wrote Mr. Carl Sandburg in *Poetry*, "ends with dragging in Ezra Pound somewhere. He may be named only to be cursed as wanton and mocker, poseur, trifler and vagrant. Or he may be classed as filling a niche today like that of Keats in a preceding epoch. The point is, he will be mentioned."²

This is a simple statement of fact. But though Mr. Pound is well known, even having been the victim of interviews for Sunday papers, it does not follow that his work is thoroughly known. There are twenty people who have their opinion of him for every one who has read his writings with any care. Of those twenty, there will be some who are shocked, some who are ruffled, some who are irritated, and one or two whose sense of dignity is outraged. The twenty-first critic will probably be one who knows and admires some of the poems, but who either says: "Pound is primarily a scholar, a translator," or "Pound's early verse was beautiful; his later work shows nothing better than the itch for advertisement, a mischievous desire to be annoying, or a childish desire to be original." There is a third type of reader, rare enough, who has perceived Mr. Pound for some years, who has followed his career intelligently, and who recognizes its consistency.

This essay is not written for the first twenty critics of literature, nor for that rare twenty-second who has just been mentioned, but for the admirer of a poem here or there, whose appreciation is capable of yielding him a larger return. If the reader is already at the stage where he can maintain at once the two propositions, "Pound is merely a scholar" and "Pound is merely a yellow journalist," or the other two propositions, "Pound is merely a technician" and "Pound is merely a prophet of chaos," then there is very little hope. But there are readers of poetry who have not yet reached this hypertrophy of the logical faculty; their attention might be arrested, not by an outburst of praise, but by a simple statement. The present essay aims merely at such a statement. It is not intended to be either a biographical or a critical study. It will not dilate upon "beauties"; it is a summary account of ten years' work in poetry. The citations from reviews will perhaps stimulate the reader to

form his own opinion. We do not wish to form it for him. Nor shall we enter into other phases of Mr. Pound's activity during this ten years; his writings and views on art and music; though these would take an important place in any comprehensive biography.

II

Pound's first book was published in Venice. Venice was a halting point after he had left America and before he had settled in England, and here, in 1908, *A Lume Spento* appeared. The volume is now a rarity of literature; it was published by the author and made at a Venetian press where the author was able personally to supervise the printing on paper which was a remainder of a supply which had been used for a History of the Church. Pound left Venice in the same year, and took *A Lume Spento* with him to London. It was not to be expected that a first book of verse, published by an unknown American in Venice, should attract much attention. *The Evening Standard* has the distinction of having noticed the volume, in a review summing it up as:

wild and haunting stuff, absolutely poetic, original, imaginative, passionate, and spiritual. Those who do not consider it crazy may well consider it inspired. Coming after the trite and measured verses of most of our decorous poets, this poet seems like a minstrel of Provence at a suburban musical evening. . . . The unseizable magic of poetry is in the queer paper book; and words are no good in describing it.³

As the chief poems in *A Lume Spento* were afterwards incorporated in *Personae*, the book demands mention only as a date in the author's history. *Personae*, the first book published in London, followed early in 1909. Few poets have undertaken the siege of London with so little backing; few books of verse have ever owed their success so purely to their own merits. Pound came to London a complete stranger, without either literary patronage or financial means. He took *Personae* to Mr. Elkin Mathews, who has the glory of having published Yeats's *Wind Among the Reeds*, and the *Books of the Rhymers' Club*, in which many of the poets of the '90s, now famous, found a place.⁴ Mr. Mathews first suggested, as was natural to an unknown author, that the author should bear part of the cost of printing. "I have a shilling in my pocket, if that is any use to you," said the latter. "Well," said Mr. Mathews, "I want to publish it anyway." His acumen was justified. The book was, it is true, received with opposition, but it was received. There

were a few appreciative critics, notably Mr. Edward Thomas, the poet (known also as “Edward Eastaway”; he has since been killed in France).⁵ Thomas, writing in the *English Review* (then in its brightest days under the editorship of Ford Madox Hueffer), recognized the first-hand intensity of feeling in *Personae*:

He has . . . hardly any of the superficial good qualities of modern versifiers; . . . He has not the current melancholy or resignation or unwillingness to live; nor the kind of feeling for nature which runs to minute description and decorative metaphor. He cannot be usefully compared with any living writers; . . . full of personality and with such power to express it that from the first to the last lines of most of his poems he holds us steadily in his own pure, grave, passionate world. . . . The beauty of it (“In Praise of Ysolt”) is the beauty of passion, sincerity and intensity, not of beautiful words and images and suggestions; . . . The thought dominates the words and is greater than they are. . . . Here (“Idyl for Glaucus”) the effect is full of human passion and natural magic, without any of the phrases which a reader of modern verse would expect in the treatment of such a subject.⁶

Mr. Scott-James, in the *Daily News*, speaks in praise of his metres:

At first the whole thing may seem to be mere madness and rhetoric, a vain exhibition of force and passion without beauty. But, as we read on, these curious metres of his seem to have a law and order of their own; the brute force of Mr. Pound’s imagination seems to impart some quality of infectious beauty to his words. Sometimes there is a strange beating of anapests when he quickens to his subject; again and again he unexpectedly ends a line with the second half of a reverberant hexameter:

Flesh-shrouded bearing the secret.

. . . And a few lines later comes an example of his favourite use of spondee, followed by dactyl and spondee, which comes in strangely and, as we first read it, with the appearance of discord, but afterwards seems to gain a curious and distinctive vigour:

Eyes, dreams, lips, and the night goes.

Another line like the end of a hexameter is

But if e’er I come to my love’s land.

But even so favourable a critic pauses to remark that

He baffles us by archaic words and unfamiliar metres; he often seems to be scorning the limitations of form and metre, breaking out into any sort of expression which suits itself to his mood.

and counsels the poet to “have a little more respect for his art.”⁷

It is, in fact, just this adaptability of metre to mood, an adaptability due to an intensive study of metre, that constitutes an important element in Pound’s technique. Few readers were prepared to accept or follow the amount of erudition which entered into *Personae* and its close successor, *Exultations*, or to devote the care to reading them which they demand. It is here that many have been led astray. Pound is not one of those poets who make no demand of the reader; and the casual reader of verse, disconcerted by the difference between Pound’s poetry and that on which his taste has been trained, attributes his own difficulties to excessive scholarship on the part of the author. “This,” he will say of some of the poems in Provençal form or on Provençal subjects, “is archaeology; it requires knowledge on the part of its reader, and true poetry does not require such knowledge.” But to display knowledge is not the same thing as to expect it on the part of the reader; and of this sort of pedantry Pound is quite free. He is, it is true, one of the most learned of poets. In America he had taken up the study of Romance Languages with the intention of teaching. After work in Spain and Italy, after pursuing the Provençal verb from Milan to Freiburg, he deserted the thesis on Lope de Vega and the Ph.D. and the professorial chair, and elected to remain in Europe. Mr. Pound has spoken out his mind from time to time on the subject of scholarship in American universities, its deadness, its isolation from genuine appreciation, and the active creative life of literature. He has always been ready to battle against pedantry. As for his own learning, he has studied poetry carefully, and has made use of his study in his own verse. *Personae* and *Exultations* show his talent for turning his studies to account. He was supersaturated in Provence; he had tramped over most of the country; and the life of the courts where the Troubadours thronged was part of his own life to him. Yet, though *Personae* and *Exultations* do exact something from the reader, they do not require a knowledge of Provençal or of Spanish or Italian. Very few people know the Arthurian legends well, or even Malory (if they did, they might realize that the *Idylls of the King* are hardly more important than a parody, or a “Chaucer retold for Children”);

but no one accuses Tennyson of needing footnotes, or of superciliousness toward the uninstructed.⁸ The difference is merely in what people are prepared for; most readers could no more relate the myth of Atys correctly than they could give a biography of Bertrand de Born.⁹ It is hardly too much to say that there is no poem in these volumes of Mr. Pound which needs fuller explanation than he gives himself. What the poems do require is a trained ear, or at least the willingness to be trained.

The metres and the use of language are unfamiliar. There are certain traces of modern influence. We cannot agree with Mr. Scott-James that among these are "W. E. Henley, Kipling, Chatterton, and especially Walt Whitman"—least of all Walt Whitman.¹⁰ Probably there are only two: Yeats and Browning. Yeats in "La Fraisine," in *Personae*, for instance, in the attitude and somewhat in the vocabulary:

I wrapped my tears in an ellum leaf
And left them under a stone,
And now men call me mad because I have thrown
All folly from me, putting it aside
To leave the old barren ways of men . . .

For Browning, Mr. Pound has always professed strong admiration (see "Mesmerism" in *Personae*); there are traces of him in "Cino" and "Famam Librosque Cano," in the same volume.¹¹ But it is more profitable to comment upon the variety of metres and the original use of language.

Ezra Pound has been fathered with *vers libre* in English, with all its vices and virtues. The term is a loose one—any verse is called "free" by people whose ears are not accustomed to it—in the second place, Pound's use of this medium has shown the temperance of the artist, and his belief in it as a vehicle is not that of the fanatic. He has said himself that when one has the proper material for a sonnet, one should use the sonnet form; but that it happens very rarely to any poet to find himself in possession of just the block of stuff which can perfectly be modelled into the sonnet. It is true that up to very recently it was impossible to get free verse printed in any periodical except those in which Pound had influence; and that now it is possible to print free verse (second, third, or tenth-rate) in almost any American magazine. Who is responsible for the bad free verse is a question of no importance, inasmuch as its authors would have written bad verse in any form; Pound has at least the right to be judged by the success or failure of his own. Pound's *vers libre* is such as is only possible for a poet who has

worked tirelessly with rigid forms and different systems of metric. His *Canzoni* are in a way aside from his direct line of progress; they are much more nearly studies in mediaeval appreciation than any of his other verse; but they are interesting, apart from their merit, as showing the poet at work with the most intricate Provençal forms—so intricate that the pattern cannot be exhibited without quoting an entire poem. (M. Jean de Bosschère, whose French is translated in the *Egoist*, has already called attention to the fact that Pound was the first writer in English to use five Provençal forms.)¹² Quotation will show, however, the great variety of rhythm which Pound manages to introduce into the ordinary iambic pentameter:

Thy gracious ways,
 O lady of my heart, have
 O'er all my thought their golden glamour cast;
 As amber torch-flames, where strange men-at-arms
 Tread softly 'neath the damask shield of night,
 Rise from the flowing steel in part reflected,
 So on my mailed thought that with thee goeth,
 Though dark the way, a golden glamour falleth.¹³

Within the iambic limits, there are no two lines in the whole poem that have an identical rhythm.

We turn from this to a poem in *Exultations*, the “Night Litany”:

O God, what great kindness
 have we done in times past
 and forgotten it,
 That thou givest this wonder unto us,
 O God of waters?

 O God of the night
 What great sorrow
 Cometh unto us,
 That thou thus repayest us
 Before the time of its coming?

There is evident, and more strongly in certain later poems, a tendency toward quantitative measure. Such a “freedom” as this lays so heavy a burden upon every word in a line that it becomes impossible to write like Shelley, leaving blanks for the adjectives, or like Swinburne, whose adjectives are practically

blanks. Other poets have manipulated a great variety of metres and forms; but few have studied the forms and metres which they use so carefully as has Pound. His ballad of the “Goodly Fere” shows great knowledge of the ballad form:

I ha’ seen him cow a thousand men
 On the hills o’ Galilee,
 They whined as he walked out calm between
 Wi’ his eyes like the grey o’ the sea.

Like the sea that brooks no voyaging
 With the winds unleashed and free,
 Like the sea that he cowed at Genseret
 Wi’ twey words spoke suddenly.

A master of men was the Goodly Fere
 A mate of the wind and sea,
 If they think they ha’ slain our Goodly Fere
 They are fools eternally.

I ha’ seen him eat o’ the honey-comb
 Sin’ they nailed him to the tree.

And from this we turn to a very different form in the “Altaforte,” which is perhaps the best sestina that has been written in English:

Damn it all! all this our South stinks peace.
 You whoreson dog, Papiols, come! Let’s to music!
 I have no life save when the swords clash.
 But ah! when I see the standards gold, vair, purple, opposing
 And the broad fields beneath them turn crimson,
 Then howl I my heart nigh mad with rejoicing.

In hot summer have I great rejoicing
 When the tempests kill the earth’s foul peace,
 And the lightnings from black heav’n flash crimson,
 And the fierce thunders roar me their music
 And the winds shriek through the clouds mad, opposing,
 And through all the riven skies God’s swords clash.

I have quoted two verses to show the intricacy of the pattern.

The Provençal canzon, like the Elizabethan lyric, was written for music. Mr. Pound has more recently insisted, in a series of articles on the work of Arnold Dolmetsch, in the *Egoist*, on the importance of a study of music for the poet.¹⁴

Such a relation between poetry and music is very different from what is called the “music” of Shelley or Swinburne, a music often nearer to rhetoric (or the art of the orator) than to the instrument. For poetry to approach the condition of music (Pound quotes approvingly the dictum of Pater),¹⁵ it is not necessary that poetry should be destitute of meaning. Instead of slightly veiled and resonant abstractions, like

Time with a gift of tears,
Grief with a glass that ran—

of Swinburne,¹⁶ or the mossiness of Mallarmé, Pound’s verse is always definite and concrete, because he has always a definite emotion behind it.

Though I’ve roamed through many places,
None there is that my heart troweth
Fair as that wherein fair groweth
One whose laud here interlaces
Tuneful words, that I’ve essayed.
Let this tune be gently played
Which my voice herward upraises.

At the end of this poem the author appends the note:

The form and measure are those of Piere Vidal’s “*Ab l’alen tir vas me l’aire*.”
The song is fit only to be sung, and is not to be spoken.¹⁷

There are, here and there, deliberate archaisms or oddities (e.g., “herward”); there are deliberately arbitrary images, having their place in the total effect of the poem:

Red leaf that art blown upward and out and over
The green sheaf of the world . . .

And the lotos that pours
Her fragrance into the purple cup . . .

Black lightning . . . (in a more recent poem)¹⁸

but no word is ever chosen merely for the tinkle; each has always its part in producing an impression which is produced always through language.

Words are perhaps the hardest of all material of art: for they must be used to express both visual beauty and beauty of sound, as well as communicating a grammatical statement. It would be interesting to compare Pound's use of images with Mallarmé's; I think it will be found that the former's, by the contrast, will appear always sharp in outline, even if arbitrary and not photographic. Such images as those quoted above are as precise in their way as

Sur le Noel, morte saison,
Lorsque les loups vivent de vent . . .

and the rest of that memorable Testament.¹⁹

So much for the imagery. As to the "freedom" of his verse, Pound has made several statements in his articles on Dolmetsch which are to the point:

Any work of art is a compound of freedom and order. It is perfectly obvious that art hangs between chaos on the one side and mechanics on the other. A pedantic insistence upon detail tends to drive out "major form." A firm hold on major form makes for a freedom of detail. In painting men intent on minutiae gradually lost the sense of form and form-combination. An attempt to restore this sense is branded as "revolution." It is revolution in the philological sense of the term. . . . Art is a departure from fixed positions; felicitous departure from a norm . . .²⁰

The freedom of Pound's verse is rather a state of tension due to constant opposition between free and strict. There are not, as a matter of fact, two kinds of verse, the strict and the free; there is only a mastery which comes of being so well trained that form is an instinct and can be adapted to the particular purpose in hand.

After *Exultations* came the translation of the *Sonnets and Ballate of Guido Cavalcanti*. It is worth noting that the writer of a long review in the *Quest*—speaking in praise of the translation, yet found fault with the author not on the ground of excessive mediaevalism, but because

he is concerned rather with the future than with a somewhat remote past, so that in spite of his love for the mediaeval poets, his very accomplishment as a distinctly modern poet makes against his success as a wholly acceptable translator of Cavalcanti, the heir of the Troubadours, the scholastic.²¹

Yet the *Daily News*, in criticising *Canzoni*, had remarked that Mr. Pound

seems to us rather a scholar than a poet, and we should like to see him giving his unusual talent more to direct translation from the Provençal.

and Mr. J. C. Squire (now the literary editor of the *New Statesman*), in an appreciative review in the *New Age*, had counselled the poet that he would

gain and not lose if he could forget all about the poets of Dante's day, their roses and their flames, their gold and their falcons, and their literary amorousness, and walk out of the library into the fresh air.²²

In *Ripostes*, there are traces of a different idiom. Superficially, the work may appear less important. The diction is more restrained, the flights shorter, the dexterity of technique is less arresting. By romantic readers the book would be considered less "passionate." But there is a much more solid substratum to this book; there is more thought; greater depth, if less agitation on the surface. The effect of London is apparent; the author has become a critic of men, surveying them from a consistent and developed point of view; he is more formidable and disconcerting; in short, much more mature. That he abandons nothing of his technical skill is evident from the translation from the Anglo-Saxon, the "Seafarer." It is not a slight achievement to have brought to life alliterative verse: perhaps the "Seafarer" is the only successful piece of alliterative verse ever written in modern English; alliterative verse which is not merely a clever tour de force, but which suggests the possibility of a new development of this form. Mr. Richard Aldington (whose own accomplishments as a writer of *vers libre* qualify him to speak) called the poem "unsurpassed and unsurpassable," and a writer in the *New Age* (a literary organ which has always been strongly opposed to metrical innovations) called it "one of the finest literary works of art produced in England during the last ten years."²³ And the rough, stern beauty of the Anglo-Saxon, we may remark, is at the opposite pole from that of the Provençal and Italian poets to whom Pound had previously devoted his attention.

May I for my own self song's truth reckon,
Journey's jargon, how I in harsh days
Hardship endured oft.

But we can notice in *Ripostes* other evidences than of versatility only; certain poems show Mr. Pound turning to more modern subjects, as in the "Portrait d'une femme," or the mordant epigram, "An Object." Many readers are apt to confuse the maturing of personality with desiccation of the emotions. There is no desiccation in *Ripostes*. This should be evident to anyone who reads carefully such a poem as "A Girl." We quote it entire without comment.

The tree has entered my hands,
 The sap has ascended my arms,
 The tree has grown in my breast—
 Downward,
 The branches grow out of me, like arms.

Tree you are,
 Moss you are,
 You are violets with wind above them.
 A child—*so* high—you are,
 And all this is folly to the world.

"The Return" is an important study in verse which is really quantitative. We quote only a few lines:

See, they return; ah, see the tentative
 Movements, and the slow feet,
 The trouble in the pace and the uncertain
 Wavering!

Ripostes belongs to the period when Mr. Pound was being attacked because of his propaganda. He became known as the inventor of "Imagism," and later, as the "High Priest of Vorticism." As a matter of fact, the actual "propaganda" of Mr. Pound has been very small in quantity. The impression which his personality made, however, is suggested by the following note in *Punch*, which is always a pretty reliable barometer of the English middle-class Grin:

Mr. Welkin Mark (exactly opposite Long Jane's) begs to announce that he has secured for the English market the palpitating works of the new Montana (U.S.A.) poet, Mr. Ezekiel Ton, who is the most remarkable thing in poetry since Robert Browning. Mr. Ton, who has left America to reside for a while in London and impress his personality on English editors, publishers and readers, is by far the newest poet going,

whatever other advertisements may say. He has succeeded, where all others have failed, in evolving a blend of the imagery of the unfettered West, the vocabulary of Wardour Street, and the sinister abandon of Borgia Italy.²⁴

In 1913, someone writing to the New York *Nation* from the University of Illinois illustrates the American, more serious, disapproval. This writer begins by expressing his objections to the “principle of Futurism.”²⁵ (Pound has perhaps done more than anyone to keep Futurism out of England. His antagonism to this movement was the first which was not due merely to unintelligent dislike for anything new, and was due to his perception that Futurism was incompatible with any principles of form. In his own words, Futurism is “accelerated impressionism.”)²⁶ The writer in the *Nation* then goes on to analyze the modern “hypertrophy of romanticism” into

The exaggeration of the importance of a personal emotion.

The abandonment of all standards of form.

The suppression of all evidence that a particular composition is animated by any directing intelligence.

As for the first point, here are Mr. Pound’s words in answer to the question, “do you agree that the great poet is never emotional?”

Yes, absolutely; if by emotion is meant that he is at the mercy of every passing mood. . . . The only kind of emotion worthy of a poet is the inspirational emotion which energises and strengthens, and which is very remote from the everyday emotion of sloppiness and sentiment.²⁷

And as for the platform of Imagism, here are a few of Pound’s “Don’ts for Imagists”:

Pay no attention to the criticisms of men who have never themselves written a notable work.

Use no superfluous word, no adjective, which does not reveal something.

Go in fear of abstractions. Do not retell in mediocre verse what has already been done in good prose.

Don’t imagine that the art of poetry is any simpler than the art of music, or that you can please the expert before you have spent at least as much effort on the art of verse as the average piano teacher spends on the art of music.

Be influenced by as many great artists as you can, but have the decency either to acknowledge the debt outright or try to conceal it.

Consider the definiteness of Dante's presentation, as compared with Milton's rhetoric. Read as much of Wordsworth as does not seem too unutterably dull.

If you want the gist of the matter go to Sappho, Catullus, Villon, Heine when he is in the vein, Gautier when he is not too frigid, or if you have not the tongues, seek out the leisurely Chaucer.

Good prose will do you no harm. There is good discipline to be had by trying to write it. Translation is likewise good training.²⁸

The emphasis here is certainly on discipline and form. The Chicago *Tribune* recognized this as "sound sense," adding:

If this be Imagisme . . . we are for establishing Imagisme by constitutional amendment and imprisoning without recourse to ink or paper all "literary" ladies or gents who break any of these canons.²⁹

But other reviewers were less approving. While the writer in the *Nation*, quoted above, dreads the anarchy impending, Mr. William Archer was terrified at the prospect of hieratic formalisation. Mr. Archer believes in the simple untaught muse:

Mr. Pound's commandments tend too much to make of poetry a learned, self-conscious craft, to be cultivated by a guild of adepts, from whose austere laboratories spontaneity and simplicity are excluded. . . . [A] great deal of the best poetry in the world has very little technical study behind it. . . . There are scores and hundreds of people in England who could write this simple measure (i.e. of *A Shropshire Lad*) quite successfully.³⁰

To be hanged for a cat and drowned for a rat is, perhaps, sufficient exculpation.

Probably Mr. Pound has won odium not so much by his theories as by his unstinted praise of certain contemporary authors whose work he has liked. Such expressions of approval are usually taken as a grievance—much more so than any personal abuse, which is comparatively a compliment—by the writers who escape his mention. He does not say "A., B., and C. are bad poets or novelists," but when he says "The work of X., Y., and Z is in such and such respects the most important work in verse (or prose) since so and

so," then A., B., and C. are aggrieved. Also, Pound has frequently expressed disapproval of Milton and Wordsworth.

After *Ripostes*, Mr. Pound's idiom has advanced still farther. Inasmuch as *Cathay*, the volume of translations from the Chinese, appeared prior to *Lustra*, it is sometimes thought that his newer idiom is due to the Chinese influence. This is almost the reverse of the truth. The late Ernest Fenollosa left a quantity of manuscripts, including a great number of rough translations (literally exact) from the Chinese. After certain poems subsequently incorporated in *Lustra* had appeared in *Poetry*, Mrs. Fenollosa recognized that in Pound the Chinese manuscripts would find the interpreter whom her husband would have wished; she accordingly forwarded the papers for him to do as he liked with. It is thus due to Mrs. Fenollosa's acumen that we have *Cathay*; it is not as a consequence of *Cathay* that we have *Lustra*.³¹ This fact must be borne in mind.

Poems afterwards embodied in *Lustra* appeared in *Poetry*, in April 1913, under the title of "Contemporania."³² They included among others "Tenzon," "The Condolence," "The Garret," "Salutation the Second," and "Dance Figure."

There are influences, but deviously. It is rather a gradual development of experience into which literary experiences have entered. These have not brought the bondage of temporary enthusiasms, but have liberated the poet from his former restricted sphere. There is Catullus and Martial, Gautier, Laforgue and Tristan Corbière.³³ Whitman is certainly not an influence; there is not a trace of him anywhere; Whitman and Mr. Pound are antipodean to each other. Of "Contemporania," the *Chicago Evening Post* discriminatingly observed:

Your poems in the April *Poetry* are so mockingly, so delicately, so unblushingly beautiful that you seem to have brought back into the world a grace which (probably) never existed, but which we discover by an imaginative process in Horace and Catullus.³⁴

It was a true insight to ally Pound to the Latin, not to the Greek poets.

Certain of the poems in *Lustra* have offended admirers of the verse of the *Personae* period. When a poet alters or develops, many of his admirers are sure to drop off. Any poet, if he is to survive as a writer beyond his twenty-fifth year, must alter; he must seek new literary influences; he will have different emotions to express. This is disconcerting to that public which likes a poet to spin his whole work out of the feelings of

his youth; which likes to be able to open a new volume of his poems with the assurance that they will be able to approach it exactly as they approached the preceding. They do not like that constant readjustment which the following of Mr. Pound's work demands. Thus has *Lustra* been a disappointment to some; though it manifests no falling off in technique, and no impoverishment of feeling. Some of the poems (including several of the "Contemporania") are a more direct statement of views than Pound's verse had ever given before. Of these poems, M. Jean de Bosschère writes:

Everywhere his poems incite man to exist, to profess a becoming egoism, without which there can be no real altruism.

I beseech you enter your life.
I beseech you learn to say "I"
When I question you.
For you are no part, but a whole;
No portion, but a being.³⁵

. . . One must be capable of reacting to stimuli for a moment, as a real, live person, even in face of as much of one's own powers as are arrayed against one. . . . The virile complaint, the revolt of the poet, all which shows his emotion,—that is poetry.

Speak against unconscious oppression,
Speak against the tyranny of the unimaginative,
Speak against bonds.
Be against all forms of oppression,
Go out and defy opinion.

This is the old cry of the poet, but more precise, as an expression of frank disgust:

Go to the adolescent who are smothered in family.
O, how hideous it is
To see three generations of one house gathered together!
It is like an old tree without shoots,
And with some branches rotted and falling.³⁶

Each poem holds out these cries of revolt or disgust, but they are the result of his still hoping and feeling:

Let us take arms against this sea of stupidities.³⁷

Pound . . . has experience of the folly of the Philistines who read his verse. Real pain is born of this stupid interpretation, and one does not realize how deep it is unless one can feel, through the ejaculations and the laughter, what has caused these wounds, which are made deeper by what he knows, and what he has lost. . . . This tone, which is at once jocund and keen, is one of Pound's qualities. Ovid, Catullus—he does not disown them. He only uses these accents for his familiars; with the others he is on the edge of paradox, pamphleteering, indeed of abuse.³⁸

This is the proper approach to the poems at the beginning of *Lustra*, and to the short epigrams, which some readers find “pointless,” or certainly “not poetry.” They should read, then, the “Dance Figure,” or “Near Perigord,” and remember that all these poems come out of the same man.

Thine arms are as a young sapling under the bark;
Thy face as a river with lights.

White as an almond are thy shoulders;
As new almonds stripped from the husk.³⁹

Or the ending of “Near Perigord”:

Bewildering spring, and by the Auvezere
Poppies and day's-eyes in the green émail
Rose over us; and we knew all that stream,
And our two horses had traced out the valleys;
Knew the low flooded lands squared out with poplars,
In the young days when the deep sky befriended.
And great wings beat above us in the twilight,
And the great wheels in heaven
Bore us together . . . surging . . . and apart . . .
Believing we should meet with lips and hands . . .

There shut up in his castle, Tairiran's,
She who had nor ears nor tongue save in her hands,
Gone, ah, gone—untouched, unreachable!
She who could never live save through one person,
She who could never speak save to one person,

And all the rest of her a shifting change,
A broken bundle of mirrors . . . !

Then turn at once to "To a Friend Writing on Cabaret Dancers."

It is easy to say that the language of *Cathay* is due to the Chinese. If one looks carefully at (1) Pound's other verse, (2) other people's translations from the Chinese (e.g., Giles's),⁴⁰ it is evident that this is not the case. The language was ready for the Chinese poetry. Compare, for instance, a passage from "Provincia Deserta":

I have walked
 into Perigord,
I have seen the torch-flames, high-leaping,
Painting the front of that church,
And, under the dark, whirling laughter.
I have looked back over the stream
 and seen the high building,
Seen the long minarets, the white shafts.
I have gone in Ribeyrac
 and in Sarlat.
I have climbed rickety stairs, heard talk of Croy,
Walked over En Bertrans' old layout,
Have seen Narbonne, and Cahors and Chalus,
Have seen Excideuil, carefully fashioned.

with a passage from "The River Song":

He goes out to Hori, to look at the wing-flapping storks,
He returns by way of Sei rock, to hear the new nightingales,
For the gardens at Jo-run are full of new nightingales,
Their sound is mixed in this flute,
Their voice is in the twelve pipes here.

It matters very little how much is due to Rihaku and how much to Pound.⁴¹ Mr. Ford Madox Hueffer has observed: "If these are original verses, then Mr. Pound is the greatest poet of this day." He goes on to say:

The poems in *Cathay* are things of a supreme beauty. What poetry should be, that they are. And, if a new breath of imagery and of handling can do anything for our poetry, that new breath these poems bring. . . .

[P]oetry consists in so rendering concrete objects that the emotions produced by the objects shall arise in the reader. . . .

Or where have you had better rendered, or more permanently beautiful a rendering of, the feelings of one of those lonely watchers in the outposts of progress, whether it be Ovid in Hyrcania, a Roman sentinel upon the Great Wall of this country, or merely ourselves in the lonely recesses of our minds, than the "Lament of the Frontier Guard"? . . .

Beauty is a very valuable thing; perhaps it is the most valuable thing in life; but the power to express emotion so that it shall communicate itself intact and exactly is almost more valuable. Of both these qualities Mr. Pound's book is very full. Therefore I think we may say that this is much the best work he has yet done, for, however closely he may have followed his originals—and of that most of us have no means whatever of judging—there is certainly a good deal of Mr. Pound in this little volume.⁴²

Cathay and *Lustra* were followed by the translations of Noh plays. The Noh are not so important as the Chinese poems (certainly not so important for English); the attitude is less unusual to us; the work is not so solid, so firm. *Cathay* will, I believe, rank with the "Seafarer" in the future among Mr. Pound's original work; the Noh will rank among his translations. It is rather a desert after *Cathay*. There are, however, passages which, as Pound has handled them, are different both from the Chinese and from anything existent in English.⁴³ There is, for example, the fine speech of the old Kagekiyo, as he thinks of his youthful valour:

He thought, how easy this killing. He rushed with his spear-haft gripped under his arm. He cried out, "I am Kagekiyo of the Heike." He rushed on to take them. He pierced through the helmet vizards of Miyanoya. Miyanoya fled twice, and again; and Kagekiyo cried: "You shall not escape me!" He leaped and wrenched off his helmet. "Eya!" The vizard broke and remained in his hand and Miyanoya still fled afar, and afar, and he looked back crying in terror, "How terrible, how heavy your arm!" And Kagekiyo called at him, "How tough the shaft of your neck is!" And they both laughed out over the battle, and went off each his own way.⁴⁴

The Times Literary Supplement spoke of Mr. Pound's "mastery of beautiful diction" and his "cunningly rhythmically prose," in its review of the *Noh*.⁴⁵

Even since *Lustra*, Mr. Pound has moved again. This move is to the epic, of which three cantos appear in the American *Lustra* (they have already appeared in *Poetry*—Miss Monroe deserves great honour for her courage in printing an epic poem in this twentieth century—but the version in *Lustra* is revised and is improved by revision).⁴⁶ We will leave it as a test: when anyone has studied Mr. Pound's poems in *chronological* order, and has mastered *Lustra* and *Cathay*, he is prepared for the Cantos—but not till then. If the reader then fails to like them, he has probably omitted some step in his progress, and had better go back and retrace the journey.

NOTES

1. This essay was written anonymously to be distributed with copies of the American edition of Pound's *Lustra*, published by Knopf in Oct 1917. John Quinn had arranged for the publication of such a work to introduce Pound's poetry to a wider American audience. Pound chose TSE to write it, and when the text was ready in Sept, made three deletions and supplied the title (*WLF* xii). Pound decreed that "it should NOT be signed by Eliot, just now when I am booming his work" (*EP/JQ* 129). In his bibliography of Pound (1963, 1969), Donald Gallup gave 12 Nov 1917 as the date of publication (42), but corrected it to "early in January 1918" in his bibliography of TSE (24), after the earlier date had been corrected in Knopf's *The Borzoi 1920* (New York, 1920), 112. The proofs Pound sent to Quinn are dated 9 Sept, but all examined copies sent by Quinn to friends and editors of periodicals are dated 18 Jan 1918. As the editors have not been able to determine reliably the exact date of publication, they have placed it at the end of 1917. The MS, with Pound's emendations, is in the Houghton Library (bMS Am 1635.3), the TS in the Beinecke (YCal MSS 43, Box 144, f. 6323). The essay was later included in *TCC* (1965), with a note on the dust jacket: "All the lectures are reprinted in their original form without any change whatsoever"; nevertheless, the essay there printed contained substantial editorial alterations and editorial slips. The copy text for the essay here printed is the first edition, with reference to the TS.

2. "The Work of Ezra Pound" appeared in *Poetry*, 7 (Feb 1916), 249. The American poet Carl Sandburg (1878-1967), like Harriet Monroe and her magazine, was based in Chicago.

3. *A Lume Spento* (Venice: Antonini, 1908) was anonymously reviewed under "A Column of Poets" in a Special Supplement to the *Evening Standard and St. James's Gazette*, 26 Nov 1908, [2].

4. The London publisher Elkin Mathews (1851-1921) printed *The Wind Among the Reeds* in 1899, *The Book of the Rhymers' Club* in 1892, and *The Second Book of the Rhymers' Club* in 1894, by William Butler Yeats (1865-1939). In the Faber edition, TSE's "Books," referring to the two editions, is changed to "Book" (*TCC* 164).

5. Thomas, who had used the pseudonym in *Six Poems by Edward Eastaway* (1916), was killed at the start of the Arras offensive in Apr 1917.

6. Thomas's article appeared in "Two Poets," *English Review*, 2 (June 1909), 627-32. The passage quoted here (627-29), however, was taken verbatim from an advertisement for *Personae* at the end of *Exultations*.

7. The journalist R. A. Scott-James (1878-1959), author of *Modernism and Romance* (1908), was literary editor of the *Daily News* when he reviewed Pound's *Personae* under the title "Modern Poetry" (9 July 1909), 3. Respectively, the three quoted lines are from "In Durance," "Cino," and "From Syria," all collected in *Personae*.

8. The medieval prose collection of Arthurian romance, *Le Morte d'Arthur* (1485) by Thomas Malory (1408-71), was the model for Tennyson's *Idylls of the King* (1859-85). In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*, like Shakespeare's plays, were published in bowdlerized versions deemed suitable for children.

9. Among the versions of the myth of Atys (TSE has "Atthis" in the TS), Ovid relates that Cybele, in her love for him, made him her priest on condition that he preserve his chastity. When he broke the covenant with a nymph, Cybele put him into a state of madness in which Atys unmanned himself. When he sought to end his life, Cybele turned him into a fir tree.

The Provençal troubadour Bertrand de Born, who lived in the second half of the twelfth century, was placed in Hell by Dante for fomenting political rebellion (*Inferno* XXVIII). In "Sestina: Altaforte" (1909), an extrapolation from de Born's own writings, Pound allows this "stirrer up of strife" to explain himself.

10. In his review of *Personae*, Scott-James asserts that "Although there are abundant evidences of different authors upon his thought and style—Browning, W. E. Henley, Kipling, Chatterton, and especially Walt Whitman—Mr. Pound is most evidently and undeniably himself" (3). The ambivalence of Pound's relationship with Whitman can be seen in his 1909 essay, "What I Feel about Walt Whitman," and in his 1913 poem, "A Pact," which begins with "I make a pact with you, Walt Whitman— / I have detested you long enough" and concludes with "We have one sap and one root— / Let there be commerce between us."

11. In a "Note Precedent to 'La Fraisine'" in *Personae*, Pound associates the poem with Yeats's *The Celtic Twilight* (1893, 1902), "I because in such a mood, feeling myself divided between myself corporeal and a self aetherial, 'a dweller by streams and in woodland,' eternal because simple in elements" (57). The debt to Browning is most obvious in Pound's use of the dramatic monologue in "Cino" and other poems in *Personae*.

12. "Ezra Pound / Translated from the French of Jean de Bosschère," part one of three parts in successive issues of the *Egoist*, 4 (Jan 1917), 8. Bosschère asserts in a note, "Pound was the first man in England to use five of the Troubadour forms." See 594.

13. From "Canzon: Of Incense."

14. In "*Vers Libre* and Arnold Dolmetsch," the first of two successive articles on the musician and maker of instruments, Dolmetsch (1858-1940), Pound states that "Poets who are not interested in music are, or become, bad poets. I would almost say that poets should never be too long out of touch with musicians. Poets who will not study music are defective." *Egoist*, 4 (July 1917), 90. Pound's "Arnold Dolmetsch" followed in the Aug issue, cited below. See n. 20.

15. Pound states in the opening of "Vorticism," *Fortnightly Review*, 96 (1 Sept 1914), 461: "Pater proclaimed that 'All arts approach the condition of music.'" Rpt. in *Gaudier-Brzeska: A Memoir* (London: John Lane, 1916), 94. Pater: "All art constantly aspires towards the condition of music."

16. From the first chorus of Swinburne's verse-play, *Atalanta in Calydon* (1865). Citing these lines in "Swinburne as Poet" (1920), TSE remarked of the chorus that "it is sententious, but it

has not even the significance of the commonplace . . . it is effective because it appears to be a tremendous statement, like statements made in our dreams; when we wake up and find that the 'glass that ran' would do better for time than for grief, and that the gift of tears would be as appropriately bestowed by grief as by time."

17. From stanza III of "Canzon: To Be Sung beneath a Window," as published in *Provença* (Boston: Small, Maynard, 1910), 70. The note, rephrased and relocated from below the title when published in the *English Review*, 4 (Jan 1910), 197, does not appear with the poem in *Canzoni*.

18. The first two passages are from "Laudantes decem pulchritudinis Johannaë Templi," sections V and III, respectively, in *Exultations*; the latter from "The Spring" in *Lustra*: "And wild desire / Falls like black lightning."

19. From stanza II of Villon's *Le Lais* (*Le Petit Testament*) (1456).

20. From "Arnold Dolmetsch," *Egoist*, 4 (Aug 1917), 104, 105.

21. Untitled review signed W. M. W. in the *Quest*, 4 (Apr 1913), 597-600; here 600.

22. The unsigned review of *Canzoni*, titled "A Modern Troubadour," appeared in the *Daily News* (25 Sept 1911), 3, and that by J. C. Squire (1884-1958) in the *New Age*, 10 (21 Dec 1911), 8.

23. Aldington, "The Poetry of Ezra Pound," *Egoist*, 2 (1 May 1915), 71-72; here 72. R. H. C. [A. R. Orage], "Readers and Writers," *New Age*, 17 (5 Aug 1915), 332. Orage published "The Seafarer" in the *New Age* on 30 Nov 1911, before it appeared in *Ripostes* (1912).

24. "Publishers' Announcements. Mr. Welkin Mark's New Poet," *Punch*, 136 (23 June 1909), 449. Elkin Mathews, whose publishing firm was opposite that of his partner John Lane in Vigo Street, Piccadilly, is parodied as Welkin Mark.

25. The letter of American critic Raymond Macdonald Alden, chairman of the English Department at the University of Illinois, appeared under the heading "The New Poetry" in the *Nation* (New York), 96 (17 Apr 1913), 386-87.

26. Pound made this distinction in the first issue of *Blast* (20 June 1914), stating that "Impressionism, Futurism, which is only an accelerated sort of impressionism, DENY the Vortex" (154), and then in "Vorticism" (1914), rpt. in *Gaudier Brzeska*: "But 'futurism,' when it gets into art, is, for the most part, a descendent of impressionism. It is a sort of accelerated impressionism" (94).

27. Quoted in an interview, "The Imagistes': A Talk with Mr. Ezra Pound, their Editor," in *The Daily News and Leader* (18 Mar 1914), in answer to the anonymous interviewer's question, "I heard a famous poet say not long ago that the great poet was never emotional. Do you agree with that?" (14)

28. These selections from Pound's "A Few Don'ts by an Imagiste" appeared in *Poetry*, 1 (Mar 1913), 200-06; they also appeared verbatim in the interview above in *The Daily News and Leader*, TSE's immediate source.

29. Anonymous editorial, "A New Literary Ism," *Chicago Daily Tribune* (11 May 1913), H4.

30. In "The Perfect Poet," which appeared in the *Daily News and Leader* of 3 Apr 1914, Archer disputed Pound's "Don'ts" for Imagists (listed in the interview in the issue of 18 Mar, note 27, above). In refuting Pound's assertions regarding the necessity of technical skill, Archer quotes three quatrains from A. E. Housman's *A Shropshire Lad* (1896) to illustrate his belief that "the individuality of accent and of feeling which makes the poem unforgettable did not come . . . from a course of poetical five-finger exercises" (6). TSE's parenthetical.

31. Mary McNeil Fenollosa (1865-1954) gave Pound some seventeen notebooks, from which he brought out, in addition to *Cathay* (1915), *Certain Noble Plays of Japan* (1916) and *'Noh' or Accomplishment* (1917), the latter reviewed by TSE in the *Egoist* in 1917 (564).

32. TSE consistently misspells Pound's title as "Contemporanea" in the text.

33. TSE expands Pound's list of admired poets, adding the Roman writers Martial (ca. 42-ca. 102) and Gaius Valerius Catullus (ca. 87-54 BC), and the French Symbolists, Jules Laforgue (1860-87) and Tristan Corbière (1845-75).

34. Floyd Dell, "To a Poet," *Chicago Evening Post Literary Review* (4 Apr 1913), 4. TSE altered Dell's use of Horace's Latin name, Horatius (Quintus Horatius Flaccus).

35. From "Ortus" (1913), in *Lustra* (1916).

36. From "Commission" (1913), in *Lustra*.

37. From "Salvationists" (1914), in *Lustra*.

38. TSE quotes from the second of the three-part printing of "Ezra Pound / Translated from the French of Jean de Bosschère," *Egoist*, 4 (Feb 1917), 27-28. See note 12.

39. From "Dance Figure" (1913), in *Lustra*.

40. Pound derived much of his knowledge of Chinese literature and language from *A History of Chinese Literature* (1901) by the Victorian Sinologist and translator Herbert A. Giles (1845-1935), who devoted a large portion of the book to translation.

41. Most of the poems in *Cathay* are loose translations of the Chinese poet Li Po (701-62), whose Japanese name, Rihaku, was used by Fenollosa and subsequently by Pound.

42. Ford Madox Hueffer, "From China to Peru," *Outlook*, 35 (19 June 1915), 800-01.

43. Following this sentence in the TS is an elided illustration from a Noh play by Motokiyo: "There is the son of the two lovers in *Nishikigi*:

Tangled, we are entangled. Whose fault was it, dear? tangled up as the grass patterns are tangled in this coarse cloth, or as the little Mushi that lives on and chirrups in dried seaweed. We do not know where are to-day our tears in the undergrowth of this eternal wilderness. We neither wake nor sleep, and passing our nights in a sorrow which is in the end a vision, what are these scenes of spring to us? this thinking in sleep of some one who has no thought of you, is it more than a dream? and yet surely it is the natural way of love. In our hearts there is much and in our bodies nothing, and we do nothing at all, and only the waters of the river of tears flow quickly.

and the fine speech of the old Kagekiyo . . ."

The passage from *Nishikigi* is spoken by the ghost of Shite to the ghost of Tsure, in *'Noh' or Accomplishment*, by Ernest Fenollosa and Ezra Pound (London: Macmillan, 1916), 132, reviewed by TSE in Aug 1917 (565).

44. Spoken by the Chorus in *Kagekiyo*, in *'Noh' or Accomplishment*, 187. TSE quoted this passage in his review (567).

45. TSE's inverted commas around "Noh" were removed in the Faber edition (*TCC* 182); the reference is not to the Noh drama generally but to the book, *'Noh' or Accomplishment*, reviewed under the title "Japanese Mysteries" in *TLS*, 784 (25 Jan 1917), 41.

46. "Three Cantos of a Poem of Some Length" had appeared in the June, July, and Aug 1917 issues of *Poetry*, edited by Monroe, before being revised for *Lustra of Ezra Pound with Earlier Poems* (New York: Knopf, 1917), 179-202.

In Memory of Henry James¹

The Egoist, 5 (Jan 1918) [1]-2

Henry James has been dead for some time. The current of English literature was not appreciably altered by his work during his lifetime; and James will probably continue to be regarded as the extraordinarily clever but negligible curiosity. The current hardly matters; it hardly matters that very few people will read James. The “influence” of James hardly matters: to be influenced by a writer is to have a chance inspiration from him; or to take what one wants; or to see things one has overlooked; there will always be a few intelligent people to understand James, and to be understood by a few intelligent people is all the influence a man requires. What matters least of all is his place in such a Lord Mayor’s show as Mr. Chesterton’s procession of Victorian Literature.² The point to be made is that James has an importance which has nothing to do with what came before him or what may happen after him; an importance which has been overlooked on both sides of the Atlantic.

I do not suppose that anyone who is not an American can *properly* appreciate James. James’s best American figures in the novels, in spite of their trim definite outlines, the economy of strokes, have a fullness of existence and an external ramification of relationship which a European reader might not easily suspect. The Bellegarde family, for instance, are merely good outline sketches by an intelligent foreigner; when more is expected of them, in the latter part of the story, they jerk themselves into only melodramatic violence.³ In all appearance Tom Tristram is an even slighter sketch. Europeans can recognize him; they have seen him, known him, have even penetrated the Occidental Club; but no European has the Tom Tristram element in his composition, has anything of Tristram from his first visit to the Louvre to his final remark that Paris is the only place where a white man can live. It is the final perfection, the consummation of an American to become, not an Englishman, but a European—something which no born European, no person of any European nationality, can become. Tom is one of the failures, one of nature’s misfortunes, in this process. Even General Packard, C. P. Hatch, and Miss Kitty Upjohn have a reality which Claire de Cintré misses. Noémie, of course, is perfect, but Noémie is a result of the intelligent eye;

her existence is a triumph of the intelligence, and it does not extend beyond the frame of the picture.

For the English reader, much of James's criticism of America must merely be something taken for granted. English readers can appreciate it for what it has in common with criticism everywhere, with Flaubert in France and Turgenev in Russia. Still, it should have for the English an importance beyond the work of these writers. There is no English equivalent for James, and at least he writes in this language. As a critic, no novelist in our language can approach James; there is not even any large part of the reading public which knows what the word "critic" means. (The usual definition of a critic is a writer who cannot "create"—perhaps a reviewer of books). James was emphatically not a successful *literary* critic. His criticism of books and writers is feeble. In writing of a novelist, he occasionally produces a valuable sentence out of his own experience rather than in judgment of the subject. The rest is charming talk, or gentle commendation. Even in handling men whom he could, one supposes, have carved joint from joint—Emerson or Norton—his touch is uncertain;⁴ there is a desire to be generous, a political motive, an admission (in dealing with American writers) that under the circumstances this was the best possible, or that it has fine qualities. His father was here keener than he.⁵ Henry was not a literary critic.

He was a critic who preyed not upon ideas, but upon living beings. It is criticism which is in a very high sense creative. The characters, the best of them, are each a distinct success of creation: Daisy Miller's small brother is one of these.⁶ Done in a clean flat drawing, each is extracted out of a reality of its own, substantial enough; everything given is true for that individual; but what is given is chosen with great art for its place in a general scheme. The general scheme is not one character, nor a group of characters in a plot or merely in a crowd. The focus is a situation, a relation, an atmosphere, to which the characters pay tribute, but being allowed to give only what the writer wants. The real hero, in any of James's stories, is a social entity of which men and women are constituents. It is, in *The Europeans*, that particular conjunction of people at the Wentworth house, a situation in which several memorable scenes are merely timeless parts, only occurring necessarily in succession.⁷ In this aspect, you can say that James is dramatic; as what Pinero and Mr. Jones used to do for a large public, James does for the intelligent.⁸ It is in the chemistry of these subtle substances, these curious precipitates and explosive gases which are suddenly formed by the contact of mind with mind, that James is unequalled. Compared with James's,

other novelists' characters seem to be only accidentally in the same book. Naturally, there is something terrible, as disconcerting as a quicksand, in this discovery, though it only becomes absolutely dominant in such stories as *The Turn of the Screw*. It is partly foretold in Hawthorne, but James carried it much farther. And it makes the reader, as well as the personae, uneasily the victim of a merciless clairvoyance.

James's critical genius comes out most tellingly in his mastery over, his baffling escape from, Ideas; a mastery and an escape which are perhaps the last test of a superior intelligence. He had a mind so fine that no idea could violate it. Englishmen, with their uncritical admiration (in the present age) for France, like to refer to France as the Home of Ideas; a phrase which, if we could twist it into truth, or at least a compliment, ought to mean that in France ideas are very severely looked after; not allowed to stray, but preserved for the inspection of civic pride in a *Jardin des Plantes*, and frugally dispatched on occasion of public necessity. England, on the other hand, if it is not the Home of Ideas, has at least become infested with them in about the space of time within which Australia has been overrun by rabbits. In England ideas run wild and pasture on the emotions; instead of thinking with our feelings (a very different thing), we corrupt our feelings with ideas; we produce the public, the political, the emotional idea, evading sensation and thought. George Meredith (the disciple of Carlyle) was fertile in ideas; his epigrams are a facile substitute for observation and inference.⁹ Mr. Chesterton's brain swarms with ideas; I see no evidence that it thinks. James in his novels is like the best French critics in maintaining a point of view, a view-point untouched by the parasite idea. He is the most intelligent man of his generation.

The fact of being everywhere a foreigner was probably an assistance to his native wit. Since Byron and Landor, no Englishman appears to have profited much from living abroad.¹⁰ We have had Birmingham seen from Chelsea, but not Chelsea seen (really *seen*) from Baden or Rome. There are advantages, indeed, in coming from a large flat country which no one wants to visit: advantages which both Turgenev and James enjoyed. These advantages have not won them recognition. Europeans have preferred to take their notion of the Russian from Dostoevski, and their notion of the American from, let us say, Frank Norris if not O. Henry.¹¹ Thus, they fail to note that there are many kinds of Russians, corresponding to the many kinds of their fellow-countrymen, and that most of these kinds, similarly to the kinds of their fellow-countrymen, are stupid; likewise with Americans. Americans

also have encouraged this fiction of a general type, a formula or idea, usually the predaceous square-jawed or thin-lipped. They like to be told that they are a race of commercial buccaneers. It gives them something easily escaped from, moreover, when they wish to reject America. Thus the novels of Frank Norris have succeeded in both countries; though it is curious that the most valuable part of *The Pit* is its satire (quite unconscious I believe; Norris was simply representing faithfully the life he knew) of Chicago society after business hours. All this show of commercialism which Americans like to present to the foreign eye James quietly waves aside; and in pouncing upon his fellow-countryman after the stock exchange has closed, in tracking down his vices and absurdities across the Atlantic, and exposing them in their highest flights of dignity or culture, James may be guilty of what will seem to most Americans scandalously improper behaviour. It is too much to expect them to be grateful. And the British public, had it been more aware, would hardly have been more comfortable confronted with a smile which was so far from breaking into the British laugh. Henry James's death, if it had been more taken note of, should have given considerable relief "on both sides of the Atlantic," and cemented the Anglo-American Entente.

T. S. ELIOT

NOTES

1. Rpt. as "In Memory" in the *Little Review*, 5 (Aug 1918), 44-47. James died in London on 28 Feb 1916. TSE was editor of this special memorial issue.

2. In *The Victorian Age in Literature* (New York: Henry Holt, 1913), G. K. Chesterton (1874-1936) compares "the insight and intricacy" of James with that of George Meredith and concludes that James "lives in glass houses. . . . None of the Meredithian things, wind or wine or sex or stark nonsense, ever gets between Mr. James and his prey. But the thing is a deficiency as well as a talent: we cannot but admire the figures that walk about in his afternoon drawing-rooms; but we have a certain sense that they are figures that have no faces" (228-29).

3. The French aristocratic Bellegarde family and the other characters mentioned in this paragraph appear in James's portrayal of the clash of European and American customs in his third novel, *The American* (1877).

4. James discussed the poet and essayist Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-82) in *Partial Portraits* (1888) and Charles Eliot Norton (1827-1908), professor of art history at Harvard, in an addendum to *Notes on Novelists* (1914).

5. The father of the novelist was the philosopher Henry James, Sr. (1811-82), whose other children included the philosopher William James and the diarist Alice James, and whose circle included Emerson, Thoreau, and Carlyle. A Swedenborgian and social reformer, he was the author of *The Nature of Evil* (1855) and *Society the Redeemed Form of Man* (1879).

6. In *Daisy Miller* (1878), the heroine's nine-year-old brother Randolph is a rambunctious urchin who judges everything he finds in Europe against its equivalent in Schenectady, New York, always concluding that the American variety is best.

7. In *The Europeans* (1878), two American-born siblings raised in cosmopolitan Europe return to the puritanical home of their uncle and cousins, the Wentworth family, in Boston.

8. The popular English playwrights Arthur Wing Pinero (1855-1934), author of farces and social dramas, including *The Second Mrs. Tanqueray* (1893), and Henry Arthur Jones (1851-1929), author of melodramas and social comedies, including *The Liars* (1897), were practitioners of the "well-made play," the English version of the *pièce bien faite*.

9. In his 1916 Extension course on English Literature, TSE discussed Meredith's use of wit and epigram, and, in a 1918 review, his uneven use of metaphor (480; 760). "Meredith knew what he was doing," TSE wrote to Eleanor Hinkley, "but unfortunately it wasn't worth doing, don't read him" (*LI* 259). He also included Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881), known for the cultural critiques in his essays and *Sartor Resartus* (1883-84), in Extension lectures in 1916 and 1917 (478; 587).

10. The European travels of Lord Byron from 1809 to 1811 inspired *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* (1812-18), and his permanent residence abroad from 1816 until his death in Greece in 1824 informed *Don Juan* and other works. Landor served in Spain as a volunteer in the national army against Napoleon, providing the inspiration for his tragedy, *Count Julian* (1812), and his later residence in Florence led to his *Imaginary Conversations* (1824-29).

11. Frank Norris (1870-1902) was known for three naturalistic novels about life in turn-of-the-century America, *McTeague: A Story of San Francisco* (1899), *The Octopus: A Story of California* (1901), and *The Pit: A Story of Chicago* (1903). O. Henry published more than six hundred realistic stories about ordinary life in America, collected in such volumes as *The Heart of the West* (1907) and *Whirligigs* (1910).

The Two Unfinished Novels

An unsigned review of *The Sense of the Past*

and *The Ivory Tower*, by Henry James

(London: Collins, 1917). Pp. 351, 348.¹

The Egoist, 5 (Jan 1918) 3-4

The two unfinished novels of James may easily be called the grave of his genius; it should be added, an impressive tomb; and they are as important as documents as the otherwise far more valuable reminiscences. They will at least enable every one to judge for himself how far he can go in the attempt to come to terms with James's later novels. Probably the most instructive point about them is the progressive devouring of the novel by the rapacious "scenario." This is not, one feels, the way in which the earlier books were constructed; it is the last stage of a method that grew visibly upon the novelist; yet accepting these books gratefully, as one accepts the last work of such a writer as James, we can hardly deplore the malady to which his writing succumbed. For in the case of these two volumes the novels are, with the exceptional flashes, very dull; the scenarios, the word of mouth by which James revealed his plans and his solitudes, are intensely interesting. Not so much with *The Ivory Tower*; here the scenario is much concerned with names, with dates, with the spotting about of the scenes—Newport, or Boston, or Lenox? But in *The Sense of the Past* talk one sees how by touch after touch the novelist would probably have gone on obliterating the outline which had in conception such unusual sharpness and distinction. *The Sense of the Past*, however, is even in its present state infinitely more important than *The Ivory Tower*. In the latter James is probably attempting no more than the social study to which an earlier manner is better adapted; in the former he is reaching out, audaciously and unconquerably reaching out toward something Jamesian beyond James, something so difficult that one holds one's breath still at the terrifying risk of the experiment.

In both books, however, the scenario is not only more interesting than the novel, but the novels themselves tend toward the scenario as their lawful form. The disappearance of conversation, noticeable in James's later novels, is more noticeable here; I do not mean disappearance of inverted

commas, for the personages are often observed to be in vocal communication, but I mean that these personages are flooded by some awareness of the whole point as it is displayed to the author's mind before being realized by their actions. There is not, indeed, enough thickness of skin and skull between them; they are all playing up to their prevision of what the writer means. Their obedience to the author is represented rather by "influence" exerted upon them than by a common pulling of puppet-strings. As for the two "wonderful" young men, Ralph in *The Sense of the Past* and Graham in *The Ivory Tower*, the perception of Ralph's impecunious English relatives, and the perception of Graham's predatory American friends of the respective wonderfulness of these adolescents of thirty, seems an echo of the paternal fondness of the author, and only renders the two characters insipid.

The Sense of the Past is one whole side of James—the side which connects him with Hawthorne, contrasted with the Turgenev side. *The Sense of the Past* might be compared with *The Seven Gables* or even the inferior *Faun*;² and it *might* have been a finer novel. The trick—an influence emanating from, or started off by, a portrait—is an old one, but it was to have been used for a new purpose, and it might have been the pattern for a story which would have given James's final word on the civilized American. That curious "sense" so peculiarly American (none the less so because so rare even in America), so different from the political sense of the Faubourg Saint-Germain or the simpler land-tenure sense of the English, the sense apparent in touches of Hawthorne's Pyncheon family, is something which ought certainly to have been done by James. And here we should have had it in its most complex form, involved with an equally acute and imperative sense of the Present, a sense of the present becoming more articulate and pressing just as the past dominates, for it becomes thus a sense of the Future. The ghostly element here gives a substance to *The Sense of the Past* which is absent from *The Ivory Tower*; it provides the admirable scene between Ralph and the Ambassador, and its temporary departure makes tedious the interminable interview between Ralph and his Midmore relatives. It should, in the fulfilment, have been present here too:

The slow growth on the part of the others of the fear of Ralph, even in the midst of their making much of him, as abnormal, as uncanny, as not *like* those they know of their own kind, etc. etc.; and his fear just of

theirs, with his double consciousness, alas, his being *almost* as right as possible for the “period,” and yet so intimately and secretly wrong. [289]

And there was to have been a masterly turn of the screw later (see page 318 ff.) with the younger sister.³ The whole thing was so difficult as to be perhaps just within James’s powers. The one scene with the Ambassador would seem to show that it was; this is a fragment torn from the edge of the impossible.

Note.—Señor Gomez wishes to thank Miss Anna Louise Babson, of New York, for revising the English version of this review.

ENRIQUE GOMEZ

NOTES

1. See textual note. The two novels were issued together with editorial prefaces by Percy Lubbock. James had abandoned *The Sense of the Past*, a time-travel novel, in 1900, took it up again in 1914, and worked on it at intervals before his last illness in Dec 1915. He began *The Ivory Tower*, an exploration of the corrupting effect of excessive American wealth, in 1914 and had completed the first three books at the time of his death.

2. *The House of the Seven Gables* (1851) and *The Marble Faun* (1860).

3. When the unfinished narrative breaks off, the protagonist Ralph Pendrel, engaged to Molly Midmore, finds himself attracted to her younger sister Nan. In his “Notes” for completion, James indicates that Nan will “divine” in 1820 that Ralph is a time-traveler from 1910 and that she will sacrifice her own happiness to help him return to a union with Aurora Coyne, a woman from his own time who had previously rejected him.

TEXTUAL NOTE

The editors attribute this review to TSE, concluding that Enrique Gomez is a pseudonym. When TSE proposed the James issue of the *Egoist*, editor Harriet Shaw Weaver requested review copies of the three posthumous works, *The Middle Years*, which Pound agreed to review for the issue, and the two unfinished novels, *The Sense of the Past* and *The Ivory Tower*, both of which TSE kept for review himself: the stamped review copies, bearing his bookplate, are in his library. “I am trying to make up a James number at present,” he wrote to Eleanor Hinkley on 31 Oct 1917. “But there are very few people to write nowadays; all the old lot is broken up, and only drivellers left” (*LI* 229-30). “I had to write most of the James number myself,” he wrote to his mother on 17 Jan 1918 (*LI* 248). As he did not wish to sign his name overmuch in issues of the *Egoist* which he edited, he frequently used pseudonyms for reviews (Apteryx) and filler letters (J. A. D. Spence and others). Having signed the lead article, “In Memory of Henry James,” he attributed this review to an Hispanicized name for Henry James, “Enrique Gomez,” a pseudonym partly inspired by the Spanish lessons that he had been taking since May 1917. By Oct, Lloyds Bank let him have all the Spanish financial newspapers for himself, and on 10 May 1918, he informed his mother, “I can read a Spanish newspaper pretty easily” (*LI* 263). He invented not only Enrique Gomez but the fictional “translator” Anna Louise Babson of New York, who

is thanked by "Señor Gomez" in the note at the end of the review; there was no such Gomez to receive the books and write a review in Spanish, no Babson in New York to translate it and return it to TSE in London for printing.

Significant thematic evidence links the essay to "In Memory of Henry James" and "The Hawthorne Aspect" (649; 736), particularly the recurring emphasis on James's "sense for situation," described in the former as "a situation, a relation, an atmosphere, to which the characters pay tribute, but being allowed to give only what the writer wants," expressed in the present review by how the characters in *The Sense of the Past* "are flooded by some awareness of the whole point as it is displayed to the author's mind before it is realized by their actions," and in the latter essay by TSE's assertion that Hawthorne, like James, possessed "the deeper psychology," that he too "was acutely sensitive to the situation; that he did grasp character through the relation of two or more persons to each other," and that James's "interest in the 'deeper psychology,' the observation, and the sense for situation . . . culminate in *The Sense of the Past*" (740).

Further, the present review contains thematic and comparative parallels with "In Memory of Henry James" and the subsequent "The Hawthorne Aspect [of Henry James]." Here, for instance, TSE writes: "*The Sense of the Past* is one whole side of James—the side which connects him with Hawthorne, contrasted with the Turgenev side. *The Sense of the Past* might be compared with *The Seven Gables* or even the inferior *Faun*." He then develops the Hawthorne side of James and makes these very comparisons in "The Hawthorne Aspect": "Compare [*The Sense of the Past*] with *The House of Seven Gables* (Hawthorne's best novel after all); the situation, the 'shrinkage and extinction of a family' is rather more complex on the surface, than James's with . . . fewer character-relations."

Unsigned reviews of fiction by Douglas Goldring and Edith Wharton¹

The Egoist, 5 (Jan 1918) 10

The Fortune: A Romance of Friendship, by Douglas Goldring.
Dublin: Maunsel, 1917. Pp. vi + 332.²

It is usually presumed that a moral or political motive is a detriment to a novel, but here is evidence that the question cannot be stated in such simple terms. For Mr. Goldring's book would be called definitely propagandist; it is a pacifist novel; and it is a novel with brilliant things and weak things in it. But the weakest things are not the propagandist things. Goldring has a definite point of view toward the war which is exposed in the second part of the book, and probably his conviction here gives him an interest in what he is doing which holds this part of the book together. The first half of the book is boring. It is a hasty biography of a young Pendennis from the time of leaving school up to his establishment as a successful playwright at the beginning of the war; it is chiefly a notebook of the author's own intellectual development and a catalogue of all the shams he got tired of between schooldays and maturity.³ It is not unintelligent, but it is unimportant, and it is not literary art. James, the hero, or rather the hero's hero (cf. George Warrington), the strong cynical enemy of nonsense, is unfortunately also Mr. Goldring's hero, and therefore rather wooden. He is real only as he is seen through the eyes of the high life into which Harold (the Pendennis, the admirer of James) marries. Harold's wife has a friend, Gwen, who remarks of James:

There's no getting away from it that Murdoch is an out-and-out bad man. . . . It is unfortunate that poor, dear Harold should have fallen so completely under his domination. I always thought there was something uncanny about it. . . . It's my belief the man used *hypnotic influence*. . . . [213]

James at once lives, and he lives also in the admiration of Harold. This, and the character of Harold's wife, are extremely well done. There is a remarkably well-sustained chapter on Harold's sensations and ideas in the trenches.

But the most successful part of the book is the presentation of the mind of English Society in August 1914; a telling and restrained satire. Very often in the writing there is a sentence too much; but this is unquestionably a brilliant novel.⁴

Summer, by Edith Wharton. London: Macmillan, 1917. Pp. 282.⁵

Even Mrs. Wharton's parerga have importance, and this parergon, a very brief novel, offers interest as a work in a curious kind of satire which Mrs. Wharton has made her own; and just the kind of satire, it may be remarked, that her literary training and sympathies might have made most difficult for her. The book is, in fact—or should be—the death-blow to a kind of novel which has flourished in New England, the novel in which the wind whistles through the stunted firs and over the granite boulders into the white farmhouses where pale gaunt women sew rag carpets. Mrs. Wharton does the trick by a deliberate and consistent realism, by refraining from the slightest touch of irony, by suppressing all evidence of European culture. She even allows herself to be detected in just the slight smile of an inhabitant of Boston (where the type of novel in question is read) at the name of the Honorius Hatchard Memorial Library, 1832, in the village of North Dormer. The young man comes up from the city (Springfield), Charity gives him all she has, and the young man returns to marry Annabel Balch of Springfield. The scene of the county fair at Nettleton is one of unrelieved horror. This novel will certainly be considered “disgusting” in America; it is certain that not one reader in a thousand will apprehend the author's point of view. But it should add to Mrs. Wharton's reputation as a novelist the distinction of being the satirist's satirist.

NOTES

1. “Unsigned, but almost certainly by T. S. Eliot” (Gallup 201).

2. The poet, novelist, and travel-writer Douglas Goldring (1887-1960) was associated with Lewis and Pound in the Vorticist group. He helped with *Blast* (1914, 1915), in the second issue of which TSE published his first poems in England, “Preludes” and “Rhapsody on a Windy Night.” In a 1920 review of modern criticism in *Chapbook*, Goldring was to say that TSE “has a scientific, analytical brain, and approaches his task with some of the detachment of the great surgeon who, knife in hand, advances towards the exposed flesh of the anesthetized ‘case’” (*Contemporary Reviews* 53).

3. In *The History of Pendennis* (1850), Thackeray depicts the escapades and moral struggles of his semiautobiographical hero, Arthur Pendennis. His mentor-hero is the cynical journalist George Warrington, who helps him get started as a writer.

4. In a letter to Goldring on 7 Nov 1918, TSE acknowledged that he had reviewed *The Fortune*: “I enjoyed the *Fortune*, as my review testified” (*LI* 293). In 1930, when Goldring contacted him about publishing a new edition, TSE declined, responding on 10 Jan, “Indeed I remember *The Fortune* very well, and my opinion about it has not changed.”

5. The American novelist Edith Wharton (1862-1937) had written several satirical novels, notably *The House of Mirth* (1905) and *The Custom of the Country* (1913).

Recent British Periodical Literature in Ethics

The International Journal of Ethics, 28 (Jan 1918) 270-77

As representative of recent periodical literature of ethical interest, two articles, or rather two series of articles, may be selected for exceptional importance. Philosophical speculation (in the pages of *Mind*) has taken the form chiefly of historical studies; practical investigation (in the pages of the *Hibbert Journal*, the *Eugenics Review*, and the *Shield*) has centred around problems of depopulation and birth-control.¹ Mr. P. S. Burrell's "The Plot of Plato's *Republic*" and Professor MacBride's "Study of Heredity" are the most valuable contributions to their respective fields.²

Mr. Burrell takes the view which is maintained by so eminent a Hellenist as Paul Shorey in his *Unity of Plato's Thought* and which is now pretty generally accepted: the view that Plato's philosophy, and the *Republic* in particular, forms a consistent whole.³ In the course of his article, he refutes certain distinguished critics (notably Jowett, Gomperz, and Mr. A. D. Lindsay) who discriminate the "Socratic" from the "post-Socratic" books, or who find various inexplicable transitions in the work.⁴ Mr. Burrell demolishes the Box and Cox bogey of the "historical" and the "Platonic" Socrates.⁵ Taking up each section of the *Republic* in order, he shows how it contributes to the whole work. To refute Thrasymachus, it is necessary to discuss the nature of reality, to raise the question whether there is a moral world. And in order to study the morality of the individual, we must first study the "larger letters" of society.⁶ Among noteworthy theories opposed are: (1) Gomperz's complete misunderstanding in his statement that the connection of moral, political, and historical philosophy was slight. For Plato the connection was vital.⁷ Furthermore, the "first city" is no more a description of real society than the second or third city: Socrates's state is ideal from end to end.⁸ (2) The three virtues in the state do not, as Jowett supposed, correspond to the three parts of the soul. Nor is there any confusion between justice and temperance.⁹ Temperance consists in harmony between the rulers and the ruled, justice in the doing by each of his own work.¹⁰ (3) Justice does not as Pater thought "supervene" upon the other virtues; it is what makes them possible.¹¹

In the April number of *Mind*, an article by E. W. Hirst, "Moral Sense, Moral Reason, and Moral Sentiment," has for its foundation a criticism of Dr. Rashdall's theories, especially as set forth in his last book (*Is Conscience an Emotion?*).¹² Dr. Rashdall fails to do justice to Shaftesbury and Hutcheson.¹³ Their Moral Sense is not simply a "particular sort of feeling or emotion" but involves reflection on action [147].¹⁴ Dr. Rashdall thinks that in reducing the Moral Sense to a kind of Moral Taste, these writers abandon all objective criteria. But in matters of art, and even in matters of food, there is always *some* objective criterion, and furthermore the moralists in question do recognise the objectivity of the Moral Sense. (When Mr. Hirst says that "the 'obligation' to cultivate correct views on art essentially differs from the duty of manifesting right conduct" [150], he perhaps means or should mean "different from the duty of cultivating correct views on conduct," which is not quite what he says). Mr. Hirst objects that Shaftesbury and Hutcheson do not sufficiently recognise the difference between the moral and the aesthetic sense: aesthetic judgment depends on a certain "involuntary factor" [150]. (So, however, does the understanding of right and wrong, as distinguished from mere correct behaviour.)

"Dr. Rashdall strenuously maintains that only as moral judgments are the work of Reason can their objectivity and authority be assured" [152]. Reason gives us the axioms of Equity and Rational Benevolence—but these, says Mr. Hirst, depend for application upon a quantitative estimate [152, 153]. Though Dr. Rashdall says that "goods" are commensurable "only for the purposes of choice" [153],¹⁵ this restriction does not seem to prevent a sufficient amount of one good from being equivalent to another amount of another good. Choice would then depend upon "taste." Dr. Rashdall, however, in his recent work, erects a hierarchy of goods.¹⁶ Mr. Hirst denies that ethical quality attaches to the form of activity (e.g. he denies that intellectual activity is more "moral" than eating), but not to the motive. "The so-called 'higher' pleasures of art and culture are 'higher' only because they tend to be less immediately selfish" [155]. Dr. Rashdall holds feelings to be an object rather than an essential constituent of the value judgment. We judge *about* feeling. Mr. Hirst suspects that Canon Rashdall does not discriminate between the value-judgment and the judgment of fact. Mr. Hirst's own view of Conscience is based upon the development of society. "Conscience in its primitive form is a regard for the Tribe" [158]. It is extended not by the admission that "one man's good is of equal intrinsic

value with the like good of another" [159]¹⁷ but by a wider notion of "unity" [161].

Recent numbers of the *Hibbert* show the absorbing interest of educational reform and international ethics.¹⁸ Mr. Harold Begbie animadverts rather vaguely upon the direction which educational reconstruction in England ought to take. Mr. Chapman deprecates extreme pacifism and outlines the platform of the American League to Enforce Peace.¹⁹ Mr. J. A. Hobson replies to a review of Armstrong's *Our Ultimate Aim in the War* by Dr. Jacks. Dr. Jacks questioned two assumptions: (1) that a common will of mankind really exists, (2) that such a common will would be in favour of perpetual peace [161]. Both of these assumptions Mr. Hobson undertakes to make plausible (deleting the word "perpetual"). He asserts that the "great majority of the more developed minds desire, will and plan many of the same objects and in conscious co-operation": in commerce, science, philosophy, religion, art, hygiene, education, social reform and society [199-200]. He believes also that a will for peace at almost any price will be strengthened by the present war. Dr. Jacks criticised the *League to Enforce Peace* because it seems to assume that only one state at a time would rebel from its decisions. He, in turn, according to Mr. Hobson, assumes that there would exist strong fixed parties in the Parliament of Nations,²⁰ and that their sympathies would be strong enough to detach a powerful minority from the decisions of the Parliament. Mr. Hobson does not claim for the Federation (at least as an immediate ideal) the right of interference in the affairs of the several states; the Federation would not, for example, be empowered to accord independence to India. He further suggests that the Federation need not, in its inception, include more than the seven great powers, and remarks justly that their conduct toward lesser nations in the capacity of a corporate body, would probably be juster than the separate Imperialisms of each. Mr. Hobson hardly meets Dr. Jacks's objection that we shall not find working toward Internationalism the same federative forces which have produced the several states, but he has a strong argument in the contention that whatever the defects of international government, no better means of avoiding the ruin of civilization has yet been devised.

In the April number, Dr. Jacks makes a number of shrewd observations on the future after the war, though with a tantalizing vagueness in conclusion.²¹ He remarks that all the schemes for reconstruction put forward depend for their execution upon the war's ending favourably for England, and goes on to point out that a Europe divided into victors and vanquished

would not be a very promising ground for the new crop of reforms—no matter which side was the victor. On the other hand, Dr. Jacks is strongly opposed to “peace without victory.” His solution is to dispense punishment to the “small group of exceptionally dangerous men” to whom the war and wars are due [379]. He does not enter upon details as to the torture to be applied to these culprits, and he mentions no names; and he does not state whether any of the persons are to be found outside of Germany.

Mr. A. D. McLaren, late a prisoner of war at Ruhleben, analyses the feelings of national hate in various countries. Mr. Barbour and Miss Maynard both discuss the place of Force in Christian ethics, and arrive at somewhat similar conclusions. Miss Maynard cuts the knot as follows:

John xviii, 36: “If my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight”. Is Britain a kingdom of this world? Most decidedly she is. She is a kingdom that above all others stands for the three great foundation-stones of the State—Justice, Liberty, and Beneficence. [491]

Professor MacBride’s article in the *Eugenics Review*, referred to above, occupies a large part of four issues.²² It is in large part highly technical, although well written, and made as intelligible as possible to the uninitiated. We can here only quote Professor MacBride’s main conclusions, without attempting to outline the experiments upon which they are based:

In all cases where large numbers of a given species of animals are raised under somewhat artificial conditions a certain number of monsters will be produced, apparently owing to a disturbance of the germ-cells in their growing and ripening. This is true both of insects raised on banana peel and of human beings raised in a large city. These monsters in most, but not in all cases, differ from the normal type, in the loss of some feature which the normal type possesses, and hence are to be looked on as defectives. . . . [353]

Exercise of the functions tends to enlarge the organs by which these functions are carried out, and this exercise continued through generations slowly modifies the structure of the stock, till eventually the resulting change can show itself in the young before the exercise has been begun. Conversely persistent disuse of function tends slowly to atrophy the organs by which they are carried on, till eventually these organs are only developed in a reduced form. [353]

Professor MacBride draws two conclusions of social importance: (1) That in former times the struggle for existence was enough to keep down the

defective element in the population; but under present conditions these people are protected and multiply. He advocates therefore segregation and sterilization for the benefit of society. (2) The transmissibility of acquired characters makes the problem of education of the highest importance: we must adopt such a system of education that "the next generation may start at a very slightly higher level of capacity than their fathers" [355].

In replying to a writer in the *New Statesman* who had written in praise of this article, Professor MacBride points out that the inheritance of acquired characters is not taken as proved, but only as rendered highly probable. And in reference to the two conclusions mentioned above, he says that while racial improvement by any means must be a very slow process, the harm done by the propagation of the defective is very quickly felt. Furthermore, he insists upon the importance of the responsibility of parents: "there is no system of State subventions," he says very justly, "which will not break down if parental responsibility be removed and reckless reproduction encouraged."²³

In the January number (1917), Major Darwin, whose articles always deserve attention, discusses methods for encouraging reproduction on the part of the best classes in the community, and for discouraging reproduction on the part of the incompetent, thriftless, and pauper element. Mr. A. K. Chalmers also has an able article on the report of the National Birth-Rate Commission.

In the April number, Havelock Ellis ("Birth-Control and Eugenics") argues that birth-control is a continuation of the same process as the gradual diminution in number of offspring in the higher animals. There are various points of view from which birth-control may be advocated: the evolutionary, the economic, the humanitarian and the medical (as in cases when a woman lacks the physical strength for child-birth). The eugenic standpoint is still another. Birth-control is an essential part of eugenic propaganda. We must (1) increase and promote the knowledge of the laws of heredity, (2) popularise a knowledge of the methods of birth-control, (3) act in accordance with our knowledge. Our action must be inspired by a high sense of personal responsibility. Mr. Ellis deprecates hasty eugenic legislation and legal regulation of marriage [37-41].

The birth-rate problem also receives attention in *The Shield: A Review of Moral and Social Hygiene*, which has done a useful service in reprinting the report of the Birth-rate Commission in England in its October issue.²⁴ Its activities intersect with those of *The Eugenics Review*, but it is occupied

with the social aspect of eugenics exclusively. Eugenics is in fact only one of its interests, and it devotes much of its space to the subject of prostitution. In printing statistics, notes, reports, and in its reviews, this quarterly performs excellent work; and its editorials are usually written in a sensible and moderate tone. For the opinions expressed in the articles, the editors disclaim responsibility; and as might be expected, the articles are of various merit and from various points of view. One confusion which exists in the campaign for public health is the differences of standpoint with which different reformers attack the same problems. There is the religious, the sentimental, the hygienic-practical; with all possible hybrids of religious-sentimental, hygienic-sentimental, et cetera. One reformer will look forward to more freedom between the sexes, another to less. The weakness of many of the articles is that they "get you nowhere."²⁵

The March number contains a full discussion, with citation of the pertinent documents, of Sir George Cave's Criminal Law Amendment Bill (1917).²⁶ The Association for Moral and Social Hygiene objects to clauses 2 and 6 of this bill.²⁷ We reprint sections 2 and 3 of clause 2, and section 6 of clause 6.

2. 2. If any person acts in contravention of this section (section 1, forbidding persons suffering from venereal disease to have intercourse or to solicit to intercourse), that person shall be liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding two years, or on summary conviction to imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding six months.

Provided that a person shall not be convicted under this section if that person proves that he or she had reasonable grounds to believe that he or she was free from venereal disease at the time the alleged offence was committed. [212; TSE's parenthesis]

2. 3. Where any person is convicted of any of the offences mentioned in the schedule to this Act, the court may, if they think fit, for the purpose of ascertaining whether that person is suffering from venereal disease in a communicable form order that person to submit to such medical examination and tests as may be requisite for that purpose.

If the person is a female, the examination and tests shall be conducted, if she so desires, by a female doctor. [212]

6. 6. The power to impose a penalty on a person convicted of an offence under paragraph (11) of section fifty-four of the Metropolitan Police Act,

1839, 2 & 3 Vict. c. 57 (which relates to loitering for the purpose of prostitution or solicitation), or convicted under section twenty-eight of the Towns Police Clauses Act 1847, 10 & 11 Vict. c. 89, as a common prostitute or night-walker for loitering and importuning passengers for the purpose of prostitution or convicted of any similar offence under any Act, by-law, or regulation is hereby (where necessary) extended so as to include power, on the conviction of a person after a previous conviction for any such offence, to impose imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding one month. [212]

The Association remarks:

The particular injustice of subsections 3 and 4 (dealing with presumption for disease) lies in the fact that this heavy sentence and forced medical examination can be imposed upon women without any evidence, other than police evidence, being given at any stage, that any person was infected, solicited, or molested by the women accused. [211; italics in original].

Miss Macmillan points out that “prostitutes” (in the legal definition of the term) are not accorded a full and equal protection of the law with other “women” [213]. The Editor (Miss Neilans) rightly deprecates the agitation for the protection of soldiers from “harpies,” and points out that much of the “protection” is merely weakening the soldier’s sense of personal responsibility and self-control, besides unfairly penalizing the women in cases where the initiative may have been on the part of the man [221]. The article is followed by official correspondence and memoranda on the subject. The “Campaign for Compulsory Notification” is discussed, and the conclusion arrived at that compulsion is highly undesirable. It is a doubtful point whether the following suggestion of the Local Government Board manifests the highest moral tone:

The moral inducements to chastity should be supported by the fear which every right-minded lad and man and every woman ought to entertain of the terrible consequences of these diseases. [241]

Prudence and morals are both good things, and can be brought to support each other, but they should not be confused. The Bhikku Silacara writes interestingly of sexual morality among the Burmese (except when contaminated by contact with other races, as in Rangoon). As reasons for the absence of prostitution and irregularity, he adduces the lack of a pastoral clergy

(marriages are civil and can easily be dissolved on reasonable grounds, even on the ground of incompatibility), the example of the Bhikkus, or monks (who apparently practice without preaching), and the simplicity and low cost of living, which render early marriages possible. If the Bhikku Silacara's information is quite unbiased, the primitive Shan tribes are undoubtedly more civilized than ourselves.²⁸

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NOTES

1. *Mind*, in continuous publication since 1876, is the major philosophy journal of Oxford University; *The Hibbert Journal*, published from 1902 to 1968, dealt with religion and philosophy; the *Eugenics Review* was published from 1909 to 1968; and *The Shield: A Review of Moral and Social Hygiene*, began publication in 1870.

2. "The Plot of Plato's *Republic*" by P. S. Burrell (1871-1958) was published in three sequential issues of *Mind*, New Series, 25 (Jan, Apr, July 1916); "The Study of Heredity" by E. W. MacBride (1866-1940) appeared in four consecutive issues of *The Eugenics Review*, 8 (1916-17), Nos. 1-4.

3. The American classicist Paul Shorey (1857-1934), whose work TSE read in graduate school, was the author of *The Idea of the Good in Plato's Republic* (1895) and *The Unity of Plato's Thought* (1903).

4. Benjamin Jowett (1817-93), classicist, theologian, and master of Balliol College, worked for thirty years on his translation of the *Republic*, published posthumously in 1894. The Viennese Hellenist Theodor Gomperz (1832-1912) was the author of *Greek Thinkers: A History of Ancient Philosophy*, 4 vols (1901-12). The Scottish classicist A. D. Lindsay (1879-1952) published his translation of the *Republic* in 1908.

5. *Box and Cox* (1846) refers to the popular English farce by J. Madison Morton, recycled by Joseph Stirling Coyne as *Box and Cox Married and Settled: An Original Farce in One Act* (1852), and again, with libretto by Sir Francis C. Burnand, as a Gilbert and Sullivan music hall act, *Cox and Box; or, The Long-Lost Brothers* (1866). The plot involves a scheme by an old soldier to get double rent from a single room by renting it by day to Mr. Box (a printer who is out all night) and by night to Mr. Cox (a hatter who works all day). After hilarious conflicts, Box and Cox discover they are long lost brothers.

6. Thrasymachus (ca. 459-400 BC) is the Sophist who maintains in the *Republic* that "justice and injustice are really appearances or names of the same thing—self-seeking" (*Mind* 25:97, 73). Burrell's summary of Thrasymachus's position: "if you want to study the morality of the individual to any purpose, you must study 'the larger letters,' the concrete fact of society, human beings organized in association with one another" (76).

7. Gomperz, as quoted by Burrell: Plato found it "impossible to weld together three main themes whose internal connexion was *slight*: moral, political, and historical philosophy" [Burrell's italics]. Burrell responds: "When a critic starts with the idea that there is only a slight connexion between things which Plato considers vitally connected, it cannot be wondered that he fails to throw light on the process of Plato's argument" (*Mind* 25:98, 164).

8. "The error of Gomperz's view [is] that the development of the city of pigs [the 'first city'] . . . is a transition from 'what is' to 'what ought to be.' Plato's *Republic* does not begin as a picture of the actual and then by some mysterious and illegitimate process take on the colours of the ideal. It is ideal all through from beginning to end" (*Mind* 25:99, 338).

9. After quoting from Jowett's introduction to his translation of the *Republic*, Burrell tries to refute "the following errors: that the three virtues correspond to the three parts of the soul; that there is a confusion in Plato's mind between temperance and justice; that justice, because more abstract than the other three virtues, is therefore the foundation of them" (342).

10. "Temperance . . . consists in concord . . . between the 'naturally worse' and the 'naturally better' as to which should rule both in the city and in the individual. . . . It is quite distinct from justice, . . . the understanding . . . that each shall do his own work as well as he can" (343).

11. "It is true that [justice] comes last in the order of discovery, like all first principles, but it is prior in the order of nature, and it is therefore simply putting the cart before the horse to say, as Pater does, that justice 'supervenes' on the other three virtues" (343). In his lecture on *The Republic in Plato and Platonism* (1898), Pater says of the three virtues: "Only, let each work aright in its own order, and a fourth virtue will supervene upon their united perfections . . . Justice . . . will be manifest at last."

12. E. W. Hirst (b. 1870), "Moral Sense, Moral Reason, and Moral Sentiment," *Mind* 26:102 (Apr 1917), 146-61. Hastings Rashdall, *Is Conscience an Emotion?* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1914). In this and the following paragraph, TSE paraphrases the views of Hirst, views similar to those he himself expressed in a review of Canon Rashdall's *Conscience and Christ*.

13. In *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* (1711), the British moral philosopher Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713), maintained, in opposition to Hobbes, that man is naturally virtuous. In *Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* (1725), the Scots-Irish thinker Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) sought to extend Shaftesbury's idea of an inner moral sense by grounding it in empiricism.

14. TSE quotes Hirst's quotation of Rashdall in *Is Conscience an Emotion?* (3).

15. Hirst's quotation of Rashdall is from volume 2 of *The Theory of Good and Evil: A Treatise on Moral Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1907, 1909), 38.

16. *Is Conscience an Emotion?* (75).

17. Hirst's quotation is from *Is Conscience an Emotion?* (162).

18. TSE discusses the following war-related articles from *The Hibbert Journal*, 15 (Jan 1917): Harold Begbie (1871-1929), "National Training: The Moral Equivalent for War," 177-88; Edward M. Chapman (1863-1952), "Enforcing Peace," 189-98; J. A. Hobson (1858-1940), "Is International Government Possible?" 199-203; and L. P. Jacks (1860-1955), untitled review of *Our Ultimate Aim in the War* (1916) by George Gilbert Armstrong (1870-1945), in the Oct 1916 issue, 161-65.

19. The American League to Enforce Peace was founded in Philadelphia on 17 June 1915. Organized to decry German militarism, it was praised by President Woodrow Wilson and became a precursor to the League of Nations. See Charles Robert Ashbee, *The American League to Enforce Peace: An English Interpretation* (1917).

20. The "Parliament of Nations" was organized in Brussels in Apr 1914 by the European-Interparliamentary Union to avoid war. It focused on obligatory arbitration and on penalties for disseminating false news and for violating the rules of war. *New York Times*, 19 Apr 1914.

21. TSE includes the following pieces from *The Hibbert Journal*, 15 (Apr 1917): L. P. Jacks, "Punishment and Reconstruction," 373-81; A. D. McLaren, "National Hate," 407-18; G. F. Barbour (1882-1946), "Force and the Conquest of Evil in Christian Ethics," 464-78; and Constance Louisa Maynard (1849-1935), "The Love Which Is Not the Fulfilling of the Law," 479-92.

22. TSE includes from the *Eugenics Review*, 8 (Jan 1917): MacBride, part 4 of his "The Study of Heredity," 329-56; Major Leonard Darwin (1850-1943), "Quality *Not* Quantity," 297-321; A. K. Chalmers (1856-1942), "The Declining Birth-Rate: Its Causes and Effects," 322-28; and from the *Eugenics Review*, 9 (Apr 1917), Havelock Ellis (1859-1939), "Birth-Control and Eugenics," 32-41.

23. *NS*, 8 (17 Mar 1917), 565.

24. TSE includes from the *Shield*, 1 (Oct 1917): Report of the Birth-Rate Commission, "The Declining Birth-Rate: Its Causes and Effects," 141-49; from the issue of Mar 1917: discussion of Sir George Cave's Criminal Law Amendment Bill, 209-12; Chrystal Macmillan (1872-1937), "Should the Term 'Prostitute' Be Abolished from the Statutes?" 213-16; Alison Neilans (1884-1942), "The Protection of Soldiers," 217-23; Bhikku Silacara (1871-1950), "Sex-Morality in Burma," 254-59.

25. "get you nowhere": not a quotation.

26. In Feb 1917, the British Home Secretary, Sir George Cave (1856-1928), introduced the "Criminal Law Amendment Bill" in an attempt to prevent the spread of sexually transmitted disease. The amendment was printed in the Mar 1917 *IJE*, from which TSE's quotations are taken.

27. The Association for Moral and Social Hygiene, publisher of the *Shield*, was established in 1915 in the wake of the Contagious Diseases Acts that were passed in Britain.

28. The indigenous Burmese Shan tribes are located in the eastern regions of the country.

Second review of *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, by Émile Durkheim. Trans. Joseph Ward Swain

London: Allen & Unwin, 1916. Pp. xi + 456.¹

The Monist, 28 (Jan 1918) 158-59

This book must be valued from three different points of view. It contains reinterpretations of the principal social phenomena of primitive peoples; it contains a theory of the genesis of knowledge with doubtful philosophic implications; and it contains what we may assume for the present to be M. Durkheim's definitive pronouncement on the nature and the future of religion. All of these strands of argument are bound together by M. Durkheim's well-known theory of the group-consciousness, but this theory itself must be assigned different values in these three developments.

It is in the more purely anthropological aspect that this book is most successful. Here M. Durkheim's views must be judged in comparison with those of the older interpreters such as Tylor, Müller, Lang, Frazer, Jevons, Robertson Smith, Mannhardt.² As in most works of the sort, the author is most convincing when he sticks closest to the facts, when he is least metaphysical, and when he is engaged in refuting his predecessors. In fact, he is most convincing when he is showing us what the phenomena of primitive religion do *not* mean. M. Durkheim confines his observation almost entirely to Australia, and his theory of Australian totemism is distinctly the best that has yet been evolved. Why? Because he is able to show that totemism is not animal worship, that it is not derivative from ancestor worship, or from the "nature cult"; the totem is not a name; the group totem is not, as Frazer holds, a development from the conception totem.³ M. Durkheim's theory is the best because it is the nearest to being no theory at all. And when he comes to state it in positive terms, he finds almost as much difficulty as his predecessors in avoiding intellectualization. His "group-consciousness" is a contribution. But is it capable of articulate expression? The totem, he says, is the "flag . . . by which each clan distinguishes itself from the others" [206]. This is just what some of the earlier theorists have said. It is a "collective representation."⁴ It has for the group-consciousness a significance quite different from the significance which that animal or plant has

for the individual consciousness. We are not sure that this means anything more than that it is incapable of explanation. Totem is the origin of the idea of force. "Religious force is nothing other than the collective and anonymous force of the clan. . . . If religious force, in so far as it is conceived as incorporated in the totemic emblem, appears to be outside of the individuals and to be endowed with a sort of transcendence over them, it, like the clan of which it is the symbol, can be realized only in and through them; in this sense, it is immanent in them and they necessarily represent it as such" [221]. M. Durkheim has given reason to believe that the examination of the individual consciousness is inadequate to explain social phenomena. He does not convince us that his social psychology is anything but an admission of the inexplicable, that the "group-consciousness" and the "collective representation" are more than a definition of the limits of individual psychology.

We should have liked to discuss the theory of the "origin of the categories" at length;⁵ although the exposition of this theory is much slighter than its place in the analytical table of contents would lead us to expect. It is open to the same charge of negativity, and leaves epistemology, we think, precisely where it was before. The theory of the nature of religion is stated in the conclusion. We have only space to draw attention to one difficulty. On page 416 we read that the "real function of religion is not to make us think, to enrich our knowledge, nor to add to the conceptions which we owe to science others of another origin and another character, but . . . to make us act." On page 428 we find that a religion "is not merely a system of practices, but also a system of ideas whose object is to explain the world."

The whole book is intensely interesting. The translation is good, but of less literary finish than the original.

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NOTES

1. TSE's first review of this book appeared in the *Westminster Gazette* on 19 Aug 1916 (420).
2. TSE expands the list of older anthropologists cataloged in his earlier review, adding Jevons, author of *The Idea of God in Early Religions* (1910), as well as William Robertson Smith (1846-94) and Wilhelm Mannhardt (1831-80). Smith, a Scottish biblical and Semitic scholar and editor of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, wrote *Religion of the Semites* (1889), a landmark study situating biblical religion within the context of Israel's neighbors. Mannhardt was the German folklorist whose collection of living superstitions of European peasantry inspired Frazer, who acknowledged in the 1890 preface to *The Golden Bough* that without Mannhardt's work, "my book could scarcely have been written."

3. Durkheim's subject, focused on the Aborigines of Australia, is totemism as an elementary form of religion. After dismissing the idea that totemism was a form of animal worship (134), he examines and in turn rejects Tylor's theory that it developed from ancestor worship, Jevons's that it was a cult of nature, Lang's that it was primarily linguistic, and Frazer's that it was the development of an abstract idea (Book II, chap. 5).

4. "Collective representations are the result of an immense cooperation, which stretches out not only into space but into time as well; to make them, a multitude of minds have associated, united and combined their ideas and sentiments; for them, long generations have accumulated their experience and their knowledge. A special intellectual activity is therefore concentrated in them which is infinitely richer and complexer than that of the individual" (16).

5. "The categories of the understanding: ideas of time, space, class, number, cause, substance, personality . . . are born in and of religion. . . . So if the categories are of religious origin, they ought to participate in this nature common to all religious facts; they too should be social affairs and the product of collective thought" (9-10).

Second review of *Elements of Folk Psychology: Outlines of a Psychological History of the Development of Mankind*, by Wilhelm Wundt. Trans. Edward Leroy Schaub

London: Allen & Unwin; New York: Macmillan, 1916. Pp. xxiv + 532.¹

The Monist, 28 (Jan 1918) 159-60

Durkheim's *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* and Wundt's *Elemente der Völkerpsychologie* appeared in the same year, 1912.² In the preface to the present work Professor Wundt states the difference in method between the earlier *Völkerpsychologie* and this shorter book. "Instead of considering successively the main forms of expression of the folk mind, the present work studies the phenomena, so far as possible synchronously, exhibiting their common conditions and their reciprocal relations. . . . The chief purpose of investigations in folk psychology must be found in a synthetic survey" [xiii-xiv]. This is in accord with Durkheim's theory that the religious phenomena must not be isolated by the investigator from the rest of the social life of a people. Otherwise the books of the two men are strikingly different. Durkheim's psychology is metaphysics. Wundt's psychology is descriptive anthropology. His method is descriptive and historical. He divides the stages of culture into four: (1) primitive man, including prehistoric man and such existing tribes as the Veddahs, Bushmen and Negritos; (2) the totemic stage, including the Australians and the Iroquois; (3) the "age of gods and heroes," the age of the folk epic; (4) the "development to humanity," which includes a discussion of "world-empires" and "world-religions." In each of these stages he takes up cult, social organization, myth, art, language; except that in the last stage the treatment is vaguer and these divisions are abandoned.

In his account of primitive and savage society Wundt is in general sound, but unsatisfying. When we turn to totemism, for example, he gives the impression of painstaking common sense. He is certainly right in rejecting the "eugenic" theory of exogamy, and in combating the "conceptional" theory of the totem. But it is improbable that the group totem is (as Wundt apparently holds) an outgrowth of the individual totem. Wundt is an animist. "Totemic ideas arise as a result of the diremption of primitive soul ideas

into the *corporeal soul* and the *breath- and shadow-soul*" (192). The soul is regarded "as a moving form, particularly as an animal, a bird, a rapidly gliding snake, or a lizard" [192]. We are inclined to believe that this "breath-soul" which totemism introduces was at first, and in fully developed totemism, much more indefinite and impersonal than Wundt would lead us to suppose. And he does not succeed in showing the relation between totemism as a social organization and totemism as a religious cult.

For the rest, Wundt is less concerned with explaining motive and meaning than with explaining the development of forms. Thus, his account of art is taken up largely with the development of the stringed instrument out of the bow, and kindred problems; he engages in a discussion of the beginnings of domestication of animals. The major part of his subject matter, in short, is not psychological at all; it belongs, in the earlier stages, to descriptive anthropology, and in the later stages, to the philosophy of history. And of the role which the sexual instinct plays in the religion and mythology of primitive peoples (indeed in all religion) Wundt has almost nothing to say. The psychoanalysis of myths, pursued by some of Freud's disciples, is surely capable of throwing considerable light on the primitive mind. It is possible that Wundt is still under the domination of a Hegelian conception of history. Although he criticises Hegel for applying a "logical schematism which is in large measure imposed upon history," his own account is very rationalistic [520]. The book is a sound and valuable handbook, enriched by Wundt's ideas. But we think that any further advance in folk psychology is conditioned by advance in individual psychology.

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NOTES

1. TSE reviewed this book for the *IJE* in Jan 1917 (507).
2. TSE reviewed the English translation (1916) of Durkheim's *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* (1912) in the *Saturday Westminster Gazette* in Aug 1916 and in the *Monist* in Jan 1918 (420; 670).

Literature and the American Courts

The Egoist, 5 (Mar 1918) 39

The Egoist wishes to call the attention of its readers to a case which was recently tried in the New York Courts, and which should be of interest in England as well as America to the small public which cares for literature. Miss Margaret C. Anderson, editress and owner of *The Little Review*, received complaints from numerous subscribers, who reported that they had not received the October issue.¹ On first inquiry at the post office, Miss Anderson was told that “all deliveries are likely to be slow in these days”;² but inquiring again a week later she learned that the issue was held pending a decision from the Solicitor of the Post Office in Washington as to whether a certain story published in that issue was lewd and indecent. On November 8 she received a letter stating that the issue had been decided unmailable. Mr. John Quinn, the distinguished New York barrister, took up the case for Miss Anderson.³

We pass over a point which was clearly brought out by the prosecution—the financial loss from the suppression of an issue of three thousand copies to a review which without subsidy is struggling quite alone in America to obtain and publish only contemporary work of the finest literary quality. We merely offer for the perusal of our readers the text of the curious law under which judgment was given against the *Little Review*, and the words of the judge in delivering the decision:

Section 211 [of the U.S. Criminal Code]: Every obscene, lewd, or lascivious, and every filthy book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter, writing, print, or other publication of an indecent character, and every article or thing designed, adapted, or intended for preventing conception or inducing abortion, or for any indecent or immoral use; and every article, instrument, substance, drug, or medicine, or thing which is advertised or described in a manner calculated to lead another to use or apply it for preventing conception or producing abortion, or for any indecent or immoral purpose; and every written or printed card, letter, circular, book, or pamphlet, advertisement, or notice of any kind giving information directly or indirectly, where or how or from whom or by what means any

of the herein before-mentioned matters, articles, or things may be obtained or made, or where or by whom any act or operation will be done or performed, or how or by what means conception may be prevented or abortion produced, whether sealed or unsealed; and every letter packet or package, or any other mail matter containing any filthy, vile or indecent thing, device or substance; and every paper, writing, advertisement, or representation that any article, instrument, substance, drug, medicine, or thing may or can be used or applied for preventing conception or producing abortion, or for any indecent or immoral purpose; and every description calculated to induce or incite a person to so use or apply any such article, instrument, substance, drug, medicine, or thing, is hereby declared to be unmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier. Whoever shall knowingly deposit, or cause to be deposited for mailing or delivery, anything declared by this section to be unmailable, or shall knowingly take, or cause the same to be taken, from the mails for the purpose of circulating or disposing thereof, shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

As is well known, all public prosecution in America with regard to printed matter, whether on the ground of sedition or obscenity, is undertaken on the basis that the crime is one of abuse of the post-office facilities. In this case the prosecution was able to cite precedent to show that according to the legal interpretation much writing of the vilest tone and content fell without the scope of the law, since it had been decided that to be “non-mailable” for the reason of obscenity, literature must have a “tendency to excite lust.”⁴ Even on this ruling, the prosecution (Mr. Quinn on behalf of *The Little Review*) contended quite rightly that the short story in question had no such tendency.

Judge Augustus N. Hand,⁵ in summing up, let the cat out of the bag with really injudicious candour:

I have little doubt [said he] that numerous really great writings would come under the ban if tests that are frequently current were applied, and these approved publications doubtless escape only because they come within the term “classics,” which means for the purpose of the application of the statute, that they are ordinarily immune from interference, because they have the sanction of age and fame, and usually appeal to a comparatively limited number of readers.⁶

The case is now closed. We need not divert our attention to the question of suppression of political opinion or the right of public interference with the prevention of undesired offspring. In America the small number of people who are sensitive to good literature are now forbidden to read one of the finest pieces of prose in the language. And America is not so far away that we need feel no concern in the matter. A writer in the *New Age*, commenting on this case, remarks:

The story in question ["Cantleman's Spring Mate"] "interests me, but I do not want it to interest my neighbours."⁷

We may reflect upon the bearings of this attitude toward literature.

T. S. E.

NOTES

1. The American author, editor, and publisher Margaret C. Anderson (1886-1973), founder of the *Little Review*, had published in the Oct 1917 issue Wyndham Lewis's "Cantleman's Spring Mate," the story of a British soldier who seduces a young woman and abandons her when she becomes pregnant. When the issue was suppressed on grounds of obscenity by the U.S. Post Office, Anderson contested, but lost the case. TSE summarizes and quotes from her notice in the Nov issue: "To Subscribers who did not receive their October issue" (43-44).

2. "in these days": a reference to WWI, now in its fourth year.

3. The Irish-American corporate lawyer and bibliophile John Quinn (1870-1924), who represented Anderson, was also the friend, patron, and legal representative of Yeats, Pound, Joyce, and TSE, whom Pound had introduced to Quinn by letter in Aug 1915. Quinn had recently investigated a rumor that an American firm planned to pirate *Prufrock*, and he had supported the publication of TSE's *Ezra Pound: His Metric and Poetry* (626). TSE wrote to Quinn as he prepared the present article: "I am putting a short notice of the Cantleman trial in this month's *Egoist*. I think the typical American attitude in such matters is like that of Miss Amy Lowell, who is always decrying abstract Puritanism, but who when faced with some particular work of art offensive to Puritan taste curls up like a hedgehog. The American Liberal Varnish. I am sure that everyone who knows about the case here is very grateful to you for your part in it" (LI 254).

4. This phrase, a test of obscenity in the federal statutes, was used by Judge Hand in referring to Lewis's story in *Anderson v. Patten* (S.D.N.Y. 1917) 247 Fed. 382: "The young girl and the relations of the man with her are described with a degree of detail that does not appear necessary to teach the desired lesson, whatever it may be, or to tell a story which would possess artistic merit or arouse any worthy emotion. On the contrary . . . the details of the sex relations are set forth to attract readers to the story because of their salacious character. I am, of course, aware that mere description of things in relation to sex may not fall within the statute. . . . Here, however, there is ground for holding that portions of the short story in question have a tendency to excite lust, and, if this be so, it falls within the prohibition of the statute." *Federal Statutes Annual-1919 Supplement* (710); partially printed in the *Little Review*, 4 (Dec 1917), 47.

5. Augustus N. Hand (1869-1954), who served on the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of New York and later on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, made

prominent rulings on obscenity statutes regarding literature, including his 1934 ruling that *Ulysses* was not obscene and therefore could not be banned from import into the United States. He ruled that any test of obscenity could not rely on isolated passages but had to consider the work as a whole, a ruling that was endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court.

6. TSE's bracketed insertion. This and other excerpts from Judge Hand's decision were printed in the Dec issue of the *Little Review*, here 47-48. Pound responded vehemently to this part of the decision in "The Classics Escape," published with the first installment of *Ulysses* in the Mar 1918 issue of the *Little Review*, ridiculing Judge Hand for holding that contemporary literature should answer to the courts while the classics are immune: "No more damning indictment of American civilization has been written than that contained in Judge Hand's 'opinion'" (34). Anderson continued to suffer censorship for publishing chapters from *Ulysses*: four issues of the periodical containing them were burned by the U.S. Post Office. She and associate editor Jane Heap were subsequently convicted of publishing obscene matter and fined \$100 each.

7. TSE's bracketed insertion. In his column "Readers and Writers" in the *New Age*, 22 (21 Feb 1918), R. H. C. [A. R. Orage] discussed several recent issues of and contributors to the *Little Review*, singling out Pound and TSE for their "exuberant individuality" and "excessive cleverness" and, without mentioning its title, expressing no sympathy for the legal plight of Lewis's story: "The story is clever—obviously clever. . . . Circulated among writers exclusively, as a kind of studio-experiment in stylistic realism, it might be a service to art; for new methods of writing are of more concern to writers than the substance of the things written. As a public document, on the other hand, to be circulated among readers as well as writers, I have no fancy for defending Mr. Lewis's story. It interests me, but I do not want it to interest my neighbours" (332-33).

Verse Pleasant and Unpleasant

A review of *Georgian Poetry, 1916-1917*, ed. Edward Marsh

(London: The Poetry Bookshop, 1917). Pp. [vi] + 3-181.

Wheels: A Second Cycle, ed. Edith Sitwell

(Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 1917). Pp. viii + 9-117.¹

The Egoist, 5 (Mar 1918) 43-44

Verse stands in constant need of what Samuel Butler calls a cross.² The serious writer of verse must be prepared to cross himself with the best verse of other languages and the best prose of all languages. In Georgian poetry there is almost no crossing visible; it is inbred. It has developed a technique and a set of emotions all of its own. In the present volume there are exceptions; Mr. Squire's "Lily of Malud" rises from the mud with a good deal of sweat and blood, but is an original and rather impressive poem which deserves better company.³ Most of the authors (including the fresh recruits) are truer to type. Mr. Stephens' "A Visit" has a kind of odd humour which must be pleasing to the adept, but is unintelligible to anyone who has not substituted Georgian emotions for human ones.⁴ There are, of course, differences between the writers: Mr. Stephens' syntax is not quite the same as Mr. Drinkwater's, and still more different from Mr. Turner's.⁵ What nearly all the writers have in common is the quality of pleasantness. There are two varieties of pleasantness: (1) The insidiously didactic, or Wordsworthian (a rainbow and a cuckoo's song); (2) the decorative, playful or solemn, minor-Keatsian, too happy, happy brook, or lucent *sirops*.⁶ In either variety, the Georgians caress everything they touch; Mr. Monro does it far better than the others, and more intelligently; *The Egoist* has praised the volume (*Strange Meetings*) from which the selections in this anthology are taken.⁷ Another variety of the pleasant, by the way, is the unpleasant (*sc.* Rupert Brooke on sea-sickness, and Masfield on various subjects).⁸

I cannot see the resemblance to Tennyson which people often remark in Georgian poetry. I do not care to pose as a champion of Tennyson, and Mr. Chesterton's approval makes one uneasy about him.⁹ But Tennyson was careful in his syntax; and, moreover, his adjectives usually have a definite

meaning; perhaps often an uninteresting meaning; still, each word is treated with proper respect. And Tennyson had a brain (a large dull brain like a farmhouse clock) which saved him from triviality. The subject given (airy fairy Lilian), he took it lightly,¹⁰ but as a serious study in technique. Mr. Stephens takes a trivial subject ponderously; only the technique is without seriousness.

And the bell rings loud, and the
Railway whistles urgently.

So I stared at the night, and she
Stared back solemnly at me.¹¹

Tennyson to the Rev. Frederick Denison Maurice is better than Mr. Sassoon to Mr. Graves.¹² Mr. Sassoon has a talent for satire, but for political rather than literary satire. Mr. Turner is not very happy in his adjectives. He weakens one of them by a superlative ("frieze on whitest marble"); his silence is naked, pure, grave, and unbroken; and he is at no pains to avoid sibilants:

giant, breathless palms,
Azaleas, clematis and vines,
Whose quietness great Trees becalms . . .¹³

Mr. Squire slips in, referring to a house as a "mean edifice."¹⁴ Mr. Nichols effects a rhetorical balance:

Whose voice would mock me in the mourning bell,
Whose face would greet me in hell's fiery way.¹⁵

Mr. Graves has a hale and hearty daintiness. Mr. Gibson asks, "we, how shall we . . ." etc.¹⁶ Messrs. Baring and Asquith, in war poems, both employ the word "oriflamme."¹⁷ Mr. Drinkwater says, "Hist!" Mr. Freeman has some power, and his "Stone Trees," if it were condensed, would be a striking image.¹⁸

Wheels is a more serious book.¹⁹ It is not Mr. S. P. B. Mais's sort of poetry at all; these are not the good boys of the Sixth Form.²⁰ The book as a whole has a dilettante effect, refreshing after the schoolroom. The authors are certainly conscious of the fact that literature exists in other languages than their own. While the Georgians have the appearance of ignorance, the Cyclists have a little the air of smattering. Instead of rainbows, cuckoos, daffodils,

and timid hares, they give us garden-gods, guitars and mandolins, Lancrét rather than Watteau, though they seem to have thrown Pierrot overboard.²¹ They need Catullus, Homer, Heine, Gautier; they have extracted the juice from Verlaine and Laforgue.²²

OSBERT SITWELL:²³ "Fountains," with the exception of a few adjectives, is a success. "Promenades" is not tight enough, the best point unfortunately occurs in the middle ("rich retired provincial mayors"—the "rich" is superfluous). "Prospect Road" tends to dissolve into its constituent adjectives and substantives, and "gigantic" should not be followed by "immense" in the next line. "The Return of the Prodigal" is good in conception, but is kept up by artificial respiration; and perhaps this sort of thing may be left to John Rodker.²⁴ "London" shows Mr. Sitwell in risk of becoming descriptive. "Promenades," however, indicates a real speciality for him.

ALDOUS HUXLEY:²⁵ It is difficult to tell what he is really like. He has come down with a serious attack of Laforgue (which may be a very good thing), and we must wait until he has worked it off.

SACHEVERELL SITWELL:²⁶ The most important and most difficult poet in the volume. In fact, the best that has appeared for several years. "The Feathered Hat" is a very unusual poem—we are apparently the first review intelligent enough to perceive this. In "The Mayor of Murcia," Mr. Sitwell rambles a bit, and he should not have allowed "blossoms of the sea" to appear. He has an idiom which looks at first sight like rhetoric, and one finds with a shock that the words have values. He tends in his weaker moments to fly off like a beautiful but ineffectual aeroplane, beating its propeller vainly in a tree,²⁷ but when he has a definite concrete sensation, as in "The Feathered Hat," he is all right.

IRIS TREE:²⁸ The most mature of the lot; on a much smaller scale than the writer just mentioned, but established. She does not need to be told what her line is. "Ballad" is very good, and really light. "Black Velvet" is very good. But "Imposture" should be compared with Mr. Pound's "Piccadilly" (at the end of *Personae*); he has done it in a third the space; this is a cut above Miss Tree.

EDITH SITWELL:²⁹ Does several sorts of thing. "From the Balcony" is overloaded, and conveys no clear image. "Saul" gets a large slow-moving finale which is effective, but the fragment ought not to have appeared until the poem was finished. I think that her speciality should be the mordant, as in "Messalina at Margate"—

steam of food
Ascending like the rich man's soul to God.³⁰

HELEN ROTHAM:³¹ Would find safety in brevity. The last two poems are quite worth a place: if from "The Nun" are omitted lines 2, 6, 11, 12, 15, 16; and if the first four lines of "Song" are printed alone.

APTERYX³²

NOTES

1. The Georgians, named by the founders for King George V, often wrote about nature and rustic life, typically in traditional forms. In the first of several anthologies (1912), of which the volume here reviewed is the third, the editor Edward Marsh (1872-1953) expressed the hope that the present Georgian period would "rank in due time with . . . great poetic ages of the past." In reaction, the anti-Georgian poet Edith Sitwell (1887-1964) started a counter-series of six volumes titled *Wheels*. On 4 Mar 1917, TSE wrote to his mother about reviewing this second volume: the poems are "mostly by some young friends of mine [the Sitwells], two young Guards officers with literary aspirations . . . I am becoming quite adept at reviewing books by people I know—a difficult art" (*LI* 251).

2. In his post-Darwinian reflection on science, *Life and Habit* (London: Trübner, 1878), Butler describes the effects of cross-fertilization: "[A]ll species, whether of plants or animals, are occasionally benefitted by a cross; but we should also expect that a cross should have a tendency to introduce a disturbing element, if it be too wide" (173-74). *Life and Habit* was included in the syllabus for TSE's 1917 Extension course in Modern English literature (590).

3. "The Lily of Malud" is the title poem of a 1917 volume by Squire, literary editor of the *NS*, which began publishing reviews by TSE in 1916. After Marsh ceased publishing the Georgian anthologies in 1922, Squire assumed leadership and published further volumes. Subsequently, the Georgians would be known by their detractors as the "Squirearchy."

4. Stephens made his third appearance in the *Georgian Poetry* anthologies with "A Visit from Abroad" and four other poems, all from *The Adventures of Seumas Beg: The Rocky Road to Dublin* (1915).

5. John Drinkwater (1882-1937), manager of the Birmingham Repertory Theatre, made his third appearance with poems from *Olton Pools* (1916) and *Tides* (1917). The Australian poet and music critic W. J. Turner (1889-1946) emigrated to London in 1907 and became music critic for the *NS* in 1915. This was his first appearance in *Georgian Poetry*, with poems from his first volume, *The Hunter* (1916).

6. Allusions to Wordsworth: "My Heart Leaps Up" ("My heart leaps up when I behold / A rainbow in the sky"), and "To the Cuckoo"; and Keats: stanza III of "Ode on a Grecian Urn" ("Ah, happy, happy boughs! That cannot shed / Your leaves, nor ever bid the Spring adieu") and stanza XXX of "The Eve of St. Agnes" ("While he from forth the closet brought a heap / Of candied apple, quince, and plum, and gourd; / With jellies soother than the creamy curd, / And lucent sirops").

7. TSE refers to his own review of Monro's *Strange Meetings* in the *Egoist* (Sept 1917) (573).

8. Brooke is not represented in this volume. TSE refers to "Channel Passage," from his first volume, *Poems* (1911), in which a young man aboard a channel steamer suffers simultaneously

from seasickness and lovesickness: "And still the sick ship rolls. 'Tis hard, I tell ye, / To choose 'twixt love and nausea, heart and belly." Masfield is represented in each of the first three volumes, here by seven poems from *Lollingdon Downs* (1917).

9. Chesterton defended Tennyson in *The Victorian Age in Literature*: "For whatever else Tennyson was, he was a great poet; no mind that feels itself free, that is, above the ebb and flow of fashion, can feel anything but contempt for the later effort to discredit him in that respect" (165).

10. An allusion to the opening of Tennyson's "Lilian" (1830): "Airy, Fairy Lilian, / Flitting, fairy Lilian, / When I ask her if she love me, / Claps her tiny hands above me, / Laughing all she can; / She'll not tell me if she love me, / Cruel little Lilian."

11. From Stephens' "Westland Row" and "Check," respectively.

12. Tennyson's "To the Rev. F. D. Maurice" (1854) is a poem addressed to the Anglican priest and theologian Frederick Denison Maurice (1805-72), one of the founders of Christian Socialism in Britain. "A Letter Home (*To Robert Graves*)," from *The Old Huntsman* (1917), is by the war poet Siegfried Sassoon (1886-1967). Sassoon and his friend Robert Graves (1895-1985) were making their first appearances in *Georgian Poetry*. Graves, who had published three volumes while recuperating from wounds at the Battle of Somme, is here represented by poems from *Over the Brazier* (1916) and *Fairies and Fusiliers* (1917).

13. From the opening of Turner's "Ecstasy" ("I saw a frieze on whitest marble drawn") and "Magic," respectively.

14. From Squire's "A House": "And this mean edifice, which some dull architect / Built for an ignorant, earth-turning hind, / Takes on the quality of that magnificent / Unshakable dauntlessness of human kind."

15. From "To——" by the war poet Robert Nichols (1893-1944). The poem is from *Ardours and Endurances* (1917), which had been praised the previous summer in the *TLS* (12 July), prompting TSE to write to Nichols, "I have not yet seen your book; I hope that I may do so" (*LI* 212).

16. From the second stanza of "Lament" by Gibson: "But we, how shall we turn to little things / And listen to the birds and winds and streams / Made holy by their dreams, / Nor feel the heart-break in the heart of things?"

17. Maurice Baring (1874-1945), author of *Poems, 1914-1917*, used "oriflamme" (bright banner or symbol) in "In Memoriam, A. H." ("That orange sea, those oriflammes outspread"); Herbert Asquith (1881-1947), author of *The Volunteer* (1916), used it in the title poem ("And horsemen . . . Went thundering past beneath the oriflamme").

18. "Hist . . . over Olton pools!" is the concluding line of the title poem of Drinkwater's fourth volume, *Olton Pools* (1916). "Stone Trees" is the title poem of a 1916 volume by Freeman, who was included in the *Georgian Poetry* series through the influence of Walter de la Mare.

19. The first volume of *Wheels*, published in 1916 and containing poems by the editor Edith Sitwell, her brothers Osbert (1892-1969) and Sacheverell (1897-1988), and a few others, was followed by five annual volumes through 1921. Edith dubbed the subsequent volumes as "cycles" and assigned them numbers, e.g., *Wheels: A Second Cycle*, hence TSE's reference to them as "Cyclists."

20. The sixth form in the British educational system is the final (optional) two years of secondary schooling.

21. The French Rococo painters Jean-Antoine Watteau (1684-1721) and Nicolas Lancret (1690-1743) were genre painters who specialized in *fêtes galantes*, or scenes of courtly amusements in Arcadian settings. Their stylistic signature was the insertion of artificial objects associated with aristocratic life (guitars, theatrical costumes) into simple pastoral scenes. The paintings of Watteau, characterized by pastel colors and sentimental settings, are pastoral; those of Lancret, by vivid colors and theatrical settings, are comedic. Both painters were students of Claude Gillot, whose *fêtes galantes* were inspired by the *commedia dell'arte*, often involving Pierrot, the clown who pines for the love of Columbine, who leaves him for Harlequin. Pierrot was embraced by Laforgue and appeared in such early TSE poems as "Humouresque (after J. Laforgue)."

22. TSE studied Latin poetry at Harvard in 1908-09 and had in his library Francis P. Simpson's edition of *Select Poems of Catullus* (London: Macmillan, 1892) and *Catulli, Tibulli, Propertii carmina: Accedunt Laevii, Calvi, Cinnae, aliorum reliquiae et Priapea* (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1904). He informed his mother on 23 June 1918 that he had "read this week most of Catullus" (*LI* 268). In "Andrew Marvell" (1921) he found the "intense levity" of Catullus in "To his Coy Mistress" but concluded that Marvell's verse "has not the grand reverberation of Catullus's Latin" (2.312). Heinrich Heine (1797-1856) was a German poet and satirist; Paul Verlaine (1844-96) and Jules Laforgue were associated with the French Symbolist poets.

23. TSE met Osbert Sitwell, the middle of the three siblings, in early Dec 1917, and on 12 Dec participated with them and others in a poetry reading organized by the London hostess, Sibyl Colefax. Writing to his mother on 22 Dec, he reported that "Edmund Gosse presided . . . It was rather amusing, as the audience and most of the poets were very solemn, and I read some light satirical stuff [including 'The Hippopotamus']" (*LI* 241, n.1). TSE here refers to poems from Sitwell's forthcoming first volume, *Argonaut and Juggernaut* (1919).

24. The poet and publisher John Rodker (1894-1955), author of *Poems* (1914), had been imprisoned as a conscientious objector during the war, after which he succeeded Pound as foreign editor of the *Little Review*. In mid-1919, he founded the short-lived Ovid Press, where he published TSE's *Ara Vos Prec*, Pound's *Hugh Selwyn Mauberley*, and his own *Hymns*, all in 1920.

25. TSE met the poet and novelist Aldous Huxley (1894-1963) at Lady Ottoline Morrell's Garsington Manor in 1917. Huxley had published three volumes of verse since 1916; and when TSE read the fourth, *Leda and Other Poems* (1920), he confided to his mother that he had "a very low opinion of the book" and believed that Huxley had "borrowed a great deal from my poetry" (*LI* 475). He later recalled that in reading Huxley's volume he was "unable to show any enthusiasm for his verse. After this attempt he wisely confined himself to the essay and the variety of fiction which he came to make his own." *Aldous Huxley: A Memorial Volume*, ed. Julian Huxley (London: Chatto & Windus, 1965), 30.

26. TSE had a high regard for the work of the youngest Sitwell, Sacheverell, and reviewed his *The People's Palace* in the *Egoist* later this year. He subsequently wrote to his Boston friend Mrs. Jack Gardner that "a younger friend of mine named Sacheverell Sitwell has unusual poetic merit" (*LI* 292).

27. In his essay "Shelley" (1888), Mathew Arnold quotes with added emphasis a phrase from his "Byron" (1881), observing of Shelley that "in poetry, no less than life, he is 'a beautiful and ineffectual angel, beating in the void his luminous wings in vain.'"

28. Iris Tree (1897-1968), poet, actress (daughter of Sir Herbert Tree), and artist's model for Modigliani, published her first volume, *Poems*, in 1917.

29. Sitwell had published her first volume, *The Mother and Other Poems*, in 1915. The scene from her unfinished verse play, *Saul*, was retitled *The Madness of Saul* and published in a longer fragment in her second volume, *Clown's Houses*, in 1918. Though TSE enjoyed a friendship with the Sitwells, he never published in the *Wheels* anthologies. As he wrote to Wyndham Lewis, advising him not to associate himself with any specific group of painters: "you drag them up to your level and give them a chance to repudiate *you* (*Would I think of contributing to Wheels?* And so give the S[itwells] a lift and the right to sneer at me")? (*L1* 552).

30. "There's comfort in old age: the steam of food / Ascending like the rich man's soul to God; / And little words that crackle as they went / How such and such a life was evil spent / Until they make a fire to warm our hands."

31. The poet and pianist Helen Rootham (1875-1938) had been Edith Sitwell's governess and companion since 1903. Sitwell's "From the Balcony" was dedicated "To Helen." TSE would have her delete six of sixteen lines from "The Nun" and seven of eleven from "Song." In a 1921 letter to Aldington, TSE describes her as "an appalling woman who trains and launches young singers" (*L1* 605).

32. This is the first of three instances in the *Egoist* in which TSE signs with the pseudonym "Apteryx," the genus of the kiwi, a nocturnal flightless bird of New Zealand.

To the Editor of *The Egoist*

The Egoist, 5 (Mar 1918) 47

MADAM,—I shall be grateful to you if you will allow me to state in your columns (in response to numerous inquiries) that to the best of my knowledge and belief, Captain Arthur Eliot, joint author of “The Better ’Ole,” is not, roughly speaking, a member of my family.¹ —Yours, etc.,

T. S. ELIOT

LITTLE TICHESTER, BUCKS²

NOTES

1. In Aug 1917, the Oxford Music Hall in London booked a musical comedy, *The Better ’Ole*, by two wartime officer-comedians, Captain Bruce Bairnsfather and Captain Arthur Eliot (d. 1936). In the Dec issue of the *Egoist*, under the pseudonym of Muriel Schwarz, TSE had referred to the production when he asked sardonically if Wyndham Lewis’s objection to the ubiquitous English Grin was not really “a slur upon the cheery philosophy of our brave boys in the trenches, which has been so happily caught by the witty pen of Capt. Bairnsfather?” (614). By Mar 1918, as the popular production headed toward a record number of performances, some of TSE’s friends had nicknamed him “Captain Eliot” (*LI* 256).

2. The imaginary address is based on one of TSE’s favorite music hall comedians, “Little Tich” (Harry Relph, 1867-1928).

A Victorian Sculptor

An unsigned review of *Thomas Woolner, R.A., Sculptor and Poet: His Life in Letters*, by Amy Woolner

London: Chapman and Hall, 1917. Pp. xviii + 352.¹

The New Statesman, 10 (2 Mar 1918) 528, 530

Thomas Woolner was a sculptor whose works and celebrity fully entitled him to the reward of a biographical volume; though the present is a very large one. To those who are interested chiefly in the sculptor's works, this book will not have much to offer; it does not attempt a criticism of the artist; Miss Woolner's modest paragraphs only bind together a series of letters in which statuary takes but a small place. The book is interesting from two aspects: as affording inspection of a Victorian sculptor, and as affording inspection of the Victorian age from its chief sculptor's point of view. Woolner knew nearly everybody; he was associated with the founders of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood, and throughout his life was on terms of intimacy with the Tennysons and Carlyles.² One gets the impression of a large but cosy society comfortably contained within the shores of this island; singularly free from envy, cliques and quarrels; deriving its intellectual illumination from the dispersed radiance of Great Men rather than from the inter-polar sparks of intelligence. It was a society generously given to admiration, and in this society Woolner appears both as Admirer and Admired. Woolner was applauded by his friends; and he was also disposed to applaud. This quality makes certain small touches all the more delightful, as when Woolner speaks of Matthew Arnold as

a regular swell, in brilliant white kid gloves, glittering boots and costume cut in most perfect fashion. [145]

Arnold was talking to Coventry Patmore,

whose countenance the whole time beamed radiant joy with the satisfaction of holding intercourse with such a high Oxford don of critical propensities. [145]³

But Woolner admired Patmore; he admired Carlyle; he admired *Aurora Leigh*; he admired Rossetti and he praised "The Defence of Guenevere."⁴ As he did so much in the way of portraiture, what he says of Browning's appearance has interest:

The connection between Browning's face and his works seems to me as little understandable as well can be. Of course his conversation would connect the two immediately but his head is I think the most unprepossessing poet's head it is well possible to imagine. [124]

Woolner's life was one of hard work and self-gained independence, but the society he frequented was spacious and easy. Various minor figures of the literary world of the time present themselves, such as the Trevelyan and Sir John Swinburne with his collection of Turners.⁵ Of Ruskin we hear little; Woolner admired *Modern Painters*, but speaks several times of Ruskin's inaccuracy or rather perversity of taste in Academy exhibitions.⁶ The two important points in Woolner's acquaintanceships were his early association with the P.R.B., and his friendship with the Tennysons. The Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood appears in his letters as a jolly little group of young men who were also artists rather than as a definite school. There was little hard warfare in the aesthetics of the '60's. Woolner wrote frequently to Lady Tennyson, with inquiries about the Bard or Lord of Farringford. With everything Tennyson wrote, Woolner was pleased; and among the letters we find the two stories of Woolner's on which were based "Enoch Arden" and "Aylmer's Field."⁷ In 1858 Woolner at York converted

a whole family to the true faith in matters poetical by reading "The Miller's Daughter" and "The Gardener's Daughter." [142]⁸

Woolner appears altogether as a most delightful man, and it is pleasant to record his great triumph toward the end of his life, when his colossal statue of Captain Cook was unveiled in Sydney, in February, 1879.⁹

Hundreds of people crowded into Sydney to see the ceremony, which was viewed by a crowd of over seventy thousand persons. A grand procession of sailors, marines and societies with their banners and bands having assembled around the Statue, the Governor, Sir Hercules Robinson, arrived, and before he made his speech "Rule Britannia!" was played and sung. [297]

Not the least interesting of the letters are the early ones in which Woolner describes his adventures as a gold-seeker in the Australian bush.¹⁰ There is one misprint, on page 6, where “Ingles” is meant for “Ingres.”¹¹

NOTES

1. Thomas Woolner (1825-92), sculptor and poet, was a founding member of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood (P.R.B.), a group of London artists, including Dante Gabriel Rossetti (1828-82), Holman Hunt, and John Everett Millais. Woolner's poem, “My Beautiful Lady,” illustrated by Hunt, was the opening piece in the first number of *The Germ* (1850), the P.R.B. magazine. Amy Woolner was his daughter.

2. Woolner's friendship with Tennyson and Carlyle extended to their wives, Emily Sellwood Tennyson, Lady Tennyson (1813-96) and Jane Carlyle (1801-66).

3. In 1857, Arnold was elected Professor of Poetry at Oxford, from which position he delivered lectures that later would be part of his essays on criticism. Coventry Patmore (1823-96) was an associate of the P.R.B. and contributed to *The Germ*. His best-known work is *The Angel in the House* (1863).

4. Woolner created bronze medallion portraits of Patmore, Carlyle, and Robert Browning. He praised the feminist epic *Aurora Leigh* (1856) by Elizabeth Barrett Browning (1806-61), and he read parts of Morris's “The Defence of Guenevere” (1858) before it was published.

5. The naturalist Sir Walter Calverley Trevelyan (1797-1879) and Pauline Jermy, Lady Trevelyan (1816-66) were patrons of the Pre-Raphaelites and friends of Carlyle, Ruskin, and Swinburne. The art patron Sir John Edward Swinburne (1762-1860), grandfather of the poet, was a friend and collector of the paintings of the English Impressionist J. M. W. Turner (1775-1851).

6. Woolner's extended praise of Ruskin's *Modern Painters* (1843) in his diary for Aug 1854 (86-88) is followed by his exasperation over Ruskin's judgment of the Royal Academy exhibition of 1856: “Ruskin has . . . praised some of the worst pictures in the place; he has made such an obvious mess of it this year that his enemies are dancing for delight. . . . The little despot imagines himself the Pope of Art and would wear 3 crowns as a right, only they would make him look funny in London!” (114).

7. Tennyson based “Enoch Arden” on Woolner's poem “The Fisherman's Story” and “Aylmer's Field” on Woolner's “The Sermon.” Both appeared in Tennyson's *Enoch Arden and Other Poems* (1864).

8. “The Miller's Daughter” and “The Gardener's Daughter” were published in Tennyson's 1842 volume *Poems* but would have been read by Woolner in the 1857 printing illustrated by his friends Millais and J. C. Horsley, respectively.

9. The statue was commissioned to commemorate the centenary of British explorer Captain James Cook (1728-79), who discovered the east coast of Australia in 1770.

10. Following his loss in the competition for the national monument to Wordsworth for Westminster Abbey, Woolner went to Australia for the gold rush of 1852, keeping a colorful journal of his diggings and frustrations. During the year, he spent £80 to find £50 of gold.

11. While in Paris, Woolner met the French neoclassical painter, Jean Auguste Ingres, (1780-1867), for whose art he had the “greatest admiration” (6).

Style and Thought

An unsigned review of *Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays*, by Bertrand Russell

(London: Longmans, Green, 1918). Pp. vii + 234.¹

The Nation, 22 (23 Mar 1918), 768, 770

Mr. Russell's latest volume, though not containing any hitherto unedited matter, is one of the most important that he has published. Containing two papers from *Philosophical Essays*, it supersedes that book, now out of print; and if we except the *Principia*, this and the *Leibniz* (which ought to be reprinted) are the essential books to possess. The *Problems* is too controversial to show Mr. Russell's own philosophy at its best; the *Knowledge of the External World* is at the disadvantage of having been prepared as a set of lectures, and is partly covered by several of the essays in the present book.² The essays in *Mysticism and Logic* belong to various years between 1901 and 1915; they represent at least three different styles; and the last six of the ten essays provide the best possible introduction to Mr. Russell's philosophy. The essay "Mathematics and the Metaphysicians" [1901] is a wonderfully lucid introduction to the logical point of view; the essays on "The Ultimate Constituents of Matter" [1915], "The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics" [1914], "On the Notion of Cause" [1912], and "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description" [1910] taken together mark Mr. Russell's logical-philosophical point of view.

It is impossible to give oneself over to a judgment of any philosopher based purely on his prose, in the narrower sense of the word "style," yet a good deal of light may often be thrown on a philosopher by holding his work up to the standards of literature. For literary standards help us to perceive just those moments when a writer is scrupulously and sincerely attending to his vision, help us to dissociate the social and the histrionic from the unique. The present volume offers a particularly interesting exercise of this sort. Some of the essays are austere technical; one is devoted to a defence of scientific education; and one contains a celebrated exposition of Mr. Russell's theology. The point is, where is Mr. Russell's insight, his peculiar vision, to be found; is it equally present everywhere? For where that is,

there will the style be; and where the style does not convince, the vision will be lacking.

Dull critics, usually of an idealistic turn, have remarked that Mr. Russell's empiricism is merely a more exact development of Mill's.³ This observation misses precisely what makes all the difference. But there is another side on which Mr. Russell has close affinities with the generation of Mill; with George Eliot walking in the garden and denying God while she affirmed the Moral Law with fuliginous solemnity.⁴ Like these, Mr. Russell is an emancipated Puritan; a little more emancipated, for he is of a later time, but like them, he takes his emancipation seriously. We know the passage as well as the conclusion to the *Studies in the Renaissance*:

Brief and powerless is man's life . . .

It is quite as good prose as Pater's, but it is not Mr. Russell's best prose.⁵ It presents a mood which could be made poignant in one of only two ways. We might be allowed to guess the sadness between the lines of a plain statement of philosophic creed; or we might realize it through the plain statement of the tragedy of a particular individual man or woman; but in either Spinoza or Homer, what we have is statement. The possibilities of lyricism are limited. Mr. Russell's Man, the *unglücksel'ger Atlas* staggering beneath the probability of the collapse of the solar system, is a descendant of Man Conceived in Sin.⁶ Elsewhere Mr. Russell has made us *feel* "the passionate splendour" of Time and Fate and Death; here he has merely told us about it.⁷

Mr. Russell's vision is not here; nor is it in "The Place of Science in a Liberal Education," where he is obviously spoiling his razor on blocks that ought to be left to the duller blades of the *Times Educational Supplement*. Incidentally he says some fine things, as this: "In science, the man of real genius is the man who invents a new method" [41]. We could wish that he had left the remark, "a life devoted to science is therefore a happy life" [45], to be written by someone else.

In those essays which are most philosophical—in the last six or seven of the book—Mr. Russell reaches the level of the very best philosophical prose in the language. The only contemporary writer who can even approach him is Mr. Bradley. As a philosopher, Mr. Bradley attains a perfection which is so emphatically a perfection of destruction, the most valuable part of his work is so purely skeptical, that his greatness is due rather to a consummation of dialectical technique than to a single vision. His relation to philosophy is

like that which Mr. Balfour, answering questions, maintains towards statesmanship. His hardness is of the surface, and conceals an affinity to Walter Pater. But Mr. Russell's hardness is from within. His style has perfect lucidity; it neither increases nor dissimulates the difficulty of the subject.⁸ The liberation of English philosophy from German influence, glibly discussed in the autumn of 1914, will have been the work, not of Mill (who was an amateur), but of Mr. Russell. His victory has been largely due to the possession of a science which most admirers of German philosophy in this country but imperfectly understood, but in the end will be due to his style, a style which this science has trained.

There is certainly something a little disconcerting at times about Mr. Russell's exposition. It is so convincingly the subject explaining itself, rather than a writer explaining the subject, that one's occasional failures of apprehension present themselves as conscious evidence of mental feebleness. The reader cannot dodge behind his ignorance of mathematics, though he is aware that the essays are addressed to the adept as much as to himself. And there are everywhere points to arrest the attention of the dullest; points which are paradoxical without meretriciousness, or which have the impact of paradox without its cheapness:

A philosopher is expected to tell us something about the nature of the universe as a whole, and to give grounds for either optimism or pessimism. Both these expectations seem to me mistaken. I believe the conception of "the universe" to be, as its etymology indicates, a mere relic of pre-Copernican astronomy . . . (98-99)⁹

People used to think that when a thing changes, it must be in a state of change, and that when a thing moves, it is in a state of motion. This is now known to be a mistake. When a body moves, all that can be said is that it is in one place at one time and in another at another. (83-84)

Not only is it doubtful whether his (Euclid's) axioms are true, which is a comparatively trivial matter, but it is certain that his propositions do not follow from the axioms which he enunciates. (94)

Or consider the discussion of "space and points" in the paper "On Scientific Method in Philosophy" and of the word "real" in the same essay.

Mr. Russell can be accepted by his own test of a man of science as one who has invented a new method; and he will probably carry this method

further; he is also a philosopher who has invented a new point of view; and a new point of view is style.

NOTES

1. Attributed to TSE by Russell in Alan Wood, *Bertrand Russell: The Passionate Sceptic* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1957), 94-95. In Feb 1918, when TSE was writing this review, Russell was being tried in London for obstructing England's progress in the war, for which he was sentenced to six months in Brixton Prison, where he was visited by TSE. Russell was impressed with TSE's review and wrote from prison on 17 June that it was the only review "with distinction" that the book attracted. Qtd. in Ray Monk, *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1996), 519.

2. TSE studied Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica* (1910-13) and Russell's *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz* (1900) at Harvard and Oxford in 1914-15. He sent Russell's *Philosophical Essays* (1910) and *The Problems of Philosophy* (1912) as gifts to his mother (*LI* 134, 143). In spring 1914, he attended Russell's Lowell Lectures, published as *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914).

3. Mill outlined his empiricism in *System of Logic* (1843). His analysis of the role of language in dealing with empirical data was later developed by Russell.

4. In 1873, George Eliot (pen name of Mary Ann Evans, 1819-80) accepted an invitation to visit the critic Frederick W. H. Myers, who later recalled in a memorial essay in *Century Magazine* (Nov 1881): "I remember how, at Cambridge, I walked with her once in the Fellows' Garden of Trinity . . . and she, . . . taking as her text the three words which have been used so often as the inspiring trumpet-calls of men,—the words *God, Immortality, Duty*,—pronounced, with terrible earnestness, how inconceivable was the *first*, how unbelievable the *second*, and yet how peremptory and absolute the *third*. Never, perhaps, have sterner accents affirmed the sovereignty of impersonal and unrecompensing Law." *Essays Modern* (London: Macmillan, 1883), 268-69.

5. In the concluding paragraph of "A Free Man's Worship" (1903), the third essay in *Mysticism and Logic*, Mephistopheles explains the Creation to Dr. Faustus: "Brief and powerless is Man's life; on him and all his race the slow, sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, . . . omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way; for Man, . . . it remains only to cherish . . . the lofty thoughts that ennoble his little day" (56-57). Pater states in the concluding paragraph of *Studies in the History of the Renaissance* that "we have an interval, and then our place knows us no more. Some spend this interval in listlessness, some in high passions, the wisest . . . in art and song. For our one chance lies in expanding that interval, in getting as many pulsations as possible into the given time."

6. An allusion to Heinrich Heine's poem "Ich unglücksel'ger Atlas!," number XXIV in his collection "Die Heimkehr," included in *Reisebilder* (1826).

7. From "A Free Man's Worship"; *read*: "passionless splendour": "The life of Man . . . is but a small thing in comparison with the forces of Nature. The slave is doomed to worship Time and Fate and Death because they are greater than anything he finds in himself . . . But, great as they are . . . to feel their passionless splendour is greater still" (55).

8. TSE returns to style and thought in Russell, Bradley, and Balfour in "A Prediction in Regard to Three English Authors" (*Vanity Fair*, Feb 1924). Russell, he remarks, "presents the curious

spectacle of a very powerful mind . . . at war with itself. . . . He was educated as a mathematician . . . , and the mathematician in him is impatient of the philosopher.” Bradley, on the other hand, “is wholly and solely a philosopher,” and “no English philosopher has ever written finer English,” while Balfour, whose *Theism and Humanism* TSE had reviewed in 1916, is but “a distinguished dabbler in metaphysics” (2,516).

9. The first quotation is from the essay, “On Scientific Method in Philosophy”; the other two are from “Mathematics and the Metaphysicians.”

Disjecta Membra¹

A review of *Tendencies in Modern American Poetry*,

by Amy Lowell

New York: Macmillan, 1917. Pp. 349.²

The Egoist, 5 (Apr 1918) 55

Miss Lowell, who not very long ago discovered six poets in France, has now mustered six poets from among her own nation.³ The six are E. A. Robinson, Frost, Masters, Sandburg, H. D., and Fletcher.⁴ In this book Miss Lowell has included much biographical information which casts new light upon the poets treated, and she further illuminates the subject with sentences on Life and Art which are pregnant with meaning. I say “pregnant” advisedly, for Miss Lowell herself is not averse to the obstetrical metaphor. Here is her summary of the three stages of poetry:

In the first stage, beauty is a thing remembered and haunting; in the third stage, it is re-discovered and intoxicating; but in the second, it is crowded out by the stress of travail, by the pangs of a birth which has not occurred. [141]

This painful second stage is “embodied,” we are told, by Mr. Masters. As Miss Lowell herself says, “Words are stubborn things, it requires much training to make them docile to one’s purpose” [288-89]. But Miss Lowell’s words are well trained; and fly obediently from trope to trope at her bidding. Thus *Poetry* was to be “a forum in which youth could thrash out its ideas, and succeed or fail according to its deserts, unhampered by the damp blanket of obscurity” [159].⁵

* * * * * *

But what makes the particular delight of Miss Lowell’s book is the personal tone. Her method is as remorselessly intimate as Sainte-Beuve’s. Only quotation is adequate:

Mr. Robinson, as his name implies, comes of good Anglo-Saxon stock.
[10]

Mr. Frost . . . entered Dartmouth College. College, however, did not agree with his state of mind. . . . He stayed at Harvard for two years. . . . He was too old for college curriculums [*sic*], for one thing, for another, a married undergraduate is naturally set apart from his fellows and cannot, by the nature of things, get all that a university has to offer. [89, 91; TSE's brackets]

The whole farming industry of New England had been knocked on the head by the opening up of the West. [95]

When Mr. Masters was about fourteen years old there came to Lewiston as assistant to the Principal of the High School, a certain Mary Fisher. [148]

Carl Sandburg's father was a Swedish immigrant whose real name was August Johnson. [204]

In 1911, Miss Doolittle went abroad. . . . She had known Ezra Pound years before. [251]

Mr. Pound's connexion with Imagism is briefly mentioned on page 254, in the words: "Mr. Pound withdrew from the group and joined the Vorticists." He would not appear from Miss Lowell's words to have had anything more to do with the inception of the Imagist movement than having been a member of "that small band of insurgent poets" [252]. Miss Lowell does not appear so well informed about Mr. Pound as about the poets with whom she is dealing.

* * * * *

As for criticism, I need only observe that Miss Lowell considers Fletcher "a more original poet than Arthur Rimbaud" [295], and affirms that *Spoon River* is the "great blot upon Mr. Masters' work" [175]. And I observe that although Puritanism is a "virulent poison," Miss Lowell exclaims:

How many excellent books of a past age are neglected because of this over-insistence upon sex! . . . The plays of Congreve would be as well known as those of Sheridan were it not for this. It is slow suicide for an author to commit this blunder. [175]

But the important point is this. Miss Lowell says that art is like politics. Her own rôle is thus Director of Propaganda. It strikes me as a most unfortunate thing that this all-American propaganda should continue. Among the six victims of Miss Lowell's enthusiasm, only one, Mr. Robinson, is negligible;

and two, H. D. and Mr. Fletcher, have done work which entitles them to international standing. If one had only Miss Lowell's text, without the long excerpts which save the situation, one would envisage these poets as Laureates of some provincial Lycaenum. Literature must be judged by language, not by place. And standards may come from Paris, or even Rome or Munich, which London as well as Topeka must respect. Provinciality of material may be a virtue, as in the *Sportsman's Sketches*;⁶ provinciality of point of view is a vice.

T. S. E.

NOTES

1. *disjecta membra*: scattered remains (literary); from Horace, "disjecti membra poetae" (limbs of a dismembered poet), in *Satires* I.iv.62. TSE's annotated copy of *The Works of Horace* trans. Christopher Smart (Philadelphia: David McKay, 1896), is in the Houghton Library. On 5 Sept 1916, TSE wrote to Eleanor Hinkley about his brother-in-law Maurice Haigh-Wood, who had been invalided home from the war: "A boy of nineteen . . . who is quite used to the sight of *disjecta membra* and has spent nights when he couldn't sleep in shooting rats with a revolver, makes me feel comparatively immature" (*LI* 162).

2. On 4 Mar, TSE wrote to his mother that he had written "an article on a very foolish book by Amy Lowell" (*LI* 251). Lowell, a member of the prominent Lowell family of Massachusetts and sister to Harvard president (1909-33) Abbott Lowell, arrived in London in 1913 and soon became involved in the Imagist movement. Pound included her poem "In the Garden" in *Des Imagistes* (1914) but soon clashed with her and rechristened the movement "Amygism" before moving on to other interests.

3. Lowell's first book of criticism, *Six French Poets* (1915), based on a series of lectures, included introductions to Albert Samain, Émile Verhaeren, Francis Jammes, Henri de Régnier, Remy de Gourmont, and Paul Fort.

4. Edwin Arlington Robinson (1869-1935).

5. *Poetry*: Harriet Monroe's *Poetry: A Magazine of Verse* (Chicago).

6. TSE wrote to Hinkley on 1 Apr: "I think you might like Turgenev. I admire him as much as any novelist, but especially in the *Sportsman's Sketches*. His method looks simple and slight, but he is a consummate master with it" (*LI* 259).

Professional, or . . .

A review of *The Stucco House*, by Gilbert Cannan

London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1917. Pp. 388.

Hearts of Controversy, by Alice Meynell

London: Burns & Oates, 1917. Pp. 115.

The Egoist, 5 (Apr 1918) 61

It is perhaps not too late to call attention to an article which appeared two months ago (January 31) in the Literary Supplement of *The Times*. The article was entitled "Professionalism in Art."¹ Like most of the leading articles in *The Times* Literary Supplement, it is altogether on the high plane; its tone is so refined and agreeable, its author so evidently one of ourselves, that we hesitate to take exception. It is in fact so delightful that we ought not to expose it to further publicity. But its thesis is not only one which may reasonably be called wrong, but importantly wrong. The author is quite against what he calls the professional; and this attitude is so thoroughly British that if it is wrong it is certainly important, and if it is wrong in art may provide some clue as to why British Art is no better than it is. We cannot be absolutely sure, after reading the article several times, what is actually the definition of the professional; the professional is not contrasted with anything definite; and the writer engages our sympathy by charging the worst lines of Milton and Wordsworth to professionalism. Here are two of his statements:

Professionalism is a device for making expression easy.

Decadence in art is always caused by professionalism.

An attitude which might find voice in words like these is behind all of British slackness for a hundred years and more: the dislike of the specialist. It is behind the British worship of inspiration, which in literature is merely an avoidance of comparison with foreign literatures, a dodging of standards. It goes to explain, for instance, why in English literature there are so few really well-written novels.

The opposite of the professional is not the dilettante, the elegant amateur, the dabbler who in fact only attests the existence of the specialist. The opposite of the professional, the enemy, is the man of mixed motives. Conspicuously the Victorian epoch is anti-professional; Carlyle as an historian, Ruskin as an economist; Thackeray who could write such good prose as the Steyne episode, and considered himself a kindly but penetrating satirist; George Eliot who could write *Amos Barton* and steadily degenerate. Decadence in art is caused by mixed motives. The art of the Victorians is spoiled by mixed motives, and Oscar Wilde finally added ingredients to the mixture which made it a ludicrous emetic.²

The writer in *The Times*, belittling technique, appears to identify technique with what may be learned from a manual of prosody. This is making technique easy. If mathematics consisted in learning the multiplication table up to 1,000,000, that would be making mathematics easy. Technique is more volatile; it can only be learned, the more difficult part of it, by absorption. Try to put into a sequence of simple quatrains the continuous syntactic variety of Gautier or Blake, or compare these two with A. E. Housman.³ Surely professionalism in art is hard work on style with singleness of purpose.

* * * * *

In some writers, non-professionalism is a radical vice; in others, rather an imperfection. It is possible that Mr. Gilbert Cannan's belongs to the latter type, and that *The Stucco House* might be rewritten into literature.⁴ If he would really write his novels, they might be literature; as it is, *The Stucco House* is merely a deposit. Mr. Cannan's material is interesting; he has put considerable thought into the book; and the book is a very interesting book. The writer really understands the kind of domestic warfare with which James and Catherine occupy their lives. But it is seldom quite the understanding of a novelist; it is the understanding of a man who has assumed a cause; Mr. Cannan's hatred is even stronger than his understanding. He preaches, sometimes with almost the twang of the Baptist chapel. He admires Samuel Butler—⁵

It is possible that he was responsible for his mother's desire for the stucco house, and that he desired to be born in it. [190]

But he has not the mastery of biographic detail which makes Christina.⁶ His style is not commonplace, like Butler's; it is sometimes bad.

From their different angles approaching the heart of this great mystery they were through bitter pain at last spiritually at one, linked with humanity, borne upward to a point at which personality and conduct vanished, and there was no need to think of right and wrong, but only to dwell in love, whose light was shed upon the dark places of tragic life. [275]

This is not prose, it is oratory, the true manly snuffle, the abdominal throb. Nevertheless, the book is an interesting book, and it might be better.

* * * * *

God took a rib from the side of Mr. Chesterton and made Mrs. Meynell.⁷ They are quite different, but as the female from the male. Both are non-professionals in criticism, as Mr. Cannan is non-professional in the novel; both use the form of criticism for non-critical ends. But while there is still hope for Comrade Cannan, there is none for these two; each has formed a kind of style fleshed and boned in irrelevance. One often agrees with Mr. Chesterton, one often agrees with Mrs. Meynell. In the present tidy small volume, she wins our hearts when she says that Tennyson is “more serious than the solemn Wordsworth” [18], or when she denounces Swinburne. (Compare her analysis of Tennyson with that of Chesterton in his *Victorian Age*.)⁸ But on the whole, she has not the single critical motive. She is an amateur of letters. Like Mr. Chesterton, she has not in the end criticized the author at all. When she writes of Tennyson:

Unaware of a separate angel of modern poetry is he who is insensible to the Tennyson note—the new note that we reaffirm even with the notes of Vaughan, Traherne, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Blake, well in our ears—the Tennyson note of splendour, all-distinct. He showed the perpetually transfigured landscape in transfiguring words. He is the captain of our dreams. Others have lighted a candle in England, he lit a sun. . . . [20-21]

it is what a University Extension audience would like; but it is not criticism. But in its peculiar anti-style, Mrs. Meynell's book, like all her books, is extremely well written, and she can incidentally pick out good bits from authors. If we can accept the attitude, we shall enjoy the book very much. And people who have a taste for that antiquated *genre*, that parlour-game, the Polite Essay—which consists in taking a tiny point and cutting figure eights around it, without ever uttering one's meaning in plain words—will

find in Mrs. Meynell's last essay ("Charmian") an almost perfect example of a forgotten craft which indeed had its attractions.⁹

* * * * *

But we must learn to take literature seriously.

APTERYX

NOTES

1. *TLS*, No. 837 (31 Jan 1918), [49]-50. The anonymous author was Arthur Clutton-Brock, since 1908 a regular contributor as an art critic and essayist.

2. In his 1917-18 Extension courses, TSE lectured on Carlyle, Ruskin, George Eliot, Oscar Wilde (1854-1900), and Thackeray. On 1 Apr, after writing this review, he wrote to Eleanor Hinkley: "George Eliot had a great talent, and wrote one great story, *Amos Barton*, and went steadily down hill afterwards. Her best stunt was just this exact realism of country life, as good in its way as anything in Russian, and she thought her business was philosophic tragedy. . . . Thackeray could do . . . the Steyne part of *Vanity Fair*, but he had a picture of himself as a kindly satirist. Not at all, he hadn't brains enough, nor courage enough to find out really what he could do well, which was high society sordidness, and do it" (*LI* 259).

3. The poet and classicist A. E. Housman (1859-1936), author of *A Shropshire Lad* (1896).

4. TSE had met the novelist, dramatist, and critic Gilbert Cannan (1884-1955) at Bosham in 1916, describing him to Conrad Aiken as "a cadaverous silent person" (*LI* 159) and had recommended Cannan's earlier novel *Satire* (1914) in his 1917 Extension course (590).

5. Cannan was the author of *Samuel Butler: A Critical Study* (1915), which TSE included on the reading list for his Extension course (592).

6. Christina Pontifex is the mother of protagonist Ernest Pontifex in Butler's posthumous *The Way of All Flesh* (1903). In his letter to Hinkley (n. 2, above), TSE wrote that the novel "was written by a man who was not an artist and had no sense of style; it is too long . . . but the character of Christina is amazing . . . one of the finest pieces of dissection of mental dishonesty that I know anywhere; Butler pursues her relentlessly to her death. It is a book you must read" (*LI* 259). TSE had assigned the novel for his Extension lectures on Butler (590).

7. The poet, editor, and critic Alice Meynell (1847-1922) included critical essays on Tennyson, Dickens, Swinburne, the Brontës, and Pope in *Hearts of Controversy*. Her *Collected Poems* appeared in 1913; her *Essays*, collected from her previous five volumes, in 1914.

8. *The Victorian Age in Literature*.

9. Meynell begins her essay on the modern artist's "preference of the waiting-woman" and "search for the beauty of the less-beautiful" with a quotation from Keats's letter of 14-15 Oct 1818 to his brother George: "She is not Cleopatra, but she is at least Charmian."

A review of *La guerra eterna e il dramma dell'esistenza*, by Antonio Aliotta

Napoli: Francesco Perrella, [1917]. Pp. 221.¹

The International Journal of Ethics, 28 (Apr 1918) 444-45

Professor Aliotta's book has a topical title, but except for a patriotic passage at the end he confines himself to philosophical issues.² His task is a popular presentation of a species of Humanism. Sig. Aliotta comes out of the idealistic tradition, and has developed a relative idealism, with a strong propension toward Pure Experience. His Empiricism stops at the subject-object relation, beyond which he believes we can penetrate no further. He begins by an assault upon naturalism and positivism ("freedom is an inner experience");³ and no less forcibly attacks absolute idealism (e.g. Royce's absolute will, 43),⁴ and the "Spirit" of neo-Hegelians (a "spirit" which is not the spirit of any concrete person).⁵ "The primitive fact" in his own words "is the experience of an individual subject in time."⁶ From experience "it is impossible for us to escape; we must not grieve thereat, because this is the concrete reality, the living model of any and every conceivable form of existence" (58).⁷ "The object is only real in its relation to the subject, and vice versa . . . outside of this relationship the two terms are mere abstractions."⁸

I have not been able to trace the links between this thesis and the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, which Professor Aliotta holds with equal emphasis.⁹ Nor is the theory of Evil—as a conflict of wills which is disappearing in the "progressive co-ordination" of the world—altogether satisfactory.¹⁰ Is the ideal of civilisation *merely* organisation? Professor Aliotta seems to think so (163, 185).¹¹ And there is perhaps a little trick of *passe-passe* in his argument for vitalism versus mechanism (187).¹² But the book is vigorous and entertaining, and is not intended as a technical treatise of the bullet-proof sort. It is pleasant to find that Croce and Gentile are spoken of as "polluting (at least *contaminando*) Hegel with Bergson."¹³

T. S. E.

NOTES

1. Antonio Aliotta (1881-1964), professor of philosophy at the University of Padua, was the author of *La Reazione idealistica contro la scienza* (1912), trans. as *The Idealistic Reaction against Science* (1914), a critical analysis of the romantic reactions against science pervading neo-Hegelianism, French intuitionism, and Anglo-American pragmatism.

2. When discussing the need to share one's feelings with others through art in the last chapter, Aliotta describes the emotions aroused when one hears "fuori d'Italia la voce d'un compatriota" (210) and then evokes various Italian landscapes before asserting the country's resilience in the face of opposition during the war (210-11).

3. "In breve: la libertà è un'esperienza interiore e può e deve esser verificata solo con altre esperienze interiori" (18).

4. "Concepire col Royce un'assoluta volontà, giunta al termine del suo infinito svolgimento e del tutto soddisfatta, equivale a concepire una volontà che non è più volontà, una coscienza che non è più coscienza, una vita psichica che non vive più" (43). In 1916, TSE completed his dissertation under the sponsorship of Professor Royce.

5. In criticizing "lo Spirito con l'iniziale maiuscola" (39), Aliotta takes issue with the neo-Hegelian concept of the universality of thought: "l'universale fuori dell'individuo è una finzione astratta; non è lecito perciò parlare d'uno spirito che non sia spirito d'una persona concreta" (46).

6. "Il fatto primitivo . . . è l'esperienza d'un soggetto individuale nel tempo" (54).

7. "Da essa [l'esperienza] ci è impossibile uscire, e non dobbiamo dolercene, perchè essa è la concreta realtà, il vivente modello di qualsiasi concepibile forma d'esistenza" (58).

8. The syntax is altered in the translation: "Ma se pensiamo che l'oggetto è solo reale nella sua relazione col soggetto, e viceversa, e che in questo rapporto appunto, che è la sintesi concreta dell'esperienza, fuori della quale i due termini sono semplici astrazioni, è la sola realtà concepibile, non ci lamenteremo più di non possedere nella nostra conoscenza l'essere vero" (58-59).

9. Chapter 9 is entitled "L'eternità delle anime" (97-123).

10. "In questo disordinato conflitto dei voleri è la radice del male, nel loro progressivo coordinarsi la sorgente d'ogni elevazione delle anime" (163).

11. "L'evoluzione della vita non ci apparisce come il concretarsi d'un perfetto disegno ideale, privo di errori e di lacune, ma piuttosto come una serie di tentativi secolari, non sempre riusciti, che conducono a poco, a poco a forme sempre più vaste di coordinazione" (185).

12. "La vita psichica non è un'aggiunta superflua, che viene d'un tratto a illuminare il teatro, dove danno spettacolo le forze meccaniche, bastevoli per sè sole a spiegare il complesso dinamismo delle strutture organiche; . . . ma è invece il principale fattore dell'evoluzione biologica" (187). *passe-passe*: slight of hand.

13. "Il neo-hegelianismo italiano del Croce e del Gentile, contaminando Hegel con Bergson, concepisce l'eternità dello spirito, non come un presente che abbracci tutta la durata . . . bensì come il ritmo indefinito della sua vita creatrice" (159). An idealist himself, Aliotta nevertheless identifies with pragmatism in his opposition to the idealism of Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile (1875-1944), at that time the author of *The Theory of Mind as Pure Act* (1916) and *Logic as a Theory of Knowledge* (1917).

A review of *Brahmadarsanam, or Intuition of the Absolute: Being an Introduction to the Study of Hindu Philosophy*, by Śrī Ānanda Āchārya

London: Macmillan, 1917. Pp. xii + 210.¹

The International Journal of Ethics, 28 (April 1918), 445-46

A good brief introduction to Indian philosophy is still much to seek. Such a work ought to be both historical and comparative. It ought to draw the line very clearly between the religious intuition, which the various schools of philosophy all assumed, and the interpretations, which are widely diverse; it ought to make quite clear to the Occidental mind the difference between the Vedas and the Upanishads, which are properly religious texts, and the earliest philosophical texts of the primitive Sankhya.² There is, though native writers are apt to obscure the fact, as certainly a History of Indian philosophy as of European; a history which can be traced in the dualistic Sankhya, for instance, from the cryptic early couplets through the commentary of Patanjali to the extraordinarily ingenious and elaborate thought of Vachaspati Misra and Vijnana Bhikshu.³ There is, moreover, extremely subtle and patient psychology in the later writers; and it should be the task of the interpreter to make this psychology plausible, to exhibit it as something more than an arbitrary and fatiguing system of classifications.

Sri Ananda has written a small book which is better than most attempts of the kind; and as there is so little in this field that is worth a layman's attention, his book is to be recommended. The historical method is hardly developed, and the author is too much concerned (as is perhaps natural) with refuting some of the European scholars' dates. He places Kapila, for instance (who may or may not have existed) as early as 3000 B.C., and Buddha himself much earlier than the seventh century.⁴ These are unimportant points, however; it is more important that we are not shown the real *development* of Indian thought. Sri Ananda devotes most attention to Vedanta; but it is good to get a book which discusses the Sankhya at all. It ought to be made clear that Prakriti (Pradhanam) is not equivalent to Matter, but sometimes

is almost the sense-data of the Realists.⁵ The lectures (for such is the origin of the book) are interestingly written.

T. S. E.

NOTES

1. Śrī Ānanda Āchārya (1881-1945), poet and philosopher at the University of Stockholm, gave these lectures in Christiania (Oslo), Norway during the spring of 1915: “My aim was to present Hindu ways of looking at the eternal verities of life in simple language before the mind of the Norwegian public” (vii).

2. The *Vedas* (Sanskrit: knowledge): the sacred texts of ancient India. The *Upanishads*: one of a late class of Vedic scriptures dealing with broad philosophic problems, such as the nature of ultimate reality. Sāṅkhya (also: Sāmkhya: “that which can be numbered, classified, grouped” [5]), one of the six schools of classical Indian philosophy, is based on metaphysical dualism, the transcendence of which leads to salvation.

3. The Indian grammarian Patañjali (fl. 150 BC) is known as the compiler of the *Yoga-sūtras*, an important collection of aphorisms on Yoga practice, and as the author of the *Mahābhāṣya*, an authoritative commentary on Pāṇini’s *Ashtadhyayi*. Vāchaspati Misra (also: Mishra; fl. 9th or 10th centuries) is the author of commentaries on the major texts of Indian philosophy. Vijnana Bhikshu (fl. 16th century) composed the *Yoga-Sara-Sangraha*.

TSE later recalled: “Two years spent in the study of Sanskrit under Charles Lanman, and a year in the mazes of Patanjali’s metaphysics under the guidance of James Woods, left me in a state of enlightened mystification. A good half of the effort of understanding what the Indian philosophers were after . . . lay in trying to erase from my mind all the categories . . . common to European philosophy from the time of the Greeks. My . . . study of European philosophy was hardly better than an obstacle. And I came to the conclusion . . . that my only hope of really penetrating to the heart of that mystery would lie in forgetting how to feel as an American or a European: which, for practical as well as sentimental reasons, I did not wish to do” (*ASG* 40-41).

4. Maharishi Kapila is an ancient Vedic sage, considered to be the original proponent of the Sāṅkhya philosophy. Śrī Ānanda places Buddha “much earlier than 680 BC” (178) and finds no difficulty, “considering the weight of the evidence, in placing Kapila prior to 3000 BC” (183).

5. Pradhānam: the material cause; the substance of matter. Prakriti: “[T]he world of phenomena has evolved out of the primal undifferented Matter . . . , an original unmanifested substance called Prakriti, or Nature, which was anterior to creation” (28). The ultimate constituents of matter, according to Russell and some of the Realists, are sense-data.

Second review of *Religion and Science*:

A Philosophical Essay, by John Theodore Merz

Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1915. Pp. xi + 192.¹

The Monist, 28 (Apr 1918) 319-20

Clearly, this book belongs to a type. To be in love with emotion has been our affliction since Rousseau; to believe in belief is a form of the same malady. Mr. Merz knows Schleiermacher; he may or may not have read Maeterlinck, or Bergson, or Jean Jacques; but he cannot have escaped Goethe. As for romanticism in theology, we find one fundamental assumption: there is something called religion, independent of articulate creeds; there is the conviction that religion is so valuable that it must be "true"; and there is the prejudice that science is hostile to religion. Strong passions do not need explanation; but just as a man who is not very much in love excuses the follies which he has committed for the purpose of appearing passionate, so the philosophical Christian apologizes for the religion in which he would like to believe, and interprets the weakness of his opponents as evidence of his own strength. Maeterlinck exulted in the "banqueroute de la science" because it made religion again possible.²

In this book the learned historian of European thought expounds three ideas: (1) Science deals only with an "external" world, which is a development of the world of common sense "with a still greater restriction of fundamental data" (107) out of an earlier and larger reality. (2) Science describes and explains, its terms consist of "spatial data and their connections" [67]. Interpretation, i.e., the assignment (or the discovery?) of value and meaning, is reserved for religion. (3) Personality is that which is most real. The highest experience which we can have is the feeling of absolute dependence (Schleiermacher) which we trace to the influence of a higher power.

Mr. Merz decides, first, that the external world is a construction, that conceptual thought abstracts and selects. The products of this selection are subject and object, "an altered and fuller conception of reality," space, time, causality [124]. These entities are carved out of a "primordial stream of thought" [95] which apparently antedates thinking, which is a reality wider (though it is said to be less "full") than the external world. This internal

possession is the earlier and truer aspect of our personality—a period (as well as an aspect) when we looked upon everything merely as “internal happenings” [170]. We entertained this hypothesis in our infancy, and our age sees the belief justified.

Although this is the earlier and truer aspect of our personality, yet contact with other personality leads us out of it. The first external object that the baby apprehends is its mother, not perhaps in her earlier and truer aspect, but as an influence, a spiritual pressure. Nothing else that we experience is so real as personality. The awareness of a group gives us law and morality. The awareness of a supreme spiritual pressure gives us religion.

Mr. Merz holds that mind is as much an abstraction as is matter. “[T]he totality of any experience . . . is of more importance, being more truly real, than the particles into which we . . . dissect it” (74). Whether personality is equivalent to this total experience, or is one of the particles, is not made clear.

The phrases “stream of thought” and “firmament of consciousness” recur many times. The account of description, explanation, and interpretation is the best part of the book (110-20).

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NOTES

1. TSE first reviewed this book in the *IJE* in Oct 1916 (434). This version contains a new introduction, some stylistic emendations, and a reduction of the penultimate paragraph.

2. TSE alludes to the late nineteenth-century debate in French intellectual circles over religion and science, which was heightened by Ferdinand Brunetière’s “Après une visite au Vatican” in the *Revue des deux mondes*, 127 (Jan 1895), 97-118, an attempt to defend religious belief by asserting the “banqueroute de la science” (98) (*banqueroute*: bankruptcy) in its claim to eliminate mystery and solve the ultimate problems of existence. TSE included Rousseau, Bergson, and Maeterlinck in his 1916 course on Modern French Literature, with emphasis on their use of “science against science” and their religious optimism, as in Maeterlinck’s *Wisdom and Destiny* (1898) and *The Life of the Bee* (1901), both on TSE’s reading list (480).

A review of *Outlines of Jainism*, by Jagmenderlal Jaini,
ed. with preliminary note by F. W. Thomas

Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1916. Pp. xl + 156.¹

The Monist, 28 (Apr 1918) 320

A compact little treatise by a distinguished Jain. The author divides his exposition into Theology, Metaphysics, Ethics, and Ritual, and appends a number of Jain texts. The book is a compendium, not an interpretation into terms of Western philosophy—which is to its credit. It will appeal chiefly to the student of Sanskrit and Pali who has some acquaintance with Indian and Buddhist philosophy, and perhaps is ignorant in this less explored field; but it should interest others as well.² We regret that the author did not find space for a comparative account; we learn nothing of borrowings, analogies, or common sources. There is an historical narrative of the teachings of Jainism, but none of the development of its philosophy. Jainism is dualistic, and one would like to know what relation it bears to the dualism of early Sankhya. From Mr. Jaini's statement of the three cardinal principles (karma, relativism, and *ahimsa* or non-injury of living beings), we do not discern any fundamental difference from some forms of Buddhism.

One is glad to see that honor is paid to the labors of that greatest of Orientalists, Jacobi.³ The book is published under the auspices of the Jain Literature Society. We hope that it will spread the interest in a noble religion and ethics and an important philosophy.⁴

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NOTES

1. Jainism: an ascetic religion founded in sixth-century India that teaches the immortality of the soul but denies the existence of a supreme being. Jagmenderlal Jaini (d. 1927), barrister and former editor of the *Jaina Gazette*, was president of the All India Jaina Association. The British Indologist F. W. Thomas (1867-1956) was president of the Jain Literature Society, founded in London in 1910.

2. TSE had studied Sanskrit and Pali at Harvard in 1911-12 under Charles Rockwell Lanman, the Wales Professor of Sanskrit. His copy of Lanman's *A Sanskrit Reader: With Vocabulary and Notes* (1906), signed "T. S. Eliot / Cambridge / 1912," retains his markings and annotations throughout.

3. The German Indologist Hermann Jacobi (1850-1937), professor at the University of Cologne, edited and translated Jain manuscripts into English and German and was well known for his work on the origins of Vedic culture.

4. “Jaina ethics is the most glorious part of Jainism,” writes Jaini. “There is no conflict between man’s duty to himself and to society. The highest good of society is the highest good of the individual. . . . The first stage of a Jaina layman’s life is that of intelligent and well reasoned faith in Jainism; and the second is when he takes a vow not to destroy any kind of life, not to lie, not to use another’s property without his consent, to be chaste, to limit his necessities, to worship daily, and to give charity in the way of knowledge, medicine, comfort, and food. And these virtues are summed up in one word: *ahimsā* (non-hurting)” (xxiii).

Observations

A review of *Others, An Anthology of the New Verse*,

ed. Alfred Kreymborg

New York: Knopf, 1917. Pp. 120.

French Literary Studies, by T. B. Rudmose-Brown

Dublin: Talbot Press, 1917. Pp. 129.

Appreciations and Depreciations: Irish Literary Studies,

by Ernest A. Boyd

Dublin: Talbot Press, 1917. Pp. 162.

The Egoist, 5 (May 1918), 69-70

Mr. Ford Madox Hueffer, in his *Henry James*, remarks upon "journalese,"

that flail of the Anglo-Saxon race, that infinite corruptor of the Anglo-Saxon mind, that destined and ultimate cause of the downfall of Anglo-Saxon empires, since the race that cannot either in allegories or in direct speech think clearly is doomed to fall before nations who can; and Japan is ever on the threshold with the tendrils twining round its well-ropes. . . .¹

I am not sure of the imminent ascendancy of Japan, a busy commercial country, and the degeneracy of one civilization does not seem to be inevitably accompanied by the rise of another; but Mr. Hueffer's warning is certainly just, and could perhaps be stated in more general terms. What we want is to disturb and alarm the public:² to upset its reliance upon Shakespeare, Nelson, Wellington, and Sir Isaac Newton;³ to point out that at any moment the relation of a modern Englishman to Shakespeare may be discovered to be that of a modern Greek to Aeschylus. To point out that every generation, every turn of time when the work of four or five men who count has reached middle age, is a *crisis*. Also that the intelligence of a nation must go on developing, or it will deteriorate; and that every writer who does not help to develop the language is, to the extent to which he is read, a positive agent of deterioration. That the forces of deterioration are a large crawling

mass, and the forces of development half a dozen men. And (here as well as anywhere else) that the Intelligence of modern Europe is considerably due to Montaigne, and that through most of the nineteenth century, the mind of France has always been a little ahead of the mind of England, if the English mind has not actually degenerated. The Englishman, completely untrained in critical judgment, looks complacently back over the nineteenth century as an accumulation of Great Writers. England puts her Great Writers away securely in a Safe Deposit Vault, and curls to sleep like Fafner.⁴ There they go rotten; for if our predecessors cannot teach us to write better than themselves, they will surely teach us to write worse; because we have never learned to criticize Keats, Shelley, and Wordsworth (poets of assured though modest merit), Keats, Shelley, and Wordsworth punish us from their graves with the annual scourge of the Georgian Anthology.⁵

We must insist upon the importance of intelligent criticism. I do not mean Sainte-Beuve, for the work of that great curious restless brain is rather a part of history than of literature, the history of manners, memoirs, boudoir whispers; or the political-ethical-religious writing of Brunetière or the highly superior Extension Lectures of M. Faguet;⁶ I mean the ceaseless employment of criticism by men who are engaged in creative work. It is essential that each generation should reappraise everything for itself. Who, for instance, has a first-hand opinion of Shakespeare? Yet I have no doubt that much could be learned by a serious study of that semi-mythical figure.

* * * * *

I have seen the forces of death with Mr. Chesterton at their head upon a white horse.⁷ Mr. Pound, Mr. Joyce, and Mr. Lewis write living English; one does not realize the awfulness of death until one meets with the living language. M. de Bosschère writes a living French; and we can now probably also count as a living writer Miss Marianne Moore.

There is some rubbish and a quite reasonable amount of good stuff in *Others*, but Miss Moore is particularly interesting.⁸ Mr. Pound, reviewing the book in the March *Little Review*, couples Miss Moore with Miss Mina Loy, and points out the type of verse of these two writers, inheritors, perhaps unconsciously, of Laforgue: "logopoeia . . . a dance of the intelligence among words and ideas and modifications of words and ideas."⁹ Loy's "Effectual Marriage" is extremely good, and suggestive of de Bosschère (whom Miss Loy has probably not read).

While Miovanni thought alone in the dark
 Gina supposed that peeping she might see
 A round light shining where his mind was
 She never opened the door
 Fearing that this might blind her
 Or even
 That she should see Nothing at all.¹⁰

But Miss Loy has not here presented such a bulk of work as Miss Moore, and it is impossible to tell whether there is a positive *œuvre* or only a few successes. "Human Cylinders" is not so good; she needs the support of the image, even if only as the instant point of departure; in this poem she becomes abstract, and the word separates from the thing. Miss Moore is utterly intellectual, but not abstract; the word never parts from the feeling; her ideas, imageless, remain quite personal. Even in Laforgue, there are unassimilated fragments of metaphysics and, on the other hand, of sentiment floating about; I will not assert that Miss Moore is as interesting in herself as Laforgue, but the fusion of thought and feeling is perhaps more complete. She has an admirable sense of form:

I recall their magnificence, not now more magnificent
 Than it is dim. It is difficult to recall the ornament,
 Speech, and precise manner of what one might
 Call the minor acquaintances twenty
 Years back; but I shall not forget him—that Gilgamesh among
 The hairy carnivora—that cat with the
 Wedge-shaped, slate-grey marks on its forelegs and the resolute tail,¹¹

and a sort of Latin stateliness. I do not know what Miss Moore has read, but being an American has perhaps aided her to avoid the diet of nineteenth-century English poetry. (Mr. Henry James and Mr. Conrad were also foreigners.) I dare say Miss Moore has written much bad stuff in her time, but the poems in this anthology have the distinctive and un-Anglo-Saxon character of an *œuvre*; it is not one or two fortunate hits, but the whole body of work that counts.

* * * * *

A writer of literary criticism may be doing one of several things, or he may be doing them all; but he certainly ought to know which he is doing, and not

confuse them all under the name of criticism. Perhaps the essence of his work is bringing the art of the past to bear upon the present, making it relevant to the actual generation through his own temperament, which must itself interest us. Rémy de Gourmont and Laurent Tailhade are good critics; their temperaments are interesting, and they have a keen sense of actuality and a conscientious sense of fact.¹² A great deal of critical writing is aimless appreciation which is pernicious in so far as it encourages people to the lazy occupation of reading about works of art instead of forming their own opinions.

Two books from Dublin are not altogether useless, though the greater part of both need not have been written. Professor Rudmose-Brown writes somewhat like a professor who wants to write; we are told that one of his qualifications is a personal acquaintance with the Symbolists; but his essays on Stuart Merrill and Viélé-Griffin are the weakest in the book.¹³ Mr. Rudmose-Brown explains their philosophy and ideals, which in the case of men like Merrill and Griffin is not very exciting. We do not want to be told that Griffin's work is a hymn to life, nor do we need to hear that Mallarmé is alembicated and precious. There is an interesting letter of Merrill's on page 102, containing the sentence: "[W]hat we must fight with all our might and power of hatred is the religious and patriotic spirit." The essay on Verlaine does not add much. But there are two charming essays on the poets of the eighteenth century (Delille, Bertin, Parny) and the School of Lyons (Maurice de Scève) and there are some sensible remarks in the introduction (as on the "bourgeois spirit" of Diderot).¹⁴ Altogether, it is not a bad book.

Mr. Boyd deals with a select number of Irish figures, not all strictly literary. He does not quite convince us of the importance of Lord Dunsany or of John Eglinton, but he makes interesting two notables of provincial life, Standish O'Grady and Edward Dowden; *paralegomena* of Irish history, not studies in European literature.¹⁵ Decidedly the best thing in the book is the long study of Bernard Shaw, "Irish Protestant," which brings to light a good deal of evidence for Shaw's unpopularity in France. "On the subject of sex, Shaw is frankly and mediaevally intolerant . . . towards this sex question his attitude remains in its primitive simplicity, cutting him off from all sympathy with the whole tendency of modern life" [115-16]. "While it would be too much to assert that Shaw's work is literature . . ." [128]—such remarks are worth making. Of course the simplest thing to say is that Shaw's work has nothing to do with literature, either for good or evil.¹⁶

* * * * *

The chief moral to be drawn from these two books is that literary studies can be meritorious and readable, but that they must not be supposed to be literary criticism. Coleridge occasionally wrote good criticism; and Walter Pater, if he had had a better English style, and been more interested in what he wrote about, might have done something in the same way.¹⁷

T. S. APTERYX

NOTES

1. *Henry James: A Critical Study* (London: Martin Secker, 1913), 172.

2. The phrase “to disturb and alarm the people” (often “the public”) was frequently used in British parliamentary debates, as in Prime Minister W. E. Gladstone’s words of 11 May 1885: “What is so mischievous, the constant apprehension, the constant rumours, . . . which are calculated to disturb and alarm the people.” *Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates*, 3rd series, vol. 298 (London: Cornelius Buck, 1885), 265.

3. Vice Admiral Horatio Nelson (1758-1805) and Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington (1769-1852), are English heroes of the Napoleonic Wars. Nelson’s defeat of the combined French and Spanish navies in the Battle of Trafalgar (1805) established England as the world’s greatest sea power, and Wellington’s victory at Waterloo (1815) ended the reign of Napoleon. Newton established English dominance in science.

4. In *Siegfried*, the third opera of Richard Wagner’s *Der Ring des Nibelungen*, the giant Fafner turns into a dragon to guard better his treasure, the Ring. When in Act II, he is awakened by Alberich and Wotan, who warn him of approaching danger and urge him to surrender the ring, he dismisses them with “Lasst mich schlafen!” (Let me sleep!).

5. TSE reviewed the third Georgian anthology for the *Egoist* in Mar 1918 (679).

6. In 1909-10, TSE had studied Ferdinand Brunetière at Harvard in Irving Babbitt’s “Literary Criticism in France.” Brunetière was director of the *Revue des deux mondes* from 1893 and author of *Études critiques sur l’histoire de la littérature française* (1880-1925). In 1900, he returned to the Catholic Church, a move toward dogma reflected in *Discours de combat* (1903-07) and other works. In the syllabus for his 1916 Extension lectures on French literature, TSE stated that he would refer to “various works” of Brunetière and the critic and historian Émile Faguet (1847-1916) for exposition of contemporary ideas such as neo-Catholicism and neo-classicism (481). Faguet’s Extension lectures were collected and translated as *Initiation into Philosophy* (1912) and *Initiation into Literature* (1913).

7. An allusion to the four horsemen of the Apocalypse in Revelation 6:2-8, in which a conqueror on a white horse is followed by riders representing war, famine, and death.

8. This was the second of the four *Others* anthologies edited by the American poet Alfred Kreymborg (1883-1966), who included TSE’s “Preludes” and “Rhapsody of a Windy Night” [*sic*]. The American poet Marianne Moore (1887-1972), represented by twenty-two poems, had previously published in the *Egoist* and, with TSE, in the first collection of *Others* (1916), but had not yet published her own volume. She and TSE formed a close literary relationship in the 1920s through the *Dial*, which she edited from 1925 to 1929.

9. In his review, entitled “*Others*,” Pound praises Moore and London-born Mina Loy (1882-1966) as poets who have “succeeded in . . . producing something distinctly American in quality, not merely distinguishable as Americans by reason of current national faults”; he identifies them as being, “possibly in unconsciousness, among the followers of Jules Laforgue” and asserts that they are poets who “write logopœia.” TSE alters the final phrase of Pound’s definition of logopœia: *read*: “modification of ideas and characters.” *Little Review*, 5 (Mar 1918), 56-57.

10. Loy’s three contributions to the volume include “Effectual Marriage,” “Human Cylinders,” and “At the Door of the House.” The poems that make up her well-known “Love Songs” (1-34), later known as “Songs to Joannes,” had recently appeared in Kreymborg’s periodical *Others: A Magazine of the New Verse*, 3 (Apr 1917).

11. From “My Apish Cousins” (83).

12. The anarchist Laurent Tailhade (1854-1919) was the author of satirical poetry and polemical essays, including *Imbéciles et gredins* (1900), *Pages choisies. Vers et proses* (1912), and *Les Livres et les hommes* (1917).

13. T. B. Rudmose-Brown (1878-1942) was professor of romance languages at Trinity College, Dublin. The American-born poets Stuart Merrill (1863-1915) and Francis Viélé-Griffin (1864-1937) lived most of their lives in France and wrote in French as members of the Symbolist movement. TSE discussed Merrill’s translations of French prose poems, *Pastels in Prose* (1890), in “The Borderline of Prose” (537).

14. The translator and descriptive poet Jacques Delille (1738-1813) is best known for his *Les Jardins* (1782) and *Trois règnes de la nature* (1808); Antoine de Bertin (1752-90) for his *Les Amours* (1780); and Évariste de Parny (1753-1814) for his *Poésies érotiques* (1778) and a collection of prose poems, *Chansons madécasses* (1787). Maurice Scève (1501-64), known for his *Délie* (1544), was the leader of the Lyonnais poets who elaborated the Platonic and Petrarchan theory of spiritual love. Rudmose-Brown says of Diderot that he “adored the sentimentality and moral platitudes of Richardson and Lillo . . . Boucher and Fragonard revolted his bourgeois soul” (16).

15. Ernest A. Boyd (1887-1946), Irish-born journalist, critic, and British consular, was also the author of *Ireland’s Literary Renaissance* (1916), the first critical study of the Revival. The dramatist, poet, and fantasy writer Lord Dunsany (Edward Plunkett), and the essayist John Eglinton (1868-1961), were minor writers of the Irish Literary Revival. Boyd portrays the historian Standish James O’Grady (1846-1928), author of the *History of Ireland: Heroic Period* (1870-80), as a “Fenian Unionist” whose aristocratic ideals were often at odds with the Revival, and Edward Dowden (1843-1913), professor of English and Shakespearean scholar at Trinity College, Dublin, as an Anglophone Irishman who remained a disinterested observer of the Revival.

16. TSE had recently lectured on the socialist activist and satirical dramatist George Bernard Shaw (1856-1950) in his 1917 Extension course on Modern English Literature, focusing on his “earlier phase” in discussing Irish and English writers of the 1890s (591).

17. TSE had also lectured on Pater in his Extension course, describing him as the “pure aesthete” and focusing on the “elaborateness” of his style and his “gospel of life” (590).

Unsigned reviews of poetry by Ford Madox Hueffer,
Susan Miles, Lancelot Hogben, and Pamela Glenconner¹

The Egoist, 5 (May 1918) 75

On Heaven and Poems Written on Active Service, by Ford Madox Hueffer.
London: John Lane, 1918. Pp. 128.

The fact that “On Heaven” is obtainable in a book should not escape mention; we can now throw away the number of *Poetry* for July 1914.² The rest of the book will not much “add to the author’s reputation.”

Dunch, by Susan Miles. Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 1918. Pp. 72.³

Dunch really deserves the quite favourable reviews which it has had from the majority of the side-whiskered weeklies. Miss (or Mrs.) Miles is a genre writer, i.e. the subject has contributed as much as the writer, and she knows her subject well. Her subject is Cranford size and shape, but the world has changed.⁴ Her presentation of the village is more a reaction than pure observation, but a vigorous and entertaining reaction. There are possibilities of a larger size satire than Minnie Rolls and the curates and imbeciles in such lines as these which I have not seen quoted by the reviewers:

I want to shout the psalms very loud indeed . . .
I want to tell the brethren
What Jesus has done for me.
And I want to tell it out among the heathen.
I want to be a minister in the Church of Christ Jesus.
I want to baptise His babies,
And teach His little ones. . . .⁵

Exiles of the Snow, and Other Poems, by Lancelot Hogben. London: A. C. Fifield, 1918. Pp. 62.⁶

The dedication “to my comrades of the Stepney Herald League” does not arouse confidence; the form is reminiscent and the content mostly

meditative; but there is a simple sincerity which strikes out a good line here and there (“When I am old and quite worn out”)⁷ and which would stand the author in good stead if he would read the right things and work hard.

The Sayings of the Children. Written down by their mother, Pamela Glenconner. Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 1918. Pp. 138.⁸

The Times says: “With little graphic touches and light suggestions of the children’s unconscious humour she gives these sayings something of their first freshness, and here and there opens a dizzy glimpse into the shining fairy world of the childish mind.”⁹ To this account, there is nothing to add, except, why did the *Times* devote only one column to this book?

Per Amica Silentia Lunae, by W. B. Yeats. London: Macmillan, 1918.

Notice later.¹⁰

NOTES

1. “Unsigned, but the review of *Dunch* is by T. S. Eliot, and the others are almost certainly by him” (Gallup 202).

2. Hueffer says in the preface that when “On Heaven” appeared in *Poetry* in June (not July) 1914, he thought it “too sloppy” and was determined to suppress it but has now decided to “resuscitate the poem” in deference to “the wishes of certain readers of Poetry, and . . . the conviction—or it might be more modest to say, the hope!—that it will bring comfort to the hearts of some of my comrades and some of the womenfolk of my comrades” (6-7).

3. Susan Miles (pseudonym of Ursula Roberts, 1888-1975), poet, novelist, suffragette. *Dunch*, her first volume, appeared under the sign of Blackwell’s “Adventurers All: A Series of Young Poets Unknown to Fame.”

4. Elizabeth Gaskell’s novel *Cranford* (1853) includes counterparts of Miles’s portrayal of middle-class characters such as “Minnie Rolls, C. C. H. F.” in the village of Dunch.

5. From “Ecce Deus Fortior Me” (58).

6. *Exiles of Snow* was the only volume of verse published by social biologist and mathematician Lancelot Hogben (1895-1975), a 1916 Cambridge graduate who had been imprisoned for several months as a conscientious objector. At the time of this review, he was associated with the left-wing, antiwar Stepney Herald League and lecturing to workers at the Marxist Plebs’ League.

7. Opening line of “At the Last” (49).

8. Pamela Wyndham, Lady Glenconner (1871-1928), was a writer of children’s books.

9. The volume was reviewed by Frederick Thomas Dalton, assistant editor of *TLS*, under the title “The Mind of a Child” in the *TLS*, 845 (28 Mar 1918), 150.

10. TSE’s review of Yeats’s book was postponed until the June/July issue of the *Egoist* (724-25).

Contemporanea

A review, in part, of *Tarr*, by P. Wyndham Lewis

London: The Egoist Ltd. 1918. Pp. xii + 320.¹

The People's Palace, by Sacheverell Sitwell

Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 1918. Pp. 52.

The Egoist, 5 (June / July 1918), 84–85

The February number of the *Little Review* anthology of modern French poets beginning with Laforgue, Corbière, and Rimbaud, has made sufficient impression to enforce some comment by the literary press in England and America.² It would seem from two of these notices that the struggle for civilization has not yet perceptibly affected the Anglo-Saxon point of view. Neither the *New Age* nor *Poetry* appears particularly pleased at having French verse called to its attention. *The Egoist*, having always insisted upon the importance of crossbreeding in poetry, and having always welcomed any writer who showed signs of international consciousness, is interested in this issue, and in the state of mind of the critics. The observer in *Poetry* is the more naïve of the two, and the less certain of his own opinions in French literature.³ He appears to have studied at the graduate school of Chicago University, as he remarks that Rimbaud's "Chercheuses de Poux" is a "beautiful adventure in child psychology" and identifies Corbière's "Rhapsode Foraine" as an exploration "of folk-religion."⁴ He notes further that poetry in French and English seems "in general" to have never been farther apart than now, and finds Corbière, Laforgue, Rimbaud, Gourmont, Régnier, Verhaeren, Tailhade, Jammes, Moréas, Spire, Vildrac, Romain a "characteristically random list."⁵ The reviewer of the *New Age* is more positive.⁶ He concludes that as "so good a French scholar as Mr. Pound" cannot interest himself in "the A B C of French culture" (the mute "e" in verse), America's affairs of culture will need to be conducted on a unilingual basis: if we cannot grow the grape, let us not import the wine.

There are two distinct points. One is the merit of the anthology as a representation of French poetry since the 'seventies. There are one or two contemporaries—perhaps Henri Franck—who might have been included;

there might have been a little more Corbière; there is one side of Rimbaud not illustrated. I cannot think of any more drastic criticism than this. Laforgue, a difficult writer to select from, is very well presented. I know of only the van Bever and Léautaud collection in two volumes; and this is too big, too indiscriminate, and does not display the most important of the poets so adequately as the *Little Review*.⁷ The latter does give in sixty pages the essentials of modern French verse for Anglo-Saxons.

The other point is the application of the anthology. It is not to be expected that any very large public in either England or America will ever take the trouble to read and understand verse in any other modern language. But it is necessary that any one who is writing or seriously criticizing indigenous verse should know the French. We insist in the face of a hostile majority that reading, writing, and ciphering does not complete the education of a poet. The analogy to science is close. A poet, like a scientist, is contributing toward the organic development of culture: it is just as absurd for him not to know the work of his predecessors or of men writing in other languages as it would be for a biologist to be ignorant of Mendel or de Vries. It is exactly as wasteful for a poet to do what has been done already, as for a biologist to rediscover Mendel's discoveries. The French poets in question have made "discoveries" in verse of which we cannot afford to be ignorant, discoveries which are not merely a concern for French syntax. To remain with Wordsworth is equivalent to ignoring the whole of science subsequent to Erasmus Darwin.⁸

* * * * *

The Englishman coddles his conception of the Inspired Bard: prose is a humbler vehicle. Mr. Joyce ought to disturb this view of prose. This brings on again the critic of the *New Age*, who objects to the "cleverness" of Joyce and Lewis.⁹ Mr. Joyce can wait his turn until *Ulysses* (immeasurably an advance upon the *Portrait*) appears as a book;¹⁰ as *Tarr* (after inevitable delays) is finally ready for the public, the case of Mr. Lewis is more urgent. We shall devote more space in the next issue to a study of Mr. Lewis's prose.¹¹ Both of these writers, and they are utterly different from each other, have been sensitive to foreign influence. This is disturbing; we can enjoy a borrowed ornament or two, but we usually object to any writer who has actually assimilated foreign influence, grown his lion-skin, become suspect in the fold. The *New Age* is "mystified, bewildered, repelled." That is quite intelligible. *Ulysses* is volatile and heady, *Tarr* thick and suety, clogging the

weak intestine. Both are terrifying. That is the test of a new work of art. When a work of art no longer terrifies us, we may know that we were mistaken, or that our senses are dulled: we ought still to find *Othello* or *Lear* frightful. But this attractive terror repels the majority of men; they seek the sense of ease which the sensitive man avoids, and only when they find it do they call anything "beautiful." Not vulgarity or salacity much disturbs the ordinary reader, and the ordinary "advanced" novel does not shake his flimsy trapeze. *Tarr* is a commentary upon a part of modern civilization: now it is like our civilization criticized, our acrobatics animadverted upon adversely, by an orang-outang of genius, Tarzan of the Apes.¹²

* * * * *

Mr. Sacheverell Sitwell's book *vient de paraître*, enveloped in the pleasant chi-chi of Blackwell's book-factory. Here is whatever appeared in *Wheels II*, and a good deal more.¹³ What is quite certain is that one can abstract from one's feeling of liking or disliking this verse, and assert positively that there is something here, and quite positive. We are seldom so sure of a young poet's determination to follow his own road. This one is not a blind follower or visibly a conscious imitator of anybody. Images hang on his verse in a heavy swarm, but he invents his own clichés, does not borrow them, and does not counterfeit any emotion that he does not feel. On the contrary, there is a distinguished aridity; and the extraordinary riot of imagery is, I think, an intellectual pleasure with him. The defence for his imagination is that he does, in the "Mayor of Murcia," "Barrel-Organs," [and] to a slightly less degree in "Outskirts," create his own world, and when this happens, there is no more to be said. The danger of the method is that it is liable to split up or obscure the original motive. The effect, accordingly, is sometimes that of the crowdedness of an Odle drawing, where there is no singleness of aim, or at any rate of execution.¹⁴ The detail, even infinite, of some masters never forgets the idea. I notice this as a possible source of danger because at the end I have a persistent feeling that flutes, bells, wind and water, and certain other stage properties have occurred more than once. The *donnée*, at least in the poems mentioned, is, we must repeat, indubitably there; but it sometimes breaks into a shower of sparks instead of leaving a single trail of fire.

I take the "Feathered Hat" as representative of Mr. Sitwell's motive; the other poems show admirable extension and development, but also a slight distraction. Probably only after long detours will the author regain the crystalline unity of this poem. That would be a natural progress; the

profession of poetry is fatiguing; it is in the inevitable dry times that work counts when a writer must either master a style or be mastered by a mannerism. We have attributed more to Mr. Sitwell than to any poet of quite his generation; we require of him only ten years of toil.

T. S. ELIOT

NOTES

1. *Tarr* was published in three different versions: an abridged serialization in the *Egoist* from Apr 1916 to Nov 1917, an American edition from Knopf in June 1918, and the English edition here reviewed.

2. In "A Study in French Poets," Pound included quotations, with brief headnotes, of fourteen French poets, including Laforgue, Corbière, Rimbaud, and others mentioned below. *Little Review*, 4 (Feb 1918), 3-61.

3. S. W., "Our Contemporaries / A Modern French Anthology," *Poetry*, 12 (Apr 1918), 54-55.

4. Of "Les Chercheuses de poux" ["The Seekers of Lice"], Pound wrote: "Many readers will be unable to 'see over' the subject matter and consider the virtues of the style, but we are, let us hope, serious people" (4). TSE, who owned Corbière's *Les Amours jaunes* (Paris: Albert Messein, 1912), included two lines from "La Rapsode foraine et le Pardon de Sainte-Anne" (1873) [The Traveling Minstrels and the Pardon of Saint Anne] as a deleted epigraph for "Sweeney Erect" ("Voici ton cierge / C'est deux livres qu'il a coûté..." *IMH* 356). In "Modern Tendencies in Poetry" (1920), he described the "Rhapsode foraine," which portrays an assemblage of the crippled and diseased at a religious festival in Brittany, as being "as substantial in its way as Villon" (2.217).

5. Henri de Régnier (1864-1936); Émile Verhaeren (1855-1916); Francis Jammes (1868-1938); Jean Moréas (1856-1910); André Spire (1868-1966). The reviewer omits from Pound's list the American-born French poets Stuart Merrill and Francis Viéle-Griffin.

6. R. H. C. [A. R. Orage], "Readers and Writers," *New Age*, 23 (6 June 1918), 89.

7. Adolphe van Bever (1871-1925) and Paul Léautaud (1872-1956) were co-editors of the anthology *Poètes d'aujourd'hui, 1880-1900: Morceaux choisis* (1900).

8. The English physician and botanist Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802), known for his two-volume *Zoonomia; or The Laws of Organic Life* (1794-96), anticipated the theory of evolution formulated by his grandson, Charles Darwin, in *On the Origin of Species* (1859).

9. In addition to criticizing Pound's suggested list of French poets, Orage focused on others in the "coterie" of the *Little Review*: "They grow cleverer and cleverer, and . . . more and more unintelligible to the public—including myself. I am staggered by the cleverness of such a writer as Mr. Wyndham Lewis; and a little more so by the cleverness of Mr. James Joyce. But in the case of both of them, I find myself growing more and more annoyingly mystified, bewildered, and repelled" (89).

10. *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, serialized in the *Egoist* in 1914-15, had appeared in 1916; *Ulysses* was currently being serialized in the *Little Review* and would be published as a book in 1922.

11. TSE's extended discussion of *Tarr* appeared in the *Egoist* of Sept 1918 (745).

12. *Tarzan of the Apes* (1914) was a popular novel by Edgar Rice Burroughs.

13. *vient de paraître*: has just been published. In the *Egoist*, Mar 1918, TSE discussed Sitwell's poems in *Wheels: A Second Cycle*.

14. Alan Elsdon Odle (1888-1948), illustrator, graphic artist, and art editor of *The Gypsy* (1915-16), made sketches in the styles of William Hogarth and Aubrey Beardsley, with a penchant for grotesquerie.

Unsigned reviews of poetry and prose by James Joyce, Clive Bell, T. Sturge Moore, and William Butler Yeats¹

The Egoist, 5 (June/July 1918) 87

Chamber Music, by James Joyce. London: Elkin Mathews, 1918.²

This is a second edition, first published in 1907. This verse is good, very good; though it never would have excited much attention but for Joyce's prose, still it would in any case have worn well. We infer from it that Mr. Joyce is probably something of a musician; it is lyric verse, and good lyric verse is very rare. It will be called "fragile," but is substantial, with a great deal of thought beneath fine workmanship.

O bend no more in revery
When he at eventide is calling,
Nor muse: who may this singer be—
* * * *

They are sadder than all tears;
Their lives ascend as a continual sigh.
Proudly answer to their tears:
As they deny, deny.³

Pot-Boilers, by Clive Bell. London: Chatto and Windus, 1918. Pp. viii
+260.⁴

Mr. Clive Bell, lingering between two worlds, one dead, is in some respects the Matthew Arnold of his time. He is not precisely a critic, but the Sunday afternoon preacher to a small and select public, smaller and more select than Arnold's. He loves Truth, certainly, and according to his own admission, but his task is the dispensing of it to an audience of whose approval he is sure beforehand. How else could he say "our three best living novelists—Hardy, Conrad, and Virginia Woolf" [11]—or "Korin . . . is about as empty as Velasquez and more brilliant than Frans Hals" [140]? This is not criticism. The book is full of intelligent remarks; it has been patently cut by the *Times*; Mr. Bell is right with the rightness of a period, a group, despises

Gothic, admires Byzantine, Persian, Chinese (but only the best); he is the *boutonnière* of post-1900 culture. He is interested in the people one is interested in, from Matisse to the last show at the Mansard Gallery.⁵ He is erudite, intelligent, urbane, knows Peacock, Trelawny, and everybody's letters. He makes points (but why even sharpen a pencil to destroy Mr. Arnold Bennett's critical pretensions!)⁶ In his comments on the War and Art, he delivers what many of us feel. But from anyone so superior as Mr. Bell, we should like something more *super*: icy inviolability, or violent fury. Perhaps these defects mark the virtue of the book as a chronicle, a document; Mr. Bell will survive not as an individual, but as the representative of a little world of 1914.

The Little School, by T. Sturge Moore.
London: Grant Richards, 1917. Pp. 63.⁷

It is a great compliment to Mr. Sturge Moore to say that even when he writes semi-children's verse he can be pleasing. In this usually distressing genre, he is more agreeable, at least to an adult, than Stevenson. He has taste and the technique to make triviality tolerable. "Plans for a Midnight Picnic" is pretty hard to swallow, but "A Dream" is altogether charming.

The body, when a man is dead,
Like an empty dress lies on the bed;
But that, which in his heart said "I,"
Travels away a butterfly.

Still, one is cheered at the end to find the always fresh and perfect "Rowers' Chant." There is something Georgian about Mr. Moore, but how superior to Georgiana is his workmanship!

Per Amica Silentia Lunae, by William Butler Yeats.
London: Macmillan, 1918. Pp. vi + 95.

It is always a pleasure to have Mr. Yeats talking, even when we cannot follow his argument through all its mazes. I think that I can understand the first part of the book, called *Anima Hominis*, with its theory of the Mask, the Daimon, the Anti-Self; in the second part, *Anima Mundi*, I am quite lost, or Mr. Yeats is lost to me, in some delicious soft mist as that in which Venus enwrap her son.⁸ One is never weary of the voice, though the accents are

strange; and as there is no one else living whom one would endure on the subject of gnomes, hobgoblins, and astral bodies, we infer some very potent personal charm of Mr. Yeats's.

Some years ago I began to believe that our culture, with its doctrine of sincerity and self-realisation, made us gentle and passive, and that the Middle Ages and the Renaissance were right to found theirs upon the imitation of Christ or of some classic hero. [26]

Wordsworth . . . is so often flat and heavy partly because his moral sense, being a discipline he had not created, a mere obedience, has no theatrical element. This increases his popularity with the better kind of journalists and politicians who have written books. [28]

It is not permitted to a man, who takes up pen or chisel, to seek originality, for passion is his only business. [36]

Such sentences as these, which I can understand, are wholly delightful.⁹

NOTES

1. "Unsigned, but almost certainly by T. S. Eliot" (Gallup 202).
2. *Chamber Music* is unpaginated, with poems numbered I-XXXVI.
3. From the second stanza (a sestet) of poem IV (*read*: "who may this singer be / Whose song about my heart is falling?"); and the second stanza of XIX, respectively.
4. The formalist art critic Clive Bell (1881-1964), a founder with Roger Fry of the Omega Workshops in 1913 and author of *Art* (1914), was a member of the Bloomsbury group of writers and artists; he was married to Vanessa Stephen, the sister of Virginia Woolf.
5. Bell had assisted Roger Fry in the first Post-Impressionist exhibition (1910) and again in the second (1912), which featured the work of Fauvist painter Henri Matisse (1869-1954) among other French painters. Bell includes his review of Fry's 1917 exhibition of English and French painters at Ambrose Heal's new Mansard Gallery.
6. Bell includes reviews of the plays of Thomas Love Peacock (1785-1866) and the letters of Edward J. Trelawny (1792-1881), James Boswell, and Thomas Carlyle. In his foreword, Bell takes issue with the novelist Arnold Bennett (1867-1931) focusing on his *Books and Persons: Being Comments on a Past Epoch 1908-1911* (1917).
7. This volume by English poet and artist T. Sturge Moore (1870-1944) was preceded by a volume of children's verse with a similar title, *The Little School: A Posy of Rhymes* (1905).
8. In Book I of Virgil's *Aeneid*, Venus cloaks her son Aeneas and his trusted friend Achates in a fog to prevent discovery on their journey to Carthage and Queen Dido's palace.
9. TSE's review of Alec Waugh's *Resentment* was printed by mistake with these reviews, thereby displacing it from the context of the composite review for which it was written. It was reprinted with a corrective note from the editor in the next issue (733).

A review of *The World as Imagination* (Series I),
by Edward Douglas Fawcett

London: Macmillan, 1916. Pp. xlii + 623.¹

The International Journal of Ethics, 28 (July 1918), 572

The essential parts of the book reveal themselves as Part I, Chapter II, and Part II, Chapter I. Here the creative imagination is disclosed. Imagination is the “primeval reality, itself unresolved, into which all else can be resolved” (7); and Mr. Fawcett persuades us toward this reality by examining the rôle of imagination in scientific hypothesis. An hypothesis advanced in explanation of natural phenomena is an “imaginal makeshift for sensible experience” (26). A physical hypothesis has meaning for us only if we can supply in imagination “all the so-called secondary qualities . . . which are present in *experienced* nature but absent from the *conceptual* or mechanical-substitute” [31]. Here “makeshift” appears to be used in the Bergsonian rather than the pragmatist sense. The imagining is a mental “substitute-fact”: it is “true” if it is sufficiently like the reality in nature. But if the imagining is to be *like*, it must be of similar nature, and we therefore conclude that ultimate reality is “imaginal.” But Mr. Fawcett adds “*presupposing, of course* (italics mine), acceptance of the main contention of this essay” (27).

Here the author’s idealistic bias shows itself; and while he criticises the orthodox philosophy severely, and on the whole justly, I am not sure that he does not stick closer by it than he thinks. His absolutist tendency is most apparent in connection with the problem of evil. “Evils are real” (569); and some space is devoted to a protest against explaining them away. But evil belongs only to the time-process: “There can be no evil in the Cosmic Imagination considered apart from creative episodes” (584). Evil is born with a “change,” aptly described as the “Fall.” “The victimiser and the victims are the same reality . . . This is a tremendous truth” (587). Tremendous, but yet a household word. It is our old acquaintance, the Red Slayer, *la plaie et le couteau*.²

If, however, one can accept imagination as a term of ultimate meaning, apart from contexts, then one can accept Mr. Fawcett’s essay as a highly important work; and those who do not so accept it must yet admit that the

thesis is elaborated with great ingenuity and care, and that many penetrating criticisms and observations have been scattered by the way. We must be grateful to Mr. Fawcett also for his outspoken denial of personality to the cosmic imagination.

T. STEARNS ELIOT

NOTES

1. The British author Edward Douglas Fawcett (1866-1960), best known for adventure novels such as *Swallowed by an Earthquake* (1894), extended his defense of the imagination in *Divine Imagining* (1921).

2. TSE alludes to the opening stanza of "Brahma": "If the red slayer think he slays, / Or if the slain think he is slain, / They know not well the subtle ways / I keep, and pass, and turn again" by Emerson; and to the penultimate stanza of "L'Héautontimorouménos": "Je suis la plaie et le couteau!" (I am the wound and the knife!) by Charles Baudelaire (1821-67). In one of *The Waste Land* manuscript poems, TSE included his own version of the ancient paradox: "I am the husband and the wife / And the victim and the sacrificial knife / I am the fire, and the butter also." Valerie Eliot notes that these lines were "influenced by *The Bhagavad-Gitā* (with perhaps a nod to Emerson's 'Brahma')" (*WLF* III, 130).

New Philosophers

An unsigned review of *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*, by J. S. Mackenzie

London: George Allen and Unwin, 1917. Pp. 487.

The Self and Nature, by DeWitt H. Parker

Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP; London: Humphrey Milford, 1917. Pp. ix + 316.

Locke's Theory of Knowledge, by James Gibson

Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1917. Pp. xiv + 338.¹

The New Statesman, 11 (13 July 1918) 296-97

The philosophical market does not at the present time manifest much liveliness. It is, indeed, very dull, if we compare it with the active first decade or first twelve years of the century. Then appeared the most important writings of Mr. Russell and M. Bergson, the vogue of William James was at its height, and the New Realists in America were dusting the arena under the imperial and slightly amused gaze of Mr. Santayana.² With the exception of a book or two by Professor Dewey, Mr. Russell's late volume of reprinted essays, and possibly Professor Holt's *Freudian Wish*, there have been no notable productions during the last few years;³ especially in the States, Realists and Pragmatists are engrossed in social and political questions—League of Nations, International Ethics, etc. The three books listed above, however, are all pure philosophy, of three different types. The third is a very competent work of scholarship, a valuable aid to the study of John Locke; the two others are essays in constructive philosophy, and what might be called, in the language of painters, first-rate school-work. It is no disparagement of these books of Professor Mackenzie and Professor Parker to say that their chief interest is in the reflection on current tendencies which they provoke, rather than in any very original intuitions or methods. Mr. Parker, who is Professor at the University of Michigan, belongs evidently to the younger generation. He has, that is to say, been a pupil of the New

Realists at Harvard at the moment when their philosophy still wore the morning dew, and the degree of purity in which he transmits their impulse may be taken as a measure of its potency. In America, this New Realism has counted, and probably will have counted for a good deal in the history of general ideas; for in America, as in Germany, the mental agitations of philosophers in universities largely supply the place of the less official activity of intellectual London or Paris. That a school of philosophy so much like materialism should prosper is important in America; that it should have cast out the older theological Idealism is miraculous. The Realists have won their victory simply by concentrating on scientific methods, leaving the implications as to theology still implicit. They have not wholly extirpated theology from philosophy; they have disturbed it and left it to take root again as best it can.⁴

Professor Parker, like the original Realists, has experienced the influence of Santayana and James; perhaps the former even more than the latter. His book is free from both the merits and defects typical of Messrs. Perry, Holt and the other Realists.⁵ It is pleasanter reading. It is a book which non-philosophers can read with interest and even approval. The writer has come by philosophy to conclusions which most thinking people have absorbed from the atmosphere.

Thus the dependence of the mind on the body has been shown to be complete. The body is the soul's expression, its indispensable tool, without which it is not. [95]

We perceive our need of ideas, our incapacity to dispense with them. [206]

The time is past for men to ask of either philosophy or religion a guarantee of the satisfaction of any of their mundane personal interests. [299]

Viewed dispassionately, the life of man is no different, from the aspect of survival, than (*sic*) that of a plant. [301]

However lofty be nature's aims . . . still, they are not ours. [311]

The queen of the sciences has become very modest of our days; and much more modest in the charming and intelligent pages of Mr. Parker than in those of his Realistic forbears.

Professor Mackenzie, of Cardiff, has also acknowledged indebtedness to the Realists; an indication that Idealism has somewhat shifted its ground. His book is founded on certain of his able articles in *Mind*, and if the book

is a little disappointing, this is because we expect a constructive advance upon the articles, which we do not find. He has presented the elements, but not assembled them. Certainly he is extremely well-informed on contemporary philosophy in all countries; and this volume is accordingly at least a most useful text-book on current problems. Mr. Mackenzie gives, for instance, a good introduction to the subjects of Value and Order and the "Theory of Objects": subjects manipulated by such writers as Driesch, Messer, Meinong, Husserl, Orestano and Ehrenfels.⁶ The lack of co-ordination, of any clear conclusions from his various interesting chapters, may be simply an indication of the present uncertainty of Absolute Idealism. One finds no sharp assertion of issues; the book is deficient in motive. It is, however, a compliment to the author's ideas to say that the attention which he devotes to other people's theories is tantalising; and on the other hand we should like to know, as we do not, exactly how the author stands with regard to the older Idealisms of Bradley and Bosanquet. The greatest fault of the book is modesty; and here it is not Philosophy who is over-modest, but the author. One is simply bewildered by his reserves:

According to the view that has been so far developed . . . these are matters that I do not pretend here to determine. . . . That at least is the view to which our general considerations appear to lead us. . . . we are not here dealing with doctrines that can be scientifically established. . . . It certainly appears that some such view as that now indicated. . . . without any very dogmatic assurance. . . . [444, 445, 449, 455, 452]

One wishes for a little more dogmatic assurance. In treating the problem of Evil (see 382 ff.) Professor Mackenzie hardly goes farther than to put forward that "It is pretty generally recognized that there is a soul of goodness in things evil" [387]. But is it generally recognised? It is often denied in practice, and even if generally accepted, it may still be altogether a mistake. Thus Mr. Mackenzie seems to go too far in assent to received ideas, and not far enough in the assertion of his own. If he would rewrite his book in a mind of arrogant contemptuousness for other philosophers, affirming his conclusions even without defending them, this would be an excellent essay; the writer is provided with both learning and ideas. But are perhaps the hesitation, the qualification, the lack of issues clearly and antagonistically put, the diffidence even, a sign of a crepuscular spirit in philosophy?

The book of Professor Gibson is in its own way the most valuable of the lot; it is a definite "contribution" to Locke bibliography. To discuss it

adequately would involve a thorough examination of Locke's theory, in which, as the commentator in this book points out, the genesis of ideas is only a subordinate problem.⁷

NOTES

1. On 2 June, TSE wrote to his mother that he "wrote a review today of three philosophy books for the *New Statesman*" (L1 265). J. S. Mackenzie (1860-1935) was emeritus professor of logic and philosophy at University College, Cardiff; DeWitt H. Parker (1855-1949), assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan; and James Gibson (1864-1943), professor of logic and philosophy at University College, North Wales.

2. The New Realists—E. B. Holt, Ralph Barton Perry, and four other American philosophers—were the contributors to *The New Realism* (1912). Influenced by Russell, they attempted to overcome the "subjectivism" in contemporary philosophy, including James's pragmatism, Bergson's vitalism, and Royce's idealism. TSE's copy of *The New Realism*, signed "T. S. Eliot," has a few marginal annotations.

Santayana, author of *The Life of Reason* (1905-06), combined scientific materialism with Platonism. As a materialist, he initially seemed compatible with the New Realists; as an idealist, however, he retained a dualistic attachment to spirit. When Holt, in the introduction to *The New Realism*, attacked dualism, Santayana replied in *Winds of Doctrine: Studies in Contemporary Opinion* (New York: Scribner's, 1913): "No one need be afraid . . . that his fate is sealed because some young prig may call him a dualist; the pint would call the quart a dualist, if you tried to pour the quart into him" (211). TSE had taken two undergraduate courses with Santayana—History of Modern Philosophy in 1908 and Philosophy of History in 1909. On 18 Oct 1956, he wrote to Anne C. Bolgan that "I only liked those of his writings which are on the borderland of literary criticism, such as *Three Philosophical Poets*. Otherwise I thought him a somewhat theatrical figure and I did not like him personally"; and on 12 Oct 1961, he wrote to William B. Goodman that "I thought the man rather a poseur, who chose to look down upon New Englanders as provincial Protestants. Most of his early books, THE LIFE OF REASON, seem to me very dull."

3. John Dewey (1859-1952), professor of philosophy at Columbia University, was with James one of the pioneers of Pragmatism. His *Essays in Experimental Logic* appeared in 1916, Holt's *The Freudian Wish and its Place in Ethics* in 1915, and Russell's *Mysticism and Logic*, recently reviewed by TSE, in 1918 (690).

4. In "Views and Reviews" (*New English Weekly*, 6 June 1935), TSE recalled that the New Realists "made a considerable stir in . . . American universities" (151). The authors "were animated by a missionary zeal against the Hegelian Idealism which was the orthodox doctrine of the philosophical departments . . . and which had begun to turn manifestly mouldy. . . . the Six Realists were un-Teutonised, and on the whole anti-religious . . . ; they were aesthetically, even gloomily, scientific; and they professed considerable respect for Mr. Bertrand Russell and his Cambridge friends."

5. Ralph Barton Perry (1876-1957), professor of philosophy at Harvard, contributed "A Realistic Theory of Independence" to *The New Realism*. TSE took Perry's course in ethics in the spring of 1914 and annotated Perry's essay in his copy of *The New Realism*.

6. In an elaborate consideration of "Order . . . in the *Ordnungslehre*," Hans Driesch (1867-1941) "treats it as an independent subject, distinguishable from Logic, Theory of Knowledge, and

Metaphysics; but perhaps not distinguishable from the *Gegenstandstheorie* of Professor Meinong” (Mackenzie 107). TSE had discussed Meinong’s *Über Gegenstandstheorie* in his dissertation (313 ff.). On 18 Oct 1956, he wrote to the German philosopher Hans Galinsky that among the influences missing in Galinsky’s *Deutschland in der Sicht von D. H. Lawrence und T. S. Eliot* “is that of Alexis von Meinong . . . I am surprised that Meinong is so little mentioned now. I did also at about that period devote a good deal of attention to Husserl’s *Logische Untersuchungen*, but I should hardly include Husserl amongst the influences.” His lightly marked copy of the *Logische* of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), read in the summer and fall of 1914 (*LI* 49, 65) and inscribed “T. S. Eliot / Marburg 1914,” is in the London Library. TSE drew on Messer’s *Psychologie* (1914) in his dissertation. The Austrian psychologist Christian von Ehrenfels (1859-1932), considered as “too psychological” by Mackenzie (294), deals with the theory of value in *System der Werttheorie* (1897). The Italian thinker Francesco Orestano (1873-1945) also dealt with value.

7. Of Locke’s theory of the genesis of ideas in the *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Gibson says: “Great as was the importance which he attached to his theory upon this subject, it played only a subordinate part in the scheme of the *Essay* as he designed it; and any attempt to make it central alters entirely the perspective of the whole” (1-2).

Reviews of Contemporary Poetry

In the Valley of Vision: Poems Written in Time of War,

by Geoffrey Faber, Captain

Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 1918. Pp. viii + 65.

Sonnets and Poems, by Eleanor Farjeon

Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 1918. Pp. 49.

—*Esques*, by E. F. A. Geach and D. E. A. Wallace

Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 1918. Pp. 39.

Resentment: Poems, by Alec Waugh

London: Grant Richards, 1918. Pp. 62.

The Egoist, 5 (Aug 1918) 99

Miss Farjeon writes sonnets with Rossettian echoes, but looser in form, more Mrs. Browning.¹ She is most agreeable in the lighter Christina style:

Dying leaf and dead leaf,
Yellow leaf and red leaf
And white-backed beam,
Lay along the woodland road
As quiet as a dream.²

The authors of —*Esques* trickle down a fine broad page in a pantoum, a roundel, a villanelle, occasionally pagan, mode of thirty years ago:³

Why then, O foolish Christ,
Didst thou keep tryst
With maudlin harlots wan
With glad things gone?⁴

To which the obvious answer is, Why did you? Young poets ought to be made to be cheaply printed; such sumptuous pages deceive many innocent critics.⁵

Captain Faber did not observe very much of importance *In the Valley of Vision*,⁶ but he has a fine heroic note, and should apply to Mr. St. L. Strachey:⁷

Sublime! Oh, 'tis the very word of the age.⁸

Mr. Waugh is more modern, and would appear to have been influenced by some older person who admired Rupert Brooke.⁹ He is stark realism:

Route march . . . field day . . . church parade . . .

Wondering would it ever end,

Wondering what the hell it meant.

Picking girls up in the street

Rather than face the empty tent.¹⁰

Mr. Waugh is said to be very young, and to have written a novel. That is a bad beginning, but something might be made of him.¹¹

In retrospect, I believe Miss Farjeon is the least insupportable of this lot.

[The above note on Mr. Waugh, written as one of this set of four, was printed by mistake in the June-July issue of *The Egoist*, with the result that the first and last sentences, taken out of their intended context, become nonsense.—Editor.]

T. S. E.

NOTES

1. Eleanor Farjeon (1881-1965), poet and author of children's stories and plays, had previously published *Pan-Worship and Other Poems* (1908) and *The Soul of Kol Nikon* (1914). Her *Sonnets and Poems* and Geoffrey Faber's *In the Valley of Vision* were the first two volumes in Blackwell's "Initiates Series of Poetry by Proved Hands." E. B. Browning, whose poetry included *Sonnets from the Portuguese* (1850), and Christina Rossetti (1830-94), known for *Goblin Market* (1862) and for religious poetry, were among Farjeon's models.

2. From "Myfanwy among the Leaves" (30).

3. E. F. A. Geach (1896-1951) was the editor of *Oxford Poetry* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1918). D. E. A. Wallace (1897-1989) was a member of the Somerville College (Oxford) group of women writers that included Dorothy L. Sayers and Vera Brittain. —*esques*: imitations of various styles.

4. From "Dionysia" (32).

5. The extravagant, large-paper volume in black wrappers with white title label was printed for Blackwell on Basingwerk parchment at a private press (Vincent Works, Oxford).

6. The poet Geoffrey Faber (1889-1961), then a captain in the London regiment (Post Office Rifles) serving in France and Belgium, had published a previous volume of verse during the war, *Interflow* (1915). After the war, he was elected to a fellowship at All Souls, Oxford. With his

colleague Maurice Gwyer, he founded in 1925 the publishing firm of Faber & Gwyer Ltd., which TSE joined later that year as a member of the board.

7. John St. Loe Strachey (1860-1927), assistant editor of the *Spectator* from 1886 and editor from 1898, was known for his literary appreciations and his Unionist politics.

8. This line opens section V of "In Memoriam. (M. E. L.)," one of several tributes to fallen comrades, the chief of whom was the poet's brother and the book's dedicatee, S. C. Faber, killed in action on 30 Mar 1917.

9. Alec Waugh (1898-1981), novelist and brother of Evelyn Waugh, was educated at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. He was a prisoner of war near Mainz when this volume was published. After the war, he joined Chapman and Hall, the publishing firm of his father Arthur Waugh.

10. From "Autobiography" (61).

11. Waugh's semiautobiographical novel, *The Loom of Youth* (1917), draws on his schooldays at the Sherborne School in Dorset. The controversial, best-selling novel got him expelled from the Old Boys' Society for mentioning homosexual practices in the school. Waugh went on to write more than fifty books, including novels, travelogues, and autobiographies.

The Hawthorne Aspect¹

The Little Review, 5 (Aug 1918) 47-53

My object is not to discuss critically even one phase or period of James, but merely to provide a note, *Beitrag*, toward any attempt to determine his antecedents, affinities, and “place.”² Presumed that James’s relation to Balzac, to Turgenev, to anyone else on the continent is known and measured—I refer to Mr. Hueffer’s book and to Mr. Pound’s article³—and presumed that his relation to the Victorian novel is negligible, it is not concluded that James was simply a clever young man who came to Europe and improved himself, but that the soil of his origin contributed a flavour discriminible after transplantation in his latest fruit. We may even draw the instructive conclusion that this flavour was precisely improved and given its chance, not worked off, by transplantation. If there is this strong native taste, there will probably be some relation to Hawthorne; and if there is any relation to Hawthorne, it will probably help us to analyse the flavour of which I speak.

When we say that James is “American,” we must mean that this “flavour” of his, and also more exactly definable qualities, are more or less diffused throughout the vast continent rather than anywhere else; but we cannot mean that this flavour and these qualities have found literary expression throughout the nation, or that they permeate the work of Mr. Frank Norris or Mr. Booth Tarkington.⁴ The point is that James is positively a continuator of the New England genius; that there is a New England genius, which has discovered itself only in a very small number of people in the middle of the nineteenth century—and which is *not* significantly present in the writings of Miss Sarah Orne Jewett, Miss Eliza White, or the Bard of Appledore whose name I forget.⁵ I mean whatever we associate with certain purlieus of Boston, with Concord, Salem, and Cambridge, Massachusetts: notably Emerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne, and Lowell.⁶ None of these men, with the exception of Hawthorne, is individually very important; they all can and perhaps ought to be made to look very foolish; but there is a “something” there, a dignity, about Emerson, for example, which persists after we have perceived the taint of commonness about some English contemporary, as for instance, the more intelligent, better educated, more alert Matthew Arnold. Omitting such men as Bryant and Whittier as absolutely plebeian,⁷ we can still

perceive this halo of dignity around the men I have named, and also Longfellow, Margaret Fuller and her crew, Bancroft and Motley, the faces of (later) Norton and Child pleasantly shaded by the Harvard elms.⁸ One distinguishing mark of this distinguished world was very certainly leisure; and importantly not in all cases a leisure given by money, but insisted upon. There seems no easy reason why Emerson or Thoreau or Hawthorne should have been men of leisure; it seems odd that the New England conscience should have allowed them leisure; yet they *would* have it, sooner or later. That is really one of the finest things about them, and sets a bold frontier between them and a world which will at any price avoid leisure, a world in which Theodore Roosevelt is a patron of the arts.⁹ An interesting document of this latter world is the *Letters* of a nimbly dull poet of a younger generation, of Henry James's generation, Richard Watson Gilder, Civil Service Reform, Tenement House Commission, Municipal Politics.¹⁰

Of course, leisure in a Metropolis, with a civilised society (the society of Boston was and is quite uncivilised, but refined beyond the point of civilisation) with exchange of ideas and critical standards, would have been better; but these men could not provide the metropolis, and were right in taking the leisure under possible conditions.

Precisely this leisure, this dignity, this literary aristocracy, this unique character of a society in which the men of letters were also of the best people, clings to Henry James. It is some consciousness of this kinship which makes him so tender and gentle in his appreciations of Emerson, Norton and the beloved Ambassador.¹¹ With Hawthorne, as much the most important of these people in any question of literary art, his relation is more personal; but no more in the case of Hawthorne than with any of the other figures of the background is there any consideration of influence. James owes little, very little, to anyone; there are certain writers whom he consciously studied, of whom Hawthorne was not one; but in any case his relation to Hawthorne is on another plane from his relation to Balzac, for example. The influence of Balzac, not on the whole a good influence, is perfectly evident in some of the earlier novels; the influence of Turgenev is vaguer, but more useful. That James was, at a certain period, more moved by Balzac, that he followed him with more concentrated admiration, is clear from the tone of his criticism of that writer compared with the tone of his criticism of either Turgenev or Hawthorne. In *French Poets and Novelists*, though an early work, James's attitude toward Balzac is exactly that of having been very much attracted from his orbit, perhaps very wholesomely stimulated at an age

when almost any foreign stimulus may be good, and having afterwards reacted from Balzac, though not to the point of injustice. He handles Balzac shrewdly and fairly. From the essay on Turgenev, there is on the other hand very little to be got but a touching sense of appreciation; from the essay on Flaubert even less. The charming study of Hawthorne is quite different from any of these.¹² The first conspicuous quality in it is tenderness, the tenderness of a man who had escaped too early from an environment to be warped or thwarted by it, who had escaped so effectually that he could afford the gift of affection. At the same time, he places his finger, now and then, very gently, on some of Hawthorne's more serious defects as well as his limitations.

The best things come, as a general thing, from the talents that are members of a group; every man works better when he has companions working in the same line, and yielding the stimulus of suggestion, comparison, emulation. [31]

Though when he says that "there was manifestly a strain of generous indolence in his (Hawthorne's) composition" [35], he is understating the fault of laziness for which Hawthorne can chiefly be blamed. But gentleness is needed in criticising Hawthorne, a necessary thing to remember about whom is precisely the difficult fact that the soil which produced him with his essential flavour is the soil which produced, just as inevitably, the environment which stunted him.

In one thing alone Hawthorne is more solid than James: he had a very acute historical sense. His erudition in the small field of American colonial history was extensive, and he made most fortunate use of it. Both men had that sense of the past which is peculiarly American, but in Hawthorne this sense exercised itself in a grip on the past itself; in James it is a sense of the sense. This, however, need not be dwelt upon here. The really vital thing, in finding any personal kinship between Hawthorne and James, is what James touches lightly when he says that

the fine thing in Hawthorne is that he cared for the deeper psychology, and that, in his way, he tried to become familiar with it. [65]

There are other points of resemblance, not directly included under this, but this one is of the first importance. It is, in fact, almost enough to ally the two novelists, in comparison with whom almost all others may be accused of either superficiality or aridity. I am not saying that this "deeper psychology" is essential, or that it can always be had without loss of other qualities,

or that a novel need be any the less a work of art without it. It is a definition; and it separates the two novelists at once from the English contemporaries of either. Neither Dickens nor Thackeray, certainly, had the smallest notion of the "deeper psychology"; George Eliot had a kind of heavy intellect for it (Tito), but all her genuine feeling went into the visual realism of "Amos Barton."¹³ On the continent, it is known; but the method of Stendhal or of Flaubert is quite other. A situation is for Stendhal something deliberately constructed, often an illustration. There is a bleakness about it, vitalised by force rather than feeling, and its presentation is definitely visual. Hawthorne and James have a kind of sense, a receptive medium, which is not of sight. Not that they fail to make you *see*, so far as necessary, but sight is not the essential sense. They perceive by antennae; and the "deeper psychology" is here. The deeper psychology indeed led Hawthorne to some of his absurdest and most characteristic excesses; it was forever tailing off into the fanciful, even the allegorical, which is a lazy substitute for profundity. The fancifulness is the "strain of generous indolence," the attempt to get the artistic effect by meretricious means. On this side a critic might seize hold of *The Turn of the Screw*, a tale about which I have many doubts; but the actual working out of this is different from Hawthorne's, and we are not interested in approximation of the two men on the side of their weakness. The point is that Hawthorne was acutely sensitive to the situation; that he did grasp character through the relation of two or more persons to each other; and this is what no one else, except James, has done. Furthermore, he does establish, as James establishes, a solid atmosphere, and he does, in his quaint way, get New England, as James gets a larger part of America, and as none of their respective contemporaries get anything above a village or two, or a jungle. Compare, with anything that any English contemporary could do, the situation which Hawthorne sets up in the relation of Dimmesdale and Chillingworth; Judge Pyncheon and Clifford, Hepzibah and Phoebe, are similarly achieved by their relation to each other; Clifford, for one, being simply the intersection of a relation to three other characters.¹⁴ The only dimension in which Hawthorne could expand was the past, his present being so narrowly barren. It is a great pity, with his remarkable gift of observation, that the present did not offer him more to observe. But he is the one English-writing predecessor of James whose characters are *aware* of each other, the one whose novels were in any deep sense a criticism of even a slight civilisation; and here is something more definite and closer than any derivation we can trace from Richardson or Marivaux.¹⁵

The fact that the sympathy with Hawthorne is most felt in the last of James's novels, *The Sense of the Past*, makes me the more certain of its genuineness.¹⁶ In the meantime, James has been through a much more elaborate development than poor Hawthorne ever knew. Hawthorne, with his very limited culture, was not exposed to any bewildering variety of influences. James, in his astonishing career of self-improvement, touches Hawthorne most evidently at the beginning and end of his course; at the beginning, simply as a young New Englander of letters; at the end, with almost a gesture of approach. *Roderick Hudson* is the novel of a clever and expanding young New Englander; immature, but just coming out to a self-consciousness where Hawthorne never arrived at all.¹⁷ Compared with *Daisy Miller* or *The Europeans* or *The American*, its critical spirit is very crude. But *The Marble Faun* (*Transformation*), the only European novel of Hawthorne, is of Cimmerian opacity;¹⁸ the mind of its author was closed to new impressions, though with all its Walter Scott-Mysteries of Udolpho upholstery, the old man does establish a kind of solid moral atmosphere which the young James does not get.¹⁹ James in *Roderick Hudson* does very little better with Rome than Hawthorne, and as he confesses in the later preface, rather fails with Northampton.^{20*}

He does in the later edition tone down the absurdities of Roderick's sculpture a little, the pathetic Thirst and the gigantic Adam; Mr. Striker remains a failure, the judgment of a young man consciously humourising, too suggestive of Martin Chuzzlewit.²¹ The generic resemblance to Hawthorne is in the occasional heavy facetiousness of the style, the tedious whimsicality, how different from the exactitude of *The American Scene*, the verbalism. He too much identifies himself with Rowland, does not see through the solemnity he has created in that character, commits the cardinal sin of failing to "detect" one of his own characters. The failure to create a situation is evident: with Christina and Mary, each nicely adjusted, but never quite set in relation to each other.²² The interest of the book for our present purpose is what he does *not* do in the Hawthorne way, in the instinctive attempt to get at something larger, which will bring him to the same success with much besides.

The interest in the "deeper psychology," the observation, and the sense for situation, developed from book to book, culminate in *The Sense of the Past* (by no means saying that this is his best), uniting with other qualities both personal and racial. James's greatness is apparent both in his capacity for development as an artist and his capacity for keeping his mind alive to

the changes in the world during twenty-five years: it is remarkable (for the mastery of a span of American history) that the man who did the Wentworth family in the '80s could do the Bradhams in the '00s. In *The Sense of the Past*, the Midmores belong to the same generation as the Bradhams; Ralph belongs to the same race as the Wentworths, indeed as the Pyncheons.²³ Compare the book with *The House of the Seven Gables* (Hawthorne's best novel after all); the situation, the "shrinkage and extinction of a family" is rather more complex,²⁴ on the surface, than James's with (so far as the book was done) fewer character-relations. But James's real situation here, to which Ralph's mounting the step is the key, as Hepzibah's opening of her shop, is a situation of different states of mind. James's situation is the shrinkage and extinction of an idea. The Pyncheon tragedy is simple; the "curse" upon the family a matter of the simplest fairy mechanics. James has taken Hawthorne's ghost-sense and given it substance. At the same time making the tragedy much more ethereal: the tragedy of that "Sense," the hypertrophy, in Ralph, of a partial civilisation; the vulgar vitality of the Midmores in their financial decay contrasted with the decay of Ralph in his financial prosperity, when they precisely should have been the civilisation he had come to seek. All of this watched over by the absent, but conscious Aurora.²⁵ I do not want to insist upon the Hawthorneness of the confrontation of the portrait, the importance of the opening of a door. We need surely not insist that this book is the most important, most substantial sort of thing that James did; perhaps there is more solid wear even in that other unfinished [novel] *Ivory Tower*. But I consider that it was an excursion which we could well permit him, after a lifetime in which he had taken talents similar to Hawthorne's and made them yield far greater returns than poor Hawthorne could harvest from his granite soil; a permissible exercise, in which we may by a legitimately cognate fancy seem to detect Hawthorne coming to a mediumistic existence again, to remind a younger and incredulous generation of what he really was, had he had the opportunity, and to attest his satisfaction that that opportunity had been given to James.

T. S. ELIOT

NOTES

1. This essay was composed between 10 May and 9 June, when TSE wrote to his mother that he had been "sitting out in a back garden all day writing about Henry James and Hawthorne" (LI 266). Entitled "The Hawthorne Phase" in manuscript draft, it had been commissioned

by Pound for this special number on James. From TSE's James number of the *Egoist* (Jan 1918), Pound reprinted his own review of James's *The Middle Years* and TSE's "In Memory of Henry James," the title abbreviated to "In Memory." In editing this issue of the American periodical, Pound retained TSE's English spellings.

2. *Beitrag*: contribution to ongoing discussion.

3. In *Henry James* (1913), Hueffer compares James to Turgenev and to Honoré de Balzac (1799-1850), the French realist who gave the whole of his fiction the umbrella title *La Comédie humaine*. In "The Shake Down," an article in the present number (republished as part of "Henry James" in 1920), Pound draws on Hueffer's work and on James's *French Poets and Novelists* (1878).

4. Norris, born in Chicago, was known for his realistic depictions of urban American life. The novelist and playwright Booth Tarkington (1869-1946) wrote *The Man from Home* (1907), which contrasts American innocence with European sophistication.

5. The New England regional writers included Sarah Orne Jewett (1849-1909), whose fiction is set in her native Maine; Eliza Orne White (1856-1947), whose stories draw on her New Hampshire childhood; and Celia Loughton Thaxter (1835-94), a poet who lived and held a literary salon in Appledore House, a resort hotel built by her father on Appledore Island, in the Isles of Shoals, Maine.

6. Concord was the home and is the burial place of Emerson, Hawthorne, and the naturalist Henry David Thoreau (1817-62), author of *A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers* (1849) and *Walden* (1854). Salem is the setting of Hawthorne's *The House of the Seven Gables* (1851). Cambridge is the home of Harvard, where the poet, editor, and diplomat James Russell Lowell (1819-91) was professor of modern languages from 1855 to 1876. He is known for the *Biglow Papers* (1848, 1867) and a book-length satire, *A Fable for Critics* (1848). He was editor of both the *Atlantic Monthly* and the *North American Review*, and in later life served as the ambassador to Spain and England.

7. William Cullen Bryant (1794-1878), best known as the poet of "Thanatopsis," published several volumes of poetry and served as the editor of the *New York Evening Post*. The Fireside Poet, John Greenleaf Whittier (1807-92), a Quaker actively involved in the abolitionist movement, is known for *Snow-Bound* (1866) and other works of rural New England.

8. The poet and translator Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (1807-82), remembered for such poems as "The Village Blacksmith" and "A Psalm of Life," was professor of modern languages at Harvard. Margaret Fuller (1810-50), whom James describes as "the apostle of culture, of intellectual curiosity" in his *Hawthorne* (1879), was a journalist and women's rights activist. George Bancroft (1800-91) and John Lothrop Motley (1814-77) were historians; and Charles Eliot Norton and Francis James Child (1825-96) were professors at Harvard.

9. Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919), twenty-sixth president of the United States (1901-09), was a robust outdoorsman, political activist, author of *The Winning of the West* (4 vols, 1889-96), and a founder of the American Institute of Arts and Letters.

10. Richard Watson Gilder (1844-1909), poet and influential editor of the *Century Magazine*, had the leisure to lead an active life of civic service and municipal politics in New York, serving as chairman of the Civil Service Reform Association and the Tenement House Commission, among many other social activities delineated in the *Letters of Richard Watson Gilder* (1916).

11. James came to know and admire Lowell in the 1870s when he was ambassador to England (1880-85). On Lowell's death, he wrote a memorial essay, "James Russell Lowell" (1892), which appeared in *Essays in London and Elsewhere* (London: Osgood, McIlwaine, 1893). He concludes that Lowell "will long count as an erect fighting figure on the side of optimism and beauty. He was strong without narrowness, he was wise without bitterness and glad without fatuity" (85).

12. Henry James, *Hawthorne* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1879). The pagination refers to TSE's later pocket edition (London: Macmillan, 1909), which contains numerous marginal strokes.

13. Dickens and Thackeray were social realists, whereas James and Hawthorne were psychological and moral realists. George Eliot was known for her psychological and religious insight in the creation of such characters as Tito Melema in *Romola* (1862-63), which TSE described as "the most inartistic novel I have ever read" (*LI* 259). After reading several of Eliot's novels in preparing for his Extension lectures, TSE wrote to his mother on 4 Mar: "I was surprised to enjoy her so much . . . and I think my memory of pleasure is based chiefly on one story—*Amos Barton*—which struck me as far and away ahead of the rest" (*LI* 251).

14. Dimmesdale and Chillingworth are characters in *The Scarlet Letter* (1850); Judge Pyncheon, Clifford, Hepzibah, and Phoebe in *The House of the Seven Gables* (1851).

15. Samuel Richardson (1689-1761) wrote epistolary novels, including *Pamela* (1740) and *Clarissa* (1748); Pierre de Marivaux (1688-1763) wrote, in addition to six published novels, two unfinished works important in the development of the French novel—*La Vie de Marianne* (begun in 1727) and *Le Paysan parvenu* (begun in 1735). TSE's "Marivaux" (1919) deals with Marivaux as a dramatist (2.1-9).

16. An unsigned review, attributed to TSE, of James's two posthumously published unfinished novels appeared in TSE's special James issue of the *Egoist* in Jan 1918 (654).

17. On 1 Apr, TSE wrote to Eleanor Hinkley about James's first published novel (1876): "I am reading R[oderick] Hudson now in preparation for an article for the James number of *The Little Review*. I am writing on the Hawthorne influence on James, which comes out at the end in an astonishing unfinished book *The Sense of the Past* (read the scenario at the end). *Hudson* I find dull and stilted and old fashioned; but it is a very early one" (*LI* 259).

18. *The Marble Faun*, published in America in 1860, had appeared the previous year in England under the title *Transformation*.

19. In her gothic novel *The Mysteries of Udolpho* (1794), Ann Radcliffe (1764-1823) established conventions that were adapted by Sir Walter Scott (1771-1832) for such works as *The Bride of Lammermoor* (1819).

20*. TSE's note: "Was Hawthorne at all in his mind here? In criticizing *The House of the Seven Gables*, he says 'it renders, to an initiated reader, the impression of a summer afternoon in an elm-shaded New England town,' and in the preface to *Roderick Hudson*, he says 'what the early chapters of the book most "render" to me to-day is not the umbrageous air of their New England town.'" Quoted, respectively, from James's *Hawthorne* (124) and the preface to the New York Edition of *The Novels and Tales of Henry James*, vol 1, *Roderick Hudson* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907, 1922), ix.

21. Barnaby Striker is a character in *Roderick Hudson*; "Thirst" and "Adam" are titles assigned by the eponymous hero to his marble sculptures of, respectively, a naked youth drinking from a gourd and a life-sized idealized male figure, the latter paired with an "Eve." Martin Chuzzlewit

is the initially selfish but later reformed protagonist of Dickens's satiric *The Life and Adventures of Martin Chuzzlewit* (1844).

22. Rowland Mallet, Christina Light, and Mary Garland are characters in *Roderick Hudson*.

23. The Midmores (Molly, Nancy, Peregrine, and Mrs. Midmore) and Ralph Pendrel are characters in *The Sense of the Past*, and the Bradhams (Davey and Gussy) in *The Ivory Tower*. The Wentworths (Charlotte, Clifford, Gertrude, and William) are characters in *The Europeans* (1878), the Pyncheons in Hawthorne's *The House of the Seven Gables*.

24. James, *Hawthorne*: "what Hawthorne designed to represent was not the struggle between an old society and a new . . . but simply, as I have said, the shrinkage and extinction of a family" (129).

25. Aurora Coyne is a wealthy widow who rejects Ralph Pendrel's proposal at the beginning of *The Sense of the Past*.

“TARR”

A second review of *Tarr* by P. Wyndham Lewis

London: Egoist Press, Ltd., 1918. Pp. xii + 320.¹

The Egoist, 5 (Sept 1918) 105-06

The fact that Mr. Wyndham Lewis is known as a draughtsman and painter is not of the least consequence to his standing as a prose writer. To treat his writing as an outlet for his superabundant vitality, or a means on his part of satisfying intellectual passions and keeping his art healthy, cannot lead to accurate criticism. His prose must be judged quite independently of his painting, he must be allowed the hypothesis of a dual creative personality. It would be quite another thing, of course, to find in his writing the evidences of a draughtsman's training—the training to respond to an ocular impression with the motion of a line on paper; the special reaction to vision and especially the development of the tactile sense, recognition of emotion by the physical strains and movements which are its basis.

It is already a commonplace to compare Mr. Lewis to Dostoevsky,² [an] analogy fostered by Mr. Lewis's explicit admiration for Dostoevsky.³ The relationship is so apparent that we can all the more easily be mistaken in our analysis of it. To find the resemblance is nothing; several other contemporary novelists have obviously admired Dostoevsky, and the result is of no importance. Mr. Lewis has made such good use of Dostoevsky—has commandeered him so efficiently for his purposes—that his differences from the Russian must be insisted upon. His mind is different, his method is different, his aims are different.

The method of Mr. Lewis is in fact no more like that of Dostoevsky, taking *Tarr* as a whole, than it is like that of Flaubert. The book does not comply with any of the accepted categories of fiction. It is not the extended *conte* (“Cantelman's Spring Mate” is not on the pattern of either Turgenev or Maupassant).⁴ It is not the elaboration of a datum, as *Madame Bovary*. From the standpoint of a Dostoevsky novel *Tarr* needs filling out: so much of Dostoevsky's effect is due to apparent pure receptivity, lack of conscious selection, to the irrelevances which merely happen and contribute imperceptibly to a total impression. In contrast to Dostoevsky, Mr. Lewis is

impressively deliberate, frigid; his interest in his own personages is wholly intellectual. This is a peculiar intellectuality, not kin to Flaubert; and perhaps inhuman would be a better word than frigid. Intelligence, however, is only a part of Mr. Lewis's quality; it is united with a vigorous physical organism which interests itself directly in sensation for its own sake. The direct contact with the senses, perception of the world of immediate experience with its own scale of values, is like Dostoevsky, but there is always the suggestion of a purely intellectual curiosity in the senses which will disconcert many readers of the Russian novelist. And there is another important quality, neither French nor Russian, which may disconcert them still more. This is Humour.

Humour is distinctively English. No one can be so aware of the environment of Stupidity as the Englishman; no other nationality perhaps provides so dense an environment as the English. The *intelligent* Englishman is more aware of loneliness, has more reserves, than the man of intelligence of any other nation. Wit is public, it is in the object; humour (I am speaking only of *real* humour)⁵ is the instinctive attempt of a sensitive mind to protect beauty against ugliness; and to protect itself against stupidity. The older British humour is of this sort; in that great but decadent humorist, Dickens, and in some of his contemporaries it is on the way to the imbecilities of *Punch*. Mr. Lewis's humour is near to Dickens, but on the right side, for it is not too remote from Ben Jonson.⁶ In *Tarr* it is by no means omnipresent. It turns up when the movement is relaxed, it disappears when the action moves rapidly. The action is in places very rapid indeed: from the blow given by Kreisler in the café to the suicide is one uninterrupted movement. The awakening of Kreisler by the alarm-clock is as good as anything of the sort by Dostoevsky; the feverish haste of the suit-case episode proceeds without a smile. Bertha's impression of Kreisler is good in the same way:

She saw side by side, and unconnected, the silent figure drawing her and the other one full of blindness and violence. Then there were two other figures, one getting up from the chair, yawning, and the present lazy one at the window—four in all, that she could not bring together somehow, each in a complete compartment of time of its own. [183]

It is always with the appearance of Tarr, a very English figure, that Humour is apt to enter; whenever the situation is seen from Tarr's point of view. Humour invests him. He impressed you "as having inherited himself last week, and as under a great press of business to grasp the details and resources

of the concern" [21]. Bertha's apartment, with the "repulsive shades of Islands of the Dead" is as it appeared to Tarr [38]. Humour, indeed, *protects* Tarr from Bertha, from the less important Anastasya, from the Lipmann circle. As a figure in the book, indeed, he is protected too well: Tarr "exalts life into a Comedy," but it remains *his* (private) comedy [xi]. In one scene, and that in contact with Kreisler, Tarr is moved from his reserve into reality: the scene in which Tarr is forced out of Kreisler's bedroom. Here there is another point of contact with Dostoevsky, in a variation on one of Dostoevsky's best themes: Humiliation. This is one of the most important elements in human life, and one little exploited. Kreisler is a study in humiliation.

I do not understand the *Times* when it remarks that the book "is a very brilliant *reductio ad absurdum* not only of its characters, but of its own method."⁷ I am not sure that there is one method at all; or that there is not a different method for Tarr, for Kreisler, and for Bertha. It is absurd to attack the method which produced Kreisler and Bertha; they are permanent for literature. But there is an invisible conflict in progress all the time, between Tarr and Kreisler, to impose two different methods upon the book. We cannot say, therefore, that the form is perfect. In form, and in the actual writing, it is surpassed by "Cantelman's Spring Mate." And "Inferior Religions" remains in my opinion the most indubitable evidence of genius, the most powerful piece of imaginative thought, of anything Mr. Lewis has written.⁸

There can be no question of the importance of *Tarr*. But it is only in part a novel; for the rest, Mr. Lewis is a magician who compels our interest in himself; he is the most fascinating personality of our time rather than a novelist. The artist, I believe, is more *primitive*, as well as more civilized, than his contemporaries, his experience is deeper than civilization, and he only uses the phenomena of civilization in expressing it. Primitive instincts and the acquired habits of ages are confounded in the ordinary man. In the work of Mr. Lewis we recognize the thought of the modern and the energy of the cave-man.⁹

T. S. ELIOT

NOTES

1. TSE reviewed *Tarr* in the *Egoist* of June/July 1918 (718).

2. In the printed text, the spelling here is "Dostoevski," TSE's preferred spelling throughout the typescript (Yale: YCAL MSS 43 box 144f.6327) and in other essays; it was overlooked by

the editors when altering the spelling in all subsequent instances. As assistant editor, TSE may have acquiesced to the house spelling, but he may not have been informed of this and other changes, below.

3. In his review of *Tarr* for the *Little Review* in Mar 1918, Pound asserted that Lewis “is the only English writer who can be compared to Dostoievsky” (35); and in the *Nation* of 10 Aug, Rebecca West described *Tarr* as “a beautiful and serious work of art that reminds us of Dostoevsky . . . because it contains one figure of vast moral significance . . . worthy to stand by Stavrogin” (506-08). In his recent “Inferior Religions,” which TSE mentions later in this review, Lewis included one of Dostoevsky’s characters among his personal “puppets,” described as “carefully selected specimens of religious fanaticism . . . Their only reference is to themselves, and their only significance their egoism.” *The Little Review*, 4 (Sept 1917), 4.

4. Lewis’s story, “Cantleman’s Spring-Mate,” appeared in the *Little Review* of Oct 1917, leading to the suppression of the issue by the U.S. postal authorities (see 675); it was slightly revised and reprinted with the spelling “Cantelman’s” in *The Ideal Giant* (1917). On 21 Aug 1916, TSE wrote to Conrad Aiken, comparing his response to Aiken’s poems to his response to the stories of Guy de Maupassant (1850-93): “Anything which can provoke as strong nausea with life as those did in me is well done. They affect me like Maupassant” (*LI* 160).

5. In the typescript, TSE struck through this parenthetical statement, which was restored in print.

6. *Punch*, which dates from 1841, is an English comic magazine combining satire, controversial wit, and irreverent humor. Ben Jonson (1572-1637) wrote popular satiric comedies, including *Volpone: or, The Fox* (1606) and *The Devil Is an Ass* (1616).

7. This was Clutton-Brock’s anonymous review, “A Scientific Experiment,” *TLS*, 860 (11 July 1918), 322.

8. In “Inferior Religions,” first published in the *Little Review* in Sept 1917, Lewis explains his theory of comedy, a variation of Bergson’s theory in *Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic* (1911). A revised version, “The Meaning of the Wild Body,” was printed in *The Wild Body* (1927).

9. In this paragraph, TSE’s English spellings of *civilised*, *civilisation*, and *recognise* were changed to house style by an editor of the *Egoist*.

A Note on Ezra Pound¹

To-Day, 4 (Sept 1918) 3-9

It is not that the critical faculty is wholly lacking to the English mind, but that our interest is seldom wholly in good literature, or in the goodness of anything as literature. To pick out “beauties” of Ezra Pound’s verse, or to expand upon his personality, would be irrelevant for different reasons. Thus when a certain Professor Phelps observes that “Rupert Brooke . . . was something more than either a man or a poet; he was and is a Personality,” he may be quite right, but is manifestly evading the duty of criticism;² and it would be equally evasive to select fragments of Mr. Pound’s work for admiration, and to search in it for revelations of the man. The point is to come to conclusions respecting the place of his work as a whole in contemporary literature. *He* is well known, exciting various reactions of harmony or irritation; but there is no tradition in English verse which might have prepared for the general acceptance of his work; and England in 1910 could have been no more ready for him than in 1890; and perhaps there is even less to respond to him in 1918 than in 1910. The absence of leisure, the pressure of political interest have tended to blunt critical discrimination and obscure the truth that only what is well written is good literature.

English verse in general may be said to have deteriorated. What we commonly find among contemporary poets is a mentality which has remained in the age of Wordsworth or in the age of Tennyson, with a technique which is actually inferior to that of either of these. Whatever we think of these or other figures of the past century, each of them did contribute (for what it is worth) something or other; Wordsworth and Tennyson were indeed adequate to at least some sides of the mind of their time; the more intelligent of their contemporaries could read them with serious self-respect. But while the mind of man has altered, verse has stood still; and the majority of our poets can only touch us as a *Child’s Garden of Verses*³, a heavy trifling; they have nothing to say to the adult, sophisticated, civilized mind; are quite unaware of its tragedies and ecstasies. To this civilized mind Mr. Pound does make appeal; and I insist upon this because superficially he may seem so much the archaeologist. We may assert with confidence that a poet ought to be highly educated, and that the core of his education ought

to be education in poetry. A large part of any poet's "inspiration" must come from reading and from his knowledge of history. I mean history widely taken; any cultivation of the historical sense, of perception of our position relative to the past, and in particular of the poet's relation to poets of the past. Mr. Pound's extensive knowledge of literature is one important thing, his particular passion for and minute knowledge of Provençal is another. What has mattered is not simply that he has by insight and labour got the spirit of Provençal, or of Chinese, or of Anglo-Saxon, as the case may be; but that he has made masterpieces, some of translation, some of re-creation, by his perception of the relation of these periods and languages to the present, of what *they* have that *we* want; and this perception of relation involves an organized view of the whole course of European poetry from Homer. He has also—I shall come to that presently—a particular gift of his own of calling the past to life; but his erudition in general is his attainment of the education which every writer of verse ought to strive for. The untutored poet, pure fount of inspiration, *may* produce a work of merit; he is more likely to waste his forces, to do again badly what has already been done well. And Mr. Pound is in this way always "modern": he never repeats.

My point is to be this: that Pound's erudition, his interest in the past, and his interest in the present are one; and that the variety of his work has a unity behind it. His poems of *mœurs contemporaines* belong to the same total *opus* as his Provençal canzone.⁴

Technically, there is this, separately: that Mr. Pound's studies in the history of metric have enabled him to make more experiments, introduce a greater variety of new verse-forms than any other living poet. His *vers libre* is sometimes a development of the versification of Yeats and sometimes a development of that of Browning, but it would not be what it is without the long attentive study of Provençal and early Italian.

The ways in which a poet may bring the past to bear upon the present can differ very widely. The way can be simply a continuance and development of tradition, an awareness rather than a conscious use. Pound makes both a general and a particular use of the past; but as there is so little tradition in English verse (as I have suggested, Pound may be said to derive from Browning and Yeats), his particular use is more evident. He is exceptionally sensitive in appreciation, so sensitive that the emotions of literary stimulus tend to fuse themselves with the emotions of the fact. In his case this is not a dilution, but a reinforcement. "Near Perigord" expresses a situation of a man and a woman; it is also an appreciation of a particular time with much

historical and geographical knowledge, and incidentally contains a beautiful translation of half a dozen lines of Dante:

Surely I saw, and still before my eyes
Goes on that headless trunk, that bears for light
Its own head swinging, gripped by the dead hair . . .⁵

and the elements are perfectly fused. The last part of the poem is as modern as Henry James. The intensity of the appreciative element, appreciation of particular places and times, of particular lines and words, the intensity carries the appreciation over and adds to the effect, by what in any other poet would only be literary criticism.

This effect is all the more peculiar because of the deliberateness. James Joyce, another very learned literary artist, uses allusions suddenly and with great speed, part of the effect being the extent of the vista opened to the imagination by the very lightest touch. Pound's recent unfinished epic, three cantos of which appear in the American edition of *Lustra*, proceeds by a very different method than that of Joyce in *Ulysses*.⁶ In appearance, it is a rag-bag of Mr. Pound's reading in various languages, from which one fragment after another is dragged to light, and illuminated by the beauty of his phrase.

"Home to sweet rest, and to the waves deep laughter" sends one back to Catullus.⁷ Or a sharp reminiscence of travel:

It juts into the sky, Gordon that is,
Like a thin spire. Blue night pulled down about it
Like tent-flaps or sails close hauled. When I was there,
La Noche de San Juan, a score of players
Were walking about the streets in masquerade,
Pike-staves and paper helmets . . .⁸

but apparently no continuity. And yet the thing has, after one has read it once or twice, a positive coherence; it is an objective and reticent autobiography.

Mr. Pound is, in fact, a reticent poet—

And would meet kindred even as I am,
Flesh-shrouded bearing the secret—⁹

he insists, loudly enough, upon principles that he believes in; but he cannot be accused of exploiting himself. It is possible, however, to trace a definite

maturing between *Personae* and *Lustra*. Half-way between these volumes comes *Ripostes*. *Ripostes*, apparently slighter than *Personae* or *Exultations*, is really more substantial. "The Return" is a technical advance; "The Picture" or "Quies" shows a gain in concentration. The feeling may appear to have lost in freshness; it has certainly gained in precision. *Cathay* seems to me to advance still further. The early Provençal work, with all its beauty, depends a little (by comparison with *Cathay*) upon the adventitious charm of enthusiasm for a particular *décor*; the author had not entirely succeeded in valuing the material apart from its attraction to himself. *Cathay* is an absolutely objective work; it depends upon nothing but its own value. Here, and in the "Wayfarer,"¹⁰ Mr. Pound shows a matured genius. He has gained in ability to set down an emotion, using images with greater austerity, only for their contribution to the total effect. Nothing could owe less to exotic charm, indeed, than "The Bowmen of Shu" or "The River-Merchant's Wife."

There are a number of poems, in *Lustra* and subsequent to *Lustra*,^{11*} which have probably fewer admirers than any of those already mentioned. There are the "Salutations," there are the epigrammatic pieces, and there are several longer studies of contemporary manners. The question of what to think of the "Salutations" and "Commission" is what one thinks of what they say—but also they must be considered in relation to everything else; to

Bewildering spring, and by the Auvézère

or

For a moment she rested against me
Like a swallow half blown to the wall,

in the same volume.¹²

As to the epigrams, the question is whether one enjoys those of Martial or Catullus; Pound, with his talent, Latin decidedly, not Greek, has done something very similar in English. In the longer "contemporanea," the majority of readers will probably find signs of desiccation.¹³ I do not think that this is right; but I am not sure that there has not been in some instances a self-consciousness which has induced reserve, with a back-rush of aggressiveness. Aggressive, I think, is what most people will say of "Simulacra," "The Social Order," even of the admirable "Cabaret Dancer." The question is simply what Mr. Pound will do with the satiric, and I consider some of these recent poems to be transitional. In at least two of the poems lately published in the *Little Review*, there is a great advance in coolness and

clearness and limpidity, in “I Vecchii” and “Ritratto,” and these sketches of manners may be expected to push their roots deeper and become studies of character.¹⁴ Mr. Pound is in the process of fabricating for himself a new mask, *persona*. That is very difficult. It will not increase the sales of his books. Yet it is the thing to do; and it is—the capacity for a lifetime of experiment and change—what completely isolates Mr. Pound from other contemporaries; it is the mark of his “singleness of mind,” integrity, devotion to good writing. And if not precisely the result of his erudition, it is a result of the same curiosity and the same passion which impelled his studies.

T. S. ELIOT

NOTES

1. This essay is primarily a discussion of *Lustra of Ezra Pound with Earlier Poems* (New York: Knopf, 1918). Many of the poems had been published in *Poetry*.

2. William Lyon Phelps (1865-1943), *The Advance of English Poetry in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1918), 124. Phelps was a professor of English at Yale University.

3. Stevenson, *A Child's Garden of Verses* (1885).

4. Pound had published nine poems under the general title “Moeurs contemporaines” in the *Little Review*, 5 (May 1918), 25-31, first collected in *Quia Pauper Amavi* (1919).

5. Pound concludes section II of “Near Perigord” with a translation of Bertran de Born's speech in *Inferno* XXVIII.118-42.

6. Ulysses was currently being serialized in the *Little Review*, with the “Hades” episode in this Sept issue. Pound's “Three Cantos of a Poem of Some Length” (*Lustra*, 180-202) is a revision of cantos that had appeared in *Poetry* in June, July, and Aug 1917.

7. In “Three Cantos” I, the narrator begins his story in Sirmio, near Verona, where Catullus lived and wrote. The quotation is Pound's translation from Catullus' *Carmina* XXXI (*Lustra*, 183).

8. From “Three Cantos” II (*Lustra*, 191).

9. From “In Durance” (*Personae*, 1909).

10. A slip for “The Seafarer” (*Ripostes*, 1912).

11*. TSE's note: “E.g. in the *Little Review* for May of the present year.”

12. From “Near Perigord,” section III, and “Shop Girl,” respectively.

13. In the June/July *Egoist*, TSE had used “Contemporanea” as the title of a review (718). Pound, who spelled it “Contemporania,” had used it as the general title for groups of his poems published in *Poetry* (Apr 1913), the *New Freewoman* (Aug 1913), and *Catholic Anthology* (1915).

14. These were poems numbered VII and VIII of IX poems included in “Moeurs contemporaines” (note 4, above).

Syllabus for a Tutorial Class in Modern English Literature

London: University of London Press, 1918.¹

ELIZABETHAN LITERATURE

I. THE EARLIEST FORMS OF DRAMA (1)

Popular festival and religious rite. The "liturgical" drama. The Guild plays. Difference between "miracle" plays, "moralities," and "interludes." Examination of several examples. Their peculiar charm and their essential dramatic qualities. Read: *Everyman*, *Abraham and Isaac*, and the *Second Shepherds Play*.

II. THE REVIVAL OF LEARNING (2)

The Renaissance in England, and its effect upon the Drama. John Bale and Heywood. Influence of humanism not always beneficial. Study of Latin literature: Seneca and Plautus. Beginnings of blank verse. Development of set tragedy and comedy. Italian influence. Read: *Gorboduc* or *Ralph Roister Doister*.

III. THE ELIZABETHAN STAGE (3)

Popularity of the Theatre. The theatres of Shakespeare's time: their construction, the audience, its character and its demands, the players and their life. The playwright: his task and his life. The continuous adaptation of old plays to current needs. Why Elizabethan life and thought found its most adequate expression in the theatre. Read: The first chapters of G. P. Baker: *Development of Shakespeare as a Dramatist*.

IV. KYD: THE FIRST IMPORTANT DRAMATIST (4)

His *Spanish Tragedy* analysed. Its great popularity. The "tragedy of blood." Comparison with *Titus Andronicus* and *Hamlet*. First appearance of stock situations. Kyd the probable author of *Arden of Feversham*, a unique attempt at tragedy based on contemporary events. Why was this kind of realism not more popular? Read: *The Spanish Tragedy* or *Arden of Feversham*.

V. CHRISTOPHER MARLOWE (5-6)

The greatest poet since Chaucer and the greatest dramatist before Shakespeare. What is known of his life. His originality. His verse in

Tamburlaine. His intellect in *Faustus*: comparison with Goethe's handling of the same legend.

Importance of the "chronicle play." Marlowe's *Edward II* compared with Shakespeare's *Richard II*.

Marlowe's *Jew of Malta* compared with the *Merchant of Venice*. Characterisation in the work of the two dramatists. Monotony of Marlowe's dramatic verse compared with Shakespeare's at his best. Read: *Dr. Faustus*, and either *Edward II* with *Richard II*, or the *Jew of Malta* with the *Merchant of Venice*.

Marlowe's minor plays: *Dido Queen of Carthage*. Two men influenced by Marlowe: Peele and Greene, and their relation to him. Read: *James IV* (Greene) or the *Old Wives' Tale* (Peele).

VI. THE CHRONICLE PLAY (7)

Examination of the *True Tragedy of Richard Duke of York* with *Richard III* and *Henry VI* for traces of Marlowe, Peele, Greene, and Shakespeare. *Henry IV* as a play by Shakespeare.

VII. EUPHUISM (8)

The work of John Lyly. The style of *Euphues* and of Lyly's plays. Its Spanish sources; its popularity. Influence upon Shakespeare. Read: Lyly's *Endymion* and Shakespeare's *Love's Labour's Lost*.

VIII. SHAKESPEARE (9-10)

The early Shakespeare and his relation to the foregoing summed up. His work as an adapter; its value for his progress. In what ways are his early plays inferior and superior to Marlowe's work? His early use of sources. Read: *Two Gentlemen of Verona* or *Comedy of Errors*. Criticism of these two plays.

The mature Shakespeare. Study of a mature play: *Measure for Measure*; the thought and the versification. His early faults and their disappearance. *King Lear*; comparison with the original play of that name. Read: *Measure for Measure*.

The later Shakespeare. Do the great tragedies exceed the possibilities of the stage? Lamb's views on this subject. Characteristics of Shakespeare's old age. Read: *Coriolanus*, or the *Winter's Tale*, or *Antony and Cleopatra*.

Shakespeare's relation to his time.

IX. NON-DRAMATIC POETRY (11)

English poetry after Chaucer. Tudor verse, and verse translation: Gawain Douglas, Golding, the poets of "Tottel's Miscellany." Surrey and Wyatt. Blank verse. Marlowe as poet: his *Hero and Leander* compared with

Shakespeare's *Venus and Adonis*. Read: Marlowe's *Hero and Leander*. Canto I. Poems of lesser men in various anthologies, especially Arber's *Surrey and Wyatt Anthology* and *Spenser Anthology*.

X. SPENSER (12)

French and Italian influence. His earlier poems. The *Epithalamion*. The *Faery Queene*; type to which it belongs. Limitations and unique merits of Spenser's verse. His place with Milton and Tennyson.

XI. THE LYRIC AND THE SONNET (13-14)

The song and music in Tudor times. Shakespeare's and Campion's lyrics. Read: Selections from Arber's *Shakespeare Anthology*.

The sonnet; its Italian origin. Popularity of Petrarch. Usual artificiality of the sonnet. Differences between the Italian and the English. Comparison of Shakespeare's with Spenser's, Sidney's, and others. Read: A few translations of Italian Sonnets in Rossetti's *Early Italian Poets*, and sonnets in *Golden Treasury* or in the *Oxford Book of English Verse*.

Lyrics of Ben Jonson. Transition to the Jacobean poetry of Marvell, Donne, and others.

XII. THE BEGINNINGS OF PROSE

Tudor Prose. The place of Malory. Work of Elyot and other Humanists. How English prose grew up: effect of theological writing, books of travels, history. The Prayer Books of Edward VI. Foxe [*Book of Martyrs?*].

XIII. SIDNEY AND RALEIGH

Lives of these two courtiers. Fulke Greville's *Life of Sir Philip Sidney*. Importance of the *Apology for Poetry* and Raleigh's *Fight of the "Revenge."* A new kind of prose. Read: The two essays mentioned above.

XIV. THE ELIZABETHAN ROMANCE

The beginnings of the novel. Why less important than the drama, and less mature. Lyly, Lodge, Sidney, Nash, Greene, and their work.

XV. MONTAIGNE

Life of Montaigne: his importance in French literature and his importance in English literature. His influence on Elizabethan England. On Shakespeare. The translation of John Florio. The first essayist. Other important translations: Holland's *Plutarch*. Read: Several of Montaigne's essays in Florio's translation.

XVI. BACON

His life. Importance as a philosopher. His English prose, the *Advancement of Learning*. The *Essays*, compared with Montaigne's. Development of philosophic prose after Bacon. The work of Hooker. Survey of prose from Bacon

to Hobbes. Sir Thomas Browne. Read: Select essays of Bacon, Browne's *Religio Medici*.

XVII. BEN JONSON

Difference from all other dramatists. His vast importance in English letters. His erudition, theories about drama. The interest of *Every Man in his Humour*. His satiric ability. Comparison with Molière. Quarrels of the time.

Jonson's view of historical tragedy. *Sejanus and Catiline*. Their inferiority to his comedies. His finest comedies: *Volpone*, *The Alchemist*, *Epicene*. His non-dramatic work.

Construction of Jonson's plays. Read: *Volpone*, or the *Alchemist*, or *Bartholomew Fair*.

XVIII. The Later Drama

Influence of Shakespeare. The various merits of Chapman, Dekker, Heywood, and Middleton. Development and decline of the drama after Shakespeare. The gifts of Beaumont and Fletcher on the whole better exhibited in the scene than in the complete play. The greatest of Shakespeare's followers is undoubtedly John Webster. His skill in dealing with horror; the beauty of his verse. Each of these men could deal marvellously with certain types of situation. The work of Ford. Each of the later dramatists has some unique quality, and in them English blank verse reaches its highest point. Read: *Webster*, the *Duchess of Malfi*. Ford, the *Broken Heart*. Beaumont and Fletcher, the *Maid's Tragedy* and the *Knight of the Burning Pestle*.

READING

DRAMA

The "Everyman" edition of *Everyman* contains the early plays mentioned, and others. Also in [J. M.] Manly: *Specimens of Pre-Shakespearian Drama*. E. K. Chambers: *The Medieval Stage* gives a very scholarly and complete account of the conditions; and [J. J.] Jusserand: *English Wayfaring Life in the Middle Ages* is useful and very interesting. For the early plays, the work of Manly, mentioned above. Particular use will be made of the "Everyman" *Minor Elizabethan Drama*: Vol. I., Tragedy; Vol., II., Comedy, contains all the Pre-Shakespearian plays to be discussed, with the exception of those of Marlowe, which are found in a separate volume of the "Everyman" edition.

There is very little good criticism of Elizabethan and Jacobean, drama, but J. A. Symonds: *Predecessors of Shakespeare* is useful, and Swinburne:

Age of Shakespeare and *Study of Ben Jonson*, as well as Rupert Brooke: *John Webster*, are interesting, though misleading. The "Mermaid" edition of most of the dramatists is good. Ben Jonson and Beaumont and Fletcher are to be had in the "Everyman" edition.

For Shakespeare, Sir Sidney Lee's *Life* is the standard biography, and Professor G. P. Baker's *Development of Shakespeare as a Dramatist* is very useful. The best Shakespeare criticism is Coleridge: *Lectures on Shakespeare*, which also contains notes on Jonson and Beaumont and Fletcher. A. C. Bradley: *Four Tragedies of Shakespeare* is an excellent study. [Thomas] Seccombe and [J. W.] Allen: *Age of Shakespeare*. F. E. Schelling: *Elizabethan Drama* is thorough. The *Shakespeare Apocrypha*, plays attributed to Shakespeare, is edited by C. F. T. Brooke. Many of the Elizabethan plays are well edited separately in the "Temple Classics." The "Temple" and the "Arden" editions of separate plays of Shakespeare, and the "Globe" edition in one volume, are good: the finest critical edition of Shakespeare is Furness's "Variorum" edition.

POETRY

Marlowe's *Hero and Leander* is in the "Everyman" edition of his works. His admirable translations are difficult to obtain. Arbor's edition of "Tottel's Miscellany," and the Arber *Surrey and Wyatt, Spenser, Shakespeare, and Jonson Anthologies* contain many fine poems unobtainable elsewhere. [A. H.] Bullen: "England's Helicon," the "Golden Treasury," and the "Oxford Book" contain many lyrics and sonnets. Campion's poems are in the "Muses' Library." For Spenser, the Oxford edition. There are cheap editions of Chapman's translation of Homer.

PROSE

Sir Thomas Elyot's *Gouvernour*, Edward VI's Prayer Books, are in the "Everyman" edition. Select writings of Raleigh recently published by the Clarendon Press, Oxford. Sidney's *Apologie* is easily obtainable. So are Florio's *Montaigne*, Holland's *Plutarch*, Bacon's *Essays*, Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*. Hobbes: *Leviathan*, and Sir Thomas Browne: *Religio Medici* are not exactly in the period, but may well be read in connection with it.

Note: For the general history of the Tudor reigns, including that of Elizabeth, the various volumes of [J. A.] Froude are of permanent value, and are many of them obtainable in the "Everyman" edition.

T. S. ELIOT, M.A.

NOTE

1. When TSE finished the second year of the Southall Tutorial Class at Easter 1918, the Extension Board invited him to return for a third year. On 10 May, he reported to his mother: "My Southall people want to do Elizabethan Literature next year, which would interest me more than what we have done before, and would be of some use to me too, as I want to write some essays on the dramatists, who have never been properly criticised" (*LI* 263). When the class convened in the autumn, however, it had a smaller than expected enrollment. "At the beginning of the Session," he wrote in his post-Armistice report to the Extension Board, "the Class found that it had lost several of its best members through death, removal, and more essential work. . . . The influenza epidemic during November and the December elections were disturbing factors and reduced the attendance. I believe we shall have the attendance at 10 to 12 during the winter." When the board declined to pay grant on the dwindling class, TSE successfully requested permission to continue it at a reduced fee. Although the lectures were on Elizabethan literature, the syllabus retained "Modern English Literature" in the title. The parenthetical numbers to the right of the first eleven subject titles represent TSE's holograph correlation of the subjects and the actual lectures (Houghton). After his final lecture, his students presented him with several books to mark the completion of the three-year course, including a copy of the *Oxford Book of English Verse*, inscribed "with the gratitude and appreciation of the students of the Southall Tutorial Literature Class May 1919."

Studies in Contemporary Criticism, I

A review of *George Meredith: A Study of His Works and Personality*, by J. H. E. Crees

Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 1918. Pp. ix + 237.

The Egoist, 5 (Oct 1918) [113]-14

The work of the critic is almost wholly comprehended in the “complementary activities” of comparison and analysis. The one activity implies the other; and together they provide the only way of asserting standards and of isolating a writer’s peculiar merits. In the dogmatic, or lazy, mind, comparison is supplied by judgment, analysis replaced by appreciation. Judgment and appreciation are merely tolerable avocations, no part of the critic’s serious business. If the critic has performed his laboratory work well, his understanding will be evidence of appreciation; but his work is by the intelligence, not the emotions. The judgment also will take place in the reader’s mind, not in the critic’s explicit statement. When he judges or appreciates, he simply (perhaps from a legitimate compulsion to spare time or thought) is missing out a link in the exposition.

Criticism, like creative art, is in various ways less developed than scientific research. For one thing, scientific progress, in Europe and America, would not have reached its present stage had it not been pretty thoroughly internationalized: if the results of any important experiment in one country were not immediately taken up, tested and proceeded upon in every other. A vast improvement in this respect had taken place, for instance, since Mendel’s time. Of course, science, as well as literature, is dependent upon the occasional appearance of a man of genius who discovers a new method. But there is much useful work done in science by men who are only clever enough and well enough educated to apply a method; and in literature there *ought* to be a place for persons of equivalent capacity. Yet what we find are discoverers of methods whose methods remain unstudied; and an illimitable number of honest toilers still seeking the literary counterpart of perpetual motion or the *lapis philosophicus*; fuddling with

putrefaction,
 Solution, ablution, sublimation,
 Cohobation, calcination, ceration, and
 Fixation.¹

We are justified in reprobating such wasted energy. There ought to be honourable vacancies for men who like to write about literature without themselves having a “method” to deliver; without (in cruder terms) being “creative” writers. There might be a recognized set of tools which the critic could be taught to use, and a variety of standard patterns which he could be trained to turn out.

Mr. J. H. E. Crees is one of the belated astrologers. He has industry and considerable native competence; he knows his author well, and is interested in his subject.² But he does not know positively what he wants to do—and is therefore somewhat uncertain in his attempt to do it. He does not know just what are the questions about a poet or novelist which are worth an answer; he has not halted to contemplate his task before he began it. This lack of training often is responsible for the issue of general observations which for a critic are utterly a waste of time. I find in a chapter devoted to Meredith’s “Art”:

Style is the man. . . . Those who have any individuality at all, and who allow this individuality to develop, must . . . attain to something individual. [129-30]

Mr. Crees is looking for Meredith’s style on a very dark night, and without knowing what “style” will be when he finds it. His misapprehension asserts itself as he proceeds to the question of originality. “[H]e who is endowed with a fine sense of style must often note the inadequacy of the hackneyed phrase, and feel for other methods, of expression” [131]. In the first place, a fine sense of style is more truly an acquirement than an endowment, but let that pass. His interpretation of the “hackneyed phrase” is illuminated by his next sentence:

Not to do so is rather spiritual indolence than love of the precise and unpretentious.

(Why *spiritual* indolence? But let it pass.) Mr. Crees says, in effect, that the “hackneyed phrase” is not invariably precise and unpretentious. Our remark upon this is that the hackneyed phrase is precisely the pretentious and

*un*precise, that this is part of its nature. It is not hackneyed because it is old, but because it is dead; and it is dead because it has lost its meaning. Mr. Crees goes on to produce numerous unconscious illustrations of dead language. Thus:

None ever thought more quickly or boasted a more teeming fancy (than Meredith's). [132]³

The first half of this sentence is alive enough; it is "precise and unpretentious." The second half is dead tissue. It is not precise, and it is pretentious. The writer has forgotten the literal meaning of both "boast" and "teeming." Aside from the fact that quickness of thought and teeming fancy are not closely enough related to be joined in one sentence.

The whole nature of the metaphor, both of such hackneyed phrases as those quoted above, and of those habitually practised by Meredith and by Mr. Crees elsewhere, is an unknown science to Mr. Crees. Had he studied the history of language in his critical education, he might have perceived finally that all thought and all language is based ultimately upon a few simple physical movements.^{4*} Metaphor is not something applied externally for the adornment of style; it is the life of style, of language. If Mr. Crees had realized how completely we are dependent upon metaphor for even the abstractest thinking, he would admit both that his hackneyed phrase is vestigial and that the Carlyle-Meredith metaphor is excrescent.

The healthy metaphor adds to the strength of the language; it makes available some of that physical source of energy upon which the life of language depends.

... in her strong toil of grace

is a complicated metaphor which has this effect;⁵ and as in most good metaphor, you can hardly say where the metaphorical and the literal meet.

Mountain echo, carrying her youth like a flag ...
a cathedral organ foully handled in the night by demons ...
a pot on the fire with a loose lid ...
Seraglio Point ...

these are merely conceits.⁶ They are not metaphors, but disguised similes. To make constant use of such is not to strengthen, but merely to drug the language. And we may say this of both Carlyle and Meredith, that they

contributed very little to make English a stronger, more subtle, more civilized instrument. They dosed it with sentimentalities.

And last—Mr. Crees affirms that Meredith's is a style which requires "vast powers of thought" [131]. It is true that Carlyle, a writer whose merits are positively of the surface, gained a reputation for profundity by a similar style. Mr. Crees speaks of Meredith's "profound philosophy" [143]. Of course it is the first duty of a philosopher to be clear and logical and simple, and he can then afford to let the profundity take care of itself; but the fact is that most of Meredith's profundity is profound platitude. His blood and brain and spirit trinity may be a profound analysis; he has left the clarity and precision to Plato, who had already conceived a somewhat similar anatomy. The style which runs to excessive metaphor is simply the style of a lazy mind: as anyone who has tried to write well and has laboured with laziness can testify. It is a pity that bad example, rather than native indolence, should have led Mr. Crees into practising the habits which he extols.

T. S. ELIOT

NOTES

1. In Act II of Ben Jonson's farce, *The Alchemist* (1610), Face the butler is asked by Subtle the alchemist to "Name the vexations and the martyrizations / Of metals in the work." He then speaks the words quoted above to Ananias, the Puritan who seeks the *lapis philosophicus* (philosophers' stone).

2. The Latinist and literary critic J. H. E. Crees (1882-1941) was headmaster of Crypt Grammar School, Gloucester, and author of *George Meredith: A Study of his Works and Personality* (Oxford: B. H. Blackwell, 1918). TSE had included readings of Meredith's essays, poems, and novels in his Extension lectures (587).

3. TSE's parenthesis.

4*. TSE's note: "All this matter of the cliché and the metaphor has been much more ably put in Remy de Gourmont's *Problème du style*."

5. *Antony and Cleopatra*, V.ii.344-46: Caesar remarks that the dead Cleopatra "looks like sleep, / As she would catch another Antony / In her strong toil of grace."

6. These lines, as quoted by Crees, are from Meredith's novels: in *The Egoist* (1879), Clara Middleton is described as "a Mountain Echo, one who carries youth like a flag" (31); in *The Tragic Comedians* (1881), Sigismund Alvan is said to be "like some great cathedral organ foully handled in the night by demons" (50); in *One of our Conquerors* (1891), Victor is compared to "a goldfish in his globe, and a pot on the fire with a loose lid" (95); and in *Diana of the Crossways* (1885), Diana Merion coins the epigram "Men may have rounded Seraglio Point, they have not yet doubled Cape Turk" (86).

A review of *The Ascent of Olympus*, by Rendel Harris

Manchester: The University Press; New York and London: Longmans, Green, 1917. Pp. vii + 140.¹

The Monist, 28 (Oct 1918) 640

Dr. Rendel Harris is an expert in that dizzy art of derivation and interpretation to which, in recent studies of comparative religion, we have become accustomed. He has every qualification of scholarship, ingenuity, and plausibility, and he makes his detective work exceedingly interesting. We are familiar with the evolution of the gods out of snakes; Dr. Harris now evolves them out of plants—plants associated, chiefly, with the thunderbolt. The oak is the thunder-tree, being struck more often than any other. Athene is horn from the head of Zeus; she is also the owl, i.e., sprung from the hollow tree. From a similar association with riven trees, bees and honey acquire sanctity. “[T]he animistic belief makes everything that thunder touches into thunder.” Not only the oak, therefore, but mistletoe and ivy, which cling to the oak, are thunder. And “when the phytomorph becomes the anthropomorph, the name of the new (subordinate) thunder-deity is Dionysos” (5).² (The lightning-smitten Semele, his mother, is nothing but the tree.) The association of Dionysus with wine follows naturally: the sacred ivy-leaves were chewed and eaten by the worshipers. Smilax and grape-vines were trained on trees. The goat and fawn, which feed on these plants, became cult-animals. The appearance of an androgynous Dionysus is due to his identification with *both* fire-sticks, the “male” and the “female”; and the fire-sticks were made out of ivy because there is thunder in the ivy. Dr. Harris thinks that the Vedic Soma may have been a surrogate for a more primitive sacred mastication, analogous to the ivy-leaves chewed by Maenads, and suggests a similar source for the custom of drinking ivy beer on Ascension Day at Lincoln College, Oxford.³

Apollo is likewise a thunder-god, the laurel being substituted for the oak, and Apollo owes his healing art to his connection with the mistletoe, a plant of supposed medicinal virtues. Artemis is identified with the mugwort, and Aphrodite with the mandrake or love-apple.

If Dr. Harris is ever found to be wrong, it will be because he clings tenaciously to a single (vegetable) line of descent. This line is certainly traceable,

but it seems possible that a developed god may have an extremely complex parentage, not to be reduced to a single root.

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NOTES

1. The biblical scholar Rendel Harris (1852-1941) was curator of manuscripts at the John Rylands Library, Manchester, where he in 1915-16 delivered the four lectures that constitute this volume. Harris wrote facetiously in his preface that while some readers who have been “familiar with the Greek gods from their earliest years . . . cannot avoid contemplating the author of these lectures as an Iconoclast,” he hopes that “when one succeeds . . . in evolving Artemis out of a wayside weed, or Aphrodite out of a cabbage . . . one may claim to belong to the brotherhood . . . that has the vision of ‘That far-off divine event / To which the whole creation moves’” (v).

2. Harris’s preferred spelling of “Dionysos” is restored in the quotation; TSE’s “Dionysus” is retained in the review.

3. “It is interesting to be able to point out,” Harris writes, “that we have, even in England, suspicious traces of the survival of an ivy-drink. Professor [Kirsopp] Lake reminds me that in Lincoln College, Oxford, they drink Ivy-beer on Ascension Day; i.e. beer in which ivy-leaves have been steeped overnight. Mr. Lake says that ‘it always seemed to me to be a very unpleasant drink’” (25).

Studies in Contemporary Criticism, II

A review of *Un poète de l'énergie, Émile Verhaeren:*

l'œuvre et l'homme, by Albert Mockel

Paris: La Renaissance du Livre, 1917. Pp. 195.

Pavannes and Divisions, by Ezra Pound

New York: Knopf, 1918. Pp. 262.

The Egoist, 5 (Nov / Dec 1918) 131-33

There are different purposes, motives, and methods possible in criticism. For the reading public, some classification of these varieties would be useful: a classification which would enable the reader to determine immediately whether a critic fulfils any of the legitimate critical functions or fulfils more than one without confusion. I propose at some future date a convenient enchiridion, *A Guide to Useless Books*, prepared in such an order that it will be possible at once to refer any new book to its category. Not only are there many books which need not have been written, and many which might have been written very differently if writers and readers had clearly in mind the several proper and improper kinds of criticism, but a great deal of waste by overlapping might be spared. It is desirable that men of letters should be more scholarly, and that scholars should acquire more lively literary perceptions; but it is also desirable that the *work* of scholarship and literature should be distinct. I shall return to this classification presently, after examining two more specimens of contemporary criticism.

It has been a commonplace since, I suppose, the time of Arnold's *Essays* that the French surpass us in every kind of critical writing.¹ They are assumed to have developed standards and the skill in dissociation to a degree quite unknown in this country. Here, in the book of M. Mockel,* is an essay which can reasonably be compared with that of Mr. Crees.² M. Mockel admired the work of Verhaeren and wanted to write a book about him;³ his impulse has so much in common with that of Mr. Crees. Verhaeren, like Meredith, is sufficiently well known, and is also dead; in neither case is there question of introducing a new or unaccepted author. As for Verhaeren, he is certainly a considerable enough poet to deserve a study; his origins,

influences, the ideas of his society and epoch, his relation as a Fleming to French verse, to the Parnassians, to the symbolists—to the group of which M. Mockel was a distinguished member. M. Mockel is also a poet of reputation. He is thus well equipped. The sequence of his essay is biographical; both in form and in style, it is superior to Mr. Creech's; his dedication (addressed, it must be admitted, to Mr. Gosse) declares an attempt to "study the man through the work, and the work through the man," and to this declaration he has consistently adhered.⁴ He has tried with considerable success to present the temperament and its environment; and some of the generalizations which he extracts in the course of the essay are more just and precise than what we usually find in English criticism. Pages 22-25 dissolve the myth of Flemish mysticism ("Émile Verhaeren . . . est peu fait pour le mysticisme" [25]);⁵ and the distinction of "art de sérénité" and "art égoïste" on pages 60-63 is interesting. The book contains many pieces of excellent criticism and interpretation. The question is, however, whether the central structure of the essay ("studying the man through the work and the work through the man") is right; whether the result is not that the book is either too biographical or not biographical enough; whether there are not too few facts, documents, pictures for a biography and too many impressions of Verhaeren's scenery, external and internal, for a sober study of his art. For example, the young Émile:

Tous les mauvais gars de l'endroit le connaissaient bien; il avait noué commerce d'amitié avec eux et c'est lui, à présent, qui entraînait leur bande. . . .

A Saint-Amand, l'Escaut n'a certes pas encore l'ampleur majestueuse . . . le plantureux pays de Waes . . . [d]es bateaux passent . . . Beau décor pour l'enfance d'un poète. . . .⁶

But especially M. Mockel is led into the sterile ways of ethnology. There is no end of the Flamand and the Walloon,⁷ though we should gladly have a further analysis of the "art maladif" mode (cf. Maeterlinck and Rodenbach) in Belgium,⁸ and its relation to the actual "physical crisis" which produced *les Soirs*, *les Débâcles*, and *les Flambeaux noirs*. The fact mentioned (page 51) that Verhaeren was "physiquement transformé" is of interest.⁹

The definition at the end is not instructive: "Verhaeren est le poète héroïque de l'énergie" [183].¹⁰ If Verhaeren was energetic, it is important, but it is part of his physiological biography. If he was an admirer of energy, there is no great merit in it. I think that M. Mockel misapplies his

words in saying (page 47) that “almost the only law (of Verhaeren’s art) is the search for intensity”;¹¹ there are a great many ways of getting intensity, and Verhaeren is too often seeking only violence. He was an imagist who wrote some remarkable pages of Flemish scenery, but who disappeared later in a verbiage of Hugo. Verhaeren was not an important innovator in verse-technique.

The book is a competent work of the second class. It is deficient in comparison and only at times successful in analysis, and does not by any means speak the last word on Verhaeren’s place in literature. Its radical fault is in mixing biography and study of Verhaeren’s art. The type, however, is popular, and is, in fact, more ably practised in France than in England.

Another and quite different critical method is that of Mr. Pound. Whether we agree or not with his opinions, we may be always sure that in his brief and fugitive utterances, he is not to be diverted on any pretext from the essential literary problem, that he is always concerned with the work of art, never with incidental fancies. This is a very uncommon merit. His critical writings are the comments of a practitioner upon his own and related arts; and in this type, we have very little since Dryden’s Prefaces of any permanent value. No one could be farther from the archaeological interest, or farther from the destructive interest: he reserves his attention for the works which he considers good, and for that part of them which he considers permanent. But much more pronounced than his enthusiasm for particular writers is his enthusiasm for good writing. And the breadth of his taste is a justification of his insistence upon technique: it is only study of technique which can widen our understanding of different types of art, for excellence of technique (often utterly dissimilar technique) is the only thing that all types of art have in common.

Mr. Pound observes: “All that the critic can do for the reader or audience or spectator is to focus his gaze or audition.”¹² It is true that if the critic does not do this he does nothing, but even Mr. Pound attempts a good deal more. The reader should be led to see for himself, and at the end, one can only lead him to the masterpiece and point to it, but there are many stages at which the critic may stop or continue. But the most valuable of Mr. Pound’s criticisms are his notes on the practice of the various arts themselves.

The workman’s notes on the work form one of the most precious types of criticism. Very few creative writers have anything interesting to say about

writing or about their predecessors, but they ought to have the sense of what is actually important in older works. We may classify other possible varieties of critical writing as follows:

- (1) Biography. The biographer ought to know a good deal about the art of his subject, if the subject is an artist; but his main purpose is to present facts and to deal with his subject's attitude toward his art. This is work of scholarship.
- (2) Historical criticism, e.g. the work of Sainte-Beuve. This may be largely dissociative and destructive, and traces the development and realization of ideas. It is not of *direct* significance for the living worker, nor is it directly concerned with aesthetic problems.
- (3) Philosophical criticism, e.g. Aristotle, Coleridge. Dangerous, but sometimes useful schematization of principles, etc. The only excuse for attempting it is very unusual intelligence. There is also the criticism which uses the work or author in question only as a point of departure, and this is justified by an interesting vision of the world. I have not listed the type of criticism of Mr. Pound and Dryden, etc. *Vide supra*.

Lastly, there are miscellaneous works of scholarship—commentaries, recensions, histories of “genres” which I mention because their writers often think it necessary to interpolate a large amount of unskilful literary criticism. Very often this “criticism” is merely a substitute for the reader's reading the original work. I have lately had occasion to examine a number of books dealing with Elizabethan literature, and the majority of these appeared either superfluous or grossly inflated. I offer as evidence comments on a few of the better known of these books in our own language:¹³

Swinburne, *Age of Shakespeare*: contains no information and conveys no clear impression of the dramatists discussed. A few notable quotations. Neither scholarship nor criticism.

Symonds, *Predecessors of Shakespeare*: absurdly long. Contains a fair amount of popularized information about the period, but the author thought it desirable to relate the story of every play that interested him.

Boas: *Shakespeare's Predecessors* exhibits the same loquacious vice. Dr. Boas is one of the most accomplished of living scholars in this period, but the facts in this book could have been condensed into a small handbook; the literary criticism is negligible.

Schelling, *Elizabethan Drama*: the most painful book of all. It should have been written in tabular form, as a list of plays with dates, etc. Swinburne, of course, ought to have known better; the other writers ought to have done good scholarship without criticism, and the critical sense would have been imputed them. Perhaps the great blunder is that nearly everyone who criticises preserves some official ideal of “criticism” instead of writing simply and conversationally what they think.

T. S. ELIOT

NOTES

1. In *Essays in Criticism* (1865), Arnold included essays on the French writers Maurice de Guérin and Joseph Joubert.

2. *TSE's note. “Mr. Crees's *George Meredith*, reviewed last month.” TSE discussed Crees's book in “Studies in Contemporary Criticism, I” (760).

3. The Belgian writer Verhaeren published his first poetry collection *Les Flamandes* in 1883 and his second *Les Moines* in 1886. Subsequent to the disappointing reception of these works, he suffered the psychological crisis in which he wrote the trilogy consisting of *Les Soirs* (1888), *Les Débâcles* (1888), and *Les Flambeaux noirs* (1891).

4. The Belgian critic and symbolist poet Albert Mockel (1866-1945), in dedicating his book to Edmund Gosse, states his intention: “je me suis efforcé d'étudier l'homme par son œuvre et l'œuvre à travers l'homme.”

5. *Trans*: Émile Verhaeren . . . is scarcely made for mysticism.

6. *Trans*: All of the local urchins knew him well; he entered into their company and it was he who, at that time, led their gang (7). In Saint-Amand, the [River] Scheldt certainly has nothing of the stately amplitude yet. . . the lush country of Waes . . . boats passing by . . . fine setting for the childhood of a poet (2).

7. Flamand, spoken by Verhaeren in his native city of Saint-Amand, is a Flemish-French dialect spoken in western and eastern parts of Belgium; Walloon is a dialect spoken in southern Belgium (Wallonia).

8. In Jean-Marie Guyau's preface to *L'Art au point de vue sociologique* (1887), the “art maladif” (morbid art) of the decadents and some “déséquilibrés” is characterized as “la dissolution des sentiments sociaux et le retour à l'insociabilité” (the dissolution of social sentiments and the return to unsociability). When Verhaeren's friend Maeterlinck left Belgium for Paris in 1886, he came under the influence of French symbolist poets and playwrights, especially Villiers de L'Isle Adam, whose morbid and solipsistic qualities also influenced the Flemish symbolist poet Albrecht Rodenbach (1856-80), author of *Eerste Gedichten* (1878) and a leader of the Flemish literary movement before his early death from tuberculosis.

9. *physiquement transformé*: physically transformed.

10. *Trans*: Verhaeren is the heroic poet of energy.

11. “Je voulais figurer ainsi un art dont la loi presque unique est la recherche de l'intensité.”

12. From “A Retrospect,” in *Pavannes and Divisions* (109).

13. In preparing for his Extension course in Elizabethan literature, which began in Oct, TSE read these and other relevant critical studies. The following titles, with the exception of the

book by Bogs, are listed on his syllabus (757–58): Swinburne, *The Age of Shakespeare* (1908); John Addington Symonds (1840–93), *Shakespeare's Predecessors in the English Drama* (1884; 551 pages); Frederick Samuel Boas (1862–1957), *Shakespeare and his Predecessors* (1896); Felix Emmanuel Schelling (1858–1945), *Elizabethan Drama, 1558–1642* (1908).

To the Editor of *The Nation*¹

The Nation (London), 24 (9 Nov 1918) 158, 160

SIR,—As an American of some years' residence in this country, I feel impelled to call attention to the conflict actually taking place between President Wilson and his domestic opponents. The information obtainable through English newspapers is meagre and the importance of the issue may easily be overlooked. It bears not only on the coming peace conference, but on future Anglo-American relations.

The Republican party, now the opposition, has for some time past applied itself to the publication of its grievances against the party in power. Many of these grievances, including charges of administrative incompetence, concern the American people alone. Many are quite likely to be well founded; with the exception of a small number of men close to the President, the Democratic Party is probably inferior to the Republican in the quality of its leaders. More recently, however, the Republicans have not confined themselves to criticism of internal policy of internal blunders; some of their spokesmen have attacked Mr. Wilson's foreign policy, or maintained tenets wholly opposed to that policy.

The effect of this campaign will soon be patent, if it is not already visible, in this country. So long as it was supposed that Mr. Wilson was unanimously supported by his own countrymen, his policy was acclaimed with universal approval by the English Press; now that domestic dissension has asserted itself, we may expect to discover who are and who are not Mr. Wilson's sincere supporters in England.

You have stated in *The Nation* that "The old guard of the Republican party, with Senator Lodge at its head, is undoubtedly opposing, as openly as it dare, the whole League of Nations idea."²

An examination of some of Mr. Lodge's speeches confirms the accuracy of this allegation. The attitude of Senator Lodge and his friends will not find favor with those elements in this country which have favored President Wilson's peace programme. My question is, whether it should commend itself to any English opinion whatever.

Henry Cabot Lodge has been senator from Massachusetts for some years, and he has the best connexions in Boston society. He belongs to a section

of the American public which has loyally supported Great Britain from the beginning of the war. And his peace programme certainly appears to offer as much historical advantage to England as England could ask. He would seem, in short, to be at least as good a friend to England as President Wilson is. But his policy is potentially even more nationalistic than it is at present pro-British. The "Old Guard" of his party is traditionally associated with a high protective tariff, and Senator Lodge is traditionally associated with the Old Guard. The history and composition of the Republican party and the present emergencies of its mere conservative elements do not encourage one to believe that it would sacrifice business interest to international amity.

It would mean universal disaster if the participation of America in the war does not lead to closer friendships and understanding, to freer intercourse of ideas, between America and England. No understanding based on economic interest alone could survive; even the legitimate interests of the two countries may cause delicate situations; the economic interests of America and England are compatible, but not identical; there are difficulties to be solved, and suspicions to be dispelled. Should affairs be simultaneously directed by Extremist factions in both countries, it is hardly to be expected that the extremes would meet.

Nothing but ideas can bind the two countries together. Since the entry of America into the War, the Republican party has not yet succeeded in producing a single idea of importance. The question whether America should not have entered the war earlier is now a dead issue. The policy of President Wilson is the only one which offers any security for the continuance and development of Anglo-American harmony.—Yours, etc,

T. S. ELIOT

NOTES

1. This letter was printed under the editorial title "The Future of Anglo-American Relations."
2. In its "Events of the Week" column of 2 Nov, *The Nation*, which supported President Wilson's Fourteen-Point Peace Plan, reported that Wilson had allegedly "interfered" in the congressional elections due on 5 Nov, leading to accusations of "political profiteering" and "advocating Free Trade" by the Republicans. The column concluded that "Far more turns on these elections than on our own. They may confirm Mr. Wilson's world-wide and beneficent power, or cripple it" (118). Henry Cabot Lodge (1850-1924), Republican senator since 1893 and at this time chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, successfully opposed President Wilson's attempt to make the United States a member of the League of Nations, arguing that it would threaten the country's political freedom.

Philosophy A¹

Syllabus for an Introductory Course from the Pre-Socratics to the Renaissance

CONFERENCES AND READING

The reading of the starred references is required; the others are optional.

September 26. INTRODUCTION.

*Perry: General Introduction to Philosophy (Lectures on Dr. Eliot's Five-Foot Shelf of Books).²

*Weber: *History of Philosophy*, §§ 1, 2.³

James: *Some Problems of Philosophy*, Ch. I.

Perry: *The Approach to Philosophy*, Ch. I.

Russell: *The Problems of Philosophy*, Ch. XV.⁴

October 3. RISE OF PHILOSOPHY IN GREECE.

*Weber: §§ 4, 5, 6.

*Benn: *Early Greek Philosophy* (Philosophies Ancient and Modern), Ch. I.⁵

*Bakewell: *Source Book in Ancient Philosophy*, pp. 1-7.⁶

Marshall: *A Short History of Greek Philosophy*, Ch. I, II.

October 10. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRE-SOCRATIC THOUGHT.

*Weber: §§ 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.

*Benn: Ch. II.

Bakewell: pp. 8-56.

Marshall: Ch. III-V.

October 17. THE ATOMISTS. THE SOPHISTS.

*Weber: §§ 12, 13.

*Benn: Ch. III, IV.

*Bakewell: pp. 67-85.

Bakewell: pp. 57-66.

Marshall: Ch. VI-X.

Clodd: *Lucretius and the Atomists* (Philosophies Ancient and Modern).

October 24. SOCRATES. THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.

*Weber: §§ 14, 15.

*Benn: Ch. V.

*Bakewell: pp. 104-141.

Bakewell: pp. 86-103.

Marshall: Ch. XI-XIII.⁷*October 31. PLATO'S THEORY OF THE IDEAS.*

*Weber: § 16 (1), (2).

*Bakewell: pp. 192-216; 160-168.

Bakewell: pp. 168-179.

Plato: *Protagoras*; *Phaedo* (Everyman's Library).⁸Taylor: *Plato (Philosophies Ancient and Modern)*, Ch. II.*November 7. PLATO'S MORAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY.*

*Weber: § 16 (3).

*Bakewell: pp. 182-192; 152-157.

*Plato: *Republic*, Bk. I (Everyman's Library).Plato: *Republic*, Bks. II-X.Taylor: *Plato*, Ch. III.*November 14. ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS.*

*Weber: § 17 (1).

*Bakewell: pp. 217-239.

Taylor: *Aristotle* (The People's Books), Ch. I-III.⁹Aristotle: *Metaphysics* (trans. by Ross).¹⁰*November 21. ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE AND MAN.*

*Weber: § 17 (2).

*Bakewell: pp. 240-247; 251-268.

Taylor: *Aristotle*, Ch. IV, V.Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics* (Everyman's Library).Aristotle: *Politics [A Treatise on Government]* (Everyman's Library).*November 28. THE EPICUREANS.*

*Weber: § 18.

*Bakewell: pp. 290-316.

Taylor: *Epicurus* (Philosophies Ancient and Modern).

Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura* (New Universal Library).

Santayana: *Three Philosophical Poets*, Ch. II.¹¹

Clodd: *Lucretius and the Atomists*.

December 5. THE STOICS.

*Weber: § 19.

*Bakewell: pp. 269-289; 317-339.

Stock: *Stoicism* (Philosophies Ancient and Modern).

Marcus Aurelius: *Meditations* (Everyman's Library).

Epictetus: *Moral Discourses* (Everyman's Library).

December 12. ECLECTICISM. SCEPTICISM. NEO-PLATONISM.

*Weber: §§ 24, 25, 26.

*Bakewell: pp. 340-374; 384-393.

Fuller: *The Problem of Evil in Plotinus*.¹²

Seneca: *On Benefits* (Temple Classics).

Plutarch: *Moralia* (Everyman's Library).

December 19. CHRISTIANITY. THE PATRISTIC PERIOD.

*Weber: §§ 27, 28.

*St. Augustine: *Confessions*, Bks. I, VII (Everyman's Library).

St. Augustine: *Confessions*, Bks. II-VI, VIII-X.

St. Augustine: *The City of God* (Temple Classics), Bks. VII-XII, XVI, XVIII.

January 9. THE RISE OF SCHOLASTICISM.

*Weber: §§ 29-36.

*Rickaby: *Scholasticism* (Philosophies Ancient and Modern), Ch. I, II, §§ 1, 2.¹³

St. Anselm: *Proslogium*, etc. (trans. by Deane) (Open Court Pub. Co.)

January 16. THE CULMINATION OF SCHOLASTICISM.

*Weber: §§ 37-40.

*Rickaby: Ch. II, §§ 3, 4; III, VII.

Thomas Aquinas: *Of God and His Creatures* (trans. by Rickaby).

Dante: *Divine Comedy* (Everyman's Library or Temple Classics).¹⁴

St. Francis of Assisi: *Little Flowers*, etc. (Everyman's Library or Temple Classics).¹⁵

Bonaventura: *Life of St. Francis* (Temple Classics).

January 23. THE DECLINE OF SCHOLASTICISM.

*Weber: §§ 41-48.

*Rickaby: Ch. IV, V.

Böhme: *The Signature of All Things* (Everyman's Library).

Pater: [*Studies in the History of*] *The Renaissance*.¹⁶

Oldham: *The Renaissance* (Temple Cyclopaedic Primers).

Montaigne: *Essays* (Everyman's Library or Temple Classics).

GENERAL REFERENCES

Ueberweg [Friedrich]: *History of Philosophy*. [1876]

Windelband [Wilhelm]: *History of Philosophy*. [2 vols, 1893]

Windelband [Wilhelm]: *History of Ancient Philosophy* [1899]¹⁷

Gomperz [Theodor]: *Greek Thinkers*. [4 vols, 1912]¹⁸

Rogers [Arthur Kenyon]: *Student's History of Philosophy*. [1901]

Cushman [Herbert Ernest]: [*A Beginner's*] *History of Ancient Philosophy*.
[1911]

Dickinson, L. [G. Lowes]: *Study of Greek Life* [*The Greek View of Life*].
[1896; 6th ed., 1909]¹⁹

Taylor, H. O.: *Ancient Ideals*. [1896]

Taylor, H. O.: *The Mediaeval Mind*. [1911]

Turner [William]: *History of Philosophy*. [1903]

Wulf [Maurice de]: *History of Scholasticism*. [1895, trans. 1907]²⁰

Hour Examination. October 29, 1913.

1. What are the *distinguishing* characteristics of philosophy? Why is European philosophy said to begin with the Ionian Physicists?
2. Who were the *Atomists* and when did they flourish? Give a brief summary of their philosophy. Compare the Atomistic philosophy with that of the Pythagoreans, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Sophists, noting points both of resemblance and of contrast.
3. Compare very briefly the doctrines of Heraclitus with those of the Eleatics.
4. In what respects was Socrates a man of his age: and in what respects was he opposed to his age?

[BOOKLIST: CONSTRUCTED BY THE EDITORS]:

- Anonymous. The "*Little Flowers*," *Life and "Mirror" of St. Francis of Assisi*, trans. Ernest Rhys, intro. Thomas Okey (Everyman's Library) (London: J. M. Dent, 1910).
- Anselm. *Proslogium; Monologium; An Appendix on Behalf of the Fool by Gaunilon; and Cur Deus Homo*, trans. Sidney Norton Deane (Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 1903).
- Aquinas, Thomas. *Of God and His Creatures: An Annotated Translation (with some abridgement) of the Summa contra gentiles of Saint Thos. Aquinas*, trans. Joseph Rickaby (London: Burns & Oates, 1905).
- Aristotle. *Metaphysics*, trans. W. D. Ross. Vol. 8 of *The Works of Aristotle*, ed. J. A. Smith and W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon, 1908).
- . *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. J. A. Smith (Everyman's Library) (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1911).
- . [*Politics*] *A Treatise on Government*, trans. William Ellis (Everyman's Library) (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1912).
- Augustine. *The City of God*, trans. John Healey (Temple Classics) (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1903).
- . *The Confessions of St. Augustine*, trans. E. B. Pusey (Everyman's Library) (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1907).
- Bakewell, Charles M. *Source Book in Ancient Philosophy* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907).
- Benn, Alfred William. *Early Greek Philosophy* (London: Archibald Constable, 1908).
- Boehme [Böhme], Jacob. *The Signature of All Things and other writings*, trans. John Ellistone (Everyman's Library) (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1912).
- Bonaventura. *The Life of Saint Francis by Saint Bonaventura*, trans. Gurney Salter (Temple Classics) (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1904).
- Clodd, Edward. *Lucretius and the Atomists* (London: Constable, 1909).
- Dante Alighieri. *The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri*, trans. John Aitken Carlyle, Thomas Okey, and Philip H. Wicksteed. 3 vols. (Temple Classics) (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1909-10).
- Epictetus. *The Moral Discourses*, trans. Elizabeth Carter and W. H. D. Rouse (Everyman's Library) (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1910).
- Fuller, B. A. G. *The Problem of Evil in Plotinus* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1912).

- James, William. *Some Problems of Philosophy: A Beginning of an Introduction to Philosophy* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1911).
- Lucretius. *De Rerum Natura*, trans. H. A. J. Munro (New Universal Library) (London: G. Routledge, 1907).
- Marcus Aurelius. *Meditations*, trans. A. S. L. Farquharson (Everyman's Library) (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1905).
- Marshall, John. *A Short History of Greek Philosophy* (London: Percival, 1891).
- Montaigne, Michel de. *The Essays of Michael, Lord of Montaigne*, Second Book, Vol. 2, trans. John Florio (Temple Classics) (London: J. M. Dent, 1897).
- Oldham, James Basil. *The Renaissance* (Temple Primer) (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1912).
- Pater, Walter. *Studies in the History of the Renaissance* (London: Macmillan, 1873).
- Perry, Ralph Barton. "General Introduction" to Philosophy section, *Lectures on the Harvard Classics*. Ed. William Allan Neilson (New York: P. F. Collier and Son, 1910), 125-42. Vol. 51 of Charles W. Eliot's "Five-Foot Shelf" of Harvard Classics.
- . *The Approach to Philosophy* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905).
- Plato. *The Dialogues of Plato . . . Phaedo, Protagoras*, Vol. 1, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York Charles Scribner's Sons, 1901) [not in Everyman's Library].
- . *Republic*, trans. Alexander D. Lindsay (Everyman's Library) (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1908).
- Plutarch. *Moralia*, trans. Philemon Holland (Everyman's Library) (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1911).
- Rickaby, Joseph. *Scholasticism* (London: Archibald Constable, 1908).
- Russell, Bertrand. *The Problems of Philosophy* (New York: Henry Holt, 1912).
- Santayana, George. *Three Philosophical Poets: Lucretius, Dante, Goethe* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1910).
- Seneca: *On Benefits*, trans. Thomas Lodge (Temple Classics) (London: J. M. Dent, 1899).
- Stock, St. George. *Stoicism* (London: Archibald Constable, 1908).
- Taylor, A. E. *Aristotle* (London: T. C. and E. C. Jack, 1912).
- . *Epicurus* (London: Constable 1911).

———. *Plato* (London: Constable, 1908).

Weber, Alfred. *History of Philosophy* (1896), 5th ed. Trans. Frank Thilly. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907.

NOTES

1. TSE was appointed Assistant in Philosophy for the academic year 1912-13 on 12 Sept 1912 and for the 1913-14 year on 1 Sept 1913. In 1913-14, using this syllabus, he taught two sections (G and H) of "Philosophy A," an undergraduate course in the history of philosophy from the Pre-Socratics to the Renaissance. The sections met weekly from 26 Sept to 23 Jan: the first on Fridays at 10 in Emerson C with 26 students, the second on Fridays at 12 in Emerson E with 24 students. On 14 Oct 1914, TSE wrote from Merton College, Oxford, to William C. Greene, then at Harvard: "I presume you are now going through what I tried my hand at last year; teaching freshmen what they didn't want to know and what I didn't know myself" (*L1* 70). The editors are indebted to Joanna Rzepa for informing us of the missing printed syllabus, which is now catalogued in the Houghton Library as MS Am 2560 (99).

2. In the spring of 1914, TSE was a student in Perry's "Philosophy 20D: Seminary in Ethics." Two essays that he wrote for Perry are included in this volume (1.136, 1.147). Charles W. Eliot's "Five-Foot Shelf of Books" was an early name for the Harvard Classics.

3. According to Donald Gallup, financial difficulties led TSE's sister-in-law Theresa Eliot "to sell items, including at least one – Tom's copy of Alfred Weber's *History of Philosophy*, New York, Scribner's, 1907 – that Henry had originally intended for inclusion in the Harvard collection." "The Eliots and the T. S. Eliot Collection," *Harvard Library Bulletin*, 36 (Summer 1988), 237.

4. TSE drew upon Russell's introductory volume for his doctoral dissertation, particularly in Chapter IV (1.310 *ff.*).

5. TSE uses several texts written for "Philosophies Ancient and Modern," a widely used series that attempted to make philosophy more accessible to the general public.

6. In spring 1914, TSE took two courses from Charles M. Bakewell, a visiting professor from Yale University: "Philosophy 15: The Kantian Philosophy" and "Seminary in Metaphysics: The Nature of Reality." Three of TSE's essays on Kant's *Critiques*, written for Professor Bakewell, are included in this volume (1.29, 1.40, 1.49).

7. TSE has written across this section of the syllabus a note to himself in ink: "Hour Ex Oct 24 / to include Soc & the Socratic Sch"

8. "The Everyman's Library," inaugurated in 1906 by the British publisher J. M. Dent, was a series of inexpensive reprints of classics in literature and philosophy intended for the general public. The "Temple Classics," also used by TSE in this course, was a slightly more limited series of reprints of classic texts, also conceived and published by Dent.

9. TSE's copy of Taylor's *Aristotle*, containing underlinings and marginal marks, is signed and dated 1913. On 3 Feb 1926, TSE invited Taylor to contribute to the *Criterion*, adding "I have for many years been interested in your work and have very much desired to have a contribution from you" (*L3* 56). In 1931, in *Thoughts after Lambeth* (1931), he described Taylor as one of "the able theologians and philosophers within the Church." Like "Everyman's Library," "The People's Books" was a popular series intended to give the general public greater access to important topics and writers.

10. TSE used Ross's translation of the *Metaphysics* in his work at Merton College in 1914-15. He read Aristotle with Harold Joachim throughout the entire year, and in Trinity Term 1915, he submitted weekly essays, of which three on the *Metaphysics* are included in this volume (1.216, 1.220, 1.227). TSE's signed and dated (1912) copy of Ross's translation is heavily annotated.

11. In spring 1908, his second year at Harvard, TSE took Santayana's "Philosophy B: History of Modern Philosophy." Much later, he discussed *Three Philosophical Poets* in his 1926 Clark Lectures at Cambridge University (2.613) and in his 1929 preface to *Dante*.

12. Jean Verdenal wrote to TSE about Fuller in a letter of 5 Feb 1912: "Il y a votre philosophe Fuller. C'est un homme charmant; bon garçon, amiable, très joyeux camarade avec tout le monde et plein d'anecdotes. J'ai cru longtemps que je ne pourrais rien en tirer mais je me suis trompé: nous faisons ensemble de la gymnastique suédoise tous les matins." *Trans*: "Your philosopher, Fuller, is still here. He is a charming man; decent, likeable, hail-fellow-well-met with everyone, and full of stories. For a long time, I thought I would be able to make nothing of him, but I was wrong; we do Swedish exercises together every morning" (*LI* 31, 33).

13. TSE refers to Rickaby's work in "A Contemporary Thomist" (1.623).

14. TSE's lightly marked copy of the Temple Classics *Divine Comedy* is in the Houghton Library, Harvard University. Both "Everyman's Library" and "Temple Classics" were published by J. M. Dent.

15. *Little Flowers* is a popular collection of stories related to the life of St. Francis by an anonymous Tuscan writer.

16. TSE's signed and annotated copy of the first edition of Pater's *Studies in the History of the Renaissance* (1873) is at King's College, Cambridge.

17. TSE owned the first American edition (1899), which contains his father's signature.

18. TSE discusses the work of Gomperz in his 1918 review, "Recent British Periodical Literature in Ethics" (1.660).

19. TSE later acquired for his library a 1938 edition of *The Greek View of Life*. He met Dickinson at Bosham in 1916 and saw him occasionally. After spending Boxing Day with him at the Sydney Waterlowes in 1919, he wrote to his mother on 6 Jan 1920: "Lowes Dickinson was there: I never liked him much, he is very common, at bottom" (*LI* 427); however, TSE commemorated his death in the *Criterion* of Oct 1932, "for it matters not only to his friends and to colleagues and all the successive generations at King's, but to everyone who sympathized – without necessarily sharing his views – with his courageous, humane and civilized attitude towards public affairs, with which his classical scholarship was in happy combination" (79).

20. In his 1926 review of de Wulf's *History of Mediaeval Philosophy* (vol 2), TSE praises "its compendious account of the interactions of scholasticism with other types of thought in the later Middle Ages and the early Renaissance" (2.870).

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The Complete Prose of T. S. Eliot

ERRATA

Volume I

First photo gallery, first and second photos are now switched in order. The caption for the newly placed first photo is altered – “Class of 1905” replaced with “The Fifth-Year Class, Classical Course Students, 1903-04,”

p. xi: New entry on Contents page, just before Index – Appendix. Philosophy A: Syllabus for an Introductory Course from the Pre-Socratics to the Renaissance

p. 71: 3rd paragraph, line 6 – “intermediary” now reads “intermediate”


p. 74: line 12 from end – “*real*” now reads “real”

p. 74: line 11 from end – “between the divided extension and the pure inextension” now reads “between divided extension and pure inextension”

p. 177, Note 4 – “the final Michaelmas essay” now reads “the penultimate Michaelmas essay”

p. 625, Note 2 – the complete text of the note on John Rickaby, SJ, has been replaced with: Joseph Rickaby, SJ (1845-1932), English priest, philosopher, and assistant master of Pope’s Hall (later Campion Hall), Oxford. TSE signed his copy of Rickaby’s *Scholasticism* (1908) and assigned it for three meetings on his 1913 syllabus for Philosophy A at Harvard. See appendix (777).


p. 775: Instead of the index beginning on this page, an appendix containing a lately discovered document, the 1913 syllabus for Philosophy A at Harvard University, appears. The index follows on page 783.




1. *The Fifth-Year Class, Classical Course Students, 1903-04, Smith Academy, St. Louis*
(Eliot front row, second from right)



2. *Eliot, age 16 (1905), Smith Academy Yearbook, St. Louis*




3. *Eliot, age 17 (1906), Milton Academy Yearbook, Milton, MA*




4. *Milton Academy (Forbes House) (Eliot back row, far right)*



5. *Eliot, age 18 (1907), as Harvard undergraduate*



6. *Charles Townsend Copeland*



7. *George Santayana*

The Defects of Kipling.

A mouth-felling
Sentence.

As the novelty of certain innovations dies away, as the school of literature, of which Mr. Kipling is the most illustrious representative, the Exotic school, passes with all its blemishes exaggerated more and more into the hands of less brilliant ^{able} practitioners, so Kipling's fame is fading, and his unique charm is diminished. He himself has made little effort to increase his reputation in his own special province of literature, the Anglo-Indian Orient, ^{and} but in his late writings has turned to other subjects. This may well be the part of wisdom. For the popularity of his work was due not ^{more} only to his emphatic and vigorous style, his unquestioned technical merits, ^{than} but to the unfamiliarity and picturesqueness of his background. Now that a score of writers can boast of an acquaintance with the Equator, we are no longer so entranced by the Kiplingese as we were when Cobras had first learned to talk, and began to bring up small boys "by hand". We are at ease with the Congo, the China Sea, even with the Khyber Pass.

If a harsh statement with some
elements of truth.

Local color, especially in outlandish and unknown

all be heartily grateful for the
more vital energy of this im-
mature middle aged man, than
a feeble era of literature -

Altho' it is a great pleasure to
see that you can at last string
a long sentence, saving several,
each growing out of the one
before, you must now be on your
guard against becoming pom-
pous, ostentatious, and voluminous.

C. T. C.

E.

Thomas Eliot

English 12

March 2 1909.


Defects of Kipling.

As usual you lean to the un-
duly harsh. Your opinion of Kip-
ling's faults would carry more
weight if you could appreciate
without any mystifying qualifi-
cations such masterpieces as
the "End of the Passage", the
"Incarnation of Krishna Mulwary"
and best of all perhaps the
man who would be King.

Kipling is no favorite of
mine - I am a pianola that
often resents the music it
plays - but we should



10. *Eliot, age 21 (1910)*, Harvard Yearbook




11. The Harvard Advocate Staff, 1910 (Eliot front row, third from left)




12. *Eliot, age 22 (1910)*



13. *Alain-Fournier*



14. *Henri Bergson*



15. *Émile Durkheim*




16. Eliot, age 25 or 26 (ca. 1913), as graduate student in Harvard Philosophy Department




17. Charles Montague Bakewell




18. *Josiah Royce*




19. *Bertrand Russell*



20. *Josiah Royce, Hugo Munsterburg, George Herbert Palmer, William James (1908)*



22. Merton Students, 1914 (*Eliot third row, third from left*)




23. *F. H. Bradley*



24. *Harold H. Joachim*



25. *R. G. Collingwood*



26. *Eliot, age 27 (1916)*



28. Eliot in London, age 29 or 30 (ca. 1918)



29. *Harriet Shaw Weaver* (The Egoist)




30. *Margaret Anderson* (The Little Review)



31. *Harriet Monroe* (Poetry Magazine)

32. *Ezra Pound*





33. *Wyndham Lewis*



34. *H. D.*



35. *Richard Aldington*