THEORISING SOMALI SOCIETY

Hope, Transformation and Development

Pluriverse of Creativity: New Horizons of Planetary Realizations

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PLURIVERSE OF CREATIVITY:
NEW HORIZONS OF PLANETARY REALIZATIONS

VOLUME ONE

THEORISING SOMALI SOCIETY

Hope, Transformation and Development

Editors
Abdulkadir Osman Farah
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Introduction: Towards the Heterogeneous Theorisation of Somali Society

Abdulkadir Osman Farah and Mohamed A. Eno

> AN URGENT S.O.S. – The [Somali military] regime should have taken note of the underground text in much the same way that a good driver heeds the squeaky sound of a troubled engine, i.e., as an early warning system and as harbinger of breakdown, if not taken care of in time. If polls and a free press can measure and gauge popular sentiments and help politicians mend their ways accordingly, then dissident underground texts give a sneak preview of the rebellion simmering below the surface.
>
> Ali Jimale Ahmed, Daybreak is Near, Won't You Become Sour?.1996.
>
> Power. The chase for power, together with the ignorance of the instruments to govern a society or the inability to use them.
>
> Nurrudin Farah responding to the question of violence and the Somalis, in the journal Tydskrifvirletterkunde.
>
> My despair….is that as far as my understanding and experience are concerned, Somalis have not learned how to create a program greater than themselves that addresses the larger questions. Look, I don't have to like you, you don't have to like me, but our destinies are interwoven. For our own survival, even though we might hate each other – our destiny hangs on the two of us cooperating for a larger cause.
>
> Interview with Professor Said Sheikh Samatar, Bildhaan: *An International Journal of Somali Studi*es, 2008.

Different scholars from diverse backgrounds had over the years discussed and theorised the Somali society from multiple perspectives. Among them include western scholars whose studies often depart from Somalia's recent challenges; mainly the human sufferings and how western governments and societies see and interpret the predicaments of the Somali society. One such study, for instance, discusses the topic of white supremacy and how Canadian military forces, deployed in Somalia in early 1990s, tortured and eventually killed Somali adolescents (Razack, 2004). The study,

seemingly critical, considers the extreme cruelty of the Canadian army not as an isolated peripheral incident. Rather, it was portrayed as an integral part of a long standing imperial colonial project, originally imposed not just on the Somali society per se – but also on many other societies around the world (Busani and Sabelo, 2019). The historical, as well as recent propagators of such colonial project classify people as civilised/governable nations against comparatively uncivilised/less governable/ungovernable nations – in other words, obedient vs. disobedient (Allard-Tremblay and Coburn, 2021).

In extension, other studies focused on the presumably Somali generated violence, particularly the presumed psychological driving force that eventually affected the Somali society and beyond (Gerritsen et al, 2006; Bhui et al 2003). Though drawing on different conceptual approaches, these studies consider most of the violence and psychological deteriorations endured by Somalis, individually and collectively, occurring within and in relation to the Somali socio-structural mind/mentality. The assumption here is that such psychic violent actions and interactions will gradually, if not responsibly managed, be transplanted into the minds of presumably healthier societies. In differentiating the victims who might mostly suffer within the Somali society, substantial additional literature elevates existing particular vulnerabilities and oppression often targeting women and children (Burke, 2020). In order to find remedy, some scholars refer to the ingenuity of external actors and agents including states and international organisations, and how such organisations could fix the recurring Somali societal raptures (McMichael, 2004).

More recently, there have been numerous studies with concerted reflection on the transnational dimension of Somali migrants and refugees (Horst, 2006). Except very few, such as Kusow and Bjork (2007; Abdi, 2015), many of these studies, however, draw on the conventional nomadic clan thesis, thereby suggesting that Somalis remain clan-oriented nomads in search of pasture; regardless of their social status, demographic and geographic location. More significantly, scholars have similarly, in recent years, pursued the familiarisation of recurring topics such as state failure, security challenges, warlords and societal fragmentation. This category of anthropological, and occasionally sociological and political studies, consider the failure in Somalia mainly emanating from social deficiencies in the Somali society and is maintained through external involvement by diverse forms of proxies (Menkhaus, 2003;

Hagmann, 2009). Though these scholars recognise the external imposition of colonial or colonially inspired ideas and projects, they argue that Somalis suffer from extreme and ungovernable cultural traits mainly resting on corruption, avarice for individual accumulation, and clan identities and dialectics. Over the years, however, critical scholars have also constructively theorised that both externally and/or internally generated violence inflicts substantial damage and dispossession on particularly defenseless constituents among Somali indigenous populations rather than a collective suffering of the Somali population as a whole (Besteman, 1996; Eno, 2004; Eno, 2008; Kusow and Eno, 2015; Eno & Kusow, 2014). The quest for justice and stability in Somalia, therefore, remains complex and involves both internal and external social and political actors operating in much more intricate and interconnected transnational networks and structures (Menkhaus, 2013; Farah, 2016).

Obviously, though interdisciplinary and applying multiple methodological approaches, within the different studies, some scholars depart from narrow presumptions. Others project capabilities of disciplinary analysis by referring to the significance of existing structures and conclusions. In contrast, constructivist critical scholars seek balance, often departing from the suffering and vulnerability of the people and segments of the societies they study, thus revealing the dynamics and complexity of diverse socio-political phenomena.

Theorising process or a process of theorisation, therefore, often embeds an ideological terrain where a variety of social conundrums are consciously observed, reflected on, shared, tested and debated in the public domain. A work of theorising measures the scope of our understanding pertinent to our own worldview as well as the efforts of generating interpretations meaningful to the factors inherent to those views. A project of this nature domesticates the theoretical assumptions of the Somali people as viewed from their own local perspectives and responds to the colonial perception, often signifying single axis mode of problematising everything Somali. Viewed from another angle, it embraces the continental yearning for indigenously theorising the African social as well as the political milieus because, as Lindfors (2001:3) submits, "Bearers of a culture are better equipped to interpret that culture than aliens who have experienced its realities only vicariously." Lindfors convinces that "Those who share a

writer's background can more readily comprehend the full implications of his message" (2001:3).

Through this edited book of theoretical reflections, the aim is not to discredit earlier theorising efforts but to minimize the absence of potential additional conceptualisations and analyses by putting into perspective an indigenous framework that suits the interpretation of the local reality within the locus of theorisation and presented from the fountain of the local intellectual (Bourdieu, 1977; Ahmed, 1995, 1996; Mkabela, 2005; Mertens, 2008). Therefore, in our endeavor to engage with some local and regional theorisations and the reflections of their thought, we discuss the works of a few of them who contributed to comment on social realities politically, culturally, academically, literarily or in any other aspect. The scholarly pieces compiled in this volume quest for a better and more extensive understanding of the dialectics and the transformations taking place among the Somali society in multiple spheres with diverse competing and complementing social, political and cultural networks as well as a host of other multi-disciplinary fields (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2012).

Background and Contribution

For centuries, if not for a millennium, Somalis struggled for achieving a just society in particularly overcoming gross inequalities and injustices. According to Amartya Sen, there are numerous ways in which people, societies and states act unjustly within and across social, economic, political and cultural backgrounds. Sen believes, among such extreme injustices include the process of more or less directly accepting, adjusting and living with the injustices:

> "the problem is particularly acute in the context of entrenched inequalities and deprivations. A thoroughly deprived person, leading a very reduced life, might not appear to be badly off in terms of the mental metric of desire-fulfillment, if the hardship is accepted with non-grumbling resignation. In situations of longstanding deprivation, the victims do not go on grieving and lamenting all the time, and very often make great efforts to take pleasure in small mercies and to cut down personal desires to modest – 'realistic' proportions" (Sen, 1992: 55).

Pierre Bourdieu agrees with Sen's observation on people's more or less unconscious adaptation to social processes as they come as social realities; but whether these activities promote and sustain justice, or whether it is the opposite seems to be as subjective as it is multi-spherical. Here is where Bourdieu coined the concept of *habitus*

in which people relate to cultures, institutions and relationships within complex matrix of social interactions and exchanges. Bourdieu believes that for most people: "The habitus is necessity internalised and converted meaningful practices and meaning-giving perceptions…" (Bourdieu, 2010: 166)

There are, therefore, multiple ways of understanding and conceptualising the Somali society including the reflection of colonial and post-colonial perspectives. This implies that, so far no, obvious consensus exists and will probably not be the case; for instance, interpretatively and analytically agreeing on the socio-political processes of Somaliness, nationhood and statehood as well as other past or currently recurring political and social propositions in dealing with social and political ailments of the Somali society. Though largely there exist diverse theorisation attempts, projections and ambiguities, the recent social science works analysing the socio-political processes among the Somalis could be divided into roughly two main theoretical propositions. The first are the colonial attempts of observing and interpreting the Somali society at their convenience, namely as an integrated part of the colonial project as there exists a long history of subjugation originating from Europe. Although we often associate European thinkers such as Hegel with the significance of ideal, peaceful co-existing society balanced by an inclusive moral state resting on vibrant and conscious civil society, Hegel, similar to his European predecessors, conceptualised a European superiority frame. The proposition by Hegel means that European cultures remain superior to other cultures in Asia and in Africa, where he argued in one occasion that Africans have, unlike Europeans, no social, cultural and political history. Hegel's outright misconception informs typical European image that Africans are, for instance, less conscious for the dynamics of their lives (McCaskie, T. C., 2019). Hegel stressed the categories of self (attributed here to the European) and the other (referring to nations that might get into a conflict with European superiority). Hegel, among other western thinkers, categorised the same old western idea of master-slave relationships that are key not just to human consciousness and idealism but also to the practical human social encounters and connections. In colonial terminology, this could be framed as a dynamic relationship between the colonisers and the colonised.

A thesis that is partially related to this superiority claim considers Somalis as potentially homogeneous nation of a people who are

nonetheless divided into often warring nomadic clan factions constantly striving for social and political power domination (Lewis, 1966). Here Lewis is not talking about a general human frame, and not even the conscious self (which is obviously taken for granted to be a European). He rather analyses the other, which in this regard happens to be the African, the Somali, who is characterised as a nomad who is together with other homogenous people living in a pastoral rural nation of fragmented and bellicose clans.

In countering Lewis' inspired scholarship and analysis based on superior-inferior categorisation, an alternative re-descriptions and theorisations proposes a much more diverse heterogeneous Somali society with potentially diverse social groups with distinct cultures and characteristics (Ahmed, 1993, 1996). Ahmed suggests the following:

> "Definitions formulated by experts [scholars, whether indigenous or not] contribute to your conception of a defined word's outside referent. Somalia as textual (possibly also verbal) construction by scholars and explorers has turned out to be different from the "real thing". From Burton to Lewis and beyond, the Somali has ritually become associated with a multiplicity of externally duplicitous phrases (tropes): pastoral democracy, oratorial excellence, poetical ingenuity, static clan structures and various forms of andro-centric metaphors. These phrases have over the years acquired official status," (Ahmed, 1993).

This volume therefore belongs to the second critical approach of Somali studies, stressing diversity and complexity in numerous aspects of theorising the political, cultural, ethnic and social formations. We nonetheless argue that the endeavor is far from conclusive. It only paves the way for other upcoming and emerging works – that any potentially and carefully thought of reasonable theorisation is a welcome contribution to the field. In our opinion, there exists no fixed theorisation of the Somalis or any other society for that matter, as cultures and civilisations remain dynamic and in constant movement with continuing encounters, interactions and transformations from below, the middle and above. The implication is that all theorisations, though different in their nature and context, are equally acceptable and in certain cases complement each other, as these different understandings represent a selected dimension or perspective towards a theorising attempt of the society.

Since Ibn-Battuta's arrival in the coastal Somali city states of Adel and Mogadishu in around 1337 (or probably much earlier when sailing Pharaohs visited the Somali peninsula for trade and semi-

theological expeditions), migrants from near and far territories recorded, reflected and interpreted Somali social and political conditions (Mukhtar, 1987). It was, however, the ambitious European colonial migrants that particularly and greatly impacted on the theorisation of Somali society as well as its political and organisational patterns, mainly within an anthropological domain. Among such prominent migrants include Richard Burton, whose successful portrait of his migration as "The First Footsteps in East Africa," not just captured western imagination but was canonised as an integral part of British colonial expansion into the region (Burton, 1966/2019).

Another prominent Briton, Lewis, left not just footsteps in the region, but also substantially lasting footprints on the theorisation of Somali society. Lewis's over six decades long theoretical scholarship created a systematic theoretical discourse and interpretation of the Somali society within the framework of clan-oriented nomadic conception. Particularly, in the social and political domain, the assumption of a primordially structured society eventually, through diverse hegemonic practices, obtained greater signification and top-down legitimisation (Lewis, 1994, 1999, 2003, 2017). Such selective theorisations prevailed in the context of decolonisation; subsequently affecting the mindset of the leaders of the diverse state building attempts of first multiparty semi-western democratic systems, in the centralised authoritarian military rule and later in the current chaotic era of factionalism, extremism and warlordism.

Researchers, both migrants and natives, studied and theorised Somalia from the perspective of clan-nomadic belief and practice for more than a century. Accordingly, Somali studies became an aspect of such static belief and practice and an extension of the old anthropological view of the colonial tutelage. In contrast to those traditionalist observations and conceptualisations, this edited volume seeks alternative paradigm in exploring existing social and political theorisations by Somalist Scholars as well as Somali cultural intellectuals. The contributors to this volume destabilize what was dominantly perceived to be stable formations, by bringing the old perceptions under a renewed scrutiny that theorizes Somalia from multi-spherical social conditions.

These multivariate transformations, as theorized by Somali writers, scholars and traditional intellectuals in different disciplines include political science, anthropology, literature, sociology, history,

linguistics and a host of other fields. They provide the reader with appropriate insights to not just access the intellectual perceptions of the discussed but also by extension the broadening of the analytical and critical domain of their works as well, if only even a little, the scope of our knowledge-base by appreciating the re-invention or rediscovery of our intellectual being through the image of our local theorists.

In addition to the two main attempts of theorizing the Somali society, we also suggest that currently, particularly regarding the Somali social and political theorisation, the society roughly falls into three main groupings. First concern is the theorisation processes representing the imitative or emulative discourses. Once, a Somali traditional intellectual, Afqalooc, urged Somalis to seek external inspiration from comparatively more dynamic and more advanced societies. He suggested "Dib maxaa idiin celinayoo horay idiin diiday, mar uun miyaydaaan ku dayaneyn khalqiga libinta doonaaya?" Like most Somali northerners seeking opportunities abroad, Afqalooc migrated to Aden, then a British economic and military powerhouse, from where he also conducted secondary migration to other countries. In exile, he became acquainted with cosmopolitanism and diversity and eventually realised both the uniformity and bias in the Somali social and political conditions. In essence, his plea longed for a linear evolutionary development in which comparison and exchanges with other societies represent the way forward. Eventually, Somali scholarship theorising a Somalised version of semi-Marxist socialist thought as well as others propagating for liberal capitalist social and political structures also presumed the need for a local adaptation of external theoretical thinking, as observed in Ahmed's work (1996). Similarly, Somali thinkers proposing religious revivalism sought inspiration and guidance from Arab Middle Eastern societies for models of social and political theorisation that could be downloaded and applied in the local context (Abdullahi, 2015).

There is another section of scholars who represent diverse critical schools of social and political theorisations. These scholars decenter and destabilize the previously held belief about Somalia by criticizing the blind adaptation of imported social and political models of euro-centrism and Arab-centrism. Instead, they propose a critical interpretation and reconceptualisation of the social and political realities on the ground from a constructivist viewpoint (Ahmed, 1995, 1996; Kusow, 2004; Eno, 2008; Mahadallah, H. (2007) The

Islamic Courts, Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia, and its implications for regional stability. Horn of Africa, 25, 135-164. Farah, 2016) – contrary to Abdullahi's (2018) unrefined, erroneous description calling them "school of revisionism" – thus overlooking the constructivist thought gleaned in the various works of the scholars in his discussion.

The third reflects the globalisation era in which movements and multiple forms of mobilities became part of an increasing de-territorialisation and displacement – both physically and mentally. Time and space are no longer organised in localised, national contexts but in an increasingly complex transnational relationships in which Somalis are part of the increasingly global dimensions of citizenships. Potential attempts of theorisation, therefore, have to take the actual spatial organisation. It can no longer be treated as an issue of linear progression of social and political realities, but a continuing evolvement and interpretation of social and political endeavors that have no particularly limited boundaries or scope of moving from A to Z or from bottom to top.

Often the assumptions of earlier theorisations imbibe from the almost canonised colonial and post-colonial perspectives emphasizing that the Somali society consists of traditional clans that confront tremendous challenges in moving towards a concerted nationhood, let alone the formation of a viable modern statehood. Meanwhile, critical scholars depart from the idea that the Somali society is as dynamic as any other society while at the same time it remains unique in its own similar to other societies of the world. The Somalis are differentiated by multiple categories and characteristics including class, ethnicity, urban-rural etc. This book argues that though Somalis might have their distinct context, situations and circumstances to depart from and belong to, they nevertheless belong to and interact within and towards the world. Therefore, it is almost impossible in today's world to theorize a genuinely homogeneous, static and unchangeable Somali nation of societies. The core issue therefore remains the individual and collective pursuit of human dignity and social justice, regardless of background. This is what Somalis, like other societies, should strive for and consolidate – maybe in accordance with their own terms and tenor.

Finally, the contributions in this book attempt to theorize multifarious aspects of Somali social and political realities that are benchmarked on models or frames of society, state, culture and self,

which they propose and present. This edition advocates not for the seclusion of Somali theorists from the interconnected global thinking. The editors and contributors of this volume are aware of the scholars' and intellectuals' influences on not just what represents the local, national but equally also on what fosters the transnational connections of knowledge and discourse framing. Somali social theorisation should, however, occupy its decent place in Somali and global studies as an essential apparatus for the imagination and pursuit of a just and inclusive society. By decency, we mean that the society should not merely receive, imitate, or adopt that which was the given/taken for granted; but aspire to assume a pertinent source of scholarship that provides pathways and perspectives for better humanity, harmonious co-existence and co-development both on the local scene as well as at the global/transnational landscape. The endeavor of this debut work on Somali social theory is reflected in the various essays contained in this volume and assembled from diverse but impressive scholars and intellectuals who bring a wide range of nuanced perspectives on how to dissect and sharpen the distinctiveness and analysis of Somali social theorisation.

Chapter Contributions

In chapter one, Abdulkadir Osman Farah analyses Hadraawi introduced analytical concept of "public dhulgariir" which means public "earthquake". Apart from capturing the Somali socio-political dynamics and transition towards hopefully a more just and inclusive Somali society, the concept of "public-dhulgariir" refers to the emergence of destructive socio-political sphere. If societies fail addressing such discrepancies, it could become lethal for the processes of not just citizenship and state formations but also in relation to the prevention of continuing widespread injustices, particularly among the most vulnerable.

From this background, the chapter suggests, that Hadraawi's presentation of the public "public-dhulgariir" enables opposing communities to understand how and why citizenship injustices prevail by stressing the importance of preventing such decline and by including the perspectives of marginalized communities into the mainstream discourse. Hadraawi's proposal also guides communities to the potential of pursuing a deliberative, open and inclusive democratic society, without necessarily sacrificing the well-being of the excluded and the least privileged in the society.

In chapter two, Danson S. Kahyana analyses two collections of Mohamed A. Eno's poetry, namely: *Corpses on the Menu: Blood, Bullets, and Bones* (2013) and *Wizard of the Two Niles* (2015) as allegories of the post-independence African situation. Kahyana argues that while the allegory seems to shroud the collections in a tone of pessimism, a closer look at the poems reveals that there in fact emit rays of hope since wizards and cannibals are not invincible. Kahyana's analysis implies that with concerted effort, the wicked can be defeated because they symbolically represent the crumbling of the moral, socioeconomic and political decadence that they indulge in. About *Corpses on the Menu*, Kahyana theorizes the everyday problems faced not only by Somalis but by the African society in general – a society impoverished by corruption, tribalism, nepotism, and poor leadership.

In chapter three, Anders Michelsen and Rashid Ali focus rest on specific part of culture: urban and architectural design of the buildings where we live for shelter, dwelling, subsistence and common social life and all that goes with this – the "life between buildings:" the livable habitat. Culture is here understood academically in the anthropological sense as something which comprehends all that goes into life: problem solutions to the most different problems, symbolized meaning, the codes and discourses we use to name things and speak about them, and aesthetics for shaping use, which convey art and beauty, including the imagination and related issue such as affect and memory, what we feel good about remembering, and the opposite. In all this building is a strong element, urban and architectural design has been a marker of the livable habitat since the earliest societies, think about the Pyramids.

In chapter four, Fred Jonyo and Mohamed A. Eno focus on the role of socio-class and clan inequalities in Somalia as among the core factors that perpetuated the conflict in the country. They theorize that the ongoing Somalia struggle is mainly characterized, among other things, by social-class as well as clan inequalities. The central question in this paper is; to what extent does the issue of inequalities in Somalia, be it class or clan, influence the persistence of the chronic instability in that country? In order to answer this question, the paper sets out the key objective which is to establish the extent to which clan and socio-class interplay to sustain and invigorate the inequalities and chaos that undermine Somali stability. The authors, drawing on the human needs theory as proposed by John Burton, and the

concept of tribal ideology as explained by Archie Mafeje (1971), express the essence of combining these dual theories in their presentation and interpretation of the conflict in Horn of Africa nation. By extension, the chapter focuses on Mafeje's observation, particularly from the perspective of "the man who invokes tribal ideology in order to maintain a poser position, not in the tribal area, but in the modern capital city, and whose ultimate aim is to undermine and exploit the supposed tribesmen" (1971, 258).

In chapter five, Abdirachid M. Ismail details the context in which Somalia's central government collapsed in a situation where substantial gap exists between Somali clan mode of organisation and the modern democratic political system. Ismail claims that among other deficiencies, it is mainly this gap that first led to chaotic governance and then developed into the political coup of the 1969 and the dictatorship of Siyad Barre. Furthermore, Ismail suggests that the concept of "Somali unity" is a relatively unstable concept. The prevailing conceptualisations of "Somali unity" remain different from the Somalis' own perceptions of unity and connectedness. Ismail argues that this perspective and the conceptual discrepancy as (mis)understood by foreigners and the (mis)interpretation of Somali unity or Somaliness itself diverges from the internal perception and conception of Somaliness.

In chapter six, Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow) provides a nuanced argument of how theorizes Islam and Islamists in Somalia. Focusing on the critical conceptions and cultural challenges, Abdullahi redefines some critical terminologies to accord to the Islamic perspective as he also lays out a general framework of Islam and conceptualizes Sharia and its critical classification of human actions and utterances. In addition, he attempts theorizing the location of the state in the general framework of Islam, thereby presenting an overview of the conceptions of Islamists regarding the modern state.

In chapter seven, Yusuf A. Nur discusses the role of the private sector and Business-Government Partnerships (BGPs) in Somalia and how they can contribute to the economic development in the country. The chapter reviews a brief historical background of the economic and political change in Somalia with focus on the role of public-private partnerships in infrastructure investment and economic development. Nur argues that statelessness in the Somali Republic has created an environment in which new business models

could flourish with minimal government interference, and without competition from international firms. Statelessness, as Nur theorizes, did away with government institutions that had long hindered Somali entrepreneurship. The author, Nur, proposes that public infrastructure investment in Somalia may build on the successful business models that the Somali economy has developed in recent years, arguing that BGPs have a unique role to play in the reconstruction of the Somali economic infrastructure.

In chapter eight, Ibrahim Karatas analyses Turkey's military assistance to Somalia and how Turkey's establishment of a military base in the Horn of Africa has led to critical debates about Turkey's real intention in Somalia. Suspected of fulfilling global hegemonic ambitions, Turkey is claimed to extend its influence to Somalia via its army to realize its self-interested goals. Karatas argues on the contrary, postulating that the Turkish army helps the Somali army to restore order and fight terrorism rather than, as it is often (mis)stated, exploiting Somalia's natural resources. This is proven by the fact that Turkey's humanitarian policies toward Somalia come before its strategic security efforts. In addition, while Turkey prioritizes solving Somalia's deep problems to its own ends, it nevertheless uses Somalia to enter the African market, control important waterways, and boost its international image via its soft power.

In chapter nine, Michele Deramo presents a narrativized theorisation of an occasion of Somali wedding, more specifically Mariam's wedding. The portrait of Mariam's wedding presents a unique observation of how a Somali diasporic community constructs identity through the continuation and adaptation of signifying cultural practices performed in the diaspora and yet connected to its original roots at home, in the village and to the ancestors. Michele argues that the beauty preparations, the extended celebrations, the public processions, the gathering of Somali Bantu from far distant cities and states, and the circulation of wedding videos months after the event discursively shape the community in a way that simultaneously characterizes it from its bi-cultural reality portraying both ancestral and diasporal images. The wedding celebration is thus performative insofar as it constitutes Somali Bantu-ness.

In chapter 10 Barack Calvince discusses the international community's efforts in the Somali peace process – considering it as a partial failure. Barack argues that the failure manly stems from the lack of consistence and coordination combined with top-down

external and internal processes – excluding and in certain extent subordinating most of the society. Despite this predicament, some regions in the Northern part of the country, namely Somaliland and Puntland enjoy relative peace and certain form of traditional public inclusion and consultation. They created some form of pragmatic hybrid political and social exchanges.

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CHAPTER 1

Preventing Socio-political Public Earthquake "dhulgariir"

Abdulkadir Osman Farah

Introduction

As one of the most prominent Somali activist intellectuals, Mohamed Ibrahim Hadraawi contributed to public debates within the Somali society for about six decades (Orwin, 2011). Particularly his poetry had long scrutinized forms of power abuses resulting social injustices in the society. Unlike in established democracies where most of people might take citizenship rights and justices as almost guaranteed – Hadraawi knew that the Somali society, though certain forms of public institutions at different levels might exist, mostly when dealing with issues related to belonging and injustices, people operate within traditional society platforms.

Existing conventional literature theorizes the Somalis as viciously competing traditional, largely clan-oriented constituents with lesser emphasis on the formation collective public institutions. Institutions that would have enabled the public coping with citizenship challenges as well as the prevention of injustices. Emerging critical studies, however, partially document the existence of public framing within the Somali society, particularly aspects related to civic challenges, generated mainly by either civic activists, diaspora groups, women and media groups (Ingiriis, 2012; Dini and Farah 2014; Affi, 2020). Within this tendential civic context, Hadraawi introduced the analytical concept of "public-dhulgariir" which means "public earthquake". Apart from capturing the Somali socio-political dynamics and transition towards hopefully a more just and inclusive Somali society, the concept of "public-dhulgariir" refers to the emergence of destructive socio-political sphere. If societies fail

addressing such discrepancies, it becomes lethal for the processes of not just citizenship and state formation but also in relation to overall prevention of continuing widespread injustices.

Since Kant's "critique of pure reason", social scientists considered public social injustices as the main obstacles for the formation and maintenance of a tolerant and inclusive society (Anderson-Gold, 2001). Generally, in the current world, debates on how should a proper society function and the characterisation of citizenship and justice, more or less, remains within the domain of western discourse (Kaldor, 2020). However other parts of the world also conceptualize and theorize public social injustices – particularly aspects emerging from processes of citizenship imposition or acquisition (Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013). In addition, such conceptions often also recognize not just the individual human agency but also the transformative capabilities of public discourse.

Although discourse is important for the public both in accessing sociological and political needs, often it is the dynamics of a just citizenship and the process of acquiring a proper justice or preventing injustices in the society that constitute the core. People often discuss concepts of injustices and citizenship through diverse forms of discourses and deliberations. Unless there is a harsh dictatorship, people will continue debating on citizenship issues and beyond. Even under dictatorships, people somehow manage in finding ways to subvert censorships or state attention by embarking on what Ahmed refers to as the "underground text" or speech (Ahmed, 1996).

Hadraawi focuses the dialectical relationship between discourses and citizenship formations, by not just viewing it from the perspectives of the mainstream, but he also elevates the concerns of marginal constituents in the society (Affi, 2014). Hadraawi, for instance, explains how, in mainstream dominated societal discourses, it is mainly the marginalized communities that often lose voice and agency. In taking notes on how dominant constituents in the society deal with the less privileged groups, he nonetheless suggests, the group remains central on how the overall society functions and eventually transforms.

In his public "public-dhulgariir" conception, Hadraawi does not specify how a "non-public-dhulgariir" public sphere takes shape. However, Hadraawi describes social and political perspectives and context in which, in the name of alternating state and citizenship

formations, people commit injustices. Over longer periods, dominant groups in the society have, through both coercive and consensual power exertions, created institutions that routinely exclude people, particularly those who belong to marginal groups in the society (Hill, 2010). Hadraawi thus suggests that societies need to avoid "public-dhulgariir" in connection with continuing reflections on societal development from the perspectives of the excluded.

Furthermore, Hadraawi focuses on how citizenship injustices and humiliations remain widespread among the Somalis. Injustices such as discrimination, oppression etc. that eventually produced the collapse of the Somali state and subsequently created immense suffering that left the world flabbergasted since early 1990s.

Although Hadraawi emphasizes the importance of societal justice in order to attain a proper citizenship in the society, he at the same time seems preoccupied with the significance of electing/selecting visionary and decent leadership. Despite this top-down emphasis on nation-state development, Hadraawi advances critical propositions of the conditions that restrain and subordinate the least privileged.

How much Hadraawi actively participated or himself suffered from direct injustices and violence remains unclear. After the war, he emerged as a committed thinker preoccupied with the promotion of enlightenment and democratic principles in the society, that he since campaigned and rigorously defended (Elmi, 2016). This has probably to do with that often thinkers who were young during world wars and may had in consequence suffered from "extreme forms of injustice, violence and cruelty" might after the end of wars become preoccupied with democracy, peace-building, consensus and co-existence (Dallmayr,2020: 97). Hadraawi grew up in a colonial Aden, Yemen, then a British colonial administered territory. Later, around late 1960s following a civil war among the Yemenis, he fled to his homeland Somalia, particularly the capital Mogadishu, where he initially supported and later fiercely resisted the military dictatorship throughout his thinking and poetry (Ahmed, 1996; Orwin, 2006; Ahad, 2015).

Hadraawi's childhood began in the diaspora. Later as a dissident opposing Somali military rule, he joined rebel movements hosted by the hegemon neighbor in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia. Demoralized and displaced by the civil war and the subsequent strife, in about five years, he lived as a refugee in England where he famously coined the phrase "waa is waayey" – which roughly translates as "I lost my

identity". In a way Hadraawi though seemingly longing for an ideal society that can curb injustices through social and political organisation and public discourse and legitimation, he describes existing injustices are a moral call for humanity to address existing and potential social and political ills as well as inequalities in order to pursue a dignified life for all. In addition, Hadraawi insists on the creation of reasonable and visionary leadership that departs from the needs and aspirations of the least privileged in the society, while also seeking the support and legitimation of the wider public. He aims moral and ethical perfection of the society. It is within the public "public-dhulgariir" as the place where dominant groups, together with the public and through the application of public discourses, more or less deliberate exclusions that subsequently destroy the society occures. His approach reflects his background as educationist, poet philosopher and public intellectual (Ahmed, 1996; Orwin, 2006; Ahad, 2015).

Subordinating the Least Privileged in the Society

Conflicting diverse groups in the Somali society interact and more or less intentionally generate the subordination of marginalized Somali communities. The marginalized then suffers (or suffer) from widespread violations including systemic injustices. Particularly, the dominant socio-political constituents, the elites, often lead the way in oppressing the lesser privileged excluded groups. The elites mainly pursue this through the monopolisation of power and public institutions as well as the sawing of divide and rule procedures and selective favourable community constituents. Hadraawi identifies such deficient asymmetries in contemporary Somali society collectively producing "public-dhulgariir" resulting from conditions of extreme societal imbalances. Under such conditions, dominant groups in the society prosper through the accumulation of power and wealth, while significant portions of the society, particularly those belonging to marginalized minority communities, routinely suffer from multiple forms of cruelties. Such violations include recurring systematic exclusions from socio-political spaces. This also include the prevalent stigma resulting concocted traditional violations and suffering for the marginalized sustaining such injustices (Kusow and Eno 2015; Eno and Kusow 2014; Eno et al. 2013).

Paradoxically, often the suffering marginalized communities long and stand for the promotion of national causes in, for instance,

responding to the call for public duty in defending the nation and relieving it from challenging national calamities. In addition, while marginalized communities, in certain times, remain reluctant and passive, in relation to existing dynamics of socio-political and cultural justifications, minority activists resist such oppressions urging communities to mobilize socio-politically in opposing the oppressions from the dominant (Mire, 2020).

Hadraawi further warns that insisting on prevailing unjust treatments of minority communities concerns not just the community alone. Such transgressions eventually engulf the wider society. Eventually, the supposedly privileged constituents also suffer from the normalisation and spread of nationwide injustices. People then realize that earlier socio-political actions and priorities, shaped under original artificial hierarchy of a dominant (us) versus a dominated (others) platforms, seem unsustainable. From such platforms the affluent groups exclude stigma-stricken and subjugated marginal groups. Avoiding and preventing people abandoning such practices, sustains the fragmentation of the war-ravaged Somali society. Thus, the persistent disempowerment upon marginal groups by the dominant constituents – in situations Hadraawi describes as "dhawawalka iyo dhoohaanta" forgetfullness and foolishness emanating from "dhab darro and dhaawac" aggression and wounds inflicted on them by the oppressors. Their suffering of "dhimir saarid and dhafoor taabasho" psychological uncertainties and shock results "dhabanna qodqodid".

Neglected expectations and status quo adaptations results from bewilderment and absence of self-confidence socio-political activities in which majority blames and criticizes with "dhaliil" guilty verdict against minorities without them doing any wrong "wax dhimis". Some of the suffering migrate from the country and society, others take revenge. A kind of a neglected "halyeey", a hero who angrily abandons his homestead. However, trauma and other psychological problems experienced during conflicts can travel with people when they resettle abroad. Such earlier traumatic experiences also moves from the generation that directly experienced to generations living under post-conflict or post-dictatorship situations (Fromm, 2018). Moreover, the majority denies the marginalized groups, particularly, from their civic rights in the public and attainment of their aspirations, though usually not materialized, minorities often expect betterment of their conditions in the social space. However,

dominant groups ignore to frame and implement a permanent solution. The condemning cases against minorities constitutes no obvious criticism "dhaliil" but only on heredity "dhaxal" and birth-right "dhalasho". This is obviously an issue of signification and legitimation by the dominant constituents in maintaining the status quo. Minorities then painstakingly assume adaptation to the status quo, while the dominant groups continue degrading them. The minorities have built and supported the society, but failed to get proper response to their efforts – by accessing no "dhay" meaning no recognition or remedy from the dominant group. Although the minority groups and their material production and contribution to the society remains immense, they, nonetheless, lack "xoolo xareyn" livestock properties which is traditionally used to be critical for social mobility, the accumulation of power as well as the measurement of wealth.

Dominant socio-political elites, often belonging to the dominant clan groups maintain oppression in the society. In forestalling injustices, Hadraawi suggests, such affluent elites and their constituents promoting progressive reforms and vision with reconciliatory ideas – in collaboration with the wider society, particularly in relation to the least privileged. This means creation of fairer state and citizenship structures, spearheaded by visionary and politically committed leadership. Such leaders then have to obtain approval and legitimacy from the wider society – particularly from the least privileged. For Hadraawi, though people should reject dictatorships and authoritarians, societies need considerable power consolidation and state constitution as long as such structures serve the society as a whole – with particular emphasis on the well-being of the marginally excluded. This requires the creation and preservation of institutional arrangements that counter dominant groups and elites. Such institutions will then provide spaces for social and political expression. The question is, however, not just to discuss and debate social equalities in equal terms – but also to strongly side with the weakest among the society. For Hadraawi, moral principles and decency remain crucial, under which particularly the economically powerful and political leaders demonstrating obvious moral virtue competence.

Institutions sustaining such discrepancies include the state as well as the traditional clan structure. For Hadraawi, Somalis have since ancient times practiced localized injustices against particularly the so-

called non-noble clan minorities. Against such underprivileged constituents, the dominant groups commit transgressions – usually with impunity (Eno, 2008). Overtime, however, ironically such institutionalized aggressions extend to most components of the society.

Despite the widely held principal of human equality, in most societies, wealth and power remains unequally distributed among diverse social groups (Sen, 2011). Such conditions strengthen domination of the elite and certain privileged groups over the rest, often disempowering the less powerful. The prolongation of such imbalance inevitably undermines the wellbeing of the society, particularly opportunities for the least privileged. These include groups of people that often represent the backbone of not just the economy but also the society as a whole (Besteman, 2014). Obviously, in accessing and maintaining social and material resources, dominant social groups, for instance the educated, prosperous urbanites etc., often subordinate vulnerable groups away from the power consolidation bracket. Similarly, colonizers or subsequent dictatorships, that for Hadraawi signify as "dhabdhable" have imposed viciously oppressive systems, in which they entertain a "dhalanteed" – meaning "illusions" and are only good at using "dhoombir" arms, intimidating violence and force.

The Publics Preventing the "Public-dhulgariir"

For Hadraawi the society prevents injustices through a rational public discursive approach – that then might promote social cohesion and solidarity. In that regard, continuing public deliberations and consensus provides best solutions for a consensus-oriented society. Nonetheless, Hadraawi highlights the importance of facilitating agency in overcoming gross injustices in the society. Agency often infringed by injustices mainly (directly or indirectly) committed by the elites supported by the majority – meaning the dominant groups in the society – against marginal communities. Research shows that injustices by the dominant constituents in the society restricting universal entitlements (Malloy, 2014). The society therefore needs the modification of the general consensus and publicity in the society by accommodating the marginalized communities.

Often if diverse social groups in the society, through rational and discursive approaches promote cohesion and solidarity, such continuing public deliberations will have the potential in

transforming the society towards more inclusive and consensus-oriented society. However, such deliberative and consensus-oriented steps represent the means to an end in maintaining a just, and thereby, lesser cruel society. This is particularly the case among those accessing or exercising socio-political public power. Eventually, better functioning institutions could emerge from such public discourses. Though in the end, the agency of particularly the marginalized community should remain vibrant.

More importantly, societies need some kind of collective articulation of how to reverse injustices and subsequent humiliations inflicted on marginal constituents in the society. Accessibility and participation of the public discourses alone therefore is not enough. For instance, Eno (2017:146) urges society to the "[re]direction of the course…towards emancipation" in Ahmed adds (2012:17) the anticipating of social cohesiveness in a "convergence ushering in the era of a new totem," Hadraawi calls for people with best moral qualities to undertake the task of transforming the public discourses into a possible legislation and subsequent institutional frames. This implies that such candidates should have what Weber conceptualized as a political "passion and direction" (Mommsen and Osterhammel, 2013: 342). In addition, for Hadraawi, there has to be a consistent moral accountability – particularly among the leaders and other influential decision-makers.

More importantly, reversing injustices and humiliations inflicted upon marginalized communities can happen by allowing such groups actively participating and contributing to the public life of the society. In concrete terms, this means the emancipation and liberation of such communities from the historical and traditional chains. In addition, the society should eliminate unjust hierarchies in the society and potential dismantling of persisting subordinations of the communities. Under such circumstances, moral integrity remains critical for such process. If sincere leadership deliberates such injustices and provides directions and legislations for overcoming such limitations then the situation could improve.

Hadraawi's reflections on gross injustices through "public-dhulgariir" herewith contributes to the rationalisation of the public (Joly, 2016). He particularly insists on the prevention of "public-dhulgariir", or in Ahmed's (2012:22) terms "Blitzkrieg". "Public-dhulgariir" occurs when the society in general fails to reflect and seriously consider the life worlds of excluded citizens and those

suffering from widespread public injustices and humiliations. The paradoxical conditions of supposedly democratic and/or egalitarian public amid the oppression of minorities creates unbalanced relationships of undesirable consequences. Needless to say, that the arrogance of the dominant not to accommodate human equality perpetrates ignorance and arrogance among the dominant groups of never understanding the core values which the denigrated section of society stands for (Ahmed 1996). The process then transpires grievances among the excluded who often are the impoverished constituents of the society.

The society needs to overcome persisting socio-political denials. This includes the acknowledgement of the contribution of marginalized communities to the well-being of the society. For instance, during periods of external pressure all citizens including the oppressed minorities equally sacrifice, particularly when the ideals of national sovereignty and protection of the motherland are at stake. For attending to higher causes such as nationalism and patriotism, all citizens, regardless of social status and ethno-cultural background, join forces to overcome pressing existential challenges. Mahadallah, H. O. (1997) The origins and essence of Somali nationalism. Tulane University.

Hadraawi sees that as soon as threats subside and leaders return to routines, the old traditional of unequal relationships and injustices are reinforced to the detriment of the weak, the voiceless. Although people jointly contributed to the liberation of societies, certain well-positioned groups often rib most of the benefits. Privileged groups, manipulating genealogical identities and colonial education, exercises dominance against marginal and lesser privileged groups. In addressing such perpetual injustices, Hadraawi proposes the political elite should project and pursue more politically inclusive vision and direction. Such commitment could consequently mobilize collective resources and might eventually reduce injustices in the society.

Preventing "public-Dhulgariir"

Somalis endured both historic and current social ruptures as well as diverse forms of injustices within the society and beyond. Usually in an ideal society, all men should supposedly be equal. However, with existing practices, prevailing circumstances and the pursuing of conflicting socio-political trajectories, people indulge into practices of inequalities, vicious division and corrupting relationships.

According to Hadraawi, the worst form of such societal degeneration and friction generates a "public-dhulgariir" (an earthquake) that "suddenly sneaks into "the middle of stable night" while people remain in deep sleep.

Such injustices remain interconnected and mostly emerge from a politicized social interaction in which dominant groups of the society claim traditional nobility and originality, while the dominated groups struggle for survival and eventually fall victim of unnecessary injustices. Hadraawi invokes the image of animals relating to unpleasant odor. While humans might do the same but also rationalize beyond in adopting to a long-term serious relationship linked to urban-hood, civilisation and neighbourhood. The dilemma is that dominant groups practice when they proclaim "heybtirsi" – as a form of genealogical connections and proclamations that might be relevant for humans to recognize and help each other. Apart from presumed biological relations, people have also different reasoning capabilities and values. Despite the persistent practicing of inequalities, through "heybtirsi" or "abtirsi" genealogical tracing and "heybsooc", genealogical discrimination/exclusion, by for instance not marrying people from particular clans, then people eventually react to such challenges. When an external dominant group in the form of colonial powers or dictatorships exert injustices against most of the society – then people mobilize collectively to address injustices temporarily – concentrating on what people presumably consider the bigger injustices.

Among the Somalis, injustices against minorities existed for centuries, if not a millennium, the enigma remained significantly unaddressed: by neither the authorities nor the wider public. When colonial powers came and subordinated the Somali society, people temporarily ignored the internal subordination and joined forces to overcome the bigger, foreign enemy. However, Somalis failed to extend such collective efforts and energy to curb the predicaments of internal injustices.

Revolting against Injustices

When things fall apart, people who have had enough of injustices eventually rise up and use bud "clubs; budgeons" iyo dhagax "stones; rocks" to revolt and seek liberation. One such uprising occurs when people rebel against oppressive systems due to prevailing "relative deprivation" that, according to Theodore Gurr, create substantial

gaps in the society. This is an expectation gap of what people expect to get and what they actually get form systems and institutions. This public discontent institute mass mobilisation that could potentially lead to violence and division (Gurr, 2015). In the past, this form of struggle and rebellion against foreigners enabled, people to achieving independence. For Hadraawi, this is a partial independence as it does not incorporate all but for the few ruling classes. Dominant group injustices therefore continue nourishing the corruption of the group itself as well as stigmatisation and adaptation of the suffering group. Though dominant social groups have obtained concessions of the new independent society, marginal groups remain subordinate, paving the way for oppression and injustices that prevailed.

One of the main obstacles was the concerns related to the lack of visionary leadership. For him, soon after the independency, the best solution would have been if the relative unity and the rebellion against colonial powers persisted and people addressed all injustices internally and externally. This did not happen and injustices inflicted against particularly minorities, as well as the wider public at large, unfortunately continued. Ultimately, the process led to the collapse and the fragmentation of the society as a whole. The fact is that here is a constant struggle for recognition and need for caring relations by those feeling excluded.

Hadraawi, however, highlights the conditions of the suppressed or ignored by dominant groups. Though the excluded remain valuable productively and historically, the elite see them as subordinate. Hence, minorities often experience exclusion in multiple dimensions: the valuation of humans and the historic dimension of belonging to the same origin and place. This is clearly an incomplete and problematic justice as it is also unfair and builds on colonisation and subsequent injustices within the society resting on structural and cultural dimensions. Hadraawi, therefore, urges the society for the recognition and valuation of the oppressed while simultaneously accusing the dominant groups for the continuing exclusion and suffering.

The poetic image Hadrawi visualizes is that of natural human equality from birth and creation. The idea of oppression and exclusion is therefore, as the thinker explains, unnatural and unsustainable. This means that the tendencies to exclude are against the natural human conditions. Consequently, the stigma of exclusion and degradation makes the oppressed experience "dhaqaaq-joogsi iyo

dhaxanta wajiga saarsaaran", which infers to both psychological stress and physical impoverishment. The irony is that while the minorities are often "dhalliileysan" meaning those always to blame; the majority remains "dhicis" unfulfilled and unrealizable – meaning the society as a whole never achieves a meaningful development and harmony without first addressing and transforming the persistent and unjustifiable social hierarchies.

Conclusion

The debate of how societies should consolidate or advance remains inconclusive and controversial. Certainly, through active engagement socio-political relations transform – depending on the circumstances and contingencies emerging from interactions, events and available resources. However, occasionally, due to manipulated and often unwise social discourses and legitimation processes, societies risk worsening conditions of injustices as recurrently occur in regions such as the Horn of Africa. Societies can also begin delegitimizing social gains through intense discourses and debates, for instance in the social media, and thereby create an atmosphere of uncertainty and post-factual conditions and disagreements in addressing concretely emerging societal challenges.

From this background, Hadraawi's presentation of the "public-dhulgariir" enables us to understand how and why citizenship injustices prevail by stressing the importance of preventing such decline and by starting to include the perspectives of marginalized communities into the mainstream discourse and wellbeing. In addition, Hadraawi's conceptual proposition guides us to the potential of pursuing a deliberative, open and inclusive democratic society, without necessarily sacrificing the well-being of the excluded and the least privileged in the society.

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CHAPTER 2

The Poetics of Poor Leadership: Representation of Decadence in Mohamed A. Eno's *Corpses on the Menu* (2013) and *Wizard of the Two Niles* (2015)

Danson Sylvester Kahyana

Introduction

This chapter reads Mohamed A. Eno's Corpses on the Menu (2013) and Wizard of the Two Niles (2015) as allegories of the post-independence African situation. It argues that while the allegory seems to shroud the collections in a tone of pessimism, a closer look at the poems reveals that they in fact emit rays of hope since the wizards and cannibals are imagined as vincible, implying that with concerted effort, they can be defeated to symbolically represent the crumbling of the moral, socioeconomic and political decadence that they indulge in.

Mohamed A. Eno is a Kenyan poet and scholar with a Somali background. He had his childhood education in Somalia where he attended public elementary and intermediate schools before joining the prestigious Shabelle Secondary School, a co-educational private institution combining day and boarding options. Located in the agricultural town of Jowhar, about 92 km from the capital Mogadishu, the school was owned and managed by the American Mennonite Mission before Siad Barre adjoined it to the national educational system, although the American missionary teachers were constituted majority of the teaching staff. He experienced disturbing sorts of identity inferiorisation and ethnic discrimination in school and in society, snippets of which he versifies in his work. A prolific

poet, he has produced four collections in just three years – *Corpses on the Menu* (2013), *Guilt of Otherness* (2013), *Wizard of the Two Niles* (2015), and *Vertical Articulations* (2015), in addition to numerous essays across the social sciences and the humanities. One of the issues that he is passionate about in his work is pandemic misrule in post-independence African nation-states. In this chapter, I examine how he uses the trope of allegory to imagine the post-independence situation in African countries. Specifically, I look at the symbol of the cannibal or wizard as an organizing tool that allows him to make insightful observations about the post-independence African situation of irresponsible, decadent leadership.

The Normalisation of Decadence in *Corpses on the Menu* (2013)

The title – *Corpses on the Menu* – is chilling, as it imagines a society where cannibalism has become a way of life so much that corpses are cooked and served in eating places (cafes, restaurants, and hotels). The notion of a menu suggests that this is a public, accepted practice, not a horrifying one done in hiding, for a menu is usually a document that is displayed in an eating house for whoever wants to buy a meal to look at. Put differently, a menu is the contract between the service provider and the customer on the type of food ordered and how much it will cost. A short Ugandan play by Nuwa Sentongo, "The Invisible Bond", is written in a similar mode: wizards rob graves at night and argue about which parts of the corpses they have stolen (eyes, noses, buttocks, etc.) and will eat; but the difference between this play and Eno's title is that the grave-robbers are aware that they are doing something prohibited by society, which is why they go about their business in the secrecy that the night provides and guarantees. The fact that the vices that cannibalism symbolises (senseless killing of innocent people, looting public money, exploitation, impunity, and so forth) have been normalized to the extent that they are practiced in broad daylight without reprisal, is something Eno laments. By using such a horrifying symbolic title as *Corpses on the Menu: Blood, Bullets, and Bones*; he aims to shock the readers out of their complacency, so that they reflect on the gravity of the misuse of power in their society/continent, and perhaps do something to rectify the situation. For, shock, as Rita Felski observes, affronts "our moral or aesthetic sensibilities" through "an encounter

with the unexpected, an experience of being wrenched in an altered frame of mind" (113).

I have entitled this section of my essay "The Normalisation of Decadence" for a number of reasons, one of them being the fact that in the text, we do not see public outrage at the unnatural phenomenon of a corpse-selling restaurant or hotel erected in this nation, making it seem as if it is normal to have such a facility. This may suggest that contrary to the popular portrayal of ordinary citizens as innocent, hapless victims of immoral, decadent regimes, there are instances where they are not guiltless as such, if we consider silence as a form of complicity. But why would Eno implicate the ruled people in the ghastly actions of their rulers, symbolically portrayed in the book as cannibals? Well, perhaps it is because in the first place, all dictators have their supporters – those who benefit from their misrule and mis-governance of public affairs. These are the big men and women who enrich themselves as thousands of people are murdered or maimed; these are the people who sanitize the regime in the various roles they perform as ministers, governors, or spokespersons, to mention but a few, by attributing to it fictitious or exaggerated achievements, or by misinforming the public about sensitive events like the murder of innocent people. In his poetry collection entitled *Anthem for Africa*, Timothy Wangusa speaks to this issue when he imagines one of Idi Amin's spokespersons explaining the disappearance (read: murder) of several persons in an official "Special Announcement" that cynically ends, "For the Government gospel truth is this: / That no one has mysteriously disappeared!" (138).

But how do we find ourselves in a situation where cannibalism, and what it represents, is normalized? To answer this question, I would like to quote from one of Chinua Achebe's often-quoted essay, "The Novelist as a Teacher", where he explains what he sees as his role as a novelist:

> Needless to say, we do have our own sins and blasphemies recorded against our name. If I were God I would regard as the very worst our acceptance – for whatever reason – of racial inferiority. It is too late in the day to get worked up about it or to blame others, much as they may deserve such blame and condemnation. What we need to do is to look back and try and find out where we went wrong, where the rain began to beat us. (43)

Achebe is writing against African colonial historiography which represented the continent as a place of savagery, thereby leading to a feeling of inferiority complex among some African people to the extent that a schoolboy writes about winter, instead of the *harmattan* (the Nigerian dry and windy season), because if he writes about the latter, he is afraid that his friends will call him a bushman. For this boy, the mission of the colonialist (or policy of the dominant neo-colonial political elite) has been done, since he uncritically accepts that writing about winter is okay, while writing about the *harmattan* is shameful. As Franz Fanon observes, the colonialist "only ends his work of breaking in the native when the latter admits loudly and intelligibly the supremacy of the white man's values" (43). The same assertion is supported by Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, who contends – in *Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of African Literature*– that "[i]t is the final triumph of a system of domination when the dominated start singing its virtues" (20). In the Somali context, Mohamed A. Eno, Omar A. Eno and Abderrazak Dammak observe in their article entitled "From Linguistic Imperialism to Language Domination: 'Linguicism' and Ethno-Linguistic Politics in Somalia," that some of the views of colonialist scholars are taken as self-evident truths, but without committing them to scholarly analysis. For instance, the notion that all Somalis descend from "a progenitor of Arabian origin, more specifically a close kin of Muhammad, the prophet of Islam" and that they all "speak the same language, share one religion (Islam), and pursue a single nomadic culture as a mode of living" has been "too damaging to sections of the society at different levels – ethnically, historically, politically, culturally, linguistically and academically" (11).

One might wonder why I am invoking Achebe's work here. It is because the issues that Eno handles in *Corpses on the Menu* are quite similar to Achebe's in two ways. First, Eno blames Western imperialism for some of the ills that he records in his book; second, the issue of discrimination on the basis of one's clan or ethnicity which he surfaces in some of the poems is quite similar to the question of racism that Achebe is writing against. Achebe's mission as a writer – "to help my society regain belief in itself and put away the complexes of the years of denigration and self-abasement" (44) – is therefore similar to Eno's, as I explain in this section.

It is significant that Eno opens this book with poems on the dark chapters in African history – slave trade and colonialism – which

continue to have far-reaching effects on the continent, since the wrongs committed against the African people have never been righted. They still continue to muddy the waters of our politics in the form of racism (the West's continued negative racist imagination of the continent) and neo-colonialism, represented in the text using a powerful symbol – "the colonial larvae"– which is used to highlight the fact that our affairs are not free from infestation by the former colonial powers whose interests are selfish, exploitative, and destructive. For in one way or another, the West has been implicated in the carnage that has gone on in different parts of the continent in various ways, for instance politicizing ethnic difference as it happened in Rwanda where the Belgian colonial regime made the Tutsi believe that they were superior to the Hutu, as Mahmood Mamdani shows in his seminal book, *When Victims Become Killers*; interfering with the affairs of nation-states, for instance through organizing assassinations (as happened in Zaire in 1961, now the Democratic Republic of Congo, when Patrice Lumumba was killed – See Edouard Bustin for insights into the involvement of the Belgian establishment in the murder of Patrice Lumumba. Michael Franc Wright identifies the United States Organisation as another party to the assassination of Lumumba); or coups d'état(as it happened in Uganda when Milton Obote was overthrown by Idi Amin with the knowledge of Britain – Mahmood Mamdani calls Idi Amin's overthrow of Milton Obote "an imperialist coup" because it was engineered by Britain and Israel. He writes, "It was because Edward Heath, the then British prime minister understood imperialism's pivotal role in the Ugandan state machinery so well that he predicted during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in Singapore in 1971, that some of the fiery leaders sitting around the table would not be able to return home!" (*Imperialism and Fascism* 31).)' or through arms sales to civil war-plagued mineral-rich nations, as it happened in Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2002, and in Liberia from 1989 to 1997 and 1999 to 2003 – For details on how natural resources fuel conflicts, see Alex Vines, Sigismond Ayodele Wilson, and Alex Vines and Tom Cargill.

One of the evils that African leaders, metaphorically imagined as blood-letting wizards and cannibals, have brought about is sectarianism – the tendency to allocate state resources on the basis of tribe, religious denomination, clan, and so forth – which has the consequence of fomenting disaffection among sections of the community. In the case of Somalia, the clan is the unit which the

leaders base on to divide the population, to the extent of establishing clan war academies, as Eno imagines in "Clan War Academy", one of the poems in *Corpses on the Menu*. The title of the poem highlights the sectarian nature of the educational institution that has been set up. The word 'educational' that I have used here is a misnomer in the context of the poem, for as Geraldine E. La Rocque observes, the *Oxford English Dictionary* closely relates the root word 'educate' to *educere* which means "to lead one, to be led forth, to branch out", thereby making the concept of education as "leading out" different from that of education as "pouring in" (6).

This concept of education as *leading out* is in line with Myles Horton's view that the role of the educator is to help somebody "analyze their experiences, interpret them, tie them to the past and to the future" (5), which is itself in line with Es'kia Mphahlele's suggestion that a person's "social environment, in combination with his or her inner resources or character, creates a disposition to inquire, search, yearn to discover, respond acutely, probe relationships" (183). The words 'analyse', 'interpret', 'inquire', 'search', 'discover' and 'probe' in these views suggest that education should be critical in the sense that students should not passively receive and accept whatever they are told, but that they should problematize it and make it their own through personal reflection that Luigi Giussani calls "verification" – finding the reasons that make the proposal or lesson given to them by the educator convincing (11). Unfortunately, this is not what happens in the world that is imagined in the poems. Instead, we see the young people being trained to uncritically accept what they are told by some of their teachers and parents –for instance that Somalia belongs to the Arab-descending Somalis (Lewis 1955, 1961), and that other groups, like the Bantu Jareer of African descent and other minorities whose discourse found a mention recently in Somali Studies (Ahmed 1995, 1996; Kusow 2004; Eno, O. 2004; Eno & Eno 2009; Eno & Eno 2010; Kusow and Eno 2015; Ingiriis 2012), are not just strangers in this land, but they are also impure, unholy, and some of them less human – This imagining of the other as terrible is the major theme of Eno's other collection of poems, *Guilt of Otherness* (2013). Consider the following distinctions made in this text: holy, impure/unholy, impure in "Otherness in the Classroom" (3); and the humans/the less humans in a poem entitled "Ensconcing Identity", which calls for an othering so radical that the so-called Somali proper

are imagined as "seeds" and the Somali improper as "weeds" (40). These parents indoctrinate their children; if we accept Gray K. Clabaugh's view, that:

> Indoctrination propagates a particular point of view – a doctrine. That's why one dictionary definition describes indoctrination as 'the process of teaching a partisan or sectarian point of view'. Another dictionary explains it more pointedly as 'teaching someone to accept doctrines uncritically. (6)

Clabaugh suggests that it is indoctrination if the instruction given by the teacher (and parent, I would like to add, since parents – as Giussani argues – are the first teachers to the child) devalues the student's sense of reason; stifles the student's personal authority; acknowledges only one source authority; permits only one interpretation of that source authority; treats reasoned disagreement as heresy, treason, insubordination, etc.; and presents truth as final (9).

It is little wonder, then, that in Eno's work, students are imagined as looking at the category 'Somali' in a singular, discriminative way. Rather than the teachers and parents doing all they can to widen the young people's perspective, since "the content of education should emphasise the inclusion of all members of society in creating the category of citizen" (11) as Romila Thapar argues, they instead set up academies where children are taught to look at Somali-ness from a blinkered perspective of the clan as we see in the poem entitled "Graduate of Clan War Academy", which smells of indoctrination and radicalisation from the title to the last line. This radicalisation, the poem suggests, starts at such a tender age that at three, the protagonist (or villain?) of the poem wins "a grand award" in "the Warfare Hymn Competition" for "reciting names of 80 weapons" used in war (38); at six, he becomes an expert in "odd activities in army tactics" like "Swiftly manoeuvring machine guns / in a blink, planting deadly bombs" (38); and before he turns ten, he engages an alien army – it is implied successfully – as the "leader of the Under-Ten Brigade" (38), even when he is not able to inscribe the alphabet (which is not surprising since he has spent much of his time so far learning about war and warfare than laying the foundational stones of a solid education, one of which is the alphabet). When we recall that the path of this child-soldier has been decided for him by his parents, we realize how destructive of children's childhoods and innocence the status quo that is decried in the poem is. The child is vulnerized

in the sense that he is exposed to grievous harm as he fights in wars whose causes or origins he perhaps does not understand, moreover with adult armies that are much more learned and experienced in war-fare than he is, like the one we are told he engaged, as commander of his fellow under-ten years of age soldiers. But he is also exploited by his parents and clan members because what he receives in return (a grand war award) most likely means nothing to him in the practical terms of making his childhood happier and more productive. The fact that he has not mastered the alphabet and is therefore illiterate, or semi-illiterate, makes it likely that he might not have a future career beyond that which his parents and clansmen have introduced him to – war-faring.

Perhaps the most frightening thing about this kind of child whose capacity to reason has not been developed through proper education and positive relationships is that for him, there is no other language he understands except that of arms, meaning that if there is anything he does not agree with or he is unhappy about, he will most likely resort to the gun to solve it. In "Posttraumatic Resilience in Former Ugandan Child Soldiers" in northern Uganda, Fionna Klasen et al observe that the child soldiers they studied "indicated that they frequently suffered from guilt, expressing that the time spent with the armed group caused them pain and suffering, and reported recurrent thoughts of their own acts being unjustified and unforgivable" (1108) – evidence that they had been traumatized. The child-soldier in Eno's poem, and his mates, are most likely going to suffer the same, thereby negatively affecting the quality of their childhood as well as that of their adulthood. Since "children represent the future" in the sense that they are the "capital that perpetuate [the community's] cultures and language" (Skinner, 8), they need to be reared in the best way possible, being taught values like truth, justice, mercy, and peace. In the poem, we see the opposite, as I have already demonstrated, leaving the reader shuddering at what kind of society the indoctrinated and radicalized child-soldier is going to build or inherit. It is possible that this will be a society like the one imagined by the Ugandan poet, Mildred Kiconco Barya, in which young warriors morbidly declare, "[In this land] we quench our thirst by cutting men's throats and /Drinking their blood, licking our lips as it oozes out" (62).Worse still, one can only imagine what kind of families these children will raise when they grow up, for if it is true that we can only give others that which we ourselves have received, it follows

that the child-soldiers will only have clan-based warlord-ism as the gift they will bequeath to their children.

To appreciate the far-reaching effects or impact of this poem we are discussing, we need to emphasize the link between the training that is taking place in the academy and the blood-letting that is going on in Somalia, or any other place where clans or ethnic groups are the basis for national identification. The poem challenges the reader to reflect on the terrible crimes that we are committing against our children – disrupting their childhood and robbing them of their humanity by turning them into war machines. But it also raises "questions about how these children can be rehabilitated and reintegrated into society" since their "lives are irrevocably harmed by their experiences" of participating in wars at a tender age, to use the words of Edgar Fred Nabutanyi, the Makerere University academic who carried out an exciting doctoral study on how troubled childhoods are narrated in African fiction in English. In the next section, I examine how the leaders who are running clan war academies brutalize the people they lead.

Imagining Cannibalism in *Wizard of the Two Niles*

The practice of cannibalism which is introduced in *Corpses on the Menu* is developed further in *Wizard of the Two Niles*. One way of reading this latter collection is to consider it as one long poem, with each of its separate poems serving as stanzas. This is because all the poems are inter-connected in subject matter and theme. While Part I gives us the heartrending, but at the same time humorous adventures of the wizard, Parts II to IV give us what we can call the fruits of the wizard's work: we see young people committing a series of atrocities in the form of bombings that leave several people dead.

The title poem, "Wizard of the Two Niles" introduces the arrival of the wizard into the text, and by implication into the community where it is set. It is rich in visual imagery, so much that the reader is able to see, with the mind's eye, what the poet is describing. The wizard is imagined as having a "frail, skeletal body with shaggy gray hair" and hollow cheeks gutting "in from every corner of the face" (4). To the persona, this is a "sickening sight" at which even "the chiefs and elders dropped down on their knees" in optimum fright, murmuring prayers and "[s]upplications for safety" (4). This safety is needed, for the old wizard's eyes "swell to the size of a fist" (4),

indicating that he is a dangerous fellow capable of causing harm to people. This is confirmed by the way he is 'dressed 'too:

> A crocodile skin dangled from one shoulder,
> a calabash of blood on the head
> Human genitals in the hand
> And swinging and swaggering from the depth
> of his muddy butthole was
> A huge ceremonial horn of a rhino. (4)

This description shows that the wizard should not be underestimated: although he is old and frail, he is a great fighter as seen by the animals he has killed (the crocodile and the rhino, from which he got the skin and the horn, respectively), and the people he has murdered (from whom he got the blood and the genitals). Or was he carrying these things as part of his ritual for bewitching and, therefore, scaring and mesmerizing the community? No wonder the people who are expected to stop such a man from coming into this place – the chiefs and the elders – immediately drop down on their knees upon seeing him: they surrender their protection to God Almighty. Despite this, however, it is clear that the persona disapproves of their conduct: they surrender too soon even before they put up a fight – something we do not expect of leaders worth their name. One wonders if they did not have an army of professional soldiers or young men and women that they had trained to protect the village against dangerous intruders like this wizard. If not, then they had shucked their responsibility as chiefs and elders; they had left their country open to invasion and destruction.

The wizard does not bother to disguise his wizardry; he goes about it in the open to the extent that he carries a calabash of blood and human genitals as casually as he does, as if it is normal to do this. Nobody dares to put him to task to explain these weird possessions, which point to the fact that he is a murderer, and a cannibal, the ultimate symbol of his inhumanity. In other words, he acts with impunity, as there is nobody to hold him accountable. It is not surprising, then, that Part I of the poetry collection is entitled "A Wizard's World", implying that the wizard is not the stranger, but the inhabitant. Does this mean that the non-wizards in this world are the strangers – that the hapless victims of his wizardry need not complain about his ways, since this is his world? This is a troubling question, for if this is the case, then we are looking at a world that has got so destroyed that the wizards are indisputably in charge of it. We are looking at a land that is similar to the colonial one, a land

where strangers come and displace the indigenes, as a poem by Kofi Awoonor so poignantly puts it. After welcoming a weaver bird in the homestead, the indigenes are shocked when it starts preaching salvation in total disrespect to their own belief system. With time, they have no option but to leave their home:

> We look for new homes every day,
> For new altars we strive to rebuild

The old shrines defiled by the weaver's excrement So if the country in which the poem is set is "a wizard's world", it is not because it was always theirs, but rather, the wizards, like Awoonor's weaver bird, have conquered it, and owned it. This point becomes clearer in the poem entitled "The Wizard's Wittiness", which I discuss in a moment.

That the wizard is a threat to the survival of this community is metaphorically depicted by his diet – human blood and genitals – two items on his menu that are very central to sustaining human life, literally (since loss of blood leads to death), and reproductively (since without genitals, human beings would not multiply themselves). By singing about the wizard's world, the poet is drawing our attention to the terrible things that take place in it so that we may be shocked into action – to rebel against all the wizards and cannibals in our societies and fight them, even if to our death, in order to reclaim the land and make it habitable once again for decent human beings. I would like to suggest that the poet's decision to highlight the wizard's frailty as evidenced by his skeletal body and the gutted-in cheeks is to underscore the fact that he is not invincible – with courage and organized action, he can be fought and defeated.

It is significant that the collection opens with a poem entitled "Wizard's Whispers". In this poem, the citizens are frustrated that however hard they strive "to erect enviable structures / In knowledge and enlightenment /The more the wizard wanes the efforts" (3). This is to say that the wizard is a saboteur of progress: he does not desire to see the society advance in knowledge and enlightenment; instead, he wants it to remain blanketed under ignorance and darkness and tolerance towards wizardry and engagement in acts of sorcery. This is not surprising, for we do not expect a wizard to be supportive of progress meant for the common good. What is surprising and disappointing, though, is that the incumbent allows the wizard to carry on with these subversive activities, by letting him have "a monopoly" on his ear, into which the wizard whispers for hours

"Every word in the book of hypocrisy" (3). This fact – that the wizard trades in hypocrisy – is the reason as to why he *whispers*; for, were he saying something constructive or truthful, he would have spoken loudly, without caring whether or not other people hear what he is saying.

That the leader has the wizard as a confidante raises questions about the kind of person he is. If we follow the wisdom of the English saying that 'birds of the same feathers flock together', we can tell that the incumbent is not a good man; he too is not for progress and enlightenment but for retrogression, which is why he hobnobs with the wizard, the conventional symbol of evil. Following this line of thought, we can surmise that the notion of a "royal court" in the poem could be one of the strange fruits of the wizard's whispers: it is possible that the incumbent has converted his leadership from an elective office to a hereditary one, since the term implies that he is now a monarch.

As a result of the wizard's activities, the citizens are delirious, for their closeness with the leader and the advantages that come with this, have been usurped by the wizard. The last lines of the poem sound like a knell: "So no one is here no more / In this hut we call a home" (3). These lines highlight the sense of helplessness and hopelessness among the citizens, as they do not know what to do to extricate their leader and their nation from the wizard. The line "No one is here no more" could be referring to people who tried their level best to do this (i.e. extricate the leader and the nation from the wizard), but failed or were exiled, if not killed; it could also mean that there is nobody bold enough to challenge the wizard or the leader or both. Indeed, the line paints a stifling atmosphere where people are hemmed in with fear for their lives; it also paints a sombre mood, for the people are resigned to their fate.

But the poem carries some hope as well. For one, the persona is able to inform the listeners or readers that not all is well in the land. This information contains the potential for change, for help may come from elsewhere to rid the country of the wizard. Besides, we might read the fact that the wizard whispers (as opposed to speaking loudly) as indicating some element of fear about him: perhaps he is aware that what he is whispering into the ear of the incumbent could create him trouble were it heard by other people. If this is the case, it betrays some level of vulnerability on his part.

In any case, as Michel Foucault says, "[w]here there is power, there is resistance" (95), meaning that the powerful wizard, and his powerful friend, the incumbent, can be resisted, and hopefully successfully. Brent L. Pickett (458) puts it even better in his discussion of Foucault's work when he observes that since "there is always at least some resistance to the imposition of any particular form of subjectivity, and thus resistance is concomitant with the process of subjectification", it is possible that the citizens of the country that the wizard and the incumbent are derailing from pursuing the attainment of knowledge and enlightenment will sooner or later resist their power, and demand that normalcy and progress return to the land. It is significant that in the poem, we see many characters pray to God, with the hope that He will respond to their supplications, and make the country better and dear to His people and by implication to Him as well.

The other way of looking at hope is to consider the reason as to why the incumbent is allowing the wizard to whisper into his ears for hours: he is aware of the limits of his power – the power he wants to bolster with the wizard's help of enlisting the occult forces. This is the point that Moses Isegawa's novel on Idi Amin, *Snake pit*, emphasizes as the narrator observes:

> Over the years, the army of presidential astrologers, witch-doctors and soothsayers had increased fourfold. Some generals blamed these people, especially their leader, Dr. Ali – alias God, Jesus, the Unholy Spirit, the Government Spokesman – for the Marshal's unpredictability, but General Bazooka knew better. *The uncertainty in the air created fertile ground for astrology and all kinds of witchcraft to flourish*. (42, emphasis mine)

If "cannibalism is one of the most extreme forms for creating a moral distance from the 'other'" as Jamon Halvaksz (337) notes, and if we accept the view that discourses surrounding this practice "are rooted in colonial ideas of the other, establishing the ultimate in ethnographic difference, and granting moral authority to colonial representatives" (ibid), I would like to suggest that Eno appropriates the term and the discourses around it. He presents this image of cannibalism to achieve a similar purpose in his analysis of the post-independence situation in the Nile countries that he is concerned with, most seemingly the Sudan, which is said to be the point where the two Niles – the Blue Nile and the White Nile merge. No wonder, therefore, that he portrays the wizard as being very distinct from other people in appearance, dressing and diet, and he grants himself,

as poets and other artists usually do, moral authority to sing against indecency so that his readers may see how horrible and horrid the wizard is.

The notion of a school where the art of this kind of practice is taught – 'the College of Nilotic Wizardry' (11) – is shrewd but rather worrying, for by their very nature, schools are meant to promote human advancement, not human destruction. That there is such a school tells us a number of things about the state of this society. First, that wizardry is considered a common good by some sections of the population – the leaders who give an operational license for this kind of school to be established, the parents who send their children to this school, the staff who teach in this school, and the students who attend it. In this kind of society where wizardry (with its characteristic practices like cannibalism) is considered a common good, it is clear that there are no morals to speak about, and people live in "continual fear, and danger of violent death", as the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes would put it, "and the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (84). Secondly, the society is depicted as corrupt to the extent that a head cleaner can be promoted to become "...head of the Faculty/ Of Magical Arts and Sciences / At the College of Nilotic Wizardry" (11). This does not shock the reader, for we do not expect any vestige of professionalism in an anomalous school like this one which teaches anti-social, if not criminal, disciplines like wizardry and cannibalism. Instead, the reader becomes hopeful that with bogus promotions like this one, the College will weaken and eventually collapse, thereby ridding the country of this symbol of debauchery. Moreover, establishing a school of wizardry speaks to the normalisation and institutionalisation of wizardry, and all it represents, as a way of life. This is similar to the normalisation of indoctrination and radicalisation that we saw in the previous section, as we discussed the poem, "Graduate of Clan War Academy" (*Corpses* 38).

The poem emphasizes that the wizard has brought about a reversal of the normal way of doing things. For instance, he engages in homosexuality and bestiality. The former vice is evident in "The Wizard at a Wedding", where he is vexed when he hears a poet singing of "man-to-man-companionship" (16) – a reference to the practice of homosexuality which African writers pervasively see as a symbol of moral dissipation since they associate its origin with the Scriptures introduced to Africa by colonial and/or imperial Western

countries, as Chris Dunton shows. To stop the poet's song, the wizard and his wife cast spells which bring about confusion, thereby bringing the wedding celebration to an end as the people at the party "stampede out of the town" upon seeing that a pregnant male bee is producing milk (16). Another dismaying vice is portrayed in "Wizardry Clientele", where we see him marry a misshapen cat ("double-tongued", and bearing "three eyes on its head's back") in the evening (13) – a vice similar to his uncle's – who "impregnated" as the poet tells us, "a she-gorilla" (12).

The above reversals allegorically point to those highlighted in the collection. For instance, the leaders amass wealth for their own good, and leave the citizens to languish in poverty; children are radicalized and indoctrinated to become killers; a woman known to be holy carries arms under her veil (43). The society has lost its radar to the extent that instead of walking on its legs, it is walking on its head; instead of moving forward, it is retrogressing; instead of becoming a better place to live in, it is getting worse and a home for radicalisation. The most shocking thing about this scenario is that the ordinary citizens are implicated in what is happening. The wizard is known to all people but they let him be, they let him go on with his wizardry, and even employ his daughter in a hospital where people go to get well, not to die, yet they are aware that it is death – not life – that wizards and their families are interested in, since they survive on human blood and flesh, as the book shows. In my view, the act of employing the wizard's daughter in a hospital, possibly due to cowardice and fear of the wizard spelling out evil to society, is the apex of irresponsibility on the part of the employing authority, since it gives the wizard direct access to whatever is happening in the facility, to the detriment of the patients or the departed. This irresponsibility – of putting a suspect character in charge of public affairs – is similar to what happens in many African countries, where the people in top leadership are of poor quality. Idi Amin, for instance, who ruled Uganda like a real wizard was a semi-literate army officer in the British Colonial army, the King's African Rifles. Having such a man in charge of Uganda proved a disaster, as several books have shown, including A State of Blood, which was written by one of his former ministers, Henry Kyemba, and John Ruganda's play, The Floods, which depicts the incessant massacres that were committed during his regime. What Eno is saying is that the quality of the nation we get will depend on the quality of the leaders we put

in charge of it. If we put war lords in charge of our nations, we shall only reap massacres; if we put self-seeking, kleptomaniac leaders, they will swindle the national treasury clean and fill their secret bank accounts in Switzerland, Belgium, and other such countries where African leaders hide their boot. It is little wonder, then, that the following events happen:

> In the district hospital
> Where the wizard's daughter works
> Missing organs of the dead
> Became the order of the day
> Until one day when the corpse
> Of a devil worshipper's child
> Jumped out of the wizard's bag
> Which the daughter had smuggled out
> Between the fat thighs under her apron (20)

Whenever the wizard is prosecuted or incarcerated, he gets away with his acts because he enjoys the protection of the top people in government – in fact, the topmost person, the incumbent. We see this in the poem, "The Wizard's Wittiness". When the authorities summon him over his neighbours' complaints about "a mysterious scuffle among unseen speakers" and a "[s]trong smell of tobacco with no smokers in sight", the court proceedings are nipped in the bud when one of the clients of the wizard enters the courtroom "[w]ith a couple of enormous escorts" and calls "off the inquiry / On grounds of the alien protection code / The incumbent had duly encoded" (14). This tells us at least three things about the country where the poem is set: first, it is run by decrees, since the incumbent can singlehandedly encode a law; two, the judiciary is not independent, since its work can be stopped at any time by the armed forces, here represented by the "couple of enormous escorts"; and finally, the wizard is after all considered as an 'alien', as shown by the fact that the law protecting him is called "the alien protection code". So although the first part of the poem is entitled "the wizard's world" (implying that he is the inhabitant, the citizen, and not the stranger), his practices do not actually belong here; it is his world simply because he has conquered it with his magical power, so to speak, since he can do as he wishes, for he is enjoying legal immunity from the incumbent, whom – it is implied – he is serving. Here, the wizard is portrayed as a symbol of dictatorship (considering that he does as he wills without being held accountable for his actions); he is also a symbol of exploitation (because he can get away with any form of

theft, including that of corpses. Indeed, the representation of the wizard or cannibal as a beast who lives outside the acceptable norms and mores of society is common in East African literature, where he is a symbol of exploitation (the man-eat-man society of Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o's *Devil on the Cross*) or of dictatorship (the cannibalistic Somo in Austin Ejiet's "Hooray for Somo" represents repressive and murderous Idi Amin, and his death represents hope that Uganda will be free again).

Notice the interesting pun in the title, "The Wizard's Wittiness". "Wittiness" can be read as constituting two separate words– witness (someone giving an account of how events happened as seen by him or her) and wittiness (from the word 'witty", which itself comes from 'wit', that to M. H. Abrams "denotes a kind of verbal expression which is brief, deft, and intentionally contrived to produce a shock of comic surprise" [330]). The use of this pun is very clever of Eno, as this malleability of language suggests that justice is a form of performance – playfulness with language of sorts. That we get such an insight from his work is not surprising since he is not only a poet, but also a linguist and an academic who is aware of the various modes in which language can be used as a tool and manipulated objectively according to context. If this is the case with the malleability of language, the poem suggests that it is not usually the innocent people who win cases, but the clever, witty crooks who are able to manipulate the system through twisting language, or those who are able to hire the wittiest of lawyers to do semantic games for them.

I would like to conclude this section by observing that while some characters in the poems try to fight the wizard (we see him incarcerated in one of the poems, and in another we see him in a court of law), generally speaking, not much is done to stop him from practicing his wizardry, and mostly due to his connection with the incumbent. This is different from what we see in African orature, where wizards – usually imagined as a human-eating, pit-mouthed, enormous-bellied ogre – are sooner or later fought to death by a young warrior, or a group of young warriors, the moment their wizardry is confirmed. In the orature of the Bamasaba people of eastern Uganda, the young warrior who fights the wizard/ogre is the legendary Mwambu, after whom Timothy Wangusa names his main character in his debut novel, *Upon this Mountain*. In two of the oral stories retold in this novel, the legendary Mwambu kills the monsters

that devour his sister, Sera. This situation – where the wizard is left to go more or less scot-free – brings to mind what Achille Mbembe says in his influential book, *On the Postcolony*, in which he argues – in part – that the citizens in African postcolonial societies (his case is Cameroon) are in a convivial relationship with their leaders, leading to what he calls "mutual zombification" (104). Kenyan literary scholar Godwin Siundu validates Member's observation when he captures the citizens' complicity with power/politicians by noting thus in his "Foreword" to Eno's *Vertical Articulation*: "For Eno, even the common citizens tend to have something in their character that resonates with the greed of their leaders" (xv), a well-conceived thought of the reality in postcolonial Africa.

I would like to suggest – quite controversially I am aware – that the complicity which Mbembe and Siundu identify does not end with the leader and the led, but extends to the level of the writer and the reader. Let me explain the reader's bit first, using the way I felt while reading the poems in Eno's collections; and this poem is not an exception. It was very humorous, and many times, I ended up bursting into laughter, even at those moments in the text when I was most horrified, for instance in "Revelations" (18) where we learn that the wizard's daughter steals corpses and body parts from the hospital, and in "The Return of the Wizard", where we read that "From a nylon basket on his back / Hung the leg of a pinkish toddler" (19). By laughing the way I did at very serious matters that the writer was raising, I ended up being complicit in the wizard's theatre of evil, for I was turned into a thrilled audience. My laughter was, of course, a result of the success with which the poet had handled the subject using allegory, linguistic prowess and humour, not because I approved of what the wizard was doing. It is in this respect that I suggest that the poet is guilty of complicity too: rather than using a humorous mode that makes the reader laugh at what the wizard is doing, perhaps he needed to use a tragic one, say the elegy – that is to say, he needed to have written the work from the perspective of the slain and the devoured, not from that of the perpetrator. This is not to say that this is a stylistic weakness on his part – not at all. To the contrary, he handles his subject with admirable expertise, which is why I laughed so hard, in the first place. The issue I am raising concerns the ethics of laughing at a tragic situation like the one we see in the poem, which requires a sound coordination of a complexity of skills only an expert like Eno can successfully convey.

In Ugandan theatre, this is a very big issue, as the audience usually laughs at the most unexpected incidents, for instance rape (in Judith Adong's play, Silent Voices, which is on the suffering of the people of northern Uganda at the hands of the Lord's Resistance Army) and death (in Joshua Mali's play, The Betrothal, where a child dies because she has not been vaccinated, since big people in government have swindled the funds allocated to the execution of this exercise). I watched the latter play at the National Theatre and witnessed this troubling phenomenon of laughing at a tragic event. For the former one, I followed Adong's frustration at the phenomenon on her Facebook page.

Despite this, however, Eno's work gives us hope even when it reads quite pessimistic. The poem suggests that whatever the tricks the wizard uses to bamboozle or bewitch people, a time will come, and it is already here, when they will fight him. Indeed, the fear with which he is received by the chiefs and the elders at the opening of the poem recedes with time, as people dare him to the extent of incarcerating him. It shows that one day, they will overcome him and his wizardry. This hope is in line with the reason as to why Eno is writing his books: not to depress the readers with sordid details of the wizard and his wizardry (and what it symbolizes), but to provoke them into asking sensitive questions on what needs to be done to reverse a seemingly daunting situation that is making Africa backward.

Conclusion

Mohamed A. Eno's imagining of post-independence decadence in Africa using the well-known trope of cannibalism is successful; for, while it highlights the gravity of the mismanagement of African public affairs by self-seeking, dictatorial leaders, it at the same time points to rays of hope in the dark tunnel, since the allusion to African orature makes it certain that sooner or later the cannibal or wizard will be defeated. It takes the efforts of a visionary society "neither threatened nor discouraged by the murkiness of the immediate horizon of the tunnel," as Eno (2017) elucidates in his state-of-the-art article "Sowing Seeds of Subalternity in Somali Studies". To Eno, such is a society so convinced "that the opaque dark is either unreal or ephemeral at most, and that an incandescent glow of light is real and perpetual at the other end of the tunnel" (150). A visionary society is important because the wizards' and

cannibals' adventures that *Wizard of the Two Niles* and *Corpses on the Menu* detail enable the readers (society) to know these monstrous creatures all too well – their customs and norms, their wiles, their strengths, their weaknesses, and so forth. This knowledge is important for the fighter who wishes to engage them in a do-or-die fight. Seen from this perspective, Eno's work does not simply urge us to resist and fight the ogres because they are terrorizing the community and making people's lives miserable; it also prepares us for this fight by unravelling the wizards' world that we may know its nooks and crannies where the man-eaters may hide when the going gets tough during combat. In my parting shot, I end with the statement that what Brent L. Pickett says about Foucault's work is similarly true of Eno's as well:

> in *Discipline and Punish* Foucault gives a history of how the body has been placed under increasingly meticulous controls over the past three centuries. The point of such a narrative is to reveal these controls and so open the possibility of resistance done in the name of the body and its history. These shared experiences of subjugation then can find expression in collective action (460)

The humour with which Eno handles his subject matter makes his works a great read, for even when the heart aches as one wades through the series of suffering, human rights abuses and violations as depicted in the work, there are many moments when one smiles or laughs because of the poet's expertise in using humour, grim though it is. Without any doubt, Eno is a welcome fresh voice in African letters.

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CHAPTER 3

Urban and Architectural Design in the Somali Peninsula – Culture as Resource …

Anders Michelsen and Rashid Ali

> "… development begins not with community needs assessment but with community strengths and assets assessment. Design is important in building self-esteem and self-reliance and to break the donor-recipient syndrome. Assets should include human, social, natural and physical capital. Sustainable livelihoods analysis requires an understanding of the trade-off that occur as we invest in or transform one type of capital into another, or into flows (income)."
>
> Buid, J, World Architecture Community, 2007

Beyond the binary of development/failure

This chapter resituates the debate on what defines the Somali society *away from* security, postcolonial predicaments and current challenges, *into decolonial and indigenous strongpoints and prospects* residing with the versatile Somali culture, with the creative articulations of life, such as found in the direct and indirect design of places where we live. It is possible to argue that culture is what has kept the Somali people together since the Ogaden War of 1977. It is locally the backbone of an increasingly well working decolonial and democratic society in the Somali Peninsula, and worldwide it brings the Somali diaspora together across borders and relate back to the origins in the Peninsula. Culture is perhaps the singular most important and emphatic bond of Somalis.

The chapter's focus is a specific part of culture: urban and architectural design of the buildings where we live for shelter, dwelling, subsistence and commona social life and all that goes with this – the "life between buildings:" the *liveable habitat* (Gehl, J., 1987). In urbanism and architecture it has led to one of the most

famous postwar approaches to urban design, Jan Gehl's idea of urban "life between buildings" which involves the experience of the urban as life-sustaining and key aspects of urban planning and design. Culture is here understood academically in the anthropological sense as something which comprehends all that goes into life: problem solutions to the most different problems, symbolized meaning, the codes and discourses we use to name things and speak about them, and aesthetics for shaping use, which convey art and beauty, including the imagination and related issue such as affect and memory, what we feel good about remembering, and the opposite. In all this building is a strong element, urban and architectural design has been a marker of the liveable habitat since the earliest societies, think about the Pyramids.

Urban and architectural design has often been kept at the margin of development conceptions for the Global South. Agencies such as the UN Habitat set up to deal with the habitat for humans has not focused much on urban and architectural design, preferring to approach issues such as housing in political and economic terms, or as registrations of what is already here, "knowledge, policy advice, technical assistance and collaborative action." (UN-Habitat, 2021). Although there are exceptions as we will get back to, design has often been relegated to the fringe of crisis solutions such as the sheltering tin sheds for internally displaced people or the et up of refugee camps, or, as is mostly the case, left to market forces and booming property markets all over the global South and elsewhere. This is not the same as design, even if the resources enveloped by crises and market forces can become design.

However, shelter, dwelling, subsistence and commonality remains a strong element of culture, which can be expressed through design in an almost primordial articulation, as Martin Heidegger believed. (Heidegger, 1971) It cannot avoid becoming entangled with problem solutions, symbolized meaning, aesthetics, and imagination which involve in hope, pride and visions for life as one sees readily in the minarets shaping up against the setting sun at the time of afternoon prayer in Hargeisa, what Raymond Williams dubbed a "particular *way of life*." (Williams, 1976;) William's definitions became a key approach to what is termed the anthropological definition of culture, which is distinguished as

different form definitions of fine or high culture, and arts, or civilisational connotations, such as being 'cultured', towards concrete studies of issue like narrative, codes and discourses co-constructing life, famously further developed in Stuarts Hall's studies in the Birmingham School. And of course urban and architectural design is deeply entangled with power, inequality and ethnic hubris the sad alignment of Enlightenment with Eurocentric and anthropocentric arrogance vis-a-vis for example a "native informant", "expulsed from the name of Man," as Gayatry Spivak has argued (Spivak,1999; Cheng I., Davis and Wilson 2020). In A Critique of Postcolonial Reason she writes on "the native informant", "a name for the mark of expulsion from the name of Man – a mark crossing out the impossibility of the ethical relation".

Nevertheless, culture in the sense of urban and architectural design, has a potential in the Peninsula, which is not only needed for practical solutions in relation to the radical urbanisation taking place as we write, from sewers and parking lots to cultural centers and shopping malls, but as answers to the questions of who Somalis are, what they can hope and want to become (Foucault, 1984).

The chapter aims to draft an outline of how design as culture can play directly into UN-frameworks of sustainable development which has increasingly turned towards urbanisation and the built environment. UN has started to apply terms as "naturbanity" which indicate that a common approach to engendering and affecting the built along with nature is increasingly key to a sustainable future (United Nations, 2019). *The Global Sustainable Development Report 2019* talks at length about liveable cities in the context of naturbanity which circumscribes not only technologies and concerns for nature but also life in between buildings. In other words, liveable cities is about *making them liveable*, and one important definition for this making, is design.

Wellbeing and resilience in a sense start with design, contrary to the common perception that design is like the frosting on the cake, what you put on last, when you all the substances are in place. We think it may in fact work the other way around, or with the architectural pioneer in the Global South Padmashree Laurie Baker's word, "There's an old saying: manners make the man. I think they also make good architecture." (Laurie, 2009).

As in other parts of the world, urbanisation processes are radically accelerating in the Peninsula. That is, a booming need for design of places for urban and architectural design. But urbanisation processes are often seen as predominantly a problem to be understood by the longstanding binary conceptions of 'development' vis-a-vis 'failure'. The multitude of indigenous resources emerging currently in the urban environment is not really accounted for and not seen as resource but bi-produce top something which must still demand attention as crisis. When OXFAM highlights the problematic impact of rural-to-urban migration, precarious changes of the environment, and influx of migrants and displaced in the Peninsula (Oxfam Urban Programming, 2019). This is a fact that cannot be avoided. But the problem with such facts is that they build up a momentous discourse which come to monopolize initiatives and expectations of empowerment which at the end may cover over or overlook resources (Cruikshank, 1999). The messy habitat of the Peninsula is saturated with past and present problems to be sure, but it is also bristling with change side-by-side with issues.

Problems are not the whole Picture

Search on the term "Somali architecture" in the Royal Library of Copenhagen only yields results only on 'security architecture' despite the fact that under the rubbles and ruins now a constant imagery of places like Mogadishu one finds a site once named the Pearl of the Indian Ocean. As Padmashree Laurie Baker said, "Every district has its own traditions and, by trial and error, over thousands of years, people have learned how to use, and to cope with, all the many factors which are involved in Architecture. – The Site, the Topography and Geology. The climate and vegetation, the available local materials – the religious and cultural patterns of living, and the main local occupants. Unsatisfactory items have long since been discarded and alternatives have been tried until a satisfactory solution has been found."

The binary of development/failure is not only *not* the full picture. More important, the binary obscures real problems that lies elsewhere and which become apparent once you address the potential of building in the Peninsula. Here it becomes apparent that development/failure has nothing to say to people who wants change and therefore grab what they can get. In a factfinding

survey on urbanisation and architecture from 2018, a repeated assumption among Somalis in Hargeisa was that design is about fascinating forms that must conform to habit. Design was seen as a symbol of resources which could be translated into status mediated by the market because no alternative exist.

Design is not addressed as a resource but as a marker of wealth, and the allegedly empowering strategies of NGOs and UN-agencies can apparently do nothing to change that. A new house must look fanciable like the neighbor's house and this means that imported coated facade panelling in vogue everywhere in the South, from Manila over Colombo to Dubai suddenly also pops up in Hargeisa and become popular even if it is dysfunctional. Panels are part of a tool-kit for design-fixes for wealth which imposed on the liveable habitat because nothing else is available. This despite the fact that they are imported, costly, and non-resilient to the wear and tear of local weather (sand blown against shiny coatings), and contributes to unnecessary warming of structures, triggering a need for equally imported, costly, and non-resilient air condition. Use of large surfaces of glass have the same problem.

Such panels and windows look like design but are a dysfunctional replica of styles such as 'curtain wall-facades' popularized by modern design in the North in the postwar era and now trickling down to almost any metropolitan part of the world in use of glass. Vernacular and indigenous approaches to design in the Somali Peninsula, such as use of narrow corridors and covered courtyards inside buildings as climate protection and shade, meticulous design of window space integrating geometric decoration and functions, as the Mashrabiya window, or wind towers are almost absent. It is not taken seriously because design remains about a fashionable frosting whether it the property market or empowering institutions. The binary of development/failure is thus not only a repetition of insufficient truth, but a blockade of future change on indigenous premises because it diverts resources and incarcerate potential.

However, sixty years after independence a dynamic realignment of forces in the Somali Peninsula maps out interesting roads to the future. Design can become a relevant case for the kind of knowledge that Beninese philosopher Paulin Hountondji terms an "endogenous knowledge": "what we have to do is to promote the growth, in countries now on the periphery of the

world system, of a process of inner-directed scientific productivity and creativity" (Hountondji, 1997).

Culture and Design: Global-local Paradox

The idea that culture and design are connected is today a well-established paradigm in design and cultural studies, material culture and urban studies, as the architect Rem Koolhaas forcefully argue: *"… the generic city, the general urban* condition, is happening everywhere, and just the fact that it occurs in such enormous quantities must mean that it's habit-able. Architecture can't do anything that the culture doesn't" (Heron, 1996). But the role of culture in design does not stand alone. In fact a very important 'turn' to culture has become an important aspect of globalisation processes and decolonisation for the past thirty years or more.

It has been reflected, discussed, and developed in several ways in studies of globalisation, which question the assumption that culture is immobile, bounded, and coherent, "occupying a physical territory mapped as political territory (predominantly the nation-state) and binding individual meaning constructions into this circumscribed social, political space," (Tomlinson, 1999). For instance, the space still circumscribed by colonialism and neo-colonialism. Importantly, the binaries binding culture to nation and ethnicity, essentialism and Eurocentricity – entangled with development/failure – can be revised as for example "travelling cultures" (James Clifford) where cultural "crossing and interaction" are seen as troubling to the "localism in many common assumptions on culture." Ulf Hannerz writes:

> "There is now a world culture, but we had better make sure we understand what this means. It is marked by an organisation of diversity rather than by a replication of uniformity ... No total homogenisation of systems of meaning and expression has occurred, nor does it appear likely that there will be one any time soon. But the world has become one network of socialrelationships, and between its different regions there is a flow of meanings as well as of people and goods" (Hannerz, 1990; 1992).

Seen from a local vantage point, as Frantz Fanon pointed out in the early postcolonial period (Fanon, 1963). The challenge of postcolonial Africa lies in the inevitable need of "invented histories, invented biologies, invented cultural affinities come with every identity; each is a kind of role that has to be scripted, structured by conventions of narrative to which the world never quite manages to conform," as Kwame Anthony Appiah (1993) argues in his book

about Ghanaian culture, *In My Father's House* (Appiah, 1993) Out of this has come not only a serious critique of what we term the binary of development/failure, but debates on decolonial resources and indigenous methods (Mignolo, 2007; 2011; Quijano, 2007). As Somali education scholar Ahmed Ilmi argues, there is a need of "indigenous social consciousness" whether a person lives in the diaspora or the Peninsula (Limi, 2012).

Malcolm Waters (1995) argues that globalisation also imply a new attitude towards the world, a new way of directing attention, a new experience of the 'global'. There is a "phenomenology of globalisation" [phenomenology meaning structured experience] in which "the inhabitants of the planet self-consciously orient themselves towards the world as a whole...". Despite the populist nationalism in the past decade this has not changed as we see in the surge of globally pervasive phenomena, which for instance increasingly put African music, fashion and art on the global map along with acknowledgement of the postcolonial relationship between key aspect of Northern culture innovation and creativity such as abstract art and rhythmic music and its deep connection with the Global South.

It is feasible to talk about the local as a pervasive paradox of the global. When Hannerz argue for a world culture consisting of a "network of social relationships" such networks are everywhere present in the Somali Peninsula; a *global-local paradox entangling local resourcefulness and global expansions as modes of interaction between assumptions of origin* and ongoing *construction.*

Change is no longer and was never a simplistic product of development/failure but of moving states of a global-local paradox; what we may term a cultural complexity (Foucault), as Hannerz argues or what Michel Foucault dubbed histories that succeed, "The successes of history belong to those who are capable of seizing these rules, to replace those who had used them, to disguise themselves so as to pervert them, invert their meaning, and redirect them against those who had initially imposed them; controlling this complex mechanism, they will make it function so as to overcome the rulers through their own rules." When the UN-Habitat in *World Cities Report 2016* states that housing is a 'burning platform' we may re-address this as a platform for design, since as the UN-Habitat points out, "adequate and affordable housing … not only improves outcomes for individuals, but affects communities and the global economy at

large." (UN-Habitat, United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 2016):

> UN-Habitat states, "Integrated Housing Framework: the embedding of housing into urban plans and both citywide and national sectoral investment strategies (as they relate to urban services, land use, transportation and environmental sustainability) to improve livability and accessibility within urban areas; Inclusive Housing: the commitment to support participatory processes, fair housing policies, and to address housing for special needs groups; Affordable Housing: the adoption of policies and measures to improve affordability of home ownership; subsidy policies to enable low-income households to rent or own adequate housing; revenue and capital generating policies, and mechanisms that limit property speculation; Adequate Housing: measures that provide for habitability (protection from natural elements, hazards, and disease), access to basic services (including to water, sanitation, lighting, electricity, and garbage disposal), legal right to secure tenure (including compliance with a continuum of land rights, promotion of gender-equal land rights, and prohibition of housing discrimination and forced eviction); and Informal Settlement Upgrading: support of neighborhood upgrading programs and protection of incremental housing," UN-Habitat 2015. Housing Indicators for the Sustainable Development Goals, February, p1 United Nations Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development Habitat III Quito October 2016,

It is part of a cultural complexity which stem from the networks Hannerz envisages which have direct impact in the neighborhoods of affluent villas in Hargeisa built by the diaspora.

Housing-issues is only at the outset an element of crisis. It is also, and perhaps most of all, a constructive option which imply cultural forces. The global-local paradox not only brings forward samples of a liveable habitat that seems to come to the Peninsula from anywhere: problem solutions of the most different problems, symbolized meaning, codes and discourses, and aesthetics for shaping use, which convey art and beauty, including the imagination and related issue such as affect and memory and so on and so forth.

It brings forward new problems but also new solutions. Housing is not per se a problem, it is a challenge. Instead of entering The Peninsula into limitless continued predicaments, urbanisation is a potential. We should not ask if it is yet another symptom of crisis, but if it is ´the right success? And if this is the right question at all? If building starts with "community strengths

and assets assessment" it also the relevant question is to ask *what assets are used for what ends,* and *how they may be used differently.*

For too long there has been lack of strategic thinking on the transformation of the liveable habitat and its natural landscapes in Somaliland and Somalia; be it man-made or formed by nature. Be it as it may, this is perhaps first and foremost problematic because a huge resource has been subjected to problematic frostings such as panels and aircon. In the subsequent sections the article traces how the habitat becomes building over time, and further how this emerges into a habitat in new terms where design can be articulated as a direct asset of "self-esteem and self-reliance."

The Postcolonial Habitat: Critical Regionalisation

Perhaps a productive way to start thinking about the habitat in the Somali Peninsula so to take a more general view of the forces at play over longer stretches of time, that is, what is built with a permanence and how thus contributes to ways of life, not too different form Foucault's idea of a historical success. As Sada Mire's groundbreaking research has documented, the Peninsula harbors a rich habitat going back to pre-Islamic Punt, which is more or less hidden but exists as a rich archaeological evidence (Mire, 2015; 2020). After the advent of Islam in the Peninsula this habitat increasingly changed into a permanent and continuous negotiation of pastoral space and urban cosmopolitanism, further linking up with the surrounding African continent and the Indian Ocean, in the extreme reaching Catalonia in Spain and Beijing in China. We find in the Peninsula a "duration" of a type which is somehow comparable to the idea of a historical structure analyzed by the French historian Fernand Braudel as a "long duration" [la longue durée] (Braudel, 1973; 1979; Foucault, 1997; 2002; Lefebvre, 974; Certeau, 1984).

Braudel was interested in how settled agricultural societies made up the material and economic foundation for Mediterranean culture and as such the topic was much different from the Peninsula. Here the entanglement of migrants from the Arabian Peninsula with population in the Horn of Africa expanded into a topography of pastoral space in negotiation with urban cosmopolitanism and this became further entangled with systems of meaning, involving all sorts of conceptions, from Somali Sufism to a pervading sense of business. What was to become particular ways of

life for Somalis, can be seen as a sedimentation of a habitat across the Horn, from North, toward South and East, establishing still existing divisions of resources for grazing and watering aligned with herding movement, aligned with hierarchies of local clans given set of relationships with foreigners, for instance Arabs, Turks, and East Africans, extending into present day Kenya and Ethiopia.

In the Southern Peninsula, between the rivers Shabelle and Jubba, this would lead to farming, but almost in every other place it would be structured as habitat based on nomadic life interacting with two major belts of cities, an *outer belt at the coast* and an *inner belt along the plains passing upwards* to the Ethiopian highlands. From Mogadishu on the Banadir coast, over the historic city Zeila, today a village, to current commercial hubs such as Berbera in Somaliland an *outer belt of coastal cities* existed, both belts remaining with permanence, even if the cities would further entangle with differing polities and colonizers. Inland, an *inner belt of landlocked cities* reaching from Baidoa over Beledweyne in Somalia to the northern Burao and Borama in Somaliland, or ancient Muslim hubs such as Harar in Ethiopia would make up the backbone of the border area toward the Ethiopians. Cities around which centers of the Ajuuraan Empire, the Adal and Warsangeli Sultanates in the 15th and 16th century evolved, and later The Sultanate of Geledi from the 17th-19th century.

States persisted in a co-existence with forms of colonisation by Europeans with the Portuguese arrival in 16th century and accelerating with Italian, French and British colonisation under the ill-fated "scramble" for Africa by European Imperialism in the 19th century. The English advances in the North led to the first nationalist state-pretensions in the rebellion of the Dervishes and their Dervish State under Sheikh Mohamed Abdulle Hassan between 1899 and 1920 developing in collaboration (as well as conflict) with other local Somali polities, such as the Majerteen Sultanate in Bossaso, and the Dhulbahante and Isaac clans. Hassan devised a chain of forts, the largest situated in Taleh, which were intensely attacked by the British, by bombing of forts and surrounding settlements of huts, including machine gunning of livestock, in fact of everything the Dervishes conceived as a proper Somali topography, despite the religious and eccentric character of the rebellion. It took Britain almost twenty-five years to subdue the Dervish State, and they only succeeded after pouring considerable resources into the concerted 'Somaliland

Campaign' in 1920, and in fact luck played its part. The British victory only transpired after the death of Hassan by the flue, after having sought refuge in Ogaden.

After the postcolonial independence in 1960 the built habitat left to the young Somali state was basically a mix of the heritage of vernacular design in the best of cities such as still found in neighborhoods in Burao and Hargeisa or in the Osman Parts of Berbera or districts such as of Xamar Weyne and Shingani in Mogadishu. (Degan, O; Meuser, and Dalbaio, 2000) However, by then the long negotiation of pastoralism and urbanism had been further mitigated by the colonial presence which had changed cities as Mogadishu into imperial footholds with no place for local architecture beyond the mix of what allowed to remain with the impriasl designs. The big cities of the Peninsula moved along on the planning foundation set up by Italians in the South and English in the North, for instance in the big urban plan for Hargeisa designed by the British along the Doox river. The most famous example is the two redefining urban plans of Mogadishu set up by the Italians, starting by Giovanni De Martino's infrastructure planning from 1912 and the changes in the late 1920s following upon Italian migration to the city, creation of a new European quarter and throughfares such as the Regina Elena Avenue, in the whole an "imperial Mogadishu." (Ali, 2014) This would "for a long time to come define Mogadishu's cityscape" conceiving it as a Southern Italian city which would be crowned by the alien figure of a Catholic cathedral designed by Antonio Vandone in "complete indifference to its local environment, allowing the church's 37m bell towers to dwarf the old compact Arab style city."

The colonial implications of Sub Saharan urban and architectural design also spilled into the sparse education which in Somalia never came into being since design was taken care off from abroad by colonialism and design as such was to become mired in colonialism till the present day, like much of Sub – Saharan Africa. (Olweny, 2020; Borys and Preiser, 1998) In Somalia the examples of adapting modern design to the postcolonial situation by "critical regionalisation" (Kenneth., 1983; Foster, 1983; Lea Catherine and Patteeuw, 2019) did not produce results such as the comprehensive regional design of the village New Qurna in Egypt designed and built in the 1940s and 50s as a prototype for as local design idiom by Hassan Fathy (1900-1989; World Monuments Fund, 2011). New

Qurna deliberately attempted to bridge the gap between postcolonial development and local culture by devising solutions combining materials and forms from the local vernacular, such as mud for walls and roofings from the Nubian tradition. Principles from modern design such a geometrical enhanced articulation of form was mixed with a catalogue of vernacular typologies such as Malkafs/windcatchers, loggia walls, detours, mashrabiya windows, and courtyards. In *Architecture for the Poor*, from 1969 Fathy wrote:

> Every people that has produced architecture has evolved its own favorite forms, as peculiar to that people as its language, its dress, or its folklore. Until the collapse of cultural frontiers in the last century, there were all over the world distinctive local shapes and details in architecture, and the buildings of any locality were the beautiful children of a happy marriage between the imagination of the people and the demands of their countryside.

In the first decades after WW2 critical regionalisation would influence the development of modern design and domesticate alleged universal solutions set up in Europe and North America as a variety of local articulations, from Latin America to Asia. Work such as Bangladesh National Archives and Library by Muzharul Islam (1993-2012) in Bangladesh (1953-54) used modern principles such as a pervading formal structure and plan but mixed these with local inspirations in the conception of relations between interior and exterior and use of materials such as brick.

Padmashree Laurie Baker (1917-2007) (ilslam, 2021; Baker, 1999) was an English architect who re-located to South India and Indianized and preferred to work as a physical builder along with locals to establish architectural design for everyone. His famous Indian Coffee House in Trivandrum, Kerala (1958) devise a ground plan which develop upwards in a turning spiral and fuse with the walls built of perforated brick. They evoke historical Indian Jali Walls, create a dynamic light patterns and allow for natural air flow into the building, reinforcing the circulation of cool air in the spiral plan.

Such attempts at critical regional and indigenous articulation have today evolved into a growing understanding for an endogenous role of urban and architectural design in the Global South, further supported by projects for social collaboration in co- and self-construction of affordable housing, (Bredenoord, Lindert and Smets, 2014). and d this bring the first postwar attempts at critical regionalisation into a contemporary indigenous articulation, as an

alternative to the predominance of global 'starchitecture' or deliberate investment in spectacular "gigantism" (Henriette and Veel, 2020) for example the Burj Khalifa in Dubai designed by the American studio Skidmore, Owing and Merrill.

These examples points to the need for further exploring the global-local paradox. The problem is not that this design is not "for the real world" as design critic Papanek and Fuller (1972) famously argued in the 1970s, but that design has become a substantial part of the global-local paradox. Design can be made a key contribution to a liveable habitat in the Somali Peninsula by develop indigenous resources in collaborative frameworks of the global/local paradox. (Kovach, 2009; Lewis, 2008). The extensive transnational relations (Farah, 2015). Follow from the paradox render a revised perspective feasible. If design designates both idea, action, intention and result (Heskett, 2005) this also entail an openness for "courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones" Simon (1996) that embed and embody strong cultural change.

Urban and architectural design– a perspective…

Till this day there has never been a concerted focus on urban and architectural design in the Peninsula, despite infrastructure development and the implementation of "public works programmes that featured the delivery of buildings for schools universities, banks, and other public institutions across the country" (Rashid, 2000) (institutions in the 1970s and 80s under the Siad Barre-regime. The rich heritage of building in the Peninsula in historical cities as Mogadishu, Merca, Bosaso, Hargeisa, Berbera and Burao is often dilapidated or lost. The preceding monuments from the past century are mostly built by outsiders, such as the colonial design of French, British and Italian origin, or even postcolonial monuments as the National Theater in Mogadishu built by Chinese in 1967, or Soviet designs of institutions and housing in Berbera and elsewhere.

Present urbanisation changes that. Cities of the Somali Peninsula may look dusty and ruined to binary perceptions but they offer a vibrant scene with a youthful demographic (OECD, 2021) which – like many urban configurations in the Global South, are un-researched and far from the horizons of the North. Before the Ogaden War in 1977, Somalia's capital Mogadishu had a mere 250.000 inhabitants, in 2017 it was almost 2.500.000, ten times more. The city is well under way to reach 3 million inhabitants,

taking up its place among African metropolises. Hargeisa, Somaliland's capital, is not known to have much history before the 19th century, when it was a water stop on the way to Harar in today's Ethiopia – therefore the name 'Little Harar'. It has grown from 60.000 at the start of the 1970es to 1.200.000 inhabit – ants today, twenty times as much. One third, or more, of Somaliland's population is now resident in Hargeisa, up from 500.000 ten years ago.

In his account of culture in globalisation Tomlinson (1999) emphasizes the particular ways of life which come across in the North as culture, in "...the trip around the local supermarket aisles, or to the restaurant, the sports hall, the dance club, or the garden centre, the conversation in the bar or in the corner;" mundane practices that contribute to lives and peoples ongoing "life-narratives" Culture is "the order of life," "...people's sense of identity, the experience of place and of the self in relation to place, shared understandings, values, desires, myths, hopes and fears," where human beings construct meaning through "practices of symbolic representation."

Of course, this northern image is only to some extent relevant for Somali life in the Peninsula but nevertheless today one finds supermarkets branded as for instance "Motherland" along with Café-latte outlets as Café Barbera in central Hargeisa, where anyone with money enough can take her coffee after pizza at a similar venue, Summertime Restaurant, and so on. When Raymond Williams (1976) argued that "culture" would take on quite different meanings over time, such as for instance *"inhabit, cultivate, protect, honor with worship,"* and more, examples such as "Motherland," Café Barbera or Summertime Restaurant, very direct influences of the global-local paradox as they are often started by returning diaspora-members and filled with diasporic holiday-makers in the Summer where they may team up with a further faceted and global-localised city-life such as seen in the spread of soccer fields where enthusiastic – if unemployed, audiences of young men (and a few women) cheer along. Or basketball games of young women playing basketball elsewhere wearing head scarfs elsewhere. Or furthermore, other young clubbing at venues like the now defunct Lion Garden in Hargeisa, "Beerta Libaaxa" dancing into the night, perhaps having visited one of the fitness center spreading in the city during day. Or, in a different direction, take up a new Islamic piety, up against the long Sufi tradition in the Peninsula, or in, yet a different manner, partake

in the annual family visits from abroad in July-August with relatives from the UK, US, Canada, Scandinavia, the Netherlands, the Persian Gulf and elsewhere.

Now, the reader may wonder how these assumedly unimportant pass time exercises can constitute a new potential as argued above?

Let us give an example; the fact that Hargeisa swells under visiting relatives is directly mirrored in the flabbergasting remittance transfer that power not only a significant part of the local economy but probably makes up a precondition for the booming property market which is a precondition for current building.

What we see in our examples are exactly how a liveable habitat is redefined in terms of exactly what makes it a liveable culture; that is, further, contribution to a radical negotiation of pastoral space and urban cosmopolitanism under impact of the global/local paradox. This negotiation is mended or transmuted from well-defined social groupings placed in structures of a definite space to systems of culture flowing along with "network of social relationships;" for instance of the kind making a Somali uncle in Birmingham willing to follow up on his remittance transfer by travelling to Hargeisa every second summer, or make the auntie support her unemployed nephew so he can cheer the football players along without too much worry.

Most importantly for our argument, in these facts – and we deliberately take our examples from trivial aspects of daily life, that are deeply familiar to any Somali – we see how the binary of development/failure comes to a limit, or is put in its place, because the binary cannot grasp or support such a dynamic but see it as an obstacle like others, that over time have been in translated into impressions of ineptitude (exactly because Somaliland has managed to escape this stigma, Hargeisa can prosper in terms of football and cafe latte, one may argue).

But how does this translate into urban and architectural design the sceptical reader may persist?

First it points to the fact that culture is not something that encapsulate design as a container which for instance can be dubbed 'particular ways of life', like an aquarium waiting to be filled with fish. Culture is travelling through design and is articulated per design, parts and whole, use and appearance as liveable habitat. One of the most consequential misapprehensions of the modern design idiom is the assumption that functionality

has a patent on design on par with GNP and economic growth as expressed in proclamations such as 'form follows function'. (Sullivan, L. 1896) Design is not primarily functional and has never been, as already very clearly stated by for example Walter Gropius when he wrote in the Bauhaus Manifesto (1919) about the crystal symbol of a new faith, *"Together let us desire, conceive, and cre*ate the new structure of the future, which will embrace architecture and sculpture and painting in one unity and which will one day rise toward heaven from the hands of a million workers like the crystal symbol of a new faith."[13]

Design is a coming together of problem solutions, symbolized meaning, and aesthetics for shaping use, including the imagination and related issue such as emotion, affect and memory: it is "making sense (of things)" as Klaus Krippendorff proclaimed in 1989 (Eric von Hippel, E. von, 2005).

Let us suggest the following diagram for design in this sense based on Cornelius Castoriadis's idea of an imaginary institutions of society, what he also termed a social "self-creation deployed as history (Michelsen, 2007). That is a system of cultural institutions (organisations) incorporating "the functional," "the symbolic" and "the imaginary," which would be placed in definite space but also related as positions in a wider continuous system of meaning, a topology (Cornelius, 1987).




Fig. 1 Design as functional, symbolic and imaginary. The topology is graphically to be understood as what transpires in the interaction in the common set in the middle of the figure, in the overlap of the three circles, even if this is only an illustration of the real topological dynamic which a distributed in all parts of its domain according to rules for signification




Fig. 2 Rashid Ali, Public Square, Hargeisa 2020

Let us conclude with a brief introduction of a project one of us (Rashid Ali) has designed which may demonstrate how the particular way of Somali life can inform and nurture such suggestions by a new design of the city center of Hargeisa, today a traffic vacuum in between major institutions such as Somaliland's National Bank and business headquarters of Dahabshiil, which negotiates culture in a new way such as envisaged in this article.

In this design we see a deliberate attempt at activating the global-local paradox emerging out of the long negotiation of pastoral and urban: the square is composed of elements of pastoral and urban duration in a definite space pointing towards something we may call the naturban for instance by involving the Peninsular plant biology. It presents this as a place which is not only present in physical space but informed by meanings in a topology of a liveable habitat negotiating the global-local paradox: problem solutions (to the functions of a city center), symbolized meaning (the center of Somaliland's capital), and aesthetics for shaping use (that embody particular ways of life), including the imagination and related issue such as emotion, affect and memory (involving elements that support imaginations of past and present,

creates feelings of interest and pride, even entertain, in the shape of a balloon).

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this design is the emphasis on the Somali fascination of encountering and meeting up which was a returning aspect of the negotiation of pastoral and urban and is transmuted into another meeting in the place and topological systems such as the soccer field, the shopping mall, the café or the reception hall: a key social aspects of this particular way of life, networking, meeting and encountering. In this sense it has no place for any exhausted binaries and it relies fully, we want argue, on what is increasingly the real backbone of Somali society.

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CHAPTER 4

Theorizing the Conditions of Inequality in Somalia

Fred Jonyo and Mohamed A. Eno

Introduction

> Marx: "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas; i.e. the class which is the ruling *material* force of society, is at the same time its ruling *intellectual* force. The class which has the means of production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it." K. Marx and F. Engels, *The German Ideology*, (London, 1965 edition, p. 61).

This chapter focuses on the role of socio-class and clan inequalities in Somalia in perpetuating conflicts in the country. The study is premised on the ongoing Somalia struggle which is characterized by among other things social-class inequalities. The central question in this paper is; to what extent does the issue of inequalities in Somalia, be it class or clan, influence the persistence of the chronic instability in that country? In order to answer this question, the paper sets out the key objective which is to establish the extent to which clan and socio-class inequalities play a role in the chaos that undermines Somali stability. The chapter will be anchored on the human needs theory as proposed by John Burton, and the concept of tribal ideology as explained by Archie Mafeje (1971). Burton's theory argues that the desire by every human being to meet his most basic needs is what drives struggles in society, and unless the most basic needs of an individual human being has been met; it's very difficult to avoid conflicts in the society since the struggle to access the basic needs is usually conflictual. On the other hand, the paper focuses on Mafeje's observation, particularly from the perspective of "the man who invokes tribal ideology in order to maintain a poser position, not in

the tribal area, but in the modern capital city, and whose ultimate aim is to undermine and exploit the supposed tribesmen" (1971, 258).

The concept of class according Sand Brook (1975) refers to a collective/grouping of people who share common economic resources which strongly influences the type of lifestyles they are able to lead, their level of ownership of wealth, and their occupation. These characterize the bases of class differentials. The author argues that it should be noted that these classes are not established by legal or religious provisions and the membership is not based on inherited position, instead class systems are more fluid and boundaries between classes are never clear cut. Also an individual's class is at least in some part individually achieved and not given at birth, this means that social mobility within the class system is characterized by upward and downward movement in the class structure.

The chapter sets out three major questions namely; what's the conceptualisation of class and how does the issue of socio-economic classes emerged in the Somalia society? What is the existing political economy of Somalia since the ushering in of a federal government? And, how does the said political economy contribute to the political, social and economic conflicts in Somalia?

Conceptualizing Class and Clan

The Concept of Class

The concept of class, according to Markowitz (1977), can also be defined as a relationship between two sets of people, who are characterized by social aggregates by way of behavior. These aggregates are historically created and are best understood in the process of production. The author observes that the producers or the owners of the means of production constitute a distinct class from the workers or the laborers. Under the concept of class, the author acknowledges that there arise two major issues: class action and class consciousness. These issues arise through the process of distribution of work roles, property relations, income distribution, occupational structure, and property relations which in most cases becomes conflictual (Markovitz 1977).

In his analysis, Karl Marx argued that the concept of class refers to the relationship that one has with the means of production, either someone has a say over the process of production or one has no say at all. Marx continued to explain the concept of class as a group of

people who stand in a common relationship to the means of production, that is to say, – the means by which they gain their livelihood. Max Weber, to a smaller extent, echoed Karl Marx's position by emphasizing that skills and credentials come into effect in determining the occupational structures. Weber believed that an individual's market position strongly influences his/her overall life's chances. This implies that an individual's market situations have relative concerns on his or her level of pay, job security and prospects for advancements; – it emphasizes material rewards and general life's chances for the individual.

In the Hegelian conception of class, it is important to realize that the presence of class without the awareness of its existence will obviously render the class belonging quite weak (Lewis 2008). Marx was to argue that a class that is not aware of its common relationship to the means of production is not effectively a class. The idea of a class consciousness becomes an important indicator of class structure. The owners of the means of production have used their monopolistic networks in determining how production and distribution of goods and services are done (Adam 2002).

The major class interests that the bourgeoisie have in common are to control and dominate market opportunities in their favor. The proletariat has no option but to continue struggling at the periphery of the economy. Further, the bourgeoisie ensure that they hire labor cheaply; this is because if the bourgeoisie are to accumulate surplus profit, they have to keep labor costs much lower so as not to affect the pricing index (Barash and Webel 2002). The authors continue to argue that the bourgeoisie have also created exploitative systems where they control the sources of raw materials that are purely meant to feed their interests towards production and the general framework of the conduct of business. This allows input costs in production to be reduced and enhance profit margins that are usually favorable to the bourgeoisie.

The Concept of Clan

Clan is explained as a cohort of people who claim a genealogical attachment to a generally assumed or actually unknown common forefather. It is also defined as being a non-corporate descent entity. The word 'non-corporate' is important in the sense that it defines non-ownership of property. A definition in the Word Atlas suggests that "in a broader anthropological understanding, a clan is any non-

corporate group in which genealogical ties are assumed between members" (www.worldatlas.com). Kathleen Collins (2004, 231) contributes that a clan is "an informal organisation comprising a network of individuals linked by kin-based bonds." It has "[a]ffective ties of kinship" that symbolize "the identity and bonds of its organisation." Collins further delineates that a clan's ties can be "both vertical and horizontal," while mirroring "both actual blood ties and fictive kinship" (Collins 2004, 231).However, the term is in many cases used as intelligible with 'tribe', contrary to the anthropologist's differentiation of the two terms. This is because, as some scholars note, a "distinction between tribe and clan is one of scale… [while] "in the anthropological literature, clans comprise segments of a larger tribe" (Hart 1970, 11–12; Hudson et al. 2015, 535). A tribe, on the other hand, and according to Durkheim, is "an aggregate of hordes or clans" (Durkheim 2013 [1893]: 204).

Whether one calls it 'tribalism' or 'clanism', reality is that ethnicity plays a central role in all aspects of Somali social life. Without it many find life hard living; and without its linkage to an Arab pedigree, many more find their identity demeaned, and their humanness degraded. Although Arab decency and nomadic pastoralism are speciously generalized as the ethnic and cultural etic of the Somali people (Lewis 1955, 1961; Said Samatar 1982; Laitin and Samatar …), that old belief has been challenged as nothing but a pastoral informant's emic of his ethno-cultural view. Recent critical analyses by constructivist scholars of multi-disciplinary orientations (Ahmed 1995; Kusow 2004; Eno 2004; Eno 2008; Kusow & Eno 2015; Ingiriis 2015) suggest multi-ethnic as well as multi-cultural reality, despite the discrepancies in the historiography sponsored by the state (Ahmed 1995, 1996; Mukhtar 1995; Eno 2017; Eno 2008; Eno et al. 2016). The spurious, uniquely nomadic characterisation has been such that the settled indigenous agrarians and other cultures have been completely obscured in the discussion about Somalia as we can see from the available literature. Prunier's (1997) statement that "A settled population is needed before any form of state can be established [and that] [n]omad society is essentially anarchic," clearly authenticates our argument regarding the diminished place of the non-pastoral Somali peoples and their cultures.

Idolisation of clan in Somalia

The presentation of the Somalis as a society entirely of nomadic background in their cultural mode is not merely common among the old school of traditionalists or originalists like Lewis and Said

Samatar but it became one that resonates well with a number of current writers. For example, authors such as Carlson (2009) and Hesse (2010) view Somalia through Lewis's misleading and criticized lens in their citation. In fact it is Carlson (2009) that says: "In the harsh struggle for survival which is a nomad's lot, suspicion is the natural attitude towards those with whom one competes for access to scarce pasture and water. This defense mechanism is extended to all contexts of social interaction and hence becomes a national characteristic." This has been to the detriment of widely-held notions of modern governance, which ultimately require a citizen to defer to a higher sovereign authority beyond one's clan, sub-clan, and/or sub sub-clan.

Hesse views how clans or members of a clan "desire a lion's share of opportunity, power and influence." Hesse further notes that even "Shared scraps whether in a '4.5 Formula' or some other form hold little appeal. In fact, some insurgents' desire to exert unrivalled control goes beyond trying to subjugate obvious enemies. At times it means they have sought to overpower sometime – and would-be allies, as has been seen in Kismayo" (p255.) The current impasse in the Jubba Regional Administration surfaces the controversial circumstances of not only nomadic political performance but the effects this can lead to the deterioration of the lives of other people under this kind of rule. Significantly, the problem is not restricted only to the people in the region but indeed extends in scope as to affect the political rivalry at the Federal Parliament as well as Federal Government level and risks further disintegration and distrust among the various administrations with the Federal Government at different levels. It also indicates possible emulation of such instances of disagreement by other regional administration once desires of certain top individuals are not met. In addition, it clearly envisages the nefarious attitude of leaders and the crave for gerrymandering in the electoral as well as the entire political system of the administration, whether federal or regional, and the elements of fuelling more fire by partisan and shortsighted political figures into the delicate situation of the country.

The matter is so fluid that the political confrontation exists at inter-clan and intra-clan levels as has in effect stretched to sub-clan and even sub sub-clan levels in unprecedented cycles. It broke out into another front where former federal leaders took sides with the various opponents to fend off challenges "interference" from the

Federal Authority in Mogadishu. The stalemate of the presidency in the Jubbaland Regional Administration and the ensuing rivalry that engulfed parts of the country's political atmosphere, as Hesse analyzed, is encouraged nothing but a greed for "a lion's share of opportunity, power and influence." Observing the very same situation in Kismayo, Jubbaland, in 2010, Hesse further reminds us:

> Shared scraps whether in a '4.5 Formula' [Somalia's clan-based power-sharing mechanism] or some other form hold little appeal. In fact, some insurgents' desire to exert unrivalled control goes beyond trying to subjugate obvious enemies. At times it means they have sought to overpower sometime – and would-be allies, as has been seen in Kismayo (p255).

The regional administration of Galmudug, despite time, effort and colossal amounts of finances to either win opponents' support or silence loud-tongued individuals, observes remain skeptical whether the framework employed and the structure constituted will endure. The reason is that discontents from certain individuals and clan and sub-clan circles have emerged that seem and have the potential to undermine the peace undertaking publicized over a period of months. It remains currently unknown what measures the Federal Government of Somalia will adopt to maintain the accord made during the Galmudug gathering. The announcement by one of the leaders of the Galmudug Regional Administration that it has withdrawn from the agreement with the Federal Government does not surprise some of the analysts who saw the process as fragile and therefore its consequence as unpredictable. All these efforts are being exerted as preliminary works for the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections expected to take place in 2020.

The current displeasure of the communities in the Benadir region (literally the capital Mogadishu) over the Federal Government's lack of consideration for regional administration equivalent to other self-administrations, poses significant potential for long term unrest. The government's reluctance, which observers differ in their opinion on whether the capital should have equal self-administering status like other regions, could be an avoidable mistake that can backfire at a later stage. Yet, and in the case that a self-administration is finally accepted to be constituted, the epidemic "lion's share" syndrome awaits to bring in a multiplicity of the rivalries that are common to clan politics and power. In such a situation, two groups among the dominant communities namely the Jareer-weyne and the Banadiri people will most probably fall victims to the armed communities of

the Hawiye sub-clans namely the smaller Murusade group and the larger Abgaal sub-clan – despite the lack of reliable census to determine clan size. Note also that these two Hawiye sub-clans constitute part of the regional administrations where their members inhabit outside the capital, while the Jareer-weyne and the Banadiri communities live in their dominant regions under subjugation by certain Hawiye groups who came to dominate their settlements by the barrel of the gun.

An Overview of the Drivers of Conflict in Somalia

In societies such as Somalia, Adams (2002), Kusow and Eno (2015), note, there is often stratification in terms of various interests and situations. At some point such societal stratification is based on assets or property (Lewis 1955, 1961; Ahmed 1995;), while on the other hand it can also occur as a result of gender, age, religious affiliation, or military rank, while recent scholars (Kusow & Eno 2015; Ahmed 1995) have observed inequalities from perspectives related to ethnic group, culture, or one's clan affiliation. Individuals and groups enjoy differential (unequal) access to rewards on the basis of their position within the stratification scheme, be it ethnic/clan or otherwise. Societies can be seen as consisting of strata in a hierarchy with some clans, sub-clans or individuals more favored at the top and the less privileged nearer the bottom. Finally, classes and clans are used as used as the foundation on which to determine and create the economic differences within groupings of individuals, inequalities in possession and control of material resources in both the public and private sector. Therefore for the case of Somalia, first and foremost, the existence of unequal distribution of power and resources since 1960 when Somalia gained its independence and the historical experiences are among the factors that are responsible for the creation of today's social/ethnic differences in Somalia. (Adams 2002; Osman 2007).

Societies such as Somalia, according to Elmi (2010), are categorized as class structures where the owners of the means of production (Bourgeoisie) and those who own their labor power (Proletariat) are constantly racing over each other. Marx was to qualify his class concept by explaining that a class does not exist for itself. Instead, Marx argues, it exists as a tool of perpetuating interests to the extent that unless and until that time when the proletariat

groups become conscious of their class exploitation can they become a revolutionary class (Elmi 2010).

The political economy of the Republic Somalia is that which perpetuates continuous scarcity of resources and opportunities among the citizens of the Horn of Africa country. Although the Republic of Somalia is characterized as the recipient of huge foreign aids, these resources, according to Abdi (2017), have been captured by a few elites in the military rule of 1969-1990 and others in top positions of the country's civilian bureaucracy of 1960-1969. These elites have in turn transferred those benefits to a few other elites from a few clans and sub-clans while leaving out majority of the other clans. This scarcity has created very huge inequalities among the different clans. As a result of the huge inequalities and the challenges of the persistent conflicts, Somalia's level of political, economic, and social instability (Menkhaus2010) have been perpetuated to greater levels that severely affect all aspects of human development. Among the major social, political and economic grounds of conflict in Somalia which are also among the key drivers of conflict revolves around clan identities, governance systems, the levels of economic performance, natural and productive resources, militarisation, inter-regional conflicts as well as international factors (Memar 2012). In the following section, we will discuss several examples of these drivers some of which may double or triple up in more than one category discussed.

Formations of Class and the Politicisation of Clan Identity

One of the major drivers of conflict in Somalia is, according to some scholars, the idolisation of clan and politicisation of culture and clan identities (Ahmed 1996; Eno 2008; Lewis1955, 1961). In the same line of thought, Memar (2012) argues that conflicts in Somalia have always occurred along the lines of the clan. Clan identities, therefore, have always been taken advantage of by the warlords and, before them, by the political and military elite to pursue their interests. These interests are usually based on the attainment of power and, subsequently, control of state resources. It should be noted though, that clans are not and have never been a basis for large scale conflicts of what we have seen in the last three decades in Somalia, but they have been used for political advantage and are currently manipulated to ensure that conflicts continue so as to benefit from the advantages provided by conditions of anarchy and lawlessness. This is because

the unequal resource and power distribution over the years has tended to favor certain classes or rather clans to the disadvantage of others; hence it created different classes within individual clans and a great lust for state resource control among the clans. This has made some clans to believe that they are poor as a result of being sidelined or dominated by the other class or clan due to huge class differentials (Menkhaus 2010).

Warlords and divisive leaders have strategically put much emphasis on inter-clan differences so as to come up with the kind of demands that resonates with the said differences. Therefore, leaders of whatever type have always invoked loyalty from clan members. In addition, divisions have also emerged from the so-called major clans that were contesting for power and resources. Nowadays, particularly since the advent of the country's destructive civil war, this conflict has been narrowed down to sub-clans and families while at the same time the intra-clan rivalries stand alive and unresolved. It should be remembered that since the collapse of the central government in Somalia in 1991, there has been a lot of fragmentation of the state and outright plunder of the economy which have perpetuated the Somali war. This plundering of the economy has in turn reinforced further class differences in Somalia by widening the gap between the haves and the have-nots. As a result of this, and despite the role of the clan and elite influence on a myriad of factors, the have-nots have always tended to rebel against the haves and continue to do so due to the grudge and main belief that they (elites) are responsible for their misery (Dagne 2010).

Since Somalia is a country that is characterized by a homogenous ethnic group of Arab descendency, as Ioan M. Lewis (1955) wrote, pursuing a nomadic culture and religion which is the Islamic faith, the clan is a very powerful tool of mobilisation. For instance, Dagne (2010) narrates that in the south-central parts of Somalia, the conflict that exists there is about the control of the Gedo region, in a war that is being fought across many sub-clans of the Marehan clan, while Besteman and Cassanelli (1996) and Omar Eno (2004) claim that the war is about the control of the fertile land of the inter-riverine regions which are heavily populated the Bantu-Jareer community. In Puntland, Barash (2002) notes that the dominant sub-clan is the Majerten of the Harti group among the Daarood clan. They are in constant competition with an aim of controlling the regional administration and the economic control of the Bosasso port. This

fight for the control of the administration and resource bases has favored some clans at the expense of the others hence further entrenching the class differentials among clans and individuals. Therefore it's this deepening of class differentials among individuals and clans that perpetuates the conflicts in Somalia.

In Somaliland, Elmi (2010) argues that the unity witnessed in the Isaaq clan that led to confrontation with Mohamed Siad Barre's regime and declaration of self-autonomy also led to the sub-clans' rivalry. For instance the war between the Habar-Yonis and the Habar-Je'lo sub-clans shows evidence of inter-clan rivalries in the competition for power and control of state resources. They wanted to outdo each other. These clan divisions have led to the emergence of cleavages and deep-seated resentment among the clans. It is this type of political economy that exists in Somalia that has pitted one class against another and it is attributed to be one of the factors responsible for the continuation of conflict. The end result of these prolonged class conflicts made it impossible for people to survive since no meaningful businesses or work could go on. It increased the levels of poverty hence widening further the issue of class differences between the agrarian communities and the pastoralist communities. It's this deepening of class differences that continues to perpetuate the conflicts in Somali since the interests of the have-nots do not rhyme with those of the haves.

Bad Governance as a Conflict Driver

Bad governance can be noted as a potential driver of the Somali conflict which has worsened the differences by heightening the idolisation of the clan to the extent of framing it on the formation of the national parliament and the sharing of cabinet and other bureaucratic posts of the so-called Federal Government in Mogadishu. Khadiagala (2008) noted that most Somalis have always viewed the state "as an instrument of accumulation and domination enriching and empowering those who control it and exploiting and harassing the rest of the population". This view was reinforced by Mohamed Siad Barre's government. In fact, Somali people disliked the central government because it was dominated by small elite of the Marehan sub-clan in association with other sub-clans of the Daarood clan. Members of Barre's kin used their sub-clan identity to control the state and exploit its valuable resources. The dictatorial government of Mohamed Siad Barre also manipulated clan identities

by favoring some and not others and this deepened the levels of suspicions and hatred that clans had for Siad Barre and his regime (Khadiagala 2008), and indeed the entire Daarood clan for that matter. Therefore it's this outright corruption and favoritisms of some clans at the expense of others that has deepened the fights between those clans and individuals who are perceived to be benefiting and those within the clan or sub-clan who perceived themselves to have been excluded from the resource distribution and access to power

Mohammed Siad Barre's regime also oppressed the Issaq clan in the Northwestern parts of Somalia which made the Isaaq wanting to secede. This played a considerable role in the Isaaq people's decision to declare independence immediately after the collapse of the state. With the collapse of the state, the legacy of the inter-clan divisions, bad governance and myopic leadership goes on till today and has in fact widened and deepened the class/clan differences among several clans and individuals. The clan and sub-clan entities have emerged as tools with unprecedented potential in the political market place and are in constant competition in the hunt for power so as to control state resource. With this kind of clan commoditisation and social disorder due to lack of a central government, it has been difficult to restore sanity and eliminate anarchy in post Barre Somalia. Conflict has therefore been and still is the order of the day in Mogadishu and other parts of southern Somalia as a result of this widened clan differences and a lust for resource control.

For quite a long period of time since 1991, leadership has been under the anarchic dictatorship of so-called faction leaders who have been forming fluid and fragile alliances in order to control Mogadishu or any administration established in a region where they could deploy their militia. At some point, the prolonged rivalry and confrontation as well as foreign interference from neighboring and other countries, have paved the way for the rise of religious groups and the introduction of some form of political Islam, which consequently led to the creation of radical groups like Al Shabaab. After the religious groups took control of Mogadishu and other parts of the country by overpowering the warlords supported by foreign powers, people accepted and even welcomed the peace and tranquility restored by the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) also called the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). In order to exploit public support, the UIC leaders established *sharia* courts, and local authorities, and

somehow accommodated civil society organisations to assist in some areas of governance.

Poor Economic Policy

The Somali conflict is also triggered by poor economic policy and performance of the Somali government which has widened not merely the clan inequality but indeed also the class differences within and across clans in Somalia. Lewis (2008) argues that before1991; Somalia had high dependency levels of foreign aid. Its GNP per capita was $170 as Lewis indicated, an IMF 2019 report says: "GDP growth is estimated at 2.8 percent in 2018 after 1.4 percent in 2017. If normal rains resume later this year, GDP growth could remain broadly unchanged at around 2.9 percent in 2019. Inflation is expected at 3.0 percent in 2019, following 3.2 percent in 2018" (IMF 2019). However, looting government coffers has been elite tradition since the first post-independence administration (Eno 2008) while Barre's dictatorial regime has seen increase of state corruption (Ali, 1995). However, the practice has crossed boundaries since the collapse of the state after warlords and immoral elite emerged and the plunder of national resources exacerbated as the order of the day in every part of the country. This led to violent conflicts and emergence of the war economy which resulted into the extension of the massive inequalities (Menkhaus 2010).

Looting and the entrenchment of the vested economic interests that benefited from the state of lawlessness multiplied. Other new forms of production by the private sector became visibly vibrant, such as the Hawalas or money transfer companies, the remittances, and private sector activities like education became examples of private entrepreneurship that are not regulated among others. These replaced the traditional ways of production such as livestock trade and export as well as agricultural production that was necessary for domestic consumption and for export. Livestock ban accompanied by the environmental degradation, and drought and displacement of agricultural communities has weakened the economy, increased poverty levels among others (de Waal 2017; Dagne 2010).

Consequently, livestock trade which has been reducing Somalia's incomes even before the collapse of the state has worsened. However in 1998 due to the Rift valley fever, Saudi Arabia's government imposed a ban on livestock from Somalia, while other Gulf States and Yemen also followed suit and did the same. The major reason as

to why they did this because they cited the poor quality control system of Somalia over its livestock as there was no regulatory body to oversee the required quality of livestock. These destroyed the livelihoods of many Somali citizens, hence an increase in high poverty levels and migration from rural to urban areas. Many pastoralists resorted to processing and exporting chilled raw meat which was not highly profitable (Lewis 2008). The situation was drastically exacerbated by several bans of Somali livestock by Saudi Arabia. In 2016 the Saudi market banned importation of Somali livestock on grounds of suspicion of a disease which was allegedly seen in livestock loaded from the port of Mogadishu prior to undergoing required vaccination processes. Although the ban was lifted in 2017, it was a temporary exercise aimed to satisfy the livestock requirement for the Hajj pilgrimage season (Khalif 2018; Shaban, 2018; EU 2017; Manson 2013).

The other economic factor underlying the conflict is that although the pastoral groups have huge numbers of livestock, they lack enough grazing lands (Memar 2012). Disputes emerge due to overgrazing. On the other hand, Agriculture has been affected by droughts, misappropriation of farmland, forced labor, which caused increased unemployment as a result of rural-urban migration, which in turn increased to poor state of poverty, among others. The other driver is that the remittances have created the problem of dependency, finance, warlords and conflicts, in cases where the clan is under attack and threat. According to the 2002 Somalis social economic survey, the Somalis in the diaspora send $360 million annually into the three regions of Somalia. The estimated amount that is held by the Somali remittance companies is about $700-800 million annually (Memar 2012).

Again, a broadened private sector can be categorized among the various economic drivers of conflict in Somalia. The expansion of this sector in uncontrolled and uncoordinated activities worsens and sharpens not clan difference alone but also that of class difference. The private sector, according to Memar (2012), has been deepened in Somalia as reflected in the telecommunications sector and Hawala companies that facilitate quick money transfer and business transactions between the Somalis and the entire world. A number of studies and reports have all pointed out that these moneys and channels have constantly been used to finance terrorism and the terrorist activities. As a result of these, some of these Hawalas and

transfer money services have been shut down, causing job loss and increasing the levels of poverty. The same private sector has also been accused of the smuggling in of arms and light weapons that were banned as a measure of decreasing the tension and conflict in the country. However, smuggling continued because smugglers and arms traffickers take advantage of the weak immigration rules at the border to smuggle not only goods such as fire arms and light weapons, but also other high profit commodities including electronics, sugar and clothes (Memar 2012), to name a few.

Included in the list of economic grounds for the continuation of the Somali conflict is the consumption of Khat (Qat).This substance, according to Menkhaus (2010), has helped so many Somalis to deal with the problems of fatigue and too much fear during the long periods of war. This practice has increased the level of addiction to this substance by the non-combatants who are not serious participants in the war. Excessive chewing of this substance, which many Western countries have banned as a type of narcotic, leads to mental incapacitation, restlessness and disinterest in work or family hence worsening the class differences in terms of health It reduces on the productivity levels and income levels of the citizens of Somalia. This means that the increased level of consumption has affected the country's needed hard currencies which, as a result of khat, have been diverted to the neighboring states (Menkhaus 2010).

The other economic ground of the Somalia conflict according to Barash and Webel (2002) is the struggle to control the commercial arteries or the ports. In fact, our analysis is that the interest for control of Somali ports is a complicated matter devised by a variety of competing bodies including foreign countries, regional administrations, the federal government as well as prominent business elite. For instance the ports of Bosasso in Puntland and Berbera in Somaliland have always acted as a source of income to merchants and regional administrations. Goods go to Ethiopia, which is a landlocked state, through these ports. The struggle to control the sea ports of Mogadishu, El-ma'an and Kismayo has made conflicts to escalate (Barash, 2002). As a result of this competition, a huge inequality has emerged amongst those clans that are in control of the sea ports and those that do not have any control of the sea ports.

The natural and productive resources have also been a major factor of the Somalia conflict. According to Khadiagala (2008), competition over natural resources such as the livestock, cash crops,

charcoal, marine resources, frankincense and potential oil and mineral reserves has escalated conflicts; this is because different clans are usually in competition with each other over these scarce resources. For instance the author points out that in the south central Somalia is a very resource rich area than Somaliland and Puntland regions combined. I n the entire Somalia, there are pastoral groups, semi pastoral groups as well as the agricultural clan groups who all need land to cultivate, graze their animals as well as get the water points for their livestock. It should be noted that since the culture of livestock keeping is the most favored venture, it has led to the increase of conflicts over access to the most fertile pasture lands and water points.

This has pitted the pastoral clan groups in conflict with the agricultural clan groups since pastoralists keep on migrating to fertile lands. Since livestock is the key export products, there is competition over the ownership and control of the main export marketing routes. This has led to the overstocking and overgrazing which has reduced the quality of land hence much stress to the two groups, lack of rain for instance in Puntland. This is in violation of the customary pastoral law. Some clans are completely zoning off grazing lands which has caused resistance from other clans. Excessive harvesting of the acacia trees for charcoal production has led to reduced bio-diversity, soil erosion and desertification and drought. This scarcity has increased competition and the conflicts, migrations (IDPs), refugees clash with the indigenes in their search for water and pasture (Khadiagala 2008).

Misappropriation of Land and Control of Crop Production

Competition for the control of the rich cash crops has led to the intense disputes in Somalia since it enriches some while it impoverishes others thereby worsening the class differences in Somalia. Climatic conditions favor the cultivation of valuable cash crops like bananas and citrus fruits. Influential businessmen and land grabbers fight for these. For instance in Juba and Shebelle river valleys in south central Somalia most of the dominant Bantu Jareer groups in those areas have been displaced by these land-looters as they pursue their new ventures. Indigenes have been turned into laborers. Also there are marine resources in these rivers. Fishing has not been an organized activity; it's also assumed that a vast amount of oil and natural gas reserves exist in these areas. It can be a huge

source of revenue that may breed conflict. Forceful occupation of land and property by the dominant armed groups has in fact contributed to the migration of the settled agricultural communities. This led to further conflicts that are continuous, causing more migration and displacement of the unarmed minority groups.

From another perspective, the unfair distribution of land, according to Lewis (2010), is another source of inequality in Somalia. Land is the most important factor of production. Because it's through Land that that individuals are able to make investments in housing, through farming, building of homesteads, plantation agriculture, building of schools, hospitals and other public and private utilities and even to have a place of burial. However it has been very difficult for majority of the unarmed ethnic groups to maintain ownership of their ancestral land. This is because the militia groups and the dominant clans have invaded people's properties and taken them by force, in other words large portions of land in southern Somalia, especially in the south central and more particularly in the inter-reviver regions of Somalia and in the capital Mogadishu, have been acquired through forceful occupation (Eno 2008; Eno 2004; Lewis 2010). Therefore the state of landlessness among majority of the Somalis, while few individuals own huge tracts of land, is another reason that contributes to the high levels of inequality.

Political Militarisation

The other key element of conflict in Somalia is the problem of the political militarisation which creates a divide between the combatants and the non-combatants, between the military elites and the subordinates. According to Dagne (2010), political militarisation was a practice that was experienced during the times of Mohamed Siad Barre whereby state organs were highly militarized and relied on. This military power was used to enforce law and order and maintain their legitimacy. After the collapse of the state, proliferation of militias and weapons began in earnest. No central authority and a united army have ever existed in Somalia ever since Barre's ouster in early 1991.

The weapons that fell into the hands of the civilians were used to loot, murder innocent people and commit robbery with violent acts. This kind of lack of accountability under the auspices of clan support led to the culture of impunity as pillaging, destruction of property and rape became the order of the day, encouraging various

social immoralities including child soldiering as well as the trafficking of illegal arms.

Conflicts in Somalia continue to exist up to date because part of the reason is that there has never been any proper form of disarmament that has taken place in the country. Therefore the problem of security has always tried to undermine development. Individuals tend to feel insecure hence people retain arms for personal protection of lives and property. Finally, there exists massive human rights violation. Many reported cases have been taken to *sharia* courts to be heard and determined according to sharia laws. The problem with these courts is that they are never neutral; instead they have always been accused of favoritism and open biasness towards the members of the dominant clans and sub-clans against the unarmed minorities, hence promotion of conflicts (Dagne 2010).

Unfair Taxation and Corporation as Causes of Inequality

Unfair system of taxation has been and still is a factor contributing to unfairness and inequality in Somalia and therefore an agitator of conflict rather than otherwise. This is because, as Barash and Webel (2002) observe, the poor are taxed more by the government itself or regional administrations and the various armed militia groups controlling different areas while the rich Somalis create avenues of avoiding tax payment or totally evading tax from both the government and the various militia groups. In fact the government of Somalia has been severally accused of giving undeserved tax holidays to the rich individuals and compensating the gap through increase of consumption taxes popularly known as the VAT. These kinds of scenarios have ensured that the rich Somalis continue getting richer while the poor Somalis continue getting poorer, hence perpetuating the Somali conflict.

Corruption and illicit financial flows in and out of Somalia, according to Menkhaus (2010), is another reason that explains the huge inequalities in Somalia. As it has been explained earlier, the Republic of Somalia is characterized by lawlessness and a state of constant political and economic instabilities. This kind of stability has led to some citizens to develop the culture of impunity whereby public resources are stolen in broad daylight in all ways. Some of these economic crimes include bribery, extortion, money laundering, printing of fake currencies, sea piracy as well as outright stealing from the public coffers by those in charge. This situation has played a

key role in ensuring that some Somali citizens have grown extremely richer while those who do not have an access to public resources and opportunities to steal continue to wallow in poverty. Corruption has also been extended to the unfair access to capital knowledge and technology; this has even worsened the situation because it's very few individuals who can access credit from banks (there were no banks in Somalia in 2010; no reliable banks even now) – hence worsening the war and conflicts (Menkhaus 2010).

Culture and Illiteracy among the contributors to Inequality

Ignorance and high levels of illiteracy, according to Memar (2012), can be viewed as a major factor that has greatly contributed in widening the inequalities in Somalia as a result of political instability form many years. Majority of the Somali citizens have not gotten a chance of sending their children to school. This is because of lack of enough resources to facilitate education, in most areas such as Mogadishu, Kismayo, Afmadow, Gedo just to mention but a few. There are so many cases of insecurities and constant attacks from the terrorist groups such as the Al-Shabaab and others. In such circumstance, it's very difficult for a parent to take their children to school even if they are able to. As a result of all these, it's very few Somalis who have received a reasonable level of education. This means that it's only few citizens who can be employed formally and contribute to the development of Somali using their skills and expertise (Memar 2012). It should also be noted that a good education helps an individual to get informed, to ensure that his heart is formed and the mind has been transformed. This therefore means that due to illiteracy it's very difficult for the problem of inequality to be narrowed down since many Somalis do not have an access to government information and they are therefore excluded from government decision making process.

Part of the Somali culture itself, according to Elmi (2010), is another reason that contributes to the high levels of inequality. The Somali culture is that which places individuals on the basis of their gender. This is because women in Somali culture have not been allowed to enjoy their human rights as freely as men do or have done. For instance the Somali women have not been allowed to access enough education, they have also been denied from owning communal land, and in certain cases they are also married off at a

very early. This has led to a huge gender inequality among the Somali citizens (Elmi, 2010).

Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter has vividly explained how the political and socio-economic factors that exist in Somalia have contributed to the escalation of conflict through widening the social-class inequalities gap. Unless the fundamentals of the existing Somalia's political economy which widens the class differences are addressed, it will be very difficult for these social class inequalities to be narrowed down and by extension it will be difficult for the existing conflict in Somalia to be resolved. This chapter would also wish to acknowledge the fact that although human beings are not equal and will never be equal, but it is also true that high level of inequality which widens the class differences is very dangerous for the stability of a country. The role of any functional state and the government is to devise on ways and means in which inequalities that widens the class differentials eliminated. This will be good for the security, peace and stability of the country. It will also go a long way in ensuring that conflict resolution in Somalia is dealt with from the root causes. Without these measures being put in place, it will be very difficult for the Federal Government of the republic of Somalia to stabilize and takes Somalia to the next level.

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CHAPTER 5

Understanding Somali State Collapse and Changing Paradigm on *Somaliness*: Creation of the Missing Supra-Clan Segment of Somali Nation

Abdirachid Mohamed Ismail

Understanding Somali State Collapse

It is often said that the Somali central government collapsed because of the gap between Somali clan mode of organisation and the modern democratic political system. This gap has first led to a chaotic governance and then to the political coup of the 1969 and the dictatorship of Siyad Barre. This latter military administration itself, due to the clan manipulation system put in place by the regime, led progressively to the Somali state collapse in 1991. This is the kind of official narrative which is often prevalent in the academic literature. But I argue, through at least the concept of "Somali unity", that this diagnosis is relatively weak, in various ways. Instead, I will illustrate how history seems to portray this unity in a certain way, and how Somalis, during all the last century, have tried to portray it in a different way. This opposition created a continuous discordance that ended up in the final collapse of the Somali Sate. Finally, I will discuss the perspectives to move forward by revisiting the historical dynamics and how to 'strengthen' this informal but yet powerful unity of the Somali nation. I will then introduce a new paradigm about Somaliness based on one of the most extraordinary Somali ancestral heritage: the xeer-dhaqameed (traditional law) conversion.

The Dominant Narrative

There is a wide spread and dominant interpretation of Somali modern history and, especially, about the collapse of Somalia's central government in 1991. We can find this interpretation expressed in Catherine Wanjiku Nyambura (2011), in paraphrasing non-Somali authors, who share her views, she says:

> The democratic principles were being enacted at the top level while nepotism, corruption and clan competition were rapidly eroding the underpinnings of Somalia's nascent democratic system. The political misrule, combined with pervasive corruption, hampered the maturity of administrative institutions and undermined development of the country's embryonic social services network, thereby engendering general disillusionment with the entire system. The exploitation of clan identity by political opportunists swiftly gave rise to an unwieldy number of clan based political parties.

This kind of statement is frequent in the literature about Somalia's collapse. Indeed, this analysis, as the others along the same lines, seems to be based on field work observations, well-documented facts and rational analysis. Indeed, the diagnosis seems logical and the arguments are so obvious that everyone automatically accepts the solutions recognized and expressed by the author as such:

> For peace to prevail, the research found out that Somalia should first involve all the conflicting parties, both internal and external, in their peace negotiations. To further improve security, the outlawed groups and civilians should be disarmed and Somalis should be encouraged to join together for peace and speak in one voice to end the conflict. The international community should as well be cautious of financing individual clans, militia and other interest groups involved directly in conflict. They should be engaged in dialogue with the warring parties without taking sides and support an outcome that would lead to the achievement of sustainable peace... (Michele, Relief web-2013)

This scenario of Somalia state failure is built on the curious assumption that all Somali political leaders from independence until today have failed "due to irresponsible policy, power greed and corruption" (Michele, 2013) or because under their governance "power and access to it was pursued as an opportunity to promote, at the state and sub-state levels, the vested interests of the given class and/or clan to which that elite belonged." (Michele, 2013) And of course, the worst of them was Siyad Barre who ransacked the country because it brought to a pinnacle all the defects of Somalia: clannism, social conservatism, nepotism, the will of territorial

conquest, etc., although the current author does not share this analysis.

In this article, let us assume that all the flaws mentioned here are not the causes of the failure of the Somalia state and its difficult recovery, but some of the logical effects of a project which has been going against the trend of history for almost one century. This project has run with more or less speed and when it reached the peak with its greatest acceleration from 1978, it simply totally collapsed in less than fifteen years later. And indeed, the driver of the state vehicle at that time was Siyad Barre, it is why he is singled out more than the politicians/leaders before him, although he has only been acting according to the historical trend that brought him to power.

Soomaalinimo: A Motto as a Political Project

What is this project? How and why does it run against the trend of history, as was said previously? This project is the "Somali Union Political Project" (SUPP) which was dreamed about by Somalis for generations, which was the main priority of the initial Somali governments, which is still turning like a leitmotiv in the minds of millions of Somalis. It is the biggest issue for which the Federal State of Somalia (FSS) has to find a solution in order to go forward and open a new era for Somalis.

Our objective here is not to draw a picture of all the historical processes which have led to the failure of the Somali Union Political Project (SUPP), but to highlight a few factors which need to be taken into account to explain this process. The first factor is the opposition between "Somali unity" and "Somali Union", the ethnic reality opposed to the historical and political project. The second is the colonisation factor which has taken advantage of Somali social structure and the customary law of the land, and the third has been the ambiguity of the concept of "soomaalinimo", which has worked first as a mobilizing factor against colonisation but has lost this "etic" meaning and has today almost an exclusive "emic" signification.

In fact, Somali unity refers to the Somali ethnic reality which, as Laitin and Samatar (1987:29) pointed out, is about "the fervent sense of belonging to a distinct national community with a common heritage and a common destiny [which] is rooted in a widespread Somali belief that all Somalis descend from a common founding father, the mythical Samaale to whom the overwhelming majority of Somalis trace their genealogical origin." But more specifically, what is

Somali unity for a camel herder of Wajeer, a farmer of Jigjiga or a fisherman of Merka, a shopkeeper of Berbera? This will lead to the extreme and most curious paradox that something which already exists has to be sought: unity.

For Somalis, unity was and still is a given fact, not something to construct or to seek. Somalis were already conscious of their unity based on "language, way of life, predominately pastoral, a shared poetic corpus, a common political culture, a profound Islamic heritage" (Laitin and samatar, 1987) and of course, as stated above, on their belief that they descend from a common source. This analysis is based on the old Lewisite interpretation of a homogeneous, selfsame, egalitarian society; but recent constructivist scholarship has challenged the traditionalist school of thought with empirical evidence on ethnic and linguistic divergences based on social and cultural reality. This is because, according to the constructionist scholarship, the very idea of "Somaliness" classifies communities at different levels of "Somaliness" or even outside the periphery of "Somaliness", (Ahmed 1994, 1995, 1996; Kusow, 2004; Eno and Kusow 2014; Kusow and Eno 2015; Eno et al. 2016; Ahad 2019), just to mention a few – a claim which the 4.5 clan power-sharing method is a more vividly and more practically visualized evidence, among other testimonies.

However, seeking or battling for what was already there was not something easy to conceptualize. If we examine recent history, it is a fact that the term "Soomalinimo" or Somaliness was specially and tremendously used to mobilize Somali clans against a foreign enemy, as was the case with Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan or with the SYL or again with the military regime of Siyad Barre.

We can now easily perceive where the trouble was: Somalis knew about their unity, which was a de facto ethnic reality, but what about "union"?...That was something out of their scope. We can unite what is separate, but how can we unite things or beings which are already "drawn together by emotive bonds of kinship and genealogical ties[?]" (Latin and Samatar, p. 21)

The question is essentially about the gap between the scope of the "Somali Union Political Project" (SUPP), which prepares for a radically different mode of organisation and the simplistic way this project was formalized, almost with only one word: "soomaalinimo". The leitmotiv was "union", but how to achieve this "union" or what

sort of union the Somalis wanted seem to be totally irrelevant for most scholars.

It is why the humblest camel herder, the female milk seller, the most prominent intellectual or political leader have exactly the same opinion about this "union". It means for all of them: having one president, one government, one parliament, one country, one capital, for all the Somalis. It is why Somali politicians have strived for one century to achieve this goal, through several governments and two different political regimes and have all failed with more or less damage. Instead of wondering about what was wrong with the way the issue was tackled, instead of putting into question the SUPP as it was conceived, politicians and many intellectuals continue accusing tradition and culture (Mansur, 1995) which, in fact, seem to reject this SUPP as an alien transplant – which, in fact, it is.

A State building Model against Somali Secular Social Organisation

The SUPP, which has monopolized our attention for decades, especially during the pre-independence period, has not permitted sufficient reflection on formulation of the national state in the Somali context. The SUPP was based on a centralized conception of state building which was at the antipodes of Somali traditional mode of political organisation (this organisation was labeled by Lewis as "pastoral democracy" and by Michael, (2003) as "Kritarchy"). This centralized conception was first promoted by Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan who tried to mobilize Somalis around the concept of *Soomaalinimo* (with drastic consequences to certain tribes/clans and/or sub-clans of the Isaaq community who saw him as a despotic mad-mullah) against the colonizers.

Putting aside the theological divergence among the different religious orders, the Somalis had not experienced a trans-tribal mode of governance or election, except that which was introduced by the western countries (Lewis, 1993). The legitimacy of the Chief in a clan or tribe was based on known rules within each clan, but the unification of the clans under a unique patron was something new which had neither been discussed nor experimented ever.

The Dervish movement was not destroyed by the British but because of insufficient support from Somalis who had not adhered to the centralized trans-tribal power of the Sayid. And he, while calling for unification based on *soomaalinimo*, was still using clan

terminology, mode of thinking and pastoral practices of raids and revenge.

After the Dervish movement, the intellectual elite, who were in contact with the westerners or with the Islamic world, through travelling and religious orders, were the first to promote the SUPP. Lewis (1993) describes that from the 1920s and especially during the decade between the 1930s and 1940s, growing Somali nationalism was indeed based on what we have called SUPP. He says:

> …with the traditional Somali national consciousness, which the experiences of Italian patriotic fervor presented in a new light and the long suppressed reaction to alien rule, all combined to provide conditions favorable to the emergence of new aspirations. Thus, in the last few years of the short lived Italian East African Empire, the first definite steps towards the creation of a modern nationalist movement began to be taken in Somalia. These took the form of small clandestine meetings, organized mainly, it appears, by some of the new generations of Somalis who had been to school and were employed by the Italian government (Lewis, p 113).

In the north, it was also the same social class who were sensitive to the SUPP and the liberation from colonial powers:

> Again, the first impetus seems to have come from the few Somalis who, after education in Aden or the Sudan, had returned to find employment in the clerical grades of the civil service. One of the earliest of these to espouse the new aspirations and to seek to promote the general social and political betterment of his countrymen was Haji Farah Omar, a former employee of the Administration, who became active in the 1920s (Lewis, p.114).

From these beginnings, we see the SUPP coming up progressively from the vision of Somali elites who were strongly influenced by foreign conceptions of state building. In Lewis's description, we could view very neatly the SUPP settlement: From these tentative beginnings the Somaliland National Society emerged shortly afterwards. Its principal aims were to encourage modern education and progress in general and to seek to overcome the traditional, particularistic rivalries which divided Somali society." After that, another prominent Somali organisation was created in Mogadishu in March 1943, the Somali Youth Club, the ancestor of the Somali Youth League (SYL), the most famous and powerful pan-Somalist organisation, composed of members from the main Somali clans and "united in the desire to abolish the wasteful clan rivalries of the past and to establish a new conception of nationhood (Lewis, p. 121).

At last, the SUPP was formalized in 1959 in Mogadishu by a gathering of all Somali parties to form the National Pan-Somali Movement with the main aim of campaigning "for the independence and unification of all the Somali territories" (Lewis, p. 121)

The tragic situation which was associated with this event was that there was almost no other alternative which could be approved by the majority of Somalis. The independence and unification of all Somali territories was the obvious and natural plan which was conceivable by everyone, irrespective of his/her class and the region he/she belonged to. The greatness and empowering impact of the project which infuses strength and considerable hope of betterment have veiled the difficulty to implement it, regarding traditional and inherent Somali policy structure. It was like putting a square peg in a round hole… in fact they did not even try to put it in the round hole, until the political independence of British Somalilandand Italian Somalia became a reality. At that moment, they had to face reality and implement their borrowed ideology based on a highly centralized state which was supposed to banish any clan reference or particularism. For about nine years, they tried hard and struggled, with every kind of possible contortion, to realize this aim. But all scholars have observed "the re-emergence of clan interests and clan politics reached a peak in 1969, coinciding with the general elections. One hundred and twenty-six "clanistic political groups competed, each one hoping to gain more power for itself" (Hassan, 1993).

What was the alpha and omega of the military coup of 1969? To reinforce the SUPP which seemed to be in danger and impose with more strength and coercion a centralized power in the most decentralized society. The tool to realize this aim has been to import a Marxism-Leninism based ideology, which was born in a pre-industrial context, far away from the mostly rural and nomadic or semi-nomadic Somali society. What is obvious, from this perspective, is that Somali society was henceforth running at a pace which was faster than its natural constitution. Siyad Barre has become naturally an absolute Sultan, being the Secretary General of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP), the only authorized party, the head of the army, the state security court and judiciary, the president of the country "with the power to appoint and dismiss high ranking officials" (Hassan, 1993, 121), In fact, he became the Sultan of Somali clans, but without the legitimacy given by clan.

The great majority of Somalis during all the 20th century believed and supported the SUPP, as it was conceived from its beginnings at the end of 19th and the early 20th century. Siyad Barre led this project to its ultimate consequences. So many analysts still think that Siyad Barre was misguided about the SUPP, introducing clannism, nepotism, etc. and by far "destroyed most of the ideals the Somali people stood for" (M.R. Sheikh Hassan, 1993, quoting Abdulqadir Shire Farah, 1990, "Xeebti Geerida").

However, Siyad Barre was only the last offspring of a project which was an ideological mushroom which revealed itself to be poisonous for Somalis. Somalis have always blamed and still blame "tribalism and clannism", which is their secular and traditional mode of organisation and try hard to change it to a western mode of organisation based on multipartism. As parties had become tribalized, Siyad was logical enough to ban all parties, as clans had been banned from politics (Le Sage, 2005), to achieve the SUPP goals. Siyad Barre was again logical enough to choose the Social-Marxist system of governance as a model, which was the most centralized power and administrative framework and could fit with the SUPP aims, as he conceived it.

The last logical step of Siyad Barre's action was to impose his rules to fulfill his political program, as does every head of a legitimately recognized state. His dictatorship was the logical and ultimate consequence of an ideology which had begun with Sayyid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan and ended with the lost war against Ethiopia in 1977-1978.

It is worth noting that Siyad Barre had tried to heal the outcome of ill-governance of the post-independence period, during which governance was based on abstract democratic rules imported from western countries (Cassanelli, 2009: 6). Siyad Barre has not changed this, he just thought that a more centralized power structure would enable him heal the problems of the Somalis and thus imported his "scientific socialism". The two options lamentably failed, because they used transplant systems without roots in Somali context.

What has been tragic in the Somali case is that there was almost no other option than the SUPP to oppose the colonial rule at that time. It was the ready program, the turn key solution, offered by intellectual elite, easily understandable by everyone and empowering all Somalis whatever their regions and clans. It is the sort of mechanism people resort to when they are "unable to situate" the

locus of a conundrum and its appropriate solution and, therefore Siyad Barre, as Ahmed (1995, 140) theorized elsewhere, "opted for the easy way out…". That is why this program has not worked because it was ill-adapted to the context of Somali traditions.

Partial Conclusion

To conclude this first part, it is necessary to reconsider the main reason why the Somali central state collapsed in 1991, after a prolonged contestation of its authority and legitimacy since Somalia's defeat in the Ethiopia-Somalia war of 1977-1978. It has been assumed in this article that Siyad Barre's regime failed simply because it led to its ultimate consequences a political project which had been unworkable in Somali context since Sayyid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan. The latter was the first who failed to mobilize all Somalis around this project, which was in fact the Somali Union Political Project (SUPP). The historicisation of the SUPP, built around a cheerful romanticisation of the Dervish movement (Samatar, 2006) had obscured the real reasons of its failure and had consequently misled those who have followed in its steps, meaning most of the nationalist movements, not exempting the late Mohamed Siyad Barre and the current political and religious leaders.

Second, whatever the capacity or incapacity (Odowa, 2013) of Somali political actors of almost one century could be, this failure is strongly linked to the real nature of the SUPP, which was insufficiently defined and based, from its origins, on overseas models of state governance. During a period of almost one century, Somalis have tried to "unite" themselves by fighting among themselves, and by struggling against the western colonialists while at the same time holding their system as the ideal reference.

So, Somalis have battled against each other to move across the gap between their traditional model of organisation and the idealized western system of governance. That unfamiliar process, untested within the Somali traditional governing system, led them to an "idealistic" abstract state which gave rise to the "invention of Somalia". Every leading political candidate has been promising that Somalis would do the great leap and realize the SUPP goals and sine qua non condition; for that has been to banish the pillar of their secular political organisation. But "what's bred in the bone will come out in the flesh". The leaders seem to have not paid attention to the Somali proverb that says *midho dhabta kuugu jira loo ma daadiyo kuwo geed*

saran" (i.e "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush"). As Mansur confirms: "The present Somali clan system has lost its traditional xeer ("customary law"), [and as a consequence]…we are, as they say, neither fish nor fowl, neither clans nor state" (Mansur, 1995:115).

The new Project

To clarify a significant point, the proposed reconstruction of the Somali nation here is not indicative of making war on neighboring states to recapture lost territories, but to put in place a structure that allows this nation to maintain its cultural and linguistic cohesion, to consider its shared destiny as a community and to consolidate stability and peace in the Horn of Africa. To achieve this natural state, the Somali Union Political Project should respect at least these four principles:

a) It should not mean the disunion of any other nation and should not be done against any nation.
b) It should not need to be recognized by others and should be based on indisputable facts.
c) It should be in concord with Somali secular traditional and religious laws
d) It should be in concord with international laws.

Purpose and Definition of the Project

This new Somali Union is to be built on the basis of the experiences acquired from the old one, which was conceived during the colonial period. The international as well as the regional and Somali contexts of the Horn have changed since the 1990's. It has already been explained that it is a legitimate and natural process for people who have strong ties to come together in one way or the other. Another reason which justifies this project is the opportunity for the Somali nation to establish the relevant structure, whatever form it may have, which is in concord with their history and secular traditions.

There is harsh competition between the superpowers for African resources in general and in the Horn of Africa in particular. Along the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean the Somalis have more than three thousand kilometers of coastline, one of the longest in Africa, if not the longest. Due to this position, control over Somali territories is most coveted since it is strategic for the international trade as well as for the landlocked countries of Africa such as that of Ethiopia. The

Federal State of Somalia, which is weakened by the extremist groups affiliated to Al Qaida or ideologies of the Islamic State, is particularly vulnerable. The recent controversy over the relationship of Djibouti and Somaliland with the company DP Word of the United Arab Emirates, is one of the warning signs of the kind of new adversity which is experienced by the Somalis due to the fierce international competitions for resources and geo-strategic positions.

During colonisation, Somalis were divided into five parts. Today, not only these five parts are not yet united, but even the central state of the Somali Republic has been socio-politically and socio-economically challenged and successfully broken into pieces.

A Project based on Traditional Somalia's Ecology

The new project has already been unfolding before us since 1991, although it has encountered important opposition, especially from the elite intellectuals and old style politicians (ITPCM International Commentary, 2003) and had great difficulty in being implemented. Strangely, foreign scholars have been more accurate and consistent in seeing what has been going on and suggest different options mapping out the future of Somalia. The first study on the topic was published in 1995 by prominent scholars, among them the well-known British anthropologist, Ioan M. Lewis (Ali, 1995), under the title "A study of decentralized political structures for Somalia". Beyond its social and anthropological interest, it is a very informative report for the amount of comparative data it contains and the different options of government and governance it portrays. The real contribution of this work is Lewis' intuition, based on his long experience of the Somali context, and of the direction of the historical trend of Somali political rebuilding. Lewis explains: "The awesome challenge now facing Somalis who seek a wider political structure is to find a way to develop a loose, over-arching framework, capable of providing these minimal common service requirements and at the same time securely rooted in local democraticprocesses. Clans are the most natural building blocks, here." (please provide year and page number) Indeed, "it's arguable whether this traditional system is compatible with the modern political systems, such as multi-party democracy, since kinship based identity politics provide fertile ground for patronage, corruption, nepotism and clannism" (Adam Haji, 2013). However, people are now aware of "the value of

bottom-up approach not only with regard to cost efficiency but also regarding sustainability of solution" (Bulhan, 2013).

Resolution of the Somaliland case

The non-resolution of the Somaliland issue has six negative effects:

1. It weakens the FSS Constitution and leaves it at a draft stage.
2. It weakens also the FSS in view of the regional states and beyond, because it is unable to exercise its sovereignty in all of its territory.
3. It allows foreign countries to take advantage of the rampant but artificial (word choice; please consider a more appropriate term because this more serious than can be simply called "artificial" i.e. the genuine grievances Somaliland is presenting cannot be simply reduced to "artificial") (word choice; this is more serious than can be called 'artificial'; i.e. the genuine grievances Somaliland is presenting cannot be called "artificial" per se.) antagonism between Mogadishu and Hargeisa.
4. It leaves unaddressed the wounds of the civil war and indicates that Somalis have not been able to open a new page.
5. It weakens the development of Somali territory (namely Somaliland) and pushes it to all kinds of adventurous agreements with foreign countries (but the people of Somaliland argue that it is a sign of their sovereignty; their right to manage their resources)
6. It delays the reconciliation and unification of the Somali nation.

These effects are serious and dangerous for the entire Somali nation, because the control of the Horn of Africa is much coveted (www.mondialisation.ca) as it has always been. It is time to offer a new perspective for the Horn of Africa and for the Somali nation. For all these reasons it is important to ignore the status quo. Until now, the way the discussions between the two parties have been tackled seems to be a kind of what Ali Mazrui would call "dialogue of the deaf", a yes or no deal, a question of take it or leave it. Each party is considering the other party with mistrust or at least as an opponent, instead of seeing it as a partner within its own geostrategic interest.

Somaliland as well as Djibouti, amidst the intense geostrategic game of the Horn of Africa, will either turn to become clients of Ethiopia or try to counterbalance the strong growing influence of the latter with another core position. In any case, Somalilandhas only two alternatives, either to become a client of Ethiopia or to renew the contract with Mogadishu--not only to build back their lost core position, but also to strengthen it considerably.

The main duty of the FSS is to preserve, not only the territory under its sovereignty, but the unity of the entire Somali nation which is going through critical times. For that, the FSS executive has to move from a wait-and-see policy but to assume a real proactive and leading role. That means that they need to have a wider view of the situation of the Somalis, to "initiate a new way of looking at things" (Ahmed, 2001) and come up with a viable political project with realistic objectives and goals.

Considering this situation, the FSS should seriously consider the self-determination of the Somaliland, because this territory has already been, for almost three decades, functioning as an independent state. Meles Zenawi saved Ethiopia from disintegration because he had taken a decisive political initiative by proposing "self-determination" to every indigenous nation, which claimed it through a regular process. Politics is not only a matter of management, but it is also a matter of clairvoyance, proactive ideas and courage to make difficult decisions. In any case, if there is not a strong enough agreement for mutual solidarity and a significant move forward from the current impasse, the Somali nation will again lose another historical opportunity to control its destiny (Keynan, 2018).

Addressing Al-Shabab issue

The Somali state is under constant threat from Al-Shabab militia which is terrorizing the population, the political leaders, the traders and even the religious leaders. The federal state has found no strategy, neither military, nor political, nor ideological, to defeat it in over ten years after the emergence of this militia (See the chapter in this volume by Ibrahim Karatas). The group derives its strength from the weakness of the federal and regional states, this weakness being based at least on four factors: 1) the absence of a constructive reconciliation throughout the country, 2) the difficulty to implement federalism, while some support the return of the former centralized state which still remains as the model for many political leaders

("awoodii Somalia ayaan u baahanahay inaan soo celino"), 3) the strategy of addressing Al-Shabab which reveals itself inefficient, 4) the absence of a formal indigenous conflict resolution system.

1. The absence of a real and sound reconciliation in the country, even within the state apparatus, is patent. One can assume that the lack of this reconciliation is related to the fact that the correct diagnosis of the collapse has not been made yet. Believing that Siad Barre's regime has been the cause of the collapse of the former Somali State remains a superficial analysis which cannot get out clans members from mutual mistrust (unclesr to understand; please rephrase it for easy understanding). As Ingirisi (2018) analyzes, there is "no doubt that Al-Shabab fighters exploited local clan grievances." Moreover, as long as the most outstanding disunity, namely the secession of Somaliland from the rest of Somalia, remains unresolved, it will be difficult to achieve a solid reconciliation throughout Somalia. And the case of Somaliland will not be solved as long as its self-determination is perceived under one single eye, namely under the old SUPP perspective. Coming to a fruitful solution, which safeguards the essential interests of the two parties (now there are more than two parties as there exist several administrations that will bargain for similar considerations and interests as Somaliland's), will blow a wind of hope for all Somalis and start a new paradigm which would weaken Al-Shabab's grip on Somalia.
2. The conception of federalism among Somali political leaders remains tinged with nostalgia of a strong central state. Successive governments have tended to focus on strengthening the central state, while federal state should draw its strength and legitimacy from the regions. This conception of a centrifugal state power which is tentatively implemented by the successive governments, especially by President Mohamed Abdullahi Faramajo's government, runs fundamentally against federalism as political ideal of governance for Somalis. This error of analysis increases the competition between the central state and the regions, and may gradually drag the federal state towards a form of government comparable to that of the old regime of Siad Barre. Besides, this approach is not efficient to confront and

defeat Al-Shabab and its activities of terror because it leaves under the sole responsibility of the Federal State the fight against the militia, while the main role of the FSS should have been to back the regional states to securitize the areas under their responsibility.

3. The war against Al-Shabab is apprehended by the Central Government as if the latter were an external force of occupation defending itself against an indigenous resistance movement. The Central Government (federal government, not central, is the standard used for the administration in Somalia), protected by twenty thousand men belonging to foreign forces, controls a very small portion of the country. The ground seems to belong to the militia, the security seems "much better in Al-Shabaab controlled territories than the federal government areas," (Ingiriis, 2018, p. 17) and the people seem to collaborate much more with them, by fair means or foul, than with the government. It is why it is said that "the Somali Government rules the sky whereas Al-Shabab controls the land." (Ingiriis, 2018, p. 17) Adding to this, the widespread corruption in all levels of public and private sectors, gives to the militia some legitimacy among the population, especially among those who are socially or politically marginalized and dispossessed of their belongings. The corruption is particularly enhanced by the insecurity which prevails in many parts of the country and the weak authority of the States (federal and local/regional). These weaknesses of the federal government compromise the legitimacy of the state among the citizens. Al-shabab takes advantage of this vicious circle – financial weakness-insecurity-corruption-weak legitimacy, in which the FSS is trapped.

So, the FSS needs to win first the heart and commitment of its citizens, from among whom the Al-Shabab fighters are. If there is not real reconciliation, if the federalism is not soundly understood and implemented, if the corruption and injustices against small clans and ethnic groups are not dealt with consistently and with due equality and justice, it will be hard to overcome easily Al-Shabab militia.

The Fundamental Change: Constituting the Supra-Clan Segment

This fundamental change will come from three observations: Somalis have not been able to transform their ethnic unity (linguistic, cultural and religious) into a common central State ; 1) Somali ethnic organisation framework has not changed significantly for centuries, although its environment has undergone tremendous change; 2) the core constitution of the major Somali clans is still the same and they have still the same type of inter-clannic relations; 3) Somalis are divided from the bottom through clan affiliation.

Somaliness has no formal foundation. This is why Somalis lack the stratum segment of their ontological ethnos and this is why they have never been able to establish one shared state. The clans are the real constitutional segments of the Somali nation and there is no social contract between these clans. There have been various "social contracts" among political leaders belonging to different clans, but they did not have the customary legitimacy to speak on behalf of their clan. These politicians have usurped the traditional leaders by disqualifying them as being regressive and preventing them from applying the SUPP.

Thus Somali society, being divided at the root by different clans, has never succeeded in establishing a central state. However, there is one Somali clan which underwent an important change in its political and ecological environment, several centuries ago and came up with the most original and most efficient social innovation, the establishment of a supra segmental law, the Xeer Issa. The Somali nation is now going through a historical phase which needs such a fundamental adaptive change if it is to survive as such.

Somali-Issa Clan Constitution model

Somali-Issa clan organisation can serve as a model for this fundamental change, for six reasons, at least:

1. The Issa have an oral corpus of law, the Xeer Ciise, which covers every aspect of life (Iye, 1998) and is remarkable because of: "the rigor of its structuring and the codification of its laws, but also by the role it plays in the foundations of the 'pastoral democracy'…" (Iye, 1988).
2. It is one of the rare Somali clans whose Ugaas, or King, is not chosen through succession but by selection, according to

a rigorous and strict procedure; 3) It is the only Somali family-clan that has one single Ugaas, recognized by all members of the community; 4) The Somali-Issa clan members have not been protagonists in the Somali civil war and have no unresolved historical dispute with another Somali clan; 5) The corpus of the Xeer draws its content from the high tradition and wisdom of the Somalis; although old, it is extremely used in this modern era; 6) The circumstances of the appearance of this Xeer strangely resemble those that prevail today in Somali territories. A. M. Iye explains that it was formalized in the 16th century which corresponds to an:

> "…important turning point in the history of the Horn of Africa [with] the total upheavals at the ethnic, cultural, social and economic level, not to mention the political transformations: failure of the conquest of Abyssinia [sic], defeat of the Muslim armies, the massive arrival of the Gallas in the Northern Horn and outbreak of deadly epidemics."

These similarities between the two periods are not the only ones, as we can read in Iye's article:

> "The Xeer Issa was born in this period of turmoil and decadence, which resulted in rising insecurity in the cities and the erosion of codes and legislation that ruled the Muslim states of the coast .... The urban centers were deserted in favor of the safer countryside. This led to a retribalisation of urban populations. It was as a result of these upheavals that some Somali tribes quoted by the chroniclers disappeared and that others until then (unknown) emerged ... The Xeer Issa is the product of this retribalisation."

Within the corpus of the Xeer have been mentioned the four reasons why the Issa had decided to come together and establish this Xeer. It is said that it was because four scourges had increased considerably: *damac*, *duulimaad*, *dil iyo dhac* (Cusmaan, 2010) meaning "envy, attacks, killing and plunder." There is a logical relation between these four types of scourges, first comes envy, then the attack, followed by the killing and finally the plunder and robbery.

Today, we could find ourselves almost in the same situation. The Horn of Africa is subjected to an intense competition between regional and international countries, Southern Somalia and especially Somalia's capital is constantly under attack from extremists controlled by foreign forces and the natural resources of Somalia are the targets of obvious covetousness and competition.

Initially, the Issa do not all hail from the same genealogical filiations concerning the six large sub-clans. Only half is considered to go back to the same eponymous forefather, Sheikh Issa. These are the Three Issa or 'Saddexda Ciise'. They are called Ceeleye, Hawla Qaade and Holle. The other three tribal groups, the Wardiq, Horoone, and Uurweyne, joined the confederation. By this unifying act, one of the most important Somali clans was founded.

Conclusion

The most important issue is to tackle the disunion of Somali nation from where it starts: at the clan level. Considering the historical stage of Somali history and the multitude of foreign pressure that this nation is undergoing presently, it is necessary to interrogate its basic foundation. From that point of view, we have seen how the Somali-Issa in 16th century changed its clanbased structure by introducing a unifying supra segment which permitted them to cope with the harsh reality of their time.

The constitution of this Supra-Clannic Segment (CSCS), through the composition of the necessary organs and above all the "capture" of a Just man, a King, shared by all Somalis, will end an old chapter of Somali history and open a new one. Traditional leaders have the moral duty to consider seriously the grave situation in which this nation is today and generate new hope for it. This nation is fortunate to have in its midst a community that has the necessary know-how to help or to carry out such an anthropological project.

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CHAPTER 6

Theorizing Islam and Islamists in Somalia: Critical Conceptions and Cultural Challenges

Abdurahman Abdullahi (Baadiyow)

Introduction

Adopting clan power-sharing of 4.5 and Islam as the ultimate reference for all legal matters marked a paradigm shift in recovering the Somali state during the Somali Peace and Reconciliation Conference (SPRC) in Djibouti in 2000. Clan power-sharing of 4.5 formula is based on the division of political power in the criteria of equal quota of four clan-families: Digil and Mirifle, Hawiye, Darood, and Dir; and half quota to the alliance of minority clans.

State-building means the es The new model has succeeded in kick-starting reconciliation and state-building; however, a functioning state has still not been achieved in the last 20 years. During this period, the Islamists were propelled to power in 2009-2017 after the rise of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in 2006. However, the two Islamist regimes of Presidents Sheikh Sharif (2009-2012) and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (2012-2017) failed to exhibit better achievements than non-Islamists in the index of good governance.

In this chapter, I theorize Islam and Islamists in Somalia focusing on the critical conceptions and cultural challenges. Through this paper, I have redefined some critical terminologies to accord to the Islamic perspective. I have also laid out a general framework of Islam and conceptualized Sharia and its critical classification of human actions and utterances. Moreover, I have theorized the location of the state in the general framework of Islam and presented an overview of the conceptions of Islamists regarding the modern state.

The paper classifies Islamists regarding their perceptions of the modern state into three groups: rejecters, reformers, and collaborators. Rejecters are revolutionaries seeking to establish what they perceive as an "Islamic Caliphate," while collaborators are legitimizers of the existing post-colonial state establishments. On the other hand, reformist Islamists are located in between the two by accepting a modern state framework whilst advocating its reformation according to Islamic authenticity. Finally, I have provided an account of the rise of Somali Islamists to power and cultural challenges of the political elites that equates them with non-Islamists regarding governance parameters.

The state-building processes in Somalia remain a limping project that has continued to repetitively create dysfunctional state institutions since 2000.[1] The successive governments created since that time scored number one in the state weakness index and have failed to secure themselves, let alone provide security to their citizens.[2] Thus, the Somali Federal Government (SFG) has remained under the protection of the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) for over a decade.[3] These governments were founded on clan power-sharing of 4.5, which was supposed to be an interim solution to kick-start the process of state-building. Unfortunately, clan power-sharing has continued for about 20 years without achieving the objective of rebuilding a functioning state.

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1 State-building means the establishment, re-establishment, and strengthening of a public structure in a given territory capable of delivering public goods. In the case of Somalia, where the state totally collapsed, state-building means to restore functioning state institutions. See Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Cornell University Press, 2004.

2 Susan E. Rise and Stewart Patrick, *Index of state weakness in the Developing World* (The Brookings Institution publications, 2008). Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/02_weak_states_index.pdf (accessed on 28 May, 2018).

3 In February 2007, the United Nations Security Council authorized the African Union to deploy a peacekeeping mission in support of Somalia's Transitory Federal Institutions (TFIs). See Cecelia Hull Wiklund, *the Role of the African Union Mission for Somalia: AMISOM Peace keeping Success or Peacekeeping Regress?* Retrieved from file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/http___webbrapp.ptn.foi.se_pdf_7e98a5b4-d472-4ad0-8f65-f0537ef93f66.pdf (accessed on May 30, 2018).

This model is in contradiction to the basic idea of a modern state founded on citizenship rather than on clan, race, gender, and religious affiliations. In the Somali case, the state-building approach was structured as a hybrid of two domains: a traditional clan power-sharing system and a modern hierarchical state structure. In this structure, the roles of the citizens were usurped and the traditional authorities empowered to represent the members of their clans for the allocation of seats in the national assembly. However, the system failed to function owing to many reasons, including structural anomaly, while the political elites selected in this process sustained mischievous political clannism and succumbed to the predatory culture of injustice, corruption, and clannism that destroyed the state in 1991. This approach to the state-building process shows that, although clan consideration in power-sharing is a *longue durée* exposition in Somali politics, the official acceptance of clan system as an official unit of power-sharing has been criticized as unjust, fragile and unsustainable.[4]

On the other hand, Islam has been recognized in the Transitional Charters and the Provisional Constitution since 2000 as the ultimate reference of all state legislations.[5] Certainly, Islam as a faith, along with its rituals of worship, system of morality, and legal code, are a *longue durée* cultural manifestation of the people of Somalia. In the process of continuity and change, the role of Islamists has grown since the 1960s, while the traditional conception of Islam (Sufi brotherhoods, etc.) has remained central.[6] The conception of Islam, which focuses primarily on individual piety and spirituality, was partially transformed. The new conception advanced by the Islamists is that Islam is a comprehensive and integrated way of life that

4 Mohamed A Eno and Omar Eno. *Intellectualism amid Ethnocentrism: Mukhtar and the 4.5 Factor. Bildhaan,* Vol. 9, 2009, 137-145.

5 See the Somali Provisional Constitution of 2012, "No law can be enacted that is not compliant with the general principles and objectives of Shariah" (article 2:3) and "The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia is based on the foundations of the Holy Quran and the Sunna of our prophet Mohamed (PBUH) and protects the higher objectives of Shariah and social justice" (article 3:1).

6 There are two branches of Sufi Orders: Qaderiyah and Ahmadiyah, and each of them has its local offshoot. See details of Sufi orders from Abdurahman Abdullahi, *The Islamic Movement in Somalia: A Study of Islah Movement (1950-2000)* (Adonis &Abbey, 2015), 29-86.

provides guidelines to all aspects of human activities, such as politics, economics, and social spheres.[7] In particular, reformist Islamists aim to not only produce virtuous individuals, families, and societies, but also to integrate Islamic moral values and legal provisions into modern state laws and policies.[8]

Evidently, both the concept of a modern state and the notion of Islamism are new phenomena in Somalia. Both conceptions were not firmly internalized, and thus, most political elites express them rhetorically, blending or vacillating between nationalism, Islamism, and clannism.[9] Hence, similar to the rhetoric of socialism during the military regime, Islamism is used rhetorically as the politics of an exclusionist clique that, at times, employs it in aggressive and violent ways.[10] These phenomena have become evident in Somalia since 2006 with the emergence of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and the subsequent occupation of Islamists at the top of national leadership.[11] In general, Islamists played a crucial role after state collapse in 1991 in the provision of social services, ameliorating ritual performance, reviving the economic sector, and strengthening societal resilience. However, in terms of state-building, Islamists have so far failed the test of time to exhibit better governance as compared to non-Islamists in the index of governance.[12] Hence, it has become clear that Islamists' claim of striving to apply *Sharia* was

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7 *Abdurahman Abdullahi, Recovering the Somali State: The Role of Islam, Islamism and Transitional Justice* (Adonis & Abbey, 2017), 15.

8 *Reformist Islamists belong to the Muslim Brotherhood movement and their ideological affiliates worldwide.*

9 The dynamic interaction of tradition represented by clan culture and Islam, and modernity represented by the state, had been conflictual, and as a result, the state collapsed in 1991. See Abdurahman Abdullahi, Tribalism, Nationalism and Islam: The Crisis of Political Loyalties in Somalia. MA thesis submitted to the Islamic Institute, McGill University, 1992.

10 Examples are the activities of Al-Itihad in 1992-97 and the ongoing violent al-Shabaab operations.

11 Presidents Sheikh Sharif Sh. Ahmed and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud both claimed to belong to the Islamist Movements. They have ruled Somalia in the period between 2009 and 2016.

12 Somali political elites could be divided into Islamists (activists) and non-Islamists (not activists). This categorisation refutes dividing these elites into secularists and Islamists. Secular political elites, if they exist, are a negligible minority.

rhetoric and merely lip service. Thus, the essence of Islam and its social, political, and economic objectives have been completely misrepresented and distorted. The biggest challenge in the state-building process is how to develop a system of governance that is compliant with Islamic morality, sensitive to the culture of the people, and at the same time, modern and functional.

Therefore, through this paper, I have redefined some of terminology in accordance with the Islamic perspective, provided a general framework of Islam beyond ritualistic and rhetoric expressions and offered a concept of *Sharia* and its classification of human actions/utterances. Moreover, I have offered a brief overview of the two conceptions of Islamists regarding the modern democratic state. Furthermore, I have also put forth a few snapshots documenting the rise of Somali Islamists to power and the challenges of Somali state-building in general and in particular for Islamists. Finally, I have offered a brief conclusion of the paper.

Redefining Critical Terminologies

The terminologies used in describing multiple phenomena of Islamically-motivated movements are confusing and hotly disputed in the academia and the media. To avoid such confusion, I have used the following terminologies, as briefly described below:

- *Islamic* is a generic term used to signify anything related to the Islamic religion; for example, Islamic education, Islamic belief, Islamic manners, Islamic laws, and so on. Muslim actions should not be related to the Islamic religion. For example, using the term Islamic history, Islamic civilisation, Islamic movement, Islamic revolution and Islamic terrorism are inaccurate. Instead, it is a Muslim civilisation, Muslim history, Iranian revolution (example), and Islamist movement and so on. This conceptualisation includes negating the use of the terminology of the "Islamic State" which is inappropriate. Instead, the best terminology is to use "Muslim state."
- *Islamists* are devoted individuals or organized groups (movements) who assertively promote Islamic teachings and values in the society and advocate for the application of Islamic principles at the state level. Islamists are not monolithic and range from moderate reformists, extremist revolutionaries, and state collaborators. They differ from one

another in their objectives, approaches, understanding of Islam, and relations with non-Muslims and other religious traditions. Indeed, it is important to be aware of those claiming to be Islamists who use Islam simply as a political tool and disregard Islamic values and principles upon assuming power.

- *Non-Islamists* are a majority of Muslims who may or may not be devoted to Islam. They share the common characteristic of not advocating for the application of Islam in neither the society nor the state. They are not synonymous with secularists. Indeed, Islamists and secularists are minorities among Muslims in all countries, but they are more organized and vocal. Secularists are mainly the ruling elites, academicians, and media experts while Islamists constitute mainly opposition forces having wide public support among the disgruntled masses. As such, in every free and fair election, the majority of the Muslim masses votes for Islamist parties that appeal to the emotional attachment to Islam.
- *Islamism* is sometimes used as synonymous with political Islam. The term political Islam alludes to the phenomenon where Islamist movements began to propagate the comprehensiveness of Islam after centuries of decadence that relegated Islam in the periphery of the political sphere. It was used by many Western scholars perplexed by the strange and unwarranted intrusion of Islam into the secular domain of politics, assumed earlier to be apolitical. The slogan that Islam is a religion and state "*Din wa Dawla,*" which continues to attract the Muslim masses, challenged the established notion of the secularity of the states. Thus, the term political Islam singles out the political aspect of the Islamic movements, which becomes problematic for the secular conception of politics in the western world and could be defined, in short, as "Islam used to a political end." Islamism is the ideology of the popular movements advocating the reordering of Muslim societies and states in accordance with the principles of Islam. It is not synonymous with militancy or fundamentalism. Also, Islamism should not be equated with Islam.

The above critical definitions are in agreement with the Qur'anic perspective of the categorisation of Muslims into three groups: those

who transgress themselves by not observing to the required Islamic standards of rituals and manners (*dhaalimun li nafsihi*); those who adhere to the main individual obligations and ethics (*muqtasid)*, which, as termed here, are non-Islamist/non-activist; and those who are highly committed to the advancement Islamic cause beyond individual requirements (*sabiqun bilkhayrat)*, as referred to here as Islamist/activist.[13] The above new definitions challenge frequently used terminologies as this author lucidly exposed in the following passage:

> The other cluster of terminologies [are] used by mainstream Western scholars and media and are mostly pejorative, such as radical Islam, militant Islam, Revolutionary Islam, extremist Islam, Islamic terrorism, and fundamentalist Islam. Attaching these terms to Islam creates a distorted system of meaning for the Islamic movements, depicting them as a threat to Western civilisation. These terminologies are relational and aspectual labelling or designating concepts that indicate a degree of something. Also, they are not value-neutral and always exonymic, which means they are applied by others to a group rather than a group labelling itself.[14]

Conceptual Framework of Islam

The essence of Islam combines four elements: the basic belief, spiritual training, moralities, and legal provisions. Islam as a faith is founded on the submission to one God (Allah), the all-powerful and all-knowing, the merciful and the compassionate. This meaning is expressed briefly in the first part of the *Shahadah* "*La ilaha Illa-Allah,*" which starts with the Arabic word "la". This simple and short phrase carries the concept of a believer's freedom from everything, except the Creator's instructions to follow a specific course of action in life. Hence, Islam is the negation and rejection of all human philosophies and ideologies that deviate from the basic concept of Islam. However, this freedom allows thinking, exploring, developing, and using everything in this world to realize Allah's will bequeathed on the human being, as long as it does not infringe the boundaries of

13 The following Qur'anic verse offers categorisation of Muslims into three groups: "Then we caused to inherit the Book those We have chosen of Our servants; and among them is [1] he who wrongs himself, and [2] among them is he who is moderate, and [3] among them is he who is foremost in good deeds by permission of Allah" (The Qur'an, 35:32).

14 Abdurahman Abdullahi, *Recovering the Somali state: The Role of Islam, Islamism and Transitional Justice* (Adonis & Abbey, 2017), 21.

Islam.[15] To understand Allah's instruction, guidance, and wisdom, the second part of the *Shahadah*, gives the answer, which is the belief that *(Muhammad Rasul Allah*), meaning Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah. This second phrase entails the belief that the Qur'an and the prophetic traditions are the basic sources of Islam. Besides the belief in Allah and Muhammad, the messenger of Allah, a Muslim individual, should believe in the existence of the angels and the hereafter; and all messengers of Allah and their revealed books, such the *Tawrat* revealed to Musa, the *Zabur* revealed to Dawud, the *Injil* revealed to Isa, and the *Quran* revealed to Muhammad. Moreover, the individual should believe in the predestination (*al-qaḍa' wa l-ar*).[16]

The spiritual training program is meant to strengthen and sustain the belief through continuous remembrance of Allah and to cultivate good morality in all its aspects. It comprises obligatory actions (Do's), such as daily prayers, fasting during the month of Ramadan, paying annual Zakat, and once-in-a-lifetime pilgrimage to Mecca conditioned on physical and financial abilities. There are also many supplementary deeds, such as performing extra prayers, helping needy people, and so on. The expected outcome of performing a training program is to breed individuals with high moral standards. For instance, the following Qur'anic verse clarifies the purpose of the daily prayers: "Indeed, prayer prohibits immorality and wrongdoing, and the remembrance of Allah is greater. And Allah knows that which you do" (The Qur'an, 29:45). Moreover, fasting teaches morality, such as

15 See Qur'anic verse "… These are the limits [set by] Allah, so do not approach them…" (2:187). Also, prophetic tradition "Verily, Allah has made duties obligatory, so do not neglect them. He has set limits, so do not transgress them..." (30), Forty Hadith, Nawawi.

16 These are the six articles and faiths or pillars of faith, according to the following Hadith narrated by Muslims: "Iman is that you believe in God and His Angels and His Books and His Messengers and the Hereafter and the good and evil fate [ordained by your God]." There are three interpretations of predestination in Islam. 1. *Al-Jabiriyah,* who believe that humans have no control over their actions and everything is dictated by God; 2. *Al-Qadiriyyah,* who believe that humans have complete control over their destiny; and 3. The Sunni school of thought interpretation that God has knowledge of everything that will be, but humans have freedom of choice. See *Aqeedah at Tahawiyyah* (The Fundamentals of Islamic Creed by al-Tahawi), which is the most accepted reference of the Sunni interpretation of the fundamentals of Creed.

honesty, truthfulness, benevolence, and abstaining from all wrongdoings, as the following prophetic tradition says: "If one does not eschew lies and false conduct, Allah has no need that he should abstain from his food and his drink."[17] The prohibited actions include stealing and looting, drinking alcohol, smoking intoxicating substances, extra-marital sex, killing, insulting, or injuring human beings, cheating, and lying. Most of these moral values are universal, while some of them may be specific to Muslims. For example, truth-telling, protecting properties, protecting human rights, and so on, are universal values. What is more specific to the Muslims and other religious beliefs include the prohibition of drinking alcohol or smoking intoxicating substances, and extra-marital sex.

The worldly objective of Islam is to cultivate high moral standards in the individual and society.[18] The Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said: "The only reason I have been sent is to perfect good manners."[19] And, the Prophet symbolized that great morality as he was praised by Allah in the Qur'an saying "And indeed, you are of a great moral character" (The Qur'an, 68:4). Moreover, another prophetic tradition affirms that "The best among you are those who have the best manners and character."[20] Studies on Islamic ethics emphasize individual morality, which includes charitableness and benevolence, forgiveness, tolerance, honesty, kindness and leniency, fulfillment of promise, modesty and humility, trustworthiness, patience, truthfulness, sincerity, and so on. Collective morality at the organisational and state realms comprises the elements of good governance, which includes accountability**,** transparency, the rule of law, responsiveness, equity and inclusiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, and participation. The deficit of collective morality is very high in Muslim-majority countries, particularly in military dictatorships and oppressive monarchies. Paradoxically, most of these countries claim to rhetorically follow Islamic *Sharia* and consider Islam as their state religion. In reality, they have strayed from realizing the ultimate objective of Islam founded on freedom, high moral values, productiveness, and a society with a humanistic and

17 Narrated by *Al-Bukhari,* book 9, hadith no. 251.

18 See Abdul Al'Ala al-Mawdudi, *Islamic way of Life* (King Fahad National Library publication, 1966)

19 Narrated by Sahih al-Bukhari, *Book of Manners*, no. 290.

20 Narrated by Sahih al-Bukhari, chapter 38, no. 6029.

universalistic mission. In contrast, most Muslim political elites of today are, depending on the society in which they live, clannish, greedy, totalitarian, and parasitic. The following figure one shows the three components of the Islamic framework and their connectedness and interactions. It also displays the input/output equation and the interactive process.




Fig.1. Input/output equation of the Islamic framework

Conception of Sharia

Islamic legal provisions are called *Sharia* in a narrow definition with a role to describe and regulate all the three components of the Islamic framework and their linkages. *Sharia* literally means "way to water," thereby signifying the source of life. To Muslims, it signifies the right way to Allah and to the eternal life in the hereafter. It is also broadly defined as "those doctrinal, practical, and dispositional regulations, which Allah had legislated through one of His messengers."[21] *Sharia* could be defined as the comprehensive body of Islamic laws that should regulate the public and private aspects of the lives of Muslims through the excessive examination of the primary sources of Islamic laws: the Qur'an and the prophetic authentic traditions.[22] *Sharia* answers to four principal issues: what to do (obligatory and supplementary) and what not to do (prohibitions and dislikes); descriptions of how to do the obligatory and supplementary deeds; and reward for the righteous and punishment of the transgressors of

21 Hanafi Jurisprudence, 1. See http://www.slideshare.net/IslamicBooks/hanafi-jurisprudencefiqh-Explained.

22 The Qur'an contains 114 chapters (*suwar*) and 6616 verses (*ayat*). Moreover, Sunni Muslims consider six major collections of the prophetic Sunna as the most authoritative. These are *SahihBukhari*and *Sahih Muslim*—the two works considered the most authentic. Both of them contain approximately 7,000 unrepeated *ahadith*. Moreover, there are four other works, such as *Sunan al-Nisai*, *Sunanabu Dawood*, *Jami al-Tirmedi*, and *Sunanabu-Majah*. See Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, *al-Nukat*Ala Kitab ibn al-Salah (Maktabah al-Furqan, Ajman, U.A.E., 2 edition, vol. 1, 2003), 153.

the prohibited actions. "It lays down the specific norms of good and bad, virtue and vice."[23]

In between the right and wrong, there is a permissible position where flexibility and freedom are given to the individuals. Therefore, all human actions are categorized according to the 'quantum of actions,' which has, at its centre, the neutral and permissible position, with two degrees of goodness and evilness to either side.[24]



Fig 2: Classification of Actions/Utterances in the Islamic *Sharia* (pls fill in the empty boxes)

Forbidden (Haram), meaning unlawful or illegal actions/utterances, is one of the foundations of the Islamic law. Explicitly-prescribed forbidden actions/utterances in the Islamic texts are very small. They include all harmful actions/utterances to the individuals and society at large. The general attributes of the forbidden actions/utterances are what hurts human life and dignity and ruffles the intellect, violates family decency and progeny, and infringes property rights.[25] Examples of these actions include harming and killing human beings, using all kinds of intoxicants, committing fornication and adultery, and thuggery and looting of others' properties. Moreover, Islam forbids anything that may lead to something that is forbidden in order to block all avenues that lead to any temptation of the forbidden things, such as wearing seductive clothing, nudity, and pornography. Furthermore, Islam forbids employing forbidden means to realize praiseworthy ends contrary to the principle that the end justifies the means. On the other hand, discouraged/reprehensible (Makruh) includes all actions/utterances

23 Adibah Binti Abdul Rahim, "Understanding Islamic Ethics and Its Significance on the Character Building." *International Journal of Social Science and Humanity*, Vol. 3, No. 6, November 2013, 508-513. Also, AbdurezakAbdulahiHashi, Islamic ethics: An outline of its principles and scope. Revelation and Science Vol. 01, No.03 (1433H/2011) 122-130.

24 Abdurahman Abdullahi, *Recovering the Somali State: The Role of Islam, Islamism and Transitional Justice* (Adonis & Abbey, 2017), 107.

25 YasseAuda, *Maqasid al-Shariah: An Introductory Guide* (published by IIIT, 2008).

which are not forbidden but disliked and detestable. Accordingly, "Muslims are advised to avoid Makruh acts because the continued and insistent commission of such acts will lead to sin."[26] Abstaining from reprehensible actions/utterances places distance between the individual and the *haram* actions/utterances and provides a protective shield from falling into *haram*.

Opposite to the forbidden and discouraged actions/utterances situate obligatory/recommended actions/utterances. Obligatory actions/utterances are legally binding in Islamic law and are rewarded for performing them and punished for disregarding them. Some common examples are performing the five major pillars of Islam, such as obligatory prayers, the payment of Zakat, fasting the month of Ramadan, and carrying out pilgrimages at least once during one's lifetime. Additionally, there are many other obligatory deeds, such as feeding the needy, protecting the oppressed, telling the truth, fulfilling promises, defending rights, saving human lives and so on. Recommended (Mustahabb) is non-binding actions/utterances which are rewarded when performed and are irreprehensible if not performed. One of the definitions of mustahabb is "an act whose performance is not firmly required, but is rewardable. Its abandonment is neither forbidden nor punishable."[27]

The neutral position is the grey area called permitted/allowed (Mubah) that locates between forbidden/discouraged and obligatory/recommended spheres. "In Islam, the sphere of prohibited things is very small, while that of permissible things is extremely vast."[28] Permitted things include all actions that have no specific ruling in Islamic law and have no divine Reward and Punishment. This includes all actions that individuals have free choices to do or not to do. Most human deeds are Mubah and the Islamic jurisprudence maxim is that everything is Mubah unless

26 http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1400(accessed on July 13, 2019)

27 Yusuf Al-Hajj Ahmad, *The Book of Purification: Encyclopaedia of Islamic Law* (Darusalam publishers, 2014), 36.

28 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *The Lawful and Prohibited in Islam* (Wisdom International School for Higher Education Studies, no published date), 13.

proven otherwise.[29] Mubah actions are rewarded if associated with good intentions.

Generally, Sharia regulates the relationship of Muslim individuals with Allah and with His creatures, such as humans, animals, and the environment. Muslim scholars have developed Islamic jurisprudence – *Fiqh* – to deal with the changing conditions of human relations and interactions with Allah and his creatures in the course of space and time. Islamic jurisprudence is the collection of various interpretations of the Islamic texts by the scholars and their production of *Ijtihad,* which is the process of deducing Islamic laws from the original Islamic sources and contemporary issues and revisitation of previous scholarly judgments.[30] These scholars employed diverse methodologies and produced different opinions and legal judgments regarding a variety of issues. [31] As a result, various interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence have been developed during the course of the Islamic history. There are four Sunni schools of jurisprudence called "*madhab (sig) and madahib (plu*); namely, *Shafi'i, Hanbali, Hanafi and Maliki*," and a number of *Shi'a* schools, such as *Ja'fari and Zaidi.* Generally, Islamic law groups all human utterances and actions into two major categories: *Ma'ruf* (right and good) and *Munkar* (wrong and bad or evil). In that context, Muslim communities and states are expected to be the best community, but only when they "enjoy the right and forbid the wrong."[32] This means abiding by the rules set out

29 See the Hadith, "What Allah has made lawful in His book is halal and what He has forbidden is haram, and that concerning which He is silent is allowed as his favour. …" (19:64) compiled by Alhakim.

30 *Ijtihad* is an intellectual effort by Muslim scholars, individually and collectively, to derive rules or choose one from among various interpretations to use when legislating for changing conditions, provided the change does not contradict with the spirit of the Sharia. Ijtihad is what keeps the dynamism of the Sharia and its suitability for all spaces and times.

31 *Ijtihad* is an intellectual effort by Muslim scholars, individually and collectively, to derive rules or choose one from among various interpretations to use when legislating for changing conditions, provided the change does not contradict with the spirit of the Sharia. Ijtihad is what keeps the dynamism of the Sharia and its suitability for all spaces and times.

32 See the Qur'anic verse, "*The Believers, men and women, are protectors one of another: they enjoin what is just, and forbid what is evil: they observe regular prayers, practise regular charity, and obey Allah and His Messenger…"* (9:71). See also, "*Ye are the best of*

by Allah or deduced by the scholars in light of the Islamic texts (abiding by the rule of law that does not contradict Islam). Obviously, enjoying what is right and forbidding what is wrong is a call for establishing a legitimate authority capable of exercising this task within the context of the legal framework of Islam. This authority is located in the domain of what is neutral and permissible in the Islamic *Sharia* and its dynamism is receptive of renewable *Ijtihad* in time and space. Besides safeguarding Islamic values and principles, the structure of state and functions are located in the domain of human prerogative and communities, which may evolve with time and space.

The Islamists' Conception of a Modern State

Based on the above-stated framework and understanding of the comprehensiveness of Islam, the motto of "Islam is a religion and state" (*al-Islamu dinun wa al-dawlah*) has been frequently used since the early years of the 20th century. This slogan was created in reaction to other opposing mottos of that time, such as "separation of state and religion" introduced by the European colonial powers to the Muslim lands.[33] It was the Muslim scholars' reaction to the western model of the state and modernity founded on secular views. However, this reaction was not monolithic, and therefore, different Islamic schools, organisations, and movements were established to promote and advocate for the application of *Sharia* at the societal and state levels.[34] To realize that objective, early Islamist scholars made intensive comparative studies on the medieval Islamic thought and concepts of the modern state. Regrettably, some of these scholars have proposed

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peoples, evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in Allah…" (3:110).

33 Other slogans include "Religion is for God, but the land is for all." On the development of the secular idea in the Muslim world, see Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *State in Islam* (Al-Falah Foundation, 2004). Also, Hassan al-Banna, *The Message of Teaching: Understanding*. Retrieved from https://thequranblog.files.wordpress.com/2008/06/_3_-the-message-of-the-teachings.pdf (accessed on Jan. 31, 2018).

34 Muhammad Samiullah, "Classification of Contemporary Islamic Movements." Jihat al-Islam Vol.5, no.2 (January-June 2012). Also, John L. Esposito, Claiming the Center: Political Islam in Transition. *Harvard International Review*. Available from https://www.unaoc.org/repository/ Esposito_Political_ Islam.pdf (accessed on Jan.31, 2018)

reinstituting the historical Muslim states of family rule founded on the medieval Muslim thought. They failed to distinguish human experiences, in particular, historical juncture from the essence and ideals of Islam regarding the state. Most of the early discourses of these scholars derived from the Islamic Jurisprudence, which focuses mainly on what is commanded (i.e., approved, recommended, or legalized) or forbidden in Islam (*al-halaalu wa al-haraamu*), while the domain of the form and structure of the state is mainly located in the space of the permissible (*Mubah*).[35] The conception of state is located in the domain where the Prophet Muhammad said: "If a question relates to your worldly matters, you would know better about it, but if it relates to your religion, then to me it belongs."[36]This means that the structure of the state, the division of duties and responsibilities, and the electoral system and laws, programs, policies, and priorities are all prerogatives of the communities.

Certainly, the only requirement in the domain of the state is to abide by the general principles and value system of Islam. This is because Islam does not prescribe either specific political systems, such as monarchies and republics, or specific structures and institutions. Islam just provides a general vision of a society founded on justice and benevolence (*adl* and *ihsan*) that opposes oppression and injustice (*zulm and 'udwan)*.[37] "In fact, Islam is deemed to permeate the entire gamut of our lives and manifests itself not only in the mosque but also in the marketplace, in the schools and universities, in the courts, and in the battlefields."[38] As such, Islam opposes authoritarianism, which is a symbol of oppression and injustice and calls for a consultative form of governance, that is, in

35 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *State in Islam* (Cairo: al-Falah Foundation for Translation, Publication & Distribution, 1998)

36 Musnad Ahmad, hadith no. 12086; and Sunan Ibn Maja, hadith no. 2462.

37 See the Qur'anic verse, usually read at the end of Friday sermons, which says: "Allah enjoins justice, generosity, and kind treatment with kindred."(16:90). In the Qur'an, many terms are used to signify the oppression and injustice, such as *Zulm, Tughyan, Israf, Tabdhir, Ifsad, 'Itida*, and *'Udwan*. See the Qur'anic verse "And whoever does this aggressively and unjustly, we will soon cast him into fire; and this is easy for Allah" (4:30).

38 MohammadAzram '*Principles of good governance in Islam.'* In *Management of Resources in Muslim Countries and Communities: Challenges and Prospects (*IIUM Press, Kuala Lumpur, 2012), 39-54.

essence, democratic governance.[39]This flexibility and dynamism is the hallmark of Islam as approached by scholars through a continuous process of *Ijtihad* (independent reasoning). This epistemology enables Muslim scholars to legislate new laws, as well as revisit and modify early scholarly judgments.[40]

There are two divergent conceptions among Islamists and Western scholars on the relations of Islam and modern democratic state. The first conception articulates that the modern state system is completely incompatible with Islam and that Islam is essentially against democracy. Western and Muslim scholars who belong to this conception deduce their rationale from different angles and narratives.[41] Muslim scholars who support this perspective belong mainly to the Salafia persuasions and can be sub-divided into revolutionaries and collaborators.[42] The revolutionary groups are symbolized by Osama bin Laden and groups that are the likes of

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39 There are two verses in the Qur'an that unequivocally bring forth consultation (Shura) as the basic principle in Islam. The first verse states that the manner of true believers is to consult with each other: "Those who hearken to their Lord, and establish regular prayer; who (conduct) their affairs by mutual consultation among themselves; who spend out of what we bestow on them for sustenance" (42:38). The second verse commands Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) to consult his companions: "Thus, it is due to mercy from God that you deal with them gently, and had youbeen rough and hard-hearted, they would have certainly dispersed from around you; pardon them, therefore, and ask pardon for them, and take counsel with them in the affair; so when you have decided, then place your trust in God; surely God loves those who trust" (3:159).

40 Al-Mawardi, *Al-Ahkām As-Sultaniyah: The Laws of Islamic Governance*. Asadullah Yate, Trans (Ta-Ha Publishers, 1996); Ann Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam: An Introduction to the Study of Islamic Political Theory: the Jurists* (Oxford University Press, 1981); Erwin Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam: An Introductory Outline* (Cambridge University Press, 1958)

41 Major western scholars who advocate that Islam is incompatible with modern democratic state are: Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilisations." Foreign Affairs 72 (3):25; Bernard Lewis. 1990. "The Roots of Muslim Rage." The Atlantic Monthly September ed.; Choueiri, Y. 1996. "The Political Discourse of Contemporary Islamist Movements." In Islamic Fundamentalism, ed. A. E. Sidahmed, A. Boulder: Westview Press.; Pipes, Daniel. 2002. In the Path of God Islam and Political Power. 2nd ed. New York: Transaction Publishers.

42 QuintanWiktorowicz, Anatomy of the Salafi Movement. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29:207–239, 2006.

ISIS, Al-Qaida, Al-Shabaab, Boko-Haram, and other similar groups. Similarly, collaborators are represented by the Mufti of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, symbolizing religious establishments or elements funded by dictatorial regimes. Most of the collaborators consider existing dictatorial and monarchic regimes in the Muslim world as legitimate Muslim states and advocate for legitimizing them from Islamic perspective. Examples of such groups are *Hizbu-al-Nur* in Egypt, the Supreme Council of Islamic Scholars in Saudi Arabia, Al-Azhar establishment in Egypt and similar religious establishments under the authority of the states.

The second conception belongs to the groups of scholars who believe that the modern democratic state should be reformed and reconciled with Islamic principles, a legal system, and values. They include some prominent Western scholars and Muslim reformists.[43] The reformist Muslim scholars include a vast spectrum of scholars and mostly belong to the Muslim Brotherhood persuasion. In light of *Ijtihad*, these scholars have studied modern state concepts to identify how Islamic principles can be reconciled, accommodated, absorbed, and integrated within major concepts of the modern state. Progress, in the theoretical aspect, has been made and the nexuses and commonalities were identified on practical governance issues. This conclusion was made after a long period of studies by adopting new *Ijtihad*, which permits referring to the Islamic text and independent human reasoning. The resonant point of convergence of human rational thought (*aql)* and revealed scripture (*naql)* is what Muslim scholars postulated that sound human judgment cannot deviate from Allah's truly prescribed ordinance.[44] In fact, according to the reformist perspective, these two sources are considered Allah's given endowments either directly through revelation, or indirectly, through intellectual faculties bestowed by the Creator upon the humans.

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43 *Examples of Western scholars who advocate that Islam is not against most of the modern state principles* include John O. Voll, John Esposito, and many others.

44 Carl Sharif El-Tobgui, Reason, Revelation, and the Reconstruction of Rationality: Taqiy al-Din Ibn Taymiyya, 'The Refutation of the Contradiction of Reason and Revelation.' PhD thesis submitted to the Islamic institute, McGill University, 2013. Also, Dar-Ifta al-Misriyah, Reason and Revelation in Islamic Thought. Retrieved from http://www.dar-alifta.org/Foreign/ViewArticle.aspx?ID=366&CategoryID=3 (accessed on June 2, 2018).

Reformist Islamists have gradually internalized and domesticated most concepts of the modern democratic state, such as democracy, equality of citizens, women's rights, and universal human rights.[45] For example, reformist Islamists assert that "democracy, in its ideal form, is like pure water that, although it does not have a shape and color, it takes the shape and color of its container. Likewise, democracy takes the color and the shape of the society in which it is applied."[46] This means that democracy is applicable to all races, religions, and cultures, though it takes different forms in different societies and contexts. This paradigm shift occurred after long periods of gestation, studies, and the juxtaposition drawn between modern state concepts and principles of Islam, such as consultation *(shura)*, the equality of human beings, women's role in the society, and human dignity and rights. However, challenges to the reformist Islamists' view on the state remains sturdy since many scholars, states, and groups that rhetorically claim Islamic legitimacy are completely against the above-stated harmonies with the modern state concepts. These groups and states strive to preserve or recreate archaic historical states with structures, names, and laws.

Islamists in all countries generally succeeded, to a certain extent, in the social and ritual Islamic aspects. Their activism during the past decades has been tremendously successful in spreading a better exercise of the Islamic rituals manifested in the increased religiosity of the Muslims around the globe.[47] This trend could be observed in the excessive building of mosques, Islamic schools, and universities, Islamic banking, Islamic media outlets, embracing Islamic dress code, attending annual Hajj, and so on. Moreover, this trend is manifested in the increased number of the states adopting Islamic laws in their legal system and declaring Islam as the state religion in their constitutions. Furthermore, other manifestations are growing,

45 John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Islam and Democracy*. http://www.artic.ua.es/biblioteca/u85/documentos/1808.pdf (accessed on June 1, 2018).

47 There are many scales of measuring Muslim religiosity, such as the "Muslim Religiosity Scale," however, it this limited space will not detail them. See Abdulaziz Abdurrahman Albelaikhi, Development of a Muslim Religiosity Scale. University of Rhode Island, 1997. Available from http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1569&context=oa_diss (accessed on 9 June, 2018).

such as Islamist political parties, participation in the elections, and becoming part of the coalition governments.[48] Indeed, the recent Arab Spring has demonstrated the popularity of the Islamic political agenda and the desire of the society for democratic transformation. However, this does not mean that the concept of the modern state and reformist interpretation of Islam on the state have been understood properly. It was rather an emotional attachment to Islam and desire for the change of the dictatorial regimes. Indeed, the road to true democratic transformation in the developing Muslim countries requires economic, political, and societal transformation.

Propelling Islamists to Power

Somalia has been entangled in establishing the skeleton of state institutions, such as parliament, presidency, federal member states, security apparatus, and public financial management since 2000. From that period, the gradual recovery of the state institutions and alteration of the political elites has been steady. Nonetheless, the first shift in the political elite occurred in 2009 when the Islamists dominated the parliament and the top echelon of the political spectrum. This was the result of the Somali Reconciliation Conference, held in Djibouti in 2008, which offered 275 MPs to the Alliance of the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), most of whom were Islamists belonging to the UIC.[49] These MPs were equal to the PMs of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) formed in Kenya in 2004. As a result, the total number of MPs in the enlarged parliament became 550. In fact, most of the new MPs were Islamists, in addition to the other Islamist MPs in the TFP.

The role of the Islamists in politics began to upsurge following the civil society driven SPRC held in Djibouti in 2000, where the role

48 Many Islamist political parties successfully participated in the political process. Examples are Al-Nahda of Tunisia, the National Awakening Party in Indonesia, the Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, the Malaysian Islamic Party, the National Congress in Sudan, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco, and many others.

49 Meredith Preston McGhie, Mediating Djibouti. Retrieved from http://www.c-r.org/downloads/Accord%2021_5Mediating%20Dijibouti_2010_ENG.pdf (accessed on 4 June, 2018); also see, Institute for Security Studies, The Somalia Conflict Implications for peace-making and peacekeeping efforts. ISS Paper 198, September 2009.

of the warlords became peripheral, clan power-sharing of 4.5 was embraced (though disputed and criticized later as un-Islamic and anti-social) – see footnote 6), and the Islamic-compliant Charter was adopted.[50] As a result of this dominance, it could be stated that a majority of MPs and their sympathizers were Islamists. The Somali Islamists' acceptance of clan power-sharing and elections of the top echelons of national leadership in Djibouti agreement demonstrate their pragmatism and victory of the Islamist reformists upon the revolutionary ideology.[51] Consequently, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, former chairman of the UIC, was elected to become president of Somalia (2009-2012). Moreover, Hassan Sheikh, who also belonged to the reformist Islamist camp, was elected in the following election of 2012.

During these two periods, Islamists affiliated to the defunct UIC surrounded the two presidents. They comprised both armed groups, parliamentarians, the civil society, and Diaspora groups.[52] The inner-circles of these two administrations, which shaped policies and influenced decision-making, were considered to belong to *Tajamu al-Islami*, also known as "Aala-Sheikh" (Sheikh Sharif era), and the *Damm Jadeed* "new blood," a splinter faction from the Islah Movement (Hassan Sheikh era).[53] Both groups belonged to the reformist Islamists. Thus, the Somali people expected better governance during these two regimes in believing that Islamists would follow Islamic principles and provisions of good governance.[54]

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50 See The Transitional National Charter of 2000, article (4: 4) that states that"the Islamic *Sharia* shall be the basic source for national legislation and any law contradicting Islamic Sharia shall be void and null."

51 *Two faction of the UIC have rejected Djibouti agreement: Hizbul-Islam and Alshabaab, both of whom belonged to the revolutionary ideology*.

52 *The alliance for the re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) was headquartered in Asmara and comprised members of the Islamic Court Union* (armed group and civil society), free parliamentarians, and the Diaspora group.

53 On the historical evolution of Islah, see Abdurahman Abdullahi, *The Islamic Movement in Somalia: A Study of Islah Movement* (1950-2000) (Adonis & Abbey, 2015)

54 Imam SayidMoustafa al-Qazwini, "Sharia and Good Governance." Implementation of Sharia by Democratic means: The Nigerian Experience, 2004; also consult, Thomas G. Wais, Governance, Good Governance, and

However, people's high expectations were frustrated with the high magnitude of mismanagement, nepotism, corruption, and failure of building effective institutions. As such, the two presidents were not re-elected in their respective second term, despite all their efforts and colossal amounts of corruption money that exchanged hands.[55] As a result, the Somali people remain disappointed and dismayed with their political elite since their core ideologies were distorted and people's support and devotion were employed merely as political instruments. Thus, Islamism, clannism, and nationalism, the three core ideologies, were in the same manner instrumentalized rhetorically by the political elites. Studying the phenomenon of using Islam as a political instrument, regardless of its core principles and value system, is a worthy topic of research as it is widely practiced in many Muslim countries. In this limited space, the emphasis will be placed on the political culture of the majority of Somali political elites including Islamists.

Challenges of Islamists' State-building

The challenges of Somali state-building are ubiquitous in the post-civil war and encompass internal and external challenges. Internal challenges encompass adopting rebuilding state institutions, developing human resources, restoring security, introducing transitional justice, reviving economics, and so on. The external challenges are huge and multi-layered foreign interventions due to Somalia's strategic location. Additionally, Islamists face extra challenges, such as identifying what part of *sharia* is implemented in the society and what are the missing parts; ambiguity of the process of applying Islam in the specific society; disagreement among Islamists on the approach of application of Islam; and multiple voices of Islamists, including moderates and extremists, and international stakeholders, who have many concerns about the Islamist political agenda.

Nonetheless, achieving all the above-stated challenges could be surmounted with the right socio-political behaviour of the Somali

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Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges. Third World Quarterly, 21:5, 2000, 795-814.

55 Jeffrey Gettleman, Fuelled by Bribes, "Somalia's Election seen as Milestone of Corruption." *The New York Times*, February 7, 2017.

political elites. This means that an elite political culture plays a crucial role in quickening or delaying recovery of the Somali state. The political culture of the elite is simply-defined, according to the International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences, as "a set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments that gives order and meaning to a political process and which provides the underlying assumption and rules that govern behaviour in the political system." Certainly, the people of Somalia are blameless as they had not been given a chance to participate in politics through democratic elections since 1969. Hence, the blame falls squarely on the political elites, who usurped power under the banner of nationalism and clannism, and Islam. Indeed, the failure of the Somali state is essentially ideological bankruptcy, a failure of political elites and their culture of leadership developed during the colonial era and exercised in the postcolonial period.

The political culture of the Somali elites could be summarized as follows: the imperativeness of clan affiliation and subsequent nepotistic behaviour; the commoditisation of politics for economic gains; falsification, fraud, and violence as political means; and dependence on foreign patronage.[56] This ambivalent political culture, which primarily depends on clan attachment cloaked with personal interest, breeds an endless proclivity for limitless greed that is satisfied by raiding the national coffers and seeking external patronage for the sake of accessing more financial resources. This culture is entirely in contradiction with the tenets of Islamic morality and value system as it becomes a breeding ground for corruption and deeply-rooted malfeasance. It is also counter to the modern state principles founded on the rule of law, citizenship, and free and fair elections. A political culture of this nature not only pollutes the whole gamut of social life but also the moral as well as psychological wellbeing of the citizens; however, similarly, it also extends its effects to the pollution of the air, water, and soil, thereby endangering the environment and the ecosystem as a whole. Figure 3 below summarizes the basic political culture of the Somali elites.

56 Abdurahman Abdullahi, *Making Sense of Somali History*, Volume one (Adonis & Abbey, 2017), 146.




Fig 3. Basic Political Culture of Somali Elites

Due to its mischievous nature, this political culture is an antithesis to good governance, which both the modern state and Islamic morality calls for as necessary to maintain a functional state and a healthy society. Governance, according to Wanyande, is explained as "the conscious management of public affairs through publicly promulgated rules and structures."[57] In a more detailed analysis, "Governance thus comprises complex mechanisms, processes, and institutions, through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate their differences, and exercise their legal and constitutional rights and obligations."[58] Opposite to good governance stands the notion of corruption, which characterizes all elements of undesirable governance that result from low ethics and morale. Corruption, as a wicked institution for the immoral among humans, is mentioned in the Qur'an several times. For instance, verse (2:188) states: "Do not eat up one another's property unjustly nor bribe with it the judges in order that you may knowingly and wrongfully deprive others of their possessions." Another nerve-chilling verse (30:41) fit to serve as a deterrent to the vice notes that "Corruption has appeared on land and in the sea for what men's hands have earned, that He may make them taste a part of that which they have done,

57 Peter Wanyande, State Driven Conflict in the Greater Horn of Africa. A Revised Paper Presented at the USAID Organized workshop on Conflict in the Great Horn of Africa. Methodist Guest House, Nairobi May 21-23, 1997.

58 United Nations Development Program 1997. *Governance for Sustainable Human Development.*

that they may return." Another Qur'anic verse admonishes that Muslims unambiguously restrain from corruption, saying: "Do not corrupt in the land, after it has been set right" (The Qur'an, 7:56). Certainly, all Somali regimes, whether ruled by the Islamists or non-Islamists, have topped the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International since 2008.[59] In particular, during president Hassan Sheikh's tenure, "Underlying corruption as a system of governance has not yet fundamentally changed and, in some cases, has arguably worsened. The monitoring group has consistently found patterns of misappropriation, with diversion rates of between 70 and 80%. The indications are that diverted funds are used for partisan agendas that constitute threats to peace and security."[60] This concludes the notion that Islamists in power have failed, so far, to demonstrate better governance and a moral-based state to differentiate themselves from the non-Islamists.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have provided new definitions of the terminologies used to designate the modern Islamic revival. I have also offered a general Islamic framework consisting of a belief system, spiritual training programs, and an ultimate moral objective. Moreover, through this chapter, I have provided a classification of human actions/utterances according to the Islamic Sharia. Furthermore, the paper locates state structure and functions in the domain of the permissible, while its constitutional principles should accord to Islamic legality and values. It traces the three conceptions of Islamists regarding the modern state: rejecters, collaborators, and reformers. Rejecters are mainly extremists and revolutionaries who claim to belong to the *Salafia* persuasion and Takfirists.[61]

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59 *Somalia Update, REPORT: President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's Government on Top of the World's Corruption Index*. Available from http://somaliupdate.com/articles/7582/REPORT-President-Hassan-Sheikh-Mohamuds-Government-on-Top-of-the-Worlds-Corruption-Index (accessed on 3 June, 2018)

60 *The Guardian*, UK-Somali links raise concern as UN alleges corruption and arms deals.

https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/nov/18/uk-somalia-corruption-arms-deals (accessed on June 2, 2018).

61 A third Salafia School claims to adopt Salafia in its theology and the Muslim Brotherhood's gradual reformation approach. These scholars include those

Collaborators include official state Islamic establishments, such as the Al-Azhar establishment, Islamic Councils, and some *Salafia* groups. Also, Sufi Orders are mostly in the category of collaborators. Reformers are those who have internalized the modern state system and have accepted its general framework, with some reservations. They advocate considering the cultural sensitivity of Muslims in the state's policies and laws and compliance with the Islamic principles and value system. Reformers are mainly Muslim Brotherhood persuasions. Having set a conceptual framework and Islamist's viewpoints, I have described political culture of the Somali political elites, both Islamists and non-Islamists, using it as a unit of analysis. The initial findings show that the rule of the Islamists was not different than non-Islamists in the governance parameters. Their governance practices are rooted in the elite political culture. Lastly, the Islamist slogan of the application of *Sharia* in the Somali government, so far, remains rhetoric, vague, and utterly misleading.

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who are currently imprisoned in Saudi Arabia, such as Sheikh Salman al-Auda, Sheikh Awad al-Qarni, and others accused of being reformers.

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CHAPTER 7

The Business-Government Partnership Way to Economic Development in Somalia

Yusuf A. Nur

Introduction

This study discusses the role of the private sector and Business-Government Partnerships (BGPs) in Somalia and how they can contribute to the economic development in the country. It reviews a brief historical background of the economic and political change in the Somali Republic and focuses on the role of public-private partnerships in infrastructure investment and economic development. Theoretical literature and empirical studies on public good provision and PPPs in Sub-Saharan African countries are reviewed. Statelessness in the Somali Republic has created an environment in which new business models could flourish with minimal government interference, and without competition from international firms. Statelessness did away with government institutions that had long hindered Somali entrepreneurship. The private sector in the Somali Republic adjusted to statelessness and created new operational models that can be tapped into in order to help the Somali Republic rebuild its state institutions and economic infrastructure. Utilizing the experience and operating models of private enterprises in a public-private partnership provides a way forward for the Somali economic and social development. A new perspective on the role for BGPs in a stateless environment is introduced. Not all state services or infrastructure can be provided by the private sector. Public goods have suffered in the anarchic environment that the civil war engendered in the Somali Republic. This chapter proposes that public infrastructure investment in the Somali Republic may build on the successful business models that the Somali economy developed in

recent years and argues that BGPs have a unique role to play in the reconstruction of the Somali infrastructure.

The Somali political and economic systems have been in flux for a long time. Since the collapse of Siad Barre's regime in 1991, one feeble and ineffectual transitional government has succeeded another in the Somali Republic. On September 10th, 2012, the Somali people finally put together a new parliament which chose a new president. The new dispensation also removed the "transitional" designation from the government, parliament, and other Federal Institutions, thus giving them more permanency, a crucial prerequisite for finding a lasting solution to the political chaos that had enveloped the country for more than a quarter of a century. The first Somali federal administration has completed its term. Unfortunately, tangible successes have been few and far apart from the promises made during the campaign, despite the implementation of certain projects. When the new regime took over the helm of the country in the 2016 presidential election, the country was still facing daunting challenges, most important of which was the task of economic development. Despite the anarchy and destruction that ensued soon after Siad Barre – the Somali military dictator who had ruled the country since 1969 –was ousted in a popular revolt in 1991, and despite the lawlessness and insecurity that became part of the landscape in the Somali Republic, businesses have boomed and many services that were hard to obtain during Barre's 21-year dictatorial near-monopoly of the public and private sectors, have become readily available to those who can afford them (Mayoux, 2001). The highly risky business environment has not deterred enterprising domestic and foreign firms from investing in the Somali Republic. The civil war transformed the Somalis from a people dependent on an all-encompassing and pervasive government to entrepreneurs imbued with ingenuity, initiative and acute business savoir-faire. If resourcefulness, opportunity recognition, exploitation, innovation, and creativity are counted among the essential characteristics of entrepreneurship (Rangan et al., 2007), Somali businesses of the civil war era have fully embodied them. In some respects, the absence of a central government has turned out to be a blessing in disguise (Leeson, 2007). It has removed all state imposed obstacles and hindrances, allowing the entrepreneurial spirit of the Somali people to flourish.

Kirchoff (1991) presents a lot of evidence on private sector entrepreneurship's significant contributions to growth and development. Somali entrepreneurial successes are not limited to the wholesale, retail, and import-export sectors traditional for the nation. Private clinics, hospitals, healthcare centers, and pharmacies have sprung up. Private schools at all levels have been established and staffed – some with foreign help, others with local initiatives and resources (Eno et al. 2014; Eno et al. 2015). There are several new universities/institutes in the capital city alone that started to offer degrees in Arabic, Islamic law, business administration, computer science, medicine and engineering (Little, 2003; Nur et al. 2013) as well as numerous tertiary institutions in the self-governing regional administrations (Eno et al. 2014; Eno et al. 2015). Granted, these educational institutions suffer from a dearth of qualified instructors and severe scarcity of other resources, but they provide strong evidence of the successful provision of some public goods with little involvement of the Somali government.

In contrast, the public sector has suffered tremendously since 1991. Leeson (2007) as well as Powell, Ford and Nowrasteh (2008) demonstrate that growth in the private sector has not translated into some major categories of public goods. No public building, utility or infrastructure has escaped the destruction of the civil war and the underinvestment that was the result of a long period of statelessness. In order to succeed, the government will have to replace the old mentalities in public sector management with new thinking that may take a page from the successes of the private sector in order to bridge the gap between statelessness and having a working government that provides public goods and services to its citizenship. In this study I argue that a business-government partnership between the government and the burgeoning entrepreneurial sector has the potential for improving the infrastructure investment and economic development in the Somali Republic.

The remainder of the chapter consists of four sections. It starts with reviewing the features of the entrepreneurial experiment of the stateless environment in the Somali Republic. This will be followed by a section reviewing evidence supporting business provision of public goods. Then a review of the literature on Business-Government Partnerships (BGPs) will be underscored. The chapter will conclude with an exposition of the benefits BGPs could have for sustainable economic development in the Somali Republic.

Entrepreneurship in a Stateless Environment

There is an abundance of literature on the crucial roles governments play in fostering entrepreneurship (see AAARI, 2005). In the entrepreneurship literature, however, the existence of governments is typically taken for granted. Comparatively, there is little discussion of entrepreneurship in an environment where no government or state institutions exist. That is why the Somali situation characterized by the absence of government institutions presents such an intriguing case (Little, 2003). Hisrich (2008) defines entrepreneurship as a process of creating something new of value, both for profit and non-profit, which requires the expenditure of the necessary time and effort while assuming the risks. This definition of entrepreneurship perfectly describes the entrepreneurial experiment that has been going on in the Somali Republic for the past thirty years or so. The necessities created by the absence of government have liberated the entrepreneurial talents of the Somali people.

The current entrepreneurial climate in the Somali Republic came into being after the collapse of Siad Barre's dictatorial regime that had stifled formation of meaningful entrepreneurship with cumbersome regulations and government fiat. The regime's collapse came in 1991 following a popular armed uprising of several years which in turn led to the destruction of state institutions during "the four-month war" when the two faction leaders whose forces deposed Siad Barre's regime, General Aidid and Ali Mahdi, could not agree to share power. This crisis culminated in a destructive civil war fought on the streets of Mogadishu. It is not by accident that the most devastated parts of the city were state buildings such as government offices, schools, tertiary institutions, and factories. Somalis had no state or state institutions of their own before the British, French, and Italian regimes gradually colonized all Somali territories in the 19th century. Perhaps because of the nomadic nature of most Somalis, neither colonial state institutions nor those created after the 1960 independence of the country were deep rooted in the psyche of the Somali people. In fact, in the Somali mind there is no distinction between state and government. To the average Somali, Siad Barre and his government *were* the state. Therefore, during the anarchy of the "four-month war" in Mogadishu, state buildings and properties were not only the primary targets thoroughly looted but in fact among the first casualties destroyed as well. The jagged remains of these

buildings today testify to the destructive anger against state institutions unleashed by the fall of the Siad Barre regime.

Since then there have been multiple attempts at reestablishing state institutions but with minimal success. The lack of strong state institutions, however, has not affected the Somali economy in its entirety. On the contrary, the private sector of the Somali economy has become more robust since 1991 (Leeson, 2007). Existing literature provides much empirical evidence that the private sector in the Somali Republic has helped the country improve its position/situation since the collapse of the state in 1991 with respect to a number of economic and social indicators (Powell et al, 2008; Webersik, 2006; Menkhaus, 2003). Mubarak (1997) shows that the Somali central government, similar to the Soviet system it had been emulating since the military coup of 1969, presided over a bloated centrally planned economic system which failed to provide many of the goods and services which the government monopolized. Throughout Siad Barre's 21-year dictatorship there had been extensive capital controls which led to the flourishing of black market, as the informal economy sprung up to provide the goods and services not available otherwise. As Leeson (2007) amply demonstrates, despite statelessness (or perhaps because of it), 13 out of 18 economic development indicators for the Somali Republic improved for 2000-2005 as compared to the same indicators for 1985-1990.

Under Barre's stifling conditions, one sees the reality that Somali entrepreneurship was born out of necessity. One of the early entrepreneurial business enterprises could be traced to the early 1980s before removal of the Siad Barre regime. Those enterprises were formed to facilitate remittances from the Somali diaspora to the families and relatives they had left behind. The benefactors were the labor seeking emigrants from the Somali Republic in Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich Gulf countries needing workers in response to the petro-dollar fueled economic boom. These enterprises called *hawala* (Arabic for exchange or transfer) became veritable financial institutions based not on government oversight and guarantees but on trust. Since then Somali *hawala* institutions have undergone tremendous growth. At present, they operate in modern offices in many of the major cities around the world. Any person who wishes to send money to the Somali Republic may walk into a *hawala* office

and, after paying the four to five percent service charge, can complete the remittance within minutes (Africa Research Bulletin, 2008).

It was not long before the entrepreneurial entities expanded into other areas of business. One example is in the telecommunications sector. There was need for Somali families to communicate with their members widely dispersed throughout the world. Thus, three private wireless telecom firms appeared and at present Mogadishu boasts of one of the cheapest wireless telecom services in the world (Davis, 2007; Feldman, 2007). Powell et al. (2008) discuss the dramatic improvement in the access to main phone lines since Somalia became stateless, moving from 29th to 8th among the African countries included in their survey. Their study points out that while in many African countries state monopolies and licensing restrictions may raise prices and hinder the growth in telecommunication services, in Somalia it takes just three days for a land-line to be installed, while prices for telecom services are generally low. Statelessness has played a major role in the telecom sector growth as the absence of regulation has led to intense competition in the Somali telecom market that resulted in good access to services (Powell et al., 2008).[1]

Entrepreneurial success in the Somali Republic is evident in the economic and political environment in other industries as well. The most successful enterprises are in fact benefiting from the highly volatile and insecure political situation. Since there are no government regulations, there are no licensing requirements; yet there are few restrictions on imports or exports. Accordingly, import and export businesses managed to develop despite the multi-year conflict-induced closure of the main sea port and airport of Mogadishu. Entrepreneurs prospected for and found a number of alternative shipping points along the Indian Ocean, the Somali Sea, and the Gulf of Aden.

While economic statistics are difficult to obtain for many aspects of the Somali economy (Leeson, 2008), multiple measures collected by the World Bank and the UNDP (2012) demonstrate improvement in the availability of goods and services provided by the private sector. Table 1 compares the figures for such goods and services provided by the private sector with the indicators of the public-sector performance in Somalia as well as the other IGAD nations.[2] Note that the indicators for privately furnished goods for the Somali Republic are comparable to or better than those for some of the IGAD nations, despite the fact that many of these countries have

enjoyed more political stability than the Somali Republic for the last three decades. In contrast, the Somali Republic fares worst in all indicators for publicly provided goods. The Human Development Index (HDI) for the Somali Republic remains the lowest among its neighbors.

The differences in the performance of the private and the public sectors are highlighted by a look at the change in the development indicators in the periods before the collapse of the Somali government in 1985-1990 and after statelessness in 2000-2005. In particular, Leeson (2007) notes large increases in the access to telephone lines and the internet as well as the number of radios, TVs, and mobile phones in use in Somalia.

Private Market Failures and the Role of Government in the Somali Republic

In spite of the significant successes of entrepreneurship and private markets in the stateless environment of the Somali Republic, economic theory predicts that private markets will fail to achieve efficiency or robust growth with respect to several areas of the provision of goods and services in an economy. One of the main requirements for a fully functioning market-based economic system, as economic theorists tell us, is the need for property rights to be protected. This ensures that the rewards earned by profit-seeking individuals that create successful businesses in a market system are protected, affirming the incentive for businesses to innovate and provide goods and services for their potential clients. The new entrepreneurs are enabled to reap the rewards of lax business regulations due to the existence of property rights that are protected through trust and social contracts inherent in the Somali social order. As these businesses continue to move farther and beyond their trusted circle of individuals, it will become very difficult to rely on social contracts alone to protect their business interests, thus creating a role for the Somali government to support the burgeoning business sector.

In economic theory, public goods have the property of being non-excludable. When the users of a good or service cannot be excluded from their consumption, the private organisations providing such goods or services will face a free-rider problem leading to a market failure. One solution to the free-rider problem is government provision of public goods. This option, however, has not been

available in the Somali Republic due to its enduring situation of either statelessness or ineffective government administrations.

Public goods in the Somali Republic have been underfunded in the stateless environment. Such public goods as roads, soil, irrigation water, drinking water, and sanitation have declined and will have to be the primary areas of concern for any Somali government. In fact, not only have these goods been grossly under-provided in the current economic environment, but their under-provision may considerably affect the growth of the private sector as households must spend a considerable amount of their time and resources on providing transportation, nutrition and health services. When a government ensures that these concerns are addressed, households can shift their resources into other productive activities that can create value in the economy.

Other sectors that are traditionally assisted by governments such as education and healthcare have had neither effective nor sufficient government support in Somalia for almost three decades beginning from 1991. Basic health care concerns such as control of malaria, TB, childhood diseases, childbirth, and nutrition (to mention a few) have not been addressed as evidenced by the statistics presented in the 2017 UNDP Human Development Report for the Somali Republic and discussed.

This report supports the need for a more pervasive government presence in the provision of the public goods mentioned above. Although the private sector of the Somali economy has improved since 1991, compared to many other African countries which have been stagnant or declining, the Somali Republic is still considered a low human development country.

One experience that the Somalis learned from their long and costly civil war is that they can accomplish a lot without a government. The entrepreneurial spirit of the Somalis has flourished not only in Somalia proper but also in the neighboring countries where there are large populations of Somali inhabitants. Statelessness has protected the private sector from stifling regulation but has also precluded the public sector from access to funding and development policy. Studies suggest that an acceleration of economic and human development may be achieved through small incremental policy changes, which in turn may lead to long-term institutional reforms (Glaeser et al, 2004; Hausmann et al, 2004). A major challenge for a forward-looking Somali government is how to strike a balance

between the two extremes: to avoid stifling the private sector, while simultaneously providing guidance in the development of the public sector. A policy that helps achieve a combination of both goals lies in the establishment of business-government partnerships (BGPs).

Business-government Partnerships (BGPs)

As the Somali government faces a variety of political and economic challenges, business-government partnerships or public-private partnerships provide an innovative way to bridge the gap between the present and future states of public good provision. In the early 1990s, entrepreneurial activities in the Somali Republic were still rudimentary. Sources of financing were mostly based on diaspora remittances and venture capital from overseas Somalis. There were no ties between the new entrepreneurial enterprises and the public sector. Eventually, private enterprises started delivering the essential services which were previously exclusively provided by the state. Until the collapse of Siad Barre's regime in 1991, both education and health care were exclusively under the management of the public sector. Within a few years after the collapse of the Barre regime, however, neighborhoods started organizing private primary schools, soon to be followed by secondary schools, then higher education institutions. Exact statistics are difficult to obtain, but in the Mogadishu environs, as well as in the newly-formed regional administrations, private institutions have emerged to cover a major part of the educational needs (Eno et al 2015; Eno et al. 2014; Nur et al. 2013; Cassanelli and Abdikadir, 2007).

There is extensive literature that explores Business-Government Partnerships (BGPs) in the global context. This literature shows that BGPs have been employed in the provision of such public goods as transportation, energy, water and sewage, telecommunications, health, and education. The literature also offers a number of BGP and/or PPP definitions. For instance, de Bettignies and Ross (2004) adopt the definition of the British Columbia (Canada) Ministry of Finance (2002) that BGPs are formal agreements between governments and businesses which obligates businesses to provide goods and services that are traditionally provided by governments." Akintoye (2009, 125) considers a BGP to be "a contractual agreement of shared ownership between a public agency and a private company, whereby, as partners, they pool resources together and share risks and rewards, to create

efficiency in the production and provision of public or private goods."

Besley and Ghatak (2001) note that BGPs run the gamut from the state contracting out the completion of projects while maintaining ownership, to complex arrangements and outright privatisation. The form any individual BGP takes depends on the compatibility of goals between the private and public participants, the coordination of decisions and the commitment of resources (Schaeffer and Loveridge, 2002). de Bettignies and Ross (2004) discuss the economics of BGPs, citing instances of BGPs used in Canada such as airports, schools, incineration facilities, water and wastewater treatment, medical facilities, recreation facilities, property management, and utilities. The authors point out, however, that independent evaluation of these BGPs' successes and failures are rare. In all the examples cited, the government limits itself to regulating the BGPs, leaving the financing and actual provision of services to the private partner.

Like PPP, the very terminology of "business-government partnership" suggests a collaboration between the public and private entities aimed at delivering increased efficiency (e.g. Pollock et al., 2001; Shaw, 2004), utilizing the private sector to absorb and manage project risks (Gaffney et al., 1999; Shaoul, 2003), and offer new forms of accountability (Mayo and Moore, 2001). Several conditions have been proposed for achieving success in BGPs, one of which is the establishment of horizontal relationships between the parties and utilizing consensual decision-making (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Kooiman, 2003; Wettenhall, 2004, 2005; Ali, 2017).

In discussing the role of BGPs in the optimal procurement of public services, Crocker and Masten (1996) as well as De Bettignies and Ross (2004) present a model of the three potential choices for providing public goods. One key determinant of the form of public good delivery is the presence of relationship-specific assets or specialized investments. Such investments typically have little use outside of the relationship between the parties and may not be easily converted to alternative uses. Examples of relationship-specific investments include infrastructure such as roads or bridges that cannot be relocated. Presence of relationship-specific assets leads to increased transaction costs as the compensation for such investments becomes difficult to determine in the absence of a true market price. In the case of a good or service that does not require any

relationship-specific assets, private enterprises may reap the gains of specialisation and reach higher levels of efficiency in providing the good or service in question. This is the reason why private enterprises may efficiently participate in delivering food for public programs such as food stamps using the spot market environment of grocery stores, but do not build specific infrastructure such as roads, bridges, or water mains without complex contracting. If a contract cannot be written, the government may have no other option but to deliver the good or service through vertical integration.

BGPs provide an efficient alternative to government provision of public goods as they allow the private organisations to reach gains of specialisation while at the same time avoid skimping on specialized investments when the parameters of the relationship are specified in a long-term contract. In the 1990s, BGPs became popular in the developed world, where the public sector was undergoing budget cuts in the face of government budget deficits. BGPs became a viable alternative to government issued bonds as a funding source for development projects. The existent literature points out that BGPs are not as prevalent in the developing world as they are in the developed world. This is an interesting finding since governments in the developing world do not have the monetary resources to fund the provision of public goods. According to Akintoye (2009), this lag in BGP adoption is due to the high transaction cost for BGPs arising from the lack of efficient and transparent policies, mechanisms, and institutions. However, the potential for BGPs in developing economies is great as their governments lack the resources to undertake the infrastructure projects necessary for development. BGPs provide a viable alternative in financing economic development.

Non-state providers of public goods in Somalia are as old the state itself, if not older. Historically the most important and popular non-state providers of services were the Qur'anic schools. These have been around since the advent of Islam in Somalia in the 7th century CE. As Great Britain, France, and Italy started colonizing the Horn of Africa in mid-19th century, missionaries followed them establishing church-run schools and clinics. However the non-state providers of services that have proliferated in Somalia after the advent of the civil war are quite different from those historical ones. Their numbers, the scope, scale and types of services they provide have tremendously expanded. This phenomenon is a worldwide trend

which, among its major causes, is attributed to market failure (Kushner and MacLean, 2015). In Somalia, this mainly came about because of the utter collapse of virtually all state institutions close to the beginning of the civil war.

In the current situation of the Somali Republic, the state has not been in a position to provide infrastructure or other public goods for close to three decades. Furthermore, the state has not been in a position to issue bonds or raise domestic funding for infrastructure development. This is in stark contrast to the private sector. Some private enterprises have even developed reputation in issuing highly profitable shares. Reputation and access to financing make such enterprises important potential partners for the state in any BGP undertaking.

The private sector also gained valuable popular goodwill during the 2012 severe drought that decimated Somalia. For the first time in the history of Somalia, the private sector rose to the occasion. Without waiting for government initiative or international aid to arrive, Somali businesses swiftly organized and coordinated relief efforts for the stricken regions of the country. This was the main reason why the Somali Republic recovered from the devastating effects much faster than any other time in the drought strewn history of the country.

The World Bank maintains a database of all public projects with private participation – The World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure Database. The database tracks four areas of investment: (1) Energy generation; (2) Telecommunications; (3) Transportation; and (4) Water, including sewage. Akintoye (2009) demonstrates that Sub-Saharan Africa is among the regions of the world where BGPs in the above four areas are least employed. Latin America and the Caribbean, and East Asia and Pacific lead the way as BGPs are more prevalent there than they are in Europe and Central Asia. Akintoye concludes that with the proper business regulatory environment, developing countries could take advantage of BGPs in reducing the risks and costs of infrastructure development and attracting infrastructure project investments that could provide efficient and high quality services.

There are a number of problems that are noteworthy with respect to BGPs. The first major problem that the literature cites is accountability. This is doubly so in Somalia since the state institutions are corrupt throughout. But since private enterprises have a better

reputation in this regard, it may be best if the state just got out of the way. The best that the Somali state can do is to assure transparency and public participation in how PPP contracts are awarded. The second problem arises when circumstances change, necessitating demand for renegotiation of the contract on the part of the private partner, which could prove costly for the public. Third, the state may not be in a position to provide the necessary supervision of the private partner, which could lead to declines in the quality of the services provided (De Bettignies & Ross, 2004). One possible remedy lies in the *ex-ante* establishment of a rigorous and comprehensive bidding process and contractual safeguards. Four, non-state provision of public goods may not bode well for state building. It exacerbates the already weak legitimacy of the state and weakens any loyalty that the citizen may have for it. There is evidence of this happening in other African countries (Bleck, 2013).There are also anecdotal indications that citizens are more likely to be critical of the state and thus may seek fundamental reforms. That kind of sentiment cannot be bad for the long-term viability of state institutions. Five, it will not be easy for the Somali state to develop its own capacities in funding and building infrastructure in the future. However, it is clear from the current situation of the Somali state that it will take decades before it is strong and stable enough to develop such capacities.

The advantages of BGPs to the Somali Republic should be weighed against the potential problems that may arise from their implementation. As pointed out by De Bettignies & Ross (2004), there are many advantages that could accrue to countries that implement BGPs as an integral part of their infrastructure development. Some of these advantages are quite relevant in the Somali situation. In particular, the private sector is more skilled in management than the public sector. Furthermore, a competitive bidding process could be used to help lower costs and improve potential outcomes. Private partners may be better suited to manage economic risks associated with infrastructure projects than the new Somali government. Finally, private partners can take advantage of economies of scale and complementarities if they provide similar services in multiple jurisdictions.

Conclusion

The Somali Republic faces a shortfall in infrastructure investment and the provision of public goods. A way to overcome this issue is to implement BGPs in the areas of the economy where the public sector or the private sector acting independently will come up short. In the case of many traditional public goods, such as infrastructure, education, and health, the new Somali government does not yet have the full trust of the Somali people or the financial wherewithal to invest the appropriate amount of money into development. Private enterprise comes up short in providing these goods due to the risks inherent in markets with non-excludable goods and services. This creates a middle-ground for the public and the private sectors to amalgamate their efforts to work together.

The private sector in the Somali Republic has developed quickly and has become efficient in providing such services as money transfers and banking, telecommunications, as well as certain public services such as education, distribution of electricity, and health care. One of the most important developments of the private sector is the crafting of locally effective business models, financing, transfer of knowledge, skills, and technology, as well as the recruitment and training of human resources. Such models and skills may contribute to development projects in a BGP setting.

Whereas the private sector has made major strides for the last decades, the public sector has lagged behind. If BGPs are structured to be managed with vision and innovative environment similar to the indigenous Somali private enterprises, they will achieve efficiencies not available in the Somali public sector before the civil war. An important factor in support of the BGPs is the problem with the corruption endemic in the public sector management in the Somali Republic. BGPs may provide a disincentive for graft, nepotism and embezzlement that have traditionally plagued the public sector in the Somali Republic.

The economic and political situation in the Somali Republic faced by the government is quite daunting but at the same time it furnishes opportunities to try out new models of economic development. As prior state institutions have been laid to waste, any visionary government has an opportunity to start not necessarily from scratch but from experiences gained and successes realized by indigenous Somali private enterprises – considering that. BGPs allow for

bottom-up economic development, a strategy which resonates well with Somalia's current business atmosphere. Here, considerations should be based on the fact that Somalis have attained many entrepreneurial successes in the past few decades. The Somali experiment, and/or experience, has been one of entrepreneurship government oversight or regulation. However, facing the challenge of stagnant human development requires growth in public goods and infrastructure investment which BGPs have the potential to provide a viable way forward in the economic development of the Somali Republic.

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CHAPTER 8

Turkey's Military Presence in Somalia: Doing What, Why, and for Whom?

Ibrahim Karatas

Introduction

Turkey's military assistance to Somalia and establishing a base there led to debates about Turkey's real intention in that country. Blamed for global hegemonic ambitions, Turkey is claimed to extend its influence to Somalia via its army to realize its self-interested goals. This study argues that the Turkish army helps the Somali army to restore order and fight terrorism rather than exploiting Somalia's natural resources. In addition, it asserts that Turkey's humanitarian policies for Somalia come before its strategic goals as the cost of supporting Somalia is higher than revenues earned from the poor African country. While Turkey prioritizes solving Somalia's deep problems to its own ends, it also uses Somalia to enter the African market, control important waterways, and boost its international image via its soft power. To this end and to support Somalia, Turkey wields its army to actualize its goals. Methodologically, concerning reports, articles, books, statements of Turkish and Somali politicians, and the Turkish army's printed and internet sources were reviewed. Since the main subject is security in this chapter, it is expected to contribute to the literature of military, international, and inter-state security.

This chapter first presents a theoretical argument that Turkey as regional power combined soft and hard power in engaging, for instance, post-conflict nation as Somalia, to consolidate its state and society. In this regard Turkey provides humanitarian as well as security and diplomatic assistance. The aim could be to contribute to

the development of regional stability as well as global stability in which the Horn of Africa is an integrate part – with threats of piracy and extremism. Second, the chapter discusses the empirical evidence supporting this theoretical argument since Turkey started fully reengaging in Somalia. Third, the chapter focuses on the literature related to the ambivalence of the combination of humanitarian and security engagements, and discusses briefly how much the Turkish case can shed light on the attempts of overcoming/solving the dilemma. Finally, this chapter theorizes state-society development in Somalia, not as merely internal linear processes but much more complicated external humanitarian and security engagements in which old and merging powers contribute and occasionally compete. In addition, this chapter argues that the Turkish engagement reflects not just security and hard power concerns, but also a soft power approach including humanitarian efforts starting, as one might suggest, prior to the security engagement. In this regard Turkey responds to not just its strategic state needs, but also the needs of the reconstitution and development of the Somali state, a state that continues to require both humanitarian as well as economic and security assistance. More importantly, Turkey filled a gap left by the west which often channels its aid and security engagement to Somalia through third or fourth party channels. Turkey's engagement seems directed to the Somali people, explaining why the Turkish involvement seems popular among the Somali public

Although the west (the US and Europe combined) provide more aid and financial resources, this aid often fails to reach ordinary Somalis and often end up with agencies and NGOs in for instance Nairobi, the capital of Kenya, as well as other local organisation stationed in Somalia but affiliated to the Western NGOs as 'local partners' and therefore implementers of projects.

Somalia has been suffering from both political instability and poverty stemming from a combination of factors including poor governance, corruption, clanism/nepotism, drought and famine since its independence. Excluding its colonial past, the sixty-year old country could not restore order due to internal contention for power and external intervention. Simultaneously, while opposing groups were fighting with each other, additionally, Somalis had to tackle the poverty problem, a reason that led to the death of hundreds of thousands of people. Somalia's problems boomed when dictator Siad Barre lost power in 1991 and civil war erupted right after his

overthrow. The absence of a government culminated in the emergence of new actors including independently acting autonomous regions and terrorist groups, e.g. al-Shabaab. International actors tried (and continue trying) hard to restore the order but the central government has not yet taken control of the whole country. As of 2017, Somalia's government was controlling 58 out of 92 districts and there is no change in 2020 (Asiedu 2017). Besides, the Somaliland region declared its independence though no country recognizes it. In addition, the government has limited authority in some regions like Puntland, Jubaland, South West State, Hirshabelle, and Galmudug (Bayram 2020). It is indeed not possible to ensure authority in such circumstances. What is more, even of the federal government and bureaucracy is shared according to an infamous clan-based formula known as 4.5, and security forces include various militant groups whose loyalty cannot be guaranteed. Lack of authority also facilitated foreign intervention. While there are well-intentioned supports from foreign countries and international organisations, there are those countries in Somalia for their self-interests as well. Although all countries interfering with Somalia's domestic conflict argue that they intervene for the goodness of the Somali people, their support of various factions clashing with each other cause doubts about their plans.

This chapter analyzes Turkey's military and partly non-military support to the Somalian government since 2011 when the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan paid a visit to Mogadishu and launched a humanitarian campaign, collecting more than $200 million aid as a donation to Somalia. Turkey has given its helping hand to Somalia in many aspects such as building hospitals, schools, and roads, educating Somalian students in Turkey, and sending cash and goods to Somalia. In addition, the Turkish government helps state-building through training the Somalian army and police both on-site and in Turkey. However, Turkey's inclusion of its military to its efforts for state-building has not been welcomed by the al-Shabaab Islamist group and governments of certain countries. Particularly, the Turkish military base established in Somalia in 2017 led to criticisms evolving around Turkey's hidden agenda of maximizing its interests via its military power. However, when examined in detail, it can be seen that the Turkish military presence in Somalia is in favor of the home country rather than Turkey. The military base was not established for combating purposes but to train Somalian security

forces, whom the Somalian government relies on for the unity of the country and for its defense. In fact, this indirect help makes Turkey the target of al-Shabaab and its supporters but Turkey goes on to do what it deems correct. Normally, it is not reasonable for a state to help another state if this help hurts the supporter. Yet, Turkey does not step back despite incurring damages. In association with this fact, from a materialistic view, Turkey's losses are more than its gains, thus blaming Turkey for imperialistic goals is preposterous.

Overall, this study tries to find an answer to the question of why Turkey gives military assistance to Somalia and what it expects from it. In association with this question, it argues that Turkey prioritizes Somalia's security and state-building to its own ends, and the Turkish military presence is one among many other tools of Turkey to help Somalia. It is correct that Turkey pursues its interests abroad like other countries. Yet, in Somalia's case, its policies are more humanitarian, religious and historical than interest-based, due to the fact that the Erdogan-led ruling party (Ak Party) gave up Turkey's Westernist and pro-status quo foreign policy and began to embrace old friends of Turkey through its soft power (Siradag 2016b; Kaya and Warner, 2012). Since soft power has its limits, hard (military) power fills the gap. That is why the Turkish army gets involved in Somalia's state-building. In addition, a second question is whether Turkey's involvement could contribute to the development of regional stability as well as global stability in which the Horn of Africa is an integral part with threats of piracy and extremism. The study contends that Turkey's efforts may not culminate in a permanent peace but it will move the intra-state and regional peace one step ahead. Theoretically, the study analyzes humanitarianism vs. security dilemma by examining Turkey's military and humanitarian assistance to Somalia. In the same vein, it also discusses the correlation between hard power and soft power over Turkey-Somalia relations.

Methodology

Methodologically, both quantitative and qualitative research methods were used. Academic articles, books, institutional reports and news stories written in Turkish as well as English were reviewed. Particularly, reports prepared by Turkish NGOs and Turkish army were analyzed in order to obtain correct and first-hand information. Some interviews with a few Somalian citizens and Turkish army

officers were also made for the confirmation of some information about Somalia. Names of interviewees are not disclosed since they wanted to remain anonymous. Necessary sources were approached and data from them were utilized for the security problem of Somalia and Turkey's military involvement in that country while all other subjects were kept out of the scope. In addition, in order not to analyze the subject only from the Turkish perspective, the studies of those scholars and analysts criticizing Turkey's posture in Somalia were examined and cited. Meanwhile, internal contentions in Somalia were skipped and only inter-state relations and their regional and international impact was located at the center of the discussion. Organisationally, the study will continue with the first section focusing on the concepts of humanitarianism and security. It then analyzes the ongoing security problem of Somalia in the second section, followed by Turkey's non-military support to the Somalian state in the third section. The fourth section focuses on the role of the Turkish army in the state-building of Somalia. The final section questions why Turkey gets involved in Somalia.

Humanitarianism and Security

The state-society relations in failed and fragile states have a humanitarian aspect as the lack of authority causes anarchical circumstances where people's lives are threatened. In such states, while the state tries to preserve its sovereignty through security measures, citizens mostly incur the oppression of the state or non-state organisations like terrorist organisations. Thus, a problem of humanitarianism emerges. The concept of humanitarianism refers to the alleviation of human suffering, human life and human dignity (King and Murray, 2001). On the other hand, security has different forms such as societal security, food security, cyber security and state security. According to Okeke (2009), the first humanitarian actions started with the establishment of the Red Cross, which provided the care to injured people in 1863. Yet, all actions had a poor legal base. However, when massacres, terrorist attacks and civil wars led to humanitarian catastrophes from 1990s onwards, humanitarianism was securitized and became a sector in security (Watson, 2011). By this way, intervening in a failed state has been legitimized. With the endorsement of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) by the UN in 2005, humanitarian intervention has become a legal action provided that the UN Security Council authorizes to employ it. In this case, the

intervention of a state where human life is in danger has been legitimized. The nature of humanitarian intervention is that while troops fight against an army or a group, they also either deliver humanitarian aid or provide protection to humanitarian NGOs.

Regarding Somalia, the line between security and humanitarianism is quite blurred in this country. When the civil war erupted in 1991, the UN-led coalition intervened in the country to restore order via peace-keeping forces. The duty of the mission was not only to build the state but also to distribute aid to the Somalian people. Yet, whether humanitarian aid was a tool for security or vice versa is still a matter of debate even today. One thing is clear that both humanitarianism and security efforts failed in 1990s. The process was resumed when Sharia courts were dissolved via foreign intervention in 2006 but the nature of the new intervention was more military than humanitarian. As of 2020, security and humanitarian efforts are maintained by the AMISOM, a mission co-formed by the UN and the African Union, and funded by the EU, the US and some other actors. International community struggles for aiding over 5.2 million people in Somalia amidst the ongoing internal conflict as of 2020 (OCHA, 2020). Among foreign donors, Turkey has a unique place in regard to security and humanitarianism dilemma. While Turkey's contribution to Somalia was mainly militaristic until 2011, the nature of assistance gained a humanitarian character from that time onwards. In addition, while Turkey was an ordinary foreign contributor among others, it became one of the main foreign actors with its soft power, which is supported by its military presence in Somalia. There are accusations about the intentions of foreign states getting involved in Somalia's state-building, including Turkey which increases its military presence there. As will be discussed below, Turkey's military assistance should be attributed to its desire to help a former region of the Ottoman Empire rather than Turkish state's strategic goals. In other words, this study argues that Turkey does not securitize humanitarianism for its ends but for the goodness of the Somalian state and people.

Somalia's Never-Ending Security Problem

Somalia gained its independence in the 1960s and began to be ruled by Mohamed Siad Barre after President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke was shot dead in 1969. However, Barre was toppled down by a coalition of clans in 1991, and a civil war, which continues, erupted in

the country. Seeing that there is no authority in the country, Somaliland, the former British colony in northern Somalia, declared its independence. While Somaliland remained secure, the other parts of the country turned into a battlefield. The United Nations introduced UNOSOM I (1992), UNITAF (1992), and UNOSOM II (1993) missions to restore order and distribute humanitarian relief but all attempts failed. Even American forces had to withdraw from Somalia due to fierce clashes in the 1990s. Thus, Somalia became a failed state. When a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed in Somalia in 2004, a group of sharia courts united under the name of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) to form an alternative government to rule Somalia, most parts of which they were already controlling. ICU was destroyed through Ethiopian intervention in 2006 but it gave birth to al-Shabaab (*Ḥarakat ash-Shabab al-Mujahidin [Youth Movement*]). Al-Shabaab controlled the majority of Somalia until it was ousted from Mogadishu in 2011. However, the terrorist organisation is still influential in the country and poses the biggest threat to the order and authority of the Somalian government.

It is estimated that al-Shabaab has 5000-6000 militants (Şahin, 2019). Since they are based in mainly rural areas and live among people like civilians, it is very difficult to stop their terrorist attacks. The group is a radical, jihadist, and Wahhabi organisation and allegedly aims to establish a caliphate in Somalia (Yalçın 2016). Yet, it is known that they also got military training from Shiite Hezbollah of Lebanon in 2006. Another one of Al-Shabaab's goal is to oust foreigners from Somalia, whom the group assumes as enemies of Somalian nation and people. But its attacks are not limited to Somalia. According to the Kenyan government, the majority of terrorist attacks happening in Kenya in recent years were conducted by al-Shabaab. Meanwhile, al-Shabaab also declared its allegiance to Al-Qaida in 2012. In addition, the organisation does not discriminate between security forces and civilians. It attacks anyone it deems an enemy. M. S., a Somalian human rights activist, says that the group is supported by Saudi Arabia in line with Saudis' plans of spreading Wahhabism in the Horn of Africa. In addition, there is an allegation that the UAE is also supporting al-Shabaab to gain influence in Somalia as the central government remained neutral during the Qatari blockade. Turkish Foreign Minister, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu also accused the UAE of supporting the group. Rumors might be correct because the Somalian government complains about the UAE's illegal

activities, too. For example, Somalian authorities seized $9.6 million of the UAE, illegally infiltrated into Somalia to be given to anti-governmental groups in 2018 (Orakçı, 2018). What is clear about the UAE's position is that it acts unilaterally in Somalia. For instance, they have military bases in the country without an official agreement and until recently paid salaries of more than 2000 troops it selectively chose. Moreover, the UAE hired Berbera port of Somaliland for 30 years without informing the federal government (Ibid). Somalian government accuses the UAE of violating Somalia's sovereignty with such policies.

While al-Shabaab and its financiers are destabilizing Somalia, international actors try to help the federal government to maintain sovereignty and security of the country. Şahin (2019) reports that the UN and its institutions are actively operating in Somalia. There are 50 UN staff and a Pakistani battalion helping them under the mission of UNOSOM (United Nations Operation in Somalia). In addition, the EU has EUTM-S (European Union Training Mission in Somalia). With trainers from nine EU members, EUTM-S has trained more than 500 soldiers. US AFROCOM Command has also a cell in Camp Lemonnier base, which they hired for $630 million for 10 years. There are jets, cargo planes, drones, and 4000 soldiers, 500 of who are deployed permanently in the base. US Army has conducted airstrikes against al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda by drones and killed some of their leaders including Ahmed Abdi Godane (CRS 2019). Besides the US, the United Kingdom is present in Somalia with military trainers. Şahin (2019), an officer from the Turkish army, informs that the British have trained 647 Somalian military personnel as of 2019. As stated above, the UAE also helps the Somalian army by putting some troops on its payroll. Except for the US Army and AMISOM, all other actors support the Somalian army in the context of training and funding. Regarding Turkey, although Turkey's intensive engagement with Somalia started with Erdogan's visit in 2011, the Turkish army's first mission for the East African country goes back to 1993. Turkish army joined UNOSOM II with a battalion and undertook duties such as distributing aid, health care, and construction (Bingöl 2013). The second engagement was to protect transatlantic ships from Somalian pirates via warships together with other joint forces formed by other countries in 2009 (Euronews, 2020). Turkish navy still supports anti-piracy operations.

There is a fact that often external actors supported diverse warlords in undermining the potential reconstitution of the Somali state through the national army. Instead of gathering trained military officers, they invited to diverse conferences they held nomadic clan leaders and their civilian spokespersons that had no clear intentions of reconstituting a functioning state. Some scholars suggest it was because both Ethiopia and Kenya did not want strong Somali state to reemerge for reasons based on the interests on their respective nations.

Academic sources argue that there has been no Somalian army since 1991 as it was dissolved when the civil war began. However, a Somalian politician says that there has always been an army but external actors often supported diverse warlords in undermining the potential reconstitution of the Somali state through the national army. Farah (2009) supports the notion that Ethiopia and Kenya were opposed to the idea and efforts of a Somalian state to reemerge. On the other hand, when international actors decided to build the Somalian state in the early 2000s, they initiated the reformation of the army simultaneously. However, the Somalian army is still weak; a reason why the government should keep relying on AMISOM. There is no compulsory military service for Somalian citizens. Şahin (2019) says that the Somalian National Army has approximately 22.000 soldiers. Yet, only a small number of them are well-trained. Salaries are paid by donor countries but a soldier is paid only if he/she is on duty. Almost the whole army consists of land forces. While the number of navy personnel is 350, the air force has only 140 staff. Navy has only eight unarmed boats. On the other hand, there are no flying vehicles, whether armed, unarmed, trainer, cargo, drone, or so on. What is worse is that except for the building of the chief of staff, neither land nor navy or air force has a building. Meanwhile, Puntland, Somaliland, and Jubaland have their military forces, which are independent of Somalian Armed Forces. Moreover, there is an arms embargo on Somalia exerted by the UN. As Somalian Foreign Minister Isa Awad states, the embargo leaves the Somalian army against al-Shabaab defenseless (Sabah, 2019). Besides being weak and in the payroll of different countries, which threatens the unity of the army, Felbab-Brown (2020) notices another danger. She argues that while state-aligned militias help to offset the national army's weakness, they are also the source of insecurity, abusive rule, and violent contestation. Therefore, it is not out of the question that pro-

government militant groups may turn their rifles to the government as well. Overall, political and popular disunity, an in-the-making fragile state, and a quite weak army with no equipment have become characteristics of Somalia. Turkey tries to give its helping hand to such a far and poor country from 4000 miles away. Before discussing Turkey's military efforts for state-building, it is worth mentioning what else it has done since 2011.

Whether it is AMISOM or other external actors in the Somali security scene, these should relate to the main research question; the presumed ambivalence of humanitarianism and securitisation, which Turkey according to the main argument and thesis of this paper, have so far managed responsibly, without major frictions, as the case was originally for western actors that could not combine humanitarian efforts with security engagement without losing the hearts and minds of the Somali people

Theoretical thesis: Turkey seems so far balancing humanism with security, in probably much more pioneering ways earlier unseen in international relations or particularly in relation to the volatile region of the Horn of Africa

Since Somalian government and army are weak, Somalia's security is ensured by AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia), a peacekeeping mission created by the African Union (AU) with the approval of the UN in 2007. AMISOM has approximately 20.000 troops from armies of Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. It is obliged to uphold order in Somalia, support the federal government, train the Somalian army and police, and ensure the security of Somalia. Its mandate is renewed every six months. AMISOM's military equipment and fiscal needs are provided by the UN, the US, the EU, and the AU jointly. Normally, its duty was expected to end in 2020 but the mission continues. Yet, there is an apparent gradual reduction in the number of troops. AMISOM directly confronts with al-Shabaab and achieved to push the terrorist organisation from Mogadishu in 2011. Thanks to AMISOM's efforts, the Somalian government could gain control in more than half of Somalian territories. If Somalia is no longer called a failed state but a fragile state, certainly AMISOM has a great role in this progress (T24, 2018). However, AMISOM's deployment and operations should not be expected to bring permanent peace to Somalia due to some controversies with the mission. First of all, the majority of military personnel of AMISOM are Christian, which gives [ideological and

cultural] legitimacy to al-Shabaab among Somalian people (Hacaloğlu, 2017). The terrorist organisation subtly wields this aspect to get people's support. In addition, whether Christian soldiers act with faith-based feelings is not clear but Somalian people would prefer Muslim peace-keeping forces. Further to their Christianity, these soldiers come from Ethiopia and Kenya, which Somalian people disfavor due to past clashes and prolonged animosity. Second, there is a weak command chain among AMISOM contingents belonging to different countries. They also have different visions, policies, and priorities while operating in Somalia. Third, some soldiers allegedly misbehave to Somalian people, including raping women (Stratejik Ortak, 2018). Fourth, there is no air combat capability of AMISOM except for US support on request. Given that airstrikes are decisive in today's wars, lack of jets and drones will result in a limited success against al-Shabaab. Finally, since AMISOM troops are not well-trained and ill-equipped, it can hardly be called a professional mission. Thus, their presence may be prolonged, but their contributions may never reach the desired level.

Despite the above controversies, AMISOM has generally been beneficial in terms of humanitarianism and security. Meanwhile, Turkey collaborates with AMISOM, too. As will be explained in detail below, when AMISOM leaves, Somalia might be re-controlled by al-Shabaab. Thus, Turkey gives military assistance to Somalia to fill AMISOM's absence with Somalian army. By this way, humanitarian activities and security will be realized not by foreign powers but by Somalians with the help of the Turkish army. More clearly, Somalia's security will be nationalized by a foreign power through military training rather than military intervention.

Turkey's Non-Military Support to Somalia

Turkish foreign policy has changed since Recep Tayyip Erdogan came to power in 2002. Previously, Turkish governments avoided getting involved in regional and international conflicts as Turkey's founding fathers led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk introduced two features to foreign policy. One is Westernisation, which is to turn away from the East (particularly from the Middle East and the Muslim World) to the West. The second one is preserving the 'status quo', meaning that Turkey should deal with its domestic problems and not intervene in others' conflicts, including Turkic communities and states. Erdogan and his aides renounced traditional foreign

policy, which they saw as passive, one-dimensioned, and Western-oriented (Sıradağ, 2016a). The new foreign policy was based on history and geography, which aimed to re-access former colonies of the Ottoman Empire. A second driving force is the religiosity of Erdogan and his electorate. Since they did not want to remain silent to the problems of other Muslim and non-Muslim communities, they began to use Turkey's soft power through humanitarian aid and providing development funds to poor countries. As part of this strategy, besides other closer regions, Turkish state-owned and civil NGOs started to deliver aid to African countries, too. Needless to say, Somalia was an important destination in Turkey's 'Opening to Africa' project (Buyruk, 2019).

Diplomatic relations between Turkey and Somalia started when the latter opened its embassy in Ankara in 1976. While Turkey's embassy in Mogadishu was opened in 1979, it had to be closed in 1991 due to the civil war among Somalian factions. When Somalia encountered a deadly famine and drought in 2011, the Turkish government stepped up under the leadership of Erdogan. The then Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan paid a visit to Mogadishu and launched an aid campaign for Somalia in Turkey. The total amount collected was announced by Erdogan as $201 million but it rose to $370 million in 2016, $130 million of which belonged to NGOs (Göksedef 2016). Erdogan also added that Turkey would send $2 million to the Somalian government every month. Being a part of the Ottoman Empire until the early 20th century, Somalia was well embraced by Turkish NGOs. As of 2020, there are tens of NGOs having offices in Mogadishu. They distribute basic needs, operate schools and hospitals, give scholarships to students, build roads and buildings, and conduct cultural activities. Particularly, TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency) undertook lots of projects necessitating higher budgets. Regarding the amount Turkey spent for humanitarian purposes, the Turkish government (and population) began with $201 million in 2011 but the flow of aid and funding development projects continued in the following years. Hürriyet (2019) newspaper reports that Turkish NGOs spent more than $500 million in Somalia as of 2019. In total, Turkey's humanitarian and developmental aid to Somalia exceeded $1 billion until 2020 (Aydın, 2020).

Concerning the nature of aid, some projects are worth mentioning. For example, the Turkish state opened the biggest

hospital with 200 beds in 2015. Named as Recep Tayyip Erdogan hospital, the big health center is operated by the Turkish Health Ministry. There are also NGO-built and operated hospitals such as *Şifa* (by Doctors Worldwide Association) and *Somali* (by Yardimeli Association) hospitals. In addition, TIKA works like the infrastructure ministry of Somalia as it constructs governmental buildings, roads, parks, sewage networks, etc. The state-owned TIKA is undisputedly the biggest investor among Turkish NGOs. Another state-sponsored NGO called *Türkiye Maarif Vakfı* (Turkish Education Foundation) runs seven schools, including one in Somaliland, and three dormitories in Somalia (TRT Haber, 2019). In addition, Turkey's *Yunus Emre Institute*, equivalent to the British Council, has taught the Turkish language to more than 4000 Somalian students. On the other hand, without exception, Turkey's biggest civilian NGOs help Somalia by operating orphan centers, schools, and hospitals, distributing aid, or opening schools of a profession like the agricultural school of IHH, the biggest Turkish NGO. Moreover, more than 2000 Somalian students have graduated from Turkish universities, thanks to scholarships given by the Turkish government. Unlike other countries, both the Turkish government and NGOs distribute aid and conduct developmental projects without using any mediators. They do it via their Turkish staff or hired Somalian staff. In this way, corruption and unjust distribution of aid are prevented. In addition, by looking at Turkey's humanitarian efforts, it can be concluded that Turkey began helping Somalia with the purpose of human-building before state-building.

Turkey is in Somalia also for economic reasons, which Turkish officials call a win-win situation (Kaya and Warner, 2012). The first attempt was to connect Somalia to the world via Turkish Airlines in 2012. The Turkish flag carrier became the first international airline flying to Somalia since the eruption of the civil war. In fact, Mogadishu is a risky and non-profitable destination but the Turkish government convinced Turkish Airlines to include Mogadishu as one of its destinations as a part of its policy for supporting the isolated country. In addition, Mogadishu International Airport and Mogadishu Port are operated by Turkish companies. The sum of Turkish companies' investment exceeds $100 million. Regarding the trade between the two countries, while the volume was $200.000 in 2002, it reached $200 million in 2018. When investment and humanitarian aid are compared, it can be seen that the latter is ten

folds higher than the former in terms of volume. Therefore, it is somehow exaggerated to claim that Turkey uses its soft power for economic gains. Meanwhile, the Somalian government invited Turkey to explore oil in its territories in January 2020. Experts say that the African country may have up to 2.7 billion barrels in its waters (Moubayed, 2020). Somalia opened up 15 blocks, approximately 100.000 square kilometers, for oil companies (Shay, 2020). The call for exploration is not exclusive to Turkey but some analysts view it as an imperialistic move by the Turkish government (see detailed discussion in the next section).

Turkey's Military Support to Somalia

Turkey pursues an active foreign policy by utilizing both soft power and hard power. While foreign policy during the early years of the Erdogan era was aiming to develop good relations with regional countries and increase its influence via mediation diplomacy, it gave up neutrality and supported popular uprisings against authoritarian regimes of the Middle East during the Arab Spring. In the same vein, when it felt the threat of terrorist organisations on its Syrian border, its army crossed borders to fight terrorism. Further to struggling with direct threats to its security, the Turkish government began to deploy troops in territories of friendly countries. Excluding troops for peace-keeping missions, Turkey's army is present in Northern Cyprus, Syria, Libya, Qatar, Iraq, Azerbaijan and Albania. Among these seven countries, the 'enemy' poses a direct threat to Turkey only in Northern Cyprus, Syria, and Iraq (all neighbors of Turkey). Other countries host Turkish troops for Turkey's strategic interests. Meanwhile, to strengthen its army with advanced military equipment, the Turkish defense industry has been striving for producing indigenous weapons, achieving to manufacture more than 70% of them in Turkey. For example, Turkey is one of the best manufacturers of drones and has a fleet of 140 armed and non-armed UAVs. Besides, Turkish manufacturers have a good market in armed vehicles. Finally, Turkish defense companies are trying to produce an indigenous tank and jet, whose production processes have already reached advanced stage as of 2020. Turkish companies now struggle to expand their export markets.

Turkey's current military relations with Somalia go back to the year 2010. Before political relations were resumed in 2011, a military agreement between Somalia and Turkey was signed in 2010, followed

by other agreements signed in 2012, 2014, and 2015. Training Somalian soldiers in Turkey and allowing Turkey to have a base in Somalia were the basic goals of the agreements. From 2012 onwards, the Turkish government brought Somalian soldiers and policemen to Turkey to train them. With a budget of 20 million TRY, hundreds of soldiers from naval, air, and land armies of Somalia were trained between 2012 and 2017. They were also dressed and equipped with light weapons, e.g. rifles. Training in Turkey continues but the most conspicuous move was the establishment of a military base by the Turkish army in Somalia in 2017.

Turkish military base in Somalia, namely TURKSOM, was opened after two years of construction on September 30, 2017. Turkey spent $50 million for the base that spreads over 400 square kilometers. The aim is to train 10.500 Somalian soldiers at the first stage by more than 200 Turkish military experts (Sözcü 2016). Being Turkey's biggest military base in a foreign country, more than 200 Somalian lieutenants and junior officers have graduated from TURKSOM as of 2020. In addition, 40 new officers and 487 privates started military training in February 2020 (Turkish Land Forces, 2020). The Turkish base trains officers for four semesters and privates for 12 weeks. It can train three battalions at the same time. Besides training, trainees are given military equipment, too. If searched on the internet, it can be seen that Somalian soldiers use the same uniforms and rifles as Turkish soldiers. The quality of training is aimed to be raised to the Turkish army's level. According to Şahin (2019), TURKSOM has three goals for Turkey. The short-term goal is to convince local people that the Turkish army is a friend of theirs, and it just aims to help them. The mid-term goal is to assist the local army to ensure the security of Somalia. Finally, the long-term goal is to construct strong ties with the Somalian population and obtain mutual economic and political gains. Regarding TURKSOM's *raison d'être* for Somalia, both Somalian and Turkish officials underline that the Turkish base is training Somalian soldiers, who would replace AMISOM troops in 2020. Currently, the local army is not strong and well equipped enough to defeat al-Shabaab. In case AMISOM withdraws from Somalia, al-Shabaab might probably seize Mogadishu again. Therefore, an army with combat capabilities is a *sine qua non* for Somalia, particularly considering the volatile internal situation.

Somalian politicians and diaspora also emphasize how necessary and beneficial the base is. For example, Somalian Deputy Prime

Minister Mahdi Mohamed Guled said in an interview that Somalian forces are performing better than ever – thanks to TURKSOM. He stated that the number of terrorist attacks dropped in Mogadishu, a fact attributed to the benefits of the training given by Turkish military trainers (Akşam, 2018). In addition, Jama Abdullahi Mohamed, Somalia's ambassador to Ankara, expresses that Turkey-Somalia relations are similar to Turkey-TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus), meaning that the two states are brothers (Bayram, 2020). On the other hand, Shajkovciet al (2020) asked the opinion of Somalian diaspora in the US about the Turkish base. A person from Minnesota argues that while other countries are in Somalia to harm, Turkey's base is there to help and make Somalia safer. Another Somalian diaspora from San Diego says unlike AMISOM troops who are in there to get paychecks, Turkish training and military support are for the self-sufficiency of Somalia. A Somalian from Minnesota adds that those soldiers trained by the Turkish army have better discipline, quality, equipment, and technical know-how. However, Somalian diaspora thinks that Turkey should also invest in an ideological fight against al-Shabaab. Yet, more involvement of the Turkish government in Somalia's domestic affairs will certainly have negative repercussions on the government since the Turkish opposition and partly because the electorate of Erdogan's party are against foreign involvement.

However, while the legitimate government is happy with the Turkish base, al-Shabaab has targeted Turkish officials, citizens, and companies many times since 2011. Before Turkey's involvement, the designated terrorist organisation was targeting AMISOM, the US army, or other foreign forces. Thinking that Turkey's military and equipment will empower the Somalian army, al-Shabaab directed attacks to Turkish officials, aid workers, engineers, and civilians. Somalians state that Turkey assumed the moral lead in fighting against terrorism as it is a Muslim country (Shajkovci et al 2020). Thus, al-Shabaab is not happy with Turkey's support as it leads to losing popular support. Yet, the militant group tries hard to show that Turkey is actually an enemy. For example, a spokesman of al-Shabaab said after a suicide bomber detonated himself in front of a hotel where Erdogan was to stay in Mogadishu in 2015 that 'NATO uses Turkey as a hammer to smash Muslims' (Moubayed, 2020). The group also tells people living in areas under its influence that Turkey is an agent of Western power and its sole aim is to spread secularism

and infidelity through distributing aid. Furthermore, leaders of al-Shabaab claim that Somalian students studying in Turkey get armed training, and female ones are not allowed to wear *burqa* (Yalçın, 2020). In general, it is al-Shabaab's radical Salafi-Wahhabi interpretation of Islam that makes it see everyone as an enemy. They see not only Christians but also other Muslims as their foes. Therefore, whoever helps the group's enemy is the enemy, too. In line with this fact, Sudagezer (2020) and many other analysts, as well as Somalians, argue that al-Shabaab gets the support of Wahhabi Gulf states to spread Wahhabist ideology in the Horn of Africa. Accordingly, a non-Wahhabi and stable Somalia is not in favor of the group and its sponsors.

Regarding how al-Shabaab resists against Turkey, it conducts attacks indiscriminately against Turks and Somalians. Militants have carried out many attacks since 2011. A few vivid attacks cited from Özkan (2014), Shay (2020), and Yalçın (2016) are as follow. A blast killed 70 Somalian students waiting in the queue of Turkish scholarships on October 4, 2011. On May 25, 2012, a Turkish businessman was assassinated in a hotel in Mogadishu. On April 15, 2013, the Turkish Red Cross' convoy was attacked by al-Shabaab, killing 16 Somalian workers and injuring four Turks. In July 2013, a car fully loaded with explosives was driven into the building of Turkish embassy staff, killing a Turkish police guard and two Somalian citizens. Again in 2014, two of the security staff of Turkish Airlines were killed in separate attacks. On January 22, 2015, a suicider detonated himself in front of a hotel that was to host Erdogan, killing three people. On January 1, 2016, two al-Shabaab assailants killed a Turkish engineer working for a relief association. In June 2016, a roadside bomb attack killed 15 Somalians. Also, in 2019, an attack killed 85 people including two Turks while a few other attacks resulted in the injury of tens of people. January of 2020 also witnessed four attacks targeting Turkish companies, killing three Somalian soldiers and injuring two. There are more attacks not mentioned here. The common point for all of them is the common target; Turks working in Somalia. However, the progress in security efforts shows that al-Shabaab's attacks have decreased due to better trained Somalian soldiers and community intelligence.

Overall, the attacks by al-Shabaab stem from the fear that it will lose ground on territories it controls. Al-Shabaab is very aware that the more Somalian army gets stronger, the more it will retreat, and

maybe eventually dissolve. It is less likely that Turkey's involvement in Somalia will end with threats and attacks of al-Shabaab. Conversely, when Turkey opened its embassy in 2011, countries such as China and the United Kingdom reopened their embassies. Thus, Turkey's activities took the attention of other countries to return to Somalia, a situation distorting the terrorist organisation's plans more. In addition, soldiers trained by the Turkish base might defeat al-Shabaab but hardly within two years as some Somalian politicians claim. Moreover, as a former Turkish intelligence veteran asserted years ago, terrorist groups survive only if they get support from states. Al-Shabaab is also sponsored by some countries such as allegedly to include the UAE and Saudi Arabia. If foreign support to al-Shabaab continues, terrorism will certainly continue. In this case, the only remedy will be the direct involvement of foreign troops, which seems not likely at the moment. Hence, more support is needed for the Somalian government to unite and secure the country. Needless to say, Turkey cannot afford to unite and secure Somalia alone. Why is Turkey supporting Somalia then?

Why is the Turkish Army in Somalia?

Turkey's growing influence in the surrounding regions and attempts to access African countries are interpreted differently by different analysts. While some deem Turkey's geo-strategic move as an imperialistic policy, others, particularly beneficiaries, appreciate Turkey's new foreign policy as a long overdue assistance. Regarding Somalia, almost a dozen of reasons are suggested for Turkey's military and non-military involvement. Öngören (2019) thinks that Somalia is significant for Turkey as it controls the entrance of Bab-Al Mandab strait, from where a great portion of the world's sea trade is flown. Telci (2018) adds that Somalia is the gate to enter Africa. He asserts that like China, France, and Japan established bases in Djibouti to enter Africa, Turkey located its base in Somalia to go deep into Africa. Bingöl (2013) emphasizes Turkey's soft power in Somalia and argues that the Turkish state is there due to the Islamic values of Turkish politicians, to find new economic markets and to get a geo-strategic advantage. In addition, Akpınar contends that Turkey wants to end the isolation of Somalia, distribute humanitarian aid, ensure security, and undertake the reconstruction of infrastructure in the African country (in Siradag 2016b). In fact, such factors are expressed by Turkish politicians including Erdogan, too.

They deny that Turkey is engaged with Somalia for its strategic interests. Yet, Farrell (2012) thinks that the Turkish government aims to improve its international image, get the support of Somalia and other African countries during the UN elections, and find new export markets. On the other hand, Kaya and Warner (2012) argue that the Erdogan government tries to get votes of conservative Turks by aiding Somalia and other Muslim countries. As per another argument, Turkey chose an ignored failed state to establish its influence over pivotal waterways (Antonopoulos et al 2017). Finally, Nassir (2018) argues that the Turkish military base boosts Turkey's soft power in Somalia.

As can be seen, some scholars contend that Turkey's involvement in Somalia is different than other countries with colonial goals, arguing that the main reason is to help a failed state to restore order, unity, and security on its territories. They also do not deny that being in Somalia will boost Turkey's strategic interests. Other analysts argue that Turkey has global ambitions of becoming a regional power by increasing its presence in former Ottoman lands. In fact, all arguments are more or less correct as well as skeptical. This study asserts that Turkey's military involvement in other countries is bi-focal. While one focuses on Turkey's strategic interests, the other indicates that Turkish policies have a win-win character. However, in the case of Somalia, it gives priority to solving Somalia's grave problems such as providing military support to the Somalian army to uphold security, mediating between autonomous regions for a united Somalia and helping Somalians to be self-sufficient economically. Even the function of the Turkish base proves that claim. Unlike other bases where there are soldiers for combat, missiles, artilleries, and tanks, there are students, classes, and shooting polygons in TURKSOM; whereas even jets are available in the American base located in Somalia. In addition, the UK and the EU have bases where soldiers and policemen are trained. If Turkey has a hidden agenda, so should all other foreign actors.

Moreover, Somalia is not a country where an ambitious regional power will maximize its interests. First, a foreign country will hardly defeat a local terrorist group. As the situation remains, even the Somalian government fails to identify militants who live among people. Perhaps, a direct intervention would be more efficient but Turkey will not confront al-Shabaab. Even if it does so, Somalian people's support will be limited. Supposing that al-Shabaab was

defeated anyway, the next problem is to unite autonomous regions with the mainland, which is another problem and requires the endorsement of other countries that have interests in those regional administrations. What is more, Somalia does not have adequate natural resources whose acquisition Turkey would struggle so hard. Also, the US, which is already present in Africa and particularly in the Horn of Africa region, would have made agreements to extract natural resources much earlier than now, had rich resources been factually identified in Somalia, despite the hints made for the possible availability of such resources. With an analysis of the evidence demonstrated here, this study argues that Turkey's military presence is aimed to strengthen its soft power in Somalia. If the reverse was the case, the Turkish government and companies should have made enormous profits, although such profits would not seem to exceed humanitarian aid, which is more than $1 billion. In the context of soft power, Somalia is a poor Muslim country, which Turkish people cannot ignore. However, players in Somalia and the region, including the Turkish government, are aware that soft power is not a remedy for the deep woes of Somalia. As a result, Turkey decided to get its military involved in state-building in Somalia indirectly. The word 'indirectly' should be emphasized since military support meant training and light military equipment.

However, Turkey indeed does have strategic interests and tries to realize them wherever it gets an opportunity. For example, to keep effective the maritime deal with Libya, it sent military advisors and weapons to Libya to assist the legitimate government against Haftar forces. It also established a base in Qatar, a friendly state with similar regional clouts. As for Somalia, some Turkish companies are operating there but, as said above, their contribution to the Turkish economy is so minimal that their revenues will only minimize the cost to Turkey. On the other hand, having a military base close to Bab-al Mandab strait will be beneficial but the benefit should not be exaggerated as there are so many other countries, including greater powers. Finally, if the seller and buyer are happy with the deal, there should be nothing to criticize. Somalia asked for Turkey's help and the latter welcomed the call. If both countries are pleased with legal cooperation, details should not matter then.

Conclusion

This study has analyzed why the Turkish government has been actively supporting the central Somalian government, which is fighting terrorism, negotiating with secessionist movement and surviving in poverty despite that Somalia is quite far away from Turkey. Beginning with supplying humanitarian aid to build Somalian people, it then proceeded to assisting state-building process. Since a state cannot be rebuilt without restoring the security system, Turkey began to use its hard power to accelerate and strengthen the process. It can be seen that criticisms came after the Turkish army's involvement in Somalia through training Somalian troops and policemen. This study argued that Turkey gave priority to Somalia's ends rather than its own strategic interests due to a few factors. First, Somalia is a poor Muslim country and Turkey is ruled by a conservative party, which deems helping another Muslim country as a religious duty. Second, when economic gains and losses of Turkey are compared, it can be seen that it is not worth involving in Somalia. Given that Turkey still supports Somalian government and people in spite of losses, Turkey's policy can be explained with humanitarian purposes. Third, the Turkish army got involved in Somalia's fight against terrorism but the way it assisted Somalian forces shows that the goal is limited to training the Somalian army. If Turkey had used its military for its self-interests, the base in Somalia would not have been a training camp but rather a base with combating troops and heavy weapons. Therefore, the Turkish army is not in Somalia for Turkey's hegemonic clout but to assist Somalian army, a policy that can be termed as empowerment through the use of soft power rather than the application of a hard power.

However, though Somalia's interests came first in Turkish-Somalian military relations, Turkey is present in Somalia with its civil and military institutions for its own ends as well. While these goals are not hegemonic as claimed, realizing them will still be beneficial for Turkey. One reason is to use Somalia as a gate to Africa. Besides being a Muslim country, Somalia is the only available country, via which Turkey can go deep into Africa. Second, as Somalian lands are next to pivotal waterways, Turkey's presence in this country will enable it to have a say about the gate of the Red Sea. Third, if Somalian government defeats terrorism, Turkey will probably increase its influence in the country and benefit more from its investments. As stated above, economic interests are secondary but

revenues generated from Somalia will most likely be welcomed by Turkey. Theoretically, this study sheds light on how military power can be used as a soft power and how certain factors can change priorities of countries in inter-state relations.

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CHAPTER 9

Constructing Identity through Cultural Sustainability and Social Reproduction

Deramo Michele

Introduction

In general refugees, when they flee from wars and oppressions, seem to sharing commonalities of fleeing and seeking protection (Gifford, 2009). Studies, however, show that the history of the refugee communities and the social groups they belonged to prior to the exodus is also critical to understand and analyze how refugees socio-cultural engage and adapt into their new destinations. It is not just about geographical and demographical displacement but also socio-political as well as socio-cultural. People might have experienced social and cultural trauma in their home societies before they happen to suffer from physical violence and expulsion (Berry, 1997; Hamilton & Moore, 2004). Despite this disempowering and traumatizing experiences and package, refugee communities reorganize and might even successfully adapt into their new host environments through socio-cultural mobilisation and in exchanges in collaboration with hosting communities as well as closer refugee group who earlier established into the new homeland. (Gifford et al.; 2009; Hodes, 2000; Nesdale, 2002). It is not just about refugees and how they survive and adjust into a new host societies, but culture in general is part of the social relations that makes people navigate and negotiate in socio-political as well as socio-cultural environments whether in their host or homeland environments (Shneiderman 2003). Such social mobilisations also occur with existing social movements seeking solidarity with refugees (Thomas et al, 2019; Sutter, 2019).

Within Somali studies there exist research on Somali refugees and how they struggle adopt into their new host societies. However these studies often focus on the trauma, the suffering of political exclusion and lack of integration into these societies. Rarely scholarship discusses on the cultural adaptation – particularly on Somali bantu communities. Few research exists in dealing with educational adjustment (Roy and Roxas, 2011). In a study on a Somali Bantu culture, Lehman and Eno (2003) cover the general dimension and the specificities of Bantu Somali culture. Other studies have also concentrated on community mobilisation and "resilience" (Frounfelker, 2020). Gender challenges within the bantu community but also within the wider Somali and other ethnic communities aiming at adjusting into western societies (Upvall, M. J., Mohammed, K., & Dodge, P. D. (2009) .

This article builds on qualitative empirical interviews and observations among members of a transnational refugee-community and their socio-cultural struggle and quest for adjusting in into their new homeland, the US. The work specifically aims at presenting a preliminary theoretical argument on the processes of socio-cultural adaptation by the some of the transnational Somali-bantu communities in the US. By discussing the case of Somali bantu communities in renegotiating cultural complexities in their new homeland, the United states, given the immense oppression such communities confronted in the homeland Somalia, the article highlights the transformations associated with the dynamics of cultural adjustment and adaptation into a new socio-cultural environment. In numerous aspects, the socio-political as well as the socio-cultural struggle by Somali-bantu communities in the US represents a kind of continuity. In other situations, it might also reflect a kind of tangible transformation or rather discontinuity from the past. Obviously, difference exist on the specifically socio-cultural adaptations and related exclusions the Somali-bantu communities confront in the USA – and the serious violations and challenges they have been through prior to and after fleeing from their original homeland, Somalia. This article particularly highlights the dynamics of diversity with attempts of socio-cultural theorisation on stressing the continuing social transformation as well as diversification among the Somali diaspora.

The Bantu Somali communities, as some might occasionally refer to as "Jareer communities" historically contributed to the formation

of Somali society not just in cultural, but also on social, intellectual as well as political and economic platforms. Whether such efforts led to the emancipation and the empowerment of the community socially and politically is another question. More concretely, methodologically, this article departs from the empirical cultural activities, such as the wedding ceremonies etc. that the studied communities routinely organize in the US. In addition, this work conceptualizes cultural platforms and performances as integral to the continuing socio-political struggles – of communities positioning themselves in a relational and competitive socio-cultural environment, whether in relation to the host or homeland environments. This implies that cultural performance travel/migrate with communities who struggle for social and political recognition and acceptance in their new host societies. The activities have, therefore, both internal and external dimensions.

Conception: Marginalized transnational communities' socio-cultural adjustment transformations

Within authoritarian hierarchical traditional regimes such as those that exist in Africa and the Middle east, marginalized communities confront numerous political, social, economic and cultural exclusion s. These factors remain interlinked and it is difficult to suggest what comes first, second and so on. Obviously if such communities struggle to participate in the political, social and economic platforms of the society, the cultural dimensions might provide them resources in negotiating position of recognition in the society. Communities herewith maintain cultural traits in preventing not just exclusion in the society but also in maintaining community cohesion. Such cultural dynamics could be part of the wider society, particularly if authorities occasionally find relevant to deploy such cultural groups in their purposes.

While attempts by dominant authorities and thereby social groups in standardizing the hegemonic cultural platforms also marginalized subordinate communities, at the same time also provides opportunities for internal community mobilisation against external imposition.

When civil war erupts then people engage basic survival and cultural dimensions attract lesser attention as people are either in the move on in precarious living conditions – that could consider transition.

Eventually when such communities, of art of such communities resettle in more peaceful and prosperous countries, certain form of cultural reorganisation occurs. This is not just a form of nostalgia towards the past, but a form new transformation that could not be directly categorized as belonging to the past or the past. It is new forms of combination and a situation that reflects the current community trajectory.

Defining Culture

Culture, broadly defined, is the expression of a shared commonality that bonds individuals as a group. Cultural identity is thus the enunciation of the self through modes of representation that both express shared culture as well as signify its continual production within the discourse of history. (Hall #:1997) As demonstrated in chapter four, the Somali Bantu trajectory was one of continuous dispersion marked by the tension of resistance to and collusion with dominant narratives of difference, belonging, and worth. (Besteman) Encampment and resettlement disrupted this liminality insofar as it offered a chance for cohesion and solidarity around a social-political subjectivity. For people like the Somali Bantu who are living in diaspora, constructing identity is mingled with the work of cultural sustainability[62] and social reproduction. The daily habits of making a life and reproducing the social connect the past with a future. However, these habits are flexible and responsive to the demands of the present and the groups' collective aspirations for the future. Culture is *lived*, therefore it is dynamic.

For the Somali Bantu, the work of cultural sustainability and social reproduction are most fully realized through the bodies of women. Whereas men occupy the public face of the community, it is the women who embody and carry out the practices and habits signifying culture. Among Somali Bantu living in the United States, a wedding celebration is a critical site of cultural sustainability and social reproduction. In addition to being an occasion for celebration, the wedding is an important rite of passage marking the continuation

62 My definition of cultural sustainability is borrowed from the World Commission on Environment and Development for the United Nations General Assembly (1987), whereby sustainability is "meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."

of cultural identity through the reproduction of family and the larger community. Whereas men and women both participate in the contracting, planning, and celebrating of the wedding, it is the woman whose role is of particular cultural significance: they are the ones who orchestrate the production of the wedding through the preparations of food, clothing, and hospitality, as well as the preparation of the bride for her new role as wife and mother. The bride is the center of the celebration upon whose body the expressive culture is manifest, maintained, and carried forward.

This chapter narrates the occasion of Mariam's wedding. The portrait of Mariam's wedding presents one view of how a diasporic community is constructing identity through the continuation and adaptation of signifying cultural practices. The beauty preparations, the extended celebrations, the public processions, the gathering of Somali Bantu from afar, and the circulation of wedding videos months after the event discursively shape community in a way that reaches back and forward simultaneously. The wedding celebration is thus performative insofar as it constitutes Somali Bantu-ness. Yet, the wedding celebration is not fixed in its form or its acceptance among participants. As I will show, the wedding celebration as it is realized in diaspora is also a point of tension between generations that reveal shifting values, expectations, and authorities within the community. Traditional weddings connected to arranged marriage have reflected the authority of the parents and elders, overriding the preferences and desires of the young adults. Yet, the young adults are more resistant to their parents' authority. There are complaints that weddings are too extravagant, that they generate gossip and hurt feelings. Further, there is growing awareness among younger Somali Bantu that the early marriage of girls may be at odds with broader aspirations for the collective community. However, even as younger adults problematize the wedding celebration, its importance as a cultural marker remains central to the Somali Bantu diaspora. Unlike the wedding practices in the United States, the Somali Bantu wedding is not exclusive to the individuals marrying. Rather, the wedding is a social reproduction of both a new family and the diasporic community as a whole. It is an event that belongs to everyone.

The Somali Bantu Wedding

The Somali Bantu wedding functions as a celebration of identity whereby group identity "asserts itself in collective performance, in

repeated and formalized collective action that manages to conflate individual feeling with collective participation." (Noyes 2003, 29-30 in Grady 114). According to Sandra Grady whose research examined adolescence among resettled Somali Bantu, there are two significant themes emerging from their wedding celebrations: the public acknowledgement of passage into adulthood, and the performance of the community's expressive culture in the midst of resettlement. (Grady, 2015)

The wedding as a public acknowledgement of passage into adulthood assumes a particular importance within the Somali Bantu diaspora and the cultural disruptions experienced by youth that have been catalyzed by third country resettlement. In Somalia and Kenya, girls were engaged to marry between the ages of 14 and 16 years. Boys of this same age were already working on their family farms. However, the extended adolescence typical of American youth requires that both males and females spend more years in school. They are subject to labor laws and educational credentialing that limit their ability to acquire full-time employment and financial independence – a status signifying adulthood for males. Further, the traditional rites of passage marking adulthood for females – specifically, genital modification – is forbidden in the United States. In the absence of the traditional rites of passage and immersed in a more regulated social sphere, staying in school and earning a high school diploma emerge as alternative rites of passage that usher young people toward adulthood and subsequent practices of social reproduction. However, the current generation of Somali Bantu adolescents must negotiate the cultural expectations of their parents and elders with those of their new society. Even with the opportunities that compulsory education makes available, young women continue to be selected for marriage while they are still early in their high school careers. The system of contracting with the family of the young woman continues to be the standard for Somali Bantu. These cultural negotiations place stress on youth. For young women, there is the pressure of being selected and the foreclosure of opportunities that might be otherwise available to them as unmarried women. For young men, there is the pressure of achieving financial independence, the long-term success of which relies upon acquiring an education. And all of this occurs in the midst of a highly materialized and sexualized youth-centered culture that Somali Bantu adolescents and young adults must negotiate in tension with

traditional practices and expectations. Grady suggests that the adaptation of elements of the U.S. wedding practices, might be a way of resolving "some of the ambivalence many young people increasingly feel toward this life passage." (Grady, 2015, p. 122)

Despite young peoples' changing attitudes toward weddings, the wedding remains a core social event for Somali Bantu of all ages that upholds the emotional structures of community in diaspora. The Somali Bantu wedding is a multi-day event marked by a convergence of friends and family, the collective preparation of food by elder women, and the elaborate beauty preparations by younger women. Men join in the celebration by transporting and socializing with guests from out of town and handling the transactional elements between the families. Most important among these transactions is the *nikka*, or the matrimonial contract. Because most Somali Bantu practice a liberal form of Islam, they follow the conditions of a valid Islamic marriage, which requires the signature of the bridegroom and a male relative or guardian of the bride, as well as an agreed upon dowry, or gift of wealth from the bridegroom's family to the family of the bride.[63] Once the *nikka* is complete, the wedding celebration is held. The actual presentation of the bride and groom as a couple has a limited ritual structure beyond their circling the room with their attendants in the midst of the community. Some of the young couples adopt Western practices such as white dresses, tuxedos and tiered wedding cakes along with dancing to popular music, creating what Grady calls a "patchwork" that "reinforces and constructs the dual nature of both assemblage and social boundedness of Somali Bantu identity practice demonstrated in everyday life." (Grady, 2015, p. 132)

The wedding celebration functions as a mechanism of memory, or – more specifically – "postmemory," the inter /transgenerational transmission of memory and the identifications forged within familial space. (Kim, 2007, p. 340) Through the phenomena of postmemory, "remembering manifests the presence of the absent world, not just the experience of the prior self." (p. 343) This is reinforced by Grady's observations that "the wedding ritual, while a contract between two individuals, seemed more important as an arrangement

63 According to Islamic custom, the bride is not required to be present however her verbal agreement to the union is required.

with the larger community, an event in which everybody had a sense of ownership." (Grady, 2015, p. 125)

The communal focus of the Somali Bantu wedding celebration is enhanced by the emergence of the wedding video. While video recordings of special events like weddings are fairly common across cultures, it is the function of the Somali Bantu wedding video as an object of expressive culture that is remarkable. The wedding celebration is shared and circulated through videotape or uploaded to You Tube as a way of engaging the wider Somali Bantu community and including extended family located in other parts of the country and, indeed, the world. Thus, Somali Bantu who are unable to travel or who are living in the refugee camps can participate. The videos are a source of entertainment that are viewed long after the event and are available on YouTube for general consumption. They are representative of more than the particular event; rather, they communicate the significance of the wedding as a mechanism for the reproduction of culture. (Hall) Families will view weddings of couples they have not met personally, and Somali Bantu videographers announce on their social media sites when new wedding videos have been uploaded.[64]

The production of wedding videos that document the event with overlays of traditional Somali music, graphics, and animations has become a cottage industry within the broader Somali Bantu community. A typical wedding video[65] will open with a lavish animation that includes the name of the video production company followed by the names of the couple, the date of the celebration, and the city where the celebration took place. The animations of hearts, flowers, or digital butterflies are superimposed over still shots of the couple and guests of the wedding. Sometimes, the stills float across a romantic backdrop of the ocean or a waterfall. After the introduction, the video switches to the actual celebration, often beginning with the couple's procession around the room – the bride

64 Videos typically have several thousand views—evidence of their broad circulation as a source of entertainment and cultural practice. One video, "Hawa Wedding" by Thu Ho had 55,913 views.

65 I viewed approximately 25 videos on YouTube produced by Wadajiir Boyz, Siidow 12 Films, Romance Studio, Dadow Studio Center, and Iftin Video Recording among others. My description here is a composite of these many productions.

and groom holding hands, arms stiffly at their sides, wearing somber expressions, followed by the wedding attendants. For the remainder of the video, the camera is stationary, its lens fixed on the dance floor. Apart from the opening montage of graphics, animations, and still photographs, the videographer imposes no narrative or editorial view. The camera is invisible to the celebration so that everyone carries on with dancing and socializing, and the viewer is simply there, another participant in the event.

The wedding video digitizes the sustainability and reproduction of culture. Coded into the production are messages about community, which are then circulated in its "phenomenal form" and translated into societal structures. (Hall) The wedding video thus captures and formalizes the wedding celebration, which makes visible and present the community in diaspora. This particular function of the digital device as means for cohering the diasporic community is demonstrated in other venues as well. Catherine Besteman writes movingly about sharing a slide show of photographs taken while doing ethnographic research in Banta (middle Jubba Valley) during the 1980's to refugees of this region who were now living in Lewiston, Maine. She recounted that the 100-plus participants who came to view the slides responded with emotion at seeing family members who have since grown into adults or died and the farms and villages they left behind. They would often call out in recognition, and requested that the slides be shown again and again. (Besteman, 2016, pp. 20-28) Later, when she interviewed an elder visiting Lewiston for a wedding about his experience during the war, "his cell phone rang constantly with calls from his relatives from Lewiston, Hartford, Springfield, and even Kenya, who wanted to add their memories" to the conversation. (p. 48) Conversely, when the Mayor of Lewiston publicly complained about the behavior of immigrants who were on their phones during a graduation ceremony, he failed to recognize that the phone calls made to relatives as far away as Somalia and Kenya were in fact modes of extended participation in what was a remarkable achievement. (p. 278)

This chapter attempts to fix a lens onto a Somali Bantu wedding in order to show how identity is performative. Unlike a video camera that merely records what passes in front of it, my view of the celebration is colored by my multiple positions as friend, guest, and outsider to the event. My position as a friend grants me a sympathetic view insofar as I have an emotional investment in the event. Therefore, how I choose to describe what I see and experience is shaped by a disposition of care. My position as a guest grants me a

partial insider view insofar as I am there participating, even though I do not fully understand the significance of everything that is happening. Finally, my position as an outsider grants me a level of detachment that enables me to bring a view of difference. Therefore, how I choose to analyze and interpret is influenced by my chosen theoretical framework as well as by my prior experiences of marriage and wedding celebrations – most significantly, the Italian-American wedding. Like the Somali Bantu wedding, the Italian-American wedding is a diasporic staging of cultural and religious values that signifies group integrity in a foreign locale. Unlike the Somali Bantu wedding, the Italian-American wedding emphasizes familial structures rather than communal, with the mothers (and the Blessed Mother Mary) assuming a place of honor in the celebration.[66] These prior experiences provide me with a point of comparison, yet it also connects me back to my position as friend and the emotional structures that shape personal investment, participation, and analysis.

Mariam's Engagement and Marriage

Mariam was approximately 15 years old when she was engaged to marry. She sent me a text informing me that she now had a phone, and that she had news.[67] But she was evasive about her news – perhaps she thought I wouldn't approve. I urged her to share. She was getting married. I replied that I was happy for her and asked how she felt about it. Mariam said that she was happy--now. She liked him, but at first she wasn't interested. She tells me that I had met the young man briefly when I visited a year before, and I recalled a young man with a small, nut-shaped head like A*. He was a cousin of A* who, in the absence of Mariam's father, handled arrangements between the families.

> Will you come to my wedding? she asked.
> Of course! I replied. How soon will it be?
> Not for a few years.[68]

66 Further, at this point in time—several generations after mass migration--the Italian-American wedding is now thoroughly branded as an American invention. Time will tell how the Somali Bantu wedding evolves and adapts.

67 According to Grady, once a contract for marriage is arranged, the young man gives his bride-to-be a cell phone that is used to secure a connection between them. (35-6)

68 The preceding paragraph is a reconstruction of the text messaging exchange. I no longer have the phone that I used at that time and had not saved my personal data.

After this particular text correspondence and on through to the year of her wedding date, Mariam's presence on Facebook evolved.[69] The photos of celebrities and invented names that concealed her identity were removed and replaced by photographs, mostly selfies, taken with her friends. Mariam's lived experience as it was expressed through her social media showed her in a new terrain: she was making the transition to adulthood. She presented herself now as desireable (albeit within the bounds of modesty required of her religion): in one photo she describes herself as "looking cute" on her way to school. She wore make up and posed provocatively beneath her modest gown and hijab, a hip thrust out and lips pursed. She created and posted digital postcards with photos of herself and of her fiancé pasted over a background of hearts.

And then, months before the actual wedding, she announced that she was deactivating her account and disappeared from Facebook altogether. Her prior whimsy on social media was replaced by a self-imposed purdah. Later, I asked her about why she removed herself from social media during this timeframe. She paused, as if reluctant to answer. She then said that there was a lot of negativity on Facebook at that time, including some profanity. She wanted to separate herself from it.[70]

The Wedding

Mariam's marriage and wedding celebration took place during the first weekend of August 2014 soon after Ramadan ended. I arrived in Milwaukee in early evening and sent a text asking if I could visit for a while, but didn't receive a reply. Figuring that she might be involved in wedding preparations and not paying attention to her phone, I decided to drive over to the house anyway. I arrived in front of the garden apartment where Mariam lived with her mother, Khadija, and her brothers, Nur and Muse. The front door was standing open and a

69 Media served as a venue for young women to experiment with self-presentation prior to their impending identity shift. Grady reported that she, as well as some of the school teachers, were shown photographs taken on their cell phones of the girls posing as American teenagers with their heads uncovered, heavily made up, and wearing Western clothes. This experimentation seemed to be limited to girls who were engaged to be married.

70 Her desire to separate herself from gossip may have had as much to do with her observance of Ramadan, which took place from June 29th-July 28th that year.

woman holding a child stood on the stoop with several other small children gathered around her. I didn't recognize any of the faces peering back at me. I approached in greeting, asking if Mariam or Khadija were at home. The woman gestured for me to go inside.

The front room of Khadija's apartment was emptied of furniture and the floor covered with blankets. Several women sat on the floor watching a video of a wedding on a 42 inch flat screen television. One of the women was holding an infant who appeared to be only a few weeks old. From the living room I could see Khadija in the kitchen with four other women, busily preparing food for the coming festivities. A plump woman stirred a large pot of rice; another turned sliced onions and green peppers sautéing in oil. Others sat on the floor, their legs stretched out in front of them, kneading dough or forming the dough into small cakes with their hands. The sultry heat of August mingled with the steam of cooking food raised the temperature of the room by twenty degrees. I stood in the kitchen doorway watching until Khadija turned around and noticed me.

"Khadija!"

"Moochel!"

We embraced. Khadija is not much older than I. She has remained slender through the years, even though most Somali Bantu women of her age are stocky with full hips and round cheeks. She spoke with animation to the women around her. I recognized the word "Virginia" and understood that she was explaining who I was to the others. They nodded in recognition. Khadija and I greeted each other with smiles, neither of us able to understand the other's language, yet communicating as best we could with the few words we had. I recognized the words "Mary Carol" – she wanted to know if one of the other volunteers from ten-plus years ago would be coming to the wedding too. I pantomimed asking if I could help to cook. Khadija replied "yes," although I knew her answer was not in response to my question but an acknowledgement of the preparations that were underway. She led me back to the front room to sit, and brought me, first, a bottle of water. Then she returned with a plate of cookies and jellied sweets, and then again with a cup and pitcher of hot beverage.

"Moochel, coffee." She poured what appeared to be a warm spiced cider. She sat on a crate in front of me with her own cup, grinning broadly. She pointed to different women, introducing me to

some of Mariam's other sisters who have come to town for the wedding. I knew that Khadija had older daughters that lived elsewhere. I learn that two of the women were half-sisters, sharing the same father as Mariam but different mothers. The woman holding the infant said that the child was not hers, but her daughter's baby. The daughter, wearing a gold hijab that read "Peace, Love, Somalia," entered the room soon after.

"Mariam is at a friend's house getting her henna." She said that when I am finished with my food she will take me to where Mariam is.

A tiny girl of four wearing leggings and a Hello Kitty shirt passes through the living room, reaching her hand out to the plate of cookies. I hand one to her and then recognize the child as Fawzia, Isha's youngest; she was still a baby the last time I saw her. Two other children sidled in front of me – a boy of about five wearing a t-shirt and shorts and a girl of seven in a long skirt, her hair in braids with pink beads. The boy spoke softly – I couldn't catch all of what he was saying. He named his brothers – Muhammed and Hassan – and I realized that these were also Isha's children. They crouched next to me:

> "I remember you brought Muhammed a ball. And you brought me a doll," said Ralia.
> "Do you have any prizes for us?" asks Hamza.
> "What kind of prize do you want?" I replid.
> "A bike," said Ralia.
> "Do you have a lot of things at your house?" Hamza inquired. "How do you get your things?"

The young woman in the gold hijab returned and I followed her through the back door of the apartment and across the courtyard to another home where the door was open. A pink bicycle leaned against the wall and a pair of four inch blue platform shoes lay on the front stoop. Just inside the door were several younger women sitting on chairs. One of the young women dashed outside – it was Mariam. She was wearing a sari and a head scarf, her face covered in a greenish cream – pimple cream, she said. We go inside where she sat down again while Noorda resumed work on the henna.

Noorda was a friendly woman with a wide smile and ready laugh. She wore a leopard skin hijab and a full dress. She was a henna artist who provided this service to women for holidays such as Eid and celebrations like weddings. She hennaed the bridesmaids the day before. When I arrived, she had already spent two hours on Mariam's

arms, drawing the design and adding red ink as highlights. One of Mariam's five wedding dresses was strapless so she asked that a necklace of henna circle her chest and shoulders as well.

While I was there, Nur and Muse and their cousin, Abdirahman, arrived through the kitchen. Abdirahman was wearing a University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee t-shirt and I asked if he was attending school there. "September 2nd" he replied, to study architecture. Nur said that he would begin college in the fall as well, at the community college to study Health Sciences.

Nur was clearly the dominant personality among the young men. While he spoke, a group of younger boys stood around quietly. His younger brother, Muse, who was easily six feet tall with the stocky build of a football player, sat quietly. I asked him what was new and he smiled happily, but was unable to think of anything to say. Eventually, the boys departed. Noorda's husband came by with styrofoam containers of nachos for everyone to eat. Mariam laughed that she was naked (actually, just her shoulders are bare) so we held up a scarf to protect her modesty while the husband passed through the kitchen.

I stayed with the young women until almost 11:30 p.m. before returning to Khadija's house. Before leaving, Noorda quickly inked a chain of flowers and swirls from my left pointer finger to my elbow. We passed through Khadija's kitchen where the older women were now sitting on the floor applying henna paste they made themselves to their feet and hands. The older women forego the intricate designs that Noorda drew and simply painted the bottoms of their feet, and drew plain circles of orange on their hands. One of the women noticed my hennaed arm. They were amused but pleased to see a white woman in American clothes participating in the beauty preparations. Isha was there. She introduced me to another of Khadija's older daughters. Khadija gestured to me, speaking to the woman.

"She is telling her how nice you are," said Isha.

"Thank you for helping my family," the woman said to me.

Isha and I go into the living room where eight or nine small children were stretched out asleep on the floor. She had just gotten off work at a bakery. Because she was employed in a food industry, she was unable to be hennaed – it wasn't allowed. However, she was granted two days of leave for the wedding. She said that she would be up all night – "Too much!" she commented, although she was clearly

dedicated to the preparations. We sat in the living room and she asked if I wanted to watch television. Her phone was networked to the television through blue tooth, and we scrolled through a series of videos – five minute snippets of Somali Bantu weddings and music videos by a Kenyan hip hop artists and an English language television show from Nigeria. When it was almost 2 a.m. I said that I must go.

The following day I arrived at Khadija's house close to noon. The skies were overcast, so fewer people were outside. I saw a tall, slender man with a small, round head entering the front door. It was A*, Isha's estranged husband. He closed the front door behind him, so I headed toward the back door – but Khadija saw me through the window and called out for me to come.

> I entered, removing my shoes. A* came toward me, surprised.
> "When did you arrive? I received no emails or phone calls that you were coming? Why are you not staying at the house?"
> "I arrived last night. I communicated with Mariam. I am staying at a hotel because I know there are so many guests coming to town."

He nodded in agreement, and then asked if I wanted to eat. He had Khadija bring a plate of bread and a bowl of goat liver in gravy. I asked about his life: he was serving as a Sheik to help the community, but received no pay for his efforts since they were not strong enough yet to pay him. He was taking some time off school, but did not say where he was working. He was helping to transport people who were arriving from Utah, Kentucky, Ohio, and beyond who had come to Milwaukee for the wedding. He pointed to an old woman sitting in the corner of the room.

> "This is our grandma. She is the oldest person in our family." The woman was surrounded by flat packages of dresses. "We give a dress to everyone who comes to help prepare for the wedding. We will give you one, too."
>
> After eating, A* tells Khadija that I will help and rebukes her protests by saying, "No, she is not a guest. She is family-this is her house."
>
> I headed toward the kitchen where I sat with Batula, another Somali Bantu woman who lived in Blacksburg, to shuck corn. Batula was rolling out dough and slicing it into small portions for baking. Batula asked about Jennifer, a volunteer who assisted Batula's family. They hadn't seen or heard from her for years. I replied that I didn't know for sure if Jennifer was still in Blacksburg, but I thought I saw her around town a few years ago. We gossiped a bit about Abdirahman's second wife.
>
> "Isha was pissed off!"

The woman, in fact was there in the kitchen with us. Noorda had said the night before that she was a pretty woman with light skin. The

woman wore a hijab that covered her head and neck, and her dress seemed to be made out of a better material than the lightweight cotton that most of the women wore. Her face was made up to accentuate her features that appeared to be more Arabic than Bantu – the aquiline nose and oval shape of face – but she spoke Mai Mai with the other women. Mariam told me later that the woman is mixed – ethnic Somali and Bantu.

I knew that Batula's husband, Abdikadir, had a second wife as well. He "divorced" the other woman in order to come to the United States, however he visited her and their children regularly in Kentucky.[71] I asked Batula if she was pissed off that Abdikadir had a second wife and she shrugged and says no. That is the way it was in Africa. The problem with Ab*'s situation was that he took a second wife while living in the United States.

When all of the corn was shucked, I returned to the living room. Mariam came downstairs from her bedroom where she had been in seclusion all morning. She hadn't slept much even though the application of henna on her feet and lower legs lasted until 5 a.m. She was so bored and wished she didn't have to stay inside – but that was the expectation for the bride to be. She surfed through Netflix trying to find something for us to watch. So many shows had partial nudity in them, which would be particularly inappropriate with grandma and numerous small children in the living room. She turned to a channel that opened with a scene of a man and a woman kissing, and immediately turned it off. We eventually settled on a police drama, Lincoln Heights, but no one really watched with all of the activity in the house. Eventually we went upstairs to her bedroom where it was cooler: a small room with pale blue tapestries on the walls and unopened packages of bedding hanging in an open closet – wedding presents from her mother and sister.

Mariam was having a religious wedding. I knew this from a flyer that Nur posted to Facebook announcing the wedding. I did not know what a religious wedding entailed, however the announcement provided some clues to its strictly gendered arrangement. It read:

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71 In order to be approved for resettlement, men in polygamous marriages were required to choose one wife over another. This requirement, which was another disruption to Somali Bantu cultural practices, created a resettlement situation that separated families and produced a high number of impoverished women-headed households.

This is official Invitation to Join us for food and psalms to celebrate S. and Mariam Mad Muse's Wedding.

Please Respect our Conditions, Rules, or Policies:

1. Parents Should Supervise their Children.
2. Boys and Girls SHOULD NOT Interact one another.
3. Boys and Girls SHOULD NOT sit together.
4. Girls Should wear their Veils (Hijab) before entrance.
5. No unnecessary Movement after entrance.

A clip art cartoon of a large-nosed man with a bow tie singing into a microphone decorated the top of the flyer. The juxtaposition of the cartoon with the strict rules for gender behavior was comical, but also unsettling. A night of sitting solemnly reciting prayers in Arabic did not sound very festive to me. I asked Mariam how she felt about having a religious wedding. Was it A*"s idea? She replied that was her choice to have a religious wedding, adding that it was also the request of her in-laws. She wanted to please her husband's family. She was eager to leave her mother's house so that she could "have a voice" in the decisions affecting her life. She was looking forward to moving in to her new home, newly remodeled by Habitat for Humanity. She wanted some American appliances, like a waffle maker, but (she gestured to the closet where the wedding gifts were stored) the women in the family got her those "old African tin pots".

We passed the time talking about her wedding night and intimate matters of becoming a wife. She would not use birth control because it was against their religion, however she wanted to wait a while before getting pregnant. Somali Bantu had too many children, she said. Several of her friends from school who married early and had children right away eventually discontinued their education. Mariam wanted to go to college. Mariam recognized the traditional practices that could potentially disadvantage her as a young woman living in the United States, yet she was also bound to these traditional practices and found meaning in them.

Mariam was growing restless. The light was dimming outside, there were no lamps in her room. Isha borrowed her phone so that she could listen to music while cooking. Mariam wanted her phone back so that she couldn't find out where her bridesmaids were so that they could take her to Noorda's where she would shower and sleep for the night. Eventually, one of her bridesmaid's, Khadija, arrived.

The room was now dark. Downstairs, the elders were chanting. The girls handed me a dress and head scarf that I put on for this moment. I stood in the stairwell looking over the front room. Twenty or thirty women, mostly older, were in a circle singing and swaying their bodies. Neither young woman was able to explain the meaning of the words being sung. It was the practice of gathering in this circle and singing together that signified the moment.

A young man entered with a 24-pack of bottled water. He looked at me standing there on the stairs in the gown and lopsided head scarf and asked if I was Muslim. After a while I went back upstairs while the activities of people coming and going continued. Mariam wanted to eat, but she didn't want "that nasty food" that was being made downstairs: rice, chicken, cookies. She wanted nachos.

We heard some commotion as if an argument was breaking out. Mariam was upset--she went into the stairwell to eavesdrop on what was happening. She and young Khadija complained to one another about the old ways that stirred up arguments, and how they would rather have a simple wedding. We found out what happened: the in-laws arrived with the required gift of gold but the amount they brought was five grams less than what was agreed upon by the families. Soon thereafter, there was more commotion coming from behind the house. We looked out the window to see a tow truck in the parking lot. A white neighbor was outside yelling at a police officer and some of the older women. Family members were gathered around. A* came out from a house across the parking lot to find out what was happening. Apparently someone made a complaint (not the neighbor who yelled that she wasn't the one to call). The police officer and tow truck eventually backed out of the lot, while the family members – just moments ago distressed, were now chuckling with one another.

The day had grown long – it was dark outside. Mariam was anxious to have her bridesmaids with her, and none of them seemed able to get there. I offered to drive to get some of the girls. "I don't want to bother you," Mariam murmured. What else did I have to do? Young Khadija and I drove to get Malyun and Asha and Makai. After I dropped them off, I left for the evening.

The following day I went directly to Noorda's where Mariam spent the night with the bridesmaids. She was happy, dressed in a red hijab and a sheer black dress. No, she hadn't slept. They spent the night talking until the early hours.

The schedule of the day was unclear to me. The *nikka* (engagement) was to be at noon, but Mariam was not a part of this. There was also a time when the family opened the gifts, but again Mariam did not participate. Over at Khadija's house there was a crush of activity and I noticed that it was mostly the elders who congregated there. Isha passed back and forth between the homes, the stress of the day growing evident on her face. Someone brought styrofoam containers of basmati rice, fried chicken, and chunks of goat. I was hungry and with my hands ate all of the chicken and goat from one container, along with some of the rice. A little boy, Omar, fell asleep in a heap on the floor near my feet. Noorda's baby toddled around, lifting a fancy shoe and then stepping his tiny foot inside it. The girls glided around the house, fixing their makeup, trying on clothes, touching up their henna. They mixed a facial of honey and other ingredients and slathered it on Mariam's face. They said it would make her face glow. Mid-afternoon, Suzanne and her daughter, Isabel, arrived. Suzanne was another resettlement volunteer. She lived in the neighborhood adjacent to the Muse family when they first arrived in Blacksburg. Isabel and Mariam were close in age and played together many years ago as little girls.

We asked Mariam about her wedding dress and she said that there were five dresses that she would change into throughout the evening. Each dress had accompanying veils and gold jewelry, some of which had been given by her in-laws for her wedding.

The beauty preparations constituted the majority of the day. At 5 p.m. Mariam had a make-up appointment at the mall. Suzanne, Isabel, and I drove over with Mariam, Noorda, and Hawiwa. Mariam was meticulously made up with false eyelashes and a spray of gold powder on her lids. Noorda and Hawiwa had their eyebrows shaped. Back at the house, the woman began dressing before the limousine arrived. I slipped on the eggshell blue dress with the sequins that spelled out "Love Somalia" that I was given the day before. Like most of the dresses worn by the women, it was a square pattern, sewn up the sides with openings for the arms. I used a belt to gather it up around my waist, so that it didn't drag on the floor. Many of the girls tucked their dresses into the waistband of their leggings or simply grabbed a bunch in their hands as they walked. I reapplied my makeup and put on a pair of heavy gold earrings. I clipped my bangs back off my face so that young Khadija could wrap the matching blue scarf around my head, a flicker of amusement in her eyes. My

hair was slippery and my forehead flat, so it was hard to keep the head wrap in place.

Mariam came out in the first dress of the evening. She was beautiful in a peacock blue scarf with a yellow flower pinned to the side. Her outfit, both elegant and modest, covered her entire body except for her hands and face. The skirt was full with gold leaf designs against cerulean blue, a wide white belt cinching her waist. The bodice was black, draped by the blue of her headscarf. In the midst of the rich colors and heavy perfumes, Suzanne commented that she felt drab.

A white limousine pulled into the cul-de-sac of the apartments. The bridesmaids lined up, surrounding Mariam. They were wearing matching dresses and scarves – two in all black with vivid orange, yellow, and red geometric designs, the others in satiny ochre green with gold leaf designs. Younger women wore artificial buns underneath their veils, creating a fashionable bustle. They processed slowly down the sidewalk and across the yard, waving small crocheted flags and ululating. The young married women, Noorda and Isha, flanked either end of the procession. Despite the festivities, the young women were somber. Mariam's eyes were downcast. I had been told that the subdued expressions were intended to ward off jealousies that might arise from onlookers witnessing the joy. Even so, Suzanne, Isabel, and I beamed with happiness, looking plain-faced and pale in our headscarves and gowns. We walked alongside the procession – along with a stream of small children. Neighbors who were not Somali Bantu came outside to watch and some called out congratulations.

We followed the limousine to the Catholic Church where the wedding was being held. It would be several hours before the festivities actually started. The church hall was set up with round tables for eight, covered in white table and chair cloths with red bows. Long tables for the wedding party were placed at the front of the room, with high-backed chairs for the bride and groom. A crucifix that was hanging on the wall was removed. After two hours, we entered and found a table toward the back on the women's side of the room. Despite the mandate that men and women be seated separately, the guests mingled freely with one another. Most of the women wore gold jewelry and sumptuous hijabs threaded in gold and silver. The young men, on the other hand, dressed casually in jeans, backward ball caps, and untucked shirts. Apart from the groomsmen,

Nur was the only young man dressed formally in a fitted suit a bright pink shirt and black bow tie. Younger girls giggled with admiration when they saw him, and one boldly whispered that she was a fan of his music.

Sheiks led the procession with tambourines and drums and chanting. They were followed by the wedding party and then the older women. I scanned the procession for Khadija. Even though she was the mother of the bride, she held no esteemed spot. She was nearly indistinguishable from the rest of the crowd that moved languidly forward chanting, ululating, and slowly waving the crocheted flags. Now, the room was full. I was moved by the emotion of the procession and seeing Mariam with her young husband, surrounded by friends, family, and the extended Bantu community.

The evening was filled with joyous chanting, singing, and dancing. Suzanne and I remained toward the back of the room, unsure of what was appropriate for us. Fowzyyia had fallen asleep and we took turns holding her. Young Abdirahman approached and asked if we were enjoying ourselves. He admonished us for not mingling, and led us to the dance floor. The Sheiks sat cross-legged on a stage singing and drumming. Guests circled the floor, swaying to the rhythms. Mariam slipped her arm through the crook of her husband's arm. An elder woman moved to the center of a dance circle, her hips rocking slowly, and then raised her arm to release a cascade of dollar bills in front of the young couple. A new song began and the men came forward, and little Hassan informed us that we had to leave because this dance was just for men and boys.

At various intervals throughout the evening, the bridesmaids escorted Mariam out of the room. They processed somberly through the crowd, and then returned shortly thereafter in new outfits: Blue and white dresses that looked like Somali flags; a brilliant yellow gown with a fiery red hijab. We did not stay long enough to see Mariam's fifth dress – it was after 3 a.m. – but the guests continued to celebrate for several more hours.

We slept late the next day and drove to Khadija's house for noon. A group had already assembled on her front stoop. Inside, Khadija was sitting on the living room floor with another woman. An older woman in Western clothes was in the kitchen cleaning. I asked if it was okay to walk on the freshly mopped floor. The woman replied yes, and I noted that she had an American accent.

> "Are you a friend from the mosque?" I asked.
>
> "No, I'm not Muslim. I'm a neighbor that lives over there." She pointed vaguely across the basketball court behind the apartment. "I knew these kids when they were little all the way up to their weddings. When they first moved in some people were being rude to them. I say that we are all the same."

The neighbor's name was Margaret. She had mopped the kitchen floor and scrubbed the stove. The cauldrons that cooked the rice and chicken were now soaking. Food was put away, trash bundled. I took a bag over to the dumpster that was piled high with garbage and tossed it to the top. I offered to help but she refused my offer saying that she was almost finished. Later when I passed by the kitchen I saw her supervising a young Somali Bantu woman while she emptied the refrigerator.

Batula came through living room balancing a bottle of oil on her head. She asked me to visit her house. I visited Batula's home where she promptly fell asleep on the floor while her daughter served me a large plate of fried corn and her husband lectured me on the differences between Somali Bantu and American Blacks. (I did not attempt to dispute his statements, many of which were based on stereotypes.) Afterward I drove to Isha's where Suzanne and Isabel were eating pizza with Isha's out-of-town sister and her unruly children. Isha needed to go to Mariam's house but first had to purchase food that she could prepare for the new couple during their first week of marriage. While we shopped in the grocery section of Walmart, she talked about the stressful demands of the wedding celebration. As the older sister, she had additional responsibilities that included purchasing household gifts, cooking for the couple during the "honeymoon" period, and instructing Mariam on marital hygiene. This was in addition to the work she already had as the primary caregiver of her five children and sole wage earner for her large family. AbdiR's absence placed additional burdens on her capacity to perform these roles. He contributed little to the household beyond paying the mortgage on the house, yet wanted to claim the children as his tax deductions. Isha felt alone in her predicament – she couldn't rely upon her mother to intervene in the way that her deceased father may have done.

Mariam's house was fully furnished by her in-laws. The décor was similar to that of many Somali Bantu homes – occupied by a large entertainment center with a large flat-screen television and a sectional

couch. Ornate tea-sets with small cups decorated the shelves of the entertainment center. Mariam decided to not choose the typical Somali sectional couch that most homes had – stiff backed chairs that hugged the edges of the room. Instead, she opted for a softer-cushioned couch and love seat set – similar in size and seating, but distinctly American. Upstairs in their bedroom, the couple had an enormous four poster bed with a highboy. A laptop sat open on the bed – a gift from Isha to her sister. Mariam was tired and happy. She was now a married woman with her own house and her own things. Through her marriage she has enlarged the Somali Bantu community; yet, in doing so, she was more fully the subject of her own life.

One Year Later

When I visited again in October 2015, Mariam had passed through several important milestones: she was a wife, mother, and a high school graduate. In a few months she would enroll in college. Earlier in the year she resumed her presence on social media, using the forum to represent herself as the pious and devoted wife. Her posts were almost exclusively dedicated to religious exhortations or expressions of affection for her husband. In the few photographs she shared, she was with her husband or youngest niece, dressed elegantly in brightly colored hijabs and dresses, heavy gold jewelry, her eyes carefully made up to emphasize their almond shape. In one photograph, she and her husband appeared to be dancing: he was in a half bow before her, holding her hand. She was barefoot, one foot before the other, her hip thrust in mid-sway. They looked at one another with delight. She wrote, "Oh how much I love u Salah Omar Ahmed."

Several months prior to my October visit, I had received a Facebook message with the photo of a newborn infant: "Thats ma daughter." I asked if she was teasing me, but, no the baby had been born a few days earlier. Mariam was recovering at her mother's house for 45 days, which was customary for first-time mothers. Despite her stated plan to wait a while before having children so that she could pursue her college education, the baby was conceived soon after she married. She graduated a month later from Clara Mohammed school, a Muslim school that served many of the Somali Bantu children. Her situation as a young, married mother in high school was not unprecedented. Even though schoolwork was hard toward the end of her pregnancy because she felt tired and heavy (she used the word

"lazy"), and, she sometimes had to miss school for doctor's appointments, she graduated on time. In a photograph of the event, she is posed with family, her mortar board perched atop her hijab like a beret.

Mariam enjoyed married life. She had more freedom to do what she wanted to do without being told "no" by her mother. Mariam lifted Aisha to her shoulder and patted her back while she described how she would be different than her parents were with her. She wanted to be a parent who was involved with her children. She couldn't talk to her mother about things like school. And so many Somali Bantu parents used fear and physical punishment to control their children.

Mariam decided that weddings were "overrated," a waste of time and money, even though she herself was drawn in to the materialism of it (as evidenced by her five wedding dresses that she changed into throughout the celebration). Mariam stated that the big wedding and all of its trappings was influenced by their living in the United States. Sometimes, she said, young women wore the white, Western wedding dress and had their shoulders bare and their hair loose and uncovered. This behavior deviated from the religious dimensions of the wedding. She posted on her Facebook page:

> There so many of us Bantu in the USA if we could come together and rise money to build a big beautiful *masjid* but we are too busy wasting our money on wedding and other pointless stuff that won't do nothing for you in this *dunya* but if we build a *masjid* imagine everytime some prays there the amount of reward you can get .....(October 14, 2015)[72]

Months later, Mariam posted, "I chose Islam over culture" (April 6, 2016) – a statement that further complicated the meaning of Somali Bantu identity in diaspora and the signifying practice of the wedding celebration as a means of cultural sustainability and social reproduction. Yet, I had noticed over the years of my association with the Muse family that doing Somali Bantu was ever more closely entwined with doing Islam.[73]

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72 *Dunya* is an Arabic word for the temporal world. *Masjid* is a mosque.

73 The confluence of Bantu and Islam was most apparent to me in how women dressed. When I first met Khadija in 2005 she was wearing a garment tied over one shoulder, the other shoulder bare, with a head scarf that tucked behind her ears and covered her hair, leaving her neck exposed—an outfit that was common among women living throughout the Jubba Valley. After moving to

Mariam's experiences as described here represent one view of the Somali Bantu wedding as a source of cultural sustainability and social reproduction. When she spoke about her decisions related to marriage, from the engagement to this particular young man to the kind of wedding that was planned, there were hints of submission to the authority of tradition. Yet, marriage also signaled for Mariam the path to adulthood and, with it, a "voice" of her own. However, "voice" in this context should not be confused with a Western, liberal feminist perspective of the autonomous self. Mayanthi Fernando, who studied how Muslim French women reconciled dominant secular interpretations of autonomy and religious authority with their constitution of self as religious subjects, argues that notions of autonomy and obligation are not framed as a relationship of opposition in the imaginations of younger Muslim women in diaspora. Rather, these notions are "inextricably linked." (Fernando, 2010, pp. 26-8) Similarly, Mariam's "voice" is the Bantu-Muslim voice grounded in her lived experience of growing up as a first generation Somali Bantu in the United States. Marriage, marked by the wedding celebration, was the chance to further construct Somali Bantu identity. For Mariam, this identity needed to include the advantages available to other young women in the United States – namely, the chance to pursue education – as well as be defined by Islam. As Mariam's story demonstrates, Islamic precepts are vital to distinguishing the Somali Bantu experience in the United States, to sustaining its values in the midst of United States materialism and individualism.

However, the confluence of wedding and marriage are complex. Despite the importance of the wedding celebration, as evidenced by the proliferation of wedding videos as cultural objects, there is nonetheless a plurality of experiences embedded in the rituals surrounding marriage. Mariam's cousin, Malyun, was engaged to be married during the summer of 2015. Her mother, Binto, asked if I

Milwaukee, the outfit evolved: the head scarf was replaced by a veil that covered head and shoulders, and eventually a hijab that allowed only the face to show. Likewise, women's dresses covered their shoulders and often their arms as well. In one of his few Facebook posts, A* shared photographs of Arabic abayas with the admonishment that women cover their beauty according to the Quran.

would be coming, the kind of open invitation that is extended broadly to the Somali Bantu community and friends. (I did not attend.) When the time for her wedding came to be, I searched their Facebook pages for photographs. Instead, I noted some strongly worded statements.

> "Fuck u all b****** live in Milwaukee," Isha wrote. "Every wedding they have to say something uff I hate Bantu people." (July 30, 2015)[74]

And on that same day from Nur, "I'm so sick of these *ojee masunguli* shit. I'm Mexican from now on."[75]

I inquired about these messages. Isha told me that problems arose with Malyun's wedding celebration. Preparations were underway for a wedding similar to Mariam's; however, Abdirahman decided at the last minute that there wouldn't be a party. Instead, he would give a lecture. Malyun said that she would not go to the wedding hall if he was giving a lecture – and in fact followed through with her protest. Because Isha was the adult woman in charge of the bride, she was blamed for "messing up" the wedding when Malyun did not appear. The old men and women changed the story to say that she was jealous of Abdirahman's new wife, and that was why she interfered with the plans made by the sheik. Of course, this wasn't the actual story. Rather, Abdirahman used the wedding to further his own agenda and to gain recognition. According to Isha, Abdirahman's public face covered the realities of his personal life – that he was often quick-tempered and failed to meet his obligations to his first wife and children. As this example demonstrates, the wedding celebration often becomes a site for magnifying the fissures within the community, a topic that will be discussed in more depth in chapter six.

While Malyun refused to participate in a wedding celebration that was appropriated for other purposes, Nur chose to forego a wedding entirely. Despite his enthusiasm at Mariam's wedding celebration, Nur entered into a love marriage that he contracted with the bride herself. The young woman, Iqra, was a more recent immigrant. She had seen Aw Ali's comedies and music videos when she was living in Nairobi. They met after she arrived in the United States and grew fond of one

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74 This posting has since been removed.

75 *Ojee*, typically spelled *oggi* in the literature, is a pejorative term used against Somali Bantu in Somalia, derived from the Italian word for "today." *Masunguli* refers here to *Mushunguli* (see chapter four).

another. Eventually, they engaged. They spent time together. When I visited in 2015, Iqra sat on the floor at Nur's feet, her arm draped over this knees – a physical intimacy that was uncharacteristic of the more closely monitored arranged engagements between other young Somali Bantu men and women.

Isha's attitudes reflect this. She tells me that Somali Bantu young people marry early because they can't date before marriage. They get married early, which then diminishes their ability to complete their education. Isha thinks it would be better if young adults got engaged and spent time getting to know each other while they finished school, and saved marriage and children for later. What she likes about American relationships is the long engagement and courtship that precedes marriage when the couple get to know one another well (and opens the space for leaving the relationship if the couple prove to be incompatible). This was not the case for her own marriage, which was arranged by her father when she was still a little girl.

Isha's attitudes about intimate relationships also reveal the constraints faced by young women within the existing system that privileges men. Isha acknowledges that her religion permits men to have more than one wife; however, the decision to take a second wife should be made only under certain conditions (where the first wife is unable to fulfill marital obligations), and both wives should be treated equally. What occurs, however, it that men take second wives "to have fun." Drawing upon her own experience, the husband's attention gravitates to the new love interest, along with all of the family resources. Yet, women are unable to initiate a divorce unless their family intercedes on their behalf. Fortunately, Isha was able to convince an uncle to arrange a meeting whereby a divorce was negotiated. Tensions remain, especially since they co-own the house where Isha lives. Abdirahman has since moved to Green Bay, but refuses to allow Isha to bring another man into her home. Isha ignores Abdirahman's threat, but has stated that she is only interested now in a man who is single. Her first priority is her children.

Isha is not without suitors. Numerous men have expressed interest in her through Facebook, and some have asked that she come to live with them. Many of these men already have wives, which is a signal to Isha to discontinue the relationship. She would be back in the same situation that she just left. What she wants is to position herself to improve her English proficiency so that she can work towards a college degree and obtain employment in social work.

Thus, she is cautious about entering another relationship with someone who will want more children. Isha has five children already and she is still young – only 26 – so she has many more years of fertility ahead of her. She says that it is usually the guys who want children soon after marrying. However, the women are the ones that do the caring work. "Somali Bantu regard having children as a gift from God", she states, but the financial realities of caring for a large family in the United States are significant. Thus, many women take birth control, often without their husband's knowledge.

Conclusion

Young women in diaspora are re-negotiating cultural identity within their new context, availing themselves of the liberal aspects of United States culture while simultaneously reshaping dimensions of the culture carried with them. (Vatsa, 2016) However, the meaning and significance of cultural practices are nonetheless sustained as critical markers of identity. When the Somali Bantu came to the United States, they were expected to restructure their lives in some fundamental ways: dissolving polygamous marriages and extended family households in order to fit the nuclear family model; abandoning communal rites of passage and traditional healing practices in exchange for compulsory schooling and institutionalized medicine; altering child rearing and disciplinary practices and handing over their systems of mutual support and conflict resolution to bureaucratic authorities.[76] In view of these cultural losses that accompanied resettlement, and the consequential disempowerment of older, non-English speaking and non-literate Somali Bantu, the value of practices such as the wedding celebration expand in importance. Even as the younger generation interrogate aspects of cultural practice where change might benefit the larger community, the event remains core to community life.

76 I observed this sort of renegotiation of fundamental values among the Somali Bantu in Roanoke. A Somali Bantu woman smacked a neighbor's child for misbehaving. A third party witnessing this reported the woman to the police and child abuse charges were brought against her. The English-speaking elders of the community asked the judge in the case if they could resolve the issue themselves, but the judge declined their request. While the community obeyed the judge's orders, they still convened for a dialogue on how to handle discipline in their new context.

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CHAPTER 10

Local Dynamics, International Intervention and Failing Peace Process in Somalia

Calvince Omondi Barack

Introduction

The international community's efforts in the Somali peace process has been characterized by failure from time to time. Amidst the failures, the international community continue to engage in Somalia in an attempt to reconstruct a working governmental structure through transitional governments. The failed attempts have been traced to the top-down approaches that the international community always adopt with regard to the peace in Somalia. The top-down approach has led to the alienation of the local traditional governance and leadership system which has invoked the feelings of foreign occupation. The foreign imposter feelings have influenced the perception of the international community as partisan and has often created divisions among the members of international community with regard to the adoption of a workable approach in Somalia. However, the case of Somaliland has demonstrated that peace and security is achievable in Somalia. This has created a dilemma in Somalia especially on the side of the international community on the reasons of failure to achieve peace and stability in Somalia despite the availability of peace in Somaliland. This chapter therefore, examines the international community's intervention in Somalia by probing the activities while using the lenses of hybridity to provide insights on the reasons behind the often failed peace in Somalia.

International interventions that seek to restore peace and stability has been associated with the liberal notion of peace (Paris, 2004; Guttal, 2005 and Elmi, 2014). This means that the pursuit of peace is

predetermined and synchronized with the general conceptualisation of the nation-state. This predetermined notion of the nation-state has influenced the international community's intervention in Somalia since the collapse of the Siyad Barre government in January 1991. The international intervention has attempted to restore the nation-state as is commonly conceived in Somalia right from the immediate post-Barre government to the post 2012 constitution. The attempts can be understood from the general leanings in favor of liberal democracy as the means of organizing a nation-state (Elmi, 2014: 129). Subsequently, transitional governments have been put in place as a mechanism of conflict resolution by peace-builders (2004). The essence of establishing these transitional governments is to entrench the neo-liberal practices that allow for free market economy like private ownership of property and liberal democratic practices (Guttal, 2005).

However, one striking feature of these transitional governments assembled with the help of the international community is their lack of legitimacy and general acceptance among the different clans within Somalia. Subsequently, it has been averred that "these international interventions can sunder the very state they seek to resurrect" (Ahmad, 2012: 314). This has been pegged on the manner in which the enormous resources that come with the international interventions alters local dynamics and relationships in the war-torn societies. For instance, the international resources compensate for the need of taxes which moderates the relationship between the warlords and the local society members. The warlords therefore, become less accountable to the local society in which they operate hence making them more violent and predatory towards the members of the society. This has alienated the ordinary Somalis and hindered their effective participation in the peace process, robing the process of inclusivity and fairness (Farah and Toure, 2018: 185). The attempt to establish a transitional government in an environment where warlords become more predatory with heightened incentives for peace spoilers, only undermine the possibility of peace that the international intervention seeks to establish (Ahmad, 2012: 314). The results has been prolonged war and lack of support for the transitional governmental structures established by the international community.

From the foregoing, some scholars have called attention to the local processes that have been able to yield peace as points of lesson

that the international community can draw upon in crafting their intervention strategies especially in Somalia (Ahmad, 2012; Bruton, 2009; Farah and Toure, 2018). This is based on the fact that the conflict in Somalia is identity based hence more protracted (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). Subsequently, Bronwyn Bruton (2009: 81) while considering the strategic options for the US in Somalia, quipped that in its interest and that of Somalia, "Washington must abandon its hope of building a viable state" in Somalia. This stems from two main factors. First, the warlords that the international community members always negotiate with are less accountable to the local clan leadership since their allegiance are in favor of accessing international resources. Secondly, there is lack of a dominant clan in Somalia which can form a legitimate central government which makes the clan identity the most important factor both in war and politics (Biegon, 2018). Thus, it can been averred that peace cannot be kept by any single clan in Somalia nor warlords who are insensitive to the local Somali culture and clan leadership. Subsequently, the support to any particular clan nor establishment of the central government by the US or any other international player holds high level of futility (Bruton, 2009: 89).

The failed attempts to establish a centralized government in Somalia points to the failure of the international community's intervention approaches. For instance, the former president of Somalia – Abdullahi Yusuf – admitted to his government's inability to govern which created room for the NGOs and fundamentalists to take charge of the Somali society (Elmi, 2014: 131). This situation has been true with most of the transitional governments put in place through different international intervention measures. From the year 2000, most of the international mediation endeavors resulted in the establishment of transitional governments like the Transitional National Government which existed between 2000 and 2004 and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which was in place between 2004 and 2012. These governments due to lack of local approvals and legitimacy operated from Nairobi in Kenya. The attempts to boost the level of the legitimacy and accommodation of these transitional governments by the locals has witnessed the use of power-sharing approach. The power-sharing formula that has been attempted in Somalia has assumed the form of 4.5 which incorporates the four major clans as part of the 4 and the other smaller clans as the part of 0.5 (Mohamud, 2019). However, these

efforts have born little fruit given the involvement of identity question, the intractability that this conflict has assumed and the general disconnect between the locals and the national leaders.

However, there are evidences especially from Somaliland where even without an intensive international interventions, the clan leaders have agreed to work together in establishing a working governance structure. These governance structures, stand in direct contrast with the ineffective and largely unrecognized federal governments established with the help of the international community in Mogadishu. Despite other scholars having written on international intervention in Somalia, this chapter takes a look at the political culture based on clannish in Somalia and how the international peace-builders can use local and indigenous approaches in crafting a governance structure that enjoys legitimacy from different significant segments of Somalia state. Subsequently, this chapter is preoccupied with the question: How does the clan-based political culture and international intervention interact to influence peace and stability in Somalia? In addressing this concern, the concept of hybridity as a conceptual framework is used to explore the interaction between the local, national and the international with emphasis on the importance of the prevailing political culture in Somalia. The case of Somaliland has been explore to exhibit the value of indigenous processes in securing peace and stability. Subsequently, the efforts of the international community in Somalia has been examined in a historical fashion to illuminate the need for sensitivity to local political culture. Finally, this chapter has explored the necessity of interaction between the local political culture and the international intervention efforts in achieving lasting peace and stability.

Method

The need to obtain data on the historical accounts of international community's involvement in Somalia necessitated the use of publications of various sources that document the Somali peace process. The reports and publications by organisations that are working in Somalia for peace-building purposes have provided valuable insights on the importance and need for sensitivity to local factors by international community in their peacebuilding efforts in Somalia. In addition to the documents, interviews have been conducted using interview schedules with professionals working on the Somali peace and those of Somali origin to get an inside view on

the causes of failure of international intervention measures in Somalia and the role that clan-based political culture play in according legitimacy to the governmental structures in Somalia. These have combined to give valuable information on the causes of failures by the international community in their intervention in Somalia.

Conceptual Framework

Hybridity as a conceptual frame has provided the lenses through which the failure by international community to establish a working transitional government in Somalia has been deciphered. The essence of hybridity is its ability to appreciate the "bottom–up lenses" which are less appreciated by International Relations scholars on peace and stabilisation efforts (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2015: 2). Hybridity enables the actors to appreciate the intricate relationship that exist between different group of actors as well as their limitations. The continued failure on the part of the international community in their intervention efforts in Somalia, can therefore be understood within the lenses of hybridity which recognizes the limitation of international interveners. Hybridity and hybrid politic orders provide the first step in understanding the forces in play "between diverse and competing structures of authority, sets of rules, logics of order and claims to power that co-exist, overlap, interact and intertwine"(Jackson and Albrecht, 2018: 37). Hybridity, therefore, enables "multiple sources of power in a society compete, coalesce, seep into each other and engage in mimicry, domination or accommodation" (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2015: 2). To effectively understand the role that clannism plays in Somali society with regard to the establishment of a governmental structure, there is need to appreciate the ongoing negotiations between the different forces in society. Hybridity offers the opportunity to interrogate the different sources of power, how they relate and interact to create a stable and enduring governance system.

Hybridity enhances the capacity of local actors enabling them to play a more instrumental role in state-building by providing room for the accommodation of customs and traditional institutions in the liberal state structures. Subsequently, hybridity reinforces legitimacy and trust among actors which then make the hybrid state systems more enduring in sustaining stability in post-conflict environment (Jackson and Albrecht, 2018: 38). The acknowledgement of the role

and agency of the local actors has been christened the "local turn in peacebuilding" (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). In similar vein, Ken Menkhaus has averred that the "local communities are not passive in the face of state failure and insecurity, but instead adapt in a variety of ways to minimize risk and increase predictability in their dangerous environments" (2007: 75). These assertions have therefore directed research into the critical role played by the local actors as well as their agency and sources of legitimacy in state-building in post-conflict environments. Hybridity therefore, points to the failure of the conventional Weberian state structures to "reflect the realities on the ground" especially with regard to the local power dynamics (Jackson and Albrecht, 2018: 40).

Stemming from the above therefore, hybridity attempts to demonstrate that violence and the evolving governance system stemming from it are more authentic and acceptable to the local actors over and above the externally imposed form of Weberian state (Boege et al., 2008). However, local actors are observed as dynamic and evolving due to internal factors that help to reshape the traditional institutions to adapt to the changes occasioned by both internal and external factors as local actors interact and transact within and across state boundaries. Hybridity therefore, provides room to fluidity among the developed social systems and structures (Mac Ginty, 2011). For instance, the non-state actor in the name of Sudan People's Liberation Army which challenged the Sudanese government, finally formed the government of South Sudan in 2011 hence a demonstration of the fluidity among local non-state actors. Similarly, in Sierra Leone, "a paramount chief in Sierra Leone, for instance, is a traditional authority, but is also defined within the constitution and has a formal role" (Jackson and Albrecht, 2018: 42). This points to the fluid nature that traditional authorities can play in a hybrid political order through a constant negotiation process between roles and positions.

The constant negotiations makes hybridity a long-term process that allows for balancing and rebalancing of societal forces thus suitable in understanding long term stability (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2012). As the balancing and rebalancing of power takes place over a period of time, hybridity bequeaths the stakeholders with dynamism that tolerate different perspectives and views in the peace process. For instance, hybridity has compelled liberal peacemakers to handle its own self-weaknesses and engage an array of actors which

enhances inclusivity and legitimacy of the peacemaking processes (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2015: 4). It has been observed for instance that due to hybridity as employed in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraqi, deals were signed with groups that are often regarded as illegitimate in the strict sense of liberal internationalism (Maley, 2013). The fact that the prolonged conflict in Somalia has generated many different kinds of actors, makes hybridity very appropriate in understanding how such actors' interests can be balanced in the pursuit of peace. Hybridity therefore helps in establishing governmental structures that enjoys legitimacy of all relevant parties for sustainable peace (Kraushaar and Lambach, 2009:1).

The dynamism that is offered by hybridity, has been lauded by Constantinou, (2007) who has pointed to the moderation role that hybridity play in overcoming rigidity that is often associated with ethnic conflicts while probing the permanency of the nation-state. This dynamism involves a trajectory of empathy and emancipation which does not often fit in the continuum of "modernisation and marketisation" that sometimes transnational and international elites often pursue (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2015: 12). This makes hybrid peace to preoccupy itself with the questions of marginalisation, ethics and exercise of power. The parameters which are key in establishing a lasting peaceful solutions. Similarly, hybridity calls for a contextualized peace process that draws its legitimacy from both local, national and international sources and emphasizing on the essence of the bottom-up approach in developing governance structures that would nurture and sustain peace (Richmond, 2008). The contextualisation helps to expose the micro-level which is rich in "organic and semi-organic forms of governmentality" that the international community seldom notice (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2015: 15). However, they are these micro-level forms of governability that define the everyday organisation and way of life for individuals in the societies. Therefore, it has been argued that hybridity allows for adaptation of societal institutions into the state governance structures for increased legitimacy (Mbembe, 2001). The house of elders in Somaliland is instructive in this regard.

The Case for Sensitivity to Local Political Culture

There is need to understand the organisation of the Somali society especially its political culture which is hardened along clan lines for effective International intervention. For instance Bruton, has

reported that the Somali diaspora community tend to coalesce in cities or regions along their clan lines especially for those living in the US – Minnesota and Washington, D.C.-, those in Canada as well as those in Norway or even Yemen (2009: 93). Subsequently, the division along the clan lines has been cited as one of the major obstacles behind the efforts to rally the diaspora to lend hand in crafting a governance structure and facilitate developments in Somalia (Ibid: 94). The hardened clan identities among the diaspora has been attributed to the nature of conflict in Somalia which has manifested itself as "low-level communal violence" with strong clan affiliations (Eklöw and Krampe, 2019: 4). These communal and clan-based politics always have always influenced the national level politics which has then hardened the clan identities making clan issues the most important factor in the Somalian politics.

The division of the Somali society into two major groups of the federal government and the Al Shabab has been conceived as blurred given the fact that both groups are motivated by "clannish and economic interests" (Bruton, 2009: 85). This position is contrary to the observation that has been made by the US and other Western diplomats who make a clear distinction between the federal government and the al Shabab with the latter always considered as a terrorist group that does not mean well for peace and stability in Somalia. From the foregoing, a case is made for the need to address low-level communal conflicts within the Somali society in the interest for long term peace and stability. This means that the local dynamics is what accounts for conflict in Somalia. This position is supported by the recommendations made by Bronwyn Bruton who while taking cognizance of the approaches that the US has employed in the Middle East has advocated for locally-based and targeted approaches that incorporates a wide range of actors from traditional and religious leaders to civil society actors (2009: 81). The adoption of dynamism that come with hybridity in the choice of actors to a peace process is instructive in the case of Somalia.

The failure by the international interventionists in Somalia to take cognizance of the local dynamics has also been pointed to as a threat to the Somali culture which must be resisted. The fact that the low-level communal leadership in Somalia feel left out in the negotiations of the governmental structures, has made them to condemn the efforts put in place by the interventionists as attempts "to promote non-Somali values" and hold the potential to brutalize the Somalis in

their country (Bruton, 2009: 88). For instance, the Djibouti Peace Conference which strove to establish a transitional government failed because it was negatively influenced by Egypt and Italy who favored Mr. Mahdi as the best candidate to lead the transitional government (Adam, 2008: 156). This conference therefore presented lack of neutrality which is a key principle in intervention (Mayer, 2004: 85). Similarly, the conference denied the participants an opportunity for genuine participation which is important in crediting the process and the outcome with legitimacy. Subsequently, Bøås and Gaas (2012) have pointed out that Somalia has experienced "more than fourteen attempts to restore a unitary state" through international interventions that have not only failed but are followed by intensive conflict.

Evidence of a Working Inter-Clan Formation: The Case of Somaliland

Despite the continued and attempted failure to establish a transitional government in Somalia, the Somaliland region has been able to establish a working government that has been able to secure peace and stability in its jurisdiction. Somaliland which declared its independence on May 18, 1991 after the collapse of the Barre government is a classic case of a successful hybrid governmental system which has sprung from the bottom up processes and forces. Despite its lack of recognition as a state from the Weberian perspective, Somaliland has a well "functioning democratic government, with disciplined national army and free market economic system" (Ahmad, 2012: 327). The peace in Somaliland has been credited to the local people who have pro-actively engaged in reconciliation conferences which brought a continuum of local actors in the interest of hybridity to craft a governmental structure (Saed, 2012). This process has been observed to have begun at the sub-clan levels by persuading the fighting groups to halt the fights and address the differences which served as the building blocks for the Borama conference as the major peace and reconciliation front in 1993 (Ibid). The entire peace and reconciliation process took a bottom-up approach.

The Somaliland bottom-up peace process traces its roots to the February 1991 peace conference that was held at Berbera which finally terminated the war. This was followed by a meeting which comprised of all non-Isaaq clans by the Somalia National Movement

(SNM) in March 1991 that strove to iron out all the differences that existed between the Isaaq clans following an earlier agreement among the liberation movements (Davies, 1994: 15). This meeting provided a platform for a congress that brought together "representatives of all clans at the end of April. The congress became known as the Guurti Congress of the Elders" (Jhazbhay, 2009: 60). It is through this particular congress that Somaliland was declared independent on May 18, 1991. Despite the optimism, war broke out in March 1992, over the control of the port and its revenue in Berbera. This conflict was settled through the Sheikh conference which also brought on board clan elders and the congress members. The Sheikh conference resolved that Berbera port was a public facility and the revenue that would be generated from the port would be for the Somaliland government. Similarly, this conference also instituted the Guurti as a national council of elders comprising of representatives of all clans and responsible for clan militia management in the preservation of peace and security in Somaliland (Farah & Lewis, 1997).

The Borama Conference has become the most defining moment for the Somaliland since it involved a community conference or what has been christened *shir beeleed* in Somali from January to May 1993. This conference is significant in several ways for the peace and stability of the Somaliland. First, this conference presided over by council of elders "guurti" handed over power peacefully from Abdulrahman Tuur who headed the Somali National Movement to Egal who formed a civilian government (Bradbury et al., 2003: 450). Secondly, the conference also resulted into a peace charter founded on traditions of the Somali people and the Islamic principles which outlined the code of conduct based on "*Xeer"* which encompasses the "written and unwritten contracts, laws, agreements or social codes among clans" (Jhazbhay, 2009: 61). This led to what Brons has termed as a locally engineered process in state formation (2001: 250). Thus, Aisha Ahmad has postulated that the bottom-up approach that the Borama conference took without international interference underlie the Somaliland peace and explains the challenges of the south (2012: 328). Finally, Bradbury et al. points to the power-sharing nature of the Borama conference that instituted clans' leadership into the governance system as a strong foundation for the Somaliland peace process (2003: 460). The resultant governmental structure has roots in both western and traditional forms of government thus, a form of hybridity that has been able to nurture peace in Somaliland.

The dynamic hybrid system used in Somaliland is based on the *beel* system which lays emphasis on the kinship system as the "organizing principle of Somali society" (Jhazbhay, 2009: 62). This makes the clans such as the Dir, Isaq and Darood as well as the lineage within and across these clans the most important factor in Somaliland (Farah, 1999: 4). The gains at the Borama conference were challenged by the breakout of war between November 1994 and October 1996 between the supporters of the former president Tuur and president Egal. This necessitated for another conference in Hargeisa which lasted from October 1996 to February 1997. This conference helped in ending the conflict and paved way for a constitutional moment in Somaliland (Ibid: 67). This conference however, attracted huge participation by delegates including women. The participation of different actors and the increased number of actors enhanced the approval rating and acceptability of this conference thereby, cementing the legitimacy of the Somaliland governmental structure.

These conferences in their reconciliation attempts acknowledged the huge costs of the conflict but did not strive to quantify the costs for compensation purposes (Walls, 2009: 379). This eradicated the disagreements over the manner and value of the compensation which then, facilitated a compromise and agreement during the conferences. The clan members were urged to forget their grievances in forging a unity agreement which buttressed the peace gains during the conferences as it eliminated the nagging and shifting of goal posts during the negotiations (Byrne, 2013: 121). The fact that many people supported this route to conflict resolution, accorded the conference process the legitimacy that it required for the resultant governmental structure to function effectively in nurturing peace. The essence of the agreement on the past and the costs of conflict has been aptly captured by Walls (2009: 386) who has opined that a settled past provides a precedent that establishes and nurtures trust and honesty which are critical to the negotiating parties.

The second principle that has nurtured the Somaliland peace has been the anchorage of the peace process in the hands of the clan elders as an insurance against anarchy (Jhazbhay, 2009: 58). The House of Elders is for instance charged with the responsibility of looking into legislations that have been approved by the House of Representatives before the presidential assent. Similarly, the House of the Elders is charged with the responsibility of approving legislations

that touch on "religion, traditions (culture) and security" (Republic of Somaliland Constitution, 2006: 21). The provision of security by the house of elders has been premised on the principle that intertwines, individuals' actions to their clans which then makes the elders from such clans accountable to such acts (Walls, 2009: 386). This principle makes clan leaders accountable for the actions of their clan members to the House of Elders which behooves them to promote moderation within their own clans. The roles and functions of the House of Elders and the state-building process in Somaliland has been enjoined at the hip-bone thus, anchoring the process on the traditional-society based consensus approach and not an imposition from above (Byrne, 2013: 121). Subsequently, Seth Kaplan (2008: 144) has averred that given the Somaliland's case, political structures should be a reflection of a society's culture, history, people and time.

The third most important principle for the success of peace and state-building in Somaliland has been the embrace of unwritten traditional law. The Somaliland as part of the British colony had a system of unwritten traditional law that it followed even during the colonisation period. This law was within the restricted purview of Somali elders who exercised it, within the entire Somaliland region (Drysdale, 2004: 4). The clan elders were able to enforce their decisions derived from this law by the help of the "clan police" who provided the threat necessary for compliance to the guidance and decisions derived from this law. This law guaranteed protection to each and every member of the society through "*tol*" which is "a self-contained group of genealogical lineage" presided over by a clan elder (Ibid: 5). The system has been incorporated with "Xeer" contract system whose authority resides in the laws and customs (Davies, 1994: 14). The incorporation of the traditional law, the tol and Xeer into the Somaliland governmental structure has imbued the structure with Somali cultural practices and values that are critical for general acceptance, approval and legitimacy.

The fourth factor that has promoted stability in Somaliland is the decentralisation and the inclusion of the women in the peace-building process. The step by step method through which the conferences were organized by incorporating different clans into the state-building and peace process has also been appreciated in decentralizing power (Byrne, 2013). This has reduced the total load of expectations on the Somaliland government hence reduced the tension at the inter-clan level for the sustenance of peace. The

decentralisation is inspired by the need to tame marginalisation and the quest for decentralisation which had been at the center-stage of the SNM's campaign against the government of Barre before its collapse (Davies, 1994: 13). The fragmentation of "the political, territorial and military" has also helped in facilitating the decentralisation efforts (Jhazbhay, 2009: 72). Women have also been included in the peace process as observers in the Borama and Hargeisa conferences. The Women's participation has expanded from the mere observer status they were accorded in the Borama conference to membership in the House of Elders from 2012 when the first woman was admitted to the Guurti. This opportunity has enabled the women to secure a seat within the House of Elders hence forming part of the 82 elders. These bottom-up approaches coupled with sensitivity to culture has enabled Somaliland to develop hybrid governmental structure that are dynamic, accommodative and supportive of the peace-building process in Somaliland with little to no support by the international community.

The success that accompanied the parliamentary and local district elections held on May 31, 2021 testify to the working and stability of the Somaliland governmental system. Despite the fact that this kind of election had not been held for the past 16 years due to disagreement over the constitution of the National Electoral Commission (NEC), after the establishment of the NEC, the polls were conducted in a fair and transparent manner which points to Somaliland's commitment to democracy and stability. Democracy was enhanced by the participation in the election by three different political parties-the Somaliland National Party, known as Waddani; the Justice and Welfare Party (UCID); and the Peace, Unity and Development Party also known as Kulmiye. Further, this election attracted 246 candidates for the 82 available parliamentary seats which points to the confidence among the political elites in the electoral system (Stebach, 2021). This was reflected in the results where the Ruling party Kulmiye was only able to garner 30 seats which left the two opposition parties of Waddani with 31 seats and UCID with 21 seats hence conferring majority seats to the opposition (Aljazeera, 2021). However, no woman was elected to the Somaliland parliament in this election. The failure to elect a woman in this election can be understood from the cultural perspective that excluded women as members of *Guurti* until 2012 when the first woman was admitted to the Council of Elders. The election of

women in the ballot may take some considerable time as the society adjust culturally in embracing hybridity with calls for the inclusion of a broad range of actors in the governance process.

International Intervention in Somalia

The international intervention in Somalia formed part of the first case of UN intervention following the then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's report in 1992 which was entitled "An Agenda for Peace" as a premise upon which the international community especially the UN would intervene in conflict situations in the interest of global peace and security (Ahmad, 2012: 313). Premised on this report and the dire humanitarian situation in Somalia, the United Nations operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was commissioned in October 1992 following the adoption on April 24, 1992 of resolution 751 by the UN Security Council (Johnson and Tierney, 2006: 208). The essence of which was to monitor a cessation of hostilities between Mahdi and Aideed as well as to secure the supply-lines of the humanitarian resources to UN locations within Somalia (Ahmad, 2012: 321). The UN safeguard of the aid tilted the balance of power in favor of the Mahdi group which gained access to a significant portion of "aid distribution contracts" (Ibid). This was conceived as an attempt to elevate the position of the Abgal over the Habr Gidir clan. This led to three important outcomes. First, it led to an intense opposition of the UN intervention by the Aideed group and the politicisation of the international intervention in Somalia. Secondly, it drew the United Task Force (UNITAF) into "active combat operations" with intricate clan contentions (Ibid). Finally, it led to the invocation of chapter VII of the UN charter on December 3, 1992 which authorized the UN peacekeepers to employ the use of force in Somalia for the restoration of peace and security.

From the foregoing, the international community actors under the UNITAF lost their neutrality and impartiality hence became much of the target in settling inter-clan rivalries. This led to two major challenges for the US led Operation Restore Hope under the UNITAF. First, it heightened pressure and confrontation from Somali National Alliance headed by Aideed (Aisha, 2012: 321). Second, it created the need to regain neutrality and impartiality by the international interventionists in Somalia. This resulted in the UN resolution 814 of March 26, 1993 which transferred the leadership from the US to "the new UN – commanded UNOSOM II mission"

(Ibid). The 814 resolution however, provided for the disarmament of all belligerent groups as a means through which law and order would be restored in Somalia (Johnson and Tierney, 2006: 208). Similarly, disarmament would facilitate the restoration of the state institutions, delivery of humanitarian aid and provide a smooth path for political settlement (Ahmad, 2012: 321). Given the mistrust that had been developed by the parties that saw the UNITAF forces as part of the combatants, 18 US soldiers were killed in Mogadishu in the infamous "Hawk Down". Consequently, President Clinton changed the US policy with regard to the state-building efforts in Somalia and called for the withdrawal of US forces from Somalia by March 1994. These triggered a chain of reactions which eventually saw the termination of UNOSOM II in 1995 without achieving the set objectives under resolution 814 of the UN Security Council.

Challenges of this Intervention

The first challenge with the UN intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s was lack of comprehensive understanding and sensitivity to the inter-clan rivalries that had informed the conflict. Subsequently, the awarding of significant portion of humanitarian aid distribution contracts to the Aideed group was conceived as an attempt of marginalisation which would only serve to empower the group against other groups. This was unacceptable act as it tilted the victory in favor of the Aideed. This therefore, politicized the international intervention in Somalia hence making the international intervention to fail in winning the hearts of the Somali people. The element which is critical in the success of the international interventions. Further, the international intervention led to the enmeshment of the peacekeepers into local inter-clan conflicts. This for instance led to the unfortunate killing of "73 civilians" who were engaged in "a peaceful meeting" on July 12, 1993 by U.S. forces (Bruton, 2009: 83). This kind of event reinforced the perception that had been created among the locals that the international intervention was skewed to favor particular clans. These events combined to undermine the legitimacy of the international community intervention in Somalia hence exposing the UNISOM forces to attack by the local warring groups. Eventually, this loss of neutrality and impartiality by the international community undermined its ability to achieve its set objectives in Somalia hence terminating its operations in 1995.

The second major challenge of the international intervention in Somalia has been the creation of a conducive environment for "fake NGO industry" and criminality (Ahmad, 2012: 325). This has further, marginalized the locals especially the clan-leaders by solidifying the elite-level cooperation between warlords and businessmen who see the opportunities accorded by the international community for peace-building and construction as attractive quick money loopholes (Johnson and Tierney, 2006). The presence of the UNITAF forces and their role in ensuring the delivery of aid to the interior sections of Somalia ended up empowering the Mahdi forces with their checkpoints. The presence of the aid led to a counter reaction on the part of the Somali National Alliance which sought to access the aid deliveries through the formation what has been referred to as the "suitcase NGO" as a business model (Ahmad, 2012: 325). This involves a clandestine agreement between the Somali NGO workers who serve as the gatekeepers to the international community aid resources and the local businessmen and warlords. This criminality network involves elites who have formed cartel around the access and distribution of international aid for individual financial gains in sustaining the activities of the warlords, the businessmen and the local NGO workers. This elite-level cooperation alienates the clan leaders and their traditional source of authority which earns the elites resentment from the community members. Subsequently, the agreements entered by these elites fail to enjoy the approval of the locals who perceive such agreements as imposed on them by foreigners through the cartel of elites. The evolution of the new business model that is less dynamic in terms of scope of actors and accommodation in terms of values and identities have threatened the possibility for a sustainable peace in Somalia.

The Transitional Federal Government of 2004

The major international community's intervention in Somalia after the termination of the UNISOM II in 1995 resulted in the birth of a transitional federal government TFG in 2004. This government was put in place by regional actors and received huge financial support from the UN as a route to peace in Somalia. The main role of the TFG was to attempt a balance of clan interests in gaining acceptance and legitimacy across Somalia. However, it has been observed that the TFG failed in its attempt to balance the clan interests with Darod clan from the north being the majority in government despite the fact

that the Hawiye clan is the majority clan in Somalia (Bruton, 2009: 83). This failure in balancing the interests of the local clans especially the Hawiye clan led to the formation of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) in Asmara-Eritrea as an anti-TFG movement. The under-representation of the Hawiye clan members and their leadership in the TFG precipitated the formation of competing forces which undermined both the efficacy and legitimacy of the TFG.

Despite the support by the international community for the TFG, the Arta Peace Process which established the transitional national government TNG in 2000 had failed to attract the financial support from the community. The failed support, stemmed from the international community's shift of attention following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack in the US. The Arta Peace process however, was locally owned by the Somalis and held a great promise for stability since it took care of the local interests and attempted at creating a hybrid governance structure (Farah and Toure, 2018: 184). The warlords were excluded from the negotiations which limited their interference. However, the failure to timely and effectively offer support to this process by the international community created room for manipulation by Ethiopia through proxy warlords (Elmi, 2014: 138).

In the same vein, the Mbagathi/Eldoret peace process provided another opportunity to strengthen the TFG government in its effort to achieve a balance among the clans within Somalia. However, the international community failed to rally their support behind a single force and path for peace. This was occasioned by the forging of delegates' list that increased the number and tilted the balance in favor of the warlords (Farah, 2012: 2). This led to the formation of government by a group of warlords who received support from the US as other international community members rooted for the strengthening of the TFG. The failure by the international community to unite its forces in rooting for a more inclusive and hybrid process undermined the peace process and eroded the already depleted legitimacy of TFG.

The support and favor that the warlords received led to the anti-warlord campaign in 2006 by a coalition of Islamists under the Union of Islamic Courts. This heterogeneous group was able to swiftly establish its control over the entire country by establishing sharia law and opening up Mogadishu port. This occurred again without much

of the international community's support hence pointing to the possibility of the success of a locally owned peace process. However, the government established by the Union of Islamic Courts was undermined by several factors which finally led to its collapse. First, there was disagreement over the support for the government of the Union of Islamic Courts. Whereas, the European diplomats regarded the UIC as the most viable route to peace in Somalia, the US objected (Elmi, 2014: 138). The US was not settled with the idea of Al Shabab as the military wing of the UIC government. This left the International community divided on which path to follow in pursuit of peace in Somalia. Secondly, the Al Shabab factor made Ethiopia to become nervous of a government with a jihadist army as its official military as her neighbor. Propelled by this nervousness, Ethiopia convinced the US of the possibility of Al Qaeda link with UIC government (Bruton, 2009: 84). The results was the Ethiopia's invasion of the government of the Union of Islamic Courts in December 2006 which led to the collapse of this government (Elmi, 2014: 138). Subsequently, the disagreement among the international community members on which route and group to support in Somalia for sustainable peace led to the end of a hybrid government that organically evolved from below.

The 2006-Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia

The fears nursed by Ethiopia over the presence of Al Shabab as an official army of the Union of Islamic Courts led to their intervention in Somalia in December 2006 which made the Ethiopian troops to occupy Mogadishu until early 2009. The immediate consequence of the occupation of Mogadishu was the collapse of the government of Union of Islamic Courts with some of its leaders seeking asylum in Eritrea while others "scattering into the bush in southern Somalia" (Bruton, 2009: 84). The occupation also led to the resuscitation of the detested transitional federal government. The TFG was supported by the Ethiopian forces backed by the US under – the Alliance Against Terrorism and the Restoration of Peace (AATRP) – which was to serve two main purposes. The first important purpose was to quash the influence of UIC and the second most important role was to combat terrorism (Little, 2012: 191). The attempts at resuscitating the TFG led to an expanded parliament of 550 members in an attempt to incorporate more significant members. However, given the manner in which the TFG was being imposed by

the Ethiopian forces made it to lose favor with the locals who viewed it as an agent of foreign occupiers. The TFG therefore, was not able to function due to its unpopularity which made most of its members to operate from Nairobi apart from being plagued by "factionalism and infighting" (Burton, 2009: 86).

The occupation and the backing of the Ethiopia forces by the US prompted much hatred for the TFG government making it look like a tool for foreign domination. This changed the nature of the Al Shabab which was less radical at the time of the occupation. For instance, it is observed that one of the leaders of the UIC Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed was able to become the president of TFG later on (Little, 2012: 191). The occupation therefore only served to provide ground for al Shabab to transform into a movement that aimed to resist TFG as a tool of domination by foreign forces which complicated the involvement of the international community in Somalia (Bruton, 2009: 82). Little, has reported from a field interview in Nairobi that the developments attained by the Al Shabab were direct opposite of the US expectations in Somalia (2012: 191). The occupation therefore, provided the Al Shabab with opportunity to recruit and spread its influence in the southern part of Somalia which bequeathed it with the ability to capture the strategic port of Kismayo. The invasion by Ethiopia lent the Al Shabab the sympathy of locals who resented being occupied by a foreign force baked by other external actors hence the locals support of Al Shabab which projected an ability to resist the foreign occupiers (Ibid: 192).

The departure by the Ethiopian forces left a feeling that the TFG which they supported were allies of the "foreign occupiers". This perception was reinforced by the presence of African Union forces comprising of Ugandan and Burundian regiments (Farah and Toure, 2018: 185). Despite the resentment of the TFG, the Al Shabab also received their share of resentment in 2010 from Hizbul Islaam for their contempt for clan leadership and clan organisation (Marcai, 2009). What is consistent therefore in Somali is the desire for a hybrid governance structure that is both acceptable to the international, national and local actors. The failure by the international and national actors to acknowledge the clan and local leadership structures in their attempt to craft a governmental structure has been responsible for the lack of support and legitimacy that has characterised the many transitional governmental structures in Somalia. This has left legacy of distaste for governmental

structures supported by international community in Somalia since the locals do not perceive the interventionists' measures as neutral, impartial and accommodative.

The African Union Mission to Somalia

The complex security situation after the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia to stem the development of the Al Shabab in December 2006, prompted the UNSC on February 20, 2007 through the resolution 1744 to establish AMISOM (Düsterhöft and Gerlach, 2013: 20). The stalemate that characterised the relationship between the UIC government and the TFG can be said to have prompted the establishment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) (Farah and Toure, 2018: 185). However, given the early disappointments with international interventions in Somalia, many countries did not have the enthusiasm to contribute troops to AMISOM. Subsequently, the attempts by international community to implore on African states to contribute troops to AMISOM bore little fruit with only Uganda and Burundi contributing forces to pair up with the Ethiopian troops which were already in Somalia. The desperate attempts by the international community to raise between 5000 to 8000 personnel for the AMISOM to equip it with the ability to mount a pre-emptive attacks on the insurgents in Somalia especially the Al-Shabab failed (Bruton, 2009: 86). This happened despite the guarantee of financial and logistics support by the US and the UN. The inability to forge a strong external force in terms of personnel for intervention in Somalia under the AMISOM undermined the community's chances of success. For instance, it has been reported the huge financial resources in the range 250 million US dollars spent every year in Somalia, the AMISOM forces were not able to subdue the Al-Shabab which even became stronger and more daring in launching attacks even across Somalian borders (Düsterhöft and Gerlach, 2013: 20).

The growing aggression of Al Shabab for instance which made it to abduct some foreign tourist from the Kenya's territory drew Kenya into the Somalia conflicts in the war against the group. The failure of the international community in its intervention in Somalia especially in containing Al-Shabab which had evolved into a full-blown insurgency group against the TFG and foreign forces drew Kenya into the Somalian conflict. Kenya therefore, mounted Operation Linda Nchi (Protect the Country) on October 16, 2011

against the Al Shabab in the Sothern part of Somalia (Düsterhöft and Gerlach, 2013: 22). This retaliatory move by Kenya only added more fuel to the fire since the Kenyan army was alleged to have been aided logistically by the US and the French governments (Little, 2012: 193). This heightened resentment for the Kenyan army which increased Al Shabab attacks on the Kenyan territory. Kenya Defense Forces however, continued their campaigns against the Al Shabab that culminated in Kenya being part of the AMISOM from July 2012 (Düsterhöft and Gerlach, 2013: 22). The efforts by KDF led to the recapture of Kismayo from the Al Shabab in the period of September and October of 2012. In spite of this remarkable gain on the part of AMISOM, the fact that they were labelled as foreign occupiers has complicated their ability to win the heart and souls of the Somali citizens which has also served to deny the TFG the legitimacy it needs to effectively establish a governmental structure.

The international community's intervention in Somalia through AMISOM has faced similar and compounded challenges in the pursuit of peace and stability in Somalia. For instance, having joined the Ethiopian forces which had already been conceived as part of the fighters in the conflict, the AMISOM forces also became active fighters in the conflict. They inherited the allegations that had been attached to the Ethiopian forces like the indiscriminate use of force on civilians by the local clerics, press and clan leaders (Bruton, 2009: 87). This means that their presence was unwelcomed and the call to oust them resonated well with different segments of the Somali society. It is observed that these voices have been echoing from the Al Shabab, Hizbul Islam, Mogadishu's local clerics council, and the Hawiye leadership (Ibid: 90). However, the departure of AMISON is unacceptable to the international community since it would mean the collapse of TFG which is acting as a check against al Shabab and a platform around which humanitarian aid is provided. Bruton, (2009) concludes that like other international intervention measures in Somalia the efforts of AMISOM has been less successful in securing peace and stability as well as in the reconstruction of a working governmental structure. This stems from lack of neutrality, impartiality and inability to mobilize a strong external coalition which are essential for the success of international intervention.

Somalia was presented with another chance for peace in 2012 which led to the promulgation of a new constitution. This new constitution which has provided for the establishment of the Federal

Government of Somalia has also struggled to discharge its mandate from time and again. The election of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed by a group of clan leaders has seen him hold the post from 2017 (Eklöw and Krampe, 2019: 9). However, it is the deep running tension and mistrust that has been caused by nearly thirty years of war which is acting as a major hindrance to peace. Like the case of the Somaliland step by step conference systems, the Federal Government of Somalia must endeavor to address the mistrust and the deep seated tensions within and between clans. This process require hybridity that will guarantee the participation of large continuum of actors drawn from different levels, dynamism that would allow the incorporation of both traditional and modern reconciliation measures that exist within the Somali society and beyond. Hybridity would also imbued the process with free and open participation thus, making it deliberative in enhancing it approval and legitimacy. The international community therefore should adopts a hands-free approach in the process so as to enable it evolve from the "*tol*" which is family lineage level to the nation-state level. It is only through this that the gains that have been achieved through AMISOM can be secured in consolidating the state and peace in Somalia.

Pitfalls in the International community's intervention in Somalia

The major pitfall of the international community's intervention in Somalia, has been their lack of appreciation of the hardened clan identities in Somalia which make the clans participate in the politics of Somalia as independent actors with specific interests to guard. This has therefore, dwarfed the top-down attempts the international community has employed in establishing the transitional governments. This position has been supported by Byrne who has decried the top-down approaches as being less sensitive to the practices, interests and customs of the Somali society hence their failure in establishing a strong foundation for peace (2013: 121). Borrowing from the Somaliland peace process, the Somali society has been governed by a set of laws under "Xeer" which has served as the foundation of the Somali system of governance. The imposition of any system that does not take cognizance of this traditional system is bound to fail. This for instance, explains the opposition that Al Shabab received from Hizbul Islam when they disregarded the local

clan leadership. For any successful intervention in Somalia, there is need to appreciate and engage the local and informal structures that have endure over time. The legitimacy of any governmental system like the one of Somaliland has aptly demonstrated the need to appreciate the local, traditional and informal practices that define belonging and leadership.

The top-down approaches to the Somalian conflict has also failed to in terms of continuum and level of actors engaged in the peace process. It has been established that in many instances, the international community has only engaged elites who have little connection with the locals due to the availability of international resources. The elites in the form of warlords, businessmen and professionals have cooperated to establish a cartel of operation around the access and distribution of international resources at the expense of the local clan leadership and the general public in Somalia. This placed the elite way above the locals in terms of accountability and also deny them the loyalty and legitimacy of their actions especially on behalf of the Somali people. The falsification of the delegates list by warlords for the Mbagathi/Eldoret conference to included fake clan and traditional leaders is a case in point. The end result was the formation of the government by a group of warlords and a counter formation of anti-warlords movement. These complicated the already complex security situation in Somalia.

For effective and successful intervention in Somalia by the international community, there is need to not only expand the continuum of actors but also to extend the reach to the lower clan leadership levels. This finding is in tandem with those of Ahmed and Green (1999), who have called for the need of inclusivity in the Somalia peace process to include local representatives of the various clans. This position has also been supported by Bronwyn Bruton (2009), who pointed to the need by US to empower the locals to effectively take charge of the peace process. The failure to pay careful attention to the clan and the local level dynamics is a major culprit in the failed international attempts at the restoration of peace and stability in Somalia. There is need for the international community to break through the elite cartel to engage the locals and bring them on board if lasting peace is to be achieved in Somalia. Similarly, conflation of the Somali peace process with other objectives like the fight against terrorism present the international community as partisan and active combatants. This has demonstratively rolled back

the incremental gains towards peace and security in Somalia. Therefore, there is need for singularity of purpose by the international community in Somalia.

Conclusion

This chapter has looked at the clan-based political culture in Somalia and how it interacts with the international community's intervention in influencing peace and stability in Somalia. It has established that the international community's intervention in Somalia has always taken the form of a top-down approach which has not integrated effectively the clan-based political culture. The naivety on the part of the international community especially on the role of marginalisation as the major root-cause of the Somali civil war informed its misconception of the Somali crisis. The legacy of the Somali civil war and the hardened clan identities which has spilled over to the national level has remained a permanent feature of Somali conflict. Subsequently, the failure by the international community to attune their activities to take care of the clan fears has created a perception of partiality and favoritism. The anti-transitional forces have always used the international community's activities as a sufficient ground to launch their accusations. The direct involvement of the Ethiopian forces to dethrone the Union of Islamic Courts which organically evolved from within the clans and attempts to empower the TFG further buttressed the notion that the international community and their agents were against the Somali culture and practices. This has continued with the evolution of Al Shabab as an insurgency and its resistance against the AMISOM forces. From the evidence drawn from Somaliland however, the development of a hybrid governmental system that combines the traditional informal practices with modern forms of state has proven effective in promoting peace and stability. Somalia peace process therefore require a close collaboration between international, national and local actors in developing a hybrid governmental structures that would be able to secure peace and stability.

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