The Pragmatics of Interaction

Handbook of Pragmatics Highlights (HoPH)

The ten volumes of *Handbook of Pragmatics Highlights* focus on the most salient topics in the field of pragmatics, thus dividing its wide interdisciplinary spectrum in a transparent and manageable way. Each volume starts with an up-to-date overview of its field of interest and brings together some 12–20 entries on its most pertinent aspects.

Since 1995 the *Handbook of Pragmatics (HoP)* and the *HoP Online* (in conjunction with the *Bibliography of Pragmatics Online*) have provided continuously updated state-of-the-art information for students and researchers interested in the science of language in use. Their value as a basic reference tool is now enhanced with the publication of a topically organized series of paperbacks presenting *HoP Highlights*. Whether your interests are predominantly philosophical, cognitive, grammatical, social, cultural, variational, interactional, or discursive, the *HoP Highlights* volumes make sure you always have the most relevant encyclopedic articles at your fingertips.

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Volume 4

The Pragmatics of Interaction
Edited by Sigurd D'hondt, Jan-Ola Östman and Jef Verschueren

The Pragmatics of Interaction

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Preface to the series

In 1995, the first installments of the **Handbook of Pragmatics (HoP)** were published. The HoP was to be one of the major tools of the International Pragmatics Association (IPrA) to achieve its goals (i) of disseminating knowledge about pragmatic aspects of language, (ii) of stimulating various fields of application by making this knowledge accessible to an interdisciplinary community of scholars approaching the same general subject area from different points of view and with different methodologies, and (iii) of finding, in the process, a significant degree of theoretical coherence.

The HoP approaches *pragmatics* as *the cognitive, social, and cultural science of language and communication*. Its ambition is to provide a practical and theoretical tool for achieving coherence in the discipline, for achieving cross-disciplinary intelligibility in a necessarily diversified field of scholarship. It was therefore designed to provide easy access for scholars with widely divergent backgrounds but with converging interests in the use and functioning of language, in the topics, traditions, and methods which, together, make up the broadly conceived field of pragmatics. As it was also meant to provide a state-of-the-art report, a flexible publishing format was needed. This is why the print version took the form of a background manual followed by annual loose-leaf installments, enabling the creation of a continuously updatable and expandable reference work. The flexibility of this format vastly increased with the introduction of an online version, the **Handbook of Pragmatics *Online*** (see www.benjamins.com/online).

While the HoP and the HoP-online continue to provide state-of-the-art information for students and researchers interested in the science of language use, this new series of **Handbook of Pragmatics *Highlights*** focuses on the most salient topics in the field of pragmatics, thus dividing its wide interdisciplinary spectrum in a transparent and manageable way. The series contains a total of ten volumes around the following themes:

- Key notions for pragmatics
- Philosophical perspectives
- Grammar, meaning and pragmatics
- Cognition and pragmatics
- Society and language use
- Culture and language use
- The pragmatics of variation and change
- The pragmatics of interaction

– Discursive pragmatics
– Pragmatics in practice

This topically organized series of paperbacks, each starting with an up-to-date overview of its field of interest, each brings together some 12–20 of the most pertinent HoP entries in its respective field. They are intended to make sure that students and researchers alike, whether their interests are predominantly philosophical, cognitive, grammatical, social, cultural, variational, interactional, or discursive, can always have the most relevant encyclopedic articles at their fingertips. Affordability, topical organization and selectivity also turn these books into practical teaching tools which can be used as reading materials for a wide range of pragmatics-related linguistics courses.

With this endeavor, we hope to make a further contribution to the goals underlying the HoP project when it was first conceived in the early 1990's.

Jan-Ola Östman (University of Helsinki) &
Jef Verschueren (University of Antwerp)

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A project of the HoP type cannot be successfully started, let alone completed, without the help of dozens, even hundreds of scholars. First of all, there are the authors themselves, who sometimes had to work under extreme conditions of time pressure. Further, most members of the IPrA Consultation Board have occasionally, and some repeatedly, been called upon to review contribu tions. Innumerable additional scholars were thanked in the initial versions of handbook entries. All this makes the Handbook of Pragmatics a truly joint endeavor by the pragmatics community world-wide. We are greatly indebted to you all.

We do want to specifically mention the important contributions over the years of three scholars: the co-editors of the Manual and the first eight annual installments, Jan Blommaert and Chris Bulcaen were central to the realization of the project, and so was our editorial collaborator over the last four years, Eline Versluys. Our sincerest thanks to all of them.

The Handbook of Pragmatics project is being carried out in the framework of the research program of the IPrA Research Center / Antwerp Center for Pragmatics at the University of Antwerp. We are indebted to the university for providing an environment that facilitates and nurtures our work.

Jan-Ola Östman (University of Helsinki) &
Jef Verschueren (University of Antwerp)

The pragmatics of interaction

A survey

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Each one of the following articles outlines a tradition, presents a basic analytical concept, or sketches the contribution of a particular author that, in one way or another, enhances our understanding of naturally occurring interaction as a socially organized activity. The domain that will be covered is defined rather loosely. A first requirement for inclusion in the present volume is that the Handbook entry in question is concerned with the *empirical* investigation of how human beings organize their exchanges in natural settings. Second, each entry focuses on speech as a form of social *action*. Third, the articles concentrate on how these actions are *practically accomplished*, thus taking the analysis beyond the level of 'what is said' to that of the interactional organization of speech and action.

The intellectual origins and disciplinary foundations of this enterprise are manifold. It bears the imprint, first of all, of a number of developments in sociology that specifically target the analysis of interaction. Among these, Erving Goffman's seminal explorations of the interaction order stand out as some of the most prominent (O'Driscoll in this volume, and also the chapters by Sidnell on participation and Kasper on politeness). Equally influential is the tradition of conversation analysis (Clift, Drew and Hutchby, this volume, and the chapter by Sidnell on sequence), which came to fruition under the aegis of Garfinkel's ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967, Firth in this volume) and can be traced to Harvey Sacks' decision to turn to conversation as a privileged site for elucidating practical reasoning (Sacks 1992; Watson in this volume). A second impetus came from anthropology. Against the background of the anthropological study of the role language plays in the construction of the different settings and events that make up the social life of particular communities (Hymes 1966, 1972), an 'interactional' approach to sociolinguistics (Gumperz 1982a, 1982b; Auer & di Luzio 1992; Eerdmans, Prevignano & Thibault 2003) developed, which focuses on the communicative basis of social processes in multi-ethnic industrialized societies, on intercultural friction, ethnicity, and inequality. In the background, linguistic pragmatics (in the narrow sense, advocated by Levinson 1983 and heavily influenced by the philosophical accounts of language use by Austin, Grice and Searle) continues to exert its influence over the field of interaction studies. Silverstein (1976, 1992, 2003),

for example, introduced a Peircean perspective on the linguistic sign, while Gricean notions of implicature and inference have informed interactional sociolinguistics (e.g., Gumperz 1982a) and politeness theory (Kasper, this volume). Speech act theory, and in particular the foundational role it attributes to speaker intentions, played the part of scapegoat for conversation analysts' proceduralistic accounts of social action (e.g., Schegloff 1992a). In the meantime, the analysis of interaction also fertilized various other domains, including psychology (Edwards & Potter 1992; Edwards 1997), education studies (Varenne & McDermott 1998; Wortham 2008), medical sociology (Heritage & Maynard 2006; Stivers 2006) and socio-legal studies (Travers & Manzo 1997; Matoesian 2001), and found a practical implementation in fields like the design of human-computer interfaces (Arminen 2002).

1. Layers of interactional organization

Throughout his career (cf. the overview in O'Driscoll, this volume), Goffman insisted that interaction embodies a structure in its own right, which can be reduced neither to the psychological properties of the individual nor to the structural properties of society. As it turns out, this interaction order is, in turn, composed of multiple layers or dimensions. Interaction is always multilayered, in the sense that the situated accomplishment of an action always requires participants to attend to multiple organizational orders simultaneously. Conversation analysis (CA) contributed the fundamental insight that actions come in *sequences.* The notion of sequence refers to a course of action in talk that is built collaboratively by different speakers in successive turns (see Schegloff 2007 and the Sidnell chapter in this volume for state-of-the-art overviews). The basic format of the sequence is the adjacency pair (Schegloff 1968). Over the years, an extensive literature has developed on the way basic adjacency pairs can be expanded by means of pre-, insertion-, and post-expansions (Schegloff 1980, 1990) and on the asymmetries that exist between different types of second pair parts ('preference organization', Pomerantz 1984a). In addition to their detailed accounts of the 'sequence organization' (Schegloff 2007) of interaction, conversation analysts identified various other minute orders of interactional organization, sometimes metaphorically referred to as 'machinery', that are collectively implicated in making our exchanges intelligible and guaranteeing intersubjectivity. These include the analysis of turn-taking and the negotiation of rights to the floor (Sacks et al. 1974), the organization of repair (Schegloff et al. 1977; Schegloff 1992b), the opening and closing of a conversation (Schegloff 1968; Schegloff & Sacks 1973) and a range of other phenomena, including gaze (Goodwin 1981) and laughter (Jefferson 1984; Jefferson et al. 1987). CA successfully demonstrated that (and how) these various phenomena are 'sequentially organized' (to be distinguished from 'sequence organization' in the narrow sense,

cf. Schegloff 2007) and thereby made other researchers aware of the overarching force of relative positioning in producing and making sense of spoken discourse. The ample evidence of the interactional significance of realizational detail supplied by these analyses furthermore made clear that interaction can only be studied sensibly on the basis of mechanical records (audio, video) and detailed transcripts of these records (O'Connell & Kowal, this volume).

Interactional sociolinguistics contributed to the emerging picture by drawing attention to the role of non-denotational aspects of talk in the inferential processes that shape interaction. It complements sequential accounts of interaction, like those provided by conversation analysis, with a Peircean semiotic perspective (Silverstein 1992) and recognizes that linguistic signs carry indexical meanings alongside referential ones. These indexical meanings are based on a "direct linkage" between the sign and its context that is "in no way mediated by any symbolic process" (Eerdmans 2003: 87). Thus, Gumperz' (1982a) account of contextualization describes how indexical meanings associated with non-lexical aspects of the realization of an utterance (*contextualization cues*, Couper-Kuhlen and Selting, both in this volume) trigger inferential processes on the part of the hearer, inviting him/her to retrieve the contextual grounds of what is said by situating the utterance into a complex of culturally based presuppositions. This inference process extends beyond the level of recognizing how subsequent utterances relate to one another or detecting their action properties (the forms of 'sequence organization' that CA is interested in), but also includes presuppositions about the activity (Levinson 1992) carried out and about how the interaction is to be framed (Goffman 1974).

It should be kept in mind, furthermore, that various participants may be implicated in the same interactional event in multiple ways. Advancing 'co-presence' as the primary unit of analysis, Goffman (1981) contributed the fundamental insight that dyadic models that describe interaction in terms of an exchange between a speaker and a listener are insufficient for understanding the complexity of naturally occurring speech events. Participants continually negotiate the participation framework of their encounter as talk proceeds, and this idea has been fruitfully taken up by conversation analysts (Goodwin & Goodwin 2004, and Sidnell, this volume).

This short overview of different organizational layers involved in the practical accomplishment of interaction is by no means meant to be exhaustive, but only serves to orient and prepare the reader for the overview of some recent developments that is to follow.

2. Context, ethnography and categorization

Attempts to identify the various layers, units, and events that are pertinent to the analysis of face-to-face interaction inevitably lead to another fundamental debate: that of

the relevant dimensions of *context* with which these various organizational layers and units are associated. As far as the context issue is concerned, there only exists agreement on the various interpretations of the concept that are to be rejected as inadequate. Researchers of different stripes and persuasions agree that it is not some static entity that determines interaction 'from the outside' (and must hence be specified beforehand) but a dynamic and fluid phenomenon that is reflexively indexed in the details of the talk, as participants negotiate the shape and course of the encounter in which they are engaged (Duranti & Goodwin 1992; Auer & Di Luzio 1992; Tracy 1998; Auer 2009). It can, therefore, only sensibly be understood from 'within' the interaction. This consensus quickly fades, however, the moment it comes to specifying in positive terms what context amounts to. The main issue here is the question of how far one is exactly allowed to depart from the details of the text when describing contextual dimensions relevant to understanding an interactional phenomenon. Everyone agrees that context must be specified 'from within' the exchange, but it is not always clear how far beyond the exchange this contextualization of utterances should extend (which is perspicuously summarized in the subtitle to Silverstein's 1992 paper on the indeterminacy of contextualization: "when is enough enough?").

Usually the issue is framed as a practical epistemological question: how much *ethnographic description* of the setting (or institution) is the analyst required (or better, allowed) to utilize while making sense of naturally occurring interactions, in addition to the mechanical records (audio, video) and transcripts documenting them?

CA furnished the most radically minimalist response to this query by embracing an exclusively talk-internal, radically endogenous conception of context that consequently became the primary point of reference for the debate that ensued. For CA, context is up for grabs in what is made publicly available in the trajectory of the talk itself. It coincides with the continually updated 'architecture of intersubjectivity' (Heritage 1984a: 254) that materializes in talk as each turn is superseded by a new one. Both context and intersubjectivity, according to this account, are essentially public phenomena: participants lay out their conduct in an orderly fashion so as to be understandable to the other participants, and in doing so they disclose to one another how they understand the activities they are engaged in and the contributions of the other participants. Context, it follows, is thus continually updated as interaction progresses, and as a consequence context and interaction mutually constitute one another. In producing new talk, participants orient to the framework of relevance that was established in the preceding utterances. Their coparticipants will also interpret this new talk in relationship to these previous utterances. On the other hand, this new talk, in turn, projects further talk and hence it becomes part of the framework to which other participants will orient as they add new talk to the conversation. Thus interactional conduct is, in Heritage's words (1984a: 242), at once 'context-shaped' and 'context-renewing.' This radically endogenous conception of context, as the publicly available product of the

interactional activities in which the participants are engaged, goes hand in hand with an equally radical rejection of all other sources of information that might shed light on what is going on. Thus, vernacular descriptions of interaction (like participants' self-characterizations of their conduct in narrative accounts or interviews) and premature ethnographic specifications of context in terms of social structural categories are unacceptable because they entail the risk of 'losing data' (Maynard 2003) by glossing over the orderliness and patterning of talk that is the ultimate repository of interactional meaning (Schegloff 1991, 1992c).

The precise extent and nature of this public intersubjectivity is further curtailed in actual research practice. A number of key publications (including seminal papers like Schegloff (1968), Schegloff and Sacks (1973), and Sacks et al. (1974), influential collections like Atkinson and Heritage (1984), and Schegloff's already mentioned (2007) primer), seem to suggest that the one aspect of interactional orderliness that is most central to reaching a common understanding of what exchanges amount to is their *sequential* order, that is, the orderliness located in "the describable ways in which turns are linked together into definite action sequences" (Hutchby & Wooffit 1998: 38). One of the most eloquent critics of the 'aridity' of such CA accounts that explicate interaction solely in terms of the "dry bones" (1988: xi) of talk is the ethnographer Moerman (1988, 1990/1, 1993), who came to adopt CA while investigating everyday interactions in a Thai village. For Moerman, "[a]ll actions are socially situated and all situations are socially structured. Sequential analysis delineates the structure of social interaction and thus provides the loci of actions. Ethnography can provide the meanings and material conditions of the scenes in which the actions occur" (1988: 57). CA can therefore be of great value to ethnographers. Since the latter depend on talk for understanding how other people interpret their environment, they must come to terms with "how the organization of talk influences what people say" (Moerman 1988: 9). Analysts of talk-in-interaction in turn face the task of acquiring a grasp of the cultural meanings and of the lay actors' intentions and the projects they are engaged in, if they want to appreciate fully how the latter make sense of subsequent turns. This poses few problems as long as the analyst is content with analyzing records of everyday activities collected in a society to which s/he is a native. This changes, however, when analysts find themselves confronted with interactional materials documenting activities collected in institutional environments or 'exotic' cultural settings with which they did not previously acquire familiarity as a lay participant. Here, participant observation and ethnographic fieldwork must come to the rescue. A similar critique of CA practitioners' naïve reliance on unexplicated forms of 'membership knowledge' underlies much of the work of Aaron Cicourel. To appreciate the complexity of the tasks that are carried out in medical settings and to comprehend how their execution is informed by bureaucratic and interactional constraints, Cicourel (1992) argues that transcripts of clinical interaction must be complemented with (1) ethnographic descriptions of the

organizational layout of the clinic, of its working arrangements and the daily social interactions that take place there, and with (2) the various textual materials (patients' charts, medical records, students' textbooks) that illuminate how knowledge is codified (which is consistent with Cicourel's long-standing interest in cognitive processing and individuals' cognitive coping mechanisms, cf. Cicourel 1974). Also, according to Cicourel (1992), CA's endogenous view of context requires analysts to manipulate their data and prepare their transcripts in particular ways (cf. Bucholtz 2000; Blommaert 2005: Chapter 3). It should also be noted, and this partially absolves CA, that Moerman and Cicourel's criticisms seem, to a certain extent, informed by different research agendas (ten Have 2007: 75) because they are not so much interested in the technology of conversation as in explicating the 'substance' of particular scenes and settings (in the case of Moerman, the texture of 'human events' (1988: 13), and for Cicourel, the nature of institutional tasks).

One effect of this critique is that conversation analysts became more explicit about their liaisons with ethnography. Maynard (2003), without yielding to the position of Moerman and Cicourel, nonetheless concedes that ethnography can be of 'limited affinity' to conversation analysis, but only *after* one has first elucidated the self-explicating patterning of verbal activities. More specifically, ethnographical techniques are useful

> to (1) refer to settings and participants according to institutional or other identities and categories [in order to avoid having to demonstrate their relevance on each occasion again and focus on focal activities instead], (2) describe courses of actions related to a focal episode and familiar terms within it [a form of 'cultural contextualization' comparable to what Moerman called for, but in a strict data-controlled fashion], and (3) explain curious sequential patterns. (2003: 77)

Approaching the issue from a slightly different angle, conversation analysts working with video records of collaborative work in complex technological environments (cf. infra) mention the necessity of carrying out fieldwork *prior* to data collection. Thus, according to Heath (2004: 273), "[i]t is not unusual […] to delay gathering recorded materials until researchers have a passing understanding of the activities in question and the various tools and technologies which feature in the accomplishment of even the more mundane activities in such settings." In a similar vein, Mondada (2006a: 7) points out that "fieldwork plays an essential role for the identification of expectable patterns of action to which to adjust the video shot" (Mondada 2006a: 7). CA in turn represents a useful tool for substantiating ethnographic findings as it enables one to explicate in detail the interactionally negotiated nature of the social world or the exact ways in which material artifacts are shaping encounters (Maynard 2003: 77; Heath & Hindmarsh 2002). On the whole, the idea that ethnography constitutes a kind of 'supplement' to sequential analysis (criticized, e.g., in Blommaert 2004) is gradually being replaced by

a more refined conception of the relationship between the two and by a recognition that CA constitutes in itself a specific form of fieldwork practice. According to Heath and Hindmarsh (2002), it is frequently the case that initial analytic observations and insights in turn trigger more focused observations and new video recordings, and, in this sense, current workplace studies are characterized by the iterative cycle also found in other field studies. Maynard (2003: 78) raises the possibility of developing a 'longitudinal' form of CA that seeks to explicate extended social activities distributed across time and space instead of concentrating on singular episodes (consider Wootton 1997 for an intriguing example of what this might look like). Furthermore, the practice of data collection is itself transformed into a topic for analysis in its own right: as much as videos are produced to preserve the relevant details and phenomenal fields of action, they also reflexively contribute to the very interactional order they document (Mondada 2006b).

Yet other authors responded that Moerman was mistaken to assume that CA is solely concerned with sequential phenomena (Heritage 1990/1: 302). Presumably 'mental' concepts like 'intention' (Heritage 1990/1), 'orientation' and 'concern' (Pomerantz 1990/1) and also cognitive states (Potter 1998), which Moerman considered to be the object of ethnography, can themselves be analyzed as locally occasioned members' constructs, and CA provides the requisite analytical tools for such an operation (cf. Heritage & Raymond 2005 for another example). Proceeding in a similar direction, Watson (1994, 1997) argued that Moerman's complaint of 'aridity' can be avoided if CA were to join forces with the forgotten tradition of membership categorization analysis (Sacks 1972a, 1972b; Jayyusi 1984; Hester & Eglin 1997; Fitzgerald & Housley 2002; see also Watson, this volume) and would investigate sequential order and the situated practices by which lay participants categorize one another 'in a single take.' Parallel with this development, and also (at least implicitly) informed by the literature on membership categorization, a flourishing literature emerged that specifically investigates how 'discursive' identities (related to the sequential organization of talk) and 'situational' identities (related to broader notions of social structure) come to be coarticulated in talk (Wilson 1991; Zimmerman 1998), in response to Schegloff's injunction (1991, 1992c) that the relevance and procedural consequentiality should be demonstrated in the details of the talk. A similar concern underlies the growing body of work that, in the wake of Atkinson and Drew's (1979) ground-breaking study of courtroom interaction, seeks to identify the 'unique fingerprint' (Drew & Heritage 1992a: 26) of institutionalized forms of interactions by systematically comparing how they differ (through reductions, respecifications, or specializations) from ordinary, mundane conversation (Drew & Heritage 1992b; McHoul & Rapley 2001; Arminen 2005; Heritage 2005, see also Hakulinen this volume). What these different developments have in common is their awareness of the fact that the *sequential* order of talk (Hutchby & Wooffit 1998: 38, cf. supra) reflexively presupposes, and is simultaneously informed by, an *inferential*

order (ibid.: 42) consisting of the various normative and inferential properties of talk that participants draw upon in holding each other morally accountable for what they are doing or saying.

In the late 1990s, the question of what counts as the relevant context of an exchange briefly reasserted itself, but the focus of the debate was then no longer the appropriateness of ethnographic 'supplements' but rather the 'analytical relevancies' the analyst imposes on the data. Partially foreshadowed by Watson's (1992) argument that Goffman's dramaturgical metaphor and CA's attempt to describe the self-explicating properties of talk constitute incompatible language games, the controversy erupted fully after Schegloff (1997) accused critical discourse analysis of 'theoretical imperialism.' By not grounding their analyses in the participants' own demonstrable orientations to what is contextually relevant, he argued, the latter are imposing their own political agenda on a world that had already been interpreted by the lay actors concerned – an allegation that was the basis of an animated debate with Wetherell and Billig on the pages of *Discourse & Society* (Schegloff 1998, 1999a, 1999b; Wetherell 1998; Billig 1999a, 1999b). The issue resurfaced a few years later in the context of interactionally oriented law and society studies, when the work of critical scholars like Conley and O'Barr (1990, 1998) was criticized from within ethnomethodology for its 'theoretical' preoccupation with issues of power (Dingwall 2000; Travers 2006).

3. Multimodality and mediation

Recently, the debate over context seems superseded by a range of new analytical concerns. One recent development that greatly reinvigorated the field of interaction analysis is the fast growing attention for the multimodal character of interaction (Norris 2004; Stivers & Sidnell 2005; Mondada 2006) and the fact that face-to-face encounters are not only composed of 'vocal-aural' events and practices (as early CA investigations of telephone calls somehow seemed to suggest) but also involve sign systems situated at the 'visuospatial' modal plane (Enfield 2005). Pioneering studies by the likes of Goodwin (1981), Heath (1986) and Kendon (1990) paved the way by drawing attention to the way gaze and the comportment of the body are instrumental in aligning speakers, facilitating a common focus, selecting a recipient for one's utterance, etc. – in short, for the interactive organization of participation (Goodwin & Goodwin 2004; Sidnell in this volume). Importantly, the task of this visuospatial modality is not confined to elaborating the semantic content of talk or 'providing the necessary context.' Rather, the different modalities actively work together in establishing coherent courses of action (Stivers & Sidnell 2005) and in providing solutions for interactional problems like the shifting of speakership (Mondada 2006a). Talk is no longer considered the sole or primary component of meaningful action, and restricted

understandings of talk-in-interaction that focus exclusively on the vocal-aural modality are complemented with a conception of situated conduct that also encompasses the way the body is exploited as a resource for producing meaningful action (Goodwin 2000). Opening up the notion of action to include embodied conduct also enables us to conceive how participants are able to engage in multiple actions simultaneously at different levels of phenomenal awareness (Norris 2004).

Parallel to this first development, researchers increasingly became aware of the mediating role tools and technologies play in the shaping of interaction. Suchman's (1987) pioneering study of how users interact with an intelligent copy machine put the analysis of collaborative work in complex technological environments high on the agenda, spurring a great amount of work on various kinds of coordination centers like subway control rooms (Heath & Luff 2000) and airport ground operation control rooms (Goodwin 1996; Suchman 1996, 1997), in addition to work on airliner cockpits (Nevile 2004) and video-mediated interactions in a surgical team (Mondada 2007) (for an overview see Luff et al. 2000). Mediating technologies also increasingly permeate the sphere of everyday interaction (e.g., see Hutchby 2001 and Arminen & Leinonen 2006 on the widespread use of mobile phones). Importantly, this growing interest in mediating technologies is closely connected to the turn to multimodality, and these two developments may be considered, to a large extent, mutually elaborative. That is, even if they are situated in a technologically mediated environment, shared workspaces are still constituted to a large extent through mutual attention (Suchman 1996), while embodied actions (like, say, a move in a hopscotch game, cf. Goodwin 2000) often derive their meaning from the way the body orients itself to meaningful semiotic structures inscribed in the material environment or contained in an artifact. Paradoxically, technological mediation also resulted in the emergence of 'disembodied' forms of action (Heath & Luff 2001: 183ff), of which computer-mediated communication (CMC) and Internet Relay Chat (IRC) (Herring 2001; Hutchby 2001) are the most radical representatives.

This recognition of the multimodal and mediated nature of interaction also had a paradoxical effect on the subsequent trajectory of analytical notions of context. Because participants rely on "a range of structurally different kinds of sign phenomena in both the stream of speech and the body, graphic and socially sedimented structure in the surround, sequential organization, encompassing activity systems, etc." (Goodwin 2000: 1490) in producing and understanding meaningful action, CA's endogenous conception of context comes to refer to a reflexively indexed, temporally unfolding *configuration* of semiotic fields (ibid.), which mutually elaborate one another and which may comprise multiple signs systems. Social actions cannot be understood solely with reference to the details of language use or their sequential surround, and reports of sequential organization must be complemented with detailed accounts of "the way in which the social, cultural [and] material structures […] of the environment

where action occurs, figure into its organization" (Goodwin 2000: 1491). In a way, then, this opening up of action to fully include phenomena situated on other modal planes further problematizes the dichotomous understandings of text and context up to a point that the distinction between the two finally seems to collapse altogether. Space, to name but one contextual parameter for a long time considered unaffected by talk, is also coming to be treated as 'configured by' as much as 'formative of' interactional exchanges (Mondada 2005, see also the contributions in McIlvenny et al. forthcoming). In the adjacent field of mediated discourse analysis (Scollon 1998; Norris & Jones 2005), similar considerations lead to the notion that understanding social action requires situating it in the dynamically (and reflexively) constituted *nexus* of the various trajectories of the means and tools that mediate it – situated discourses ('voices', 'ways of speaking'), interaction orders (formats for organizing togetherness), non-verbal signs, material objects, physical bodies and their habitus, etc. – each of which is subject to its own cycle and timescale (Scollon & Scollon 2003, 2004).

The paradoxical effect of this demise of the text-context dichotomy, analytically speaking, is that an increasingly wider array of phenomena is being subjected to CA's policy of 'reverse engineering' (i.e., the practice of 'reasoning back' from text to context and from the details of interaction to the practices by which it is constituted, Arminen 2005). To the extent that this move entails a recognition of the role that historically contingent material and semiotic resources play in sense-making, it provides part of the answer to the much sought-after 'contextualization' of talk as advocated by Moerman (1988). Sidnell (2008), for example, argues that talk-in-interaction must be conceived of as "organized around a base of generic principles which are inflected by a variety of local conditions. Local circumstances, including grammatical patterns, onomastics, and demographic factors, can be seen to 'torque' the generic organization in different directions" (2008: 481). In his view, "the generic problems of human interaction (turn-taking and repair, for instance) are solved through the mobilization of the eminently local semiotic resources of a particular language in a particular social setting" (2008: 479). In fact, Sidnell is here sketching the outlines of a position that elegantly reconciles orthodox CA claims about the universality of the machinery by which talk is constituted (and, by extension, of the talk-internal, endogenous conceptions of context that is the corollary of this autonomy-claim) with a recognition of historically constituted variability that is a longstanding ethnographic and sociolinguistic concern (cf. the comment on Sidnell in Rampton 2008). What is at stake in this development is also nicely captured in the following quote from Jean Lave, initially formulated in the context of practice-centered neo-Vygotskian accounts of cognition (Lave 1988; Goodwin 1994; Hutchins 1995; Engeström & Middleton 1996), in which she quotes Suchman as stating that "concern with historical mediation has become a point of convergence between activity theorists and phenomenological analysts: the latter are beginning to recognize that immediate situations include historical artefacts,

practices, and routines, and that historical artefacts provide resources, interactionally, to be garnered and employed on next occasions" (Lave 1993: 21).

4. Style and indexicality

One conceivable text-context connection that we have not touched upon yet – probably because it partially exposes the limits of CA's policy of reverse engineering – centers around the fact that speakers can convey meaning by selecting particular variables over others and the interactional significance of particular *communicative styles* (Selting, this volume). Recent work in stylistics (Eckert & Rickford 2001; Auer 2007) strongly insists on the processual, practice-like nature of style and emphasizes the agency of the speaker. The idea that linguistic variables passively mirror particular identity categories or that their social meaning is, in a straightforward sense, located in geographic locations or class positions is no longer accepted. Rather, variables are assumed to become socially meaningful when they are creatively reconfigured in the course of linguistic performance to present oneself as a particular kind of person (Coupland 2001; Eckert 2004) or to perform a stylized version of a recognizable Other (Rampton 1999; Auer 2007). Because these reconfigurations-in-performance involve variables situated at different levels of linguistic and interactional structuring (and also because these reconfigurations are, in turn, part of broader semiotic systems that also encompass particular types of clothing, musical tastes, etc., cf. Eckert 2004), style is ineluctably also a "holistic and multilevel phenomenon" (Auer 2007: 11). Furthermore, these performances cannot be understood solely within the context of the immediate speech situation. To the extent that 'doing' a particular style is embedded in a system of distinctions (Irvine 2001), and the notion of style mediates between socially situated performance and heterogeneity within linguistic systems (or, in the case of code-switching, across systems) (Auer 2007), styles minimally presuppose a form of paradigmatic contrast that can only be understood in the context of the wider systems of distinctions and arrangements of resources that foster them. As such, the meanings of a particular stylistic choice are always indexical (in the Peircean sense, cf. supra) and based on complex associations between linguistic signals and their contexts.

The attention accorded to an indexical phenomenon like style exemplifies the difference in analytical approach between interactional sociolinguistics and conversation analysis. As indicated earlier, the former shares with CA an overarching concern with situated meaning and with the practical reasoning that shapes interaction. Its treatment of identity as a symbol produced in talk and not as an externally constraining variable (Gumperz & Cook-Gumperz 1982, see Tannen 1981 for a classic analytical demonstration) is furthermore consistent with the CA position that membership of an identity category constitutes a practical achievement (Antaki & Widdicombe 1998).

What sets these two approaches apart, however, is the way in which they conceptualize the nature of conversational inferencing. While CA locates inferences primarily in explicit identity ascriptions and in the capacity of particular 'doings' to invite corresponding categorizations of the actor (along the lines of the viewers' and hearers' maxims identified in Sacks 1972a, 1972b), interactional sociolinguistics includes in the inferential process the various indexical meanings of the linguistic material speakers use for producing their interactional contributions. Opening up the notion of inference to include indexical properties of talk requires analysts to take into consideration aspects of context that lie beyond the immediate situation of speech. For one thing, the indexicality of a particular linguistic feature is very often mediated by metalinguistic awareness and linguistic ideology (Silverstein 2003): the 'initial' indexical values of a particular variable (say, its association with a particular geographical region) may, in turn, develop into an indexical 'of the second order' (say, it comes to be perceived as an indication of a particular sociocultural milieu) on the basis of a language ideology that distinguishes between correct and incorrect speech forms and projects these distinctions onto a perceived class structure (Johnstone et al. 2006).

5. This volume: Interaction as a topic

While systematically investigating the organizational patterning of activity constitutes a self-contained, autonomous topic of inquiry in its own right, it can also be used as a *method* or *resource* for shedding light on a host of other phenomena in the social life of human beings and in the fabric of the various societal arrangements they live in (consider Goodwin 1994 for a powerful example). As a consequence, the field of interaction analysis attracts many scholars with strong affiliations to various other intellectual communities. As Tracy and Haspel recently noted in a review of the institutional and disciplinary background of Language and Social Interaction (LSI) research, "the communities LSI scholars argue with are quite diverse. Almost always LSI scholars have a foot, albeit sometimes only a tentative one, in some other world besides the interdisciplinary one that comprises LSI research" (Tracy & Haspel 2004: 788; cf. Rampton 2007; Bucholtz & Hall 2008 for similar statements). Dedicated to revealing the interactional basis of the phenomena that make up the horizon of their native intellectual community (be it anthropology, sociology, psychology, education studies, or another), for these scholars, "it is mainstream of their discipline that is the chief target of their arguments" (ibid.). One particularly visible example of such a collective of interaction scholars occupying a dissident position within an adjacent disciplinary community is Discursive Psychology (Edwards & Potter 1992; Edwards 1997), which concerns itself with an interactional analysis of psychological phenomena in a way that is strongly indebted to CA (pace Wetherell 2007, see also the discussion she had with Schegloff, referred

to earlier). In CA, the interactional patterning of participants' displays of cognitive states (and of related presumably mental phenomena) and the various tasks which these displays may accomplish in conversation is a long-standing topic of inquiry (see, e.g., Pomerantz 1980, 1984b; Heritage 1984b; Heritage & Raymond 2005; Stivers 2005; Raymond & Heritage 2006). Discursive Psychology continues and extends this line of work. Rooted in the disciplinary context of psychology (and also addressing cognitive science, see te Molder & Potter 2005), it complements CA's analytical respecification of cognitive and mental phenomena as interactional displays with an explicit focus on talk *about* mental phenomena, specifying the ways psychological categories and constructs are used in everyday talk and the actions they accomplish in context. In adopting such a distinctly anti-mentalist position, it has proven a potent alternative, for example, for experimental work in laboratory settings, which often fails to come to terms with the contextual variability of psychological phenomena.

For this volume, a principled choice was made to include only *Handbook* entries that explicitly focus on interaction as the topic of inquiry. Thus, one finds in this volume contributions that outline a particular tradition (ethnomethodology (Firth), conversation analysis (Clift, Hutchby and Drew)) or the intellectual contribution of a particular author (Harvey Sacks (Watson), Erving Goffman (O'Driscoll)) next to others that outline a particular level of interactional organization (prosody (Couper-Kuhlen), communicative style (Selting), sequence organization (Sidnell), participation (Sidnell), grammar (Lindstrom)) or an interactional phenomenon connected to a specific episode (listener response (Deng Xudong), reported speech (Holt)). An overview of various transcription systems for spoken discourse is supplied in O'Connel and Kowal's chapter.

It is hard to deny the overall influence of CA in the various *Handbook* articles that were selected, although many of them also cover contributions from other scholars and adjacent traditions, such as those of Goffman (see e.g., the chapters on participation (Sidnell), reported speech (Holt), politeness (Kasper)) and interactional sociolinguistics (see e.g., the chapters on prosody (Couper-Kuhlen) and communicative style (Selting)). It should be kept in mind, however, that this bias in favor of CA is not so much an indication of its intrinsic superiority, but rather expresses the fact that its account of the machinery of interaction represents a common core in which many will recognize a point of departure.

As indicated, it was decided not to include forays into substantially defined domains resulting from interaction analysts' engagements with other disciplinary communities. Priority was given to accounts of the interactional 'machinery' rather than to work that focuses on the substance of particular settings. Thus, one finds accounts of the indexical potential of speech styles as a contextualizing phenomenon, but no surveys of the range of identities that may be indexed by them (e.g., through crossing (Rampton 1995; Quis & Normann Jörgensen 2007) or stylization (Rampton 1999;

Auer 2007)) or overviews of specific distributions of stylistic practices in particular societal arrangements. For these, the reader is referred to other volumes in the *Handbook of Pragmatics Highlights* series, in particular *Culture and language use* and *Society and language use*.

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Communicative style

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1. Definition, delimitation, basic concepts

'Style' refers to the meaningful deployment of language variation in written and spoken discourse, to the particular way that discourse is formed and structured and that it is interpreted by recipients as socially and interactionally relevant (Sandig & Selting 1997).

In contrast to other kinds of language variation, such as dialects, sociolects, registers etc., styles are not conceived of as uni-directionally determined by extra-linguistic and/or contextual factors, but as meaningful choices made in order to achieve particular effects or to suggest particular interpretations. While dialectal or socio lectal language variation may be perceived as a symptom of the speaker's biographical background which is not interactionally relevant, stylistic variation is interpreted as a signal or symbol to suggest particular meanings and interpretations, such as the definition of the situation in terms of, say, a particular level of formality. This entails that, whereas other kinds of language variation are mostly viewed as determined or at least influenced by contextual factors in a uni-directional process, the relation of style and context has been conceived of as a bi-directional process: "Context can influence choice of style, but also choice of style can influence context" (Semino & Culpeper 1995: 518, with particular reference to the work of Enkvist).

Stylistics has mostly dealt with the style(s) of written texts. The present entry will concentrate on communicative style(s) of spoken language in natural verbal interaction.

The conception of 'style(s)' has largely been dependent upon the approach adopted (see below). Modern approaches prefer dynamic, processual views of style in which style is looked upon as a production device or strategy which is both formed by and adapted to the exigencies of the local situation for which it is produced.

Styles in spoken natural language have been shown as having the following properties: Rather than simply applying pre-fabricated styles, speakers actively construct communicative styles as dynamic, flexible and alter(n)able linguistic structures, i.e. styles of speaking and styles of conversation. These styles are constructed and interpreted as contextualization cues in relation to contextual stylistic norms and expectations as well as to fit the recipient design for the particular recipient(s) and their reactions in the context of social interaction. Styles function as holistic structures which can be reconstructed as being constituted by bundles of co-occurring style-constitutive

features. The goal of stylistic analysis is to decompose/deconstruct holistic styles and reconstruct their inventory of more or less (proto)typical style features and their rules of co-occurrence and alter(n)ation (Ervin-Tripp 1972). In relation to the activities that are stylistically structured, 'style' refers to the particular way in which an activity is carried out. In relation to an activity type or genre that can be kept constant as a tertium comparationis, meaningful different ways of constituting this activity type or genre can be described as different communicative styles. Styles suggest additional social or interactional meanings which often have to do with self-presentation, definition of the situation, definition of the relationship between speaker and recipient, framing of activities and situations, etc.

2. A few landmark reference works

The approaches that have been devised to describe communicative style(s) of spoken language in natural verbal interaction naturally build on earlier conceptions of style in linguistics. Most important landmarks are the following conceptions which developed in orientation to development in general linguistics.

Traditional work in stylistics largely followed Jakobson's (1960) giving birth to modern stylistics by introducing structuralist methods for the analysis of literary texts (for the further development of literary stylistics see Semino & Culpeper 1995). After stylistics opened its subject matter and perspective by incorporating non-literary texts, the notion of context began to play an important role. Enkvist (1973), dealing mostly with style-markers of written texts, developed an approach that he later himself summarized as follows: "I once suggested that styles come into being as aggregates of probabilities of expressions in situational contexts, or, more briefly, as aggregates of contextual probabilities" (Enkvist 1988: 129). Styles are thus conceived of as varieties of language that correlate with particular contexts. In a somewhat similar conception, Crystal & Davy (1969: 11) follow the hypothesis "that any use of language displays certain linguistic features which allow it to be identified with one or more extra-linguistic contexts". They set out to describe the stylistically significant or distinctive features of varieties such as 'the language of conversation, unscripted commentary, religion, newspaper reporting and legal documents'. Differences between written and spoken language are captured as structural differences that correlate with discourse medium and situation or context of language use (cf. also Chafe 1994 for a more recent account). This kind of structural description culminates in Crystal's (1991) more recent proposal of 'stylistic profiling', a method for analysing and classifying written styles in order to overcome and remedy the criticized diversity and idiosyncracies of stylistic analyses. In sociolinguistics, Labov (1972) devised a quantitative approach to the study of style, using correlational methodology for the description of contextual styles as determined

by contextual features of the situation and the degree of attention paid to speech. So, in the speech of New York city speakers, the frequency of particular realizations of the phonological variables 'r', 'eh', 'oh', 'th' and 'dh' was found to correlate with the following styles: careful speech in the interview situation, reading styles for continuous passages of text, reading word lists, minimal pairs. This line of thinking was further developed by Bell's (1984) model of style as audience design. All these approaches are based on the unidirectional model of the relationship between context and style, treating extralinguistic factors as independent and linguistic variation as dependent variables. The distribution of selected linguistic variables is calculated over selected passages of interviews or other texts. Analysis mostly aims at a typology of styles from an etic perspective. The turn-by-turn use and alter(n)ation of speech styles in talk as an interactional resource in general slips through the analytic net.

R. Lakoff (1979) extends the model of transformational grammar for a conception of styles: "when I speak of a grammar of style, I mean that we are to transfer the concepts devised for linguistic theory — rules, co-occurrence constraints, ungrammaticality, and so forth — to the description of other forms of human behavior, a system that if adequate will not only categorize what is actually extant, but will also indicate what does not exist, in normal persons on the one hand, and in general on the other" (Lakoff 1979: 59f.). She postulates that personal style can be distinguished with reference to four basic determinants: Clarity, Distance, Deference, Camaraderie (ibid.: 62). Applying this to male and female speech, Lakoff suggests that male and female ideal styles in the American culture differ with respect to their surface styles: "American women's traditional target is Deference as men's is Distance/Clarity" (ibid.: 71). As both genders produce and interpret the behavior of the other gender according to their own styles, these stylistic differences may result in misunderstandings in cross-gender-communication.

Textlinguistic and pragmatic approaches led the way to a modern conception of style. Enkvist (1988: 146) outlines a dynamic, processual view of style, in which "styles arise through a generative process steered by a set of heterarchic parameters" and in which "(e)ach parameter is set at a value and it carries a certain weight in relation to other parameters". In spite of this dynamic conception of style, in which styles are viewed as processes of text production, style is nevertheless viewed as determined by parameter values and weightings which contrast with other values and weightings (ibid.: 149). The proposed methodology relies "on the researcher's stylistic competence and on his intuitions" (ibid.: 150).

Pragmatic approaches in stylistics describe both the recurrent constitution of particular speech acts rather than others, and the particular features of the performance of speech acts, for instance the particular wording of requests and their effects. Work in this framework was presented by, for instance, Sandig (1978, 1986) and Hickey (1989). Sandig (1986) developed a comprehensive conception of stylistic structures and functions.

Hickey (1989: 8) formulates the goal of his approach, which he calls 'pragmastylistics' as follows: "Pragmastylistics will always attempt to show how the different possible ways of saying 'the same thing' (style) depend on factors which compose the situation (pragmatic factors)". Most work in this approach, too, relies on intuitive analyses.

In sociolinguistics, Hymes (1974) built on Ervin-Tripp's (1972) notions of rules of co-occurrence and alternation and suggested the analysis of 'styles of speaking' as an important goal of an ethnography of speaking. Within a speech community, "(p)ersons are recognized to choose among styles themselves, and the choices to have social meaning" (Hymes 1974: 434f.) Hymes in general distinguishes between etic and emic accounts: 'etic' denotes a description and classification 'from without', without necessary recurrence to the participants' own notions and categorizations; 'etic' denotes a description 'from within', reconstructing participants' own notions and categorizations. The goal of ethnographic description is to show which etic components and functions of speech are emically relevant in a particular speech community or speech event.

More recently, Gumperz (1982) suggested an interpretive-sociolinguistic conception of styles of speaking as contextualization cues. "(A) contextualization cue is any feature of linguistic form that contributes to the signalling of contextual presuppositions" (ibid.: 131). For the most part contextualization cues "are habitually used and perceived but rarely consciously noted and almost never talked about directly" (ibid.); their meaning is implicit. As contextualization cues, Gumperz describes code, dialect and style switching processes, prosodic phenomena as well as choices among lexical and syntactic options, formulaic expressions, conversational openings, closings and sequencing strategies (ibid.). In this approach, the notion of context is no longer conceived of as an aggregate of material properties and factors, but as an interpretive construct, an interpretive frame. Contextualization cues are thus cues "that speakers use to suggest the interpretation of what is said within and in relation to particular interpretive frames for dimensions such as politeness, degree of intimacy, formality, institutionalization, etc.". (Sandig & Selting 1997: 145; cf. also Gumperz 1992; Auer & di Luzio 1992).

An interactional approach to the analysis of communicative style(s), which combines the analysis of style(s) as contextualization cues with conversation analytical methodology, will be exemplified in Section 4 of this paper.

Within communicative styles, we can distinguish between styles of speaking and styles of conversation. 'Styles of speaking' refers to the participants' interactionally relevant and meaningful ways of using co-occurrent cues from lexico-semantics, syntax, morpho-phonology, prosody and rhetorics in their talk in interaction. In addition to this, 'styles of conversation' also comprise the participants' interactionally relevant ways of organizing the routine tasks of (conversational) interaction in situational contexts. This involves the organization of turn-taking, the constitution of activity types and genres, the management of topical talk and interactional modality (Sandig & Selting 1997: 5).

In my sample analysis in Section 4, I will illustrate styles of speaking. A good example of the analysis of styles of conversation is Tannen's (1984) analysis of a thanksgiving dinner at which participants met who brought along different conversational styles. Tannen showed that participants with an American east coast Jewish background and those with a west coast Californian (and one British) background used different (sub-cultural) styles. These differed most saliently in terms of pacing, grossness of humour, and story-telling (1984: 149). The east-coast Jewish raised participants performed and preferred a "high-involvement style" with, e.g. machine-gun questions, gross humour, lively story-telling, and personal statements, to get into contact with their co-participants. The other participants, however, performed and preferred a "high considerateness style" which avoids imposing on co-participants in any way. While talking with a high-considerateness style co-participant, a high-involvement style speaker lacked enthusiastic responses and therefore lost interest. At the same time the high-considerateness style speaker had the feeling of being treated impolitely and put down by their more active co-participants and so reacted with retreat. The relevance of these styles was testified by showing that the participants encountered difficulties in getting on with each other on easy terms in their cross-subcultural discourse. Nevertheless, style is not a matter of polar distinctions, and Tannen summarizes: "each person used a unique mix of conversational devices that constituted individual style. When their devices matched, communication between or among them was smooth. When they differed, communication showed signs of disruption or outright misunderstanding" (1984: 147).

All kinds of linguistic and non-linguistic cues can be used for stylistic purposes, i.e. as a resource to signal interactional meaning. Work has been done on genre and activity-type specific styles (cf. Selting 1992, 1994, 1997), regional and social styles (cf. Dittmar; Schlobinski & Wachs 1988; Kallmeyer 1994; Hemphill 1989), gender styles (e.g. Tannen 1990; Goodwin 1990), and cultural styles (e.g. Tannen 1980; Pavlidou 1994). Recently, a collection of papers edited by Selting & Sandig (1997) presented work on speech styles as ways of contextualizing activities in verbal interaction, gender styles, social styles, professional styles and cultural styles in German.

Bourdieu's (1979) notion of 'habitus' has been adopted in order to model the fact that our styles of speaking and conversation co-occur with other aspects of the life-style of members of speech communities and other social entities: their housing, ways of living, clothing, taste etc. Styles are socially evaluated, they are used and interpreted according to the symbolic value attached to them in social and economic life.

Recently, analyses of style have been inspired by Bakhtin's (1979) or Vološinov's (1929/1975) aesthetic semiotic theory, in which the utterance is taken as the starting point of a dialogical conception of language and style, and in which the notion of polyvocality plays an important role (cf. Günthner 1997; Kotthoff 1997). Many of the insights which Bakhtin/Vološinov have originally developed with reference to literary

texts, mainly novels, have proved to be valuable also for students of spoken language in natural interaction (cf. Bakhtin 1986; cf. also Linell's 1998 exposition of a general dialogical perspective for the analysis of talk in interaction).

3. Problems

As shown above, stylistics has incorporated ideas from other linguistic fields and has seen the development of several distinct approaches: traditional, mostly structuralist, stylistics was followed by pragmatic stylistics, text linguistic stylistics, sociolinguistic stylistics, pragmatic stylistics and interactional stylistics (for more details see Sandig & Selting 1997: 143ff.). Most often, stylistic analyses which orient to general linguistic approaches share the theoretical and methodological merits and shortcomings of these more general approaches. Some general issues are the following.

1. Stylistics has always been a field of study that many mainstream linguists have been very critical of. Crystal (1991: 223) voiced the following criticism of stylistics: "It is indeed the case that the goal of stylistics is the explication of linguistic distinctiveness, but this leaves open the question of how this goal might be achieved. […] we have too many procedures. Each stylistic article develops its own approach, which is often as idiosyncratic as the characteristics of the style it investigates." He suggests his structural profiling procedure as a remedy in order to arrive at comparable descriptions.
2. After stylistics has broadened its scope to incorporate the analysis of styles of spoken language and discourse, 'style' has been criticised to have swallowed what formerly was described as 'text'. The concept has been criticised for having become too broad, the boundaries of texts or activities and styles seem to have become blurred. This attests the need to show why the concept of style and stylistic analysis is a relevant one in linguistics, text and discourse analysis. In my opinion, the concept of 'style' is relevant in order to describe the different ways of constructing activity types and/or genres in interaction (see also below).
3. Should we adopt etic or emic standpoints for the description of styles? Do we wish to adopt an etic perspective and thus follow largely Crystal's (1991) plea for structural profiling 'from without' — or do we rather wish to reconstruct member's own categorizations and methods of constructing and interpreting styles as resources for the construction and negotiation of meanings in local situated interactions (see below)?
4. What relations between context and style should we adopt: style as unidirectionally determined by contextual factors or style as a contextualization cue that suggests contexts as interpretive frames?

5. What methods should we use: On the one hand, many students of style use empirical research methods and apply them to corpora of written and/or spoken discourse; on the other hand, other students of style rely on intuitive analyses, often on the basis of their own stylistic competence.
6. What kind of and how many categories do we need to identify in order to describe styles? In general, students of style agree that style is a property of texts or discourses. Style is a holistic structure that is constituted by bundles of features on several levels simultaneously. How many such features, style-markers, do we need in order to identify a distinct style or a style shift? Can single prototypical style-markers be used on their own and still suggest a holistic style or a style shift?
7. How can we validate stylistic analyses? Stylistic meanings and functions are interpretations. How can we be certain that our interpretations are not just our own idiosyncratic ones? Most stylistic analyses lack evidence that their categories and interpretations are really relevant to the participants in the discourse. Shouldn't we devise methods to validate our interpretations and analyses of styles? Validation methods could involve, for instance, perception experiments and/or methods of warranting discourse analytical interpretations, such as those shown in Section 4 of this paper.

4. Sample data and methodology of an interactional stylistic analysis

The following analysis focusses on styles of speaking in conversational interaction. On the background of interactionist thinking, conversation and contextualization analysis (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974 and Gumperz 1982) are combined with stylistic analysis for the study of language variation as an interactionally meaningful resource. (This analysis is an abbreviated version of the analysis presented in Selting 1997.)

The constitution of style in spoken language in conversational interaction is conceived of as a holistic contextualization device. Style is taken to be constructed by the use of bundles of co-occurring linguistic cues from, e.g. lexico-semantics, syntax and prosody. These make utterances interpretable within their conversational context and constitute particular kinds of participant relations for the collaborative construction of activity types in conversation.

Methodologically, I will follow the following steps:

1. *Identification of styles as relevant resources in interaction*. Start by (intuitively) identifying holistically interpreted styles which seem to be relevant for the constitution and recognition of activity types or the constitution of particular meanings for given activity types in conversation.
2. *Structural analysis: Decomposition or deconstruction of styles*. Substantiate the intuitive interpretation of holistic styles by showing how style-constitutive features on

all linguistic levels, i.e. phonetic-phonological, prosodic, morphological, syntactic, lexico-semantic, rhetoric, pragmatic, and strategies on the level of conversational organization such as turn-taking and repair are used to constitute the style(s) and their alter(n)ations.

3. *Functional analysis*. Reconstruct the social and interactive meaning, the interpretive frames and inferences that are suggested by the use of styles in interaction.
4. *Warranting the analysis and the interactional relevance of the category 'style'*. Use details of the speakers' use and the recipients' reactions to the speakers' use of style, and in particular to alter(n)ations of style like style shifting and switching, for the warranting of the analysis of style and for the demonstration that participants indeed do orient to styles. Various methods of warranting the analysis will be detailed below.

The example

The following transcript presents an extract from an informal conversation. The participants are female. After talking about their bad consciences because of smoking, Mia, a young university teacher willing to stop smoking, tells her recipient that a male colleague, Friedrich, suggested she stop smoking on the occasion of her promotion.

(1) K0: 484–507 (Laufnr. 189ff.)[1]

1	Mia:	=Friedrich sachte übrigens zu mir dann (.) ähm
		Friedrich, by the way, then said to me uhm
2		ja m: dann mach das doch so=
		well why don't you do it like this
3		=ab erstn sechstn rauchs du nich mehr
		the first of june you stop smoking

1. Transcription symbols

Segmental and sequential phenomena:

aber DA kam	primary accented syllable(s) of a unit
aber dA kam	secondary accented syllable(s) of a unit
si:cher	lengthening of a sound
(.)	brief pause of up to ca 0.5 secs
((lacht))	para- and/or non-linguistic events
ich [gehe [jaha	simultaneous talk, overlapping utterances

Pitch at the end of utterances:

.	falling to low
;	falling to mid
–	level
,	rising to mid
?	rising to high

4	Dor:	JA
		ya
5	Mia:	neue stelle [ohne rauchen
		new job *without smoking*
6	Dor:	[ja
		ya
7	Mia:	(.) m: dat dat einzige was mir dazu eingefalln is
		m: the the only thing that I could think of
8		is zu sagn (.)
		was to say
9		dann hab ich angst daß ich meine seminare nich mehr schaff
		then I am afraid that I won't manage my teaching
10	Dor:	((gives a [snort and quietly laughs for ca 3 secs.))
11	Mia:	(.) [is auch so
		it is like that
12	Dor:	ou(h) mi(h)i(h)ia
13		(.) ja ich mein: ausredn findse immer
		well I mean one can always find an excuse

The extract presents a sequence of story telling. Work in conversation analysis has shown that story telling is a sequentially organized process and accomplishment, which is embedded into the local conversational context (e.g. Sacks 1992; Jefferson 1978; Goodwin 1984; for an introduction see also Hutchby & Wooffitt 1998: 131–142). The basic sequential structure of story telling has been summarized as follows:

> story telling can involve a story preface in which a teller projects a forthcoming story, a next turn in which a coparticipant aligns himself as a story recipient, a next in which teller produces the story, […] and a next in which the story recipient talks by reference to the story. Further, the story preface can have consequences for the story's reception, and thus a rather extended series of turns at talk can be seen as a coherent conversational unit. (Jefferson 1978: 219)

Pitch movements on and after accented syllables:

‘	falling
’	rising
–	level
↑	little step-up to an accented syllable
↓	little step-down to an accented syllable

Other prosodic parameters which are used with local or global extension, the extension is indicated by the position of the 〈 〉:
〈*loud voice*〉, 〈*soft voice*〉 etc.

4.1 The first intuitive analysis of speech styles in the given sequential context

In the present example, the story is announced as an aside into topical talk about the participants' bad consciences because of smoking (see *übrigens* 'by the way' in line 1). The gap in line 1 can be analysed as leaving room for recipients' ratification (or rejection) of the story. After no rejection has come forth, Mia continues telling her story.

In the telling of her story, Mia changes styles dramatically and thereby suggests a particular interpretation of the problem which her story illustrates, and thus makes relevant the very participant reactions Dor gives in lines 4, 6 and 10ff. Both Friedrich's proposal and Mia's reaction are contextualized as different voices to suggest opposite ways of thinking (cf. Bachtin's (1979) and Vološinov's (1976) notions of 'stylization' and 'voices' in reported speech). Both proposal and reaction are presented in direct speech: Friedrich's proposal as the preferred and Mia's reaction as the dispreferred way of thinking. The problem which Mia's story illustrates is not presented as dealing with a severe problem that the recipient is supposed to react to seriously and helpfully, but as dealing with a ridiculous nuisance that needs to be laughed about.

I want to show how, in addition to the sequential implicativeness of story telling outlined by Jefferson (see above), the linguistic details of Mia's story telling, her speech styles constructed to represent the characters of her story, suggest a particular interpretation and thus make the particular response to her story relevant that is provided by the recipient.

4.2 Structural analysis: Decomposition/deconstruction

For the detailed analysis of spoken styles, we need a more detailed representation of the extract. The following transcription conventions are most important in the detailed transcript version (cf. Selting et al. 1998): If transcription lines do not represent turn-constructional units (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974), they represent rhythmic cadences (Couper-Kuhlen 1993), i.e. accented syllables (beats) plus their following unaccented syllables up to the beginning of (but not including) the next accented syllable. Capital letters are used to represent accented syllables. Cadences which are heard as rhythmically structured, i.e. roughly similar in length of time, are placed beneath each other in slashes. In order to verify the auditive interpretation of rhythm, the length of cadences was also measured with a stop watch; the mean values are given in the right margin of the transcript. Beneath the text, relevant intonation, loudness, tempo and other cues are indicated. They will be spelled out in the analysis.

What are the styles that Mia constitutes and how are they constituted? I will make explicit the various co-occurring style-constitutive cues for each of the two

contrasting parts, dealing successively with cues from (a) lexico-semantics, (b) syntax, and (c) prosody — here further differentiated on the basis of (ca) rhythm, (cb) intonation, (cc) loudness, and (cd) other articulatory features.

The first part of Mia's story is represented in lines 1 through 13:

1	Mia:		=↑ 'FRIEDrich sachte übrigens zu mir dann. (.) ähm-	
			Friedrich, by the way, then said to me uhm	
2			/↑'JA; m: dann /	/0.5/
			⟨*loud voice*	
			well then	
3			/↑ 'mAch das doch /	/0.5/
			loud voice	
			do it like	
4			/↑ 'SO;=ab /	/0.3/
			loud voice	
			this from	
5			/↑ 'Erstn /	/0.4/
			loud and tense voice, precise articulation	
			first of	
6			/'sEchstn /	/0.4/
			loud and tense voice, precise articulation	
			sixth (=june)	
7			/'RAUCHS du nich mehr.	/1.2/
			loud and tense voice, precise articulation⟩	
			you don't smoke any more	
8	Dor:		/'JA /	/0.3/
			ya	
9	Mia:		/⁻nEue /	/0.3/
			⟨*loud, precise articulation*	
			new	
10			/↑⁻STELle⁻ /	/0.4/
			loud, precise articulation	
			job	
11	Mia:	[	/⁻Ohne /	/0.4/
			loud, precise articulation	
		[	*without*	
12	Dor:	[	'JA;	
		[	*ya*	
13	Mia:		/↓ ⁻*RAUchen. /*	/0.5/
			loud, precise articulation ⟩	
			smoking	

Friedrich's proposal is presented as follows:

a. *Lexico-semantics*: After her very brief initiation of story telling, in which Mia names the relevant characters in the episode, for the 'complication', Friedrich is quoted in direct speech to have used positively evaluated vocabulary in presenting a concrete proposal: *MACH das doch SO*, *ab ERStn SECHStn RAUCHS du nich mehr*, and *NEUe STELle OHne RAUchen*.
b. *Syntax*: The telling of Friedrich's proposal culminates, after some introductory full sentences, in the phrasal units *NEUe STELle OHne RAUchen*. The full sentences present the actual proposal, the culmination phrases formulate the pointed positive result, if Mia were to follow this proposal.
c. *Prosody*: This is further contextualized with prosodic cues. These, however, differentiate between the first part of the proposal and its culmination.
ca. *Rhythm*: After the initiation of story telling, which is not organized rhythmically (line 1), for the presentation of the first part of Friedrich's proposal, Mia adopts a saliently rhythmic organisation of talk. Most of her accents in lines 2 through 13 are placed at rhythmic intervals in time, all these rhythmic cadences are comparatively short ones: Mia starts with two cadences of 0.5 secs length which are then followed by a shorter cadence of 0.3 secs. This short cadence is the result of the presentation of the beat on *ERStn* (line 5) early in comparison to the previous beats; this is why in the transcript the slash indicating the beginning of the cadence starting with *ERStn* is shifted to the left. All the following rhythmic cadences are now adjusted and timed with reference to the cadence starting with *ERStn*; this is why the sequence of cadences from here on is presented as beginning in line with the early cadence in line 5. Both the cadences for *ERStn* and *SECHStn* are 0.4 secs short. The next cadence, however, which ends the first part of Friedrich's proposal, breaks the rhythm: this cadence is 1.2 secs long and sounds like a tail to the prior cadences.
cb. *Intonation*: All the pitch movements in and after accented syllables are falling ones. But while these normally end in a more or less mid pitch range, the last pitch movement falls down to low pitch.
cc. *Loudness*: In contrast to normal loudness in the initiation, Friedrich's direct speech is quoted with increased loudness.
cd. Articulation is tense in lines 5–7, precise throughout the whole passage.

4.2.1 *Recipient reaction after this first part of the story telling*

The recipient of the story telling, Dor, arguably interprets the long cadence with low falling pitch co-occurring with the possible end of Friedrich's quoted words as somehow segmenting the story telling. It is just after this that she gives her recipient token *JA* in line 8 which displays rhythmically integrated agreement with Friedrich's proposal.

After this, Mia continues her story telling by presenting the culmination of Friedrich's proposal once more in an even more pointed way, prosodically organized as follows:

ca. *Rhythm*: All the cadences are short: they slowly increase from 0.3 over 0.4 to 0.5 secs; all cadences are perceived as rhythmically structured, even if they slowly become slightly longer.
cb. *Intonation*: The pitch accent movements in the four words *NEUe STELle OHne RAUchen* are all stylized levels. While the first pair is stepping up from mid to high level pitches, the second pair is stepping down from mid to low level pitches. All four accents form an entire *gestalt* prosodically.
cc. *Loudness*: remains increased throughout.

4.3 Functional analysis

These cues in co-occurrence present Friedrich's proposal as culminating in the sketching of Mia's positive situation if she were to follow his proposal. Within the *gestalt* that is configured intonationally, the level pitches seem to signal something like the following meaning: Metaphorically speaking, the positive situation of having a new job and having stopped smoking is presented as a kind of complete *gestalt.* The short cadences and increased loudness throughout the proposal present the quoted speaker Friedrich as a 'positive-thinking' type of personality who represents the preferred way of thinking about Mia's problem.

4.4 Warranting

Mia's presentation of a pointed culmination of Friedrich's proposal is arguably understood by Dor. She provides a recipient token *JA* in line 12, displaying her recognition and collaborative constitution of a first culmination in Mia's story-telling. This early collaboration in making the point of Mia's story seems to make up for the absence of a(n) (audible) recipiency token after the entire culmination, e.g. in the brief pause in line 14. This pause is not perceived as an awkward one but as a pause for dramatic effect, as an increase of suspense.

See how Mia continues her story in lines 14–18:

14 (.) m: dat dat ↓ '**EIN**zige was mir dazu ↓ 'EINgefalln is?
⟨*decreasing loudness*
the the only thing which I could think of
15 is zu sagn
decreasing loudness⟩
was to say
16 (.) dann hab ich /0.7/
⟨*soft voice, breathy, lax articulation*
then I am

17 /↑ʻANGST daß ich meine semi / /1.0/
soft voice, breathy, lax articulation
afraid that I won't
18 /ʻNAre nich mehr schaff; / /1.0/
soft voice, breathy, lax articulation 〉
manage my teaching

4.5 Structural analysis: Decomposition/deconstruction

As can be expected, after the brief pause, Mia presents her own reaction. At the very beginning of this part, in line 14, the constitution of contrast between Friedrich's perspective, which she has talked about so far, and the new one, which she is going to talk about now, is indicated by phonetic cues: in contrast to the standard pronunciation *das* with a final [s] for the words *das/daß* in lines 3 and 17, she produces two items of marked dialectal *dat* with final [t].

The second part of her story is then organized as follows:

a. *Lexico-semantics*: Her own words are presented as the only words she could think of (*dat EINzige was mir EINgefalln is*), she talks about her anxiety (*ANGST*) that she might not be able to manage her teaching (*meine semiNAre nich mehr schaff*). Both the repetition of the syllables *EIN* in *EINzige* and *EINgefalln* and the repetition of the sound /a/ in the words *dann, hab, ANGST, daß, semiNAre,* and *schaff* create cohesion within the utterance and intensify its meaning. The items present negatively evaluated matters.
b. *Syntax*: All the units in lines 14–18 are full sentences.
c. *Prosody*:
ca. *Rhythm*: After her first introductory sentence to her own direct speech, which is not organized rhythmically, Mia again changes to an organization in rhythmic cadences. Yet, this time, the cadences are notably longer than before, namely 1.0 secs (lines 17 and 18). This is heard as only thinly accented and markedly slower in tempo.
cb. *Intonation*: While the introductory sentence has rising pitch movements throughout, the direct speech has falling pitch movements ending within a mid pitch range, thus again constructing an entire *gestalt* with prosodic means.
cc. *Loudness*: After gradually decreasing loudness in the introductory sentence, all the direct speech is given in decreased loudness.
cd. The entire quotation is produced with breathy and lax articulation.

4.6 Functional analysis

These cues in co-occurrence give the impression of Mia's slow and played-down reaction to Friedrich's proposal. Mia suggests the interpretation of her own reaction as an 'unimaginative', 'fearful', 'negative-thinking' one which is clearly dispreferred. Her reaction is contextualized as in direct contrast to Friedrich's proposal. At the same

time, the contrast between the two ways of thinking is made very ostentatiously. It is exaggerated and overdone. This exaggeration seems to be used as a cue to suggest and make recognizable for the recipient that Mia's modality in telling her story is a self-mocking and humorous one.

4.7 Warranting

This is exactly what the recipient Dor reacts to in lines 19–22:

19	Dor:	((gives [a snort and quietly laughs for ca 3 secs.))
20	Mia:	(.) [↑ '**IS** auch so.
		[*it is like that*
21	Dor:	OU(h) mi(h)i(h)ia.
22		(.) ja ich mein: ↑ 'AUSredn findse ↑ '**IM**mer;
		well I mean one can always find an excuse

Dor does not treat Mia's problem as a serious problem which ought to be treated with serious problem talk. Instead, Dor gives a snort and bursts out laughing. Simultaneously, Mia changes to a different perspective: she confirms that it is like she said in reality, thus implying that although she made fun of herself, the problem is a real one for her.

The fact that recipients orient to the styles shows that they are relevant to them in their interaction. In her reaction after Mia's story telling, Dor orients to both Mia's way of presenting her story and her confirmation that she has the problem as a real one. First, Dor provides the interjection *Ou(h) mi(h)i(h)ia* in a laughing voice, giving a more explicit reaction than her mere snorting and laughing, yet still remaining highly implicit as to her exact evaluation. After a brief pause, Dor then goes on to tell Mia that one can always find an excuse, openly implying that Mia is not willing enough to stop smoking. In this, she agrees and aligns with Mia's negative evaluation of her own thinking as presented in the telling of her story. At the same time, however, she also uses some items which save Mia's face and thus seem to take Mia's real problem as confirmed by *IS auch so* (line 20) into account: Firstly, the expression *ja ich mein* qualifies Dor's opinion as her own and softens the words projected to come. Secondly, in the expression *findse*, which results from the reduction and assimilation of the finite verb form *findest* plus the address term *du*, the form of address is not clearly pronounced; it is ambiguous and may be a generalizing form of address, the English equivalent being *one* rather than *you*. Similarly, the formulation with the adverb *immer* also supports the interpretation of the utterance as a generalization. As a generalizing remark, however, it is less face threatening for Mia. Arguably, after Mia's contextualization of her story in the way outlined above, Dor's reactions are perfectly expectable. Mia does not raise any problems with them.

As a result, Dor's reactions are just the kind of reactions that Mia suggested by first using and altering her speech style for the presentation of her story in the way

she did, and by afterwards confirming that she has the problem in reality. Both Dor's reactions in succession orient to the immediately prior way in which Mia presented her own problem.

This analysis shows that the co-occurrence of cues from lexico-semantics, syntax and prosody is used by participants to constitute styles of speaking which are used as actively deployable, flexibly and dynamically alterable resources in interaction. Style is conceived of here as a dynamic resource which is altered according to sequential context and recipient design. Styles are used as contextualization cues to suggest interpretive frames for the interpretation of talk and make relevant particular recipient responses. They are deployed to organize the construction of activities as interactional accomplishments.

The type of language variation that I have described as 'style' is neither determined by the context nor by the activity-types being constituted, nor is it a coincidental choice by the speaker. It is a meaningful choice in that the speaker chooses a resource that suggests an interpretive frame and is interpretable by the recipient. Such structures, styles of speaking, can be adapted to the interaction at hand, they can be switched and shifted, they can be used across activity types. Therefore, they must be conceived of as autonomous and independent of the respective activity type. Styles of speaking are deployed in order to suggest particular kinds of social and interactional meanings such as definitions of the situation, definitions and negotiations of participant relations, modality, contextualization of activity types and parts thereof in relation to surrounding activities, etc. The categorization of 'style' presupposes that (a) cues that are analysed as style-constitutive are not normally used coincidentally but recurrently, and that (b) they are systematically used in order to suggest particular interpretive frames that recipients orient to.

The notion and analysis of style can be justified by recourse to recipient reactions and interpretations giving evidence that recipients indeed interpret styles as a meaningful and interactionally relevant contextualization device. Therefore, an important task of stylistic research is to develop methods of warranting analyses.

Some methods that can be used as search procedures and for warranting stylistic analyses, i.e. methods detailing step (4) of my analysis, are the following (cf. also Wootton 1989):

(4–1) Substantiation of interpretations with recourse to co-occurring evidence within a turn or discourse. We can look for lexical items or other explicit formulations co-occurring with more implicit style-constitutive features in order to find more explicit evidence for our interpretation of implicit stylistic meanings. This was used when I analysed the wording co-occurring with the prosodic contextualization of Mia's story as evidence confirming the meaning of the more implicit syntactic and prosodic cues.

(4–2) Reconstruction of suggested interpretive frames, presupposed stylistic expectations and restrictions for the activities under investigation. Are there conventionally expected stylistic realizations or restrictions for the given type of discourse which the speaker in her/his style constitution conforms to or which s/he presupposes in her style alter(n)ations or deviations from expected realizations? What interpretive frames does the speaker suggest via the use of style? I showed how Mia in story telling used style to present herself and Friedrich as different types of personalities and the problem at the heart of her story as a ridiculous nuisance.

(4–3) Comparison of juxtaposed styles. In the case of style-alter(n)ation, we can compare the styles used for the constitution of a given activity with the styles used (for other activities) previously in the discourse. Thus, the previously used style functions as an empirical and dynamic *tertium comparationis*, which the participants in the interaction orient to in their successive style uses and alter(n)ations. This procedure was employed when the styles of Mia's presenting the two parts of her story were compared.

(4–4) Reconstruction of the interactional organization of style choices and alter(n)ation in the interaction at hand. In-depth analysis of interaction sequences can show how participants use style to locally organize the process of interaction, how they negotiate styles and thus collaboratively constitute the style of an interaction as an interactional achievement. For instance, style alter(n)ations for culminations in story telling have been analysed as devices to secure the recipients' collaborative constitution of the process of story telling (Selting 1994).

(4–5) Analysis of the interpretation and treatment of styles, or the activities thus contextualized, in subsequent interaction. This procedure is intended to demonstrate that and how recipients in their reaction to a device display that they indeed orient to it, i.e. that the device is interactionally relevant, and that participants' orientation to it corroborates the researcher's analysis of the device. This was made use of when Dor's reactions were shown to orient both to Mia's style(s) of presenting her story in two parts and then to Mia's confirmation that she has the problem as a real one.

(4–6) Analysis of the interpretation and treatment of "deviant cases". The strongest evidence we can find for our analyses are "deviant cases", in which other than expected styles are used, and in which speakers give explicit explanations and accounts for it, or recipients complain and react with initiations of repair or the like. In such cases, the treatment of the deviant case is, on a deeper level, evidence that the participants orient to the device under investigation as the one to be expected.

Of course, in actual analyses, not all of these and other possible warranting procedures need to be relevant simultaneously. Furthermore, not all of the procedures can be kept separate; some interact and overlap with each other. Yet, each of the procedures points to an aspect that might be relevant.

As an alternative way to analyse this example one might think of, for instance, Hymes' (1998) line or verse analysis of spoken narratives. While his textual and prosodic analysis of the utterances constituting oral narratives is partly similar to my structural analysis, Hymes' analysis is aimed at exposing the poetic skills with which members of (in his case native American) speech communities tell their stories. As his data are not interactional ones — he analyses the telling of traditional myth stories by narrators in their cultures, he does not deal with any interactional matters. His approach is much more promising for the analysis of myth stories as told to anthropological or ethnographic field workers by semi-professional narrators than for the analysis of story telling in everyday conversational interaction.

5. Perspectives for future research

The construction and alter(n)ation of communicative style(s) in everyday conversational interaction is one of the most subtle ways of suggesting interactional meaning and thereby of managing (and manipulating) interaction. Stylistic analyses should therefore be integrated into analyses of social interaction, in particular into analyses of narratives or story telling in interaction (for an overview see also Gülich & Quasthoff 1986; Ochs 1997), argumentation and disputes, and into the analysis of larger 'packages' and 'communicative genres' in general (see Bergmann & Luckmann 1995; Günthner & Knoblauch 1995), wherever relevant.

The management of communicative style in interaction is part of our communicative competence that needs to be described for theoretical and practical reasons. A lot of work is still needed which describes the principles of constructing and manipulating styles in interaction in different activity types and genres and in different languages. Analyses of communicative style are aimed to reconstruct our stylistic competence, i.e. our competence to effectively and flexibly use language variation as a situationally adapted and recipient-designed resource in social interaction.

The analysis of communicative styles can be useful as part and prerequisite of consciousness raising for a practical and descriptive rhetoric of talk-in-interaction (cf. Kallmeyer 1996). Such consciousness raising with respect to the effects of stylistic variation in talk will be useful both for mothertongue and foreign language teaching as well as for professional rhetorical training.

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Conversation analysis

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1. Introduction

Conversation analysis (CA) has come to be the recognised term for what is in fact the study of talk-in-interaction (henceforth 'talk') in general; while it is not restricted to the study of conversation, it recognises that ordinary conversation is the basic environment for language use. In studying conversation and its adaptations, CA contributes to the development of a naturalistic, observation-based empirical science of actual verbal behavior alongside work in related fields within pragmatics (e.g. sociolinguistics and discourse analysis). What makes this approach distinctive is both its analytical focus and its treatment of interactional data. The focus of CA research is talk as a vehicle for action and its concern with how participants collaborate in constructing recognisable and coherent courses of action. To that end, recordings of naturally-occurring interaction are transcribed in such a way as to capture the temporal production of utterances in turns-at-talk and thus make available for analysis how participants understand and respond to one another. We shall see in due course a sample of data transcribed according to conversation analytic conventions and establish what this transcription makes possible, but we first turn to its emergence as a distinct field of inquiry.

2. Origins and overview

Conversation analysis emerged in the pioneering researches of Harvey Sacks into the structural organization of everyday language use, at the University of California in the early 1960s (Sacks 1992). Influenced both by ethnomethodological concerns with members' methods of practical reasoning (through an early association with Harold Garfinkel; see Garfinkel 1967), and by Erving Goffman's explorations of the structural properties of face-to-face interaction (Goffman 1963, 1964), Sacks initiated a radical research programme designed to investigate the levels of social order which could be revealed in the everyday practice of talking.

The hypothesis with which this programme was begun — that ordinary conversation may be a deeply ordered, structurally organized phenomenon — could best be explored, Sacks reasoned, through the use of recorded naturally-occurring data

which could be looked at repeatedly. Initially, Sacks worked on whatever data were available to him: principally recordings of calls to a Los Angeles Suicide Prevention Center. While retaining his sensitivity to the troubles of the persons whose talk he was studying, Sacks began to develop a unique approach to the study of ordinary language, which focused on the 'machinery' of conversational turn-taking — the methods by which persons concertedly manage the routine exchange of turns while minimizing gap and overlap between them — and on the sequential patterns and structures associated with the management of social activities in conversation (see Sacks, 1992). Because he had access to a whole corpus of phone calls, Sacks was able to show that the activities he was investigating were accomplished in systematic and methodical ways across several calls, irrespective of the personal characteristics or individual histories of the participants involved. As these researches progressed, and through his collaboration with colleagues Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson, the available data were supplemented with expanding corpora of more 'mundane' telephone calls; and the exploratory research was refined and developed. Their landmark paper on turn-taking in conversation (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974) is notable for being the first study of language to put participants' own displayed understandings in interaction at the centre of the analysis; the units of analysis are taken to be those that the participants themselves are observed to be using, rather than any abstraction or grammatically defined entity, such as the sentence or clause. This focus on turns and the management of turn exchange has laid the groundwork for two distinct but related lines of investigation, firstly into the structural organization of talk, and secondly, investigation of the distinctive methods of turn-taking and activity organization found in the specialized settings of institutional talk. We now examine these two lines of investigation in turn.

Research into the structural organization of talk encompasses both the mechanisms through which talk is accomplished and the actions and activities prosecuted by means of the talk itself. We now have compelling accounts of sequence organization (Schegloff, 1990, 2006), structural organizations in overlapping talk (Jefferson, 1986; Schegloff, 2000), repair (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks, 1977; Schegloff, 1979, 1992, 1997, Drew, 1997), and preference organization (Pomerantz, 1984, Schegloff, 1988a). The actions analyzed in talk have included the familiar, such as greetings (Schegloff, 1986), invitations (Drew, 1984), complaints (Drew & Holt, 1988; Drew, 1998), teases (Drew, 1987), questions (Koshik, 2005), answers (Raymond, 2003), anticipatory completions (Lerner, 1996) and agreements and disagreements (Pomerantz, 1984; Heritage, 2002), as well as the less so, such as preliminaries of various kinds (Terasaki 1976 [2004]; Schegloff 1980, 1988b), and even the hitherto unidentified, such as confirming allusions (Schegloff, 1996) or asserting epistemic priority (Heritage & Raymond, 2005; Stivers, 2005). Alongside these has been research into activities, or a series of connected actions managed over a sequence, such as storytelling (Jefferson 1978; Lerner 1992) and topic shift (Jefferson, 1984a, 1993; Drew & Holt, 1998, Holt & Drew, 2005).

This structural investigation of talk has imported a rigorously empirical methodology to traditional areas of linguistic inquiry (see Clift, 2005 for an overview). So CA work on such items as *oh* (Heritage, 1984, 1998, 2002), *well* (Pomerantz, 1984; Schegloff & Lerner, 2009), *actually* (Clift, 2001) and *so* (Raymond, 2004) addresses issues relevant to lexical semantics; and research on turn-taking has been integrated with work on prosody (see Local & Kelly, 1986; Couper-Kuhlen, 2001; Local & Walker, 2004; Local, 2005, and the collection in Couper-Kuhlen & Selting, 1996, and Couper-Kuhlen & Ford, 2004) as well as syntax (see, e.g. Lerner, 1991; Ono & Thompson, 1996, and the collections in Ochs et al. 1996, and Ford et al. 2002). Yet it is also evident that the study of naturally-occurring interaction necessitates reference to domains broader than those of traditional linguistics. There has, for example, been extensive work on non-lexical response tokens such as *Uh huh* (Schegloff 1981), laughter (Jefferson, 1984b; Jefferson, Sacks & Schegloff 1987), *Mm* (Gardner 1997) and the expression of surprise (Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 2005). And work on membership categorization (see, e.g. Kitzinger, 2005, Zimmerman, 1998), beyond the realm of the solely linguistic, returns to one of Sacks's earliest preoccupations (Sacks, 1992). In addition, conversation analytic work has expanded beyond the domain of telephone interactions, which represented a propitious starting point for the analysis of talk-in-interaction precisely because of the lack of possibly 'complicating' visual and gestural contact between participants, to study video recordings of interactions with the aim of analyzing the integration of speech with non-vocal activities. This has revealed further ways in which participants may mobilize a range of resources – both linguistic and non-linguistic – in the service of interaction (Charles Goodwin 1981, 2000). Indeed, in cases where language is impaired, as in cases of aphasia (Charles Goodwin, 1995, the collection in Goodwin, 2003), or yet to develop, as in young children (Lerner & Zimmerman, 2003), the study of video materials is essential.

That the preponderance of conversation analytic work has been with English materials should not go unremarked. This is, of course, a function of its origins. However, there is an increasing diversity of research on languages as varied as Thai (Moerman, 1988), Swedish (Lindström, 1994), Dutch (Mazeland & Huiskes, 2001) Finnish (Sorjonen, 1996, 2002; Ogden, 2004), German (Egbert, 1997a, b), Mandarin (Wu, 2004), Japanese (Hayashi, 1999; Hayashi et al. 2002; Lerner & Takagi, 1999; Tanaka 1999), and Korean (Kim, 1999; Park, 1998).

The central focus of conversation analytic work – to identify the generic practices of talk and develop the tools for analyzing them – has emerged from its engagement with the materials of mundane conversation. Yet, as Sacks's early work on helpline calls indicates, conversation analysts have, from the earliest days, worked on interactional materials from institutional settings, and it is research on institutional talk which forms the other main line of investigation in CA research. We now have accounts of interactions in courts of law (Atkinson & Drew, 1979, Maynard,

1984), classrooms (Mehan, 1979; Lerner, 1995), public speeches (Atkinson, 1984), broadcast news interviews (Clayman & Heritage, 2002), calls to the emergency services (Zimmerman, 1992), and medical interaction (Stivers & Heritage, 2001, see the collection in Heritage & Maynard, 2006) amongst others; for an overview, see the introduction in Drew and Heritage (1992) and the collection therein. CA has also been used within a broader ethnographic framework by anthropologists such as Moerman (1988) and Marjorie H. Goodwin (1990, 2002).

In all these applications, CA research aims to reveal how the technical aspects of speech exchange are the structured, socially organized resources by which participants perform and co-ordinate activities through talking-in-interaction. Talk is treated as a vehicle for social action; and also as a principal means by which social organization in person-to-person interaction is mutually constructed and sustained. Hence it is a strategic site in which social agents' orientation to and evocation of the social contexts of their interaction can empirically and rigorously be investigated.

3. Data, transcription and analysis

Conversation analysis focuses its attention on recordings of actual spates of talk-in-interaction. These are transcribed using a system which is intended to capture in fine detail the *temporal* production of talk; in other words, the characteristics of the *sequencing* of turns, including gaps, pauses and overlaps; and elements of *speech delivery* such as audible breath and laughter, stress, enunciation, intonation and pitch, all of which have been shown to have interactional import. The transcription system of course is a selective system: it does not capture — nor does it claim to capture — all the possible distinctions that any recording of talk might yield. Rather, transcripts aim to provide a detailed but accessible rendering of those features that, for CA researchers, prove to be the most relevant for analyzing the methods by which participants concertedly accomplish orderly and intelligible social interaction. An important methodological upshot is of course transparency: transcripts are available for inspection alongside the analyses themselves.

The following extract, taken from a recording of a telephone call between two middle-aged, middle class American women, is representative of the kind of transcripts with which conversation analysts work.

(1) NB: II:2:1–2

1.	Nancy:	Hello:,
2.	Edna:	.hh HI::.
3.		(.)
4.	Nancy:	Oh: 'i:::='ow a:re you Edna:,
5.	Edna:	FI:NE yer LINE'S BEEN BUSY.
6.	Nancy:	Yea:h (.) my u-fuhh! h- .hhhh my fa:ther's wife

7. ca:lled me,h .hhh So when she ca:lls me::,h I
8. always talk fer a lo:ng ti:me cuz she c'n afford it
9. en I ca:n't.hhh[hhhh[huh]
10. Edna: [^OH:][:::] : my [go:sh=Ah ↑th][aht=
11. Nancy: [↑↑AOO:::::hh!]
12. Edna: =my phone wuz outta order:
13. (0.2)
14. Nancy: n[:No::?
15. Edna: [I called my sister en I get this busy en then I'd
16. hang up en I'd lift it up again id be: busy.
17. (0.9)
18. Edna: .hh How you doin'.
19. Nancy: .t hhh Pretty good I gutta rai:se.h .hh[hh
20. Edna: [Goo:u[d.
21. Nancy: [Yeh
22. two dollars a week.h
23. (.)
24. Edna: Oh [wo:w.
25. Nancy: [↑Ih::huh hu[:h huh,
26. Edna: [Wudee gun: do with it a:ll.
27. Nancy: Gol' I rilly I jis' don't know Ah'm gunnuh
28. spend all that money
29. (0.2)
30. Edna: Y'oughta go sho:pping,
31. Nancy: .hhhh Well I should but (.) yihknow et eight
32. dollars a mo:[n:th:, anything I'd] buy'd, be using=
33. Edna: [hm hmm hm-mm-hm.]
34. Nancy: =up my raise fer 'alf[a YEA:R:] ((smile voice))
35. Edna: [Ye:a:h.]
36. Edna: .hhhhh Bud j's lef' t' play go:lf he's gotta go tuh
37. Riverside

This transcript shows a number of relevant features of the socially organized nature of talk-in-interaction. At the most basic level, it is designed to display how the talk is organized into a series of turns. For conversation analysis, however, turns are not just serially organized but are sequentially organized (Sacks 1987). That is to say, there are describable loci of order relating one turn to a next; and coordinating them into patterned sequences through which particular activities are accomplished. Those loci of order are found by treating the transitions between turns as revealing two kinds of things. First, 'next turn' is the place in which speakers display their understanding of a prior turn's possible completion; and second, next turns are places where speakers display their understanding of a prior turn's 'content', or more specifically, the action it has been designed to do.

In terms of the first issue, empirical observation shows that overwhelmingly, turn-transitions are coordinated by participants with no or minimal gap and overlap between turns. Note in the transcript above, for instance, that only four between-turn gaps occur, and the longest of these is no more than two-tenths of a second, showing participants' orientations to the projectability of turns. (We return to the issue of overlaps presently.) Sacks et al. (1974) proposed that turns are made up of turn-constructional units (TCUs) — examples are: a sentence, a clause, a phrase, or a single word such as *Hello* — which are recognizable by members as meaningful units. The end of any TCU represents a point at which a next speaker may legitimately make a bid for the floor: Sacks et al. captured this feature by referring to TCUs as presenting transition-relevance places (TRPs) at their completion. At a TRP a candidate next speaker may, but need not, attempt to take a turn; while a current speaker may, but need not, attempt to produce a next TCU. Current speakers may also select a next speaker, in which case the one selected is obliged to take a turn at that point. These rules for turn-taking are context-free: that is, they allow for such local contextual variations as the identities and number of speakers, length and content of turns, and so on. But they are also context-sensitive in that they apply to the local circumstances of particular turns in particular conversations.

The crucial point about these rules is that they are observably oriented to by members. An orientation to the possible completion of a turn at TCU completion, and the legitimate relevance of turn-transition at that point, can be illustrated using the extract above if we focus on the occurrence of overlap. On the face of it overlapping talk may be considered evidence of an incoming speaker's failure adequately to attend to the status of a current speaker's turn. However, we can notice that most instances of overlap in Extract 1 (marked with left brackets [for onset and right brackets] for cessation) clearly occur in the environment of TRPs (see Jefferson 1986). For instance, at line 9 what Edna's *OH:::::* overlaps is a quiet laugh particle, *hhh hhh huh*, which Nancy fits onto the end of a TCU: *So when she calls me::, h I always talk fer a lo:ng ti:me cuz she c'n afford it en I ca:n't*. At line 21, what Nancy overlaps is the last phoneme of a recognizable TCU: Edna's assessment, *Goo:ud*, to Nancy's announcement *I gutta rai:se*.

Other instances appear more complex, but can still be accounted for as orderly. For instance at line 11, Nancy's *AOO:::::hh!* is a high-pitched laugh (or hoot), which seems to be produced in overlap with — but prior to the recognizable completion of — Edna's remark that she thought her phone was out of order (since she had tried numerous times to get through). However, notice that in her immediately prior turn Nancy had offered a joke of sorts about talking on the phone for a long time when her *fa:ther's wife* calls, *cuz she c'n afford it en I ca:n't*. She then begins quietly to laugh. Edna's turn is begun with a loud, and high-pitched *OH::::: my gosh*, to which Nancy responds with her similarly-pitched *AOO:::::hh!* We can say then that Nancy hears the action that Edna is doing as that of responding to her joke, and starts to laugh by

reference to *OH::::: my gosh* as a recognizable, and possibly complete, joke-response. The overlap is 'complicated' by Edna's carrying on her turn, following up Nancy's quip by herself quipping about the length of time Nancy's phone has been engaged: *OH::::: my gosh=Ah thaht my phone wuz outta order*.

Focusing on this instance of overlap, and wondering why it occurs in the place it does, allows us to illustrate a principal policy of conversation analysis, and to suggest the analytical pay-off from that policy. The policy is to treat anything that occurs in talk-in-interaction as possibly orderly — to dismiss no detail a priori as disorderly, trivial, or irrelevant. The pay-off is that we thereby gain an insight into the nature of participants' own understandings of what is going on at any moment in interaction, as displayed in the ways their turns address the turns they are sequentially 'next' to.

4. Exhibiting an understanding in next turn

CA's interest in how the sequential organization of talk can be used to reveal the ways participants exhibit understanding of one another's utterances can be illustrated further with the use of data from the second half of Extract (1). In line 19, Nancy announces that she *gutta rai:se*. By the end of the extract, it is evident that the raise has been presented as, and understood to be, a *lousy raise*: that Nancy is dissatisfied with the raise; the raise, in brief, was hardly worth getting. However, none of these things are said outright. The presentation of the raise as a *lousy raise* is achieved entirely *indirectly*. A central resource used by Nancy here is that of irony. What is interesting to note is the way that ironical complaint, and its uptake, emerge in the course of a sequence of talk in which Edna's understanding of the meaning of Nancy's talk is observably modified.

The sequence begins at line 18, when Edna inquires, *How you doin'*. This inquiry reciprocates Nancy's earlier *'ow a:re you Edna:* (line 4); the intervening 13 lines having been taken up with the talk occasioned by Edna's remark *yer LINE's BEEN BUSY*, which we focused on above.

In line 21, Nancy's response to Edna's inquiry begins: *Pretty good*. A first thing to note is that *Pretty good* is a different kind of response from a *How are you*-type inquiry to the response that Edna had given earlier — i.e., *FI:NE*. *Fine* represents the conventional response to *How are you* (Sacks 1975); it is a *no problem* response. *Pretty good*, on the other hand, represents a 'downgraded conventional response': although it appears very similar to *Fine*, one kind of work which *Pretty good* does that *Fine* does not do is to adumbrate 'bad news' (Jefferson 1980). Basically, if a speaker has some bad news to report or some trouble to tell, it appears they will use *Pretty good* in this sequential environment in order to set up a trajectory in which the trouble might be

elaborated on; by contrast, use of *Fine* in this position, although it may be followed by news of some sort, is specifically not followed by bad news.

Adumbrating bad news, then, is a potential property of a *Pretty good* response to *How are you*: potential in that bad news may or may not follow, and may or may not be told (for instance, Jefferson 1980 analyzes cases in which the troubles talk adumbrated by a *Pretty good* response at the beginning of a conversation in fact does not emerge until some minutes into that conversation). This potentiality makes it a perfect kind of resource for Nancy to engage in complaining about her raise ironically, and hence indirectly. The first mention of the raise immediately follows the *Pretty good* response; and itself takes the form of a straightforward, unelaborated announcement: *I gutta rai:se*. At this stage, then, the news that is being offered is, it appears, good news. And indeed, it appears that Edna understands that to be the case, as exhibited in her response in line 20: *Goo:ud*.

It is only in the next two turns (lines 21–24) that the sense of Nancy's news being 'not so good' in fact emerges. But notice that there is nothing in Nancy's next turn itself — *Yeh two dollars a week* — which overtly suggests that Edna may need to revise her initial understanding of the news. She does not contest Edna's congratulatory reaction, for instance by saying, *It's not that good* — it's only two dollars a week'. Rather, her turn begins with an affirmation, *Yeh*, and then goes on simply to name the amount. In other words, the turn does the work of ironicizing the news implicitly: it is left up to Edna to recognize the significance of *two dollars a week*, and so to detect the irony in Nancy's talk. Edna's reinterpretation of the announcement appears in the next turn, line 24. Notice that while her initial reaction, *Goo:ud*, was fitted to the form of the announcement as 'good news', this second reaction, a downward-intoned *Oh wo:w*. (the period marking the downward inflection), equally is fitted to the revised status of the news following Nancy's naming of the tiny sum involved. The fact that the turn begins with *Oh* is significant here. The marker *Oh* routinely performs the interactional work of displaying that its producer has undergone some 'change of state' in their knowledge (Heritage 1984). Thus Edna's use of the item here connects with the way she is exhibiting a new understanding of her coparticipant's talk. More importantly, the particular kind of new understanding being exhibited is marked in the enunciation of the *wo:w*. itself. The downward inflection on *wo:w* marks the 'bad news' — or perhaps more accurately, 'no news' — status to be accorded the raise, just as an alternative, upward and animated inflection (*Oh wow!*) would mark the news as something quite different.

Following that, and Nancy's burst of laughter in line 25, Edna works to sustain the joke about the paltriness of the raise by asking, ironically, *Wudee gun: do with it a:ll* (line 26) and suggesting that Nancy *oughta go sho:pping* (line 30). Nancy's responses to these turns — especially the heavily ironic *Gol- I rilly I jis don't know how Ah'm gunnuh*

spend all that money (lines 27–28), in sustaining the irony, work to display to Edna that her revised understanding in fact is the correct one.

These brief remarks on the interactional accomplishment of irony illustrate how 'next position' can be treated as a systematic locus in which participants in talk-in-interaction use essentially local interpretive resources to establish and maintain a shared orientation on salient aspects of social reality. Furthermore, by focusing on the sequential emergence of irony in this instance, we have illustrated another central issue in CA: that of the relationship between particular social actions and the sequential resources by which they are accomplished. As Schegloff has noted, '…both *position* and *composition* are ordinarily constitutive of the sense and import of an element of conduct that embodies some phenomenon or practice' (1993:121). Our observations on the ironical form and ironical uptake of Nancy's complaint show how indirect actions such as ironical reference are not simply properties of individual speech acts but are situated features of interaction, achieved in local space and real time (Schegloff 1988b).

5. Conditional relevance of next position

Next position can also be a place in which specific interactional constraints are operative. Certain categories of utterance make relevant a circumscribed class of responses in next position. Canonical examples are: a question, which makes an answer relevant as the next move; a greeting, which makes a return greeting relevant in next turn; an invitation, which makes an acceptance or declination relevant in next position; or an accusation, which makes a rebuttal or justification relevant next. These are all representative of types of *adjacency pairs*: one of the central concepts in CA research.

The concept of the adjacency pair illustrates the way in which particular types of utterance can be made conditionally relevant by prior turns. The production of a first pair-part, such as a greeting, sets up a constraint that a next selected speaker should follow directly by producing the relevant second pair-part — in this case, a return greeting. Moreover, whatever does follow a first pair-part will be monitored for exactly how it works as a response to that move. By saying that a second pair-part is conditionally relevant given a first, conversation analysts are pointing to the normative character of the adjacency pair relationship. The normative constraint is strong on two levels. First, motivational inferences can be drawn from the non-occurrence of a second part following the production of a first. For instance, not returning a greeting may be taken as a sign of rudeness; not providing an answer to a question may be taken as indicative of evasiveness; while not proffering a defence to an accusation may be taken as a tacit admission of guilt.

Second, the oriented-to relevance of second parts following the production of a first can remain in play across time: it is not limited to cases of literal adjacency. Thus,

instances in which, say, a question is followed by another question, rather than an answer, may seem to militate against the force of the adjacency pair concept. But such cases in fact can quite strongly display the temporally extendible relevance of the adjacency pair framework, once we see that the second question routinely represents a first move in an insertion sequence (Levinson 1983: 304–306; Schegloff 1990). Insertion sequences defer a second pair-part's production, but they do not negate its relevance. A speaker may respond to a question such as, *Can I borrow the car?* with another question: *How long do you need it?* The response to that inserted question — say, *Only a couple of hours* — provides a next slot in which a response to the first question is relevant and can be monitored for.

Another aspect of the normative properties of adjacency pairs lies in the systematically different ways that recipients of first parts design the alternative actions to be done in second position. Invitations, for instance, can be accepted or declined; requests can be granted or rejected. These alternatives are non-equivalent. That non-equivalence is traced in the features of turn design through which alternative second parts are proffered. Broadly, responses which agree or are congruent with the expectation projected by a first pair-part are produced contiguously and without mitigation. Responses which diverge from that expectation — which in some way disagree — tend to be prefaced by hesitations, discourse markers such as *Well…*, and, unlike congruent responses, are accompanied by accounts for why the speaker is responding in this way (Pomerantz 1984; Sacks 1987; Schegloff 1988b).

These different response types are termed preferred and dispreferred respectively. The concept of preference in CA is not used to refer to the psychological dispositions or motives of individuals; but to point to just this structural feature of the sequential organization of some types of adjacency pair. Research has shown that the design features of dispreferred responses can be used as a resource for the maintenance of social solidarity in talk-in-interaction. This is so not only in the way that dispreferred responses may be accompanied by accounts or explanations; but also in the way that hesitations and other means of 'marking' a dispreferred response can provide a source for a first speaker to revise the original first pair-part in such a way as to try and avoid disagreement or rejection (Davidson 1984).

These points bring out again the centrality, for CA, of the inferential properties that attach to speakers' moves in interaction sequences. They also address the ways that those inferences have a distinctly moral, or evaluative, dimension. Speakers can be seen not only to be establishing and maintaining mutual understanding of one another's actions in sequences of talk, but also to be holding each other accountable for those actions. In this sense the adjacency pair framework, and the preference organization that operates for some types of adjacency pair, constitute an important site in which to observe the relationships between patterns of language use and structures of social action.

6. Conclusions

We have stressed two principal areas of analytic concern in conversation analysis: 'position and composition', or the relationship between turns at talk in specific sequences, and the design features of individual turns within sequences. Of course, other subfields within or related to the pragmatics tradition have been interested in these 'syntagmatic' and 'paradigmatic' dimensions of language use. Central to the originality of CA is the fact that it is not primarily interested in one or other of these elements, but specifically in the interrelationships between them. This is what has made conversation analytic insights so valuable to linguists, sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, and indeed all those interested in social interaction; through exploring these relationships, CA reveals an institutionalized substratum of rules and procedures by reference to which conversationalists engage in recognizable, coherent and accountable interaction. And this is a form of social organization which is at the heart of the pragmatic enterprise: the description of language as a vehicle of social action.

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Conversation types

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1. Introduction

One way of defining conversation is to see it as something that people engage in off-duty. According to Levinson's influential text book (1983: 284), conversation is "the predominant kind of talk in which two or more participants freely alternate in speaking, which generally occurs outside specific institutional settings". On the basis of more recent research, one can view types of conversation as forming a continuum with mundane talk at one end and carefully pre-planned interviewing or some other strictly role and status dependent form of institutional interaction at the other end. What all forms of conversation share, however, is the fact that it is through them that we, as human beings, manage our daily affairs and construct and make sense of our life and activities.

The classificatory dimension for kinds of conversation that easiest comes to mind is one of *formality*. Informal talk is unplanned, and takes place between peers, among family and friends; formal talk is typical of exchanges in public, between strangers and in the broadcast media. When talking about a phenomenon he calls 'conversationalization' that is taking place both in the broadcast media and in printed media Fairclough (1992: 204) is using conversation as a synonym to 'informal talk'. Another factor that is often seen as influencing the interactional outcome of talk is *setting* or *context*, both physical and social. As a matter of fact, however, no one-dimensional typology of conversations will correctly capture the variety and richness of conversational activity, nor does the notion of context prove particularly helpful as a decisive factor in defining the linguistic characteristics or the sequential patterns of talk in specific situations.

In this entry, conversations are grouped along several dimensions, in order to attempt to capture the multi-faceted character of talk-in-interaction. Accordingly, context is taken to be a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon. (For a similar view, see the chapter on Context and Contextualization in volume 1 of this series).

Conversational activity has been approached from a range of different research traditions and disciplines from sociology and social psychology to more linguistically oriented discourse and text analysis. These approaches vary with respect to their views on the relationship between theory and empirical analysis, the position of 'ordinary conversation' vis-a-vis institutional talk, and the relevance of ethnographic data on the

interpretation of what is going on in a conversation. Moreover, they draw on different conceptual frameworks, sharing the interest in the dialogical nature of language use, however. For social-psychologically oriented *discourse analysts*, discourse is a means of building identities and of constructing social reality (Potter & Wetherell 1989); discourse analysts of the critical linguistic tradition (Fairclough 1992) combine a systemic linguistic analysis developed by Halliday (1985) with a political and ideological criticism. Two pioneering examples of more strictly linguistically oriented discourse analytical studies were Labov & Fanshel's (1977) exhaustive description of therapeutic discourse, and Sinclair & Coulthard's (1975) classification of teacher's and pupil's turns of talk in the classroom; the latter one inspired by the ideas of speech act theory, originally developed within the philosophy of language (Austin 1962; Searle 1969). The method of *interactional sociolinguistics* as developed by Gumperz (1982) has specifically influenced research on intercultural communication by showing the relevance of cues other than verbal for the interpretation of a message.

Within sociology, two important innovations that have influenced not only sociological work on human co-operation but also the development of interactionally oriented pragmatics were Goffman's (1981, 1986) ideas of the interaction order and, especially, the research tradition of *conversation analysis* that was developed on the ideas of Garfinkel's ethnomethodology by Harvey Sacks (1992; Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974; cf. also Heritage 1984). It is the latter methodology that has most consistently focussed on and pursued the analysis of conversation as a phenomenon in itself, and it has been greatly influencing empirical work not only in sociology but in anthropology, education, linguistic pragmatics and other neighbouring fields of study. Therefore, in what follows we will mostly make use of conversation analytic references.

2. Three basic dimensions

There are three basic dimensions that cut across all kinds of talk-in-interaction:

Firstly, the *channel* through which conversation is carried out — whether auditory, visual or visual-cum-auditory (multi-modal). Secondly, conversation may be *dyadic* or *multi-party*, and thirdly, conversation may be mundane/everyday or institutional by nature. Let us look at each of these dimensions at a time.

2.1 The channel

Although an enormous amount of information in face-to-face conversation is passed through the visual channel, interaction is perfectly fluent without it: between people who are blind, or talk in the dark or on the telephone. Early conversation analytic work concentrated on telephone conversations, partly in order to isolate the purely auditory aspects of interaction. Much of the sequential organization of talk follows the

same patterning irrespective of the channel, but e.g. the beginnings and closings are managed in a way dependent on the channel (Schegloff 1979; Schegloff & Sacks 1973), manifesting different cultural patterns in the ways the participants are identified (cf. e.g. Houtkoop-Steenstra 1991; Hopper 1992). To what extent other verbal means of communication depend on the accompanying visual cues has yet to be attested, in particular the gestural behaviour vis-a-vis the use of response tokens like *mm, yeah*, or *no*, which also have visual counterparts like nodding and head-shaking, need to be further investigated. (See Gardner 1995 and Sorjonen 2001 for extensive analyses of verbal response tokens in conversation.)

The post-war period has witnessed a quick expansion of the broadcast media, and both radio and TV have become increasingly interactive. Much research has been devoted to political interviews in particular (cf. e.g. Heritage & Roth 1995). Interviews and debates resemble 'genuine' conversations outside the media, but they also show certain features that are not there in a conversation carried out without an audience. For example, as the interviewer is not the primary recipient of the interviewee's answers, (s)he does not use the kinds of responses that mark the acknowledging of new information (Heritage & Greatbatch 1991). Broadcast language does not merely represent one-way communication from performers to audience but involves, in increasing numbers, phone-in programmes where the audience is expected to engage in public exchange with hosts who are professional broadcasters (Hutchby 1996). In this genre that is a mixture of telephone conversation and broadcast interaction, then, lay persons may be called 'show-relevant callers' whose identities are locally created and may vary according to the nature of the show they participate in (Hester & Fitzgerald 1999).

In the 1990's, a fast growing type of interaction has been *computer mediated communication* (Herring 1996) through the internet, which has given rise to new forms of written exchange that closely resemble both dyadic (e-mail) and multi-person (chat-boxes, etc.) conversations. Due to these new means, the notion of conversation is extended to encompass purely visual, i.e. written exchanges that, in many ways, do resemble talk in that they increasingly take place in real time.

Sign languages, as used by the deaf and the deaf-blind, are dependent on visual and tactile channels in interaction. Most of the research on these types on language has focussed on their grammar and semantics. Recently, some work has been done on the conversational aspects of signed languages. McIlvenny (1995) has conducted pioneering work on the visual conversations in the Finnish sign language. In Sweden, Mesch (1998) is a dissertation on the tactile aspects of questioning in deaf-mute interaction.

2.2 Dyadic vs. multi-person

Dyadic conversations differ from those between many speakers first of all with respect to the ways in which turn allocation works. In a dyad, it is basically a question of speaker and recipient incessantly taking turns, with the recipient always being the

addressee as well, the recurring pattern being AB AB AB, and the relevant variability, when does speaker change occur rather than who speaks next. In multi-party talk, turn allocation tends to follow more complex rules (cf. the classic paper by Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974), which are to a high extent contex-independent. With three speakers or more, the issue of who is to speak next is perpetually relevant. A speaker may self-select, steal the turn or be appointed by the current speaker as the addressee by gaze, naming or by topic selection. Within a conversation, participants may align with certain others to form a team — something that often happens in disputes particularly. The more there are speakers in a group, the easier it will get split into two or more separate conversations (see Egbert 1997).

In addition, the positions and orientations of the participants in multi-party conversations can be illuminatingly described in terms of the so called *participation framework*, to replace the received dichotomies of speaker and listener(s), or speaker vs. addressee. This Goffmanian (1981) concept was introduced to the analysis of deictic phenomena by Levinson (1988), and first applied to the analysis of conversation by C. Goodwin (1981; 1987). In multi-party conversations in particular, the participants create and re-create discourse identities for each other, thereby forming an ever changing context for the talk. Goodwin shows how the current speaker can, by way of eye contact, by turn design, and even by hesitation at turn beginnings, gain the attention of a particular participant, and make her/him the addressed recipient; while the others remain at that point non-addressed participants.

2.3 Everyday vs. institutional

Classifying conversations into everyday and institutional is partly methodological, partly hypothetical. The difference between them is not clear cut, and it can with reason be claimed that all talk is institutional in so far as language itself is an institution, and so is the family, one of the typical settings for mundane conversation. However, as was pointed out at the beginning, it has proved useful to discover and explicate the basic kinds of rules and practices that any unplanned conversation might exhibit before taking a stand as to how these resources are made use of in more restricted, specific kinds of contexts, such as institutional settings.

A major difference between everyday and institutional conversations is that the latter have as a rule an overall structure and are organized into *phases*: they have a recognizable beginning and an end, and the conversationalists — or at least one of them — know what to expect from the talk and what the topics to be dealt with are. In everyday conversation, there are normally no recognizable phases, and no formal procedures (other than the local rules underlying turn taking) to guide the speakers through the event. As Bergmann (1990) pointed out, one of the consequences is that in mundane talk, the topic may easily ebb out, which may lead to speakers resorting to

anything at hand for a new topic. Another, obvious difference in multi-party conversations is that in the institutional ones, the turns are pre-allocated as there is normally someone chairing or otherwise responsible whereas in mundane conversations, the turns are being allocated on a local basis.

In institutional conversations, the participants have typically different rights and responsibilities so that it is most likely that their institutional roles have a bearing on their discourse identities. In interviews for example, it is the right and the duty of the interviewer to present the questions and the interviewee is obliged to answer. Thus, institutional conversations are often asymmetrical. (For more about asymmetry, see Section 4.) Moreover, although institutional conversations can be shown to play upon the resources that are there in ordinary interaction, there are also clear differences. If the doctor asks the patient in the beginning of a consultation, *How are you today*, it is not expected that the patient answer back, *Fine, how are you*? In opening interviews with the elderly (Coupland et al. 1993), older people are likely to answer the same question with expressions such as *Not too bad considering* or *Mustn't grumble*.

3. Types of institutional talk

The institutionality of an encounter is not crucially dependent on the setting. Rather, it is the conversational rights and responsibilities of the participants, and especially their orientation to each other's roles and to specific tasks that constitute the institutional nature of a conversation; as Heritage (1984) has put it, institutions are "talked into being". (For detailed examples, see Drew & Heritage 1992; Drew & Sorjonen 1997.) Also, institutional interaction has typically a goal or purpose, which is not necessarily a constitutive element of mundane conversations.

Much empirical research has been carried out on dyadic conversations between lay/client and professional speakers, most of it on face-to-face encounters. These types of interaction share one feature: the orientation to a question — answer format of the exchange. The range and variation as to the turn design of both the questions and the answers within this overall format can be detected by comparing research on e.g. courtroom interaction (Atkinson & Drew 1979), police interrogation (Linell & Jönsson 1991), and news interviews (Clayman, Heritage & Greatbatch 2002) on one hand, with counselling in career guidance (Vehviläinen 1999), intensive therapy talk (Labov & Fanshel 1977), and medical interaction in general (Heritage & Maynard 2004) on the other hand. As the goals of these activities are quite different, and the agenda of the professional who proposes the questions as well, the sequential outcome may differ, despite the fact that it is the professional who is doing the questioning. In classroom interaction, the question — answer format is manifested in a one — many arrangement

(McHoul 1978; 1990), and typically consist of a three-part sequence that includes a question, an answer, and a follow-up (see also Sinclair & Coulthard 1975).

Certain institutionalized multi-party conversations have systematically exploited ways of conversing that may be found occurring in a more marginal way in ordinary talk. For example, AA-talk follows very strict (written down) rules of interacting with one speaker talking at a time, allowing no interruptions or questions, thereby prescribing extended turns to each speaker at a time. In addition, each turn has an end that will inform others of the imminent change of speakers. The aim of the strictly regulated way of interacting is to lead the members into articulating their shared experience of being an alcoholic by connecting their stories to those in previous turns: to produce 'second stories' (Arminen 1998). Counselling work, with delicate issues like AIDS in particular, has led to specific patterns of turn taking called 'circular questioning', as shown by Peräkylä (1995). Although meetings tend to have negotiations as their generic constitution, negotiations form a conversational genre that exists practically everywhere (cf. Firth 1995; see also Section 5 below). Some types have become institutionalized activities, with clearly definable profiles and aims. It is possible to make further classifications into business negotiations, political negotiations between inimical parties, and negotiations carried out in the labour market. However, it is not yet fully clear to what extent these may systematically differ among themselves with respect to the kind of linguistic means that the participants make use of.

Having an institutional role, say that of a scientist, does not automatically make the talk produced as representing institutional talk. For example, talk among colleagues over a specimen in the microscope, or over a piece of linguistic data on a tape, may come close to everyday talk (Goodwin 1998).

4. Symmetry and asymmetry in conversations

Understanding asymmetries in interaction presupposes knowledge of what is typical of ordinary talk between people of similar status and shared outlook (Heritage 1984: 240). Methodologically, it has proved useful to try and discover the recurrent typicalities of talk in interaction in their own right before launching into explanations that resort to social attributes like gender, (professional) status or social class, or to more diffuse interpersonal phenomena like power or politeness.[1] With respect to the discourse-external roles and such as social and professional identities that co-conversationalists embody, conversation is, on the face of it, seldom symmetrical. In many types of

1. This approach is not subscribed to by all researchers. Traditions that are closer to sociolinguistics will prefer to use ethnographic and cultural information in the analysis from the outset.

conversation, the roles — with the (linguistic) rights and responsibilities that they imply — are institutionally given. However, it is an empirical question to what extent and under what kind of circumstances these roles are displayed in the actual *discourse identities* of the participants, i.e. whether and how the identities are reflected in or constituted by the linguistic choices made during an encounter.

As Linell & Luckmann (1991) point out, 'asymmetry' can mean a range of different things. By it, one can refer to the inequality — in terms of rights and/or abilities — inherent in child–adult, novice–expert, lay–professional, foreign–native, aphasic (~ autistic, Alzheimer, etc.)–non-aphasic relationships, presumably manifesting in globally asymmetrical types of conversation. However, it is not necessarily so that the less able would not excel in certain areas where the 'normal' participant prove less successful. Additionally, asymmetry can be used to characterize the less easily attestable relationship of imbalance in male — female interaction. First of all, there is the tricky issue of whether gender proves to be an omni-relevant category, or one that is locally made relevant in certain kinds of context. It is equally debatable and a serious empirical question to what extent gender is inextricably entangled with attributes like power, status, and age in any kinds of context.[2]

On the other hand, 'asymmetry' may simply mean a temporary lack of reciprocity, caused by e.g. a speaker's unfamiliarity with the topic at hand, by a temporal lapse of one of the parties' attention, or by some features of the setting that may be felt as discriminatory by one or more of the participants. The latter kind of asymmetry will of course cut across any type of conversation.

Linell & Luckmann (1991: 9) take the view that asymmetry is an 'intrinsic feature of dialogue'. However, the cross-categorial asymmetry is easier to detect than the intra-categorial one, and it has until now received a lot more attention in research; see, however, e.g. Drew (1991) on the exploitation, by the participants in ordinary conversation, of asymmetries in their respective knowledge. Harness Goodwin (1990) is an important work as it addresses the issue of peer group interaction, looking into adolescent interaction in separate gender groups.

For obvious reasons, much more work has been done on male-female conversation than on communication between men, or among women, and hypotheses about conversation among women being inherently different from that among men still await proof. Within accommodation theory (cf. Giles, Coupland & Coupland 1991), the interest lies more in finding out how old people are talked to than how they talk among themselves. Goodwin (1995) gives insights to the way successful even if highly asymmetric conversation is carried out with a severely aphasic man;

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2. For an overview, consult the articles in Tannen (ed., 1993); for a problematization and explication of the gender imbalance see Crawford (1995).

Klippi (1996) is a pioneering report on the gestural and other compensating abilities of the aphasic in group conversation. Of growing relevance is research on native–non-native conversation not only with respect to its possible applications to second language teaching but also as a means of coming to grips with the notions of shared knowledge and breakdown of communication between 'equals', respectively (Kalin 1995; Wagner 1996).

5. Conversation types and communicative genres

By virtue of the way in which types of conversation have been delineated above they could also be called genres. However, 'communicative genre', or 'communicative activity type' is a term that is particularly suitable for a further sorting out of different kinds of ordinary conversation such as intimate talk, family dinner-table conversation, troubles telling, small talk, etc. Genre can be viewed as the fabric of discourse as it were, consisting of much practised patterns of language use. Some genres are linguistically more easily characterizable, and germane to certain contexts (cf. Linell 1998: 238–241) whereas others may cut across different types of conversation. For example, the question — answer patterns are constitutive of a number of institutional settings, as was mentioned earlier, but they may well be resorted to in family situations between parents and children, in quarrels between spouses, etc. Troubles talk is a genre that occasionally emerges in talk between friends that trust each other (Jefferson 1988). This type of talk in everyday setting shares characteristics with some aspects of counselling talk (Vehviläinen 1999: 127) as well as certain sequences in medical settings (Haakana 1999) even though professionals will most likely behave in a 'neutral' way vis-à-vis the client's talk in comparison with the affiliation and/or second stories expected of friends.

Less conspicuous with respect to the linguistic means employed, and as yet much less known is negotiation talk, which could also be seen as a genre of its own. Negotiations have been intensively studied within economics and political theory, but much less within discourse and conversational studies (Firth 1995). Their generic constitution has probably more to do with the kinds of turns used than the structure of turn taking as such. Any bargaining tends to have proposals and counter proposals, suggestions and refusals, arguments and counter arguments (Maynard 1984) but none of these are perhaps obligatory elements in a negotiation. Negotiations, furthermore, often glide into and out of disagreements and conflict talk, which create alliances and alignments among the speakers (Kangasharju 1996), but negotiations need not involve conflicts. In fact, drawing a clear line between genres is not very fruitful; quarrelling and conflict talk come close to negotiations but they could be viewed as genres of their own, as well.

6. Conclusion

In the past three or four decades, one of the important changes within the study of language has been the rise of various traditions of use-oriented research to complement the earlier, almost exclusively structure-oriented, to a large extent unempirical research that is still taken to be the mainstream within linguistics in many parts of the world. We now understand better than say twenty years ago 'the situationally relevant meanings of utterances' — but by far not enough. Results are cumulating of work on how we as members of a linguistic community manage our daily routines in mundane encounters and make use of the practices learned within them[3] to cope with the ever expanding jungle of different types of institutional situations that we encounter. In particular, the investigations on interaction between 'normal' and less able (children, aphasic, non-native etc.) speakers help us understand the importance of co-operation in conversation for making sense of and verbalising individual experience, but also, hopefully, deepen our understanding of the variability within 'normality'. The fast development of highly sophisticated techniques for analysing video recorded interaction will, in the course of time, also increase our informedness of the status of non-verbal means such as gesture as constitutive elements in various types of conversation.

Linguists are not alone in studying different forms of discourse. Within conversation analysis, there is more and more collaboration between sociologists, linguists, and anthropologists in particular when investigating institutional talk. Various forms of discourse analysis, on the other hand, are the fashion of the day in social studies. Negotiation, which is a recurring genre of interaction in many if not most types of conversation, has received much attention within economics, political science, and social psychology. Consultations and advice giving is a genre that is growing in importance in many different kinds of work place.

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3. Not much is known yet about how children acquire different kinds of conversation and become aware of differences between genres. Wootton (1997) has made an in-depth analysis of the development of a child's sequential reasoning parallel with the learning of different kinds of requests. This is a line of research that has great promise in enriching out understanding of the importance of a rich conversational environment for the child in the early formative years.

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Ethnomethodology

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1. Introduction

Ethnomethodology is a radical form of sociology that offers a distinctive perspective on the nature and researchability of social order. Ethnomethodologists study the taken-for-granted, commonsense reasoning practices through which members of society coordinate, structure and understand their everyday social activities. Through practical, situated actions, people are seen to *create* and sustain social order. At core, ethnomethodology is concerned with social action, with intersubjectivity, and with linguistic communication — topics that lie at the heart of pragmatics. In addition to producing a diversified range of percipient and groundbreaking studies in its own right, ethnomethodology in large measure underpins conversation analysis. The insights and foundational ideas of ethnomethodology can be increasingly detected in ethnography, social psychology, cognitive science, and in researches into language and social interaction. Yet despite a growing influence on such areas, ethnomethodological writings can be notoriously difficult to penetrate, particularly for the uninitiated. Due to a general resistance to theorize upon its own unconventional research procedures and findings, the perceived lack of 'theory' or 'method' (in the accepted senses of the word), and a predilection for a compressed and sometimes jargonistic prose style,[1] ethnomethodology has acquired and maintained a position as a marginalized, and commonly misunderstood, sociological enterprise.

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1. Garfinkel's seminal *Studies in ethnomethodology* (1967) is a prime example (and in many ways the genesis) of the compressed and jargonistic argot that has become one of ethnomethodology's hallmarks. In recent years several monograph-length 'Introductions' to ethnomethodology have been produced, and many of these are admirable attempts to render the enterprise more easily accessible, though without diminishing the importance of reading Garfinkel's *Studies* (see, e.g., Mehan & Wood 1975; Leiter 1980). A particularly lucid description and appraisal of Garfinkel's work, and of the field of study in general, is Heritage (1984).

2. Overview

The term 'ethnomethodology' was coined in the 1950s by the American sociologist, and ethnomethodology's leading intellectual figure, Harold Garfinkel.[2] Researching on jurors' deliberations, Garfinkel became interested in the jurors' reasoning procedures — which he entitled 'methods' — through which collective decisions were made and verdicts reached. Such 'methods' were not based upon specialized knowledge or particular types of logical or legalistic thinking; rather they were predicated upon everyday, commonsense knowledge.

Garfinkel's invention of the term 'ethnomethodology' marked the initiation of a program of studies that was to undermine prevailing structural functionalist preoccupations with 'scientific' explanations of how social order is constituted and maintained. Rather than seeking corrective 'scientific' or evaluative explanations of social order, studies in ethnomethodology were to be conducted with 'ethnomethodological indifference' (see Garfinkel & Sacks 1970). This was to be achieved by suspending (or 'bracketing') corrective and evaluative aspirations, and focusing instead on *how* members of society themselves, through their own taken-for-granted, *commonsense practices* ('methods') *accomplish* the social order. To ethnomethodologists, social order, sense-making, and rationality are socially accomplished *phenomena*, ceaselessly 'worked at', and locally and contingently achieved. 'Ethno-methods' are thus people's own (and not scientists') methods for both accomplishing and exhibiting such phenomena; they are, as Turner (1974: 83) phrases it, members' "production practices".

Ethnomethodology holds that it is the study of *how* 'practices' or 'methods' are used by members[3] acting contingently in particular and concrete circumstances to create and sustain social order, that provides for a fundamental reappraisal and a detailed understanding of the nature of that order. Such an 'order' is seen to be created and known, not on the basis of an external or 'objective' matrix, but endogenously — from *within* temporally ordered activities. Ethnomethodology, as Garfinkel (1967: 185) puts it, is

> concerned with the question of how, over the temporal course of their actual engagements, and 'knowing' the society only from within, members produce stable, accountable practical activities, i.e., social structures of everyday activities.

The program of ethnomethodology holds that no social activity or event — no matter how apparently trivial or insignificant — is immune from or unworthy of study. In a substantial and variegated body of work spanning thirty years, ethnomethodologists' descriptions

2. On the origins of the term 'ethnomethodology', see Garfinkel (1974).

3. The term used by ethnomethodologists to refer to the 'mastery of natural language'; see Garfinkel & Sacks (1970: 342).

of 'production practices' include the way clinicians compile records (Garfinkel 1967: Ch. 6), the way 'gender' (Garfinkel 1967: Ch. 5) and 'ethnicity' (Moerman 1968) is accomplished, the methods by which conversationalists categorize persons (Sacks 1972), how jazz piano playing is learned (Sudnow 1978), the way scientists construct reportable findings and scientific objects (Garfinkel et al. 1981), how social relations are textually mediated (Smith 1984), and the methods by which software engineers follow technical guidelines (Button & Sharrock 1994). (For an extensive bibliography of ethnomethodological studies, see Coulter 1990: 475–559.)

In effect, Garfinkel launched a full-frontal assault on the assumption of an objective, external reality whose existence can be known and described independently of human agency.[4] He proposed that members are not simply *in* 'objective' social settings; rather, that they in fact *do* those settings (cf. McDermott & Wertz 1976: 166). And it is through the doing — and only there — that the order, sense, rationality, and stability of social activities is made possible and *achieved*. To study this achievement, ethnomethodology focuses on "a member's knowledge of his ordinary affairs, of his own organized enterprises, where that knowledge is treated by us as part of the same setting that it also makes observable" (Garfinkel 1974: 17). That is, the observable-reportable quality of actions — i.e., the *accountability* of actions — cannot be divorced from the *way* members within a setting organize and coordinate their actions. Neither, by implication, can social settings be accounted for by recourse to the scientist's *a priori* analytic constructs. As Garfinkel (1967: 33) inimitably puts it:

> a leading policy [for ethnomethodology] is to refuse serious consideration to the prevailing proposal that efficiency, efficacy, effectiveness, intelligibility, consistency, planfulness, typicality, uniformity, reproducibility of activities — i.e., that rational properties of practical activities — be assessed, recognized, categorized, described by using a rule or standard obtained outside actual settings within which such properties are recognized, used, produced and talked about by settings' members.

In sum, the purpose of the program of study that came to be known as ethnomethodology was to analyze social organization solely from *members'* 'experience structures', rather than through 'objectively' or 'scientifically' deduced categories, constructs or schemes. For it is uniquely through such 'experience structures', ethnomethodologists maintain, that activities and events are recognizably produced as orderly and rational phenomena.

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4. This is not to assert that an 'objective', 'external' reality has no relevance in people's everyday assumptions and reasoning. Indeed, Pollner's (1987) ethnomethodological thesis on *mundane reason* is predicated on the belief that perceptions of reality, self, and the social world are underpinned by a presupposed 'external' and 'objective' world.

3. Social action, social knowledge

In forwarding ethnomethodology as a program of study, Garfinkel was reacting critically to Talcott Parsons's hugely influential sociological work, *The structure of social action* (1937). In this work, Parsons propounded what he called the 'voluntaristic theory of action'. This theory in essence contends that social order is made possible and maintained as a result of individual agents' internalization of a given culture's shared social norms. It is these norms, argued Parsons, that are internalized as 'need dispositions', such that each agent is socialized into *wanting* to conform to a community's norms. Agents thus *voluntarily choose* to conform to the shared norms, and, Parsons argued, it is this norm-driven choosing that renders society stable and orderly.

However, although proclaiming his work as a theory of action, Parsons omitted or at least seriously distorted issues of central importance. In particular, Garfinkel saw that the voluntaristic theory gave rise to three major problems which center on actors' *knowledge* of their practical, concrete circumstances. These problems relate to norms and rules, the contexted character of actions, and rationality (cf. Heritage 1984: Ch. 2).

3.1 Norms and rules

To Parsons, and the majority of a generation of sociologists following him, socially learned and internalized norms exert a constraining and determining influence on action. Garfinkel saw this as an erroneous portrayal of the individual agent as a 'judgmental dope', acting passively and unreflectingly on his or her surroundings (Garfinkel 1967: 68). In a series of case studies, Garfinkel showed that, in actual situations of occurrence, 'norms' and 'rules' are flexible, interpretative *resources* that participants (most often tacitly) 'orient to' in order to understand and recognize meaningful (and deviant) behavior. Moreover, rules cannot be mechanically followed, regardless of their elaborateness and specificity. Rule-following necessitates ceaseless, contingent, judgmental 'work' — requiring *ad hocing* practices. Whenever a rule is applied, it is done so "for another first time" (Garfinkel 1967: 9). Furthermore, rules in themselves are insufficient to determine or explain action: they must be adapted for each and every occasion of their use. Focusing on the activity of coding in a psychiatric clinic, Garfinkel (1967: Ch. 6) found that participants interpretatively 'filled in' relevant (though 'missing') 'background' information where required, and allowed perceived anomalies to pass, in order to *make* sense of the rules and make the coding categories 'fit' the data (see also Cicourel 1968; Zimmerman 1971). Generalizing on the study, Garfinkel (1967: 21) concluded that

> No matter how definitely and elaborately instructions had been written, and despite the fact that strict actuarial rules *could* be formulated […] in every instance, for every item, 'et cetera', 'unless', 'let it pass' and 'factum valet' accompanied the coder's grasp of the coding instructions as ways of analyzing actual folder contents.

In order to code adequately and reliably, it was found that the coders were assuming contextual knowledge of the clinic's procedures — the very phenomena that the coding was intended to determine (Heritage 1987: 236). Such *ad hocing* practices were invariably treated as a 'nuisance' by the coders and coding designers, resulting in attempts to remedy the 'nuisance' by stipulating increasingly more elaborate and explicit rules of procedure. However, complaining about *ad hocing* getting in the way of rules and instructions is, wrote Garfinkel (1967: 22), "very much like complaining that if the walls of a building were only gotten out of the way one could see better what was keeping the roof up". Garfinkel's aim here was not to demean coding procedures in particular, or, indeed, question the existence of rules and norms in general; rather it was first to reject the Parsonian idea that rules 'cause' or 'explain' behavior; second to underscore the inherent 'looseness' and resourcefulness of rules; and third to demonstrate that their *use* in actual settings was empirically researchable as a topic in its own right.

3.2 The contexted character of actions

The 'voluntaristic theory of action' was oblivious to participants' actual actions carried out in concrete settings. By way of contrast, ethnomethodologists take participants' actions as their point of departure, and attend to the way those actions are, in 'seen but unnoticed' ways, made observable and orderly in concrete and particular situations. The concern with local occasions of action has two major manifestations in ethnomethodology; these are (1) the *indexicality* of actions, and (2) the contextually *reflexive* qualities of actions.

3.2.1 *Indexicality*

Parsons's insistence that shared, internalized norms underpin behavior extended to linguistic communication. Interpersonal meaning is thus implicitly explained by recourse to a theory of semiology that claims a correspondence between 'signs' and 'referents'; socialized individuals are viewed as being cognizant of the correspondences. In a paper co-authored with Harvey Sacks (Garfinkel & Sacks 1970), Garfinkel rejected this notion of intersubjectivity, proposing instead a *procedural* basis for interpersonal meaning. The case against Parsons's (Augustinian) conception of meaning was predicated on the linguistic notion of 'indexicality'. Drawing upon Schütz's phenomenological writings (see below), Wittgenstein's (1958) and Peirce's (1932) work on natural language, and Bar-Hillel's (1954) philosophy, Garfinkel & Sacks (1970) expanded the notion in two ways: first by showing that it is not only pro-terms (I, her, you, etc.) and deictics (here, this, that, etc.) that are indexical — the concept, they argued, could usefully be extended to all linguistic forms, and second by showing that the indexicality of actions is both ubiquitous and irremediable. Hence, logicians' (and, in particular,

sociologists') efforts to somehow scientifically 'remedy' indexicality are, in the final analysis, doomed to failure. Any linguistic form (utterance, description, expression, etc.) is irremediably and inescapably *indexical.* That is, the sense of an utterance is not fixed, but motile, yet contextually and procedurally 'discoverable' by virtue of members *contingently* invoking an array of commonsense-based interpretative 'methods' and contextual information. No linguistic actions — including utterances that purport to 'step outside' events and 'gloss' or 'formulate' them — can be performed 'context-free' or 'non-indexically'. Indeed, even a remark's characterization as, for example, 'out of context', is dependent upon that very utterance's indexicality.

In light of the inherent indexicality of natural language, Garfinkel (1967: 28–29) recommends that we "drop the assumption" of a sign-referent correspondence. Once this assumption is dropped, "then what the parties talked about could not be distinguished from *how* the parties were speaking" (Garfinkel, op. cit.: 28). In other words, understanding is *accomplished* not on the basis of pre-established shared meanings, but *procedurally* and *contextually* — in that what is said is invariably assessed in a particular, local context, by particular persons, at a particular moment.

Importantly, Garfinkel and Sacks point out that the indexicality of natural language is a *resource*, rather than a handicap, for conversationalists. Following Mannheim, Garfinkel contends that the inherent vagueness of language is overcome in the way members tacitly invoke the 'documentary method' of interpretation. This involves the search for "an identical homologous pattern underlying a vast variety of totally different realizations of meaning" (Mannheim, in Garfinkel 1967: 78). Garfinkel (ibid.) continues: "The method is recognizable for the everyday necessities of recognizing what a person is 'talking about' given that he does not say exactly what he means" (see 4.1. below). Thus, in the sense that the search for 'homologous patterns' engages interactants' considerations of the way language use and interpretation is embedded in particular activities in specific circumstances, the ethnomethodological position on intersubjectivity displays strong affinities with the Wittgensteinian notion of 'language games' (see Wittgenstein 1958, also Heritage 1984: 310).

3.2.2 *Reflexivity*

According to 'mainstream' (Parsonian) thinking in sociology, actors share common perceptions about normative requirements of social settings; the argument runs that it is these requirements that serve to direct behavior in different contexts. Ethnomethodology proposes an alternative conception. Rather than situation-specific norms being determinative of behavior, they enter a matrix of contextual (tacitly known) information about context. This information is centrally underpinned by the observed behavioral patterns (actions), which in turn continually — *procedurally* — feed back into the matrix of contextual information. To ethnomethodologists, then, actions are not causally related to context; they are reflexively related: They help to construct and

elaborate the very context in which they are an intelligible — *accountable* — part. An abiding task for ethnomethodological studies has been to detail this *reflexive* character of actions. Heritage (1984: 109) claims that the concern with the 'reflexive accountability' of actions is the central pillar of Garfinkel's work. The notion of 'reflexivity' emphasizes the way observable-reportable actions — 'accounts' — and context, mutually and 'endlessly' elaborate one another. Behavior and talk are thus simultaneously *in and about* the settings they describe (Leiter 1980: 139). Thus Garfinkel (in Hill & Crittenden 1968: 208):

> One might talk of a kind of endless reflexivity that accounts have in the same way that 'talk' folds back on the setting in which it happens to illuminate the features of that setting and thereby illuminate the talk's own features as well.

While an account is produced and recognized as intelligible and orderly on the basis of its embeddedness in a particular (temporal, sequential, spatial, etc.) context, the account itself simultaneously — and hence reflexively — permits participants to construct, observe and elaborate the order and intelligibility in the selfsame context (cf. Mehan & Wood 1975: 13; Heritage 1984: 106–110).

One of the most famous ethnomethodological studies that focuses specifically on the 'reflexivity' of 'accounts' is Wieder's (1974a) study of the way the "convict code" was used in a halfway house for paroled narcotics addicts. The 'convict code' identified a set of (unwritten) 'maxims' of conduct (e.g., 'don't snitch', 'don't take advantage of other residents', 'share what you have'). Wieder (1974b) observed that on several occasions, while he was engaged in conversation with a resident, the resident would respond to certain questions by retorting 'you know I won't snitch'. This utterance, Wieder showed, was multifunctional, and reflexively related to its context of use. It formulated the preceding action (a request for the resident to snitch), provided the resident with a reason for not complying with the request, and indexed the relationship of the interactants as 'outsider' and 'resident'. Talk which invoked the code was thus not simply a description of life in a halfway house; it was also an 'embedded method' for seeing and describing 'routine', 'typical', 'normal' *and* 'deviant' behavior in the setting. Talk that 'tells the code' thus simultaneously *exhibits* and *accomplishes* the observed order:

> this [convict code] talk was at the same time *part of life* in the halfway house, and it was a part that was itself included within the scope of things over which the code had jurisdiction. It is in this sense that talk involving the code was reflexive within the setting of its occurrence. (Wieder 1974b: 152, emphasis added)

Wieder's work on the reflexivity of accounts is a vivid illustration of the inherent 'looseness' of rules (see 3.1. above). In showing that accounts (here invocations of the 'convict code') and settings mutually configure, Wieder demonstrates that rules are

not invoked by residents for merely abstract or descriptive purposes; rather, rules *do contextual work*. They are a means for particular members to do particular things at particular times, and to 'index' those doings — as, e.g., a rebuttal or an assurance — as they are being done (cf. Mehan & Wood 1975: 141).

3.3 Rationality

Rather than ignoring or (as was usually the case among sociologists) subsuming commonsense knowledge under the canons of 'scientific rationality', ethnomethodology asserts that the situated application of commonsense knowledge can be studied directly in its own right. After all, Garfinkel (1967: 35–37, 96–103) pointed out, while asserting the superiority of scientific knowledge and rationality over the layman's commonsense knowledge, social scientists' theories and observations are ineluctably predicated upon commonsense knowledge; such knowledge is both the scientist's and the layman's taken-for-granted, 'uninteresting' and 'unseen', *resource*. For Garfinkel, the unavoidably 'local' nature of this 'resource' is ethnomethodology's 'topic' of inquiry (cf. Zimmerman & Pollner 1971).

4. Commonsense reasoning

In order to document the empirical character of the actor's 'seen but unnoticed' commonsense knowledge and reasoning, Garfinkel exploited the exceptional fecundity of the conceptual framework developed by the German phenomenological sociologist, Alfred Schütz (see Garfinkel 1967: 36ff.). Schütz (1962, 1964) had worked extensively on Husserl's notion of the 'natural attitude' of the *Lebenswelt* ('life world'). This notion emphasizes the actor's ability to draw upon past experience, and to 'suspend doubt' about the stability of the 'life world' in the face of apparent anomalies. Schütz championed the pragmatically-infused *verstehende* processes of interpretation, the processes through which actors (social scientists and laymen alike) ascribe meaning and 'rationality' to social events and activities. This is done by *contingently* applying commonsense 'type constructs' (e.g., goals, sign systems, motives, and typifications) in order to understand 'what is going on here and now'. Moreover, while these constructs are assumed to be shared 'for all *practical* purposes', they are also seen to be fundamentally 'elastic', 'rules of thumb', and thus eminently capable of revision in accordance with local circumstances. To Schütz, 'rationality' cannot be divided into 'scientific' and 'non-scientific' categories, since 'rationality' is irredeemably located in contingent commonsense knowledge and actual social practices. Hence it is on the basis of a ceaseless 'fixed-contingent' dialectic that everyday *inter*subjective understanding — and, by extension, social order — is made possible. As Schütz (1962: 55) puts it: "commonsense knowledge of everyday life

is sufficient for coming to terms with fellow-men, cultural objects, social institutions — in brief, with social reality".

One of ethnomethodology's major achievements was to demonstrate that Schütz's conceptual framework for social action is an empirically-researchable domain. This was memorably achieved in Garfinkel's *breaching experiments*, the purpose of which was to provide insight into *how* 'ordinary', 'routine' social activities are constructed through a reliance on a set of 'seen but unnoticed' assumptions underlying practical actions. Garfinkel (1967: 36) asserted that the aim of the breaching experiments was to 'make commonplace scenes *visible*'. In order to do so, the experiments started with familiar, life-as-usual scenes, and then 'made for trouble'. 'Trouble' entailed the experimenters acting markedly 'out of the ordinary'. The reason for doing so being that

> [t]he operations that one would have to perform in order to multiply the senseless features of perceived environments; to produce and sustain bewilderment, consternation, and confusion … and to produce disorganized interaction should tell us something about how the structures of everyday activities are ordinarily and routinely produced and maintained. (Garfinkel 1967: 37–38)

Garfinkel showed that experimenters' unexpected, discrepant behavior resulted in the subjects' immediate attempts to restore *normality*. For example, when playing the game of ticktacktoe ('noughts and crosses'), the experimenter would first erase the other player's mark, relocate it in a different square, and then make their own mark. All this was carried out without indication of anything being unusual. In half the 247 trials, the unknowing subjects treated the move as a gesture with hidden but definite significance, such as making a sexual pass, commenting on the subject's stupidity, or making an impudent gesture. Garfinkel (1967: 72) reports that identical effects occurred when experimenters joined without invitation an unacquainted group of conversationalists; or when the experimenters asked their unsuspecting co-conversationalists to clarify commonplace remarks (e.g., A: How are you? B: Fine. A: How do you mean, 'fine'; in what way?); or when the experimenters allowed their gaze to wander randomly during a conversation; or, in the course of a conversation, and without indication of anything unusual happening, the experimenters brought their faces up to the subject's until their noses were almost touching.

Garfinkel (1967: 94) reports that the 'normality' perceived by the subjects arose from the subjects' *documenting work*. In essence, such 'work' is the substance and sustenance of social order, consisting of a complex array of contingent commonsense knowledge, background assumptions, and tacitly known skills. "Searching for and determining pattern" (1967: 94) — i.e., the 'documentary method of interpretation' — is one interpretative resource that enabled the subjects to make sense of otherwise incoherent actions. This 'method', and the Husserlian notion of the 'natural attitude', are key elements in ethnomethodology's conceptual apparatus, and are claimed to permeate all

acts of mundane perception and cognition. Following Schütz, Garfinkel maintains that the 'natural attitude' is part of a member's 'commonsense assumptions' that underpin social interaction and the 'accommodative work' which the interaction necessitates. The assumptions include:

1. *Searching for a normal form*. That is, when discrepancies and/or ambiguities appear, people suspend doubt and search for an assumed 'normal form' that would account for the discrepancies.
2. *Doing the reciprocity of perspectives*. This entails sustaining the assumption that each participant would have the same experiences if they were to change places.
3. *Employing the et cetera principle*. This assumption entails participants 'filling in' (observedly 'missing') information during social activities; in this way, participants let unclarities or anomalies 'pass' in the belief that they will be subsequently clarified (cf. Mehan & Wood 1975: 101–2; Cicourel 1973: 84–88).

The breaching experiments were meant to cast light upon a tenebrous terrain: the taken-for-granted resources through which order, sense, routineness and normality are *accomplished*. What is remarkable for ethnomethodologists is that such accomplishments remain, for members, *un*remarkable.

5. Developments in ethnomethodology

Ethnomethodology can be seen to have been forged by three separate though contiguous aims that originated in Garfinkel's writings. These aims are manifest in past and current work in the field. While each centers around ethnomethodological concerns with the accomplished nature of social order, taken together they account for the variegated research undertakings of the enterprise in its present form. The first aim was to challenge prevailing sociological *theory* on the nature of social order. In particular, by highlighting practical, commonsense knowledge rather than 'objective', 'scientific' knowledge as the basis upon which the social world can be known and described, ethnomethodology has seriously brought into question sociology's conception of the social actor and, more fundamentally, raised the issue of the ontological status of sociology as a scientific discipline. Consequently, a major scholarly preoccupation in contemporary ethnomethodology is the enterprise's position in and implications for social theory. Recent publications dealing specifically with this topic include Wilson & Zimmerman (1980), Button (1991), Hilbert (1992), and Garfinkel & Wieder (1992).

The second aim of ethnomethodology was to emphasize the constitutive role of *cognition* in the organization of social activities. This aim was manifest most clearly in Garfinkel's reliance on Schütz's phenomenological framework in order to account for how 'rationality' was constructed upon the cognitive foundations of commonsense

assumptions. A prominent strain of ethnomethodological research reflects this aim, notably Cicourel's *Cognitive sociology* and its focus on 'interpretive procedures' (1973), and Coulter's *The social construction of mind* (1979) and *Rethinking cognitive theory* (1983); a useful review of this work is provided by McHoul (1988). The cognitive dimension of ethnomethodology has also extended to research into human-machine interaction, as illustrated by Suchman's *Plans and situated actions* (1987).

The third aim of ethnomethodology was to describe the local, contingent and reflexive 'work' through which concrete social settings, identities and activities are rendered recognizable and meaningful. This third aim has undoubtedly produced the most substantial amount of ethnomethodological research. Garfinkel's (1967) studies on the 'accomplished' character of gender (i.e., the study of the transsexual, 'Agnes'), and the methods through which clinical records are compiled, were groundbreaking studies which reflect this third aim. Other prominent researches include Sudnow's *Passing on* (1967), and Wieder's *Language and social reality* (1974a). During the last decade, important ethnomethodological work has been carried out into the 'practices' and discourses of natural scientists. This work attempts to show how, in the laboratory worksetting, scientific objects and reports are constructed; see, e.g., Gilbert & Mulkay (1984) and Lynch (1985).

It is also in terms of this third aim that ethnomethodology has exerted significant, indeed formative, influence on the enterprise known as 'conversation analysis' (CA). Although there is some debate about contemporary CA's precise relationship to ethnomethodology (for discussions, see Bilmes 1986: 165–166 and Clayman & Maynard 1994), there is general agreement that CA's intellectual heritage is firmly grounded in ethnomethodology. Whereas most CA work is directed to the sequential analysis of interactive *talk*, in which case the ethnomethodological heritage is at best alluded to, others (e.g., Boden 1994) are attempting to unify CA methodologies and sensibilities with ethnomethodology's aim of describing the accomplished character of particular activities carried out in concrete social *settings*.

6. Conclusion

Ethnomethodology is a diversified sociological enterprise that is concerned with the nature of an 'accomplished' social order and people's engagement in that order. With its insistence on the primacy of empirical, situated investigations of social actions, its concern with intersubjectivity and interpersonal meaning, its exhortation that social activities are locally accomplished achievements, and with its abiding interests in linguistic communication, ethnomethodology has important affinities with the encompassing concerns of pragmatics. It is only recently that scholars have begun addressing directly the nature of the affinities and the relevance of ethnomethodology

for studies in pragmatics. Bilmes (1993), in his study of conversational implicature, proposes that the empirical foundations of pragmatics will be strengthened if scholars are able to address natural language from an ethnomethodological viewpoint. This will necessitate studying actual, situated instances of language use, and will awaken us to the artful, contingent, and socially-accomplished character of language-in-action. Discovering and explicating the methods and practices of people using language is thus an ethnomethodological enterprise.

Throughout its development, ethnomethodology has established and maintained its position as a radical enterprise, located in the intellectual hinterlands of sociology. More recently, however, some ethnomethodologists — e.g., Pollner (1987: xvi) and Hilbert (1992) — have emphasized that the enterprise is not as distanced from 'mainstream' sociology as was earlier contended, and that time is ripe for ethnomethodologists to initiate a dialogue with and within sociology.

Ethnomethodology is a continually developing field of inquiry; it is built upon radical foundations and offers a unique and challenging perspective on human sociation; its research methodologies are eclectic, some might say haphazard and arbitrary, relying on a seemingly capricious assortment of ethnographic field work, audio- and video-recordings, experimentations, field notes, transcriptions, first-hand observations, and more besides. Given all this, the 'dialogue' that Pollner and Hilbert call for should also be extended to neighboring disciplines, one of the most relevant of which is pragmatics.

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Erving Goffman

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1. Introduction

Erving Goffman (1922–1983) was not a linguist. Although he admired linguists as the only group of scholars with "the capacity to study the small behaviours of their own society and to treat the conduct of their own familiars objectively" (1971: xviii), only one aspect of language form, tangentially, attracted his attention (see end of Section 4). He was not interested in semantics at all. He *did*, it is true, quite frequently have recourse to examples of language in his writings, but his examination of these was always perfunctory in the extreme because, for him, they were never the object of examination themselves; they were there only as illustrations of something else.

What can such a scholar possibly have to say to pragmaticians? The answer, as this paper hopes to show, is quite a lot. In fact, Goffman's work had many of the same concerns as pragmatics. The most complete overlap is the concern for language-use in situated contexts. However, Goffman's approach to this subject-matter was from the opposite direction to that of pragmatics. Historically, pragmatics started with linguistic meanings and then added on the situations of their use. Goffman started with situational meanings and then added on the language. A central question of pragmatics, as a branch of linguistics, might be expressed as: what can we learn about language and communication from the study of its cultural, social and cognitive aspects? One question for Goffman, as a sociologist, was: what can we learn about culture and society from the study of its communicative aspects?

However, this was not his main question. For one thing, he was interested in communication only in as far as it is part of something bigger. His purview was *all* aspects of people's behaviour when they are together. The word he used to denote all these aspects was 'interaction', and it was 'interaction' in a very wide sense (see Section 4 below).

Secondly, the focus of Goffman's work gave 'culture and society' a relatively peripheral place. The recurring argument and invariant practice of his whole oeuvre was the study of interaction in its own right. For him, the central question was simply: *what can we learn about interaction itself?* The oft-professed thrust of his work was to explore what he called the 'traffic-rules of interaction' and move towards 'a sociology of occasions'. In the introduction to one collection of his essays (1967: 1–3), he describes the objectives of this enterprise as twofold. One is the identification and description of interactional units. The other is the exploration of the 'behavioural' and "expressive

order prevailing within and between these units". The first of these is also a major objective of conversation analysis. But Goffman, unlike CA, limits himself neither to empirical data nor to conversation nor, when asking what properties interactants must possess in order for them to interact in the first place, to sociolinguistic properties. The second objective which bears a close relation to the ethnography of communication, except that Goffman's exploration does not refer to a cultural order in the first instance but to an (autonomous) interactional one.

Of course, interaction is the place where people and society meet. Therefore, in learning about interaction, we inevitably learn something about people and something about that aspect of culture and society which is constituted of interaction. He allows for this second outcome in the introduction to one of his books (1963b: 3–4) and argues its benefits in his final work (1983). However, in the preface to another (1971: xi), he pokes gentle fun at the notion that interactive data is merely a source of evidence for social structure. His focus is fixed on interaction because, for him, the social aspect of people and the interactional aspects of society are not merely instantiated in interaction — they are essentially a product of it. While Descartes told us the essence of a human being is in thought, Sartre that is in mere existence, and the modern religion of the body tells us 'you are what you eat', for Goffman, we are what we project.

> To *be* a given kind of person, then, is not merely to possess the required attributes, but also to sustain the standards of conduct and appearance that one's social grouping attaches thereto." (1959: 81).

In this paper, I first identify the two central tenets, the twin foundations upon which Goffman constructed his explorations of the nature of interaction (Sections 2 and 3). Then, in Section 4, I attempt an outline of his investigative framework through a typology of the concepts he employed, his building materials, as it were. (For the sake of brevity, I make no attempt to trace the development of his thought. This is Goffman 'in the round'.) Finally, in Section 5, I discuss his significance for pragmatics. This paper is chiefly intended for pragmaticians largely unfamiliar with Goffmans's work. At the same time, it is inevitably a personal interpretation and in that respect I hope it will also be of interest to those who already are.

2. The primacy of the situation

Goffman's arguments in favour of interaction as a locus of research in the realm of human activity take the form of claiming its autonomy with regard to other possible loci. On the one hand, he claims the independence of interaction from the 'macro' concerns of social roles and social structure because "whatever social role the individual plays during

a conversational encounter, he will in addition have to fulfil the role of interactant" (1967: 116). Thus interactants' roles are analytically separate from social roles.

But it is not just that the roles which people play and the ground rules by which they play them are a part of social organisation. These rules, he notes, "can regulate dealings when those who participate share hardly any additional organization at all" (1971: xiii). Moreover, the properties and structure of instances of spoken interaction involve more than merely the intersection of properties of speech and social attributes of the interactants. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts. You can't study either (properties of speech or social correlation) without getting drawn into aspects of situation. He points out that when people study the impact of the social attributes that interactants bring along with them, they are not studying the significance of the attributes themselves but rather the value placed on them in the situation (1964: 134). "Face-to-face interaction has its own regulations" (1964: 136).

On the other hand, he espouses the value, and to some degree the pre-eminence, of the study of interaction for the 'micro' concerns of interpersonal relationships and psychological reality. With regard to the former, he points out that interactants express evaluation of participants in interaction *because* they express a view of the situation, and not the other way around (1967: 5). Similarly, people's rational objectives regarding the actions or feelings of other people are pursued by influencing their definition of the situation (1959: 15).

With regard to the latter, he repeatedly recommends that psychological phenomena be studied from the vantage point of interaction, working inwards rather than outwards from the presumed deep recesses of the individual. He argues, for instance, that psychological traits such as self-deception can be seen as occurring "when two different roles, performer and audience, come to be compressed in the same individual" (1959: 86–87). He suggests (1967: 136) that through the study and understanding of how a person becomes alienated from interaction "we can learn something about the way in which he can become alienated from things that take much more of his time" such as "his occupational career, his political involvements, his family membership" because "there will be a sense in which these wider matters consist in recurrent occasions of…. interaction". Thus Goffman sees interaction as providing a window not only outwards onto social realities but also inwards onto psychological ones, and in one paper, *Mental Symptoms and Public Order* (1967: 137–148), he makes a direct plea that psychotic phenomena be studied from this vantage point.

In fact, Goffman regarded much psychiatric practice with not a little scorn and it was sometimes the target of his sarcasm. In this same paper, he remarks of psychiatrists that "few professions … have so well been able to institutionalize, to sell on the social market, their own fantasies of what they were engaged in doing" (1967: 139). For Goffman, mental illness is a social creation (see e.g. 1971: 335–390) and therefore

his preference is not to study the putative psychological causes of offensive behaviour but rather to study the "improprieties themselves" (1967: 138 — see also 1963b: 3–12). This involves examining "the general rule of conduct of which the offensive behavior is an infraction", then proceeding to identify the set of rules of which it is part "and at the same time try to get a glimpse of the social circle or group that sustains the rules and is offended by the infraction of any one of them" (1967: 140). Thus he places offensive behaviour in the context of codes of conduct and the values held by social groups.

So far in this account of Goffman's reifying of interaction as a worthy field of study, there has been much that pragmaticians can easily approve of, or even cheer along with. After all, interaction is meat and drink to pragmatics; even those scholars who eschew its more sociological aspects (see, for example, many of the entries in the handbook by Horn & Ward 2004) appreciate interaction, or at least a consideration of it, as a source of data. What may be less easy to swallow (and perhaps just plain inedible to the latter group) is the distinctly small portion of this field he allots to language. He repeatedly insists that spoken communication is only one aspect of face-to-face interaction, so that any 'rules of conduct' we might identify refer not to communication in the first instance but rather to behaviour in the presence of others.

His argument goes beyond the obvious one of subordination, that on the one hand plenty of interaction takes place without any talk at all and on the other hand speech nearly always takes place within situations of interaction, so that these situations are "the natural home of speech" (1964: 135). It is also that even when speech *does* occur, it is more often than not in situations where "a conversation is not really the context of the utterance; a physically elaborated, nonlinguistic undertaking is, one in which nonlinguistic events may have the floor" (1981: 141). This is true both of brief service contacts and those between strangers and also of extended pieces of interaction such as mother-child paediatric consultations, mechanics working on a car or a game of bridge, where utterances are only meaningful as part of "a presumed common interest in effectively pursuing the [non-linguistic] activity at hand" (1981: 143). Thus the characteristics of the encounters which take place in interaction, although "often expressed through a linguistic medium", are "not intrinsically linguistic in character" (1964: 136).

Among other observations he makes in support of this viewpoint are: that many encounters are begun with non-verbal moves (as in approaching the check-out at a supermarket); that some queries can be answered verbally or gesturally (you can tell someone the time or show them your watch); that responses are often directed not to a verbal prompt but rather to the situation which prompted the previous words (as when someone accepts another's apologies). These points are made in a paper (1981: 5–77) where he argues that even a minimal mutual greeting (hullo — hullo) is better seen not as a response from one person to another but rather as mutual responses to the situation.

Another argument is that examples of speech can be found which cannot possibly be part of a talk or anything like that because they occur in isolation. When alone but in the presence of strangers, we sometimes blurt out imprecations such as "oops" or "eek" so as to be audible to all those present, so that they will realise that what they have seen of our plight "is not something that should be taken to define us" (1981: 136). In so doing, we try to elicit a response but not a reply, to acquire overhearers but not conversational partners.

For all these reasons, Goffman believes that the thing utterances are part of cannot be called a speech event and that an analysis of any bit of spoken language needs to refer to the situation as a whole, not just to the totality of speech within that situation, and to take account of the role of everybody else who might be present, not just those engaged in the spoken encounter (1981: 137). This can only be done if the primary unit of analysis is the situation itself, and for Goffman it should remain so even if it is the spoken bits of the situation on which an analysis wishes to focus.

3. Ritual and the sacred self

The emphasis on situation as the starting point for all analysis of interaction is essentially a matter of analytical procedure. The other foundation of Goffman's work is an explanatory one. It addresses how interaction is possible at all and why it takes forms that it does. His answer is contained in his conception of the interacting individual as a vaunted being of sacred status — not, it should be hastily added, the individual of socio-political theory but rather the 'performed self'.

Goffman argues the importance and nature of this self partly from logical reasoning and partly from observation. The reasoning aspect involves a consideration of the nature of interaction for those taking part in it. The 'reality' of a situation can never be fully known by an interactant, so appearances must be used instead and people have to act and treat others on the basis of impressions. Given this, an interactant cannot help conveying impressions, regardless of intention, and "others act *as if* he conveyed a particular impression" (1959: 18). As a result, interaction has a moral character, the impressions being received as claims and promises. A particular claim morally obliges the claimant to be truthful about this claim and morally obliges others to accept it (1959: 24). Thus, those involved in interaction often pay heed to the impression that others receive of them and focus their efforts on creating the right impression, one that can be sustained. Knowing that others do the same thing, and also because of the fragility of these performed selves (see 1971: 28–61), they typically pay heed to the impressions of others that they receive and, in the expectation that their own projections will be respected, respect them. This courtesy in turn becomes part of their own selves to be sustained and so mutual courtesy becomes a mutual expectation.

Following Durkheim, the name that Goffman gives to the mechanism by which this moral salience is enacted is *ritual*. He defines it as "a perfunctory, conventionalized act through which an individual portrays his respect and regard for some object of ultimate value to that object of ultimate value" (1971: 62). He argues and then exemplifies at length (1971: 62–186) that the interpersonal rituals by which people attest to their own civility and goodwill and others' worthiness — to the "small patrimony of sacredness" (1971: 63) they are each thereby accorded — are ubiquitous in everyday life, that "whenever one individual rubs up against another, he is likely to say hullo or excuse me" (1971: 64). and that this ubiquity testifies to the omnipresent concern which people have for each others' selves.

Elsewhere he observes (1967: 30–31) that so essential is mutual courtesy to interactants that reciprocal self-denial (e.g. "No. After *you*.") is commonplace and often includes "negative bargaining" which "as a form of exchange perhaps is more common than the economist's kind". He also expounds (1967: 102–103) on the tact with which people attempt to hide their knowledge that a fellow interactant is embarrassed. In fact, so inbuilt are the mutual expectations that interactants will uphold each others' projections of themselves that they become mutually dependent. Shamelessness damages not only one's own 'face' but that of others, because everybody is implicated in everybody else's face (1967: 14) and

> the mere witnessing of an involvement offense … can cause a crime against the interaction, the victim of the first crime himself being made a criminal. Thus … when one individual is stricken with uneasiness, others often come down with the disease. (1967: 125–126)

For Goffman, the moral element, and thus the moral character of the mutual expectations that result, which themselves become moral rules, are not merely an integral part of interaction — they are also an essential prerequisite for it. It is through such moral rules that

> socially responsible people [are transformed] into people who are interactively responsible as well … [and] …society is made safe for the little worlds sustained in face-to-face encounters. (1967: 118).

He also argues (1981: 16–19) that what is necessary for orderly communication to take place consists of more than the 'system requirements' which make effective transmission of messages possible. There are ritual requirements as well and these "safeguard[s] not only feelings [cf. above] but communication too" (1981: 18). He notes that features often taken to be system requirements, such as back channel cues and relevance norms, simultaneously serve ritual concerns as well as transmission and that therefore ritual constraints subsume system ones. In any case, they cannot be separated out in terms of their enactment. For example, in the request "Do you have the time?" the 'remedy'

(that is, the bit that begs sufferance for a potential offense) is encoded in the request itself (it is not separate from the bit that indicates a desire for the information). Ritual concerns thus have explanatory power.

Thus Goffman casts the self as an omni-salient element of all interaction, and thus something that the analyst of interaction cannot ignore. It should be added here that the performed nature of the self, the fact that it is "something of collaborative manufacture" (1959: 245), a dramatic effect, is for Goffman not something on that account to be dismissed as a charade. The extended dramatic metaphor which he employed in *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959) has led some to regard his view of interpersonal relations as cynical. But Goffman frequently writes warmly of the ritual order in which the self participates, painting a picture in the final pages of his essay *On Face-work*, for example (1967: 5–45), of a co-operative system whereby individuals can shelter themselves and each other from whatever they regard as the more unpalatable aspects of reality. In *Stigma* (1963a), he writes with ironic compassion of the plight of those whose condition means they are unable to enjoy some of the comforts of this order (the irony being directed at 'we normals') and, in *Asylums* (1961), with something akin to moral outrage at the Catch 22 situation of inmates of mental institutions, who find that all the everyday props with which the self can be performed have been stripped away from them and any of the strategies it can normally deploy to resist or offset this loss are interpreted as confirming their abnormality (see also 1967: 67). Hence his scorn noted above. Elsewhere, he describes mental hospitals as "hopeless storage dumps trimmed in psychiatric paper" whose effects on the incarcerated are "not merely a bad deal [but] a grotesque one" (1971: 336).

Ultimately, the performed nature of the self is sacred because it is what makes life bearable. Presumably, the conception of drama that Goffman had in mind was not the modern one but the Ancient Greek.

4. Goffman's working framework

For the purposes of studying interaction and its 'traffic rules' Goffman offers "the units of association which make these rules possible" (1967: 143). This section attempts an exegesis of these and the kinds of action accompanying them, in other words the main concepts which Goffman employed. (This is not, of course, a complete list. I have chosen what I regard as the most crucial ones, in most cases because they can be found repeatedly in his work. For this latter reason, I do not provide citations — there would be just too many — unless I use direct quotes.)

As a starting point, Goffman identifies three units. First, there is the *situation* (sometimes called 'social situation'), 'an environment of mutual monitoring possibilities' for the people present; that is, these people find themselves accessible to each other

through their 'naked senses'. A situation could be anything from a small room to a long stretch of beach. The aggregate of all the people present in a situation is a *gathering*. There are of course different kinds of gatherings with differing reasons for existence. To denote the auspices under which situations occur (e.g. a funeral, a workday at the office), Goffman uses the term *occasion* (sometimes, 'social occasion'). While the limits of a particular situation and its gathering from any one participants' viewpoint are the result of the 'system requirements' that make mutual monitoring possible, and so may be objectively defined, occasions are social creations. It is therefore possible that different (groups of) members of a gathering may not concur about what sort of behaviour is appropriate to it (see 1963b: 20 for examples). How people manage to arrive at and negotiate definitions of the situation is something that Goffman explores at length through the concept of *frame* (see below).

There are two basic types of gathering, *focused* and *unfocused*. As the less elaborated, I will take the latter first. An unfocused gathering is one in which *unfocused interaction* takes place in that the members of the gathering "have not extended to each other the status of co-participants" (1967: 145). If every member is a 'single' (they have not entered the situation already in a 'with'), this is likely to comprise the sum total of interaction that goes on in many train carriages and urban and suburban streets. One might wonder what such a situation has to do with interaction at all. However, it is axiomatic to Goffman (spelled out most extensively in 1963b: 24–88) that all members of a gathering, however unfocused, are at least minimally and visibly alive to each other's presence, mutually monitoring and holding themselves in some kind of readiness for some kind of *encounter*.

In an encounter (also called a 'face engagement'), participants "jointly ratify one another as authorized co-sustainers of a single… focus of visual and cognitive attention" (1964: 135) who are "open to each other for talk or its substitutes" (1967: 144). The people thus involved are designated *ratified participants* and *focused interaction* results. Some encounters comprise the whole gathering — for example, private sex. But if it takes place within a wider gathering, whether this consists entirely of unfocused interaction (for example, somebody buying a book over the counter while everybody else in the shop quietly browses), or several other encounters (a couple on the dance floor full of similarly engaged couples), it is an *accessible engagement* and thus, within the orbit of the encounter, there will be people who, while not partaking in the abovementioned mutual ratification, are party to what goes on. They are *unratified participants*, who Goffman calls *bystanders*. The fact that the actions of those engaged in encounters, as well as those of singles, are partly designed to take account of bystanders (see 1981: 85–98 for examples) shows the importance of addressing analyses to all members of a gathering.

So far, I have avoided using examples of encounters where talk is essential. But Goffman appears to fall into this trap when identifying two types of bystander: those

who are party to the doings of the encounter by accident and those who are party by surreptitious intent. The former he calls *overhearers*, the latter *eavesdroppers*, both implying an aural channel for their intelligences. And when he comes to study the doings of *ratified participants* of an encounter, those who have ratified each other as such, it is talk that he focuses on. Nevertheless, he shows (1981: 23–29) that any one doing is not the same thing as a turn at talk or an utterance and therefore proposes a *move* as the elementary unit of analysis in an encounter. A move is anything with a unitary bearing on the circumstances of the gathering.

When an encounter takes place in the presence of bystanders, various kinds of *subordinate communication*, organised so as not to interfere with the main focus of attention, are possible. These are: *byplay*, involving a subset of ratified participants; *crossplay*, which takes place between (a) ratified participant(s) and (a) bystander(s); and *sideplay*, involving bystanders only. All of these may take place with no effort at concealment, or may involve *collusion*. Collusion can be accomplished through concealing the very fact of subordinate communication, or through "affecting that the words the excolluded can't hear are innocuous, or through allusion which, although ostensibly meant for all, only some participants will catch" (1981: 134).

The possibilities of subordinate communication are obviously greater when more than two people are ratified participants to an encounter because in these cases one or more of the recipients of any one move, while still fully ratified, may be not be directly addressed. Thus Goffman distinguishes between *addressed* and *unaddressed recipients*. He recognises, however, that matters may not be that simple. In 'podium events', for example, there are special kinds of recipient who, whether addressed (e.g. lectures, charismatic religious services, people watching the news on TV) or unaddressed (the audience at a stage play) have particular rights and obligations which are different to those of fellow conversationalists (1981: 137–140).

The distinction between ratified participants and bystanders is not always straightforward either. When talk is subordinated to some other non-talk task at hand, in which stretches of silence are neither exactly interludes between encounters nor pauses within them, an *open state of talk* prevails in which those involved are neither exactly ratified nor bystanders "but a peculiar condition between" (1981: 135).

Goffman sees the above categories as a way of escaping from the unanalysed notion of 'hearer'. He also deconstructs the notion of 'speaker', identifying three roles. These are: the *animator*, the 'talking machine', the individual active in making language noises; the *author*, the selector of the sentiments expressed and the words in which they are encoded; and the *principal*, who is the person whose position is established by the words spoken and committed to what the words say and thus "a person active in some particular social identity or role" (1981: 145). This, of course, may change rapidly, even though animator and author remain constant (as when we change hats in committee meetings or code-switch). Canonically, these three roles are combined

in the same person, but there are exceptions. For example, a person reciting or reading aloud a is animator but neither author nor principal; a politician giving a speech is animator and principal but often not author; a person reporting what someone else said is animator and author but not principal. (In Goffman's terms, I am animator and author of this section, but to a large extent and most of the time Goffman is its principle, the person committed to its meanings. But only 'to a large extent' because my organization of this presentation stresses some concepts and the links between them at the relative expense of others, and only 'most of the time' because at some points, most obviously here, I stand back and offer comment. I hope I make it clear at any one time whether I am merely reporting or doing something more than that.)

The configuration of these roles at any one time, constitutes the *production format* of an utterance. Goffman also uses the term *participation status* to denote the role or function of any one person in a gathering, relative to an utterance or all the activity in a situation, and *participation framework* to denote the pattern of participation statuses in a gathering. He is ambiguous, however, about whether he intends these terms to encompass productions formats or just all recipients.

So far, this exposition has presented static categories of participant. In reality, of course, the participation status of those involved in talk is changing all the time, not just because *who* is talking and who they address can change but, more crucially, because of *what* is said. Part of Goffman's ritual model assumes that anything done in interaction always and inevitably carries implications about the character of the person who says it, that person's evaluation of other participants and the relationship between them (see, for example, 1981: 19–22). To capture these potentially infinitely mutable personal circumstances, Goffman uses the term *footing*, which he defines as "the alignment we take up to ourselves and others present as expressed in the way we manage the production and reception of an utterance" (1981: 128). In addition, anything said also carries an implication about what sort of thing is going on, about how the speaker construes the experience. This is where Goffman's use of the concept of *frame* comes in. For him, a frame is "principles of organization which govern events … and our subjective involvement in them" (1974: 10). Now, it should be obvious that framing does not take place independently of the abovementioned concerns. When something is said which effectively claims a definition of the situation, it simultaneously makes claims about the participants and their relationships. Therefore, "a change in footing is another way of talking about a change in our frame for events" (1981: 128).

Footing and framing are complicated by the phenomenon which Goffman calls *embedding*. At its simplest level, this happens when utterances involve a *figure*, a person "who belongs to the world that is spoken about, not the world in which the speaking occurs" (1981: 147). A figure can be different from the principal even when we say "I", because the figure "I" may not embody the same social role as that we embody as speakers committed to our words (e.g. when telling a story about what happened

to us). Embedding means that an utterance can involve more than one animator, as when we begin with "I said" (or "he" or "you"). Embedded authors and principals are also possible. Putting on a mock voice and employing an adage or proverb, and thus an appeal to a wider authority, are other cases of embedding which, by being a kind of reporting, involve changes in footing. Moreover, it is not just utterances which can be embedded but participation frameworks themselves, and therefore frames, and "within one alignment, another can be fully enclosed" (1981: 155). Among examples he offers are: collusion where nobody is excolluded (as in the semaphored elbow nudge or wink); the mock whisper as if bystanders were present when they aren't; and affecting a podium speech register within an informal conversation.

> What nature divides, talk frivolously embeds, insets, and intermingles. As dramatists can put any world on their stage, so we can enact any participation framework and production format in our conversation. (1981: 155)

5. Goffman's influence and significance

Goffman's influence on pragmatics has been simultaneously great and small; far-reaching in its extent but remarkably lacking in localised impact. This paradox has much to do with his singular discursive and methodological practices.

At the most general level, he is a source of inspiration, an expander of consciousness. All those who have read him (would) testify to the sheer excitement of the experience. First, there are the frequent gasps of recognition when readers relate his descriptions to their own lives. But it's not just our own individual, inevitably limited, lives. Another aspect of the excitement is the vast range of human behaviour that comes within Goffman's sights. Leaving tooth marks in a cake (1971: 47), the ritual of gas-chamber executions (1971: 115), the functions of seconds in duels (1967: 27), bursting bubble-gum bubbles (1967: 87), the physical movements of puppets (1971: 149), the significance of different reading material when eating alone in public (1963b: 52) are all grist to his mill. Goffman's capacity to illuminate human experience, together with his matchless prose style, has meant that, as Grimshaw (1990: 4) notes, even literary scholars sometimes feel obliged to read him.

Another excitement is his frequently subversive approach to a phenomenon, his angle being diametrically opposed to the default expectation. Thus, when considering those whose behaviour is in some way offensive (1963a, 1963b), he turns it round and looks at the offended and asks: what are the rules we live by which causes us to be offended? Similarly, starting from the philosophical question of 'what is reality' (1974), he turns it round and looks at the perceiver, asking: why and how do we perceive some things as real (or not)? That is, "a problem having to do with the camera and not what it is that the camera takes pictures of" (1974: 2).

The above features have made Goffman, for those who favour his general approach and share his substantive interests a source of wisdom and authority and sometimes a major inspiration for new fields of studies (see below). His name crops up in references with impressive frequency in an impressive range of studies. The adjective 'Goffmanian' has taken its place in the study of language-related human activity alongside 'Bakhtinian', 'Chomskyan', 'Foucauldian', 'Hallidayan' and a handful of others.

However, when it comes to the detail, we see the other side of the coin. The numerous frameworks and concepts he offered and explored have *not* been systematically developed to any appreciable extent and have led only indirectly to theory-building. There is no Goffmanian school of anything. In explanation, we can again appeal to his working practices.

Many of the books through which his writings have reached a wide academic public are collections of essays, many of which were previously published. In his prefaces or introductions to these books, he makes no apologies for this lack of integration. Indeed, he extols the virtues of approaching the same general issue from different vantage points even in those books written more-or-less in one go. Even in those volumes when he introduces, sustains and develops a single perspective and set of concepts throughout, he does not normally pursue them further, exhibiting a cavalier disregard for them in his subsequent writings, a promiscuous, love-'em-and-leave-'em attitude.

His concept of 'face' is a case in point. At the start of his 1955 paper *On Face-Work*, he defines it as "the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact" (1967: 5) and then proceeds to explore it and its ramifications at some length. But *The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life*, originally published in 1956, and similarly concerned with how interactants express definitions of the situation by managing each others' situationally contingent identities, makes no use whatever of the term he had so carefully nurtured only a year before. Not so many years later, he published *Stigma* (1963a), which, it has been remarked (Friedson 1983), is a kind of mirror image of this previous work, the presentation of the *discredited* self. In it, he distinguishes between a person's 'virtual' and 'actual' social identity (1963a: 12), the former circumscribed in a way which is remarkably similar to 'the line others assume he has taken' (cf. above). In the same work, he contrasts 'ego identity' on the one hand and personal and social identity on the other, the former defined as a person's "subjective sense of his own situation" (1963a: 129) and an image that "the individual constructs … himself" (1963a: 130), thus bearing a close relation to 'the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself' (cf. above). It is not stretching a point, therefore, to suggest that in these two constructs we may detect an exploration of the elements involved in his 1955 face. And yet, once again, there is no reference to it.

As with the concepts and perspectives, so with the works themselves. As is evident from the quality of his writing, Goffman lovingly gestated them and gave birth to them

but then left them to fend largely for themselves. In only one of them (1974), is there anything more than very occasional reference to any of his previous ones. Other than intermittently herding some of the smaller ones together into a book, he did nothing in his professional practice to nurture their reception. In the words of one admirer:

> He seems to have entirely eschewed the ritual apparatus of institutional continuity: never editing collections of papers by his students or imitators; never contributing a prefatory endorsement of another's book; discouraging the growth of commentaries and secondary studies of his work; and, until 1981 [two years before his death], never publicly responding to published criticisms. (Williams 1988: 64)

Finally, to this untended riot of theoretical perspectives and conceptual resources he adds an ill-mannered riot of empirical ones: fieldwork notes, more informal ad hoc observations, introspection, etiquette manuals, biographies, fiction, press cuttings, anything. His method is described by Schegloff (1988: 101) as 'analytical pointillism'. The cumulative effect of these characteristics has been that he stands accused of lack of cumulation, of theoretical discontinuity, of failing to produce a 'body of work'.

Goffman was not unaware of his unorthodox modus operandi and sometimes commented on it. He regarded his theoretical constructs as working ones, necessary because they are "implied in what has gone before and required for what is to follow" (1959: 26), but without claim to wider validity. With reference to his conceptual frameworks he more than once uses the metaphor of scaffolding (1959: 246; 1967: 47) and "scaffolds, after all, are to build other things with, and should be erected with an eye to taking them down" (1959: 246). Those with a penchant for following theories might object that the 'other things' which the scaffolding was purportedly supporting never emerge into the light of day. Goffman's interest remains directed to his subject-matter, not to theory-building, of whose efficacy he is lukewarm: "Better, perhaps, different coats to clothe the children well than a single, splendid tent in which they all shiver" (1961: xiv).

His justification for lack of empirical rigor is similar: "a loose speculative approach to a fundamental area of conduct is better than a rigorous blindness to it" (1963b: 4). Scholars, depending on their methodological stance, regard this aphoristic advocacy coupled with irony as either wise caution or just plain lazy. But in another preface (1971: xv–xviii), he makes a more explicit case for his method of "unsystematic, naturalistic observation" and embarks on a scathing attack on the attempt to apply the traditional, hypothesis-testing research design to this subject-matter. He claims that this kind of research has yielded no new fields of study, no new significant concepts of social activity and no new frameworks capable of accommodating more facts. "Understanding of ordinary behavior has not accumulated; distance has". It is this understanding, not academic conceptualization, on which Goffman remains focused.

(For a convincing, more elaborated justification of his working practices than Goffman could ever be bothered to supply, see Williams 1988.)

These contradictions emerge most notably in regard to Goffman's relation to the practice of conversation analysis (CA). Goffman was a major influence at the inception of CA, whose central aim has been described as to "uncover the sociolinguistic competencies underlying the production and interpretation of talk in organized sequences of social interaction" (Hutchby & Drew 1995). As such, by making great strides in providing more detailed analytical tools for one part (the spoken part) of one kind (the focused kind) of interaction, it may be seen as having fleshed out an area of inquiry for which Goffman provided only the bones. However, to put it like this is to locate CA as a Goffmanian sub-field, which may not sit well with those conversational analysts who emphasise its empirical and methodological rigor. The practice of CA involves minute, exhaustive study of instances of real-time spoken data and on careful operational definitions of units of talk which are supposed to be transferable to any situation of talk. This is why Schegloff (1988) takes exception to Goffman's exploration (1981: 124–159) of the concept of the adjacency pair (which is one such unit) and its limits in terms of a prototype. He assumes that Goffman is discussing the validity of the concept. But for Goffman, 'adjacency pair' is just another piece of scaffolding. As for interpretation, Schegloff argues that, despite Goffman's professed aim to view interaction as autonomous and to discover its traffic rules, he never quite got over his 'addiction' for face and ritual, so that he remained focused too much on the drivers. For Goffman, however, such a focus is essential, not only because the drivers go some way to explaining the nature of the traffic rules but also because, ultimately, they are the reason for the existence of the rules in the first place.

Nevertheless, a great deal of work has found the concepts of participation frameworks, framing and footing fundamental to the analysis of talk-in-interaction in a variety of settings. See, for example, most of the contributions in the volumes edited by Grimshaw (1990), Drew & Heritage (1992), Tannen (1993) and Sarangi & Roberts (1999). Of particular note is the notion of 'frame attunement', proposed by Kendon (1990). Although Kendon himself applies this notion to spatial orientation, the emphasis on process implied means that it can be applied to the minute details of ongoing talk (e.g. Hutchby 1999).

Frame is, of course, not a concept which Goffman invented. But his exploration of how frames are established and modified within interaction in *Frame Analysis* has proved hugely influential. It has, in fact, mushroomed in all kinds of directions, many of them by now a long way from what Goffman had in mind (or, indeed, from interaction — see e.g. Benford & Snow 2000). This kind of tendency, whereby one of Goffman's concepts is picked up and then carried far away, is also evident in the field which has become known as 'politeness studies'. This was kick-started when Brown & Levinson ([1978] 1987) picked up on his concept of face-work (1967: 5–45), bifurcated

it with reference to Durkheim's positive and negative rites and proceeded to typologize its instantion in great detail (much of this suggested by Goffman's exemplifications of supportive and remedial interchanges in his 1971 work, *Relations in Public*). A huge amount of work has subsequently emerged, but, despite recent attempts to prick this face-balloon and return to a more Goffmanian spirit (e.g. Bargiela-Chiappini 2003; Watts 2003), in most of it Goffman is no more than a revered forerunner, a John-the-Baptist to Brown & Levinson's Christ. The sheer inspirational qualities of Goffman's writings seem to carry their own dangers, with many of his terms being bandied about imprecisely, reduced to the status of buzzwords.

But the above comments are not to deny the potential value of such cherry-picking. To give just two examples: Cromdal & Aronsson (2000) show how the concept of footing can be used to illuminate the phenomenon of code-switching; O'Driscoll (2001) picks up on the relation between face and 'line' (Goffman 1967: 5–45) to develop a model of language-choice in face-to-face interaction.

These two examples above raise the question of Goffman's cross-cultural applicability. Goffman himself was not primarily interested in intercultural comparisons. But he is always careful to qualify any generalisations regarding the instantiation of the phenomena he observes and occasionally recommends enquiry in a cross-cultural direction, for example, the origins of and methods for dealing with embarrassment (1967: 101). In particular, while insisting that ritual requirements are always there, he observes that the form they take are likely to be radically cross-culturally dependent (1981: 17). And in advising that it is these kinds of differences we should first look to in trying to account for improper behaviour rather than to individual personality (1967: 124–125), he expresses what has since become a commonly cited raison d'etre for studies in cross-cultural communication.

A great deal of work in the above-mentioned politeness tradition has had a cross-cultural focus and, notwithstanding its conceptual flaws, much of it has proved illuminating. Certainly, as Kendon (1988) observes, it is a promising area for future Goffman-inspired work. The other main area which Kendon recommends is systematizing and elaboration of Goffman's units of analysis, a notable attempt at which is Levinson (1988) with respect to categories of participation framework.

It remains to be seen, however, whether such ventures will prove fruitful. What has already proved so is Goffman's unwavering attention to interaction itself and his exposition of so many of the factors involved. That this has meant locating *spoken* interaction within something bigger has, in this writer's opinion, strengthened the analyses of talk. It has also liberated it from its former limitation to 'conversation'. All sorts of possibilities open for the study of talk in the wider context of unfocused interaction (the modern ubiquity of the mobile phone use being just one), although this part of Goffman's terrain remains notably fallow. His greatest value has been to point up that moves, verbal or otherwise, *achieve* something. This emphasis on process

is reflected in (what might be called) the 'negotiational' turn which pragmatic studies of language-in-use have taken in the last few decades, which emphasis that frames in interaction are jointly constructed and where illocution and perlocution are considered together (see Aronsson 1996). And Goffman's simultaneous emphasis on the self, reminding us that there are *people* out there who achieve these things, has had the same effect. Identities, roles, group membership, footings, meanings and reference are all up for grabs all the time.

Finally, it is worth re-emphasising that in all this constant shifting for position, in his presentation of face concerns as sometimes fraught with anxiety, in his use of the imagery of the stage, in his recognition of "a potentially infinite cycle of concealment, discovery, false revelation and rediscovery" (1959: 20), Goffman does not present a miserable view of interactive life. Nor does his insistence on the primacy of situation belittle human agency. Goffman revels in the sheer complexity of human interaction. The effect of his writings is not to point up the puny insignificance of the individual, but rather to celebrate the amazing intricacy of our togetherness. The mutual obligations of interactants and fellow-interactants, recognised by each and modifying the behaviour of each,

> form the bridge that people build to one another, allowing them to meet for a moment of talk in a communion of reciprocally sustained involvement. It is this spark, not the more obvious kinds of love, that lights up the world. (1967: 116–117)

Note

The Goffman references in this list are incomplete in two respects. First, they refer only to the volumes to which I had recourse; his papers, collected in many of these, are not recorded separately. Second, it is not a bibliography; only works cited in the text are recorded here. For attempts at comprehensive bibliographies, see Ditton (1980) and www.tau.ac.il/~algazi/mat/goffman.htm.

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Interactional linguistics

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1. Background

In the dawn of the twenty-first century, interactional linguistics was recognized as a new, internationally emerging direction in the field of linguistics. While most adherents of this direction are heavily influenced by the methodology of conversation analysis (CA), interactional linguists have backgrounds in and orientations to a diversity of traditions, including discourse analysis, (interactional) sociolinguistics, anthropological linguistics, (discourse) functional linguistics, construction grammar, and grammaticalization theory. It is thus fair to say that interactional linguistics is interdisciplinary within linguistics but also connected to other sciences, in the first place sociology (Selting & Couper-Kuhlen 2001). The unifying perspective is to describe linguistic structures and meanings as they serve social goals in naturally occurring spoken, in a broad sense, conversational language, viz. 'talk-in-interaction'. In this perspective, linguistic structures are seen as resulting from the practical needs of (repeated) interaction(s) as well as giving form to (particular) interaction(s), thus providing a trajectory of an on-going interaction for the speakers. From the point of view of pragmatics, research in interactional linguistics contributes to an empirically based understanding of language use and the dependency of linguistic form on social action, and vice versa.

Overarching topics within interactional linguistics comprise the syntactic and sequential organization of turns and utterances, their prosodic features, and the lexico-semantics of interactionally central functional elements of language. Many of the topics were projected in the first published conversation analytic, micro-sociological works in the 1970s and early 1980s (e.g. Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974; Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks 1977; Goodwin 1981; Pomerantz 1984). In these studies several points of connection between patterns of language use and structures of social action were observed, including the design of a turn, the adjacency pair framework and the formal reflections of preference organization; moreover, the need of developing a 'syntax-for-conversation' with the help of linguists was expressed (very explicitly in Schegloff 1979). Meanwhile, linguistic research in discourse and pragmatics began to focus on interactive facets in the structure and style of speech as well as on the role of intonation as a possible unit-delimiter (Tannen 1984; Chafe & Danielewicz 1987). Cross-linguistic

and cultural dimensions were connected to this line of research especially in the directions called interactional sociolinguistics and anthropological linguistics (Gumperz 1982; Schieffelin & Ochs 1986). As these currents continued to attract the interest of researchers with their specialization in linguistics, the need of a framework for a systematic and empirical study of spoken, interactive language and its structure became evident. Such an orientation can also be seen as a reaction against the dominant formal, non-empirical and written language biased directions in linguistics (see Linell 2005). Accumulating evidence for motivated relations between the linguistic form and interactional function spurred a view of grammar as a dynamic, locally adjustable resource of communication rather than as a self-contained, static and abstract system (Hopper & Thompson 1984; Hopper 1998). From these orientations developed a tradition called discourse functional linguistics which has offered a theoretically relevant framework for many CA-inspired linguists especially in the USA.

Research at the interface between linguistics and conversation analysis has gained the label interactional linguistics in Europe but also in a more global perspective. Important for the international establishment of this linguistic direction was the publication of the volumes *Interaction and Grammar* (Ochs, Schegloff & Thompson 1996), *Studies in Interactional Linguistics* (Selting & Couper-Kuhlen 2001), *The Language of Turn and Sequence* (Ford, Fox & Thompson 2002a), and *Syntax and Lexis in Conversation* (Hakulinen & Selting 2005). There is a generation of researchers developing this direction in their own languages, thus also enabling further cross-linguistic studies of universals and differences involving the regularities of talk-in-interaction; pioneering studies concern English, German, Dutch, Japanese, Finnish, Danish, Swedish and Norwegian, but the number of languages studied is constantly increasing.

2. Points of departure

The basic discovery procedure in interactional linguistics relies on the radically inductive methodological tools developed within conversation analysis. The starting point is an audio or (preferably) a video recording of naturally occurring interaction, for example an informal get-together among friends, which for a better analytic access is carefully transcribed. The research objects and categories are reconstructed from collections of sequences that represent instances of a recurrent interactional or linguistic phenomenon. It is analytically important that phenomena are not studied in isolated utterances but in the original prior and subsequent sequential context around the utterance or action of interest. Of course, there are instances which can be properly understood only when the whole preceding interaction or the comprehensive activity is taken into account (Linell 2005), which calls for a qualitative rather than a quantitative

approach to the data. As in CA, the analysis departs from a participant perspective and establishes the relevance of structures and categories as they can be seen to be made relevant by the interactants themselves in the data.

Interactional linguistics builds on the same assumption as CA, namely, that ordinary conversation is an ordered, structurally organized phenomenon, and that the structures of language on different levels are subordinated, moulded or influenced by the general normative aspects of social interaction. Basic interactive constraints on the speakers' linguistic choices are turn-taking organization, sequence organization, preference organization and repair organization. A special sequential constraint is temporal; that is, talk-in-interaction takes place in real time. Thus, utterances are not planned to their end before the speakers set out producing them. The production is incremental in nature and in this respect also influenced by the conduct of the recipient to whom the current speaker orients, possibly changing the course of a current utterance/turn as a response to recipient reactions (cf. Goodwin 1981). The production and interpretation of talk-in-interaction is thus situated in time and in a surrounding physical and participant space.

Turns in talk-in-interaction are made of turn constructional units (TCUs), which are defined in terms of action and linguistic structure, including syntax and prosody; at the completion of such a unit, turn transition becomes relevant (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974). Studying turn organization and turn allocation is thus a matter of linguistic form and the speakers' linguistic competence to a high degree. The syntactic design of an utterance is also dependent on its position in an interactional sequence and the type of action carried out (Schegloff 1996). Responses are often produced in a characteristic manner, usually not in full form but in an 'elliptical' fashion; however, how ellipsis should be treated in grammatical terms is a largely unsolved problem. Furthermore, responses that are socially dispreferred, viz. generally negative or rejecting, differ formally from unproblematic responses; the dispreferred ones tend to be delayed, contain characteristic discourse markers and are followed by accounts (Pomerantz 1984). Finally, the question of grammaticality can be seen in a new light when repair is considered. So called false starts, self- and other corrections do not necessarily follow from the speaker's grammatical mistakes but are prompted by problems of hearing or understanding (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks 1977). What is produced in syntactic terms may in many cases be fully grammatical up to the point where repair is initiated; moreover, repair itself is carried out in an orderly fashion within or between utterances/turns (Schegloff 1979, 1996).

Given the above, the research questions in interactional linguistics focus on the relation between language structure and the social organization of talk-in-interaction. Basically, there are two sorts of orientations: (i) the research can start from a particular linguistic form and explore its association with interactional function(s) or (ii) it can start from a particular interactional function and then specify which linguistic

form(s) typically realize that function (Selting & Couper-Kuhlen 2001). These orientations give different results, but both types of results are relevant. The first approach enables a thorough account of diverse potential uses of an element of language (e.g. a certain discourse marker) but not of other resources that could alternatively realize the interactional task in question. The second approach gives a rich description of the linguistic resources that are used in order to carry out a certain action or practice (e.g. declining an offer) but it does not account for potential uses of the observed linguistic elements outside of the focused contexts (Hakulinen & Selting 2005). In practice, the two approaches complement each other for a fuller linguistic *and* sequential description of the regularities of talk-in-interaction.

3. Topics

Syntactic units were identified as central resources for the construction of turns in ground breaking CA studies. Hence, it is no wonder that *syntax in conversation* has attracted the interest of interactional linguists. Many studies have been concerned with the syntactic shaping of turn constructional units: what makes them identifiable as completed units and orientable in turn transition (Selting 1996, 2000, Tanaka 1999; Steensig 2001); how can they be expanded with increments or parentheses (Auer 1996; Ford, Fox & Thompson 2002b, Couper-Kuhlen & Ono 2007); how does word order correlate with interactional function (Auer 2005; J. Lindström 2006); what are the structural regularities in repair segments (Fox & Jasperson 1995); what is formally characteristic of different request and response formats (A. Lindström 1999)? This vein of research has made important contributions towards a new understanding of syntax and grammar: It is not sufficient to account for the internal structure of utterances ('sentences'), since the internal structure is relative to the external structure of the utterance, viz. the sequential and actional context. Syntactic structure provides a resource of organizing an interactional task, e.g. in a story-telling sequence, a repair sequence, or an adjancency pair sequence, and its resulting shape is a reflection of the contingencies involved in the task (see Helasvuo 2001). In other words, syntax cannot be fully understood without an account of its interactional inhabitat in a turn.

In close association with conversational syntax, more specific aspects of interactional meaning and *lexis in conversation* are studied. Most attention has been directed to interactionally loaded 'form words', that is, various discourse markers. This line of research is directly connected to earlier investigations in a more general pragmatic perspective (cf. Östman 1981; Schiffrin 1987). Studies of response tokens of the type *yes* and *no* have given new insights into their discourse functions that go beyond simply confirming or negating a prior utterance (A. Lindström 1999; Sorjonen 2001); one characteristic function is their use as 'continuers' and as tokens of feedback. There are

also interesting cross-linguistic similarities and differences in the use and repertoire of response tokens. Another class of interactionally central form words is sentence connectors. For example, conjunctions and adverbs have uses in talk-in-interaction that do not naturally surface in written language. Conjunctions can signal affiliation or disaffiliation with the prior speaker, continuity or discontinuity of a topic, relatedness or unrelatedness to the prior turn (Günthner 1996; Mazeland & Huiskes 2005). In addition to responsive and connective elements, reference practices, and particularly the use of pronouns, have been studied in an interactional perspective (Laury 1997). It is fair to assume that in talk-in-interaction, which occurs 'here and now', reference practices may show other kinds of complexity and dynamicity than in written exposition.

A third major subfield within interactional linguistics deals with *prosody in conversation*. This line of research has contributed to the defining characteristics of TCUs which are not only syntactic but also prosodic (and pragmatic) units. Are there regular features of prosody that can project or mark a turn transition place? Results in this area are yet somewhat conflicting but it seems clear that prosodic cues are important for the delimitation of units of action, not only marking closure but also new beginnings (Auer 1996; Ford & Thompson 1996; Selting 1996). To take another example of the communicative import of sound patterns, studies of lexical prosody have shown that the interactional function of an expression relies not only on the lexical choice itself but also on the phonetic design. Response tokens can thus have affiliating or non-affiliating interpretations depending on the phonetic delivery (A. Lindström 1999); moreover, their phonetic design may indicate if a response token was a complete response or if there is more to come. Yet another field of interest is prosodic stylization, a feature that may have been overlooked as paralinguistic and thus not really linguistic (Ogden, Hakulinen & Tainio 2004). By stylization the speaker typically communicates modal aspects such as whether an action is to be interpreted as problematic or not, as newsworthy or not. All in all, prosody in conversation is a challenging field in many respects, not least because there is a great lack of professional phonetic basic research on conversational speech in practically all languages (Kelly & Local 1989 is one of the first openings in this field). Another challenge is that large scale generalizations are difficult to make because prosodic patterns may vary considerably within dialects of one language, let alone between different languages.

4. Possibilities and challenges

Interactional linguistics is a rapidly growing field with intriguing prospects in many directions of linguistic inquiry. Some approaches imply a progress towards more formalistic, although empirically based, accounts of grammar(s) for spoken, dialogic language (Du Bois 2003; Linell 2004). However, this endeavor may involve some tension

between the terms and methods of CA on the one hand and traditional linguistics on the other hand. Practitioners of a CA-inspired linguistics must come to terms with how to draw generalisations that are necessary for the description of the *language*, not only for the description of particular instances of interactions. While plain counting can never satisfy a methodologically informed interactional linguist, the analytic work may still have to be complemented with quantification and computer corpus studies at least to some degree. The same tension is related to acoustic measurements of sound patterns; these are probably needed in order to be able to objectively show that a phenomenon really is there and not only in the analyst's mind.

The biggest challenge for interactional linguistics, however, is to enable and establish a better understanding between socio-pragmatically oriented linguistic directions and traditional, even formal linguistics. One of the tasks of interactional linguistics is to explore the relevance of grammatical categories, e.g. the subject or the object, for the orientations that the speakers are making in talk-in-interaction. If relevant, exact linguistic terms may provide an analytic access to interactional linguistic phenomena that could be too bluntly expressed by the (deliberately) vernacular terms used in CA (e.g. beginning, continuer, cut-off). A dialogue with grammarians, for example practioners of construction grammar, may provide interactional linguistics with tools for making (careful) formalistic accounts of certain regular phenomena of talk-in-interaction. Furthermore, contributions to and from typological linguistics are of relevance since interactional linguistics is gradually evolving in a truly international and cross-linguistic direction.

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Listener response

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1. Introduction

The conversational phenomenon of listener response has attracted a great deal of attention during the past five decades from such diverse scholarly disciplines as linguistics, conversation analysis, (cross-cultural) communication studies, sociolinguistics, and experimental and social psychology. A number of terms have been used to describe this kind of listener behaviour, including 'signals of continued attention' (Fries 1952), 'recognition' (Rosenfeld 1966, 1967), 'concurrent feedback' (Krauss & Weinheimer 1966), 'accompaniment signals' (Kendon 1967), 'listener responses' (Dittmann & Llewellyn 1967, 1968; Bavelas, Coates, & Johnson 2002), 'assent terms' (Schegloff 1968; Leet-Pellegrini 1980), 'back channels' or 'backchannel responses' (Yngve 1970; Duncan 1972, 1973; Duncan & Niederehe 1974; Duncan & Fiske 1977, 1985; Ward & Tsukahara, 2000; Cutrone 2005; Li 2006), 'encourager' (Edelsky 1981), 'continuers' (Schegloff 1982), 'limited feedback' (Kraut, Lewis, & Swezey 1982), 'responsive listener cues' (Miller, Lechner, & Rugs 1985), 'minimal responses' (Fishman 1978; DeFrancisco 1991; Bennett & Jarvis 1991), 'reactive tokens' (Clancy et al. 1996; Young & Lee 2004), 'acknowledgment tokens' (Jefferson 1984, 1983/1993; Drummond & Hopper 1993a, 1993c), 'receipt tokens' (Heritage 1984), 'response tokens' (Gardner 2001, 2007) and 'project makers' (Bangerter, Clark, & Katz 2004). For the sake of generality and easy comprehensibility, the term 'listener response' is used in this paper to refer to the verbal and nonverbal behaviours of a listener in response to his or her co-conversationalist's talk.

The wide range of interests in the study of listener responses is not surprising as it is such a ubiquitous phenomenon in our daily conversations, but nonetheless one very seldom attended to by conversational participants in a conscious way. Such a conversational phenomenon, trivial as it may seem, carries a large burden of interactional meaning, plays a significant role in the emergent construction of a conversation, and contributes to the interpersonal and social context on an ongoing basis (McCarthy 2003). Its study becomes even more important in cross-cultural communication settings. It is widely documented in cross-cultural communication literature that people from different cultures may follow a different conversation norm and can have different conversational styles, of which the use of listener responses in conversations is an important part (Tannen 1984). Interactional sociolinguists have shown repeatedly that when speakers with diverse conversational practices interact with each other,

communicative difficulties or even miscommunication are most likely to occur, which can further result in negative cultural evaluations and stereotyping (Gumperz 1982; Tannen 1990).

2. Approaches to the study of listener responses

In the history of research on listener response, two major strands of study can be identified which are representative of two different approaches to its study. One is the lumping approach, which treats as a single category or class a group of different forms of listener responses. The other is the splitting approach which is taken mainly by ethnomethodological conversation analysts. This approach analyses one or more discrete listener responses in their sequential context and tries to demonstrate that each token of listener response can perform distinctive interactional functions.

2.1 The lumping approach

The lumping approach to the study of listener response is widely used in the fields of linguistics, sociolinguistics (most prominently, language and gender studies), cross-cultural communication, and experimental and social psychology. This approach probably starts with Fries' (1952) study of American English sentence patterns, though earlier more general allusion to listener response could arguably have been made by Bales (1950) in one of his major groups of interaction process categories called 'Positive Reactions'. Fries (1952), in his discussion on the classification of different kinds of sentences, distinguished three large classes of sentences based on the "characteristic responses that regularly followed or attended their utterance" (p. 51). One of the three large classes is 'those single free utterances in a series that have as responses continued attention' (p. 49). He found in his telephone-conversation data the following brief oral signals of attention, listed in order of their relative frequency of occurrence: 'yes', 'unh hunh', 'yeah', 'I see', 'good', 'oh', 'that's right', 'yes I know', 'oh oh', 'fine', 'so', 'oh my goodness', and 'oh dear' (pp. 49–50). These signals of attention, according to Fries, "do not interfere with the continuous flow of the utterances of the speaker" and "simply serve to give something of the hearer's reaction and to signal the fact that he is listening attentively to the speaker" (p. 50).

Earlier studies of listener response in the lumping approach come largely from experimental and social psychology, commencing in the 1960s (e.g., Dittmann & Llewellyn 1967, 1968; Kendon 1967; Rosenfeld 1966, 1967) and continuing through the twenty-first century (e.g., Bennett & Jarvis 1991; Bavelas, Coates, & Johnson 2002). The earlier studies focused mainly on two general themes: the structural characterisation of listener response and its roles in conversation in general or more specifically in the conversational encoding and decoding process (cf Duncan & Fiske 1985).

2.1.1 *Structural properties of listener response*

A number of studies, which were concerned with the first theme, i.e., the structural description of listener response in the conversation, typically dealt with it in connection with its non-verbal versions such as headnods, gaze, and smiles (e.g., Birdwhistell 1962; Kendon 1967; Dittmann & Llewellyn 1967, 1968; Brunner 1979). Others have mainly been concerned with its non-turn status in conversation (e.g., Yngve 1970; Duncan 1972, 1973; Duncan & Niederehe 1974; Duncan & Fiske 1977, 1985).

Kendon (1967), looking at functions of gaze direction in dyadic conversation, also examines gaze direction in relation to the occurrence of short utterances, one of which is 'accompaniment signals'. Based on where the listener places his/her signals in relation to the speaker's behaviour (particularly the gaze-direction in the course of producing these signals), Kendon identifies two main classes of accompaniment signals: attention signal and point granting or assenting signal. With respect to the attention signals such as "yes quite", "surely", and "I see", the listener appears to do no more than signal to the speaker that s/he is attending, and following what is being said (Kendon 1967/1990: 73). As regards point granting or assenting signals, the speaker structures his/her argument in such a way that "his continuing is dependent upon his interlocutor consenting to, or specifically granting him, the points that he is making" (Kendon 1967/1990: 73). Kendon found that the two types of accompaniment signals are clearly distinguished from each other in terms of gaze-direction. In almost every case, when the listener produces an attention signal, s/he continues to look steadily at the speaker. But when s/he produces a point-granting or assenting signal, s/he looks away.

Dittmann & Llewellyn's study (1967) of listener response is aimed at providing evidence that spoken language is decoded by the listener in word groups called phonemic clauses, which are defined as clauses having a certain rhythmic structure involving a primary stress and terminal juncture (p. 345). Their data are simulated telephone conversations between college students. They found that vocal listener responses occur almost exclusively in the junctures surrounding speakers' phonemic clauses. In their subsequent study, Dittmann & Llewellyn (1968) examined the use of vocal listener responses in relation to a visual one, the head nod. They found that the head nod tended to occur in the same location (i.e., at the end of phonemic clauses) with vocal listener responses (or to be more exact, head nods slightly preceding vocal responses), and that the two types of signals, visual and vocal, co-occur more often than would be expected by chance. They also conducted a content analysis of these co-occurring visual and vocal listener responses and found that they usually serve an interpersonal function: the wish of the listener to speak or the wish of the speaker for feedback.

Dittmann & Llewellyn's discussion of the positions of listener responses in conversation is illuminating as it begins to take into consideration the interactional environment in which listener responses occur. Their examination of the location of listener responses with reference to phonemic clauses, being based upon a theory of

sentence structures (Trager & Smith 1957), was later taken up and improved by scholars in other fields such as cross-cultural communication studies in the investigation of the positions of listener response in the conversational context. For example, Clancy et al. (1996) examined the positions of listener responses with reference to what they call the 'Complex Transition Relevance Places' which comprise grammatical, pragmatic and intonational completion points (see also Ford & Thompson 1996; cf Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974).

Yngve (1970) introduced the most common term currently in use for conversational listener responses — 'back-channel communication'. As the term 'back channel' implies, Yngve assumed the existence of two channels in a conversation: the main channel and the back channel. He argued that short utterances such as 'uh huh' and 'okay' took place in the back channel, whereas the activities of the primary teller took the main channel. Yngve (1970: 568) defines back channels as a device which allows the person who does not hold the turn to send "short messages such as 'yes' and 'uh huh' " without forcing his/her partner to relinquish the turn.

Duncan and his associates carried out a series of studies in which they attempted to 'discover some of the structural properties of dyadic conversations among speakers of American English' (Duncan 1973: 29). In these studies, back channel responses were discussed with respect to the turn taking mechanism they aimed to develop. The key concern of this line of work is the identification of the signals with their constituent cues and of the rules governing turn taking in conversations, specifically in two-person face-to-face conversations.

Duncan's early work (Duncan 1972, 1973, 1974; Duncan & Niederehe 1974) was based on two dyadic interactions. One was an interview between a 40-year old male therapist and a female client in her early 20s, while the other was a conversation between the male therapist who participated in the first interview, and a second male therapist, also 40 years old. On the basis of the exploratory data, Duncan (1972) formulated a system of signals and rules, called the turn-taking mechanism (later referred to as 'the turn system' [Duncan & Fiske 1977, 1985]), that he hypothesised to govern turn taking in dyadic face-to-face interaction.

The turn-taking mechanism proposed by Duncan (1972, 1973; Duncan & Niederehe 1974) consists of three basic signals, one of which is the back channel communication, or 'auditor back-channel responses' (Duncan & Fiske 1985), defined as the display of at least one of its six constituent forms as below (ibid: 58–59):

1. M-hm: a group of readily identified verbalisations, such as "m-hm," "yeah," "right," "yes quite," "surely," "I see," and "that's true." These back channels may be used singly, in combination, or repeated in groups, such as "yeah, yeah."
2. Sentence completion: the auditor completing the speaker's sentence.
3. Request for clarification: the auditor making brief requests for clarification.

4. Brief restatement: the auditor giving a brief restatement of an immediately preceding thought expressed by the speaker.
5. Head nods and shakes.
6. Smiles.

In addition to the three basic signals described above, Duncan & Fiske (1977, 1985) also proposed a set of rules specifying the appropriate action by one participant in response to a signal by the other (Duncan 1973: 29; Duncan & Fiske 1985: 51). The rules proposed for auditor back-channel responses are as follows:

> Auditor back channels … do not constitute speaking turns or claims of the speaking turn. They appear to indicate continuing attentiveness and responsiveness of one sort or another to the speaker's message. The back channel appears to provide the auditor with a way of actively participating in the conversation, thus facilitating the general coordination of action by both participants within the structure of the interaction. (Duncan & Fiske 1985: 58)

After the formulation of the turn-taking mechanism, a number of studies were done to test its validity, but with varying results (Duncan 1972; Dittmann 1973; Duncan & Niederehe 1974; Duncan & Fiske 1977; Beattie 1978; Wiemann & Knapp 1975; Trimboli & Walker 1984; Walker & Trimboli 1984; for review, see Wilson, Wiemann & Zimmerman 1984).

With specific reference to their discussion of back channels, Duncan & his associates' studies are important as they are among the first to provide a systematic classification of back channels in respect of their non-turn status in the turn system. But the major problem in this classification is the difficulty in determining the status of an utterance in conversation as a turn or a non-turn. In the work of Duncan & his associates, no explicit definition of the concept of a turn is provided, though Wilson, Wiemann, & Zimmerman (1984) manage to deduce it as "a continuous period during which a participant has the undisputed right to speak" (p. 164). In fact, Duncan & his associates themselves find problematic the distinction between back-channels and turns

> In summary, early structural descriptions of listener response in the lumping approach have focused on the relationship between verbal and non-verbal listener responses, the location where they occur in conversation with reference to phonemic clauses, and their non-turn status with respect to the turn system in general. These studies, especially those by Duncan & his associates, provide a systematic base for the classification of listener responses, which has served as analytic framework in many subsequent studies (e.g., Marche & Peterson 1993).

2.1.2 *Roles and functions of listener responses in conversation*

In addition to the structural description of listener responses, the study of their roles and functions in conversation, or in interpersonal communication more generally, is

another frequent theme in the study of listener responses in the fields of experimental and social psychology and communication studies. This theme may have its origin in the study of the effects of feedback on human communication, a more general term which covers virtually all kinds of responses (visual or vocal) to a speaker ranging from headnods and smiling to interrupting and question-asking (Leavitt & Mueller 1951; Argyle, Lalljee, & Cook 1968; Rosenfeld 1966, 1967; Krauss et al. 1977; Davis & Perkowitz 1979; Kraut, Lewis, & Swezey 1982; Vogal, Keane, & Conger 1988; Bennett & Jarvis 1991; Li 2006). For example, Leavitt & Mueller (1951) study the effects of feedback giving and withholding on the transmission of information from one person to another. In their study, feedback is a much wider notion than, for instance, the concept of Duncan & his associates' back channels (Duncan & Fiske 1977, 1985), and includes any form of verbal or expressive language such as visibility of conversation partners, question asking and interrupting (pp. 402–403). They found that when an instructor is giving a description of some patterns, s/he can present the information more accurately and the students can understand it better with the availability of feedback on the part of the students.

One of the earliest studies of the interactional roles and functions of listener responses with a more restricted sense (i.e., the Duncanian sense) may be the one by Rosenfeld (1966, 1967). Rosenfeld (1967) studies the reciprocation of approval-related responses, which he divides into either approving responses or disapproving responses. Approving responses include nonverbal reactions (such as smile, positive head nod, and gesticulation) and verbal acknowledgment or 'recognition'. 'Recognitions', more or less equivalent to the notion of listener responses or back channels, refer to 'a broad class of usually brief responses to an utterance which indicate attentiveness to the other person, but apparently add no other information to the conversation', and include 'verbal reinforcers' such as 'mm-hmm,' and attentional responses such as 'I see,' 'no kidding?' and 'really?' (p. 105). Disapproving responses comprise frown, negative head nod, and verbal disparagement. Rosenfeld asked the interviewer to present questions to 48 ninth-grade students from 14 to 16 years. He found that the student interviewee emits a significantly higher percentage of smiles and positive head nods in response to the approving interviewers than to the disapproving or nonresponsive interviewers. But the recognitions by the students occurred too infrequently to permit analysis. Rosenfeld suggests that one can use appropriate tactics to gain or maintain another individual's approval.

Krauss et al. (1977) study the role of audible and visible back-channel responses in interpersonal communication. Specifically, they want to find out whether visible back-channel responses have the same functions as audible ones and how the speaker would respond with only the presence of visible back-channel responses. Krauss et al. used simulated telephone conversations as their data but manipulated the responses of the listener into four different types: (1) visible back-channels only; (2) audible back-channels

delayed for one second; (3) both visible and audible back-channels; (4) visible back-channels plus delayed audible ones. They found that when audible back-channels are delayed, the speaker has greater difficulty in encoding the information (i.e., uses more words in the encoding process). But if visible back-channels are available, this difficulty decreases even though the audible ones are delayed. Krauss et al. thus conclude that visible back-channel responses are functionally equivalent to vocal back-channel responses, at least in situations in which the vocal responses are unavailable (p. 527).

The 1980s also saw a number of studies concerned with the role and functions of listener responses in conversation. Kraut, Lewis, & Swezey (1982) examine how feedback influences the production and reception of information in interaction. They asked 76 university students to watch a movie and then summarise it to one or two listeners. The listeners provide the speaker with varying amounts of feedback: (1) unrestricted feedback, where the listener can provide any form of feedback including asking questions and interrupting; (2) limited feedback, where the listener can only provide brief listener responses such as "h-hmm," "I see," "huh?" "who?" or "really!"; (3) no feedback, where the speaker receives no feedback from the listener at all. Kraut, Lewis, & Swezey found that the more feedback speakers received from a partner, the more comprehensible their summaries were to the listeners. In addition, feedback individuated communication; that is, the listener who provided the feedback understood the movie better than the listener who listened to the same conversation but provided no feedback. They conclude that feedback plays an important role in the coordination of conversation.

The study on the function of listener responses in conversation continues to the 1990s and the 2000s. Bennett & Jarvis (1991) studied whether withholding minimal responses would affect how listeners perceive an interaction. They asked eighty undergraduate students to listen to a recording of conversation between two people in two different versions, one being the original recording and the other being an edited version in which minimal responses such as "mmm," "hmm," "yeah," and "aha" had been deleted. The students were then asked to make judgments about various aspects of the interaction (as provided in a questionnaire). Their results showed that minimal responses have two main functions, that is, to denote agreement and to suggest a context of informality. Li (2006) examined the relationship between the frequency of backchannel responses (any verbal or nonverbal act occurring during the conversation in a non-intrusive manner) and listener recall scores in inter- and intra-cultural conversations. With forty simulated physician-patient interactions between 40 Chinese and 40 Canadians, Li found that while backchannel responses facilitated content communication in the two intra-cultural groups (i.e., Chinese physician/Chinese patient and Canadian physician/Canadian patient), these responses seem to serve as misleading feedback and cause miscommunication in the two inter-cultural groups (Chinese physician/Canadian patient and Canadian physician/Chinese patient).

In summary, the above studies have in various ways examined the roles and functions of listener responses in conversation and most of these studies have shown, in one way or other, that listener responses play an important role in successful communication (except probably in intercultural communication contexts).

2.2 The splitting approach

The other approach to the study of listener responses is what can be termed the splitting approach. This approach, mainly taken by conversation analysts, has examined some discrete listener response tokens in their sequential contexts. Unlike the lumping approach, it is not concerned with the relationship between the occurrences of listener response tokens and the external variables. Rather, it is mainly concerned with their occurrences with respect to the operation of the turn-taking organization (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson 1974). In the conversation analytic literature, several listener response tokens have received an intensive systematic study. Each of them is found to be distinctive in terms of its placement and roles in the sequential environment and its consequences for subsequent turns. These tokens include: 'yeah,' 'uh huh,' and 'mm hm' (Schegloff 1982; Jefferson 1983/1993, 1984; Drummond & Hopper 1993a, 1993b, 1993c); 'oh' (Heritage 1984); assessments such as 'wow' and 'good' (Goodwin 1986); high-grade assessments such as 'lovely' and 'brilliant' (Antaki 2002; Antaki, Houtkoop-Steenstra, & Rapley 2000); 'okay' (Beach 1993, 1995; Pillet-Shore, 2003); 'mm' (Gardner 1997a, 1997b, 1998, 2001) and 'right' (Gardner 2007).

Schegloff (1982), for example, studied listener response tokens like 'uh huh'. He advises that discourse be studied as an interactional achievement, which is partially shaped by its turn-taking organisation. He observed that vocalisations like 'uh huh' in their sequential context can have two main and related usages: 'a usage as continuer and a usage to pass an opportunity to initiate repair' (p. 88). According to Schegloff, the most common usage of vocalisations such as 'uh huh' is as continuer, the function of which is to encourage the previous speaker to continue talking, and by producing 'uh huh', etc, the producer passes the opportunity to take a fuller turn at talk (p. 81). Listener response tokens like 'uh huh' occur frequently in an environment when an extended unit of talk by another is underway.

Jefferson (1983/1993, 1984) examined listener response forms like 'mm hm' and 'yeah,' which she labelled 'acknowledgment tokens'. She found that the two tokens are functionally and sequentially different from each other in that the former (i.e., 'mm hm') indicates more of a passive recipiency and the latter (i.e., 'yeah') is more related to full speakership incipiency. Passive recipiency, according to Jefferson (1984), means that "its user is proposing that his co-participant is still in the midst of some course of talk, and shall go on talking" (p. 200). This is consistent with the above observation by Schegloff (1982) that listener response tokens like 'uh huh' and 'mm hm' serve mainly

as continuers. Drummond & Hopper (1993a, 1993b) later took up the theme, attempting to reassess in a quantitative mode Jefferson's claim about speakership incipiency of 'yeah' and passive recipiency of 'mm hm'. Their studies received a critical response from Zimmerman (1993), although their findings reaffirmed Jefferson's claim.

Also on the basis of the analysis of sequential organisation, Goodwin (1986) distinguished between continuers (e.g., 'uh huh') and assessments (like 'wow' and 'good'). He claimed that while continuers serve as bridges between turn-construction units and tend to overlap with the primary speaker's next unit, assessments normally end in the current unit and do not overlap with the speaker's next unit. He also noted that the recipient speaker of the continuer orients to it by continuing to speak whereas that of the assessment may see the telling as an ending.

Heritage (1984) did an extensive study of one listener response token 'oh', which he called a 'change-of-state token'. By this he means that an 'oh' is used to "propose that its producer has undergone some kind of change in his or her locally current state of knowledge, information, orientation or awareness" (p. 299). 'Oh' was found to occur in a variety of conversational sequences such as in informings, question-elicited informings, counterinformings, other-initiated repair, understanding checks and in displays of understanding. In all these environments, its generic change-of-state usage holds though with slight variations of meaning in each sequence. Additionally, Heritage observed that the sequential role of 'oh' is "essentially backward looking and scarcely ever continuative" (p. 336). That is, 'oh' by itself does not invite or promote any continuation of an informing from the primary speaker. This is accounted for by the fact that 'oh' most regularly occurs either in conjunction with additional turn components such as assessments or requests for further information, or in company with some further talk from the 'oh' producer. The change-of-state usage of 'oh' and its non-continuative sequential role makes it distinctive from such receipt tokens as 'yes' and 'mm hm'. The latter, unlike 'oh', avoid or defer treating prior talk as informative and are regularly used as continuers in extended tellings (pp. 305–306).

Building upon previous studies on 'okay' usages in phone call openings and closings (e.g., Schegloff 1968, 1979, 1986; Schegloff & Sacks 1973), in service-encounters (e.g., Merritt 1984), and in simulated family interactions (e.g., Condon 1986), Beach (1993) goes on to examine "the interactional work giving rise to 'Okay' usages, participants' orientations to them, and their consequences for subsequent talk" (p. 328). He found that 'okay' has a dual character, by which he means that it is used at or near transition/opportunity spaces as responsive to the current speaker's prior talk on the one hand and displaying 'state of readiness' for movements to next-positioned matters on the other.

Gardner (1997a, 1997b, 1998) studies the token 'mm', which he calls as a 'weak acknowledging' token. He observes that this token is very common in Australian and British English, but not in American English. Unlike previous researchers of listener

response tokens, who focus mainly on the examination of the sequential placement and the speakership incipiency of the tokens, Gardner also looks at their prosodic shape and pause environment; these latter two he regards as being crucial in distinguishing between different uses of 'mm' and other related tokens such as 'mm hm' and 'yeah'. According to Gardner, when 'mm' takes on a falling intonation contour, it is used as a weak acknowledging token, which is its most common or its canonical use. When 'mm' has a fall-rising intonation contour, it is used as a continuer-like object. It can also be used as a weak assessment token, but then it takes on the rise-falling contour. Gardner (1997a) also found that 'mm' displays a speakership incipiency about midway between 'uh huh' and 'mm hm' on the one hand, which are rarely followed by same-speaker talk, and 'yeah' on the other, which is frequently followed by the same-speaker talk. Moreover, 'mm', with whatever prosodic shape, was found to be topically disaligning in that "its speaker has nothing further to say on the topic of the talk to which it is oriented, so either the prior speaker continues, on or off topic, or the Mm producer continues, but off topic" (Gardner 1997a: 133).

Most recently, Gardner (2007) turns his attention to the token 'right'. In addition to the two common uses of 'right' (one denotes 'correct', 'true' and is similar to the epistemic confirmation token *That's right*; and the other is somewhat a truncated version of *Alright* and serves, like the token *Okay*, as a boundary marker or change-of-activity marker such as a warrant to signal the end of a conversation), he focuses more particularly on the uses of 'right' as what he calls an 'epistemic dependency marker'. By this, he means that the 'right' is used by its producer not only to acknowledge a turn but also to claim understanding of the relevance of this turn in relation to something prior (p. 336). According to Gardner (2007), 'right' as an epistemic dependency token is found frequently in information- and advice-giving sequences in Australian and British English.

In summary, the conversation analytic approach to the study of listener responses examines discrete listener response tokens in its sequential context. Studies in this approach found that each of these tokens is distinctive from the other and each is a separate token on its own. Different listener response tokens can occur in different sequential environments, have different roles and functions in these environments and/or project different trajectories for subsequent talk.

3. Classification of listener response

As studies of listener responses in the conversation analytic perspective seek mainly to establish the uniqueness of individual tokens, the various classification systems of listener responses derive mostly from studies in the lumping approach. A number of these systems have been based upon Duncan & his associates' classification of 'auditor

back channel responses' (e.g., Marche & Peterson 1993; for Duncan & his associates' classification, see Duncan & Fiske 1985). Their classification distinguishes auditor back channel responses from other listening and speaking behaviours on the basis of the former's non-turn status. That is, auditor back channel responses, according to Duncan & Fiske (1985), do not constitute a turn.

In addition to the use of turn, a few other researchers have sought to look into other criteria in the identification and classification of listener responses. These criteria include, most notably, the concept of 'floor' (e.g., Hayashi & Hayashi 1991) and the form and/or sequential organisation of listener responses (Tottie 1991; Clancy et al. 1996). For example, Clancy et al. (1996), which classified listener responses (or Reactive Tokens in their terminology) based partly on their form and partly on their sequential function, distinguished five types of Reactive Tokens:

1. Backchannel: a non-lexical vocalic form, which serves as a 'continuer', display of interest, or claim of understanding. Examples of backchannels include 'hm,' 'huh,' 'oh,' 'mhm,' and 'uh huh'.
2. Reactive Expression: a short non-floor-taking lexical phrase or word" produced by the non-primary speaker. Typical Reactive expressions include, for example, 'yeah,' 'sure,' 'exactly,' 'shit,' and assessments such as 'good' and 'wow'.
3. Collaborative Finish: an utterance produced by the non-primary speaker to finish a previous speaker's utterance.
4. Repetition: the non-primary speaker repeats a portion of the speech of the primary speaker.
5. Resumptive Opener. Resumptive Openers (RO) share the same form as Backchannels (BC), i.e., they are both non-lexical vocalisations. But RO is distinguished from BC in that RO is followed by a full turn whereas BC stands alone. There is normally a short pause between a RO and the full turn following it. In the sequential context, RO serves to acknowledge the prior turn and commence a new turn. Thus, ROs are parallel to Jefferson's acknowledgment tokens which signal speakership incipiency (Jefferson 1984, 1983/1993; Drummond & Hopper 1993a).

Clancy et al.'s classification system of listener responses provides a promising link between the aggregate and the individualised studies of the conversational phenomena.

4. Cross-cultural study of listener response

Though scholarly interest in the conversational phenomenon of listener response dates back to the fifties, cross-cultural studies of this phenomenon are more recent, originating probably from the comparative studies of the conversational conventions of Japanese

and Anglo-American native speakers of English (e.g., Lebra 1976; Hinds 1978; Clancy 1982; Mizutani 1982; LoCastro 1987; Maynard 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1997; White 1989; Yamada 1989; White 1997; Hayashi 1988, 1990, 1991; Hayashi & Hayashi 1991; Clancy et al. 1996; Ward & Tsukahara 2000; Cutrone 2005). This is probably because Japanese pay exceptional attention to the interactional and affective aspects in conversations. In fact, unlike most other languages such as English and Chinese, the Japanese language has a special term to describe the use of short listener responses, called aizuchi. The literal meaning of the term aizuchi refers to "the joint hammering of and swordsmiths' pounding on a sword's blade or the hammer two workers use to drive a large wooden stake into the ground" (Hirokawa 1995: 40). This was later extended to mean an act of indicating agreement with another party or that of going along with the other party so as not to cause a conflict (ibid). According to Clancy et al. (1996), the use of aizuchi is a matter of everyday discussion among Japanese people and it is common to comment on other people's over- or under-use of aizuchi.

The comparative studies of the use of listener responses by Japanese and Americans have shown that the two groups of people differ greatly in their use of this conversational strategy in terms of the frequency of its use, its placement in the conversation, and its functions in the conversational context. With respect to the frequency of the use of listener responses, previous studies have most consistently shown that Japanese speakers produce listener responses more frequently than do Anglo-Americans (Hinds 1978; LoCastro 1987; Maynard 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1997; White 1986, 1989; Yamada 1989; Hirokawa 1995; Cutrone 2005; but for exception, see Clancy et al. 1996). The more frequent use of listener responses by Japanese was evidenced in a variety of conversational contexts: (1) in casual conversations (Maynard 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1997; White 1989; Hirokawa 1995), formal conversations (Hinds 1978) and in business negotiations (White 1997); (2) in dyadic (Maynard 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1997; White 1989; Hirokawa 1995; Cutrone 2005) and multiparty conversations (Yamada 1989; LoCastro 1987); (3) in intracultural and intercultural conversations (Maynard 1986, 1989, 1997; White 1989; Hirokawa 1995; Yamada 1989).

With regard to the placement of listener responses in the conversational context, a number of studies have also observed differences between Japanese and American speakers (Maynard 1986, 1989, 1990, 1997; Hirokawa 1995; Clancy et al. 1996). For example, Maynard (1997) found that Japanese listeners frequently send back channels during a brief speaker pause which she terms 'Pause-bounded Phrasal Unit' (p. 45) whereas American listeners give back channels at the grammatically significant breaks, i.e., at the end of the clause and at the sentence-final position (somewhat equivalent to the notion of Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson's Transition Relevance Place or TRP). In other words, Japanese listeners may tend to produce back channels at non-TRP while their American counterparts may be more likely to utter back channels at TRP.

A few studies have also attempted to identify some specific functions of listener responses in the conversational context and to determine whether differences exist between Japanese and American speakers. Maynard (1986, 1989, 1997), for example, specified six categories of the functions of back channels, including: (1) "continuer" (Schegloff 1982); (2) display of understanding of content; (3) support toward the speaker's judgment; (4) agreement; (5) strong emotional response; (6) minor addition, correction, or request for information. She observes that while back channels sent by both Japanese and Americans function in all six categories, in Japanese the display of understanding of content is more often used as a kind of moral support for the primary speaker, whereas in American English the function as "continuer" is the more primary function (Maynard 1997: 46).

Several studies have also examined the types of listener responses different cultural groups of speakers tend to use. In this respect, Japanese speakers have consistently been found to be more likely to produce semantically empty listener responses (like 'mmhm' and 'uh huh') than Americans, who, in turn, prefer to use contentful ones more (like 'yeah') (White 1989; Clancy et al. 1996; Hayashi & Hayashi 1991; White 1997; but see Maynard 1997). For example, Sheida White (1989) compared the use by Japanese and American speakers of the five most frequently-occurring backchannels in her conversational data: 'mmhm,' 'yeah,' 'uh-huh,' 'oh,' and 'hmm'. She found that Japanese speakers use all of the five backchannels more than Americans do in intracultural interactions, with the exception of 'yeah'.

The cross-cultural differences in the use of listener responses between Americans and Japanese have largely been accounted for by different cultural values of the two groups. Japanese people are said to be more concerned for harmony and cooperation (Lebra 1976; LoCastro 1987; Clancy et al. 1996; White 1989), more sensitive toward "self-contextualization" (i.e., "the ongoing process of continually defining oneself in relation to one's interactional environment") (Maynard 1997: 54), and more other-oriented and listening-oriented (Hirokawa 1995). Americans, on the other hand, are more concerned for self expression and frankness (LoCastro 1987; White 1989) and more self-involving and speaking-oriented (Hirokawa 1995).

The comparative study of the use of listener responses by cultural groups other than Japanese is a relatively recent development and does not seem to receive much attention. A few exceptions include the study of Finnish conversation behaviours (e.g., Lehtonen & Sajavaara 1985), the use of feedback between French native speakers and American advanced learners of French (Wieland 1991), British and American use of backchannels (Tottie 1991), Swedish and (American and British) English use of acknowledgment tokens (Beach & Lindstrom 1992), Maori and Pakeha's use of verbal feedback in New Zealand English (Stubbe 1998), Chinese use of listener responses (e.g., Tao & Thompson 1991; Günthner 1993; Clancy et al. 1996), and Korean and American use of reactive tokens (Young & Lee 2004).

Lehtonen & Sajavaara (1985), in their discussion of the Finnish listening behaviours, reported that vocalisations and verbal backchannel signals are less frequently used in Finnish than in Central European languages or in British and American Englishes (pp. 195–196). According to them, verbal backchannel signals are used mostly in informal and enthusiastic discourse, but their too frequent use is considered intrusive and can even be taken as behaviour "typical of drunken people" (p. 196). They conclude that the typical Finn is a 'silent' listener (p. 196). Lehtonen & Sajavaara (1985) contend that a Finnish listener's silence or the absence of verbal signals may be misinterpreted as being inattentive, indifferent, sullen, or even hostile on the part of the Finnish interlocutor. It is also sometimes interpreted by their foreign counterparts as showing that the Finn is feeling anxiety and would like to end the conversation. Misinterpretations like these necessarily result in a communication breakdown and negative cultural evaluations and stereotypes.

Wieland (1991) analysed conversations between French native speakers and American advanced learners of French. She found that Americans use a lot of hearer signals (e.g., 'um hum,' 'uh huh,' 'huh,' 'oui'). French speakers, on the other hand, only infrequently employ such signals. Instead, they use quite a lot of 'minor contributions' (viz., short phrases that are uttered during the primary speaker's turn in reaction to what is being said). But their use of these minor contributions is sometimes interpreted by American speakers as an interruption rather than as feedback.

Tottie (1991) compared the use of backchannels in British and American English conversations. She found that American English conversations, with 16 backchannels per minute, contain more backchannels than do British English conversations which have only 5 backchannels per minute.

Beach & Linstrom (1992) is one of the very few studies which comparatively examines the interactional work done by acknowledgment tokens in Swedish and English conversations. Through detailed analysis of these tokens in their sequential context, they found that "Swedes and Americans rely upon the same or similar interactional resources, acknowledgment tokens being a prime example, while organizing such activities as stories or topics" (pp. 36–37). Beach & Linstrom (1992) specifically compared how speakership and recipiency are achieved through the use of acknowledgment tokens in Swedish and English conversations. They observed that although in Swedish some different forms of acknowledgment tokens are sometimes used such as 'eh', similar organising principles are complied with by Swedish and English conversations to achieve passive recipiency and exhibit incipient movements toward speakership and topic shift/change. They conclude that the routine achievement of Swedish talk "may not be a radically different enterprise from, for example, the achievements comprising interaction with English-speaking cultures," thus refuting the commonly-held beliefs that Swedes are incapable of providing adequate feedback and are conversationally inept (p. 37).

Stubbe (1998) compared the use of verbal feedback by Maori and Pakeha (i.e., people of European descent) speakers of New Zealand English. In her study, feedback is classified into minimal responses and cooperative overlaps, with the former (i.e., minimal responses) being further classified into neutral (such as 'mm') and overtly supportive minimal responses (such as 'oh gosh'). She found that Pakeha speakers produced more verbal feedback in general and more minimal responses in particular than their Maori counterparts. But she did not provide results for neutral and overtly supportive minimal responses, which may prove to be useful in showing whether the two groups differ in any way in the different types of minimal responses. Further, more data need to be included than her eight dyadic conversations (with two independent variables of ethnicity and gender) to have a more valid claim for ethnic and gender differences in the use of verbal feedback.

As to Chinese speakers, existing studies seem to show that they are very infrequent users of listener responses compared with some other cultural groups such as Japanese (Clancy et al. 1996), Americans (Tao & Thompson 1991; Clancy et al. 1996), Germans (Günthner 1993) and Australians (Deng 2008). Clancy et al. (1996), for example, compared the use of reactive tokens in three languages – English, Japanese, and Chinese. They demonstrated that the three languages differ in the use of reactive tokens in several ways. Specifically, Chinese speakers use reactive tokens less than half as frequently as English and Japanese speakers, and they tend to use reactive tokens which are lexically contentful more than Japanese speakers, but a little less than English speakers. Chinese also place about the same percentage of reactive tokens at points of grammatical completion as English speakers but a higher percentage than do Japanese speakers. Clancy et al. (1996) suggest that Chinese listener behaviour "is part of a 'non-coercive cultural orientation' that places high value on personal autonomy and avoids putting oneself above others" (p. 382). They also propose that avoidance of backchannelling by the Chinese reflects an appropriate stance of non-interference toward the speaker and represents an interactional style which values respectful deference on the part of Chinese interactants (pp. 382–383).

In summary, previous studies of cross-cultural differences in the use of listener responses have clustered in the examination of their use in Japanese and American conversations. More recently the patterns of their use by other cultural groups have also been investigated. These studies have to a great extent provided evidence that people from different cultural groups may use listener responses differently in terms of their frequency of use, their placement in the conversational context and in terms of the different types of listener responses. These studies, by comparing the pattern of use of listener responses in different languages, have largely shown that speakers of different cultural groups use listener responses differently, which can result in communicative difficulties and negative cultural evaluations and stereotyping.

5. Gender-differentiated use of listener response

Listener responses are one of the most widely studied conversational phenomena which have been claimed to show gender-related differences. Although a few studies seem to provide evidence to the contrary (i.e., no or little gender-differentiated use of listener responses) (e.g., Kollock, Blumstein, & Schwartz 1985; Marche & Peterson 1993), a majority of studies have supported the claim that women use more listener responses than men do. These studies include research in varieties of the English language such as in British and American English (e.g., Hirschman 1973/1994; Leet-Pellegrini 1980; Fishman 1978; Roger & Schumacher 1983; Roger & Nesshoever 1987; Tottie 1991), New Zealand English (e.g., Hyndman 1985; Gilbert 1990; both cited in Holmes 1995), and Indian English (e.g., Valentine 1986). A similar pattern of gender differentiated use of listener responses has also been documented in some other languages including Greek (Makri-Tsilipakou 1994) and Swedish (Nordenstam 1992).

Hirschman (1973/1994) is one of the first to note gender-differentiated use of listener responses, although earlier allusions have been made in studies of sex-role behaviour in small groups, to the effect that men were more task-oriented whereas women were more socio-emotion-oriented in interaction and that men tended to "pro-act," i.e., give opinions, suggestions, and information while women tended to positively "react" to the contributions of others such as showing solidarity and agreeing (e.g., Strodtbeck 1951; Parsons & Bales 1955; Strodtbeck & Mann 1956; Strodtbeck, James, & Hawkins 1957; Bennett & Cohen 1959; Heiss 1962; Borgotta & Stimson 1963; Gouran 1968). Hirschman (1973/1994) analysed six conversations on love-related themes between four university students, two male and two female. She divided "responses made to the speaker" into two categories: "affirmative" ('yeah,' 'ok,' 'mm hmm,' 'right,' 'all right') and "other" ('oh,' 'well' in utterance-initial position) (p. 434–435). In terms of the use of affirmative responses, she found that females had a higher frequency than males. More specifically with the use of the token 'mm hmm', Hirschman found that it was a predominantly female speech form, as it was used much more frequently by the two female speakers than by the two males. But most of these 'mm-hmm's occurred in female-female interaction.

Fishman (1978) studied 52 hours of conversations between three heterosexual couples in their homes. She found that women used what she called "attention beginnings" (like "this is interesting" and its variations) much more frequently than their partners did. With respect to minimal responses such as 'yeah,' 'umm,' and 'huh', Fishman observed that whereas men and women both used minimal responses, they used them in quite different ways. Men might give only a minimal response at the end of a woman's lengthy remark, while women would insert these responses throughout the stream of men's talk, signalling their constant attention. Fishman thus maintained that women use minimal responses for support work, whereas the male usages of them

displayed lack of interest. Her conclusion was that "women are the 'shitworkers' of routine conversation" (Fishman 1978: 405).

Leet-Pellegrini (1980) studied conversation between 70 pairs of unacquainted college students. She reported that women used more 'assent terms' such as 'yeah,' 'right,' 'uh-huh,' and 'that's true' than men did. Some other experimental studies have also produced the results to the effect that women use more listener responses than men do both in same-gender conversation (e.g., Roger & Schumacher 1983) and in mixed-gender interaction (e.g., Roger & Nesshoever 1987).

Studies on gender-related patterns in the use of listener responses have largely been based on English data. Very few studies have been done in this respect in other languages. Two exceptions are Nordenstam's (1992) study of Swedish conversation and Makri-Tsilipakou's (1994) study of Greek conversation. Both studies have revealed that women used more listener responses than men did, though in Nordenstam's study, this pattern occurred only in same-sex groups and not in married couples.

6. Future research

This paper has depicted a wide range of research traditions for the study of the conversational phenomenon of listener responses. The scholarly interest in such a phenomenon does not seem at all to have subdued. Studies of individual listener responses or clusters of listener responses to examine their nuanced meanings and functions in local sequential contexts as well as in entire conversations are continuing (e.g., Bangerter, Clark, & Katz 2004; Gardner 2007). In addition to the expanding number of studies of listener responses in cross-cultural contexts, more studies of their acquisition by first and second language speakers and of their production in various sociopragmatic contexts are also expected, in both the quantitative and the qualitative modes (Blum-Kulka, House, & Kasper 1989). The increasing availability of various properly transcribed conversational corpora has made possible the large corpus study of listener responses and other conversational behaviours, which will undoubtedly contribute to the understanding of their meanings and functions in multiple contexts (e.g., McCarthy 2003). As new communication media such as Instant Messaging and other online chatting programs have become increasingly popular in this era, studies of the use of conversational behaviours like listener responses in these relatively untapped media may also begin to emerge.

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Participation

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Whenever people talk together they establish and sustain a little world of shared attention and involvement, a "communion of mutual engagement," as Goffman (1957) described it. As such participation, or better co-participation, in an activity cannot be reduced to mere physical co-presence. Rather, participation (or non-participation) in talk is organized moment-by-moment, incarnately in and through that talk. While this may seem obvious, it raises a series of important questions about the organization of human conduct. Specifically, what are the practices of speaking, listening, gesturing, posturing and so on by which persons constitute themselves and co-present others as participants in social interaction and participants of a particular kind? What forms of participation are possible and how are these realized in the particular activities with which they are associated? In this chapter I trace ideas about this fundamental aspect of human interaction from an initial conception of the "speech circuit" through mid-century notions of "channel" and "phatic communion" to Goffman's innovative rethinking of the issue in terms of "mutual monitoring possibilities" and his trail-blazing analysis in the late essay "Footing". I conclude with a discussion of current research in conversation analysis, linguistic anthropology and pragmatics that investigates the complex structures and practices of participation that characterize human social interaction.

1. "Phatic communion" and the practices of participation

In his, "The problem of meaning in primitive languages", Malinowski argued for a behavioralistic theory of language in which the meaning of an utterance is connected with the speaker or hearer's behavior, with the "purpose of what they are doing." Malinowski develops his theory in a discussion of talk in task activity (e.g. fishing) but notes that there are types of speech that do not fit this mold. Specifically, there is talk-for-talk's sake or, as he puts it, "the exchange of words almost as an end in itself" (1923: 312): "a flow of language, purposeless expressions of preference or aversion, accounts of irrelevant happenings, comments on what is perfectly obvious" (1923: 314). This type of speech which he termed "phatic communion," posed a problem for Malinowski's theory in which words are understood to get their meanings from the activities in

which they are used and the actions with which they are associated. The problem arose as a result of Mailnowski's highly simplistic understanding of "action" and "activity" which he thought of more or less completely in terms of task. So his theory works best, perhaps, for cases such as "a party of fisherman on a coral lagoon, spying for a shoal of fish, trying to imprison them in an enclosure of large nets, and to drive them into small net-bags" (1923: 310) and using single word commands to coordinate their efforts. Although Malinowski was aware of the ways language played a role in the coordination of such activities, he seems not to have grasped the fact that language is itself an instrument of action.[1] As such conversation – in which Malinowski's "expressions of preference or aversion" become the vehicles of actions such as praising and blaming, complimenting and excusing, complaining and sympathizing and so on – posed a problem for his theory as did narrative. He solved the problem for conversation by arguing that (1923: 315):

> But what can be considered as *situation* when a number of people aimlessly gossip together? It consists in just this atmosphere of socialbility and in the fact of the personal communion of these people. But this is in fact achieved by speech, and the situation in all such cases is created by the exchange of words, by the specific feelings which form convivial gregariousness, by the give and take of utterances which make up ordinary gossip. The whole situation consists in what happens linguistically. Each utterance is an act serving the direct aim of binding hearer to speaker by a tie of some social sentiment or other. Once more language appears to us in this function not as an instrument of reflection but as a mode of action.

Malinowski suggests here and elsewhere that much of what we do when we talk is reaffirm social relationships and contrasts such uses of language with more genuinely "informational" communication. Malinowski used the term phatic to talk about role of talk in reaffirming social bonds.

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1. Jakobson, of course did. He disagrees with efforts to distinguish poetics from linguistics on the grounds that the former but not the latter is concerned with "evaluation":

> This separation of the two fields from each other is based on a current but erroneous interpretation of the contrast between the structure of poetry and other types of verbal structure: the latter are said to be opposed by their "casual," designless nature to the "noncasual" purposeful character of poetic language. In point of fact, any verbal behavior is goal-directed, but the aims are different and the conformity of the means used to the effect aimed at is a problem that evermore preoccupies inquirers into the diverse kinds of verbal communication. (Jakobson 1960)

So, in attempting to solve fundamental problems in his theory of meaning, Malinowski actually put his finger on something vitally important that, though it may have been noticed before him, had not been accorded any real significance. The notion of "phatic communion" focused attention on the practices of speaking that underlie all human interaction insofar as establishing contact between the parties to talk is clearly prerequisite to any form of interaction.

Jakobson incorporated these ideas into his model of "speech functions". Here again, the notions of "contact" and of the "phatic" crop up almost as a by-product of other considerations. The "phatic" dimension is discussed on two occasions in Jakobson's writings: in the first (Jakobson 1960) he is primarily concerned with the "poetic function" ("the set toward the message"), in the second (Jakobson 1980 [1957]) with the "metalingual" function. Thus, in his discussion of the poetic function he writes, "Language must be investigated in all of the variety of its functions. Before discussing the poetic function, we must define its place among the other functions of language."




Figure 1. Schematic representation of the functions of language, adapted from Jakobson 1960

Jakobson's (1985: 115) discussion of the phatic dimension is brief enough that it may be reproduced here in its entirety:

> There are messages primarily serving to establish, to prolong, or to discontinue communication, to check whether the channel works ("Hello, do you hear me?"), to attract the attention of the interlocutor or to confirm his continued attention ("Are you listening?" or in Shakespearean diction, "Lend me your ears!" – and on the other end of the wire "Um-hum!"). This set for CONTACT, or in B. Malinowski's terms PHATIC function (1923) may be displayed by a profuse exchange of ritualized

> formulas, by entire dialogues with the mere purport of prolonging communication. Dorothy Parker caught eloquent examples: "Well!" she said. "Well, here we are," he said. "Here we are," she said, "Aren't we?" "I should say we were," he said, "Eeyop! Here we are." "Well!" she said. "Well!" he said, "well." The endeavor to start and sustain communication is typical of talking birds; thus the phatic function of language is the only one they share with human beings when conversing with them. It is also the first verbal function acquired by infants; they are prone to communication before being able to send or receive informative communication.

Jakobson used the term "phatic" to focus in on particular aspects of the communicative situation – what he thought of, somewhat inadequately, as the "channel" of communication. This contrasts with Malinowski for whom "phatic" is more about the social relationships involved. Jakobson introduced another crucial modification in suggesting that uses of speech were not categorically either "phatic", "referential", "meta-lingual", "connotative" or whatever else. Rather these different functions were combined in a single instance of speaking though their relative importance varies.

> Although we distinguish six basic aspects of language, we could, however, hardly find verbal messages that would fulfill only one function. The diversity lies not in a monopoly of some one of these several functions but in their different hierarchical order. The verbal structure of a message depends primarily on the predominant function. But even though a set (Einstellung) toward the referent, […], briefly the so-called REFERENTIAL, "denotative", "cognitive" function – is the leading task of numerous messages, the accessory participation of the other functions in such messages must be taken into account by the observant linguist.

Jakobson's important move was to think in terms of concurrent functions rather than categorical utterance or activity types. However, because he continued to think in terms of "predominant functions" that shape "verbal structure" the consequences of this remain somewhat muted. Consider in this respect a few of Jakobson's examples from the passage on the phatic function. Jakobson suggests that there are utterances designed "to attract the attention of the interlocutor or to confirm his continued attention" and proposes that "Are you listening?" might be an example of the latter. But in fact studies by Goodwin (1980, 1981) for example clearly show that this kind of thing is typically not accomplished by an "utterance" devoted to the task but rather by various forms of same-turn self repair and especially by turn-restarts. And, inversely, a speaker who says, in so many words, "are you listening?" will likely not be heard simply as "confirming" the continued attention of the interlocutor but reprimanding her for a suspected lapse thereof. The problem here lies in Jakobson's failure to distinguish between what is announced (by an explicit question

such as "are you listening" to which other actions are bound to attend) and what is embodied (by various forms of self-repair for instance) (See Schegloff & Sacks 1973). The distinction is also relevant to his discussion of "entire dialogues with the mere purport of prolonging communication." The example he provides looks very much like what Schegloff and Sacks would describe as a floor-passing exchange which acts as a "possible pre-closing" and thus serves not to prolong conversation but rather to bring it to a close. According to this argument, an exchange such as this "embodies" (rather than announces) a warrant for closing the conversation – each participant is presented with an opportunity to raise a topic of conversation and each passes that opportunity thereby conveying "together" that they have nothing left to talk about. Because, Jakobson had no account of turn-taking he was not able to see what an exchange such as this might be doing.

But perhaps more importantly there is a sense in which, by equating the "phatic" with, for instance, the "referential" or "the meta-lingual" Jakobson committed a category mistake (Ryle 1949) since, on one analysis at least, these are not, in fact, comparable phenomena.

The terms "referential" and "metalingual" describe unique features of human language but, as Jakobson himself noted, the "phatic" is a much more general feature of social interaction.[2] We can see this, for instance, in the fact that it is in no way specific to interaction between humans. Non-human primates, wolves and other mammals use various means to get a conspecific's attention and by this establish contact in order to interact. Moreover, it is clear that children establish contact, and thereby show sensitivity to the phatic dimension, long before they begin talking (Trevarthan 1998). And as this entails, "phatic" communication or the phatic dimension of communication is not limited to speech as both Jakobson and Malinowksi writings on the topic imply. Indeed, it would seem that gaze as well as head and body orientation more generally are much more important resources in this area than is speech per se. To anticipate the discussion that follows somewhat, by limiting a consideration of the "phatic dimension" to speech, Jakobson and Malinowski cast the associated phenomena as *speaker's* practices and thus failed to take account of other participants including the recipient. This meant that they were never able to conceptualize the phenomena as interaction *between speaker and recipient,* that is, to move beyond the activity of single speaker.

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2. For one proposal on the unique features of human language see Hockett (1960) for more recent discussion see Tomasello (2003, 2008).

The importance of gaze and body orientation in establishing contact or what we will eventually come to call, after Goffman and the Goodwins, participant frameworks is obvious. The visual arts provide particularly clear examples here.



Figure 2. Officer and Laughing Girl, c. 1657. Johannes Vermeer (1632 – 1675)

In Vermeer's "Officer and laughing girl," the artist has captured a moment of mutual gaze. Notice also the way, by the arrangement of their bodies, the participants are oriented to one another (on this see Schegloff 1998; Goodwin 2002) in this way sustaining co-participation in the activity of the moment. Consider, by way of contrast, the image of "Venus with an organist" by Titian. As Schegloff notes

in his discussion of a similar painting by Titian, the body of the organist is torqued with the bottom half (from the waist down) set towards the organ and the top half gazing towards the body of Venus. Schegloff shows that such positionings as this – body torque – can convey instability and project change. Moreover, the positioning appears to suggest multiple involvements – the one associated with the orientation of the head/gaze having being managed within the framework of the one established by the lower part of the body. In this version of the painting, there is a second body torque depicted with Venus herself attending to cupid at her side. So here the painting suggests that the organist has *not* established "contact" with Venus, rather, he is apparently "sneaking" a glimpse of the beauty while he continues the "official" activity of playing the organ and while she is momentarily distracted by an engagement with Cupid.



Figure 3. Venus and Cupid with an Organist. c.1548. Titian

Goffman (1963: 43ff) noted the possibility of multiple involvements: "main" and "side" or "dominant" and "subordinate". Consider in this respect the painting of a peasant dinner in which the main involvement between the man on the right and the man on the left is sustained via mutual gaze while a subordinate, side involvement between the man on our left and the woman is underway. Notice that by positioning his hand to receive the glass, the man displays attention to this task and a willingness to participate in that subordinate activity of object transfer.



Figure 4. Peasants' Dinner. c. 1618. Diego Velázquez

Consider now the well-known print by Norman Rockwell entitled "Homecoming". Here we see a group of co-present persons who together form what Goffman described as a "focused encounter".

It is by virtue of the participants' gaze that we can see they are engaged in a single, joint activity. With the help of the title, we can see that the marine is telling the story of his service. Notice in this respect that though no one in the scene is apparently talking at this moment we can nevertheless recognize that the marine is the one telling the story. That is, the others are, each one of them and together, collectively, arranged or oriented in such a way as to show that they are acting as recipients.[3]

Once we recognize the crucial role that gaze and body orientation play in the organization of participation, it is possible to see that contact is a pervasive concern and a contingent accomplishment which is achieved moment-by-moment in the details of interaction. This of course leads to an account of "involvement" and ultimately to a

3. On the problem of depicting and seeing "non-verbal" communication in the still images of painting see Gombrich (1972).



Figure 5. Homecoming. Norman Rockwell

theory of "participation". The pioneer here is the sociologist Erving Goffman and it is to his early studies that we turn next.

2. Goffman: Attention, involvement and focused encounters

For all their insight, Malinowski and Jakobson thought in terms of "contact" or "channel". Although this was a significant improvement on the Saussurean notion of a "speech circuit", famously diagrammed in the *Cours*, in so far as it made the *means by which contact is established* a possible topic of investigation, it nevertheless encourages a massively over-simplified view of the relevant range of phenomena.




Figure 6. Saussurean speech circuit

Most problematic is the fact that notions of "contact" and "channel" conceptualize the phenomena in terms of a binary, on-off function: contact is either established or not. Once it is established it is assumed to remain in the "on" position until there is reason to suspect otherwise.

In some of his earliest writings Goffman developed a radically alternative account. Goffman begins not with language or speech but with social interaction and conceptualizes participation therein not in terms of contact but rather "involvement". For Goffman each episode of interaction, each encounter, constitutes a self-sustaining system in which there is, normatively, "a single, albeit moving, focus of visual and cognitive attention" (Goffman 1964: 135).[4] Inevitably, we speak in "social situations" and Goffman complains that this basic fact of social life has been handled in a "happy-go-lucky" way, typically in terms defined by research on some other topic.

> If one is dealing with the language of respect, then social situations become occasions when persons of relevant status relationships are present before each other, and a typology of social situations is drawn directly and simply from chi-squaredom: high-low, low-high and equals. (Goffman 1964: 34)

Such an approach, according to Goffman, wrongly assumes that "social situations do not have properties and a structure of their own, but merely mark, as it were, the geometric intersection of actors making talk and actors bearing particular social attributes" (1964: 134). Against this, Goffman suggests:

> Your social situation is not your country cousin. It can be argued that social situations, at least in our society, constitute a reality *sui generis* as He used to say, and therefore need and warrant analysis in their own right, much like that accorded other basic forms of social organization.

4. Later in his career Goffman noted various permutations of by-play, cross-play and side-play (see Goffman 1981; Goodwin 1997). See also Egbert 1994.

Goffman (1964: 135) goes on to define the social situation as an environment of "mutual monitoring possibilities, anywhere within which an individual will find himself accessible to the naked senses of all the others who are 'present', and similarly find them accessible to him."

Within the general category of social situations, Goffman distinguishes unfocused interactions (such as a group of people waiting at a bustop) from focused interactions which he terms "encounters" (see Goffman 1964). The latter include "card games, ball-room couplings, surgical teams in operation and fist fights." Goffman (1964: 135) continues, saying:

> These ventures in joint orientation might be called encounters or face engagements. A preferential mutual openness to all manner of communication is involved. A physical coming together is typically also involved, an ecological huddle wherein participants orient to one another and away from those who are present in the situation but not officially in the encounter.

It is within these kinds of social arrangements, these focused interactions, these "encounters" that speaking takes place according to Goffman (talk which does not, such as talk to oneself, represents a departure from the norm according to Goffman 1964: 136).

And, thus, for Goffman underlying all speech are the practices of participation by which the environments for talk – social situations – are constituted. He describes this in terms of "functional gestures" which, as the passage quoted below makes clear, is meant to be a cover term for a wide range of practices ranging from actual hand gesturing and body-positioning to intonation and prosody.

> Utterances must be presented with an overlay of functional gestures – gestures which prop up states of talk, police them, and keep these little systems of activity going. Sounds are used in this gestural work because sounds, in spoken encounters, happen to be handy; but everything else at hand is systematically used too. Thus many of the properties of talk will have to be seen as alternatives to, or functional equivalents of, extra-linguistic acts, as when, for example, a participant signals his imminent departure from a conversational encounter by changing his posture, or redirecting his perceivable attention, or altering the intonation contour of his last statement. (Goffman 1964: 136)

So here, rather that the abstract "speech circuit", Goffman is proposing a dynamic system of interaction the moment-by-moment maintenance of which is sustained by "all-manner of communication." Various studies by Goodwin (1980, 1981, 1986), Kendon (1990), Streeck (1992, 1993) and others provide ample evidence that gesture, gaze, and body orientation are crucially involved here. All speech takes place within some such interactive system and thus we can see that the Saussurean model of a "speech circuit"

and Jakobson's notion of "contact" and "channel" are abstractions. What they gloss and thereby obscure are the actual practices of interaction that are prerequisite to any speech in context: talk-in-interaction.

According to Goffman, face-to-face interaction is an incredibly delicate thing: to maintain the fiction and the feel of ease each participant must dutifully do their part, attending to the right things at the right moments, conveying just the right degree of involvement and so on. In "Alienation from interaction," Goffman described this delicate balancing act by which we engage "in a reciprocally sustained communion of involvement." He does this by describing the various ways in which participants in interaction can become alienated from it. He writes (1957: 47):

> I want to consider the ways in which the individual can become alienated from a conversational encounter, the uneasiness that arises with this, and the consequence of this alienation and uneasiness upon the interaction. Since alienation can occur in regard to any imaginable talk, we may be able to learn from it something about the generic properties of spoken interaction.

Goffman argues that in order for interaction to come off smoothly, participants must satisfy a variety of "involvement obligations" by paying attention in just the right measure at just the right moments. The problem is that one cannot do this self-consciously for, as soon as one does, attention is redirected from the course-of-action underway towards the problem of being spontaneously involved in it. As such, there are any number of ways in which a participant may become alienated from interaction. Goffman (1957) describes four such ways.

1. External preoccupation: "The individual may neglect the prescribed focus of attention and give his main concern to something that is unconnected with what is being talked about at the time and even unconnected with the other persons present, at least in their capacity as fellow-participants." (1957: 49)
2. Self-consciousness: "At the cost of his involvement in the prescribed focus of attention, the individual may focus his attention more than he ought upon himself – himself as someone who is faring well or badly, as someone calling forth a desirable or undesirable response from others." (1957: 50)
3. Interactional consciousness: "A participant in talk may become consciously concerned to an improper degree with the way in which the interaction, *qua* interaction, is proceeding, instead of becoming spontaneously involved in the official topic of conversation." (1957: 50)
4. Other-consciousness: "During interaction, the individual may become distracted by another participant as an object of attention-exactly as in the case of self-consciousness he can become distracted by concern over himself." (1957: 51)

In this early work, Goffman was describing interaction from the point of view of the individual and he focuses on the causes and consequences of alienation for the individual participant specifically. The insights of Goffman's early researches may, however, be applied to a study of interaction as such. For instance, with the idea of focused encounter we can consider the practices by which participation is constituted within any given instance of face-to-face interaction. And we can find cases that are illuminating precisely because the question of whether some individual is or is not a participant is called into question.

Consider in this respect the following fragment of interaction from a backyard barbeque in which three men (Curt, Gary, Mike), one child and one woman (Carney) are seated at a table. The men have been telling "dirty jokes." As seen in Figure 7 in one configuration, Curt, Gary and Mike are arranged so as to form a focused encounter: an environment of "mutual monitoring possibilities". Carney, in contrast sits with her back to the table, facing in the other direction. This organization provides for a kind of equivocal participation in so far as Carney is present and can hear what the others are saying without *necessarily* counting as a recipient of the talk at the table.




Figure 7. Equivocal participation

The participants can themselves be seen to orient to this equivocality. Thus at one point Curt is telling a joke to Gary, claiming that he and Mike were in Vietnam and were "captured by the enemy."

(1) Auto discussion pp. 45

01	CUR:		=D'd I ever tell you about th'time Mike
02			en I were in Vietnam en' got captured by
03			the enemy¿
04			(0.4)
05	MIK:		Oh[:: come o::n.]
06	CUR:		[Mike en I en,] Y[eah.
07	GAR:		[Mike en I?
08	CUR:		Mike en [I yeh
09	GAR:		[Mackina:w?
10	GAR:		[(Mike'n I.)]
11	CUR:		[N o m e] 'n Mike wz in Vietnam we got
12			captured by the
13			Me['n Mike 'n,
14	GAR:		[Oh:: horseshit,=
15	CUR:		=Ye::s we di:d!
16			(0.7)
17	CUR:		'n we wz in- en there wz me'n Mike en,
18			en another guy en,
19	GAR:		Alright, kee[p goin Curt,
20	CUR:		[Ennuh:::
21	GAR:		[Keep bullshittin] a w a y ,]
22	CUR:		[W e d i : d ?] Didn' we.] r'member
23			Mike?
24	CAR:		([ )
25	GAR:		[R'member Mike?
26	MIK:		Dah, [yeh, sure enou.gh,
27	GAR:		[You remember Mike, he wz
28			[pretty nice ( ).]
29	CUR:		[Remember we wz in there]
30			he [s a y[s-
31	GAR:		[ˈuhh! [
32	CAR:	->	[You ferget I'm here.
33	CUR:		Ulright,
34	CAR:		[Teh hhah hah hah
35	CUR:		[Mhh hehh heh[heh
36	MIK:		[heh-heh-heh hah-hah
37			[hah heh heh
38	CUR:		[ehh heh heh
39	CAR:		Go o:n,
40	CUR:		We:ll? We wz just in there et the
41			prison camp ennuh,

Here then Curt, who is Carney's cousin, is telling a joke which he presents as a true story about the time that he and Mike were captured by the enemy in Vietnam. Gary,

the primary recipient for the joke, expresses doubt saying, in line 07 'Mike en I?' and then in, line 14, 'Oh:: horseshit,=':[5] In response to these repeated displays of doubt, Curt attempts to enlist Mike with 'Didn' we. r'member Mike?' at lines 22–23. At this point, Carney turns to her cousin Curt and says 'You ferget I'm here.' With this Carney suggests that she can disconfirm what Curt is saying. Indeed, Curt, who has persevered in the face of multiple challenges by Gary, here appears to acquiesce to Carney. Not only does he suspend the telling in progress saying 'ulright', he joins with Carney in a bout of laughter. In this way, Curt displays that he has been 'caught out' by Carney and does not in fact proceed with the telling until Carney instructs him to with 'Go o:n,'.

Notice then that in formulating this in the way she does, Carney characterizes her own participation as something that has been treated by others as equivocal, ambiguous or peripheral – as someone, who though present, can be, and has been to this point, disattended, in fact, forgotten. In a study of this episode (Sidnell frth) I argue that this equivocality is carefully managed by the participants, and especially by Carney, in such as way as avert potential recipient-design problems implicated in the telling of dirty jokes.

3. Goffman: Footing

Goffman's "Footing" marked a watershed in the analysis of participation. Although anticipated in many respects by his earlier discussion of "involvement" and face-to-face encounters and even more so by what he called in 1974 "the frame analysis of talk," "Footing" broke new ground and established a touchstone for future studies. Indeed, the ideas presented have generated a sizeable secondary literature which branches into conversation analysis, linguistic anthropology, interactional sociolinguistics and pragmatics.

Goffman begins this article with a news item reporting on an interaction in the Oval office between (then) president Nixon and a female news reporter. In this first section of the article, Goffman seems to be talking about "footing" as something akin to his earlier notion of "role-distance" (Goffman 1961) but he quite quickly shifts gears again and links footing to what we would today describe as speaker's stance: shifts in the alignment the speaker takes up with respect to what she is saying. Indeed,

5. Gary is initiating repair of the phrase 'Mike and I' – he appears to finds the use of the (grammatically correct) nominative pronoun in this position 'presumptuous' – 'putting on airs' as it were. This is a rather interesting case in which the 'incorrect' form is oriented-to as the appropriate one. It may also be that Gary hears this as 'formulaic' and thus by initiating repair of it means to be highlighting its status as an index of the story's inauthenticity. Note in any case that when he continues Curt "corrects" to "Me and Mike" and "Mike and me". On the use of questioning repeats to challenge what another speaker has said see Schegloff (1997), Sidnell (frth.).

in this first section of the paper Goffman links "footing" to a rather bewildering array of practices: shifts in alignment, code-switching, the framing of utterances, bracketing different episodes, "keyings" of talk as serious or joking, marking role-distance. This virtual barrage of connections does not bode well for the argument and it initially looks as though "footing" is being used to talk about just about everything and nothing in particular. Thankfully, Goffman reins things in at the conclusion of this section remarking:

> I want to make a pass at analyzing the structural underpinnings of changes in footing. The task will be approached by re-examining the notions of speaker and hearer, and some of our unstated presuppositions about spoken interaction. (Goffman 1981: 128)

The rest of the paper is in fact a reasonably focused consideration of different kinds of participation in interaction. It is this discussion which, for the most part has provided a foundation for subsequent work in this area. Goffman begins with a critique of what he describes as the "traditional analysis of saying" which, he claims, is based upon two basic yet faulty assumptions. First, the traditional analysis of speaking assumes just two persons: a speaker and a hearer. Second, the traditional analysis fails to take account of whatever else the participants are doing while, in and through speaking. This model, we are told "informs the underlying imagery we have about face-to-face interaction" (Goffman 1981: 129) despite the fact that it can only adequately handle a small slice of talk-in-interaction. Goffman's critique of the traditional analysis has several barbs. These include the following:

1. The unanalyzed notions of speaker and hearer seem to imply that voice and sound are all that is involved in talking. Goffman notes that this is problematic insofar as sight and even touch are of obvious importance to a range of practices (including those involved in the distribution of turns-at-talk for instance).
2. The traditional analysis does not recognize that any bit of talk is always part of "a talk": "a substantive, naturally bounded stretch of interaction comprising all that relevantly goes on from the moment two (or more) individuals open such dealings between themselves and continuing until they finally close this activity out." (1981: 130)
3. The traditional notions of "speaker" and "hearer" presuppose a dyadic event and do not take account of the range of other participants potentially involved in any occasion of talk.
4. The traditional notions "speaker" and "hearer" are not precise enough. Finer discriminations are required to describe the range of participant roles that these terms gloss.

The third and fourth points are directly concerned with the analysis of participation and it is these that I will focus on in what follows.

Goffman's argument is that the notions of "speaker" and "hearer" should be decomposed. On the speaking side, Goffman suggests that we should think in terms of a "production format". On the side of the hearer, he proposes a "participant framework". Following Levinson (1988) I substitute the terms "production roles" for "production format" and "reception roles" for "participant framework". "Participant roles" serves as a cover term for the entire range of roles. Goffman uses this typology of different kinds of participation to construct a corresponding typology of different kinds of talk. Thus besides the dominating communication among ratified participants, there can be various forms of subordinate communication. "By-play" is subordinate talk between ratified participants (see Goodwin 1997), "cross-play" is talk between a ratified participant and one or more bystanders, and "side-play" is talk among by-standers.

Table 1. Goffman's participation roles[6]

Production roles	
1. A*nimator*	'the sounding box' (p. 144–145)
2. A*uthor*	'the agent who scripts the lines' (p. 144–145)
3. P*rincipal*	'the party to whose position the words attest' (p. 144–145)
Reception roles	
A: ratified	
1. *Addressed recipient*	'the one to whom the speaker addresses his visual attention and to whom, incidentally, he expects to turn over his speaking role' (p. 133)
2. *Unaddressed recipient*	(p. 133) the rest of the 'official hearers', who may or may not be listening
B: unratified	
1. *Over-hearers*	'inadvertent', 'non-official' listeners (p. 132) or bystanders
2. *Eavesdropper*	'engineered', 'non-official' followers of talk (p. 132)

Consider the "production roles" first. The animator role is introduced in recognition of the fact that a speaker may produce talk that is not his or her own. Obvious examples include a herald (Wagner 1939), a town-crier, a bellman or a beadle who, in the course of fulfilling his occupational duties, produces talk of which he is not the author. In reporting speech, at least of the "direct type" (see Holt 1996), the speaker disclaims authorship of what is said. Actors who speak the lines of a playwright (under instructions from a director) and hosts who speak while possessed by spirits similarly fall into this category.[7] The Wolof Griot as described by Irvine (1992) presents a more

6. Adapted from Levinson (1988). Page references are to Goffman (1981).

7. On the griot, see Irvine (1992, 1996). The literature on reported speech is voluminous, Holt and Clift ed. (2007) provides an excellent introduction with a focus on conversation analytic approaches (See also Volosinov 1973). The literature on spirit possession is similarly expansive, see

complicated case. While the Griot is clearly an animator, she is typically not *solely* an animator. Rather, as a Griot, the speaker provides both the sounding box and some aspects of the linguistic and poetic form while at the same time "speaking on behalf of another". She may thus be both animator and author but not the principal (see my discussion of Irvine 1996 below). In the case of talk delivered by a press secretary, the secretary is often only the animator of the talk, while the author may be an individual or a committee charged with the task of "spinning" what is to be said (a speech-writer). The principal, the person ultimately responsible for what is said, is the head of office whom the press secretary represents.

Writing in 1949, Jakobson (1987) provides a lovely example illustrating the complexity of "production". He writes:

> Recently, aboard a train, I overheard a scrap of conversation. A man said to a young Lady, "They were playing 'The Raven' on the radio. An old record of a London actor dead for years. I wish you had heard his *Nevermore*". Although I was not the addressee of the stranger's oral message, I received it nevertheless and later transposed this utterance first into handwritten and then into printed symbols; now it has become a part of a new framework – my message to the prospective reader of these pages.

Jakobson explains the layers of authorship that went into the production of "Nevermore".

> The stranger had resorted to a literary quotation, which apparently alluded to an emotional experience shared with his female interlocutor. He referred to a performance allegedly transmitted by broadcast. A dead British actor was the original sender of a message addressed "to whom it may concern". He, in turn, had merely reproduced Edgar Allan Poe's literary message of 1845. Furthermore, the American poet himself was ostensibly only transmitting the confession of a "lover lamenting his deceased mistress" – perhaps the poet himself, perhaps some other man, real or imaginary. Within this monologue, the word nevermore is attributed to a talking bird, with the further implication that that one word uttered by the Raven had been caught from some unhappy master, as the melancholy burden of his customary laments.
>
> Thus the same single word was successively set in motion by the hypothetical "master", the Raven, the lover, the poet, the actor, the radio station, the stranger on the train, and finally, by the present author. The "master" repeatedly exteriorized the elliptic one-word sentence of his inner speech, nevermore; the bird mimicked its sound sequence; the lover retained it in his memory and reported the Raven's part with reference to its probable provenience; the poet wrote and published the lover's story, actually inventing the lover's, Raven's, and master's roles; the actor read and recited for

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Boddy (1994) for a useful overview and Lambek (1981) for a classic case study. Urban (1989) and DuBois (1986) provide useful theoretical framings of these issues.

> a recording the piece assigned by the poet to the lover with its nevermore attributed by the lover to the Raven; the radio station selected the record and put it on the air; the stranger listened, remembered, and quoted this message with reference to its sources, and the linguist noted his quotation, reconstituting the whole sequence of transmitters and perhaps even making up the roles of the stranger, the broadcaster, and the actor. This is a chain of actual and fictitious senders and receivers, most of whom merely relay and to a large extent intentionally quote one and the same message, which, at least to a few of them, was familiar beforehand.[8]

In these examples there is a clear temporal dimension to the sequence of production roles: the words originate with an author or principal and are only later articulated by the animator. But different temporal permutations are possible. Consider for instance the following example from the famous "Frost-Nixon" interview. This begins with Frost pressing Nixon on his characterization of what he did as consisting of "mistakes". Nixon responds by asking Frost what word he would use to express this. In answering, Frost mentions "three things I would like to hear you say". For at least the last two of these, Frost actually animates an imagined Nixon, saying "I did (.) abuse the power I had as President." (line 28–29) and "I: put the American peup-people through two years of needless agony and I apologize for that." (lines 31–33).

(2) Frost-Nixon – Frost's "Three things I would like to hear you say"

01	Frost:	Would you: (.) go further than "mistakes"?
02		(0.2)
03		Thet y- you've explained how you got caught up
04		(.) in this thing. Youv- You've explained your
06		motives. .hhh I don't wanta quibble about any of
07		that.
08		(0.4)
09		But just coming to the shee:r substance,
10		(0.6)
11		wouldju go further than "mista:kes".The wo:rd,
12		(1.0)
13		that seems, n- u- not enough for people to
14		understand.

8. Jakobson (1950) notes that examples such as this will not fit within Saussurean speech circuit:

> The whole sequence offers a typical example of an intricate process of communication. It is very different from the trivial pattern of the speech circuit graphically presented in textbooks: A and B talk face to face so that an imaginary thread goes from A's brain through his mouth to the ear and brain of B and through his mouth back to A's ear and brain.

15		(1.5)
16	Nixon:	Welwhat word would you express?
17		(2.0)
18	Frost:	My goodness. That's uh- I: think that there are three
19		things, since you asked me, I: would like to hear you
20		say. I think the American people would like to hear you
21		say. (0.2) One is:
22		(1.2)
23		There was probably mo:re (.) tha:n (0.4) mistakes,there
24		was (0.6) wrongdoing. Whether it was a crime or not.
25		Yes, it may have been a crime, too.
26		(1.0)
27		Secondly, (1.0) I did- (1.0) and I'm saying this without
28		questioning the motives, right. I did (.) abuse the power
29		I had as President. (0.6) or, ah, not fulfill the (.)
30		totality .hh of the oath of office.That-That's the second
31		thing, (.) And thirdly, (0.6) I: put the American peup-
32		people through two years of needless agony, and I
33		apologize for that. (0.8) And I say that you've explained
34		your motives I think those are the categories.
35		(1.0)
36		And I know how difficult it is for anyone and most of all
37		you but I think (0.6) that people need to hear it (.)
38		and I think unless you say it, you're gonna be haunted
39		for the rest of your life.

Frost's use of "I" is clearly not self-referential (see Urban 1989). Rather, in a way similar to reported speech, there is a transposition here such that "I" refers not to the current speaker but to the speaker in an imagined scene. In this example then Frost animates Nixon saying something that he has not yet said and, in fact, never did say.

Some shifts of footing are extremely subtle, even artful. Consider in this respect the following case which begins with Rick offering Matt a bottle opener, accounting for the rather enthusiastic summons in line 1 with an explanation that the beer bottle Matt is holding is a "pop" and, therefore, cannot be opened with a bare hand (discussed in Sidnell 2006). The opener is received and at line 3 Rick is thanked. After Matt jokes that he was, "trying to be really macho 'n stuff," (by not using an opener), Rick begins to tell a story about a person opening a bottle with his teeth. At line 16, Dave proposes to tell about a similar event (see Sacks, 1995, for discussion of such "second stories"). The act of opening the bottle is here referred to using "did that". It is the result of opening the bottle with one's teeth that takes center stage in Dave's story. Thus at line 18, Dave tells how he looked at the one opening the bottle and at line 19 describes the person's teeth as "just all fucked up."

(3) Rip your hand

1	Rick:	ere ere Matt
2		don't rip your hand off (.) it's uh uh it's uh pop
3	Matt:	°oh man cool [thanks°
4	Dave:	[hahaha
5	Matt:	I was tryin to be really macho 'n [stuff
6	?:	[hahhahha
7	Rick:	wn I wuz in Mexico?
8	G:	mmhmhm
9	Rick:	an' an' the du::de that we wen- we wen on a crui::se?
10		(0.5)
11		an this guy opnzit with his mouth like this
12		(0.8)
13	Dave:	yes
14		(1.5)
15	G:	ouch
16	Dave:	uh guy at my house a- um (.) fourth of july did that
17		(0.7)
18		'n I wuz all wha::t?=I Iooked at iz teeth and jstall
19		f:::ucked [uh:p
20	J:	[hahaha
21	Rick:	[hahahha, Oh Shi:t=
22	J:	=haha
23	Rick:	[I dunnit like this] y'know on the table (.)
24	J:	[don't drink much huh?]

What is remarkable in this example is the way the perspective shifts within the course of Dave's talk, from the person watching the events to one participating in them. Thus when, at line 18, Dave says that he was "all what" he tilts his head slightly to the side in a querying gesture at the same time widening his eyes (Figure 8). Although, it is difficult to see this in the figure provided, examination of the video record clearly shows Dave realigning his head – cocking it to one side – and widening his eyes. Here the speaker momentarily withdraws his gaze from the co-participants and re-enacts his own surprise at seeing the result of opening the bottle with one's teeth. By the time Dave produces the word "teeth," he has begun a gesture with his hand and arm. This comes up over the mouth and makes a sudden slash across his face. At this point, then, Dave describes the damage done to the teeth. So in the course of this single turn at talk, Dave has presented to the recipients the events from two quite different perspectives: First, he has shown them his own reaction as a witness to the events and, secondly, he has shown them the event itself (a depiction of it). Here then a subtle repositioning of the head and widening of the eyes marks a significant transformation of the participation framework. It conveys to the participants that what they are looking at is not

simply Dave telling the story but Dave witnessing, with surprise, a person who has just opened a beer bottle with his teeth and, in doing so, damaged them.




Figure 8. Footing shift

Consider now the reception roles. A single example will illustrate the bulk of the categories Goffman introduces. For this we return to the back-yard barbeque known as Auto-discussion. In this particular episode the participants are initially seated at the picnic table as follows: on the left-side of the table Curt is in the foreground and Gary is behind him. On the right-side of the table Carney is in the foreground and Mike in the back, between them is Phyllis.




Figure 9. "She gonna g'm down here'n break those two up"

At the point where we pick up the action, Carney rises from the table, stands up and walks around to other side (see Figure 9). As she approaches Gary (her spouse) and Curt, Mike produces the utterance given as 4 below:

(4) Auto Discussion

06	MIK:	Oh look-eh-she gonna g'm down here'n break those two u:[p.
07	CAR:	[ehhhh!
08	MIK:	se[e:?
09	CUR:	[Aw[: ma:n,]
10	MIK:	[hah hah] hah hah[hah.
11	GAR:	[(You)talk about[j e alous.]

To whom is this addressed? Goffman (1981: 133) suggests that the addressed recipient is 'the one to whom the speaker addresses his visual attention and to whom, incidentally, he expects to turn over his speaking role'. While gaze surely plays an important role here, the answer to the question of to whom an utterance is addressed should, I think,

be sought first of all in the structure of the talk itself. In English at least, pronouns and other forms of person reference are used in such a way as to define a "structure of address".[9] Third person pronouns and other forms of reference are used to cast participants as objects of talk and specifically not the addressed recipient of an utterance. Here, Mike's use of "she" to refer to Carney and "those two" to refer to Gary and Curt casts these persons as non-addressed participants. By a process of elimination then, this utterance appears to select Phyllis as its recipient.[10] Goffman's suggestion that the addressed recipient is the one "to whom the speaker addresses his visual attention" is not borne out: As he is producing this utterance, Mike seems to be looking at Curt and Gary. It is not until he has finished his utterance that he brings his gaze to Phyllis.[11]

This example also casts doubt on Goffman's suggestion that the addressed recipient is the one to whom speakership passes. In this case, it is Curt who speaks next saying "Aw man" and after that Gary saying, apparently to Curt, "talk about jealous". It's possible that Goffman put this too strongly and that he should have said that the addressed recipient is "selected" to speak even if s/he does not do so. But the evidence available does not support this suggestion either. Rather, as Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974, see also Lerner 2003) showed, it would appear that, in order to select next speaker, an utterance must combine address with some sequence, initiating action (such as a question, a request, an invitation etc.). This is not to say that gaze is not used in picking out a particular participant as the addressed recipient for an utterance or even part of an utterance. Indeed as Goodwin (1979) demonstrated, to whom a turn-at-talk is addressed is frequently worked through in the course of its production. Not only can different components of an utterance target different participants as the primary addressed recipient, but, moreover, a speaker may modify the utterance to make it appropriate to the primary addressed recipient of the moment.

According to Goffman's scheme Curt, Gary and Carney are undifferentiated as "unaddressed recipients". But, they are not solely unaddressed recipients, they are also persons being talked *about*. Both Levinson and Goodwin note Goffman's failure to discriminate here. Levinson (1988), for instance, discusses the utterance produced by Mark at line 34 (below), where Karen is a present participant.

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9. On this point the classic statement is from Benveniste (1971) who describes the third person pronoun as a "non-person". Not all languages work in quite the same way in terms of which forms are used for address and which for reference. In English for instance it is marked to use kin terms like "mother" and "father" for self-reference. In Vietnamese, this is perfectly acceptable and unmarked (see Luong 1990).

10. See Lerner (2003) on next speakers being selected by a process of elimination.

11. Goffman does not fully endorse this idea, see his qualifications in "Footing" (1981: 141).

(5) SN-4 p. 02–03

32	Sher:	[You didn't come t' talk t' Kerin?
33		(0.4)
34	Mark:	No, Kerin: (·) Kerin 'n I 'r having a fight.
35		(·)
36	Mark:	After-sh' went out with Keith (the night be°fore.)
37	?She:	[( )
38	Ruth:	[UH HUH HUH HUH HUH
39		(0.2)
40	Ruth:	·huh ·huh
41	(??):	((sni [ff))
42	Kar:	[W'l Mark you never asked me ou:t.

In a case like this it is clearly problematic to categorize Ruth and Karen together as "unaddressed recipients." For though the utterance is explicitly addressed to Sherry as a response to her question, it is "tacitly" addressed to Karen as a complaint. And notice that Karen takes it up as a complaint by responding with a justification (which might itself be heard as a counter-complaint). This and other examples from the literature suggest the need for a category of "target" (e.g. Fisher 1976).

4. Elaborations and critique of footing

Levinson (1988) presents a highly sophisticated appreciation and critique of the argument in "Footing" in which he suggests that in seeking to decompose the notions of speaker and hearer, Goffman was on the right track but that he did not go far enough. With a nod to Prague school structural phonology, Levinson suggests that participant roles can be decomposed using a kind of "distinctive feature" matrix which generates a set of basic categories as well as "super-ordinate natural classes". Table 2 reproduces Levinson's simple version of this for production roles.

Table 2. Feature matrix for production roles (from Levinson 1988)

	Message origin	**Transmission**
Author	+	+
Indirect source	+	–
Relayer	–	+

Super-ordinate ('natural') classes

Speaker = + transmission

Source = + origin

Levinson goes on to provide evidence both from grammatical categories and from the ethnography of communication that his finer discriminations are indeed warranted. He notes, for instance, that though first and second person appear to be basic, universal categories across the world's languages, non-basic participant roles are also reflected in a range of grammatical categories. For instance, as Boas (1911) long ago noted, many languages have obligatory evidential marking which distinguishes between different degrees of personal commitment. Hidatsa, for instance, includes a quotative mood indicating "a second-hand but indefinite source" and a report mood indicating "that the speaker was told the information given in the sentence by someone else" (Levinson 1988: 184–185, from Matthews 1965: 99ff). As Levinson notes, English glosses of such sentences are problematic precisely because they make the "quotative" character of the utterance explicit where, in the original, it is completely embedded. The point here is that these forms seem to grammatically encode the various different production roles developed in the analysis of interactional footing.

Levinson discusses a number of grammatical codings which bear on reception roles as well. He mentions, for instance, hortatives glossed with English "Let" constructions, such as "Let him be welcome." These are non-second person imperatives:

(6) *wio ate awahu kuo axou-ka* (Hidatsa, Matthews 1965: 107)
The woman hide in the house
"I demand that the woman hide in the house"

Levinson explains that such "third person imperatives" are of special interest in so far as they are "a request to an addressee to get some third party to do something" and thus presuppose two speech acts, a current one and a projected one. They thus distinguish between an "illocutionary target" and an immediate recipient. Mention may also be made here of elicitation routines characteristic of interaction between caregivers and children (see, for example, Schieffelin 1990; Sidnell 1997; de Leon 2000). Levinson also shows that "avoidance registers", documented for Guugu Yimdhirr by John Haviland (1979), for instance, index and presuppose affinal "by-standers" or "overhearers".

Hanks (1990, 1996) develops ideas from Goffman's footing as part of his masterful study of deixis and lived space among the Maya. Like Levinson, Hanks argues that participation frameworks constitute the foundation of deixis and thus, in one basic sense, of context. It is often noted that deictic forms such as the English demonstratives "this" and "that" make reference by virtue of an indexical connection to the event of speaking. More specifically, though, they are tied to the participant roles of speaker and hearer. On one analysis, "this" and "that" are organized via an asymmetric opposition in which marked "that" conveying "not close to speaker" is opposed to unmarked "this" (see for instance Enfield 2003; Sidnell 2005). In this sense, participant categories provide anchoring via an indexical origo for all other deictic forms.

Of course, participant categories are themselves instantiated through the use of deictic, or at least indexical forms: pronouns, directed gaze, bodily orientation and so on. As we've seen, in practice, these forms constitute emergent and unfolding participant frameworks subject to moment-by-moment permutation and transposition. It thus would seem that the ground to which deixis is anchored is constantly shifting under one's feet. Given that situation, Hanks (1996) wonders how the participants (the actual incumbents of participant roles that Goffman and Levinson described) are able to keep it all straight (who is the principal or author now, who is being addressed?) He goes on to suggest that participation frameworks might be made more tractable if viewed from the perspective of some "superordinate units such as *events* or *genres* of practice" which will allow for the incorporation of "native understandings and habitual orientations toward speech, along with a less abstract view of utterance production" (1996: 168). Hanks (1996) develops this argument in an analysis of ritual performance.[12]

Irvine develops Goffman's and Levinson's ideas about footing along similar lines arguing that a central issue has to do with the way in which complex participant role structures are mapped onto actual incumbents. In this context, Irvine (1996: 136) suggests that:

> The best approach to the mapping problem, then, may be to resist the temptation to try to arrive at a single, all-purpose solution that thrusts the problem into the background as merely the rationale for a scheme of PRs. Instead, the mapping problem itself – the process by which participation structures are constructed, imagined, and socially distributed – is what should come to the fore. It is not only an analytical problem; it is also a participants' problem, to which there are creative, if often evanescent, solutions.

Elaborating this important critique of the footing model, Irvine argues on the basis of a consideration of Wolof insult poetry that complex participant mappings should be understood diachronically. This genre of poetry is performed at weddings after the wife has moved into the husband's household. The event is sponsored by the new-bride's co-wives but the insult-poetry is delivered by a low-ranking (griot) woman. Some days before the event the griot visits her patronesses and, together, they compose the poems to be performed. So Irvine notes we have a split between author and principal (the sponsoring/co-authoring co-wives) and the animator (the griot). Irvine notes then that these footings, achieved in the event itself, presuppose and thus index another occasion in which a different distribution of roles was in place. Specifically, in the earlier event the griot was the addressee and the co-wives the speakers (including the animators).

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12. Hanks (1990) also develops the argument for more everyday/conversational contexts.

In his discussion of footing, Goodwin (2007), like Irvine, questions the utility of complex typologies of participants arguing that this in fact obscures the actual interactive work that participants do in building complex participation frameworks moment-by-moment in their talk. Goodwin, goes further, suggesting that an essential problem with the footing model lies in its analytical separation of the speaker and hearer. This, according to Goodwin and Goodwin (2004), has a number of consequences:

1. "Speakers and hearers inhabit separate worlds" so that while Goffman notes the importance of mutual monitoring (see M.H. Goodwin 1980), he does not provide analytic resources for examining the way speakers and hearers take each other into account in the course of building an utterance.
2. As noted, Goffman's analysis results in a typology and a set of static categories. "No resources are offered for investigating how participation might be organized through dynamic, interactively organized practices."
3. There is an asymmetry in the analysis of different kinds of actors. The speaker is a complex actor with an elaborate set of linguistic practices (of embedding, reporting, contextualizing etc.) whereas all other participants are "left cognitively and linguistically simple", indeed, they are characterized solely "as points on an analytic grid."
4. The model privileges what is occurring in the stream of speech over all other forms of embodied practice that, as we've seen, are implicated in the organization of participation – from body orientation to gaze to gesture.

Goodwin (2007: 24) develops a compelling alternate view in which participation is "analyzed as a temporally unfolding process through which separate parties demonstrate to each other their ongoing understanding of the events they are engaged in by building actions that contribute to the further progression of these very same events" (see also Goodwin 1986, 1987, 1988, 2000; Goodwin & Goodwin 1987, 1990, 1992).

Goodwin demonstrates this through the analysis of an episode in which one participant (Ann) tells a story about something her co-present partner (Don) said while the couple was visiting the new house of friends. While touring the house, Don notices some wallpaper and remarks "did they make you take this wallpaper or did you pick it out." Goodwin shows how Don organizes his body both to anticipate and prepare for the retelling of this remark. In fact he does this twice. When Ann first starts the report with "en D(h)o(h)n sa(h)ys," Don adjusts his body so that his head and face are visually accessible to the story-recipients. However, Ann momentarily discontinues the report in order to provide some parenthetical background information. During this talk, Don again adjusts his body, withdrawing slightly from the gaze of the recipients. When, at the conclusion of the parenthetical background information, Ann comes again to the

report frame with "Do(h)n said," Don resumes the postural alignment he had adopted earlier, making his face visually accessible to the recipients. As Ann reports the faux –pax about the wallpaper (and comments upon it through the inclusion of laughter), a smile spreads over Don's face.

5. Conclusion

In this chapter I've attempted to provide a review of a series of important ideas about the organization of interaction. Although scholars have discussed the phenomena under a range of quite different rubrics according to their own disciplinary background (speech circuit, phatic communion, channel, contact and so on) I hope to have shown that the term "participation" points to a highly organized domain of human conduct that can be studied empirically. In this I follow one of the pioneers in this area, M.H. Goodwin, who wrote in her classic study of talk among children that "activities align participants toward each other in specific ways" and that "this process is central to the way that activities provide resources for constituting social organization within face-to-face interaction" (Goodwin 1990: 10). A focus on participation then highlights the fact that talk is as Goffman insisted first and foremost a form of social organization quite irreducible to anything else be it the psychology of the individuals involved, the language they employ or the "culture" they share. Rather, talk-in-interaction is its own organization with its own distinctive properties and features. Clearly, an analysis of the practices of participation will be required if we are to continue making gains in the study of that organization.

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Politeness

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1. Historical overview

As a research object in linguistic pragmatics, politeness has a rather short history. The impulse to the study of politeness came from H.P. Grice's seminal paper 'Logic and conversation' (1975), in which he proposed a Cooperative Principle and four maxims underlying transactional discourse ("maximally efficient information exchange"). Grice noted that in order to account for other aspects of language use, additional maxims may be needed, such as a politeness maxim. This suggestion was taken up and elaborated in early accounts of linguistic politeness by Lakoff (1973, 1979), Leech (1977, 1983), and Edmondson (1979, 1981). The common denominator of these proposals is that they view politeness in terms of maxims or rules, thus underscoring their conceptual link to the Gricean maxims.

A different approach to politeness was proposed by Brown & Levinson (1978/87), who derive politeness from Goffman's (1971) notion of face. To date, this has proven to be the most influential proposal, extremely powerful in its generation of research and controversy. Most theoretical contributions and empirical studies adopt Brown & Levinson's work as a reference point, debating in particular the universality of their theory.

2. Approaches to politeness

2.1 Folk notion

Many though not all languages have a lexical item roughly equivalent to 'politeness' in English. The changing semantics of these lexical entries provide a window to the perception of politeness in the speech community, from a diachronic and synchronic perspective. For instance, the lexical element 'li' in Chinese 'limao' (='polite appearance') underwent important semantic changes which reflect such historic sensitivity: in Confucius' writings (551–479 B. C.), 'li' referred to the slavery-based social hierarchy of the Zhou Dynasty, which Confucius advocated to be restored. The modern concept of 'li' was first documented in the book Li Ji (attributed to Dai Sheng, ca. 200–100 B. C.), where 'li' was equated with demonstration of self-denigration and respect to the other

person, especially in vertical relationships (Gu 1990). In English, 'polite' dates back to the 15th century (='polished'); in the 17th century, a polite person was 'of refined courteous manners' (The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology). Politeness was thus associated with the norms of social conduct extant in the upper classes, and this sense of the term has survived in collocations such as 'polite society'. The semantic association of 'polite' with behaviors of the upper classes is even more obvious in German '*höflich*', French '*courtois*', Spanish '*cortes*', all of which are adjectival derivatives of nouns for court (G. *Hof*, Fr. *cour*, Sp. *corte*).

The semantics of the lexical entry 'politeness' thus sheds light on social members' perception and classification of politeness. Further sources of politeness as a folk notion are key cultural concepts, etiquette manuals, the prescriptions and proscriptions of socializing interaction, and metapragmatic comments on what is and is not polite behavior. Since they are embedded in the cultural practices of a community, these assessments and activities provide an emic perspective on politeness as an action-guiding construct in the community. Politeness as a folk notion, representing the 'social norm view' of politeness in Fraser (1990), has also been categorized as 'first order politeness'. 'Second order politeness', by contrast, presents different theoretical accounts of politeness (Watts, Ide & Ehlich 1992). First order politeness phenomena constitute the empirical input to politeness theories.

2.2 Conversational maxim(s)

While all conversatinal maxim accounts of politeness are modeled on the Gricean maxims, they differ in their relationship to the Cooperative Principle (CP). The views reach from entirely subsuming politeness under the CP to affording the CP and politeness equal status. Politeness, defined as 'considerateness', is often seen as inherently face-threatening, and needs to be counterbalanced by appropriate doses of politeness. Brown and Levinson distinguish a number of major politeness strategies, ranging from avoiding the face-threatening act (FTA) altogether, to carrying it out in different guises. Off-record FTAs are performed indirectly; due to their inherent ambiguity, they have the greatest potential for negotiation (including denial). On-record performance of FTAs can be achieved without redressive action, or by adopting either or both of two kinds of redress: positive politeness, addressing the hearer's positive face wants, or negative politeness, addressing negative face wants. Positive politeness strategies emphasize closeness between speaker and hearer by confirming or establishing common ground, or by referring to desirable attributes in the hearer (hence 'solidarity strategy', Scollon & Scollon 1983); negative politeness strategies suggest distance by accentuating the hearer's right to territorial claims and freedom from imposition (hence 'deference strategy', Scollon & Scollon 1983).

Objections against Brown & Levinson's theory have centered on their notion of face. While in Goffman's (1967) original concept, face is a public property, 'on loan' to the individual from society, and a negotiable outcome of social interaction, Brown & Levinson's construct is an individual's unalienable possession, a trait that can be threatened but not lost or taken away. It has been argued that the individualistic orientation of Brown & Levinson's face notion conflicts with cultural orientations outside the Anglo-American community, where 'face' predominantly entails recognition of participants' placement in social hierarchies (Ide 1989; Matsumoto 1988). In an attempt to reconcile egocentric and sociocentric views of face, Mao (1994) proposed a 'relative' face orientation: the 'ideal social identity' and the 'ideal individual autonomy'. Societies differ according to which of these two interactional ideals they favor; hence substantive face constructs vary cross-culturally.

Writers who recognize a role for face in politeness have recently pointed out that face can only be correctly understood in the context of notions of self, emphasizing that such notions are necessarily informed by culturally varying perceptions of personhood and relationships between individual and society. While a comprehensive review of studies on self concepts in different communities points to a consistent opposition between *interdependent* and *independent* notions of self (Markus & Kitayama 1990), an alternative view questions the adequacy of categorizing cross-culturally varying self-orientations according to these categories, or even as ordered on a continuum between these. Thus Rosenberger (1989) argues against the popular belief of a consistent sociocentric self concept in the Japanese community, and for a dialectic model as one of many maxims, on the same epistemological footing with the Maxims of Quality, Quantity, Relevance, and Manner. Consequently, violating the Politeness Maxim gives rise to conversational inference, just as in the case of any other maxim. While politeness thus has a secondary status vis-à-vis the CP in Brown & Levinson's (1987) theory, Lakoff (1973) and, in a much elaborated version, Leech (1983) see politeness as a coordinate construct to the CP. For Lakoff, pragmatic competence is constituted by two major 'rules': "1. Be clear. 2. Be polite," where clarity amounts to a condensed version of the Gricean maxims, while politeness serves to avoid conflict between participants. In Leech's proposal of an 'interpersonal rhetoric', the CP is complemented by a Politeness Principle (PP): "Minimize the expression of impolite beliefs" (1983, p. 79). Both CP and PP are 'second-order principles,' each elaborated by a set of 'contributory maxims': the Gricean maxims in the case of the CP, and six maxims of politeness — the Maxims of Tact, Generosity, Approbation, Modesty, Agreement, and Sympathy — in the case of the PP (p. 131ff). The 'conversational maxim view' (Fraser 1990) of politeness thus comes in different versions, depending on how the relationship between the CP and politeness is conceptualized. Less detailed versions of the conversational maxim approach to politeness have been suggested by Lakoff (1973, 1979), Edmondson (1981), and

Kasher (1986), and for Chinese by Gu (1990). Myers-Scotton's (e.g. 1993) markedness model, developed as a conversational maxim approach to the sociopragmatic functions of codeswitching in multilingual communities, can also account for politeness marking in monolingual or bilingual interaction.

2.3 Redress to face-threat

The face-saving view of politeness, proposed by Brown and Levinson (1978/1987), has been the most influential politeness model to date. Its fundamental assumptions are a Weberian view of communication as purposeful-rational activity, combined with Goffman's concept of 'face' (1967), an individual's publicly manifest self-esteem. Social members are endowed with two kinds of face: 'negative face', the want of self-determination, and 'positive face', the want of approval. Participants are assumed to adopt as a global interactional strategy "the diplomatic fiction of the virtual offense, or worst possible reading" (Goffman 1971: 138f), i.e., the working hypothesis that face is constantly at risk. Consequently, any kind of linguistic act which has a relational dimension is seen which captures the switches of the Japanese self (*jibun*) between opposing orientations: "group productivity, personal accomplishment, harmony or affection, and pure impuls or gratification" (1989: 89f). Switching between these modes is brought about through the flow of a person's vital energy (*ki*) and actualization according to social, spatial, and temporal context (also Lebra 1986). 'Western' and Japanese notions of self differ not so much in their 'independent'/'egocentric' vs. 'interdependent'/'sociocentric' orientations but in their diverging beliefs about the *unity* of self: the 'western' ideal of a consistent self that transcends conflicting contextual demands, and the Japanese ideal of an accommodative self that optimally responds to varying contexts and purposes. The ideological character of the 'western' construction of a consistent self has been illustrated in an analysis of team sport in the US (Green 1992), demonstrating how athletes are required to switch from the individualistic orientation prevalent in the society at large to a strongly group-oriented, hierarchical subculture. The facility by which these adjustments are performed suggests that 'western' selves are more contextually sensitive than presumed by folk beliefs as well as some scientific models of self, e.g. in Freudian or Jungian psychodynamic theory.

2.4 Social marking

According to some critics, the face-based politeness construct does not accommodate politeness in the sense of social marking, e.g. by choosing a sociolinguistically appropriate style and forms of person deixis. Whereas strategic politeness is called for as an antidote to the face-threat involved in many linguistic acts, social marking is seen as a pervasive normative feature of verbal interaction, unrelated to particular communicative goals. The social marking view thus represents a second-order approach to politeness as social norms.

Different proposals have been made to conceptualize the social marking position relative to the face-saving view. According to Ide (1989), Brown & Levinson's notions of positive and negative face are universally valid but have to be complemented with a component called discernment (Japanese *wakimae*), signalling social relationships. Politeness in any society comprises a 'volitional' component (strategic politeness attending to face concerns) and discernment, or social marking. These two components are regarded as universal; communities differ in the emphasis they put on each. Thus for Japanese interlocutors, 'place' purportedly takes precedence over 'face' (Ide 1989).

In contrast to Ide's universalist position, Matsumoto (1988) rejects the notion of negative face altogether as being inapplicable to Japanese culture. Her work emphasizes the importance of social marking in Japanese language use and does not explore how strategic politeness is encoded in Japanese interaction. Her position therefore represents a 'place instead of face' view.

Ide's proposal that any politeness theory has to account for relationship marking and redress to face-threat, while being theoretically convincing, also has the advantage of being empirically testable. It is more difficult to provide empirical support for her contention that speech communities place differential premium on social marking and face-saving strategies. In order to sustain this claim, etic criteria have to be found to measure amounts and social significance of both politeness features across cultures; this task remains to be accomplished by future data-based studies on linguistic politeness.

While conventional, or sociopragmatically unmarked social indexing affirms the existent power structure in social relationships, unconventional, marked uses do occur. Such deviations from expected choices (e.g. of personal deixis, styles, or indeed languages) carry special social messages. In light of Myers-Scotton's (1993) markedness model, they may be seen as strategic exploitations of unmarked choices (e.g. Cook 1996a, b).

2.5 Conversational contract

The conversational contract view, proposed by Fraser (e.g. 1990), represents the most global perspective on politeness. Rather than conceiving of politeness as something additional to cooperation, such as redress in view of face-threat, polite conduct implies acting in accordance with the requirements of the conversational contract at any given moment of an encounter. At the outset, the terms of the conversational contract are determined by participants' rights and obligations; however these may change during and as a result of the interaction itself. What exactly the current terms of the conversational contract are would depend on each participant's assessment of relevant contextual factors and of the conversational interchange itself. Acting politely, then, is virtually the same as using language appropriately. In order to distinguish politeness in this broad sense from speakers' deliberate expression of respect and appreciation, Fraser follows Goffman (1971) in referring to this aspect of linguistic activity as deference.

2.6 Politeness and politic behavior

Yet another line of criticism denies the role of face in politeness altogether. Watts (1989) asserts that rather than being motivated by face concerns, politeness is located in the wider context of *politic* behaviour, understood as (linguistic) activity serving to establish and maintain interpersonal relationships. With special reference to Chinese politeness, Gu (1990) argues that politeness is more appropriately seen as adherence to social norms than attending to individual's face wants. While these authors' proposals are thus at variance with Brown & Levinson's individualistic notion of face, they are quite compatible with the relative face concept proposed by Mao (1994).

2.7 Politeness and tact

Whereas Leech (1983) had proposed a tact maxim as one of the implementations of his Politeness Principle, Janney & Arndt (1992) distinguish two coordinate types of politeness, 'social politeness' and 'tact.' Social politeness refers to participants' ability to organize interaction smoothly by coordinating their activities along the conventions holding for any given encounter. The main vehicle for social politeness is the routine formulae serving to facilitate interaction in standard situations, such as structuring and managing conversation and performing recurring speech acts. Social politeness thus refers to observing the rules of the social-communicative game, while tact refers to participants' need to mutually save and enhance face. Hence, the function of tact is to regulate interpersonal relationships by providing support, empathy, and avoiding offense. In biological perspective, tact appears as a species-specific adaptive response, allowing humans to produce affective display purposefully (emotive communication) rather than as the mindless externalization of an affective state (emotional communication). Both social politeness and tact are universals of human behavior; yet communities differ in the ways they organize their social interaction, what counts as tactful, and how tact is strategically and linguistically implemented.

3. Expression of politeness

3.1 Inherently polite speech acts?

Speech acts have been classified according to their inherent face-threat (threat to speaker/hearer's positive/negative face; Brown & Levinson 1978/1987) and interpersonal impact (competitive, convivial, collaborative, conflictive; Leech 1983). Such classifications are theoretically problematic because what is categorized as face-threatening or interpersonally beneficial or disruptive would depend on the larger conceptual framework; an empirical drawback is that abstract categorizations of speech acts may tell us little

about as how polite or impolite participants perceive such linguistic acts in ongoing interaction. On the other hand, at the level of first-order politeness, at least routinized speech acts such as greeting, thanking, complimenting, or apologizing are categorized as intrinsically polite in many communities. Whereas clearly any of these acts can be used in a socially offensive way, this is perceived as highly marked and does not invalidate their categorization as 'polite' in unmarked use.

Some types of linguistic action are carried out more frequently in some cultures than in others, and this seems to reflect their politeness value as perceived in the community. Hearer-beneficial acts such as complimenting and thanking occur more regularly in the US than in mainland China, reflecting both the strong positive politeness orientation and reluctance to impose on others in mainstream American culture, on the one hand, and the assumption, in China, that participants act according to their social positions and associated roles and obligations, on the other hand. Also, hearer-costly acts such as refusals are perceived as being more socially offensive by Japanese and Chinese interlocutors and thus tend to be avoided, whereas it seems more consistent with American interlocutors' right to self-determination not to comply with another person's wishes. However, because refusing is threatening to the hearer's positive face and therefore problematic for American speakers, too, they tend to mitigate refusals in various ways.

3.2 Conventions of means

Brown & Levinson (1978/87) offer rich evidence for the microstrategies available to implement each of the major strategic choices for carrying out face-threatening acts. Most of the subsequent studies have examined how specific speech acts are realized, within a particular speech community or cross-culturally/cross-linguistically. For a number of speech acts, finite repertoires of realization strategies, or speech act sets, have been identified, e.g. for requests (Blum-Kulka & House 1989), apologies (Olshtain & Cohen 1983), complaints (Olshtain & Weinbach 1993), compliments (Herbert & Straight 1989), refusals (Beebe & Cummins 1996), rejections (Bardovi-Harlig & Hartford 1990), disagreement (Sornig 1977), chastisement (Beebe & Takahashi 1989b), giving embarassing information (Beebe & Takahashi 1989a), corrections (Takahashi & Beebe 1993), thanking (Eisenstein & Bodman 1993), suggestions (Banerjee & Carrell 1988), and offers (Fukushima & Iwata 1987).

Current evidence suggests that the established speech act sets are cross-linguistically robust. Thus for requests, modificatory dimensions include three major levels of directness (direct, conventionally indirect, indirect), measured in terms of distance between locution and illocution; internal modification of the requestive act, mitigating or aggravating impositive force; and external modification, expressed by 'adjuncts' supporting the request proper. The speech act set of apology consists of an expression of regret,

admission of the offense, assumption of responsibility, account, minimizing the offense/responsibility, and offers of compensation (Blum-Kulka, House & Kasper 1989). The strategies composing specific speech act sets, and global modificatory dimensions such as indirectness, minimization and maximization of pragmatic force (House & Kasper 1981; Held 1989) have been demonstrated to be valid across the languages and communities studied so far. Yet the selections participants make from such repertoires vary between speech communities, and these variations systematically reflect different cultural orientations. Chinese (PRC) speakers not only compliment less, but also on different attributes compared to American speakers. For instance, physical attractiveness is not regarded a suitable topic for public praise by many Chinese people (Ye 1995). Danish interlocutors invested more effort into supporting their requests by justifications than native speakers of English and German (Færch & Kasper 1989). Ritual refusal of offers and invitations is traditionally required in Chinese culture (Gu 1990; Mao 1994) but not everywhere else. Americans are more prone to preface corrections with positive remarks than Japanese speakers (Takahashi & Beebe 1993) and to maximize compliments, both of which reflect a positive politeness orientation. In refusals, Japanese and Chinese speakers use proverbs and philosophical statements more often than American speakers. While the indirect expression of pragmatic intent is a universally available strategy, the relationship of indirectness and politeness is complex and varies cross-culturally. In American English and Hebrew, conventional indirectness, rather than non-conventional indirectness, was identified as the most polite request strategy; next in politeness value were direct strategies in the perception of Israeli raters and nonconventional indirectness according to American raters (Blum-Kulka 1987). In interaction with familiars but not intimates, direct strategies (e.g. imperatives, statement of hearer's future action) seem more acceptable in the Slavic languages, Hebrew and German than in any of the standard varieties of English examined so far. It has been suggested that directness to speakers of these languages connotes sincerity, straightforwardness and cordiality (Katriel 1988; Wierzbicka 1985) rather than imposition on their freedom of action. However, in these languages direct strategies are often combined with mitigating modal particles, diminutives and other linguistic means which do not alter the direct expression of pragmatic intent but soften impositive force; politeness is thus explicitly marked by different linguistic expressions, rather than dispensed with altogether.

3.3 Conventions of form

Languages differ in the conventionalized forms by which illocutionary force and politeness can be implemented. For instance, formal equivalences of the structure 'can/could you do x' serve to express conventional indirectness in the Germanic and Romance languages as well as in Hebrew, Japanese, and Chinese, but not in the Slavic languages

(Wierzbicka 1985). Repertoires of polite formulae index recurrent social events which are most efficiently handled by language-specific pre-fabricated routines (Coulmas 1981). It is part of the pragmalinguistic knowledge shared by members of a speech community to recognize the contextual distribution of such frozen forms, whereas speakers do not usually have an awareness of the semantic structure of politeness routines. To the pragmaticist, such formulae are informative tokens of first order politeness since they encapsulate the interpersonal meanings which are regularly conveyed in the community. Stylistic choices, honorifics, and address terms function primarily as social indicators rather than expressions of strategic politeness, although they can also be used for that purpose. The assumption that social indexing may be more prevalent in some languages than others is well supported by the fact that in Asian languages such as Japanese, Korean, Thai, Javanese and others, relationship marking is grammaticized in highly complex morphological systems, whereas such specialization is only rudimentary in European languages (Coulmas 1992). Taxonomies of conventions of means and form have been established crosslinguistically and for specific languages (e.g. Blum-Kulka 1989). What is still not well understood, however, is the relative contribution of such conventions to the overall politeness value of an utterance or discourse sequence.

4. Variables in politeness investment

It is an in-built sociolinguistic axiom of politeness theories that politeness investment varies according to contextual factors. The two most elaborated theories, Brown & Levinson (1978/1987) and Leech (1983), concur in this regard. First, they identify the same factors as independent variables in politeness marking: social distance (Brown & Levinson, Leech), social power (Brown & Levinson)/authority (Leech), and the degree of imposition associated with a face-threatening act (Brown & Levinson)/costs and benefits of an act (Leech). Secondly, both theories posit a linear relationship between these factors and politeness investment. Thirdly, they both assume a positive correlation between politeness and indirectness.

Data-based studies lend strong support to the identified context variables, whereas the correlational issues are problematic. Each of the proposed factors represents a composite construct which is culturally and contextually elaborated and weighted. *Social power* includes factors such as

- interlocutors' relative positions in social hierarchies (e.g. Morand 1991);
- age; e.g. in communication by and with the elderly (Coupland, Coupland & Giles 1991) and children (Kwarciak 1993, for overview);
- gender (Fasold 1990, for overview);
- language impairment (Bliss 1992; Stemmer 1994).

The impact on expended politeness of factors related to social power varies intra- and interculturally. Intraculturally, the weight of each factor might vary contextually. For instance, gender was identified as determining the amount of complimenting and apologies received by New Zealand interlocutors, women receiving consistently more, mostly from other women (Holmes 1988). Comparing politeness in requests, American students did not vary politeness according to gender, whereas Hispanic students were more polite towards the opposite sex (Rintell 1981). Different positional roles in institutional hierarchies (university, work place) affected the politeness investment of American and Japanese interlocutors; however, Japanese speakers varied their politeness strategies more dramatically, depending on whether speaker or hearer was the status superior (Takahashi & Beebe 1989).

Social distance has been demonstrated to impact politeness in a more complex way than theoretically predicted. Reviewing a number of studies on speech act realisation, Wolfson (e.g. 1989) concluded that rather than correlating in a linear fashion, social distance and politeness are related in a reverse bell-shaped curve ('Bulge'): most politeness appears to be expended in negotiable relationships with familiars but nonintimates, such as co-workers and friends. In the more fixed relationships at the opposite ends of the social distance continuum, intimates and strangers, politeness is found to decrease. More recent evidence for the Bulge Hypothesis comes from studies on complaining (Olshtain & Weinbach 1993) and expressions of gratitude (Eisenstein & Bodman 1993).

While there is a comprehensive literature on the impact of social variables on politeness implementation, much less research exists on the influence of psychological factors. To some extent, this may simply reflect the fact that demographic variables are easy to identify whereas (social-)psychological factors are not. Ciliberti (1993) argues that interactional style is as much a product of participants' cultural background as of personality, and an analogous argument can be made for demographic profiles and personal variables. Slugoski (1985) demonstrates that familiarity (= social distance) has to be distinguished from affect (= psychological distance), a hypothesis supported by historical evidence from a study of politeness in Shakespearian tragedies (Brown & Gilman 1989; on the impact of affect also Boxer 1993).

In addition to these participant variables, features of linguistic acts themselves — the '*imposition*', or costs and benefits accruing from them — shape politeness enactment. For several speech acts, the elements of the composite construct 'imposition' have been identified, for instance, in

– requesting: urgency, legitimacy (Hermann 1982), likelihood of hearer's compliance and speaker's psychological difficulty in carrying out the request (Blum-Kulka & House 1989)

- apologizing: perceived severity of the offence, subsuming obligation to apologise and likelihood of apology acceptance (Olshtain 1989)
- thanking: indebtedness, comprising the degree of received benefit and trouble undergone by the benefactor (Ikoma 1993)
- complaining: magnitude of social obligation violated by the offender (Olshtain & Weinbach 1993).

Participant factors and properties of contextualized linguistic action interact in complex ways and vary crossculturally in their impact on linguistic politeness. For instance, in request performance, Israeli speakers varied their strategy selection according to requestive goal, age, and power (Blum-Kulka, Gerson & Danet 1985); Japanese and German speakers modified their requests according to legitimacy and likelihood of hearer's compliance, but the German not the Japanese speakers made their strategy selection also contingent on urgency (Hermann 1982; Morosawa 1990); Israelis, Germans, and Argentinians differed in their perceptions of interlocutors' rights and obligations, likelihood of hearer's compliance, and speaker's difficulty in performing the request (Blum-Kulka & House 1989); requestees' obligation to comply was perceived higher by American than by Japanese raters (Shimamura 1993).

While most studies have examined the impact of context variables on politeness investment, Brown & Levinson's theory also predicts a flow of pragmatic information in the reverse direction: speakers' choices of politeness strategies inform listeners about the value of context variables. Perceived imposition in requesting, for instance, was found to be contingent on actual imposition, request realization, and time of judgement.

Just as the relationship between context variables and politeness varies intra- and interculturally, so does the relationship between patterns of linguistic action and their politeness value. Negative politeness strategies were perceived as more polite by Japanese residing in the US than by Japanese in Japan (Kitao 1990). Japanese and Americans also gave different appropriateness judgements of requests with and without supportive moves (Shimamura 1993). A particularly intriguing issue is the relationship between indirectness and politeness. Contrary to theory derived predictions, it was conventional indirectness (e.g. preparatory strategies such as 'can/could you') rather than nonconventional indirectness (hinting) that was rated most polite by Israeli, American (Blum-Kulka 1987) and German (House 1986) judges. The preference for conventional indirectness appears to be motivated by the balance struck between clarity and consideration and in the low processing costs to the hearer. Consistent with this finding, Weizman (e.g. 1993) has suggested that nonconventional indirectness in requesting is not motivated by politeness at all but by the 'deniability potential' inherent in ambiguous language use. Whether this re-interpretion of indirectness can be sustained across speech communities is a question for future study.

5. Discourse perspective

Instead of isolating specific context variables and examining their impact on politeness, a large body of literature explores politeness in different discourse contexts, for instance

- in institutional discourse: courtrooms (Berk-Seligson 1988; Lakoff 1989), medical practice (Aronsson & Rundström 1989), psychotherapy (Lakoff 1989), academic advising (Bardovi-Harlig & Hartford 1990), counselling (Frederiksen & Shultz 1982; Fiksdal 1991), supervisory conferences (Robert 1992), special education conferences (DuFon 1993), classroom discourse (Lörscher & Schulze 1988), language proficiency interviews (Ross 1995), consumer service agencies (Johnson & Fawcett 1987), sermons (Dzameshie 1992), citizen-bureaucracy interaction (Hero 1986), opinion poll interviews (Johnstone, Ferrara, & Bean 1992), church business meetings (Pearson 1988);
- in workplace communication (Bryan & Gallois 1992) and other professional interaction, e.g. aviation discourse (Linde 1988), business negotiations (Yamada 1990), sales negotiations (Lampi 1993), organisational interaction (Morand 1991), sports teams (Jones 1992);
- in interpersonal discourse, e.g. family dinners (Blum-Kulka 1990), dinner entertainment (Befu 1986), phatic talk (Coupland, Coupland, & Robinson 1992), intimate conversation (Frank 1988), interpersonal decision-making (Scheerhorn 1991/92);
- discourse in different media, e.g. telephone conversations (Sifanou 1989), computer games (Covato 1991), computer messages (Yasuhisa 1991), interpreted discourse (Knapp-Potthoff 1992);
- written discourse, e.g. letters of request (Cherry 1988), business letters (Hagge & Kostelnick 1989), narratives (Scollon & Scollon 1981), argumentative writing (Zammuner 1991), scientific writing (Myers 1989), peer reviews (Johnson 1992).

A general outcome from these studies is that politeness is not only located in the conventions of means and form by which linguistic action is carried out, but also in the discourse structure. In conversation, politeness is jointly managed by the interlocutors through activities such as turn-taking, backchanneling, preference organization, and the principle of recipient design. The ongoing discourse itself constitutes, maintains and alters participants' rights and obligations, increases and reduces distance, and strengthens and weakens affective bonds. Rather than viewing the relationship of discourse context and politeness as one between dependent and independent variables, it is more appropriately conceptualized as a dynamically evolving, dialectic interplay of figure and ground.

6. Further reading

Several journals have published special issues on linguistic politeness: *Multilingua* 7:4 (1988), 8:2/3 (1989), 12:1 (1993), *Journal of Pragmatics* 14:2 (1990), 21:5 (1994), *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 27 (1981), 92 (1991). An edited volume on the topic is Watts, Ide, & Ehlich (1992). For bibliographies on linguistic politeness, see DuFon, Kasper, Takahashi, & Yoshinaga (1994); specifically on politeness in Japanese: Yoshinaga, Maeshiba, & Takahashi (1992).

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Prosody

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1. Prosody defined

The term **prosody** is current both in the fields of literature and of linguistics. In literary studies it is used to refer to the metrical analysis of verse, while in linguistics its denotation encompasses not only *stress*- and *accent*-related phenomena in language use, but also diverse types of melodic or *pitch*-related, and dynamic or *loudness*-related speech modulation. In addition, it is used for the temporal manipulation of syllables and segments — whether with respect to their *duration* (stretching and clipping) or with respect to their *timing* (rhythm and rate of speech). Prosodic features create auditory effects in spoken language above and beyond those which identify the sound segments themselves. They are in one sense distinct to speech, but of course also *virtually* present in many written forms of verbal communication.

However easy it may be to list single prosodic phenomena, it is no simple matter to establish the upper and lower bounds of the category 'prosodic'. Nor can this be done in a language-independent fashion. At the lower end it is necessary to exclude phenomena such as, for instance, lexically and/or syntactically determined pitch accents and tones. The label 'prosodic' applies only to those suprasegmental auditory effects in speech which, in Crystal's words, have "an essentially variable relationship to the words selected" (1969: 5). Crystal argues, on the other hand, that not *all* lexically variable auditory effects in speech qualify as prosodic. He would restrict the category to only those auditory effects which can be traced to the dimensions of pitch, loudness and duration, and whose domain is minimally the syllable. Such features, he claims, are constantly present in speech, whereas other auditory effects — such as, for instance, giggling (a 'voice qualification' in his terminology) or whispering (a 'voice qualifier') — are not continuous with speech at all times and therefore do not count as prosodic. One disadvantage of taking such a restrictive view is that it relegates *pauses* to the margins of the category. Yet the manipulation of pausing is generally recognized as an eminently prosodic phenomenon.

Other scholars have taken a more inclusive view. Firth (1957), for instance, called all types of syntagmatic relations holding between syllables *prosodies*, including syllable structure and number or nature of the syllables, e.g. as concerns stress, tone, quantity or quality. In this more encompassing view, certain of Crystal's 'voice qualifiers' — e.g. breathiness, creak, nasalization, whisper — would also qualify as prosodic, provided they are independent of the phonemic make-up of the single

sounds. Indeed, the fact that such vocal devices are often deployed in speech to the same effect as, say, rising pitch, increased volume or syllable stretching, argues in favor of grouping them together — as early work did (Trager 1958). For present purposes, the label 'prosodic' will be used in this more encompassing, paralinguistic sense.[1]

2. Prosody as a pragmatic phenomenon

It is a commonplace to say that the way we speak conveys as much meaning as the words we use. Much of this additional meaning can be ascribed to prosodic effects in speech. Yet how does prosody convey what it does? In the structuralist tradition it has been customary to draw an analogy between prosodic phenomena and meaning-distinctive units such as phonemes and/or meaning-bearing units such as morphemes. Pike (1945), for instance, argued that pitch levels in American English distinguish meaning in much the same way as phonemes do in minimal words. Other linguists have seen a parallel between holistic intonational contours or melodies and 'discourse' meanings such as contradiction or surprise, making prosodic patterns more similar to morphemes (Liberman & Sag 1974; Sag & Liberman 1975). Followers of this line of thinking speak of an 'intonational lexicon', in which the semantics of particular tones or tone sequences can be represented in a fashion similar to that for morphemes and words. Yet this view — if feasible at all — applies to only a very small part of prosody, namely to a restricted set of tonal configurations for single utterances. Larger-scale, non-compositional pitch patterns, e.g. at the level of declination unit (Schuetze-Coburn, Shapley & Weber 1991) or paratone (Yule 1980; Couper-Kuhlen 1983), cannot be captured. Moreover, dynamic and temporal variations including e.g. rhythm, tempo and pause (see e.g. Auer, Couper-Kuhlen & Müller 1999) are not amenable to the lexical analogy and would have to be disregarded altogether.

Prosodic phenomena are particularly recalcitrant when it comes to establishing discrete categories, as is necessary in the structuralist enterprise. Bolinger was acutely aware of this and argued persuasively against a view of intonation entailing discrete phoneme-like pitch levels and predictable (i.e. semantically determined) accent placement (1965, 1972a). Instead, he emphasized that intonation is in important ways a gradient phenomenon: "whatever it is that we find with the raised […] peak, there is more of it as that peak goes higher" (1961: 43). Bolinger compares intonation to gesture and calls it gesturing with one's larynx (1986). There is a great deal of insight in this remark, as we shall see. It also transfers nicely to other aspects of prosody such as rhythm or pause, where — although an organic source may be lacking — a gestural function is nevertheless discernible. In short, the best answer to the question of how prosody conveys what it does is that

1. See also Kelly & Local (1989), who advocate the wider, Firthian denotation of 'prosodic' and give it the general label 'phonetics'.

it does so in a fashion similar to mimetics, gesture and kinesics — all dimensions which reflect the embodiment of language when used in actual (face-to-face) communication.

If one's aim is to come to terms with prosodic phenomena as they function in genuine language communication, the structuralistic framework is thus of limited value (see also Couper-Kuhlen & Selting 1996). This is because, semiotically speaking, prosodic effects, like gestures, are not symbolic signs but are rather *indexical*, and on occasion *iconic*, signals. As indexicals, prosodic signals function pragmatically, *cueing inferences* rather than symbolically representing aspects of extra-linguistic reality. In contrast to the symbolic signs of language (words or morphemes), the meanings which prosodic signals cue cannot be specified out of context. In fact, prosodic effects never appear without words or word-like entities to carry them. These words and the discourse situation in which they are used provide a context for interpreting the prosody which accompanies them — just as, vice versa, the prosody itself provides a context for interpreting its carrier, the words. The relation between prosody and its context is thus a reflexive one, as we might expect in general of indexical signs.[2]

Because prosodic signals hint at possible ways of understanding what is being said, they have been called **contextualization cues** for language (Gumperz 1982; Auer 1986; Auer & di Luzio 1992). As contextualization cues, one of their significant features is that the interpretative frames they call up are open to negotiation in interaction. For instance, although one interpretive frame may be cued by the speaker, the recipient may choose to interpret according to another. What is ultimately understood to have been said is the product of negotiating which frame is to be taken as the relevant one for the talk in question. Related to this is a second feature of prosodic signals: they are not 'accountable' in the same way that words are (Garfinkel 1967). Speakers can be held responsible for (i.e. criticized, blamed, asked to apologize for, etc.) their choice of words, but it is difficult to take them to task for their prosody. Someone who asks a friend in a complaining voice 'Why do you leave the fridge door open all the time?', when challenged, can always escape blame by claiming 'I'm not criticizing, I'm just asking' (Günthner 1996). As Silverstein has put it, prosody is often "beyond the limits of pragmatic awareness" (1976).

3. Prosody and early work on spoken discourse

Within modern linguistics, the pragmatic nature of prosody, in particular intonation, was not recognized until relatively late.[3] Among the first to do so was Halliday

2. Although they are indexical, prosodic signs are also partially conventionalized, as becomes apparent from cross-cultural comparison (Gumperz 1982). This is what makes a systematic description of their inference-cueing potential in specified situations of use feasible.

3. Anthropologists and scholars of oral poetry had been appealing to the prosodic dimensions of performance for longer (cf. Lord 1964; also, more recently, Tedlock 1977 & Woodbury 1985.)

(1967, 1970), who saw in intonational distinctions such as tonality (division into tone-groups), tonicity (placement of the tonic accent) and tone a means for speakers to chunk information into units, to mark information foci and to distinguish new from given information, respectively. At about the same time, Bolinger was warning against the predictability of accent on syntactic grounds (1972a) and claiming that because of its gradience and essentially expressive function intonation was 'around the edge of language' (1972b).

A second wave of work on prosody, especially intonation, as a pragmatic phenomenon was initiated when linguists enlarged their perspective from the sentence to larger units of discourse. Yule (1980), for instance, identified on prosodic grounds a phonological unit larger than the intonation phrase (often seen as corresponding to a clause; cf. Crystal 1975) which he dubbed, in analogy to the paragraph, 'paratone' (see also Couper-Kuhlen 1986: 189–200).[4] Brazil, Coulthard & Johns (1980) also described intonational contrasts beyond the intonation phrase and identified patterns of pitch-level 'harmony' within classroom exchanges, which they then postulated as constraints applying to the production of asymmetrical discourse in general.

At about the same time but in a different part of the world, Chafe was examining the use of prosody in the organization of oral narrative and in particular of the Pear Stories (1980). Chafe sees intonation as providing a window on consciousness via the establishment of the intonation unit, which encompasses the information that is in the speaker's focus of consciousness at a given moment, and the accent unit, which is the domain of activation for new, accessible and/or given information (1993). Also within this tradition, DuBois et al. (1992, 1993) postulate a notion of transitional continuity between one intonation unit and the next, marked by different sorts of terminal pitch contours. The term *transitional continuity* describes the extent to which "the discourse business at hand will be continued or has finished" (1993: 53).

While all of the above work addresses intonation, or more generally prosody, at the level of discourse, it tends to do so almost exclusively in terms of information. Moreover, with the exception perhaps of Brazil, the focus is heavily on spoken text and monologic discourse. To redress the balance, the following discussion will be geared primarily to the pragmatics of prosody in more interactive forms of discourse. As conversation analysis has developed a methodology especially adapted to talk-in-interaction, the discussion will be framed in this model.

4. Major paratones are said to begin with an extra high pitch on the first stressed syllable of an intonation phrase and to end with extra low pitch and a noticeable pause at the end of a subsequent intonation phrase. They are thus roughly equivalent to what Schuetze-Coburn et al. (1991) call 'declination unit'.

4. Prosody in talk-in-interaction: Structural dimensions

What sorts of interpretations does prosody cue in interaction? Research so far has suggested that it is implicated in both structural and interactional dimensions of talk-in-interaction. Structurally speaking, participants in interaction construct minimal and extended turns at talk; they organize successive turns at talk sequentially; and they manage rights to the floor, all in systematic ways. Prosody can be seen as one of the resources at their disposal for handling the tasks of turn construction, sequential organization and floor management.

4.1 Turn construction

Consider the turn-constructional unit (TCU): this is the smallest unit which can form a turn at talk (Schegloff 1996). According to Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson (1974), TCUs are constituted by different sorts of syntactic constituents, including words, phrases, clauses, sentences. Now, since these syntactic constituents are hierarchically ordered with respect to one another, it is not immediately obvious — on syntactic grounds alone — whether, say, a single word is a TCU itself or instead only part of a phrase or clause which constitutes the TCU. Yet, as recent research has shown, intonation helps resolve this problem. It is melodic phrasing which contributes to deciding what piece of potentially complete syntax is indeed a minimal unit of turn construction. A morpho-syntactically constituted lexeme, phrase or clause which can stand on its own is typically not considered transition-relevant unless it is configured with a potentially complete intonation contour (Ford & Thompson 1996; Ford, Fox & Thompson 1996; Selting 1996a; Schegloff 1998).

Prosody is also implicated in the construction of multi-unit turns. When several TCUs make up a turn, they are typically formatted in a way which reflects their position in the turn (see also Schegloff 1998). For instance, a TCU will be displayed as a follow-up to a prior TCU if its first accented syllable, or onset, is *lower* than the onset of the prior TCU. Signalling prosodic 'subordination' this way appears to be used in interdependence with whatever 'rhetorical' relations — e.g. causality, concession, contrast — may hold between the TCUs in question (Ford 1993; Couper-Kuhlen 1996a; Couper-Kuhlen & Thompson 1999; Ford 2000). Further, the fact that a particular TCU is being constructed as the first in a set of TCUs can be displayed, for instance, by positioning its first accented syllable (or onset) at a relatively *higher* position in the speaker's voice range. This strategy is often employed in 'big packages', for instance in reason-for-the-call turns in radio phone-in talk (Couper-Kuhlen 2001).

4.2 Sequential organization

Prosody is furthermore crucial in displaying sequential structure, the relation between successive turns at talk. For instance, the *adjacency pair* — a set of two consecutive

turns, the first of which anticipates and makes conditionally relevant the second — is characterized by 'close ordering': first pair-parts are 'fitted' to second pair-parts with respect to the action being carried out (Schegloff & Sacks 1984). But the notion of 'close ordering' also has prosodic correlates. Seconds to first pair-parts tend to be 'fitted' not only in terms of action but also in terms of *the way* this action is done. For instance, they are 'fitted' in terms of amplitude, the second pair-part being regularly matched in volume to the first (Goldberg 1978). Moreover, seconds are typically produced — in English — with rhythmic integration: the first accented syllable in the second pair-part is timed so as to coincide with a 'beat' which has been established by the regular timing of the last two accents of the immediately prior first pair-part (Couper-Kuhlen 1993; Auer, Couper-Kuhlen & Müller 1999). And finally, seconds tend to be 'fitted' intonationally, in the sense that the onset of the second pair-part will not be higher in pitch, *ceteris paribus,* than the onset of the first pair-part (see §5 below).

But it is not only turns within an adjacency pair which are made cohesive prosodically. As the work of Schegloff and Fox has shown, adjacency pairs themselves 'cohere' in differing degrees with respect to the actions which are being carried out. Schegloff (1990), for instance, shows how adjacency pairs may be expanded by pre-, insert and post-sequences. Fox (1987) speaks of adjacency pairs being extended by follow-ups, and of adjacency pairs which engage in the same activity as being ordered in a series. One of the ways of cueing that the first pair-part of an adjacency pair is engaging in the same activity as another is to format it prosodically like this other, for instance by using identically high onset in its first pair-part (see §5 below). Prosodic parallelism between adjacency pairs can be iconically suggestive of structural parallelism. Conversely, a noticeably lower onset in the first pair-part of an adjacency pair will suggest, by comparison with the onset of the first in a prior pair, that the two adjacency pairs are in a hierarchical relationship to one another. This can be found, for instance, in sequence expansions (see §5 below) and in repair initiation by other.

4.3 Floor management

When speakers wish to place a turn-constructional unit on the floor, they rely on prosodic cues in order to judge when this can be done legitimately. By monitoring the prosodic development of the current turn, they can anticipate an upcoming transition-relevance place (TRP), the moment at which a current speaker's turn will be potentially complete. Would-be next speakers of course monitor for a prosodically complete contour, one of the constitutive features of a TCU. But as Schegloff (1998) and Wells & Macfarlane (1998) have argued, they also listen for specific pitch accents which help *project* when the next TRP is due. In English, for example, a 'pitch peak', i.e. a pitch accent which begins higher than prior syllables and then falls, has been observed to regularly precede the TRP (Schegloff 1998). According to Wells & Macfarlane (1998), there is actually a set of distinct *TRP-projecting accents* in English which

characterize possible turn endings.[5] Once such a pitch accent has occurred, a potential transition space has been opened. Significantly, the notion of a (pitch-initiated) transition space has a rhythmic or temporal corollary: any overlap which occurs between the last accented syllable of a current turn and the first accented syllable of an incoming turn — what Jefferson (1984) has called 'transitional overlap' — generally goes unnoticed in English interaction. Participants do not orient to there having been a possible 'interruption' in these cases (Couper-Kuhlen 1993).

When, on the other hand, speakers have urgent business that needs addressing *now* and they come in during an ongoing turn rather than at the next transition relevance place, then those speakers may be heard as competing with a current speaker for rights to the floor. As French & Local (1983) have shown, turn-competitive incoming talk is regularly marked with high pitch and forte volume, cueing the message 'This is urgent, I need the floor here and now'. Incoming talk which lacks these prosodic features tends to be treated as an aside, an 'illegitimate' contribution but not one which is competing for the floor. A speaker whose control of the floor is threatened by an illegitimate incoming will be observed to react not only verbally — e.g. by abruptly cutting off or by re-cycling — but also prosodically. French & Local (1983) describe two strategies: either the current speaker yields to competition for the floor by reducing pitch and volume, or the current speaker returns the competition by suddenly using higher pitch and increasing the volume. The latter — a prosodically cued 'return of competition' — tends to last until the floor struggle has been decided one way or the other.

In this section then prosody has been shown to be implicated in three form-related tasks in conversation: constructing turns, organizing sequences and managing the floor.

5. Prosody in talk-in-interaction: Interactional dimensions

These prosodically cued structural dimensions engage in important ways with more interactional, or sense-making, dimensions of talk. As speakers we deploy grammar and prosody in routine ways to carry out particular actions. Moreover, we can designedly exploit the routine formatting of our actions in order to convey special meanings. As recipients, we interpret what actions our interlocutors are engaging in with reference to our expectations for grammatical and prosodic design. If and when our expectations are foiled, we inferentially impute special meanings to our interlocutors' talk. The meanings conveyed by the deployment and exploitation of prosodic routines are more than structural: they impinge upon our interpretations of what kind of action is being accomplished and on affect-related dimensions such as attitude and stance.

5. Although these may vary from dialect to dialect, within one single dialect they are said to contrast with *non-TRP-projecting accents,* which do not signal upcoming transition relevance.

5.1 Prosodic routines for action

As resources for carrying out actions in interaction, grammar and prosody are deployed in routine and typical ways. For instance, interrogative forms are frequently used to do questioning (Freed 1994; Heritage & Roth 1995), evaluative adjectives are frequently used to do assessments (Pomerantz 1984), *oh* is frequently used to receipt question-elicited informings (Heritage 1984). Moreover, these lexico-syntactic forms have prosodic routines associated with them. For instance, *oh* as a news receipt tends to be produced with a dynamic rising-falling pitch accent if a recipient is displaying 'surprise' at the informing (Local 1996). It is in particular when the words used to carry out an activity are functionally indeterminant in context that prosodic cueing becomes a distinctive feature. Consider the case of self-repair. Fox & Jasperson (1995) have shown how self-repairing speakers of English rely on syntactic means to mark the repairing segment as doing just that — repair — and not, say, adding on to prior material. This is partly accomplished by using disjunctive lexico-syntax (see also Fox, Hayashi & Jasperson 1996). But prosodic signals too are deployed in self-repair to the same effect: abrupt increases in pitch and volume as well as rhythmic breaks routinely mark the material in question as replacive rather than additive (Couper-Kuhlen 1993).

Another action for which speakers often deploy routines is complaining. For instance, Schegloff (1988) has shown that a noticing of something which has *not* taken place, in the proper context, will come across as a subtle complaint. One lexico-syntactic device frequently deployed to do complaining in German and English is the wh-question. Yet here prosodic cueing is crucial. A question like 'Why is it not in the paper?' with expressive lengthenings and accents realized as rising-falling glides will be treated in the appropriate context as a complaint, whereas the same question without such prosodic marking, although in a similar context, will be heard as simply eliciting information (Günthner 1996). (Extreme formulations such as *why on earth, never* or *always* will of course help to mark the wh-question as a complaint.)

Finally, take the case of lexical repetition. Within the context of dialect survey interviews, Kelly & Local (1989) show that word repetitions by the interviewee with high falling pitch to low and marked loudness are treated as understanding checks, eliciting confirmation tokens from the interviewer, whereas word repetitions by the interviewee which lack high falling pitch to low and have breathy, soft voice are heard as cueing that the speaker is 'mulling over' the word he or she has been asked to gloss. In a wholly different context — that of a riddle-guessing game on a radio phone-in — Couper-Kuhlen (1996b) shows that lexical repetitions by the studio moderator of a caller's candidate answer come off as requests for confirmation if they are designed with similar prosody, i.e. if the moderator uses the same relative pitch register as the caller. But if the prosody is identical, i.e. the same absolute pitch register, then the moderator will be heard as mimicking his caller and in a sense laterally assessing the proffered guess as silly for the overhearing radio audience.

5.2 Prosodic cueing of stance and affect

Often it is relatively clear in a given sequential context which action is being carried out. But the prosodic design of the turn in question may signal something special about the *way* it is being done and thus cue the speaker's stance towards the message or its recipient. Speech rate, for instance, understood as the number of syllables articulated within a given unit of time, is often deployed as a prosodic cue to relative importance (Uhmann 1992). Within long turns, turn-constructional units which are said with a sudden *increase* in speech rate compared to surrounding units will come across as less important or less central to a speaker's goal than ones which lack this marking. Inversely, turn-constructional units with a noticeable *decrease* in speech rate will be heard as the 'main' point.

Another action in which prosody is often implicated is other repair initiation. Extra loudness and high pitch on *wie bitte?* in German, for instance, will not only elicit a confirmation of the prior turn from one's interlocutor but at the same time tend to express the speaker's astonishment over it, thus prompting the recipient to provide some accounting (Selting 1996b). Pausing and rhythmic delay in other repair-initiation have been shown to provide an extra opportunity for one's interlocutor to engage in self-repair (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks 1977). But they also 'expose' the trouble source (Jefferson 1987), locating it in the interlocutor's turn and providing for interlocutor repair, thus subtly deflecting responsibility (Couper-Kuhlen 1992).

As a final example, consider the way news is responded to in talk-in-interaction. Here too timing is crucial. A noticeable pause or rhythmic delay on next turn — be it a news mark, a repeat or a news-receipting *oh* — will contribute to signalling that the news was unexpected, a surprise (Auer, Couper-Kuhlen & Müller 1999). (*Oh* alone, as Heritage 1984 has shown, does not carry this implication.) Moreover, the pitch configuration will display whether the news is being receipted as good or bad. Sharp pitch rises, wide pitch range and a lively speech rate tend to be associated with receipts which have 'positive' valence, while stretched vowels slightly falling in pitch together with nasalization and creaky or breathy voice tend to cue receipts with 'negative' valence (Freese & Maynard 1998).

In this section some of the ways in which prosody contributes to sense-making in interaction have been discussed, in particular as regards the type of action which is inferred to be in progress and the stance which a speaker is inferred to be taking.

6. Prosody in talk-in-interaction: A case study

To make some of these observations more concrete, let us examine the way prosody is deployed in the following excerpt from a long-distance telephone conversation

between Lesley and her mother.[6] The exchange takes place approximately two minutes into the conversation at a topical juncture within a section of the conversation where participants are engaged in 'bringing (each other) up to date' since they last talked. Ann lives in the same city as Lesley's mum; Gordon is Lesley's son.

(1) Holt I:1

1	Lesley:	.hh (oh)=↑By the wa:y ANN hasn't:: sent gordon anything.=
2	Mum:	=yes she HA:S.
3	Lesley:	well it hasn't CO:ME,
4	Mum:	oh well probably get it TOMORROW.
5		(0.3)
6	Lesley:	OH: yes.= ((late))
7		=↑What is she SENDING,
8		do you KNOW,
9		(.)
10	Mum:	(uh YES./well GUESS.)
11		(0.3) ((empty beat))
12	Lesley:	oh Not one of those whi:te TEE shirts.=
13	Mum:	=well i don't know what sort of tee shirt it IS,
14		but it I:S.
15	Lesley:	⟨l⟩ OH:: mu::m::. ((slower))
16		(0.4) ((empty beats))
17	Lesley:	it's just a waste of MONEY.

Focusing first on turn construction, notice how each TCU corresponds to a single intonation phrase[7] (indicated by a separate line in the transcript). Words that could on principle be TCUs — for instance, *yes* in line 2 or *oh well* in line 4 — are not heard as such in these instances because they do not form independent pitch contours or intonation phrases of their own. Yet there is nothing intrinsic which prevents them from being designed this way, as line 6 demonstrates. Here *oh yes* is a TCU of its own; it is responsive to Mum's prior turn in line 4, whereas the next TCU *what is she sending* is the first part of an adjacency pair projecting a next turn from Mum. Notice that the second TCU in this turn has high onset (indicated by the upwards arrow at the beginning of line 7). In this case the second

6. This excerpt was transcribed by Gail Jefferson. To facilitate reading, 'eye dialect' has been converted to standard orthography. Furthermore, selected prosodic symbols have been replaced by the author — after multiple listenings to the original tape — according to the list of conventions appended.

7. An intonation phrase is generally taken to be a unit of prosodic phrasing which displays internal rhythmic and melodic cohesion, with e.g. its pitch accents being regularly timed and forming a holistic melody or contour. At the same time it is said to be delimited by rhythmic and melodic breaks, with e.g. pauses, anacrustic syllables and pitch step-ups on unaccented syllables marking its boundaries. For further details see Couper-Kuhlen (1986) and Cruttenden (1997).

TCU is designed in a way which suggests that it is not carrying on from the prior but is instead engaging in a new activity. Compare this prosody now with that in Mum's multi-unit turn in lines 13–14. Here the second TCU *but it is* is designed so that its onset is no higher than that of the prior TCU (it lacks an upwards arrow). This prosody underlines the rhetorical relation of contrast between the two TCUs (see §3.1 above).

With respect to sequential organization, notice how successive turns are 'fitted' prosodically to one another. 'Close ordering' generally translates rhythmically as a lack of empty 'beats' between turns.[8] And indeed this is the case at all transitions between Lesley and her mother except for two. The first rhythmic break comes in line 5, indicated in transcription as a 0.3 sec. pause. Mum's prior turn has established a regular beat with the secondary accents on *oh* and *probably* and the primary accent on *tomorrow*. Yet Lesley's *oh* in line 6 is late with respect to the next pulse. In this case, where close sequential ordering makes close timing expectable, the lack of rhythmic integration cues special inferencing (see below). The second rhythmic break occurs in line 11 after Mum's next turn. Once again an empty beat goes by unfilled. On the reading of line 11 as *uh yes*, Mum could be expected to elaborate on what Ann's present is, and the next beat is when she should do so. But this beat is empty — a missed opportunity. It may be because of this that Lesley now realizes Mum is not going to be forthcoming with details and so proceeds to proffer a guess herself (line 12).

Next, consider how successive adjacency pairs are designed prosodically. One noticeable feature of Lesley's first turn in this excerpt (line 1) is the extra high pitch on *by the way*. The expression *by the way* has been called a 'misplacement marker' (Schegloff & Sacks 1984): it does the work of signalling that an upcoming topic proffer is not motivated by anything in prior talk. The high onset here — together with the relatively slow rate of delivery — can be heard as a cue to the fact that the misplaced topic is being proffered as a full-fledged contribution to the floor rather than as an aside, an implication which low onset and fast speech rate, by contrast, would have. Significantly, Lesley's next first pair-part (line 3) has lower onset than the prior topic-opening first pair-part in line 1. This is a rather iconic signal of the fact that her next action is a follow-up to, and thus in a sense dependent on, her prior action. By contrast, Lesley's subsequent *what is she sending* in line 7 — by virtue of its high onset — comes across as an action on a par with that in line 1: the two adjacency pairs are thus cued as forming a series.

Finally, consider how interactional meaning is cued prosodically in the excerpt above. Lesley's first turn *Ann hasn't sent Gordon anything* is, on one possible reading, an informing action: it claims to tell Mum about something which Lesley knows, which

8. A beat is to be understood with reference to the regular or rhythmic timing of accented syllables in talk. A rhythmic pattern, once established, tends to project continuation. If, however, a next accented syllable does not come at the projected point in time, an 'empty' or silent beat is created. For further details see Auer, Couper-Kuhlen & Müller (1999).

Mum is assumed to be ignorant of but which Lesley believes Mum should know. Mum's response makes it clear not only that she *does* have knowledge about Ann's sending a gift but furthermore that she knows something different from Lesley, namely that Ann has sent one (line 2). Lesley's next turn is, on this same reading, another informing: *well it hasn't come* (line 3). Mum's response *oh well probably get it tomorrow* (line 4) reconciles Lesley's information with Mum's state of knowledge. On another reading, however, Lesley's informings are noticings, and indeed noticings of things which have not happened. In this sense they are hearable as complaints (see §4.1 above). Moreover, the fact that the complaints are being addressed to Mum potentially implicates her as a responsible party. On this second reading, Mum's responses can be heard as removing the grounds for Lesley's complaint about Ann. Moreover, if they are heard this way, then it is worth noting that Mum carries out this action from a position of alignment with Ann. (This can be seen by comparing other possible responses from Mum. Had she said, for instance, 'Yes I know, it's awful — she's always forgetting birthdays but believe or not, this time she actually remembered', then Mum would be perceived as more in line with Lesley.)

Now it is the prosody of Lesley's response in next turn (line 6) — rhythmic delay and a low-pitched, slow downwards glide — which is a cue to her sense-making of prior talk. Indeed, her delivery of *oh* is consistent less with the interpretation of prior talk as an informing sequence, in which case we might expect a more enthusiastic response to the 'good news' — than with an understanding of prior talk as a complaining sequence. If Mum is heard as removing the grounds for a complaint from Lesley — and indeed in alignment with Ann — then a prosodically cued 'begrudging' *oh* from Lesley is fully consistent. Thus, prosody displays here what actions are being carried out in talk — and indeed from participants' (here, Lesley's) perspective.

The subsequent development of talk confirms Lesley's and Mum's alignment with their respective roles of 'complainer' and 'supporter of Ann'. When Lesley now inquires what it is that Ann is sending and appends a post-completer *do you know*, Mum — on one hearing — responds to the post-completer: *uh yes* (line 10).[9] But she also hearably withholds any further information (see the empty beat in line 11), thus displaying once again a sensitivity to Ann's point of view as a gift-giver who is likely to want her gift to remain a surprise. This prompts Lesley to proffer a 'best guess', expressed via the negation as a worst case: *not one of those white tee shirts* (line 12). Since Mum is a knowing recipient, Lesley's proffered guess makes some answer on Mum's part the next relevant action. Mum's response once again displays a sensitivity to Ann's concerns by offering only minimal information: she claims not to know what kind it is but concedes that it is a tee shirt (lines 13–14).

Lesley's next turn *oh mum* is verbally indeterminate, but its prosodic design leaves no doubt as to her stance. With low register, slow delivery, extreme lengthening on

9. The alternative hearing *well guess,* which Jefferson opts for, is to my ears less likely but does not invalidate the analysis being given here.

both syllables and a downwards glide on *oh*, it cues the informing as 'bad news', suggesting a negative reaction on Lesley's part. By contrast, a high, sharp pitch jump on *oh* in conjunction with quick delivery would have cued the news as 'good' and Lesley's reaction as enthusiastically positive. When Mum now withholds a response to Lesley's prior 'appeal' (see the empty beats in line 16), Lesley makes her stance concrete in next turn: *it's just a waste of money* (line 17).

The above analysis demonstrates how crucial the prosodic details of interaction are for an understanding of participants' sense-making in talk. It documents the fact that the prosodic features of talk are not accidental but are *designed* and that their decipherment, via careful application of the tools of conversation analysis, will enrich our understanding of interaction.

7. Directions for future research

Among some of the more promising directions for future research are those dealing with prosody in first and second language acquisition and in language-impaired communication. Intonational patterns appear to be acquired extremely early in infanthood (see Crystal 1975 for an overview of the literature) — indeed before language, as the phenomenon of 'jargon intonation' indicates (Cruttenden 1997: 167). Yet children do not acquire the ability to produce reduced syllables and stress-timed rhythm until much later: Allen & Hawkins (1980) found English-speaking children as old as four still having difficulty using light or reduced syllables properly. Once prosody is acquired, however, it enters the realm of meta-pragmatic unawareness, with the result that its contribution to successful communication is often overlooked or neglected in second language teaching and learning. Prosodically based misunderstandings are consequently at the root of many problems in intercultural communication (Gumperz 1982). A 'first in, last out' phenomenon, prosody often remains intact even after severe language loss (aphasia) — where, together with other gestural and body semiotics, it can be crucial to the (co-)construction of meaning in interaction (Goodwin 1995).

Appendix: Selected transcription conventions

1 line of transcript	1 intonation phrase
(oh)	Uncertain hearing
(uh yes/well guess)	Alternatice hearings
=	Latching
::	Lengthening
(.)	Micropause
(0.3)	Measured pause

CAPS	Major accented word
.	Final pitch falling to low
,	Final pitch rising to mid
↑	High pitch onset
<l>	Low overall pitch
.hh	Inbreath
(( ))	Transcriber's comment

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Reported speech

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1. Introduction

Typically the term 'reported speech' is used to refer to the presentation of discourse that purports to be from a prior occasion, and may originate from another author. It is often used as a synonym of 'quotation' or 'citation'. The category includes, for example, the replaying of the words of another speaker, or the same speaker on a previous occasion, in spoken discourse. The term can also include less prototypical instances such as reports of hypothetical locutions (see Irvine, 1996; Mayes, 1990). Reports of discourse not covered by the term 'speech', for example, thought and writing, are closely related and sometimes subsumed by it. Thus, the portrayal of the words of characters in a novel, or the quotation of a comment made by a public figure in a newspaper, can be included within the category. Instances of reported speech are recurrently preceded or followed by a reporting clause such as 'he said', 'I thought', 'she goes', 'he whispered', 'they were like'.

Reported speech has received attention from scholars in the fields of literary theory, philosophy of language, linguists, sociolinguists, conversation analysis and ethnographers of communication. Although much research focuses on reported speech in English, there are a number of studies of the phenomenon in other languages (see, for example, Aikhenveld & Dixon, 2003; Cohen et al. 2002). Issues receiving analytic attention include: the reflexive and metapragmatic capacity of reported speech (D. Davidson, 1968–9, 1984; Lucy, 1993; Quine, 1960); the semantic and syntactic differences between direct and indirect forms (Banfield, 1973, 1982; Li, 1986; Partee, 1973; Wierzbicka, 1974); the relationship between the reporting clause and the report (McGregor, 1994); the absence of the reporting clause and alternative forms (Mathis & Yule, 1994; Tannen, 1986); the authenticity of reported speech (Philips, 1986, 1992); its role in storytelling (Wierzbicka, 1974); and its use in a wide range of different interactional environments and contexts (see below).

Reflecting the fact that the majority of authors have tended to focus on spoken discourse, this article will be mainly concerned with reported speech in verbal interaction. I begin by referring to a number of authors who have recognised the importance and ubiquity of reported speech in discourse and who have been highly influential in the field (Section 2). I then consider the structure and forms of the device (Section 3),

which leads on to consideration of its role in interaction and the environments of its use (Section 4).

2. Influential figures

2.1 Vološinov and Bakhtin

Recognition of the incredible ubiquity of speech reporting has much to owe to the work of Vološinov and Bakhtin. Considering both literary and spoken communication, Bakhtin (1986: 93) undermined the distinction between reported and non-reported discourse by pointing out that any utterance contains the "half-concealed or completely concealed words of others". Furthermore, he highlighted how pervasive reporting the words of others is in interaction:

> …in real life people talk most about what others talk about – they transmit, recall, weigh and pass judgement on other people's words, opinions, assertions, information; people are upset by others' words, or agree with them, contest them, refer to them and so forth." (Bakhtin, 1981: 338)

The work of Bakhtin and Vološinov has subsequently inspired many authors in the study of reported speech. They identified its functions across a wide range of types of discourse and Vološinov (1971: 153) adumbrated the direction most research would take when he wrote:

> Earlier investigators of the forms or reported speech committed the fundamental error of virtually divorcing the reported speech from the reporting context…the true object of inquiry ought to be precisely the dynamic interrelationship of these two factors, the speech being reported (the other person's speech) and the speech doing the reporting (the author's speech).

Yet despite recognising the ubiquity of reported speech in discourse and urging investigators to study the relationship between the reported utterance and the reporting context, Bakhtin and Vološinov drew most of their examples from literary narrative. In this article it will become clear that research based on invented examples or ones taken from literary contexts has revealed much about the forms of the device. But the increasing body of research based on empirical analysis of its use across a wide range of contexts has shed further light on both its design and uses.

2.2 Goffman

Like Vološinov and Bakhtin, the Sociologist, Erving Goffman recognised that reported speech is part of a wider process that is pervasive in talk:

> In daily life the individual ordinarily speaks for himself, speaks, as it were, in his 'own' character. However, when one examines speech, especially the informal variety, this traditional view proves inadequate…When a speaker employs conventional brackets to warn us that what he is saying is meant to be taken in jest, or as mere repeating of words by someone else, then it is clear that he means to stand in a relation of reduced personal responsibility for what he is saying. He splits himself off from the content of the words by expressing that their speaker is not he himself or not he himself in a serious way (1974: 512).

To Goffman, reported speech is a function of the fact that speakers constantly 'shift footing'. Footing is defined as 'the alignment of an individual to a particular utterance…' (1981: 227). He shows that the role of speaker is in fact made up of a number of constituent parts: the 'animator' – 'the sounding box'; the 'author' – 'the agent who scripts the lines'; and the 'principal' – 'the party to whose position the words attest' (1981: 226). Although the speaker may play all three roles at the same time, commonly they play only one or two. Goffman gives the example of a vice-president reading out a speech on behalf of the president: he plays the animator but not the author or principal. Reported speech is, then, one of the many ways in which we can adopt a footing by changing roles within the 'production format'. (See C. Goodwin, 2007; and Levinson, 1988; for further discussion of the production format.)

Goffman (1981) pointed out that one reason for shifting footing in order to play the animator of an utterance that was authored by someone else on another occasion is that it reduces personal responsibility. Thus, a speaker can have greater licence when using reported speech. He notes how taboo utterances and curses may be used with greater freedom when speakers shift footing to distance themselves from the authorship and principal of the locution.

3. Forms of reported speech

3.1 Categories and terminology

Many terms have been used to refer to the phenomenon reflecting both the diversity of the category and concerns with the term 'reported speech'. These include: quotation, quoted direct speech (Macauley, 1987), oratio recta/oratio oblique, represented speech/thought, direct/indirect speech, summary reported speech (Buttny & Williams, 2000), reported dialogue (Günthner, 1997), discourse presentation (Semino & Short, 2004) and constructed dialogue (Tannen 1986, 1989).

This range of terms reflects growing awareness of the varied forms that can be considered members of the category; however, much research has focused on distinctions between direct and indirect reported speech (henceforth DRS and IRS). In DRS the writer/speaker claims to produce an authentic version of the prior, for

example (taken from conversation and transcribed using conversation analytic transcription conventions):

(1) [Holt:C85:4:2–3]
1 Lesley: AND uh ↑we were looking rou-nd the ↓stalls 'n poking about
2 'n he came up t'me 'n he said Oh: hhello Lesley, (.) ↑still
3 trying to buy something f'nothing .tch! .hhhahhhhhhhhh!

Here Lesley purports to reproduce the locution. It begins with the discourse particle or turn initial 'Oh' followed by the greeting. These clearly indicate that she is purporting to reproduce words said on a previous occasion. Inclusion of the term of address 'Lesley' also indicates that this was an utterance made to her by another speaker. A marked shift in prosody, represented by the underlining (for emphasis) and the arrows (indicating a marked upward or downward shifts in intonation), also helps to portray this as the words of another being replayed by Lesley now.

In IRS the writer/speaker does not purport to reproduce the actual words used:

(2) [Holt:X(C)1:1:6:8]
1 Lesley: ih↓Ye::s uhm-:-: u-Mark said eez not surpri:zed
2 that he:hh that he behaved like tha:t?

In this instance Lesley does not claim to reproduce the locution. The pronoun 'he' is not changed to 'I' and there is no noticeable shift in intonation or inclusion of a turn initial (as in, for example, 'he said ↑well I'm not surprised he behaved like that').

According to Coulmas (1986: 2) DRS "evokes the original speech situation and conveys, or claims to convey, the exact words of the original speaker" while IRS "adapts the reported utterance to the speech situation of the report". In DRS the speaker purports to portray not only the words used, but also the way the utterance was made. Thus, in DRS pronominalization, place and time deixis, and verb tense are all from the point of view of the 'original' speaker (Li, 1986). Further elements of DRS such as turn initials, terms of address and marked changes of intonation or voice quality can be used to contribute to the impression that the speaker is portraying an utterance from another occasion. In IRS inclusion of the complementizer 'that' may contribute towards indicating that the reported utterance is being adapted to the current speech situation.

According to Vološinov (1971) DRS is characteristic of the 'linear style' and reflects a concern for maintaining the "integrity and authenticity" (p. 153) of the original. IRS is characteristic of the 'pictorial style' and facilitates infiltration by the author to comment on or interpret the meaning of the quotation.

However, the distinction between direct and indirect forms is not always clear-cut. Speakers can, for example, recall utterances using IRS, while including words or phrases that appear to be directly reported.

(3) [NB:II:2:10)

1	Nancy:	…I only had o:ne (0.3) .hhhhhh (0.4)
2		dero:gatory rema:rk? if: you c'd call it
3		tha:t a:nd ah,h (0.6) u-it ca:me from a
4		gi:rl (0.2) and she said she fe:lt thet
5	→	I: would of gott'n more out'v the cla:ss
6	→	if I hed not been en eVOIder, h w'tever
7	→	sh'meant by tha:t, .hhhhh u-but that
8	→	ah:::, (0.5) I will c'ntinue t'remember
9	→	th'class en gro:w from it. Er sump'n (.)

The majority of Nancy's report here is indirect (for instance, the pronouns are from the point of view of the current speaker), but "en eVOIder" appears to be directly reported. Elements of the last part of the reported speech – "will c'ntinue t'remember th'class en gro:w from it" – may also to be directly reported. Forms that amalgamate elements associated with indirect and direct reporting have been termed 'free indirect' or 'quasi-direct' speech and have received attention in spoken and written form (Banfield, 1973, 1982; Coulmas, 1986; Semino & Short 2004; Thompson, 1984; for a survey see McHale, 1978).

The division of the category into direct and indirect speech (sometimes with the inclusion of free-indirect), and concentration on these forms, may derive, at least in part, from the fact that early analysis was often based on invented examples or ones taken from literary texts (e.g. Coulmas, 1986; Haiman, 1985; Halliday, 1985; Li, 1986; Wierzbicka, 1974). However, recent research on reported speech in interaction has demonstrated that divisions based on the features mentioned above can gloss over the complexity of the device. Günthner (1997), in an analysis of reported speech in German, found that speakers can convey affect using indirect forms and, thus,

> …the simple dichotomy between direct reported speech as conveying the "message plus the form" of the quoted utterance, and indirect reported speech as just conveying the "message", unduly reduces the complexities of restaging past dialogues in everyday interactions. (Günthner 1997: 267)

Other recent research on reported speech in spoken interaction has begun to reveal the range of forms that may be seen as being included within the category. For example, Haakana (2007) explored reported thought in complaint sequences in Finnish, and Holt (2007) considered 'enactments' of hypothetical conversations (see also Semino & Short, 2004).

3.2 The reporting clause

Reported speech usually involves two elements: a reporting or framing clause involving a pronoun or name and a *verbum dicendi*, such as 'he said' or 'I thought', and the

report itself. Linguists have been interested in the relationship between these two, and it has variously been viewed as involving the embedding of the report as a complement clause, as one of dependence (Foley & van Valin, 1984; Halliday, 1985;), and of framing (McGregor, 1994). On occasions reported speech may be introduced without a prefatory component or framing clause, these are sometimes known as zero-quotatives (see Holt, 2007; Klewitz & Couper-Kuhlen, 1999; Longacre, 1985; Mathis & Yule, 1994; McGregor, 1994; Romaine & Lange, 1991; Tannen, 1989). Linguists and sociolinguists have explored the variety of phenomena that can be used to introduce the reported speech. Certain elements such as 'be like', 'be' and 'like' appear to be undergoing change in the frequency of their use. Thus, according to Romaine and Lange (1991) the increasingly widespread use of 'like' in American English blurs the boundaries between direct and indirect forms (see also Cukor-Avila, 2002; Ferrara & Bell, 1995; Macauley, 2001; and Tagliamonte & Hudson, 1999). Whilst analytic attention has been paid to the various means by which the start of a reported utterance is signalled, there has been less concern with indications that the speaker has reached the end of a report. However, in a study focusing on reported speech in Russian, Bolden (2004) found that a range of 'repositioning' devices, such as producing a comment on the quoted utterance(s), the presence of disfluencies in the talk, and using indexical expressions co-referential with the reporting context, as well as changes in prosody, can act as an 'unquote'. But speakers can also introduce ambiguity about whether they are continuing to report the words of another, or reverting back to their own, by 'fading out'.

4. Reported speech in discourse

4.1 The authenticity of reported speech

Because reported speech purports to be a replaying of a prior utterance, it has commonly been viewed (by analysts and speakers [see Mayes, 1990: 330–31]) as an accurate rendition of previous speech. Quotations were seen as 'demonstrations' by Clark and Gerrig (1990) because, unlike descriptions of a prior comment, they depict their referents. DRS, in particular is considered to be an authentic reproduction of a prior locution. In an early study of the device, Bally (1914) described DRS as "a phonographic reproduction of the thoughts and words of the original speaker" (quoted in Clark & Gerrig, 1990). Li (1986) states: "A direct quote communicates a more authentic piece of information than an indirect quote in the sense that a direct quote implies a greater fidelity to the source of information than an indirect quote" (p. 41). According to Mayes (1990: 331), direct quotation is assumed to be a verbatim 're-enactment' the prior utterance that may include the original intonation and gestures. That DRS is generally judged to be an accurate replaying can be used by participants to interaction, for

example, in courtroom talk lawyers exploit the assumption that DRS is seen as more accurate and consequently more reliable (Philips, 1986). In religious rituals -such as trances- and medium-client consultations, speakers use DRS to convey the authenticity of their message (Du Bois, 1986; Wooffitt, 2007). According to Besnier (1993) on the Polynisian Island of Nukulaelae Atoll, where it is believed that messages should be conveyed with great accuracy, there is a preference for direct forms.

An upshot of the fact that reported speech (particularly DRS) is often seen as an authentic rendition of a prior locution means that it not only conveys what was said but also offers evidence. In research on speakers recounting paranormal experiences Wooffitt (1992) discovered that DRS is frequently employed to make their claims robust. Here is an instance from his corpus:

(4) [HD:223]
((The speaker has just finished recounting an experience that occurred to her husband while he was living in a particular hut on the Samoan Islands.))
A: And, well, what is even more fascinating about the story is, that he's telling the experience to other people and they said "Oh, that wasn't too strange an experience" because they had heard it before about this particular hut.

According to Wooffitt (1992: 159) "The reported talk in this account serves to confirm the objectivity of her husband's experience: if others have heard similar reports from people staying in the same place, the husband's account is, in part, substantiated". In conversation DRS is also used to provide evidence of a former locution. In the following extract from a telephone conversation, DRS is employed to provide evidence when speakers disagree over a former comment.

(5) [Holt:SO88:1:11:11]
((Vanna is staying with Lesley's Mum. During a call between Mum and Lesley, Mum asks if she would like to talk to Vanna.))

1	Mum:	[W'l y'talk tuh][[Vanna,
2	Les:	[hh[hhhh
3	Mum:	Lesley=
4	Mum:	=Mm. ([ )
5	Les:	[((sniff!))
6		(0.5)
7	Van:	H'llo Lesle[y.
8	Les:	[Hello:, Sh[e getting confu:sed,.h[hhhh
9	Van:	[( ) [Pardon?
10	Les:	Is she getting confu:se[d?h
11	Van:	[↑No:: she's not[gett↓ing=
12	Les:	[.hhhh
13	Van:	=confu[sed.↓

14 Les: [ih-↑She called you v- me Va:nna heh heh
15 Les: he[h ↑.eh .h h h h h h h
16 Van: [No:: she said would you like tuh talk tuh Va:-nna.=
17 Les: =.hh ↑N- Oh eh I think she meant the other way round.

Lesley's question in line 8 appears to stem from her belief that her mother has just called her Vanna. Vanna disagrees emphatically in lines 11 and 13 and uses DRS (line 16) to portray Mum's "actual" words (Holt, 1996). Thus, in the face of disagreement (see lines 14–15), Vanna purports to reproduce the disputed locution. (Interestingly, although it was uttered only a short while beforehand, Vanna does not reproduce the turn at line 1 entirely verbatim.)

A related feature of reported speech (particularly direct forms) is that it purports to provide the recipient with "access" to the locution (or thought) (Golato, 2002; Holt, 1996). An upshot of this is that recipients can assess a reported comment. This is particularly useful in complaints, as Extract (1) exemplifies. Here is the extract again with the following turns where the recipient reacts to the story.

(1) [Continuation]
1 Lesley: AND uh ↑we were looking rou-nd the ↓sta:lls 'n poking
2 about 'n he came up t'me 'n he said Oh: hhello Lesley,
3 (.) ↑still trying to buy something f'nothing,
4 Joyce: hh[hahhhhhh!
5 Lesley: [↑ hhohhh!
6 (0.8)
7 Joyce: Oo[: : :]: ( )]
8 Lesley: [↑Oo:.]ehh heh ↑heh]
9 (0.2)
10 Joyce: ↓I:s[n ' t] [↓he
11 Lesley: [↑What]do ↑y[ou ↑sa↓:y.
12 (0.3)
13 Joyce: ↓Oh isn't he ↓drea:dful.

In recalling this put-down Lesley portrays the man's word's without overtly evaluating them (in introducing the story she says she is "broiling about something", but she then proceeds to give a number of details leading up to the DRS without any overt evaluation). In line 4 Joyce does a shocked sounding in-breath followed by an exasperated sounding "Oo::::" (the colons representing a stretched sound). She begins an assessment in line 10 which appears to be completed in line 13. Thus, based on the story Lesley has told, culminating in the report of the man's words, Joyce offers a negative assessment (Holt, 1996, 2000). The capacity to provide access to locutions or thoughts renders reported speech a useful device in many interactional environments, for example, when speakers wish to portray a series of utterances or thoughts. Thus,

DRS is recurrently used to convey several turns that constituted a conversation, giving the recipient an insight into the stances of the reported speakers, or to portray a series of thoughts that accompanied some actions or occurrences (Holt, 1996).

But reported speech is characterized by paradox. Despite the fact that it is used to provide evidence of a former locution (or thought), and that recipients often treat it as accurate, it is unlikely to be so on most occasions. Psychologists have demonstrated that verbatim recall is not often possible: participants tend to remember the meaning rather than the form of locutions (see Lehrer, 1989). In an analysis of reported speech in interaction Mayes (1990) found that the authenticity of at least fifty percent was doubtful. Further, Sternburg (1982: 108) observed that, no matter how accurately discourse is reproduced, "tearing a piece of discourse from its original habitat and recontextualizing it within a new network of relations cannot but interfere with its effect". Increasing awareness of the unlikelihood of reported speech being the accurate portrayal of prior locutions or thoughts has lead many researchers to reject the term and substitute others that avoid the implication of authenticity. For example, Tannen (1986) referred to it as 'constructed dialogue'.

4.2 Reported speech in storytelling

In the prior section aspects of the interactional uses of reported speech have begun to become clear. This section continues this theme by considering research that has focused on reported speech in discourse. The recent move towards empirical analysis has both lent further weight to claims made by linguists and other authors based on invented examples, and revealed new aspects of the device.

Reported speech commonly occurs in the environment of storytelling, so researchers have tended to concentrate on identifying its uses in terms of its contributions to this activity. According to Labov (1972) quoted direct speech can provide 'embedded' or 'external' evaluation. The former refers to occasions where the speaker explicitly states their justification for telling a story in his or her role as a narrator; the later refers to conveying the point of the story implicitly within the telling by, for example, reporting the word's of another.

The use of DRS at the peak of a narrative has been reported in a number of languages (see Glock, 1986; Larson, 1978; Li, 1986). Based on his analysis of the use of reported speech in narratives in a Scottish dialect, Macaulay (1987: 29) stated:

> The use of quoted direct speech adds liveliness to a narrative, it provides the possibility of a different perspective and it can give the impression of authentic recollection of an event…

DRS can display the speaker's 'involvement' in the story (Chafe, 1982; Tannen, 1982) and according to Wierzbicka (1974) DRS has a 'theatrical' nature. Mayes (1990: 346) attributes the theatrical nature of DRS to the fact that its deictic centre is that of the

original event, thus "the speaker assumes the role of the person she/he is quoting, and whether the quote is real or invented makes little difference as long as it is presented effectively and the listeners believe the story". While DRS occurs at the peaks of narratives, can convey the point of a story, and gives an insight into the teller's stance towards the reported utterance, IRS is recurrently used to convey factual and background information (Holt, 1996; Mayes, 1990).

4.3 The interactional environments of reported speech

The recent move towards exploring the use of reported speech in interaction (and written [non-narrative] discourse, see Baynham & Slembrouck, 1999; Semino & Short, 2004) has resulted in analysis of the use of reported speech in a wide range of interactional environments and contexts. Some of these will be considered in this section in an attempt to provide an insight into the diversity of methods of speech and thought presentation, the environments of its use, the interactional role it plays, and how conclusions based on invented examples (or from literature) are born out or refuted by empirical analysis. I will begin with consideration of research exploring the device in informal conversation, then turn to institutional contexts including the media.

In informal interaction reported speech is recurrent in many environments. One particularly common one has already been mentioned, that of complaints. That DRS can be employed to provide access to, and evidence of, a reprehensible comment coalesce to render the device particularly useful at the climax of complaint stories (Drew, 1998; Holt, 2000). An upshot of these characteristics is that it can be used to provide the recipient the opportunity to be the first to explicitly assess the complained about comment/conversation, thus enabling him or her to support the speaker's implicit evaluation (Holt, 2000). Hakanna (2007) showed that reported thought is also recurrently used in a collection of Finnish complaint stories. It can present a silent criticism of the complained about person, thus helping to create a multi-layered portrayal of the 'original' conversation and convey the current speaker's evaluation, consequently guiding the current recipient in offering assessment.

An upshot of the fact that DRS can provide implicit insight into the speaker's stance towards a reported utterance, and the level of fine 'granularity' (Schegloff, 2000) on which it operates, contribute towards explaining its recurrent use in another conversational environment. Reported speech commonly occurs in amusing stories and joking sequences. In telling a story a speaker may use laughter or smile voice at the delivery of a reported utterance to convey their (and sometimes the reported speaker's) stance towards the locution. This can also serve to invite laughter from the current recipient, thus helping to facilitate a coordinated response by the participants in the light of the report (Holt, 2000). In joking sequences involving 'enactments' (Holt, 2007) of (often hypothetical) scenarios, speakers can use a form of DRS to collaboratively

produce a series of turns in which they play the roles of characters or actual people. That these enactments often contain improprieties, leads us to another feature of DRS: the speaker has greater licence when suggesting that the words are not their own. In a study of joking sequences in which Western Apaches portray 'the whiteman' Basso (1986) found that they were able to take moral liberties that would have been highly controversial under different circumstances.

These features of DRS also coalesce to help explain its recurrence in a further conversational environment – gossip. Bergman's (1993) analysis of reported speech in German 'gossip' demonstrates that speakers can delegate responsibility for the reported words to the reported speaker. According to Bergman (1993: 113),

> The fact that in quoting the speaker has greater freedom to use forbidden expressions than in his own discourse makes quotations a particularly suitable means of presenting obscene jokes – but also for gossip which is often concerned with sexual themes too.

Much of the research considered up until now has tended to focus on reported speech in story-telling. However, analysis of interaction has revealed recurrent patterns underlying the use of the device in non-narrative contexts, and has demonstrated that it can be used to perform different actions. Based on analysis of a corpus of interviews in French, Vincent and Perrin (1999: 293) concluded that non-narrative reported speech can have "an appreciative function, if it reproduces a distinct point of view in order to highlight an event related by the speaker…"; "a support function, if it tends to illustrate a metadiscursive comment by the speaker…"; and "an authority function, when the speaker personally communicates what is expressed in the quote…". Conversation analytic research by Couper-Kuhlen (2007) and Clift (2007) also demonstrated that reported speech recurrently occurs in non-narrative contexts, and that a thorough understanding of the device should consider other environments in which it is used. Couper-Kuhlen (2007) found that reported speech is recurrently associated with assessments and accounts and serves to heighten evidentiality. Relatedly, Clift (2007) discovered that reported speech is used when there is some disagreement over rights to assess.

Research on group interaction has highlighted similar uses of reported speech. In an analysis of data drawn from focus group discussions, Myers (1999) built on Clark and Gerrig's (1990) argument that reported speech is a kind of demonstration to show that it is employed to convey both 'detachment', when the report is distinct from what the speaker says for him or herself, and 'direct experience' when it depicts what was said and carries an immediacy, bearing an indexical connection to the reported context. An upshot is that reported speech can be used in quite diverse ways including to offer evidence in the light of actual or expected challenges, or to convey a stance that the speaker may not agree with. In a study of discussions of racial attitudes on a college campus, Buttny (1997) and Buttny and Williams (2000) found evidence of

the evidential use of reported speech, as well as its association with assessment and complaints. Reported speech, in the data, is used to evaluate the speakers and others, mainly involving criticising others.

That reported speech can be used to introduce a distance between the speaker's stance and the words or utterance portrayed has been found to be crucial in the use of reported speech by news interviewers in 'displaying neutrality' (Clayman, 1988). Building on Goffman's theory of footing, Clayman (1988, 2007) shows that news interviewers use reported speech and related forms to attribute a statement (often one that is potentially contentious) to a third party (or to people en mass) in order to maintain an appearance of neutrality. Wooffitt (2007), based on analysis of a corpus of public demonstrations of mediumship in theatres, as well as private sittings, found that mediums regularly use DRS to claim to reproduce the words of a spirit. Wooffitt attributes this to the engaging nature of the device which also offers evidence of the presence of the spirit, and to the contribution it makes to the ongoing sequence whereby it can be used to manage potentially damaging episodes, thus supporting the finding that DRS plays an important evidential role.

It is clear, then that much of this research follows Volšinov's exhortation to explore the relationship between the reported speech and the reporting context. The fundamental significance of the use of the reported speech on the ongoing action sequence has been documented in a variety of settings. For example, Matoesian (2000) showed how playing sections of a police/witness interview within the Kennedy Smith rape trial was used in subtle and powerful ways to undermine the witness during cross-examination. M.H. Goodwin (1990), in a study of American children, explored how the reporting of potentially controversial comments by other children could lead to confrontational events. That the use of reported speech may have a fundamental impact on the recipient was suggested by Noy (2007) who found that listening to accounts by Israeli backpackers changes the status of the listener to that of a 'second order witness'. (See also Wortham [1994] for an analysis of the impact of enactments during classroom discussion).

5. Conclusion

In sum, recent interest in the use of reported speech in interaction has extended our knowledge of the device and tested many of the claims made based on invented examples or ones drawn from literature. In terms of forms of the device it has shown that DRS is common and that speakers do orient to distinctions between it and other forms, such as IRS. However, it has also highlighted the complexity of the category, demonstrating that speech, thought and writing may be represented in a range of ways and that all need to be considered for a full understanding of the device. It has

also demonstrated that we must be wary of seeing rigid distinctions between forms or making assumptions about their design or uses without empirical analysis.

However, bearing this in mind, it is clear that much research on DRS has attested to a group of overlapping and interconnected uses which stem from the fact that the speaker purports to be simply reproducing the words (and sometimes prosody) of a prior speaker, thus acting as a 'demonstration' or 'showing' of a previous locution. This underlies the evidential use of the device, its ability to give the recipient 'access' to an 'original' utterance, exchange or thought, and that a speaker can distance themselves from the report thus inviting the recipient's assessment or making use of the greater licence afforded in these circumstances. The complexity, multi-layered and sometimes paradoxical use of the device is exemplified by its use as an evidential. Research has shown that it is likely that it is rarely verbatim, yet speakers often treat it as providing evidence. Further, although it may appear to be the reporting of a former utterance etc, it contributes to a range of sequential environments in the reporting sequence, and is, therefore designed to contribute to this action sequence as much as to report a previous one.

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Harvey Sacks

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Harvey Sacks was educated at Columbia, Yale and Berkeley. He qualified in Law as well as Social Science and came to be Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Irvine. He died in a car accident in 1975 at the age of 40. By that time, he had devised the analytic instruments for a methodologically-radical respecification of the sociology of knowledge and, derivatively, of sociology itself. He treated knowledge as being, primordially, of lay, commonsense status and gave us ways of analysing it, which — unlike conventional sociologies — did not conflate lay society-members' concerns with those of analysts.

This approach contrasted with the sociology of knowledge and culture as propounded by analysts such as Karl Mannheim, who, for instance, treated truth value as something to be arbitrated by the professional analyst rather than lay members: for Sacks, truth value was, first and foremost, a practical matter to be interactionally managed by members, (Sacks 1975, 1992: 549–67). Instead of analytically stipulating the so-called 'connectives' between knowledge and social groupings, Sacks examined commonsense cultural knowledge as incorporated into social actions — practices such as laic sociological description (Sacks 1963, 1972). Sacks refrained from 'second guessing' or 'trumping' either lay members' descriptions or their descriptive work, and, importantly, treated lay descriptive practices as characteristically being linguistically transacted.

Sacks' respecification of the sociology of knowledge and culture might thus be conceived in terms of a number of 'turns': (i) a turn focalising the lay determinations of knowledge, (ii) a praxiological turn, focalising members' practices, and (iii) a linguistic turn, concentrating upon the conjoint, *in situ* linguistic transaction of these practices.

In addition — by virtue of his early and continuing association with the founder of ethnomethodology (EM), Harold Garfinkel — Sacks took a procedural or methodic turn, treating ordinary commonsense knowledge of social structures as 'knowledge how' or 'know-how' rather than just 'knowing that (something is the case)': on this distinction and its implications, see also Ryle 1971a. This knowledge of social structures was not only employed by interlocutors in putting their conversations together as assembled objects, but was also exhibited in and through the talk thus produced — in 'what was being talked about'. These intricately interpenetrating concerns formed the basis of his *Lectures on Conversation* (1992), (though the title of that collection does scant justice to the intellectual scope of its contents). One of the best examples of the

confluence of these concerns is to be found in Sacks' work on membership categorisations, to which I shall later return.

These turns resulted in a variety of analytic trajectories, especially in Sacks' earlier work, but the predominant one instituted a body of work known as 'Conversation(al) Analysis' (CA). CA was not primarily intended to designate a sociological (or linguistic) 'research technique' as such, let alone a 'perspective', but instead was an indicatory title, pointing to a topic for analysis, one that conventional sociologies had by their very nature overlooked, ignored or otherwise neglected.

That topic was the methodic conversational practices conjointly undertaken by lay members in conducting their everyday lives, e.g. in co-producing recognisably adequate lay sociological descriptions of the situations to which they were party, and from *within* these selfsame situations. Phenomena such as 'description', 'recognition' and 'familiarity' are of generic significance as they point to members' conversational practices as, most centrally, possessing a sense-making dimension — again, we see an early and strong affinity with Garfinkel's EM. This affinity was to take published form in an article co-authored with Garfinkel (Garfinkel & Sacks 1970), in which the authors assembled conceptual resources for the naturalistic, praxiological analysis of the reflexively accountable features of members' practices. The paper was notable for the authors' insistence upon the centrality of members' mastery of natural language practices, e.g. glossing practices: such mastery was, indeed, considered to be constitutive of membership.[1]

Sacks laid claim to the invention of CA (Sacks 1992: 549), but how he arrived at it is not so easy to specify. To the missing topic of conversational order, Sacks did not bring a research technique but what one might best describe as an 'analytic mentality', as Schenkein (1978: 1–6) termed it, and this mentality had very many facets. In it, one can, most assuredly, see Garfinkel's ethnomethodology but also Goffman's quasi-ethnographic orientation (Sacks 1972), sensibilities deriving from his legal training (Sacks 1997), an eclectic mix of philosophies, e.g. A. Schütz, J.L. Austin, and the range of cognitive-anthropological approaches collected under the title 'Componential Analysis' as espoused by Frake, Conklin, Sturtevant *et al*. However, from the earliest phases of his work, we see a distinctly Sacksian 'take' on all these influences: they were not models for his approach.

Instead of an aprioristic reliance upon analytic models, Sacks began with an empirical puzzle. He himself attested that he had tape-recorded some naturally-occurring talk and then began to conjecture how one might make sociological sense of these recordings were he to treat them as data. To conceive of recorded talk as 'data' in itself was

1. Sacks told me and some others in John Lee's house in 1973 that the paper was essentially Garfinkel's. That much seems clear, yet one can discern many of Sacks' early preoccupations in the paper, especially the issues he raised through his 'Commentator Machine' metaphor (Sacks 1963).

a big reach for the vast majority of sociologists, and still is. What members said was typically adumbrated, edited down and re-written by sociologists for the purposes of corroboration of some analytic claim or other. This selection, paraphrasing, condensing, 'clarifying', etc. exemplified what Dorothy Smith (1974) later analysed as 'the ideological practices of sociology': a key example of these practices *vis-à-vis* linguistic data was to be found in the work of sociolinguist Basil Bernstein. At least, though, Bernstein noted the centrality of language in society. Most sociologists simply ignored it or took it to be merely a transparent conduit to the great empirical complexes of, say, social stratification, religion, occupational structure and the rest. Even linguists of the TG persuasion treated conversational utterances as linguistic detritus.

Sacks made sure that his own work changed all that. Instead of treating language in such a cavalier fashion, he considered it to be a sociological datum in its own right, and not just another topic to be added to the litany of others. He treated language as a generic phenomenon through which these other phenomena of social order were constituted: again, see his 'commentator machine' metaphor (Sacks 1963). Rather than treat language as theory-iterative, he let the tape- recorded, transcribed data set the terms of his analysis, and did so in the most radically naturalistic way. He at least endeavoured to transcribe the data in ways that maximised the retention of its phenomenological integrity — including its socially-organised nature. Thus, instead of establishing a methodologically ironic stance that involved a competitive, down-grading, scientistic or otherwise relativising approach to members' knowledge-based language uses, Sacks proposed the following respecification (referring to some strands of componential analysis):

> Fields like ethnobotany, ethnoastronomy, etc. …are basically directed to a cross-cultural situation in which one wants to be able to map onto a universal grid the various conceptions of botany that one would find in given cultures, where what one finds is treated as a version of scientific botany. [Or], for example, one would map color conceptions onto our scientific organization of the possibilities and then you could compare various societies.

Our relation to such an enterprise is perhaps better clarified by an alternative kind of consideration. A curious fact becomes apparent if you look at the first paragraph — it may occur in the third paragraph — of the reportedly revolutionary treatises back to the pre-Socratics and extending up to at least Freud. You find they all begin by saying something like this, 'About the thing I'm going to talk about, people think they know but they don't. Furthermore, if you tell them it doesn't change anything. They still walk around like they know even though they are walking in a dreamworld'. Darwin begins this way, Freud begins in a similar way. Bloomfield's analysis of language begins in a similar way and I could provide a much larger list. What we are interested in is, what is it that people seem to know and use? Here, what people know and use is not to be mapped for each area onto what it is that science turns out to know but is to be

investigated (in) itself. How does 'what people know and use' work? How could it be enforced? What are its properties? …

> The problem is that, since each major treatise that has set up scientific fields starts out by saying that what people know and use is wrong, obviously it would not be a way to find out about what people know and use by using considering 'science' proposals, what we want to do is see if we can look at the enforceable and usable procedures for whatever knowledge persons happen to have. What procedures do people use to do going about knowing about the world? In that way, the aim is not to map what we learn onto some pre-given grid … it does not turn on … the existence of a science of sociology against which an ethnosociology for America or for the Burundi would be mapped. (Sacks, 1968: 12–14)

This early quotation amounted to a rejection of methodologically-ironic approaches and its replacement by a conception of social (including, focally, conversational) order as commonsensically describable and, as such, incorrigible by the analyst *qua* analyst: instead, lay descriptive practices are transformed into an object of analysis (again, Sacks 1963). The contemporary evolution of CA is the major — though not the only[2] — derivative of Sacks' concern, though whether Sacks would licence some of these contemporary developments is open to question. Still, the early incarnations of CA recognisably bear his stamp, and it is to these that I shall now turn.

Many of Sacks' lectures exhibit a profound ethnographic sensibility and might even be seen as a dialogue with the ethnography of communication and 'Chicago School' ethnographies. He was a great admirer of the latter, considering them to be about the only form of sociology that was worth critically considering: he showed considerable disdain for the rest. His analysis of police assessment of moral character (Sacks 1972) manifests Chicago-style concerns as elaborated by Goffman. He showed considerable interest in anthropologists such as Ethel Albert, and he himself contributed to the extension of techniques of ethnographic discovery. As Garfinkel (2002: 182) attests, Sacks had semi-conjecturally arrived at a quasi-Austinian conceptual distinction between 'possessables' and 'possessitives', and said to Garfinkel:

> Now, Harold, what do I mean by that distinction? That is what I want to find out. I don't want you to tell me. I don't want to settle it like that. I could go to the UCLA Library…. but that's not the way I want to learn what I mean … I don't want to write definitions, I don't want to consult authorities. Instead, I want to find a work group, somewhere, perhaps in Los Angeles, who, as their day's work, and because they know about it as their day's work, will be able to teach me what I could be talking about as they know it as their day's work.

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2. For example, Sacks occasionally considered textual data on, say, membership categories from newspapers, etc., and indeed wrote an early example of what came to be known as textual analysis in EM and beyond (eventually published in Sacks 1999).

Sacks did find such a setting in the L. A. Police Department's identification of lost cars, and he spoke more generally about the distinction, partly with reference to conversational data in a lecture (Sacks 1992, vol. 1, pp. 605–9). The elaboration of ethnographic technique, however, became part of the armoury of contemporary EM rather than CA, where, say, work groups would 'teach the ethnographer what he was talking about' (Garfinkel 2002, p. 186).

When Sacks gave a series of lecture-seminars at Didsbury College, Manchester in 1973, he again showed his ethnographic sensibilities in citing a transcript of a woman speaking about a child who, as part of a charitable operation, had been given a coat which was much too big for him. 'He ran up and down in it and wasn't he *pleased*!' declared the woman. Sacks noted that there was a two-way, not just a one-way, transfer of benefits operating here — a transfer of goods to the child and a transfer in the opposite direction of moral credit and associated definitional rights to the woman. This proceduralised ethnographic description was built into Sacks' observations of the story format of the woman's account and struck me at the time as being an exemplary instance of the ethnography of communication.

As the above 'police' example suggests, Sacks regarded ordinary persons as being 'practical ethnographers', and one cultural resource at their disposal was what he termed 'membership categorisation activities'. Membership categorisations were one locus of the distribution of persons' commonsense knowledge of social structures. These categorisations comprised ordinary-language references to persons and were employed in conversation. Sacks submitted some componential-analytic work to a radically praxiological respecification, and the sphere of membership categories was a major focus of his early up to mid-point CA. He inspected the lay methods persons employed in using such categorial references — the co-selection of categories, the prediction of activities upon categories, the achieving of referential adequacy, the selection between natural collections ('devices') of membership categories, and the incorporation of categories into conversational sequencing (see, e.g. Sacks 1972b, 1972, and vol. 1 of his *Lectures*, *passim*). This 'mix' of sequential and categorial concerns is to be found in some canonical papers by Sacks (e.g. Sacks 1975) and in those of some of his earliest collaborators. For instance, such a mix is to be found in what many consider to be E.A. Schegloff's finest paper (Schegloff 1972).

The analysis of membership categories, always a shadowy presence in later CA, has latterly become an object of fierce debate, with some arguing that sequential and categorial concerns ought to be pursued under a single rubric (Watson 1997) and others who believe that membership categorisation analysis should become a separately-pursued form of CA (as was mooted by Carolyn Baker and others, at the I. I. E. C. A. Conference in Manchester, 1973).

What cannot be denied is that as Sacks' work evolved and became more of a collaboratively controlled enterprise, it increasingly came to focalise (a) sequen-

tial analysis and (b) the 'systematics' of sequencing. The notion of (a) 'systematics', like that of 'mechanism' or 'apparatus', is here best understood as an allusion to the methodic, procedural organisation not only of the talk itself but also of the 'knowledge how' that is integral to that organisation. The notion of 'systematics' comprises the CA determination of what, for Garfinkel, is the methodic practices that comprise the locally-embedded production procedures for specifically-situated patterned outcomes (as recognised by interlocutors themselves).

Like Garfinkel, Sacks produced procedural descriptions of these outcomes, where, increasingly, the emphasis was on the turn-organised nature of the outcomes. An utterance may be treatable by interlocutors as some single speaker's responsibility but Sacks and his associates observed that each utterance was multilaterally formed, not only by the speaker but also those who hand the floor to him/her, recipients who listen and monitor for projected utterance completion and so on: the baseline resource for this multilateral production is the turn-taking system itself. The utterance is treated as a serial object, as integrated (by all parties) into a turn-organised sequence. The turn-taking system involved is one that is specifically, minutely adapted to natural conversation and for nothing else: queues, for instance, have a differently-adapted turn organisation. Each system is self-organising — brought about by parties to that specific system from *within* the system.

In addition to his work on membership categorisation practices, Sacks' *Lectures on Conversation* analyse adjacency-paired utterances, pre-sequences and other expansions of adjacency pairs, pronouns as transformational and tying techniques, turn-allocation techniques, preference organisation in relation to repair and agreements, topic and story organisation, conversational openings and closings, the design of utterances as sequential objects, recipient design (orientation to co-participant), repeat utterances and transformations, puns, paradoxes, the use of numbers and spatialised references considered as produced sequential objects, and very many other phenomena — all phenomena for co-participants, not just the professional analyst, and phenomena whose orderliness was available only at a level of fine detail.

Sacks showed both exquisite craftsmanship and intellectual profundity in his empirically grounded yet deeply conceptual analyses of this detail. He identified a proof procedure for the characterisation of utterances, one that was grounded in interlocutors' own laic proof procedures. These procedures involved the inspection of how a given utterance is treated by next speaker in the immediately succeeding utterance. This treatment may, in turn, be monitored by the first speaker as displaying an understanding (or otherwise) of her/his utterance: this is most highly delineated in adjacency-paired utterances.

> By an adjacently positioned second, a speaker can show that he understood what a prior aimed at, and that he is willing to go along with that. Thus, by virtue of the occurrence of an adjacently produced second, the doer of a first can see that what he

> intended was indeed understood, and that it was or was not accepted. Also, of course, a second can assert his failure to understand, or a disagreement, and inspection of a second by a first can allow the first speaker to see that while the second thought he understood, indeed he misunderstood … (Schegloff & Sacks 1974: 240)

Here we see how close CA was to espousing the EM project of focalising sense-making practices, and how conversational sequencing was, at least in part, analysed in that way. It shows that 'next (second) utterance analysis' comprises an intersubjectively-grounded 'check' on the characterisation of what an utterance is doing in just *this* sequential location, here and now. This contrasts with the more arbitrary, and often more schematic, attribution of action or 'function' to utterances that is characteristic of so much Discourse Analysis.

One corollary of the insistence on the finely-tuned adaptation of turn-taking systems to the work they have to do — co-ordinating people's conversational activities, producing an order of service, etc. — is the development of a sub-branch of CA focusing upon speech exchange in contexts that were 'institutional' rather than those of ordinary conversation: these include doctor — patient interaction, courtroom cross-examinations, school classroom talk, etc. This preoccupation has its origins in the closing section of Sacks' and his colleagues' powerful summary statement of the concepts and findings of early CA (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson 1974). These 'institutional' speech exchanges were seen as each involving variable 'mixes' of ordinary-conversational features and features that were specific to that particular setting-type. It is too easy, however, to reify these systems: after all, Sacks' foundational observations on *ordinary* ('natural') conversation came, to a significant extent, from 'institutional' settings — telephoned calls to a 'crisis intervention centre' and group therapy sessions. There was, in Sacks' analyses of these data, precious little reference to the 'institutional' nature of the talk.[3]

Some final remarks on Sacks' own conception of his work. Whilst — as the quotation on p. 4 of this paper indicates — Sacks opposed scientism and the methodologically ironic invocation of idealised versions of 'science', he nonetheless conceived of his work as founding a 'primitive natural science', one that was resolutely empirical in nature. Its conceptualisations would thus be grounded in empirical phenomena, where these phenomena were, without exception, intersubjectively available within the practical attitude of members/interlocutors themselves and were displayed as such. Along with Garfinkel (e.g. Garfinkel 2002: 186) Sacks referred to 'reproducible' solutions to questions as found, usually, in single instances (though, more rarely, in

3. In addition, we must take into account Ryle's argument (1971b) that things that get done linguistically are not themselves necessarily linguistic in nature.

collections of data too). It must be said, however, that Sacks' *Lectures* and publications seldom make reference to the scientific nature of his work, and 'science' hardly seems to have been for him an omnirelevant concern or organising principle of his analyses. He certainly eschewed sociology's proclivity toward ungrounded, unconstrained formal abstraction (what Garfinkel 2002, calls Formal Analysis, FA): like Garfinkel, he sought to find order in the concrete, specifically identifying phenomenal detail of actions and settings. We can speculate that he might have found an irony in the arrogation of so much contemporary CA by linguistics; CA has apparently cast off one disciplinary kind of FA only to take on another! More generally, one might observe that, impressive as the current corpus of CA is, it is debatable as to whether it expresses the sheer scope of Sacks' intellectual concerns and ways of dealing with members' sociological descriptions.

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Sequence

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1. Introduction

In conversation, actions are not arranged serially, one after the other, like so many marching penguins but rather come grouped together in various ways. An answer, for instance, responds to a question and the two form together a paired unit. Some of the ways in which actions are grouped together and related to one another so as to form sequences are discussed in what follows. This leads to a consideration of the distinctive way in which understanding is achieved and sustained in conversation. It also leads to an examination of "preference" – a set of biases which operate across a wide range of sequence types.

Let's begin by looking at a very brief recorded telephone conversation. Here Janet has called Anne who apparently has Janet's daughter at her house.

(1) **xtr. 1**

			⟨⟨ring⟩⟩=
1	A:		=Hello::
2	J:		Oh=hi:_=it's Janet_ [Cathy's mo]m
3	A:		[hi: Janet]
4			How eryou(h) .h hh
5	J:		I'm goo:d,how are y[ou
6	A:		[I'm fi:ne.h [we're
7	J:		[°good°
8	A:		actually: uhm (0.2)
9			we're running bit late=but we're
10			(.)
11			on our wa(h)y:
12	J:	a→	Do you want me to come an' get her?
13	A:		Uhm:, it doesn't matte:r, like(hh)
14			(0.4)
15			.hhhhh
16	J:	a→	I- I could.it's very easy.
17			so rather than you h:av(h)e(h)
18			(.)
19			you know (.) tuh get everybody ou[t
20	A:		[.hhh
21	J:		I'll justa
22			(0.2)

23			come dow:n.=
24	A:		=we:ll,my mom's here, so I don't have to uhm::
25			(.)
26			I don't have to put my kids in the ca:r.
27	J:	a→	I'll ju[s- I'll just come down.
28	A:		[bu
29		b→	↑Oka(h)y(h)=
30	J:		=yeah
31	A:		ok(h)ay
32	J:		uh what's yo[ur number again?=
33	A:		[.hhhhh
34			=It's seven-seven eight.
35	J:		Okay great.
36	A:		↑Oka:y [thanks]
37	J:		[thanks]
38	A:		bye.

There are many ways this brief conversation could be analyzed. For instance, one could focus on the topics of the conversation i.e. what these people were talking about (Anne's Mom, Anne's kids, the car?). An alternative would be to examine the talk for the identities which the participants enact (e.g. "mother") or the particular face arrangements which their talk implicates. What distinguishes the conversation analytic approach from these alternatives is a focus on the participants's own understandings as these are revealed in the talk itself. So the first thing we need to ask is what these people understood themselves to be doing here. We need to begin, that is, by asking what actions are being accomplished in this conversation. Let's begin with talk at line 12 reproduced here for convenience as (2):

(2) **XTR 1 – Fragment**

12	J:	a→	Do you want me to come an' get her?
13	A:		Uhm:, it doesn't matte:r, like(hh)
14			(0.4)

The turn at line 12 could be characterized in several different ways. If we look at the linguistic form of the turn, we find that the auxiliary verb "do" occurs before the pronoun "you" and thus the sentence involves subject-auxiliary inversion (see Quirk 1985). Moreover, the turn at line 12 is produced with a markedly rising intonation contour indicated by the question mark at its completion. These are two ways in which speakers of English convey that they are asking a question (see Schegloff 1984). If the talk in line 12 is a question, it seems likely that Anne's response is an answer to it.[1]

1. In fact, there are good reasons to suppose that responses such as this do not count as answers for the participants.

The question and answer pair together form a small sequence, what we will come to call below, an adjacency pair. Or do they?

That Janet's talk at line 12 poses a question is clear enough, but she seems also to be doing something else. Specifically, Janet seems to be *offering* to come and pick up her daughter from Anne's house. In a moment we will review several types of evidence for this claim that Janet is making an offer. However, before doing so, it may be useful to briefly consider the relationship between the question and the offer in this example. Describing this turn as a question captures something important about its design – specifically about the use of recurrent and stable features of English grammar (and intonation) which distinguish "Do you want me to come over and get her?" from "I'm coming to get her" etc.. Because these are recurrent and relatively stable features which recur across a wide range of utterance types and actions, we call them "practices of speaking" or, simply, "practices." Describing this turn as an offer, on the other hand, captures something important about what this speaker, on this occasion, is *doing*. An offer then is an action. Analysis typically involves attention to both the actions which are being accomplished by a turn *and* the practices of speaking which make them happen.[2]

So what evidence, beyond our own intuitions, do we have for the claim that Janet is making an offer when she says "Do you want me to come an' get her?" First, we can quite readily find other examples of just this construction used in apparently similar ways. For instance:

(3) **Heritage 1:3:4**

1	Ile:	=Wellnow look.
2	→	d'you want me ti[h come over'n get her?=or wha:t.
3	Lis:	[°( )°
4	Lis:	↑Just please yerself dear we were g'nna t-bring'er
5		↑back b't chor very wel[come
6	Ile:	[No well when you- when you
7		going to bring her ↓ba:ck.=

Or

(4) **Holt 5/88:2:4:**

1	Dee:→	So: are you going to go ˉback that night or d'you want
2		(.) a bunk bed or somethi[ng
3	Mar:	[nNo we'll go back thank you
4		very much it's not very far

2. This is not to say that "questioning" cannot itself be the action with which a turn is occupied. For that reason it is useful to distinguish between interrogative "practices of speaking" which are recurrent features of grammar and questioning as an action. Notice that a turn can do questioning even if it has no interrogative features (See Sidnell frth).

5		(.)
6	Dee:	Are you su:re becuz we're not having anybody to stay
7		here I mean we (.) we c- (.) we could
8		accomoda[te you:=
9	Mar:	[.hhhhhh
10	Dee:	=uh:[m
11	Mar:	[n:No:: (.) no it's alright it's not (.) not
12		particu'rly fa:r a couple of hours 'n we're
13		home again.

Here are two examples in which speakers use the "do you want X" construction to make offers. Notice that this kind of evidence involves a focus on the "practices of speaking" involved in our example and requires that we look across a collection of instances. A second kind of evidence is provided by what comes next in the sequence. That is, we can look to see how the participants themselves treated the utterance in responding to it. Consider Example 4 in this respect. Here Deena has invited Mark, her cousin, to stay overnight after her daughter's wedding. She does this by offering "a bunk bed or something." Mark's response answers the question which is the vehicle for the offer ("no") and, at the same time both registers the offer and rejects it with "we'll go back." Moreover, Mark's "thank you very much" responds to Deena's turn explicitly in terms of its status as an offer.

We can access a third type of evidence by looking at the relation between the focal turn and the previous one. That is, we can look at the talk to which the focal turn was itself designed as a response. In this respect, it can be observed that offers are frequently produced in response to a description of speaker-trouble (e.g. "my car is stalled,"). Notice then that Janet's offer to "come and get her" follows directly on the heels of Anne's "we're running a bit late." To summarize, we can draw on three kinds of evidence, beyond our own intuitions, in making claims about what a given utterance is doing. First, we can collect other instances of the same construction or, more generally, the same practices of speaking to see if they do the same or similar jobs in those other cases. Secondly, we can look at the response which the focal turn elicits from a recipient. Thirdly we can examine the interactional circumstances which occasion the focal turn and, in particular, the immediately preceding turn to which it is built as a response.

In Example 4 we saw an offer rejected. In Example 1, Anne seems neither to accept nor reject Janet's offer in the immediately subsequent turn. Rather, Anne's "Uhm: it doesn't matter" withholds a response to the offer. Moreover, after coming to completion of her turn, Anne starts again only to trail-off the production of "like" in this way providing Janet with another opportunity to speak. Thus, a sequence is initiated by Janet's offer and the recipient withholds a response to that offer in the position where it is due. With, "it doesn't matter" Anne puts the ball back in Janet's court so to speak.

(5) **XTR 1 – fragment 3**

12	J:	a→	Do you want me to come an' get her?
13	A:		Uhm:, it doesn't matte:r, like(hh)
14			(0.4)
15			.hhhhh
16	J:	a→	I- I could.it's very easy.
17			so rather than you h:av(h)e(h)
18			(.)
19			you know (.) tuh get everybody ou[t
20	A:		[.hhh
21	J:		I'll justa
22			(0.2)
23			come dow:n.=
24	A:		=we:ll,my mom's here, so I don't have to uhm::
25			(.)
26			I don't have to put my kids in the ca:r.
27	J:	a→	I'll ju[s- I'll just come down.
28	A:		[bu
29		b→	↑Oka(h)y(h)=
30	J:		=yeah
31	A:		ok(h)ay

Rather than launch a new course of action at line 16, Janet continues what was begun in line 12. There are various ways in which an offer may be declined. Although declination may be accomplished by a simple "no thank you," often it involves the recipient giving a reason or account for why the offer is not being accepted (see below). For instance, the recipient may claim not to want or need the thing being offered as in Example 4. Alternatively, the recipient of an offer may decline it on the basis of the burden acceptance would create for the one making it. The one making the offer may themselves orient to potential grounds for declining it. Here, in line 16, Janet's "I- I could.it's very easy" pushes the offer forward by characterizing the task as a minimal inconvenience.[3] Janet then goes on to contrast the course of action which she is proposing with the alternative of Anne coming to Janet. She concludes with, "I'll just come down," which, in this context, transforms the offer such that it no longer hinges on Anne's wants. In this sense it is strongly built towards acceptance which it subsequently elicits from A with "okay."

We can thus see how this talk forms a sequence of action initiated with an offer by Janet to Anne and eventually brought to completion with an acceptance of that offer by Anne. Now that we have seen something of this organization in action, we can turn to describe its technical features.

3. See also the talk at lines 6–8 of Example 4 for a parallel case.

2. The adjacency pair

A great deal of talk is organized into sequences of paired actions or adjacency pairs. For instance, a question creates a 'slot', 'place', or 'context' within which an answer is relevant and expected next. Schegloff (1968: 1083) noted that such paired actions pose two basic problems for analysis. First,

> How can we rigorously talk about two items as a sequenced pair of items, rather than as two separate units, one of which happens to follow the other?

And secondly,

> How can we, in a sociologically meaningful and rigorous way, talk about the "absence" of an item; numerous things are not present at any point in a conversation, yet only some have a relevance that would allow them to be seen as "absent."

Recognition of these problems led Schegloff (1968: 1083) to introduce the concept of conditional relevance:

> By the conditional relevance of one item on another we mean: given the first, the second is expectable; upon its occurrence it can be seen to be a second item to the first; upon its nonoccurrence it can be seen to be officially absent – all this provided by the occurrence of the first item.

So questions are not always followed by answers. However, the conditional relevance that a question establishes ensures that participants will inspect any talk that follows a question to see if and how it answers that question. In other words, the relationship between paired utterance-types such as question and answer is a norm to which participants themselves orient in finding and constructing orderly sequences of talk (see Goodwin & Heritage 1990; Heritage 1984). Adjacency pairs are, then, frameworks of accountability which provide for the intelligibility of action. Schegloff and Sacks (1973) identified four defining characteristics of the adjacency pair. It is composed of two utterances that are:

i. Adjacent.[4]
ii. Produced by different speakers.
iii. Ordered as a first pair part (FPP) and second pair part (SPP).
iv. Typed, so that a particular first pair part provides for the relevance of a particular second pair part (or some delimited range of seconds, e.g. a complaint can receive a remedy, an expression of agreement, a denial as its second).

4. See the discussion of insert sequences.

Discussing the last feature in this list, Schegloff (2007: 13) writes:

> the components of an adjacency pair are pair-type related. That is, not every second pair part can properly follow any first pair part. Adjacency pairs compose pair *types*; types are exchanges such as greeting-greeting, question-answer, offer-accept/decline, and the like. To compose an adjacency pair, the FPP and SPP come from the same pair type. Consider such FPPs as "Hello," or "Do you know what time it is?" or "Would you like a cup of coffee?" and such SPPs as "Hi," or "Four o'clock" or "No thanks." Parties to talk-in-interaction do not just pick some SPP to respond to a FPP: that would yield such absurdities as "Hello," "No thanks," or "Would you like a cup of coffee?" "Hi." The components of adjacency pairs are "typologized" not only into first and second pair parts, but into the *pair types* which they can partially compose: greeting-greeting (Hello," Hi"), question-answer ("Do you know what time it is?" "Four o'clock"), offer-accept/decline ("Would you like a cup of coffee?" "No thanks," if it is declined).

What kind of organization is the adjacency pair? It is not a statistical probability and clearly not a categorical imperative. Rather, the organization described is a norm to which people hold one another accountable. The normative character of the adjacency pair is displayed in participants' own conduct in interaction. For example, as the principle of conditional relevance implies, when a question does not receive an answer, questioners treat the answer as "noticeably" absent. Questioners' orientation to a missing answer can be seen in three commonly produced types of subsequent conduct: pursuit, inference and report.

In the following example (from Drew 1981) mother asks the child, Roger, what time it is.

(6) **Drew 1981: 249**

1	M:	What's the time- by the clock?
2	R:	Uh
3	M:	What's the time?
4		(3.0)
5	M:	(Now) what number's that?
6	R:	Number two
7	M:	No it's not
8		What is it?
9	R:	It's a one and a nought

After Roger produces something other than an answer at line 2, mother repeats the question at line 3. Here then a failure to answer prompts the pursuit of a response (see Pomerantz 1984b). When this second question is met with three seconds of silence, Mother, transforms the question now asking, "what number's that?" Note that the first question, "What's the time?" poses a complex task for the child. The child must first identify the numbers to which the hands are pointed and subsequently use those numbers to calculate the time. Here, in response to a failure to answer, mother takes this

complex task and breaks it down into components. She has apparently inferred that the child did not answer because the question, as initially put, posed a task that he could not accomplish. Mother's subsequent conduct is informed by an inference that the child did not answer because he was not able to do so.

Although it does not happen here, questioners may also report an absent answer saying such things as "you are not answering my question," or "he didn't answer the question", or "she didn't reply" etc.. In public inquiries, lawyers commonly suggest that the witness is not answering the question that has been asked of them (see Ehrlich & Sidnell 2006; Sidnell 2004; Sidnell frth.).

It is important to see the difference between an absence on the one hand and an "official," "noticeable" or "accountable" absence on the other. An infinite number of things can be accurately described as absent after the occurrence of a first pair part. The next speaker did not blow his nose, scratch his head, jump up and down, sing "O' Canada" etc.. The point here is that the first pair part of an adjacency pair has the capacity to make some particular types of conduct noticeably or relevantly absent such that their non-occurrence is just as much an event as their occurrence.

Would-be answerers also orient to a missing answer. Thus, the non-occurrence of an answer typically occasions an account for not answering. One particularly common account for not answering is not knowing. The following examples from Heritage (1984) illustrate this:

(7) **From Heritage 1984 (W:PC:1:MJ(1):18)**
1 J: But the trai:n goes. Does th'train go o:n th'boa:t?
2 M: °h °h Ooh I've no idea:. She ha:sn't sai:d.

(8) **From Heritage 1984 (Rah:A:1:Ex:JM(7):2) – simplified**
1 M: Is he alri:ght?,
2 J: Well he hasn' c'm ba-ack yet.

In the first example the speaker accounts for not answering by saying she has "no idea" and subsequently accounts for not knowing by saying "she hasn't said." In the second example, the speaker produces only an account for not knowing and by this implies an account for not answering. To summarize, at the heart of many sequences are adjacency pairs which organize two turns via a relation of conditional relevance. An orientation to the normative character of adjacency pairs is revealed in various aspects of the participants' own conduct (questioners' pursuit, inference and report and answerers' accounts).

Many explanations of human conduct involve people learning or otherwise internalizing patterns, scripts, procedures, ideologies, cultural values etc.. Scholars in a number of traditions have recently pointed to the difficult questions about "structure" and "agency" to which such explanations inevitably lead. This is the old philosophical problem of determination and freewill. The question arises as to how much of what

we do is a matter of self-conscious decision-making and how much is a matter of shaping by a hidden hand. As long as the questions are posed in this way it seems as though we must either be puppets or gods. The preceding consideration of adjacency pairs hints at the distinctive way in which this issue is conceptualized within conversation analysis. CA is not deterministic since people may or may not do the normatively called for action. On the other hand, it is not just a matter of people doing whatever they want either since in making sense of what others are up to conversationalists are also holding them accountable to the dictates of normative structures. Looking at the sequential organization of talk we see that, from the perspective of conversation analysis, "each speaker in conversation participates in an organization whose contingent outcomes are only partially under his or her control" (Heritage 1984) and further that, "conversationalists are … not so much constrained by rules or sanctions, as caught in a web of inferences" (Levinson 1983: 321).[5]

3. "A context of publicly displayed and continuously up-dated intersubjective understandings"

The relatedness of the two turns in an adjacency pair has both a prospective and retrospective dimension. Thus, as discussed above, the occurrence of a first pair part creates a slot for a specific second pair part. At the same time, a second pair part displays its speaker's understanding of the first to which it responds. Adjacency pairs allow then for a framework of understanding that is constructed and sustained turn-by-turn. If a speaker responds to an FPP with an inappropriate SPP, the speaker of the FPP can see that they have not been understood. They can then go back and initiate repair. This is precisely what happens in Example 9.

(9) **Third turn repair – from Schegloff 1992.**

1	Annie:		Which one:s are closed, an' which ones are open.
2	Zebrach:		Most of 'em. This, this, [this, this ((pointing))
3	Annie:	→	[I 'on't mean on the
4		→	shelters, I mean on the roads.
5	Zebrach:		Oh!
6			(0.8)
7	Zebrach:		Closed, those're the ones you wanna know about,
8	Annie:		Mm[hm
9	Zebrach:		[Broadway…

5. Schegloff suggests that conditional relevance has the status of a social fact.

Here, Annie and Zebrach are looking at a map together and, at line 1, Annie asks Zebrach "which ones" are closed and which are open. In his response at line 2, Zebrach indicates which of the "shelters" are open. This turn reveals a misunderstanding of the question and specifically the reference with "which ones" in line 1. Zebrach's response reveals to Annie that he has understood her to be asking about the shelters when in fact she meant to be asking about the roads. The problem is addressed via third position repair at lines 3–4 (see Schegloff 1992).

Participants in conversation look to a next turn to see if and how they have been understood. As analysts we can exploit the same resource. This is sometimes called the next turn proof procedure. Consider the following fragment from one of Sacks' recordings of the Group Therapy Sessions.

(10) **(Sacks 1995 vI: 281).**

1	Roger:	On Hollywood Boulevard the other night they were
2		giving tickets for dirty windshields ((door opens))
3	Jim:	hh
4	Therap:	Hi, Jim [c'mon in.
5	Jim:	[H'warya
6	Therap:	Jim, this is uh Al,
7	Jim:	Hi
8	Therap:	Ken,
9	Jim:	Hi
10	Ken:	Hi
11	Therap:	Roger.
12	Roger: →	Hi
13	Jim:	Hi
14	Therap:	Jim Reed.

Sacks (1995 [1966]) draws attention to "the *prima facie* evidence afforded by a subsequent speaker's talk" in his analysis of the therapist's turns at 8 and 11 as recognizable introductions. Thus, when, at line 12, Roger responds to the

> utterance with his name (…) not with "What" (as in an answer to a summons), indeed not with an utterance to the therapist at all, but with a greeting to the newly arrived Jim, he shows himself (to the others there assembled as well as to us, the analytic overhearers) to have attended and analyzed the earlier talk, to have understood that an introduction sequence was being launched, and to be prepared to participate by initiating a greeting exchange in the slot in which it is he who is being introduced (Schegloff 1995: xliii).

Thus a response displays a hearing or analysis of the utterance to which it responds. As noted, such a hearing or analysis is "publicly available as the means by which previous speakers can determine how they were understood" (Heritage 1984). The third position in a sequence is then a place to accept the recipient's displayed understanding or, alternatively, to repair it. Heritage (1984: 259) writes:

> By means of this framework, speakers are released from what would otherwise be an endless task of confirming and reconfirming their understandings of each other's actions … a context of publicly displayed and continuously up-dated intersubjective understandings is systematically sustained… Mutual understanding is thus displayed … 'incarnately' in the sequentially organized details of conversational interaction.

There is, of course, significant room to maneuver within this framework. Thus, Goodwin and Goodwin write that, "rather than presenting a naked analysis of the prior talk, next utterances characteristically transform that talk in some fashion – deal with it not in its own terms but rather in the way in which it is relevant to the projects of the subsequent speaker" (Goodwin & Goodwin 1987 cited in Heritage 1984). Consider for instance the following in which Dick is reporting trouble in getting his family over for the holidays.

(11) **Deb and Dick**

22	Deb:	[s]o don't you have all your
23		family coming today?
24	Dick:	Well: they're coming around two and I °hhh left
25		messages with Brian an:d mydad to(uh) see if
26		they wanted to come but=ah
27		(0.2)
28		°hh that's all I could do was leave messages.
29	Deb: →	owh
30		(0.4)
31	Dick:	°Gotsome° °hhhh five pound lasagna thing to(hh)
32		throw in the oven=an
33	Deb: →	o(h)h(h)=huh (.) well: I'm sure you'll have a
34		good time.
35	Dick:	[oh
36	Deb:	[⟨at least it's inside. And it didn't rain
37		yesterday so we were lucky [l- looking at it
38	Dick:	[mmhm yeah
39		
40	Deb:	today god. woulda been awful.

At line 22–23 Deb asks whether Dick's family is coming to visit. In response, Dick indicates that although some members of the family are expected, he has been unable to get a hold of "Brian" and his "Dad." The answer concludes with Dick saying, "that's all I could do was leave messages." The selected extreme case formulation (see Pomerantz 1986) might well have elicited an expression of sympathy. Instead, however, Deb registers the report with a prosodically non-committal "owh". After a pause, Dick continues saying, "°Gotsome° °hhhh five pound lasagna thing to(hh) throw in the oven=an" . The selection of "some", rather than "a", and "throw", rather than "put", endow Dick's description with a sense of pathos. By adding "thing" to the description of the food, Dick does not even allow it to be unequivocally categorized as "lasagna". Moreover, Dick's description of the lasagna in terms of its weight characterizes it as something to be eaten but not

necessarily enjoyed. Taken together these choices in description convey Dick's negative stance towards what he is saying and suggest that he may have "troubles" to tell Deb, however, blocks the projected troubles-telling by saying, "I'm sure you'll have a good time" and "at least it's inside." The "at least" here is a device for retrieving the good in otherwise bad news. Used here, it also allows Deb to move step-wise into her own topic. In this example, then, Deb resists being aligned as a "troubles recipient" (see Jefferson 1988) by dealing with Dick's talk, as Goodwin and Goodwin say, "not in its own terms but rather in the way in which it is relevant to the projects of the subsequent speaker." Since this is a point of crucial importance, one further illustration will be considered.

In the following, Dee has invited her cousin Mark to her daughter's wedding. She has decided not to invite Mark's mother (her aunt) after whom Dee is asking in line 1.

(12) **Holt 5/88:2:4:3**

1	Dee:	You doh-uh how is she[Mark.
2	Mark:	[.hhh We:ll she's-:-: r-
3		physically n-: she is: gettin' a bit o:ld you
4		kno:w, uh::m .hhhhhh she can't get around quite
5		so much although she still does 'er shopping
6		still looks a:fter 'erse:lf I mean it's amazing
7		really, u-uh::: .hhhhhh She drives us nu:ts but
8		stihhhll[h-h .hu .hu
9	Dee:	[Oh I know love I do know the feeling
9		you've got my every sy[mpathy
10	Mark:	[phhh! ↑heh heh e-[he
11	Dee:	[( ).
12	Mark:	.hhhhhh[hh
13		[We: had it,
14		(.)
15		believe you me we had[it.
16	Mark:	[hI: kno:w.[hYe:s

Dee has phoned to tell Mark that she has decided not to invite his mother to her daughter's wedding ostensibly so as not to inconvenience Mark and his wife. As such, Dee has something invested in hearing, in response to her query at line 1, that she (Mark's mother) is not well, this having been presented as grounds for not inviting her to the wedding. In his response, Mark seems initially to align with Dee's evaluation of his mother's health (with e.g. "bit old," "can't get around") but at line 4 he moves in the opposite direction detailing the extent to which she is, in fact, able to get around and look after herself. Note that there are several points within the turn at which Dee might have treated Mark's report about his mother's heath as possibly complete. Dee, however, holds off responding until the point at which Mark remarks that his mother "drives us nuts." "Drives us nuts," confirms in no uncertain terms Dee's already expressed

conviction that the mother would hamper Mark and his wife's enjoyment of the wedding. It is here that Dee responds with an empathetic "I know…". A report of this kind then can be seen as the product of an interaction between speaker and recipient. The recipient plays an active role in the production of the report in at least two ways. In the first place, Dee selects a particular place in the course of Mark's talk at which to begin a response and thereby helps to construct its completion. Secondly, of the many ways in which she might have responded – e.g. with optimism, with surprise, with skepticism, etc. – Dee's expression of sympathy ("Oh I know love I do know the feeling you've got my every sympathy") treats Mark's report about his mother's health as a complaint. Dee hears in what Mark says here a description of the ways in which the mother has become a burden and it is *this* hearing that she displays in her response to it.

Heritage (1984), from whom I have borrowed a great deal for the discussion in this section, notes that "observations concerning the way a turn's talk displays an analysis, appreciation or understanding of a prior turn do not simply apply to … responses or 'reactive' second utterances. They also apply to 'first' or initiatory actions … which, in their own various ways, also display analyses of the 'state of talk'." As Heritage notes a speaker who initiates the pre-closing of a call with "well::" or some other "possible pre-closing" displays an analysis of that " 'there and then' as an appropriate place for that to occur." Indeed, any utterance can be heard as, in some sense, exhibiting its speaker's sense of the current state of talk and the context in which that talk is produced.

4. Preference

Schegloff (2007) writes, "In the vast majority of sequence types, there are not only alternative responses which a first pair part makes relevant and a recipient of a first pair part may employ; there are alternate types of response. These embody different alignments toward the project undertaken in the first pair part." Thus, a request can either be granted or it can be rejected. Of course, there are many ways in which a request may be granted (e.g. "sure", "I guess", "of course, you needn't ask" etc.) or rejected ("I don't think that would be a good idea", "It's just not possible", "no way!") but as Schegloff, again, points out "accepting and declining, granting and rejecting, are fundamentally different *types* of responses and alignments." These are not "symmetrical alternatives" (Schegloff & Sacks 1973: 14), rather, the response to the first pair part that promotes accomplishment of the activity is, typically, the preferred one.

Preference, in this context, refers not to psychological states of the participants but, rather, structural regularities in the talk. Consider a situation in which you are invited to a dinner party at the house of someone whose company you assiduously avoid. In such a situation, it is likely that you would prefer, in the individual

or psychological sense, to decline the invitation but this does not alter the fact that acceptance is the preferred alternative in terms of the organization of the talk. A decline will likely require an accompanying explanation, for example you are too busy, you have a rare and highly contagious fungus etc., whereas an acceptance will not. In order to see that this is the case, consider the following example:

(13) **SBL, T1/S1/C10, simplified**

1	A:	Uh if you'd care to come and visit a little while
2		this morning I'll give you a cup of coffee.
3	B:	hehh Well that's awfully sweet of you. I don't
4		think I can make it this morning. .hh uhm I'm
5		running an ad in the paper and-and uh I have to
6		stay near the phone.

In this extract from a telephone conversation, A's turn at 1–2 is an invitation to B to come and visit "a little while" and have a cup of coffee. In this context, B's talk at lines 3–5 clearly constitutes a decline of the invitation. Notice, however, that B never says "no thanks". How then does this talk nevertheless *do* declining – what features of the talk make it clear to A that B does not accept the invitation? In fact, this turn collects together many of the features characteristic of dispreferred responses (see also Kitzinger 2000).

i. Delays: B delays the production of the decline by prefacing the turn with audible breathing ("hehh") and "well" and "that's awfully sweet of you". In terms of positioning, dispreferred responses are often delayed both by interturn gap and turn-initial delay.
ii. Palliatives: It is typical for dispreferred responses to contain some kind of appreciation, apology and/or token agreement by which the overwhelmingly negative valence of the turn is mitigated. Here the dispreferred response is accompanied by the appreciation "that's awfully sweet of you". The declination is further mitigated by being framed with "I don't think…".
iii. Accounts: Dispreferred responses typically contain explanations or justifications indicating why the invitation is being declined.

    Here B explains that she is prevented from accepting the invitation by the fact that she is "running an ad in the paper" and thus must "stay by the phone." With accounts of this sort, people typically suggest that they are unable to accept the invitation (or grant the request) not simply unwilling. Note, further, that the account is designed to describe the relevant details of B's situation which prevent acceptance of the invitation (B has to stay by the phone (see Drew 1984)).

Returning to the distinction between structural preferences of talk-in-interaction and personal preferences of individuals we can see from this example that they are

quite different. There is no way for us to know whether B would "prefer" to accept or decline the invitation. On the other hand, it is clear that she builds her decline of the invitation as a dispreferred rather than preferred response.

5. Structural consequences of preference organization

The features of dispreferred turns mentioned above, particularly delay, are resources which the speaker of a first pair part can use to project or anticipate the imminent production of a dispreferred response. Anticipating a dispreferred response, the speaker of the first pair part may take measures to prevent it from being produced. Thus, the features of dispreferred second pair parts play a role in minimizing the chance that such a response will, in fact, ever be articulated. Consider,

(14) **Levinson 1983**

1	C:	So I was wondering would you be in your office
2		on Monday (.) by any chance?
3		(2.0)
4		Probably not

C's talk at lines 1–2 is building towards some kind of request (although the exact nature of that request is not available to us). Moreover, the design of the question is constructed so as to prefer an affirmative answer – compare, "I don't suppose you'll be in your office on Monday?" (see Sacks 1987[1973]). Note that, after coming to possible completion after "Monday", the request is extended a little bit with "by any chance?".[6] When the recipient does not respond immediately allowing a sizeable two seconds of silence to develop, C treats this as foreshadowing a negative answer and partially withdraws the (pre)-request by reversing the valence of the question with "probably not".

Alternatively, rather than withdraw the action in the face of a projected dispreferred response, the speaker can add further talk in an effort to make it more appealing or easier to accept. Consider:

(15) **Levinson 1983**

1	A:	C'mon down he:re,=it's oka:y,
2		(0.2)
3		I got lotta stuff,=I got be:er en stuff.

Here a slight pause after the invitation reaches possible completion provides an opportunity for its speaker to 'upgrade' the action being implemented – here by adding 'beer'.

6. This "by any chance" looks very much like what Davidson (1984) called a "monitor space."

In most cases the preferred response is the one which advances or aligns with the action launched by the first pair part. However, there are at least two exceptions to this general rule. First, there are actions that, by their very nature, inherently prefer disaligning responses. For instance, both self-deprecating assessments and compliments appear to prefer disagreeing rather than agreeing responses (Pomerantz 1978).

In addition to particular actions that prefer non-aligning responses, we must be alert to the potential for general preferences to be defeated or even reversed in certain contexts. For instance, although offers seem to generally prefer acceptances, they can also be built to prefer declines. An offer such as, "why don't I come over and pick her up" is built towards acceptance whereas one such as "do you want me to come an' get her" may not be. The emphasis placed on the recipient's needs or wants in the latter appears to invite special treatment. Consider the example with which we began:

(16) **XTR 1 -**

12	J:	Do you want me to come an' get ↑h<u>e</u>r?
13	A:	Uhm:, it doesn't matte:r, like(hh)
14		(0.4)
15		.hhhhh
16	J:	I- I <u>c</u>ould.it's very easy.
17		so rather than you h:av(h)e(h)
18		(.)
19		you know (.) tuh get everybody ou[t
20		[.hhh
21		I'll justa
22		(0.2)
23		come <u>d</u>ow:n.=

Here Anne's turn at lines 13–15 is clearly built as a dispreferred response. The turn begins with delay. Moreover, as noted above, Anne's talk in 13 does not contain either an acceptance or declination of the offer. Janet's talk at lines 16–23 suggests that she hears Anne's *dispreferred* turn as adumbrating an acceptance rather than declination. This then suggests that the offer is built to prefer a decline.

Preference is also implicated in the organization of sequences in so far as participants routinely work to avoid the production of dispreferred *first* actions as well. In order to see how this is accomplished we need to consider the various ways in which sequences can be expanded.

6. Sequence organization

So far we have considered sequences composed of only two turns – a first and second pair part. Clearly, sequences can be much more complex than this. Much of this added

complexity is the product of expansion. An adjacency pair can be expanded prior to the occurrence of its first part, after the occurrence of its first part but before the occurrence of its second, or after its second pair part.

Expansions are typically built out of paired actions and can themselves serve as the bases upon which further expansion takes place. It does not take much to see how this could result in sequences of considerable complexity and length (see Schegloff, 2007).

As the name implies, pre-expansions involve an expansion of a sequence prior to the occurrence of a base first pair part. Pre-expansions are, in a basic sense, preparatory to some other, projected work to be done in the sequence (the action of the first pair part).

Some pre-expansions are type-specific, that is, they project a specific base first pair part, e.g. they are pre-invitations "hey, are you busy tonight?", pre-announcements "Guess what happened to me?", pre-requests "You wouldn't happen to be going my way would you?" (see Levinson 1983; Schegloff 1988; Terasaki 2004 [1976]). Such type-specific pre-expansions typically check on a condition for the successful accomplishment of the base first pair part. So, for instance, pre-invitations may check on the *availability* of the intended invitee. Consider the following:

(17) **HS:STI,1**

1	A:		Judy?
2	B:		Yeah,
3	A:		John Smith
4	B:		Hi John
5	A:		How ya doin'=
6		→	=say wh*a*t'r you doing.
7	B:	→	Well, we're going out. Why.
8	A:		Oh, I was just gonna say come out
9			and come over here an' talk about
10			this evening, but if you're going
11			out you can't very well do that.

Judy's "why" at line 7 displays an orientation to the preceding turn as something more than an information-seeking question. John's answer at lines 8–11 confirms this inference. Pre-requests typically check on the availability of the item to be asked for. Consider the following example in which the participants have been talking about some fish tanks belonging to Vic. At lines 1–2, Mike inquires about one particularly large tank.

(18) **US. 24**

1	M:	Wuhddiyuh doing wh dat big bow-puh-tank.
2		Nothing?
3		(0.5)
4	V:	((cough))
5		Uh-h-h

6			(1.0)
7	V:		I'm not intuh selling it or giving it. That's it.
8	M:		Okay
9			(1.0)
10	M:	→	Dat wz simple. Khhhh huh-huh-heh=
11	V:	→	=Yeh.

Vic hears Mike's inquiry as building towards a request (or possibly an offer to buy the tank) and responds by indicating that it will not be granted. In both cases (Examples 17, 18), the second part of the pre-expansion blocks the doing of a projected first pair part (an invitation in 17 and a request in 18). In this way, pre-expansions work to prevent the occurrence of dispreferred second actions (e.g. declinations, rejections). Presequences may also be seen to contribute to the non-occurrence of dispreferred first actions. For instance, requests are dispreferred relative to offers.[7] Consider the following:

(19) **Levinson 1983: 343**

1	C:	Hullo I was just ringing up to ask
2		if you were going to Bertrand's party
3	R:	yes I thought you might be
4	C:	Heh heh
5	R:	Yes would you like a lift?
6	C:	Oh I'd love one

Here, C asks whether R will be going to Bertrand's party. This is hearable as leading to a request such as "can I get a ride with you?" Indeed, it could be said to check on the availability of the service to be requested. R clearly anticipates this and, before the request is produced, makes an offer.

These participants, then, treat questions such as "Wuhddiyuh doing wh dat big bow-puh-tank" as preliminary moves to other, projected, actions. Recipients of such questions are thus given an opportunity to show the way in which the action projected (request, invitation) will fare. Recipients of such pre-requests or pre-invitations can give a response which either encourages the other to go-ahead with or to abort the projected action. Alternatively they can respond to the action as if it had already been articulated – as the recipients in both 17 and 18 do.

Announcements and story-tellings are also frequently initiated with pre-expansions: pre-announcements or story prefaces. It was suggested earlier that pre-expansions typically check on a condition for the successful accomplishment of the base first pair part. In the case of announcements and other tellings, perhaps the most important

7. Showing that this is, in fact, the case would take us too far afield (see Schegloff 2007).

and basic of such conditions is that the recipient does not already know the thing to be told or announced (this is the principle of recipient design, see Sacks et al 1974; Sacks 1995 [1971]). It should thus come as no surprise to find that pre-announcements often take the form of questions about what the recipient knows.

(20) **HG**

1	Hyla:→	D'you know w't I did t'day
2		I wz so proud a'my[s e l]f,=
3	Nan:	[What.]
4	Hyla:	=?hh I we:nt- (0.2) A'right like I get off
5		et work et one,=
6	Nan:	Uh hu:h,=

In 20, Nancy responds to Hyla's pre-announcement "D'you know w't I did t'day" with a go-ahead response which suggests that she does not know the thing to be told. In the following fragment, Vivian's pre-announcement does not elicit an audible response from the co-participants but Vivian nevertheless produces the announcement in the following turns.

(21) **Chicken Dinner**

16	SHA:	[Uh wz goi:n
17		crazy tihday uh on th'on the roa:d
18		(0.2)
19	VIV:→	We' yih know w't he di[↑:d?
20	SHA:	[Wen'outta my
21		fuckin'mi[:nd.
22	VIV:	[He maHHde
23		(.)
24	VIV:	a right- it wz- in Sanna Monig'yihknow

One type of pre-expansion, the summons-answer sequence, is generic and checks on the precondition of any interactional project – the availability of a projected recipient to attend the talk for which s/he is selected as recipient.

(22) **Atkinson and Drew 1979: 46**

1	Ch: →	Mummy
2	M:	Yes dear
3		(2.1)
4	Ch:	I want a cloth to clean the windows

As Schegloff (1968) noted, a summons projects further talk by the same speaker. Participants orientation to this is seen in deferring (e.g. "wait a minute"), go-ahead (e.g. "what?") and blocking (e.g. "I'm not interested in what you have to say," "I know, take out the trash.") responses. Go-ahead responses, in so far as they orient to imminent

further talk, are minimal contributions (similar in this respect to continuers) that claim as little turn-space as possible. Taken to the extreme, this may result in the collapse of a sequence into a single turn with an adjustment in gaze direction being treated as equivalent to a summons' answer (see Schegloff 2007).

An adjacency pair consists of two adjacent utterances, with the second selected from some range of possibilities defined by the first. As discussed above, this account of adjacency pairs is meant to describe members's own normative expectations. However, on some occasions, the two utterances of an adjacency pair are not, in fact, adjacent. In some cases this is because a sequence has been *inserted* between the first and second pair part of an adjacency pair (see Schegloff 1972). Such insert expansions can be divided into post-firsts and pre-seconds (Schegloff 2007) according to the kind of interactional relevancy they address. The most common form of post-first insert-expansion consists of a next turn repair initiator (NTRI) and its response. Pre-second insert expansions are oriented not to trouble with the FPP but rather to trouble with an expected SPP. Such insert expansions routinely address issues that stand as preconditions to the doing of a preferred SPP (for instance, locating an object requested in the FPP).

Post-expansions are highly variable with respect to their complexity. Schegloff suggests that they can be divided into minimal and non-minimal types. Minimal post-expansions consist of one turn. "Oh" for instance can occur after a second pair part and thus minimally expand the sequence as in the following example:

(23) **HG:II:25:ST Hyla & Nancy – Heritage 1984: 286–87**

25	Nancy:		=?hhh Dz he av iz own apa:rt[mint?]	
26	Hyla:			[?hhhh] Yea:h,=
27	Nancy:	→	=Oh:,	
28			(1.0)	
29	Nancy:		How didju git iz number,	
30			(·)	
31	Hyla:		I(h) (·) c(h)alled infermation'n San	
32			Fr'ncissc(h)[uh!	
33	Nancy:	→	[Oh:::.	[Oh:::.

"Okay" may also serve as a minimal post-expansion:

(24) **YYZ 2 – Deb and Dick**

55	Dick:	Are they leaving today?
56	Deb:	I don't know
57	Dick:	O(hhh)kay(hh)

Non-minimal post-expansions come in a variety of forms. One kind involves commentary upon the just prior sequence which it thereby expands. Consider again:

(25) **US. 24**

1	M:		Wuhddiyuh doing wh dat big bow-puh-tank.
2			Nothing?
3			(0.5)
4	V:		((cough))
5			Uh-h-h
6			(1.0)
7	V:		I'm not intuh selling it or giving it. That's it.
8	M:		Okay
9			(1.0)
10	M:	→	Dat wz simple. Khhhh huh-huh-heh=
11	V:	→	=Yeh.

After the request is blocked, the sequence is expanded by a short assessment sequence that involves Mike characterizing the interaction as "simple" and Vic agreeing. Clearly there are many other ways in which a sequence may be expanded after the occurrence of a second pair part (Schegloff 2007).

7. The power of sequential analysis

The discovery of sequential organization in the mid-to-late 1960s more or less coincided with the emergence of conversation analysis as a field. Others, including rhetoricians, playwrights, novelists, philosophers and linguists, had pointed to the existence of paired actions such as question and answer, greeting and greeting etc. What Sacks (1995[1965]) and Schegloff (1968) discovered was the normative order or logic that undergirds such paired actions. This made it possible to examine not just paired actions *per se* but conversational sequencing and conditional relevance. Since the early studies of Sacks and Schegloff a large number of sequence-types and underlying principles or preferences have been described across a range of ordinary and institutional settings. Moreover, empirical research on conversation has provided a window into the organization of human interaction more generally and recent work has pointed to the implications for human development (Wootton 1997) and human adaptation (Levinson 2006).

Earlier, I drew a distinction between "practices of speaking" and the actions which those practices are used to accomplish within some particular bit of talk. The distinction plays an important role in conversation analysis and distinguishes it from many other approaches to language use in the human sciences which, for the most part, emphasize *either* practices of speaking (such as repetition, or clause structure) or actions (promises and such). Conversation analysis, on the other hand, examines the relation *between* practices of speaking and actions-in-talk within sequences.

Nowhere is the power of such an analysis displayed more clearly than in Schegloff's study of "confirming allusions." The phenomenon Schegloff examines in that paper appears, at first glance, perfectly simple: repetition. Here are two examples:

(39) **Berkeley II: 103–114; simplified (from Schegloff 1996: 174)**

1	Evelyn:		=Hi: Rita
2	Rita:		Hi: Evelyn:. How [are y'
3	Evelyn:		[I hadda come in another room.
4	Rita:		Oh:. Uh huh.=
5	Evelyn:		=I fee:l a bi:ssel verschickert.
6			(0.2)
7	Rita:		W- why's 'a:t,
8			(0.4)
9	Rita:	→	uh you've had sump'n t'drink.=
10	Evelyn:	→	=I had sump'n t'dri:nk.
11	Rita:		Uh huh.

(40) **MDE, Stolen (from Schegloff 1996: 185)**

1	Marsha:		=He's flying.
2			(0.2)
3			En Ilene is going to meet im:.Becuz the to:p
4			wz ripped off'v iz car which is tih ssay
5			someb'ddy helped th'mselfs.
6	Tony:	→	Stolen.
7			(0.4)
8	Marsha:	→	Stolen. Right out in front of my house.

Schegloff shows these repetitions to be instances of a previously undescribed action – "the practice of agreeing with another by repeating what they have just said is shown to constitute the action of confirming an allusion – that is, confirming both its 'content' and its prior inexplicit conveyance" (Schegloff 1996: 161). In 39, Evelyn reports that she "hadda come in another room" and goes on to remark "I fee:l a bi:ssel verschickert." Schegloff notes that there is an ambiguity here in the Yiddish word "verschickert" which may refer either to a state brought on by the consumption of alcohol, "tipsy", or one arrived at without – "groggy" might serve as a translation for the latter. After, Rita offers the understanding check "you've had sump'n t'drink", Evelyn produces the repetition. "In confirming with a repeat, Evelyn not only verifies the supposition as to how she came to be in the state she is in, but invokes the presence of that meaning in her own immediately prior talk" (Schegloff 1996: 186). In 40, Marsha is telling her ex, Tony, that their son is flying, rather than driving, back to northern California where Tony is. She accounts for what is a change of plans by saying that the "to:p wz ripped off'v iz car" and, apparently catching the possible ambiguity of "ripped off" between an idiom for robbery and the act of tearing, extends her turn with "which is tih ssay

someb'ddy helped th'mselfs." However, although this is meant to disambiguate, it is again not to be taken literally. As Schegloff says, "the sense of what has happened has, then, been conveyed without being given its 'common name.' When Tony offers 'stolen' as literally what happened, Marsha not only confirms that that is what has happened, but does so with a form that confirms as well that that is what she was conveying in her prior talk" (Schegloff 1996: 185).

The action of confirming allusions could not have been noticed without careful examination of the sequences in which it occurs since without attention to the sequence of which these repetitions are a part, it would not have been possible to see the "allusive" character of the talk that gets confirmed. Moreover, by bringing together instances of the practice into a collection, Schegloff is able to specify "environments of relevant occurrence" – that is, interactional environments in which the action *could* be done, even if it is not in that instance. This in turn allows Schegloff to identify a case in which the speaker appears to specifically avoid repetition in order *not* to confirm an allusion – the speaker comes to "the very verge of a possible allusion-confirmation before veering away" (Schegloff 1996: 194). Schegloff (1996: 199) remarks about such instances that: "… it is virtually certain that nothing of interest would have been seen at all were we not already familiar with the practice of confirming allusions and its environments of possible occurrence. Here then we may have some of the most distinctive fruits of inquiry in rendering what would otherwise be invisible visible in its very absence." This remarkable analysis is the product of many years of research, patiently tracking the phenomenon and allowing it to come fully into view as instances were collected and put side-by-side. It well-illustrates the power of sequential analysis.

One way to begin an analysis of a fragment of talk is by blocking out the sequences that together compose it. This provides a point of entry – a way of accessing some of the technical details of talk – even if a more complete analysis, such as Schegloff's study of confirming allusions, requires attention not just to sequence organization but also to turn-design, turn-taking, repair and other aspects of conversational organization.

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Transcription systems for spoken discourse

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1. Transcription: Basic terminology

The vast majority of natural language usage is *spoken,* and most of it is forever lost in the very next moment. Human memory records very little of it, and very little of it is audiorecorded, much less of it transcribed. *Verba volant:* the spoken flies away; but fortunately, *scripta manent:* the transcribed remains.

In the context of this article, transcription will be understood to mean any graphic representation of selective aspects of speaking and of one or more persons' behavior and setting concomitant with speaking. This representation always presupposes a unique performance, it is not meant as a script for a further performance. It is always sequential in that real-time is necessarily involved. In this respect, transcription is to be distinguished from description of some aspect of behavior. For example, one might transcribe laughter as 'ha ha ha', but describe the same laughter as 'laugh', a designation which eliminates the notions of both sequentiality and numerosity included in 'ha ha ha'.

'Transcription' must be distinguished from another related concept, that of *inscription*. Clifford (1990: 51) uses "inscription" to indicate an interruption of ongoing discourse on the part of an ethnographic fieldworker who wishes to make a note.

In this article, we will reserve the term 'transcription' for the generic concept itself, and we will distinguish between the following terms: 'transcribing' for the activity, 'transcript' for the result, and 'notation' for the tools of that activity, i.e. the set of signs used to represent selective aspects of spoken discourse graphically. These three aspects of transcription provide the framework for any scientific research in this domain; to date, however, notation systems alone, rather than transcribing and use of transcripts, has been the focus of all the current transcription systems to be considered in what follows (but see more recent psycholinguistic research on the production, reproduction and use of transcripts [O'Connell & Kowal 1999; O'Connell & Kowal 2000; Romero, O'Connell & Kowal 2002; and Spinos, O'Connell & Kowal 2002]).

From time immemorial, people have produced and used transcripts according to their own needs. One has only to reflect for a moment on the many modern forms such transcriptions take, e.g. medical records, court reports, therapy protocols, students' classnotes, and secretarial dictation. Thus, transcription is neither a modern scientific invention nor the sole preserve of scientists. For the most part, however, such everyday

transcripts have been limited to the verbal component, to the exclusion of prosodic, paralinguistic, and extralinguistic components. For example, the phone message: *Tell John, 'Emily called. Your car is ready'*, is restricted to verbal components. The intonation pattern of the speaker, the tempo, and other characteristics of the spoken message are disregarded for the purposes of this transcribed message.

For many years, the derivation and use of transcripts of spoken discourse in various scientific disciplines went on without generating a great deal of critical interest, although it is true that the linguists themselves have had the longest tradition of interest in transcription: "The choice of symbols to represent speech sounds has been a matter of debate for centuries" (Roach 1992: 200).

In the 1970s, however, a new interest arose among a group of sociologists who concerned themselves with conversation analysis and have come to be known as ethnomethodologists. Their effort was to make transcripts, particularly of conversations, as inclusive and detailed as possible. By contrast, the psycholinguists of this same era manifested very little interest in the notational aspects of transcription (e.g. Brown 1973: 53), and as for interest in the transcribing itself, many of them even delegated such operations — clearly considered by them to be an unimportant step in the scientific elaboration of data — to secretarial assistants (e.g. Maclay & Osgood 1959: 23). Most of these transcripts for scientific use are derived from audio or audio-video recordings. But it is also possible to derive transcripts by means of what Shriberg, Kwiatkowski & Hoffmann (1984: 456) refer to as "live transcriptions", i.e. the production of a transcript directly from the 'live' performance. Both the method of derivation of a transcript and the complexity of the spoken discourse (see Pye, Wilcox & Siren 1988: 33ff) affect the difficulty of transcribing. For example, a 'live transcription' from spoken discourse during a rock concert would pose monumental problems; the signal-to-noise ratio would not allow adequate accuracy.

Only in the decade of the 1990s did a critical interest in transcription arise, not limited to any one scientific discipline, but embracing linguists, sociologists, anthropologists, ethnologists, and psychologists. At least partly responsible for this critical interest was the potential for computerization of notations and transcriptional procedures, and for the archivization and sharing of data banks. It should be noted, however, that the focus of most of this critical interest was the notational systems themselves.

The crucial role of the transcriber as the user of a notational system in the very process of transcribing, and the role of the reader who is the consumer of the notational system have still not been adequately studied. This neglect also entails a lack of concern about reliability and validity in the use of the notational systems, both on the part of the transcriber and on the part of the transcript reader. Transcription theory has been concerned with the selection of adequate notation signs, but not with the psychological processes involved in using them.

Apart from these systems, however, there has been some concern regarding reliability and validity in the transcribing activity itself. Most of this research has concerned children's and pathological spoken discourse (e.g. Oller & Eilers 1975; Pye, Wilcox & Siren 1988; Shriberg, Kwiatkowski & Hoffmann 1984); but O'Connell & Kowal (1994b) as well as Lindsay & O'Connell (1993) and Kowal & O'Connell (1995) have found similar problems with the transcribing of normal adult spoken discourse.

2. Speaking: The behavior under consideration

Although there is some research available on transcription from the written (e.g. Keseling, Wrobel & Rau 1987: 349–365; Matsuhashi 1987: 208ff), from the silently read (e.g. Rayner & Pollatsek 1989: 116), and from the signed (e.g. Boyes Braem 1990: 29ff; Prillwitz et al. 1989), our coverage in this article is restricted to transcription from spoken discourse.

2.1 The verbal component

Spoken discourse always involves an audible sequence of sounds. This sequence constitutes the segmental verbal component in transcription. There are traditionally four ways of encoding this component: standard orthography, literary transcription, eye dialect, and phonetic transcription.

The most common way of representing the verbal component of spoken discourse is by means of *standard orthography,* i.e. the spelling given to lexical items (words) in a standard dictionary of the language such as *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary.* 11th ed. (2003). In any case in which a speaker deviates from standard pronunciation, the transcription will clearly have a loss of information if that deviation cannot be recorded in standard orthography.

The *literary transcription* method is a convenient way of taking into account deviations of pronunciation. Ehlich (1993: 126) identifies this method as involving "systematic departures from the standard orthographic rendering of an item but in a manner that is meaningful to someone familiar with the orthographic system as a whole". The example he gives is the use of "*ye*" for "*your* [sic]" in the transcription of a Yorkshire dialect.

Eye dialect is a method of transcribing the verbal component of spoken discourse that is somewhat less systematic than literary transcription, but at the same time takes into account a greater amount of deviation. It is, in fact, a sort of pseudo-phonetic transcription, an effort to encode impressionistically all relevant sound categories. Edwards (1992b: 368) describes eye dialect as "an impressionistic extension of English spelling". She offers the following examples: *uv* for *of, cuz* for *because,* and *askedche*

for *asked you.* Eye dialect has its origin in fiction, where it serves the purpose of verisimilitude. Its scientific use has been primarily in ethnomethodological research, where the emphasis is on everyday conversation. The criticisms of eye dialect include "uninformativeness, inconsistency, ambiguity, faulty phonetics, and poor readability" (Edwards 1992b: 368). Gumperz & Berenz (1993: 96ff) add that "eye dialect tends to trivialize participants' utterances by conjuring up pejorative stereotypes".

Phonetic transcription yields a representation of the phonetic categories sequentially realized in a corpus of spoken discourse. For example, what in eye dialect might appear as *cuz* may be phonetically encoded as [k^h^z] (Edwards 1993b: 20). The representation may be either 'broad' (minimal) or 'narrow' (comprehensive) (see e.g. Kohler 1977: 145). Hence it is ideally suited for producing detailed transcripts. But except in research in which phonetic considerations are themselves of importance (including research on previously undocumented languages), this method of transcribing spoken discourse is not commonly used. The disadvantages of phonetic transcription are that special training is needed both to transcribe and to read the notations of the International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA) and that the notations are not all accessible on word-processor keyboards, much less on ordinary typewriters. The problem of accessibility has been addressed through a Machine Readable Phonetic Alphabet (MRPA) that makes use only of the characters of a standard keyboard (Taylor 1990: 184ff). Note, however, that phonetic transcription is definitely to be recommended "in the study of children's early morphosyntactic development" (Johnson 2000: 199) because of phonological variability.

Kelly & Local (1988: 198) have pointed out still another disadvantage of IPA: "It is not well suited to work on the systematics of conversation", not because it gives too much detail, but quite the contrary, because it does not provide enough phonetic detail. Accordingly, they recommend "a notational system that is theoretical and, in principle, indeterminately large" and results in what they refer to as "impressionistic transcription" — transcriptions reflecting all possible idiosyncracies of individual utterances. The singular advantage of Kelly & Local's impressionistic transcription is that it pinpoints the rich, unique detail of an individual spoken corpus. Although such very detailed transcription systems have been used throughout the larger part of the 20th century in dialect studies, nothing approaching such detail has been incorporated in any of the transcription systems to be considered below.

2.2 The prosodic component

The prosodic component includes the features of pitch, duration, and loudness. The terms 'emphasis' and 'stress' both subsume one or more of these features indiscriminately. The features are typically represented by discrete graphic units interposed among the verbal segments. An example of such a prosodic transcript of falling pitch (\), lengthening

(=), and loud quality (<F F>) according to Du Bois et al. (1993: 56, 59, 68) would be the following:

(1) <F It's co=ld in here F>.\

But since pitch, duration, and loudness are essentially both continuously variable and suprasegmental, they cannot adequately be represented by interposed, discrete graphic units.

The continuous variability over time in the prosodic component calls for a notation beyond the discrete graphic units that are primarily intended to encode the verbal. For example, the graphemic transcript of a simple utterance such as *by no means* cannot represent any of the following continuant and variable dimensions: a pitch varying from 150 to 170 Hz, duration varying from 0.3 to 0.6 sec, and loudness varying from 16 to 20 dB. Although all the current transcription systems include notations for prosody, none of them can cope with these dimensions adequately. Ehlich's (1993: 129) "supralinear notations" for increasing (> > > >) and decreasing (< < < <) tempo come closest to an iconic representation of continuous and suprasegmental variation in duration:

		<<<<		>>>>
(2)	It's	cold	in	here.

2.3 The paralinguistic component

The paralinguistic component includes vocal features that occur during speaking but are not themselves linguistic in nature. Examples would include laughter, breathing, aspiration, sighing, and crying. Paralinguistic components may occur as separate segments (e.g. a speaker who stops speaking for a moment in order to laugh), or they may occur superimposed upon verbal segments (e.g. a speaker who produces an utterance laughingly, i.e. the audible quality of one or more sequential syllables is altered by the laughter). In the latter case the same problems arise as with the prosodic component, namely the inadequacy of static graphic symbols to represent continuous variability over time. To date, there exist no conventional notations that incorporate a phonology of paralinguistic phenomena.

2.4 The extralinguistic component

It is difficult in principle to exclude from the extralinguistic component any concurrent event or circumstance which is not already included in the prosodic and paralinguistic components and yet influences the spoken discourse in some way. The extralinguistic component can vary as widely as a nod from an interlocutor to the light from a nearby traffic signal or the sound of a burglar alarm. Cook (1990: 1) refers to this broad spectrum of phenomena as the problematic of "transcribing infinity". A narrow band of

this spectrum — bodily movements — has been addressed by both Birdwhistell (1960) and Pittenger, Hockett & Danehy (1960). According to Edwards (1992a: 437), "nonverbal acts" are among the three types of information that must be included in a transcript. Still, in the current transcription systems reviewed in the following section, the extralinguistic component is added as optional description, or as "researcher's comment" (Du Bois 1991: 105), or as "nonlexical phenomena, both vocal and nonvocal, that interrupt the lexical stretch" (Gumperz & Berenz 1993: 121), or finally as *"changeable headers"* and *"dependent tiers"* (MacWhinney 1991: 122 & 125). Ehlich (1993: 138) includes extralinguistic notation, but adds it as a sort of ad hoc description of "the body parts involved in a gesture, in conjunction with *l* and *r,* for 'left' and 'right,' respectively". For example, a speaker whose hands *(HA)* remain folded while she or he is speaking is represented as *"---------- HA folded----------"* (Ehlich 1993: 139; our translation).

3. Current transcription systems

In addition to the well-established transcription system devised by researchers in the Survey of English Usage in London and Lund (see Svartvik & Quirk 1992), which is still widely used especially in northern Europe, there are at least five systems in current use for transcribing spoken discourse, those of John W. Du Bois (1991), Konrad Ehlich (1993), John Gumperz & Norine Berenz (1993), Gail Jefferson (1988), and Brian MacWhinney (1991). A comparison of the Jefferson, Du Bois, and MacWhinney systems with several German transcription systems is presented in Kowal & O'Connell (2003). They found that, across these American and German systems, there is general agreement as to *what* is to be transcribed, but little agreement as to *how* to do so. It would appear that there is to date no single widely accepted system for any or all of the scientific disciplines that require transcription of spoken discourse.

Part of the variety springs from the historical purposes for which the methods were originally devised. Although Ehlich's system dates from 1976 (Ehlich & Rehbein 1976), it was originally intended primarily for German. The other four systems originate in the American English tradition. Of them, Jefferson's has the most seniority and enjoys a more extensive use within the ethnomethodological tradition than any of the others (see O'Connell & Kowal 1994a). Although the transcription system of Gumperz & Berenz (1993: 92) is very similar to that of Jefferson, the authors distinguish it by emphasizing in their approach "the rhetorical impact" of "pausing, timing of exchanges, rhythm, prosody, and other paralinguistic signs" "in affecting the *situated interpretations* on which the conduct and outcome of the exchange depends". They refer to their approach as a "basically functional perspective".

Du Bois, on the other hand, is concerned about the computerization of his transcription notation. Hence, he, more than any of the other authors, spells out a

set of principles for the design of his system. Finally, MacWhinney adds to this preoccupation with computerization yet another concern, the desirability of archival data, particularly those data concerned with first-language acquisition. We proceed now to a thumbnail sketch of each of these transcription systems.

3.1 Du Bois' discourse transcription (DT)

Among all the authors of transcription systems, John W. Du Bois is unique insofar as he builds his discourse transcription (DT) system *ab initio* and top down and defines it "as the process of creating a written representation of a speech event so as to make it accessible to discourse research" (Du Bois et al. 1993: 45). In keeping with Ochs' (1979) position, it is important for him that "transcription is theory" (Du Bois 1991: 71). Accordingly, he proceeds to articulate transcription design principles summarized in a set of five maxims (1991: 78):

1. *Category definition*: Define good categories.
2. *Accessibility*: Make the system accessible.
3. *Robustness*: Make representations robust.
4. *Economy*: Make representations economical.
5. *Adaptability*: Make the system adaptable.

On the one hand, these maxims are so stated that no one could disagree with them or wish to deliberately violate them. On the other hand, they are articulated at a level of generality that is not particularly helpful in specifying the details of a transcription system.

Essentially, what Du Bois has done is to select a set of signs for notation and declare them good, accessible, robust, economical, and adaptable. He provides no empirical evidence that his notation system is preferable to any other with respect to these qualities, nor does he establish that these five qualities are the necessary and sufficient ones for adequate notation.

Du Bois has presented a standard keyboard-friendly set of notation signs for discourse transcription and has plausibly grounded them in his design principles. What is still needed is research on the use of these signs in accordance with Du Bois et al.'s (1993: 45) own emphasis on the "process of creating a written representation".

An example of a transcript in DT is the following (Du Bois 1991: 77):

(3) ((LUNCH))
L: .. But 'they never 'figured ^out what he had?
R: … He had ^pneumonia.
… [The ^second 'week] he had 'pneu@monia,
M: [^Eventually].

For the verbal component, Du Bois uses standard orthography. Most of the additional signs are prosodic (104 ff): Double and triple periods represent short and medium pauses; the grave and circumflex accents represent secondary and primary accent; the question mark, the period, and the comma represent transitional continuities: appeal, final, and continuing. The square brackets indicate speech overlap, the @ symbol indicates laughter, and LUNCH in double parentheses indicates a researcher's comment.

3.2 Ehlich's heuristic interpretative auditory transcription (HIAT)

Konrad Ehlich's terminology is really an attempt to retain the acronym based on the German language name of his system: *halb-interpretative Arbeitstranskription,* which we have preferred to translate as "semi-interpretative working transcription" (O'Connell & Kowal 1994a: 84). According to Ehlich & Rehbein (1976: 23; our translation):

> This type of transcription is partially interpretative insofar as the transcriber on the one hand already structures the spoken corpus in terms of both segmentation and commentary on the basis of his own reflectively applied everyday knowledge of language, while on the other hand he imposes no further structure on the corpus by way of interpretation.

The system has been developed and applied in Europe for more than three decades now, as the original German publications indicate (Ehlich & Rehbein 1976, 1979, 1981). Essentially, Ehlich's system is quite like Du Bois' in that it is based on a listing and explication of a set of notational signs and rules for their usage. Also similar to Du Bois is Ehlich's (1993: 125) reliance on a set of criteria for an adequate and useful transcription system: "(a) simplicity and validity, (b) good readability and correctability, and (c) minimum of transcriber and user training". However, this is the sole mention of validity and no further preoccupation with the process of transcribing is in evidence.

Peculiar to Ehlich's (1993: 125) notation system is what he refers to as its *"score notation"* by analogy to musical scores: "Semiotic events arrayed horizontally on a line follow each other in time, whereas events on the same vertical axis represent simultaneous acoustic events" (1993: 129). Score notations have also been suggested by both Fishman (1978: 402) and Eckert (1993: 60ff) quite independently of Ehlich. In Ehlich's score notation, the verbal component is represented in literary transcription. Periods, commas, and question marks in their functions as "standard orthographic punctuation" represent "basic intonation" (1993: 128). Hyphens/dashes indicate intonation, and slashes are used to indicate that the immediately preceding element is interrupted. Arrows pointing upwards or downwards, linking different parts of an exchange, are introduced for what Du Bois et al. (1993: 84) have referred to as "*presentation* of transcriptions": they help the reader to follow score notation at ambiguous places.

3.3 The transcription system of Gumperz & Berenz

John Gumperz and Norine Berenz first published their transcription system in the mid 1990s (Gumperz & Berenz 1993). It has been developed out of a tradition of ethnographic fieldwork in urban institutions. Peculiar to their approach is the following goal:

> To set down on paper all those perceptual cues that past research and ongoing analyses show participants rely on in their online processing of conversational management signs. (1993: 92).

This attempt to adopt the perspective of the participants leads Gumperz & Berenz (1993: 101) to an "interpretive approach to transcription". For example, unlike Du Bois et al. and Ehlich, they do not time speech pauses, but instead assess them perceptually. But like Du Bois et al. and Ehlich, their transcription system is limited to the presentation of a set of notation signs, without empirical evidence for their usefulness.

The following example is taken from a consultation between a medical student and her supervising physician (Gumperz & Berenz 1993: 115):

(4) 14. S: ==um so, i think this may be just post traumatic/
15. ==because it's- {[f] it's been about three months/}
16. but the pain's been redu- {[dc] has been reducing/}
17. ==it's not- definitely not *increased/

In the example, the verbal component is represented in standard orthography. For purposes of computer search, all text is required to be in lower case letters, hence the 'i' instead of 'I' as the only exception to the rule. Double equal signs indicate that the turn following the signs is latched to the preceding turn. The comma indicates a "slight rise as in listing intonation", the slash a "slight final fall indicating temporary closure" (1993: 121). The 'f' in square brackets indicates more fortis tone for the entire segment enclosed in curly brackets, and 'dc' indicates deceleration of the segment in curly brackets. The hyphen indicates truncation, and the asterisk indicates normal prominence or accent.

3.4 The Jeffersonian tradition

The Jeffersonian transcription system has been adapted in many ways and for many different research purposes by other researchers in the course of time. In sharp contrast to Du Bois' system, Gail Jefferson's system has been developed over the past three decades in a bottom-up rather than top-down fashion. In fact, no explicit theoretical orientation or set of foundational principles has ever been provided for this system. It remains largely a skeletal set of variant notation signs, most often relegated to appendices of research publications. Hence, Jefferson and her colleagues are innocent of any of the theoretical abstractions characteristic of other authors.

Zimmerman & West (1975: 128) have emphasized this practical approach to transcription in the Jeffersonian tradition:

> The transcript techniques and symbols were devised by Gail Jefferson in the course of research undertaken with Harvey Sacks. Techniques are revised, symbols added or dropped as they seem useful to the work. There is no guarantee or suggestion that the symbols or transcripts alone would permit the doing of any unspecified research tasks; they are properly used as an adjunct to the tape recorded materials.

As the last sentence of the quotation indicates, researchers in the Jeffersonian tradition also emphasize the fact that transcripts are not the primary data but a derivative database. For example, Button & Lee (1987: 9) remind us:

> Nor should it be thought that transcripts are the data of conversation analysis as such. The data is naturally occurring conversation as a feature of social life, and the use of tape-recordings and transcripts is a practical strategy for apprehending it, and making it available for extended analysis.

The reminder is an important one. The danger of allowing derivative data to take on a life of their own, independent of the spoken discourse from which they originate, is very real. The search for ideal transcription systems makes this danger all the more proximate, since the primary emphasis is thereby given to transcripts rather than to the actual database. The following example is from Jefferson (1988: 167):

(5) ((telephone))

Mr F:		Got them sorted out the: tent's: the tent's up and everything,
Jessie:		Ye:s,
Mr F:	→	A:nd uh:m (0.6) uh I've just given them a mea:.l so: (.) they're gonna be uh it'll keep them warm for a while,

In the example, the verbal component is represented in literary transcription. Short underscoring indicates light stress; a colon indicates that the immediately preceding sound is prolonged; a comma indicates a slight rise in intonation; the number in parentheses indicates silent pause time in tenths of a second; and the period in parentheses indicates a "tiny 'gap'" (1988: 194). Finally, the arrow marks "an utterance that the author has referred to in the text" (Button, Drew & Heritage 1986: 110) and therefore constitutes another instance of Du Bois et al.'s (1993: 84) presentation of transcriptions.

3.5 MacWhinney's CHAT system for the CHILDES project

The *Codes for the Human Analysis of Transcripts* (CHAT) system of Brian MacWhinney (1991; see also MacWhinney & Snow 1985, 1990) has been specifically devised for use with corpora of children's language acquisition (especially CHILDES, Child Language Data Exchange System). It is also explicitly intended for computerization with a view

to archivization of such corpora. Hence, "ease of data entry" (MacWhinney 1991: 5) becomes an additional criterion for the notation system.

Edwards (1989: pages unnumbered) has criticized three outdated biases essential to CHAT:

> toward written rather than spoken language; toward a reductionist, compositional perspective on language and discourse; and toward the view of child language as defective adult language rather than as systematic in its own right.

Thereafter, this controversy continued in a series of articles. Edwards (1992a: 435) further specified "principles for archive based language research: Maximum Readability and Minimum Bias; Consistent Encoding for exhaustive computer search; Systematic Contrastiveness; and Data Comparability in elicitation, transcription and coding". MacWhinney & Snow (1992: 459), in turn, asserted that Edwards used "an overly rigid set of principles". Finally, Edwards (1993a: 209) replied that "M&S underrate the impact of corpus inconsistencies on substantive conclusions". It would appear that the controversy regarding CHAT was not thereby resolved.

Another criticism of CHAT involves the conflict between two mutually exclusive goals, both aimed for in the system: optional, variable selectivity on the one hand, and on the other, comparability of data (see O'Connell 1991: 279). An example from MacWhinney's (1991: 108) own corpus is the following:

(6) ***FAT:** you guys getting ready for school # hmm?
***MAR:** except ["] means no ["].
***FAT:** except ["] means no ["]?
***ROS:** she [!] knows that.

In the example, the verbal component is in standard orthography. The sign # indicates a silent pause. The punctuation marks are all designated as *"Utterance and Tone Unit Terminators"* (1991: 123). Quotation marks in square brackets set off a "metalinguistic reference" (1991: 48) to the preceding word, and an exclamation mark in square brackets indicates that the preceding word is stressed.

4. Conclusion: Basic principles for scientific use of transcription

In O'Connell & Kowal (1994a: 102ff) we have articulated a set of basic principles for transcription (see also the recommendations for transcribers in O'Connell & Kowal 1995: 98ff). The rationale for all of them is fundamentally the same: their usefulness for the purpose of producing orderly, simple, and clear transcripts that are readable and meaningful for the reader. These principles, however, are not intended as a vote for standardization of transcript notation (see O'Connell & Kowal 1999); quite the

contrary, they encourage notation dictated by the purposes of a given research project. In paraphrase, they are:

1. *Parsimony.* Only those components of spoken discourse that are to be analyzed should be transcribed, and only what makes analyses intelligible should be presented in transcripts for the reader.
2. *Conventionality.* Graphemes should be used only for the segmental representation of lexical items, and punctuation marks should be used only for their conventional purposes as standardized signs to clarify meaning and separate structural units (see *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary.* 11th ed. 2003).
3. *Lexical integrity.* For the sake of readability, the internal integrity of words should not be interrupted by any supernumerary signs.
4. *Objectivity.* Subjective perceptions and/or categorizations of the transcriber should not be recorded as objective measurements.
5. *One-to-one correspondence.* Signs used in transcription systems should stand for only one feature of the spoken discourse, and no feature should be represented by more than one sign.
6. *Description.* Nonphonological vocal phenomena (e.g. laughter) should be described rather than transcribed.
7. *Separation.* Descriptions, explanations, commentaries, and interpretations should be clearly distinguishable from the transcription of phonological features of spoken discourse.

A great deal of research into the empirical validity of these principles is still needed. For the present, however, they are to be considered scientific hypotheses to be further tested. For example, in all the transcription systems reviewed in Section 3, the notation of speech pauses is considered important. But whether an ethnomethodological perceptual estimation of their occurrence and duration (Couper-Kuhlen 1990: 1) suffices or whether, in accordance with our objectivity principle, physical measurement is also needed (Kowal & O'Connell 1993) can only be determined by further research. The more recent studies of Kowal & O'Connell (2000) and of Spinos, O'Connell & Kowal (2002) clearly indicate the need for physical measurement. Scholars do not know much about the psychology of the transcriber or about the psychology of the transcript reader. However, O'Connell & Kowal (2000) have shown that complex transcription systems may be too difficult to reproduce from an original source without unintended changes.

All of the principles are violated in one or another of the transcription systems reviewed in Section 3. Despite the fact that these systems overemphasize standardization, produce transcripts that are difficult to read, and fail to physically measure prosodic characteristics of spoken discourse, they remain popular, especially in sociolinguistic

research. It is interesting to note that Macaulay's (1991: 287) criticisms of transcription systems have led him quite independently to a set of principles for transcription which are remarkably identical with the principles presented here.

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