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THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

[THEORY and PRACTICE]

THIRD EDITION

Peter T. Coleman
Morton Deutsch
Eric C. Marcus

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"Professor Morton Deutsch is one of the greatest contributors of the twenty-first century to the important and crucial field of conflict resolution. His contributions have been in theory and practice, in attracting outstanding people to work with him, in stimulating superb people to carry on in their own paths. The net effect is a truly major contribution to this field, and it is summed up beautifully in this revised and enlarged edition. Highly informative, profoundly insightful, and, indeed, a definitive account of conflict resolution."

—David A. Hamburg, president emeritus, Carnegie Corporation of New York; DeWitt Wallace Distinguished Scholar; and cochair, Social Medicine and Public Policy Programs, Department of Psychiatry, New York Presbyterian Hospital and Cornell University Medical College

"This volume is an extraordinary resource, a much-needed comprehensive handbook on conflict resolution."

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"This Handbook should be on the reading list of every course in peace and conflict studies and especially on the lists used in teacher preparation courses in peace education, a field that seeks to cultivate understanding of constructive ways of confronting violence, alternatives to force and lethal conflict for the pursuit of social purposes."

—Betty Reardon, founding director emeritus, Peace Education Center, Teachers College, Columbia University

“In the past, I have been saying to all of my students at Kyushu University and the participants in my mediation trainings, ‘If you are serious about mediation, read *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution* .’ Now seeing the updated and enlarged edition, I would say, ‘Read it, for it will help you become a thoughtful and insightful mediator.’”

—Hisako Kobayashi-Levin, associate professor, Faculty of Law, Kyushu University

The Handbook of Conflict Resolution

Theory and Practice

THIRD EDITION

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PREFACE

The field of conflict resolution continues to develop rapidly. As a consequence, we have updated and revised the second edition of this Handbook. Almost all of the chapters in the second edition have been updated; in some, the revisions have been extensive, and in others, only minor changes seemed necessary. Also, we have added new chapters on topics that were not covered or needed more coverage than they received in the first two editions. Given the scope of growth in the field, we have expanded the book considerably. And in order to make this expansion more cost effective for the readership, we have developed a new online section of the book.

The new chapters for this edition have an asterisk next to them in the Contents. They are important, original contributions to the field of conflict resolution by outstanding scholars and practitioners, as are the updated chapters from the first two editions.

In the Preface to the first edition, we characterized the purpose of the Handbook, its organization, professional value, and orientation. This book is meant for those who wish to deepen their understanding of the processes involved in conflicts and their knowledge of how to manage them constructively. It provides the theoretical underpinnings that shed light on the fundamental social psychological processes involved in understanding and managing conflicts at all levels: interpersonal, intergroup, organizational, and international.

As an area of scholarship and professional practice, conflict resolution is relatively young, having emerged as a discipline after World War II. Practice and theory have been only loosely linked. This book aims to foster closer

connection between the two by demonstrating the relevance of theoretical ideas and empirical research to practice. Although the link between theory and practice is inherently bidirectional, this book primarily emphasizes the path from theory to practice.

The theoretical ideas presented in this book were for the most part not developed specifically in relation to understanding conflict or to facilitate professional practice in this area. They have relevance to any area in which it is important to understand the basic processes in social interactions of all sorts and in various contexts—at work; in politics, schools, families, clinics, courts, and bedrooms; on highways; and elsewhere. For the purposes of this book, the authors have developed their chapters to bring out the relevance of the theories and research being discussed to understanding conflict specifically.

When appropriate, chapters are organized to address three general topics. The first deals with the theoretical ideas in the substantive area being discussed. The second draws out the implications of these ideas for understanding conflict, and the third is concerned with the implications of these ideas for educating or training people to manage their conflicts more constructively.

The Handbook of Conflict Resolution is divided into parts somewhat arbitrarily, and inevitably there is overlap among them. The introductory chapter gives examples of real conflicts and indicates the kinds of questions one might pose to understand what is going on in the conflicts—questions that are addressed in many of the chapters. The Introduction also has a brief discussion of the orientations of practitioners on the one hand and researcher-theorists on the other, to offer some insight into the misunderstandings that often occur between these two groups. It also contains an abbreviated history of the study

of conflict from a social psychological perspective and indicates the sorts of questions that have been and are being addressed.

Parts 1 through 4 comprise the major portion of the book and present the theoretical ideas that have been developed (mainly in areas of social psychology) that are useful in understanding conflict processes as well as in helping people learn to manage their conflicts constructively. The authors of the chapters in these parts discuss the practical implications of their ideas for conflict, as well as the theoretical foundations underlying the implications they draw.

Even apart from their usefulness for conflict, the theoretical ideas should be of value to anyone interested in understanding the nature of basic social psychological processes and involved in social interactions of any kind. The Contents pages for parts 1 through 4 indicate the broad range of theoretical ideas and their implications for conflict. They are grouped, arbitrarily, into interpersonal and intergroup processes, intrapsychic and intragroup processes, personal differences, and creativity and change. Almost all of the chapters discuss matters that cross such arbitrary boundaries. New chapters (chapters 3, 14, and 15) respectively deal with privilege and justice, group decision making, and gender, as they relate to conflict.

Part 5 contains four chapters that consider the relation between culture and conflict, each from a somewhat different perspective. Chapters 25 through 27 (all new chapters) examine some of the common sorts of misunderstanding that can arise when people from varying cultural backgrounds interact and what can be done to help them learn to understand one another’s cultural background. Then chapter 28 examines an influential theoretical approach to conflict resolution developed in the

United States to see how it is (or is not) applicable to conflict in the entirely different context of China.

Part 6 is concerned with difficult conflicts. Two revised chapters (29 and 30) examine aggression and violence and intractable conflict, respectively. Two new chapters have been added: chapter 31 is focused on the connections between human rights and conflicts and chapter 32 on terrorism.

Part 7 is most directly concerned with practice. Its eleven chapters are all authored by leaders in the field and focus on theory and research behind common models of practice such as negotiation (33), mediation (34), the Coleman Raider model for training in constructive conflict resolution (35), dialogue processes (36), and John Gottman's model of conflict management with couples (37). These chapters then go on to strategies for working with larger groups (38), employing group relations theory (39), reconciliation between groups (40), and employing social network theory to conflict analysis and resolution (41). Chapter 42 focuses on using research findings in practice and chapter 43 on nonviolence and conflict.

In part 8, we look to the future. Chapter 44 presents a framework for thinking about research on conflict resolution training. As of this writing, there has been little good and systematic research in this area. If the field is to develop and have a bright future, it needs more research. Chapter 45 presents the authors' views of the future directions that basic research on conflict and its resolution might well take.

The concluding chapter is an overview and commentary on the current state of the field; it considers issues such as what substantive questions need to be addressed that have not received the attention they warrant—that is, the practice as well as theoretical issues.

The final (online) section contains what we have labeled our domain-specific chapters. The expert authors of these chapters were asked to familiarize themselves with the basic processes chapters of this Handbook and then to speak to these models and practices in their chapters, making links to existing chapters explicit. They include chapters in the following domains: gender conflict in marriage (chapter 46), conflict resolution in schools (47), conflict in organizations (48), labor relations and conflict (49), law and dispute resolution (50), police and conflict resolution (51), participatory action research, conflict resolution, and communities (52), religion as a third side for peace (53), nongovernmental organizations as a vehicle for collective action (54), managing environmental conflict (55), and international conflict resolution (56).

The contributors to this edition of *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution* are an illustrious group of experts in the areas with which their chapters are concerned. We have asked them to write chapters that can be easily understood by readers who are not social scientists but are also credible to other experts in their areas. Furthermore, we suggested to them that they limit considerably the number of technical references in their chapter. Given the opaqueness of much writing in the social sciences, it is surprising how well the contributors have succeeded in writing clear, informative, interesting, useful, and authoritative chapters.

We believe *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution* is accessible and valuable to a wide variety of groups with an interest in constructive conflict management: to undergraduate and graduate students, as well as their professors, in a number of academic fields such as psychology, education, sociology, political science, business, international relations, law, social work, and health care. It is also of value to practitioners such as conflict resolution trainers and consultants, negotiators, mediators, and those

who manage or supervise others. In editing this Handbook, we have learned a great deal, so we believe that even those considered experts can find much of value in it.

One final word about the orientation of this Handbook: it is concerned with finding cooperative, win-win solutions to conflict, no matter how difficult. The “black arts” of conflict (such as violence, coercion, intimidation, deceit, blackmail, and seduction) are not discussed except, if at all, in the context of how to respond to or prevent the use of such tactics by oneself or others. In our view, such tactics are used too often, are commonly destructive and self-defeating, and are less productive in the long run than a constructive approach.

We thank our faculty colleagues who participated in an informal seminar on conflict resolution at Teachers College. The inspiration for this book emerged from the lively discussions in the seminar. We also thank Elizabeth Hernandez, Joseph Dillard, Kyong Mazzaro, Nick Redding, Christine Chung, and Regina Kim, who typed, e-mailed, did editorial work, and provided other invaluable services necessary to produce a completed manuscript.

January 2014

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New York, New York

INTRODUCTION

Morton Deutsch

In this introduction, I give some examples of conflicts and indicate the kinds of questions one might pose to understand what is going on in the conflicts—questions that are addressed in many of the following chapters. It also includes a brief discussion of the orientations of both practitioners and researcher-theorists to provide some insight into the misunderstandings that often occur between these two groups. It concludes with an abbreviated history of the study of conflict from a social psychological perspective.

A CONFLICT BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

Some time ago, I had the opportunity to do therapeutic work with a professional couple involved in bitter conflicts over issues they considered nonnegotiable. The destructiveness of their way of dealing with their conflicts was reflected in their tendency to escalate a dispute about almost any specific issue (e.g., a household chore, the child's bedtime) into a power struggle in which each spouse felt that his or her self-esteem or core identity was at stake. The destructive process resulted in (as well as from) justified mutual suspicion; correctly perceived mutual hostility; a win-lose orientation to their conflicts; a tendency to act so as to lead the other to respond in a way that would confirm one's worst suspicion; inability to understand and empathize with the other's needs and vulnerabilities; and reluctance, based on stubborn pride, nursed grudges, and fear of humiliation, to initiate or

respond to a positive, generous action so as to break out of the escalating vicious cycle in which they were trapped.

Many couples in such conflicts do not seek help; they continue to abuse one another, sometimes violently, or they break up. The couple I worked with sought help for several reasons. On the one hand, their conflicts were becoming physically violent. This frightened them, and it also ran counter to their strongly held intellectual values regarding violence. On the other hand, there were strong constraints making it difficult for them to separate. Their child would suffer; they felt they would be considerably worse off economically; and they had mutually congenial intellectual, aesthetic, sexual, and recreational interests that would be difficult to continue engaging in together if they separated. As is often the case in such matters, it was the woman, being less ashamed to admit the need for help, who took the initiative to seek the assistance of a skilled third party.

The wife, who worked (and preferred to do so), wanted the husband to share equally in the household and child care responsibilities; she considered equality of the genders to be a core personal value. The husband wanted a "traditional marriage" with a conventional division of responsibilities in which he would be the primary income-producing worker outside the home, while his wife would principally do the work related to the household and child care. The husband considered household work and child care inconsistent with his deeply rooted image of adult masculinity. The conflict seemed nonnegotiable to the couple. For the wife, it would mean betrayal of her feminist values to accept her husband's terms; for him, it would violate his sense of male adult identity to become deeply involved in housework and child care.

Yet this nonnegotiable conflict became negotiable when, with the help of the therapist, the husband and wife were

able to listen to and really understand the other's feelings and how their respective life experiences had led them to the views each held. Understanding the other's position fully, and the feelings and experiences behind them, made each person feel less hurt and humiliated by the other's position and readier to seek solutions that would accommodate the interests of both. They realized that with their joint incomes, they could afford to pay for household and child care help that would enable the wife to be considerably less burdened by such responsibilities without increasing the husband's chores in these areas (though doing so, of course, lessened the amount of money they had available for other purposes).

This solution was not perfect for either partner. Each would have preferred that the other share his or her own view of what a marriage should be like. But their deeper understanding of the other's position made them feel less humiliated and threatened by it and less defensive toward the other. It also enabled them to negotiate a mutually acceptable agreement that lessened tensions despite the continuing differences in basic perspective. (See Deutsch, 1988, for further discussion of negotiating the nonnegotiable.)

AN INTERGROUP CONFLICT AT A SCHOOL

A conflict has developed between two groups of teachers at a high school in New York City: the Black Teachers Caucus (BTC) and the newly formed Site-Based Management (SBM) Committee. The SBM committee's eighteen members consist of the principal, the union chairperson, a representative from the parents' association, a student, and an elected teacher representative from each academic department. All of the SBM members are European

American, with the exception of an African American teacher chosen from the math department.

At the last SBM meeting, the math teacher proposed that an official voting seat be designated for an African American teacher. After much heated discussion, the proposal was voted down. But the problems raised by the proposal did not go away. Much personal bitterness has ensued.

The school has experienced a recent demographic shift from a predominantly white student body to one that is now mainly composed of students of color. This has occurred for two reasons. First, there has been a large influx of students of color from the city-owned housing projects constructed in the district during the past two years. Second, as a result, the number of science-oriented students coming from other parts of the city has dropped.

The student population is now 40 percent African American, 30 percent Latino American, 25 percent European American, and 5 percent Asian American. The faculty is 90 percent European American and 10 percent African American. The parents' association is 100 percent European American.

The Position of the BTC

The BTC believes that the SBM committee needs its input to make the changes needed—specifically, the curriculum is Eurocentric and many school policies are out of touch with the cultural perspective of the current student population. In addition, the caucus is very concerned about an increase in bias-related incidents in the community and wants to initiate antiracism classes at all grade levels.

The members of the BTC believe that although the majority of the management committee members are sincerely

interested in bringing about positive school change and are good, dedicated teachers, they lack personal understanding of the impact of racism on the African American experience. Some even seem to still value the old melting-pot approach to race relations, a position the caucus members believe is naive and dysfunctional when it comes to positive educational change.

The BTC believes that having its representative present as a voting member on the committee will add a needed multicultural and antiracist perspective at this critical time of change. The caucus wants to be part of this change and will not take no for an answer.

The Position of the European American SBM Committee Members

There are many reasons the European Americans voted against an African American seat on the SBM committee, and they deeply resent the implication that they are racists for so doing. First, they believe that if any particular black teacher wants a seat, he or she should go through regular democratic procedures and get elected by the respective department. New elections will be held in May.

Second, it would not be fair to give a special seat to the black teachers without opening up other seats for the Latino, Asian, Jewish, Greek, or “you name it” teachers. SBM is about department representation, the members say, not about representation based on race or ethnicity.

Third, designating a seat for blacks or establishing quotas of any kind based on race would give the appearance of catering to pressure from a special-interest group and be difficult to explain to the rest of the faculty and the parents’ association. They believe that the best direction for the school and society as a whole is a color-blind policy that would assimilate all races and ethnic groups into the great

American melting pot. The site management members sincerely believe that they do not discriminate because of race, and they resent the implication that they are incapable of teaching children of color.

The principal of the school, who is strongly committed to both site-based management and multiculturalism, very much wants this conflict to be resolved constructively. After several months of unproductive discussions between the two groups, during which they become progressively hardened in their respective positions, the principal calls in a mediator to help the groups resolve their conflict. By various means over a period of time, she—as well as the principal—encourages a civil problem-solving discussion of the issue. Together the groups brainstorm and come up with twenty-seven ideas for handling the problem. Ultimately they agree on one solution as being the best: each year the principal will appoint seven faculty members to a multicultural task force that reflects the student composition. Two of the task force members will also be members of the SBM committee, one to be elected by the task force members and one selected from the ethnic group most heavily represented in the student population.

The solution, though not perfect, is acceptable to both sides and is implemented to the satisfaction of the teachers. It goes on contributing to the reduction of intergroup tensions as well as to the effectiveness of the SBM committee.

THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND

As Cairns and Darby (1998) point out, “The conflict in Northern Ireland is at its most basic a struggle between those who wish to see Northern Ireland remain part of the United Kingdom and those who wish to see the reunification of the island of Ireland” (p. 754). The roots of

the conflict go back centuries to the period when the English colonized the island, occupied 95 percent of the land, and introduced a community of foreigners (mainly Scottish Protestants) in Northern Ireland. They became a majority in this area, in contrast to a Catholic majority in the Republic of Ireland.

Cairns and Darby (1998) also state that “years of oppression by the colonists and rebellion by the native Irish culminated in the Treaty of 1921, which partitioned the island into two sections: the six predominantly Protestant counties of the North, which remained an integral part of the United Kingdom, and the twenty-six mainly Catholic counties of the South, which separated from the United Kingdom” (p. 755) and ultimately became known as the Republic of Ireland. Despite the partition, significant violence has occurred periodically in Northern Ireland.

The use of the terms *Catholic* and *Protestant* to label the conflicting groups is not meant to indicate that the conflict is primarily a religious one, although that is an element. A small sector of the Protestant population is virulently anti-Catholic and fears for its religious freedom if union occurs with the Republic of Ireland, whose population is 98 percent Catholic. The Irish Roman Catholic hierarchy has heavily influenced its laws in such matters as divorce and birth control.

Other elements come into play as well. The Catholics mainly consider themselves to be Irish, while the Protestants prefer to be viewed as British. Economic inequality has been an important factor in fueling the conflict: there has been considerably more unemployment, less education, and poorer housing among the Catholics as compared with the Protestants. The two communities are largely separated psychologically even though they are not always physically separated. Each has developed separate

social identities that affect how the members in each community view themselves and the people of the community. The social identities of the two groups have been negatively related until recently: a perceived gain for one side is usually associated with a perceived loss for the other.

Although the costs of the intergroup conflict in Northern Ireland have been relatively small compared to ethnic conflicts in areas such as Rwanda, Lebanon, Bosnia, Sri Lanka, Kosovo, and Syria, they have not been insignificant. Taking into account population size, the deaths due to violence in Northern Ireland are equivalent to 500,000 deaths in the United States. There are not only the direct costs of violence in terms of death and injury (about 3,000 killed and 30,000 injured between 1969 and 1994) but also the indirect, harder-to-measure economic and mental health costs. Some of these costs were borne by England: the economic, psychological, and political toll from seeing some of its soldiers attacked and killed in an attempt to control the violence.

Over the years, various attempts have been made to reduce the explosiveness of the conflict, including efforts by the Northern Ireland government to improve the economic situation of the Catholics, stimulation of intergroup contact under favorable circumstances, conduct of intergroup workshops for influential leaders in both groups, organization of women's groups that conducted demonstrations against violence, integration of some of the Catholic and Protestant schools, recognition and honoring of the cultural traditions of both groups, and so forth. Many of these efforts were sabotaged by extremist groups on both sides. However, cumulatively they began to create the recognition that peaceful relations might be possible and that continued violence would not lead to victory for either

side. Most of the ordinary people on both sides became increasingly alienated from the perpetrators of violence.

The conditions for possible successful negotiation of a solution to the conflict were beginning to develop. The heads of three interested and concerned governments—President Bill Clinton of the United States, Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain, and Prime Minister Bertie Ahern of Ireland—played key roles in getting the leaders of the various factions involved in the conflict to the negotiating table. Appointing former US senator George Mitchell, a highly respected and influential political figure, as a mediator was an important, positive step. He was acceptable to both sides and was a well-practiced, skilled political mediator.

There have been substantial popular votes in Northern Ireland as well as in Ireland in favor of an agreement negotiated among leaders of the main Protestant and Catholic factions in Northern Ireland that was hoped would end their protracted, sometimes violent conflict. The agreement was developed with the aid of a skillful mediator, and with strong pressures from the leaders of the three interested governments in constant telephone contact with the negotiators during the difficult phases of the process. In coming to an agreement, each of the conflicting parties had to modify long-held positions, reduce their aspirations, and act with greater civility toward one another, as well as bring the extremists in their groups under control. This was difficult to do. The level of distrust among the conflicting groups is still very high despite the agreement. Its successful implementation over a period of time requires a high level of vigilance among those committed to preventing misunderstandings or the actions of extremists from unraveling it. The agreement itself was a creative attempt to respond to the apprehensions as well as interests of the various participants in the conflict. Its

achievement was honored in 1998 by the Nobel Peace Prize, awarded to John Hume and David Trimble, the leading negotiators for the Catholics and Protestants, respectively.

Ed Cairns, a social psychologist at the University of Ulster in Northern Ireland, e-mailed me on November 5, 2005, with his views of what has happened since the agreement. He indicated that the agreement led to the setting up of a regional parliament known as the Northern Ireland Assembly. This made a good start and included ministers from all parties, even those initially opposed to the agreement. However, the assembly has had a stop-start existence and has been suspended more often than it has been in action. These suspensions came about largely because of Protestant and Unionist perceptions that the IRA was refusing to decommission its weapons as required by the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. No weapons were decommissioned until 2001, and the final decommissioning was not announced until 2005. In between, however, there were allegations that the IRA had been involved in espionage, training Colombian guerrillas, and a major bank robbery.

Sinn Fein has also pointed out that Loyalist paramilitaries, which tend to be smaller organizations, have not offered to decommission and are now believed to be involved in racketeering and major crime. Furthermore, although there have been major changes to the policing system, Sinn Fein believed that all the reforms promised in the agreement have not yet been implemented.

The IRA’s refusal to decommission cost David Trimble, the main Unionist leader at the time of the agreement and in the assembly, dearly. He had entered into the government with Sinn Fein—seen by most as the political wing of the IRA. However, Protestants felt that Catholic/Nationalists

had most of their demands met—for example, by the release of “political” prisoners and the disbandment of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, but had given nothing in return. The result was that in the 2003 elections, Trimble lost his seat, and his party was virtually wiped out, being replaced by the more radical, antiagreement Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) led by Ian Paisley. Similarly, Sinn Fein made gains in the 2003 elections replacing the Social Democratic and Labour Party SDLP (founded by John Hume) as the largest Catholic/Nationalist party.

Generally these electoral moves have been reflected in social surveys in which a majority of Protestants report that in 2013 they would be unlikely to vote again for the agreement had they the opportunity to do so. Demographic trends also suggest a worsening of intergroup relations indicating that Northern Ireland is entering a period of “benign apartheid,” with segregation now worse than it was before the troubles began in 1968. Observers are in agreement, then, that one lesson from Northern Ireland is that a peace agreement does not necessarily lead straight to a postconflict era but instead may be followed by a postagreement phase, which may last a considerable period of time.

Despite mostly gloomy news, the original Good Friday Agreement is still in existence, large-scale violence is unknown, and there is general agreement that no appetite exists among politicians, the people, or indeed the (former) terrorists for a return to out-and-out violence.

To make recommendations for improving the situation in Northern Ireland, Shapiro (2012) in his case study of the conflict in Northern Ireland, indicates that the problems still exist in fully implementing the argument. He employs his relational identity theory (RIT), which emphasizes the importance of achieving social-emotional relationships

between the conflicting parties that incorporates two main value affiliations: building positive, cooperative relations with one another at both the personal and collective levels, and autonomy, which means respecting the other, including the other's right to have existential equality to one's own identity, to be independent, and to have freedom. Shapiro's important point that the successful implementation of an agreement depends not only on the quality of the substantive agreement but also on the social-emotional relationship developed between the parties making the agreement.

SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT CONFLICT

Conflicts such as these three suggest many questions pertinent to conflicts of all sorts—interpersonal, intergroup, and international. These questions relate to fundamental processes that have been studied extensively by social psychologists. The chapters in this book address many of the fundamental social psychological processes involved in conflict and develop the implications of these processes for understanding conflict and for managing conflicts more effectively. Here is an outline of some of the processes affecting conflict that are addressed in one or more chapters.

- *Cooperation-competition* . Each of the conflicts I have described had a destructive phase characterized by a win-lose or competitive orientation to the conflict. What determines whether a conflict takes a destructive, win-lose course or a constructive, cooperative, problem-solving one?
- *Social justice* . All of the parties in the three conflicts had initially differing conceptions of what would be a

fair resolution. What are the important sources of perceived injustice?

- *Motivation* . What needs do the parties in conflict have? Are their needs the same as their positions? What motives foster conflict, and which are fostered by conflict and tend to perpetuate it? Which facilitate constructive conflict resolution?
- *Trust* . Distrust is common whenever a conflict takes a destructive course. What processes give rise to trust, and which give rise to distrust?
- *Communication* . Faulty communication engenders misunderstanding, which may lead to conflict, and conflict often leads to a breakdown of communication. What are the characteristics of effective communication in terms of the communicator and the listener? What can be done to develop such communication?
- *Language* . What role does language use play in affecting the course of conflict? Do metaphors, images, and words relating to war (e.g., *battle, struggle, fight, coercion, defeat, enemy, suspicion*) dominate the discourse and competition relating to conflict, or does the language use reflect terms related to cooperation and peace (e.g., *constructive controversy, problem solving, creativity, mutual enlightenment, persuasion, trust*)?
- *Attribution processes* . Our emotional responses toward the actions of another are very much influenced by what intentions we attribute to the other, as well as how much responsibility for the actions we attribute to that person. What are the nature and consequences of common errors in attribution?
- *Emotions* . What emotions make a constructive conflict resolution less or more likely? What gives rise to these

emotions? How can one control one's destructive emotions during a conflict?

- *Persuasion* . In most negotiations and conflicts, much of each party's effort is channeled into attempting to persuade the other of the soundness of the former's position. What insights into the conditions resulting in effective persuasion have resulted from systematic research of the processes involved in persuasion?
- *Self-control* . Effective goal-directed actions, particularly those that have to be sustained over a period of time, require effective self-control. During the course of conflict, various distractions, unexpected events, and emotions (such as rage, wounded pride, despair, anxiety) may, when uncontrolled, lead one to lose sight of one's important, enduring needs and goals. Knowing how to keep oneself on course during a conflict is obviously valuable. What help does theory provide?
- *Power* . The distribution of power among parties in conflict and how power is employed strongly influence conflict processes. How do the bases of each party's power (including economic resources, weapons, information, legitimate authority, effective social organization) determine the type of influence exerted during a conflict?
- *Violence* . When conflict takes a destructive course, it sometimes leads to violence. What factors contribute to violent behavior? What sorts of intervention reduces the likelihood of violence?
- *Judgmental biases* . A host of misunderstandings, misperceptions, and potential biases interfere with the ability to resolve a conflict constructively. What gives rise to misunderstandings and biases, and how can their occurrence be reduced?

- *Personality* . How do unresolved self-conflict and individual personality characteristics affect how conflict is managed? How important is it to know the conflictual styles of various types of people (anxious, obsessive, analytical, and so on)?
- *Development* . What differences typically exist in managing conflict depending on whether it is between children, adolescents, or adults? How does psychological development (such as acquisition of language, increase in physical strength, and decreasing dependence on adults) affect response to conflict?
- *Group problem solving and creativity* . Constructive management of conflict can be viewed as a creative, cooperative problem-solving process in which the conflict is defined as the mutual problem to be solved. What leads to effective group problem solving, and what enables individuals to be creative in their approach to nonroutine problems?
- *Intergroup conflict* . Conflict between groups that differ in ethnicity, race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, and the like appear to have become prevalent and salient in recent years. How do the processes involved in intergroup conflicts differ from those in interpersonal conflicts?
- *Moral conflict* . Conflict over basic values (for example, “pro-choice” versus “pro-life”), which are often experienced as moral conflict, are often difficult to resolve. Why are they so difficult to resolve, and what approaches have been developed to manage such conflicts constructively?
- *Religious conflict* . Despite the fact that the major religions of the world share many values, religious differences have given rise to many destructive conflicts.

Why? It is also evident that religious leaders have often been instrumental in preventing deadly conflict. How can leaders of the different religions be encouraged and helped to foster more cooperative relations among the different religions and more constructive conflict resolution within their own communities?

- *Family and gender conflict* . Some of the most destructive interpersonal conflicts occur within families and between genders, between spouses, and between parents and children. What are the conflicts about, why are they so emotionally intense, and how can the participants learn to manage their conflicts constructively?
- *Organizational conflicts* . Most of us spend a considerable portion of our lives in organizations: as students in schools, as workers in economic organizations, as citizens in community organizations, and so on. We experience interpersonal conflicts with peers, subordinates, or superordinates; intergroup conflicts with other groups within our organizations; and interorganizational conflicts with other organizations. How are such conflicts managed constructively?
- *Culture* . How does the culture in which an individual or group is embedded affect how conflicts develop and are managed? What problems do negotiators from diverse cultural backgrounds face?
- *Intractable conflicts* . Difficult, long-standing, intractable conflicts occur at all levels—interpersonal, intergroup, and international. When are such conflicts “ripe” for intervention? What methods of intervention are likely to be productive? How can reconciliation and forgiveness be encouraged between historically bitter enemies?

- *Mediation* . Third-party intervention, such as mediation, can sometimes help people resolve their conflicts when they are unable to do so by themselves. When is mediation likely to be effective? What are the processes involved in mediation?
- *Managing conflict in large groups* . When the conflict occurs among factions within a large group, are there ways of bringing the total group, or its relevant components, together so that the group as a whole can contribute to resolving the conflict?
- *Constructive controversy* . Conflict can take the form of lively, constructive controversy, which stimulates creativity and richer thought processes; yet differences in belief and opinion often produce quarrels that lead to hardening of positions and breakdown of relations. What leads to lively controversy rather than deadly quarrel?
- *Culture and conflict* . Is conflict theory, largely developed in Western culture, applicable elsewhere? Can it be usefully applied in China, for example? What modifications, if any, are necessary for other cultures?
- *Teaching the knowledge, attitudes, and skills of constructive conflict* . What are the methods employed by some of the most experienced educators (practitioners and trainers to help students acquire the knowledge, attitudes, and skills of constructive conflict resolution)?
- *Research* . The field of conflict resolution is relatively young. There is still much basic research needed to acquire fundamental knowledge about all of the issues mentioned in this list. What are the most important and urgent questions to investigate? Also, there are many practitioners doing training and intervening in relation to many different kinds of conflicts. There is much need

for research that helps us to know what kinds of intervention or training, with what kinds of clients, in what sorts of circumstances, produce what types of effects.

These and other questions relevant to all sorts of conflict are addressed in one or more of the chapters of this Handbook—sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly by articulating the fundamental social psychological processes that occur in all sorts of conflict.

SOME DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ORIENTATION OF THEORISTS AND PRACTITIONERS

Inevitable differences in theory and practice orientations can lead to misunderstanding and alienation if these inherent differences are not understood. In many disciplines of the natural as well as social sciences, the "scientist" and the "practitioner" tend to stereotype each other: the scientist viewing the practitioner as "unscientific" and the practitioner considering the scientist to be "impractical." In the hope of fostering mutual respect and understanding of each other's orientation, the following sections contrast several aspects of each orientation.

Analytical versus the Synthetic Approach

The practitioner must synthesize the knowledge from many theories and research studies; she must make a collage or mosaic of many theoretical ideas of the kind presented in this book rather than relying on any single one. In contrast, the theorist-researcher generates knowledge by analysis and isolation of the object of inquiry; the focus is often

narrowly defined. Breadth of theoretical knowledge is more important for the practitioner than precision, consistency, or elegance, although the opposite is true for the theoretically oriented researcher. Moreover, because there are no well-established procedures for combining theories to fit them to a given practical problem, practitioners must often work intuitively without being able to specify precisely how they are weaving together the theoretical ideas they are using. In contrast, the pressure on theorist-researchers is to be explicit and specific about their ideas and procedures.

Skeptical versus Pragmatic

The practitioner is rewarded if what he does “works” even if his practice is not grounded in well-established knowledge. Moreover, he is usually more persuasive and effective if he has a positive, confident attitude about what he is doing and recommending. The scientist knows very well that the path of progress in science is littered with discarded theories and honor goes to those who help to determine the well-established ones. Thus, it is no wonder that the professional stance of the theorist-researcher is hesitant, self-critical, and skeptical toward the theory and research that social technologists often use with a confident attitude.

Enduring versus Useful Truths

The theorist has the (rarely achieved) aim of developing knowledge that is universally true, enduringly valid for different times and places, and relevant for understanding cave people as well as astronauts, aborigines in Kakadu as well as Park Avenue sophisticates. Such theoretical knowledge is usually general and abstract, and developing its implications for specific situations requires considerable additional thought and effort. The scientist is especially

interested in developing the surprising and thus interesting implications of a theory because its validity and generality seem enhanced by the ability to predict the unexpected.

In contrast, the practitioner is necessarily concerned with the mundane and practical, namely, with those aspects of a specific situation that can be altered with minimum cost to produce the desired consequence. Her interest is more focused on the here-and-now, on the concrete aspects of the situation in which she has to work, rather than on the general and abstract. Of course, the practitioner also seeks to have general knowledge of the kind of situation and type of people with whom her model of intervention is effective, but the focus of attention is on what can be done to produce the desired effects. In practical work, it is more important to know that a child's ability to learn may be improved more easily and economically by changing motivation rather than by modifying genes, even though the child's genes may play an important role in determining ability to learn.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIZING ABOUT CONFLICT

This section of the introduction is an overview of the progress made during the past one hundred years or so in the social psychological study of conflict. The writings of three intellectual giants—Darwin, Marx, and Freud—dominated the intellectual atmosphere during social psychology's infancy. These three theorists significantly influenced the writings of the early social psychologists on conflict as well as in many other areas. All three appeared, on a superficial reading, to emphasize the competitive, destructive aspects of conflict.

Darwin stressed “the competitive struggle for existence” and “the survival of the fittest.” He wrote that “all nature is at war, one organism with another, or with external nature. Seeing the contented face of nature, this may at first be well doubted; but reflection will inevitably prove it is too true” (quoted in Hyman, 1966, p. 29).

Marx emphasized class struggle, and as the struggle proceeds, “the whole society breaks up more and more into two great hostile camps, two great, directly antagonistic classes: bourgeoisie and proletariat.” He and Engels end their *Communist Manifesto* with a ringing call to class struggle: “The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Working men of all countries, unite.”

Freud’s view of psychosexual development was largely that of constant struggle between the biologically rooted infantile id and the socially determined, internalized parental surrogate, the superego. As Schachtel (1959) has noted, “The concepts and language used by Freud to describe the great metamorphosis from life in the womb to life in the world abound with images of war, coercion, reluctant compromise, unwelcome necessity, imposed sacrifices, uneasy truce under pressure, enforced detours and roundabout ways to return to the original peaceful state of absence of consciousness and stimulation” (p. 10).

Thus, the intellectual atmosphere prevalent during the period when social psychology began to emerge contributed to viewing conflict from the perspective of “competitive struggle.” Social conditions too—the intense competition among businesses and among nations, the devastation of World War I, the economic depression of the 1920s and 1930s, the rise of Nazism and other totalitarian systems—reinforced this perspective.

The vulgarization of Darwin's ideas in the form of "social Darwinism" provided an intellectual rationale for racism, sexism, class superiority, and war. Such ideas as "survival of the fittest, "hereditary determinism," and "stages of evolution" were eagerly misapplied to the relations between human social groups—classes and nations, as well as social races—to rationalize imperialist policies. The influence of pseudo-evolutionary thinking was so strong that as a critic suggested, it gave rise to a new imperialist beatitude: "Blessed are the strong, for they shall prey upon the weak" (Banton, 1967, p. 48). The rich and powerful were biologically superior; they had achieved their positions as a result of natural selection. It would be against nature to interfere with the inequality and suffering of the poor and weak.

Social Darwinism and the mode of explaining behavior in terms of innate, evolutionary, derived instincts were in retreat by the mid-1920s. The prestige of the empirical methods in the physical sciences, the point of view of social determinism advanced by Karl Marx and various sociological theorists, and the findings of cultural anthropologists all contributed to their decline. With the waning of the instinctual mode of explaining such conflict phenomena as war, intergroup hostility, and human exploitation, two others have become dominant: the psychological and the social-political-economic.

The psychological mode attempts to explain such phenomena in terms of "what goes on in the minds of men" (Klineberg, 1964) or "tensions that cause war" (Cantril, 1950). In other words, it explains such phenomena in terms of the perceptions, beliefs, values, ideology, motivations, and other psychological states and characteristics that individual men and women have acquired as a result of their experiences and as these characteristics are activated by the particular situation and role in which people are

situated. The social-political-economic mode, by contrast, seeks an explanation in terms of such social, economic, and political factors as levels of armament, objective conflicts between economic and political interests, and the like.

Although the two modes of explanation are not mutually exclusive, there is a tendency for partisans of the psychological mode to consider that the causal arrow points from psychological conditions to social-political-economic conditions and for partisans of the latter to believe the reverse is true. In any case, much of the social psychological writing in the 1930s, 1940s, and early 1950s on the topics of war, intergroup conflict, and industrial strife was largely nonempirical, and in one vein or the other. The psychologically trained social psychologist tended to favor the psychological mode; the Marxist-oriented or sociologically trained social psychologist more often favored the other.

The decline of social Darwinism and the instinctivist doctrines was hastened by the development and employment of empirical methods in social psychology. This early empirical orientation to social psychology focused on the socialization of the individual, in part as a reaction to the instinctivist doctrine. It led to a great variety of studies, including a number investigating cooperation and competition. These latter studies are, in my view, the precursors to the empirical, social psychological study of conflict.

Field Theory, Conflict, and Cooperation-Competition

During the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, quite independent of the work being conducted in the United States on cooperation-competition, Kurt Lewin and his students were theorizing and conducting research that profoundly

affected later work in many areas of social psychology. Lewin's field theory—with its dynamic concepts of tension systems, "driving" and "restraining" forces, "own" and "induced" forces, valences, levels of aspiration, power fields, interdependence, overlapping situations, and so on—created a new vocabulary for thinking about conflict and cooperation-competition.

As early as 1931, employing his analysis of force fields, Lewin (1931, 1935) presented a penetrating theoretical discussion of three basic types of psychological conflict: approach-approach, in which the individual stands between two positive valences of approximately equal strength; avoidance-avoidance, where the individual stands between two negative valences of approximately equal strength; and approach-avoidance, meaning the individual is exposed to opposing forces deriving from positive and negative valences. Hull (1938) translated Lewin's analysis into the terminology of the goal gradient, and Miller (1937, 1944) elaborated and did research on it. Numerous experimental studies supported the theoretical analysis.

My own initial theorizing on cooperation-competition (Deutsch, 1949b) was influenced by Lewinian thinking on tension systems, which was reflected in a series of brilliant experiments on the recall of interrupted activities (Zeigarnik), the resumption of interrupted activities (Ovsiankina), substitutability (Mahler), and the role of ego in cooperative work (Lewis and Franklin). But even more of my thinking was indebted to the ideas that were in the air at the MIT Research Center for Group Dynamics. Ways of characterizing and explaining group processes and group functioning, employing the language of Lewinian theorizing, were under constant discussion there among the students and faculty. Thus, it was quite natural that when I settled on cooperation-competition as the topic of my doctoral dissertation, I employed the Lewinian dynamic

emphasis on goals and how they are interrelated as my key theoretical wedge into this topic.

Even more important, the preoccupation at the MIT center with understanding group processes pressed me to formulate my ideas about cooperation and competition so that they would be relevant to the psychological and interpersonal processes occurring within and between groups. This pressure forced my theory and research (Deutsch, 1949a, 1949b) to go considerably beyond the prior social psychological work on cooperation-competition. My theorizing and research were concerned not only with the individual and group outcomes of cooperation and competition but also with the social psychological processes that would give rise to those outcomes. This work has central relevance to understanding the processes involved in conflict. It is summarized in chapter 1.

Game Theory and Games

In 1944, von Neumann and Morgenstern published their now-classic work, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* . Game theory has made a major contribution to the work of social scientists by formulating the problem of conflict of interest in mathematical terms. However, it is neither the mathematics nor the normative prescriptions for minimizing losses when facing an intelligent adversary that have made game theory of considerable value to social psychologists. Rather, it is the core emphasis on the parties in conflict having interdependent interests; their fates are woven together. Although the mathematical and normative development of game theory has been most successful in connection with pure competitive conflict (zero-sum games), game theory also recognizes that cooperative as well as competitive interests may be intertwined in conflict (as in coalition games or non-zero-sum games).

Game theory's recognition of the intertwining of cooperative and competitive interests in situations of conflict (or, in Schelling's useful term, the mixed-motive nature of conflict; Schelling, 1960) has had a productive impact on the social psychological study of conflict, theoretically as well as methodologically. Theoretically, at least for me, it helped buttress a viewpoint that I had developed prior to my acquaintance with game theory: that conflicts were typically mixtures of cooperative and competitive processes and that the course of conflict would be determined by the nature of the mixture. This emphasis on the cooperative elements involved in conflict ran counter to what was then the dominant view of conflict as a competitive struggle.

Methodologically, game theory had an impact on an even larger group of psychologists. The mathematical formulations of game theory had the indirect but extremely valuable consequence of laying bare some fascinating paradoxical situations in such a way that they were highly suggestive of experimental work. Game matrices as an experimental device were popular because they facilitated precise definition of the reward structure encountered by the subjects, and hence of the way they depend on one another. Partly stimulated by and partly in reaction to the research using game matrices, other research games for the study of conflict were also developed. Well over one thousand studies based on experimental games had been published by 1985. Much of this research, as is true in other areas of science, was mindless—being done because a convenient experimental format was readily available. But some of it has, I believe, helped to develop systematic understanding of conflict processes and conflict resolution. Fortunately, in recent years, experimental gaming has been supplemented by other experimental procedures and by

field studies that overcome some of the inherent limitations of experimental gaming.

Themes in Contemporary Social Psychological Research on Conflicts

Social psychological research and theorizing on conflict during the past fifty years have primarily addressed fifteen major questions (see Deutsch, 1990, for more detail about the first five):

1. *What conditions give rise to a constructive or destructive process of conflict resolution?* In terms of bargaining and negotiation, the emphasis here is on determining the circumstances that allow the conflicting parties to arrive at a mutually satisfactory agreement that maximizes their joint outcomes. In a sense, this first question arises from focusing on the cooperative potential inherent in conflict. In social psychology, this question has been most directly addressed in my work and that of my students and summarized in my 1973 book, *The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes* . All of the chapters in this Handbook are relevant; the chapters focusing on constructive controversy and cooperation-competition are most relevant.
2. *What circumstances, strategies, and tactics lead one party to do better than another in a conflict situation?* The stress here is on how one can wage conflict, or bargain, so as to win or at least do better than one's adversary. This question emerges from focusing on the competitive features of a conflict situation. It has been mainly addressed by economists and political scientists (e.g., Schelling, 1960). In social psychology, research related to this question focuses on bargaining tactics such as "being ignorant," "being tough," "being

belligerent," "the effects of threats," and how to increase one's bargaining power. This question is treated only indirectly in this Handbook, by inference, because of the book's emphasis on constructive conflict resolution.

3. *What determines the nature of the agreement between conflicting parties if they are able to reach an agreement?* Here the concern is with the cognitive and normative factors that lead people to conceive a possible agreement and perceive it as a salient possibility for reaching a stable agreement—one that each of the conflicting parties sees as "just" under the circumstances. This third question is a recent one and has been addressed under the heading of research on the social psychology of equity and justice. Chapter 2, on social justice, is most directly relevant to this question, but other chapters bear on it as well.
4. *How can third parties be used to prevent conflicts from becoming destructive or to help deadlocked or embittered negotiators move toward constructive management of their conflicts?* This question has been reflected in studies of mediation and in strategies for deescalating conflict. Chapter 34, on mediation, pertains most directly, but all of the chapters have some relevance.
5. *How can people be educated to manage their conflicts constructively?* This has been a concern of consultants working with leaders in industry and government and also with those who have responsibility for educating children in our schools. All of the chapters bear on this question. During the past twenty-five years, many additional questions have emerged as a focus of work in the field of conflict resolution as the field has expanded in popularity as well as substance.

6. *How and when should one intervene in prolonged, intractable conflicts?* Much of the literature in conflict resolution has been preventive rather than remedial in its emphasis. It is concerned with understanding the conditions that foster productive rather than destructive conflict (as in question 1) or developing knowledge about the circumstances that lead to intractable, destructive conflict in the hope of preventing such conflict. More recently, the reality that many protracted, destructive conflicts exist in the world has induced some scholars to focus their attention on this problem. In this book, the discussions of intractable conflicts (chapter 30), mediation (chapter 34), and intergroup conflict (chapter 1) are particularly relevant.
7. *How are we to understand why ethnic, religious, and identity conflicts frequently take an intractable, destructive course?* With the end of the Cold War, there appeared to be a proliferation of such conflicts. In the past thirty years, interest in such conflicts has been renewed. The chapters most directly pertaining to this question are those dealing with intergroup and cultural conflict, but almost all are relevant.
8. *How applicable in other cultural contexts are the theories related to conflict that have largely been developed in the United States and Western Europe?* In recent years, there has been much discussion in the literature of the differences that exist in how people from varying cultural backgrounds deal with negotiations and, more generally, manage conflict. We have not attempted to summarize the cultural differences that exist with regard to conflict management. However, in discussing culture and conflict (chapters 27 and 28), on applying conflict theory in China, there is discussion of the issue of cross-cultural generalizability.

9. *How do we foster reconciliation between parties who have been in a bitter, deadly, destructive conflict?* Since the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, there has been considerable interest and some research related to this question. See chapter 40 by Staub. Other chapters have relevant discussions as well—for example, the chapters on justice, trust, change, intractable conflict, and intergroup conflict (chapters 2, 5, 8, 22, and 30).
10. *How do we help people "negotiate the nonnegotiable," as in conflicts over identity, basic values, or religious conflict?* In its more extreme form, this question can be expressed in another way: How does one understand and deal with fundamentalism, terrorism, and suicide bombers? While many chapters have relevance to this question (in its less extreme form), the chapter dealing with moral and religious conflicts are focused on this issue (chapter 53).
11. *How do we understand the often implicit, theoretical presuppositions and framework about the conflict that affect one's orientation to and behaviors during conflict?* These presuppositions often reflect personality disposition, cultural influences, and life experiences. The chapters on implicit theories and conflict, personality and conflict, and culture and conflict are directly relevant (chapters 16, 17, and 25); many other chapters have indirect relevance.
12. *How do we identify ripeness, critical moments, or turning points in a conflict?* Often these crucial periods provide an opportunity to change the direction of a conflict from a destructive process to a constructive one. No chapter focuses on this specifically, but there are relevant discussions in the chapters dealing with trust,

intractable conflict, and mediation (chapters 5, 30, and 34).

13. *What are the constructive and destructive effects of emotions during conflict?* The important role of emotions during conflict has been much neglected until recently. The chapter on emotions and conflict focuses on this question (chapter 12), and many other chapters have some relevant discussion.
14. *Terrorism* . Since the terrorist attacks by Al Qaeda on September 11, 2001, there has been increased interest in understanding such questions as: What gives rise to terrorism? How does it get organized? What is the nature of its leaders? What are the psychological and demographic characteristics of those who carry out terrorist activities such as suicide bombing? Chapter 32 addresses this topic.
15. *Evaluation research* . There has been a considerable increase in research in the area of conflict research in recent years as the field has grown. The research has employed such different methodologies as experimental laboratory studies, field studies, and participatory action research. Research has focused on theory development and also on the effectiveness of various types of intervention such as mediation to resolve conflicts; reconciliation efforts after destructive conflict; workshops to help leaders and managers learn to manage organization conflicts constructively in their organizations; and education in schools to teach students at all levels the skills, knowledge, and values of constructive conflict resolution.

Although various chapters of this book have direct relevance to the questions listed here, the aim of this third edition of *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution* is not to

summarize the work done so far in the field of conflict resolution. Rather, its aim is to enrich the field by presenting the theoretical underpinnings that throw light on the fundamental social psychological processes in all levels of conflict. None of the theories is adequate to deal by itself with the complexities involved in any specific conflict or any type of conflict. As I noted previously in this chapter, each theory is a component of the particular mosaic that needs to be created to understand and manage a unique conflict constructively.

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PART ONE
INTERPERSONAL AND INTERGROUP PROCESSES

CHAPTER ONE
COOPERATION, COMPETITION, AND CONFLICT

Morton Deutsch

Some time ago in the garden of a friend's house, my five-year-old son and his chum were struggling over possession of a water hose. (They were in conflict.) Each wanted to use it first to water the garden. (They had a competitive orientation.) Each was trying to tug it away from the other, and both were crying. Each was very frustrated, and neither was able to use the hose to sprinkle the flowers as he had desired. After reaching a deadlock in this tug-of-war, they began to punch one another and call each other names. As a result of their competitive approach, the conflict took a destructive course for both of them—producing frustration, crying, and violence.

Now imagine a different scenario. The garden consists mainly of two sections, flowers and vegetables. Each kid wants to use the hose first. Let's suppose they want to resolve their conflict amicably. (They have a cooperative orientation.) One says to the other, "Let's flip a coin to see who uses the hose first." (It is a fair procedure for resolving the conflict.) The other agrees and suggests that the loser be given the right to select which section of the garden he waters. They both agree to the suggestion. (They reach a cooperative, win-win agreement.) Their agreements are implemented, and both children feel happy and good about one another. (These are common effects of a cooperative or constructive approach to a conflict.)

As this example illustrates, whether the participants in a conflict have a cooperative orientation or a competitive one is decisive in determining its course and outcomes. This

chapter is concerned with understanding the processes involved in cooperation and competition, their effects, and the factors that contribute to developing a cooperative or competitive relationship. It is important to understand the nature of cooperation and competition because almost all conflicts are mixed motive, containing elements of both cooperation and competition.

A THEORY OF COOPERATION AND COMPETITION

The theory being presented here was initially developed by Morton Deutsch (1949a, 1949b, 1973, 1985, 2011) and much elaborated by David W. Johnson (Johnson and Johnson, 2005, 2011). The Johnsons have provided the most extensive summary of the theory and the research bearing on it; their 2005 book and 2011 publication should be consulted for greater detail.

The theory has two basic ideas. One relates to the type of interdependence among goals of the people involved in a given situation. The other pertains to the type of action that the people involved take.

I identify two basic types of goal interdependence: positive (where the goals are linked in such a way that the amount or probability of a person’s goal attainment is positively correlated with the amount or probability of another obtaining his goal) and negative (where the goals are linked in such a way that the amount or probability of goal attainment is negatively correlated with the amount or probability of the other’s goal attainment). To put it colloquially, if you’re positively linked with another, then you sink or swim together; with negative linkage, if the other sinks, you swim, and if the other swims, you sink.

Few situations are purely positive or negative. In most situations, people have a mixture of goals so that it is common for some of their goals initially to be positive and some negatively interdependent. For analytical purposes, I discuss pure situations in this section. In mixed situations, the relative strengths of the two types of goal interdependency, as well as their general orientation to one another, largely determine the nature of the conflict process.

I also characterize two basic types of action by an individual: effective actions, which improve the actor's chances of obtaining a goal, and bungling actions, which worsen the actor's chances of obtaining the goal. (For the purpose of simplicity, I use dichotomies for my basic concepts; the dichotomous types of interdependence and the dichotomous types of actions are, I assume, polar ends of continua.) I then combine types of interdependence and types of action to posit how they jointly affect three basic social psychological processes that I discuss later in this chapter: substitutability, attitudes (cathexis), and inducibility.

People's goals may be linked for various reasons. Thus, positive interdependence can result from people liking one another, being rewarded in terms of their joint achievement, needing to share a resource or overcome an obstacle together, holding common membership or identification with a group whose fate is important to them, being unable to achieve their task goals unless they divide up the work, being influenced by personality and cultural orientation, being bound together because they are treated this way by a common enemy or an authority, and so on. Similarly, with regard to negative interdependence, it can result from people disliking one another or from their being rewarded in such a way that the more the other gets of the reward, the less one gets, and so on.

In addition to positive and negative interdependence, there can be lack of interdependence, or independence, such that the activities and fate of the people involved do not affect one another directly or indirectly. If they are completely independent of one another, no conflict arises; the existence of a conflict implies some form of interdependence.

One further point: asymmetries may exist with regard to the degree of interdependence in a relationship. Suppose that what you do or what happens to you may have a considerable effect on me, but what I do or what happens to me may have little impact on you. I am more dependent on you than you are on me. In the extreme case, you may be completely independent of me and I may be highly dependent on you. As a consequence of this asymmetry, you have greater power and influence in the relationship than I do. This power may be general if the asymmetry exists in many situations, or it may be situation specific if the asymmetry occurs only in a particular situation. A master has general power over a slave, while an auto mechanic repairing my car's electrical system has situation-specific power.

The three concepts of substitutability, attitudes, and inducibility are vital to understanding the social and psychological processes involved in creating the major effects of cooperation and competition. *Substitutability* (how a person's actions can satisfy another person's intentions) is central to the functioning of all social institutions (the family, industry, schools), the division of labor, and role specialization. Unless the activities of other people can substitute for yours, you are like a person stranded on a desert island alone: you have to build your own house, find or produce your own food, protect yourself from harmful animals, treat your ailments and illnesses, educate yourself about the nature of your new environment

and about how to do all these tasks, and so on, without the help of others. Being alone, you can neither create children nor have a family. Substitutability permits you to accept the activities of others in fulfilling your needs. Negative substitutability involves active rejection and effort to counteract the effects of another's activities.

Attitudes refer to the predisposition to respond evaluatively, favorably or unfavorably, to aspects of one's environment or self. Through natural selection, evolution has ensured that all living creatures have the capacity to respond positively to stimuli that are beneficial to them and negatively to those that are harmful. They are attracted to, approach, receive, ingest, like, enhance, and otherwise act positively toward beneficial objects, events, or other creatures. In contrast, they are repelled by harmful objects and circumstances and avoid, eject, attack, dislike, negate, and otherwise act negatively toward them. This inborn tendency to act positively toward the beneficial and negatively toward the harmful is the foundation on which the human potentials for cooperation and love, as well as for competition and hate, develop. The basic psychological orientation of cooperation implies the positive attitude that "we are for each other," "we benefit one another"; competition, by contrast, implies the negative attitude that "we are against one another" and, in its extreme form, "you are out to harm me."

Inducibility refers to the readiness to accept another's influence to do what he or she wants. Negative inducibility refers to the readiness to reject or obstruct fulfillment of what the other wants. The complement of substitutability is inducibility: you are willing to be helpful to another whose actions are helpful to you but not to someone whose actions are harmful. In fact, you reject any request to help the other engage in harmful actions and, if possible, obstruct or interfere with these actions if they occur.

THE EFFECTS OF COOPERATION AND COMPETITION

Thus, the theory predicts that if you are in a positively interdependent relationship with someone who bungles, the bungling is not a substitute for effective actions you intended; thus, you view the bungling negatively. In fact, when your net-playing tennis partner in a doubles game allows an easy shot to get past him, you have to extend yourself to prevent being harmed by the error. But if your relationship is one of negative interdependence, and the other person bungles (as when your tennis opponent double-faults), your opponent's bungle substitutes for an effective action on your part, and you regard it positively or value it. The reverse is true for effective actions. An opponent's effective actions are not substitutable for yours and are negatively valued; a teammate can induce you to help him or her make an effective action, but you are likely to try to prevent or obstruct a bungling action by your teammate. In contrast, you are willing to help an opponent bungle, but your opponent is not likely to induce you to help him or her make an effective action (which, in effect, harms your chances of obtaining your goal).

The theory of cooperation and competition then goes on to make further predictions about different aspects of intrapersonal, interpersonal, intragroup, and intergroup processes from the predictions about substitutability, attitudes, and inducibility. Thus, assuming that the individual actions in a group are much more frequently effective than bungling, among the predictions that follow from the theory are that cooperative relations (those in which the goals of the parties involved are predominantly positively interdependent), as compared with competitive ones, show more of these positive characteristics:

1. *Effective communication is exhibited* . Ideas are verbalized, and group members are attentive to one another, accepting of the ideas of other members and influenced by them. They have fewer difficulties in communicating with or understanding others.
2. *Friendliness, helpfulness, trust, and lessened obstructiveness* are expressed in the discussions. Members also are more satisfied with the group and its solutions and favorably impressed by the contributions of the other group members. In addition, members of the cooperative groups rate themselves high in desire to win the respect of their colleagues and in obligation to the other members.
3. *Coordination of effort, division of labor, orientation to task achievement, orderliness in discussion, and high productivity* are manifested in the cooperative groups (if the group task requires effective communication, coordination of effort, division of labor, or sharing of resources).
4. *Feeling of agreement with the ideas of others and a sense of basic similarity in beliefs and values, as well as confidence in one's own ideas and in the value that other members attach to those ideas* , are obtained in the cooperative groups.
5. *Recognizing and respecting the other by being responsive to the other's needs* .
6. *Willingness to enhance the other's power* (e.g., the knowledge, skills, resources, and so on) to accomplish the other's goals increases. As the other's capabilities are strengthened, you are strengthened; they are of value to you as well as to the other. Similarly, the other is enhanced from your enhancement and benefits from your growing capabilities and power.

7. *Defining conflicting interests as a mutual problem to be solved by collaborative effort* facilitates recognizing the legitimacy of each other's interests and the need to search for a solution responsive to the needs of all. It tends to limit rather than expand the scope of conflicting interests. Attempts to influence the other tend to be confined to processes of persuasion.

In contrast, a competitive process has the opposite effects:

1. *Communication is impaired* as the conflicting parties seek to gain advantage by misleading the other through use of false promises, ingratiation tactics, and disinformation. It is reduced and seen as futile as they recognize that they cannot trust one another's communications to be honest or informative.
2. *Obstructiveness and lack of helpfulness lead to mutual negative attitudes, distrust, and suspicion of one another's intentions* . One's perceptions of the other tend to focus on the person's negative qualities and ignore the positive.
3. *The parties to the process are unable to divide their work* , duplicating one another's efforts such that they become mirror images. If they do divide the work, they feel the need to check continuously what the other is doing.
4. *The repeated experience of disagreement and critical rejection of ideas* reduces confidence in oneself as well as the other.
5. *The conflicting parties seek to enhance their own power and reduce the power of the other* . Any increase in the power of the other is seen as threatening to oneself.
6. *The competitive process stimulates the view that the solution of a conflict can be imposed only by one side on*

the other , which leads to using coercive tactics such as psychological and physical threats and violence. It tends to expand the scope of the issues in conflict as each side seeks superiority in power and legitimacy. The conflict becomes a power struggle or a matter of moral principle and is no longer confined to a specific issue at a given time and place. Escalating the conflict increases its motivational significance to the participants and may make a limited defeat less acceptable and more humiliating than a mutual disaster.

As the conflict escalates, it perpetuates itself by such processes as autistic hostility, self-fulfilling prophecies, and unwitting commitments. *Autistic hostility* involves breaking off contact and communication with the other; the result is that the hostility is perpetuated because one has no opportunity to learn that it may be based on misunderstandings or misjudgments or to learn if the other has changed for the better.

Self-fulfilling prophecies are those wherein you engage in hostile behavior toward another because of a false assumption that the other has done or is preparing to do something harmful to you; your false assumption comes true when it leads you to engage in hostile behavior that then provokes the other to react in a hostile manner to you. The dynamics of an escalating, destructive conflict have the inherent quality of a *folie à deux* in which the self-fulfilling prophecies of each side mutually reinforce one another. As a result, both sides are right to think that the other is provocative, untrustworthy, and malevolent. Each side, however, tends to be blind to how it and the other have contributed to this malignant process.

In the case of *unwitting commitments* , the parties not only overcommit to rigid positions during the course of escalating conflict but also may unwittingly commit to

negative attitudes and perceptions, beliefs, defenses against the other's expected attacks, and investments involved in carrying out their conflictual activities. Thus, during an escalated conflict, a person (a group, a nation) may commit to the view that the other is an evil enemy, the belief that the other is out to take advantage of oneself (one's group, nation), the conviction that one has to be constantly vigilant and ready to defend against the danger the other poses to one's vital interests, and also invest in the means of defending oneself as well as attacking the other. After a protracted conflict, it is hard to give up a grudge, to disarm without feeling vulnerable, as well as to give up the emotional charge associated with being mobilized and vigilant in relation to the conflict.

As Johnson and Johnson (2005, 2011) have detailed, these ideas have given rise to a large number of research studies indicating that a cooperative process (as compared to a competitive one) leads to greater group productivity, more favorable interpersonal relations, better psychological health, and higher self-esteem. Research has also shown that more constructive resolution of conflicts results from cooperative as opposed to competitive processes.

For understanding the nature of the processes involved in conflict, this last research finding is of central theoretical and practical significance. It suggests that constructive processes of conflict resolution are similar to cooperative processes of problem solving, and destructive processes of conflict resolution are similar to competitive processes. Because our prior theoretical and research work gave us considerable knowledge about the nature of the processes involved in cooperation and competition, it is evident that this knowledge provides detailed insight into the nature of the processes entailed in constructive and destructive conflict resolution. This kind of knowledge contributes to understanding what processes are involved in producing

good or bad outcomes of conflict. There are many ways of characterizing the outcomes of a conflict: the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the parties, material benefits and costs, improvement or worsening of their relationship, effects on self-esteem and reputation, precedents set, kinds of lessons learned, effects on third parties (such as children of divorcing parents), and so on. Thus, there is reason to believe that a cooperative-constructive process of conflict resolution leads to such good outcomes as mutual benefits and satisfaction, strengthening relationships, positive psychological effects, and so on, while a competitive-destructive process leads to material losses and dissatisfaction, worsening relationships, and negative psychological effects in at least one party (the loser if it is a win-lose outcome) or both parties (if it is a lose-lose outcome).

CONSTRUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE COMPETITION

Competition can vary from destructive to constructive: unfair, unregulated competition at the destructive end; fair, regulated competition in between; and constructive competition at the positive end. In constructive competition, the losers as well as the winners gain. Thus, in a tennis match that takes the form of constructive competition, the winner suggests how the loser can improve, offers an opportunity for the loser to learn and practice skills, and makes the match an enjoyable or worthwhile experience for the loser. In constructive competition, winners see to it that losers are better off, or at least not worse off than they were before the competition.

The major difference, for example, between constructive controversy and competitive debate, is that in the former,

people discuss their differences with the objective of clarifying them and attempting to find a solution that integrates the best thoughts that emerge during the discussion, no matter who articulates them (see chapter 4 for a fuller discussion). There is no winner and no loser; both win if, during the controversy, each party comes to deeper insights and enriched views of the matter that is initially in controversy. Constructive controversy is a process for constructively coping with the inevitable differences that people bring to cooperative interaction because it uses differences in understanding, perspective, knowledge, and worldview as valued resources. By contrast, in competitive contests or debates, there is usually a winner and a loser. The party judged to have "the best"—ideas, skills, knowledge, and so on—typically wins, while the other, who is judged to be less good, typically loses. Competition evaluates and ranks people based on their capacity for a particular task rather than integrating various contributions.

By my emphasis throughout this chapter, I do not mean to suggest that competition produces no benefits. Competition is part of everyday life. Acquiring the skills necessary to compete effectively can be of considerable value. Moreover, competition in a cooperative, playful context can be fun. It enables one to enact and experience, in a nonserious setting, symbolic emotional dramas relating to victory and defeat, life and death, power and helplessness, dominance and submission—dramas that have deep personal and cultural roots. In addition, competition is a useful social mechanism for selecting those who are better able to perform the activities involved in the competition. Furthermore, when no objective, criterion-referenced basis for measurement of performance exists, the relative performance of students affords a crude yardstick. Nevertheless, serious problems are associated with

competition when it does not occur in a cooperative context and if it is not effectively regulated by fair rules. (See Deutsch, 1973, pp. 377–388, for a discussion of regulating competition.)

Fair competition is an essential ingredient of a democratic governance process as well as of an effective free market economic system. In elections (e.g., if the rules and procedures make it more difficult for those who favor one party or candidate rather than the other to vote or have their vote counted), this undermines a democratic governance process. Similarly, if bribery or political influence allows one company or industry to avoid following regulations that others are required to implement, economic efficiency and the free market are undermined.

PATHOLOGIES OF COOPERATION

As I have indicated in my writings on cooperation and competition (Deutsch, 1949a, 1949b, 1973), there is a natural tendency for cooperation to break down as a result of the very social psychological processes—substitutability, attitudes (cathexis), and inducibility—that are central to cooperation. Thus, *substitutability* , which enables the work of one cooperator to replace the work of another so that they don't have to duplicate one another's efforts, leads to specialization of function. Specialization of function in turn gives rise to specialized interests and specialized terminology and language; the likely consequence is a deterioration of group unity as those with special interests compete for scarce resources and communicate in a language that is not fully shared. Similarly, *cathexis* of other group members (the development of personal bonds between members) can lead to in-group favoritism, clique formation, nepotism, and so on. Here, the consequences are likely to be a weakening of overall group cohesion as

cliques develop, a deterioration of cooperation with other groups as in-group favoritism grows, and a lessening of group effectiveness as a result of nepotism. *Inducibility* , the readiness to be influenced positively by other group members, can lead to excessive conformity with the views of others so that one no longer makes one's own independent, unique contribution to the group. The cooperative process, as a result, may be deprived of the creative contributions that can be made by each of its members; also, those who suppress their individuality may feel inwardly alienated from themselves and their group despite their outer conformity. In addition, free riding or social loafing may occur in which some members shirk their responsibilities to the group and seek to obtain the benefits of group membership without offering the contributions they are able to make to it.

Among the procedures that are employed to prevent the impairment of cooperation are these:

- Rotation among positions and job enlargement to retard the development of specialized interests
- Fostering communication among individuals and groups with different interests to facilitate perception of common interests
- Educating and indoctrinating members so that they become group oriented
- Developing group symbols, rituals, and occasions to foster group unity and personal identification with the group
- Instituting coordinating and translating mechanisms, as well as cross-cutting memberships in specialized subgroups

- Honoring and cherishing individuality and buttressing the right to differ
- Maintaining sufficient individual accountability so that shirking can be detected and responded to with appropriate diagnostic and intervention procedures
- Engaging in periodic, independent reviews of the way the cooperative system is functioning and making the necessary repairs

The effort in maintaining effective cooperative systems and repairing them when required is considerable. When cooperation is not required and individual action is feasible, the costs of cooperation may outweigh its benefits and make the individual action preferable. However, often individual action is insufficient and cooperation is necessary. In such cases, the effort required to develop and maintain an effective cooperative process may be the only sensible alternative to the dismal consequences of failure to do so.

INITIATING COOPERATION AND COMPETITION

If we know that cooperative and competitive processes have important effects on conflict resolution, a question follows: What initiates or gives rise to one or the other process? I did much research (Deutsch, 1973) in an attempt to find the answer. The results of my many studies fell into a pattern I slowly began to grasp. They seemed explainable by an assumption I have immodestly labeled “Deutsch’s Crude Law of Social Relations”:

> The characteristic processes and effects elicited by a given type of social relationship also tend to elicit that type of social relationship, and a typical effect tends to induce the other typical effects of that relationship.

Thus, cooperation induces and is induced by perceived similarity in beliefs and attitudes, readiness to be helpful, openness in communication, trusting and friendly attitudes, sensitivity to common interests and deemphasis of opposed interests, orientation toward enhancing mutual power rather than power differences, and so on. Similarly, competition induces and is induced by the use of the tactics of coercion, threat, or deception; attempts to enhance the power differences between oneself and the other; poor communication; minimization of the awareness of similarities in values and increased sensitivity to opposed interests; suspicious and hostile attitudes; the importance, rigidity, and size of issues in conflict; and so on.

In other words, someone who has systematic knowledge of the effects of cooperative and competitive processes has systematic knowledge of the conditions that typically give rise to such processes and, by extension, the conditions that affect whether a conflict takes a constructive or destructive course. My early theory of cooperation and competition is a theory of the effects of cooperative and competitive processes. Hence, from the Crude Law of Social Relations, it follows that this theory brings insight into the conditions that give rise to cooperative and competitive processes.

This law is certainly crude. It expresses surface similarities between effects and causes; the basic relationships are genotypical rather than phenotypical. The surface effects of cooperation and competition are due to the underlying type of interdependence (positive or negative) and type of action (effective or bungling), the basic social psychological

processes involved in the theory (substitutability, attitudes, and inducibility), and the cultural or social medium and situational context in which these processes are expressed. Thus, how a positive attitude is expressed in an effective, positively interdependent relationship depends on what is appropriate to the cultural or social medium and situational context; that is, presumably one would not seek to express it in a way that is humiliating or embarrassing or likely to be experienced negatively by one's partner.

Similarly, the effectiveness of any typical effect of cooperation or competition as an initiating or inducing condition of a cooperative or competitive process is not due to its phenotype but rather to the inferred genotype of the type of interdependence and type of action. Thus, in most social media and social contexts, perceived similarity in basic values is highly suggestive of the possibility of a positive linkage between oneself and the other. However, we are likely to see ourselves as negatively linked in a context that leads each of us to recognize that similarities in values impel seeking something that is in scarce supply and available for only one of us. Also, it is evident that although threats are mostly perceived in a way that suggests a negative linkage, any threat perceived as intended to compel you to do something that is good for you or that you feel you should do is likely to be suggestive of a positive linkage.

Although the law is crude, my impression is that it is reasonably accurate; phenotypes often indicate the underlying genotypes. Moreover, it is a synthesizing principle, which integrates and summarizes a wide range of social psychological phenomena. The typical effects of a given relationship tend to induce that relationship; similarly, it seems that any of the typical effects of a given relationship tend to induce the other typical effects. For example, among the typical effects of a cooperative

relationship are positive attitudes, perception of similarities, open communication, and orientation toward mutual enhancement. One can integrate much of the literature on the determinants of positive and negative attitudes in terms of the other associated effects of cooperation and competition. Thus, positive attitudes result from perceptions of similarity, open communication, and so on. Similarly, many of the determinants of effective communication can be linked to the other typical effects of cooperation or competition, such as positive attitudes and power sharing.

SUMMARY OF THE THEORY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

In brief, the theory equates a constructive process of conflict resolution with an effective cooperative problem-solving process in which the conflict is the mutual problem to be resolved cooperatively. It also equates a destructive process of conflict resolution with a competitive process in which the conflicting parties are involved in a competition or struggle to determine who wins and who loses; often the outcome of the struggle is a loss for both parties. The theory further indicates that a cooperative-constructive process of conflict resolution is fostered by the typical effects of cooperation. The theory of cooperation and competition outlined thus far in the chapter is a well-verified theory of the effects of cooperation and competition and thus allows insight into what can give rise to a constructive or destructive process.

The theory cannot serve as a cookbook for a practitioner in the field of conflict resolution. It is a general intellectual framework for understanding what goes on in conflicts and how to intervene in them. In addition, understanding and intervening in a specific conflict requires specific

knowledge about the conflicting parties, their social and cultural contexts, their aspirations, their conflict orientations, the social norms, and so on.

Cooperation-competition, although of central importance, is only one factor influencing the course of conflict. The other chapters in this Handbook detail some of the other ingredients affecting conflict: power and influence, group problem solving, social perception and cognition, creativity, intrapsychic conflict, and personality. A practitioner must develop a mosaic of theories relevant to the specific situation of interest rather than relying on any single one. The symptoms or difficulties in one situation may require emphasis on the theoretical theme related to power; in another, it may require focusing on problem-solving deficiencies.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY FOR UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT

Kurt Lewin, a famous psychologist, used to tell his students, of whom I was one, that “there is nothing so practical as a good theory.” To this point, I have presented the basic ideas of a good theory; in what follows, I indicate their usefulness in conflict situations.

The Importance of a Cooperative Orientation

The most important implication of cooperation-competition theory is that a cooperative or win-win orientation to resolving a conflict enormously facilitates constructive resolution, while a competitive or win-lose orientation hinders it. It is easier to develop and maintain a win-win attitude if you have social support for it. The social support can come from family, friends, coworkers, employers, the

media, your community, and the culture in which you are embedded.

To have a win-win attitude in a hostile environment, it is valuable to become part of a network of people or a member of groups with similar orientations that can extend social support to you. It is also helpful to develop the personal strengths and skills that are useful in bucking the tide.

If you are the manager in a system (e.g., a principal in a school, a CEO in a company, a parent in a family), it is worthwhile to recognize that basic change in the system involves more than educating students, employees, or children to have a win-win orientation. It also involves educating yourself and other key people in the system, such as supervisors, staff, teachers, and parents, so that their actions reflect and support a win-win orientation. In addition, it often requires fundamental change in the incentive structure so that the rewards, salaries, grades, perks, and so on in the system do not foster a win-lose relationship among the people in it.

Reframing

The second most important implication of the theory has to do with the cooperative process that is involved in constructive conflict resolution. At the heart of this process is reframing the conflict as a mutual problem to be resolved (or solved) through joint cooperative efforts. Reframing helps to develop a cooperative orientation to the conflict even if the goals of the conflicting parties are initially seen to be negatively interdependent. A cooperative orientation to what is initially a win-lose conflict leads the parties to search for just procedures to determine who the winner is, as well as for helping the loser gain through compensation or other means. Reframing has inherent within it the

assumption that whatever resolution is achieved, it is acceptable to each party and considered to be just by both. This assumption is made explicit when one or both parties to a conflict communicate to the other something like, “I won’t be satisfied with any agreement unless you also feel satisfied with it and consider it to be just, and I assume that you feel the same way. Is my assumption correct?”

Thus, consider a school that is developing site-based management (SBM) procedures but faces a conflict (the second opening vignette of the Introduction to this Handbook). One group of teachers, mainly white, insists on having teachers elected to the SBM executive committee from the various academic departments by majority vote. Another group of teachers, the Black Teachers Caucus (BTC), demands that several members of the committee be from minority groups to represent their interests. This conflict can be reformulated as a joint problem: how to develop SBM procedures that empower and are responsive to the interests and needs of faculty, parents, and students from minority groups without abandoning the regular democratic procedures whereby teachers are elected to the SBM committee by their respective departments.

This joint problem is not easy to solve, but many organizations have faced and resolved similar problems. There is reason to believe that if the conflicting groups—the SBM committee members elected by their departments and the BTC—define the conflict as a joint problem to be resolved cooperatively, they can come up with a solution that is mutually satisfactory. (See chapter 2 for a discussion of resolving conflicts about what is just.)

The Norms of Cooperation

Of course, the parties are more likely to succeed in reframing their conflict into a mutual problem if the

participants abide by the norms of cooperative behavior, even when in conflict, and have the skills that facilitate effective cooperation. The norms of cooperative behavior basically are similar to those for respectful, responsible, honest, empowering, and caring behavior toward friends or fellow group members. Some of these norms, particularly relevant to conflict, are the following:

- Placing the disagreements in perspective by identifying common ground and common interests.
- When there is disagreement, addressing the issues and refraining from making personal attacks.
- When there is disagreement, seeking to understand the other's views from his or her perspective; trying to feel what it would be like if you were on the other's side.
- Building on the ideas of the other, fully acknowledging their value.
- Emphasizing the positive in the other and the possibilities of constructive resolution of the conflict. Limiting and controlling expression of your negative feelings so that they are primarily directed at the other's violation of cooperative norms (if that occurs) or at the other's defeatism.
- Taking responsibility for the harmful consequences—unwitting as well as intended—of what you do and say; seeking to undo the harm as well as openly accepting responsibility and making sincere apology for it.
- If the other harms you, be willing to forgive if the other accepts responsibility for doing so, sincerely apologizes, and is willing to try to undo it; seeking reconciliation rather than nurturing an injury or grudge.
- Being responsive to the other's legitimate needs.

- Empowering the other to contribute effectively to the cooperative effort; soliciting the other's views, listening responsively, sharing information, and otherwise helping the other—when necessary—to be an active, effective participant in the cooperative problem-solving process.
- Being appropriately honest. Being dishonest, attempting to mislead or deceive, is of course a violation of cooperative norms. However, one can be unnecessarily and inappropriately truthful. In most relationships, there is usually some ambivalence, a mixture of positive as well as negative thoughts and feelings about the other and about oneself. Unless the relationship has developed to a very high level of intimacy, communicating every suspicion, doubt, fear, and sense of weakness one has about oneself or the other is likely to be damaging to the relationship—particularly if the communication is blunt, unrationalized, and unmodulated. In effect, one should be open and honest in communication but appropriately so, realistically taking into account the consequences of what one says or does not say and the current state of the relationship.
- Throughout conflict, remaining a moral person—therefore, a person who is caring and just—and considering the other as a member of one's moral community—therefore, as a person who is entitled to care and justice.

In the heat of conflict, there is often a tendency to violate the norms of cooperation. For example, you begin to attack the other as a person ("you're stubborn," "you're selfish," "you're unreasonable," "you're inconsiderate," "you're narcissistic," "you're paranoid"). Recognize when you start to do this, stop, apologize, and explain what made you angry enough to want to belittle and hurt the other. If the other starts to do this to you, then interrupt, explain why

you are interrupting, and try to resume a mutually respectful dialogue: “You’re calling me names; that’s making me angry and makes me want to retaliate, so pretty soon we’ll be in a name-calling contest and that will get us nowhere. Let’s stick to the issues and be respectful of one another. If you’re angry with me, tell me why. If I’m at fault, I’ll remedy it.”

It is wise to recognize that you, as well as the other, have hot buttons that, if pressed, are likely to evoke strong emotions. The emotions evoked may be anxiety, anger, rage, fear, depression, withdrawal, and so on. It is important to know your own hot buttons and how you tend to react when they are pressed, so that you can control your reactions in that event. Sometimes you need to take time out to control your emotional reactions and consider an appropriate response to what elicits them. Similarly, it is valuable to know the other’s hot buttons so as to avoid pressing them and provoking disruptive emotions in the other.

The Values Underlying Constructive Conflict Resolution

The norms of cooperation and constructive conflict resolution reflect some basic values, to which people who are “profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines” can adhere (Rawls, 1996, p. xxxix). A reasonable doctrine includes conceptions of the values and norms with regard to conflict that people who adhere to another reasonable doctrine (as well as those who adhere to one’s own) can endorse and be expected to follow during conflict. Thus, pro-life and pro-choice advocates in the abortion conflict may have profoundly differing views, but they are both components of reasonable doctrines if the adherents to each are willing to follow common values in dealing with their conflict about

abortion. Among such values are reciprocity, human equality, shared community, fallibility, and nonviolence. A brief discussion of these interrelated values follows.

Reciprocity.

This is the value in the maxim, “Do unto others as you would have others do unto you.” My understanding of the maxim as it applies to conflict requires each party to treat the other with the fairness that it would normatively expect if in the other’s position. It assumes reciprocity from the other—fairness to and from the other. The fairness in behavior, process, and outcomes expected is normative. As defined by one’s culture, it is how the conflicting parties should or should not behave toward one another if they are, at a minimum, to avoid a destructive conflict or, more positively, to promote constructive management of their conflict. The norms against violence, disrespect, deceit, and irresponsibility are widespread standards for avoiding destructive conflict.

Human Equality.

This value implies that all human beings are equally entitled to just and respectful treatment, with consideration for their needs and to such basic liberties as freedom of conscience, thought, and expression, as well as freedom from coercion. You are entitled to this from the other, and the other is entitled to this from you too. Human equality does not imply that people necessarily have the same status, privileges, power, needs, or wealth. It does imply that such differences are not the consequence of one’s violation of the other’s entitlements.

Shared Community.

Implicit in constructive conflict resolution is mutual recognition of being part of a broader community that

members wish to preserve, a community sharing some key values and norms. Such recognition occurs despite important differences between oneself and the other.

Fallibility.

The sources of disagreement between reasonable people are manifold. Disagreements may arise from such sources as the nature of the evidence, the weight to be given to types of evidence, and the vagueness of the moral or other concepts involved, as well as from differences in basic values or worldviews. Reasonable people understand that their own judgment as well as the judgment of others may be fallible.

Nonviolence.

This value implies that neither you nor the other use coercive tactics to obtain agreement or consent. Such tactics include physical or psychological violence (e.g., humiliation), destruction of property or other valued goods, harm to one's life chances (a potential career), and harm to one's loved ones.

IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGING CONFLICT

In prior sections, discussion focused on the attitudes, norms, and values that foster cooperation. These are necessary but not in themselves sufficient. Knowledge and skills are also important in promoting constructive resolution of a conflict. This is the thesis underlying this Handbook. Knowledge of the theory offers a useful framework for organizing one's thinking about the social psychological consequences of cooperation and competition, as well as the conditions that lead to one

rather than the other. It is a way of orienting oneself to new situations. Along with the other theories discussed in this book, it enlarges one's knowledge of the range of conditions to be considered as one wishes to develop and maintain a constructive, cooperative process of conflict resolution and prevent developing a destructive process.

Skills are also vitally important for developing and implementing successfully an effective, cooperative problem-solving process. There has not been much systematic discussion of the skills involved in constructive solutions to conflict. There are, I believe, three main kinds useful to the participants in a conflict as well as to third parties (such as mediators, conciliators, counselors, or therapists) who are called on to provide assistance to conflicting parties. For convenience, I label them rapport-building skills, cooperative conflict resolution skills, and group process and decision-making skills.

First, there are the skills involved in establishing effective working relationships with each of the conflicting parties and between the conflicting parties if you are the mediator or with the other if you are a participant. Some of the components of this broad category include such skills as breaking the ice; reducing fears, tensions, and suspicion; overcoming resistance to negotiation; establishing a framework for civil discourse and interaction; and fostering realistic hope and optimism. Thus, before negotiations begin between two individuals or groups perceiving each other as adversaries, it is often useful to have informal social gatherings or meetings in which the adversaries can get to know one another as human beings who share some similar interests and values. Skill in breaking the ice and creating a safe, friendly atmosphere for interaction between the adversaries is helpful in developing the prenegotiation experiences likely to lead to effective negotiations about the issues in dispute.

A second, related set of skills concerns developing and maintaining a cooperative conflict resolution process among the parties throughout their conflict. These are the skills that are usually emphasized in practicum courses or workshops on conflict resolution. They include identifying the type of conflict in which you are involved; reframing the issues so the conflict is perceived as a mutual problem to be resolved cooperatively; active listening and responsive communication; distinguishing between needs and positions; recognizing and acknowledging the other's needs as well as your own; encouraging, supporting, and enhancing the other; taking the perspective of the other; identifying shared interests and other similarities in values, experiences, and so on; being alert to cultural differences and the possibilities of misunderstanding arising from them; controlling anger; dealing with difficult conflicts and difficult people; being sensitive to the other's anxieties and hot buttons and how to avoid pressing them; and being aware of your own anxieties and hot buttons as well as your tendencies to be emotionally upset and misperceiving if they are pressed so that these can be controlled.

A third set of skills is involved in developing a creative and productive group problem-solving and decision-making process. These include skills pertinent to group process, leadership, and effective group discussion, such as goal and standard setting; monitoring progress toward group goals; eliciting, clarifying, coordinating, summarizing, and integrating the contributions of the various participants; and maintaining group cohesion. This third set also includes such problem-solving and decision-making skills as identifying and diagnosing the nature of the problem confronting the group; acquiring the relevant information necessary for developing possible solutions; creating or identifying several possible alternative solutions; choosing the criteria for evaluating the alternatives (such as the

“effects” on economic costs and benefits, on relations between the conflicting parties, and on third parties); selecting the alternative that optimizes the results on the chosen criteria; and implementing the decision through appropriate action.

People are not novices with regard to conflict. From their life experiences, many have developed some of the component skills involved in building rapport, constructive conflict resolution, and effective group process and problem solving. However, some are not aware that they have the skills or how and when to use them in a conflict. The fact that everyone has been a participant and observer in many conflicts from childhood on results in implicit knowledge, preconceptions, attitudes, and modes of behavior toward conflict that may be deeply ingrained before any systematic training occurs. Many of a person’s preexisting orientations to conflict and modes of behavior in it reflect those prevalent in his or her culture, but some reflect individual predispositions acquired from unique experiences in the contexts of family, school, watching TV, and the like.

Before students can acquire explicit competence in conflict resolution, they have to become aware of their preexisting orientations to conflict as well as their typical behaviors. Awareness and motivation are developed by having a model of good performance that students can compare with their preconscious, preexisting one. Internalization comes from guided and repeated practice in imitating the model. Feedback on the students’ successfulness gradually shapes their behavior to be consistent with the model, and frequent practice leads to its internalization. Once the model has been internalized, recurrence of earlier incompetent orientations to conflict is experienced as awkward and out of place because there are internal cues to the deviations of one’s behavior from the internalized

model. In tennis, if you have internalized a good model of serving, internal cues tell you if you are deviating from it (say, by throwing the ball too high). If self-taught tennis students have internalized poor serving models, training should be directed at making them aware of this and providing a good model. So too in conflict resolution.

In summary, the discussion in this and the preceding sections has centered on the orientation, norms, values, and skills that help to develop a cooperative, constructive process of conflict resolution. Without competence in the skills, having a cooperative orientation and knowledge of conflict processes is often insufficient to develop a cooperative process of conflict resolution. Similarly, having the skills is insufficient to develop a cooperative process without the cooperative orientation and motivation to apply the skills or without the knowledge of how to apply the skills in various social and cultural contexts.

IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING

The material already presented in this chapter has several implications for training. They center on the social context of learning, the social context of applying one's learning, the substantive content of the training, and the reflective practitioner.

The Social Context of Learning

The theory described in this chapter suggests that the social context of learning be one in which cooperation, constructive conflict resolution, and creative controversy are strongly emphasized. The teaching method employed should take the form of cooperative learning, and the conflictual interactions within the classroom or workshop between teacher and students and among students should model those of creative controversy and constructive

conflict resolution. The social context of learning should walk the talk, and in so doing offer students the experiences that support a cooperative orientation, exemplify the values and social norms of cooperation, and model the skills in constructive management of conflict.

The Social Context of Application

It can be anticipated that many social contexts are unfavorable to a cooperative orientation and the use of one's skills in constructive conflict resolution. In some social contexts, an individual who has such skills may expect to be belittled by friends or associates as being weak, unassertive, or afraid. In other contexts, she may anticipate accusations of being "disloyal," a "traitor," or an "enemy lover" if she tries to develop a cooperative problem-solving relationship with the other side. In still other contexts, the possibility of developing a constructive conflict resolution process seems so slim that one does not even try to do so. In other words, if the social context leads you to expect to be unsuccessful or devalued in employing your skills, you are not likely to use them; you will do so if it leads you to expect approval and success.

This explanation suggests that in unfavorable social contexts, skilled conflict resolvers often need social support as well as two additional types of skill. One relates to the ability to place yourself outside or above your social context so that you can observe the influences emanating from it and then consciously decide whether to resist them personally. The other type involves the skills of a successful change agent—someone who is able to help an institution or group change its culture so that it facilitates rather than hinders constructive conflict resolution. I mention these additional skills because it is important to recognize that institutional and cultural changes are often necessary for

an individual to feel free to express his or her constructive potential.

The common need for social support after training has occurred has implications for who are selected for training and also for posttraining contacts. There are several ways to foster a social context that is supportive: train all of the participants in it, train the influential people, or train a cohort of people of sufficient size to provide effective mutual support in the face of resistance. Posttraining contacts with the training institution and its trainers may also yield the social support necessary to buttress the individual in a hostile environment.

The Substantive Content of Training

In prior sections of this chapter, I have outlined what I consider to be the attitudes, knowledge, and skills that amount to a framework for education in constructive conflict resolution. A skillful trainer fleshes out such a framework with substantive content that is sufficiently vital and intellectually compelling to engage the interest and motivation of the student, is relevant to his or her most common and most difficult conflicts, and is sufficiently diverse in content and social context to facilitate generalizing and applying the training in a variety of situations. To accomplish these objectives, a trainer must not only have a clear framework for training, but also must be open and creative so that he or she can respond to the students' needs effectively.

The Reflective Practitioner

One of the important goals of education in this area is to help the student, as well as the trainer, become a reflective practitioner of constructive conflict resolution. I refer to two kinds of reflection: on managing the conflicts that you

are experiencing and on the framework of conflict resolution that you are employing. Self-reflection about how you are handling conflicts is necessary to continuing improvement and also to prevent old habits, your hot spots, social pressure, and the like from making you regress to less constructive modes of conflict resolution.

Conflict resolution as a field of study is relatively young; it is going through a period of rapid intellectual development. It is experiencing an upsurge in research, theoretical development, and practical experience that I hope results in improvement of the frameworks that are used for training in conflict resolution. The reflective practitioner, by reflecting on his or her practice, can learn from as well as contribute to this growing body of knowledge and reflected-on experience.

Suppose the Other Does Not Want to Cooperate; What Then?

Suppose the other wants to win and does not want to cooperate to resolve the conflict constructively. What then? Or suppose the other agrees to negotiate a resolution of the conflict but engages in dirty tricks to try to triumph in the negotiations. How do you respond? These are difficult questions, and it should be clear that in some instances, it may be impossible to establish a cooperative conflict resolution process or prevent the other from employing dirty tricks during a negotiation. Nevertheless, as the cases in the Introduction to this Handbook indicate, difficult, deep-rooted conflicts can be resolved or managed well. I next briefly discuss some suggestions for managing each of the two difficult types of situations.

The Other Refuses to Cooperate.

There are two main reasons for not wanting to cooperate: (1) you think it would be futile, a waste of time and energy, or (2) you feel you are the dominant power and are satisfied with the existing situation and will lose something of value (e.g., power, status, identity, wealth, religious doctrine) if you do. Before attempting to influence the other in either case, it is crucial to seek to understand the other —the other's position, reasons, emotions, social context, and experiences that have led to and support the other's position. This requires the development of communication with the other and active, nonjudgmental listening to the other. After achieving some understanding of the other, one will seek to influence the other to be willing to cooperate; influence attempts commonly involve the use of persuasion strategies or nonviolent power strategies, or both.

Persuasive strategies involve three types of appeals: to moral values, self-interest, or self-fulfillment.

A *moral appeal* to another person (group, organization, or nation) who feels it is futile to attempt cooperation might be: "If you are a moral person, you should try to achieve the good even if it is difficult or the chances of success are small. If you see a child drowning near you, you should try to rescue him even if the chances of success are small and it is difficult to do. Similarly, it is your moral obligation to try to resolve your conflict with the other in a cooperative manner even though you think the chances of success are small and it may be a difficult process."

Appeals to the moral values of the dominant power assumes they are not fully aware of the negative impact of their power on the low-power person or group. For example, one might appeal to values related to justice, religion, or the welfare of one's grandchildren, to name a few. Engaging high-power members to see the discrepancy between their practices and their moral values or

conscience could move them to take action and change their behavior.

Self-interest appeals emphasize the gains that can be obtained and losses that can be prevented when there is cooperation to resolve the conflict. It is important that such messages be carefully constructed so as to clearly state the specific actions and changes requested of the other and to highlight the values and benefits to the other by cooperating and the potential losses of not cooperating (Deutsch, 2006).

Appeals to *self-actualization* focus on enhancing the sense that one's better self—a self that one has wanted to be—is being actualized. In a sense, these are a type of self-interest appeal. The gain for the other is the feelings associated with an actualized self. In considering ways that one might share one's power over others, one might emphasize the use of one's power to further common interests; the spiritual emptiness of power *over* others; the fulfillment of creating something that goes well beyond self-benefit. By creating power *with* others rather than maintaining noncooperation or power *over* (Follett, 1973), you may actually increase your power.

Low-power individuals or groups seeking change in those who have a vested interest in maintaining their power sometimes find it difficult to employ persuasion strategies because of rage or fear. Rage, as a result of the injustices they have experienced, may lead them to seek revenge, to harm or destroy those in power. Fear of the power of the powerful to inflict bearable harm may inhibit efforts to bring about change in the powerful.

Given the possibility of the prevalence of rage or fear among low-power groups, it would be the goal of change agents (group leaders, mediators, conciliators, therapists) who seek to foster cooperation, rather than rage or fear, to

harness the energy created by feelings of rage and fear and convert it into effective cooperative action. (See Gaucher and Jost, 2011.) By engaging large numbers of people through social media and other communication methods, you channel the energy generated by feelings of rage or fear toward effective action. Here the task of the change agent is to help people realize that they are more likely to achieve their goals through effective action, including cooperation with potential allies among members of high-power groups. It is important for the change agent to recognize the power of the motivational energy of low-power groups, regardless of its source.

A potentially effective strategic starting point using persuasive strategies would be for low-power groups to use social influence strategies by seeking out and creating alliances with those members of high-power groups, as well as other prestigious and influential people and groups, who are sympathetic to their efforts of building cooperation (Deutsch, 2006). Developing allies is a key method of increasing a low-power group's power and increasing its influence and credibility with those in power.

It is useful for change agents to understand the psychological implications of appealing to the power needs of members of high-power groups—understanding how to convince those in power that their power needs can be fulfilled through fostering a common good.

Nonviolent power strategies involve enhancing one's own power (by developing the latent power in one's self and one's group, as well as developing allies), employing the power of the powerful against the powerful, and reducing the power of the powerful. Gene Sharp (1973, 2005) has elaborated in great detail the many tactics available to those who seek to employ nonviolent power strategies and also discussed the strategy in producing successful

nonviolent change in facing dominating, exploiting others. There are three types of nonviolent actions:

1. *Acts of protest* such as have been occurring recently in the Middle East
2. *Noncooperation* such as in Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* when the women withhold sex from their spouses until war is abolished
3. *Nonviolent intervention* such as general strikes and other methods of disrupting the economy and other components of the status quo

The employment of nonviolent methods against a potentially violent, autocratic, resistance to change in power often requires considerable courage, discipline, and stamina as well as effective preplanning and organization.

There is a difference between persuasive strategies and nonviolent strategies. Nonviolent strategies are often used when persuasion strategies by themselves are not effective in bringing about change. The aim of nonviolent strategies is to open those in power so that they can be persuaded to change: resistance to and interference with the implementation of the power of the high-power group makes its power ineffective and could open it to the possibility of persuasion. Both are useful in altering the status quo in service of developing cooperation. However, in contrast to violent strategies, neither persuasion nor nonviolence seeks to destroy those in high power: they seek to change the relationship so that power is shared and used to benefit both sides.

There are two major problems with the use of violence: it commonly leads to increasing destructive cycles of reciprocating violence between the conflicting parties, and it can transform those using violent methods into mirror

images of one another, so if a low-power group employs violence to overthrow a tyrannical high-power group, it may become tyrannical itself. I am suggesting that violence is never necessary to stop unrelenting tyranny. As Mandela (1995), indicated, if violence is thought to be necessary to motivate the other, it should be employed only against nonhuman targets, such as bridges or communication facilities, only.

Facing Dirty Tricks during Cooperative Negotiation.

Suppose the other agrees to negotiate cooperatively to resolve the conflict but engages in dirty tricks to advantage itself during negotiations, such as lying, misrepresenting, spreading false rumors, undermining your power, or amassing its own power to threaten and coerce you. What do you do? First, you openly confront the other with what you consider to be his dirty trick in a nonantagonistic manner and give the other a chance to respond and explain. He might persuade you that you are mistaken, and if so, you would apologize. If he denies guilt but you are not convinced of his innocence, you seek to resolve this conflict cooperatively. Here the involvement of neutral third parties such as a judge, mediator, or therapist may be of value or necessary. If the other pleads guilty, apologizes, and pledges not to continue to engage in dirty tricks but you are not completely reassured, it may be necessary to establish a mutually agreed-on neutral, independent individual or system that can detect dirty tricks (by you or the other) as well as verify or falsify accusations of dirty tricks and provide sufficient positive and negative incentives to deter their occurrence.

Whether or not the other is willing to engage in fair cooperation, one’s own approach throughout should employ the four Fs: be firm, fair, flexible, and friendly;

Firm in the sense that you will strongly protect yourself from being disadvantaged unfairly

Fair , in the sense that you will treat the other fairly and not attempt to disadvantage the other by dirty tricks

Flexible in the sense that you will not commit yourself to rigid positions and will respond flexibly to the legitimate interests of the other

Friendly , in the sense that you are always open, even after some difficulties, to fair, amiable, mutual cooperation.

CONCLUSION

The central theme of this chapter is that a knowledgeable, skillful, cooperative approach to conflict enormously facilitates its constructive resolution. However, there is a two-way relation between effective cooperation and constructive conflict resolution. Good cooperative relations facilitate constructive management of conflict. The ability to handle constructively the inevitable conflicts that occur during cooperation facilitates the survival and deepening of cooperative relations.

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CHAPTER TWO
JUSTICE AND CONFLICT

Morton Deutsch

That's not fair" expresses a feeling that frequently leads to conflict. A younger brother cries out that his older brother is getting "a bigger piece of cake than I am." An applicant for a job feels that the selection procedures are biased against members of her race, gender, or ethnic group. A politician thinks the election was lost because his opponent stuffed the ballot boxes. A wife feels that her husband doesn't help sufficiently with the household chores. These all involve issues of justice, which may give rise to conflict. Conflict can lead to changes that reduce injustice, or it can increase injustice if it takes a destructive form, as in war.

It is useful to make a distinction between injustice and oppression. *Oppression* is the experience of repeated, widespread, systemic injustice. It need not be extreme and involve the legal system (as in slavery, apartheid, or the lack of right to vote) or violent (as in tyrannical societies). Harvey (1999) has used the term "civilized oppression" to characterize the everyday processes of oppression in normal life. Civilized oppression

> is embedded in unquestioned norms, habits, and symbols, in the assumptions underlying institutions and rules, and the collective consequences of following those rules. It refers to the vast and deep injustices some groups suffer as a consequence of often unconscious assumptions and reactions of well-meaning people in ordinary interactions which are supported by the media and cultural stereotypes as well as by the structural features of bureaucratic hierarchies and market mechanisms. (Young, 1990, p. 41)

Structural oppression cannot be eliminated by getting rid of the rulers or by making some new laws, because oppressions are systematically reproduced in the major economic, political, and cultural institutions. While specific privileged groups are the beneficiaries of the oppression of other groups and thus have an interest in the continuation of the status quo, they do not typically understand themselves to be agents of oppression. (See Deutsch, 2006, for a fuller discussion on oppression.)

THE FORMS THAT INJUSTICE TAKES

I consider here six types of injustice: distributive injustice, procedural injustice, the sense of injustice, retributive and reparative injustice, moral exclusion, and cultural imperialism. To identify which groups of people are oppressed and what forms their oppression takes, each of these six types of injustices should be examined. (For a comprehensive discussion of social psychological research related to the following topics, see Tyler and associates, 1997.)

The scholarly literature on injustice has the following focuses:

- *Distributive injustice* , which is concerned with the criteria that lead you to feel you receive an unfair outcome. (The boy receives an unfair share of the pie being distributed.)
- *Procedural injustice* , concerned with unfair treatment in making and implementing the decisions that determine the outcome. (Is the politician being treated with dignity and respect? Has he lost the election fairly?)
- *The sense of injustice* , centering on what factors determine whether an injustice is experienced as such. (If the wife does more than her fair share of the household chores, what will determine whether she feels it is unjust?)
- *Retributive and reparative injustice* , concerned with how to respond to the violation of moral norms and how to repair the moral community that has been violated (as in the case of job discrimination against an applicant because of race).
- *Moral exclusion* , or the scope of injustice, is concerned with who is included in the moral community and who is thought to be entitled to fair outcomes and fair treatments. Generally you do not include such creatures as ticks and roaches in your moral community—and some people think of other ethnic groups, heretics, or those with differing sexual orientation as “vermin” who are not entitled to justice.
- *Cultural imperialism* , which occurs when a dominant group imposes its values, norms, and customs on subordinated groups so that members of these subordinated groups find themselves defined by the dominant others. To the extent that women, Africans, Jews, Muslims, homosexuals, the elderly, and so on must

interact with the dominant group whose culture mainly provides stereotyped images of them, they are often under pressure to conform to and internalize the dominant group images of their group.

I discuss each focus separately in this chapter. Recognize, though, that there is considerable overlap among them.

Distributive Justice

Issues of distributive justice pervade social life. They occur not only at the societal level but also in intimate social relations. They arise when something of value is scarce and not everyone can have what they want or when something of negative value (a cost, a harm) cannot be avoided by all. In the schools, such questions arise in connection with who gets the teacher's attention, who gets what grades, and how much of a school's resources are to be allocated for students who are physically disabled or socioeconomically disadvantaged. Similarly, distribution of pay, promotion, benefits, equipment, and space are common problems in work settings. Issues of distributive justice are involved in health care and medical practice as well: How is a scarce or expensive medical resource, such as a heart transplant, to be allocated?

Scholars have identified a large number of principles that could be used in distributing grades, pay, scarce medical resources, and the like. Discussions focus on three key principles—equity, equality, and need—and their variants:

- The *equity principle* asserts that people should receive benefits in proportion to their contribution: those who contribute more should receive more than those who contribute less.
- The *equality principle* states that all members of a group should share its benefits equally.

- The *need principle* indicates that those who need more of a benefit should get more than those who need it less.

In any particular allocation situation, the three principles may be in conflict. Thus, paying the members of a work group according to their individual productivity may conflict with paying all the members of a work group equally, and these two principles may conflict with paying them according to their need, such as giving higher pay to those with more dependents. Only if all are equally productive and equally needy is there no conflict among the principles.

The principles of distributive justice may be favored differently among individuals, groups, social classes, ideologies, and so forth. For example, in a collectivist community such as an Israeli kibbutz, the members have essentially the same pay and standard of living no matter how much they differ in their individual work productivity. In contrast, in an individualistic society such as the United States, the CEO of a profit-making firm may get paid more than a thousand times what an individual worker makes. Conflict within the kibbutz arises if individuals feel that their standard of living does not adequately reflect their unusually valuable contribution to the community; conflict within the American firm is likely if workers feel that they are not getting a fair share of the profits.

Theory and research (Deutsch, 1985) suggest that the principles are usually salient in different social contexts. Equity is most prominent in situations in which economic productivity is the primary goal; *equality* is dominant when social harmony, cohesiveness, or fostering enjoyable social relations is the primary emphasis; and need is most salient in situations where encouraging personal development and personal welfare is the major goal.

Many times, all three goals are important. In such situations, the three principles can be applied in a manner that is either mutually supportive or mutually contradictory. In a mutually supportive application, the equity principle leads to recognizing individual differences in contribution and honoring those who make uniquely important contributions. In a socially harmonious honoring, no invidious distinctions are drawn between those who are honored and those who are not; the equal divine or moral value of everyone in the cooperative community is affirmed as the community honors those who give so much to it. Similarly, the equal moral worth of every individual leads to special help for those who are especially needy.

Thus, if a football player helps his team win by an unusually skillful or courageous feat, he is honored by his teammates and others in such a way that they feel good rather than demeaned by his being honored. His being honored does not imply that they have lost something; it is not a win-lose or competitive situation for them. If, in contrast, the equity principle is applied in a manner that suggests those who produce more are better human beings and entitled to superior treatment generally, then social harmony and cohesiveness are impaired. If the equality principle leads to a sameness or uniformity in which the value of unique individual contributions is denied, then productivity as well as social cohesion are impaired. It is a delicate balance that often tilts too far in one direction or the other.

The judgment that you have received a fair outcome is determined not only by whether the appropriate distributive principles are employed but also by whether your outcome is in comparative balance with the outcomes received by people like you in similar situations. If you (a woman) and a male coworker are equally productive, do you each receive the same pay raise? Are all members of a club invited to a party given by the club leader? If it’s my

turn to receive a heart transplant, is someone else—maybe a wealthy benefactor of the hospital—given higher priority?

The *theory of relative deprivation* indicates that the sense of deprivation or injustice arises if there is comparative imbalance: *egoistical deprivation* occurs if an individual feels disadvantaged relative to other individuals, and *fraternal deprivation* occurs if a person feels her group is disadvantaged relative to other groups. The sense of being deprived occurs if there is a perceived discrepancy between what a person obtains of what she wants and what she believes she is entitled to obtain. The deprivation is relative because one's sense of deprivation is largely determined by past and current comparisons with others as well as by future expectations.

There is an extensive literature on the determinants of the choice of other individuals or groups with whom one chooses to compare oneself. This literature is too extensive to summarize here, but it clearly demonstrates that people's feelings of deprivation are not simply a function of their objective circumstances; they are affected by a number of psychological variables. Thus, paradoxically, members of disadvantaged groups (such as women, low-paid workers, ethnic minorities) often feel less deprived than one might expect, and even less so than those who are more fortunate, because they compare themselves with "similar others"—other women, other low-paid workers. In contrast, men and middle-income workers who have more opportunities may feel relatively more deprived because they are comparing themselves with those who have enjoyed more success in upward mobility. Also, there is evidence that discontent, social unrest, and rebellion often occur after a period of improvement in political-economic conditions that leads to rising expectations regarding entitlements if they are not matched by a corresponding rise in one's benefits. The result is an increased perceived

discrepancy between one’s sense of entitlement and one’s benefits; this is sometimes referred to as the revolution of rising expectations.

Procedural Justice

In addition to assessing the fairness of outcomes, individuals judge the fairness of the procedures that determine the outcomes. Research evidence indicates that fair treatment and procedures are a more pervasive concern to most people than fair outcomes. (See Lind and Tyler, 1988, for a comprehensive discussion of procedural justice.) Fair procedures are psychologically important for several reasons, first in encouraging the assumption that they give rise to fair outcomes in the present and also in the future. When it is not clear what fair outcomes should be, fair procedures are the best guarantee that the decision about outcomes is made fairly. Research indicates that one is less likely to feel committed to authorities, organizations, social policies, and governmental rules and regulations if the procedures associated with them are considered unfair. Also, people feel affirmed if the procedures to which they are subjected treat them with the respect and dignity they feel is their due; if they are so treated, they find it easier to accept a disappointing outcome.

Questions with regard to the justice of procedures can arise in various ways. Consider, for example, the evaluation of teacher performance in a school. Some questions immediately come to mind:

- Who has voice or representation in determining whether such evaluation is necessary?
- How are the evaluations to be conducted?
- Who conducts them?
- What is to be evaluated?

- What kind of information is collected?
- How is the accuracy and validity of the information ascertained, and how are its consistency and reliability determined?
- What methods of preventing incompetence or bias in collecting and processing information are employed?
- Who constitutes the groups that organize the evaluations, draw conclusions, make recommendations, and make decisions?
- What roles do teachers, administrators, parents, students, and outside experts have in the procedures?
- How are the ethicality, considerateness, and dignity of the process protected?

Implicit in these questions are some values with regard to procedural justice. One wants procedures that generate relevant, unbiased, accurate, consistent, reliable, competent, and valid information and decisions, as well as polite, dignified, and respectful behavior in carrying out the procedures. Also, voice and representation in the processes and decisions related to the evaluation are considered desirable by those directly affected by the decisions. In effect, fair procedures yield good information for use in the decision-making processes, voice in the processes for those affected by them, and considerate treatment as the procedures are being implemented.

The Sense of Injustice

Whether an injustice takes the form of physical abuse, discrimination in employment, sexual harassment, or disrespectful treatment, there will always be some people who are insensitive to the injustice and hence seemingly

unaware of it. Here we examine factors that influence the sense of injustice.

Victims and Victimizers.

Distributive as well as procedural injustice can advantage some people and groups and disadvantage others. Those who benefit from injustice are, wittingly or unwittingly, often its perpetrators or perpetuators, and they are usually not fully aware of their complicity. Awareness brings with it such unpleasant emotions as guilt, fear of revenge, and sometimes feelings of helplessness with regard to their ability to bring about the social changes necessary to eliminate the injustice. As one might expect, the disadvantaged are more likely to be aware of the injustice. Associated with this awareness are feelings such as anger (outrage, indignation), resentment, humiliation, depression, and a sense of helplessness. Positive emotions related to self-esteem, sense of power, and pride are experienced by those who are engaged in effective actions to eliminate injustice, whether they are advantaged or disadvantaged.

There seems to be a straightforward explanation for the asymmetry in sensitivity to the injustice of the disadvantaged (the victims) and the advantaged (the victimizers). The victims usually have relatively little power compared to the victimizers; the latter are more likely to set the terms of their relationship and, through their control of the state and other social institutions, establish the legal and other reigning definitions of justice.

Thus, the victimizers, in addition to gains from their exploitative actions, commonly find reassurance in official definitions of justice and the support of such major social institutions as the church, the media, and the schools, to deaden their sensitivity to the injustices inherent in their relations with the victim. The victim may, of course, be

taken in by the official definitions and the indoctrination emanating from social institutions and, as a result, lose sensitivity to her situation of injustice. However, the victim is less likely than the victimizer to lose sensitivity to injustice because she is the one who is experiencing its negative consequences. She is also less likely to feel committed to the official definitions and indoctrinations because of her lack of participation in creating them.

This explanation of differential sensitivity in terms of differential gains and differential power is not the complete story. There are, of course, relations in which the victimizer is not of superior power; even so, he avoids experiencing guilt for his actions. Consider a traffic accident in which a car hits a pedestrian. The driver of the car often perceives the accident so as to place responsibility for it on the victim. Seeing the victim as responsible enables the driver to maintain a positive image of himself. Projecting the blame onto the victim enables the victimizer to feel blameless.

If we accept the notion that most people try to maintain a positive conception of themselves, we can expect differential sensitivity to injustice in those who experience pain, harm, and misfortune and those who cause it. If I try to think well of myself, I shall minimize my responsibility for any injustice that is connected with me or minimize the extent of injustice that has occurred if I cannot minimize my responsibility. If instead I am the victim of pain or harm, I have to believe that it was not my due to think well of myself; it is not just desserts for a person of my good character. Thus, the need to maintain positive self-esteem leads to opposite reactions in those who cause an injustice and those who suffer from it. There is also the possibility that a victim may seek to maintain her self-esteem by denying or minimizing the injustice she is suffering; denial may not be completely conscious. Resort to denial is less

likely to occur if there are other similar victims who are prepared to acknowledge and protest their own victimization.

Although the need to maintain positive self-regard is common, it is not universal. If she views herself favorably, the victim of injustice may be outraged by her experience and attempt to undo it; in so doing, she may have to challenge the victimizer. If the victimizer is more powerful than she is and has the support of legal and other social institutions, she will realize that it is dangerous to act on her outrage—or even to express it. Under such circumstances, in a process that Anna Freud (1937) labeled "identification with the aggressor," the victim may control her dangerous feelings of injustice and outrage by denying them and internalizing the derogatory attitudes of the victimizer toward herself as well as toward others who are similar to her (other women, other disadvantaged groups). Paradoxically, by identifying with the aggressor, you feel more powerful as you attack or aggress against others on whom you project the "bad" characteristics in yourself that you have suppressed because of your fear of being attacked by someone with the power to harm you. We can see this phenomenon in parents who were abused as children going on to abuse their own children and in traditionally submissive women derogating independent, assertive women.

From this discussion, it is evident that for numerous reasons, victims as well as their victimizers may be insensitive to injustices that are occurring. I turn now to a brief discussion of how the sense of injustice may be activated in the victim and the victimizer. (See Deutsch and Steil, 1988, for an extended discussion.)

Activating the Sense of Injustice.

The process entails falsifying and delegitimating officially sanctioned ideologies, myths, and prejudices that "justify" the injustices. I am referring to such myths as these:

- Women like men to make sexual passes at them, even at work, because it makes them feel attractive.
- African Americans are morally and intellectually inferior to European Americans.
- The poor deserve to be poor because they are lazy.
- Everyone in the United States has equal opportunity in the competition to achieve success.

The activation process also involves exposing the victims and victimizers to new ideologies, models, and reference groups that support realistic hope about the possibility that the injustice can be eliminated. Because of the anxieties they elicit, one can anticipate that the changes necessary to eliminate an injustice produce resistance from others—and sometimes in oneself. It is easier to manage resistance and anxiety by becoming aware of the value systems that support the change and of models of successful change as well as of the social support you can get from groups and individuals who support the change. You feel less vulnerable if you know that you are not alone, that others are with you.

In addition, the process entails the work necessary to make oneself and one's group effective forces for social change. There is internally directed work, aimed at enhancing cohesiveness, trust, and effective organization among those who favor change. There is also external work, involved in building up one's political and economic strength as well as one's bargaining power. Doing so enables effective action to increase the incentives for accepting change among the advantaged who are content with the status quo and among

those who desire change but are fearful of the consequences of seeking change. However, some victims of injustice may have to free themselves from the seductive satisfaction of feeling morally superior to the victimizers before they can fully commit to and be effective in their struggle against injustice. (See Deutsch, 2006, for a more detailed discussion of overcoming oppression and injustice.)

Retributive and Reparative Justice

A study comparing responses to injustice and to frustration (reported in Deutsch, 1985) found that an injustice that is experienced, whether to oneself or to another, involves one not only personally but also as a member of a moral community whose moral norms are being violated; it evokes an obligation to restore justice. The psychology of retributive and reparative justice is concerned with the attitudes and behavior of people in response to moral rule breaking.

It is reasonable to expect a person's response to be influenced by the nature of the transgression, the transgressor, the victim, and the amount of harm the victim experiences, as well as by the person's relations to the transgressor and victim. A transgression such as murder evokes a different response from violation of customary norms of courtesy and politeness. In the United States, a white murderer is less likely to be executed than a black one. Similarly, beating and raping a black woman is less likely to result in widespread media attention than in the case of a white victim. Burning a synagogue is considered a more serious offense than painting swastikas on its walls. An Israeli Jew is less likely to be concerned about Israeli discrimination against Palestinians than Arabs are, and Arabs are unlikely to be as concerned about discrimination against Jews in their countries as Israeli Jews are.

A number of means are employed to support and reestablish the validity of moral rules once they are violated. They generally call for one or a combination of these actions on the part of the violator: full confession, sincere apology, contrition, restitution, compensation, self-abasement, or self-reform. They also may involve various actions by the community addressed to the violator, such as humiliation, physical punishment, incarceration, or reeducation. These actions may be addressed not just to the violator but also to others related to the violator, such as his children, family, or ethnic group.

Retribution can serve a number of functions:

- Violation of a moral code tends to weaken the code. One of the most important functions of retribution is to reassert the continuing strength and validity of the moral rule that has been violated. For example, many communities are experiencing a breakdown of the rules of courtesy and respect because children and adolescents are no longer taught these rules and there is no appropriate response when they are violated.
- Retribution can serve a cathartic function for members of the moral community who have been affronted and angered by the transgression.
- Punishment of the violator may have a deterrent effect against future violation as well as a cathartic effect.
- Retribution may take the form of compulsory reeducation and reform of the transgressor so that he is no longer likely to engage in immoral behavior.
- Retribution in the form of restitution, in addition to its other functions, may serve to help the victim recover from the losses and damages that he or she has suffered.

There are considerable variations among cultures and subcultures with regard to the nature of moral rules and how to respond to violations of them. Ignorance with regard to the moral rules of another culture as well as ethnocentrism are likely to give rise to misunderstanding as well as conflict if one violates the moral code of the other's group.

Moral Exclusion

Moral exclusion, or scope of justice, refers to who (and what) is included in one's moral community. Who is and is not entitled to fair outcomes and fair treatment by inclusion or lack of inclusion in one's moral community? Albert Schweitzer included all living creatures in his moral community, and some Buddhists include all of nature. Most of us define a more limited moral community.

Individuals and groups who are outside the boundary in which considerations of fairness apply may be treated in ways that would be considered immoral if people within the boundary were so treated. Consider the situation in Bosnia. Prior to the breakup of Yugoslavia, the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats in Bosnia were more or less part of one moral community and treated one another with some degree of civility. After the start of civil strife (initiated by power-hungry political leaders), vilification of other ethnic groups became a political tool, and it led to excluding others from one's moral community. As a consequence, the various ethnic groups committed the most barbaric atrocities against one another. The same thing happened with the Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi.

At various periods in history and in different societies, groups and individuals have been treated inhumanly by other humans: slaves by their masters, natives by colonialists, blacks by whites, Jews by Nazis, women by

men, children by adults, the physically disabled by those who are not, homosexuals by heterosexuals, political dissidents by political authorities, and one ethnic or religious group by another.

Lesser forms of moral exclusions, marginalization, occur also against whole categories of people—women, the physically impaired, the elderly, and various ethnic, religious, and racial groups—in many societies where barriers prevent them from full participation in the political, economic, and social life of their societies. The results of these barriers are not only material deprivation but also disrespectful, demeaning, and arbitrary treatment, as well as decreased opportunity to develop and employ their individual talents. (For extensive research and writing in this area, see the work of Susan Opotow, 2001, a leading scholar in this area.)

Three central psychological questions arise with regard to moral exclusion:

1. What social conditions lead an individual or group to exclude others from the individual or group's moral community?
2. What psychological mechanisms enable otherwise moral human beings to commit atrocities against other human beings?
3. What determines which individuals or groups are likely to be excluded from the moral community?

Existing knowledge to answer these questions adequately is limited; their seriousness deserves fuller answers than space allows here.

Social Conditions.

Studies of political, ethnic, and religious violence have identified several social conditions that appear particularly conducive to developing or intensifying hatred and alienating emotions that permit otherwise nonviolent members of a society to dehumanize victims and kill (Gurr, 1970; Staub, 1989).

The first of these conditions is emergence of, or increase in, *difficult life conditions* , with a corresponding increase in the sense of relative deprivation. This may happen as a result of defeat in war, economic depression, rapid social change, or even physical calamity. The resulting decrease in living standards often leads to a sense of insecurity and a feeling of being threatened by potential rivals for scarce jobs, housing, and the like.

The second condition is an *unstable political regime* whose power may be under challenge. In such situations, those in power may use scapegoating as a means of deflecting criticism and attacking potential dissidents and rivals.

Third, there may be a *claim for superiority*— national, racial, gender, class, cultural, religious, genetic—that justifies treating the other as having inferior moral status.

The fourth condition is when *violence is culturally salient* and sanctioned as a result of past wars, attention in the media, or availability of weapons.

Fifth, there may be *little sense of human relatedness* or social bonding with the potential victims because there is little in the way of cooperative human contact with them.

The sixth condition consists of *social institutions that are authoritarian* . Here, nonconformity and open dissent against violence sanctioned by authority are inhibited.

Finally, hatred and violence are intensified if there is *no active group of observers of the violence* , in or outside the

society, who strongly object to it and serve as a constant witness and reminder of its injustice and immorality.

Psychological Mechanisms.

There are many mechanisms by which reprehensible behavior toward another can be justified. One can do so by appealing to a higher moral value (killing physicians who perform abortions to discourage abortion and "save unborn children"). Or one can rationalize by relabeling the behavior (calling physical abuse of a child "teaching him a lesson"). Or one can minimize the behavior by saying it is not so harmful ("It hurts me more than it does you"). Or one can deny personal responsibility for the behavior (your superior has ordered you to torture the prisoner). Or one can blame the victim (it is because they are hiding the terrorists in their village that the village must be destroyed). Or one can isolate oneself emotionally or desensitize oneself to the human consequences of delegitimating the others, as many do in relation to beggars and homeless people in urban areas.

Selection of Targets for Exclusion.

We are most likely to delegitimate others whom we sense as a threat to anything that is important to us: our religious beliefs, economic well-being, public order, sense of reality, physical safety, reputation, ethnic group, family, moral values, institutions, and so on. If harm by the other was experienced in the past, we are likely to be increasingly ready to interpret ambiguous actions of the other as threats. A history of prior violent ethnic conflict predisposes a group to be suspicious of another's intentions. We also delegitimate others whom we exploit, take advantage of, or otherwise treat unfairly because of their deviance from normative standards of appearance or behavior. However, there is an asymmetry such that the

ability to exclude the other is more available to the powerful as compared to the weak; the powerful can do this overtly, the weak only covertly. Thus, the targets for exclusion are likely to be those with relatively little power, such as minority groups, the poor, and “social deviants.”

Sometimes suppressed inner conflicts encourage individuals or groups to seek out external enemies. There are many kinds of internal needs for which a hostile external relationship can be an outlet:

- It may amount to an acceptable excuse for internal problems; the problems can be held out as caused by the adversary or by the need to defend against the adversary.
- It may be a distraction so that internal problems appear less salient.
- It can provide an opportunity to express pent-up hostility arising from internal conflict through combat with the external adversary.
- It may enable one to project disapproved aspects of oneself (which are not consciously recognized) onto the adversary and to attack those aspects through assault on the adversary. The general tendency is to select for projection those who are weaker, those with whom there is a prior history of enmity, and those who symbolically represent the weaker side of the internal conflict. Thus, someone who has repressed his homosexual tendencies, fearing socially dangerous consequences for acting on them, may make homosexuals into an enemy group.
- Especially if it has dangerous undertones, conflict can serve to counteract such personal feelings as aimlessness, boredom, lack of focus, lack of energy, and depression. It can give a sense of excitement, purpose, coherence, and unity as well as energize and mobilize

oneself for struggle. It can be an addictive stimulant masking underlying depression.

- It may permit important parts of oneself—including attitudes, skills, and defenses developed during conflictual relations in one's formative stages—to be expressed and valued because relations with the present adversary resemble earlier conflictual relations.

Cultural Imperialism

"Cultural imperialism involves the universalization of a dominant group's experience and culture and establishing it as the norm" (Young, 1990, p. 59). Those living under cultural imperialism find themselves defined by the dominant others. As Young points out, "Consequently, the differences of women from men, American Indians or Africans from Europeans, Jews from Christians, becomes reconstructed as deviance and inferiority" (p. 59). Culturally dominated groups often experience themselves as having a double identity—one defined by the dominant group and the other coming from membership in one's own group. Thus, in my childhood, adult African American men were often called "boy" by members of the dominant white groups, but within their own group, they might be respected ministers and wage earners. Culturally subordinated groups are often able to maintain their own culture because they are segregated from the dominant group and have many interactions within their own group, which are invisible to the dominant group. In such contexts, the subordinated culture commonly reacts to the dominant culture with mockery and hostility fueled by their sense of injustice and of victimization.

IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT

There are several interrelated implications for conflict in this discussion:

- Perceived injustice is a frequent source of conflict.
- If the processes or outcomes of a conflict are perceived to be unjust, the resolution of a conflict is likely to be unstable and give rise to further conflict.
- Conflict may exist about what is “just.”
- Paradoxically, justifying as a negotiation technique—that is, blaming the other for an injustice and claiming special privilege because of the injury one has presumably suffered—is likely to lead to conflict escalation unless the other agrees that she has been unjust and takes responsibility for remedying it. Blaming tends to be inflaming.

Injustice as the Source of Conflict

A paradigmatic example of procedural as well as distributive injustice is two people who have to share something to which each is equally entitled (found cash, space, equipment, inherited property) and the one who gets at it first takes what he wants of it and leaves the remainder (a smaller or less valuable portion) to the other. Thus, if two children have to share a piece of cake and the one who divides it into two portions takes the larger one, then the other child is likely to get mad. If not afraid of the other, the child may challenge the unfair division and try to restore equality. If afraid, the child may be unwilling to admit the injustice, but will be resentful and try to get even covertly. Thus, conflict continues even though the episode ends.

There is a clear procedural way to avoid this sort of injustice (see also the later section, “Inventing Solutions”), in which the person who divides the cake (or whatever)

does not get first choice with regard to his or her portion of the division. There is also final-offer arbitration, a form sometimes employed when the parties cannot resolve conflict by themselves. It is based on a similar notion: creating an incentive for making fair offers. Each party to a conflict agrees to binding arbitration and secretly informs the arbitrator of his or her last and best offer for an agreement. The arbitrator then selects the one that is the fairest.

Suppose two ethnic groups in a country are in conflict over how many representatives they are each allocated in the national parliament. One group wants to make the allocations in terms of the proportion of each ethnic group in the population; the other group wants to do it in terms of the proportion of the territory occupied by each ethnic population. Ethnic group A, which has fewer people but more land, makes its final offer a bicameral legislature in which one legislative body would be elected by per capita vote and the other in proportion to the size of the territory. Ethnic group B makes a final offer of a simple legislative body based on per capita vote.

Injustice in the Course of Conflict

Unfair procedures employed in resolving conflict undermine confidence in the institutions that establish and implement the policies and rules regulating conflict. Thus, people become alienated from political institutions if they feel that elections are not conducted fairly, or that their interests are ignored and they have no voice in affecting social policies and how they are implemented, or that they are discriminated against such that they are likely to be the losers in any political conflict. Similarly, people lose confidence in legal and judicial institutions and third-party procedures such as mediation and arbitration if the police, judges, and other third parties are biased, if they are not

treated courteously, if competent legal representation is not available to them, or if they have little opportunity to express their concerns.

Trust in organizations and groups as well as in interpersonal relations is also undermined if, when conflict occurs, one is abused, not given opportunity to voice one's concerns and views, treated as an inferior whose rights and interests have legitimacy only as they are bestowed by others, or otherwise not respected as a person.

Alienation and withdrawal of commitment are not the only possible forms of response to unjust processes of conflict resolution. Anger, aggression, rebellion, sabotage, and assertive attempts to remove the injustice are some other forms of response. Depending on the perceived possibilities, one may become openly or covertly active in attempting to change the institutions, relations, and situations giving rise to the injustice. Conflict is central in the functioning of all institutions and relations. If the processes involved in conflict resolution are unfair, pressures to bring about change arise; they may take a violent form if there are no socially recognized and available procedures for dealing with grievances.

Conflict About What Is Just

Many conflicts are about which principle of justice should be applied or how a given principle should be implemented. Thus, disputes about affirmative action often center on whether students (or employees) should be selected on the basis of individual relative merit as measured by test scores, academic grades, and prior work experience, or selected so as to reflect racial and ethnic diversity in the population. Each principle, in isolation, can be considered just. However, selection by the criterion of relative merit as measured by test scores and grades often means that

ethnic diversity is limited. Selection so as to achieve ethnic diversity frequently means that some individuals from the majority group, with higher relative standing on tests, are not selected even as some minority group members with lower standing are. These results are possible even when only well-qualified applicants are chosen.

Conflict over affirmative action may not only be about principles of justice; it also concerns the justness of the procedures for measuring merit. Some claim that the standard measures of merit—tests, grades, prior work experience—are biased against individuals who are not from the dominant culture. Others assert that the measures are appropriate since selection is for performance in a setting—a college or workplace—that reflects the dominant culture.

The BTC-SBM conflict described in the Introduction to this Handbook is between two principles of justice. Should teacher representatives on the school council be selected to represent their academic department by vote of the department members? Or should they be selected to represent their academic departments but also chosen to represent the ethnic diversity of the teachers?

In dealing with conflict between reasonable principles of justice, it is well to apply the notions advanced in the chapter 1. Specifically, you want to turn the conflict into a win-win one in which it is perceived to be a mutual problem to be resolved cooperatively. In the illustration of affirmative action, there are many ways in which both claims—for diversity and for merit—can be represented in selection policies. It is better to discuss how these two principles can be combined, so that the claims of each can be adequately realized, than to create a win-lose conflict by denying the claims of one side so that the other’s can be victorious.

“Justifying” as a Negotiation Tactic

“Justice” can be employed as a tactical weapon during negotiations to claim higher moral ground for oneself. Doing so claims greater morality for your position as compared to the other’s. This form of justifying commonly has several effects. It hardens your position and makes it inflexible as you become morally committed to it as well as increasingly self-righteous. It leads to blaming the other and implicit denigration of the other as morally inferior. It produces a similar effect in the other and escalates the conflict into a conflict about morality.

As this happens, the conflicting parties often lose sight of the actual interests underlying their respective positions and the conflict becomes a win-lose one that is not likely to advance the interests of either side. It is not the justifying or giving reasons for your interests that is harmful but rather the claim of moral superiority, with its explicit or implicit moral denigration of the other. Whatever justifying takes place, it should be in the context of full recognition of one another’s equal moral status.

IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING

There are several important implications here for training in constructive conflict resolution:

- Knowledge of the intimate connection between conflict and injustice has to be imparted. (This chapter is an introduction to the knowledge in this area.)
- Training should help to enlarge the scope of the student’s moral community so that he or she perceives that all people are entitled to care and justice.
- It should help increase empathic capacity so that the student can sense and experience in some measure what

the victims of injustice experience.

- Given the nature of the many embittered conflicts between groups that have inflicted grievous harm, we need to develop insight into the processes involved in forgiveness and reconciliation.
- Training should help to develop skill in inventing productive, conflict-resolving combinations of justice principles when they appear to be in conflict.

Many training programs deal in some measure with the first three implications, but few if any deal with the last two. Before turning to a more extended consideration of the latter implications, I briefly consider the first three.

Knowledge of Systematic Forms of Injustice in Society

Some injustices are committed by people with full realization that they are acting unjustly. Most are unwitting participants in a system—a family, community, social organization, school, workplace, society, or world—in which there are established traditions, structures, procedures, norms, rules, practices, and the like that determine how one should act. These traditions, structures, and so on may give rise to profound injustices that are difficult to recognize because they are taken for granted since they are so embedded in a system in which one is thoroughly enmeshed.

How can we help become aware of systemic injustices? I suggest taking each type of injustice (distributive, procedural, retributive, and morally exclusionary) discussed at the beginning of the chapter and using them to probe the system we wish to examine to heighten awareness of its structural sources of injustice. Illustrations for each type of injustice follow.

Distributive Injustice.

Every type of system—from a society to a family—distributes benefits, costs, and harms (its reward systems are a reflection of this). One can examine such benefits as income, education, health care, police protection, housing, and water supplies, and such harms as accidents, rapes, physical attacks, sickness, imprisonment, death, and rat bites, and see how they are distributed among categories of people: males versus females, employers versus employees, whites versus blacks, heterosexuals versus homosexuals, police officers versus teachers, adults versus children. Such examination reveals some gross disparities in distribution of one or another benefit or harm received by the categories of people involved. Thus, blacks generally receive fewer benefits and more harm than whites in the United States. In most parts of the world, female children are less likely than male children to receive as much education or inherit parental property, and they are more likely to suffer sexual abuse.

Procedural Injustice.

One can probe a system to determine whether it offers fair procedures to all. Are all categories of people treated with politeness, dignity, and respect by judges, police, teachers, parents, employers, and others in authority? Are some but not others allowed to have voice and representation, as well as adequate information, in the processes and decisions that affect them?

Retributive and Reparative Injustice.

Are “crimes” by different categories of people less likely to be viewed as crimes, to result in an arrest, to be brought to trial, to result in conviction, to lead to punishment or imprisonment or the death penalty, and so on? Considerable disparity is apparent between how “robber

barons” and ordinary robbers are treated by the criminal justice system, between manufacturers who knowingly sell injurious products to many (obvious instances are tobacco and defective automobiles) and those who negligently cause an accident. Similarly, almost every comparison of the treatment of black and white criminal offenders indicates that if there is a difference, blacks receive worse treatment.

Moral Exclusion.

When a system is under stress, are there differences in how categories of people are treated? Are some people likely to lose their jobs, be excluded from obtaining scarce resources, or be scapegoated and victimized? During periods of economic depression, social upheaval, civil strife, and war, frustrations are often channeled to exclude some groups from the treatment normatively expected from others in the same moral community.

Enlarging the Scope of One’s Moral Community

The previous discussion of the scope of justice suggests several additional, experientially oriented foci for training. A good place to start is to help students become aware of their own social identities: national, racial, ethnic, religious, class, occupational, gender, sexual, age, community, and social circle. Explore what characteristics they attribute to being American, or white, or Catholic, or female, and so on and what they attribute to contrasting identities, such as being Muslim or black. Help them recognize which of these identities claim an implicit moral superiority and greater privilege in contrast to people who have contrasting identities. Have them reverse roles, assuming an identity that is frequently viewed as morally inferior and less entitled to customary rights and privileges. Then act out, subtly but realistically, how they

are treated by those who are now assuming the morally superior and privileged identity. Such exercises help students become more aware of implicit assumptions about their own identity as well as other relevant contrasting identities and more sensitive to the psychological effects of considering others to have identities that are morally inferior and less privileged.

Intergroup simulations can also be used to give students an experience in which they start developing prejudice, stereotypes, and hostility toward members of competing groups—even as the students have full knowledge that they have been randomly assigned to the groups. Many such experiences can be employed to demonstrate how a moral community is broken down and to illustrate the psychological mechanisms that people employ to justify this hostility toward out-group members.

It is also useful to give students the experience of how their moral community can expand or contract as a function of temporary events. Thus, research has demonstrated that people are likely to react to a stranger with trust after being exposed by radio broadcasts to “good” news about people (such as acts of heroism, altruism, and helpfulness) and with suspicion after “bad” news (such as murder, rape, robbery, assault, and fraud). By helping students become aware of the temporary conditions, inside as well as outside themselves, that affect the scope of their moral community, they gain the capacity to resist contracting their moral community under adverse conditions.

Increasing Empathy

Empathic concern allows you to sympathetically imagine how someone else feels and put yourself in his or her place. It is a core component of helpful responsiveness to another. It is most readily aroused for people with whom we identify,

with those we recognize as people who are like ourselves and belong to our moral community. Empathy is inhibited by excluding the other from one's moral community, dehumanizing him, and making him into an enemy or a devil. Empathy stimulates helpfulness and altruism toward those who are in need of help; dehumanization encourages neglect, derogation, or attack.

Enlarging one's moral community increases one's scope of empathy. However, empathy can occur at different levels. The fullest level contains all of several aspects of empathy: knowing what the other is feeling; feeling in some measure what the other is feeling; understanding why the other is feeling the way she does, including what she wants or fears; and understanding her perspective and frame of reference as well as her world. Empathic responsiveness to another's concern helps the other feel understood, validated, and cared for.

Role playing, role exchanging or role reversal, and guided imagination are three interrelated methods commonly employed in training people to become empathically responsive to others. *Role playing* involves imagining that you are someone else—seeing the world through his eyes, wanting what he wants, feeling the emotions he feels, and behaving as he would behave in a particular situation or in reaction to someone else's behavior. *Role exchange* or role reversal is similar to role playing, except that it involves reversing or exchanging roles with the person with whom you are interacting in a particular situation (as during a conflict). In *guided imagination* , you help the student take on the role of the other by stimulating the student to imagine and adopt various relevant characteristics (not caricatures) of the role or person being enacted, such as how he walks, talks, eats, fantasizes, dresses, and wakes up in the morning.

Forgiveness and Reconciliation

After protracted, violent conflicts in which the conflicting parties have inflicted grievous harm (humiliation, destruction of property, torture, assault, rape, murder) on one another, those parties may still have to live and work together in the same communities. This is often the case in civil wars, ethnic and religious conflicts, gang wars, and even family disputes that have taken a destructive course. Consider the slaughter that has taken place between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi; between blacks and whites in South Africa; between Bloods and Crips of Los Angeles; and among Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia. Is it possible for forgiveness and reconciliation to occur? If so, what fosters these processes?

There are many meanings of *forgiveness* in the extensive and growing literature concerned with this topic. I shall use the term to mean giving up rage, the desire for vengeance, and a grudge toward those who have inflicted grievous harm on you, your loved ones, or the groups with whom you identify. It also implies a willingness to accept the other into one's moral community so that he or she is entitled to care and justice. As Borris (2003) has pointed out, it does not mean you have to forget the evil that has been done, condone it, or abolish punishment for it. However, it implies that the punishment should conform to the canons of justice and be directed toward the goal of reforming the harm doer so that he or she can become a moral participant in the community.

There has been rich discussion in the psychological and religious literature of the importance of forgiveness to psychological and spiritual healing as well as to reconciliation (see Minow, 1998; Shriver, 1995). Forgiveness is, of course, not to be expected in the immediate aftermath of torture, rape, or assault. It is

unlikely, as well as psychologically harmful, until one is able to be in touch with the rage, fear, guilt, humiliation, hurt, and pain that have been stored inside. But nursing hate keeps the injury alive and active in the present instead of permitting it to take its proper place in the past. Doing so consumes psychological resources and energy that is more appropriately directed to the present and future. Although forgiveness of the other may not be necessary for self-healing, it seems to be very helpful, as well as an important ingredient in the process of reconciliation.

A well-developed psychological and psychiatric literature deals with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), that is, the psychological consequences of having been subjected or exposed to grievous harm, and a growing literature is emerging from workshop experiences centering on forgiveness and reconciliation. These literatures are too extensive and detailed for more than a brief overview of the major ideas here.

Treatment of PTSD (Basoglu, 1992; Foa, Keane, and Friedman, 2000; Ochberg, 1988) essentially (1) gives the stressed individuals a supportive, safe, and secure environment (2) in which they can be helped to reexperience, in a modulated fashion, the vulnerability, helplessness, fear, rage, humiliation, guilt, and other emotions associated with the grievous harm (medication may be useful in limiting the intensity of the emotions being relived), thus (3) helping them identify the past circumstances and contexts in which the harm occurred and distinguish current realities from past realities; (4) helping them understand the reasons for his emotional reactions to the traumatic events and the appropriateness of their reactions; (5) helping them acquire the skills, attitudes, knowledge, and social support that make them less vulnerable and powerless; and (6) helping them develop an everyday life characterized by meaningful,

enjoyable, and supportive relations in their family, work, and community.

PTSD treatment requires considerable professional education beyond that involved in conflict resolution training. Still, it is well for students of conflict to be aware that exposure to severe injustice can have enduring harmful psychological effects unless the posttraumatic conditions are treated effectively.

Forgiveness and reconciliation may be difficult to achieve at more than a superficial level unless the posttraumatic stress is substantially relieved. Even so, the processes involved in forgiveness and reconciliation may also play an important role in relieving PTSD. The causal arrow is multidirectional; progress in forgiveness or reconciliation or posttraumatic stress reduction facilitates progress in the other two.

There are two distinct but interrelated approaches to developing forgiveness. One centers on the victim and the other on the relationship between the victim and the harm doer. The focus on the victim, in addition to providing some relief from PTSD, seeks to help the victim recognize the human qualities common to victim and victimizer. In effect, various methods and exercises are employed to enable victims to recognize the bad as well as good aspects of themselves, that they have “sinful” as well as “divine” capabilities and tendencies. In other words, one helps victims become aware of themselves as total persons—with no need to deny their own fallibility and imperfections—whose lifelong experiences in their family, schools, communities, ethnic and religious groups, and workplaces have played a key role in determining their own personality and behavior. As the victim comes to accept his or her own moral fallibility, he or she is likely to accept the fallibility of

the harm doer as well and to perceive both the good and the bad in the other.

Both victims and harm doers are often quite moral toward those they include in their own moral community but grossly immoral to those excluded. Thus, Adolf Eichmann, who efficiently organized the mass murder of Jews for the Nazis, was considered a good family man. The New England captains of the slave ships, who transported African slaves to the Americas under the most abominable conditions, were often deacons of their churches. The white settlers of the United States, who took possession of land occupied by Native Americans and killed those who resisted, were viewed as courageous and moral within their own communities.

Recognition of the good and bad potential in all humans, the self as well as the other, facilitates the victim's forgiveness of the harm doer. But it may not be enough. Quite often, forgiveness also requires interaction between the victim and harm doer to establish the conditions needed for forgiving. This interaction sometimes takes the form of negotiation between the victim and harm doer. A third party representing the community (such as a mediator or judge) usually facilitates the negotiation and sets the terms if the harm doer and victim cannot reach an agreement. In some European courts, such negotiations are required in criminal cases before the judge sentences the convicted criminal.

Obviously the terms of an agreement for forgiveness vary as a function of the nature and severity of the harm as well as the relationship between the victim and harm doer. As I suggested earlier in this chapter, the victim may seek full confession, sincere apology, contrition, restitution, compensation, self-abasement, or self-reform from the harm doer. (For an excellent discussion of apology and

other related issues, see Lazare, 2004.) The victim may also seek some form of punishment and incarceration for the harm doer. Forgiveness is most likely if the harm doer and the victim accept the conditions, whatever they may be.

Reconciliation goes beyond forgiveness in that it not only accepts the other into one's moral community but also establishes or reestablishes a positive, cooperative relationship among the individuals and groups estranged by the harms they inflict on one another. Borris (2003) has indicated: "Reconciliation is the end of a process that forgiveness begins." (For excellent discussions of reconciliation processes, see Nadler, 2003; chapter 40 in this Handbook.)

In chapter 1, I discussed in detail some of the factors involved in initiating and maintaining cooperative relations —that discussion is relevant to the process of reconciliation. Here, I consider briefly some of the special issues relating to establishing cooperative relations after a destructive conflict. In the following list, I outline a number of basic principles:

- *Mutual security* . After a bitter conflict, each side tends to be concerned with its own security, without adequate recognition that neither side can attain security unless the other side also feels secure. Real security requires that both sides have security as their mutual goal. If weapons have been involved in the prior conflict, mutually verifiable disarmament and arms control are important components of mutual security.
- *Mutual respect* . Just as true security from physical danger requires mutual cooperation, so does security from psychological harm and humiliation. Each side must treat the other side with the respect, courtesy, politeness, and consideration normatively expected in

civil society. Insult, humiliation, and inconsiderateness by one side usually lead to reciprocation by the other and decreased physical and psychological security.

- *Humanization of the other* . During bitter conflict, each side tends to dehumanize the other and develop images of the other as an evil enemy. There is much need for both sides to experience one another in everyday contexts as parents, homemakers, schoolchildren, teachers, and merchants, which enables them to see one another as human beings who are more like themselves than not. Problem-solving workshops, along the lines developed by Burton (1969, 1987) and Kelman (1972), are also valuable in overcoming dehumanization of one another.
- *Fair rules for managing conflict* . Even if a tentative reconciliation has begun, new conflicts inevitably occur —over the distribution of scarce resources, procedures, values, and so on. It is important to anticipate that conflicts will occur and to develop beforehand the fair rules, experts, institutions, and other resources for managing such conflicts constructively and justly.
- *Curbing the extremists on both sides* . During a protracted and bitter conflict, each side tends to produce extremists committed to the processes of the destructive conflict as well as to its continuation. Attaining some of their initial goals may be less satisfying than continuing to inflict damage on the other. Extremists stimulate extremism on both sides. The parties need to cooperate in curbing extremism on their own side and restraining actions that stimulate and justify extremist elements on the other side.
- *Gradual development of mutual trust and cooperation* . It takes repeated experience of successful, varied, mutually beneficial cooperation to develop a solid basis

for mutual trust between former enemies. In the early stages of reconciliation, when trust is required for cooperation, the former enemies may be willing to trust a third party (who agrees to serve as a monitor, inspector, or guarantor of any cooperative arrangement) but not yet willing to trust one another if there is a risk of the other failing to reciprocate cooperation. Also in the early stages, it is especially important that cooperative endeavors be successful. This requires careful selection of the opportunities and tasks for cooperation so that they are clearly achievable as well as meaningful and significant.

Inventing Solutions

It is helpful in trying to resolve any problem constructively (as with a conflict between principles of justice) to be able to discover or invent alternative solutions that go beyond win-lose outcomes such as selecting the more powerful party's principle or flipping a coin to determine the winner. Flipping a coin provides equal opportunity to win, but it does not result in satisfactory outcomes for both sides.

For simplicity's sake, let us consider a conflict over possession of a valuable object, say, a rare antique clock bequeathed to two sons who live in separate parts of the world. Each wants the clock and feels equally entitled to it. Unlike the cake in an earlier example, the clock is not physically divisible. However, they could agree to divide possession of the clock so that they share it for equal periods, say, six months or one year at a time. Another solution is to sell the clock and divide the resulting money equally.

Let us assume, though, that the mother's will has prohibited sale of the clock to anyone else. Here is an alternative: the two sons can bid against one another in an

auction, and the higher bidder gets the clock while the other gets half the price of the winner's bid. The auction can offer open bidding against one another or a closed, single, final bid from each person. Thus, if the winning bid is $5,000, the winner gets the clock but has to pay the other $2,500; each ends up with equally valued outcomes. The winner's net value is $2,500, but the loser also ends up with $2,500.

Another procedure employs a version of the divide-and-choose rule. A pool to be divided between the sons comprises the clock and an amount of money that each son contributes equally to the pool, say, $3,000. One son divides the total pool (the clock and $6,000 in cash) into two bundles of his own devising, declares the contents of the bundles, and lets the other party choose which bundle to take. Thus, if the son who values the clock at $5,000 is the divider, he might put the clock and $500 in one bundle and $5,500 in the other. Doing so ensures that he receives a gross return of $5,500 and a net return of $2,500 ($5,500 minus $3,000), no matter which bundle the other chooses. The chooser can also obtain a net return of $2,500 if he chooses the cash bundle; presumably he would do so if he values the clock at less than $5,000. Such an outcome would be apt to be seen as fair to both sons.

The outcome of the divide-and-choose approach as well as the auction procedure seem eminently fair. Both sons win. The one who wants the clock more obtains it, and the other gets something of equivalent value. Other win-win procedures can undoubtedly be invented for types of conflict that at first glance seem to allow only win-lose outcomes. (See Bram and Taylor, 1996, for a very useful discussion of developing fair outcomes.) Training creates readiness to recognize the possibility that win-win procedures can be discovered or invented. Skill in developing such procedures can be cultivated, I further

believe, by showing students illustrations and modeling this development as well as giving them extensive practice in attempting to create them.

CONCLUSION

The relationship between conflict and justice is bidirectional: injustice breeds conflict, and destructive conflict gives rise to injustice. Preventing destructive conflict requires more than training in constructive conflict resolution. It also necessitates reducing the gross injustices that characterize much of our social world at the interpersonal, intergroup, and international levels. Such reduction requires changes in how various institutions of society—political, economic, educational, familial, and religious—function so that they recognize and honor the values underlying constructive conflict resolution described in chapter 1: human equality, shared community, nonviolence, fallibility, and reciprocity. Adherence to these values not only eliminates gross injustices but also reduces the likelihood that conflict itself takes a destructive course and, as a consequence, gives rise to injustice.

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CHAPTER THREE
A DELICATE AND DELIBERATE JOURNEY TOWARD JUSTICE
Challenging Privilege: Building Structures of Solidarity

Michelle Fine
Alexis Halkovic

We live in a time when structures and relations of inequity are being (re)produced breathlessly and relentlessly on global, national, and local scales. Slowly we grow anesthetized by claims of "progress" and forget to notice the dispossession left behind (Fine and Ruglis, 2009). As inequalities swell within and across nations, the logics of global capitalism permeate social and workplace relations, while competition and individualism are assumed the natural way one might think about "what's fair." In this political moment, it is important to remember that many scholars, practitioners, and activists have argued that distributions are made and can be unmade and remade. There are multiple ways—some more progressive and some more regressive—to conceptualize, design policy, structure organizations, and organize movements for redistributive justice. Morton Deutsch, in particular, has encouraged researchers, policymakers, organizers, and managers to consider how social policies and justice frameworks might challenge rather than reproduce privilege, and to facilitate policies and organizations that support shared fates rather than ruthless individualism.

However, we know well from history and contemporary politics that privilege has long refused to recognize itself; inequality gaps are stubborn, and unequal outcomes are

increasingly viewed as natural, unfortunate, and yet inevitable. While newspapers and the Internet and the popular imagination are saturated with images of revolutions in Syria and Egypt, the courageous persistence of Rosa Parks and Nelson Mandela, the fall of apartheid in South Africa, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and groundbreaking legal struggles including *Brown v. Board of Education* and other civil rights victories, little is known about midlevel social movements, social policies, and organizational strategies launched by coalitions of privileged and marginalized activists, designed to reduce inequality gaps, cultivate a sense of solidarity, and build coherent structures for material and psychological shared fates.

This chapter is written to help readers review the inevitability of privilege; cultivate conditions for solidarity; and enjoy case studies of workplaces, schools, and public projects designed for shared ownership, diminished inequality gaps, and deep and democratic participation. We focus in particular on the role that persons of relative privilege can play in delicate coalition to challenge inequality, contest privilege, and build cultures of solidarity. We ally ourselves with writer bell hooks (1989) who argues, “Even in the face of powerful structures of domination, it remains possible for each of us, especially those of us who are members of oppressed and/or exploited groups as well as those radical visionaries who may have race, class, and sex privilege, to define and determine alternative standards, to decide on the nature and extent of compromise” (p. 81).

While we recognize that persons of privilege do not inherently share the commitments and struggles of those who have been marginalized, we believe that many are discomforted by unfair advantage; many would be willing to sacrifice some privilege for more justice, and quite a few

would engage in activism or structural reforms, or both, to promote distributive justice. There is indeed a substantial psychological literature arguing that persons of privilege are motivated to amass, retain, and justify privilege at all costs. Yet at the same time, the media report social movements that include persons of privilege spreading across Spain, Greece, Israel, Egypt, Central and South America, South Africa, New Zealand, Australia, India, Burma, the United States, and England, insisting on the redistribution of power, resources, opportunities, and participation. In this chapter, we invite you to consider the second half of this vision: that privileged persons, once provoked to recognize injustice, can be mobilized to join with allies to pursue more equitable social relations.

We review briefly the social psychological literature on privilege and solidarity and present three case studies of social organizations—schools, workplaces and advocacy organizations—that have taken bold steps toward challenging inequality gaps and confronting privilege. We offer these examples as delicate and provisional windows through which researchers, practitioners, educators, activists, and policymakers might take up critical responsibility for movements and reforms that seek to diminish inequality gaps and heighten a sense of shared responsibility for our collective fates.

THEORIZING JUSTICE FRAMEWORKS: DENATURALIZING INEQUALITY AND PRIVILEGE

In 1975, Deutsch published a now-classic essay challenging the untroubled assumption within the discipline of psychology that individuals conceptualize justice as capitalist economists might—by calculating and maximizing

“what’s in it for me.” Deutsch implored psychologists to theorize and research varied principles of justice; he firmly challenged the taken-for-granted assumption that equity beliefs are “normal,” that greed and personal accumulation are primary motives, and that persons of privilege are comfortable with unfair advantage.

Defining distributive justice as the distribution of conditions and goods that affect psychological, physiological, economic, and social aspects of well-being, Deutsch distinguished three frameworks for conceptualizing justice: economic, solidarity, and caring. While these orientations may coexist (and may conflict with one another) within a single society, there is always a dominant orientation. In capitalist countries, the economically oriented value system has overwhelmingly determined social policy, institutional arrangements, and social relationships.

Deutsch was concerned at the time that psychologists had simply imported this logic into the discipline as if it were the natural way to conceptualize justice: individuals are motivated toward personal advantage, and unequal outcomes are therefore a “just” distribution is proportional to personal inputs. Deutsch asked us to recognize that while most workplaces are organized around equity, there are also public and some private institutions organized around equality and need, including libraries, trade unions, public education, and credit unions, along with clean air and water; parks and civil rights legislation based on notions of equality; and social security, disability insurance, healthy family dynamics, and college financial aid based on need. All of these goods are accessible based on a distinct principle of distributive justice. Susan Opotow (2011), in extending Deutsch’s theorizing, has demonstrated that these distinct justice frameworks have profound consequences for influencing a nation’s, community’s, or

person’s scope of justice, arguing that justice principles of deserving are extended only to those who are considered to be a part of one’s own moral community. Thus, the narrower one’s sense of community is, the narrower is one’s scope of justice.

Deutsch elaborated on the social psychological consequences of the economic and equity distribution principle: people are viewed in terms of use value and excess; economic values are insinuated into all aspects of life; greater allocations are made to those who begin with advantage and then appear to be more productive or better able to manage resources; and those in power disproportionately allocate more to themselves, making the system conflictful, precarious, and ultimately dysfunctional. When people are assessed in terms of use value, the bonds of collective well-being are severely threatened: safety nets fray; elite communities build gates, walls, and prisons, and the poor are left to suffer on their own, often out of sight, sometimes with the “help” of charity. The very fabric of democracy is at stake.

In a solidarity-oriented society, policies and structures emphasize equal status relations or the “optimum distribution of status for the mutual support of self-esteem” (Deutsch, 1975, p. 146). In such contexts, including labor unions, credit unions, food co-ops, housing cooperatives, and planned communities, for instance, participants enjoy mutual respect and engage through a shared fates orientation. At the moment in the United States, libraries, parks, public services, the right to clean air and water, and civil and human rights are distributed, at least in the abstract, with a solidarity orientation.

Deutsch argues that in a caring-oriented society, distribution of resources, opportunities, and dignity is based on need, such that there is a sense of shared

responsibility for the collective well-being of all members of a society, even if distributions are, at any moment in time, technically unequal. Our social security system in the United States, veterans' benefits, and Medicare have been organized as need-based, and respect-filled, systems that serve all of those deemed eligible based on their needs. Inclusion and deservingness are assumed. When natural disasters occur, presumably our government attends to people based on need, not income. And yet the neglect of survivors of Hurricane Katrina forces us to understand how race and class dynamics systematically influence who is considered deserving and who is excluded from the moral community of the deserving (Opotow, 2011).

In the United States, we are living at a time of enormous contradiction. We believe ourselves to be a nation premised on equality and care, and yet economic values penetrate every aspect of our daily life as we witness all things public being handed over to the private sector. Swelling inequality gaps abound, government-funded safety nets are fraying, and the very public institutions that have bound us together—public education, public housing, civil rights protections, trade unions, higher education, environmental protections, public parks, and health care—are threatened by disinvestment. At the same time, however, there is ample evidence that people—even people with privilege—are organizing throughout the United States and globally to demand more just social arrangements and a redistribution of resources, opportunities, and dignity. Just as infants crave relationships (Winnicott, 1971), we believe that the desire for solidarity is natural and essential to our collective well-being.

ROOTING SOLIDARITY IN (OUR) NATURE

We begin with a simple and well-researched premise that shared fates and solidarities are critical to collective well-being and sustainability. We offer initial thoughts about our natural roots in solidarity.

Sylvia Cremer is an evolutionary biologist studying the social life of ants. Her experiments have demonstrated that if one ant in a colony is contaminated with smallpox, the other ants do not exclude the sick one but instead organize to lick her clean until she is healthy (Konrad et al., 2012). And what Cremer has found is that not only does the one ant survive in more than 90 percent of the cases, but the collective immunity of the colony rises.

Similar findings come from the writings of science writer Janine M. Benyus (1997), who places human problems under a microscope and asks, “How would nature solve this?” (Elizabeth and Goldsmith, 2011). Benyus has studied, for instance, how trees survive natural disasters, including Katrina, and she tells us that in every forest, there are sacrifice trees (you know these sacrifice trees too well). But she also tells us that the secret to survival lives in the mighty oaks. Oak trees, standing tall, almost unbowed, grow in communities, expansive, bold, and comfortably taking up lots of space. Although they appear autonomous and free-standing, the truth is that they are held up by a thick, entwined maze of roots, deep and wide. These intimate underground snuggles lean on each other for strength even, and especially, in times of natural disaster. Beynus and Cremer, like Deutsch, implore us to understand that we are profoundly interdependent; we are only as strong as our weakest members and strengthened by licking others’ smallpox away. Moving from nature to realpolitik, we see “revolting” evidence of intersectional solidarities across the globe.

Consider the Occupy movement, engaged by a wide range of young and old, rich and working class, people with summer homes and people with no home at all. In legal struggles for gay marriage or undocumented youth to be granted citizenship, there have been significant stories of heterosexual “allies” and American Indian/Native-born people fighting for the Dream Act. In *Checkpoint Watch* , journalist Amira Hess writes about coalitions of Jewish women standing arm in arm with Palestinian women, bearing witness to the occupation at checkpoints into the occupied territories, to make visible their rejection of and outrage against the occupied territories (Keshet, 2006). In community-based activist and consciousness-raising groups of white antiracist organizing, or Men Organized against Rape, young adults of racial or gender privilege are interrogating the damage done by racial or gender hierarchies and presumptions of superiority, by colluding in white or male privilege and passively ignoring the violence of inequality gaps. CEOs of flourishing corporations are increasingly deciding to sell their companies to the workers and convert the business into a worker-owned cooperative, because “if I like owning and making a profit, they probably would too.” And of course many were relieved to hear Bill Gates and Warren Buffett, two of the wealthiest men in the country, advocate taxing wealthy Americans more heavily than they have been.

Thus, in this chapter, we join Noam Chomsky who explained to a reporter from the *Observer* (2003):

> Responsibility I believe accrues through privilege. People like you and me have an unbelievable amount of privilege and therefore we have a huge amount of responsibility. We live in free societies where we are not afraid of the police; we have extraordinary wealth available to us by global standards. If you have those things, then you have the kind of responsibility that a person does not have if he or she is slaving seventy hours a week to put food on the table; a responsibility at the very least to inform yourself about power. Beyond that, it is a question of whether you believe in moral certainties or not.

And so we in turn ask, under what conditions do persons of privilege take up this responsibility, linking arms with others, for redistributive justice and collective dignity?

UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS DO PERSONS OF PRIVILEGE CHALLENGE UNJUST SOCIAL ARRANGEMENTS?

Much of social psychology would tell us that persons of privilege are unwilling to relinquish their power (Jost, Banaji, and Nosek, 2004; Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). Ample studies demonstrate that elites, whites, Christians, heterosexuals, and men, compared to their less powerful counterparts, hold more rigid and resistant views about existing social relations and justify their advantage as though it were meritorious and legitimate inequities as "the ways things have always been." College football coach Barry Switzer said it well: "Some people are born on third base and go through life thinking they hit a triple" (Shatel, 1986). Marx too was doubtful that elites could ever be induced to act in solidarity with workers. And yet we would argue that the complex sympathies, contradictory

identifications, and varied activisms enacted by persons of privilege have been underestimated, undertheorized, and understudied.

The classic experiments on “equity motive,” designed by Walster, Berscheid, and Walster (1973), discovered that people, *if unrestrained* , will maximize their own benefits at the expense of others, but that groups are better off if group members behave equitably and will therefore develop policies that will lead to more equitable behavior. They proposed that those who discover that they benefit from inequitable relationships will feel distress and try to resolve the inequity.

This line of work on elite and oppressed class consciousness has been advanced more recently by Jost and colleagues (2004) studying what they call system justification and by Sidanius and Pratto, who advance social dominance theory. They argue that the institutional nature of social dominance—the structural assurance of cumulative privilege in laws, systems, and structures that benefit the dominant group in a society both materially and psychologically—requires almost no activity by individuals in order to maintain group dominance. According to Pratto and Stewart (2012), social reproduction is effortless: “No one intends for group dominance to occur” (p. 32). A decade earlier, critical race theorist Beverly Tatum (2003) published *Why Are All the Black Kids Sitting Together in the Cafeteria?* where she unpacked the historic, effortless reproduction of racism in schools, conjuring the metaphor of the automatic walkway in an airport. In order to participate in a racist society, Tatum explains, all one has to do is step on. No one has to start the engine. Participation in injustice is passive; resistance, however, requires activity (see Stetsenko, 2012).

Together these researchers argue that the historic, structural, institutional, and intimate nature of inequality facilitates a cloud of denial by many dominant group members who can move unencumbered through a system that normalizes and reinforces their privilege as if earned. In other words, these researchers argue that privileged people typically cannot see their own unearned advantage. The greater the inequality gaps are, the less likely they are to interact meaningfully with those experiencing oppression. Unaware and seemingly unaffected by inequitable historic and structural arrangements, these women and men are likely to support policies that reinforce their (unfair) advantage, in all likelihood without realizing that they are perpetuating injustice. However—and this is crucial—when inequities are made visible, members of dominant groups may become uncomfortable and advocate for change.

A number of justice researchers have begun to investigate how to most effectively induce persons of privilege to confront injustice. Iyer and Ryan (2009) found that men are most willing to engage with women on gendered grievances when they experience sympathy and identification with women and perceive the grievances to be highly legitimate. In analogous research on the willingness of white people to act on behalf of Aboriginal grievances, Leach, Iyer, and Pedersen (2006) found anger about in-group advantage to be a stronger predictor of willingness to act than guilt about out-group disadvantage. Powell, Branscombe, and Schmitt (2005) also discovered that focusing on white privilege rather than black disadvantage was correlated with higher levels of collective guilt and lower levels of racism. Taken together, this body of research suggests that persons of privilege are more likely to act against injustice when they view the problem as unfair advantage rather than unfair disadvantage.

Within the social psychology literature, however, studies on the motivations for those with greater privilege to act in solidarity with groups having less privilege are limited. The topic of solidarity, or the conditions under which people will act as groups versus as individual actors in order to achieve social mobility, was addressed in Tajfel's (1975) early work on intergroup dynamics. Subsequent work has narrowed, unfortunately, and in lopsided fashion, into studies of intergroup conflict rather than solidarity. Even the vibrant literatures on liberation psychology focus primarily on the consciousness and action of historically oppressed persons, with seemingly little hope for action by members of the privileged or oppressor group (Martin-Baro, 1994; Freire, 2007).

This does not mean that relatively privileged people are irrelevant to social movements for justice. Indeed, the research of Subašić, Schmitt, and Reynolds (2011) on solidarity of consumers with sweatshop workers suggests that consumers who share a sense of common injustice, or "co-victimization," with sweatshop workers report an inclusive social identity that increases their willingness to act in solidarity. Similarly, in a variety of field studies, social psychologist Maria Elena Torre (2009) has documented how "contact zones" of differentially positioned persons, that is, those living in privilege and those in more oppressive social conditions, can be mobilized to take up collectively important questions of power, difference, and solidarity. Relations of solidarity are not automatic; they must be cultivated in deep, power-sensitive collaboration with persons who have historically been oppressed through intergroup dialogue by organizing and strategic attention to challenging dominant narratives, stereotypes, and ideologies (Burton and Kagan, 2009; Tuhiwai Smith, 1999).

Thus, a growing number of experimental and field studies suggest that persons of privilege do indeed experience

discomfort about their unfair advantage, particularly when their advantage is made salient, or when collaborating with others on projects rooted in shared action for social justice. We may actually be living in a “control condition” where there is a virtual blackout of policy, media, and social science attention to examples of, and evidence from, intersectional coalitions for justice. This chapter is written in part to expose and circulate these images, pierce the anesthesia that naturalizes injustice and our powerlessness to promote social change, and break the silence on the social psychological dynamics of inclusive coalition work.

CHALLENGING INEQUALITY, CONFRONTING PRIVILEGE

At this historic moment, when local, national, and global inequalities seem inevitable and irreversible, it is important to make visible and accessible concrete examples of how and why everyday people have joined together to redesign work spaces toward greater equality, more inclusion, and deeper participation. We present three case studies of strategic designs for solidarity, situated within and across social organizations, launched by coalitions of historically privileged and marginalized persons. Allied with larger movements for social justice, these initiatives are located within the efforts of everyday people trying to create more just workplaces, schools, and public agencies. We sketch three prototypes:

1. *Policy changes initiated to reduce inequality gaps:* Policies and practices designed to compress social and organizational hierarchies toward the redistribution of opportunities, resources, and power
2. *Psychoeducational strategies designed to foster inclusion:* Policies and practices designed to transform

organizational culture to be more inclusive, participatory, and diverse at all levels

3. *Organizational transformation and development:* The redesign of companies into worker-owned cooperatives to facilitate the redistribution of finances and ownership, democratize participation, and cultivate material and psychological shared fates

The Equality Trust: Structural Policies Designed to Reduce Inequality Gaps

The Equality Trust is a national advocacy organization, located in London, designed to produce research, develop policy, and advocate for "more equal" societies and organizations. Over decades, director Richard Wilkinson and colleague Kate Pickett have amassed a wealth of evidence demonstrating that more equal nations, states, cities, and organizations have better outcomes than unequal societies in terms of rates of infant mortality, life expectancy, incarceration rates, high school completion, teen pregnancy, obesity, and diabetes. Their argument is simple and their evidence compelling: advanced economic democracies with relatively narrow inequality gaps enjoy a higher level of collective well-being than nations, states, cities, and organizations with wide inequality gaps.

In 2011, Wilkinson and Pickett published *The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Strong* in which they demonstrated that severely unequal societies produce high rates of social pain: adverse outcomes including school dropout, teen pregnancy, mental health problems, lack of social trust, high mortality rates, violence and crime, and low social participation. Their book challenges the belief that the extent of poverty in a community alone predicts negative outcomes. They assert instead that the size of the inequality gap sculpts the material and psychological

contours of the chasm between the wealthiest and the most impoverished, enabling various forms of social suffering and dissociation to saturate a community and appearing natural. In societies with large gaps, one finds rampant state and socially reproduced disregard, dehumanization, policy neglect, and abuse. As one might guess, the inequality gap of the United States ranks among the highest in their international comparisons and, in comparison to other "developed nations," we suffer a disproportionate share of social problems ranging from infant mortality to incarceration, homelessness and civic disengagement, obesity and diabetes, teen pregnancy, homicide and violence, and poor academic performance. Wilkinson and Pickett demonstrate that the size of the gap, even more than the proportion living in poverty, predicts negative social outcomes.

With the reduction of inequality gaps as their political goal, the Equality Trust has mobilized a national and international campaign, throughout the United Kingdom and beyond, to expose top-to-bottom pay ratios for major corporations and public sector organizations in the country. The trust publishes the salary ratio of the lowest- and highest-paid civil servants in an agency and has inspired, and embarrassed, local governments to take the equality pledge, promising to limit the ratio of the top salary to the lowest wage earners among civil servants. These public agencies not only reduce their internal gaps but pledge to contract only with private firms that also have relatively small wage gaps. By so doing, the Equality Trust has activated a national campaign to regulate top wages, advocate for livable wages, and maintain economically responsible and ethical public institutions and contractors.

In 2010, the Equality Trust website reported: "The Greater London Assembly have voted in favour of Darren Johnson's proposal to limit pay ratios within the GLA and associated

bodies to 1:20—with a long term goal of reducing them to 1:10."

In the United States, pay disparities between CEOs and employees has accelerated swiftly over the past twenty years jumping from a ratio of 201:1 in 1992 to 354:1 in 2012 (AFL-CIO, 2013).

A year later, Crabtree (2011) wrote, "Wall Street has deployed an army of lobbyists to try to whittle away as much of the Dodd-Frank financial reform bill as possible, spending $242.2 million on 712 hired guns to press their message on Capitol Hill since the beginning of 2010, according to a new report by Public Citizen."

The Equality Trust is a compelling example of a national, and increasingly global, advocacy organization dedicated to limiting economic hierarchy through policy change and public campaigns. It addresses a range of topics, including state policy, tax reform, and health disparities but also livable-wage campaigns and the intimate dynamic relationship between those at the top and those at the bottom.

Bringing Social Justice Home to School: Psychosocial Education for Diversity and Inclusion

We turn now to a case study of a school that has dedicated resources toward maximizing a culture of inclusion as a way to challenge themselves to identify and undo all forms of social inequity, systems of unearned privileges, and acknowledging the existence of racial preferences and bias. Through interviews with a teacher, a psychological consultant (the school psychologist), and the director of diversity, we track the transformation of an independent school with espoused beliefs in diversity and multiculturalism to the implementation of a social justice

and civil rights mission. The work was accomplished through the cumulative mobilization of many individuals and their networks of support within and outside the school and the accumulation of struggle over time that organically widened the net of those engaged in the work. Over time a dedicated minority of school faculty and staff became committed to developing a social justice orientation of diversity at the school. Essential to this work was a consistent focus on structural inequality and interpersonal and group dynamics, as well as the inclusion of multiple perspectives through the consensus model of decision making.

Brooklyn Friends School (BFS) is a pre-K through 12 Society of Friends school in Brooklyn that was founded in 1867 by a community long recognized for a courageous commitment to the abolition movement. While diversity is a value of Quaker education, antiracism, or the contestation of power and privilege at the structural level, has not necessarily been part of that tradition.

In 2000, a student of color and a white student were both caught in the same infraction. By all accounts, the white student got a slap on the wrist, while the school was attempting to suspend the student of color. Parents in the community said, “Enough is enough,” and initiated a walkout from the school.

Beginning his job at BFS as psychological consultant in this climate, Jeffrey Cox stepped in and announced that the students needed affinity groups—safe spaces for students of color and spaces where white students can learn to become allies. Cox was shocked that the call for segregated spaces was met with outrage from the teachers. Quaker culture has long struggled with a belief in the universal human community and internal tensions around racial identity and class power. The school culture reflected this

larger dynamic: although embracing diversity was a schoolwide value, some teachers, staff, and administrators viewed the implementation of structures to support students of color as a departure from the traditions of the Quaker community. He said, “They rode on the laurels of—we have such a diverse population—a diverse school community—more than any other private school, therefore racism doesn’t exist—we’re racially tolerant of each other. The denial was based on the belief that being a faith-based institution took care of any racism.” The implementation of diversity programs was seen as the admission that the school was falling short of their Quaker values.

Looking for ways to address the internal challenges, Cox attended the People’s Institute for Survival and Beyond’s (PISAB) Undoing Racism (UR) training where he had an epiphany: “I thought, oh, yes—this is an institutional thing—a systemic thing. It’s not individual and one person can’t fix it.” Wanting to share this perspective, Cox convinced three colleagues to attend the UR training and convinced the head of school to make this training available to all faculty and staff who wanted to go. This is how Jesse Phillips-Fein, a white middle and upper school teacher, engaged in antiracist work and became an ally in the struggle to implement affinity groups and hire a diversity director. Out of those who attended the UR workshop over the next several years, a core group developed who held monthly meetings in their homes, usually over dinner. This multiracial group, the “cofacilitators,” currently numbers around fifteen and has become an important piece of a structure that sustains community as it challenges the leaky dynamics of power and privilege at BFS.

Wishing to engage a larger community in dialogues about race, power, and privilege, Cox enlisted the help of one of the PISAB trainers to facilitate a “privilege 101” workshop at BFS that included a discussion of Tim Wise’s book *White*

Like Me (2007). While participants appeared positive during the workshop itself, several teachers after the session expressed anger at having to read the book. The head of school also kicked off the school year by having the faculty read an article about black boys and the achievement gap, meaning that dialogue has been opening up in a variety of spaces even as there continues to be resistance.

Phillips-Fein was on both the all-school diversity committee, the group that was asked to make a recommendation about whether to hire a diversity director, as well as the committee that made a final recommendation to the head of school to hire Eddie Moore Jr. for the position. The committee, which represented faculty and staff from the various divisions of BFS, used the consensus process to reach a hiring decision. This process is used for all decision making in the Quaker school and was seen as being extremely important to the culture of the organization. It ensures that dissenting voices are heard, and it seeks to find unity among the members of the organization as a guiding force for the head of school to act on. The head of school took up the committee's recommendation and hired Moore.

Hiring Eddie Moore Jr. constituted a decisive shift in organizational values. Moore is the founder of the White Privilege Conference, an annual antiracist conference in its fourteenth year where educators and activists get together in order to share material to try to get to the roots of racism. Putting Moore at the helm of the school's diversity initiatives indicated a transformation from thinking simply about diversity to reframing the school's mission to encompass social justice and civil rights. While hiring a diversity director had been on the table for more than five years, the decision to hire occurred only after a critical mass of faculty had become engaged in antiracist work,

shifting their perspective on what diversity should be to a social justice and civil rights focus. This new social justice orientation made the selection of Moore as the diversity director logical; it would not have been had the groundwork been laid through the involvement of faculty in trainings and conversations around power and privilege. Individuals and structures both within and beyond the school led to Moore's becoming the head of diversity, and together these structures and individuals provide the infrastructure for antiracist work at BFS.

Moore does not characterize his work as addressing inequality gaps, which he considers "too monumental and entrenched in our society" to possibly address. The gaps that he hopes to close fester in the space between potential and actual performance for children of color. "I want to get little Eddie from a 2.5 to a 3.8," said Moore, indicating the type of achievement gap that is often discussed in US schools.

Phillips-Fein attributes these achievement gaps in part to the dominance of white culture in schools: "School is a place of white culture—it's not just going to school in a culture that's different from your own, but it's also that the dominant culture is built to serve white people and white supremacy, necessarily at the expense of everyone else." Addressing power and privilege in the school context takes the form of curriculum that begins in the pre-K classes and extends through high school. Today Moore and Phillips-Fein are central to a schoolwide commitment to rigorous antiracism training for educators, curriculum for youth, and culture for the community. But we are getting ahead of ourselves.

In interviews with Moore, Phillips-Fein, and Cox, we asked about the extent to which Quaker culture created fertile grounds for systematic interrogation of privilege, power,

and diversity. We were initially confused and then delighted when both Moore and Phillips-Fein referred to Quakerism as being synonymous with whiteness, and Moore proceeded to explain that “white privilege allows people to feel as if they can do something to address inequality gaps” (whereas Moore, as an African American does not) “and that’s a beautiful thing about whiteness.” White people tend to expect justice. Moore contends that whiteness, a form of power from which antiracist activists often distance themselves, is actually a resource that enables people to have a greater impact.

While Moore was unclear about what motivates white antiracists, Phillips-Fein felt that with a provocative awareness of injustice, “they can see that this is messed up (how unequal things are) and it is really eating people up inside.” This ethical sense that things should be and are not just leads to anger, which can be a powerful motivator to act. She continued:

> Anger—having a certain attitude about what’s justice. The ability to be deeply self-reflective—in public, I think that’s what helped me—to make horrible mistakes and not wanting to see it and having people walk me through seeing it. It’s brutal, but whiteness is such a blind spot, really. Yeah, I think uh—Anger, I think is a crucial, crucial emotion—I think rage really propelled me for a long time, but it’s not sustainable.

These emotional reasons for committing to action connect closely to those hypothesized in recent research looking at motivations for solidarity (e.g., Iyer and Ryan, 2009), but they do not complete the picture as there are many in the same position who have not become engaged in antiracist work (Phillips-Fein estimated that 15 to 20 percent of the teachers at BFS are), a proportion that is no doubt well above the rest of the population, which gives hope that the

actions of individuals within organizations can lead to significant social change. She also described her own motivation for the work coming out of a place of love—love for both marginalized and dominant groups—as well as a belief in the possibility of a different world. It is this belief in the ability to effect change that fuels faculty and administrators' commitment to the work. While all acknowledge that there is still much work to do, Cox, Phillips-Fein, and Moore vacillate between hope and despair, but so far, the hope is still winning.

Praxis Consulting Group: Building Employee-Owned Cooperatives by Addressing Inequality

Social psychologist Ginny Vanderslice (president) and Alex Moss, cofounders and principles of Praxis Consulting in Philadelphia, provide organizational consultation to employee-owned companies (through employee stock ownership plans) and worker cooperatives, for profit and nonprofit, to help redesign organizations or their internal processes toward increased worker participation control and greater economic equity. Providing some history, they explained that worker-owned organizations in the United States are modeled in part after Mondragon, the "embodiment of the co-operative movement," launched in 1956 in the Basque region of Spain and founded on the principles of cooperation, participation, social responsibility, and innovation. Vanderslice and Moss then referenced research on worker cooperatives that workplaces where employees share ownership and participate significantly in decision making are healthier organizations in terms of return on equity, low employee turnover, growth in revenue, job retention in economic downturns, and organizational sustainability.

A 2012 survey of restaurant employees conducted by Restaurant Opportunities Centers United, for example,

found that restaurants that treated their employees, particularly undocumented employees, with respect and job security had higher profits and lower employee turnover than restaurants rated as having poor management-employee relations. The report states:

> The restaurant industry is one of the largest and fastest-growing sectors of the national economy. In 2009 it accounted for $277 billion of U.S. Gross Domestic Product and employed nearly 1 in 12 private-sector workers. While the industry has grown rapidly, its long-term stability is threatened by poor job quality. Restaurant workers have the lowest wages of any occupational category, and 90% of restaurant workers do not receive paid sick days, paid vacation, or health insurance through their employer. Moreover, there is often little career mobility and racial segregation keeps people of color disproportionately in the lowest paid positions. These factors increase employee turnover and decrease employee loyalty and productivity, which in turn reduce the quality of food and service. Moreover, restaurant patrons are exposed to contagion when workers cannot afford to stay home when sick.
>
> Illustrating the direct link between job quality and the long-term success and stability of a restaurant, this report provides concrete examples of restaurateurs who have created “win-win-win” solutions for workers, diners, and employers alike. Other restaurant employers can learn from the experiences and insights of these successful business owners.
>
> Studies place the cost of turnover between $4,000 and $14,000 per employee turnover, and the National Restaurant Association has placed the cost at $7,000, in current dollars. (ROC United, 2012)

When asked. “Why would a CEO try to steer a hierarchical organization toward employee ownership?” Vanderslice and Moss provided a range of responses:

- Some CEOs or managers really want to flatten an organization and move away from organizational hierarchy. Often these are people of some privilege, with progressive politics, who are dedicated to equalizing power among workers or members and who believe workers ought to have the right to share in the wealth they are creating through their work.
- Some cooperatives, like artist cooperatives or farmer cooperatives, are initiated by individuals who seek to build nonhierarchical organizations rooted in economic, social, and political interdependence in which consumers (food co-op) or producers (artist or dairy co-ops) become the shareholders.
- Some CEOs find themselves running an organization that has a 100 percent employee stock ownership plan (ESOP), which legally pays no taxes on profits, and are eager to learn more about how to manage such an organization with economic interdependence, but begin with little knowledge about worker ownership or participation.

Vanderslice and Moss explained that while the traditional corporation is driven primarily by a profit motive, today a growing number of corporations and organizations are driven by commitments to the three Ps: people, profit, and the planet. Careful to avoid a romantic interpretation of the proliferation of organizations dedicated to the three Ps, they were generous in describing a variety of organizational strategies for narrowing inequality gaps, fostering a sense of collective ownership, and facilitating broad-based participation:

> So we got a call a couple of weeks ago from the CEO [of a hybrid ESOP] and he said, "You know, we've just come to the end of a one-year compensation design process and we've done the market studies and we've figured out what I as CEO ought to be paid relative to my workers because we've benchmarked this against a lot of other companies and the Board thinks we're done, but I don't think we're done and the reason I don't think we're done is because we haven't asked the question, is this fair? What does pay fairness mean? . . . Should I have a ratio of four-to-one? Four hundred disgusts me. Four to one probably ties my hands—and I'm not worried about me, I'm worried about hiring these guys [gestures toward *leadership team* on diagram] who will become me. Can I attract and retain people with the kind of experience and talent? . . . The board is saying fair is market—you've got market comp." And the CEO said no, market is market—that is not fairness. We're not going to define fairness as market. But they don't know what [fair] is and so they're arguing about it.

They sketched a fuller model of shared ownership, economics, and participation when they described the Cooperative Home Care Association (CHCA) in New York City, a cooperative initiated by a Latina woman and Anglo man committed to organizing home health care workers, primarily low-wage-earning black and Latina women, into a for-profit collective for workers' rights, quality home care, and community development. Over almost thirty years, the association has built a strong infrastructure of shared governance, quality care, and strong advocacy for increased pay and benefits. For the first fifteen years, CHCA was funded through support from philanthropic foundations. It has been financially self-sustaining for the past ten years. Dedicated to quality care through quality

jobs, one of the founders transitioned out of his management role and launched a 501(c)(3) organization for organizing and coordinating high-quality services for persons with disabilities. CHCA and this organization, working for disability justice, invited the health care workers' union, 1199, to organize their workers in order to help them address grievances, pay disputes, and benefits and to participate in worker-management initiatives to improve working conditions.

Clear that worker participation and protection do not derive automatically from shared ownership, Praxis encourages organizations to pursue organizational strategies that simultaneously address structural and economic change in ownership and financial interdependence and practices that support the psychological participation and well-being of the workers. "Being an owner doesn't protect your worker interests," says Moss. "It doesn't give you a right to make grievances." With insight for organizations and movements working on structural change, Vanderslice and Moss are clear that any strategic design to narrow inequality gaps must deliberately and explicitly address both the material conditions of organizational life (economics and structure) and the social psychological dynamics (participation and engagement).

Reciting studies that link high worker engagement with high organizational effectiveness, the Praxis consultants explained that ESOPs, which now comprise more than 10 percent of the US workforce (although this is usually a minute percentage of total ownership, especially in publicly traded companies), serve as an economic platform on which conversations about joint ownership, participation, and justice can be launched. Building and leading organizational cultures of shared ownership, strong participation, and authentic inclusion, however, requires

dedicated leadership, as we saw in BFS. Vanderslice explains that ESOPs are increasingly popular; given the financial incentives of 100 percent ESOPs paying no taxes on profits, the ranks are swelling. But in an ESOP, employees who have been granted additional economic rights develop heightened expectations for participation and involvement in governance. Vanderslice explained that the leadership challenges are great for maintaining a relatively equitable and participatory organization across status and hierarchy.

Finally, Vanderslice and Moss described an emergent social movement of certified B Corporations—for-profit corporations that have earned a recognized certification for social responsibility based on workforce and social and environmental metrics. Essentially these corporations replace the dominant bottom-line-only-focused organizational mission with high standards of purpose, sustainability, and transparency. The inclusion of social responsibility in the organizational mission constitutes a radical shift in business philosophy. Fourteen states now have laws that recognize benefit corporation status, which requires that boards of directors have an obligation to consider not only the stakeholders' well-being and profit maximization but also the well-being of employees and the environment.

CONCLUSION

With quite distinct strategies, the Equality Trust, the Brooklyn Friends School, and Praxis expand our cultural understanding of how social policies, social movements, and work-based organizations can be redesigned to diminish inequality gaps, contest privilege, deepen cooperation, and maximize participation. The Equality Trust argues that policies and procedures that encourage

organizations to pledge to threshold inequality gaps will alter social arrangements, and they have much evidence to back them up. The leadership of the Brooklyn Friends School has explored how a school can fundamentally transform its culture, challenging white privilege and endorsing diversity, through the painstaking work of individual and institutional consciousness raising. Praxis Consulting facilitates processes whereby traditional organizations can be reengineered to enhance economic interdependence, democratize ownership, diversify leadership, and cultivate the dynamics of shared fate.

Each of these organizations has bold leadership, processes for democratic participation, and a strong and relentless goal to challenge privilege and build diverse equitable communities, and each is linked to a broader social movement for redistribution: the inequality gap campaign, the white allies' antiracist movement, and struggles for labor justice and B Corporations. Each organization also confronts internal and external resistance and yet persists, fueled by a vision of redistribution, radical inclusion, and deep participation.

We end ironically hopeful in these dark days of political filibuster, stalemates, counterrevolutions, war, violence, and Wall Street abuse. Diverse coalitions are mobilizing globally and locally on the streets in the halls of Congress and Parliament, through social media and Twitter, in for-profit and nonprofit workplaces, schools, community based organizations, universities, and union halls—contesting inequality, challenging privilege, and building always precarious nests for solidarity and sustainability. As researchers, consultants, educators, and practitioners, we have a responsibility to pierce the anesthetizing weight of inevitability, circulate images of equity, educate the public about these sweet experiments in democratic ownership and equitable wage structures, and provoke our collective

imagination for what could be a far more democratic, just, and participatory society.

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CHAPTER FOUR
CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROVERSY *The Value of Intellectual Opposition*

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Roger T. Johnson
Dean Tjosvold

> *Since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinion that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied.*
>
> —John Stuart Mill

An airline flight crew is taking its large passenger jet with over 150 people on board in for a landing. The instruments indicate the plane is still five thousand feet above the ground, and the pilot sees no reason to doubt their accuracy. The copilot thinks the instruments are malfunctioning and the plane is actually much lower. Will this disagreement endanger the passengers and crew by distracting the pilot and copilot from their duties? Or will it illuminate a problem and increase the safety of everyone on board?

We know what Thomas Jefferson would have said. He noted, “Difference of opinion leads to inquiry, and inquiry to truth.” Jefferson had a deep faith in the value and productiveness of constructive controversy. He is not alone. Conflict theorists of many persuasions have posited that conflict could have positive as well as negative benefits. Freud, for example, indicated that extra psychic conflict was a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for psychological development. Developmental psychologists have proposed that disequilibrium within a student’s

cognitive structure can motivate a shift from egocentrism to accommodation of the perspectives of others and what results is a transition from one stage of cognitive and moral reasoning to another. Motivational theorists believe that conceptual conflict can create epistemic curiosity, which motivates the search for new information and the reconceptualization of the knowledge one already has. Organizational theorists insist that higher-quality problem solving depends on constructive conflict among group members. Cognitive psychologists propose that conceptual conflict may be necessary for insight and discovery. Educational psychologists indicate that conflict can increase achievement. Karl Marx believed that class conflict was necessary for social progress. From almost every social science, theorists have taken the position that conflict can have positive as well as negative outcomes.

Despite all the theorizing about the positive aspects of conflict, there has been until recently very little empirical evidence demonstrating that the presence of conflict can be more constructive than its absence. Guidelines for managing conflicts tend to be based more on folk wisdom than on validated theory. Far from being encouraged and structured in most interpersonal and intergroup situations, conflict tends to be avoided and suppressed. Creating conflict to capitalize on its potential positive outcomes tends to be the exception, not the rule. In the late 1960s, therefore, building on the previous work of Morton Deutsch and others, we began a program of theorizing and research to identify the conditions under which conflict results in constructive outcomes. One of the results of our work is the theory of constructive controversy.

This chapter provides an integration of theory, research, and practice on constructive controversy for individuals who wish to deepen their understanding of conflict and how to manage it constructively. The first part of the

chapter provides the definitions and procedure and a theoretical framework that illuminates fundamental processes involved in creating and using conflict at the interpersonal, intergroup, organizational, and international levels. The second half of the chapter is aimed at helping readers use constructive controversy effectively in their applied situations.

WHAT IS CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROVERSY?

> *The best way ever devised for seeking the truth in any given situation is advocacy: presenting the pros and cons from different, informed points of view and digging down deep into the facts.*
>
> —Harold S. Geneen, Former CEO, ITT

Constructive controversy exists when one person's ideas, information, conclusions, theories, and opinions are incompatible with those of another and the two seek to reach an agreement. Constructive controversies involve what Aristotle called *deliberate discourse* (i.e., the discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of proposed actions) aimed at synthesizing novel solutions (i.e., creative problem solving). Related to controversy is cognitive conflict, which occurs when incompatible ideas exist simultaneously in a person's mind or when information being received does not seem to fit with what one already "knows" (Johnson and Johnson, 2007).

Structured constructive controversies are most commonly contrasted with concurrence seeking, debate, and individualistic learning. *Concurrence seeking* occurs when members of a group inhibit discussion to avoid any disagreement or arguments, emphasize agreement, and avoid realistic appraisal of alternative ideas and courses of

action. Concurrence seeking is close to Janis's (1982) concept of *groupthink* , when members of a decision-making group set aside their doubts and misgivings about whatever policy is favored by the emerging consensus so as to be able to concur with the other members. *Debate* exists when two or more individuals argue positions that are incompatible with one another and a judge declares a winner on the basis of who presented his or her position the best. An example of debate is when each member of a group is assigned a position as to whether more or fewer regulations are needed to control hazardous wastes and an authority declares as the winner the person who makes the best presentation of his or her position to the group. *Individualistic efforts* exist when individuals work alone without interacting with each other, in a situation in which their goals are unrelated and independent from each other (Johnson, Johnson, and Holubec, 2008). The meta-analysis that follows compares these four forms of conflict. First, however, we review the theory of constructive controversy.

CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROVERSY THEORY

> *There is no more certain sign of a narrow mind, of stupidity, and of arrogance, than to stand aloof from those who think differently from us.*
>
> —Walter Savage Landor

Structure-process-outcome theory (Watson and Johnson, 1972) posits that the structure of the situation determines the process of interaction, and the process of interaction determines the outcomes (e.g., attitudes and behaviors of the individuals involved). The way in which a controversy is structured in learning and decision-making situations determines how group members interact with each other,

which in turn determines the quality of the learning, decision making, creativity, and other relevant outcomes. Conflict among group members' ideas, opinions, theories, and conclusions may be structured along a continuum (Johnson and Johnson, 2007) with constructive controversy at one end and concurrence seeking at the other (see table 4.1 and figure 4.1).

Table 4.1 Process of Controversy and Concurrence Seeking

Source: Johnson, D. W., & Johnson, R. T. (2007). *Creative Controversy: Intellectual Challenge in the Classroom* . Edina, MN: Interaction Book Company. Reprinted by permission.

Controversy	***Concurrence Seeking***
Organizing what is known into an initial conclusion	Organizing what is known into an initial conclusion
Presenting, advocating, elaborating at least two positions and rationale	Presenting, advocating, elaborating dominant position and rationale
Being challenged by opposing views, which results in conceptual conflict and uncertainty about the correctness of one's own views	Majority pressures dissenting group members to conform to majority position and perspective, creating a conflict between public compliance and private belief
Conceptual conflict, uncertainty, disequilibrium result	Conflict between public and private position
Epistemic curiosity motivates active search for new information and perspectives	Seeking confirming information that strengthens and supports the dominant position and perspective
Reconceptualization, synthesis, integration resulting in consensus consisting of best joint reasoned judgment reflecting all points of view	Consensus on majority position —often false consensus due to members' publicly agreeing while privately disagreeing




Figure 4.1 Theory of Controversy

Source: Johnson, D. W., & Johnson, R. T. (2007) *Creative Controversy: Intellectual Challenge in the Classroom* . Edina, MN: Interaction Book Company. Reprinted by permission.

Structure of the Situation

The structure of the situation contains the role definitions and normative expectations that define appropriate and inappropriate ways for individuals to interact with each other in the situation, as well as other situational influences, such as the number of people involved, spatial arrangements, hierarchy of prestige, social sanctions, power, and the nature of activities to be conducted (Watson and Johnson, 1972). Changes in any or all of these factors lead to changes in the processes of the system and the interactions of the members, which subsequently change the attitudes and behavior and the other outcomes of the individuals involved.

Structuring Constructive Controversy.

In constructive controversy, individuals research their position, present the best case they can for it, challenge the opposing positions, step back and see the issue from all sides, and then arrive at their best reasoned judgment. Constructive controversy is structured by

1. *Establishing a cooperative contex* t (i.e., structuring positive interdependence). Participants to come to an agreement (i.e., one answer) that reflects their best reasoned judgment as to solution to the problem, the best course of action to take to solve the problem, or an answer.
2. *Establishing the constructive controversy procedure* . Participants are required to (1) research and prepare a position; (2) present and advocate their position; (3) analyze, critically evaluate, and (often after further research) refute the opposing positions while rebutting criticisms of one’s own positions; (4) reverse perspectives to communicate that they can see the issue

from all points of view; and (5) synthesize and integrate information into factual and judgmental conclusions that are summarized into a joint position to which all sides can agree (Johnson and Johnson, 2007). This is an advocacy-based-inquiry procedure. In engaging in this procedure, participants advocate a position and challenge opposing positions to gain increased understanding of the issue so that an agreement reflecting their best reasoned judgment can be made. here is a reliance on argumentative clash to develop, clarify, expand, and elaborate one's thinking about the issues being considered. Advocacy and critically challenging the opposing positions are key elements in engaging in inquiry to discover the best course of action.

3. *There are a number of roles that each participant needs to assume adequately:* researcher, advocate, devil's advocate, learner, perspective taker, and synthesizer. Participants need to be effective advocates, persuasively presenting the best case possible for their positions. Participants also need to be effective devil's advocates, critically analyzing opposing positions, pointing out their weaknesses and flaws in information and logic. No position should be unchallenged. Participants need to be able to learn thoroughly the opposing positions and their rationales. This facilitates their critical analysis as devil's advocates, but also facilities their performance of the role of perspective taker. Finally, participants need to be effective synthesizers, integrating the best information and logic from all positions into a new, novel position that all participants can agree to.
4. *Participants need to adhere to a set of normative expectations* . Participants need to follow and internalize the norms of seeking the best reasoned judgment, not winning; being critical of ideas, not people; listening to and learning everyone's position, even if they do not

agree with it; differentiating positions before trying to integrate them; and changing their mind when logically persuaded to do so.

Structuring Concurrence Seeking.

In concurrence seeking, individuals present their position and its rationale. If it differs from the dominant opinion, the dissenters are pressured by the majority of members to conform to the dominant opinion; if the dissenters do not, they are viewed as nonteam players who obstruct team effectiveness and therefore subjected to ridicule, rejection, ostracism, and being disliked (see Johnson and Johnson, 2007). If they concur, they often seek out confirming information to strengthen the dominant position and view the issue only from the majority's perspective, thus eliminating the possible consideration of divergent points of view. Thus, there is a convergence of thought and a narrowing of focus in members' thinking. A false consensus results, with all members agreeing about the course of action the group is to take, while privately some members may believe that other courses of action would be more effective. Concurrence seeking is structured in these ways:

1. *A cooperative context is established* (i.e., structuring positive interdependence). Participants are to come to an agreement based on the dominant position in the group.
2. *The concurrence-seeking procedure is established* . The dominant position is determined, and all participants are encouraged to agree with it. Both advocacy of opposing positions and critical analysis of the dominant position are avoided. Participants are to "be nice" and not disagree with the dominant position. Doubts and misgivings are to be hidden and outward conformity in

supporting the dominant position, whether you believe in it or not, is encouraged.

3. *There are a number of roles that each participant needs to assume adequately:* Supporter, persuader. Participants need to be supporters of the dominant position and persuaders of dissenters to adopt the dominant position.
4. *There is a set of normative expectations that participants need to adhere to* . Participants need to follow and internalize the norms of hiding doubts and criticisms about the dominant position, being willing to quickly compromise to avoid open disagreement, expressing full support for the dominant position, never disagreeing with other group members, and maintaining a harmonious atmosphere.

PROCESSES OF INTERACTION

Constructive controversy and concurrence seeking promote different processes of interaction among individuals, which in turn promote different outcomes (Johnson and Johnson, 1979, 1989, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2009; Johnson, Johnson, and Johnson, 1976) (see table 4.1 and figure 4.1).

Constructive Controversy

The process through which constructive controversy creates positive outcomes involves the following theoretical assumptions:

- When individuals are presented with a problem or decision, they have an initial conclusion based on categorizing and organizing incomplete information, their limited experiences, and their specific perspective.

They have a high degree of confidence in their conclusions (i.e., they freeze the epistemic process).

- When individuals present and advocate positions to others (who are advocating opposing positions), they engage in cognitive rehearsal, deepen their understanding of their position, and use higher-level reasoning strategies. The more they attempt to persuade others to agree with them, the more committed they may become to their position. The intent is to convert the other group members to one's position. Knowing that the presenting individual is trying to convert them, the other individuals involved may scrutinize the person's position and critically analyze it as part of their resistance to being converted. Hearing opposing views being advocated stimulates new cognitive analysis and frees individuals to create alternative and original conclusions. Even being confronted with an erroneous point of view can result in more divergent thinking and the generation of novel and more cognitively advanced solutions because they unfreeze the epistemic process.
- When individuals challenge the positions of opposing advocates, they attempt to refute opposing positions while rebutting attacks on their own position. To do so, they critically analyze one another's positions in attempts to discern weaknesses and strengths. Individuals tend to evaluate information more critically. In other words, dissenters tend to stimulate divergent thinking and the consideration of multiple perspectives. Members start with the assumption that the dissenter is not correct. If a dissenter persists, however, it suggests a complexity that stimulates a reappraisal of the issue. The reappraisal, often including additional information, involves divergent thinking and a consideration of multiple sources of information and ways of thinking about the issue. It also breaks the tendency of groups to

try to achieve consensus before all available alternatives have been thoroughly considered. On balance, challenging and being challenged tend to increase knowledge and understanding, the creativity of thinking, and the quality of decision making.

- When individuals are confronted with different conclusions based on other people's information, experiences, and perspectives, they become uncertain as to the correctness of their own views, and a state of conceptual conflict or disequilibrium is aroused. Hearing other alternatives being advocated, having one's position criticized and refuted, and being challenged by information that is incompatible with and does not fit with one's conclusions leads to conceptual conflict, disequilibrium, and uncertainty. The greater the disagreement among group members, the more frequently disagreement occurs, the greater the number of people disagreeing with a person's position, the more competitive the context of the controversy, and the more affronted the person feels, the greater the conceptual conflict, disequilibrium, and uncertainty the person experiences.
- When individuals are faced with intellectual opposition within a cooperative context, they tend to ask one another for more information, seek to view the information from all sides of the issue, and use more ways of looking at facts. Conceptual conflict motivates an active search (called *epistemic curiosity*) for more information and new experiences (increased specific content) and a more adequate cognitive perspective and reasoning process (increased validity) in hopes of resolving the uncertainty. Indexes of epistemic curiosity include individuals' actively searching for more information, seeking to understand opposing positions

and rationales, and attempting to view the situation from opposing perspectives.

- By adapting their cognitive perspective and reasoning through understanding and accommodating new information as well as the perspective and reasoning of others, individuals derive a new, reconceptualized, and reorganized conclusion. Novel solutions and decisions that on balance are qualitatively better are detected. The positive feelings and commitment of individuals as they create a solution to the problem together is extended to each other, and interpersonal attraction increases. A bond is built among the participants. Their competencies in managing conflicts constructively tend to improve. The process may begin again at this point, or it may be terminated by freezing the current conclusion and resolving any dissonance by increasing confidence in the validity of the conclusion.

When overt controversy is structured by identifying alternatives and assigning members to advocate the best case for each alternative, the purpose is not to choose one of the alternatives. Rather, is to create a synthesis of the best reasoning and conclusions from all the alternatives. Synthesizing occurs when individuals integrate a number of different ideas and facts into a single position. It is the intellectual bringing together of ideas and facts and engaging in inductive reasoning by restating a large amount of information into a conclusion or summary. Synthesizing is a creative process that involves seeing new patterns within a body of evidence, viewing the issue from a variety of perspectives, and generating a number of optional ways of integrating the evidence. This requires probabilistic (i.e., knowledge is available only in degrees of certainty) rather than dualistic (i.e., there is only right and wrong and authority should not be questioned) or

relativistic thinking (i.e., authorities are seen as sometimes right but right and wrong depend on your perspective). The dual purposes of synthesis are to arrive at the best possible decision and find a position that all group members can commit themselves to implement. When consensus is required for decision making, the dissenting members tend to maintain their position longer, the deliberation tends to be more robust, and group members tend to feel that justice has been better served.

Concurrence Seeking

The process through which concurrence seeking creates outcomes involves the following theoretical assumptions (Johnson and Johnson, 2007) (see figure 4.1):

1. When faced with a problem to be solved or a decision to be made, the group member with the most power (i.e., the boss) or the majority of the members derive an initial position from their analysis of the situation based on their current knowledge, perspective, dominant response, expectations, and past experiences. They tend to have a high degree of confidence in their initial conclusion (they freeze the epistemic process).
2. The dominant position is presented and advocated by the most powerful member in the group or a representative of the majority. It may be explained in detail or briefly, as it is expected that all group members will quickly agree and adopt the recommended position. When individuals present their conclusion and its rationale to others, they engage in cognitive rehearsal and often reconceptualize their position as they speak. In addition, their commitment to their position increases, making them more closed-minded toward other positions.

3. Members are faced with the implicit or explicit demand to concur with the recommended position. The pressure to conform creates evaluation apprehension that implies that members who disagree will be perceived negatively and rejected. Conformity pressure is also used to prevent members from suggesting new ideas, thereby stifling creativity. The dominant person or the majority of the members tend to impose their perspective about the issue on the other group members, so that all members view the issue from the dominant frame of reference, resulting in a convergence of thought and a narrowing of focus in members' thinking.
4. When a member does not agree with the recommended position, he or she has a choice: concur with the majority opinion or voice dissent and face possible ridicule, rejection, ostracism, and being disliked. This creates a conflict between public compliance and private belief, which can create considerable distress when the dissenter keeps silent, and perhaps even more stress when the dissenter voices his or her opinion. Dissenters realize that if they persist in their disagreement, they may be viewed negatively and will be disliked and isolated by both their peers and their supervisors, or a destructively managed conflict may result that will split the group into hostile factions, or both. Because of these potential penalties, many potential dissenters find it easier to remain silent and suppress their true opinions.
5. Members concur publicly with the dominant position and its rationale without critical analysis. In addition, they seek supporting evidence to strengthen the dominant position and view the issue only from the dominant perspective, thus eliminating the possible consideration of divergent points of view. Dissenters may adopt the majority position either because they assume that truth lies in numbers (i.e., the majority is

probably correct) or they fear that disagreeing openly will result in ridicule and rejection. They also search for information in a biased manner to confirm the majority position. As a result, they are relatively unable to detect original solutions to problems.

6. All members agree about the course of action the group is to take. while some members privately may believe that other courses of action would be more effective.

Benefits of Constructive Controversy

> *He that wrestles with us strengthens our nerves, and sharpens our skill. Our antagonist is our helper.*
>
> —Edmund Burke, *Reflection of the Revolution in France*

The research on constructive controversy has been conducted over the past thirty-five years by several researchers in a variety of settings using many different participant populations and many different tasks within an experimental and field experimental format (see table 4.2). (For a detailed listing of all the supporting studies, see Johnson and Johnson, 1979, 1989, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2009.) All studies randomly assigned participants to conditions. The studies have all been published in journals (except for one dissertation), have high internal validity, and have lasted from one to sixty hours. The studies have been conducted on elementary, intermediate, and college students. Taken together, their results have considerable validity and generalizability. A recent meta-analysis provides the data to validate or disconfirm the theory (Johnson and Johnson, 2007).

Table 4.2 Meta-Analysis of Academic Controversy Studies: Weighted Effect Sizes

Source: Johnson, D. W., & Johnson, R. (2007). *Creative controversy: Intellectual conflict in the classroom.* Edina, MN: Interaction Book Company. Reprinted with permission

Dependent Variable	*Controversy/ Concurrence Seeking*	*Controversy/ Debate*	*Controversy/ Individualistic Efforts*
Achievement	0.68	0.40	0.87
Cognitive Reasoning	0.62	1.35	0.90
Perspective Taking	0.91	0.22	0.86
Motivation	0.75	0.45	0.71
Attitudes toward Task	0.58	0.81	0.64
Interpersonal Attraction	0.24	0.72	0.81
Social Support	0.32	0.92	1.52
Self-Esteem	0.39	0.51	0.85

Quality of Decision Making, Problem Solving, and Learning.

Effective decision making and problem solving includes higher-level reasoning, accurate understanding of all perspectives, creative thinking, and openness to influence (i.e., attitude change). Compared with concurrence seeking (ES = 0.68), debate (ES = 0.40), and individualistic efforts (ES = 0.87), constructive controversy tends to result in higher-quality decisions (including decisions that involve ethical dilemmas) and higher-quality solutions to complex problems for which different viewpoints can plausibly be developed. Skillful participation in a constructive controversy tends to result in significantly greater mastery and recall of the information, reasoning, and skills contained in one's own and others' positions; more skillfully transferring of this learning to new situations; and greater generalization of principles learned to a wider variety of situations than do concurrence seeking, debate, or

individualistic efforts. Being exposed to a credible alternative view results in recalling more correct information, more skillfully transferring learning to new situations, and generalizing the principles they learned to a wider variety of situations. The resolution of a controversy is likely to be in the direction of correct problem solving even when the initial conclusions of all group members are erroneous and especially when individuals are exposed to a credible minority view (as opposed to a consistent single view) even when the minority view is incorrect.

An interesting question is whether the advocacy of two conflicting but wrong solutions to a problem can result in a correct solution. The value of the constructive controversy process lies not so much in the correctness of an opposing position as in the attention and thought processes it induces. More cognitive processing may take place when individuals are exposed to more than one point of view, even if one or more of the points of view is incorrect. A number of studies with both adults and children have found significant gains in performance when erroneous information is presented by one or both sides in a constructive controversy. Thus, the resolution of the conflict is likely to be in the direction of correct performance. In this limited way, two wrongs came to make a right.

Cognitive Reasoning.

When difficult issues are being discussed and effective decisions are needed, higher-level reasoning strategies are needed. Controversy tends to promote more frequent use of higher-level reasoning strategies than do concurrence seeking (ES = 0.62), debate (ES = 1.35) or individualistic efforts (ES = 0.90). For example, controversy tends to be more effective than modeling and nonsocial presentation of information in influencing nonconserving children to gain

the insights critical for conservation. In classrooms where students are free to dissent and are also expected to listen to different perspectives, students tend to think more critically about civic issues and be more tolerant of conflicting views. Thus, cognitive reasoning across domains of inquiry is improved when controversy is used.

Perspective Taking.

Understanding and considering all perspectives is important if difficult issues are to be discussed, the decision is to represent the best reasoned judgment of all participants, and all participants are to help implement the decision. Constructive controversy tends to promote more accurate and complete understanding of opposing perspectives than do concurrence seeking (ES = 0.91), debate (ES = 0.22), and individualistic efforts (ES = 0.86). Engaging in controversy tends to result in greater understanding of another person's cognitive perspective than does the absence of controversy, and individuals engaged in a controversy tend to be better able subsequently to predict what line of reasoning their opponent would use in solving a future problem than do individuals who interacted without any controversy. The increased understanding of opposing perspectives tends to result from engaging in controversy (as opposed to engaging in concurrence-seeking discussions or individualistic efforts) regardless of whether one is a high-, medium-, or low-achieving student.

Creativity.

Constructive controversy tends to promote creative insight by influencing individuals to view problems from different perspectives and reformulate problems in ways that allow the emergence of new orientations to a solution. Compared with concurrence seeking, debate, and individualistic

efforts, constructive controversy increases the number of ideas, quality of ideas, creation of original ideas, the use of a wider range of ideas, originality, the use of more varied strategies, and the number of creative, imaginative, novel solutions. Being confronted with credible alternative views has resulted in the generation of more novel solutions, varied strategies, and original ideas. Participants in a constructive controversy tend to have a high degree of emotional involvement in and commitment to solving the problems the group was working on.

Attitude Change about the Issue.

Open-minded consideration of all points of view is critical for deriving well-reasoned decisions that integrate the best information and thought from a variety of positions. Participants should open-mindedly believe that opposing positions are based on legitimate information and logic that, if fully understood, will lead to creative solutions that benefit everyone. Involvement in a controversy tends to result in attitude and position change. Participants in a controversy tend to reevaluate their attitudes about the issue and incorporate opponents' arguments into their own attitudes. Participating in a constructive controversy tends to result in attitude change beyond what occurs when individuals read about the issue, and these attitude changes tend to be relatively stable over time (i.e., not merely a response to the controversy experience itself).

Motivation to Improve Understanding.

Effective decision making is typically enhanced by a continuing motivation to learn more about the issues being considered. Most decisions are temporary because they may be reconsidered at some future date. Participants in a constructive controversy tend to have more continuing motivation to learn about the issue and come to the best

reasoned judgment possible than do participants in concurrence seeking (ES = 0.75), debate (0.45), and individualistic efforts (ES = 0.71). Participants in a controversy tend to search for more information and new experiences (increased specific content) and a more adequate cognitive perspective and reasoning process (increased validity) in hopes of resolving the uncertainty. There is also an active interest in learning the others' positions and developing an understanding and appreciation of them. Lowry and Johnson (1981), for example, found that students involved in a controversy, compared with students involved in concurrence seeking, read more library materials, reviewed more classroom materials, more frequently watched an optional movie shown during recess, and more frequently requested information from others. Generally motivation is increased by participating in a constructive controversy.

Attitudes toward Controversy.

If participants are to be committed to implement the decision and participate in future decision making, they must react favorably to the way decisions are made. Individuals involved in controversy liked the procedure better than did those working individualistically, and participating in a controversy consistently promoted more positive attitudes toward the experience than did participating in a debate, concurrence-seeking discussions, or individualistic decisions. Constructive controversy experiences promoted stronger beliefs that controversy is valid and valuable.

Attitudes toward Decision Making.

If participants are to be committed to implement the decision and participate in future decision making, they must consider the decision worth making. Individuals who

engaged in controversies tended to value the decision-making task more than did individuals who engaged in concurrence-seeking discussions (ES = 0.63).

Interpersonal Attraction and Support among Participants.

Decision making, to be effective, must be conducted in ways that bring individuals together rather than create ill will and divisiveness. Within controversy, disagreement, argumentation, and rebuttal could create difficulties in establishing good relationships. Constructive controversy, however, has been found to promote greater liking among participants than did debate (ES = 0.72), concurrence seeking (ES = 0.24), or individualistic efforts (ES = 0.81). Debate tended to promote greater interpersonal attraction among participants than did individualistic efforts (ES = 0.46). In addition, constructive controversy tends to promote greater social support among participants than does debate (ES = 0.92), concurrence seeking (ES = 0.32), or individualistic efforts (ES = 1.52). Debate tended to promote greater social support among participants than did individualistic efforts (ES = 0.92). The combination of frank exchange of ideas coupled with a positive climate of friendship and support not only leads to more productive decision making and greater learning, it disconfirms the myth that conflict inevitably leads to divisiveness and dislike.

Self-Esteem.

Participation in future decision making is enhanced when participants feel good about themselves as a result of helping make the current decision, whether or not they agree with it. Constructive controversy tends to promote higher self-esteem than does concurrence seeking (ES = 0.39), debate (ES = 0.51), or individualistic efforts (ES =

0.85). Debate tends to promote higher self-esteem than individualistic efforts do (ES = 0.45).

Conditions Determining the Constructiveness of Controversy

Although controversies can operate in a beneficial way, they will not do so under all conditions. Whether controversy results in positive or negative consequences depends on the conditions under which it occurs and the way in which it is managed. These conditions include the context within which the constructive controversy takes place, the heterogeneity of participants, the distribution of information among group members, the level of group members' social skills, and group members' ability to engage in rational argument (Johnson and Johnson, 1979, 1989, 2007).

Cooperative Goal Structure.

Deutsch (1973) emphasizes that the context in which conflicts occur has important effects on whether the conflict turns out to be constructive or destructive. There are two common contexts for controversy: cooperative and competitive. A cooperative context tends to facilitate constructive controversy, whereas a competitive context tends to promote destructive controversy. Controversy within a competitive context tends to promote closed-minded disinterest and rejection of the opponent's ideas and information (Tjosvold, 1998). Within a cooperative context, constructive controversy induces feelings of comfort, pleasure, and helpfulness in discussing opposing positions; an open-minded listening to the opposing positions; motivation to hear more about the opponent's arguments; more accurate understanding of the opponent's position; and the reaching of more integrated positions

where both one's own and one's opponent's conclusions and reasoning are synthesized into a final position.

Skilled Disagreement.

For controversies to be managed constructively, participants need both cooperative and conflict management skills (Johnson, 2014; Johnson and F. Johnson, 2013). The following skills are necessary for following and internalizing these norms:

1. I am critical of ideas, not people. I challenge and refute the ideas of the other participants, while confirming their competence and value as individuals. I do not indicate that I personally reject them.
2. I separate my personal worth from criticism of my ideas.
3. I remember that we are all in this together, sink or swim. I focus on coming to the best decision possible, not on winning.
4. I encourage everyone to participate and to master all the relevant information.
5. I listen to everyone's ideas, even if I don't agree.
6. I restate what someone has said if it is not clear.
7. I differentiate before I try to integrate. I first bring out all ideas and facts supporting both sides and clarify how the positions differ. Then I try to identify points of agreement and put them together in a way that makes sense.
8. I try to understand both sides of the issue. I try to see the issue from the opposing perspective in order to understand the opposing position.
9. I change my mind when the evidence clearly indicates that I should do so.

10. I emphasize rationality in seeking the best possible answer, given the available data.
11. I follow the golden rule of conflict: act toward opponents as you would have them act toward you. I want the opposing pair to listen to me, so I listen to them. I want the opposing pair to include my ideas in their thinking, so I include their ideas in my thinking. I want the opposing pair to see the issue from my perspective, so I take their perspective.

One of the most important skills is to be able to disagree with each other's ideas while confirming each other's personal competence (Tjosvold, 1998). Disagreeing with others while simultaneously confirming their personal competence results in being better liked. In addition, opponents tend to be less critical of your ideas, more interested in learning more about your ideas, and more willing to incorporate your information and reasoning into their own analysis of the problem. Disagreeing with others, and at the same time imputing that others are incompetent, tends to increase their commitment to their own ideas and their rejection of the other person's information and reasoning. Protagonists are more likely to believe their goals are cooperative, integrate their perspectives, and reach agreement.

Another important set of skills for exchanging information and opinions within a constructive controversy is perspective taking (Johnson, 1971; Johnson and Johnson, 1989). More information, both personal and impersonal, is disclosed when one is interacting with a person who is engaging in perspective-taking behaviors such as paraphrasing, which communicates a desire to understand accurately. Perspective-taking ability increases one's capacity to phrase messages so that they are easily understood by others and comprehend accurately the

messages of others. Engaging in perspective taking in conflicts results in increased understanding and retention of the opponent's information and perspective. Perspective taking facilitates the achievement of creative, high-quality problem solving. Finally, perspective taking promotes more positive perceptions of the information exchange process, of fellow group members, and of the group's work.

A third set of skills involves the cycle of differentiation of positions and their integration (Johnson and F. Johnson, 2013). Group members should ensure that there are several cycles of differentiation (bringing out differences in positions) and integration (combining several positions into one new, creative position). The potential for integration is never greater than the adequacy of the differentiation already achieved. Most controversies go through a series of differentiations and integrations before reaching a final decision.

Rational Argument.

During a constructive controversy, group members have to follow the canons of rational argumentation (Johnson and Johnson, 2007): generating ideas, collecting relevant information, organizing it using inductive and deductive logic, and making tentative conclusions based on current understanding. Rational argumentation requires that participants keep an open mind, changing their conclusions and positions when others are persuasive and convincing in their presentation of rationale, proof, and logical reasoning.

STRUCTURING CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROVERSIES

> *Conflict is the gadfly of thought. It stirs us to observation and memory. It instigates invention. It shocks us out of sheeplike passivity, and sets us at noting and contriving . . . Conflict is a "sine qua non" of reflection and ingenuity.*
>
> —John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct: Morals Are Human*

Over the past thirty-five years, in addition to developing a theory of constructive controversy and validating it through a program of research, we have trained teachers, professors, administrators, managers, and executives in numerous countries to field-test and implement the constructive controversy procedure and developed a series of curriculum units, academic lessons, and training exercises structured for controversies. There are two formats, one for academic learning and one for decision-making situations. (A more detailed description of conducting constructive controversies may be found in Johnson and R. Johnson, 2007, and Johnson and F. Johnson, 2013.)

Constructive Controversy in the Classroom

In an English class, participants are considering the issue of civil disobedience. They learn that in the civil rights movement, individuals broke the law to gain equal rights for minorities. In numerous literary works, such as *Huckleberry Finn* , individuals wrestle with the issue of breaking the law to redress a social injustice. Huck wrestles with the issue of breaking the law in order to help Jim, the runaway slave.

In order to study the role of civil disobedience in a democracy, participants are placed in a cooperative learning group of four members. The group is given the assignment of reaching their best reasoned judgment about

the issue and then divides into two pairs. One pair is given the assignment of making the best case possible for the constructiveness of civil disobedience in a democracy. The other pair is given the assignment of making the best case possible for the destructiveness of civil disobedience in a democracy. In the resulting conflict, participants draw from such sources as the Declaration of Independence by Thomas Jefferson; *Civil Disobedience* by Henry David Thoreau; “Speech at Cooper Union,” New York, by Abraham Lincoln; and “Letter from Birmingham Jail” by Martin Luther King Jr. to challenge each other’s reasoning and analyses concerning when civil disobedience is, or is not, constructive.

Structure the Task.

The task must be structured cooperatively so that there are at least two well-documented positions (pro and con). The choice of topic depends on the interests of the instructor and the purposes of the course. In math courses, controversies may focus on different ways to solve a problem. In science classes, controversies may focus on environmental issues. Since drama is based on conflict, almost any piece of literature may be turned into a constructive controversy, for example, having participants argue over who is the greatest romantic poet. Since most history is based on conflicts, controversies can be created over any historical event. In any subject area, controversies can be created to promote academic learning and creative group problem solving.

Make Preinstructional Decisions and Preparations.

The teacher decides on the objectives for the lesson. Students are typically randomly assigned to groups of four, and each group is divided into two pairs. The pairs are randomly assigned to represent the pro or con position.

The instructional materials are prepared so that group members know what position they have been assigned and where they can find supporting information. The materials helpful for each position are a clear description of the group's task, a description of the phases of the constructive controversy procedure and the relevant social skills, a definition of the positions to be advocated with a summary of the key arguments supporting each position, and relevant resource materials, including a bibliography.

Explain and Orchestrate the Task, Cooperative Structure, and Constructive Controversy Procedure.

The teacher explains the task so that participants are clear about the assignment and understand the objectives of the lesson. Teachers may wish to help students get in role by presenting the issue to be decided in an interesting and dramatic way. Teachers structure positive interdependence by assigning two group goals. Students are required to

1. Produce a group report detailing the nature of the group's decision and its rationale. Members are to arrive at a consensus and ensure everyone participates in writing a high-quality group report. Groups present their report to the entire class.
2. Individually take a test on both positions. Group members must master all the information relevant to both sides of the issue.

To supplement the effects of positive goal interdependence, the materials are divided among group members (resource interdependence), and bonus points may be given if all group members score above a preset criterion on the test (reward interdependence).

Academic Controversy Procedure.

The purpose of the constructive controversy is to maximize each student's learning. Teachers structure individual accountability by ensuring that each student participates in each step of the constructive controversy procedure by individually testing each student on both sides of the issue and randomly selecting students to present their group's report. Teachers specify the social skills participants are to master and demonstrate during the constructive controversy. The social skills emphasized are those involved in systematically advocating an intellectual position and evaluating and criticizing the position advocated by others, as well as the skills involved in synthesis and consensual decision making. Finally, teachers structure intergroup cooperation. When preparing their positions, for example, students can confer with classmates in other groups who are also preparing the same position.

The students' overall goals are to learn all information relevant to the issue being studied and ensure that all other group members learn the information, so that their group can write the best report possible on the issue and all group members achieve high scores on the test of academic learning. The constructive controversy procedure is as follows (Johnson and R. Johnson, 2007):

1. *Research, learn, and prepare a position* . In the group of four, one pair is assigned the pro position and the other pair the con position. Each pair is to prepare the best case possible for its assigned position by
    a. Researching the assigned position and learning all relevant information. Students are to read the supporting materials and find new information to support their position. The opposing pair is given any information students find that supports its position.

b. Organizing the information into a persuasive argument that contains a thesis statement or claim (“George Washington was a more effective President than Abraham Lincoln”), the rationale supporting the thesis (“He accomplished a, b, and c”), and a logical conclusion that is the same as the thesis (“Therefore, George Washington was a more effective president than Abraham Lincoln”).

c. Planning how to advocate the assigned position effectively to ensure it receives a fair and complete hearing. Make sure both pair members are ready to present the assigned position so persuasively that the opposing participants will understand and learn the information and, of course, agree that the position is valid and correct.

2. *Present and advocate the position* . Students present the best case for their assigned position to ensure it gets a fair and complete hearing. They need to be forceful, persuasive, and convincing in doing so. Ideally, they will use more than one medium to increase the impact of the presentation. Students are to listen carefully to and learn the opposing position, taking notes and clarifying anything they do not understand.

3. *Engage in an open discussion in which there is spirited disagreement* . Students discuss the issue by freely exchanging information and ideas. Students are to argue forcefully and persuasively for their position (presenting as many facts as they can to support their point of view); critically analyze the evidence and reasoning supporting the opposing position; ask for data to support assertions; refute the opposing position by pointing out the inadequacies in the information and reasoning; and rebut attacks on their position and present counterarguments. Students are to take careful notes on

and thoroughly learn the opposing position. Students are to give the other position a trial by fire while following the norms for constructive controversy. Sometimes a time-out period will be provided so students can caucus with their partners and prepare new arguments. The teacher may encourage more spirited arguing, take sides when a pair is in trouble, play devil's advocate, ask one group to observe another group engaging in a spirited argument, and generally stir up the discussion.

4. *Reverse perspectives* . Students reverse perspectives and present the best case for the opposing position. Teachers may wish to have students change chairs. In presenting the opposing position sincerely and forcefully (as if it was their own), students may use their notes and add any new facts they know of. Students should strive to see the issue from both perspectives simultaneously.
5. *Synthesize* . Students are to drop all advocacy and find a synthesis on which all members can agree. They summarize the best evidence and reasoning from both sides and integrate it into a joint position that is new and unique. Students are to
    a. Write a group report on the group's synthesis with the supporting evidence and rationale. All group members sign the report indicating that they agree with it, can explain its content, and consider it ready to be evaluated. Each member must be able to present the report to the entire class.
    b. Take a test on both positions. If all members score above the preset criteria of excellence, each receives five bonus points.
    c. Process how well the group functioned and how its performance may be improved during the next

constructive controversy. The specific conflict management skills required for constructive controversy may be highlighted.

d. Celebrate the group's success and the hard work of each member to make every step of the constructive controversy procedure effective.

Monitor the Controversy Groups and Intervene When Needed.

While the groups engage in the constructive controversy procedure, teachers monitor the learning groups and intervene to improve students' skills in engaging in each step of the constructive controversy procedure and use the social skills appropriately. Teachers may also wish to intervene to highlight or reinforce particularly effective and skillful behaviors.

Evaluate Students' Learning and Process Group Effectiveness.

At the end of each instructional unit, teachers evaluate students' learning and give feedback. Qualitative as well as quantitative aspects of performance may be addressed. Students are graded on both the quality of their final report and their performance on the test covering both sides of the issue. The learning groups also process how well they functioned. Students describe what member actions were helpful (and unhelpful) in completing each step of the constructive controversy procedure and make decisions about what behaviors to continue or change. In whole-class processing, the teacher gives the class feedback and has participants share incidents that occurred in their groups.

Decision Making

A large pharmaceutical company faced the decision of whether to buy or build a chemical plant (*Wall Street Journal* , October 22, 1975). To maximize the likelihood that the best decision would be made, the president established two advocacy teams to ensure that both the buy and the build alternatives received a fair and complete hearing. An advocacy team is a subgroup that prepares and presents a particular policy alternative to the decision-making group. The buy team was instructed to prepare and present the best case for purchasing a chemical plant, and the build team was told to prepare and present the best case for constructing a new chemical plant near the company's national headquarters.

The buy team identified over one hundred existing plants that would meet the company's needs, narrowed the field down to twenty, further narrowed the field down to three, and then selected one plant as the ideal plant to buy. The build team contacted dozens of engineering firms and, after four months of consideration, selected a design for the ideal plant to build. Nine months after they were established, the two teams, armed with all the details about cost, presented their best case and challenged each other's information, reasoning, and conclusions. From the spirited discussion, it became apparent that the two options would cost about the same amount of money. The group therefore chose the build option because it allowed the plant to be conveniently located near company headquarters. This procedure represents the structured use of constructive controversy to ensure high-quality decision making.

The purpose of group decision making is to decide on well-considered, well-understood, realistic action toward goals every member wishes to achieve. A group decision implies that some agreement prevails among group members as to which of several courses of action is most desirable for achieving the group's goals. Making a decision is just one

step in the more general problem-solving process of goal-directed groups, but it is a crucial one. After defining a problem or issue, thinking over alternative courses of action, and weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each, a group will decide which course is the most desirable to implement. To ensure high-quality decision making, each alternative course of action must receive a complete and fair hearing and be critically analyzed to reveal its strengths and weaknesses. In order to do so, the following constructive controversy procedure may be implemented. Group members

1. *Propose several courses of action that will solve the problem under consideration* . When the group is making a decision, identify a number of alternative courses of action for the group to follow.
2. *Form advocacy teams* . To ensure that each course of action receives a fair and complete hearing, assign two group members to be an advocacy team to present the best case possible for the assigned position. Positive interdependence is structured by highlighting the cooperative goal of making the best decision possible (goal interdependence) and noting that a high-quality decision cannot be made without considering the information that is being organized by the other advocacy teams (resource interdependence). Individual accountability is structured by ensuring that each member participates in preparing and presenting the assigned position. Any information discovered that supports the other alternatives is given to the appropriate advocacy pair.
3. *Engage in the constructive controversy procedure* .
    a. Each advocacy team researches its position and prepares a persuasive presentation to convince other

group members of its validity. The advocacy teams are given the time to research their assigned alternative course of action and find all the supporting evidence available. They organize what is known into a coherent and reasoned position. They plan how to present their case so that all members of the group understand thoroughly the advocacy pair's position, give it a fair and complete hearing, and are convinced of its soundness.

b. Each advocacy team presents without interruption the best case possible for their assigned alternative course of action to the entire group. Other advocacy teams listen carefully, taking notes and striving to learn the information provided.

c. There is an open discussion characterized by advocacy, refutation, and rebuttal. The advocacy teams give opposing positions a trial by fire by seeking to refute them by challenging the validity of their information and logic. They defend their own position while continuing to attempt to persuade other group members of its validity. For higher-level reasoning and critical thinking to occur, it is necessary to probe and push each other's conclusions. Members ask for data to support each other's statements, clarify rationales, and show why their position is the most rational one. Group members refute the claims being made by the opposing teams and rebut the attacks on their own position. They take careful notes on and thoroughly learn the opposing positions. Members follow the specific rules for constructive controversy. Sometimes a time-out period needs to be provided so that pairs can caucus and prepare new arguments. Members should encourage spirited arguing and playing devil's advocate. Members are instructed: "Argue forcefully

and persuasively for your position, presenting as many facts as you can to support your point of view. Listen critically to the opposing pair's position, asking them for the facts that support their viewpoint, and then present counterarguments. Remember this is a complex issue, and you need to know all sides to make a good decision."

d. Advocacy teams reverse perspectives and positions by presenting one of the opposing positions as sincerely and forcefully as team members can. Members may be told, "Present an opposing position as if it were yours. Be as sincere and forceful as you can. Add any new facts you know. Elaborate their position by relating it to other information you have previously learned." Advocacy pairs strive to see the issue from all perspectives simultaneously.

e. All members drop their advocacy and reach a decision by consensus. They may wish to summarize their decision in a group report that details the course of action they have adopted and its supporting rationale. Often the chosen alternative represents a new perspective or synthesis that is more rational than the two assigned. All group members sign the report, indicating that they agree with the decision and will do their share of the work in implementing it. Members may be instructed: "Summarize and synthesize the best arguments for all points of view. Reach a decision by consensus. Change your mind only when the facts and the rationale clearly indicate that you should do so. Write a report with the supporting evidence and rationale for your synthesis that your group has agreed on. When you are certain the report is as good as you can make it, sign it."

f. Group members process how well the group functioned and how their performance may be improved during the next constructive controversy.

4. *Implement the decision* . Once the decision is made, all members commit themselves to implement it regardless of whether they initially favored the alternative adopted.

Controversies are common within decision-making situations. In the mining industry, for example, engineers are accustomed to address issues such as land use, air and water pollution, and health and safety. The complexity of the design of production processes, the balancing of environmental and manufacturing interests, and numerous other factors often create the opportunity for constructive controversy. Most groups waste the benefits of such disputes, but every effective decision-making situation thrives on what constructive controversy has to offer. Decisions are by their very nature controversial, as alternative solutions are suggested and considered before agreement is reached. When a decision is made, the constructive controversy ends and participants commit themselves to a common course of action.

CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROVERSY AND DEMOCRACY

Thomas Jefferson believed that free and open discussion should serve as the basis of influence within society, not the social rank within which a person was born. Based on the beliefs of Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and their fellow revolutionaries, American democracy was founded on the premise that truth will result from free and open-minded discussion in which opposing points of view are advocated and vigorously argued. Every citizen is given the

opportunity to advocate for his or her ideas and to listen respectfully to opposing points of view.

Political discourse is the formal exchange of reasoned views as to which of several alternative courses of action should be taken to solve a societal problem (Johnson and Johnson, 2000). It is intended to involve all citizens in the making of the decision. Citizens are expected to persuade one another through valid information and logic as to what course of action would be most effective. Political discourse is aimed at making a decision in a way that ensures all citizens are committed to implement the decision (whether they agree with it or not) and the democratic process. Once a decision is made, the minority is expected to go along willingly with the majority because they know they have been given a fair and complete hearing. To be a citizen in our democracy, individuals need to internalize the norms for constructive controversy as well as mastering the process of researching an issue, organizing their conclusions, advocating their views, challenging opposing positions, making a decision, and committing themselves to implement the decision made (regardless of whether one initially favored the alternative adopted). In essence, the use of constructive controversy teaches the participants to be active citizens of a democracy.

CONCLUSION

Thomas Jefferson based his faith in the future of democracy on the power of constructive conflict. Based on structure-process-outcome theory (Watson and Johnson, 1972), it may be posited that the way in which conflict is structured determines how group members interact, which in turn determines the resulting outcomes. Conflicts may be structured to produce constructive controversy or concurrence seeking (as well as debate or individualistic

problem solving). Each way of structuring conflict leads to a different process of interaction among group members and different outcomes.

The process of constructive controversy includes forming an initial conclusion when presented with a problem; being confronted by other people with different conclusions, becoming uncertain as to the correctness of one's views, actively searching for more information and a more adequate perspective; and forming a new, reconceptualized, and reorganized conclusion. The process of concurrence seeking includes seeking a quick decision, avoiding any disagreement or dissent, emphasizing agreement among group members, and avoiding realistic appraisal of alternative ideas and courses of action.

Compared to concurrence seeking (and debate and individualistic efforts), controversies tend to result in greater achievement and retention, cognitive and moral reasoning, perspective taking, open-mindedness, creativity, task involvement, continuing motivation, attitude change, interpersonal attraction, and self-esteem. This is especially true when the situational context is cooperative, there is some heterogeneity among group members, information and expertise are distributed within the group, members have the necessary conflict skills, and the canons of rational argumentation are followed.

While the constructive controversy process can occur naturally, it may be consciously structured in decision making and learning situations. This involves dividing a cooperative group into two pairs and assigning them opposing positions. The pairs then develop their position, present it to the other pair and listen to the opposing position, engage in a discussion in which they attempt to refute the other side and rebut attacks on their position, reverse perspectives and present the other position, and

drop all advocacy and seek a synthesis that takes both perspectives and positions into account. Engaging in the constructive controversy procedure skillfully provides an example of how conflict creates positive outcomes.

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CHAPTER FIVE
TRUST, TRUST DEVELOPMENT, AND TRUST REPAIR [a]

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The relationship between conflict and trust is an obvious one. Most people think of trust as the glue that holds a relationship together. If individuals or groups trust each other, they can work through conflict relatively easily. If they do not trust each other, conflict often becomes destructive, and resolution is more difficult. Bitter conflict itself generates animosity and pain that is not easily forgotten; moreover, the parties no longer believe what the other says or believe that the other will follow through on commitments and proposed actions. Therefore, acrimonious conflict often serves to destroy trust and increase distrust, which makes conflict resolution ever more difficult and problematic.

In this chapter, we review some of the work on trust and show its relevance to effective conflict management. We also extend some of this work to a broader understanding of the key role of trust in relationships and how different types of relationships can be characterized according to the levels of trust and distrust that are present. Finally, we describe procedures for repairing trust that has been broken and for managing distrust in ways that can enhance short-term conflict containment while rebuilding trust over the long run.

WHAT IS TRUST?

Trust is a concept that has received attention in several social science literatures: psychology, sociology, political science, economics, anthropology, history, and sociobiology (for reviews, see Worchel, 1979; Gambetta, 1988; Lewicki and Bunker, 1995; Bachmann and Zaheer, 2006, 2008). As can be expected, each literature approaches the problem with its own disciplinary lens and filters. Until recently, there has been remarkably little effort to integrate these perspectives or articulate the key role that trust plays in critical social processes, such as cooperation, coordination, and performance (for notable exceptions, see Kramer and Tyler, 1996; Sitkin, Rousseau, Burt, and Camerer, 1998).

Worchel (1979) proposes that these differing perspectives on trust can be aggregated into at least three groups (see also Lewicki and Bunker, 1995, 1996, for detailed exploration of theories within each category):

1. The views of personality theorists, who focus on individual personality differences in the readiness to trust and on the specific developmental and social contextual factors that shape this readiness. At this level, trust is conceptualized as a belief, expectancy, or feeling deeply rooted in the personality, with origins in the individual's early psychosocial development (see Worchel, 1979; Rotter, 1971; Kramer, 2006).
2. The views of sociologists and economists, who focus on trust as an institutional phenomenon. Institutional trust can be defined as the belief that future interactions will continue, based on explicit or implicit rules and norms (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer, 1998; Currall and Inkpen, 2006). At this level, trust can be conceptualized as a phenomenon within and among institutions and as the trust individuals put in those institutions. For example, one group of researchers explored the role of trust in interfirm relationships at both the interpersonal

and organizational levels. They showed that high levels of interorganizational trust enhanced supplier performance, lowered costs of negotiation, and reduced conflict between firms (Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone, 1998). Others argue that organizations must significantly redesign their governance mechanisms in order to address the considerable loss of public trust in American corporations in the past decade (Caldwell and Karri, 2005).

3. The views of social psychologists, who focus on the interpersonal transactions between individuals that create or destroy trust at the interpersonal and group levels. At this level, trust can be defined as expectations of the other party in a transaction, considering the risks associated with assuming and acting on such expectations and contextual factors that either contribute to or inhibit development and maintenance of the relationship. The earliest examples of this perspective can be found in the pioneering studies of Deutsch (1958, 1960, 1962) and his exploration of the dynamics of trust among experimental subjects playing a prisoner's dilemma game. Examples of elaborated models of trust, particularly in organizations, can be found in Jones and George, (1998), Dirks and Ferrin (2001), and Colquitt, Scott, and LePine (2007).

A DEFINITION OF TRUST

The literature on trust is rich with definitions and conceptualizations (see Bigley and Pearce, 1998). In this chapter, we adopt as the definition of *trust* "an individual's belief in, and willingness to act on the basis of, the words, actions, and decisions of another" (McAllister, 1995, p. 25; Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies, 1998). Implicit in this definition, as in other comparable ones (Boon and Holmes,

1991), are three elements that contribute to the level of trust one has for another: the individual's chronic disposition toward trust (see our earlier discussion of personality), situational parameters (some are suggested above, others below), and the history of their relationship. Our current focus is on the relationship dimension of trust, which we address throughout this chapter.

WHY TRUST IS CRITICAL TO RELATIONSHIPS

There are many types of relationship, and it can be assumed that the nature of trust and its development are not the same in all the types. In this chapter, we discuss two basic types: professional and personal relationships. The former is considered to be a task-oriented relationship in which the parties' attention and activities are primarily directed toward achievement of goals external to their relationship. The latter is considered to be a social-emotional relationship whose primary focus is the relationship itself and the persons in the relationship (see Deutsch, 1985, for a complex treatment of types of interdependence in relationships; see also Sheppard and Sherman, 1998; and chapters 1 and 37 in this handbook).

An effort to describe professional relationship development in a business context was proposed by Shapiro, Sheppard, and Cheraskin (1992). They suggest that three types of trust operate in developing a business relationship: deterrence-based trust, knowledge-based trust, and identification-based trust. Expanding on this work, Lewicki and Bunker (1995, 1996) adopted these three types of trust and made several major additions and modifications. We briefly present these ideas (Lewicki and Bunker's articles provide a richer and fuller description of each type of trust

and how it is proposed that the types are linked together in a developmental sequence).

Calculus-Based Trust

Shapiro et al. (1992) identified the first type as *deterrence-based trust* . They argued that this form of trust is based in ensuring consistency of behavior; simply put, individuals do what they promise because they fear the consequences of not doing what they say. Like any other behavior based on a theory of deterrence, trust is sustained to the degree that the deterrent (punishment) is clear, possible, and likely to occur if the trust is violated. Thus, the threat of punishment is likely to be a more significant motivator than the promise of reward.

Lewicki and Bunker (1995, 1996) called this form *calculus-based trust* (CBT). We argue that trust at this stage is grounded not only in the fear of punishment for violating the trust but also in the rewards to be derived from preserving it. This kind of trust is an ongoing, market-oriented, economic calculation whose value is determined by the outcomes resulting from creating and sustaining the relationship relative to the costs of maintaining or severing it. Compliance with calculus-based trust is often ensured by both the rewards of being trusting (and trustworthy) and the threat that if trust is violated, one’s reputation can be hurt through the other person’s network of friends and associates. Even if you are not an honest person, having a reputation for honesty (or trustworthiness) is a valuable asset that most people want to maintain. So even if there are opportunities to be untrustworthy, any short-term gains from untrustworthy acts must be balanced, in a calculus-based way, against the long-term benefits from maintaining a good reputation.

The most appropriate metaphor for the growth of CBT is the children's game Chutes and Ladders. Progress is made on the game board by throwing the dice and moving ahead ("up the ladder") in a stepwise fashion. However, a player landing on a "chute" is quickly dropped back a large number of steps. Similarly, in calculus-based trust, forward progress is made by climbing the ladder, or building trust, slowly, step by step. People prove through simple actions that they are trustworthy, and, similarly, they are regularly testing others' trust. Results of such incremental trust development are being reported in the neuroscience literature. In one study, researchers found that as parties played a game of economic reciprocity and one party gained a reputation for trustworthy choices, the other's intention to make a reciprocal trusting choice and actual trust decision could be tracked through changes in brainwaves in the dorsal striatum (King-Casas et al., 2005). Balancing this trust-building development, trust declines can also occur frequently; a single event of inconsistency or unreliability may "chute" the relationship back several steps—or, in the worst case, back to square one. Thus, CBT is often quite partial and fragile.

The dynamics of this trust development may not always be as rational as this description suggests. In fact, trustors and those who are trusted may be motivated by different things. [1] Trustors are more likely to focus on the risk associated with taking the trusting action. Thus, trust-building activities such as placing trust in the other in spite of the possible associated risks may be both irrational and necessary to develop that trust. At the same time, the trusted are more likely to focus on the level of benefits they are receiving. Thus, trustors will be cautious; they focus on risk of trust and may be more likely to initiate trusting actions that do not risk extending high (but potentially unreciprocated) rewards to the other. In contrast, the

trusted are more likely to focus on the benefits and may be more likely to reciprocate (and create joint gain for the parties) when the reward level is high (Malhotra, 2004; Weber, Malhotra, and Murnighan, 2005). Paradoxically, from the trustee's point of view, trust cannot be asked for, but is more likely to be accepted if it is offered.

Identification-Based Trust

While CBT is usually the first stage in developing more intimate personal relationships, it often leads to a second type of trust, based on identification with the other's desires and intentions. This type of trust exists because the parties can effectively understand and appreciate one another's wants (Rousseau et al., 1998, have called this relationship-based trust). This mutual understanding is developed to the point that each person can effectively act for the other. Identification-based trust (IBT) thus permits a party to serve as the other's agent and substitute for the other in interpersonal transactions (Deutsch, 1949). Both parties can be confident that their interests are fully protected and that no ongoing surveillance or monitoring of one another is necessary. A true affirmation of the strength of IBT between parties can be found when one party acts for the other even more zealously than the other might demonstrate, such as when a good friend dramatically defends you against a minor insult.

A corollary of this "acting for each other" in IBT is that as the parties come to know each other better and identify with the other, they also understand more clearly what they must do to sustain the other's trust. [2] This process might be described as second-order learning. One comes to learn what really matters to the other and comes to place the same importance on those behaviors as the other does. Certain types of activities strengthen IBT (Shapiro et al., 1992; Lewicki and Bunker, 1995, 1996; Lewicki and

Stevenson, 1998), such as developing a collective identity (a joint name, title, or logo), co-location in the same building or neighborhood, creating joint products or goals (a new product line or a new set of objectives), or committing to commonly shared values (such that the parties are committed to the same objectives and so can substitute for each other in external transactions). For example, at the leadership level, De Cremer and van Knippenberg (2005) have shown that leader self-sacrifice enhanced follower trust, cooperation, and collective identification with the leader. At the team level, Han and Harms (2010) have shown that identification with the team strengthened trust and decreased both task and relationship conflict. Finally, at the organization level, Kramer (2001) has argued that identification with the organization's goals leads individuals to trust the organization and share a presumptive trust of others within it.

Thus IBT develops as one both knows and predicts the other's needs, choices, and preferences and as one also shares some of those same needs, choices, and preferences as one's own. Increased identification enables us to think like the other, feel like the other, and respond like the other. A collective identity develops; we empathize strongly with the other and incorporate parts of their psyche into our own identity (needs, preferences, thoughts, and behavior patterns). This form of trust can develop in working relationships if the parties come to know each other very well, but it is most likely to occur in intimate, personal relationships. Moreover, this form of trust stabilizes relationships during periods of conflict and negativity. Thus, when high-trusting parties engage in conflict, they tend to see the best in their partner's motives because they make different attributions about the conflict compared to low-trusting parties. Thus, the determinant of

whether relationships maintain or dissolve in a conflict may be due to the attributions parties make about the other's motives, determined by the existing level of trust (Miller and Rempel, 2004).

Music suggests a suitable metaphor for IBT: the harmonizing of a barbershop quartet. The parties learn to sing in a harmony that is integrated and complex. Each knows the others' vocal range and pitch; each singer knows when to lead and follow; and each knows how to work with the others to maximize their strengths, compensate for their weaknesses, and create a joint product that is much greater than the sum of its parts. The unverbalized, synchronous chemistry of a cappella choirs, string quartets, cohesive work groups, emergency medical delivery teams, and championship basketball teams are excellent examples of this kind of trust in action.

Trust and Relationships: An Elaboration of Our Views

In addition to our views of these two forms of trust, we need to introduce two ideas about trust and relationships. The first is that trust and distrust are not simply opposite ends of the same dimension but conceptually different and separate. Second, relationships develop over time, and the nature of trust changes as they develop.

Trust and Distrust Are Fundamentally Different.

In addition to identifying types of trust, Lewicki et al. (1998) have argued that trust and distrust are fundamentally different from each other rather than merely more or less of the same thing (see also Ullman-Margalit, 2004; Kramer and Cook, 2004). Although trust can be defined as "confident positive expectations regarding another's conduct," distrust can indeed be "confident

negative expectations” regarding another’s conduct (Lewicki et al., 1998). Thus, just as trust implies belief in the other, a tendency to attribute virtuous intentions to the other and willingness to act on the basis of the other’s conduct, distrust implies fear of the other, a tendency to attribute sinister intentions to the other, and a desire to protect oneself from the effects of another’s conduct.

Relationships Are Developmental and Multifaceted.

In discussing our views of the types of trust, we also pointed out that these forms of trust develop in different types of relationships. Work (task) relationships tend to be characterized by CBT but may develop some IBT. Intimate (personal) relationships tend to be characterized by IBT but may require a modicum of CBT for the parties to work together effectively or coordinate their lives together (e.g., share property, meet obligations and commitments).

All relationships develop as parties share experiences with each other and gain knowledge about the other. Every time we encounter another person, we gain a new experience that strengthens or weakens the relationship. If our experiences with another person are all within the same limited context (I know the server at the bakery because I buy my bagel and juice there every morning), then we gain little additional knowledge about the other (over time, I have a rich but very narrow range of experience with that server). However, if we encounter the other in different contexts (if I join a colleague to talk research, coteach classes, and play tennis), then this variety of shared experience is likely to develop into broader, deeper knowledge of the other.

People come to know each other in many contexts and situations. Conversely, they may trust others in some contexts and distrust in others. You may have friends you

would trust to take care of your child but not to pay back money that you loan them. A relationship is made up of components of experience that one individual has with another. Within these relationships, some elements hold varying degrees of trust, while others hold varying degrees of distrust. Our overall evaluation of the other person involves some complex judgment that weighs the scope of the relationship and elements of trust and distrust. Most people are able to be quite specific in describing both the trust and distrust elements in their relationship. If the parties teach a class together, work together on a committee, play tennis together, and belong to the same church, the scope of their experience is much broader than for parties who simply work together on a committee.

Finally, we cannot assume that we begin with a blank slate of trust or distrust in relationships. In fact, we seldom approach others with no information. Rather, we tend to approach the other with some initial level of trust or of caution (McKnight, Cummings, and Chervaney, 1998). In fact, some authors have argued that there is a strong disposition to overtrust in early relationships, a situation where the trustor's trust exceeds the level that might be warranted by situational circumstances (Goel, Bell, and Pierce, 2005). Thus, determining the appropriate level of initial trust prior to substantial data about the other party may be more difficult than determining the appropriate level after some data have been collected (Ullman-Margalit, 2004).

In addition, we develop expectations about the degree to which we can trust new others, depending on a number of factors:

- *Personality predispositions* . Research has shown that individuals differ in their predisposition to trust another (Rotter, 1971; Wrightsman, 1994). The higher an

individual ranks in predisposition to trust, the more she expects trustworthy actions from the other, independent of her own actions. Similarly, research has shown that individuals differ in their predispositions to be cynical or show distrust (Kanter and Mirvis, 1989).

- *Psychological orientation* . Deutsch (1985) has characterized relationships in terms of their psychological orientations, or the complex synergy of "interrelated cognitive, motivational and moral orientations" (p. 94). He maintains that people establish and maintain social relationships partly on the basis of these orientations, such that orientations are influenced by relationships and vice versa. To the extent that people strive to keep their orientations internally consistent, they may seek out relationships that are congruent with their own psyche.
- *Reputations and stereotypes* . Even if we have no direct experience with another person, our expectations may be shaped by what we learn about him or her through friends, associates, and hearsay (Ferris, Blass, Douglas, Kolodinsky, and Treadway, 2003). The other's reputation often creates strong expectations that lead us to look for elements of trust or distrust and also to approach the relationship attuned to trust or to suspicion (Glick and Croson, 2001).
- *Experience over time* . With most people, we develop facets of experience as we talk, work, coordinate, and communicate. Some of these facets are strong in trust, while others may be strong in distrust. For example, one study of organizational communication showed that as frequency of communication increases, the parties' general predisposition toward the other party decreased in importance, while organizational and situational factors (e.g., tenure, autonomy) increased in importance

in the determination of trust. Over time, it is likely that either trust or distrust context or experience elements begin to dominate the experience base, leading to a stable and easily defined relationship. As these patterns stabilize, we tend to generalize across the scope of the relationship and describe it as one of high or low trust or distrust.

Implications of This Revised View of Trust.

By incorporating the revisions just described into existing models of trust, we can summarize our ideas about trust and distrust within relationships:

- Relationships are multifaceted, and each facet represents an interaction that provides us with information about the other. The greater the variety of settings and contexts in which the parties interact, the more complex and multifaceted the relationship becomes.
- Within the same relationship, elements of trust and distrust may peacefully coexist because they are related to different experiences with the other or knowledge of the other in varied contexts.
- Relationships balanced with trust and distrust are likely to be healthier than relationships grounded only in trust. Particularly in organizational and managerial relationships, “neither complete lack of trust, nor total trust, nor very high levels of affective attachment, nor enduring social reliance, nor destructive mistrust and betrayal, are appropriate or positive for organizational purposes” (Atkinson and Butcher, 2003, p. 297). Particularly in business relationships, unquestioning trust without distrust is more likely to create more problems than solutions (Wicks, Berman, and Jones, 1999; Blois, 2003). Similarly, unquestioning distrust

(e.g., paranoia) can sometimes be healthy, but sometimes perverse (Kramer, 2001, 2002). To quote the popular caution: "Trust . . . but verify!"

- Facets of trust or distrust are likely to be calculus based or identification based. Earlier, we defined trust as confident positive expectations regarding another's conduct and distrust as confident negative expectations regarding another's conduct. We now elaborate on those definitions:

  Calculus-based trust (CBT) is a confident positive expectation regarding another's conduct. It is grounded in impersonal transactions, and the overall anticipated benefits to be derived from the relationship are assumed to outweigh any anticipated costs.

  Calculus-based distrust (CBD) is a confident negative expectation regarding another's conduct. It is also grounded in impersonal transactions, and the overall anticipated costs to be derived from the relationship are assumed to outweigh the anticipated benefits.

  Identification-based trust (IBT) is a confident positive expectation regarding another's conduct. It is grounded in perceived compatibility of values, common goals, and positive emotional attachment to the other.

  Identification-based distrust (IBD) is a confident negative expectation regarding another's conduct, grounded in perceived incompatibility of values, dissimilar goals, and negative emotional attachment to the other.

Characterizing Relationships Based on Trust Elements

Because there can be elements of each type of trust and distrust in a relationship, there are many types of

relationships, varying in the combination of elements of calculus-based trust, calculus-based distrust, identification-based trust, and identification-based distrust. All of these types of relationships theoretically exist, but given the relative infancy of this theory, we cannot effectively explore or discuss all of the possibilities.

To simplify this framework, let us assume that we can characterize relationships as simply high or low in the number of CBT, CBD, IBT, and IBD elements. This reduces the framework to sixteen possible combinations of trust elements (see table 5.1). Each row in this table represents a type of relationship based on the pattern of high or low levels of CBT, CBD, IBT, and IBD. These combinations are listed in the first four columns, and a brief description of the relationship is found in the last column.

Table 5.1 Sixteen Relationship Types Based on Dominant Trust and Distrust Elements

Type	*CBT*	*CBD*	*IBT*	*IBD*	*Brief Description of the Relationship*
1	Low	Low	Low	Low	Arm's-length relationship
2	High	Low	Low	Low	High CBT; good working relationship
3	Low	High	Low	Low	High CBD; working relationship characterized by cautiousness
4	Low	Low	High	Low	Instant good chemistry with the other based on strong perceived value compatibility but limited experience with the other
5	Low	Low	Low	High	Instant bad chemistry with the other based on strong perceived value incompatibility but limited experience with the other
6	High	Low	High	Low	Classic high-trust relationship, based on strong elements of CBT and IBT
7	Low	High	Low	High	Classic high-distrust relationship, based on strong elements of CBD and IBD
8	High	High	Low	Low	Complex professional relationship; strong number of CBT and CBD elements, limited experience on identification-based elements
9	Low	Low	High	High	Love-hate relationships; high passion and ambivalence, characterized by strong positive and strong negative attraction to the other; limited experience on calculus-based elements
10	High	Low	Low	High	A necessary service provider; strong CBT but also strong IBD; maintain an arm's-length relationship to benefit from the CBT aspects but minimize the IBD elements
11	Low	High	High	Low	"I love you, but you are erratic and unpredictable"; strong CBD (which makes us cautious) but also strong IBT (which attracts us to the other)
12	Low	High	High	High	Dominant love-hate relationship, with additional elements of CBD and few elements of CBT
13	High	Low	High	High	Dominant love-hate relationship, with additional elements of CBT and few elements of CBD
14	High	High	Low	High	Dominant high-distrust relationship, although with some elements of CBT possible; "very distrusting, but bounded trusting transactions are possible"
15	High	High	High	Low	Dominant high-trust relationship, although there are some elements of CBD; "very trusting but takes precautions"
16	High	High	High	High	Rich, complex, highly ambivalent relationship;

16	High	High	High	High	Rich, complex, highly ambivalent relationship; lots of trust and distrust along all dimensions of the relationship

Note: CBT = calculus-based trust; CBD = calculus-based distrust; IBT = identification-based trust; IBD = identification-based distrust. Relationships 15 and 16 are high in CBT, CBD, and IBT, and low or high, respectively, in IBD. These relationships are characterized by a high degree of ambivalence. The parties find that there are contexts in which they can work together successfully, but they also have to regulate and limit those interactions to minimize the distrust. In addition, the parties have some strong positive commonalities in values, goals, and interests, but they may (or may not) have strong dissimilarities in the same areas. The parties learn to manage their relationship by maximizing interaction around those areas where they have strong CBT and IBT, while regulating, controlling, or minimizing interaction in those areas with strong CBD (and perhaps IBD). However, ongoing uncertainty, coupled with the potential for strong emotional reactions to one another in a variety of circumstances, may make it difficult for the parties to sustain a stable relationship over time (Jones and Burdette, 1994).

Based on our model, all sixteen types of relationship are hypothetically possible and may be found among one's friends, acquaintances, and professional associates. However, space limitations in this chapter only permit us to offer a few selective illustrations.

Relationship 1 of table 5.1 , low in all forms of trust and distrust, represents new relationships in which the actors have little prior information and no expectations about each other. Type 1 relationships may also not be new to us, but because we have had such limited interaction with the other, there has been no basis for developing significant trust or distrust. Nevertheless, we tend to extend a modicum of trust. We walk into a new dry cleaning store chosen at random and give the attendant our favorite suit because we trust that the dry cleaner will clean it, not ruin it. The very existence of the shop's appearance as a clean, professional-looking, legitimate business is sufficient to satisfy our trust. Thus, while the "low-low-low-low" situation may exist hypothetically, in fact this type of relationship may occur only when there are actual data for the trustor to infer that low levels of trust and distrust are the most appropriate disposition (Jeffries and Reed, 2000).

Relationship 2 is high only in CBT. This is likely to be a business or professional relationship in which the actors

have had a number of successful exchanges and transactions that are beneficial to them. Over time, each person's behavior has been positive and consistent, and the parties rely on each other to continue to act in the same way. For example, my investment counselor has made very good decisions about my money over time, and I continue to take his advice about when it is time to buy or sell.

Relationship 6, high in CBT and IBT, represents a prototypical high-trust relationship. Both parties benefit greatly from the relationship, so they seek out opportunities to be together and do things together. Continued success in these interactions enhances their trust.

MANAGING TRUST AND DISTRUST IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS

As we have noted, trust and distrust develop as people gain knowledge of one another. One of the benefits of our model of relationships based on trust is its clear explanation of changes in relationships over time. Relationship changes can be mapped by identifying actions that change the balance of the trust and distrust elements in the relationship or fundamentally alter the type of interaction in the relationship. In this section, we identify behaviors that previous research suggests can change perceptions of trust and distrust.

Actions That Build Calculus-Based Trust

People who are involved in relationships with high levels of CBT and low levels of IBT (such as relationship 2 in table 5.1) may have relatively stable expectations about these relationships. Initially CBT may be based on only the other's reputation for trustworthiness (Gabarro, 1978;

Butler, 1991). Over time, CBT develops as we observe the other and identify certain behavior patterns over time. Previous research has demonstrated that effective business relationships are based on predictability (Jennings, 1971), reliability (McAllister, 1995), and consistency of behavior (Gabarro, 1978). In work relationships, then, CBT is enhanced if people behave the same appropriate way consistently (at different times and in different situations), meet stated deadlines, and perform tasks and follow through with planned activities as promised.

In any context, if people act consistently and reliably, we are likely to see them as credible and trustworthy (Lewicki and Stevenson, 1998). For example, students often want to be able to trust their faculty instructors. To the degree that faculty clearly announce their course requirements and grading criteria, use those standards consistently, follow the course outline clearly, and keep their promises, they enjoy a great deal of trust from students.

Emotions can also build trust. Happiness and gratitude can build trust, while anger decreases it. The salience of the emotion's cause and familiarity with the target moderate the relationship between emotions and trust (Dunn and Schweitzer, 2005).

Strategies to Manage Calculus-Based Distrust

As we have noted, CBT and CBD are often founded on a cost-benefit analysis. If the costs of depending on someone's behavior outweigh the benefits, we are typically inclined to change or terminate the relationship. This may be feasible with personal friendships, but it is often not possible to leave professional relationships even when CBD is high. [3] Consequently, it is necessary to manage CBD so that the parties can continue to work together.

There are several strategies for managing CBD:

- Agree explicitly on expectations as to what is to be done, on deadlines for completion, and on the penalties for failing to comply with them. This upfront commitment by the parties to a course of action and to the consequences for nonperformance sets explicit expectations for behavior that may reduce the fear parties have about the vulnerabilities associated with working together.
- Agree on procedures for monitoring and verifying the other's actions. If we distrust someone, we seek ways to monitor what he does to ensure that future trust violations do not occur. Writing about disarmament during the Cold War, Osgood (1962) explicitly proposed unilateral steps that antagonistic parties can take to signal good faith and an intention to build trustworthiness.
- Cultivate alternative ways to have one's needs met. Someone who distrusts another (and the other's possible performance in the future) tries to find ways to minimize future interaction or discover alternative ways to get needs met. Distrust can be managed by letting the other know that one has an alternative and is willing to invoke it if there are further trust violations.
- Increase the other's awareness of how his own performance is perceived by others. Workplace difficulties are sometimes alleviated when supervisors discuss performance expectations with subordinates rather than assuming that both have the same understanding of what constitutes appropriate work behavior. Many workplace diversity efforts are actually attempts to familiarize workers from different cultures with one another. Behaviors that seemed strange or inconsistent may be explained as differences in cultural patterns of interaction. Once the parties recognize the

logic inherent in each other's behavior, they are likely to view the other as consistent and predictable (Foeman, 1991), which enhances CBT.

Actions That Build IBT

Research indicates that trust is enhanced if the parties spend time together-sharing personal values, perceptions, motives, and goals (Gabarro, 1978). But specific time must be set aside for engaging in this activity. Parties in work relationships may do this in the course of working together, while parties in personal relationships explicitly devote time to these activities. In general, parties should engage in processes that permit them to share:

- Common group membership (Brewer and Kramer, 1986)
- Common interests
- Common goals and objectives
- Similar reactions to common situations
- Situations where they stand for the same values and principles, thereby demonstrating integrity (Lewicki and Stevenson, 1998)

For example, Kramer (2001), interpreting a stream of research on the impact of common group membership on identity and trust, argues that common group and organizational membership was sufficient to solidify trust, and in a way that went significantly beyond the ability of simple reputation or calculative-based considerations for trust development. Common group membership creates actions that also have expressive and symbolic meanings: "engaging in acts of trust thus provides organizational members with an opportunity to communicate to others the symbolic value they attach to their organizational identity. From this perspective, the psychological significance of

trust acts resides . . . in the social motives and affiliative needs of group members that are met through such actions" (Kramer, 2001, p. 171).

Similarly, Rothman (1997) has proposed a four-step framework for resolving identity-based disputes. The second key step in the framework is resonance, or the process of reflexive reframing, by which parties discover common values, concerns, interests, and needs. In Rothman's framework, effective completion of the resonance step permits individuals to establish a basis of commonality (IBT) on which to build mutually acceptable solutions to managing their dispute. Moreover, studies in organizations have indicated that one component of managers' trust in their subordinates is the degree to which the employee demonstrates that she has the best interests of the manager or the organization (or both) at heart (Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis, 1996; Butler, 1995). If we believe that the other shares our concerns and goals, IBT is enhanced. IBT may also be increased if we observe the other reacting as we believe we would react in another context (Lewicki and Stevenson, 1998); however, research on the connection between similarity and perceptions of trustworthiness has produced mixed results (see Huston and Levinger, 1978).

It should be noted that IBT has a strong emotional component and is probably largely affective in nature (Lewicki and Bunker, 1995, 1996; McAllister, 1995). Despite our attempt to think logically about our relationships, how we respond to others often depends on our idiosyncratic, personal reactions to aspects of the other's physical self-presentation (Chaiken, 1986), the situation and circumstances under which we meet the person (Jones and Brehm, 1976), or even our mood at the time of the encounter. Consequently, we are likely to build IBT only with others whom we feel legitimately share our

goals, interests, perceptions, and values and if we meet under circumstances that facilitate our learning of that similarity.

Strategies to Manage IBD

If we believe that another's values, perceptions, and behaviors are damaging to our own, we often find it difficult to maintain even a semblance of a working relationship. However, if we anticipate that we will have a long-term relationship with someone who invokes elements of IBD and believe we have limited alternatives, there are strategies for managing the encounter that offer both opportunities for self-protection and attainment of mutual goals. One of the most important strategies is to develop sufficient CBT so that the parties can be comfortable with the straightforward behavioral expectations that each has for the relationship.

As we noted in the section on managing CBD, explicitly specifying and negotiating expected behaviors may be necessary to provide both parties with a comfort zone sufficient to sustain their interaction. It may also be helpful for the actors to openly acknowledge the areas of their mutual distrust. By doing so, they can explicitly talk about areas where they distrust each other and establish safeguards that anticipate distrustful behaviors and afford protection against potential consequences (Lewicki and Stevenson, 1998). For example, if the parties have strong disagreements about certain value-based issues (religious beliefs, political beliefs, personal values), they may be able to design ways to keep these issues from interfering with their ability to work together in more calculus-based transactions. If the costs and benefits of consistent action are clear to both parties, the groundwork for CBT may be established. This enables them to interact in future encounters with some confidence that despite deep-seated

differences, they will not be fundamentally disadvantaged or harmed in the relationship.

We should note here that our working assumption is that the trustor's strong IBD is healthy and appropriate—that is, grounded in accurate perceptions and judgments of the identity differences between the parties. Kramer (2001, 2002) has also written extensively about the conditions under which paranoid cognitions develop and the conditions under which this paranoia may be prudent or highly destructive to the actor and to relationships.

What Happens If Trust Is Violated?

Trust violations occur if we experience an outcome that does not conform to our expectations of behavior for the trustee, and this outcome is attributed to the trustee as opposed to the situation or some other person (Tomlinson and Mayer, 2009). Note that trust violations can occur in both directions—that is, we can expect trusting behavior and encounter distrust, or we can expect distrusting behavior and encounter trust. [4] Our discussion here elaborates on the more commonly studied case of expecting trust and encountering distrust. If this disconfirming information is significant enough or if it begins to occur regularly in ongoing encounters, we are likely to reduce our perceptions of trust dramatically and possibly alter the type of relationship we have with the other (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). [5]

Research on the consequences of trust violations consistently shows that violations lead to a reduction in subsequent trust and cooperation (Deutsch, 1958; 1973; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Kramer, 1996). For example, employees' trust in their employer declines when they perceive that their employer has violated the psychological contract—that is, the expectations held by both parties

about the nature of the employment relationship (Morrison and Robinson, 1997). More specifically, trust violations stifle mutual support and information sharing in that relationship (Bies and Tripp, 1996), reduce the level of organizational citizenship behavior and job performance (Robinson, 1996), and may lead to low employee morale that adversely affects relationships with customers (Berry, 1999). There is also some indication that when managers are low in behavioral integrity (i.e., the perceived alignment between their words and actions), this characteristic can have a negative effect on the profitability of these organizations (Simons and McLean Parks, 2000; Simons, 2002).

For these reasons, the repair of damaged trust has emerged as a matter of tremendous practical significance. Trust repair can be regarded as a process that reverses the trustor's confident negative expectations accruing from a violation to the point where he or she is once again willing to be vulnerable to the trustee (Dirks, Lewicki, and Zaheer, 2009; Kramer and Lewicki, 2010). [6] Although this process is regarded as bilateral—involving decisions and actions from both the trustor (the person whose trust has been violated or victim) and trustee (the violator; see Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Kim, Dirks, & Cooper, 2009)—the bulk of trust repair research has focused on the efficacy of the violator's responses in the wake of a violation. In a review, Kramer and Lewicki (2010) presented a general typology of likely trustee responses to violations and subsequent efforts to repair trust: social accounts (including explanations and apologies), compensation (including reparations and penance), and structural solutions.

This categorization can be easily integrated with the stages of trust we described earlier. Specifically, CBT relationships are arm's-length, market oriented, and transaction focused. Trust at this stage relies heavily on a cognitive assessment

by the trustee that the benefits of honoring trust will outweigh the costs of damaging it; this type of trust sustains and enhances the trustor's reliance on the trustee for some valued outcome (which is usually more economic or tangible in nature). Emotional concerns are not irrelevant here; they are merely less salient than cognitive concerns about the tangible costs and benefits of the transaction and loss. Therefore, while trust repair in CBT relationships might be facilitated to some degree by social accounts, greater efficacy in trust repair will result from actual compensation or structural changes that more directly facilitate the achievement of the trustor's desired (economic) outcome. In short, dealing with the impact of a violation is paramount in violations of CBT.

Similarly, IBT relationships are close interpersonal relationships characterized by a strong emotional bond between the parties. These parties share the same goals and values and mutually demonstrate a strong commitment to continuing and nurturing the relationship to even higher levels. Trust at this stage relies heavily on an emotional assessment that the other party is equally motivated to invest in the relationship. Consequently, as opposed to CBT relationships, cognitive concerns are not irrelevant here, but they are merely less salient than emotional concerns. In this case, one might expect that trust repair is more effective to the extent that the trustee conveys social accounts that reaffirm commitment to the relationship. In short, dealing with the intent of the trustee in the wake of a violation is paramount in violations of IBT.

In the only study to directly test these predictions, Tomlinson, Lewicki, and Wang (2012) examined the independent and combined effects of impact (compensation) and intent (apology, explanation, and promise) tactics to repair both CBT and IBT relationships. They found no significant difference in the effectiveness of

impact versus intent tactics for repairing violations in CBT relationships. However, intent tactics (accounts, apologies, verbalizations) were significantly better than impact strategies for repairing violations in IBT. Moreover, across both stages of trust, combining both strategies was found to be more effective than either type alone, suggesting these tactics combine in an additive manner.

We now inventory the remaining trust repair research, finding that the majority of this work has been done on CBT relationships and has examined the impact of all three categories in the Kramer and Lewicki (2010) typology (accounts, compensation, and structural change).

Trust Repair

Most trust repair studies have examined the use of verbal accounts (as opposed to compensation, for example) to repair CBT relationships. This is noteworthy insofar as talk is "cheap"—which is to say that mere words are unsubstantiated by the offender and unverified by the victim (Farrell and Rabin, 1996). According to this view, "a verbal contract isn't worth the paper it's printed on"—a quote attributed to the famous New York Yankees catcher (and "philosopher") Yogi Berra. An initial study by Bottom, Gibson, Daniels, and Murnighan (2002) found that apologies and simple explanations led to restored cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma game. Similarly, Tomlinson et al. (2004) found that apologies whereby the offender fully accepted culpability for the violation were significantly related to the victim's willingness to reconcile after a violation; this beneficial effect was magnified when the receiver judged the apology as sincere and timely.

A subsequent stream of research by Kim and his colleagues (2004) examines the relative effects of apologies versus other types of social accounts. They found that when trust

violations were regarded as matters of the violator's low competence, apologies were more effective than when the offender denied the offense had happened; however, denial was more effective than an apology when the violation was ascribed to the violator's low integrity. The authors explain this finding by suggesting that breakdowns in competence can often be readily explained ("I made a mistake") and hence an apology can be effective, while breakdowns in integrity ("I lied" or "I broke my promise') are less readily fixed by a simple apology, and hence denying the violation might indeed be more effective. They also established that apologies were more effective when there was subsequent evidence of actual guilt; denials were more effective when there was subsequent evidence of innocence.

A subsequent study by Kim, Dirks, Cooper, and Ferrin (2006) examined two types of apologies. In one, the trustee made an internal attribution and admitted full responsibility for the violation, while in the other, the trustee made an external attribution and the "blame" for the violation was deflected away from the trustee. The results support the findings of the earlier study: trust repair was more effective when apologizing with an internal attribution on matters of a competence breakdown, but when there was an integrity breakdown, an apology with an external attribution was more effective.

In a third study, these researchers also explored the viability of a third social accounting device: reticence (silence). They found that reticence (compared to apology and denial) is always a suboptimal response, which is striking given how apparently prevalent silence is in accounting for trust violations committed by highly visible politicians, sports figures, business leaders, and others (Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, and Dirks, 2007). To the extent that apologies influence trust repair, they appear to signal repentance (Dirks, Kim, Ferrin, and Cooper, 2011). That is,

they are construed by receivers as evidence that the offender is remorseful enough over the violation to the point that this person pledges to reform his or her behavior in subsequent interactions.

Interestingly, not all trust repair research has supported the efficacy of mere apologies (i.e., admission of responsibility and expression of regret) in CBT relationships. Because some researchers contend that apologies are distinct from other types of accounts (such as promises of future trustworthy behavior, hence manifesting a signal of repentance without actually apologizing for past behavior), their effects have been examined independently. Schweitzer et al. (2006) found that apologies did not influence trust repair, but promises of future trustworthy behavior significantly accelerated this process when the violator displayed a pattern of trustworthy behavior after the violation (as long as the victim did not perceive any deception). Similarly, Tomlinson (2012) separated the effects of apologies and promises and found that promises (but not apologies) were predictive of postviolation trust.

Despite the conceptual distinction between an apology and other verbal accounts, Polin, Lount, and Lewicki (2012) recognized six potential components of a fully effective apology: expression of regret for the violation, explanation of why the violation occurred, acknowledgment of responsibility for causing the violation, declaration of repentance (intent to not commit the violation in the future), offer of repair (for damage created by the violation), and request for forgiveness. They found that an apology that included more of these elements was more effective in stimulating trust repair than one including fewer components. They also replicated the findings of Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, and Dirks (2004) showing that apologies were more effective for competence violations compared to integrity violations; yet they also found that

more complete apologies were more effective than less complete apologies for integrity violations as well.

Kramer and Lewicki (2010) also recognized that trustees might attempt to repair trust using strategies that rely more on actions than words. Bottom et al. (2002) found that penance (financial compensation for damage created by the violation) had an even greater effect on restored cooperation than apologies and explanations alone. Moreover, the actual size of the penance mattered less than whether the violator offered the penance voluntarily, combined with some degree of linguistic finesse in explaining it (i.e., “What can I do?” was superior to, “What will it take?”). Similarly, Desmet, De Cremer, and van Dijk (2011) found that financial overcompensation after a violation led to greater trust repair as long as the offense was not regarded as being due to the trustee’s malevolent intentions (e.g., deception). Much like apologies, substantive penance can signal repentance. Yet once again, repentance is more effective for violations of competence than integrity; that is, penance did not repair trust after intentional deception.

The final category to repair trust presented by Kramer and Lewicki (2010) is to change the structure of the situation so as to minimize trust violations in the future. As with accounts and reparations, the volitional nature of a structural change by the trustee is pivotal. One key study on this tactic did not focus on interpersonal trust per se but does empirically demonstrate the basic dynamic. Nakayachi and Watabe (2005) examined the effect of hostage posting on trust repair. *Hostage posting* refers to a self-sanctioning system whereby the trustee voluntarily accepts monitoring by the trustor and, if a violation occurs, penalties. These researchers found that hostage posting facilitates trust repair by removing the trustee’s incentive for untrustworthy behavior because he or she has agreed to

be regularly monitored. Similarly, regulation is a tactic that focuses on altering the situation to make trust more likely to be honored in subsequent interactions because critical behaviors are monitored and punishable if they occur. Regulation can also signal the trustee's repentance (Dirks et al., 2011).

Thus, violations of CBT can be repaired when the offender gives a timely, sincere, and complete apology (e.g., complete apologies include explicit promises of future trustworthiness). Trust repair can be further accelerated by other congruent tactics such as compensation or structural changes. As long as these tactics are seen as volitional and indicating repentance, they are likely to boost the likelihood of trust repair. However, boundary conditions do seem to exist. When there is reason to believe that deception or malevolent intent drives the violation, or when the violation is regarded as a matter of low integrity instead of low competence, such matters appear to be more resistant to repair. Similarly, violations that are more severe appear to be harder to repair (Tomlinson, 2012; Tomlinson et al., 2004).

If relationships are established that are high in IBT, there is also a higher level of emotional investment. In these relationships, trust violations contain both an affective and a practical component. Once a shared identity has been established, any disconfirming trust violation can be viewed as a direct challenge to the trustor's (victim's) most central and cherished values (Lewicki and Bunker, 1995), and it may also represent conflict with the trustor's psychological orientation (Deutsch, 1985). The trustor is likely to feel upset, angry, violated, or even foolish if loss of face is a result of trusting the other when trusting turned out to be inappropriate. In cases where IBT is violated, we argue that reparative effort must at least be attempted for a high-IBT relationship to have even a chance of continuing. A number

of studies have shown that when parties (particularly those in a close relationship) cannot or will not communicate about a major problem in their relationship, they are more likely to end the relationship than continue interacting (Courtright, Millar, Rogers, and Bagarozzi, 1990; Gottman, 1979; Putnam and Jones, 1982).

We envision three stages to the process of restoring IBT trust. First, the parties exchange information about the perceived trust violation (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). From the Tomlinson et al. (2012) study, we noted that strategies that attempted to address the intent of the violation were more effective for repairing IBT. Thus, parties should attempt to identify and understand the act that was perceived as violation. Miscommunication and misunderstandings are often cleared up at this stage. A husband might accuse his wife of admiring another man at a party, perceiving this to be an uncharacteristic violation of the IBT he has for her and the integrity of their marriage. When the wife explains that she was merely admiring the man's sweater and thinking of purchasing a similar one for her husband, it might transform the husband's perception of an IBT trust violation. An explanation that the act either was not what he perceived it to be or that the motivation for the act was consistent with his expectations of his wife's commitment to their relationship may be adequate to restore the IBT relationship. (However, if this pattern persists whenever the couple is out together, the wife's explanation will cease to be adequate over time.)

Second, the violated party must be willing to forgive rather than to engage in other forms of reaction to trust betrayal (see McCullough, Pargament, and Thoresen, 2000; Finkel, Rusbult, Kumashiro, and Hannon, 2002, for reviews). Research reveals that the victim's commitment to the relationship plays an important role. Commitment occurs

as a result of high satisfaction with the relationship, increasing investments in the relationship by the victim, and the declining availability or suitability of alternative relationships to meet important needs. When the victim is highly committed to the relationship (as measured by these indicators), he or she is far more willing to forgive than to experience negative feelings, make negative attributions to the violator, or engage in behaviors such as revenge or retaliation toward the violator (Finkel et al., 2002; Tomlinson, 2011).

In the final communication stage, the parties reaffirm their commitment to a high-IBT relationship. They may affirm similar interests, goals, and actions (Lewicki and Stevenson, 1998) and explicitly recommit to the relationship. They may also explicitly realign their psychological orientations to each other (Deutsch, 1985) and discuss strategies to avoid similar misunderstandings, miscommunications, or disconfirmations in the future.

However, when the parties either fail to reconcile the trust violation within their shared identity or are unable to do so, high-IBT relationships may be transformed to low IBT or even IBD. If the violation is largely inconsistent with the core beliefs and values of one of the partners and cannot be adequately explained within the context of the current relationship, then the parties must elect to either renegotiate their shared identity or terminate the high-IBT relationship (Larson, 1993).

Naturally not every IBT relationship is as all-encompassing as a marriage. But there are business and professional relationships where the same dynamics apply. One worker may take another into confidence and share strong dissatisfaction with the boss’s behavior, only to discover that the coworker has told the boss about the negative comments. A student may ask a favorite teacher to read

some poetry that the student has written and later discover that the teacher published the poetry under his own name. Thus, no model of trust restoration can explain the idiosyncrasies of each individual relationship. Our intent is merely to explore the dynamics of trust restoration within the context of various kinds of relationship, to better understand the link between relationship and trust type.

Strategies of trust restoration necessarily differ with the kind of relationship the parties have. For example, research has demonstrated that people who perceive few alternatives to their existing relationship or experience a high degree of interdependence may continue the relationship with the partner despite repeated or even violent trust violations (Rusbult and Martz, 1995; Tomlinson, 2011). It may also be that those who are heavily invested in high-IBT relationships are actually less sensitive to trust violations (Robinson, 1996).

Despite the generally negative affect associated with distrust, we should note that trust restoration is not always a desirable alternative. Distrust is necessary when people perceive a need to protect themselves or others from possible harm or when other parties in the relationship are not well known (Lewicki et al., 1998). Some work teams also perform better in CBD situations, perhaps because each member takes more care to ensure that the partners perform as expected. This self-policing contributes to higher product quality.

Implications for Managing Conflict More Effectively

Some of what we have said about trust we have known for a long time, but other parts are quite new and somewhat speculative. They remain to be validated through further research on how people develop and repair trust in their

relationships. By way of summarizing this chapter, we make some statements about trust and its implications for managing conflict:

- *The existence of trust between individuals makes conflict resolution easier and more effective* . This point is obvious to anyone who has been in a conflict. A party who trusts another is likely to believe the other's words and assume that the other will act out of good intentions, and probably look for productive ways to resolve a conflict should one occur. Conversely, if one distrusts another, one might disbelieve the other's words, assume that the other is acting out of dark intentions, and defend oneself against the other or attempt to beat and conquer the other. As we have tried to indicate several times in this chapter, the level of trust or distrust in a relationship therefore definitively shapes emergent conflict dynamics.
- Trust is often the first casualty in conflict. If trust makes conflict resolution easier and more effective, eruption of conflict usually injures trust and builds distrust. It does so because it violates the trust expectations, creates the perception of unreliability in the other party, and breaks promises. Moreover, the conflict may serve to undermine the foundations of identification-based trust that may exist between the parties. Thus, as conflict escalates, for whatever reason or cause, it serves to decrease trust and increase distrust. The deeper the distrust that is developed, the more the parties focus on defending themselves against the other or attempting to win the conflict, which further serves to increase the focus on distrust and decrease actions that might rebuild trust.
- *Creating trust in a relationship is initially a matter of building calculus-based trust* . Many of those writing on

trust have suggested that one of the objectives in resolving a conflict is to “build trust.” Yet in spite of these glib recommendations, few authors are sufficiently detailed and descriptive of those actions required to actually do so. From our review of the literature and the research we have reported in this chapter, it is clear to us that to build trust, a party must begin with the actions we outline in this chapter: act consistently and reliably, meet deadlines and commitments, and repeatedly do so over time or over several bands of activity in the relationship.

- *Relationships can be strengthened if the parties are able to build identification-based trust* . Strong calculus-based trust is critical to any stable relationship, but IBT (based on perceived common goals and purposes, common values, and common identity) is likely to strengthen the overall trust between the parties and the ability of the relationship to withstand conflict that may otherwise be relationship fracturing. If the parties perceive themselves as having strong common goals, values, and identities, they are motivated to sustain the relationship and find productive ways to resolve the conflict so that it does not damage the relationship.
- *Relationships characterized by calculus-based or identification-based distrust are likely to be conflict laden, and eruption of conflict within that relationship is likely to feed and encourage further distrust* . At the calculus-based level, the actor finds the other’s behavior (at least) unreliable and unpredictable, and the other’s intentions and motivations might be seen as intentionally malevolent in nature. At the identification-based level, the actor believes that he and the other are committed to dissimilar goals, values, and purposes and might thus attribute hostile motives and intentions to the other. Once such negative expectations are created,

actions by the other become negative self-fulfilling prophecies (“I expect the worst of the other, and his behavior confirms my worst fears”), which often lead the conflict into greater scope, intensity, and even intractability.

- *Most relationships are not purely trust and distrust but contain elements of both* . As a result, we have positive and negative feelings about the other, which produces another level of conflict, an intrapsychic conflict often called “ambivalence.” States of ambivalence are characterized by elements of both trust and distrust for another; the internal conflict created by that ambivalence serves to undermine clear expectations of the other’s behavior and force the actor to scrutinize every action by the other to determine whether it should be counted in the trust or the distrust column. Ambivalent relationships are often finely grained and finely differentiated (Gabarro, 1978) because the actor is forced to determine the contexts in which the other can be trusted and those in which the other should be distrusted. As noted elsewhere (Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin, 1995; Lewicki and McAllister, 1998), ambivalence can lead actors to become incapacitated in further action or modify strategies of influence with the other party. Thus, an actor’s internal conflict between trust and distrust probably also affects how he handles the interpersonal conflict between himself and the other party. Because of the number of bands in the bandwidth of a relationship and the ways in which trust and distrust can mix in any given relationship, we also argue that relationships holding varied degrees of ambivalence are far more common than relationships characterized by “pure” high trust or high distrust.
- *It is possible to repair trust—although it is easier to write about the steps of such repair than to actually*

perform it . Effective trust repair is often a key part of effective conflict resolution. In the preceding section of this chapter, we discussed some of the steps necessary to repair trust. Three major strategies were identified: providing a social account (e.g., apology) that explains the violation and verbally attempts to minimize the trust damage created by the violation; providing penance to economically compensate the victim for the tangible costs of the trust violation; and introducing structural changes or rules and regulations that attempt to minimize the likelihood of trust violations in the future. Research into the effectiveness of these strategies is growing, and more work is necessary to identify which strategies are likely to be more effective given different types of violations.

Repairing trust may take a long time because the parties have to reestablish reliability and dependability that can occur only over time. Therefore, although rebuilding trust may be necessary for effective conflict resolution in the relationship over the long run, addressing and managing the distrust may be the most effective strategy for short-term containment of conflict. By managing distrust, we engage in certain activities:

1. We explicitly address the behaviors that created the distrust. These may be actions of unreliability and undependability, harsh comments and criticism, betrayal of previous agreements, or aggressive and antagonistic activities occurring as the conflict escalated.
2. If possible, each person responsible for a trust violation or act of distrust should apologize and give a full account of the reasons for the trust violation. Acknowledging responsibility for actions that created the trust violation, and expressing regret for harm or

damage caused by the violation, is often a necessary step in reducing distrust. Alternative actions, such as penance and structural approaches to minimizing trust violations, may also be necessary.

3. We restate and renegotiate the expectations for the other's conduct in the future. The parties have to articulate expectations about the behavior that needs to occur and commit to those behaviors in future interactions.
4. We agree on procedures for monitoring and verifying the designated actions to ensure that commitments are being met.
5. We simultaneously create ways to minimize our vulnerability or dependence on the other party in areas where distrust has developed. This often occurs as the vulnerable parties find ways to ensure that they are no longer vulnerable to the other's exploitation or identify alternative ways to have their needs met. If one person depends on another for a ride to work and the driver is consistently late or occasionally forgets, then even if the actor accepts the other's apology and commitment to be more reliable, the actor may also explore alternative ways to get to work.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have described the critical role that trust and distrust play in relationships. We have reviewed some of the basic research on trust and elaborated on the types of trust that exist in most interpersonal relationships. We have suggested that trust and distrust coexist in most relationships, that trust and distrust can be calculus based or identification based, and that relationships differ in form and character as a function of the relative weight of the

two types of trust in the relationship. Finally, we have suggested that managing any relationship requires us to both create trust and manage distrust effectively. These processes are most critical when trust is broken and needs to be repaired. A great deal of research remains to be done on these propositions, but we hope that the ideas proposed in this chapter serve to move this work forward.

Notes

1 . The term *trustor* has typically been reserved for the "donor, settlor, grantor or other person creating a trust" in a legal or fiduciary capacity (*Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary*). In the broader context of interpersonal trust relationships discussed in this chapter, we refer to the trustor as the person initiating and expressing the trust gesture and the trustee as the person receiving that trust.

2 . In earlier work, Lewicki and Bunker (1995, 1996) identified knowledge-based trust as a separate trust. We now believe that knowledge is a dimension of relationships, along which people move from uncertainty to confidence about the other's intentions, motivations, and behaviors.

3 . This is an important point. If CBD is high, we believe that parties are likely to leave the relationship—assuming the interdependence between them and others is not required and that they have viable alternative ways of getting their needs met (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959; Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1981; and Lewicki, Barry, and Saunders, 2010).

4 . Although we do not have empirical evidence to support it at this writing, our belief is that expectation violations function much like the chutes-and-ladders process we

described in discussing calculus-based trust. Thus, the impact of expecting trust and experiencing distrust is more disconfirming and distressing than expecting distrust and encountering trust. Expecting trust and having it violated in a high-trust environment is more disruptive than encountering trust in a high-distrust environment (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996). To our knowledge, no research has been done on reactions to expecting distrust and experiencing trust.

5 . Although we indicated that trust violations can occur in both directions, we discuss only violations of trusting expectations, not violations of distrusting expectations.

6 . Both theory and research on this subject are currently unclear about whether trust is actually repaired or restored. Most research simply looks at changes in trust following efforts to repair a trust violation. It is still unclear whether rebuilt or restored trust is significantly different in structure and character from trust that has never been violated (see Dirks et al., 2009 for a fuller exploration of this idea).

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CHAPTER SIX
POWER AND CONFLICT

Peter T. Coleman

In the Sonagachi red-light district in Calcutta, India, prostitutes have organized to mobilize against AIDS, altering the power structure by challenging any pimp or madam who would insist on a customer's right to sex without a condom.

At a company in the United States, in an attempt to avoid layoffs, the great majority of employees agreed to cut their own salaries by 20 percent; the CEO rejected the offer and chose instead to fire 20 percent of the workforce, stating that "it was very important that management's prerogative to manage as it saw fit not be compromised by sentimental human considerations" (Harvey, 1989, p. 275).

In the wilds of Wyoming, groups of ranchers and environmentalists, historically bitter adversaries, have teamed up to fight the problems posed by an increase in the population of wolves in their neighboring national parks.

All of these conflicts have one basic element in common: power. Power to challenge, power to resist, and power through cooperating together. In fact, virtually all conflicts directly or indirectly concern power. Conflict is often a means of seeking or maintaining the balance or imbalance of power in relationships. It may also be waged as a symbolic expression of one's identity and right to self-determination. Power is commonly used in conflict as leverage for achieving one's goals. It influences the types of conflicts to which people of differing levels of power are more or less frequently exposed to, as well as the relative availability of the strategies and tactics employed. The

powerful also largely determine what is considered to be important, fair, and just in most settings and thus shape and control many methods of resolution. Of course, changes in power, particularly when they are dramatic, can also affect conflict, with substantial impacts on people's motivations, aspirations, and tactics. Because of its ubiquity, it is paramount that when we address conflict, we consider power.

This chapter provides an overview of some key components of the relationship between power and conflict. It is organized in five sections, beginning with a discussion of the dimensions of power that are important when considering conflict and its constructive resolution. In the second section, I describe some of the personal and environmental factors that research has shown affect people's behavioral tendencies and responses to power in social relations. In the third section, I discuss the relevance of these ideas to conflict resolution, examining some of the principles of the dynamics of power and conflict and outlining the tendencies of members of both high-power and low-power groups in conflict. I then describe a new situated model of power and conflict, before concluding by discussing the implications of these ideas for training in conflict resolution.

A DISCUSSION OF POWER

Bertrand Russell wrote, "The fundamental concept in social science is power, in the same sense in which energy is the fundamental concept in physics" (1938, p. 4). Despite its pervasive role in social relations, power has proven to be a particularly difficult and elusive concept. There are many treatments of it in the social sciences. It has been conceptualized alternatively in terms of *sources* of power (Depret and Fiske, 1993; Emerson, 1962; Fiske and

Berdahl, 2007; Kipnis, 1976; Thibaut and Kelley, 1959), the *capacity* to bring about effects (Boulding, 1990; Cartwright, 1959, 1965; Coleman, 2004; Follet, 1924/1973; French and Raven, 1959; Lewin, 1943; Pfeffer, 1981; Rummel, 1976; Weber, 1914/1978), influential *actions* (Deutsch, 1973; Foucault, 1984; Zartman and Rubin, 2002), and its resultant *effects* (Dahl, 1957; Russell, 1938; Simon, 1957). Clearly, power means different things to different people.

Even once *power* is defined, its meaning often remains mercurial. For instance, if *power* is defined as "a capacity to produce effects," its effects can be intentional or unintentional; it can be employed effectively or ineffectively in achieving goals; it can be associated with a wide variety of sources, strategies, and tactics, all with different qualities and consequences, and these qualities and consequences can vary dramatically across contexts and cultures. This capacity can also vary in terms of its relative (local) or absolute nature, be associated with helping or harming others, and be of a hard (military, economic) or soft (attractive) nature (Nye, 1990). Such nuance and complexity of meaning has resulted in a long list of (sometimes contradictory) definitions and operationalizations of power in theory and research and more than a fair amount of confusion.

Despite the conceptual challenges the construct of power presents, research on power in social conflict has increased considerably over the past decade (Fiske and Berdahl, 2007). This research has focused primarily on the effects of high versus low power in relation to others on perceptions, emotions, and behaviors (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, Whitson, and Liljenquist, 2008; Magee and Galinsky, 2008; Rouhana and Fiske, 1995; Rubin and Brown, 1975; Tjosvold, 1981, 1991; Tjosvold and Wisse, 2009; Zartman and Rubin, 2002), and has typically operationalized power as some form of independence from others in social

relations (e.g., Kim, Pinkley, and Fragale, 2005). Although this body of research has advanced our understanding a great deal, it has been critiqued on three grounds: (1) it tends to atomize and decontextualize related aspects of social power, thus removing each element from the relations and contexts that imbue them with meaning; (2) it focuses primarily on the short-term effects of independent variables on outcomes and neglects the study of power dynamics over time; and (3) it generally neglects the positive side of power dynamics in social relations or, for that matter, the complications posed when holding mixed motives such as greed and guilt when wielding power (Fiske and Berdahl, 2007).

Nevertheless, the literature on social power that has accumulated over many decades has identified a number of important distinctions that can help us to better specify and comprehend power. We next look at these.

Power as a Dynamic

Power is often attributed to people as a stable characteristic (“Donald Trump is a very powerful person”). However, the ability to make things happen is most often determined not only by people but by the dynamic interaction of particular people behaving in a certain manner in a given situation. Accordingly, Deutsch (1973) described power as a relational concept functioning between the person and his or her environment. Power therefore is determined not only by the characteristics of the person or persons involved in any given situation or solely by the characteristics of the situation, but by the interaction of these two sets of factors. The power of the Indian prostitutes, for example, can be seen as the result of their ability to organize and mobilize their colleagues in this particular setting where demand for their services was high.

Environmental, Relational, and Personal Power

Deutsch (1973) also offered a distinction among three specific meanings of power: *environmental power* , the degree to which an individual can favorably influence his or her overall environment; *relationship power* , the degree to which a person can favorably influence another person; and *personal power* , the degree to which a person is able to satisfy his or her own desires. These three meanings for power may be positively correlated (e.g., high relationship power equals high personal power), but this is not necessarily so. The CEO mentioned at the beginning of the chapter may have had more relationship power than his employees in that situation (in terms of his power over their jobs) and so could resist their attempts to influence the layoff decision, but by doing so and firing 20 percent of the workers, he may well have sacrificed environmental power (his company's efficiency or market share) given the effects of his actions on the morale and commitment of the remaining employees. This loss of environmental power could result in diminution of the CEO's personal power, if it adversely affects his sense of self-efficacy, self-esteem, or even personal income. The important point is that these are three distinct but interrelated realms of power: a shift in one type of power (relationship) may result in a gain or loss of another type (personal or environmental) depending on the people and circumstances.

Potential and Kinetic Power

Lewicki, Litterer, Minton, and Saunders (1994) distinguish three aspects of power: power bases, power use, and influence strategies. Power bases are the resources for power or the tools available to influence one's environment, the other party, or one's own desires. This is potential power. There exist in the literature many typologies of the bases of power: wealth, social capital, physical strength,

weapons, intelligence, knowledge, legitimacy, respect, affection, organizational skills, allies, and so on. These typologies can be useful for discerning different resources for power, but they should not be confused with the enactment of power. Kinetic power involves the active employment of strategies and tactics of influence, which are the manner in which the resources are put to use to accomplish particular objectives. Lewicki et al. (1994) identified such diverse strategies as persuasion, exchange, legitimacy, friendliness, ingratiation, praise, assertiveness, inspirational appeal, consultation, pressure, and coalitions.

Primary and Secondary Power

Power can be seen as operating at two distinct levels—one determining the nature of the interactions among players on the field and one determining the nature of the field itself (Voronov and Coleman, 2003). *Secondary power* refers to the exercise of power in the conventional sense—the ability to get one's goals met in a relational context. This can take a coercive or positive form; however, it entails operating in a domain that has already been defined normatively. *Primary power* refers to the ability to shape the normative domain or affect the sociohistorical process of reality construction (Coleman and Voronov, 2003). This is the process by which our sense of reality, as we know it—our sense of truth, fairness, and justice—is constructed. Deutsch (2004) writes, "The official ideology and myths of any society help define and justify the values that are distributed to the different positions within the society; they codify for the individual what a person in his position can legitimately expect. Examples are legion of how official ideology and myth limit or enhance one's views of what one is entitled to" (p. 25).

Thus, primary power refers to the ability to affect those activities (e.g., the law, the media, policies) that define the

domain. This includes defining what is considered “good” in a society: prosocial versus antisocial forms of violence (e.g., “freedom fighting” versus “terrorism”), morality, religion, ideology, politics, education, and so on. This can be achieved through the blatant tactics used by totalitarian rulers such as Hitler and Stalin or more subtly through political spin, by emphasizing biased accounts of history in schools and textbooks, indirectly controlling or censuring the media, or keeping the judiciary and the legislature in the hands of the dominant group. It is important to recognize that the various sources of power (French and Raven, 1959) are not concrete but are socially constructed. “Legitimacy,” for example, is not objective but is created through management of meaning. Only when the domain has been defined does it become possible for power as conceived in a conventional sense to be exercised. Thus, the two forms of power are interconnected. Primary power opens and constrains the possibilities for exercising secondary power. Secondary power can be seen as expressing and reproducing the status quo of primary power relations. However, secondary power can also contribute to transforming primary power. Revolutions or hostile coups are dramatic examples of secondary power being used in an attempt to transform primary power.

Top-Down, Middle-Out, and Bottom-Up Power

Power in any social system can be the result of resources and influence strategies employed by way of three distinct channels within systems: top down, middle out, and bottom up (Coleman, 2006). Top-down channels are typically used by formal or elite leaders and decision makers (although third parties often employ this channel) and, although they can take many forms, often involve command-and-control strategies of influence that have a rapid and dramatic effect on systems. Middle-out channels reside with the midlevel

leaders, managers, and organizations of social systems (such as community-based and nongovernmental organizations) that can influence systems through their social capital and social networks. The influence employed at this level can have a strong effect on systems but typically takes time to unfold. Bottom-up power is the result of changes at the local level (such as changes in individual attitudes or behaviors) that can have a substantial emergent effect on systems but tends to take the longest amount of time to emerge.

Effective Power and Sustainable Outcomes

Having resources and knowledge of influence strategies does not necessarily translate to power; they may be employed more or less effectively in terms of bringing about desired outcomes. Deutsch (1973) outlined the conditions for “effective power” as having control of the resources to generate power, motivation to influence others, skill in converting resources to power, and good judgment in employing power so that it is appropriate in type and magnitude to the situation. However, outcomes can be short or long term. Achieving sustainable outcomes requires both long-term strategic thinking and the ability of power users to read changes in situations, identify negative feedback, and respond adaptively when required (Coleman, 2006).

Perceived Power

Saul Alinsky (1971) said, “Power is not only what you have, but what the enemy thinks you have.” Thus, for power to be effective, it does not necessarily have to be the result of actual resources owned and strategies employed by people but, in some circumstances, by what they are merely perceived to have. In fact, many of those who are less than

powerful go out of their way to create an image of power as the critical element of effective influence (Sun Tzu, 1983).

General versus Relevant Power

Often initial assessments of another's power are erroneous because they are based on aggregates of relative power (the sum total of another's power in comparison to my own), not on the other's relevant power resources or the other's efficacy in implementing the strategies relevant to the interaction at hand (Salacuse, 2001). This typically leads to a sense of overconfidence on the part of general power holders and a sense of helplessness for those in low power.

* * *

In summary, power is dynamic and complex. It can be usefully conceptualized as the ability (or the perception of the ability) to leverage relevant resources in a specific situation in order to achieve personal, relational, or environmental goals, often through using various strategies and channels of influence of both a primary and secondary nature. Now I turn to a discussion of some of the central factors that influence power dynamics in social relations.

COMPONENTS OF POWER

The extensive literature on social power has offered a wide array of conceptual frameworks for studying and analyzing power (see, e.g., Foucault, 1980; Clegg, 1989; Pfeffer, 1981; Blalock, 1989). Here, I employ a rather simple schema to organize a presentation of some of the many factors that research has shown affect people's orientations and actions with regard to power. The schema, borrowed from social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1999), suggests that human behavior, and in particular human agency, can be

understood as the result of dynamic interactions among three sources of influence: personal factors, behavioral patterns, and environmental events. Bandura (1999) writes:

> Human behavior has often been explained in terms of unilateral causation, in which behavior is depicted as either being shaped and controlled by environmental influences or driven by internal dispositions. Social cognitive theory explains psychosocial functioning in terms of triadic reciprocal causation. In this model of reciprocal causality, internal personal factors in the form of cognitive, affective, and biological events; behavioral patterns; and environmental events all operate as interactive determinants that influence one another bidirectionally. (p. 23)

This triadic model is consistent with a dynamic view of power and conflict but allows the categorization of factors into the three separate but interrelated categories. I next summarize some of the key personal and environmental factors that can interact to determine people's behavioral patterns regarding power in social relations.

Personal Factors

Power Orientations.

In his seminal work on power and motivation, McClelland (1975) presented a developmental framework for categorizing people's experiences and expressions of power. He argued that people everywhere seek power in these ways:

- *Support:* Obtaining assistance and support from others, often through a dependence relationship. Such relationships can serve to meet the needs of the low-power person, but they can take many forms, from benign and supportive (as in many mentor-mentee

relationships) to oppressive and abusive (as with a dictatorial parent). The negative physical and psychological impact of prolonged experiences of dependence and powerlessness by adults has been shown to be dire (Sashkin, 1984) and can lead to a tendency to become more rigid, critical, controlling of others in lower power, and, ultimately, more irrational and violent (Kanter, 1977).

- *Autonomy:* Establishing one's autonomy and independence from others. Scholars have referred to this approach as having "power to" or "power from," in the sense that one has enough power to achieve one's objectives without being unduly constrained by someone or something else. Individuals who feel empowered in a particular situation have a reduced need for dependence on others, which opens up the possibility of acting independently, thereby bolstering their sense of self-esteem, self-efficacy, and confidence.
- *Assertion:* Assertively acting on, influencing, and dominating others. This approach to power has been termed *power over* and is consistent with the popular definition of *power* as "an ability to get another person to do something that he or she would not otherwise have done" (Dahl, 1968, p. 158). This orientation to power is commonplace and was evident in the earlier example of the CEO and his response to the employees' initiative.
- *Togetherness:* Becoming part of an organization or a group. Mary Parker Follett suggested that although power is usually conceived of as power over others, it would also be possible to develop the conception of "power with" others. She envisioned this type as jointly developed, coactive, and noncoercive (Follett, 1973). Bandura (1999) labeled this approach as one of collective agency. This is the form of power illustrated in

the vignette about a partnership between ranchers and environmentalists.

McClelland proposed that as people mature, they progress sequentially through each of these stages of development and orientations to power, ideally moving toward the stage of togetherness. This is commensurate with the developmental progression of humans from more egocentric to more sociocentric beings (Piaget, 1937). McClelland also stressed, however, that each of the four power orientations may be useful in any given situation and that problems typically arise for people when they become fixated on any one orientation (such as assertion) or when an individual's chronic orientation fits poorly with the particular realities or demands of a situation. From this perspective, an individual's flexibility and responsiveness to changes in his or her environment can be seen as critical to the ability to respond effectively to situations involving power.

For example, returning to the CEO in our earlier example, it is possible that he may have been operating from a chronically assertive orientation to power (power over) and therefore interpreted the employees' offer as a competitive tactic ("They're trying to humiliate me or ingratiate themselves"), was motivated to win at all costs, and saw this as morally legitimate because of a belief that low-level employees must make sacrifices for the greater good of the organization. Ultimately, one's power orientation affects one's behavior through an assessment of the feasibility of a given action ("Do I have the capacity to act in such a manner, and what will the consequences be?") unless the orientation is excessively chronic.

Authoritarianism.

A classic area of research that has been found to influence people's orientations to power is authoritarianism (Adorno, Frenkl-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford, 1950), which involves an exaggerated need to submit to and identify with strong authority. Originating from psychodynamic theory, this syndrome is thought to stem from early rearing by parents who use harsh and rigid forms of discipline, demand unquestioning obedience, are overly conscious of distinctions of status, and are contemptuous or exploitative toward those of lower status. The child internalizes the values of the parents and therefore is inclined toward a dominant, punitive approach to power relations. Individuals high in authoritarianism tend to favor absolute obedience to authority and resist personal freedom. These tendencies would most likely orient one toward either authoritarian or submissive orientation to power, depending on the relative status of the other party.

Need for Power.

Need for power ("nPower"; McClelland, 1975; McClelland and Burnham, 1976) has been described as an individual difference where people high on nPower experience great satisfaction in influencing people and arousing strong emotions in them. Individuals high on nPower tend to seek out positions of authority and display a more dominating style in conflict (Bhowon, 2003). This orientation, however, is thought to interact with another personality difference known as "activity inhibition" (see also chapter 17). This is essentially the individual's level of self-control and general orientation to others. These two traits combine to produce two separate types of power orientation: the personalized power orientation and the socialized power orientation. Individuals high on nPower and low on activity inhibition exhibit a more personalized power orientation, exemplified by a tendency to dominate others in an attempt to satisfy

one’s hedonistic desires. Individuals with high nPower and high activity inhibition tend to exhibit socialized power orientation, using power for the good of a cause, an organization, or an institution.

McClelland (1975) postulated that individual power orientations develop through various stages, with the personalized orientation emerging at an earlier stage of development and the socialized orientation at a later stage. This is consistent with Kohlberg’s work on moral development (1963, 1969), which found that individuals in the latter stages of moral development place much higher value on justice, dignity, and equality. The personal-social separation is a useful distinction between the destructive and constructive sides of power; it contradicts the notion of Lord Acton that all power necessarily corrupts.

Ideological Frames.

Burrell and Morgan (1979) identified differences in people’s ideological frames of reference as determining of their approach to power. These frames are comprehensive belief systems about the nature of relations between individuals and society. They classified three types of ideological frames: the unitary, the radical, and the pluralist. From the *unitary view* , society is seen as an integrated whole where the interests of the individual and society are one and power can be largely ignored and assumed to be used benevolently by those in authority to further the mutual goals of all parties. This perspective is common in collectivist families and cultures and in some benevolent business organizations. In contrast, the *radical frame* pictures society as comprising antagonistic class interests that are “characterized by deep-rooted social and political cleavages, and held together as much by coercion as by consent” (Morgan, 1986, p. 186). This perspective, epitomized by Marxist doctrine, focuses on unequal

distribution of power in society and the significant role that this plays in virtually every aspect of our lives. Finally, the *pluralist frame* views society as a space where different groups "bargain and compete for a share in the balance of power . . . to realize a negotiated order that creates unity out of diversity" (Morgan, 1986, p. 185). Power is seen as distributed more or less equally among the groups and as the primary medium through which conflicts are resolved. This pluralist view of power is prevalent in the many forms of liberal democracies.

Each distinct ideological frame engenders its own set of expectations about what one can anticipate, what one should attend to, and therefore how one should respond to situations of power and conflict. For example, Stephens (1994) has described how such differences in ideological frames lead various conflict practitioners to use conflict resolution processes to achieve vastly disparate objectives in their work (unitarians favoring maintenance of the status quo of power relations, radicals favoring fundamental systems change and redistribution of power, and pluralists favoring a combination of both, depending on the situation). These translate into significant differences in procedures, such as alternative dispute resolution practices to achieve organizational unity versus peace education and activism to produce community change.

Implicit Power Theories.

Research on implicit power theories (Coleman, 2004) has shed light on a central problem within the power-and-conflict dynamic: the unwillingness of the powerful to share their power (e.g., wealth, information, access, authority) with those in need. Implicit theories are cognitive structures—naive, unarticulated theories about the social world that influence the way people construe events. Research has identified two theories of power that people

can hold: a limited-power theory that portrays power as a scarce resource that triggers a competitive orientation to power sharing and an expandable-power theory that views power as an expandable resource and fosters a more cooperative power-sharing orientation. The two competing views of power have been shown to affect people's decisions and actions on whether to share or withhold resources, as well as the degree to which they involve others in decision-making processes (Coleman, 2004).

Subsequent research on implicit power theories has demonstrated that the social environment can play a critical role in influencing their use by making different theories more or less cognitively salient. For example, in a study conducted in China, participants portraying managers in an organizational simulation were found to share more power (information and assistance) with subordinates when they were led to believe that their organization had a history of approaching organizational power as an expandable resource than when it was portrayed as traditionally viewing and approaching power as a scarce resource (Tjosvold, Coleman, and Sun, 2003). This research emphasizes the critical role the context plays in triggering and fostering differences in implicit theories. Thus, social and organizational structures, norms and climate around empowerment, as well as more informal influences such as myths and legends regarding preferred ways of interacting may be formative and go a long way in providing a context of meaning through which to interpret the value of power sharing.

Social Dominance Orientation.

A more recent model relevant to power and conflict comes from social dominance theory (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, and Malle, 1994), which contends that societies worldwide organize according to

group-based hierarchies, with dominant social groups possessing a disproportionate share of positive social value (wealth, health, status). These hierarchies are maintained by several key factors, including the social dominance orientation (SDO) of members of the groups. SDO is defined as a very general orientation expressing antiegalitarianism; a view of human existence as zero-sum with relentless competition between groups; the desire for generalized, hierarchical relationships between groups; and a desire for in-group dominance over out-groups. The research on SDO has identified consistent gender differences in women's and men's levels of SDO (Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo, 1994), with men having significantly higher levels of SDO than women do. We could expect this type of general orientation to group relations to contribute to a chronically competitive orientation (assertion) to power differences.

* * *

Other individual differences—as wide ranging as interpersonal orientation (high or low sensitivity to others), Machiavellianism, interpersonal trust, and gender—are relevant to discussing people's orientation to power, but space does not allow for further elaboration (see Lewicki et al., 1994, for a discussion of these variables). Each of the distinct personal factors described here can work in concert to contribute to a chronic orientation and fixation on any one of the power orientations (such as powerlessness). These orientations affect how people perceive conflict, how they evaluate authority relations, and ultimately the decisions and responses they make to power differences in conflict situations. However, except for extreme cases, the influences of these individual difference factors need to be understood as operating in interaction with the individual's environment.

Environmental Factors

Again, the environmental factors affecting personal differences and behavioral patterns regarding power are innumerable (see Deutsch, 2004, and Blalock, 1989, for summaries). The following sections examine a few major factors.

Deep Structure.

A few scholars propose that the deep structure of most conflicts is dictated by preexisting power relations (Chomsky, 2002). This structure, established through past relations between the parties, their differential access to resources, and existing norms and roles, has been historically constructed. This history is composed of the decisions and actions, victories and defeats, justices and injustices experienced by those who came before us: members of our families, our gender, our communities, our race, our nation, and so on. These cumulative experiences in many ways have defined the rules of the power game. This perspective emphasizes the influences exerted on power by such factors as class and race relations, intergroup conflicts of interest and social competition, inequity between social groups on highly valued dimensions, opportunity structures and the educational systems that perpetuate them, the relative stability of status and power differences, and the perceived legitimacy of all of these factors. Understanding the historical context encourages us to look beyond the current surface manifestations of secondary power and into the processes of primary power. From this perspective, people are seen as agents or carriers of power relations embedded in the wider structure of history and society. They can learn to understand the rules but are rarely able to change them significantly.

Culture.

The culture in which we are immersed is another important influence on our experience of power. Hofstede (1980) identified *power distance* as a dimension of social relations that is determined by and varies across cultures. He defined it as the extent to which the less powerful persons in a society accept inequality in power and consider it normal. Hofstede argued that inequality exists within every culture, but the degree to which society tolerates it varies from one culture to another. So, for example, in some high-power-distance cultures, such as in parts of India, the notion of empowering employees through participation in decisions and delegation of authority is considered inappropriate and insubordinate by the employees themselves. This cultural difference regarding power not only is the source of much cross-cultural misunderstanding and conflict but also significantly affects how individuals from different cultures respond to conflicts with others in high and low power.

Legitimizing Myths.

The extent to which power disparities between people and between groups are accepted in any society are embedded and constructed within a contradictory set of “legitimizing myths” about hierarchy and group superiority present in every society (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). These myths, or systems of beliefs, tend to either support and enhance hierarchical relationships and dominant group superiority (examples are sexism, racism, classism, meritocracy, and conservatism) or challenge and attenuate these social arrangements (e.g., feminism, multiculturalism, pluralism, egalitarianism, and liberalism). These divergent sets of myths exist in a state of oppositional tension in many social systems (e.g., conservatism versus liberalism), which can provide important checks and balances against the

fanaticism of either side. In some settings, these myths become infused into the “fairness-making” and “conflict-resolving” structures, thereby institutionalizing group dominance, bias, and conflict (Rapoport, 1974).

Roles.

Another powerful aspect of the structure of many social situations is the roles people assume. Role theory views power relations as if they were scripted theater. The theory holds that the roles we have in society or in our organizations (manager, laborer) often dictate the social rules or norms for our behavior. These roles establish shared expectations among members of a system, which in most cases came into existence long before the individuals who now inhabit them. It argues that we largely act out these preexisting scripts in our institutions and organizations and that these roles, these shared norms and scripts, dictate our experiences, expectations, and responses to power. So, for example, role theory argues that the CEO from our initial example was acting more or less consistently with what would be expected from someone in his position. Furthermore, if any one of his employees had been in the same position, that person would have made essentially the same decision, for it is within the underlying structure of the organization and its place in society that power relations between groups are largely predetermined and thereby constrained and perpetuated.

One of the most blatant examples of the power of roles to determine behavior is the classic experiment conducted at Stanford University on the effects of deindividuated roles on behavior in institutional settings (Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo, 1973). Student subjects were recruited for this study and randomly assigned to play the role of either a guard or a prisoner in a simulated prison environment for

two weeks. From the very beginning, the “guards” abused and denigrated the “prisoners,” showing increasingly brutal, sadistic, and dehumanizing behavior over time. The research observations were so disturbing that the study was called off after only six days.

Hierarchy.

A related component of structure is hierarchy. Barnard (1946) argued that distinctions of status and authority are ultimately necessary for effective functioning and survival of any group above a certain size. As a result, most groups form some type of formal or informal hierarchical structure to function efficiently. Often the greater advantages associated with higher positions lead to competition for these scarce positions and an attempt by those in authority to maintain their status. This is consistent with the findings of social dominance theory (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999).

However, a hierarchical structure does not necessarily lead to competitive or destructive power relations within a group. In a series of studies on power and goal interdependence, Tjosvold (1997) found that variation in goal interdependence (task, reward, and outcome goals) affected the likelihood of constructive use of power between high-power and low-power persons. Cooperative goals, when compared to competitive and independent goals, were found to induce “higher expectations of assistance, more assistance, greater support, more persuasion and less coercion and more trusting and friendly attitudes” between superiors and subordinates (Tjosvold, 1997, p. 297). The abundant research on cooperative and competitive goal interdependence (see chapters 1 and 4 in this Handbook) has consistently demonstrated the contrasting effects of these goal structures on people’s attitudes and behaviors in social relations. Among other things, competition fosters

“attempts to enhance the power differences between oneself and the other,” in contrast with cooperation, which fosters “an orientation toward enhancing mutual power rather than power differences” (Deutsch, 1973). In cooperative situations, people want others to perform effectively and use their joint resources to promote common objectives.

Inequitable Opportunity Structures.

At the structural level, we also see the establishment of opportunity structures that often grant the powerful unequal or exclusive access to positions of leadership, jobs, decent housing, education, health care, nutrition, and the like. Galtung (1969) labeled the effects of this “structural violence” because of its insidious and deleterious effects on marginalized communities. These inequities contribute to a setting where difficult material circumstances and political conflict lead to social disorganization, which makes it harder for some people to get their basic physical and psychological needs met. The result is a pervasive sense of powerlessness for many members of low-power groups. The privileged circumstances of the powerful, on the contrary, insulates them and contributes to their lack of attention and response to the concerns of those in low power until a crisis, such as an organized or violent act of protest, demands their attention (Deutsch, 1985). Typically, the powerful respond to such acts of protest with “prosocial” violence to quell the disturbance and maintain the status quo.

* * *

The many personal and environmental factors outlined here interact to both encourage and constrain responses to power inequality and conflict. However, because these different areas of research have often gone off in different

directions, we today find ourselves with a rather fractured understanding of power and conflict dynamics. We currently have a series of midlevel or microlevel models of antecedents, processes, and outcomes that have yet to become convergent with a more general theory of social relations.

Principles of Power-Conflict Dynamics

The following set of principles is gleaned from the literature and grounded in the assumption that power differences affect conflict processes that can affect power differences:

- *Significant changes in the status quo of the balance of power between parties can affect experiences of relative deprivation and increase conflict aspirations* . Relative deprivation theory is a central model of the origins of conflict, which specifies the conditions under which need deprivation produces conflict (Merton and Kitt, 1950; see chapter 45 in this Handbook). Relative deprivation is said to occur when need achievement falls short of a reasonable standard determined by what one has achieved in the past, what relevant comparison others are achieving, what law or custom entitles one to, or what one expects to achieve. Research has shown that people compare themselves with others who are salient or similar to themselves in group membership, attitudes, values, or social status (Major, 1994). However, when changes in the status quo lead to a reordering of relative group status (such as through changes brought on by elections or military coups), new comparisons will be made to the previously dominant (and incomparable) groups, leading to an increase in awareness of deprivation relative to those groups (Gurr, 1970). Such changes are likely to increase demands for

change by those experiencing deprivation, and thus to the open expression of conflict. This dynamic has been central to many social movements in the United States, such as the civil rights and women's movements.

- *Obvious power asymmetries contain conflict escalation, while power ambiguities foster escalation* . Research suggests that situations where there exist significant imbalances of power between groups are more likely to discourage open expressions of conflict and conflict escalation than situations of relatively balanced power (Deutsch, 1973). For instance, in a historical analysis of wars between 1816 and 1989, Moul (2003) found that approximate parity in power capabilities (abilities to oppose individual states) encouraged wars between great power disputants. Sidanius and Pratto (1999) have argued that this can account for the utility and ubiquity of asymmetrical group status hierarchies worldwide. However, research in the interpersonal realm has shown that the relationship between power symmetry and destructive conflict is moderated by trust; when parties of equal power are trusting of each other, they will choose more cooperative strategies to resolve their differences (Davidson, McElwee, and Hannan, 2004).
- *Sustainable resolutions to conflict require progression from unbalanced power relations between the parties to relatively balanced relations* . Adam Curle (1971), a mediator working in Africa, proposed a particularly useful model for understanding the longitudinal relationships between conflict, power, and sustainable outcomes (see Lederach, 1997, for more detail). He suggested that as conflicts moved from unpeaceful to peaceful relationships, their course could be charted on a matrix that compares two elements: the level of power between the disputants and the level of awareness of the conflict. Curle described this progression toward peace

as having four stages. In the first stage, conflict is hidden to some of the parties because they are unaware of the imbalances of power and injustices that affect their lives. Here, any activities or events resulting in *conscientization* (erasing ignorance and raising awareness of inequalities and inequities) move the conflict forward. This is where the experience of relative deprivation fits it. An increase in awareness of injustice leads to the second stage, *confrontation* , when demands for change from the weaker party bring the conflict to the surface. Confrontations, of course, can take many forms from cooperative to nonviolent to violent. Under some conditions, these confrontations result in the stage of *negotiations* , which are aimed at achieving a rebalancing of power in the relationship in order for those in low power to increase their capacities to address their basic needs. Successful negotiations can move the conflict to the final stage of *sustainable peace* if they lead to a restructuring of the relationship that effectively addresses the substantive and procedural concerns of those involved. Support for this model is anecdotal and could be considerably strengthened through case studies and longitudinal survey research.

- *A chronic competitive (assertive) orientation to power is often costly* . From a practical perspective, a chronic competitive approach to power has harmful consequences. Deutsch (1973) suggested that reliance on competitive and coercive strategies of influence by power holders produces alienation and resistance in those subjected to the power. This in turn limits the power holder’s ability to use other types of power based on trust (such as normative, expert, referent, and reward power) and increases the demand for scrutiny and control of subordinates. A parent who demands obedience from his adolescent son in a climate of mutual

distrust fosters more distrust and must be prepared to keep the youngster under surveillance. If the goal of the power holder is to achieve commitment from subordinates rather than merely short-term compliance, excessive reliance on a power-over strategy eventually proves to be costly as well as largely ineffective. Research by Kipnis (1976) supported this contention by demonstrating that a leader's dependence on coercive strategies of influence has considerable costs in undermining relationships with followers and in compromising goal achievement.

Furthermore, it is evident that when power holders have a chronic competitive perspective on power, it reduces their chance to see sharing power with members of low-power groups as an opportunity to enhance their own personal or environmental power (Coleman, 2004). From this chronic competitive perspective, power sharing is typically experienced as a threat to achieving one's goals, and the opportunities afforded by power sharing are invisible. If the father views the conflict over curfew as a win-lose power struggle, he is unlikely to reflect on the advantages of involving his daughter in reaching a solution and thereby engendering in her an improved sense of responsibility, collaboration, and trust.

- *Cooperative interdependence in conflict leads to power with* . When conflicts occur in situations that have cooperative task, reward, or outcome interdependence structures, or between disputants sharing a cooperative psychological orientation, there is more cooperative power. In other words, in these situations, conflict is often framed as a mutual problem to be solved by both parties, which leads to an increased tendency to minimize power differences between the disputants and to mutually enhance each other's power in order to work

together effectively to achieve their shared goals. Thus, if the parents can recognize that their daughter's social needs and their own needs to have a close family life are positively linked, then they may be more likely to involve her in the problem-solving and decision-making processes, thereby enhancing her power and their ability to find mutually satisfying solutions to the conflict.

- *The overwhelming evidence seems to indicate that the powerful tend to like power, use it, justify having it, and attempt to keep it* . The powerful tend to be more satisfied and less personally discontent than those not enjoying high power; they have a longer time perspective and more freedom to act and therefore can plan further into the future. These higher levels of satisfaction lead to vested interests in the status quo and development of rationales for maintaining power, such as the power holders' belief in their own superior competence and superior moral value (Deutsch, 1973). Kipnis (1976) argued that much of this may be the result of the corrupting nature of power itself. He proposed that having power and exercising it successfully over time lead to an acquired "taste for power," inflated sense of self, devaluing of those of lesser power, and temptation to use power illegally to enhance one's position.

  Fiske (1993) has demonstrated that powerful people tend to pay less attention to those in low power since they view them as not affecting their outcomes, they are often too busy to pay attention, and they are often motivated by their own high need to dominate others. Inattention to the powerless makes powerful people more vulnerable to use of stereotypes and implicit theories when interacting with the powerless. Mindell (1995) explained the state of unawareness that having

privilege often fosters in this way: “Rank is a drug. The more you have, the less aware you are of how it affects others negatively” (p. 56).

Thus, in conflict situations high-power holders and members of high-power groups (HPGs) often neglect to analyze—as well as underestimate—the power of low-power holders and members of low-power groups (LPGs; Salacuse, 2001). In addition, they usually attempt to dominate the relationship, use pressure tactics, offer few concessions, have high aspirations, and use contentious tactics. HPGs therefore make it difficult to arrive at negotiated agreements that are satisfactory to all parties.

When members of HPGs face a substantial challenge to their power from LPGs, their common responses fall into the categories of repression or ambivalent tolerance (Duckitt, 1992). If the validity of the concerns of the LPG is not recognized, HPGs are likely to use force to quell the challenge of the LPG. But if the challenges are acknowledged as legitimate, HPGs may respond with tolerant attitudes and expressions of concern—though ultimately with resistance to implementing any real change in their power relations (Duckitt, 1992). This has been termed the *attitude-implementation gap* .

In light of their unreflective tendency to dominate, it becomes critical for members of HPGs to be aware of the likelihood that they will elicit resistance and alienation (from members of LPGs with whom they are in conflict) through using illegitimate techniques, inappropriate sanctions, or influence that is considered excessive for the situation (Deutsch, 1973). The cost to the HPG is not only ill will but also the need to be

continuously vigilant and mobilized to prevent retaliation by the LPG.

- *The tendencies for members of LPGs are opposite to those of members of HPGs, with one important exception: LPG members tend to be dependent on others, have short time perspectives, are unable to plan far ahead, and are generally discontent* . Often the LPG members attempt to rid themselves of the negative feelings associated with their experiences of powerlessness and dependence (such as rage and fear) by projecting blame onto even less powerful groups or onto relatively safe in-group targets. The latter can result in a breakdown of LPG in-group solidarity (Kanter, 1977), and impair their capacities for group mobilization in conflict. Intense negative feelings may also limit the LPG members' capacity to respond constructively in conflict with HPGs and impel such destructive impulses as violent destruction of property (Deutsch, 1973).

Several tactics can enhance the power of LPGs. The first is for the group to amass more power for assertion —either by increasing their own resources, organization, cohesion, and motivation for change or by decreasing the resources of (or increasing the costs for) the HPGs (see chapter 2 in this Handbook). The latter can be accomplished through acts of civil disobedience, militancy, or what Alinsky (1971) described as "jujitsu tactics": using the imbalance of power in the relationship against the more powerful. Another approach available to LPG members is to attempt to appeal to the better side of the members of the HPG by trying to induce them (through such tactics as ingratiation, guilt, and helplessness) to use their power more benevolently or by trying to raise HPG awareness of any injustice that they may be party to. LPGs would also do well to develop a broad menu of tactics and

skills in implementing the strategies of autonomy, dependence, and community.

* * *

Despite many decades of fine research, our field still lacks a basic unifying framework that integrates our understanding of the many theories and principles of power and conflict dynamics. Thus, the findings from this research are often piecemeal, decontextualized, contradictory, or focused solely on negative outcomes. I next describe a new model of power and conflict that aims to bring a sense of coherence and parsimony to the study of power and conflict.

A SITUATED MODEL OF POWER AND CONFLICT

Our model builds on Deutsch's theory of social relations and psychological orientations (Deutsch 1982, 1985, 2007, 2011) to offer a situated model of power and conflict (Coleman, Kugler, Mitchinson, Chung, and Musallam, 2010; Coleman, Vallacher, and Nowak, 2012; Coleman, Mitchinson, and Kugler, 2009; see figure 6.1). It suggests that when people are faced with a conflict, they have three primary considerations:




Figure 6.1 The Situated Model of Power and Conflict

1. Is the other party with me or against me or some combination of both?
2. What is my power relative to the other party's (high, equal or low)?
3. To what extent are my goals linked to the other party's goals, and how important is this conflict and relationship to me?

The model specifies the three basic dimensions of conflict situations:

- *The mixture of goal interdependence* : The type and mix of goal interdependence in the relationship, with pure positive forms of goal interdependence (all goals between parties in conflict are positively linked) at the extreme left of the *x* -axis, *pure negative* interdependence (all goals are negatively linked) at the extreme right of the *x* -axis, and *mixed-motive types* (combinations of both positively and negatively linked goals) along the middle of the *x* -axis.
- *The relative distribution of power* : The relative degree to which each party can affect the other party's goals

and outcomes (Depret and Fiske, 1993; Thibaut and Kelley, 1959). It constitutes the *y* -axis of the model, with pure types of unequal distribution of power (A over B) at the top of the *y* -axis, the *opposite types of unequal distribution of power* (B over A) at the bottom of the axis, and various types of relatively *equal* distribution of power along the middle of the *y* -axis.

- *The degree of total goal interdependence–relational importance* : The degree of importance of the relationship and linkage of goals (total goal interdependence) in conflict. This constitutes the *z* -axis of the model, with *high degrees* of goal interdependence between the parties in conflict located at the front of the *z* -axis (strong goal linkages and/or high proportions of linked goals), *low degrees* of interdependence located at the rear of the *z* -axis (no, few, or weak goal linkages), and *moderate degrees* of goal interdependence located along the middle of the *z* -axis.

These three dimensions constitute the core of the situated model. They provide a sense of the basic social context in which people experience conflict. Thus, conflicts that appear to be similar by virtue of representing the same perception of incompatible activities (you and I are competing for the same job) may be experienced in fundamentally different ways depending on the settings of the three parameters in the model (our mix of cooperative or competitive goals; my high, equal, or low relative power; and the high or low importance of our relationship).

The situated model suggests that when conflicts are perceived, the three basic features of social conflict—mix of interdependence, relative distribution of power, and degree of total interdependence—interact to situate parties psychologically in different regions of a conflict stimulus field (Kelley 1997): a perceiver’s representation of his or

her external world or environment. These different regions tend to afford distinct conflict orientations, which are syndromes of disputants' perceptions, emotions, values, and behaviors in the conflict (see figure 6.2). In other words, the different regions of the stimulus field tend to influence how conflicts are perceived (as mutual problems or win-lose challenges), how it feels to be in the situation (relatively comfortable versus anxiety provoking), what is likely to be valued in the situation (solving problems and sharing benefits with other parties versus conquering them), and how to best go about responding to the conflict and obtaining these values and goals (through respectful dialogue and problem solving versus forceful domination or submission to power). The different regions do not rigidly determine specific thoughts, feelings, and actions in conflict but rather tend to orient disputants like improvisational scripts; they provide the general frame and contours for responses to conflict, and mostly determine which behaviors are not appropriate to a particular situation.




Figure 6.2 Psychological Orientations in the Basic Conflict Stimulus Field

The findings from research conducted through focus groups, critical incidents, and correlational and

experimental studies have found that when participants were presented with the same conflict in terms of incompatible goals and issues, they described markedly different experiences—perceptions, emotions, values, and behavioral intentions—across the five regional conditions (Coleman et al. 2010; Coleman, Kugler, Mitchinson, and Foster, 2013). When faced with a region 1 scenario (relative high-power, cooperative, high-interdependence relations), participants described a more benevolent orientation to conflict than most other regions. Participants said they valued taking responsibility for the problem and listening to the other, and they expressed genuine concern for their low-power counterpart. In contrast, region 2 scenarios (relative high power, competitive, high interdependence) were found to induce an angrier, more threatening, and confrontational approach to the other party, with heightened concerns for their own authority and goals (dominance). Region 3 scenarios (low power, cooperative, high interdependence) afforded more of an orientation of appreciative support than the other regions, where people respectfully sought clarification of roles and responsibilities, worked harder, and felt anxious and confused about the conflict situations. This was in contrast to the reactions observed to region 4 scenarios (low power, competitive, high interdependence), which induced higher levels of stress and anger, a strong need to tolerate the situation, and a desire to look for possibilities to sabotage the supervisor if the opportunity presented itself (appeasement). Region 5 scenarios (low interdependence), in contrast to the others, afforded a less intense experience of the conflict, where people preferred to simply move on or exit the conflict (autonomy).

When parties perceive themselves to be located in a particular region of the stimulus field for extended periods of time (e.g., stuck in low power in a competitive conflict

with their boss), they will tend to foster the development of a stronger orientation for that region, which can become chronic. Once an individual has developed a strong propensity for a particular conflict orientation (e.g., dominance), it can become very difficult to change one's orientation, even when it fails to satisfy one's goals, the intensity of the conflict dissipates, or social conditions change (see Coleman et al., 2010). More chronic orientations will often operate with automaticity and may begin to be employed even when they are inconsistent (ill fitting) with particular situations (Barge, 1996). For example, case study research on state-level international negotiations also provides strong support for the view that high-power parties often become very comfortable with dominance orientations and find it difficult to employ other strategies when power shifts and conditions change, and that low-power parties too can become very skilled and accustomed to their role (Zartman and Rubin, 2002).

Generally, more adaptive orientations to conflict—those that allow the use of different orientations and behaviors in order to satisfy goals in a manner not incongruent with the demands of the situations encountered—will lead to greater general satisfaction with conflict processes and outcomes over time. It is important to stress that each of the different orientations outlined in our model has its particular utilities, benefits, costs, and consequences depending on the psychological makeup of people, the orientation of other parties, and the nature of the situations. Ultimately what is particularly useful in evolving situations of conflict is the capacity to adapt: to move freely between various orientations and employ their related strategies and tactics in a manner that helps to achieve one's short- and long-term goals.

Case-based research on interstate negotiations found that parties tended to be more effective in negotiations to the

extent that they were able to adjust their orientations and behavior to the relative (and relevant) power of the other side (Zartman and Rubin, 2002). In a correlational study (Coleman et al., 2009), investigators found that more adaptive individuals (those who saw utility in employing all five orientations when necessary) had greater levels of satisfaction with conflicts in general than did less adaptive individuals. This study also found that more adaptive individuals learned more from conflicts and had more global perspectives on conflict, focusing more on both long-term and short-term goals than less-adaptive individuals did. Another study found that people who were able to employ orientations and behaviors that were not incongruent with the situation (ill fitting) expressed significantly more satisfaction with the processes, outcomes, relationships, and their own behavior in those conflicts (Coleman and Kugler, 2011).

The situated model of power and conflict builds on the essential features of social conflict that have been identified by prior research and theorizes how different configurations of these factors together influence constructive and destructive dynamics in conflict. By integrating the three dimensions, the model helps to synthesize many disparate and even contradictory findings from decades of prior research and therefore contribute to our understanding of how power, interdependence, and relational importance affect conflict dynamics. Instead of emphasizing how a set of predispositions or conditions invokes positive conflict processes, the model stresses the necessity of adapting flexibly to new situations in a manner that helps to achieve important goals. Conflicts can be constructively managed when the disputants are able to move between different orientations, strategies, and tactics as the evolving situation requires.

IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The situated model of power and conflict presented here highlights the importance of adaptivity in constructive conflict resolution. This is what Harvard professor Joseph Nye (1990) has called smart power—a capacity to combine the use of hard power (military, economic) and soft power (moral, cultural) as circumstances dictate. Research has found that although many negotiators and leaders tend to get stuck in one approach to negotiating conflict (often domination), more effective leaders and negotiators are more nimble (Hooijberg and Quinn, 1992; Lawrence, Lenk, and Quinn, 2009; Zartman and Rubin, 2002). They read situations more carefully, consider their short- and longer-term objectives, and then employ a variety of strategies in order to increase the probabilities that their agenda will succeed (Dörner, 1996).

Thus, according to our model, conflict resolvers of all stripes should develop their capacities and skills for these traits:

- Domination through command and control—employing power, information, and authority to demand, incentivize, threaten, coerce, expose and, publicly shame opponents when absolutely necessary
- Taking the high road through benevolence—modeling exemplary, collaborative, win-win leadership by listening carefully to the needs and concerns of opponents, finding common ground on the priority objectives, and uniting parties around a common vision and purpose
- Building bottom-up support—reaching out to the other side, allies, and other stakeholders in order to persuade,

seduce, barter, beg, and ingratiate in order to mobilize them and secure their support

- Appeasing opponents—learning to tolerate attacks, inflammatory rhetoric, and hyperbole of opponents in the short-term; give in to them on their key demands; suck up to them as much as possible, and quietly lay in wait for conditions to change and opportunities to present themselves to blithely sabotage them and derail their agenda
- Developing autonomy through strong BATNAs (best alternative to a negotiated agreement)—spending time and energy developing a good plan B, where they can still achieve their principle goals unilaterally

Our upcoming book, *Conflict Intelligence: Harnessing the Power of Conflict and Influence* (Coleman and Ferguson, in press), provides step-by-step instructions for developing skill in applying these strategies and tactics and enhancing competencies for adaptivity in conflict.

In conclusion, I offer a few summary propositions from this chapter for use in designing training approaches for power and conflict. The general goals of such training are to develop people's understanding of power, facilitate reflection of their own tendencies when in low or high power, and increase their ability to use it effectively when in conflict:

- Training should help students understand and reflect critically on their commonly held assumptions about power, as well as the sources of these assumptions. It should also educate students on the dynamic complexity of processes of power and influence; the importance of localized, situation-specific understanding; and the importance of distinctions such as primary and secondary power.

- Students should be supported in a process that helps them become aware of their own chronic tendencies to react in situations in which they have superior or inferior power over others and develop the capacity to employ dominance, benevolence, appeasement, support, and autonomy when necessary and appropriate.
- Students should be encouraged to become more emotionally and cognitively aware of the privileges or injustices they and others experience as a result of their skin color, gender, economics, class, age, religion, sexual orientation, physical status, and the like.
- In a conflict situation, students should be able to analyze for the other as well as themselves the resources of power, their orientation to power, and the strategies and tactics for effectively implementing their available power. Students should also be able to identify and develop the necessary skills for implementing their available power in the conflict.
- Students should be able to distinguish between conflicts in which power with, power from, and power under, rather than power over, are appropriate orientations to and strategies for resolving the conflict.

Susan Fountain has developed an exercise showing the type of training that gives students simple yet rich experience useful for exploring and examining many of the principles I have just described.

Participants in the exercise are asked to leave the training room momentarily. The room is then organized into two work areas, with several tables grouped to accommodate four or five people per group in each area. In one work area, the tables are supplied with markers, colored pencils, paste, poster board, magazines, scissors, and other colorful and decorative items. In the other work area, each table

receives one piece of white typing paper and two black lead pencils. The participants are then randomly assigned to two groups and allowed into the room and seated.

The groups are told that their objective is to use the materials they have been given to generate a definition of power. They are informed that once each group has completed its task, they will display their definition and everyone will vote on the best definition generated from the class. The groups begin their work on the task. The trainers actively support and participate in the work of the high-resource group while attempting to avoid contact with members of the low-resource group. When the work is complete, the class votes on the best definition of power. The participants are then brought into a circle to debrief.

In our experience with this exercise, many useful learning opportunities present themselves. For example, the types of definition generated can differ greatly between the high-resource and low-resource groups. The former tend to produce definitions that are mostly positive, superficial, and largely shaped by the mainstream images from the magazines (beauty, status, wealth, computers, and so on). The low-resource group definitions tend to be more radical and rageful, often challenging the status quo—and even the authority of the instructors. One image listed a series of negative emotions and obscenities circled by pencils that were then jabbed into the paper like daggers. These starkly contrasting definitions often lead to discussion that identifies the source of these differences.

It is also fairly common in this exercise for many members of the high-resource group to remain completely unaware of the disparity in resources until it is explicitly pointed out to them at the conclusion of the exercise. Members of the low-resource groups, in contrast, are all very aware of the discrepancies. This can be a very powerful moment. Again,

the actual difference in resources is minor, but it is symbolic of more meaningful ones, and the participants begin to make the connection to other areas in their lives where they are often blind to their own privilege.

Finally, during the exercise, members of the low-resource group often attempt to alter the imbalance of power. They try various strategies, including demanding or stealing resources, ingratiation, playing on the guilt of high-resource group members, appealing to higher authorities (the instructors), or challenging the legitimacy of the exercise. Of course, there are also members of the low-resource group who simply accept their lot and follow the rules. These choices are all opportunities to explore what sort of strategies and tactics can be useful when in low power, have participants reflect on their own inclinations and reactions in the situation (whether in low or high power), and examine the beliefs and assumptions on which many of the strategies were based.

CONCLUSION

Rosabeth Kanter once said that *power* is the last dirty word. I have attempted to challenge that notion in this chapter and emphasize the potential for an expansive approach to power in conflict. The realists of the day may remain skeptical, for the world is filled with evidence to the contrary: evidence of coercive power holders, power hoarding, of the defensiveness and resistance of the powerful under conditions that cry out for change. Perhaps the time is ripe for a new approach to power.

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CHAPTER SEVEN
COMMUNICATION AND CONFLICT

Robert M. Krauss
Ezequiel Morsella

> *Battle, n. A method of untying with the teeth a political knot that would not yield to the tongue.*
>
> —Ambrose Bierce, *The Devil's Dictionary* (1911)

When neighbors feud, lovers quarrel, or nations war, the predictable remedy prescribed by the voices of reason is communication. The prevailing view is that, faced with conflict, communicating is always the right thing to do: the UN Security Council encourages hostile countries to "hold talks," and marriage counselors advise quarreling couples to "express their feelings." So commonplace is the prescription that advice to the contrary seems anomalous; it's difficult to imagine the secretary general imploring hostile nations to refrain from dialogue. The positive role of communication in ameliorating conflict seems so obvious that the premise is seldom given serious examination. Why should communicating be so helpful? Under what conditions does communication reduce conflict?

An attempt to answer such questions is the main burden of this chapter. In large part, the answers derive from considering what communication entails and what its instantiation precludes, that is, what it brings to, and demands of, particular situations. To understand the complex interplay between communication and conflict, we describe four paradigms of communication—four models of the communication process—and consider how each relates to conflict. [1] We briefly examine communicative mishaps that are potential sources of conflict and consider how and why communication can ameliorate conflict. Finally, we

discuss some inherent limitations of communication as a peacemaker, limitations that result from the realization that understanding, the cardinal goal of communication, does not imply agreement, as Bierce's definition illustrates.

FOUR COMMUNICATION PARADIGMS

Before we begin discussing the intricate interplay of conflict and communication, it is important to specify what we mean by the latter term. The concept of communication is an important focus for fields as diverse as cell biology, computer science, ethology, linguistics, electrical engineering, sociology, anthropology, genetics, philosophy, semiotics, and literary theory, each of which employs the term in its unique way. Indeed, communication has been used in so many ways and in so many contexts that, as sociologist Thomas Luckman observes, it "has come to mean all things to all men."

Common to all conceptualizations of communication is the idea of information transfer. Information that originates in one part of a system is formulated into a message that is transmitted to another part of that system. As a result, information residing in one locus comes to be replicated at another. In human communication, the information corresponds to what are loosely referred to as ideas or, more scientifically, mental representations. In its most elemental form, human communication may be construed as the process by which ideas contained within one mind are conveyed to other minds. Though attractive because of its simplicity, this description fails to capture the true richness and subtlety of the process by which humans communicate, an enterprise that involves far more than automatically transferring ideas.

The Encoding-Decoding Paradigm

The most straightforward conceptualization of communication can be found in the *encoder-decoder paradigm* , in which communication is described as transferring information via codes. A code is a system that maps a set of signals onto a set of meanings. In the simplest kind of code, the mapping is one-to-one: for every signal there is one and only one meaning, and for every meaning there is one and only one signal. Such is the case for Morse code. The sequence *dot dot dot dot* signifies the letter *H* , and only *H* ; conversely, the letter *H* is uniquely represented by the sequence *dot dot dot dot* , and only that sequence.

Much of the communication in nonhuman species is based on the encoding-decoding principle. For example, vervet monkeys have two distinctive vocalizations for signaling the presence of their main predators, eagles and snakes. When one or the other signal is sounded, the vervets respond quickly and appropriately, scanning the sky in the first case, and scanning the grass around them in the second. Just as the Morse code *dot dot dot dot* invariably designates the letter *H* , the vervet “aerial predator call” unambiguously signals the presence of predacious eagles.

Viewing human communication as encoding and decoding assumes a process in which an abstract proposition is (1) encoded in a message (i.e., transformed into a signal whose elements have a one-to-one correspondence with the elements of the proposition) by the sender, (2) transmitted over a channel to the receiver, and (3) decoded into an abstract proposition that, it is believed, is isomorphic with the original one. For example, a speaker may formulate the proposition [John] [give book] [Mary] and thus transmit the message, “John, please give Mary the book.” After receiving and processing the message, John presumably understands that he has been asked to give a particular book to someone named Mary.

One reason the received message may not be identical to the transmitted one is that all communication channels contribute some degree of noise (any undesired signal) to the message. The more signal there is relative to the amount of noise (the signal-to-noise ratio), the closer the transmitted message is to the received message; hence the more similar the received proposition is to the original one. A low signal-to-noise ratio can distort the meaning of a message or even render it incomprehensible.

Noise, of course, has a deleterious effect on all communication, but its effect in the arena of conflict can be especially pernicious because it forces the recipient of a message to fill in information the noise has distorted. Given the antagonistic interpersonal orientation that parties in such situations often have, the filled-in information is more likely to worsen conflict than reduce it.

As an example of how noise may be introduced into communication, consider what happens when using third (or fourth or fifth) parties to transmit messages, in contrast to direct communication. As in the children's game of Telephone, each party's successive retelling of a message is likely to introduce some distortion, so that when it arrives at the ultimate destination, it may bear little resemblance to the original. There may be times when discussing delicate subjects is inadvisable in environments where misunderstanding is likely to occur. Also, whenever distortion is likely, redundancy (multiple encoded messages) can be helpful. Restating the same idea in different forms does not guarantee its acceptance, but it should increase the probability of correct understanding.

Principle 1.

Avoid communication channels with low signal-to-noise ratios; if that is impossible, increase redundancy by

restating the same idea in various forms.

Noise is not the only factor that can compromise communication. Even if the transmitted and received messages are identical, the retrieved proposition may vary significantly from the original. Speaker and listener may be employing codes that differ subtly, and this may lead to misunderstanding. For example, lexical choice often reflects a speaker's implicit attitude toward the subject of the utterance. In a given situation, any one of several closely related terms (*woman, lady; Negro, black, African American; crippled, handicapped, disabled, physically challenged*) might serve adequately to designate or refer to a particular individual, yet each term may be associated with a somewhat different conceptualization of its referent as part of a complex ideology or network of attitudes and values. If such ideologies or values are not shared, application of a term may be construed as antagonistic.

For example, at the height of the Cold War, an offhand comment made by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to a British diplomat was translated as, "We will bury you." According to linguist Alan K. Melby, Khrushchev's remark, made in the context of a conversation about the competition between communism and capitalism, was essentially a restatement (in considerably more vivid language) of Marx's claim of communism's historic inevitability. Although "we will bury you" is an acceptable literal rendering of Khrushchev's words, an equally accurate, and contextually more appropriate, translation would have been, "We will be present at your burial." Such a rendering is consistent with Khrushchev's comment later in the same conversation that communism did not need to go to war to destroy capitalism, since the latter would eventually self-destruct. In the United States, the common interpretation of "we will bury you" was that "we" referred to the USSR, "you" meant the United States, and "bury"

denoted annihilate. For many, especially those who viewed communism as a malign doctrine, the phrase became prima facie evidence of the USSR's malevolent intentions toward the United States.

The controversy over proper translation of Khrushchev's remark reveals a serious shortcoming of the encoder-decoder account of human communication: although language is in some respects a code, in other respects it is not. The fact that "we will bury you" could yield two equally "correct" renderings that differed so radically underscores the fact that humans do not use language simply as a set of signals mapped onto a set of meanings.

The Intentionalist Paradigm

The Khrushchev episode dramatically illustrates why the process of encoding and decoding is not a good characterization of human communication. There was no question about the specific words Khrushchev had uttered, and competent translators did not differ on the ways the Russian utterance might be rendered in English. At issue was a more complicated question: What had Khrushchev intended the utterance to mean?

The view of communication implicit in the encoder-decoder position is that meanings of messages are fully specified by their elements—that meaning is encoded, and that decoding the message is equivalent to specifying its meaning. However, it is easy to demonstrate that this is often not the case. Unlike the vervet's aerial-predator call, which has an invariant significance, in human communication the same message can be understood to mean different things in different circumstances, and this fact necessitates a distinction between a message's literal meaning and its intended meaning. "Do you know what time it is?" is literally a question about what the addressee

knows, but it is usually understood as a request. Although its grammatical mood is interrogative, it is conventionally taken to be an imperative; a reasonable paraphrase might be, “Tell me the time.” However, not all sentences of the form *Do you know X?* are intended as requests; “Do you know C++?” is likely to be understood as a question about familiarity with a programming language.

Understanding consists of recognizing communicative intentions—not the words used, but rather what speakers intend those words to mean. The intentionalist paradigm highlights the danger of participants’ misconstruing each other’s communicative intentions.

Principle 2.

When listening, try to understand the intended meaning of what your counterpart is saying.

What might be called the Humpty Dumpty approach to communication (“When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less”) is a formula for disaster. In fact, communicators in a conflict situation should assume precisely the opposite of what Humpty Dumpty’s maxim advises.

Principle 3.

When formulating a message, consider what the listener will take your words to mean.

Had Khrushchev prefaced, “We will bury you,” with an allusion to Marx’s claim of communism’s historic inevitability, it is unlikely that the remark would have fanned the flames of the Cold War.

In conflict, misunderstandings are especially likely because individuals interpret utterances to be consistent with their own attitudes. More than half a century ago, Solomon Asch

(1946) demonstrated that the same message (“I hold that a little rebellion, now and then, is a good thing, and as necessary in the political world as storms are in the physical”) would be interpreted quite differently depending on whether it was attributed to V. I. Lenin or to Thomas Jefferson (its actual author). The word *rebellion* can be interpreted in more than one way. Respondents’ knowledge of the purported author was an important determinant of their interpretation of the word, and hence of the message’s intended meaning.

The problem can become considerably more problematic when the parties to the conflict use different languages to communicate, as the furor caused by Khrushchev’s remark illustrates. The translator had provided a literal English rendering of a Russian phrase that was intended to be understood figuratively. Nonliteral usage is a pervasive feature of language use. It adds enormously to our ability to formulate colorful and nuanced messages, but it does pose particular problems for a translator. In the first place, correctly apprehending the intended meaning of a nonliteral expression often requires cultural knowledge that goes beyond just technical mastery of the language. Understanding the significance of Ronald Reagan’s challenge to Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev—“Go ahead, make my day! ”—requires at least a vague awareness of the Clint Eastwood film it echoes, *Dirty Harry* . It can require considerable cognitive effort to apprehend a speaker’s communicative intention, but the effort must be expended if the parties are to understand each other. In the absence of this effort, communication can become bogged down in a cycle of misinterpretation and denial:

> PARTY 1: You said X.
>
> PARTY 2: Yes, but it should have been obvious that I meant Y.

PARTY 1: Well, how was I to know you didn’t mean X?

Given the flexible relationship between the literal and intended meanings of an utterance, it is remarkable how well we understand each other. Utterances that are intended to be understood nonliterally are a common feature of everyday language use. Although some canonical forms of nonliteral usage are so salient that they have names (irony, metaphor, hyperbole), more mundane examples of nonliteral usage pervade everyday talk. When we say that we understand what others say, we are implicitly claiming to comprehend what they intend for us to understand. The decoded meaning of the utterance certainly contributes to that intended meaning, but it is only part of it. Occasionally misunderstandings do occur (as when an addressee interprets an ironic statement literally), but for the most part, we understand nonliterally intended utterances correctly, usually without being consciously aware of possible meanings that such an utterance could have in other contexts.

Despite facility in accomplishing this, the process by which a listener constructs the intention of an utterance is exceedingly complex and a matter of some contention among psycholinguists. In large part, it depends on the existence of knowledge that is shared between speaker and addressee, or common ground, as it is often called.

The most elemental kind of common ground communicators rely on is knowledge of the language they are speaking. But as many an embarrassed tourist has discovered, much of the common ground that underlies language use derives from a complex matrix of shared cultural knowledge. Without this knowledge, many utterances are incomprehensible or, perhaps worse, interpreted incorrectly. This point is particularly relevant to use of language in conflict situations, especially when the

conflict stems from differences in intention, goal, value, and ideology. To the extent that such variations derive from a lack of mutually shared knowledge, communication suffers. Understanding the importance of common ground in interpreting utterances points to one of the drawbacks of relying too heavily on an intentionalist interpretation of communication: the addressee cannot derive the intended meaning from a message if the meaning resides outside the realm of shared knowledge. Moreover, since what is common ground for a given speaker varies as a function of the addressee (i.e., it varies from addressee to addressee), the speaker is obliged to generate only those utterances that he or she believes the addressee is capable of understanding.

Of course, it is within participants' power to make this easy or less easy to accomplish. Not only can addressees try to look beyond the speakers' words to the underlying communicative intention, but speakers can seek to express themselves in ways that will lead to the desired interpretation on their addressees' part. This, of course, requires one to see the world through the eyes of another.

The Perspective-Taking Paradigm

Perspective taking assumes that individuals perceive the world from differing vantage points and that because the experiences of each individual depend to some degree on his or her vantage point, messages must be formulated with this perspective in mind. The late Roger Brown put the essential idea succinctly: "Effective coding requires that the point of view of the auditor be realistically imagined" (1965, p. 242). However, apart from the general admonition that the addressee's perspective be taken into account, it is not always clear how one should go about implementing what is sometimes referred to as the principle of audience design—the idea that messages should be designed to

accord with an addressee's ability to comprehend them. In the best of circumstances, it is difficult to take the perspective of another accurately; the more unlike oneself the other happens to be, the more difficult the task becomes.

In conflict situations, even more problematic than the absence of common ground may be the misperception of common ground—incorrect assumptions that communicators make about what their partners know. It is well established that people's estimates of what others know, believe, or value tend to be biased in the direction of their own beliefs—what they themselves know. As a result, comprehending the intended meaning of an utterance may require knowledge one lacks, and this is particularly likely if the cultural situations of the parties involved are markedly different. In all probability, it would never have occurred to so confirmed a Marxist as Nikita Khrushchev that the context for the interpretation of his ill-received remark would be anything other than the doctrine of Marxism's historic inevitability.

Such misperceptions are common in conflict for two reasons. First, the magnitude of the perspectival differences that communicators must accommodate may itself be an important source of conflict. For an ardent pro-life activist, it may be difficult to conduct a discussion about abortion that is not grounded in the position that abortion is a kind of murder; messages grounded in this premise, directed at the activist's pro-choice counterpart, are unlikely to ameliorate conflict.

Second, conflict tends to make perceived distinctions among participants more salient and in so doing heighten the tendency to categorize them as members of in-groups or out-groups. The language people use in such situations reflects these distinctions. One manifestation of this is what

Maass, Semin, and their colleagues have termed the linguistic intergroup bias (Maass and Arcuri, 1992; Maass, Salvi, Arcuri, and Semin, 1989). Any interpersonal act can be characterized at various levels of generality. For example, an observer might remark, “John carried Mary’s suitcase,” or “John helped Mary,” or “John is a helpful person,” all in reference to the same incident. A well-established research finding is that people describe the actions of in-group and out-group members with systematic differences. For an action that is negatively valent, the behavior of out-group members tends to be characterized at a relatively high level of abstraction, while that of in-group members is characterized more concretely. For positively valent behaviors, however, the pattern is reversed. Positively valent behavior of out-group members is characterized as a specific episode, while that of in-group members is characterized abstractly.

One consequence of the linguistic intergroup bias is to make stereotypes resistant to disconfirmation, since behavior that is congruent with a negative out-group stereotype tends to be characterized as a general property (“Smith is aggressive”), while behavior that is inconsistent with the stereotype tends to be characterized in quite specific terms (“Smith gave CPR to an accident victim”). The enhanced salience of stereotypes in conflict situations enormously complicates the process by which, again in Brown’s words, “the point of view of the auditor [can be] realistically imagined,” and by so doing undermines the effectiveness of communication.

Principle 4.

When speaking, take your listener’s perspective into account.

Just as the speaker must take pains to be aware of the possible constructions listeners may place on an utterance, listeners have to be sensitive to the alternative constructions an utterance might yield. Although we habitually respond to what others say as though it could mean one and only one thing, this is seldom the case.

How insensitivity to this principle can affect communication is illustrated in a 1999 controversy involving Washington, DC, public advocate David Howard's use of the word *niggardly* in a conversation with two aides. The aides, both African Americans, were unfamiliar with the obscure synonym for stingy and took it to be a form of a similar-sounding racial epithet, to which it is in fact etymologically unrelated. The ensuing flap (Howard, who is Caucasian, initially resigned but was then reinstated by Mayor Anthony Williams) polarized activists on both sides of the political spectrum. Although Howard was correct philologically, he was mistaken in assuming the word *niggardly* was in common ground. In retrospect, it seems clear that his choice of words was injudicious. Because the word was obscure, there was a good chance that at least some people would not know its meaning, and because of its similarity to a taboo word, the likelihood was great that it would be misinterpreted. Especially in situations where the addressee's interpretation is consequential, an effective communicator tries to view his or her own utterances from the other's perspective.

A serious complication of perspective taking in conflict situations derives from what is called the multiple audience problem. It is not uncommon for a communication to be designed to simultaneously convey different messages to different listeners, and this seems particularly likely to occur in conflict situations. For example, a mayor negotiating a salary increase with the teachers' union may feel it is necessary to "send a message" to other municipal

unions that he is willing to run the risk of a strike. Or the leader of the union may go to great lengths to ensure that a reasonable concession, part of the normal give-and-take of negotiation, is not seen by union members as a sign of weakness. The number of different (and sometimes contradictory) perspectives that a speaker may feel obliged to take into account can make public or open negotiations extremely difficult. Other things being equal, participants would be well advised to reduce the number of audiences to which their messages are addressed.

Of course, another person's perspective is not always self-evident. It probably is in the best interests of the parties to expend some effort ascertaining what is and is not in common ground, and if necessary enlarging its contents. Such mutually cooperative efforts to ensure coordination on meaning is the essence of a dialogic approach to communication (discussed next). Participants deeply enmeshed in an acrimonious and apparently intractable conflict may find it difficult to achieve the degree of sensitivity to the other that such an approach requires. But without it there can be no communication of any consequence.

The Dialogic Paradigm

Thus far, our discussion has depicted communication as an unremittingly individualistic process—the product of contributions by what Susan Brennan has called "autonomous information processors." Speakers and addressees act with respect to one another, but they act as individual entities. Communication consists of a set of discursively related but independent episodes. This kind of depiction may be appropriate for certain communications, such as the process by which writers communicate with their readers and broadcasters with their audiences, but it

seems to miss the essence of what happens in most of the situations in which people communicate.

Participants in conversations and similar highly interactive communicative forms behave less like autonomous information processors and more like participants in an intrinsically cooperative activity. Clark and Brennan (1991) have made the point nicely: “It takes two people working together to play a duet, shake hands, play chess, waltz, teach, or make love. To succeed, the two of them have to coordinate both the content and process of what they are doing. . . . Communication . . . is a collective activity of the first order” (p. 127).

What we call the dialogic paradigm focuses on the collaborative nature of communicative activity. Perhaps the most fundamental respects in which the other three paradigms we have discussed differ from the dialogic is where they locate meaning. For the encoding-decoding paradigm, meaning is a property of messages; for the intentionalist paradigm, it resides in speakers’ intentions; for the perspective-taking paradigm, it derives from the addressee’s point of view.

In dialogic perspective, communication is regarded as a joint accomplishment of the participants, who have collaborated to achieve some set of communicative goals. Meaning is socially situated—deriving from the particular circumstances of the interaction—and the meaning of an utterance can be understood only in the context of those circumstances. Because the participants are invested in understanding, and being understood by, each other, speakers and addressees take pains to ensure that they have similar conceptions of the meaning of each message before they proceed to the next one.

An encoding-decoding approach to communication puts the listener in the role of a passive recipient whose task is to

process the meaning of the transmitted message, but a participant in a communicative interchange is not limited to this role. Active listeners raise questions, clarify ambiguous declarations, and take great pains to ensure that they and their counterpart have the same understanding of what has been said. It is instructive to observe the person who is not speaking in a conversation in which the participants are deeply involved. Typically, such listeners are anything but inactive. They nod, interject brief comments (“uh-huh,” “yes,” “right, right,” “hmmm”), and change their facial expressions to mirror the emotive content of what is being said. These actions—sometimes called communicating in the back channel—are one means by which participants demonstrate their involvement in the interaction and their understanding of what has been said. Considerable research has shown that the absence of back-channel responses makes communication significantly more difficult (Krauss, 1987). Effective communication requires that listeners be responsive.

Principle 5.

Be an active listener.

This recommendation seems to ask parties involved in an unresolved conflict to behave cooperatively; indeed, that is precisely what they do. Communication is intrinsically a cooperative activity. As the dialogic perspective makes clear, in communication the participants must collaborate to create meaning, and one reason that communication between conflicting parties so often is unavailing is that the parties are unable to collaborate to that degree. As Bismarck might have remarked, communication becomes a continuation of conflict by verbal means. Of course, the cooperation necessary for effective communication is of a minimal sort, and participants may collaborate to express (one hopes regretfully) their inability to see a resolution

that is mutually acceptable. Nevertheless, that communication can be a first step, and developing lines of communication can be the foundation on which a solution ultimately rests. A paradoxical fact about human nature is that few things are as effective in inducing conflicting parties to cooperate as a common foe. In communication, the common foe is misunderstanding, and in collaborating to vanquish this enemy, the parties to a conflict may be taking the first step toward reducing their differences.

Principle 6.

Focus initially on establishing conditions that allow effective communication to occur; the cooperation that communication requires, once established, may generalize to other contexts.

FORM VERSUS SUBSTANCE: BOTH MATTER

Each of the four paradigms reveals pitfalls that an effective communicator should avoid (noise, third-party transmitters, multiple audiences, and so on). The discussion thus far has mainly focused on the inherent complexity of communication and how its misuse can engender or exacerbate conflict. At first glance, the picture it presents is bleak. Tallying all the ways a communicative interchange can go awry leads one to wonder whether communication can ever have an ameliorative effect. Nevertheless, we all know that at least some disputes do get resolved peacefully, that long-standing adversaries can become allies, and that even seemingly irresolvable conflicts can be isolated, allowing parties to “agree to disagree.” In this section, we consider some simple behaviors that can enhance (though not guarantee) the ameliorative effects of communication.

Given a genuine desire to resolve the conflict, communication, artfully employed, can help achieve that end. Obviously what is most critical is the substance of the communication—the quality of the proposals and counterproposals that each participant makes. It would be foolish to expect others to accept solutions not in their best interests just because of "good communication." However, quite apart from substance, the form that messages take can have (sometimes unintended) consequences. The very flexibility that makes communication so adaptable a tool also allows for more and less effective ways of achieving the same ends. For example, "Shut the door," "Would you mind closing the door?" and "I wish we could leave the door open, but it's so noisy" could (in appropriate contexts) be instances of utterances understood to have the same intended meaning. Although they differ in grammatical type and in the particular words they employ, all are understood as directives—attempts to induce the addressee to do something.

Utterances often are described in terms of the speech acts (Austin, 1962) they represent. Like physical actions, the things we say are intended to accomplish certain purposes; but unlike physical actions, they accomplish their purposes communicatively rather than directly. As we have just illustrated, the same speech act can be accomplished by a variety of utterances. Nevertheless, although "Shut the door" and "Would you mind closing the door?" both represent directives to close the door, they differ in another respect. The latter is an indirect speech act (one whose literal and intended meanings differ), while the former is a direct speech act that represents its meaning literally. Generally, indirect speech acts are perceived as more polite than direct ones, probably because the two kinds of directive have implications for the status or power differential of requester and requestee. Although different

versions of the same speech act may be identical insofar as the message's explicit content (construing that term narrowly) is concerned, it behooves a communicator to ensure that the form of the message does not undermine the information it conveys.

Principle 7.

Pay attention to message form.

CONCLUSION

We conclude this discussion with a point we alluded to earlier. Communication is not a panacea, and in the absence of genuine desire to resolve conflict, it is as likely to intensify the parties' disagreement as to moderate it. Although the point may seem too obvious to warrant mentioning, conflicts often serve multiple functions, and the parties may approach resolution with some ambivalence. They may find that the perceived benefits of continuing conflict outweigh its costs. In such cases, communication aimed at resolving the conflict may be unavailing—and could conceivably make things worse.

In a study published more than forty-five years ago, Krauss and Deutsch (1966) provided subjects in a bargaining experiment with an opportunity to communicate. The bargaining problem they confronted in the experiment was a relatively simple one to solve. However, allowing participants the means by which they could obstruct each other's progress complicated matters considerably, typically resulting in poorer outcomes for both. The means of obstruction transformed participants' focus from jointly solving a simple coordination problem to devising individual strategies that would defeat the other. Giving them a verbal communication channel did not materially

improve matters; indeed, in some cases it made things worse.

The results of this experiment underscore the naiveté of regarding communication as the universal solvent for conflict, one whose application is certain to improve matters. More realistic is a view of communication as a neutral instrument—one that can be used to convey threats as well as offers of reconciliation, to put forth unreasonable offers as well as acceptable ones, to inflame a tense situation as well as to defuse it.

Given a genuine desire to resolve a conflict, communication can facilitate achieving this goal. Although we can affect others (and be affected by them) through communication, we can affect them (and be affected by them) only so much. The fruit of communication is to establish understanding, but beyond this, communication can do little (directly) to change the state of affairs or sway the outcome of a conflict based on irreconcilable goals. Good communication cannot guarantee that conflict is ameliorated or resolved, but poor communication greatly increases the likelihood that conflict continues or is made worse.

Note

1 . In this chapter, we try to summarize very briefly a large body of theory and research on the social psychology of communication as it relates to conflict. Space limitations prevent us from doing much more than skimming the surface, and in so doing we present a picture that is distorted in certain respects. Detailed treatments of these issues can be found in Krauss and Fussell (1996) and Krauss and Chiu (1998).

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CHAPTER EIGHT
LANGUAGE, PEACE, AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Francisco Gomes de Matos

This chapter aims at contributing to the understanding of the interrelationship of language, peace, and conflict resolution by drawing on approaches, insights, and practices from interdisciplinary sources. It is organized in three sections, beginning with a discussion of the key concepts in the title and an updated, expanded definition of language. The second section summarizes the implications, for applied peace linguistics, of four communication-based approaches to conflict resolution, selected from the literature in English and Portuguese. In the third section, implications are drawn for the preparation of peaceful language users; examples are given for a mnemonically based technique designed to help language users communicate peacefully in sociopolitical contexts. The chapter concludes with a call for the integration of language, peace, and conflict as a new type of communicative right and responsibility to be considered in the peace education of language users.

CONCEPTS OF LANGUAGE, PEACE, AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

To examine the interconnectedness of language, peace, and conflict resolution would call for probing each core concept in the perspective of each of the three fields and then relationally. Instead, I provide a brief description of how linguists, peace educators and psychologists, and conflict

resolution researchers view those fundamental processes for human interaction, growth, and development.

What is language? is the first question posed by scientists called linguists, whose goals may be broad and deep. Thus, a look at the table of contents of a reference work by Crystal and Crystal (2000) shows that linguists' interests can range from the nature of language—analysis of its structure, diversity, functions, meanings, forms—through its uses and effects (friendly or unfriendly). How do linguists define or characterize language? In that source we find these statements: "Language is a purely human and non-instinctive method of communicating ideas, emotions and desires by means of a system of voluntarily produced symbols" (Sapir, 2000), and, "Language is a social fact" (de Saussure, 2000). Definitions of *language* reflect the theoretical or applicational views of definers; thus, cognitively oriented linguists might regard language as "a cognitive system which is part of a human being's mental or psychological structure" (Atkinson and others, 1999, p. 1).

The most recurring defining element in these lists of traits of language is that of systematicity. In my surveys of the literature for distinguishing features of language (Gomes de Matos, 1973, 1994), the view of language as a system occurred more frequently than descriptions: "Language is social," for example, or, "Language varies/changes." Although lists of traits of language have been enriched with the cognitive dimension, an important feature has been conspicuously missing: that of humanization. To fill that conceptual gap, I suggested that "the humanizing nature of language" be added to the linguistics literature (Gomes de Matos, 1994, p. 106). In merely stating that language is human, we do not do full justice to another distinguishing trait of that system: its humanizing power. Such a trait would subsume both making language human (the

traditional sense) and making language humane (the newer sense). Realistically, such characterization of language would be worded so as to cover both its humanizing and dehumanizing power, because, as linguists Bolinger (1980) and Crystal and Crystal (2000) have emphasized, language can also be used as a weapon.

That such a (de)humanizing trait of language is still invisible in works for a general audience can be seen from looking through dictionaries. Thus, *Random House Webster's College Dictionary* (1997, p. 737) carries on the tradition of defining language as "communication using a system of arbitrary vocal sounds, written symbols, signs, or gestures in conventional ways with conventional meanings," but it does not make the dehumanizing trait explicit, despite offering its readers a useful section on avoiding insensitive and offensive language, with examples of linguistic sexism and ageism. If I were to update definitions of *language* within the perspective adopted for this chapter, I would sum it up in this way: language is a mental marvel for peaceful meaning making and problem solving. Such formulation reflects the fact that we are cognitive, communicative, creative, and (potentially) peaceful language users.

Another critical question is: Have the concepts of peace and conflict been dealt with in the linguistics literature? The answer is in the affirmative, but minimally so, with possible increasing attention as peace linguistics gains momentum. This emerging branch of linguistics is the study of the interaction of language and peace for improving human communicative life. Interestingly, the expression *linguistics of conflict* appears in a sociolinguistics book (Downes, 1998) and "Discourse and Conflict" is the title of a chapter in a comprehensive handbook (Schiffrin, Tannen, and Hamilton, 2001). Precursorily, dehumanization (through vocabulary and

syntax) is discussed in Van Dijk's *Handbook for Discourse Analysis* (1985). What about peace? How do linguists define or characterize it? A suggested definition is given by Hungarian scholars Szepe and Horanyi in a publication sponsored by the World Federation of Modern Language Teachers Association (1995, p. 66): "Peace is a dynamic process of cooperation for the resolution of conflicts." Significantly, in that book, we are told that in UNESCO's Linguapax Program, "Language can be viewed in a broader sense, as the merger of two global fields: language and peace" (p. 65).

Given this chapter's threefold conceptual focus—language, peace, and conflict resolution—two exemplary definitions of *peace* by scholars of conflict resolution seem appropriate: one by Yarn, author of the *Dictionary of Conflict Resolution* (1999)—"Peace: state or condition of quiet, security, justice, and tranquility" (Yarn, personal communication, September 15, 2001)—and the other from Deutsch: "Peace—whether intrapsychic, interpersonal, intragroup, or international—is a state of harmonious cooperation among the entities involved" (personal communication, October 6, 2003).

Before looking at the third concept in this chapter's title, conflict resolution, let's see how pervasive the underlying concept of conflict is in a recent lexicographic volume of interest to researchers in conflict resolution and in peace linguistics: Sharp's *Dictionary of Power and Struggle* (Sharp, 2012). In its 997 entries, there are 102 in which the concept-term *conflict* occurs. Thus, we are led to agree with Sharp, a political scientist, that "we live in a world filled with conflicts" (p. 1). Here is the alphabetically arranged list of entries in that pioneering lexicon in which use is made of the noun *conflict* . Note that eight entries refer to specific types of conflict, but many other forms of conflict are discussed or mentioned in the dictionary: *accommodation, ambush, arbitration, authority backlash,*

battle, case history, casualty, civilian, civilian struggle, civil resistance, civil war, class struggle, coercion, collaboration, combat, commercial resistance, commercial war, compromise, conciliation, conflict, conflict resolution, conflict studies, contingency plans, conversion, decollaboration, defeat, defiance of blockade, demolition, domestic conflict, dynamics of violent action, economic nonintercourse, escalation, Fabian tactics, fearless, fight, front, general administrative noncooperation, grand strategy, guerrilla warfare, indirect strategy, industrial conflict, institutionalized violence, intergroup conflict, intersocietal conflict, intrasocietal conflict, irregular warfare, just war, leadership, logistics, maneuver, Marxism, mechanism of change, mediation, militancy, militant, military, military war, negotiation, neutrality, nonviolent struggle, occupation forces, open conflict, opponents, pacifism, peace, peacekeeper, peacekeeping, peace research, political ambush, political warfare, politics, professional strike, protracted struggle, provisional government, public opinion, realism, reconciliation, repression, sabotage, seizure of assets, selective patronage, social conflict, social distance, solidarity, strategic advance, strategy, strike, struggle group, struggle technique, subversion, success, tactic, terror, third parties, truce, ultimatum, unconventional warfare, violent action, war, war resistance .

Sharp defines *conflict resolution* as “the diverse ways in which conflicts are settled without violence.” Such ways “include arbitration, conciliation, judicial or legislative action, negotiation and other approaches” (p. 96). How would peace researchers define *conflict resolution* ? A renowned peace educator says, “Conflict is a part of all our lives: yet few of us have the skills to transform conflict from a painful destructive process to one of significant learning and constructive change” (Reardon, 2001, p. 103). She

cogently argues that “conflict resolution is one function of non-violence” (p. 106).

Mention of violence is a good reminder of the major goal of this chapter: helping to integrate language, peace, and conflict resolution as an approach to understanding, preventing, monitoring, overcoming, and, if possible, eliminating forms of communicative violence in our personal lives, our communities, and the world. Alas, that human beings can be communicatively violent is easy to demonstrate through a list of thirty verbs in English expressing violent communicative acts: *abuse, antagonize, attack, belittle, blow off steam, browbeat, bully, coerce, calumniate, debase, defame, deprecate, discriminate, disparage, disrespect, degrade, force, fustigate, humiliate, intimidate, insult, irritate, mock, offend, oppress, ridicule, scorn, slander, stigmatize* , and *vilify* .

As an instructive and revealing exercise, readers are urged to produce a corresponding list of verbs representing peaceful communicative acts. Would these lexical items outnumber those in the list of verbally destructive actions? Here are some peace-enhancing verbs (contextualization would provide the necessary positiveness): *affirm, agree, acknowledge, applaud, approve, assist, benefit, bless, build, celebrate, commend, compliment, congratulate, console, construct, dignify, encourage, enhance, exalt, hail, help, honor, improve, like, love, praise, promote, recommend, reconcile* , and *respect* . That human beings need to be educated as peaceful language users is one of the chief motivations for writing this chapter. Another reason is the powerful and pervasive role that metaphors play in the uses of languages, especially with representations of conflict, war, and peace.

To illustrate how much language users activate metaphors based on war, here is a list of verbs Ellison (2002) used:

attack, be vulnerable, camouflage, counterattack, deface, disarm, entrap, fight, fight back, retaliate, sabotage , and *supply with ammunition* . Given this chapter's focus on the interplay of language, peace, and conflict resolution, a strategy for enhancing language users' awareness of the pervasiveness of war-based metaphors is what I call the use of contrastive metaphors. It consists of presenting sets of three verbs, displayed as a continuum from war based to peace based: "X attacked/strongly criticized/questioned Y's views. X's views conflict/differ from/are not the same as mine. Of Y's argument, X demolished it/showed that it was wrong/showed that it was questionable."

This practice of using contrastive metaphors in continuums of human attitudes, emotions, and feelings could have its place in the educational sun all over the world. After having characterized language, here is a brief definition of the science that is exclusively focused on language, both theoretically and applicationally: linguistics.

Linguistics is the scientific study of language, that is, of the universal human faculty of communication and expression as realized through specific systems called languages. Applied linguistics (AL) is an interdisciplinary field that addresses an increasing variety of language-based problems in areas such as language learning and teaching, literacy, language contact, language policy and planning, language pathology, and language use. (For details, see Grabe, 2002.) Given the diversity of research approaches in AL (Duff, 2002) and the increasing importance of peace and conflict in the social and political sciences, it is natural to expect a growing interest among applied linguists in peaceful and conflictive aspects of language use.

I started to explore the connection between language and peace in the early 1990s through workshops and seminars on constructive communication in Portuguese, the outcome

of which was a book advocating a pedagogy of positiveness (Gomes de Matos, 1996). I had presented the core concept underlying that approach—communicative peace—in a sociolinguistics publication three years earlier (Gomes de Matos, 1993) and revisited it in a brief discussion for a journal that was new in the field of peace education at the time (Gomes de Matos, 2005a). *Peace linguistics* is an emerging approach with a focus on peaceful/nonviolent uses of languages and an emphasis on "attitudes which respect the dignity of individual language users and communities" (Crystal, 1999, p. 255). Its complementary side, applied peace linguistics (APL), could be defined as an interdisciplinary approach aimed at helping educational systems create conditions for the preparation of human beings as peaceful language users. My commitment to APL reflects the conviction that every citizen should have the right to learn to communicate peacefully for the good of humankind (Gomes de Matos, 2005b).

IMPLICATIONS FOR AN APPLIED PEACE LINGUISTICS

After briefly characterizing *linguistics, applied linguistics, peace linguistics* , and *applied peace linguistics* —an Internet search for such terms can be instructive—attention in this section focuses on possible implications of four language-based approaches to conflict resolution. The key question is, "What implications can we draw that would inspire work in APL?" Because limitations of space prevent the exploration of different kinds of implications, I have opted to examine educational implications as a means of translating some key concepts and insights from each conflict resolution approach (CRA) into an applied peace linguistics perspective.

Nonviolent Communication

The first CRA, known as nonviolent communication, is grounded on a broadly based conceptual repertoire: appreciation, compassion, conflict, feeling(s)/nonfeelings, judgments, needs, positive action, responsibility, and vocabulary (for feelings).

Because our focus here is on applications of CRA by human beings as language users, Rosenberg, the author of *Nonviolent Communication* (2003), included a chapter in that book titled “Applying NVC in Our Lives and World.” The finding of such applicational sense in a conflict resolution (CR) work helps bring together its author—in this case, a psychologist—and applied linguists engaged in peaceful communication.

How can the key concepts in NVC be translated into APL? A simple way of bringing the two approaches closer is to add the adjective *communicative* to each of the concepts in the NVC system, thus: *communicative appreciation, communicative compassion, communicative conflict, communicative responsibility* , and so forth. The addition of *communicative* gives each NVC concept greater specificity and serves as a reminder to language users that peace in and through language is a varied and vast territory inhabited by interrelated dimensions.

Another educationally relevant contribution of the NCV to APL is its two lists of vocabulary for feelings (Rosenberg, 2003). The first list, of adjectives representing positive feelings (needs being met), can serve as a checklist of communicative responsibilities. In such spirit, language users would be challenged to be *communicatively affectionate, appreciative, cheerful, free, friendly, good humored, loving, optimistic, peaceful, pleasant, tender* , and *warm* . That same enumeration could become a list of nouns, representing communicatively desirable actions:

communicative affection, appreciation , and so forth. The second list Rosenberg provided is focused on negative feelings (needs not being met). Accordingly, language users could use them as reminders of what to avoid in interacting with other human beings. Such a preventive or self-monitoring checklist would include, for example, *communicative anger, bitterness, despair, exasperation, hostility, impatience, irritation, pessimism, resentment, shock* , and *wretchedness* . A third inspiring insight from NVC could be borrowed by applied peace linguists: the translation of judgmental vocabulary and phraseology into nonjudgmental, peace-promoting equivalents. Provocatively, Rosenberg makes a case against the objectionable use of *should* when it creates shame or guilt. He argues that "this violent word, which we commonly use to evaluate ourselves, is so deeply ingrained in our consciousness that many of us would have trouble imagining how to live without it," and he counsels, "Avoid shoulding yourself!" (Rosenberg, 2003, p. 131).

Rosenberg's mention of violent words provides food for thought and action by applied peace linguists. What violent vocabulary do we use not only about other human beings but about ourselves, and how can that be self-monitored? How can our condition of peaceful communicative creatures be improved in that respect? The seemingly unconscious use of negative verbs, which may reflect imposed authority or oppression, would be another area for collaborative investigation by CR experts and applied peace linguists. An example would be a teacher's use of the verb *force* in a classroom context: "I don't force my students to read texts aloud in front of the class." In this case, the humanizing verb expected of a peaceful-language-aware educator would be *ask* . Two other authoritarian verbs that may be found in teacher discourse are *have* and *let* , as in these remarks heard during a teacher education workshop:

“Do you have your students share their notes with their peers?” (alternate humanizing verbs: *ask, encourage*), and, “I let/allow my students to use a bilingual dictionary, during essay writing in English” (alternate humanizing equivalents: “I assure my students their right . . .” or, more empathically, “My students have the right . . .”). The very use of *should* in classroom instructions can also be questioned. Thus, saying, “One student should assume the role of minigroup leader,” instead of *could* may reflect the fact that teachers and teacher educators are unaware of the humanizing nature of language use, a trait of language that is new in the linguistics and communication literature.

Nonviolent Communication Research

Founded in 1984 by far-sighted, innovative psychologist Marshall Rosenberg, the Center for Nonviolent Communication has grown into an international nonprofit organization that provides expertise in the NVC approach through a network of “well over 150 certified trainers worldwide” (Cox and Dannahy, 2005, p. 41). Given its longevity and increasing internationalization, NVC has been tested in varied contexts.

According to Thomas P. Caruso (personal communication, November 2, 2005), research was conducted in Costa Rica in 2004 on the impact of NVC training at the Elias Castro School of Excellence; in the United States in 2002 as A Step toward Violence Prevention: NVC, part of a college curriculum; in the Netherlands in 200l on NVC as a way to reduce violence in kindergartens; in Finland in 2001 on how NVC reduces bullying by 26 percent at the International School of Helsinki; and in Yugoslavia in 1996 as “Mutual Education: Giraffe Language in Kindergartens and Schools” (the giraffe, the land animal with the largest heart, is the symbol for the compassionate language advocated by NVC practitioners). Researchers in conflict

resolution can gain a sense of the high quality of empirical research on the effects of NVC by reading a 2005 paper by Cox and Dannahy in which they use the Rosenberg model "as a way of developing the openness needed for successful communication in e-mentoring relationships." According to those researchers (one from the United States, the other from the United Kingdom), "there is evidence to suggest that the use of NVC, with its focus on feelings and needs, encourages trusting relationships characterized by openness." Interestingly, they continue, "Case study research was undertaken with students participating in an online coaching and mentoring module that formed part of a Masters degree at a British university." In their conclusion, they state that "the most noteworthy indication of NVC's ability to facilitate electronic dialogue is illustrated through the speed at which in-depth relationships were forged with students." (For insights into applied research possibilities by NVC for individual and group practice, *Nonviolent Communication: Companion Workbook* by Leu, 2003, is well worth reading.)

Appreciative Inquiry

This approach places "language at the center of human organizing and change" (Whitney and Trosten-Bloom, 2003, p. 53) and characterizes that system as "the vehicle by which communities of people create knowledge and make meaning" (p. 56). Four key concepts of appreciative inquiry (AI) are positive change, meaning making, freedoms, and power. *Positive change* emphasizes the positive potential of people and organizations by focusing on "the best of what has been, what is, and what might be" (p. 15). From a peace linguistics perspective, AI authors believe that "words create worlds" and that language has the power to create social change and reality (p. 53). The term *meaning making* means the sharing of interview data—stories,

quotes, and inspirational highlights—for deeper interaction. *Freedoms* , “six conditions for the liberation of power” (p. 238), include the freedom to be heard. In AI, “having no voice . . . is the experience of the oppressed. To be heard is to have a recognized and credible voice”(p. 241). By *power* the authors mean “the capacity to create, innovate, and positively influence the future” or “an unlimited relational resource” (p. 236). Also of possible applicational interest is AI’s “Positive Principle: Positive Questions Lead to Positive Change”(p. 66). Such formulation is similar to the philosophy underlying the checklist for asking questions positively proposed by Gomes de Matos (1996).

Although Whitney and Trosten-Bloom (2003) do not deal explicitly with the core concept of conflict, examples are provided of communicative conflicts in the workplace. Of additional interest, especially to researchers in typologies of conflict, is Whitney and Trosten-Bloom’s mention of AI meetings of people experiencing conflicts of a cultural, generational, or religious nature. Those researchers in organizational change acknowledge the relevance of the field of positive psychology and claim that the approach initiated by American Psychological Association president Martin Seligman in 1998, “along with Appreciative Inquiry, may well revolutionize the way that we live, work, and organize our families, communities, and businesses” (p. 85). For applied peace linguists, it is gratifying to learn from Whitney and Trosten-Bloom that “psychologists, like organization development consultants, believe that, to contribute constructively to human and societal well-being, they need to develop a vocabulary of joy, hope, and health” (p. 85).

Research on AI

Appreciative inquiry, a process for positive change, had its beginnings at Case Western Reserve University in 1985. It

is being used by businesses, educational institutions, health care systems, governments, and communities in the United States and abroad. As Whitney and Trosten-Bloom state, "Appreciative Inquiry (AI) is a bold invitation to be positive. . . . Over and over people have told us that AI works, in part, because it gives people the Freedom to be Positive" (2003, p. 250). The positive impact of AI comes from its capacity to bring together and liberate the power of diverse groups of people. In a personal communication (November 2, 2005), Whitney clarifies that

> research into why AI works shows that its 4-D Cycle (discovery, dream, design, and delivery) is effective as a change process for five reasons: 1) it lets people meet and be known to each other in relationships rather than in roles; 2) it enables people to be heard for what they value and care about; 3) it creates opportunities for people to share their dreams in a broader community of colleagues and friends; 4) it fosters an environment in which people are able to choose how they want to contribute; and 5) it builds systems and structures through which people are supported in taking risks to create and to innovate.

Ríos and Fisher (2003) provide an example of the use of AI as a tool for conflict transformation in which they explore how the positive features of AI might help bring about reconciliation between conflicting parties in the long-standing maritime conflict between Bolivia and Chile. In their conclusion, the two researchers say that "although AI applications in corporate and community settings have been successful in addressing complicated issues, scenarios of deep-rooted and longstanding conflict within or between countries can bring quite different challenges" (p. 247). According to Whitney, "It is AI's relational, narrative approach to the cooperative discovery of what matters to people that is at the heart of its success as a

process for creating positive futures in human organizations and communities" (personal communication, May 2, 2005). (On other uses of AI methodology, see Sampson, Abu-Nimer, Liebler, and Whitney, 2003.)

Powerful Nondefensive Communication

This approach shares with NVC the use of the negative prefix *non* , which has been universalized in such foundational concepts as Gandhi's *nonviolence* , a term coined in 1915, meaning "the policy or practice of refraining from the use of violence, as in protesting oppressive authority" (*Random House Webster's College Dictionary* , 1997, p. 891). When asked why she used a negative hyphenated word, *non-defensive* , powerful non-defensive communication (NDC) author Ellison explains that she "couldn't find a word in the English language that describes how to communicate without (a) being dependent on the other person's cooperation and (b) joining in the power struggle" (personal communication, April 21, 2005). She adds that "most of the words like *peaceful, cooperative* , and so on, inspire most people to think of the cooperative." She continues, "My process allows people to speak with power regardless of whether s/he cooperates."

On Ellison's combining *power* and *non-defensiveness* in her book's subtitle, T*he Art of Powerful Non-Defensive Communication* , she clarifies that people respond strongly to those two adjectives together and want to know more about being powerful and non-defensive at the same time (personal communication, April 21, 2005).

The core concepts in powerful non-defensive communication (PNDC) are power, the war model (a traditional system of communicating), and the powerful nondefensive model (tools instead of weapons). Although the term *peace* is conspicuously absent from the book's

index, it is given prominence in its conclusion: “Peace and Power.” In another personal message, Ellison sums up her approach to power, language, and peace in this way: “The tendency toward power struggle among individuals and groups of people and conflict in epidemic proportions is often seen simply as human nature. It seems to be the story of recorded human history. I believe that we have used a particular understanding of power as the foundation of all human communication and if we were to change how we conceive of power and use it, we could change human destiny” (August 10, 2005). Ellison states that “the war model reflects a unilateral view of power, with subsequent need to control and manipulate expressed in how we use language, asking questions that are interrogating, making statements of opinion as fact, and trying to convince others to agree, as well as making predictions designed to threaten or punish others.” She clarifies that in the war model, reciprocity is seen as being effective only if others cooperate and argues that the alternative is what she call reciprocal power: “where I choose how to respond to you based on how you treat me, but I do not try to control you, or convince you to be different. I call the language for this system powerful non-defensive communication.” She goes on to explain,

> In this system, reciprocity is not dependent on anyone else's cooperation. I simply judge how much I do for you and with you based on how you treat me. Of course, there is still oppression and many circumstances where one person or group can use violence to take control. However, my belief is that in millions of personal interactions, reciprocal power expressed through a powerful non-defensive system of language not only has more power for the individual using it, but the other person is very likely to disarm their own defenses. This non-defensive system of language addresses the human need for connection, love and respect.

In Ellison's concluding remarks, she speaks of what I call communicative peace: "If we change how we communicate in our own families and communities, it will begin to change our human mindset and someday, when one more person changes to a non-defensive way of listening and speaking, using power in reciprocal ways, . . . our wisdom can guide us in finding peaceful solutions to the global issues that we all face." Of special interest for applied peace linguists in Ellison's applicational insights might be her description of questions, statements, and predictions as tools of PNDC; her formats for NDC (content- or process-based questions, descriptive statements, if-type predictions); and a list of individual reactions in interactions.

Constructive Communication

My approach, described in greater length in Portuguese (Gomes de Matos, 1996, 2002a) and briefly in English (Gomes de Matos, 2000, 2001, 2002b, 2005b), reflects the assumption that communicating well is communicating for the good of humankind. In my 1996 book, I provided several checklists and guidelines on how to communicate

constructively. The following sample guidelines are translated from the text in Portuguese:

How to Interact Positively

1. Help integrate seemingly conflicting points of view (yours and your conversational partner's).
2. Be cordial to your linguistic neighbor.
3. React responsibly, in a spirit of dignifying reciprocity.
4. Interact for mutual good and kindness.
5. Find out as much as possible about your interactive neighbor's beliefs and values. Remember: People are more important than problems.
6. Ask for constructive feedback.
7. Form questions positively.

Another checklist is centered on how to write constructively. It was first used by undergraduate students of Portuguese at the local Federal University of Pernambuco, then by police officers in a community policing program sponsored by the Pernambuco State Department of Social Defense and by the Center for Applied Social Sciences:

How to Write Constructively

1. In writing texts for academic or administrative/management purposes, be sure to foster constructive interpersonal relations.
2. In closing a personal exchange (traditional mail or e-mail), enhance interaction with your communicative friend by creating variants for the complimentary close: go beyond *sincerely* , and depending on prevailing weather conditions, wish your addressee sunniest

regards, and so on. Exercise your right to be communicatively creative.

3. In writing to friends, wish them health, peace, friendship, faith, development, and so forth as established by your culture and theirs, or boldly go beyond conventions. Underlying such constructive writing-centered guidelines is the belief that writing well is writing for the good of writers and readers and more broadly, one's group, as well as national, regional, or international communities.

Peace linguists might be interested to know that in my workshops aimed at positive or constructive writing, self-monitoring checklists such as the following are shared:

1. What constructive knowledge do/did I have about my readers?
2. How can/could I contribute to their individual or collective well-being?
3. What constructive values do/did I communicate/enhance/prioritize? How?
4. What constructive vocabulary and phraseology do/did I have to change to communicate more constructively? How?
5. What can/could my text contribute to my readers' (and my own) communicative, cultural, ecological, economic, ethical, moral, political, social, and spiritual well-being?

My constructive communication (CC) approach capitalizes on the applicational possibilities of checklists. Also included in the 1996 book are guidelines on how to read and listen positively (this adverb is often used instead of *constructively*), how to criticize positively, how to interact

with older persons positively, and how to use linguistics at the service of positive communication.

Constructive Communication Research

In more recent work (Gomes de Matos, 2012), I refer to my approach to peace linguistics as LIF PLUS: the life-improving force of peaceful language use. In that work, I provide two applications of my technique rhymed reflections (RRs): a set of four stanzas and a set of twenty-one couplets. Here is one of the four-line RRs:

When with their parents teenagers interact

Disagreements and even conflicts may take place

How could those persons begin to learn to react?

By putting on a smiling friendly face

Following are two of the two-line RRs (slightly adapted for this chapter):

If a conflict we want to manage constructively

Let’s do our best and cooperate creatively

In mediation, Peace can be a conciliatory Power

In meditation, Peace can be a spiritualizing Flower

I also recommend that RRs be considered as the textual component of artistically designed posters. Here is an example: the third stanza of a three-stanza RR produced at the Design Department of Associação Brasil América, Recife, Brazil:

What is meant by being educated for Nonkilling?

It is a globally needed type of educational right

It involves Life-supporting-saving-and-preserving

and serves Humankind as a peace-promoting light

And here is my reason for using RRs as a psychoeducational-communicative technique:

Cognitively, rhymed reflections are mnemonic

but they can have a deep function: being solomonic

Phonetically, they are pairs of reflections that rhyme

Semantically, they are vocabulary mountains for us to climb

Creatively, RRs are imaginatively wrought

and provide us with more alternatives to be sought

To languages as meaningful mental marvels, RRs pay tribute

To the VERSEtility of language users, such reflections contribute

Rhymed reflections, from the mind and heart, human dignity will elevate

Rhymed reflections, for constructive conflict resolution purposes, will educate

Given its relatively young age and the fact that its two foundational works were published in Portuguese (Gomes de Matos, 1996, 2002a), the constructive communication approach has experienced somewhat more diffusion in Brazil, but it is slowly becoming known in English. (For two examples, see Gomes de Matos, 2001, in which the pedagogy of positiveness is applied to diplomatic communication, and Gomes de Matos, 2005b, in which uses of peaceful language are discussed and exemplified.)

Empirical research on the effects of such approaches is still to be conducted, but it seems to hold promise for an understanding of some of the challenges facing language users when being asked to explore the friendly-to-unfriendly communication continuum, through the use of contrastive metaphors, as illustrated in this chapter. Gomes de Matos's book on communicative peace (2002a) was reviewed in English by Rector (2003). According to the University of North Carolina linguist, "the book is a new step in the development of linguistic theory" and "it constitutes an interdisciplinary work, intertwining philosophy, psychology, and social sciences." The reviewer adds that Gomes de Matos "suggests a method for achieving a positive and humane communication for peace" and "teaches how to be positive and avoid being offensive or destructive."

A brief appraisal in English of the constructive communication approach can be found in a linguistic introduction to Portuguese by Berkeley linguist Azevedo (2005, p. 290): "Research on negative language . . . has led some scholars to make a case for intentional use of positive language as a strategy to improve communication, and ultimately, one would hope, human relations (Gomes de Matos, 1996, 2002b). Whether such efforts can be effective as a tool for social change is an open empirical question."

IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION FOR PEACEFUL LANGUAGE USE

In educating for human rights and responsibilities, one of the still little-explored dimensions in applied peace linguistics has to do with communicative peace, that is, the right to communicative peace, that is, the right every person should have to learn to communicate peacefully for the good of humankind. In such spirit, a plea of mine was

the subject of a message by the president of the International Communication Association (Craig, 2003), in which my formulation is described as an in-depth integration of three fundamental human rights: the right to live in peace, the right to learn, and the right to communicate.

My updated version of that interpretation, with the addition of the notion of conflict resolution, is that human beings should have the right and the responsibility to learn to communicate peacefully in varied societal contexts, especially in challenging, life-threatening situations. The right to communicate constructively is much neglected in schools and other forms of education. This neglect is detrimental to social life and is in need of change. In such spirit, let’s make the humanizing force of language a frequent rather than an occasional feature of communicative use. Accordingly, I make a plea here for organizations committed to helping persons, groups, communities, and nations (re)solve conflicts and disputes to invest more in interdisciplinary research aimed at integrating knowledge about peaceful uses of languages into programs such as Columbia University’s Peace Education Program, which sustains an International Institute of Peace, founded in 1982 by peace educator Betty Reardon (Jenkins, 2005). An emphasis on peaceful communication in such initiatives would reflect the assumption of the need for transformative communicative change leading to the preparation of citizens as peaceful users of languages, a systematic practice conspicuously absent from school curricula in Brazil, for instance, and presumably in most other countries.

To provide a concise view of some implications of the approaches dealt with in the preceding section, I turn to my THRIL (threefold repetition of the initial letter) technique, inspired by the long-cherished literary tradition

of alliteration, still underexplored in communicatively vital contexts such as conflict resolution.

What follows are four sets of alliteration through which key concepts and insights from each approach are presented. Readers are urged to apply their alliterative talents to their readings in the CR field; it may prove both entertaining and provocative. By creating such alliteration, you make dual use of your meaning-making marvel—your mind: (1) you try as best you can to accurately translate some of the philosophy underlying each approach and (2) you challenge your ability to be concise, thus enhancing memorability. To illustrate how such a practice of making meaningful, memorable messages can be used effectively in political science contexts, here is a set created for a lecture given to students of international relations at a college, Faculdade Integrada do Recife. Only some letters have been selected for inclusion:

AAA—Aim at affinity and alliance.

BBB—Build bridges between nations.

CCC—Consider conflicts constructively.

DDD—Dignify your diplomatic discourse.

GGG—Generate gentleness and generosity.

HHH—Harvest humanity and humaneness.

III— Inspire for integration and interdependence.

LLL—Let liberty be the light.

MMM—Maximize mediation and meditation.

NNN—Nurture national negotiating styles.

PPP—Perceive persons as peace partners.

RRR—Recommend realistic reconciliation.

SSS—Support and sustain human solidarity.

TTT—Treat others with tact and tolerance.

VVV—Veto all varieties of violence.

WWW—Weigh your words wisely.

Nonviolent Communication

EEE—Express yourself empathically rather than evaluatively.

CCC—Communicate by connecting compassionately.

VVV—Value a vital vocabulary for feelings.

Appreciative Inquiry

AAA—Act amiably and appreciatively.

CCC—Communicate for cooperation and change.

FFF—Foster faith and freedom.

Powerful Nondefensive Communication

CCC—Communicate constructively with compassion.

RRR—Relate through reciprocity and respect.

PPP—Promote peaceful power.

Constructive Communication

CCC—Communicate through cordial, caring language.

LLL—Love your linguistic neighbors in all lands.

MMM—Monitor your manipulative messages.

As a creative practice, alliteration has much to offer inquiring minds in all domains of human knowledge,

especially those that call for language-peace-and-conflict awareness, a much needed trio in today's increasingly turbulent world. In closing, may communicative peace be with you, so that in your language-based conflicts and disputes, you act as true humanizers, humanists who are imbued with the ideals of human rights, justice, peace, and dignity and who, with a keen sense of global social responsibility, apply such values for the improvement of the human communicative condition everywhere.

LANGUAGE IN PEACE-BUILDING TEACHER EDUCATION

The focus of this chapter has been the interaction of three core concepts: language, peace, and conflict resolution. How about their integration in materials aimed at the preparation of educators as communicative peace builders from a conflict-management-resolution perspective? As an inspiring example of that, a description will be made of a recent publication, sponsored by the US Institute of Peace: *Peacebuilding Toolkit for Educators: High School Lessons* (Milofsky, 2011). The book is the outcome of a collective effort: the editor plus seven contributors with expertise and experience in a variety of fields, among them teacher education, international education, curricula development, conflict resolution, teaching of ethics, and public policy. As a peace linguist, I was attracted by the book's practical treatment of conflict and language. In two of its three sections are four lessons focused on conflict (definition, identification of conflict elements, identification of conflict style, conflict mediation), one lesson on nonverbal communication (the authors remind us that "about 80 percent of our communication is nonverbal," p. 57), and one lesson on active listening, in which seven techniques

are presented according to a tripartite framework of purpose, method, and example.

The example component consists of phraseologies used for such purposes as encouraging, restating, clarifying, empathizing, summarizing, and reframing. Given the relevance of phraseologies in human linguistic interaction, the illustrative phraseologies found in the handout for active listening techniques may not only draw readers' attention but challenge them to contribute to the promising area of cross-linguistic phraseological studies: the comparison of set phrases (e.g., on apologies, agreement, conciliation, dignity, empathy, persuasion, problem solving). Two examples of listening actively (humanizingly, peacefully) are, "I can understand how you would perceive that as a threat" (p. 68), and, "Let's see how we can work together to address your concern" (p. 69). One of the bits of communicative advice given is worth quoting: "In redirecting negative or adversarial statements, use neutral or positive rather than accusatory language" (p. 69). Although addressed to educators in a US context, this tool kit can be adapted to other contexts sharing the authors' conviction that students should be encouraged "to think critically about the world around them and their place in it" (p. 7).

The Rise of Nonkilling Linguistics

A recent initiative of the Honolulu-based Center for Global Nonkilling should be brought to the attention of readers of this third edition: the launching of the volume *Nonkilling Linguistics: Practical Applications* (Friedrich, 2012). It includes the pioneering chapter, "Nonkilling Linguistics," coauthored by Patricia Friedrich and Francisco Gomes de Matos, originally published in *Toward a Nonkilling Paradigm* (Pim, 2009). The volume contains an interview with Gomes de Matos, in which suggestions are made for

applications of nonkilling linguistics. This emerging branch of linguistics aims at using principles of linguistics to help language users avoid and prevent acts of communicative violence and killing. Recognition of the relevance of nonkilling linguistics can be found in Deutsch (2010). In his poster-review, Deutsch states, “Gomes de Matos’ poems are a contribution to the world.” Given the relationship between peace linguistics and nonkilling linguistics, developments in both initiatives should prove inspiring to practitioners of conflict resolution.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have offered to readers a sense of the theoretical and applied dimensions related to the emerging area of applied peace linguistics. I have summarized the key concepts of language, peace, and conflict resolution and have described their interrelationship through a synthesis of implications from four communication-based approaches to conflict resolution, three of them from the United States and one from Brazil. Finally, I have provided examples of applications of communicative peace and have called for a new type of communicative right and responsibility to be considered in the education of peaceful language users:

> In such spirit what do peace linguists recommend?
>
> Language, Peace, and Conflict Resolution
>
> Let’s constructively blend.

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APPENDIX: ON LANGUAGES

A Poem-Plea by Francisco Gomes de Matos

What is a language? A mental marvel
Used for all kinds of meaning making
But how can we integrate languages
Into the blessed ways of peace making?
By avoiding forms of verbal abuse
Preventing aggressive acts of discourse
So that our communicative intentions
Can be free from a collision course
Being communicatively empathic and friendly
In speaking, listening, reading, writing, or signing
By interacting with persons, groups, communities
In language that is linguistically dignifying
For languages to shine everywhere
And deeply touch the human soul
Let’s promote peaceful language
And make it a permanent goal
Ensuring for everyone the right to learn
Is a universal human rights priority
Learning to communicate peacefully
Should also be a vital necessity
Language uses can be loaded
It’s like a weapon, some would say
Instead, let’s give it PeacePower
And make it a truly humane way
As language users, each of us is different

But in one role very much alike we can be:
That of acting as peaceful meaning makers
And believing a kinder world there will be

CHAPTER NINE
THE PSDM MODEL *Integrating Problem Solving and Decision Making in Conflict Resolution*

Eben A. Weitzman
Patricia Flynn Weitzman

One way to think about what people do when they resolve conflict is that they solve a problem together. Another way to think about it is that they make a decision—again, together. Sometimes problem solving and decision making are treated as synonymous. For convenience, we distinguish between the two in order to make clearer the ways in which they complement each other, even though the processes are intermingled in the course of conflict resolution. In the "Problem Solving" section of this chapter, we discuss diagnosis of the conflict and also the development of alternative possibilities for resolving a conflict. In "Decision Making," we consider a range of the kinds of decisions people involved in resolving conflict have to make, both individually and together, including choice among the alternative possibilities and commitment to the choice that is made. When faced with the necessity for commitment and choice, the parties may decide that the alternatives are inadequate and reiterate the process of diagnosis and development of alternatives (problem solving); there may be repeated cycles of such reiteration before a conflict is resolved. This implies a cooperative conflict resolution process consisting of four general phases: (1) diagnosing the conflict, (2) identifying alternative solutions, (3) evaluating and choosing a mutually acceptable solution, and (4) committing to the decision and implementing it. As we discuss in this chapter, this process is not strictly linear, and

it will often be necessary to loop back through parts of it repeatedly.

It is thus possible to think about problem solving and decision making as components of a broader conflict resolution process. Research and practice over the past few decades have shown these ways of thinking about conflict to be profitable for both understanding conflict and developing constructive approaches to resolving it. We begin by suggesting a simple model of the interaction between problem-solving and decision-making processes in conflict resolution. This model introduces a framework and guide for the remainder of the chapter.

A SIMPLE MODEL

In figure 9.1 , we suggest an integrated model of problem solving and decision making in conflict resolution. (For simplicity, we refer to it as the *PSDM model* .) When people are unable to resolve conflict constructively, they are in some way unable or unwilling to reach a resolution that is to all parties—at the least—acceptable. There are many potential sources of such stuckness. Their interests might appear to be (or actually be) incompatible; they might be too angry with one another to talk constructively; they might have fundamental differences in values about the subject of their conflict or about processes for resolving it; they may hold different versions of “the truth” about what has already happened, what will happen, or about any of the “facts” involved; they may have different views of, or desires for, the nature of their relationship, or they may have deep misunderstandings that are hard to sort out. (Because the word *interests* is often understood as a reference to the tangible outcomes people may be seeking, we use the term *concerns* to encompass not only interests but also values, emotional investments, views of reality, and so on.)




Figure 9.1 An Integrated Model of Problem Solving and Decision Making in Conflict Resolution

We could say, then, that there is a complex puzzle, or problem, to be solved: putting together the various interests, values, preferences, realities, emotional investments, and so on, of the parties involved and finding a solution that accounts for these at least well enough. In that sense, problem solving needs to take place. Along the way, there are many decisions to be made, both individually and together (see figure 9.1). The private decisions include prioritizing concerns, evaluating proposals, figuring out whether to offer or seek more, and deciding whether to trust, to name a few. Decisions to be made together may concern processes to be used, whether and when to get help from a third party, choices from among the options generated during problem solving, and whether to enter into an agreement. Some of these decisions are made *during* the course of problem solving and some *after* the problem-solving process has yielded a set of alternatives to

consider. One possible decision to be made afterward is whether the options generated are adequate or inadequate. If inadequate, the parties must return to another round of problem solving. So, the process may be iterative, necessitating repeated return to the problem-solving stage until the parties decide to agree.

The rest of this chapter aims to move us through this outlined process. To do so, we must understand the parts of the process, and how they work.

Note that in what follows, the lists of decisions to be made are intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.

PROBLEM SOLVING

Broadly speaking, problem-solving approaches to understanding and resolving conflict deal with conflict as a puzzle, or interpersonal dilemma, to be worked out. There are two fundamental parts to the problem-solving process:

1. Diagnosing the conflict (figuring out what the cause of the stuckness is, or identifying the problem)
2. Developing alternative solutions to the problem

In this section, we give an overview of some problem-solving approaches to conflict resolution. We discuss some of the research that supports the use of problem-solving approaches, as well as research that helps us understand the conditions under which problem solving is more or less likely to be undertaken. We also consider some of the major critiques of problem-solving approaches, both in the literature and out in the field.

Problem Solving as the Search for Good, Constructive, Mutually Satisfying Solutions

An important part of the motivation to engage in problem solving is a desire to take some of the heat out of the process—to move people away from being stuck in their anger, their desire for revenge, and so on, and focus them on finding a way out.

One view of how problem-solving approaches attempt to do this has to do with a particular understanding of what the word *problem* means. One sense of the word is as dilemma, obstacle, difficulty, or predicament—generally, a bad thing. Another is as puzzle, enigma, riddle, or question—often seen as a challenge and even an opportunity for growth. Conflicts are often felt to be problems in the first sense of the word: as difficulties or predicaments. Problem-solving approaches to conflict resolution attempt to recast the conflict as a problem in the second sense—as puzzles or riddles—and attempt to engage the parties in solving those puzzles. In a training or intervention, we might hear the notion put something like this: "We're in conflict. We can fight it out, or work it out. If we're going to work it out, let's figure out what that would take." (See chapters 1 and 30 in this Handbook for further discussion of reframing a conflict as a mutual problem to be solved cooperatively.)

Along these lines, Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim suggest that "problem solving can be defined as any effort to *develop a mutually acceptable solution to a conflict"* (1994, p. 168; emphasis added). *Developing mutually acceptable solutions* is the hallmark of problem-solving approaches.

A Discussion of Problem-Solving Approaches.

In the third edition of their book *Social Conflict* , Pruitt and Kim (2004) (earlier editions were coauthored with the late Jeffrey Rubin) offer one of the best, most useful discussions available of problem-solving approaches. So it seems worthwhile to devote a few paragraphs to their work at the outset of this chapter.

Although the phrase “any effort” in the preceding quote might leave the definition a bit broad, those authors go on to clarify the highest aspirations of problem-solving approaches:

> At its best, problem solving involves a joint effort to find a mutually acceptable solution. The parties or their representatives talk freely to one another. They exchange information about their interests and priorities, work together to identify the true issues dividing them, brainstorm in search of alternatives that bridge their opposing interests, and collectively evaluate those alternatives from the viewpoint of their mutual welfare. (Pruitt and Kim, 2004, p. 190)

In describing problem-solving approaches, the same authors describe two broad classes of outcomes that can be sought: compromise (meeting in the middle through a process of sacrifice on both sides) and integrative solutions (those in which all parties’ needs are considered and met).

The second type of solution, the integrative, is the hoped-for goal in problem-solving approaches, though it may not always be realistically possible (more on this later). Pruitt and Kim (2004) review a variety of forms for finding such solutions:

- *Expanding the pie* (finding ways to work together to create more of a resource to be divided)
- *Nonspecific compensation* (finding new ways to compensate a party for yielding on an issue)
- *Cost cutting* (finding ways to reduce the cost for a party in yielding on an issue)
- *Logrolling* (each side concedes on issues it believes are less important, building momentum toward agreement and goodwill)

- *Bridging* (new options are created that satisfy critical underlying interests, if not the initial demands that were put on the table)

To illustrate, imagine the case of a hypothetical labor negotiation in which management and a union are divided over a range of issues, including wages, medical insurance, disability, workplace safety conditions, and productivity goals. The first approach, expanding the pie, might entail raising prices to bring in more revenue to support the compensation desired by the union, while also providing more profit for the company. The second, nonspecific compensation, might oblige management to offer, say, additional vacation time or a flex-time arrangement to compensate for a concession on wage demands. Cost cutting might involve finding a new insurance company that is able to provide better benefits without costing the company as much as the old plan would have charged. The parties might also engage in the fourth approach, logrolling: the union concedes on a minor change in productivity goals (which union representatives view as less important in this case), and management concedes on an issue of work safety conditions that is relatively inexpensive to fix.

The combination of agreements builds momentum toward reaching agreement on some of the more difficult issues. Finally, the parties might find a bridging solution, in which moderate redesign of the facility and work flow (1) eliminates the safety issue (union interest) and (2) increases productivity (management interest) without imposing an unacceptable burden on the workers, (3) thereby generating the revenue to pay for increased wages and benefits (union interest) as well as profits (management interest). What makes this bridging solution different from the price-raising, expanding-the-pie example is that it makes use of a new option (redesign) that addresses the various underlying interests on both sides of the table in an integrative way.

A key component, not only to the approach Pruitt and Kim described, but to most of the problem-solving approaches, is analyzing underlying interests—those often unspoken real needs that produce the publicly stated demands in the first place. In addition, Pruitt and Kim suggest pushing further to look for interests under those interests, and so on, in an effort to find interests that are bridgeable—that is, satisfiable in newly created, mutually acceptable ways.

Pruitt and Kim (2004) offer a good description of a problem-solving process for conflicts of interest. They suggest (1) determining whether there is a real conflict of interest; (2) determining one's own interests, setting high aspirations, and sticking to them; and (3) seeking a way to reconcile both parties' aspirations. Note that steps 1 and 2 are part of the diagnosis phase of problem solving, and step 3 represents the phase of generating alternatives. If step 3 is particularly difficult, it may be necessary to lower aspirations and search some more. Steps 2 and 3 represent the core of many problem-solving approaches: developing clarity as to the real issues and interests and developing *mutually satisfactory* solutions.

Evidence of Better Outcomes with Problem-Solving Approaches.

There is evidence for the effectiveness of problem-solving approaches in both the short term (reaching agreements, short-term satisfaction) and the long term (long-term satisfaction with, adherence to, and quality of agreements).

In a key study, Kressel and his colleagues (1994) compared the effectiveness of mediators using a problem-solving style (PSS), focused on good problem solving rather than settlement itself, with those using a settlement-oriented style (SOS), focused on the goal of getting an agreement, "more or less independent of the quality of the agreements" (p. 73), in child custody cases. They found overwhelmingly

that disputants working with mediators using PSS more frequently reached settlement and were more satisfied with their agreements. They also found that the PSS settlements tended to be more durable, produce long-term outcomes of higher quality, leave disputants with more favorable attitudes toward the mediation, and be more likely to have a lasting positive impact on the relationship between parties. It is also important to note that there were some consistent exceptions: for example, when one party bargained in bad faith or was psychologically disturbed, PSS did not produce workable agreements.

Although Kressel and colleagues focused on long-term outcomes, Zubek and her colleagues (1992) looked at short-term benefits of problem-solving behavior in mediation in community mediation centers. They demonstrated a greater likelihood of short-term success in mediation (STSM) with joint problem solving and less STSM with hostile and contending behavior by the conflicting parties. They then looked at the mediator behaviors that led to STSM and found them to include those that stimulate thinking and structure discussion. In addition, the more that mediators applied pressure on disputants to reach agreement, the lower the rates were of reaching agreement and goal achievement, satisfaction with the agreement, and satisfaction with the conduct of the hearing, which lends further support for the PSS versus SOS findings of Kressel and colleagues.

In yet another context, van de Vliert, Euwema, and Huismans (1995) found that problem solving tended to enhance effectiveness in conflict for police sergeants, with both superiors and subordinates. This is the type of traditional, hierarchical context many critics point to as one in which a problem-solving approach is unlikely to gain acceptance or be effective. Furthermore, it is worth noting that problem solving tended to enhance the sergeants'

effectiveness in conflicts with both their subordinates and their superiors (though the latter effect represented a nonsignificant trend).

Finally, Carnevale and Pruitt (1992) reviewed a wide range of both experimental and field research on problem solving in negotiation and mediation. They concluded that problem solving is much more likely than other approaches to lead to win-win solutions to conflicts. In addition, they found that problem solving is more likely both to be engaged in and to be effective, when disputants are concerned about the other party's welfare than when they are focused solely on their own.

Research That Predicts Use of Problem Solving.

Given the potential benefits of problem-solving approaches, it is helpful to know about the conditions under which disputants are more or less likely to engage in problem-solving behavior.

Some information is available. Strutton, Pelton, and Lumpkin (1993) found that if the psychological climate of an organization was characterized by higher levels of (1) cohesion, (2) fairness, (3) recognition of success, and (4) openness to innovation, members were more likely to choose problem-solving and persuasion strategies and less likely to engage in bargaining and politicking. In a study pointing to factors that might inhibit problem solving, Dant and Schul (1992) found that a group making frequent use of integrative problem-solving conflict resolution strategies among its members still preferred directive third-party intervention when stakes were high, issues were complex, there were significant policy implications, and dependence on the organization was high.

Carnevale and Pruitt (1992), as well as Pruitt and Rubin (1986), argue that disputants' relative levels of concern for

their own and each other's interests predict the conflict resolution strategy that is adopted. Thus, when disputants do not care about their own or the other's outcomes, they are likely to adopt a strategy of *inaction;* when they are concerned with the other's outcome but not their own, they are likely to *yield;* and when they are primarily concerned about their own interests, they tend to adopt *contending* strategies. But when disputants are concerned about both their own interests and the other's as well (holding a *dual concern*), they are more likely to engage in problem solving. This suggests that strategies and techniques that help to cultivate a concern for the other's interests and outcomes help to promote problem solving in conflict situations. (See also chapter 1, the "Initiating Cooperation and Competition" section.)

Individual and Social Interaction Perspectives on Problem Solving

Consistent with the viewpoint put forth by Carnevale and Pruitt (1992), another angle on problem solving in conflict has come from the social cognitive literature, particularly from developmental researchers interested in the development of social understanding and its relationship to thought processes during conflict and other social interactions. Within cognitive psychology, problem solving is viewed as a cognitive process, very much in the sense of working through puzzles (solving a math problem, stacking crates to get the banana, and so on). Social cognition theorists have tended to look at conflict resolution as a particular kind of cognitive problem solving, that of solving *interpersonal* problems.

Two complementary ways of looking at interpersonal conflict have arisen from this perspective. One takes an information-processing approach, in which each phase of the interpersonal problem-solving process is analyzed

against an ideal standard (for example, Dodge, 1980; Spivack and Shure, 1976). The individual goes through an internal problem-solving process in determining how to engage with the other. More effective strategies are equated with success at achieving some predetermined outcome. The phases are (1) identifying the problem, (2) generating alternative strategies, (3) evaluating consequences, and (4) using new or different strategies for resolution. It is important to note that these phases may be executed well or poorly and may lead to a decision to engage in contentious, collaborative, or any other type of tactics. Although these phases have been drawn from cognitive psychology, research has shown them to be applicable to the realm of social problems (see review by Rubin and Krasnor, 1986). If collaborative tactics are chosen by both parties, a joint problem-solving process may then occur that can be described with the same four phases.

The other approach emphasizes general social competencies such as communication skills, skills in finding common ground, and other social skills that are discussed in various chapters in this book. From this perspective, one of the primary social cognitive tasks that conflict presents to the individual is *social perspective coordination* . In other words, how do I understand the other's perspective and develop an understanding of the situation that accounts for both that perspective and my own? Within this framework, a model of interpersonal negotiation strategies (INS) has been described that depicts a developmental progression in the ability to coordinate social perspectives in conflict, ranging from an egocentric inability to differentiate subjective perspectives (i.e., mine from yours) to the ability to coordinate the self's and the other's perspectives in terms of the relationship between them, or from a third-person viewpoint (Selman, 1980; Yeates, Schultz, and Selman, 1991). The functional steps of the INS model are

similar to the steps articulated in information-processing approaches—that is, defining the problem, generating alternative strategies, selecting and implementing a specific strategy, and evaluating outcomes—but the INS model integrates additional developmental levels of perspective taking (egocentric, unilateral, reciprocal, and mutual) that underlie each of the functional steps (Selman, 1980). Here are descriptions adapted from Selman (1980) and Weitzman and Weitzman (2000):

- At the *egocentric* level, which is characterized by impulsive, fight-or-flight thinking, the other is viewed as an object and the self is seen as being in conflict with the external world. The types of behaviors that might be seen at this level are whining, fleeing, ignoring, hitting, cursing, or fighting.
- At the *unilateral* level, which is characterized by obeying or commanding the other person, although the other is now understood to have interests, the self is seen as the principal subject of the negotiation, with interests separate from the other. The types of behaviors typically seen at this level are threatening the other person, going behind the other's back, avoiding the problem, or waiting for someone else to help.
- At the *reciprocal* level, which is characterized by exchange-oriented negotiations and attempts at influence, the needs of the other are appreciated but considered after the needs of the self. Typical behaviors are accommodation, barter, asking for reasons, persuasion, giving reasons, and appealing to a mediator.
- At the *mutual* level, which is characterized by collaborative negotiations, the needs of both the self and the other are coordinated, and a mutual, third-person perspective is adopted in which both sets of interests are taken into account. The types of behaviors that might be

seen at this level are various forms of collaboration to develop satisfaction of mutual goals simultaneously.

In our work, we have used the INS model to explain the nature of everyday conflict in the lives of adults (Weitzman, 2001; Weitzman, Chee, and Levkoff, 1999; Weitzman and Weitzman, 2000). Our research has revealed some discontinuity between strategy choice and its social cognitive foundation. For example, in a study with elderly women, we found that although many women articulated reciprocal or mutual social perspective-taking skills, many of these same women opted for strategies associated with the unilateral level (Weitzman and Weitzman, 2000). Similarly, Yeates, Schultz, and Selman (1991) have shown that although the essential sequence of problem-solving steps is stable across conflict contexts, perspective taking often is not. Cultural norms (e.g., where older women are socialized to yield, particularly to men, rather than press to get their needs met), perceived power differentials between the parties in conflict, and other contextual factors may lead to the use of less sophisticated strategies, regardless of perspective-taking ability.

So even though the basic steps of individual problem solving remain fairly constant across situations, good, collaborative outcomes do not. The key issue this research brings to light is that an individual's decision whether to coordinate his or her perspective with that of the other person is a central aspect of the conflict resolution process, one that may be highly relevant for training.

Critiques

There are also some serious critiques of problem-solving approaches to conflict resolution, and they deserve some attention here as well. For simplicity, we summarize them

here as the Bush and Folger critique and the skeptic's critique.

The Bush and Folger Critique.

Bush and Folger (1994) argue that problem solving, an orientation they see as underlying a "satisfaction story" of mediation (focusing only on satisfying the disputants and not taking advantage of the broader opportunities inherent in mediation), is narrow and mechanistic in that it assumes that conflict is a problem. This is seen as at odds with widely held values in the dispute resolution field to the effect that because of its capacity for stimulating growth and leading to change, conflict is a good thing.

We happen to share those values, but we believe there is a fundamental error in this critique. That is, Bush and Folger (1994) cast what the problem-solving mediator does as looking to solve problems in the first of the two senses we offered at the beginning of this chapter: problems as obstacles, difficulties, or predicaments, that is, "bad things." The result is that their argument frames problem-solving approaches to mediation as more or less equivalent to the settlement-oriented style described by Kressel and colleagues (1994). This misses the fact that the work of Kressel and colleagues, Zubek and colleagues (1992), and others has found substantial differences between such approaches. Cooperative problem-solving approaches in mediation are working on a problem-as-puzzle model, which is very much consistent with the values of conflict as opportunity. If conflict is to be taken as an opportunity for change and growth, it is imperative that disputants move beyond fighting and take full advantage of the power of collaboration to develop new and better alternatives. That is the essence of problem-solving approaches. They can lead to transformation and empowerment of others as this

approach becomes a general, personal orientation to resolving conflict.

The Skeptic's Critique.

There is a skeptic's critique often heard out in the field—during training or in conversation among practitioners—that says, "This is fine on paper, but it isn't realistic." In detail, it goes something like this. People are angry and do not want to solve problems, work with each other, or talk to each other. What may help to persuade those holding this view of problem solving is that research and practical experience are firm in their conclusions. People *do* respond better to problem-solving approaches than settlement-oriented ones, they reach agreement more often and faster, they report being more satisfied, and both agreements and satisfaction hold up better in the long run.

Another critique argues that people often do not know what actually constitutes "the problem," and even when they think they do know, each side often has a very different problem in mind. Recall, however, that an essential part of what problem-solving approaches do is attempt to get the parties to focus on identifying the issues at the heart of their quarrel (in other words, to diagnose the nature of their conflict), and do not assume that those central, underlying issues are already known. They then ask the parties to treat the collection of issues (or needs or interests or other types of concern) on the table as a mutual problem to be solved collectively. Note that there is no assumption here that the parties have the same basic issues in mind as they approach the negotiating table, and they do not define their conflict in terms similar enough even to give it the same name. The core of problem-solving approaches is helping parties see their own interest in finding solutions that meet not only their needs but those of the other as well. That is often hard to do, and so there is this challenge: What kind of solution

can we come up with such that my needs, which are A, B, and C, and your needs, which are X, Y, and Z, can all be met at least acceptably well? It is *this* puzzle that is the problem to be solved.

DECISION MAKING

Consider again, briefly, our simple PSDM model (figure 9.1). We suggested that decision making is going on both during and after the problem-solving process. At both of those points, there are decisions that each party makes individually and decisions made by the parties together. In the following discussion, we look first at the individual as decision maker and then at group decision making.

First, we offer a broad summary. Many of the theorists whose work is mentioned here define the negotiation process itself in decision-making terms (e.g., Bazerman and Neale, 1986; Kahneman, 1992; Zey, 1992). Some taking this view conceptualize each party as a decision maker (e.g., Kahneman, 1992; Mann, 1992), while others focus on the conflict resolution process as one of joint decision making (e.g., Bennett, Tait, and Macdonagh, 1994; Brett, 1991). It is possible, on the one hand, to think of the negotiator as someone with a series of decisions to make in the course of a negotiation, ultimately leading to the decision of whether to agree to a particular solution. On the other hand, one can also think about the process of negotiation as one of *joint* decision making, in which two or more parties with differing interests must jointly reach a decision—the resolution they ultimately agree to. In fact, many clients, when engaging a third-party mediator, describe their conflicts precisely as decision-making problems in which people are having a hard time making a decision together.

The Individual as Decision Maker

The emphasis here is on the problem of *choice* among alternatives, be they alternative agreements or alternative actions to take along the way. Many theories of decision making emphasize the notion of rational choice and are built on the notion of expected utility. The expected-utility principle has been traced as far back as the eighteenth-century to theorist Bernoulli (Abelson and Levi, 1985). The idea is that risky decisions involve choices in which we cannot be certain of what will happen as a result of our choice (as when a negotiator decides to hold out for a larger concession). For each option, we have to consider (1) the likelihood (expectation) that making this choice will get us what we hope it will and (2) the value, or utility, we attach to that outcome. Assuming that both the probability and the utility can be expressed as numbers, the expected utility for each option, then, is the product of probability and the associated utility. Thus "the expected-utility principle says that preferences between options accord with their relative expected utilities" (Abelson and Levi, 1985, p. 244). In conflict resolution, this principle would imply that people's preferences among outcomes, possible settlements, or offers will be determined rationally according to the expected-utility principle.

Various limits to this approach have been discovered, however, and they have led to a number of useful ideas. Here we briefly summarize a few of the key findings and theories.

Anchors, Frames, and Reference Points.

It turns out that anchors, frames, and reference points can influence decision-making processes in such ways that people do not make the kinds of choices that the "rational" decision-making model predicts. The description here follows Kahneman (1992), whose excellent review is

recommended to those interested in pursuing these ideas in detail.

The *reference point* in a negotiation is the point above which the party considers an outcome to be a gain and below which any outcome is considered a loss. In a given negotiation, several reference points might be available to a party: the status quo, the party's opening offer, the other side's initial offer, a settlement reached in a comparable case, and so on. Depending on which reference point a party has in mind, a given outcome might be seen (or *framed*) as a gain or a loss. The central finding here is that people tend to be *loss averse:* avoiding loss is more important than achieving gain, and "concessions that increase one's losses are much more painful than concessions that forgo gains" (Kahneman, 1992, p. 298). As a result, when faced with a possible loss, people become more willing to take risks rather than accept a large loss. For example, one may be inclined to *risk* impasse, rather than make an offer accepting a large loss. By contrast, if there is a possibility of gain, people tend to be less willing to take a risk (perhaps of impasse) in the hope of yet larger gains. If a decision is framed negatively (as one between losses), then people tend to be more risk prone than if it is framed positively (as one between gains). There is an important exception to this effect: if the goods being lost or gained are desirable only, or mainly, to be used in exchange (money kept for spending, goods kept for trading), then giving them up may not be viewed as a loss, and concessions may not be as painful (Kahneman, 1992).

Anchors are salient values that influence our thinking about possible outcomes, much like reference points. The difference is that whereas reference points define the neutral point between gains and losses, anchors may be anywhere along the scale and are often at the extremes. One of the most striking of anchoring effects is that

negotiators are often unduly influenced by an anchor that they clearly know to be irrelevant—such as an outrageously low offer. Kahneman defines anchoring effects as “cases in which a stimulus or message that is clearly designated as irrelevant and uninformative nevertheless increases the [perceived] normality of a possible outcome” (1992, p. 308). There are a great many subtleties to the effects of anchors. The critical point for conflict resolution is recognizing their existence and developing methods for coping with their influence.

Impact of Stress.

Conflict often produces psychological states, such as stress, and affective (emotional) reactions that include anxiety, anger, and elation (Mann, 1992), thus introducing another set of barriers to “rational” decision making. From the perspective of Janis and Mann’s conflict theory of decision making (1977), there are important linkages among stress, conflict, and coping patterns (Janis, 1993; Mann, 1992). According to Mann, “the model is founded on the assumption that decisional conflict is a source of psychological stress. The task of making a vital decision is worrisome and can cause anxiety reactions such as agitation, quick temper, sleeplessness or oversleeping, loss of appetite or compulsive overeating, and other psychosomatic symptoms” (p. 209).

From this perspective come a number of interesting findings. Cognitive functioning in decision making declines under stress; time pressure increases stress and thus negatively affects decision making, as well as reduces the willingness to take risks; and mood has predictable effects on risk taking: when in a good mood (compared to a neutral mood), people are more risk seeking when the risk is low but less risk seeking when risk is high. This pattern appears to reflect the fact that in a good mood, people think more

about loss under high-risk situations, but they think less about loss when risk is low (Mann, 1992).

Another View of Risk.

In the previous sections, we discussed some of the impact of framing, stress, emotion, and mood on risk taking. Taking a slightly different view, Hollenbeck and his colleagues have argued that much of the research on risky decision making is limited in that it uses decisions that are static: they involve a one-shot decision with no future implications, no effect of past performance, and a high degree of specificity about outcomes and probabilities (Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Phillips, and Hedlund, 1994). By contrast, most decisions in conflict situations do not meet these conditions. Hollenbeck and colleagues conducted an experiment in which they varied these conditions and found that giving a general do-your-best goal instead of a specific goal actually reversed the framing effect that Kahneman and Tversky (1984) described. Hollenbeck and colleagues conclude that to better understand the conditions that lead to risk taking, we need to know more about dynamic contexts, and we cannot freely generalize findings from static settings.

An Applied Approach.

Approaches such as that of Janis and Mann (1977) are close in flavor to problem-solving approaches in being analytical and depersonalizing the conflict. In this approach, a decision maker fills out a “decisional balance sheet,” listing all outcomes, weighting and summing costs and benefits, and thus analyzing the relative costs and benefits of each choice in order to make a decision. If the parties are willing to undertake the process together, they may be able to arrive at a decision they can agree to accept. But this approach makes some serious errors (as do others like it). In particular, it assumes that preferences on all issues can

be translated into a common currency. This may be workable in some circumstances, as in a divorce mediation, for weighing relative preferences for the pots and pans on the one hand and a painting on the other. But it may be much less workable for weighing relative preferences for the house, on the one hand, and custody of the children, on the other, since the house and the children do not readily convert into a common currency.

Group Decision Making and Commitment

Viewing negotiation as joint decision making opens up the possibility of exploring such decisional biases as overconfidence and lack of perspective taking—processes about which there is knowledge in the decision-making domain—that may alter performance and dispute resolution behavior (Bazerman and Neale, 1986).

Behavioral Decision Making.

One prominent, and particularly helpful, approach to understanding group decision making is known as behavioral decision making (BDM). BDM emphasizes rational negotiation, with the goal of making decisions that maximize one's interests (Bazerman and Neale, 1992). Bazerman, Neale, and their colleagues have conducted an extensive program of research based on this approach (Bazerman and Neale, 1986; Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman, 1989; Mannix and Neale, 1993; Neale and Bazerman, 1992; Thompson and Loewenstein, 1992; Valley, White, Neale, and Bazerman, 1992). Their findings are informative in terms of understanding conflict and working to resolve it. From a behavioral decision theory perspective, negotiation is seen as "a multiparty decision making activity where the individual cognitions of each party and the interactive dynamics of multiple parties are critical elements" (Neale and Bazerman, 1992, p. 157). The

approach aims at being both descriptive and prescriptive, and it works with such concepts as the perceptions of the negotiators, their biases, and their aspirations.

Bazerman and Neale (1992) offer a list of seven pervasive decision-making biases that interfere with the goal of negotiating rationally to maximize one's interests. The first is "irrationally escalating your commitment to an initial course of action, even when it is no longer the most beneficial choice" (p. 2). Possible causes of this bias include the competitive irrationality that can ensue when winning becomes more important than the original goal and also the biases in perception and judgment resulting from our tendency to seek information that confirms what we are doing and avoid information that challenges us.

The second bias is "assuming your gain must come at the expense of the other party, and missing opportunities for tradeoffs that benefit both sides" (Bazerman and Neale, 1992, p. 2). Earlier, we discussed some of the benefits of approaching mixed-motive conflict as potentially integrative rather than purely distributive. Bazerman and Neale argue that "parties in a negotiation often don't find these beneficial trade-offs because each *assumes* its interests *directly* conflict with those of the other party" (p. 16). They call this mind-set the *mythical fixed pie* .

The third bias is "anchoring your judgments upon irrelevant information, such as an initial offer" (Bazerman and Neale, 1992, p. 2). (For more on anchoring, see our earlier discussion in the "Anchors, Frames, and Reference Points" section.)

The fourth is "being overly affected by the way information is presented to you" (Bazerman and Neale, 1992, p. 2). This refers to the effect of framing, discussed earlier. Bazerman and Neale suggest that a mediator who wants to encourage parties to compromise should work to help the parties see

the conflict in a positive frame, one emphasizing gains rather than losses.

The fifth bias, “relying too much on readily available information, while ignoring more relevant data” (Bazerman and Neale, 1992, p. 2), has obvious implications for the quality of decisions. Bazerman and Neale urge negotiators to work to counteract this bias. Similarly, we urge mediators to be on the lookout for this tendency, both in disputants and in themselves.

The sixth bias, “failing to consider what you can learn by focusing on the other side’s perspective” (Bazerman and Neale, 1992, p. 2), takes a somewhat different slant on perspective taking from those presented earlier. In their version, emphasis is on gaining information about the other side’s motives by paying attention to their actions and taking their perspective into account.

The final bias, “being overconfident about attaining outcomes that favor you” (Bazerman and Neale, 1992, p. 2), is a particularly important one. Through anchoring on one’s own initial proposal, failing to learn from considering the other side’s perspective, distorting one’s perceptions of the conflict situation in order to feel better about oneself, and focusing too strongly on information that supports one’s position and ignoring information that challenges it, parties to a dispute often become overconfident in their ability to win; as a result, they miss out on opportunities to create integrative solutions. Thus, mediators in court-connected mediation programs may be faced with two parties, each absolutely certain that if they fail to settle the dispute, the judge or jury will find in their favor.

Let us now briefly discuss a number of other findings from the work of Bazerman, Neale, and their colleagues.

Power Imbalance.

In an experimental study of the effects of power imbalance and level of aspiration, Mannix and Neale (1993) found that in a negotiation with integrative potential, (1) higher joint gains were achieved when power was equal than when unequal; (2) higher joint gains were achieved when aspirations were high rather than low; and (3) when power was unequal, higher joint-gain solutions tended to be driven by the offers of the low-power party. That is, in unequal power situations, the high-power party was less likely to initiate a joint-gain solution. As a result, the onus of generating and selling a joint-gain solution appeared to fall on the low-power party.

Interpretations of Fairness.

Thompson and Loewenstein (1992) found a tendency among negotiators, in a simulation of a collective bargaining process, to make "egocentric interpretations of fairness." That is, participants tended to assess fairness with a bias toward their own interests. This led to discrepancies between what each party saw as fair, each side tending to an interpretation benefiting themselves. Furthermore, "the more people disagreed in terms of their perception of a fair settlement wage, the longer it took them to reach a settlement" (p. 184). Perhaps more surprising, providing the subjects with more background information, which might be expected to reduce bias, served only to exacerbate the self-serving nature of fairness assessments. (For more on biases, see chapter 11.)

Preferences in Different Types of Relationships.

Finally, in a study that bears directly on our earlier discussion of problem solving, Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman (1989) found that people's preferences for doing better than the other in disputes depended strongly on the nature of the relationship between the parties. The

researchers manipulated two aspects of the dispute relationship: whether it was a business or personal dispute and whether the relationship between the parties was positive, negative, or neutral. They found that although parties (across combinations of dispute type and relationship) did not like outcomes in which they did more poorly than the other, there were substantial differences in how much parties preferred an outcome in which they did better than the other. First, in a negative relationship, disputants tended to like doing better than the other, while in a positive or neutral relationship, disputants tended to *dislike* doing better than the other (up to a certain high amount of gain, after which their preferences begin to rise again). Similarly, in business disputes, participants liked doing better than the other, but in personal disputes, they disliked doing better than the other (again, up to a point). Significantly, these two tendencies reinforced each other; in business disputes, the preference for doing better was substantially enhanced in a negative relationship.

This study may have profound implications for the problem-solving approaches we have discussed. In particular, it tells us that in certain situations (such as a business dispute or negative relationship) people may be highly motivated to create a large difference between what they and their negotiating partners receive. Such motivation runs directly counter to the goal of the cooperative problem-solving approaches: to engage parties in maximizing mutual gain.

UNDERSTANDING PROBLEM SOLVING AND DECISION MAKING IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS

Our simple model of the interaction of problem solving and decision making in conflict resolution (figure 9.1) offers a framework for integrating what we know about these

processes. In this section, we take a brief walk through the PSDM model, illustrating some of the ways these findings and perspectives can be used to enhance our understanding of conflict.

The PSDM Model Revisited

We have proposed that problem solving and decision making be viewed as integral parts of the cooperative conflict resolution process. We have also suggested that decision making takes place both *during* and *after* problem solving and that at each point, some decisions are made by the parties as individuals and some by the parties together.

Both problem-solving and decision-making approaches to conflict resolution, be they conscious designs of the professional mediator or spontaneous behaviors by the most naive of disputants, fundamentally work with the basic dynamics of cooperation and competition, as discussed at greater length in other parts of this book (see chapter 1). Briefly, if conflict is approached as a cooperative endeavor in which the parties see their outcomes as positively correlated, people tend to work hard to create a resolution that maximizes both parties' outcomes. The goal becomes to *do as well as possible for both self and other* , rather than to engage in the kind of destructive win-lose struggle that exemplifies competitive, contentious conflict.

In the kind of integrated view we are taking, cooperative conflict resolution consists of four general phases: (1) diagnosing the conflict, (2) identifying alternative solutions, (3) evaluating and choosing a mutually acceptable solution, and (4) committing to the decision and implementing it. The left-hand part of the PSDM model (figure 9.1) is concerned primarily with phases 1 and 2, with both problem solving and decision making taking place. The right-hand part of the model, labeled "Decision making *after* ," is concerned primarily with phases 3 and 4, where the solutions

generated must be selected and committed to. As indicated in the model, if it becomes clear during phases 3 or 4 that an adequate solution has not been generated, it is necessary to return to the problem-solving process, looking for further solutions and, if necessary, reconsidering the original diagnosis.

Diagnosis

Diagnosis is the first part of the problem-solving process. Perhaps the first step in diagnosis involves an important decision: determining what kind of conflict you are in. A fundamental problem in conflict resolution in applied work is determining those few conflicts that really are *not* amenable to a constructive, integrative approach.

Determining What Kind of Conflict You Are In.

Often we are working to convince our students and those we train that most of the conflicts initially appearing to be unalterably competitive, zero-sum situations by their nature are in fact at worst mixed motive. Many of us even take an initial, dogmatic stance with students that there are virtually no cases in which collaborative approaches are impossible, in an effort to break them of the common tendency to respond competitively (Bazerman and Neale, 1992). (At least the first author of this chapter knows he is guilty of this.) Yet we know from practical experience, as well as some of the research findings discussed earlier, that this is not the case. It would seem naive to deny that there are situations in which power-wielding, contentious tactics are warranted. Books such as Bazerman and Neale's that alert readers to common biased misperceptions and urge them to look more closely are an important start. A set of empirically and theoretically justified principles, guidelines, or frameworks are badly needed to help identify those cases that really are immutably contentious.

This would serve at least two aims. It would be an indispensable tool for conflict resolution efforts both in the first person and by a third-party intervenor. It would also give us the ability to say to our students, “Here’s how you know a case that really *can’t* be transformed into a ‘mutual problem to be solved collaboratively.’ If it doesn’t meet these criteria, the potential is in there somewhere. Now let’s work on how to find it.”

Identifying the Problem or Problems.

The next step in diagnosis is to develop an understanding of what the conflict is about—whether in substantive interests, values, or other types of concerns—that lends itself to problem solving. This involves identifying each side’s *real* concerns (getting past initial positions or bargaining gambits) and developing a common understanding of the joint set of concerns of each party. Some questions that might be asked or investigated at this stage include

What do I want?

Why do I want it?

What do I think are the various ways I can satisfy what I want?

What does the other want?

Why?

What are the various ways the other believes he or she can satisfy his or her wants?

Do we each fully understand one another’s needs, reasons, beliefs, and feelings?

Is the conflict based on a misunderstanding, or is it a real conflict of interests, beliefs, preferences, or values?

What is it about?

Finally, during the diagnosis phase, social perspective coordination is important. To arrive at a joint diagnosis, parties have to be willing and able to appreciate the other as a person, with concerns of his or her own, and coordinate these concerns with the party's perspective so as to create the joint diagnosis.

Identifying Alternative Solutions

Once the parties have reached a joint diagnosis, the next step is to begin generating alternative solutions that may meet each party's goals at least acceptably well. One of the most commonly mentioned approaches to doing this is brainstorming. Here, the emphasis is on generating as many creative ideas as possible, hoping to encourage parties to think of the kinds of mutually acceptable solutions that have eluded them. Most brainstorming sessions employ a "no evaluation" rule: during the brainstorming session, no comments on proposed ideas are allowed, in the hope of encouraging parties to think of as many ideas as they can, no matter how silly or impractical. Once a list of alternatives is on a blackboard or newsprint, parties are often able to begin sorting through them and find options that are workable.

A list of other techniques is suggested by Treffinger, Isaksen, and Dorval (1994). For example, they recommend "idea checklists," lists of idea-stimulating questions such as, "What might you do instead?" or "What might be changed or used in a different way?" (p. 43). They also recommend using metaphors or analogies to stimulate creativity and blending active strategies (like brainstorming) with reflective strategies (such as built-in down time, for thinking things over).

In our earlier discussion of decision making, we emphasized research concerned with decision making under conditions of risk. Risk taking is important in this context in at least

two ways. The research we have reported focused on the willingness to hold to a position and risk impasse—a risky decision that works against cooperative conflict resolution. But there are other kinds of risks where such a course of action is desirable. For example, offering a concession (or an apology!) can feel like a risk if you are not sure it will be reciprocated. In building trust where it is lacking between parties in conflict, it is often necessary to get one of the parties to take a risk and demonstrate trust in order to persuade the other party to begin trusting.

Social perspective coordination is important here as well. To create viable solutions that meet each party's concerns, it is helpful—if not essential—for parties to be able to grasp and appreciate the importance of the other's perspective and choose to engage in the search for solutions that satisfy the other's concerns.

Evaluating and Choosing

Once a set of possible alternative solutions has been identified, the next task is to evaluate the various options and choose among them. This involves a variety of individual decisions: about preferences among the advantages the options offer, about which seem fairer, which are likely to last, and so on. As the parties make these decisions, such factors as stress, anchors, frames, and reference points may all play a role in interfering with reasonable, rational decision making. Procedures such as Janis and Mann's decisional balance sheet exercise (1977) may be helpful here, as may the recommendations offered by Bazerman and Neale (1992) for overcoming biases.

There are also, at this stage, group decisions to be made, primarily as to which option is chosen. Several of the behavioral decision-making findings are important here, largely as things that negotiators as well as mediators and other third parties should look out for. Integrative solutions,

for example, are more likely if power is relatively equal, and they tend to be driven by the low-power party if it is not (Mannix and Neale, 1993). There is a tendency to egocentric interpretations of fairness (Thompson and Loewenstein, 1992), which can add a sense of moral justification, and thus intractability, to a party's sense of need. Also, people are less interested in doing better than the other (a competitive goal) when the relationship is personal and when it is positive (Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman, 1989). Again, procedures such as that of Janis and Mann (1977) may be helpful.

Committing to a Choice

Finally, once a mutually agreeable solution has been found, the decision must be made to enter into agreement. Trust and the attendant risks are important factors. It is critical that parties be willing to put mutual satisfaction before the goal of "doing better than the other." Social perspective coordination is important again, and here the issue of choosing to act on the social understanding gained is crucial; it is not enough just to understand; understanding must be translated into willingness to act. Among the key factors suggested by our work with elderly women (Weitzman and Weitzman, 2000) for encouraging this translation are beliefs that the agreement will really work and be abided by and that the costs, emotional and otherwise, will not be too high.

IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING AND PRACTICE

We suggest that rather than being taught separately, in different training programs, problem-solving and decision-making approaches to cooperative conflict resolution should be taught together in integrated fashion. In the previous

section, we made an argument for considering the conflict resolution process in roughly four phases, incorporating problem solving and decision making throughout. We also recommend the development of training programs and intervention designs that approach the process in the same way. In this section, we briefly highlight a few factors that should be part of such efforts.

Conditions That Encourage Problem Solving

Training in problem-solving approaches should include information about the conditions that are likely to lead to parties' willingness to engage in problem solving. We know, for example, that a psychological climate characterized by cohesion, fairness, recognition of success, and openness to innovation encourages people to choose problem-solving and persuasion strategies, and less likely to engage in bargaining and politicking (Strutton, Pelton, and Lumpkin, 1993). Training for mediators, designs for organizational alternative dispute resolution programs, and conflict resolution programs for high schools, to name a few, could all make use of this information.

In addition, encouraging problem solving through cultivating concern for the other can be important (e.g., Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992; Pruitt and Kim, 2004). One common approach is to engage parties in perspective taking to help them see the other's concerns as legitimate. Our work on social perspective coordination (Weitzman and Weitzman, 2000) suggests not only that people must learn to take the perspective of the other but also that attention must be paid to translating perspective-taking ability into the choice of conflict resolution strategy. (See chapters 1 and 3 for more on the conditions that encourage conflict resolution.)

Although working to improve conditions that encourage problem solving is important, it is also essential to provide

people with the tools to do it well. Trainings and intervention plans should include the sorts of specific problem-solving techniques referred to earlier, such as expanding the pie, logrolling, nonspecific compensation, and bridging. Furthermore, a consideration of some of the issues raised here can lead to novel approaches to intervention. To take an example from our practice, we were asked to mediate a community dispute in which there were known to be many “sides” with different perspectives. A consideration of the concern discussed as a critique, that people may not agree on a definition of the problem in the first place and that this alone can undermine conflict resolution efforts, led to an approach based on the very issue of problem definition. A group of about thirty community members were asked to begin the “mediation” session by engaging in brainstorming definitions of “the problem” they were facing. As the session proceeded, the group gradually worked toward a mutually agreed definition of the problem. By the time the group reached agreement on a definition of the problem, the solution was close to obvious and was easily agreed to.

Teaching the Lessons from the Decision-Making Literature

The information from the decision-making literature that would be particularly helpful if built into conflict resolution training includes the concepts of anchors, frames, and reference points. Kahneman (1992) suggests what he calls the Lewinian prescription, based on the concept of loss aversion: concessions that eliminate losses are more effective than concessions that improve on existing gains. Mediators as well as negotiators could learn to look for these opportunities.

Earlier, we presented selected information about the decision-making phenomena that help explain and predict

disputant behavior. Such information is often incorporated into negotiation training aimed at “winning” in competitive negotiations, but it seems, at least anecdotally, much less often to be a part of mediation training. Yet understanding issues such as the impact of stress, power imbalance, disclosure of information, egocentric interpretations of fairness, and preferences for relative outcomes, as well as the role of issues of risk taking and the factors that influence risk-taking propensity, would seem to be of enormous value for mediators.

One more approach from the decision-making literature needs introduction here. Building on the sort of literature described earlier, Brett argues for “transforming conflict in organizational groups into high quality group decisions” (1991, p. 291) and prescribes techniques for doing so. Her approach is based in the assumption that by harnessing negotiation and decision theory, one can bring conflict to a constructive outcome through a decision-making approach. Her prescriptions include

- Criteria for determining if a high-quality decision has been reached
- Guidelines for improving the decision-making process
- Methods for integrating differing points of view
- Tactics for creating mutual gain, coalition gain, and individual gain
- Choosing decision rules that maximize integration of information
- Guidelines about when to use mutual gain, individual gain, and coalition gain approaches

This approach offers concrete, structured advice, based solidly in the research literature, for applying decision-making techniques to resolving group conflict. These

techniques can be helpful at many of the decision-making moments identified in the PSDM model.

In a similar vein, Janis and Mann's approach (1977) suggests that parties sit down together and analyze their conflict as a difficult decision. Their book offers devices such as the decisional balance sheet, a form for listing choice criteria (the things that matter to each party), assigning numerical values and valences (1 or 2) to each, and manipulating the results. In this approach, disputants sit down together with a decisional balance sheet, carefully consider their own and the other's concerns, and look for a solution that maximizes each side's benefit and minimizes cost. With reference to the PSDM model presented here, such techniques might be helpful at the stage of either generating alternatives or choosing among alternatives; in fact, it bridges the two.

Approaches such as those of Brett (1991) and Janis and Mann (1977) represent formalized, detailed technologies that can and should be taught more widely than they currently are. Though we have criticized some underlying assumptions of some of these approaches (questioning, for example, the common currency assumptions in the Janis and Mann approach), they remain tools that can be of great value if applied appropriately and as tools integrated into a problem-solving and decision-making approach. Our training programs would benefit from offering students more in the way of such concrete, specified techniques for incorporation into their tool kits.

CONCLUSION

We have suggested that problem solving and decision making are processes interwoven in many cooperative conflict resolution procedures and have proposed an integrated PSDM model reflecting four general phases: (1)

diagnosing the conflict, (2) identifying alternative solutions, (3) evaluating and choosing a mutually acceptable solution, and (4) committing to the decision and implementing it. This integrated model offers a way of thinking about the opportunities for applying both problem-solving and decision-making knowledge and techniques. An understanding of how problem-solving approaches work, are helpful, and can be encouraged in various contexts can be a critical component of training, intervention, and dispute-resolution program design. Similarly, an understanding of decision-making biases and strategies for overcoming them can be a vital component of both conflict resolution education and practice. Furthermore, a consideration of the issues raised here, and even of some of the critiques of these approaches, can lead to new approaches to intervention, training, and program design.

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CHAPTER TEN

INTERGROUP CONFLICT [a]

Ronald J. Fisher

Intergroup conflict is expressed in many forms and in many different settings in all societies. In organizations, poorly managed differences between departments or between factions within the same unit can dampen morale, create animosity, and reduce motivation and productivity. In community settings, schisms between interest groups on important social issues can lead to polarization and hostility, while low-intensity conflict between ethnic, racial, or religious groups finds expression in prejudice, discrimination, and social activism to reduce inequity. At the societal level, high-intensity conflict between such identity groups on a broader scale can break out into ethnopolitical warfare, which engages the international community as well as local actors. At all levels of human interaction, poorly handled conflict between authorities and constituents or between majorities and minorities can lead to frustration and alienation on both sides. In fact, the potential for destructive intergroup conflict exists wherever there are important differences between groups.

Destructive intergroup conflict is only one major form of relationship in the wider domain of intergroup relations, that is, interactions among individuals that occur in terms of their group identifications. The study of intergroup relations is concerned with all manner of relationships among groups, including cooperative interactions and competitive ones, as well as constructive intergroup conflict. In most ongoing intergroup relationships in all manner of settings, cooperative relations exist and conflict is handled in a more or less constructive manner to the

satisfaction of the parties involved. However, when this does not occur around incompatible goals or activities and the parties work to control or frustrate each other in adversarial and antagonistic ways, the scene is set for destructive intergroup conflict. Given that such conflicts can be very costly to the parties involved as well as the wider system, especially at the intercommunal and international levels, it is essential to understand them and look for ways of managing and resolving them, the focus of this chapter.

From the point of view generally held in the social sciences, intergroup conflict is not simply a matter of misperception or misunderstanding. It is based in real differences between groups in terms of social power, access to resources, important life values, or other significant incompatibilities. These realistic sources of conflict are typically exacerbated by subjective processes in the ways that individuals see and interpret the world and in the ways that groups function in the face of differences and perceived threat. As individuals and within groups, human beings are not well equipped to deal with important differences between themselves and others, and often they engage in behaviors that make the situation worse unless social processes and institutions are available to them to manage their incompatibilities effectively. When differences are handled constructively, such conflict can be a source of learning, creativity, and social change toward a more pluralistic, harmonious, and equitable world.

Although intergroup conflict finds innumerable expressions, this chapter focuses on the general processes of causation, escalation, and resolution that are applicable to these many forms. However, it needs to be understood that each organizational, community, cultural, political, and societal setting requires further analysis in order to truly understand the intergroup conflicts at that level of

interaction and within that particular context, prior to suggesting avenues for handling these constructively. In addition, the general concepts and principles that are available from Western social scientific research and practice have to be interpreted, modified, and augmented in culturally sensitive ways in order to have utility in different cultural settings. In some cases, general prescriptions will be inappropriate and counterproductive, and application will need to await further developments in theory and practice, both local and global.

While compatible with much theory and research in the social sciences on intergroup conflict, this chapter draws especially on work in social psychology, an interdiscipline between sociology and psychology that seeks to integrate understanding of individual processes, especially in perception and cognition, with knowledge of social processes, particularly those at the group and intergroup levels. Original studies of the development and resolution of intergroup conflict over time—for example, with boys' camp groups (Sherif, 1966), management personnel in training workshops (Blake and Mouton, 1961), volunteers in a prison simulation (Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo, 1973), and university students in a simulated community conflict over resources and values (Fisher et al., 1990)—have illuminated our understanding of the processes and outcomes that can arise from realistic group incompatibilities. Much of this understanding has been captured in general treatments of conflict—its sources, its tendency to escalate, and general strategies directed toward its management (see, e.g., Deutsch, 1973, 1983, 1991; Fisher, 1990; Kriesberg and Dayton, 2012; Pruitt and Kim, 2004). Knowledge is also drawn from theories of social identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), realistic group conflict and ethnocentrism (Levine and Campbell, 1972), social dominance (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999), and

intergroup relations (Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994; Moghaddam, 2008). In addition, social and organizational psychologists have contributed to the development of methods to manage and resolve intergroup conflict in various settings (Bar-Tal, 2011; Blake and Mouton, 1984; Blake, Shepard, and Mouton, 1964; Brown, 1983; Fisher, 1994, 1997; Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo 2013; Tropp, 2011).

From these and other sources, one can deduce a social psychological approach to addressing intergroup conflict that is phenomenological (stressing the subjective reality of individuals in group and intergroup settings), interactive (emphasizing the behavioral interaction of the groups in expressing, maintaining, and resolving their conflict), and multilevel (realizing that understanding is necessary at multiple levels of analysis from various disciplines within a systems orientation; Fisher and Kelman, 2011). Thus, the ideas examined in this chapter come from many sources identified in the preceding references and need to be combined with the fruits of the other social sciences in order to gain the necessary context and greater meaning. Therefore, interested readers are requested to search the literature for concepts and practices that are identified here rather than referencing this chapter as the primary source.

INTERGROUP CONFLICT: SOURCES AND DYNAMICS

The essence of intergroup conflict lies in three elements: incompatibilities, behaviors, and sentiments. A broad definition of destructive conflict sees it as a social situation in which there are perceived incompatibilities in goals or values between two or more parties, attempts by the parties to control one another, and antagonistic feelings

toward each other (Fisher, 1990). When the parties are groups, individuals are acting and reacting toward members of the other group in terms of their social identification with their group, which forms an important part of their social identity, rather than as individuals. The definition stresses that incompatibilities by themselves do not constitute conflict, since the parties could live in peaceful coexistence. However, when there are attempts to control the other party in order to deal with the incompatibility and when such interactions result in and are fueled by antagonistic emotions, destructive conflict exists. This definition is in line with an approach to studying conflict known as realistic group conflict theory, which stresses that objective conflicts of interest cause conflict. In contrast, social identity theory holds that the simple categorization of individuals into groups (in a minimally competitive social context) is enough to create differentiation between groups and some amount of bias in favor of one's in-group and discrimination against out-groups. In real life, both contributions are typically in play, and it is not easy to know which is the primary one, although the judgment here is to put more weight into real differences of interest.

Sources of Intergroup Conflict

What are some areas of incompatibilities that can give rise to destructive intergroup conflict? One useful typology, proposed by Daniel Katz (1965), identifies economic, value, and power differences as primary drivers. Economic conflict is competition over scarce resources and can occur in all manner of settings over all manner of desired goods or services. Resources are typically in finite if not short supply, and groups understandably often approach this distributive situation with a fixed-pie assumption that what one gains, the other loses. The stage is thus set for

competitive strategies and behaviors to obtain one's fair share (which the other group sees as unfair) and in so doing to frustrate the other group's goal-directed behavior. Reciprocal interactions along this line usually generate perceptions of threat and feelings of hostility.

Value conflicts involve differences in what groups believe in, from minor variances in preferences or principles to major cleavages in ideologies or ways of life. Conflict can arise over valued means or valued ends, that is, over how goals are achieved or what their nature or priorities are. Organizations often comprise groups in conflict over how decisions should be made (such as in an autocratic or participative manner) and over the outcomes to be prized (such as the best-quality service or highest return on investment). Societies and the world at large are composed of different cultural and religious groups with myriad variations in their preferences, practices, and priorities that can place them in situations of incompatibility. Again, the question is how the groups, particularly the dominant groups, choose to deal with these differences, for example, by forcing their cultural norms on other groups or supporting multicultural respect and harmony.

Power conflict occurs when each group wishes to maximize its influence and control in the relationship with the other. At base, this is a struggle for dominance, whether in a corporate office or a region of the globe, and is not resolvable in the first instance, often resulting in a victory and a defeat or a tense stalemate and deadlock. Power conflict often recycles through various substantive issues, and over time the dynamic of a mutual win-lose orientation becomes apparent. This, however, is not to confuse the inherent use of power in all types of conflict in which parties work to influence each other. Power conflict is often distinguished by the use of negative power through behaviors such as threat, deception, or manipulation, as

opposed to tactics of positive power such as persuasion, the use of valid information, and a consideration of the pros and cons of alternative actions. (See chapter 5.)

To this typology can be added the more contemporary concern with needs conflict, that is, differences around the degree to which the basic human needs of groups, and the individuals within them, are being frustrated or satisfied. This line of theorizing comes partly from the work of psychologist Abraham Maslow and sociologist Paul Sites and has been brought into the conflict domain by international relations specialists John Burton, Edward Azar, and others. Basic needs are seen as the fundamental requirements for human development, and proposed lists include those for security, identity, recognition of identity, freedom, distributive justice, and participation. Identity groups are seen as the primary vehicle through which these necessities are expressed and satisfied, thus leading to intergroup conflict when one group's basic needs are frustrated or denied. It is proposed that the most destructive and intractable conflicts on the world scene between identity groups, that is, racial, religious, ethnic, or cultural groups, are due to need frustration. However, identity groups also exist in organizations and communities wherever groups form around a common social identity, and if needs for recognition of that identity or for dignity, safety, or control are denied, conflict is similarly predicted (Rothman, 1997).

An important qualification is that many conflicts are mixtures of the preceding sources rather than pure types. This can be true in the initial causation, as when power and economic competition are simultaneously expressed, or over time, as when value differences or need frustrations are addressed through the increasing use of negative power. The typology also does not rule out misperception and miscommunication as potential sources of conflict, but

it is unlikely that serious intergroup conflict could sustain itself for any period of time based solely on these subjective aspects. This is not to deny that misperceptions can lead to behaviors that give rise to serious conflict, as when, for example, one group launches a preemptive strike against another out of the mistaken fear that the other is about to attack. However, destructive conflict is typically over real differences, poorly managed.

Perceptual and Cognitive Factors

Regardless of the source, conflict between groups often engages perceptual, cognitive, emotional, and behavioral mechanisms at both the individual and group levels, which exacerbate the initial incompatibilities. Social identity theory tells us that the simple perceptual act of group categorization in a minimally competitive context will set in motion a process of group differentiation with resulting in-group favoritism. This is apparently due to the need of individuals to attain and maintain a positive social identity, which they do based on the social categorization of groups and by making favorable social comparisons of their own group in relation to other groups. Thus, there is pressure to gain distinctiveness for one's own group and to evaluate it positively in comparison with other groups, thereby leading to discrimination against other groups.

The concept of ethnocentrism captures how identity groups tend to be ethnically centered, to accept and even glorify those who are alike (the in-group) and to denigrate, discriminate against, and reject those who are unlike (out-groups). Realistic group conflict theory sees ethnocentrism as an outcome of objective conflicts of interest and competitive interactions by groups to obtain their goals, a process in which the perception of threat plays a key role by heightening in-group solidarity and engendering hostility toward the threatening out-group, especially if

there is a history of antagonism between the groups (Levine and Campbell, 1972). In contrast, the original research supporting social identity theory demonstrates that intergroup discrimination can occur without any clear conflict of interest or any intergroup interaction (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). However, this discrimination appeared to be limited to in-group favoritism rather than out-group derogation and hostility. The growing accumulation of research on the role of collective identity in intergroup conflict demonstrates that group members who strongly identify with their in-group are less critical of the group (the loyalty aspect of ethnocentrism), are more in favor of aggressive policies toward the out-group (the discrimination side of ethnocentrism), and are less amenable to conflict resolution interventions (Roccas and Elster, 2012).

A direct approach to intergroup discrimination is taken by social dominance theory, which augments both realistic group and social identity theories by stressing group differences in power while still explaining individual differences in discrimination (Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar, and Levin, 2004). This theory holds that individuals vary in their social dominance orientation (SDO) and that high SDO supports ideologies that promote group-based hierarchies and legitimize both individual and institutional discrimination in favor of more powerful groups in society (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). Social dominance theory has recently been extended to the level of societies by research that found that average national levels of SDO across twenty-seven societies correlated with a number of cultural and societal variables. In particular, high national levels of SDO were related to high levels of institutional discrimination and values of hierarchy and traditional group identification and to low levels of democracy, gender

empowerment, and egalitarianism (Fischer, Hanke, and Sibley, 2012).

All of these theories predict that individuals in intergroup conflict will engage in misperceptions that accentuate group differences (Fisher and Kelman, 2011). Groups in conflict tend to develop negative stereotypes of each other —oversimplified, inaccurate, rigid, and derogatory beliefs about the characteristics of the other group that they apply indiscriminately to all the individuals in that group. These come about partly through the processes of group categorization, which exaggerate the differences between groups and the homogeneity of the out-group. However, they also come about through selective perception and memory retrieval, by which qualities and behaviors that fit the stereotype are accepted and retained, while those that do not are rejected. Mutual stereotyping leads in part to a mirror image in which each group sees the other negatively, as aggressive, untrustworthy, and manipulative, and itself positively, as peaceful, trustworthy, and cooperative. Through the process of socialization, these simplified pictures are passed on to new group members (children, recruits, new employees) so that they can take their rightful place in defending the interests of their in-group against out-group enemies.

Cognitive biases also enter into intergroup conflict in the attributions that individuals make about the behavior of others, such as how they make judgments about the causes of behaviors or events. In intergroup relations, there is a tendency to see out-group members as personally responsible for negative behavior (“He is sadistic”) rather than this being due to situational factors (“He was ordered to do it”). In addition, the personal characteristics that are the focus of attribution tend to be group qualities that are embodied in the negative stereotype (“They are all monsters”). In contrast, undesirable behaviors by in-group

members tend to be attributed to external conditions for which the member is not responsible (“What else could the poor man do?”). Thus, attributions perpetuate and strengthen stereotypes and mirror images and also fuel hostility between conflicting groups as each holds the other largely responsible for the shared mess they are in.

Group-Level Factors

The individual processes of perception and cognition make important contributions to understanding intergroup conflict, but its complexity and intractability are also due to group-level forces. Social groups, like individuals, do not usually respond in a constructive manner to differences that appear to threaten the identity or well-being of the group. The functioning of each group in terms of identity, cohesiveness, conformity pressures, and decision making has a significant impact on how conflict is played out and ultimately resolved or terminated. In addition, the structure and culture of the organization, community, or society in which intergroup conflict occurs will influence both its expression and its management. Unfortunately, these latter areas are not as well explored as they should be, and space limitations here preclude a consideration of these higher-level influences.

All individuals are members of social groups, by either birth or choice, and the group identifications that one carries form the central element of one’s social identity. Many theorists, including those who developed social identity theory, believe that an individual’s self-esteem is linked to group membership, in that a positive self-concept requires favorable evaluations of one’s group(s) and invidious comparisons with other groups. Thus, the seeds are sown for ethnic groups to display ethnocentrism and national groups to exhibit nationalism—pride and loyalty to one’s nation and denigration of other nations. However, we

do not need to be at the level of large collectivities to see the functioning of group identity. Professional groups, scientific disciplines, political parties, government departments, lobby groups, businesses, sports teams, street gangs—all have their sense of group identity that affects their relations with other groups. The dark side of social identity is that in expressing commitment and affection to in-groups, there is a tendency to devalue and disrespect out-groups, thus contributing to intergroup conflict in situations involving incompatibilities.

Along with identity, groups tend to develop cohesiveness, essentially a shared sense of attraction to the group and motivation to remain in it. In addition to increasing satisfaction and productivity, cohesiveness is a powerful force in fostering conformity to the group and thus has important implications for intergroup conflict. Not only are cohesive groups more effective in striving toward their goals, but it is also generally accepted that intergroup conflict increases cohesiveness within the competing groups, primarily through the effects of threat. Thus, the interplay between group cohesiveness and competition is a significant factor in sustaining intergroup conflict.

Groups in conflict are notorious for the conformity pressures that they place on members to toe the line and support the cause. Group norms (standards of acceptable behavior) and related social influence processes dictate both the stereotypes and the discriminatory behavior that are appropriate with respect to out-groups. Members who deviate from these norms are called to task and may be ridiculed, punished, ostracized, or eliminated, depending on the severity of the conflict and the deviant behavior. Polarized opinions are a characteristic of cohesive groups under threat, and insidious and powerful influences are brought to bear on members who voice disagreement with the majority.

Cohesiveness is the main factor behind the phenomenon of groupthink articulated by Irving Janis (1982), by which an insulated group of decision makers under stress pushes concurrence seeking to the point that it overrides the realistic and moral appraisal of alternatives. Janis identifies a number of US foreign policy fiascos (the Bay of Pigs invasion, the bombing of Cambodia) as examples in which independent critical thinking was replaced by decisions to engage in irrational and dehumanizing actions toward out-groups. Groupthink is characterized by symptoms showing overestimation of the group's power and morality, closed-mindedness, and severe pressures toward uniformity. This is compatible with a large body of theory and research that demonstrates that decision making in general is not a rational, orderly process but indeed involves cognitive biases, group liabilities, and organizational constraints that produce less than optimal outcomes. (Also see chapter 9). The sobering thought with regard to intergroup conflict is that groups on both sides may be making faulty decisions that exacerbate rather than alleviate the situation.

The role of group leadership in intergroup conflict is also an important element of decision making, given that leaders and other higher-status members hold more power than the rank and file. A common phenomenon in situations of competition and conflict is that more aggressive leaders tend to come to the fore, while cooperative or accommodating leaders tend to lose power or position. Janis postulated that a lack of impartial leadership was also an important condition of groupthink, in that directive leadership that was committed to particular directions or decisions tended to influence cohesive groups toward concurrence seeking. In addition, groups in conflict tend to influence leaders in aggressive directions, and this constituent pressure supports militant leaders toward the

use of “contentious tactics” in interactions with the out-group.

Escalation Dynamics

All of the individual and group factors described so far have one thing in common: they tend to influence conflict interactions in the direction of escalation, that is, the process by which conflicts become more intense and more hostile. Escalation involves the increasing use of heavier methods of influence, especially coercive or punishing tactics, by each group to reach its goals in opposition to those of the other group. Escalation also typically results in the proliferation of issues, not simply basic ones that the conflict is perceived to be about (wages or benefits in union-management conflict), but also process or relationship issues that arise from how the two parties treat each other (the use of deception in negotiations). Finally, the motivations that drive the conflict change from wanting to do well in achieving one’s goals, to winning over the other, and then to hurting or destroying the other (Pruitt and Kim, 2004). Escalation feeds largely on fear and defensiveness, in which threats by one party to gain its objectives are met by counterthreats from the other, and these reciprocal interactions move to a higher level of costs each time around in a climate of increasing mistrust. The self-fulfilling prophecy, first identified by Robert Merton (1952), comes into play in a specific manner, in that defensiveness and mistrust motivate cautious or controlling moves, which elicit a defensive and hostile counteraction that is then perceived as justifying the initial action. This type of interaction, for example, led Ralph White (1984) to characterize the Cold War as partly due to “defensively motivated aggression.”

Our understanding of escalatory processes has been enhanced by the work of Morton Deutsch (see chapter 1 in

this Handbook) on the differences between cooperative and competitive interactions. The modal approach that parties take in terms of perceptions, attitudes, communication, and task orientation tends to show a consistency that is very powerful in determining the nature of their interaction over time. Deutsch's Crude Law of Social Relations captures a great deal of the reality of intergroup conflict—the characteristic processes and effects elicited by a type of social relationship (cooperative or competitive) tend also to elicit that type of social relationship. As Deutsch points out, cooperative processes of problem solving are similar to constructive processes of conflict resolution, while competitive processes are similar to destructive ones in addressing conflict. Deutsch (1983) also captured the competitive-destructive dynamic in his elucidation of the "malignant social process," which describes the increasingly dangerous and costly interaction of high-intensity intergroup conflict. Through a combination of cognitive rigidities and biases, self-fulfilling prophecies, and unwitting commitments to prior beliefs and actions, parties are drawn into escalating spirals wherein past investments justify increasing risks and unacceptable losses foreclose a way out. Thus, it is understandable how groups get locked into destructive conflict and appear unable to de-escalate or resolve the situation by themselves.

Resistances to Resolution and Intractability

The downside of escalation is found not only in the pains and costs that the parties endure but in the resistances to deescalation and resolution that the negative interactions create. The late Jeffrey Rubin, Dean Pruitt, Sung Hee Kim, and their colleagues have been at the forefront of studying and theorizing about how parties get locked into their conflicts. At the individual level, they see psychological

changes, including hostile attitudes and perceptions, which first encourage escalation (through the biases noted) but then support the persistence of escalatory interactions (through similar biases). To these they add the processes of deindividuation (by which out-group members are not seen as individuals but as members of a category who carry no inhibitions against maltreatment) and dehumanization (wherein out-group members are perceived as less than human and thus appropriate for inhumane treatment) (Pruitt and Kim, 2004).

Structural changes at the group level also result from escalation. Hostile perceptions of the out-group and destructive motives toward them become cemented in group norms, and pressures are brought to bear for members to accept these as right. As already noted, increased cohesiveness and militant leadership tend to support more contentious tactics and aggressive objectives. In addition, militant subgroups, which benefit from the conflict in terms of status, power, or wealth, develop strong vested interests in its continuation. At the level of the larger social system—the organization, community, or global society—intense conflict induces polarization, by which other players, who are initially outside the conflict, get drawn into coalitions that ultimately fracture the system into two opposing camps. This not only increases the intensity of the conflict but eliminates neutrals who could serve a useful third-party role in resolution.

The final contributor to deescalation resistance is the phenomena of overcommitment and entrapment. Psychological and group changes tend to strengthen commitments made to contentious behaviors, such that they become self-reinforcing, partly through the act of rationalization. Whatever was done in the past is seen as necessary, and the barrier to conflict termination is the other party’s intransigence. Commitment to destructive

and costly courses of action is increased further by the phenomenon of entrapment, in which costs already incurred are justified by continuing expenditures in pursuit of victory. Although this is irrational by outside judgment, each party pursues its goals, believing that the ultimate reward is just around the corner and that only its attainment will justify what has already been expended. The longer that mutual intransigence persists, the more the parties feel compelled to justify their positions through continued intransigence.

The high degree of resistance to resolution exhibited by certain intergroup conflicts has led to increasing interest in the concept of intractable conflict, seen as those that persist over long periods of time at an intense yet fluctuating level and that are extremely difficult to resolve (see chapter 30). Intractable conflicts may be initiated by or linked to objective incompatibilities over land or other resources, but they are generally seen as maintained by subjective factors, such as hostile attitudes, polarized and exclusive identities, extreme emotionality, and destructive relationships. It is also generally acknowledged that intractable intergroup conflicts are immune to the traditional methods of conflict management, such as negotiation, mediation, and arbitration, In fact, it is posited that the premature application of such methods may render the conflict more resistant to resolution (Rothman, 1997).

IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND PRACTICE

The complexity and intractability of destructive, escalated intergroup conflict boggle the mind and depress the spirit of those who would deign to do anything about it, whether members of the conflicting groups or outsiders. This is true whether the conflict involves factions in an organization

that have crossed each other off, interest groups in a community that only yell at each other about the issues that divide them, or ethnic groups that believe total eradication of the enemy is the only viable solution. Nonetheless, this horrendous social problem is a phenomenon that can be understood and can be rendered amenable over time to actions and interventions that transform seemingly intractable incompatibilities into workable relationships. The task is not easy, and civilization is a far way from having the knowledge and expertise required. However, based on what we now know, some implications for addressing intergroup conflict can be discerned.

A number of implications are in the form of broad orientations to approaching the resolution of intergroup conflict, which need to be further operationalized as more specific strategies and tactics. First among these is the premise that intense intergroup conflict is both an objective and subjective phenomenon and that attempts to address only one set of factors or the other are doomed to failure, either immediate or long term. Thus, methods are required that settle substantive interests and address psychological, social, and cultural aspects—the stuff of identity conflicts. Given this complexity and its attendant intransigence, it is typically the case that members of the parties themselves are unable to engage in the analysis and interaction required. Thus, it is implied that the involvement of third parties outside the conflict, who are perceived as impartial, competent, and trustworthy, is usually required to de-escalate and resolve the situation. In doing so, third parties must realize that de-escalation is not the simple reverse of escalation because of the residues and resistances that have been built up through a history of antagonistic interaction.

A further implication of the objective-subjective mix is that different methods of intervention may be required at different stages of escalation in order to de-escalate the conflict to a level where subsequent interventions will now work. For example, interventions that focus on perceptual, attitudinal, and relationship issues may be required before third-party efforts at mediating agreements on substantive matters can be successful. This form of contingency modeling has been put forward by Loraleigh Keashly and me, as well as other scholar-practitioners in the field, including Dean Pruitt and Paul Olzack.

A related implication is that intervention in intergroup conflict needs to start with a thorough analysis of the situation, including a cultural analysis where appropriate, before interventions are designed and implemented. Such analysis should involve not only the third party, but also the members or representatives of the groups themselves, because each phase of deescalation and resolution depends on earlier ones. For example, analysis, understanding, and dialogue are necessary for reconciliation to occur, and the development of alternative solutions must be based on a diagnosis of each party’s motivations, aspirations, and constraints.

Finally, the objective and subjective mix of conflict also implies that changes are required in both the process or relationship qualities and in the substantive or structural aspects for intergroup conflict to be resolved in an enduring manner. That is, the clearing up of misattributions and the rebuilding of trust, for example, need to go hand in hand with the development of decision-making procedures and resource allocation systems that address the basic incompatibilities. Thus, conflict resolution is prescribed not simply as a mechanism for dealing with difficult differences within existing social systems, but also as an approach that

can facilitate constructive social change toward more responsive and equitable systems.

Elsewhere, I have delineated a set of generic principles for resolving intergroup conflict, which embody implications that flow from these ideas (Fisher, 1994). I summarize these principles here in a manner that specifies further implications that they incorporate or are based on. The principles are organized into three major phases of addressing intergroup conflict: analysis, confrontation, and resolution.

Analyzing the Conflict

Conflict analysis should be the lead activity in moving into a field of incompatibilities and destructive interactions. Unlike the analysis that parties usually engage in (which identifies political, economic, legal, or military strategies and resources they can use to prevail), conflict analysis carried out by third parties in a facilitative role focuses on the sources and dynamics of the conflict that have brought it to its current state of expression. This involves identifying the parties and factions and the issues that they maintain the conflict is about. However, it also goes beneath the surface issues to identify the underlying interests, values, and needs that relate to the positions the parties take, that is, their demands and offers. A cultural analysis of parties who differ from each other or from the intervenor should also be carried out to illuminate their culture of conflict, that is, how they conceptualize conflict and believe it should be addressed in terms of accepted norms, practices, and institutions (Ross, 1993). In addition, this initial phase must entail a process analysis that surfaces and discusses the perceptions, thoughts, goals, fears, and needs of each party and a trust-building process that allows the parties to exchange clarifications,

acknowledgments, assurances, and possible contributions to rebuilding their relationship.

It is implied in these activities and outcomes that the parties will be engaging in intense, face-to-face interaction that involves genuine communication and the development of realistic empathy for each other. It is further implied that this form of analysis needs to be carried out by a skilled, impartial, and trusted third party who carries knowledge of conflict processes and skills in group dynamics and intergroup relations. It is conceivable that members of the parties can form a balanced team to undertake this consulting role, but it is doubly difficult for them due to their group identifications. Given that the third party also requires knowledge of the system and culture in which the conflict is embedded, be it organizational, community, societal, or international, it is also implied that the intervenor will be a multiskilled team of diverse individuals.

The stage of conflict analysis may reveal that objective interests predominate and that the parties are motivated to settle their differences and either ignore subjective elements or defer their consideration to a future time. In this case, the parties may shift to a negotiation mode and move toward a mutually satisfactory agreement; more likely, they will need to engage the services of a mediator who will assist them in crafting a settlement. It is also possible that the parties will agree to engage and accept a binding third-party judgment by a superior authority—a higher manager or body in the organization, an arbitrator appointed for the purpose, or a legal adjudicator who is available to them. Unfortunately, in intense intergroup conflict, these options are either not engaged (because each group fears losing and believes they can still win) or are not successful in the long run (because the settlements do not deal with the underlying sources and subjective aspects that drove the conflict to high levels of escalation

and intractability). In these cases, continuing involvement by a third party in a consultative role is often required, although it is not readily available in many settings.

Confronting the Conflict

When third-party-assisted interaction is possible, the stage of productive confrontation follows analysis, in which the parties directly engage each other on the issues that divide them and work toward mutually acceptable solutions through joint problem solving. It is essential that this process be carried out under norms of mutual respect, shared exploration, and commitment to the problem-solving process rather than a fixation on positions. It is implied that the facilitative conditions of intergroup contact (articulated by social scientists starting with Gordon Allport) are in place for these interactions, including equal status participants from each group, positive institutional supports for the process, a cooperative reward and task structure, a good potential for participants to get to know each other as persons, and the involvement of respected, competent, and well-adjusted individuals. Thus, it is further implied that intergroup engagements need to be well designed, with appropriate selection of individual participants and identification of both formal and informal activities and goals. This again is a role best left to knowledgeable, skilled, and trusted third-party consultants.

Equally challenging is the facilitation of the engagement sessions themselves, which need to incorporate qualities such as open and accurate representation of group perceptions, recognition of intergroup diversity including gender and cultural differences, and the persistence to attain mutually acceptable outcomes. A strong implication is that the parties must be encouraged to follow a strategy of collaboration rather than competition. That is, they need to engage in a combination of assertive behavior (stressing

one’s own needs) and cooperation (showing concern for the other party’s needs). This two-dimensional approach or dual-concern model is well represented in the conflict resolution field, building on the early work of Robert Blake and Jane Mouton with elaborations by Kenneth Thomas, Afzalur Rahim, and others. The parties must also engage in a joint problem-solving process that will get them to shared solutions. Knowledge of group problem solving is a starting point, but it was the pioneering efforts of Robert Blake, Jane Mouton, and their colleagues that led to the development of a social technology of intergroup problem solving. They have articulated how this technology can be applied by consultants or by members of the groups themselves, at least in organizational settings.

Resolving the Conflict

Conflict resolution refers to both the collaborative process by which differences are handled and the outcomes that are jointly agreed to by the parties. As distinct from conflict management, mitigation, or amelioration, conflict resolution involves a transformation of the relationship and the structural situation such that solutions developed by the parties are sustainable and self-correcting in the long term. It also requires that an adequate degree of reconciliation occurs between the parties, in that harmony has been restored through processes such as acknowledgment of transgressions, forgiveness by the victims, and assurances of future peace. Future incompatibilities will of course occur, and further problem solving toward social change will be required, but the manner of approaching differences and the quality of the outcomes will be different. Thus, one implication of this approach is that conflicts and the relationships in which they are embedded need to be transformed in an enduring fashion as opposed to simply settling disputes or, worse,

suppressing differences. In order to accomplish this, the resolution process and outcomes must address the basic human needs for development and satisfaction to some acceptable degree. Needs for security, identity, recognition, participation, distributive justice, and so on must be identified in the analysis, and mechanisms to address them ("satisfiers") must be built into the outcomes. Relations between identity groups can then be built around each group having a satisfactory degree of recognition and autonomy (power), so that they can freely enter into an interdependent relationship that is mutually beneficial.

A further implication related to outcomes necessary for resolution is that mechanisms and procedures for dealing with differences assertively and cooperatively must be built into decision making and policymaking. If all parties concerned with a situation of conflict are involved in a meaningful fashion and if procedures that work to achieve consensus (not unanimity) are implemented, the chances of incompatibilities escalating into destructive conflict are markedly reduced. This assertion is built on humanistic and democratic values, which of course are not in play in many institutions, cultures, and societies, and that is why conflict resolution must be seen as part of the slow march of civilization toward a participative and egalitarian world. Each social unit (organization, institution, community, society) has choices to make regarding the benefits and costs of social control (oppression in the extreme) versus the benefits and ultimately reduced costs of moving in democratic directions.

Thus, at the far end of conflict resolution, it is implied that institutions and societies must create political and economic structures that support equality and equity among different groups as well as individuals. (Refer to the discussion of the values and norms underlying constructive conflict resolution in chapter 1.) At the societal level,

democratic pluralism and multiculturalism are policies that will reduce destructive intergroup conflict. Depending on the geographical distribution of groups, political arrangements involving power sharing or federalism are congruent with a conflict resolution approach. Recognition of and respect among distinct identity groups in cultural and political terms need to go hand in hand with equality of opportunities in economic terms. Conflict resolution thus does not imply assimilation or homogenization, although members of distinct identity groups may share a political or national identity as well, but it does imply a mosaic of integrated social groups, cooperating in an interdependent fashion for mutual benefit.

IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING

The preceding implications cry out for new roles, innovative practices, and transformed policies and institutions to creatively deal with differences among diverse groups. Whether one is a member or representative of a group in conflict, or a third party charged with facilitating conflict resolution, the challenge in terms of the qualities and skills required is daunting. At the same time, there is now a welcome proliferation of education and training opportunities at all levels (elementary and secondary schools, colleges and universities, undergraduate and graduate programs, professional development workshops) in relevant areas such as interpersonal communication, problem solving, consensus building, and conflict management. The question to be addressed here is, What are the basic skills required to build on the understanding just outlined in order to operationalize conflict resolution processes? Only a rudimentary answer will be given because of space limitations, but I hope it will be a useful starting point.

These comments share some points Deutsch has already made in chapters 1 and 2 on the skills required for maintaining a cooperative conflict resolution process and a productive group problem-solving process.

The list of analytical and especially behavioral skills to enact the facilitation role in resolving intergroup conflict is a long one indeed and is drawn from multiple areas of professional practice, including human relations training, counseling, cross-cultural communication, community development, organizational consulting, intergroup relations, and international diplomacy. No one intervenor can aspire to develop the full skill set required to facilitate productive confrontation at the intergroup level, and it is therefore assumed that such work will involve teams of professionals, often from different but complementary disciplines relevant to the particular context of the conflict, for example, organizational, urban community, or international region. Teams are also required since it is common at certain points to work with the groups separately as well as at the interface of their relationship.

Analytical Skills

Analytical skills from many domains of understanding are useful, but at the core of this practice is the ability to apply knowledge about social conflict—its causes, forms of expression, processes of escalation, and mechanisms for its deescalation, management, and resolution. The task of the intervenor is to offer theoretical interpretations and insights at apparently useful points. Often these inputs illuminate the functioning of groups in conflict, such as normative pressures toward aggressive actions, or dynamics of the interface between the groups, such as the typical manner in which majorities and minorities relate to each other. Further understanding of the context and the cultures in which the intergroup conflict is occurring is

essential, whether one is working in an urban American community, a human service organization, or a particular region of the globe. In this regard, facilitators who are from the context and culture in question, and even from the parties in conflict, can play an especially illuminating role if they are able to rise above their in-group identity and biases and their preconceived notions related to the conflict and its resolution.

Personal Qualities

At the personal level, intervenors require many of the qualities and skills of any other professional, reflective practitioner, such as integrity and detachment. Considerable self-confidence and assuredness (although not overly so) are necessary to move into the cauldron of intergroup conflict. A high level of self-awareness is essential in terms of how one is affected by the behaviors of others, such as criticism or attack, and how one's own behavior is usually perceived by and affects others. One needs the capacity to tolerate considerable ambiguity and respond constructively to defensiveness or resistance to one's efforts. Sensitivity to gender, cultural, and other differences needs to be coupled with a respect for and capacity to work well with the wide variety of individuals and people who may be encountered. And finally, the intervenor needs the genuineness, caring, and strength of character to build meaningful and authentic relationships with others and to persevere with them in difficult times and over the long term.

Interpersonal Skills

In terms of interpersonal functioning, facilitators of interpersonal conflict should develop many of the commonly trained communication and relationship-building skills of the helping professions. The ability to speak in

genuine and respectful ways and convey messages in a concise, organized fashion needs to be coupled with the skills of reflective, empathic listening. Included are the importance of being able to give and receive feedback on behaviors and the ability to productively discuss differences in perceptions that often arise. Advanced skills of relating are also often useful, for example, confrontation (sensitivity to inconsistencies in another's behavior and the capacity to describe these in a clear and nonjudgmental manner) and immediacy (the ability to relate another's implied statements to your relationship or the situation at hand). In short, a team of facilitators needs the ability to respond to whatever messages members of antagonistic groups bring forward in a constructive and respectful fashion that does not antagonize individuals or escalate differences.

Group Leadership Skills

The third-party role at the group level is that of a facilitative leader, who has the capacity to help the antagonistic groups work together toward their shared goals in the intervention and in the longer term. This requires a deep knowledge of group processes and the capacity to facilitate group interaction. With regard to task leadership, the facilitator needs the abilities to design and implement agendas that engage conflicting parties in productive confrontation and to keep them on track as necessary. On the socioemotional side of leadership, the facilitator needs to provide encouragement and support, release tension at certain points, and harmonize misunderstandings. The intervenor must also be capable of dealing with disruptive or aggressive behavior that challenges the work of the group. In essence, the facilitation team must work to model and uphold the norms of analytical and respectful interaction. Their role thus

combines those of discussion moderator, human relations trainer, dialogue facilitator, and process consultant.

Intergroup Skills

Another important role for the intervenor is to manage the intergroup problem-solving process toward deescalation and resolution. Although based in models of group problem solving, the process at the intergroup level has additional challenges and pitfalls. The facilitator needs to understand that at best, only an uneasy coalition can be built between members or representatives of different and conflicting identity groups. That is because of the constant pull of in-group forces in ethnocentric directions, including all of the cognitive and social biases noted. Thus, moving the groups through the problem-solving process has to be a shared and mutually accepted experience at all stages. If any one stage, such as initial diagnosis or the creation of alternatives, is imbalanced through the domination of one group or biased in the interests of one group, the outcomes will not be sustainable. Mutuality and reciprocity are the keys, and the parties need to be constantly reminded that only through joint involvement and shared commitment can they be successful in dealing with their conflict.

An additional set of skills for individuals who intend to orchestrate intergroup confrontation revolves around the ability to manage difficult interactions at the interface of two or more groups. Building on all the previous skills, this challenge requires the facilitators to design and implement constructive interchanges between individuals from the conflicting groups that will move them toward resolving their difficulties and toward a renewed relationship. The ability to control disruptive interactions (arguments, debates, mutual accusations, recriminations, and attacks on the third party or the process) needs to be combined with the skill to manage a charged agenda over time, stay

on track, and move toward accomplishment and closure. At all times, the facilitator is working toward increasing mutual understanding and inducing joint problem solving. Sometimes the best that can be done is for the parties to agree to disagree, but if that is done with full understanding and a sense of respect, it is a far cry from the usual antagonism and blaming. The skills of the human relations trainer are especially useful at this level of interaction. However, when working with intergroup conflict resolution, facilitators must focus not on individuals as they interact with other individuals in the group but on how individuals are interacting in terms of their group identities with members of the other group.

Consultation Skills

This approach to intergroup conflict resolution is a form of professional consultation, wherein the help giver uses his or her expertise to facilitate the problem solving of the client system. Thus, skills and ethical practices that are necessary to implement the process and attain the outcomes of consultation are the final requirement for this line of work. The skills of consultation revolve around the capacity to initiate and manage the phases of consultation from contact to closure. Contact with the groups in conflict should come from a base of credibility, legitimacy, and impartiality, even in the case of a facilitation team composed of members of the two groups, where intervenors are respected within and outside their communities and balance on the team provides overall impartiality.

In the entry process, the consultants need to assess the antagonists' perceptions of these qualities, and all parties need to assess the goodness of fit between the intervenors' values, capabilities, and goals and the client system's need for consultation. If entry is successful, the consultant next

concentrates on the critical process of contracting, wherein expectations of all parties are clarified and ground rules for the intervention are specified. Thus, the consultant must spell out the rationale, methods, and objectives of the proposed intervention and seek agreement of the parties on these.

Diagnostic skills are central to the next phase of consultation, in which the intervenor gathers information about the current state of the client system—in this case, the intergroup conflict—and about the preferred state as perceived by the parties. The phase of implementation then invokes many of the skills noted wherein the consultant delivers the activities at the intergroup interface that are intended to increase the capacity for joint problem solving.

Evaluation is the last phase prior to exit and requires the methodological skills of the social scientist in order to judge how the intervention was carried out and what its effects were, both intended and unintended. In exiting the client system, the hope of the consultant is that the parties now have the understanding and skills to manage their future relations by themselves.

In all phases of consultation, the intervenor needs to function with a high degree of ethical conduct, including the ability to deal with ethical issues as they arise. Thus, casting this work as professional consultation adds another challenging layer to the training requirements for would-be intervenors.

CONCLUSION

Intergroup conflict occurs frequently and is often handled poorly at all levels of society and between societies. It is based in numerous sources and involves a complex interplay of individual perceptions, attitudes, and

behaviors, as well as group factors that provide a built-in tendency for escalation. Therefore, there is a considerable need for skilled intervenors and social roles and institutions to support their practice. A wide range of knowledge, much of it from a social psychological base, yields implications for analyzing, confronting, and resolving intergroup conflict.

One of the greatest challenges is training a wide range of professionals in the knowledge and skills required to facilitate the productive resolution of intergroup conflict. Through a combination of skills in interpersonal communication, group facilitation, intergroup problem solving, and system-level consulting, outside third parties or balanced teams of representatives can assist groups to confront their differences effectively and build long-term partnerships.

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PART TWO
INTRAPSYCHIC AND INTRAGROUP PROCESSES

CHAPTER ELEVEN
JUDGMENTAL BIASES IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND HOW TO OVERCOME THEM

Leigh L. Thompson and Brian J. Lucas

A common misconception that negotiators and dispute resolution professionals hold is that conflict escalation, stalemates, impasses, and lose-lose agreements are exclusively driven by intransigence and self-interested motivation. Whereas self-interest and competitive motivations interfere with productive conflict resolution, many seemingly benign beliefs and cognitions also thwart effective conflict resolution but often go undetected. Unfortunately, these beliefs are not easily corrected during the process of conflict resolution itself because it is difficult for negotiators to monitor them. Furthermore, third-party intervention is no guarantee that erroneous beliefs and cognitions will be adequately identified and eliminated. In fact, the mere presence of a third party may exaggerate the tendency of these faulty and erroneous beliefs to disturb the otherwise effective resolution of conflict. Indeed, third parties and other self-proclaimed neutrals often fall prey to similar cognitive bias (Gibson, Thompson, and Bazerman, 1994).

We argue in this chapter that detecting and challenging negotiator biases can do much to resolve disputes and conflicts of interest. Unfortunately, most negotiators are not aware of the existence of cognitive biases and their deleterious effects. In the first section, we introduce three types of bias that occur over the time course of negotiation: biases of cognition, biases of process and the dance of negotiation, and biases with regard to allocation and

outcomes. In the second section, we consider the implications of bias for negotiation. Finally, we examine methods for eliminating or reducing cognitive bias at the bargaining table, and in so doing, we consider naturally occurring social-contextual factors that affect bias as well as structured intervention.

BIAS: A DEFINITION

The tendency to use shortcuts, or heuristics, when we process information is an extremely cost-effective strategy, and much of the time, heuristic processing provides us with accurate information. It may seem peculiar to argue that heuristics—cognitive shortcuts—are cost-effective, given that they lead to biases and hinder effective conflict resolution; however, our point is that much of the time, these shortcuts may be effective when used in nonconflict situations because they can lead to an answer or solution that is acceptable and efficient (see Bazerman and Moore, 2013). For example, in forming an impression of a new next-door neighbor, one could do an extensive search (interviewing friends and relatives, perhaps even hiring a private investigator), or one could simply rely on a first impression. Whereas the former strategy is costly and time-consuming, the second strategy is simple and, in nonconflict situations, typically adequate. Indeed, people's judgments of others' likability, personality, sexual orientation, performance as teachers, socioeconomic status, psychopathology, and a host of other predictions can be evaluated within seconds (Ambady and Rosenthal, 1992, 1993; Johnson, Gill, Reichman, and Tassinary, 2007; Krause, Piff, and Keltner, 2009; Fowler, Lilienfeld, and Patrick, 2009). Thin slices of behavior reveal that people pay attention to key cues when forming judgments (Carney, Colvin, and Hall, 2007).

In competitive encounters such as negotiation, the heuristic-based judgments we make are often wrong. Furthermore, the nature of our errors is not random but instead systematic. For the purposes of this discussion, we focus on systematic error and patterned fallacy; these are known as *cognitive biases* . Biases come in many forms and shapes. For instance, people can be biased about other people, as when they use stereotypes (someone might perceive all New Yorkers as pushy). People can also be biased about situations (the gambler's fallacy—having lost so many times in a row that he or she is due to win; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Paradoxically, people can also be biased about themselves (the vast majority of people judge themselves to be above average on many positive characteristics and abilities, even though it is logically impossible for most people to be above average). Many biases can affect decision makers in many contexts, for example, confirmation bias (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1978). We do not purport to present and discuss a large list of biases and do not intend to discuss all documented negotiation-related biases (Malhotra and Bazerman, 2007; Bazerman and Moore, 2013; Thompson, 2012). Rather, this chapter focuses on three key aspects of negotiation: (1) biases of cognition, which include anchoring, framing, and decision fatigue; (2) biases of the process of negotiation, which include the fixed-pie perception, exaggeration of conflict, biased punctuation of conflict, and the illusion of transparency; and (3) biases of outcome and allocation, which include egocentric allocations and judgments of fairness, and reactive devaluation with regard to proposed solutions.

Biases of Cognition

In this section, we discuss biases that are often the first to emerge when negotiators are at the bargaining table. In

some cases, these biases can be triggered before the negotiation even begins. For example people are much more cooperative in a prisoner's dilemma game when the game is described as the "community game" versus when it is described as the "Wall Street game" (Liberman, Samuels, and Ross, 2004). Students taking economic courses play the same game more competitively than do students taking humanities courses (Frank, Gilovich, and Regan, 1993). And the mere presence of business-related objects, such as briefcases and business suits, leads people to behave more competitively in social encounters and economic games (Kay, Wheeler, Bargh, and Ross, 2004).

Anchoring.

Anchoring is a bias that occurs when a salient reference point—an anchor—influences the range and diversity of people's thoughts and ideas (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). It affects judgment because people do not sufficiently adjust away from the anchor (Epley and Gilovich, 2001). For example, if asked, "In what year was George Washington elected president?" most Americans who do not know the correct answer will anchor on the year 1776 (the year America declared independence) and give an estimate somewhere in the late 1770s, failing to sufficiently adjust away from the anchor (the correct answer is 1788).

Anchoring can bias judgments at every stage of the negotiation and conflict resolution process. For example, Northcraft and Neale (1987) surveyed real estate brokers who claimed they could assess the value of a property to within 5 percent of the true or appraised value. In their study, professional brokers as well as naive students were given a ten-page packet about a house for sale and asked to determine its value. Both the brokers and the students were affected by the list price of the house, which served as

a powerful anchor, yet brokers denied using list price in their appraisal decision. Ritov (1996) found that extremely subtle shifts in how negotiators look at information can have a large impact on final outcomes. For example, buyers and sellers in a simulation viewed possible agreements in order that moved from best for the buyer to best for the seller; in all instances, the first possible agreement served as a powerful anchor.

The anchoring bias amplifies the importance of first offers and issue timing. Another investigation found that in both e-mail and face-to-face negotiations, those who made first offers in distributive negotiations claimed more total value (Galinsky and Mussweiler, 2001). Presumably the first offers acted as anchors from which the negotiating party was unable to sufficiently adjust. Anchoring can also affect the overall joint value of negotiated agreements. For example, in multi-issue negotiations with integrative potential, negotiators may anchor on one issue. The first issue chosen for discussion may influence the way the remaining issues are discussed and ultimately negotiated. For example, consider a negotiation with a supplier in which cost-efficiency and product quality are both important issues. Discussing cost-efficiency first may anchor the subsequent discussion of product quality on costs and benefits, reducing the focus on product quality.

Framing.

Another cognitive bias that influences negotiation and conflict resolution is framing, which refers to the way in which a situation or decision is subjectively construed as a loss or a gain (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). According to Tversky and Kahneman, almost any decision can be reframed as a gain or a loss relative to something. Thus, decision makers' reference points for defining gain and loss are often arbitrary. When outcomes are framed positively,

as a gain, people tend to exhibit risk aversion, preferring a sure outcome over a risky gamble. However, when outcomes are framed negatively, as a loss, people become risk seeking, preferring risky gambles over sure outcomes.

How might framing bias negotiation and conflict resolution outcomes? In an initial experimental investigation of gain and loss framing on negotiation outcomes, Neale and Bazerman (1985) manipulated the framing of a contract negotiation between participants assigned to the role of a management or a union leader. Participants were much more likely to reach a negotiated settlement when concessions were framed as overall gains for the company than when they were framed as losses. When concessions were framed as losses, participants were more likely to opt for arbitration, a riskier outcome that often leads to impasse. If one negotiator has a negative (loss) frame and the other a positive (gain) frame, the negotiator with the negative frame reaps a greater share of the resources (Bottom and Studt, 1993).

Framing also affects behavior and outcomes across a series of negotiations. Negotiators who have recently experienced a string of failures are more likely to adopt a loss frame in a negotiation; conversely, negotiators who have experienced a string of success feel greater control (Kray, Paddock, and Galinsky, 2008). Loss-framed negotiators are reluctant to reveal information that could potentially be used to exploit them. In an investigation of ultimatum games, in which player 1 receives an endowment and decides how to allocate it between herself and player 2, player 2 is likely to accept unfair allocations when player 1’s actions are framed as “claiming” rather than “dividing” resources (Blount and Larrick, 2000).

Decision Fatigue.

Decision making and negotiation can be tiring. Indeed, negotiators often view negotiations as stressful, and those who perceive it in this way are particularly vulnerable to low-quality outcomes and faulty perceptions (O'Connor, Arnold, and Maurizio, 2010). Moreover, making decisions can lead to mental fatigue and reduce people's ability to effectively make subsequent choices (Vohs et al., 2008). Making decisions reduces the effectiveness of subsequent decision making in a number of domains, ranging from simple consumer product choices (Bruyneel, Dewitte, Vohs, and Warlop, 2006) to complex judicial sentencing decisions (Danziger, Levav, and Avnaim-Pesso, 2011).

Negotiations and attempts at conflict resolution often involve multiple issues, parties, and rounds. In short, they can be long and tiring. Two aspects of negotiations can exacerbate decision fatigue: duration and information complexity. Duration, or the time course of a negotiation, is an important determinant of decision fatigue. Over the time course of a negotiation, it is increasingly likely that decision fatigue will bias subsequent decisions and outcomes. Early research documented the effects of duration on negotiation behavior. One study found that as a negotiation progressed, people tended to engage in fewer cognitively demanding activities, such as making high demands of their opponents and bluffing (Pruitt and Drews, 1969). Another determinant of decision fatigue is information complexity. As the number of issues and constituents in a negotiation increases, so does the number of possible negotiated agreements. Research on the psychology of choice suggests that as choice sets become larger, people exhibit a preference for simplicity (Iyengar and Kamenica, 2010) or prefer not to make a decision at all (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000). In complex and multiround negotiations, the search for simple solutions may bias a fatigued negotiator's judgment and result in capitulating on

important issues or, alternatively, leaving the negotiation table altogether. In sum, decision fatigue is a prominent source of bias in negotiations and conflict resolution. It can lead to less strategic pursuit of desired outcomes and a preference for simplified decisions.

Fixed-Pie Perception

In very general terms, people in negotiation and conflict situations tend to assume that the degree of opposition between themselves and other parties is greater than it actually is. A classic root cause of most ill-fated negotiations is the fixed-pie perception: the belief that the other party's gain comes at our expense and our gain at theirs (Bazerman and Neale, 1992; Thompson and Hastie, 1990). The fixed-pie perception simply means that most negotiators work under the assumption that the other party's gain is one's own loss, and vice versa. In one investigation, for example, more than two-thirds of the negotiators assumed that the amount of available resources was fixed, even though this was not the case (Thompson and Hastie, 1990).

A close cousin of the fixed-pie perception is the lose-lose outcome (Thompson and Hrebec, 1996). The possibility of lose-lose negotiations often goes unchecked, because most people tend to view the opposite of win-win as win-lose; however, lose-lose negotiations do exist (Thompson and Hrebec, 1996). They occur if both parties settle for something that both prefer less than what they can readily have. Consider the following lose-lose situations:

- Two countries have been in conflict for decades. Each would benefit from peaceful coexistence, but their attempts at peace talks never achieve substantive progress, and the conflict rages on.

- The management and labor representatives for a local industry embroiled in contract-renewal talks both realize that if the union goes on strike, company owners and union membership alike will suffer. But they do not reach an agreement by the time the contract expires.

Given the ubiquity of the fixed-pie perception and its deleterious effects on negotiation, a great deal of research has examined how to minimize it. To the extent that negotiators share their interests and priorities and learn those of the other party, the fixed-pie perception can be dramatically reduced (Thompson, 1991). Another key way to combat this perception is to engage in perspective taking, or put oneself in the other negotiator's shoes. Perspective taking leads negotiators to construe the other party in a less competitive light (Neale and Bazerman, 1982) and increases the likelihood of using integrative bargaining tactics such as logrolling (Trötschel, Hüffmeier, Loschelder, Schwartz, and Gollwitzer, 2011). Perspective taking is distinctly more effective than is empathy when it comes to crafting integrative agreements (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, and White, 2008). Moreover, negotiators who behaviorally mimic their negotiation opponents are more likely to make accurate judgments and reach mutually beneficial agreements as compared to negotiators who do not mimic their opponents (Maddux, Mullen, and Galinsky, 2008).

Biases of Process and the Dance of Negotiation

In this section, we discuss biases that emerge during the process of negotiation, particularly as the sequence of offers and counteroffers occurs. Specifically, we discuss the exaggeration of conflict, the biased punctuation of conflict, and the illusion of transparency.

Exaggeration of Conflict.

People involved in social or political conflict tend to overestimate the extremity of the other side's beliefs. Consider the reactions to the real-life conflict commonly referred to as the Howard Beach incident, in which a young black man, Michael Griffith, was struck and killed by a passing car as he attempted to escape a group of white pursuers in the Howard Beach neighborhood of Queens in New York City. In one study, people who characterized themselves as liberals or conservatives were asked to rate the extent to which they believed in the truth of certain statements about the case ("The white pursuers deliberately chased Michael Griffith into the path of oncoming traffic"; "Michael Griffith had consumed cocaine on the night in question"; Robinson, Keltner, Ward, and Ross, 1995).

The same people were then asked to predict how "the other side" would rate the truth of the same statements. That is, conservatives were asked to predict liberals' ratings for each question, as were liberals asked to predict conservatives' ratings. Both liberals and conservatives overestimated the difference between their side and the other. Liberals overestimated the extent to which conservatives believed in the truth of statements favoring the white perpetrators; conservatives overestimated the extent to which liberals believed in the truth of statements favoring the black victim. Thus, the partisans in this case believed that the distance between their positions was greater than it really was.

Perhaps most surprising, neutrals (people who described themselves as neither liberal nor conservative) also succumbed to this mistake; they too overestimated the gap between liberals' and conservatives' beliefs about the Howard Beach incident. All three groups (liberals,

conservatives, and neutrals) exaggerated the extent of conflict: all three groups overestimated the extent to which conservatives would interpret the events in ways that blamed the black victim and the extent to which liberals would interpret events in ways that favored the black victim.

The pattern of results is not unique to this incident. Exaggeration of perceived conflict exists in many other domains: abortion, the death penalty, the arms race, and even the Western canon debate (the dispute among educators about the choice of books in introductory college-level civilization and literature courses; Robinson and Keltner, 1996).

It is important to consider the implications of the tendency for people to exaggerate conflict. If the partisans in a conflict perceive their differences as greater than they really are, they might be overly pessimistic about finding common ground. If people hold erroneous assumptions about the gap between their own position and that of the other party, then they might decide that it is not worthwhile to initiate negotiations (Robinson et al., 1995).

The fact that people exaggerate the extent of conflict suggests that information exchange among parties is crucial. Unless both parties to a conflict discuss the nature of their beliefs, assumptions, and concerns, each party continues to perceive the other as unreasonable and extreme. Because neutral third parties also tend to exaggerate conflict, these results have important implications for mediators as well. To be effective, mediators must accurately understand the other party's interests. If a mediator relies on her preconceived assumptions about each party's position, she is likely to overestimate the extremity of each party's position and the disparity between the parties' interests.

In addition to forming an accurate understanding of the conflict, mediators have an important role to play in helping parties overcome their own perception of exaggerated conflict. Exaggeration of conflict comes in two forms: each party tends to see the other party's position as more extreme than it really is, and one's own side is also seen as more extreme than it really is (Robinson et al., 1995). Mediators can help parties see that their own position does not need to be as extreme as they think it needs to be.

Biased Punctuation of Conflict.

The need to simplify a conflict situation can lead to faulty perceptions about cause-and-effect relationships. People may falsely infer a causal relationship where none exists, or they may assume that a given action by one person results in an action by the other person. This effect, known as the *biased punctuation of conflict* , occurs when people interpret interaction with their adversaries in other-derogating terms (Kahn and Kramer, 1990). Actor A perceives the history of conflict with another actor, B, as a sequence of B-A, B-A, B-A, in which the initial hostile or aggressive move was always made by B, obliging A to engage in defensive and legitimate retaliatory action. Actor B punctuates the same history of interaction as A-B, A-B, A-B, however, reversing the roles of aggressor and defender. Disagreement about how to punctuate a sequence of events in a conflict relationship is at the root of many disputes. When each side to the dispute is queried, they explain their frustrations and actions as defenses against the acts of the other party. As a result, conflict escalates unnecessarily.

Closely related to the biased punctuation of conflict is the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977). For example, negotiators who bargain with an opponent who has an attractive BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated

agreement) and have difficulty settling on an outcome are inclined to regard the negotiator as disagreeable rather than to surmise that the other party has a better outside option (Morris, Larrick, and Su, 1999). In short, negotiators are quick to ascribe personality flaws as the root of intransigent behavior and overlook situational factors.

The Illusion of Transparency.

In our daily interactions with others, we tend to assume that when we express particular emotions or preferences, the people with whom we are interacting will accurately detect these cues. Yet this is not necessarily the case. We often overestimate the degree to which others have access to our internal states.

The tendency to overestimate the degree to which others understand what is on our minds is known as the *illusion of transparency* (Gilovich, Savitsky, and Medvec, 1998). The illusion of transparency suggests that negotiators believe that they are revealing more than they actually are. In other words, they believe that others have access to information about them when in fact they do not. For example, in one investigation, negotiators judged whether an observer to the negotiation would be able to accurately discern their negotiation goals from their behavior (Vorauer and Claude, 1998). Negotiators consistently overestimated the transparency of their objectives. Thus, people feel more like an open book with respect to their goals and interests in negotiations than they actually are.

In highly contentious negotiations, parties may receive a better outcome if they do not express too much excitement over closing a deal. For instance, if a prospective home buyer is so enamored with the house that he may be willing to pay the asking price, then communicating this level of enthusiasm to the seller would put the buyer at a

disadvantage. If the seller were aware of the buyer's exuberance, she may simply refuse to lower the price at all, knowing that the buyer would likely be willing to settle for the asking price. In this case, it is in the buyer's best interest not to let his enthusiasm for the home leak out. Yet even when we are consciously trying to hide our true preferences, we still experience the illusion of transparency. In one investigation, Van Boven, Gilovich, and Medvec (2003) found that negotiators who consciously tried to conceal their preferences nevertheless believed that they had tipped their hand to the other party more than they actually had: "The illusion of transparency is thus due to the sense that one's *specific* actions and reactions that arise in the give-and-take of negotiation—a blush here, an averted gaze there—are more telling than they actually are" (Van Boven et al., 2003, p. 128). Sometimes there are advantages to revealing information. For example, when negotiators have different priorities, negotiators who share information are more likely to reach integrative agreements than those who do not (Thompson, 1991). This is partly because of our inclination to reciprocate: if you share information, chances are that the other party will share information as well (Thompson, 1991). But the illusion of transparency can discourage beneficial information sharing because it can mislead negotiators into falsely believing that the other party has enough (or too much) information already (Van Boven et al., 2003). Alternatively, a negotiator who is aware that he might fall prey to the illusion of transparency can make a conscious effort to share information with the other party, thereby increasing the likelihood of resolving a conflict in a mutually beneficial way.

Biases of Outcome and Allocation

In this section, we discuss biases that affect how negotiators evaluate outcomes and allocations. Specifically, we focus on egocentrism and reactive devaluation.

Egocentrism and Biases in Fairness Allocations.

People tend to view themselves in a favorable light (Taylor and Brown, 1988). Our psychological immune system is so efficient that we do not even realize our judgments are tainted with self-interest. For example, consider a husband and wife reflecting on their perceptions of responsibility for cleaning dishes, shopping, child care, and other household and relationship activities. Imagine asking each spouse independently to score who does what percentage of the work. In such a case, both partners generally assume themselves to be more responsible than the other (Ross and Sicoly, 1979). When both spouses' contributions are totaled for a "couple's" score, the perceived contributions frequently amount to more than 100 percent! The same pattern can occur in mixed-motive situations. Such differences in perception undoubtedly exacerbate conflict at home, in the workplace, and elsewhere. For example, in the Chicago teachers' strike of 2012, Chicago teachers failed to reach an agreement with the city of Chicago regarding their pay and benefits. The resulting strike postponed the school year by over a week. Whereas the city thought it was making fair concessions by proposing to create new teacher jobs and a pay increase, the teachers perceived their previous concessions to be substantial; the result was gridlock and strike (Sustar, 2012).

Yet despite the egocentric bias, most negotiators describe themselves as wanting to be "fair" (Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman, 1989). And most people also prefer to divide resources "fairly" (Messick, 1993). The problem is that self-interest tinges negotiators' perceptions of the fair allocation of resources. This is because fairness

is not an absolute construct but highly subjective. What is fair to one person may not be fair in the eyes of another. Although people generally want what is fair, their assessments of fairness are often self-serving (Messick and Sentis, 1979). Moreover, the fact that we have little or no self-awareness of this influence on our otherwise sound judgment heightens the intransigence of our views. Suppose you have worked for seven hours and have been paid twenty-five dollars. Another person has worked for ten hours doing the same work. How much do you think the other person should get paid? If you're like most people, you believe the other person should get paid more for doing more work—about thirty dollars, on average (Messick and Sentis, 1979). This is hardly a self-serving response. Now consider the reverse situation: the other person has worked for seven hours and been paid twenty-five dollars. You have worked for ten hours. What is a fair wage for you to be paid? Messick and Sentis found the average response to be about thirty-five dollars. The difference is about ten dollars, and it illustrates the phenomenon of egocentric bias: people pay themselves substantially more than they are willing to pay others for doing the same task.

We have made the point that fairness is not an absolute construct; instead, it is socially defined. What is fair to one person may not be fair in the eyes of another. Consider what happened when two vice presidents of a major Fortune 100 company were promoted to senior vice president at about the same time in the late 1990s (Klein, 2003). Both moved into new offices, but one of them suspected an inequity. He pulled out blueprints and measured the square footage of each office. His suspicions were confirmed when it turned out the other's office was bigger than his by a few feet. A former employee said, "He blew a gasket." Walls were removed, and his office was

reconfigured to make it as large as his counterpart's. This example illustrates that in any situation, there are as many interpretations of fairness as there are parties involved. Here, equality, equity, and need are all plausible principles on which a decision can be made. Hence, in conflict resolution, two people may both truly want a fair settlement, but they may have very different and equally justifiable ideas about what is fair.

Consider another example. You are told about an accident in which a motorcyclist was injured after being hit by a car. After learning all the facts, you are asked to make a judgment of how much money you think is a fair settlement to compensate the motorcyclist for his injuries. Then you are asked to play the role of either the injured motorcyclist or the driver of the car and to negotiate a settlement. Most of the time, people in this situation have no trouble coming to an agreement (Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, and Camerer, 1995).

Now imagine doing the same thing, except that your role assignment comes first. That is, first you are asked to play the role of the motorcyclist or the driver, and then you learn all the facts, decide on a fair settlement, and finally negotiate. In this situation, the only thing that changes is that you learn the facts and make a fair settlement judgment through the eyes of one of the parties instead of from the standpoint of a neutral observer. As it turns out, this difference is crucial. Instead of having no trouble coming to an agreement (as do the people who do not know their roles until just prior to the negotiation), people who know their roles from the beginning have a very difficult time coming to an agreement (Babcock et al., 1995). The high impasse rate among people who know their roles from the beginning is linked to self-serving judgments of fairness. The more biased the prenegotiation fair

settlement judgment is, the more likely the later negotiation will result in impasse.

Thus, a person who knows she is playing the role of motorcyclist before making a fair-settlement judgment is likely to assess a large damage award (in her own favor). A person who knows he is playing the role of the car driver before making a fair-settlement judgment is more likely to assess a small damage award (in his own favor). The result is that these two people have quite a hard time negotiating an agreement because their assessments of what is fair are so far apart.

Although biased perceptions of fairness are quite common (Babcock et al., 1995), cultural factors can exaggerate or mitigate these biases. In comparison to negotiators from individualistic cultures (e.g., the United States), negotiators from collectivist cultures (e.g., Japan) are less likely to hold such extreme biased perceptions of fairness (Gelfand et al., 2002). In one investigation, Gelfand et al. (2002) found that because of their higher levels of biased perceptions of fairness, U.S. negotiators experienced impasse more often compared to Japanese negotiators.

In general, there are often as many proposed solutions as there are parties to the conflict. Each party sincerely believes its own proposed outcome is fair for everyone. At the same time, each party's conception of fairness is tainted by self-interest, so that each solution is most favorable to the party proposing it.

Reactive Devaluation.

When a conflict is resolved, the parties often assess how satisfied they are with the outcome of the resolution. Because of the absence of clear objective criteria, parties to conflict do not measure their outcomes on an absolute scale. Instead, success is a socially determined construct

that is measured by many factors, including comparison with similar others, views of significant others, and the outcomes of one's opponent. In fact, there is little or no relationship between how good people feel and their actual outcomes (Thompson, 1991). In conflict situations in which parties' interests are not completely aligned, how good people feel is a converse function of the emotions displayed by the other person: when the other is sad, we feel good; when they are happy, we feel bad (Thompson, Valley, and Kramer, 1995).

Our feelings of satisfaction after the fact are not the only way we are affected by our opponent. Our preferences during an ongoing dispute can also be affected by the opponent's expressed preferences. For example, in a survey of opinions regarding possible arms reductions by the United States and the Soviet Union, respondents were asked to evaluate the terms of a nuclear disarmament proposal, a proposal that was allegedly initiated by the United States, Soviet Union, or a neutral third party (Ross and Stillinger, 1991). In all cases, the proposal was identical; however, reactions to it depended on who allegedly initiated it. The terms were seen as unfavorable to the United States when the Soviets were the initiators, even though the same terms appeared moderately favorable when attributed to a neutral third party and quite favorable when attributed to the United States. (See also Oskamp, 1965.)

This case is an example of *reactive devaluation* , the tendency for a party to undervalue an offer just because it was the other party who offered it (Oskamp, 1965; Ross and Stillinger, 1991). The reasoning behind reactive devaluation might sound like this: "My opponent wouldn't make this offer unless it's good for him. But if it's good for him, then it's probably bad for me, so I'll refuse to accept it." The examples of responses to the arms reduction

proposals illustrate that our preferences and our evaluation of a dispute can be determined by the other party's preferences and reactions. When the other party is happy, we are sad; when the other party seems to favor a particular outcome, we devalue it.

Curhan, Neale, and Ross (2004) demonstrated that in typical negotiation formats, in which negotiators begin by simply exchanging initial proposals with one another, reactive devaluation of initial offers is a common response. By engaging in reactive devaluation—assuming the other party's offer was primarily beneficial for the other party—many negotiators failed to reach agreement with one another. Two techniques helped to prevent reactive devaluation. First, asking negotiators to assign a rating to a variety of proposals reduced reactive devaluation by motivating negotiators to remain consistent with their original assessment even after one of the previously rated proposals is endorsed by the opponent. Second, asking negotiators to have a general discussion about the issues on the table, without making any proposals or offers, also reduced reactive devaluation. During these discussions, negotiators were able to express their needs and priorities, leading their counterparts subsequently to make more charitable attributions about the offers they received. Both prerating proposals and prior discussion are techniques that can be easily implemented by a mediator; if no mediator is present, the parties can try to structure the negotiation so that prediscussion of needs and priorities takes place before any specific offers are exchanged.

IMPLICATIONS OF NEGOTIATOR BIAS

The incidence of bias takes its toll on negotiators and negotiation outcomes. Some of these negative effects are evident, such as the fact that the fixed-pie perception

reduces mutual agreement and increases the incidence of lose-lose outcomes. However, biases might also exact a psychological toll on negotiators. In this section, we consider several negative effects of biases.

Exaggeration of Conflict: False Conflict

Negotiations that involve some amount of conflict or mixed motives are highly susceptible to exaggerated perceptions of conflict and competition. This can lead to false conflict, that is, conflict where no conflict exists. For example, people who take extreme positions on an issue assume their opponents take an equally strong, but opposite, position (van Boven, Judd, and Sherman, 2012). In a labor negotiation, a labor union may highly prioritize the issue of salary increases. Because the union holds such a strong position on the issue, union members may presume that management is strongly against salary increases, even though management may not hold a strong position at all. For example, Kelley and Stahelski (1970) classified negotiators as either predominantly cooperative or predominantly competitive on the basis of their actual behavior. In a subsequent simulation, competitors negotiated with cooperators; whereas cooperators accurately perceived the competitors to be fundamentally competitive, the competitors failed to realize that the cooperators had benevolent intentions, and instead falsely assumed the cooperators were behaving competitively, which ultimately paved the way toward lose-lose outcomes. Thus, cognitive biases and faulty perceptions exacerbate conflict.

Failure to Reach Agreement When Agreement Would Be Mutually Beneficial

Cognitive biases can lead negotiators to “leave value on the table.” The most drastic case is when negotiators opt for

impasse when a mutually beneficial agreement could have been made. Cognitive biases can reduce negotiators' abilities to reach a deal by restricting what we call *interpersonal scope* and *issue scope* . Interpersonal scope is the extent to which a negotiator considers the needs of the other party. Restrictions of interpersonal scope are fueled by egocentric biases, or the tendency to focus on one's own perspective. In addition, because people have exclusive access to their own thoughts but others do not, they tend to overpredict how well the other party understands their arguments. Both of these tendencies lead to reductions in interpersonal scope: the extent to which a negotiator flexibly considers the issues involved to arrive at an optimal outcome. Anchoring and framing often restrict issue scope. For example, if one party anchors the negotiation with an extreme first offer, the other party might assume there is no zone of possible agreement and fail to pursue that issue for possible win-win solutions. Framing restricts issue scope when a particular frame causes an issue to be seen in only one way. For example, when concessions on an issue are framed as losses rather than gains, negotiators may dismiss them (Neale and Bazerman, 1985). Although we have distinguished interpersonal and issue scope, some biases are equally pernicious to both types. For example, decision fatigue will reduce a negotiator's likelihood of considering the other party's perspective (Lin, Keysar, and Epley, 2010) as well as being able to think flexibly about the issues on the table (Vohs et al., 2008).

Reaching Agreement Prematurely or in Substandard Way

Sometimes all of the people in an interdependent decision-making situation prefer one settlement to another but nevertheless fail to achieve it. This is known as a lose-lose

outcome (Thompson and Hrebec, 1996). For example, in the end-of-year-2012 fiscal cliff negotiations, both Republicans and Democrats came to the table with a goal: Republicans wanted to cut government spending and Democrats wanted to raise taxes. Both Republicans and Democrats stood to lose by failing to reach agreement. However, after the midnight deadline passed on New Year's Day, President Obama and Congress were at a deadlock. On January 2, an agreement was clumsily reached, and by many accounts, the agreement was not attractive for any group, in particular, Republicans (Calmes, 2012). Known as a lose-lose agreement, both parties settled for an outcome that is clearly worse for both as compared to other viable outcomes.

The frequency with which lose-lose agreements occur is both surprising and alarming. One statistical analysis involving more than five thousand participants revealed that lose-lose agreements occurred 20 percent of the time (Thompson and Hrebec, 1996). That is, in cases where the parties have compatible preferences with regard to a particular issue, fully one time in five they agree on an alternative that both prefer less than another outcome. Moreover, it is unlikely that the lose-lose agreement is an artifact of the laboratory, with no real-world significance. Balke, Hammond, and Meyer's (1973) examination of labor-management negotiations at Dow Chemical is a case in point. Analysis of that dispute revealed that labor and management both preferred the same wage increase, yet neither party realized it until after a costly two-month strike.

Another example is illustrated in Walton and McKersie's analysis (1965) of the Cuban missile crisis, which stemmed from the Soviet Union's buildup of missile bases in Cuba during the Cold War. The crisis had reached dangerous proportions when the United States threatened to retaliate

against the Soviet Union when Cuba fired on American airplanes. In fact, the Soviet Union, unbeknown to the United States, also preferred that Cuba refrain from provoking the United States because there was a danger that Cuba's behavior would incite a war over issues not important to Soviet interests. The parties that had come to the brink of nuclear war shared compatible interests without realizing it.

Why does this happen? As discussed earlier, people sometimes adopt a fixed-pie perception in which they believe that the other person's interests are completely opposed to their own. This belief is established at the outset, before people even have the opportunity to meet or talk with each other. In addition, the fixed-pie perception is remarkably durable; it remains even when people have attractive incentives and ample feedback is available to challenge the perception. But sometimes people do realize their preferences are compatible with the other party's and yet still fail to capitalize on shared interests. Political pressures, situational norms, and organizational constraints prevent people from optimizing their compatible interests. A vacation rental company with a week-long rental policy gets a call late in the week from a renter requesting a midweek stay. It would be better for both parties to rent the property, but this means that company policy would be broken, so the agency refuses. Parties may face similar kinds of social pressure in other situations, and the desire to save face may prevent a person from settling on what is obviously a better deal (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1994).

Negotiation Relationships

Another consequence of cognitive biases is that they can damage relationships between negotiators. Negotiators must often try to predict the thoughts and motives of their

counterparts with little information. Because the fixed-pie bias often causes negotiators to perceive their counterparts as competitors who intend to claim their resources, negotiators often attribute malevolent intentions to their counterparts, leading to more competitive behavior (Epley, Caruso, and Bazerman, 2006). Viewing a counterpart as a competitor makes it more likely that a negotiator will approach a negotiation with a focus more on economic and outcome issues at the expense of relational concerns (Curhan, Elfenbein, and Xu, 2006). In sum, cognitive biases lead negotiators to view counterparties as adversaries, which reduces concerns for relational outcomes and may damage negotiators' relationships and reputations.

Self-Perception and Self-Confidence

Negotiators who are unable to reach their outcomes and maintain relationships may begin to suffer a loss of confidence and may begin to doubt their overall effectiveness in interpersonal relationships. Over time, negotiators who are ineffective may develop a prevention focus rather than a promotion focus. Negotiators who have a prevention focus try to avoid bad or undesirable outcomes; conversely, negotiators who have a promotion focus attempt to achieve desired goals. One investigation found that negotiators with a prevention focus achieve worse outcomes than do those with a promotion focus (Galinsky, Leonardelli, Okhuysen, and Mussweiler, 2005). Other research indicates that negotiators who have dealt with angry partners in the past are less (rather than more) likely to make demands in a subsequent negotiation (Van Kleef and de Dreu, 2010), suggesting that negotiators plummet further into self-doubt with negative experiences. The research suggests that failed bargaining experiences act as a self-fulfilling prophesy, such that negotiators who have reached impasses on a prior negotiation were more

likely to have impasses in their next negotiation or reach deals of low joint value compared to those who had previously reached agreement (O'Connor, Arnold, and Burris, 2005).

REMEDYING BIAS IN NEGOTIATION

Much more thought goes into examining the nature of bias and error at the bargaining table than to solutions as to how to eliminate or reduce it. Perhaps this reflects the fundamental tension between basic and applied research. However, we are not content to naively suggest that mere awareness of bias is sufficient to deal with it. We discuss two types of remedies: naturally occurring social-contextual factors that may either enhance or exacerbate biases, including teams of negotiators, constituency and accountability pressure, communication media, and social relationships; and deliberate and structured interventions, such as might occur in a classroom or training session, including feedback, analogical reasoning, and formal training.

Naturally Occurring Remedies of Bias

The Team Effect.

Team effect refers to the empirical observation that as compared to one-on-one negotiations, teams are better able to forge mutually beneficial agreements in negotiations that contain potential for integrative agreement (Thompson, Peterson, and Brodt, 1996). Specifically, a comparison of three types of negotiation configurations (team versus team, team versus solo, and solo versus solo negotiations) revealed that the presence of at least one team at the bargaining table increased the overall joint value (Thompson, Peterson, and Brodt, 1996). Why are

teams able to forge mutually beneficial agreements when solos often fail? Negotiators exchange more information when a team is at the bargaining table than when just two parties negotiate (O'Connor, 1997; Carnevale, 2008). Information exchange leads to greater judgment accuracy about parties' interests, which paves the way toward integrative agreement.

Constituency and Accountability Pressure.

A number of studies have found that when negotiators are accountable to a constituency, they often bargain in a more assertive fashion. When the bargaining zone is small and the potential for integrative agreements does not exist, constituency pressure may lead to deadlock and impasse. However, other research has found that in cases where negotiators often too rapidly capitulate and make concessions, accountability to another party can lead to more beneficial outcomes. For example, in research on gender and negotiation, women often perform worse than men, holding other factors constant (Kray, Thompson, and Galinsky, 2001). However, when females are positioned to be accountable to another, they are more likely to forge better deals (Bowles, Babcock, and McGinn, 2005; Bowles, Babcock, and Lai, 2007; Amanatullah and Morris, 2010).

Relationships.

The relationship between negotiators may affect cognitive biases. For example, negotiators who are friends or have close network ties may be less likely to falsely presume conflict with the other party and may even be able to synchronize and communicate more fluently. It is likely that close negotiators come to the bargaining table with an eye toward their own outcomes and toward future negotiations and reputation. However, friendships may exacerbate decision biases such as anchoring and framing effects. If

one negotiator anchors on a particular issue, the friendship may make it especially hard to adjust away from that offer for fear of damaging the relationship or a common network tie. Indeed, negotiators may engage in premature concession making, and such unmitigated communion might paradoxically reduce joint gains (Amanatullah, Morris, and Curhan, 2008).

Communication Medium.

Negotiation modalities can range from text or e-mail messages to face-to-face conversation. In an initial study of e-mail negotiation, negotiators who had only e-mail contact fared much worse than did those who had an opportunity to connect by phone (Moore, Kurtzberg, Thompson, and Morris, 1999). The most personal modality, face-to-face, helps to diffuse biases that result from impoverished communication; even a short telephone call can pave the way to integrative agreement (Morris, Nadler, Kurtzberg, and Thompson, 2002). However, because face-to-face negotiations tend to take more time and effort than less rich modalities (Purdy, Nye, and Balakrishnan, 2000), they may also exacerbate biases that result from decision fatigue. On the other end of the spectrum, negotiations by e-mail can be helpful when negotiations are simple and the issues can be clearly laid out or when it is possible that a negotiator may get overly emotional in person. However, the impoverished communication medium may exacerbate perceived conflicts by not providing sufficient context around communications.

Deliberate and Structured Interventions for Remedying Bias

Feedback.

Most people do not get timely or accurate feedback about their negotiation performance. Thus, they continue to make the same mistakes time and again. To return to the fixed-pie perception, most negotiators assume that the other party's gain comes at their direct loss, and vice versa. Even if people receive feedback, it is often incomplete or misconstrued, whether by the sender or the recipient. This, of course, is consistent with the egocentric biases we discussed earlier.

As a way of combating bias, Thompson and DeHarpoort (1994) examined the effects of three types of feedback: process feedback, outcome feedback, and no feedback. Negotiators who received no feedback knew nothing about the other party or the underlying structure of the negotiation. They were given a blank sheet of paper and asked to write some comments about the nature of their experience in the negotiation they had just completed. Negotiators who received outcome feedback were told the value of the overall package to the other party in the completed negotiation. This feedback provided important information about the underlying structure of the negotiation. Finally, negotiators who received process feedback were given complete information about their opponent's preferences for each issue negotiated.

As an example, for a company representative who negotiated an employment contract, process feedback imparted information about how the employee subjectively valued the various issues discussed (salary, vacation, annual raise, and so on). Negotiators who received process feedback were most likely to abandon the pervasive fixed-pie assumption in subsequent negotiations and to recognize trade-offs that were mutually beneficial for both parties. Suppose two negotiators have just received process feedback after negotiating a job contract. Assume these same parties are to negotiate again about a completely

different set of issues, say, regarding a house rental. Having received process feedback, they are likely to assume correctly that not every gain for the other party constitutes an equal loss for themselves. Furthermore, they recognize that mutually beneficial exchanges can be made: if the landlord is to concede on an issue important to the tenant (say, monthly rent), then in exchange, the tenant can concede on an issue important to the landlord (lease length). In this way, negotiators who receive process feedback reach agreements that are satisfactory to both parties. By contrast, negotiators who receive only outcome feedback are not as successful in recognizing this integrative potential, and those who receive no feedback are the least successful of all.

Analogical Reasoning.

One of the most effective means by which people solve problems is analogical reasoning (Gick and Holyoak, 1983). Analogy is the process of mapping the solution for one problem into a solution for another problem. This involves noticing that a solution to a problem from the past is relevant, and then mapping the elements from that solution to the target problem. For example, a student learning about the structure of the atom furthers her understanding by drawing on her prior knowledge of the structure of the solar system.

In many instances, experienced negotiators have occasion to reason by analogy from a previous negotiation experience but often fail to do so. This problem of failing to capitalize on opportunities to learn by analogy is not limited to negotiators; in general, people’s ability to take full advantage of prior experience is highly limited (Loewenstein, Thompson, and Gentner, 1999). Having solved one problem does not always help in solving an analogous problem if the two come from different contexts.

We do not always access prior knowledge, given an analogous situation.

In a study of learning by analogy (Gick and Holyoak, 1983), students were given a problem about how to use radiation to destroy a patient's tumor, given that the stream of rays at full strength will destroy the healthy tissue en route to the tumor. The solution is to converge on the tumor with low-strength radiation from multiple directions. Having been given this problem and learned the solution, people are then given an analogous one: a general needs to capture a fortress but finds he cannot use his entire army to make a frontal attack. One solution is to divide the army and converge on the fortress from many directions. Even when the tumor problem and the fortress problem are presented in the same session, only about 41 percent of students spontaneously applied the convergence solution to the radiation problem. Though they retained the knowledge about the first solution, they failed to access it. Yet when simply told to "think about the earlier [tumor] problem," a full 85 percent of students applied the convergence solution to the new problem. Simply reminding people of an analogous problem helps them map the solution onto the new problem.

The good news for negotiators is that analogy training can substantially improve negotiation performance. In one study, managers who received analogy training were nearly three times as likely to recognize and apply the appropriate principle in future negotiations (Loewenstein et al., 1999). As a result, negotiators who had analogy training outperformed those who did not. For example, in negotiating a deal for a Broadway production, negotiation dyads with analogy training gained an average of twenty-one thousand dollars over their untrained counterparts, who made suboptimal agreements and left large amounts of money on the bargaining table—wasted, as far as both

parties were concerned. A subsequent investigation revealed that reading two examples is no more effective than reading just one example unless the learner compares the examples (Gentner, Loewenstein, Thompson, and Forbus, 2009). Moreover, by comparing two or more examples, negotiators can not only perform better in subsequent negotiations, they can more meaningfully analyze their previous negotiation experiences (Gentner et al., 2009).

In another study of negotiator training, four other learning principles were compared to learning by analogy (Nadler, Thompson, and Van Boven, 2003):

- Learning by observation (watching other negotiators)
- Textbook learning (reading about negotiation principles)
- Learning by feedback (process feedback, as described in the previous section)
- Learning by experience only (no explicit training)

The greatest improvement in negotiator performance was seen with negotiators who had analogy training or observation training. Performance also improved, albeit to a lesser extent, when negotiators learned through feedback. Those exposed to textbook learning or to learning by experience alone showed no measurable improvement in performance. Thus, the picture emerging from this research is that training programs teaching negotiators how to make relevant comparisons between prior and current negotiation experiences are extremely important for equipping negotiators with the skills to leverage their past experiences in current and future negotiations.

Negotiation Skills Training.

Several studies have used training and education to improve negotiators' effectiveness. For example, Idson and colleagues (2004) trained negotiators to focus more accurately on the decisions of other parties in mixed-motive negotiations and found that participants made superior decisions. Similarly, Moran and Ritov (2007) found that negotiators who understand their opponent's gains for particular offers versus their general priorities among issues were more likely to improve their performance. In a different set of experiments, Kray, Galinsky, and Markman (2009) found that negotiators who generate additive (as opposed to subtractive) counterfactuals for negotiations perform better.

One fruitful line of research involves regulating emotions in negotiations that involve high conflict. The idea here is that the general ability to regulate one's emotions at the bargaining table will help people keep a level head during heated negotiations. In one study, Israeli participants were exposed to information about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and then rated their support for different policies that address the situation. In addition, half the participants were given cognitive-reappraisal training, which teaches people to change the meaning of a situation in order to change their emotional responses to that situation (see Ochsner and Gross, 2008), and the other half were not trained. Those who were trained with cognitive-reappraisal strategies showed more support for conciliatory policies and less support for aggressive policies than those with no training (Halperin, Porat, Tamir, and Gross, 2012). Because negotiators' effectiveness is contingent on their thoughts and feelings at the bargaining table, strategies that can help negotiators optimally regulate their behavior may help improve the outcomes of negotiations and conflict resolution attempts.

CONCLUSION

We believe that the marriage between practitioners and theorists should be much more solid than it is. Theorists have identified a host of rather benign-looking beliefs and cognitions that hinder effective negotiations, but they have failed to produce a systematic body of research aimed at reducing cognitive biases that hinder effective dispute resolution. Unfortunately, most negotiators are not aware of the existence of cognitive bias and its deleterious effects. In this chapter, we have identified biases that negotiators carry into negotiation, biases that erupt during negotiation, and biases that contaminate negotiators' perceptions of outcomes. We examined naturally occurring remedies as well as structured techniques to remove or mitigate bias. We hope that theorists and practitioners continue to identify and examine new methods by which to eliminate or reduce cognitive bias at the bargaining table.

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CHAPTER TWELVE
EMOTION AND CONFLICT *Why It Is Important to Understand How Emotions Affect Conflict and How Conflict Affects Emotions*

Evelin G. Lindner

How do emotion and conflict interact? This chapter begins with two introductory examples—one international and one personal.

Adolf Hitler was obsessed with bemoaning the weakness of Germany already during World War I. But he was a loner without any influence. It was only later that his obsessions began to resonate with the feelings of other people, particularly with *die kleinen Leute* , as they were called in Germany, or “the little people,” “the powerless.” He invited everybody to join in a grand narrative of national humiliation and invest their personal grievances, including those they suffered due to general political and economic misery. “The little people” had occupied a distinctly subordinated position in Germany’s social hierarchy prior to Hitler’s rise. Nobody had ever deemed them worthy of particular attention. They greeted Hitler as a savior; his invitation provided them with an unprecedented sense of importance.

Hitler was an expert on feelings. He wrote: “The people in their overwhelming majority are so feminine by nature and attitude that sober reasoning determines their thoughts and actions far less than emotion and feeling. And this sentiment is not complicated, but very simple and all of a piece. It does not have multiple shadings; it has a positive and a negative; love or hate, right or wrong, truth or lie,

never half this way and half that way, never partially" (Hitler, 1925–1926, p. 167).

Many Germans put such faith in Hitler that they followed him even when it became obvious that the situation was doomed. It required total defeat for many of his "lovers" to painfully realize that their loyalty had been fatally misplaced. Their loyalty not only led to million-fold homicide, it was even suicidal. Their own country, Germany, was bombed to ashes. Only Hitler himself was satisfied, as he believed in "*das Recht des Stärkeren* " ("might is right"). Hitler said on November 27, 1941, to the Danish foreign minister, Erik Scavenius, and the Croat foreign minister, Mladen Lorkowitsch: "I am also here ice cold. If the German people are no longer strong enough and ready to sacrifice their own blood for their existence, then they must disappear and be destroyed by another, stronger power. . . . I will not shed a tear for the German people" (Haffner, 1978, p. 139).

Now to a personal example. Imagine you are a social worker with a client named Eve. She comes to you because she is depressed. She is severely and regularly beaten by her husband, Adam. Neighbors describe scenes of shouting and crying, and the bruise marks on Eve's body are only too obvious. You implore Eve to leave her unsafe home and seek refuge in sheltered housing, at least at times of crisis. In your mind, she is a victim and her husband is a perpetrator. You explain to Eve that "domestic chastisement" has long been outlawed. You suggest that Adam utterly humiliates her and that she ought to develop a "healthy" anger as a first step toward collecting sufficient strength to change her life. To you this situation represents a destructive conflict loaded with hot and violent emotions and you wish to contribute to its constructive resolution.

Eve stubbornly undermines your efforts: “Beating me is my husband’s way of loving me! I am not a victim. I bring his anger on myself when I fail to respect his authority! He saved me from a cruel father! My father never spoke of love and care—Adam does!” Adam also adamantly refuses to be labeled a “perpetrator.” He accuses *you* of viciously disturbing the peace of his home, claiming that *you* violate his male honor.

From Eve’s and Adam’s perspective, there is no destructive conflict, no suffering victim, and no violent perpetrator. It is you, the social worker, the human rights defender, the therapist, an uninvited third party, who creates conflict.

As we see, the definition of love and benevolence is crucial here. You define love as the meeting of equal hearts and minds in mutual caring, a definition embedded in the human rights ideal of equal dignity for all. Eve and her husband, however, connect love with female subservience. They are right in that you introduce conflict by drawing their attention to a new definition of love.

In both cases, that of Eve and that of the “little people” of Germany, their loyalty was intensified by their dominators’ giving them the feeling of being loved as human beings endowed with feelings, rather than simply dominated like chattel. Martin Buber speaks about I-Thou relationships, in contrast to I-It relationships. People hunger to be approached as human beings and not as things. The promise of dignity, even if undelivered, is strong enough to elicit considerable loyalty—and it can be tragically instrumentalized and abused.

We can easily find more examples. Typically neither the supposed “perpetrators” nor their co-opted “victims” initially accept human rights framings of equal dignity. The South African elites, for example, were defensive about apartheid—they felt it was nature’s order itself that entitled

them to superiority. Many “victims” also internalized this worldview. The more a ranking order was one of benevolent patronage rather than malevolent oppression—or at least convincingly portrayed as such—the more outcomes were condoned that were other- and even self-destructive.

Practices such as “honor killings” and female genital cutting have recently moved from the category of “cultural practices” to “harmful traditional practices.” Emotion researchers will want to resist the introduction of new “nonlethal weapons” that target emotions and thoughts. The Center for Cognitive Liberties affirms “the right of each individual to think independently and autonomously, to use the full spectrum of his or her mind, and to engage in multiple modes of thought” (www.cognitiveliberty.org).

In this conundrum, in which emotion and conflict are entangled in intricate ways, questions arise. When and in what ways are emotions (feelings of suffering, pain and rage, or love and caring) part of a “conflict” that calls for our attention? And when are they not? Who decides? If perpetrator and victim agree that there is peace, who, as a third party, has the right to call it conflict? And what about “waging good conflict”?

What we learn is that emotion and conflict are not unfolding in a vacuum. They are embedded into larger historical and cultural contexts. We live in transitional times where growing global interdependence is connected with the human rights ideal of equal dignity for all. Emotions and conflicts and their consequences—how we live them, how we define them—are part of this transition. They too change as the world transforms.

THE NATURE OF EMOTIONS

What are emotions? Are emotions cultural or biological, or both? Are they nothing more than constructs of folk knowledge? Or are they merely bodily responses, dictated by hormones, skin conductance levels, and cerebral blood flows? Are there basic emotions? Affects? Feelings? Thoughts? Why do we have them? What functions do they serve? What about the so-called social emotions? What about the meta-emotions of how people feel about feelings? Are there universal emotions across cultures? Are emotions rational? Controllable? To which actions do emotions lead? Is there an automatic link between emotion and action?

Interestingly, William James (1842–1910), one of the fathers of the field of psychology as we know it today in the academic context, gave significant attention to research on human emotion, while his immediate successors did so much less. Only a few visionary scholars, such as Silvan Tomkins, Magda Arnold, Paul Ekman, Carroll Izard, Klaus Scherer, and Nico Frijda, continued studying emotion. For a while, behaviorism and cognitivism were “sexier” than looking at emotions—until behaviorism turned out to be too narrow, as did cognitivism.

Today we know that thought, behavior, and feeling are closely connected. And this insight is as important for the field of conflict studies as for psychology. Political scientist Robert Jervis (2006) underscores how “over the past decade or so, psychologists and political psychologists have come to see . . . that a sharp separation between cognition and affect is impossible and that a person who embodied pure rationality, undisturbed by emotion, would be a monster if she were not an impossibility” (p. 643).

Interest in learning about emotions is now exploding and already rapidly changing, fueled (some would say, overfueled) and “legitimized,” not least, by new technologies. Research on mirror neurons, for instance,

underpins the recent emphasis on emotion, making headlines in mainstream publications such as the *New York Times* : “Social emotions like guilt, shame, pride, embarrassment, disgust and lust are based on a uniquely human mirror neuron system found in a part of the brain called the insula” (“Cells That Read Minds,” 2006).

Imaging techniques are being employed to examine the function and structure of the neural circuits that support human emotion processing and emotion regulation. The Program for Imaging and Cognitive Sciences at Columbia University in New York City is but one example of similar projects emerging in many places. What is being researched is crucially important also for conflict studies: the neurocircuitry of emotional systems (amygdala and basal ganglia) and control and regulatory systems (cingulate and prefrontal cortex).

Until only a few years ago, researchers were intent on constructing classifications of fundamental basic emotions. Andrew Ortony and Terence Turner (1990) give a tabular overview of some of the classification systems.

Today the new cohort of researchers no longer endorses a single perspective on emotion. They prefer multilayered approaches that conceptualize elaborated emotions as comprehensive packages of meanings, behaviors, social practices, and norms that crystallize around primordial emotions. Jan Smedslund (1997) describes the psychologic inherent in our dealings with emotions. James Averill (1997) discusses how emotional experiences are “scripted.” The application of such scripts varies according to cultural and historic influences. A rich overview of the new approaches to emotion research is to be found, among many others, in David Yun Dai and Robert Sternberg (2004), Joseph Forgas (2001), and Tracy Mayne and George Bonanno (2001). Among the journals that serve as

platforms for emotion research are *Emotion, Emotion Review, Emotion, Space and Society, International Journal of Work Organisation and Emotion, Consciousness and Emotion, Motivation and Emotion, Cognition and Emotion, Research on Emotion in Organizations* , and *Frontiers in Emotion Science* .

Another major shift in the field of psychology is toward a more relational view, away from regarding the individual as the main unit of analysis (Jordan and Hartling, 2002). “Social connectedness is one of the most powerful determinants of our wellbeing” (Putnam, 2000, p. 326) and “happiness is best predicted by the breadth and depth of one’s social connections” (p. 332). Mutually empathic and empowering relationships are key to resilience in the face of hardships and stress (Hartling, 2003). Individualistic “separate-self” models of psychological development have endured in Western psychology perhaps not least because these models serve a consumer economy that thrives on a myth of self-sufficiency (Cushman, 1996).

Another new trend is the “humbling of Western psychology.” Western psychology is merely one psychology among others, and indigenous psychologies of emotion are gaining visibility now. (See, for instance, Averill and Sundararajan, 2006; Sibia and Misra, 2011; Dalal and Misra, 2012.)

All new approaches invalidate the old nature-versus-nurture debate. Emotions are both hardwired and malleable, and adaptive to social and cultural influences. Basic affects are the bedrock on which elaborated emotions build. Our primordial emotions are universal biologically based response systems that have enabled humans to meet the problems of physical survival, reproduction, and group governance. Culture, however, has loosened the link between those primordial emotions and their functions.

New solutions to old problems have emerged, as have new uses for old emotions.

The historical evolution of the brain and emotions is mirrored in each human being's individual development. Ontogeny (development of an individual organism) often recapitulates phylogeny (evolution of a particular species). Newborns process basic affects in lower brain structures. Emotions, which are more recent in human evolution, become possible only when certain cognitive milestones have been reached in the life of a child. In the second half of the second year of life, the cognitive capacity of objective self-awareness emerges, with accompanying emotions such as embarrassment, empathy, and envy. Between two and three years of age, the complex ability to evaluate one's behavior according to an external or internal standard emerges. Self-conscious evaluative emotions such as pride, shame, and guilt are now possible. Schemas for emotions evolve to organize what we believe and how we react to emotions. Finally, cognition and affect are forcefully intertwined in cultural symbol and knowledge systems such as religions.

The most immediate function of the emotional apparatus is to warn us. Fear alerts us to potential danger or to potential benefit (LeDoux, 2002). We hear a noise. Is it a thief—or just our favorite cat? The first brain structure to react is the *amygdala* , an almond-shaped neurological structure in the lower cortical brain. This structure identifies shapes, sounds, and other perceptual characteristics, sorting for threats and, very quickly and automatically, responding with avoidance if necessary. It acts as a preattentive analyzer of our environment and works without our conscious control, triggering fast and automatic changes in tone and heart rate. Fear is a primary reaction that is processed via adrenergic neurons (as opposed to dopaminergic neurons). Is it a thief? We jump

up from our chair, breathe heavily, and feel frightened. This system developed early in human evolution and dominates our first years as children. In adults, stress brings it to the fore again, often in unfortunate ways.

Let's assume the noise proves to emanate from our favorite cat. The amygdala can relax, passing the data on to the basal ganglia to encode and store, awash in positive-valence dopaminergic neurons. We open our arms to our purring pet. This simple daily stimulus response is aided by information from two internal "library" structures (the left prefrontal cortex and a posterior area) from which our brain draws stored abstract semantic and associative knowledge. All of this is automatic. We are not in control. Indeed, research shows that our brain begins to unconsciously prepare our decisions several seconds before they reach our awareness. (The potential implications of this research for free will, highly relevant for conflict studies, have been discussed at great length in the literature; see, for instance, Roskies, 2010.)

Our brain "wakes up" to controlled emotion processing when a higher brain structure, the *anterior cingulate* (ACC), signals discrepancy, uncertainty, errors, conflicts, pain, or violations of expectations. The ACC tells us when something is wrong, when our automatic responses do not work and we need to do something different. At that point, two high cortical structures, the *ventromedial frontal cortex* (VMFC) and *orbital frontal cortex* , weigh our current goals and the affective value of the situation we face. We need these higher cortical structures particularly in conflict situations, because they empower us to regulate and control our emotional responses. Here we learn and adapt, and generate self-consciousness, abstraction, and imagination. The VMFC is crucial for appropriate judgments of right and wrong; damage to it increases narrow, utilitarian moral judgments. Research on these

processes clearly is highly relevant for conflict studies. ("Neuroscience and Ethics: Intersections" is the title of a relevant article by Damásio, 2007.)

To come back to Eve facing Adam—or to global neighbors negotiating climate change or nuclear disarmament—all participants' brains loop through at least six brain structures that deal with emotion, from lower to higher brain structures, from evolutionarily older to more recent components, from stored memories of how we reacted as children to new modes of responses that are open to us as adults. There are several distinctions and dualities. Feelings can be hot or cold, they can have positive or negative valence, and they can be automatic or controlled. Furthermore, there is the doer-watcher duality. The duality of attention and processing is based on the fact that we can perform a task and at the same time watch ourselves performing this task. Emotions can interfere in this duality and disturb task focus and performance.

Our behavior is regulated by feedback loops that are organized hierarchically. *Superordinate loops* attend to longer-term, abstract goals. Embedded within them are *subordinate loops* for short-term tasks. Long-term goals, such as the future of our children and our planet, require that we use long-term mental tools. We create or maintain unnecessary destructive conflict when we allow lower-order phylogenically more immediate and automated emotional processes to override higher-order, more abstracted regulatory processes. In turn, conflict situations themselves, with their increased levels of stress, may cause us to override those loops and let older parts of the brain leap into action.

Emotions serve at least three functions: they monitor our inner world, our relationships with the outer world, and help us act. The second function can cause us to make

grave mistakes, because the outer world entails both our ecological and social environments. Our desire for belonging and recognition may entice us to over-hastily turn untested observations and opinions into firm beliefs and create unnecessary conflicts while leaving necessary conflicts unaddressed. The problem lies in that beliefs serve not only our reality testing and understanding of the world but also our psychological and social needs to live with ourselves and others (Jervis, 2006). Nicos Poulantzas (1936–1979), a Greco-French political sociologist in Paris, was one of Pol Pot's teachers. Seeing what he had instigated, he later committed suicide (personal communication with Kevin Clements, August 21, 2007). Pol Pot had turned Poulantzas's academic reflections into rigid ideology, ruthlessly implemented it in his homeland, Cambodia, and in that way created immense unnecessary suffering.

In today's world, challenges such as global climate change and unsustainable economic models are necessary conflicts that wait to be addressed. One underlying obstacle is the culture of ranked honor. Human history has shown that narratives of honor have never been very functional with regard to reality testing. Hitler's allegiance to honor made him lose his connection with reality. In general, the common good of all is undercut and sound reality testing undermined when people forge strong emotional allegiances to cultural scripts that suggest that "worthier beings" merit privileged access to resources and domination over "lesser beings." In human history, this arrangement has manifested by way of direct force, but also indirectly, as via "success" in accumulating monetary resources. As a result, in 2012, 21 million people live in slave-like situations, and several planets would be needed to continue the present overuse of resources.

Emotions are hardwired *and* malleable. There is the hardwired physiological response and negative state of "feeling bad" and, at the psychological level, "this is bad for me," or "feeling good" and "this is good for me." Elaborated emotions such as rejection and enmity, as well as affection, attachment, loyalty, cooperation, and other positive emotions, are no longer automatic but context dependent. Spiders or worms are greeted as welcome delicacies in some cultures and in others with disgust. For a vegetarian, eating meat is sickening, while it is a joy for a nonvegetarian. In social contexts influenced by human rights values, the term *domestic chastisement* has transmuted into the negative concept of "domestic violence." In five hundred years or so, this century will perhaps be decried as a dark century of unsustainable social and ecological arrangements. In all cases, the same sequence of behavior that once was regarded as "good for everybody" is later deemed to be "bad for everybody."

Neuroimaging may show Adam's left anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortices being activated by his *social dominance orientation* (the preference for social hierarchy over egalitarianism) and his lack of empathy (Chiao et al., 2009). However, such orientations are not to be taken as fixed states. They are embedded into meta-emotions that guide us in how we feel about feelings (Gottman, Katz, and Hooven, 1997). These meta-emotions emerge within social contexts. Since it is human nature to be social and cultural, efforts to create a new culture of dignity are not in vain.

It would be easy to overwhelm readers with an overabundance of concepts and terms at this point. *Goals, attitudes, affects, feelings, emotions, emotional states, moods, consciousness, self, psyche* —the list of terms is endless, and often scholars do not agree on their definitions. For our purposes, it is sufficient to understand that we have to give up any quest for rigid context-free

classifications of complex elaborated emotions. Elaborated emotions are multifaceted clusters embedded in culture and history.

THE INTERACTION BETWEEN EMOTION AND CONFLICT

This section begins with the subject of fear as a basic emotion processed in our “old” brain. From there, we move on to more complex emotions.

Fear, and How It Affects Conflict and Is Affected by Conflict

> *The voice of intelligence is drowned out by the roar of fear. It is ignored by the voice of desire. It is contradicted by the voice of shame. It is biased by hate and extinguished by anger. Most of all, it is silenced by ignorance.*
>
> —Karl Menninger

In 1998, I interviewed Adam Bixi in Somaliland as part of my doctoral research. He described growing up in the Somali semidesert, learning as a very small boy to be constantly alert, even at night, for dangerous animals and “enemies” from other clans. He learned to be ready for fight or flight in a matter of seconds at any time, day or night. Continuous emergency preparedness meant that all other aspects of life had to wait. Emergency trumped everything else. As a consequence, Bixi admitted, he felt he had not lived life.

Modern managers often feel the same way. Continuous emergency alertness diminishes the zest for life. It may even lead to cardiac failure. This is also valid for societies. The reason is the neglect of essential maintenance that is vital in the long term.

Fear and humiliation carry the potential to link up in particularly disastrous ways. In Rwanda, fear of future humiliation, based on the experience of past humiliation, was used as justification for genocide. In his speeches, Hitler peddled the fear of future humiliation by the world Jewry. The Holocaust was his horrific “solution.”

During a conflict, to reap the potential advantage of fear, enhanced alertness, we need to cool down and help our opponents to calm their fears. In negotiations, operating with threats—making others afraid—may undermine constructive solutions rather than provide advantages. Today’s politically polarizing talk media are doing society a disservice when they evoke fear for the sake of profit from drama.

At some point Eve and Adam seek counseling. Adam is afraid to lose power and Eve is afraid to be empowered. The therapist succeeds in nurturing respect, love, understanding, empathy, and patience in an atmosphere of warmth, firmness, and safety in their larger social support network. Slowly their fears translate into deep personal growth for both.

Anger and Hatred, and How They Affect Conflict and Are Affected by Conflict

> *Victory breeds hatred. The defeated live in pain.*
>
> *Happily the peaceful live, giving up victory and defeat.*
>
> —Gautama Buddha

We easily get angry when we feel hurt. Sometimes we even kick a chair that stands in our way and get a bruise. Still, anger is a more composite set of mental processes than fear. Our brain does three things. First, it maps a comprehensive representation of the thing, animal, or person who has hurt us; second, it maps the state of our

body, for example, our readiness to fight; and third, it maps the kind of relationship we have to the perpetrator and how we might respond. For example, we presumably would refrain from hitting a sumo wrestler.

We react with anger—rather than sympathy—when we believe that the other person, through either neglect or intentionally, treats us with disrespect. The more we feel hurt, the more we get angry. We get angry when we deem that the person who hurts us has sufficient control over the situation to avoid harming us (the so-called controllability dimension). We get even angrier when we infer that the other intended to hurt us. Indeed, research shows that we want to harm others, either overtly or covertly, when we believe they could have avoided hurting us. It is one thing to be pushed accidentally by a drunken man, another to be harmed deliberately by an apparently clearheaded man.

Our beliefs as to why others behave as they do are being addressed by *attribution theory* , one of the basic paradigms in social psychology. Fritz Heider is regarded as the first attribution theorist. (For further discussion of attribution theory, see Gilbert, 1998; Jones and Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967; Ross, 1977.) During a contentious conflict, the *fundamental attribution error* , for example, may lead each side to overestimate the other's hostility as well as one's own benign attitude. We tend to attribute others' hostile remarks to their personality dispositions ("they simply hate us" or "they are unworthy, lazy, and primitive people") rather than to transient circumstances ("we belittled them first"), while making opposite attributions for ourselves. *Reactive devaluation* is another insidious bias: we tend to reject even the best solutions when "the enemy" suggested them.

Adam is angry that Eve is not submissive enough, while Eve does not dare to be angry at his wrath; frightened by him,

and the possibility and the strength of her own anger, she seeks relief in renewed subservience. Psychiatrist Jean Baker Miller (1986) emphasized that anger, if duly acknowledged and transformed, can lead to constructive conflict and growth. The therapist invites Adam to relinquish using anger as an easy-to-use escape route and helps him to instead face deeper feelings of hurt and pain. She encourages Eve and Adam to explore the new normative universe of mutual respect for equal dignity that defines concepts such as love, loyalty, cooperation, connection, and relationship in profoundly new ways. It is important for Eve to dare to feel anger, at least sometimes —not frantic rage and hatred but the confident firmness of being authentic.

If we consider intergroup or international relations, the world will benefit from everybody firmly standing *up* in the face of abuse instead of passively standing *by* (Staub, 1989). If we wish to produce constructive results, however, this anger must be channeled into the *conscientization* of consciousness and conscience that Paulo Freire suggested, and then into Gandhi- or Mandela-like strategies for action.

Humiliation, and How it Affects Conflict and Is Affected by Conflict

> *It has always been a mystery to me how men can feel themselves honored by the humiliation of their fellow beings.*
>
> —Mahatma Gandhi

Fear is basic, anger more complex, and humiliation even more so. Humiliation refers to feelings, acts, and systemic structures. The act of humiliation involves putting down, holding down, and rendering the other helpless to resist the debasement. The feeling of being humiliated emerges when one is unable to repel the degradation and deems it

to be not just unwanted but illegitimate. Apartheid was humiliation qua system. The humiliating effects of feudalism were brilliantly unmasked by Lu Xun (1881–1936), considered the founder of modern Chinese literature.

What counts as humiliation and what it leads to—the consequences of humiliation—is determined by emotional scripts that vary from one historical period to another, from one cultural realm to another, from one person to another, and even within a single person as he or she reacts at different times to the same humiliation.

Morton Deutsch (2006) observes, “By his persistent public refusal to be humiliated or to feel humiliated, Mandela rejected the distorted, self-debilitating relationship that the oppressor sought to impose upon him. Doing so enhanced his leadership among his fellow political prisoners and the respect he was accorded by the less sadistic guards and wardens of the prison” (p. 39).

My research suggests that feelings of humiliation may acquire the quality and strength of obsession and addiction and can be seen as the “nuclear bomb of the emotions” (Lindner, 2006). Also Avishai Margalit (2002) warns of addiction to the emotion of humiliation, as this secures the “benefits” of the victim status and an entitlement to retaliation. Vamik D. Volkan (2004) in his theory of collective violence set out in his book *Blind Trust* , puts forth that when a chosen trauma is experienced as humiliation and is not mourned, this may lead to feelings of entitlement to revenge and, under the pressure of fear or anxiety, to collective regression.

Due to their potency, feelings of humiliation lend themselves above all other emotions to being used to unleash mass violence. When people are determined—either genuinely or through manipulation—to perpetrate

atrocities, costly military weaponry may no longer be needed. In Rwanda in 1994, everybody had machetes at home for agricultural use, with which neighbors could be hacked to death. The only resource required was Radio Mille Collines to disseminate the necessary propaganda. As a result, within a time span of a few weeks, almost 1 million people were being viciously humiliated, literally, by being "cut short" from allegedly arrogating superiority, and then brought to death. As it seems, the only true "weapons of mass destruction" are hearts and minds that translate feelings of humiliation into acts of humiliation.

Until very recently, few researchers have studied humiliation explicitly, and even when doing so, it is often used interchangeably with shame or conceptualized as a variant of shame. However, particularly the rise of human rights ideals changes the position of humiliation in relation to concepts such as shame and humility and makes humiliation more salient. In the English language, "the earliest recorded use of *to humiliate* meaning to mortify or to lower or to depress the dignity or self-respect of someone does not occur until 1757" (Miller, 1993, p. 175). As in the case of Nelson Mandela, people who face humiliating treatment may sternly reject feeling humiliated or ashamed. And even if they feel humiliated, victims of torture and maltreatment recount that part of their success in being resilient was not to feel ashamed while indeed feeling humiliated.

The view that humiliation may be more than just another negative emotion, but may indeed represent a particularly forceful phenomenon, is supported by the research of a number of authors, including James Gilligan (1996), Jennifer Goldman and Peter Coleman (2005), Linda Hartling and Tracy Luchetta (1999), Donald Klein (1991), Helen Lewis (1971), Evelin Lindner (2000, 2006, 2009,

2010, 2012a), Richard Nisbett and Dov Cohen (1996), and Thomas Scheff and Suzanne Retzinger (1991).

Considering feelings of humiliation may shed more light on violence or terrorism than other explanations. Conditions such as inequality, or conflict of interest, or poverty are not automatically perceived as negative. As long as all players accept justifications (poverty as “divine order,” for example, or as *karma*), there might be pain, but no shared awareness of a problem that needs fixing, no conflict, and no violent reactions. And conflict, even if it becomes open, is not automatically destructive either; it can be solved mutually and creatively. It is when feelings of humiliation emerge that rifts are created and trust destroyed. If feelings of humiliation are not overcome constructively, cooperation fails. In the worst-case scenario, violence ensues.

Research on mirror neurons indicates that witnessing others’ feelings makes us experience these feelings ourselves. We feel humiliated when we see media coverage of other people we identify with experiencing humiliation, even if they live far away and our life circumstances are radically different. “Everyone knows how the Muslim country bows down to pressure from the west. Everyone knows the kind of humiliation we are faced with around the globe,” said Faisal Shahzad, who planted the Times Square bomb (Elliott, Tavernise, and Barnard, 2010). Mirror neurons are perhaps the most potent “globalizing agent” of our emotions, for better and worse. They can make us help earthquake victims in Haiti, or become “warriors of terror,” wherever we are on this planet.

At the current historic juncture, two new forces—globalization in concert with the rise of the human rights ideals—increase the significance of feelings of humiliation (Lindner, 2006). “All human beings are born free and equal

in dignity and rights" means that all human beings are part of one family and equal in dignity. When the underprivileged of this world, and those who identify with them, see how the gap between the poor and the rich grows wider, when they suspect the rich and powerful of peddling empty human rights rhetoric only to maintain and even increase their dominant position, then life at the bottom turns from *karma* into humiliation and the powerful become humiliators. There is nothing as humiliating as empty promises of equal dignity.

Thomas Friedman, *New York Times* columnist, states (2003), "If I've learned one thing covering world affairs, it's this: The single most underappreciated force in international relations is humiliation."

Based on many years of research on humiliation, I suggest that the desire for recognition unites the human family and thereby provides us with a platform for cooperation. Ethnic, religious, or cultural differences or conflicts of interests can lead to creative cooperation and problem solving, and diversity can be a source of mutual enrichment, but only within relationships characterized by respect. When respect and recognition fail, those who feel victimized are prone to highlight differences to 'justify' rifts caused by humiliation. '*Clashes of civilizations* are not the problem, but *clashes of humiliation* are'" (Lindner, 2006, p. 172).

What happens when feelings of humiliation emerge? Blema Steinberg (1996) posits that feelings of humiliation may trigger narcissistic rage and acts of aggression meant to lessen pain and increase self-worth. Steinberg analyzes political crises and cautions that international leaders who have been publicly humiliated may instigate mass destruction and war. Roy Baumeister (1996) suggests that perpetrators of violent crime combine high self-esteem,

albeit brittle, with poor self-regulation, particularly when it is challenged. Walter Mischel, Aaron DeSmet, and Ethan Kross (2006) explain that rejection-sensitive men may even get hooked on situations of debasement in which they can feel humiliated.

Adam may be such a rejection-sensitive man. As long as Eve merely fades into subservience at his onslaught, no open destructive conflict and no cycles of humiliation occur. An unwise therapist could very well create such cycles if she were to nurture feelings of humiliation in Eve that would lead to nothing but the creation of cycles of humiliation. The therapist needs to lay out a vision for Mandela-like dealings with feelings of humiliation for both Eve and Adam.

Cycles of humiliation occur when feelings of humiliation are translated into acts of humiliation that are responded to in kind. In cases of collectively perpetrated mayhem, Hitler-like humiliation entrepreneurs “invite” followers to pour their frustrations into grand narratives of humiliation that call for retaliatory acts of humiliation as “remedy.” Massacres typically are not just efficient slaughter; rape, torture, and mutilation, with the aim to humiliate “the enemy,” often precede killing. Only “Mandelas” can avoid this.

Even the history of the field of psychology itself could be narrated as a story of humiliation. The field began its existence as an underdog (and still is, in many ways). Foregrounding hard science—through quantitative methodologies or the application of the latest technologies—is a path to gaining respect, honor, and dignity in a Western world that is still characterized by a male culture of domination (Lindner, 2010). Emotions, relationships, and qualitative approaches are “soft” and have a taste of the female sphere. Also, listening to indigenous peoples

provides little prestige. Currently, it is the arrival of new hard imaging technology that provides prestige to soft emotions. Here we see how psychologists themselves can become victims of traps that are part of their very own field of inquiry—in their wish to avoid being humiliated as "touchy-feely" (to formulate it provocatively), they overlook feelings and relationships, as well as neglecting the wisdom of indigenous peoples.

To conclude, feelings of humiliation affect conflict in malignant ways when they are translated into violence like Hitler's or terrorism and set off cycles of humiliation. Yet feelings of humiliation do not automatically trigger violence. There is no rigid link. Feelings of humiliation can also be invested in constructive social change. Paulo Freire's conscientization depends on feelings of humiliation to unfold. What if Mandela had not been sensitive to the systemic humiliation meted out by apartheid? What if he had meekly bowed to humiliation, or cultivated the "resilience" of denial and apathy? Yets while Mandela used the force entailed in feelings of humiliating to rise up, he did not translate these feelings into violent retaliation. He did not follow the example of Rwanda, where the former underlings killed their former elite in a genocide. *Indignez-vous! Cry out!* This is the voice of Stéphane Frédéric Hessel in 2010, a French wartime resistance hero, born in 1917. In the 1940s, he cried out against Nazism. Today he calls on people to "cry out against the complicity between politicians and economic and financial powers" and to "defend our democratic rights." The Occupy movement followed his call.

Conflict affects feelings of humiliation through the way it is managed. If managed in condescending, patronizing, and arrogant ways, even if this is done unwittingly, feelings of humiliation will undermine constructive cooperation. The essence of "waging good conflict" is that necessary conflict

is addressed rather than neglected, and that this is done in dignified ways, without humiliating the humiliators. This insight can be institutionalized at the societal level. In his book *The Decent Society* , Margalit (1996) calls for institutions that do not humiliate. What is needed today is a decent global society.

Guilt, and How It Affects Conflict and Is Affected by Conflict

> *It has become appallingly obvious that our technology has exceeded our humanity. Technological progress is like an axe in the hands of a pathological criminal. I believe that the horrifying deterioration in the ethical conduct of people today stems from the mechanization and dehumanization of our lives, a disastrous by-product of the scientific and technical mentality. Nostra culpa!*
>
> —Albert Einstein

Guilt is an elaborated emotion and a topic for psychology, psychiatry, ethics, criminal law, and other related fields. To feel guilty, we need self-awareness and the ability to measure our behavior in relation to standards. Self-conscious evaluative emotions such as pride, shame, or guilt are not possible earlier than the second or third year of life. However, since elaborated emotions are culturally dependent, the concept of guilt might never evolve, at least not in any Western sense; in some cultural spheres, a word for guilt simply does not exist.

In its simplest description, guilt may be understood as an affective state of regret at having done something one believes one should not have done. Humiliation, humility, shame, and guilt are related concepts. When I feel ashamed, I accept that I fell short. I blush when I break wind inadvertently. I can be ashamed even if nobody

notices. Norbert Elias (1897–1990) places the emerging "skill" of feeling shame at such transgressions at the center of his theory of civilization.

We deem humility to be a virtue, and shame and guilt as hugely important. Shame needs to be acknowledged if bypassed, it can maintain destructive conflict (Scheff and Retzinger, 1991). Particular men in honor contexts may reckon that feeling shame is an unacceptable dishonorable humiliation. Facing guilt and shame can render healing for perpetrators, victims, and larger society through remorse, apology, forgiveness, and restorative justice.

However, guilt can also be abused. When people are taught to feel guilty for their very existence or for certain characteristics of their appearance, this represents a destructive application of guilt. Deliberately creating pathological guilt to weaken opponents in conflict risks undermining long-term constructive solutions.

Shame and guilt societies have been differentiated—Ruth Benedict's name has become connected to this distinction. Chinese scholars, however, explain that shame and guilt shade into each other, both directing people into self-examination in social situations and motivating people to evaluate their behavior and adapt it.

Eve is kept in timid subservience not least by feeling guilty. She partly believes Adam's complaint that she ought to be more docile. Indeed, in traditional normative contexts of ranked honor, a woman is expected to efface herself. However, times have changed. Eve is entitled to develop a more comprehensive and expansive personal space—not arrogantly attacking Adam in retaliation but maintaining a spirit of firm and respectful humility. Adam no longer needs to bypass his shame and cover up with violence. He is entitled to feel proud to be a male who supports a strong woman at his side. He may even come to feel guilty and

apologize to his wife for not having grasped this insight earlier.

Confidence and Warmth, and How They Affect Conflict and Are Affected by Conflict

> *What sets worlds in motion is the interplay of differences, their attractions and repulsions. By suppressing differences and peculiarities, by eliminating different civilizations and cultures, progress weakens life and favors death.*
>
> —Octavio Paz

The amygdala maintains close connections with the insular cortex, which is more adapted for social behavior and empathy. Frans de Waal (2009) carried out seminal research on empathy, highlighting its anchoring in maternal care. De Waal's research confirms that *Homo sapiens* is not just a narrowly self-interested *Homo economicus* .

Throughout the past millennia of human history, neighboring groups in a fragmented world were always potential enemies, and war was frequent. What political scientists call the *security dilemma* was often very strong. The motto "if you want peace, prepare for war," was inescapable. "Loving your enemy" was unforgivably unpatriotic. Gandhi's recommendation that "there is no path to peace; peace is the path" had little space to manifest. Men were trained to foreground the human capacity to be aggressive toward hostile out-groups, while women nurtured and maintained the relationships within the in-group. The *dominator model* of society was ubiquitous, a male-dominant "strong-man" rule, in both the family and polity, with hierarchies of domination maintained by institutionalized and socially accepted

violence ranging from wife and child beating to aggressive warfare on the larger tribal or national level (Eisler, 1987).

At this point in history, former out-groups merge into one single global in-group or “global village” (or, as anthropologists would phrase it, the human tribes are *ingathering*). This gives the *partnership model* of society (Eisler, 1987) a window of opportunity to manifest (Lindner, 2006, 2009, 2010, 2012a, 2012b). The traditional female role script for maintaining relationships within an in-group can and must now be projected onto the global level. Both men and women together can collaborate as a global family rather than compete for global enmity. The exploitative and divisive aspects of globalization can be harnessed by a new global culture of care that is intentionally shaped. That human nature is on our side—it is social and cultural—is the hope-inducing message from new research.

The problem, however, is that coming together in a common in-group (such as a global village) does not automatically create positive feelings. Humans also share a strong tendency to split into in- and out-groups. New closeness may bring not joy but negative feelings, creating whole new fault lines. The *contact hypothesis* , or the hope that mere contact can foster friendship, is not necessarily true, particularly not when globalization makes the world frightfully “liquid” (Bauman, 2010) or, even worse, when it exposes the humiliation of empty human rights rhetoric.

Anthropologist Alan Page Fiske (1991) found that people, most of the time and in all cultures, use just four elementary and universal forms or models for organizing most aspects of sociality: (1) communal sharing, (2) authority ranking, (3) equality matching, and (4) market pricing. Family life is often informed by communal sharing. Relationships of trust, love, care, and intimacy can prosper in this context. In my work, I suggest that we need to

reinstate communal sharing as the leading frame, globally and locally, since the current primacy given to market pricing eats into our humanity and diminishes it at all levels and in all contexts (Lindner, 2010).

Allow me to share my personal experience. I was born into a displaced family, into an identity of “here where we are, we are not at home, and there is no home for us to go to.” I have healed the pain of displacement by living as a global citizen for almost forty years (Lindner, 2012b). I am embedded in many cultures on all continents, far beyond the “Western bubble.” I understand that many people feel the world becoming liquid, confusing, and fear inducing. Yet to me, true global living provides the stark opposite: a sense of security, trust, and confidence. After all, our forefathers were continuously surprised by new discoveries, while I have a lived experience of how small a planet Earth is.

According to my observation, it is not the ingathering process that poses a problem; on the contrary, it represents a historically unparalleled opportunity. The most significant problems flow from our currently reigning economic frames, which are equally unhelpful locally and globally. They offer illusionary solutions, needlessly intensify old conflicts, and hinder the transition to equality in dignity (Lindner, 2012a). Moreover, people confound the negative and positive sides of globalization. As a result, the promise that the in-gathering trend entails is being overlooked by those who have the capabilities and resources to harness and develop it intentionally and leave it open to being misused by others (social media, for instance, covertly instrumentalizing it for profit).

Sunflower identity is the name I coined for my global unity-in-diversity identity (Lindner, 2012b). Through my global life, its core is more securely anchored in our shared

humanity than any human identity ever before had the opportunity to be. My experience indicates that it is psychologically feasible to relate to all human beings as if they are family members and that most people are able to respond in kind. I agree with indigenous psychologist Louise Sundararajan who calls for preserving the relational contexts that our emotions are evolved for, of which a rich source of information is found in many traditional societies.

At the periphery of my identity (the petals of the sunflower, so to speak), it is profoundly enriching to find safety in learning to swim in the flux of life rather than to cling to illusionary certainties. I join Japanese architect Kisho Kurokawa in his call for a shift from a machine principle to a life principle, not just in architectural designs. Rigidity needs to give way to process and complexity (Lindner, 2009). Social identity complexity can and must be nurtured, even if power elites fear fluidity and complexity (because it makes for disloyal underlings).

We have to become confident voyagers and not rigid vindicators, according to David Matsumoto, Seung Hee Yoo, and Jeffery LeRoux (2007). When we do not understand our counterpart, jumping to conclusions out of a need to “be sure” will produce failure. Guessing what our spouse (or terrorists) “want” and basing our actions on such speculations simply does not work. We have to learn to stay calm while we use our frustration creatively, with imagination and inspiration.

Intercultural communication scholar Muneo Yoshikawa (1987) has developed a *double-swing model* that conceptualizes how individuals, cultures, and intercultural concepts can meet in constructive ways. Double-swing pendulation—from you to me, back to you, back to me, and so on—has to be conducted with warmth and respect for all

conflict parties. Respect and warmth are the glue that keeps people together while they move back and forth.

From Michel Serres to Kwame Anthony Appiah to Emmanuel Lévinas, all advocate *métissage* , or intermingling, meaning that both I and the Other are changed when we meet. I suggest harvesting those elements from all world cultures that foster relationships of loving mutuality and respect for equality in dignity—be it from the African philosophy of *Ubuntu* or indigenous knowledge about consensus building. There are many alternative cultural practices and concepts that merit further exploration if we want to improve democratic practices—*ho'oponopono, musyawarah, silahturahmi, asal ngumpul, palaver, shir, jirga, minga, dugnad, sociocracy* is an arbitrary collection of terms I personally came across at different corners of the world, which all point at less confrontational and more cooperative ways of arriving at consensus and social cohesion than Western concepts of democracy stand for.

Not only Eve and Adam's conflict but also community conflicts and global conflicts can be conceptualized along similar lines. Liberation from humiliating domination must be conducted without perpetuating cycles of humiliation; otherwise dignity is lost. Emancipatory psychology must hold hands with relational psychology; otherwise social cohesion is lost. And dignity and social cohesion are needed if we want to cooperate as a global family and face our global challenges with our diversity as a source for our creativity.

HOW TO INTERVENE IN CONFLICT, CONTROL NEGATIVE EMOTIONS, AND FOSTER POSITIVE EMOTIONS

> *More than an end to war, we want an end to the beginning of all wars. Yes, an end to this brutal, inhuman and thoroughly impractical method of settling the differences between governments.*
>
> —Winston Churchill

> *When will our consciences grow so tender that we will act to prevent human misery rather than avenge it?*
>
> —Eleanor Roosevelt

Let us assume we have just quarreled and are “out of our mind” (the preattentive brain has taken over). Modern brain imaging yields evidence of the effectiveness of meditation techniques. Buddhist concepts such as mindfulness and the concept of *sukha* point at “a deep sense of serenity and fulfillment.” We find similar approaches in many fields. Victor Frankl’s concept of self-observation in the framework of logotherapy, for instance, is comparable.

The next step is to constructively regulate our negative emotions of anger, fear, and distress because they are the gatekeepers of any communicative effectiveness. Matsumoto et al. (2007) explain that four main ingredients are key: emotion regulation, critical thinking, openness, and flexibility. These psychological processes are the psychological engine of adaptation and adjustment.

Barbara Fredrickson and Christine Branigan (2001) offer the *broaden-and-build model* . Rather than physical action, positive emotions facilitate changes in cognitive activity. What negative emotions are to threat, positive emotions are to opportunity. Positive affects and emotions promote intuitive-holistic (right hemisphere) mental strategies, while negative affects and emotions further analytic-serial (left hemisphere) mental strategies.

Too much positive emotion—“blissful ignorance”—however, may maintain or create conflict. Learning to “be happy” within abusive systemic frames makes for “useful idiots.” Successful conflict transformation often requires a certain amount of conceptual change for which negative emotions can be crucially instrumental. Paulo Freire’s conscientization has its place here. In the face of abuse, we need to muster the courage to foster systemic change so that abuse no longer occurs. Apartheid needed to be dismantled, not placated. And this had to be done in dignified ways. “Never again! ” calls on all of us to help create a dignified world.

Conflict benefits from being approached with a *task-oriented learning-mastery* orientation. With this orientation, even if we might get confused or look stupid, we learn together from our mistakes. People who believe intelligence is fixed develop an ego-oriented performance orientation. They are “facade polishers” who wish to satisfy expectations of others, avoid mistakes, and look smart. When they cover up for hazardous mistakes, they risk endangering others.

Cooperation is superior to competition. Deutsch’s Crude Law of Social Relations stipulates that “cooperation induces and is induced by a perceived similarity in beliefs and attitudes, a readiness to be helpful, openness in communication, trusting and friendly attitudes, sensitivity to common interests and de-emphasis of opposed interests, an orientation toward enhancing mutual power rather than power differences” (Deutsch, 1999, pp. 19–20). In contrast, unhelpful competition induces and is induced by coercion, threats, deception, suspicion, self-serving biases, poor communication, and attempts to enhance the power differences between oneself and the other.

Matsumoto's voyager needs what Barnett Pearce (2005) calls *cosmopolitan communicative virtuosity* . For a cosmopolitan communicator, disagreement is an opportunity for learning and constructing new realities. Disagreement is a dilemma—rather than a catastrophe—that calls for further exploration to find creative solutions. *Virtuosity* means a "grand passion" for what we are doing, an ability to make insightful distinctions and engage in skilled performance.

The term for Gandhi's concept of firm respect and warmth, *satyagraha* (nonviolent action), is assembled from *agraha* (firmness-force) and *satya* (truth-love). This is the social glue of "Big Love" that Western individualism has delegitimized and that we have to regain (Lindner, 2010). The sense of serenity that is expressed by the word *sukha* has kinship to many concepts that point at appreciation, care, communal sharing, appreciation of compassion, faith in shared humanity, and the experience of divinity through awe and wonderment in the face of the wonder that our world represents. Concepts such as personhood, dignity, rights, character, autonomy, integrity, shame, humility, and entrustment are all intertwined here. We also have a duty for self-respect. We cannot be moral citizens if we violate our own dignity. Finally, apology has the power to heal.

Social psychologists have researched the role of framing. When students were asked to play a game where they had the choice of cooperating or cheating on one another (the prisoner's dilemma game) and were told that this was a community game, they cooperated. They cheated on each other when told that the same game was a Wall Street game.

When we combine cooperation and framing, we can conclude that the notion of global consciousness, if grounded in human rights ideals of equality in dignity, is

the only frame that has the power to lift cooperation and its benefits from a haphazard to a systemic level. Only when our consciousness, our scope of justice, and our actions become globally inclusive can cooperation become the cultural norm also at local levels and put competition at its service. Only then can we end the competitive race to the bottom that drives long-term social and ecological destruction.

Eve and Adam gradually learn that there are other definitions of love and happiness around, not just love defined as mutual dependence in submission-domination. It is like mastering a totally new language. All their hypotheses about what works and what does not work have to be redefined. Time and again they fall back. However, they do not give up. They even attempt to achieve a global unity consciousness, a grand passion to join in and co-create a new future for our human family.

CONCLUSION

> *We have the right to be equal whenever difference diminishes us; we have the right to be different whenever equality decharacterizes us.*
>
> —Boaventura de Souza Santos

> *The person who says "it cannot be done" should not interrupt the person doing it.*
>
> —Chinese proverb

Ever increasing global ecological and social challenges require global cooperation for their resolution. Conflict and emotion are at the core of both the problems and the solutions. Social emotions at the global level are no longer defined and channeled by a few diplomats. They are felt and responded to by millions of people and become salient for conflicts in the global village in unprecedented ways.

Global terrorism is one outfall, a terrifying one. Avoiding important conflicts for the benefit of unnecessary conflicts or denial is equally malignant. Psychology will gain ever more significance at the global level, since political scientists deal with relations between states, a frame that moves into the background in tact with increasing global interdependence.

Is humankind prepared? Two processes stand out: globalization and the rise of human rights ideals. Currently, this mixture is a recipe for heating up feelings of betrayal, humiliation, and conflict.

Globalization entails both opportunities and risks. Ingathering helps us recognize and act on the fact that we are one human family that has to collaborate to survive on our only tiny home planet. However, globalization also opens new arenas for power abuse as it increases levels of anxiety and risks for misunderstandings. Traditional in-group/out-group demarcations, for instance, must be overcome. In-group pride, if built on out-group enmity, is destructive when a globally united in-group is what is needed. We must create a global family of creative diversity and attend to our family problems in ways that good families do.

The rise of human rights ideals is fueled by feelings of humiliation, and it fuels feelings of humiliation. And this happens in the global public arena as much as at home. At this point in history, at all corners of the world, formerly legitimate humbling turns into illegitimate humiliation.

This happens in myriad ways. When inequality—rather than *karma* —is understood as a violation of human rights, the result can be violent conflict. Conditions such as poverty, inequality, and conflicts of interest can all be addressed constructively by cooperative “waging of good conflict”; enabling environments can be built jointly; scarce

resources can be shared. It is when feelings of humiliation emerge that trust is destroyed and seemingly unbridgeable rifts are created. Double standards and empty human rights rhetoric compound this situation: “To recognize humanity hypocritically and betray the promise, humiliates in the most devastating way by denying the humanity professed” (Stephan Feuchtwang, personal note to the author, November 14, 2002). If feelings of humiliation are not overcome constructively, cooperation at best fails; at worst, violence ensues. Feelings of humiliation thus cross-cut other explanations of violence.

All this is occurring at a time when humankind remains blind to the fact that it is emotionally unprepared. We have to learn to move back and forth, get into the others’ perspectives and feelings, and then step back into our own perspective. We have to learn to stay calm and use frustration creatively with imagination and inspiration. For that we need to nurture qualities of curiosity, courage, and patience in ourselves and in others.

We must attend to our negative emotions first, knowing that they are the gatekeepers to our deeper, more positive capacities. However, “positive thinking” can be overdone—we do not want to descend into “blissful ignorance.” We need to learn how to foster positive feelings that are firm and take from negative feelings what is constructive.

We must learn to wage good conflict through mutual entrustment and cooperative problem solving. It is not a question of some experts possessing a collection of smart techniques. We, all members of the global community—the global street, so to speak—have to forge new practices and institutions locally and globally. This chapter offers guidelines.

We can no longer continue to hope that strategies of domination and submission will bring peace, justice, and

love—at home or abroad. An adversarial culture with combative communication styles of sending messages of strength to each other triggers the fight-or-flight avoidance system and deepens rifts. In a globalizing world, the traditional pathways of defense and security can be suicidal.

Human security means keeping a formerly fragmented world united in a new global in-group, a global community. To reach that end, the available cultural diversity within the human family must be harnessed in unity. Elements that violate equal dignity or are divisive no longer have a place. Cultural diversity needs to be increased. It is as crucial to protect and nurture cultural diversity as it is to protect biodiversity. However, diversity enriches only when embedded into the unity of respect for individual dignity and choice, the unity of acknowledging that culture is neither fixed nor unequivocally good (since cultural difference can also humiliate or be the result of humiliation). Subsidiarity is the way to achieve this. *Subsidiarity* is a word that points at layered approaches, be it the loops in our brain at the microlevel or, at the macrolevel, the way to organize societal institutions.

We live in historical times when realistic optimism is warranted. Did our ancestors see pictures of our blue planet from the perspective of an astronaut? Did our grandparents have access to as comprehensive a knowledge base as we have about the universe and our place in it? Mature global citizenship can overcome the security dilemma as well as the commons dilemma (the problem that commons are vulnerable to free-riders and raiders). The present ingathering of humankind opens a window of opportunity to manifest Gandhi’s tenet that peace is the path.

During my global life in all corners of our planet, I have experienced wonderful Buberian I-Thou orientation, connected knowing (rather than separate knowing, Mary Belenky), let-it-flow thinking (rather than verdict thinking, S. M. Miller), listening into voice (Linda Hartling), flourishing (Martha Nussbaum, Amartya Sen), and dialogue (Paulo Freire).

I have coined the term *egalization* to connote the true manifestation of equality in dignity and match the word *globalization* to form the term *globegalization* (Lindner, 2006, 2010). And my term *dignism* means nurturing unity in diversity, preventing unity from being perverted into oppressive uniformity, and keeping diversity from sliding into hostile division (Lindner, 2012a).

The Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies network (www.humiliationstudies.org), and the World Dignity University initiative (www.worlddignityuniversity.org) are examples of initiatives that work for a world where every newborn finds space and is nurtured to unfold his or her highest and best, embedded in a social context of loving appreciation and connection—a world where the carrying capacity of the planet guides the way in which everybody's basic needs are met and where we unite in our respect for equal human dignity while celebrating our diversity.

This is also the message of the International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution, which was founded by Morton Deutsch and is headed by Peter Coleman. Its message is that cooperation is superior to competition—not the cooperation that serves global exploitation of resources for special interests, but global cooperation for the common good of all, for a new ethics of mutuality and care, for a new definition of success, wealth, well-being, and fulfillment. This can succeed only through understanding Deutsch's reminder that in an interdependent world, fates

are linked in a way that all sink or swim together. And this requires that we all, every member in the global family, develop a sense of truly responsible global citizenship (Lindner, 2010).

In the final analysis, as Marshall McLuhan said, “There are no passengers on spaceship earth. We are all crew.” We cannot expect that our diplomats will foster sufficient global cooperation on the conflicts that we need to solve if we wish to survive as a species. We all have to step in. Traditional sources of love, such as parental or romantic love, friendship, or charity, will not be enough. We must learn to nurture, intentionally and proactively, a new level of love to achieve global cohesion: the glue of worldwide interhuman love. Let us learn to be the family we are on our tiny home planet.

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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
SELF-REGULATION IN THE SERVICE OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

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Some of the most frustrating conflicts are those that people fight within their own heads, as they struggle with the dilemmas and temptations they encounter and create, as has been chronicled ever since Adam was tempted by Eve and Paradise was lost forever. In everyday life, we experience these internal wars when, after resolving to skip the dessert, we are faced with the pastry tray, or when the tobacco addict, choking with emphysema, battles with himself not to light the next cigarette. Such conflicts are omnipresent as people try to pursue a difficult achievement goal, follow through on a health regimen (adhering to diets, exercise schedules, medications), or maintain a close relationship—efforts that require more than habit and routine to stay on course as conflict becomes inevitable and the difficulty and frustration of the effort escalate.

In this chapter, we consider some of the main findings from psychology that address these internal battles. We do so on the assumption that understanding what makes intrapsychic conflict easier to negotiate constructively is also relevant to the diverse types of conflict that characterize the human condition at every level, from the interpersonal to the international. Our primary goal is to capture what psychological research and theory tell us about willpower and to examine the potential implications for conflict resolution.

UNDERSTANDING “WILLPOWER”

The facet of willpower that is of particular concern here is the ability to inhibit impulsive, automatic, “hot” emotional responses that conflict with and threaten to undo the more valued but distant future goals one is trying to pursue (trying to bypass the pastry, or continue studying for an exam rather than turn on the TV, or forgo alcohol, or save for retirement rather than buy the sports car, or settle a long-standing border dispute with one’s neighbor).

A Prototypic Conflict within the Self: The Marshmallow Dilemma

The “delay of gratification” paradigm (Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez, 1989) is more widely known as the “marshmallow test” in media versions and best-selling advice volumes. Popularization notwithstanding (Goleman, 1995), in psychological research, this method has been a prototype for the study of willpower in pursuit of difficult goals and a cornerstone for the concept of emotional intelligence (EQ). It has been researched extensively, both in experiments and in longitudinal studies that follow the same individuals for many years. (For reviews, see Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999; Mischel and Ayduk, 2004; and Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez, 1989).

In this method, a young child is presented with some consumable that she desires, for example, a food treat. A dilemma is then posed: wait until the experimenter returns and get two of the desired treats, or ring a bell and the experimenter returns immediately, but the child gets only one treat. The child clearly prefers the larger outcome and commits herself to wait for it. Soon, though, the delay becomes very difficult as waiting for the chosen goal drags on in the face of conflict, frustration, and temptation to ring the bell and take the immediately available treat. Though

simple in its structure, this method has been shown to tap the type of skills and self-regulatory strategies that are fundamental for impulse control and for sustaining willpower in the face of temptation and frustration.

A choice conflict between either waiting for two marshmallows or settling for one now may seem artificial and far from the choices adults confront in their worlds. But for the young child, this type of problem, when carefully structured in age-appropriate ways, creates a genuine conflict as involving to her as many dilemmas of life are to adults. It provides a route to study the processes underlying willpower systematically. Early studies of the delay situation revealed large individual differences in children's willingness and ability to delay. Years later, the time spent waiting for two marshmallows later versus one now proved to be remarkably indicative of important outcomes in later life (Ayduk and others, 2000; Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriquez, 1989). As examples, the number of seconds a preschooler is willing to wait for the bigger treats, rather than settling for the lesser one available immediately, significantly predicts diverse adaptive cognitive and social outcomes decades later, notably SAT scores (Mischel, 1996) and cognitive control ability (Eigsti and others, 2006).

Given that behavior in this situation is not of trivial interest, it becomes important to understand what is happening psychologically that makes some children ring quickly and others wait for what seems like forever. This problem has driven an extensive research program (Mischel, 1996; Mischel and Ayduk, 2004), addressing the question if humans initially are driven by impulses, pressing for immediate release, ruled by a pleasure principle, and largely indifferent to reason—as has long been assumed—how do they become able to control their actions and feelings, overcoming the power of stimuli to

elicit automatic reactions and exerting the self-control strategies or willpower essential for executing their difficult-to-achieve intentions?

It is tempting to interpret the marshmallow-test results to support the view that how people manage to persist and exert self-control reflects basic character traits such as ego control or conscientiousness, traits that may already be visible quite early in life. Such constructs can be useful in characterizing broad individual differences in the predisposition to self-control and ability to negotiate difficult conflicts without losing the long-term goal that one seeks, but at best they offer incomplete explanations. They overlook, for example, the finding that the same preschooler who was unable to wait even a minute under some conditions was able to wait twenty minutes when the situation was represented or framed in other terms or when the conditions changed in even seemingly minor ways. So we need to understand what people can do when they try to persist in goal pursuit, to deal effectively with conflict without succumbing impulsively to the immediate temptations and impulses to quit.

Essential Preliminaries for Self-Regulation

Beginning in the early years of life, ineffective self-regulation predicts many adverse outcomes: subsequent school failures, poor academic and social competence, conduct disorders, and various forms of addictive and antisocial behavior. (For review, see Mischel and Ayduk, 2004.) Conversely, individuals who can effectively self-regulate and cope with conflict in pursuing their goals can at least partially shape their lives and futures in constructive directions. It is therefore important to understand the processes that enable self-regulation and willpower in the service of constructive conflict resolution.

Over the course of the past four decades, research has gone beyond folk wisdom and speculation to demystify the concept of willpower. The findings speak to why at least some people under some circumstances are able to turn their good intentions into effective behavior as they cope with the conflicts most important to them. Much of this research focuses on the psychological processes involved in self-regulation that make it extremely difficult—or relatively easy—for people to deal effectively with seemingly mundane but potentially life-threatening conflicts

Effective self-regulation or its failure depends on a sequence of closely connected and interacting cognitive and emotional processes. These include (1) how the individual encodes or construes the situation in which self-regulation is attempted, (2) the expectancies and beliefs that become activated, (3) the feelings and emotions triggered and experienced, and (4) the goals and values engaged. Although these are essential preliminaries for even attempting to exert effortful control, sustaining effort depends on the self-control skills and strategic competencies that are employed in trying to pursue them.

Encodings.

The motivation to self-regulate tends to increase to the extent that the activity or situation is encoded as personally meaningful and self-relevant. New mothers, for example, cope better with the often exhausting and conflict-provoking chores and routines of parenting an infant if they view those tasks as fulfilling important self-obligations rather than as taking time away from other modes of self-fulfillment, such as a career. Even if events and situations are perceived as highly self-relevant, however, the person does not necessarily consciously attempt to self-regulate. On the contrary, such situations often easily and

automatically trigger the enduring behavior patterns that characterize an individual's personality and function to undermine self-regulation. One example of such an automatic reaction is the anger and abusiveness readily triggered in rejection-sensitive men who are quick to perceive rejection from a romantic partner even if it has not occurred. Their maladaptive reaction pattern of uncontrolled hostility may be essentially reflexive, bypassing conscious control and preventing purposeful self-intervention effort. In such a case, the person encodes the situation as personally relevant even if it is not and maintains this representation regardless of contradictory evidence. The ironic and often tragic result is that the outcome the man most fears and expects—rejection by the romantic partner—is precipitated by his own behavior in a self-fulfilling prophecy (Downey, Freitas, Michaelis, and Khouri, 1998).

Expectancies.

Expectancy and belief that one is able to exert control and successfully execute necessary action is also an essential prerequisite for self-regulation. It supports one's efforts and guides whether, where, when, and how one attempts to self-regulate (Mischel, Cantor, and Feldman, 1996). To even try purposeful self-regulation requires a representation of the self as a causal agent capable of executing an intended action. Perceived self-efficacy—the belief that "I can do it"—is a foundation for successfully pursuing a difficult goal or for changing and improving one's situation or oneself (Bandura, 1986). Its psychological opposite, perceived helplessness, is the route to giving up, apathy, and depression (Dweck, 1986; Seligman, 1975). Even when the self-regulatory task is something aversive that has to be endured and cannot be controlled—say, a painful dental procedure or hostile interaction—the belief that one can

predict or control the stress is an important ingredient for coping. Generally, most people tend to become less upset if they think they can predict and control stressful or painful events, even if the perception is illusory (Averill, 1973; Miller, 1979; Rodin, 1987; Taylor, Lichtman, and Wood, 1984; Thompson, 1981).

Affect.

Whereas expectations of efficacy and control enhance the potential for self-control and goal pursuit, anxious feelings and self-preoccupying thoughts undermine such efforts. The thought, “I’m no good at this; I’ll never be able to do it” in the test-anxious person competes and interferes with task-relevant thoughts (for example, “Now I have to recheck my answers”). Interference from self-preoccupying thoughts tends to be greatest when the task to be done is complex and requires many competing responses, as is always the case when the problem and conflict to be solved are complex and difficult. As the motivation to do well increases (as when success on the task is especially important), anxiety and the tendency to catastrophize become particularly maladaptive, interfering with attention to the task and concentration on how to master it effectively.

Motivation and Persistence in Goal Pursuit.

Encodings, affect, and expectancies notwithstanding, equally important for facilitating adaptive self-regulation is that the individual be motivated to self-regulate. If the person presented with a delicious-looking piece of chocolate cake does not care about losing weight, then it is unlikely that the person will refrain from taking a bite. Assuming that the individual is in fact motivated to self-regulate, their persistence in goal pursuit will be bolstered or undermined by their outcome expectancies about the

likelihood that the effort, cost, and time spent on the task will or will not actually result in the desired outcome. People base outcome expectations on both information in the current situation and expectations generalized from previous similar situations. In short, expectancy has a substantial impact on self-regulatory choices and motivation: people are likely to choose to perform an action that requires effort if they believe that they can perform the action (they have high self-efficacy expectancy) and expect it to lead to favorable consequences.

Hot Reactions and the Emotional Brain

The situations in which people most need and want to self-regulate and control their impulses as they struggle to resolve conflict tend to be those in which it is most difficult for them to do so. These are the situations that elicit hot emotional reactions such as intense fear and anxiety or strong appetites or craving. In such situations, the person may be subject to what is called *stimulus control* —namely, situations in which the stimulus triggers a virtually uncontrollable automatic response. The central challenge for the individual is to overcome such reflexive, automatic stimulus control with reflective self-control.

Consider, for example, the dilemma of the addict who is trying to quit but is tempted with heroin, or the starving dieter faced with the ultimate chocolate cake, or the test-anxious student facing an important examination. This kind of hot situation tends to automatically trigger a hot reaction, rapidly generating the associated feelings of fear or desire and the urge to respond impulsively, bypassing self-regulatory controls just when it is most important to have them. Such hot, reflexive reactions may be part of the overall arousal state that helps initiate quick adaptive action, as in an emergency response to a fire alarm or sudden danger that mobilizes the body’s resources.

However, the arousal state makes thoughtful self-regulation and planful action and reflection most difficult (Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999).

Crucially important in emotional reactions, particularly fear, is a small almond-shaped region in the brain called the *amygdala* (“almond” in Latin). This brain structure reacts almost instantly to stimuli that individuals perceive as threatening (Adolphs and others, 1999; LeDoux, 1996, 2000; Phelps and others, 2001; Winston, Strange, O’Doherty, and Dolan, 2002), immediately cueing behavioral, physiological (autonomic), and endocrine responses. It mobilizes the body for action, readying it to fight or flight in response to a perceived threat. This reflexive emergency reaction is useful for adaptation: there is evolutionary survival value in reacting automatically to a snake in the grass without taking time to reflect on it or to fight an opponent who is ready to strike when flight is not possible. But these automatic reactions are only a quick fix and can become destructive if they persist (Ledoux, 1996, 2000). When activated indiscriminately, in response to stimuli that are not threatening, they can lead to negative consequences for the self.

Unlike lower animals in the evolutionary ladder, human beings have the capacity to eventually take control with high-level brain centers (the prefrontal cortex) and start thinking and planning their way through perceived threats that the amygdala responds to automatically. In this vein, findings on the neural basis of emotion regulation indicate that the amygdala does not operate in isolation in response to perceived threats. Instead, it projects to and interacts with a number of prefrontal brain regions (among other areas) that support high-level executive functions that are believed to play a critical role in the cognitive control of emotion. (For review, see Ochsner and Gross, 2005.) For example, studies of people’s ability to down-regulate

negative emotional responses have shown that instructing people to cognitively reappraise the meaning of threat-arousing stimuli to perceive them as less aversive (e.g., imagine that the blood on a corpse is ketchup) leads to concomitant decreases in autonomic responses, amygdala activation, and self-report negative affect (Jackson, Malmstadt, Larson, and Davidson, 2000; Levesque and others, 2003; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, and Grabrieli, 2002; Ochsner and others, 2004). Thus, the trick in achieving effective self-regulation is to move from the automatic, hot, emotional response that can quickly become maladaptive to a cooler, more reasoned, and reflective action that makes use of the vast cognitive resources that give humans their advantage (Mischel and others, 1989).

FROM HOT TO COOL: ENABLING WILLPOWER

To understand the processes that enable willpower in executing one's intentions, two closely interacting systems have been proposed: a "hot" system and a "cool" one (Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999). The cool system is a "know" system: it is cognitive, complex, contemplative, slow, rational, strategic, integrated, coherent, and emotionally neutral—it is the basis of self-regulation and self-control. In this theory, it consists of a network of informational *cool nodes* that are elaborately interconnected to each other and generate rational, reflective, and strategic behavior. In contrast, the hot one is a "go" system: emotional, simple, reflexive, and fast. It consists of relatively few representations, or *hot spots* , that, when activated by trigger stimuli, elicit virtually reflexive avoidance and approach reactions. The hot system develops early in life and is dominant in the first few years. It is tuned biologically to be responsive to innate releasing stimuli,

both negative and positive, that elicit automatic, aversive, fear-and-flight reactions, or appetitive and sexual approach reactions. Impulsive and reflexive, the hot system is the basis of emotionality, fears as well as passions; it undermines rational attempts at self-control.

The hot-cool model assumes that cognition and affect operate in continuous interaction with one another. (For similar opponent process models, see Epstein, 1994; Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert, and Trope, 2002.) Specifically, hot spots and cool nodes are directly connected to one another and thus link the two systems (Metcalfe and Jacobs, 1996, 1998; Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999). Hot spots can be evoked by activation of corresponding cool nodes; alternatively, hot representations can be cooled through intersystem connections to the corresponding cool nodes. Willpower becomes possible to the extent that the cooling strategies generated by the cognitive cool system circumvent hot system activation through such intersystem connections that link hot spots to cool nodes. Thus, consequential for self-control are the conditions under which hot spots do not have access to corresponding cool representations, because these conditions are the ones that undermine or prevent cool system regulation of hot impulses.

Analysis of the interactions between hot and cool systems allows prediction and explanation of diverse findings on the nature of willpower from decades of research. Although the processes involved in these interactions are quite complex, the implications for conflict management are straightforward. Namely, the essential ingredient for effective self-regulation is to strategically cool the hot system and its impulsive reaction tendencies—reactions that are readily activated in conflict situations—and instead mobilize the cool system in pursuit of long-term goals.

The balance between the hot and cool systems depends on several factors, the first of which is the developmental level of the individual. The hot system develops and dominates early in life, whereas the cool system develops later (by age four) and becomes increasingly dominant over the course of development. Consequently, early in development, the baby is primarily responsive to the pushes and pulls of hot stimuli in the external world as many of the hot spots do not have corresponding cool nodes that can regulate and inhibit hot system processing. These developmental differences are consistent with evidence on the differential rates of development of the relevant brain areas for these two systems. (For reviews, see Eisenberger, Smith, Sadovsky, and Spinrad, 2004; Rothbart, Ellis, and Posner, 2004.)

Empirical evidence from the delay of gratification studies supports these expectations. For example, whereas delay of gratification is virtually impossible for children younger than four years of age (Mischel, 1974), by age twelve almost 60 percent of children in some studies were able to wait the duration of the period to receive the awaited reward (25 minutes maximum; Ayduk and others, 2000, study 2). As the cool system develops over time, however, it becomes increasingly possible for children to generate cooling strategies (such as self-distraction, inventing mental games to make the delay less aversive), to be less controlled by their temptations (Mischel and others, 1989).

In the context of conflict resolution, the most important determinant of hot-system, cool-system balance is stress. At high levels, stress deactivates the cool system and creates hot-system dominance. At lower levels of stress, complex thinking, planning, and remembering are possible. When stress levels jump from low to very high, as in life-threatening emergency conditions (escape the approaching perpetrator or die, get the food or starve), responding

tends to be reflexive and automatic—hardly the time for cognitive complexity and reflection. Under conditions in which an animal's life is threatened, quick responses driven by innately determined stimuli may be essential. At the same time, such automatic reactions undo rational efforts at constructive conflict resolution for the types of dilemmas that typically characterize everyday human conflicts.

The effects of chronic stress are evident even at a physical level. For example, exposure to prolonged stress has correlated with decreases in the volume of the hippocampus (Sapolsky, 1996), a brain structure that is basic for the functioning of the cool system. Other studies indicate that rats exposed to repeated stress demonstrate dendritic spine loss in medial prefrontal cortex (Brown, Henning, and Wellman, 2005; Radley and others, 2004; Radley, 2005)—a cellular feature of stress-related psychiatric disorders in which the prefrontal cortex is impaired—and dendritic spine growth in the amygdala (Mitra, Jadhav, McEwen, Vyas, and Chattarji, 2005; Vyas, Bernal, and Chattarji, 2003)—a neuronal event that is thought to facilitate increased emotionality. In humans, severe and chronic stress (as in war and terror conditions) may result in dominant activation of the hot system as opposed to the cool system in ways that become relatively stable and difficult to reverse. In short, conflict and stress are intimately linked and feed each other so as to easily and automatically undermine rational problem solving and escalate irrational and self-defeating hot behavior. In this cycle, stress increases the potential for conflict, which in turn escalates the level of stress, producing a pernicious cascade of impulsive hot-system responses and consequences that further undermine any chance for rational and effective conflict resolution. Fortunately, diverse strands of research from several fields converge that speak directly to this dilemma and point to new

directions—or at least metaphors—for dealing constructively with conflict.

Consider again the marshmallow test. For this situation, delay of gratification and frustration tolerance are enhanced if the person can transform the aversive waiting period into a pleasant, nonwaiting situation. There are two primary ways that this can be done. One way is by diverting attention and thoughts away from the frustrative components of delay of gratification and thinking instead about other, pleasant things. Such distractions can be achieved by engaging in activities, overtly or mentally, during the delay period that help to suppress or decrease the aversiveness of waiting for the desired outcome, while retaining the goal and continuing to persist for it. Distraction tactics such as these often are seen in everyday conflict situations in the form of “time-outs,” which allow people to take a break from building disputes to focus attention elsewhere in order to calm down, regain composure, and have a fresh look.

Second, the aversiveness of the delay period also can be neutralized by changing the way people mentally represent the outcomes they are waiting or working for. For example, in a number of studies, Mischel and colleagues have shown that cueing children to think about the rewards in terms of their concrete, motivating, “hot” features (i.e., you can think about how gooey and yummy marshmallows taste) undermines children’s ability to delay gratification. In contrast, a focus on the more abstract, informational, “cool” features of desired treats (that is, you can think about how round and puffy marshmallows are, like cotton balls or clouds) has the opposite effect, functioning to enhance delay ability. (For review, see Mischel and others, 1989.) In short, voluntary delay of reward can be aided by activities that serve as distracters from the reward and thus from the aversiveness of wanting it but not having it,

or by mentally re-representing the reward more abstractly and less concretely. Through such distraction and mental re-representation, it is possible to convert the frustrating delay-of-reward situation into a psychologically less aversive condition. Thus, rather than trying to maintain an aversive activity through an act of will or focused attention, effective self-control is helped by transforming the difficult into the easy, the aversive into the pleasant, and the boring into the interesting, while still maintaining the task-required activity on which the ultimate reward depends.

Doing this effectively when the task is complex may require extensive rehearsal and planning for implementing the necessary action when it is needed (Gollwitzer, 1996; Mischel and Patterson, 1976). In effective delay of gratification, the child tunes out the hot properties of the reward stimulus while strategically cooling through self-distraction to sustain waiting behavior. Similarly, distracting and relaxation-induced activity, such as listening to music, reduces anxiety in the face of uncontrollable shocks and helps people cope with chronic pain (such as from rheumatoid arthritis and even with severe life crises). Cooling strategies generally can help one transform potentially stressful situations to make them less aversive. For example, if surgical patients are encouraged to reconstrue their hospital stay as a vacation from the stresses of daily life, they show better postoperative adjustment, just as chronically ill patients who reinterpret their conditions positively also show better adjustment.

When considering how people can be helped to self-regulate adaptively, there is an important caveat: in the real world, situations that require individuals to exert self-control often involve both strategic cooling processes that enable people to remain calm and reflective in the face of temptation, as well as strategic heating processes to

maintain commitment to pursuing the goals rather than quitting. For example, Peake, Hebl, and Mischel (2002) investigated second-by-second attention deployment during efforts at sustained delay of gratification. Self-regulation depended not just on cooling strategies, but on *flexible attention deployment* as well—delay in working situations was facilitated most when attention was intermittently shifted to the rewards, as if the children tried to enhance their motivation to remain calm by reminding themselves about the rewards, but then quickly shifted away to prevent excessive arousal (Peake and others, 2002). Such flexibility in attention deployment is consistent with the idea that it is the balanced interactions between the hot and cool systems that sustain delay of gratification, as they exert their motivating and cooling effects in tandem. (See also Mischel and others, 1989.)

INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT

The findings just described have direct implications for analyzing interpersonal conflicts.

Self-Regulatory Failure in Interpersonal Conflict

Interpersonal conflict often involves complex, mixed-motive situations, in which the relationship between one's own set of goals and another's are simultaneously positively interdependent and negatively interdependent. (See chapter 1 of this book.) Sayings such as, "You always hurt the ones you love," indicate the common wisdom that the interdependence coming from interpersonal closeness creates the very situation in which emotions are strong and the tendency to react impulsively in hurtful, damaging ways is greatest. Although people may attempt to control the hot, emotional responses that intensify conflict and damage relationships, they often find that their good

intentions are not enough to refrain from blowing up, making personal attacks, or otherwise doing what they later regret.

Regulating expression of negative feelings is difficult in the heat of conflict. The conflict situation itself creates a general level of stress that readily shifts the balance from cool-system to hot-system dominance. Under high stress, specific things are often said and done during conflict that push specific psychological buttons, which in turn trigger hot, emotional reactions. Failure to exert self-control over such reactions can instigate similarly hot responses from the other party, thus intensifying the conflict, further undermining efforts at self-control, and making cool, collaborative responses even more difficult. High stress also tends to decrease one's ability to solve complex problems. So people who argue when they are stressed and fatigued often find that they lack the self-control they might otherwise have. Their problem-solving ability is also impaired, so stress doubly undermines any attempt to resolve the conflict constructively.

Given the negative implications associated with stress for successfully resolving conflicts, it is not surprising that managing stress plays an important role in conflict resolution. Managing and reducing stress improves not only self-cooling and self-control, but also one's ability to generate and assess possible solutions to the conflict. Because a high level of stress can shift the balance from cool-system dominance to hot, managing stress effectively can mean the difference between suppressing hot impulses and lashing out uncontrollably. In this vein, Gottman and colleagues, working with married couples experiencing serious relationship-threatening conflicts, has found that stress management strategies, including exercise, mediation, and self-soothing rituals for unwinding or decompressing at the end of the day, can help improve

conflict resolution and marital satisfaction. (For review, see Gottman and Silver, 2000.)

In addition to stress, there are countless other reasons that people fail to self-regulate during conflict (for review, see Baumeister and Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister, Heatherton, and Tice, 1993), among them ambivalence or lack of firm resolve (i.e., motivation) to accomplish a particular goal. As mentioned earlier, one's motivation to self-regulate increases if the situation or activity in question is considered personally relevant and meaningful. Because self-regulation and self-control require a certain amount of psychological and physiological energy, it comes as no surprise that when people are emotionally stressed, mentally drained, distracted, busy with other things, or just plain tired, they find it all the more difficult to overcome a powerful emotional impulse (Baumeister and Heatherton, 1996).

Anxiety, rumination, and preoccupation may undermine self-regulation as well, particularly if the conflict is a complex one that requires abundant mental resources for successful resolution (Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). As the perceived stakes increase, however, the anxiety level and the propensity to catastrophize also tend to increase, interfering with the ability to self-control and solve a complex problem. The very nature of a conflict situation—emotional and stress inducing—thus undermines self-control and suggests the commonsense advice to try to avoid dealing with potential conflict situations when one is busy, anxious, stressed, or physically exhausted—advice that is easy to give but difficult to execute given the "hot" conditions in which real-life conflicts generally are confronted, whether battling for the parking space or taxi on the way home or dealing with sudden world crises.

Escalating Spirals in Conflict

Often, one little step crosses an imaginary line, leading to more frequent and severe transgression and the collapse of the good intentions. The dieter who cheats a little for a special occasion, the ex-smoker who sneaks just one little cigarette to help calm the nerves, or the alcoholic who takes one tiny sip to feel more at ease at the annual holiday party—these are the first steps to an unhappy ending; hence such idioms as “falling off the wagon.” Such snowballing, of course, occurs not just in internal conflicts, as in dieting struggles within the self, but also in interpersonal conflicts.

Altercations that readily become violent typically begin with relatively innocuous acts, followed by an escalating spiral of reciprocal provocation. The initial aggressive act may seem at the time essentially harmless but elicits a hostile response that seems to justify an even more aggressive countermove, and so on, eventually snowballing into violence (e.g., Zillman, 1994), and the cycle of emotional arousal, impulsive automatic responding, and aggression continues to escalate. It is evident, for example, in the divorced couple who simply cannot be in the same room together without the slightest provocation triggering a series of aggressive reactions that quickly spiral out of control. Such habitual escalating reactions between parties in a protracted conflict follow some of the same rules as all other kinds of habitual responses. To illustrate, consider Pavlov’s dogs, who were exposed to food that made them salivate. The food was repeatedly paired with a distinctive bell, so that when the bell rang, food was shown, and the dogs salivated. Eventually the dogs learned to anticipate food whenever they heard a bell and would salivate merely at the sound of the bell, regardless of whether food was ever presented. In human relations, the trigger for the original angry response is the other’s behavior and its perceived harmful consequences. (See Allred, 2000.) Over

time in these escalating cycles, however, the anger and hostility may become such strong conditioned responses that the presence of the other person, physically or in thought, may be sufficient to trigger them automatically unless cooling strategic interventions are introduced.

Cooling Strategies and Techniques

Between six and eighteen months of age, infants begin to learn to regulate their emotions. Six-month-olds approached by a stranger tend to cope with their fear and anxiety by averting their eyes and fussing. Twelve- and eighteen-month-olds use other strategies, such as self-distraction and self-soothing, to deal with an anxiety-producing stranger. These more sophisticated cooling strategies allow children to effectively cope with their hot fear and anxiety reactions. Because conflict elicits similar fight-or-flight emotional responses, self-distraction, self-calming, and other cooling strategies are equally important skills for adults.

Time-Out

People who have stressful jobs are able to reduce conflict and improve their family relationships by taking brief time-outs after returning home from work. Without a time-out, going straight from a stressful workday to a family interaction often leads to argument and dispute. But spending part of an hour by themselves enables these stressed-out wage earners to calm down prior to dealing with their families, and subsequent family interactions are therefore much more pleasant.

In the middle of a conflict, calling for a time-out or even just stopping and counting to ten can allow people the extra time they need to calm down and cool off. If people take an extended time-out, they should take care not to

engage in other arousing or anxiety-producing activities and avoid “silent seething” (Baumeister, Heatherton, and Tice, 1993) in which the time-out is used to nurse the angry feelings and plot the next counterattack. Engaging in such silent seething, in which people focus specifically on the hot, concrete emotion-arousing aspects of the conflict (for example, “I can’t believe she said that” or, “He’s being so stubborn”) is likely to perpetuate hot responses by leading to rumination that further increases negative arousal and hostility (Kross, Ayduk, and Mischel, 2005; Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). Instead, people can use time-outs constructively to engage in behaviors that calm them down, reducing their arousal levels so that they can later rejoin hostile negotiations and contribute to them meaningfully, in ways that lead to adaptive resolutions. The specific behaviors that facilitate this will likely vary across people and depend on a host of factors, including the individual’s personality, the type of conflict, as well as its intensity. Regardless of the specific behavior that people choose, however, the objective of a time-out remains the same—to pause and calm down, not to pause and reload, or as a way of avoiding dealing with the conflict and abandoning the efforts to resolve it.

Reflection

One way to facilitate more constructive conflict resolution is to become more self-aware. Stopping to reflect, comparing one’s behavior to important goals and standards, and trying to take the other person’s perspective can be helpful. People who stop to focus attention on themselves and succeed in adaptively reflecting on their current thoughts, feelings, goals, and behaviors are more likely to see themselves accurately, to act consistently with goals and standards, and to be faithful to shared standards such as societal norms or agreed

ground rules of the relationship (e.g., Carver and Scheier, 1981; Wicklund, 1979). However, efforts to constructively analyze feelings can also easily become hazardous by entangling people in rumination that further increases negative affect (e.g., Ayduk, Downey, and Mischel, 2002; Rusting and Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). Given these conflicting findings, a key need is to understand how people can adaptively reflect rather than ruminate about their feelings.

According to the hot-cool model, whether a person ends up ruminating or reflecting depends critically on two mechanisms: the individual's *arousal level* and the individual's *construals* of their experience (Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999). As noted earlier, at high levels of arousal, hot-system processing is accentuated while cool-system processing is attenuated. Consequently, when a person experiences high negative arousal, as is often the case during conflict, it is assumed that efforts to rationally analyze negative feelings will be impaired. Instead of fostering abstract thinking and reasoning, such efforts are expected to lead individuals to construe negative experiences in predominantly concrete, descriptive terms (i.e., focusing specifically on what one is feeling and what happened to them), which in turn feeds back and serves to further increase negative arousal. To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical example. Imagine that Joanne is in the midst of a frustrating negotiation with John. She finds herself becoming increasingly upset and is motivated to figure out why she is feeling so hostile in order to prevent the negotiation from blowing up. She takes a time-out and asks herself, "Why am I so angry at John?" In response, she tells herself, "Because he's arrogant and a control freak and his proposal is unfair." Thus, although Joanne is motivated to understand her feelings, her attempts to do so do not lead to insightful understanding.

Instead, they lead her to focus specifically on what it is about John and the situation that is upsetting her, causing her to become increasingly upset. In order to prevent this kind of ruminative response and enable adaptive reflection, the hot-cool model suggests that specific strategies are needed to reduce arousal while attention is directed to a more abstract and less concrete analysis of one's feelings.

Studies by Kross and colleagues (2005) have begun to shed light on the psychological operations that enable such cool, reflective processing. In their research they demonstrate that two strategies play a critical role in enabling people to adaptively reflect, rather than ruminate, over negative feelings. One is the adoption of a *self-distanced* perspective, in which the individual becomes an observer of himself and the experience (rather than maintaining the usual *self-immersed* perspective). The other is a "why" focus on the specific reasons underlying one's negative feelings (rather than a "what" focus on the specific felt emotions experienced). Findings from a series of studies indicate that the combination of these strategies (that is, why focus engaged in from a self-distanced perspective or "distanced-why" strategy) enables people to analyze negative experiences and emotions in relatively cool, cognitive terms, making sense of them without overwhelming them with their aversiveness and refueling the problem. For example, Kross and colleagues (2005) have shown that instructing people to focus on the reasons underlying their negative feelings surrounding interpersonal conflicts (why focus) from self-distanced perspectives leads them to experience less anger, assessed both implicitly (indirectly) and explicitly (through self-report), and to construe their experiences less concretely (that is, "I can't believe she said that to me" or, "He's so unreasonable") and more abstractly (such as, "I realize that she felt threatened by my presence"; "Looking back on it

now, I could have responded differently by . . .") relative to individuals who focus on the reasons underlying their emotions without adopting a self-distanced perspective.

The distanced-why strategy thus appears to offer one route for facilitating reflection and constructive problem solving. Theoretically, a number of techniques may be similarly useful so long as they function to attenuate arousal levels while leading people to construe their experiences more abstractly and less concretely. In this vein, time-outs, third-party mediators, and writing interventions may all prove useful to the extent that they fulfill these enabling conditions.

SELF-REGULATORY PLANS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES

Implementation strategies connect general goals ("Resolve conflict constructively") to a specific implementation intention ("If she says I'm rude, I'll ask her to cite specific examples; I won't lose my temper and start calling her names"). Creating a specific contingency (IF_____) that becomes connected to a specific planned response (THEN_____) helps ensure implementation of the plan by tying a hot trigger event to the intended response rather than the habitual response. For instance, translating the goal of "health and physical fitness" into an intention to "exercise regularly" is not an effective plan of action because it is too broad. An effective plan of action specifies the how, when, and where rather than just the what of the action steps needed to accomplish the goal (Gollwitzer, 1996). A better plan for the person seeking a healthier lifestyle might be, "I'll go to the park and jog two miles every weekday evening as soon as I get home from work." This is a better plan because it specifies the exact action (jogging two miles), when and where it happens (every

weekday in the park), and the situation that triggers the action (as soon as I get home from work). A similarly detailed plan of action can help ensure that specific conflict resolution strategies are initiated at the right time and place and with the appropriate people.

MODELING, ROLE PLAY, OR REHEARSAL

People do not learn new response patterns just through direct experience. They can also learn adaptive responses to conflict from observing others. Aggressive children and adolescents, in particular, can profit immensely from training interventions that teach them nonviolent techniques for handling interpersonal conflicts. Observing skilled models deal effectively with difficult situations allows the observer to achieve greater freedom in coping with current and future problems of all sorts (Bandura, 1986).

In modeling, appropriate and effective responses are repeatedly modeled by competent individuals in a variety of problem-provoking situations (Bandura, 1969, 1986). Generally the modeling begins with observation of effective behaviors in relatively easy situations and, when learners have mastered them, moves gradually to those that are increasingly difficult. In participant modeling, in addition to observing, learners also have guided opportunities to try the modeled behavior and receive the necessary guidance along with ample opportunity to practice the new behavior until they can respond to similar problem situations skillfully and generalization is achieved.

Live or videotaped modeling demonstrations can be an excellent way to communicate appropriate behaviors in a variety of realistic situations and contexts. Voice-over

narration can direct attention to key features and explicate the underlying action plan of which the model is merely an example. On an instructional video, voice-overs can be used to represent what people are thinking to themselves and the cognitive-affective strategies they are using to help manage themselves during the conflict and can point to nonobvious behaviors such as body language. Demonstration can be used to contrast good and poor performance and to show the positive outcomes associated with good performance and the potential negative consequences of poor performance. Demonstration can also be used to symbolically model internal processes of self-control by showing what people are thinking and feeling. By having people talk out loud and explain what they are thinking and feeling, one can use demonstration to model internal dynamics as well as observable behavior.

CONCLUSION

Intense conflicts, whether internal within the individual or external between individuals and groups, typically generate strong, “hot” emotional arousal that easily triggers automatic, virtually reflexive reactions, such as avoidance and flight or aggression and fight. Often these impulsive reactions are exactly the ones that lead to disadvantageous long-term consequences for all concerned. Shifting from hot, emotion-driven, impulsive reactions to cooler, more effective modes of cognitive problem solving is facilitated by a variety of cooling strategies, such as selective attention and reappraisal. A variety of techniques, including time-outs, reflection, exposure to effective models, planning or rehearsal, and role play, can help individuals readily use such strategies when they are most needed—and, ironically, most difficult to access spontaneously—in efforts at effective conflict resolution.

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CHAPTER FOURTEEN GROUP DECISION MAKING IN CONFLICT *From Groupthink to Polythink in the War in Iraq*

Alex Mintz
Carly Wayne

Political leaders around the globe routinely make critical decisions concerning war and peace. As citizens, we hope and believe that these leaders are engaging in thorough, careful, systematic and thoughtful decision-making processes, rationally weighing the costs and benefits of each potential action. However, as Irving Janis demonstrated in his famed book, *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes* (1982), group decision-making dynamics and processes at the highest level of government are prone to suboptimal, defective decision making. Whether the extreme cohesiveness of Janis's groupthink, or the pluralism of group members' opinions and the rampant divisiveness of decision-making groups, a dynamic Mintz, Mishal, and Morag (2005) and Mintz and DeRouen (2010) term *polythink* , such "defective" processes can lead to foreign policy and national security fiascos. These fiascos can severely damage U.S. credibility, interests and security. Clearly, the divisiveness triggered by polythink or the extreme cohesive decision dynamics caused by groupthink can be costly and prevent the governmental responsiveness required to stave off or appropriately prepare for impending conflicts.

In this chapter, we analyze the implications of groupthink and polythink on war and peace decisions made by the U.S. government regarding Iraq. Specifically, we analyze the

group dynamics in the Bush and Obama administrations and their effect on the decisions to initiate the war, execute a war strategy and, ultimately, withdraw from Iraq.

GROUPTHINK AND POLYTHINK

Groupthink

The well-known concept of groupthink, as described by Janis (1982), is “a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action” (Janis, 1982 p. 9). At the national level, this means that cohesive policymaking groups, such as the advisors to the president, intelligence and enforcement agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, often make suboptimal decisions due to their conscious or unconscious desire for uniformity over dissent. Decision-making groups ignore important limitations of chosen policies, overestimate the odds for success, and fail to consider other relevant policy options or possibilities. In this way, groupthink can lead to suboptimal decision-making processes that result in unnecessary or ill-planned conflict and resultant violence and loss of life.

According to Janis (1982, p. 10) the policy discussions of groups characterized by groupthink contain seven major defects that will have a negative impact on the decision-making process:

1. *Limited review of alternatives* . The group’s discussion will be limited to a few potential courses of action and will therefore lack a survey of the full range of alternatives.

2. *Limited discussion of objectives* . The group will not adequately answer the questions, “What are the key objectives?” and, “What values are implicated by the chosen strategy?”
3. *Failure to examine the risks of the preferred policy* . The group will consistently fail to reexamine the course of action that the majority of members initially preferred. They will thus fail to look for nonobvious risks and drawbacks that may not have been considered when a policy was originally evaluated.
4. *Failure to reevaluate previously rejected alternatives* . Group members will neglect courses of action that were initially evaluated as unsatisfactory by the majority of the group, failing to see the nonobvious benefits of these actions.
5. *Poor information search* . The members of the group will make little or no attempt to obtain information from external experts who can supply important estimates or projections of the potential gains and losses of a particular strategy.
6. *Selective bias in information processing* . Selective bias will be exhibited in the way the group reacts to factual information and relevant judgments from experts, the mass media, and outside critics. They will process only information that confirms their preexisting beliefs and ignore information that challenges those beliefs.
7. *Failure to consider contingency plans* . The group members will spend very little time deliberating about how “the best-laid plans” could be derailed. Consequently, they will fail to develop contingency plans to cope with potentially foreseeable setbacks, thereby endangering the overall success of the chosen course of action.

Since Janis introduced the concept of groupthink, much emphasis has been placed in foreign policy decision-making circles on the processes that can be used to prevent it from occurring and produce optimal decisions. However, many of the same policy prescriptions recommended by theorists and practitioners for addressing groupthink may leave decision makers at risk of swinging too far in the other direction, contributing to a very different, but no less detrimental, phenomenon, which we term *polythink* .

Polythink

Polythink characterizes a decision-making unit that has a large plurality of opinions, views, and perceptions among group members. Whereas groupthink tends toward overwhelming conformity and unanimity, polythink leads to the equally problematic extreme of disagreement, myriad opinions, interpretations of reality, and policy prescriptions (Mintz and DeRouen, 2010; Mintz et al., 2005). This may lead to a situation where it becomes virtually impossible for group members to reach a common interpretation of reality and achieve common policy goals.

Polythink is essentially the opposite of groupthink on a continuum of decision making from “completely cohesive” (groupthink) to “completely fragmented” (polythink). Polythink can thus be seen as a mode of thinking that results from membership in a highly disjointed group rather than a highly cohesive one (Mintz et al., 2005)

Polythink is also a generic phenomenon; that is to say, it is a horizontal concept that can be applied to myriad different realms and has far-reaching implications for decision makers in the arena of foreign policy, domestic policy, business decisions, national security considerations, and any other small group decision in individuals’ daily lives. [1]

Not surprisingly, many of the consequences of polythink are similar to those of groupthink. However, this is the case "not because the group is thinking alike or sharing the same views but because the group is actually failing to carry out any significant collective thinking" (Mintz et al., 2005, p. 17). As is the case with groupthink, polythink is likely to lead to defective, suboptimal decisions; limited review of alternatives, objectives, and risks; and selective use of information. However, a number of important consequences are unique to polythink due to the broad cacophony of viewpoints and policy prescriptions the group espouses—for example (Mintz et al., 2005):

1. *Greater likelihood for group conflict* . Because group members have different, sometimes even opposing views of the situation and of potential solutions, there is a greater likelihood of group conflict due to polythink.
2. *Greater likelihood for leaks* . Since group members do not hold uniform views of the situation under polythink, they are more likely to leak information (e.g., to undermine positions that they oppose) than in a groupthink situation.
3. *Less likelihood for the group to speak with one voice* . Under polythink, there is a greater likelihood that group members will talk to their counterparts, constituencies, and even the media espousing different views and opinions, leading to confusion over policy direction.
4. *More likelihood for framing effects* . Under polythink, some members may frame offers, proposals, counterproposals, and even disagreements in different ways: some may give it a positive spin and others a negative spin.
5. *Confusion and lack of communication* . The myriad viewpoints and actors represented in the decision-

making unit may lead to confusion over potential policy options and the failure to communicate all relevant information among the bureaucracies represented by the decision-making group. This reduces the ability of the group to make the most educated decision possible given the information available at the time.

6. *Decision paralysis or adoption of positions with the lowest common denominator* . Polythink may create decision situations in which the lowest common denominator becomes the dominant product of the group. This is the case because each member of the group needs to make concessions in his or her normative worldview and organizational and political agendas in order to reach an accommodation with other members of the group. Group divisiveness and discord may also severely limit the ability of the group to develop any policy at all. This can lead to perhaps the most destructive symptom of polythink, complete decision paralysis, which results in missed opportunities at best and catastrophic policy failures at worst.

These many symptoms of polythink are particularly detrimental to long-term policy planning, essentially forcing decision makers to make satisficing short-term compromises for which they can achieve group approval and to put off more far-reaching long-term policy plans for which it would be even more problematic to gain group consensus. Because war and peace decisions typically require long-term policy planning in order to achieve sustainability and minimize violence and bloodshed, polythink can be particularly problematic in these contexts.

The Groupthink-Polythink Continuum

Both polythink and groupthink should be considered pure types. In real-world decision-making situations, there is

rarely a case of pure or extreme polythink or groupthink. It is therefore more useful to think of these two processes as extremes on a continuum in which good decision-making processes typically lie toward the middle, whereas defective decision-making processes lean closer to one of two extremes: the group conformity of groupthink or the group disunity of polythink (figure 14.1).



Figure 14.1 The Groupthink-Polythink Continuum

In this groupthink-polythink continuum, the midpoint can be viewed as a balanced group process in which neither groupthink nor polythink dominates. We call this point or area on the continuum the *con-div group dynamic* , the point at which convergence and divergence of group members' viewpoints are more or less in equilibrium. In this situation, all group members do not share the same viewpoints, yet neither do they possess highly diverse or divisive opinions. In this scenario, the group is most likely to benefit from thorough yet productive decision-making processes that consider a multitude of options and are ultimately able to reach agreement and execute well-formulated policies and actions.

In many ways, the con-div group dynamic can be thought of as a type of group-based integrative complexity that results in a more nuanced understanding of policy issues and can therefore promote balanced and successful policymaking. [2] Thus while traditional literature on integrative complexity focuses on the degree of integration of multiple perspectives and possibilities at the individual level, integrative complexity may also function at the group level

(Erisen and Erisen, 2012; Conway et al., 2012; Suedfeld, Cross, and Brcic, 2011).

In this chapter, the groupthink, polythink, and con-div dynamics are applied to the realm of U.S. national security decision making on Iraq, demonstrating how the detrimental consequences of defective group decision-making processes can be particularly problematic and destructive in the context of conflict, war, and peace.

THE IRAQ WAR—FROM GROUPTHINK TO POLYTHINK

On December 18, 2011, all U.S. combat troops officially left Iraq. After almost nine years of war, the American combat role in Iraq had come to a close. However, the full legacy of what many label a mismanaged decision-making process in a “war of choice” has yet to be fully determined.

As this chapter demonstrates, after a near universally criticized groupthink decision-making dynamic regarding the entrance to the war, the successful decision-making surrounding the surge orchestrated by General David Petraeus was characterized by a more balanced con-div decision-group dynamic. In 2008, the new administration of Barack Obama, a staunch critic of the war, exhibited polythink as competing voices within the administration diverged on the wisdom, pace, and number of troop drawdown levels in Iraq.

By contrasting the early groupthink decision-making processes regarding the entrance to the war with the later con-div decision-making processes over the surge and then with the polythink that characterized the withdrawal, we demonstrate the detrimental effects of extreme groupthink or polythink in the U.S. national security apparatus. These three decisions—the groupthink decision to invade, the

con-div balanced surge, and the managed polythink decision to withdraw—also demonstrate the ways in which decision-making processes can be placed at different points on the groupthink-polythink continuum and applied to decisions regarding war and peace.

The Decision to Invade Iraq in 2003: A Classic Groupthink Dynamic

In the months leading to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the small group of decision makers in the administration of George W. Bush exhibited a pattern of groupthink (Badie, 2010; Schafer and Crichlow, 2010; Cairo, 2009; Scheeringa, 2010; Houghton, 2008). There was a consensus within the decision-making unit that American forces would be greeted as liberators by the Iraqi people. Though the backgrounds, worldviews, beliefs, and mind-sets of members of the group could clearly be divided in three distinct categories—assertive nationalists (Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld), neoconservatives (neo-con; Paul Wolfowitz, John Bolton, Richard Perle), and pragmatic internationalists (Colin Powell, Richard Haass)—pragmatic internationalists quickly found themselves frozen out of most foreign policy discussions as the like-minded nationalists and neoconservatives dominated the cabinet debate (Daalder and Lindsay, 2005, cited in Caldwell, 2011). The universal opinion of the so-called neoconservatives in the post-9/11 environment with respect to removing Saddam Hussein from power represents a typical groupthink syndrome in which “the decision processes and norms within that structure (or lack of structure) worked to reinforce existing biases and stereotypes more than to raise questions about how workable the strategies and tactics stemming from those stereotypes really were” (Schafer and Crichlow, 2010, p. 235).

Other symptoms of groupthink were also evident in this phase; for example, the administration often focused on the short-term results of the military campaign while ignoring the longer-term problems of insurgency and political violence in Iraq (Mintz and DeRouen, 2010). Whereas the Shock and Awe air campaign at the start of the war was well planned and successful, the occupation of Iraq was a nightmare, leading to 4,485 Americans killed and tens of thousands of Iraqi casualties over the course of the war (News Research Center Iraq War Casualties Database, 2009). Just as in the classic groupthink syndrome, group members:

1. Locked in on their preferred alternative course of action, ignoring the risks of this chosen policy and failing to focus on what could go wrong in Iraq, only on what could go right (Hersh, 2004)
2. Did not seriously evaluate different alternatives or contingency plans for dealing with Iraq (Yetiv, 2004) and failed to reevaluate policy options that had previously been rejected
3. Engaged in biased, selective information processing, ignoring critical information that contradicted their views and preferences
4. Engaged in poor information search, overestimating the group's ability to correctly estimate their rival's capabilities on weapons of mass destruction and failing to trust or seek out external counsel or intelligence
5. Framed and portrayed their views, goals, and the invasion in a way that supported their position and overall preference, while discounting competing assessments and descriptions
6. Rejected the advice of those who did not share the same worldview as the majority of the group, for example

Secretary of State Colin Powell, leading to a near unanimous group recommendation to attack Iraq

A review of these classic symptoms of groupthink that were present in the Iraq invasion decision makes it clear that the groupthink dynamic of the decision-making unit was a contributor to the faulty policy planning that characterized the invasion and early war years.

The Surge: The Con-Div Group Dynamic

Beginning in 2006, the administration began discussing a possible troop surge in Iraq to stem the rampant violence that was quickly leading Iraq down the path to civil war. During this period, the decision-making processes inside and outside Washington became much more balanced, careful, and comprehensive, perhaps due to the lessons learned from the calamitous first three years of the war.

The so-called surge in Iraq, often referred to as a New Way Forward in Iraq, was a reinforcement of U.S. forces by thirty thousand troops that began in spring 2007 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2008). President Bush announced the surge in January 2007 during a television speech in which he outlined the U.S. strategy in Iraq and articulated the goals of the surge and its key objectives:

> America will change our strategy to help the Iraqis carry out their campaign to put down sectarian violence and bring security to the people of Baghdad. This will require increasing American force levels. So I have committed more than 20,000 additional American troops to Iraq. The vast majority of them—five brigades—will be deployed to Baghdad. These troops will work alongside Iraqi units and be embedded in their formations. Our troops will have a well-defined mission: to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs. . . . A successful strategy for Iraq goes beyond military operations. Ordinary Iraqi citizens must see that military operations are accompanied by visible improvements in their neighborhoods and communities. So America will hold the Iraqi government to the benchmarks it has announced. ("Transcript of President Bush's Speech," 2007)

Some saw the surge as a dramatic policy change from that of a small footprint to a more public embrace of the counterinsurgency strategy championed by General Petraeus. However, others claimed that it was simply a continuation of the path-dependent, U.S. strategy in Iraq. These opposing voices claimed that the administration had no clear exit strategy from the war. Whereas the military campaign at the beginning of the war was successful, once the United States actually invaded Iraq and became embroiled in the war, with all the sunk costs incurred in terms of casualties, money, and reputation, this led to a path-dependence process to stay the course in Iraq, a process that was extremely difficult to reverse. This often led to post hoc rationalization of the invasion, its causes

and explanations. Not surprisingly, considerable debate preceded the surge decision in 2006–2007.

Unlike in the preinvasion period, however, the administration's decision makers strongly benefited from the diverse and conflicting points of view regarding the best strategy for moving forward with the Iraq war. The administration took into account various viewpoints when considering the surge, such as the one presented by the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, which recommended a steady reduction in troop levels (Baker and Hamilton, 2006). Nancy Pelosi, Speaker-elect of the U.S. House, also very publicly opposed the surge proposal in an article entitled "Bringing the War to an End Is My Highest Priority as Speaker" (Pelosi, 2006). Following the 2006 U.S. midterm elections when the Republicans lost control of the House and Senate, a Heritage Foundation conference chaired by Republican whip Roy Blunt (R. Missouri) under the title "The New Way Forward: Refocusing the Conservative Agenda" (Blunt, 2006) supported a surge in U.S. forces in Iraq, albeit not exactly in the way in which it was ultimately carried out.

President Bush recognized these many conflicting viewpoints in his speech, claiming that "many are concerned that the Iraqis are becoming too dependent on the United States and, therefore, our policy should focus on protecting Iraq's borders and hunting down Al Qaida. Their solution is to scale back America's efforts in Baghdad or announce the phased withdrawal of our combat forces. . . . *We carefully considered these proposals* . And we concluded that to step back now would force a collapse of the Iraqi government, tear that country apart, and result in mass killings on an unimaginable scale" ("Transcript of President Bush's Speech," 2007, emphasis added).

Thus, the decision on the surge exhibited strong characteristics of a quality (balanced) decision that took into account the views of many players: experts; think tanks; opposing groups (e.g., Democrats in Congress); policy groups such as the ten-person bipartisan Iraq Study Group; military leaders; Senator John McCain (R. Arizona), a strong advocate of the surge; the Iraqi government; and many others.

The surge decision was not rushed or conducted with shortcuts concerning information review and assessment of policy alternatives. In fact, President Bush waited for three other studies, conducted at the Pentagon, State Department, and National Security Council, before making the decision. The president echoed this idea, claiming, "My national security team, military commanders and diplomats conducted a comprehensive review. We consulted members of Congress from both parties, allies abroad, and distinguished outside experts. We benefited from the thoughtful recommendations of the Iraq Study Group. . . . In our discussions, we all agreed that there is no magic formula for success in Iraq. And one message came through loud and clear: Failure in Iraq would be a disaster for the United States" ("Transcript of President Bush's Speech," 2007).

Overall, the surge has been largely credited as a success by many experts, as evidenced by a *New York Times* report that claims "the surge, clearly, has worked, at least for now . . . The result, now visible in the streets, is a calm unlike any the country has seen since the American invasion" (Filkins, 2008). Clearly, the balanced con-div group dynamic of President Bush and his national security team at the time benefited the decision-making process, leading to a carefully considered policy review process. Despite this, many have continued to criticize the surge for the

damage it brought to Iraq and for not ending the war sooner and more decisively.

The Withdrawal from Iraq: A Polythink Process

The withdrawal from Iraq, unlike the early periods of the war and the surge, was characterized by polythink. There was a plurality of views and opinions on this critical decision. There was also divergence of policy opinions on the speed and character of the withdrawal process. However, the decision to withdraw from Iraq is also an example of a polythink dynamic that was, relatively speaking, effectively managed and controlled by the president, and it largely resulted in productive decision-making processes. In the following we will review the many symptoms of Polythink present in the Iraq troop withdrawal.

Group Conflict: Infighting, Turf Wars, and the Fear of Leaks.

Internal group conflict often results from polythink decisions. The many competing viewpoints, interpretations of the situation at hand, and potential courses of action available are all hotly debated among group members, which increase the likelihood of destructive group conflict and chronic disagreement, particularly if this process is not effectively managed by the leader. This divisive conflict in turn impedes optimal decision making. Group conflict retards the ability of group members to overcome personal animosity, concede refuted ideas, and successfully collaborate in developing optimal policies. In this way, group conflict both causes and is caused by the polythink syndrome.

During the Obama administration, group conflict remained an important problem to be overcome. This was not due to

the ostracizing of one discordant group member or institution, as was done to Colin Powell in the Bush administration, but rather to the large plurality of viewpoints throughout the decision-making group regarding the Iraq troop drawdown. One foreign policy analyst goes as far as to claim that “a man who advertised himself as ‘No Drama Obama’, in reality . . . presides over an administration pulsing with internecine conflict and policy disarray” (Karl, 2012). While Obama’s administration was not necessarily as fractious as this comment suggests, many battles did indeed take place between Obama’s inner circle of political staffers and his military advisors. [3] For example, the deputy assistant to the president, Mark Lippert, was forced out of his position amid internal friction with the national security advisor, General James Jones. Jones had accused Lippert of “leaking negative stories about him” that were eventually reported in Bob Woodward’s book *Obama’s Wars* (2010).

General Stanley McChrystal’s famed *Rolling Stone* interview demonstrates this troubled relationship among Obama’s various advisors, each representing different agencies and interests. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mike Mullen, was also concerned with the positions of many advisors who were not in favor of maintaining a residual force in Iraq after the end of combat operations (Hastings, 2010). He voiced his concerns in a confidential letter to Thomas Donilon, head of the National Security Administration that upset many of Obama’s political advisors who felt that the military was boxing in the White House and creating a potential political liability if it leaked (Gordon and Trainor, 2012). Thus, the polythink atmosphere of the Obama administration, composed of Obama’s inner circle of political advisors, who were very against the war; Democratic holdovers from the Clinton administration, who were moderate in their advocacy for a

troop drawdown; and military leaders, who had previously served under George Bush's Republican administration and supported continuing the war effort, created ample ground for intergroup conflict that at least partially impeded the close cooperation necessary to ensure not just a stable drawdown of troops but also a lasting plan for ensuring the survival of Iraq's fledgling democracy.

Lack of Communication and Confusion.

A lack of communication and subsequent confusion within the decision-making apparatus often relates directly back to the polythink phenomenon; the large, heterogeneous group of policymakers and advisors who compose the federal security and defense apparatus can naturally lead to interagency competition and concerns regarding security leaks and subsequently heightened bureaucratic issues of access to information. This issue is particularly problematic in situations of group conflict within the decision unit.

In the Obama administration during the 2009–2011 withdrawal from Iraq, communication between agencies was much stronger than during the early Bush years, largely due to the bureaucratic changes implemented following the interagency communication failures of 9/11. However, communication between civilian advisors and the military remained problematic. This confusion and lack of communication between the channels was not due to simple bureaucratic challenges or a lack of technological ability. Rather, it was the result of completely conflicting worldviews that at times built a wall between the two groups of advisors. For example, Obama and his close political advisors generally saw America's involvement in Iraq as a potential mine field rather than an opportunity and thus sought to chart a way out of Iraq as quickly as possible, a view that was at odds with many military

commanders' desire to preserve hard-fought gains in the field (Gordon and Trainor, 2012).

The reasons for these institutional battles may have their root in Graham Allison's (1971) famed observation that "where you stand depends on where you sit." Thus, members of the military have their own institutional goals and agendas that may not meld well with the goals and agendas of political advisors or White House staff. Institutional considerations therefore often exacerbate polythink in the decision-making processes of the federal government. This problem is particularly pronounced when the decision group is made up of representatives of various agencies; each representative feels that he or she needs to staunchly defend the interests, perspectives, and worldview of his or her respective agency and therefore may make more extreme policy recommendations than if he or she were not acting as an official representative of his or her respective group.

In the withdrawal from Iraq, these institutional considerations clearly contributed to the communication barriers and growing sense of policy confusion regarding the plans for the troop withdrawal. What's more, communication with the Iraqi government, a key player in the ultimate decision surrounding a U.S. troop presence in Iraq, still remained incredibly problematic. This symptom of interstate polythink was a critical factor in the Obama administration's failure to secure a second Status of Forces Agreement that would have enabled a small contingent of U.S. troops to remain in Iraq following the 2011 withdrawal. For example, whereas President Bush held a weekly teleconference with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, President Obama spoke to Maliki only a handful of times during his entire first term in office. This greatly hampered communication between the two sides at a very sensitive period.

Moreover, in their negotiations with the Iraqis, Kenneth Pollack (2011) explains, the Obama administration often "negotiated against themselves more than it negotiated with the Iraqis," demonstrating the competing viewpoints and perspectives within the administration itself. This confusion and lack of communication within and between the American and Iraqi administrations severely hampered efforts to work out a long-term solution to the issue of U.S. troop levels in Iraq that would have enabled a sustained U.S. presence to support Iraq's democracy and temper the influence of Iran over the long-term.

Limited Review of Alternatives, Objectives, Risks, and Contingencies.

As in groupthink, polythink can also contribute to a limited review of alternatives, as there is typically lack of consensus among group members concerning which options will enter the choice set. In order to reduce prolonged and potentially costly and divisive debate, decision makers may preemptively limit the choice sets under discussion. This effort to act quickly and decisively while still considering a diverse range of policy options is a central challenge of decision-making units characterized by polythink.

This dilemma is clearly demonstrated in the Obama administration's decision-making processes surrounding the Iraq troop withdrawal. Almost immediately after President Obama was elected on a campaign promise to bring troops home from Iraq, a debate began between key decision makers within the national security apparatus regarding the alternatives, objectives, and risks moving forward in Iraq. However, this debate was mainly limited to the speed of the withdrawal, rather than the overall wisdom of the withdrawal. On the one hand, the Iraq Study Group advocated that U.S. troops be shifted from combat to

training and that combat troops be withdrawn from Iraq over a relatively short period of time. Obama and his political advisors had also made a campaign promise that all troops would leave Iraq within sixteen months. In contrast, the military, including Iraq commander Ray Odierno, generally advocated a withdrawal plan of twenty-three months, stressing the importance of not withdrawing many troops in the early months, before the Iraqi elections scheduled for January 2010—much longer than Obama's campaign promise.

To bridge this divide, Defense Secretary Robert Gates advocated a nineteen-month timetable that would enable the White House to say that the combat mission in Iraq had come to a close at the politically opportune moment—right before the midterm elections (Gordon and Trainor, 2012). What's more, Obama would specify a date for ending the American "combat mission" in Iraq, but would not remove all of the brigades at that point; those that remained would simply be renamed "advise-and-assist units" (Gordon and Trainor, 2012). This plan enabled Obama to keep his campaign promise while also incorporating advice from the military and is also a key example of lowest-common-denominator decision making.

Failure to Reappraise Previously Rejected Alternatives.

Another important consequence of polythink in decision-making processes is the permanent removal of key options from the table. Because arriving at consensus is so arduous when there is such a large plurality of conflicting perspectives and policy prescriptions, decision makers are often reluctant to reopen discussion on a previously rejected alternative, for fear of near endless debate on a potentially time-sensitive decision. Combined with the already limited review of alternatives caused by polythink,

this means that alternatives that were not given a full airing at the outset will most likely not return to the table to be reconsidered later.

The Obama administration's very public, steadfast commitment to the policy of speedily withdrawing from Iraq was never fully reconsidered: the administration maintained its pledge to draw down troop forces and shift resources to domestic concerns and the war in Afghanistan. Though this policy was perhaps warranted, the administration's singular focus on withdrawal did hamper U.S. efforts to ensure political stability in addition to security in Iraq. By publicly signaling a pivot toward Afghanistan, domestic concerns, or even the Far East, many felt that the administration had taken irreversible steps that sent Iraq "beyond America's influence" (Pollack, 2011). According to Iraq expert Kenneth Pollack in his testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, "There is no turning back the clock, even if Washington suddenly had a change of heart. The decisions that have been made are now virtually set in stone. There will not be a significant American military presence in Iraq in the future. That train has left the station and it cannot be recalled or reboarded at some later stop" (Pollack, 2011).

Thus, the government's public commitment to one course of action, troop drawdown, hindered U.S. goals of providing long-term political stability and security in Iraq, a major criticism levied by the president's political opponents. However, in contrast to the Bush administration, the Obama administration did reconsider many of the specific details of its war plans, particularly its sixteen-month troop drawdown policy in Iraq, limiting this negative aspect of polythink to some extent.

Biased Information Processing: Selective Use and Framing.

Policymakers and elite decision makers inherently have strong time constraints placed on them by the sheer enormity of pressing political issues they are tasked with addressing. In situations of polythink, decision makers are bombarded with information and intelligence from a variety of individuals and organizations suggesting seemingly innumerable and perhaps even contradictory policy prescriptions. This combination of severe time constraints and near unlimited wells of information can cause decision makers to selectively process information, relying on heuristics and personal predispositions in order to make crucial decisions about, for example, war and national security.

Although this wealth of information and analysis was indeed voraciously, and less selectively, consumed by both administrations in the later years of the war, the availability of information and intelligence remained a stubborn key problem, particularly as the number of forces in Iraq shrunk from 2009 onward. Political scientist Michael Gordon explains how a key consequence of the military's departure from Iraq was that the United States had a vastly diminished capacity to monitor violent incidents in a critically strategic country, undermining claims that violence had diminished (Gordon and Trainor, 2012). Indeed, an analysis conducted by Michael Knights at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy has shown that Iraqi-on-Iraqi violence has increased in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal:

> Analysis of general incident levels across the country is a better means of tracking these trends, but it is precisely this kind of data that the U.S. government no longer receives due to its military disengagement in Iraq. In effect, the U.S. government is slowly going blind in Iraq due to the military drawdown and the U.S. embassy's inability to get out and about. According to Washington Institute for Near East Policy metrics derived from ongoing security-liaison relationships in Iraq, there were 561 reported attacks in January 2012, an increase from the 494 in December 2011 and well above the 302 incidents in November. (Knights, 2012)

Polythink often also results in the development of competing frames to present the same issues, clearly demonstrated by the Bush and Obama administrations' fundamentally different framing of the Iraq war. It is safe to say that while the Bush administration focused on the potential benefits of nation building in Iraq for the spread of democracy in the Arab world, President Obama introduced a loss aversion framework that portrayed the decision to continue the war as a potential loss on numerous dimensions (e.g., economic, reputation costs, and loss of life).

However, even within the Obama administration, the decision to end the war was framed in several ways. Instead of talking about a lack of success in establishing democracy in Iraq and about the numerous casualties of the war, or even the growing influence of Iran in Iraq, the administration often framed the decision to exit the war as an economic decision and as a fear of overstretching U.S. commitments abroad. However, often the decision to exit Iraq was also framed as a redoubling of the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan: in order to do a better job in Afghanistan, we must withdraw from Iraq. Thus, both a thematic framing strategy and evaluative framing

mechanisms were advanced by the Obama administration, demonstrating the competing worldviews of the decision unit in shaping the withdrawal policy (Geva and Mintz, 1997).

Lowest-Common-Denominator Decisions and Decision Paralysis.

Finally, and perhaps most important, polythink can lead to paralysis of the decision-making unit, resulting in a failure to implement policy or the implementation of short-term satisficing policies for which approval can be gained. The postwar planning and withdrawal plans in Iraq are a key example of this phenomenon as the withdrawal plan was tailored to fit lowest-common-denominator compromises that could achieve the broadest coalition of support from the discordant national security, diplomatic, and political teams.

A key example of this type of satisficing decision making can be seen in the decisions on troop levels and withdrawal pace in the early stage of the Obama administration. In essence, there were two main plans on the table for withdrawing troops from Iraq: the twenty-three-month drawdown plan from the military that Obama had inherited and his sixteen-month campaign promise. The nineteen-month time line for troop withdrawals that was eventually chosen essentially “split the difference between the sixteen months he promised as a candidate and the twenty-three-month timeline favored by his commanders” rather than as the optimal military strategy” (Bruno, 2009). The search for balance between various viewpoints has characterized much of the Obama administration, and this “sometimes awkward attempt to accommodate both sides of the political spectrum, deemed insufficient by critics and infuriating by allies” has also included “his plans to

withdraw troops from Iraq and Afghanistan” (Parsons and Hennessey, 2012).

Summary: Managed Polythink in the Iraq Troop Withdrawal

To sum up, by reviewing these many key symptoms of polythink in the final stages of the Iraq war, we can clearly see in what ways polythink was detrimental to the decision-making process and in what ways President Obama successfully managed to benefit from polythink in the decision-making process.

And indeed, these many concerns and problems notwithstanding, the decision-making process surrounding the withdrawal succeeded in managing many aspects of these polythink symptoms so that the diversity of policy opinions and viewpoints could contribute to positive decision making. While there was an important and helpful divergence of opinions on the exact details of the time frame of the drawdown (a dynamic we term *productive polythink*), the decision-making unit was unified in its goal of ending the Iraq war in order to turn its attention to the still-struggling war in Afghanistan. Even Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, the “once-ardent opponent of a firm departure date from Iraq,” announced in 2008 that a bridge had been crossed” and the “debate in Iraq was no longer over when to leave, but rather how to do this in a responsible way” (Bruno, 2009).

CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The Iraq war has been the most divisive US military conflict since the Vietnam War. With an estimated 110,991 to 121,182 Iraqis (Iraq Body Count, 2013) and 4,485

Americans killed (News Research Center Iraq War Casualties Database, 2009), and at a cost of more than $800 billion (an astounding 3,000 dollars per second) as of 2011 (Francis, 2011), the costs of this conflict in blood and treasure have been immense. They underscore the critical importance of understanding and optimizing foreign policy decision-making processes before, during, and after the conflict.

This chapter analyzed three such decision-making processes in Iraq: the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, the surge of 2007, and the decision to end the war in 2011–2012. The chapter demonstrates the ways in which these decisions characterized a dynamic (and often suboptimal) group decision-making process ranging from groupthink in the decision to invade Iraq, to the con-div balanced decision on the surge, to the polythink decision on exiting the war.

The concept of polythink is also relevant to the current developments in Iraq. Due to the multireligious, multiethnic makeup of Iraq and competition among rival groups for power, a newly elected Iraqi government is likely to exhibit more symptoms of polythink than of groupthink. The concept of polythink has broad theoretical and policy applications for many countries and can serve, with further development, as a useful tool to help explain and predict conflict processes and outcomes.

Remedies to Polythink

The key to overcoming polythink and groupthink lies in the concept of the decision unit. Decisions are shaped and influenced by the composition of the decision unit. As such, executives in business, politics, public policy, foreign policy, national security decision making, and other domains need to carefully compose the decision unit. Among the

recommendations we provide is to focus on the decision unit architecture or engineering in forming advisory units to the president and other executives. In other words, policymakers should try to think in advance of the policies and solutions they want to achieve and build the decision unit accordingly, preferably in a con-div mode, where there are divergent perspectives among group members but a general consensus on policy goals and overall worldviews. One example of decision unit engineering can be found in the deliberate construction of President Obama's second-term team. The advisory group of this second Obama administration seems to be more unified in its worldviews and conception and limitation of American military power than the more diverse "team of rivals" group in Obama's first term (Ignatius, 2013). Many analysts view this as a deliberate move on Obama's part, a result of the discord he faced in his first term in office among his cabinet members. This is likely to have implications for U.S. foreign policy and national security decisions.

Another method of countering unbalanced decision-making units is through the use of analytical tools including a decision support system such as the decision board system (Mintz et al., 1997). The use of an objective, computerized system may be one way of assisting the president to avoid polythink and groupthink in his decision unit for the following reasons:

- It displays a wide range of policy alternatives, including those that the president may not ultimately use and policy alternatives that can be viewed as representing new ideas.
- It lists a large set of criteria for selecting the right policy for the president. The human mind cannot comprehend and calculate so many dimensions of a decision without

a computerized system that aids policymakers in formulating their decisions.

- It enables the president and his advisors to do if-then analysis, based on various assumptions and scenarios.
- It leads to a careful evaluation of alternatives and dimensions in a comprehensive and systematic way, thus overcoming many of the biases in information processing, group dynamics, and individual decision making. It can also assist policymakers in organizing alternatives in a clearer, more controlled manner.

For example, the use of a decision support system for President Obama on the Iran nuclear issue may help the president determine policy options even in the dynamic and chaotic environment of the Middle East.

Polythink, Groupthink, and the Con-Div Dynamic in Conflict Management Processes

When applied to conflict management and conflict resolution, one can expect polythink, groupthink, and the con-div processes to affect conflict initiation decisions, conflict escalation or deescalation decisions, and conflict termination decisions as a function of the group decision-making composition and dynamic. For example, the neo-con group that dominated the Bush administration in the lead-up to the Iraq war may have made very different policy choices than a more diverse group would have made. The challenge for the policymaker is to build a decision unit that reflects various opinions in a balanced way. In cases of polythink in an advisory group, the policymaker should strive to leverage the plurality of inputs into a successful and balanced conflict management and resolution decision.

We have focused on the effect of polythink on conflict management and resolution. Our analysis has several

policy implications:

- The composition of the decision unit making war and peace decisions and the group dynamic affects the ultimate choice.
- Decision units can exhibit groupthink, polythink and various con-div configurations.
- Whereas sunk costs affect most national security and foreign policy decision, leaders should avoid falling into a path-dependence trap that is likely to lead them to decisions that are then difficult to reverse. Many foreign policy conflicts are a result of following such path-dependence processes.
- Polythink can be beneficial to leaders who can successfully manage and use the plurality of views as important input into decision making. It can even unfreeze the close-mindedness of group members.
- Groupthink can lead to defective, shortsighted decisions, as evident by the problematic planning of postwar Iraq in the administration. Another characteristic of groupthink that was evident in the decision to enter the war was the failure to consider the complexity of the adversary and its multifaceted composition, including tribal and religious factions.
- Polythink can have a negative effect on long-term planning in war and in peace, as conflicting opinions within the decision unit and advisory group lead to some satisficing incremental decisions rather than to carefully planned long-term objectives. This can impede long-term policy planning and policy implementation.

We showed that the polythink, groupthink, and con-div processes have wide-ranging implications for war initiation decisions, escalation, and termination decisions. The

composition of the decision unit making war and peace decisions and the group dynamics within this unit affect the choices it makes. Understanding these dynamics is key to understanding, predicting, and improving national security and foreign policy decisions.

Notes

1 . Consider, for example, the effect of polythink, groupthink, and con-div on budgetary decisions at the local, state, or federal level. It is clear that such group processes affect the ultimate choice and allocation and distribution of resources, for example, to national security versus social programs—what is known as the guns-and-butter dilemma in budgeting.

2 . Indeed, there has been much research on the important role of higher levels of integrative complexity (an iterative process of divergent and convergent thinking) on constructive decision making by political leaders (see Suedfeld, Tetlock, and Ramirez, 1977). In the War on Terrorism project, Suedfeld and colleagues expand on previous work (see Suedfeld and Leighton, 2002) seeking to analyze changes in the integrative complexity of world leaders prior to 9/11 and up until the end of the Iraq war. Specifically, the authors examined the integrative complexity of world leaders during the war on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the war on the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq and U.S leaders during the broader War on Terrorism.

3 . This group conflict is perhaps best represented in the high turnover of staff in the Obama administration. By the end of Obama’s third year in office, only one of the top eight officials in the government’s foreign policy apparatus was in the same job as at the start of the administration: Hillary Clinton (Mann, 2012).

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PART THREE
PERSONAL DIFFERENCES

CHAPTER FIFTEEN
NATURAL-BORN PEACEMAKERS?
Gender and the Resolution of Conflict

Mara Olekalns

Two males sit apart, staring at each other from the corners of their eyes. A female approaches one, takes him by the arm, and pulls him toward the other male. She alternates between the two and eventually brokers peace. In a different scenario, two males are again in conflict. A third male inserts himself between them, screaming at them or physically separating them to prevent the conflict from escalating. He keeps them separate and harangues them into submission (de Waal, 2009). Female as peacemaker, male as peacekeeper. These examples fit with our intuitions about how gender might shape the way that conflicts are resolved. Women, with their stronger emphasis on preserving social harmony, choose less confrontational strategies than men do. Men, with their stronger emphasis on autonomy and status, choose more assertive strategies than women do. What is intriguing about the opening examples is that they describe the resolution of social conflicts by chimpanzees.

In this chapter, I explore whether the gender differences that Franz de Waal observes in his chimpanzee colonies are paralleled in our human world. Is there evidence that women and men approach conflicts differently, and with what consequences? Two theoretical frameworks, summarized in figure 15.1 , suggest that we should anticipate gender-based differences in conflict resolution. They represent the two sides of the gender coin. Relational self-construal theory, which proposes that women and men think about their relationships with others differently,

underpins predictions about how women and men will behave. Social role theory, which proposes that we hold different expectations of how women and men should behave, underpins predictions about how we react to gender-role-congruent and -incongruent behaviors.




Figure 15.1 Gender-Based Differences in Self-Construal and Social Role Expectations

The first framework invokes relational self-construal, differentiating between interdependent self-construals, in which individuals recognize that they rely on the actions of others to achieve their goals, and independent self-construals, in which individuals see themselves as standing apart from others. Women are thought to hold more interdependent self-construals and, as a consequence, are more focused on preserving relationships with others. Men are thought to hold more independent self-construals that lead to a greater emphasis on the transactional aspects of negotiation and, as a consequence, are more focused on maximizing individual outcomes (Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishii, and O'Brien, 2006; Gray, 1994). The different relational self-construals held by women and men predict different approaches to conflict resolution and negotiation. The greater communality and other-concern attributed to women implies that they will favor strategies that protect and preserve their relationships. The greater agency and self-concern attributed to men implies that they will favor strategies that protect and boost their personal outcomes.

The second framework invokes social roles (Stuhlmacher and Linnabery, 2013). Social roles contain a set of behavioral expectations for how individuals do and should behave: they are both descriptive (what women and men do) and prescriptive (what women and men should do). These prescriptive stereotypes convey the expectation that women should be more communal than men, displaying characteristics such as warmth and other-concern, whereas men should be more agentic than women, displaying characteristics such as ambition and self-reliance (Rudman and Phelan, 2008). This framework, which identifies the standards against which women's and men's strategies will be evaluated, gives us some insight into the consequences for women who violate role expectations. To negotiate effectively, women need to enact agentic behaviors that

clearly violate prescriptive gender stereotypes (Kray and Thompson, 2005). Because these violations are experienced as negative (worse than expected), women incur social costs. When men negotiate, they do not violate prescriptive stereotypes because they are expected to act agentically. Should they decide to enact a more collaborative negotiation style, they get a boost to their social outcomes because they have a created a positive violation, that is, better-than-expected behaviors (Kulik and Olekalns, 2012).

Although sex and gender are closely intertwined, they are distinct constructs. *Sex* refers to our biological makeup, and our classification as female or male is often based on our observable external characteristics. *Gender* captures the sociocultural expectations that follow from differences in our biological makeup.

Both relational self-construal and social role theory reflect societal beliefs about how women and men will, and should, behave. The different self-construals held by women and men, and the gender-based expectations held of women and men, reflect the gender roles that have developed within specific societies. These sociocultural expectations follow from our physical makeup, based on the activities that women and men perform. The division of labor between women and men, based on their biological sex, thus informs gender role expectations (Wood and Eagly, 2010). In conflict and negotiation research, although researchers derive their hypotheses from gender role theory, they typically use biological sex to signify gender.

RESOLVING CONFLICTS

The most common measure of conflict styles is the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Style Inventory. Variations on this scale are provided by the Blake and Mouton Grid and by Rahim's Conflict Style Inventory. Common among these scales is

their placement of conflict resolution styles in a two-dimensional space in which one dimension assesses concern for self and one dimension assesses concern for other. This two-dimensional typology yields four conflict resolution styles: avoiding (low other-concern, low self-concern), accommodating (high other-concern, low self-concern), competing (low-other concern, high self-concern), and collaborating (high on both other- and self-concern).

Choosing a Conflict Resolution Strategy

Several studies, using a range of self-report instruments, establish that women favor more communal, relationship-oriented strategies than men do. Women endorse collaborating (Brahnam, Margavio, Hignite, Barrier, and Chin, 2005) and compromising (Holt and DeVore, 2005) more strongly than men do. They favor constructive rather than destructive approaches to conflict resolution (Davis, Capobianco, and Kraus, 2010). Conversely, men favor more agentic, self-oriented strategies than women do. Not only do they score more highly on competing than women do (Brahnam et al., 2005; Thomas and Thomas, 2008), but they are also more likely to use destructive rather than constructive approaches to conflict resolution (Holt and DeVore, 2005). In organizations, managers and peers (but not subordinates) report males as expressing more anger than females do (Davis et al., 2012). Although each of these studies used a different measure, jointly they are consistent with the intuition that women and men favor gender-congruent conflict management styles. The outlier is men's preference for avoidance as well as competing (Brahnam et al., 2005), a preference that fits with a classic fight (compete) or flight (avoid) behavioral pattern.

The same preference for gender-congruent behaviors is also apparent in how disputants in mediation and mediators resolve conflict. Again, women favor more

conciliatory, other-oriented strategies than men do. Two studies investigated how female and male disputants behave during mediation. In their analysis of thirty Israeli couples in divorce mediations, Pines, Gat, and Tal (2002) found that men adopt a more rights-based approach than women do, relying on legal precedent and rational argument to justify their claims. In comparison, women focus more on the relational aspects of the situation, stressing their contribution to and sacrifice within the relationship as a means for justifying their claims.

Further insight into the role that gender plays in divorce mediations is provided by Olekalns, Brett, and Donohue (2010). Using a word count program to analyze communication, these authors showed that whether mediations ended in agreement was more strongly influenced by what wives said than by what husbands said. Mediations were successful when wives avoided blaming in the first quarter of the mediation (using *I* more than *you*). Mediations were also successful when husbands converged to wives' high levels of positive emotion but were unsuccessful when husbands converged to wives' low levels of positive emotion.

On the other side of the mediation table, gender affects mediators' style. Differentiating between an instrumental, problem-solving mediation style and a transformative style focused on enhancing communication between disputants, two differences emerge. Female mediators are more likely than male mediators to endorse a transformative style, and they are also more likely than male mediators to endorse process-focused interventions. Conversely, male mediators are more likely to endorse directive actions (Nelson, Zarankin, and Ben-Ari, 2010).

Evaluating and Adapting Conflict Resolution Style

The different expectations conveyed by female and male social roles imply that the same conflict resolution strategies, when used by women and men, may elicit different reactions. Consistent with this proposition, recent research shows that mediators' gender is critical to whether impartiality or empathy plays the greater role in establishing a mediator's trustworthiness. Whereas impartiality is a stronger predictor of trust in female mediators, empathy is a stronger predictor of trust in male negotiators (Stuhlmacher and Poitras, 2010), suggesting that disputants look for gender-incongruent cues to establish mediators' trustworthiness. This finding is consistent with negotiation research showing that women are given greater latitude to violate social role expectations when they are in other-advocacy roles than when they are in self-advocacy roles (Amanatullah and Tinsley, 2013).

The social role construct highlights the importance of context more generally in shaping how women and men resolve conflicts. It hints at the role others' characteristics, including gender, might play in shaping how individuals resolve conflicts. In short, who is involved in a conflict affects the relationship between gender and conflict style. Focusing on friendships and romantic relationships, Keener, Strough, and DiDonato (2012) found that in disputes with same-sex friends, both women and men were equally likely to use agentic strategies, but that women were more likely than men to use communal strategies. However, in disputes with romantic partners, women and men were equally likely to use communal strategies, but women were more likely than men to use agentic strategies. Focusing on organizational relationships, Davis et al. (2012) found that female managers' use of active destructive behaviors (winning, demeaning others, retaliating) was unaffected by subordinates' gender. Male managers used fewer of these active destructive strategies

in their interactions with female subordinates than in their interactions with male subordinates.

Jointly, these findings show that both women and men tailor their conflict resolution style to the social context. An interesting implication of these two studies, and one that is ripe for further research, is that whereas women are more likely to adapt their strategies in a social context (friends, romantic partners), men are more likely to adapt their strategies in a professional context.

Summary

Three key findings emerge from research on conflict resolution styles. The first is that, consistent with the different self-construals attributed to women and men, women favor more communal and process-oriented conflict resolution styles, whereas men favor more agentic and task-oriented conflict resolution styles. The second key finding is that, consistent with social role analyses, the actions of women and men are evaluated differently: whereas female mediators gain trust through demonstrating impartiality, male mediators gain trust through empathy. The third key finding is that social context plays an important role in how women and men resolve conflicts. Studies to date suggest that women are more likely to take into consideration who they are in conflict with in social relationships, whereas men are more likely to take into consideration who they are in conflict with in professional relationships.

NEGOTIATING CONTRACTS

The persistence of the gender wage gap has motivated researchers to return to the question of whether the poorer economic outcomes of women can be attributed to differences in how women and men negotiate. Research

over the past decade has shown that gender affects negotiations in more complex ways than by directing women to a more accommodating strategy and men to a more a competitive strategy. Instead, gender has impacts at several points in a negotiation (Babcock and Laschever, 2003).

It is clear that in terms of economic outcomes, men outperform women. Recent research adds to past meta-analyses (Stuhlmacher and Walters, 1999; Walters, Stuhlmacher, and Meyer, 1998), establishing that women are less willing to negotiate and consequently less likely to obtain promotions, that they perform more poorly in salary negotiations, and that when they negotiate with other women, they are less effective at value creation than men are (Crothers, Hughes, Schmitt, Theodore, Lipinski, and Bloomquist, 2010; Curhan, Neale, Ross, and Rosencranz-Engelmann, 2008; Greig, 2010; Miles and LaSalle, 2009). Although it is easy to attribute these differences in economic outcomes to differences in the negotiating styles of women and men, the evidence supporting this assumption is far from clear: Walters, Stuhlmacher, and Meyer's (1998) meta-analysis showed that only 1 percent of the difference in women's and men's preference for competitive strategies can be attributed to gender. If there are differences in the economic outcomes of women and men, it is not because women are less competitive than men. This observation has highlighted the importance of understanding not just what women do but when and where they do it (Sondak and Stuhlmacher, 2009).

Self-Construal and Negotiation

Although women and men do not differ in their willingness to act competitively in their negotiations, how they plan for and approach a negotiation is underpinned by their different self-construals. The first point of difference is in

the opening and closing moments of a negotiation. At both times, women make choices that are more consistent with a communal representation of relationships, whereas men make choices that are more consistent with an agentic representation of relationships. A recent study showed that whereas 42 percent of men are willing to initiate a negotiation, only 28 percent of women are willing to do so (Eriksson and Sandberg, 2012). Given this greater reluctance to negotiate, it is unsurprising that women are more likely than men to accept the first offer that they receive and to express more relief than men at having their first offers accepted (Kray and Gelfand, 2009).

Women and men also differ in the opening offers that they make and elicit from their opponents. Opening offers play a critical role in determining negotiators' outcomes because they anchor the negotiation. Negotiators signal what is an acceptable outcome for them and also shape their opponents' expectations about what it takes to reach agreement through their opening offers. Higher opening offers predict better outcomes. Compared to men, woman make less extreme opening offers and make offers that are more favorable to their opponents (Eckel, de Oliviera, and Grossman, 2008; Miles, 2010). Underlying these different opening offers, we find different beliefs about entitlements: whereas men believe they are entitled to higher salaries than others, women believe they are entitled to the same salaries as others (Barron, 2003). The more egalitarian attitudes of women appear to create economic disadvantage (Curhan et al., 2008), and as women's relational concerns increase, so their economic outcomes worsen (Amantullah, Morris, and Curhan, 2008).

A second manifestation of women's greater relational concerns is their greater empathy (Pelligra, 2011) and their better perspective-taking ability (Horgan and Smith, 2006). There is mounting research evidence that the ability to step

into another negotiator's shoes improves outcomes: the better able negotiators are to incorporate the other party's interests into their proposals and to frame those proposals in a way that demonstrates the benefits to others, the better able they are to influence others (Maddux, Mullen and Galinsky, 2008). Because women are better than men at interpreting nonverbal behaviors (Horgan and Smith, 2006), they are likely to detect subtle cues that indicate the other party's reactions to proposals. This may explain why women perform better than men when they are able to see each other and maintain eye contact with their negotiating counterparts than when visual cues are absent (Swaab and Swaab, 2009). It may also account for why women are less likely than men to be influenced by e-mail and to behave in a more hostile manner in virtual negotiations (Guadagno and Cialdini, 2002, 2007; Katz, Amichai-Hamburger, Manisterski, and Kraus, 2008; Stuhlmacher, Citera, and Willis, 2007). These findings suggest that women become more self-protective when they are unable to read the other negotiator and that they obtain poorer outcomes as a result.

A third manifestation of women's greater relational concern is their attitude to the use of ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics. A recent meta-analysis of behavioral ethics suggests that women generally follow a more ethical path than men do (Kish-Gephart, Harrison, and Trevino, 2010; Kray and Haselhuhn, 2012). The broad trend is replicated in women's and men's attitudes to a range of ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics, including competitive behaviors, misrepresentation, making false promises, and faking positive and negative emotions. In each case, women rate these tactics as less acceptable than men do (Cohen, 2009; Kray and Haselhuhn, 2012; Ma and McLean Parks, 2012; Schweitzer and Gibson, 2008).

Social Roles and Negotiation

Social roles set the expectations that we hold of how women and men should behave. These prescriptive stereotypes, and their violations, appear to play a central role in women's economic and social outcomes (Kulik and Olekalns, 2012). It is therefore important to consider how the activation of male and female gender stereotypes affects negotiation outcomes. One line of research suggests that when women link effective negotiation to male-stereotyped behaviors, their performance deteriorates. When male gender stereotypes are implicitly activated, women are placed at a disadvantage. Men outperform women when effective negotiation is linked to male-typed behaviors such as assertiveness or when negotiation is described as diagnostic of ability (Kray, Thompson, and Galinsky, 2001; Kray, Galinsky, and Thompson, 2002). This effect is boosted when negotiators also have high power (Kray, Reb, Galinsky, and Thompson, 2004). Conversely, when effective negotiation is linked to feminine traits, women outperform men. These findings suggest that both men and women perform better when they believe that stereotype-congruent traits are predictive of success (Kray et al., 2002, 2004). When stereotypes are explicitly invoked, negotiators adopt stereotype-incongruent behaviors (Kray et al., 2001). When negotiators have high power, stereotype-incongruent behaviors are also triggered by the desire to make a positive impression: under these conditions, men are more likely to concede to others, whereas women are more likely to claim a greater share of resources (Curhan and Overbeck, 2008). Women may thus benefit from contextual cues that prime problem solving or explicitly prime gender stereotypes.

These findings, together with evidence that women do behave in a gender-congruent way in the opening and closing moments of negotiations, suggest that they are

more sensitive than men to the potential costs of violating social roles. This sensitivity is well justified because women who negotiate incur social penalties: the very act of initiating a negotiation results in women being perceived as less likable and more demanding (Amanatullah and Tinsley, 2013; Bowles, Babcock, and Lai, 2007). Consequently, at least the reluctance to initiate negotiations might be attributable to their anticipation of the social costs that they incur when they do negotiate (Greig, 2010).

The expectation that women are more concerned about preserving relationships may invite others to act exploitatively. Focusing on the use of deception, Kray, Kennedy, and Van Zant (2012) showed that women elicit more deception than men do. Moreover, recent research shows that women are less likely than men to retaliate against unfair behavior (Singer et al., 2006; Zak, Borja, Matzner, and Kurzban, 2005), suggesting that they are less likely to fight back in pursuit of economic outcomes. It is therefore unsurprising that although women are more trustworthy, they are less willing to trust others and are more attuned to the possibility of betrayal (Buchan, Croson, and Solnick, 2008; Hong and Bohnet, 2007; Maddux and Brewer, 2005). They are also more likely to base their actions on the perceived trustworthiness of others (Pelligra, 2011).

Social Roles and Context

The discussion of conflict styles identified the possibility that women and men may adapt their behavior to the social context within which conflicts occur. In negotiations, there is considerable evidence that women are more sensitive to context than men are. One benefit of this greater sensitivity is that they are better able to match the nonverbal and verbal behaviors of the other party, leading to better outcomes (Flynn and Ames, 2006; Maddux et al., 2008).

Research shows that women adjust their behavior in anticipation of others' reactions. Unlike men, women adjust their negotiating styles depending on whether they are negotiating for themselves or on behalf of others (Bowles, Babcock, and McGinn, 2005). Their level of assertiveness increases when they negotiate on behalf of others, resulting in better outcomes in other-advocacy negotiations (Amantullah and Morris, 2010). Finally, women are more likely to persist when male counterparts say no than when women counterparts say no. However, they change styles in order to continue the negotiation: consistent with women's greater propensity to mask their feelings, women express disappointment with their male counterparts indirectly through nonverbal cues (Bowles and Flynn, 2010).

Many of the negotiations studied in pursuit of gender differences focus on compensation issues (Stuhmacher and Walters, 1999). Compensation negotiations have been identified as a protoypically male domain, and so it is possible that women are doubly disadvantaged in compensation negotiations (Gray, 1994). Not only are they negotiating for themselves, they are also negotiating on a topic that may be seen as inappropriate for women. Two recent studies test the hypothesis that women may perform as well as or better than men when they negotiate about more gender-congruent issues. Bear (2011) focused on the relationship between the gender congruency of the issue under negotiation and the preference to avoid negotiating. She showed that women were more likely than men to avoid compensation negotiations. However, men were more likely than women to avoid negotiations about access to a lactation room. Extending this finding, Bear and Babcock (2012) showed that women outperform men when they negotiate about a female-typed topic (decorative beads for making lamp shades) but that men outperform women when they negotiate about a male-typed topic (halogen

headlights). These findings suggest that gender stereotypes define what is an appropriate negotiation for women and that the economic and social costs that women incur may be more evident when they violate stereotypes by negotiating male-typed issues.

Women are also sensitive to their opponent's gender. Eriksson and Sandberg (2012) show that women's willingness, but not men's willingness, to initiate negotiations is affected by their opponent's gender: women are more likely to initiate negotiations with men than with other women. Although this seems counterintuitive, women's reluctance to persist in their negotiations with other women may have some merit. Research shows that women are most frustrated by conflicts with other women, more likely to compete and retaliate when negotiating with other women, and least cooperative in response to other women (Scharlemann, Eckel, Kacelnik, and Wilson, 2001; Schroth, Bain-Chekal, and Caldwell, 2005; Sutter, Bosman, Kocher, and van Winden, 2009). More recent research shows that women incur the greatest loss of trust when they enact a competitive strategy in negotiations with other women (Olekalns, Kulik, and Simonov, 2010). This pattern of behavior casts the finding that two female negotiators obtain poorer economic outcomes than two male negotiators in a new light, suggesting it may be the result of escalating competitiveness and relational damage rather than women's greater willingness to accommodate other female negotiators.

Finally, in an investigation of deception in negotiation, Olekalns, Kulik, and Chew (in press) showed that deception was lowest in all-female dyads and highest in male-female dyads. However, negotiating style and opponents' trustworthiness modified this basic pattern. Olekalns et al. (in press) reported that in male-female dyads, deception consistently increased when untrustworthy opponents used

an accommodating strategy. In all-female dyads, the decision to deceive an opponent was more complex. Of particular note was that whereas low trust encouraged women to withhold information when their female opponents competed, high trust encouraged women to misrepresent information when their female opponents accommodated.

Summary

The key findings in negotiation research parallel those from the dispute resolution literature. First, there is evidence that women and men manage several aspects of negotiation differently and in ways that reflect their different self-construals. Women are more likely than men to avoid negotiations, they ask for less than men do, and they end negotiations as quickly as possible by accepting the first offer. They also display greater empathy and better perspective-taking skills. As a result, they perform better in face-to-face situations where they can read the other negotiator than in electronic negotiations where this is not possible.

Second, there is evidence that social roles affect how negotiations unfold. An intriguing set of findings shows that women perform poorly only when male-stereotyped behaviors are linked to negotiation success; they outperform men when they believe that female-stereotyped behaviors are the key to negotiation success. A more readily predicted set of findings shows that women incur social costs when they initiate negotiations and that the anticipation of these social costs underpins their reluctance to negotiate. Finally, the anticipation that women place greater emphasis on preserving relationships appears to invite exploitation: unfair offers and more deception.

Third, the broader social context affects how negotiations develop. Paralleling the finding that women are more successful when female-stereotyped traits are linked to effective negotiations, they are also more successful when negotiating about female-typed topics. Women also adapt their actions based on an opponent's gender: women are less likely to initiate negotiations with other women, report greater frustration when negotiating with other women, and evaluate stereotype violations by female opponents more harshly than men do. Finally, in their decisions to deceive an opponent, women are more sensitive than men to social cues: an opponent's trustworthiness, gender, and negotiating style.

NEGOTIATING BOUNDARIES

Women's employment negotiations dominate the research on gender differences in negotiation. Yet these contract negotiations, despite their considerable economic impact, form only a small part of the negotiations that women and men engage in. Employment contract negotiations occur at quite distinct and constrained points in individuals' careers: at organizational entry, on promotion or role change, or following a move to a new employer. In between these career moments, individuals negotiate almost daily. While many of these negotiations take place within their organizations, an equal number occur outside organizations in the day-to-day lives of men and women. It is surprising that these day-to-day negotiations receive relatively little attention (see Stuhlmacher and Linabery, 2013, for a review of work-life negotiations).

One obvious area for negotiation is in the division of household tasks. Paralleling women's general reluctance to negotiate, Mannino and Deutsch (2007) report that even though wives are typically dissatisfied with the division of

household tasks, they are also reluctant to renegotiate that division of labor. Thebaud (2010), using International Social Survey Program data, tested the relationship between household income and the division of household tasks. Specifically, she tested whether the relative earning capacity of men and women in the same household is reflected in how housework is allocated. She argued that housework allocation gives us insight into household bargaining, specifically the extent to which men who earn less than their partners exchange income for household tasks. Although, in general, men with lower incomes than their spouse do report doing more housework than men with higher incomes, the increase in housework (1.5 hours per week) does not restore parity. Women, no matter what their income, do more housework than men. These findings imply not only that women have failed to negotiate an equitable exchange, but that they may be punished for the counternormative behavior of earning more than their husbands through an expectation that they continue to do more of the housework.

In the same way that career changes punctuate work lives, a series of socially defined transitions punctuate lives outside work. One such transition is pregnancy. At the point a women announces her pregnancy in the workplace, she also needs to negotiate changes to her work arrangements. Despite a general reluctance to negotiate, women are more likely to ask for flexible work arrangements than men based on their child care responsibilities (Hornung, Rousseau, and Glaser, 2008). Although women and men are equally likely to negotiate parental leave following the birth of a child (Brandth and Kvande, 2002; Greenberg, Ladge, and Clair, 2009), the rationale for their requests differs. Like men in divorce mediations, men negotiating parental leave use rational arguments that incorporate their work responsibilities. Like men in negotiations more generally,

they persist through moments of adversity—in this case, unsupportive managers.

Women, because of their legal entitlements, do not need to craft arguments in support of leave. However, they do incur social penalties that men do not: whereas the announcement of a pregnancy decreases women's perceived competence, it boosts men's perceived likability (Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick, 2004). This change in status might explain why women who negotiate the terms of their maternity leave are perceived as more difficult than women who do not do so (Liu and Buzzanell, 2004). The difficulties spill over to the point when maternity leave ends, affecting women's ability to negotiate their reentry into the workforce with responsibilities comparable to preparental leave responsibilities (Miller, Jablin, Casey, and Lamphear-Van Horn, 1996).

A very different kind of life transition occurs when adult children need to negotiate care arrangements with elderly parents who have had multiple falls. Horton and Arber (2004) showed that how the discussion about fall prevention is approached depends on whether it is initiated by sons or daughters. Sons, in negotiations with their mothers, take either a protective or a coercive approach, whereas in negotiations with their fathers, they take no specific actions other than maintaining respect. Thus, through their negotiation styles, sons relegated their mothers to a more powerless and submissive position than their fathers. In comparison, daughters employed the same strategies of engaging and negotiating with both mothers and fathers. They thus established a more empowering relationship with their parents, giving them greater input into the decisions surrounding their ongoing care.

Summary

Once the focus moves from contract negotiations to other kinds of negotiations, research centers more around the impact of social roles than the impact of women's and men's self-construals. Nonetheless, there are some striking parallels between the findings described in this section and the previous sections on conflict resolution and contract negotiations. Social roles and gender-based expectations discourage women from negotiating an equitable (decreased) housework load but encourage them to negotiate the terms and conditions of their maternity leave. Despite their greater willingness to negotiate on a gender-congruent topic, women who do choose to negotiate the terms of their leave and reentry into the workforce are perceived as more difficult than those who do not, incurring the same social costs that they incur in contract negotiations. Women and men, in negotiating care arrangements with elderly parents, treat mothers and fathers differently.

QUESTIONS NOT YET ANSWERED

Emotion, and the role of emotional expression in negotiation, has emerged as a central theme in negotiation research. This research has explored how the expression of emotions affects opponents, in particular their willingness to give concessions. A consistent body of research shows that anger, directed toward an opponent, increases the size of concessions (van Kleef and Sinaceur, 2013). Disappointment, however, affects opponents' offers seemingly because it triggers guilt in the other party (Leliveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, Steinel, and Van Kleef, 2011; Nelissen, Leliveld, Van Dijk, and Zeelenberg, 2011). Whereas negative emotions appear to improve a negotiator's individual outcomes, positive emotions improve the relationship with opponents. Negotiators who

express positive affect are seen as more desirable future negotiation partners (Kopelman, Rosette, Thompson, 2006), and positive affect increases negotiators' willingness to implement a final agreement (Mislin, Campagna, and Bottom, 2011).

These findings are of interest because of growing evidence that emotions are gender typed. Plant, Hyde, Keltner, and Devine (2000) report that in general, women are expected to express more emotions than men. The exception is anger, which is perceived as appropriate to men but not women. Consistent with this general observation, research shows that women who express anger are accorded lower status and perceived as less competent than men who express anger (Brescoll and Uhlmann, 2008; Schaubroeck and Shao, 2012). It is then unsurprising that in relationship conflict, women suppress anger whereas men express anger (Fischer and Evers, 2011). Conversely, in a study of sexual attractiveness, Tracy and Beall (2011) found that happiness was highly attractive when expressed by women but highly unattractive when expressed by men. These findings suggest that women should not display either genuine or strategic anger in their negotiations. Doing so is unlikely to yield the benefits associated with anger and highly likely to incur social costs. There may be merit in expressing more gender-appropriate emotions such as disappointment in order to improve individual outcomes. However, it seems that Babcock and Laschever's (2007) recommendation that women display unrelenting niceness may present a better strategic route in negotiations. What is clear is that expressing the same emotions may have different consequences for female and male negotiators. Research is needed to clarify how a negotiator's gender, and that of her or his opponent, affects the impact of emotional expression in negotiation.

In investigating gender effects, research has focused almost exclusively on two-party negotiations. How gender might affect outcomes in multiparty negotiations is an unknown. Evidence from small group research, however, hints at the likelihood that what women do, and how it is perceived, will differ depending on a team's gender composition. In ultimatum bargaining games, all-male groups make more generous allocations to an opposing team than all-female or mixed-gender groups (Hannagan and Larimer, 2010). In negotiations, men perceived their team's performance to be increasingly poorer as the number of women on their team increased (Karakowsky, McBey, and Chuang, 2004). And in their investigation of loan payment default in microcredit groups, Anthony and Horne (2003) found that as the number of women in a group increased, repayment defaults decreased. Research also suggests that the impact of team composition is more subtle than a simple majority-versus-minority effect. For example, Loyd, White, and Kern (2011) showed that independent of group size, women are perceived as warmer, more competent, and better leaders when they are the only female team member or when there are three women on a team. Research also suggests that gender diversity affects group performance only when a gender faultine is activated (Pearsall, Ellis, and Evans, 2008) and that gender dissimilarity has its strongest effect on perceptions of relationship conflict within teams when team members have a strong gender social identity (Randel and Jaussi, 2008).

This collection of findings does not yet give us coherent insight into how the gender composition of groups affects perceptions of group performance, individual group members, and perceptions of group members. However, it does suggest that whether women are perceived to have violated stereotypes, whether a group is perceived to have

high relationship conflict, how and when alliances form, and the resource allocation decisions made by groups are affected by their gender composition. These findings have implications for multiparty negotiations. They suggest that women will be most influential in such negotiations when they are in a clear minority (the only woman) or a clear majority (more than two women), but that they may lose influence when there are two women in a multiparty negotiation. They also suggest that how women form alliances may be critical to the perceived success of a negotiation: same-gender alliances may increase the salience of gender fault lines, which may increase a sense of relational conflict and discord. The same issues arise when we consider negotiating teams: the extent to which women can influence their teams and the extent to which those teams may focus on relational conflict is tied to a team's gender composition. Finally, in interteam negotiations, the gender composition of teams may inadvertently shape resource allocation, which appears to be more egalitarian when teams are mixed gender or all female (Hannagan and Larimer, 2010). Although these implications are intriguing, research has yet to systematically explore how multiparty and team negotiations are affected by the proportion of women and men participating in negotiations.

IMPLICATIONS AND APPLICATIONS

I started this chapter with the question of whether women are natural-born peacemakers. The conflict styles research that I reviewed suggests that the answer is yes. This research shows that women tend to favor gender-normative behaviors when resolving conflicts, either directly or as third parties. The answer in relation to negotiation is more complex, however. To the extent that women avoid

negotiation, they behave in a gender-congruent way by averting interpersonal tension. And in planning negotiations, they appear to be guided by more egalitarian principles. However, once in a negotiation, they are as likely as men to implement a competitive strategy.

Both compliance and noncompliance with gendered expectations carry costs for women. When women comply and accommodate their negotiation partners, they undercut their ability to claim resources for themselves. If they accommodate when they are negotiating on behalf of others, they are perceived as incompetent leaders (Amanatullah and Tinsley, 2013). As third parties, their trustworthiness hinges on their ability to implement gender-incongruent techniques (Stuhlmacher and Poitras, 2010). Women are thus caught in a double-bind, not clearly benefiting from either complying with or violating gender stereotypes. A potential cost of this double-bind is that it places women in a self-perpetuating negative spiral (Ely, Ibarra, and Kolb, 2011): women, initially reluctant to negotiate, incur either economic or social costs when they initiate negotiations, thus reinforcing their inclination to avoid negotiating. In the following sections, I describe three pillars that underpin a broad strategy designed to support women who negotiate for improved outcomes.

The First Pillar

Much of the discussion about how to improve women's outcomes has centered on "fixing women" (Ely et al., 2011). Such an approach focuses on how women can better manage their negotiations to offset the negative consequences of asking. Recently Kulik and Olekalns (2012) identified two sets of strategies that might mitigate the costs incurred by women who negotiate. The first set of strategies focuses on offsetting the negative violations that women incur when they initiate negotiations. These

negative violations, the result of behaving in a gender-incongruent way, trigger backlash and resistance on the part of an opponent. One reason for this backlash is that in the absence of other information, opponents are likely to make a person-based attribution (Kulik and Olekalns, 2012). This tendency may reflect a broader attributional bias in which not only are women's and men's actions evaluated against different standards, but women's actions are more likely to elicit person-based attributions, whereas men's actions are more likely to elicit situation-based attributions (Ragins and Winkel, 2011). Women can benefit by adding information that redirects the attribution for their ask from a person-based one to a situation-based one. Perceived demandingness decreases and perceived likability increases when women provide normative information by referring to their skills or to "industry standards," or create external attributions for requests by saying they were encouraged to ask by their mentor. These strategies increase the perceived legitimacy of their ask and enhance the other person's willingness to work with them in the future (Bowles and Babcock, 2008; Tinsley, Cheldelin, Schneider, and Amanatullah, 2009).

The second set of strategies amplifies positive violations, that is, heightens gender-congruent characteristics. These strategies reflect Kray and Thompson's (2005) suggestion that women will gain the most benefit in negotiations if they harness and work with gender stereotypes. Reflecting this advice, Kray and Locke (2008) showed that women can boost their negotiations by flirting with their opponents. Flirting points to the role of gender-congruent influence in negotiation. Guadagno and Cialdini (2007) showed that influence strategies are gender marked and that women gain influence by using gender-congruent strategies such as flattery, supplication, and an appeal for sympathy (Bolino and Turnley, 2003; Gordon, 1996). A second route for

harnessing gender stereotypes is to use gender-congruent language. The use of linguistic devices such as tag questions and qualifiers, while signaling powerlessness (Mulac and Bradac, 1995), reduces social distance and improves outcomes in interdependent settings such as negotiation (Fragale, 2006). Inclusive language (using *we* and *us*) similarly reduces social distance and leads to improved outcomes (Donnellon, 1994; Simons, 1993). Because these linguistic strategies reduce social distance, they are congruent with the expectation that women strive for social harmony.

The Second Pillar

The responsibility for improving outcomes does not reside solely with women. The second pillar is thus built on the organizational policies and practices that create a more equitable environment: one that legitimizes the act of "asking" and reduces ambiguity about what is a legitimate "ask" (Kulik and Olekalns, 2012).

Promote a Collaborative Culture.

Kray et al.'s (Kray et al., 2001, 2002, 2004) research showed that women perform poorly when their negotiation success is linked to male-stereotyped behaviors such as being assertive and rational and pursuing personal interests. However, when the behaviors associated with negotiation success are linked to female-stereotyped behaviors such as communicating clearly, showing good listening skills, and having insight into the other negotiator's feelings, women outperformed men (Kray et al., 2002). This finding suggests that in the same way that women's negotiation success increases when they negotiate about gender-congruent topics, their success increases when they believe gender-congruent skills lead to negotiation success. Organizations can embrace this

finding and consider whether their culture encourages a purely agentic, male-stereotyped approach to negotiations or if it also supports a communal, female-stereotyped approach to negotiations. Promoting a more collaborative culture that links negotiation success to problem solving should improve outcomes for women. Because those skills reflect a principled problem-solving approach to negotiation, they should also benefit the organization as a whole.

Reframe Negotiation.

How organizations frame requests also affects women's outcomes. Women are more likely to negotiate, and to negotiate to the same level as men, when they are told they can "ask for more" but not when they are told "payment is negotiable" (Small, Gelfand, Babcock, and Gettman, 2007). This finding suggests that very small changes in how organizations talk about making requests (asking versus negotiating) may give women the confidence to improve their outcomes.

Reduce Ambiguity.

Bowles et al. (2005) demonstrated that women's negotiation performance worsens as ambiguity about a negotiation increases. At least two factors contribute to this ambiguity. The first factor is the degree to which negotiating for improved outcomes is seen as a legitimate organization activity: women are more successful in their negotiations when institutional policies legitimize negotiating (Niederle and Versterlund, 2008). This legitimization is important because women are reluctant to initiate negotiations; understanding when negotiating is appropriate within an organization creates clearly defined opportunities for women to ask. This means that women are invited to negotiate for the resources that they need. It

is also important because it shifts attributions about the underlying reasons for negotiating from the women to the situation. When women initiate negotiations in clearly defined and organizationally normative contexts, they should be more protected from backlash. Organizations that establish transparent policies for when it is appropriate to negotiate will assist women in becoming more effective negotiators.

The second factor is the degree to which organizations clearly define what is negotiable. Women may be reluctant to negotiate because they are unclear about what is negotiable. In the absence of clear information, both women and men need to predict what is negotiable in terms of both the range of negotiable issues and the upper bounds of what is possible. This ambiguity advantages men, who see more of the world as negotiable than women do (Babcock and Laschever, 2003). It also advantages men because men predict the upper limit on what is attainable to be higher than women do (Babcock and Laschever. 2003). Organizations that provide transparent information about salary ranges and appropriate standards encourage women to ask (Bowles et al., 2005) and to set their asks at appropriate levels.

Analyze Network Access.

Differences in women's and men's network access may heighten differences in what women and men believe is negotiable. When deciding when and what to negotiate, individuals are likely to draw on their networks to disambiguate what is normative. However, because women and men differ in how they build networks, this strategy is likely to perpetuate gender-based differences in negotiation outcomes. Men's networks include mainly men and few women, are multipurpose, and are composed of many shallow ties. Women's networks are typically composed of

fewer deep ties. Their networks include both men and women, but the two groups serve different functions: women turn to men in their network for resources and to other women for friendship and social support (Ibarra, 1992; Ragins and Kram, 2007).

Because men build trust on in-group membership whereas women build trust on personal relationships (Maddux and Brewer, 2005), women are likely to be at a disadvantage in their ties to men: the relationships between women and men are likely to be characterized by lower trust because women are out-group members for men. As a result, men may restrict the information that flows to women about when and what to negotiate. Because the other female ties in a network all share this gender disadvantage, they cannot correct this information bias. Women consequently enter negotiations with a distinct informational disadvantage. Organizations might then consider how to better develop women's networks. Formal mentorship schemes and other activities that develop and strengthen women's ties to men provide one mechanism for overcoming this informational disadvantage.

The Third Pillar

The final pillar focuses on women's development programs. What kinds of training should organizations deliver to improve women's negotiation effectiveness? (Stevens, Bavetta, and Gist, 1993; Sturm, 2009). Ely et al. (2011) outline three skill sets that are especially important for women who engage in negotiations: recognizing what is negotiable, managing the process, and planning. They focus less on prescriptive advice about how to negotiate a good deal and more on managing the specific challenges that women encounter.

The Domain of Negotiation.

Two factors come into play in determining the domain of negotiation. First, women see less of the world as negotiable than men do (Babcock and Laschever, 2003). Consequently, they operate in a narrow domain of what can be negotiated (the most traditional items, such as salary, bonuses, job roles) and fail to recognize opportunities to negotiate items outside of this narrow range. Second, women appear more comfortable negotiating on gender-congruent issues (Bear, 2011; Bear and Babcock, 2012). As a result, they may further constrain the domain of negotiable items because gender-congruent issues such as work flexibility are more available than gender-incongruent issues. Using a program to explore what is negotiable, or inviting human resource managers into the program to talk about what is negotiable, helps women to broaden the domain of negotiable issues.

Managing the Process.

Women are not only reluctant to negotiate; they are also reluctant to push through adversity. Unlike men, who continue to negotiate through difficult moments, women end negotiations at that point (Babcock and Laschever, 2003). Although ending negotiations clearly fits with the desire to preserve relationships, it means women are disinclined to push through for better outcomes. Many of these moments of adversity can be described as moves—deliberate tactics that negotiators use to assert power and signal resistance to a woman's proposal (Kolb, 2004).

Caught in the moment, it can be difficult to respond constructively to such tactics. Women may therefore benefit from their perspective-taking ability: by placing themselves in the other party's shoes prior to negotiating, they may better anticipate and prepare for an opponent's moves. At the same time, women need to learn how to respond effectively to such moves by turning the

negotiation, that is by redirecting the negotiation from a power dynamic to a problem-solving dynamic. Kolb (2004) identified five broad turns that help women level the playing field (restorative turns) and redirect the negotiation to a more collaborative style (participative turns). Women may reestablish the power balance by providing an alternative account for their behavior (“I am looking for what’s fair” rather than “I am being greedy”), or by explicitly identifying the power tactics used by an opponent. They may invite the other negotiator to join them in a problem-solving approach by refocusing on the problem to be resolved, by using questions to solicit further information from an opponent, or by creating the opportunity to reconsider the negotiation process by briefly pausing the negotiation. Training programs can coach women in recognizing moves and to develop their skill in using turns.

Planning to Negotiate.

Good planning is essential for any negotiator, but women should be encouraged to plan for gender-specific challenges alongside the more routine planning that characterizes all negotiations. For women, it is especially important to generate broad lists of negotiable items and incorporate both gender-congruent and gender-incongruent items in their lists. It is also important for them to consider the reasons that a manager or peer might resist their proposals and to develop strategies for promoting their needs. In developing these strategies, and based on their knowledge of the individuals they negotiate with, they need to anticipate the moves that they might encounter and to plan how they can turn the negotiation. They might also assess their networks and other organizational relationships and consider how to gather the support necessary to support their proposals. Training

programs can kick-start this process by incorporating planning for a forthcoming negotiation into the schedule. They can further assist by offering negotiation clinics and setting up peer support groups to help women think broadly about how to approach their negotiations.

CONCLUSION

Women and men to some extent approach conflicts and negotiations in gender-congruent ways. Gender differences are more clearly apparent in how women and men resolve conflicts, surfacing in more subtle ways in negotiations. As conflict resolvers, women favor more communal and process-oriented strategies than men. As negotiators, although women and men are equally likely to act competitively, only women incur the social costs of doing so. As self-advocates, women incur penalties for acting assertively; as other-advocates, women incur penalties for not acting assertively enough.

This chapter highlights the important role that social context plays in both modifying women's and men's strategies choices and shaping the reactions that those strategy choices elicit. To fully understand how gender affects conflict resolution and negotiation, we need to understand not just what strategies are used but the context within which they are used. Much of the research on gender has focused on contract negotiations. We have yet to explore in equal detail the role that gender plays in other kinds of negotiations: the domain in which negotiations occur, the role of emotional expression, and the impact of gender composition in team and multiparty negotiations are among the topics that would benefit from further research.

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CHAPTER SIXTEEN RESOLVING INTRACTABLE INTERGROUP CONFLICTS *The Role of Implicit Theories about Groups*

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In most cases, intractable conflicts are based on real disagreements over concrete issues, such as territory or natural resources. These real issues must, of course, be addressed in conflict resolution. Yet it is well known that even when these real disagreements can be resolved, the conflicts often drag on because of powerful psychological barriers (Ross and Ward, 1995).

Psychological barriers to conflict resolution, such as intergroup hatred or a one-sided view of the history of the conflict, often impede progress toward peaceful settlement of conflicts. They stand as obstacles to beginning negotiations, achieving agreement, and engaging in a process of reconciliation later (Bar-Tal and Halperin, 2011). In fact, parties often fail to address the real disagreements at all because of psychological barriers.

In this chapter, we focus on one psychological barrier—an entity (or fixed) theory about groups. We contend that one of the most powerful psychological barriers to conflict resolution, especially in the context of intractable conflicts, is the belief that the out-group will never change its destructive behavior, harmful intentions, or hawkish political views. When a belief in the fixed (negative) nature of the out-group is prevalent, in-group members do not have any reason to seriously consider options for resolution raised by the out-group (or others) and hence will reject

compromises or gestures that are critical to the peace process.

In this view, one of the major challenges of the conflict resolution process is to help people understand that their adversary can change in meaningful ways. We address this challenge by drawing on the well-established framework of implicit theories (Dweck and Leggett, 1988; Chiu, Dweck, Tong, and Fu, 1997) that in recent years has been applied at the group level (Rydell et al., 2007). According to this approach, while some people (entity theorists) believe that the nature and characteristics of individuals and groups are fixed, others, who hold an incremental theory, believe that individuals and groups can change and develop (Dweck and Leggett, 1988). The cornerstone of the current framework is our premise that altering people's general beliefs about the malleability of groups provides a means of decreasing negative attitudes toward their specific out-group.

By using these ideas in the context of intractable conflicts, we show how some of the most destructive intergroup attitudes and policies can be changed, often without even mentioning the out-group itself or the specific conflict. In what follows, we first present some of the most powerful prior social psychological approaches to conflict resolution. We then introduce our approach and distinguish it from prior approaches. Next, we review recent research supporting our model, conducted in the context of two different ongoing intractable conflicts. Finally, we examine the practical implications of our approach and consider future research directions.

DIRECT SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Many social psychologists have introduced interventions to reduce intergroup prejudice and promote reconciliation. Most of these interventions have been direct attempts to change people's beliefs, attitudes, and emotions regarding the out-group. Some of the most popular approaches include those based on the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954—both extended contact—Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, and Ropp, 1997—and imagined contact—Crisp and Turner, 2009), perspective taking (Galinsky and Moskowitz, 2000), common in-group identity (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, and Rust, 1993), the strategy of increasing the perceived variability of the out-group (Brauer and Er-rafiy, 2011), and the strategy of addressing the groups' differing psychological needs in the conflict (Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, and Carmi, 2009).

Although they differ in important ways, all of these approaches involve explicit focus on the out-group, and some of them even involve direct encounters with out-group members. An exhaustive review is not possible here, but we will outline two of the most successful of these direct approaches as background for our proposed model and intervention. We focus on these two examples because they are considered to be the most successful of the social psychological interventions and allow us to highlight the unique nature of our proposed intervention.

One of social psychology's most important contributions to reducing intergroup conflict has been contact theory (Allport, 1954; Dovidio, Gaertner, and Kawakami, 2003). This theory proposes that positive interactions between members of hostile groups can improve intergroup attitudes when the interactions involve factors such as equal status, mutual cooperation, and support from the relevant authority (for a meta-analysis, see Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Interventions informed by this theory have addressed relations between Catholics and Protestants in Northern

Ireland (Hughes, 2001), Jews and Arabs in Israel (Maoz, 2004), and Caucasians and African Americans in the United States (for a review, see Brown and Hewstone, 2005). A major limitation of this approach, however, is that its success depends on specific conditions being met (e.g., equal-status contact), and these conditions can be difficult to ensure in the context of intergroup conflict (Bekerman and Maoz, 2005; Hammack, 2007). Some of these limitations are addressed by an extension of contact theory involving imagined contact (Turner, Crisp, and Lambert, 2007; Crisp, Stathi, Turner, and Husnu, 2008; Turner and Crisp, 2010), but the efficacy of this variant has not been tested in the context of intractable conflict.

A second psychological approach does not depend on bringing groups together (in reality or in imagination) but instead relies on perspective taking or empathy promotion. This approach has yielded some impressive results in increasing empathy, decreasing animosity, and improving intergroup relations (Dovidio et al., 2003; Galinsky and Moskowitz, 2000; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2008). However, this method can sometimes be counterproductive: resistance rather than empathy can arise from direct encounters with opposing viewpoints or from being instructed to sympathize with one's enemies (Epley, Caruso, and Bazerman, 2006; Galinsky, Ku, and Wang, 2005; Vorauer and Sasaki, 2009). This is especially true for those holding extremely negative attitudes and emotions toward the out-group or for those adhering to uncompromising ideologies (Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009). Moreover, as Paluck (2010) noted, "Perspective takers on one side of a conflict can lose credibility with their in-group if they attempt to understand the other side" (p. 3; see also Galinsky et al., 2005).

INDIRECT SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The two direct approaches we have discussed have proven successful in certain contexts. However, they have two major limitations. First, as noted, they often require bringing rival parties together, thereby creating logistical and economic constraints, possible resistance, or in-group reprisals. Thus, these programs may be unable to reach those most in need of an intervention. Second, direct instructions to empathize with the out-group can have counterproductive consequences in the form of defensive reactions; this is especially true for those with the most negative attitudes and emotions toward the out-group. The last thing people suffering from an out-group's violence might want to hear are positive things about that very same group and justifications or excuses for its harmful behavior.

Hence, at least when intractable conflicts are at their peak, it may be important to use social psychological interventions that are more implicit and avoid focusing on the out-group and the specific conflict (Bar-Tal and Rosen, 2009). These kinds of interventions can convey messages about general values like tolerance (Agius and Ambrosewicz, 2003) or human rights (Flowers, Bernbaum, Rudelius-Palmer, and Tolman, 2000), or they can teach unique skills of conflict resolution (Bodine and Crawford, 1998; Deutsch, 1993) or emotion regulation (Halperin, Porat, Tamir, and Gross, 2013). Yet one of the major critiques of some of these approaches is that they are too disconnected from the relevant conflicts and therefore people may fail to apply the general ideas to the specific context of their ongoing conflict.

We offer a new approach to implicit interventions, aiming at changing negative intergroup attitudes by changing beliefs about the nature of groups more generally. The proposed approach is unique because it touches on one of the most powerful driving forces of intractable conflicts, negative intergroup attitudes, without focusing on content that might give rise to antagonism and defensive reactions. In other words, we believe that in developing the new intervention, we have identified the optimal distance: not too close, but also not too far from the actual content of the conflict.

This intervention is predicated on the assumption that any progress toward the resolution of the conflict, which requires mutual gestures, risk taking, and compromises, must be accompanied by the hope that the out-group is capable of changing its destructive behavior. Empirical support for this assumption comes from research showing that the most harmful intergroup attitudes are those implying that the rival group is evil by nature and therefore will never change its immoral, violent behavior (Halperin, 2008). It stands to reason that people who believe that the out-group is irrevocably evil might be reluctant to compromise or try to resolve conflict in peaceful ways. And indeed, empirical data show that those who hold such (strong) beliefs also oppose intergroup negotiation, compromises of different kinds, and even long-term normalization of intergroup relations (Halperin, 2011).

How can these destructive beliefs be changed while bypassing the potential negative side effects inherent in directly praising or empathizing with the out-group? We suggest that by emphasizing the dynamic, malleable nature of groups in general, we can indirectly affect people’s beliefs about the rival group in particular. That is, by dispelling the idea that groups have a fixed or immutable nature, we can potentially decrease the animosity between specific groups and increase their support for making

compromises in the service of peace. The impact of implicit theories in areas other than conflict resolution and the efficacy of teaching a malleable view of human attributes have been demonstrated in a number of studies.

Research by Dweck and colleagues (see Dweck and Leggett, 1988; Dweck and Molden, 2005) has focused on implicit theories about the nature of human attributes. Whereas people who hold an entity theory believe that human attributes are fixed, concrete, internal entities, those who lean toward an incremental theory believe that human attributes are more dynamic qualities that can be changed and developed. Although the application of this approach to conflict resolution is new, the effects of lay beliefs about the malleability of people have been extensively investigated in the field of person perception. For instance, those holding malleable (incremental) beliefs about persons or groups have been found to be less prone to make stereotypical judgments (Levy, Stroessner, and Dweck, 1998; Plaks, Stroessner, Dweck, and Sherman, 2001; Rydell, Hugenberg, Ray, and Mackie, 2007). They are also less likely than those with fixed, entity beliefs to attribute perceived wrongdoing to people's inherent nature (Chiu, Hong, and Dweck, 1997; Levy, Stroessner, and Dweck, 1998), less prone to recommend punishment and retaliation for wrongdoing (Chiu, Dweck, Tong, and Fu, 1997), and more likely to recommend negotiation and education (Chiu, Dweck et al., 1997), suggesting that these beliefs guide preferred methods of resolving troubling situations.

In more recent developments, studies have shown that people hold implicit theories not only about individuals but also about social groups (Halperin, Russell, Trzesniewski, Gross, and Dweck, 2011; Rydell et al., 2007). According to this approach, those who hold entity beliefs about groups do not think that groups in general can change, while those who hold incremental beliefs see groups as dynamic and

capable of change. Studies have shown that these beliefs influence intragroup attitudes and dynamics (Tong and Chang, 2008), but more relevant to this chapter, they also have implications for intergroup relations. For example, Rydell and colleagues (2007) demonstrated that those maintaining an incremental implicit theory of groups are less prone to holding and forming stereotypes. This is highly relevant when studying intergroup conflicts and conflict resolution, given that the central players in these conflicts are social groups rather than isolated individuals.

Of critical importance to this topic is a growing body of literature suggesting that these beliefs about individuals (Blackwell, Trzesniewski, and Dweck, 2007; Heslin Latham, and VandeWalle, 2005; Plaks et al., 2001) and groups (Halperin et al., 2011; Rydell et al., 2007) can be changed. The fact that beliefs about groups' malleability can be influenced means that the application of the proposed idea to the conflict resolution domain could potentially cross the boundary of descriptiveness and become an actual conflict resolution intervention. If people can be led to believe that groups can change for the better, it would be more difficult for them to hold the contradictory belief that their rival group is evil by nature and will never change.

This reasoning led us to predict that negative intergroup attitudes would be attenuated by teaching people to see how groups' nature, attitudes, and behavior can be dynamic and not fixed, that is, by increasing their acceptance of incremental beliefs about groups. According to the model presented in figure 16.1 , inducing an incremental belief about groups would change negative attitudes toward the out-group, which in turn should have an impact on conciliatory political action tendencies, such as willingness to compromise for peace.




Figure 16.1 The Influence of Implicit Theories about Groups on Support for Conciliatory Political Actions Tendencies

First, we show the impact of implicit theories on the cognitive (judgment) component of attitudes, but we are also beginning to explore the impact of implicit theories on the emotional component of attitudes, and we will present this work as well.

INCREMENTAL BELIEFS, NEGATIVE TRAIT JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE OUT-GROUP, AND CONCILIATORY POLITICAL ACTION TENDENCIES: THE JUDGMENT DIMENSION

We have suggested that a general incremental theory of groups (the idea that groups in general are capable of change) should be associated with more positive judgments of one’s particular out-group and with greater willingness to compromise for peace compared to a general entity theory of groups (the idea that groups in general are incapable of change). A positive change in judgments about the out-group represents a direct application of beliefs about the malleability of groups in general to the particular out-group involved in the conflict. For example, the belief that violent groups can change their behavior because of changes in context or leadership can be easily transformed to the expectation that the adversary group would do the same.

The first question, then, is whether implicit theories about groups do indeed relate to judgments of the out-groups and to support for conciliatory political action tendencies, such as compromises for peace.

In a correlational study based on a large sample of all subgroups within the Jewish society in Israel, we measured people's beliefs about groups by asking them to agree or disagree with items such as, "Groups can do things differently but the important parts of who they are can't really be changed." We found that the more people held an incremental belief about groups, the less they agreed with extreme forms of negative trait judgments of Palestinians (Halperin et al., 2011). Specifically, when asked about their views of Palestinians, those who held incremental beliefs about groups were less accepting (than those holding entity beliefs) of statements portraying Palestinians as "evil by nature", as all wanting "to annihilate the Jews", and as a group that "should never be trusted." Even more interesting, we found that negative judgments of Palestinians in turn were associated with less willingness to compromise or reconcile with the Palestinians (Halperin et al., 2011, study 1).

Can these beliefs be altered to change judgments about the out-group and support for conciliatory action? To address this question, in a second study (Halperin et al., 2011, study 2), we temporarily manipulated Jewish-Israelis' beliefs about groups. Participants first read a *Psychology Today* – style article about a renowned researcher who ostensibly found that groups either did (entity belief) or did not (incremental belief) have a fixed nature (with no mention of Palestinians). Later in the session, participants gave their trait judgments of Palestinians and rated their support for major steps for resolving the conflict (e.g., Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders, sharing Jerusalem as a capital). Our results showed that although no mention was

made of Palestinians in the articles, participants in the malleable condition had significantly more positive judgments of Palestinians ($M = 3.32$, $SD = 1.01$) than those in the fixed condition ($M = 2.83$, $SD = .75$; $t(74) = 2.43$, $d = .56$, $p < .05$). These more positive judgments in turn predicted greater support for major compromises ($r = .45$, $p < .001$).

One important question is whether these findings apply only to the strong groups in a conflict (such as Jewish Israelis have been). It might be that only groups that have many resources can allow themselves to support compromises because they have learned that groups have the potential to change. To determine whether the same pattern of findings would hold for the traditionally less powerful sides of the dispute (Halperin et al., 2011), we used the same method in the next two studies to change the mind-sets of Palestinian citizens of Israel (study 3) and non-Israeli Palestinians (study 4) living in the West Bank, many whom were members of Fatah and Hamas, groups with militant wings. Each group was later (as part of a large questionnaire covering many issues) asked about support for key compromises that were relevant to them. In both studies, people in the incremental group showed significantly more positive judgments of Israeli Jews than those in the entity condition. Even more important, in both studies these positive judgments predicted greater support for major compromises.

To summarize, the studies we have reviewed provide evidence that (1) highlighting the fact that groups can potentially change leads people to become more supportive of concrete compromises for peace and (2) this greater willingness to compromise for peace is driven by a shift in their judgment of the nature and traits of the adversary group. The focused yet implicit message we developed managed to affect people’s judgments of a longstanding and

hated out-group without ever mentioning that out-group—that is, without trying to create empathy for or understanding of the out-group and without creating actual or imagined interaction with that group.

INCREMENTAL BELIEFS, EXTREME INTERGROUP EMOTIONS, AND CONCILIATORY POLITICAL ACTION TENDENCIES: THE EMOTIONAL DIMENSION

Although most of our previous research has focused on negative judgments about the out-group as the key path from implicit theories to heightened support for conciliatory actions, we believe that intergroup emotions can also play an important role in that process. In our research, we hypothesized that changing people's belief about the malleability of groups should help them to down-regulate or decrease the experience of two of the most destructive intergroup emotions: hatred and anxiety. Our assumption derives from findings that these emotions are strongly connected to the belief in a fixed negative nature of the out-group (Halperin, 2008).

Hatred is one of the most powerful emotional sentiments in the context of intergroup conflicts (Opotow and McClelland, 2007; Sternberg, 2003). It is an extreme and continuous affective phenomenon that is directed at a particular individual or group (Sternberg, 2003). A recent study, based on appraisal theories, shows that hatred is the affective phenomenon that corresponds to the idea of stable negative characteristics in the out-group and to a belief in the out-group's inability to undergo positive change (see Halperin, 2008, study 2). As such, we presumed that hatred could be attenuated by reducing adherence to "entity" (or fixed)

implicit theories about groups and by increasing acceptance of “incremental” (or malleable) implicit theories about groups (Levy et al., 1998; Rydell et al., 2007).

One of our previously reported studies in the Middle Eastern context (Halperin et al., 2011, study 1) was conducted as part of a much larger survey. In addition to our questions about judgments of the out-group, there were also, in another part of the survey, items about negative emotions toward the out-group. When we examined the relation between implicit theories and hatred toward Palestinians, we found that an incremental theory about groups was significantly associated with lower levels of hatred toward Palestinians among our Israeli Jewish participants ($r = -.30$, $p < .001$). Moreover, the effect of an incremental theory on hatred remained significant after controlling for key demographics, such as political orientation or levels of religiosity. Importantly, implicit theories did not predict other negative emotions, such as anger ($r = .08$, n.s.), thus demonstrating that hatred in particular (as opposed to negative affect more generally) is predicted by implicit theories about groups.

Another interesting, and preliminary, example of the emotional mechanism can be found in a study we recently conducted in Cyprus. The aim of this study was to increase the motivation of Turkish Cypriots to engage in contact with Greek Cypriots (Halperin Crisp, Husnu, Dweck, and Gross, 2013, $N = 62$). Evidence suggests that intergroup anxiety is the emotion that has the widest influence on people’s motivation for intergroup contact (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Here we asked whether teaching an incremental theory would lead people to down-regulate intergroup anxiety and increase their motivation to meet and communicate with out-group members. In thinking about the core appraisal themes of intergroup anxiety, we realized that intergroup anxiety in intractable conflicts is likely to be

driven by a combination of two appraisals: (1) the out-group repeatedly threatens to hurt the in-group, and (2) the out-group will never change, and thus will always try to hurt the in-group. Accordingly, we proposed that the group malleability manipulation would be effective in promoting contact willingness through intergroup anxiety reduction. We speculated that such a belief change would reduce intergroup anxiety by creating expectations for less threatening behavior by the out-group. Alternatively, the intervention might increase contact motivation because it would lead people to believe that by meeting out-group members in person, they can convince them to abandon the violent approach and replace it with constructive dialogue.

Indeed, the results show that Turkish Cypriot participants in the malleable condition had significantly less anxiety about Greek Cypriots ($M = 2.50$, $SD = 1.40$) than those in the fixed condition ($M = 3.35$, $SD = 1.40$; $t(60) = 2.37$, $d = .61$, $p < .05$). In addition, Turkish Cypriots in the malleable condition were more willing to have contact with Greek Cypriots than those in the fixed condition ($M_{\text{malleable}} = 0.16$, $SD = 1.48$, $M_{\text{fixed}} = -0.80$, $SD = 1.37$; $t(60) = 2.63$, $d = .67$, $p < .05$). Furthermore, we found that intergroup anxiety was a significant mediator of the relation between the incremental intervention and willingness to have contact (anxiety indirect effect = .50, 95% CI = .09 to .94, $p < .05$).

To summarize, these results show that within the context of widely recognized, long-term intractable conflicts such as those in the Middle East and Cyprus, a simple manipulation of group malleability led to decreased feelings of intergroup hatred and anxiety and increased support for compromises and increased willingness to interact with out-group members. Interestingly, Yeager and his colleagues (Yeager, Trzesniewski, Tirri, Nokelainen, and Dweck, 2011) had very similar findings about the emotional impact of growth mind-

set intervention on conflicts, which they obtained in a totally different context. In their studies, conducted among adolescents in Finland and the United States, students who held more of a growth mind-set or were primed with a growth mind-set responded to conflict or victimization in the schoolyard with less hatred, less shame, and a lower desire to wreak vengeance on others. Even more important, in a later study, a growth mind-set intervention yielded relatively enduring changes in adolescents' propensity for aggressive behavior (see also Yeager, Trzesniewski, and Dweck, 2013).

IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

In this chapter, we have argued that the belief that groups cannot change constitutes a powerful barrier to the resolution of prolonged intergroup conflicts. Altering this fundamental belief represents a significant challenge. We have proposed an implicit approach and have reported initial evidence that changing the belief that the out-group cannot meaningfully change leads to changes in willingness to take steps that would be conducive to peace.

We believe that integrating these ideas into the field of conflict resolution would improve our understanding of intergroup conflicts and their resolution and would enable the development of more focused interventions that could mobilize public opinion toward increased support for peace processes. These interventions may be optimal especially in cases where the conflict remains acute and the climate is not ripe for more direct interventions in which both sides confront the each other. In these cases, an indirect intervention aimed at changing mind-sets and only indirectly influencing attitudes and emotions toward the out-group could be ideal.

Although the ideas and findings we have presented are promising, there is still much to be done to transform them into effective conflict resolution interventions. In terms of research, these ideas should be examined outside the lab using extended educational workshops and longitudinal assessment. This work will also enable a more rigorous test of our model by applying it to more diverse populations and in a real-world situation when people are confronted by continuing conflict-related adverse events. We have already conducted some pilot studies along these lines, and although much work remains to be done, the results are very promising.

Efforts should also concentrate on how to disseminate the incremental message about groups' capacity to change to larger populations. Media, and especially social media, have enormous potential for disseminating these ideas by focusing on stories presenting groups that went through meaningful changes. Some efforts have been made in recent years to use media channels to reduce prejudice and promote peace (Paluck, 2009; Singhal, Cody, Rogers, and Sabido, 2004), but they have not used the messages developed in our intervention. New technological developments and the huge popularity of social media create a fertile ground for improving intergroup relations by changing attitudes and intergroup emotions.

Given the nature of intractable conflicts, it may seem remarkable that the relatively modest implicit interventions described here would lead to meaningful change. However, following Yeager and Walton (2011), we believe that interventions such as this can potentially have constructive effects by setting into motion more positive recursive social and psychological processes when people repeatedly face conflict-related events. The growth mind-set about groups, internalized by those who take part in the proposed intervention, can serve as a more constructive filter through

which group members analyze conflict-related events and evaluate new opportunities.

These interventions are not magic; we believe that they will be successful only under the right conditions and with powerful supporting mechanisms. One example of supporting mechanism might be the integration of the proposed approach with other conflict resolution interventions. For example, when combined with an existing intervention, we assume that messages regarding groups' capability to change can make contact more effective or can help people overcome the almost natural resistance to empathize with the perspective of an adversarial out-group.

At this early stage, caution is clearly in order, and our indirect approach may have limitations that should be taken into account. Most important, our approach relies on the assumption that people will apply their growth beliefs regarding groups in general to their most hated out-group, with which they have been in conflict for so many years. It is well established that in the context of intergroup conflicts, people often delegitimize and sometimes even dehumanize out-group members (Bar-Tal, 1990; Staub, 1989). The problematic implication might be that group members can acknowledge the fact that groups of people can potentially change but do not see their adversary out-group as a legitimate group of people due to the dehumanization process. In this case, levels of delegitimization or dehumanization of the out-group may block the positive effects of incremental mind-set manipulation on attitudes toward peace. Our aggregated findings show that even in the most intractable conflicts, our indirect approach proved to be efficient; nevertheless, much more remains to be done to understand the boundary conditions for this type of intervention.

Finally, although we and others have examined the role played by malleability beliefs regarding individuals and

groups in conflict resolution processes, other potential targets should be considered. For example, less attention has been paid to people's beliefs regarding the malleability of situations. In line with our prior discussion of the advantages of implicit approaches in conflict resolution, an important challenge might be to develop an implicit approach that deals with the dynamic nature of situations rather than groups. This is especially true in intractable conflicts where people do not see a way out and believe that the conflict itself is irresolvable. And indeed, we (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, and Gross, 2013) have recently begun exploring whether there is an existing concept based on implicit theories, which refers to people's malleability beliefs regarding highly negative situations such as prolonged conflicts. We believe that in order for people to preserve hope for the resolution of a conflict, they must believe that conflicts are malleable and even resolvable. Our preliminary results, based on both correlational and experimental studies conducted among Israeli Jews, show that increased belief in the malleability of violent conflicts leads to increased levels of hope regarding the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which in turn leads to more support for major concessions in order to promote conflict resolution (Cohen-Chen et al., 2013). We believe that these very preliminary indications pave the way to a new line of research and potentially the creation of new indirect interventions focusing on people's beliefs about the general nature of conflicts.

In sum, our conceptualization and empirical studies represent an innovative application of knowledge about basic psychological processes to the realm of conflict resolution research and practice. We were initially unsure what effects such an indirect intervention would have. We now have more confidence in this approach, given the consistent findings from our studies and interventions

conducted in different societies and across different conflicts. We believe that we have managed to identify one of the centers of gravity of the psychology of intractable conflicts. The challenge is now to develop methods for durably altering the mind-set of large populations over long periods of time.

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CHAPTER SEVENTEEN
PERSONALITY AND CONFLICT

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Throughout literary history, many novelists and playwrights have defined personality as “destiny,” poignantly illustrating the “inevitability” of their protagonist’s fate as a consequence of character traits that relentlessly determine his or her choices in life. Even as naive observers, if we look deeply enough within ourselves, we are often surprised by the extent to which we are ruled by needs and strivings that defy commonsense logic. Although many social scientists agree with the fiction writers on the power of personality to shape the course of our lives, scientists focus on predictability rather than inevitability. The task of science is to observe and document any reliable association between specific character traits and the likelihood of varying life choices, patterns of behavior, and consequences of the behavior for oneself and others.

Parties involved in a conflict they are attempting to resolve constructively must strive to understand each other despite any difference in ethnic and gender identities, family and life experiences, and cultural perspectives. Although conflict resolution practitioners and theorists recognize the potentially important effects that individual differences have on the negotiation process and its outcome, research in this area has been piecemeal, and few guidelines exist for practical application. At this stage, a synthesis of cross-discipline information concerning personality can offer additional tools to benefit practitioners and prove useful to theorists wishing to conduct future investigation in this area. Awareness of how personal characteristics predispose

an individual to respond within the negotiation setting equips all parties more effectively to (1) uncover and understand the psychological as well as substantive interests underlying conflict—particularly those interests that would normally remain unrecognized or unarticulated if personality is not considered; (2) respond so as to facilitate a constructive resolution process avoiding escalation and deadlock; and (3) generate a satisfying solution to meet the priority needs of both parties.

We have added new material to each section of this chapter to reflect some of the more relevant research—and thoughts about personality and conflict—conducted since the previous edition of this Handbook was published. This includes an introduction in the first section on the psychodynamic approach to some irrational deterrents to negotiation and their role in perpetuating conflict. In the section on need theories, we discuss some recent thoughts on the existence of a negative pole to Murray's need for self-actualization. Finally, we discuss several relevant research studies that have appeared in print since the publication of the previous edition. These more recent studies relate to the influence of individual personality traits on choice of conflict resolution strategy and replicate some of the findings we presented in the second edition of this Handbook (Sandy, Boardman, and Deutsch, 2006).

As in previous editions, the first section of this chapter reviews some of the ideas relevant to conflict from several major theoretical approaches to personality: psychodynamic theory, need theory, social learning theory, and situation-person interaction theory. Our review of these theories is not intended to be comprehensive. It is limited to selecting several ideas from each theory that are useful to understanding personal reaction and behavior in a conflict situation. In the second section, we discuss the trait approach to personality and assessment. First, we briefly

indicate some of the individual traits thought to be related to conflict behavior and then discuss some of the limitations of this approach. Next, we discuss more fully a multiple-trait approach, as well as a method for assessing personal conflict orientations that seem to have considerable promise for the evaluation of personality style, reaction, and behavior as they relate to conflict. In the final section, we discuss how one can use personality theory and assessment to enhance conflict resolution in practice.

REPRESENTATIVE MODELS OF PERSONALITY

There are two major approaches to the study of personality: idiographic, the belief that human behavior cannot be broken down into its constituent parts; and nomothetic, the view that some general dimension of behavior can be used to describe most people of a general age group (Martin, 1988). To illustrate, we begin by noting that one of the most influential models of personality, the psychodynamic, relies on idiographic use of case history studies to reach conclusions about human nature.

Psychodynamic Theories

Sigmund Freud's work from the late 1880s to the late 1930s marks the beginning of the psychodynamic study of human personality. His intellectual descendants are numerous: Carl Jung, Alfred Adler, Karen Horney, Anna Freud, Erik Erikson, Erich Fromm, Harry S. Sullivan, Melanie Klein, W.R.D. Fairbairn, Donald Winnicott, Heinz Hartman, Jacques Lacan, and Heinz Kohut.

Much of early psychodynamic theory can be described as a drive theory, which is mainly concerned with the "vicissitudes of, and conflicts associated with libidinal and aggressive drives" (Gratch, 2012, p. 205). More recent

versions of psychodynamic theory (which have the odd label of *object relations theory*) consider social attachments and the internalization of one's early social relations with significant others as the primary psychic determinants.

Inevitably, Freud's descendants have modified, revised, extended, and in other ways changed his original ideas. The changes have mainly been to place greater emphasis on the social (cultural, class, gender, familial, and experiential) determinants of psychodynamic processes, develop detailed characterization of the structural components involved in the dynamic intrapsychic processes, and seek adequate conceptualization of the cognitive and self-processes that are central to the individual's relation to reality. Despite these changes, which seek to integrate the biological and social determinants of personality development, some key elements characterize most of the psychodynamic approaches.

An Active Unconscious.

People actively seek to remain unaware (unconscious) of their impulses, thoughts, and actions that make them feel disturbing emotions (e.g., anxiety, guilt, or shame).

Internal Conflict.

People may have internal conflict between desires and conscience, desires and fears, and what the "good" self wants and what the "bad" self wants. This conflict may occur outside consciousness.

Control and Defense Mechanisms.

People develop tactics and strategies to control their impulses, thoughts, actions, and realities so that they will not feel anxious, guilty, or ashamed. If their controls are ineffective, they develop defense mechanisms to keep from feeling these disturbing emotions.

Stages of Development.

From birth to old age, people go through stages of development. Most current psychodynamic theorists accept the view that the developmental stages reflect both biological and social determinants, even though they may differ in their weighting of the two, their labeling of the stages, and how they specifically characterize them. Freudian theory focuses mainly on the three earliest stages of development—the oral, anal, and phallic—because it was believed that the main features of personality development were set early in childhood. Freud employed these anatomical terms to characterize the early stages because he thought these bodily zones were successively infused with libidinal energy.

Later psychoanalysts were likely to characterize them psychosocially in terms of the social situation confronting the developing child. In the oral stage, infants are primarily concerned with receiving feeding and care from a parenting figure; in the anal stage, they are faced with the need to develop control over their excretions as well as other forms of self-control; and in the phallic stage, they face the need to establish a sexual identity as a boy or girl and to repress their sexual striving toward the parent of the opposite sex. Associated with these stages are normal frustrations, a development crisis, and typical defense mechanisms. However, certain forms of psychopathology are likely to develop if severe frustration and crisis face the child during a particular stage, with the result that the child becomes “fixated” at that stage; in addition, some adult character traits are thought to originate in each given stage.

Table 17.1 presents, in summary form, some of the features that Freud and the earlier psychoanalysts associated with the three early stages.

Table 17.1 Normal Frustrations, Typical Defense Mechanisms, Developmental Crises, Psychopathology, and Adult Character Traits with Several Early Stages of Psychosexual Development

Stages of Development	*Normal Frustrations*	*Developmental Crisis*	*Defense Mechanisms*	*Psychopathology*	*Adult Character Traits*
I. Oral (0 to 18 months)					
A. Oral erotic period (from birth to about 6 months)	Lack of continuous availability of caretaker to satisfy infant's needs	Trust versus mistrust	Apathy, withdrawal, denial, introjection, hallucinatory gratification	Schizophrenia, manic-depression, depressive states, schizoid personality	Passivity, dependence, restlessness, receptivity, curiosity, generosity, compliance, optimism
B. Oral sadistic (from about 6 to 18 months)	Teething, weaning, and the birth of a new sibling		Withdrawal, denial, introjection, projection		Demandingness, clingingness, exploratiVeness, ambivalence, cynicism, pessimism, sarcasm
II. Anal (8 to 48 months)					
A. Anal-erotic (from about 8 to 24 months)	Onset of toilet training and other demands for self-control	Autonomy versus shame and guilt	Projection	Paranoia, psychopathy, sadomasochism, obsessive-compulsive disorders	Bossiness, hostility, disorderliness, irresponsibility, dirtiness, assertiveness
B. Anal-sadistic (from about 12 to 48 months)	Toilet training and other demands for self-control		Reaction-formation, undoing, intellectualization, rationalization		Stubbornness, parsimony, punctuality, cautiousness, pedantry, righteousness, indecision
III. Phallic (2 to 6 years)	Transformation of the pregenital child into a "boy" or "girl" with internalization of key values concerning future adult and sex roles, with renunciation of the opposite-sex parent as an object of sexual strivings	Initiative versus guilt	Repression, displacement, conversion, histrionics	Histrionic personality, amnesia, anxiety states, phobias	Impulsiveness, naiveté, fickleness, conformity, shallowness, opportunism, haughtiness, assertiveness, arrogance

The Layered Personality.

How someone has gone through the stages of development determines his or her current personality. One can presumably discover the residue of earlier stages of development in current personality and behavior. Thus, a paranoid or schizoid adult personality supposedly reflects a basic fault in the earliest stage of development in which the infant did not experience the minimal love, care, and nurturance that would enable him to feel basic trust in the

world. The concept of layered personality does not imply that earlier faults cannot be repaired. However, it does imply that an adult personality with a repaired fault is not the same as one that did not need repair. Under severe frustration or anxiety, such a personality is likely to regress to an earlier stage. Also, the concept of layered personality does not imply that an unimpaired adult personality is able to completely resist becoming temporarily or permanently suspicious and paranoid if the current social environment is sufficiently dire and hostile for a prolonged period. It is natural and adaptive to become hypervigilant and suspicious if one is immersed in a dangerous hostile environment.

In this section, we discuss several important ideas deriving from the work of psychodynamic theorists that are particularly relevant to conflict practitioners. Undoubtedly, many more ideas could be expressed in a detailed and comprehensive exposition of psychodynamic viewpoints than we attempt to present in this chapter.

Conflict with Another Can Lead to Intrapsychic Conflict and Anxiety.

People may feel anxious because they sense they are unable to control their destructive or evil impulses toward the other in a heated conflict. Or the conflict may lead to a sense of helplessness and vulnerability if they feel overwhelmed by the power and strength of the other. Freud called the first type of internal conflict id-superego conflict (between a primitive impulse and conscience) and the second type an ego-reality conflict (between an immature self and a threatening reality). Later psychoanalysts used somewhat different language, speaking of a conflict among “internal objects” or between internalized images of self and of significant adults (as between an evil self and a harsh

or punitive parent or a weak self and an overwhelming, controlling parent).

If the anxiety aroused by the conflict with another is intense, the individual may rely on unconscious defense mechanisms to screen it out in an attempt to reduce the anxiety. Anxiety is most likely to be aroused if one's basic security, self-conception, self-worth, or social identity is threatened. Defense mechanisms are pathological or ineffective if they create the conditions that produce anxiety, thus requiring continued use of the defense. For example, a student who may be anxious about his intellectual abilities avoids studying and as a consequence does poorly in his course work. He rationalizes that his poor grades are due to lack of motivation and effort. His grades further his anxiety about his ability, which in turn fuels his defenses of avoidance and rationalization. The defenses would not be pathological if in fact external circumstances had prevented him from studying and, given the opportunity, he would have put much effort into his studies.

The defense mechanisms that people use are determined in part by their layered personality, which may have given rise to a characterological tendency to employ certain defense mechanisms rather than others, and also in part by the situation they confront. Psychoanalysts have identified many defense mechanisms; they are usually discussed in relation to intrapsychic conflict. We believe that they are also applicable in interpersonal and other external conflict. We have space to discuss only a number of the important ones for understanding conflict with others (see Fenichel, 1945, and Freud, 1937, for fuller discussions):

- *Denial* occurs when it is too disturbing to recognize the existence of a conflict (as between husband and wife about their affection toward one another, so they deny it

—repressing it so that it remains unconscious, or suppressing it so they do not think about it).

- *Avoidance* involves not facing the conflict, even when you are fully aware of it. To support avoidance, you develop ever-changing rationalizations for not facing the conflict ("I'm too tired," "This is not the right timing," "She's not ready," "It won't do any good").
- *Projection* allows denial of faults in yourself. It involves projecting or attributing your own faults to the other ("You're too hostile," "You don't trust me," "You're to blame, not me," "I'm attacking to prevent you from attacking me"). Suspicion, hostility, vulnerability, hypervigilance, and helplessness, as well as attacking or withdrawing from the potential attack of the other, are often associated with this defense.
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- *Reaction formation* involves taking on the attributes and characteristics of the other with whom you are in conflict. The conflict is masked by agreement with or submission to the other by flattering and ingratiating yourself with the other. A child who likes to be messy but is anxious about her mother's angry reactions may become excessively neat and finicky in a way that is annoying to her mother.
- *Displacement* involves changing the topic of the conflict or changing the party with whom you engage in conflict. Thus, if it is too painful to express openly your hurt and

anger toward your spouse because he is not sufficiently affectionate, you may constantly attack him as being too stingy with money. If it is too dangerous to express your anger toward your exploitative boss, you may direct it at a subordinate who annoys you.

- *Counterphobic defenses* entail denial of anxiety about conflict by aggressively seeking it out—by being confrontational, challenging, or having a chip on your shoulder.
- *Escalation* of the importance of the conflict is a complex mechanism that entails narcissistic self-focus on your own needs with inattention to the other's needs, histrionic intensity of emotional expressiveness and calling attention to yourself, and demanding needfulness. The needs involved in the conflict become life-or-death issues, the emotions expressed are intense, and the other person must give in. The function of this defense is to get the other to feel that your urgent needs must have highest priority.
- In *intellectualization and minimization* of the importance of the conflict, you do not feel the intensity of your needs intellectually but instead experience the conflict with little emotion. You focus on details and side issues, making the central issue from your perspective in the conflict seem unimportant to yourself and the other.

The psychoanalytical emphasis on intrapsychic conflict, anxiety, and defense mechanisms highlights the importance of understanding the interplay between internal conflict and the external conflict with another. Thus, if an external conflict elicits anxiety and defensiveness, the anxious party is likely to project onto, transfer, or attribute to the other characteristics similar to those of internalized significant others who in the past elicited similar anxiety in unresolved earlier conflict. Similarly, the anxious party may

unconsciously attribute to himself the characteristics he had in the earlier conflict. Thus, if you are made very anxious by a conflict with a supervisor (you feel your basic security is threatened), you may distort your perception of the supervisor and what she is saying so that you unconsciously experience the conflict as similar to unresolved conflict between your mother and yourself as a child.

If you or the other is acting defensively, it is important to understand what is making you or her anxious, what threat is being experienced. The sense of threat, anxiety, and defensiveness hampers developing a productive and cooperative problem-solving orientation toward the conflict. Similarly, transference reactions—for example, reacting to the other as though she were similar to your parent—produces a distorted perception of the other and interferes with realistic, effective problem solving. You can sometimes tell when the other is projecting a false image onto you by your own countertransference reaction: you feel that she is attempting to induce you to enact a role that feels inappropriate in your interactions with her. You can sometimes become aware of projecting a false image onto the other by recognizing that other people do not see her this way or that you are defensive and anxious in your response to her with no apparent justification.

Irrational Deterrents to Negotiation.

There are many reasons that otherwise intelligent and sane individuals may persist in behaviors that perpetuate a destructive conflict harmful to their rational interests. Following are some of the common reasons

- Perpetuating the conflict enables one to blame one’s own inadequacies, difficulties, and problems on the other so that one can avoid confronting the necessity of changing oneself. Thus, in the couple I (M.D.) treated (see the

Introduction to this Handbook), the wife perceived herself to be a victim and felt that her failure to achieve her professional goals was due to her husband's unfair treatment of her as exemplified by his unwillingness to share responsibilities for the household and child care. Blaming her husband provided her with a means of avoiding her own apprehensions about whether she personally had the abilities and courage to fulfill her aspirations. Similarly, the husband who provoked continuous criticism from his wife for his domineering, imperious behavior employed criticisms to justify his emotional withdrawal, thus enabling him to avoid dealing with his anxieties about personal intimacy and emotional closeness. Even though the wife's accusations concerning her husband's behavior were largely correct, as were the husband's toward her, each had an investment in maintaining the other's noxious behavior because of the defensive self-justifications such behavior provided.

- Perpetuating the conflict enables one to maintain and enjoy skills, attitudes, roles, resources, and investments that one has developed and built up during the course of one's history. The wife's role as "victim" and the husband's role as "unappreciated emperor" had long histories. They had well-honed skills and attitudes in relation to their respective roles that made their roles very familiar and natural to enact in times of stress. Less familiar roles, in which one's skills and attitudes are not well developed, are often avoided because of the fear of facing the unknown. Analogous to similar social institutions, these personality institutions also seek out opportunities for exercise and self-justification, and in so doing they help to maintain and perpetuate themselves.
- Perpetuating the conflict enables one to have a sense of excitement, purpose, coherence, and unity that is

otherwise lacking in one's life. Some people feel aimless, dissatisfied, at odds with themselves, bored, unfocused, and unenergetic. Conflict, especially if it has dangerous undertones, can serve to counteract these feelings: it can give a heightened sense of purpose as well as unity and can also be energizing as one mobilizes oneself for struggle against the other. For depressed people who lack self-esteem, conflict can be an addictive stimulant to mask an underlying depression.

- Perpetuating the conflict enables one to obtain support and approval from interested third parties. Friends and relatives on each side may buttress the opposing positions of the conflicting parties with moral, material, and ideological support. For the conflicting parties, changing their positions and behaviors may entail the dangers of loss of esteem, rejection, and even attack from others who are vitally significant to them.

How does a therapist or other third party help the conflicting parties overcome such deterrents to recognizing that their bitter, stalemated conflict no longer serves their real interests? The general answer, which is quite often difficult to implement in practice, is to help each of the conflicting parties change in such a way that the conflict is no longer maintained by conditions in the parties that are extrinsic to the conflict. In essence, this entails helping each of the conflicting parties to achieve the self-esteem and self-image that would make them no longer need the destructive conflict process as a defense against their sense of personal inadequacy, their fear of taking on new and unfamiliar roles, their feeling of purposelessness and boredom, and their fears of rejection and attack if they act independently of others. Fortunately the strength of the irrational factors binding the conflicting parties to a destructive conflict process is often considerably weaker than the motivation arising from the real havoc and distress resulting from the

conflict. Emphasis on this reality, if combined with a sense of hope that the situation can be changed for the better, provides a good basis for negotiation.

Summary and Critique of the Psychodynamic Approach.

We have not attempted to present an exposition of the specific theories of the many contributors to the development of psychoanalytical theory, from Freud to today. Rather, we seek to draw from these theories some of the major ideas that are useful to conflict practitioners and that can be briefly presented.

Psychoanalysis has been criticized, particularly the earlier Freudian version, which no longer seems appropriate in light of the changes made by later theorists: it is too biologically deterministic, too sexist, too pessimistic, and too focused on sex and aggression as the motives of behavior, as well as not oriented at all to positive motivations, to the learning and development of cognitive functions or to the broader societal and cultural determinants of personality development. Nevertheless, it is a useful framework for understanding issues that we all confront during development (security, control and power, sexual identity, transformation from childhood to adulthood) and the problems and personality residues that may result from inadequate care and harsh circumstances during our early years.

The discussion of psychodynamics in this section has focused on the psychodynamics of individuals in conflict situations. However, psychodynamic theory has also been used to throw light on issues of war and peace (Gratch, 2012), the Arab-Israeli conflict (Falk, 2004), international relations (Volkan, 1988, 2009), the rise of fascism (Reich, 1946), Hitler’s ideology (Koenigsberg, 1975), as well as on many other topics related to conflict.

Psychoanalysis is not a scientific theory that was developed and tested in a scientific laboratory, as is the case for most of the theories presented elsewhere in this Handbook. Rather, it is a mosaic of subtheories mainly developed in clinically treating psychopathology. Many of its concepts are not defined so as to indicate how they can be observed and measured. It is instead an encompassing intellectual framework for thinking about personality and its development, one that has given rise to a variety of useful subtheories and ideas, many of which are testable and indeed have been tested in research.

Need Theories

Under this heading, we consider some of the ideas of Henry A. Murray and Abraham Maslow, the most influential of the need theorists.

Murray's Need Theory of Personality.

Murray's approach to personality was influenced by the work of Jung, Freud, and their successors, and he was one of the first psychologists to translate psychodynamic concepts and ideas into testable hypotheses. Unlike their concern with the abnormal, Murray's focus was on the normal personality. The most distinctive feature of his theory is its complex system of motivational concepts. In his theory, needs arise not only from internal processes but also from environmental forces.

Murray's most influential contribution to personality theory is the concept of the individual as a striving, seeking being: his orientation reflects primarily a motivational psychology. As he wrote, "The most important thing to discover about an individual . . . is the superordinate directionality (or directionalities) of his activities, whether mental, verbal, or physical" (1951, p. 276). This concern with directionality led

him to develop the most complete taxonomy of needs ever created.

Need is a force in the brain region that organizes perception, thought, and action so as to change an existing unsatisfactory condition. Needs can be evoked by environmental as well as internal processes. They vary in strength from person to person and from situation to situation. Murray hypothesized the existence of about two dozen needs and characterized them in some detail. He insisted that adequate understanding of human motivation must incorporate a sufficiently large number of variables to reflect, at least in part, the tremendous complexity of human motives.

Working from Murray's theory, McClelland and his colleagues (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, and Lowell, 1953; McClelland, 1971) did extensive research on four basic needs: achievement, affiliation, power, and autonomy. Those high in need of achievement are concerned with improving their performance, do best on a moderately challenging task, prefer personal responsibility, and seek performance feedback. Persons rated high in the need for affiliation are concerned with maintaining or repairing relationships, are rewarded by being with friends, and seek approval from friends and strangers. Those in need of power are concerned with their reputation and find themselves motivated in a situation presenting hierarchical conditions. In their desire to attain prestige, they are likely to engage in competition more than the other types do. Finally, those with high autonomy needs want to be independent, unattached, and free of restraint.

Murray's theory is a rich and complex view of personality. It can help practitioners become aware of the diversity of human needs and their expression, as well as the external circumstances that tend to evoke them and the childhood experiences that lead individuals to varied life striving. Its

major deficiency is the lack of a well-defined learning and developmental theory of what determines the acquisition and strength of an individual's needs.

Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs.

Although Abraham Maslow, early in his professional career, coauthored an excellent textbook on abnormal psychology with a psychoanalyst, he came to feel that a psychology based on the study of the abnormal was bound to give a pessimistic, limited view of the human personality and not take into account altruism, love, joy, truth, justice, beauty, and other positive features of human life. Maslow was one of the founders of the humanistic school of psychology, which emphasizes the positive aspects of human nature.

Maslow is best known for his postulation of a hierarchy of human needs (Maslow, 1954); our discussion in this chapter is limited to this area of his work. In order of priority, he identified five types of needs:

- *Physiological needs* —for air, water, and food and the need to maintain equilibrium in the blood and body tissues in relation to various substances and types of cell. Frustration of these needs leads to apathy, illness, and death.
- *Safety needs* —for security, freedom from fear and anxiety, shelter, protection from danger, order, and predictable satisfaction of one's basic needs. Here, frustration leads to fear, anxiety, rage, and psychosis.
- *Belongingness and love needs* —to be part of a group (a family, a circle of friends), to feel cared for, to care for others, to be intimate with another, and so forth. Frustration of these needs produces alienation, loneliness, and various forms of neurosis.

- *Esteem needs* —for self-esteem (self-confidence, mastery, worth, strength, and the like) and social esteem (respect, dignity, appreciation, and so on). Feelings of inadequacy, inferiority, helplessness, incompetence, shame, guilt, and the like are associated with frustration in this category.
- *Self-actualization needs*— to achieve one's full potential in relation to others, in developing one's own talents, and in taking part in one's community (includes metaneeds such as truth, justice, beauty, curiosity, and playfulness). Frustration of the self-actualization need leads to restlessness, depression, and loss of zest in life.

Maslow considered the first four on this list to be deficiency needs, arising from a lack of what a person needs. Once these basic needs are all reasonably satisfied, we get in touch with our needs for self-actualization and pursue their satisfaction. Although Maslow initially postulated needs as hierarchically ordered, he later accepted the view that in reality, some people violate the hierarchy—say, putting themselves in danger and going hungry to protect someone they love or a group with which they identify.

One interesting, albeit controversial, perspective on Maslow's theory queries the function of hierarchical order, particularly in relation to applying the definition of self-transcendence to negative consequences, or "negative" self-transcendence (Fields, 2004; Koltko-Rivera, 2006). If self-transcendence is defined as surrendering one's personal needs to a cause beyond the self or a greater good, then these theorists ask whether we should include not only Gandhi but also suicide terrorists as self-transcendent individuals. This speculation brings up the question of order in Maslow's theory: suicide terrorists are often young and would appear unlikely to have successfully completed the lower motivational levels in the hierarchy. Koltko highlights the need for further exploration concerning individuals who

step out of sequence in fulfilling Maslow's needs and questions whether this leads to a negative pole of self-transcendence.

Maslow's theory, or a variation of it, is the foundation of the "human needs" theory of John Burton (1990) and his colleagues and students. The fundamental thesis of this approach is that a conflict is not resolved constructively unless the parties' basic human needs are brought out and dealt with to the satisfaction of each party. The application of this idea to conflict is called the "problem-solving workshop." Burton initially developed it while he was serving as a consultant to the conflict in Cyprus between the Greeks and the Turks; subsequently, it was systematically developed by Kelman (1986) and his colleagues. It entails creating conditions that enable the participants to express their real needs openly and honestly, and then try to work out a resolution that meets the basic needs of both sides. (See also mention of this in chapter 10.)

Social Learning Theory

In Bandura's interactionist perspective on personality (Bandura, 1986), the individual is a thinking person who can impose some direction on the forces from within and the pressures from the external environment. Bandura asserts that behavior is a function of a person in her environment: cognition, other personal traits, and the environment mutually influence one another. People learn by observing the behavior of others and the different consequences attending these behaviors. Learning requires that the person be aware of appropriate responses and value the consequences of the behavior in question.

Unlike a number of other theorists, Bandura does not believe that aggression is innate. Through imitation of social models, people learn aggression, altruism, and other forms of social behavior as well as constructive and destructive

ways of dealing with conflict. The ability to imitate another's behavior depends on the characteristics of the model (whether or not the model makes her behavior unambiguous and clearly observable), the attention of the observer (whether or not the observer is sharply focused on the model's behavior), memory processes (whether or not the observer is intelligent and able to recall what has been observed), and behavior capabilities (whether or not the observer has the physical and intellectual capability to reproduce the behavior observed).

Assuming that one has the capability, readiness to reproduce the behavior of the model is determined by factors such as whether the model has been perceived to obtain positive or negative consequences as a result of behavior, the attractiveness and power of the model, the vividness of behavior, and the intrinsic attractiveness of behavior that has been modeled. Thus, a boy may be predisposed to engage in aggressive behavior (using a handgun to threaten a rival) if he has seen a prestigious older figure (his father, older brother, a group leader, a movie star) engage in such behavior and feel good about doing so. Access to a handgun ensures that the boy has the capability of acting on his aggressive predisposition.

Developing a sense of self-efficacy or confidence in these competencies requires one to (1) use these skills to master tasks and overcome the obstacles posed by the environment, (2) cultivate belief in the capacity to use one's competencies effectively, and (3) identify realistic goals and opportunities to use one's skills effectively. Realistic encouragement to achieve an ambitious but attainable goal promotes successful experience, which aids in developing the sense of self-efficacy; social prodding to achieve unattainable goals often produces a sense of failure and undermines self-efficacy.

We selectively emphasize Bandura's concepts of observational learning and self-efficacy because of their relevance to conflict. Given that most people acquire their knowledge, attitudes, and skills in managing conflict through observational learning, some people have inadequate knowledge, inappropriate attitudes, and poor skills for resolving their conflicts constructively while others are better prepared to do so. It is very much a function of the models they have been exposed to in their families, school, communities, and the media. It is our impression that many people have been exposed to poor models. When this is the case, making changes in the ways they handle conflict requires relearning, a process involving commitment and effort.

Relearning involves helping people become fully aware of how they currently behave in conflict situations, exposing them to models of constructive behavior, and extending repeated opportunities in various situations to enact and be rewarded for constructive behavior. In the course of relearning, people should become uncomfortable and dissatisfied with their old, ineffective ways of managing conflict so that they may develop a sense of self-efficacy in new, constructive methods of conflict resolution.

Social Situations and Psychological Orientations

Although Deutsch is not classified as a personality theorist, his concept of situationally linked psychological orientations is a useful and somewhat different perspective. He employs the term *psychological orientation* to refer to a more or less consistent complex of cognitive, motivational, and moral orientations to a given situation that serve to guide one's behavior and response to a particular situation. He assumes that the causal arrow between psychological orientation and social situation is bidirectional; a given psychological orientation can lead to a given type of social relation or be

induced by that type of social relation (Deutsch, 1982, 1985, 2012). With Wish and Kaplan (Wish, Deutsch, and Kaplan, 1976), he identified five basic dimensions of interpersonal relations:

1. *Cooperation-competition* . Social relations such as “close friends,” “teammates,” and “coworkers” are usually on the cooperative side of this dimension, while “enemies,” “political opponents,” and “rivals” are usually on the competitive side. See chapter 1 for further discussion.
2. *Power distribution (equal versus unequal)* . “Business partners,” “business rivals,” and “close friends” are typically on the equal side, while “parent and child,” “teacher and student,” and “boss and employee” are on the unequal side. See chapter 6 for further discussion.
3. *Task oriented versus social-emotional* . Interpersonal relations such as “lovers” and “close friends” are social-emotional, while “task force,” “negotiators,” and “business rivals” are task oriented.
4. *Formal versus informal* . Relations with a bureaucracy tend to be formal and regulated by externally determined social rules and conventions, while the relationship norms between intimates are informally determined by the participants.
5. *Intensity and importance* . This dimension has to do with the intensity or superficiality of the relationship. Important relationships, as between parent and child or between lovers, are on the important side, while unimportant relationships, as between casual acquaintances or between salesperson and customer, are on the superficial side.

The character of a given social relationship can be identified by locating it on all the dimensions. Thus, an intimate relationship between lovers is typically characterized in the

United States as relatively cooperative, equal, social-emotional, informal, and intense. Similarly, a sadomasochistic relationship between a bully and his victim is usually identified as competitive, unequal, social-emotional, informal, and intense. Deutsch indicates that a distinctive psychological orientation is associated with the particular location of a social relationship along the five dimensions. Positing that there are three components of a psychological orientation that are mutually consistent, he describes them as follows:

- *Cognitive orientation* consists of structured expectations about oneself, the social environment, and the people involved. This makes it possible for one to interpret and respond quickly to what is going on in a specific situation. If your expectation leads to inappropriate interpretation and response, then you will likely revise that expectation. Or if the circumstances confronting you are sufficiently malleable, your interpretation and response to them may help to shape their form. Thus, what you expect to happen in a situation involving negotiations about your salary with your boss is likely to be quite different from what you expect in a situation in which you and your spouse are making love.
- *Motivational orientation* alerts one to the possibility that in the situation, certain types of need may be gratified or frustrated. It orients you to questions such as, “What do I want here, and how do I get it?” “What is to be valued or feared in this relationship?” In a business negotiation, you are oriented to the satisfaction of financial needs, not affection; in a love relationship, the opposite is true.
- *Moral orientation* focuses on the mutual obligations, rights, and entitlements of the people involved in the relationship. It implies that in a relationship you and the other mutually perceive the obligations you have to one

> another and mutually respect the framework of social norms that define what is fair or unfair in the interactions and outcomes of everyone involved.

To illustrate Deutsch's ideas, we contrast the psychological orientations in two relations: friend-friend and police officer–thief. For practical purposes, we limit our discussion of the cooperative-competitive, power, and task-oriented versus social emotional dimensions.

Friends have a cooperative cognitive orientation: "we are for one another." The motivational orientation is of affection, affiliation, and trust, and the moral orientation is one of mutual benevolence, respect, and equality. In contrast, the police officer and thief have a competitive cognitive orientation (what's good for the other is bad for me); the motivational orientation is of hostility, suspicion, and aggressiveness or defensiveness; the moral orientation involved is that of a win-lose struggle to be conducted under either fair rules or a no-holds-barred one in which any means to defeat the other can be employed.

Friends are of equal power and employ their power cooperatively. Their cognitive orientation to power and influence relies on its positive forms (persuasion, benefit, legitimate power); their motivational orientation supports mutual esteem, respect, and status for both parties; their moral orientation is that of egalitarianism. In contrast, the police officer and thief are of unequal power. The officer is cognitively oriented toward using negative forms of power (coercion and harm), with a motivational orientation to dominate, command, and control. Morally, the officer feels superior and ready to exclude the thief from the former's moral community (those who are entitled to care and justice). In cognitive response to the low-power position, the thief either tries to improve power relative to the police officer or submits to the role as one who is under the

officer’s control. Thus, the thief’s motivational orientation may be rebellious and resistant (expressing the need for autonomy and inferiority avoidance) or passive and submissive (expressing the need for abasement). This moral orientation is either to exclude the officer from the thief’s own moral community or to “identify with the aggressor” (Freud, 1937), adopting the moral authority of the more powerful for oneself.

Friends have a social-emotional orientation, while the police officer and thief have a task-oriented relationship to one another. In the latter, one is cognitively oriented to making decisions about which means are most efficient in achieving one’s ends; the task-oriented relationship requires an analytical attitude to compare the effectiveness of various means. One is oriented to the other impersonally as an instrument to achieve one’s ends. The motivational orientation evoked by a task-oriented relationship is that of achievement, and the moral orientation toward the other is utilitarian. In contrast, friends have a cognitive orientation in which the unique personal qualities and identity of the other are of paramount importance. Motivations characteristic of such relations include affiliation, affection, esteem, play, and nurturance-succorance. The moral obligation to a friend is to esteem the other as a person and help when the other is in need.

Deutsch’s view of the relation between social situation and psychological orientation is not only that a particular situation induces a particular psychological orientation, but also that individuals vary in their psychological orientation and personality. Based on their life experiences, some people tend to be cooperative, egalitarian, and social-emotional in their orientation, while others tend to be competitive, power seeking, and task oriented. For example, in many cultures, women, compared to men, tend to have relatively strong orientations of the former type

(cooperative and so on), while men have relatively stronger orientations of the latter (competitive) type.

Personality disposition influences the choice of social situations and the social relations that one seeks out or avoids. Given the opportunity, people select social relations and situations that are most compatible with their dominant psychological orientations. They also seek to alter or leave a social relation or situation if it is incompatible with their disposition. If this is impossible, they employ the alternative, latent psychological orientations within themselves that are compatible with the social situation.

Knowledge of the dimensions of social relations can be helpful to a conflict practitioner in analyzing both the characteristics of a situation and the psychological orientations the parties are likely to display in the circumstances. It is also useful in characterizing individuals in terms of their dominant psychological orientations to social situations. It should be noted, however, that Deutsch's ideas are not well specified about what happens if the individual's disposition and the situational requirements are incompatible.

TRAIT APPROACHES

The second major approach to the study of personality is the nomothetic, exemplified by trait research and its application to behavior. *Traits* can be defined as words summarizing a set of behaviors or describing a consistent response to relationships and situations as measured through an assessment instrument (Martin, 1988). It is assumed that in well-designed and tested assessment instruments, many individuals can validly report social-emotional responses and behaviors that are broadly consistent across situations (some characteristics are less stable across situations than others). Measurement of individual characteristics is

widespread and has proven to be quite useful in a number of situations, as when a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist diagnoses a patient and prescribes treatment based on the results of a battery of trait-assessment instruments in addition to a diagnostic interview. Research studies frequently use personality measures to predict behavior under designated situational constraints. Personality assessment may also be extremely useful in placing children or adults in the most effective educational settings or identifying a cognitive mediator that affects behavior, such as an individual's attribution of intentionality as a reaction to imagined hostility from another.

Because our interests center on multitrait measurement, we briefly mention single-trait approaches and refer readers to other sources for in-depth discussion. The single-trait approach to studying conflict process and outcome seeks to understand social behavior in terms of relatively stable traits or dispositions residing within the individual; it is now considered to have limited usefulness. The trait approach typically focuses on one or more enduring predispositions of specific types: motivational tendencies (aggression, power, pride, fear), character traits (authoritarianism, Machiavellianism, locus of control, dogmatism), cognitive tendencies (cognitive simplicity versus complexity, open versus closed mind), values and ideologies, self-conceptions and bases of self-esteem, and learned habits and skills of coping. (See Bell and Blakeney, 1977; Neale and Bazerman, 1983; Rotter, 1980; and Stevens, Bavetta, and Gist, 1993, for discussions of some single-trait measures.)

The now-dominant approach to explaining social behavior is one that seeks to understand its regularity in terms of the interacting and reciprocally influencing contribution of both situational and dispositional determinants. There are several well-supported propositions in this approach:

1. Individuals vary considerably in terms of whether they manifest consistency of personality in their social behavior across situations—for example, those who monitor and regulate their behavioral choices on the basis of situational information show relatively little consistency (Snyder and Ickes, 1985).
2. Some situations have strong characteristics, in which little individual variation in behavior occurs despite differences in individual traits (Mischel, 1977).
3. A situation can evoke dispositions because of their apparent relevance to it; subsequently, the situation becomes salient as a guide to behavior and permits modes of behaving that are differentially responsive to individual differences (Bem and Lenney, 1976).
4. A situation can evoke self-focusing tendencies that make predispositions salient to the self, and as a consequence, these predispositions can become influential determinants of behavior in situations where such a self-focus is not evoked.
5. There is a tendency for congruence between personal disposition and situational characteristics (Deutsch, 1982, 1985) such that someone with a given disposition tends to seek out the type of social situation that fits the disposition; people tend to mold their dispositions to fit a situation that they find difficult to leave or alter. That is, the causal arrow goes both ways between situational characteristics and personality disposition.

Multitrait Measures of Personality and Conflict

Given the importance of creating clearer definitions and comprehensive measures of personality, a number of researchers have worked to develop reliable multidimensional personality assessment instruments. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to present an overview of

these instruments; however, we describe what has become a fundamental model of adult personality (Antonioni, 1998; Digman, 1990).

The Five-Factor Model.

In an attempt to describe personality more completely than is afforded by individual traits, Costa and McCrae (1985) developed the *five-factor model* (FFM) of personality, composed of five independent dimensions: neuroticism, extraversion, openness, conscientiousness, and agreeableness. Although there has recently been research conducted to show that the theory is applicable to young children (Grist and McCord, 2010; Grist, Socha, and McCord, 2012) as well, we concentrate on the adult personality in this chapter:

- *Neuroticism* . This is a tendency to experience unpleasant emotions. It encompasses six subscales: anxiety, hostility, depression, self-consciousness, impulsiveness, and vulnerability (e.g., panic in emergencies). People with strong neurotic tendencies are thought to be less able to control their emotions and cope effectively with stress (Costa and McCrae, 1985). With respect to interpersonal conflict, individuals high in levels of angry hostility, depression, vulnerability, and self-consciousness might find conflict threatening, prompting them to avoid conflict situations or to use contentious tactics as a reaction to the threat. People with low neurotic tendencies would be less likely to interpret the situation in terms of their own emotional distortion and perhaps use more constructive strategies.
- *Extraversion* . Differences in the desire for social activity are incorporated in this scale, which includes interpersonal traits such as warmth, gregariousness, assertiveness, activity, excitement seeking, and interest

in other people. Although extraverts are motivated by both affiliation and social dominance, it has been suggested that during conflict, the extravert's motives for dominance may be stronger than the desire for communion (Bono, Boles, Judge, and Lauver, 2002). Accordingly, an individual's scoring on specific extraversion facets (warmth, assertiveness, and so on) may be indicative of the conflict goals (social dominance or affiliation) most likely to be pursued during a conflict episode.

- *Openness* . Openness to experience denotes receptiveness to ideas and experiences, with subscales of openness to fantasy, aesthetics, feelings, actions, ideas, and values. This trait is thought to involve intellectual activity, originality, a need for variety and novel experiences, and cognitive complexity. With respect to conflict situations, one would expect open individuals to prefer strategies that involve flexibility, generation of alternatives, and consideration of the other's view—strategies used in direct, constructive negotiation. Closed individuals tend to emphasize order and conformity and a need for closure. They are less flexible and have more difficulty understanding others' points of view. Closed individuals find unresolved conflict upsetting and prefer an efficient, quick solution, perhaps being more likely to impose their own resolution.
- *Conscientiousness* . This dimension refers to achievement striving, competence, and self-discipline. Those low on this scale may be disorganized or lazy, negligent, and prone to quitting rather than persevering. Those on the high end of this dimension are well prepared and well organized, and they strive for excellence. Given these characteristics, those high in conscientiousness might be expected to prefer dealing with conflict directly, where low scorers might be

expected to either use attacking strategies or avoid conflict situations altogether.

- *Agreeableness* . This refers to persons who are trusting, generous, cooperative, lenient, good natured, and sympathetic to others' needs. High agreeableness leads individuals to have sympathy and concern for others, but it also may inhibit assertiveness or cause them to defer to others. In a conflict situation, this may result in decisions that fail to meet their own best interests. Overall, those who score high on such facets as trust, altruism, and compliance would be expected to use constructive strategies such as negotiation and to be concerned with interpersonal relationships. Low scorers are suspicious, antagonistic, critical, irritable, and self-centered. These individuals are prone to express anger in conflict situations, to be guarded in expressing their own feelings, and to compete rather than cooperate with other people. Research indicates that low scorers experience conflict more frequently (Suls, Martin, and David, 1998).

The FFM dimensions have been reliably demonstrated to occur in an impressive number of groups, including children, women and men, nonwhite and white respondents, and people from such varied linguistic and cultural backgrounds as Dutch, German, Japanese, Chinese, and Filipino. Furthermore, the personality trait constructs of the FFM reflect many of the personality categories used in psychotherapy, the difference being that the FFM dimensions are more testable in research and cover a broader range of human behavior than the attributes of personality emerging from the study of psychopathology.

We focus on the five-factor trait model to offer information for conflict resolution because it is

- More comprehensive than other trait models of personality in incorporating a wide range of human response and behavior. Most other inventories can be subsumed within its dimensions.
- Inclusive of normal behaviors as well as the extremes to be found in personality disorders.
- A robust measure of personality that has been validated in a variety of languages and cultures.
- A personality approach that is straightforward, fairly easily understood, and one of the dominant models of personality used in current research (Park and Antonioni, 2007; Grist and McCord, 2010; Jensen-Campbell, Gleason, Adams, and Malcolm, 2003; Moberg, 2001; Sibley and Duckitt, 2008; Wood and Bell, 2008).

Obviously, nonpersonality factors such as cognitive distortion, dysfunctional belief, personal evaluation, intelligence, and situational demands need to be examined along with the five personality factors to fully account for behavior. However, dismissing the multitrait approach would be to lose sight of its merit for use by laypersons without an advanced degree in personality psychology or psychotherapy. In methodologically appropriate use, the FFM appears to offer valuable information about the conflict resolution process for practitioners, as we discuss below.

Measures of Conflict Style.

A number of similar approaches to measuring individual styles of managing conflict have been developed (Blake and Mouton, 1964; Kilmann and Thomas, 1977; Rahim, 1986; Thomas, 1988). Although the early model of Kilmann and Thomas was named “the MODE,” these models are now commonly called “dual concern models” (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1994). They have their origins in Blake and Mouton’s two-dimensional managerial grid, in which a manager’s

style was characterized in terms of the two separate dimensions of having a concern for people and a concern for production of results.

The dimensions in the dual-concern model of conflict style are concern about others' outcomes and concern about own outcomes. High concern for the other as well as for oneself is linked to a collaborative problem-solving style. High concern for self and low concern for the other is connected with a contending, competitive approach. High concern for the other and low concern for the self is associated with yielding or submission. Low concern for both self and the other is associated with avoiding behavior.

Although additional work remains to be done on the measures of conflict style, it is likely that conflict behavior is determined by both situational and dispositional influences. Research by Rahim (1986) indicates that a manager in conflict with a supervisor resorts to yielding, while with peers, the manager employs compromising and with subordinates problem solving.

Personality and Conflict Resolution Strategies.

In research conducted by Sandy and Boardman (2006), 237 graduate students with no conflict resolution training experience were asked to fill out the NEO-PI-R FFM questionnaire (Costa and McCrae, 1985; Costa, McCrae, and Dye, 1991). Following this, subjects were asked to select three conflicts they had experienced during the previous three months. Each week for three successive weeks, they were given a comprehensive questionnaire and asked to describe one conflict (open-ended question) and report the strategies they used to handle it using both open-ended questions and the Kilmann and Thomas (1977) dual concerns model instrument. They also characterized their relationship with the other person in the conflict and, using five-point rating scales, indicated the size and importance of

the conflict. In addition, they reported whether the conflict was resolved and whether the conflict strengthened or weakened their relationship.

The types of conflict reported included relationship issues (13 percent), another person's failure to meet one's own expectations (18 percent), discourteous or annoying behavior (16 percent), disagreements about what should be done (3 percent), one's own failure to meet another's expectations (6 percent), being offended by what another person said (14 percent), and displaced anger (15 percent). Conflicts were with relatives (17 percent), significant others (17 percent), friends (36 percent), acquaintances (12 percent), and people in the workplace, for example, bosses or subordinates (16 percent).

Factor and reliability analyses of the responses to the dual concerns instrument indicated that these subjects used four strategies for handling conflict, which we have labeled negotiation, contending, avoidance, and attack/blame. Negotiation consisted of strategies such as, "I sought a mutually beneficial solution," and, "I tried to understand him or her." Contending strategies included, "I used threats," and, "I was sarcastic in my sense of humor." Avoidance covered items such as, "I tried to change the subject," and, "I denied there was any problem in the conflict." Finally, attack/blame included, "I criticized an aspect of his or her personality," and, "I blamed him or her for causing the conflict."

Big Five Dimensions.

Negotiation Strategy.

Personality facet scales from the FFM dimensions formed predictive clusters of individual characteristics that tended to be associated with the dominant strategy used in the conflict reported. For example, those who used negotiation

strategies scored high on agreeableness (particularly facets such as trust, altruism, and compliance). Conversely, they tended to score low on neuroticism (involving such facets as angry hostility, depression, self-consciousness, and vulnerability).

The positive association between a collaborative conflict resolution strategy and the personality characteristic of agreeableness has also been found in other investigations of personality and conflict resolution style (Park and Antonioni, 2007; Bono et al., 2002; Wood and Bell, 2008). Speculation is that agreeable persons may be more likely to make positive attributions for behavior others might consider provocative (Graziano, Jensen-Campbell, and Hair, 1996) and also may experience more positive affect when engaging in cooperative actions.

Contending Strategy.

Personality facets influencing choice of a contending conflict resolution strategy include low scores on the conscientiousness domain (competence, duty, self-discipline, and deliberation); low scores on agreeableness (straightforwardness, trust, altruism, compliance and modesty); low scores on openness (ideas and values); and low scores on extraversion (warmth).

Higher scores on all the facets of the neuroticism domain were related to the choice of contending as a conflict resolution strategy. Other work in this area has found that neurotic individuals are more likely to employ attacking strategies or avoid conflicts altogether (Moberg, 2001). Such characteristics as impulsivity and emotional instability make the neurotic person more likely to attack the other person or, conversely, to avoid the conflict.

Avoidance Strategy.

Low scores on facets of the conscientiousness domain (competence, self-discipline, and order) and the extraversion domain (warmth, gregariousness, and assertiveness) are associated with people who use avoidance as a strategy for handling conflict. Avoidance is also used when individuals have higher scores on facets of neuroticism (angry hostility, depression, self-consciousness, and vulnerability).

Attack Strategy.

Low scores on facets (competence, self-discipline, and order) of the conscientiousness domain are associated with the use of an attacking or blame type of behavior in conflict situations. The same is true for low scores on agreeableness facets (straightforwardness, trust, compliance, and tenderness) and the actions facet of the openness domain. High scores on facets of neuroticism (anxiety, angry hostility, depression, self-consciousness, and vulnerability) are also associated with the use of attacking or blame to deal with conflict.

Situation versus Personality

Using a repeated measures analysis, we examined the influence of personality on consistency of conflict resolution strategy across situations or different conflicts described. Conflict resolution strategies were significantly different across situations, indicating that situational constraints were more influential in these cases in determining a conflict management approach.

Influences on Whether the Conflict Is Resolved

Importance of the Issue.

The importance of the conflict to the disputants played a significant role in whether the conflict was resolved. The

more important the conflict was to the disputants, the less likely it was to be resolved.

Personality.

Individuals scoring higher on deliberation facets (conscientiousness), self-conscious and angry hostility (neuroticism), and feelings (openness) were less likely to have resolved their conflicts than those scoring in the lower group. Those scoring higher on warmth and assertiveness (extraversion) and actions (openness) were more likely to report their conflicts were resolved. What we do not know is whether their partners felt the conflict was resolved or found satisfaction in its resolution. It is likely that the attributions individuals make about any particular conflict episode are a function of their own personality, the personality of their partner, and salient factors of the situation.

Preferred Conflict Resolution Strategy

Those scoring higher on strategies such as attack, avoidance, and contending were less likely to have resolved the conflicts they described in the study. A negotiation strategy was significantly associated with resolved conflicts.

We note that the findings reported here are all statistically significant even though the correlations between personality facets and conflict behavior are low (mostly in that the ability to predict an individual’s conflict behavior from his personality measures is quite low). However, in the section that follows, we suggest that there are “difficult” or “extreme” personalities (which are relatively rare in the graduate student population that participated in this research) who are more likely to be consistent in their conflict behaviors in different situations.

Negotiating with Difficult Personalities

All too often, individuals have to negotiate with difficult people. It is often surprisingly easy to describe such individuals: people who are hostile, overly aggressive, or who explode emotionally; people who avoid conflict, avoid discussions, or resist by using passive-aggressive techniques; individuals who complain incessantly or blame others but never try to do anything about the conflict or situation; people who appear very agreeable but do not produce or follow through on what they propose; enervating, negative people who sap energy from others, claiming nothing will work and that there are no solutions; “superior” people who believe they know everything and are only too eager to tell you they do; and people who cannot make decisions, who stall, and who are indecisive (Bramson, 1981).

Drawing from past work on personality and conflict (Bramson, 1981; Heitler, 1980; Ury, 1993) as well as our own research, we offer some suggestions for coping with difficult people. As we discussed previously, the use of contentious tactics and blame is more often associated with people low in conscientiousness (e.g., self-discipline, deliberation, and competence), low in agreeableness (e.g., straightforwardness, trust, and altruism), and high in neuroticism (e.g., anxiety, angry hostility, depression, and impulsivity). Such angry, hostile people require special handling. First, it is useful to not react immediately to an attack: give the attacking party time to run down and regain emotional control. This is a critical first step, as well as difficult, because our natural tendency is to defend ourselves. William Ury (1993) calls this “going to the balcony” or choosing not to react. He describes imagining negotiating on stage and then climbing to the balcony overlooking the stage. The balcony is a metaphor for achieving a state of mental detachment necessary to arrive at constructive problem solving and regaining equilibrium.

It is not useful to argue with someone who is attacking because she cannot “hear” you anyway and it only adds fuel to the fire. If the attack does not subside, it is helpful to say (or shout) a neutral word like, “Stop! ” to break into her tantrum or take a break from the negotiation. Once the other has calmed down a bit, it is useful to state your opinions and perceptions calmly, facilitating the discussion by not arguing with her—as Ury calls it, “stepping to her side.” This means listening to her, acknowledging her feelings, and agreeing with her whenever possible to defuse negative emotions. Some hostile people, which Bramson (1981) called “snipers,” are slightly more subtle in their attacking behavior: they take potshots at you, making cutting remarks, or give you not-so-subtle digs. A helpful strategy in dealing with these people is to surface the attack, that is, do a process intervention by commenting on an observed behavior.

With respect to avoiding conflict, we found this strategy to be most often associated with low conscientiousness, low agreeableness, low extraversion, and high neuroticism. When trying to engage another who is avoiding conflict, a good strategy is to use open-ended questions and wait as calmly as you can for an answer. Many people rush to fill silences with conversation. Try to resist the temptation. If the person continues to avoid or remain silent, comment on what you are observing and end your comment with another open-ended question. If necessary, remind the other party of your resolve to solve the conflict to mutual satisfaction and try to pursue additional opportunities to engage in conversation.

Ury (1993) talks about “building a golden bridge” to help draw the other party in the direction you want him or her to move. This process has several steps: involving the other party in drafting the agreement; looking beyond obvious interests such as money to take into account more

intangible needs, such as recognition or autonomy; helping the other save face as she backs away from an initial position. The last step could involve showing how circumstances may have changed since the beginning of the negotiation or using an agreed-on standard of fairness. You may want to proceed slowly and remember that it is important to note that addressing more intangible psychological needs is critical to the process of building a bridge.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have presented several different approaches to understanding how personality may affect conflict behavior—one's own behavior as well as that of the other with whom one is in conflict.

In brief, psychodynamic theories stress the view that conflict might induce anxiety, which is likely to lead to various forms of defensive behavior, which can disrupt the constructive resolution of conflict. This approach suggests that in a conflict, it is important to know what makes you anxious (your hot spots), when you are experiencing anxiety (your symptoms of anxiety), and the defensive behaviors you tend to engage in when you are anxious. Such knowledge will help you to control your anxiety and inhibit destructive, defensive behavior during a conflict. Also, this approach suggests that you understand that the other has hot spots, which you want to avoid, and that if the other seems defensive, you might try to reduce his anxiety level by adjusting behavior on your part to make the other feel more secure.

The need theories indicate that it is important to know what needs of yourself and the other are in conflict. Your needs as well as the needs of the other may not be well represented in the positions that are expressed. Learning how to

understand the needs of the other as well as of oneself is an important conflict resolution skill that can be acquired. (See chapters 1 and 2 of this Handbook.) If the needs of the other, as well as one's own, are not respected and addressed in a conflict agreement, the agreement is not likely to last.

Trait theories indicate that people who differ in personality traits also may systematically differ in their approach to conflict and their behavior during a conflict. Again, it is worth reiterating that for most people, situational factors (the social context, the power relation, and so on) are at least as important as personality traits in determining one's conflict behavior. It is heartening to note that our own research and that of subsequent work by others have found consistent patterns in associations between personality and the choice of conflict resolution strategy. For example, there appears to be a reliable link between low conscientiousness, low agreeableness, and high neuroticism personality characteristics and the use of contentious tactics and avoidance strategies in conflict situations. Similarly, high agreeableness and low neuroticism is associated with negotiation and resolution of conflict. The value of being aware of one's personality-driven behavior tendencies lies in the implication that through awareness, an individual can learn to control and modify inappropriate behavior for improved conflict outcomes. Continued research needs to focus on personality from the perspective of both parties in the conflict in relation to the dominant characteristics of the situation.

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CHAPTER EIGHTEEN
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION SKILLS *Preschool to Adulthood*

Sandra V. Sandy

Anna Hall considered manners more important than feelings and beauty most important of all. From the beginning, she made Eleanor feel homely and unloved, always outside the closed circle that embraced her two younger brothers. Anna mocked her daughter's appearance and chided her manner, calling her "Granny" because she was so serious, even at the age of two. Before company, Eleanor was embarrassed to hear her mother explain that she was a shy and solemn child. And, Eleanor wrote, "I never smiled."

—Cook (1992)

* * *

In early childhood, feelings and emotions are the primary intellectual puzzles that children are required to solve before they can successfully maneuver through the complicated cognitive tasks of later development. If the emotional components of learning are improperly laid in the brain's pathways, a variety of problems may result. Although Eleanor Roosevelt managed, through a loving father, caring teachers, and a privileged social position, to overcome her mother's put-downs and lead an extraordinarily productive life, she suffered emotional pain and struggled against feelings of insecurity most of her life. Consistent, small put-downs often have sizable negative emotional consequences for young children, who, during

this period of their lives, need to be acquiring confidence in their own ability to influence the environment.

Prior to the 1970s, the study of development tended to end in adolescence when the individual is presumed to have substantially "developed" into the adult he or she will remain for the next fifty or sixty years, with some minor variation. There are also theorists and researchers who see development as highly stable after the age of thirty (McCrae and Costa, 1990; Block, 1977). Others consider adulthood not as an end state but as a continuation of development occurring over the life span (Erikson, 1963; Kegan, 1994).

In this chapter, I am constrained by space limitations and must choose only a few issues and conflict resolution programs to briefly discuss from what is a rich, extensive field of research and practice. Unfortunately, this means that important processes such as restorative justice, which provides an important alternative to punitive discipline in schools, fall outside the scope of this chapter. Omissions on my part are unavoidable, and I urge readers to pursue the wealth of material made available by the authors listed in the References. Nonetheless, I have added new material to the previous edition of this Handbook on two important areas in the development arena: development from a neuroscientific perspective and conflict coaching, an interesting new approach to conflict management focused on the individual.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL-EMOTIONAL LEARNING AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

The pedagogical approach to social-emotional learning emanates from a multidisciplinary perspective that

integrates the most compelling findings from the fields of neuroscience, education, and psychology. One conclusion, however, clearly stands out from the converging evidence on social-emotional skills development: early childhood is the time when the building blocks for all later development and intellectual growth are set in place. Many conflict resolution programs for children concentrate on middle childhood or adolescence because conflict, bullying, and other forms of violence occur more frequently at these ages (Warner, Weist, and Krulak, 1999); however, I emphasize early childhood as the time when basic social-emotional learning and conflict resolution skills are the most easily and most indelibly developed. This emphasis is not meant to diminish the need for continued honing and development of these skills throughout middle childhood, adolescence, and beyond.

Although there are many ways to settle a conflict (litigation, arbitration, distributive bargaining, integrative negotiation, and the like), I refer to constructive or principled negotiation throughout this chapter. This reflects a view that this type of conflict interaction best promotes emotional and cognitive growth in children and adolescents.

Finally, it should be noted that both the fields of social emotional learning approaches and conflict resolution education contribute heavily to knowledge about children’s development of conflict resolution skills. Although considered separate disciplines, both approaches emphasize the importance of building the same basic competencies, including emotional awareness, empathy, relationships, communication, and conflict resolution. In both approaches, it is how we learn to handle conflict that determines the positive or negative role it has in constructing our feelings, intellect, and personality.

Most people are well aware of the general differences among preschoolers, elementary school-age children, and adolescents; however, not everyone has a solid understanding of the important cognitive, emotional, and physical capabilities that differentiate these groups. For example, nowhere else in an individual's lifetime are there such tremendous growth spurts in all developmental areas as during early childhood, roughly from infancy to five years of age. During this time a child is learning gross and fine motor skills, self-regulation (e.g., toilet training), and acquiring language for communication and reasoning. From the ages of three to five, children also begin learning to form peer relationships, discriminate gender roles, and develop a sense of right and wrong.

Following the discussion on early childhood, this chapter also briefly covers developmental issues and conflict management in middle childhood (ages six to twelve), adolescence (ages twelve or thirteen to approximately twenty-one), and adulthood. The discussion at each level focuses on how developmental differences can guide our approach to teaching children age-appropriate skills.

In most sections, conflict resolution programs that may be used for the relevant age group, including peer mediation, are discussed. The final section assesses how well we are doing currently in our efforts to reach children and adults and suggests future directions in conflict resolution programs as well as improvements to be made in terms of curricula and systematic evaluation.

STAGE THEORIES OF EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT

Prior to the 1970s, the study of development tended to end in adolescence when the individual is presumed to have

substantially “developed” into the adult he or she will remain for the next fifty or sixty years, with some minor variation. Although there are several current theorists and researchers who see development as highly stable after the age of thirty (McCrae and Costa, 1990; Block, 1977), others now consider adulthood not as an end state but as a continuation of development occurring over the life span (Erikson, 1963; Kegan, 1994).

The views on early childhood development presented in this chapter are dependent on a wide range of theory and research in the field. First, we must credit several pioneering developmental theorists (Piaget, Kohlberg, Selman, and Erikson) and mention some of the more important aspects of their classic stage theories concerning social cognition and emotional development. Although recent research suggests that children may know more than they tell us and that some stages may appear earlier or show more inconsistency than previously thought, there is still much that is useful in these theories.

Preoperational Stage

Conflict serves different purposes according to the level of early childhood development. Kohlberg called early childhood the stage of heteronomous morality, a time that Piaget referred to as the preoperational stage of development, or morality of constraint. (See tables 18.1 and 18.2 .) Children in this stage are subject to externally imposed rules and adhere unquestioningly to these rules and the directives of powerful adults. Their motives and those of other children and adults are disregarded; only outcomes are important.

Table 18.1 Piaget's Social Cognitive Approach to Children's Development

Source: Adapted from Piaget and Inhelder (1969).

Stage	***Description***
Sensorimotor (birth to age 2)	Centration describes this stage. Children focus on the most salient aspect of an event. It is most evident in their egocentrism, seeing the world in terms of their own point of view.
Preoperational (2 to 6)	Children can now use symbols, words, and gestures to represent reality; objects no longer have to be present to be thought about. However, they have difficulty differentiating their perspective from another's point of view and are unsure about causal relations.
	Emotions: Four-year-olds can usually distinguish between real and displayed feelings but are unable to provide justifications for their judgments.
Concrete operational (6 to 12)	Operational thought enables children to combine, separate, order, and transform objects. However, these operations must be carried out in the presence of the objects and events.
Formal operational (12 to 19)	Adolescents become capable of systematic thought. They are interested in abstract ideas and the process of thought itself.

Note: One of the major critiques of Piaget is that researchers are finding evidence that children are actually more competent in a number of ways than Piaget thought. Neo-Piagetians retain Piaget's theories of stage but criticize the postulation of an invariant sequence in stages. On the basis of information-processing theory and cognitive science perspectives, many developmentalists

agree that cognition develops in varying domains over a period of time rather than in separate stages.

Table 18.2 Comparison of Social Cognitive Approaches to Development

Sources: Adapted from Kohlberg (1976), Damon (1980), and Selman (1980). Damon contests the idea of stages as an invariant sequence because children regress in level and show inconsistent levels of performance from one testing time to the next.

Kohlberg: Moral Stages	***Damon: Justice in Dividing Resources***	***Selman: Perspective Taking***
Level 1: Preconventional		
Early childhood (heteronomous morality) Stage 1 (end of early childhood to beginning of middle childhood)	Level 0-A (4 and under)	Egocentric impulsive level (0) (ages 3 to 6) [a]
The morality of obedience: adherence to rules backed by punishment	Justice is getting what one wishes: “I should go because I want to.”	Negotiation through unreflective physical means (fight or flight); shared experience through unreflective imitation

Kohlberg: Moral Stages	***Damon: Justice in Dividing Resources***	***Selman: Perspective Taking***
	Level 0-B (ages 4 to 5) Justifications are based on external factors such as size and gender: “I should get more because I’m bigger.”	
Middle childhood (instrumental morality) Stage 2 (ages 7 to 10 or 11)	Level 1-A (ages 5 to 7)	Unilateral one-way level (ages 5 to 9)
Justice is seen as an exchange system: you give as much as others give you.	Justice is always strict equality: everyone gets the same.	Negotiations through oneway commands or orders or through automatic obedience
	Level 1-B (ages 6 to 9) A notion of reciprocity develops: people should be paid back in kind for doing good or bad things.	Shared experience through expressive enthusiasm without concern for reciprocity.
Level II: Conventional		

Kohlberg: Moral Stages	***Damon: Justice in Dividing Resources***	***Selman: Perspective Taking***
Stage 3 (10 or 11 to beginning of adolescence) Social-relational morality	Level 2-A (ages 8 to 10)	Reciprocal reflective level (ages 7 to 12)
Children believe that shared feelings and agreements are more important than selfinterest.	Moral relativity—learning how different persons can have different yet equally valid claims for justice.	Negotiation through cooperation using persuasion or deference; shared experience through mutual reflection on similar perceptions and experiences.
Adolescence Stage 4 Law and order	Level 2-B (ages 10 and up)	Mutual third-person level (3) (beginning in adolescence)

Kohlberg: Moral Stages	***Damon: Justice in Dividing Resources***	***Selman: Perspective Taking***
Laws govern what is right.	Choices take account of two or more people's (as well as situational) demands. There is feeling that all persons should be given their due (does not necessarily mean equality in treatment).	Negotiation through strategies integrating needs of self and other: shared experience through empathic reflective process.
Level III: Principled		
Stages 5 and 6 (Adolescence to adulthood) Principled, postconventional understanding		Societal perspective taking level (4) (late adolescence to adulthood) Individuals are capable of taking a generalized perspective of morality.
[a] Recent research suggests that preschoolers may know more than they can tell us, and so this level may need revision.		

Egocentric Orientation

As can be seen in table 18.3 , Kegan (1994), a neo-Piagetian constructive-developmentalist, frames different development periods in terms of the individual's struggle to make meaning of life and refers to these different stages as

orders of consciousness. In total, Kegan theorized five stages, or “orders of consciousness,” that combined cognitive, affective, interpersonal, and intrapersonal development throughout the life span. The first order of consciousness encompasses children under the ages of seven or eight whose cognitive capabilities allow a socially egocentric construction of the world. In practical terms, this means that they believe others share their viewpoints and experience the same moment-to-moment relationship to personal desires, preferences, and abilities. At this age, children are unable to delay gratification for any length of time, and they are unable to remember failed efforts from the past. Self-esteem is largely kept intact because their abilities are reconstituted continually from one moment to the next.

Table 18.3 Kegan's Cognitive Orders of Consciousness

Source: Adapted from Kegan (1994).

Orders of Consciousness	***Appropriate Audience***	***Cognitive Operation***
First order: Socially egocentric	Early childhood: Roughly two to six years	Fantasy
Second order: Durable categories	Middle childhood: Grades 1–3 (a stretch), grades 4–6 (elaborating an emerging capacity)	Data
Third order: Crosscategorical structures	Adolescents: Middle school students (a stretch), high school students (elaborating an emerging capacity)	Inference
Fourth order: Complex systems	Adults: Any higher education setting (a stretch for many)	Formulation
Fifth order: Transsystem structures	Any higher education setting (a stretch for most); graduate programs and practicing within the field itself (a stretch for many)	Reflection on formulation

Egocentric, Impulsive Stage

Selman (1980) refers to the "egocentric, impulsive stage" of development as representing the primitive foundation of social perspective taking (see table 18.2). According to this view, young children may recognize that other children display different preferences, but they lack the capacity to distinguish between their own perception of an event or person and that of another child. Neither do they see a cause-and-effect relationship between thinking and

behaving. This often leads to confusion over cause-and-effect relationships, such as whether punishment following misbehavior is the effect of misbehavior or its cause. Without guidance, children are likely to feel that they did something wrong because they are punished but fail to understand precisely what they did wrong.

Post-Piagetian Theories

Comparatively recent modifications of Piaget's theory include the work of De Vries and Zan (1994) and Elias and others (1997), the latter group seeing development in terms of social-emotional competence domains. There has also been a biosocial-behavioral shift in thinking about development, in that the idea of set stages has come to be modified to a view of development allowing the characteristics of various stages to coexist (Fischer, Bullock, Rotenberg, and Raya, 1993). These postclassic theorists, including Vygotsky and Bronfenbrenner, add significantly to knowledge about the fundamental elements of school readiness and conflict management: personality and individuality, emotional control, role taking, empathy, perspective taking, moral reasoning, problem solving, and the interconnection between social-emotional learning and academic achievement.

Neuroscientific Contributions

Over the past two decades in particular, neuroscientific researchers have made significant progress in mapping how a child's mind develops and learning takes place (Jensen, 1998, 2003; Knudsen, Heckman, Cameron, and Shonkoff, 2006; Shonkoff and Phillips, 2000; Sousa, 2001; Shore, 1997). Social experience in the first few years of life has a powerful influence on the development of brain structure and neurochemistry, which in turn structures cognitive and social skills. Nurture is a critical force in

development: children get smarter as they interact with their environment and stimulation from important others promotes essential brain activity. Skill development and brain maturation are hierarchical processes: higher-level function depends on lower-level functions, and the capacity for change in skill development and neural circuitry is highest earliest in life and decreases over time.

It is the interplay between neural activity and learning that builds personality. Negative patterns can be interrupted during the brain's high-activity stage in early childhood, and patterns promoting the child's emotional, social, and cognitive well-being can be "automatized" by learning and frequent practice. Neuroscientific research shows that

- The first forty-eight months of a child's life are more important to brain development than previously thought. In fact, much of the brain's infrastructure is in place by age four. By this age, children have already mapped out, through repetition, significant aspects of their cognitive and behavioral repertoire.
- Early experience at home and school critically influences the ability to learn and the capacity to regulate emotion.
- Across all ethnic groups, the human brain benefits significantly from good experience and teaching, particularly during the first four years.
- Children learn in the context of important relationships. Caregiving and stimulation help children develop the capacity for empathy, perspective taking, emotional regulation, behavioral control, problem solving, and optimal cognitive functioning.
- Although emotion in Western cultures has often been considered irrational in relation to cognition, neuroscientists now believe that emotions provide information in much the same way logic does. Emotions

also direct attention and create meaning using their own memory pathways.

Having an egocentric orientation toward social perspective taking, children at this age view a conflict situation as being an event where one cannot do what one wants because of how the other person is behaving. Conflict resolution thus consists of fight (“Hit her!”) or flight (“Go play with another toy or do something else”). According to the theorists in table 18.2 , there is little full-scale perspective taking in early childhood. However, incipient perspective taking is readily apparent in the child’s empathic response to others, and a number of theorists believe young children are more capable of perspective taking than classic stage theories allowed. As evidence, they point to the fact that children are often seen comforting friends who are upset or mirroring the emotion of others around them.

THE FUNCTION OF CONFLICT IN EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT

Role of Conflict

From the viewpoint of conflict resolution, the three-to-five age range and its cognitive growth and social development are incredibly important periods where children learn and are highly accessible to being taught constructive versus destructive ways of thinking and behaving. Naturally occurring conflict is an opportunity for children to develop social, emotional, intellectual, and moral skills by working through the challenges they face in developmental tasks. If they master the challenges constructively during this period and are supported in their efforts, they are able to lay a solid foundation for the further expansion of their

capabilities at later developmental stages. If children's development takes a more negative route and they do not pass the key emotional milestones of early childhood appropriately, they are at risk of retaining such negative traits as impulsivity, immature emotional functioning, behavioral problems, and even a propensity to violence.

When this happens, these basic skills of early childhood will have to be relearned at a later date, if at all—relearning represents a more difficult path. Perhaps here is the place to remind parents and other adults that the goal is not always to "change my child's behavior so that she is more agreeable," but to recognize the full importance of the role that oppositional, conflict-provoking behavior has in development. The increasing assertiveness, or autonomy, of the child during the second and third years is to be desired rather than socialized into compliance with parental demands. What may need to be changed is how the child's behavior is viewed and, in particular, how the parent addresses it.

Emotion.

The emotional maturation of the young child is, arguably, the most important task of early childhood. Emotion influences most of our behavior. A threatening situation (a hostile look from a classmate) may trigger intense emotion, which creates action that occurs without thinking. This is why preschoolers need to be taught emotional management strategies (e.g., stop before responding and think about what you will do) repetitively, so they can become automatic responses.

The development of social-emotional competence begins with acquiring the communication skills involved in clearly expressing one's own emotions as well as in effective listening and attending to the other's verbal and nonverbal

emotional expression. To be emotionally competent, children need to develop awareness of both their own emotional states and those of others. Adults need to create constructive conflict experiences to assist children, especially in early childhood.

Involving emotions in learning begins with getting and maintaining the attention of the preschooler. One way to do this is to structure strong, frequent contrasts in activity. Sustaining continuous high-level attention for more than ten minutes is difficult even for adults. Knowledge of children's capacity for concentration must guide an expectation for sustaining attention in early childhood. A rough guideline is to involve preschoolers in four to six minutes of direct instruction (*external instruction*) at any one time (Jensen, 1998). Following brief external instruction, children need time to create meaning, which is accomplished through internal, largely unconscious processes that occur while the child is playing or engaged in an apparently mindless activity. Last but far from least, time is required for the learning to "take." Activities and practice sessions should be repeated with the children in a variety of situations and over many weeks for enduring internalization of these lessons. Parental support and assistance in conducting at-home practice sessions is an integral component of this process.

Since stress is deleterious to learning, teachers and parents must strive to reduce stress for children. The outcome of stress is the activation of defense mechanisms, which may be useful for surviving a physical danger but interfere with learning. Stressors range from a rude classmate to a tense parent overreacting to the child's behavior or a teacher who, perhaps unwittingly, embarrasses a student in front of peers.

In addition to music, games, drama, or storytelling, there are other ways to engage emotion in learning, such as ritual clapping, cheers, chants, or songs to mark the beginning or completion of a project. It is important for adults to model a love of learning, letting children share the ideas and activities that excite them. Even as preschoolers, it is important for students to show and discuss their work with one another and tell what they like and dislike about it. In seemingly simple ways, emotions can be elicited as part of the learning experience, resulting in greater recall and accuracy about the information learned (McGaugh and others, 1995).

Empathy.

As rage fuels aggression, so empathy inspires understanding, sharing, helping, and cooperation. There is some question about when empathy can first be seen to emerge. Some theorists believe empathy begins in infancy, when even a two-week-old child may cry upon hearing another child cry, while others feel that empathy at this stage is an innate reflex. The second stage in developing empathy is commonly understood to be comforting behavior, which occurs during the second year of life. At this age, children begin to understand that it is the other person who is distressed; this understanding may lead them to engage in efforts to comfort. Because a two-year-old is not skilled at recognizing the other person's point of view, the child's attempt usually reflects what she herself finds comforting, such as giving Mommy a toy or her blankie if she sees that her mother is distressed. The third stage occurs roughly at three to five years of age when a child shows more empathy to the distress of a friend than to other children who do not fall into this category (Farver and Branstetter, 1994). Also at this age, increasing language skills enable children not only to empathize with

people in stories, pictures, or film, but also to take into account differences between their own level of knowledge and that of children younger than themselves. This indicates less egocentrism than presumed by Piaget.

Although children appear to have some level of innate capacity for certain social-emotional responses, such as empathy and perspective taking, these are frequently hit-or-miss skills unless the child is effectively tutored by an adult. Since interpersonal understanding is influenced more by experience than by age, a three-year-old can be at a higher developmental level than a six-year-old.

Perspective Taking.

Although preschoolers may no longer be totally centered on their own actions but also influenced by external reality, they still assume that other people see things the way they do. While we know that there is age variation in development, a good general rule is to approach perspective taking as being difficult for children at this age.

For example, my godson's three-year-old child, Sam, shares almost all his toys with his playmate Isabella when she visits; however, he refuses to let her use his Batman action figure in games involving the Bat Cave. This he considers fair because it follows his own interests in the matter: I want to play with Batman. The situation provides an excellent opportunity for an adult to assist in Sam's development of emotional awareness by helping him focus on what Isabella is feeling ("What does she feel, Sam, when she can't play with Batman?") and what will happen as a result.

Obviously before Sam can understand and view the situation from Isabella's perspective, he must be able to recognize his own emotions and their link to his behavior. Sam, like other children his age, needs to be assisted in the

task of identifying what he is feeling in different situations. With guidance, Sam will then be able to make the transition to identifying what Isabella feels when he refuses to share the desirable toy and the potential outcomes of this behavior: Isabella may decide to end their playtime and go home.

Children do not learn skills merely by observation; they require instruction in cause-and-effect sequences before they can separate right from wrong or unintentional from intended harm. Equally important, children must learn empathy and perspective taking before they can become aware of the effects their actions have on others. These lessons need to be conveyed through gentleness and kindness; turning an amoral child into a moral one need not include inducing lifelong guilt.

Two important ways to promote social-emotional learning of empathy and perspective taking as well as other prosocial behaviors include explicit modeling by adults and induction. *Modeling* refers to adults behaving in ways they desire the child to imitate. *Induction* refers to parents and teachers giving explanations that appeal to the child's pride, desire to be grown up, and concern for others.

Developing Relationships

Equal peer relationships in early childhood give children a chance to experience reciprocity, which in turn provides an opportunity for them to learn to identify emotions in themselves and others, a prerequisite skill for developing empathy. Empathy is a factor in promoting perspective taking (the ability to analyze a situation in terms of emotions, intentions, and reasons from both sides of an issue), moral development and, ultimately, the ability to constructively problem solve.

Self-Control.

Self-control is a critical skill that enables a child to inhibit his initial impulses, for example, to stop before acting and think about what you'll do. (See also chapter 13.) Basically, there are four forms of inhibition to be mastered (Maccoby, 1980):

Movement . Prior to age six or seven, children have difficulty in stopping an action already in progress.

Emotions . Before age four, young children have little control over the intensity of their emotions.

Reflection . Before age six or so, children commonly fail to engage in the reflection necessary to perform well.

Gratification . Children under twelve often have difficulty in refusing immediate gratification to wait for a better choice later.

Discipline.

When stressful methods of discipline (arguing, yelling, and overly harsh punishment) are used with preschoolers, the brain becomes rewired so as to make children prone to impulsiveness, overarousal, and aggressiveness. Children exposed to such harsh methods are often especially in need of remedial help to acquire the emotional literacy skills necessary to understand the nonverbal behavior of others correctly (Jensen, 2003).

Internalization of standards of right and wrong depends on consistency about clearly stated rules, consistent and appropriate praise for following rules, and consistent, appropriate discipline when rules are broken. Most important, internalization depends on loving parents who are loved in return by the child; discipline has a much greater positive effect from a loving parent than from a

distant or unloving one. If a child is motivated through love to adopt his parents' standards, he is likely to remember the rules prior to potential misbehavior and, anticipating his parents' disappointment if he breaks the rules, resists engaging in that behavior. But if punishment is used as the primary deterrent to misbehavior, the child learns that the objective is not to get caught.

Summary.

Differentiating cause and effect, empathy, and perspective taking, along with self-regulation and problem solving, are among the key elements of positive conflict management. Modern theorists and researchers find the young child to be more capable of learning these skills than did their classic predecessors. Indeed, there is evidence that the most effective, long-lasting, and pervasive acquisition of these skills occurs in early childhood, a time when the brain is most receptive to learning.

The ECSEL Program

The Peaceful Kids Educating Communities in Social-Emotional Learning (ECSEL) Program (Sandy and Boardman, 2006), was developed at the International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution, Teachers College, Columbia University. The four-year longitudinal study to develop and validate this program supports a fluid sequence in cognition and learning: the authors found that stage-like changes in early childhood are rarely straightforward. The context and emotional state of children at particular times determine whether they act according to a new stage or reflect characteristics of an earlier one. This fluidity appears to be true at later developmental stages as well.

In the ECSEL curriculum, emotional, social, and intellectual growth was promoted through an integrated approach involving parents, preschool staff, and children in a shared learning network. Researchers developed curriculum material based on neurological research relating to the brain's optimal functioning and brain-based learning strategies. ECSEL staff did extensive on-site role modeling and assisted parents and teachers in doing the same at home and in the classroom. We encouraged parents and teachers to set rules and discuss them with children before actual implementation. We also helped them plan cooperative discipline techniques, that is, assist the child to understand not only her own feelings but the other person's feelings and perspective as well and to fully grasp the consequences of her actions.

Children themselves were introduced to vocabulary related to feelings, cooperation, and problem solving. This vocabulary was amplified and extended to various situations and emotional contexts. It began with four basic emotions: sad, angry, scared, and happy. Through ongoing experiences in the preschool classroom and in activities sent home with parents, children learned to recognize both verbal and nonverbal cues as to how other people feel in various situations. The four basic emotions were later amplified through pantomime, stories, puppet shows, discussion about situations in which these emotions occur, and role plays involving both adults and children to include complex feelings such as disappointment, embarrassment, joy, and excitement.

Parents were encouraged to read extensively to their children: the program provided stories, games, and word exercises as take-home activities for parents to use with their children, thus providing home reinforcement for skills introduced in the classroom. We also talked with parents about turning storybook time into an expanded emotional

and cognitive learning experience for their children, for example, by questioning the child about the feelings of the character in the book, what the character might be thinking, alternative actions the character might have taken, and how to evaluate actions and their consequences.

The ECSEL program used a spiraling effect to review or teach older preschoolers what the younger preschoolers are taught in their basic program. We never finished a topic but revisited it at other levels of complexity according to the child's ability to understand.

In addition to spiraling, revisiting material learned at other levels of complexity, the ECSEL program used scaffolding in parent take-home activities. Scaffolding is a process whereby an adult creates a supportive guideline for thinking about problems through a series of questions. One particularly popular scaffolding activity involved using three sets of picture cards (large ones in the classroom and a smaller version for take-home use) illustrating a situation. According to the particular picture shown, the task was to identify the feelings shown, the consequences likely to follow different actions, and ways to resolve two incompatible desires. For example, if a colorful drawing showed one child teasing another, the question posed to the child was, "If someone teases you, what should you do?" Children were encouraged to list as many potential actions as they wished before the adult assisted them in determining what behavior might be most acceptable to both children and the situation. As with other activities and learning tasks, the picture cards were designed for relevance to the children's interests and experiences. One reason for this is to assist in facilitating a connection between the new information and existing neural sites in the brain, thus bolstering the likelihood of retention in memory.

To teach about cooperation, we structured tasks where it was necessary for the children to work together to achieve success. Children enjoyed motor tasks such as creating group drawings, building structures together with interlocking blocks, and balancing activities (two children carrying a small object on a board). To be successful in these tasks, children were required to work together in a constructive way. As frequently as possible, we engaged the teaching staff in leading small groups of children in such activities as communication go-rounds, pantomime, puppetry, and structuring role plays and skits to build children's skill in such behaviors as listening, sharing, and taking turns.

A problem-solving strategy was presented in our SOAR model:

S top and think.

O pen up and tell how you feel.

A sk what you (and the other person) can do.

R esolve the situation together.

Puppet scenarios were enacted to show ways of achieving a goal, demonstrating positive and negative behavior. For example, aggressive behavior such as that of two children fighting may lead to both of them failing to achieve their goals. Shy or fearful behavior could end in the child's failing to even attempt to achieve a goal. The best approach was to assertively ask for or work toward one's goals. If that failed, then it was time to think of another way to attain what is wanted or needed. Including negative consequences was essential because children do not intuitively know which actions are likely to lead to a negative outcome. However, in modeling or demonstrating negative behaviors, it is important to assume a quiet,

understated manner, since children are often attracted to loud, rude behavior and will imitate what has excited their interest. Positive behavior is best shown in a lively, celebratory way, since children are naturally drawn to noisy, action-filled events.

ECSEL was evaluated over a two-year period in a study design that included three conditions: a parent-teacher-child group, a teacher-child group, and a no-program group (where the program was given the following year). Results significantly showed that the parent-teacher-child group experienced the greatest increase in skill development. For example, in comparison to classrooms, where only teaching staff were engaged in skill development, we found that the combined efforts of parents and teachers resulted in the most significant gains in children's assertiveness, cooperation, and self-control. Children in the parent-teacher-child group also showed a significant decline in externalizing (aggressive) and internalizing (withdrawn, moody) behaviors. In classrooms with parent participation, preschool staff and parents were in agreement concerning the positive effects for the children. Preschool staff was also likely to integrate the ECSEL curriculum throughout the day's activities. Parents increased in authoritative (as opposed to authoritarian) parenting practices; they remained in control while respecting their children and recognizing that the youngsters too were entitled to a number of rights. Parents explained rules and decisions to children while also considering the child's point of view—even if that view was not accepted in the end result. Authoritarian practices (rigid obedience to strict rules) and permissive practices (little structure and low control over children) also diminished among parents in the ECSEL program.

MIDDLE CHILDHOOD

Middle and later developmental periods require increasingly complex conflict resolution and social skills development. Motivation, interests, and influences change dramatically from early childhood to middle childhood, adolescence, and, later, adulthood. Each developmental age has its own external influences and unique problems, which require their own type and level of instruction to promote skill development. A lesson learned within the context of one age must be revisited and revised to meet the needs of another.

One of the major differences between early childhood and middle childhood is that children dramatically reduce the amount of time they spend with parents and other adults and increase the time they spend with peers. As a consequence of decreased adult supervision, children find themselves with greater personal responsibility for their behavior and often need to work out disputes for themselves. These conflict management experiences are an opportunity for children to master more sophisticated cognitive and social skills. Other differences include expanded social contexts in which to function and increased responsibility for participation in their own education.

Stage Theories of Middle Childhood

Piaget observed that from ages seven or eight to approximately nine through eleven, the imaginary play of early childhood gives way to play with largely unquestioned rules. Rule-based games are an opportunity for children to experience the give-and-take of negotiation, settling disagreements, and making and enforcing rules. In this way, the child comes to understand that social rules provide a structure for cooperating with others. (See Selman's reciprocal reflective level in table 18.2 .) Erikson viewed this time of life as the period when children

confront the task of learning to be competent at activities valued by adults and peers: success in this endeavor creates a sense of industry, and failure results in a sense of inferiority. (See table 18.4 .) Successful conflict management in middle childhood helps children create and maintain peer friendships, thus promoting a sense of competency and industry.

Table 18.4 Erikson's Psychosocial Stages in Development

Source: Adapted from Erikson (1950).

Stage	***Development Themes and Challenges***
First year	"Trust versus mistrust": Infants learn to trust or mistrust others to care for their basic needs.
Second year	"Autonomy versus shame and doubt": Two-year-olds learn to exercise their will and to control themselves. Otherwise, they become unsure of themselves, doubting that they can do things for themselves.
Third to sixth year	"Initiative versus guilt": Children learn to initiate their own activities, become purposeful, and enjoy their accomplishments. When they are frustrated by adults in their attempts to initiate activities, they feel guilty for their attempts to become independent.
Seventh year through puberty	"Industry versus inferiority": Children are learning to be competent at activities that adults and peers value; when they are not, they feel inferior.
Adolescence	"Identity versus role confusion": The primary task of adolescence is to establish a sense of personal identity as part of a social group. Failure to do this results in confusion about who they are and what they want to do in life.
Young adult	"Intimacy versus isolation": The young adult develops the ability to give and receive love and make long-term commitments to relationships.

Stage	***Development Themes and Challenges***
Middle adulthood	“Generativity versus stagnation”: At this stage of life, the adult takes an interest in guiding the development of the next generation.
Older adulthood	“Ego integrity versus despair”: The older adult develops a sense of acceptance toward life as it was lived and the importance of the relationships that were part of the individual’s life.

According to Kegan, the second order of consciousness begins between approximately the ages of seven and ten when children are able to construct “durable categories.” The mental organization that characterizes durable categories means changing physical objects from being principally about one’s momentary perceptions of them to being about their having ongoing rules about what elements may be properties regardless of the individual’s perceptions. Children develop the ability to see that the phenomenon being considered (thing, other, self) has its own properties, which are elements of a class or category, and that all classes have durable rules regulating class membership. For example, an individual’s preferences, habits, and ability are aspects of the person in an ongoing way rather than a momentary desire. A child’s desires change from being primarily about her current impulses to being about ongoing, time-enduring needs or preferences, which may contain current wishes.

Sense of Self.

The sense of self acquired in early childhood must be further developed or revised to fit a new context in middle childhood. In addition to spending more time with other children and with far fewer adults involved, the child in the

elementary classroom is primarily engaged in structured learning tasks. The change from an adult-centered to a peer-centered environment requires the child to reconcile the sense of self-identity acquired within the family context with the new self-concepts being formed as a consequence of different relationships. The child's relationship with parents also changes as the parents begin to rely on discussion and explanation of cause and consequence to influence the child's behavior.

Bingham and Stryker (1995) suggest that the stages of social-emotional development for girls may differ somewhat from boys. They describe five stages of development for girls that parallel those posed by Erikson but differ in emphasis at sensitive time points. Through age eight, girls have the task of developing the hardy personality. Accomplishing this task means feeling in control of their own life, being committed to specific activities, and looking forward to challenging growth activities. Stage 2 finds the nine-through twelve-year-old forming an identity as an achiever. This involves developing a durable core of oneself as a person who is capable of accomplishment in a number of areas, such as intellectual, social, and so on. The stage of skill building for self-esteem occurs between the ages of thirteen and sixteen. Girls develop feelings of being worthy, entitled to assert their needs and wants, and confidence concerning the ability to cope with life. From ages seventeen to twenty-two, the task becomes creating strategies for self-sufficiency, both emotional and financial. Here, girls take on responsibility for taking care of themselves based on a sense of autonomy. The adult task is finding satisfaction in work and love and being content with personal accomplishments and social or personal relationships.

Self-Conception and Motivation.

Dweck (1996) has demonstrated that major patterns of adaptive or maladaptive behavior (such as a mastery orientation or a helplessness orientation to tasks) are affected by children's implicit theories or self-conceptions about their ability. For example, some children believe their intelligence is a fixed entity; others believe it can be increased by effort. Those holding a fixed entity theory are oriented toward proving the adequacy of their performance in order to win approval of their intelligence. The latter group, adhering to an incremental effort theory, is more interested in pursuing learning goals whereby they can increase their ability. These children, who focus on controllable factors such as effort, are likely to persist when experiencing setback or failure. (For further discussion, see chapter 13.) Implicit motivational theories do not exist only in the intellectual realm; they are paralleled in social interaction as well. School adjustment depends on both social and academic goals and abilities: having prosocial goals and successful peer relationships is critical in promoting interest in and achievement in school.

In addition to implicit theories about ability, several other factors influence the choice of a goal: its importance, the interpretation of an event (attribution), knowledge of strategies for reaching the goal, and environmental variables. For example, aggressive children are bound by the importance of control and dominance. They have more confidence than other children that they can master events involving aggression. In social situations, they interpret the actions of their peers, even when accidental or ambiguous, as being hostile; thus, the behavior of others becomes provocative and inspires a need for retaliation. Frequently these children lack strategies for interacting successfully with peers. They do not know that it is important to show interest in what a peer is doing or that they need to cooperate with others in playtime activities. Similarly,

children who fear or experience rejection by others are caught up in the importance of avoiding rejection. These children are handicapped by a lack of group entry skills, such as knowing how to express interest in others' activities and to suggest cooperative ways of joining the ongoing group process. Environmental variables refer primarily to the atmosphere established in the home or classroom and whether it promotes adaptive or maladaptive behavior.

Parents, teachers, and other adults play a major role in determining what kind of theories children develop about their personality characteristics. They do this mainly in two ways. One is the implicit theories and explicit explanations that adults offer for their own behavior and personality; children imitate adults and internalize their explanations for their own behavior and personality. The second way is to explain the child's behavior and personality characteristics. A parent who explains the child's behavior by presumably fixed characteristics such as genes, ability, or temperament rather than malleable characteristics such as knowledge, effort, or mood often stimulates the child to use similar explanations. As previously stated, the type of theory that children develop about their personality and behavior greatly affects their academic learning and emotional development.

Adults also need to consider the environmental or context variables that may be changed to help children, especially those who are socially isolated or aggressive. An effective way of doing this involves decreasing competition among children and promoting cooperative learning activities (Johnson and Johnson, 1991). In the classroom, structuring tasks so that children work cooperatively in small groups promotes common achievement goals and contributes to the motivation to learn through group acceptance and support. For optimal results, children require instruction

and coaching in the various strategies that they can use to achieve their goals and benefit from multiple practice sessions.

Self-Esteem.

Social acceptance is an important goal of middle childhood. At this age, children become aware of their relative status among peers and have concerns about rejection. They also use gossip as a means of finding out about the group's norms; once they know what their friends value and approve, they can shape their own behavior to achieve peer acceptance. Children already competent in group-entry skills achieve peer acceptance easily and are likely to resist unwelcome pressure from the group.

There is evidence that social comparison affects a child's self-evaluation more strongly with increasing age. This fits well with the decreasing self-esteem that occurs during middle childhood as children begin to compare their performance with that of their peers and to define themselves accordingly. They also begin to think of the interpersonal implications of their own characteristics ("I always do my homework and know the answers in class, so other kids call me nerdy").

Children of all ages whose friendships have positive, cooperative features are high in self-esteem and prosocial behavior, are popular with peers, have few emotional problems, are well behaved, and experience good academic adjustment, including positive attitudes toward school. Despite greater reliance in middle childhood on peer opinion and values, parents remain an important influence on the child. In fact, high self-esteem has been linked to authoritative parenting. This approach to parenting includes a close, affectionate relationship that makes the child feel important; clearly defined limits and

consequences for transgression, to give the child the sense that norms are real and significant; and respect for individuality, because the child needs to express individuality. Parents show respect for their children by reasoning with them and taking their point of view into account. The key to a child's high self-esteem is the feeling, transmitted in large part by the family and valued teachers, that she has the ability to control her own future by controlling both herself and her environment.

Conversely, a child with negative friendship relationships (characterized by rivalries and put-downs) is likely to be a low achiever both academically and socially. He also displays disruptive behavior and may suffer depression and anxiety. In contrast to a child with high self-esteem, this child is more likely to have had authoritarian or permissive parents and less parental acceptance, fewer clearly defined limits, and less respect for individuality. Low self-esteem may also result if a preadolescent fails at attempted tasks. Unlike younger children, a preadolescent is prone to attribute her failure to innate ability and not to situational factors such as effort. This failure experience results in reduced expectations for success, negative feelings, and low persistence (Dweck, 1996).

Social Relationships.

Around age ten or eleven, children change to a "social-relational moral perspective" (see table 18.2), wherein shared feelings and harmony with people close to them are more important than individual self-interest. This perspective marks the growth of an inclination and ability to interact with other children without adult supervision. One problem with this growing ability is that children now depend more on peers to define right and wrong and less on such authorities as parents and teachers.

Friends influence children through their attitudes, behavior, and personal characteristics. The quality of the friendship is important: positive, mutually supportive, and cooperative relationships are, not surprisingly, more constructive than those characterized by put-downs and hostile rivalry.

Poor grades and dropping out of school can frequently be traced to lack of social-emotional skills. Social competence and appropriate behavior are strong and consistent predictors of academic outcomes, and the social climate of the classroom appears to be a powerful motivator of academic as well as cooperative classroom behavior. In fact, social and emotional variables predict achievement as well as or better than intellectual ability, sensory deficits, or neurological factors (Horn and Packard, 1985). Research shows a strong link among social-emotional and conflict resolution skills, traditional intellectual skills (reading, writing, and math), and success in the adult workplace (Deutsch, 1993; Gardner, 1993; Goleman, 1998; Gottman, 1997; Jensen, 1998; Shore, 1997).

The ability to develop friendships positively affects a child's school adjustment in three ways:

1. Attitude toward classes. Cooperative students value classes, teachers, and what they are learning.
2. Classroom behavior. Cooperative students are rarely disruptive.
3. Academic achievement. Cooperative students learn what is taught and receive high grades and test scores.

Perspective Taking.

With rule-based games, children must keep in mind the overall set of task conditions as well as engage in social perspective taking. Thus, they must take into consideration

the wishes, thoughts, and actions of other children along with their own. At this age, children make inferences about the perspectives of other people and are aware that other people can do the same about them. But they often have difficulty in simultaneously focusing on their own perspective while trying to assume the perspective of another. As a result, they frequently adhere to the correctness of either their own view or that of an authority (adult or older child seen as an authority). Becoming skilled in negotiating conflictful social interactions with peers while playing a game depends on a child's growing ability to understand how others think (social perspective taking) and feel (social-emotional competence).

Cooperation.

In middle childhood, children begin wrestling with such issues as morality and rules of fairness (see table 18.2). According to Kohlberg (1976), children around the age of seven or eight enter the stage of development called instrumental morality, or self-regulation, which includes cooperative behavior. In this sense, cooperating means working toward a common goal while coordinating one's own feelings and perspective with another's. The motive for cooperation is mutual affection and trust, which develops into the ability to take the perspective of another. Given that children may show characteristics of earlier stages of development depending on the circumstances, middle childhood youngsters may still have a somewhat egocentric point of view, in which they have difficulty distinguishing between their own interests and those of other children.

Middle childhood also sees emerging belief in equity: if a group member works harder and contributes more to a project, that member is seen to be deserving of a greater share of the rewards. This is justice as an exchange system, in which you should receive as much as you can give.

Sometimes the temptation of an appealing reward, however, causes even older children to attempt to get as much as they can from outcome without regard to how much they contribute (Damon, 1977).

Self-Control.

To encourage a child's self-regulation, the goal of the adult (parent or teacher) should be to increasingly appeal to the child's cooperation rather than obedience. Although adult-child relationships are not equal in power, an adult who respects the child's thoughts, opinions, and endeavors can permit and encourage the child to think about and question causes, potential outcomes, and general explanations.

The Role of Conflict

If a relationship is threatened (on the playground, for example), preadolescents engage in fewer conflicts with friends than with acquaintances. However, in the classroom or places where continued interaction is not at risk, the preadolescent disagrees more with friends than nonfriends. The type of conflict most commonly occurring depends on gender: boys' disagreements often involve power issues, whereas for girls, disagreements usually involve interpersonal matters. Children who are aggressive also engage in conflicts that differ according to gender: boys have goals of instrumentality (getting what they want, whether it be a material object or a privileged position) and dominance, whereas girls are likely to engage in relationship aggression: they are displaying behavior intended to damage another child's friendship or feeling of inclusion by the peer group.

Preadolescents commonly believe that one person is responsible for any given conflict, and they feel that resolution should come from that person. Thus, it becomes

important for adults to engage both (or all) participants in a dispute in what Shure and Spivack (1978) refer to as problem-solving dialoguing—a form of questioning, similar to scaffolding, that helps a child develop an alternative solution and consequential thinking. This process results in clearly defining the problem, searching for the original problem (one child's version of the conflict may not include the first action that occurred), and emphasizing the child's ability (not the adult's) to solve the problem.

A well-respected conflict resolution program widely used with children in middle childhood was developed by Creative Response to Conflict (CRC) in Nyack, New York. [1] CRC employs age-appropriate classroom activities in five thematic areas: affirmation, communication, cooperation, problem solving, and bias awareness. In addition, it emphasizes the importance of actively training and involving school staff, parents, and other community members as part of a holistic approach to changing culture and climate.

For children in the middle years, advances in development allow the use of more complex and collaborative approaches to skill development than those developed at a younger age—for instance, asking students to respond to a conflict scenario by brainstorming and problem solving in cooperative groups. Unlike young children, who have trouble stepping outside their own identities, middle-years children can engage easily and independently in role plays, which require them to separate their own thoughts and actions from those of the characters they play.

This movement away from egocentrism also makes the middle years a time when children can be introduced to mediation. CRC trains children beginning in the third grade to be peer mediators who help other children work out conflicts in the playground. Solutions to conflict are not

imposed; rather, mediators help disputants work out their own agreements. This approach, which promotes perspective-taking and problem-solving skills, is particularly successful with middle-years students because it meshes with their growing reliance on peers for affirmation and their need for autonomy and self-direction. (For further information on peer mediation programs, I highly recommend Jones and Compton, 2003.)

ADOLESCENCE

The defining developmental task of adolescence is identity formation. (See table 18.3 .) Rapid and dramatic physical and psychosocial changes occur in almost all aspects of adolescent life. Consequently, adolescents are confronted with the stressful necessity of reworking early developmental tasks to respond to their new problems and needs. To build an identity, adolescents must integrate sexual drives and social demands into a healthy personality.

Stage Theories of Adolescence

According to Erikson's psychosocial stages in development (table 18.3), the transition from childhood to adulthood requires a return to earlier developmental issues that have emerged with age-related complexity:

- Adolescents revisit the attachment phase of infancy as they search for trust, as with trustworthy and admirable friends. In later adolescence, this task focuses on finding intimate partners. As they begin to function as members in a society rather than only family, classroom, or other small group, adolescents seek to establish trust through political and social causes and trustworthy leaders.
- Expression of autonomy begins with the two-year-old's insistence on "doing it myself." In adolescence,

autonomy refers to learning to make one's own decisions and choices in life rather than accepting those of parents or friends.

- In early childhood, initiative was demonstrated through pretend play. Its counterpart in adolescence is establishing one's own goals rather than simply accepting what others plan.
- Industry in middle childhood focuses on tasks set by the teacher or parent. In adolescence, industry means taking responsibility for one's own ambitions and the quality of work produced.

Kegan (1994) describes adolescence as a time when the individual develops cross-categorical knowledge. At this level of development, adolescents begin to subordinate durable categories to a higher-order principle. The primary idea is that one's approach to a relationship changes so that not only is what happens to the individual important, but also what happens to one's connection with another person as a consequence of behavior or activity. Thinking reflectively, inferentially, or thematically requires that a durable category become an element of the principle of knowing rather than the principle of knowing itself. Adolescents develop the capacity to subordinate durable categories to the interaction between these categories, which allows adolescent thinking to become abstract and feelings to become self-reflective emotion. As a result, adolescent social relations become capable of commitment and bonding to a community of people or ideas larger than the self. Evolving the cross-categorical way of knowing moves the adolescent from being the subject of his experience to being the object of his experience.

Friends and Self-Esteem.

Prior to the Internet age, adolescent high school students spent an average of twenty-two nonschool hours a week interacting with their peers, approximately twice as much time as with adults (Czikszentmihalyi and Larson, 1984). [2] Time spent with friends is critical for adolescent development. Research conducted on neural activity has provided evidence concerning the protective role of adolescent friendships—those spending more time with friends were found to have less neural sensitivity to later peer rejection (Masten, Telzer, Fuligni, Lieberman, and Eisenberger, 2012).

Influence of Parents on Peer Involvement.

Studies show that although teens prefer to avoid their parents when others are around, they still enjoy and need time with parents. In fact, shared time with parents, particularly fathers, results in the development of better social skills with peers and higher self-esteem (Lam, McHale, and Crouter, 2012). The actual amount of time spent with peers may be influenced by how parents respond to the child's developmental changes. The adolescent frequently responds to strict, authoritarian behavior from parents by turning to peers for support and behavioral guidance. Authoritative parents accept their child's growing up, continue to include her in family decision making, support her self-expression, and monitor her behavior (asking her to call when she will be late coming in at night, for example). As a consequence, adolescents of authoritative parents become competent in school and are less likely to cause trouble.

For adolescents, friendship goes beyond reciprocal action and is viewed within the context of a long-term series of interactions. Conflict is seen as a natural occurrence within this relationship. The adolescent realizes that working

through and resolving a conflict usually strengthens a relationship if the conflict is constructively managed.

Although the extent to which friends may have a negative influence on the adolescent appears to be exaggerated, friends have considerable influence because of the need for social approval. Praise from friends rewards specific behaviors and makes it likely they will occur again. Adolescents seek to be like their friends for two primary reasons: friends have characteristics the individual wishes to have (intrinsic motivation), and the individual judges her own competence by comparing her performance with that of classmates (social comparison). Prosocial and responsible classroom behavior has been related directly to classroom grades and test scores even when the effects of academic behavior, teacher preference among students, IQ, family structure, sex, ethnicity, and days absent from school were taken into account (Wentzel, 1993).

Loyalty and intimacy are valued and expected in adolescence friendships; the self-disclosing conversations that occur between close friends, especially among girls, help teenagers shape their identity. However, by the late teen years, the adolescent is capable of tolerating friends with different likes, dislikes, values and beliefs. Selman's levels 3 and 4 illustrate this change (see table 18.2). Boys between the ages of fourteen and sixteen usually form relationships with a group, and it helps them assert their independence from authority figures. For boys, validation of worth occurs through action rather than personal disclosure between friends. Like attachment in infancy, adolescent boys and girls use friends to make sense of ambiguous or anxiety provoking situations.

Friendship and Cooperation.

Although conformity to peer pressure increases between ages nine and fifteen but usually decreases thereafter, it is also likely that middle adolescence becomes a time when conventional standards of behavior are least followed. On the whole, adolescents are perceived to engage in high levels of behavior that poses risks to their health, safety, and well-being. However, antisocial behavior is more common among boys than girls and is much higher when peer groups are organized around competition, as with gangs. Contrary to common belief, adolescents are no more likely than other age groups to feel invulnerable (Quadrel, Fischoff, and Davis, 1993). Sensation seeking, or the need for novel experiences, has also been found wanting as a viable hypothesis for this behavior. At present, there exists no generally accepted explanation for risk-taking behavior in adolescence.

Students often establish borders between their group and other groups during early adolescence. Students of other races are frequently seen as possessing different values and orientations. Teachers and other adults too often fail to pay attention to the effect of peer group dynamics in forming students' attitudes about others. This may be due in part to the fact that adolescents are likely to keep their activities unobserved by parents and other adults in authority.

Perspective Taking.

Erikson's model of the identity crisis of adolescence fits well with Piaget's ideas of formal operational thought as well as empirical studies exploring the development of understanding in adolescents. Adolescents' thinking about themselves grows more abstract and self-reflective. They also work to integrate their past selves with the self they hope to achieve in the future (Selman, 1980).

Younger adolescents (approximately nine to fifteen) develop friendships for intimacy and support. Because the adolescent at this age is capable of stepping outside the interaction and taking the perspective of a third party, friendships survive run-of-the-mill conflict. However, adolescent relationships are frequently tinged with possessiveness and jealousy.

Although still recognizing the need for the support and sense of identity provided by friends, older adolescents (approximately age twelve to adulthood) are capable of accepting their friends' needs to have other relationships as well. They are able to view events from the perspective of the law, morality, and society as a whole.

The Role of Conflict

The adolescent is able to see parties in a conflict from a generalized third-person perspective, that is, to step outside the conflict as a neutral third person and simultaneously consider both his own perspective and the other's. He can view the conflict interaction from the vantage point of the disinterested average spectator.

Conflict in adolescence occurs more frequently with parents than siblings or peers—presumably because individual autonomy has become the developmental issue at this age. The most common conflict issues between parents and adolescents are authority, autonomy, and responsibility (Smetana, 1989). Adolescents report an average of seven disagreements daily (Collins and Laursen, 1992). However, the parent's response to differences of opinion with the adolescent can help the young person's developing sense of identity, ego formation, and social-cognitive skills. The most helpful parental response takes the form of a supportive but challenging discussion about the issue. Adolescents from families that openly and

constructively express their conflict are significantly better able to resolve conflict with their peers than those whose parents cut off disagreements unilaterally. As at younger ages, conflict in adolescence is likely to occur in close relationships. Conflict with same-sex friends declines in later adolescence but increases with romantic partners.

Naive Conflict Resolution Strategies.

Without specific skills development in conflict resolution, the resolution strategies the adolescent uses with friends commonly involve submission (one person gives in to the other's demands), compromise (both parties make concessions), third-party intervention (parties accept a resolution suggested by an uninvolved person), standoff (parties change the topic or divert their attention to a different activity), and withdrawal (one person refuses to continue the conflict exchange). More than 50 percent of adolescent conflicts are resolved by standoff or withdrawal. Unilateral power assertion is used more frequently than negotiation, the least used method of resolution (Vuchinich, 1990).

Educators for Social Responsibility.

Particularly responsive to adolescent developmental needs, this organization offers programs as well as training and staff development directed toward middle and high school students and the teachers and staff. The issues addressed include reducing violence and prejudice, supporting students' social-emotional development, enhancing academic achievement, and building multicultural competencies

ADULTHOOD

In premodern periods, when adult time was exclusively devoted to providing basic family needs, adulthood was seen as a static state with no systematic changes until old age. With the Malthusian explosion of modern conveniences and time savers, adults now have the time and opportunity for exploring their own growth potential. This change has meant that researchers began seriously investigating the stages or levels of adulthood experience. For example, Bernice Neugarten (1996) focuses on three critical time lines influencing adult development: the biological timetable (e.g., gray hair, menopause, reduced activity), social time (go to school, raise a family, retire), and historic time (war, recession, resurgence of religion). In a similar vein studying men's (1978) and women's (1996) lives, Daniel Levinson also divided the life span into three eras: early, middle, and late adulthood. Transitional periods lasting for some years divided the life eras. Roughly, these transitions occur around age thirty, early forties, fifties, and so on. These transitions can be difficult or smooth; however, one's life commitments often change from the beginning and end of such periods. Stable periods lead to enriched work and family choices; transition periods result in a reappraisal of work and family, leading to changes in the following stable period.

From Kegan's perspective, a large percentage of adults (43 to 46 percent) have internalized the values of others (e.g., their family's values, a political ideology), which become their own norms and standards. Thus, in the face of a conflict between people or ideologies, these people are dependent on others' expectations and have difficulty making a decision or thinking for themselves. While thinking at this level, which he calls the third-order consciousness, may be appropriate for teenagers, it represents a lack of maturity in adults. Unfortunately, the modern world often demands that people mediate between

different ideologies or key people in their lives, and this puts third-order thinkers at a disadvantage. What is needed in today's world is a fourth-order way of thinking that allows individuals to reflect on others' rule systems, opinions, and expectations and develop a self-authored system of their own rules and regulations. A higher, or fifth order, of consciousness occurs in a few people: they can reflect on their own and others' inner systems of values and ferret out similarities underlying what appears to be differences.

According to Kegan, parents today are expected to take charge of the family, institute a vision that will serve the family, promote the development of children, and develop an overall set of values by which the family functions. These tasks require parents to operate with a fourth- or even fifth-order consciousness. He provides the example of a woman's young daughter asking her whether she has had intimate relationships since her divorce. The mother's third-order consciousness would provoke guilt if she lied and said, "No." A fourth-order consciousness would emphasize the ability of the mother to place her child's best interests in the forefront of her decision making. In this case, a higher-order value system would dictate that the mother keep burdensome information from her child. In this way, the mother has strengthened her family through her leadership role and autonomous decision making. Note that there has been concern about Kegan's model of development as disregarding women's perspective on values and their emphasis on the importance of relationship.

The Role of Conflict

Kegan's view of the role of conflict may best be illustrated through the ways in which individuals at the fourth- and fifth-order of consciousness approach conflict.

Fourth-Order Consciousness.

This couple views conflicting parties as being whole and distinct. They promote the willingness and ability of each party to understand and respect the position of the other. The transformation of the relationship involves the transformation of attitudes that each party holds concerning the other person's ability to respect his or her position, not the positions themselves. The changes that are brought about involve greater understanding of both positions by both parties, altered attitudes about the other's understanding of one's own position, and new possibilities in different problem-solving approaches. This represents integrated negotiation as it is usually practiced.

Fifth-Order Consciousness.

A couple at this stage would seek to use conflict to individually transform their own attitudes and positions, including the need to win. There is a mutual suspicion that one's own and the other's integrity is also ideology—a partiality to a particular position or perspective. Based on this approach, a protracted conflict means that one or both of the conflicting parties revealed a partial position.

A postmodern view of conflict would have disputants (1) consider the protracted conflict as a sign that one or both parties had become identified with the polar ends of the issue; (2) reflect that the disputing relationship is not due to opposing views but an expression of incompleteness; (3) view the relationship, as cantankerous as it may be, as an opportunity to reveal the parties' multiplicity; and (4) concentrate on ways to let the conflicting relationship transform the parties rather than focusing on resolution of the conflict. Resolving conflicts through transforming the conflicting parties is difficult because postmodern conflict resolution requires people to organize experience at a level

beyond the fourth order, something few people can do (Argyris, 1993). This approach requires a transsystemic or cross-theoretical epistemological organization.

Conflict Coaching for the Individual

Conflict coaching began in the 1990s as a strategic skill for business executives and a supplement to mediation on university campuses. According to Tricia Jones (Jones and Brinkert, 2008), one of the leading theorists and developers of this process, “Conflict coaching is the process in which a coach and client communicate one-on-one for the purpose of developing the client’s conflict-related understanding, interaction strategies, and interaction skills” (p. 19). It is a process involving one disputant or client and one conflict resolution professional. The coach and client communicate one-on-one with the goal of developing the client’s understanding of the conflict situation as well as her interaction strategies, and skills. While this form of conflict resolution skills development has been practiced mainly with adults and college students, it seems likely that conflict coaching would also be beneficial for youth in the K–12 range as well. One of the great advantages of this approach is the potential help provided to those in conflicts with a conflict partner who is unwilling to negotiate or mediate. There is also, in the alternative dispute resolution community, a need for a way to enable individuals to develop deeper understanding and strategic skills that are responsive to the specifics of different situations.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has focused somewhat more on the early childhood end of the age spectrum primarily because there has historically been a dearth of research and evidence-based programming on later ages. Perhaps this is because

it is far easier to learn good habits from the beginning than it is to have to relearn lessons at a later age. It is important to remember that learning does not stop with any particular age. Developmental advancement brings new levels of complexity to which we must develop appropriate strategies for managing the inevitable conflict that is a fact of living and growing.

There are several directions for research to improve our understanding and practice of conflict and its resolution. The theory and practice of conflict resolution is a relatively young, rapidly developing field in the process of establishing rigorous evaluation of all aspects of programming. Evaluation studies to establish evidence-based programming will benefit practitioners and consumers by speaking to the efficacy of what is being taught. We need to quantify the amount of training that is necessary for the most effective skills' development. Second, we need to explore how personal traits and characteristics are differentially responsive to our methods of instruction. Does one approach work for all? Obviously, it does not always or entirely, and we need to be aware of differences. For example, some children lack assertiveness and may require work in this area prior to successful conflict resolution functioning, while others have impulse or self-control issues that may increase their level of aggression in a conflict situation. Finally, research investigating what leads to transforming consciousness so that individuals are more likely to see similarities instead of differences in their lives would be valuable given the protracted conflicts we face nationally and internationally. Given where we are and where we want to go in this world, development in conflict resolution and social-emotional learning skills is so essential to the education of all our children that we must actively support infusion of this

instruction throughout each child's educational experience in school and at home.

Notes

1 . For information, contact Priscilla Prutzman, executive director, Creative Response to Conflict, Box 271, 521 North Broadway, Nyack, NY 10960; phone 845-353-1796; Crc-global.org .

2 . That statistic will certainly be modified by the increasing use of media by today's adolescents, given their penchant for multitasking with cell phones, laptops, iPods, social networking, and so on. A study by the Kaiser Family Foundation (Rideout, Foehr, and Roberts, 2010) found that eight- to eighteen-year-olds spend an average of seven hours thirty-eight minutes daily consuming media. This study linked heavy media use (sixteen hours or more a day) with lower grades and personal contentment.

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PART FOUR
CREATIVITY AND CHANGE

CHAPTER NINETEEN
CREATIVITY AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION [a] *The Role of Point of View*

Howard E. Gruber

First conundrum: educators often view conflict as the problem child, the practitioner's task as elimination of conflict. Students of creativity often view conflict as its necessary companion: (1) novelty engenders conflict and/or (2) creativity requires conflict.

Second conundrum: conflict resolution requires collaboration, if not as the goal then at least as the means. Creative work has been treated, by and large, as an individual effort, sometimes painfully isolated.

As an undergraduate at Brooklyn College, I learned from Solomon Asch, my teacher, about two interesting lines of research: his work on group pressures and his work with Witkin on frames of reference. Both of these bear on the issue of point of view, the major focus of this chapter. It has become clear to me, as to others, that an essential and almost omnipresent aspect of creative work is posing good questions. In studying Darwin's notebooks and correspondence (Gruber, 1981), one sees that he gloried in discovering questions. He wrote many letters to scientists and naturalists around the world, posing challenging questions. His contemporaries were often mystified: Where did his questions come from? As a student, I adopted the position that having a novel point of view is the main thing. After all, among the contemporaries in question, then as now, were many good problem solvers—but where do their problems come from? Novel problems stem from a novel

point of view. Then the central question becomes: How is a novel point of view constructed?

In his 1996 book, *Human Judgment and Social Policy* , Kenneth Hammond distinguishes between theories of truth, which center on the correspondence of ideas with facts, and theories that look inward for coherence of ideas with other ideas. The latter, coherence theories, do not offer definite procedures for making judgments and consequently must rely on wisdom and intuition. Correspondence theories do so provide, but in a world teeming with uncertainties, there is a triple price to be paid —which Hammond (1996) sums up beautifully in the subtitle of his book: *Irreducible Uncertainty, Inevitable Error, Unavoidable Injustice* . In both existing and historically experienced circumstances, this view casts a pretty dark shadow. My chosen topic, however, is not judgment but its necessary prelude, discovering or inventing the alternatives to be judged and among which to choose. Here, what is needed is not so much accuracy or logic but creative imagination and construction.

In this chapter, I give a brief account of the evolving systems approach to creative work, with special emphasis on point of view and social aspects of creativity. In addition, I explore some possible relations between creativity and conflict resolution, presenting experimental work with a “shadow box” designed to illuminate collaborative synthesis of disparate points of view.

EVOLVING SYSTEMS APPROACH

This approach is predicated on the uniqueness of each creative person as he or she moves through a series of commitments, problems, solutions, and transformations. These aspects of the creative process are not fixed, and they are not universal. Rather, they constantly evolve, and

they differ from one creator to another. The system as a whole is composed of subsystems that are loosely coupled with each other. This looseness provokes the emergence of disequilibrium and the finding of new questions; consequently, it opens the way to unpredictable innovation.

Our task is to describe how a given creator actually works. It is not our task to measure the amount of creativity or to find factors that apply in the same way to all creators. What is necessary for one creative person confronting a problem may be unnecessary or even ill-advised for another.

The creative individual described here, interested in creativity in the moral domain, is only a first approximation. People who take responsibility want to make something happen. For this, they need allies, who must be persuaded, recruited, trained, and supported. Moreover, a full expression of morality would bring together moral thought, moral feeling, and moral action. Beyond these components, there must be creative integration. Although this last is rarely discussed, Donna Chirico has made an interesting effort in her integrative article, “Where Is the Wisdom? The Challenge of Moral Creativity at the Millennium” (1999). And of course, Erich Fromm’s whole oeuvre is a reflection on such a synthesis. (See Fromm, 1962, for example.)

In her case study of Niebuhr, Chirico shows how the quest for integration of thought, feeling, and action can lead to surprising results, can even go astray. She shows how Niebuhr achieved such an integration, but at a price. As he grew in influence, he gained new opportunities to move to the plane of moral action. But this brought him into collaborative interaction with a largely conservative establishment. In a series of such contacts, he became more conservative. Chirico (1999) writes, “As Niebuhr became involved increasingly in the political power

structure as an insider, his radical views about the role of government shifted toward those of the authority figures he had previously denounced. Niebuhr moved from speaking as an independent thinker, whose ideology was informed by the Christian message, to acting as an advocate for the prevailing opinions of the United States government."

Chirico stresses the difficulty, the need for the hard and steady work required, if we want to contribute to social transformation. She writes, "In a postmodern world where all is relative anyway, it is easier to accept inequity in the guise of personal or cultural differences than to take a moral stand . . . without moral creativity there can be no attempt. This involves self-sacrifice so that a community of concerned selves can come together and provoke change. It starts with taking a moral stand."

Each creative case presents different aspects for study. These evolving opportunities may be grouped under three major headings: knowledge, purpose, and affect. All of them apply in the first instance to the creative individual at work. In addition, there are aspects that apply to the creator as a social being: social origins and development; relations with colleagues, mentorships, and so on.

Since each creative person is unique, if collaboration is needed, it must be collaboration among people who differ (in style, background, ability profile, and the like). Collaboration and similar relationships may take many forms: working together on a shared project where both members of a pair do work that is essentially the same (as Picasso and Braque did in inventing cubism); working together in a teamlike setting where participants complement each other (as in the production of a film, an opera, or a ballet); and sharing ideas either face-to-face or in written correspondence (as Vincent van Gogh and his brother, Theo, did through the medium of thousands of

letters mostly about Vincent's actual work, his plans for future work, and his sensuous experiences).

Networks of Enterprise

It is well established that creative work evolves over long periods of time. Some writers even speak of the ten-year rule. Whether this duration is two years or twenty or simply highly variable, it is certainly a far cry from the millisecond flashes vaunted by the devotees of sudden insight and mysterious intuition as the essence of creative effort.

If creative work takes so long, we must have an approach to motivation that recognizes the time it takes. I have found that one important aspect of creative work is the way each creator organizes a life so that diverse projects do not become obstacles to each other. I use the term *enterprise* to make room for the typical situation in which a person who completes one project does not abandon the line of work it entailed but picks up another that is part of the same set of concerns. I use the term *network* to accommodate the finding that creators are often simultaneously involved in several projects and enterprises linked to each other in complex ways.

Time and Irreality.

One of the most persistent myths about creative work is the allegation that novelty comes about through lightning-like flashes of insight. On the contrary, serious studies reveal accounts in which the time taken is on the order of years and decades. Even when a moment of sudden transformation occurs, it is the hard-won result of a long developmental process.

Engagement and commitment for such long periods of steady work require appropriate organization of the task space. On the one hand, the creator must fashion a network

of enterprise that can withstand the challenges of distraction, fatigue, and failure. On the other hand, one of the chief instruments of creative persistence is a well-developed fantasy life: what cannot be done (yet) on the plane of reality is attainable in the world of dreams, fantasy, half-baked notebooks (Darwin), and private discussions (Einstein). Play becomes the midwife of creative change.

Play Ethic.

We teach and preach the work ethic, but from time to time the play ethic rears its head, especially among creators. But there is no inescapable conflict between work and play. There is fusion of work and play as well, as transformation of activity from playlike to worklike and vice versa, in an endless cycle.

Once we take account of this constructive, collective, perdurably patient character of creative work, it follows that some of the miasmal mystery surrounding thought about creativity can evaporate. To work together, people must communicate. For this, they must share a common language, which sometimes means that one must teach others the language to be shared. A striking example of this process is how the physicist Freeman Dyson deliberately set about working with Richard Feynman, bent on learning to understand “Feynman diagrams” so that he could teach the wider community of physicists to do likewise. (See Schweber, 1994.)

Extraordinary Moral Responsibility and Creativity in the Moral Domain

These are closely linked ideas. For the most part, research on moral development has been limited to the plane of judgment. When all that is required of the subject is to

make a moral judgment, he or she is free to choose any position, from the mundane to the fanciful, from the craven to the courageous. But if morally guided conduct must follow from judgment, many, if not most, subjects disappear into the cracks. Indeed, these judgmental interstices are seen as normal and necessary for maintaining an orderly society. “Who will bell the cat?” is experienced as a threatening question.

The expression

Ought→ Can→ Create

is shorthand for a somewhat complex idea, to wit, that one “ought” to do some particular thing, or that there “ought to be a law” only makes sense if the predicated “ought” is possible. So “ought” implies “can.” But situations occur in which it is urgent to make the passage from “cannot” to “can” and where this can only be done by discovering and taking some new, unexplored path. This is when creative work becomes the moral imperative.

THE SHADOW BOX EXPERIMENTS

In Plato’s parable of the cave, the prisoners are chained to a single station and see nothing but shadows on the wall. They have no way of distancing or decentering themselves from this one limited view of the world. Limited and distorted as it may be, it is their reality. Plato’s point is that this is the normal situation of ordinary mortals, leaving them vulnerable to the distortions of group pressure. Sherif’s (1936) work on the formation of social norms and Asch’s (1952) work on group pressures have important points in common with the prisoners in Plato’s cave. The subjects in the experiments of both researchers are all looking at the scene to be judged in essentially the same

way and from the same point of view. Thus, a difference in reports of what is seen must mean a disagreement. There is no opportunity for dialogue among the observers. The subjects are limited to looking and listening; they have no chance for an active exploratory or manipulative approach. Finally, the situation invites only judgment on a single variable, not the construction of a complex idea or object.

Under such conditions, intersubjective differences become disagreements that can be solved only by yielding, domination, and compromise—all of which occur.

In contrast, it is possible to imagine conditions in which observers have different information about the same reality but no need to disagree with each other. They may even be able to transcend their individual limitations and together arrive at a deeper grasp of the reality in question than would be possible for each alone. Our research grew out of the conviction that people can be vigorously truthful.

We have embodied this possibility in the microcosm of a shadow box. (See figure 19.1 .) In this arrangement, an object concealed in a box casts two differing shadows on two screens at right angles to each other. The subjects' task is to discover the shape of the hidden object by discussing and synthesizing the two shadows of which each sees only one. Although our main interest was the process of collaboration of subjects with different viewpoints, to study that we also looked at the performance of single subjects shuttling back and forth between two screens.




Figure 19.1 The Shadow Box

Source: Gruber, H. E. "The Cooperative Synthesis of Disparate Points of View." In I. Rock (ed.), *The Legacy of Solomon Asch: Essays in Cognition and Social Psychology* . Mahwah, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1990. Reprinted with permission.

Note: The task is to use the two shadows to work out the shape of the hidden object.

Cooperative synthesis of such disparate points of view in the shadow box situation is not a simple matter. Each subject is asked to make an a priori assumption that the other participant's observations represent the same entity. Each participant must convey what he or she sees clearly and correctly to the other. This may require inventing a suitable scheme for representing the information in question. When difficulties of communication arise, the problem of trusting the other must be dealt with. Often, too, the subjects must overcome a common tendency to

ignore or underemphasize the other person’s contribution and to center attention on one’s own point of view.

When we compare one person shuttling between two station points with a pair of people, each of whom sees only one screen, sometimes the single person is superior and sometimes the pair. Over a wide range of situations, the individual perceptual apparatus is admirably organized for synthesizing disparate inputs: binocular vision, the kinetic depth effect, and all sorts of intermodal phenomena testify to the capability. However, there are at least some situations in which two heads are better than one.

From a practical point of view, the question of one head or two may not always be germane. There are real-world situations in which shuttling back and forth between station points is not feasible, so there must be an observer at each point. In negotiating situations, the number of heads is determined by sociopolitical realities. Going beyond the shadow box, the processes involved in cooperative synthesis of points of view are interesting in their own right.

Experiment One: Interaction of Social and Cognitive Factors

The subjects were first shown how the setup worked: two lamps, two screens, and a stalk on which to mount the object. (See Figure 19.1 .) They were shown how two shadows could be generated, one on each screen, and it was suggested to them that they could figure out what the object was by talking to each other or drawing pictures (material supplied). We compared subjects working in pairs with subjects working alone. In the pair situation, they were asked not to look at the other person’s screen. The subjects were children (ages seven to nine), adolescents (fourteen to sixteen), and adults (twenty to fifty-three). The

pairs were asked to communicate with each other about what they saw and to work together to come to an agreement as to the shape of the concealed object that would account for the two shadows. Each single subject or each pair of subjects worked on two Lego objects and two geometrical objects, as shown in figure 19.2 .




Figure 19.2 Objects and Shadows in Experiment One: Geometrical Objects and Lego Objects

Source: Gruber, H. E. "The Cooperative Synthesis of Disparate Points of View." In I. Rock (ed.), *The Legacy of Solomon Asch: Essays in Cognition and Social Psychology* . Mahwah, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1990. Reprinted with permission.

The subjects almost invariably found the task challenging and interesting and worked on it for as long as an hour. Among children, the majority failed to solve (correctly

synthesize) any of the objects; and among the adolescents and adults, there were a few who failed completely.

The main difference between adolescents and adults was that the latter often hit spontaneously on the idea that there might be more than one solution to a problem, sometimes even recognizing the possibility of an unlimited number of solutions. To our surprise, in a number of experiments, there was little difference in problem-solving success between singles and pairs. In only one respect was the pair condition clearly superior to the single: frequency of multiple solutions. This superiority was more pronounced in adult pairs than in adolescents.

Experiment Two: Comparison of Cooperative and Individualistic Orientations

Our goal was to examine the effect of social orientations within pairs on the synthesis of points of view. We used three kinds of instruction to the pairs. The cooperative instruction encouraged the pair to work together throughout the experiment, indicating that their performance would be evaluated as a pair compared with other pairs. The individualistic instruction asked the subjects to exchange information as to their respective shadows and then to work alone in solving the problem, indicating that their performance would be evaluated as individuals. The neutral instruction did not specify any mode of working together and did not mention evaluation. The subjects were twenty-four pairs of adolescents (ages fourteen to sixteen) and twenty-four pairs of adults (twenty-three to fifty-eight). There were no consistent or striking differences between the sexes, so that variable is ignored in this discussion.

Each pair was given a single problem, a tetrahedron fixed on an edge in such a position that each subject saw a

triangular shadow, one with apex up, the other with apex down (see figure 19.1). We chose this rather difficult task to avoid the possibility that most subjects would solve the problem easily and to keep the subjects working long enough for us to make the observations we were interested in.

The resulting patterns of social behavior could be classified as individualistic, cooperative, or competitive. Subjects by no means followed the instructions we gave them. Surprisingly, among the adults the predominant behavior was cooperative, even when the instructions were neutral. Furthermore, even in the group given individualistic instructions, almost half the subjects were cooperative. It seemed as though the structure of the shadow box situation, presenting two perspectives bearing on a single object, naturally evoked cooperation as the appropriate response mode.

Most of the successful adult pairs were ones in which both members were cooperative. Moreover, in six of eight such pairs, the partners had different problem-solving strategies, one working mainly by adding planes and the other by constructing volumes. In exchanging information, the adults were more precise and detailed than the adolescents, giving information not only about shape but also about orientation, size, and position on the screen. The adults gave equal weight to both shadows, while the adolescents tended to focus on their own viewpoint. Adults were attentive to their partner’s suggestion, and they duly profited from their differences by improving the quality of their solutions and their comprehension of the tasks. The adolescents were less interested in the other’s ideas. They were also more concerned about whose solution was correct, as if only one were possible.

THE IMPORTANCE OF POINT OF VIEW

The importance of point of view emerges explicitly in many settings: Plato's cave, the anthropologist's relativism (which need not be despairingly total), postmodern nihilism, and so forth. Under conditions in which subjects are not able to explore and communicate freely, intersubjective differences become disagreements that are difficult to resolve. Techniques of conflict resolution that are successful under some conditions may lead only to fiasco in other circumstances, such as change in scale or change of mood. For example, sharing the commons requires civility and negotiation, and such conditions may sometimes be unattainable.

From our work with the shadow box, it becomes clear experimentally that under certain conditions taking the point of view of the other (POVO) is essential for collaborative work and that some problems absolutely require the synthesis of disparate points of view (POVOSYN). But such synthesis, like all creative work, is a delicate plant and may fail if conditions change.

The classic studies of conformity by Sherif (1936) and by Asch (1952) stemmed from rather different perspectives about the truth value of beliefs. Sherif thought that the development of social norms could be readily studied in a highly ambiguous stimulus situation, notably the autokinetic effect, and that this ambiguity corresponds well to real-world conditions. Asch objected to this image of human nature as passively yielding to group pressures; he believed that if confronted with clearly discriminable and unambiguous stimuli, observers would resist conformity.

Does the epistemology of the shadow box, especially recognizing multiple solutions, mean that anything goes, that we are no further than when we started in our quest

for paths to truth? I think not. Even though there are multiple solutions, at least some are always excluded. The existence of multiple solutions does not open the way to unregulated relativism. To take only one example, a stationary cube can cast a variety of shadows, depending on its orientation, but it can never cast a circular shadow. By the same token, a stationary sphere can never cast a square shadow.

The importance of point of view is concisely expressed in a remark often attributed to Isaac Newton: “If I have seen farther, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants” (reported by Catherine Drinker Bowen in Merton, 1985). Merton’s book-length exploration of this aphorism is a pleasure to read. When all is said and done, a stationary sphere can never cast a square shadow.

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CHAPTER TWENTY
SOME GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING A CREATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT

Peter T. Coleman
Morton Deutsch

In his stimulating essay on creativity and conflict resolution in chapter 19, Howard Gruber raised a number of important questions, which we discuss briefly before presenting some guidelines to creative conflict resolution.

CREATIVITY RESULTING FROM CONFLICT

The first question is, “If creativity requires conflict,” under what conditions of conflict is creativity likely to emerge?

One of the creative functions of conflict resides in its ability to arouse motivation to solve a problem that might otherwise go unattended. A scholar who exposes his theories and research to the scrutiny of his peers may be stimulated to a deeper analysis if a colleague confronts him with conflicting data and theoretical analysis. Similarly, individuals and groups who have authority and power and are satisfied with the status quo may be aroused to recognize problems and be motivated to work on them, as opposition from the dissatisfied makes the customary relations and arrangements unworkable and unrewarding, or as they are helped to perceive the possibility of more satisfying relations and arrangements. Accepting the necessity for change in the status quo (rather than rigid, defensive adherence to previously existing positions) is most likely, however, when the circumstances arousing new motivation suggest courses of action that pose minimal

threat to the social or self-esteem of those who must change.

Thus, although acute dissatisfaction with things as they are and motivation to recognize and work at problems are necessary for creative solutions, these things are not sufficient. The circumstances conducive to creatively breaking through impasses are varied, but they have in common that “they provide the individual with an environment in which he does not feel threatened and in which he does not feel under pressure. He is relaxed but alert” (Stein, 1968). Threat induces defensiveness and reduces both tolerance of ambiguity and openness to the new and unfamiliar; excessive tension leads to primitization and stereotyping of thought processes. As Rokeach (1960) has pointed out, threat and excessive tension lead to the closed rather than open mind. To entertain novel ideas that may at first seem wild and implausible, to question initial assumptions of the framework within which the problem or conflict occurs, the individual needs the freedom or courage to express herself without fear of censure. Much research (see, e.g., Carnevale and Probst, 1998, and chapter 4 of this Handbook) has demonstrated that a competitive, as opposed to cooperative, approach to conflict leads to restricted judgment, reduced complexity, inability to consider alternative perspectives, and less creative problem solving.

NOVEL POINT OF VIEW

The second question is, “How is a novel point of view developed and constructed?”

Gruber rightly stresses the importance to creativity of a novel point of view that stimulates new questions. Throughout this Handbook, there is stress on the fact that a novel perspective regarding conflict is to view it as a

mutual problem that the conflicting parties can work on together, cooperatively, in an attempt to discover mutually satisfactory solutions. As chapter 1 emphasizes, reframing the conflict so that the conflicting parties see themselves as being in a collaborative rather than oppositional relation with regard to resolving their conflict is crucial to creative resolution. It not only produces an atmosphere conducive to creativity, but vastly expands the range of potential solutions as well.

Although reframing makes a conflict more amenable to a solution, the ability to reformulate the reframed mutual problem so that, in turn, one can find a solution to it depends on the availability of cognitive resources. Ideas are important to creative resolution of conflict, and any factors that broaden the range of ideas and alternatives available to the participants in a conflict are useful. Intelligence, exposure to diverse experiences, interest in ideas, preference for the novel and complex, receptivity to metaphors and analogies, the capacity to make remote associations, independence of judgment, and the ability to play with ideas are some of the personal factors that characterize creative problem solvers. The availability of ideas also depends on such social conditions as the opportunity to communicate with and be exposed to other people who may have relevant and unfamiliar ideas (such as experts, impartial outsiders, people facing similar or analogous situations), a social atmosphere that values innovation and originality and encourages exchanging ideas, and a social tradition that fosters the optimistic view that, with effort and time, constructive solutions to problems that initially seem intractable can be discovered or invented.

TIME AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The third question is, “Do creative solutions emerge only after extensive time and effort are focused on the problem, or are there conflicts that permit solution in a relatively short time?”

Gruber is surely correct to emphasize that such profound, intellectual problems as those addressed by Darwin and Einstein require extended time and effort. Similarly, one can assume that such complex conflicts as those in the Middle East and the Balkans—or in an embittered dysfunctional family—also involve prolonged creative effort. But not all problems are profound, and not all conflicts are deeply enmeshed in difficult personal, social, economic, and political conditions. So what kind of conflicts permit solution in a relatively short time? What would be an example of a “noncomplex” conflicts?

PLAY AND CREATIVITY

Fourth, “Why is play the midwife of creative change?”

Almost all scholars of creativity emphasize the importance of playfulness to the creative process. As Gruber points out, the play ethic permits one to engage in fantasy and to consider fantastic and unreal ideas, which sometimes can be transformed into workable solutions. It also permits fun, humor, and relaxation of internal censors that inhibit expression of challenging, unconventional, far-out ideas. Families, groups, and organizations as well as individuals who have the play ethic are likely to discover novel solutions to the problems and conflicts they experience.

INDIVIDUAL WORK AND COLLABORATION

Fifth, “What are the differences between creative individual work and creative collaboration?”

Gruber’s fascinating experiments bring this question sharply into focus. From his research, as well as that of others, it is evident that an individual is not at a disadvantage, compared to a collaborating pair of people, if she has access to the different perspectives (which are available within the pair) necessary to construct an appropriate integrated picture of the reality with which she is dealing. However, the individual could reasonably assume that if she is limited to her own perspective, it would be much more difficult or perhaps impossible to do so. In contrast, a pair of subjects, each with his or her own perspective concerning the reality being perceived (but with sufficient information between them), is also able to construct a valid picture of the reality if they are cooperative. In fact, they are able to generate more such pictures than the individual problem solver is.

On the one hand, one can generalize by stating that collaborative (as compared to individual) problem solving—when the collaboration is effectively cooperative—usually provides more resources, more diversity in ideas, and more social support for the work involved in creative problem solving. On the other hand, individual as compared to collaborative work does not require the skills and attitudes involved in effective cooperation, which include communication, perspective taking, trust, empathy, control of egocentricity, and the like. (See chapter 1 for a fuller discussion of the skills and attitudes involved in effective cooperation.) Thus, individual work is likely to be more creative if it is difficult to establish effective cooperation, while collaborative work is likely to be so if there is effective cooperation and the collaborators have more resources available to them than are available to an individual.

The Egg Drop Exercise

As Gruber and we have emphasized, constructive resolution of conflict often requires that the disputants be able to see old things in new ways. Here we describe an innovative training experience, developed by Kenneth Sole, for exploring conflict and creativity under conditions of cooperation and competition. We also outline several guidelines for conflict resolvers to use in facilitating a creative process in conflict situations.

This is an exercise in intragroup creative problem solving conducted under conditions of intragroup and intergroup competition and conflict. The participants are put into teams of five to ten individuals and informed of the task. A coat hanger has been hung from the ceiling, and one dozen raw eggs are suspended from it by strands of cotton thread. A ladder leads to the structure. The teams are then instructed that the objective of the activity is to be the first team to build a freestanding apparatus that successfully catches and holds a falling raw egg, unbroken, six inches above the floor.

Each team is furnished with an identical kit of “stuff” (string, tape, cupcakes, instant soup, hairpins, and so on) and instructed to build an apparatus to catch the egg of their choice. The eggs are numbered sequentially. The teams are informed that they may use only the materials in their kit to build the apparatus.

In addition, each team is asked to select a member of their group to sit on a panel of judges. They are instructed not to consult with any of their prior team members regarding the creative process. In addition to the rules provided, the judges may decide (unilaterally) to impose additional rules for the teams to follow. These rules are delivered to the teams by formal proclamation.

When the judges begin the competition, each team member suits up in garbage bags and rubber gloves and then begins work on designing the apparatus. As soon as a team is ready, one member is required to call, “Ready.” At that time they must announce (within fifteen seconds) the number of the egg they wish to catch. From the time the team declares the egg they plan to catch, they have three minutes to position their apparatus for catching the egg. By the end of the three-minute period, one of the team members must cut the thread that holds the chosen egg. Each team is limited to two egg attempts per apparatus.

No member of a team may touch any egg, suspension threads, or hanging structure at any time. A judge noticing violation of any of these rules imposes the penalty of confiscation. The other teams confiscate one item from the kit of the offending team. Teams have thirty seconds to select the item they wish to confiscate. If a team member informs the judges (or a judge) of violations, the penalty is doubled. Decisions of the judges are final.

This exercise gives participants a rich (and ridiculous) opportunity to explore creative problem solving under conditions of competition and conflict. The experience can be particularly useful for intact work groups or for other groups experiencing conflict, because it allows exploration of conflict dynamics under relatively benign circumstances. During the exercise, conflicts typically emerge between the teams, between the panel of judges and the teams, and within a team between individuals with differing ideas and styles of problem solving. All of these conflicts have implications for the creative problem-solving process.

General Guidelines for Creativity and Conflict

The discussions that follow the exercise can cover many of the themes outlined in the guidelines we offer here. The

ideas and processes summarized here have been informed by the work of many scholars and practitioners, among them Howard Gruber, Kenneth Sole, John Cleese, Donald Treffinger, Scott Isaksen, Brian Dorval, and Peter Carnevale.

Challenge the Myths about Creativity.

Treffinger, Isaksen, and Dorval (1994) identified four common myths that many people hold about creativity:

1. “I’m not a creative person.” (Creativity is a rare and special quality possessed by only a few.)
2. “Creativity is too mysterious to be taught.” (Creativity is a supernatural and uncontrollable phenomenon.)
3. “Creativity equals arts.” (Creativity exists only in relation to artistic endeavors.)
4. “Creativity is madness.” (Creativity is associated with eccentricity and insanity.)

The egg drop exercise often puts people face-to-face with these and other assumptions that they hold about the creative process and their own capacity to be creative. These myths negatively influence people’s approach to problem solving under many conditions, but particularly under conditions of perceived threat that are associated with many conflict situations. Training should support people in exploring these assumptions and broadening their understanding of the creative process to include how they solve conflicts and other problems in their lives.

Use Time and Space Arrangements to Create an Oasis for Creative Problem Solving.

John Cleese, who first found fame in *Monty Python’s Flying Circus* and has been a consultant to many organizations on

creativity, coined the term *time-space oasis* to depict a situation where the most basic conditions are met for functioning creatively (Cleese, 1991). The condition of time has two dimensions, length and endurance. People must have a sufficient amount of time to open up and see things flexibly and creatively, particularly if working in a conflict situation where they are operating primarily in a critical mode. Thus, the competition to be the first to complete the egg drop apparatus reduces the group's time and usually stresses its ability to innovate. Once in a creative mode, disputants need ample time to create, but not so much time that they tire and become discouraged. Cleese recommends ninety minutes as a good amount of time for a working session (thirty minutes to open up and sixty minutes to work constructively).

The other component of time is the need for disputants to persist and endure, even after a marginally acceptable solution presents itself. Research has shown that humans tend to be poor decision makers because they often choose the first acceptable solution to a problem that emerges, even if it is far from being the best that could be developed. Truly creative solutions are usually discovered only after persisting in exploring the problem and its potential solutions. Prolonged and deep engagement with a problem can lead not only to a high level of innovation but also to deep and enduring satisfaction among the disputants with the agreement they produce.

The second dimension of the time-space oasis is having access to a different space. It is often useful for disputants to remove themselves from their customary environments to be able to think afresh. The many demands and distractions of one's usual environment, whether related to the conflict or not, draw one back into habitual or standard ways of seeing a problem and responding to it. A new environment (particularly a confidential one) can allow

disputants some degree of freedom to try out new perspectives, behaviors, or ways of working with a problem. This is a primary reason that exercises such as the egg drop, which are removed from actual work or conflict settings, can be useful in helping disputants explore relational or conflict dynamics.

Develop a Serious but Playful Atmosphere.

As Howard Gruber indicated, playfulness is often central to a creative process. Humor, play, and a sense of fun can all contribute to releasing tension and opening up one's view of things, ultimately leading to development of a novel point of view. The egg drop exercise captures this relationship between play and a new perspective. The rules of the exercise are always presented in the most formal of manners, but the task, the uniforms, and the objects involved belie this formality and communicate a high degree of silliness. This climate is experienced by the participants as especially conducive to experimenting, making mistakes, and attempting the uncommon or ridiculous.

But humor, playfulness, and fun are tricky endeavors when working with difficult conflicts. Particularly in escalated conflicts, disputants often approach their problems grimly. Having a conflict resolver introduce humor or play could easily offend or enrage in these situations. If introduced, it must be done with sensitivity and artistry. To establish a climate that allows for humor or play, Cleese (1991) recommends that we separate the idea of seriousness from that of solemnity. He claims that it is rarely useful to be solemn and that serious topics can often be approached with a touch of humor. Conflict-resolving practitioners could greatly benefit from training to develop the social skills useful in creating a serious but playful problem-solving atmosphere.

Foster Optimal Tension.

Tension is the primary link between conflict and creativity. Conflict signals dissatisfaction with something or someone. This dissatisfaction brings tension into the system. If standard approaches to reducing tension are ineffective, it increases. This increase can eventually motivate people to seek new means of reducing the tension (or to keep hammering away with the old means), which can lead to adaptation or innovation and eventual reduction in tension. However, too much tension in a system can impair people's capacity to think creatively to envision a new approach.

The egg drop exercise introduces many sources of tension. The intergroup competition over winning, the limited and obscure resources that the teams are asked to work with, the constant evaluation of the judges, and even the request that the members wear trash bags and rubber gloves all increase tension. The tension works to engage the participants, but it also adversely affects their ability to think creatively, even if there is only minimal intergroup competition. Optimal tension therefore is a state in which there is not too little tension regarding the problem being faced in a conflict (where the disputants are not sufficiently motivated to deal with the issues and the conflict remains unresolved) or too much tension (which can lead to conflict avoidance because it is so threatening or conflict escalation as the tension limits one to an oversimplified black-and-white perception of the issues).

Thus, it becomes critical for conflict resolvers to develop the skills necessary to assess the level of tension in a conflict system, diagnose what level is optimal for a given system, and discover levers for increasing tension (such as through using open confrontation or empowering members of low-power groups) or decreasing it (such as through

using humor or temporarily separating disputants from one another).

Foster Confidence to Take the Risk of Being Outlandish.

Self-confidence is an individual characteristic that can affect a person's ability to take the risk involved in developing a novel point of view. However, a person's confidence level can also be significantly affected by the situation and by those in power (or perceived to be so) in the situation. Conflict specialists who emphasize their expertise and knowledge in a problem-solving session tend to elicit dependence and less confidence from the disputants, with the consequence that fewer novel ideas and recommendations are generated by the parties. A conflict specialist who supports and encourages the ideas of the disputants, highlighting those aspects of their ideas that are particularly useful or innovative, is likely to draw out a flow of ideas that expand the menu of perspectives and alternatives. It is important for facilitators to remember that the open flow of ideas and information is a dynamic responsive to the support (and playfulness) of the facilitator.

Have Appropriately Phased Open (Divergent) and Closed (Convergent) Thinking.

This is the yin and yang of the creative problem-solving process. Creativity is most often associated with openness of ideas, a free flowing of thoughts, images, symbols, and so on. Decision making, though, is most often associated with moving toward closure: converging on the alternative or set of alternatives that best address the problem. A creative problem-solving approach to conflict requires both. Disputants must have the capacity and opportunity to open up to understand a problem from various perspectives

and to generate many, perhaps novel, ideas or solutions. In addition, disputants must have the chance to (eventually) reach closure by taking a hard look at those perspectives and ideas and determine if they are any good and will work in a particular situation.

The open and closed modes of experience are in opposition to each other in that it is difficult to remain open to new alternative possibilities while trying to close in on a final decision. It is therefore useful to alternate from one mode to another during the problem-solving process. Alternating between the open and closed modes can be useful during various phases of the problem-solving process, such as when defining or redefining the issues, generating solutions, or planning methods of implementation or achieving constituent buy-in. It is useful to defer judgment (delayed evaluation of the alternatives) when in the open mode, and then weigh both the strengths and weaknesses of the alternatives when moving into the closed mode for decision making.

Typically conflict moves people into the closed mode and produces rigid thinking with restricted judgment, reduced complexity, and narrower range of attention. Exactly why this occurs is unclear, but scholars have speculated that it may be due to a number of factors: the conflict triggering a negative affect such as anxiety, a competitive orientation overloading cognitive functioning and leading to preoccupation with formulating strategies and tactics to prevail in the conflict, or simply providing too much cognitive stimulation. If this occurs, conflict resolvers must find the means to reorient disputants, at least temporarily, into an open mode.

Research by Carnevale and Probst (1998) has identified an important qualifier to the causal chain of “conflict equals tension equals impaired cognitive functioning.” The

research found that people's cognitive functioning becomes more rigid and restricted if they either anticipate or engage in competitive conflicts, but not when they expect or engage in cooperative conflict. People in a cooperative experience are better able to combine categories, see commonalities in their positions, and better locate integrative solutions than those in competitive conflicts.

The exact reasons for this difference are as yet unclear, but the implications for practice are important. Conflict resolvers who effectively reframe the conflict as a mutual problem to be solved cooperatively by the parties also open up the disputants' capacity to think creatively about the problem and the solution.

Adequately Define the Problem.

Adequate definition is the aspect of creative conflict resolution that is most often shortchanged. The uncomfortable experience of tension associated with many conflicts often moves people to try to solve the problem quickly. This tendency puts them prematurely into the closed mode of decision making around the nature of the problem, before they take the time to open up and examine the problem from alternative perspectives. Ultimately this can lead to superficial or even incorrect understanding of the problem at hand, and much time wasted generating and implementing solutions to the wrong concerns.

Ironically, this approach can take more time than if the problem is examined thoroughly up front. For example, what is the egg drop problem? Is it to build an apparatus quickly? Is it to keep the other teams from building an apparatus? Or is it to stop the egg six inches from the ground? Each of these definitions of the problem leads to a distinct strategy for solving it. Spending some time exploring the problem, and perhaps identifying the

pervasive concerns behind the presenting problem, can lead to satisfying, long-lasting, and even efficient solutions.

TECHNIQUES FOR STIMULATING NOVEL IDEAS

It is important to recognize that most creative artists, writers, and scientists produce many ideas before they find a good, novel, creative one. In the preceding guidelines, we discuss some of the conditions fostering openness of the free flow of thought necessary to produce many ideas. Brainstorming (see Osborn, 1953) is a technique widely used to generate ideas. In conflict situations, it may be employed to come up with ideas about the problem or conflict, its potential solution, and action to be taken (Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1991). In a brainstorming session, whether as an individual or as a group, one is encouraged to use imagination to come up with as many varied ideas as possible, without censoring or judging them, whether produced by oneself or by another. In a group setting, people are encouraged to free-associate with, elaborate, and build on the ideas of others.

To encourage novelty as well as quality in ideas, people are encouraged to use metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980) and analogies. (For example, what new ideas might be developed about a conflict between ethnic groups by using the metaphor of a family feud?) Other techniques for stimulating novelty include synectics, or joining together opposites (Gordon and Poze, 1977); raising questions about ways of changing the situation (Eberle, 1971); and substituting, separating, adding, combining, reducing, magnifying, deleting, or otherwise rearranging elements.

As the chapters on change processes (chapter 22), intractable conflict (chapter 30), and large-group methods

(chapter 38) indicate, another way of getting out of a rut and creating new ideas is to try imagining a desirable future. Beckhard and Reuben (1987), Blake and Mouton (1984), Boulding (1986), and others have used various terms—“envisioning the desired future state,” “social imaging,” “future search”—to characterize the process by which individuals, groups, or organizations are encouraged to free themselves from the constraints of current reality to develop an image of a better future. In practice, this procedure has been useful in helping people develop awareness of new possibilities and new directions. One could expect such a procedure to be helpful in a conflict situation: the parties are aided in imagining desirable relations in the future and to start the process of thinking about how they can get there from the current situation.

A third party, such as a mediator, can bring new thinking into a stuck conflict. He or she may help the conflicting parties become aware of new possibilities for agreement other than win-lose or lose-lose resolution of their conflict. Thus, as Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim (1994) have pointed out, mutually satisfactory agreements may be reached by (1) expanding the pie, so that there is enough for both sides; (2) nonspecific compensation, which involves having one party receive its best alternative and compensating the other in some other way; (3) logrolling, by having the parties make mutually beneficial trade-offs among the issues; (4) cost cutting, by reducing or eliminating the costs to the party not getting its way; or (5) bridging, by finding an option that satisfies the interests of both parties (see also the discussions in chapters 33 and 34).

Also, by making the parties aware of their potentially creative differences in what they value, their expectations, their attitude toward risk, their time preferences, and the like (Thompson, 1998), we help them see that their differences can facilitate mutually satisfactory agreement.

CONCLUSION

Betty Reardon, a noted peace educator, once said, “The failure to achieve peace is in essence a failure of imagination” (personal communication). Throughout history, considerable human and economic resources have been invested in creating new and deadlier means to wage war. The time has come to invest the energy and resources necessary to innovate and create new and livelier means to wage peace.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE CREATIVITY IN THE OUTCOMES OF CONFLICT [a]

Peter J. Carnevale

> *It were not best that we should all think alike; it is difference of opinion that makes horse races.*
>
> —Mark Twain, "The Tragedy of Pudd'nhead Wilson"

How does creativity play out in social conflict? Just like Mark Twain's observation about difference of opinion and interesting horse races, it is difference of interest, and how difference is handled, that makes interesting solutions to social conflict. If creativity is applied to the handling of differences, the outcome might very well be a mutually beneficial, integrative agreement; but creativity can be applied just as well to contentiousness, pursuit of selfish interests, and asymmetric outcomes. In this chapter, my focus is on creativity in the service of developing mutually beneficial, integrative agreements.

Consider the story of the Prophet Muhammad and his idea for settling a dispute that occurred during rebuilding of the Kaaba in Mecca. When the sacred Black Stone was to be put in place, leaders of several tribes quarreled about who should have the honor of placing it. The Prophet's idea was to place the stone on a cloak, and the heads of each tribe would take a side of the cloak and together carry it in; thus, each could have the honor of putting the stone in place (Satha-Anand, 1998). [1] The story points to the characteristics of an outcome, a product—in this case, an agreement that allowed each party to achieve its interest, and it might be judged an especially creative outcome. Indeed, the kind of solution that allows each party to

achieve its interests is fundamental and represents a basic type of high-value outcome. The key question is, “What is the structure of creative outcomes of conflict?”

The focus on the products of negotiation is one of three basic perspectives on creativity in social conflict. The second perspective is about the person (the negotiator or mediator), and here it could be said that the Prophet Muhammad was creative in his suggestion. What are the characteristics of highly creative negotiators?

The third perspective, on process, is about the set of processes and conditions that connect the person to the product. The key questions are, “How does a given person, or group of people, in situations with pressures and constraints, limited capacities, strong emotions and motives achieve a creative agreement? What are the key underlying, explanatory processes?” [2]

OVERVIEW: PERSON, PROCESS, AND PRODUCT

The three perspectives on creativity in conflict—person, process, and product—can be seen as guides for the analysis of how people can get to integrative agreements. Simonton (2003, 2004) and Runco (2004) outlined these three perspectives in the study of creativity in scientific achievement. This chapter is an extension of that framework to the study of social conflict and reflects as well other works in the broad study of creativity (Amabile, 1993; Mumford, 2003; Sternberg, 1999). In many ways, the development of integrative agreements in social conflict is a subdomain of group creativity (compare Paulus and Nijstad, 2003).

The perspective on the person includes case studies of famous negotiators and mediators (e.g., Kolb, 1997), as

well as studies of negotiator personality characteristics (such as Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe, and Smith, 2002) and studies of basic features of human cognition as they affect negotiation (Kahneman and Tversky, 1995). [3] The perspective on the process reflects the social psychological focus on circumstances that evoke motives, incentives, and processes of problem construal and problem solving, a perspective originated by Deutsch (1973, chapters 1 and 2 of this Handbook), Druckman (1977), Kelley (1966), Pruitt (1981, 1998, this volume), and developed by Ross and Ward (1995) and Carnevale and de Dreu (2005; de Dreu and Carnevale, 2003).

The perspective on the product that can emerge from social conflict and its creativity is the least studied and is the focus of this chapter. In negotiation, the creative products perspective is founded in Follett's (1940) descriptive writing as well as Walton and McKersie's (1965) notion that "bargaining is not just a process of dividing up existing resources but is also a process sometimes used for creating additional values or mutual benefits" (p. 23). An important advance in the creative products perspective was Pruitt's taxonomy of integrative agreements (1981; see also Pruitt and Carnevale, 1982, 1993; Pruitt and Kim, 2004), which is reflected in theoretical work by Hopmann (1996) and descriptive work on deal development by Lax and Sebenius (1986, 2002).

INTEGRATIVE AGREEMENT AS CREATIVITY

Herbert Simon (2001) wrote, "We judge thought to be creative when it produces something that is both novel and interesting and valuable" (p. 208). This multiple component definition is seen in other writing as well; for example,

Sternberg and Lubart (1999) focus on creativity as being original as well as appropriate, and Smith (2005) emphasizes that a creative idea must have some bearing on reality as defined by "professionals in the domain at issue" (p. 294). In social conflict, creativity is sometimes equated with cooperation and problem solving, that is, it is seen as the opposite of competitiveness. But creativity can be applied to competitive intent as well, that is, the motives in a given situation can drive the form and expression of creativity.

The positions taken on the issues in conflict and negotiation often reflect underlying interests, that is, the parties' values and needs (Burton, 1987; Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1991). The search for underlying interests is one aspect of problem finding and problem solving, which is defined in negotiation as "any effort to identify a formula that will satisfy both sides' aspirations" (Pruitt and Kim, 2004, p. 189). As a result, the possible end product of problem solving, an integrative agreement, can be characterized as "efficient," "optimal," or "rational" (Smith, 2003), although the interesting issues are the basic structures of agreement, and their characteristics, that give them value of one form or another.

Compromise Versus Integrative

Some agreements are better than others, and this is seen in Follett's (1940) distinction between compromise and integration, a distinction that has carried through to most major treatises on negotiation and social conflict (Deutsch, 1973; Pruitt, 1981; Walton and McKersie, 1965). A compromise is a superficial treatment of differences that typically has each side give up something, meeting midway between opening positions. Integration "means that a solution has been found in which both desires have found a place, that neither side has had to sacrifice anything"

(Follett, 1940, p. 32); integrative agreements give greater collective value to the parties and can be seen as the product of a process of creative thinking (Pruitt, 1981).

Of course, not all situations have equal integrative potential. The conflict between Al Qaeda and the United States has little such potential (see Deutsch, chapter 2 of this Handbook, for a discussion of difficult conflicts). But there are conflicts that appear not to allow the possibility of integrative potential but can be resolved constructively with creativity. Consider, for example, two siblings who quarrel over the possession of a single family heirloom; they think only one can have it. However, as Deutsch's example in chapter 2 of this Handbook indicates, there are several creative solutions to such a conflict. Another well-known example is that of the story of two sisters who quarrel over an orange that both want: they could reach a compromise by simply cutting the orange in half and each taking half. However, with some openness and search for information, they might discover that one sister wanted the orange for its juice and the other wanted the peel for baking cakes. Clearly the integrative solution of one taking all the juice and the other taking the entire peel is the better solution. In Follett's (1940) words, "Integration involves invention, and the clever thing is to recognize this, and not to let one's thinking stay within the boundaries of two alternatives which are mutually exclusive" (p. 33). And this raises the question about the relative merits of an integrative agreement over a compromise.

Settlement versus Resolution

The distinction between compromise and integration is about the differences at hand, about the issues faced at the moment and whether they are treated in a superficial manner. An analogous distinction can be made about the broader relationship between the parties in conflict:

settlement versus resolution. A settlement is an agreement of the issues at hand and may even be an integrative agreement that ends a conflict yet leaves other issues in the broader relationship between the parties unresolved. Resolution is more substantive: it is an agreement in which most or all issues “are cleared up” (Pruitt and Kim, 2004).

The Conflict Management System

An optimal state for any relationship is the achievement of a conflict management system—a set of procedures for fostering integrative agreements in the resolution of existing and future differences. Sometimes conflict management systems are devised in an explicit manner, where the parameters are highly structured and negotiated, as when a labor contract has an organizational dispute resolution system that entails a mix of procedures such as negotiation, mediation, and arbitration (Bendersky, 2003). At other times, conflict management systems develop informally, even tacitly, and entail adoption of procedures or norms on how future conflicts will be handled in a mutually beneficial manner. Cooperation in establishing such systems has a parallel in instrumental cooperation in social dilemmas, which are efforts by people to increase the likelihood that others will cooperate and share resources and thus foster collective welfare (Yamagishi, 1986).

Conflict Needs Creativity, and Creativity Needs Conflict

The potential of constructive conflict is to produce positive personal and social change (Deutsch, chapter 1 of this Handbook). To do so, conflict must be handled in a way that stimulates creative solutions and avoids the negatives of destructive conflict. A main advantage of creative, integrative agreements over compromises is that they

foster stability of relationships (Follett, 1940; Pruitt, 1981; Thomas, 1976). There are other advantages as well: the larger organization or society will benefit if the constituent groups and individuals reach high-value agreements (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993); also, unless the agreement is integrative, designed to satisfy the parties' major interests, there might be no agreement at all.

Conflict is an important element of creativity. Sometimes productive change would not occur without it. Follett (1940) told the story of an improvement in a work environment that occurred as a direct result of a conflict, and the improvement would not have occurred had the conflict not occurred. Two groups of workers, dairymen, fought over who would have access to a loading and unloading dock: "If the Dairymen's League had not fought over the question of precedence, the improved method of unloading would not have been thought of. The conflict in this case was constructive. And this was because, instead of compromising, they sought a way of integrating" (p. 34). Coleman and Deutsch (this volume) make the important point that the status quo might favor an unjust system, and conflict provides the impetus for powerful parties, who favor the status quo, to make change.

The idea that conflict—or tolerance of conflict—is a precursor to creativity is well known and part of several broad theoretical statements in social conflict. The dual-concern model, for example, holds that "concern of own aspirations"—which specifies the degree of personal importance of the issues in conflict—is an important determinant of problem solving and integrative outcomes; it provides the impetus for people to stick it out in conflict and explore various options that will satisfy their own aspirations (Pruitt, 1981). In her concept of integrate, Follett (1940) put it this way: "A friend of mine said to me, 'Open-mindedness is the whole thing, isn't it?' No it isn't; it

needs just as great a respect for your own view as for that of others, and a firm upholding of it until you are convinced. Mushy people are no more good at this than stubborn people" (p. 48).

John Dewey (1922) tells us that "conflict is the gadfly of thought. It stirs us to observation and memory. It instigates to invention. It shocks us out of sheep-like passivity, and sets us at noting and contriving. Not that it always effects this result; but that conflict is a sine qua non of reflection and ingenuity" (p. 300). Indeed, there is supporting evidence: conflict can enhance creativity (Nemeth, Personnaz, Personnaz, and Goncalo, 2004) and innovation (Postmes, Spears, and Cihangir, 2001). Beersma and de Dreu (2005) report that the positive effects of conflict on creativity depend on the nature of the task, and de Dreu and Nijstad (2008) suggest that it depends on whether the domain of judgment is in or outside the realm of conflict.

CREATIVE PRODUCTS: THE STRUCTURE OF INTEGRATIVE AGREEMENTS

The products, or outcomes, of negotiation and social conflict can be creative, meaning that they are—to paraphrase Simon—novel, interesting, valuable, and appropriate in having a bearing on settlement or resolution. Dean Pruitt identified five basic types of integrative agreements: expanding the pie, nonspecific compensation, logrolling, cost cutting, and bridging (see Pruitt, 1981, see also Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993, p. 198; Pruitt and Kim, 2004). These five can be augmented; indeed, there are three additional types (including compromise) that derive from a close look at the underlying dynamics of integrative agreements.

The nature of integrative, creative conflict outcomes is greatly affected by the type and difficulty of the problem faced by the parties in conflict. Figure 21.1 presents a classification schema called the Agreement Circumplex (Carnevale, 2013). [4]




Figure 21.1 The Agreement Circumplex

The classification schema provides a starting place for understanding the structure and dynamics of integrative agreements. It has value regarding theory—the underlying dynamics of each type of integrative agreement is distinct—and it has practical value in that it can serve as a checklist

for negotiators and mediators interested in reaching creative, integrative, high-value agreements.

The schema proposes that agreements can be categorized as one or another of four main types (each with two subtypes). The key distinction in the schema is that between the parties' positions and the parties' underlying interests.

Main Agreement Types

The four main agreement types, related to each other as the four quadrants of a circumplex structure, are identified by the main goal that each entails. The goals pertain to what the parties hope to achieve with regard to the positions taken and their underlying interests. Each main agreement type has two subtypes, detailed in the following.

Quadrant I: Accommodate the Parties' Positions.

There are two forms of position accommodation wherein the parties' initial demands on the issues are accommodated: simple compromise and logrolling. Compromise is meeting halfway on the issues, and logrolling is giving up one issue in exchange for getting what one wants on a more important issue.

Quadrant II: Achieve the Parties' Positions.

In position achievement, each party gets exactly what it stated in its initial demand. For example, in a dispute over a resource, if the resource is doubled, the parties each get exactly what they want, that is, their initial demands are met. There are two forms: one driven by an increase in the resource and the other driven by modifying the resource so that it now fits what the parties want.

Quadrant III: Achieve the Parties' Underlying Interests.

Interest achievement has two forms, bridging and cost cutting. In both cases, the parties' underlying interests are met. In the former, a novel alternative arises, whereas in the latter, one (or both) parties' reasons for resistance are met and overcome. Often some exploration of underlying interests is required; indeed, an analysis of interests that underlie interests may not be sufficient (Pruitt and Kim, 2004): "It will often be necessary to seek the interests underlying these interests, or the interests underlying the interests underlying these interests, and so on" (p. 199). Often there is a hierarchy of interests. For example, in a dispute between a father and son over whether the son can buy a motorcycle, the son wants the motorcycle because he has an underlying interest of wanting to impress the girl next door. The father's interest in not wanting his son to have a motorcycle is that he does not want to hear the noise. It may be that at a deeper level, the boy's interest is self-esteem or other identity-related concern (compare Rothman, 1997); certainly the father has no problem with his son having high self-esteem. Perhaps this self-esteem can be achieved by another means, for example, golf lessons for the son so that winning a golf trophy can impress the neighbor. The point is that differences often take on a new character, and the appearance of opposition can diminish at a deeper level of interest. (See Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1991.)

Quadrant IV: Substitute the Parties' Underlying Interests.

There are two forms of interest substitution, often bilateral as in superordination, or unilateral as in compensation. In the case of compensation, the one party who is indemnified for acceding to the other's demand has his or her interest

replaced by the interest manifest in the compensation. In the case of superordination, this happens with both sides—both give up their initial interests in favor of that which is gained in the superordination, and the form of the superordination does not need to be the same for each side. However, disputants often make vicarious comparisons of what is gained by compensation, especially if it comes from a mediator. (See Carnevale, 1986, 2002.)

The Dimensions of the Subtypes

Person-Based versus Issue-Based.

At the left side of the circumplex, logrolling and compromise entail fitting the parties to the issues under discussion; that is, they involve an element of one side moving toward the other side, simply giving in, either on each issue or with some sense of the priorities among the issues. The term *person-based* refers to the focus on fitting the persons to the issues and this is done by concessions or issue trades. The change that leads to agreement stems from the person modifying her position on the issues in the conflict.

At the right side of the circumplex, modify and expand entail fitting the issues under discussion, or the resources, to the parties; that is, an element of search for additional resources or investigation into the nature of the issue is required. The term *issue-based* refers to the focus on fitting the resources or issues to the persons. The change that leads to agreement stems from a change in the issue or resource under discussion. Bridging, cost cutting, superordination, and compensation have elements of both person and issue bases.

Simple versus Complex.

What are the information requirements for that particular type of agreement to occur? Either they are simple, meaning not much, or complex, meaning that the information requirements are extensive. Simple agreements do not require a close look at the concerns that underlie the parties' positions—concerns that may involve goals, values, principles, or needs. Complex agreements do. Bridging, cost cutting, logrolling, and modifying the resource, in particular, may require extensive conceptual work, skill, expertise, learning about what the parties want or do not want, and bringing this information into the set of agreement alternatives. The parties may be able to do this on their own, but often they need the help of a third party. For a logrolling solution, information about the parties' priorities is useful so that one can trade a concession on one issue for concession on a lower-priority issue. Often it is difficult to get such information, particularly when trust is low. In a solution through cost cutting, information about the costs or reservations felt is useful, and it may take some doing to uncover this. Bridging often needs a deep understanding of both parties' underlying interests.

This is not to imply that compromise, or searching for more of a resource, or compensation, or superordination can occur without some thought. To the contrary, knowing when to compromise is often a delicate skill that if not handled well may cause the other to expect even more (compare Hilty and Carnevale, 1993). Knowing what a person values is key for any compensation scheme. And superordination requires an understanding of the parties' values and interests apart from the set of differences defined in the issues. The information requirements for expanding the pie are small in the sense that all one needs to know is what the other demands. Of course, even here, some information is needed; certainly one needs to know what is available in the environment. But the point is that

these outcomes, which reside more at the surface of interests and positions, are shallow and are more simply achieved than outcomes that reflect hidden interests, needs, values, and desires, which lurk at depths often hidden well below the extant positions.

Complexity in negotiation can be managed via a mental operation called unlinking (Pruitt, 1981; Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993). Sometimes differences of interest are a bundle of connected demands, goals, aspirations, and values that are seen as inseparable from other demands, goals, aspirations, and values; it looks as if there is just one issue. Unlinking entails breaking the bundle into smaller parts. Hopmann (1996) calls this process “disaggregation” and Fisher (1964) calls it “fractionation.” Lax and Sebenius (1986, p. 108) refer to it as a process of converting “one issue into more than one.” Through unlinking, the smaller parts might then be realigned, or prioritized, and form the basis of trade-offs, or a new alternative might emerge, as seen in the following examples.

Types of Products in the Agreement Circumplex: Eight Basic Types

Type 1: Compromise.

A compromise is defined as a middle ground on an obvious dimension connecting the parties’ initial offers (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993). A compromise is largely viewed as a nonintegrative, noncreative form of agreement, not novel, not interesting, and not all that valuable (but likely valuable as an agreement when no other is available and when agreement is better than no agreement). Compromise serves as a useful baseline to which to judge more integrative options; thus, it will be useful to include compromise in an organizing framework.

Type 2: Logrolling: Trading High- and Low-Value Issues.

When a conflict involves differences across a set of issues and the issues differ in their relative importance to the parties, the difference can be traded for one another. This is possible especially if one of the issues is more important than another issue for one party, and the other side has the opposite preference ordering on the issues. Thus, as a set, the differences on the issues are complementary. In the trade, each side gets what it wants on its high-priority issue and gives in to the other on its low-priority issue; this gives greater value in the agreement to each side individually—and to them collectively—than each getting something in the middle on the issues or making no deal at all. Lax and Sebenius (1986) describe this as “the trading of differences.” Suppose Carsten has an apple and a pear and really loves pears but is just okay on apples. And Esther also has an apple and a pear and really loves apples but is just okay on pears. Each is better off, and they are better off together, if they exchange a whole apple for a whole pear. The compromise solution, fifty-fifty, that is, the middle ground would be an exchange of half an apple for half a pear.

Type 3: Modify the Resource Pie.

When a conflict is about how a resource is shared or divided, one solution is to figure out a way to modify the resource so that both parties can achieve their objectives. There is a reconfiguration of the existing resource. Follett (1940) gives an example:

> A Dairyman’s Co-operative League almost went to pieces last year on the question of precedence in unloading cans at a creamery platform. The men who came down the hill (the creamery was on a down grade) thought they should have precedence; the men who came up the hill thought they should unload first. The thinking of both sides in the controversy was thus confined within the walls of these two possibilities, and this prevented their even trying to find a way of settling the dispute which would avoid these two alternatives. The solution was obviously to change the position of the platform so that both up-hillers and down-hillers could unload at the same time. (pp. 32–33)

In this case, it took an element of ingenuity to figure out how the resource, the platform, could be modified so that both sides could have what they wanted.

Type 4: Expand the Resource Pie.

When a conflict is about how a resource is shared or divided, a simple but powerful solution is to simply increase the amount of the resource. The resource may be about money, space, time, an object, or any other resource. Two units of an organization vie over a limited budget; or two managers both want the nicer corner office; or a husband and wife have a week of vacation but one prefers going to the beach and the other to the mountains; or siblings quarrel over who will inherit the nice antique chair. It is essentially a supply problem, with the supply exceeding the demand. An integrative solution is achieved by increasing the resource: get a larger budget, find a second nice office, take two weeks of vacation, find a second chair. Each side achieves exactly what it wants.

Sometimes the increase in the resource or the idea for modifying the resource comes from a third party (the

“integrator consultant” from Follett, 1940; or the “3-D move” from Lax and Sebenius, 2002). Imagine if the Dairyman’s Co-operative League decided to double the size of the unloading platform. In this case, the supply of the resource (the platform) expands to provide enough for both parties to be satisfied. Each gets what it wants from an influx of resources. Consider the story told by a student: “My sister bought this adorable shirt that I always borrowed without asking; we often get into conflict over ‘sharing’ clothes (I usually just take hers). To solve this situation, my mother intervened and bought me the exact same shirt that my sister had, so that instead of us arguing over the single shirt, we each had our own.”

Modifying the resource pie—or expanding it—can succeed when the difference of interest is about an opportunity cost—the uphillers were not able to unload when the downhillers unloaded and vice versa. Increasing the resource or modifying it is not workable if what one side wants will make the other suffer; for example, if one sister could not stand seeing the other sister wear that style shirt, getting another shirt is pointless. In this case, the problem is not a shortage of shirts.

Type 5: Bridge the Interests.

Perhaps the most creative form of integrative agreement is bridging. In bridging, a new alternative is devised that gives the parties what they want in terms of the interests that underlie their positions. A husband and wife had a one-week vacation, but one wanted to go to the mountains and the other wanted to go to the beach. They talked about the reasons for their preferences, and they learned that one wanted to do freshwater fishing and the other wanted to play volleyball in the sand. With a search for new alternatives, they discovered a resort that had both freshwater fishing and sand volleyball. Each gave up their

initial demand and became enthusiastic about the new option that gave them both what they wanted. The interesting feature of the agreement was not that each side gave in, or that they made a trade on low- and high-priority issues, or one side was compensated or had its costs cut, but rather a new alternative emerged through discussion and exchange of information about underlying interests, and these interests were completely met.

A search model (Simon, 1957) guides the discussion and discovery process. Sometimes a distinction is made between low- and high-priority interests, with the higher getting the weight of the attention in the search (Pruitt, 1981). The important dimension that distinguishes bridging is the focus on the underlying interests, reasons, concerns, or values that generate demands and positions. If those can be met, the demands and positions are satisfied.

There are several types of bridging formulas, including alternation (Pruitt, 1981). In alternation, the parties take turns, which is especially useful when there is a time constraint. (With only one week of vacation, two people cannot do what they both want—go to the beach as well as go to the mountains—so this year they go to the beach and next year they will go to the mountains.) Another bridging formula is the contingent agreement, which entails building unknown futures into the agreement, which is especially useful if the parties differ in their expectations about the future. For example, one person thinks that the weather is going to be great at the beach, but the other thinks it will be horrible; so they build weather in as a contingency: if the weather is good, they go to the beach, but if the weather is bad, they head for the mountains.

Lax and Sebenius (2002) give several interesting examples of contingent agreements including the earnout, in which a buyer and seller of a company structure the agreement to

reflect their different appraisals of future earnings or risk. The more optimistic party gets a future payment contingent on the future income; the less optimistic party is happy with the arrangement because he thinks that the future income will not be so much. “Without the earnout, an otherwise mutually beneficial deal may well languish” (p. 17).

Type 6: Cut the Costs.

If one party is resistant to agreement because what the other proposes has costs and these costs can be identified and reduced, then agreement is likely. The agreement is integrative not due to a change in position or trade-off on issues, but because one party does not suffer so much. Cost cutting is a form of compensation, but it is specific in the sense that the compensation addresses the exact value that formed the basis of resistance. An example was provided by a student:

> I had the habit of staying up really late at night to finish assignments for class, and eventually finish my work at around 3 a.m.; but my roommate would go to sleep much earlier than that. I tried very hard to keep the light from my desk shining near my roommate’s bed, but unfortunately she had difficulty sleeping at night and she asked me not to stay up so late. I felt bad for keeping her awake. . . . I went out and bought her an eye mask so that the light wouldn’t disturb her as she tried to sleep. She thanked me, used the mask, and was able to sleep through the night while I was still able to continue burning the proverbial midnight oil!

In their discussion of “dealcrafting,” Lax and Sebenius (2002) give an interesting example of joint cost cutting: two manufacturing companies in a joint venture deal pooled their resources so that each had lower costs. As a result,

they made a greater profit—individually and together—than they would without such a deal. In Pruitt's words, joint cost cutting is "reducing the cost to both parties of baking a pie of fixed size." Sometimes the costs are cut by the parties themselves, and sometimes by third parties. Sometimes the costs are associated with precedents and future implications, in which case those precedents can be decoupled (Pruitt, 1981).

Type 7: Compensation (Nonspecific).

With nonspecific compensation, one side goes along with what the other wants and does so because it receives something of value. What it receives is outside the issues and thus nonspecific to the matter at hand. For example, the sister who wants to wear the other's shirt offers to do all the other's house chores for a day, and the shirt-wealthy sister agrees; she finds that the compensation overcomes her resistance to loaning out her shirt. Often what one party receives is itself subject to negotiation about what is appropriate compensation. Foa (1971) developed a theory of resources about how suitable one resource is for exchange with another (e.g., money, love); the theory posits that resources that are closer to one another conceptually (e.g., how tangible they are, such as money and goods versus money and love) are more likely to be exchanged. In any compensation scheme, it is very useful to know what the other values, as well as a way to calibrate appropriate amounts of compensation.

Logrolling can be seen as a form of nonspecific compensation, where one side's concession on its low-priority issue is compensation for the other side's concession on the other's low-priority issue; in this case, the parties stay within the set of issues rather than reach out for new issues or dimensions of value.

Type 8: Superordination.

Sometimes agreement is reached when the differences in interest that gave rise to the conflict are superseded or replaced by other interests. The use of compensation, as described, is a form of this but usually applied to just one party to a conflict; the compensated party gives up its resistance because the interest served by the compensation replaces the initial interest that drove its resistance to the other's demand.

In superordination, both parties drop their initial interests and positions in light of changed circumstances or goals, a revised view of the conflict, or an enticing new opportunity. Consider two children quarreling over a TV show to watch, but then they hear the ice cream truck go by, and both have a new interest in ice cream that replaces their interest in the TV, and the quarrel about the TV ends. Sometimes a third party affects the change in interest, as when a parent offers the quarreling children a trip to McDonald's. Or the couple trying to decide on the location of a vacation—mountain or beach—decides instead not to take a vacation but instead use the week for buying new furniture and redecorating their house. In these cases, new matters arise that replace or supersede the interests that gave rise to the initial differences. Sometimes the added costs in a "hurting stalemate" redirect the parties' interests away from that which drove their initial positions (Zartman, 2001).

Agreement by superordination has a parallel in the effect discovered by Sherif and Sherif (1969) in their famous field studies of intergroup conflict. Using a summer camp for boys, they created the conditions for groups to compete with one another and saw the competition escalate to overt hostility. They discovered that the escalation reversed when the children had a superordinate goal, that is, they had a common objective that required them to work together

cooperatively. One such goal was created when a camp water tower ostensibly collapsed, and the groups of boys, who were thirsty, needed to work together to get it fixed. As a result, the conflict between the groups lessened and the relationships between boys across the groups improved. Considerable evidence points to the multiple effects of superordinate goals; for example, they can help bonds form between people across groups. But an important effect is that the superordinate interests overshadow or supplant the initial interests that led the groups to fight in the first place.

Perhaps the most powerful form of superordinate interest is working together to fend off a common enemy. Third parties often know this and use it in the effort to foster cooperation, as Henry Kissinger mentioned to Israeli and Egyptian leaders that a real threat in the Middle East was intervention by the Soviet Union (Rubin, 1981). Another form of superordination is the common enticing opportunity: the possibility of a higher standard of living, better hospitals, cleaner water, access to international capital for better roads, and so on might supplant some of the concerns that gave rise to the initial differences in a conflict. The new matters become so important that they eclipse the original matters, and the result is cooperation and agreement because people make gains on other, important dimensions of value.

CREATIVE PRODUCTS FROM CREATIVE PERSONS IN A CREATIVE PROCESS

Much of the behavioral research in social conflict and negotiation is about delineating the relationship between characteristics of the people involved, the processes that occur, and the outcome (the products) (compare Simonton, 2003, 2004). Social psychologists who study negotiation

and social conflict tend to emphasize how people interact in and are affected by context and environmental constraints, for example, negotiating as a group or alone or negotiating under high time pressure. Much of this work is designed to understand the conditions or circumstances that either move people from the pursuit of destructive aims in conflict, from contentious, win-lose pursuit of asymmetric outcomes, to problem-solving processes and balanced agreement, or move people from pursuit of simple compromise agreements to the more creative, integrative forms of agreement. But there is a third set of questions, not at all well addressed in the empirical literature, and this is about the conditions or circumstances that move people to pursue one form of integrative agreement over another. This is a matter of predicting the type of integrative agreement that will emerge, given that one will emerge in the first place.

Flexible Thinking and Idea Generation

One set of processes that is likely to encourage the more information-rich, complex forms of integrative agreement is related to the notion of flexible thinking. Lewin (1951) wrote that conflict can produce a “freezing” of cognition, and subsequent evidence supports this. For example, Carnevale and Probst (1998) had people expect to enter a cooperative or contentious negotiation; just before doing this, they evaluated material that assessed cognitive organization, for example, a “functional fixedness” task and a task that had them rate category exemplars. The fixedness task required, for a creative solution, that people separate two concepts normally fixed, for example, the concept “box of tacks” is separated so that the box can be used as a platform to hold a candle, which solves the task. People who expected contentious conflict were less likely to “unfix” the concepts and less likely to see creative

solutions. In the category exemplars task, people rated the goodness of items such as “camel” as examples of the category “vehicle.” People who expected contentiousness rather than cooperative negotiation were less likely to see a camel as an example of the vehicle category. Both effects suggest that expected contentiousness can produce a narrowing of vision and a general change in cognition that extends beyond that associated with the particular items.

Of course, conflict can, under other conditions, enhance creativity (compare Beersma and de Dreu, 2005; de Dreu and Nijstad, 2008), and this suggests that the trick is to manage the process so that positive effects emerge. One way of generating creative alternatives in conflict might stem from brainstorming (Osborn, 1957), particularly if a third-party mediator assists. A mediator may be able to foster conditions in which people feel comfortable listening to one another and do this in an “active” way (see chapter 34; Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993). Sometimes a third party can help uncover information, especially in private meetings with one side, the caucus. The caucus is an effective third-party vehicle for uncovering the parties’ concerns, and there is evidence that problem-solving discussions start in the caucus and then migrate to joint sessions (Welton, Pruitt, and McGillicuddy, 1988). Caucuses may help attenuate biases and assumptions, for example, the assumption that interests are completely opposed, an assumption that so many studies have shown can interfere with the development of integrative agreements (Pruitt and Lewis, 1975).

The Mix

Another set of processes likely to encourage the more information-rich forms of integrative agreement is the mixture of people and strategies on each side of the negotiation table. A good deal of work now points to the

notion that mixtures of strategies and mixtures of types of people can be especially effective in negotiation. For example, groups tend to be more contentious in negotiation, more likely to hold onto aspirations, and yet be better at problem solving (Morgan and Tindale, 2002). Moreover, a mixture of hawks and doves on one side is more likely to produce an integrative agreement in between-group negotiation (Jacobson, 1981). A similar effect is seen in the good-cop/bad-cop strategy (Hilty and Carnevale, 1993): the tougher partner (the "bad cop" or the "hawk") conveys an image of firmness that cannot be exploited, whereas the more cooperative partner (the "good cop" or the "dove") conveys an impression that cooperation will succeed, that agreement can be reached. The mix is more effective than either is alone.

But the mix is not always sanguine: sometimes dissension on a negotiation team is an impediment to effective between-group negotiation. Consider the comment made by former Middle East envoy Dennis Ross on Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat at Camp David in July 2000: "What's more, in the completely closed environment of Camp David, he did nothing to control the fratricidal competition in his delegation, effectively giving license to those who were attacking other members who were trying to find ways to bridge the differences" (Ross, 2001). It seems reasonable to suppose that people who try to bridge differences between groups will need leadership support and should as well be protected from the spoilers who have a less cooperative agenda. Carnevale (2005) argued that mediators should work to foster within-group cooperation, solving problems within each side, in the effort to facilitate between-group negotiation.

An interesting perspective on the mixture of group process is found in Cronin, Argote, and Kotovsky's (2002) analysis of partitioning cognition in group problem solving. These

authors found that groups were better—had more insight and better insight—when they divided roles among the group members so that one person in the group focused on the design of a problem solution and the others in the group focused on implementing the design. Such partitioning has quite a history in the study of group creativity (March, 1991). Cronin et al., as well as others in the group creativity area, suggest that the literature in negotiation and social conflict and in group creativity have considerable points of contact and considerable potential for integration.

Locations for Creativity

Coleman and Deutsch (see chapter 20 in this Handbook) note that time and space are essential elements of creative problem solving, that people need sufficient time to open up and be creative, as well as a physical space: “A new environment (particularly a confidential one) can allow disputants some degree of freedom to try out new perspectives, behaviors, or ways of working with a problem.” The right environment can provide the opportunity for incubation and play. Creativity scholars suggest that incubation is especially helpful for insight problems such as integrative agreements (Simonton, 2003). It may be helpful for negotiators to take a break and let ideas incubate. If “play becomes the midwife of creative change,” then the problem becomes how to implement play in the heat of conflict. Again, one mechanism for this is the use of the caucus, with a third party holding a private meeting with one side of the dispute.

Seeing the Other’s Point of View

The ability to take the point of view of the other is an important element of the collaborative, creative enterprise, and this is seen clearly in the clever experiments developed

by Gruber (1990; chapter 19 in this Handbook). Sometimes, however, the point of view of the other is a detriment: in some cases, too much information about the other can interfere with agreement, particularly when that information underscores large value differences (Rubin, 1980).

Cooperative and Creative

There is evidence that some people are more likely to be creative in conflict than others. Pruitt and Lewis (1975, experiment 2) found that asking and giving truthful information about the issues were positively related to integrativeness of the agreements but only for negotiators who were high in cognitive complexity (which reflects an individual's consideration of alternative conceptions of situations and better use of information for decisions). It was interesting that the overall levels of information exchange did not differ between high- and low-complexity negotiators, suggesting that the high-complexity negotiators had a lower threshold for information, that is, they were able to understand more with less. de Dreu and Carnevale (2003) argue that persons who have epistemic motives—a desire to better understand the world—will be especially adept at avoiding biases and being creative in negotiation.

CONCLUSION

Carnevale and Wall (2009) collected data relevant to the Agreement Circumplex. They asked, first, if it is possible to reliably categorize agreements, using the taxonomy, from very brief descriptions of disputes and outcomes provided by mediators. They had a sample of about six hundred agreement descriptions, written by mediators in community disputes from eleven countries (the United States, Turkey,

Taiwan, India, Malaysia, China, Philippines, Thailand, Japan, Korea, and Israel). An example dispute from India was: “A conflict between two families over arranged marriage of their children. The future husband fled the village because he didn’t want to marry the destined woman. The wife’s family had made wedding arrangements and asked to discuss this matter with the groom’s family. Outcome: The wife was found a different groom from the village and the wedding took place.” Carnevale and Wall asked coders to evaluate the agreements and then assign them to one of the circumplex eight types of agreement. They asked, in the analysis of the coding (which, by the way, was done reliably), if some types of agreement were more common than others. And they asked as well if there was country sample (possibly cultural) variation in types of agreement. The answer in each case was yes. One interesting note from this study was that only about 7 percent of the agreements codes were of the logrolling type, when virtually all of the social psychological inspired work on integrative agreements derives from studies of logrolling tasks.

The framework developed here (figure 21.1) is founded in the role that interests play in negotiation and social conflict and how what people say or demand is often an expression of those underlying interests. Follett (1940) originated this important notion; thus, it is fitting to conclude on a point she made about how to approach underlying interests: the game of interest chess. Follett argued that the other’s positions and interests in negotiation and conflict should be anticipated, much like a chess master anticipates moves and countermoves on the chessboard. And like the chess master, this is done prior to taking any action. In other words, a careful playing through of the underlying interests and then managing them can be the key to success. Follett’s example:

> A man liked motoring, his wife walking; he anticipated what her response might be to a suggestion that they motor on Sunday afternoon by tiring her out playing tennis in the morning. . . . You integrate the different interests without making all the moves. . . . like a game of chess. . . . A good chess player sees the possibilities without playing them out. (Follett, 1940, p. 43)

Is managing interests in such a strategic manner cooperative or contentious? [5] Of course, if the husband's wife discovered that his interest in playing tennis was to get her to go for a drive, that he had an ulterior motive, the game might change; but then again, a game of tennis followed by an afternoon of motoring might be just fine for her. And there's the rub, [6] the creative, silver lining to the dark contentious cloud: the result may be an asymmetric outcome—but this may be just fine with the party who accepts it. Indeed, some laboratory work suggests that strategic misrepresentation does not necessarily interfere with the development of integrative agreements (O'Connor and Carnevale, 1997). [7]

Deutsch (chapters 1 and 2 of this volume) details the values and norms that underlie constructive conflict resolution and includes reciprocity, human equality, shared community, fallibility, and nonviolence. I would just add one thing to this impressive list: a norm of creativity, with the suggestion that a norm for a creative product may be the missing piece when peace is missing.

Notes

1 . See http://al-islam.org/kaaba14/1.htm ; see also Rubin's (1981) introductory chapter that describes interesting mediations of disputes in the Bible.

2 . See Carnevale and de Dreu (2006) for a sense of the wealth of perspectives on methods across many disciplines for addressing these and related questions.

3 . Kahneman and Tversky (1995) indicate that a cognitive orientation to one's own economic interest, often defined as economic rationality, can inhibit an integrative resolution of conflict, whereas an orientation that also takes in the interests of others may reach agreements that are individually and collectively more desirable than the cognitive orientation of individual economic rationality. As they put it: "It would be inappropriate to conclude, however, that departures from rationality always inhibit the resolution of conflict. There are many situations in which less-than-rational agents may reach agreement while perfectly rational agents do not. The prisoner's dilemma is a classic example in which rationality may not be conducive for achieving the most desirable social solution" (pp. 45–56).

4 . Presented here with a tribute to Joe McGrath (see McGrath, 1984).

5 . Consider creativity in the pursuit of death and war, which was revealed in comments by Muhammad Dahlan, a leader of the Palestinians in Gaza, while lamenting the assassination of a leader of the Black September terrorist group: "When we lost Abu Iyad, we lost the creativity and ability to shape opinion" (Samuels, 2005).

6 . Shakespeare, Hamlet: "To sleep: perchance to dream: ay, there's the rub: For in that sleep of death what dreams may come."

7 . Where, for example, would the outcome in Follett's motoring example go in the Agreement Circumplex? Do we need a Disagreement Circumplex for asymmetric

agreements or for agreements where one party pulled the wool over the eyes of the other? A large issue is how the parties come to know or be aware that they have found a creative, integrative agreement. It may ultimately be a matter of appropriate measurement that takes into consideration objective and subjective factors that are immediate as well as long term.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO
CHANGE AND CONFLICT *Motivation, Resistance, and Commitment*

Eric C. Marcus

> *Change means movement. Movement means friction. Only in the frictionless vacuum of a nonexistent abstract world can movement or change occur without that abrasive friction of conflict.*
>
> —Saul Alinsky (1971)

In this chapter, I consider the relationship between change processes and conflict. If we define conflict as incompatibility—of ideas, beliefs, behaviors, roles, needs, desires, values, and so on—then resolving such incompatibility leads in some way to change: in attitude, perception, belief, norms, behavior, roles, relationship, and so forth. I examine how conflict influences change and how change influences the conflict process. Finally, I discuss some of the implications these influences have on the practice of training people in skills for productive conflict resolution.

I make the assumption that the process of change is, at its core, one of conflict resolution. Therefore, one can think of change as an outcome of a constructive or destructive conflict resolution process and the process of change as a series of conflict resolution activities that lead to some new (changed) end state. Thus, engaging in planned and spontaneous change gives rise to conflict; conversely, conflicts and how they are resolved exert a strong influence on the success of change efforts. A second assumption I make is that there is a conceptual similarity in the process of change for individuals, groups, and organizations.

In this chapter, I look at common theoretical notions regarding the process of change and focus on three critical psychological components involved in any planned effort of change: motivation, resistance, and commitment to change. I start by clarifying a few ideas about change that guide the remainder of the chapter: definition, context, and scope. I rely on a dictionary definition: “To cause to be different; to give a completely different form or appearance to; transform.” My discussion centers on change affecting individuals and groups within a social context, that is, changes in the social systems of which we are part: a dyad (a marital relationship), small groups we belong to (the fundraising committee of the PTA), and larger groups (the organization in which we work). My interest is in looking at change as it occurs in such social systems as distinct from changes in weather patterns and other types occurring outside our individual or social realm.

THEORETICAL CONCEPTIONS OF THE CHANGE PROCESS

Although there are many psychological theories of individual change (notably the psychodynamic and learning theories), few have been applied to understand change as it occurs in social systems. Nevertheless, Lewin, Beckhard, Bridges, Burke, Prochaska, and others offer theoretical conceptions to help us understand the process of change occurring in organizations and groups as well as individuals. Lewin provides an overall theoretical framework for understanding the process of change in these types of social systems. Beckhard and Harris, Bridges, Burke, and others apply the concepts to understanding planned change. Prochaska, DiClemente, and Norcross (1992) apply a similar linear notion of behavior change as it applies to individuals. I briefly review

some of these conceptualizations and then explore key aspects of each and their related dynamics of motivation, resistance, and commitment during the process of change. Furthermore, observations about how planned change occurs have changed in the last decade. Approaches trying to capture the process of change by using a linear view have embraced views that are less linear, seemingly more chaotic yet patterned (See Coleman, chapter 30) and even looked at as successfully coming about through dramatic, sudden episodes driven by subtle, small shifts (Gladwell, 2002). I begin with the more traditional and more time-tested understandings of the process of planned change.

Lewin: The Process of Change

Much of the theorizing on the change process is rooted in Lewin's (1947) original concepts of unfreezing, movement, and refreezing. This is a linear description often applied to understanding change in both individuals and social systems:

Unfreezing→ Movement→ Refreezing

Unfreezing.

In Lewin's framework, the first step toward change is unfreezing, or developing openness toward something different, a melting of the solidity of the current state. The process of unfreezing is an energy creation activity. Unfreezing may involve numerous methods, depending on the specific area of change. For example, to enable a group to attain higher-level productivity, one might use social comparison processes (such as productivity data) to show how other groups are already attaining such levels. In New York City during the 1990s, one of several techniques used to engage precinct commanders in a renewed effort to reduce crime was to employ a process called CompStat

(computerized or comparative statistics). This involved using key statistical measures, gathered weekly and reported separately by police precinct. Precinct commanders were able to see how their precincts compared with others. Those at higher and lower ends of the spectrum were singled out in public forums of peers and police “brass.” Moreover, everyone’s data were public to all present. The CompStat process is a form of feedback useful at this stage and discussed in greater detail in a later section. This part of the change process has also been referred to as developing awareness of the need for change (Lippitt, Watson, and Westerley, 1958). The critical psychological process involved in unfreezing is concerned with creating the motivation for becoming different.

Driving and Restraining Forces.

Lewin’s application of force field analysis to characterize human social behavior is relevant to understanding the process of unfreezing. Force field analysis is a useful method for portraying the array of forces acting on a system at any given time, and it serves to illustrate the current state of the system. Among these forces are those that promote the change goal (driving forces) and those working in opposition to it (restraining forces). Furthermore, the forces may differ in strength in facilitating or hindering movement. These driving and restraining forces, along with their relative strengths, together identify a quasi-stationary equilibrium that reflects the current state, albeit always changing in minute ways at any given moment.

Driving forces are the motivations, attitudes, behaviors, or other characteristics of a situation that help move toward the goal or unfreeze from the existing situation. In an example of someone trying to get in better physical shape, some of the forces might be tiring easily when climbing

stairs, increasing difficulty getting around a tennis court, discomfort in clothes that are getting too tight, or a desire to feel better.

Restraining forces are the opposite: they are the constellation of forces working against change to keep the status quo in place. Again, with the goal of getting in better shape, some examples of restraining forces are low willpower and motivation, enjoyment of eating as a social experience, a preference for sloth, and finding oneself often in the presence of lots of unhealthy food.

To begin the process of change, or unfreezing, the driving forces must be relatively stronger than the resisting forces, and a certain level of tension must be created. Increasing tension is a key factor in unfreezing and creating motivational energy to change. It is the fuel that powers the beginning of the change process. For the tension to be productive, it must be experienced at an optimal level. If the candle is brought too close to the ice cube or for too long, it produces too much tension. If it is kept too far away, not enough unfreezing occurs and not enough tension. Some feelings associated with tension are stress, discomfort, and anxiety. A variety of methods may be used to create productive levels of tension. Examples include the CompStat process and any of the many formal methods used in organizations to create feedback opportunities (multirater feedback, performance appraisals).

A useful construct for understanding a system’s ability to handle tension is tolerance for ambiguity or the unknown. This refers to one’s ability to handle the feelings generated by the tension in a productive way. In fact, tolerance for ambiguity is a construct cited as a core quality associated with creativity and effective leadership, as well as productive conflict resolution and successful change.

As an example, the legal order to break up the Bell system and AT&T to create competition in long-distance phone service created tension in that system (AT&T) to change (Tunstall, 1985). In this case, an external event (a federal court order) stimulated (actually forced) a process of unfreezing from the status quo. A situation that once worked—that was comfortable, successful, and stable—now becomes uncomfortable, does not work so well any longer, and forces people to look at something in a new way.

Movement.

Once openness or a sufficient state of tension has been achieved, the next step is transition or movement: taking some action that changes or moves the social system to a new level. Some examples of this movement in our get-in-shape example are eating better foods (to lose weight), walking to work rather than driving (to get oneself in shape), and similar activities. Examples in other realms are reorganizing employees' job responsibilities (to increase organizational efficiency) and engaging in acts of civil disobedience (to improve the social, economic, or political conditions of a particular group).

Although these activities signifying movement seem rather straightforward, complex processes are operating that make such movement difficult. Primary among these are restraining forces, which are also a form of resistance to change. This resistance is a key psychological component playing a strong role in the transition process. Resistance is the mobilization of energy to protect the status quo in the face of a real or perceived threat to it. Resistance may be thought of as behavior intended to protect one from the effect of real or imagined change (Zander, 1950). It is a key factor influencing the intensity of the conflicts that arise during change and the ability to resolve them productively. Early on, the degree of resistance has an impact on the

ease of unfreezing. The stronger the resistance, the greater the effort is needed to unfreeze from the current state.

Refreezing.

Refreezing establishes actions or processes that support the new level of behavior and lead to resilience against the resistant forces encouraging old patterns and behaviors. In other words, deliberate steps must be taken to ensure that the new behaviors stick, or remain relatively permanent in the system. This is often a process of restabilizing a system to its new or changed level of functioning. For example, a group whose members are trying to embrace a norm of not talking about members behind their backs might adopt a process of frequent group meetings or avoiding discussion of interpersonal issues if all group members are not present. Refreezing may also be understood in terms of the degree of commitment to the new, changed state that exists in the system.

Commitment is a psychological construct that has received much empirical attention as a predictor of key organizational phenomena such as retention and performance. According to Salancik (1977), commitment is a state in which we become bound by our actions, where our beliefs about those actions keep us doing them. Salancik defines three aspects of committing behavior: it is *visible* , observable to oneself and others; *irrevocable* and cannot be taken back; and behavior *undertaken of one's own volition* , or by choice. This is linked to personal responsibility: we usually accept responsibility for behavior we enact by choice.

This last component of commitment, volition, makes evidence for it ambiguous; it is not observable and can only be attributed. It is this element that distinguishes commitment from compliance. Here, I use *compliance* to

refer to behavior whose origin lies outside of oneself and is based on the perceived values of the system. Argyris (1998) refers to compliance as external commitment, where the desired state is one of internal commitment. Many strategies for refreezing a system end up achieving compliance to change because the methods used to bring about change do not offer choice for those whose commitment is needed. On the surface, compliance looks like commitment because both kinds of behavior are public, or visible, and may be irrevocable.

There are often many opportunities that tempt the system to move back to behaviors associated with the prechange state. This process has been referred to as commitment testing (Marcus, 1994). It occurs when we are faced with the choice of reverting to old behaviors. For example, once we change our eating habits to be healthier, commitment testing occurs as we see the pastry carousel at the local diner, or smell butter cookies baking in the kitchen, or are invited to have a piece of seven-layer cake at a birthday party. Or, referring back to the situation where we are trying to change a group norm, we are often seduced by the invitation from colleagues when they ask some variation of, “Can I tell you something about Chris that just happened? But you have to PROMISE not to tell anyone else.” Our response to these situations is an opportunity to test as well as renew our commitment to our new behavior.

Often, commitment testing engenders conflict. In the dietary examples, one conflict is intrapersonal, the other interpersonal. The desire to support the changed state is incompatible with the desire to revert to old habits. The resolution of this conflict affects the level of success of the change. To the extent that these conflicts are resolved in support of the changed state (looking away from the carousel, leaving the kitchen, or not agreeing to the colleague’s secrecy deal), the change is likely to be

successful. That is, the refrozen state is likely to stay frozen.

Beckhard: Managing Planned Change

Beckhard and Harris (1987) and others (such as Bridges, 1980, 1986) have applied these concepts to understand and manage planned organization change; they use slightly different terms when applying Lewin's concepts. Beckhard's model can be represented as follows:

Current state→ Transition state→ Desired future state

When this model is applied to organization change, it often helps members develop a deeper understanding of the process and phases of planned change. Though linear looking, Beckhard suggests beginning with the end. The first step for those involved is to envision a desired future state. This helps to establish a goal for the change and serves the purpose of beginning the process of unfreezing by creating an openness to something different. Similarly, it has been found that starting with what people desire in the future generates energy, enthusiasm, motivation, and commitment to the plan and its implementation (Lindaman and Lippitt, 1979). Once this is undertaken, the next step is to move backward and assess the current state of the organization or entity—its current capabilities, capacities, and so forth. With the envisioned future and assessment of current state, the next phase is to create a transition state. This is based in part on the gaps between the current state and the desired future state. These gaps (like feedback) create tension, which serves as a motivating force in the transition state. The larger the gap, or discrepancy, the greater the tension is. The transition state is a way for a system to balance or modulate its own need for stability with its need for change.

Although this model is most often used in large, complex organization change, the concepts are applicable on both the individual and small group levels. Indeed, the model has been used successfully in managing many types of change, such as future search (Weisbord, 1992; on future search, see also chapter 38 on large group methods). This is a methodology for gathering all key stakeholders of a group or organization to identify and plan a desired future together. It takes place over a relatively short period of time (several days) and is intended to generate motivation, overcome resistance, and strengthen commitment to the agreed-on change plan.

PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS AFFECTING THE CHANGE PROCESS

Lewin's and Beckhard's models are presented as linear conceptions of a sequential process of change. The models imply a logic and ordering of the phases one goes through in the change process. In practice, these models of change rarely feel as though they move in a linear fashion (see Burke, 2011). Rather Burke, Prochaska, and others refer to planned change more as a spiral than a line. There are many unanticipated, unintended consequences that affect and are affected by the intended, planned change effort. Furthermore, little empirical work has examined the factors that may facilitate or hinder moving from one stage to the next. For example, what might be some of the conditions conducive to unfreezing? In other words, what conditions motivate unfreezing? How can resistance be weakened or overcome without inducing compliance? What factors make refreezing difficult? How is commitment to change maintained? We turn now to a discussion of these and related questions.

Motivation and Unfreezing

Whenever a change is contemplated in any social system, a key question that is often raised among the leaders of planned change is, “How can we get people to buy in to a new state of affairs?” The key psychological process these leaders are grappling with concerns generating the motivation to change, to unfreeze from the current state.

Creation of conflict is inherent in the process of unfreezing. The nature of the conflict, though differing with the situation, may be expressed as follows: “Our desire to do things as we’ve been doing them is incompatible with our need and desire to do things differently in the future.” In other words, the existing state is incompatible with the desired or necessary future state. The prospect of change spurs this conflict. Beckhard’s model brings out this conflict in identifying gaps between the current state and the desired future. Bartunek (1993) refers to this as a conflict of cognitive schemas—our beliefs and expectations about ourselves and our environment. The original schema is no longer adequate and a new schema is not yet apparent. The experience of this conflict often gives rise to resistance—the forces working to protect the status quo.

Conflict creates the tension or motivating forces that call into question the status quo; it contributes to the process of unfreezing from the current state. Therefore, a curious question to consider is how to create conflict that increases the level of tension to unfreeze from the current state to move out of one’s comfort zone. I focus on two areas: feedback and social support.

A common method used to generate motivation centers on providing feedback to the system. This can occur in many forms. The intent is to identify and make salient discrepancies between the current state and the desired or ideal state. Feedback, or information obtained about a

system from outside the system, is a common way to increase people's understanding of the need for change. Information constituting feedback is intended to stimulate the kind of conflict that motivates change. Nonetheless, the conflict that might be generated by the feedback can be handled in a variety of ways, sometimes, but not always, in ways that increase the motivation to change.

There is often ample feedback available from our social environment. Unfortunately, though, such social feedback is rarely unambiguous because it can be interpreted in multiple ways. Furthermore, our interpretation (on the receiving end) is strongly influenced by factors such as our own needs and experiences, the context and timing of when it occurs, the sender or source of the feedback, and so on. Meaningful, accurate feedback can be most useful as a motivator of change when it occurs in a context of support, is nonevaluative and nonjudgmental, and builds on existing strengths of the group, community, or organization.

Earlier, I described the process of unfreezing as generating the energy to change and tolerating the ambiguity that unfreezing can foster. What contributes to the ability of an individual or group to tolerate ambiguity? One element concerns the perception that one possesses or has access to the resources needed to manage the unknown. Social support is often cited as one of those critical resources in managing significant personal change. Approaches using a twelve-step model (e.g., Alcoholics Anonymous) rely on social support as a way to strengthen people's tolerance for the stressful, anxious state that accompanies ambiguity during change. Social support can derive from many sources. In these programs, it comes from working in a group with individuals who share a common personal goal and often have had similar personal experiences outside the context of the twelve-step meetings. Social support may also stem from benevolent leadership or when those in

authority contribute to the social climate in a way conducive to individuals' being able to tolerate the ambiguity of change. Behaviors by those in authority that may enhance people's ability to tolerate ambiguity include doing things to contribute to feelings of safety, keeping some aspects of the social environment stable and predictable, highlighting opportunities for members to support each other, and so forth.

The CompStat process was successfully used to unfreeze the New York City Police Department from the status quo. The public forum in which comparisons were presented created a certain degree of tension among precinct commanders responsible for their neighborhoods to improve their crime statistics.

Using formal and informal feedback methods to create motivation for change is common in organizational life. In skill training, for example, when we are practicing our public presentation skills, videorecording practice sessions can be useful in enhancing trainees' understanding of the potential gaps between where they see themselves on the recording and where they want to be as a presenter. Another practice in many organizational contexts is the use of multirater feedback to an individual in order to generate a level of productive tension by revealing a discrepancy between the idealized self and the way others see the individual.

Looking at unfreezing from the status quo of long-standing, seemingly intractable conflicts, Coleman (2011) has explored the utility of triggering instability in stable intractable conflicts to destabilizing them and create opportunities for movement. Such instability can come about in a variety of ways, some planned, others by happenstance. Nonetheless, capitalizing on such

destabilizing events can also create motivational energy for change.

Movement and Resistance

I stated earlier that resistance serves a protective function in any change. At the same time, resistance is a key factor working against successful change. This presents a curious paradox: resistance is a necessary part of change yet can be its undoing. Our interest is in looking at two aspects of resistance: how to identify and diagnose resistance when it emerges and how to find ways to weaken it rather than strengthen it. Is change possible without resistance? Is the goal of a successful change effort to prevent forces of resistance from emerging? What factors weaken or strengthen resistance to change?

Many common practices surrounding planned change efforts view resistance similarly to conflict. That is, it is something to get rid of, stamp out, push down, and in any other manner treat as an undesirable force that needs to be eradicated. Or it may be seen merely as a nuisance that one must get past. If the resistant forces are linked to specific people or groups (with such language as “troublemakers,” “naysayers,” or “malcontents”), a common tactic used by the larger part of the system is to try to weaken or get rid of those people and, by implication, any resistance.

This orientation may sometimes lead to successful change, but it overlooks the potentially constructive role that resistance plays in the change process. In other words, resistance is a naturally emerging part of the change process or any movement away from the status quo (Connor, 1992). As Klein notes, “A necessary prerequisite of successful change is the mobilization of forces against it” (1966, p. 502). Change without resistance is akin to premature conflict resolution; the parties involved manage

to avoid the necessary parts of the process that lead to real change (or real resolution).

It is likely that the conflict expressed by individuals or groups labeled as “resisters” is a type of misattributed conflict in which the true conflict is about the planned change. In other words, conflict that emerges as an expression of resistance is between the wrong parties and over the wrong issues. Such conflicts can be viewed as a manifestation of the central conflict in any change—between what we want to be (a desired future) and what we are (the current state). Thus, in using Beckhard’s model, we uncover this central conflict early on, when we highlight the gaps between where we are and where we want to be.

It is useful to consider the observation that resistance to change may be manifested in an infinite number of creative ways (Kenneth Sole, personal communication). Often, though, it is difficult to understand how particular behaviors or actions manifest resistance.

As an example, consider a patient’s decision to change therapists just as she is about to make significant progress in her therapeutic situation. This can be understood as a legitimate desire for the patient to seek better therapy. Another possibility is to view this as a form of resistance to the patient’s movement toward greater psychological health. The therapist can handle this situation in a variety of ways. The most constructive might be for the therapist to support the patient at this stage. This may involve reminding her that therapeutic progress is sometimes very difficult. Or it may mean suggesting to the patient that she is here by her own choice, and if she feels she would be better served by another therapist, she should seek a new one. Properly diagnosing and taking subsequent actions

takes great skill on the part of the therapist *and* contributes to the strength of the patient.

Resistance and Conflict.

A system cannot change without experiencing conflict. How it is handled profoundly determines the success of the effort to change. Furthermore, there is a strong similarity between the process involved in successful change efforts and that involved in constructive conflict resolution.

The goal of planned change efforts is not necessarily to prevent forces of resistance from emerging but rather to manage them productively, to weaken rather than strengthen them (Ford and Ford, 2009), to harness their energy rather than displace it: a complex and fascinating challenge. Furthermore, there is a reciprocal relationship between handling resistance appropriately (in ways that weaken it) and the process of constructive conflict resolution. The same process used to weaken forces of resistance may also promote constructive conflict resolution. Conversely, if inappropriate strategies are used in meeting the resistance, it is likely that destructive processes will be used to deal with the emerging conflicts.

With this in mind, what factors might serve to strengthen or weaken resistance? Though little empirical work exists in this area, some common theoretical notions are available. One of the key variables influencing the strength of resistance occurs among those most affected by change. It concerns increasing this group’s understanding of the need for change and participation in its planning. To the extent that there is little understanding of the need for change and little participation in planning among those affected by it, the stronger the forces of resistance are likely to be (Zander, 1950). Conversely, if there is a high degree of understanding of and participation in the planned

change, the resisting forces become weaker (Coch and French, 1948).

It can be hypothesized that the strongest forces of resistance are expressed by those with the greatest interest in preserving the status quo. Furthermore, resistance is aggravated and hence strengthened as more energy is directed to eradicating it. The more we try to push against the forces of resistance (through persuasion, logic, or coercion) in an attempt to weaken or abolish them, the stronger they become and the more likely they are to manifest themselves in a multitude of ways. Zander (1950) and Deutsch (1973) identify several other factors likely to increase resistance:

- Basing the logic for the change on personal reasons rather than objective ones
- Disregarding already established group or organizational norms
- Lack of uniformity or agreement in the rationale for the change
- Using illegitimate techniques that fall outside the boundaries and norms of interaction
- Negative sanctions such as punishments and threats
- Sanctions that are inappropriate in kind, such as reward of money for agreeing to support a group's strategic direction
- Influence that is excessive in magnitude

Efforts to diminish resistant forces through coercion or other means of force may lead to temporary compliance rather than lasting change (Deci, 1995).

Consider a decision to close down a plant manufacturing a product that is no longer profitable. This action has varying

impact depending on how the resistance is handled. A common way of handling this type of change is to anticipate the resistant reactions of those most affected and respond to them with persuasive, convincing, well-thought-out, rehearsed, logical statements about such things as the financial need to take the action. Another approach occurs when those responsible for the decisions make every attempt to avoid the employees most affected—to lay low, disappear, or hide after the announcement is made. If those affected are denied the opportunity to express their feelings and thoughts (especially feelings of loss), strong negative attitudes are likely to emerge, along with the potential to sabotage the best interests of the organization. In other words, these actions often strengthen the forces of resistance.

Constructively Handling Resistance.

We identify several factors that may strengthen resistance. What, though, are some of the conditions that may weaken resistance and foster a constructive resolution process? Some of them are a smaller change: keeping parts of the system stable, giving all parties a chance to mourn the loss that any change entails, making abundant resources available during change, and involvement by those most affected in planning their own fate. Let us consider each of these in some detail.

The first condition is a smaller change or amount of deviation from the status quo. It is not necessary, though, to assume that only small conflicts can be resolved productively and thereby yield small change. It is useful to apply Roger Fisher’s notions on fractionating conflict (1964). His methodology suggests that we first look at any conflict and break it down into manageable pieces. Although he applied these notions to large international conflicts, they can be applied to conflicts of even the

smallest magnitude. Once they are fractionated, or broken down, Fisher suggests working on resolving the smaller pieces first. This allows parties to experience constructive resolution albeit on a small matter. Nonetheless, such success can boost the parties' confidence as they progress to working on resolving larger issues, which thereby may produce greater change. This notion of fractionating has been applied to organization change as well. In the work of Schaffer and Siegel (2005), the creation of smaller change goals and subsequent efforts to meet those goals were more likely to produce desired change than attempting to focus primarily on a larger (more distant, amorphous) change goal whose outcomes were more difficult to see and feel by those expected to bring them about.

Another condition for weakening resistance involves keeping parts of the system stable. This is related to issues concerning the size of the change. Here, though, it is important to pay attention to the balance between stability and change. If there is too much change going on (simultaneously moving to a new house, becoming a parent, and switching jobs), this may generate a level of tension that is too high for change to be productive. Keeping parts of the system stable can reduce the level of stress and tension the parties experience and therefore foster constructive resolution.

Giving parties the chance to mourn the loss that any change entails is another critical influence that may serve to weaken forces of resistance. As Levinson (1972) and Bridges (1986) have written, in any change, there is loss. If parties are able to recognize and express feelings of loss associated with change, they can move forward in the change process. Many cultures, including our own, have elaborate rituals for mourning the death of a person. Such rituals enable the mourners to accept the loss and move on. Similarly, in any change process, opportunities to mourn

the loss of the past play a valuable role in helping people move toward a desired future. An example that I often think about is from a company that was being acquired by a larger institution and before doing so had given employees a “tribute package,” which included a kind of yearbook with pictures and artifacts from the history of the organization. Included in this yearbook were spaces for employees to have colleagues sign and write in their notes and reflections and include their own memorabilia about their years with the organization (Brooks, 1998).

Moreover, these opportunities may allow the parties to move on in more productive ways than when such opportunities are denied. One difficulty in this concerns our natural tendency to avoid thinking about the past as we move toward a desired future. This is often apparent in many planned organization change efforts. There is often a taboo against speaking about or holding on to symbols of the past. A primitive assumption implies that the past is bad, negative, to be forgotten, and all of the hopes and dreams become bound up in the desired future. Thus, it is important to examine our assumptions about the past in order to move successfully toward the future. I am reminded here of an executive, relatively new to a recently merged financial institution, walking into the office of an employee who had been with the institution over several mergers. Upon seeing mementos of past events and celebrations containing old company logos, she casually and rather lightheartedly mentioned to him that he ought to remove them from his shelf. While she did not mean to be demeaning or insulting in any way, I heard this as symbolic of these notions that what no longer exists should be erased from our identity so that a new collective identity can more easily emerge.

It appears that one ingredient that might lower resistance is abundant availability of resources (time, money, people)

to support change. However, there is a paradox here as well: under some conditions, abundant resources may serve to undermine the change by lowering the necessary degree of tension and therefore weaken the motivation needed to change. (For further relevant discussion, see chapter 20).

One last factor, written about extensively in the field of organization development, is to involve those most affected by change in its planning and implementation (see Burke, 1987, 2011). Participation in planning one's future can have beneficial effects on one's future. Involving people affected by change in planning and implementation serves to increase their commitment to any change.

With reference to handling a plant closing, I suggest that one alternative strategy is a stronger presence by the leaders of the change effort among those most affected by it. The leaders of the operation could meet with employees and encourage them to express their reactions and concerns. This type of action, though understandably difficult, may serve to weaken the resistant forces productively. Furthermore, having a chance to candidly express attitudes, conflicts, concerns, and biases in a setting where they can be heard by those with power to change the situation (regardless of whether they do change it) often serves to weaken those forces. There are many possibilities other than simply closing the plant and making immediate mass layoffs. However, although participation may lower resistance, it does not ensure a cooperative process of resolving the inevitable conflicts that emerge in such a situation. In many ways, it increases the likelihood that conflicts will emerge and be brought to the table. This can be a sign of healthy movement to yield lasting change.

An alternative perspective on these notions of resistance comes from Gladwell's ideas from his book *The Tipping Point* (2002). He likens change (no matter how well

planned) to the spread of a virus, or “rage,” that sweeps across and engrosses the majority of a social system. This does not happen from a “big bang” or by overwhelming the system, but rather through three characteristics:

- Contagiousness, or word-of-mouth spreading of an idea, product, event, or desired future
- Stickiness, or the idea that small incidents or messages can have big effects and eventually tip the balance in a particular direction, which becomes almost impossible to reverse
- The idea that change happens suddenly once a critical mass is reached

He argues that this type of change happens due to three kinds of people who have strong influence in a social system: salespeople who persuade, relate well, and empathize with those they are trying to influence; connectors, who are part of the relevant social networks and have strong influence in those networks; and mavens—the individuals or groups who are collectors of information, driven to know much about a particular issue or phenomenon or product. Ultimately these ideas have as their basis the assumption that peer pressure has more power to create change than those in formal authority. The dynamics of motivation, resistance, and commitment are bound up in Gladwell’s notions.

Gaining Commitment

Commitment by a critical mass of people is the sufficient condition needed to sustain any change. It is the force that refreezes a system to its new, changed state. There are methods that may serve to increase the level of commitment to a new, changed state. Several strategies are similar to methods useful for weakening forces of

resistance. As just discussed, it is widely accepted that meaningful participation and involvement enable those affected to commit to the change; participation leads to commitment.

In a conflict situation, several types of action may lead to increased commitment to bring about constructive changes: recognizing that both parties are engaged by choice, acknowledging that either can walk away at any time, making unilateral statements of one's own commitment to a mutually productive resolution, and placing oneself in a situation where avoidance of the conflict is less likely.

We can influence our own and others' level of commitment by telling the party we are in conflict about our commitment to constructive resolution during the early stages of the conflict: "I'm determined to work this out in a way that we can both be satisfied with," or, "I'll persist until we're both comfortable." Such statements are public, cannot be taken back, and intend to give both parties an opportunity to commit to engaging in constructive conflict-handling skills.

Another type of action is to place oneself in a situation where avoidance of the conflict is less likely. By voluntarily doing so, we force ourselves to take action that we might not otherwise take. If I am angry at a colleague for some action he took but concerned about letting him know I am angry, I might avoid contact with him and therefore the prospect of telling him about my feelings. If, though, I voluntarily place myself in closer proximity to him, I increase the likelihood that we will work on the conflict and present a greater possibility for productive benefit than continued avoidance.

It is important to further differentiate processes that might increase commitment from those that increase compliance.

From the preceding discussion, we can understand that it is difficult to discern when a group or individual is complying with someone else's wishes and when the behavior reflects true change. In any system where there is a power hierarchy, gaining commitment to change becomes especially tricky. Although the outcome (committing to change versus complying with another's wishes) looks the same on the surface, understanding the methods used is one way to see which outcome we are headed for. That is, when those higher in the authority structure use methods of coercion (methods likely to feed forces of resistance) in a context where two-way communication between the hierarchy levels is not supported, the desired behaviors are surely meant to comply with the wishes of those in higher authority. Furthermore, the long-term effect of compliance is that behaviors revert to the prechange state whenever the people above are not around. As an example, consider the efforts of parents to change a particular behavior of a child (burping, for example) that is often considered socially unacceptable among many adults. If those with greater power use methods that diminish forces of resistance (such as relying on high participation and involvement among those lower in the hierarchy—engaging the child in active discussion, active listening, providing opportunities to mourn the loss of what people are giving up), they may see greater commitment to the changes being sought. This is visible as the behaviors stick even when no one in higher authority is around to notice them.

SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING

Several implications for training emerge from this discussion. First, let us briefly explore how the newly trained conflict resolver may act as a change agent within her own social system. Here I am referring to the issue of

finding ways to change the system to which the newly trained conflict resolver returns.

The question I address is, “How can the trained conflict resolver be an effective change agent?” A difficulty that people often experience after receiving training in a particular skill area is how to practice the new skills back in a setting that does not necessarily support developing those skills in the first place. How can we apply what we know about the change process to encourage changing a system to be more supportive of constructive conflict resolution skills?

With this question in mind, we can apply the same three psychological principles involved in change to this application: create the motivation to change systemic conflict resolution skills, overcome people’s resistance to changing those skills, and generate commitment to constructive conflict resolution skills in future conflicts in the system.

Thus, the person who strengthens his or her conflict resolution skills through training can be seen as a representative of the system whose conflict skills need strengthening. The person’s role is twofold: to acquire productive conflict skills and transfer those skills to the system that offered the resources for the individual to attend the training. This second role involves becoming a change agent.

Generating Motivation

To become a change agent after conflict training, one needs to identify where the system is in relation to strengthening its conflict resolution skills. We can assume that the act of undertaking training in this area is a sign of unfreezing from the current state. However, we must not confuse this sign with the system’s motivation to change. It is seductive

to believe that by providing training to members, an organization will, on completion of the training, believe that it has become skilled in the area of training. We must also consider how to change the system that endorses the training. To begin this process, it is useful for the change agent to reflect on the nature of her own changes—how she may have moved closer to a desired future state with regard to conflict-handling skills.

The skilled conflict resolver must also work at making salient to the system some desired future state, or change goal. This can be done by reflecting on the initial reasons for undertaking the training. These may include, for example, the desire to reduce divisiveness between professional staff and support staff. A way to create tension, then, would be to highlight the gaps between the current state of divisiveness and the desired future state, perhaps by articulating a sense of introspection about where the system currently is or posing questions about the current state to groups of stakeholders (perhaps the leadership of the organization, the two groups with a history of divisiveness, or one's peers). From these activities, it is important to identify a group that, in the change agent's judgment, demonstrates sufficient readiness for change: people who are most interested in strengthening their own skills in ways that the change agent has done. Stated prescriptively, he or she should find where there already exists some motivation and begin efforts there. Using Gladwell's terminology, we want to find those who are conflict "mavens," others, similarly inclined, who are strong at connecting appropriate people together, and "salespeople" who can broaden interest in such change.

Identifying and Handling Resistance

Many forces operate to move the individual and the social system back to the pretraining state, among them using the hierarchy and power structure to resolve conflict, leaders' modeling of poor conflict-handling skills, and using verbal or physical threats or abuse to resolve issues. It is an important first step for the conflict resolver to be aware of (and not overwhelmed by) the power of those forces working to maintain the status quo. It is also difficult to anticipate all the manifestations of resistance that may arise. Nonetheless, the key idea to keep in mind is not how to prevent resistance from developing but rather how to recognize and handle it productively.

One idea for doing this is to focus on how the conflict resolver himself is learning and changing, rather than focusing on how the other, or the system, needs to change. Schein (in Coutu, 2002) eloquently discusses the importance of this among change agents: unless they become willing to look at themselves and acknowledge their own anxieties, conflicts, and vulnerabilities (and strengths), then any efforts at changing the system will never take place. Second, change agents often devote too much attention and resources to those most resistant to a change, underemphasizing the degree of attention and support needed by the least resistant individuals and groups. Another way to look at this is to increase the level of support, attention, and resources to those whose motivation for change is already high. To some, preaching to the converted is redundant or a waste of energy. It can, though, play a valuable role in helping to spread the positive energy for change and thereby lessen the effects of negative forces against change. This embodies the notions that Gladwell speaks of in creating the tipping point, or the point at which the seesaw swings in the desired direction and the forces to go back are overwhelmed.

Fostering Commitment

Several ideas can be applied to generating commitment to changing a system's conflict-handling skills. First, the change agent must create opportunities for key members of the system to participate in planning how their skills are to be strengthened. If, for example, the change agent must reduce intergroup conflict, she might engage members of both groups in strategizing effective ways of bringing parties together. Under the guidance of the conflict resolver, this type of session might serve to model effective conflict-handling skills and build some of the commitment needed for further strengthening the skills in the system.

A related idea about generating commitment has to do with free choice. Choosing the level of involvement people wish to pursue in the change effort (and making that choice salient to them) contributes to commitment. In many social systems, especially in work settings, we come to believe that we are in an unpleasant situation by force. This is rarely the case. Reminding people about their choice in these matters can be freeing, both reducing resistance and generating commitment. Thus, if people do not want to participate in strengthening their conflict skills, the change agent should not mandate or force their participation. Such action merely leads to compliance and other increases in resistance.

CONCLUSION

It was my intent, in this chapter, to look at some of the linkages and interrelationships between conflict processes and change. I have discussed the bidirectional nature of the processes involved in change and conflict. My view is that any change process—at the individual, group, organizational, community, or societal level—finds conflict

inherent in the process. Similarly, any conflict resolution process brings about change of some form between or within the parties in conflict.

I have highlighted three important psychological components of the change process and how they influence the course of conflict. Motivation, resistance, and commitment are by no means the only psychological dynamics involved in change. It is my contention, though, that they are important enough to warrant further theorizing and empirical study as they relate to conflict and change. Furthermore, it would behoove the conflict resolution practitioner to work with these dynamics as they relate to changing a system to which they return after such training. Similarly, there is often meaningful change associated with enhanced conflict resolution skills training. In classes and workshops that I have been teaching at the International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution and elsewhere, students often return to class and share experiences related to their practice with skills associated with productive conflict and how such practice has led to significant changes in their personal or professional relationships: something changed for them, and they notice a difference in the interactions they have in their personal and professional lives. Finally, since the previous edition of this Handbook, I have noticed through my work with individuals and groups that there is a small but more frequent interest in, acceptance of, and eagerness to explore the connections between the difficult work of planned change and the productive use of conflict during change. I am encouraged by this and continue to do what I can to fuel this motivation.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE CHANGING MINDS *Persuasion in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution*

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The focus of this chapter is on persuasion and attitude change in negotiation, mediation, and conflict resolution. *Persuasion* refers to the principles and processes by which people's attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors are formed, modified, or resist change in the face of others' attempts at influence. These attempts are designed to convince targets of persuasion to accept a position on some issue that differs from their current position.

Importantly, persuasion is distinct from coercion in that persuasion involves influence designed to change people's minds, whereas coercion involves influence designed to change people's behavior (with little regard for whether they have actually changed their minds). For example, in a conflict between labor and management, company employees might attempt to *persuade* the managers to raise wages by pointing out that higher wages will increase motivation and commitment among workers, thereby benefiting the company as a whole. Alternatively, they might attempt to *coerce* the managers to raise wages by threatening to strike if their demands are not met. Research on social influence has established that if public compliance is not accompanied by private acceptance (in this case, truly believing that there is good reason to raise wages), the outcomes of influence are typically ephemeral and unstable. (See Eagly and Chaiken, 1993.) Persuasion is

therefore a critical tool in creating lasting settlements between parties in conflict.

Although participants in negotiations often bring an impressive amount of implicit knowledge to the conflict resolution setting, an increased understanding of the principles and processes that underlie persuasion can help improve the processes and outcomes of a negotiation. In this chapter, we review major theories and findings in the field of persuasion, summarize relevant research in negotiation and intergroup settings, and discuss practical implications for conflict resolution.

AN OVERVIEW OF PERSUASION THEORY AND RESEARCH

Although theory and research on persuasion have been brought to bear on the study of negotiation, mediation, and conflict resolution, they remain largely disconnected fields. As Malhotra and Bazerman (2008) noted, “The vast majority of writing on negotiation has ignored the element of interpersonal influence . . . [which] seems to be a glaring omission” (p. 510). In this chapter, we seek to bridge this gap by describing relevant theory and research in persuasion that has important and useful implications for research and practice in conflict settings.

We begin by providing a brief, foundational overview of persuasion theory and research. After illustrating the research paradigm that has guided both historical and contemporary approaches to persuasion, we discuss a broad theoretical perspective on persuasion (called a dual-process perspective) that distinguishes between two basic ways in which people think.

The Paradigmatic Persuasion Experiment

Before we discuss theory and research in persuasion, it is important to understand how research is typically conducted in this area of social psychology and how we can (and cannot) relate the results obtained in such settings to real-world situations such as negotiation. In this section, we describe the prototypical persuasion experiment, highlight key differences between the laboratory and the real world, and discuss how persuasion research has addressed this gap.

The prototypical persuasion study takes place in a university laboratory and investigates how exposure to persuasive messages influences an audience's attitudes, beliefs, or behavioral intentions. These studies typically involve a message (information about a given issue), a source (the communicator of the message), and a recipient or target (the person receiving the persuasive message). Researchers then typically measure recipients' attitudes toward the issue discussed and often perceptions of the source or freely generated thoughts about the issue. Most notably, such studies examine the extent to which message recipients' attitudes move toward the position advocated in the message.

The issues addressed in such paradigmatic persuasion studies are wide ranging, including foreign affairs (e.g., whether Israel should withdraw from the West Bank); political and social issues (affirmative action, welfare policies); business and government proposals (retirement benefits, corporate mergers); and a host of more mundane issues of relevance to audience members' work, school, or personal lives. The traditional paradigm allows experimenters to study how aspects of the source, the message, and the recipient influence attitude change. For example, research has established that persuasion tends to increase as the perceived trustworthiness, expertise, and likability of a source increase or as the number and

strength of the arguments presented increase. (See Crano and Prislin, 2008; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993.)

Despite the range of issues and variables studied in persuasion research, the essential paradigm is somewhat constrained in its portrayal of natural persuasion settings. A one-way, source-to-recipient model of persuasion reflects only some of the contexts in which social influence occurs. Although it might afford an accurate picture of persuasion through exposure to public media such as television, newspaper, and the Internet, it is unlikely to capture the dynamic aspects of persuasion that occur in the kinds of interpersonal interaction that characterize negotiations.

In contrast to the one-shot, one-way message transmissions used in the persuasion paradigm, conflict and conflict resolution involve dynamic, repeated interactions between sources and recipients who together engage in bidirectional, mutual attempts at persuasion. In addition, attempts at influence may be directed not only at one's opponent, but also at the groups represented by each party and at any mediators who might be present (and the mediator may meanwhile attempt to influence the negotiators). Moreover, the messages exchanged during negotiations often address multiple, related issues and the relations among them (such as order of priority) rather than single, independent ones. Finally, in negotiations, the parties are interdependent rather than autonomous: their outcomes depend on one another's actions (Neale and Bazerman, 1991). These differences between the typical negotiation setting and the typical persuasion paradigm are important to bear in mind as we review the persuasion literature.

Persuasion researchers can and do study persuasion as it relates to complex social settings; they traditionally do so by adding layers of complexity to the basic paradigm

described earlier. This involves introducing new variables that capture the essential features of particular settings. For example, researchers have examined the effects of direct interpersonal influence by leading study participants to expect an interaction with the message source. (See Bohner and Dickel, 2011; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993.)

The prototypical persuasion paradigm has therefore been treated as a skeletal framework onto which variables are often added to understand more fully the complex processes of persuasion. It is clear that the framework represents a simplification of social influence in real-life contexts. Nevertheless, we believe that the study of persuasion, using variations of its basic paradigm, can inform us about how attitude change occurs in a wide range of conflict resolution settings. The basic paradigm and its modifications permit us to address a host of issues manageably and to draw causal conclusions about the effects of particular variables. The leap from there to real-world conflict resolution settings is sizable but feasible, given good theory about both conflict and persuasion.

The Heuristic-Systematic Model

Theories of persuasion that explain how attitude change occurs as a result of two qualitatively different modes of processing are called dual-process theories. Dual-process theories have been influential in numerous domains of social psychology, including prejudice, stereotyping, and decision making (see Chaiken and Trope, 1999; Evans, 2008), and have also been applied in the negotiation domain (see de Dreu, 2004).

Our theoretical perspective, called the heuristic-systematic model (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, and Chen, 1996; Chaiken and Ledgerwood, 2012), is one of several dual-process models proven to be important in social psychology. We

treat this model simply as a perspective, borrowing terms and insights from other dual-process models as well. Our goal is to acquaint readers with dual-process models in general and exploit the general perspective these models offer for understanding conflict and negotiation.

Modes of Information Processing.

Like other dual-process theories, the heuristic-systematic model proposes two distinct modes of information processing. *Systematic processing* involves attempts to thoroughly understand any information encountered through careful attention, deep thinking, and intensive reasoning about relevant stimuli (such as arguments, sources, and the causes of sources' behavior) and to integrate this information as a basis for subsequent attitudes and behaviors. A systematic approach to processing information about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might entail reading as many newspaper reports as possible to learn about the conflict and develop an opinion about the "best" course of action. Not surprisingly, such systematic thinking entails a great deal of mental effort, requiring both deliberate attention and allocation of mental resources. Thus, systematic processing is unlikely to occur unless a person is both able and motivated to do it.

Relative to systematic processing, *heuristic processing* is much less demanding in terms of the mental work required and much less dependent on adequate levels of personal or situational capacity (such as knowledge and time). In fact, heuristic processing has often been characterized as relatively automatic, in that it requires little cognitive effort and capacity (Chaiken and Trope, 1999). Heuristic processing involves focusing on salient and easily comprehended cues, such as a source's credentials, the group membership of those endorsing an opinion, or the number of arguments presented. These cues activate well-

learned decision rules known as heuristics. Examples are "experts know best," "in-group but not out-group sources can be trusted," and "argument length implies argument strength." These simple associative rules allow judgments to be formed quickly and efficiently, with little additional cognitive processing. A heuristic approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might involve simply adopting the opinion of a noted political expert. Put simply, heuristics are the *ifs* in an if-then rule structure, and judgments are the *thens* ("If expert, then agree").

Cognitive Consequences of Processing Modes.

Although heuristic processing is more superficial and systematic processing involves greater depth of detail, neither mode is necessarily more or less rational, and both can produce nonoptimal, poor, or biased judgments. In the case of heuristic processing, many of the mental rules of thumb that people use to make judgments have proven useful and reliable in the past and should presumably remain so in the present. Moreover, in a world that offers abundant information but too little time or opportunity to think in a detailed, systematic way about every decision, heuristic processing can be highly functional.

However, heuristic processing is obviously fallible. Experts can sometimes be wrong, one's own group is not always right, and numerous reasons are not always good reasons. Thus, although heuristic processing can and often does produce reasonable judgments that people hold with relatively high confidence, it can sometimes produce judgments that are different—and subjectively poorer—from those that people would reach if they processed information more systematically. This is because systematic processing of persuasive appeals can increase both the breadth and depth of a person's issue-relevant knowledge in ways that heuristic processing cannot.

Systematic processing involves sustained attention and information search. This can increase the depth of understanding about a particular issue or at least about a particular point of view. Moreover, when driven by a need for accuracy, systematic processing can involve more objective and even-handed thinking than heuristic processing, which tends to be biased in favor of prior judgments and habitual responses. Open-minded and accuracy-driven systematic thought can increase the breadth of knowledge about a given issue and, more important, about alternative perspectives from which it can be understood.

For example, systematic processing driven by accuracy motivation can lead to complex thought patterns that involve examining issues from multiple viewpoints and weighing the pros and cons of opposing perspectives. Research on cognitive complexity has established that a number of advantages are associated with this kind of reasoning, including diminished susceptibility to overconfidence and superior performance in group problem solving (Curşeu, Schruijer, and Boroş, 2011; Gruenfeld and Hollingshead, 1993). Of special relevance to conflict settings, cognitive complexity has been associated with increasing tolerance for alternative viewpoints, facilitating compromise, and identifying integrative solutions to conflict (Pruitt and Lewis, 1975; Winter, 2007). Individuals who process information in cognitively complex ways are thus often more effective in conflict and decision-making settings.

Importantly, systematic processing is more likely than heuristic processing to lead to deep, pervasive cognitive restructuring. This means that the cognitive changes that occur as a consequence of systematic processing are likely to persist, and thus affect future judgments and behavior, relative to the changes that accompany heuristic

processing. (See Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Petty and Wegener, 1998.) Hence, in the long run, open-minded systematic processing may well produce more optimal judgments than heuristic processing.

Sources of Bias.

Although systematic processing is enduring, it is far from foolproof. This is because the cognitive effort associated with systematic processing does not necessarily mean that all possible information will be sought out and weighed in an open-minded, even-handed manner. In fact, sometimes systematic processing simply strengthens prior convictions. Systematic processing can be biased by both "cool" cognitive factors (such as a recipient's existing attitudes) and, as discussed later, "hotter" motivational factors (such as a recipient's goals or ideological commitments).

People's current attitudes can exert a biasing effect at virtually all stages of information processing. Existing attitudes bias our attention to information in the environment (we tend to selectively seek and attend to information that confirms our existing attitudes), our interpretation of this information, and our memory for attitude-relevant information (see Albarracín, Johnson, and Zanna, 2005). The way our minds organize information often makes it easier for us to process information that is congenial to our own attitudes (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993, 1998). Thus, through the cool, cognitive process of critically thinking about a source's arguments, perceivers may find themselves genuinely swayed by arguments that fit their preexisting beliefs and attitudes.

Importantly, even if perceivers engage in modest to high amounts of systematic processing, heuristics can provide another source of cognitive bias. For example, based on the heuristic that in-group sources tend to be correct, we often

expect that politicians from our own political party will have more compelling and valid positions than politicians from an opposing political party. This heuristic-based expectation may guide systematic processing in a way that ends up confirming our initial expectation. As we attend to our own party's arguments, we may perceive them to be compelling, and we may elaborate them in ways that make them even more convincing. In contrast, if we instead hear exactly the same arguments put forth by the opposing political party, we may think of various reasons that the arguments are flawed or unconvincing.

Motives for Processing

Researchers have identified three types of motives that influence how individuals process information. An *accuracy* motive is geared toward discovering what is correct. But thinking is not always accuracy driven and objective. Two other, "directional" motives are geared toward validating a particular judgment or stance: *defense* motivation is self-focused and egoistic, whereas *impression* motivation is other focused and relational (see Chaiken et al., 1996; Kunda, 1990).

The motivation to attain accurate judgments is pervasive in everyday life because we need to accurately understand the world around us in order to behave effectively. When accuracy motivation is present but not particularly high, people tend to look for heuristic cues that signal accuracy, such as source credibility. Indeed, communicators often seek to enhance others' perceptions of them as trustworthy, expert, and likable because this provides heuristic information suggesting that the advocated position is accurate. However, if accuracy motivation increases, heuristic processing may be accompanied by systematic processing: if we want to be very confident that a judgment

is correct, we are often uncomfortable making a snap decision based on a simple heuristic.

How much processing occurs, and thus whether heuristic or systematic processing dominates judgment, depends primarily on (1) the extent to which judgment-relevant heuristics are accessible (e.g., the “in-group sources can be trusted” heuristic may be particularly salient in conflict situations; see Chen and Chaiken, 1999; Ledgerwood and Chaiken, 2007); (2) the extent to which people have the time and mental resources necessary for systematic processing (in negotiations, anxiety or time constraints could decrease the capacity for systematic processing); and (3) the level of judgmental confidence that a perceiver desires. Assuming the first two factors are in place, our theoretical perspective predicts that people will process as little as possible but as much as necessary: in general, people want to satisfy their goals as efficiently as possible, without expending unnecessary effort. As the desired level of confidence increases, the minimal amount of processing necessary to reach this “sufficiency threshold” increases as well.

Thus, when accuracy motivation is modest (or when capacity is inadequate), heuristic cues such as source expertise and consensus opinion can exert a powerful influence on judgment—regardless of persuasive arguments or other information that might otherwise temper or reverse the heuristic-based judgment (Chaiken, Wood, and Eagly, 1996; Petty and Wegener, 1998). Ample systematic processing occurs only if accuracy motivation is higher—for example, if the issue is of great personal importance or the perceiver is accountable to others (and even then, accuracy-motivated systematic processing can still be biased by initial heuristics).

Although people usually assume that they are motivated to reach accurate judgments, they can also be motivated (usually without realizing it) by defense and impression concerns (Chaiken and Ledgerwood, 2012). Defense motivation compels people to process information in ways that protect and validate their own beliefs and interests. These beliefs could be about a person's own valued qualities ("I'm intelligent"), ideological values ("Government should be as limited as possible"), or identity in valued groups ("Being Jewish is important to who I am"). These self-interests or self-definitional beliefs are defended because the perceiver feels, at least unconsciously, that overall personal integrity and well-being would be threatened if they were challenged.

When defense motivation is present but moderate, desired confidence, and therefore the amount of processing, is also moderate. Thus, heuristic processing dominates judgment —but defensively or selectively. In other words, since the goal of processing is to arrive at judgments that protect the self, heuristics are selected to the extent that they serve this goal. For example, if an expert source presented a short argument in favor of deporting illegal immigrants, you might invoke the heuristic "experts know best" if that position is congruent with your ideological values, whereas you might instead rely on the heuristic "argument length implies argument strength" if the short message contradicts your values and you want a reason to discount it.

When defense motivation is strong, additional systematic processing occurs until a person is sufficiently confident in her self-protective judgment. Like defense-motivated heuristic processing, defense-motivated systematic processing is also biased by a person's favored position. For example, people tend to counterargue information that threatens their preferred position (Eagly, Kulesa, Chen, and

Chaiken, 2001; Ledgerwood, Mandisodza, Jost, and Pohl, 2011).

The third broad motivational concern addressed by our perspective is impression motivation, which involves considering the interpersonal consequences of expressing a particular judgment in a given social context (such as in an interaction between two negotiators). Here, the target's goal is to express positions that are socially acceptable to other people in their environment. As with defense motivation, impression-motivated processing is not necessarily self-conscious and is marked by a selective bias.

Impression-motivated heuristic processing entails selective application of heuristics that ensure a smooth interaction with specific others. On the one hand, when interacting with a person or group whose views on an issue are unknown or vague, a perceiver might invoke the heuristic "moderate judgment minimizes disagreement." On the other hand, when others' views are known, a "go along to get along" heuristic might better serve the same goal.

With sufficient cognitive capacity and higher levels of impression motivation, people may also process systematically but still selectively. Thus, a negotiating politician who is motivated to be well liked and respected by his constituents might think more favorably about an agreement that is likely to be popular among his constituents, and more critically about an agreement that is likely to be unpopular. Importantly, parties in conflict resolution are often concerned with the impressions they make on multiple audiences, and the content of the desired impressions may differ depending on the audience. For example, a negotiator seeking to resolve an international conflict may be motivated to look collaborative to the other party, tough and competent to his constituency, and dignified to the world at large. Which of these audiences is

most salient at a given moment may influence which desired impression motivates the negotiator's information processing.

Illustrating the importance of impression-motivated processing, Chen and Chaiken (1999) reported a study in which participants anticipated a discussion about a social issue with a partner who allegedly held either a favorable or an unfavorable opinion on the issue. Before this discussion, participants read "imagination scenarios" subtly designed to activate either the accuracy goal of determining a valid opinion or the impression goal of getting along with another person. After this task, participants familiarized themselves with the discussion issue by reading an evaluatively balanced essay concerning the issue (in this case, whether election returns should be broadcast while polls are still open). Participants then listed the thoughts that had occurred to them as they read the essay and indicated their own issue attitudes. Finally, they learned that there would be no actual discussion and were excused.

Impression-motivated participants expressed attitudes that were much more congruent with their alleged partners' attitudes than did accuracy-motivated participants: when the partner favored one side of the issue, they favored the same side, whereas when the partner opposed it, they opposed it. Interestingly, accuracy-motivated and impression-motivated participants exhibited the same amount of systematic processing (as measured by the number of issue-relevant thoughts that were listed). However, whereas accuracy-motivated participants' systematic processing was open-minded and unbiased by their partners' attitudes, impression-motivated participants exhibited systematic processing that was biased toward their partners' attitudes. For example, when the partner favored allowing broadcasts of election returns while the

polls were still open, impression-motivated participants listed thoughts that were much more positive about arguments supporting the issue and more critical about arguments opposing it.

Although accuracy motivation, defense motivation, and impression motivation may sometimes operate in isolation from one another, it is likely that multiple motives may be relevant in any given setting. A negotiator, for example, may be motivated both to attain an accurate understanding of the opposing party's needs and demands and to present an image of herself as tough and assertive. Which motivation exerts a stronger impact on heuristic and systematic processing may change depending on what concerns are most important to a particular person in a particular setting (Zuckerman and Chaiken, 1997, as cited in Chen and Chaiken, 1999).

Summary

The heuristic-systematic model proposes two distinct modes of thinking about information. Systematic processing involves attempts to thoroughly understand any available information through careful attention and deep thinking, whereas heuristic processing involves focusing on salient and easily comprehended cues that activate well-learned judgmental shortcuts. Heuristic processing is a more efficient and relatively automatic mode of processing but confers less judgmental confidence; systematic processing confers more confidence but is relatively effortful and time-consuming. Thus, individuals tend to engage in heuristic processing unless they are both motivated and able to think carefully about information. Furthermore, both modes of processing can be relatively open-minded, driven by accuracy concerns, or relatively biased, driven by defense or impression concerns.

The principles of this model have important implications for persuasion in conflict and negotiation. By facilitating mutual persuasion, participants in conflict resolution can increase the likelihood of identifying win-win solutions and creating long-lasting agreements. We turn now to examine research that is especially relevant to conflict settings and discuss implications and recommendations for practice.

PERSUASION IN THE CONTEXT OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Over the past decade, persuasion theory has been increasingly incorporated into research on the processes underlying negotiation and conflict resolution (see Thompson, Wang, and Gunia, 2010). In this section, we discuss these advances in light of our heuristic-systematic perspective and address other areas of persuasion research that have implications for conflict situations.

Heuristic and Systematic Processing in Negotiation Settings

Research exploring heuristic and systematic processing in negotiation simulations has confirmed the utility of the dual-process perspective for understanding how people process information in conflict settings. When negotiators have only modest levels of motivation (or insufficient cognitive capacity), they often rely on heuristics such as fixed-pie assumptions (the perception that a negotiation is a zero-sum game), initial anchor values (e.g., first offers, or information about the value of agreements typically reached), and stereotypes about an opponent's group membership. (See de Dreu, 2010, for a review.) In contrast, when motivation and capacity are relatively high, reliance on these heuristics tends to decrease as systematic processing increases.

Researchers have identified several factors that influence the extent to which people process information in negotiations. (See de Dreu, 2010.) These factors include both stable individual differences and temporary elements of a given situation that influence motivation or capacity. For instance, individuals high in the dispositional need for cognitive closure—that is, the desire to reach a judgment quickly and avoid ambiguity (Webster and Kruglanski, 1994)—are more likely to rely solely on heuristics than are those who have a low need for closure.

Temporary, situation-specific factors such as the presence of a highly involving task or process accountability (the need to justify the way a decision was made) tend to increase the extent of systematic processing, whereas time pressure and aversive conditions (noise, for instance) tend to decrease such processing. In one relevant study, de Dreu (2003) examined the effect of time pressure on fixed-pie perceptions. Business students were paired and asked to play the role of a buyer or seller in a negotiation over a car. The negotiation task was designed to hold integrative potential: the issues varied in importance to the two negotiators, so an integrative solution that capitalized on this variation in priorities would be more beneficial to both negotiators than a fifty-fifty split based on a fixed-pie assumption. Participants were led to believe that they had either plenty of time in which to complete the negotiation (low time pressure condition) or relatively little time (high time pressure condition). Participants were more likely to revise their fixed-pie assumptions, which led to higher joint outcomes, under low rather than high time pressure. These results suggest that time pressure reduces systematic processing, heightening reliance on heuristic cues like fixed-pie assumptions, and preventing negotiators from capitalizing on integrative potential.

Multiple Motives in Conflict Resolution

Historically, the study of conflict has emphasized the importance of underlying motives in driving behavior. A negotiator may be motivated to further her own party's interests, explore integrative potential cooperatively in an effort to expand the pie, defend her own beliefs and those of her group, or convey a favorable image of herself to her opponent, any third parties, and her constituency. Although the classic definition of the negotiation as a mixed-motive situation focuses mainly on negotiators' conflicting motives of cooperation and competition, conflict settings can be characterized by a wide range of motivations held by a wide range of participants. Next, we examine the cooperation-competition distinction common in the negotiation field and then return to our three broad motives of accuracy, defense, and impression, now in the context of conflict resolution.

Social Motivation.

The theory of cooperation and competition (Deutsch, 1973) and dual-concern theory (Pruitt and Rubin, 1986) suggest that social motives are critical to understanding negotiator behavior. A basic distinction between two broad social motives—motivation to maximize one's own outcomes (a competitive, egoistic motivation) and motivation to maximize joint outcomes (a cooperative, prosocial motivation)—is frequently used in conflict research and has been shown to influence information processing in these settings. (See de Dreu and Carnevale, 2003.)

Social motivation may arise from individual differences (such as social value orientation: the tendency to prefer a certain distribution of outcomes between oneself and another person; see Kuhlman and Marshello, 1975) or from elements of the situation. Situational elements shown to

increase prosocial motivation include instructions from trusted authorities to be cooperative (versus competitive), expecting a future interaction with the other party, viewing a task as a cooperative rather than competitive enterprise, and focusing on similar (versus differing) group memberships. (See de Dreu, 2004, for a review.) For example, Liberman, Samuels, and Ross (2004) found that simply changing the name of a prisoner's dilemma game from "The Wall Street Game" to "The Community Game" drastically increased cooperative behavior among their participants, presumably by increasing people's motivation to cooperate with each other on the task. Negotiators and mediators can use such techniques to increase prosocial motivation in conflict settings. Changing the terminology associated with a negotiation (e.g., calling it "joint problem solving"), emphasizing the ongoing relationship between parties, and highlighting shared group membership may each help increase cooperative behavior.

Like defense and impression motivation, social motivations can lead to selective processing geared toward fulfilling competitive or cooperative goals. For example, de Dreu and Boles (1998) measured participants' social value orientation and asked them to read a list of competitive and cooperative heuristics (e.g., "your gain equals my loss," "equal split is fair") in preparation for a negotiation task. Participants were later given a surprise memory quiz in which they were asked to recall as many of the heuristics on the original list as possible. Prosocial participants recalled more cooperative than competitive heuristics, whereas egoistic participants recalled more competitive than cooperative heuristics. Social motivation thus influenced information processing such that people remembered heuristics consistent with their competitive or cooperative goal.

Although competitive and cooperative motives are clearly basic elements of conflict situations, we may gain a finer-grained understanding of persuasion in these contexts by linking social motives with the tripartite analysis of motivation discussed earlier. Competitive, or egoistic, motivation is often comparable to defense motivation: both involve concern with protecting the self or the in-group against threats to actual resources or to one's self-image or group image. In contrast, prosocial motivation may often be associated with accuracy or impression motivations. Concern with both parties' outcomes should give rise to accuracy motivation because open-minded processing of all available information provides the best route to discovering integrative potential and maximizing joint outcomes. Prosocial motivation may also be associated with impression motivation: the desire to cooperate and the desire to make a good impression seem reciprocally linked. If two countries want to cooperate with each other, their leaders will probably seek to establish and maintain a positive relationship.

Thus, whereas egoistic motivation and defense motivation seem closely related, prosocial motivation may be linked to accuracy or impression motivation, or both. We turn now to consider how these three broad motives operate in conflict settings.

Accuracy Motivation.

Accuracy motivation in conflict situations may be induced by a number of factors, including prosocial motivation. Certain kinds of accountability can also give rise to accuracy motivation. (See Lerner and Tetlock, 1999.) When an individual expects to discuss an issue with, justify a decision to, or be evaluated by an unknown audience, he tends to engage in preemptive self-criticism, displaying motivation to arrive at an accurate conclusion. (See

Tetlock, Skitka, and Boettger, 1989.) Thus, when a negotiator is accountable to an audience whose views are unknown, he is likely to process information in an open-minded fashion.

To test this idea in a negotiation context, de Dreu, Koole, and Steinel (2000) randomly assigned business student participants to high-accountability and low-accountability conditions before asking them to engage in a mock negotiation over the purchase of a car. In the high-accountability condition, participants expected that their negotiation strategies and decisions would be reviewed and evaluated by an experienced negotiator and a psychologist. In the low-accountability condition, participants did not receive this information. The results showed that under high accountability, participants were more likely to revise their fixed-pie assumptions and obtain higher joint outcomes. Increasing accuracy motivation therefore increases the likelihood that integrative solutions will be identified and used when they exist. In general, accuracy goals seem desirable in conflict situations because they motivate people to seek out and consider information in an open-minded way, which is critical for discovering potential solutions and accepting necessary compromises.

Defense Motivation.

Unfortunately, we suspect that accuracy motivation is unlikely to naturally dominate in conflict situations, especially in the early stages of a negotiation. At least in Western cultures, parties often assume that their interests are diametrically opposed (see Morris and Gelfand, 2004), and therefore any gain by an opposing party seems to mean a loss for one’s own. Group or individual identities can also be perceived as zero sum, in that the validation of one party’s identity and history delegitimizes that of the other (Kelman, 1999). Such perceptions motivate people to

defend their resources and identities and to engage in biased information processing to bolster their positions. Indeed, research suggests that defense motivation can interfere with integrative solutions and lead to partial impasses in negotiations (de Dreu, Weingart, and Kwon, 2000; Trötschel, Hüffmeier, Loschelder, Schwartz, and Gollwitzer, 2011).

Egoistic, competitive motives may also be triggered by aspects of the situation that cue competition in a given culture. For example, Kay, Wheeler, Bargh, and Ross (2004) found that exposing participants to objects associated with the business world (such as briefcases and business suits) increased their selfish, competitive behavior in an ultimatum game (a task in which participants proposed a take-it-or-leave-it split of money between themselves and an unknown partner). Simply seeing objects typically associated with competition can therefore lead to competitive behavior and may trigger defense-motivated, selective information processing. Removing such objects from a negotiation context, or using a setting associated with cooperation, may help limit defense motivation and encourage cooperation and open-minded thinking.

Accountability to a mediator, arbitrator, or one’s constituents can also activate defense motivation when a negotiator is committed to a certain position. Research shows that although accountability to an unknown audience can increase accuracy motivation, accountability instead results in “defensive bolstering” of an initial viewpoint when a person is already highly committed to this position (Tetlock, Skitka, and Boettger, 1989). Because opposing parties often enter negotiations highly committed to their opinions, accountability to others may tend to activate defense rather than accuracy motivation.

Persuasion research indicates that if systematic processing is activated by defense motivation, parties seek out and attend to information that supports the desire to dismiss, resist, and reject an opponent's overtures, and they resist attending to information that supports the appropriateness of cooperative responses. When defense motivation is primary, one's goal in processing is to resist influence, maintain prior beliefs and commitments, and look for confirmation of those beliefs wherever possible. This sort of motivated processing leads parties to overestimate the divergence between their positions and can exacerbate conflict (Keltner and Robinson, 1993). Conversely, factors that reduce defense motivation, such as perspective taking, can help move parties toward agreement (Trötschel et al., 2011).

Impression Motivation.

In addition to defense motives, impression motives may also operate in the early stages of negotiation, since parties are eager to create a specific impression for various audiences. The actual or imagined presence of others determines the audience toward whom an impression motive is geared. For example, a negotiator may focus on conveying an impression of toughness when face-to-face with an opponent but might instead play the role of a victim when communicating with a third party to gain sympathy. If both parties are in the room at once, the target of the impression goal may vary depending on the relative salience of the two parties from moment to moment. When the negotiator's attention is drawn toward one party as opposed to the other, the salient party may become the focus of impression-management attempts.

A number of factors may influence impression motivation in negotiation situations. When an individual is accountable to a known audience and has low commitment to a position,

impression motivation is triggered, and the individual processes information so as to align his own position with that of the target audience (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). If, for example, a mediator is accountable to his superiors and knows that they believe party A aggressed against party B, he may process information to selectively support his superiors' position and therefore come to believe in party A's culpability himself.

One's role as an advisor may also affect impression motivation. Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, and Frey (2005) found that participants playing the role of an advisor who made a nonbinding recommendation to a client were more even-handed in their information processing than were the clients. However, when advisors were asked to make a binding decision on behalf of their client, impression motivation was triggered, and information processing was selectively geared toward being able to justify their recommendation to their client. These results suggest that when a representative is negotiating on someone else's behalf, asking for a nonbinding recommendation will maximize accuracy motivation, whereas allowing the representative to make a binding decision on the other person's behalf can lead to biased processing and suboptimal decisions.

Impression motivation may have both positive and negative effects on information processing in conflict situations. On the one hand, when negotiators wish to project an image of themselves as cooperative, they may be motivated to process information open-mindedly and seek to maximize fairness and joint outcomes. For example, Ohbuchi and Fukushima (1997) found that individuals higher in general impression-management concerns were more cooperative in their responses to an unreasonable request, when capacity and motivation were sufficient. In such instances, impression motivation and cooperative tendencies may be

closely associated. On the other hand, when the desired image is more competitive, impression motivation may lead to selective processing geared toward conveying and justifying a tough image. Thus, an impression-motivated negotiator seeking to project a cooperative image should be especially likely to discover integrative potential in a conflict situation, but an impression-motivated negotiator who instead wants to project a competitive image may be especially unlikely to question fixed-pie assumptions.

Implications of Multiple Motives for Conflict Resolution.

Parties in conflict often perceive their positions to be opposing and irreconcilable. Initially negotiators may therefore attempt to coerce the opposition into accepting an outcome that fails to achieve the latter's own stated position. However, successful conflict resolution requires that opposing parties turn away from their public positions to find compatible issues within their underlying interests (Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 2011; Thompson et al., 2010). The discussion of underlying needs and interests makes it increasingly possible to persuade one another both that these needs are legitimate and that sacrificing some things of lesser interest may allow each side to gain what is more important to them. It is only through this sort of persuasion —rather than coercion—that successful and lasting resolution can be achieved. This can occur, however, only if opponents are both willing and able not only to transmit but also to receive information. In other words, negotiators must be willing and able to persuade and to be persuaded. Moreover, they must want to search for information that disconfirms, as well as information that confirms, their prior beliefs about their opponents' interests. If parties in negotiation begin to change one another's minds about the nature of the conflict, the issues at stake, and the

compatibility of underlying interests, then cooperation can ensue.

From a persuasion perspective, then, the key to successful conflict resolution is to move parties toward open-minded, accuracy-motivated processing. In fact, research suggests that when even one negotiator is high in accuracy motivation, the likelihood of identifying integrative potential can increase (Ten Velden, Beersma, and de Dreu, 2010). Participants should seek to increase the accuracy motivation of all parties, including themselves, and to dampen defense and impression motives that inhibit cognitive flexibility and willingness to consider information that disconfirms prior beliefs.

PROMOTING OPEN-MINDED PROCESSING

In the final sections of this chapter, we discuss other factors that may increase accuracy motivation in conflict situations and recommend strategies for promoting open-minded processing. Awareness of these factors should help negotiation participants craft situations that encourage open-minded thinking and integrative solutions and enable them to identify potential sources of bias in their own and others' reasoning.

Group Identity

Because group identities tend to be highly activated in conflict situations, it is important to understand the role that group identification plays in persuasion. Group identification, or the subjective perception that one belongs to a group, defines a particular group as an in-group, opposing groups as out-groups, and irrelevant groups as neutral groups.

In general, shared group membership—the perception that the audience and the source belong to the same social category—tends to increase persuasion relative to unshared group membership (Fleming and Petty, 2000; Mackie and Queller, 2000). Highlighting a common in-group identity between source and target can increase persuasion by providing an important heuristic cue that the message is valid. Negotiators and mediators would therefore do well to make common in-group identities salient when conveying information to each other. For example, a mediator might increase the willingness of two negotiators to consider a proposed agreement by highlighting an identity she shares with each negotiator (such as mother, Muslim, or Indian). Importantly, a social identity must be salient in order to influence persuasion (Fleming and Petty, 2000). So a mediator and negotiator's shared identity as mothers will increase mutual persuasion only so long as they continue to think of themselves as mothers.

However, it is important to note that group endorsement of a position can also lead individuals to selectively process information. Individuals may be motivated by defense or impression concerns to agree with the in-group and disagree with the out-group and may therefore process information selectively to arrive at these preferred judgments (Fleming and Petty, 2000; Wyer, 2010). For example, Cohen (2003) asked liberal undergraduate students to evaluate a proposal for a generous (stereotypically liberal) federally funded job training program. Half the participants learned that their own political group opposed the program, while half received no information about group endorsement. On average, participants in the latter condition supported the program, in keeping with their ideological beliefs. However, when participants were told that their in-group opposed the

program, they showed biased processing of the information presented in the proposal, selectively thinking about the information in a way that allowed them to agree with the in-group's position. As a result, participants in the in-group-oppose condition were more likely to oppose the program themselves. Moreover, participants believed that group endorsement influenced the attitudes of others but perceived themselves to be relatively unaffected by this information.

Information about group positions can thus strongly influence attitudes by inducing selective information processing in support of the in-group position, but people may be unaware of this bias in their own judgments. Such effects can hinder conflict resolution: once a group takes a position on an issue, in-group and out-group members will likely diverge in their attitudes regardless of actual issue content, exacerbating conflict. Furthermore, self-serving and group-serving perceptions of bias ("I am more objective than anyone else," "We are more objective than they are") make it difficult to convince someone that other opinions may be valid. We describe several strategies to reduce such close-mindedness in the sections that follow.

There may also be at least one way to harness this bias toward agreeing with one's in-group as a tool to promote successful conflict resolution. If individuals tend to follow their group's lead in forming opinions about relevant issues, then in-group endorsement of peaceful conflict resolution should be a powerful persuasive tool. Publicizing in-group support for deescalation, or for a particular agreement, may help consolidate general support for reconciliation. For example, if 60 percent of a nation's citizens support a particular agreement, publicizing that support could help persuade even more citizens that the agreement is a good one. (See Ledgerwood and Callahan, 2012; Stangor, Sechrist, and Jost, 2001.)

Self-Affirmation

Given that mediators and negotiators often face other parties who may be biased by motivations to agree with their own group or present a tough, aggressive image, what can be done to increase open-minded and accuracy-driven information processing? One useful tool may be a strategy called *self-affirmation* . Research suggests that affirming an important aspect of a person's self-image can reduce defense-motivated processing in response to self-relevant threats in other domains. According to self-affirmation theory, individuals are motivated to maintain a positive image of themselves and they respond to threatening information defensively in order to maintain this positive self-concept (see Sherman and Cohen, 2006). Importantly, however, if the self is positively affirmed in some way, this can buffer the self-concept against a subsequent threat and reduce defensive processing (see Sherman, Nelson, and Steele, 2000).

Thus, if negotiators reflect on their commitment to an important personal value before beginning a negotiation—or if one negotiator makes a point of recognizing that the other has lived up to an important value in some way—this could reduce defensiveness and increase open-minded thinking. For example, a political leader who is highly committed to her country might enter a negotiation quite high in defense motivation, unwilling to consider any information that calls her country's goodness into question. Identifying and affirming a value that is important to her self-concept could help reduce this defense-motivated processing (e.g., if equality is important to her, one might compliment her recent actions in promoting equality in her country).

Research on self-affirmation has found that self-affirmation increases openness to belief-disconfirming information,

buffering against the threat of messages that counter self-relevant attitudes and enabling accuracy-driven processing. (See, for example, Correll, Spencer, and Zanna, 2004.) Self-affirmation has also been shown to effectively reduce or eliminate bias in information processing when identity concerns are high, and it can increase concession making and positive attitudes toward one's partner in a negotiation situation (Cohen, Sherman, Bastardi, Hsu, and McGoey, 2007). The most salient identities in conflict situations tend to be those most likely to interfere with open-minded processing of information related to the conflict: an individual is most likely to think of his identity as a Democrat when debating with a Republican, as a manager when negotiating with labor, and as a father when arguing with his son. Research on self-affirmation suggests that affirming the self-concepts of those involved in conflict resolution can reduce motivation to defend salient identities and increase accuracy-motivated processing. [1]

Unexpected Information and Moderate Positions

Information that is unexpected or surprising can increase accuracy-motivated, systematic processing, leading to a revision of assumptions and an open-minded consideration of all available information (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Petty and Wegener, 1999). For example, when people are relatively low in motivation to think carefully about an issue, encountering incongruent information (e.g., reading arguments against an issue yet learning that most people support the issue) can trigger increased systematic processing (Maheswaran and Chaiken, 1991). In conflict situations, parties often assume their opponents to be competitive and self-interested. These assumptions may be revised if negotiators offer unexpected concessions, talk about the other's interests rather than their own, or focus

on gains that the other can accrue from settlement rather than losses that loom if a suboptimal settlement is adopted. Initially the opposition might meet such tactics with great suspicion, since defense motives are likely to be strong and it may be difficult to believe that communications are motivated by something other than self-interest. Nevertheless, with persistence, this sort of tactic should gradually induce the opposition to become more open-minded and systematic in their thinking.

Research also suggests that adopting moderate rather than extreme positions can help increase accuracy-driven, open-minded processing. Message extremity and attitude change tend to have an inverted U-shaped relationship: as the discrepancy between the position advocated in a message and a target's own position increases, there is more room for persuasion to occur, yet when message discrepancy is extreme, it can trigger defense-motivated processing and counterarguing (Aronson, Turner, and Carlsmith, 1963; Bochner and Insko, 1966). Thus, it is important to identify the sweet spot of message discrepancy: a position that is different enough to change someone's mind yet not so extreme that it leads to defensive processing. Especially in conflict situations, where opponents often assume their interests to be diametrically opposed and perceive the two sides' positions to be more polarized than they actually are (Keltner and Robinson, 1993; Thompson and Hastie, 1990), signaling moderation may be an especially important tool for encouraging open-minded thinking. For example, a negotiator who wants to promote accuracy-driven processing in his opponent could make his own positions seem less extreme by first highlighting a shared group membership or by talking about an unrelated issue on which he and his opponent share similar views at the beginning of the negotiation (see Weiss, 1957).

CONCLUSION

We had two primary goals in this chapter. First, we wanted to give an overview of current psychological research from a dual-process perspective on persuasion. The first part of the chapter thus presented a dual-process theory describing how persuasion results from two types of information processing—one based on heuristics and the other involving systematic processing. In addition, we argued that there are three classes of motives (accuracy, defense, and impression) that may influence information processing, and hence persuasion. Each of these can be associated with both heuristic and systematic processing. As a result, it is the level of motivation, not the specific type, that influences the extent of systematic processing.

The goal in the second part of the chapter was to review theory and research that relates persuasion to conflict situations and to describe implications and recommendations for practice. Here we described research applying the heuristic-systematic perspective to negotiation settings. We then discussed a number of evidence-based strategies that negotiators can use to try to increase accuracy-driven, open-minded processing, including highlighting shared group identities, affirming the other party's important values, doing the unexpected (e.g., offering unexpected concessions), adopting moderate rather than extreme positions, and emphasizing areas of similarity or agreement at the beginning of a negotiation.

Our hope is that the considerations raised by persuasion research can encourage new insights into the process of conflict resolution and how to achieve both integrative and long-lasting agreements. By understanding and attending to factors that influence information processing, practitioners can better facilitate open-minded, thoughtful

consideration of alternate viewpoints by all parties involved in a conflict, and ultimately, its resolution.

Note

1 . Self-affirmation research has yet to be applied to non-Western cultures. In collectivistic cultures, self-affirmation may be more effective when focused on interdependent aspects of self. (See Kitayama, Snibbe, Markus, and Suzuki, 2004.)

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CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR LEARNING THROUGH REFLECTION ON EXPERIENCE *An Adult Learning Framework for How to Handle Conflict*

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Conflict is endemic to modern life. As Thompson (2005) and numerous chapter authors in this Handbook recognize, when individuals seek to balance competing interests and build long-term and fair relationships, conflict resolution skills are enormously valuable—not just for negotiating practical issues, such as one's salary, but also for the complicated and difficult conversations that pervade our lives (Stone and Patton, 2000). How do adults successfully learn to handle conflict? How do individuals learn to improve their negotiation skills?

In this chapter, we introduce a framework for learning to handle conflict that we call *learning through reflection on experience* , based on Marsick and Watkins's model of informal and incidental learning (Cseh, Watkins, and Marsick, 1999; Marsick and Watkins, 1990; Watkins and Marsick, 1993) which in turn is informed by Dewey (1938), Mezirow (1991), and Argyris and Schön (1974, 1978).

We begin by discussing the roots of the framework in adult learning theory and draw out implications for its use in the teaching—and learning—of conflict resolution using examples, some drawn from one author's research (Weaver, 2011). We illustrate ways in which those involved in conflict can use reflection to handle challenging situations—whether before a conflict is negotiated, during a heated or

difficult event, or after a conflict—and enhance learning. Finally, we address the implications of our framework; suggest how facilitators, negotiation education teachers, coaches, and other professional trainers can help students learn to become reflective about conflict in order to improve their negotiation skills; and draw some conclusions about the value and limitations of the framework.

THE ROOTS OF THE FRAMEWORK IN ADULT LEARNING THEORY

Our framework was strongly shaped by adult learning theory, so we begin our chapter reviewing some key ideas from the field.

John Dewey: Learning from Experience

Many models of learning from experience have their roots in the thinking of John Dewey (1938) who examined the way in which past actions guide future actions (Boud, Cohen, and Walker, 1993; Jarvis, 1992; Kolb, 1984; Schön, 1987). Dewey observed that when people do not achieve desired results, they attend to the resulting “error” or mismatch between intended and actual outcomes. He described learning as a somewhat informal use of what is known as the scientific method: people collect and interpret data about their experiences, then develop and test their hunches even though they may not do so in a highly systematic fashion.

Dewey summed up learning from experience as involving (Dewey, 1938):

- Observation of surrounding conditions
- Knowledge of what has happened in similar situations in the past, a knowledge obtained partly by recollection

and partly from the information, advice, and warning of those who have had a wider experience

- Judgment that puts together what is observed and what is recalled to see what they signify

People make meaning of situations they encounter by filtering them through information and impressions they have acquired over time. They determine whether they can rely on past interpretations and behaviors or need a new response set. They may need to search for new ideas and information or reevaluate old ideas and information. Under Dewey's theory, learning takes place as people reinterpret their experience in light of a growing, cumulative set of insights and then revise their actions to meet their goals. In terms of learning how to handle conflict, Dewey's theory reminds us that people can—and do—alter how they handle conflict over time, adjusting their behaviors to yield better results. However, Dewey's approach does not help us understand why changing those behaviors is sometimes so difficult for so many people. Jack Mezirow's theory of learning sheds light on this issue.

Jack Mezirow: Critical Reflection to Discover "Habits of Mind"

In Jack Mezirow's theory (1991, 1995, 1997), adults shape their understanding of new situations by using "critical reflection," a deliberate effort to examine the tacit, often unconscious belief systems held by all people. He calls these *meaning perspectives* (or more recently, *habits of mind*) and *meaning schemas* (or more recently, *points of view*). Mezirow defines *meaning perspectives* as follows:

> A general frame of reference, set of schemas, worldview, or personal paradigm. A meaning perspective involves a set of *psychocultural* assumptions, for the most part culturally assimilated but including intentionally learned theories, that serve as one of three sets of codes significantly shaping sensation and delimiting perception and cognition: *sociolinguistic* (e.g., social norms, cultural and language codes, ideologies, theories), *psychological* (e.g., repressed parental prohibitions which continue to block ways of feeling and acting, personality traits) and *epistemic* (e.g., learning, cognitive and intelligence styles, sensory learning preferences, focus on wholes or parts). (Mezirow 1995, p. 42; italics added)

Another way of understanding meaning perspectives is as broad, guiding frames of mind that influence the development of an individual's internalized meaning schemas. Meaning schemas are "the specific set of beliefs, knowledge, judgment, attitude, and feeling which shape a particular interpretation, as when we think of an Irishman, a cathedral, a grandmother, or a conservative or when we express a point of view, an ideal or a way of acting" (Mezirow, 1995, p. 43).

Meaning perspectives and schemas are the containers that shape our experiences. These containers are taken for granted and are therefore hard to see, let alone to question. Some meaning perspectives concern how we expect people to behave, in terms of categories such as race or gender, which has an impact on—and even complicate—situations in ways that can lead to conflict. This is why it may be difficult for a white person to understand how some of her views or behaviors may be perceived as racist or insensitive, for example, or for a man to understand how women could experience his actions as sexist. Through critically reflective self-exploration and

questioning, a person can see the basic assumptions of his or her group and culture in a new light. In Mezirow's theory, the process of critical reflection helps individuals understand the impact of those assumptions, which then leads them to change those assumptions and perhaps to challenge them across the broader society.

For individuals seeking to learn how to handle conflict, Mezirow's work points to the need for critical reflection, but it does not give us much practical advice about how to probe deeply into assumptions. His theory also does not give much understanding or guidance about the deeply seated emotions.

We now turn to the work of other theorists who, like Mezirow, emphasize reflection but in doing so, bring in other dimensions of learning, for example, advice about how to probe assumptions or understand deeply seated emotions.

Action Science, Experiential Learning, and the Role of Reflection about Emotions and Affect

Chris Argyris and Donald Schön (1974, 1978) developed action science to explore the gap between what people say they want to do and what they are actually able to achieve. They argued against the behaviorists' belief that people act somewhat blindly in response to their external environment: "Human learning . . . need not be understood in terms of the 'reinforcement' or 'extinction' of patterns of behavior but as the construction, testing, and restructuring of a certain kind of knowledge" (1978, p. 10). People often believe that they act according to one set of beliefs (espoused theory), but because of tacitly held assumptions, values, and norms, they actually act in ways that often contradict their espoused theories (theory-in-use). It is seldom possible to probe deeply into our beliefs without

confronting many facets of our psychological makeup that we may find difficult to name, face, and change.

Engaging in critical reflection can evoke powerful feelings that seem at odds with instrumental, rational ways of learning from experience. Some adult educators critique this rational focus and seek to develop a broader lens with which to see the impact that critical reflection has for individual learning. Boud et al. (1993), for example, describe learning as a holistic process that involves thinking, feeling, and the will to action. They note that in English-speaking cultures, “there is a cultural bias towards the cognitive and conative aspects of learning. The development of the affect is inhibited and instrumental thinking is highly valued” (p. 12).

Boud et al. (1993) factor the affective side of learning from experience into their views. By the “affective side,” they mean all the attendant sensations and feelings that people can encounter when they have experiences. From their point of view, the affective dimension of learning includes naming and recognizing emotions and also probing the deeper, nonrational aspects of the situation in order to come to a fuller level of understanding. These authors legitimize feelings as grist for the mill of reflection. They do not shrink from feelings and even highlight that an emphasis on rationality can leave people ashamed or embarrassed about emotions.

Other experiential learning theorists, such as Heron (1992), go a step further. For these theorists, feeling precedes rational explanation and therefore can point the way to fresh insights when people revisit and reinterpret their feeling. For Heron, the affective is the psychological basis for experiential knowledge.

Sometimes experiential educators help learners get in touch with insights that they normally filter out of their

awareness (Yorks and Kasl, 2006; Davis-Manigaulte, Yorks, and Kasl, 2006). In essence, feelings and the experiential knowledge that they hold are brought into awareness through the use of various forms of expression that engage the learner's imaginative and intuitive processes, which in turn connects these processes to new conceptual possibilities. Paying attention to feelings is important for establishing an "empathic zone" (Yorks and Kasl, 2002). Creating such a zone can provide insights into the different lived experiences of others that often block pathways to understanding through rational discussion as parties talk past one another.

For individuals seeking to learn how to handle conflict, these theorists offer processes that yield productive results. For example, deliberately establishing an empathic zone after an interpersonal conflict can help set the stage for exploration of what occurred with respect (versus blame) and for building a mutually, beneficial solution through an integrative conflict resolution process.

OUR FRAMEWORK OF LEARNING THROUGH REFLECTION ON EXPERIENCE

Our framework of learning through reflection on experience highlights the role of individual reflection more than in Dewey's model or other adult learning theory models. Our goal in the balance of this chapter is to focus readers on the challenges—and potential—of learning through reflection on experience, especially when the framework is applied to learning how to handle conflict.

Figure 24.1 depicts a framework for learning through experience based on the model that Marsick and Watkins developed in 1990. Building on the work of John Dewey as

applied to problem solving, the circle in the center represents the encountering of a new experience or problem, such as a conflict or difficult interpersonal situation. New experiences are often hard to navigate, even though people may simplify them by emphasizing what is familiar. Problem-solving steps are located at vertical and horizontal axes, and are labeled (clockwise) as North, East, South, and West. *Learning steps* are located in-between problem-solving steps, and are labeled (beginning clockwise just before North) as Northwest, Northeast, Southeast, and Southwest.




Figure 24.1 Marsick and Watkins' Informal and Incidental Learning Model

Source: Adapted from Marsick and Watkins (1990).

Note: The arrows denote reflection.

In our framework of learning through reflection on experience, people use reflection to become aware of the problematic aspects of an experience, probe these features, and learn new ways to understand and address the challenges they encounter. In other words, reflection takes

place at key points between these axes as the glue between the problem-solving steps and the learning. The role of reflection in this revised framework is outlined in the example below.

Problem solving begins when people encounter a new experience and frame it based on what they have learned from past experience (Northwest). Often people make these judgments quickly, without much conscious reflection. Reflection should slow the diagnosis and help a person become aware of the complexity of the situation and the assumptions used to judge the new challenge. After diagnosing a new experience, people learn more about the context of the problem (Northeast). They find out what other people are thinking and doing.

At this juncture, reflection can play a key role by opening up lines of thinking that would otherwise have remained unexplored. Using time for reflection allows for interpretation of the context as well as the emotions and leads to choices around alternative actions that are guided by recollections of past solutions and the deliberate search for other potential models for action. Before committing to any decision, the person can brainstorm options, perhaps discussing alternatives with peers and trusted others, such as coaches, educators, or facilitators.

Once a decision has been made about a course of action (East), a person develops or gathers what is needed to implement the decision (Southeast). Reflection might be anticipatory at this point and lead to a decision to gather new capabilities in order to implement the solution. Sometimes reflection occurs while the action is being implemented over time. When people are taken by some surprise in the course of action, as can happen during conflict, they may make quick judgments based on partial

information. Handling a conflict without reflection is often counterproductive to reaching a sustainable solution.

Once an action is taken (South), people assess consequences and decide whether the outcomes match their goals (Southwest). Reflection after the fact allows for a full learning review: an explicit process to assess whether the outcome fulfills expectations or if there were unintended consequences, including interpersonal or emotional ones. When data are available to make sound judgments and goals are reasonably explicit, learning reviews are fairly straightforward. It is harder, however, to recognize unintended consequences, and particularly difficult after many complex conflicts. Reflection is often required at this juncture to understand the full scope of the situation. In order to fully understand the context, many sources of information should be explored and many questions asked of a wide range of people. Ignoring the full picture may yield inappropriate blame, which can be particularly damaging when there are ongoing relationships between the participants.

A full learning review leads to conclusions about results (West) and lessons learned that can be of help in planning future actions. Reflection at this point brings a person full circle to new understandings (Northwest) that are drawn in a new iteration of the cycle. Later in this chapter, we offer a further definition, as well as several examples of learning reviews in action.

Reflection stimulates learning in every phase of our framework. Although consciously using reflection to its fullest potential is difficult, individuals can learn to incorporate reflection as part of their handling of new experiences. Regular reflection sensitizes people to surprises and mismatches that signal the inadequacy of their prior stock of knowledge. Schön (1987), labeled this

process of adjusting one's behavior in the midst of a situation as reflection-in-action, highlighting how people can learn and change their behaviors while they are seeking an immediate solution. According to Schön and other action science theorists, reflection after the fact helps to draw out lessons learned that are useful for the next problem-solving cycle.

In situations of conflict, people are forced into making sense of many complex factors in a short period of time, which can influence how they interpret the context and whether they are open to identifying unintended consequences. Studies of informal learning have highlighted the fact that when contexts are highly variable and surprise rich, as is certainly the case under conditions of conflict, people's interpretation of what is happening assumes larger significance (Cseh, 1998; Cseh et al., 1999; Volpe, Marsick, and Watkins, 1999).

Our framework calls attention to the central importance of reflection during a conflict. Specifically, we recommend that individuals use a deliberate "pause button" and focus their reflexive attention on a wide range of contextual factors that could be influencing their interpretation of what is happening, looking for unintended consequences, and thinking about alternative actions to address the situation.

The quality of reflection is central to the way in which a person makes meaning of what is occurring. Since people are often guided by internalized social rules, norms, values, and beliefs that have been acquired implicitly and explicitly through socialization, they should reflect on these and consider how these internalized constructs may be influencing their choices. In this way, our framework links to the work of Jack Mezirow (1991, 1995, 1997) and Argyris and Schön (1974, 1978). To learn deeply from

experience, we agree that people must critically reflect on a full range of assumptions, values, and beliefs that shape their understandings. Our framework also links to the work of Boud et al. (1993) and Yorks and Kasl (2002) by focusing on the role of emotions and feelings. At the heart of the framework of learning through reflection on experience is a dynamic and ongoing interaction of action—having an experience—and reflection that helps a person to interpret and reinterpret experience.

Two case illustrations of learning through reflection on experience follow.

Case Example: Reflection after Conflict

In her early career as a lawyer, Janice described her style of negotiating with people as “obnoxious” and “overbearing” (Weaver, 2011). Over time, she ran into problems due to her outspokenness and take-no-prisoners behaviors. Janice lived through a mounting number of conflicts during which her tone and behaviors were criticized. After a judge sanctioned her for her behavior in the courtroom and her law firm faced a fine, she stepped back and thought about whether her approach was getting her where she wanted to go.

She engaged in some honest self-appraisal and realized that her approach was causing problems. After a period of personal reflection, she decided to gather information through negotiation classes exploring alternative styles. As her awareness of competitive versus collaborative styles increased, she decided to experiment with different approaches to resolving conflicts outside the classroom setting. Her ongoing experiences with new styles and reflection on the positive outcomes allowed her to begin to internalize a different modality, a different way of being (Weaver, 2011). After her internal learning review, Janice

concluded that she should use her toughest style of negotiating only under certain, very limited, circumstances.

In her description of her personal learning process, Janice described how her ongoing desire to get better at negotiation allowed her to understand that every conflict is unique and that her style of negotiating needed to be nuanced, tailored to the specifics of the individuals and circumstances involved, and actively chosen rather than one-style-fits-all. Her ongoing reflection and learning show that she has moved from West to Northwest, where she is ready to face new experiences. Janice found that over time, her new and more flexible approach to negotiation brought solid outcomes and also stronger relationships with her counterparts, colleagues, and peers.

Seen through our framework of learning through reflection on experience, Janice's process of learning how to handle conflict clearly required reflection at several points: when she acknowledged that her outspoken approach was no longer working, when she decided how to gather information about other options, and when she reflected on the successful outcome of using a more nuanced approach to conflict resolution.

Case Example: Reflection with the Help of a Trusted Other

Kelly is an educator who describes herself as someone who was raised with explicit expectations about remaining "quiet" and always behaving as "a good girl" (Weaver, 2011). In her early career, she struggled with the idea that it was acceptable, or even safe, to speak up and negotiate, especially with authority figures.

Kelly had difficulty handling conflict with her bosses for the first decade of her career and eventually worked with a psychotherapist on this issue. Kelly's meaning perspective

about authority and how to interact with authority was initially an unconscious constraint. By using critical reflection in conjunction with a trusted other person, she eventually recognized her meaning perspective's power over her emotions and behavior. The empathic zone that was created in that relationship helped her to talk about and understand the emotional aspects of her fears. As her understanding grew, she became increasingly willing to speak up for herself, eventually becoming confident handling conflicts with her boss and other authority figures.

Kelly learned that it was within her control to improve how she handles problematic situations by using reflection before, during, and after conflicts. She said, "As I get older and reflect upon things . . . I say: 'Well, I could've said this. I could've done this differently' you know? It's like having a reflective mind, so you're always looking at the situation again, and thinking: 'How could I have done that differently and change the outcome?'"

In addition, Kelly now sets aside time to assess difficult situations and make deliberate choices about her actions. By planning what she will say to her boss and role-playing negotiations with trusted friends and family members, Kelly has learned to speak up on her own behalf, overcoming longstanding behavioral habits. Even in the midst of a conflict with her boss, she described an ability to pause and reflect, carefully choosing her words and actions in order to move the discussion to resolution.

Looking at Kelly's situation solely through the work of Mezirow would yield a somewhat one-dimensional and decontextualized analysis. While such an analysis would refer to her changed meaning perspective, it could not reveal how Kelly was regularly overwhelmed by conflict situations, the strong pain and emotions that were

involved, or how hard it was for her to learn to handle conflict in new ways, including the many setbacks that she had over more than a decade. It also would not reveal the important role that a facilitator—in her case, the psychotherapist—played in her learning.

Our framework of learning through reflection on experience integrates the impact of reflection and critical reflection in situations like Kelly's and the key role that a trusted other person can play in learning. Although Kelly had reflected on her issues with authority in her early career, it was not until she engaged in a deeper process of critical reflection that she was able to break through some of her longstanding habits. Powerful emotions often arise as people try to learn from their experiences. These feelings need to be acknowledged and sometimes probed with professionals—whether coaches, trainers, or (for some individuals) psychologists or psychotherapists. Learning through reflection on experience can be strengthened by working with trusted other people, who can serve as catalysts to the learning process.

We now turn to a more in-depth discussion of different kinds of reflection and the kinds of questions that can be employed to encourage reflection, especially before, during, and after conflict situations.

Reflection and Critical Reflection

Simple reflection involves a review of attendant thoughts, feelings, and actions without questioning one's interpretation or meaning of an experience such as a conflict. But people can be misled by their interpretation of experience. They might frame the experience or solutions inaccurately, especially if they miss information or signals about the nature of the new challenge. Prior assumptions and beliefs can lead to a partial, limited, or incorrect

assessment of a situation. Simple reflection in our framework is stimulated by questions such as the following:

- What did I intend?
- What actions, feeling, emotion, or results surprised me?
- How is this experience alike or different from my prior experiences?
- What metaphors and stories capture my experience and differentiate it from those of others?
- What does this experience tell me about worldviews other than my own?

Critical reflection and critically reflective questions do more than simple reflection. Critical reflections probe the context, the assumptions of the people involved, and the way these influence their judgments, expectations, and behaviors. Such questions look more like the following:

- What else is going on in the environment that I might not have considered but that may have an impact on the way I understand the situation?
- What is the other person’s point of view, assumptions, and expectations, and how can I find out more about them to be sure?
- In what ways could I be wrong about my hunches?
- How are my own intentions, strategies, and actions contributing to outcomes I want to avoid?
- In what way might I be using inapplicable lessons from my past to frame problems or solutions, and is this framing accurate?
- Are there other ways to interpret the feelings I have in this situation? How can I better gain a pathway into

experience of other people that might challenge or change my assumptions?

It is not easy to engage in critical reflection during a conflict or in the midst of a longstanding interpersonal problem, although it can be done with practice. Critical reflection demands an open mind and heart, including the willingness to slow things down (to push the reflexive "pause button"), to question one's interpretations of the situation and the other person (or people) involved, to listen carefully with a suspension of blame, as well as to probe for alternative viewpoints. Critical reflection is more easily carried out before or after the fact, when emotions and feeling can be examined and understood, and with time to learn new skills in order to change one's customary response patterns.

WHY COACHES AND FACILITATORS CAN BE CATALYSTS FOR LEARNING THROUGH REFLECTION

Just as coaches can help individuals, facilitators can help groups of people reflect on both the cognitive and noncognitive dimensions of conflict. Individuals can be in a rut (Dewey, 1938) about how they think about conflicts and how they approach negotiations, where they do not know how to interrupt old habits. As we saw in the example of Kelly, trusted other individuals can help, especially those trained to encourage reflection, such as psychiatrists, coaches, adult learning specialists, negotiation educators, and facilitators.

Facilitators focus on helping individuals to critically reflect on their patterns—for example, their patterns of handling conflict, including those who often avoid speaking up and

negotiating. They can help individuals reflect on what has gone well during a specific conflict and what was not satisfactory. Over time, facilitators can help clients build skills to better address conflict by encouraging them to always use reflection to learn from experience, breaking down assumptions, learning to probe the other person's point of view, and debriefing what was intended compared to what happened. The challenge may be greatest when conflict emerges unexpectedly.

Facilitators can also help people attend to the noncognitive dimensions of conflict. Perhaps the most powerful first step for doing so is to make space for naming and working with feelings and emotions. There is often a shame and stigma associated with discussing feelings and showing emotion, especially in groups. Facilitators can help to create a respectful, safe environment for feelings to be expressed, such as the empathic zone referred to above. Such an environment can be constructed through encouraging what Torbert (2001) describes as first-person inquiry and practice. First-person inquiry involves paying attention to one's own intentions and reactions and developing a capacity for attention and self-awareness. Bringing this first-person mindfulness to second-person inquiry through mindful use of how we interweave our framing, advocating, illustrating, and inquiring in our dialogues and awareness of how a situation is playing out is foundational for creating empathic zones. Facilitators in groups may well have to stand tough when others wish to avoid feelings and emotions or, even worse, "punish" a person for showing and discussing them. To do so, facilitators need to be willing to take the time to identify and address underlying values and beliefs that are influencing cultural norms and specific behaviors in the room.

One step that facilitators use to encourage learning in groups is the process known as learning review. Learning

reviews help people to become more aware of goals, outcomes, and contextual factors that influence the way they understand a situation, assumptions that influence actions, and feelings that they cannot articulate but recognize are operative. They facilitate reflection on experience, which sometimes surfaces conflicts in points of view but also creates a process for learning from experiences about differences and reconciling conflicts based on deep probing of assumptions and beliefs. A learning review is typically guided by four questions:

1. What did we intend to happen?
2. What happened?
3. Why did it happen that way?
4. How can we improve what happened?

Facilitators can identify different ways for groups to do such learning reviews, helping the individual members gain skills in carrying them out, and encouraging them to articulate their viewpoints and discuss them openly with others. They can create a culture where conflict is expected and recognized for the value it will bring to results and where learning reviews become routine.

Two case examples of facilitated learning through reflection follow.

Case Example: After-Action Reviews

The U.S. Army developed the after-action review (AAR) for the purpose of incorporating reflection into their learning (Sullivan and Harper, 1996). AARs are structured in the learning reviews in the learning-through-experience framework we have described. They are typically held in the middle of a battle, but they are also being used in noncombat situations. It is a deliberate process to

encourage individuals to be reflective and examine the unexpected and unintended without blame and with a forward-looking orientation to handle similar situations better when they arise again.

AARs focus attention on goals, which in itself can increase conscious learning. Data are collected to track actions and results so that the discussion can be based on what is called “ground truth,” that is, accurate data-based reports of what took place on the battle ground. Ground truth in the Army is collected by using computer-based technology that can provide detailed information on moves that were made. Although data are collected and reviewed, about 75 percent of the time spent in an AAR is focused reflection on why things occurred and how people can improve moving forward. Ground rules are set for dialogue and reflection that include freedom to speak up, regardless of one’s rank, a norm of honesty rather than sugarcoating or holding back for fear of reprisal, and strict avoidance of blame.

AARs are being adapted by corporations for use in noncombat situations where the enemy may not be as easily identified, the motivation for working together not as clear, and the consequences of a mistake not as obvious. Conflicts in civilian life may also not be resolved by a clear-cut win-loss outcome. As the examples throughout this chapter illustrate, conflicts are handled best with attention to the complexities of the situation, and with reflection by all of the participants.

Case Example: Using an Action Science Facilitator to Learn to Handle Conflict

Let us imagine that a businesswoman named Sue had the conversation with her team members that we present in exhibit 24.1 . In this conversation, Bob (one of Sue’s peers at work) challenged Sue over a recommendation she made.

Because she was upset at the brewing conflict with Bob, Sue decided to meet with an action science coach who uses our learning through reflection on experience framework.

The action science coach helps Sue to identify her explicit and implicit intentions for this interaction. At first, Sue identifies her goal as trying to get the best solution to the problem, but eventually she acknowledges her conflicting goals and emotions, such as her strong desire to win in her confrontation with Bob. She might also realize that she values looking good in front of her teammates, especially in light of her perceptions of the subtle, and not-so-subtle, gender discrimination at the company. Most of all, she wants to be respected as a professional and therefore has to decide what that means in this situation. The coach then helps Sue recognize the mismatch between her intentions (her espoused theory) and outcomes (her theory-in-use), a mismatch that stimulates Sue’s desire to learn a new way of negotiating this kind of difficult situation going forward.

Exhibit 24.1 Sue's Dialogue with Her Teammates

What Sue Felt or Thought But Did Not Say	***What Sue and Teammates Said***
These guys! We've been chewing on this question ever since we began meeting. Someone must know something about this situation that I don't know.	Sue: So, that summarizes what we have agreed to. I think we disagree about whether we think that the people we want to reach actually shop in the kind of convenience store we have targeted. I suggest that we hire ThinkRight consultants to do focus groups to check out our assumptions on this one.
What's Bob up to now! This is coming from left field.	Bob: You have been pushing those people from the moment we met. What's in it for you to use these guys?
Here we go again. These guys are trying to make me look like I don't know what I am doing.	Sue: Huh? I am just trying to move us forward. We have been circling around this question ever since we began meeting. I want us to move forward.
What do I do with this one . . . he's made it look like, if I confront him, he's right. The jerk! He's not really joking.	Bob: Yeah, yeah. I know how you women work. Give you an inch and you take a mile [as if in humor; laughter all around from others]. You are just trying to railroad your decision through. [Others nod in agreement; no one else speaks up.]

As they review the conflict, the coach probes Sue's assumptions about her teammates and her interactions with them, and asks about Bob's likely reasoning as well.

This process will make it clear to Sue that she and Bob have very different framings and interpretations of the situation. Since they are both influenced by deeply held beliefs and values, these strong feelings are affecting their behavior toward each other. These feelings may lead them to actions that actually create the consequences that they say they do not wish to experience.

When the coach helps Sue to map the links between her assumptions, her emotions, and the ways both shape her actions, Sue can see how the chain of consequences is directly connected to her initial assumptions and emotions. Exhibit 24.2 illustrates this kind of mapping. It takes some time to map this kind of causal linkage with any degree of accuracy, as the coach has to test various interpretations. People's responses often reflect views in the dominant culture, but the goal must be to map Sue's own sense of the causal linkages. Ultimately the coach helps Sue to see that her interpretations are likely to lead her to the very gap she says she wants to avoid between her various stated intentions and the likely outcomes from the interaction: she wants to be seen as a professional, but her actions are not appropriate for the situation at hand, and may well be seen by her colleagues as unprofessional.

Underlying beliefs and values and habits of behavior—Sue's, Bob's, the other teammates', and the company's—are not easily changed even when they might be recognized as unproductive. Using the learning-through-reflection-on-experience framework, the coach supports Sue's personal reflection as well as her critical reflection on the situation at work, including Sue's perceptions of discrimination. Over a series of sessions, the coach can work with Sue to develop her ability to reflect on her day-to-day experiences, strengthening her understanding and skill at handling conflict.

By mapping out responses in a variety of situations, reflecting and discussing those reflections with others, people can identify deeper patterns that cause conflict. When this kind of process happens across many organizations, it may begin to produce a change in the cultural patterns themselves. For example, when Karen Watkins at the University of Georgia taught a graduate course in action science (Marsick and Watkins, 1999), two individuals from different organizations had brought in cases in which sexual harassment was an underlying theme. In the group discussion that ensued, many individuals agreed that this was a significant societal concern. The class mapped these themes using common responses, and the way in which these responses would have to change in order to allow greater learning to occur. These maps are shown in table 24.1 . Action science can help to make public issues that otherwise could not easily be addressed because of potential repercussions.

Exhibit 24.2 Mapping One Possible Set of Causal Links in Sue's Case

Sue's Intention	*Sue's Assumption*	*Sue's Action*	*Sue's Outcome*
To be taken seriously as a professional	Bob is trying to make me look bad.	I'll stick to my guns and push to hire ThinkRight.	Sue's teammates thinks she is too wedded to her own solution and thus not professional.

Table 24.1 Action Science Map around Sexual Harassment in the Workplace

Source: Marsick and Watkins (1999).

Contextual Cues	*Action Strategies*	*Consequences*	*System Consequences*
Individual level			
When sexually harassing behavior occurs	I make a joke of it, pretend it didn't happen, and say nothing . . .	. . . which guarantees that the behavior will escalate . . .	. . . and neither I nor the others affected by the behavior [perpetrators, managers, and by-standers] learn how to define limits of acceptable behavior in the workplace.
System level			
When sexually harassing behavior occurs	Managers and others ask victims to "just handle it," tease and make light of it, and expect victims to confront it alone without upsetting the system . . .	. . . which guarantees that the behavior will escalate . . .	. . . and a sexually harassing culture will be tolerated or encouraged, and victims are doubly victimized.
The learning alternative			
When sexually harassing behavior occurs	Recognize that others and I are affected and ask that all concerned become involved in remedying the situation . . .	. . . which guarantees that the behavior that is acceptable will be publicly discussed and consensus may emerge about what is and is not acceptable . . .	. . . and the system will either publicly admit that it tolerates this behavior or begin to engage in explicit conversations to help both victims and perpetrators make meaning of "sexually harassing behavior."

ENCOURAGING DIALOGUE AND NEW IDEAS IN OUR LEARNING THROUGH REFLECTION ON EXPERIENCE FRAMEWORK

As the examples show, people are often blind to their own views. Mezirow (1991, 1997) recommends dialogue and what he calls “rational discourse” as a way of identifying and considering preferred ways of acting. The conditions for discourse seem impossibly idealistic at first glance:

> Those participating have full information; are free from coercion; have equal opportunity to assume the various roles of discourse (to advance beliefs, challenge, defend, explain, assess evidence, and judge arguments); become critically reflective of assumptions; are empathic and open to other perspectives; are willing to listen and to search for common ground or a synthesis of different points of view; and can make a tentative best judgment to guide action. (Mezirow 1997, p. 10)

Despite these seemingly impossible standards, we have created action science dialogue groups based on our framework, and results show that they in fact stimulate a broader exploration of relevant issues and ideas.

In our work, we have found that it is easier to help a person to identify, name, and deal with powerful feelings after a real or perceived conflict or threat occurs. All facilitators should seek to create empathic zones in which participants can probe, acknowledge, and address fears; separate real from imagined consequences; and facilitate brainstorming about working with the specific conflict.

Facilitators of groups can also engage people in anticipatory reflection of alternative worldviews in order to

step outside current mental models that may be restricting new insights and skill development. Some theorists find that expressive ways of tapping into tacit experiential knowing can aid individuals in breaking through their habits and be open to new insights (Yorks and Kasl, 2006; Davis-Manigaulte et al., 2006). For example, Richard Leachman (1999) uses abstract paintings along with word descriptions to help people create, populate, visit, and experience new worlds. He then invites people to revisit a problem through the lens of experience created by their foray into this alternative space. Other experiential educators engage people in dance, poetry, metaphor, guided imagery, or painting. Bruce Copley (1999) designs learning experiences that use all of the senses. Activities such as these help set the stage for creating an empathic zone where new insights can be found.

CONCLUSION

We have introduced, described, and illustrated a framework for learning through reflection on experience that we believe holds potential for those who help others to address and learn from conflict. The value of reflection is that it is available to everyone. At the same time, as Ellen Langer (1989) has observed regarding a similar capacity for mindfulness, the very availability of mindfulness may make people discount its usefulness or take it for granted.

In order to use reflection to learn from experience, people have to slow down their thinking process so that they can critically assess it. They need to get in touch with deeper feelings, thoughts, and factors that lie outside their current mental and sensory models for taking in and interpreting the world that they encounter. Although some individuals may find this process disconcerting and at times difficult, we believe that individuals need to step outside the

frameworks and cultural norms by which they understand experience. At these moments, reflection can lead to new insight, but it is often a process that needs support from facilitators and trusted other people who can encourage the reflective process. As people develop new capabilities and habits, ongoing reflection on their experiences will help them learn additional skills and more nuanced approaches to complex situations.

When applied to conflict and learning to handle conflict, our framework of learning through reflection on experience can support individuals as they seek to change their patterns and styles of negotiating, building alternative patterns over time that will help them to resolve the conflicts in their lives more successfully.

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PART FIVE
CULTURE AND CONFLICT

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE
THE ALCHEMY OF CHANGE *Cultural Fluency in Conflict Resolution*

Michelle LeBaron

Imagine a conflict that matters in your bones. It may be a social injustice. It may be a family knot that has proved difficult to untangle. Or perhaps it is an internal struggle that resists rational analysis. The toughest problems are not easily amenable to rational dissection and linear problem solving. If they were, we would need fewer psychotherapists and mediators. Computers could tumble the factors together, producing the most promising way forward. But humans are complex, and human conflict—deep in our very bones—is always about what lies below the surface as well as what can be found above. Intractable conflicts meld history, identity, face, worldviews, sacred meanings, and personal filters in a mélange that always includes culture as an unacknowledged yet very important player.

The complex interrelatedness between conflict and culture is well documented and has been the subject of many conferences, volumes, and special issues. Yet while many have acknowledged its importance, culture and cultural fluency (CF) are arguably still not at the heart of conflict resolution practice, education, and theory. The field tends toward the parochial, as unexamined, unarticulated, and culture-specific assumptions about conflict, engagement, and resolution continue to infuse programs both within and outside the United States.

Multiple conflict resolution projects exist in thousands of sites around the world, fueled by USAID and other funding. North American conflict resolution programs are in the

midst of their own life cycles, some flourishing and others withering as technological shifts and the institutionalization of programs in civil and administrative justice yield a range of changes. Professionalization and standardization of practice have sometimes amounted to challenges to the meaningful integration of CF into conflict resolution, squeezing creativity to the sidelines as uniformity is accented.

At the same time, the field is graying as founders retire, seminal thinking branches out, and organizations refocus. In the midst of so much change, what can be said about the relationship between culture and conflict? Is there more awareness of the importance of culture now than there was ten or twenty years ago? Are there more practitioners and scholars from a wide range of ethnocultural groups? Do training materials feature embedded understandings of cultural dimensions of conflict, and have simulations moved beyond stereotype-ridden chasms that would trap the unwary novice in caricatures? Finally, does CF animate and inform policy, process, and system design approaches, or are they being guided in more facile ways by either sequestering culture as an optional extra or forgetting it altogether, yielding approaches based on privileged experiences of agency, mobility, capacity, and maneuverability?

There are some encouraging signs. The waters on neutrality have been troubled, with Mayer, Wing, and others emphasizing how a discourse of neutrality masks systemic inequities and culturally enacted partiality. The worldviews that have shaped conflict resolution theory and spawned unacknowledged culture-specific approaches to pedagogy have been questioned in a thoughtful four-volume series, Rethinking Negotiation Teaching (Honeyman, Coben, and De Palo, 2009, 2011). The personal qualities—and with them, the cultural lenses—of mediators

have been highlighted by Bowling and Hoffman in their seminal work, *Bringing Peace into the Room* (2003). John Paul Lederach (2005) and others have long emphasized the importance of cultural and contextual adaptations born of careful observation and respect for different conceptions of the nature of conflict and context-sensitive ways of engaging it.

At the same time, Peter Adler and other thought leaders have argued that it is essential to move beyond the rigidly analytical orientations so important to the field's establishment to a more protean, dynamic, and complex way of conceptualizing and actualizing change. Such an approach situates culture as central to analyses of conflict and nudges us toward a more complex mental model of change. All conflict resolution work is ultimately about change, and change requires creativity as well as sensitivity to culturally informed ways of achieving it.

In this chapter, I explore relationships between conflict and culture as they relate to theory, practice, and pedagogy. Beginning with a summary of theoretical starting points, I examine recent multidisciplinary work to inform a discussion of culturally fluent ways to enliven theory, infuse practice, and invigorate pedagogy in conflict resolution. I argue that recent findings in neuroscience underline the importance of drawing from work on creativity, expressive arts, and multimodal experience to inform CF. My thesis rests on three simple assertions:

- Cultural fluency—familiarity and facility with cultural dynamics as they shape ways of seeing and behaving—is essential to effectiveness in all aspects of theorizing, practice, and pedagogy in conflict resolution.
- The field is not "there yet." We very much need the infusion of work from multiple arts and science

disciplines to inform culturally fluent progress.

- The most promising route to inculcating CF in conflict work draws on art and science as equal progenitors of effective practices and pedagogies that are respectful and relevant across difference while featuring immediacy and protean adaptability.

DEFINING CULTURE

Before describing cultural fluency in more detail, it is important to lay a foundation by defining culture itself, a definition that has been approached in multiple ways. The definitions span the prosaic—culture is the way we do things around here—to the poetic—culture is an underground river, always present yet seldom tasted—to the semiotic—culture is our grammar of being. While culture is omnipresent, it is not explanatory in relation to every facet of conflict. Political, sociological, historical, and other macrodynamics always interweave with culture, as do personal factors that shape patterns of behavior and habits of attention. At the same time, culture is implicated in all conflicts and is always shaping common sense and ideas of fairness, as well as the range of possible avenues and approaches that might constitute resolution.

Culture is a dynamic and changing set of shared patterns reflexively interweaving with knowing, being, perceiving, behaving, and sense making in a given group of people. It relates in multifaceted ways to many aspects of identity, including, among others:

- Territory
- Language
- History

- Religion
- Migration
- Region
- Ability/disability
- Sexual orientation
- Gender
- Generation
- Organization
- Socioeconomic status
- Ethnicity
- Race

Culture always informs starting points—those ways it seems natural to engage with others. We explore these in more depth later in this chapter. Culture also necessarily invokes the symbolic dimension—that place in which sense is made of our own and others' behaviors and ideas. As we will see, the symbolic dimension is largely below the surface of observable behavior; therefore, accessing it requires symbolic tools including ritual, metaphor, and narrative. The concept of cultural fluency deepens our exploration, offering specific ways to increase individual and collective abilities to bridge differences.

CULTURAL FLUENCY: WHAT IS ITS IMPORTANCE, AND HOW DOES IT WORK?

Cultural fluency is a developmental process never fully attained, yet whose pursuit is vitally important. The term was first used in relation to conflict resolution in *Bridging*

Cultural Conflicts (LeBaron, 2004) and elaborated by Tatsushi Arai (2006) in *Conflict across Cultures* (LeBaron and Pillay, 2006). It has also been applied in a number of other fields, including business and education (Scott 2010; Mount St. Mary's College, n.d.). It refers to awareness of culturally shaped worldviews—our own and those of others—and the capacity to pay attention to how these cultural lenses affect what we see, interpret, and attribute in conflict. Cultural fluency involves readiness to internalize, express, and enact culturally sensitive meaning-making processes in engaging conflict. The process is a dynamic feature of interdependent social contexts, enhancing our capacities to

- *Anticipate* a range of possible ways to navigate communication and relationship in unfamiliar and diverse cultural contexts
- Become and remain conscious of cultural influences *embedded* in meaning-making processes
- *Express* cultural assumptions transparently to others unfamiliar with particular meaning-making patterns
- *Navigate* sometimes turbulent cross-cultural dynamics to cocreate functional and constructive processes, systems, and ongoing engagements

Meaning-making processes are the constant brain-body activities that connect experiences to our existing mental schemas. We make narratives of our lives, resisting our lives as a series of non sequiturs. Conflicts are no exception: we excavate our own and others' intentions, reasons for behavior, justifications, aspirations, and attributions in the context of social and relational structures, patterns, and past experiences. Thus, we conclude that an interaction is "not fair" or a way we have been treated is "unjustified." Cultural fluency means

accounting for meaning making in two ways: by examining the constructed contexts in which experiences occur and by using a series of tools to prevent or bridge misunderstandings and enhance communication.

Cultural fluency is best illustrated through examples. Consider an experience of traveling to a new place for the first time. Did people seem abrupt or relaxed? Polite or impolite? Did they stand too close or too far away? When gates opened, did they line up or crowd in? Were directions you received easy to follow or impossible? Air travel gives us the opportunity to literally land in another world in a few short hours. But even if we know the language, we may miss cultural cues, violate unspoken cultural norms, and find ourselves in the midst of opaque situations. We may miss the subtleties that could have been identified had we a greater fluency of the culture or cultures of the new destination, and we may even instigate conflict without realizing it.

On a trip to Switzerland to offer conflict resolution training to the worldwide staff of an international organization, a colleague and I staged a conflict to illustrate different strategies of engaging difference. As our conversation became more heated, audience members had a variety of responses. Some disengaged, finding our behavior unseemly and uncomfortable. Others became activated, cheering one or both of us on to more dramatic engagement. Still others were perplexed, unsettled, or amused, watching closely to see what would happen next.

When we took a break, several members of the group approached us. Some congratulated my male colleague’s aggression toward me as a show of “putting her in her place.” Others remonstrated him for treating me disrespectfully. Only later did those for whom pretending to be in conflict made no sense at all surface their discomfort.

They came from cultural contexts that privilege authenticity and transparency above artifice, cultures that precluded even the prospect of taking on synthetic roles for pedagogical purposes. Their concern was how we would be able to repair our relationship now that we had lost face publicly with each other and the group. Thus, a technique we had used many times in North America became a lens that refracted a wide spectrum of ways of making meaning. We had some repair to do as we moved forward with the group!

Clearly, cultural fluency is not only about navigating around a new setting; it also enhances capacities to prevent, engage, and resolve conflict and to be more credible, effective teachers. One of the ways cultural fluency can assist us in pedagogy is in its emphasis on the metalevel. It prompts us to examine teaching strategies according to the cultural assumptions that infuse them and to make these explicit in diverse groups. For example, when using a simulation or other experiential activity, describing some of the culturally influenced ideas of the what, how, and why will give participants a context that facilitates their participation. Effective and thorough debriefing that poses questions about culturally shaped perceptions and experiences can buttress and model cultural fluency in teaching settings.

For instance, many conflict resolution teaching materials contain embedded assumptions about the usefulness of direct, explicit communication. A learner from a cultural context where indirect, high-context approaches are expected may find these techniques difficult and uncomfortable. Welcoming a spectrum of communication strategies, an effective teacher can frame this difference as a catalyst for dialogue about how communication approaches can be usefully adapted across a range of settings and parties.

Let’s take a look at cultural fluency in practice. As we saw earlier, culture shapes expectations and ways of engaging far below conscious awareness. Lederach (1996) has written about whether an “insider partial” or “outsider neutral” is desirable as an intervenor depending on cultural context. The degree of formality of a setting is also related to culture, varying with the kind of issue as well as with the generation and the relational history of the parties. In child protection mediation, for example, a setting that is too formal may have a distancing effect on youth parties, while a setting that is too informal may be uncomfortable for state officials. Cultural fluency means anticipating and addressing parties’ needs, wants, and comfort levels in relation to setting, timing, roles, style of practice (such as facilitative, settlement, or problem solving; also the mix of caucusing and face-to-face meetings), manner of engagement, and myriad other elements.

The following example comes from an estate mediation held between two Chinese brothers. After agreeing to a division of most of their father’s property and assets, one building remained. Neither was willing to yield it to the other, and the fate of the entire agreement stood in the balance. The mediator shifted her facilitative approach, asking the brothers if she might make a suggestion. She then floated the idea that they might sell or manage the building as a revenue property, donating the proceeds to an educational scholarship in their father’s name. This culturally fluent mediator knew that education had been a strong value of their father, that honoring his name was important in their ethnic and family cultures, and that this would allow both to save face by not giving in to the other. They agreed, and the settlement was complete.

Moving beyond anecdotal evidence, we examine empirical evidence for the usefulness of cultural fluency as a tool in conflict resolution and negotiation. Michele Gelfand and

Naomi Dyer (2000) suggest that flaws in research design have made it difficult to draw conclusions in relation to cultural dynamics negotiation. They observe that researchers have limited generalizability and utility of results by conflating culture with geographic location, failing to incorporate complex understandings of psychological processes as they interact with culture, and studying limited numbers of proximal conditions in negotiations. Gelfand et al. (2011) went on from these observations to follow their own advice, investigating so-called tight and loose cultures across thirty-three nations in relation to social structures, psychological dynamics, and related conflict-handling behaviors. In recent work, Gelfand, Leslie, Keller, and de Dreu (2012) examine conflict cultures in organizations, exploring how group and organizational cultures constellate socially shared and normative approaches to conflict.

And what of cultural fluency? Has this construct been the subject of empirical research other than that done on the theoretical elements on which it rests (Hall, 1990; Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars, 2000)? Michele Gelfand (Imai and Gelfand, 2006) details work done in the past ten years on a related phenomenon, cultural intelligence (CQ), defined as a "person's capability for successful adaptation to new cultural settings" (Earley and Ang, 2003, p. 9). CQ has four elements, described below and related to components of CF:

- *Metacognitive:* level of mindfulness and skills applicable in the new culture; closely connected to the embeddedness component of CF
- *Cognitive:* degree of specific knowledge about the new culture; closely connected to the navigational capacity of CF

- *Motivational:* evidence of self-efficacy and persistence in adapting to a new culture; related to the anticipatory capacity of CF
- *Behavioral:* adaptive verbal and nonverbal behaviors; connected to the navigational component of CF

In examining cultural intelligence in relation to organizational negotiations across cultures, Imai and Gelfand (2006) found that CQ measured a week before a negotiation was a valid predictor of value creation in the process. They also found that CQ was a more powerful predictor than other common psychological constructs and that only one high CQ score in a dyad was enough to lift the results for each negotiator. As more work is done replicating and extending these findings, both CQ and CF will become better understood. For now, we consider traps that may inhibit cultural fluency and ways to cultivate it.

BUILDING CULTURAL FLUENCY

As we have observed, cultivating self and other awareness is a good start in developing cultural fluency. But given the submerged influence of many cultural factors, it may be insufficient and even problematic. This is in part because of the ubiquitous traps that await the novice. Such traps may arise from taxonomy, universalism, separation, and automatic ethnocentricity.

The *taxonomy* trap posits that cultural characteristics can be reliably ascribed to a given group in short, generalized lists. These lists are generally prescriptive and include such behavioral do’s and don’ts as bowing, kissing, or shaking hands on greeting. The difficulty is that these lists do not account for in-group variability, rapidly changing dynamics, or generational and other differences.

The *universalism* and *separation* traps are opposites of each other, with the first overascribing similarity across cultures and the second underestimating that similarity. To the universalist, we are all alike under the skin and share the same origin. While it is true that we have basic human needs, the way we experience and pursue these needs—and how we act when they are frustrated—varies a great deal. To the separationist, members of one group are so different from others that no understanding or rapprochement is possible. This is obvious in writing about gender, which would lead the naive reader to imagine that men and women can never have healthy, functional relationships (Grey, 1992). Many narratives from parties in intractable conflict feature separationist rhetoric, ranging from dehumanizing others to diminishing or disregarding them through a variety of discursive devices.

Finally, *automatic ethnocentricity* —sometimes called mirror imaging—is a tendency to use our own groups' ideas and values as a reference point, as in the expression "common sense." While not associated with ethnicity per se, discourses of Republicans and Democrats in the United States are replete with examples of automatic *culture - centricity* whose application perpetuates the dialogue of the deaf that too often characterizes communication between them. Debates over gun control, abortion, capital punishment, and other controversial issues are difficult not only because they are complex public policy issues. They are also challenging because they become proxies for symbolic worldview clashes over freedom, power, agency, right relations between women and men and between people and government, and other deeply rooted ideas (Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997). The antidote to this tendency is genuine curiosity and engagement, along with a willingness to suspend confidence about givens. This is the opposite of what actually happens not only in too many

parliaments and legislatures around the world, but in communities, organizations, and families.

Avoiding these traps is essential to cultivate comfort with ambiguity. There will always be opacity across cultures; this is part of relating across difference. Not knowing is a necessary part of the process, and reducing anxiety associated with this not knowing can enhance functionality. Another good strategy is to internalize continua that can inform educated guesses as to what might be happening in any given interaction. One such continuum relates to how time is viewed (synchronous or sequential) and whether past, present, or future orientations are accented. Examining it in detail illustrates how tools like this can increase cultural fluency in conflict theorizing, practice, and pedagogy.

Intercultural theorists have identified two orientations to time: monochronic and polychronic. Monochronic approaches to time are linear and sequential, and involve focusing on one thing at a time. These approaches are most common in the Western European–influenced cultures including the United States, though there are significant regional and contextual differences. Polychronic orientations to time involve simultaneous occurrences of many things and the involvement of many people. The time it takes to complete an interaction is elastic and more important than any schedule. This orientation is most common in Mediterranean and Latin cultures, as well as some Eastern and African cultures. Negotiators from polychronic cultures tend to

- Start and end meetings at flexible times
- Take breaks when it seems appropriate
- Be comfortable with a high flow of information
- Expect to read each other’s thoughts and minds

- Sometimes overlap talk
- View start times as flexible and not take lateness personally

Negotiators from monochronic cultures tend to

- Prefer prompt beginnings and endings
- Schedule breaks
- Deal with one agenda item at a time
- Rely on specific, detailed, and explicit communication
- Prefer to talk in sequence
- View lateness as devaluing or evidence of lack of respect

Another dimension of time relevant to negotiations is the focus on past, present, or future. National cultures, including those of Iran, India, and East Asia, lean to accenting the past, while the United States tends to be oriented to the present and the near future. Latin American peoples have both present and past orientations, while indigenous peoples in the Americas often use a past and future-oriented approach to time, stretching seven generations forward and back. Parties or third parties focused on the present should be mindful that others may see the past or the distant future as part of the present. Those for whom time stretches into the past or the future may need to remember that a present orientation can bring about needed change.

Of course, no one group fits neatly on a continuum; we all have some capacity to move around. A traumatic event may catapult an entire group into a focus on the past once the immediate crisis is over; a society experiencing rapid economic growth may spend a lot of time contemplating the future that is fast approaching. Differences abound

within groups not only in relation to generation, but also in relation to many other aspects of identity. At the same time, conflict is likely to escalate when those involved do not realize, or discount, the extent to which different relationships to time are confounding their communication.

The importance of these differences in relation to time came home to me when I offered negotiation training in relation to land claims to representatives of two levels of government and First Nations people in British Columbia. During introductions, the First Nations people welcomed everyone to their traditional territory with a prayer in their language, then began a narrative account of their history with the preface: “Seven generations ago . . .” When the government representatives were asked to make introductory remarks, they projected PowerPoint slides of the steps for ratification and adoption of an eventual agreement. The vastly different starting points in relation to time also played out in the way the three groups wanted to structure meetings, their attitudes to punctuality, ideas of what constituted effectiveness, and their attributions about each other. Though the time-related differences were not a surprise to anyone, they still functioned to make communication and progress more difficult.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore other cultural continua identified by interculturalists. Interested readers are directed to the online web resource Beyond Intractability (http://www.beyondintractability.org/), especially the essay on cross-cultural communication (LeBaron, 2003). Other continua address a wide range of starting points, including these:

- Spatial orientation—how close it is comfortable to stand, how furniture should be arranged, who should be seated where

- Affiliation and agency—individual autonomy versus group decision making
- Communication content and approach—directness and indirectness and the related ideas of high and low context, the degree to which things are named explicitly (low context) or to which the context is used to communicate what is not said (high context)
- Axiology and epistemology—including whether the universal or the particular is emphasized, as in the difference between mass production and one-of-a-kind creation; also, whether there is a reliance on specificity and diffuseness as in the difference between decision making based on empirical data or intuition
- Permissibility and kind of touch—greeting and parting rituals and the range of acceptable behavior across genders and generations and within and between groups
- Meanings associated with nonverbal communication—including eye contact, specific gestures, and particular facial expressions, as well as comfort or discomfort with silence
- Attitudes toward fate and personal responsibility—whether personal accountability is expected or people anticipate that many things are outside their control
- Face and face-saving—important in virtually every culture but manifested differently across and within world regions
- Power distance—the degree to which people are comfortable with vertical hierarchies
- Uncertainty avoidance—the degree to which people avoid risk and associated uncertainty

For more about these concepts, readers are directed to Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (2000) and Edward T. Hall (1990) and the scholars cited in these books, which are gold mines for culturally fluent practitioners. They deepen self-understanding, increase awareness of the cultural assumptions embedded in theory and practice approaches, and scaffold mental maps that can significantly improve practitioner guesses about what might be going on when cultural misunderstanding occurs.

Other helpful tools in cultivating cultural fluency are poetry, metaphors, rituals, and narratives. These tools are windows into cultural influences on the conscious and even unconscious motivations and actions of individuals and groups. They have shaped and thus reflect ingrained and emerging behavioral patterns and collective identities across generations. We come back to these toward the end of the chapter in the discussion of pedagogical approaches. For now, we consider how new work in neuroscience may contribute to culturally fluent conflict work.

NEUROSCIENCE AS CONFLICT RESOLUTION RESOURCE

Neuroscience is a new frontier, daily generating insights that relate to conflict resolution. Although many conflict resolution scholars are investigating this nexus, few have considered how neuroscience relates to cultural fluency. In this section, I summarize recent advances and pose questions about their implications for culturally fluent processes and pedagogy. Neuroscientists' conflict-relevant work spans a wide range, including the physiology of emotion, communication, receptivity, attunement, empathy, and creative thinking. This fast-changing corpus has already yielded important insights into the intertwined and complex relationship between cognitive and embodied

states, as well as how change happens in attitudes and behavior. Cultural patterns and habits, too, interact with nervous system physiology in ways not yet fully understood.

One important finding related to culture is that the brain is more malleable than originally thought; it is more like plastic than like iron, hence the term *neuroplasticity* . The ubiquitous machine-brain metaphor is thus being replaced with the understanding that the brain is actually more like muscle tissue, as it literally rewires itself in relation to external stimuli. Because brains can rewire quickly, the theories of change that animate conflict work come into question. Given that individual or collective shifts need not be painstaking and drawn out, conflict resolution processes of relatively short duration, designed with brain functioning in mind, may be powerful catalysts for change (Pascual-Leone et al., 1995; Doidge, 2007).

Also of interest from a cultural perspective, neuroplasticity reveals that neurons that fire together are wired together and those that fire apart remain wired apart. Repeated instances of associated neurons firing in particular patterns create pathways in the brain that become neural superhighways, relegating the untraveled back roads of unfamiliar pairings to increasingly less accessibility and use. In the pressure and anxiety of conflict, we may fall back on familiar thought patterns, chains of reason, and group-approved behaviors and have greater difficulty perceiving alternatives—what Tidwell calls “trained incapacity.” He cautions that “through [our] own training [and experience, we may] become blind to alternatives . . . [and] become so habituated to one set of behaviors that no others seem possible” (1994, p. 4). We literally get locked in to habitual perceptions, communication patterns, and behaviors despite their limitations and their associations with impasse. Add cultural patterning and group pressure

to conform to the mix, and the challenge of accessing neuroplasticity is even greater.

While much neuroscientific work pertains to individual brains, provocative questions arise about the effects of rapid brain rewiring on collective thinking and consciousness. Research in this area has the potential to reshape conflict intervention as it reveals ways that cultural patterns and collective attitudes can shift in the midst of intense conflict, catalyzing relational change among former enemies, even in the face of cultural pressure to distance from “the other.” Are there ways to influence the malleable brain toward cooperation and peaceful coexistence? And can this be done on a collective scale? The very plasticity that enabled the formation of entrenched patterns offers the possibility for future change —and relatively rapid change at that (Wexler, 2008).

Other recent work in neuroscience on subjects as diverse as embodiment, empathy, and bicameral brain functioning is also potentially fertile for work on cultural dynamics (Siegel, 2010; Beausoleil and LeBaron, 2013), as are discoveries about perception. Perception is always a factor in culture and conflict. Who we perceive ourselves—and others—to be relates to the very existence or absence of conflict. It is important to remember that perception is not a function of the present moment; memories stored and processed in the body also shape and limit perceptions and related responses. Even forgotten childhood or traumatic memories—individual and collective—are carried in the body, having bypassed the hippocampus, where memory consolidation occurs. These unconscious impressions influence how the sympathetic and parasympathetic systems, which regulate emotions such as calmness, tension, openness, or fear, are activated. In this way, implicit memories stored in the body contribute to “enduring structural changes” in the limbic and autonomic

nervous systems that affect perception, interpretation, and behavior (Schore, 2002, p. 9; Porges, 2009).

When stress, threat, or shame is experienced, the autonomic nervous system unconsciously increases adrenaline and cortisol, which limits blood flow to the frontal lobes of the brain. This is why access to thinking functions or previous knowledge is limited in the midst of intense emotions and why it is more difficult to remain receptive to unfamiliar people or ideas or to enact novel responses to conflicts. The brain is, quite literally, short-circuited (Porges, 2004). When the body senses safety, the autonomic nervous system supports a state of "open receptiveness." This state is essential to both learning and integrating new information, as well as preventing retraumatization when recalling past experiences (Siegel, 2010). It remains to be seen whether these phenomena also operate in groups. That is, does the short-circuiting of an individual's brain make it more likely that others in the vicinity will follow suit? Do the physiological processes associated with stress and resistance to change operate collectively in ways that are shaped by, or even transmitted through, culture? Work on mirror neurons and transgenerational brain patterns suggests that individual states are indeed mirrored in others nearby and reproduced over time (Wexler, 2008). The neurobiology of culture is a frontier of much significance for culturally fluent conflict resolution scholars.

Because receptivity is integral to transforming conflict, neuroscientific work is important and potentially game changing. It directs our attention not only to culture and its influences, but the way that cultural dynamics affect individual and collective attitudes, values, thoughts, and behaviors. As well, it draws essential attention to the phenomenology of physical experience as we realize that rigid patterning can be carried and transmitted

intergenerationally. It also brings us to a focus on the neurobiological state we hold as third parties and individual parties. What if our analytic and communication techniques are less potent unless we find ways to shift into more receptive states before using them? Too often, we work with conflict parties when they are in states that block or severely truncate the possibility of change. If individual parties' neural habits, reinforced and held in place by the forces of tradition and collective patterns, involve perceiving and responding to each another as a threat, further entrenchment and distance can be expected from engagement. To shift to openness to learning and change, it is vital to find ways to shift out of unhelpful neural feedback loops and into those associated with increased plasticity and change. An example comes from a problem-solving workshop held twenty years ago in Ireland.

In 1993, a group of diplomats from many parts of the world gathered near Dublin to problem-solve about one of the most intractable conflicts of our time: Israel-Palestine. The challenge for the facilitators was to move them out of the well-worn superhighways of reflexive statements, repetitive framings, and limiting assumptions. For two days, the process followed a conventional problem-solving format, and little new was revealed.

On the third day, a bus trip to Belfast gave participants opportunities to look down Falls Road, searching in a "pre-Good-Friday-agreement Northern Ireland" for ways to address intractable differences. Jostled in the bus, the previously restrained participants began to see each other as more multidimensional and complex. As they uncovered commonalities and shared passions, they began to relate more playfully. Dialogue with Northern Irish peacemakers and visits to bicommunal projects deepened camaraderie within the group. As the bus headed back to Dublin following a group meal, participants sang together under

the comforting cover of darkness. Only after this excursion did conversations enliven, originality emerge, and imaginative possibilities for shifting intractable conflict in Israel-Palestine begin to reveal themselves.

Reflecting on this experience, facilitators wondered how conflict transformation processes could be intentionally structured (or unstructured) to invite physiological and psychological states and mutual openness conducive to creativity and innovation. Without the neuroscientific understandings described above, we speculated that people step out of habitual perceptions and limiting understandings to welcome nuance and texture when they step out of business as usual. Creative imaginations are more easily engaged in the midst of an open and relaxed state than in the midst of a focus on thought and analysis alone. Yet shifting workshop designs and getting buy-in from participants is difficult: in the already-tense terrain of conflict, people are understandably reluctant to step outside their comfort zones in ways that might seem risky or embarrassing.

An obvious hidden-in-plain-sight truism occurred to us: everyone attending had real-life bodies with creative capabilities and a love of play and beauty. Why state these obvious facts? Because this workshop, like dozens of others, was designed as if everyone existed from the neck up; as if brilliant analysis would flow directly from careful selection among a range of cognitively generated alternatives; as if facilitators had only to nudge people to “think creatively, outside the box,” and new spirals of fecund possibility would unfurl themselves, unfettered by previous inhibitions, perceptual and cognitive habits, or norms of interaction. Neuroscientific work has confirmed the hunch that physical movement is a huge catalyst to attitude change in ways we are only beginning to realize (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, 2011).

It turns out that physical and verbal expressions are intricately interrelated: both activities are located in Broca's area of the brain, activated during both speech and expressive movement. In fact, the brain's pathways for speech are overlaid on the areas associated with sensorimotor work, suggesting that neural processes for verbal language are relatively recent specializations, with movement being a form of prelinguistic communication (Massey, 2009). Movement offers an alternative and instinctual mode of expression, and indeed it may be more effective than verbal language for some forms of expression and cognition: when the language center of the brain is temporarily deactivated, individuals often exhibit savant-like mental capacities, including improved artistic, mathematic, and proofreading abilities (Snyder et al., 2003). Perhaps we can access savant-like facility with conflict through movement. A new book examines these possibilities (LeBaron, MacLeod, and Floyer Acland, 2013).

Just as a jostling bus ride, singing in the darkness, and the stark reality of somatically experiencing "the Troubles" in Northern Ireland interrupted the diplomats' patterns of cognition and behavior to yield imaginative openings, so is the alchemy of arts essential for transforming conflict and catalyzing social change. Arts, completely intertwined with culture, are essential in a world that cries out for creativity, even—or especially—in the midst of ashes. Invoking the arts is not to look through a rose-tinted window. It is to be clear and unrelentingly rigorous in finding ways to transform conflict, acknowledging its complexity while trusting its mysteries. These approaches invite creativity and imagination into practice and training in ways that make both more compelling and potentially far more productive. They are explored here as complements to the neuroscience work described above. Together, they offer

the potential to deepen cultural fluency and thus the effectiveness of conflict resolution pedagogy and practice.

ARTS-BASED APPROACHES TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION

As artist and conflict scholar Dena Hawes (2007) writes, arts-based approaches take conflict parties outside business as usual, disrupting facile narratives and facilitating communication across psychological, physical, cultural, and emotional boundaries. Conflict resolution professor Craig Zelizer (2003) situates them as part of a larger framework of civil society–based initiatives for peace building. This family of approaches has long been used in traditional cultures through rituals to foster and mark progress toward peace, yet has not always been seen as a resource in our reach for scientific legitimacy in conflict studies. Contemporary conflict practitioners sometimes find it difficult to use arts-based approaches even though they span cultural divides and offer connectivity across differences. Yet the age-old division of heart and mind that privileges analytic, reason-based approaches discounts the more diffuse resources of arts at its peril. To counter cognitive habits of enmity, state change and creativity are essential. The plastic, culturally fluent brain can more easily develop new neural associations when creativity is scaffolded through the arts.

Conflict scholar Tatsushi Arai defines creativity as “unconventional viability” (2009). His definition evokes the oft-quoted statement of Einstein that “we can’t solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.” Johan Galtung (2009) poses this question in his Foreword to Arai’s book: “What, then, stands in the way [of creativity]?” He answers, “In one sentence: actors deeply engaged not in solving but in

winning, victory, the V-word. To conflict parties committed to the goal of winning, Other is the problem, *not the relation to Other* . Bring Other to heel, and the world is right. Other is Evil, up against our good Self, there can be no compromise, no creative 'transcendence,' only victory for the Good over Evil. Moreover, Other should not only be deterred from exercising his evil craft, but be crushed never to rise again."

Arts-based approaches are a fruitful counterpoint to this habit, ingrained in many conflict parties' minds, of seeking to vanquish the other. In the nuanced world of the arts, it is difficult to maintain stark black-and-white dichotomies and a crisp sense of separation from others. People emerge from creating images or moving together in improvised dance with new appreciation for each other's dilemmas and complexities. With actual experiences of each other's cultural common sense, they are better able to appreciate commonalities and find ways to bridge differences.

Arts-based approaches encompass a whole constellation of enacted, somatic tools that foster creative expression, from visual and theater arts to music, dance, and poetry, from the humanities, fine and performing arts to expressive arts, providing fruitful vehicles for imagination and intuition in the midst of conflict. Resonating on the symbolic level where meaning is made, they welcome sensing and feeling —dimensions too often "managed" or sidelined in conventional approaches—as embodied experiences essential for truly transforming conflict. This is important because emotions can be powerful motivators toward transformation just as they are central drivers in conflict escalation. As well, sensing and feeling trigger mirror neurons, thus evoking empathy as experiences are shared (Gallese, Eagle, and Migone, 2007).

Arts approaches need not be formal. It is useful to tap a wide range of expressive and imaginative tools in conflict resolution processes, whether arising spontaneously or planned. These modes are not used primarily as performances or to generate artistic products (though sometimes participants choose to continue joint efforts that yield such things), but as conduits for accompaniment and change. They can also be vastly beneficial in pedagogy because of their versatility and capacity to help learners deepen creative, somatic capacities (Alexander and LeBaron, 2013).

Arts approaches need not always adhere to specific forms. They can be as simple as imagery-based metaphors, as in the example of dialogue between pro-life and pro-choice activists in Canada. Invited to identify their heroes or heroines, people from both sides chose Martin Luther King and Nelson Mandela. This commonality surprised them, interrupting the negative labels each had long assigned to the other. An exploration of what these figures represented to each side—compassionate leadership, justice, and emancipation—fostered emergent mutual respect. From this base of respect, dialogue participants collaborated on a range of social actions to ameliorate the feminization of poverty.

As is evident from this example, cultural fluency is intricately bound up with arts-based work. Seeing a play in France gave me more contextual understanding than ten lectures about patterns of conflict-handling behavior in France. Humor, tone, textures of engagement, ways of naming or skirting differences, nuances of communication —all these were present in an engaging narrative that literally took me inside the frames of reference of the characters. Participating in creating a play or a piece of visual art—necessitating sharing assumptions about what works and why—is potentially even more fruitful.

As more neuroscientists study arts, conflict, and change, our field will be revolutionized (Berrol, 2006; Ramachandran, 2000). Collaborations among conflict resolution scholars, neuroscientists, and artists are thus among the most promising for the development of the field going forward. In addition to informing process innovations, these collaborations hold strong promise for pedagogy.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PEDAGOGY

In spite of the efforts of many scholars and practitioners, cultural fluency in conflict is elusive. It is a nonlinear developmental process that relies on neuroplasticity and creativity, both of which are augmented through the arts. Cultural fluency is also enhanced when people are motivated to cultivate it. Motivation can come from conflict when parties realize they really do not understand each other yet are interdependent. Equally, conflict can function to short-circuit the curiosity so vital to developing cultural fluency. In learning contexts, cultural fluency is most easily surfaced when a group is diverse and an atmosphere invites safe exploration of shared and differing patterns of paying attention and constructing meaning.

Over the twenty-five years I have taught about culture and conflict, I have noticed repeatedly that those with privilege attached to their identities have had a harder time than others in identifying their cultural lenses. To someone who has not felt exceptionalized, culture is harder to discern and its workings may seem exotic. Cultural institutions may reveal and even reify this problem: a visit to the National Museum of the American Indian, for example, reveals countless ways that native peoples in North America have been romanticized while also persecuted. Culture is always in some way refracted through the lenses of power, and

power unexamined can have disastrous effects for those perceived as other.

I have developed a suite of pedagogical approaches designed to invite learners to investigate their own lenses and associated cultural assumptions in safe yet boundary-extending ways. These approaches draw on creative and expressive arts as ways of accessing symbolic understandings of conflict and resolution strategies, and on recent neuroscientific findings. They cluster into three categories:

- *Individual exploration* . Activities include drawing a "culture flower" or other multidimensional figure and filling in different cultural identifications and influences and associated messages about conflict and resolution; identifying cultural metaphors for conflict and ways these have shaped experience and perception; and writing a cultural autobiography that identifies key messages about inclusion and exclusion, acceptable and unacceptable behaviors in conflict, turning points in cultural identification and other aspects of personality formation.
- *Group experience* . Activities include debriefing and comparing notes on individual explorations; lines of privilege (in which learners line up and step forward or back in relation to privilege or disadvantage they have experienced, physically demonstrating and experiencing their relative positioning); dialogically exploring cultural accounts of familiar cultural patterns and looking for surprises (e.g., an account of American negotiators written by a Japanese negotiator for his colleagues); and simulations like BaFa' BaFa' or Barnga (Centre for Advanced Research on Language Acquisition, n.d.). [1]

- *Synthesis* . Sculpting and expressive arts activities that invite participants to work across modes of expression to embody experiences of conflict related to affiliation; spatial dynamics and positioning; perception and vantage point; and ineffable aspects including power, privilege and disadvantage, and exclusion and inclusion. (For more on the use of expressive arts in conflict pedagogy and practice, see Levine and Levine, 2011, and MacLeod, 2013.)

Using these and other experiential tools in combination with the cultural continua described earlier, learners move beyond scripted role plays into deeper capacities to understand and work across difference. These approaches stand in sharp contrast with much of the training in the conflict resolution field with its overreliance on planned simulations. We are far better served by stepping outside business as usual to see where and how we need to stretch in the midst of a rapidly changing world (Alexander and LeBaron, 2010).

IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND PRACTICE

As the multidimensional and dynamic effects of culture are understood as central to conflict resolution theory and practice, both must change. Cultural fluency involves suppleness and flexibility, the capacity to attend to nuance and what is under the surface, and an ever-refining ability to sense and respond to diverse starting points. As culture is acknowledged, it becomes clear that all theory arises from a particular standpoint, as do diverse approaches to practice. Culturally fluent conflict theory is transparent about which cultural assumptions inform its course. As we have seen, the appropriateness of direct or indirect

communication; face-to-face engagement; intervention by outsiders or insiders; particular timing or setting; degrees of formality; neutrality or partiality; a problem-solving, facilitative, or transformative orientation—all of these are culturally shaped. Thus, it becomes clear that there is no universal theory of conflict or uniform best practices in conflict resolution. Everything is exquisitely particular. It is from this acknowledgment that the best practices emerge, as well as the theories and research that explain them. Just as a powerful personal story—think the diary of Anne Frank (2010)—can have universal resonance, so too can a well-crafted, culturally fluent conflict process live beyond any resolution it attains, not only for the parties involved but in its role as a field builder.

As we stand at the threshold of new worlds shaped by technological advance, transformative scientific discoveries, and possible radiant futures, cultural fluency becomes vitally important. As it is admitted to the canon, new ways of integrating it will be developed. In this is the alchemy, that is more than the sum of its parts, and the way to constructive social and individual change.

1 . These and other simulations were developed by intercultural communication scholars to provide authentic experiences of cultural and worldview differences. See Sandra Mumford Fowler, “Intercultural Simulation Games: Removing Cultural Blinders,” *New Directions for Adult and Continuing Education* , 2006, *30* , 71–81. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ace.36719863009/abstract .

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CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX
INDIGENOUS LESSONS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION [a]

Geneviève Souillac
Douglas P. Fry

This chapter explores indigenous values and peacemaking systems from micro- and macroperspectives. It considers not only conflict resolution within particular cultural contexts but also attempts to cross the borderlands between indigenous worldview and the value orientation of the modern, postindustrial West, while keeping a focus on how to apply conflict resolution lessons in new contexts and at higher levels of social complexity, right up to and including the global.

The first section of this chapter focuses on indigenous conflict resolution orientations and practices. We explore contrasting value systems and the implications for engaging in participatory dialogue in the service of conflict resolution. Next, we consider how the critically important principle of reciprocity informs our understanding of justice seeking and conflict resolution. Finally, we briefly examine some salient features of nonwarring peace systems.

The second section explores the implications for both theory and practice. We pursue insights that indigenous approaches might contribute to the emergence of peace-with-justice-oriented values and practice in the context of modern, pluralist, postindustrialized societies. We also argue that indigenous practices have considerable implications for peace education and conflict resolution for global society.

INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICE

Conflict and aggression are not equivalent concepts. Conflict entails divergent interests, needs, or goals, and a cross-cultural view demonstrates that people address conflict in numerous ways, many of which entail no use of aggression whatsoever (Fry, 2006). For instance, individuals may simply avoid each other or put up with a difficult situation, talk about their differences, negotiate resolutions to their disputes, seek out mediators or arbitrators, appear in front of a tribunal, and so forth. Violence and war are not the only options for settling differences. Whereas it is unrealistic to eradicate all forms of conflict, it is realistic to create alternatives to war and other forms of violence. If the creation of peace is seen as an ongoing dynamic process, certain questions are raised: How can nonviolent forms of conflict resolution and social interaction be promoted within and among societies? Can the institution of war be given up and intergroup conflicts within and between nation-states be addressed in less destructive ways?

Humans are a social species wherein each individual is highly dependent on relationships and assistance from others, and one reflection of this fact is that the overwhelming majority of social behavior is prosocial, not physically aggressive (Fry, 2013; Goldschmidt, 2006; Sussman and Cloninger, 2011). Some societies tolerate higher levels of physical aggression than do others (Fry, 2000). The cross-cultural variation in this regard can be viewed along a peacefulness-aggressiveness continuum, which has an empirical basis (Fry, 2006). The position of any particular society on the continuum is not immutably fixed; its position can shift in either direction over years, generations, or centuries. The fact that a culture may have

a high level of physical aggression today does not preclude its shift toward peacefulness in the future, and by extension, the same type of shift away from aggression and toward peaceful conflict resolution could occur within global society.

The Waorani of Ecuador illustrate that fairly rapid shifts are possible since they managed to decrease an initially high rate of deaths through feuding by over 90 percent in just a few years. Robarchek and Robarchek (1996, p. 72) explain, “As bands became convinced that the feuding could stop, peace became a goal in its own right, even superseding the desire for revenge. . . . The killing stopped because the Waorani themselves made a conscious decision to end it.”

Societies near one end of the aggressiveness-peacefulness continuum can be characterized as internally peaceful, meaning that they have nonviolent belief and value systems and display very little physical aggression (Bonta, 1996; Fry, 2006). Overall, most societies in the ethnographic record do engage in some sort of feud or war, but at the same time, nonwarring, nonfeuding cultures such as the Mardu of Australia and the Batek of Malaysia shun intergroup violence (Fry, 2006, 2012, 2013).

Scholars such as Black (1993) provide a cross-cultural typology of conflict management approaches that includes avoidance of a disputant, simple toleration, bipartisan negotiation to search for a mutually agreeable resolution, unilaterally imposed coercive or aggressive self-redress, and various kinds of third-party-assisted settlement (e.g., arbitration, mediation, and adjudication). Most of these approaches involve practices and procedures for dealing with conflict without the manifestation of any physical aggression, with the self-redress category being the obvious exception. In humans and other mammalian

species, physical aggression appears to be the least often used means to address a conflict of interest, but obviously it can be extremely harmful and disruptive when employed (Fry, 2013; Sussman and Cloninger, 2011).

We now consider how a cross-cultural examination of conflict resolution approaches within indigenous societies may offer some insights into how to get along with less violence. Across the past millennia and into the present, humans have always faced the challenge of how to minimize the harmful effects of conflict within bounded social groups. In the twenty-first century, the entire planet has become a social group of sorts. Whereas much conflict is handled nonviolently through agreements, treaties, negotiation, toleration, avoidance, mediation, and so forth, intergroup violence, whether within or between nation-states, nonetheless continues to erupt periodically. We suggest that conflict management ethos, processes, and institutions need to be further developed and implemented internationally so that the institution of warfare, like torture and slavery before it, can become delegitimized and phased out of existence. Clearly, many forms of extreme violence related to warfare and conflict, such as slavery, torture, and genocide, have followed a distinct historical process of both moral and legal delegitimization. The Geneva Conventions limiting the means of warfare have also played a powerful role in inscribing the ethical limits theorized by just war theorists into international law. The great development of the international legal architecture with regard to human rights and the right conduct of war since World War II demonstrate the need for a pool of legal and conceptual resources for the limitation of war. Yet its expansion toward increased identification, understanding, and vocabulary to reinforce the role played by conflict resolution and transformation for conflict prevention at all levels of social and cultural organization remains very

much needed. We argue that a cross-cultural view of human conflict behavior and its management suggests that nonviolent alternatives are not only possible but constitute a vital resource for humanity. Integrating modern and indigenous conceptions of community, peace, and violence constitutes one important step toward the achievement of this goal (Souillac, 2012).

The remainder of this section focuses first on a technique called structured dialogue processes and on the importance of an indigenous normative value system dubbed the four Rs. Second, it proposes that one of the four Rs, reciprocity, is of central importance in providing just and effective conflict resolution. The section concludes with a brief consideration of peace systems.

Values

A consideration of value orientations is critical for deriving more generally applicable lessons from indigenous forms of conflict resolution. At a macrolevel, various terms and concepts have been applied to contrast indigenous, non-Western value orientations with those reflected by modern, pluralist, postindustrial nations, for example, cooperative versus competitive, tribal versus modern, collectivist versus individualistic, self-transcendent versus self-achievement, and the four Rs (relationship, responsibility, reciprocity, and redistribution) versus the two Ps (power and profit) (Harris and Wasilewski, 2004; Maybury-Lewis, 1992; Miklikowska and Fry, 2010; Triandis, 1994). These dichotomous distinctions do not imply an absolute, all-or-nothing chasm between value perspectives, but rather suggest markedly different cultural emphases on general orientations. The indigenous orientation is toward certain C-words and R-words (e.g., *cooperation, collaboration, collectivity, relationships, respect* , and *reciprocity*), which in turn correlate with conflict practices such as

compromise, reconciliation, and restoration, all in contrast to a modernist Western, postindustrial penchant for win-lose, coercion, domination, “might-makes-right” conflict-related ethos and practices. At the microlevel of the individual culture and subculture is a plethora of more specific value constellations and conflict management practices (Fry, 2000, 2006). In addressing the central question about what lessons for the modern, postindustrial West that indigenous societies may offer regarding conflict resolution theory and practice, a consideration of core value orientation in relation to justice seeking and dispute resolution becomes critical.

Comanche core values include sharing, respect, patience, maintaining good relationships, and acting so as to favor the community over one’s self-interest (Harris, 2000). La Donna Harris is the founder of Americans for Indian Opportunity and a citizen of the Comanche nation. Harris and Jacqueline Wasilewski, an expert on intercultural communication and conflict resolution, discuss the two-decade-long development and use of a technique called structured dialogue processes (Harris and Wasilewski, 2004; Christakis and Bausch, 2006; www.globalagoras.org). Christakis and Bausch (2006) note how structured dialogue processes show “some of the essential features of pre-contact decision-making processes in North American tribal communities,” including “an order of speaking, everyone having a chance to speak, no evaluative comments, the speaking going on until no one had anything else to say” (Harris and Wasilewski, 2004, p. 4). As Harris and Wasilewski show, applying a model of dialogue and conflict resolution designed to democratically harness the wisdom of people was the beginning of a process of recovery of a whole series of concepts that were found to overlap across the boundaries of culture, both indigenous and nonindigenous.

Wasilewski (n.d., p. 5; Harris and Wasilewski, 2004) explains that a team of scholar-practitioners identified four core Native American values that transverse “generation, geography, and Tribe.” First, the value of relationship reflects a feeling that all humans (and other aspects of the world) are related. People should be included, not excluded. One implication is that decisions should be made by consensus, allowing everyone to have input. Another implication relevant to conflict resolution is that relationships are centrally important and should be mended and maintained, not ignored or broken. The second core value is responsibility (Harris and Wasilewski, 2004). People have a responsibility to care for their relatives, broadly conceived, to include people and even animals and plants. Responsible indigenous leadership rests on caring, not coercion. The third core value is reciprocity, and we consider it, a key variable, in the next section. Finally, Harris and Wasilewski (2004) point out that redistribution keeps relationships in balance through obligations to share material and social goods. This value is the opposite of materialism: “The point is not to acquire things. The point is to give them away” (Wasilewski, n.d., p. 5).

Clearly the four core values are interrelated in their conceptualization and in their social manifestations. In an indigenous society with such an ethos, everyone is interdependent, linked through caring and sharing, being responsible, and helping and in turn being helped within the contexts of relationships. Related to the handling of conflict, Harris explains:

> One highly prized characteristic within the tribe is the ability to behave in a way that maintains these [community] relationships, even through disagreements. In order to be able to do this, one's focus must not be on winning but on making the best decision for the community. Good relationships are dependent on people feeling good about themselves, which in turn creates strong persons who can contribute to the well-being of the community. (Harris and Wasilewski, 1992, quoted in Harris, 2000, p. xix)

The exploration of indigenous collective wisdom through the structured dialogue processes proved to be particularly successful in the area of the emergence of peace building, conflict resolution, and peace values. It compelled participants to reflect on the values that both structured the dialogue process and emerged as common and overarching. This clearly exemplified the potential sophistication in procedure and results for the pooling of conflict resolution and transformation resources within an inclusive public and democratic agora. As peace, nonviolence, and the recovery of the common wisdom that structures community were prioritized, the types of values encompassed in the four Rs emerged as key elements in a dialogical process that respected the worthiness of all contributors. The dialogical, integrative, and reflexive process that transpired created a learning situation for all sides.

In addition, the rights of indigenous peoples, not only to conserve their own time-tested practices but also to participate equally in the global normative arena, are implemented within projects such as structured dialogue processes. As Wiessner argues, the "remarkable comeback" of the indigenous peoples in its "most comprehensive expression in the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples" has meant that excluded

peoples “overcame their cultural and political isolation and joined together to reclaim their essential identity as well as their role on the global stage of decision-making” (Wiessner, n.d.). In the context of this “remarkable comeback” of indigeneity, the application of the ideals contained in the law have been especially resonant as indigenous peoples have been able to recover their cultural, social, and political subjectivity and, even further, see the contribution of indigenous knowledge, values, and practices to a modern world. Conversely, the unique nature of this integrative process across the historical divide between the indigenous and modernity leads to a recovery by modern societies, and indeed by the international society as a whole, of the ethical resources as they have existed prior to the development of modernity itself. Finally, it should be noted that the modern nation-states that compose international society do not always provide safe and protective living environments for their indigenous peoples. This issue is of central concern in terms of creating positive peace and addressing structural and historical violence.

The importance of the recovery of an alternative worldview based on the four Rs of relationship, responsibility, reciprocity, and redistribution to peace and survival on an interdependent planet cannot be overemphasized (Harris and Wasilewski, 2004). Harris and Wasilewski (2004, p. 1) stress that structured dialogue processes “have provided culturally resonant means through which Indigenous peoples have been able to identify and articulate their core values to broader audiences.” They further contend that these four Rs form the core of an emerging concept of indigeneity, where the “dynamic inclusivity of this value cluster has much to contribute to global discourse as we go about the task of constructing global agoras, the dialogic spaces of optimal mutual learning of the 21st century”

(2004, p. 1), and especially as these relate to ethical living in a society. As Harris and Wasilewski (2004, pp. 2–3) evocatively write:

> It is our system of values that sustains us, both as persons and as societies. It is adherence to our value systems that leads to and ensures our continuance. . . . The Comanche have always been keen students of human nature and paid great attention to constructing social spaces that reduce conflict. . . . Maintaining a certain level of social harmony kept everyone's energy focused where it needed to be focused, on the continuation of the community into the future.

One of the key concepts that emerges from an examination of the value orientations with regard to peace and violence both cross-culturally and across the indigenous-modernity divide is the need to sustain and recover community when it has been broken. In the indigenous model, human relationships are primary, and therefore great emphasis is placed on avoiding the disruption of relationships to begin with and on restoring them if they do become strained or damaged. Most indigenous societies where people are highly interdependent are more cooperatively oriented than are modern postindustrial societies. An emphasis on maintaining relationships makes sense under such conditions of interdependence. Conflicts threaten the smooth functioning of the social group and so indigenous cultures have a variety of ways to minimize the negative impact of discord and strife while maximizing community harmony and prosociality as reflected in the four Rs.

Reciprocity

Not only is reciprocity one of the four Rs and therefore soundly represented across indigenous societies, but more generally, reciprocity is a central principle of social life,

whether in an indigenous or a modern context (Mauss, 2000; Sahlins, 1965; Westermarck, 1924). This observation is of utmost relevance to the modern world because conceptions of justice are intricately interwoven with the reciprocity principle.

Reciprocity can manifest itself in exact paybacks, or it can be elaborated via inexact judicial mechanisms and cultural meanings into patterns of apology, compensation, fines, or ordeals. In all cases, the intention is to restore the balance. The key point is that conflict resolution and judicial procedure, across diverse social contexts, share common foundational elements in the manifestation of the principle of reciprocity. Justice and resolution involve making a balance, which may be done, for instance, by a payback, compensation, punishment, or apology and forgiveness.

In its simplest form, the reciprocity principle is fulfilled through exact equivalents. We could call this the eye-for-an-eye approach. Here are some examples. When a man from Lesu in Melanesia hit another man, the bystanders urged the recipient of the blow to strike the assailant back to put an end to the matter (Powdermaker, 1933). Among the Nama of southern Africa, a man convicted of murder will be executed in exactly the same manner that he killed his victim, for instance, stabbed if he had stabbed, shot if he had shot, and so forth (Schapera, 1930). This reasoning also is applied by the Suku of Africa, as a description by Kopytoff (1961, p. 63) makes clear: “Reciprocity is also maintained by balancing an action with a similar counteraction. A theft is wiped out by an answering theft, an insult returned effaces an insult given, a murder is compensated by a reciprocal murder; in these cases no further settlement is necessary.”

In contrast to this literal reasoning, many societies are more flexible as to how to balance the scales of justice; we

can refer to this type of payback as inexact equivalents. A very common way to resolve a dispute is through the payment of damages. In a recent study of indigenous village courts among the Enga of Papua New Guinea, pertaining to cases involving homicide, rape, assault, and property issues, the vast majority of cases (69 percent) involved compensation (Wiessner and Pupu, 2012). Of the Garo of India, Burling (1963, p. 252) writes that "compensation should end the dispute and clear the air. To pay compensation is to acknowledge guilt formally, and grant satisfaction to the other side." Some societies have indemnity scales that specify the amount and type of payments that are required to compensate the plaintiffs for particular kinds of crimes, such as blinding someone, raping a woman, accidently killing someone, or deliberately committing murder.

Another path to justice through inexact equivalents is restoring the balance through the administration of punishment. In different cultural contexts, the guilty may be beaten, whipped, verbally humiliated, fined, or jailed. Among the Nama, for example, the convicted may be flogged, fined, have property confiscated, or even be killed (Schapera, 1930). As a variation on this punishment theme, some societies rely not on humans but on supernatural beings to mete out punishment. Eminent justice is believed to occur, for example, by Rotuman Islanders of the Pacific and among the Konso of Africa.

Revenge homicide, a form of self-redress, is another widely prevalent example of justice seeking that accords with the reciprocity principle. Revenge killings occur in about half of the societies in the Standard Cross Cultural Sample of 186 cultures from around the world (Ericksen and Horton, 1992). Whereas revenge killing is an example of exact reciprocity, many cultures have implemented the practice of paying restitution in the form of blood money, a practice

that fits the second, more flexible, inexact application of the reciprocity principle, which balances the initial crime in terms of equivalents rather than exactitudes. One broader implication is that exact systems, which can be quite violent, have been replaced in some instances by mechanisms of inexact payback, as in cases where blood revenge of the past has been supplanted by blood money, as among the Iroquois, Otoro Nuba, and Azande (Fry, 2012).

There is a major practical reason for highlighting reciprocity as a foundational principle behind justice seeking and conflict resolution. In the twenty-first-century, global pluralistic society consisting of approximately two hundred nation-states, numerous ethnic groups, and a multitude of religious orientations, which can be conceptualized as constituting a plethora of interactional borders (Souillac, 2012), transborder conflict behavior is definitely affected by the principle of reciprocity. Despite the fact that effective, nonviolent conflict resolution mechanisms are well developed at the micro group and intragroup level (e.g., in the form of mediation moots, courts of law, supernatural sanctions, and so forth), judicial and resolution processes are only poorly manifested or even absent at the global level. The powerful and ubiquitous principle of reciprocity can be harnessed in the creation of inexact conflict resolution systems and mechanism at the global level just as balance restoration using inexact equivalents has been implemented repeatedly at lower social strata as alternatives to the exactness of violent revenge.

Peace Systems

A final set of indigenous insights for conflict resolution, peace, and justice comes from the study of peace systems. A peace system is a group of neighboring societies that do

not make war on each other and sometimes not with outsiders either (Fry, 2006, 2012). For example, the aboriginal inhabitants of the central Malaysia Peninsula, the Inuit of Greenland, the Montagnais, Naskapi, and Cree bands of the Labrador Peninsula, the societies of India's Nilgiri and Wynaad Plateaus, the tribes of the Upper Xingu River basin in Brazil, the Iroquois of North America, Australian Aborigines generally, but especially those groups of the Great Western Desert, and even the European Union (EU) exemplify peace systems (Fry, 2006, 2012). The existence of peace systems such as these not only contradicts the assumption that war is inevitable but also may provide insight into how to create a global peace system.

Common features of active peace systems include an overarching social identity that spans the member subgroups, interlinkages among subgroups (e.g., trade or kin relationships), interdependence (e.g., ecological, economic, or defensive), nonwarring core values, ceremonies and symbolism that reinforce peace and the overarching common identity, and effective conflict management processes and institutions (Fry, 2012). Regarding the last point, sometimes familiar and effective conflict resolution mechanisms that were already present at lower social strata are recreated at new higher social levels. For example, the individual nations that were to unite into the Iroquois Confederation had a long history of handling disputes in village and tribal councils. When the original five neighboring nations of the Iroquois Confederation unified and gave up internally warring with one another, they also created a new governing institution, the Grand Council, which consisted of fifty chiefs appointed by matrilineal matrons and representing all five tribes (Dennis, 1993). The Mohawks and the Senecas sat to one side of the Grand Council fire and the Oneidas and Cayugas

sat on the opposite side (Wallace, 1994). The Onondagas were the official Keepers of the Fire and mediated the discussion from a central position (Dennis, 1993). If a consensus emerged from the discussions, the Onondagas ratified the decision; if disagreements were voiced, the Onondagas might refer the matter back to one of the subcouncils for further consideration. With the formation of the Iroquois Confederation, the seeking of violent revenge within and among tribes was outlawed and replaced with the payment of compensation by the perpetrator to the family of the occasional homicide victim. The abandonment of revenge killings, feud, internal warfare, and cannibalism accompanied the creation of the Iroquois peace system (Dennis, 1993; Wallace, 1994). The unity and peace within the confederation were maintained for over three hundred years (Fry, 2012).

The fact that people have created and maintained nonwarring peace systems in various quarters of the globe demonstrates that alternatives to the war system are in fact possible. Culturally diverse examples of peace systems in conjunction with the regional EU peace system should combine to stimulate our imagination about how to create a global peace system. Global interdependence exists. This reality parallels an indigenous conception of relationship and interconnectivity, among humans and also with nature, and can provide the rationale for why cooperation and new institutions of governance are necessary to address common concerns such as global warming, oceanic pollution, population growth, and loss of biodiversity. Safety and security under current global circumstances require unified action among all the parties. Because the peoples of the world today are interdependent in numerous ways, just as are members of any given society, they must meet common challenges with cooperative strategies, not with individual strife.

Reflections

Every society has ways of dealing with conflict. Some entail violence, but most do not. Our current postindustrial, Western value orientation contains significant omissions in its development of a legal and normative framework to organize international society. While important advances have been achieved in terms of the recognition of the interdependence of states and societies, and war-related violence as well as the abuse of human rights have been delegitimized at the level of international law and norms, this is clearly insufficient. A global peace system that reinforces the wide array of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation processes and norms is needed but has not been created. With power, authority, competition, and materialism at its cultural and social core, the modern, postindustrial value orientation remains accepting of and even conducive to the waging of war. Our global community rests on a social and cultural complex of values that is evolutionarily recent, and of which its many blind spots with regard to the inevitability of war, violence, and conflict are an aberration. This observation raises the question as to the global sustainability of such a complex of values and the practices they support. However, there is another reason to question the long-term sustainability of the modern, postindustrial Western value orientation. Until recently, societies have persisted through the cooperation, sharing, and caring for their members as reflected in the four Rs. At this juncture in human history, all people on the planet are in many ways part of the same interdependent social-economic-ecological system. We suggest that an indigenous caring, sharing, cooperating value orientation, which has served human societies well for millennia, is needed at the planetary level. Our very survival as a species requires us to take a huge step toward this ancient ethos, that is, back toward

an ethos fostering relationship, responsibility, reciprocity, and redistribution, in order to develop a new sustainability with the environment and with ourselves. Concordant with this shift in values would be the creation of a global peace system to provide collective human security for the entire interdependent planet. We can develop further ways of harnessing collective wisdom in a way that is grounded in cultural reflexivity on all sides to accomplish this transition.

HARNESSING OF COLLECTIVE WISDOM FOR GLOBAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, JUSTICE, AND PEACE

In 1963, a UNESCO study (Lowie, Métraux, and Morazé, 1963) of indigenous approaches to conflict resolution pointed out that the usual dualistic comparison between an industrialized society governed by the rules of reason and traditional societies in which mystical affect played a large part crumbled in the face of the observation of conflict resolution practices. The report emphasized how anthropology, in the beginning period of decolonization, led Western powers to question their own assumptions about society, rationality, and ethics, thus noting, for example, that “modern man will not always obey pure logic without giving way to the irrational” (Lowie et al., 1963, p. 178). The UNESCO study remains limited by its binary interpretation of a more “violent archaic world” in the prohibition of the deviation from ritual, for example, and of a “rational and innovation and truth seeking West.” Nevertheless, this early inquiry can serve as a reminder of how careful observation of indigenous societies around the globe can serve not as a means of further reinforcing a Western perspective on concepts such as conflict resolution but, rather, as a lesson in humility and in the deconstruction of dominant historical narratives in which

the common elaboration of values, whether through ritual, practice, beliefs, or rational discussion, takes its rightful place.

The observation that practices such as conflict resolution may have been an integral part of a society's ethical existence and survival, rather than a mere means to an end, can shed light on the limitations of theory or practice that continues to frame conflict resolution as a response to momentary crisis rather than as a consistent ethical approach to human and cultural survival. Conflict resolution approaches that are built into a culture's ethos, or way of life, can provide a powerful claim for the need to build bridges across the traditional divide between indigenous and modern perspectives. As we have seen from ethnographic considerations, reciprocity is inherent in conflict resolution and justice mechanisms. Achieving justice, theoretically and in practice, involves exact or inexact means of restoring a balance. A conflict resolution and justice philosophy that asserts the nonexclusiveness of methods and concomitantly embraces the idea of inexact reciprocity, as well as the inclusion of indigenous perspectives and practices, provides a knowledge and resource pool from which to draw on to create viable justice and conflict resolution mechanisms needed by humanity in the short- and long-term future. This inclusive creative process can include careful weighing of the pros and cons of the competition-driven, win-lose, power-based orientation in comparison to a four Rs, cooperatively focused, win-win ethos in the globalized and interdependent twenty-first-century world.

A central observation is that conflict resolution and justice mechanisms that are relevant to particular societies need not remain limited in their application to these particular societies. Instead they could become part of the pool of shared meanings and resources used for managing conflict

and addressing issues such as climate change, species and habitat loss, nuclear proliferation, providing true human security, and other concerns that cross borders and are fundamentally nothing less than urgent matters related to human survival.

Consideration of conflict resolution, justice-seeking, and peacemaking processes all emerge as common and even sacred endeavors, from both historical and anthropological perspectives, to link peace with life, ethics with justice, and, successfully or less successfully, to keep the excesses of power and human violence at bay. The modern, postindustrial emphasis on debate and rational discussion in the public sphere in which peacemaking, conflict resolution, and mediation find their place can be powerfully combined in practice and intervention with a sense of ethical responsibility to alleviate the burden of violence and aggression that potentially threatens all human societies.

There are clear variations in the Western history of ideas that underlie modern concepts at the heart of our global conflict resolution techniques and of our conceptions of peace with justice, such as human rights and the goals of democracy (Souillac, 2005, 2011, 2012). Nevertheless, these general orientations lead to different perceptions and practices regarding conflict and peacefulness that can supplement and enrich contemporary global models of conflict transformation and peace with justice.

A process of pooling and integrating indigenous and modern knowledge and practice about peacemaking and conflict resolution requires a two-pronged strategy. The first is a value-based approach. It entails emphasizing normative and ethical components of knowledge and practice to construct a peace-based value system. Thus, whereas it makes sense to analyze these procedures across different systems, highlighting what is culture specific, it is

also enlightening to consider cross-cultural normative or ethical components to these procedures—that is, values—as they can be inferred from observation of the practices and discussion with the participants.

One example is the emphasis on the socially restorative and the socially interdependent components of ritual reconciliation used in different cultures and ranging, for example, from negotiation to gift giving to restitution and third-party mediator involvement (Fry, 2000, 2006). Peace systems also reflect values favoring peace over violence as the constituent societies live together without war to the advantage of all, forming a higher level of social identity through interaction, rituals, and exchange. Members of peace systems find many paths to keep the peace under conditions of interdependence. Peace systems represent new possibilities for creating a world without war, a sustainable peace with sustainable development, based more on cooperation than competition, and favoring an indigenous value orientation along the lines of the four Rs.

The second equally important task is to open a dialogue between the indigenous and the modern. A dialogue space for interaction, sharing, and cooperation between the indigenous and modern members of global society is needed. Indigenous practices and knowledge constitute an "other" for modernity. The usual approach taken by modern discourse toward indigenous knowledge, as exemplified by the UNESCO study of conflict resolution (Lowie et al., 1963), has been to adopt the culturally powerful position of the scientific observer. Instead we advocate egalitarian knowledge- and practice-sharing approaches along the lines of the structured dialogue processes.

In addition, well-known historical knowledge with regard to the abuse of indigenous peoples at the hands of modern colonizers must be addressed for a genuinely inclusive

global approach to the pooling of knowledge and resources on conflict resolution and justice-promoting techniques to occur. In other words, a transborder ethical approach that allows for reflexivity within the very process of this harnessing enterprise must be undertaken in order for a genuine dialogue to be created between the modern and the nonmodern (Souillac, 2012). Indeed, convergence of relationality, responsibility, mutuality, respect, and sharing are crucial to bridging this gap between the modern and the indigenous. These ethical concepts ultimately arise from the internal requirements for peaceful and orderly functioning within any society.

Cutting-edge concepts in democratic theory such as respect and recognition typically invoke sources of justice that reach beyond the realms of reason into those of affect and religious cognition. Debates on the role played by affect in cosmopolitan theories of citizenship and global responsibility, such as they have focused on hospitality or the global justice burden, are now superseding or completing those frameworks that have relied on an exclusive concept of rational deliberation for the global public sphere and consensus on basic human rights norms (Honneth, 2007; Innerarity, 2012; Souillac, 2012, Young, 2013). Modernity today is constituted by what it has rejected as much as by how it has defined itself, as Gauchet (1999) has shown in his anthropological analysis of the emergence of political modernity based on the exit of religion and the question of the reconstitution of social ties in an increasingly atomized rights-based society (Souillac, 2011). A careful approach to the establishment of a dialogic space between indigenous concepts of justice and practices of conflict resolution and peace building and the nonindigenous participants of a global knowledge world must be conceptualized so as to reflect the nonviolent integration of a peace-knowledge community for a world

that retains its worthy goals of constructive dialogue and consensus building around peace itself.

As Harris and Wasilewski (2004) have shown in the context of a civil society initiative directly involving indigenous conflict resolution, justice-seeking, and peacemaking practices and beliefs, the application of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples can lead to an extensive reworking of the relationship between the modern world and indigenous knowledge when it comes to peace and conflict resolution—one that can deeply extend even our own democratic values of participation, equality, and responsibility for a complex plural world. In particular, this project actively demonstrates profound possibilities for active alternatives to a democratic status quo and an international normative order that does not take dialogue seriously for the purpose of peacemaking, keeping such ventures on the superficial levels of cultural diplomacy. Harris and Wasilewski (2004) draw on work by Taiaike to emphasize the modeling of new standards of accountability beyond those of deliberative rationality, which often do not suffice in bridging the cultural and religious divides established by modernity. The focus on reciprocity and the recognition of the prior existence of relational bonds, whether these be harmonious or conflictual, allows a context that transmits a deeper message about human continuity than do various forms of deliberative and instrumental rationality with all its attendant, though admittedly and rightly contested, Western heritage. Whether it be with regard to the environment or justice, the sheer historical longitude of the existence of indigenous societies provides them with a special status with regard to the conservation of humanity itself, in being, as Taiaike observes, “the repository of vast experience and deep insight” (Taiaike, 1999, cited in Harris and Wasilewski, 2004, p. 21).

The indigeneity concept, as it covers the four Rs and as it emerged from the application of an inclusive structured dialogue process, became operational to identify a globally applicable practice for an alternative relational politics in a modern world defined through its complexity and plurality. This relational politics “creates relationships between diverse elements” (Harris and Wasilewski 2004, p. 5) rather than seeks to eliminate differences. Thus while the indigeneity concept, argue Harris and Wasilewski (2004, p. 5), “is culturally—which means communally—grounded, it is neither culturally neutral, nor is it culturally exclusive.” In other words, it creates bonds of relationality across patterns and experience of difference, and between the concrete and specific, and the abstract and universal. Thus, while all identities of participants in a dialogic space that honors such peacemaking values as the four Rs are respected and honored and all voices are heard, these identities need not exist in mutual exclusion or differentiation from each other. Indeed as these identities are engaging in dialogue, the dialogic space that is formed generates something of its own as a peacemaking practice, which in turn creates links where there were none, on whatever topic is pursued, demonstrating even beyond the need for formal consensus, that we are as individual and collective identities “*both* autonomous and connected” (Harris and Wasilewski, 2004, p. 7). This allows for the realities of dynamic coemergence to empirically emerge as testimony of what Edward Said has termed the quest for a “deep coexistence” (cited in Harris and Wasilewski, 2004, p. 7).

Dynamic inclusivity also insists that the democratic pluralist paradigm that requires the toleration of diversity be expanded to encourage the reincorporation of the viewpoints of the “enemy” and thus discourage the excessive polarizations, as well as processes of

victimization and humiliation, that are increasingly becoming the feature of democratic societies and of an international society where tremendous power differentials remain the norm. Thus, the dynamic inclusivity captured by the notion of indigeneity allows such emergent solutions to be identified beyond the stagnation of status and power differentials that are historically determined. It does not exclude discussion on moral and ethical difference, but it allows first for voices that have been historically polarized and inherently opposed to understand the process of historical construction that has created our various prejudices and influenced our worldview. As such, what was mere conflict management can become conflict transformation through a collaborative dialogic venture that, as the authors explain, investigates the shared complex mechanisms that control our cultural, economic, and historical differentiations.

APPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Several observations of practical significance can be offered for reflection. First, we have seen examples of humans bringing about significant changes toward peace in their societies so social change is possible. Values, norms, practices, and institutions can promote physical and structural violence or, conversely, can be created to support nonviolence, human rights, and just conflict resolution.

Second, in that values have an impact on behavior, some value orientations are more supportive of nonviolent conflict resolution than are others. It would be important to focus on making a global ethical and normative shift along the aggressiveness-to-peacefulness continuum toward the peaceful pole.

Third, consideration of the structured dialogue processes suggests that the medium in fact can be part of the

message; it is important to employ conflict resolution and dialogue processes that are inclusive and egalitarian rather than exclusive and dominating. It is not possible for any nation to go it alone because all of humanity is interconnected by conditions of global warming, population increase, degradation of the global ecosphere, and the existence of weapons of mass destruction. As in interdependent indigenous communities, cooperative and socially inclusive methods for dialoging and working together toward shared goals are necessary in the global community.

Fourth, the existence of peace systems in the indigenous world deserves much closer consideration. Their very presence shows that neighboring societies can live in peace and security. An examination of the formation and maintenance of peace systems has the utmost relevance for global society. Relations among nation-states are in some ways parallel to those of the Iroquoian tribal nations before they joined together and stopped killing each other. Humanity now faces a security challenge that is remarkably similar to that addressed successfully by the Iroquoian peoples of the fifteenth century: How can a war system where bloodshed and mass destruction remain an ever-present danger be replaced by a global system in which peace and security constitute the new reality?

In conclusion, indigenous conflict resolution practices shed light on the immense human potential for living in peace and resolving conflict without violence. The global implementation of a dialogic process that incorporates indigenous peacemaking practices and value systems can serve as a peacemaking venture in its own right—one that leads to the further recovery of dignity by indigenous peoples and to the recovery of those elements that have been occulted during the rise of modernity. This in turn leads to a tripartite critique of the contemporary modern

worldview. First, we have the unsubstantiated uniquely modern view that human nature is warlike and must remain mired in its aggressive impulses. Entering into respectful dialogue with indigenous knowledge and insight with regard to peace can help model the concrete application of time-honored values as well as their political and social usefulness across time for achieving balance, integration, coordination, and cooperation. Second, the creation of a dialogic space that serves to integrate indigenous wisdom in a global modern arena also serves as a practical example of the limits of a uniquely modern worldview by unveiling its rational dualist and exclusionary approach. As the structured dialogue processes and other dialogic and peace-building projects show, modern democratic ethics must go through an expansion of understanding with a goal of generating and harnessing for human welfare and survival a knowledge and resource pool that includes diverse and useful justice promoting conflict resolution approaches. Third, it is often said that values that have founded the modern West, such as freedom, equality, and democracy, will increasingly be on the decline as other emergent nations' systems overtake the West economically. At this historical juncture, the creation and modeling of democratically inspired dialogic systems for the common elaboration of peace values as a collective strategy of survival has much to teach us. Harnessing the wisdom of indigenous conflict resolution practices in how they reflect a deeper concern for social harmony and well-being on the one hand (positive peace), and conflict transformation and violence reduction on the other (negative peace), offers a unique historical opportunity for all those interested in delegitimizing war and violence and promoting the development of peace.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN MULTICULTURALISM AND CONFLICT

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One need only briefly peruse the Internet to come to face to face with the reality of today's shrinking world. In little more than the time it takes to press the Enter key of a laptop, you can gain access to a recipe for Ukrainian syrniki, take a virtual tour of a hotel in Bhutan, and watch traditional Tshwane dancers in South Africa. The exchange between different cultures is increasingly less distant and voyeuristic, however, and more active and significant. Consider the impact of microloans and the opportunity to assist people all over the world—a pig farmer in Guatemala, a coffee seller in Cambodia, a hairdresser in Liberia. If you live in a multicultural society like the United States, the vast array of subcultures and ethnic enclaves means that many of us do not have to leave our home town to experience another culture's language, cuisine, art, and traditions.

With significant interaction and unlimited accessibility come the inevitable contrasts in how people make sense of, experience, and treat one another and the environment. When cultures collide, the impact can be devastating on individuals, groups, and society at large. In a world that is familiar with culturally based conflicts at the group level, there is a sense that culturally derived rifts occur increasingly in day-to-day life and at more personal microlevels than ever before. Thus, there is great need to stop and reflect on how to understand and effectively manage the tensions that arise as a result of our increasingly multicultural existence.

In this chapter, we offer an introduction to the relationship of multiculturalism, conflict, and conflict resolution. First, we present an overview of multiculturalism as a social movement—the good, the bad, and the practical—in a manner distinct from but not unrelated to conflict. We then link multiculturalism with conflict resolution theory and practice through a reflection on the implications of multiculturalism for how we define good research and practice and a discussion of how a multicultural conflict lens compares and contrasts with the study of culture and conflict. We devote the second part of the chapter to the presentation of a theoretical approach to the management of multicultural conflict: the integrity-adaptivity model (I-AM), which provides an integrated approach to managing conflict in a culturally and multiculturally congruent fashion.

MULTICULTURALISM AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT

The literature on multiculturalism is interdisciplinary in nature, with important contributions from education, psychology, philosophy, history, sociology, and political science. As a by-product of the diverse approaches to multiculturalism, it has become a multifaceted concept with varying shades to its definition. In the broadest sense, multiculturalism refers to the presence of and significant interaction between different cultures in a geographical space (Gutmann, 1993). The appeal of this definition is the simplicity and applicability it offers to scholars and practitioners regardless of one’s intellectual roots. At the same time, however, such a generalist take minimizes what makes multiculturalism a construct imbued with passion and purpose. More than a look into the presence of diversity, multiculturalism takes into account the

implications of living in a diverse society, where issues of status, power, privilege, and politics often take center stage. It pertains to how dominant cultures perceive, relate to, and treat the various subcultures within a society. History and experience tell us that the resulting social hierarchies typically confer superiority on the dominant culture and marginalization and discrimination on subcultures, to varying degrees (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999).

Fowers and Richardson (1996) offer a definition of multiculturalism that emphasizes its normative role as a social movement: “Multiculturalism is a social-intellectual movement that promotes values of diversity as a core principle and insists that all cultural groups be treated with respect as equals” (p. 609). Stemming from atrocities associated with the Holocaust, colonization, and both direct and institutionalized forms of racism in the post–World War II United States, support for multiculturalism rose as a component of the broader “human rights revolution” (Wessendorf, 2010, p. 35). A spirited characterization of the term, one quickly understands why multiculturalism is an energizing concept, with strong supporters and harsh critics anchoring a continuum of beliefs and opinions. Its three core elements of identity, recognition, and social justice play an important role in mobilizing an approach to intergroup relations that prioritizes mutual respect and equality in managing difference (Taylor, 1994).

Taylor (1994) positions multiculturalism as a political call for the recognition of identity. He contends that when individuals or a group, because of their cultural difference, are denied recognition, their collective identity is experienced as tainted and insignificant within the mainstream understanding of what is good, ideal, and desirable. This lack of recognition has an oppressive effect on individuals, restricting their ability to enact with pride and confidence their authentic selves in the context of their

cultural identity. Thus, in its most political form, multiculturalism as a movement seeks to mitigate the lack of acknowledgment of identities through advocating special rights and policies for groups whose culture is in danger of being ignored, squelched, or demeaned. In other words, it seeks social justice.

However, two somewhat contradictory strategies have developed in response to calls for justice through multiculturalism (Marsh, 1997; Meyer, 2010). The first focuses on the values of direct interaction and communication between members of different cultural groups in service of a more multicultural society. Such interactions provide opportunities for cultural differences to be shared and communicated in a manner that helps to foster greater multiculturalism. This is the sentiment expressed in *e pluribus unum* : “Out of many, one.” The second strategy emphasizes the importance of maintaining cultural uniqueness. More insular cultural practices can protect the uniqueness of a local culture of a nation or area and therefore strengthen its cultural diversity. A common aspect of many policies following this approach is that they avoid presenting any specific ethnic, religious, or cultural community values as dominant or central (Mooney-Cotter, 2011). To some degree, multicultural societies require both.

Multiculturalism as a political movement has been recognized for several notable contributions. First, it provides a normative framework for enacting liberal ideals of dignity, freedom, and equality within organizations and communities. By championing these as basic human rights, it impresses on groups and societies the need to uphold the civil liberties afforded everyone, regardless of culture. Second, multiculturalism supports the recognition and survival of distinct cultures in an evolving world with increasingly blurred international boundaries and intermingling of groups. When actions are taken to

safeguard culturally relevant values and norms, communities feel more secure that their group's existence is not only recognized but appreciated. Third, a multicultural frame seeks to engender in everyone the capacity for empathy, perspective taking, and critical reflection—and in members of dominant groups particularly—resulting in increased cultural intelligence, or the "capability to adapt effectively to new cultural contexts" (Earley and Ang, 2003). From scholars to practitioners, leaders to managers, teachers to medical professionals, stretching beyond one's worldview to question the generalizability of our assumptions and behaviors fosters greater intercultural competence. Fourth, using a multicultural frame can facilitate the advancement of organizations and societies. Benefits include heightened creativity (Chatman, Polzer, Barsade, and Neale, 1998; Harrison, Price, and Bell, 1998), increased learning and individual effectiveness (Thomas and Ely, 1996), and stronger organizational performance (Kochan et al., 2003; Richard, Murthi, and Ismail, 2007).

With all its promise, multiculturalism is not without its problems, and critics have been quick to note limitations. Although one of the goals of multiculturalism is to ensure the dignity and rights of all individuals and groups, there are instances in which an unmitigated approach to multiculturalism reinforces the oppression of certain subgroups within cultures. For example, if the goal of multiculturalism is to respect and uphold, without exception, a cultural group's beliefs and practices, then what happens when a culture engages in the oppression of women through acts such as clitoridectomy and honor killing (Boege, 2006)? This is a dilemma within multiculturalism, because in prioritizing the rights of cultures to live according to their internally derived standards, the rights and liberties of certain low-power subgroups within cultures are potentially violated

(Gutmann, 1993). This tension arises from the faulty assumption that there exists uniformity within a culture regarding the acceptance and justness of its traditions. The norms and values defining a culture are likely to be highly influenced by its dominant members, and groups holding such prominence are often determined by systematic differences in age and gender (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). Consequently the multicultural elements of identity, recognition, and social justice need to be considered not only in relations between cultures but in relations within cultures as well. Ultimately, valuing and respecting difference cannot usurp addressing systemic inequities, lest the multicultural approach fail to deliver on one of its basic tenets (Purdie-Vaughns and Waltons, 2011).

Furthermore, multicultural societies have been found to strain levels of trust and social cohesion. Putnam (2007) conducted an extensive study investigating the effects of multiculturalism on social trust. Surveying nearly thirty thousand people in forty American communities and controlling for class, income, and other factors, his analysis revealed that racial diversity in a community was associated with greater the loss of trust. He found that generally:

> Inhabitants of diverse communities tend to withdraw from collective life, to distrust their neighbours, regardless of the colour of their skin, to withdraw even from close friends, to expect the worst from their community and its leaders, to volunteer less, give less to charity and work on community projects less often, to register to vote less, to agitate for social reform more, but have less faith that they can actually make a difference, and to huddle unhappily in front of the television. (Putnam, 2007, p. 150–151)

It seems that in more diverse communities, we distrust people both different from us and similar to us.

Despite the tensions and challenges of multiculturalism, there does not seem to be reason enough to throw the principles out with the problems. Volpp (2001) makes a compelling case regarding the detriment of pitting rights and equality-based ideologies against one another, for they need not be mutually exclusive. She argues that feminist criticisms of multiculturalism tend to focus on what are deemed the oppressive aspects of minority cultures (e.g., clitoridectomy in Sudan) and obscure the cultural aspects of gender-oppressive acts existing in Western liberal societies in general (e.g., gun violence against women in the United States). She writes,

> In this discourse, feminism also stands for "rights" and multiculturalism stands for "culture." . . . Each term is presumed to exclude the values of the other. Feminism is presumed not to value the rights of minority cultures; multiculturalism is presumed not to value the rights of women. Constructing feminism and multiculturalism as oppositional severely constricts how we think about difference. (p. 1203)

APPLICATIONS OF MULTICULTURALISM

Today there are several noteworthy applications of multiculturalism employing the spirit of its principles and objectives. For example, multicultural education offers an important critique of and alternative to traditional Western approaches to curriculum design and pedagogy. It is "a progressive approach for transforming education that holistically critiques and responds to discriminatory policies and practices in education" (Gorski, 2010). Woven together by ethics of social justice, educational parity, and critical pedagogy, multicultural education is ultimately about the transformation of self, schools, and society. Banks (1993), a seminal scholar on multicultural education, offers a

multipronged approach to school reform covering educational content, pedagogy, teacher and student attitudes, and school culture that provides an exemplary model for comprehensive change.

Another fruitful application of multiculturalism is in the area of counseling psychology. A call to the profession was made in 1992 by Sue, Arredondo, and McDavis for better multicultural competencies and standards. They delineated three broad competency areas: self-awareness regarding cultural values and biases, awareness of client's worldview, and culturally appropriate intervention strategies. The seriousness with which the call has been taken is evident in the guidelines published by the American Psychological Association (2003) for realizing multiculturally appropriate practice, education, and research in psychology writ large (Sampson, 1993). The guidelines outline competencies in terms of cultural self and other awareness, responsiveness to and knowledge of the culturally different, employment of diversity concepts, and consideration of cultural issues in research.

The area of multicultural organizational development and consultation (MODC) (Jackson and Holvino, 1988; Sue, 2008) is another promising application of multiculturalism. MODC assists organizations in understanding how various diversity dimensions, including race and ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation, affect individuals, institutions, and society (Sue, 2008). It "focuses specifically on multicultural organizational development (MOD) in which the primary goal of the consultant is to enhance the organization's ability to adapt to and use diversity to maintain or improve effectiveness by providing for equal access and opportunity" (Sue, 2008, p. 158–159). A multiculturally competent consultant seeks and embraces occasions to dismantle oppressive structures of power and privilege within

organizational systems, using various techniques and tools to break down individual and group resistance to change.

These applications are a testament to the usefulness of multicultural principles in various aspects of societal and organizational life, offering a practical social justice orientation to managing diversity.

Multiculturalism and Conflict: Reflections on the Meaning of Conflict and Resolution

In the application of multiculturalism to education, Banks (1993) emphasizes the notion of knowledge construction, which concerns how doctrine and wisdom inherently reflect the assumptions, values, and ideologies of those who create it. Multiculturally sensitive practice calls for recognition of various types of knowledge, reflection on dominant and subordinated types of knowledge, and debate about the interpretation of knowledge. This critical eye toward the construction of knowledge has similarly been applied to the meaning of conflict and the recommended strategies for resolution.

Rooted primarily in Western ideals and principles and dominated in practice, theory, and research by white Americans and Europeans, conflict resolution as a field is culturally bound (Deutsch, 2005; Faure, 1995; Lederach, 1995). This is not to suggest that conflict and dispute resolution professionals do not value cultural issues, because they do (Avruch, 2003), and attention to issues of diversity has increased dramatically in the field (Deutsch, Coleman, and Marcus, 2006). But despite promising trends, conflict resolution cannot escape a history that in its origins paid insufficient attention to issues of difference (Avruch, 2003). For instance, Burton and Sandole (1986), asserted a generic theory of conflict, one that disregards the role of culture in favor of universal human needs, such as identity, meaning, development, and consistency. Critics, however,

noted that the identification of universal needs is itself influenced by culture and therefore not an objective process (Avruch, 1987). Attention to the intercultural generalizability of conflict resolution principles and propositions is certainly appropriate given its application beyond Europe and North America as a process for ameliorating various forms of contention (Faure, 1995; Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, 1999). Indeed, conflict resolution has global appeal and necessity.

Helping to unpack bias in mainstream approaches to conflict analysis and resolution, Salem (1993) identified several Western assumptions that undergird the field, suggesting that our interpretations of the main constructs related to peace, time, change, and conflict are often not universally shared. For instance, he contrasts Western linear assumptions regarding change through cause-and-effect processes with alternative perspectives such as change through dialectics and synchronicity. In addition, Salem argues that as Western societies thrive economically and technologically, there is a higher sense of confidence in the attainability of collaborative, win-win solutions to problems, an assumption not likely to be held in societies and subcultures with turbulent histories and economic stagnation or decline. In addition, he argues that predominant attention is often paid in the field to the role of human agency in conflict, which could be challenged culturally in collectivist societies, or alternatively attributed to explanations related to ideology, religiosity, and spirituality. Furthermore, in nonrelativistic cultures that hold tightly to right-wrong and zero-sum schemas, integrative strategies based on constructive values can be experienced as near-futile options.

The cultural variation in perceptions and beliefs regarding conflict and dispute resolution is undeniable (Avruch and Black, 1991; Gelfand, Nishii, Holcombe, Dyer, Ohbuchi, and

Fukuno, 2001). To bolster the cross-cultural generalizability of conflict resolution theory and research, Faure (1995) suggested that “we start from the beginning, avoiding from the very start the domination of American perspectives” (p. 53). He recommended incorporating multicultural perspectives and voices at the start of initiatives designed to explore or research conflict-related concepts and practices, with the thinking that this would be a good way to ensure cultural inclusion as a basic process in conflict analysis and resolution. While this seems to be a radical solution, it does beg us to consider where we go from here.

The eminent American conflict resolution scholar Morton Deutsch (1995) suggests a path forward that honors the efforts and progress of the field and integrates culturally conscious ways of knowing:

> My brand of grandiosity is at the level of constructs, not at the level of phenomena. It is my hope that our field can develop constructs and then be able to specify the relationships among them so that they are applicable across cultures and time, and to different types of social actions. The phenomena to which one would relate the underlying constructs (“interdependence,” “trust,” “hostility,” “influence,” “goal,” “cooperation,” “competition,” “conflict”) would vary considerably from culture to culture, from one type of social actor to another, from one situation to another. Thus, hostility would be manifested differently in Japan than in the United States and would be expressed differently between nations than between people. But presumably hostility would have the same basic relation to the other constructs in the theory in the various contexts. (p. 125)

Multiculturalism, Culture, and Conflict

Thus far we have discussed multiculturalism as an approach and a movement that proposes guidelines for equitably and

inclusively managing the increasing cultural diversity in today's societies. If the charge of multiculturalism is to ensure recognition, equality, fairness, and the safety of identities, then its relationship to the study and practice of conflict could be seen as a lens through which to examine and ensure a socially just understanding, analysis, and resolution of conflict. Before we delve into the particulars of this lens, a brief discussion on the similarities and differences between multicultural and cultural approaches to conflict study will help provide conceptual clarity (also see chapter 25 in this Handbook).

When we talk about conflict, is a distinction between multiculturalism and culture useful? Several years ago, one of us served in a supporting role at an intercultural awareness training for a culturally diverse organization. One of the training exercises had each person share a norm or artifact about his or her nationality or ethnicity. One woman from a Latin American nation explained that in her culture, if a man saw a woman on the street and found her attractive, it was not only acceptable but expected that he indicate his liking for her through verbal expression: whistling, complimenting her physical appearance, shouting a term of endearment to her. Some outward display of affection was generally viewed favorably by women. Now suppose an exchange such as this occurred, but the man and woman do not share the same understanding. A man whistles at a woman as she walks by on a public street. The man sincerely believes his gesture to be complimentary, but it is not perceived as such by the woman; rather, she believes it to be demeaning and intrusive. Is this a cultural conflict or a multicultural conflict? Does it matter?

We can define *culture* as "shared often unspoken, understandings in a group that shape identities and the process of making meaning," (LeBaron and Pillay, 2006, p.

26). Avruch (2003) identified three ways in which culture is conceived in the domain of conflict resolution:

- Culture as constituted by norms, values, and beliefs, which provide the context for understanding rules of appropriate behavior during times of conflict
- Culture conceived as “affecting significant perceptual orientations toward time, risk or uncertainty, affect (in self and others), hierarchy, power, or authority” (p. 354)
- Culture as composed of mental models, schemas, scripts, or maps and takes forms such as language, symbols and metaphors

The latter two conceptions shed light on why cross-cultural praxis is heavily focused on communication patterns and styles and why there is a rich tool kit for managing communication processes across cultures (Avruch, 2003).

Based on this composition of cultural conflict theory, there is alignment with the multicultural perspective; broadly, the content and process of culture matter. In order to understand and resolve both multicultural and cultural conflicts, knowledge of the unique beliefs, values, perceptual orientations, and schemas of social groups are vital for negotiating across difference. Both schools would agree that with this knowledge, there must also be openness and adaptivity of mind, body, and emotion in the face of difference. In the case of culture, harmony can be neither a method nor a result when there is resistance to accepting the cultural differences of another. In the case of multiculturalism, identities cannot be recognized and justice cannot prevail when the boundaries of one’s cultural conceptions are narrow, rigid, and exclusive. Therefore, conflict perspectives from a multicultural and a cultural lens converge on the importance of cultural knowledge and adaptation to its content and process.

This similarity between the two approaches is also met with several notable differences. First, the culture perspective offers a more neutral orientation to the study of conflict across difference. Culture from this perspective is descriptive of social groups, and these descriptions are used to make meaning of intergroup conflict and to suggest viable management alternatives. The culture approach to conflict illuminates the particularities of culture-near and culture-distant experiences in an attempt to land on appropriate and sensitive methods and practices for engaging culturally different others in preventing and deescalating conflict. In an admittedly overly simplistic example, two culturally different groups in the process of resolution may ask, "Given *our* culture—its norms, expectations, beliefs, etc.—and given *your* culture—its norms, expectations, beliefs, etc.—how can we negotiate across these differences to problem solve fairly and effectively?" (see Kimmel, 2006).

Multiculturalism, however, is anything but neutral. By emphasizing the power and status imbalances that exist between groups, it is prescriptive of how such asymmetries can and should be reduced. The brunt of attention is not about a particular culture, yours *or* mine, but focus is placed on each culture's relationship to the other and their standing within a larger power and privilege context of intergroup relations. For two culturally different groups in conflict, the question then becomes, "Given our culture's standing and sociopolitical history as it relates to your culture's standing and sociopolitical history, how can we negotiate across these differences to problem-solve fairly and effectively?"

Another distinction between multiculturalism and culture concerns the degree of importance paid to harmony. In the various culture-focused avenues within conflict theory and analysis, there is the *cross-cultural* variety, explicating the

specific conflict maps of various cultures; there is the *intercultural* perspective, honing in on the implications of similarities and differences in conflict modes and styles between cultures; and there is the *transnational* perspective, the study and application of strategies with effectiveness in multiple cultures (Avruch and Black, 1991). Implicit in these approaches is the concern for understanding culture so as to achieve and maintain harmony in and across human relationships, preferably with constructive, low-risk processes and outcomes. The multiculturalist perspective on conflict, in its deliberate attack on injustice, gives much less prominence to the role of harmony. Undeniably multicultural conflicts characterized by harmonious processes and outcomes are appealing, but multiculturalists acknowledge and prepare for often tumultuous and protracted journeys to equity and equality.

Returning to our illustration of the man who whistles at a woman as she passes, it is likely obvious at this point that the lens with which one views the situation does matter and that it is both a cultural and multicultural incident. From the cultural and multicultural point of view, one might use lenses of national, ethnic, and gender contexts to make sense of the situation. However, the cultural intervention might place emphasis on misunderstanding and norm differences, while the multicultural intervention might place more emphasis on sexual politics and gender hierarchies.

There is another similarity between multiculturalism and culture that represents a shared weakness of both perspectives. The critique on multiculturalism as overestimating the homogeneity of culture is also a critique regarding many cultural approaches to conflict theory, research, and practice. Assumptions of culture as an embodiment rather than something that is embodied, as static and uniform, and as traditions and customs rather than a form of locally derived consciousness, have acted as

obstacles to a more nuanced understanding of culture-based conflicts (Avruch and Black, 1991). These assumptions foreshadow an increasingly relevant limitation associated with both multiculturalism and culture-based strategies: the complexity and dynamism of culture has increased as social identities have multiplied and intersected.

For one of us, this limitation has acute relevance. Born to an African American mother and Puerto Rican American father, she has yet to read any description of these cultures that accurately conveys or intuitively resonates with her experience. There is no nicely packaged review, for instance, of what African–Puerto Rican American culture is, let alone what conflict means to this group or how one should engage with them when in conflict. In situations that potentially violate identity, recognition, or justice for individuals with multiple identities, cultural and multicultural lenses fall short of appropriate analytical and practical tools to resolve conflict.

Showing the importance of understanding multiple identities, a recent study by Kim-Jo, Benet-Martínez, and Ozer (2010) examined the conflict styles of biculturals (Korean Americans) in comparison to monoculturals (European Americans and Koreans). Given the previously identified conflict style differences between members of more individualistic (European Americans) and collectivistic (Korean) cultures, the researchers were interested in how exposure to both types of cultures would influence conflict management strategies. They found that Korean Americans used the individualistic style of competing more than Koreans did and that they also used the collectivistic style of avoidance more than Koreans did. This illustrates that how we experience culture and conflict is a function of our constellation of identities, and this becomes even more complicated when we consider the hegemonic variation among identities.

The relationship of multiculturalism, culture, and conflict resolution is both complex and complementary. It is our hope that we have provided meaningful distinctions and caveats on how both lenses affect ways of seeing and not seeing the relationship between cultural differences and conflict. However, the research in these areas remains disjointed, and much remains to be explored and validated. We propose that providing a framework for understanding the core conditions and competencies needed to successfully address both cultural and multicultural conflict will assist researchers in conducting studies with greater coherence, focus, and rigor and will support practitioners in enhancing constructive and mitigating destructive forms of multicultural conflict.

A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO MANAGING MULTICULTURAL CONFLICT: THE INTEGRATION-ADAPTATION MODEL

The model we present here integrates the aims, values, and strategies of both the cultural approach to conflict management, which emphasizes the harmonious navigation of difference in conflict, with the multicultural approach, which champions notions of equity, justice, and fairness in disputes. It does so by highlighting the core competencies and strategies needed for managing cultural and multicultural conflict in both a just and constructive manner. Thus, the core foci of the model are fairness and fit.

The integration-adaptation model (I-AM) takes a dynamical systems theory (DST) approach to multicultural conflict and its resolution (see Nowak and Vallacher, 1998; Vallacher, Coleman, Nowak, and Bui-Wrzosinska, 2010; Vallacher et

al., 2013). This approach has a few basic tenets (for elaboration, see Coleman, 2011; Vallacher et al., 2013):

- It focuses on the *longer-term patterns* of multicultural conflict dynamics in social systems (e.g., organizations and communities) rather than on episodic or shorter-term interactions and outcomes.
- It recognizes that these patterns are affected by a *complex, dynamic constellation of factors* (attitudes, beliefs, assumptions, interactions, policies, structures, and so on) and suggests that *actionable, high-impact solutions* that are informed by an awareness of this complexity and dynamism can lead to constructive changes in the patterns.
- It emphasizes the *emotional context* of multicultural conflicts: the reservoirs of positivity and negativity that gather over time and shape the interests, thoughts, and actions of disputing groups and parties.
- It aims to *increase the probabilities* for more constructive and less destructive multicultural conflict patterns to emerge and stabilize in social systems.

DST suggests that all social systems, whether families, organizations, or nations, have two functional tasks: internal integration and external adaptation (Svyantek, 1997). *Internal integration* —coming together—helps to define what it means to be a member of a particular group or organization and provides a normative context for interaction within it. This occurs within ethnic groups, religious groups, socioeconomic classes, schools and universities, business organizations, cities and nations. Such integration makes it meaningful, purposeful, and predictable to act as a member of the group and affects feelings of identity, esteem, status, and inclusion (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). Integration can result in social identities and

group processes that are anywhere from open, flexible, complex, and inclusive to closed, rigid, simplistic, and exclusive (Coleman and Lowe, 2007; Roccas and Brewer, 2002). The values and norms espoused by the group are then replicated across different generations of members through processes of selection, socialization, sanctioning, and rewards (Schneider, Goldstein, and Smith, 1995), leading to more or less stable patterns of inclusive to exclusive interactions within and between groups.

In cultural and multicultural conflict, integration helps define what disputants most value, believe, and hold sacred as members of a group. Whether they value money and status, honor and dignity, or the care and feeding of the poor is largely defined by the types of families, groups, and organizations in which they were socialized and live in today. In other words, the degree to which people integrate and identify with their group memberships and the degree to which these identities are threatened determines their core concerns in intergroup conflict, particularly with regard to the fairness and respect their groups are shown relative to other groups (Crosby, 1984; Gurr, 1970; Pruitt, 2006; Pruitt and Kim, 2004, Runciman, 1966; Tyler and Smith, 1998). When these concerns are low, conflicts tend toward more negotiable resource conflicts (Rothman, 1997); when they are high, they tend toward more intractable identity conflicts; and when identity conflicts persist, they contribute to repositories for negativity between members of the groups, which can set the context for dramatic escalation of the conflict (see chapter 37 in this Handbook).

In contrast, processes of external adaptation allow people and groups to interact with their external environment in a manner that fits and thus enables them to survive and thrive in changing circumstances. In multicultural conflict, achieving external fit requires the skill and ability to employ strategies and tactics that are appropriate to a given

conflict culture, which are determined by the expectations of the other party (i.e., their assumptions, styles, and preferences) and the norms, values, and constraints imposed by the broader environment (e.g. national culture or formal organizational roles). Employing a behavioral approach that is congruent with these demands places two requirements on the individual. First, one must be able to assess the demands of the situation, understanding what is appropriate in a given setting by attending to the relevant cues. Second is the ability to respond behaviorally in a way that is fitting with the situation. Failing to assess cultural differences and norms accurately or to respond in ways congruent with the situation can also lead to negative outcomes and consequences in conflict.

Both the internal and external concerns and pressures that act on individuals in multicultural conflicts have potential negative consequences. When driven by strong internal concerns for group integration, an individual may find himself or herself unresponsive to environmental cues and therefore employing conflict strategies that are ill fitting and inappropriate to the situation, potentially increasing tension in the relationship and escalating the conflict. Conversely, when an individual's approach to conflict is buffeted purely by situational demands, their approach, while fitting, may be unnatural to the actor, be viewed as inauthentic by the other party, and lead, perhaps unnecessarily, to being unable to meet their individual goals (e.g., as one party is "forced" to accommodate the other party). Neither of these situations is optimal.

Thus, a tension exists. Problems can occur when an individual becomes too internally focused and rigid or consistently responds purely in a manner that is dictated by the situation. Therefore, we suggest developing the competencies and conditions for integrative adaptivity, which allow individuals and groups to strike a balance

between honoring their values and identity, on the one hand, and constructively navigating the environment in which they operate, on the other. As Coleman, Kugler, Bui-Wrzosinska, Nowak, and Vallacher (2012) suggest, what is necessary and useful in dynamic conflicts is the capacity to be flexible while maintaining integrity, to move effectively between various conflict management strategies and tactics, while also achieving one's own goals and maintaining a sufficient sense of integrity. As much of the literature in cultural psychology and conflict is about either lack of fit or lack of awareness of need for fit, our approach emphasizes the skills that contribute to adaptivity and fit. In addition, as the literature on multiculturalism emphasizes justice and fairness, our approach also places focus on the need for skills, processes, policies, and structures of accountability that are required for bringing about fair processes and outcomes.

We next elaborate on the micro- and macroskills, processes, and structures that research has identified as enhancing the four core components of the I-AM model: awareness, accuracy, adaptivity, and accountability (see table 27.1 for a summary of relevant strategies and interventions).

Table 27.1 I-AM-Inducing Strategies and Interventions at the Individual and Organizational Levels

Strategies and Interventions	*Awareness*		*Accuracy*		*Adaptivity*		*Accountability*	
	Individual	*Organizational*	*Individual*	*Organizational*	*Individual*	*Org.*	*Individual*	*Org.*
Readings, courses, and trainings on culture and (multiple) identity	x		x		x		x	
Readings, courses, and trainings on intergroup relations and processes	x		x		x		x	
Readings, courses, and training on cognitive processes (e.g., implicit bias, stereotypes) as related to culture	x		x		x		x	
Readings, courses, and training on conflict management strategies	x		x		x		x	
Cultural, personality, and conflict style assessments	x		x		x		x	
Cross-cultural interactions	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Cultural immersion programs	x		x		x		x	
Structured intergroup dialogues	x		x		x		x	
Demographic indicators and tracking		x		x				x
Conflict resolution strategy with multicultural contingencies				x		x		
Conflict resolution impact evaluation measures						x		x
Multicultural SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis		x		x				x
Organization culture audit		x		x				
Diversity scorecards (e.g., Hubbard, 2004)		x		x				x
Race, culture, and diversity climate measures		x		x		x		x

Awareness

Awareness refers to the cultural assumptions, cultural rules, racial-ethnic identities, privilege, class, and other components of the worldview of ourselves and others.

Individual Level.

Awareness at the individual level requires the recognition of self, other, and contextual factors likely to play a role in multicultural conflicts. An individual should aim to become aware of his or her own cultural assumptions, values, and expectations and how these influence perception and behavior. For instance, an awareness of the impact and consequences of microaggressions, defined as “everyday verbal, nonverbal, and environmental slights, snubs, or insults, whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative messages to

persons based solely upon their marginalized group membership" (Sue, 2010, p. 3), is critical. Research has documented the deleterious effects that microaggressive acts can have on individuals, including experiences of isolation, frustration, stress, and self-doubt (Solozarno, Ceja, and Yosso, 2000; Yosso, Smith, Ceja, and Solorzano, 2009), as well as feeling that their voices are being muted at work, resulting in frustration and anger (Meares, Oetzel, Torres, Derkacs, and Ginossar, 2004).

An understanding of one's own self as multicultural and of the value of holding a more complex view of one's subidentities can also foster increased awareness and lead to more tolerant and constructive intergroup interactions (Roccas and Brewer, 2002). Higher levels of social identity complexity, or the way in which we see ourselves with regard to our multiple subgroup identities (Puerto Rican, African, female, PhD) has been found to predict positive out-group affect, increased out-group tolerance, less negative out-group bias, and reduced positive in-group bias (Brewer and Pierce, 2005; Miller, Brewer, and Arbuckle, 2009; Roccas and Brewer, 2002). For instance, one study in Northern Ireland examining ethnic and religious identity representations found that holding more complex, integrated identities predicted more favorable out-group attitudes than lower levels of identity complexity where distinction between the prototypes of one's ethnic and religious in-groups was less nuanced (Schmid, Hewstone, Tausch, Cairns, and Hughes, 2009).

Also vital for multicultural awareness is knowing one's own standing in relation to privilege, oppression, and power structures (Deutsch, 2006; McInsosh, 2001). A report published by Catalyst, a nonprofit specializing in diversity and inclusion, described the impact of an initiative aimed at enhancing such awareness with white male managers (Prime, Foust-Cummings, Salib, and Moss-Racusin, 2012).

Activities focused on bolstering specific diversity leadership competencies and increasing self-awareness by sharing personal experiences as a vehicle for questioning beliefs and assumptions. As a result of the program, awareness of white male privilege increased, and participants reported greater facility with the intergroup competency behaviors proposed by Ramsey and Latting (2005), including critical thinking about social groups and hierarchies, inquiring across difference, empathic listening, and addressing emotionally charged conflicts related to difference.

Organizational Level.

Institutional awareness starts with a holistic understanding of the various cultural groups comprising internal and external stakeholders and their concomitant assumptions, norms, values, and expectations (Sue, 2008). This understanding must be viewed in light of the organization's industrial and national context. It can be fostered through discussions of how privilege, oppression, and power structures within the organization and society differentially affect access to resources and outcomes for different stakeholder groups and members. For instance, hierarchical structures and hegemonic processes often result in differential outcomes that fall along cultural lines, benefiting high-status groups and disadvantaging low-status groups (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). The systematic collection and presentation of data on such differential group processes and outcomes can help to keep these discrepancies salient in organizations.

It is also important to unearth and acknowledge the underlying assumptions and values of the organization's culture and consider how they interact with various diversity dimensions. In monocultural organizations, homogeneity is typically prized and emphasized, and conflict is seen as needing to be suppressed, resulting in

favored conflict management strategies of distributive bargaining, coercion, and negotiation (Jackson and Holvino, 1988). In more multicultural organizations, conflict is viewed as a natural and inevitable process requiring management skills of action learning, consensus building, and other forms of collaborative problem solving (Jackson and Holvino, 1988).

The need for heightened self and organizational awareness in situations of multicultural conflict emphasizes the importance of reflecting on the following questions: In what cultural context is this occurring? What aspects of my identity are relevant in this situation? How is this (or are these) relevant identity dimension affecting my experience? What aspects of the other's identity are relevant in this situation, and how might these relevant identity dimensions be affecting the other's behavior and experience? What is the history or relationship between these two cultural groups? Who has more power or privilege in this situation? What assumptions am I making about the other and what assumptions may the other be making about me?

Accuracy

This refers to accuracy in reading situations, valuing data and verification, and not giving in to preconceived theories, beliefs, and stereotypes regarding multicultural dynamics and conflict.

Individual Level.

Beyond awareness, individuals need to become as accurate as possible in the assessment of the conflict situations they face. In fact accuracy motives have been found to moderate an individual's more defensive motives by moving them into more systematic forms of information processing (Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, and Chen, 1996). This requires careful observation and the drawing of conclusions that are more

data driven (based on direct observations, facts, trends and figures) and less theory driven (e.g., based on cultural assumptions and stereotypes). Knowledge of common cultural stereotypes is critical here, as such information has been found to mitigate the use of stereotypical assumptions in discriminatory behavior (Devine, 1989). To increase accuracy, Osland and Bird (2000) suggest an intentional and iterative sense-making approach whereby the individual acts “like a scientist who holds conscious stereotypes and hypotheses in order to test them” (p. 75). A critically reflective mind-set where one also systematically interrogates assumptions and structures affecting power can help to bring about assessments based on a more objective accounting of conflict situations, cultural influences, and concomitant power dynamics (Reynolds, 1998).

Organizational Level.

Multicultural accuracy in conflict at this level requires data-based approaches to acquiring knowledge at preconflict, present, and postconflict stages. Preconflict, it is critical that organizations collect baseline data regarding the hiring, retention, treatment, and perceptions of members of different cultural and ethnic groups. This information can provide critical information to the organization on trends in the climate of discrimination, multiculturalism, and diversity and therefore provide a sense of context when multicultural conflicts arise. During a conflict, organizations must be vigilant in analyzing the situation by gathering data from all relevant parties, being careful not to exclude or mute minority voices. Analysis of the conflict and examination of multicultural data, themes, and patterns should foster more accurate assessment. Postconflict, action should be taken to evaluate the short- and long-term impact of the conflict processes and outcomes to ensure the greater effectiveness and fairness of processes, procedures, and policies. In

taking these measures, organizations can identify strengths to leverage, weaknesses to target, opportunities to nurture, and threats to suppress that will foster not only greater accuracy but awareness, adaptability, and accountability in managing multicultural conflicts.

The need for accuracy raises several questions including these: What actual evidence do I have to support the conclusions I have made? What does the person's nonverbal behavior tell me? What am I not seeing? What impact does the historical treatment of different groups in this context have on these events?

Adaptivity

Adaptivity refers to responding to multicultural conflict in a manner that fits the demands of the situation.

Individual Level.

While the first two A's of I-AM are crucial for helping to make sense of a conflict situation, this third component helps individuals to respond in multiculturally appropriate ways (see Coleman et al., 2012). Adaptivity requires disputants to be oriented to the demands of situations and capable of gleaning what is relevant and irrelevant to the conflict. Thus, higher degrees of cultural intelligence (Earley and Ang, 2003) and social perceptiveness or the capacity to be aware of and sensitive to the differing needs, goals, and demands of others (Zaccaro, Foti, and Kenny, 1991) is core to adaptivity. Kang and Shaver (2004) found that higher emotional complexity (the degree to which an individual has a broad range of emotional experiences, and the capacity to make subtle distinctions within emotion categories) leads individuals to be more oriented to and empathetic with the feelings of others and thus have greater degrees of interpersonal adaptability. In addition, higher self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974), or the tendency for people

to monitor themselves in social situations and behave in a manner that is responsive to social cues and situational context, also plays a role in conflict adaptation.

Even when situations are perceived accurately, an adaptive individual must also be able to respond in ways that fit the situation. Thus, an enhanced behavioral skill set is needed in order to respond fittingly. Zaccaro et al. (1991) found that behavioral flexibility, defined as the ability and willingness to respond in significantly different ways to correspondingly different situational requirements, is a critical component of adaptive leadership. Behaviorally, an individual needs to possess a range of conflict management responses that he or she can employ appropriately given the expectations of the other party and broader environmental demands. In order to do so authentically and successfully, one must be learning agile, that is, have the "willingness and ability to learn new competencies in order to perform under first-time, tough, or different conditions" (Lombardo and Eichinger, 2000, p. 323).

Leaders also play an important role in multicultural conflict processes in organizations. Monocultural leaders tend to approach the management of conflict in multicultural organizations in a manner that fails to de-escalate tensions, neglects attention to dominant power structures, and ignores the importance of reducing stereotypical thinking and behavior (Canen and Canen, 2008). This type of leadership behavior has been linked to bullying, silencing, low morale, a divisive climate, and decreased organizational performance (Canen and Canen, 2008). Multicultural leaders are more nimble. They read situations more carefully, consider their short- and longer-term objectives, and then employ a variety of strategies in order to increase the probabilities that their agenda will succeed. They know the difference between a temporary dispute and a long-term war. They know when to stay the course and when to

change strategies. They recognize that good leadership requires both a sense of stability, vision, and purpose and the capacity to respond effectively to important changes in the landscape.

Organizational Level.

Organizations can benefit from a culture of openness to different experiences and learning at the institutional level. In response to multicultural conflicts, organizations should have at their disposal a range of conflict management strategies and should be ready to deploy any number of them. Cox (1993) identified five sources of conflict in multicultural organizations—competitive goals, resources, cultural differences, power discrepancies, and identity negation—and suggested that diversity in conflict management strategies is essential for intervening in these tensions. Specifically, in addressing power-related conflicts, he recommended changing the organizational context (e.g., restructuring), using collaborative and distributive problem solving, redefining organizational processes and policies, removing personnel who act as barriers to equality, making hierarchical appeals, and organizing structured interactions between parties.

With respect to structured interaction, intergroup dialogue is a strategy commonly employed to facilitate the reduction of multicultural conflict within an organization. Engagement in dialogue across difference can increase self-awareness of cultural identity and centrality (Nagda and Zúñiga, 2003). In a review article, Dessel and Rogge (2008) synthesized the outcomes related to intergroup dialogue interventions, which included increased perspective taking, complex thinking about difference, appreciation for power systems, self-efficacy for managing conflict, positive relationships, and reduced stereotyping and bias.

Adaptivity heightens the importance of the following issues: What does this specific cultural situation call for? What are my behavioral and organizational options here? If I employ these options, will I achieve my goals? What behavioral alternatives can I employ if my intent does not match the impact of my deescalation tactics?

Accountability

Accountability to self, other, and community is accomplished through eliciting, institutionalizing, and reading feedback and responding with appropriate reforms.

Individual Level.

To be accountable is to take and own responsibility for multiculturally appropriate processes and outcomes in conflict. This requires a continuous process of critical self-reflection on the part of individuals as they interact with members of other groups (Reynolds, 1998). Of paramount concern is the balancing and achievement of procedural, distributive, and interactional fairness in conflict (see chapter 1 in this Handbook). Even when both parties cannot get their needs met, individuals must demonstrate respect for the culture and identity of the other. Maintaining a sense of integrity and follow-through is essential to preserving identity.

Organizational Level.

Most organizations profess to value accountability with regard to diversity but fail to establish measures to ensure it; thus, it is a developmental opportunity for many (Sue, 2008). Formalizing multicultural accountability requires prioritizing and institutionalizing procedural, distributive, and interactional forms of justice. Organizations should establish a systematic process for conducting periodic institutional research and evaluative studies that can track

trends in the organizational climate with respect to discrimination and diversity. This should entail examining the overall climate with respect to race, culture, and diversity (RCD), with particular attention to inclusiveness and antidiscrimination patterns over time. In addition, they should evaluate and monitor the perceived quality of existing RCD initiatives in the eyes of key constituent groups. Questions would aim to gather information on respondent perceptions of discrimination and exclusion; support, inclusion, and opportunity; and impact of existing RCD initiatives in improving the organization's climate with respect to RCD.

Other questions guiding the evaluation process could focus on the impact of programs such as affirmative action on recruitment and retention of various categories of employees. Self-report data should be complemented with hard quantitative data on the frequencies and types of grievances recorded by year and constituent group, with similar data on recruitment, tenure, promotion, and self-motivated employee departures. Specific trends that could be monitored are frequency of grievances by year, types of incidents by year, frequency of incident by type and constituent category, and cross-tabulations of frequency and type of incidents by Title Nine categories (nationality, race-ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religion, disability, income-social class).

Ultimately the timely dissemination of reports, along with use of the results and findings for making organizational improvements, is key to bringing about transformative institutional change. Collectively and over time, the evaluations may yield generalizable principles and suggest models that enhance our understanding of factors that contribute to and promote organizational health with respect to RCD. Any new initiatives implemented following

presentation of RCD climate reports should themselves be subjected to evaluative inquiry in forthcoming studies.

CASE STUDY: MULTICULTURALISM AND THE BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA

The Boy Scouts of America (BSA) is an iconic American institution currently in the throes of an intense multicultural conflict. With its mission to prepare “young people to make ethical and moral choices over their lifetimes,” the organization has been struggling with the boundaries of its own ethics and morals. The BSA’s ban on gay membership has placed issues of civil rights, fairness, values, religion, respect, exclusion and inclusion, and dignity at the forefront of a contentious political and personal issue. Coming under increasing fire for not allowing openly gay members to participate, this situation reflects the national broadening of equal rights and antidiscrimination policies to include the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer (LGBTQ) community. What values-based organizations like the BSA must reflect on during multicultural expansions and transitions is how the traditional translation of their values excludes and marginalizes certain groups.

Building on the current BSA conflict, we analyze the situation through the lens of I-AM to highlight its practical implications at the organizational level. Our focus is on the position of the BSA and how in this unfolding story, the components of I-AM have and have not been applied. This is not to suggest that those in opposition to the BSA’s handling of LGBTQ issues in scouting are exempt from the principles of I-AM in this situation. It is our contention, however, that because the BSA holds a position of dominant power with regard to decision-making capacity to change or not change its policies, the use of I-AM will have the greatest impact when undertaken by the higher-power group.

Founded in 1910, the BSA has served more than 114 million youth in its 103-year history with the help of more than 33 million volunteers (BSA, 2010). In three main programs—Cub Scouts, Boy Scouts, and Venturing—the BSA uses experiential learning in the form of outdoor adventure to teach youth knowledge and skills. The values impressed on its members include doing one's best to fulfill duty in serving God and country, help others, and keep oneself "morally straight" (BSA, 1911). The touted benefits of BSA involvement include academic enhancement, confidence, ethical development, leadership skills, and citizenship skills (BSA, 2001).

The conflict regarding the exclusion of members based on sexual orientation gained heightened public attention after the US Supreme Court's ruling in 2000 upheld the BSA's legal right to ban openly gay individuals from participating as members or volunteers. The BSA's argument for excluding gays is a heteronormative one in that the organization views homosexuality as inconsistent with its traditional moral values and feels the inclusion of gay individuals would inhibit the BSA's ability to advocate and inculcate its beliefs in youth members. While the nation's highest court has affirmed the BSA's argument, public sentiment has increasingly assailed the institution's membership requirements, leading to a proposed resolution that would allow openly gay youth as members but maintain the ban on participation of adult leaders and volunteers who are openly gay (BSA, 2013a). The BSA's 1,400-member voting community voted in May 2013 to accept the new policy which will take effect on January 1, 2014 (BSA, 2013b). Varying positions on the issue abound and resonate with elements crucial to multicultural conflict. We explore the primary position of the BSA and how the organization could have engaged the conflict with greater awareness, accuracy, adaptability, and accountability.

We start with I-AM's focus on awareness. Over the past twenty years, the BSA has been compelled to increase self-awareness as a result of objections to its exclusionary practices. Starting with the events leading up to the Supreme Court decision, when James Dale, a lifelong member of the BSA in New Jersey, was expelled from his duties as a scoutmaster for coming out as gay when he started college and subsequently filed a lawsuit, the BSA has intermittently needed to reflect on its core assumptions, beliefs, and values, which it has done and reaffirmed time and again. Arguably, however, this has been done in limited scope. For instance, has the organization considered in its awareness the full landscape of gay oppression within the United States? Within society, the LGBTQ community is typically not treated with helpfulness, friendliness, courtesy, or kindness, all explicit standards of conduct toward others in the Scout Law (BSA, 1911). From this perspective, the BSA could be perceived as violating the very tenets it seeks to uphold. Thus, if the BSA were to think about the application of its values and the implications of exclusion more broadly, perhaps it could have allowed a redefining of what it means to be "morally straight" as an individual participant and as an organization with a social mission.

The I-AM dimension of accuracy is also relevant in this conflict. As the BSA revisited its membership standards more critically over the past ten years, it has been difficult for its leaders to ignore the changing attitudes of Americans. To its credit with respect to accuracy and recognizing the increasing diversity of the nation and lifestyles, the organization itself commissioned research about American values in 1995 and in 2005 (BSA) as a means of assessing value change over time; however, the data do not reflect explicit attitudes regarding sexual orientation or values that might be directly related to it. Despite this lack of specific information, in 2000, following

the Supreme Court's decision, the BSA (2000), in an "Open Letter to America's Families," stated that its "values are consistent with the ideals embraced by most American families and are grounded in the tenets and teachings of the majority of the world's religions. We believe an avowed homosexual is not a role model for the values espoused in the Scout Oath and Law."

Americans may still embrace BSA ideals broadly, but certainly the attitudinal tide regarding whether homosexuality is contradictory to these ideals is changing. According to one current poll, 63 percent of Americans are in support of ending the ban for youth, and 56 percent are in favor of allowing openly gay adult volunteers (Clement, 2013). Other aspects of accuracy, however, have probably not been so obvious to the organization and build on the BSA's potentially limited awareness. As part of its investigation into the potential value conflict in having gay members, did the BSA challenge its own assumptions about homosexuality, gay culture, and the LGBTQ community? A thorough and accurate understanding of the group the BSA banned would have included seeking out information about the other from the other. Preconceived notions and negative stereotypes concerning LGBTQ individuals are pervasive. Deliberation regarding these assumptions as well as perceived value and lifestyle differences could have mitigated the harmful and unfair generalizations that likely played a role in determining the BSA's policy.

The BSA's revision of its standards also demonstrates the importance of adaptability. With declining membership linked to the organization's resistance to inclusion along lines of sexual orientation (Arneil, 2010) and the cutting of funds by corporate donors (Dade, 2013), the BSA increasingly faces a reality that threatens its existence. Its recent attempt at flexibility, however, comes more than twenty years after James Dale publicized the conflict

through litigation. When the organization found out about Dale's sexual orientation through a newspaper article mentioning Dale's leadership role in a gay and lesbian student group at his university, it immediately sent a letter to Dale revoking his membership (Hutchinson, 2001). Had the BSA had a culture that was adaptive and open to learning, it would have engaged Dale directly to explore the issue and employ creative problem solving. The time would have been ripe to reflect on entrenched patterns of assuming, believing, and being, but the organization's rigid culture and celebrated reliance on tradition prevented it from even considering other responses as alternatives. With an orientation toward adaptivity, perhaps the organization's membership standards would have changed long before now. Still, in its attempts to flex, the organization has used dialogue with its multiple stakeholders for nearly three years in coming to the current resolution (BSA, 2013a).

Finally there is the notion of accountability. The BSA has acknowledged greater accountability to the youth of America by proposing to end the ban. In its own words, the organization has justified the inclusion of gay youth by highlighting the vision "to prepare *every* [emphasis added] eligible youth in America to become a responsible, participating citizen and leader who is guided by the Scout Oath and Scout Law," noting that "youth are still developing, learning about themselves and who they are," and that "the organization's policies must be based on what is in the best interest of its young people, and the organization will work to stay focused on that which unites us" (BSA, 2013a, p. 8). Now that voting members have agreed to lift the ban on gay youth members, the integrity with which the new policy is implemented will be an additional test of the BSA's commitment to accountability. The institution could do this by assessing the impact of its decision through surveys with current members and

volunteers, including measures of climate, participation, and retention rates at multiple intervals to ascertain the BSA's progression toward a more inclusive organization. There is also the question of whether and when the BSA will expand its level of consciousness to permit openly gay adult leaders and accept them as role models for youth, comparable in worthiness to heterosexual volunteers. It would require a reframing in leaders' response to whom the BSA is accountable and how accountability is demonstrated in this environment.

Internal integration, rather than external adaptation, has been the priority for the BSA. The organization has stood, towering and immutable, firm in its core values and beliefs, but now finds itself necessarily in an awkward modern dance of fit, fairness, and integrity. Whether those in support of preserving BSA's policy or those in support of breaking down barriers to participation, there seems to be uneasiness about this alteration in organizational identity. No one is completely satisfied, and things might get messier before they get better, but one should expect nothing less in this case of multicultural conflict. I-AM is not a recipe for resolution but a framework that respects and helps organize the inherent messiness of managing the tough multicultural issues we face in today's world.

CONCLUSION

The eager and sincere vetting of multiculturalism as a framework for ensuring the recognition, value, and dignity of cultures has made it a viable approach to addressing sociocultural justice issues. Flawed yet attractive, it has advanced the conversation about culture and diversity to critical and nuanced effect. It has much to offer with respect to how we conceptualize, analyze, research, and practice conflict and its resolution. Our recommendation is to

approach multicultural conflicts at the most provocative level, as we believe that working diligently through the accompanying discomfort and complexity will have the greatest positive impact for socially just outcomes. We hope that we have provided a realistic preview of multicultural conflict resolution's strengths, weaknesses, and applications.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT COOPERATIVE AND COMPETITIVE CONFLICT IN CHINA

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China is a powerful test of the universalistic aspirations of Deutsch's (1949, 1973) theory of cooperation and competition and, in particular, its utility for understanding the conditions and dynamics through which conflict becomes constructive. China would seem to be a most inhospitable culture for the theory. As part of a collectivist culture, Chinese people are expected to be particularly wary of conflict and its open discussion (Leung, 1997). Many social scientists consider the application of Western developed theories to Asia unwarranted, even "imperialistic" (Li, Leung, Chen, and Luo, 2012). Since 1994, we have conducted cooperation and competition research in China and East Asia by using experimental, survey, and interview methods to understand interdependence and conflict and their manifestations in areas such as organizational teamwork and leadership, supply chain relationships, and government-business partnerships.

Although the work of Deutsch and other theorists of conflict management cannot be assumed to apply to other cultures, conflict theories that cannot be applied to various cultures are increasingly irrelevant in our global marketplace. Demonstrating that this theory can be applied in China would seem to be strong indirect evidence that it can be useful in various cultures and countries. In addition to substantial research in North America and growing

research in China, studies directly document the value of the theory in other countries, including those in Europe and the Middle East (Desivilya, Somech, and Lidgoster, 2010; Tjosvold and Chia, 1989; Tjosvold and de Dreu, 1997; Vollmer and Seyr, 2012) as well as India (Bhatnagar and Tjosvold, 2012), Japan, and Korea (Chen, Tjosvold, and Pan, 2010; Tjosvold, Nibler, and Wan, 2001; Tjosvold and Sasaki, 1994; Tjosvold, Sasaki, and Moy, 1998; Tjosvold and Tsao, 1989).

This chapter proposes that the considerable research documenting the value of the theory for China, coupled with studies conducted in other countries, suggests that the cooperative and competitive framework can be fruitfully applied to understand conflict management in non-Western as well as Western cultures. However, much more research is needed to support the argument that the theory of cooperation and competition is highly useful for understanding conflict management worldwide.

Deutsch's (1949) original theory aims to explain the development of relationships and values; actors were expected to have motives and goals, without assuming particular values and preconditions. China provides an opportunity to understand how values and other preconditions have an impact on the cooperative and competitive management of conflict. Chinese people are, for example, thought to be particularly oriented toward the projection and protection of social face and to rely on high-context, nonverbal communication. Studies have focused on the impact of Chinese values on cooperative conflict.

Westerners, believing they are open and responsive, often conclude that Chinese people avoid conflict and are closed to dealing with differences. They see themselves as democratic and Chinese as autocratic. Our studies explore and explode these generalizations about China.

The chapter first summarizes arguments against generalizing Deutsch's theory to China and East Asia. It then describes our experimental, interview, and survey research approaches. Our studies show that Chinese people can use open discussions productively, especially within a cooperative context, and they value relationship-oriented, cooperative leadership. Research in China is just beginning to challenge and extend the theory. The final sections outline research and major practical implications, including how to manage conflict in Sino-Western teamwork.

SHOULD THE THEORY OF COOPERATION AND COMPETITION BE APPLIED IN CHINA?

Many social scientists are skeptical that Western theories can be applied in such collectivist cultures as China, arguing that an imposed theoretical framework captures the cultural experience only of the West. Specific objections can be raised to the application of Deutsch's theory. The theory assumes that individuals are self-interested. Their actions and feelings are hypothesized to depend on whether they believe their self-interests are cooperatively or competitively related. As collectivists rather than individualists, Chinese are thought to pursue the interests of their groups rather than their own individual interests. Is the Deutsch assumption that self-interest motivates group behavior justified in China?

A related objection is that in a collectivist society, Chinese people are highly oriented toward cooperation rather than competition and independence. Are the Chinese able to interact in competitive and independent ways, or are these experiences infrequent and countercultural?

Deutsch argued that conflict is an inevitable aspect of social interdependence and that even with highly cooperative goals, group members conflict. However, the Chinese culture highly values harmony, making conflict anathema.

A related though somewhat inconsistent objection is that conflict, when surfaced, is inevitably competitive, although Deutsch argued that conflict has a cooperative face. The Chinese word for *conflict* connotes "warfare," suggesting that conflict is invariably win-lose. Is the cooperative conflict approach viable in China?

Chinese people are thought to avoid conflict because they are particularly sensitive to social face and highly averse to interpersonal hostility and assertive ways of handling frustrations and problems. These values make it difficult to initiate conflict; even disagreeing easily and nonverbally communicates an aggressive affront to face. With social face values, can conflict be dealt with directly and open-mindedly?

Chinese society is considered traditional and hierarchical—one where employees readily defer to their superiors. But open conflict is more consistent with participative management. Is open-minded discussion consistent with hierarchical values in China?

More generally, the open-minded teamwork proposed by Deutsch's theory supports organizations pressured to maximize value for customers. Deming and other popular theorists have argued that teamwork and conflict are necessary because of market demands to serve customers with quality products and services. China still remains a largely centrally controlled economy dominated by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that appease ministers rather than serve customers. Are Chinese organizations using cooperative conflict to serve customers?

Studies have directly tested the validity of Deutsch's theory in China. Before examining these findings, the next section reviews the experimental and field methods employed.

RESEARCH METHODS IN CHINA

North American research methods to test the theory, like the theory itself, cannot be assumed to apply in China. East Asian researchers have modified our North American methods. Trained in both the East and West and based in East Asia, researchers have debated the theory and developed the methods. The research network itself has demonstrated the value of cooperative teamwork and constructive controversy. We are most grateful for our colleagues' openness and contributions to the research.

In an initial step, network members as well as managers in the region argued that cooperation and competition were both important in Chinese organizations. Concretely, they translated the major concepts and research questions into Cantonese (the local Hong Kong dialect), Mandarin (the national language of China), Japanese, and Korean. This process also simplified and improved the English operations. Interview, questionnaire, and experimental methods have all been used to test the theory.

Interviews

The interview studies have employed the critical incident methodology. Rather than provide general ratings, respondents describe concrete experiences. Interviewers can establish a relationship with the respondents, provide an informal and personal climate, clarify and answer questions, and encourage the respondents. Chinese people, with their relationship-oriented culture, were thought likely to respond positively to this climate.

The interview has a highly defined structure. For example, in a study on developing commitment to Japanese organizations in Hong Kong, Japanese and Chinese managers were asked to identify a specific interaction that affected their commitment and to describe the setting, what occurred, and the consequences (Tjosvold, Hui, and Law, 1998). Then they answered specific questions about goal interdependence, constructive controversy, and consequences that allow statistical tests of the framework and hypotheses.

The interviews provided rich descriptive information about effective and ineffective interaction between Japanese and Chinese that affected commitment. Data were coded and sorted to identify the reasons for cooperative, competitive, and independent goals; the interaction behaviors that occurred; and the consequences of the interactions. These interview methods have been used to study cooperation, competition, and constructive controversy in a variety of organizational contexts.

Questionnaires

Questionnaire surveys allow for the sampling of many people and the use of independent sources for outcome measures. For example, 191 pairs of supervisors and employees were recruited from ten SOEs in Nanjing and Shanghai to participate in a leadership study on goal interdependence, justice, and citizenship behavior (Tjosvold, Hui, Ding, and Hu, 2002).

Employees completed questionnaires on cooperation, competition, independence, and constructive controversy with their supervisors and their level of procedural, distributive, and interactional justice. Their supervisors completed questionnaires on the extent to which the employees engaged in in-role performance (productivity)

and extra-role performance (organizational citizenship). The overall model supported by a structural equation analysis of the data showed that a strong sense of justice promoted cooperative goals. These goals led to open-minded, constructive controversy, which in turn resulted in high levels of job performance and citizenship behavior.

Experiments

Experiments directly test hypothesized causal relationships with high internal validity. We theorized, for example, that open discussion of conflict need not affront social face in China and could contribute to effective problem solving when face was confirmed (Tjosvold, Hui, and Sun, 2004). Eighty participants from a university in Guangzhou were randomly assigned to four conditions: open discussion–affront to face, open discussion–confirmation of face, avoiding discussion–affront, and avoiding discussion–confirmation.

To begin, the participants read that as supervisors, they were to meet with employees about job rotation. The supervisor, as a representative of management, opposed this job rotation as inefficient. The “open” participants read where their organization valued frank discussion of differences and where they could earn up to five chances in a lottery if they discussed their differences openly and directly. The “avoiding” participants would earn chances to the extent that they minimized their disagreement.

After eight minutes of discussion, the participant and a confederate completed a questionnaire with the social face induction, which the experimenter unexpectedly exchanged between them. The “affront” participants read the confederate’s ratings indicating that they were seen as ineffective and the “confirm” participants that they were seen as effective. After another ten minutes, participants

made the decision, were fully debriefed, and were given a small gift and one chance in a lottery.

The number of questions the participants asked measured curiosity and their listing the opposing arguments measured learning. Participants also indicated on seven-point scales their interest in learning and the strength of their relationship. Their decisions were coded as to the extent that they integrated the opposing view into their decision. Results indicated that the Chinese participants were curious, informed, and integrative when they had an open discussion, especially when their face was confirmed.

Interview, surveys, and experiments have their strengths and limitations. Our results are not method specific and deserve confidence because they are derived from diverse methods.

EAST ASIAN TESTS OF THE THEORY

Results of experiments, surveys, and interview studies provide consistent support that Deutsch's theory is useful for understanding conflict management in China. Cooperative conflict dynamics have been found to contribute substantially to effective teamwork, leadership, and quality customer service in today's Chinese organizations. This section first reviews experiments indicating that discussion of conflicting opinions in a cooperative context promotes open-mindedness and integrated solutions (Chen, Lu, and Tjosvold, 2008; Chen, Tjosvold, Huang, and Xu, 2011; Chen, Tjosvold, and Wu, 2008a; Tjosvold and Sun, 2005, 2010). The second part summarizes surveys that provide evidence that these causal relationships generalize to Chinese organizations and demonstrate how Chinese values can contribute to constructive conflict (Chen, Tjosvold, Li, Fu, and Liu, 2011; Chen et al., 2008; Tjosvold, Wu, and Chen, 2010). The third

part reviews studies showing that the cooperative and competitive approach to conflict is useful for understanding relationships between organizations as well as within them. The final part reviews evidence that diverse people can use the cooperative and competitive framework to guide their cross-cultural collaboration.

Cooperation, Open-Minded Discussion, and Effectiveness: Experiments

Chinese people who had cooperative compared to competitive goals demonstrated more openness toward the opposing position and negotiator (Tjosvold and Sun, 2001). Participants in cooperation were committed to mutual benefit, were interested in learning more about the opposing views, considered these views useful, had come to agree with them, and tended to integrate them into their own decisions. They were more attracted to the other protagonist and had greater confidence in working together in the future than did participants in the competitive condition.

Perhaps more surprising, the Chinese participants were able to use and responded favorably to open discussion itself. Direct disagreement, compared to smoothing over the opposing views, strengthened relationships, and induced curiosity where Chinese people asked questions, explored opposing views, demonstrated knowledge, and worked to integrate diverse views (Tjosvold and Sun, 2003). Indicating that they found open discussion valuable, participants characterized protagonists who disagreed directly and openly as strong persons and competent negotiators, whereas avoiding protagonists were considered weak and ineffectual.

Chinese participants were found to choose disagreement when they felt confident in their own abilities (Tjosvold et

al., 2001). Protagonists used direct controversy to build a cooperative relationship and open-mindedly explored and understood the opposing view, whereas avoiders were competitive and unaware of the opposing ideas (Tjosvold and Sun, 2003). In another experiment, participants in China found that open compared to avoiding discussion and problem solving compared to blaming stimulated the exploration, integration, and adoption of alternative ideas as well as strengthened interpersonal relationships (Tjosvold and Sun, 2005). Evidence also suggests that openness and problem solving have these effects by developing perceived cooperative interdependence that encourages people to believe that incorporating alternative ideas can help them succeed. Avoidance and blaming result in a competitive struggle to see who can impose their ideas on the others, leaving people committed to their original thinking.

Cooperation, Open-Minded Discussion, and Effectiveness: Surveys in Chinese Organizations

Field studies provide evidence that the experimental findings apply to various kinds of tasks and organizational settings in China. Cooperative goals have been found to predict open-minded discussion of diverse views (Chen and Tjosvold, in press; Snell, Tjosvold, and Su, 2006; Tjosvold, Chen, Huang, and Xu, 2012; Tjosvold, Peng, Chen, and Su, 2012; Tjosvold and Su, 2007; Wang, Chen, Tjosvold, and Shi, 2010; Wong, Tjosvold, and Chen, 2010). Studies also indicate that managing conflict for mutual benefit (cooperative conflict) promotes effective teamwork and leadership (Chen, Liu, and Tjosvold, 2005; Chen, Tjosvold, and Su, 2005a; Tjosvold, Poon, and Yu, 2005; Tjosvold and Wong, 2010; Tjosvold, Yu, and Wu, 2009; Tjosvold, Law, and Sun, 2006; Zhang, Cao, and Tjosvold, 2011).

In a study of thirty-nine groups and their supervisors in Hangzhou, China, work teams in China that used open-minded, constructive discussion of their differences promoted product quality and cost reduction; these discussions were more likely with cooperative than competitive goals (Tjosvold and Wang, 1998). Cooperative, open-minded discussions of service problems helped restaurant employees work together to serve their customers (Tjosvold, Moy, and Sasaki, 1996). Conflicts over scarce resources have been thought particularly divisive. However, an open-minded discussion helped Hong Kong accountants and managers resolve budget issues, strengthen their relationships, and improve budget quality so that limited financial resources were used wisely (Poon, Pike, and Tjosvold, 2001). These discussions were much more likely with cooperative than competitive goals.

Constructive controversy can be useful for Chinese people to deal with both task and emotional issues. Over one hundred teams working in Chinese organizations that discussed issues open-mindedly were able to deal with biases and took risks effectively (Tjosvold and Yu, 2007). These risk-taking groups were able both to innovate and recover from their mistakes. Constructive controversy also helped managers and employees in Hong Kong and the Chinese mainland express and handle their anger productively (Tjosvold, 2002; Tjosvold and Su, 2007).

Earlier studies found that cooperative goals and constructive controversy were useful for Singaporean Chinese managers and employees to resolve issues and work productively together (Tjosvold and Chia, 1989; Tjosvold and Tsao, 1989). Findings also demonstrated that student groups that have cooperative goals have more open-minded and more productive discussion of diverse ideas than those with competitive and independent goals

(G. Chen and Tjosvold, 2002a; Tjosvold, Wong, Nibler, and Pounder, 2002).

Cooperative approaches to managing conflict, evidence suggests, are typically more productive for getting things done as well as developing relationships compared to competitive and avoiding approaches to conflict. Cooperative conflict was found to help one hundred work teams in Shanghai, China, reflect on their work effectively so that they could adjust and strengthen their procedures (Tjosvold, Yu, and Hui, 2004). Teams that rated themselves as high on cooperative conflict and reflexivity were productive and good organizational citizens as rated by their managers. Cooperative conflict was found to develop a sense of fairness in teams that helped them be productive (G. Chen and Tjosvold, 2002b). Work teams in China that worked cooperatively strengthened their confidence in their relationships, and this confidence in turn predicted team innovation (Wong, and Tjosvold, 2009).

Cooperative conflict management may be an important contributor to effective top management teams in China. Executives from 105 high-technology firms around Beijing who indicated that they relied on cooperative rather than competitive or avoiding conflict were rated by their CEOs as effective and their organizations as innovative (Chen, Liu, and Tjosvold, 2005).

Cooperative Conflict between Organizations in Chinese Society

Research has documented support for Deutsch's theorizing that the theory applies at the intergroup as well as the interpersonal level (Hempel, Zhang, and Tjosvold, 2009). Indeed, studies have used the theory to document that cooperative conflict management is useful for facilitating coordination among supply chain partners (Tjosvold, Wong,

and Chen, 2005; Wong et al., 2010; Wong, Tjosvold, and Zhang, 2005a; Wong, Tjosvold, Wong, and Liu, 1999a, 1999b) and among competitors in the marketplace (Wong, Tjosvold, and Yu, 2005; Wong, Tjosvold, and Zhang, 2005b; Wong, Wei, and Tjosvold, 2011). Hong Kong, Korean, Taiwanese, and Japanese building contractors used cooperative conflict, but not competitive or avoiding conflict, to work successfully with their subcontractors (Tjosvold Cho, Park, Liu, Liu, and Sasaki, 2001). Studies indicate that cooperative conflict management promotes the effectiveness of partnerships between government officials and business managers (Tjosvold, Peng, Chen, and Su, 2008; Wong and Tjosvold, 2010). In addition to promoting teamwork and leadership, developing cooperative relationships and discussing conflicts for mutual benefit very much contribute to an effective functioning market economy and society.

CROSS-CULTURAL STUDIES

A few studies have directly suggested that the theory is useful in cross-cultural settings (Chen et al., 2010). Hong Kong senior accounting managers were found to be able to lead employees working on the mainland of China when they had cooperative goals but not when their goals were competitive or independent (Tjosvold and Moy, 1998). They were then able to discuss their views openly, which led to stronger relationships and productivity, consequences that resulted in future internal motivation.

Chinese employees described specific examples of when they worked with their American or Japanese managers (Chen et al., 2005a). Results indicated that cooperative goals contributed to an open discussion of views that led to productive collaborative work and strengthened relationships. Managers in the Hong Kong parent company

and new product specialists in Canada who developed cooperative links and engaged in constructive controversy were able to develop strong, trusting relationships despite their cultural differences and geographic separation (Tjosvold, 1999). Cooperative, constructive controversy interactions were also found critical for Chinese staff to work productively and develop relationships with Japanese managers, outcomes that built commitment to their Japanese companies (Tjosvold, Sasaki, and Moy, 1998). Cooperative conflict was found to help Chinese employees develop effective relationships with their Western managers (Chen, Tjosvold, and Su, 2005b).

More than two hundred Chinese employees from various industries in Beijing, Shanghai, Fujian, and Shandong indicated that cooperative, but not competitive or independent, goals helped them and their foreign managers develop a quality leader-member exchange relationship and improve leader effectiveness, employee commitment, and future collaboration (Chen and Tjosvold, in press). Cooperative interdependence and open discussion of opposing views appear to be important for overcoming obstacles and developing an effective leader relationship within and across cultural boundaries (Tjosvold and Moy, 1998).

Field and experimental studies in North America and Asia provide strong internal and external validity to central hypotheses of cooperative and competitive approaches to conflict. Whether protagonists emphasize cooperative or competitive goals dramatically affects the dynamics and outcomes of their conflict management. Contradicting cultural stereotypes, Chinese participants appear to appreciate others who speak their minds directly and cooperatively.

CHINESE VALUES FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN CHINA

Chinese people have traditionally been characterized as conflict avoiders because as collectivists, they do not want to risk their relationships with open disagreement. However, as the previous section suggests, Chinese people are able to use cooperative goals as a basis for discussing their ideas openly and productively. This section reviews research that directly examines how values can affect conflict management. It argues that collectivist-valuing relationships are not an impediment to effective conflict management, and indeed, as the studies reviewed already indicate, cooperative relationships are a foundation for open, constructive conflict.

Leung and his colleagues (Leung, Koch, and Lu, 2002; Leung, Brew, Zhang, and Zhang, 2011) have proposed that harmony has two distinct motives in Chinese society. Disintegration avoidance is instrumental in nature in that maintenance of harmony is a means to other ends. With this motive, people avoid conflict as a way to further their self-interests and avoid potential interpersonal problems. Harmony, though, can also refer to the desire to engage in behaviors that strengthen relationships, a motive called harmony enhancement. This motivation represents a genuine concern for harmony as a value in and of itself and involves feelings of intimacy, closeness, trust, and compatible and mutually beneficial behaviors. Leung et al. (2011) found that this harmony value, which has a long tradition in the collectivist Chinese culture, is related to problem solving in conflict management, whereas disintegration avoidance is related to conflict avoidance. Some collectivist values in Chinese societies are conducive to open conflict management.

Consistent with Leung's argument, a study of 194 teams in three regions of China suggests the positive role of collectivist values on conflict (Tjosvold, Law, and Sun, 2003). Teams that had developed collectivist rather than individualistic values were found to have cooperative goals. The analysis also indicated that these cooperative goals helped the teams discuss their opposing views openly and constructively; the result was strong relationships and productivity as rated by their managers.

A recent experiment supported the causal relationships that collectivist values heighten cooperative goals and open-minded controversy. Chinese protagonists with opposing views in organizations that valued collectivism, compared to individualism, were found to feel cooperatively interdependent (Tjosvold and Wu, 2005). They were also confident that they could work together and make decisions, sought to understand the opposing position by asking questions, demonstrated that they understood the opposing arguments, accepted these arguments as reasonable, and combined positions to create an integrated decision.

Additional experimental studies indicate that social face concerns, when expressed by confirming the face of protagonists, can promote cooperative conflict in China (Tjosvold, Hui, and Sun, 2000; Tjosvold and Sun, 2001). Emphasizing their cooperative goals, protagonists demonstrated more curiosity in that they explored the opposing views and were interested in hearing more of the others' arguments. Protagonists whose face was confirmed, compared to those affronted, were prepared to pressure the others, and when they also disagreed, they experienced more collaborative influence. They also indicated that they learned in the discussion, considered the opposing views useful, and worked to integrate and accept them. Studies also indicate that confirmation of social face helped

Chinese people discuss their frustrations cooperatively and productively (Peng and Tjosvold, 2011; Tjosvold, Hui, Ding, and Hu, 2002).

Chinese people have been theorized to avoid conflict because they assume that conflict requires coercion and they prefer persuasion. However, conflict can give rise to either persuasion or coercion. Persuasive influence was found to result in feelings of respect, cooperative relationships, and openness to others and their positions (Tjosvold and Sun, 2001). Persuasion compared to coercion helped discussants seek mutual benefit, listen to each other openly, integrate their reasoning, and strengthen their relationship.

Chinese culture has been characterized as a high-context society where implicit communication is influential (Gudykunst, Ting-Toomey, and Chua, 1988). Conflict is avoided because open conflict communicates interpersonal hostility. However, nonverbal communication can help develop a cooperative context for conflict discussion. Expressing warmth compared to coldness developed a cooperative, mutually beneficial relationship with the opposing discussant (Tjosvold and Sun, 2003). Protagonists who experienced warmth incorporated the opposing view and reasoning into their decision and thinking and were confident they could work with the others in the future.

Chinese values are not only compatible with cooperative goals and constructive controversy; they can be a valuable foundation for them. Feeling collective, endorsing harmony enhancement rather than disintegration avoidance, being sensitive to social face and in particular confirming social face, using persuasive influence attempts, and expressing interpersonal warmth have been found to help Chinese managers, employees, and partners deal with their differences openly and productively.

LEADERSHIP IN A HIERARCHICAL SOCIETY

Although leaders not only have conflict with employees, they often get involved in resolving conflicts between employees and departments. However, conflict management research has not been brought to bear much in the study of leadership. This section reviews research using Deutsch's theory to understand leadership strategies and effectiveness in China and to show that leaders in China who manage conflict cooperatively can provide direction to get things done and strengthen their relationships.

A persistent Western stereotype is that Chinese leadership is autocratic: followers quickly and automatically follow the wishes and decisions of leaders. Consistent with this image of power distance, Chinese employees have been found to accept unilateral decision making and prefer their leaders to be benevolent autocrats (Leung, 1997). Whereas superior power in the West is often associated with domination and authoritarianism, leaders in China are expected to be supportive and nurturing (Spencer-Oatey, 1997).

Our research challenges Western stereotypes and indicates that effective leaders in China must develop an open, mutual relationship with employees (Chen and Tjosvold, in press; Liu, Tjosvold, and Yu, 2004; Tjosvold, Hui, and Su, 2004; Tjosvold and Leung, 2004; Tjosvold, Wong, and Hui, 2004). Authority cannot be assumed; leaders must earn it by demonstrating a commitment to employees and openness to them. Strong cooperative goals were found to be critical for a high-quality leader relationship, and this relationship in turn led to employees being effective organizational citizens (Tjosvold, Law, and Hui, 1996). An

open discussion of opposing views between leaders and employees was highly crucial, resulting in productive work, strong work relationships, experiencing the leader as democratic, and believing that both the leader and employee are powerful (Tjosvold, Hui, and Law, 1998). Hong Kong senior accounting managers were able to lead employees working on the mainland when they had cooperative goals, but not when their goals were competitive or independent (Tjosvold and Moy, 1998).

Democratic, open-minded leadership is valued in China; Chinese employees want a cooperative relationship with their leaders. Although they are hesitant to initiate conflictful discussions, they expect their leaders to consider their needs and views. Despite power distance values, cooperative conflict is a concrete way for managers in China to develop the leader relationship and demonstrate their openness. Cooperative conflict is an ideal that both managers and employees in China and in the West can aspire to.

DEVELOPING THE THEORY THROUGH RESEARCH IN CHINA

Studying conflict in different cultural contexts can challenge and refine understandings of cooperative and competitive conflict management. Our research in China has not capitalized much on this possibility, but there are worthwhile possibilities. Research in China has the potential to deepen our understanding of conflict and the theory of cooperation and competition.

Antecedents to Cooperative Goals

Chinese society has a unique relation system, *guanxi* , where personal connections are central to work.

Maintaining good relations is a key job motivator and ingredient for success. Particularistic ties—coming from the same village, attendance at the same school, and prior connections between fathers—all can build guanxi.

Research on guanxi may illuminate how cooperative goals evolve. Guanxi bases may be prima facie evidence that the partners are on the same side with cooperative goals, and these beliefs of cooperative interdependence in turn leads to mutual trust and assistance (Y. Chen and Tjosvold, 2007; Y. Chen et al., 2008a; Y. Chen, Tjosvold, and Wu, 2008b; Wong and Tjosvold, 2010). Guanxi bases, however, do not inevitably result in mutual relationships. Perhaps the development of competitive goals between partners can explain the failure to capitalize on guanxi bases. At present, it is unclear how guanxi may facilitate or hinder the development of cooperative goals. Studies could also explore the extent to which Westerners have similar relational ties that help them develop strongly cooperative relationships.

Research in China has begun to suggest conditions conducive to the formation of cooperative goals. Confirmation of face, implicit communication to convey warmth, benevolent and participative leadership, and in-group relationships and guanxi may convince Chinese people that their goals are cooperative. These conditions may also promote cooperative goals among Westerners.

Approaches to harmony may affect goal interdependence in China (Leung, 1997; Leung et al., 2002, 2011). Harmony enhancement—the desire to engage in behaviors that strengthen relationships—is solid and involves feelings of intimacy, closeness, trust, and compatible and mutually beneficial behaviors, whereas disintegration avoidance—a tendency to avoid actions that will strain a relationship—involves differences in values and interpersonal styles and

the avoidance of disagreement and conflict. Research can explore the hypothesis that harmony enhancement induces cooperative goals and constructive controversy whereas disintegration motives develop competitive goals and close-mindedness.

Competition and Conflict Avoidance

Research is needed on the conditions under which competitive goals and alternative approaches to cooperative conflict are useful in Chinese culture. One study suggests that competition can be constructive in China when competitors already have a quality interpersonal relationship (Tjosvold, Johnson, and Sun, 2006). China should be a fertile context to study when and how conflicts can be avoided (Peng and Tjosvold, 2011). Cooperative interpersonal relationships were found to be important to effective conflict avoidance (Tjosvold and Sun, 2002). Cooperative goals appear to be foundations for constructive competition and conflict avoidance.

Responsiveness to Goal Interdependence

A potential cultural difference is that Chinese people, as highly relationship oriented, may be particularly responsive to goal interdependence differences. They are flexible and responsive to the situation, and hence they may be very conscious of the goal relationship they have with others. In-group members are allies worthy of trust; out-group members are suspect. Leung (1988) found that, compared to Americans, Chinese were more likely to pursue conflict with a stranger and less likely to pursue conflict with a friend.

In North America, independent goals have an impact on dynamics and outcomes similar to but not as powerful as competition. However, in some field studies in China,

interactions characterized by independent goals have been more powerful and destructive than those characterized by competition (Tjosvold, 1998; Tjosvold and Poon, 1998). It can be speculated that Chinese people are particularly suspicious and closed-minded toward persons with whom they are not involved. They may find the lack of relationship implied by independent goals more highly disruptive of effective collaborative work than competition.

Becoming a Cooperative Conflict Team

Studies reviewed indicate that learning how to resolve conflicts cooperatively helps managers and employees build teamwork and strengthen supply chain and other partnerships that cross organizational boundaries. But how can individuals, teams, and organizations become committed and skilled at managing conflict cooperatively?

Research on cooperation and competition, as well as training research, indicates that employees need to be motivated and knowledgeable of the target ideas and behaviors, actively participate in the training, be trained as a cohort, and engage in ongoing development and feedback for effective training (Johnson, Druckman, and Dansereau, 1994). In addition, cooperative goals have been found to facilitate learning and application to a wide range of training objectives, including learning teamwork.

Cooperative goals should be strengthened over time and supported by ongoing feedback. Unresolved disputes, promotion opportunities, ineffective interaction, and many other developments may lead team members to emphasize that their goals are negatively or independently related. Competition and independence are both possible and, at times, highly appealing alternatives.

A major advantage of cooperative team training is that the use of cooperative groups can facilitate training goals

(Johnson et al., 1994). Team members become more knowledgeable and skilled in working cooperatively through team training and follow-up activities. The method of cooperative team training reinforces the message. Cooperative experiences also can improve feedback processes that stimulate learning. Chinese people have been found to be more accepting, open, and respectful of feedback when they are working cooperatively rather than competitively (Tjosvold, Tang, and West, 2004).

A combined consideration of training and cooperation and competition research suggests the following features for cooperative conflict training. Members from interdependent teams

1. Form cooperative learning teams to understand the theory and review the research to appreciate the value for them and their organization of strengthening cooperative goals and managing conflicts for mutual benefit. They learn how to reinforce cooperative goals and reduce competitive and independent ones.
2. Use cooperative conflict to discuss and decide whether they want to invest in developing cooperative teamwork.
3. Participate in follow-up activities after workshops to assess and receive feedback on their teamwork within and between groups and develop concrete ways to strengthen them.
4. Commit themselves to ongoing development of their cooperative teamwork.

Cooperative team workshop and two-month follow-up of team feedback and development followed these four steps to train teams in a high-technology company based in Beijing (Lu, Tjosvold, and Shi, 2010). Over 150 employees from all the teams in the company participated in the

workshop and follow-up activities. Overall, the results support that the theory of cooperation and competition not only can identify conditions and dynamics by which teams can effectively contribute to their organization, but also provide a basis on which teams can strengthen their internal functioning, collaboration among teams, and their contributions to their organization. In particular, the study indicates that cooperative teamwork training can heighten beliefs that goals are positively related, foster constructive controversy and creative processes across teams as well as within them, and enhance group productivity and potency.

Call center employees in Guiyang, China, formed teams that developed cooperative goals and open discussion of differences. Results after two months indicated they felt more interdependent and involved and turnover had fallen (Tjosvold et al., 2012). They also performed their individual tasks much more effectively, resulting in over 50 percent fewer complaints and nearly 40 percent increase in phones answered on time.

These studies validate that the theory of cooperation and competition can be applied to strengthen teamwork in China. They also suggest that developing a cooperative conflict team is a practical investment that pays off for organizations and employees.

Cooperative Conflict for Cross-Cultural Teamwork

Can cooperative conflict be a common platform for people from diverse cultures? This section argues that cooperative conflict has this potential, but more research, especially in Africa and the Middle East, is needed to demonstrate how diverse culture teams can develop and use cooperative conflict.

Cross-cultural teams confront many challenges in working together productively. Although research supports the theory of cooperation and competition in China, results do not imply that goal interdependence is operationalized in a highly similar way in the East as in the West (Tjosvold and Hu, 2005). While the “geneotype,” that is, the underlying conceptual structure of the theory, appears to be similar, the “phenotypes,” how the theory is manifested in particular situations, often are not (Leung and Tjosvold, 1998). In particular, the actions that develop cooperative goals or communicate an attempt to discuss conflicts openly may be quite different in China than in North America, as may the general levels of goal interdependence and cooperative conflict. Even if they have common goals and objectives, people from China and the West may have different views of right and wrong, the best ways to accomplish goals, the value of a long-term versus a short-term perspective, appropriate etiquette, and the value of the contributions people make to a joint venture.

Chinese and Western team members then are likely to confront a great deal of conflict. But this chapter has reviewed research showing that Chinese people as well as Westerners can understand cooperative conflict, agree that this approach is useful, and manage their conflicts cooperatively and constructively. Cooperative conflict is not an imposition of Western culture on Chinese but offers a common approach that they all can use to manage their many conflicts.

Researchers have called for direct tests of cross-cultural interaction to identify conditions that facilitate how diverse people can work together productively to supplement the traditional focus on documenting differences between cultures (Bond, 2003; Smith, 2003). People from the East and West who rely on cooperative conflict were found to collaborate effectively compared to those who approach

conflict competitively or avoid conflict (Y. Chen and Tjosvold, 2005, 2007, in press; Y. Chen et al., 2010; Y. Chen, Tjosvold, and Wu, 2008a, 2008b; Chen et al., 2005a, 2005b; Tjosvold, 1996, 2008; Wong, Tjosvold, and Lee, 1992). These findings directly support that Sino-Western teams can approach their conflicts cooperatively and productively.

If studies can demonstrate the value of cooperative conflict in Africa and the Middle East as well as continue to be successfully demonstrated in Europe and East Asia (Desivilya et al., 2010; Tjosvold and de Dreu, 1997; Vollmer and Seyr, 2012) as well as India (Bhatnagar and Tjosvold, 2012), Japan, and Korea (Chen et al., 2010; Tjosvold, Cho, Park, Liu, Liu, and Sasaki, 2001; Tjosvold and Sasaki, 1994; Tjosvold, Sasaki, and Moy, 1998), the framework of cooperative conflict has the potential of acting as a common guide for how people from different cultures can develop their own ways of managing conflict.

Without a common framework, organizations are likely to impose the procedures of one culture on another by, for example, insisting that everyone conforms to the head office's ways. With cooperative conflict as a common framework, people from several cultures can structure ways of managing conflict cooperatively that are appropriate and effective for them, express their diversity, solve problems and strengthen their relationships.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The theory of cooperation and competition has performed well in China, with the amount of variance explained comparing favorably with studies in North America. Chinese people distinguish and understand cooperation and competition, and they recognize that they can pursue individual and collective outcomes when they believe their goals are cooperative (X. Chen, Xie, and Chang, 2011).

Conflict research in China questions the unidimensionality of collectivism-individualism. Individuals can be highly committed to the collective with strong cooperative goals, but this does not assume a lack of individuality. Indeed, a cooperative, collective commitment has been found to promote the open expression of individual opinions and needs. A strong cooperative team fosters outspoken, assertive, and confident individuals; an effective cooperative team depends on members' willingness to express their individuality (Tjosvold, 1991, 2002; Tjosvold, Chen, and Liu, 2003). Individuals can be both self-assertive and team oriented; cooperative goals encourage both.

Although a theory developed in the West has guided our research, the resulting studies have exposed Western stereotypes of China. In contrast to the ideas that Chinese consider conflict anathema and inevitably deal with open conflict competitively, Chinese people were found to welcome open discussion of opposing views and to use conflict to explore opposing views and integrate them, especially when they had cooperative goals.

Chinese values on social face, persuasion, and nonverbal communication need not imply conflict avoidance. These values, when constructively expressed, contribute to open cooperative conflict management. Organizational values in China support developing effective, two-way relationships among leaders and employees. Chinese leaders are more effective and appreciated when they seek the views of employees and develop cooperative relationships with them. Participative management requires that leaders be responsive and open; cooperative conflict contributes to open, productive relationships between leaders and employees.

Cooperative conflict was also found to develop teamwork for delivering high-quality, high-value service to customers,

a competitive advantage organizations need to survive and flourish in China's growing market economy (Tjosvold, Chen, and Liu, 2003; Tjosvold and Hu, 2005). Chinese employees who use their conflicts cooperatively have been found to improve the quality of products and services and reduce costs as they strengthen their relationships within their groups and with alliance partners. Ironically, although the theory of cooperation and competition has been developed in the West, it may be particularly applicable to relationship-oriented China.

Our research on cooperation and competition in China is just a beginning. More work is needed on how Chinese values and settings affect the underlying dynamics of cooperative and competitive interdependence and to modify the theory. Research can usefully explore the ways the theory is operationalized, important antecedents to cooperative goals, and when and how competition and conflict avoidance might be constructive. Research clearly documents that cooperative conflict is a viable, potentially highly constructive approach in China and can be a foundation for productive cross-cultural teamwork.

Note

1 . The relevance of research findings and evidence for mediation is developed in Tjosvold and Su (2006).

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PART SIX
DIFFICULT CONFLICTS

CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE *Causes and Correctives*

Wen Liu
Susan Opotow

How can we understand the causes of aggression and violence? Sadly, examples abound. Violence can be part of daily life in structural arrangements, such as unemployment, poverty-level wages, and inadequate health care, in which some have benefits and others do not, and it is always present during war. In this chapter, we invite readers to consider aggression and violence from a broad perspective that includes varied explanations and examples of aggression and violence. We begin by defining *aggression* and *violence* and then discuss five lines of psychological research that study the nature, scope, and the dynamics of aggression and violence. The next section describes key precepts of conflict resolution practice and discusses nonviolent and violent collective action.

DEFINING AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE

Morton Deutsch (1973) has argued that conflict can have constructive as well as destructive potential. Even competitive conflict, he argues, can serve constructive social functions, particularly in such cooperative, playful contexts as sports (Opotow and Deutsch, 1999). Competition, however, can be destructive when it does not occur in a cooperative context and is not regulated by fair rules (Deutsch, 1973, discusses regulation of competition). Destructive conflict and competition can foster a win-lose

orientation to conflict rather than an interest in mutual concern. As a result, conflict can rapidly expand and escalate, ratcheting up the stakes of the conflict and its costs (Deutsch, 1973, 1983).

What is the relationship between the constructs aggression and violence? While aggression does not inevitably lead to violence and violence can occur without aggression (e.g., failures of the built environment, natural disasters), the terms are closely related and often used interchangeably. In popular usage, aggression can be confused with *assertion* —the bold, energetic pursuit of one's goals. Robert Baron's (1977) influential psychological definition of *aggression* clarifies that aggression is negative in action and intent: "Any form of behavior directed toward the goal of harming or injuring another living being who is motivated to avoid such treatment" (p. 7). A public health definition of *aggression* , which is broader, describes it as "the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation" (World Health Organization, 2002, p. 4).

This definition encompasses interpersonal violence as well as self-inflicted injury and armed conflict. It also includes the negative consequences of violence that, beyond physical injury, compromise the well-being of individuals, families, and communities. In its emphasis on force and power, this definition is attentive to both direct and structural violence.

Aggression and violence can be characterized as direct or structural (Galtung, 1969). Direct violence occurs at every level of analysis from individual to international and involves some kind of physical force, from stabbing to

rampage shooting. Worldwide, violent acts account for one in ten deaths annually for people of all ages and all economic backgrounds, with suicides (844,000) and homicides (600,000) the leading modes of violence (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011). Structural violence can be less obvious than direct violence but nevertheless injurious. It accounts for chronic, accumulated sources of harm that occur as normalized discrimination, segregation, or disparate access to important resources (e.g., medical care, clean water, and adequate nutrition). Structural violence can result in negative material and psychological disadvantage that can last throughout a lifetime and across generations. Under colonization, for example, an inferior racial identity imposed on colonized subjects profoundly affected their sense of self-efficacy and worthiness (Fanon, 2008).

An enduring debate about aggression and violence concerns its origins: Are aggression and violence hardwired, ineradicable aspects of human nature, or do they emerge from social contexts? More simply, do aggression and violence result from nature or nurture? The Seville Statement on Violence, written in 1969 by twenty leading scientists throughout the world, argues that it is scientifically incorrect to say that war is caused by instinct, humans have a violent brain, evolution has selected for aggressive behavior, aggression is programmed into human nature, or we have inherited our tendency for warlike behavior from animal ancestors. Instead, the Seville Statement argues, “Biology does not condemn humanity to war. . . . Just as ‘wars begin in the minds of men,’ peace also begins in our minds. The same species who invented war is capable of inventing peace. The responsibility lies with each of us” (Adams, 1989, p. 113).

Our view, consistent with the 1969 Seville Statement, is that social context makes a crucial difference. It can

influence the forms that aggression and violence take, their intensity, and the formal and informal norms and mechanisms that can curb the tendency to aggress or act violently. This view is hopeful because if violence emerges from social structures, then the systems that created it are amenable to change.

As Deutsch points out (1973) in his Crude Law of Social Relations, “The characteristic processes and effects elicited by a given type of relationship tend also to elicit that type of social relationship” (p. 365). Thus, aggression and violence can be understood as a both a cause and outcome of malignant social relations. Applying Deutsch’s seminal theorizing on conflict to the constructs aggression and violence offers a way to interrogate them critically. From this perspective, social structures and social relations are closely related as causes and outcomes of aggression and violence. Both must be considered if we seek to understand aggression and violence.

THEORIES OF AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE

Over the past seventy years, psychologists have investigated the human capacity for violence from a number of perspectives that offer a variety of ways to understand the causes of aggression and violence. Our discussion focuses on five influential approaches: biology and personality, frustration and social learning, morals, culture, and structural violence.

Aggression and Violence as Innate: Biology and Personality

Biological, evolutionary, and traits and dispositional research positions aggression and violence as part of

human nature or as within the person.

Biology.

Biologically focused research describes aggression and violence as emerging from an innate human response that promotes survival in threatening contexts. Using animal and anthropological studies, experiments, and clinical trials, evolutionary theories describe aggression and violence as an adaptive, hardwired, physiologically based human predisposition that has evolved over millennia (Waller, 2002; Mobbs, Lau, Jones, and Frith, 2007). While biologically oriented research has tended to focus on direct violence at the individual level, recent studies are now examining mechanisms of aggression and violence beyond simplified biological determinism. This work is offering a more complex social understanding of violent social relations consistent with Kurt Lewin's tenet (1935) that social behavior is a function of the person and the environment.

Social biological research on the interaction among biological mechanisms, social context, and social perception examines how young men respond to a provoking agent's perceived fighting ability, operationalized as physical size, number of allies, and reputation for aggression in simulated settings (Archer and Benson, 2008). These studies found that as a survival strategy, research participants were less likely to respond to a provocation when a provoker's perceived fighting ability was high. In prison settings, however, where social norms and rules were replaced by a culture of honor, this finding was reversed: men in prison were less likely to attack those who seemed weaker due to the need to establish reputation (Archer, 2007), indicating the importance of social context on the propensity to aggress (also see Coleman, Goldman, and Kugler, 2009).

Personality.

Personality (also called *disposition* or *temperament*) influences how individuals perceive and respond to conflict. Some people are unflappable and others easily irritated. Although a hostile environment might provoke aggressive responses in anyone, people labeled aggressive can see hostility in ambiguous circumstances, tend to react to minimal provocation, and are highly reactive when under the influence of alcohol (Giancola, 2006; Parrot and Zeichner, 2002).

Similar to a biological orientation, personality research looks within individuals to understand the origins of aggression and violence. This kind of analysis can risk stereotyping individuals based on a particular trait or can rely on available but unexamined assumptions to explain the causes of aggression and violence. For example, the media describe teen perpetrators of mass violence (e.g., the 1999 Columbine High School massacre) as harboring pent-up grudges and being explosively angry at the “point of no return” (Egan, 1998, p. 22). Scientific evidence, however, has not linked such acts with a mental illness diagnosis (Harmon, 2013). In the 2007 Virginia Tech massacre and, more recently, the 2013 Sandy Hook Elementary School massacre, causal accounts foreground mental illness, downplaying other factors that can contribute to such tragedies (e.g., Urbina, 2007; Barron, 2013). In these cases, personality-focused explanation of aggression blamed individuals but ignored structural roots of violence (Psychologists for Social Responsibility, 2013). By slighting the contribution of context (Diefenbach, 1997) and offering simple, dispositional explanations of aggression and violence, the media emphasize individual factors.

Aggregated data, for example, indicate that 90 percent of mass shootings in elementary and high schools in the United States over the past thirty years have been committed by young white men, implicating a culture of violent masculinity in mass violence (Kimmel, 2013). Analyses attentive to social and political contexts emphasize other than dispositional factors: the availability of semiautomatic weapons, lax federal gun control policy, a system that ignores or is insensitive to adolescent needs, the unavailability of affordable mental health services, and a culture in which exposure to media violence is high across age groups (Negy, Ferguson, Galvanovkis, and Smither, 2013; Gentile, Mathieson, and Crick, 2010). Clearly both personality and context are important, and troubled youths with a sense of entitlement to retribution and easy access to weapons can be a lethal combination.

Personality or dispositional explanations for aggression and violence are not limited to individuals. In conflicts at larger levels, dispositional explanations can also oversimplify causes of aggression and violence, for example, by depicting opposing groups in conflict as malevolent or depicting an entire sociopolitical or ethnic group—or even an entire country—as dangerous, unprincipled, uncivilized, or evil (DiFilippo, 2006).

Aggression and Violence as Internal and Social Processes: Frustration and Social Learning

In contrast to the biological or personality perspective that conceptualizes aggression and violence as innate, predetermined by genes, hormones, neuron activity, or a person’s enduring personality, this section on frustration and social learning describes research addressing an interaction between internal and social processes.

Frustration.

In 1939, a group of psychologists at Yale sparked controversy and influenced a robust research agenda in the behavioral sciences when they asserted that “aggression is always a consequence of frustration” (Dollard et al., 1939, p. 1). They defined *frustration* as a state that emerges when circumstances interfere with a goal response. This work gave rise to decades of research by these scholars, Roger Barker, Leonard Berkowitz, and others. A revision of frustration-aggression theory proposes that frustration gives rise to aggression only when it is experienced as unpleasant (Berkowitz, 1988, 1989), suggesting that how a person interprets a stimulus and emotions that arise from it mediates how a person will respond to frustration.

Building on this theory and psychoanalytical ideas, motivation theories describe aggression as resulting from blocked human needs. Maslow (1970) argued that biological needs for food, water, oxygen, and rest must be met before higher needs (i.e., social attachment, self-esteem, creativity, understanding, self-actualization, and spiritual transcendence) can be satisfied.

Critique of the frustration-aggression hypothesis has argued that although frustrated needs can intensify competition, anger, and aggression, frustration can also motivate constructive behavior. For example, frustrated biological or safety needs can mobilize war or community cooperation; frustrated love needs can prompt self-destructive behavior and stalking, or it can inspire other creative energies. Motivation theories focus on individual needs, but social groups (e.g., families, communities, states) also have basic needs for environmental resources, security, and positive identity. These needs are at the heart of many protracted deadly intranational and international conflicts. In addition, while frustration can activate the readiness to aggress, it does not inevitably result in aggression. Instead, frustration may generate creative and

productive problem solving. Nor does aggression always result from frustration. It can also result from competition, greed, or fear. Research has identified a number of key factors, including negative and positive feelings, prior learning, understandings about the situation, displaced hostility, social rules, and individual differences, that can mediate the effects of frustration on aggression (Berkowitz, 1989, 1993). Critique of the frustration-aggression hypothesis has also argued that aggression is not always based on frustration and may not be hostile. Instead, aggression can be a learned response that functions as instrumental behavior to achieve goals and benefits.

At larger levels of analysis, frustration, arousal, and social comparisons interact in the construct of *relative deprivation* , defined as the sense of injustice that can emerge when groups compare their lot with others (Crosby, 1982). When such comparisons reveal that one's own group is disadvantaged compared with similarly situated groups, it can give rise to shared frustrations and the conviction that fairness has been violated. This can in turn precipitate political unrest and violence (Gurr, 1970). Relative deprivation theory positions violence as a political response to structural marginalization in political and economic contexts (Fortman, 2005). From this theoretical perspective, aggression is not viewed as human instinct but is instead highly motivated, cognitively complex, and environmentally driven.

Social Learning and Behavior.

Social learning theory describes the origins of aggression and violence in behaviors people learn from watching influential role models act in social contexts. Observations can then segue into behavioral imitation (Bandura, 1983; Cairns, 1996). Research on social learning and violence has examined the potential of media to facilitate the social

learning of aggression and violence, particularly in young populations. Although there is no consensus on whether exposure to media violence directly causes aggressive behaviors, current evidence supports the assertion that violent media content increases the likelihood of aggressive inclinations (Anderson, 2004; Huesmann and Kirwil, 2007). Through repeated exposure to violent content, an individual can develop cognitive structures that support the enactment of violence (Krahe et al., 2011).

Recent research on social learning is focused on school-related aggression and violence, particularly antisocial behavior, bullying, and the use of weapons. Exposure to school violence can have adverse effects on youth, affecting their social skills, self-concept, and academic competence (Cedeno, Elias, Kelly, and Chu, 2010). Because the prevalence and severity of school violence has intensified, social scientists have developed school-based violence prevention programs that take the entire psychosocial dynamics of young people's life setting into account. This body of work promotes youth's engagement in prosocial community service as a way to reduce violence (e.g., Kelder et al., 1995; O'Donnell et al., 1999) and also includes effective conflict resolution programs in schools (Coleman and Deutsch, 2001).

Moral Theories of Aggression and Violence

Morton Deutsch's (1982) theory of interdependence and psychological orientation emphasizes that psychological orientations to social situations have moral as well as cognitive and motivational components. From this standpoint, it is apparent that theories of aggression that primarily emphasize biology, personality, frustration, and social learning may neglect moral aspects. *Morals* are the norms, rights, entitlements, obligations, responsibilities, and duties that guide our behavior with others and shape

our sense of fairness. Morals can be conveyed through observational learning and culture. They are attuned to what is owed to whom in particular social contexts (e.g., family, work, community). They can deter aggression and violence when they instruct patience when faced with provocation, but they can also provoke aggression and violence when they instruct honor-, reputation-, or status-preserving responses to provocation. Perceived violations of shared social norms can activate a sense of threat capable of charging a conflict with great intensity. Even unarticulated morals can be deeply felt, such as when people perceive a discrepancy between what should be and what is (Opotow, 2009). Moral theories about norms and social judgment, moral exclusion, and structural violence emphasize the close relationship between morals and violence.

Norm Violations.

Social norms guide our expectations about how people should behave toward each other. Because social norms foster social coordination and communication, their violation can be viewed as disruptive and dangerous, and therefore warranting punishment. Norm violations can also set in motion a vicious cycle that attributes malevolent motives and antagonistic interests to a person designated as an adversary, resulting in hostile reactions and conflict escalation that can ultimately lead to violence. Norm violations are less likely to trigger these negative responses when they are perceived as transient rather than stable, as unintentional rather than intentional, and when parties to a conflict at all levels of analysis (friends, community groups, or nations) have developed norms of redress. Norms of redress are procedures for bringing about retributive or reparative justice. They are more likely to be effective and prevent conflict escalation if they are in place and well

established before norm violations occur (De Ridder and Tripathi, 1992).

Moral Reasoning and Judgment.

Sociomoral reasoning examines how people judge their own and others' behavior (Rule and Nesdale, 1976). Aggression can be normative or norm violating, depending on prevailing norms in families, communities, and cultures. Such sociomoral judgments consider an actor's intentions; the appropriateness, intensity, and nature of the aggression; and the harm done. These judgments, which can be accurate or faulty, are influenced by such factors as the perceiver's age, ideology, and feelings of affinity for the victim or aggressor. Sociomoral development tends to increase with age and maturity (Killen and Hart, 1995), but it is also reactive to context. Danger and threat, for example, can cause people capable of sophisticated sociomoral reasoning to revert to simpler, more egocentric thinking.

Domain theory, a sociocognitive approach to moral reasoning, posits that interpretations of behavior can be construed in various ways: (1) in the moral domain, in which fairness, responsibility, and deserving are salient; (2) in the conventional domain, in which social conventions and structures are salient; or (3) in the personal domain, in which personal discretion and privacy are salient. Interpreting behavior—one's own or that of others—depends on whether that behavior is construed in moral or nonmoral terms (Smetana, 2006). For example, people can view drug use as a moral issue (right or wrong), socially conventional behavior (hanging out with friends), or a personal issue (their own preferences) (Berkowitz, Guerra, and Nucci, 1991). Similarly, abortion can be viewed as a moral issue or a matter of personal discretion (Smetana, 1982).

When applied to aggression and violence, domain theory can have chilling implications, such as when domestic violence is dismissed as a nonmoral issue by aggressors claiming that their behavior is in the personal domain: “This is a family matter. Why do you want to make a big deal of it?” (Quindlen, 1994, p. A21). People who commit hate crimes, too, can invoke prevailing homophobic, misogynistic, or racist norms that justify violence as conventional rather than acknowledge that it violates widely shared morals about respect and human rights (Opotow, 2005; Opotow and McClelland, 2007).

Moral Exclusion.

Morton Deutsch (1985) has defined *scope of justice* as the psychological boundary of one’s moral community and the extent to which one’s concepts of justice apply: “The narrower one’s conception of one’s community, the narrower will be the scope of situations in which one’s actions will be governed by considerations of justice” (Deutsch, 1985, p. 37). To empirically investigate and further theorize the scope of justice, Opotow (1990, 1993, 1995, 2001a) has conducted research to investigate the sociopolitical factors associated with changes in the scope of justice over time (Opotow 2008, 2012).

The scope of justice influences how people think about and behave toward others. It also can position some people as inferior, irrelevant, undeserving, or expendable. It therefore has important implications for aggression and violence: a shrinking scope of justice that narrows the applicability of justice can support destructive conflict and violence. Aggression and violence justified by moral exclusion can seem normal, acceptable, and unproblematic, rendering moral exclusion invisible. Yet symptoms of moral exclusion can indicate its presence. These symptoms include minimizing harm through euphemism, disclaiming,

or concealing moral exclusion's harmful effects; excluding others through biased evaluation of groups, condescension, derogation, or dehumanization; and self-exoneration through victim blaming, deindividuation, diffusing and displacing responsibility, and comparisons that glorify one's own group at the expense of others (Opotow, 1990; Opotow and Weiss, 2000). Consistent with Deutsch's Crude Law of Social Relations (1993), these symptoms can be an outcome of moral exclusion or can actively promote it.

Cultural Theories of Aggression and Violence

Culture is relevant to moral exclusion because it shapes human behaviors through norms, beliefs, values, and traditions. While traditional social science treats culture as a natural, essential property of a group (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, and Norenzayan, 2001), a critical approach to culture conceptualizes it as a political as well as a social construct, emphasizing that structures of power regulate representations of culture (Gjerde, 2004). From this perspective, culture shapes how we represent, communicate, and respond to violent events. Thus, cultural violence is also a critical construct in its attention to forms of violence including those that are forbidden or unacceptable and those that are ignored, justified, or normalized. Recent scholarship on aggression and violence that analyzes the relationship of violence and culture largely focuses on three contexts: sexualization, honor ideologies, and non-Western practices.

Sexualization.

Violence against women and girls has gained international attention over the past decade as the sexualization of women and girls is increasingly understood as a symptom of social inequality on multiple axes of oppression (American Psychological Association, 2007; Gill, 2012). As

feminist scholars observe, this form of gendered violence is often foregrounded and sensationalized in the popular media, but such media accounts do not discuss key themes that feminist scholars have identified as important: the agency, participation, and pleasure women and girls experience in their sexuality. To dispute the predominant image of feminine victimhood in the media, academic scholarship focuses on women's lived experience, the social location of women in society, and it positions women as agents within a complex web of power relations (Coy and Garner, 2012). This offers a broader analytical and critical framework because it considers the multiple spheres that contribute to the sexualization of women and focuses attention on systems of gender inequality, evident in frequency data on violence directed at women. Academic feminist literature argues that these data reveal how female bodies are appropriated in the cultural production of masculinity that naturalizes hierarchical and gendered power relationship (Garner, 2012).

Honor Ideologies.

While feminized and sexualized violence is generally considered unacceptable (but not in all contexts), masculinized forms of violence can be widely supported by norms, beliefs, values, and traditions. Honor killings are an extreme example, but gendered beliefs, such as "boys will be boys" (Miedzian, 1991), excuse violent expression of masculinity.

Masculinized justifications for violence have been studied in war (Barnes, Brown, and Osterman, 2012), rural southern culture (Lee and Ousey, 2011; Nisbett, 1993), and as a social mechanism to develop subculture identities such as street gangs (Brookman, Bennett, Hochstetler, and Copes, 2011). When masculine honor ideologies condoning aggressive attitudes and behavior are described as

biologically determined, they are presumed to be hardwired, unchangeable, and situated within a fixed cultural context in which all individuals—men, women, and children—are subjected to this cultural influence (Nisbett, 1993).

Studies on gay male youth athletes dispute the assumption of fixed cultural precepts and cultural uniformity. A study of masculinity found a decrease in homophobia, a more positive environment for gay male athletes, and an increasingly inclusive sense of masculinity for young men who came out from 2008 to 2010 compared with young men who came out from 2000 to 2002 (Anderson, 2011). Another study examined the construction of masculinity on a university rugby team (Anderson and McGuire, 2010). Players' and coaches' gendered belief systems differed sharply. Players saw their coaches as adhering to an orthodox, out-of-date version of masculinity. These players, who all identify as heterosexual, had an inclusive approach to masculinity that contested homophobia, misogyny, and excessive risk taking. They did not support the degradation of women or gay men, and they expressed emotional support for each other, particularly when a team member was ill or injured. Because this research indicates that masculinist ideologies are changeable within some contexts —rather than global and immutable—the studies offer evidence that neither masculinity nor culture is a fixed construct.

Non-Western Practices.

When culture is represented as the practices of a geographical, national, or ethnic group (Nisbett, 2003), it foregrounds and essentializes particular customs, traditions, or systems while it slights within-group or within-nation variation. When researchers then identify non-Western practices as having a seemingly self-evident

influence on social relations in these contexts, it implies that the non-Western culture being studied is static and, by implication, inferior.

Chinese culture, for example, is framed problematically in discussions of student victimization by teachers (Chen and Wei, 2011; Chen and Astor, 2010) or interpersonal violence that results in loss of face or dignity (Liao and Bond, 2011). This perspective positions culture as an analytical construct that differentiates the normative West from the problematic East. The East is positioned as culturally exotic and lacking in a contemporary and sophisticated grasp of human nature or human rights. Problematizing the culture of the East in this way obscures complex power relations and practices, and it depicts the culture of the East as homogeneous and morally underdeveloped. Critical scholars, in contrast, who have, for example, focused on one aspect of Chinese culture, parenting practices, situate it within the ongoing transformations of China's political and economic context rather than as a predetermined behavioral pattern (Chang, Chen, and Ji, 2011). They do so to argue that drastic social change brings about new forms of cultural adaptations, including parenting practices. Thus, an understanding of the dynamics of change, including cultural adaptation strategies and political-economic structures, disputes the stereotypical image of the authoritarian Chinese parent as fixed and universal.

In sum, without deconstructing the hegemonic ideologies and systems at work in a given context, the deployment of culture as a sole explanation of aggression and violence is problematic as both an analytical approach and for developing culturally sensitive policy. Instead of making broad assumptions about the norms, beliefs, values, traditions, or behaviors of a particular group, a nuanced perspective of the culture of aggression and violence would attend to structural mechanisms that justify and perpetuate

violence. Deeply rooted systematic factors must be understood to effectively address violent practices.

Structural Violence

Both cultural and structural analyses of aggression and violence focus on the macrolevel, but they are not identical constructs. Cultural theories focus on forms of violence that have been normalized and taken for granted within a particular subgroup, community, region, or nation (Galtung, 1990), whereas structural theories focus on the systematic disadvantages conferred on marginalized groups in society. Such disadvantages include a lack of access to basic resources that lead to chronic, negative outcomes. Theories of structural injustice and violence are critical in that they interrogate how social arrangements and power can privilege one group and marginalize others.

Structural violence not only influences societal institutions and social groups; it also can penetrate psychologically at the personal level. Derek Hook (2004) articulates how Frantz Fanon's (2008) theories of racism and identity contribute to a critical redefinition of violence by describing "the systematic undermining of an individual's physical or psychological resources" (p. 103). For example, under apartheid in South Africa, segregation policies forced black workers into distant townships requiring up to ten hours a day of travel to reach their jobs. In addition to the negative physical effect of prolonged travel and lack of sleep (Goldblatt, 1989), the accumulated psychological stress should be understood as a form of structural violence that continually reinscribed the inferior, excluded status on black South Africans.

Structural violence is not distinct from direct violence. Indeed, structural violence can occur in tandem with direct forms of violence, such as when patriarchal, misogynistic

mores support both discrimination and violence against women and children (European Commission, 2010; Hart and Schwab, 1997). As another example, the gunning down of twenty children at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut, in 2012 highlighted the interactive effects of structural violence and direct violence. Laws and norms within the United States vary by state and can be more protective of gun ownership than public safety. While aggressive dispositions and pathological portrayals of mental illness often become the cultural trope blaming a single perpetrator as the sole cause of the incident (Langman, 2009), the structural elements that contribute to such shootings, which are influential and complex, often evade scrutiny.

The challenges of addressing direct violence through structural change are currently being debated in response to recent incidents of gun violence in the United States. Psychologists for Social Responsibility (2013) have argued that the long-term solution comes from structural changes that include stricter gun control laws, universal access to mental health services, removing the stigma of mental illness, and the right of children worldwide to protection from harm (also see United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, 2005). Structural change toward equality and resource sharing is consistent with an expanding scope of justice that widens our sense of moral obligation, responsibility, and duty toward others and supports mutual respect, constructive approaches to conflict, and cooperative, peaceful intergroup relations (Opotow, 2012).

ADDRESSING AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE

This chapter has described the many ways that aggression and violence can occur within individuals and social relationships, as well as in communities, organizations, societies, and nations. As the Seville Statement argues, violence emerges in human relations and human systems; therefore, the activities, behaviors, processes, norms, or systems that created violence are amenable to change. Indeed, strategies for deescalating direct and structural violence are urgently needed for social relations at smaller and larger levels of analysis. This section turns to the conditions that can allow conflict to take a constructive course that has emerged from theory and work in the field (see Deutsch, 2011, for an extended discussion). Because both nonviolence and violence have been used by social movements to foster equality and constructive societal change, this section concludes by discussing both.

Conflict Resolution: Examining Attitudes and Developing Skills

Morton Deutsch (1993) has identified thirteen elements that are common components of conflict resolution programs designed to enable individuals or groups to resolve conflict cooperatively and constructively (also see Deutsch and Coleman, 2012). We discuss three key elements that focus on attitudes, knowledge, and skills: self-reflection, perspective taking, and deescalation.

Self-Reflection.

Effective conflict resolution intervention helps individuals reflect on their own conflict resolution style, distinguish between healthy and unhealthy ways of expressing anger, and be more aware of the long-term consequences of violent behavior. Individuals who understand their own conflict resolution style can be vigilant about situations that are likely to provoke their anger. They can also learn to

critically examine their justifications for anger and aggression and realistically assess the gains and losses that can result from violence. Individuals are more likely to use healthy ways of expressing anger if they can differentiate between assertive and aggressive responses and can communicate assertive responses effectively.

Perspective Taking.

Conflict resolution programs can help individuals learn perspective taking to understand and avoid behaviors that provoke others. Individuals who can take others' perspectives are more likely to see the issues with more complexity, acknowledge rather than deny problems, and approach conflict constructively, with the flexibility and creativity that can more fully use available resources to resolve their conflict. Perspective taking is difficult during the intense arousal of escalated, violent conflict, and it can be threatening, and therefore avoided, when it can reveal unpleasant truths about oneself, one's group, or one's position.

The Alternatives to Violence Project uses these and related ideas in their work. Founded by Quakers and prison inmates in 1975, this national and international association of volunteer groups is an antiviolence nongovernmental organization that teaches participants about conflict and violence (Alternatives to Violence Project/USA, n.d.). Its motto is "conflict is part of daily life . . . but violence doesn't have to be." Its mission is to encourage peaceful individuals and communities by facilitating perspective taking and related conflict resolution skills that can reduce resorting to violence, including managing strong feelings such as anger and fear, dealing more effectively with risk and danger, building good relationships with others, and communicating well in difficult situations.

De-escalation.

Because aggression and violence can escalate rapidly, effective conflict resolution programs help individuals detect aggression in its early stages and learn how to de-escalate conflict. Just as the resort to violent behavior can be acquired through social learning, nonviolent responses to conflict, such as discussion and negotiation, can also result from social learning. However, constructive discussions with an adversary can take considerable communicative, interpersonal, and conflict resolution skill. Such skills are more likely to be acquired and used effectively if they have been taught and demonstrated in various spheres, including at home and in school, the workplace, the community, the media, and the larger society (Opotow and Deutsch, 1999). Sensitivity to incipient violence is also important. Early detection offers an opportunity to de-escalate conflict before it gains momentum and escalates out of control. Because history illustrates that violence, once begun, can become extreme, the earlier a person, group, or country faces up to dangerous situations, the better.

Ron Fisher and Loraleigh Keashly (1990) describe how intervenors, facing violent situations, can effectively de-escalate them in a step-by-step process. At the destructive stage, when parties try to destroy or subjugate each other, intervenors can serve as peacekeepers by forcefully setting norms, defining unacceptable violence, and isolating parties if necessary to prevent violence from escalating. At the segregated stage, when hostility and threats predominate, intervenors can discourage further hostility, help parties examine the dynamics of their conflict, and engage parties in developing ground rules that can move them toward negotiation. At the polarized stage, when conflicts undermine trust and respect, distort perceptions, and support negative stereotypes, intervenors can act as

consultants who seek to increase mutual tolerance by suggesting that parties scrutinize their assumptions about an adversary's unworthiness. They can also help parties identify mutually acceptable conflict resolution processes by encouraging information exchanges that can later serve as a basis for negotiation. At the discussion stage, when perceptions are relatively accurate, commitment to negotiation is stable, and parties believe in the possibility of joint gains, intervenors can facilitate negotiation as mediators who help parties find mutually acceptable solutions.

Conflict Resolution Programs: Change Efforts

Effective and sustainable conflict resolution can address both systemic and individual change. These change efforts can proceed in four key steps: diagnosis, intervention, evaluation, and ethics.

Diagnosis.

"Fools rush in where angels fear to tread" is especially true for interventions involving violence. Solutions that begin without careful diagnosis have the potential to cause additional harm. Because there are many kinds of violence, many kinds of aggressors, and many contexts in which violence can occur, no one conflict resolution intervention is always suitable. However, in general, individuals need to recognize how pervasive violence is, how small arguments can precipitate violence, and how using weapons contributes to violence.

Accurate diagnosis of violent conflicts considers the issues, parties' motivations, beliefs, values, and attitudes. Interventions should be based on fact finding and research rather than assumptions and anecdote (World Health Organization, 2002). For example, research indicates that

juvenile justice systems can be harmful to girls when it focuses on their crimes and not on the abusive conditions that they may have endured earlier in their lives; their personal history might be related to the crimes for which they are charged. Limiting the focus to a particular crime or criminal history can lead to misdiagnoses and inadequate treatment, and this can begin a vicious cycle of violence and incarceration driving young women further into criminal behavior and the criminal justice system (Simkin and Katz, 2002).

Preliminary diagnostic work can identify presenting and underlying issues in aggression and violence, including parties' basic needs, fears, and interests. It can identify those affected by direct and structural violence, including secondary victims, such as children or elderly relatives who depend on primary victims for their well-being. Diagnosis also needs to transcend prevailing norms that may render some kinds of people invisible and some kinds of violence acceptable, inevitable, or innocuous (Farmer, 1998). Myths such as "violence is a natural part of life" or "I saw lots of violence as a kid and I turned out okay" deny the way that violence, enacted in relationships, in the media, and in society, actively shapes expectancies, perceptions, moral norms, and behavior.

Intervention.

Because aggression and violence often have multiple causes, they are best addressed by ecological models and coordinated multiparty efforts (World Health Organization, 2002). Intervention strategies for domestic violence, for example, can seek to create healthy family environments and provide professional help for distressed families; monitor public venues in which violence can occur; address situations with the potential for violence; address practices and attitudes that support gender inequality; and address

cultural, social, and economic factors that maintain disparate access to goods, services, and opportunities.

Effective community antiviolence programs are tailored to the issues and resources of the community they serve (Greene, 1998). They listen to community members, including youth, and respect their knowledge and coping skills. They teach participants to recognize warning signs of escalating conflict and instruct participants on the use of nonviolent conflict resolution approaches. Their educational approaches have a psychological component that includes mentoring programs, family cohesion efforts, and counseling. They encourage youth to develop programs that teach, from firsthand experience, the dire consequences of violent behavior. Involving youth in conflict resolution interventions as partners can develop knowledgeable, conflict-savvy leaders for the future.

Conflict resolution programs working alongside mental health or community agencies approach the deescalation of aggression and violence with a broad array of resources. Deterring domestic violence, for example, can be more effective when advocacy groups, health and social service agencies, conflict resolution agencies, and the justice system cooperate. Conflict resolution efforts at the community, city, state, and national levels can benefit from collaborations that include medical societies, elected officials, the media, and school systems (Currie, 1998; Hawkins et al., 1999).

Evaluation.

Evaluation is a crucial but underused element of intervention and training. Because few violence intervention programs are rigorously evaluated for their efficacy, the World Health Organization (2002) urges that evaluation of conflict resolution efforts should have a high

priority (also see Flaxman, 2001, concerning school antiviolence programs). Evaluation should not be an afterthought and instead should be built into implementation strategies before programs begin. There are a number of compelling reasons to use formative evaluations (during program implementation) as well as summative evaluations (when a program is completed). First, social contexts change, and aggression and violence can accelerate this rate of change. Second, evaluation builds in the opportunity to revisit program implementation plans with new insights and knowledge as they emerge. Third, diagnosis and design strategies, no matter how carefully they are designed and implemented, can miss key elements or have unintended consequences. Evaluations can check that conflict resolution programs, as they continue to evolve, are well matched with the project's goals.

The physician's maxim, "First do no harm," has particular urgency in violent relationships. Evaluations can offer practitioners concrete data that permit assessment of an intervention's ability to produce constructive outcomes. Evaluation data not only serve research purposes but also offer a practical tool for ensuring that an intervention in fact ameliorates violence and that positive outcomes remain stable over time. Even when an intervention transforms a conflictual relationship into a more cooperative one, conflict residues can remain. Conflicts, particularly violent conflict with roots in the past, can simmer and later reproduce destructive conflict as a journalist notes in his description of intergroup violence in Indonesia: "This round of cruelties has roots deep in the past. And it is but one example of what Indonesia fears most: an explosion of religious and ethnic violence that roars out of control, fed by old hatreds and fresh grievances, defying the peacemaking efforts of local

leaders and the restraining presence of armed soldiers" (Mydans, 1999, p. 50). Thus, periodic evaluation of key social indicators can monitor quiescent conflict to detect troubling shifts.

Ethics.

Interventions in violent systems pose special ethical difficulties. An intervenor in a violent relationship is a witness to past, current, and potential harm. Therefore, intervention has moral as well as practical urgency. Naming a relationship "violent" invokes particular norms, responsibilities, and obligations; remaining silent also carries moral weight. Intervenors need to be comfortable with forthrightly addressing violence in order to be able to motivate parties to view their relationship realistically and seek safe ways to address conflicts they face. Thus, practitioners intervening in violent systems must be skilled at recognizing violence, coercion, and oppression in relationships. Identifying violence can be difficult. Domestic violence is largely underreported by psychologists conducting marital therapy, teachers and counselors in schools, and emergency room doctors. Research in hospital emergency rooms indicates that sensitivity, courage, and good training are needed to recognize and document domestic violence (Braziel, 1998). When directly asked, victims and batterers tend to admit to violence. When the answer is yes, practitioners who ask the difficult questions need the skill as well as mental health and public safety backup to help parties sort out their situation and their options.

Nonviolent and Violent Responses to Aggression and Violence

Research and practice that is attentive to the causes, expression, and amelioration of aggression and inevitable

violence connects to perceptions of social injustice (Opotow, 2009, 2001b). The sense that justice has been violated can motivate individuals or groups to protest policies or action they see as unjust. Their action can include nonviolent protests as well as armed struggles (Muñoz Proto and Opotow, 2012). As we write this chapter, civil wars in various parts of the world pit authoritarian governments against rebels seeking participatory governance. Before concluding this chapter, we therefore address collective nonviolent and violent resistance as methods that groups use to redress chronic oppression, violence, and injustice.

Nonviolence.

Nonviolence is “a technique used to control, combat and destroy the opponent’s power by nonviolent means of wielding power” (Sharp, 1973, p. 4; also see Kool, 1993). Even in violent or unjust contexts, nonviolent actions can foster peace, such as when social actors refuse to cooperate with unjust procedures (e.g., by going limp during an unjust arrest), intervene to disrupt unfair conditions (e.g., by carrying out a sit-in), or persuade opponents to consider new points of view (e.g., through symbolic public acts, protests, marches, and public statements; Sharp, 1973). A nonviolent perspective is based on the belief that peace depends on the development of sustainable cooperative social relations (Deutsch, 1983) along with a widening of scope fostered by constructive structural change justice (Opotow, Gerson, and Woodside, 2005). Thus, when faced with unjust contexts, nonviolent movements renounce violence and instead engage in peaceful protest to achieve social justice. Two well-known examples of nonviolent activism that mobilized people to redress oppression and social injustice are the Indian independent movements in the first half of the twentieth

century and the US civil rights movement in the mid-twentieth-century United States.

Violence and Resistance.

Even under repressive sociopolitical conditions, nonviolent tactics can achieve social and political goals. However, in some circumstances, especially under extreme repression, the principles of nonviolence may not be politically effective (Ryan, 2002). To combat harsh and enduring domination, oppressed people may resort to violence, believing that they have little to lose. Violence can offer marginalized groups hope that social change can be achieved and that collective struggle can result in freedom. When violence pervaded all levels of Algerian society under colonization, Frantz Fanon (2004) argued for the necessity of employing violent tactics against the oppression and exclusion institutionalized by the state. He stressed that through violence, colonized people can come to realize their collective power. Violence, he argued, dispels the passivity and despair imposed by a colonial power so that colonized people can recreate themselves and their own society.

In another place and at an earlier time, Fredrick Douglass, a noted abolitionist leader born in slavery in the United States in 1818, gave a speech commemorating the twenty-third anniversary of the British West Indies slave revolt that expressed similar ideas: “If there is no struggle there is no progress. Those who want freedom but will not fight are people who want crops without plowing up the ground; they want rain without thunder and lightning. They want the ocean without the awful roar of its many waters. This struggle may be a moral one, or it may be a physical one, and it may be both moral and physical, but it must be a struggle” (Douglass, 1857, p. 22).

Both Fanon and Douglass argue that action, even when it takes the form of direct violence, may be necessary to redress structural violence. While nonviolent struggles (e.g., Solidarity in Poland in 1980) can effectively achieve social and political goals in some contexts, struggles may also take a violent form in systems that oppress or enslave.

Legal scholars, writing about a “right to violence” (Paust, 1983), invoke Abraham Lincoln’s First Inaugural Address (1861): “This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing Government, they can exercise their constitutional right of amending it or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it.” Such violence can be directed at people or property. In his struggle against apartheid, Nelson Mandela supported violence against the property of the oppressors but not against the oppressors themselves. Clearly violent struggles can be justified for liberatory or oppressive social change. In either case, morally justified violence has the potential to precipitate new cycles of injustice and violence (Opotow, 2009).

CONCLUSION

The way that “stop and frisk” (Grynbaum and Connelly, 2012), “assault rifle” (Goode, 2012), and “drones” (Carr, 2013) have entered everyday speech demonstrates that violence not only has immediate effects but also ripples out into the culture, affecting individuals, institutions, cities, and nations. Addressing aggression and violence effectively means addressing it proactively. Its root causes are not only biological, motivational, and moral but also systemic and operationalized in the political, economic, and legal spheres of a society. Social issues such as poverty, human rights violations, political repression, and economic privation can be a cause as well as an effect of aggression

and violence. Effective schools, affordable health care, safe housing, full employment, and environmental safety are social investments that can also ripple out into a society and have long-term positive benefits. As we have argued, the expression and intensity of aggression and violence are susceptible to social context. Therefore, initiatives such as gun control, curtailing media violence, and training parents and influential community members (e.g., elected politicians, police, school personnel, psychologists, and doctors) to model cooperative conflict resolution processes has the potential to reduce the intensity and prevalence of violence.

Although aggression and violence affect all social classes, people at the lowest socioeconomic levels bear the highest risks. Therefore, preventative and protective services must be available if violence is to be met. There is a tendency worldwide for authorities to act only after violence has occurred. But investing in prevention, especially primary prevention activities that operate upstream of problems, may be more cost-effective and have large and long-lasting benefits (World Health Organization, 2002).

Peaceful cultures not only reduce aggression and violence but can also sustain cooperative social relations by emphasizing distributive, procedural, and inclusionary justice (Muñoz Proto and Opotow, 2012). Constructive approaches to conflict can reduce violence when they address conflict forthrightly and foster tolerance of diverse perspectives, the free flow of information, and democratic participation (Opotow et al., 2005). Although potentially dangerous, the struggle for social change to achieve greater equality should not be immediately condemned as it may be a necessary tactic when oppression is institutionalized and intransigent. With these activist and humanistic conceptions of social justice in mind, we encourage awareness of the breadth and complexity of

aggression and violence, as well as the range of factors that can cause and moderate their expression. The challenge is to use this knowledge to foster a culture inspired by a vision of moral inclusion, social justice, and peace.

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CHAPTER THIRTY
INTRACTABLE CONFLICT

Peter T. Coleman

When destructive conflicts persist for long periods of time and resist every attempt to resolve them constructively, they can appear to take on a life of their own. We label these *intractable conflicts* . They can occur between individuals (as in prolonged marital disputes) and within or between groups (as evidenced in the antiabortion/pro-choice conflict) or nations. Over time, they tend to attract the involvement of many parties, become increasingly complicated, and give rise to a threat to basic human needs or values. Typically they result in negative outcomes for the parties involved, ranging from mutual alienation and contempt to atrocities such as murder, rape, and genocide.

Today, of the roughly seventy geopolitical conflicts that the International Crisis Group is monitoring, fifteen have lasted between one and ten years, twelve have persisted between eleven and twenty years, and forty-three have dragged on for more than twenty years. This last category of long-enduring conflicts is what I refer to as the 5 percent of intractable conflicts (Coleman, 2011).

In a series of studies analyzing the Correlates of War database, a source of information on all interstate interactions around the world from 1816 to 2001, Paul Diehl and Gary Goertz (Diehl and Goertz, 2000; Klein, Goertz, and Diehl, 2006) have been exploring the dynamics of ongoing competitive relationships between states that employ either the threat or the use of military force. Of the 875 rivalries they have identified over the time span of the database, they estimate that between 5 and 8 percent become enduring, persisting more than twenty-five years with an average

duration of thirty-seven years. From 1816 to 2001, approximately 115 enduring rivalries have inflicted havoc in the geopolitical sphere.

Although the percentage of enduring rivalries in terms of all rivalries is small (5 percent), these ongoing disputes are disproportionately harmful, destructive, and expensive. Together they have accounted for 49 percent of all international wars since 1816, including World Wars I and II, and have been associated with 76 percent of all civil wars waged from 1946 to 2004 (DeRouen and Bercovitz, 2008). These protracted conflicts include those today in Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Colombia, and Cyprus. They cause extraordinary levels of misery, destabilize countries and entire regions, inflict terrible human suffering, and deplete the international community of critical resources such as humanitarian aid and disaster funding.

This chapter provides a practical overview of our current understanding of intractable conflict. It has six sections. It begins with a basic definition of intractable conflicts that distinguishes them from more manageable forms of conflict. It then outlines five common paradigms for addressing these types of conflicts. The third section outlines a variety of component parts of intractable conflict that scholars have identified as sources of their intransigence. Next, a dynamical-systems model of intractable conflict is presented, which helps to integrate our understanding of how the many subcomponents combine to foster intractability. The next section offers general guidelines for intervention, and the chapter concludes with a discussion of implications for training intervenors and disputants.

DEFINING INTRACTABLE CONFLICT

Intractable conflicts are essentially conflicts that persist because they appear impossible to resolve. Scholars have used labels such as *deeply rooted conflict* (Burton 1987), *protracted social conflict* (Azar, 1986), *moral conflict* (Pearce and Littlejohn 1997), and *enduring rivalries* (Goertz and Diehl, 1993) to depict similar phenomena. Kriesberg (2005) stresses three dimensions that differentiate intractable from tractable conflicts: their persistence, destructiveness, and resistance to resolution.

Most intractable conflicts do not begin as such but become so as escalation, hostile interactions, sentiment, and time change the quality of the conflict. They can be triggered and emerge from a wide variety of factors and events but often involve important issues such as moral and identity differences, high-stakes resources, or struggles for power and self-determination (Burgess and Burgess, 1996). Intractable conflicts are typically associated with cycles of high and low intensity and destructiveness, are often costly in human and economic terms, and can become pervasive, affecting even mundane aspects of disputants' lives (Kriesberg, 1999; Coleman, 2003).

APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING INTRACTABLE CONFLICT: FIVE PARADIGMS

Over the past several decades, the literature on social conflict has put forth a large array of approaches for prevention, intervention, and reconstruction work with protracted social conflicts. This section outlines five major paradigms employed currently in framing research and practice in this area: realism, human relations, pathology, postmodernism, and systems (see Coleman, 2004). These paradigms are, in effect, clusters of approaches that vary internally across a myriad of important dimensions and

overlap to some degree with approaches from other paradigms. The five paradigms are presented in order from most to least influential in the field today.

The Realist Paradigm

Historically this perspective has been the dominant paradigm for the study of war and peace in history, politics, and international affairs. Essentially a political metaphor, it views protracted conflicts as dangerous, high-stakes games that are won through strategies of domination, control, and countercontrol (see Schelling, 1960). Although they vary, approaches of this nature tend to assume that resources and power are always scarce, that human beings are basically flawed (always capable of producing evil) and have a will to dominate, and that one's opponents in conflict at any point may become aggressive. Consequently, they present an inherently conflictual world with uncertainties regarding the present and future intentions of one's adversary, leading to risk-aversive decision making. Thus, intractable conflicts are thought to result from rational, strategic choices made under the conditions of the "real politics" of hatred, manipulation, dominance, and violence in the world. These conflicts are seen as "real conflicts" of interest and power that exist objectively due to scarcities in the world and are exacerbated by such psychological phenomena as fear, mistrust, and misperception. In this context, power is seen as both paramount and corrupting, and real change is believed to be brought about primarily through power-coercive command-and-control strategies.

The realist approach highlights the need for strong actions to provide the protections necessary and requires that we find effective methods for minimizing acts of aggression and bolstering a sense of social and institutional stability, while at the same time confronting the underlying patterns of intergroup dominance and oppression that are the bedrock

of many conflicts. Examples of this approach include the use of direct force, Machiavellian approaches to statesmanship, game-theoretical strategies of collective security and deterrence, and “jujitsu” (redirecting the force of an opponent against itself) tactics of community organizing (Alinsky, 1971). They also include acts of stabilization to offset uncertainties, such as establishing clear and fair rules of law, a trustworthy government and judiciary, fair and safe voting practices, and a free press. In some settings, they involve activism to offset power imbalances, including raising awareness of specific types of injustice within both high-power and low-power communities; helping to organize, support, and empower marginalized groups; and bringing outside pressure to bear on the dominant groups for progressive reforms (Deutsch, 1985).

The emphasis given by the realist paradigm to the dangerous power politics and anarchy operating within the context of protracted conflicts is crucial. It highlights basic human concerns over threats to security, stability, and justice that lie at the heart of most experiences of protracted conflict. In turn, its myriad theories and approaches offer many insights and techniques for working politically in such systems. However, this orientation is not without its drawbacks. Its assumptions of rational choice are “economic” in nature (reasoning through efficient cost-benefit analyses), which, although valid under certain conditions, fails to account for other types of human reasoning and action (such as social, legal, moral, and political forms of reasoning) that function differently and have a large impact on decisions and outcomes in conflict settings (see Diesing, 1962, for an extensive discussion). In addition, its “preventative orientation” to managing conflict (see Higgins, 1997) leads to a focus on short-term security needs, worst-case scenarios, and an overreliance on strategies of threat and coercion (see Levy, 1996).

Furthermore, its core competitive assumptions regarding the nature of power and security, the availability of resources, and the inevitability of the other's aggression can limit a party's response options and typically results in competitive and escalatory dynamics and self-fulfilling prophesies that foster further entrenchment in the conflict (see Deutsch, 1973, 2000).

The Human Relations Paradigm

An alternative to the realist paradigm emerged primarily through the social-psychological study of conflict and stresses the vital role that human social interactions play in triggering, perpetuating, and resolving conflict. Based on a social metaphor, its most basic image of intractable conflict is of destructive relationships in which parties are locked in an increasingly hostile and vicious escalatory spiral and from which there appears to be no escape. With some variation, these approaches view human nature as mixed, with people having essentially equal capacities for good and evil, and they stress the importance of different external conditions for eliciting either altruism and cooperation or aggression and violence. This orientation also identifies fear, distrust, misunderstanding, and hostile interactions between disputants and between their respective communities as primary obstacles to constructive engagement. Thus, subjective psychological processes are seen as central as well, significantly influencing disputants' perceptions, expectations, and behavioral responses and therefore largely determining the course of conflict (see Deutsch, 1973). From this perspective, change is thought to be brought about most effectively through the planful targeting of people, communities, and social conditions and is best mobilized through normative—reeducative processes of influence (Fisher, 1994).

The human relations approach promotes a sense of hope and possibility under difficult circumstances. It stresses that we recognize the central importance of human contact and interaction between members of the various communities for both maintaining and transforming protracted conflicts. Human relations procedures include various methods of integrative negotiation, mediation, constructive controversy, and models of alternative dispute resolution systems design. In addition, scholars have found that establishing integrated social structures, including ethnically integrated business associations, trade unions, professional groups, political parties, and sports clubs, is one of the most effective ways of making intergroup conflict manageable (Varshney, 2002). Other variations include interactive problem-solving workshops (Kelman, 1999), town meeting methodologies, focused social imaging (Boulding, 1986), and antibias education.

The focus of the human relations paradigm on the promotion of positive moments of human contact between deadly enemies brings, if nothing else, hope to situations deemed by many to be hopeless. Even its less optimistic forms offer visions of the future of the conflict that are less violent, less traumatic, and well worth working for. Such seeds of hope can be priceless to a community locked in despair. In addition, the many procedures developed through the years for inducing cooperation, analyzing human needs, and fostering tolerance or reconciliation are creative and impressive and offer genuinely practical tools for the repair of even severely damaged relations.

Nevertheless, relationally focused strategies of intervention, when not complemented by other methods, often fall well short of their objectives in hazardous situations of protracted conflict. Although overstated, they have been criticized by some realists as “at best well-intentioned, at worst soft and driven by sentimentalism, and for the most

part irrelevant" (Lederach, 1997). They typically work best in situations where there is an a priori acceptance of the values of reciprocity, human equality, shared community, fallibility, and nonviolence (Deutsch, 2000). Contexts that are void of these norms, and the laws and institutions that regulate them present substantial challenges to the constructive use of relational strategies. For example, in societies where male superiority goes unquestioned, the use of cooperative strategies to address protracted gender conflicts may in fact perpetuate the oppressive quality of gender relations in that context. Finally, most human relations approaches are based on the values and assumptions of scientific humanism and planned social change (Fisher, 1994). These values and assumptions define the boundaries of these approaches and limit their applicability in situations where such values are not shared.

The Pathology Paradigm

This view pictures intractable social conflicts as pathological diseases—as infections or cancers of the body politic that can spread and afflict the system and therefore need to be correctly diagnosed, treated, and contained. A medical metaphor, it views its patient, the conflict system, as a complicated system made up of various interrelated parts that exist as an objective reality and can be analyzed and understood directly and treated accordingly. These patients are thought to be treated most effectively by outside experts who have the knowledge, training, and distance from the patient necessary to accurately diagnose and address the problem. This perspective views humans and social systems as basically health-oriented entities that, due to certain predispositions, neglect, or exposure to toxins in the environment, can develop pathological illnesses or destructive tendencies. Treatment of these pathologies, particularly when they are severe, is seen as

both an art and a science, with many courses of treatment that can bring their own negative consequences to the system. Although not as common as the realist and human relations paradigms, the medical model is particularly popular with agencies, community-based organizations, and nongovernmental organizations working in settings of protracted conflict.

A classic example of the medical approach is Volkan's tree model (Volkan, 1998), which recommends working collectively with communities in conflict to unearth the "hidden transcripts" (hidden resistances), the "hot" locations (symbolic sites), and the chosen traumas and glories that maintain oppositional group identities. This diagnostic phase is followed by a series of psychopolitical dialogues between influential representatives of relevant groups, who then work toward a "vaccination" campaign to reduce poisonous emotions at the local community, governmental, and societal levels. Other activities aimed at containing the spread of pathologies of violence in communities include strategies of nonviolence and many types of preventative diplomacy (such as early warning systems), crisis diplomacy, peace enforcement (conflict mitigation), and peacekeeping. In addition, this approach is associated with a wide variety of activities for postconflict reconstruction, including rebuilding damaged infrastructure, currency stabilization, demining, creating legitimate and integrated governments, demilitarizing and demobilizing soldiers, resettling displaced peoples, and establishing awareness of and support for basic human rights (Wessells and Monteiro, 2001).

Understanding and treating the pathological aspects of protracted conflicts has unquestionable value. The needs to contain high levels of tension and violence, unearth and assuage destructive, unconscious motives and hidden tensions and agendas, and address toxic emotions, trauma,

and societal-level damage are straightforward indeed. However, once again, this worldview is limited in its capacity to manage protracted conflict unaided. For example, the amelioration of tension and violence in protracted conflicts is often only temporary and superficial. As Martin Luther King Jr. once said, “Peace is not merely the absence of tension, but the presence of justice.” Although hostilities between people may be temporarily controlled by the acceptance of a cease-fire or peacekeeping troops, the conflict may move no closer to resolution and may in fact become more intractable as a result of the disengagement of the parties (Fisher, 1997). In addition, the approach of identifying and exposing covert motives and interests rests on the straightforward assumption that doing so is good—that it is both possible and constructive to unearth such motives, that people have the capacity and support to tolerate such information when it is forthcoming (about themselves, their government, their businesses, and so on), and that people, corporations, and governments will then have the motivation and the capacity to reform. These assumptions, although hopeful, are often inaccurate. Finally, this orientation is based on a deficit model, with a focus on that which is wrong or pathological in a conflict system. While important, this orientation often neglects focusing on positive responses such as resiliency or altruistic and ethical behavior under difficult circumstances, and it can foster a negativity bias in our understanding of and responses to the phenomena.

The Postmodern Paradigm

This perspective portrays intractable conflicts as rooted in the ways we make sense of the world. A communications metaphor, its most basic image is of conflict as a story—a narrative or myth that provides a context for interpretation of actions and events, both past and present, that largely

shapes our experience of ongoing conflicts. Thus, conflict comes from the way parties subjectively define a situation and interact with one another to construct a sense of meaning, responsibility, and value in that setting. Intractable conflicts, then, are less the result of scarce resources, incendiary actions of parties, or struggles for limited positions of power than they are a sense of reality, created and maintained through a long-term process of meaning making through social interaction (Lederach, 1997; Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997). This worldview highlights a form of power as meaning control: an insidious primary form of power that is often quietly embedded in the assumptions and beliefs that disputing parties take for granted. It suggests that it is primarily through assumptions about what is unquestionably "right" in a given context that different groups develop and maintain incommensurate worldviews and conflicts persist. Thus, change is believed to be brought about by dragging these assumptions into the light of day through critical reflection, dialogue, and direct confrontation, thus increasing disputant awareness of the complexity of reality, our almost arbitrary understanding of it, and the need for change.

The postmodern approach can be operationalized through a variety of channels, including targeting how conflicts are depicted in children's history texts, challenging the media's role in shaping and perpetuating conflict, and working at the intragroup level on renegotiating oppositional identities (Kelman, 1999). Many nongovernmental organizations facilitate small dialogue groups of disputants who come together with the support of carefully structured facilitation to share their memories and experiences of conflicts in the presence of others who hold profoundly different views. These dialogues offer an experience that is distinct from problem solving, mediation, or negotiation in that they discourage persuasion and argumentation and encourage

alternative forms of intergroup contact that emphasize learning, openness to sharing, and gathering new information about oneself, the issues, and the other. Other examples of this approach include the reframing of environmental conflicts (see Lewicki, Gray, and Elliott, 2003) and are evident in the work of groups such as the Public Conversations Project, the Public Dialogue Consortium, and the National Issues Forum (see Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997).

Although rich and intuitively appealing, postmodern constructivism has been criticized for its abstract intellectualism (Alvesson and Willmott, 1992a, 1992b) and its tendency to denigrate and alienate the elite (Voronov and Coleman, 2003). Critics find its central ideas and jargon vague and difficult to operationalize in any useful manner: it seems to find meaning-making processes and dominance everywhere but makes it difficult to pinpoint them anywhere. It has also been chided for its overemphasis on the subjective and denial of the importance of objective circumstances.

Although this approach is intriguing, the level of consciousness required with it can be quite demanding and difficult to sustain, even under nonthreatening conditions (Kegan, 1994). Therefore, the possibilities of applying such methods in situations of intense, protracted conflict are particularly challenging.

The Systems Paradigm

In essence, the system’s perspective is based on an image of a simple living cell developing and surviving within its natural environment. A biological metaphor, it views conflicts as living entities made up of a variety of interdependent and interactive elements that are nested within other, increasingly complex entities. Thus, a marital conflict is nested within a family, a community, a region, a

culture, and so on. The elements of systems are not related to one another in a linear manner but interact according to a nonlinear, recursive process so that each element influences the others. In other words, a change in any one element in a system does not necessarily constitute a proportional change in others; such changes cannot be separated from the values of the various other elements that constitute the system. Thus, intractable conflicts are viewed as destructive patterns of social systems, which are the result of a multitude of different hostile elements interacting at different levels over time, culminating in an ongoing state of intractability (see Ricigliano, 2012; Burns, 2007; Körppen, Ropers, and Giessmann, 2011). Power and influence in these systems are multiply determined, and substantial change is thought to occur only through transformative shifts in the deep structure or pattern of organization of the system.

Ironically, the systems orientation is one of the most common and yet least well developed of the conflict paradigms. Its approach encourages us to see the whole. It presents the political, the relational, the pathological, and the epistemological as simply different elements of the living system of the conflict. Thus, it stresses the interdependent nature of the various objectives in intervention of mutual security, stability, equality, justice, cooperation, humanization of the other, reconciliation, tolerance of difference, containment of tension and violence, compatibility and complexity of meaning, healing, and reconstruction. It suggests that through the weaving and sequencing of such complementary approaches, it may be possible to trigger shifts in the deep structure of systems like Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Israel-Palestine, or Sudan in a manner that may produce a sustained pattern of transformational change.

However, a great deal of work must be done for this worldview to become useful at an operational level. General systems theory has been criticized for its lack of specificity, imprecise definition, and contributing relatively little to the generation of testable hypotheses in the social sciences (Kozlowski and Klein, 2000). In addition, its emphasis on homeostasis and equilibrium in systems, while important, neglects the critical temporal dimension: how conflict systems change and evolve over time (Nowak and Vallacher, 1998). Work from this perspective will need to move beyond its use as a general heuristic in order for it to realize its full potential to address complex social conflicts.

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These five paradigms and various associated procedures provide us with an extensive menu of perspectives and options for addressing intractable social conflicts. Each approach is supported to some degree by empirical research, and each offers a unique problematique, or system of questioning, that governs the way we think about intervention in conflicts. However, each paradigm is also aspectual: orienting our focus toward certain aspects of conflict and away from others. Ideally we must develop a capacity to conceptualize and address intractable conflicts in a manner that is mindful of the complementarities and limits of these diverse approaches.

COMPONENTS OF INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS

What makes intractable conflicts persist? Scholars have identified a diverse and complex array of interrelated factors that help distinguish between tractable and intractable conflicts (Coleman, 2003). Of course, all conflicts are unique, and it may not always be useful to compare, say, moral conflicts with intractable conflicts over territory or

water rights, or conflicts between a husband and wife in the United States with those between a powerful majority group and members of a low-power group in East Asia. However, despite the many differences that arise in such comparisons, we suggest that intractable conflicts, particularly if they have persisted for some time, share to some degree some or all of the following characteristics related to their context, core issues, relations, processes, and outcomes.

Context

Many peace scholars have emphasized the importance of structural variables embedded in the context of protracted conflicts as the primary source of their persistence.

Legacies of Dominance and Injustice.

Intractable conflicts regularly occur in situations where there exists a severe imbalance of power between the parties in which the more powerful exploit, control, or abuse the less powerful. Often the power holders in such settings use the existence of salient intergroup distinctions (such as ethnicity or class) as a means of maintaining or strengthening their power base (Staub, 2001). Many of these conflicts are rooted in a history of colonialism, ethnocentrism, racism, sexism, or human rights abuses in the relations between the disputants (Azar, 1990). These legacies manifest in ideologies and practices at the cultural, structural, and relational levels of these conflicts, which act to maintain hierarchical relations and injustices and thereby perpetuate conflict.

Instability.

When circumstances bring about substantial changes, they can rupture a basic sense of stability and cause great disturbances within a system. This is true whether it is the divorce of two parents, the failure of a state, or the collapse

of a superpower. Under these conditions, conflict may surface because of shifts in the balance (or imbalance) of power between disputants or because of increased ambiguity about relative power (Pruitt and Kim, 2004). It can also emerge when a sense of relative deprivation arises out of changes in aspirations, expectations, or achievable outcomes of the parties (Gurr, 1970, 2000). Such changes can bring into question the old rules, patterns, and institutions that have failed to meet basic needs and can decrease the level of trust in fairness-creating and conflict-resolving procedures, laws, and institutions, adversely affecting their capacity to address problems and further destabilizing the situation. Anarchical situations, where there is a lack of an overarching political authority or of the necessary checks and balances that help manage systems, are an extreme example of power vacuums that can foster protracted conflict.

Core Issues

Other peace scholars highlight the unique nature of the issues as the main driver of intractability.

Human and Social Polarities.

Tractable conflicts by definition involve resolvable problems that can be integrated, divided, or otherwise negotiated to the relative satisfaction of a majority of the parties. As such, they have a finite beginning, middle, and end. Intractable conflicts often revolve around some of the more central dilemmas of human and social existence that are not resolvable in the traditional sense. These are polarities (structured contradictions) based on opposing human needs, tendencies, principles, or processes, which have a paradoxical reaction to most attempts to “solve” them. These can include dilemmas over change and stability, interdependence and security, inclusive and efficient

decision making, and individual and group rights (Coleman, 2003).

Symbolism and Ideology.

Intractable conflicts tend to involve issues with a depth of meaning, centrality, and interconnectedness with other issues that give them a pervasive quality (Rouhana and Bar-Tal, 1998). The tangible issues (e.g., land, money, water rights) that trigger hostilities in these settings are largely important because of the symbolic meaning that they carry or that is constructed and assigned to them. For instance, Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem in 2000 was seen as a frivolous gesture to some and as a flagrant attack on Islam to others. In Kashmi, much of the mountainous territory in dispute is frozen, uninhabitable wasteland, yet soldiers and civilians die each day to secure it. Such specific issues (resources, actions, and events) become symbols of great emotional importance through social interaction between people and through their connection to existing conflict narratives: stories that define the criteria for what is good, moral, and right in any given conflict setting (Bar-Tal, 2000).

Relationships

In addition, a subset of the field has focused on the central nature of the relations between disputants as basic to their enduring quality.

Exclusive and Inescapable.

In many intractable conflicts, the relations between the parties develop in settings where exclusive social structures limit intergroup contact and isolate the in-group across family, work, and community domains. This lack of contact facilitates the development of abstract, stereotypical images of the other, autistic hostilities, and intergroup violence

(Deutsch, 1973; Varshney, 2002). However, the relationships are also typically experienced as inescapable by the parties, where they see no way of extricating themselves without becoming vulnerable to an unacceptable loss. This may be due to a variety of constraints, including geographical, financial, moral, or psychological factors. When destructive conflicts persist under these conditions, they tend to damage or destroy the trust, faith, and cooperative potential necessary for constructive or tolerant relations. In such relationships, the negative aspects remain salient, and any positive encounters are forgotten or viewed with suspicion and misconstrued as aberrations or attempts at deception.

Oppositional Group Identities.

As group conflicts escalate, opposing groups become increasingly polarized through in-group discourse and out-group hostilities, resulting in the development of oppositional identities constructed around a negation and disparagement of the out-group (Kelman, 1999). This is particularly likely with collective identities of ascribed statuses (such as family, sex, racial, and national group membership) where there is a long-term emotional attachment to the group that is unalterable and significant. When such group identities are subject to discrimination or oppression (and such treatment is viewed as unjust), protracted conflicts are likely to manifest and persist. These group memberships can provide members with an important sense of mutual respect, a meaningful understanding of the social world, and a sense of collective efficacy and agency. However, deep investments in these polarized identities can become a primary obstacle to constructive forms of conflict engagement and sustainable peace.

Intense Internal Dynamics.

Conflict is more likely to be resolvable when it (1) concerns conscious needs and motives, (2) is between unified groups or between individuals with little ambivalence regarding resolution, and (3) is over overt issues that can be explicitly detailed and addressed. As such, the conflictual intrapsychic and intragroup dynamics and hidden agendas associated with intractable conflicts contribute to their difficult nature. They typically consist of both implicit and explicit issues, formal and informal agendas, and deliberate and unconscious processes. In addition, the high degree of threat, harm, and anxiety associated with them leads to a felt need for defensiveness and secrecy, which drives many motives, issues, and actions underground.

Processes

The negative, highly emotional, and pervasive nature of the interactive processes of protracted conflicts have also been studied.

Strong Emotionality.

Economically rational models of costs and benefits or positions and interests cannot begin to model the fabric of protracted social conflicts. These processes have a boiling emotional core, replete with humiliation, frustration, rage, threat, and resentment between groups and deep feelings of pride, esteem, dignity, and identification within groups. In fact, some scholars contend that extreme reactions seen in conflicts are primarily based in emotional responses (Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997). In effect, the overall distinction between emotionality and rationality may be rather dubious when it comes to intractable conflicts, where they are often inseparable. Here, indignation, rage, and righteousness are reasons enough for retributive action. However, it is not merely the type and depth of emotions that distinguish tractable from intractable conflict, but rather differences in

the normative structures and processes that imbue them with meaning. Our feelings of raw emotion (hate, rage, pride) are often labeled, understood, and acted on in ways shaped by rules and norms that define what certain emotions mean, whether they are good or bad, and how people should respond to them. Thus, similar emotions may be constructed and acted on differently in dissimilar families, communities, and cultures. Communities entrenched in an intractable conflict may unwittingly encourage emotional experiences and expressions of the most extreme nature, thereby escalating and sustaining the conflict.

Malignant Social Processes.

Over time, a variety of cognitive, moral, and behavioral processes combine to bring protracted conflicts to a level of high intensity and perceived intractability. They include such cognitive processes as stereotyping, ethnocentrism, selective perception (like the discovery of confirming evidence), self-fulfilling prophecies (when negative attitudes and perceptions impact the other's behavior), and cognitive rigidity. These can fuel processes of deindividuation and dehumanization of the enemy, leading to moral disengagement and moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990), that is, the development of rigid moral boundaries between groups that exclude out-group members from typical standards of moral treatment. This can result in a variety of antagonistic behaviors such as escalatory spirals (where each aggressive behavior is met with a more aggressive response), autistic hostilities (a cessation of direct communication), and violence. What is unique to intractable conflicts is the pervasiveness and persistence of psychological and physical violence, how it typically leads to counterviolence and some degree of normalization of violent acts, and the extreme level of destruction it typically inflicts. These escalatory processes culminate in the development of malignant social

relations, which Deutsch (1985) described as a stage (of escalation) “which is increasingly dangerous and costly and from which the participants see no way of extricating themselves without becoming vulnerable to an unacceptable loss in a value central to their self-identities or self-esteem” (p. 263).

Pervasiveness, Complexity, and Flux.

Tractable conflicts have relatively clear boundaries that delineate what they are and are not about, whom they concern and whom they do not, and when and where it is appropriate to engage in the conflict. In intractable situations, the experience of threat associated with the conflict is so basic that the effects of the conflict spread and become pervasive, affecting many aspects of a person’s or a community’s social and political life (Rouhana and Bar-Tal, 1998). The existential nature of these conflicts can affect everything from policymaking, leadership, education, the arts, and scholarly inquiry down to the most mundane decisions such as whether to shop and eat in public places. The totality of such experiences feels impenetrable. Yet they are systems in a constant state of flux. Thus, the hot issues in the conflict, the levels where they manifest, the critical parties involved, the nature of the relationships in the network, the degree of intensity of the conflict, and the level of attention it attracts from bystander communities are all subject to change. This chaotic, mercurial character contributes to their resistance to resolution.

Outcomes

Finally, the outcomes of many intractable disputes in turn establish the conditions that contribute to their persistence.

Protracted Trauma.

The experience of prolonged trauma associated with these conflicts produces what is perhaps their most troubling consequences. Long-term exposure to atrocities and human suffering, the loss of loved-ones, rape, bodily disfigurement, and chronic health problems can destroy people's spirit and impair their capacity to lead a healthy life. At its core, trauma is a loss of trust in a safe and predictable world. In response, individuals suffer from a variety of symptoms, including recurrent nightmares, suicidal thoughts, demoralization, helplessness, hopelessness, anxiety, depression, somatic illnesses, sleeplessness, and feelings of isolation and meaninglessness. Trauma adversely affects parenting, marriages, essential life choices, and the manner with which authority figures take up leadership roles. It also impairs communities and can hamper everything from the most mundane merchant-client interactions to voting and governmental functioning (Parakrama, 2001). Thus, the links between trauma and intractability seem to lie in the degree of impairment of individuals and communities and, in particular, to the manner in which trauma is or is not addressed postconflict.

Normalization of Hostility and Violence.

In these settings, destructive processes gradually come to be experienced as normative by the parties involved. The biased construction of history, ongoing violent discourse, and intergenerational perpetuation of the conflict contribute to a sense of reality where the hostilities are as natural as the landscape. For example, Israeli and Palestinian youth in the Middle East were found to accept and justify the use of violence and war in conflict significantly more than youth from European settings of nonintractable conflict (Orr, Sagi, and Bar-On, 2000). In addition, they found Israeli and Palestinian youth more reluctant than Europeans to be willing to pay a price for peace. Again, what appeared to matter in this study was how the meaning of violence

differed for the youth from these different settings. The violence-war discourse in the Middle East, passed down through the distinct parental and community ideologies of the Israeli and Palestinian communities, depicted violence as an act of self-defense and war as a noble cause. This type of ideology has been found to shield youth from the psychological harm typically associated with exposure to violence. Thus, increased levels of violence had become normalized for the Middle Eastern youth and were seen as necessary and useful particularly because of the perception that negotiations were impossibly costly (in terms of the nonnegotiable concessions that would need to be made).

Persistence.

What is particularly daunting about this 5 percent of protracted conflicts is their substantial resistance to good-faith attempts to solve them. In these settings, the traditional methods of diplomacy, negotiation, and mediation—even military victory—seem to have little impact on the persistence of the conflict. In fact, there is some evidence that these strategies may make matters worse (Diehl and Goertz, 2000).

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To summarize, intractable conflicts are multiply determined, complex, mercurial, exhausting, and rife with misery. Their persistence can be the result of a wide variety of causes and processes. Ultimately, however, it is the complex interaction of these many factors across different levels of the conflict (from personal to international) over long periods of time that brings them to an extreme state of hopelessness and intransigence. Therefore, we must employ models that conceptualize and address them in a manner that is mindful of the many components and complex relationships inherent to the phenomenon. The dynamical-systems approach provides such a model.

A DYNAMICAL SYSTEMS MODEL OF INTRACTABLE CONFLICT

Conflict engagement is essentially about change. It revolves around a need or desire to address incompatibilities by changing a situation; a relationship; a balance of power; another's actions, values, beliefs, or bargaining position; or a third party's wish to change a conflict from high intensity to low or from destructive to constructive. Therefore, how we think about and approach change or, in the case of intractable conflicts, how we understand conflict systems that doggedly resist change is paramount. There are many theories of change, and disputants as well as conflict resolution practitioners all operate with respect to these theories, whether implicit or explicit, complex or simple, accurate or inaccurate (Coleman, 2004). Dynamical systems theory, a school of thought coming out of applied mathematics, offers new, highly original, and practical insights about how complex systems of all types, from cellular to social to planetary, change and resist change (for more detail, see Coleman, 2011; Coleman, Vallacher, Nowak, and Bui-Wrzosinska, 2007; Vallacher, Coleman, Nowak, and Bui-Wrzosinska, 2010; Vallacher et al., 2013).

A dynamical system is defined as a set of interconnected elements (such as beliefs, feelings, and behaviors) that change and evolve over time in accordance with simple rules. A change in each element depends on influences from other elements. Due to these mutual influences, the system as a whole evolves in time. Thus, the effects resulting from changes in any element of a conflict (such as level of hostilities) depend on rules-based influences of various other elements (e.g., each person's motives, attitudes, actions) that evolve to affect the disputants' general pattern of interactions (positive or negative). The task of dynamical systems research is to specify the nature of these rules and

the system-level properties and behaviors that emerge from the repeated iteration of these rules. In recent years, the dynamical systems perspective has been adapted to investigate personal, interpersonal, and societal processes under the guise of “dynamical social psychology” (Nowak and Vallacher, 1998; Vallacher and Nowak, 1994, 2007). The most recent extension of this approach focuses on the defining features of intractable conflict (Coleman, 2011; Coleman, Vallacher, Nowak, and Bui-Wrzosinska, 2007; Nowak et al., 2006; Vallacher et al., 2010, 2013).

Intractable conflicts seem to operate and change differently from most other conflicts, according to their own unique set of rules. Think of epidemics, which do not spread like other outbreaks of illness that grow incrementally. Epidemics grow slowly at first until they hit a certain threshold, after which they grow catastrophically and spread exponentially. This is called nonlinear change. We suggest that the 5 percent of enduring conflicts operate in a similar manner. In these settings, many interrelated problems begin to collapse together and feed each other through reinforcing feedback loops, which eventually cross a threshold and become self-organizing (self-perpetuating) and therefore unresponsive to outside intervention. In the language of applied mathematics and dynamical systems theory, these conflict systems become attractors: strong, coherent patterns that draw people in and resist change. This, we suggest, is the essence of intractable conflict.

As a conflict evolves toward intractability, each party’s thoughts, feelings and actions—even those that seem irrelevant to the conflict—take on meaning that maintains or intensifies the conflict. Metaphorically, the attractor serves as a valley in the social-psychological landscape into which the psychological elements—thoughts, feelings and actions—begin to slide. Once trapped in such a valley, escape

requires tremendous will and energy and may appear impossible to achieve.

Despite the self-destructive potential of entrenched conflict, attractors satisfy two basic social-psychological motives. First, they provide a coherent view of the conflict, including the character of the in-group, the nature of the relationship with the antagonistic party, the history of the conflict, and the legitimacy of claims of each party. This function of attractors is especially critical when the parties encounter information or actions that are open to interpretation. An attractor serves to disambiguate actions and interpret the relevance and true meaning of information. Second, attractors provide a stable platform for action, enabling parties to a conflict to respond unequivocally and without hesitation to a change in circumstances or an action initiated by other parties. In the absence of an attractor, the conflicting parties may experience hesitation in deciding what to do, or engage in internal dissent that could prevent each party from engaging in a clear and decisive course of action. Such hesitancy or indecision can have calamitous consequences in the context of violent conflicts.

This perspective provides a new way to conceptualize and address intractable conflict. Conflicts are commonly described in terms of their intensity, but this feature does not capture the issue of intractability. Even conflicts with a low level of intensity can become protracted and resistant to resolution. We propose instead that intractable conflicts are governed by strong attractors for negative dynamics and weak attractors for positive or even neutral dynamics. Hence, knowledge of the attractor landscape of a system—the ensemble of sustainable states for positive, neutral, and negative interactions—is critical for understanding the progression, stabilization, and transformation of intractable conflicts.

A relationship between conflicting parties may be characterized by incompatibilities with respect to many issues, but this state of affairs does not necessarily promote intractability. To the contrary, the complexity or multidimensionality of such relationships may prevent the progression toward intractability or even enhance the likelihood of conflict resolution. Because each party may lose on one issue but prevail on others, conflict resolution is tantamount to bartering or problem solving, with both parties attempting to find a solution that best satisfies their respective needs (Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1992).

However, it is the collapse of complexity in relationships that promotes conflict intractability. When distinct issues become interlinked and mutually dependent, the activation of a single issue effectively activates all the other ones. The likelihood of finding a solution that satisfies all the issues thus correspondingly diminishes. For example, if a border incident occurs between neighboring nations with a history of conflict, there is likely to be a reactivation of all the provocations, perceived injustices, and conflicts of interest from the past. The parties to the conflict thus are likely to respond disproportionately to the magnitude of the instigating issue. Even if the instigating issue is somehow resolved, the activation of other issues will serve to maintain and even deepen the conflict.

The loss of issue complexity is directly linked to the development of attractors. Interpersonal and intergroup relations are typically multidimensional, with various mechanisms operating at different points in time, in different contexts, with respect to different issues, and often in a compensatory manner. The alignment of separate issues into a single dimension, however, establishes reinforcing feedback loops, such that the issues have a mutually reinforcing rather than a compensatory relationship. All events that are open to interpretation become construed in

a similar fashion and promote a consistent pattern of behavior in relation to other people and groups. Even a peaceful overture by the out-group, for instance, may be seen as insincere or as a trick if there is strong reservoir of antagonism toward the out-group.

However, any psychological or social system is likely to have multiple attractors (e.g., love and indifference and hate in a close relationship), each providing a unique form of mental or behavioral coherence with different levels of stability and resistance to change. When the dynamics of a system is captured by one of its attractors, the others may not be visible to observers, perhaps not even to the participants. These latent attractors, though, may be highly important in the long run because they determine which states are possible for the system if and when conditions change. Critical changes in a system, then, might not be reflected in the system's observable state but rather in the creation or destruction of a latent attractor representing a potential state that is currently invisible to all concerned.

Despite their considerable resistance to change, it is important to recognize that attractors for intractable conflict can and do change. There are three basic scenarios by which this seems to occur (Vallacher et al., 2010). In one, an understanding of how attractors are created can be used to reverse-engineer an intractable attractor. Attractors developed as separate elements (e.g., issues, events, pieces of information) become linked by reinforcing feedback to promote a global perspective and action orientation. Reverse engineering thus entails changing some of the feedback loops from reinforcing to inhibitory, thereby lowering the level of coherence in the system. A second scenario involves moving the system out of its manifest destructive attractor into a latent attractor that is defined in terms of benign or even positive thoughts, actions, and relationships. The third scenario goes beyond moving the

system between its existing attractors to systematically changing the number and types of attractors. These three strategies are described in more detail in the guidelines in the next section.

Dynamical systems theory offers a new perspective and language through which to comprehend and address intractability. Its use requires a working understanding of the main constructs and relationships of complex dynamical systems, nonlinearity, feedback loops, attractors, latent attractors, repellers, emergence, self-organization, networks, and unintended consequences. (For more information, see Coleman, 2011; Vallacher et al., 2010, 2013.)

TEN GUIDELINES FOR ALTERING THE ATTRACTOR LANDSCAPES OF INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS

The dynamical systems model of intractable conflict has direct implications for practice (see Coleman, 2011, for a fuller account). Following are ten general guidelines for working with long-term conflicts that have emerged from this approach:

1. Leverage instability
2. Complicate to simplify
3. Read the emotional reservoirs of the conflict
4. Begin with what is working
5. Beginnings matter most
6. Circumvent the conflict
7. Seek meek power
8. Work with both manifest and latent attractors

9. Alter conflict and peace attractors for the long term
10. Restablize through dynamic adaptivity

Guideline 1: Leverage Instability

Intractable conflicts involve ultracoherent, closed systems that steadfastly resist many good-faith attempts at change. When such coherence and absolute certainty about us versus them provides the foundation for understanding and the platform for action in conflict, it is useful to leverage whatever is necessary to change the patterns. Here the challenge becomes what the organizational theorist Gareth Morgan (1997) refers to as “opening the door to instability.” This entails either capitalizing on existing conditions or creating new conditions that in fact destabilize the system.

For instance, in research by Diehl and Goetz (2000; see also Klein, Goertz, and Diehl, 2006) of the approximately 850 enduring international conflicts that occurred throughout the world between 1816 to 1992, over three-quarters of them were found to have ended within ten years of a major political shock (world wars, civil wars, significant changes in territory and power relations, regime change, independence movements, or transitions to democracy). From the perspective of Dynamical Systems Theory (DST), these shocks created fissures in the stability of the previous systems, eventually leading to the establishment of the necessary conditions for the major restructuring and realignment of conflict landscapes.

This suggests that events such as those erupting in the Middle East today (e.g., the Arab Spring) promote optimal conditions for a dramatic realignment of sociopolitical systems. Similarly, a family system plunged into crisis by the sudden announcement of divorce by the parents, a child’s diagnosis of terminal illness, a criminal conviction of a family member, or the need to quickly uproot and move out

of state for work could all place a family system in a tenuous, high-anxiety state. Such shocks can destabilize protracted conflict systems and allow the deconstruction and reconstruction of the attractor landscape. However, the results of destabilization may take years to become evident, as the initial shock most likely affects factors that affect other factors and so on until overt changes occur. It is also important to note that such ruptures to the coherence and stability of sociopolitical systems do not ensure radical or constructive change or peace. It must therefore be considered a necessary but insufficient condition when working with intractability.

Guideline 2: Complicate to Simplify: Mapping the Dynamic Ecology of Peace and Conflict

A central task for intervenors working with intractable conflict is to avoid premature oversimplification of the problems they face and to identify and work through key elements of the system that are driving or constraining change in a manner informed by the complexities of the situation. Consequently, one of the first challenges for intervenors working in a system with a collapse of complexity (strong us-versus-them polarization dynamics) is to maintain or enhance their own and the disputants' tolerance for ambiguity, contradiction, and sense of integrative complexity with regard to the case (Coleman, Redding, and Ng, forthcoming; Conway, Suedfeld, and Tetlock, 2001). This includes the capacities to tolerate ambiguous and contradictory information and to view the system holistically; to begin to see different aspects of the problem and how they relate to one another and then to put this information together in a manner that informs action. This is no small task under the pressures and constraints of intense, long-term conflict. Coleman, Redding, and Ng (forthcoming) have developed a two-level framework to help

assess and enhance these competencies in decision makers and disputants and to assess and foster the institutional conditions known to be conducive to them.

One increasingly useful and popular method of enhancing complexity is through conflict and peace mapping. Because destructive conflicts demand attention to the here and now —to the violence, hostilities, suffering, and grievances evident in the immediate context—they often draw attention away from the history, trajectory, and broader context in which the conflict is evolving. Today many peace practitioners employ the use of complexity and feedback-loop mapping to recontextualize their own and the stakeholders' understanding of the conflict (see Burns, 2007; Coleman, 2011; Körppen et al., 2011; Ricigliano, 2012).

The dynamical system of the conflict, in the form of a dynamic network, can be represented through a series of feedback loop analyses (see figure 30.1 for a representation of the conflict and peace process in Mozambique in the 1980s and 1990s). Loop analysis, developed by Maruyama (1963, 1982), is useful for mapping reinforcing and inhibiting feedback processes that escalate, de-escalate, and stabilize destructive conflicts. Reinforcing feedback occurs when one element (such as a hostile act) stimulates another element (such as negative out-group beliefs) along its current trajectory. Inhibiting feedback occurs when one element inhibits or reverses the direction of another element (such as when guilty or compassionate feelings damper hostilities). Strong attractors are created when reinforcing feedback loops are formed between previously unrelated elements while inhibiting feedback dissipates in the system.




Figure 30.1 Feedback Loop Analysis of Mozambique Conflict and Peace

Source: Coleman, P. T., Vallacher, R., Nowak, A., Bui-Wrzosinska, L., and Bartoli, A. (2011). Navigating the landscape of conflict: Applications of dynamical systems theory to protracted social conflict. In N. Ropers (Ed.), *Systemic thinking and conflict transformation* . Berlin: Berghof Foundation for Peace Support.

Feedback mapping not only captures the multiple sources and complex temporal dynamics of conflict systems but can also help identify central nodes and patterns that are unrecognizable by other means. The process typically begins by identifying the key elements in the conflict that emerge during different phases of escalation and specifying the nature of the linkages among these elements. This analysis can be characterized as evolving through various developmental stages (such as phases 1 to 9 in figure 30.1). Maps can be generated at the individual level (identifying the emotional and cognitive links that parties hold in their

attitudes, feelings and beliefs—associations related to the problem and to their sense of the other), the interpersonal level (allies, enemies, power structures and so on), and the systemic level (e.g., mapping the feedback loops that allowed a particular series of events to escalate, such as seen in figure 30.1). This can be useful for remaining mindful of the systemic context of the conflict and restoring a sense of complexity into the parties' understanding of events.

Feedback mapping can be particularly useful for identifying and understanding the more constructive or functional aspects of social systems. Merely asking stakeholders, "Why doesn't the conflict get worse?" "Why did disputants settle in the past?" or "What provides a sense of hope today?" can orient the analysis toward more constructive components or dynamics of the system, as can asking, "Where are the islands of agreement or the networks of effective action today?" or "What type of taboos exist for destruction and violence here [places of worship, children, hospitals]?" This information, which is typically ignored in conflict analysis, can help reveal the system's own autoimmune system that operates to inhibit the conflict.

Conflict maps can be generated alone as a prenegotiation exercise (with minimal training), with the help of facilitators or mediators, or in small groups of stakeholders. With conflict mapping, the goal is not necessarily to get it right. The goal at this stage is to get it different, that is, to try to reintroduce a sense of nuance and complexity into the stakeholders' understanding of the conflict. The goal is to try to open up the system: to provide opportunities to explore and develop multiple perspectives, emotions, ideas, narratives, and identities and foster an increased sense of emotional and behavioral flexibility.

However, feedback loop mapping can result in extremely complex visualizations of a conflict's dynamics; therefore, it

is critical to be able to offer strategies for subsequently focusing and simplifying. For instance, once a system is mapped, one can employ basic measures of network analysis and centrality to assess different qualities of the elements, such as their levels of in-degree (how many links or loops feed them), out-degree (whether they serve as a key source of stimulation or inhibition of the conflict for other nodes), and betweenness (the degree to which they are located between and therefore link other nodes; see Wasserman and Faust, 1994). This process can help to focus the analysis and manage the anxiety associated with the overwhelming sense of complexity of the system. However, it does so in a manner better informed by its complexity, history, and context.

Guideline 3: Read the Emotional Reservoirs of the Conflict

Emotions are not simply important considerations in intractable conflict; they are *the* issue as they set the stage for destructive or constructive perceptions, cognitions and interactions. In fact, research on emotions and decision making in patients with severe brain injuries found that when people lose the capacity to experience emotions, they also lose their ability to make important decisions (Bechara, 2004). Thus, emotions are not only relevant to our decisions; they are central to them.

Laboratory research on emotions and conflict dynamics tells a consistent tale; it is the ratio that matters (Gottman, Swanson, and Swanson, 2002; Kugler, Coleman, and Fuchs, 2011; Losada and Heaphy, 2004). It is not necessarily how negative or how positive people feel about each other that really matters in conflict; it is the ratio of their positivity to negativity over time. Studies show that healthy couples and functional, innovative work groups tend to have disagreements and experience some degree of negativity in

their relationships. This is normal, and in fact people usually need to experience this in order to learn and develop in their relationships. However, these negative encounters must occur within the context of a sufficient reservoir of positivity for the relationships to be functional. And because negative encounters have such an inordinately strong impact on people and relationships, there have to be significantly more positive experiences to offset the negative ones. Scholars have found that disputants in ongoing relationships need somewhere between three and a half to five positive experiences for every negative one to keep the negative encounters from becoming harmful (Gottman et al., 2002; Kugler et al., 2011; Losada and Heaphy, 2004). They need to have enough emotional positivity in reserve. Without this, the negative encounters will accumulate (rapidly), helping to create and perpetuate wide and deep attractors for destructive relations—in other words, intractable conflicts.

Guideline 4: Begin with What Is Working

Conflict resolution practitioners tend to focus on identifying and solving problems. While important, this orientation tends to obstruct our view of what is already working or of existing opportunities for solutions. Nevertheless, virtually every conflict system, even the most dire, contains people and groups who, despite the dangers, are willing to reach out across the divide and work to foster dialogue and peace. These are what Laura Chasin calls *networks of effective action* (Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997) and Gabriella Blum (2007) labels *islands of agreement* . For example, Blum has found that during many protracted conflicts, the disputing parties often maintain areas in their relationship where they continue to communicate and cooperate despite the severity of the conflict. In international affairs, this can occur with some forms of trade, civilian exchanges, or medical care. In

communities and organizations, these islands may emerge around personal or professional crises (e.g., a sick child), outside interests (mutual work on common causes), or by way of chains of communications through trusted third parties. Recognizing and bolstering such networks or islands can mitigate tensions and help to contain the conflict.

There are countless examples of this in the international arena: among Germans and Jews during the Nazi campaign in Europe during World War II, blacks and whites in South Africa in the 1980s, and today in places like Darfur, Somalia, Iran, and North Korea. These networks are often the centerpiece of latent constructive attractors for people and groups. During times of intense escalation, these people and groups may become temporarily inactive; they may even go underground. But they are often willing to reemerge when conditions allow, becoming fundamental players in the transformation of the system. Thus, early interventions should identify and engage with these individuals and networks carefully and work with them to help alleviate the constraints on their activities in a safe and feasible manner.

In addition, communities around the world usually have well-established taboos against committing particular forms of violence and aggression. In fact, archeological research suggests that communal taboos against violence have existed for the bulk of human existence and were a central feature of the prehistoric nomadic hunter-gatherer bands (Fry, 2006, 2007). Indeed, a key characteristic of peaceful groups and societies, both historically and today, is the presence of nonviolent values, norms, ideologies, and practices. To varying degrees, they all emphasize impulse control, tolerance, nonviolence, and concern for the welfare of others. These values, when extended to members of other groups, hold great potential for the prevention of violence and the peaceful resolution of conflict.

Guideline 5: Beginnings Matter Most

Research on nonlinear systems consistently shows that they are particularly sensitive to the initial conditions of the system. This means that beginnings matter. Studies in our Intractable Conflict Lab have found that how people feel during the first three minutes of their conversations over moral conflicts sets the emotional tone for the remainder of their discussions (Kugler et al., 2011). Gottman's (2002) research on marriage has found similar effects: the first few minutes of a couple's emotions in conflict are up to 90 percent predictive of their future encounters. Computer simulations of conflict dynamics suggest that even very slight differences in initial conditions can eventually make a big difference (Leibovitch et al., 2008). The effects of these small differences may not be visible at first, but they can trigger other changes that trigger other changes and so on over time, until they have a huge impact on the dynamics. These initial differences can be the result of various things: strong attitudes of the people coming in, their openness to dialogue or the level of complexity of their thinking, how the conversations are set up and facilitated, or the history of the disputants' interactions together. But what is clear is that the initial encounters tend to matter more than whatever follows.

Guideline 6: Circumvent the Conflict

Recognizing that stakeholders in protracted conflicts often view peacemakers themselves as also being players in the theater of conflict, some intervenors attempt to work constructively in these settings by circumventing the conflict. The idea here is that a main reinforcing feedback loop of intractability is the fact that the destructiveness of the conflict exacerbates the very negativity and strife that created the conflict conditions in the first place and thereby perpetuates it. However, attempts to address these

circumstances directly, in the context of a peace process, typically elicit resistance; they are seen as affecting the balance of power in the conflict (usually by supporting lower-power groups most affected by the conditions). Intervenors recognizing this will work to address these conditions of hardship, without making any connection whatsoever to the conflict or peace processes. To some degree, this is what many community and international development projects try to achieve. The difference is that this tactic targets the conditions seen as most directly feeding the conflict and requires that every attempt be made to divorce these initiatives from being associated with the peace process (Praszkier, Nowak, and Coleman, 2010). This unconflict resolution strategy can help address some of the negativity and misery associated with conflicts, without becoming incorporated (attracted) into the polarized good-versus-evil dynamics of the conflict.

Guideline 7: Seek Meek Power

Sometimes more direct intervention in a conflict is necessary. Intractable, entrenched patterns of destructive conflicts typically reject out of hand strong-arm attempts pressing for peace and stability or even less coercive approaches to statist diplomacy or third-party mediation. History provides countless examples of the UN, the United States, and other powerful outside parties failing to forge peace in enmity systems such as Israel-Palestine, Cyprus, and Kashmir. Nevertheless, peace sometimes does emerge out of long-term conflicts, and one path is through the power of powerlessness, that is, through the unique influence of people and groups with little formal or hard power (military might, economic incentives, legal or human rights justifications, and so on) but with relevant soft power (trustworthiness, moral authority, wisdom, kindness). Hard-power approaches in high-intensity conflicts tend to elicit

greater resistance and intransigence from their targets. Meek-power third parties are at times able to weaken resistance to change by carefully introducing a sense of alternative courses of action, hope for change, or even a sense of questioning and doubt in the ultracertain status quo of us-versus-them conflicts. They can also begin to model and encourage more constructive means of conflict engagement such as shuttle diplomacy and indirect communications through negotiation chains.

The events in the Mozambique peace process in the 1990s provide an excellent example of the utility of meek power in strong systems. During the conflict, the internal coherence of the two hostile systems was very high. Ideologically, militarily, and politically, there was no communication and exchange between the systems. Change emerged at the margins through nonthreatening communication processes facilitated by the Community of Sant'Egidio, a Catholic lay organization that allowed some key actors in the enmity system to consider alternatives to the current status quo. This initial consideration was made possible by the "weaknesses" of the propositions and of the proponents.

Guideline 8: Work with Both Manifest and Latent Attractors

Understanding change requires comprehending how things change over time. Complex systems evidence both linear and nonlinear change, which operate at different timescales. Linear change means that a change in any one element (e.g., increased cooperation) results in a proportional change in another (more constructive conflict) in a relatively direct and immediate manner. However, the elements of complex, tightly coupled conflict systems such as those characteristic of intractable conflicts tend to interact in a nonlinear fashion. This means that a change in any one element does not necessarily constitute a

proportional change in others; such changes cannot be separated from the values of the other elements that constitute the system. This has major implications for conflict transformation and peace building.

First, it is critical to recognize that a system's (current) states and attractors change according to different timescales. Manifest conflicts can evidence dramatic and rapid changes in their states, from relatively peaceful states to violent ones, or from intensely destructive states to peaceful ones. This is seen when social processes move from one attractor pattern to another across what has been termed a threshold or tipping point (Gladwell, 2000). However, such changes in the current state of the conflict should not be confused with changes in the underlying attractor landscape. Attractors tend to develop more slowly and incrementally over time as a result of a host of relevant conditions and activities, although their presence may not become known for some time.

Second, latent attractors may be highly significant in the long run because they determine which states are possible for the system if and when conditions change. Critical changes in a system, then, might be reflected not in the system's observable state but rather in the creation or destruction of a latent attractor representing a potential state that is currently invisible to all concerned. This is what the world witnessed during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Hostile relations had been obvious for decades between the two countries, but after perestroika, their relations moved rapidly into a more tolerant and constructive attractor, which had been present but latent during the Cold War. During destructive conflicts, negative attractors are usually visible and positive attractors are latent. During more peaceful times, positive attractors are visible and negative attractors become latent.

The potential for latent attractors has important implications for addressing intractable conflict (Coleman, Bui-Wrzosinska, Vallacher, and Nowak, 2006; Coleman et al., 2007; Nowak, Vallacher, Bui-Wrzosinska, and Coleman, 2006). For example, although such factors as objectification, dehumanization, and stereotyping of the out-group can promote intractable intergroup conflict (Coleman, 2003; Kriesberg, 2005), their impact may not be immediately apparent. Instead, they may create a latent attractor to which the system can abruptly switch in response to a provocation that is relatively minor, even trivial. By the same token, although efforts at conflict resolution and peace building may seem fruitless in the short run, they may create a latent positive attractor for intergroup relations, thereby establishing a potential dynamic to which the groups can suddenly switch if conditions permit. A latent positive attractor, then, can promote a rapid deescalation of conflict, even between groups with a long history of seemingly intractable conflict.

Guideline 9: Alter Conflict and Peace Attractors for the Long Term

Although people tend to believe that peaceful relations are the opposite of contentious ones, research has found that the potential for both are often simultaneously present in our lives (Gottman et al., 2002). Although we can usually attend to only one or the other, the underlying potential for both exists in many relationships. In fact, they tend to operate in ways that are mostly independent of one another. In other words, conflict and peace are not opposites; they are two prospective and independent ways of being and relating—two alternative realities. This suggests that people can be at war and at peace at the same time. Even during periods of intense fighting between divorcing couples, work colleagues, ethnic gangs, or Palestinians and Israelis, there

exist hidden potentials in the relationships—latent attractors—that are in fact alternative tendencies for relating to one another (Coleman, 2011; Vallacher et al., 2010, 2013). We see evidence of this when people or groups move very quickly from caring for each other to despising one another, or when the opposite occurs.

The implication of latent attractors for both conflict or peace is that our actions in a conflict can have very different effects on three distinct aspects of the peace and conflict landscape: the current situation (the levels of hostility and harmony in relations right now), the longer-term potential for positive relations (positive attractors), and the longer-term potential for negative relations (negative attractors). This suggests that we need to develop separate but complementary strategies for (1) addressing the current state of a conflict, (2) increasing the probabilities for constructive relations between the parties in the future, and (3) decreasing the probabilities for destructive future encounters. Most attempts at addressing destructive conflict target numbers 1 and 3 but often neglect to increase the probability for future positive relations. But without sufficient attention to the bolstering of attractors for positive relations between parties, progress in addressing the conflict and eliminating future conflict will be only temporary.

For example, if there is a long history of interaction between disputants, there may be other potential patterns of mental, affective, and behavioral engagement, some of which foster positive intergroup relations. Accordingly, identifying and reinforcing latent (positive) attractors, not simply disassembling the manifest (negative) attractors, should be the aim of both conflict prevention and intervention. A classic approach to this is the identification or development of joint goals and identities in an attempt to establish a foundation of cooperation and eventually trust between

parties (Sherif et al., 1961; Deutsch, 1973; Worchel, 1987). Thus, even if dialogue, reconciliation processes, trust-building activities, and conflict resolution initiatives appear to be largely ineffective in situations of protracted struggles, they may very well be acting to establish a sufficiently strong attractor for moral, humane forms of interactions that may provide the foundation for a stable, peaceful future. The gradual and long-term construction of a positive attractor may be imperceptible, but it prepares the ground for a positive state that would be impossible without these actions.

Of course, establishing latent attractors for peace is only part of the story. The most obvious need is to quell the current state of violence and contain actively destructive processes. This is often done by introducing peacekeeping troops or other forms of regional or international military or police support. However, even when systems de-escalate and appear to move into a state of peace, it is critical that we recognize that the potential for destructive interactions (destructive attractors) is still functioning. Here, it is important that we work actively to begin to deconstruct and dismantle the negative attractors. This entails decoupling some of the reinforcing feedback loops that perpetuate the conflict, thereby lowering the level of supercoherence in the system.

There are a variety of strategies for delinking reinforcing feedback loops that contribute to complexity collapse and escalation (see Coleman, 2011). For instance, if the structure of conflict binds together perceptions of all the out-group members, showing positive examples of specific out-group members can increase complexity since a single judgment cannot accommodate all the out-group members. Another tack is to find an important (e.g., high-status, charismatic) in-group member who does not share the in-group's view of the conflict. If this person is sufficiently

central that he or she cannot be marginalized within the group, the homogeneity of the in-group's perspective will be destabilized. These are best determined through the initial mapping of the escalatory system.

Another strategy for dismantling destructive attractors is to reinstate the salience of individual elements, devoid of their higher-level integration with other elements. Psychological research provides clues regarding this "disassembly process" (Vallacher, Nowak, Markus, and Strauss, 1998; Vallacher and Wegner, 2012). For example, disruptions to ongoing action tend to make people sensitive to the overlearned details of the action, as do instructions to focus on the details of a narrative rather than focusing on the narrative's larger meaning. When habitual actions and generalized judgments and beliefs are deconstructed in this way, people become vulnerable to new interpretations that provide an avenue of emergence to a coherent perspective. In effect, the tack is to recapture the complexity of a conflict attractor and reconfigure the elements to promote a more benign form of coherence.

Guideline 10: Restabilize through Dynamic Adaptivity

Research by Dörner (1996) has taught us a lot about decision making, change, and leadership in complex systems that raises important considerations for fostering sustainable solutions in intractable conflict. His research has shown that participants were able to improve the well-being of the communities they worked with when they (1) made more decisions: they assessed the situation and set a course but then continually adapted, staying open to feedback and reconsidering their decisions and altering their course. They were found to make more, not fewer, decisions as their plans unfolded; finding more possibilities for developing their community's well-being as the situation evolved. Effective decision makers also (2) acted more complexly: they understood that the problems they were

addressing were closely linked with other problems, and so their actions would have multiple effects. Therefore, they introduced many more actions when attempting to achieve one goal. In addition, effective decision makers (3) identified the central issues early on and stayed focused on addressing them, but (4) did not develop a single-minded preoccupation with one solution. If the feedback data informed them that a solution was too costly or ineffective, they altered their approach.

In the end, it is important to remember that intractable conflicts are different. They follow a unique set of rules and dynamics that make them particularly damaging and unresponsive to standard forms of diplomacy and intervention. The dynamic perspective conceptualizes this difference in terms of basic generic processes that underlie their immense complexity. However, human experience is clearly unique in many respects, and one should never lose sight of the idiosyncratic factors relevant to any particular conflict. Furthermore, much work needs to be done to continue to translate dynamical concepts and principles into hypotheses and develop rigorous and reliable empirical methods to test these hypotheses in order to ultimately increase the efficacy of these strategies for increasing probabilities of peace.

IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING

Space does not allow detailed discussion of the needs for training in this area. However, the ten guidelines outline many of the objectives to address in a comprehensive training program for practitioners working with intractable conflict. In summary, such training should address

- *Understanding nonlinear networks of causation* . Developing a basic understanding of how complex,

nonlinear systems function, stabilize, and change, including becoming familiar with ideas of emergence, self-organization, attractors, repellers, feedback loops, networks, and unintended consequences.

- *Enhancing complex thinking, feeling, acting, and identification* . Learning the difference between divergent and convergent thinking and developing the skills for employing both in an iterative fashion when addressing complex, long-term problems. Also, enhancing our capacity for (1) emotional complexity, that is, increasing the degree to which we experience a broad range of emotional events and are able to make subtle distinctions within emotion categories; (2) behavioral complexity, defined as the array of differentiated and even competing behaviors people display; and (3) social identity complexity, or the capacity to identify with contradictory group memberships.
- *Thinking globally and locally, and understanding how they are connected* . The theory of action identification holds that identities of action vary from low-level identities that tell how an action is done (such as chewing and swallowing) to higher-level identities that indicate the action's consequences (such as getting nutrition or gaining weight). Understanding these differences is important for learning how to "work down below"—that is, how to identify and address the component parts of problems without their getting snarled in general principles. This is critical to altering attractor landscapes.
- *Understanding latent processes* . Understanding how implicit (latent) processes (such as implicit intergroup attitudes and beliefs) operating psychologically and socially can provide important insight into how latent attractors develop and change over time.

- *Managing the tensions between short-term and long-term thinking and action* . Seeing how crisis intervention and long-term planning often work at cross-purposes and learning how to strike an effective balance are critical for managing the long-term dynamics of intractable conflicts.
- *Learning to see both the opportunities and the dangers ahead* . The dynamical systems approach suggests that conflict and peace often coexist. It is important to understand how our chronic prevention orientations (concerns with safety) versus promotion orientations (thinking about our hopes and dreams) affect our perceptions of social conflicts, and the importance of both for visualizing and attaining sustainable solutions. This can help us to appreciate the challenges and opportunities for working on constructive and destructive attractors simultaneously.
- *Leveraging multilevel strategies* . Increasing probabilities for peace often requires thinking and working at different levels (psychological, social, structural, institutional, cultural) simultaneously. This necessitates an understanding of the activities and interventions possible at different levels, the differences in the time they take to unfold in a system, and a sense of the mechanisms that link these initiatives across levels (Coleman et al., forthcoming).

Together these skills constitute a set of building blocks for developing the capacity to employ the dynamical systems practices effectively. These are all learnable skills—skills that many of us already possess but that most of us would benefit from developing further.

CONCLUSION

There are no simple solutions to intractability. Once conflict reaches this level of destructiveness, we can only hope to contain the violence and bloodshed and begin the considerable work of repairing the damage to people, places, and relationships. This is a daunting task, but there is hope—hope in prevention. Intractable conflicts usually have a long history of escalation prior to reaching crisis and entrenchment. We must find ways to intervene earlier, when disputants can still see the humanity and the validity of the other's needs. Unfortunately, it is typically the squeaky wheel of crisis that grabs the attention of the media, the international community, and our systems of governance. Therefore, we must be proactive in establishing early-warning systems at the community, regional, national, and international levels. Their charge would be to monitor emerging disputes and focus our attention on situations before they become impossible to address. Our greatest hope in working intractable conflicts is to find the means to avert them.

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CHAPTER THIRTY-ONE
THE PRAGMATICS OF PEACE WITH JUSTICE *The Challenge of Integrating Mediation and Human Rights*

Eileen F. Babbitt

Most conflict resolution practitioners hope that their work catalyzes a process that supports both peace and justice. This is particularly challenging in cases where there are large power asymmetries between disputing parties or where massive human rights violations are being or have been committed. This chapter explores these challenges to conflict resolution by focusing operationally, at the track 1 level of practice where peace agreements are negotiated and implemented. It looks specifically at the interface between mediation and human rights as a microcosm of the challenge. It posits that synergy is both possible and necessary between these two practices, but there are inherent tensions between peace and justice goals that must be addressed in order for such synergy to occur.

INHERENT TENSIONS

It is often asserted that reaching a sustainable agreement to end intergroup political violence requires stemming the human rights violations that are both a precursor to and a consequence of such conflicts. But this is easier to assert than to achieve. Two areas of practice that pursue these separate but interrelated goals, mediation and human rights, make different assumptions, apply different methodologies, and have different institutional constraints (table 31.1). These differences include the treatment of

norms violators, the way justice is defined, and the implicit theory of social change that animates each.

Table 31.1 Key Differences between Human Rights and Mediation

Source: Babbitt, Eileen F. (2008). "Conflict Resolution and Human Rights: Pushing the Boundaries." In I. W. Zartman et al. (eds.), *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution* (613–629). San Francisco: Sage Publications.

Issue	***Human Rights***	***Mediation***
Treatment of norms violators	Naming and shaming; set no precedent for rewarding bad behavior; change behavior with "sticks" approach	Include violators in discussion to learn their interests and change their behavior with "carrots" as well as "sticks." Change attitudes as well as behavior
Conception of justice	Individual accountability; punishment/retributive justice	Fairness in the eyes of the parties; restorative as well as retributive justice, to maintain relationships if possible
Theories of social change	Define the ends; design means to reach those ends	Define means; ends that emerge will be fair if the process is designed well and is impartial

In human rights practice, human rights violators are prosecuted through national or international courts and the human rights treaty bodies, or are shunned and stigmatized in keeping with the use of "naming and shaming" as a strategy for enforcement. There is a grave concern in human rights practice about appearing to reward bad

behavior. Conversely, in third-party conflict resolution practice such as mediation, violators of human rights norms are often included in discussions with both official and nonofficial third parties. Track 1 processes (i.e., those that take place between the decision makers from each party) include human rights violators because they are often the leaders who can deliver an agreement. Such processes do not place a high priority on confronting perpetrators over human rights violations.

A second major difference between mediation and human rights is in their interpretations of justice. In human rights terms, justice is connected to state-level and individual-level accountability for violations of human rights, and the remedy sought is primarily retributive in nature: prosecution of individuals, for example, or political or economic sanctions against states. For mediators, justice is either sidestepped or deferred, or defined in terms of the fairness of a settlement in the eyes of the parties to the dispute. Accountability mechanisms are discussed and included in negotiations only if the parties want them to be. The mediator weighs in primarily to review the appropriateness of incorporating accountability mechanisms used in other contexts but does not dictate what must or should be done.

Finally, mediation and human rights differ in their theories of what creates constructive social change. Human rights focuses on the creation of international norms, which are intended to shape behaviors. The implicit assumption is that change occurs when individuals and governments are held accountable for the way they act, specifically in regard to the norms negotiated and agreed to in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the implementing covenants that followed it. Because of external pressure (e.g., public shaming, sanctions imposed by other states) or internal pressure (e.g., advocacy by local human rights

organizations and state-level legislation), political leaders will calculate that it is in their interest to abide by these norms.

Mediation practice has proceeded in a different way, by designing processes in which fair and sustainable results can be achieved and then seeking to demonstrate the power of those processes to produce such results. One crucial element that makes these processes work is their voluntary nature: parties can choose whether to participate or to accept deals that are offered. This lends legitimacy and staying power to the outcome. An effective way to encourage voluntary participation is through the perceived impartiality of any mediator. Impartiality assures all of the parties to the conflict that their interests will be taken seriously in the negotiation process and that the facilitator or mediator will not be unduly biased in communicating about or attempting to get these interests met. Without such perceived impartiality, parties in conflict are likely to opt out of a mediation process unless they are coerced into participation by a "mediator with muscle." [1] A mediator with muscle is one with the resources (political, military, economic) to induce a disputant to change his or her calculus about the costs and benefits of accepting a deal. Such a mediator can force parties to the table and even impose an agreement, but then must maintain a continuing presence to be sure the parties implement the imposed settlement. Therefore, for sustainability, it is much better if an agreement is self-reinforcing, requiring less oversight by external actors.

Mediators are therefore concerned that parties will not voluntarily submit to or implement a process that calls their human rights record into question. If one or more of the primary parties to the conflict refuse to participate, the viability of negotiation is threatened. For example, when Lakhdar Brahimi, as the UN special representative to

Afghanistan, negotiated with the Afghan warlords to conclude the 2002 Bonn Agreement, [2] he was criticized by international human rights nongovernmental organizations for not insisting on accountability for their past abuses as part of the negotiations. His response to this criticism was to say that his job was to stop the violence first and that accountability would follow later in the process. [3] One can infer from this that Brahimi felt he could not get the warlords to participate in negotiations or to come to agreement if each knew he would be opening himself up to punishment for his past acts.

So while it is true that some strong track 1 mediators have very specific substantive goals for an agreement and seek to impose those goals on the parties (e.g., the United States in the 1995 Dayton Accords for Bosnia), many track 1 mediators believe that constructive deals come instead through a well-designed process of engagement and problem solving. By facilitating such processes and educating participants in how to develop strategies consistent with effective conflict resolution principles, these mediators hope to improve the quality and sustainability of agreements.

EXPLORING THE PRACTICE

In order to investigate whether and how these differences in assumptions affect practice, a study was done to compare a set of conflicts in which both human rights work and mediation were actively engaged: Colombia, Sierra Leone, and Northern Ireland. [4] The initial purpose of commissioning the case studies was to explore how these two agendas proceeded in each conflict and whether constructive interaction between their activities was achieved. The research and writing was done from 2005 to 2008 and published in 2009. These cases were chosen

because they allowed a comparison of violent political conflicts at three phases: during violence, immediately after violence ended, and several years after a peace agreement was signed.

Ellen Lutz and I provide the full case studies in our edited volume, *Human Rights and Conflict Resolution in Context* .[5] We provide informative detail from the perspective of human rights and conflict resolution practitioners on the ground during each of these conflicts. In this chapter, I revisit the findings from that original study to explore both tensions and synergies between mediation and human rights practice and to investigate how the synergies may be improved.

Colombia: Ongoing Violence

The guerrilla war in Colombia began in the mid-1960s with the formation of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and, later, other insurgency groups, all of which were protesting the extreme economic inequalities in the country and the government's draconian measures to repress dissent. The violence, perpetrated by government, paramilitary, and insurgency groups, continues to the present day. The latest revival of peace talks between the Colombian government and FARC was begun in 2012; as of this writing, the talks have not yielded any agreement.

During the period covered by our case studies, from the 1960s to 2007, both the human rights and negotiation agendas were active in the country. On the negotiation front, the government justified its rejection of the guerrillas' demands by invoking antidrug policies and later antiterrorism in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United States. Each of these framings was very much driven by US foreign policy preferences and the military and financial support provided to Colombia by the US government.[6] The

lack of resolution to the conflict led to massive human rights violations by the government and the paramilitary groups it spawned, which in turn created locally based human rights organizations in the 1970s and the continuing attention of international human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch. [7] This NGO pressure on the Colombian government has had some positive impact, including negotiations leading to the disbanding of many paramilitary groups after 2002 during President Alvaro Uribe's term of office. However, the continuation of the war itself has kept the country's human rights record from improving.

In addition, the overall peace agenda has not been successful and has generated both synergy and antagonism at various points with its human rights counterpart. Most negotiation attempts have been bilateral, with the only third-party mediation efforts initiated by the European Union in the 1990s, and often as a result of pressure from civil society within Colombia. During President Andres Pastrana's administration (1998–2002), talks with FARC began in 1998, leading to significant gestures on the part of the government but continuing threats to the insurgents from the paramilitaries. [8] The concessions to FARC, especially the ceding of territory by the government in order to provide opportunity for negotiation, was strongly criticized by human rights groups, creating the first clear conflict with the peace agenda. [9] However, the US antiterrorism push after 9/11 ultimately led to the abandoning of negotiations by the government, which continued during the succeeding Uribe administration.

During the Uribe years (2002–2010), however, negotiations did take place with the paramilitary groups, and many did technically disarm. But the groups' members were not required to relinquish the lands they had confiscated,

resulting in another outcry from the human rights community against the de facto impunity being granted to them. [10]

The unfortunate outcome in Colombia to date is no end to the conflict and no accountability for human rights abuses committed by any of the combatants—thus a failure of both the peace and justice agendas.

Sierra Leone: Immediate Postviolence Period, 1999–2000

The civil war in Sierra Leone began in the 1990s, when Fodoy Sankoh and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attempted to overthrow the government because of resentments against the country's elites and desire for control over mineral resources, especially diamonds. [11] Many years of brutal civil war ensued, complicated by support to the rebels from Liberia and attempts at containment via military intervention by the Economic Community of West African States. A peace accord was signed in Lome in 1999, but lax implementation and renewed attacks by the rebels in 2000 threatened to restart the war. British troops finally stabilized the country, and an updated agreement was signed in November 2000, finally bringing the war to an end.

An unfortunate hallmark of this war was the widespread recruitment of child soldiers and the mutilation of the civilian population as a fear tactic by the rebel army. This brought strong condemnation by the human rights community and the committed presence of nongovernmental human rights organizations on the ground in the country beginning in the mid-1990s. In addition, the government set up the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights during this same period, funded by the UN Development Program. The UN itself

deployed to Sierra Leone in 1998, sending a special envoy and setting up a mission that included a robust human rights component. [12] The integration of diplomacy, human rights monitoring, and peacekeeping functions was to continue throughout the peacemaking and postsettlement phases.

The case writers of this study identified both synergies and tensions between the peace and justice agendas during and after the peace agreements were negotiated. The synergies included extensive human rights input into the preparation and negotiation of the Lome Agreement in 1999, focusing on inclusion of civil society in peace talks, reparations for victims, and accountability mechanisms such as a truth and reconciliation commission. All of these provisions were included in the final agreement.

The tensions revolved around amnesty for Fodoh Sankoh and his close associates in the RUF. While the human rights community strongly opposed this, the negotiators decided that such an amnesty was necessary in order for political reconciliation to occur. The government and RUF included such a provision in the agreement; however, largely due to pressure from the human rights community, the UN envoy was instructed to attach a handwritten addendum declaring that general amnesty would not extend to violations of international law. [13]

Another tension concerned the implementation of the Lome Agreement, plus the additional mechanisms for accountability put in place after the upsurge of violence during the implementation phase in 2000. In addition to the truth and reconciliation commission, a special court was established to prosecute those in authority during the worst of the human rights abuses. Both the truth and reconciliation commission and the special court were set up as hybrid bodies, with the participation of both local and

international members. While having both types of institutions operating in tandem was considered a positive step, critics noted that neither was equipped to fully address the distributive justice needed for reparations as demanded by the human rights agenda or to pay sufficient attention to local customs for reconciliation as required by the peace agenda. [14]

The country remains beset by “entrenched corruption, poor health conditions, weak governmental institutions, high unemployment, slow economic growth, abject poverty, and inadequate social services.” [15] However, in the November 17, 2012, presidential and parliamentary elections, over 87 percent of the electorate participated. The US State Department called it “a generally peaceful process that marked the third consecutive successful election since the end of the war.” [16] Perhaps the biggest step forward in terms of justice seeking was the May 30, 2012, conviction and sentencing of Charles Taylor, the former Liberian president, by the Sierra Leone Special Court on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the Sierra Leone civil war.

Northern Ireland: Implementation of Peace Agreement, 1998–2005

The Troubles, as the conflict in Northern Ireland is called, began in the late 1960s, brought on by demands for protection of civil, political, and economic rights by the minority Catholic community. When the United Kingdom took over governance of the country in 1972, the struggle became one of “national liberation” from British rule and continued for over twenty-five years until the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in April 1998. [17]

One of the interesting features of this case is that the perceived rights violations against one party (the Northern

Ireland Catholics) by the other party (the Northern Ireland and British Protestants) was transformed in the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) to being protection of rights for all. According to human rights experts in the country,

> In the GFA a paradigm shift occurred. Human rights protections moved from being the traditional zero-sum game of determining the winners and losers to operating as a neutral vehicle facilitating the resolution of deeply entrenched differences between political opponents. Moreover, human rights concerns stopped belonging exclusively to the nationalist domain (generally denoting the minority Catholics). Instead the human rights formulas in the GFA function as a means for the unionist community (generally denoting the Protestant majority) to ensure that their long-term political and cultural identities are protected through institutional and legal means. [18]

The intention in both the nonpartisan approach to human rights and the power-sharing arrangement provided for in the GFA was a country with more inclusion, less discrimination, and therefore less violence—explicitly a peace-with-justice agenda. As our case writers noted, in the early years after the agreement was signed, there were two significant ways in which the agenda faltered and violence continued: during the so-called marching season, in the months when the Protestant loyal orders commemorate historic victories and march triumphantly through Nationalist/Catholic areas in Belfast, and at the interface areas, mostly poorer parts of West Belfast where Protestant and Catholic neighbors live side by side but separated by high fences called “peace lines.” [19]

Some analysts explained the postagreement violence as coming from the deeply rooted mistrust and suspicion that exist between these identity groups, which they claim will

take more than a peace agreement to heal. Others said that the crux of the problem was (and is) about political power and that attending to human rights would never be enough unless the fundamental structure of the state was altered. [20] Having a strong human rights framework in the peace agreement is necessary but not sufficient to overcome the mistrust and reorganize power relationships. Interestingly, the attention to human rights in the postagreement phase has led some in the unionist/Protestant community to frame the parades as expressions of their right to celebrate their identity and therefore assert that the marches must not be tampered with or rerouted because they offend nationalist sensitivities. Rather than being a conflict-resolving mechanism, the new equality at least initially created competing human rights claims. The Parades Commission, set up in 1998 to deal with disputes about parades, attempted to use mediation to manage these disputes at the local level, but in many cases, the mediators were branded as biased by one of the parties simply for allowing the views of the "other" to be taken seriously. [21]

Others in the human rights community claimed that the continuing violence was due to the underenforcement of the framework set out in the GFA in the first few years after the agreement was reached. In their view, better follow-through on improved policing, judicial reform, transitional justice, and the passage of a bill of rights are essential if peace in the country is to be preserved. [22] Local conflict resolution experts, however, were critical of this view, asking why the human rights emphasis was solely at the policy level and on holding the government accountable, and not on looking more deeply at local realities and investigating group-level relationships and responsibility. [23]

CHALLENGES TO SYNERGY

These case studies identified two key challenges to creating better synergy between human rights and mediation in peace-building practice in order to address both peace and justice concerns. One is the tension between establishing sustainable nonviolent relations between contending groups within a country and holding accountable the members of such groups for human rights abuses or war crimes. The second is the problem of coordinating attention to immediate impacts of violence at the ground level with the longer-term structural changes needed at the policy and government levels.

Challenge 1: Potential Trade-Offs between Accountability and Inclusion during All Phases of Conflict

It is widely known that one of the critical issues in the period after a peace agreement has been reached is how to deal with war crimes and human rights abuses committed by the previous government. While human rights advocates push for accountability for crimes committed and punishment to deter further abuses, conflict resolution advocates worry about circumstances in which punishing the perpetrators might further splinter the society, making the healing process more difficult.

One of the interesting findings in our case studies is that this disagreement about whether perpetrators should be punished or rehabilitated occurs not only after an agreement has been reached, but also at every other conflict phase. In Colombia, where violence is still occurring and no agreement has been reached, this tension manifests itself in the government's response to the guerrillas, particularly the FARC. One of our case writers claims that while there is a desire on the part of FARC leaders for inclusion and dignity, they have come to see violence as the only way they can participate in a

government from which they have been alienated for generations. However, over the years, these same guerrillas have turned to illegal activity such as drug trafficking to support themselves. This creates a real challenge: to recognize the legitimate interests of the guerrillas for establishing that politics as opposed to violence is the way to resolve differences (the conflict resolution perspective), while at the same time to strengthen the rule of law by prosecuting criminals for their drug activities and kidnappings (the human rights perspective). How can both views be accommodated?

In Sierra Leone, the conundrum occurred around the issue of amnesty for the leader of the RUF, Fodoy Sankoh, as the peace agreement was being negotiated. A BBC report from July 10, 1999, summarized the situation faced by the international mediator: [24]

> The architect of the recent Sierra Leone peace deal has defended the ceasefire agreement, amid accusations that it would allow rebels to go unpunished for atrocities committed during the eight-year civil war. The Togolese Foreign Minister, Kokou Koffigoh, told the BBC it was unrealistic to talk about respecting human rights unless the war was brought to an end. The Togolese foreign minister was speaking the day after the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, said any internal reconciliation commission should be backed up by an international inquiry. Mrs Robinson said she welcomed the peace accord, but confirmed the UN would not accept that amnesties could be granted to those guilty of genocide, crimes against humanity and other gross violations.

> Several human rights organisations have voiced protests against the deal, saying that that those who have carried out atrocities would be allowed to benefit from an amnesty. The UN representative who signed the peace deal added a hand-written note, which said the amnesty should not cover gross violations of international humanitarian law. The New York–based Human Rights Watch says it wants the UN to develop this note into a formal protocol, and to put pressure on both the Sierra Leone Government and the rebels to endorse it.

It became a watershed case in that it pushed the UN secretary general at the time, Kofi Annan, to develop guidance for UN mediators that prohibits support for the granting of amnesty for war crimes as an incentive for a peace deal:

> Demands for amnesty may be made on behalf of different elements. It may be necessary and proper for immunity from prosecution to be granted to members of the armed opposition seeking reintegration into society as part of a national reconciliation process. Government negotiators may seek endorsement of self-amnesty proposals; however, the United Nations cannot condone amnesties regarding war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide or foster those that violate relevant treaty obligations of the parties in this field. [25]

Thus, the UN guidance makes explicit that agreements mediated under UN auspices may not excuse parties from accountability for mass atrocities, in accordance with the UN Charter. Since the Sierra Leone case, the International Criminal Court has begun its operations, making it possible to prosecute leaders for these crimes. This makes it even

less likely that leaders can obtain complete amnesty in return for signing a peace accord.

The Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, while containing a strong human rights component to govern future relations, is silent on acknowledgment of past acts of discrimination against the Catholics in the region, the original cause for violence when the Troubles began. Our case writers noted that the founding of the state itself institutionalized discrimination, and even in 2013, the bill of rights promised by the 1998 agreement had yet to be agreed on.

Challenge 2: Coordinating Attention to Short-Term Violence and Long-Term Structural Changes

If the pursuit of peace and justice outcomes appears to be at odds, one commonly suggested approach is for sequencing: stop the physical violence first, then attend to the structural violence (including human rights protections). This was Lakhdar Brahimi's view in negotiating with the Afghan warlords. The challenge is that stopping the structural violence requires dealing directly with the power asymmetry, and the will to accomplish that may wane (especially for the higher-power party) after the peace agreement has been signed. In addition, how the agreement is reached and what it contains will greatly affect whether and how human rights concerns are ever addressed.

Sierra Leone demonstrates how peace and justice can be pursued simultaneously. Recall that the peace agreement initially provided amnesty for the RUF, but the UN mediator added a caveat saying that the UN could not agree to this when war crimes had been committed. The overwhelming evidence of such crimes and the horrific

nature of them created an international backlash against waiting for accountability, and both a truth and reconciliation commission and a special court were convened in the wake of the peace agreement. Fodoy Sankoh himself was brought before the court, as were several of his commanders in the RUF. There has been no backlash against these proceedings.

Northern Ireland offers a counterpoint. The peace agreement contains a strong human rights framework, but implementation has been slow. The emphasis has been on getting the power-sharing arrangements to work rather than on human rights or accountability. Unlike Sierra Leone, there has been no international groundswell of pressure to do so. As the ongoing parades-related violence shows, there is a new challenge of competing rights, with no trusted body to mediate or arbitrate.

In a 2012 review of the implementation of the peace agreement, undertaken by the Community Relations Council in Northern Ireland, the findings are decidedly mixed. On the one hand, data show that the political institutions are secure and violence is down. [26] On the other hand, the divisions within the society endure, with power firmly entrenched in identity-based political parties, the police forces still largely segregated, and no strategy for addressing the core divisions between Catholics and Protestants. Interestingly, the report found that one of the causes of violence in 2011–2012 was the release of findings of inquiries into historical events, or the lack of such inquiries. Depending on the events in question, either the Protestant or Catholic community has disputed the results or demanded that more action be taken to hold people accountable. Dealing with the past has not really taken hold.

In Colombia, the demonizing of the FARC by both the Colombian government and the United States has made it impossible to negotiate a peace agreement. Under such circumstances, the evil “other” is not thought to have any legitimate interests, and any concession could be seen as offering impunity for unacceptable behavior. As the other two case studies demonstrate, until that hurdle is cleared and the peace process acknowledges the rights and interests of all parties, no peace agreement is possible.

On sequencing, the context is therefore crucial in determining the timing. The groundwork must be laid in the peace process and in the agreement itself for protection of rights and accountability of past infringements to happen. But the optimal time period for that process, if one in fact exists, is yet to be determined and requires more study.

LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

Since this study was done, two additional changes in the international order have greatly influenced the mediation of conflicts involving human rights abuses: increased international prosecutions for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide through the International Criminal Court (ICC), established in July 2002; and the 2009 UN General Assembly resolution supporting the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). R2P affirms that states have the responsibility to protect their citizens from mass atrocity, and if the state is unable or unwilling to do so, international actors must do so instead. It is driven by human rights concerns to protect groups rather than individuals from the harm caused to them by their own governments. Several important conflicts—notably those in Uganda, Libya, and Syria—illustrate the peace and justice challenges that these new obligations are creating.

ICC Indictments in Uganda and Libya

In a 2007 conference address, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the ICC's chief prosecutor, said, "It is essential . . . to ensure that any conflict resolution initiative be compatible with the Rome Statute, so that peace and justice work effectively together. Arrest warrants are decisions taken by the judges in accordance with the law, [and] they must be implemented. I call upon States Parties and other stakeholders to remain in all circumstances aware of the mandate given to the Court; there can be no political compromise on legality and accountability." [27]

The tension created by the ICC prosecutor's approach has played out most poignantly in Uganda, where the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), led by Joseph Kony, has been fighting against the government ostensibly on behalf of the Acholi people since 1987. The case was referred to the ICC by President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda in 2003 and the ICC issued its indictment of Kony and several others from the LRA in 2005. Much has been written about how this undermined the peace talks taking place between the Ugandan government and the LRA. [28] In response, local Acholi leaders in northern Uganda asked that the ICC suspend its prosecution and allow "reconciliation" to take place according to local custom; the court refused. Kony broke off peace talks and retreated and is now continuing the violence from camps in south Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic.

The case conversely illustrates the concept of "bargaining in the shadow of the law." [29] The term was coined in a very different context, in US domestic negotiations, and refers to the process by which legal rules set the boundary of acceptable outcomes in many negotiations. Moreno-Ocampo, the former ICC prosecutor, used the term to describe the potential of this judicial institution to

transform international conflicts by virtue of introducing a rights framework into the way local stakeholders think and talk about justice. [30] Indeed, one author writing about Uganda reported witnessing firsthand the profound transformation that happened on the ground in northern Uganda as the court began its investigation into the violations that allegedly occurred there. He claims that the impacts went far beyond the cases of the five indicted individuals, reinvigorating society-wide discussions on the importance of human rights and dignity as part of any peace process. [31]

The case of Libya illustrates a different ICC story. The UN Security Council referred the case to the ICC in February 2011. [32] Indictments followed in June 2011, an amazing change of pace for the ICC, which usually takes a year or more to bring indictments. African foreign ministers denounced the indictment, accusing the body of “failing to collect enough evidence to prove that (Muammar) Gaddafi has committed war crimes” and accusing it of being used “as an instrument by powerful Western governments to punish and humiliate African leaders.” [33]

The head of the Commission of the African Union (AU), Jean Ping, reported that the AU delegation attempting to mediate between the warring parties in Libya was denied authorization to visit the country by the UN Security Council. [34] The five-member delegation was scheduled to visit the Libyan capital, Tripoli, on March 20, 2011, and Benghazi, the capital of the rebellion, on March 21. The bombing of Libya by coalition forces began on March 19 and prevented any further efforts at a mediated end to the conflict.

Some analysts have asked whether the ICC indictment, coming so early in the escalation of the conflict, precluded offering asylum to Gaddafi as a condition of his leaving

office (as was done in Yemen), and therefore doomed any mediation efforts to failure. Along with the rush to use military force, it is notable that the indictment also undercut any African Union mediation efforts.

Syria

In the Libya case, the US government pushed early and hard for a punitive approach with negotiation not ever seen as a viable option. In Syria, the United States has taken a different tack. In February 2012, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton backed away from seeking an ICC indictment of President Assad:

> "Based on definitions of war criminal and crimes against humanity, there would be an argument to be made that he would fit into that category," Clinton told a Senate hearing on the State Department budget.
>
> "But I also think that from long experience that can complicate a resolution of a difficult, complex situation because it limits options to persuade leaders perhaps to step down from power," Clinton said. [35]

At that point, the United States was implicitly supporting UN mediation efforts by Special Representative Kofi Annan, by leaving an "out" on the table for the leader. Since 2012, the US government has explicitly asked for President Assad to step down, Russia has continued to support the Assad regime, and the mixed signals from the UN Security Council have undermined the mediation efforts of Annan's successor, Lakhdar Brahimi. Subsequently, the United States and Russia proposed an international conference at which the Syrian government and opposition groups would presumably negotiate an end to the war, with no progress being made. At the time of this writing, the US government is considering air strikes against Syria due to use of chemical weapons on civilians, for which the US

government holds Assad responsible. It is not clear what options are available for the future governance of the country, or for accountability for the death and devastation that has taken place since the war began.

MOVING FORWARD: OPERATIONALIZING PEACE WITH JUSTICE

Although there are challenges to implementing both peace and justice, the linkages are apparent, and the benefits to doing so are significant. Based on the case study analysis and taking recent policy developments into account, I offer some preliminary steps to improve the synergy of these two agendas.

Incorporating Human Rights Experts as Advisors in Peacemaking

In order for mediators to embrace the human rights agenda, especially in conflicts with large power asymmetries, they must have advisors who understand both the opportunities and limits of human rights provisions in negotiating and writing peace agreements. In many instances, such agreements simply list references to all of the human rights documents and treaties without tailoring these obligations to the context at hand. While better than no reference at all to human rights, these general obligations make implementation easy to defer or avoid altogether.

One positive example of such consultation is the UN expert standby team, individuals who are available to consult with UN mediators during negotiations and as agreements are being drafted. One member of the team has expertise in human rights and can advise on how these concerns might

be addressed both prospectively and retrospectively. Such experts must be aware, however, of the caveats of timing discussed in this chapter and not be dogmatic about pushing for accountability in ways that will undermine the overall peacemaking effort.

Analyzing the True Impacts of Retributive Justice

No study has been done to determine whether amnesty does or does not lead to the undermining of rule of law or to the instability of peace agreements, and yet this has now become UN guidance for mediated agreements. Empirical analysis must be done to determine what is really accomplished by punishing leaders and other perpetrators and whether the timing of such punishment matters in these impacts.

There is a complementary practice, being pioneered at the community level in the United States, to provide restorative justice. In this approach, perpetrators and victims meet each other face to face in an effort to humanize each other and, in some cases, mend the relationship. At the political level, the BBC replicated this process by sponsoring a series of encounters in Northern Ireland between victims and perpetrators, facilitated by Archbishop Desmond Tutu. Some of these were chosen for broadcast on BBC stations in the United Kingdom. Rather than assuming that this is an effective strategy for peace with justice, as with retributive approaches, empirical study must be done to determine what such encounters actually accomplish.

Creating Complementary Processes and Mechanisms to Address Postagreement Accountability and Reconciliation

The Sierra Leone case demonstrates the value of creating separate, parallel mechanisms that are coordinated in their efforts. Having a peace agreement that created a truth and reconciliation commission designed to repair relationships, but also later a special court for prosecutions of war crimes, struck a balance between the two goals. This was not the initial plan; the court was created only after the RUF reneged on its agreements and continued to commit atrocities. However, the learning is that these are not mutually exclusive mechanisms but can work in tandem.

With the ICC now in place, it is even more important to find complementarity between reconciliation and accountability processes. As Uganda and Libya demonstrate, this may be seen as a challenge to the independence of the court, but more exploration of options needs to occur so that the tensions with peacemaking are mitigated.

Accepting That Sometimes Sequencing Is the Best Alternative, with an Eye to Enabling the Sequence to Progress

Mediation is more likely to produce a deal if the mediator is perceived by the parties to be impartial. This was true in Northern Ireland, and in 2012–2013, a lack of impartiality created problems for UN mediation in Syria because the only agreement acceptable to the mediator became the removal of President Assad. Without being able to enforce that outcome, the negotiations could not go forward.

By taking a sequencing approach, mediation can pursue at least a negative peace (stopping the physical violence) while laying the groundwork for accountability further along in the peace-building process. Mediation that explicitly incorporates human rights norms builds that grounding in two important ways. First, it helps to empower the weaker party. By strengthening the salience

of human rights norms during negotiation and in the peace agreement itself, third parties can give a weaker party the support it might need to negotiate from a more equitable vantage point. Second, human rights norms are important in reinforcing the notion that a state's sovereignty carries with it a responsibility to protect the civilians within its borders. Northern Ireland has taken this sequencing route, and while it is imperfect and takes time, it is often more realistic than pushing for both peace and justice simultaneously.

Under conditions of large asymmetries of power in which the power differential is resulting in extreme violence against the weaker party, however, impartiality is difficult to sustain. Mediation that seeks to punish the more powerful party under such circumstances can be successful only if it is paired with the use of military force. In Sierra Leone, it took intervention by the British army to stop the violence and create the mechanisms to bring perpetrators to justice. Unless such force is available and usable, a negotiated end to the violence in which accountability is deferred may be the only possible short-term outcome.

Making Commitments to Both Peace and Justice over Time

As other studies have shown, deal making is not the end of a negotiation process; the implementation also requires attention, as the relationships may still be problematic and the conflict, while no longer violent, may be far from over.

Human rights goals also require time to implement, and governments may drag their feet after an agreement is signed because the pressure for immediate action is lifted. Here is where the commitments to both agendas are tested for internal and external actors. Ideally, such commitments can be sustained by external actors until internal actors

have the capacity for both. Pragmatically, ongoing commitments are very hard to come by because of the political and financial costs. The human rights community has been much better at sustaining its involvement than have mediators, and that must change in order for rights to be negotiated over the long term rather than being the basis for ongoing conflict.

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CHAPTER THIRTY-TWO TERRORISM Negotiating at the Edge of the Abyss

Guy Olivier Faure

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. The word comes from the French Revolution with the idea of a group imposing a new power through terror, but the practice is much older. It was already a method used in the biblical times by the Sicarii (“dagger men”) Zealots, a Jewish group spreading terror among “collaborators” of the occupying Romans. In the mid-nineteenth century, terrorism became a common tool in Russia for anarchist groups in their struggle against the czar. French anarchists, then Irish Republicans, then Jewish groups in the Middle East took their turn in inducing fear to enforce their views. More recently, Palestinians, and jihadists have illustrated this type of action to meet their political or religious purposes.

The dawn of the twenty-first century has given increasing importance to terrorism as a potential way to achieve important goals with little means. Dealing with terrorist groups includes fighting them, preventing their development, and, whenever useful and possible, negotiating with them. Negotiators who are confronted with terrorists include members of the police and national defense agencies, agents working for specialized services, consultants, and intermediaries operating as proxies or mediators. This is an unusual type of diplomacy, for these people represent a country without representing it. Officially, as a matter of principle, states do not commit to negotiating with terrorists. Furthermore, terrorists, even hostage takers, are among the most unlikely negotiators. When they take hostages, it is not to discuss what could be

agreed on to have the hostages released but simply to impose their demands.

Nothing in the diplomatic tradition of governments has prepared states to deal with such people, but necessity has increasingly led to negotiating with these very special counterparts. The negotiation process operates as a two-circle system. The negotiators themselves belong to the first circle of actors—those who are in direct verbal contact with the terrorists. Thus, they stand in stark contrast to the official authorities, the second circle, who remain behind the scenes but are the decision makers. This form of track 2 diplomacy, which is an informal channel for negotiating without any official commitment, is an asymmetrical relationship: on the one hand, there is a state (or her informal representatives) and on the other hand a group that is often a nebulous and evasive organization with no obvious territorial basis and goals that are not always clear. The management of such a relationship is challenging, for the negotiation is officially a nonnegotiation and the counterparts are the most unwilling bargainers.

Governments or official authorities aim to achieve two conflicting goals: saving hostages and at the same time deterring their counterparts from taking any more hostages. This is one of the most difficult dilemmas to manage when facing terrorists. Saving the life of the hostages is a short-term objective that has a highly emotional dimension, while deterrence is a long-term objective that is not spectacular but has a high global return.

Two basic types of situations can be distinguished: those where discussions can take place immediately and those where the potential for negotiation has to be created. Examples of the first situation can be found in terrorists who have taken hostages or pirates who attack a ship. They

seek to exchange the captured persons or goods for members of their organization who are in prison, or for money, or for logistical assistance. When terrorists do not ask for anything and conceive their actions as being strictly punitive, negotiable issues have to be created. For instance, this can be done in a siege or hijack situation by trying to convince terrorists who are ready to die that they can serve their cause much more effectively by staying alive and that they can save the reputation of their organization by not killing their hostages. These are the major tasks that actors in this special form of diplomacy strive to carry out.

THE TERRORISTS

The concept of terrorism, which is politically and emotionally charged, is not easy to characterize. There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism but simply a working definition widely used by social scientists:

> Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat and violence-based communication processes between the terrorist organisation, imperilled victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience[s]), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. (Schmid and Jongman, 1988)

Using violence against a population or a group is essentially done through intimidation or calculated coercion. A weapon of the weak against the strong, terrorism resorts to a number of tactical means: assassination, car bombing, suicide bombing, rocket attacks, sniping, hijacking, kidnapping, hostage taking, or issuing threats. Terrorism is understood as an attempt to provoke fear and intimidation. It is the result of an extremely imbalanced situation in terms of forces compensated by extraordinary means. The practice of terrorism falls into the category of asymmetrical warfare, for the belligerents resort to resources and methods differing in essence from the means of action usually accepted in a classical conflict. Terrorists try to exploit the weaknesses of their designated enemies by replacing missing resources by unconventional means and psychological commitment (Mack, 1975). Their actions could be understood as the equivalent of war crimes in peacetime (Schmid, 1992).

Engaging in terrorist actions is often a by-product of frustration. There is no war on terrorism or possible negotiations with terrorism, because it is simply a method, a set of strategies and tactics. Wars and negotiations can be carried out only with or against terrorists, which are objective counterparts. Terrorists seek to spread fear and therefore aim to attract wide publicity and cause public shock. The goal may also be to provoke disproportionate reactions from governments, thus generating an escalation process (Zartman and Faure, 2005). Terrorism as asymmetrical warfare does not abide by laws and international rules, whereas governments are bound by them. As Laqueur (1999) has said, “In the terrorist conception of warfare there is no room for the Red Cross.”

TERRORIST PROFILES: THE POLITICAL, THE RELIGIOUS, THE CRIMINAL

For the past thirty years, over 160 organizations dealing with political issues have been identified as terrorist. Currently, the US government has officially designated 53 of them as terrorist organizations. This list includes neither terrorist states nor “lone wolf terrorists.”

Terrorists fall into three clusters related to their goals and motivations, which can be political, religious, or economic. In the first group, political organizations, are the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), the Shining Path in Peru, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, the Red Brigades in Italy, the Red Army Fraction (a leftist group in Germany), the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) in Turkey, separatist groups in the Northern Caucasus, the ETA in Spain, Al-Aqsa Martyrs brigades (a Palestinian nationalist movement), the former Nepalese Maoists (Unified Communist Party of Nepal), and the former IRA in Northern Ireland. Rogue states are sometimes included in this category because they abide only by their own rules and engage in illegal or criminal activities, as North Korea or Iran do with nuclear dissemination. Through nuclear businesses or secret sales of missiles, for example, they finance themselves and increase their leverage in the international arena.

In the category of religious groups are Al Qaeda; Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement); the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines; the former Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in Algeria, now Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb; al-Shabaab, a radical militant group in Somalia; Lashkar-e-Taiba, “Army of the Pure,” a Pakistani group that

has attacked civilian targets in India; Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese religious sect; Lord's Resistance Army, a Christian/pagan group that operates in northern Uganda; and Hezbollah ("Party of God"), a Shiite military organization in Lebanon.

If the issue at stake is a territory or the demand for autonomy, as is often the case with separatist factions, a compromise through negotiations might be achieved, but dialogue is extremely difficult to establish with religious fundamentalists such as Islamist radical movements. Their purpose is to spread or enforce their system of beliefs in specific territories. Their demands are often far beyond what can reasonably be accepted, such as the restoration of the caliphate, a pure Islamic state made of the entire community of the believers, from Morocco to Pakistan or the removal of all Western forces from Muslim territories (with the suppression of the state of Israel) and the restitution of formerly Muslim lands (including parts of Spain). These organizations can be classified as absolute terrorists if we use the definition given by Zartman (2006) and developed by Faure and Zartman (2010). Absolute terrorists are those whose action is "non-instrumentalist, a self-contained act that is completed when it has occurred and is not a means to obtain some other goal" (Zartman, 2006, p. 2). In these cases, even if the point is not just to punish the other party, as with the September 11 attacks in the United States, totally unrealistic claims make any negotiation most improbable.

The third type of terrorists corresponds to the economic category and operates as organized crime, a nongovernmental actor that will play a key role in the new diplomatic practice (Hocking, Melissen, Riordan, and Sharp, 2012). Prominent examples are the Sicilian Cosa Nostra; the Calabrese 'Ndrangheta; the Neapolitan Camorra; the Albanian mafia; Chinese triads such as the

14K triad from Hong Kong; Mexican and Colombian drug cartels such as the Tijuana Cartel or the Sinaloan cartel from Mexico; Yakuza gangs in Japan such as the Yamaguchi-Gumi syndicate; and, more recently, the Russian Solntsevskaya Mafia, the Serbian mafia, and the Ukrainian Bratva.

These nonstate actors aim to control economic activities; business channels; and underground activities such as drug trafficking, prostitution, gambling, smuggling of weapons, stolen art, Internet fraud, contract killing, human trafficking, money laundering, voter buying, bid rigging, loansharking, and racketeering for so-called protection. For instance, the ’Ndrangheta, one of the fastest-growing such groups, controls an estimated 80 percent of the cocaine imported to Europe. It has penetrated the European Parliament through its Italian representatives (“Mafias on the Move,” 2012). The Russian mafia, Solntsevskaya Bratv (the Brotherhood), trades in everything from stolen art to nuclear technology. The six hundred major Russian organized crime groups may have 100,000 to 500,000 members spread over fifty countries.

All of these organizations resort to threats and assassinations to establish and maintain their control over an activity or a portion of territory. Their estimated earnings account for almost 10 percent of world GDP—over $6 trillion (World Economic Forum, 2010). They use psychological warfare based on fear instilled to such an extent that ordinary people concede to their demands rather than follow the law. Sometimes religious or political groups expand their activities to organized crime in order to make money through kidnapping, drug dealing, or extorting a “revolutionary tax”, an involuntary financial contribution obtained through racket. The FARC of Colombia and Chechen rebel groups belong to this last category. For instance, in 2000, the FARC held at least

thirty-five hundred hostages as captives as an exchange currency.

Although negotiating with most of these groups has not always led to many tangible results, it is realistic to consider political and criminal groups as possible counterparts because the values they promote can find a concrete expression in specific circumstances that make the problem negotiable. It has been the case with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) concerning the issue of power sharing in Northern Ireland and Maoists in Nepal. They fall into the category of contingent terrorists, and possible trade-offs with them can be considered (Zartman, 2006; Faure and Zartman, 2010). In such cases, the whole point of negotiating is the possibility that as a result, they will shift from absolute terrorist to contingent terrorist. This means that the group has to modify its perception of the problem and its related objectives and demands. For their part, the authorities have to concede something they did not offer before in order to make the negotiation option attractive enough.

TERRORISTS IN ACTION

Terrorism draws considerable advantages from globalization because terrorist groups can be set up on transnational bases. Borders are no longer obstacles, and the extension and sophistication of technology has greatly contributed to the development of multifunctional organizations operating at the financial, social, and strategic levels. They can be informal and decentralized in a context where communication is fast, anonymous, and effective. It is no longer necessary to have a territorial base even if situated, for instance, in a country with a collapsed state. There are a number of anarchical megapoles such as Karachi that can be used as unassailable sanctuaries. The

field of action of terrorism is a civilian context, where spotting a group is difficult and their actions the most deadly. In addition, Western laws emphasizing individual freedom often drastically limit defense capacities.

The most spectacular terrorist attacks have been carried out in the United States and Europe, but the West is not the prime target of jihad terrorism. The most fatalities occur in the Middle East. Muslims are the principal victims of terrorism perpetrated in the name of Islam. The Iraq war has drastically boosted terrorism instead of lessening it. Considering the high level of domestic attacks and fatalities in Iraq, one may conclude that September 11, and the "war on terror" that has followed, have clearly contributed to a clash within one civilization, turning this country into an epicenter of terrorist activities. Nevertheless, Europe has been another battlefield. The Madrid attacks and the London bombings tragically illustrate this fact. Thus, some countries have gradually become an operating base for terrorist support groups. This evolution has been facilitated by the increase in Muslim communities in the West, growing tensions with native populations, and the relative freedom with which radicals can organize themselves in mosques and charitable and cultural organizations (Alonso, 2010; Clutterbuck, 2010). The ideological work was done by militants who came to these countries as religious dignitaries.

Another phenomenon in the Western world has also provided new human resources for terrorist groups: the radicalization of the second generation of immigrants. In Europe alone in the year 2010, 179 members of terrorist organizations planning an attack were arrested preventively. Among the major targets of Al Qaeda were, and possibly still are, Heathrow Airport, the Panama Canal, the port of Dubai, the Brooklyn Bridge, the Lincoln and

Holland tunnels, the FBI building in Washington, DC, and the White House.

Russia is another target for terrorists, especially with female suicide attackers who are Chechen militants involved in a separatist war in the Caucasus and exporting their bombing campaign to Moscow. In less than a decade, sixteen strikes of women bombers have been recorded in crowded places—such as subway stations, airplanes, cafés, and music festivals—killing hundreds of people. These women, nicknamed “black widows” because they wear billowy black robes and are strapped with explosives, are taking revenge for their husbands killed in Chechnya.

Over two decades, considerable changes have occurred in terrorism. One of the most important is the organizational shift from a pyramidal system to a rhizome model. The pyramidal system is a stage that prevailed until the end of the cold war. Terrorist groups and guerrilla movements were following Leninist principles of organization with a strict centralized command system. They were most often financed, controlled, trained, and monitored by states that had a strategy whose rationale was, if not shared, at least well understood. The rhizome type of organization stage corresponds to the birth of entities proliferating in a quasi-biological way like bamboo groves or strawberry plants. These entities are loosely structured, autonomous, and ideology driven. They may lead to individual jihad, a form of do-it-yourself terrorism. The extensive Al Qaeda networks resort to modern means of propaganda using the Internet and unexpected places such as jails for recruiting members. The number of their websites is growing. They publish an online magazine for recruiting young Muslims. They are uncontrollable by states, difficult to identify, and even more difficult to infiltrate. As shown by the killing of Osama bin Laden, his activities were mostly focused on reinterpreting Islamic doctrine in a modern context. Thus,

the head of Al Qaeda, literally “the base,” had turned his place into nothing more than a spiritual base. Now he has become immortal.

STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR ENGAGING TERRORISTS

Negotiations with terrorists use methods that are fundamentally alien to the classic practice of diplomacy because of the nature of the terrorists, the issues at stake, the context, and the basic paradigm governing the situation. The terrorist is not perceived as an equal in terms of status or legitimacy. An element of psychological asymmetry characterizes the relation, and communication is scarce. Terrorists are viewed as imposing themselves, forcing their way, resorting to unethical means, and thus not respecting the other. What is at stake is most often highly dramatic because one is dealing with human lives (Faure, 2002). Thus, the smallest mistakes may have terrible consequences for the hostages, along with highly traumatizing effects on the negotiators. The scarcity of solutions when the hostages are detained in a place or a country that is a partner in crime with the terrorists adds to the difficulty. The situation is characterized by a number of uncertainties, in particular the credibility of the threat, which is one of the basic techniques terrorists use. Uncertainty may also characterize the health status of the hostages: Are they alive, wounded, sick, underfed, beaten, tortured?

Each terrorist group has its own methods. For instance, Al Qaeda members originally did not take hostages, for their purpose was to punish “Judeo-Crusaders” or “Nazarene unfaithfuls” (the Christians) and to trigger an escalation process in reciprocal violence between the West and the Muslim world. Later, they started (especially with AQIM, Al

Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) taking hostages and thus turned to extortion. Bin Laden referred to the hostages as "enemy prisoners." Still, they would take only male prisoners to be traded.

Negotiators have five strategic options in the face of terrorist actions such as hostage taking: no negotiation, manipulation of the terrorist group, secret negotiation, normal negotiation, and negotiation in order to prepare for an assault. The *no negotiation* doctrine aims to deter terrorists from taking more hostages. It makes sense in a long-term strategy in terms of risk management. It is, for instance, the official Israeli policy with regard to Palestinians. This is also British policy: the United Kingdom strictly bans any form of substantive concession such as a ransom or the release of prisoners. This option has the most painful consequences concerning the hostages, who may feel that they are being sacrificed to long-term national interests.

Manipulation of the terrorist group is a complex strategy that can yield high benefits but requires great skills, time, and an ability to deal with a high level of risk. The principle behind it is to use sophisticated ploys in order to get the hostages free. It is a smart game of deception that has been successfully used against the FARC of Colombia, for example. Detainees of this Marxist-Leninist movement were kept in several mountain areas and jungles controlled by the FARC, and communication between the camps was difficult. The Colombian military intelligence managed to infiltrate some of these local hideouts and spent months gaining the terrorists' trust. At some point, a government mole was able to convince the FARC's chiefs in charge of the hostages to accept a so-called request from FARC headquarters to transfer the hostages for safety. In fact, they were brought to a meeting place where they were taken care of by a very small number of Colombian

government commandos dressed as guerrillas acting as a kind of medical help and put in a helicopter similar to those used by the Red Cross. All fifteen captives had been handcuffed before being placed aboard the helicopter, along with two of their FARC guards, who were disarmed and subdued after take-off. Then the hostages were taken to freedom when a government intelligence agent told them. “We are with the army; you are free.” The whole operation was performed without a single shot, and no one was wounded.

The *secret negotiation* strategy is more commonly used. No one mentions anything about what is really going on, not even that there are meetings or discussions. One of the major advantages of this option is that negotiators are removed from the influence of public opinion and media. It provides more flexibility for the authorities, who do not have to report to any outside audience and avoid the issue of looking weak if they make concessions. This was the case after the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran in 1979 by Islamic students supported by the Iranian government. Fifty-two US diplomats and employees of the embassy were kept as hostages during 444 days of terrible mistreatment under the slogan, “America can’t do a thing.” After a rescue mission that turned into a disaster, the US government, humiliated and helpless, had no other choice than to negotiate discretely to free the Americans.

The *normal negotiation* option is used when there is no way of hiding the hostage taking from the public. The authorities have to stand the pressure of the media, public opinion, and actions carried out by the families of the hostages. This is what happened with the French journalists taken as hostages in Iraq in 2004 and 2005. At that time, it was common practice in Iraq, almost a national sport, and there was even a base rate for the ransom to be paid for a Western hostage.

Some of these negotiations save lives as in the case with a Lufthansa flight in Mogadishu (1977). When the plane was still in Dubai, the four Arab terrorists started checking passengers' papers to find out who was a Jew. They did not know that religion is not mentioned on German passports. Then they tried to find other clues to spot their first victims. One of the passengers had a Mont Blanc fountain pen with, at the tip, the white stylized six-pointed star with rounded edges, representative of the Mont Blanc snowcap from above. The hostage takers understood it as a Jewish symbol and decided to execute the owner of the fountain pen. After a long discussion, the pilot managed to convince them to delay the execution. Then the copilot was spotted wearing a Junghans wrist watch with an eight-pointed star. Suspecting that he was wearing a Jewish product, the terrorists' leader decided to kill him. After another long and dramatic negotiation, the terrorist agreed to destroy only the watch and did it on the spot with an axe.

Negotiation in order to prepare for an assault is another way of resorting to the discussion process in order to collect information about the terrorists, such as the number of terrorists and details of their equipment and state of mind. It is also a means of exhausting them or altering their concentration levels before launching an attack. This is usually done when the environment is well controlled by the authorities. The storming of the residence of the Japanese ambassador in Lima, Peru, in 1996–1997 is one of many cases belonging to this category.

These options refer to distinct negotiation paradigms. The no negotiation policy can be framed as an anticipated "chicken game": there is no option for cooperation. The priority is not to free the hostages but to deter terrorists from repeating this type of action. Considering the current situation, the setting is one with a win-lose outcome at best and a lose-lose outcome at worst. The manipulation of the

terrorist group belongs to the no negotiation rationale and carries the idea that what is played is a win-lose game with the highest possible gains: total victory at no cost while saving the hostages' lives. It can be a victory at several levels: human, political, strategic, and psychological. The negotiation in order to prepare for an assault can lead the negotiation process astray. It turns it into a simple means of achieving a different objective, one that does not involve any form of agreement. There is no real process of adjustment, with the negotiation simply setting the stage for the surrender, or potentially the death, of the terrorists and the hostages. The secret negotiation and normal negotiation options relate to the prisoner's dilemma paradigm: they leave room for competition but also some kind of cooperation in which the two parties can achieve at least part of their goals.

KNOWING THE CULTURE, PSYCHOLOGY, VALUES AND GOALS OF THE TERRORIST GROUP

Fighting or negotiating with a terrorist group implies first understanding it, which means grasping its vision of the world; its representation of the others; and its goals, motivations, and values. It is information gathering, an essential condition for discussions. Some groups are well known, publish about themselves, have websites, have access to media, have been the object of research and reports on them. Some are not well documented, and negotiators may have to resort to infiltration to collect enough information to be effective with them or about them. Introducing moles in a secret organization is not a practice without risk, and the human cost may be dramatic. Debriefing former members of the terrorist group is another way to collect strategic data but runs the risk of

getting misleading information. Furthermore, democracies put a number of limitations on the techniques that can be used during interrogations.

As soon as different cultures face each other, the reality lies very much in the eyes of the beholder. For instance, Western analysts believe that Egypt's poverty stems from overpopulation, mismanagement of resources, and excessive defense expenditures, whereas its fundamentalist groups explain it by the spiritual failures of the population, its religious laxness, its secularist trends, and widespread corruption. In their view, the solution is a return to the simplicity, the hard work, and the self-reliance of true Muslim living.

Terrorist organizations have been thoroughly studied much beyond their structure and methods of action (Creenshaw, 2010; Sageman, 2008; Post, 2007; Hoffman, 2006; Horgan, 2005; Laqueur, 2004). For instance, we know that Al Qaeda members believe that the world is degenerate and unjust and that salvation lies in adopting Sharia, Islamic law. It sees the main enemies of Muslims as Jews, "heretics," and the United States. It considers these forces as the main causes of Muslim suffering, and Shia Muslims are viewed as apostates. Members believe that the "Zionist entity," meaning the state of Israel, should be eliminated, the United States should be expelled from the Middle East, and new caliphate established on the ruins of this degenerated world, all of which can only be achieved through violent jihad. To serve this purpose, suicide bombers are ready to make the ultimate sacrifice for God. It is a path to sanctity, and the martyrdom of one of its members brings pride and respect to the family. The usual distinction between civilians and military people is abandoned. Both regard themselves as "soldiers of Allah" mobilized to fight "evil" and overthrow the "impure order."

On personal and social behavior, radical Islamists consider "fornication," homosexuality, gambling, intoxicants, and the practice of usury as absolute evils. Music and theater are not acceptable, and women should be fully covered, including their face. They want to impose their understanding of Islam through delegitimating other creeds. The overall strategy conceived by bin Laden was to lure the United States into a war of attrition against the Muslim world, where tribal law requires revenge, triggering an escalation process in the global jihad with the purpose of "bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy" (Al-Jazeera, 2004). Tactically, Al Qaeda finds some leverage by embedding itself in local insurgencies, especially in countries with a failing state, and spreading its ideology in a highly disturbed social fabric. Thus, at first sight, for Al Qaeda, there is no room for negotiation with the "infidels."

NEGOTIATING WITH TERRORISTS

Having lost the American Revolution, a British general tried first to surrender to a French commander, who politely directed him to George Washington. At stake was an issue of legitimacy. Similarly, negotiating with terrorists implies a kind of de facto recognition of their organization. Prior to entering the negotiation, terrorists usually raise this issue. Officially no government recognizes a terrorist group, an extortionist, or a hostage taker as a legitimate equal. Democracies must never give in to crime, and terrorists must never be rewarded for using it. In addition, there is a widely acknowledged principle of stipulating that one does not negotiate under threat even though threat is the most basic and most effective weapon that terrorists use. The principles are clear, but because the point is to save lives, negotiators have to be realistic.

The moral duty of intervening was formalized in a 1987 UN resolution that condemns hostage taking, whatever the motivations, but requires governments to take all necessary measures to put an immediate end to the confinement. Most often governments choose to intervene, either directly or with the help of a third party. This is done through what is conventionally called track 2 diplomacy. The no negotiation principle is more of a hard-line rhetoric than a reality, especially if the place where the hostages are kept is unknown or is in a country friendly to terrorists. History shows that democracies are more willing to negotiate and compromise with terrorism than they admit (Quinney and Coyne, 2011; Zartman and Faure, 2011). For instance, The British government sustained a back channel to the Irish Republican Army even after the IRA launched a spectacular mortar attack on 10 Downing Street during a cabinet meeting in 1991. In the case of Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier abducted by Hamas in 2006, the Israeli government abandoned its no negotiation principle and finally decided to open discussion with the Hamas, a terrorist organization that does not recognize Israel's right to exist.

Should a government negotiate with terrorists? Considering only the effectiveness criterion, that is, the freedom or life of the hostages, some researchers (Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1991) provide a positive answer on the ground that communication is a way to exert influence. Negotiation is a mechanism for influencing other parties' decisions, and given adverse or suboptimal circumstances, it may be a measure of last resort for avoiding an undesirable outcome. The point is not whether to negotiate or not to negotiate but to negotiate properly. One should simply make clear that a decision to negotiate does not mean recognition of the legitimacy of the demand or the acceptance of the other side's behavior. What one does

accept when negotiating with terrorists is the humanitarian cause it serves through trying to save lives (Faure, 2006).

If the basic principle that applies to such a situation is at least not to make any concessions, the only resource left to authorities is persuasion. This is usually insufficient to free the hostages. Then, discrete concessions have to be made at some point. This was the case in Tehran with the storming of the US embassy. Usually the final deal is not made public because often the country involved has to make concessions that if known, would create problems with other countries or with its own public opinion (Faure and Shakun, 1988). Here the iceberg principle applies more than in any other situation: disclosing only a small portion of the information known. If one considers again, for instance, the actions of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines for over a decade, no government has acknowledged having paid a ransom to obtain the freedom of its own nationals. For its own part, the Filipino government formally opposes payment of ransom for hostages. In all cases, it is unlikely that persuasion alone has been sufficient to free hostages whose only function is to serve as exchange currency.

Faure and Zartman (2010) contend that negotiating with terrorist organizations is not supping with the devil. It is not soul selling or evil and does not imply that the state is abandoning its moral values. The point is to induce moderation and flexibility in the terrorists' demands, reshaping their ends into attainable reforms, and forcing an end to their violent means of protest while at the same time opening the political process to broader participation. States should engage not because of terrorist violence but to end terrorist violence.

What Can Be Negotiated with Terrorists?

On the side of the authorities, what is traded off with terrorists is human lives. In return, the concessions made to hostage takers fall into the following categories:

- Payment of a ransom
- Providing weapons, food, equipment, technology, or information
- Release of imprisoned terrorists, political prisoners, or dissidents
- Release of imprisoned supporters or sympathizers of terrorism
- Putting an end to a military intervention and withdrawing soldiers
- Making a public apology
- Providing access to the media to publicize their cause
- Providing transport to another location
- Providing political asylum or amnesty within a host country
- The promise of a fair trial
- Secret arrangement on a specific issue

As hostage taking spreads around the world, a sort of market price for hostages has been established. According to the place, conditions, number of hostages, and the financial resources of governments, the ransom may vary from $1 million to $10 million. Among the most generous governments stands Japan, then Western countries such as Germany. The world record for ransom was probably set by Li Ka-shing, a renowned Hong Kong real estate tycoon, who paid an estimated amount of HK$1.3 billion for his son who was abducted in 1966.

Types of Negotiation Situations

Two major generic types of situations created by terrorist actions call for negotiation: kidnapping and barricade hostage taking. *Kidnapping* usually refers to an action done in a context not controlled by the captors unless it is perpetrated in a rogue state, one without control over its territory. The authorities who have to solve the case do not know where the hostages are confined. The terrorists hide within the society by appearing as unnoticeable as possible. Contacts between the authorities and the captors are indirect and uneasy, with little interaction. The FARC of Colombia has illustrated this practice with a record four thousand people kidnapped over the last decade. The Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines also has an impressive record in this domain. Because there were not enough potential targets in their country, this group went to neighboring countries to kidnap people they thought would be good currency for exchange. The former GSPC (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat) in North Africa took Western tourists as hostages after having carefully selected those from countries that have been particularly generous in paying for the freedom of their nationals.

The second type of situation, barricade hostage taking, corresponds to a situation of siege. Here the fishbowl theory applies: the fish is the perpetrator and the bowl his sphere of protection. Outside the bowl, he is highly vulnerable because he does not control anything in the immediate surroundings. He is under the constant threat of assault. Even electricity, food, and water depend on the goodwill of the forces that surround the terrorists. A number of cases illustrate such a situation in which the final purpose of the negotiation is not to seek an agreement but to prepare for what is usually called the “tactical solution,” a storming of the place. This is what happened with the Maalot School in Israel in 1974 when children

were taken hostage by a Palestinian group. In Moscow in 2002, a group of Chechen militants took over a theater and held the entire audience, over 850 people, as hostages. In Lima, Peru, in 1996, the residence of the Japanese ambassador was occupied by a revolutionary group for more than four months. Fourteen rebels from the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement took seventy-two hostages during a traditional celebration. In the three cases, the place of detention was stormed and the terrorists killed. In addition, in the Maalot hostage taking, twenty-one children were killed, and in the Moscow theater case, at least ninety hostages died during the assault.

Hijacking a plane is a mixed situation, with characteristics of both barricade hostage taking and kidnapping. Terrorists try to maximize their chances of success by creating a situation in which they can move the situation of siege to a friendlier context such as a rogue state. If this is carried out successfully, the captors do not risk having their place stormed. Typical hijacking cases were the Lufthansa flight that was forced to land in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1977 by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; a TWA flight hijacked from Athens by the Hezbollah and constrained to land at Beirut in 1985; and an Air France flight hijacked in 1986 first to Benghazi, Libya, then to Entebbe, Uganda, by a Palestinian terrorist group and a German leftist organization.

Negotiating: Stages and Variables

Hostage takers who appropriate the lives of innocent people they do not know and representatives of legitimate organizations whose action is carried out according to the law do not have much in common. This characteristic has an obvious consequence for the negotiation process. The empathy phenomenon—one side stands in the shoes of the other and tries to understand (if not to share) its views—

rarely operates. The moral gap created by the hostage-taking act is an element structuring the negotiation in terms of relational incompatibility and raises a major obstacle to the implementation of a mechanism of exchange and concessions. Thus, the negotiated package is at the same time a necessary tool but extremely difficult to set up. Because negotiation is the process of combining divergent positions into a joint decision, the first challenge when negotiating with terrorists is to establish common rules with people who reject all the rules by which the others act. Furthermore, this is a negotiation under conditions of high asymmetry because, for instance with fundamentalists, negotiators receive their instructions from their government, while jihadists consider that they receive their own orders directly from God.

Negotiating.

The negotiation process taken as a whole may be broken down into three stages: prenegotiation, the establishment of a formula for a possible agreement, and fine-tuning on each of the issues kept for discussion.

The *prenegotiation* stage requires the utmost diplomacy because it takes place during the first hours after hostage taking, and this is the time that most of the killings of hostages occur. The brutal change introduced by the hostage taking brings uncertainty to both sides even if the operation has been extremely well planned because no one knows for sure how the other and the hostages are going to react. The situation has to be stabilized, a channel of communication established, a crisis management group created, and a negotiation team selected. Then the legal authorities have to make sure that the hostages are alive. This is a phase of active listening with the purpose of gathering intelligence in order to prepare the coming negotiation.

The second stage consists of agreeing on a list of issues that can be accepted for negotiation—in other words, a formula. It is often a protracted phase because seldom does a ZOPA (zone of potential agreement) naturally come out from combining both ranges of demand and offer. Furthermore, terrorists often have demands that governments normally cannot meet, such as providing weapons and making public apologies.

Time plays an important role, working at the beginning against the terrorists and after a period of time turning to their advantage, especially because of public opinion and pressure from the families of the hostages who expect the government to solve the problem. Sometimes terrorists escalate their demands, which they link at each stage with a deadline to add pressure. As a rule, many obstacles stand in the way of the negotiation because terrorists tend to think that some governments are able to pay any amount of money to get their own nationals back.

The third stage deals with fine-tuning each of the issues that both parties have accepted. It is very much of a zero-sum game where all sorts of ploys may be used to cheat the other or reduce the cost of the concessions or the risk of being caught afterward. For instance, the authorities might pay with counterfeit money or hand over outdated medicine or equipment that does not work properly. Kidnappers might kill hostages to avoid releasing someone who can later help the authorities discover their hideout. A positive-sum game may thus be turned in a moment into a lose-lose outcome. Sometimes if no MHS (mutually hurting stalemate) takes place, the negotiation may be deadlocked for years. If a situation is painful for both sides and increasingly unbearable, the pain has a positive effect because it gives the sides an incentive to restore negotiation. Thus, what can be done is first to create the

conditions for a MHS by increasing the shared pain (Zartman, 2000; Faure, 2012).

Each stage of the process has its own goals and rationale and has to be dealt with using its own specific tactics. For instance, the prenegotiation stage does not require any discussion on the substance of the negotiation; it is to establish the conditions for negotiating. The second phase enables building the structure of a possible deal. Creativity may be important at that level, and credibility and commitment are essential tools in this complex phase. The third phase is highly distributive. Bluffing, deadlocks, and unexpected events feed the process. Even if a minimum necessary level of trust has been achieved, anything may happen at this stage.

As it is with terrorist action, the threat organizes the interaction. On one side, the authorities are facing the risk of having the hostages killed. On the other side, the terrorists are often under the constant threat of an assault. Each side tries to modify the situation in a more favorable way in order to have a better bargaining position. Terrorists take measures to protect themselves against a possible storming and strengthen their commitment by sometimes killing one or several hostages. The authorities try to put all sorts of pressure on the perpetrators to lower their level of expectation and weaken them through harassment, exhausting them, and depriving them of sleep.

A traditional way to improve one’s bargaining position is to buy time to collect strategic information. On the authorities’ side, it means, for instance, using microphones and laser systems to listen to conversations or introducing hidden bugs in the place. This is what was done with the Lima hostage case: microphones were carefully hidden in chess wooden pieces. For terrorists, it means having

accomplices among the onlookers, the media covering the event, or even among the hostages.

When the reputation of the counterparts make them untrustworthy or merciless, it may authorize behaviors that would otherwise not be present in a negotiation such as lying, playing tricks, manipulating, and using deception. “We should not be constrained by Boy Scout ethics in an immoral world,” stated Kenneth Adelman, former assistant to the US secretary of defense. Terrorist groups do not care about the requirements of the Geneva Convention. A number of people highly familiar with this type of negotiation, such as heads of police, believe that hostage takers should be promised everything and delivered nothing (Miller, 1980). Thus, not only the final purpose of the negotiation but the quality of the counterpart may morally justify lying and cheating. The role of a negotiator may be to distract the enemy while the legal authorities are preparing to attack them. However, if the police have to deal later with similar cases, the question of its credibility will be raised. If there is not a minimum amount of credibility among the parties, no serious and effective negotiation can be carried out.

Any hostage-taking negotiation develops under a high degree of uncertainty as the process may lead to an agreement but may also end up triggering an escalation in commitments, demands, level of threat, or violence (Zartman and Faure, 2005). On occasion, it may also lead to the surrender of the hostage takers or their escape. Predictability about terrorist behavior is extremely difficult, for one of the most important causal variables is the psychological-ideological profile of the terrorist group. How sensitive a fundamentalist group may be to arguments such as the reputation of Islam, the idea of fair justice, or the principle according to which Muslims should not take women as hostages is an important issue. Furthermore,

terrorists, when captured, are cautious about releasing unnecessary information and may deliver misleading information to gain time and help their accomplices realize that they are no longer free to move on with their projects. When possible, terrorists avoid dealing with professional negotiators for fear of having them “read their minds.” Al Qaeda provides training on these issues so that its members can keep the upper hand even when they are in a difficult position. Nonetheless, some models have been developed to help predict the outcome in hostage-taking incidents, giving invaluable support to negotiators (Wilson, 2000).

Intervention Techniques.

SWAT (special weapons and tactics) teams, tactical units trained to perform high-risk operations, are specialized in handling terrorist matters. They turn to elaborate methods and techniques in order to intervene effectively, particularly with hostage takers (Davidson, 2002; Lanceley, 1999; McMains & Mullins, 2001; Thomson, 2001). Here is a seven-stage process developed by a French organization when dealing with a barricade-siege situation:

1. Gain time to better understand the situation and collect information. This is done through observation and the use of microphones, bugs, and minicameras.
2. Organize a negotiating group of two or three people and decide who will be “the voice”—the person who will talk to the terrorists. Sometimes when circumstances allow it, it will be a female negotiator to avoid getting into an escalation process.
3. When verbal exchanges have started, show respect to the counterparts; care about their face and reputation; do not criticize them. Offering status is the least costly concession to be made.

4. Let the terrorist express his anger, hate, fury, rage. He has to express that emotional part before getting into any rational discussion. He must overcome his own fear. Then, at some point, the negotiators have to cast doubt in the mind of the terrorists on the success of their action.
5. Make no concession without reciprocity. Always apply a tit-for-tat strategy. However, one has to remain balanced in any offers to keep enough credibility. The point is to start and then feed a negotiation process by creating some negotiable issues—for instance, turn off any spotlights, restore air-conditioning, or bring cigarettes, food, or water.
6. Set up some kind of personal relationship by, for instance, introducing oneself by first name.
7. Never invoke principles or values. Never introduce morals and judgments into the discussion.

These are the basic rules and techniques to enable the negotiators to create the process for the negotiation. Then the issue has to be dealt with according to the three-phase model: a prenegotiation, the establishment of a formula, and the fine-tuning on each of the issues.

ROGUE STATES

Negotiating with rogue states is a variation of negotiating with terrorists. It raises many questions starting with the definition of a rogue state. It is a controversial label because it sometimes includes dictatorships terrorizing only their own populations. A rogue state may be defined as a country that does not abide by international rules: it may disseminate weapons of mass destruction, export drugs, sponsor terrorist groups, or engage in organized crime. At

least a dozen countries have been associated with this concept, sometimes briefly, including North Korea, Iran, Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, Cuba, Yugoslavia, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and Myanmar. Some governments have been so infiltrated by terrorists that there is de facto collusion between the country and the terrorist group. This is the case with Mali and AQIM, for instance, concerning Western hostages detained in the Sahara/Sahel.

The term *rogue state* was coined in the United States and has been much debated. It has at times been assumed that the United States uses it to refer to any country it has had serious troubles with. In the same wake, some countries such as Iran have labeled the United States and Israel as rogue states.

Rogue states develop two types of activities that qualify them for this designation:

- Building up a nuclear arsenal in order to increase their international influence or using it to extract money, such as North Korea has been doing for over a decade. North Korea has managed to extract $1.3 billion from the United States in compensation for stopping its missile program, although it actually never stopped it (Congressional Research Service, 2013).
- Supporting or even sponsoring terrorist groups such as Iran does with the Hamas and Hezbollah. In this role, rogue states may become a counterpart when one has to deal with terrorist actions.

Originally governments faced a dilemma: Should they engage rogue states through negotiations or apply the no negotiation doctrine and try to isolate them? They are now engaging more and more with these states under the formula of “talking” to them instead of “negotiating.” In reality, they discretely negotiate even with countries they

have no diplomatic relations with. Demonization comes only when discussions lead nowhere and governments look for an excuse to resort to other means of action.

Probably the oldest negotiation with a rogue state recorded is between the United Nations represented by an American general and a North Korean general in Panmunjom for going beyond the armistice agreement. Here is a description of the process:

> The American general and the North Korean general glared at each other across the table and the only sound was the wind howling across the barren hills outside their hut. . . . They sat there, arms folded for 4½ hours. Not a word. Finally Gen. Ri got up, walked out and drove away. It was the 289th meeting of the Korean Military Armistice Commission at the truce village of Panmunjom and set a record as the longest such meeting since the Korean War ended July 27, 1953. The generals had been there 11 hours and 35 minutes. Neither ate or went to the toilet in all the time. Delegates to such meetings may leave the room only with a formal adjournment proposal. (Rubin and Brown, 1975)

Several characteristics distinguish these negotiations from more usual ones: the question of accountability, the trust issue, and the seizure of the historical moment. Rogue states, like any other state, are supposed to be accountable to two types of audiences: their own people and the international community. Dictatorships do not mind fulfilling the first type of obligation. However, there is still the rest of the world to deal with. If they were totally isolated, they would be totally free but weak. Therefore, they need allies or close friends, but as soon as they have some, they are accountable to them. Thus, they cannot act beyond a certain limit if they do not want to harm the

reputation of their ally. This is, for instance, the case for North Korea with China.

TRUST AND HISTORICAL GESTURES

The issue of trust is challenging. There should be some trust built, at least concerning the implementation of the agreement. On occasion, it may work, such as with the negotiations between the United Kingdom and Sinn Féin. This is not the case with counterparts such as North Korea or Iran, however. If the counterpart is not perceived as trustworthy, there is little chance of striking a deal, and the negotiation turns into a game of deception.

Sometimes history provides a chance for achieving something that otherwise would not be possible. Anwar El-Sadat, the Egyptian leader, made this historical gesture with his visit to Israel and speech before the Knesset in Jerusalem in 1977. Chancellor Helmut Kohl did something of similar importance when giving up the deutsche mark for the euro in order to strengthen European ties. In the area of terrorism, this sort of historical gesture was made when United Kingdom and the Sinn Féin achieved peace with the Good Friday Agreement on the Northern Ireland issue.

There are other options than engaging terrorists, such as appeasement, rollback, and containment. However, the two first are much riskier because they may be interpreted as signs of weakness and open the path to escalation. The containment strategy may be productive as a first step in a process that will be concluded by some kind of negotiation. Containment could be viewed as a condition to bring both sides to the negotiation table because of the incurred costs of the status quo. Containment may entail extremely high costs, and the consequences for the terrorist group may be harmful to its own purpose and members, which is a typical

situation of mutually hurting stalemate (MHS). This was, for instance, the case in Egypt with the Gamaa al Islamiyya, an Islamist movement responsible for killing hundreds of Egyptian police, soldiers, and civilians and dozens of foreign tourists. In this case, the negotiated outcome was that the terrorist organization renounced the ideology of violence so that the government would release most of its members who were held as prisoners (Goerzig, 2011).

THE VICTIMS

Victims of terrorists are most often killed not for what they have done but for who they are. Thus, they bear consequences of realities on which they have neither responsibility nor control. Psychologically this is one of the most difficult issues. Usually objects of negotiations do not speak, but in this very specific situation, the people kept as hostages can tell something about the way they lived during their captivity.

Two periods can be distinguished: during the confinement and after liberation. The period of time they are secluded can last from a few days to a few years. For instance, the Israeli soldier referred to previously, Gilad Shalit, was kept hostage for over five years, and Terry Anderson, a kidnapped American journalist, was held for almost seven years in Lebanon. FARC hostages have been kept in the jungle of southern Colombia for over ten years—one of them for thirteen years. Some of the captives are decently treated; many others are treated inhumanely: solitary confinement, always attached and sometimes chained, blindfolded, underfed, with no elementary hygiene conditions, eaten by insects, with no light, beaten, tortured, victims of casual sadism and simulated executions. Some did not speak or know anything about the world outside their confinement for years. In quite a few situations,

especially in the Middle East, hostages are sold from a first terrorist group to a second, then to a third, and sometimes to even more. This instability and uncertainty bring additional stress to captives, who realize that they are just bargaining chips. It contributes to a great extent to the dehumanization of the hostages.

In addition to the fact that years of their lives have been stolen, they will never return to a normal life and will have psychological sequelae. Constant fear, loss of the notion of time, sensory deprivation, and absence of intimacy have long-term consequences. Once freed, some hostages are unable to speak or sleep. In all cases, they went through one of the most traumatic experience humans can endure. Some find it extremely challenging to readjust to social life, even to family life. Some suffer from phobias, face recurrent nightmares, are subject to an extremely high level of irritability, cannot develop any trust, and may become paranoid.

MEDIA AND PUBLIC OPINION

The essential task of the media is to inform readers and watchers about world events. They often have a special interest in terrorist actions and hostage-taking cases because of their dramatic dimension. The hostage takers strive to take advantage of this fact. Many terrorists are technologically sophisticated and use Internet-based media such as YouTube to reach prospective members and the general public. They often resort to the media as an amplifier of their claims and a megaphone for their propaganda. Thus, the head of the People’s Front of Liberation of Palestine said that for him, it was more important to keep one Jewish prisoner in a highly dramatic fashion such as being hostage than killing one hundred of them in a battle. This is why, for instance, the soldier

Shalit, after having been kidnapped, was kept prisoner by the Hamas for over five years before any agreement could be struck.

At times and without intending it, the media, especially the television, may gradually turn the hostage taker from an ordinary person, an anonymous individual among the crowd, into a hot-headed star in the limelight whose words and moves are echoed all over the world. A quasi-symbiotic relation may thus be established between journalists and terrorists, each providing something essential to the other. TV watchers and newspaper readers may feel emotionally involved in the drama related by the media. Public opinion may thus play a role in the strategy that governments adopt. In the case of the hijacking of the Air France flight to Entebbe, Uganda, in 1976 by Palestinians and German leftists, Israeli opinion was opposed to a military solution until the terrorists raised their demands, putting the possibility of reaching a negotiated agreement in jeopardy. [1] Only because of this new situation were the Israeli authorities able to implement their usual policy of firmness and decided to storm the airplane.

The media have occasionally played a direct role in the hostage-taking situation by intervening among the protagonists. Thus, in New York, in a case in which the negotiation had led to an agreement including the release of the hostages and the surrender of the captor, a journalist almost derailed the operation. He managed to reach the hostage taker by telephone and interviewed him on the reasons for his action. The immediate effect was to reactivate the grievances of the captor, who then put the agreement into question again. In a Manila hostage crisis, twenty-five tourists were kept as hostages on a bus by a former police inspector. Millions watched the siege and rescue attempt on live television and the Internet, including the hijacker, because a TV on the bus provided him with

essential information concerning the preparations for the assault (Faure, 2011). Eight of the hostages died and a number of others were injured.

Especially in hostage and barricaded situations social media are changing the way crisis negotiators must approach events. Well-trained terrorists watch TV news coverage to get strategic information and can also manipulate audiences and police. In the Mumbai attacks by an Islamist terrorist group from Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Taiba, in 2008, killing 164 people and wounding over 300 others, media played a counterproductive role. The attacks by a group of ten men lasted for fifty-eight hours in eleven different places. Attackers had taken cocaine and LSD to keep awake for this amount of time. The media covered the events live and thus unwittingly provided strategic information to the terrorists, which had the effect of increasing the number of casualties. It took almost two days for the security forces to realize that the terrorists were receiving television broadcasts before the feeds to the hotels where attackers were detaining hostages were blocked. Using clever use of their mobiles, the terrorists managed to confuse the media and the authorities. At one stage, TV reporters announced, incorrectly, that all the attackers had been killed and all hostages were free. As a result of this information, people started to move around without caution, while in fact two terrorists were still alive and ready to shoot. Internet social networks played an important role in spreading live detailed information about the attacks. A map of the attacks was set up by a journalist using Google maps.

On the media side, even when fully respecting the principle of the freedom of the press, journalists should take into account two considerations: the accuracy of the information and the appropriateness of releasing it. The accuracy issue goes against the necessary speed for being

the first to deliver the information. The appropriateness issue concerns the consequences of delivering this information for the hostages, the authorities, and the captors. As a basic principle, authorities normally in charge of the hostage problem try their utmost to keep the media away from the negotiation. With the development of technology, this is getting more and more challenging. Furthermore, hostages' families and captors tend to turn to media to gain more weight in the negotiation process. In all cases, the consequence is that the value of the captives is raised, making any agreement costlier, if not more unlikely.

NEGOTIATION EFFECTIVENESS

There is no more difficult and complex task than assessing the effectiveness of negotiating with terrorists. Should the authorities get the hostages back at any price? Should they unwillingly reward the terrorists this way and encourage them to continue hostage taking? Does each day, week, month, or year of captivity add negative points on the balance sheet of the negotiators' performance? Should a successful negotiation lead to the capture, surrender, or death of the terrorists? Should the outcome be assessed from a hostage point of view or only from the legal authorities' point of view? How to evaluate the level of danger for the hostages that may cause the authorities to give up negotiating and shift to the tactical solution by storming where they are held? Criteria for measurement are not obvious and may be even contradictory (Faure, 2004).

How should one assess, for instance, the outcome of the negotiation on Shalit between the Israeli government and the Hamas: 1 Israeli exchanged for 1,027 Palestinians? There are two ways to understand such an imbalanced swap: it means that 1 Israeli is worth 1,027 Palestinians, or

that the Palestinians got a very high return because of their negotiating skill. Each of these two interpretations would reflect the point of view of one party. If we take the negotiation's point of view, more elements of the context have to be integrated into the overall analysis to explain the settlement reached. On the Israeli side are the political constraints bearing on a government that has to show its effectiveness in taking care of its own people and the pressure exerted by the Shalit family through advocacy groups and media. On the Hamas side, Shalit could not be kept as a prisoner forever and the Israelis would probably eventually find him, thus ruining the whole project for them. Turning all these factors into numbers and reaching a final figure as precise as 1,027 is more a product of an interaction process than a rationally calculated outcome.

In spite of the potential for mutual gain, negotiation may fail to quickly free (or even save) the hostages. One of the obstacles to negotiation between targets and terrorists is the perceived inability of terrorists to engage in credible commitments (Walter, 1997; Kydd and Walter, 2002). A key barrier to successful negotiation is that governments usually distrust militants and expect them to break their promises. No enforcement mechanism exists to punish terrorists if they do not abide by their commitments. If terrorists face no costs for breaking agreements, targets have no reason to believe that terrorists will stick to their commitments (Lake and Rothchild, 1998; Leeds, 1999).

Research on terrorism often assumes that terrorists operate free from any institutional constraints, an assumption that is strongly challenged by facts. If terrorists want to negotiate, they must find some mechanism to convince targets that defection has a painful cost. To build their own credibility, terrorists must keep promises in order to establish a reputation for trustworthiness (Lapan and Sandler, 1988). If governments become convinced that

terrorists care about their reputation, they may believe that terrorists will abide by their promises. However, few terrorist groups think that they have to stick to the rules and values promoted by their enemies. Terrorist groups, even if not anchored in any specific territory, have often to rely on foreign sympathy to conduct their operations. They also need some base of operations, even for a limited time. Given that the terrorists' base is located within a host's territory, for instance, a rogue state, the group is subject to some kind of authority by the host. With sufficient political capacity, hosts may thus influence a group's behavior and ability to operate (O'Brien, 1996). Countries hosting terrorist groups have been active supporters of a wide range of terrorist actions, most notably in bombings and hostage taking. States such as Iran and Syria strongly influence terrorists' ability to operate (Ranstorp and Xhudo, 1994). Sponsors influence their groups by controlling weapons supplies, funding, and political support. Taking advantage of this situation, the host can constrain terrorists in their behavior to a varying extent.

Talks and trade-offs between governments and terrorists are often viewed as parentheses in an ongoing warfare. In that case, solving the problem goes through submitting to or destroying the other, and the negotiation is only a means serving this ultimate objective. However, the tactical option has not always been a panacea, and some of negotiations have met resounding failure. The Israeli hostage disaster in Munich in 1972, the Beslan school case, South Russia, in 2004, and the Moscow theater hostage taking ended in bloodbaths with hundreds of victims among the hostages. Nevertheless, brilliant operations such as the successful hostage rescue in Entebbe by the Israelis, the German assault in Mogadishu, the storming of the residence of the Japanese ambassador in Lima, Peru, and the hijacking of the Air France flight at Algiers airport illustrate that

tactical solutions may work. However, in nearly all of the recorded cases, death is on the agenda.

CONCLUSION

Among the edgiest negotiations are dealing with terrorists. To expect a sufficient level of effectiveness in that task, several requirements have to be met: accepting the terrorist as a negotiating counterpart, developing a specific concept of negotiation, conceptualizing a new strategic approach, implementing specialized skills, and managing a complex system of accountability.

Considering the terrorist as a possible negotiating counterpart raises the issue of legitimacy. Rebels usually labeled as terrorists are unlikely counterparts. Associating principles of negotiation activity and terrorist action leads to the management of an oxymoron. For a government, discussions with terrorists are a way to legitimize a dissident movement that denies this government as representative and provides them with a formal status. The policy shift usually starts by discussions at the political level, then switches to violent means, then gets to the negotiation table. This is done because the government sees no other way to end the violence, because the stalemate is so damaging that something has to be done to stop it, or because a third party had enough influence to bring the two sides to the negotiation table.

Producing a specific concept of negotiation relates to the fact that the basic understanding of a negotiation with terrorist groups is that it dramatically differs from traditional practice in substance and in form. It differs in substance because cooperation is not truly on the agenda. The parties do not feel that they are from the same human fabric. The spirit is often much more that of a cease-fire to be agreed on, with each party having a hidden agenda that

does not exclude violence, treachery, and deception. The underlying negotiation paradigm tends to be much more a chicken game than a prisoner's dilemma. It also differs in form, because this type of negotiation is an extension of war through other means. The ideological and ethical dimensions do not contribute to ease tensions among the proponents.

A new strategic approach, such as turning the absolute terrorists into contingent terrorists, has to be developed. This is an essential response to the most deadly terrorists' actions. Such an approach means that something in the mind-set of the counterparts has to be changed, that their perceptions of the problem and their actual role have to be modified. This is a challenging task that is critical to save human lives. The terrorists have to see that they can do better through smart negotiation than by killing people.

Implementing specialized skills is an important requisite because often the two sides do not meet physically or meet in places where one of them has to face an extremely hostile environment. The culture of the terrorist groups is usually not so much borrowed from a set of negotiation values but rather belong to a task force at war. Tension manipulation, aggressive language, hostile listening, threats, deliberately triggered crisis, and other types of hard bargaining tactics are the most common tools they use for a negotiation which is not even called as such.

Managing relations with stakeholders that have contradictory objectives such as freeing hostages but deterring terrorists from taking any more hostages is a challenge. Consistency and effectiveness are constantly at risk. Negotiation is not only a human struggle but a struggle of reason. These are the attributes of this singular type of interaction that consists of talking to terrorists to contribute to making this world a little safer.

Note

1 . Two militants from the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine and two from the German Revolutionäre Zellen, after having embarked in Athens, first hijacked the plane to Benghazi, let go all non-Israeli and non-Jewish passengers, and then diverted it to Entebbe, Uganda. At Entebbe, the four hijackers were joined by three additional terrorists and supported by the pro-Palestinian forces of Uganda's President, Idi Amin. The Israeli government sent two airplanes of paratroopers, who managed to kill all the captors and release all the hostages.

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PART SEVEN
MODELS OF PRACTICE

CHAPTER THIRTY-THREE
NEGOTIATION

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Edward C. Tomlinson

Negotiation is “a form of decision making in which two or more parties talk with one another in an effort to resolve their opposing interests” (Pruitt, 1981, p. xi). In other words, the parties to a dispute attempt to jointly create an agreement that resolves a conflict between them (as opposed to, for example, resorting to force or appealing to a third party’s judgment). Because conflicts can arise in every facet of life, negotiation can be a relevant and viable conflict resolution technique in contexts far beyond purchasing a car or settling the terms of a new job.

The potential that negotiation offers in terms of resolving conflicts more efficiently and creating more satisfaction with and commitment to resulting agreements can be hindered when it is not done well. For some, negotiation is an intimidating activity akin to visiting the dentist and agreeing to a root canal. For others, it is a competitive sport embraced with the aggression typical in professional hockey. Our perspective, however, is that negotiation is fundamentally an interpersonal skill, and the success of negotiated endeavors rests on skillfully applying basic principles. Here we supplant some of the more negative, emotional metaphors (dental patient, hockey player) and the schemas they evoke with those principles and replace dysfunctional dispositions (aversion, hypercompetitiveness) with confidence.

To accomplish this, we rely on an approach referred to as *integrative negotiation* . In integrative negotiation, the negotiators attempt to settle a dispute in a way that

maximizes both of their respective interests (as opposed to having one winner and one loser, or “splitting the difference”). Maximizing joint gain is possible insofar as the parties focus on creating rather than claiming value; the goals of the parties are not mutually exclusive (although they sometimes appear that way initially). We adopt this lens for three reasons. First, while this technique is popularly referred to as “win-win” negotiation, our experience has shown that few people truly understand what this means or how to achieve it. Second, research has shown that many individuals display a natural tendency to view conflicts such that one person’s gain automatically entails the other person’s loss, even when this is not the case (Thompson, 1990). Third, integrative techniques are especially appropriate when dealing with very difficult conflicts. In short, we focus broadly on how to negotiate well using integrative techniques, even in conflicts that are difficult to resolve. First, we discuss the theoretical and empirical roots of integrative negotiation.

THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ROOTS OF INTEGRATIVE NEGOTIATION

The intellectual roots of the formal study of negotiation as a process for conflict resolution can be traced back almost a century ago to specific contexts in which early social scientists began to study how negotiation strategy and tactics were being applied. The two dominant contexts available for investigation were labor relations and international relations. In the labor relations area, the Great Railroad Strike of 1877 and its aftermath brought national focus to a number of abusive labor practices in the railroad industry. The Railway Labor Act of 1926 (as amended in 1934) began to control these abusive practices by introducing mandatory negotiation into labor relations,

and over the longer term, they helped to modernize the contemporary collective bargaining process (for reviews, see Kochan and Verma, 1983; Walton, McKersie, and Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 2000). In the international relations area, political scientists began to observe the ways that international and cross-border disputes were being resolved and to make sense of these cases by employing early analytical tools and frameworks to deepen the understanding of how dispute resolution was being handled and to be more prescriptive about how negotiation and dispute resolution processes should be handled (for a number of retrospective reviews and essays on these early initiatives, see Zartman, 1977; Kremenyuk, 1991).

The early work in labor relations and international relations, both of which were largely assessments of specific cases, gained significant traction from the creative, seminal work of a collection of applied economists, political scientists, and behavioral scientists in the 1950s and 1960s. Some of this work was speculative and largely based on case analysis and observation, while other parts were drawn from empirical studies built on economics-based game theory models and empirical social psychological laboratory experiments. While a complete analysis and reconstruction of these intellectual roots and their cross-fertilization is far beyond the scope of this chapter, a number of these contributing roots include

- Observational studies of the ways that disputes were being resolved in real conflict settings. These include reports prepared by Stevens (1963) in labor relations or Ikle (1964), and Schelling (1960, 1966) in international relations.
- The introduction of simple economic games to model complex behavior, initiated by economists John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1947) and

significantly elaborated over the next two decades by intellectual pioneers including Thomas Schelling, Howard Raiffa, Duncan Luce, Martin Shubik, and Anatol Rapoport, particularly to create economic games that could simulate and induce competitive behavior, cooperative behavior and mixed-motive behavior (Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Schelling, 1960; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965, Raiffa, 1982).

- The field of social psychology, which began to explore the psychologically based behavioral dynamics that were associated with the game-theoretic predictions of the previously cited works. Early studies in this field include the seminal work of Morton Deutsch on the fundamentally different nature of cooperation and competition (1949), the nature of bargaining communication to resolve a mutual problem (Deutsch and Krauss, 1962; Kelley, 1966), the importance of a negotiator's motivational orientation in solving a bargaining problem (Deutsch 1960), and the important role of trust in conflict management processes (Deutsch, 1958, 1962).
- Walton and McKersie's (1965) effort to deconstruct the fundamental collective bargaining process into four subprocesses: distributive bargaining, integrative bargaining, attitudinal structuring, and intraorganizational bargaining. Identifying the structural and procedural dynamics associated with these first two subprocesses—distributive versus integrative—served to crystallize the distinctive differences between these processes and fuel streams of work that elaborated on the key strategic and tactical dynamics associated with each subprocess.

After approximately twenty years of cross-fertilizing research and conversation between the game theoreticians,

social psychologists, and ethnographic researchers in labor relations, international relations, game theory, sociology, and psychology, several integrative works emerged that tied many of the threads together into a strong conceptual grounding for the process of integrative negotiation:

- Jeffrey Rubin and Bert Brown's *The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation* (1975), which summarized the broad structural, personality-based, and contextual drives of negotiating behavior
- Dean Pruitt's *Negotiation Behavior* (1981), whose case studies, theoretical contributions, and empirical studies have generally provided the broadest research-based rationale for understanding how parties with opposing interests can achieve effective integrative agreements
- Roger Fisher and William Ury's (1981) popular *Getting to Yes* , which recast much of the earlier Walton, McKersie, and Pruitt research (unfortunately, without explicitly acknowledging it) into a popular, widely accessible framework and parlance

These works form the fundamental superstructure of the integrative bargaining process that has been enhanced, elaborated, and extended over the last three decades.

WHY OUR EMPHASIS ON INTEGRATIVE NEGOTIATION?

Readers who are familiar with the historical and conceptual roots of integrative negotiation are also aware that most of these same roots served as the foundation for the extensive study of distributive, or more win-lose, fixed-pie, claiming value negotiations (Walton and McKersie, 1965; Rubin and Brown, 1975; Raiffa, 1982). Indeed, most full treatments of

negotiation research provide an extensive review of the strategy and tactics of both the distributive and integrative approaches (Lewicki, Barry, and Saunders, in press; Thompson, 2011). Moreover, many negotiations are neither purely distributive or integrative, but a combination or hybrid of the two processes.

Many purely distributive negotiations may resolve conflict only over the substantive issues at stake (and not the relationship concerns), while other distributive negotiations resolve neither the substantive nor relationship concerns. We have chosen here to focus on the integrative negotiation process, one that is more likely to resolve both substantive differences in conflict as well as to minimally do no harm, or, we hope, to preserve or strengthen the relationship between the disputing parties. This is particularly crucial when the parties have an important or long-term relationship with each other. Thus, the more traditional form of negotiation is referred to as distributive negotiation. More commonly known as haggling or bargaining, this approach assumes that the resources to be negotiated over are fixed, such that one negotiator's gain comes at the other's loss. We acknowledge that there is a time and a place for distributive negotiation, such as when there are indeed fixed rather than expandable resources or when the relationship with the other negotiator is short term or relatively unimportant, and we explain the strategy and tactics of this approach more fully elsewhere (Lewicki et al., in press).

HOW TO DO INTEGRATIVE NEGOTIATION WELL IN TYPICAL CONFLICTS

Integrative negotiation has five major stages: preparation, building the relationship with the other negotiator, exchanging information, inventing and exploring options, and reaching a settlement.

Stage 1: Preparation

We begin with the premise that the objective of negotiation is not merely to secure a mutual agreement; rather, it is to create a good agreement—one that, to the fullest extent possible, satisfies the underlying needs that motivated the negotiation. It is essential to articulate these needs carefully in advance, so our discussion on preparation begins here.

Defining Interests.

Interests are the underlying desires and concerns that negotiators seek to resolve (Fisher et al., 1991). While it may appear unnecessary to articulate interests because they may seem obvious, this is indeed a critical step. Many negotiators understand when there is a conflict that needs to be resolved yet remain unclear on exactly what would satisfy their concerns. Furthermore, interests can be confused with positions—what negotiators say they want—while interests explain why they want those things. Positions tend to be singular and rigid (e.g., “I will not accept less than $30,000 for this car”); interests are flexible insofar as there are multiple ways to achieve the same objective. Consider a dispute between a manager and his employee. The manager strongly desires to promote the employee to a higher position, but the employee is not willing to accept the position without more money than the position is paid. What may seem on the surface to be a conflict over how much money the employee is to be paid (a fixed-pie issue), it might really be a conflict over what work tasks are involved. The new position may require a task

that the employee finds especially noxious, giving rise to an otherwise unnecessary demand for compensation to offset this undesirable feature. Viewed in this manner, the conflict might become more tractable because there are multiple routes to this end.

Questions that may be especially useful for articulating one's interests include, "What do I want from this negotiation?" followed up with, "Why do I want that?" "Why is that important to me?" "What will achieving that help me do?" and "What will happen if I don't achieve my objectives?" (Lewicki et al., in press).

Defining the BATNA.

While a negotiator strives to satisfy his or her interests in a negotiation, this is not always possible. However, there may be other alternative ways to satisfy those interests if the negotiation fails. The best of these other ways is referred to as the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA; Fisher et al., 1991). When a job seeker receives two employment offers, the second one is available to be pursued if satisfactory terms for the first are not reached. Negotiators must always be prepared for the possibility of not reaching an agreement, as this gives them the power and confidence to walk away (knowing they can still satisfy their objectives elsewhere). In addition, having a BATNA established in advance may be useful in encouraging the other negotiator to cooperate in reaching agreement (Pinkley, 1995).

Defining Issues.

Issues are specific topics to be negotiated; when an agreement is reached, the parties will have achieved a settlement on each issue. Relevant issues can become more apparent after clarifying one's interests. The identification of multiple issues can be very helpful in integrative

negotiation, since parties often have different priorities among the issues. As an example, in a two-issue negotiation, one negotiator might place very high value on issue A and much less value on issue B; the other negotiator may have the opposite preferences. In this manner, expanding the number of issues and exploring relative preferences among the negotiators may allow them to find an agreement that allows both to achieve their most valued outcome. This type of agreement is called logrolling.

Defining Targets and Walkaways.

Targets and walkaways are positions negotiators take on the set of negotiated issues. After all of the issues are identified, a common metric can be used to scale them (such as points), recognizing that some issues will be very important to the negotiator (and the highest plausible settlement would be worth a very high number of points), while others will be less critical (so the highest plausible settlement would be worth a fairly small number of points). (For an excellent example of this process, see Simons and Tripp, 1997.) Negotiators can then establish a reasonable target number of points for the entire negotiation. This target represents what the negotiator realistically strives to obtain from the agreement. It is also necessary to establish the walkaway point—that point at which a mutual agreement would fail to satisfy a minimally acceptable threshold. In such an instance, it would make more sense to abandon the negotiation in favor of your BATNA.

Understanding the Other Party.

Up to this point, preparation has focused on only one's own point of view. Now attention shifts to analyzing the other negotiator's (likely) perspective. This calls for careful analysis to discern the other negotiator's interests, the

issues she wishes to discuss, and where her preferred settlement lies.

Exchanging an agenda in advance of the negotiation might be one useful tool to facilitate this type of analysis. This preliminary effort provides insights to test and refine when meeting with the other party in the negotiation. Systematically considering the conflict from the other's perspective might provide insight that can be used to create an integrative agreement. Indeed, research has shown that such perspective-taking ability is associated with enhanced joint problem solving in negotiation (Richardson, Hammock, Smith, Gardner, and Signo, 1994); those with higher perspective-taking ability are more likely to identify and capitalize on integrative potential (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, and White, 2008). For example, the other party might have different priorities among issues that allow a logrolling solution. Or both negotiators might have commonalities that can be exploited. For example, a father and son might share a highly valued superordinate goal of spending more time together (even though the father dislikes playing video games and the son dislikes watching football on television). This facilitates the search for an activity that both of them can enjoy, or at least tolerate, because it is outweighed by the pleasure of time spent together.

Be Prepared for the Negotiation to Take More Time and Effort.

Integrative negotiations are time and effort intensive and require a greater exchange of information on interests and priorities. It takes longer to discuss options and weigh each of them along a set of mutually agreed-on criteria. The process of ensuring an agreement that fully satisfies each party's interests cannot be rushed. In the end, however, it not only produces an agreement that generates higher

mutual satisfaction and commitment but also builds a stronger relationship between negotiators (which is important for future negotiations).

Stage 2: Building a Relationship with the Other Party

Our natural tendency in conflicts is to view the other party as part of the problem (Fisher et al., 1991). We usually see the other's goals as necessarily in opposition to our own and their actions as impediments to our desires (Hocker and Wilmot, 1985). Integrative negotiation requires a different mind-set, where the other party is seen as a partner in solving a joint problem rather than an enemy who must be defeated (Fisher et al., 1991).

Whenever there is an important or ongoing relationship with the other party, integrative negotiation is especially appropriate. This is because the collaborative (instead of competitive) approach in integrative negotiation emphasizes and preserves the quality of the relationship between negotiators. As we will discuss in the next section, integrative negotiation relies on exchanging information that parties are otherwise disposed to keep hidden. This exchange of information will not occur if the parties do not trust each other. Distrust of the other party entails suspicion of their motives and fear of exploitation, and it leads to heightened scrutiny and lower information exchange. This incites competitive behaviors (motivated by a perceived need to defend oneself) rather than collaborative behaviors (Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-Goldband, and Carnevale, 1980). Thus, it is vital to take steps to communicate and demonstrate trustworthiness so the other party will not fear exploitation. When the parties trust each other, they are more willing to openly and truthfully share information such as interests and relevant situational details (Butler, 1999; Tenbrunsel, 1999). If the

prior relationship history of the negotiators has been strained and tense, it will be even more important to take steps to repair this relationship (for a fuller discussion, see chapter 5 in this Handbook).

Stage 3: Exchanging Information

Because integrative negotiation is a joint problem-solving endeavor, both parties need to openly share information with each other to discover areas of commonality and difference. They should begin with a negotiation over how they will negotiate. Specifically, the negotiation should begin with a statement that joint (rather than individual) gain is being sought, information on interests should be fully discussed first, and all viable options should be explored to maximize the likelihood of a win-win solution. That is, any agreement on a particular issue should be completely tentative until the very end, so trade-offs among issues can be used to maximize joint gain. In addition, the negotiators can set ground rules such as sticking to a preset agenda, committing to respectful dialogue, dealing with less contentious issues first, and agreeing to take breaks when discussions become tense.

As the negotiation proceeds, it is imperative to focus the discussion on each negotiator's interests. Negotiators should directly ask the other party to state his or her interests (and priorities among these interests), as this is much more likely to lead to integrative agreements (Thompson, 1991). While this advice may seem obvious, very few negotiators actually do this (Thompson, 1991). Simply asking why a negotiator has taken a particular stance on an issue can provide the key to resolving the conflict in a mutually beneficial way (Malhotra and Bazerman, 2007).

When the negotiation over the issues begins, the parties can start by stating their opening offers on each issue. These offers should be the most a party can plausibly justify, and that rationale should be explained. This rationale should highlight the interests to be served. While "asking for the moon" may seem incompatible with integrative negotiation, this is important because one party's ultimate settlement on an issue might not be a problem for the other party to grant (either because he views it as a trivial issue or that settlement point on the issue also has high value to him). It is unlikely to get the highest possible settlement point on an issue without asking for it, and you just might get it! Furthermore, making a subsequent concession to a lower-valued settlement point on that issue is more likely to be accepted than if you were to make the same offer without the more extreme offer preceding it. Finally, this avoids the so-called myth of the fixed pie, where a negotiator assumes (without testing) that the goals of both parties are mutually exclusive; this is not necessarily the case.

To maximize the chances of the other party sharing information with you, you must be willing to share information with her. When you indicate willingness to openly exchange information (as we have suggested) if your partner does as well and you proceed to share information, you increase the likelihood that your partner will reciprocate (Malhotra and Bazerman, 2007). In addition, making multiple offers of equivalent value to you can provide you with information about the relative priorities of the other party (Malhotra and Bazerman, 2007).

Stage 4: Inventing and Exploring Options

With the opening offers (and underlying interests) now on the table, the parties can quickly see where they agree and

where they do not. There may be some compatible issues where both parties prefer a particular settlement point, so these can be quickly settled.

Having exchanged information on interests allows the parties to proceed to discuss options, which are different possible settlements on the issues. When there are multiple issues, there are many potential ways of arriving at an agreement. The parties should now brainstorm potential options that would likely satisfy both of them. This means withholding any criticism in order to generate a long list of potential agreements. These are not proposals or offers. They are simply options to be explored and evaluated to see which one most fully creates value for both parties and allows them to satisfy their respective interests. In this process, the parties should demonstrate “firm flexibility” (Fisher et al., 1991)—an uncompromising stance on resolving the interests that motivated the negotiation, yet openness to any viable solution that might be useful in serving those interests.

Toward that end, options can be created in a variety of ways. What initially appears as a single issue might be more fruitfully considered as two or more separate issues, which might create the potential for a logrolling solution (Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Pruitt, 1981, 1983). When problems are large and present multiple issues, breaking the problem into smaller, more solvable parts can often create a breakthrough toward reaching agreement. There are other types of options as well—for example:

- Expanding the pie—finding a creative way to add more resources to a fixed-pie issue, allowing both negotiators to receive enough to be sated
- Nonspecific compensation—paying off the other party in a completely different currency in exchange for getting

what we want

- Cutting the cost of compliance—by reducing the burden one negotiator endures by agreeing to the desires of the other
- Finding a bridging solution that creates new alternative possibilities that neither side had earlier envisioned

Particularly when parties have to negotiate a long-term contract and there are considerable differences about whether conditions in the future will improve or decline, parties can create contingent contracts, which capitalize on unresolved differences between negotiators on how the future will unfold by specifying different contract terms for different future scenarios (Pruitt, 1981; Bazerman and Gillespie, 1999; Lax and Sebenius, 2002; Lewicki et al., in press). All of these processes require both creating options and then trading off on those options so as to maximally satisfy the needs of both parties. Negotiators may also offer multiple offers of equivalent value simultaneously to each other, suggesting several packages of offers that have equivalent value to the person making the offer but may have differential value to the receiver (Bazerman and Neale, 1992).

Stage 5: Reaching Settlement

After generating a wide variety of potential options, the parties must negotiate over how to settle. This is done by agreeing on objective criteria for the optimal solution. Market rates, industry practice, past precedent, and other similar metrics form objective criteria along which each option can be evaluated. The importance of objective criteria cannot be overstated, as it is important that the final solution not be seen as unfairly biased toward one party at the other’s expense. These criteria may also serve

as benchmarks to gauge the degree to which interests are met. They can also be set before options are invented, although these may artificially limit the number of options invented. Essentially, integrative negotiation is a rational decision-making technique that seeks to optimize joint gain. More specifically, the objective is to reach the Pareto-efficient frontier, where “there is no agreement that would make any party better off without decreasing the outcomes to any other party” (Neale and Bazerman, 1991, p. 23). This ensures that value is created to the furthest extent possible.

Once agreement is reached on the criteria, the parties may proceed to apply them to each option. The option scoring the highest along the chosen criteria is selected as the optimal solution. The parties may also choose to leave the door open for the possibility of postsettlement settlements (Bazerman, Ross, and Yakura, 1987). In this process, the current agreement becomes the parties’ new BATNA, while they continue to explore additional options that might improve on the existing deal. This process can be pursued very soon after the deal is reached or may be initiated weeks or months after the deal was arrived at, as the context has changed, new contingencies have arisen, or new opportunities have become available.

HOW TO DO INTEGRATIVE NEGOTIATION WELL IN DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS

Clearly the process of integrative negotiation we have described works optimally when both parties mutually agree to pursue it. Under those conditions, the process can flow almost seamlessly. More likely, however, at least one party is not as committed to the integrative bargaining

process as the other is, or the size, complexity, and other characteristics of the issues themselves make it difficult to find an integrative agreement. In this section, we first address the question of how an integrative negotiator can deal with a difficult opponent and then address the problem of negotiation impasse—that is, characteristics of the issues themselves and the context in which they occur.

Characteristics of the Parties

There may be characteristics of the parties themselves that make integrative negotiation more difficult to achieve.

Definition of One's Own Identity.

It is not uncommon for parties to define themselves—to define their identity—in ways that make working together with others more difficult. Members of certain groups—political, religious, geographic, racial—link themselves to issues in ways that make negotiation over the issues inextricably tied to definitions of self (Shapiro, 2006). For example, a research study examining the characteristics of intractable environmental disputes showed that the identities assumed by some of the disputing parties ("environmentalists" or "preservationists") contributed to the parties' taking negotiation positions they defined as nonnegotiable (Gray, 2003; Brumans et al., 2008).

Characterization of the Other's Identity.

Just as negotiating parties may define themselves in ways that self-limit their willingness to negotiate, parties may define the other party in stereotypical ways that generate the same result. As parties define themselves as unique and distinctive, they often define the other in ways that preclude productive negotiation or even meaningful communication. For example, in the ongoing debate over abortion, if one defines one's position as "100 percent pro-

life” and the other as “100 percent pro-choice,” this definition of self and characterization of the other may preclude any further productive dialogue between them. Babcock, Wang, and Loewenstein (1996) have shown how the self-definition and other-definition process leads parties to make positive attributions to themselves about their self-definitions and their positions on issues, and comparably negative attributions to their opponents and their positions on issues (Ross, 1997), and that these dynamics systematically lead to negotiation impasses.

Use of Competitive, Distributive Tactics.

A third problem is that the opposing negotiator tends to resort to competitive, distributive tactics as part of the process—for example, good cop–bad cop, nibbling (requesting an unlimited number of small concessions), or deception (Lewicki et al., in press). There are several strategies an integrative negotiator can use to confront the other party’s use of these tactics, particularly if the parties have agreed to approach negotiation in an integrative manner:

- Ignoring the tactic and persisting in the effort to sustain the integrative negotiation process
- Notifying the other party that one is aware of the tactic being used, raising that tactic to the level of open discussion, and indicating that the tactic is likely to be unproductive in an integrative negotiation and unlikely to yield positive outcomes to the opponent
- Making an offer to the opponent to change the negotiation approach to a more productive course of action by explaining how the integrative negotiation process can yield superior outcomes for both sides and offering to guide the other through that process in a productive manner (Lewicki et al., in press)

Dealing with Power Differences.

Power differences between the parties can inhibit effective integrative negotiation. Parties with more power, particularly some form of coercive power, may believe that they can use that power to force an agreement on the other, and hence have less of an incentive to negotiate constructively (Donohue and Kolt, 1992; Brams and Doherty, 1993; de Dreu, 1995). Similarly, if the low-power party believes that the high-power party has the capacity and willingness to exert such power, the low-power party may fail to adequately protect himself or herself from abuse. Finally, the introduction of power into the relationship may create emotions of fear and anger or a desire to seek revenge—to save face and not look weak, redress past injustices, or attempt to prevent future abuses of power (Kim and Smith, 1993).

Several strategies may be used to counteract the use of this power:

- Protect oneself by understanding one's bottom line or minimally acceptable settlement, while constantly attempting to bring the conversation back to the discussion of mutual interests.
- Cultivate one's BATNA so that the negotiator believes that he always has some viable alternative to pursue as a way to satisfy his interests and that the other (high-power) negotiator is aware that we have viable alternatives and can walk away from the deal being discussed at the table. It may also be useful to specify in advance indicators that a negotiator should be aware of that may indicate that abuse of power is likely to occur and that the BATNA should be actively considered.
- Enable the negotiators to agree to discuss the power imbalance and redistribute power in order to enhance

the integrative conversation. Specific tactics might include sharing resources, sharing control over key processes (e.g., setting and shaping the agenda, parties at the table), and discovering common interests that can focus the conversation and override the power differences that exist (Donohue and Kolt, 1992).

- Agree to employ a third party (e.g., mediator, facilitator) who can referee and broker the negotiation process. This refers to empowering this third party to keep the negotiators on track and follow the agenda, orchestrate them through the steps of integrative negotiation we examined, identify tactics that the parties may be using that may be disruptive to the flow of integrative negotiation and intervening so as to curtail the use of those tactics, and regulate emotional outbursts so that they do not derail productive, problem-solving conversations (Lewicki et al., in press; Ury, 2000).

Dealing with Negotiation Impasses

While integrative negotiators may wish to believe that every problem can be solved by following the process we have spelled out here, in fact, many disputes are inherently more difficult to resolve. In addition to difficulties with the other party, two major characteristics of disputes make some negotiations more difficult to resolve: the types of issues under discussion and characteristics of the negotiation environment (the basic objectives of the parties and how they have evolved) and the setting (e.g., where and when the negotiation occurs, cultural and relationship differences between the parties). We also mention several key ways that negotiators can engage in productive actions in an effort to resolve impasses.

Characteristics of the Negotiation Issues.

Some issues are simply more difficult to resolve than others. Several authors (Putnam and Wondolleck, 2003; chapter 30 in this Handbook) have indicated that impasses often result because the issues become intractable—that is, difficult to resolve because of the complexity of the conflict, intensity of the emotions associated with the conflict, pervasiveness of the conflict in people's personal lives, and persistence of the problem over a long period of time. Three major characteristics of issues can contribute to the likelihood of impasse:

- The differences between the parties originate in fundamental differences in personal and social values. Many of the most difficult issues to resolve in our society —gay marriage, abortion, global warming, gun control, government-supported health care—can be traced to fundamental differences in the personal and social values of the conflicting parties (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002).
- In spite of the parties' efforts to approach integrative negotiation with a focus on interests rather than positions, the targets and walkaways set by the parties on key economic issues may be so far apart that no viable zone of agreement is envisioned. These differences may have been exacerbated by the parties' inflating their negotiating positions or created by public declarations of their positions that make any concession making look like weakness.
- The issues themselves may be so complex—due to a necessary understanding of highly technical information —that negotiators cannot proceed without the advice of experienced professionals who themselves seriously disagree about facts, relevant data, and interpretations. Negotiations over environmental cleanup, pollution control, or the resolution of the many cases of financial

fraud due to complex financial manipulations in the collapse of Wall Street in 2008 (e.g., credit default swaps, mortgage-backed securities) are common examples.

Characteristics of the Negotiation Environment and Setting.

By far, the major contributing sources of impasse that inhibit effective integrative negotiation are the characteristics of the issues and the parties. Two more factors also deserve brief mention: the characteristics of the negotiation environment and the setting. In the first case, parties may have different expectations about what they are negotiating, what is on the agenda, or whether they are negotiating the deal for the short term or the long term (Fortgang, Lax, and Sebenius, 2003). Renegotiation of existing agreements can also be a major contributor to impasse—either because an existing deal is about to expire, because one side believes that the existing deal needs to be reopened, or because one or both parties believe the existing deal has been violated and that consequences or sanctions should be imposed.

In most cases, the passage of time has changed the environmental circumstances (e.g., balance of power, stability of markets) in ways that have changed the conditions under which new negotiations must now occur (Salacuse, 2001). In the second case, changes in the negotiation setting can also enhance (or decrease) the likelihood of impasse. Changing the location of a negotiation from biased to neutral physical space, or from more formal to more informal space, can bear on the likelihood of impasse. So can changing the timing of a negotiation and when certain offers are tendered or introduced in the sequence of offers and counteroffers. Finally, changing negotiators themselves—replacing more

or less aggressive negotiators with more or less cooperative ones—can clearly lead to the likelihood of impasse or break that same impasse (Kolb and Williams, 2001, and their discussion of the critical role played by the shadow negotiation).

Ways That Negotiators Can Resolve Impasses

There are many ways that negotiators can work to resolve or break impasses and return to the bargaining table.

Agree on the Rules and Procedures for Conducting the Negotiation.

Elements of this conversation may include where the negotiation will take place, what items are on the agenda and in what sequence they will be discussed, who may be present at the meetings, what kind of time schedule and time limits will be observed, whether there will be procedural rules on who can speak, how long parties can speak, what kind of records will be kept, how agreements will be recorded, and rules of decorum for how the parties will conduct themselves in a civilized and productive manner (Dukes, Piscolish, and Stephens, 2000; Kolb and Williams, 2001).

Find Ways to Reduce Tension, Negative Emotion, and Polarized Positions.

Strategies here may include

- Separating the parties (temporarily taking a break or longer cooling-off periods)
- Clearing the air by letting the parties ventilate in a manner that discharges emotional tension while minimizing further escalation

- Using active listening techniques to ensure that one is both listening to the other's issues and acknowledging the emotionality and personal meaning of those issues
- Agreeing to synchronize a series of moves that will allow the parties to de-escalate from the extreme positions they may have taken in earlier negotiations (Ross and Stillinger, 1991)

Improve the Accuracy of Communication.

Language is everything in negotiation. As negotiations move toward impasse, language becomes more emotional, more polarizing words and expressions are used, differences on issues become more positional and magnified, and parties stop listening to each other because they expect that they know exactly what the other is going to say. While reducing the negative emotionality may be integral to improving communication, parties can also use techniques such as role reversal and imaging (Johnson and Dustin, 1970; Alderfer, 1977) and explicit rephrasing of polarizing language (Donohue, Rogan, and Kaufman, 2011) in order to reduce the emotionally triggering tone of communication and to ensure that one fully understands the other party's message.

Control the Number and Size of Issues.

A fourth approach to managing impasses is to control the number of issues in discussion. As conflicts escalate, the size and number of issues also tend to expand. Getting the number and size of issues back under control may be instrumental to restoring productive negotiation. Issue control can be gained by limiting the number of issues to be discussed in any given set of negotiations; finding ways to break big issues into smaller, more manageable ones; reducing the number of parties involved in the discussion; depersonalizing the issue and keeping personalities out of

it; and being concrete and specific about the issues rather than allowing them to be stated as broad principles or precedents (Fisher, 1964; Fisher et al., 1991).

Recognize That Some Negotiations Are Difficult Because They Are on Stressful Topics and Laden with Strong Emotionality on Both Sides

Several studies and advice-giving resources (Weeks, 2001; Stone, Patton, and Heen, 1999; Patterson, Grenny, McMillan, and Switzler, 2005) have offered advice on ways to structure difficult or crucial conversations so as to keep them on track and minimize the likelihood that they will become incendiary, emotional, or otherwise unproductive. These sources offer specific advice on ways to prepare for these conversations and how to manage the clarity, tone, and phrasing of language so as to minimize the provocative nature of what is said and keep the conversation on point, on message, and moving toward productive resolution.

Create, Recreate, or Strengthen Commonalities between the Parties.

Since impasse and conflict escalation often serve to maximize the differences between the parties, negotiators can work to establish, reemphasize, and strengthen what they have in common. Some examples of these commonalities may include

- Working toward superordinate goals, or goals that both parties desire but neither can attain without the help of the other (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif, 1988);
- Working against common enemies, or outcomes that neither party desires and both must work together to avoid

- Creating common futures and expectations, such as vision statements, processes for ensuring participation by all key parties, principles and ground rules to be followed, and mechanisms for honoring and respecting agreements (Dukes et al., 2000)
- Removing the pressures of artificial deadlines or ground rules that are inhibiting a full and open discussion of the issues
- Work toward rebuilding trust between the parties so that ideas and information can be adequately shared in a way that will enable the expression of interests and exploration of options we described earlier in this chapter (see chapter 5, this Handbook).

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have reviewed a strategic approach to negotiation that can be used to resolve conflict effectively. We have noted the historical roots of documenting this approach as they arose in the practice fields of labor relations and international diplomacy. We also noted how the strategy evolved as behavioral scientists in the past fifty years sought to capture the essence of this strategy and move from a descriptive understanding of how it was being done to a set of prescriptive stages and steps for optimizing the process. We noted the five key steps that are critical to the effective execution of an integrative negotiation approach. Finally, we noted a number of ways that integrative negotiation may be difficult to execute effectively, and proposed some strategies for dealing with these difficulties. These problems may arise because of the behavior and disposition of the opposing negotiator, the nature and complexity of the issues under discussion, or the broader social and cultural context in which the negotiation is occurring.

In closing, we make three additional points. First, this chapter has been highly selective in the approach to negotiation that we have recommended and the research supporting it. The past half-century has seen an explosion of research on negotiation strategy and tactics of all varieties (Schneider and Honeyman, 2006; Lewicki et al., in press) and in all contexts (legal, business, community, environmental, international, and cross-cultural). Moreover, not only did we choose to limit our review to integrative negotiation (and pass over much of the research on distributive, or claiming-value negotiation), but we also chose to limit our discussion to interpersonal negotiation: one-on-one efforts to resolve a conflict. Many negotiations are far more complex: negotiators are being represented by agents; negotiators are functioning in groups or teams where there are both within-group and between-group negotiation activities; there may be multiple individuals or groups seeking to achieve a collective solution; and parties may be working across cultural boundaries where there are some very different rules for how a negotiation is conducted. As the number of parties involved increases—both on our side of the table and around the table—the complexity of negotiation increases, as do the challenges of executing an effective integrative agreement.

Second, we have not spent very much time in this chapter defining the nature of a true integrative agreement. While there are various checklists available for judging the quality of an agreement (e.g., satisfaction of the parties, addressing all interests, implementability of the agreement), in fact, the parties may never know how much new value was created and how much value was left on the table as a result of incomplete implementation of any of the steps we identified or because parts of the agreement required a distributive negotiation process to claim specific economic value. At its best, good integrative negotiation is

most likely an iterative process, in which agreements are forged, doing the best that we can under the circumstances, and then adapted and reforged as interests and needs change, contexts and conditions change, and parties recognize new opportunities to work together to create (and occasionally claim) value. These renegotiations are apparent to all those in strategic long-term relationships: marriages, families, partnerships, and alliances in various relationship contexts.

Finally, the greatest challenge to the future of integrative negotiation is to discover how to encourage and enable its use in a world where the problems seem to be more complex and intractable, the parties more polarized, and the public and private leadership more intransigent or cowardly to address those problems. How can multiple stakeholders work together toward finding common ground on issues like gun control, climate change, or environmental cleanup when even the suggestion of compromise (no less win-win) has been defined by all sides as violation of fundamental values or rights? While our understanding of how to design and execute good integrative negotiation might be reasonably sound when performed under ideal laboratory conditions, we have a long way to go to understand how to best implement these practices in the world's most vexing social, political, and environmental problems. Much has been learned, but both research and practice still have significant work ahead.

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CHAPTER THIRTY-FOUR
THE MEDIATION OF CONFLICT
Context, Cognition, and Practice

Kenneth Kressel

Mediation may be defined as a process in which disputants attempt to resolve their differences with the assistance of a third party whom they find acceptable. The mediator's objectives are typically to help the parties search for a mutually acceptable solution to their conflict and to counter tendencies toward competitive win-lose strategies and objectives. Mediators are most commonly single individuals, but they also can be twosomes, threesomes, or even larger groups.

Although mediation is a pervasive and fundamental human activity—try to imagine family life devoid of parents' interceding in their children's squabbles—in the past several decades, formal mediation has begun to play a role in virtually every significant area of social conflict. Some of the most prominent examples are divorce mediation, peer mediation in the schools, community mediation, victim-offender mediation, mediation of public resource disputes, mediation of disputes within organizations, and the increasing visibility of mediation in conflicts between and within nations. Within the United States, the federal and state governments have become active sponsors of mediation programs, ranging from personnel and employment dispute to public conflicts in health care, economic development, governance, and the environment. Federal sponsorship of mediation and related programs has been characterized as "one of the most significant movements in U.S. law in the latter half of the 20th

century" with "profound effects on the way the federal government handles conflict" (Nabatchi, 2007, p. 646).

THEORY AND RESEARCH

The use of mediation in its myriad forms far outstrips systematic research on the process. Nonetheless, with increased use has come widening understanding. Our knowledge of mediation as a social psychological process has three major sources: extrapolation from theories of conflict (Deutsch, 1973; Fisher, Ury, and Patton, 1981), empirical research (Kressel and Pruitt, 1989; "Conflict Resolution in the Field," 2004), and the in-depth case wisdom of practitioners (Kolb and others, 1994; Moore, 1996; Riskin, 1996).

In this chapter, my primary goal is to give a concise account of what this collective literature has to tell us about the factors influencing the use of mediation and what happens during the mediation process, particularly in terms of mediator behavior.

Since I last summarized these matters in the second edition of this Handbook, mediation services have expanded into domains as diverse as mental health, insurance, debt, taxation, and intergang conflict. As has been true since the beginning, research on mediation has not kept pace with practical developments. However, recent studies have clarified the role of social context in shaping what mediators do and the important divergence between what mediators espouse as their formal model of practice and the tacit and often unacknowledged ideas that influence their actual behavior. This chapter describes those developments.

I begin with what is known about the efficacy of mediation and the types of conflict for which it appears most (and

least) effective. [1]

The Efficacy of Mediation

The rise in mediation services over the past three decades has generally occurred in the context of offering disputing parties an alternative to the traditional use of lawyers and the courts. The proponents of mediation have argued that it should provide superior outcomes because it is based on a model of cooperative conflict rather than the win-lose orientation of the adversarial legal system and because it involves the parties directly in searching for solutions to their differences rather than imposing a solution on them.

Research on the efficacy of mediation has distinctive strengths and weaknesses. Among the problems are the failure (or inability) to randomly assign disputing parties to mediation or control conditions, the absence of standardized mediation protocols and checks on mediator adherence to such protocols, the paucity of well-defined outcome measures, and the atheoretic, one-shot nature of most studies (Beck and Sales, 2001; “Conflict Resolution in the Field,” 2004; Wall and Dunne, 2012).

On the positive side, the cumulative record has assessments of thousands of disputes across numerous domains of conflict and employs a wide array of methods. This large and methodologically diverse literature is remarkably consistent in its overall picture of mediation as an imperfect but highly useful and satisfying adjunct or alternative to more traditional means of conflict management. (Despite its shortcomings, mediation research also compares favorably in its vigor and extensiveness to the far more limited empirical record on the conflict management results produced by lawyers, judges, arbitrators, and governmental administrators.)

The most positive results are in terms of client satisfaction, settlement rates, and compliance. Thus, on the order of 70 to 90 percent of disputing parties who have tried mediation say they were pleased with the process, and for those who fail to reach agreement in mediation, the satisfaction rate is typically above 75 percent. These results compare favorably with public satisfaction with kindred services, such as the use of attorneys (66 percent) and the role of the courts (40 to 50 percent).

Mediation also fares reasonably well in terms of its ability to produce agreements, around 80 percent on average—an impressive figure bearing in mind that this figure includes many intractable cases in which attorneys have already tried and failed to produce settlement.

Compliance with mediated agreements has also been reported at around the 80 percent level (compared to 48 percent for those using traditional adjudication). Although there are occasional nonconfirmatory findings, there is also evidence that compared to adjudication, mediation produces more compromise, more equal sharing of resources, and more detailed terms designed to improve the likelihood of compliance (Wissler, 2004).

The record is more equivocal for mediation as an instrument for saving time and money. A few studies report appreciable savings for mediation compared to more adversarial methods, and mediation has been found to reduce court dockets and case overload for government agencies (Wall and Dunne, 2012). The evidence from other studies is more uncertain. Thus, in general civil cases, Wissler (2004) reports a few studies finding in favor of mediation and a nearly equal number finding no cost savings compared to adjudication.

Perhaps the most ambitious claims made for mediation is that it can be a vehicle for personal and social change.

When mediation began to expand significantly beyond its industrial relations base in the 1970s, such claims were often extravagant. The research record paints a more modest but still favorable picture.

Impact on Individuals.

On the positive side, divorce mediation has been found to produce agreements that are more favorable to children (Wall and Dunne, 2012), and offenders participating in victim-offender mediation have lower levels of offending in the future than they did before or compared with a similar group of offenders who did not meet with their victims (Umbreit and others, 2004). In studies of peer mediation in elementary schools, students who have served as peer mediators have been found to have improved social skills, decreased aggressiveness, a greater capacity for perspective taking, and higher academic achievement compared to students who lack such training.

Improvement in Relationships.

Studies of court-connected mediation of civil disputes find little consistent evidence for an ameliorative impact of mediation (Wissler, 2004), but in domains such as environmental mediation (Dukes, 2004), employee grievances (Bingham, 2004), and divorce, there are more consistently positive results. For example, mediating parents are more likely than parents relying exclusively on lawyers and the courts to report an increased capacity to work together as parents and a reduction in parental conflict. In one of the rare studies employing random assignment, Emery et al. (2001) report that compared to fathers who litigated custody or visitation, fathers who were assigned to mediation remained more involved with their children as long as twelve years later.

Social Impact.

The capacity of mediation programs to alter wider social environments has been relatively little studied, but ameliorative effects have been reported. Peer mediation in elementary schools has been associated with student and teacher perceptions of improved classroom climate and with decreases in classroom management problems, discipline referrals, and suspension rates. Research on the impact of the US Postal Service's implementation of a nationwide mediation program for dealing with employee grievances reports a significant impact on the USPS conflict management system, including a reduction of complaint caseloads and the number of chronic complainants (Bingham, 2004).

Conditions for Effective Mediation

Mediation is not a magic bullet. The accumulating evidence suggests that it is most likely to be successful in conflicts occupying a general middle range of difficulty—those with

- Moderate rather than extreme levels of conflict
- Parties who are motivated to resolve their difficulties and use mediation as a vehicle for doing so
- Available resources, whether material, social, or emotional
- Parties of more or less equal power
- The absence of issues involving fundamental religious, political, or ethical principles

It is also important to note that mediation often succeeds because the skillful mediator is able to modify some of the initially inhospitable parameters of the dispute in a favorable direction. It is also true that even when the

mediator cannot overcome barriers to collaboration, the parties may attain notable benefit from mediation even if they do not succeed in reaching an agreement: issues may be clarified, the opponent may be humanized, or partial agreement may be reached.

Factors Determining Use of Mediation

Mediation should be helpful in any conflict in which interdependent parties are identifiable; have the cognitive, interpersonal, and emotional capabilities to represent themselves; have interests that are not entirely incompatible; and face alternatives to consensual agreement that are undesirable—for example, a costly trial (Moore, 1996). Mediation is especially likely to prove useful whenever there are additional obstacles that would make unassisted negotiations likely to fail, such as intense negative feelings, a dysfunctional pattern of communicating, or serious differences about the “facts” or circumstances.

Although many disputes meet criteria of these kinds, getting mediation started turns out to be something of a challenge. In interpersonal disputes of all kinds, one-third to two-thirds of those given the opportunity to use formal mediation decline it. It is also apparent that in work settings where informal mediation could be used (as by a manager), the would-be mediator declines to intervene, looks the other way, or chooses to employ power and authority rather than the skills of facilitation. Characteristics of the social environment, the disputing parties, and the potential mediator are among the variables that determine whether mediation occurs.

Characteristics of the Social Environment.

In many nonindustrial societies, the community is frequently unwilling to tolerate the disruption in social life that would be triggered by intense conflicts between clans having many cross-cutting kinship ties. In such cases, much social pressure may be brought to bear for the parties to mediate, and powerful community leaders are likely to be involved in making sure that mediation occurs and that the parties take it seriously.

There are, of course, notable instances in our own society in which mediation is socially mandated, as in labor laws that require mediation once bargaining has reached an impasse. Less formal but equally powerful mandates occur, as when a judge to a small-claims or divorce dispute suggests to the parties that they try mediation before proceeding to a judicial hearing. One of the important research findings is that such pressure does not appear to decrease the effectiveness of divorce, small claims, or neighborhood mediation.

In work settings, the environment may work for and against the use of mediation. Support for the process may come from an organization’s need to get work done by means of a task force comprising individuals or groups with equal standing and no common superior. If conflict erupts in such a group, it presents an opportunity for informal mediation for a manager with conflict resolution skills.

Although the modern organization is comfortable with the notion of conflict with its competitors, it is often much less disposed to acknowledge that conflict exists within the organization. Managers often behave accordingly, preferring conflict-avoidant strategies to mediation. They are inclined to bolster these approaches by defining conflicts as being rooted in the parties’ personalities and thus not amenable to resolution.

These competing attitudes toward using mediation in organizational settings are also affected by circumstances. Thus, people tend to prefer mediation when the parties must continue working with each other and there is sufficient time available to do mediated problem solving. When time is limited, the matter is complex, or strong managerial authority is perceived to be required, mediation is less likely to occur (Goldman, Cropanzano, Sterin, and Benson, 2008).

There are two extensive analyses of the importance of broader social forces on the institutionalization of mediation services. One comes from studies of the reaction within federal agencies to the government's ambitious efforts to promote alternative dispute resolution methods; the other is on the stance of American corporations toward establishing internal alternative dispute resolution (ADR) systems.

The enactment by Congress of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act in 1990 strongly encouraged all federal agencies to consider using ADR. The response was highly uneven, with some federal agencies implementing ambitious and widely used mediation programs and others reacting in a much more tepid manner. Nabatchi (2007) and Bingham (2004) describe the panoply of social factors associated with this diverse response.

Part of the variability in response was due to the legislation itself, which provided no sanctions for failing to implement ADR programs and no additional funding to mount them. In addition, although the legislation designated the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and the newly created Working Group on ADR to facilitate the spread of ADR programs, neither had much authority, experience, or resources to do so.

Despite this ambivalent initiative, the use of mediation to resolve employment disputes gained wide acceptability within the US Postal Service. Among the reasons were the long, well-established history of employment mediation within the federal government; the largely intraorganizational nature of employment disputes, which allows agencies such as the Post Office to reap the benefits of ADR directly; the development of a unified and heavily promoted nationwide system of mediation; and strong external pressure to implement ADR by the General Accounting Office and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

In American corporations, as in the federal government, the response to institutionalizing mediation and other forms of ADR has been highly variable (Lipsky, Seeber, and Fincher, 2003). ADR is most likely to be institutionalized in companies in which management believes that significant amounts of time and money can be saved by handling the problems through consensual procedures; management faces the same type of dispute on a regular basis (especially when these disputes do not involve a lot of money or matters of principle); and the dispute concerns the interpretation of contracts rather than of statutes.

Lipsky et al. reach the dour conclusion that while the use of mediation may be widespread in the corporate world, institutionalized ADR has not occurred in most large American businesses because evidence for the benefits of institutionalized mediation and arbitration programs is typically lacking, and because corporate ADR is invariably a reactive response to managing particular disputes, not by the desire to make corporate culture more fair and procedurally just.

Perceptions of the Disputants.

A decision to mediate often depends on the parties' attitudes toward alternative means of attaining their objectives. Thus, a nation may choose to mediate when the human and financial costs of continuing conflict become too high; divorcing parents may mediate as a preferred alternative to the expense and unpredictability of relying entirely on lawyers and the court. A modicum of goodwill also appears helpful. Compared to nonmediating divorcing couples, those who choose mediation have a more positive view of their spouse, more optimism about the prospects for cooperating as parents, and greater willingness to accept responsibility for the marital breakup.

The choice of mediation may also hinge on whether a party perceives that the mediator has leverage with the adversary. Thus, industrial mediators report that management sometimes prefers a mediator with whom the union is comfortable. In the sphere of international mediation, the classic illustration is Egypt's eagerness to have its 1974 dispute with Israel mediated by the United States because of its known affinities with and strong economic influence over Israel. Receptivity to mediation may also be a function of the justice orientation of the party; a disputant with a strong desire for revenge is likely to find mediation unappealing because of the wish to retaliate.

Characteristics of the Potential Mediator.

The crucial distinction here is between contractual and emergent mediation. In contractual mediation, the mediator is an outsider with whom the parties contract for the specific purpose of helping them resolve their dispute. The contractual mediator's relationship with the parties usually ends when the mediation ends. Moore (1996) points out that this form of mediation is common in cultures with an independent judiciary that provides a model of fair

procedures and use of third parties as impartial decision makers.

In emergent mediation, the parties and the mediator have enduring ties to one another. Emergent mediation is found in families, friendship groups, organizations of all kinds, and international relations. Emergent mediators often have a strong vested interest in the outcome of the dispute (e.g., family stability) and are usually willing and able to mobilize considerable social and other pressure toward resolving the conflict.

In the contractual case, getting mediation started is comparatively straightforward. All that is required is that the disputants (or a party such as the court that controls their interests) decide on mediation. In emergent mediation, by contrast, potential mediators may decline to serve even if the parties wish assistance or the parties themselves may need to be persuaded to mediate. For these reasons, mediator characteristics are especially important in determining whether emergent mediation occurs.

Third parties may choose to mediate if important interests of their own are at stake. Thus, in organizational settings, managers are willing to take on the mediational role if an important agreement between organizational task forces is being negotiated; in an international conflict, nation-states are willing to mediate to protect or extend their own spheres of influence. Whether in international politics or communal affairs, powerful mediators with self-interested motives for mediating a conflict are more likely than less powerful ones to be able to convince (or oblige) the disputants to make use of their services.

There is some evidence about variables that deter third parties from mediating. In organizational settings, mediation does not appear to be a popular choice among

managers, despite some lip-service to the contrary. Speculation about why this is so includes lack of training in mediational skills and the perception that the informal mediational role is not generally valued or may not be highly visible to the would-be mediator's superiors. There is also evidence that third parties decline to mediate if they feel there is little common ground between the parties or if they are not concerned about whether the parties attain their aspirations (Carnevale, 1986).

Mediator Behavior

It is impossible to give a universally accurate account of what transpires in mediation since the process occurs across so many domains of conflict and since mediators often strive for quite contrasting goals, ranging from settling the substantive issues narrowly defined to accomplishing broad relational, psychological, or social objectives.

Accurate descriptions of mediator activity are also hampered by a surprising lack of research. When Dean Pruitt and I edited our book on mediation research in 1989, we believed that we were at the beginning of an exciting era in the empirical study of mediation and that our book would help stimulate many more such contributions. The golden era we envisaged has, by and large, not occurred. In the past decade, there have been only a handful of studies on such important matters as mediator-disputant interactions, informal third-party mediation in the workplace and among family or friends (Goldman et al., 2008), and institutionalized ADR systems in businesses and organizations. Observational studies continue to be infrequent, and the study of the mediation process largely occurs in a theoretical vacuum (Wall and Dunne, 2012). Social psychologists, who were once in the vanguard of mediation research and who, by the nature of their training

are very well qualified to do the kinds of studies Pruitt and I recommended, have made limited contributions to the mediation research literature since the high point of mediation research in the 1980s and 1990s (Pruitt, 2012).

Despite these disappointments, researchers and reflective practitioners have captured certain regularities in mediator behavior and, since the previous edition of this Handbook, there have been some valuable new studies on mediator stylistic behavior and thinking.

I have divided my overview of mediator behavior into two parts. The first deals with discrete mediator tactical behavior; the second with mediator stylistic orientation of a more global kind.

Mediator Tactical Behavior.

Wall and Dunne (2012) have recently estimated that mediators have more than one hundred discrete tactical interventions to choose among. In describing these choices, I use a typology that I developed while studying experienced labor mediators. With modifications, the typology has also been used to describe other forms of mediation (Feld and Simm, 1998; Kressel, 1972, 1985; Kressel and Deutsch, 1977; Kressel and Pruitt, 1985; Carnevale, Lim, and McLaughlin, 1989). It divides mediator behavior into *reflexive, contextual* , and *substantive* strategies. Mediator behavior also varies in its degree of assertiveness, a dimension that cuts across these three categories. I shall not attempt a comprehensive catalogue in each area but rather try to convey the overall flavor.

Before proceeding, three preliminary observations may be helpful. First, any typology of mediator tactical behavior involves obvious oversimplifications. Mediation is a fluid, multifaceted activity in which the same act may serve several purposes. Second, mediator behavior is a function

of the context in which mediation is embedded. While researchers have made this point for a while, especially in regard to national culture (Wall and Dunne, 2012), it has now become a standard perspective among practice-oriented scholars (Frenkel and Stark, 2012).

Third, it is commonplace among practitioners that successful mediation is a structured activity proceeding in distinctive stages, with various mediator behaviors predominating in each stage. Empirical evidence supports this general proposition, although the precise number and characteristics of such stages may vary considerably. Figure 34.1 presents Moore's twelve-stage model (1996) for professional mediators dealing with complex conflicts, and exhibit 34.1 (Deutsch and Brickman, 1994) presents a simpler stage model for students, parents, or other nonprofessionals to use in mediating simple conflicts.



Stage 1: Establishing relationship with the disputing parties
• Make initial contacts with the parties
• Build credibility
• Promote rapport
• Educate the parties about the process
• Increase commitment to the procedure
Stage 2: Selecting a strategy to guide mediation
• Assist the parties to assess various approaches to conflict management and resolution
• Assist the parties in selecting an approach
• Coordinate the approaches of the parties
Stage 3: Collecting and analyzing background information
• Collect and analyze relevant data about the people, dynamics, and substance of a conflict
• Verify accuracy of data
• Minimize the impact of inaccurate or unavailable data
Stage 4: Designing a detailed plan for mediation
• Identify strategies and consequent noncontingent moves that enable the parties to move toward agreement
• Identify contingent moves to respond to situations peculiar to the specific conflict
Stage 5: Building trust and cooperation
• Prepare disputants psychologically to participate in negotiations on substantive issues
• Handle strong emotions
• Check perceptions and minimize effects of stereotypes
• Build recognition of the legitimacy of the parties and issues
• Build trust
• Clarify communications
Stage 6: Beginning the mediation session
• Open negotiation between the parties
• Establish an open and positive tone
• Establish ground rules and behavioral guidelines
• Assist the parties in venting emotions
• Delimit topic areas and issues for discussion
• Assist the parties in exploring commitments, salience, and influence

Figure 34.1 Twelve Stages of Mediator Moves

Source: C. W. Moore, *The Mediation Process* , 2nd ed. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996, pp. 66–67. Reprinted by permission.




Exhibit 34.1 A Mediation Outline for Parents

I. Introduction

Get the quarreling children’s or adolescents’ attention.

Ask them if they want help in solving their problem.

If they do, move to a “quiet area” to talk.

Explain and get their agreement to four rules:

- Agree to solve the problem.
- Do not use name-calling.
- Do not interrupt.
- Be as honest as possible.

Listening

Decide which child will speak first.

Ask Child #1 what happened, how he or she feels, and his or her reasons.

Repeat what Child #1 said so that Child #2 can understand.

Ask Child #2 what happened, how he or she feels, and his or her reasons.

Repeat what Child #2 said so that Child #1 can understand.

Solution

Ask Child #1 what he or she can do here and now.

Ask Child #2 what he or she can do here and now.

Ask Child #1 what he or she can do differently in the future if the same problem arises.

Ask Child #2 what he or she can do differently in the future if the same problem arises.

Help the children agree on a solution they both think is fair.

Wrap-up

Put the agreement in writing, read agreement out loud if necessary, and have both sign it.

Congratulate them both.

Source: Deutsch, M. and Brickman, E. “Conflict Resolution.” *Pediatrics in Review* , 1994, *15* , p. 21. Reprinted by permission.

Reflexive Interventions.

By reflexive intervention, I refer to mediators’ efforts to orient themselves to the dispute and establish the groundwork on which later activities will be built. Of necessity, they are of primary importance early in mediation, although they occur throughout the process. Establishing rapport and diagnosis are the most important of the reflexive activities.

Absent rapport with the parties, mediators can hope to accomplish little. Among the many things mediators can do to establish rapport include giving a convincing and credible introduction to the mediation process and the role of the mediator, conveying sincere concern about the dispute, showing empathic understanding of each side, and behaving evenhandedly. Although rapport building is a central tenet of the practitioner community, it has not received wide attention from researchers. Such strategies are associated with favorable outcomes in studies of labor mediation and mediation of interpersonal disputes in a community justice center.

Maintaining impartiality toward the parties and neutrality about the issues is often invoked as the sine qua non of rapport building and effective mediation generally, but as we have seen, many mediators (especially those of the

emergent variety) hold decided preferences and biases and are often selected by the parties for precisely this reason. Perhaps more crucial than neutrality and impartiality is mediator acceptability, which can be established through rapport-building activities.

Before they can intervene effectively, mediators must also educate themselves about the dispute. Among the diagnostic tasks, we may count deciding whether mediation is an appropriate and mutually acceptable forum (in a case of extreme power imbalance or where there is a history of violence and intimidation, it may not be), separating the manifest from the latent (and more genuine) issues, identifying the real leaders and power brokers (in complex, multiparty disputes), and understanding the relationship dynamics of the parties. Among the mediator's common diagnostic tactics are use of sustained interrogatories (often in conjunction with separate caucuses with each side, where sensitive questions can be asked easily) and keen observation of the parties' behavior in joint sessions.

Contextual Interventions.

Contextual interventions refer to the mediator's attempts to produce a climate conducive to constructive dialogue and problem solving. This class of strategy embodies the traditional view that a mediator ought to be a facilitator, not an arm-twister or proponent of a specific solution. Among the contextual strategies, we may include improving communications, establishing norms for respectful listening, managing anger constructively, maintaining the privacy of negotiations, educating the parties about the negotiating process, and establishing mutually acceptable procedures for fact finding. There is evidence that many of these behaviors, especially those associated with improving communication flow, are associated with favorable mediation outcome.

Structural intervention, such as deciding who should be present at negotiation sessions and conducting separate meetings with the parties (caucusing), may also be used as a method of "climate control." Using the caucus is both common and somewhat controversial. The majority of practitioners see caucusing as an essential mediation tool for managing intense emotions, getting at sensitive information, and overcoming impasse. But some mediators avoid the caucus on the grounds that it fosters distrust between the parties, places an undue burden on the mediator for maintaining confidentiality, and engenders secrecy and scheming. Research on mediation of interpersonal disputes in a community justice center (Pruitt, McGillicuddy, Welton, and Fry, 1989) documents that mediators spent approximately one-third of their time in caucus and tended to do so when hostility was high and positions rigid. Although many disputants used the caucus as an occasion to bad-mouth the other side to the mediator, the results were a strong decline in direct hostility between the parties and an increase in problem-solving activity. More equivocal results for the caucus have been reported in labor mediation under particularly unfavorable conditions (unmotivated parties, large positional differences, and high hostility), where mediators sometimes fared better by eschewing the caucus altogether.

Substantive Interventions.

Substantive interventions refer to tactics by which the mediator deals directly with the issues in dispute. All mediators are obliged to deal with the issues in some way, although some philosophies of the mediator's role de-emphasize a substantive, problem-solving focus in favor of relational objectives, such as increased understanding of self and other (Bush and Folger, 1994). Competence at formulating an overarching strategic direction for the

negotiations—a flexible plan for reaching agreement informed by a sound understanding of each party's interests, constraints, and limitations—is considered a central cognitive ability for the mediator in models that emphasize a problem-solving focus (Honoroff, Matz, and O'Connor, 1990). Certain contexts appear to promote a substantive focus for the mediator. This appears to be the case for mediators who work directly in the shadow of the law, such as divorce mediators or judges who elect to play a mediational role as part of pretrial conferencing.

Research on mediator tactical behavior suggests three distinct but overlapping substantive domains for mediator activity: issue identification and agenda setting, proposal shaping, and proposal making. Mediator interventions in all of these domains have been associated with favorable mediation outcomes, although the pattern is not always uniform.

There is also increasing awareness of the importance of substantive activities aimed at increasing the probability that agreements reached in mediation are implemented and complied with. The risk of noncompliance may rise with the increasing number and complexity of the issues, the number of parties involved, the level of tension and distrust between the disputants, the strength and number of internal factions within each party whose cooperation is needed to implement the agreement, and the length of time during which the obligations set forth in the agreement must be performed (Moore, 1996). Among the important substantive activities of the mediator in this final stage of agreement implementation, we may assist in selling the agreement to various constituencies; help in developing criteria and procedures for monitoring and evaluating compliance, and procedures for dealing with intentional or unwitting noncompliance; encourage a return to mediation if disagreements arise during the implementation stage;

and prepare the parties to maintain their agreements in the face of opposition and resistance from extremist factions (Coleman and Deutsch, 1995).

Assertiveness.

Assertiveness refers to how forcefully the mediator behaves along a continuum ranging from mild and nondirective at one end to forceful and highly directive at the other. Assertive behavior is most common in the substantive domain. Mediators frequently engage in arm twisting to persuade reluctant parties to accept particular agreements, particularly during the later phases of mediation (Wall and Chan-Serafin, 2009). Reflexive and contextual activities are not generally insistent, but even here mediators can act forcefully to overcome obstacles. Thus, judicious diagnostic questioning can yield to demanding and pointed interrogatories if the mediator suspects dishonesty or concealment; interventions aimed at improving the flow of communications can become stern and more assertive if one or both parties persist abrasively or provocatively.

Although the practitioner literature conveys a decidedly ambivalent attitude about behaviors at the assertive end of the spectrum, it is clear that pressure tactics are commonly used, especially if the dispute involves very high levels of tension and hostility, if a mediator's own interests or values are at stake, if the mediator is under strong institutional pressure to avoid the costs of adjudication, or if the mediator wields power over the disputants (a far-from-rare occurrence in some settings, as with judicial mediators). It is also clear from the research literature and more than a few case studies that assertive and even downright heavy-handed and coercive mediator tactics are often effective in producing settlements, particularly if conflict is intense and positions badly polarized (Wall and Chan-Serafin, 2009). What is not yet clear are the long-term effects of exercising

such pressure, particularly on compliance and future willingness to use mediation.

Mediator Stylistic Orientation

Although most empirical studies of mediator behavior have focused on discrete intervention of the kinds just summarized, it is clear that mediators also have distinctive stylistic leanings. It is these stylistic predilections that organize and direct the tactical behaviors described in the preceding section (Kressel and Gadlin, 2009; Kressel, Henderson, Reich, and Cohen, 2012).

Mediator style may be defined as a set of interrelated behaviors that are strongly shaped by the mediator's ideas about the causes of dysfunctional conflict, the goals to be achieved in mediation, and the behaviors that are acceptable (and unacceptable) for achieving those goals.

Mediator style occupies a central place in the world of practice. Wall and Dunne (2012) estimate that about twenty-five styles are described in the literature, although many of them seem like minor variations around some major themes. Identifying with a particular style (or styles) helps mediators clarify for themselves the inherent ambiguities in the mediation role (e.g., between task and relational demands) and provides a guide to intervention decision making under stressful and uncertain conditions (Kressel et al., 2012). In the practitioner literature, depictions of facilitative, evaluative, and transformative styles are common (Bush and Folger, 1994; Riskin, 1996), and proponents of one style or the other often argue about which approach is "best" (Bush and Folger, 1994; Lande, 2000; Love, 1997; Winslade and Monk, 2006). Courts and agencies offering mediation services have been urged to decide what mediator style they wish to promote for reasons of quality assurance and the obligation to tell

consumers what they can expect (Charkoudian, 2012; McDermott, 2012). In one important instance—the US Postal Service nationwide mediation program—this advice was explicitly followed (Bingham, 2012).

Research on mediator style has not, unfortunately, kept up with practice. Since the groundbreaking ethnographic studies of mediator style decades ago that first made clear the ubiquity of stylistic inclinations in the life of practicing mediators (Kolb, 1983; Silbey and Merry, 1986), there have been, by my search, only six observational studies of this central phenomenon (Kressel et al., 2012).

Progress is being made, however. Recently, Jim Wall and I, and our respective colleagues, have published studies of mediator style (Kressel et al., 2012; Kressel, 2013; Wall and Chan-Serafin, 2009), and Wall and I coedited a special issue of *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research* devoted exclusively to mediator stylistic orientation (Kressel and Wall, 2012). The material that follows draws heavily on these sources.

Any summary of mediator stylistic inclinations is bound to ignore significant areas of overlap among mediators practicing in broadly different styles. However, a discussion of mediator stylistic differences alerts us to the distinctively different worlds of practice encompassed by the term *mediation* and the extent to which practice is powerfully shaped by context and experience. Most stylistic accounts portray the mediator acting in either a problem-solving or relational style.

Problem-Solving Styles.

The problem-solving style has been, until fairly recently, the presumptive approach of nearly all mediators. It gives priority to unblocking the parties' stalled efforts to reach agreements (the "problem" to be solved) through the

mediator's active grappling with the issues. Within the problem-solving mode are three major stylistic subtypes: facilitative, evaluative, and strategic.

In the facilitative subtype (Riskin, 1996), mediators focus on helping the parties identify and express their underlying interests and needs on the assumption that doing so will bring to the surface underlying compatibilities or areas for trade-offs and compromises. Mediator neutrality (as to outcomes) and impartiality (regarding the disputants) are emphasized. This is the classic integrative approach to agreement seeking enshrined in Fisher et al.'s (1981) best-selling *Getting to Yes* . Among mediators, it is also the most popular philosophy of the mediator's role, albeit one that is frequently contradicted by empirical studies of their behavior. The facilitative approach appears to be most often used in complex disputes involving parties with an ongoing relationship (e.g., divorcing spouses) and multiple tangible and intangible issues.

The evaluative subtype (Riskin, 1996) is a more distributive version of the problem-solving approach. In this variant, the mediator's implicit assumption is that the primary obstacle to settlement is the parties' unrealistic confidence in the validity of their respective positions. A primary job of the mediator is to provide the parties with a more balanced and realistic positional assessment. The approach is often highly directive and appears most common in settings where the disputants have no ongoing relationship, are contending around a single issue, usually money, and there is an emphasis on speedy resolutions to conserve time and money (as in many court settings). The model is often favored by mediators used to exercising considerable decision-making authority such as judges or former judges. Wall and Chan-Serafin's (2009) observational study of experienced mediators dealing with civil disputes identified a variant of the evaluative approach, which the authors

consider sufficiently distinctive in its highly assertive attempts to lower the parties' expectations and push them toward settlement, to be considered a separate "pressing" style.

The strategic subtype is far less commonly discussed in the mediation literature, perhaps because it rests on an assumption alien to the labor-relations and legal traditions from which professional mediation arose: that destructive conflict is often the result of powerful latent causes of which the parties are unaware. A primary focus of the strategically oriented mediator is to help the parties identify such causes and modify them to the extent necessary to produce agreements on substantive issues. The approach is associated with mediators who have had training in disciplines where the notion of latent causes is familiar (e.g., psychotherapy or organizational development) and who work with parties who are deeply interdependent and have the time, capacity, and motivation to engage in the requisite analytical work.

In intensive case studies I conducted with Howard Gadlin and his colleagues at the Office of the Ombudsman at the National Institutes of Health (Kressel and Gadlin, 2009), the strategic approach was the default intervention style. The NIH ombudsmen were adept at recognizing and addressing three primary latent causes of dysfunctional conflict: impaired communication patterns (typically avoidance or coercion), a blocked trajectory toward scientific autonomy in the mentor-protégé relationship, and systemic dysfunction (e.g., ineffectual leadership) in the unit in which the conflict was occurring. The preference for the strategic model appeared to be significantly augmented by the ombudsmen's repeated opportunities as institutional insiders to develop expertise in recognizing these latent causes, their formal responsibility for facilitating systemic

change within NIH, and regular consultation with each other in the management of cases.

Relational Styles.

In contrast to problem-solving styles, relational styles focus less on agreement making and more on opening lines of communication and clarifying underlying feelings and perceptions. Relational styles gain at least some of their impetus from a dissatisfaction with the perceived limitations of the problem-solving approach. They tend to be optimistic about the parties' ability to manage their own affairs and emphasize the need of the parties to work through to their own solution. The orientation is ordinarily combined with interest in improving the parties' long-term relationship and has a strongly humanistic flavor. Transformational (Bush and Folger, 1994), narrative (Monk and Winslade, 2001), and victim-offender mediation (Umbreit, 2001) are examples.

Transformational mediation is perhaps the best articulated, and certainly the most popular, of the relational approaches to the mediation role. It served as the basis for the US Postal Service's ambitious and successful approach to managing employee grievances (Bingham, 2012). The transformational mediator's allegiance is to the twin objectives of empowerment and recognition. *Empowerment* refers to strengthening each party's ability to analyze its respective needs in the conflict and to make effective decisions; *recognition* refers to improving the capacity of the disputants to become responsive to the needs and perspectives of the other. The approach is avowedly critical of mediator activities to produce settlement, direct problem solving, or substitute mediator judgment or analysis for that of the parties. All of these activities are felt to narrow the parties' opportunity for self-reflection and mutual recognition.

Despite the polemical tone that often characterizes discussions of problem-solving and relational styles, there is no strong empirical evidence for preferring one approach over another. In several correlational studies, disputing parties have been found to be more satisfied with a facilitative approach than a more evaluative one (Alberts, Heisterkamp, and McPhee, 2005; Kressel et al., 2012; McDermott and Obar, 2004; Wissler, 2004). However, in conflicts involving significant financial concerns, measures such as settlement rates and dollar amounts gained (by plaintiffs) have favored more aggressive, evaluative mediator behaviors (McDermott and Obar, 2004; Wall and Chan-Serafin, 2009). In international conflicts, where tangible consequences may be enormous, directive tactics (e.g., proposing a particular settlement and pressing for it) have been found more likely to produce successful outcomes than nondirective ones (Bercovitch and Lee, 2003).

The reported differences between styles are of considerable interest, but the number of studies is small and the measures of stylistic difference are primarily of the self-report variety. No studies use the gold standard of randomized experimental designs based on observed mediator behavior to make systematic stylistic comparisons. Such designs are very much needed, but there are significant practical barriers to conducting them (Wall and Kressel, 2012).

Mediator style is also almost certainly a function of the context in which mediation is occurring. Mediators are often encouraged to be stylistically flexible on the sensible grounds that under different circumstances, different adaptive behaviors are required and significant numbers of mediators present themselves as stylistically eclectic (Charkoudian, 2012; McDermott and Obar, 2004; Picard, 2004). Whether they are actually stylistically adaptive is an

open empirical question. There are observational studies that report mediator stylistic inflexibility (Charkoudian, 2012; Kolb, 1983; Kressel et al., 2012; Kruk, 1998) and a few that report mediators moving between styles in the same case (Golann, 2000; Silbey and Merry, 1986; Wall, Dunne, and Chan-Serafin, 2011) or between cases. In the National Institutes of Health study (Kressel and Gadlin, 2009), ombudsmen had a default preference for the strategic problem-solving approach described above but used a narrower tactical approach (facilitative or evaluative), depending on their assessment of the degree to which latent causes were fueling a particular conflict and, if they were, of the parties' capacity and motivation to address them. Part of the difficulty in measuring the extent of mediator stylistic flexibility is that we lack a meaningful taxonomy of mediation situations against which to measure mediator stylistic activity. Preliminary ideas on this matter have been suggested (Coleman, Gozzi, Katsimpras, and Ng, 2012; Kressel, 2007), but more work is clearly needed.

Finally, it is important to realize that mediator-conscious identification with a stylistic orientation is unlikely to be the complete story behind how mediators behave. A formal, prescriptive model cannot possibly account for the unique elements of every conflict. In addition, the highly unpredictable and rapid interactions unfolding in front of the mediator require a blend of conscious deliberation and unconscious, reflexive responding based on each mediator's unique beliefs, values, and experiences.

In recognition of these considerations, my colleagues and I have begun exploring the tacit thinking that lies behind mediator decision making. To do so, we invited seventeen experienced mediators and five novices into the lab and asked them to mediate The Angry Roommates, a simulated conflict between two college women, and then to watch a video recording of the session and report on their in-

session thinking (Kressel et al., 2012; Kressel, 2013). Trained observers also reviewed the videos of the mediation sessions with instructions to describe what the mediators might have plausibly been thinking to behave in the way that they did.

Our analysis of the Angry Roommates study indicated that while familiar formal models of practice were clearly influencing mediator intervention choices, mediator behavior was also being influenced by tacit schema. These schema could be at variance with the mediator's conscious stylistic allegiance and with the schema of other mediators identified with and trained in the same style of practice; could block mediator access to potentially useful knowledge they possessed from other contexts (e.g., as a therapist); and were associated with differing capacities for self-reflection that participating in the study provided.

This initial foray into identifying the idiosyncratic schemas of practice that lie behind mediator conscious stylistic orientations suggests strongly that describing such schema, especially through efforts to get at the thinking of our most skilled practitioners, should be a central research goal. I return to this theme in the next section.

IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGING CONFLICT

I divide my thoughts on the practical meaning of our knowledge about mediation into two segments: the relevance of this knowledge for the user (or would-be user) of mediation and its relevance for the mediation practitioner.

Implications for the Mediation User

Although mediation has become more familiar in recent years, this chapter reviews evidence that its use is often hindered by ignorance, resistance, and a lack of social support. Embroiled parties and the individuals with formal or informal authority over them can do a number of things to offset these tendencies.

Encourage Use of Mediation.

Whereas research indicates that mediation is effective in many conflicts, parties are often reluctant to try it because they are unfamiliar with the process and distrustful of their adversary. For this reason, exercising tactful but firm pressure on antagonists to try mediation is often extremely helpful. Those in a position to exercise such pressure can take comfort from the evidence that it has not been found damaging to the mediation process so long as the parties retain the right to withdraw from mediation at any time.

A more pervasive issue is the unavailability of mediation in many settings, particularly in the workplace. There are at least two things that people with organizational authority can do in this regard. The first is to promote establishment of formal mediation services. Typical settings for such services are as part of a human resource department or ombuds office, but other creative locations can be found; in one university, a faculty development center became the locus for informal mediation of faculty disputes (Kressel, Bailey, and Forman, 1999).

A second way to foster use of mediation in the workplace is to give managers mediation training. Such education can be useful in helping them make informed and appropriate referrals to mediation and promoting the acceptance of mediation services. Mediation training can also empower managers and other emergent mediators to intervene directly in conflict between subordinates in new and

productive ways. Although managers often fear to mediate the conflicts of their subordinates on the grounds that they are not neutral, it is clear that neutrality is not a sine qua non for effective mediation. More important is acceptability built on rapport and the mediator's evenhandedness. These qualities depend on skills and attitudes basic to all good human interaction: active listening, patient inquiry, respect for differences, skepticism about win-lose solutions, and avoidance of premature closure whenever complex issues and feelings are involved. People taught such skills and attitudes as part of a mediation training program often report general improvement in their interactions with others, quite apart from their usefulness in mediation proper.

Be Prepared to Participate.

Voluntarily seeking or accepting referral to mediation is almost always sensible in any conflict. Disputants should enter mediation willing to suspend distrust and competitive stratagems at least long enough to give the process a chance. It is also important to keep in mind that active participation in the mediation process is likely to produce benefits even if a comprehensive settlement is not reached. Benefits include such things as gaining a clearer perspective on your interests and objectives as well as those of the other, making progress toward agreement on some issues, and the satisfaction of knowing that a thorough and sincere effort to work collaboratively has been made. In addition, parties who have made a good-faith initial effort at mediation often return to the process later in the trajectory of their dispute with positive results.

Managers and others with authority over the disputants should also be receptive to participating directly in the mediation process if invited to do so, since many conflicts are a reflection of broad dynamics that the parties alone

may have limited ability to influence. Authoritative third parties often have knowledge or resources that can greatly expand the opportunities for creative problem solving in such circumstances.

Accept a Broad Definition of the Mediation Role.

Mediation comes in a great range of strategies and styles, and all appear useful under some circumstances. We have also seen that mediators with ostensibly the same stylistic orientation may have very different ways of enacting that style (i.e., different schemas of practice). The consumer of mediation services needs to be aware of these complexities. The important thing in judging the suitability of a given mediator—and we are always talking about that, not some abstract, uniform process—is to be able to give positive answers to some basic questions: Does the mediator communicate a reasonable definition of his or her role? appear evenhanded? make you feel safe? understood? free to make your own decisions?

Implications for the Practitioner

Mediation Is an Inordinately Stressful Social Role.

Mediators work under conditions that are often emotionally unpleasant, and they usually work in isolation. The role also contains contradictory and ill-defined elements and is often poorly understood by disputants and referral sources alike (Kressel, 1985; Kolb and others, 1994). Mediator stress is compounded by the lack of proven theory on many central issues of professional behavior. Three practical implications for avoiding mediator burnout can be drawn: maintain realistic expectations, develop awareness of your own role and stylistic preferences, and become a reflective practitioner.

Maintain Realistic Expectations.

Like the participants in mediation, the mediator too should have realistic expectations for success. Since so much depends on the motivation and circumstances of the parties, do not expect every case to settle; as many as one-third or more do not, regardless of the mediator's best efforts. Settlement mania is an unfortunate occupational hazard among mediators, who need to bear in mind that disputants often derive benefits from mediation independent of their ability to reach agreement, and that parties leaving mediation without an agreement but with a good feeling about the process and the mediator often return at a later point when their motivation and circumstances are more suitable to using the process effectively.

Know Your Own Style and Role Preferences.

Mediator activity is driven by strong, if sometimes unarticulated, ideas about how the mediation role should be enacted. There is evidence that some of these role interpretations may be superior to others for certain types of conflict, but our knowledge about these matters is sketchy. It is important that mediators become aware of their own role predilections. A mediator without this kind of self-awareness may be particularly vulnerable to unrealistic expectations for success and to social pressure from referral sources and others to produce settlements. Being clear about your own vision of the role also helps you give the parties appropriate expectations of what mediation requires of them—a crucial matter since disputants often enter the process with notions that are either vague or unacceptable (to you) of what will happen. For example, my colleagues and I tried to be clear with the divorcing couples referred to us by the family court that we saw our primary role as helping orchestrate a good problem-solving

process, more or less independent of the goal of settlement. We did our best to socialize the parties to this version of the mediation role, but if they had other motives from which they could not be dissuaded (to reach a speedy agreement, or to give cover to a behind-the-scenes deal, or to extract revenge or expiate guilt), we learned to tactfully refer the case back to the attorneys and the court.

Become a Reflective Practitioner.

Although not every case can reach resolution, every case can be an occasion for reflective learning. A reflective practitioner can also make an important contribution to conflict theory since practitioners often have much intuitive wisdom about the dynamics of conflict that inform their strategic choices that they are not necessarily able to articulate without special procedures, as I learned in my work with Howard Gadlin and his colleagues in the NIH Office of the Ombudsmen. I have also noted the intriguing evidence from The Angry Roommates study (Kressel et al., 2012) that mediators' tacit schemas of practice often contradict their explicit stylistic orientations or differ in surprising and important ways from colleagues with the same stylistic identifications. Your tacit schema of mediation practice may, ironically, also cut you off from using skills or knowledge you possess but unconsciously rule out using. Cultivating habits of systematic reflection can make you less vulnerable to such consequences.

Reflective learning can be done in many ways, but a number of suggestions may be helpful (a detailed account of these ideas is found in Kressel, 1997). First, *be systematic* . Try to think reflectively after every session where possible, or certainly at the conclusion of mediation. Reflection can be made systematic with the help of even very simple debriefing protocols. Among the items that such a protocol might include are questions about the

characteristics of the parties or their circumstances that appeared to facilitate or inhibit the mediation process and interventions or strategies that were particularly helpful or unhelpful. Much of what occurs in mediation is relatively familiar and uneventful. Periodically, however, puzzling, unanticipated, vexatious, or transforming episodes occur for which training and prior experience provide no ready answers. These “indeterminate zones of practice” (Schön, 1983) represent the greatest challenge to professional competence. Reflective case study protocols can be tailored to help identify and understand them.

Second, *reflect with others* . Interaction with others can enrich reflective learning; indeed, it may be a precondition for it. A reflective partner or team can also serve as at least a provisional check on wishful or incomplete thinking and extend emotional as well as intellectual support. There are many ways to structure the interaction with teammates. Ideally, team meetings should be regular and give each member of the team an equal opportunity to debrief using the same reflective protocol to organize dialogue. A useful approach is to build the dialogue around persistent questioning of each other’s tactical choices. The best interrogatory moments are those in which the team is able to simultaneously convey a supportive stance toward the mediator whose case is being discussed, while pushing for articulation of hidden hunches about the conflict or the mediation role that produced the intervention being scrutinized. A typical series of queries might ask: “Why did you do [or not do] X?” “What were you thinking when you did X?” “Can you say more about the cues in the situation that led you to do that?” “Why didn’t you do Y or Z?”

Interestingly, team discourse of this kind relies on the same sort of skill that mediation requires: empathy, persistent questioning, attentive listening, curiosity about underlying ideas, and willingness to tactfully challenge positions. In

this sense, a reflective team can help develop an explicit understanding of mediation theories-in-action, while simultaneously presenting an opportunity to practice the interpersonal skills needed in mediation.

The third suggestion is to *formulate and test reflective hypotheses* . No reflective method is immune to subjective bias or distortion, but the insights of reflection can be subject to a crude but useful verification procedure. The approach is essentially this: first, establish a reflective hypothesis based on observed similarities over a number of sessions or cases; second, at the next appropriate occasion, use the hypothesis to fashion a relevant mediation strategy; third, evaluate the consequences of the intervention strategy. Did it make sense to the parties? reduce tensions? lead to creative problem solving?

My colleagues and I used this procedure to identify the central role of mediator question asking in divorce mediation. We noticed that even though we experienced a strong press to control conflict by using exhortations and advice, they appeared far less useful than persistent and focused queries on topics directly related to the focal conflict. A mediation strategy was formulated reflecting this possibility (“In the next session, try to avoid exhortations and suggestions. Instead, ask as many open-ended, relevant questions as you can think of”) and its effects observed. Several things became apparent. Asking good questions was easier said than done, there were distinctive types of question that were useful for different purposes, and question asking was indeed a powerful vehicle for reducing tensions and moving the parties toward problem solving. Here again, the team discourse reinforced skills needed in mediation itself. In both contexts, it is important to develop hypotheses about underlying phenomena by persistent questioning and to devise strategies to test them.

Finally, *make use of a reflective facilitator* where possible. My experiences with the reflective case study method as a research tool in divorce mediation and in the mediation of disputes among scientists at the NIH indicates that, particularly in group settings, reflective learning can be impeded by evaluation apprehension, implicit pressures to maintain group cohesion, a proclivity for talking in abstractions rather than about concrete instances, and the need to tolerate extended periods of ambiguity and confusion about case meaning. The presence of a skilled facilitator who is not a formal member of the group can help the group cope with such obstacles by reinforcing the norms of reflective learning (e.g., concreteness, supportive confrontation), monitoring counterproductive group processes, and helping to coalesce reflective insights in a timely way. The task of reflective facilitation, like any other quasi-clinical role, contains hazards of its own. There is an emerging need to develop the role as a subspecialty in its own right and to train people to meet its demands.

IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAINING

The ability to effectively manage conflict may well be considered one of the basic characteristics of the truly educated person. Training in mediation is an important subset of this ability. There is evidence that such training may profitably begin as early as the elementary school years. Ironically, although there is an extensive cottage industry in mediation skills training, much of it is geared to preparing contractual mediators to handle formalized conflict of the kind that typically ends up in court. Relatively speaking, training in generic mediation skills for the nonspecialist has been left to languish. This is doubly unfortunate, since conflict in the workplace, school, home, and community is ubiquitous and would often respond well

to mediation—if only there were a mediator prepared to handle it. Several implications for training nonspecialists in mediation may be derived from the material presented in this chapter.

Train Leadership

The most effective way to multiply the benefits of mediation training is to offer the training first and foremost to the leaders of a group or organization. Leaders who understand the mediation process can make effective and meaningful referrals to mediation within the organization, can stimulate others within the organization to acquire and use such training, and are likely to turn to mediation in the event that serious conflict arises. In addition, leaders often need the skills of mediation as much as others in an organization or group do, if not more, because the power and authority that leaders possess often lead them away from collaborative modes of influence for resolving their differences with others. In theory, mediation training can reduce this tendency. In sum, organizations wishing to convey to the rank and file their serious commitment to collaborative conflict management can send no clearer message than to train their leaders.

Teach a Hierarchy of Mediation Concepts and Skills

We are still far from a complete understanding of which mediator activities and styles are most appropriate under which conditions of conflict, but for training purposes, it is obviously useful to distinguish between two broad classes of intervention: foundational and higher-order activities. Foundational activities are the reflexive and contextual interventions by which mediators establish rapport and provide a meaningful negotiating structure within a collaborative (rather than adversarial) set of norms. Skill in

active listening and the ability to gather information about the dispute and the parties' perspectives on it are the most salient foundational activities. Foundational activities also rest on mastery of certain basic concepts, such as the importance of distinguishing interests from positions and the primacy of situational forces rather than personality attributes in fostering destructive conflict. In problem-solving models, the higher-order activities are substantive and assertive behaviors by which mediators interject themselves forcefully into a conflict and play an active role in the problem-solving process, including imparting strategic direction to negotiations and shaping the substantive proposals.

Although the more vigorous higher-order activities are often necessary in an intensely polarized dispute, the foundational skills and concepts are often sufficient to produce a collaborative orientation in the low-to-moderate-intensity conflict that permeates organizational and group life. They also have broad general utility for trainees, quite apart from their usefulness in mediation. For these reasons, the foundational skills should be emphasized in mediation training programs where training time is limited, as is especially likely if the trainees are organizational or community leaders.

Create a Supportive Environment for Reflective Learning

Learning the skills of mediation, including the foundational skills, requires direct practice and active learning through role play and simulation. These are often done to greatest collective profit in a fishbowl setting, where the entire group can share the same experience and compare ideas and reactions. Practicing skills in front of others also duplicates some of the tension associated with actual practice; for this reason, it is often highly valued by

trainees for its verisimilitude. However, such a context also stirs anxiety and evaluation apprehension, which can be inimical to skill development and inhibit a reflective stance toward the learning experience. There are many ways to conduct experiential learning to produce a supportive and reflective learning environment. A four-stage schema for debriefing mediation role play has proved useful in this regard, and I describe it here for illustrative purposes.

Reflective debriefing of a role play begins with a ventilation stage, during which the person who has been the mediator is encouraged to describe immediate feelings and impressions associated with the role play. The trainee is instructed to emphasize spontaneity (here-and-now feelings) and de-emphasize cerebral analysis. It is meant partly to be cathartic and partly to begin the reflective process. The other trainees are encouraged to respond to the target person by exercising empathic listening skills; they are also instructed to avoid critical evaluation or advice giving.

There follows a stage of supportive feedback, during which members of the training group are asked to praise the mediator for things that were done well during the role play, with the injunction to be as specific and concrete in their remarks as possible—not, “You were calm,” but, “When one of the parties challenged your lack of experience as a mediator, you answered nondefensively and reasonably.”

Once all supportive feedback has been given, a third, reflective, stage begins. The target person is instructed to describe any source of puzzlement, frustration, or surprise that occurred during the role play. Once again, the other trainees are required to respond in an empathic, nonevaluative manner. They are also encouraged to ask questions that may help clarify the underlying issues raised

and offer suggestions to the mediator role player on strategies for handling them.

The final stage, implementation, is a return to the role play and an attempt to make use of any lessons learned from the reflective debriefing. Throughout the process, the trainer ensures that trainees adhere to the debriefing procedures and models appropriate behavior and attitude.

CONCLUSION

The empirical and practitioner literatures of more than two decades make clear that mediation is an important and useful instrument for managing many forms of social and interpersonal conflict. Mediation is of documented value for conflicts occupying a broad middle range of difficulty, but for highly polarized disputes as well, it can bring distinctive benefits even if settlement is not reached. They include reducing tension, clarifying issues, and humanizing the adversary. Research and practice have also identified the structured, if never precisely predictable, stages that constitute the mediation process and the skills, attitudes, and behaviors characterizing the mediator's art. Certain of these skills and attributes (such as the ability to establish rapport with angry parties, gather information through sustained questioning, listen actively and empathetically to contending points of view, suspend judgment, and foster norms of collaboration) would seem of such demonstrable value that training in mediation can well be justified as part of the learning experience of the well-educated person.

My review also suggests some intriguing ironies. Thus, although mediation is an empirically validated process, getting disputants to use it often amounts to a hard sell, requiring the persuasive powers of a court or application of other powerful social and cultural pressures. A second irony is that most of our knowledge about mediation comes

from the formal arena of legally definable conflicts; about use of mediation in the informal and ubiquitous conflicts of everyday life we know a good deal less. Here too there is evidence that the process is underused. It also appears to be the case that for all its established value, those who assume the mediation role enter a world of significant ambiguity and stress, some of which, ironically, derives from ignorance about their own schema of practice. A final irony is that the successful mediation process is still something of a mystery, as is illustrated by argument over such things as the meaning and importance of mediator neutrality, the appropriateness of highly assertive mediator tactics, and the relative merits of problem solving versus relational approaches to the mediation role.

This blend of positive findings, intriguing ironies, and demonstrable role stresses and ambiguities amounts to a rich opportunity for researchers and practitioners, especially those of the reflective variety, who can approach the conundrums and debates of the field in the same tolerant, focused, and inquisitive manner that characterizes the constructive mediation process itself. My broad overview also suggests a seminal role for the friends and supporters of mediation. By familiarizing themselves with mediation and encouraging its use, managers, parents, and leaders (of a community, an institution, a group) can transform mediation from a frequently untapped resource to a familiar and common instrument for resolving the disputes of everyday life.

Note

1 . The research findings and evidence about mediation mentioned in this chapter are presented in greater detail in Carnevale and Pruitt (1992), Kressel and Pruitt (1985,

1989), Kressel and Wall (2012), “Conflict Resolution in the Field,” 2004, and Wall and Dunne (2012).

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CHAPTER THIRTY-FIVE
TEACHING CONFLICT RESOLUTION SKILLS IN A WORKSHOP [a]

Susan W. Coleman
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This chapter describes the Coleman Raider model, used to teach negotiation and mediation skills to adult learners. By making explicit our teaching philosophy, course objectives, and methods, we hope to stimulate discussion and research about how conflict resolution is taught. Although organizations around the world have invested significant financial resources on this topic, there has been little systematic research over the past decade on the pedagogy of conflict resolution or on the models and methods used to teach these skills (Movius, 2008; Raider, 1995). We first share six pedagogical insights derived from our practice that have come to underpin our training design. Then we discuss the objectives of the course as a whole and the learning activities in each of our seven training modules. We follow with some recommendations for social science researchers and theorists. We conclude with a postscript to the earlier editions that shares three recent examples in which modules from this conflict resolution training have been used in other interventions: intact team building, a collaborative inquiry, and an organizational mediation with leadership coaching.

INSIGHTS FROM PRACTICE

The first pedagogical insight is that each learner has a unique and implicit “theory of practice” for resolving conflicts. Each individual’s theory of practice has been

developed over a lifetime, influenced by many factors, such as various individual differences, skills, and competencies (see part 3, Personal Differences, in this Handbook), as well as salient cultural and identity groups' norms and values, and situational roles and hierarchies (see part 5, Culture and Conflict, in this Handbook).

Second, learners need both support and challenge to examine their own theory of practice. Intellectual and experiential comparison of competitive and collaborative processes can create challenging internal conflict for most learners. From our experience, learners experience two types of internal conflicts. The first is felt by those who embrace collaboration as an ideal and yet experience dissonance as they discover through course exercises how much of their own behavior is viewed by others and themselves as competitive, accommodating, or compromising. The second is felt by those who resist or reject collaboration and then struggle when collaborative approaches appear to have some merit. Although the first group is typically larger, because most participants in our training are volunteers, the trainers must create a learning community where all feel safe enough to try on new skills and attitudes.

The third insight is that experiential exercises shift the responsibility for learning from the trainer to the participant. For many adult learners, role playing and subsequent public debriefing are powerful learning tools as well as unfreezing devices for behavioral and attitudinal change. The excitement, fun, and support of mutual self-discovery counteract the potential embarrassment of being less than perfect in front of the others.

Fourth, self-reflection based on video or audio feedback gives many learners motivation to modify problematic behavior. Videotaping or audiotaping the role-play exercise

for later review enables each learner to observe and reflect on his or her own behavior in terms of general knowledge about the collaborative conflict resolution process presented by the trainers.

Fifth, user-friendly models and a common vocabulary enable a group of learners to talk about their shared in-program experience. Conceptual frames, like the ones taught in modules 2 through 7 (discussed in the next section), are broad enough to illuminate the underlying structure of a collaborative process across many contexts and cultures because they leave room for variation. The trainer needs to be contextually sensitive to explain and illustrate the heuristic frames in ways that are culturally and situationally relevant.

The final insight is that learners need follow-up and support after workshop training to internalize new concepts and skills. As in other areas of skills training, most participants need additional coaching in a supportive environment for behavioral change to occur (Raider, 1995). A three- to six-day workshop in conflict resolution can make the learner aware of what she does not know, thereby beginning the learning process, but more work is needed if a collaborative process is to become the preferred response to mixed-motive conflicts. This humbling but valid observation needs serious consideration by the conflict resolution field—by trainers as well as organizations that sponsor trainings.

OVERVIEW OF THE COLEMAN RAIDER WORKSHOP DESIGN

Developed by Ellen Raider and Susan Coleman, Conflict Resolution: Strategies for Collaborative Problem Solving is a highly interactive workshop typically conducted in a

three- or six-day format. (It is based on Raider's 1987 training manual, *A Guide to International Negotiation* .) The three-day format is for groups requesting training in collaborative negotiation. The longer format includes an extensive three-day module on mediation. All participants receive a training manual, which is divided into sections corresponding to the seven course modules:

1. Module 1 presents an overview of conflict resolution, with an emphasis on distinguishing between competitive and collaborative resolution strategies.
2. Module 2 introduces a structural model, the elements of negotiation. In this module, we focus on the difference between positions and needs or interests, as well as the skill of reframing and the use of a prenegotiation planning tool.
3. Module 3 describes five communications behaviors or tactics that are typically used during negotiations, and it emphasizes the difference between the intent and the impact of any communication.
4. Module 4, combining the learning from the previous modules, gives the learner a sense of the flow of a collaborative negotiation by introducing a stage model.
5. Module 5 describes how cultural differences affect the conflict resolution process.
6. Module 6 helps participants understand and deal with emotions, which typically arise during interpersonal and intercultural conflict.
7. Module 7 in its short form introduces mediation as an alternative if negotiation breaks down. The longer form teaches participants the general skill and practice of mediation.

Although the information contained in these seven modules is the foundation for every workshop, the material presented is customized to meet the needs of each client. This is accomplished through selecting or creating case simulations, including previously recorded video examples of negotiations or mediations from our library, and prior assessments of the trainee group.

This precourse assessment and customization is an important part of our work. During the assessment, the training team builds rapport with the client and discovers many of the conflicting issues currently in the client's system. This information enables the team to anticipate, recognize, and then incorporate relevant teachable moments during the training, that is, to link the training material to real concerns of the learners as they emerge. In this way, we have been able to teach this course to such diverse groups as schoolteachers in New York, Dallas, and Skopje; corporate executives in Buenos Aires, Paris, and Tokyo; grassroots community groups dealing with tenant organizing and environmental justice; diplomats from the Association of South-East Asian Nations and the European Union; and United Nations staff throughout the world. The course has been taught over the past twelve years to over ten thousand people. The materials have been translated into French, Spanish, Arabic, and Macedonian, and a book based on our manual has been published in Japanese.

WORKSHOP OBJECTIVES AND PEDAGOGY

Like other educators, we find it useful to identify for ourselves specific knowledge, skills, and attitude objectives for the training.

Knowledge Objectives

A glance at the Contents of this Handbook indicates the many areas of academic inquiry that affect the study of conflict and its resolution. How much of this body of knowledge can be included in an introductory experiential workshop?

We have decided to emphasize the distinction between competitive and collaborative approaches to conflict resolution (see chapter 1). Thus, we want participants to understand conceptually and experientially why and under what conditions cooperative conflict resolution processes such as collaborative negotiation and mediation are a better choice for individuals and society than are the commonly used strategies of competition and avoidance. Although we make it clear that we value cooperation, we also believe that we must not impose it on others. Our pedagogy encourages participants to try on this new paradigm to see if it is useful. Ultimately each participant must be self-motivated to make meaningful changes in his or her conflict-resolving behavior. We hope to provide information and experiences during our training that foster this exploration.

Through short essays in the training manual and minilectures, the trainers highlight and summarize in nontechnical language key insights from the field. In graduate courses at Columbia University and other institutions, we have supplemented these essays and lectures with additional assigned readings. Although specific knowledge objectives are associated with each module, there are some global knowledge objectives for the course:

- To develop an understanding that conflict is a natural and necessary part of life and that how one responds to conflict determines if the outcomes are constructive or destructive

- To develop awareness that competition and collaboration are the two main strategies for resolving conflict and for negotiation
- To develop awareness of one's own tendencies in thinking about and responding to conflict
- To become a better conflict manager—in other words, to know which conflict resolution method is best suited for a particular conflict problem (e.g., avoidance, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, litigation, or force)
- To become aware of how critical it is to the process of constructive conflict resolution to share information about one's own perspective without attacking the other and to listen and work to understand the perspective of the other side

Skills Objectives

The most fundamental skills objectives of our training are the following:

- To effectively distinguish positions from needs or interests
- To reframe a conflict so that it can be seen as a mutual problem to be resolved collaboratively
- To distinguish threats, justifications, positions, needs, and feelings and to be able to communicate one's perspective using these distinctions
- To ask open-ended questions in a manner that elicits the needs, rather than the defenses, of the other and, by so doing, communicate a desire to engage in a process of mutual need satisfaction
- When under attack, to be able to listen to the other and reflect back the other's needs or interests behind the

attack

- To create a collaborative climate through the use of informing, opening, and uniting behaviors

Attitude Objectives

The shifts in attitude and awareness that we intend to support are a little harder to enumerate succinctly. We hope that each participant leaves the program believing that collaborative conflict resolution skills are useful in their own lives. We hope that they commit to the larger goal of increasing the use of cooperative conflict resolution skills at all levels to create a more caring and just society. We want people to leave with a greater sense of humility or "conscious incompetence"—an awareness that there is always room to improve their conflict negotiation skills and that improvement will not only make their lives better but will enhance the lives of those around them. We want participants to be aware of the pervasiveness of identity-based conflict and to increase their own sense of humility to counter the self-righteousness and dangerous fundamentalism that has grown so exponentially in our time. In short, we want them to leave owning their part.

In a similar vein, we want participants to leave with an appreciation of difference as a source of richness rather than a liability. We want them to be intrigued by the multiple perspectives that human beings from around the globe can have about the same event and the multiple possibilities there are for misunderstanding. While we want to excite and motivate, we also want to avoid the Pollyanna effect with participants underestimating just how difficult it can be to use these skills. In most of our programs, participants are returning to systems that are not predominantly collaborative. They will likely encounter managers and colleagues who may very well not support

them in their use of collaborative conflict management skills. We want them to leave ready and wanting to do the hard work and be realistic about how difficult it might be.

Our process permits exploring this continuum through whole-group and small-group discussions and reflection through personal journaling. This investigation varies in depth and breadth depending on the specific audience and the time available for the training.

SEVEN WORKSHOP MODULES

With this overall learning perspective in mind, we present a description of the seven modules of the Coleman Raider workshop training with pedagogical commentary. Focus on each of the seven modules in the training sequence is adjusted according to the learning objectives of the audience.

Module 1: Overview of Conflict

The first module presents an overview of conflict. The focus is on exploring the participants' attitudes. The exercises chosen are intended to create internal conflict within each participant, so that each examines his or her own attitudes toward conflict, competition, and collaboration. The main activities are a diagnostic case, a physical game, and an interactive video-based minilecture illustrating various methods of conflict resolution.

Collaborative negotiation and mediation are introduced by locating them along the spectrum of conflict resolution approaches that range from avoidance to war. Both negotiation and mediation are explained as consensual alternatives that focus on the parties' underlying needs and interests and require their buy-in to try to reach an agreement. This is contrasted with quasi-judicial and

power-based methods such as arbitration, litigation, or war. (See figure 35.1 .) In the minilecture we connect these strategies to important theories, such as Deutsch's Crude Law of Social Relations (see chapter 1) and the dual-concern model.




Figure 35.1 Coleman Raider Resolution Continuum

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A diagnostic case is the first experiential learning exercise. Small groups of four to six people are divided in half to represent each side of the dispute. The groups negotiate for twenty-five minutes—competitively for ten minutes, then collaboratively for fifteen. A frequently used diagnostic situation, the Ossipila case, is a conflict between international developers who, with local government backing, want to strip-mine on the ancient farmland used by villagers (who have support from environmental groups).

The exercise is recorded on audio (or video) and played back to the small groups; it is also used in module 3 for an

in-depth analysis of negotiation behavior. There is a short debriefing immediately after the exercise.

The diagnostic case serves six functions:

1. It immediately draws in both skeptics and believers to our process.
2. It generates a baseline assessment for participants to discern those specific skill areas they need to work on during the rest of the training.
3. 3. It brings out the inherent discrepancy between what we propose and what participants are actually doing.
4. It demonstrates that the learning exercises in the workshop are highly participatory.
5. It allows learners to experience the difficulty of switching from one negotiation strategy to the other, as well as the possible consequences of each approach.
6. It initiates a positive atmosphere of shared learning.

The power of this experience comes from the direct challenge to the participants' views of competition and collaboration. As they listen to themselves and hear the group's feedback, the participants contrast their behavior with their own implicit theories and self-perceptions. This creates a discomfort that is the pivotal stimulus for change during the training. We have found that even if people cognitively grasp the principles of collaboration and want to use them, many will still act out a competitive or avoidant orientation without further practice and motivation to change.

Module 2: The Elements of Negotiation

In module 2, the goal is to introduce a framework called the elements of negotiation, that serves as the underlying

grammatical structure of a negotiation. Just as parsing a sentence for verbs, nouns, and adjectives fosters understanding in any language, so too understanding the elements of negotiation fosters analysis of a conflict prior to and during a negotiation. We identify six structural elements: worldview, climate, positions, needs and interests, reframing, and bargaining “chips” and “chops”:

- One’s deeply held beliefs, attitudes, and values comprise a worldview. They are derived from one’s culture, family, and other important groups with which one identifies. Worldview is a central component of identity. It is almost always nonnegotiable, although it can change over time.
- Climate is the mood of the negotiation. It reflects the competitive or collaborative orientation of the parties in the negotiation.
- Positions are the specific demands or requests made by each party as negotiation commences—the party’s preferred solution to the conflict. If someone is competitive in her orientation, she may inflate her position or state it as nonnegotiable. A collaborative approach requires positions that are specific, clear, and honest with respect to negotiability.
- Needs and interests are what each negotiating party is looking to satisfy. If the position is “what you want,” the need is “why you want it.” Collaboration sometimes requires sorting through layers of positions and needs to arrive at a place where both sides’ salient needs can be adequately addressed and met.
- Reframing is a way to refocus the conflict issue on needs, not positions. It is essentially the question, “How can we satisfy the priority needs of the parties to the conflict?”

- “Chips” and “chops” are, respectively, bargaining offers or threats that each side can use to influence the negotiation. Chips are positive need satisfiers that one side proposes so as to meet the needs of the other. They are effective only if perceived as valuable by the other party while also not undermining one’s own interests. Chops are negative need thwarters, such as threats or insults. They may be useful to counter threats or level a power imbalance between the disputants. However, they can encourage competition and undermine the trust needed for collaboration, so we discourage their use.

This shared frame of reference, with its common language, becomes a tool to make clear what the students often know intuitively. They learn to analyze the elements of each conflict presented and use this analysis to prepare for negotiation. A key learning goal is to be able to distinguish needs from positions and reframe conflict from a competitive clash of positions to collaboration based on understanding and acknowledgment of underlying needs and worldviews. The theoretical discussion underlying reframing in chapter 1 of this Handbook constitutes the intellectual context of our emphasis here. The main learning activities are analysis of simple or complex cases to practice recognition of needs, positions, and reframing (see figure 35.2) and use of the elements as a prenegotiation planning tool. We describe an example shortly.




Figure 35.2 Coleman Raider Reframing Formula

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After a minilecture explaining the elements, the trainers lead the group through analysis (using a form similar to figure 35.3 , the negotiation planning form) of a conflict presented in two parts on video. Part 1 shows a heated conflict, and part 2 shows one possible resolution. Using a video to display the conflict grounds the discussion in a specific real-world context. The choice of which case to use is an important design decision and is made with understanding of its suitability for a particular client group. One case, A Community Dispute, has proved useful in many contexts, so we briefly describe it here to illustrate the definitions given earlier.




Figure 35.3 Coleman Raider Negotiation Planning Form: A Community Dialogue

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The mayor of Centerville has called a meeting to address citizen complaints that a factory in the town is emitting powerful toxins that are causing respiratory illness. The

owner of the chemical plant, the town's main employer, is present, as are three members of Concerned Citizens of Centerville, made up of plant workers and community members. The mayor cautions that the cause of the illness is as yet undetermined but announces that the results of a preliminary environmental report require the factory to close for one week to see if it is the source of the problem.

As the video begins, it is not immediately clear whether this conflict is a clash of worldviews or an apparent conflict of interests. Assumptions abound, however, during class discussion. Is the factory owner a "greedy capitalist" unconcerned with the well-being of the town? Are the concerned citizens merely "environmental crazies" out to destroy the factory, as the owner implies? The workshop discussion generated by the ambiguity helps participants distinguish among position-, interest-, and identity-based conflict and to better understand the concept of worldview.

In part 1 of the video, the climate is hostile and competitive. The disputants interrupt, yell, contradict, and accuse one another, as well as make it clear that each side sees the other as unreasonable. The position of the community group is to close the factory immediately. The owner's counterposition is to keep the factory open, and he asserts that his plant is not causing the infections.

Through analysis, the class members come to understand that the community needs health and jobs and that the owner needs to protect the economic viability of his factory and have healthy workers to run it. In addition, all have the need for accurate information about the source of the infections, as well as having their perspective acknowledged and understood. Much common ground is uncovered in what initially appears to some as a worldview clash. The rhetoric of the competitive climate simply makes it difficult to see what calm analysis reveals.

After part 1, the trainers lead the class in forming a reframing question. When they view part 2 of the video, they are able to compare their own reframe with the one used by the mayor: “How can we clear up the source of the symptoms and keep the factory and the economy of this town in good shape?”

In part 1, community members’ chops include the threat to take the environmental report to the local newspapers, thereby undermining the factory owner’s reputation and bottom line. Among the owner’s chops is the implied threat to move the factory to another town, taking jobs with him.

In part 2, after hearing the mayor’s reframing question, the group exchanges chips. At the psychological level, both sides listen to one another as they meet their mutual needs for respect and understanding. On the tangible level, the chips from the worker-and-community side are the workers’ willingness for them all to take paid vacation time during the same week in July and an agreement by the community to consider a tax break if the inspection finds that the factory is not the source of the problem. The factory owner’s chips include his willingness to close the factory for the inspection and to be flexible concerning the workers’ vacation and work scheduling.

After analyzing the video, the participants divide into pairs to continue practicing the skills of identifying positions and needs and forming reframes using a series of small cases. Through repetition, these drills pose the opportunity to try, err, and retry applying cognitive learning until learners thoroughly understand the skill. Mastery may or may not occur during the workshop. We hope that sufficient value and understanding are experienced so that the learning can continue to be practiced and applied in the participants’ lives.

The participants then use a similar format (see figure 35.3) as a planning tool for further conflict simulation. The planning process helps each party not only clarify its own side of the conflict but also begin to understand the other side better. We caution participants that identifying the other's positions, needs, and so on can only reveal party A's assumptions about party B and vice versa and that these assumptions must be tested during the upcoming negotiation. We also ask parties to think of all their chops, and those of the other, in this planning process so they can prepare not to use or react to them negatively, which would nullify the attempt to be collaborative.

Module 3: Communication Behaviors

In an ideal collaborative negotiation, each side thoroughly communicates its perspective and arrives at an understanding of the other side. In reality, the unique and particular worldviews of individuals and groups often make our interactions very complicated. Although two people speak the same language and know each other well, they may feel that they do not really understand one another. Furthermore, conflict can exacerbate misunderstanding. When our buttons are pushed, our ability to communicate can become quite imprecise and problematic.

To develop collaborative skills and enhance understanding of the communication process, we introduce a second frame, which is grounded in a research tool known as behavioral analysis (Rackham, 1993; Situation Management Systems, 1991). We identify five communication behaviors that occur during negotiation:

1. Attacking

Evading

Informing

Opening

Uniting

The mnemonic for these behaviors is the familiar English language vowel series AEIOU. These categories encompass nonverbal as well as verbal communications. We employ only these five types of communication behavior because they amount to an easily learned framework for understanding core communication behavior in conflict.

At the beginning of the module, the trainers present and role-play a two-line interchange. An example of a context-relevant miniskit frequently used with groups of managers is an employee reminding his boss about his upcoming vacation. Each time the interchange is repeated, the boss responds by demonstrating another behavior. The trainers elicit from the group a description of the kind of behavior they are observing. Then the trainers label the behavior:

- Attacking (A) is any type of behavior that the other side perceives as hostile or unfriendly: threatening, insulting, blaming, criticizing without being helpful, patronizing, stereotyping, interrupting, and discounting others' ideas. It also includes nonverbal actions such as using a hostile tone of voice, facial expression, or gesture.
- Evading (E) occurs when one or both parties avoid facing any aspect of the problem. Hostile evasions include ignoring a question, changing the subject, not responding, leaving the scene, or failing to meet. Friendly or positive evasions include postponing difficult topics to deal with simple ones first, conferring with colleagues, and taking time out to think or obtain relevant information.
- Informing (I) is behavior that, directly or indirectly, explains one side's perspective to the other in a

nonattacking way. Information sharing can occur on many relevant levels: needs, feelings, values, positions, or justifications.

- Opening (O) invites the other party to share information. It includes asking questions about the other's position, needs, feelings, and values (nonjudgmentally); listening carefully to what the other is saying; and testing one's understanding by summarizing neutrally what is being said.
- Uniting (U) emphasizes the relationship between the disputants. This behavior sets and maintains the tone necessary for cooperation during the negotiation process. The four types of uniting behavior are (1) building rapport, (2) highlighting common ground, (3) reframing the conflict issues, and (4) linking bargaining chips to expressed needs.

After a presentation of AEIOU, the class returns to the small groups that were formed for the diagnostic case in module 1. The participants listen to the audio (or video) of the case. Together they fill in an AEIOU coding form (see table 35.1 for a summary of what is assessed) by identifying each comment as an attacking, evading, informing, opening, or uniting behavior. Within their groups, each member receives specific feedback on how his or her statements are perceived. Importantly, the type of behavior is identified by its impact on the receiver rather than by the intent of the speaker.

Table 35.1 Coleman Raider AEIOU Coding Sheet (Abridged)

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Negotiating Styles
Attack: threats, hostile tones or gestures, insults, criticizing, patronizing, stereotyping, blaming, challenging, discounting, interrupting, defending
Evade: ignore, change subject, withdraw, postpone, table issue, caucus
Inform: reasons, justifications, positions, requests, needs, underlying positions, feelings
Open: listen quietly, probe, ask questions nonjudgmentally, listen actively, paraphrase, summarize understanding
Unite: ritual sharing, rapport building, establish common ground, reframe, propose solutions, dialogue or brainstorming

Each group has its own insights and, as a result, is often motivated to try new skills after people hear how they themselves sound. They also learn to give safe feedback by focusing on the impact the behavior has on them rather than assuming the intent of the sender. Self-awareness is heightened when a speaker finds that her actions have an unintended effect. This disparity gives her the opportunity to clarify or rectify her message. It also gives her a chance to think about how she generally comes across to others. It is clear from the debriefing of this exercise that the participants learn about the complexity of the communication process and its importance in maintaining a collaborative process.

We believe that for most trainees, this experiential learning is necessary, beyond cognitive understanding, for

behavioral changes to take place. Multiple skills exercises combined with personal feedback motivate learners to produce the effort needed to change conflict behavior habits (Raider, 1995). Learners often describe this part of the course as a life-changing event. But because we know how difficult it is to integrate these skills and change one's behavior, we believe that continued learning requires a supportive postworkshop environment, heightened self-motivation, and follow-up programs wherever possible. Empirical research into the long-term effect these workshops have on participants, in the context of supportive or resistive environments, would be very helpful.

Module 4: Stages of the Negotiation

For life and for training purposes, we think it is useful to have a sense of the general order of an ideal collaborative negotiation. Although there is usually a back-and-forth flow to the negotiation process, it is useful to break it down into stages for training purposes. In module 4 we posit four stages:

1. Ritual sharing
2. Identifying the issues (positions and needs)
3. Prioritizing issues and reframing
4. Problem solving and reaching agreement

Although we present the stages linearly, we acknowledge that unless both parties want to be collaborative and are equally competent in collaborative skills, most real-life negotiations do not follow this simple pattern. However, this is not to say that they cannot.

The minilecture by the trainers starts this segment, using a video of a rehearsed bare-bones negotiation (see Figure

35.4): one in skeletal form that places each element and behavior in its ideal spot within the framework of the four stages.




Figure 35.4 Colman Raider “Bare-Bones” Model

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Ritual sharing involves preliminary and often casual conversation to build rapport, establish common ground, and pick up critical background information (such as the other’s values), which may affect the negotiation. Uniting behavior predominates during this stage.

Identifying the issues has two phases: identifying the positions that frame the conflict and clarifying the needs that drive them. Informing and opening behaviors predominate during this phase, the first being used to tell where you are coming from and the second to understand the other.

Prioritizing issues and reframing has two parts. Prioritization is needed if there is more than one key issue and an order must be established (through a mininegotiation) for manageable problem solving. Reframing invites the parties to engage in creative problem solving around needs. It is characterized by a neutral and inclusive question, such as, “How can we satisfy the needs of A while also satisfying the needs of B?”

Problem solving and reaching agreement, the final stage, are characterized by brainstorming (using the informing, opening, and uniting behaviors) that facilitates fresh, novel solutions to the now shared problem. Humorous and even apparently absurd ideas are encouraged because they increase open-mindedness and often inspire clever solutions. Uniting and opening behaviors are used to diffuse any perceived attacks, highlight common ground, and reiterate the objective: to find mutually satisfying solutions. The negotiators then choose from the brainstormed list those solutions that are feasible and timely and that optimize the satisfaction of each party’s needs and concerns. Success depends in part on maintaining a continued collaborative, positive climate that encourages creativity.

As stated earlier, the trainers present the stages as a linear progression, but real-life negotiations rarely flow so predictably. A good negotiator develops the ability to identify the essence of each stage to diagnose whether the essential tasks embedded within it have been accomplished

and to feel comfortable with the surface disorder. As certain needs are addressed, others may surface. Recognition and processing of all of these needs is necessary for a good and sustainable agreement.

After the stages have been covered, participants practice their own bare-bones negotiation. Trainers explain metaphorically that this is more like a map of the territory than the territory itself. As with maps, we must make a mental leap from a symbolic portrayal to what is seen when navigating the real landscape. The more clearly the underlying structure and process of bare bones are embedded in our thinking, the more effectively we as negotiators can deal with the variations that occur in actuality.

The bare-bones framework is the most prescriptive in our training. Therefore, great caution has to be used by the training team to make sure that examples used to illustrate this module are context relevant in form and substance, so that the model is seen as doable in various cultural contexts. The participants analyze conflict cases taken from their own lives and then present a skeletal and ritualized performance in front of the whole group. Each step is abbreviated, thus revealing whether the role players really understand the essence, or bare bones, of the conflict. The trainer coaches the role players and gives feedback at each point of the process. It is in this way that the role players and other participants begin to internalize all the previously learned material.

Module 5: Culture and Conflict

From its inception, our training model has woven the topic of culture throughout the process of teaching and learning negotiation skills. Our original audiences were made up of managers from multinational organizations eager to learn

how to negotiate across borders. Building on the work of Weiss and Stripp (1985), Hofstede (1980, 1991, 2001), Ting-Toomey (1993, 1999, 2004), and others, we facilitated the trainees' learning through readings, video clips (e.g., Griggs Productions, 1983; Wurzel, 1990, 2002;), and role plays to understand and internalize cultural variables such as high- or low-power distance, high- or low-communication context, individualism or collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and polychronic or monochronic time.

One role-play exercise has been particularly instructive and enjoyable for the participants. The group is divided into groups of four. One pair from the foursome is instructed to create a fictitious cultural ritual based on the Hofstede dimensions. The other pair comes to the role play unaware that they are entering a "new culture" and, as a result, experience a simulated form of culture shock as they interact with the classmates who have taken on different persona. The experience is videotaped and then reviewed by each foursome, with much laughter. The educational point is made that it is ideal to know the rules and norms of another culture and, at a minimum, to avoid negative judgments in order to have a successful negotiation.

Video clips and exercises like this are debriefed by using our filter check model (see figure 35.5). For example, one of the video clips from Going International, Part Two shows a businessman from the United States (Mr. Thompson) waiting for his Mexican counterpart (Sr. Herrera) in an outdoor café in Mexico City. Mr. Thompson reacts negatively to the late arrival of Sr. Herrera (to whom he is trying to make a sale), apparently assuming the lateness is some form of disrespect or power play.




Figure 35.5 Coleman Raider Filter Check Model

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The video captures elegantly and with humor how monochronic and polychronic individuals can misunderstand each other.[1] Sr. Herrera, the polychronic of the two, is late because he is greeting important people along the way. He also does not want to get down to business until he has gotten to know something about the man with whom he is doing business. Mr. Thompson, though, is driven by the task, always looking at his watch and pushing to get the contract signed—so then he can go out and have a good time!

By working through the filter check chart, participants come to see that the misunderstanding displayed is based on cultural assumptions (filters) of the meaning of time,

task, and relationships. Neither way is the right way; they are just different. Of course, it is noted that “when in Rome, do as the Romans do,” and certainly so if you are in a lower power position, as a seller typically is relative to a buyer.

For audiences of educators, we use role-play simulations such as melting pot or salad bowl to surface issues of class, race, and gender. The disputants in this case are two groups: the Black Teachers Caucus (BTC) and the predominantly white school governance committee at an urban high school in New York City. (This case is based on a real conflict that Raider mediated; it is also discussed in the Introduction and chapter 1 of this Handbook.) The BTC demands a black seat on the governance committee, claiming that the student population is predominantly of color. The governance committee rejects this demand for a “race-based” seat, countering that representation should be by academic department, not by racial or ethnic identity group.

One way to use this case is to divide a group of four into sides A and B. In round 1 of the negotiation, each side presents its point of view, while the other side tries hard to listen and paraphrase the underlying needs it is hearing. In round 2, sides A and B switch and repeat the negotiation, following the model of constructive controversy (see chapter 4 in this Handbook). This technique helps not only to move the conflict toward resolution but to get participants to realize how difficult it is to step into the shoes of the other side. This technique might be unworkable if the gap in worldviews is too vast, perhaps due to the participants’ emotional attachment to the issues or their inability to take another’s perspective.

Module 6: Dealing with Anger and Other Emotions

To effectively work with emotions that arise during conflict, a negotiator must have good listening, communication, and problem-solving skills. This section outlines how these skills can be employed to direct emotions into a positive and productive component of the negotiation process. Anger is our main focus because it presents one of the biggest challenges to resolving conflict.

A Philosophy for Dealing with Anger.

The philosophy we present to participants is that if someone blames you, states his position inflexibly, confronts you, or attacks you:

1. Avoid the defend-attack spiral and ethnocentric and egocentric responses. Assume that the other has a perspective different from yours and that you need to find out where he is coming from.
2. 2. Listen actively. Your needs are more likely to be heard by the other if he knows through your active-listening behavior that you have understood his needs.
3. Continue to change the climate from competition to cooperation by acknowledging that there are differing perspectives at play, each with part of the truth.
4. Work with the other as a partner to solve the problem.

To build awareness on this topic, participants read an essay in the training manual covering such topics as the relationship of anger to unmet needs, anger as a secondary response that masks more vulnerable emotions, the attack-defend spiral, and additional destructive and constructive responses. Sometimes in the workshop, participants form groups of four to discuss the essay. Members offer examples from their own lives, sharing situations in which

they themselves were angry or were dealing with another person’s anger.

Skills Practice.

A key exercise we use in building skills in this area is a round-robin, with one side of each negotiation team working competitively and the other collaboratively, and with one side moving from group to group and the other staying put. In the first round, the traveling partners are competitive. This means they can use attacking and evading behaviors to act angry, patronizing, and unfair. They are encouraged to make their attacks personal if possible. The stationary partners take on the role of skilled collaborative negotiators. They work to change the climate by using predominantly opening, and some uniting, behaviors to draw out the needs, feelings, and concerns of the others. This round lasts for ten minutes. The goal of the exercise is not to reach an agreement but simply to build readiness for negotiation by changing the climate. In the second round, all the traveling pairs rotate to the next table. The group reverses roles so that the stationary pair is now competitive and the traveling partners are collaborative. In the final round, the traveling pairs move to a third table, where a new foursome attempts to solve the conflict by having both sides use collaboration.


The whole group debriefs after each section so that the participants learn as they proceed. The rounds are often tape-recorded for review. The trainers guide the discussion with questions: “How did the emotions affect the process?” “Were the negotiators able to draw out emotions, unexpressed perspectives, and underlying needs?” “Were they able to create distance between the other’s position and needs in their paraphrases?” and, “What could they have done better?”

In this exercise, participants experience how difficult it can be to manage another's attacks, emotions, and blaming behavior. Many acquire the insight that people have little control over someone else's responses apart from developing their own collaborative skills. This is when they become "consciously incompetent"—beginning to know what they do not know. We consider this an important learning milestone because handling another's anger is a common motivating concern for participants coming to the workshop. This exercise further motivates them to develop their own skills of listening and "going to the balcony," or rising above the conflict to see it objectively from all perspectives (Ury, 1993).


Module 7: Introduction to Mediation

In the Coleman Raider model, we often introduce a one-hour overview of mediation in our three-day workshop. The longer version teaches mediation skills. Here we briefly discuss the longer program (see figure 35.6).


Stage 1:
Set up the mediation.
1. Set up the room.
2. Deliver an opening statement.



Stage 2:
Identify the issues.
1. Listen to each side, one at a time; probe for their priority underlying needs (*opening*).
2. Reframe (*uniting*).
3. Prioritize the issues.



Stage 3:
Facilitate IOU and problem solving.
1. Help them negotiate directly (*informing, opening,* and *uniting*).
2. Keep reframing (*uniting*).
3. Clear up assumptions (*cultural issues*).
4. Brainstorm alternative solutions (*uniting*).



Stage 4:
Reach agreement.
1. Have disputants confirm their understanding of their future commitments to each other.
2. Write the agreement, if appropriate.
3. Close the mediation.




Figure 35.6 Coleman Raider Meditation Model

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The negotiation model already learned forms the framework for understanding mediation. We might move into the mediation segment of the program by asking participants to create a model for mediation based on what they already know about collaborative negotiation. This task is surprisingly simple as students realize how closely mediation is related to negotiation.

Participants are introduced to four stages of the mediation process (which almost parallel negotiation): (1) setting up

the mediation, (2) identifying the issues, (3) facilitating informing, opening, and uniting (IOU) behaviors, and (4) problem solving and reaching agreement. The vehicles used to practice these stages are skill practice and role playing, the latter constituting the bulk of the activity.

The role plays offer the participants the opportunity to practice everything learned in both the negotiation and mediation segments of the course. Each mediation stage is practiced in trios, rotating the role of mediator. In debriefing, the mediator receives feedback from the trainers and the disputants themselves—how they felt the mediator moved or blocked the process and how specifically the mediator could have helped their role-play character. (For further discussion of mediation, see chapter 34 in this Handbook.) Cases are either furnished by the trainers or elicited from the audience. In addition to small-group mediations, trainers may facilitate the role plays in the center of the room, fishbowl style, with the class watching. Audio- or videotape is often used in various ways and in any segment of the program.

Throughout the program, trainers present numerous videos of experienced mediators, each with a distinctive style. These show differences in pacing, amount of questioning or silence, and a variety of techniques. The message we intend to impart is that there is no one right way to mediate. We present our model like training wheels on a bicycle: as soon as the learner-mediator grasps the process, he can begin to discover how to make it his own.

Relevant topics (such as caucusing, shuttle diplomacy, getting the parties to the table, organizational context, and culture) are discussed at intervals throughout the program. Prepared videos are used wherever available and relevant to elaborate on these topics and enrich the participants' learning.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have sought to give readers a sense of the theoretical underpinnings and pedagogical techniques used in our delivery of a conflict resolution training program. We have enumerated a number of insights, drawn from our years of practice, that inform our training designs. We have summarized the knowledge, skill, and attitude objectives we strive for in conducting the program. Finally, we have described in some detail the typical learning activities used in each module of the program.

We hope that sharing both what we have taught, as well as how we have taught it, will stimulate discussion as well as further research. More collaboration is needed with researchers to scientifically link training methods and content with resultant behaviors, along the lines of Peter Coleman and Ying Ying Lim's pioneering study in 2001. In that study, they used a 360-degree feedback instrument to systematically examine the impact of this negotiation training on participants. One month following completion of the training, supervisors and subordinates reported more constructive outcomes to conflicts, and observers (who knew the participants well) also reported that participants used more uniting and informing behavior. Recently we have developed a conflict resolution 360-degree feedback instrument based on the AEIOU framework (Coleman and Raider, 2010), which could also be a tool that measures training impact in the future (http://cglobal.com/products/aeiou).

POSTSCRIPT

As we have grown as practitioners who have delivered this training over many years, we have come to the conclusion that while this training is very powerful, it is generally

insufficient when it comes to systemic change. When conflict resolution was emerging as a popular topic in the 1980s, training was the intervention of choice for both clients and practitioners. When there was tension, difficulty, or conflict, both practitioners and clients chose conflict resolution training. It was always helpful but not the tool that could ultimately make a systemic impact given its focus on the individual. Human behavior is a function of the person and the environment (Lewin, 1936), and unfortunately training often focuses only on building capacity at the individual and interpersonal levels. As a result, when participants return to work, they may not feel that the climate or context adequately supports them to practice their new awareness and skills. The danger is that participants revert to their old behaviors.

As we and our clients have evolved, so have the types of interventions that we suggest and that our clients allow. We offer three examples to illustrate this evolution. Each example uses the training in different ways: for intact team building, as part of a collaborative inquiry project, and as a component of an organizational mediation with leadership coaching. Future research could compare and contrast the impact these other interventions have in relation to that of traditional training—for example, whether they result in more or less conflict, closer working relationships, or greater organizational performance. Finally, each of the case study examples below is based on interviews with the authors and their colleagues.

Intact Team Building, by Krister Lowe

A regional headquarters of an international organization, located in the Caribbean, was struggling with conflict resulting from a slow leadership succession process. The region consisted of approximately fifty staff members and had been without an official leader for approximately one

year. During that time, numerous divisions emerged among personnel related to the absence of clear direction from the top. The organization engaged me, as a conflict resolution specialist, in the hopes that they could get their house in order before a new leader was selected, which was set to occur in the coming months. The client and I agreed to conduct conflict resolution training, followed by a whole-system meeting, in order to give personnel both the skills and a forum to have constructive dialogue about the state of affairs. Since all staff members located in the regional office participated in the intervention, ranging from senior management to administrative support personnel, we called it an intact team-building initiative.

I split the staff into two groups of approximately twenty-five people each, so that half of the office could continue conducting business, while the other half received training. I then delivered two, two-day conflict resolution trainings back-to-back and brought the entire office together on a fifth, final day. Despite the logistical challenges, working with an intact team enabled me to influence the conflict culture within which the participants operated.

During the first four days of training, I encouraged the entire staff to focus on the individual and interpersonal levels of conflict. By the end of the four days, a climate of collaboration, consultation, and creativity emerged, such that when the fifth day arrived, the participants were primed for a discussion of group norms and culture. The group engaged in an honest and constructive dialogue, something that had been perceived as impossible earlier in the week. The group also engaged in collective group problem solving and convened in subunits to address insights at the team level of analysis. Following the week-long intervention, I provided one-on-one coaching to help resolve remaining disputes. In addition, a number of individuals requested coaching support; they realized they

faced some long-standing intrapersonal conflicts and wanted to initiate a process of individual change.

In conclusion, in contrast to just delivering training, I had the privilege in this intervention of focusing on multiple systemic levels—individual, interpersonal, team, and regional office—all resulting in a shift in the climate and context within which the participants functioned. I witnessed how conflict resolution training for intact groups can create a climate for deeper reflection and systematic learning. The emotional nature inherent in the topic, if managed well, can segue into deeper, more longitudinal interventions that other training topics often do not create.

Collaborative Inquiry Project, by Sandra Hayes

A school approached me, an adult learning and development specialist, to facilitate improvements in teacher pedagogy to enhance student achievement. The client recognized that there might be differences among faculty, including different teacher and administrator perspectives, about how to improve pedagogy and wanted to create some good discussion. The client also wanted to test assumptions about who can achieve and in what context given that most of the educators were members of privileged groups (race, class) in contrast to their students.

We agreed to conduct two collaborative inquiry processes, one for teachers and one for administrators, to begin sharing perspectives on this complex topic. Collaborative inquiry is an innovative approach to action research that enables participants to address questions and challenges that matter to them most. Based on cycles of action and reflection, the process offers a rich opportunity to reflect on issues while providing a space to learn from each other and envision action that will enhance their practice and improve their organization. In this case, both teachers and

administrators were united in their goal of increasing student achievement. However, different, and sometimes strong, perspectives emerged both within and between these two groups. Despite their shared value of teamwork and belief that their successful collaboration was key to increasing student achievement, they struggled to reconcile differences. As is common in many systems, power dynamics inhibited dialogue, and many participants did not feel comfortable exploring or challenging assumptions held by others.

It became clear to me that these participants would benefit from a deeper understanding of collaboration and the expanded vocabulary that conflict resolution training provides. I therefore integrated a half-day session on conflict resolution into the program design. The training helped the participants deepen their level of dialogue by shifting their focus from positions to underlying needs and determining whether those needs were being satisfied or frustrated. Clearly, the half-day training format did not give participants sufficient time to practice their skills as the longer conflict resolution training format does. However, the shorter module did offer participants new insight into the dynamics they were experiencing and increased their ability to reframe situations more positively. They also expressed commitment to fully engage with one another moving forward and not be conflict avoidant, as they had in the past. One final result worth noting was that the short module whet participants' appetite for additional learning, a healthy outcome, particularly for a school.

Organizational Mediation with Leadership Coaching, by Susan Coleman

A regular part of my practice is building common ground with groups and departments that are experiencing conflict. I have done this work in different parts of the

world with various clients, including large universities, health care organizations, the United Nations, and high-tech start-ups. Both my client and I frame the work in different ways depending on the situation. It can be called “mediation,” “retreat facilitation,” “leadership coaching,” or just “consulting.” The presenting problem is also defined differently depending on the situation: it can be “the leader,” “those two employees,” or “a nonperforming team.” Regardless of how the situation presents, my focus is systemic. One key theoretical foundation for my work is negotiation theory and concepts, including the Coleman Raider model.

A few years ago, I did one of these interventions in West Africa with a UN group of about ten people with a mutiny on its hands. The presenting issue was a conflict between the group leader, Fatou (I use fictitious names), an African woman from another country, and the local staff headed by the most senior man, Derick. The client who retained me was Fatou’s supervisor, Pierre. Tension was high when I became involved.

One of the first things I do in these situations is map the actors using the ingredients of the negotiation planning analysis. I send out a confidential questionnaire that asks each party in lay terms for information on their positions, needs and interests, chips/chops, worldview, emotions, and best alternative to a negotiated agreement. Based on their answers, I identify the issues that need to be addressed. The negotiation and conflict lens is a very turbocharged way to get clear about what is actually going on in a system and how I might best support the client.

My work in West Africa was conducted over a five-day period with different processes, all designed to support positive shifts in climate and build common ground:

- An opening interactive group session to help people learn more about each other and convey some key conflict resolution concepts (here, I wore my trainer hat)
- Confidential interviews with all staff to further understand their perspectives (mediator hat) and explore how they might more positively influence the group dynamic (coach hat)
- Daily updates and coaching of Pierre so that, as the most senior leader, he could positively influence the situation (coach and organizational consultant hat)
- A midpoint whole group conversation to help everyone track developments (facilitator and mediator hats)
- Coaching sessions of individual parties as needed, especially Fatou (coaching hat)
- “Mediation” sessions between parties as needed (mediator hat)
- A closing whole-group session in which all parties made public commitments about actions they will take to continue to improve the situation (mediator, facilitator hats)

The mix essentially included negotiation training, mediation of the whole group, mediation of especially conflicted pairs, group facilitation, and consulting to and coaching of the system leadership.

As the work on the ground came to a close, the group expressed deep gratitude for the experience. Awareness had been heightened, important apologies made, misunderstandings rectified, and the air cleared. After leaving West Africa, I continued to coach Fatou long distance for a time and stayed connected with Pierre. Four months later, I conducted a check-in with the whole group, with positive results.

The training described in this chapter is a powerful tool to build good grounding for all sorts of more complex, live interventions. It is probably not, in and of itself, enough to work effectively in the way I did in West Africa, but it is a great place to start.

Note

1 . A person with a polychronic orientation will prioritize relationships over tasks; a person with a monochronic orientation will get tasks done and then focus on the relationship. A monochronic orientation is characterized by tightly controlling time. A polychromic orientation is more loose with time. See Hall (1976) for further discussion of these cultural dimensions.

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[a] We express special thanks to Marc Roennau for preparing the figures for this chapter, which is based on the original article by Ellen Raider, Susan Coleman, and Janet Gerson.

CHAPTER THIRTY-SIX CREATING CONSTRUCTIVE COMMUNICATION THROUGH DIALOGUE

Beth Fisher-Yoshida

Communication is the most important means of interaction between people. It is a critical component of our relationships with others. The quality of our communication is important to our relationships, and this is what creates our social worlds. In destructive conflict situations, the quality of our communication is poor; it destroys our relationships and escalates and spreads conflict, perpetuating this destructive cycle. In order to improve our relationships and change our social worlds from destructive conflict to constructive interactions, we need to transform the nature of the communication we have with others.

This chapter discusses transforming communication to create and sustain peaceful social worlds through better-quality relationships. We will look at the communication we use, specifically the content and process of the communication itself, rather than through communication as a means to an end. The focus is on a dialogic approach to communication, which shifts the direction from unilateral to bilateral and will be addressed at a variety of levels: interpersonal, intergroup, societal, and global. We will look at factors affecting communication, our roles and the dynamics we create, the types of messages being communicated, and the influence of context and culture on our communication. Conflict has an impact on those factors, and these problems will be identified with suggestions for shifting the tone of the communication from destructive conflict to constructive interactions. The

chapter concludes with ideas for sustaining the transformed communication necessary in an environment of constructive communication.

Communication is the process by which we exchange information with others for the purpose of making meaning in our interactions. Making meaning leads to understanding, and as humans we seek to understand because it is a primal instinct that lets us know if we are safe. This understanding derived from making meaning also shapes our subsequent course of action and determines the behaviors we select in response to the other in a particular context. Several elements affect the quality of our communication and influence our meaning making (figure 36.1):




Figure 36.1 Elements of Communication Process

- *Self* and the level of awareness we have about the influences in our lives that shape and frame how we understand the messages of others and how we communicate and interact with others, including the wording, tone, and timing of our messages. It includes

how well we know the values we hold and what is important to us. This also reflects on how well we recognize and manage our emotions. Emotions provide information, and the more self-aware we are, the better we are able to channel the energy from our emotions toward constructive outcomes. This is referred to as emotional intelligence.

- *Other* and how aware we are of what is important to them, how our messages may affect them, and whether this aligns with the intention of our communication. Included here is how we interpret and understand their communication to us to frame it in a way that best aligns with assuming good intentions. There is also connection on an emotional level and more awareness of other means that we are able to use to respond to their expression of emotions in a way that channels their emotional energy toward constructive outcomes. This is referred to as showing empathy.
- *Context* and the role the environment has in affecting our communication with others. This includes what took place before in the relationship and about the topic, the current climate, and other factors that may be affecting the nature and quality of the communication. Levels of safety, trust, comfort, neutrality, and power shape the space of the context and influence the self in interaction with the other. This has an impact on the quality of the relationship in communication and the ability to coconstruct meaning making.
- *Culture* , in which all of this is embedded, influences how we create frames that shape how we interpret the world around us. This includes the lessons we have learned about right and wrong, good and bad, appropriate and inappropriate behavior, and how we should lead socially acceptable lives. There are customs

and rituals we have embodied, which lead us to have expectations and make assumptions about the other and the way we think things should be.

- *Meaning making* takes place in relationships and the quality of the relationship that is affected by the interaction of self, other, context, and cultural influences. The more self and other aware we are, the more conducive the context is for constructive interaction, the deeper our understanding of the role of culture, the more receptive we will be to cooperative means of coconstructing meaning in relationship with the other, and the better able we will be to develop the mind-set and skills to do so.

In the next section, we explore the dialogic approach to communication that affects the elements of the communication process and enables us to transform destructive patterns of communication that lead to conflict to constructive patterns of communication that lead to better relationships.

DIALOGIC APPROACH TO COMMUNICATION

Conflict transformation as a process involves changing the nature of the communication between parties in conflict as they engage in dialogue. This in turn alters the nature of their relationships as they find ways to identify common ground through mutual meaning making. Communication is made and transformed in relationship, and relationship is made and transformed in communication. The term *dialogue* has been used in a number of ways by a number of people, and this naming does not imply shared understanding or process (Pearce and Pearce, 2000). Some of the common themes of the many scholars and

practitioners who comment on dialogue and use a form of it in their practice are that it is about deeply listening to each other, joint inquiry in a shared exploration to cocreate understanding, temporary suspension of assumptions, deepening of connection and relationship about our humanity, and a space or container in which all of these can take place (Cissna and Anderson, 1994; Ellinor and Gerard, 1998; Isaacs, 1999; Pearce and Pearce, 2000).

We can think of dialogue as the means to an end or the end in itself (Pearce and Pearce, 2000). Dialogue can focus on the *relationship* , it can be framed as an *event* , or it can be thought of as a *context* . If we think of dialogue as being about relationship, then it is the process through which better-quality communication is made using certain defined criteria, such as moving from hostility, blame, and antagonism to one of listening, respect, and understanding, being fully present, and entering into I-Thou relationships on a mutual level (Buber, 1996).

Buberian dialogue refers to having dialogic communication. In an I-It relationship, the other person is treated as an object, and there is no regard to that person's humanity, which is more typical in conflict situations. An I-Thou relationship implies a mutual respect for each other's humanity, and with this comes the attributes of respectful and effective communication. To explore this further, Buber believes it is a shift from the I-It communication to an I-Thou relation, and that dialogue is a primary form of relationship. While much of Buber's work centers on the interpersonal dynamics of communication between people, he also comments on the broader context and implications of these interpersonal relationships: "True community does not come into being because people have feelings for each other (though that is required, too), but rather on two accounts: all of them have to stand in a living, reciprocal relationship to a single living center, and they have to stand

in a living, reciprocal relationship to one another" (Buber, 1996, p. 94).

This is profound in the sense that it reinforces the interdependent relationships we have with each other as social beings. This interdependence can evolve in many ways: where our goals are mutually satisfied, none are met, or a mixed bag with some being met and others not (Deutsch, 1982). Each step along the way influences what will next transpire as we build our relationships through this interdependence. We therefore need to foster a certain quality relationship among us and toward a common, overarching goal that is central to our existence. In the case of shifting from a relationship riddled with destructive conflict, the overarching goal is to create a peaceful existence through better-quality interpersonal relationships that is done through better-quality communication. This happens as we increase our awareness of self, other, and context in the process of making meaning that leads to more constructive communication.

A second form of dialogue, such as that noted by Ellinor and Gerard (1998), refers to *having a dialogue:* it is a transformational conversation in which a shift in thinking and action takes place. Here it is viewed as an event. People come together with a specific start and end time to hold this dialogue, and this can be a sequence of dialogues to achieve particular goals. These events can be considered rites of passage in which the old form of communication and relationship comes to an end and a new way of communication and relationship begins. There is an implication here that the quality of the communication has the characteristics of what is implied in Buber's I-Thou relationship, yet the focus is on the event of the interaction as being a dialogue rather than on the relationship. Here is where it is important to recognize the critical role that holding dialogue as an event can have on interrupting

patterns of destructive, negative, or otherwise unbeneficial patterns of communication. The dialogue can be a pivotal turning point in breaking these old patterns to experience a different type of communication. There are turning points in the flow of the conversation and the way the parties interact with one another that make a notable difference and create a new pattern toward more mutually beneficial and respectful communication.

Isaacs (1999) refers to a third type of dialogue as techniques used to create the field or space for the co-inquiry to occur. Here we focus on the conditions creating the atmosphere that allows the event of dialogue to take place with the qualities of an I-Thou relationship. In this view of dialogue, participants, facilitators, and organizers identify the qualities needed to change the dynamics to those of openness, trust, and safety with no fear of retribution, so that those involved can feel more inclined to want to change their communication style and tone. This is a significant shift for those in conflict in which the qualities of trust and safety that lead to openness in communication have been eroded. It requires a deliberate, conscious, and skilled effort to rebuild these relationships through improved lines of communication.

In considering the context as a critical factor in dialogue through the involvement of the community and surrounding environment, we are distributing the responsibility across a broader field. If we focus only on the actual communication, the relationship between self and other, there is potentially a great deal of pressure on the involved parties to make a change. These parties grew up in and were developed in their communities, and it was these very social systems or cultures in which they are embedded that influenced and shaped their points of view, how they communicated with others, and the nature of the relationships they had with those within and outside their

communities. In addition, there is fluidity between people—the context they are in and the broader cultural system in which they live—so that one influences the other. In order to have more respectful and peaceful communication and better-quality relationships, the environment has to be conducive to fostering these qualities and receptive to this change. Sharing the burden of transforming communication through creating a context receptive to this change must also consider the cultural norms that have guided behaviors thus far and will continue to do so.

These three ways of considering dialogue—as a relationship, an event, or a context—overlap with each other in practice. The importance of noting the differences is that this awareness influences how we think about and prepare for dialogues to take place. Do we want to improve the quality of our communication through increased awareness of self and other for our ongoing relationship as the focus with no specific beginning or end in sight? Do we want to target a specific time frame in which to hold a dialogue as a rite of passage to create a new form of relationship with healthy patterns of communication? Or do we want to focus on the context, social conditions, and cultural norms and values that allow this new form of communication and relationship building to occur?

DIALOGUE PROCESSES

To put this into the realm of practice, I provide some examples of cases in which dialogue as a form of communication was used and discuss the impact this had on the relationships of the involved parties and their communities. They will demonstrate how dialogue can act as an agent to transform the quality of the communication so that parties can transform out-of-conflict communication to that of dialogic communication. In this way, they shift the

qualities of their relationships and engage in mutual meaning making, which transforms the meaning they made in their communication when they were in conflict. These examples of different dialogue practices are not meant to represent a comprehensive overview of the field, and they do not claim to be the only or best methods to use. Instead, they can be thought of as good examples of effective practice in the hope that reading about them will foster a better understanding of how they work and why they are effective, so we can apply these approaches to our own work in this area going forward.

Sustained Dialogue

The International Institute for Sustained Dialogue (IISD) was formed in collaboration with the Kettering Foundation. It defines *sustained dialogue* as "a systematic, open-ended political process to transform relationships over time" (www.sustaineddialogue.org). The sustained dialogue (SD) approach focuses on transforming relationships through a five-stage process over a period of several meetings. The process has a specifically defined concept of relationship that includes notions about identity, interests, power, perceptions, and patterns of interaction that plays a critical role in organizing and facilitating how a dialogue process will begin and unfold. The five stages are

1. Deciding to engage to change their relationships
2. Mapping and naming their problems and relationships
3. Probing problems and relationships to identify the underlying dynamics
4. Scenario building to begin the process of envisioning different relationships
5. Acting together to carry out these newly envisioned scenarios and integrate these notions about relationship

in their design and process

SD is referred to as a political process, and the IISD is clear in noting that while governments may broker peace agreements, the citizenry holds the power to transform the political climate through human relationships and this is the arena within which they work. Between relationship, event, and context, the focus is on relationship.

Case Study.

In the early 1990s, Tajikistan gained independence from the Soviet Union. The infrastructure in place was weak, and civil war broke out, causing thousands of deaths and resulting in the installation of an authoritarian regime led by former Communist Party members. In early 1993, two Russian members of the Regional Conflicts Task Force (RCTF, which later evolved into SD) approached about one hundred members of the warring factions to see if they would like to participate in a dialogue created by the task force. Over the course of the following ten years, the group held more than thirty-five dialogue sessions, created two of its own nongovernmental organizations for dialogue and democratic collaboration—Inter-Tajik Dialogue (ITD) and Public Committee for Democratic Processes (PCDP), which grew out of the ITD—and participated in UN-run mediated sessions between 1994 and 1997.

In 2000, the PCDP established a multitrack initiative in Tajikistan to rebuild the broken relationships among the people who had previously been embroiled in civil war and to facilitate the post-UN-mediated peace. It did this by establishing regional dialogues so that the people within each community could live in harmony and stability by rebuilding relationships with one another. For the first two years of these dialogue sessions, they focused on creating a shared understanding of the relationship of religion, state,

and society in Tajikistan. This was important because the voice of the people was heard, healing was allowed to take place, and they had an opportunity to take an active role in shaping how the government in their communities would be run. In addition, these dialogue sessions led to establishing an undergraduate curriculum in conflict resolution and peace building in collaboration with the Ministry of Education. This educational initiative would instill in young adults the mind-set and skills to resolve issues constructively and avoid another outbreak of destructive civil war. They also developed a procedure for holding public dialogues on issues of national importance to involve the citizenry at large.

The initiative of implementing and developing the use of dialogue as a means of communication to build peace through active involvement of the citizenry worked well here. There were leaders in place who had the energy and skills to recognize the importance of this initiative and a population looking for a way to heal and rebuild community. They knew they would continue to live and work together in interdependence and were determined to create relationships that would allow peaceful coexistence. The focus of SD in this case was on building relationship.

World Café

The World Café developed by chance when a group of business and academic leaders who were gathered for a large circle dialogue in a town in northern California were rained out and instead engaged in smaller group dialogues. They randomly and periodically rotated members of each small group to share and build on insights with the other groups. At the end of that morning, they realized they had developed a new method for gathering collective intelligence that fostered more creative and critical strategic thinking. They wanted to capture what it was that

enabled this to take place and through action research in several countries developed the seven design principles of the World Café and the foundational concepts of what they refer to as “conversational leadership” (www.theworldcafe.com/principles.html):

1. *Set the context* so the purpose for bringing the participants together at this time is clear
2. *Create hospitable space* so the participants feel comfortable and safe to openly share their ideas
3. *Explore questions that matter* to the participants so they feel the relevance of this dialogue to their own lives
4. *Encourage everyone’s contribution* and in doing so acknowledge that people may choose to participate in different ways at different points in the process
5. *Connect diverse perspectives* by having people rotate to different tables and connect the distinct conversations
6. *Listen together for insights, patterns, and themes* that emerge, as the success of the World Café is determined by the quality of the listening that participants do
7. *Share collective discoveries* that is done at the end in the “harvest” portion of the process when the individual table conversations are connected to the whole by identifying common themes and patterns

The World Café design and process is most closely related to being a dialogue event rather than focusing on relationships or context.

Case Study.

There are many examples of the ways in which World Café has made a difference in communities, organizations, and the everyday lives of the participants. Even a few examples

demonstrate the breadth of applications for this dialogic event:

- Many people believe that climate change is a growing concern, and they believe people who can do something about it are not paying enough attention to the topic. A World Café was held in Boston, Massachusetts, with its main purpose to strategically develop ways to foreground the conversation on climate change to engage politicians and the public at large to the conversation.
- In the United Kingdom, a World Café entitled "Transforming Conflict" focused on creating innovative ways in which to introduce and develop life skills for children through education.
- In Thailand, over three thousand citizens gathered in conversation about the country's future. Their recommendations were sent to the future political leaders, an especially poignant outcome considering the escalating conflict of political factions in Bangkok.
- In Mexico, the National Fund for Social Enterprise gathered a diverse group of stakeholders to discuss the focus of the social economy in Mexico and the rest of the world. Decisions were made for the next year's agenda, and a follow-up World Café was scheduled to build on the year's initiatives.

By joining diverse voices together to collectively address issues that pertain to them all through a World Café event, more voices are heard and acknowledged and the chances for these recommendations to be implemented and followed are increased. When stakeholders are invited to give voice to their concerns, they have a vested interest in making their recommendations successful. This can be directly linked to more cohesive and peaceful communities.

Public Conversations Project

The Public Conversations Project (PCP) is an organization whose mission is to support individuals, organizations, and communities to be able to have difficult conversations in a respectful and civilized manner. They do this through the use of dialogue, which they define as “a structured conversation or series of conversations, intended to create, deepen and build human relationships and understanding” (www.publicconversations.org/dialogue). In their work with individuals and communities, they train and facilitate members to use qualities of dialogic communication in their conversations. This includes such characteristics of dialogue as listening so that all are mutually heard, speaking respectfully so that all are understood the way they want to be understood, and broadening perspectives to include those of others in addition to one’s own views. PCP focuses mostly on context aspects of dialogue, knowing that the quality of the communication in relationships needs to be paid attention to as well.

Case Study.

PCP works globally. One example of the work it has done to repair war-torn communities and transform the communication and relationships was in Burundi, where it worked with Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa villagers after their violent civil war. PCP worked with a local organization, Community Leadership Center (CLC), to train a cadre of master trainers to design and facilitate dialogues across Burundi. The master trainers, with the guidance of PCP, learned these skills, carried out pilot dialogues with PCP support, and then took the PCP dialogue principles and practices and localized them to their own culture. In its brochure describing the dialogue process it followed, there were a couple of points worth noting (described in the following), especially in the way PCP and CLC prepared the

context for the dialogues to occur (www.publicconversations.org/dialogue/international/burundi).

Relationships and trust were so destroyed during the years of violence that bringing people together in the same space to engage in respectful communication was an immense challenge. The first step of the process was for the participants and facilitators to create communication agreements, in effect ground rules for the dialogue. This important step makes explicit what will and will not be accepted as a practice in their dialogues as a beginning for establishing a safe environment that will support the participants in rebuilding their trust. The next step was that the facilitators began the dialogue by asking opening questions. Here the facilitators play a key role by getting the conversation started and setting the tone by modeling the types of questions and the manner in which they could be asked. Once the conversation began, participants were encouraged to ask their own questions that focused on curiosity and interest. This focused them on the potential sharing and learning that can take place and not having the conversation turn into a blaming exercise. In closing, the facilitators asked questions to bring the session to an end with the agreement on next steps, which could include more dialogue sessions. The way this process unfolded and the role of the facilitator in action weighed this more heavily on creating the conditions for dialogue to take place, locating it more centrally in the context of dialogue.

The communities in Burundi knew that in order to continue living and building a good quality of life, they needed to shift the dynamics that existed among them. Their once thriving communities had deteriorated into bloodshed, and they needed to do something to regain the safety in their environment and rebuild their community. They elected to

learn and practice dialogue as a means to this goal and to localize it so that it was culturally relevant to them.

Other Uses of Dialogue

The three examples present some level of detail of how sustainable dialogue, World Café, and Public Conversations Project used dialogue as relationship, event, and context. Dialogue can have a broader use depending on the purpose and how it is framed. It thus may deepen understanding of the concept and practice of dialogue and appeal to some readers for their own specific purposes. In addition, knowing about them may trigger other ideas as well.

Stewart, Zediker, and Black (2004), in their review of dialogue, identified five core philosophies of dialogue. In these five approaches to dialogue, one particular characteristic stood out as being common to all five, and that was the concept of holism: “For Bohm the ‘implicate order’, for Buber the wholeness of human being, for Bakhtin the whole of speech communicating, for Freire the whole of critical consciousness, and for Gadamer the whole of the relation between the human and his or her world” (p. 26). We can think of this sense of holism as the whole person being engaged, the whole relationship as the focus, the whole interaction and the whole community. In the elements of a communication model, this holism is represented by the integration of self, other, context, and relationship in meaning making, all of which are embedded in the cultural norms and practices that went before and continue. These elements influence the quality of the communication, and altering one element has an effect on all of the other components, as it operates as a dynamic and interactive system.

Yankelovich (1999) indicates that dialogue can be used on a larger scale to bring about social change. Cissna and

Anderson (1994) believe that the ideals of dialogue are difficult to sustain as the standard of communication, but that within any communication, there can be dialogic moments. Dialogue requires a high level of awareness of our assumptions, our style of communication and how we express ourselves, deeper listening skills, and that this increased intensity and focus is challenging to maintain over any extended period of time. Pearce and Pearce (2000) build on Cissna and Anderson's notion of dialogic moments to find a longer stretch of time than a dialogic moment although shorter than a constant norm of communication. They name this an "episode," which is a series of turns in communication in a given interaction with an agreed-to beginning and end (Pearce and Pearce, 2000). In framing communication in episodes, they view the qualities of dialogic communication as sustained within an episode, which can vary depending on the agreed-to number of turns in the conversation.

Bohm (1997) talks about dialogue as being about collectively changing thought processes and creating the space for that to occur. The collective change of thought processes can be linked to Yankelovich's support of dialogue as a means toward social change. Bohm's suggestion about creating the space for dialogue to occur connects the use of dialogue as providing the context for within which it can occur, similar to how the Public Conversations Project case used dialogue.

PROBLEMS IN COMMUNICATION DURING CONFLICT

If we look at the factors affecting communication and assume the worst-case scenarios when these dynamics are in play, we have communication while in conflict. It starts with our not having a developed sense of self-awareness so

that we do not fully understand why the actions of others affect us the way they do. This is in large part because we may not be clear about our underlying needs and interests and may be looking for satisfying our surface demands instead. In addition, this undeveloped self-awareness may lead us to not fully understand the impact our actions have on others. It then continues on to our not having a developed sense of awareness of the other party and not holding a shared understanding of what it means to be in relationship with others in the way they envision it. If the context within which these interactions take place is hostile, it can exacerbate the impact of our communication so that the negative attributes of sides are magnified. This creates, fosters, and supports a culture of destructive conflict. Add to this the eroded trust from these destructive dynamics, and we have a strong case for assuming bad intentions as a filter for interpreting and understanding others' behavior. We will explore the impact of emotions, patterns, framing, and blaming that occur and hamper our communication when we are in conflict.

Emotions

Conflict brings up many emotions, usually negative, and this emotional overlay clouds our thinking, adding to the lack of clarity in our communication and exacerbating the effect of assuming bad intentions. The context may play a role in fueling the conflict if the parties are embedded in a hostile environment that puts them more on the defensive and makes them less willing to engage in open and constructive communication. This makes it easier for the hostilities and conflict to escalate and increasingly more difficult to de-escalate and resolve. The less aware we are of self and other, the easier it is for these dynamics to exist and escalate to control our communication.

Patterns

Our communication style generally becomes habitual and is characterized by specific patterns we use that we may not be aware of. Patterns we default to that do not improve our communication, and in fact may lead to destructive outcomes, may be referred to as unwanted repetitive patterns (URPs). Typically we have reactions that are out of habit and we are not aware of these patterns, resorting to them by default. We may end up in a repetitive rut and wonder why we are not achieving the results we want. If we were aware of these repetitive patterns, the next step would be to want to change them and do something different that is not part of our habit. We may not have alternative methods to use and so may fall back to our default pattern of reacting, knowing full well that even as we are speaking, the communication will not lead to the results we want because it never did in the past. This can lead to frustration and feelings of being stuck in a vicious cycle.

Framing

Our worldview created by our experiences, values, culture, and other influencing factors shapes how we see the world. This way of framing our experiences affects what we pay attention to, how we interpret it, how we understand and make meaning out of it, and how we connect it to what we know and what we believe is important. If we assume bad intentions, as in a relationship in conflict, we will more likely than not frame other people’s comments and actions in a negative light. In addition, we may be prone to interpret their communication and action as having ulterior motives, especially because we probably have a very low level of trust, if any.

Blaming

In destructive conflict situations, we tend to attribute all actions from others as intentionally harmful. If they insist it was not intentional, we will still probably attribute blame to them and fault them for not being more careful, not taking our wants into consideration, and wanting to take revenge against us. Even if we do the same actions to others, we will not attribute the same level of blame to our own behavior because we justify our own actions, even though the other party most likely will attribute blame to us.

* * *

These attitudes and behaviors lead to styles of communication that destroy relationships and are typical of what happens in destructive conflict. In this next section, I offer recommendations on how to improve relationships by shifting our attitudes and behaviors to practice more dialogic communication.

PREVENTING AND OVERCOMING PROBLEMS IN COMMUNICATION

At the beginning of the chapter, I mentioned that we would be looking at communication rather than through it, so that we could focus on the method and process of the communication itself. We explored the basic elements of the communication process and what is needed in self, other, context, culture, and meaning making in relationships to shift from destructive patterns of communication to constructive patterns of better relationships. We reviewed dialogue as an approach to communication that leads to more effective outcomes and improved relationships. In exploring dialogue, we saw that there are three broad categories of how dialogue is framed and approached, including focusing on the relationship, event, or context, yet in practice, the reality is that it tends

to be a blended method. We also noted the broader applications of dialogic communication and some of the effects it may inspire. We explored factors affecting communication and how these factors may erode our communication when in conflict situations.

In order to communicate more effectively and subsequently improve our relationships through coconstructing meaning making with our conversation partner, it is necessary for us to pay more attention to the quality and process of our communication. We need to be more deliberate about what we say and how we say it instead of relying on our default mode, which may lead us into URPs. At the risk of becoming hypersensitive, we need to be more thoughtful in how we phrase what we say, in our word choices, in our timing, in the tone we use, and in anticipating the impact on the other party in conversation with us, the surrounding environment and context, and what we hope to achieve as a follow-up to that exchange.

The characteristics of dialogic communication common across many approaches to dialogue are that it involves listening deeply to each other, cocreating shared understanding through joint inquiry, becoming aware of and suspending assumptions, deepening the connection and strengthening the relationship, and taking place in a space or container that allows this to happen so that we get in touch with the essence of our humanity. The following framing addresses these factors in three stages—preparation, in the moment, and reflection—incorporating the themes listed in factors affecting communication (self, other, relationships, emotions, context, and episode) and problems in communication during conflict (emotions, patterns, framing and blaming) so that we can practice and integrate specific practices into our everyday communication. All of the basic elements of the communication process model are addressed in these three

stages. If we practice this type of dialogic communication, there are increased chances we will prevent some conflicts from occurring, lessen the possibility that conflicts that do occur will escalate, and that we will be able to resolve our conflicts sooner with solutions that are mutually beneficial.

Stage 1: Preparation

There is some preparatory work that we can do to help ourselves become more self-aware and knowledgeable about those with whom we interact. We have experienced so much in life that there are many layers of influencing factors that have shaped who we have become and are becoming. There are endless opportunities for us to know ourselves and other people more deeply through every experience we have.

Self.

Developing stronger self-awareness is a foundational necessity to improving the quality of communication so that conflict is either prevented or managed constructively. Knowing our worldview, values, and what is important to us helps us identify our core needs and interests and how far we are willing to go to stand up for what we believe in and not feel compromised. At the same time, it helps us prioritize our interests so that we have more clarity when we enter into negotiations with others. There are two suggestions for tools that facilitate this exploration into deeper self-awareness. One is the daisy model from coordinated management of meaning (CMM), which provides a format for us to map our social worlds and the influencing factors that have shaped our worldviews (Pearce, Sostrin, and Pearce, 2011). In the center of the daisy model we put our name and then on each petal surrounding the center, we write in key people, events, and circumstances that have had a profound influence on us.

The petals on the surface have a stronger influence at this time, and the petals underneath have a secondary influence. The influencing factors on these petals may change places to be more or less influential depending on the context and relationships with those with whom we are interacting.

A second model is the social identity map that is a Venn diagram, including life context, life choices, and personality attributes (Fisher-Yoshida and Geller, 2009). In the life context circle, we include items such as our cultural background, family status and birth order, socioeconomic status, age, and physical attributes. In the life choices circle, we include educational attainment, career choices, religious practices, and leisure pursuits. In the third circle, personality attributes, are items such as aptitudes, strengths, limitations, and motivations. This information may seem obvious, but we have found that the process of thinking about it, writing it down, and mapping it out brings new insights to people about their core values and the reasons they place importance on certain aspects of their lives. This influences our behavior and the choices we make. The more we understand this, the better able we are to make choices that satisfy our core interests.

Other.

The second part of preparation for dialogue and transforming communication, in addition to knowing ourselves, is to know others with whom we are in relationships. We can use the daisy model and social identity mapping as tools to identify influences on the other party and his or her values, beliefs, and assumptions. We can do this before meeting with this person and then spend time with him or her verifying that what we assumed to be true is accurate or not. This can be done directly by sharing the daisy models and social identity mappings or creating

them together if the relationship and context are conducive to this level of disclosure. If not, then we can use active listening skills so that we are attuned to listening for information that can help clarify and verify whether the assumptions we made about the other party are accurate or need to be modified. Either way, knowing more about the other party's values and beliefs will support us in understanding the other person better and identifying resolutions that will appeal to his or her needs and interests. Using inquiry to gather information and reflecting back what we heard can assure the other party that we hear him or her and acknowledge this person's interests. In order to do this well, we may first need to create the context that allows safety and trust to be built in order to expand the level of disclosure possible.

Cultural Framing.

The influences that develop who we are and how we see the world create frames from which we view, interpret, understand, and make meaning of our worlds. The more we develop our self-awareness and awareness of others, the more apparent these frames are to us and the more aware we can be about the perspectives we are taking and how these may be biasing our understanding of a situation. This in turn will also influence the decisions we make and the actions we take, and the same is true for our conversation partner. Transforming communication so that we transform conflict into constructive relationships requires us to broaden our perspectives so that we can see, interpret, understand, and make meaning from more than one perspective (Fisher-Yoshida, 2009). Using different frames offers us a broader spectrum of possibilities, which can allow us to be more creative in seeking mutually beneficial outcomes to a conflict situation.

Stage 2: In the Moment

Engaging in dialogue with others requires good listening skills to create shared understanding that is mutually beneficial. We are able to do this more effectively once we have a stronger sense of self-awareness and awareness of others because we will have been able to identify our core needs and interests through this exploration. The more developed this awareness is, the better equipped we will be to engage more deeply in empathic listening and clarify our own thoughts and feelings. It might be helpful to frame dialogic encounters as episodes (Pearce and Pearce, 2000) so we can clearly mark the beginning and end of a series of conversation turns within an interaction. This framing of a dialogue as an episode would lend itself to all three approaches to dialogue as building relationship, holding an event, and creating the context. This section addresses the dialogic episode by looking at relationship, context, and dialogic communication.

Relationship.

Dialogic communication builds relationship because within these dialogic episodes, we are engaging in quality communication that improves our mutual understanding. There is an increased chance of feeling heard and acknowledged, and this empathy can go a long way in improving relationship dynamics. In addition, through relationship building, we are able to address dynamics that may stem from power differences to level the playing field within these episodes. These dialogic episodes transform the very nature of our disjointed and destructive communication in conflict to one of mutual benefit and caring as we engage in meaning making in peace.

Context.

We need to create suitable conditions that make it easier for us to be open and receptive to listen to others more deeply and express ourselves in ways we want to be heard (Isaacs, 1999). This space needs to make us feel safe and to have trust in the process and others, which is a leap of faith when we have been in conflict. Having a facilitator (as mentioned in the Public Conversations Project work in Burundi) often provides the security for feeling safe and developing trust as the participants initially rely on the facilitator to be the protector and enforcer of the agreed-on ground rules. This responsibility will eventually be shared by all once their experiences in these dialogic episodes strengthen their relationships and trust.

Dialogic Communication.

The characteristics of dialogue communication include empathic listening in that our focus is on listening to understand. Gathering information through good listening skills helps us identify the core needs, interests, and feelings of the other party with whom we are in communication. Listening as a first step is a way to show caring and can then relax the other party and open him or her up to being more receptive to hearing what we have to say. There is a craft and an art to expressing ourselves constructively. The craft is to phrase our thoughts and feelings in ways that are easier for the other party to hear and accurately reflect what we want to say. The art involves developing sensitivity to timing, framing, pacing, and phrasing that is favorable to a constructive conversation and relationship building.

We all make assumptions, which can be traced back to tactics we use for survival. In dialogue, it is important to temporarily suspend the assumptions we make or look for confirmation to prove them accurate or not. This deepens the connection we make with the other party, which shifts

the tone of our interaction and improves the quality of the relationship. Stringing a series of these dialogic episodes together can dramatically transform the nature of the relationship. New habits and patterns are being formed to replace the URPs that may have characterized the relationship and conflict in the past. There is mutual respect even in disagreement and a desire to honor and stay with the process because of the belief that it will lead to beneficial outcomes.

Stage 3: Reflection

There is much learning opportunity in the space we set aside for reflecting on our interactions and communication. Argyris and Schön (1974) identify reflection-on-action and reflection-in-action as two stages of reflective practice. When we engage in reflect-on-action, it is after a communication is completed, and we look back over what took place, assess the process and outcomes, and examine the status of the relationships as a result of that interaction. When we do this on a regular basis, we build up experience on reflecting and being able to identify best practices that we can then apply to future communication. Reflecting-in-action takes place when we can take a metaview of the situation and detach emotionally from what is happening so that we can look at it with an eye toward assessing the process and whether it is leading us toward desired outcomes. The advantage of reflecting-in-action is that we are better able to redirect our communication in the moment, as it is taking place, and ensure more constructive outcomes. Dialogic communication is what reflective learning can foster. It is a method that needs practice in order for it to become more deeply ingrained in how we operate on a regular basis. This section addresses reflective processes from the perspective of critical reflection and unwanted repetitive patterns.

Critical Reflection.

This can take place whether we are reflecting on action or in action as long as we are identifying our assumptions, beliefs, and perspectives. The act of critically reflecting stimulates us to become more conscious about what we think and feel and how that relates to the decisions we make and the actions we take. This process is a disciplined way to surface hidden assumptions we have about ourselves, other people, our situation, and the context and how this influences the perspective we take (Mezirow, 2000).

One of our challenges is that when we are in the middle of an interaction and if it is a conflict situation, our emotions may cloud our judgment, and we will not be able to engage in reflection-in-action. In reflection-on-action after the interaction has concluded, and our emotions are back to normal, we can have a less biased and emotional view of the situation and may be able to gain insight into the interaction. Another model that might be useful in these situations to use individually or with others is the quadrants-of-reflection chart with guiding questions (Fisher-Yoshida and Geller, 2009). One axis represents the individual and group and the other in-action and on-action. A series of questions within each quadrant can be used to stimulate dialogue and reflection on the process of interaction. This is especially useful as a tool to use in teams to reflect on group process.

Unwanted Repetitive Patterns.

In addition to reflecting on our assumptions, beliefs, and perspectives, we can reflect on the patterns of our communication and whether any URPs are inhibiting us from having more productive communication. These URPs can be interrupted through this focus of consciousness by

looking at our communication rather than through it. First, we need to recognize that our communication has fallen into a pattern of responses that is not benefiting us and may be causing our relationships to deteriorate. We then want to identify ways in which we can interrupt these patterns to change the dynamics for better outcomes.

The more we have developed our self-awareness, the more we will know our core needs and interests. A model that may be useful to detecting URPs is the serpentine model in CMM (Pearce, 2007). This model helps to track the flow of the conversation, and within this flow, the parties take turns in the communication. Each one of these turns can be thought of as a bifurcation point or critical moment (Pearce, 2007). Bifurcation points are choice points we have within any communication episode. Someone says something to us as a first turn in a conversation, and we have a choice as to how to respond in the second turn. How we respond will influence the next choice or third turn our conversation partner makes, and so on. Each response stimulates a response from the other person. Being more deliberate about the choices we make will help direct the communication flow toward a more constructive and desirable outcome, creating new and healthier patterns of communication.

CREATING NEW SOCIAL WORLDS MADE FROM DIALOGIC COMMUNICATION

This chapter has focused on looking at ways to transform communication so that we shift from conflict communication to dialogic communication. This shift changes the quality of our communication, interactions, and relationships, resulting in better social worlds. Why is

this important for sustaining a more constructive environment?

If we think about the communication patterns we create and sustain out of habit, we can use this to our advantage by creating and sustaining healthier patterns of communication, which build healthier relationships. Earlier in the chapter we identified dialogic episodes as being more sustainable than ongoing dialogic communication and more expansive and extensive than dialogic moments. Making these dialogic episodes more of a reality, even if only an intention as a beginning, will support the creation of a different type of interaction from what may have been experienced in the past. It is certainly different from what happens between people in conflict.

Conflict is habitual, and it engages us in URPs that lead us to destructive relationships and deteriorating social worlds. When we have experienced that over a period of time, it becomes tiresome and an energy drain. Turning these patterns upside down so that we create constructive habits and patterns is not only possible but desirable. They will be easier to sustain in small bites. The more we practice and support these dialogic episodes, the more they become a part of who we are, a part of our communities, and the new social worlds we are creating.

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CHAPTER THIRTY-SEVEN
AN EMPIRICALLY BASED APPROACH TO COUPLES' CONFLICT

John Gottman
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In this chapter we summarize the research strategy and major findings from approximately forty years of scientific research and clinical work in the study of couples. The basic initial research question was, "What discriminates relationships that work well, are stable, and reasonably happy from relationships that dissolve or stay together and are unhappy?" The initial hope was that there were indeed differences between successful and unsuccessful couples that were measurable, reliable, stable, and understandable.

The scientific climate in the early 1970s in psychological research suggested that the best measures of personality had been relatively unsuccessful in predicting and understanding individual human behavior, accounting for at most 9 percent of the variance (Mischel, 1968). Therefore, the prevailing climate asked, "What chance did psychology have of understanding relationships that involved two people? Wouldn't one merely square the error and totally fail in predicting and understanding a relationship?" And yet, in hindsight, it is precisely within naturally occurring social organizations that clearly discernible behavioral patterns exist in highly social species. After all, in studying the bee, the Nobel laureate Karl von Frisch discovered the social dance of bees only by observing the hive (von Frisch, 1967). Had he studied only one bee in a laboratory, he would have probably concluded that bees suicidally dash

their brains out on glass trying to get out of the window. This turned out to be as true of families of humans as it is of bees in a hive. John and Julie Gottman then took the research out of the ivory tower, created theory and interventions based on it, studied these, then created the Gottman Institute in 1996 to serve couples and their needs through providing research-based workshops and products, and to train clinicians in their research-based methods worldwide.

STAGE 1: THE DISCOVERY OF RELIABLE PATTERNS OF INTERACTION

Research on married couples began in 1938 with the publication of a classic book by Louis Terman (Terman, Buttenweiser, Ferguson, Johnson, and Wilson, 1938). Terman and his colleagues interviewed couples and gave them questionnaires. Fortunately, decades of excellent sociological research on couples later produced reliable and valid questionnaire measures of marital satisfaction and happiness. Sociologists were interested in various social factors that affected happiness and the longitudinal course of marriages, but they were uninterested in behavior.

When John Gottman began his research in 1972 at Indiana University, he was the first to attempt to discover reliable patterns in the data. In this research with couples, he wanted to see if there were patterns of behavior or sequences of interactions that could discriminate happy from unhappy couples. It was not at all clear that these patterns existed.

Gottman later teamed up with Robert Levenson in 1979. Together they used the newly available technology of home videotape to sample natural interactions—couples talking

about the history of their relationship and how they thought about relationships and their own and their parents' relationships. They also observed couples talking about how their day went (after having been apart for at least eight hours), performing tasks like the NASA moon shot consensus decision-making task (a task that tests decision-making abilities), talking about areas of conflict and trying to resolve them, and so on. It became clear that even highly distressed couples could do very well when they worked together on a standard lab task as long as the task was not personal. For example, on the NASA moon shot task, the couple's score when they worked on the task together exceeded the best individual partner's score regardless of the couple's marital satisfaction. This meant that most couples were not deficient in decision-making skills, regardless of the condition of their marriage. Yet, when some couples, the unhappily married ones, tried to talk about their own conflicts, their conflict resolution skills evaporated into thin air.

However, laboratory tasks that induced real marital conflict artificially, like a task in which each partner got a different version of some other couple's travails and had to decide which partner was more at fault, easily discriminated happy from unhappy couples. But it was not actually a useful task because the task induced conflict in unhappy couples, and positive affects, like laughter, in happy couples. In other words, unhappy couples took the task to heart, but happy couples didn't take the task seriously. Therefore, the task was not ecologically general or clinically useful because it failed to show how happily married couples dealt with their own very real conflicts. So the Gottman lab decided to study real conflicts in both happily and unhappily married couples.

It was clear in this research that conflict was real and present in all couples, regardless of marital happiness.

However, in unhappily married conflict interactions, most conversations began with negative affect, blaming the partner for the problem, while happily married couples were far more likely to begin gently and sometimes, even with positive affects like affection and humor. Also, Gottman and his colleagues quickly discovered that the way the conversation began in the first three minutes, regardless of marital satisfaction, determined how it would continue through the rest of the conversation—in 96 percent of the cases.

Even in happily married couples, Gottman found that there were always some issues that created high levels of negative affect. Happily married couples initiated some discussions the way unhappily married couples did, and when that happened, the same sequences were observed as in unhappily married couples. However, Gottman determined that happily married couples could repair negativity far more easily and could rebound more easily when asked to talk about a positive topic than could unhappily married couples.

For unhappily married couples, conflict often became pervasive in the relationship (transferring to our positive discussion topic), and eventually these couples began avoiding one another, leading parallel lives filled with loneliness. Levenson and Gottman charted this deterioration over time and subsequently it was called the Emotional Distance and Loneliness Cascade.

The Gottman lab discovered stable sequences of interaction in a study of university students (using sequence analysis of Gottman's observational coding system that scored videotapes and was called the couples' interaction scoring system, CISS). Later, a graduate student of Gottmans, Mary Ellen Rubin, repeated the same experiment with couples in rural Indiana for her dissertation. Amazingly, the CISS

numbers in the two studies discriminated happily from unhappily married couples, differing only in the second decimal place. This was the first hint that replication was possible.

In a series of research studies, Gottman developed new observational coding systems with Cliff Notarius, at the time Gottman's student, and the lab applied new methods for analyzing sequences of interaction that were developed by Jim Sackett and Roger Bakeman. These sequences (described in Gottman, Notarius, and Markman, 1979) described the skillful conflict management patterns of happily married couples and how very different they were from the patterns of unhappy couples. One of the first discoveries was that during conflict discussions, the ratio of positive to negative interactions was 5/1 on average for happily married and stable couples and 0.8/1 on average for unhappily married and unstable couples. The laboratory then asked whether all negative interactions were equally corrosive. The answer was no. In particular, four behaviors turned out to be excellent predictors of divorce. Gottman called these "the four horsemen of the apocalypse": criticism (expressing a complaint as a defect in one's partner), defensiveness (counterattacking or acting like an innocent victim), contempt (insult, mockery, disrespect, acting superior), and stonewalling (listener withdrawal, no usual listener verbal or nonverbal responses).

The Gottman lab also began using social exchange theory, an application of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's (1949) book on game theory, which was followed by Thibaut and Kelley (1986) in their classic book, *The Social Psychology of Groups* . To operationalize exchange theory within interactions, Gottman built a device called a "talk table" in which people could interact and also rate after every turn at speech how positive or negative their intentions were and how positive or negative the

impacts of the messages they received were. This was the first application of game theory to couples' interaction, a theme the Gottman lab later returned to in studying trust and commitment. The lab used these methods to define reliable patterns of interaction and thought during conflict. Following a series of peer-reviewed journal articles, Gottman published these results in a series of scientific papers and a book (Gottman, 1979).

In a randomized clinical trial attempting to apply these early findings to change unhappy marriages, the Gottman lab found they could get large changes in marital satisfaction, but that these changes mostly relapsed within a year. However, one of Gottman's students, Howard Markman, applied the same intervention (described in Gottman, Notarius, and Markman, 1979) to newlywed couples and consistently discovered that the same intervention as a preventive measure was effective at preventing marital discord and divorce. This was the first discovery of a general effect: Preventive effects with couples who are not yet unhappy are much larger and more stable than intervention effects with unhappy couples.

STAGE 2: PREDICTION AND THE REPLICATION OF THE PREDICTION

The second stage of the Gottman research program was attempting longitudinal prediction. Prediction in psychology means being able to predict important outcomes from the patterns observed. In repeated studies over time, the patterns and sequences Gottman observed were able to discriminate happy from unhappy couples.

In 1979, another research breakthrough occurred. Robert W. Levenson and John Gottman teamed up to combine the study of emotion with psychophysiological measurement

and a video recall method that gave them rating dial measures of how people felt during conflict. This was the new way of getting talk table numbers. The research also became longitudinal. Few predictions were made in the first study. They were interested in a measure of physiological linkage because a prior study showed that the skin conductance of two nurses was correlated only if they disliked one another. They thought this phenomenon might be linked to negative affect in couples as well. Indeed it was.

They were also amazed that in their first study with thirty couples, they were able to predict the change in marital satisfaction (over a three-year period) almost perfectly using just their physiological measures. Time 1 was their first observation of the couples in their new laboratory, and Time 2 occurred three years later. The correlations between Time 1 and Time 2 were very high, with Time 2 marital satisfaction (from the .70s to the .90s) controlling for Time 1 marital satisfaction. They found that the more physiologically aroused couples were in all channels (heart rate, skin conductance, gross motor activity, and blood velocity), the more their marriages deteriorated in happiness over a three-year period, controlling the initial level of marital satisfaction.

As predicted by exchange theory, the rating dial and observational coding of the couples' interaction also predicted changes in relationship satisfaction. Levenson and Gottman had never seen such large correlations in their data before (correlations ranged from .7 to .9).

In another study, they asked couples to first have an events-of-the-day reunion conversation in which couples talked about the events of their day, then next a conflict discussion, and finally a third conversation about a positive topic. What was surprising was that during the conflict

discussion, the use of a harsh start-up (mostly by women) was predictable by the partner's disinterest or irritability in the events-of-the-day discussion; the responses of men during the events-of-the-day conversation were especially important in this prediction of harsh start-up during conflict. It became clear at that point that to understand conflict, one had to also examine the quality of nonconflict conversations. This finding was the beginning of realizing that the quality of the couple's friendship, especially as maintained (or not maintained) by men, was critical in understanding conflict. Furthermore, the ability to rebound from conflict to the positive conversation became an important marker of the emotion regulation ability of couples. As conflict persists without resolution, apparently it could come to pervade all of a couple's life.

Both Levenson and Gottman had discovered Paul Ekman and Wallace Friesen's facial affect coding system (FACS; Ekman and Rosenberg, 2005) and began working with the Ekman laboratory. Gottman subsequently developed the specific affect coding system (SPAFF), which was an integration of FACS and earlier systems in the Gottman lab. The SPAFF directly coded affect using all channels of communication in a cultural informants system. Gottman also began applying time-series analysis to the analysis of interaction data.

Levenson and Gottman began attempting to replicate observations from the first study. The subsequent studies that they conducted in their two labs (some with colleagues Laura Carstensen, Lynn Katz, Sybil Carrere, and Neil Jacobson in the Gottman lab; Jacobson and Gottman, 2007) eventually spanned the entire life course, from a study following newlyweds through the transition to parenthood to a study of two groups of couples (one in their forties and one in their sixties) in the Levenson lab at University of California, Berkeley, on the transition through retirement.

The study of couples in later life involved following couples for twenty years in Levenson's Berkeley lab.

The Gottman lab at the University of Illinois also studied the linkages between marital interaction, parenting, and children's social development (with Lynn Katz) and later, at the University of Washington, studied these linkages with infants (with Alyson Shapiro). Gottman had begun studying families, at first examining children from age three longitudinally up to age fifteen. He developed the concept of meta-emotion, which is how people feel about emotion in general, specific emotions (like anger), emotional expression, and emotional understanding (Gottman, Katz, and Hooven, 1997). The idea of emotion coaching emerged from that research, a scientific validation of the work of child psychologist Haim Ginott (2003). In a study of newlyweds, Gottman began studying the transition to parenthood and learning how to do research on babies and parents (Gottman, 2004; Gottman and DeClaire, 1998).

Gottman and Levenson discovered that couples interaction had enormous stability over time (about 80 percent stability in conflict discussions separated by three years). They also discovered that most relationship problems (69 percent) never get resolved but are perpetual problems based on personality differences between partners (reported in Gottman, 1999). In seven longitudinal studies, one with violent couples (with Neil Jacobson), the initial findings and predictions replicated. The researchers could predict whether a couple would divorce with an average of over 90 percent accuracy across studies using the ratio of positive to negative SPAFF codes, the four horsemen of the apocalypse (criticism, defensiveness, contempt, and stonewalling), physiology, the rating dial, and an interview they devised called the oral history interview, as coded by Kim Buehlman's coding system. They could also predict whether stable couples would be happy or unhappy using

measures of positive affect during conflict, which Jim Coan and Gottman discovered was used not randomly but to physiologically soothe the partner. They also discovered that men accepting influence from women was predictive of happy and stable marriages. Levenson discovered that humor was physiologically soothing and (with Anna Ruef) that empathy had a physiological substrate in a study using the rating dial.

The Gottman-Levenson labs' prediction of divorce was often misunderstood by laypeople who were not very acquainted with the mathematics of probability. Some critics, for example, claimed that a 90 percent divorce rate was not impressive since the national divorce rate was about 50 percent. They said, "If you guess that everyone will divorce, you will be right half the time." However, the commonly reported 50 percent rate is an estimate of the chance of divorcing over a very long forty-year period. Our divorce predictions were over much shorter time periods, like six years. In six years, for example, seventeen newlywed couples divorced out of 130 newlywed couples, or only 13.1 percent. Guessing that each of these newlywed couples would divorce in 6 years would produce about an 87 percent error rate. A 90 percent correct prediction rate is like blindly picking correctly (by chance alone) 15 out of 17 red balls (the couples who will divorce) in an urn that also contains 113 white balls (the couples who do not divorce). The chance of that correct prediction is about 10^{-13} . Hence, the prediction rate in the Gottman lab was probably not a chance event.

Later, Jacobson and Gottman collaborated on a basic study of domestic violence with four groups of couples: (1) happily married, nonviolent, (2) unhappily married, nonviolent, (3) situationally violent, and (4) characterologically violent (all men). They discovered a typology of battering that has mostly been replicated in the

literature. Later this finding led to a successful treatment for situational domestic violence.

In 1986 Gottman built an apartment laboratory at the University of Washington, in which his student Janice Driver spent a decade (first as a volunteer and then a doctoral student) discovering the basis of friendship and intimacy and its relation to conflict through a bids and turning coding system. With that work, Gottman and Driver discovered how couples create and maintain friendship and intimacy and how turning toward or away from a bid for emotional connection (during nonconflict interaction) was related to behavior during conflict, especially repair. Newlyweds who divorced six years after the wedding had turned toward bids 33 percent of the time, while newlyweds who stayed married six years after the wedding had turned toward bids 86 percent of the time. The idea of the friendship being an “emotional bank account” was verified. Friendship was related to repair of negativity and, also surprisingly, to the quality of sexual intimacy.

When fourteen-year longitudinal data became available, Gottman and Levenson discovered a second dysfunctional pattern, emotional disengagement. It was marked by the absence of both high levels of negative affect and any level of positive affect during conflict (no interest, affection, humor, or empathy). Now they could predict not only if a couple would divorce, but approximately when. Couples who had the four horsemen divorced an average of 5.6 years after the wedding, while emotionally disengaged couples divorced an average of 16.2 years after the wedding. This was a very new finding.

Levenson, Carstensen, and Gottman began studying marriage in later life with two groups of couples in the Bay Area, one in their forties and one in their sixties. Thanks to

Levenson's tenacity, this work has turned out to be a twenty-year longitudinal study that his lab is now finishing.

Levenson and Gottman also conducted a twelve-year study of gay and lesbian couples, work they published in two papers in the *Journal of Homosexuality* (2003). Patterns replicated across the life course, and they replicated for gay and lesbian couples as well.

STAGE 3: THEORY BUILDING, UNDERSTANDING, AND PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION

The third phase of the Gottman research was trying to understand the empirical predictions, and thus building and then testing theory. Testing theory requires clinical interventions. The Gottman lab returned to intervention research seventeen years ago. Together Gottman and his wife, Julie S. Gottman, started by building their Sound Relationship House theory (SRH), which became the basis for the design of clinical interventions for couples in two books: *The Marriage Clinic* (J. M. Gottman, 1999) and *The Marriage Clinic Casebook* (J. S. Gottman, 2004). The Gottmans next established the Gottman Institute in August 1996 in Seattle, Washington. At the same time, as part of theory building, world-class award-winning mathematical biologist James Murray, his students, and Gottman began working on building a mathematical model of relationships, which led eventually to the publication of *The Mathematics of Marriage* (Gottman, Murray, Swanson, Tyson, and Swanson, 2002). The mathematical modeling work completed a dream of von Bertalannfy's (1969) classic work, *General System Theory* , in which he envisioned equations linking parts of interacting systems. Precise mathematical concepts like emotional inertia, influence

functions, and stable steady states replaced imprecise metaphors and vague concepts. The mathematical modeling has now been extended by Paul Peluso to the psychotherapy context. It has generated testable theory.

It is important to note that Gottman Couples Therapy and the Sound Relationship House theory were built on John Gottman et al.'s earlier basic scientific research, and the theory emerged from that basic research. Gottman Couples Therapy therefore should not be considered a school of therapy, but a work in progress that should always be based on solid empiricism. SRH theory is designed to be an initial theory, one that is totally disconfirmable, subject to empirical testing. Its assumptions are clearly spelled out in the Gottmans' level I training for clinicians. Over time, it will no doubt be modified as the therapy is made more effective by empirical self-examination and the work of other investigators.

The Sound Relationship House Theory

Characteristics of long-term, stable relationships are described in the three components in the SRH theory: the friendship and positive affect system, the conflict management system, and the shared meaning system. The first three levels of the SRH describe the friendship-and-positive-affect system. In the Sound Relationship House theory, there are seven key social processes, represented as "levels" in a drawing of a house (figure 37.1). The first three levels are what are called the domain of "friendship and intimacy." The basis of effective repair during conflict, Weiss's "positive sentiment override," is the next level of the house and bridges the first and second domain, effective conflict management. The third domain is the shared meaning system. All three domains are presumed to be mutually causally connected.



Figure 37.1 The Sound Relationship House Theory

Friendship and Intimacy

1. *Build love maps* . The most basic level of friendship, building love maps, refers to feeling known by your partner. It is the road map one creates of one's partner's inner world of thoughts, feelings, hopes, aspirations, dreams, values, and goals. The fundamental processes are asking open-ended questions and remembering the answers. Both superficial knowledge and deeper

knowledge (as well as knowledge of one's partner's erotic world) are part of building love maps.

Share fondness and admiration . This level describes partners' ability to notice and express what they appreciate about each other. Building a culture of respect and appreciation, partners catch their partner doing something right and convey appreciation, respect, and affection both verbally and nonverbally. The fundamental processes are a positive habit of mind that ignores or minimizes the partner's mistakes and instead notices and maximizes what the partner is doing positively for the relationship. It expresses appreciation, fondness, affection, and respect.

Turn toward instead of away . When couples were just hanging out, they actually were often letting their needs be known to one another nonverbally or verbally. They were making bids for emotional connection that might or might not be responded to by their partner. When partners turn toward bids, it is like putting money in their emotional bank account that gets built over time. Conversely, if bids are ignored (turning away) or attacked in response to the bid (turning against), it is like taking money out of the emotional bank account. There is a hierarchy of bidding, from getting one's partner's attention to getting shared humor, empathy, and emotional support.

Sentiment Overrides

1. *The positive perspective* . If the first three levels of the friendship system are working well, couples will be in positive sentiment override. Conversely when the friendship is ailing, they will be in negative sentiment override. This concept was initially proposed by Weiss (1980).

- *Negative sentiment override* . Here the negative sentiments people have about the relationship and their partner override anything positive the partner might do to repair. They are hypervigilant for put-downs and tend not to notice positive events. They tend to distort and see even neutral, sometimes even positive things as negative. They are overly sensitive to negativity.
- *Positive sentiment override* . Here the positive sentiments people have about the relationship and their partner override negative things their partner might do. They do not take negativity personally, merely as evidence that the partner is stressed. They tend to notice negative events but not take them very seriously. They tend to accurately see the positive things the partner is doing and minimize the negative, perhaps even distorting toward the positive, and seeing even negative interactions and gestures as neutral.

Manage Conflict Constructively

1. *Manage conflict* . Relationship conflict is natural, and it has functional, positive aspects. The masters of relationships are gentle toward one another; they start conflict discussions without blame (including preemptive repair), accept influence, self-soothe, repair and de-escalate, use positive affect during conflict to de-escalate physiological arousal (especially humor and affection), and offer and then arrive at compromise.

   Gottman's longitudinal research indicated that only 31 percent of couples' problems are solved over time. Surprisingly, it turned out that 69 percent of the problems were perpetual (they do not get solved), relating to lasting differences in personality,

preferences in lifestyle, and differences in needs. The masters of relationships create a dialogue with these perpetual issues, while the disasters are in gridlock about these perpetual issues (i.e., the conflict keeps recurring with hurt and alienation in which each person feels rejected and misunderstood). This finding reveals the existential nature of most conflicts and has led to the "dreams within conflict" intervention, an existentially based intervention. Compromise seems unthinkable to couples gridlocked on perpetual issues because it seems to each partner that for the sake of peace, they have to give up core aspects of themselves they really value. With the dreams-within-conflict intervention, the existential basis of each person's position is explored, and gridlocked conflict is replaced by self-disclosure and understanding.

Shared Meaning System

1. *Make life dreams come true* . A crucial aspect of any relationship is to create an atmosphere that encourages each person to talk honestly about his or her dreams, values, convictions, and aspirations and to feel that the relationship supports those life dreams.
2. *Create shared meaning* . A relationship is about building a life together—a life that has a sense of shared purpose and meaning. Couples do that in many ways, including creating formal and informal rituals of connection, creating shared goals and life missions, supporting one another's basic roles in life, and agreeing on the meaning of values and symbols. So here we return once again to build love maps, but at a deeper level.

Intervention and Prevention Studies

The Gottmans began the interventions with exploring what happened to a couple when the first baby arrived. They discovered that 67 percent experienced a precipitous decline in relationship satisfaction in the first three years of the infant's life. Gottman's student Alyson Shapiro compared the 33 percent of couples who did not experience this downturn in satisfaction with the 67 percent who did. This is the same method of comparing the masters to the disasters and designing the therapy empirically. They studied the couples from a few months after their wedding and during pregnancy as well and developed the pregnancy oral history interview.

The predictions by Gottman's student Eun Young Nahm of the baby's temperament, made by observing the couple in the last trimester of pregnancy, were impressive. Furthermore, Shapiro's thesis showed that they could predict how much the baby laughed and cried at three months from the way the couple discussed a conflict in their last trimester. Again, based on the differences between the "masters" of relationships and the "disasters" of relationships, the Gottmans designed a couples' workshop and couples' therapy. Based on the comparison of the couples who declined and did not decline in relationship satisfaction after the baby, they designed the Bringing Baby Home (BBH) workshop. The ten-hour BBH workshop had four goals: (1) keeping fathers involved with the baby, (2) teaching constructive conflict management skills, (3) maintaining intimacy and romance between parents, and (4) teaching parents about how babies say "yes" and "no" during play. Then they performed a randomized clinical trial study of the workshop with long-term follow-up. BBH proved to be highly effective. It has now been taught to one thousand birth educators from twenty-four countries, and its successful effects have been replicated in Australia and Iceland.

Next, the Gottmans created an intervention to strengthen parenting called “Emotion-Coaching” (described in Gottman and DeClaire’s, 1998). That intervention has been evaluated and found to be effective in three randomized clinical trials by Australian psychologist Sophie Havighurst and in a study in South Korea led by certified Gottman therapist Christina Choi in two orphanages in Seoul and in Busan. Emotion coaching is now being taught to teachers throughout South Korea, and in several other countries as well.

Third, comparisons of the “masters and disasters of relationships” and analyses across the Gottmans’ studies have led to what has come to be called “Gottman Couples Therapy.” The Gottmans also extended their work to lower-income unmarried couples who had a new baby in a program called Loving Couples Loving Children (LCLC). This intervention uses a facilitated couples’ group format in which couples’ groups meet for twenty-one two-hour sessions. They begin with brief talk show segments. The segments show couples talking with Julie Gottman about a particular issue, like avoiding violent quarrels. They are designed to initiate group self-disclosure by showing couples similar to the ones in the groups talking openly and honestly about the topic at hand. The LCLC intervention was evaluated by the policy group, Mathematica Policy Research in a randomized clinical trial with thirty-five hundred lower-income unmarried couples with a new baby, and effectiveness was demonstrated, especially with African American couples.

Fourth, the Gottmans modified LCLC into the Couples Together Against Violence (CTAV) curriculum to treat situational domestic violence. In that intervention study (also conducted with Mathematica Policy Research) the same couples’ group approach was used with four added modules and the use of the Heart Math “emwave”

biofeedback device before every interaction exercise in the group. The emwave is a small, hand-held biofeedback device that teaches people how to self-soothe by guiding them to breathe slowly and focus their attention on a positive thought. Before couples did the exercise of a particular module, they first had to both be in “the green zone” (a calm state) obtained by moving a light on the device from red to blue to green as they self-soothed. The Gottman Relationship Research Institute completed a randomized clinical trial study with an eighteen-month follow-up with a group of situationally violent couples. The CTAV program has been shown to be effective, and these effects last.

Fifth, in collaboration with Julia Babcock (a former Gottman student, now professor at the University of Houston), an initial randomized clinical trial study was performed with characterologically violent married men. Babcock used brief audio training tapes that the Gottmans developed to modify the conflict interaction of these violent men with their wives, obtaining significant changes in interaction and in the satisfaction of wives with the nature of the interaction following treatment. This research is at the beginning phase.

Trust and Betrayal Theory

More recently theory building has been concerned with returning to earlier work applying game theory in a new way toward an understanding of how couples build trust and loyalty versus erode trust and create betrayal. New metrics for trust and betrayal have been created and validated by Gottman and has led to two books, Gottman’s *The Science of Trust* and Gottman and Silver’s *What Makes Love Last?* In the near future, with Paul Peluso, a randomized clinical trial study is planned for couples trying to heal after an extramarital affair. This work on trust and

betrayal dovetails and combines with Caryl Rusbult's thirty-year research work on trust and commitment.

Trust and loyalty are systematically built by couples through a process called emotional attunement—turning toward one's partner's negative affect and listening with empathy. Loyalty is systematically built by cherishing the partner's positive qualities and minimizing the partner's negative qualities. Loyalty nurtures gratitude for what one has. Trust is eroded by turning away from, dismissing, or disapproving of the partner's negativity. Betrayal is systematically built by minimizing the partner's positive qualities and maximizing the partner's negative qualities. Betrayal nurtures resentment for what is missing.

The key variable is one that Caryl Rusbult measured and Thibaut and Kelley (1986) studied systematically, in which the comparison level for alternative relationships is central. When the variable is characteristically negative, a partner is negatively valuing a behavior exchange and thinking that he or she can do better in a real or imagined alternative relationship. When it is characteristically positive, a partner is positively valuing a behavior exchange and thinking that he or she is lucky to be in this relationship and can do no better in any real or imagined alternative relationship.

SUMMARY OF EFFECTIVENESS EVIDENCE FOR INTERVENTION AND PREVENTION

It is reasonable to ask what is the current status of evidence for the effectiveness of Gottman couples' interventions. Here is the current status.

Proximal Change Experiments

Gottman suggested that a couples' therapy program could be built empirically by performing a series of proximal change studies. In these studies, the goal is smaller than that of couples' therapy. The proximal goal is only to change specific aspects of a couple's relationship, for example, how they begin a conflict discussion, and then examine the effect of that intervention on the second of two conflict discussions. These proximal change studies were examined in a study with Kim Ryan (unpublished) and a dissertation with Amber Tabares (unpublished).

Randomized Clinical Trial of Workshops and Gottman Method Couples' Therapy

In a randomized clinical trial that became Kim Ryan's dissertation, a one-day workshop on building friendship, a one-day workshop on conflict regulation, a two-day workshop combining both, called The Art and Science of Love (ASL), and a group that added nine sessions of Gottman Couples Therapy were compared with a one-year follow up. Effectiveness was demonstrated, with the greatest one-year effectiveness and least relapse for the combined two-day workshop with therapy. An unpublished report is available from the Gottman.com website. A paper with Julia Babcock (in press) is under editorial revision with the *Journal of Family Therapy* .

Bringing Baby Home

A randomized clinical trial with the Bringing Baby Home workshop compared to a control group showed powerful effects in reversing the drop in marital satisfaction, reducing postpartum depression, reducing interparental hostility, improving the parents' interaction with the baby, and improving the baby's emotional and language development. The paper is published with Alyson Shapiro (2005). That intervention is being taught to birth educators

by the Relationship Research Institute (bbhonline.org). It has also had large effects in hospitals in Australia.

Loving Couples Loving Children

This program was developed for lower-income couples who probably did not see school as a positive experience. It is based on a twenty-one-session couples' group curriculum with talk show segments initiating self-disclosure and skill building. It has been evaluated by Mathematica in a randomized clinical trial with thirty-five hundred fragile-family unmarried couples, all expecting a baby. (Information, training, and materials are found at lclconline.org .)

Couples Together Against Violence

In a randomized clinical trial completed at the Relationship Research Institute, a couples' group intervention for situational domestic violence has demonstrated long-term effectiveness. (Information, materials, and training are found at rrinstitute.com .)

Emotion Coaching with Children.

The work Gottman and Katz have done in the area of meta-emotion (see the book *Meta-emotion* with Lynn Katz and Carole Hooven, training DVDs available from the Talaris Research Institute and the Gottman.com website, the *What Am I Feeling?* book, and *Raising and Emotionally Intelligent Child* with Joan DeClaire) has borne fruit in a highly effective intervention for parents with their children. A randomized clinical trial conducted by Australian psychologist Sophie Havighurst found emotion coaching to be highly effective.

The Gottmans' Conflict Blueprints

In Gottman method therapy, three blueprints are necessary to help couples cope constructively with conflict. The first blueprint, the Gottman-Rapoport blueprint, replaces the old Guerney “active listening” approach to conflict (Guerney, 2005). A blueprint is a guide for changing the nature of conflict discussions so that they are more constructive and less divorce prone.

Gottman-Rapoport Conflict Blueprint.

In the Gottman-Rapoport blueprint, partners take turns as speaker and listener, and each partner is equipped with a clipboard and pen. There are bullet points (requirements) for both the speaker and the listener. The reason for also regulating the behavior of the speaker is the discovery that even in happy marriages, the same dysfunctional sequences emerge if conflict begins with attack.

There are two steps in this blueprint, understanding and compromise. In the understanding step, Rapoport’s principle is used: postpone persuasion and problem solving until each person can state the partner’s position to the partner’s satisfaction. The speaker needs to speak without attack or blame, use I-statements to talk about feelings about a specific situation, and express only very specific and explicit positive needs, that is, what one needs rather than what one does not need. The listener takes notes, postpones his or her own agenda, summarizes, and validates.

In part 2 the couple uses what we call the two-oval method to reach compromise. In this method each partner specifies what his or her minimal core need is (i.e., what he or she cannot compromise on) and also specifies what he or she is flexible about. Then proposals for compromise that honor both core needs are entertained.

The role of physiological flooding (versus self-soothing) is stressed in this blueprint, and pulse oximeters are used as a measure of peripheral autonomic arousal. The Heart Math emwave biofeedback device is prescribed for people who are physiologically dysregulated by anxiety or anger. The Gottman-Rapoport conflict blueprint differs from active listening in that the behavior of both the speaker and the listener are regulated.

Aftermath of a Fight or a Regrettable Incident.

In this blueprint, a past fight, emotional injury, or unfortunate incident is discussed following a five-step process:

1. Listing what each person felt without explaining why by reading aloud the feelings one had from a list of fifty-three feelings
2. Taking turns as listener and speaker describing each subjective reality about what happened and what each person needed during the incident
3. Describing the triggers that escalated the conflict for each person and the history of these triggers in one's past
4. Taking responsibility for one's role in the incident and apologizing
5. Constructive plans for dealing with this kind of incident should it arise again

Dreams-within-Conflict Blueprint.

This blueprint is designed to deal with perpetual problems that are not in a quiescent state we call dialogue but instead are gridlocked. In the dreams-within-conflict blueprint, designed for perpetual issues that are gridlocked without compromise, each person takes turns answering a

set of six questions designed to provide understanding of the existential meaning of each person's position. For example, a conflict about money may really be a conflict about what each person dreams about with respect to money. For one partner it may represent security, whereas for the other it may represent freedom or adventure. In our experience, 86 percent of couples move from gridlock to dialogue in this exercise within the ASL workshop.

The Need for Follow Through: Deepening the Gottman Method Workshop

A two-day workshop, The Art and Science of Love (ASL), plus couples' therapy have been shown to be effective in improving marital satisfaction and reducing destructive conflict, and these effects last at least a year. However, a substantial minority of couples take the ASL and use the material subsequent to the ASL, and yet find they could benefit from additional support and practice. With that in mind, A.G. and M.W., both certified Gottman therapists and trainers, designed an additional two-day program, Deepening the Gottman Method workshop, that took the work of the ASL and expanded it into new approaches to strengthen the skills taught. The purpose is to help couples integrate and absorb the skills learned in the ASL, books, DVDs, audio, and CDs from the Gottman Institute.

One of the major components of Gottman's research, the ASL and the two-day Deepening the Gottman Method workshop, is to assist couples in resolving their conflicts. The major steps are to help them learn to listen to one another more clearly, help them learn to not move on in the conversation for resolution until they each understand the other's position, and help them become better friends and establish a more positive regard for one another.

The Deepening the Gottman Method workshop follows the model of the Sound Relationship House theory. The first exercises are designed to practice deeper understanding of each other on various issues and practice the speaker-listener model. Admiration and respect are emphasized. Turning toward rather than away from bids for emotional connection is a necessary ingredient. The workshop leaders present information and tools on speaking clearly about what participants are thinking, feeling, and wanting and how to listen. The leaders then explore the four horsemen of the apocalypse in depth with various exercises, so the partners can recognize how the four horsemen show up in themselves. Demonstrations follow that help couples to recognize when they are flooded. Additional opportunities for self-soothing are provided at several times during each day, so that couples can integrate this rhythm into their patterns with each other.

Workshop leaders also provide a role-play demonstration of the aftermath of a fight or regrettable incident, and then give the couples forty-five minutes to practice this skill. The skill involves a five-step process: (1) listing feelings, (2) presenting perceptions of what happened with the listener summarizing and validating the speaker, (3) identifying triggers that escalated the fight and telling the story of why these are triggers, (4) taking responsibility for one's part in the fight, and (5) constructive solutions. Couples are also given a chance to practice a shortened version of the aftermath of a fight so that they can use it when their time is limited. A DVD created by the Gottman Institute demonstrates the aftermath of a fight intervention. With multiple opportunities to both observe and practice this intervention during the workshop, it is learned well, since one of the goals of the workshop is to be able to integrate the skills and take them home.

The main focus of several hours of the workshop is the dreams-within-conflict concept, a major tool in conflict resolution. All the main points about handling conflict are reviewed before the conflict conversation: softened start-up emphasizing the importance of expressing feelings, thoughts, and desires without criticism or contempt; the importance of repair early and often; and a quick review of the four horsemen. Couples are then asked to choose an ongoing perpetual problem that both are willing to discuss.

One of the difficulties observed is that couples often have trouble letting go of their own agenda when they are in the listening mode. The example we use that couples have said is effective for them is as follows. To demonstrate how to listen better, a diagrammed circle is presented. On the inside of the circle is a list of words describing the facts, truth, and reality. A stick figure is then drawn on each side of the circle to represent that each person has his or her own view of the truth, the facts, and the reality of the perpetual problem. Arrows are drawn from each stick figure to the other figure's list of words, demonstrating that empathy takes giving up one's own point of view, temporarily, in order to grasp the other's point of view. The presenters briefly role-play this concept by looking at each other and describing what each sees, which are different parts of the room. Both views are obviously correct, although different. The leaders teach that every partner has a unique history, culture, agenda, and experience, and understanding those of the other partner becomes essential before proceeding any further. Understanding before compromise or finding a solution is stressed.

There is a period of time for each partner to discuss his or her point of view. Listening carefully is stressed. Questions are given for the listener to ask in order to help the speaker go more deeply into his or her point of view, feelings, and history on the topic. The listener is encouraged to give

adequate feedback so the speaker knows he or she is understood and not misunderstood. Then the partners switch roles. After both have understood the other's point of view fully, the partners work on compromise using tools taught in the ASL workshop.

The workshop concludes with an affirmations exercise. The intention is to provide the experience of expressing positive regard even in the space of working through difficult conflict and strengthening couples' friendship.

The following is an example of how a couple was helped by this workshop: The couple needed assistance in recovering from an affair. The husband was forty-two years old, the wife twenty-seven; they had two children. He was a professional, working full time, and she was a stay-at-home mom. Some months prior to coming into session, he had had an affair. Convinced that he might do it again, she decided that the only choice was a divorce. He was distraught and was certain that the maintenance of the marriage would be the optimum thing for them as individuals, as a couple, and as parents. She finally agreed to work on the relationship under the condition that they meet weekly with a couples' therapist. They both wanted to understand why he engaged in that behavior.

They began couples' therapy. They also decided very quickly to attend the Art and Science of Love workshop and explored the effects of the affair using the tools and exercises presented there. They also decided to continue their repair by attending the Deepening the Gottman Method workshop. Within the context of the workshop, the couple continued to explore the emotional distress that the affair had on both of them. Each followed the clear instruction repeated often from the presenters—that listening and understanding the other was primary in handling their differences. At each step with each exercise

presented on the Sound Relationship House model, they addressed the affair. With time, it was possible to discuss their sexual relationship. Each partner was able to practice listening and understanding, even on this difficult issue. Each also practiced editing out the four horsemen and doing repair as quickly as they were aware repair was needed. The listener was focused on understanding the speaker, knowing the listener would have an opportunity to be the speaker. Both understood that convincing the other and arguing on their own behalf was not effective.

With these understandings, practiced in sessions with their counselor, practiced in the ASL, and practiced in the Deepening workshop many times, they were able to speak clearly and with respect about their sexual relationship. They realized that their sexual relationship had felt incomplete and unsatisfactory for each of them, but neither had been willing to discuss that with the other. In the course of this healing and rebuilding of trust, they understood that using the communication tools they had learned was essential to their success.

This couple has now learned to stop their communication when they are not feeling heard or understood. Each can use a repair to say, “Stop; let’s start over.” There is commitment that the listener will try to understand the speaker without imposing his or her own misinterpretations on what is being said. They are practicing how to suspend judgment and deepen understanding rather than reflexively reacting to what the other is saying. They are also working on knowing when either partner is flooded and taking a break before continuing their conversation.

Through the workshop, the couple has reestablished their emotional relationship and moved toward rebuilding trust. They also understand that the affair and its consequences will probably resurface over the ensuing years and are

prepared to continue to work through any of the hurt that might be triggered. What has made the difference is their ability to listen fully to one another when the related matters surface.

In another example, a couple who had been to the ASL came to the workshop. They had learned many tools and new ways to think about themselves and their relationship and had practiced many times, including looking over the manual from the ASL together. An event happened in their lives that caused each of them to forget their new learnings and experiences. She went into criticism and contempt; he used defensiveness and then stonewalling. That was the condition in which they came to the workshop. In other words, they were not talking to each other. Both said they were tired of what was happening and were not sure they would stay together. They had already worked diligently on their relationship and it wasn't working. Both were obviously distressed.

The couples seemed to have some trust and hope in the process of the workshop, because they were very present as information was being shared. However, although they were involved with the process, they were not involved with each other. They were willing to do the first exercise related to love maps, which was to choose an area of their lives not related to their relationship to discuss, such as health or friends. They seemed distant and disconnected but willing to participate. Next, they were able to practice the speaker-listener model because they were familiar with it and the presenters' instructions were specific and repeated often.

This couple continued to participate with each of the next sections, paying close attention during the present related exercises. In the afternoon, the four horsemen were presented in detail with questionnaires given to each

person so each can look closely at his or her own behavior and help identify their own tendencies toward criticism, defensiveness, contempt, and stonewalling. The wife in this couple realized that she had been extremely critical and contemptuous of her husband. She was able to say to one of the staff assistants helping them that she now realized that under stress, she did not know how to say anything to her husband that was not critical and contemptuous: “I don’t know how not to be contemptuous when he does something wrong. All the things he has done wrong lately and forever come rushing into my head. Then I want to tell him what a jerk he has been and is.” That was a big opening experience for her. The Gottman-trained assistant helped her see that when she was under stress, she moved quickly into the negative perspective and that’s when the list of everything her partner had done wrong came out. She was reminded that when this happens, at these times she was probably flooded and needed to self-soothe, and then examine what just happened that warranted repair, and to then voice her needs without criticism and contempt. Now she was able to apologize to her husband.

Meanwhile, the husband realized that when he was criticized even slightly, he became defensive and stonewalled his wife right away, which caused her to become more critical and then contemptuous. He understood the effect of his stonewalling on his wife and apologized to her. They were still distant, but the healing had begun. Each of these steps was part of the repair this couple needed in order to begin to reconnect with each other. In the aftermath of a fight exercise, both partners were able to state their own feelings and be listened to. They discussed what happened for each of them when they felt compelled to stonewall one another. As they talked to each other, the distance between them began to melt.

On the second day of the workshop, the couple was finally able to listen to one another in depth using the dreams-within-conflict exercise. Both spoke clearly about their dreams, their distress, and what they were hoping for. Each felt listened to by the other. By the end of the second practice session, they were holding hands and looking at each other eye to eye, which they had avoided until that point. By lunchtime, they were laughing with each other. They proceeded to do the other exercises in the afternoon and at the end of the day were committed to their relationship and each other. Both had been able to recognize, own, and apologize for their part in the disruption of the relationship. They recognized that when their emotions were triggered, the best course was to first get clear on what they were thinking, feeling, and needing and then communicate these with each other in the speaker-listener format, editing out the four horsemen. If they got into a fight, they could practice the aftermath of a fight and repair the relationship. They no longer felt hopeless, powerless, nor distressed. Like all participants, this couple took home a box that contained all the tools they had learned in the workshop, with instructions to discuss their favorites with one another.

Quantitative study has not yet been conducted on the effect of the Deepening workshop. However, anecdotally many couples have reported that practicing the speaker-listener dreams-within-conflict exercise has transformed their relationship. They have replaced blame, judgment, and distance with understanding, compassion, and respect for one another. They have been able to deepen their love maps and to stay connected with one another, verbally and nonverbally expressing admiration and respect for one another. They have been able to recognize when they are flooded, and to then take a break and self-soothe, using a smorgasbord of ways to self-soothe that works for each of

them. They can practice repair, early and often, and get back on track in their communication. They also practice the aftermath of a fight when needed, long form or short form, and appreciate that tool as well.

In summary, therapists sometimes believe conflict is the enemy of long and happy relationships. It is not. Conflict in couples is common, normal, and necessary. It highlights differences between individual partners and provides a pathway to understanding that can deepen intimacy. The key is how conflict is managed. As the research reveals, conflict conducted with criticism, contempt, defensiveness, stonewalling, and blame is destructive. Conflict expressed through personal self-disclosure, clear articulation of needs, awareness of each partner's viewpoints, and willingness to compromise builds the scaffolding for interpersonal safety, friendship, and connection—admirable goals for all relationships.

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CHAPTER THIRTY-EIGHT
MANAGING CONFLICT THROUGH LARGE GROUP METHODS

Barbara Benedict Bunker
Susan W. Coleman

This chapter begins in practice and works backward toward the theoretical question: Are there situations where managing conflict is enough, that is, in which our socialized desire for conflict resolution may be more than is really needed for joint action?

We live in a world in which our environment is continuously changing. Organizations and communities are constantly dealing with new developments and pressures. A predictable and stable world surrounding organizations and communities is a luxury we used to take for granted and no longer exists. In the United States, we are also living in communities and in organizations at work in which our diversity and our awareness of our differences in values, ethnicity, and religion are increasing. Learning to manage these differences is becoming ever more important. This new situation requires organizations that are far more flexible and responsive than those in our past. It requires communities to develop ways of gathering people for input and planning immediately, not six months hence. It requires methods that can acknowledge and deal with differences, not suppress them in the service of homogeneity.

Practitioners of organization development (OD) who consult with organizations and communities have developed large group methods of working with the whole system in large groups. These remarkable methods allow groups ranging in size from fifty to several thousand to gather and work together. Barbara Bunker and Billie Alban have been

studying these methods since the early 1990s. Their book, *Large Group Interventions: Engaging the Whole System for Rapid Change* (1997), is a conceptual overview of twelve major methods, what underlies their effectiveness, and how they work. They edited a special issue of the *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science* in 2005 that presented new trends and developments in the use of these methods. Their *Handbook of Large Group Methods* (2006) updates their first text and presents detailed cases that demonstrate the contemporary reach and use of these methods.

In this chapter, the first three sections are an overview of the three types of methods now in use: methods for creating the future, methods of work design, and methods for discussion and decision making. In each section, we describe the methods and then speculate about the processes that allow conflict to be managed and sometimes resolved in these events. Then we turn to the recent innovations of Coleman and others using these methods in peace-building and legislative processes. Finally, we review the underlying principles that make these methods effective in dealing with differences.

WHAT ARE LARGE GROUP INTERVENTION METHODS?

These methods are used to create systemic change such as a new strategic direction for a business, the redesign of work in order to be more productive, or the resolution of some community- or systemwide problem. In contrast to older methods where decisions were made by an executive group at the top of the business or in the mayor’s office, these methods gather those who are affected by the decision or actions to participate in the discussion and decision making. In business organizations, this might include employees, customers, suppliers, even competitors.

In school districts, teachers, administrators, and board members might be joined by students, parents, and community representatives. In communities, agencies, schools, churches, police, housing areas, and local and state government might all be present. Depending on the nature of the issue, the question is asked: “Who is affected by this decision or action? Who has a stake in the outcome?” The idea is to get the whole system into the room with all of the stakeholders so that a new kind of dialogue about the situation they face can take place. The size of the group assembled is determined by the critical mass of people needed to bring about real change and is constrained by limitations of budget and available meeting space.

Why bring together so many people? Why not let the decision makers do their jobs and make the decisions? This question leads us to the second major defining assumption of large group methods. The assumption is that when people have an opportunity to participate in shaping their future, they are more likely to sustain the change; in other words, people support what they help to create. These are very participative events: people express their views, listen to others, have voice, and are heard. They do not necessarily make every decision, but they have the opportunity to influence others and the decisions.

Stakeholders in communities and organizations bring knowledge, values, and experience to these events. Many of the decisions that face us today are enormously complex and need the best thinking and experience of all those involved, not just a few. Executives who participate in large group events for the first time are often moved by the amazing variety of talent and capacity in their organizations. They often make remarks like, “I had no idea how great and how talented the people in this organization are! It has been a revelation to me!”

Underlying these methods is an assumption that democratic processes are more effective for moving forward in a united direction than hierarchical or bureaucratic processes. This assumption closely matches Deutsch's ideas about the values underlying collaboration and cooperation. (See chapter 1.)

THREE TYPES OF LARGE GROUP METHODS

A useful way to organize these methods is by the outcomes that they produce. A brief description of each type with an anecdote that illustrates one of the methods follows.

Methods That Create the Future

Future Search (Weisbord and Janoff, 1995), the Appreciative Inquiry Summit (Ludema, Whitney, Mohr, and Griffin, 2003), the Search Conference (Emery and Purser, 1996), the Institute of Cultural Affairs Strategic Planning Process (Spencer, 1989), Real Time Strategic Change (also called Whole-Scale Change) (Jacobs, 1994; Dannemiller Tyson Associates, 2000), and America*Speaks* (Lukensmeyer and Brigham, 2005) are six methods that gather systems to define and set goals for the future. (See figure 38.1 for summaries.)

THE SEARCH CONFERENCE
Purpose: To create a future vision
Merrelyn and Fred Emery

- Set format: Environmental scan, history, present, future
- Criteria for participants: Within system boundary
- Theory: Participative democracy
- Search for common ground
- Rationalize conflict
- No experts
- Total community discussion
- Two-and-a-half-day minimum
- Thirty-five to forty or more participants
- Larger groups = Multisearch Conferences
- One-third total time is action planning

WHOLE-SCALE CHANGE
Purpose: To create a preferred future with systemwide action planning
Kathie Dannemiller and Robert Jacobs

- Format custom-designed to issue
- Highly structured and organized
- Theory: Beckhard change model
- Common database
- Two to three days plus follow-up events
- Use of outside experts as appropriate
- Use of small groups and total community
- Self-managed small groups
- One hundred to twenty-four hundred participants
- Logistics competence critical
- Daily participant feedback
- Planning committee and consultants design events

FUTURE SEARCH
Purpose: To create a future vision
Marvin Weisbord and Sandra Janoff

- Set format: Past, present, future, action planning
- Stakeholder participation (no experts)
- Minimize differences
- Search for common ground
- Self-managed small groups
- Eighteen hours over three days
- Forty to eighty participants
- Larger groups = Multisearch Conferences

ICA STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS
Purpose: Strategic planning



- Stakeholder participation
- Two to seven days
- Fifty to two hundred participants
- Planning committee and consultants design events




Figure 38.1 Large-Group Methods for Creating the Future

Source: Adapted from B. B. Bunker and B. T. Alban, *The Handbook of Large Group Methods: Creating Systematic Change in Organizations and Communities* . San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2006. Reprinted by permission.

"What kind of school system do we want to be by 2015?" "What new market niche can we create in the next three years?" "How can we be a community with housing for all by 2020?" "How can agencies and funders collaborate to provide better mental health service delivery?" All of these are appropriate theme questions for these future-oriented conferences.

Each future-oriented event is carefully planned by a group representing the sponsoring system working with a consultant who is expert in the method. For example, the

planning committee for a Future Search for a small Jesuit college business school about what it needed to do with its curriculum to create a successful future for the MBA program included representatives from the dean's office, faculty, staff, students, alumni, and the business community. A planning committee of all the stakeholders creates a better understanding of the whole system and helps anticipate conflicts that may emerge in the large group meeting. Sometimes these conflicts can even be resolved in the committee so that they do not emerge on the floor of the large group. It also builds trust in the process as all sides are represented.

To show what the meetings are like, here is a description of a Future Search that occurred in Danbury, Connecticut. The initiating concern that brought the community together was the rapid increase in violence in schools as well as in the community as a whole. Realizing that "reducing violence" was too limited an emphasis for the future they wanted, they finally agreed on "creating a community free from fear" as the theme.

Imagine 180 people arriving at a big hall and picking up name badges that assign them to one of twenty-three five-foot round tables that seat eight. They are purposely assigned as heterogeneously as possible. This means that they will meet and work with representatives of all the other stakeholder groups at their assigned tables. Each table is designed to be a microcosm of the system in the room.

Future Search begins with a statement of purpose from the sponsors, and then everyone is asked to participate at their tables in an activity that reviews the history of the community, the world, and each person over the past thirty years. Using a worksheet, people think about the important events in these histories first. Then everyone gets up and writes their important events on long sheets of butcher paper that have been posted on the walls and labeled by

decade. After everyone has put up their thoughts, the facilitators assign each table to do an analysis of the patterns they see and report their analysis to the whole assembly. This activity gets people involved and working together at the tables. In the course of the analysis, the history of the system is shared with everyone, the impact of the environment on the system is better understood, and people get to know each other personally.

Creators of Future Search have developed a “design,” or series of activities: discussion, self-disclosure, imagining, analyzing, and planning. These activities have both an educational and an emotional impact on participants. They represent the major steps in any open systems planning process (Kleiner, 1986). Thus, there are activities that scan the external environment and notice the forces affecting the organization or community. Next, there are activities that look at the capacity of the organization to rise to the challenges it faces. Then there are activities that ask people to dream about their preferred future in the face of the reality that they confront. Finally, there is work to agree on the best ideas for future directions and action planning to begin to make it happen. Although the overall plan is rational, the activities themselves are also emotionally engaging, fun, and challenging. The interactions that occur among people create energy and motivation for change.

In two days, the conference in Danbury discovered in their history that the sense of community had been disrupted by the loss of industry that moved out, the building of a superhighway that bisected the town, and the loss of the well-known community fairgrounds that brought the community together. In addition, new groups were moving into the area. They learned that forty-two languages were now spoken in the high school, creating new educational issues. When they assessed the resources of the community, they found that many groups did not know what other

groups were doing and that there were untapped opportunities for synergy, coordination, and cooperation. The skits that groups created developed themes about housing, racism, hospital services in underserved areas of the city, and summer recreation transportation for children. Action planning groups were formed and began work. In two days, 180 people created over a dozen major initiatives to improve life in that community. Two years later, a number of these task forces were still at work and a number of major initiatives had been completed. Three other future methods—Search Conference, ICA Strategic Planning Process, and Whole-Scale Change—all have elements in common with Future Search. They vary in design activities, the structure of decision making, and how many people they can accommodate.

The work of America*Speaks* focuses on citizen participation in democracy. In the aftermath of 9/11, there was furious debate about what was going to happen to the World Trade Center site in Lower Manhattan. Many stakeholders—the people who lived in the area, the site owners, the tenants, the survivors of the disaster, the families of the victims, people from nearby states who worked in Lower Manhattan, the transportation authority, police, firefighters, and more—had divisive and competing ideas about what they wanted to see there. America*Speaks* created a one-day meeting in the Javits Convention Center in New York City to which forty-five hundred representative stakeholders came to express their views on how the site should be developed. Using voting keypads and computers to enter their views at the round tables, these were presented to the decision makers at the end of the meeting and changed the architect's plans for the site. To be sure that the views are a valid representation of all stakeholders, America*Speaks* goes to great lengths to ensure that people attend in numbers that represent the prevalence of their stakeholder category.

America*Speaks* is committed to creating processes that help citizens find their voice and be heard in projects at the national, regional, and city level (Lukensmeyer and Brigham, 2005).

A radically different approach is taken in the Appreciative Inquiry Summit. This method takes only a positive approach to change. In examining history, for example, it looks for the very best experiences from the past in order to carry that best into the future and amplify it. No attention is given to negative experiences that, if they emerge, are required to be translated into future desires. Appreciative Inquiry has been extraordinarily effective in organizational mergers because it provides a process for affirming the best of both organizational cultures rather than the usual takeover by one culture of the other. However, whether it can be effective in deeply divided systems where conflict is rampant remains a question.

Dealing with Differences about the Future.

One would think that when you bring together people from many different interests and perspectives, you are bound to have conflict or at least major differences about perceptions and future directions. What keeps these methods from blowing up? So many aspects of organizational and community life disintegrate into bedlam. Why don’t these events?

First, of course, there are differences—real differences and many of them. But all of these events operate under a different assumption from, say, a traditional town meeting or a hearing in front of the city council. The key here is the search for common ground. People are asked to focus their minds and energy on what is shared. Early activities in all of these events create a shared data base of information as well as personal connection with those present. People are encouraged to notice and take differences seriously, but not

to focus on them or give a lot of energy to conflict resolution. Rather, they try to discover what they agree on, and this becomes the base for moving forward. Usually they are surprised by how much agreement there actually is when they look for it. This is because the usual process of focusing on differences has been disrupted. When people are focused on making their points stick, on winning, they tend to lose sight of what they have in common with others and see only the difficult differences.

Some years ago, National Public Radio had a story that illustrates this different approach. It was reported from St. Louis where the pro-life and pro-choice forces were poised for escalating violence. Some leaders in both groups wanted to avoid violence. They asked, “Is there anything that we agree on that could become a source of common ground?” And although there is much that they will never agree about, they discovered common ground in their mutual concern for pregnant teenagers. As a result of this discovery, they created a successful jointly sponsored project to help pregnant adolescents that did a great deal to manage the incipient violence in that city.

Merrelyn Emery’s thinking about the relationship between conflict and common ground in her writing about the Search Conference makes these issues very clear (Emery and Purser, 1996). She sees the conference setting as a “protected site” where people can come together and search for commonalities despite their fear and natural anxiety about conflict. She believes that “groups tend to overestimate the area of conflict and underestimate the amount of common ground that exists” (p. 142). “Rationalizing conflict” is the important process that takes conflict seriously when it arises so that the substantive differences are clarified and everyone understands and respects what they are. A short time is allowed to see if it can be resolved. If not, it is posted on a “disagree list,”

meaning that the differences are acknowledged and that the issue will not receive further attention.

At the Seventh American Forestry Conference held in 1996 using the Whole-Scale method, the importance for conflict management of the principles and processes just discussed is further illustrated.

Before the congress was convened, over fifty local roundtables and collaborative meetings were held all over the United States to develop draft visions of forest policy for the next ten years and principles to support them. These meetings included environmental groups, lumbering, public agencies, small business owners, research, and academia. In this prework, it became clear to the conference planning committee that they could not use the traditional talking heads conference format. They chose Kristine Quade and Roland Sullivan, organization consultants from Minneapolis, Minnesota, to design and facilitate the conference.

When the fifteen hundred people invited to the three-and-a-half-day conference convened in Washington, DC, in 1996, the draft visions and principles already created by these local meetings formed the basis of discussions at the tables. The table task was to incorporate the various visions and principles into one set that most people could endorse as the desirable policy for the next decade.

In order to avoid the win-lose confrontations so typical of public issues with diverse stakeholders, they adopted several ground rules:

1. The leadership did not take positions on controversial issues even though there were interest groups present that wanted them to do so.
2. They used color cards to vote or show where they stood. Green signaled agreement; yellow indicated uncertainty or ambivalence; red meant disagreement. Agreement

was declared when more than 50 percent of the congress was green. This method created space to explore people's views, especially the meaning of a yellow vote.

3. Some potentially explosive issues such as divisive pending legislation were avoided as part of the agenda for the congress. In other words, the level of conflict was managed.

On the first day, people worked together at diverse table groups of ten. Then many information sessions by knowledgeable experts were offered. Tables decided where they wanted members to go and these members came back and reported what they had learned to their table team after each of these sessions. During the second and third days, table deliberations were integrated, creating visions and principles that more than 50 percent of those assembled agreed on. Finally, time was devoted to planning next-step initiatives to carry forward the vision and principles.

In the course of discussions, acquiring new information, and trying to move toward agreement, people begin to understand, if not agree, with others in their group. Boundaries become less rigid, and they become more flexible in looking for solutions that might provide gains for both themselves and others on their table team. As they engage in this cooperative process, the atmosphere at the group level becomes supportive and affirming, and the group begins to feel successful. One symptom of this shift in perspective is that rather than saying "I," there is a noticeable increase in the use of "we."

Interestingly, at this congress, there was a group of about two hundred delegates who did not like the participative way the congress was organized and met in rump sessions to plan demonstrations and disruptions. As the table groups worked together, however, fewer and fewer of the original

dissident delegates were willing to go to rump meetings or participate in disruptive demonstrations. They realized that they could get some of what they cared about through this more collaborative process. Toward the end, only a single person, the leader of this movement, was still walking around the floor picketing and trying to arouse others. The process had clearly captured and engaged all the others.

Methods for Work Design

The second group of methods involves stakeholders in the redesign of work. (See figure 38.2 for a summary.) Large group work design focuses on optimizing the fit between efficient technology and a responsive and motivating human environment for workers.




Figure 38.2 Large-Group Methods for Work Design

Source: Adapted from B. B. Bunker and B. T. Alban, *The Handbook of Large Group Methods: Creating Systematic Change in Organizations and Communities* . San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2006. Reprinted by permission.

In the Conference Model (Axelrod and Axelrod, 2000), large conference meetings are interspersed with smaller task forces in a pattern that makes sense for each client. This always includes addressing future goals for the organization as both a business and a social system, an assessment of the impact of the environment on the organization, a technical analysis of the core work process, and a redesign of that process and the structure that supports it. This participative process is used in all types of organizations from hospitals to manufacturing plants and usually takes up to six months to complete.

In the Mercy Healthcare system in Sacramento, California, for example, five hospitals needed to redesign their patient care delivery processes, a core hospital process. They needed to save money and at the same time improve patient care. The first conference, the Vision and the Customer Conference, created a vision of the goal of patient care and involved customers (in this case, former patients and the community) in describing their needs. Then there was an analysis of the current patient care process and where it needed to be improved (the Technical Conference) and a Design Conference to make changes to create improved service delivery with the organizational structure to support it. Finally, the decisions were refined and acted on in the Implementation Conference.

The Technical Conference was held in five adjacent ballrooms, one for each hospital, so that there could be coordination among the hospitals. For example, at different moments in the process, selected members of each hospital went on a “treasure hunt” to the other four ballrooms to look for good ideas that they could incorporate from others. These conferences are usually held about a month apart, which gives time for designated teams to go back into the system, present what has happened to those not attending, and get their input for the next conference. When Mercy

Healthcare surveyed three thousand people in the hospital system, 85 percent said that they felt involved and able to give input to the process. This is rather remarkable since only about 150 people from each hospital attended any conference.

The underlying principle here again is that there is a great deal of wisdom and experience in the people who do the work and deliver the service. They, better than even top management, often know where the problems are and what goes wrong at work. Therefore, they need to be involved in the analysis and redesign process. Even if jobs are at stake, as they were at Mercy Healthcare, people would ordinarily rather have a voice in what is changing than have it done to them. In situations of cutbacks and change, anxiety runs high. It helps manage anxiety if there is openness and regular communication about the process of change and how decisions will be made.

The other work design method is distinctively different. Participative Design, created by Fred and Merrelyn Emery (1993), is a method that redesigns work and the work organization from the bottom of the organization up (see figure 38.2). It is based on the idea that the people who do the work need to be responsible for, control, and coordinate it. This is in sharp contrast with the bureaucratic principle where each level controls the work of those below them. Work is redesigned to conform to the critical human requirements that create meaningful and productive work. Management decides in advance what constraints or minimum critical specifications the unit must work within—for example, that they cannot add jobs or exceed certain budgetary levels. Within these limits, the whole work unit analyzes what skills are needed to get the work of their unit done and who has them. Next, they redesign the unit to meet both the objective criteria for satisfying work and their own requirements. After the bottom of the organization is

redesigned, the next-higher level asks, “Given this new work design, what is our work?” and proceeds to redesign it. Theoretically this continues to the very top of the organization. To be successful, Participative Design requires top management to understand and endorse this democratic approach to working with employees.

Interpersonal conflict occurs most often in the Participative Design workshop when people in the work unit are analyzing their work and creating a new organization that they will manage and be responsible for. According to Nancy Cebula, an experienced practitioner doing work with this method, about halfway through the redesign process, the group wakes up to the fact that in the new world that they are creating, they will have to deal with and manage their own conflicts. This is usually a new experience because in hierarchically controlled organizations, people can run to the boss and complain and expect her to do something. Self-managing units, however, must develop processes for dealing with conflicts in their own team and with other teams. For this reason, teams are encouraged to work out a script for the steps they will take when conflict appears. They may start by having the affected parties try to talk it out; then it may become team business. Some teams have rotating roles for mediators. The steps can include calling in human resources to mediate as a last resort. Defining the process in advance helps people openly deal with issues.

In one team on the verge of becoming self-managing, the process faltered when the group seemed unable to select people for the two new teams that were proposed. Someone finally blurted out to the inquiring facilitator, “Our problem is that we have two slackers in the group and no one wants them on their team.” The facilitator asked, “What’s the best way to deal with this?” The group decided to go off into a room and deal with it without their manager or the

facilitator. The facilitator said they could take one hour. They retired to the room, from which angry sounds emerged from time to time. Thirty minutes later, however, they emerged with two teams, each including one of the slackers who had been told that they would have to shape up or depart. They had had their first experience at managing their own conflict. Interestingly, one of the slackers quit within a few days. The other turned herself around. She could no longer be mad at the system. Now there were peers in her world to whom she was accountable.

Managing Conflict in the Redesign Process.

Because the people who come to work design events belong to the same organization and have a stake in its future, it is not in anyone's self-interest to let the organization die. Even if labor relations have been troubled and there are intraorganizational battlefields, there is always a certain level of energy for change and improvement.

Training in conflict management, particularly in systems where there is a strong history of conflict, is often part of the prework that gets a system ready to do participative design.

For some organizations with a long history of mistrust between labor and management, an invitation to participate will not be easily believed. This history is likely to be in evidence in the large group meeting. It appears in a number of forms. Often it is carried by outspoken individuals who make themselves known on the floor. Although the rules of large group events are that people and their views will be listened to and treated with respect, what do facilitators do when someone grabs a microphone and unleashes a tirade against management? On the one hand, these people deserve to be treated with respect. On the other, they are not authorized to speak, and their speech violates acceptable behavior. Often such a person will instigate

others with similar axes to grind. In all likelihood, they represent only a small percentage of those present, but their aggressiveness is often intimidating to those whose views are more moderate and are more hesitant to express themselves in front of five hundred other people.

One theory that governs this kind of emotional display is catharsis theory. The idea is that you let dissidents speak their minds, even if it disrupts the time schedule, but you do not let them filibuster or totally disrupt proceedings. If they are not willing to stop after a reasonable time, you may call a short break (everyone else will depart for the coffee and restrooms) and then go on to the next activity.

In one plant in the Midwest with a troubled labor history that Bunker observed, a vocal group of disbelievers in management's good intentions was holding forth in negative and strong voices. After about fifteen minutes, Bunker wandered out into the hall, where, to her surprise, she found a lot of people grousing. They said things like: "It's always the same people, and they always say the same things. Why don't they shut up, and let's see what happens. I am tired of listening to them." After the break, when people went back to work on the next activity, the energy level in the room was high and positive. People were deeply engaged and making suggestions for changes that would improve work at the plant.

A second strategy that is sometimes useful is to respectfully engage the whole group in reacting to what is being said by the vocal minority. For example, a facilitator might ask for an indication of those who agree with what is being said and then ask for those with different views to make themselves known. Facilitators often ask questions that bring out other points of view. Moderates need encouragement to express their views, but when they do, a clearer picture of the views of the whole system begins to emerge. As others join the discussion, the community begins to manage it. People will

say things to the people hogging the floor like, “Joe, you know you are taking advantage of this and that we don’t support you. Why don’t you sit down and shut up?” Working in this context, the facilitator senses when the group has had enough and is ready to move on to the next steps.

There are times, however, when the frustration and aggravation with the organizational situation and with management is very strong, and for good reason. If people have not been treated well, they need to be able to say this publicly to management and hear the response. This level of conflict has the potential of escalation and of taking a destructive turn. If voices from the floor become personally accusative and cross the invisible line of acceptable public behavior toward superiors, a bad situation could occur. This is everyone’s worst fantasy about large groups—that there might be an irreparable explosion that would do permanent damage.

Although this possibility always exists, it is important to consider and harness the other forces working in this setting to keep conflict within responsible limits. An organization is not an association of persons with no particular bonds. There is a history, a present, and, it is hoped, a future. It is in everyone’s self-interest that things come out better rather than worse. These forces encourage collaboration and help to keep the conflict in bounds. In a large-scale event, conflict is a public process that occurs with the whole system present. The public nature of the conflict is also a force for responsible management of the conflict. The facilitator’s skill to martial the positive forces while at the same time allowing the expression of the conflict is key to its successful management.

Methods for Discussion and Decision Making

This is the third category of methods developed as ways to diagnose and find solutions to problems, or explore and

understand issues.

The large group methods used for these purposes are substantially different from each other (see figure 38.3). Work-Out is a method developed at General Electric that is being used in numerous companies to solve serious organizational problems by bringing together all of the stakeholders in a time limited problem-solving format. Simu-Real (Klein, 1992) creates a simulated organization with the real role holders acting their own jobs in order to understand problems or even to test out a new design for a new organizational structure. Large-scale interactive events uses the Whole-Scale Change framework to solve many types of problems from diversity issues to intergroup coordination problems—for example, to get police, emergency rooms, agencies, and homeless shelters to better deal with the rise of tuberculosis among homeless people in New York City.

SIMU-REAL
Purpose: Do real-time work on current issues, test future designs, learn about system
Donald Klein and Alan Klein

- Organization selects issue for work.
- Room arrangement reflects organization's structure.
- People act their organizational roles.
- There are periods of stop action and reflection.
- Decision process is agreed to in advance.
- One day
- Fifty to 150 people
- Facilitator needs expertise in process consultation.

WHOLE-SCALE INTERACTIVE EVENTS
Purpose: Problem solving
Kathie Dannemiller and Robert Jacobs

Uses same methodology as Whole-Scale Change in figure 38.1.

- Flexible method with many different uses.

WORK-OUT
Purpose: Problem identification and process improvement
General Electric

- Improvement target selected
- Employee cross-functional meeting held
- One to two days
- Process: Discuss and recommend
- Senior management responds immediately.
- Champions and sponsors follow through to implementation.
- Thirty-, sixty-, ninety-day follow-up

OPEN SPACE TECHNOLOGY
Purpose: Discussion and exploration of system issues
Harrison Owen

- Is least structured of large group methods
- Uses divergent process
- Large group creates agenda topics.
- Interest groups form around topics.
- Newsroom printouts allow for sharing information across interest groups.
- One facilitator lays out format and ground rules, "holds the space."
- Facilitator needs an understanding of large group dynamics.
- One to three days




Figure 38.3 Large-Group Methods for Discussion and Decision Making

Source: B. B. Bunker and B. T. Alban, *The Handbook of Large Group Methods: For Community and Organization Change* . San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2006. Reprinted with permission.

In terms of conflict resolution, the three methods just described use many of the principles of creating common ground, acknowledging but not dwelling on conflicts, rationalizing conflict, and creating new conditions for resolution.

World Café (Brown and Issacs, 2005) creates several rounds of discussion on a theme among diverse stakeholder groups. This method is useful in settings with potential conflict because it does not allow people to cluster in their interest groups, but continually exposes them to different viewpoints in a very personal and relational setting.

Open Space Technology (Owen, 1992, 1995) is unique among these methods. Instead of using designed activities in preplanned groupings, it places the responsibility for creating and managing the agenda on the participants. Its founder, Harrison Owen, describes it as effective in highly conflicted situations.

Open Space creates a simple structure in which people create and manage their own discussions for one, two, or three days—for example:

- The Presbyterian Church USA invited five hundred people to an Open Space to discuss some difficult and contentious issues before the church just prior to its annual national meeting.
- A series of Open Space meetings held in Canada considered the Québecois sovereignty movement issue.
- A hospital system in California faced with the need to cut costs held an Open Space in each hospital community to hear from the community about their concerns and priorities.

This method has been used in hundreds of different venues to create good conversations about a wide range of issues.

The simplest way to describe Open Space is that it is a self-managed meeting in which those attending create their own agenda in the first hour of the event. Everyone sits in a large circle with open space in the middle. The facilitator introduces the theme of the meeting and describes the

norms for participation. Then people are invited to come forward and declare a topic that they have strong feelings about so that they can convene a group to talk about it. They write their topic and name on a piece of newsprint, announce their topic to the total group, and post it on a wall called the “Community Bulletin Board.” As they post their topic, they select a time and place from the choices written on sticky notes. They place these stickies on their topic sheet and hang it on the wall. The posted topics create the visual agenda for a meeting of several days. People can add new topics whenever they want by tacking a notice on the bulletin board. Each person who proposes a topic agrees to show up and start the discussion; after it is over, they type a summary of what was said using a simple computer template. These meeting reports are printed out and immediately posted on another long wall so that everyone can keep up with what is being said in other groups.

After the initial agenda-setting meeting, the only meetings of the total group are brief circle gatherings in the morning and evening for comments and new topic announcements. The group discussion periods are usually about ninety minutes long, so there can be four or five sessions (with multiple groups convening at each session) during a day and more if the evening is also used.

A unique feature of Open Space is its rules and norms. Rather than being an event where everyone is supposed to attend everything and people feel mildly guilty if they do not, it encourages self-management and freedom to do what is needed to maintain individual focus and energy. The “law of two feet” suggests that if you are not engaged in the group you are attending, you get your two feet under you and go somewhere that is more productive. There is a lot of floating around and in and out, which is quite freeing and energizing. Other norms suggest that things begin to happen when people have energy to make them happen, so,

“Whenever it starts is the right time,” and, “Whoever comes is the right people.” “Whatever happens is the only thing that could have,” and, “When it’s over, it’s over.”

Open Space removes the oughts, shoulds, and musts from meeting participation. What happens is usually quite interesting, even remarkable. An example may be helpful in getting a better sense of this unusual methodology and how conflict is dealt with. In this example of a business school in a public college, an intact organization uses Open Space three times a year to deal with long-term conflicts in the system.

The dean, then in her third year, believed that the school had fallen behind in its ability to produce “job-ready” BA graduates because faculty were using old methods, texts, and technology. Shrinking government funding had intensified the competition for resources and exacerbated interdepartmental rivalries. The faculty was unionized, as was the staff. This was a faculty that was angry at each other, at the dean, and at the administration.

Harrison Owen has said that Open Space should be used (1) for issues that affect the whole organization or system, (2) in situations of high conflict, and (3) when there seems nothing else to do. It is possible that all three reasons were part of the dean’s decision to try Open Space. The theme to be explored was “Issues and Opportunities for the Future of the Faculty of Business.” The event was held during working hours at the college over two and a half days. Fifty of eighty faculty attended, plus staff and administration. The first two days were Open Space as described above. The final half-day was a convergence process often added to the Open Space experience in order to plan for action.

In the opening agenda-setting circle, the facilitator was struck by the fact that no one looked at anyone else, often a symptom of deep conflict in a system. Although the topics

posted were about the expected number, they were superficial given the theme (e.g., “the cleanliness of the college” and “academic excellence”). There was a general air of anger toward the administration. The evening news at the end of the first day was bland.

The overnight soak time clearly had an effect. The next morning, new issues were posted that were quite different from the first day, such as “conflict and conflict resolution” and “the strategic direction to get out of this mess.” The dean posted a topic, “The human face of management,” which everyone present attended. In that discussion, she talked personally about her role and views and became known to those who were present. As the day progressed, a number of individuals approached the facilitator saying things like, “You wouldn’t believe what is happening in our group!” There was excitement and energy on the second day as compared with flat affect and withdrawal on the first day.

The Open Space exploration was closed at the end of day 2 with a talking stick circle, a version of a Native American custom. The stick is passed around the circle. The person who holds it may speak if he or she chooses to, and others are expected to listen respectfully. These are not group reports but just what people are thinking and feeling at the end of the day. From the comments, it was clear that the faculty had begun to move from being frozen in conflict to another posture. Examples were, “I haven’t spoken to [another faculty member] for fifteen years because of a disagreement we had, but that is going to change.” A number reported the first meaningful conversations in years. Others talked about the need to sort out relationships and move on.

Open Space is a divergent process for allowing ideas to emerge and develop and creates really good conversations. Many people, particularly Westerners with our need for

visible results and actions, add a half-day convergent structure to it in order to plan and take action. In this case, everyone voted on the issues as they emerged in the group reports, and then it was possible to name the top vote getters and form voluntary task forces around them. The group decided to hold another Open Space in four months to hear reports from the task forces and continue the conversation.

Four months later, forty-five members reassembled for another two-and-a-half-day Open Space event. This time, it opened with a ninety-minute session of reports from the task forces. Then the facilitator opened the space for new agenda items, and the meeting continued in the form described above. This time there was much more willingness to address the complex and difficult issues that they faced as a faculty trying to create a better future. Many more academic issues were addressed, as were the difficulties of dealing with departments where everyone is both tenured and out of date. Again, the last half-day was used to prioritize and organize new task forces with a four-month reporting date.

The final Open Space was run completely by the faculty, who had learned to use the methodology and made it a way of working together. Many changes have since occurred, and the faculty is continuing to work with the dean to create a secure future. One marker event that happened between the second and third Open Space is diagnostic. A dismissed faculty member tried to rally support for ousting the dean. When he went to his former anti-administration supporters, he was rebuffed and told, “This dean is the best one we have ever had.”

What principles might explain this shift in energy from being dug into conflict, blaming and attacking, to being able to problem-solve and work together? One major dynamic is the removal of the hierarchical authority structure in Open

Space. There is no “they.” It is all “we.” Facilitators wait for people to create their own agenda. They believe that what is on the wall is what that group needs to talk about. Nothing is imposed. Although there is a theme, participants decide what issues they will address. The dean was there, but as an equal member of the group.

When hierarchy is absent, the well-worn patterns of manipulation and control are disrupted. There is no decision structure or way of getting power. The normal way of doing business is suspended, and people are asked to follow their own energy and commitments so that they both get and give. In Open Space, the law of two feet and the four principles replace hierarchy with guidance that creates huge freedom to act in ways that are both delightful and anxiety provoking. But everyone is in the same situation, and people enjoy exploring their freedom and work it out. It leaves the participants with one critical question: What is it that we have energy for and the will to do?

Embedding New Patterns of Collaboration

What is the impact of participatory meetings of the whole system after the event is over? What happens back at work? There is anecdotal evidence that one meeting of this type can create new plans and get action going that has a strong impact on the system. Another big effect of all of these methods is to create useful new networks and relationships. In the case of the business school, faculty began to use Open Space as a way of working together. When this happens, hierarchy and the bureaucratic processes in the organization are modified.

We want to strongly point out that senior management’s understanding of the collaborative nature of these meetings is crucial. They need to understand and agree to this method of working and provide strong sustained leadership of the process from the beginning.

What we see in the business school case just described is the transfer of or embedding of new patterns of working together and relationship management from the large group event into the workplace. This truly is a culture change. The movement in the business school was from hostility and suspicion to collaboration and a more productive and satisfying workplace. With strong, persistent leadership over time, there is growing evidence that it is possible to shift the culture of organizations from polarized and conflicted to much more collaborative and productive.

NEW FRONTIERS: APPLICATIONS TO PEACE BUILDING AND LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES

We now focus on two emerging areas of large group application: peace building and legislation. Peace-building applications are quite numerous, while legislative applications are just emerging. The term *peace building* , increasingly in evidence in recent years, describes outside interventions that are designed to prevent the start or resumption of violent conflict within a nation by creating a sustainable peace. The practice is a close cousin to the more narrow concepts of rack II or multitrack diplomacy that have evolved since the 1980s and refer to informal negotiation processes between stakeholder groups of a conflict. Legislation, or rule making of rights and responsibilities, is one way we resolve differences, manage conflict, and keep the peace. Like peace building, it is proactive prevention because the rule of law reduces volatility and is a critical step forward for countries that have relied on power and force to resolve their differences.

Over time, the history of conflict management and resolution has moved from the use of hierarchy and force by those in power to the use of rights, rules, and due process in

courts and tribunals, to focusing on interests and needs in more informal negotiation and mediation processes. We see this trend reflected in organizational dispute resolution and also in all realms of governance—executive, judicial, and legislative. With it has also come a reduced dependence on an authority to resolve or manage the conflict and a greater responsibility of the constituency to take charge of the situation that affects them. Large group methods, with their high participation and inherent democracy, seem to be a logical extension of this trend.

The traditional approach to diplomacy and the resolution of international deadly conflict is to address disputes hierarchically through military interventions, high-level negotiation or mediation, or UN resolution. The focus has been more on content than process, with many subject matter experts devising a solution. The conventional approach is to meet in small formal negotiating groups with a fixed agenda. The underlying tone is one of competition and power, not about building understanding and creating cooperation. Even if high-level negotiators are intent on bringing a collaborative strategy to the process, the fact that they are representatives will mean at best that they have to sell the agreement to their constituency or, at worst, look like traitors for talking to the other side. Similarly, the parties at the table can often be those who are most polarized and often entrenched in identity politics.

Large group methods are designed to create a collaborative rather than a competitive climate. All of the stakeholders are in the room, reducing the need to sell outcomes. All views can be represented—the extremes, the moderates, the more silent ones. When a large group comes together to create a Common Future agenda, many of the short-term subgroup disputes disappear when a longer-term vision that is more compelling comes into view. Good facilitation of these methods enables the presenting polarities to give way

to deeper affinities, and the passion surrounding the immediate impasse may fade or take new form. Large group methods allow more than just a negotiated settlement between polarized groups; they promote the creation of a common ground agenda for the whole system. And by making the facilitator less prominent and the participants more empowered, they engage each participant's innate capacity for cooperation and responsibility to resolve the conflict.

The benefits of large group methods for intergroup deadly conflict also apply to rule making. The American legal system is based on the benefits of the adversary process—the idea that out of polarization of the issues comes objective truth. Those who facilitate large group methods understand that looking for common ground rather than highlighting difference may be a far more efficient way of managing difference and moving forward. Legislative applications of these methods could provide a hopeful alternative to political processes that in many parts of the world are often highly adversarial and frequently lead to impasse.

We now turn to a few case descriptions to show how these methods are being used in peace-building and legislative settings and suggest possible ways that their application might be extended.

Applications to Peace Building

One of the early applications of a large group method to violent intergroup conflict was in early 2000, when Coleman was asked to provide collaborative negotiation training and then mediation to about thirty political representatives from the PUK and KDP parties in Iraqi Kurdistan. [1] These two groups had been in armed conflict with each other, resulting in losses on both sides. The US State Department was interested in building collaboration among them to unite

against Saddam Hussein. For our part of the initiative, we were given five days. On the first three days, we delivered collaborative negotiation training, which did a lot in and of itself to create a collaborative climate in these two groups (for a detailed description see Holman, Devane, and Cady, 2006). The last two days, in lieu of mediation or mediation training, Open Space was used with a focusing theme: "Building Collaboration among Us: Issues and Opportunities."

Open Space was a greater success than could have been imagined. Not only did the representatives of the two sides end up with their arms around each other singing Kurdish songs, the process resulted in the creation of a bilateral conflict resolution center that supported on-the-ground collaboration in many ways, including the use of Open Space as a process for high-conflict problem solving, much more collaboration between the two sides, and the rollout of many more Open Space and other large group processes around the world.

Zachary Metz, then a graduate student at the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) at Columbia University and part of the team in this initiative, took the Kurdish example and has replicated versions of it in Iraq, Thailand, Burma/Myanmar, Northern Ireland, Lebanon, and East Timor. Metz, now in private practice and adjunct faculty at SIPA, was one of the first to identify his work as peace building. Generally the work is sponsored by governmental organizations or foundations with the intention of addressing violent intergroup conflict. Methods used have included Open Space, Appreciative Inquiry, and versions of the Public Conversations Project dialogue process. Typically in these situations, the people in the room are highly stratified and polarized along political, social, and national identities. There are also security challenges of bringing a large group of people together in war-torn areas

as they become an easier target and often need to change venues on a moment's notice. Metz regularly reports great success with these methods, in that they often effectively create new communication dynamics and transformative interactions amongst polarized groups.

The examples are joined by many others:

- In working with Mediators beyond Borders in 2012, Loretta Raider and Debey Sayndee applied an adapted Future Search design to quell political violence resulting from elections in Sierra Leone.
- Harrison Owen, Avner Haramati, Carol Daniel, and Tova Averbruch have used applications of Open Space on multiple occasions to bring together Palestinians and Israelis.
- John Engle in Haiti successfully convened dire enemies in the same room in an Open Space process to preempt violence resulting from the assassination of an elder statesmen.

We suspect there are hundreds more of these stories of using large group methods to build peace and address violent conflict.

Admittedly the examples are often events more than an important component of an integrated peace-building process, but this does not have to be so. Building peace has been and often is an elite process that has been conducted at high levels by famous people such as Jimmy Carter, Nelson Mandela, F. W. de Klerk, and Kofi Annan. Indeed, many prominent people have made it their post-office mission to provide trusted mediation expertise to stakeholders of violent intergroup conflict. We applaud these efforts and believe they could be greatly strengthened with simultaneous large group engagements at multilevels in the system in question. The mediation effort could engage

not just other high-level leaders, but midlevel influentials as well as the grassroots, to create a more broad-based effort to build common ground.

Applications to Legislative Processes

The exploration of applications of large group methods to legislation and the political process is just beginning. Here are a few examples from the field that show the promise.

After two years of fighting over how to spend a $1.5 billion legislative entitlement to build highways on tribal and public lands and getting nowhere, federal, state, and citizen stakeholders came together in an Open Space facilitated by Harrison Owen. If the fight was not resolved, the money would go back to the US Treasury. Three stakeholder groups convened: one-third Native American, one-third from the federal government, and one-third from state and local governments. What they could not do in two years, they did in two days in Open Space and reached an agreement all could live with.

Coleman is currently working with a parliamentary body that is interested in using these methods to make rules. Codex, a global body not unlike the UN General Assembly, is charged with reaching consensus on global standards that protect consumer health and fairness in global food trade. [2] Traditionally, Codex has done this through informal negotiations prior to a parliamentary vote. In recent years, however, intense polarization around issues such as genetic modification and the use of growth hormones in meat is causing this body to seek alternative methods of dispute resolution, including large group facilitation processes to build common ground.

A final example was the use of Open Space in 2003 by the Scottish parliament as an alternative to adversarial hearings. Kerry Napuk facilitated a successful event in

Glasgow for the Social Justice Committee. It involved three committee members and seventy-four stakeholders working in the area who felt the process gave them an immersion course on the issues and allowed them to vote on priorities. Subsequently, with Kerry's help, Fay Young created Leith Open Space (Leith is a district of Edinburgh), which regularly convenes the community of Leith in Open Space with elected officials including members of Parliament (www.leithopenspace.co.uk).

The values of large group processes—participatory democracy, transparency, direct involvement—lend themselves to legislative environments. But politicians and political institutions are often risk averse and slow to change. Trends toward deeper democracy will ultimately bring the usefulness of these methods into clearer view. So will the recognition that, as Harrison Owen reflects, much of the work of legislation takes place informally "in the hallways" anyway. The greater use of large group methods would acknowledge this reality by providing state-of-the-art processes to support the hard work of reaching agreement.

CONCLUSION

Practitioners of large group methods have created processes that work at the organizational, community, and intergroup levels to manage or resolve conflicts. Here are eight principles about large group processes that account for their effectiveness:

1. *Focus on common ground* , areas of agreement, rather than differences or competitive interests.
2. *Rationalize conflict* . This means acknowledge and then clarify conflict rather than ignoring or denying it. Agree to disagree, and move on to areas of agreement.

3. *Expand individuals' egocentric views of the situation* by exposing them to many points of view in heterogeneous groups that do real tasks together collaboratively and develop group spirit. This broadens views and educates.
4. *Promote the development of personal relationships* through structures such as small table groups that exchange information and views with each other in structured activities. (A sense of having a personal relationship helps manage differences.)
5. *Allow time to acknowledge the group's history of conflict* and feelings before expecting people to work together cooperatively.
6. *Manage the public airing of differences and conflict* . Treat all views with respect. Allow minority views to be heard but not to dominate. Preserve time for the expression of views of people "in the middle," as well as those who are more extreme.
7. Manage conflict by *refocusing incendiary issues* on issues that can be dealt with in the time available.
8. *Reduce hierarchy* as much as possible. Push responsibility for working together and for managing conflict down in the system so that people are responsible for their own activities.

Large group methods tackle conflict in different ways at different points in its development—sometimes dealing with past history, sometimes putting differences aside and simply managing them, sometimes directly addressing and resolving issues that divide people and groups. These eight principles are primarily at the systems level. These processes, however, simultaneously affect the group and the individual level as reflected in principles 3 and 4. These methods also document many of the principles developed in the research on conflict and conflict resolution. We can hope

that they may also stimulate new theoretical thinking about how conflict is managed and resolved.

Notes

1 . Coleman's work was part of a larger initiative undertaken by Andrea Bartoli at the Center for International Conflict Resolution at the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University.

2 . The Codex Alimentarius Commission was established by the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization in 1963.

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CHAPTER THIRTY-NINE
GROUP RELATIONS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Sarah J. Brazaitis

> *We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately.*
>
> —Benjamin Franklin at the signing of the Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776

Benjamin Franklin spoke these words at one of the most important moments in the history of the United States as a reminder to his colleagues that the colonies must remain united or risk death for treason against the king of England. He was calling for collaboration and unity, essential characteristics of an effective group. The founding fathers of the United States certainly needed to be an efficacious group in order to establish a new nation, but their group was not without conflict. Indeed, their opinions diverged on several critical issues, such as relations among the emerging states and themselves and between the states and foreign powers. But they also appealed to common principles and a shared vision for a new entity, free from an oppressive monarchy. In some ways, this extraordinary group was also ordinary: it was a group with immense talent as well as significant conflict.

Groups can vary by many factors, including goals and tasks, membership, duration, and leadership structure. They may work toward something as transformative as nation building or as ordinary as choosing new office space. Yet all groups have conflict (Levi, 2011). Conflict in groups is sometimes constructive, sometimes destructive, often a nuisance, but certainly unavoidable (Deutsch, 1973).

In over a decade of consulting to organizations on groups, I have witnessed firsthand numerous group conflicts, some constructive and some destructive. In fifteen years of teaching a graduate-level group dynamics course, I have heard about hundreds more—again, some that helped the group move forward, others that obstructed the group's work or forced its premature disbandment. Much has been studied and written about regarding group dynamics in conflict resolution (see Tindale, Dykema-Engblade, and Wittkowski, 2005, for a review). The focus of this chapter is a discussion of a group relations framework for looking at conflict and a group relations model for conflict resolution in groups.

The field of group relations combines theory and research from open systems and psychodynamic perspectives in studying groups, and its ideas and concepts are widely used internationally to understand group, team, and social system processes, often as part of organizational development and consulting work (Agazarian, 2005; Geller, 2005). Central to the group relations perspective is that covert and irrational processes underlie group and organizational life, and understanding these processes engenders optimal group and organizational functioning. In addition, the notion of organizations as open systems is a fundamental tenet of group relations (Rice, 1965; Rioch, 1975; Geller, 2005). This chapter delineates a taxonomy for understanding conflict in groups and offers a framework to resolve it from a group relations perspective.

The group relations taxonomy for examining conflict in groups is the five levels of organizational processes (Wells, 1995): intrapersonal, interpersonal, group-as-a-whole or group-centered, intergroup, and interorganizational. I use a case study from my consulting practice to illustrate these concepts. I also describe a model I have developed and used in my group work toward conflict resolution from a

group relations perspective. This model combines the use of BART in examining a group's boundaries, authority, roles, and tasks (Brazaitis and Gushue, 2004; Green and Molenkamp, 2005; Hayden and Molenkamp, 2004; Noumair, 2013) across Wells's five levels of organizational analysis (1995) as a means of resolving group conflict. This chapter therefore is an examination of conflict and conflict resolution from a specific group relations perspective.

GROUP DYNAMICS AND GROUP RELATIONS: A BRIEF HISTORY

One of the most influential contributors to the study of group dynamics was Kurt Lewin, who is said to be the field's founder (Forsyth and Burnette, 2005). Lewin fled Nazi Germany in 1932 and settled in the United States, first at the University of Iowa and eventually at MIT, where he started the Research Center for Group Dynamics (RCGD) in 1945. Lewin was strongly influenced by his experiences of living under fascism in Europe and of having to flee Nazi Germany for the United States prior to World War II. As a result of these experiences, he was deeply concerned with social change and social action through action research (Deutsch, 1992). For Lewin, it was imperative to link basic and applied research with the goal of developing theories that can be applied to important social problems (Deutsch, 1954).

Lewin's research produced groundbreaking ideas about groups, including his famous psychological model of human behavior, field theory. Field theory is the idea that individuals and groups interact with their environment in a dynamic interplay of psychological and social forces (Lewin, 1951). Studying groups, then, necessitates studying the social and psychological forces in which those groups and their individual members are embedded. Lewin

summarized this view of interactionism with his formula $B = f\{P, E\}$: behavior (B) is a function of the interaction of personality (P) and environment (E), a premise that remains at the core of group process research today. At the RCGD, Lewin assembled a network of graduate students, researchers, and practitioners who proceeded to produce some of the most influential theoretical and empirical work in the field of group dynamics and social psychology (Deutsch, 1999; Forsyth and Burnette, 2005), including social comparison and dissonance theory (Festinger, 1954, 1957), communication and cohesion in groups (Schachter, 1951, 1959), exchange theory (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959), groups as change agents (Back, 1972), power in groups (French, 1956), motives and goals in groups (Zander, 1996), group cohesion (Cartwright, 1968), and conflict and cooperation (Deutsch, 1949a, 1949b), which is especially relevant to this chapter.

Lewin was also responsible for the first T-group (training group), which led to creation of the National Training Laboratory in Group Development (NTL), an organization that continues to offer workshops and training to improve interpersonal and group skills. This first T-group sprang from a meeting at the Connecticut Workshop on Intergroup Relations in 1946 where Lewin had assembled a staff of scholars and practitioners from RCGD, including Ron Lippitt, Ken Benne, Lee Bradford, Murray Horowitz, Mef Seeman, and Morton Deutsch, to help train leaders to manage intergroup tensions in their communities (Deutsch, 1999; Highhouse, 2002). One evening, after a long workshop day, the training and research staff members were discussing their impressions of the interaction patterns and other process observations of the group meetings that day. Workshop participants who were present at this discussion asked to join in. Lewin agreed it might be productive. Indeed, it was. The lively, rich

conversation that followed was later hallmarked as the genesis of the T-group as the staff and participants openly discussed the group members' behavior and its impact. NTL began offering sensitivity training in earnest in 1947 with a focus on learning in real time about the effect of one's behavior in groups through open and honest communication and feedback (Highhouse, 2002).

At the same time that scholars and practitioners were producing seminal work on group dynamics at the RCGD and NTL, Lewin's theories and research were also strongly influencing group scholar practitioners at the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations in London. The Tavistock Institute brought together psychoanalysts and social scientists to apply psychoanalytical and open systems concepts to groups and organizations (Fraher, 2004; Geller, 2005). Under the auspices of a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, the institute spun off from the Tavistock Clinic, a mental health clinic providing treatment to patients and families affected by World War I, particularly returning soldiers suffering from shell shock. The institute was charged with addressing wider societal issues than solely mental health, including "the study of human relations in conditions of well-being, conflict and change, in the community, the work group, and the larger organization, and the promotion of the effectiveness of individuals and organizations" (Neumann, 2005, p. 120). Like Lewin and his team at RCGD, scholar-practitioners at the Tavistock Institute were concerned with social action for social change through action research. Social scientists at the institute developed an approach to understanding and improving organizational processes; they stressed the interconnectedness of psychological, technical, economic, and other needs for work, role, and task flow in organizational systems, which they named sociotechnical systems. A fundamental part of their studies was an

experiential, living laboratory, called a group relations conference, where participants examined their lived experience of small, large, intergroup, and organizational dynamics with the goal of learning about social systems as these dynamics unfolded (Rice, 1965).

These ideas were reminiscent of Lewin's field theory, and, indeed, Neumann (2005) noted that Kurt Lewin was a "shadow founder" of the institute (p. 119). Neumann continued, "For the first 25 years [of the institute's life], scientific staff explicitly experimented with and applied Lewinian ideas. In the subsequent two decades, approaches from the earlier period became institutionalised into a house style" (p. 120). Shortly before Lewin's untimely death in 1947, the founders of the Tavistock Institute invited him into a publishing partnership between Tavistock and RCGD to establish the journal *Human Relations* , an invitation Lewin accepted (Neumann, 2005). The first eight volumes of the journal published work from researchers associated with both institutions, demonstrating their continued collaboration even after Lewin's death. In 1951, the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues awarded the Tavistock Institute the Kurt Lewin Memorial Award for recognition of its practical theories of sociotechnical systems and group relations.

Continuing the Lewinian influence, group relations is the interplay of psychodynamic and open systems theories to understand group and organizational dynamics. The open systems aspect of group relations concerns Lewin's work on the significant impact of environmental context on a person's behavior. Open systems include the approach that organizational subsystems are all related to each other and any change in one part of the organization will affect change in the other subsystems. Thus, there is an input-throughput-output model implicit in the group relations framework (Agazarian, 2005; Miller and Rice, 1967). The

environment provides the input, the organization creates the throughput, and then it delivers work as the output back to the environment. One affects the other continuously, and boundary permeability, or lack thereof, across sectors and subsectors is constantly assessed (Agazarian, 2005; Miller and Rice, 1967).

The psychodynamic contribution of group relations centers on the work of Bion (1961), who wrote about the presence of both conscious and unconscious processes in group life. Bion (1961) asserted that groups always have two primary aspects operating simultaneously: the “work group” (p. 143), consisting of overt, conscious, known group processes, and the “basic assumption group” (p. 146), consisting of covert, unconscious, sometimes irrational ones. Indeed, one of the tasks of attempting to resolve conflict in a group or team is to make the covert overt.

In addition, the Freudian concepts of defense mechanisms, unconscious strategies used to cope with anxiety (Freud, 1966), are also incorporated in group relations thinking (Menzies, 1959). Group relations theorists posit that groups engage most commonly in the defense mechanisms of splitting and projective identification when faced with extreme anxiety (Horowitz, 1985, Wells, 1995). Splitting is categorizing people, groups, or systems as all good or all bad. The defining quality of splitting is that opposite qualities cannot be contained in the same entity. Young children do this naturally (e.g., Mommy is all good; Daddy is all bad) before they have the psychological maturity to understand that Mommy can be both good and bad, as can Daddy. In groups, members may seek to portray one member as all bad (a scapegoat) while the rest of the group remains all good (martyrs), or the human resource department may be seen as all good (helpful, dedicated to people) while the finance department is characterized as all bad (greedy, bean counters). Groups may engage in

splitting when faced with significant anxiety (e.g., when tasks are extremely ambiguous, budgets are cut, work is high profile, leadership is incompetent or absent) so as to make a situation seem more manageable. For example, it may be easier for team members to characterize a team leader as inarguably incompetent rather than confront the fact that the team members may not have the talent or resources to produce the required deliverables.

Similarly, groups that are under significant stress may engage in the defense mechanism of projective identification, whereby group members seek to disown undesirable characteristics in themselves and project them onto another, who then enacts them on their behalf. This protects the group from having to experience intensely uncomfortable feelings while allowing their expression through the member who "carries" the projections. Thus, the "bad" member of the group (unconsciously) enacts members' incompetence, laziness, or other unwanted characteristics so as to free the other group members from having to own such undesirable qualities. Members then encourage the bad member's badness (unconsciously) in order to identify with it, that is, to see their own feelings expressed. This defense mechanism protects group members from having to acknowledge their own painful, undesirable, unwanted qualities. Psychodynamic theorists typically position defense mechanisms as individual dynamics, that is, strategies that individuals use to cope with intrapsychic conflict. Yet group relations theorists believe they are applicable to group and organizational contexts (e.g., projective identification is, from a group relations perspective, the foundation of scapegoating in groups; see Gemmil, 1989). Relatedly, Sandy, Boardman, and Deutsch in chapter 17 in this Handbook discuss how defense mechanisms may be useful constructs in

understanding not just intrapersonal conflicts but interpersonal and other external conflicts as well.

CONFLICT IN GROUPS: A DIAGNOSTIC FRAMEWORK

The group relations perspective offers a way to understand conflict in groups both systemically as well as in its discrete, specific parts (Lazar, 2004). Conflict in groups is frequently beneficial, as when it helps group members identify constructive, cooperative problem-solving strategies (see chapter 1 of this Handbook) or when it helps the group forge its identity, clarify goals, or develop better decision-making processes (Wheelan, 2013). Wheelan (2013) even asserts that high-performing teams have frequent conflict. These conflicts are typically brief, however, because these teams have effective strategies for managing conflict and engage in more cooperative processes than competitive ones in conflict resolution (see chapter 1 of this Handbook).

The group relations approach to understanding conflict affords one multiple units of analysis and, as a result, numerous options in working toward productive conflict resolution in groups. The group relations perspective has been applied to a wide variety of organizational systems in organization development work, including urban school reform (Pruitt and Barber, 2004), an AIDS therapy group (Brazaitis and Gushue, 2004), a pediatric oncology nursing service (Fruge and Adams, 2004), Dalit empowerment in India (Viswanath, 2009), and a national financial institution in South Africa (de Jager and Sher, 2009), among others. The psychodynamic aspects of the group relations perspective include an examination of the unconscious and covert processes of group life. This affords a deeper understanding of the conflict dynamics in groups as well as

more options for conflict resolution (see chapter 17 in this Handbook for an in-depth discussion of psychodynamic theory and conflict). The open systems tenets of group relations include using a levels approach to understand group dynamics and conflict and incorporating the impact of the environmental context as a vital source of information about the conflict's root causes and possibilities for intervention.

Wells (1995) described five levels of organizational analysis used to understand dynamics in groups and systems from a group relations perspective. This levels approach is a taxonomy for diagnosing group dynamics and conflict, as well as a blueprint to craft appropriate interventions. Wells's framework is also called a group-as-a-whole or group-centered model, in that one of its central premises is that a group is more than the sum of its disparate parts. Again, this builds directly on the work of Lewin (1951), who, with a background in Gestalt psychology, also purported in his work that the whole is different from the sum of its parts. According to Wells and other group relations theorists (see Agazarian, 2005; Ettin, 2004), a group is not just a collection of individuals but an amalgam of those individuals. This means that the group's essence or, as Wells puts it, the group's "élan vital" (1995, p. 55), includes something different from but related to each individual's contribution. Each group has its own personality or essence that is related to its particular members but is not equal to each discrete individual contribution. Using Wells's group-as-a-whole framework, one might understand conflict in a group in related but different ways depending on which level of organizational analysis was being applied. The framework is described in detail below with an illustrative case example of how it can be used to understand group dynamics and conflict resolution.

The first level in Wells's model is *intrapersonal* . Understanding conflict at the intrapersonal level of organizational analysis means thinking about how one's individual personality, internal traits, or state of mind is related to the conflict. An individual's actions are said to be diagnostic of the actor at this level of analysis. So someone who explodes in a rage at a business meeting might be said to have an explosive personality, an anger management problem, or perhaps to be underrested and overcaffeinated. Either a trait (enduring personality characteristic) or a state (temporary condition) explanation is a potentially valid hypothesis at the intrapersonal level of analysis.

The second level in the model is the interpersonal level. At this level, dynamics are understood by looking at member-to-member relations, often in a dyad. If two people have a significant conflict at a meeting, the interpersonal level of analysis means that we understand the conflict as residing primarily between the two of them. The conflict is understood as about the dyad rather than due to either one's personality alone or as part of a larger group dynamic.

The third level is the *group-as-a-whole* or *group-centered* level. At this third level of analysis in Wells's taxonomy, a group member who erupts in anger would be said to be expressing that anger on behalf of the group. That is, others in the group likely also feel angry yet deny those undesirable feelings in themselves, project them onto another member, and then subtly, unconsciously, encourage that member to express them on their behalf.

The fourth level in the model is the *intergroup* level. This level concerns individuals engaging in behaviors as representations of their respective group membership. Therefore, a conflict that occurs between two individuals could be understood at the intergroup level of analysis as

being between their respective groups through their group membership. Thus, a human resources executive in conflict with a finance executive in an organization could be understood as a conflict between the HR and finance departments being expressed by these two individuals but existing between the two departments or subgroups.

Finally, the fifth level of Wells's taxonomy is the *interorganizationa* l level. Diagnosing and understanding conflict at this level means looking at the conflict as a representation of the organization's relationship to another organization or organizations, as well as the organization's relationship to its environment. Employees of two organizations undergoing a merger and acquisition may engage in conflict that is less about the individual employees and more about the relationship between the acquiring organization and the acquired one. That is, the conflict may represent power dynamics between the organizations such as turf wars or struggles around redundancies rather than real animosity between the employees from each organization.

The five levels of organizational analysis framework can be applied to a group or team experiencing conflict as a means to diagnose the various sources of that conflict. The BART framework—boundary, authority, role, and task—can then be used across Wells's five levels to develop strategies to improve group, team, and organizational performance, including conflict resolution.

The BART system is a set of social-structural concepts for intervening in groups, teams, and organizations and can be used to address conflict (Green and Molenkamp, 2005; Hayden and Molenkamp, 2004). BART helps group members consider emotional and other potentially covert factors, including projective processes that may affect their ability to engage in constructive conflict (Noumair, in

press). Focusing on the concepts of boundary, authority, role, and task in conflict resolution is consistent with recent empirical research findings on group conflict in organizations that identify task conflict, relationship conflict, and process conflict as the essential areas of study and intervention (Tindale et al., 2005). In addition, BART can be mapped across Wells's five levels of analysis as a means of conflict resolution in groups. Each component of BART is explained below:

- *Boundary* . Group boundaries refer to the physical and psychological container that surrounds a group and lets us know a group is a group when we see it (McCollom, 1995). Physical boundaries include time and space (e.g., when a group meets, where it meets, including virtual meetings). Psychological boundaries form the "psychosocial basis of the group's structure" (Hartman and Gibbard, 1974, p. 155). Psychological boundaries form around a group when members achieve a sense of group belonging and identity. Optimal boundary permeability is a key component to good group functioning. A group whose boundaries are too permeable will suffer from a loss of identity and purpose. A group that is overly bounded will not be attuned to the environment and will ignore imperative resources (ideas, talent, and the like) that it needs to thrive (McCollom, 1995).
- *Authority* . Authority refers to the right to make rules and decisions and enforce them (Obholzer, 1994). In a group or organization, authority also includes structural aspects (e.g., hierarchical, a matrix, flat). Authority might be shared or rotated among group members, or it might be static. Key questions regarding authority in groups are, "Who is in charge formally or officially, informally or in practice? Who is authorized to do what

in the group? That is, whose leadership is supported, whose is ignored? What types of work are condoned, and what work is devalued?" Authority also applies to roles.

- *Roles* . Roles refer to the position or tasks one performs in an organization, as well as one's response to the position or tasks (Krantz and Maltz, 1997). Roles can be formal, such as executive director or administrative assistant, or informal, such as clown or nurturer. Roles include aspects given (set forth by the organization or one's boss) and taken (how one enacts a role on a daily basis) (Krantz and Maltz, 1997). They are authorized when an authorizing person or persons, such as a boss or manager, gives them significant resources, influence, prominence, or attention.
- *Task* . Task refers to the operationalization of the aims of the group, team or organization (Roberts, 1994). *Task* can be a synonym for *goal* or tasks can be a subset of goals. Hackman (2002) refers to task in groups as "compelling direction." Tasks are typically in line with an organizational mission, yet there are often competing tasks in a group or organization, and conflicts arise when there is not a clear understanding concerning which task or tasks take priority. In addition, there may be covert tasks (advancing one's private agenda) that are not aligned with overt tasks (working for the good of the team) (Roberts, 1994).

Following is a case study of a group experiencing conflict, The Case of Pink Power. Group members at the Pink Power organization are wrestling with weighty issues, including diversity, access to resources, succession, and the organization's future among others. There is nothing inherently wrong with the tensions they are experiencing; in fact, they are asking important, even profound, questions

of each other. Yet they cannot make use of their differences of opinion to engage in problem solving around the organization's critical issues. On the contrary, they degenerate into mistrusting one another and each other's work. Some of the group's problematic dynamics are described in the case study, and Wells's taxonomy is applied to the case such that the group's dynamics are categorized at each level of analysis. The BART model is then applied to the case as a group relations conflict resolution framework that can be used to help the group engage their conflicts more constructively.

CASE STUDY: THE CASE OF PINK POWER

Pink Power is a nonprofit educational and philanthropic organization that includes in its mission the goals of educating women and their families about breast cancer and its treatment, helping women advocate for themselves as they navigate the medical world of diagnosis and treatment for breast cancer, and providing one-time funds to women in need as a way to ease the economic stress that inhibits recovery and quality of life for those with breast cancer. The organization's senior leadership team had been struggling with entrenched conflicts about diversity for nearly a year.

Pink Power's senior leadership team is made up of mostly white women (five out of nine), including the executive director, Diana, who is also the organization's founder and a breast cancer survivor herself. On the team are one African American man, one African American woman, one Asian American woman, and one white man. The African American man, Leon, serves in the newly created role of director of diversity for the team. He had formerly been a part of the development function and was a very successful

fundraiser. The African American woman, Nina, is the HR director; the Asian American woman, Angela, is the head of information technology; and the white man, David, is the medical director and an oncologist. The other white women's roles are research director, Karen; education director, Emily; development and finance director, Alice; and program director, Pam.

Over the past year, the organization has been trying to work more closely with communities of color, particularly the African American community, as rates of female breast cancer are disproportionately high among African American women and the community is seen as underserved in terms of education and support from the medical establishment. Furthermore, two years ago, there was an article in the local newspaper about Pink Power where an African American woman said she did not feel welcome as a client at the organization. Although the quote was only a small part of the article, it was taken up heatedly in the blogosphere for several days afterward and reverberated negatively throughout the organization and its board for months. Diana and the board discussed improving Pink Power's efforts to reach out to communities of color as both donors and clients. Pink Power's board is very supportive of Diana as executive director and is in agreement that the organization should include new communities in its strategic plan.

One specific point of contention on Diana's senior leadership team is that it did not unanimously agree on the creation of Leon's position of director of diversity. Many felt that all members of the team "did diversity" and so did not think it necessary to add another director-level position. Yet Diana was swayed by Leon's argument that he was already being pulled into that role anyway, as he was the "go-to-guy" whenever diversity issues came up in the organization. Several team members were quite critical of

Leon, stating he was “narcissistic,” “slick,” and “pushing his own race agenda.” Diana acknowledged that Leon was a lightning rod on the team, noting that he was not liked or trusted by some team members, but she liked him and appreciated his skill and expertise.

Since taking up his new role eighteen months ago, Leon worked with Alice and Pam to sponsor “affinity events” where African American women with breast cancer came together for information, support, and guidance in completing applications for Pink Power’s Stress Relief Fund. Affinity events are typically for one particular social identity group only (e.g., African American women); those of other social identities (e.g., white women) are not included. A few of the white women on the team were outspokenly against this. Several o were openly hostile to Leon about his initiatives, noting that Pink Power was renowned for its inclusiveness; they thought starting affinity groups and events would splinter the group irreparably. A number of the white women repeatedly stated that Pink Power already had a diversity group, Pink Rainbow, which was headed by a major donor to the organization and staffed by breast cancer survivors and other donors, staff, and volunteers. It is a diverse group in terms of members’ racial and cultural backgrounds. Pink Rainbow organized various diversity events to bring the work of Pink Power to diverse constituencies. Diana was supportive of the separate affinity events and thought they could coexist along with Pink Rainbow. She stated this publicly several times, but the bitter fight over Pink Rainbow versus affinity events continued on her team

Angela noted that she comes from a family of immigrants and that she worked hard to get where she is. She thinks other people of color should do the same rather than benefit from special events or resources that others do not get. Alice said that as a Jewish American woman, she feels

the same way. David is quietly supportive of the diversity efforts at Pink Power, including Leon and his work. Emily and Pam are new to the team. Each said she feels she has walked in on a conversation about diversity that started a long time ago, so it is difficult to get her bearings. Emily said she was confused by the concern about affinity events as they were conducted often at her last job (a similar one) with good results. Pam does not have much experience with affinity events but thinks they are a good idea for reaching new markets and new constituencies. She said that although she agrees with Leon, she finds it difficult to support him openly because he is seen as such a polarizing figure on the team.

Indeed, several of the white women who had been at Pink Power for a long time said Leon was untrustworthy and accused him of jockeying for his next career move rather than focusing on what Pink Power really needed. Alice, in particular, was often at odds with Leon. The two seemed to strongly dislike each other, each criticizing the other frequently behind closed doors (albeit rarely directly). Several younger team members said they thought Alice was old-fashioned, and some even said they feared she wanted Pink Power to remain an organization that served white women only. Alice was brilliant at her job, however; her team routinely exceeded their quarterly fundraising goals. Several on the senior leadership team mentioned they thought it was difficult for Diana to give Alice frank feedback because the board loved Alice (and the money she brought in to the organization). Nina has a long history of doing diversity work in conjunction with HR in other jobs. She would like to put together some staff development workshops on diversity, racism, and white privilege for this team, but fears such trainings would be poorly received. Recently Nina overheard Alice say to Angela, “The last thing we need to spend our time on right now is white

privilege!” Nina noted that the team is not going to get very far with its diversity efforts in the community until “we do our own work on diversity around the table.”

TOWARD CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A GROUP RELATIONS MODEL OF INTERVENTION

Wells’s five levels of organizational analysis (1995) can be applied to the senior leadership team of the Pink Power organization in order to understand some of the team’s destructive conflicts surrounding diversity and how to resolve them. The BART system can then be used across Wells’s five levels to formulate specific conflict resolution strategies for this team.

Applying the Five Levels

Level 1: Intrapersonal.

When we use the first level of Wells’s model, the intrapersonal level of analysis, Leon is a source of this team’s conflict. His colleagues describe him negatively, and others on the team blame him as the major cause of much of the team’s struggle regarding how to approach diversity in the organization. For some, he is the cause of the conflict, and indeed, Leon *is* part of this team’s conflict. He has an intense personality that some experience as disingenuous and manipulative. It should be noted that others experience him as charming, compelling, and skilled. (More on this point later.) Leon is surely a provocative team member, due in part to who he is and how he takes up his work role. Yet given that others on the team also praise him, he is not the sole source of the conflict (as many of his colleagues believe). Removing Leon from the

team would not make the conflict about diversity disappear. Therefore, it is helpful to examine other sources of the conflict at the other levels of analysis.

Level 2: Interpersonal.

Diana and several team members describe ongoing conflict between Leon and Alice. The two of them often heatedly argue in staff meetings, they do not support each other's work, and they speak disparagingly of each other privately. Alice criticizes Leon's diversity programs saying they are divisive and exclusionary, and she says that Leon loves "to play the race card." Leon says Alice is a dinosaur when it comes to understanding diversity in organizations in the twenty-first century; he calls her ignorant and unskilled. The pair has a long history of dislike and distrust.

Looking at the conflict in this team at the interpersonal level of analysis, one might conclude that Leon and Alice are the problem. They are two of the primary drivers of the destructive conflict because they refuse to work out their differences and will not collaborate in a constructive manner as team members. Indeed, in working with Leon and Alice, it is easy to see how they might dislike each other. They are very different in temperament. Leon is extroverted and speaks his mind freely and often. He is well versed in the latest trends in popular culture, loves to salsa dance, and sees blockbuster movies the day they open. Alice is introverted and measured when she speaks, dresses in modest, conservative clothing, and prefers quiet evenings at home to being in crowds at film openings.

Leon and Alice also differ across a number of identity variables, including age, race, gender, political affiliation, religion, and socioeconomic status. It is not shocking that they would have conflicts. Yet some members of the team largely agree with Leon's arguments, while others agree

with Alice. The team members informally take sides and argue vehemently in defense of Leon or Alice. Therefore, while the conflict surely is in part between Leon and Alice, it is not solely between them but is also present in the larger group. Were it not, other group members would not so easily be able to identify with one or the other of them, nor would they be able to articulate their own position so strenuously in favor of one or the other. In fact, the other group members may be invested in positioning the conflict as only about Leon or located solely between Leon and Alice so as not to have to acknowledge their own role in it. That is, it serves the others on the team, albeit likely unconsciously, to insist the conflict is only intrapersonal or interpersonal instead of belonging to all of them.

Level 3: Group as a Whole.

Understanding the conflict at the group-as-a-whole level of analysis means considering that the conflict exists in the entire senior leadership team at Pink Power and that Leon and Alice are both enacting destructive aspects of the conflict on behalf of the group as a whole. Both can be seen as potential scapegoats who are asked (unconsciously) to carry the team's conflict so that other members do not have to. According to Wells (1995), Gemmil (1989), Horowitz (1985), and other group relations theorists (e.g., Taylor, Kurlioff, and Smith, 2004), group members are put forth (unconsciously) to represent unwanted aspects of group life, in particular, when there is significant anxiety present in the group. Some group members then become "serviceable others" (Morrison, 1992) to contain noxious, painful, or frightening feelings so that others in the group are freed from them. The extreme example of this is scapegoating. A scapegoat represents the badness (errors, failure) in a group and she or he is often sent away (isolated, fired) even though all members of the group are

responsible for the group's badness. Yet the scapegoat is made to carry the badness on behalf of the other group members.

The Pink Power organization has not recovered from the newspaper article and subsequent social media attention suggesting it was unwelcoming to African American women. This event was discussed frequently at various levels of the organization, yet no clear strategic plan of how to address it was put forward. This caused significant anxiety in the group, and the senior leadership team was still reeling from this incident and its implications. The fear that Pink Power was perceived as a racist organization or even that it actually was one was never said explicitly, yet it remained an unspoken concern at team meetings when the topic was discussed.

Examining the team's conflict from the group-as-a-whole level of analysis means understanding Leon's behavior and Leon and Alice's interactions as a manifestation of the group's conflict. This team was exceedingly anxious about how it "did diversity." Leon was outspoken about the need to make changes in the organization in order to effectively engage the African American community. His communication style was commanding, and he exuded confidence about his ideas and beliefs. Indeed, at times, Leon seemed to suggest he was the only one who was skilled at diversity work in the entire organization. Other team members complained bitterly about Leon and his "race agenda." He came to represent and voice the (feared) failure of the organization to be truly inclusive. Rather than using this conflict as an opportunity for the group to examine their own team's diversity and its relationship to their organization's perhaps outdated practices regarding diversity, the group members engaged in destructive conflict. Members disowned their own beliefs that Pink Power was potentially racist and asked Leon to carry them

unknowingly on their behalf. They then hated him for it. So Leon was indeed a lightning rod, but he was also a talented fundraiser and a valued colleague. Clients adored him, and several of his colleagues on the leadership team said how lucky they were to have him as part of their staff given his expertise in both fundraising and diversity.

Alice was also scapegoated. She was portrayed as a "dinosaur," a living representation of the organization's worst fears about what it had become: old, outdated, and out of touch. Some on the team said Alice needed to be fired given her inability to embrace new ideas about diversity, multiculturalism, and what inclusiveness means today. Yet Alice also received high praise from some in the organization. They noted she was warm, caring, and skilled as a fundraiser, and they felt she always put the clients first. Alice had been one of the first employees of the organization and was treasured by some as a member of the old guard and a living symbol of the organization's history and tradition.

This feedback about Leon and Alice suggests that neither he nor she is solely "the problem." Rather they both have strengths and weaknesses like all other members of the team. Leon had been cast as "the problem" in this conflict, as had Alice to a lesser extent, when actually all members of the team were a part of it. Leon and Alice represented conflicts in the group that were covert, and helping the team members make these conflicts overt would enable them to see there are group root causes, not solely individual or interpersonal ones.

Surfacing these conflicts at the group-as-a-whole level might be a difficult process for this team, although one that could potentially truly unstick them from their entrenchment. That is, helping the group examine their conflicts at the group level might enable them to work

toward collaborative solutions. The group-as-a-whole framework includes the idea that group members are put forth to carry or represent unwanted or undesirable feelings or qualities that others want to disown. Therefore, scapegoating Leon, Alice, or the two of them as a pair served a purpose for the other team members, although they might not be fully aware of it. At the group-as-a-whole level of analysis, Leon contains all the self-interest on behalf of the group. That is, he is seen as pushing his own agenda so that others are seen as not self-interested but only as advocates for the good of the group. Alice is cast as the dinosaur so the others on the team are free to be young and cutting edge. By not addressing the group issues, the team members leave them stuck in Leon, Alice, and in Leon and Alice's pair.

Level 4: Intergroup.

Leon and Alice's interactions can be understood at the intergroup level of analysis as a representation of a conflict not just between the two of them (interpersonal level), but also between their respective informal subgroups. Their conflict can be seen as between the new guard of younger staff recently hired by the organization whose understanding of multiculturalism and diversity is very different from that of the old guard, the veteran advocates who started the organization in the 1980s after working actively in the feminist movement over the previous decade. It is a conflict about who owns the organization and who gets to decide its constituencies: the old or the new. The old felt pushed out of the conversation on diversity at times, while the new felt the old was unskilled in multiculturalism. The new failed to take into account the critical importance of the organization's history and traditions as inclusive and egalitarian and instead wanted to jump to new ways of working with diversity without

acknowledging or accounting for the organizational culture around such issues. The old failed to consider that what diversity and inclusiveness mean now may be different from what it meant in the 1980s.

This generational conflict then was not only about age differences, but also about the organization's future and mortality. This vantage point sheds more light on why the conflict about affinity events was so entrenched. The conflict was not just about whether the organization should hold affinity events. Were that the case, it would likely have been resolved more expediently. Rather, when viewed at the intergroup level, affinity events represented a conflict about the organization's future. These events stirred up questions about leadership succession and symbolized a concern about the organization's mortality and sustainability. Would Pink Power be able to adapt with the times in order to thrive in its current environment? To do so, did Pink Power have to disempower, silence, or eliminate the old guard? The conflict between Leon and Alice was between them certainly, but it was also representative of deeper, painful, critical conflicts between subgroups in the larger senior leadership team.

Level 5: Interorganizational.

Finally, the team's conflicts could be seen as a manifestation of larger organizational issues. Examining the conflict from Wells's fifth level of analysis means looking at how this team's infighting about diversity at their organization reflects larger issues in the breast cancer advocacy community regarding these same topics.

Broadly speaking, breast cancer advocacy organizations want to be seen as inclusive of all women (and sometimes men), and that means having a community of staff and clients reflecting the demographics of who gets breast

cancer. It also means having policies that promote diversity and inclusion, as well as an organizational climate that does the same. Yet how to do this exactly is not always clear and is often challenging. The interorganizational level of analysis focuses on how the conflict in the group is related to these larger systemic issues. Therefore, it is not just about Leon, or Leon and Alice, or the senior leadership team, or the older and younger generations, but also the entire organization and how it is relating to its larger environmental context: the breast cancer advocacy organization community, the breast cancer research community, the US health care system, and so on. Recognizing these conflicts as opportunities for the organization to grow and change rather than as permanent fissures among group members could help shift the conflicts to being constructive rather than destructive.

Wells's Framework for Understanding Conflict

Wells's levels of organizational analysis provide a framework for understanding conflict in groups at multiple points of entry. Wells emphasized that in any group or system, there are dynamics that occur at each level continuously. That means there are rarely dynamics solely at the intrapersonal level or solely at the interpersonal level and so on. Rather, processes occur at each level at any given time. One may notice, attend to, or intervene at a select level or levels based on a variety of factors. The level where one intervenes in a group conflict is related to what one has been asked to do, who one has access to, as well as how sophisticated and capable an organization is to look at itself at multiple levels. Sometimes psychological sophistication is built into an organization's culture whereby employees and team members are used to thinking about themselves critically and working on organization development from a systemic perspective.

Other organizations have cultures that de-emphasize psychological inquiry and organization development and would be less capable at looking at group conflict across various levels of analysis, at least at the outset. It is sometimes possible to do a phased approach where one addresses the group's presenting problem first and over time is allowed to work more deeply with the group on the more emotionally laden, values-based issues that reverberate systemically.

For example, in the case of Pink Power, a consultant might be hired to provide Leon with executive coaching to reduce his antagonizing behaviors (intrapersonal level), mediate the conflict between Leon and Alice (interpersonal level), conduct team building (group-as-a-whole level), or address diversity issues in the organization (intergroup or interorganizational). An executive coach who worked with Leon individually could (and should) address how the larger contextual issues have an impact on how he functions in the organization but would not necessarily be allowed to expand the scope of work to include working directly with the larger team or organization.

A mediator might work at the interpersonal level of analysis toward conflict resolution between Leon and Alice, getting them to agree to shared goals, ground rules for working together, and the like but might not have access to the larger team or organization.

At the group-as-a-whole level, a consultant might be hired to work with the senior leadership team on team building, as a way to address its conflict regarding diversity, but may not be given access to the board. And so on.

Ideally, a practitioner engaged in conflict resolution work in a group or team would have access to the entire organization or system and would use Wells's taxonomy to diagnose the conflict of the group, team, or system at each

level. This provides the most breadth and depth in offering strategies for conflict resolution. Yet when one is granted access to only one or two levels, it is still immensely helpful to frame the issues at the other levels to provide valuable organizational context for the conflict's potential multiple root causes.

Joining Wells's Levels and the BART System

Wells's five levels of organizational analysis applied to a group conflict allow a nuanced diagnosis of that conflict at every level of the system. This gives practitioners maximum information in understanding the conflict, as well as a maximum number of options in where and how to intervene toward conflict resolution. This approach provides multiple points of entry to help a group shift from destructive conflicts that paralyze to constructive conflicts that enable a group to more forward. The BART system—boundary, authority, role, and task—is a set of social-structural concepts for intervening in groups, teams, and organizations and can be used across Wells's five levels. BART is a useful model for helping the Pink Power's senior leadership team resolve their group conflict.

At the intrapersonal level of analysis in Pink Power, Leon would benefit from attending to authority and role. His role of director of diversity was ambivalently authorized. Several on the team did not approve of its creation. Diana had said repeatedly she supports Leon's role and Leon himself, yet Leon noted he feels unsupported by Diana. Part of the problem is that Diana does not clearly, forcefully, and publicly state that the diversity work that Leon is doing for Pink Power is integral to the entire organization; as a result, Leon's work and his role are underauthorized. Instead, affinity events are perceived as Leon's pet project and an outgrowth of his own career goals rather than role-appropriate work that is vital to the organization's growth

into new communities. Diana needs to acknowledge to Leon and the rest of her team that the diversity director role is essential and that affinity events are a key part of the organization's efforts to serve new communities in breast cancer advocacy. Framing some of these conflicts for Leon (and the entire senior leadership team) as about role and authority enables the team members to engage in concrete strategies for resolution rather than staying stuck in a fight about Leon's personality.

At the interpersonal level of analysis, Leon and Alice need to work on role and task. Both care deeply about the organization and have shared goals to help the organization grow and thrive. Thus, they have shared tasks broadly speaking: promoting the organization and securing its successful future. In addition, both are skilled fundraisers, so they share a common strength. Leon and Alice would be helped to see how their work roles complement rather than contradict each other. Although they may not be best friends, each has areas of expertise the other could appreciate: Leon in strategies in diversity and Alice in history and tradition. Both areas are needed to help Pink Power continue to be successful. Reorienting Leon and Alice away from the idea that they can never get along and toward the idea that they can work well together in role on shared tasks would be a useful strategy for ameliorating the conflict between them.

At the group-as-a-whole level of analysis, the entire team needs to work on task, role, and authority. The senior leadership team is having significant conflicts over diversity in the organization, yet working with diversity (their own and that of their clients) is an essential part of their organizational work. Diana sees it as key to their organization's continued growth, and her board concurs. The senior leadership team needs help understanding how diversity tasks are aligned with the organization's mission

and its strategic plan. Clarity around these tasks also means authorizing diversity work. The senior leadership team is refusing to authorize affinity events as if they are not a part of their organizational work. If the team can agree to rethink how they do diversity as a way to improve their effectiveness, they would likely be able to authorize affinity events as a valuable offering. Finally, at the group-as-a-whole level, the team has difficulty addressing conflict openly. Leon is being scapegoated as “the problem” when the difficulties around diversity lie within the entire team. There is a lack of role clarity and a lack of authorization concerning Leon’s role. The team unknowingly has an investment in keeping Leon’s role and authority ambiguous because this maintains him as the problem and protects them from having to take responsibility for the conflict as a group issue. Similarly, the team has allowed Leon and Alice to enact the conflict as if it were solely between their dyad rather than present in the entire team.

At the intergroup level of analysis, the various subgroups on the senior leadership team need to address boundaries, task, and authority. The organizational tasks require them to work across generational boundaries to collaborate to get work done. The tasks require them to authorize both the young and the senior, the new and old. They need to stop splitting into subgroups that keep them isolated and in opposing camps, and instead collaborate across generational and belief boundaries. They would do well to form a subcommittee with multiple members of both generational groups to work explicitly on addressing diversity both within and outside the organization. Knowing that their conflicts about diversity are related to generational struggles and the future of the organization and that they need each other in order to move forward would likely help them collaborate more and fight less. That is, they would have new awareness of what the critical

issues are rather than staying stuck in a conflict about affinity events. They then could directly address strategic planning for Pink Power's future sustainability that incorporates tradition yet embraces new ideas and strategies concerning diversity.

At the organizational level of analysis, the team needs to work on boundaries, specifically, increasing its boundary permeability with the external environment. If the organization's recent negative press is to be believed, Pink Power is in danger of being too insular and ignoring the very communities it should be targeting (e.g., African American women). It could amplify its community engagement and make it visible and meaningful. Those at Pink Power could go on a public relations campaign to highlight their accomplishments and the ways in which they do work for a broad cross section of women. They could form strategic partnerships with organizations that work directly with African American women with breast cancer. They could build a strategic plan incorporating this type of community outreach as an essential goal.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has presented a group relations taxonomy for understanding conflict in groups: Wells's (1995) five levels of organizational analysis. The group relations perspective incorporates psychodynamic and systems thinking, and Wells's model provides a means to understand group conflict at various levels across an organizational system (intrapersonal, interpersonal, group-as-a-whole, intergroup, and interorganizational) that includes group members' unconscious behaviors that promote destructive group conflict and keep it entrenched. In addition, this chapter offered a group relations framework for conflict resolution, BART (boundary, authority, role, and task), which can be

applied across Wells's five levels to offer groups specific strategies for making group conflict constructive rather than destructive.

The field of group relations and the use of its perspectives to understand and improve group and organizational life remain strong nearly seventy years after its birth in England just after World War II. Dozens of group relations professional organizations around the world and organization development consultants engage in conflict resolution work from a group relations perspective internationally in settings as diverse as small community mental health centers to large multinational corporations. A group relations perspective offers an unparalleled richness in understanding group life in that it examines all levels of the organizational system in which the group lives, as well as helps to uncover and explain group members' unconscious motives, behaviors, and feelings (as well as their conscious ones) to free a group from entrenched conflicts. More applied research on the use of these models in organizations will help refine and hone what works and what does not across what organizational contexts and will add to our understanding of group dynamics and conflict resolution. We surely need to understand more about how to hang together so we do not hang separately.

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CHAPTER FORTY
RECONCILIATION BETWEEN GROUPS: Preventing (New) Violence and Improving Lives

Ervin Staub

In this chapter I write about reconciliation both after and before significant violence between groups. Reconciliation between groups that have long been hostile to each other can prevent violence. After significant violence, whether the violence ended through a peace treaty or victory of one side, new violence is highly probable without reconciliation (Long and Brecke, 2003; Staub, 2011). The hostile attitudes toward the other that led to the violence and have intensified in the course of it are still there.

Reconciliation may be defined as mutual acceptance by two groups of each other (Staub and Pearlman, 2001), and "the societal structures and processes directly involved in the development and maintenance of such acceptance . . . Genuine acceptance means trust in and positive attitude toward the other, and sensitivity to and consideration of the other party's needs and interests" (Staub and Bar-Tal, 2003, p. 733). "Reconciliation also means that in people's minds the past does not define the future. It means that members of previously hostile groups can engage in actions that represent and further create positive coexistence" (Staub, 2011). Most definitions, like mine, focus on relationships, whether between individuals or groups—for example, "restoration of trust in an interpersonal relationship through mutual trustworthy behaviors" (Worthington and Drinkard, 2000, p. 93). To the extent that reconciliation addresses inequitable relations between parties, it can lead to a new moral and political framework

and “mutual legitimacy” (Rouhana, 2010). The practices and institutions that foster reconciliation fulfill basic psychological needs and are likely to create a peaceful society.

Reconciliation is progressive, with likely setbacks. For example, Israeli collective narrative has increasingly acknowledged that one of the reasons that about 700,000 Palestinians left Israel during the 1948 war was expulsion, whether by force or pressure. This shift from the earlier narrative that they all left due to their leaders telling them to do so for the duration of the fighting, or because they wanted to escape danger, facilitates reconciliation. The number of Israelis who accepted this narrative or collective memory increased over time, but it then decreased in the course of the violence of the second intifada between 2000 and 2005, the second Palestinian uprising (Nets-Zehngut and Bar-Tal, 2011). There can be reversals in other elements of reconciliation as well, whether forgiveness or positive attitude toward the other.

Arie Nadler and Nurit Schnabel (2008), Israeli psychologists, differentiated between instrumental and socioemotional reconciliation. Instrumental reconciliation refers to cooperation to achieve common goals, socioemotional reconciliation to the admission of past wrongdoing and subsequent forgiveness. The practices that promote the former include contact, that is, engagement or working together, the essence of the latter is an “apology-forgiveness” cycle. This is a worthwhile distinction, although I see the two types as overlapping. After significant violence that deeply wounds people, the capacity to cooperate for shared goals is an initial step. Without emotional reconciliation, without addressing psychological woundedness, fear and anger, new threat, or changing conditions can bring an end to cooperation and lead to renewed violence. However, the practices that

contribute to either type of reconciliation also contribute to the other. Significant contact in the course of cooperation can humanize the other, reduce fear of the other, and make forgiveness more likely.

Reconciliation requires that people engage with what happened during past violence. Bert Ingelaere (2008) wrote that the *gacaca* , the community justice process in which well over 100,000 accused perpetrators of the genocide in Rwanda were tried between 2001 and 2010, broke down the amnesia that had begun to characterize Rwandan life as people settled down to “normal” everyday relations—coexistence required by circumstances. We can see such “amnesia” as psychological defense in people who have to live together and feel it is dangerous to address the past emotionally and practically in engagement with each other.

THE ORIGINS OF VIOLENCE AND BASIC PSYCHOLOGICAL NEEDS

The frustration of universal, basic psychological needs is a core influence in leading to violence between groups. Violence in turn deeply frustrates such basic needs. Practices and conditions that help to constructively fulfill these needs contribute to reconciliation and lasting peace.

Difficult social conditions in a society are one starting point for an evolution that can lead to genocide or mass killing or intensify conflict between groups. Such conditions include economic deterioration, political chaos, enormous social change, and especially a combination of these. These conditions often frustrate material needs but even more universally frustrate basic, universal, psychological needs for security, feelings of effectiveness and control over important goals, autonomy and choice, positive identity,

connections to other people, and a comprehension of reality and of one's place in the world (Staub, 1989, 2003, 2011).

Certain cultural characteristics that can be present in societies to different extents are another potential influence. A history of devaluation of some subgroup of society preselects this group as a likely scapegoat or ideological enemy. Past victimization of the group and psychological woundedness make the group feel vulnerable and the world seem dangerous, and it can lead to hostility and unnecessary "defensive" violence. Overly strong respect for authority makes it less likely that people speak out against destructive leaders.

In difficult times, members of a group often blame or scapegoat a previously devalued group for life problems. They create a vision of a hopeful future for their group, an ideology that is destructive in that it identifies enemies who stand in the way of the ideology's fulfillment, usually the scapegoated group. These processes fulfill frustrated needs for identity, effectiveness, community, and understanding of reality. But they do so destructively because they lead to turning against and harming others (Staub, 1989, 2003, 2011). Without restraining conditions and forces (especially active bystanders), there tends to be an evolution of increasing harm doing and violence.

Another starting point for the evolution of intense violence is group conflict (Fein, 1993; Staub, 2011), especially conflict that becomes intractable—persistent, resisting resolution, and violent. Intractable conflict also frustrates basic needs. It is often maintained by ideology, as well as by people seeing their own cause and group as right and moral, and the other as responsible and immoral (Bar-Tal, 2000; Kelman and Fisher, 2003). Over time the groups often come to see each other as implacable enemies.

Anything good that happens to the other group is seen as harmful to one's own group. I have called this kind of enmity an "ideology of antagonism" (Staub, 1989, 2011).

Instigating conditions and the violence that evolves out of them have destructive effects not only on victims but also on perpetrators and members of the perpetrator group who passively stand by. In contrast the processes of reconciliation in table 40.1 help fulfill basic needs constructively. They contribute to feelings of security, the belief by people in their capacity to influence events, fulfill the need for a positive identity, create connections within and between groups, and help develop a new, positive understanding of the world.

Table 40.1 Reconciliation and the Prevention of New Violence

Source: Developed from tables and materials in Staub (2011).

Inhibitors	***Promoters***
Lack of understanding of the roots of violence	Understanding and actions guided by it
Lack of understanding of the impact of violence	Understanding its impact on survivors, perpetrators, bystanders
Devaluing the other	Humanizing the other and developing positive attitude toward the other through words, deep contact, working on shared goals, education
Unhealed psychological wounds of survivors, perpetrators, bystanders	Healing the wounds by all parties
Lack of Truth	Truth (complex: shared)
Conflicting collective memories—histories	Working both toward a shared history and toward accepting that the other group has a different view of history
“Chosen” traumas	Addressing the impact of the past
Lack of Justice	Justice: punitive, restorative, procedural, economic
Lack of forgiveness	Moving toward forgiveness (with mutuality)

Inhibitors	***Promoters***
Lack of acknowledgment of their responsibility by perpetrators and their group	Acknowledgment, apology, regret, empathy
Lack of acceptance of the past	Increasing acceptance of the past: “This is what happened, this is part of who we are.”
Destructive ideologies	Constructive ideologies
Undemocratic systems and practices	Developing pluralistic, democratic, values and institutions
Raising children as obedient followers	Raising inclusively caring children with moral courage (positive socialization)

SECURITY AND RECONCILIATION

The question has been raised in the literature as to whether reconciliation can begin when there is still ongoing violence. In the eastern part of the Congo (DRC), starting in 1996 (Prunier, 2009; Staub, 2011), millions of people died due to violence and accompanying disease and starvation. Huge numbers of women were raped. To a lesser but still substantial degree, the violence is continuing through 2013. Fear and mistrust create a challenge for effective reconciliation processes. The ongoing violence and the insecurity it creates interfere with healing from past violence, an important element in reconciliation. Nonetheless, even in such a situation, public education in the form of educational radio programs and accompanying grassroots activities such as the training of

conflict resolution agents using the principles guiding educational radio, can build underpinnings for reconciliation (Staub, 2011).

In conflicts with less chaotic conditions and less widespread violence, small groups of people from the two sides have engaged with each other. Engagement between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, and contact and dialogue in many settings between Palestinians and Jewish Israelis, most likely limited the level of violence and have created the basis on which further reconciliation practices can build (see Staub, 2011, for an overview).

THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF RECONCILIATION

In the following section, I discuss the principles and practices of reconciliation that I consider especially important (see also Staub, 2011, 2013). They are presented in table 40.1 . In discussing the first two of these, I briefly review the work that my associates and I have been doing in Rwanda, starting in 1999, and then in Burundi and the Congo, to promote reconciliation and help prevent further or renewed violence.

Understanding the Roots of Violence and Avenues to Prevention and Reconciliation

Understanding the conditions that lead to violence and the impact of violence can provide a useful framework for people to work on both prevention and reconciliation. It can lead them to resist these influences, to respond to them in ways that makes violence less likely. It can lead them to use their critical consciousness, their own judgment in evaluating the meaning of events. It can lead to active bystandership in the service of prevention, reconciliation,

and peace building. After violence, understanding how it came about can contribute to healing.

In the genocide in Rwanda, in 1994, about 700,000 Tutsis were killed by Hutus—parts of the military, young men in militias (the *Interehamwe*), as well as neighbors and even relatives in mixed families. About 50,000 Hutus were also killed because they were politically moderate, or opposed the genocide, or, as it happens when violence becomes widespread, because of personal enmity (des Forges, 1999; Melvern, 2004; Mamdani, 2001; Staub, 2011).

Starting in 1998 and ongoing, my associates and I have conducted two types of interventions in Rwanda to promote reconciliation and help prevent new violence, and we have conducted research to evaluate their impact (for a detailed description, see Staub, 2011). We first conducted workshops and trainings, lasting from two days to two weeks, with varied groups. The first training was with the staff of local organizations that worked with groups in the community. A central element in all trainings was information about how genocide originates (based primarily on Staub, 1989). We described the influences that lead to genocide and other intense violence between groups and provided examples of these from varied instances except Rwanda. In the course of extensive discussion, the participants applied these concepts to Rwanda. Other elements of the trainings included information about the impact of violence on people and about the role of basic human needs in the origins of genocide, in woundedness, and in healing.

We evaluated the effects of the approach primarily not on the participants but on people once removed from the training, members of newly created community groups (Staub, Pearlman, Gubin and Hagengimana, 2005). Training participants and these groups included both Tutsis

and Hutus. The community groups were led in twice-a-week meetings, for two hours, over a two-month period, either by facilitators we trained (integrated groups) or by facilitators we did not train (traditional groups), or without a facilitator (control groups). There were many groups, controlled for various characteristics, in each of these three conditions.

Treatment group members showed positive changes from before the training to two months after the end of the training and greater changes than the changes in the traditional and control groups from before the training to two month afterward. These changes included increased understanding of the complex origins of genocide, more positive attitudes by Hutus and Tutsis toward each other, "conditional forgiveness"—expressing the willingness to forgive if perpetrators acknowledge what they did and/or ask forgiveness—and reduction in trauma symptoms (Staub et al., 2005).

Knowledge of the influences that lead to group violence seemed to become experiential understanding, deeply held, as people applied the information they received to the genocide in Rwanda, and thereby to their own experience. Such understanding can be an avenue to healing. In addition to the reduction of trauma symptoms by members of community groups, when the participants in our training were exposed to examples of group violence around the world, seeing that others had experiences similar to their own, they seemed to feel reincluded in the human realm ("so God did not select us for such punishment") (Staub et al., 2005).

Understanding the influences that lead to mass violence also seemed to humanize Hutus, members of the group that perpetrated the genocide, in both the eyes of Tutsis and their own eyes. Seeing that understandable human

processes can lead to terrible acts made it less likely that members of either group viewed perpetrators as simply evil. By reducing defensiveness, this makes it more likely that members of the perpetrator group accept responsibility for their group's actions, an important contributor to forgiveness and reconciliation. In all of these ways, understanding can initiate and contribute to reconciliation. It can also increase people's ability to foresee the long-term consequences of events, including destructive leadership, and increase their resistance to them emotionally and as active bystanders, thereby preventing violence (Staub, 2011).

In subsequent years, we conducted separate trainings with national leaders, journalists, and community leaders, and we also trained trainers in our approach (Staub, 2011; Staub and Pearlman, 2006; Staub, Pearlman, and Bilali, 2010). In these trainings, we also introduced information about avenues to prevention and reconciliation. In the training with national leaders we used separate tables of origins and prevention that are partly summarized in table 40.1 . One column in the table shows the influences that lead to violence (or inhibit reconciliation), the other side those that prevent violence (or promote reconciliation). At the end of the training, we had leaders in groups of three evaluate whether the policies they were just introducing in the country would make violence more likely or help prevent violence. Within the training, they did this highly effectively.

To expand the reach of this approach, we developed educational radio programs, in collaboration with a Dutch nongovernmental organization, LaBenevolencija, which produces the programs. The central aims again were to help listeners understand the influences that lead to violence between groups; how extreme violence such as genocide evolves; psychological woundedness; and avenues

to healing, reconciliation, and prevention. Our first program, a radio drama, Musekeweya (New Dawn), that began to broadcast in Rwanda in 2004 and is still continuing, has become extremely popular. It is a story of two villages in conflict, with attacks, counterattacks, destructive leaders and followers, positive bystanders, a love story between two young people from the two villages in conflict, a village fool who is also a wise man and a truth teller, and more. The educational content is embedded in the story and in the actions of the characters (Staub, 2011; Staub et al., 2010). For example, the story aims to promote community healing as people empathically listen to each other's painful stories and support each other. Over time in the radio drama, the people in the two villages move toward reconciliation.

An evaluation at the end of the first year (with a complex design due to the fact that the program aired nationally) showed a variety of significant effects. In comparison to a control group in which people listened to a radio program about health, treatment group members expressed more empathy with everyone—survivors, perpetrators, and leaders. They expressed, and showed in behavior, greater willingness to speak what they believe. They also showed greater independence of authority and a willingness to discuss issues and make decisions for themselves (Paluck, 2009; Staub, 2011; Staub and Pearlman, 2009).

The educational radio dramas and other radio programs were expanded to Burundi beginning in 2005 and to the Congo in 2006. While it is important to develop general principles of prevention and reconciliation, they need to be applied with sensitivity to particular contexts (Staub, 2011). The situation in the Congo is highly complex. Many groups, motivated by varied factors, have been involved in violence (Prunier, 2009, Staub, 2011). The government and military are highly dysfunctional. The radio drama aimed to

apply the conceptual elements of the educational approach to the existing conditions in Burundi and the Congo. Evaluation studies found positive effects in Burundi and more complex effects in the Congo, mostly positive but not on all dimensions (Bilali, Vollhardt, and deBalzac, 2011). The limitation on the effects of the radio drama may have been due to the chaotic and insecure conditions in the Congo. However, the evaluation also showed what may have been too much conflict between groups within the radio drama, which in the context of ongoing violence could be responsible for the less positive effects. These findings of the evaluation now inform the continued development of the radio drama in the Congo.

Understanding the Impact of Violence on Survivors, Perpetrators, and Bystanders

Both the trainings and the radio programs aimed to foster understanding of the impact of violence on groups and individuals. One of the influences leading to violence by a group is past victimization of the group, which creates a feeling of vulnerability and seeing the world as dangerous, and may generate hostility to the world. When there is new conflict or other instigating conditions, previously victimized groups are more likely to respond with violence that they see as defensive but may be unnecessary, making them into perpetrators. At times victimization and unhealed trauma become persistent aspects of the group's culture and identity. Such "chosen traumas," as Vamik Volkan (2001) called them, shape the perceptions of and responses to new events (Staub, 1998, 2011).

Understanding the impact of violence is an important beginning step on the road to healing and can motivate activities that promote healing. It helps people interpret certain emotions and actions of their own and others as the result of psychological woundedness or the way

woundedness is passed down to children. This can improve social interactions and people's quality of life. Seeing children as traumatized is likely to lead to more constructive reactions to them than seeing them as disobedient and bad.

From the standpoint of both positive social relations and reconciliation, it is important to understand that engaging in violence is also wounding (McNair, 2002; Staub, 2011), as is to some extent remaining passive in the face of it. Even soldiers fighting wars are psychologically wounded (Maguen et al., 2009), and more so if they have perpetrated atrocities by killing civilians (McNair, 2002). The relatively new concept of moral injury was proposed because of the widespread psychological woundedness of soldiers returning from the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan, a result of killing, witnessing killing, or being unable to take actions in situations when their fellow soldiers were killed (Litz et al., 2009). Perpetrators of group violence and passive bystanders are thus likely to be wounded; at the very least, they undergo personal transformation as they justify violence, increasingly devalue victims, and experience less empathy with their suffering. This lessening of empathy over time tends to generalize to other people as well, partly explaining the frequent expansion of group violence to new targets.

Healing the Wounds of All Parties

Healing by survivors can lessen their feelings of vulnerability and their perception of the world as dangerous, and open them to increasing engagement at least with members of the perpetrator group and, over time, even with actual perpetrators. Healing by perpetrators and passive members of the perpetrator group can diminish their (usually unacknowledged) guilt and shame (Staub and Pearlman, 2006), which may be limited

at the time of the violence but can become more intense as the violence is brought to an end and the world points to the immorality and horror of their actions (Nadler Malloy, and Fisher, 2008; Staub, 2011, 2012).

In order to heal, survivors of violence need to talk about their experiences (Pennebacker, 2000), ideally to empathic others (Herman, 1992; Pearlman and Saakvitne, 1995). Rather than individual therapy, healing in groups is usually preferable or even necessary. After group violence, usually huge numbers of people are psychologically wounded, and there are few resources available for healing. In addition, the violence was perpetrated by members of one group against members of another, and the culture may be collectivist, so that connection to the group is of special importance.

Because of the widespread psychological woundedness, we have advocated in our workshops and in educational radio programs person-to-person engagement—people talking to each other about their experiences and providing support to each other. Doing this in a group setting can be especially beneficial (Herman, 1992; Staub and Pearlman, 2006). For example, in a religious community in Rwanda, Solace ministries, people give testimonies and describe their experiences during the genocide in front of the community, with others supporting them.

Commemorations are also important for healing. However, they are likely to work best if, in addition to remembering the violence and their losses, and grieving, which by themselves can maintain psychological wounds, they point to the possibility of a better future. They can do this, for example, by including in remembrance “rescuers,” members of the perpetrator group who saved lives or attempted to save lives, endangering their own (Africa Rights, 2002; Oliner and Oliner, 1988; Staub, 2011). This

can show the possibility of living together in peace as members of both groups are reminded that there have been caring and courageous people in the perpetrator group. Commemorations of mass violence will ideally include honoring rescuers.

Empathy with perpetrators can contribute to their healing. It is daunting, of course, to feel and express empathy with perpetrators of extreme violence. One example of engagement with and over time empathy with a perpetrator seemingly leading to his regret about his actions was the conversations and interviews between Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela and De Kirk, a notorious killer in the South African apartheid system (Gobodo-Madikezela, 2003). Including members of the perpetrator group in commemoration and over time as it becomes psychologically possible even perpetrators can also contribute to the healing of all parties.

An aspect of healing important for both prevention and reconciliation is exploration within a group of past victimization, psychological woundedness of the group and the extent the culture has maintained or even built itself around past traumas. Woundednesss can be handed down through the generations and shape perceptions of and responses to events (Volkan, 2001; Vollhardt, 2012). Gaining societal self-awareness is likely to lessen the impact of past trauma on group life and call attention to the need for healing (Staub, 2011).

An aspect of healing and community building is the reintegration of harm doers into the community and productive civilian life. There are many different kinds of harm doers, ranging from child soldiers who were abducted or enticed into rebel groups and often were led to engage in violence against their own communities, to adult perpetrators—of violence, rape, and genocide. Some can be

reintegrated into the community only after appropriate justice processes and punishment, while others, such as child soldiers, may not need to be punished. Depending on who they are and what they have done and on the culture, different processes of reintegration are required. Often a combination of Western and traditional approaches is used. For example, in Angola and elsewhere, to reintegrate them into the community child soldiers are led to engage with the spirit of ancestors (Wessells, 2007). In another example, by providing the opportunity to talk about their experiences, to work and study, and to live in a community of their own, the community has led a group of former child soldiers to become a constructive group that helps others (Myers, 2008).

While some individuals and groups that have been victimized have a propensity to turn against others, there are people who have been victimized who want to help those who have suffered, and prevent others' suffering. An important aspect of reconciliation and stable peace is to learn how to develop what I have called *altruism born of suffering* (Staub, 2003, 2005b; Staub and Vollhardt, 2008) so that those who have suffered become agents of positive change. Positive experiences in childhood, others reaching out at times of persecution and violence to its targets, intended victims acting on their own behalf and helping others, can all mitigate the negative effects of victimization. Healing practices, caring, and support by other people and the world after suffering harm, strong human connections, and people who have been harmed beginning to help others so that they "learn by doing" can all contribute to altruism born of suffering.

Humanizing the Other, Developing a Positive Orientation to the Other

Among the influences leading to violence between groups differentiating between “us” and “them” and devaluing “them” is a central one. Moreover, devaluation increases in the course of the violence, as harm doers justify their actions, exclude the other from the moral and human realm, and even come to see killing their victim as right (Fein, 1993; Opotow; 1990; Staub, 1989, 2011).

Humanizing the other, developing a more positive orientation to the other, is a crucial aspect of reconciliation and prevention. Others can be humanized by words: what people say about them, what they write about them. This is likely to be especially effective if the words refer to real and significant positive actions of the other, for example, Hutus saving the lives of Tutsis, or if they show communality in the lives of people, such as Macedonian journalists from different ethnic groups together interviewing and writing in their newspapers about the lives of people belonging to those groups (Burg, 1997). Print media, radio, and television can all humanize members of groups. Symbolic acts are also important, such as Arafat and Rabin shaking hands, and Willy Brandt, the chancellor of Germany, kneeling at Auschwitz and asking forgiveness.

Contact has an important role in overcoming devaluation and coming to see the other’s humanity (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2066), especially significant, deep contact (Deutsch, 1973; Staub, 2011). Its varied forms can include working on joint projects, such as cooperative learning in schools (Aronson, Stephan, Sikes, Blaney, and Snapp, 1978), building houses together (Wessells and Montiero, 2001), deep engagement between Hindus and Muslims in work settings (Varshney, 2002), or persistent dialogue. One barrier to peace between Israelis and Palestinians has been the absence of persistent engagement and dialogue between leaders (Staub, 2011). However, even imagined

contact can promote positive attitudes (Crisp and Turner, 2009) and give a positive start for actual contact.

I have referred already to the importance of active bystandership. To create social change requires people joining together, building connections and networks (Thalhammer et al., 2007). This is necessary to create and maintain motivation, as well as to exert influence. However, single individuals sometimes have a dramatic role in limiting violence as well as initiating positive processes (Staub, 2011). An example of this is Joe Darby, who was instrumental in making public the photos of the treatment of prison inmates at Abu Ghraib.

Another example is a woman who for a period of time settled in and studied the conflictual and potentially violent conditions in a community in Poland. She found that one segment of the community had access to most of its resources, and two groups, disorderly and aggressive youth and old people, were excluded from social processes. She organized the young people to collect recipes of traditional dishes from the old people, which they gathered in a book. The book was a success, and a later more formal edition became an even greater success (Praszkier, Nowak, and Coleman, 2010). Contact and cooperation changed attitudes toward the other and significantly affected the way the young people related to the world, benefiting the community as a whole.

Each of the contributors to reconciliation listed in table 40.1 can have multiple effects. Understanding the influences that have led to violence, healing, and other influences can contribute to more positive attitudes towards members of the other group.

Establishing (the Complex) Truth

Truth is essential for survivors. Their society and the world establishing what was done to them, and proclaiming that the violence and victimization should not have happened, acknowledges their suffering, confirms their experience, and affirms the moral order. It thereby increases survivors' feelings of security. Establishing the truth is also important to make it less likely that perpetrators deny their actions or claim that they had justifiable reasons such as self-defense or were the victims.

While the truth can sometimes be simple, often it is complex. Both sides may have been violent. Or actions in the past by one side may have contributed to later violence by the other side, as in Rwanda (Mamdani, 2001; Staub, 2011). But perpetrators tend to deny or justify their actions, and even when the violence is clearly one sided, the two sides usually have different narratives or "truths."

The history of events is sometimes established through documents and testimonies during trials, such as of German leaders at Nuremberg. The aim of the people's tribunals in Rwanda, the *gacaca* , was also both truth and justice. Offering testimony often has negative emotional consequences for witnesses. The *gacaca* took place in many locations, in front of local communities, with a large majority of the people Hutus, including the relatives of those who were being judged. The difficulty was even greater for Hutu than Tutsi witnesses, who probably felt that they betrayed their group. In addition to the emotional difficulty of talking about painful events in front of hostile people, there was often harassment before, during and after providing testimony (Bronéus, 2008).

It has become common to use truth commissions, which interview many people and provide a report of events. An early example was Nunca Mas (1986), the report on the "disappearances" in Argentina in the late 1970s. The Truth

and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa powerfully showed what the apartheid regime did. This had little effect on black people, who were the victims of the apartheid regime, but it contributed to reconciliation by affecting whites (Gibson, 2004), who either did not know or had avoided knowing the violence of the apartheid regime.

Processes to Change Collective Memories and Move toward Shared Views of History

Differing and conflicting views of history, usually each party blaming the other, are usually deeply held (Newbury, 1998) and are a likely source of new violence. Seeing the other as the one responsible maintains fear and antagonism. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it has been difficult for people to engage with and seriously consider the other's narrative (Staub, 2011). But exposing Israeli high school students to both sides' narratives in a conflict removed from their own, the Northern Irish conflict, increased their ability to take the Palestinian perspective (Salomon, 2004). We have also found in our training in Rwanda that giving examples from other countries has been useful.

Establishing who did what can move the two groups toward a shared narrative. The "new historians" in Israel, using historical documents, showed that Palestinians did not all leave voluntarily, that in part they were expelled in the course of the 1948 war (Morris, 1989, 2004). Autobiographical writings by soldiers and other witnesses describing their experiences at the time, supported the new history (Nets-Zehngut, 2009). These were published many years after the events due to a combination of government censorship and loyalty to the country that made people unwilling to write about questionable Israeli actions. Open communication in a society and positive active bystandership—an aspect of which is telling the truth—contribute to peacemaking. Four studies with groups of

Palestinians living around the region also showed that contrary to the dominant Palestinian narrative, especially by leaders, while there was expulsion, it was not the only or even the primary reason for the Palestinian exodus. Many left because of fighting at or near their villages, as well as other reasons (Nets-Zehngut, 2011).

Collective memory consists not only of facts, but also of their interpretation. Groups often claim that their violent acts were necessary self-defense. Dialogue and negotiation between parties can shape their interpretation of events and, in domains where no common ground is found, at least acknowledge the other's view of history. Moving toward a shared history can benefit from commissions composed of representatives of the two parties, as well as dialogue within populations (Staub, 2011).

However, when the parties reach a limit in the extent to which they are able to create a shared history, a related task is to accept that they have different views of events—when neither view is clearly historically incorrect or morally unacceptable. It would indicate a significant level of reconciliation by Israelis and Palestinians if they taught in their schools some version of both groups' views of the history of their conflict.

JUSTICE PROCESSES

There have been arguments among scholars and practitioners, some stressing the importance of human rights and justice, others claiming that punishment interferes with reconciliation and peace. I see justice as an integral part of reconciliation. It balances the relationship between members of perpetrator and victim groups and reestablishes a moral order. But the punishment of perpetrators is only one form of justice. Another is perpetrators or their group participating in restoring

society. In Rwanda many perpetrators are sentenced to community labor. Working to compensate victims, at least by helping to rebuild society, is one meaning of restorative justice. Another, increasingly practiced in crimes committed against individuals and beginning to be used in cases of group violence, is to bring the parties together so that perpetrators can apologize and express regret. This requires a readiness by both parties and has beneficial effects on both victims and harm doers (Strang et al., 2007).

One potential problem after group violence is unequal justice. After the genocide about 1.5 million Hutus streamed out of Rwanda into Zaire, now the Congo (DRC), including many of the perpetrators. These *genocidaires* then conducted raids into Rwanda, killing more Tutsis. Just as at the time of the genocide, the international community did nothing. The new Rwandan army invaded the Congo twice to fight these *genocidaires* , but it also killed a very large number of Hutu civilians. The justice processes in Rwanda have addressed only crimes of Hutus during the genocide, and not these crimes of the Tutsi-led army.

Countries that forgo justice processes tend to return to them after some period of time. In Argentina, perpetrators of the disappearances in the late 1970s received blanket pardons. This led to persistent distress and protests in segments of the population. As a result, amnesty laws have been overturned and the prosecution of harm doers began more than twenty years after their deeds (Burchianti, 2004). In Cambodia after the genocide in the late 1970s, a tribunal began its work only in 2009, with the first sentence of a perpetrator in 2010.

Economic justice is also very important. Tutsi survivor women in Kigali said at a hearing in 1999 as the Unity and Reconciliation Commission began its work: “We lost

everything, cannot feed our children, cannot pay for their schooling, and need economic compensation." One aspect of economic justice is to help those devastated by violence. This often happens only minimally. In South Africa, victims received much less compensation than initially promised by the TRC (Byrne, 2004). In Rwanda, a poor country, they also have not received sufficient help.

Another aspect of economic justice is addressing inequalities, often a primary source of conflict and violence (Fein, 1993). This requires psychological change in attitudes by the more powerful toward the less powerful and an accompanying change in legitimizing ideologies that justify group differences in access and privilege (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). Only then is it likely that institutions will be created that provide equal access for all groups to society's resources. Equal access may also require practices that address the consequences of a past history, whether differentness or discrimination, such as helping immigrant groups like Muslims in European countries to acculturate (Staub, 2007, 2011),

MOVING TOWARD FORGIVENESS

Forgiveness means letting go of anger and the desire for revenge and moving toward an increasingly positive view of and acceptance of the party that harmed oneself or the people one cares about (McCullough, Finchman, and Tasang, 2003; Worthington, 2005; Staub, 2011). Forgiveness is an aspect of reconciliation, central to which is mutual acceptance. But forgiveness is one-sided: it comes from the party that is harmed, victimized, injured. Forgiveness by victims after intense victimization is extremely difficult. However, it is much more likely if harm doers, or the group they come from, acknowledge their actions, the harm they have caused, express regret,

apologize, and show empathy with their victims or the survivors of their violence. The joining of acknowledgment and progressive forgiveness is then a mutual process, which is the essence of reconciliation.

Private forgiveness, with its element of letting go of pain, can bring relief to people who suffered. But one-sided public forgiveness can be dangerous. Violence creates an imbalance in the relationship between harm doers and victims. While publicly forgiving people who have not acknowledged and showed regret for their actions can sometimes make further harmful action by them less likely, this is more probable if there has been no intense hostility between the parties (Wallace, Exline, and Baumeister, 2008), or if their power to harm has diminished. Otherwise, it can instead increase the imbalance in the relationship and embolden perpetrators, leading to more violence (Staub, 2005a, 2011). The conditions under which unconditional or one-sided forgiveness by those who were harmed moves groups toward peaceful relations, rather than new violence, requires further research.

Usually it is a combination of processes that effectively promotes reconciliation. For example, forgiveness is more likely after some degree of healing and in the context of or after appropriate justice processes (Deutsch, 2008). In our research, soon after the genocide, without yet a justice process, we thought it unreasonable to expect that people would forgive. It is for that reason that we measured "conditional forgiveness" (Staub et al., 2005). As I noted, with many reconciliation processes, there can be reversals, as there was in the Israeli public's view of the "new history" in the course of the second intifada. Immacule Ilibigaza (Ilibagiza and Erwin, 2006) described in her memoir forgiving the Hutu killers while still in hiding from them. But when she went back to her village where all

except one other member of her family was killed, it took her time and effort to recapture the feeling of forgiveness.

Acknowledgment, Apology, Regret

Acknowledgment of suffering—by perpetrators, bystanders, the rest of the world—is likely to contribute to healing. But perpetrators tend to deny what they did or justify their actions as necessary self-defense or in other ways. The devaluation of victims, or opponents in a violent conflict, that is normally present from the start and intensifies in the course of the evolution of increasing violence does not disappear when the violence stops. Members of groups that have engaged in violence often continue to blame victims or opponents and hold on to a destructive ideology that made the other the enemy. These tendencies may be enhanced by guilt and shame that is unacknowledged (Staub, 2011).

However, feeling affirmed can lead people to acknowledge the harm their group has done. When Israelis, and Serbs in Bosnia, were led to focus on experiences that affirmed them, they were more likely to both acknowledge their group's responsibility for harmful actions and support reparations for them (Čehajić;-Clancy, Effron, Halperin, Lieberman, and Ross, 2011; see also Nadler and Schnabel, 2008). And after their group was affirmed, participants in several studies were more willing to accept shame and guilt for harmful actions by their group—e.g., Canadians for their treatment of Aboriginals (Gunn and Wilson, 2011). Healing also strengthens the self and presumably makes acknowledgment more possible (Staub, in press).

THE MULTIPLE PROCESSES IN RECONCILIATION

Practices of reconciliation usually involve a combination and intermingling of elements. As an example, consider a project in Sierra Leone of Fambul Tok, “Family Talk,” a community organization that has designed ways of engaging people with each other:

> Under a tree, or in other settings, organizers, ex-combatants, and victims/community members sit around a bonfire. Religious leaders start the meeting, saying, “If you have done something wrong, come forward, tell about it, apologize to the family of the people harmed, and the whole community.” Confess to a person who never knew who killed his or her son that you did it. The spirit of these meetings is that the truth is cleansing and can be the beginning of reconciliation. This is followed by engaging people, killers and survivors, in varied activities. Some are recreational, such as a soccer match, followed by dialogue. In others people work together, for example, to replenish stock. Others are community forums that people initiate. In still others, sitting under a tree, they talk through how to engage in acts that contribute to reconciliation—such as having worn a blue shirt while killing someone’s parents, and not wearing blue when visiting that person. (Staub, 2011, p. 485)

In Sierra Leone, violent groups not only killed but also maimed many people, cutting off arms or other body parts. One of the activities of Fambul Tok has been to bring perpetrators together with survivors whose family members they killed and the communities in which they killed people. This also is a multifaceted process, more so than it looks on the surface. The public aspect of it is to bring a perpetrator to a community and face-to-face with a survivor who seemingly miraculously forgives him in front of the community (Fambul Tok, 2012) . But there is a great deal of both preparation, working with the perpetrator, the

community, and the individual who publicly forgives, as well as follow-up. Over time the symbolic act of forgiveness turns into real reconciliation. In this process, some perpetrators become agents of reconciliation.

Progressively Increasing Acceptance of the Past

Letting go of the past, not dwelling in pain, is an important contributor to reconciliation. This view comes from my experience in the field. Acceptance of the past does not mean forgetting. It requires healing and is furthered by understanding, but it may precede forgiving. Accepting is a psychological state or attitude that says: “This is what happened to us, this has been our life, this is who we are. But our past does not dictate our future. We can use what we learned from the past wisely, not be a slave or victim of it.” It is one of the things that Palestinians and Israelis seem to have difficulty with (Staub, 2011). At least some Palestinians cannot accept the state of Israel, a well-established entity, and the loss of the homes of their grandparents or parents and their suffering as refugees and having lived under occupation. At least some Israelis cannot move beyond all the Jewish victimization in the past, the terrorist attacks on them, and Arab hostility toward them over the years. Although Israelis are in a dominant position relative to Palestinians, they cannot live enough in the present and future to trust reconciliation with Palestinians and engage in actions that can lead to it. Both groups also hold on to destructive ideologies that interfere with peace.

Destructive Ideology versus Constructive Ideologies

Ideologies are visions of social arrangements and of relationships between groups and individuals. In the face of

difficult social conditions, new ideologies tend to emerge, visions of the future to be created, that provide hope for their group. These visions, and joining together in an ideological movement, help fulfill needs for effectiveness, community, identity, and an understanding of reality. However, they are often destructive, as they identify enemies who stand in the way of the fulfillment of the ideology—the creation of the better future. These ideologies are powerful motivators of violence against the identified enemy.

Among some Palestinians, in particular Hamas, a continuing vision is the elimination of Israel (and perhaps of Jewish Israelis) and the creation of a Palestinian state in its place. Among some Israelis, the destructive ideology is the recreation of historical Greater Israel, which includes the West Bank, with the Palestinians who live there, standing in the way. Reconciliation requires moving from destructive to constructive ideologies in which the vision of the hopeful future includes all groups. This makes it possible for all groups to join in working for the ideology's fulfillment. Such a shared vision for Palestinians and Israelis can include, minimally, two states in an economic community living in peace, thus benefiting the region and making terrorism less likely (Staub, 2011).

Political Conditions and Reconciliation: Pluralistic, Fair, and Democratic Institutions

What are the institutionalized practices and institutions that promote reconciliation, or interfere with it and with one of its primary aims, a peaceful society? As I discuss them, I will provide examples for some of them from Rwanda.

Pluralism, the free flow of ideas, and the access of all groups to the public space, all groups having a voice, are

essential for reconciliation and lasting peace. Sometimes reconciliation processes and the sociopolitical context are at odds with each other. For example, in Rwanda, the government advocates reconciliation and promotes certain reconciliation processes. At the same time it holds an "ideology of unity," that there are only Rwandans, not Hutus and Tutsis. In the name of unity, it discourages references to Hutus and Tutsis. There are laws that can lead to jail sentences for vaguely defined "divisionism" and advocating genocidal ideologies, also vaguely defined. This limits the free expression of ideas and the discussion of issues between Tutsis and Hutus (Prunier, 2009; Staub, 2011).

Limits on press freedom and on the expression of varied views limit political processes. It is a free and active press that enables people to make their own judgment about events and advocate for political views and parties. The government limits political opposition in other ways as well. This may be in part because Tutsis, about 15 percent of the population, still fear Hutus, about 84 percent of the population, and in part because once in power, governments in countries that have not developed democratic institutions resist yielding power.

Democratic political institutions mean a free press, civic institutions that involve people in the political process, and free elections. These create trust that through proper representation of the different groups in the population, conflicts can be peacefully resolved. In societies with subgroups of very different sizes, with each holding on to its identity, constitutions are needed that provide for representing the interests of each group. External bystanders working together with internal groups can be helpful in this. In Macedonia, external nongovernmental organizations developed ideas that were used in creating a new constitution that helped address some of the issues

between ethnic groups (Burg, 1997). The US Department of Justice provided such help in Rwanda. Other important institutions are the police and the justice system. To create a peaceful society, there needs to be equal justice regardless of group differences in wealth and power and accountability for violent and criminal conduct. Even better is the prevention of such conduct. For example, the Rwandan government carefully monitors the behavior of its leaders to prevent corruption.

I have already discussed the importance of economic justice. In Rwanda, new laws attempt to create equality of opportunity in access to education and jobs. The fast economic development of Rwanda (Kinzer, 2008) has increased differences in wealth between segments of the population, as usually happens in cases of speedy economic development in poor countries. But equal access to opportunity, especially if it becomes increasingly de facto, can create trust in the system.

Psychological changes and the development of institutions are intertwined. Members of each group, especially powerful groups, increasingly need to see the humanity of other groups in order to be motivated to establish institutions that treat people equally. Such institutions in turn further change attitudes and values. Just as violence and the institutions that serve it evolve progressively, so do the processes and institutions that serve reconciliation and peace.

The presence of the psychological conditions I described and their social manifestations (e.g., positive attitudes toward other groups, some degree of healing, constructive ideology) and constructive institutions can be used together to assess the level of reconciliation in a society and the prospects for peace. In summary, these institutions include a free press, civic institutions that promote political

participation by all groups, free elections, a law-abiding and fair police, a justice system that addresses both present and past crimes, the absence of corruption, lack of discrimination in access to education and jobs, and a culture and social system that makes equal opportunity real.

Public Education about Conflict and Conflict Resolution

Even if the processes of prevention and reconciliation are effective, conflicts between subgroups of societies can emerge, especially in plural societies. In addition, even after healing processes and more positive attitudes by groups toward each other, great past violence leaves in its wake psychological vulnerabilities. These can emerge and have strong effects under newly developing difficult life conditions or group conflict. Understanding this can serve to some degree as inoculation against its happening. Creating fair and democratic institutions, and knowledge and skills to prevent and or address conflict can build confidence, lessening the impact of challenging conditions as well as enabling groups to peacefully deal with them.

Lederach (1997) has written about downward influence (the influence of leaders on the population), upward influence (the influence of the population on leaders), and groups in the middle (such as the media and church leaders), who can exert both upward and downward influence. One avenue for the transformation of each of these groups, so that it becomes an agent of positive change, is public education through radio and television, depending on what is appropriate for a particular setting, as well as trainings and workshops.

Our trainings in Rwanda and its use with leaders is one example (Staub, 2011; Staub and Pearlman, 2006).

However, because of insufficient human and material resources, these trainings were not continued as we moved on to educational radio programs. For lasting change, especially by leaders guided by ideology and part of a highly hierarchical system, extended trainings are needed (Staub, 2013). Another example is the trainings that Howard Wolpe and his associates (Wolpe et al., 2004) conducted in Burundi. In Burundi also, Hutus and Tutsis are the two primary groups, and they have engaged in a great deal of violence against each other. Wolpe and his associates brought leaders of various kinds together—military, different civilian groups, and so on—to develop skills in dialogue and negotiation, as well as comfort with each other, before addressing issues to be resolved. Such trainings can develop the capacity of parties to listen to each other, hear the essential concerns of the other group and express their own effectively, compromise, use mediators as appropriate, to be able to identify escalation and use de-escalation processes, and in general gain knowledge and skills in conflict management and resolution (Coleman, 2012; Kelman and Fisher, 2003). One relevant institution to create would be mediation centers that both provide training and offer mediation services.

After violent conflict or mass violence—one-sided or mutual harm doing—as the parties come together, it is difficult for them not to start with expressing all their pain, anger, and hostility. In our workshops in Rwanda, people interacted around ideas and gained experiential understanding that apparently lessened the negative view of the other party and modulated feelings of hurt and anger (Staub et al., 2005; Staub and Pearlman, 2006). Starting with such a process may help parties to engage effectively with each other.

Raising Inclusively Caring Children with Moral Courage

A crucial aspect of reconciliation and long-term peace is the way children are socialized. How history is taught, how children in different groups are led to engage with each other, affects attitudes toward the other. Fostering inclusive caring, expanding empathy and a feeling of responsibility to all people, is crucial. So is moral courage, the willingness and capacity to express caring and moral values in action, even in the face of possible or actual opposition and negative reactions.

There is research and theory about practices for raising caring and helpful children, with more limited research and theory about raising inclusively caring and morally courageous children (Eisenberg, Fabes, and Spinrad, 2006; Oliner and Oliner, 1988; Staub, 2003, 2005b, in press). These practices include love and affection, and positive guidance, with adults verbally promoting, providing models of, and leading children to engage in positive behavior. To make caring inclusive, this has to be toward all people, not only members of one's own group. For the development of moral courage, it is important also to allow and encourage children to express their views and act on their beliefs (Staub, 2003, 2005b, 2011, in press). But to engage in such practices, there must be transformation in adults. The processes of reconciliation I described, including ways to promote positive orientation toward others and healing, can contribute to this transformation. But substantially more research is needed on how to develop inclusive caring and moral courage.

CONCLUSION

Reconciliation between groups requires a variety of psychological changes, which can be maintained and further promoted through the creation of certain kinds of institutions. Just as violence progressively evolves, reconciliation and the building of a peaceful society are also progressive. Following the principles of learning by doing, earlier actions and the changes that result from them can transform people in positive ways. What to do (e.g., humanizing the other group), how to do it (e.g., through significant contact, or what is said about a devalued group in the media or by leaders), and who are the appropriate and necessary actors for particular reconciliation processes and activities all need to be addressed (Staub, 2011). Actions by leaders, followers, bystanders, the media, intellectuals, and parents and teachers who promote devaluation and destructive ideologies are all involved in the development of significant violence between groups; they are also all very much needed for promoting reconciliation and building a peaceful society.

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CHAPTER FORTY-ONE
SOCIAL NETWORKS, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION [a]

James D. Westaby
Nicholas Redding

Research on social networks has seen exponential growth in the social sciences since the turn of the twenty-first century (Knoke and Yang, 2007; Watts, 2004). The network approach also has considerable value for conflict scholars and practitioners because it provides a unique set of metaphors and tools that can help describe social conflicts. In this chapter, we first provide an overview of traditional social network analysis and then review a number of studies using social network concepts to understand conflict and the role of social media in conflict settings. We next demonstrate how new concepts in dynamic network theory may provide a deeper psychologically based explanation of social conflicts (Westaby, 2012), which can also inform conflict resolution strategies. By infusing goals into social networks, dynamic network theorizing provides social scientists and practitioners with new ways to conceptualize conflict.

TRADITIONAL SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

Social network concepts allow us to methodologically describe the structural linkages among entities (Newman, 2003; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Figure 41.1a illustrates a traditional social network analysis of a small social network interacting around a working and a stay-at-home spouse. In this illustration, five individuals have various

links with one another. These charts have considerable appeal for describing basic connections among people, and social scientists have generated an array of statistics to describe the interactions in these case studies (Balkundi and Kilduff, 2006). For instance, the concept of density indicates the number of observed links divided by the number of total possible links in the network. In figure 41.1a , there are four links divided by ten possible linkages, which results in a network density of .40. When this number approaches 1, it represents a network where everyone is densely connected to one another and implies a strong form of interdependence. When the metric is near 0, it illustrates a social network where no one is connected and implies independence among actors.




Figure 41.1 Network Chart Comparisons

Sociologists have developed other metrics to describe social networks as well (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). For

example, centrality typically represents how information flows through central individuals in social networks. In figure 41.1a , you can see that the working and stay-at-home spouses are more centrally located in the network than others. When the centrality indicators approach 1, it often suggests that information is flowing through key individuals in the system, such as the spouses in this case. Another important conceptualization in the social network literature is that of structural holes (Burt, 1992), which represent “gaps in the social world across which there are no current connections, but that can be connected by savvy entrepreneurs who thereby gain control over the flow of information across the gaps” (Kilduff and Tsai, 2003, p. 28). The concept that weak links can be powerful (Granovetter, 1973) also illustrates situations where people can leverage their weak contacts with others to facilitate social capital in their lives. For example, by engaging in even a brief conversation with your new neighbor, you could create a weak link, which may facilitate your social capital in the future. However, this line of theorizing does not sufficiently differentiate how various types of links may have different effects (e.g., a weak hostile link could have an adverse impact on such capital), which can be important according to dynamic network theory (Westaby, 2012).

The principle of homophily is relevant to some conflict settings as well. Homophily often refers to the tendency for people to interact and connect with similar others. Kupersmidt et al. (1995) showed how similarity between individuals increased their likelihood of being friends. In contrast, the ties between people that are not similar to one another are more vulnerable to decay, which can set the stage for social niches to form (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001). However, such dissimilarity need not always lead to conflict. Dynamic network theory (Westaby, 2012) illustrates that there are many situations in

which people are willing to work with and support others that are not similar to themselves in pursuit of common goals.

Finally, in line with assumptions that people are motivated to maintain structural balance in their interpersonal relations and cognitions (Cartwright and Harary, 1956), researchers often look at the generic positive and negative valences people have with one another and then make assumptions about the entire system. In other words, if we know how many positive and negative links exist in a social network, we may presume that we can understand how much overall conflict and cooperation there is in the system. For example, in 41.1a, you can easily see that the working and stay-at-home spouses have a negative relation with each other (the dashed path), which implies an interpersonal conflict. All other linkages have positive valences in the system (the solid paths). From this orientation, the ratio of positive to negative valences is .75 in this example, implying a generally positive system of interpersonal relations. Although mapping valences in this way is a common approach for studying interpersonal relations and is presumed to model the true motivational forces of full systems, it has the potential to oversimplify the underlying motivational and conflicting forces in the network. Dynamic network theorizing that incorporates goals provides an alternative perspective as illustrated below. Overall, traditional social network perspectives benefit both researchers and practitioners of conflict resolution by encouraging the assessment of conflict in broader social systems instead of focusing on the primary parties involved in the conflict.

SOCIAL NETWORK RESEARCH ON CONFLICT

We now review research findings regarding traditional networks and conflict. Although not an exhaustive review, this includes a sampling of research at different levels of analysis. First, in a study of 2,348 married or cohabitating adults, Walen and Lachman (2000) found that networks with higher levels of support reduced harmful effects during strained interactions. They also found that women benefited more from friends and family than men did. From another vantage, Vanbrabant et al. (2012) found a positive association between personal social network size and reported verbal aggression, controlling for extraversion, neuroticism, and gender. Neal (2009) examined the peer social networks of third through eighth graders, looking specifically at the location of aggressive children in terms of network centrality and density and how these variables were associated with relational aggression. Results indicated that network density was positively related to relational aggression. In contrast, in a study of sixth graders, Mouttapa, Valente, Gallaher, Rohrbach, and Unger (2004) found that children who were friends with a bully (self-reported) were more likely to self-report bullying behavior themselves and less likely to report being a victim of bullying.

Social network analysis has been applied to understanding a variety of negative group dynamics as well. One study examined conflict within groups in terms of adversarial networks (Xia, Yuan, and Gay, 2009). Not surprisingly, these researchers found that group members who have more negative evaluations of other group members are less satisfied with the group. As for psychological dynamics in groups, research has shown that task conflicts can have a positive effect on groups performing complex tasks as compared to routine tasks, but relationship conflicts have a negative effect (Jehn, 1995). Curşeu, Janssen, and Raab (2011) extended these findings by identifying network

structures that minimize destructive conflict in groups. They suggest that work groups can maximize the benefits of conflict in teams by dividing groups into subgroup task units while minimizing the destructive elements of relationship conflict through training in communication and interpersonal skills.

de Dreu and Gelfand (2008) have pointed out that organizations today operate in an interorganizational network that has a strong influence on personnel selection, managerial techniques, and technologies, all of which play a role in conflicts and tensions in an organization. These conflicts often manifest internally as environmental pressures exert uneven influences on different aspects of the organization. As for leadership in organizations, Balkundi, Barsness, and Michael (2009) found that leaders who were frequently sought out for advice reported lower incidents of team conflict.

Labianca, Brass, and Gray (1998) found that individual perceptions of high intergroup conflict in an organization were related to negative relationships across groups, indirect negative relationships through friends in the organization, and low intragroup cohesiveness. Using simulations, Krackhardt and Stern (1988) found that organizations with a higher density of friendship links that extended across subgroups outperformed those where friendship networks were most dense within subgroups.

SOCIAL MEDIA

The past two decades have seen unprecedented innovation in social media technology and services that facilitate digital communication between individuals, groups, organizations, and nations. According to Hughes, Rowe, Batey, and Lee (2012), “social networking sites (SNS) are quickly becoming one of the most popular tools for social

interaction and information exchange" (p. 561). For instance, at the time of this writing, among all US adults, 66 percent use at least one social networking site (e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn, or Google+), and 48 percent visit these sites as part of their typical day. Facebook, launched in 2004, is currently the most popular digital social networking service. As of September 2012, the number of monthly active users of Facebook worldwide reached 1 billion, with Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and the United States being the top five countries in terms of membership numbers (Facebook, 2012). That means that roughly one in seven global citizens is using the service in some capacity. Twitter is also a popular social media website, and it is likely that a variety of new services will emerge in the future as competition increases in this expanding market. Although there are reasons to suspect that these online tools would reduce conflict through increased social interaction and the ability to express views regardless of geographic location or social stratus, it is also likely that the increased availability of these communication tools, combined with the ability to remain anonymous, may serve the opposite effect (Bargh and McKenna, 2004).

Early experimental research on computer-mediated communication showed that users participated more equally, were able to more quickly shift positions on topics or decisions, and were less inhibited than when communicating face-to-face (Kiesler, Siegel, and McGuire, 1984). Today there are countless spaces online where individuals can form virtual groups for discussion and sharing ideas, including places to help resolve conflicts. While many of these groups may function well, there are frequent examples of online interactions that escalate into destructive, counterproductive dialogues (Lee, 2005; Moor, Heuvelman, and Verleur, 2010). Lee (2005) has illustrated

various ways that social media users deal with hostile situations online, such as competitive strategies (e.g., flaming and denouncing), avoidance approaches (e.g., withdrawal), and cooperative tactics (e.g., showing solidarity, apologizing, and mediating).

Some research has shown how online social networks can complicate relationships. For example, Papp, Danielewicz, and Cayemberg (2012) found that disagreements among couples as to whether the relationship status should be shared on Facebook was associated with decreased relationship satisfaction for women but not men. Some researchers suggest that sites such as Facebook also make it easier for an individual to obsessively observe someone without his or her consent, especially the case for former romantic partners (Chaulk and Jones, 2011; Lyndon, Bonds-Raacke, and Cratty, 2011), as well as promote jealousy in current relationships due to online monitoring of the partner's activities (Muise, Christofides, and Desmarais, 2009).

Cyberbullying is also becoming a serious concern. Mesch (2009) reported that adolescents who have active profiles on social networking sites or who participate in online chat rooms are more likely to be bullied. In a survey of 756 Turkish middle school students, males indicated engaging in more cyberbullying than females, and students were often not aware of effective strategies for bringing cyberbullying issues to adults (Yilmaz, 2011).

Defamation on the Internet and on social media is another serious source of conflict and interpersonal hardship, and there are few standardized ways to deal with its presence. For example, some individuals may take advantage of freedom of speech values (e.g., implicitly or explicitly endorsed by a website's policy) by making false accusations about others in efforts to tarnish or destroy their

reputations. Some may even do so to promote their competing products or ideology. This is often made possible when website platforms do not sufficiently vet posted information or do not remove abusive information, have insufficient guidelines to avoid defamatory situations, and do not verify (or post) true identities. Complicating matters further is when such defamatory accusations are made anonymously without verifiable evidence. In such cases, it is difficult to hold the accusers accountable for their commentary, which may remain online indefinitely. Some of the ways that people could manage these escalated situations is to pursue legal action against the websites or the individuals posting such material online (if they can be identified through court action or digital tracking). This can be a costly and emotionally laborious process. Various people have described the current state of affairs on the Internet as the “wild west” (Hundley and Anderson, 1995), which implies that some people may become victimized by others who exploit systems or take advantage of poor accountability. A related issue of conflict concerns privacy of information. Given that communications and images are held in digital form online, conflicts arise in terms of how that information is used by third parties. Large-scale conflicts can arise when important digital information is lost, stolen, or sold without permission.

Relevant to new advances in online gaming technology, Ferguson (2010) highlights the implications of massive multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPG). These games often include violence toward fictional characters, but at the same time promote complex social interactions between individuals, even individuals who would otherwise be challenged in social situations, which allows whole online social communities to develop. However, because research has shown that violence on TV can affect

aggressive behavior (Bushman and Huesmann, 2006), much more research is needed to evaluate MMORPGs.

Even basic e-mail conversations can contribute to the escalation of network conflicts. Friedman and Currall (2003) suggest that the nature of e-mails is asynchronous, which means that e-mail correspondence is not a conversation but instead a back-and-forth exchange of statements. It is also text based, which means it lacks the facial expressions of face-to-face or videoconferencing interactions and verbal intonation and nuance that would be present in a telephone conversation. This can contribute to misunderstanding. However, e-mail allows people to delay responses and take more time to review and revise their messages for accuracy. Turnage (2007) suggests several ways to deal with these pitfalls such as “netiquette” training programs.

In communities around the globe, many youth represent the wired generation of individuals who have connected and engaged in ways never before possible, which allows entirely new ways of organizing and exercising participatory citizenship roles (Herrara, 2012). Social media may also play an important role in how citizens take action when they become dissatisfied with their governments. For example, in Egypt, early social media use among youths was primarily in the form of blogging. The extreme popularity of blogging was soon supplanted by the introduction of Facebook, which saw membership grow from a little over 800,000 in 2008, to 5.6 million three years later, with 2 million users joining Facebook during the first few months of the Arab revolutions (Herrera, 2012). Facebook may have allowed many youth to organize much more effectively than blogging because of the ability of individuals to create groups, Facebook pages for various issues, and mass invites for Facebook members to attend events (such as sit-ins, protests, marches, and strikes). In

addition, Twitter may have provided protestors with an effective way of quickly engaging foreign media, and the media were able to provide more comprehensive and moment-to-moment reporting of events in real time (Lysenko and Desouza, 2012).

Online communication tools such as Twitter also offer a promising new platform for researchers to explore large-scale conflict dynamics. Not only are various forms of data publicly available, but the data often represent an aspect of the actual network of communications characterizing the situation. Scholars can use these data to analyze international conflicts dynamically because people on the ground are disseminating information about events that are occurring in their communities in real time. For example, Zeitzoff (2011), using content from Twitter and other social media sources, was able to measure the military responses of Israel and Hamas during the 2008–2009 Gaza conflict to identify important turning points in the conflict: the movement of Israeli troops into Gaza and the UN Security Council vote calling for an immediate cease-fire. As social media tools proliferate, researchers will have more opportunities to conduct studies like this, mapping complex large-scale conflict dynamics as they unfold.

DYNAMIC NETWORK THEORY

Although traditional social network concepts have been incredibly helpful in showing how people are linked to one another in various ways, they have lacked a deeper integration of psychologically based goal pursuit and intention concepts, which are often presumed to be critical drivers of human action (Ajzen, 1991; Westaby, 2005; Westaby, Probst, and Lee, 2010). This psychological void may be a concern because many human conflicts result from tensions originating with people’s opposing goals,

desires, and aspirations (Deutsch, 1977). Hence, accounting for goals in social networks is critical to advancing our understanding of how conflicts can be addressed and resolved. Fortunately, new advances in the dynamic network theory of goal pursuit (Westaby, 2012) explicitly address how social networks are involved in fundamental goal pursuits, which has implications for the study of conflict and its resolution.

What's New and Different?

A unique feature of dynamic network theory (Westaby, 2012) is that it articulates how only eight social network role behaviors are critical to explain how social networks are involved in goal pursuits and human aspiration. We illustrate these roles in the context of a network having a work-family conflict generated by a working spouse with a strong desire or goal to work a lot of overtime. In this case, the working spouse is considered a *goal striver* toward working overtime (G) in the theory. The spouse is also receiving a lot of support for working overtime from a supervisor and other coworkers at the firm (who are perhaps swamped at work). These entities are referred to as *system supporters* (S) in the theory. These linkages and their labels can be seen in the dynamic network chart in 41.1b. The theory predicts that systems that have considerable goal striving and system supporting (more generally referred to as network motivation) will have higher levels of success in reaching their target goal, especially when they are competent in their actions.

In contrast, social conflict can arise in social systems through *network resistance* , such as emanating from the stay-at-home spouse who is trying to stop the overtime. This is referred to as *goal prevention* role behavior in the theory (P) and is shown with dashed paths to goals. If this spouse has others in the network supporting the resistance,

referred to as *supportive resistance* (V), it shows how other entities in the network are helping fuel forces against the goal and thus how a wider conflict can exist in the social network. This is also depicted in 41.1b with dashed paths between relevant parties. Greater goal preventing and supportive resisting in a social network is predicted to have a larger effect on thwarting the target goal pursuit. Ironically, the individuals in some of these conflict settings may not show any hostility or aggression toward one another, such as two professional athletes engaged in a tough match who share no animosity toward each other (or may even be friends). Hence, dynamic network theorizing allows for such nuanced relations, instead of relying on assumptions that goal prevention and supportive resistance behaviors always have hostile or aggressive intent.

In other cases, interpersonal negativity, such as hostility, prejudice, and aggression, can coexist with goal prevention (e.g., a hostile competition). Dynamic network theory refers to such interpersonal linkages that contain such affect-based hostility, negativity, or prejudice as, first, *system negation* (N), to represent a person's negativity toward another's goal pursuit. Second, *system reactance* (R) represents a person's negativity toward another's resistance toward the goal pursuit. To illustrate these concepts in our example in figure 41.1b , the stay-at-home spouse shows system negation toward the working spouse's desire for overtime (i.e., is upset about it), while the working spouse is reacting to this by showing hostile negativity back to the spouse because of the resistance. [1] This example illustrates how a mutual conflict in the social network has formed in relation to the underlying goal issues about overtime work. That is, system negation has formed in conjunction with goal prevention. More broadly, research has shown that negative social network ties in general are related to increased psychological distress

(Finch, Okun, Barrera, Zautra, and Reich, 1989) and lower life satisfaction (Brenner, Norvell, and Limacher, 1989), although much of this research has not unpacked how these negative links are related to underlying goal prevention and/or system negation, which we presume are often independent dimensions that may be correlated in some contexts.

Finally, there may be other ironic effects of goal prevention and supportive resistance on conflict resolution processes. For example, these behaviors could represent constructive forms of conflict resolution when they successfully prevent others from pursuing actions that ironically inhibit them from securing other more valuable goals and outcomes, such as a negotiator getting another person to see that the counteroffer will actually result in more positive outcomes for the person than the initial offer.

More generally, besides providing a new approach to understand social connections, dynamic network charts also allow scholars and practitioners to describe overall dynamics in social systems. For example, the network affirmation ratio shows the overall ratio of positive to negative forces involved in goal pursuits. This value was .57 in the work-family conflict in figure 41.1b , illustrating that considerable conflict exists in this system in relation to the overtime issue. It is here where we can see potentially sharp differences between traditional social network diagrams and dynamic network charts. For example, the traditional network approach (without goals) indicates that the overall ratio of positive to negative valences in figure 41.1a was .75. This represents a rather positive system and a substantively higher value than .57 in the dynamic network chart, which represents a system with considerably more conflicting forces that in some intractable contexts may accumulate over time (Coleman, 2011; Gottman and Levenson, 1992).

How do we explain this difference? On closer inspection, we see that although the friend and stay-at-home spouse's linkage is positive in the traditional network approach, this linkage is actually a set of behaviors that is supporting the stay-at-home spouse's resistance to others wanting to pursue overtime. Although the friend and stay-at-home spouse have a generally positive link with each other, this link is a force working against others in the social network wanting the overtime. Hence, the traditional network approach is potentially oversimplifying the system and overestimating the positivity ratio when we look at a key issue in the system. The dynamic network chart, in contrast, can unpack how people are working with (or against) one another toward their different goals and desires, which may provide a deeper understanding of human conflict forces operating in a systemic context (Lewin, 1951).

Finally, although not shown in figure 41.1b for simplicity, dynamic network theory also illustrates that people in peripheral roles can have an impact on goal pursuit and human conflict processes. In particular, *interactants* (I) are people who are interacting around others in goal pursuit but not helping, hurting, or even observing what is going on in the system. For example, a child may be interacting around the spouses but is not paying attention to their discussions about overtime at work. Such interactants can also change conflict dynamics inadvertently, such as the two spouses toning down their disagreement about overtime when the children are nearby. This interaction may also introduce additional goals into the system. For example, a child may remind the couple of their positive interdependence and love, which in turn would decrease the relative importance of the work-conflict issue. *Observers* (O), the last role in the theory, represent people watching, listening to, or generally observing a given goal

issue or conflict between people but not helping, hurting, or interfering with the situation. For example, a cousin may have heard about the conflict between the spouses but did not take a position either way. People in peripheral roles can also be targets for change in conflict resolution strategies. For instance, the working spouse may ask the cousin to support the overtime and try to change the stay-at-home spouse's mind about it. [2]

The Network Rippling of Emotions

Dynamic network theory also proposes how emotions and hostilities spread in networks through the network rippling of emotions process (Westaby, 2012), which is important in explaining how relational conflicts can start. This process illustrates how goal achievement or goal progress (or a lack thereof) affects the spreading of emotions to specific people in social networks. To illustrate, when goal strivers achieve their goals or desires, they are expected, not surprisingly, to feel positive emotions about the success. But if these goal strivers also had system supporters (even among those in out-groups), these supporters would be expected to have positive emotional reactions in regard to the goal striver's success, such as a parent feeling good about his or her child's winning an award in a heated competition. Here, one can see that emotions in the network are contingent on the goal and are directed in systematic ways.

In contrast, if goal preventers, supportive resistors, or system negators exist in the same system defined around a given goal issue, they would be expected to experience negative emotions such as frustration, envy, or jealousy when others are achieving the goals they wanted to resist. For example, both the child who lost the heated competition and his or her parents would likely feel negative emotions and target some of this negativity and frustration toward those on the winning side. It is here

where interpersonal negative links now exist. This hostility may be direct, such as confronting the other family, or indirect, such as gossiping malevolently about them. Such triggers can also set the stage for potentially longer-enduring or even intractable conflicts between people (with negative attractor states) unless these negative orientations can be destabilized or reconciled (Vallacher, Coleman, Nowak, and Bui-Wrzosinska, 2010).

The theory also delineates that generalized conflicts can exist among entities in social networks even when there is no previous interaction or direct goal prevention. For example, some people may have preconceived stereotypes and prejudices about others, based on their group classification or identity, even though they have never interacted before. Or people may believe negative things they hear about others through third-party gossiping—even things that may be groundless in fact. In these cases, individuals and groups can learn and develop system negation, distrust, and prejudice without having been involved in one another's lives.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION STRATEGIES IN SOCIAL NETWORKS

In this section, we illustrate how practitioners could use dynamic network concepts to portray conflicts and use such information for facilitating change. In the traditional social network approach, a practitioner would often enter network data into a computer program (such as through an adjacency matrix) to understand how people are positively or negatively linked to one another, as illustrated in figure 41.1a . Computer programs then provide visuals that allow practitioners to see all the linkages between entities. Although visually interesting, the data can be overwhelming to understand when the network becomes

large, with many boxes and numerous lines. Fortunately, as an alternative, researchers or practitioners could also focus on calculating statistics about each of the entities (i.e., an egocentric analysis) to gauge their presumed importance in the system, especially their level of centrality (Balkundi and Kilduff, 2006). A traditional network approach often assumes that the entities that are most central are critical to target in an intervention.

While this makes intuitive sense at first glance, there may be some difficulties in implementation when compared to other approaches. To illustrate, in figure 41.1a , the working spouse is most central in this simple network because he or she has the most connected linkages. Thus, a traditional network approach could suggest that this is the primary entity to target with the intervention. However, such an approach, void of other motivational orientations in the conflict, may not steer an intervention effectively. For example, according to dynamic network theory, an intervention must include both the working spouse and stay-at-home spouse because they are not only negatively reacting to one another (N and R), they are both equally and directly involved in their goal-related conflict about working overtime (G and P). The theory therefore provides additional guidance to understand key motivational orientations in networks, which can be used to inform interventions.

NETWORK CONFLICT WORKSHEET

Another concern that practitioners face when using social network diagrams and even fully detailed dynamic network charts is the laborious nature of using these methods in practice. Fortunately, because dynamic network theory can capture critical motivational parameters involved in network conflicts, it can provide another parsimonious

approach, which we introduce in this chapter. Specifically, figure 41.2 presents a network conflict worksheet that may be helpful for gaining a system perspective about how multiple social network entities are motivationally involved in a network conflict. This initial formulation, which needs further refinement, could provide practitioners with a basic method of conflict analysis from a network perspective. This tool could also be used in conjunction with other tools of assessment, such as those assessing the parties' values, interests, and objectives. To process the worksheet, researchers or practitioners could use the worksheet to collect information confidentially from individuals in the network. Or the worksheet could be used to facilitate group discussions by initially breaking the groups into different sides of the conflict to minimize overt conflict between parties and then later bringing the sides together to develop a deeper understanding of the complexities of the conflict once a professional facilitator processing the information deems it safe and ethically appropriate. That is, researchers or practitioners should be very careful about the way in which identities, general descriptors, or pseudonyms are used in discussions, reports, or data presentations based on ethically appropriate choices for information sharing. In sensitive settings, it may be prudent for mediators, for example, to use the information collected confidentially (or anonymously) from individuals using the worksheet to help understand the social context and brainstorm solutions, but not to share how individuals responded to the worksheet in public.




Figure 41.2 Network Conflict Worksheet

Before describing the worksheet, there are important considerations to keep in mind. At first glance, it would

appear that the worksheet forces the practitioner to limit the conflict analysis to a dichotomy of side 1 versus side 2. [3] Although such a dichotomy may help map how people see some parties in the system, the worksheet goes beyond this. That is, the analysis allows researchers or practitioners to identify the various parties involved in conflicts beyond those taking sides. Furthermore, to maintain simplicity, the worksheet does not directly detail larger systemic-level forces acting on the conflict situation, which could be addressed in discussion, such as the effects of new policies, laws, or environmental pressures imposed on a system. Hence, the worksheet should be used with complementary assessments and processes whenever possible to assess a given conflict.

To complete this basic version of the worksheet, a researcher or practitioner would ask participants (individually or in group discussions) to start at the top of the page and work their way down for each category of questions. [4] For example, participants would first respond to, “What’s the conflict about?” (box 1). Answers may also reveal the types of issues, interests, needs, procedural concerns, substantive disagreements, worldviews, psychological needs, and so forth that are involved in the conflict. Then participants would be asked to indicate which parties they perceive to be directly versus indirectly involved in side 1 of the conflict (boxes 2 and 4). Then perceptions about entities involved on the other side of the conflict would be assessed (boxes 3 and 5). Conceptually the upper part of the worksheet illustrates entities who are deeply involved in the network conflict. The lower part of the worksheet illustrates entities exclusively involved in more peripheral roles in the system, such as those who are observing or are neutral in the conflict but are not involved. [5] Once the information is collected individually or discussed in groups, researchers or practitioners can use the

worksheet in various ways to learn about the system and then potentially to intervene.

Describing the System

Worksheet information can be beneficial in describing a variety of system characteristics. First, it can gauge the group's overall level of confidence about the roles they perceive in the system. To calculate this, one would simply count the number of question marks in the worksheet or calculate the *certainty ratio* (i.e., [number of question marks/total number of entities in the system]−1). Second, researchers or practitioners could use information from the worksheet to measure the level of agreement, common ground, or disagreement between the parties about the nature of the conflict itself (box 1). If there are inconsistencies, practitioners could attempt to generate a clearer and more agreed-on understanding of the conflict among the parties or encourage the parties to appreciate how other views of the conflict could have legitimately formed in an effort to build more compassion and understanding in the system, akin to classic methods of conflict resolution (Deutsch, 1977; Pruitt and Kim, 2004).

Third, the worksheet approach could be used to explore interesting clues about dynamic network intelligence (DNI) in the network (Westaby, 2012). DNI represents how accurate people are in their perceptions about who plays what roles in the system. For example, if Jane on side 1 sees Joe as a direct actor on side 2 of the conflict (e.g., a goal preventer), but Joe sincerely does not place himself in that role at all, and instead views himself as an observer in box 8, such feedback to Jane may help alleviate her anger and system reactance toward Joe. In this case, Jane's initial DNI was low, and this could be a significant psychological contributor to the conflict that is generating her negativity toward Joe. Moreover, if some people are placed in multiple

boxes at the same time, they may be playing various sides of the conflict or are acting in ways perceived to be ambiguous by people monitoring the actions in the system. In a conflict situation where low DNI has been identified, the facilitators would ideally try to help members of the network navigate how perceptions are mapping onto reality (or not) in the social context, akin to how counselors apply principles in cognitive behavioral therapy.

Fourth, one can gauge a network hostility ratio in the system (the negators and reactors) by calculating the number of people who have checked names in side 1 and side 2 boxes divided by the total number of people named in those boxes. As this ratio approaches 1, it suggests an extremely contentious or escalated conflict, which would require a more urgent and directed intervention strategy. An implicit goal for those trying to resolve the conflict is to reduce this ratio so that anger does not transform into physical aggression. Finally, one can also gauge a conflict motivation ratio, which shows the overall balance of people motivated on side 1 versus side 2 of the conflict (the number of people in box 2 and 4 divided by total number of people in boxes 2, 3, 4, and 5). When this ratio approaches 1, it suggests that side 1 is dominating the network. When it approaches 0, it suggests that side 2 is dominating. When it is near .5, it suggests an even split of motivation on both sides. To gather this information, researchers or practitioners could create a network conflict scorecard to portray the variety of statistics in the broader system.

Transforming Roles

Another critical way that practitioners can use the network conflict worksheet is by examining how roles can be transformed. There are many ways this can happen. First, actors who are directly involved in the conflict are often interested in changing others themselves. For example,

these parties may directly confront others in the system who are generating resistance. To illustrate, the primary actors for side 1 may directly confront the primary actors for side 2. These individuals will often use traditional techniques of negotiation, persuasion, incentives and disincentives, sanctions, and physical interventions to marshal their efforts (Pruitt and Kim, 2004).

However, there are many more dynamics that can occur in social networks when looking at the broader set of roles in the system. This network analysis approach assumes that an important underlying force for promoting conflict resolution in social networks comes from the power of resolution support. *Resolution supporters* (box 5) are individuals in a social network who are trying to help both sides of the conflict resolve their differences. A higher ratio of people in resolution supporter roles (the resolution supporter ratio) could serve as a force on the conflicting parties to stop or change their behavior. Mediators, leaders, or people simply interested in helping to stop the conflict would be found here. Instrumentally, resolution supporters may not only encourage the parties deep in the conflict to resolve their issues, they can also encourage people in peripheral roles to get involved as resolution supporters to help reduce the conflict. In all, this places a stronger cooperative force onto the conflicting parties and increases the likelihood that the parties may see the negative social consequences of their continued fighting.

Theoretically the lower middle portion of the worksheet represents a powerful location for motivating change in the broader system. This illustrates an important nonlinear orientation. That is, a practitioner may not want a network to simply move toward the peripheral part of the system as an approach to resolve all conflicts. This is because more social power in resolving conflicts is presumed to result from having more resolution supporters in a system than

pure observers or interactants. Furthermore, moving entities to basic observer roles (box 8) may implicitly promote stonewalling behavior (“Just be quiet.”) or avoidant behavior, which can prevent issues from being sufficiently addressed, thereby increasing the potential for continued aggression when new triggering events occur. An important area for future research will be to examine the conditions under which a move to the observer box is more effective (e.g., When is taking time out more constructive or unconstructive in comparison to other options?).

Other interesting and unexpected processes can occur among those in peripheral roles. For example, on the one hand, resolution supporters (box 7) may be able to get some observers (box 8) to transform and join their efforts to help resolve the conflict, which would be constructive. On the other hand, resolution supporters may need to be more careful and mindful when trying to solicit support from important interactants in the system who were not aware of the conflict (box 9). Some of these interactants will understand the resolution supporters’ position and agree to join their efforts. In other cases, once interactants learn about the conflict, they may realize that they have their own vested interests and decide to join one of the sides, thereby escalating the conflict in the network. Alternatively, some interactants, after learning about the conflict, could become very upset with both sides of the conflict and enact the joint reactor role (box 6), which could do one of two things. When the conflicting parties learn that the previous interactant is angry at both sides, that could motivate them to cooperate, especially if that person is a powerful player in the system. Ironically, this would represent how the positivity of negativity can help resolve conflicts. However, this new joint reactor could cause the deeply entrenched parties to become angry toward the joint reactor, which may widen the level of

hostility in the overall network. [6] Hence, resolution supporters need to be mindful of other people's underlying motivations and reasons for their potential behavior when intervening in a network (Westaby, 2005). Finally, moving people from joint reactors to resolution supporters may also be a function of promoting empathy among the joint reactors so that they can understand how the parties may have ended up in the conflict. If empathy is generated, joint reactors may be more likely to transform into resolution supporters.

Other Applications and Caveats

The worksheet has the potential to introduce more complex ways to think about the social situation, which may start to reconfigure avenues for change in line with dynamical systems thinking (Vallacher et al., 2010). In problem-solving sessions, additional worksheets could also be generated around proposed solutions to the conflict to see whether everyone agrees on one side (i.e., a full agreement). Understanding the basic roles in network conflicts may help scholars and practitioners understand how large-scale interventions can be formed to reduce conflict, such as creating antibullying interventions in school systems. For example, this could be used to theoretically explain some of the work of Olweus, Limber, and Mihalic (1999), who developed a program for bullying prevention. Through dynamic network theory, their approach often targets the bully (e.g., side 1 actors who are goal striving to bully), the victim (e.g., side 2 goal preventers wanting the bullying to stop), as well as teachers, student peers, and school staff members in the network who are engaged in various other roles in the network, some of them dysfunctional. The network conflict worksheet would assist in clarifying the role behaviors that

people are (or are not) implementing in the system to foster antibullying efforts.

As for caveats, one needs to be mindful of not too definitively labeling individuals in their roles. To counter this general human tendency, practitioners should highlight how it is common for people to change their roles over time or switch their roles quickly depending on the context. Also, although people may believe they are confident in their initial placement of individuals in the worksheet, there may still be unreliability in some systems. For example, a person may indicate that Juan is a primary actor for side 1 at time 1, but when asked again a day later, the person may fail to indicate Juan anywhere on the worksheet. Whenever possible, it is ideal to do multiple assessments over time to assess reliability. (See Westaby, 2012, for additional conflict resolution strategies and methodological issues.)

INTERNATIONAL LINKAGES

To widen our discussion, what about ways to promote sustainable world peace from a network perspective? The following was proposed as one example in dynamic network theory:

> If entities across national borders can engage in joint network motivation linkages (i.e., G and S) toward collective goals that actually result in meaningful overall goal achievements, it will not only satisfy fundamental needs and desires across borders, but will also affect the network rippling of positive emotions that transcend national boundaries and promote goodwill between the nations from the ground up. Motivational and emotional bonds could then start stabilizing across borders. The delicate challenge in such initiatives is to build such linkages that at the same time do not overly interfere with each country's desired state of sovereignty. (Westaby, 2012, p. 82)

Otherwise, some international linkages may be perceived as unwelcome advances that generate cultural conflicts and network resistance.

Several lines of research provide indirect support for these broad propositions. For example, using network methods on data compiled since World War II, Dorussen and Ward (2010) found support for the classic liberal argument that trade linkages between states reduce interstate conflict. In a study of what promotes international mediation linkages, Böhmelt (2009) found that states that had more indirect connections with other states as potential third parties increased the potential for mediation as compared to states that had only bilateral linkages during war. From a dynamic network theory perspective, this would increase the odds that observing states would change to resolution supporters of both sides, when needed, to help resolve conflicts. Dorussen and Ward (2008) also examined how intergovernmental organizations may promote peace. They found that state membership in these organizations increased network connections between states, which allowed organizational members to intervene in conflict resolution as individual members or as a collective. This

illustrates the power of indirect resolution support as compared to direct diplomatic ties alone. However, Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2006) caution that such international organizations and their disparate distribution of members can highlight power and prestige differences that may affect other conflict-related processes, such as in-group favoritism.

ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

The emerging field of online dispute resolution (ODR) is also relevant to conflict resolution. ODR represents a type of alternative dispute resolution that involves the use of e-mail, chat rooms, and other Internet-based media to facilitate communications between parties and their mediators or arbitrators (Hammond, 2003). Since the 1970s, negotiators have been using computers to organize negotiations, starting with platforms to organize data to today's fully Web-based electronic negotiation systems (for a review, see Kersten and Lai, 2007). ODR has its advantages and disadvantages, and while some mediators believe that it provides an opportunity for reconciliation when face-to-face mediation is not possible or appropriate, others may believe that it should be avoided because written communication is more vulnerable to miscommunication (Raines, 2005). One study showed that negotiators in an e-mail condition, as compared to face-to-face negotiation, had more difficulty establishing rapport and trust, which contributed to poorer outcomes (Morris, Nadler, Kurtzberg, and Thompson, 2002). In a follow-up study, these researchers found that simply introducing a five-minute telephone call prior to commencing with e-negotiations had a significantly positive effect on outcomes by increasing rapport between negotiators. From a communication perspective, Brett et al. (2007) examined

text from transcripts of online negotiations between buyers and sellers on the popular online auction site Ebay.com . They found that parties who phrased their arguments and complaints in such a way as to maintain the face of the other party had a positive effect on dispute resolution. Thus, online negotiators were served best by communicating concerns fairly and in a way that did not directly attack the other party.

CONCLUSION

Scholars and practitioners in the field of conflict resolution are acutely aware of the importance of capturing the complexity of social systems (Ricigliano, 2012). The approach taken in this chapter was to highlight how social network concepts can provide an additional approach to understanding the complexities of human conflict and its potential resolution. We illustrated how traditional social network concepts have been applied to a range of issues related to conflict, including some of the new dynamics observed in popular social media platforms, such as Facebook and Twitter, which are changing the landscape of human interaction. This area will remain a hotbed of research as social media become even more common around the world. A major methodological limitation of this literature is that many of the empirical findings are based on cross-sectional designs with little experimental manipulation of variables.

We also illustrated how new concepts in dynamic network theorizing can provide a complementary approach to traditional network analyses by explicitly accounting for goals in networks. Including goals in networks not only provides a way to map how people are working with or against one another in a network; it may provide a more refined analysis about the level of positivity and negativity

in relation to goal conflicts. Future research is needed to examine these contrasts because it is imperative for scholars and practitioners to have an accurate understanding of overall system dynamics in efforts to structure effective interventions. Although social network concepts are providing a useful way to portray social relations and human conflict, much more rigorous research is needed to fully appreciate this potential.

Notes

1 . The special paths with black circles placed on them denote these conflicted relations between people in the charts; this allows the charts to clearly distinguish between system negation and system reactor roles. Having these circles on the lines allows researchers to quickly see where potentially hostile conflicts exist between people. Placing labels on all solid black lines could also be done as a simplifying technique, whenever relevant or useful, instead of visually differentiating the paths.

2 . Contact the first author about other applications of dynamic network theory for analyzing social interactions in real time or from video or social media platforms. Such analyses may not only help describe overall system dynamics, they could also be used to potentially predict emergent states, such as perceived cooperative, competitive, or hostile climates in dyads, groups, or organizations.

3 . The worksheet could also be extended to three- or more-sided conflicts when necessary.

4 . Computerized versions of the worksheet could also be created to automatically calculate statistics in the network conflict scorecard.

5 . Once the entities are listed and if further information is desired about motives underlying the roles, one could ask participants to indicate on another page the reasons they perceive that each of the entities is engaged in the given roles, consistent with assumptions in dynamic network theory that decision-making factors underlie the role behaviors.

6 . Technically, people in boxes 6 and 7 represent entities who are firmly enacting what are called multiplex roles in dynamic network theory (two or more role behaviors at once). Checks by individuals' names in the various boxes also indicate multiplex role behaviors connected to system negation or system reactance. See Westaby (2012) for details.

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CHAPTER FORTY-TWO
USING RESEARCH FINDINGS IN PRACTICE: From Knowledge Acquisition to Application

Daniel Druckman

A noticeable trend toward multimethod research is evident in the fields of conflict management and resolution. This may be due to the complexity of the problems that confront researchers and practitioners, as well as the overlap with related fields, each emphasizing a particular mode of inquiry. It is due also to an increasing recognition that conflict is best understood from both general and specific perspectives: the general perspective focuses on shared features of different conflicts; the specific perspective seeks to understand conflict within its local context. Although the perspectives are complementary, they are also a source of tension among conflict researchers. Both the complementarities and the tensions are discussed in this chapter with implications for the application of research in applied settings.

I introduce readers to various conflict research approaches with examples of how studies within each approach are performed. With this grounding, I discuss how the findings from these studies may be applied. I deal first with issues of communicating findings to practitioners. The chapter then considers how the findings are embedded in different kinds of practice. A key question, whether these experiences improve learning, is addressed in the next section by reporting some evaluation results. The chapter concludes with a look back on the innovations that have been achieved and a look forward toward new innovations

that contribute to improving the ways that we bridge research and practice.

DOING RESEARCH ON CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION

Preferences for one or another research approach develop from assumptions of contending philosophical traditions. Most of the attention is given to the distinction between positivist and constructivist philosophies. The former aligns more closely with traditional scientific approaches that emphasize a search for explanation through rigorous methods. The latter is rooted in subjective phenomenological approaches that emphasize a quest for understanding through inquiry. Other distinctions have loose connections to this philosophical divide. Researchers in the positivist tradition usually, but not always, prefer quantitative analysis, while constructivists often, but not always, do qualitative research. Preferring generality over nuance (or vice versa), these schools contest the purpose for doing research. The generalizers operate largely in an abstract world where concepts take precedence over description; the nuancers operate in a less abstract world where situated or contextual factors are emphasized. These differences are captured by another distinction made originally by linguists and referred to as emic or etic approaches (see Headland, Pike, and Harris, 1990). For emics, a conflict is a unique event to be understood within its own context. For etics, a particular case of conflict is regarded as an instance of a larger class of conflict processes.

These distinctions have implications for the way that research is performed. For example, data collected from laboratory studies are usually analyzed with quantitative methods with the etic goal of generalizing results beyond

the experimental situation. Case studies are often done with qualitative methods in an emic mode for contextual understandings. These sorts of connections between assumptions, analysis preference, and research methodology are summarized in table 42.1 .

Table 42.1 Examples of Methodologies in Four Research Traditions

	Emic	***Etic***
Qualitative	Ethnography, single case study	Focused comparison (small number of cases)
	?	
Quantitative	Case time series	Experiments, surveys, aggregate case comparisons (large number of cases)

Note: The question mark indicates that the challenge of integrating findings from the different approaches is considerable.

Thus, conflict researchers investigate conflict and resolution processes in a variety of ways. Although the challenge of integrating findings from the different approaches is considerable (and noted by the question mark in the table), it is nonetheless useful to show how research is performed within the approaches. The table provides a way of organizing the discussion that follows. I will move from one cell of the matrix to another in my illustrations of how conflict research is done.

Single Case Studies: Emic, Qualitative

A number of features of case studies make them valuable contributions to knowledge about conflict. These include holistic and thick descriptions of cases, allowing also for detailed analyses of processes. Other features limit the

prospects for causal analysis and generalizing results beyond the focal case. These trade-offs work for investigators who embrace the assumptions of emic or constructivist approaches. A way of bridging the approaches is through conducting theory-relevant case studies. Referred to also as enhanced case analysis (Druckman, 2005a), this approach views or analyzes the case through the lens of theoretical concepts. The approach can be illustrated with two examples from case studies of negotiation.

The talks between the Soviet Union and the United States from 1985 to 1987 on the reduction of intermediate nuclear forces were analyzed in terms of the turning point concept (Druckman, Husbands, and Johnston, 1991). Turning points were discovered as punctuated events during a chronological sequence that unfolded during the talks. Theoretical implications were developed from particular turning points: convening a summit in Reykjavik, committing to unilateral initiatives, and presidential involvement in the negotiation process. Similar analyses of turning points were performed by Tomlin (1989) on the prenegotiation stage of the North American Free Trade talks and by Cameron and Tomlin (2000) on the NAFTA process. These researchers showed how critical events in the chronology provided an impetus for transitions from one negotiating stage to another. The concept was shown to be useful as well in analyses of cases of international trade negotiations (Crump and Druckman, 2012).

Talks in 1986 between the Philippines Aquino administration and the New Peoples Army (NPA) provide another example of an enhanced case study (Druckman and Green, 1995). Drawing on literature in the sociology of conflict, we viewed the negotiation chronology through the lens of propositions on the way that values interact with interests. This analysis provided insights into cycles during

the talks of polarized and depolarized values that influenced the intensity of the larger conflict between the parties. These insights provide case evidence for a theory and enhanced understanding of the way this particular case unfolded.

The analysis process used in these studies consisted of two steps: (1) developing a detailed chronology of events that occurred before, during, and after the negotiation and (2) interpreting the events in terms of theoretical concepts. Case analysis is merged with theory in a sequential order. First, a chronology is developed and considered as the data for analysis; then relevant concepts are used to discern patterns that may be relevant to other cases. Theory is grounded in a particular case, which illuminates more general concepts as exemplars or demonstrations of particular theories. Exemplar cases were also used in another study to illustrate differences between the concepts of positive (Mozambique peace process) and negative (Nagorno-Karabakh agreement) peace (Druckman and Lyons, 2005).

Time Series Analysis: Emic, Quantitative, Qualitative

Times series analyses on single cases add several features to the case study approach. One feature is systematic tracking of changes through an extended time line. Another is the assembling of a large number of events to perform the analyses. A third feature consists of facilitating comparative analysis of trends during different time periods (longitudinal comparisons) or different cases (cross sectional comparisons). And a fourth feature is referred to as an interrupted time series, where the impact of a particular event is evaluated by comparing trends before and after it occurred. This feature also makes plausible a causal interpretation of changes in trends. Limitations are

the single case and events focus of the approach. The former limits generalizability; the latter de-emphasizes roles played by the context surrounding the case. Examples of three types of time series analyses are illustrated and referred to as postdiction, interrupted, and process tracing.

When an analyst is interested in predicting known outcomes in completed cases, he or she is doing postdiction. This can be done inductively to diagnose patterns preceding focal events or deductively to evaluate theories or models. An example is the coding of negotiating moves made by the Spanish and US delegations leading to the eruption of crises in the 1975–1976 base rights talks (Druckman, 1986). Rule-based coding of moves as hard or soft produced trends leading up to and following each of the four critical incidents when one or the other party left the table. Statistical analyses of the trends showed both the move patterns that preceded the crises (out-of-sync responding) and the consequences that followed (actions taken to resolve the crises). A causal interpretation involving precipitating events, departures, and consequences was induced from the time series. A companion study deduced similar patterns in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiation process. Comparing three models of the way negotiators are expected to respond to each other's concessions, Stoll and McAndrew (1986) showed a best fit for a pattern referred to as comparative reciprocity: negotiators respond to the difference between them in previous-round concessions, which is similar to the out-of-sync pattern that preceded crises in base rights study. (See also Druckman and Harris, 1990, for similar time series results from seven cases.)

Another example of time series analysis is the evaluation of the impact of an intervention (or interruption) that occurs at a particular time. For conflict analysts, these include worker strikes, government or company collapse, an

insertion of a peacekeeping force, a summit conference, a sudden influx of foreign aid, or a new insight into the source of the conflict. It may also consist of a major offensive that escalates an ongoing conflict. The 1994 offensive in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan was shown to alter the course of that conflict: before-and-after statistical comparisons of events indicated that the offensive, rather than successive mediations, made the difference (Mooradian and Druckman, 1999). This was clearly a turning point in the chronological record of negotiations or related interactions between these disputing parties. A study in progress examines a similar question about summitry: When are summits between heads of state turning points? The question is addressed by assembling a sequence of events that occurred prior to and following the meetings. It will be answered by comparing impacts on foreign policy decisions taken by the respective governments.

A third type of example of time series analysis comes from qualitative research. Instead of coding events as they occur, these investigations evaluate typologies or are guided by a framework that specifies a sequential pattern that can be discerned from chronologies. Lepgold and Shambaugh's (1998) analysis of Sino-American relations from 1969 to 1997 illustrates the typology idea. Various time periods within the three decades were depicted in terms of whether the parties had short- or long-term horizons and high or low expectations of benefits. Their results indicated that the country with the longer time horizon or the one that perceived more benefits from the relationship was able to prolong negotiations until the preferred outcome was attained. Along similar lines, Leng (1998) performed a time series of recurring militarized crises between post–World War II rivals. He concluded that of the four influence strategies studied—bullying,

reciprocating, trial and error, and stonewalling—reciprocating strategies were most effective in promoting cooperation. Rather than charting the trend in coded events, as is done in quantitative research, these studies compare larger chunks of time referred to often as periods during the course of relations.

The sequential pattern idea, referred to also as process tracing, takes a closer look at particular sequences within a longer chronology. These may be defined by a framework such as the precipitant-departure-consequence sequence used to illuminate turning points in negotiation. The analyst first defines departures in the chronology, then moves backward to identify precipitants and forward to discover consequences. Further specification comes from breaking each leg of the sequence into types, such as substantive, procedural, or external precipitants. The sequences provide distinctions between critical and noncritical paths taken during the long road from getting to a table to leaving with an agreement. They also provide an approach to comparing the paths for cases from different issue areas (Druckman, 2001), types of forums (Crump and Druckman, 2012), or size of negotiation. These qualitative analyses capture changes through time that would be missed with cross-sectional analyses and complement the quantitative work.

Focused Comparison: Etic, Qualitative

Structured focused comparisons (SFC) add other valuable features to the case study method. One feature is that more than one case is analyzed. Another is that the study design is based on the logic of experimental controls: the distinction between independent and dependent variables encourages causal inferences to be made. A third is that the small number of cases allows in-depth analyses similar to a single case study in the emic tradition. By adding an analytical dimension to case studies, SFCs bridge cases

with field experimentation. The demanding design requirements bolster internal validity, while the small number of cases poses problems for generalizability or external validity. The increasing popularity of this approach is due in part to difficulties in arguing for the theoretical relevance of case studies. It is due also to concerns about the limited relevance of experimental findings for real-world conflicts. An appreciation for the approach is likely to be gained from examples of application in current research.

Examples of SFC mechanics come from research in progress on the role played by justice considerations in various types of international negotiations. Focusing specifically on adherence to distributive (DJ) and procedural (PJ) justice principles—the dependent variables (DVs)—the study examined the influence of power, size (bilateral, multilateral), and type of setting in which the talks are conducted—the independent variables (IVs). A key challenge is to provide evidence of a mostly uncontaminated relationship between each IV and the DVs. This is done by controlling for other variables that are not specified in the hypothesis. For the hypothesized relationship between power and justice, the chosen cases are matched on issue area, parties, size, and type of setting. An example of a comparison from the area of arms control is between the earlier and later periods of SALT negotiations: disparate power in SALT I changed to parity between the superpowers in SALT II. An example from environmental negotiations is a comparison between the US-Canada acid rain talks (asymmetrical power) and the same countries negotiating in the context of the UN Economic Commission for Europe.

Similar controls can be achieved for evaluating hypotheses about the relationship between size and justice. Cases are chosen for similarities on power symmetry, parties, issue area, and type of setting. An example is a comparison

between Singapore and Australia negotiating free trade issues in bilateral and multilateral forums. Controls can only be imperfect, but if this is done carefully, it can increase an analyst's confidence in inferring a causal relationship between the IV (power symmetry) and DV (justice).

Another SFC application comes from a published study on the durability of peace agreements (Albin and Druckman, 2012). The study design addressed questions about relationships among the peace process (adherence to PJ principles), outcome (agreements based on equality), and implementation of the agreement (success, partial success, failure). Four peace processes were chosen for similarity in terms of time period, region, and types of issues at stake. Each fit one of four profiles on the IVs: adhere to PJ, equality is central (Sun City, 2002); violate PJ, equality is central (Arusha Accord, 2000); adhere to PJ, equality is marginal (Helsinki agreement, 2005); and violate PJ, equality is marginal (Luanda, 2002). Each case was blind-coded for implementation success (the DV). The results were close to the expected pattern: Sun City (partial success), Arusha (partial success), Helsinki (partial success), and Luanda (failure). Only the Sun City agreement deviated somewhat from the expected successful result. These qualitative findings also supported those obtained from correlation analyses computed on a larger sample of earlier cases. More important for our purposes in this chapter, the study description illustrates the requirements that need to be met for performing SFCs.

Experiments, Surveys, and Aggregate Case Analyses: Etic, Quantitative

Quantitative methods have been a hallmark of scientific approaches to the study of conflict. Their popularity stems in part from addressing threats to both the internal and

external validity of findings. Experiments are designed to reduce the plausibility of alternative explanations for findings. This is done through laboratory controls for extraneous variables, by which is meant variables not included in the causal reasoning developed in hypotheses. This has been shown to be a useful technology for accomplishing these purposes.

Surveys and aggregate case studies are designed to increase the external validity, or generalizability, of findings. This is done in surveys by a random sampling of respondents. The concept of sampling error from opinion polling captures the extent to which results obtained from a sample are likely to hold for the population from which the sample is drawn. This technology, which is quite sophisticated, has proven to be useful for reducing threats to external validity. For analyses with a large number of cases, this is done mostly through representative sampling, which means selecting cases from each of the segments (regions, time periods, actors) of a known population, such as all international negotiations on trade from 1950 to the present. A number of conflict projects include an entire population, such as the events data analyses performed on all known cases of international mediation from 1945 to 2003 (Bercovitch and Fretter, 2004). Clearly there is a trade-off between the relative emphases on internal and external validity concerns for experiments and surveys or aggregate case studies. Recognizing this trade-off, a number of recent methods texts develop mixed-methods strategies for doing research (e.g., Druckman, 2005a; Creswell and Plano Clark, 2006).

A topic explored with both experiments and comparative case analyses is the impact of type of issue on negotiation processes and outcomes. Laboratory research showed that conflicts over values, such as issues of fairness or justice, were more difficult to resolve, resulted in less yielding, and

were viewed as being more competitive than conflicts over interests (Druckman, Rozelle, and Zechmeister, 1977; Harinck and de Dreu, 2004). Knowing this, researchers have been asking about interventions that may facilitate agreements for each of these types of conflict. Two types of interventions in particular are being evaluated for their impact on the two types of issues. One, relevant for value conflicts, is a shared identity: shared identities improve the chances of resolving value differences (but not the differences on interests). Another, relevant to interest conflicts, is transaction costs: increasing costs incurred as the negotiation unfolds improve the chances of resolving the conflicting interests (but not the conflicting values). Thus, the impacts of the interventions on resolution are expected to depend on the type of issue being discussed. This is referred to as a statistical interaction.

To investigate this interaction hypothesis, a two-variable experiment was designed: type of issue as values (for or against raising prices for donations to charity) or interests (for or against raising prices for increasing profits) and type of intervention as rate of increase in transaction costs or shared values as similar or different political orientations. Referred to as a 2×2 design, the experiment provides opportunities to gauge the impact of each variable separately (known as main effects) and together (an interaction). Support for the hypothesis would occur if high transaction costs led to more agreements than low costs for the interest conflict but not for the value conflict, and if a shared identity produced more agreements than when identities were not shared for the value but not for the interest conflict. In addition to specific practical implications, these findings contribute more generally to bargaining theory (see Cramton, 1991) and theories of identity threat (Brewer, 2000).

Value and interest issues can also be compared with case data. An example comes from a study of turning points in international negotiation (Druckman, 2005b). Turning points were coded for thirty-four cases sorted by three primary sources of conflict: conflicts over values, understanding, or interests. A turning point was considered to be a departure in the negotiation process leading toward or away from eventual agreement. The interesting finding was that the turning points that occurred in the value conflicts led to escalations (away from agreement), while those that occurred in the conflicts of understanding and interests had deescalatory (toward agreement) consequences. Most of the escalations that occurred were for the cases that dealt primarily with values. Note here the difference between experiments and case studies. The former are prospective: types of conflict are created in the scenarios presented to negotiators; the outcomes are unknown prior to the negotiation. The latter are retrospective: completed negotiation cases are coded for the primary source of conflict; the outcomes are known prior to the analysis. The convergent results obtained from the two methods bolster the argument for validity.

The findings from case analyses of a large number of cases provide evidence for robustness, by which is meant evidence from a diverse set of cases. An example comes from cross-cultural research. A challenge posed for cross-cultural researchers is to measure variables at more or less the same time period for each sample case. Time synchrony allows a researcher to perform statistical analyses that specify causal relationships among the set of measured variables. This challenge was met by Ember and Ember's (1992) study of 186 societies drawn from the Human Relations Area Files. They coded warfare frequency, threat of famine, threat of natural disasters, resource scarcity, and taking of resources. Each variable was measured for a

specified time and scaled for frequency or degree, taking into account concerns about threshold effects (for famines and disasters) and organizational features of preindustrial societies. These and other precautions taken in coding (including reliability analyses) provided confidence in the interesting findings obtained: war may be caused by a history of natural disasters (fear of nature) and to some extent by socialized mistrust (fear of others). People in preindustrial societies protected themselves from future disasters by taking resources from their enemies.

This study is a good example of doing systematic research in an etic tradition with archived ethnographic reports assembled for emic (case study) research. Verbal reports were used to construct scaled variables that were analyzed by statistical path models, leading to inferences about the strength of relationships and direction of causation. It is a model for how rigorous research can be performed with archival data on topics that have important theoretical implications.

* * *

This concludes the section on how research is done. My aim was to sample studies that are exemplars for each of the four primary conflict research traditions. I turn now to a discussion of how these kinds of results can be communicated to a broad audience of practitioners with an interest in improving their craft through training.

COMMUNICATING RESEARCH FINDINGS

The research I have discussed contributes to the understanding of conflict and resolution processes. A question of interest is whether the knowledge also contributes to the conduct of negotiation and related

approaches to conflict resolution. One way of addressing this question is through gathering data on impacts. This has been difficult for various reasons, most notably a lack of access to practitioners but also a lack of interest from them emanating from the widely discussed gulf between the knowledge-generating and practice cultures (George, 1993; Druckman and Hopmann, 1989). Without access to practitioners and a strategy for communicating research results (and perspectives) to them, it is unlikely that their work will be informed by academic research. One route for addressing both challenges is through training. In this section, I describe an approach intended to bridge this gap.

A hallmark of the approach is the thematic narrative—a short essay that communicates key research findings on a theme, such as alternatives, culture, flexibility, or turning points in negotiation. The narrative emphasizes readability and thus attempts to avoid technical jargon and details of methodology while citing the articles that report the findings. To date, seventeen narratives have been prepared drawing on negotiation as well as some mediation research published from 1965 to the 2000s. In addition, a number of learning aids are included in the narratives package: discussion questions, key points from each narrative, counterintuitive insights, and some prescriptions that derive from the research. Here is an example of a counterintuitive finding from the narrative on achieving integrative agreements: Extensive information searches during negotiation may reveal incompatibilities of interest that escalate rather than resolve the conflict. A corresponding prescription is: If an integrative solution is apparent, avoid exchanging too much information. The narratives are regarded as works in progress because they can be updated to include new research findings.

Many of the findings discussed in the section on doing research are included in the training narratives. These

include findings from case studies about process dynamics, such as the interplay of values and interests or the emergence of turning points during a negotiation, as well as from experiments on the relative importance of values and interests or the conditions that produce turning points. For these narratives, both kinds of findings are included, illustrated by a snapshot of the narrative on interests and values.

We refer first to experimental findings in the etic-quantitative tradition as follows: A finding obtained in several studies is that conflicting interests are more difficult to resolve when they are linked to differences in values over the sources of the problems. When values are salient, negotiators take longer and settle fewer issues than when values are not invoked. One way to reduce the negative impact of values is to separate them from the interests. Another is to discuss the values prior to and outside negotiation, in informal workshops. The latter approach has been shown (in experiments) to be more effective in producing durable agreements.

We turn next to field research in the emic-qualitative tradition as follows. When these two sources of conflict are examined in the field with historical cases, we observe how they interact over time, leading to more or less difficult negotiations. These cycles of escalation and deescalation have also been shown to be influenced by differences (in values) within the negotiating teams as when moderates pull their more extremist members toward the (ideological) center, increasing the chances for compromise agreements. The real-world research has the advantage of allowing researchers to examine processes that unfold over a longer period of time than would be possible in the laboratory.

This kind of juxtaposing of findings demonstrates an advantage of multimethod research. The field research

illuminates a process that unfolds over a time period that is difficult to reproduce in the laboratory. The experiments provide comparisons of conditions or scenarios—in this case, alternative approaches to addressing value differences. These findings are knit together in the narrative form, similar to telling a story. But this form conveys received wisdom from research largely conducted in a positivist tradition. It does not encourage argumentation by raising contentious issues for discussion as emphasized by constructivist orientations toward knowledge generation and application. The subjective experiences that are invoked by the latter extend the learning process in the direction of questioning the findings: You have now reviewed the research on culture in negotiation. How do these findings comport with your experience negotiating with people from other societies?

The idea of challenging conventional wisdom, including accepted research findings, is similar to the concept of constructive controversy. This consists of a series of steps involving role reversal and synthesis (see Johnson and Johnson, 2008, 2009; Rapoport, 1960). The process encourages open debate of different perspectives leading to an unfreezing of positions or opinions. In turn, the unfreezing provides opportunities for new solutions to problems or new ways of viewing old issues. It also encourages breaking down dualities such as between positivist and constructivist epistemologies or the distinction between emic and etic approaches to knowledge (see Druckman, 2005a). An exercise used to address negotiating dilemmas illustrates how this is done.

An example of a negotiating dilemma is as follows. Your delegation is faced with a decision dilemma as a deadline approaches: you must decide whether you will take the available terms, reject them in favor of a stalemate, or reconvene at another time. How should you balance your

available alternatives against accepting the terms on the table in making this decision? The relevant narratives are time pressure and alternatives. The relevant issue for the negotiators is how to deal with the uncertainty that comes from incomplete information about alternatives. One group is primed to address this question with research findings summarized in these narratives. This priming alerts them to the importance of perceptions (and misperceptions) of the other negotiator's alternatives. They are likely to avoid a stalemate by accepting the terms. Another group is asked to construct a response based on their own experience in similar bargaining situations. This priming leads to a focus on the attractiveness of one's own alternatives. They are likely to reject the terms and accept a stalemate. These different conclusions are then debated with ground rules established for engaging in constructive controversy. Properly enacted, the process should encourage unfreezing and synthesis, leading to new solutions that take into account research findings on both perceptions and lived experience.

Other negotiating dilemmas used for this exercise emphasize such concepts as searching for integrative agreements, power asymmetries, prenegotiation planning, flexibility, and boundary roles. The focus of our work to date on negotiation is due to the existence of a large research literature on the subject. Research-based narratives can also be written for research on mediation and arbitration. Fewer research-based themes are likely to be found for other conflict-resolving or -managing approaches, including peacekeeping, interactive conflict resolution, coercive diplomacy and sanctions, institutional system design and intervention, justice in truth and reconciliation processes, and the many facets of peace building. These topics are on the agenda for further

development of the narrative or argumentation approach to teaching and training.

The focus of this section on communicating research findings dealt primarily with the learning process, particularly for conflict resolution practitioners. I regard this as a step toward the goal of using the findings in conflict situations. A next step consists of providing opportunities for applying the new knowledge. These opportunities take the form of exercises that resemble the actual situations that often confront practitioners. The exercises are discussed in the next section.

APPLYING RESEARCH FINDINGS

The key idea for application is to recreate the situations often confronted by the practitioners who participate in our training workshops or courses. With regard to negotiation or diplomacy, four situations are created corresponding to functions performed by negotiators: analysis, strategy, performance, and design. In each of these situations, course participants are encouraged to apply research findings from relevant narratives. A difference between the situations is the way that the findings are applied. I describe how this is done with each type of exercise.

The analyst and strategist exercises are performed with case studies of historical negotiations. The goal of the analyst role is to achieve an understanding of the case; the strategist role is tasked with resolving an impasse in the same case. The cases are drawn from the archive of Pew Case Studies in International Affairs held by Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. Cases that are frequently used are a negotiation between South Korea and the United States in the later 1970s over running shoes (Odell and Lang, 1992) and the Panama Canal talks (Habeeb and Zartman, 1986). Participants are guided

through these exercises with sets of questions linked to relevant narratives. For the Korean running shoes negotiation, these are emotions, relationships, alternatives, time pressure, rewards, and power. For Panama Canal, these are alternatives, time pressure, integrative agreements, two faces, and power. Here is an example of a question asked of Panama Canal analysts:

> The cornerstone of the U.S. negotiating strategy was the overwhelming advantage they possessed in terms of available alternatives to a negotiated agreement. How does the narrative on alternatives help explain the dynamics of the negotiation? What shifts in alternatives eventually permitted a negotiated agreement?

Other questions asked for Panama Canal are

> Would you describe the 1977 treaty as an integrative agreement? How does the narrative on integrative agreements help explain the final outcome?

With regard to strategy, Korean running shoes strategists were given the following task:

> Suppose that the negotiators refused to adjust their positions to get an agreement. An impasse was caused by Korea’s demand of a higher export quota than the U.S. was willing to give. Using the information in the relevant narratives, develop a plan that can be used to advise the respective delegations (either together or separately) on strategies that they might use to get the talks back on track.

These guiding questions provide a focus for the exercises. Small teams simulate consulting groups working together for roughly an hour and a half to deliver their advice to the delegations. Completing the analyst task first provides preparation for the strategist challenge, which is usually completed in about an hour. Each workshop team debriefs

their report with an added feature of appointing another group to serve as the “client.” That client group, having worked on a different case, is asked to render a judgment about the report, including a decision about whether to retain their services in the future.

The third exercise focuses on negotiating performance. They participate in a multi-issue bilateral negotiation on security issues concerning inspection of facilities and border troops. The workshop (or class) is divided into quartets with each two-person team assigned the role of either Anice (resembling the United States) or Izeria (resembling Iraq prior to the war). One member of the team acts as the chief negotiator, and the other serves as an advisor-observer. Simultaneous plays, with multiple quartets, create an atmosphere of noise not unlike the tenor of conference diplomacy.

Central to this exercise is the application of the narrative themes. Negotiators are primed to address the following questions: When should alternatives be brought into play: early or late during the negotiation? How might you encourage a switch from making concessions to sharing information? When should you hold firm, and when should you convey flexibility? How should you convey anger or flattery to avoid misperception of your intentions? These are the types of questions that are repeated during a debriefing session following the negotiation. They provide a focus for a discussion of lessons learned from the role-play experience. They also provide a basis for comparing processes (including tactics and ideas for resolving impasses) and outcomes (impasse, compromise, integrative solution) obtained by the different teams.

The role-play provides an experience that helps participants implement the final exercise, which is to design a simulation for training. Again, they are

encouraged to use the narratives in their designs. Working again in small groups, but not usually the teams that worked together on the Anice or Izeria simulation, designers are encouraged to incorporate selected narratives into their scenario. Popular themes have been balancing alternatives with time pressure, altering the negotiating situation to enhance flexibility, dealing with communicating with constituents and the other negotiating party, and the use of two-face tactics.

Many designer groups build on their experience with the power asymmetries evident in the case studies used in the Korean running shoes and Panama Cana exercises and in the simulation (Anice versus Izeria). The asymmetry theme is central in a variety of scenarios, including father-son disputes, talks between managers at different levels in a company hierarchy, and police-citizen interactions. The symmetry theme emerges in rock singer versus composer disputes and various intercultural scenarios. Focusing their work on conveying these concepts to a new cohort of trainees, the designer groups are guided through the steps needed to produce a useful exercise. In some classes or workshops, the designs are enacted in role plays conducted by other members of the course. These enactments provide evaluations of the designs and a comparative assessment of the design versus role-play experience.

The sequence of exercises discussed in this section is intended to capture functions performed by practitioners involved with negotiating delegations. In addition to negotiating, these practitioners provide support to delegations or teams at several stages during the process, including prenegotiation preparation and between-round strategizing. Even the designer role has a place in this environment: simulation is used on occasion to anticipate options that may develop in a next round. An example is the talks over mutual and balanced force reductions during the

1970s. The US delegation regularly designed exercises to anticipate moves made in a next round of these talks. Thus, the training portfolio discussed in this section is tailored to these functions as well. Further modifications could be made to provide experience relevant to implementing agreements.

Whether these exercises are effective in accomplishing their purpose is a question of interest. Some progress toward evaluating impacts is discussed in the next section. Furthermore, just as the narrative format can be extended to other conflict resolution approaches, so too can the exercises be designed to capture the functions served by those approaches.

LEARNING GAINS

Evaluations are performed routinely following each training session or class. These consist of both self-report ratings of the narratives and exercises and open-ended questions about applications of the concepts. The negotiating dilemmas discussed previously are used also as an assessment tool for semester classes. The results, accumulated to date across sessions conducted on five continents, are summarized in this section.

An early control group comparison produced interesting results: groups using the narratives performed better in the analyst and strategist exercises than those given only the themes, but not the content, of the narratives (see Druckman and Robinson, 1998). The narratives were regarded by all participants as providing useful information, relevant, easy to apply to the assigned cases, and helpful in implementing their roles. It was also found that performance was further enhanced when narrative groups were first provided with key negotiation frameworks in concert with an overview of this research

field. These groups produced more complex reports in each of the roles (analyst, strategist, designer) than did those who were not exposed to the larger field. These differences are also shown in Druckman and Robinson (1998).

With regard to the long-term impacts of these experiences, a set of questions was asked several weeks following the workshops and classes. The results are encouraging: practically all participants indicated more interest in the scientific literature, noted that they would consult the literature when appropriate, and recalled issues and dilemmas raised by the narratives in their professional work. A smaller number of respondents said that they actually did consult the literature in their everyday work environment.

With regard to the exercises, both professional and student participants expressed a preference for the analyst exercise. They found this task to be easier to execute than the strategist and designer exercises, particularly for cases where the concepts were evident in the description of the negotiation process. An example of such a case is the Korean running shoes negotiation. Although the quality of the written reports did not differ by exercise, the professionals (but not the students) demonstrated more complexity in their oral compared to their written presentations.

More generally, four conclusions emerge from the various evaluations: (1) the narratives seem to work well, (2) learning is enhanced when frameworks and overviews of the field are provided prior to the narratives, (3) the analyst role may be the easiest to implement, and (4) there appears to be a long-term interest in using the research knowledge. But it is also likely that long-term impacts would benefit from periodic refresher training. It may benefit as well from adding a unit on constructive controversy. Advantages

of the former are to reinforce and update the knowledge base. Advantages gained from the latter are to reinforce the idea that knowledge is subject to debate and to unfreeze any commitments that may occur in the course of learning about research findings.

The role of designer has received more attention recently in training evaluations, sparked by an interest in the issue of comparative learning benefits from designing scenarios and playing roles in scenarios designed by others. The focus of the experiments was on concept learning, in particular, learning three concepts from the narratives: alternatives, time pressure, and power. The question asked was whether designers (role players) learn these concepts better than role players (designers) do. The experiment was replicated in Australia and Israel.

The results were striking, with clear differences across a variety of dependent variables. The results obtained from self-report and open-ended questions, including learning and motivation, showed that 86 percent of the answers favored designers, of which 52 percent were statistically significant. Only 9 percent of the answers favored role players (Druckman and Ebner, 2008). The design process was particularly effective for learning about relationships among the concepts: designers showed stronger awareness of relationships than role players did, and this was reflected in their scenarios. These findings underwrite the decision to use a designer exercise in our training package as one of the functions performed during the negotiation process.

Overall, the exercises seem to work well. Participants report learning and motivational gains, as well as indicate, when asked, that they intend to use the new knowledge, or at least consult the literature, in the workplace. This is a step in the direction of using research findings in practice.

Next steps include (1) instituting a regular course of refresher training, including updating the narratives with current research findings; (2) incorporating constructive controversy exercises in the training package; (3) bringing the approach to venues where real-time negotiation occurs; and (4) applying the approach to other areas of conflict resolution where research has been active, such as third-party consultation. An aim is to increase the awareness among practitioners of developments in research. This awareness should also make them more sophisticated consumers of what the research community has to offer.

CONCLUSION

Above all, this chapter makes evident the variety of approaches to doing research, communicating and applying findings, and evaluating the applications. There are many bridges that can be crossed to connect the islands of theory and research with the territory occupied by practices. In this concluding section, I review what has been learned about these bridges and chart a path forward that builds on the progress to date.

The chapter began with a discussion of four approaches to doing research. Rather than dwell on the differences among them in philosophy and technique, it would appear more helpful to explore their complementarities. Particularly notable is the combination of the deeper probes done by case study researchers and the wider explorations of comparative researchers. This has been done in several ways. One is to use the insights from particular cases to ground the more general findings from many cases (Gibbler, 2010; Pierskalla, 2010). Another is to search for correspondences between case analyses and experimental simulation results (Hopmann and Walcott, 1977; Beriker and Druckman, 1996). A third is to perform

focused comparisons of a small number of cases to corroborative statistical findings (Druckman and Albin, 2011) or to update findings from a large number of historical cases with a few more recent cases (Albin and Druckman, 2012). A fourth is to conjoin qualitative analyses of a case with a quantitative time series of trends in an evolving process (Druckman, 1986). Taken together, both types of probes, emphasizing depth and width, bolster confidence in the kinds of empirical regularities we observe in many settings. They also call attention to the contingent feature of such findings as the relationship between crises and turning points or between hurting stalemates and negotiation.

The combined research strategy has implications for practice. One example comes from our research on justice in international negotiation. Converging results from statistical and qualitative analyses bolster the conclusion that the distribution principle of equality leads to more durable peace agreements: equality principles in the agreements lessened the impact of conflict intensity on durability, but principles also heightened the impact on durability of procedural justice principles during the negotiation process. These findings were briefed to diplomats, particularly those serving as third parties in the peace processes. They were advised to include equality principles in the crafting of agreement texts. The multimethod research approach used increased our confidence in dispensing this advice.

The approach of research narratives is one way for communicating research findings to students and practitioners. It has the advantage of organizing the research literature thematically. The themes guide the interweaving of findings; they also contribute categories to broad frameworks that provide coherence to the topic and suggest avenues for further research. This may be more

useful for researchers than practitioners. As I noted, the narratives convey received wisdom in the form of what research has produced to date. The learning aids that are provided in the form of discussion questions and application exercises may encourage students to overlearn the material. One antidote to this possible consequence is to regard the findings as being subject to interpretation. This can be done through a process of debate using the method of constructive controversy (Johnson and Johnson, 2008). It can also be accomplished through scenario design where students have an opportunity to use the concepts in a playful manner (Druckman and Ebner, 2008). A challenge is to achieve the dual goals of learning and flexible application. Another challenge is that of expanding the theory-practice nexus to other conflict resolution approaches.

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CHAPTER FORTY-THREE
NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE *An Overview*

Gene Sharp

EXAMPLES OF NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE

Many of the most dramatic and politically significant conflicts of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have been waged by nonviolent struggle. Some of these struggles have filled our television screens and front pages. We remember the Solidarity struggles in Poland in the 1980s; the disintegration of the dictatorships in Czechoslovakia and East Germany in 1989, including the fall of the Berlin Wall; the successful defiance of the attempted hardline coup in the Soviet Union in 1991; and the undermining of the Milosovic regime in Serbia in 2000. We also remember the brave student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1989, as well as the earlier mass demonstrations and the killings in 1988 in Burma. Less often we remember that little Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania waged nonviolent struggles and won independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Also, the African strikes, student boycotts, and defiance were major factors in the collapse of the apartheid system in South Africa.

It was nonviolent struggle that ended the Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines in 1986. The civil rights campaigns with boycotts, sit-ins, bus rides, and marches shook legalized segregation in the US South in the 1950s and 1960s. Czech and Slovak noncooperation and defiance held off full Soviet control for eight months following the

August 1968 invasion. General strikes and noncooperation were major weapons in two phases of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956–1957. Still earlier in the twentieth century were the successful nonviolent insurrections against military dictators in El Salvador and Guatemala in 1944 and the remarkable Norwegian nonviolent resistance by teachers and others during the Nazi occupation. In 1943 wives of arrested Jewish men with great courage massed in the streets of Berlin until their husbands were finally released.

More recently, the predominantly nonviolent revolutions against long-entrenched autocratic regimes in Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011 launched the Arab Spring. These struggles were stunning in their mass mobilization, nonviolent discipline, fearlessness, and speed.

Such struggles go further back, not only to the struggles Gandhi led in India for independence and social justice, not only to the women's suffrage movements in several countries, but also to the labor union strikes for recognition and improved working conditions. These struggles have not required people to become believers in moral nonviolence, to be saints, to die, or to become or to follow a charismatic leader. Sometimes it is even impossible to identify the "leader," because the action is conducted in a disciplined way by groups without prominent individual leaders.

Of course, there have been important nonviolent struggles that were ill reported or neglected by our media of public communication. These cases include the nine-year nonviolent movement of noncooperation in Kosovo, which under certain conditions could have been so successfully concluded as to make the later war and military intervention quite unnecessary.

Nonviolent action probably goes as far back as the first human beings. We have long possessed the human capacity

to be stubborn, to refuse to do what we are told, and to persist in doing what has been forbidden to us. That capacity, when applied by groups of people, can become nonviolent struggle. There have also been prophets, saints, and others who have espoused rejection of violence for moral or religious reasons. Such injunctions have also been important in many situations, but they are a different phenomenon. The two phenomena should not be confused.

Nonviolent struggle has mostly been used by people who otherwise would have used violence. However, for various reasons, they have recognized that the technique of nonviolent action offered them significant advantages over violence, including greater chances of success. Usually their opponents have had vastly superior military capacity. Often the potential resisters understood that although there likely would be casualties during the nonviolent struggle, the numbers of wounded and dead during violent struggles and the extent of physical destruction are always vastly greater. They may also have recognized that although in a violent struggle the fighting forces are usually only able-bodied young men, potentially the whole population can participate in a nonviolent struggle.

With few exceptions, the people who have chosen to resist with these nonviolent weapons have seen them to be the most practical way to conduct their struggle. In these cases, the nonviolent character of the resistance has been simply a requirement for the effectiveness of this type of conflict. These situations undoubtedly constitute the vast majority of the applications of nonviolent struggle.

This phenomenon of nonviolent struggle has been demonstrated to be very powerful. Yet the understanding of it has been very limited. Far too frequently, the reporting has lacked perceptiveness, and the commentaries have been superficial or erroneous. Both reporting and analyses

can be improved for future nonviolent struggles. For that improvement to occur, it is essential that reporters and commentators understand this technique more accurately and also have some basic insight into its nature and modes of operation.

DEFINITION OF NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE

These struggles have not been unique. This type of action has spanned many cultures, traditions, circumstances, and religions. Throughout human history, a multitude of conflicts have been waged in which one side has fought by psychological, social, economic, or political methods, or a combination of these, against opponents able and willing to apply violent repression.

These types of action are identified by what people have done or are doing, not by what they believe. In many cases, the people who are using these methods believe violence to be perfectly justified in moral or religious terms. However, for the specific conflict they currently face, they have selected methods that do not include violence. Only rarely does a group or a leader have a personal belief in a philosophy or religion that espouses rejection of violence as a principle. Nevertheless, a struggle conducted with nonviolent methods because of pragmatic or even accidental reasons may become viewed as acting in a morally superior way.

Belief that violence violates a moral or religious principle does not constitute nonviolent action. Nor does the simple absence of physical violence, as in passivity or submission, mean that nonviolent action is occurring. The type of activity employed identifies the technique of nonviolent action, not the simple absence of violence. It is also widely

taken for granted that nonviolent struggle by its nature usually takes much time to succeed, whereas violent conflict produces successes quickly. Both claims are factually false.

There are three main types of activity that constitute nonviolent action. At least 198 specific methods have been identified. The first large class is called nonviolent protest and persuasion. These are forms of activity in which the practitioners are expressing opinions by symbolic actions to show their support or disapproval of an action, a policy, a group, or a government, for example. Many specific methods or forms of action fall into this category. These include written declaration, petition, leafleting, picketing, wearing of symbols, symbolic sound, vigil, singing, march, mock funeral, protest meeting, silence, and turning one's back. Such activities may be termed nonviolent protest. They do not constitute the full range of nonviolent action or nonviolent struggle. In many political situations, these methods are quite mild, but under a highly repressive regime, such actions may be dramatic challenges and require great courage.

The second class of methods is noncooperation—an extremely large class that may take social, economic, and political forms. In these methods, the people refuse to continue usual forms of cooperation or initiate new forms. The effect of such noncooperation by its nature is more disruptive of the established relationships and the operating system than are the methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion. The extent of that disruption depends on the system within which the action occurs, the importance of the activity in which people are refusing to engage, the specific type of noncooperation, which persons and groups are refusing cooperation, how many of them, and how long the noncooperation can continue. The methods of social noncooperation include social boycott,

excommunication, student strike, stay-at-home, and collective disappearance.

The forms of economic noncooperation are grouped under (1) economic boycotts and (2) strikes. The methods of economic boycott include a consumers' boycott, rent withholding, refusal to let or sell property, lockout, withdrawal of bank deposits, revenue refusal, and international trade embargo. Labor strikes include protest strike, prisoners' strike, slowdown strike, general strike, and economic shutdown.

Political noncooperation is a much larger subclass. It includes withholding or withdrawal of allegiance, boycott of elections, boycott of government employment or positions, refusal to dissolve existing institutions, reluctant and slow compliance, disguised disobedience, civil disobedience, judicial noncooperation, deliberate inefficiency and selective noncooperation by enforcement agents, noncooperation by constituent government units, and severance of diplomatic relations.

The methods of nonviolent intervention all actively disrupt the normal operation of policies or the system by deliberate interference—psychological, physical, social, economic, or political. Among the large number of methods in this class are the fast, sit-in, nonviolent raid, nonviolent obstruction, nonviolent occupation, overloading facilities, alternative social institution, alternative communication system, reverse strike, stay-in strike, nonviolent land seizure, defiance of blockades, seizure of assets, selective patronage, alternative economic institution, overloading administrative system, seeking imprisonment, and dual sovereignty and parallel government.

These identified methods have developed in the past as a result of the imagination and ingenuity of participants in conflicts who were conducting their struggle without

violence. The use of these or many other similar methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention constitutes applications of the technique of nonviolent action. Some of these methods can be employed as a substitute for violence against other groups in one's society or against groups in another society, against one's own government or against another government.

Many times, only the methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion are used in attempts to influence opinions. Such action may affect the moral authority or legitimacy of the opponents. However, those are the weaker methods. Many of the methods of noncooperation are much more powerful in that they reduce or sever the supply of opponents' sources of power. These methods require significant numbers of participants and usually the participation of groups and institutions in the refusal of cooperation.

The methods of nonviolent intervention usually require fewer numbers of participants but are generally, in the short run at least, more disruptive of the status quo. These methods are, however, likely to be met with extreme repression, which the participants must be prepared to withstand while persisting in their nonviolent defiance. Unless the numbers of participants are extremely large, it may not be possible to maintain the application of these methods for long periods of time.

Those who plan to engage in a nonviolent struggle must choose the methods they will use with extreme care. To be most effective, the methods will need to be chosen and implemented in accordance with a grand strategy for the overall struggle. The methods should strike at the opponents' vulnerabilities, make use of the resisters' strengths, and be used in combination with other methods in ways that are mutually supportive.

The effects of the use of the diverse methods of nonviolent action vary widely. Such effects depend on the nature of the system within which they are applied, the type of the opponents' regime, the extent and proficiency of their application, the normal roles of the persons and groups applying them in the operation of the system, the skill of the groups in using nonviolent action, the presence or absence of the use of wise strategies in the conflict, and, finally, the relative ability of the nonviolent opposition to withstand repression from the opponents and persist in their noncooperation and defiance.

The nature of the opponents' regime is obviously important, including its means of administration and repression and its competency in responding to nonviolent struggle. However, these characteristics are not by themselves decisive in the face of skilled and powerful nonviolent struggle. Often the roles of third parties may also be significant.

The most important reason that even dictatorships are vulnerable to nonviolent struggle is that, contrary to common perceptions, all hierarchical systems and all governments, no matter how dictatorial, are dependent for their necessary sources of power on the populations and the constituent or subordinate groups and institutions over which they claim dominance. The power of any regime, including dictatorships and even totalitarian systems, will be determined by the extent and degree to which it has free access to its needed sources of power. These include acceptance of its authority or legitimacy, human resources, skills and knowledge, intangible factors, material resources, and sanctions or punishments.

Each of these sources of power is in turn closely related to or directly dependent on the degree of cooperation, submission, obedience, and assistance that the rulers are

able to obtain from their subjects. These include the general population, the paid “helpers” and agents, and the relevant groups and institutions. The groups and institutions that supply the necessary sources of power are called *pillars of support* . That dependence makes it possible, under certain circumstances, for the population and the regime’s functionaries and agents to reduce the availability of these necessary sources of power or to withdraw them completely by reducing or withdrawing their necessary cooperation and obedience. If the withdrawal of acceptance, submission, and assistance can be maintained in face of the rulers’ punishments for disobedience, the end of the regime is in sight. When the pillars of support are withdrawn, the regime must collapse.

Since these methods of nonviolent action, especially those of noncooperation, often directly disturb or disrupt the supply of the needed sources of power and normal operations, the opponents are likely to respond strongly, usually with repression. That repression has often included beatings, arrests, imprisonments, executions, and mass slaughters. Despite repression, the resisters have at times persisted in fighting with only their chosen nonviolent weapons. Past struggles have only rarely been well planned and prepared and have usually lacked a strategic plan. Therefore, not surprisingly, in the face of such repression, nonviolent struggles have often produced limited positive results or even resulted in clear defeats and disasters. Yet, amazingly, many nonviolent struggles have triumphed.

When nonviolent struggles succeed in achieving their declared objectives, the result is produced by the operation of one of four mechanisms—conversion, accommodation, nonviolent coercion, or disintegration—or a combination of two or three of them. Rarely, the opponents have a change of view or conversion takes place. In that case, as a result of the nonviolent persistence and the willingness of the

people to continue despite suffering, harsh conditions, and brutalities perpetrated on them, the opponents decide that it is right to accept the claims of the nonviolent group. Although religious pacifists frequently stress the possibility, it does not occur often. One example is the 1924–1925 sixteen-month, twenty-four-hour-a-day campaign of Untouchables and their allies in Vykom, Travancore, in south India. Despite arrests, a flood, and the hot sun, the Untouchables campaigned for the right to walk on a road that passed a Hindu temple.

A much more common mechanism is accommodation. This essentially means that both sides compromise on the issue and receive and give up some of their original objectives. This can operate only in respect to issues on which each side can compromise without believing themselves to be abandoning a principle or condition that they believe would be in violation of their fundamental beliefs or political principles. Accommodation occurs in almost all labor strike settlements. The final agreed working condition and wages are usually somewhere between the originally stated objectives of the two sides.

In other conflicts, the numbers of resisters have become so large, and the parts of the social and political order they influence or control are so essential, that the noncooperation and defiance have taken control of the conflict situation. The opponents are still in their former positions, but they are unable to control the system any longer without the resumption of cooperation and submission by the resisters. In this case, not even repression is effective, either because of the massiveness of the noncooperation or because the opponents' troops and police no longer reliably obey orders. The change is made against the opponents' will because the supply of their needed sources of power has been seriously weakened or severed. The opponents can no longer wield power

contrary to the wishes of the nonviolent group. This is nonviolent coercion. This is what occurred, for example, in the 1905 Russian Revolution. As a result of the Great October Strike, Czar Nicholas issued the constitutional manifesto of October 17, 1905, which granted a legislature, thereby abandoning his claim to be sole autocrat.

In more extreme situations, the noncooperation and defiance are so vast and strong that the previous regime simply falls apart, and no one is left with sufficient power even to surrender. In Russia in February 1917, the numbers of strikers were massive. All social classes had turned against the regime, huge peaceful street demonstrations were undermining the loyalty of the soldiers, and troop reinforcements dissolved into the protesting crowds. Finally, Czar Nicholas, facing this reality, quietly abdicated, and the czarist government was dissolved and swept away.

While noncooperation to undermine compliance and to weaken and sever the sources of opponents' power are the main forces in nonviolent struggle, one other process sometimes operates. This is *political jiu-jitsu* . In this process, brutal repression against disciplined nonviolent resisters does not strengthen the opponents and weaken the resisters. Rather, widespread revulsion against the opponents for their brutality operates to shift power to the resisters. More people may join the resisters. Third parties may change their opinions and activities to favor the resisters and act against the opponents. Members of the opponents' usual supporters, administrators, and troops and police may become unreliable and even mutiny. The use of the opponents' supposedly coercive violence has then been turned to undermine their own power capacity. Political *jiu-jitsu* does not operate in all situations, however, and heavy reliance must be placed on the impact of large-scale, carefully focused noncooperation. Effective nonviolent struggle is not the product of simple application

of the methods of this technique. A struggle conducted by nonviolent means will generally be more effective if the participants understand the factors that contribute to greater success or to likely failure and act accordingly.

Another important variable in nonviolent campaigns is whether they are conducted on the basis of a wisely prepared grand strategy. The presence or absence and, if present, the quality of strategic calculation and planning can have a major impact on the course of the struggle and in determining its final outcome.

IMPORTANCE OF NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE

Past nonviolent struggles have often played significant roles in determining social and political events. These means of conducting conflict are often used when groups believe, rightly or wrongly, that they cannot secure redress of perceived injustices or achieve certain objectives by milder means or by conventional political procedures or processes.

The many methods of nonviolent action have been applied for many different purposes, of which not everyone would approve. This technique has been used in campaigns to protect or extend civil liberties; in economic conflicts by both labor and management to lift economic or political oppression; in ethnic conflicts; in struggles to gain liberation from foreign occupations and achieve national liberation; to end racial and religious discrimination and domination; to resist and undermine dictatorships; to establish democratic systems; to resist possible social, economic, and political changes; to gain equal rights for women, as in suffrage, employment, and legal status; and diverse other objectives.

Nonviolent struggle has at times produced or contributed to producing major political and social change, such as ending the Communist system in Poland, breaking down racial segregation in the United States, undermining dictatorships in Latin America, and blocking military rule in Thailand. The technique has contributed to the empowerment of oppressed people by providing them with means of action that they can use even when they lack high status and the instruments of administration and repression that their opponents can wield. This technique was used to block fascist controls in Nazi-occupied Norway from 1940 to 1945 and to block coups d'état by military forces and dictatorial groups as in Germany in 1920 and the Soviet Union in 1991.

At times, violence and destruction of property have occurred alongside the methods of nonviolent action. Some of the violence in the midst of nonviolent campaigns, however, has been staged by the opponents' agents provocateur to force a shift to resistance violence, which the opponents can more easily defeat. At other times, violence has also been instigated during nonviolent campaigns by political doctrinalists who are committed to violence and who will lose major political opportunities if the substantive objectives are instead gained by nonviolent struggle. Violence from both sources requires careful handling by the nonviolent resisters if negative effects are to be limited.

Over many centuries, nonviolent struggle has served as an instrument of wielding power in society and politics. It has served as a pragmatic substitute for the use of violence to gain objectives. Despite setbacks and frequent poor preparations, this choice of nonviolent means to wage conflicts has had major beneficial consequences that are rarely recognized. What would the United States and the world be like if African Americans in the 1950s and 1960s

had, instead of the nonviolent civil rights movement, employed mass violence and terrorism? What would Poland, the Soviet Union, and the rest of world be like today if the Poles in 1980 had risen up by violence or Czechoslovakia in 1968 and 1989 had fought the Soviet Union and domestic Communist rule by violence?

MEDIA COVERAGE OF NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE

We live in a world with many serious conflicts. By what means they are waged, whether they are conducted skillfully, and with what results are highly important. Therefore, accurate media coverage of ongoing and past nonviolent struggles and perceptive commentaries on them are both highly important. When references are made that either falsely credit positive accomplishments to the use of violence or otherwise discredit or trivialize the accomplishments of nonviolent struggles, the effect can be to encourage the use of violence in future conflicts. That can have highly negative consequences. Our view of the past heavily influences our perception of what is possible at present and in the future.

If the reports provided to the public and policymakers about nonviolent struggles are inaccurate or the interpretations and explanations of the events are false, the reporters and analysts will have violated their responsibilities to inform the general public accurately. They will also have done a disservice to the participants in the nonviolent struggles and to their own and other societies.

There have been instances when a clearly nonviolent struggle has been referred to as “rioting,” “violence,” “unrest,” “mob action,” and the like. Only slightly less

inaccurate have been the terms “pacifist” or “passive resistance” to describe nonviolent struggles. Ill-informed commentators or analysts may neglect or denigrate the role of the masses of participants in the action. Some commentators are prone to give credit for major changes to presidents, prime ministers, and dictators, or to ineffective military policies, when masses of people have taken powerful nonviolent action and paid the price.

Even within the context of nonviolent struggle, such commentators have at times given excessive credit to a single individual whose role was actually highly limited. One prominent American television personality said that Boris Yeltsin “almost single-handedly” defeated the 1991 hardline coup d’état, when in fact noncooperation and protests by many thousands of defiant people and even disobedient Soviet troops had defeated the attempt to restore the Stalinist system. These and other distortions may even cloud the perspectives of future historians so that the full nonviolent characteristic of that conflict may receive insufficient future research and analytical attention.

Some groups facing acute conflicts reject nonviolent struggle and choose violence because they claim that only violence can attract worldwide attention for their cause. That claim may be untrue, but it is undeniable that media neglect or very limited coverage of important ongoing nonviolent struggles has occurred and can have important consequences. For example, the media failed to give major attention to the nine-year Kosovo campaign of nonviolent noncooperation with Serbian controls and the building of alternative institutions that had been remarkably effective, short of achieving independence. The neglect certainly contributed to the failure to provide major international support for the Kosovo nonviolent movement. Added to this was the internal Kosovar failure to develop a grand

strategy of nonviolent struggle for gaining recognized independence. All of this led to the establishment and growth of the Kosovo Liberation Army, catastrophic Serbian repression, expulsions, slaughters, and finally military intervention by NATO and the United States.

Inaccurate reporting and faulty analyses, or even the absence of reporting, may mean that analysts and policymakers lack accurate information on the basis of which to recommend or support policies or actions. The consequences of poor reporting and analyses may be serious and widespread. Such unfortunate results can be partially or fully avoided with improved information and understanding about nonviolent struggle by reporters, editors, and commentators.

THE FUTURE OF NONVIOLENT ACTION

New Scholarly and Strategic Attention

The twentieth century brought new intellectual efforts to understand this phenomenon, mostly from social scientists and, at times, from advocates of this technique. Among such studies, beginning in 1913 and going to 1994 are these (listed chronologically): Harry Laidler, *Boycotts and the Labor Struggle* (1913); Clarence Marsh Case, *Non-Violent Coercion* (1923); E. T. Hiller, *The Strike* (1928); Wilfred H. Crook, *The General Strik* e (1931); Karl Ehrlich, Niels Lindberg, and Gammelgaard Jacobsen, *Kamp Uden Vaaben* (1937); Bart de Ligt, *The Conquest of Violence* (1938); Krishnalal Shridharani, *War without Violence* (1939); Joan V. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence* (1958); Theodor Ebert, *Gewaltfrier Aufstand* (1968); Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (1973); and Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict* (1994). Of these, Laidler, Hiller, and Crook draw

heavily on the labor movement in Europe and North America. Case, Ehrlich and colleagues, and de Ligt include examinations of diverse historical cases. Shridharani and Bondurant base their studies heavily on the movements led by Gandhi. Ebert, Sharp, and Ackerman and Kruegler also use historical cases and represent a significant advance in their analyses of the technique.

The combination of the growing practice of nonviolent struggle and such intellectual efforts to learn about this technique means that greater knowledge is now available than previously to groups that wish to use nonviolent action.

Efforts have also recently been made to enhance the effectiveness of future nonviolent action by study of strategic principles. The most important single contribution to this is Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler's *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict* .

A new, highly unorthodox dictionary, *Sharp's Dictionary of Power and Struggle* (2011), with nearly one thousand entries, challenges the pro-violence biases in our language about power and defense, among other topics.

Efforts at Planned Adoption

Past uses of the technique of nonviolent action have mostly been improvised to meet a specific immediate need and were not the result of long-term planning and preparations. However, the planned and prepared substitution of nonviolent action for violent means has been recommended for consideration in certain types of acute conflicts. These include the following purposes:

- Conducting severe interethnic conflicts with "no compromise" issues

- Producing fundamental social change to correct oppressive social, economic, or political conditions
- Resisting a dictatorship or attempting to disintegrate it
- Deterring and resisting coups d’état
- Deterring and resisting external aggression
- Deterring and resisting attempts at genocide

There exist unplanned, improvised, cases of the application of nonviolent struggle for all these purposes. It has been claimed, and recent studies suggest, that advance analysis, planning, and preparations can increase the capacity of this technique to be effective even under extreme conditions. In the struggles against dictatorships, oppressive systems, genocide, coups d’état, and foreign occupations, the appropriate strategies all involve efforts to restrict and sever the sources of power of the hostile forces. Application of nonviolent struggle in all of these acute conflict situations involves resistance in face of extreme repression.

The planned and prepared application of this type of struggle against internal or external aggression is known as civilian-based defense.

In assessing the viability of nonviolent struggle in extreme circumstances, it is also important to examine critically the adequacy and problems of applying violent means rather than assuming axiomatically its superior effectiveness.

Expanded knowledge gained through scholarly studies and strategic analyses and its spread in popularized forms is likely to contribute to increased substitutions of nonviolent struggle for violent action. Some policy studies have already been initiated for dealing with coups d’état, defense, and other national security issues.

Nonviolent Action for “Wrong” Objectives

Concerns have been voiced that nonviolent action could be used by certain groups for “wrong” objectives, for purposes that many would not endorse. For example, in the nineteenth century, Scottish, English, and US factory owners combating trade union activities sometimes shut down operations in a lockout, Nazis organized economic boycotts of Jewish businesses in the 1930s, and southern segregationists in the United States used social and economic boycotts of civil rights activists in the 1960s. Comparable cases are likely to occur in the future.

The response to this situation of some specialists on nonviolent struggle is that the use of nonviolent action for those purposes is preferable to those groups continuing to apply violence for the same purposes. Suffering from the results of an economic boycott is preferable to being lynched, for example.

In acute conflicts, the contending groups are unlikely to abandon or even compromise their beliefs and objectives. However, there sometimes is a possibility that such a group might shift to other means of conducting the conflict. It is argued that the real issue is not therefore whether one would prefer them to change their beliefs and goals (since that is almost certainly not going to happen), but whether one prefers them to struggle for those same goals by violent or nonviolent means. The target group of those applications of nonviolent action would need to decide how to resist the “wrong” objectives, whether by violent repression, educational efforts, or counter-nonviolent action.

Needed Future Explorations

The technique of nonviolent action has been disproportionately neglected by academics, policymakers, and exponents of major social and political change. As the

practice of this type of struggle grows and scholarly studies of it increase, it is becoming ever clearer that nonviolent action merits increased attention in several fields. Significant efforts are still required to correct the long-standing neglect of this phenomenon.

Studies of nonviolent action and the dynamics of this technique are likely to cross disciplinary boundaries, but certain disciplines have been identified as particularly relevant. Nonviolent action is of major significance for the social sciences, especially for the study of social conflict, social movements, historical sociology, and political sociology. Social psychologists can shed light on the shifts in attitudes, emotions, opinions, and group action during the course of a nonviolent conflict.

Some historians have identified the need to examine understudied developments of the past to correct the historical record that has usually given priority attention to violent action rather than nonviolent struggle. Recent studies that focus on nonviolent struggles are Walter H. Conser Jr., Ronald M. McCarthy, David J. Toscano, and Gene Sharp (Eds.), *Resistance, Politics, and the American* Struggle *for Independence, 1765–1775* (1986); and Nathan Stoltzfus, *Resistance of the Heart: Intermarriage and the Rosenstrasse Protest in Nazi Germany* (1996).

Recent studies of the practice of nonviolent action provide grounds for political and social theorists to reexamine basic concepts such as power, authority, sanctions, political obligation, and the presumed necessity of violence. In addition, it has been suggested that some important problems in political ethics and moral theology related to the use of violence require reexamination in light of the growing practice of nonviolent struggle and the scholarly studies of the phenomenon.

CONCLUSION

Nonviolent action is an important technique for conducting social, economic, and political conflicts without the use of physical violence. It is an old technique that appears to be coming into increasingly significant use in conflicts in various parts of the world. The phenomenon has been attracting scholarly attention and also efforts to refine its strategic application. Expanded knowledge of nonviolent action, and its operation and potential, is likely to have a significant impact on its future consideration in conflicts and the quality of its application. New efforts have been initiated to make the technique more effective in dealing with the hard cases, such as foreign occupations, coups d'état, and ruthless dictatorships. Steps are being taken to disseminate the increasing knowledge of the technique through popularization for the general public. Although knowledge of the technique has expanded, nonviolent struggle merits additional careful attention by scholars in various disciplines and policy analysts and also policymakers dealing with internal and international conflicts.

GLOSSARY

Boycott
: Noncooperation—social, economic, or political.

Civil disobedience
: A deliberate peaceful violation of particular laws, decrees, regulations, ordinances, orders, and the like.

Civilian-based defense
: A national defense policy to deter and defeat aggression, both internal (i.e., coups d'état) and external (i.e., invasions) by preparing the population and institutions for massive nonviolent resistance and defiance.

Mechanisms of change

The processes by which change is produced in successful cases of nonviolent struggle: conversion (rare), accommodation (compromise), nonviolent coercion, and disintegration.

Methods

The specific forms of action within the technique of nonviolent action. They are grouped under three classes: nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention.

Noncooperation

A class of methods of nonviolent action that involve deliberate restriction; discontinuance; or withholding of social, economic, or political cooperation (or a combination of these) with a disapproved person, activity, policy, institution, or regime.

Nonviolence

A term commonly used with various meanings, including moral and religious beliefs that reject violence, pragmatic nonviolent struggle, and mixtures of these. Therefore, the term often contributes to ambiguity and confusion, and it is not recommended to be used except with very restricted meanings, such as, “They maintained their nonviolence.”

Nonviolent action

A general technique that includes a multitude of specific methods grouped into three main classes—nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention—all conducted without physical violence.

Nonviolent intervention

A class of methods of nonviolent action that in a conflict situation directly interfere by nonviolent means with the opponents’ activities and operation of their system.

Nonviolent protest and persuasion

A class of methods of nonviolent action that are symbolic acts, expressing opposition opinions or attempting persuasion (as vigils, marches, or picketing).

Pillars of support

The institutions and sections of the society that supply the existing regime with its needed sources of power to maintain and expand its power capacity.

Political jiu-jitsu

A special process that may sometimes operate during a nonviolent struggle to change power relationships. Negative reactions to the opponents' violent repression against nonviolent resisters are turned to weaken the opponents' power position and strengthen that of the nonviolent resisters.

Sources of power

Origins of political power that derive from the society, including authority, human resources, skills and knowledge, intangible factors, material resources, and sanctions. Each of these sources is dependent on the acceptance, cooperation, and obedience of the population and the society's institutions and may be supplied or restricted in varying degrees.

Strategic nonviolent struggle

Nonviolent struggle that is waged according to a strategic plan that has been prepared on the basis of analysis of the conflict situation; the strengths and weaknesses of the contending groups; the nature, capacities, and requirements of nonviolent action; and, especially, strategic principles of that technique.

Violence

Physical violence against other human beings that inflicts injury or death, or threatens to do so, or any act dependent on such infliction or threat. Nonviolent struggle is the waging of determined conflict by strong

forms of nonviolent action, especially against determined and resourceful opponents who may respond with repression.

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PART EIGHT
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

CHAPTER FORTY-FOUR
A FRAMEWORK FOR THINKING ABOUT RESEARCH ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION INITIATIVES

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In this chapter, we propose a framework for conceptualizing research on conflict resolution initiatives (CRIs). [1] We first describe different types of research and for what kinds of issues each is most suited. Second, we briefly discuss types of audiences or users of research and what they want. Here, we explore some substantive issues or questions for research that practitioners consider to be important. Next, we consider some of the difficulties in doing research in this area, as well as what kinds of research strategies may be helpful in overcoming these difficulties. Finally, we offer a brief overview of the research in this area.

TYPES OF RESEARCH

There are many kinds of research, all with merit. They have differing purposes and often require varying types of skill. There is a tendency among both researchers and practitioners to derogate research that does not satisfy their specific needs or does not require their particular kind of expertise. Thus, “action research” is frequently considered to be second-class research by basic researchers and “basic research” is often thought of as impractical and wasteful by practitioners. Such conflict, however, is based on misunderstanding rather than on a

valid conflict of value, fact, or interest; it is what Deutsch (1973) has termed as a “false conflict.”

We turn to a discussion of several types of research that are relevant to conflict resolution: basic research, developmental research, field research, consumer research, and action research. Some researchers work primarily in one type; others move back and forth among them. We start our list with a discussion of basic research, but we do not assume the natural flow is unidirectional from basic to developmental research, and so forth. The flow is (and should usually be) bidirectional: basic does not mean initial.

Basic Research

There are many unanswered questions basic to knowledge and practice in the field of conflict resolution. To illustrate just a few:

- What is the nature of the skills involved in constructive conflict resolution?
- What determines when a conflict is ripe for intervention or mediation? What gives rise to intractable conflict, and how can it be changed constructively?
- What are the basic dimensions along which different cultures vary in their response to and management of conflict?
- How can people learn to control transference and countertransference (to use psychoanalytic terms) so that their emotional vulnerability does not lead to counterproductive behavior during conflict?
- What are the important similarities and differences in conflict processes at the interpersonal, intergroup, and international levels?

- What are reliable, valid, and reasonably precise ways of measuring the knowledge, attitudes, and skills involved in constructive conflict resolution?
- What are the intervening psychological processes that lead to enduring and generalized change in managing conflict, and what are the psychological and social consequences of such change?
- What are the most effective ways of dealing with difficult conflict and difficult people?
- What type of value system is implicit in the current practice of conflict resolution?

These are only a few of the important questions that must be addressed if we are to have the kind of knowledge that is useful for those interested in making conflict constructive—whether in families, schools, industry, community, or across ethnic and international lines. Many other questions are implicit in the chapters of this book.

Developmental Research

Much developmental research is concerned with helping to shape effective educational and training programs in this area. Such research is concerned with identifying the best ways of aiding people to acquire the knowledge, attitudes, and skills necessary for constructive conflict resolution by answering such questions as these: How should something be taught (e.g., using what type of teaching methods or pedagogy)? What should be taught (using what curriculum)? For how long? Who should do the teaching? In what circumstances? With what teaching aids? These best ways are likely to vary as a function of the age, educational level, cultural group, and personality of the children and adults involved.

There is a bidirectional link between developmental and basic research. To assess and compare the changes resulting from various educational and training programs, it is necessary to know what changes these programs were seeking to induce and also to develop valid and reliable measuring instruments and procedures for measuring these changes. We are now creating and testing such instruments and procedures. One example is the conceptual framework for comparative case analysis of interactive conflict resolution by d'Estree, Fast, Weiss, and Jakobsen (2001). This framework was devised as a tool that can be used to evaluate and compare the results of a diverse set of conflict resolution initiatives. The framework is described in the final section of this chapter. Another example is the action evaluation research initiative (Rothman, 1997, 2005; Rothman and Friedman, 2005; Rothman and Land, 2004; Rothman and Dosik, 2011; Ross, 2001), a process that has been developed (though still being tested and refined) to help CRIs identify the changes they seek to create and evaluate whether and how those changes have occurred. This project is also described at the end of this chapter. While these examples demonstrate the work currently being done to increase our ability to evaluate CRIs, there is still much work to do in order to empirically better understand what types of initiatives are most effective and most efficient.

Field Research

Much developmental research can be done in experimental classrooms or workshops. However, field research is needed to identify the features of political systems, cultures, and organizations that facilitate or hinder effective CRIs. What type of effects do CRIs have with populations living under conditions of intractable ethnic conflict? What kinds of cultures are most favorable to such

initiatives, and what kinds make it unfeasible or ineffective? Which levels in an organizational hierarchy must be knowledgeable and supportive of a CRI for it to be effective? In schools, what types of CRI models should be employed: extracurricular activities, specific courses in CR, an infusion model in all school courses, use of constructive controversy, or all of these? Is cooperative learning a necessary precondition or a complement to a CRI? What criteria should be employed in selecting CR practitioners? And so forth.

Most of these questions have to be asked and answered in terms of the specific characteristics of an individual setting, taking into account the resources, organization, personnel, population, and social environment. While this type of research can be difficult and costly (in both time and money) to conduct, examples can be found in the literature. Such research has been conducted on CRIs that have taken place over the past few decades between parties in ethnic conflict, including those between Israelis and Palestinians (see Abu-Nimer, 1999, 2004, 2012; Kelman, 1995, 1998, 2011; Maoz, 2004, 2005, 2011) and Greek and Turkish Cypriots (Angelica, 2005; Rothman, 1999), among others, both internationally and domestically.

Consumer Research

It would be valuable to have periodic surveys of where CRIs are taking place, who is participating, what kinds of qualifications the practitioners have, and so on. Also, it would be good to know how the CRIs are evaluated by recipients both immediately after the initiatives and one year later. In addition to studying those who have participated in CRIs, it would be useful to assess what the market is for CRIs among those who have not yet engaged in these programs.

Most of the research on CRIs in organizations has been essentially studies of “consumer satisfaction.” The research usually involved studying the effects of CRIs in a particular classroom, workshop, or institution. Results are quite consistent in indicating a considerable degree of approval among those exposed to CRIs, whether in the role of practitioner or participant. This is indeed encouraging, but awareness of the Hawthorne effect suggests both caution in our conclusions and the need to go considerably beyond consumer satisfaction research. (The Hawthorne effect refers to the phenomenon of people changing their behavior, often for the better, when participating in a program and how this may result simply from the increased attention they receive in the context of being in the program and not due to the benefits of the program itself.)

Action Research

Action research is a term originally employed by Kurt Lewin (1946) to refer to research linked to social action. To be successful, it requires active collaboration between the action personnel (the practitioners and participants) and the research personnel. What the action personnel do can be guided by feedback from the research concerning the effectiveness of their actions. To study the processes involved in successfully producing a change (or failing to do so) in a well-controlled and systematic manner, researchers depend on the cooperation of action personnel. Most studies on CRIs conducted in the field are a form of action research.

There are two main ways in which successful collaboration with practitioners increases the likelihood that research findings are used. First, participation usually raises the practitioners’ interest in the research and its possible usefulness. Second, collaboration with practitioners helps to ensure that the research is relevant to problems as they

appear in the actual work of the practitioners and the functioning of the organization in which their practice is embedded.

However, there are many potential sources of difficulty in this collaboration. It is time-consuming and hence often burdensome and expensive to both the practitioners and researchers. Also, friction may occur because of the disparate goals and standards of the two partners: one is concerned with improving existing services, the other with advancing knowledge of a given phenomenon. The practitioner may well become impatient with the researcher's attempt to have well-controlled independent variables and the intrusiveness involved in extensive measuring of dependent variables. The researcher may become exasperated with the practitioner's improvisation and reluctance to sacrifice time from other activities to achieve the research objectives. In addition, there is often much evaluation apprehension on both sides: the practitioners are concerned that, wittingly or unwittingly, they will be evaluated by the research findings; the researchers fear that their peers will view their research as not being sufficiently well controlled to have any merit.

AUDIENCES FOR RESEARCH

There are several audiences for research: foundations and government agencies, executives and administrators who decide whether a CRI will take place in their organization, CR practitioners, and researchers who do one or more of the types of research described above. The audiences rarely have identical interests.

Funding Agencies

Our sense is that most private foundations are less interested in supporting research than they are in

supporting pilot programs, particularly if such programs focus on preventing violence. Their interest in research is mainly oriented to evaluation and answering the question: Does it work? Many government agencies have interests that are similar to those of private foundations. However, some domestic agencies, such as the National Science Foundation and the National Institute of Mental Health, are willing to support basic and developmental research if the research is clearly relevant to their mission.

Internationally, as humanitarian organizations integrate CRIs into their work, the need to evaluate CRIs for the purposes of reporting the results to funders of humanitarian organizations has become a significant and challenging aspect of CR work (Church and Shouldice, 2002; Culbertson, 2010; Hunt and Hughes, 2010). For example, while funders may be accustomed to evaluations of humanitarian programs that use immediate, concrete measures such as the number of people who participated in an initiative, a more accurate indicator of success for CRIs may be the long-term impact on the larger community. Working with funding agencies to reconcile the methods used to evaluate the short-term outcomes and long-term impacts of humanitarian-related CRIs can prove a challenging but worthy task.

With respect to the type of evaluation research needed, we suggest that there is enough credible evidence to indicate that CRIs can have positive effects. The appropriate question now is under what conditions such effects are most likely to occur—for example, who benefits, how, as a result of participating in what type of initiative, what type of practitioner, under what kind of circumstance? That is, the field of conflict resolution has advanced beyond the need to answer the oversimplified question, “How does it work?” It must address the more complicated questions

discussed in the section on types of research—particularly the questions related to developmental research.

Executives and Administrators

The executive and administrative audience is also concerned with the question of, “Does it work?” Depending on their organizational setting, they may have different criteria in mind in assessing the value of CRIs. A school administrator may be interested in such criteria as the incidence of violence, disciplinary problems, academic achievement, social and psychological functioning of students, teacher burnout, and cooperative relations between teachers and administrators. A corporate executive may be concerned with manager effectiveness, ease and effectiveness of introducing technological change, employee turnover and absenteeism, organizational climate, productivity, and the like.

It is fair to say that with rare exceptions, CRI researchers and practitioners have not developed the detailed causal models that would enable them to specify and measure the mediating organizational and psychological processes linking CRIs to specific organizational or individual changes. Most executives and administrators are not much interested in causal models. However, it is important for practitioners and researchers to be aware that the criteria of CRI effectiveness often used by administrators—incidence of violence, academic achievement, employee productivity—are affected by many factors other than CRIs. They may, for example, be successful in increasing the social skills of students, but a sharp increase in unemployment, a significant decrease in the standard of living, or greater use of drugs in the students’ neighborhood may lead to deterioration of the students’ social environment rather than the improvement one can expect from increased social skills. The negative impact of

such deterioration may counteract the positive impact of CRIs.

One would expect executives and administrators to be interested in knowing not only whether CRIs produce the outcomes they seek but also whether it is more cost-effective in doing so than alternative interventions. Some research has evaluated the effectiveness of alternative dispute resolution procedures, such as mediation (see chapter 34) compared to adjudication, but otherwise little research has examined the cost-effectiveness of CRIs.

Practitioners

Conflict resolution practitioners often have questions about the degree to which their work successfully affects both individual and institutional change. With regard to each focus, practitioners have articulated a need to have measuring instruments that they can use to assess the effectiveness of their work. Such instruments could be of particular value to them in relation to funding agencies and policymakers. Practitioners often feel that the methods they use during their training and consulting, to check on the effects of their work, are more detailed and sensitive than the typical questionnaires used in evaluations. Their own methods may be more useful to them, even if these are less persuasive to funding agencies. Much of the general value could be gained from a study of the implicit theoretical models underlying the work of practitioners, as well as a study of how practitioners go about assessing the impact of what they are doing.

Practitioners' focus on individual change tends to be concerned with such issues as these:

- How much transfer of knowledge and skill is there from the conflict resolution training, workshop, or encounter

to the participants' other social contexts? How long do the effects of CRIs endure? What factors affect transfer and long-term outcomes?

- How can CRIs be responsive to individual differences among participants in personality, intelligence, age level, social class, ethnic group, gender, and religion?
- How important is similarity in sociocultural background between practitioner and participant in promoting effective CRIs? Are well-trained junior or student practitioners particularly effective in training other participants or students?
- What models of training are being employed among trainers?
- Can levels of expertise be characterized? How long and pervasive does training have to be for these levels?
- What selection and training procedures should be employed with regard to participants? With regard to trainers of trainers?
- At what age are the effects of CRIs most likely to take hold?

The focus on institutional change is concerned with other questions:

- In schools and communities, what set of adults and other community members—for example, administrators, teachers, parents, staff, and guards—should participate in CRIs if students' learning is to take hold? Must other community institutions be involved, such as the church, police, health providers, and other community agencies?
- What are the most effective models for institutionalizing CRIs in schools, universities, communities, and at the

political level?

- What changes in a CRI's structure, pedagogical approach, and culture are typically associated with a significant institutional change?
- What critical mass of community or political involvement is necessary for systemic change?

It is evident that the issues raised by the practitioners are important but complex and not readily answerable by a traditional research approach. In addition, the complexity suggests that each question contains a nest of others that have to be specified in greater detail before they are accessible to research.

Researchers

Psychologically, other researchers are usually the most important audience for one's research. If your research does not meet the standards established for your field of research, you can expect it to be rejected as unfit for publication in a respected research journal. This may harm your reputation as a researcher—and may make tenure less likely if you are a young professor seeking it. This may be true even if funding agencies, administrators, and practitioners find the research to be very useful to them.

The research standard for psychology and many other social sciences is derived from the model of the experiment. If one designs and conducts an experiment ideally, one has created the best conditions for obtaining valid and reliable results. In research, as in life, the ideal is rarely attainable. Researchers have developed various procedures to compensate for deviation from the ideal in their attempt to approximate it. However, there is a bias in the field toward assuming that research that looks like an experiment (e.g., it has control groups and before- and

after-intervention measurements) but is not, because it lacks randomization and has too few cases (more on this later), is inherently superior to other modes of approximation. We disagree. In our view, each mode has its merits and limitations and may be useful in investigating a certain type of research question but less so in another.

We suggest three key standards for research: (1) the mode of research should be appropriate to the problem being investigated, (2) it should be conducted as well as humanly possible given the available resources and circumstances, and (3) it should be knowledgeable and explicit about its limitations.

RESEARCH STRATEGIES

Many factors make it very difficult to do research on the questions outlined in the previous sections, particularly the kind of idealized research that most researchers prefer to do (see chapter 42). For example, it is rarely possible to randomly assign students (or teachers, or administrators) to be trained (or not trained) by randomly assigned expert trainers employing randomly assigned training procedures. Even if this were possible in a particular school district, one would face the possibility that the uniqueness of the district has a significant impact on the effectiveness of training; no single district can be considered an adequate sample of some or all other school districts. To employ an adequate sample (which is necessary for appropriate statistical analysis) is very costly and probably neither financially nor administratively feasible.

Given this reality, what kind of research can be done that is worth doing? Here we outline several mutually supportive research strategies of potential value.

Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Research

Experimental research involves small-scale studies that can be conducted in research laboratories, experimental classrooms, or experimental workshops. It is most suitable for questions related to basic or developmental research, questions specific as to what is to be investigated. Thus, such approaches would be appropriate if one sought to test the hypothesis that role reversal does not facilitate constructive conflict resolution when the conflict is about values (such as euthanasia) but does when it centers on interests. Similarly, it would be appropriate if one wished to examine the relative effectiveness of two different methods of training in improving such conflict resolution skills as perspective taking and reframing.

This kind of research is most productive if the hypothesis or question being investigated is well grounded in theory or in a systematic set of ideas rather than when it is ad hoc. If well grounded, such research has implications for the set of ideas within which it is grounded and thus has more general implications than testing an ad hoc hypothesis does. One must, however, be aware that in all types of hypothesis-driven research, the results from the study may not support the hypothesis—even when the hypothesis is valid—because implementation of the causal variables (such as the training methods), measurement of their effects, or the research design may be faulty. Generally it is more common to obtain nonsignificant results than to find support for a hypothesis. Thus, practitioners have good reason to be concerned about the possibility that such research may make their efforts appear insignificant even though their work is having important positive effects.

In good conscience, one other point must be made: it is very difficult and perhaps impossible to create a true or pure experiment involving human beings. The logic involved in true experiments assumes that complete randomization has occurred for all other variables except

the causal variables being studied. However, human beings have life histories, personalities, values, and attitudes prior to their participation in a conflict workshop or experiment. What they bring to the experiment from their prior experience may not only influence the effectiveness of the causal variables being studied but also be reflected directly in the measurement of the effects of these variables. Thus, an authoritarian, antidemocratic, alienated member of the Aryan Nation Militia Group may not only be unresponsive to participation in a CRI but also, independent of this, score poorly on such measures of the effectiveness of the CRI as ethnocentrism, alienation, authoritarianism, and control of violence, because of his or her initial attitudes. Such people are also less likely to participate in CRIs than democratic, nonviolent, and nonalienated people. The latter are likely to be responsive to CRIs and, independent of this, to have good scores on egalitarianism, nonviolence, lack of ethnocentrism, and the like, which also reflect their initial attitudes.

With appropriate “before” measures and correlational statistics, it is possible to control for much (but far from all) of the influence of initial differences in attitudes on the “after” measures. In other words, a quasi-experiment that has some resemblance to a true experiment can be created despite the prior histories of the people who are being studied.

Causal Modeling

Correlations by themselves do not readily permit causal inference. If you find a negative correlation between amount of exposure to CRIs and authoritarianism, as we have suggested, it may be that those who are authoritarian are less likely to expose themselves to CRIs or that those who have been exposed to CRIs become less authoritarian or that the causal arrow may point in both directions. It is

impossible to tell from a simple correlation. However, methods of statistical analysis developed during the past several decades (and still being refined) enable one to appraise with considerable precision how well a pattern of correlations within a set of data fits an a priori causal model. Although causal modeling and experimental research are a mutually supportive combination, causal modeling can be employed even if an approximation to an experimental design cannot be achieved. This is likely to be the case in most field studies.

Consider, for example, a study we conducted on the effects of training in cooperative learning and conflict resolution on students in an alternative high school (Deutsch, 1993; Zhang, 1994). Prior theoretical analysis (Deutsch, 1949, 1973; Johnson and Johnson, 1989), as well as much experimental and quasi-experimental research (see Johnson and Johnson, 1989, for a comprehensive review), suggested what effects such training could have and also suggested the causal process that might lead to these effects. Limitation of resources made it impossible to do the sort of extensive study of many schools required for an experimental or quasi-experimental study or to employ the statistical analysis appropriate to an experiment. Therefore, we constructed a causal model that in essence assumed training in cooperative learning or conflict resolution would improve the social skills of a student. This in turn would produce an improved social environment for the student (as reflected in greater social support and less victimization from others), which would lead to higher self-esteem and greater sense of personal control over one's fate. The increased sense of control would enhance academic achievement. It was also assumed that improvement in the student's social environment and self-esteem would lead to an increased positive sense of well-being, as well as decreased anxiety and depression. The

causal model indicated what we had to measure. Prudence suggested that we also measure many other things that potentially might affect the variables on which the causal model focused.

The results of the study were consistent with our causal model. Although the study was quite limited in scope—having been conducted in only one alternative high school—the results have some general significance. They are consistent with existing theory and also with prior research conducted in very different and much more favorable social contexts. The set of ideas underlying the research appears to be applicable to students in the difficult, harsh environment of an inner-city school as well as to students in well-supported, upper-middle-class elementary and high schools.

Nonexperimental field research may be exploratory research, testing of a causal model, or some combination of both. Exploratory research is directed at describing the relations and developing the set of ideas that underlie a causal model. Typically it is inappropriate to test a causal model with the data collected to stimulate its development. Researchers are notoriously ingenious in developing ex post facto explanations of data they have obtained, no matter how their studies have turned out. A priori explanations are much more credible. This is why nonexploratory research has to be well grounded in prior theory and research if it is to be designed to clearly bear on the general ideas embedded in the causal model. However, even if a study is mainly nonexploratory, exploratory data may be collected so as to refine one's model for future studies.

Survey Research

This form of research is widely used in market research; preelection polling; opinion research; research on the occurrence of crime; and collection of economic data on unemployment, inflation, sales of houses, and so on. A well-developed methodology exists concerning sampling, questionnaire construction, interviewing, and statistical analysis. Unfortunately, little survey research has taken place in the field of conflict resolution. Some of the questions that could be answered by survey research have been discussed earlier, under the heading of consumer research. It is, of course, important to know about the potential (as well as existing) consumers of CRIs. Similarly, it is important to know about current CR practitioners: their demographics, their qualifications to practice, the models and frameworks they employ, how long they have practiced, the nature of their clientele, the goals of their work, and their estimation of the degree of success.

Experience Surveys

Experience surveys are a special kind, involving intensive in-depth interviews with a sample of people, individually or in small focus groups, who are considered to be experts in their field. The purpose of such surveys may be to obtain insight into the important questions needing research through the experts' identification of gaps in knowledge or through the opposing views among the experts on a particular topic. In addition, interviewing experts, prior to embarking on a research study, generally improves the researcher's practical knowledge of the context within which her research is conducted and applied and thus helps her avoid the mine fields and blunders into which naiveté may lead her.

More important, experts have a fund of knowledge, based on their deep immersion in the field, that may suggest useful, practical answers to questions that would be

difficult or infeasible to answer through other forms of research. Many of the questions mentioned earlier under the heading of field research are of this nature. Of course, one's confidence in the answers of the experts is eventually affected by how much they agree or disagree.

There are several steps in an experience survey. The first is to identify the type of expert to survey. For example, with respect to CRIs in schools, one might want to survey practitioners (the trainers of trainees), teachers who have been trained, students, or administrators of schools in which CRIs have occurred. The second step is to contact several experts of the type you wish to interview and have them nominate other experts, who in turn nominate other experts. After several rounds of such nominations, a group of nominees usually emerges as being widely viewed as experts. The third step is to develop an interview schedule. This typically entails formulating a preliminary one that is tried out and modified as a result of interviews with a half-dozen or so of the experts individually and also as a group. The revised schedule is formulated so as to ask all of the questions one wants to have answered by the experts, while leaving the expert the opportunity to raise issues and answer the questions in a way that was not anticipated by the researcher.

Many years ago, Deutsch and Collins (1951) conducted an experience survey of public housing officials prior to conducting a study of interracial housing. The objective was to identify the important issues that could be the focus of a future study. It led to a study of the effects of the occupancy patterns: whether the white and black tenants were housed in racially integrated or racially segregated buildings in a given housing project. In addition, the survey created a valuable handbook of the various other factors that, in the officials' experiences, affected race relations in

public housing. It was a useful guide to anyone seeking to improve race relations in public housing projects.

Although it is possible for the experts to be wrong—to have commonly held, mistaken, implicit assumptions—their articulated views are an important starting point as either constructive criticism or a guide to informed practice.

Learning by Analogy

Not only can the conflict resolution field learn from its experienced practitioners, it can also learn from the work done in other closely related areas. Many of the issues involved in CRIs have been addressed in other areas: transfer of knowledge and skills is of considerable concern to learning theorists and the field of education generally; communication skills have been the focus of much research in the fields of language and communication, as well as social psychology; anger, aggression, and violence have been studied extensively by various specialties in psychology and psychiatry; and there is an extensive literature related to cooperation and competition. Similarly, creative problem solving and decision making have been the focus of much theoretical and applied activity. Terms such as *attitude change, social change, culture change, psychodynamics, group dynamics, ethnocentrism, resistance, perspective taking* , and the like are common to CRIs and older areas. Although the field of conflict resolution is relatively young, it has roots in many well-established areas and can learn much from the prior work in these areas. The purpose of this Handbook is, of course, to provide knowledge of many of these relevant areas to those interested in conflict resolution.

As an educational and social innovation, CRIs in the form of training, workshops, and intergroup encounters are also relatively young. There is, however, a vast literature on

innovation in education and the factors affecting the success or lack of success in institutionalizing an innovation in schools. In particular, by analogy, cooperative learning could offer much useful experience for CR training in this regard. Cooperative learning, which is conceptually closely related to CR training, has accumulated a considerable body of experience that might help CR practitioners understand what leads to success or failure in institutionalizing a school program of CR training.

RESEARCH EVALUATING CONFLICT RESOLUTION INITIATIVES

In 1995, Deutsch wrote, “There is an appalling lack of research on the various aspects of training in the field of conflict resolution” (p. 128). The situation has been improving since then. For example, there is now much evidence from school systems of the positive effects of conflict resolution training on the students who were trained. Most of the evidence is based on evaluations by the students, teachers, parents, and administrators. In Lim and Deutsch’s international study (1997), almost all institutions surveyed reported positive evaluations by each of the populations filling out questionnaires. Similar results are reported in evaluations made for school programs in Minnesota, Ohio, Nevada, Chicago, New York City, New Mexico, Florida, Arizona, Texas, and California (see Bodine and Crawford, 1998; Johnson and Johnson, 1995, 1996; Lam, 1989; Flannery et al., 2003; Stevahn, Johnson, Johnson, and Schultz, 2002).

While research evaluating CRIs may have begun primarily with research conducted on conflict resolution training, in the last fifteen years conflict resolution evaluation research has expanded to include the development of tools, methodologies, and research conducted on a range of

initiatives, including interactive conflict resolution workshops involving politically influential parties from both sides in international conflicts (see d'Estree et al., 2001; Fisher, 1997; Kelman, 1995, 1998), interethnic encounter groups (see Abu-Nimer, 1999, 2004; Maoz, 2004, 2005; Bekerman and McGlynn, 2007), and peace-building activities (see Lederach, 1997; Zartman, 2007), to name a few. In this section, we offer a brief overview of some of the methodologies and instruments developed and research conducted over the past few years. We begin with an example of an instrument created by d'Estree et al. (2001) to assess the short-, medium-, and long-term impacts of interactive conflict resolution and other similar initiatives.

A Framework for Comparative Case Analysis of Interactive Conflict Resolution

D'Estree et al. (2001) created a framework, grounded in theory and practice, designed to be used as a tool for evaluating CRIs. While the framework was developed to address interactive problem-solving workshops (see Kelman, 1995, 1998; Fisher, 1997), it can be modified to address the particular goals of other types of CRIs as well.

The framework has four categories, and each category contains a set of criteria for assessing CRIs. The first category, changes in thinking, includes criteria regarding various types of new knowledge that participants may gain from an involvement in CRIs, such as the degree to which participants are able to attain deeper understanding of conflicts, expand their perspective of others, frame problems and issues productively, problem-solve, and communicate effectively. The second category, changes in relations, includes various indicators that the relationship between the parties in conflict has changed, such as the extent to which parties are better able to engage in empathetic behavior, validate and reconceptualize their

identities, and build and maintain trust with the other side. The third category, foundations for transfer, includes criteria for assessing how well a CRI establishes a platform for transferring the learning to participants' home communities once the CRI has ended. The criteria in this category include the extent to which participants have created artifacts (e.g., documents describing agreements, plans for future negotiations, joint statements) and put in place structures for implementing new ideas, and the extent to which the CRI has helped create new leadership. The foundations for outcome or implementation category include criteria that assess the extent to which the CRI contributed to medium- and long-term achievements that occur between the parties. Such criteria include the degree to which relationship networks have been created, reforms in political structures have occurred, new political input and processes have been created, and increased capacity for jointly facing future challenges can be demonstrated. It is important to note that the categories and accompanying criteria are interrelated, not mutually exclusive, and are not meant to be used in a linear fashion.

The framework also includes a matrix that differentiates between temporal phases of impact and societal levels of intervention. The temporal phases of impact are the promotion phase, in which a CRI attempts to promote or catalyze certain effects (assessed during the CRI); the application phase, in which attempts are made to apply or implement the effects of the CRI in the parties' home environments (assessed in the short term after the CRI takes place); and the sustainability phase, in which the medium- and long-term effects of the CRI are assessed. The societal levels of intervention enable evaluators to distinguish between effects that occur at the individual (micro) level, societal (macro) level, and the community (meso) level, in which the transfer of effects from the

individual to the societal level often takes place. D'Estree et al. (2001) suggest using a variety of unobtrusive methods to collect data along the dimensions of their proposed frameworks, including interviews, surveys, observations, content analysis, and discourse analysis.

The Action Evaluation Research Initiative

Another methodology that has been developed to evaluate a wide range of CRIs is called action evaluation research (Ross, 2001; Rothman, 1997, 2005; Rothman and Friedman, 2005; Rothman and Land, 2004; Rothman and Dosik, 2011). Action evaluation research refers to a process of creating alignment and clarification about the goals of a CRI with a variety of stakeholders as a way of monitoring and assessing the successful implementation of a CRI. The action evaluation process centers on three main sets of questions: (1) What long- and short-term outcome goals do various stakeholders have for this initiative? (2) Why do the stakeholders care about the goals? What motivations drive them? For trainers or developers of the initiative, what are the theories and assumptions that guide their practice? (3) How will the goals be most effectively met? In other words, what processes should be used to meet the stated goals?

These questions form the baseline, formative, and summative stages of the research. At the baseline stage, the action evaluator engages project members in a cooperative goal-setting process. He or she collects data from all members using online surveys and interviews and then feeds back the data to the group with the purpose of creating a baseline list of goals that all stakeholders can use to monitor and evaluate the success of the CRI over time.

As the CRI is implemented, the action evaluation process enters the formative stage in which participants reflect on

the action that has been taken so far, refine their goals as needed, and identify obstacles that need to be overcome in order to achieve the goals. The formative stage is an ongoing process of refinement and learning rather than a discrete, one-time process. The methods used at the formative stage include an online project log in which members can communicate with one another about important events, problems, and ideas; a shared journal in which participants communicate directly with the action evaluator about ideas and concerns; critical incident stories in which participants enter particularly positive or challenging events into a project database; and interviews conducted with participants. Once again, the action evaluator feeds back the collected data to the group members and works with them to continue clarifying the goals of the initiative, monitoring progress toward the goals, and directing future work. A progress report will be generated to compare the results thus far with the baseline stage goals. The report addresses questions such as, Toward what goals has observable progress been made? What new goals have emerged over time? Where have problems and obstacles occurred? The action evaluator helps participants assess the obstacles and make changes to address them as needed.

The summative stage occurs as a CRI reaches its conclusion or another natural point at which it makes sense to more formally evaluate the results of the CRI. At this stage, participants use the goals created at the baseline and formative stages to establish criteria for retrospective assessment of the CRI. As participants review their goals and examine whether they have reached them, they identify what worked well and what they would do differently to improve other similar CRIs in the future.

We now look at several research studies conducted to evaluate a variety of CRIs in different types of

environments.

Comprehensive Peer Mediation Evaluation Project

The Comprehensive Peer Mediation Evaluation Project (CPMEP), conducted by Jones and her colleagues, involved twenty-seven schools with a student population of about twenty-six thousand, a teacher population of approximately fifteen hundred, and a staff population of about seventeen hundred (Jones, 1997). They employed a three-by-three design: three levels of schools (elementary, middle, and high school); each level of school split into three possible conditions (peer mediation only, which was called a “cadre program”; peer mediation integrated with a schoolwide intervention, which was called a “whole school program”; or no training at all, designated as the control group. The training and research occurred over a two-year period.

The following draws on the report’s summary of general conclusions:

- Peer mediation programs yield significant benefit in developing constructive social and conflict behavior in children at all educational levels. It is clear that exposure to peer mediation programs, whether cadre or whole school, has a significant and lasting impact on students’ conflict attitude and behavior. Students who are direct recipients of program training benefit the most; however, students without direct training also benefit. Exposure to peer mediation reduces personal conflict and increases the tendency to help others with conflict, increases prosocial values, decreases aggressiveness, and increases perspective taking and conflict competence. These effects are significant, cumulative, and sustained for long periods, especially for peer mediators. Students trained in mediation, at all

educational levels, are able to enact and use the behavioral skills taught in training.

- Peer mediation programs significantly improve school climate. The programs had a significant and sustained favorable impact on teacher and staff perceptions of school climate for both cadre and whole school programs at all educational levels. The programs had a limited to moderately favorable effect on student perceptions of climate. There is no evidence that peer mediation programs affected overall violence or suspension rates.
- Peer mediation effectively handles peer disputes. When used, it is very effective at handling disputes. There is a high rate of agreement at all educational levels on satisfaction by both the mediator and disputants.
- The results do not support the assumption that whole school programs are clearly superior to cadre programs. The latter have a strong effect on students' conflict attitudes and behaviors, and whole school programs have a strong impact in terms of school climate. Based on this evidence, schools that cannot afford a whole school approach may secure similar, or even superior, benefits with a cadre program that is well implemented.
- Peer mediation programs are effective at all educational levels.

It is important to recognize that not only was this study well designed from a research point of view, but also the conflict resolution training was well designed and systematic. The trainings for the peer mediation only and peer mediation plus whole school conditions are outlined here.

For Peer Mediation Only

- Grades trained included fourth and fifth (elementary); sixth, seventh, and eighth (middle); and ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth (high school).
- Eighteen to twenty-four students were trained per school in year 1; a second group was trained in year 2.
- A minimum of fifteen hours of training was given in elementary schools and twenty to thirty hours in middle and high schools. Training was completed in four weeks or less and took place at the beginning of the fall semester in each year.
- Each school had a site leadership team (SLT) of four or five adults, with at least one teacher, one nonteaching staff member, and (where possible) one administrator. The SLT was responsible for day-to-day implementation and oversight of the peer mediation program.
- Each training organization gave SLTs one day of front-end program implementation training and contacted SLTs biweekly to monitor program implementation, offer program activities, and debrief cases.

Whole School Programs

- In addition to the peer mediation training and activities, each whole school program received curriculum infusion training and conflict skills training for staff.
- Regarding curriculum infusion

  Six to eight hours of training were given, using a standardized curriculum.

  A select group of teachers was trained (voluntarily, although any teacher could attend the training), who committed to using at least one period (forty-five minutes) per week of class time to teach from the conflict curriculum.

One or two teachers per grade in elementary schools and two teachers per grade in middle and high schools delivered the conflict training in curriculum infusion classes for at least one full semester following training.

Participating teachers received ongoing contact and support from the training organization.

- Conflict skills training

  This training included six to eight hours of developing conflict resolution competencies.

  It was offered to all adult staff of the school (teachers, nonteaching staff, and administrators).

  It was required for curriculum infusion teachers and SLT members.

Negotiation Evaluation Survey

The Negotiation Evaluation Survey (NES) is a time-delayed, multisource feedback approach to assessment and development of collaborative negotiation training and its effects on individuals and groups (Coleman and Lim, 2001). This approach uses a modified MACBE model (motivation, affect, cognition, behavior, environment) (Pruitt and Olczak, 1995) to assess change at the individual level in terms of conflict-related cognitions, attitudes toward the use of cooperative and competitive strategies, affect and behaviors, and at the group level in terms of conflict outcomes and work climate. In order to correct for self-report bias inherent in many evaluation tools, the NES was designed as a multisource feedback (MSF) tool, often referred to as a 360-degree feedback instrument (Church and Bracken, 1997). The MSF process elicits perceptions of a target person’s behavior from a variety of sources (in this

study, from questionnaires filled out by self, a close friend, a supervisor, and a subordinate).

The NES was used to evaluate the effects of the Coleman Raider collaborative negotiation model, which was used in the twenty-hour Basic Practicum in Conflict Resolution course at Teachers College, Columbia University (see chapter 35). In addition to using the modified MACBE model as an organizing construct for the survey, the authors identified the elements of the Coleman Raider model and translated the elements into specific training objectives and then into measurable constructs that form the basis of the actual items used in the NES.

The study used a Solomon four-group experimental design with two treatment groups and two control groups. Both treatment groups received the training and a posttest survey, but only one took the pretest survey. Neither control group received the training, and both took the posttest survey, but only one took the pretest. No significant effects were found in any of the four groups from taking the pretest, and no interactions between pretesting and training were found.

Training was found to have a significant effect on participants' collaborative negotiation behaviors, thoughts, feelings, attitudes, negotiation outcomes, and work climates. For example, as compared to participants who did not receive the training, those who received the training were found to have

- More cooperative and less competitive attitudes toward conflict
- More use of opening, uniting, and informing behaviors (as opposed to attacking and evading behaviors)
- More constructive conflict outcomes and work climate one month after the training

- Fewer attacking and evading behaviors
- Fewer negative emotions

Regarding the multisource feedback approach, the study found that

- Friends tended to be more candid evaluators of targets' negotiation behavior, particularly as compared to subordinates and self-reports.
- Subordinates tended to be kinder in their ratings than friends and supervisors, perhaps resulting from power imbalances in their relationship to the target and the nonanonymous nature of the instrument.
- Supervisors tended to give more flattering evaluations than participants themselves, particularly in categories that might reflect equally on the supervisor's skills (such as on conflict outcomes and work group climate).

In an extension of this evaluation research study, Lim (2004) conducted a study in which she had the participants engage in a two-party negotiation simulation three weeks after taking the posttest. Participants' behavior and attitudes during the simulation were measured by blind raters (who coded tape-recorded verbal exchanges) as well as by participants' self-reports regarding their own and their negotiating partner's behaviors and attitudes during the negotiation simulation. She found that compared to those who did not receive training, participants who received the training established a more cooperative climate in the simulated negotiation, did a better job probing for (as opposed to ignoring) the other party's needs, demonstrated better active listening skills, and agreed to outcomes that better addressed both parties' interests. Lim's study also replicated the Coleman and Lim

(2001) study, and its findings were similar to the original study.

Evaluation of Intergroup Encounter Interventions

In extensive field research, Maoz (2004, 2005, 2011) used a process evaluation approach to assess the extent to which intergroup encounter CRIs promote relationships, behaviors, and interactions that fulfill the standards of social justice, equality, and fairness that they strive to achieve within the larger conflict setting. Intergroup encounter interventions are programs that implement the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954), a theory that explains how relations between highly contentious groups may be improved through facilitated meetings between the groups where they engage in cooperative tasks together. Much of the research done on these interventions focused on the quality of the outcomes rather than on the process of the encounter itself, and therefore it was difficult to ascertain what types of encounters led to improvements in group relations and which types did not (d'Estree et al., 2001; Pettigrew, 1998). Maoz addressed these limitations by using process evaluation, which delves into the key characteristics of an intervention, those characteristics that are theorized to improve intergroup relations, and then assessing the attitudinal and behavioral outcomes that result from these characteristics.

Maoz's research examined intergroup encounter programs supported by the Abraham Fund for Jewish-Arab Coexistence, which brought together Jews and Palestinians living in Israel. As theory suggested that these CRIs may be successful when they establish for participants a cooperative orientation across lines of identity (coexistence model) and also to help participants relate to each other as equals (symmetry), these were the process characteristics

explored by the study. The level of symmetry between the Jewish and Palestinian participants, as well as between the facilitators, in all forty-seven CRIs were assessed through direct observations of each CRI by the evaluation research team members, who recorded interactions and verbal exchanges using a detailed coding sheet and instructions booklet. Each CRI was assessed on a scale ranging from 1 (maximum dominance of one side, in this case Jewish) to 9 (maximum dominance of the other side, in this case Palestinian). A rating score of 5 reflected symmetrical participation by Jews and Palestinians.

The encounter programs were classified into three categories: (1) the coexistence model, which emphasizes commonalities among the two groups and encourages mutual understanding and cooperation; (2) the confrontation model, which focuses on the conflict and power relations between the groups and raises awareness of inequalities; and (3) the mixed model, which incorporates elements from both the coexistence and confrontation models in its interventions. The programs were identified as following one of these models through interviews with the directors and program coordinators, as well as examinations of their organizational materials and documents. The process evaluation of these programs found that

- Symmetry or near symmetry was exhibited in a great majority (87 percent) of CRIs, such that both Jewish and Palestinian participants were equally active. Programs that were highly structured by facilitators, emphasizing equality values and describing “good” work processes as needing contributions from all members, were more successful at achieving symmetry.
- Most of the encounter programs (60 percent) were based on the coexistence model and thereby promoted

collaboration and perspective taking. Only 13 percent used the confrontation model, 21 percent used the mixed model, and the remaining 7 percent were not able to be reliably categorized.

- Among participants, there was no significant difference in the degree of symmetry in coexistence programs versus confrontation programs.
- However, with regard to facilitators, only 45 percent of the CRIs had full or near symmetry between Jewish and Palestinian facilitators. In 45 percent of the CRIs, Jewish facilitators were rated as having medium to great dominance, while only a small percentage of Palestinian facilitators were rated as having medium to great dominance.
- For symmetry between participants, there was a marked difference between coexistence programs versus confrontation programs. Approximately two-thirds of CRIs in the coexistence category were rated as symmetrical, and approximately one-third of CRIs in the confrontation category were rated as symmetrical.
- Interestingly, for symmetry between facilitators, there was a reversal: approximately one-third of CRIs in the coexistence category were rated as symmetrical, and approximately two-thirds of CRIs in the confrontation category were rated as symmetrical.

The results from these studies allow researchers to understand the processes that are critical to the success of intergroup encounter programs and offer ways in which they may be studied further to investigate the efficacy of such programs in promoting constructive conflict resolutions between groups in even the most difficult situations.

CONCLUSION

This chapter was initially stimulated by the paucity of research on conflict resolution initiatives. While evaluation research on CRIs has expanded over the past few years, the continued lack of systematic research is due to a number of factors, including lack of adequate funding to support the kind of research that would be valuable to conduct. Another important factor is the lack of appreciation of the large range of worthwhile questions that can be addressed by research, as well as the research strategies that are available to address them. In response to this latter factor, we have sketched out a framework for thinking about the research possibilities related to CRIs and have provided examples of innovative methodologies that have been developed and projects that have been conducted in this realm.

Note

1 . We use the term *conflict resolution initiatives* to refer to the diverse set of activities that fall within a broad set of conflict resolution programs such as training, mediation, dialogue groups, intergroup encounters, youth exchanges, and other programs that occur from the grassroots to the political levels.

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CHAPTER FORTY-FIVE
SOME RESEARCH FRONTIERS IN THE STUDY OF CONFLICT AND ITS RESOLUTION

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It would be idle to assume that a single chapter like this one can be a comprehensive guide to the gaps in the field of conflict studies. The preceding chapters summarize the knowledge in this field, and the gaps undoubtedly greatly exceed that knowledge. Furthermore, future research is likely to follow unforeseen theoretical directions, leaving a chapter like this one in the dust. Nevertheless, we hope that it will provide some guidance to those new to the field and some stimulation to seasoned scholars.

The chapter may seem quite one-sided to those who follow traditions other than those we will describe. But there is no way around this. What we find most exciting and can think about most clearly are research issues that fit into our way of looking at the field.

We have divided the chapter into six sections: origins and impact of conflict, strategic choice, escalation and intractability, readiness for conflict resolution, negotiation, and mediation. Besides identifying recent trends in conflict research, we pose questions that need attention and present some possible directions for answering these questions with some testable hypotheses. We also discuss some of the research methods that are needed to move ahead.

ORIGINS AND IMPACT OF CONFLICT

Conflict originates in clashing opinions, interests, or values or in annoyance with another party. Its roots can be as superficial as attitudes and money or as profound as basic human needs such as food, shelter, security, identity, dignity, and control over one's life (Burton, 1990). Conflict is inherent in all social life; hence, scholars in many fields have contributed to its literature. In this section, we focus on three areas that address the diverse approaches to research on this phenomenon.

Positive Consequences of Conflict

Conflict has a bad reputation, but it can be quite beneficial if it remains within bounds. For example, many studies have shown that dissent, and hence within-group conflict, can increase understanding of complex issues and thus enhance work group performance, creativity, and innovation (see Brodbeck et al., 2011; de Dreu, 2002; de Dreu, De Vries et al., 2000; de Dreu, Weingart, and Kwon, 2000; de Dreu and West, 2001; Nemeth, 1986; Nemeth and Kwan, 1987). However, recent meta-analytic reviews (de Dreu and Weingart, 2003; De Wit, Greer, and Jehn, 2012) do not find this positive effect across all groups, which implies that conflict is productive in some circumstances and counterproductive in others. This suggests the need to sort out those circumstances—to identify when dissent should be encouraged versus discouraged (de Dreu, 2008; Tjosvold, 2008). That problem would seem to call for experimentation in group laboratory settings, where theoretically derived variables can be systematically manipulated. Subsequent field studies, for example, in organizational settings, will be necessary to ensure the generalizability of the laboratory findings.

Relative Deprivation

Relative deprivation occurs when achievement falls short of a “reasonable” standard, such as what was achieved in the past, what comparison figures are achieving, what law or custom says one deserves, or what one expects to achieve. Sociologists and social psychologists know a lot about relative deprivation but not much about its impact on behavior, including conflict behavior. For example, we know from laboratory experiments that people tend to compare themselves with others who are proximate or salient or are similar to themselves (Major, 1994). But there is little, if any, research about the effect of social comparison on social conflict.

The social psychological laboratory is a possible site for studies of these effects. Such studies could build on prior research about the impact of relative deprivation on cognition. The beauty of laboratory experiments is that they allow creation of novel conditions, precise operationalization of variables, and unambiguous assessment of cause and effect (Pruitt, 2005b). The design of such studies might compare three conditions: no deprivation, deprivation in the absence of a standard, and deprivation in the presence of a standard. The dependent variables could be such conflict behaviors as demands for changed behavior, threats, and retaliation.

In addition to determining whether and how much conflict behavior is produced under each condition, such studies should explore the mechanisms underlying these effects, such as whether relative deprivation has its effect by encouraging a sense of injustice and anger. The impact of various moderating variables should also be examined, guided by what is already known about the conditions encouraging relative deprivation.

Group Mobilization

By *group* , we mean any set of people with a common identity who have some ability to communicate and take organized action. Groups, in this meaning, run all the way from small face-to-face friendship groups and work groups to departments, organizations, and even nations. How do the origins of intergroup conflict differ from those of interpersonal conflict? For one thing, relative deprivation must be understood in somewhat different terms. Questionnaire studies have found that readiness to participate in social protest is more closely related to collective deprivation, a sense that one's group is not doing as well as other groups, than to personal deprivation (Dion, 1986; Dubé and Guimond, 1986). In addition, group mobilization is usually a forerunner of intergroup conflict.

Group mobilization theory (Azar, 1990; Gurr, 1996) identifies a series of stages on the way to group action. First, individuals must become strongly identified with their group—the group must be an important part of their self-definition. Then they must develop a sense of collective deprivation—a perception that the group as a whole has been victimized, that their own suffering and that of their fellow group members is part of a larger pattern. For this perception to lead to actual conflict behavior, group members must also be willing and able to pool their actions in a joint endeavor. This requires some level of group mobilization, which usually involves the emergence of an activist subgroup with militant leaders who are willing to carry the group's grievances to the adversary. These three stages—group identity, perceived collective deprivation, and group mobilization—tend to recycle. For example, militant leaders, once they emerge, often encourage increased group identity and greater perceived collective deprivation.

Group mobilization theory is powerful, but it is not yet well developed in the sense of understanding the processes that

occur at each stage and the conditions that produce them. We need more case studies to understand these processes and some large-sample studies to test hypotheses about these conditions. Among the hypotheses that could be tested are Dahrendorf's (1959) proposal that mobilization occurs under three conditions: (1) ease of communication within the group, (2) the availability of leaders to organize for group action, and (3) the absence of outside suppression of such leadership efforts.

We hesitate to propose that such hypotheses be tested with laboratory groups because of the complexity of the phenomena under study and the corresponding difficulty of developing an adequate laboratory simulation. Yet laboratory studies require clear operationalization of concepts, making them a good place to sharpen hazy ideas, such as those now found in the theory of group mobilization. Laboratory settings also make it easy to observe stages in the development of groups because they occur right before the eyes of the investigator.

Studies should also be done on group humiliation, which has been suggested as a motive for the current spate of terrorist attacks. Research is needed to determine whether humiliation is indeed a powerful group motivator (for an exemplary study at the level of the individual, see Coleman, Goldman, and Kugler, 2009) and what conditions produce it in its apparently virulent form.

STRATEGIC CHOICE

A popular version of strategic choice theory holds that parties in conflict must choose among four strategies: contending, problem solving, yielding, and inaction (de Dreu, Weingart, et al., 2000; Pruitt and Kim, 2004; Thomas, 1976). The first two strategies have drawn the most attention in research. Contending, which involves such

tactics as threats and coalition building, is aimed at defeating the other party. Because contending tends to elicit a comparable response from the other party, it often makes conflict hard to solve. Furthermore, contending may produce a conflict spiral, leading to escalation that hurts both parties' interests—what Deutsch (1973) calls a "destructive process." Problem solving, which is aimed at finding a solution that satisfies both parties' needs, is in sharp contrast to contending. It encourages lasting settlements and improved future relations between the parties.

There are many research findings on the antecedents of contending and problem solving (see Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993; Pruitt and Kim, 2004). However, some of the field's most important assumptions about this matter are based on theoretical reasoning or inferences from research on related phenomena. For example, Pruitt and Kim (2004) hypothesize that problem solving is fostered by positive-sum (as opposed to zero-sum) thinking, momentum from prior agreement with the other party, and a belief that both parties (rather than just the adversary) are to blame for the conflict. Hypotheses such as these need to be tested. Social psychological research suggests opposing hypotheses with respect to the impact of positive mood on strategic choice. The finding that positive mood encourages helping behavior (Isen and Levin, 1972) implies that it should also encourage problem solving, but the finding that positive mood encourages blame of the adversary (Forgas, 1994) implies just the opposite. This contradiction needs to be sorted out empirically.

Many conflict theorists believe that heavy contentious behavior, such as violence, is encouraged by moral exclusion of the other party, that is, viewing the other as "outside the community in which norms apply, and therefore as expendable [and] undeserving" (Opotow, 2000,

p. 417). Moral exclusion removes some of the main inhibitions against aggressive behavior. This body of theory is challenging but quite underresearched. Data need to be gathered on the psychological nature of moral exclusion, its precise impact on behavior, the conditions that foster it, and the conditions that encourage expansion of a moral community to include one's adversaries.

Strategic choice theory has been criticized as an oversimplification in that sequences and combinations of the four basic strategies are often found (Van de Vliert, 1997; Van de Vliert, Euwema, and Huismans, 1995; Van de Vliert et al., 1999). For example, combinations of problem solving and contending are particularly common and are often quite beneficial. That is because problem solving requires that one be firm about one's basic needs (while flexible about the means for achieving them), and contentious tactics are sometimes required to underline this firmness (Druckman, 2003). Furthermore, a vigorous defense of one's position on certain issues provides information about one's priorities and hence may help the other party locate an acceptable exchange of concessions.

Pruitt and Kim (2004) have put forward some testable advice about how to employ contentious tactics without courting escalation:

1. Combine promises with threats, employing both the carrot and the stick.
2. Use legitimate threats, such as those from a legal authority.
3. Employ deterrent rather than compellent threats. "Deterrent threats request that Other *not take* a particular action, while compellent threats request that Other *take* a particular action" (Pruitt and Kim, 2004, p. 75).

4. If one must employ compellent threats, give the other party a choice of possible actions so as to minimize the appearance of pushing the other around.

Other researchers have proposed that the capacity for flexible and adaptive use of different conflict strategies is beneficial (Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Mannix, Thompson, and Bazerman, 1989; Rackman and Carlisle, 1978; Raiffa, 1982; Van de Vliert, Euwema, and Huismans, 1995; Van de Vliert, 1997). This proposal inspired Coleman and Kugler (2011) to design a measure of adaptive conflict management in organizations, the Managerial Conflict Adaptivity Assessment. The approach is based on a situated model of conflict in social relations described by Coleman et al. (2010, 2012, 2013b). Their studies show that adaptive and flexible conflict management in the workplace (i.e., changing one's strategy as the situation demands) is predictive of satisfaction with conflicts and relationships and a sense of well-being at work. This promising beginning suggests the need for a systematic research agenda on conflict adaptivity. This and similar approaches assume that conflicts are usually complex and dynamic and hence require adaptive and flexible behavior.

ESCALATION AND INTRACTABILITY

Most conflicts are quickly settled in a more-or-less positive way. However, a few conflicts escalate, becoming increasingly destructive and intractable, in the sense of resisting all efforts at resolution. These conflicts, though infrequent, tend to be important because escalation and intractability can have severe consequences.

In its most basic sense, *escalation* means movement from less extreme to more extreme contentious tactics by one or both parties. Such movement often goes through a series of

intermediate stages, which can be called an escalation sequence. There are two types of escalation sequences, unilateral and bilateral (Pruitt 2005a). In unilateral sequences, only one party escalates; in bilateral sequences, the parties escalate in tandem.

Unilateral Escalation Sequences

A laboratory experiment on unilateral escalation suggests questions for future research. Mikolic, Parker, and Pruitt (1997) studied reactions to persistent annoyance by having confederates of the experimenter withhold needed supplies from the participants. The data were based on a content analysis of telephone messages to the confederates. Most participants tried to get the supplies by means of the following orderly progression of tactics: requests, demands, angry statements, threats, harassment, and abuse. They stopped escalating at different points along this progression. Some made only requests; others requests and then demands; still others, requests, then demands, then angry statements, and so on. Groups on the whole escalated further than individuals—following the same orderly progression.

This study raises several questions that require further research. The most basic of these is: Why does persistent annoyance so often produce escalation? There are at least three possible answers, which need empirical test: people may reason that if a less extreme tactic fails to deter the other party, a more extreme tactic may do so; or they may become angrier and more aroused over time, which should make them more aggressive; or their moral exclusion may grow because they see the other party as increasingly guilty of a transgression. A second question concerns how to account for the orderly sequence of tactics seen in this study. A third question concerns the level at which parties stop escalating. Why did groups escalate further than

individuals in our study, and why did some individuals escalate further than others?

Bilateral Escalation Sequences

Bilateral escalation sequences usually develop through conflict spirals, entailing repeated retaliation and counterretaliation or defense and counterdefense. Thus an employee might criticize a management policy, provoking disciplinary action such as denying the employee a raise. Annoyed by this treatment, he or she might then talk to the press, provoking dismissal.

It is possible for conflict spirals to go around and around without advancing in level of escalation. I yell at you, you yell at me, I yell at you, you yell at me. Heavy contentious tactics are being used, but they are not getting heavier. This raises an important theoretical question: Under what conditions and through what processes do conflict spirals produce bilateral escalation rather than simply going around and around? One possible answer is that in bilateral escalation, each party sees the other as responsible for every new round of the conflict spiral, a phenomenon called *biased punctuation* . Biased punctuation has often been discussed by conflict theorists (e.g., Kramer, 2004), but research on this topic appears to be nonexistent. If this is indeed a source of bilateral escalation, we need to understand the conditions that produce it and the processes by which it develops.

Another possible answer is that bilateral escalation occurs when persistent structural changes take place in one or both parties or the community surrounding them. Pruitt and his colleagues (Pruitt and Kim, 2004; Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1994) have put together a theory about structural change based on an earlier speculative conflict literature and social psychological research about related issues.

Some structural changes are in the psychological realm. Hostile attitudes and perceptions set in, trust takes a nosedive, and new, more competitive goals develop. Hostile attitudes, perceptions, and goals are accentuated by group discussion through the process of group polarization (see Isenberg, 1986), and these psychological states often become group norms, which are perpetuated by the processes of norm enforcement. Changes may also occur in normative and social structures within the groups. Once groups become mobilized, it is often hard to put the genie back into the bottle. Strong group identities tend to persist, crystalized grievances are easily remembered, activist subgroups often remain organized, and militant leaders seldom fade away gracefully. Structural changes may also occur in the community surrounding the parties. Community members are pulled into one or the other camp, leaving nobody in the middle to mediate—a phenomenon known as community polarization. Structural change theory is a synthesis of much prior thinking, but it is greatly in need of empirical test.

A remaining question is, What are the determinants of the rate of bilateral escalation, and how severe it becomes? Some testable answers to these questions can be derived from social psychological research on the antecedents of aggression (see Berkowitz, 1993). For example, people who have been annoyed become more aggressive when they are recently angered, autonomically aroused, or under the influence of alcohol and when time pressure is too great to allow careful thought. They become less aggressive when they are in a good mood or engaged in competing activities. Impulsive individuals and those with high, unstable self-esteem are easily provoked, while people with a strong need for social approval are not. All of these conditions are possible contributors to, or detractors from, escalation, especially if found on both sides of the conflict.

Relationships between individuals are also important. Several studies (e.g., Bradbury and Fincham, 1992) have shown that people in distressed marriages are prone to retaliate when annoyed. Since retaliation is at the base of many conflict spirals, this suggests that bilateral escalation should be greater in distressed marriages and other hostile relationships, a plausible and testable hypothesis. Positive relationships presumably have the opposite effect.

An old study by Back (1951) adds an intriguing twist to the latter speculation. He found that more cohesive groups engaged in *more* internal conflict but were *less* prone to internal escalation. This suggests that strong, positive interpersonal relationships provide enough security that people feel free to raise issues with one another but they inhibit the use of heavy contentious tactics. Back's study needs to be replicated and extended with modern research methods.

Again, there is room for laboratory research on the conditions and processes underlying bilateral escalation. What is needed is a laboratory simulation that allows discovery of complex interactions between variables and careful measurement of escalation as it unfolds. Laboratory games like the prisoner's dilemma were once thought to provide such a simulation, and some things were learned in these studies (Pruitt, 1998). But these games are so simple that they do not involve most of the complex processes described earlier. Clearly the field needs new laboratory paradigms.

Conflict Intractability

It is said that about 5 percent of conflicts become intractable—highly escalated, enduring, and destructive (Coleman, 2011). Due to the severe consequences of intractable conflicts, it is important to gain a better

understanding of when and why some conflicts become intractable and how to transform and ultimately resolve them.

Drawing on dynamical systems theory, some recent authors have postulated that “intractable conflicts are formed when the cognitive, affective, and behavioral patterns characterizing a party’s conflict-relevant dynamics lose their complexity” (Coleman et al., 2007, p. 1470; see also Vallacher et al., 2010, 2013). Complexity represents the degree to which people are multidimensional in their “perception of issues, judgment of out-group members, and action tendencies” (Coleman et al., 2007, p. 1471). Such oversimplification flies in the face of the enormous and increasing complexity of intractable conflicts. In addition to this basic postulate, dynamical systems theory helps understand intractable conflicts by focusing on concepts like feedback loops, tipping points, latent attractors, and others. The theory suggests research questions such as those outlined by Vallacher et al. (2010). Initial studies suggest that this approach is a fruitful basis for further research (Bui-Wrzosinska, 2005; Kugler, Coleman, and Fuchs, 2011; Kugler and Brodbeck, 2011; Kurt et al., in press). However, such studies are difficult to do because they require methods that incorporate complex dynamics.

READINESS FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The basic question in this section is: Under what conditions does an intractable conflict become ready for deescalation and, hence. for negotiation or mediation? A subsidiary question is, What can third parties do to hasten this readiness?

A variety of answers have been given to these questions. Some authors advocate simple contact between the parties (Miller and Brewer, 1984). While this can be an effective remedy in mild conflicts, research suggests that it is counterproductive in highly escalated ones (Rubin, 1980). A second possibility is the development of superordinate (common) goals, which seem more important to both parties than the aims of the conflict. Case materials—for example, the turnaround of US-Soviet enmity when both countries began fighting the Nazis and Sherif's boys' camps (Sherif and Sherif, 1969)—suggest that this can be an effective solution. But compelling common goals are seldom available in intractable conflicts. A third approach involves ordinary mediation or various kinds of problem-solving workshops (for the latter topic, see Fisher, 1997; Kelman, 2002; Lederach, 1997). Research suggests that formal mediators have great difficulty solving heavily escalated conflicts (Kressel, 2000), and the problem would seem even larger for problem-solving workshops, which usually do not include the main decision makers of the groups involved in the conflict. More research is needed on the effectiveness of these methods, but as we suggest below, it seems likely that they are mainly effective in conjunction with other forces. A fourth approach involves having powerful third parties (e.g., UN peacekeepers) pressure the disputants to stop fighting and start talking (Fisher and Keashly, 1990). This makes sense if such third parties are available and ready to serve, though much more research is needed on the details of how this works.

Efforts to resolve conflicts often fail and sustainable constructive relations between parties cannot be established. This raises two questions: Under what conditions does a heavily escalated, intractable conflict become ready for de-escalation and, hence for negotiation

or mediation? What can third parties do to hasten such readiness?

Ripeness theory (Zartman, 1989, 2000) is designed to answer these questions. Its author, an international relations specialist, characterizes a ripe moment as follows: “The concept of a ripe moment centers on the parties’ perception of a mutually hurting stalemate, optimally associated with an impending, past, or recently avoided catastrophe. . . . The other element necessary for a ripe moment is . . . the perception of a way out . . . a sense that a negotiated solution is possible for the searching and that the other party shares that sense and the willingness to search too” (Zartman, 2000, p. 228). Ripeness is a necessary but insufficient state for conflict resolution.

Ripeness theory concerns psychological processes but is not presented in the language of psychologists. Hence, the first author of this chapter (Pruitt, 1997, 2005c, 2007, 2012b) has developed a close cousin, readiness theory, which employs variables and looks separately at the motives and perceptions of decision makers on each side of the conflict. A party’s readiness to de-escalate and enter into negotiation or mediation is a joint function of its motivation to escape a conflict and its optimism about finding a mutually acceptable solution. Motivation to escape a conflict is a direct function of the costs and risks attributed to the conflict and an inverse function of the perceived likelihood of winning the conflict. Optimism is a direct function of trust that the adversary wants to resolve the conflict and an inverse function of the perceived distance between the two parties’ positions.

When the parties are groups of any size, optimism often grows as a result of secret, informal communication between them. Hostilities typically continue during periods of informal communication. Some readiness is required for

such communication to take place, but much more is needed before formal negotiation or mediation will be initiated. Third parties can try to enhance motivation to escape the conflict, but their main role is to sponsor, and often to be the medium of, informal communication that contributes to optimism once motivation is established.

The following are some of the potentially testable hypotheses implied by readiness theory:

1. Receptivity to third-party intervention is a function of readiness, as defined above.
2. The more severe the escalation, the harder it will be to establish optimism, since optimism is a function of trust.
3. 3. Greater motivation to escape the conflict can compensate for lesser optimism, and vice versa.
4. New leaders are more likely than old leaders to recognize that a conflict cannot be won or is producing unacceptable costs or risks. Hence, the likelihood of escaping an intractable conflict tends to be greater at times of leadership change.

Tests of such hypotheses need to combine laboratory experiments (e.g., Coleman, Kugler, and Vallacher, 2011) and field studies (for example Mooradian and Druckman, 1999).

NEGOTIATION

Research on negotiation has a long tradition and is quite extensive (see de Dreu, 2010; Pruitt, 2012a). Here we mention three recent trends in this research, each needing further development.

Negotiations are inherently relational, yet as Gelfand et al. (2006) noted, “There is still a dearth of theory and research

on relational constructs in negotiation" (p. 428). These authors introduce a model that focuses on relational self-construal, a cognitive representation of the self as connected to others that includes relational cognitions, emotions, and motives. A research agenda introduced by the authors of this model (Gelfand et al., 2006), shows avenues for future empirical work, which is likely to enrich the existing, mostly arelational, research on negotiation.

Other research has explored the relationship between affect and negotiation. Some studies have looked at the impact of affect on negotiator behavior (Carnevale and Isen, 1986; Forgas, 1998) and, more recently, the impact of knowledge about the other party's affect (Van Kleef, de Dreu, and Manstead, 2004). A blind spot in this research has been the impact of displayed affect (Pruitt, 2012a). For example, the following questions need to be addressed empirically: Does displayed negative affect provide information that helps the other party find a mutually beneficial solution, or does it produce conflict spirals that fuel the conflict further? If it has both effects, what conditions encourage one over the other?

Another recent development is the study of stages in negotiation. For example, several authors have put forward psychological models concerning when and why people initiate negotiation or refrain from doing so (e.g., Reif and Brodbeck, 2011; Volkema and Fleck, 2012). These models open new avenues for research. The reasons for initiating a negotiation can strongly influence the subsequent processes during the negotiation, a phenomenon that also needs to be explored. Time series methods (e.g., Putnam, 1990) facilitate the study of later stages and the turning points between them. However, there is little convergence in the results of studies using these methods, with each investigator finding different stages and sequences of stages (see Pruitt, 2012a). Clearly these strands need to be

untangled and a theory built that explains the various findings. Such an effort might begin with Druckman's (2001) simple classification of negotiator strategy as cooperative versus competitive. In his study, 75 percent of the turning points in negotiation were positive (competitive followed by cooperative) and 25 percent were negative (cooperative followed by competitive). Follow-up research is needed to find the conditions and processes leading to one versus the other type of turning point.

MEDIATION

Mediation can be defined as third parties helping disputants overcome their differences. It can be formal, in the sense of involving specially trained third parties who offer their services to the public, or emergent, in the sense of involving third parties who are drawn from the same social milieu as the disputants. (For comprehensive summaries of the mediation research, see Pruitt, 2012a, and Wall and Dune, 2012.)

Rival Approaches to Mediation

Mediation has traditionally been viewed as assisted negotiation, the goal being to aid the disputants reach a viable agreement through problem solving (see Kressel, 2000; Herrman, 2006). The mediator helps the parties locate the interests (goals, values, needs) underlying their initial positions and their priorities among these interests. Then a search is made for options that satisfy these interests and priorities. If the parties are unable to devise their own options, the mediator throws out suggestions, but the final decision requires agreement between the parties.

This traditional approach has been challenged from a number of directions. A friendly amendment comes from writers who stress the importance of perceived justice in

both negotiation and mediation (Conlon, 2005; Tyler and Blader, 2004; Zartman et al., 1996). The argument is that disputants are as concerned about justice as about satisfying their interests. Hence, if one or both parties feel that they are suffering an injustice, the traditional approach to mediation may produce no agreement or an agreement that is not followed. Injustice can be experienced in many ways (Deutsch, 2006): distributive injustice, procedural injustice, retributive injustice, moral exclusion, or cultural imperialism; hence, mediators must have a broad understanding of this phenomenon. Research has demonstrated the importance of perceived justice for success in mediation (e.g., Albrecht, 2010; Bollen, Ittner, and Euwema, 2012; Lind et al., 1993; Pruitt et al., 1993), but more empirical work is needed.

The traditional approach to mediation is more radically challenged by two new schools of practice. One is narrative mediation, which sees the job of the mediator as flushing out and restructuring the parties' narratives—the stories they tell about the history of the conflict and how they think, feel, and speak about it (Cobb, 2003; Winslade and Monk, 2001). Narrative mediators have little use for the traditional effort to discover the parties' interests because they view these interests as derived from the entering narratives and as likely to change when the narratives change. Agreements may be reached during narrative mediation, but that is not the basic goal, which is to improve the parties' capacity to deal effectively with each other. The other dissenting voice comes from proponents of transformative mediation (Bush and Folger, 2005). Transformative mediators seek to improve the relationship between the parties and give the parties a sense of empowerment rather than to find a viable agreement. Their technique is very nondirective. They provide little structure and no advice, instead encouraging the parties to make

their own decisions and helping them understand their own and the other party's viewpoints.

There is considerable evidence favoring the claims of traditional mediation (Kressel and Pruitt, 1989), but narrative and transformative mediation have rarely been evaluated empirically (for an exception, see Nabatchi, Bingham, and Moon, 2010). Laboratory research does not seem appropriate for this evaluation unless one can bring experienced mediators and genuine disputes into the laboratory, which is likely to be very difficult. A more plausible setting would be a community mediation center that uses all three types of mediation, if such could be found. Otherwise, centers specializing in each kind of mediation would have to be used.

What is needed first is a careful study of how traditional, narrative, and transformative mediators behave to pinpoint similarities and differences. Then a comparative study should be done in which several mediators of each type handle several cases. The ideal design would involve random assignment of the three types of mediators to cases. This is likely to be difficult in mediation centers, but a study by McGillicuddy, Welton, and Pruitt (1987) shows that it can be done. Finding common measures of success will be a challenge, since the proponents of these methods espouse different goals.

Contingent Mediation

Advocates of the three contrasting schools just described often assume that their method fits all cases. But this assumption is highly questionable, considering the variety of conflicts that undergo mediation. Instead, it makes sense to employ a contingent approach, using diagnosis followed by choice among a diverse set of strategies and tactics (Pruitt, 2013; Wall and Dunne, 2012). Empirical

researchers need to come to terms with Wall and Dunne's (2012) observation that "faced with such a complex set of categories, scholars have not been able to grapple with the two fundamental questions for mediation: (1) What are the major causes/antecedents of mediators' strategies? That is, what causes mediators to use the strategies they do? (2) And what are the major impacts of the mediators' use of particular strategies?" (p. 227). To these should be added a question about contingent mediation: (3) What strategies are appropriate under different conditions?

Addressing these questions directly, Coleman et al. (2013a) have begun to identify fundamental dimensions of the situation that influence a mediator's strategy and the process and outcome of mediation. They suggest a situated model of mediation, which asserts that mediator success depends on the situation and the mediator's capacity to adopt strategies appropriate to it. Predictions from this model need to be tested empirically.

Fisher and Keashly (1990) have grappled with the third question, distinguishing four levels of escalation that require different approaches to third-party intervention:

1. *Discussion* , in which the parties have a good relationship but are unable to solve a particular problem. Here, relationship building is unnecessary and traditional mediation is fully appropriate.
2. *Polarization* , in which "trust and respect are threatened, and distorted perceptions and simplified stereotypes emerge" (pp. 236–237). Here relationship building is necessary before moving to traditional mediation.
3. *Segregation* , in which the parties are competitive and hostile.

4. *Destruction* , in which the main aim of the parties is to hurt or destroy each other.

At these last two levels of escalation, relationship building is not feasible, and the mediator should try to contain the conflict by taking firm steps to stop hostile action. If such steps are successful, it may be possible to turn to relationships and substantive issues. Firm action of this kind requires some form of mediator power.

Fisher and Keashly's elegant model was developed in the context of international and ethnopolitical conflict, but it seems equally appropriate to conflict between individuals and between small groups. The model clearly needs empirical test, preferably in several different settings. Taking firm steps to stop hostile action (also advocated by Saposnek, 2005, for divorce mediation) is 180 degrees antithetical to the nondirective approach of transformative mediation, a discrepancy that needs to be sorted out empirically.

The importance of taking a contingent approach is also argued by Dugan (2001), who suggests that the source of a conflict may lie at any of three levels: the issues under dispute, the relationship between the parties, and the broader social system. Conflicts are usually presented in terms of surface issue but on deeper probing are found to derive from flawed relationships or a problematic social system. An example of the latter would be a conflict between two brothers over an old piece of furniture that turns out to hinge on a cultural norm that the older son inherits his parents' property—a norm that the older brother accepts and the younger one rejects (Pruitt and Kim, 2004). Dugan argues that systems conflicts cannot be solved by dealing with the presenting issues or trying to improve the parties' relationship. Instead, the underlying structural problem must be addressed.

In a study of the mediation methods used by the National Institutes of Health Office of the Obmudsman, Kressel and Gadlin (2009) found evidence of a search for underlying structures similar to that prescribed by Dugan. In a series of case studies, they found that the mediators began with a diagnostic phase in which they classified most of the controversies as deriving from one of three underlying difficulties: a dysfunctional communication pattern, a supervisor blocking the scientific autonomy of a rising new investigator, or weak program administration. In some cases, they were able to work on the underlying difficulty, while in others, the disputants insisted on a more superficial, issue-based approach. Similar diagnostic templates are sometimes used by family therapists, who classify cases as arising from such standard causes as parental blockage of adolescent efforts to break away or the husband retreats–wife pursues pattern. It is possible that professional mediators often develop a typology of underlying causes in the realm of their practice and use this typology to diagnose new cases. If so, our field needs more in-depth case studies like that done by Kressel and Gadlin and broader theoretical work once they have been done.

Multiple Mediators

Sometimes more than one mediator is involved with a dispute. For example, in formal comediation, two trained mediators are assigned to a case. Differences between these mediators often mirror differences between the disputants—for example, black and Hispanic mediators when one disputant is black and the other Hispanic. The pluses and minuses of comediation need theoretical analysis and empirical test.

In emergent mediation, two or more mediators may form a communication chain between the disputants. For example,

in Northern Ireland in the early 1990s, a chain went from Sinn Fein (the political wing of the Irish Republic Army) to the SDLP (a moderate Catholic political party) to the government of Northern Ireland and then to the government of Great Britain (Pruitt, 2007). It can be argued that such chains are useful for two reasons: (1) there is greater understanding and trust between parties adjacent in the chain than between the parties at either end, and (2) chain length makes it hard for hawks in each camp to detect and thwart peacemaking efforts. Research is needed to fully understand the functions of such chains, the conditions under which they form, the extent of their success, and how chain users cope with the inevitable distortions in messages that are transmitted through chains.

Sometimes disputants communicate through two or more chains simultaneously. For example, during part of the time in which the chain in Northern Ireland was operating, Sinn Fein and the British government were also communicating through a mysterious individual known as the “contact” (Mallie and McKittrick, 1996). Scholarly opinion differs on whether such multiplicity contributes to (Pruitt, 2003) or detracts from (Crocker, Hampson, and Aall, 1999; Wanis-St. John, 2006) successful conflict resolution. This dispute needs to be sorted out empirically.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have identified a number of questions that need to be answered, outlined some possible theoretical directions for answering these questions, suggested some testable hypotheses, and proposed some research methods. In doing so, we are under no illusion that we have made a significant dent in the research program that is needed for our field. That would be

impractical in a chapter of this length and impossible for two scholars to achieve. Rather, we have explored the issues and ideas we know best. It is likely that other authors would come up with very different agendas. Our hope is that a few of you have found in this chapter an idea or two that will stimulate future research.

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CONCLUDING OVERVIEW

Peter T. Coleman
Eric C. Marcus

We begin the conclusion of this third edition of the Handbook with a story of hope. For several years, our center, the International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution (ICCCR), cosponsored a course with our colleagues at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs on the theory and practice of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution at the United Nations. This was an innovative course, bringing eminent theorists and researchers from academia together with highly skilled international diplomats and practitioners and encouraging lively dialogue among them. The students for the course were a mix of graduate students from Columbia and foreign embassy and UN personnel.

In 1999, we began the course with a conceptual overview of Deutsch's theory of cooperation and competition (see chapter 1) and discussion of its relevance for resolving international conflict. After providing a summary of the theory, we asked the students to work in small groups to apply the ideas from the theory to the emerging conflict in Kosovo (this was in January, prior to the NATO bombing campaign), with the objective of generating recommendations for the United States and the international community.

At the conclusion of this exercise, one particularly articulate student, a military attaché to a UN ambassador, summarized his group's discussion. He said they felt there were few feasible options to the crisis other than recommending that NATO threaten to bomb or use other force against the Serbians to stop the ethnic cleansing in

the area. There was general consensus on this conclusion among the students in the class.

Three months later, at the final meeting of the course, Richard Holbrook (whose position as US ambassador to the United States was at that time pending approval in Congress) spoke to the class about what was then current US and NATO policy in Kosovo and Serbia. He spoke passionately for the need to continue the bombing campaign against the Serbs. His argument was detailed, articulate, and very convincing. After Holbrook concluded his statement and left the room, discussion of the situation in the former Yugoslavia continued.

It was at this point that the same young attaché who had advocated bombing earlier in the term spoke again. He began by saying that he had been struck by something during Holbrook's remarks: the fact that the military initiatives that were typically employed in these situations, such as use of bombing missions or sending in ground troops, were rarely successful in achieving their political objectives. The objectives, he claimed, in many such situations were to inflict enough harm on the general population that either the leadership feels its pain and acquiesces or the people organize and remove the leaders. The use of military force, he said, as we had seen in Vietnam, Iraq, and now in Kosovo, rarely achieved these objectives. I paraphrase him: "The notion of bombing a village in order to save it, as in Vietnam, is insane. The Serbs are bombing Kosovo in order to save it, and we are bombing Serbia in order to save it. It simply makes no sense. There has to be a better way!"

He continued, as best I recall: "Every day I look at a map of Africa hanging in my office, and I think that if these are the types of solutions we have to offer the many conflicts on that continent, there will never be peace." Here was an

accomplished US Marine, someone who had risen in the ranks of the military to a position of substantial importance, stating emphatically, “There has to be a better way!” In subsequent discussion with this student, he thanked us for the course and said that learning about a constructive approach to conflict had challenged his thinking about conflict resolution and peacemaking in important ways.

For more than eighty years, scholars and practitioners in the field of conflict resolution have been searching for a better way. As is evident in the many chapters of this Handbook, a great deal of progress has been made toward understanding conflict and resolving it constructively. However, a great deal of work remains to be done.

We find this opening story hopeful because it illustrates how education in conflict resolution, particularly when presented in practical terms to individuals who are in influential positions, can begin to have an important impact on our world. The story also points out, however, that there are no simple answers to complex conflicts and that we all must keep striving to find a better way.

THE CHALLENGES THAT LIE AHEAD

In the last section of the Introduction to this Handbook, Morton Deutsch outlines a series of questions that the field of conflict resolution has been or is currently addressing. In this, the Concluding Overview, we outline some of the questions and challenges that theorists, researchers, and practitioners of conflict resolution will face in their work in the years ahead. Many of the issues outlined here are themes that run throughout the book; we summarize them here for purposes of clarity and to begin to set out a new agenda for scholar-practitioner collaboration in the field.

Oppression and Conflict

The first question is, How can a field that holds notions of neutrality and egalitarianism so dear work constructively and ethically in situations where intergroup dominance and oppression are the norm?

In 2012, the National Urban League released a study reporting that 149 years after the issue of the Emancipation Proclamation, the equality gap between blacks and whites in the United States continues to be substantial, and in some areas it is increasing. According to the report, black unemployment is 15.8 percent, while white unemployment rate is 7.9 percent; the health status of black Americans is 76 percent that of whites; and teachers without an undergraduate major in the subject they are teaching are working in minority schools at twice the rate they teach in white schools. The incarceration rate (prisoners per 100,000) for blacks is 1,540, while the rate for whites is 252. In 2006, the overall equality index was 73 percent, but in the 2012 report, the equality index was 71.5 percent (an equality index of 100 percent would mean that blacks and whites are equal). So there was a 1.5 percent decrease in equality for blacks over those six years. To be specific: black economic standing is 56.3 percent of whites, black health standing is 76.5 percent of whites, black education standing is 59.7 percent of whites, and black social justice standing is 56.8 percent of whites. In addition, median income for blacks was $33,578 (2010 data reported in 2012 report), while median income for whites was $54,168 (2010 data reported in 2012 report). The poverty rate for blacks is 27.1 percent, and for whites, 10.6 percent. These are just a few examples of the extraordinary disparities in equality between groups that are becoming more and more pronounced worldwide.

In the 1990s, the Minorities at Risk Project documented 275 minority groups at risk for ethnopolitical conflict in 116 nations. This constitutes 17.4 percent of the world's population who belong to groups disadvantaged due to discriminatory practices or currently politically organized to defend their interests. The links between such inequities and protracted conflict and violence cannot be overstated. (See chapter 2 by Deutsch on social justice, chapter 29 on violence, chapter 6 on power, and chapters 3 and 31 also.

The substantial scholarship on oppression, particularly in the social sciences, does an excellent job of describing the intractability of systems of dominance and conflict (see, for example, Sidanius and Pratto, 1999) but offers little direct utility for interrupting patterns of injustice or sustaining constructive changes in the balance of power when they do occur. Thus, it becomes paramount for conflict scholars and practitioners in the field to identify the processes and conditions that can undo the dynamics of oppression at individual and group levels and thus enable constructive conflict resolution processes to work in tandem with those that promote justice.

Beginning in 2002, we at the ICCCR began conducting a faculty seminar to explore and develop comprehensive conceptual models for addressing oppression and conflict. The main focus of the seminar was on strategies that can ameliorate the increasing gap between the haves and the have-nots in institutions and societies worldwide. This investigation culminated in a two-day working conference at Teachers College, Columbia University in spring 2004, which brought together eighty invited participants from a wide variety of academic disciplines (e.g., economics, psychology, politics, and education) and professional practice areas (scholars, activists, philanthropists, students), focused on generating strategies for interrupting oppression and sustaining justice. The work from this

meeting resulted in the development of a new cross-sector network of individuals interested in supporting each other in their work in this area, and in a special issue of *Social Justice Research* in 2006. It was our hope that the outcomes of this conference would evolve and shape, enrich, or transform future research agendas on justice and conflict spanning across disciplinary boundaries. Much work in this area continues to be needed.

Readiness

The second question is, How can readiness to resolve conflict constructively be fostered in individuals, groups, and nations?

This raises many issues, several of which were touched on in the chapters on personality, intractable conflict, training, change, and large group intervention in this Handbook. However, many questions remain. People and institutions are seldom ready to undertake significant change. Yet competitive and avoidant approaches to resolving conflict are ingrained in many people and institutions; collaborative, integrative approaches represent a new way of thinking and acting for them. The collaborative approach generally goes against the prevalent competitive style of resolving conflict modeled in families; by the media; and by many of our leaders in sports, business, and government.

The first task is, quite often, simply to broaden people's awareness that there are options available to them when in conflict other than to fight or flee. This is largely what most preliminary training or course work in conflict resolution attempts to achieve: to increase people's understanding of their own competitive or avoidant tendencies in conflict and of the fact that they have a broader menu of available options. For these educational experiences to be successful, it is important that they effectively engage and inspire

students sufficiently to motivate them to try something new and strengthen their skills at resolving conflict constructively.

A separate but related concern with regard to readiness has to do with our ability as third parties to assess and engender a degree of authentic readiness for disputants involved in a conflict. Collaborative negotiation and mediation are voluntary processes. They work only when the disputants engage in them willingly, by choice, if they are to help to make real progress toward understanding each other's needs and reaching agreement. At times, disputants may seem to be cooperative during a negotiation process, while having no intention of following through once an agreement has been reached. This is related to the distinction between compliance and commitment. This is thought to have occurred at the Cambodian Peace Accords in the mid-1990s, an exemplary collaborative peace process that fell apart on implementation because the parties reneged on the agreement. Work needs to be done on developing better methods of assessing and fostering disputants' genuine willingness to collaborate and make peace.

Systems must also be readied. Research has shown that unless schools and districts are sufficiently motivated to embrace a change initiative such as instituting a program of conflict resolution training, it is likely to fail. This readiness must exist for a majority of the system, including regents, board members, superintendents, principals, teachers, other professional staff, students, and parents. One method for assessing organizational readiness in schools was used in the Learning Communities Project initiated by the New York City Resolving Conflict Creatively Program (Roderick, 1998). For a school to be included in the project, 70 percent or more of the faculty must vote in favor of its implementation. This approach could be taken

for entire school districts or even for statewide school initiatives. Administrators and conflict practitioners need to work to develop innovative methods of assessing and fostering readiness throughout these and other systems.

Finally, awareness of constructive responses to conflict needs to be widespread among the general population. One way of attaining this is for the field to attempt educating prestigious individuals in high-profile positions within a given society. In 1995, a campaign was initiated in Australia through the leadership of the nationwide Conflict Resolution Network (CRN), which sought to influence the campaign process of local, state, and federal elections in that country. Their basic objective was to ensure high-level political dialogue by encouraging the candidates to adopt an orientation to issues, not insults; dialogue, not debate; and collaboration, not confrontation. Immediate response to the campaign was very positive, with 32 percent of candidates for their House of Representatives committing to the CRN conflict-resolving principles. In the United States, the League of Women Voters has been doing important work in promoting its Code of Fair Campaign Practices, which requires candidates for public office to commit to uphold basic principles of decency, honesty, and fair play.

These efforts hope to foster a new type of political process and a government that models respect, care, and common sense in addressing the issues, conflicts, and visions of the people it represents. A general shift in attitude and response to conflict could come about if those in influential positions of high visibility (political leaders; sports, entertainment, and media celebrities; and business leaders) were to model constructive strategies and skills.

Change Agents

Third, How can we help people in the field of conflict resolution understand and develop skills in their roles as change agents?

The field is increasingly aware of the fact that conflict professionals often have to act as change agents within the systems in which they work. Whether intervening in a professional relationship, a family, an organization, a community, or a nation, you will find it useful to think about conflict resolution systemically. This has two implications, one practical and one political. The practical concerns the need to broaden understanding of what we do. Much of the emphasis of past work in the field has been on training conflict specialists in the skills of getting disputants to the table, facilitating a constructive process, and reaching an agreement. However, there is increasing recognition of the problems that occur in implementation, both in helping to ensure that disputants can effectively implement their agreements and implementing effective mediation and training programs within larger systems.

In the case of disputes between individuals, it is not uncommon for good agreements to fall apart because of problems with implementation or changes that occur after the agreement is made. Conflict specialists need to be better trained to help disputants anticipate future problems and build in feedback mechanisms so that if problems occur with implementation, the disputants will attempt to resolve them collaboratively or return to the table to work them out.

Considerable challenges can also occur in implementing mediation or training programs within systems. There is increasing recognition of the difficulties of implementing any lasting change in systems with regard to dispute resolution mechanisms and the need to identify the processes and conditions that give rise to successful

implementation. Introducing cooperation and conflict resolution concepts and practices into systems often involves, in a sense, a paradigm shift in how people see and approach differences. Fostering this type of fundamental change in the norms and practices of a system requires that conflict specialists have the necessary skills to motivate and persuade, organize, mobilize, and institutionalize the change. These skills need to be adequately integrated into the training of conflict specialists who work in systems, particularly complex ones.

The second implication of defining our work in terms of change concerns the conflict resolver's level of awareness of the political repercussions of his or her work. Intervening in part of any system in some way affects the whole system. If one department in an organization undergoes a substantial change in how it functions, this is likely to have an impact on the entire organization. It is therefore important for the intervener to be informed about the political context in which she or he works and to be aware that the intervention has a likely impact on the balance of power existing within the system.

This is both a moral and a practical obligation. In *The Promise of Mediation* (1994), Bush and Folger discussed this issue under the heading "The Oppression Story" of mediation. They argued that in some settings, mediation can serve to oppress those in low power by masking patterns of injustice within systems or allowing those in high power to set the agenda and intimidate others. Conflict specialists must be trained to think in terms of the social and political processes within organizations and reflect critically on their own role in the power dynamics within institutions so that they can work fairly and effectively. Furthermore, the moral obligation of the conflict specialist extends beyond understanding his or her impact

on power dynamics and toward undoing systemic injustices that may exist.

The Importance of Cultural Differences

The fourth challenging issue is, How can our growing recognition of the importance of cultural differences be used to improve the practice of constructive conflict resolution and help develop practical theories in this area that are universally valid?

Most scientific theories and models of practice have the laudable aim of being universally true. Theorists commonly assume that the basic ideas in the theories related to cooperation and competition, equity theory, social judgment, communication, self-control, persuasion, and so on are as applicable to, say, the aborigines in Kakadu as to Park Avenue sophisticates, to people living in caves as well as to astronauts. However, most theories are developed in particular societies with their particular cultures, gender roles, and other characteristics that are often invisible to the theoreticians.

Theorists often do not articulate their assumptions about the relations between the theory and the social context in which it is to be applied. Does a theory developed in the United States implicitly assume that the social context is one in which there is a market economy and individualistic values are strongly held? If so, it may be applicable only in social contexts similar to the ones in which it was developed. There is a strong need for the field of conflict resolution, and the social sciences generally, to better articulate explicitly aspects and assumptions about the social context that are understood as relevant to theories.

Even if the basic ideas of a theory are applicable in a variety of social contexts, specific implementation of its ideas always depends on the characteristics of the social

context in which they are applied. Thus, effective implementation of many of the theoretical ideas in this book depends on whether a practitioner is working in a social context (such as the American one) that is predominantly individualistic, has low power distances, is strongly task oriented, has low uncertainty avoidance, and is more masculine and modern or in a social context that differs significantly on any of these dimensions.

In general, scholars and practitioners can respond to these concerns in several ways. First, it is important that both scholars and practitioners be aware of their own gendered, cultural, and societal mind-sets with regard to their work (see Fisher, 1988). Some degree of mindfulness of our own biases and assumptions can help us examine our theories, models, and practices for similar biases and make them explicit.

Second, a significant amount of work has been conducted in the past few decades on identifying the psychological dimensions on which people differ due to variations in culture, ethnicity, religion, and gender (summarized in chapter 25; see also Hofstede, 1980; Kolb and Coolidge, 1991; Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Segall, Lonner, and Berry, 1998). Conflict specialists working cross-culturally need to be informed about these dimensions and be mindful of how they affect the way people make meaning in conflict situations.

Third, scholars and practitioners need to better distinguish those elements of conflict resolution that are universal and therefore applicable across cultures from those that are not. For example, Deutsch (in chapter 1 in this Handbook) has suggested that specific values such as reciprocity and nonviolence universally occur in enduring, voluntary, and significant relations of cooperation and constructive conflict resolution. The cross-cultural universality of the

linkage between such values and constructive conflict resolution is different from the culturally specific usefulness of certain prescribed processes (such as recommendations to “separate the people from the problem,” openly express one’s needs, or take an analytical approach to understanding the issues); these are likely to vary considerably across cultures, gender, class, and so on.

Lederach (1995) has suggested practicing an “elicitive” approach when offering conflict resolution training across cultures. He argues that “prescriptive” approaches to training, which view the trainer as the expert and participants as passive recipients of predetermined knowledge, models, and skills, are often inappropriate in many cultures. Lederach advocates an approach in which the context expertise of the participants is emphasized and combined with the process and content expertise of the trainer, so that the trainer and the participants together create a new model of constructive conflict resolution that is specifically suited to the resources and constraints of the particular social context in which the participants are embedded.

Conflict within the Field of Conflict Resolution

Fifth, given the existence of much conflict in the field of conflict resolution (as among the scholarly disciplines, among theorists, researchers, and practitioners; and among training programs and graduate studies for scarce resources—students, clients, grants, and so on), How can the field learn to better walk its talk and model how conflicts can be resolved constructively?

The field of conflict resolution has become, ironically, a fairly competitive arena. This competition and the resulting conflict between individuals, disciplines, programs, and

institutions pose substantial challenges to progress in our field.

For example, the various scholarly disciplines often approach conflict from contrasting perspectives. Take a dispute over water rights between two neighboring tribal groups. A social psychologist is first concerned with the characteristics of the parties, their prior relationship, the strategies and tactics they use in the dispute, their respective needs in the situation, escalatory dynamics, and so on. A legal scholar working in this area is concerned with prior treaties or contracts, land rights, the existence of legal precedents, and so on. A scholar of international affairs may be oriented to contextual or structural factors such as the balance of power in the dispute or the national or regional sources and implications of the conflict. Scholars from anthropology, business, history, and economics may emphasize still other aspects of the situation.

At one level, these orientations are due simply to the varieties of educational training and task orientation. At a deeper level, however, beneath many of the disciplinary contrasts are ideological and value differences. If conflict is believed to exist within a unitary ideological frame (where society is seen as an integrated whole in which the interests of the individual and society are one) as opposed to a radical frame (in which antagonistic class interests are seen as comprising society), it requires one kind of response and not another. Similarly, whether one's primary orientation to conflict is competitive or cooperative dictates strategy.

These and other variations in how conflict is understood and approached typically come into conflict themselves when scholars or practitioners attempt to work together. Because many of the significant conflicts that societies face

are rooted in political, economic, and social histories and are fueled by social psychological dynamics, we are finding that analysis and resolution cannot be adequately conducted from any one disciplinary perspective; a multidisciplinary framework is required. But the traditional reward systems and orientations of the disciplines lessen the chances for such an approach. Combining traditional disciplinary paradigms and methodologies with multidisciplinary ones is a daunting task, though an essential one if the field of conflict resolution is to offer effective solutions to some of the world's most perplexing problems.

At another level, there is concern in the field of conflict resolution over the substantial gap between theory and practice. As Deutsch notes in the Introduction, many practitioners of conflict resolution dismiss (or are simply unaware of) the contributions of theorists and researchers, particularly if the research challenges their own opinions or methods. At the same time, scholars often fail to use the expertise of highly skilled practitioners in their development of theory, and research designs often fail to take into account what practitioners and policymakers want or need to know. In fact, an evaluation of the eighteen, mostly university-based Hewlett Theory Centers found that the work of most practitioners surveyed was largely unaffected by the important contributions generated by the various centers (theory, publications, and so forth). At the same time, much of the research conducted at these centers was found to be "removed from practice realities and constraints." This lack of effective collaboration between scholars and practitioners hinders the development of the field and is a significant loss for both scholars and practitioners.

There exists an interesting problem when trying to enhance the connections between theory and practice. It is

embodied in this Handbook, which is geared more toward the scholarly, academic modes (learning through reading) than the practice mode (learning through doing). The issue is, How can we foster the growth of knowledge in this field by using more practical modalities? We have made efforts on two fronts in this regard. One way we have done so in this Handbook is by asking those trained in the knowledge aspects of conflict, but whose work lies primarily in its practice, to contribute chapters (see, for example, Burke; Bunker and Coleman; Marcus; Coleman and Prywes; Honeyman; and Bartoli, Manojlovic, and Magellan). Although the balance is not equal, we have sought an even greater contribution from the practice side in this third edition. A second way we have sought to strengthen the linkage is that we have asked contributors to devote a section of each chapter to the implications of their contributions to the arena of practice.

A curious and related matter concerns the distinction between knowledge and skill in the area of conflict resolution. Unlike other scholarly areas, we in the field of conflict studies have all experienced conflicts: within ourselves, with other people, within and between groups we belong to, and so forth. That is, we have more skill practice than theoretical knowledge in both well-resolved and poorly resolved conflicts. So even the most scholarly oriented conflict student continues to have many opportunities to increase her skill by practicing with the very concepts she is studying. This is less likely to be the case in other areas of scholarship (e.g., the study of comparative political systems). In other words, there is more of an inherent connection between theory and practice in the conflict field. Furthermore, as our understanding of conflict phenomena increases in both knowledge and practice, it becomes ever more important to

find ways of cross-fertilizing these: theory-informed practice and practice-informed theorizing.

The field will be well served if we work harder at practicing what we preach and learn to work together to resolve the conflicts that exist across orientations, organizations, and disciplines and between theory and practice. There is much strength in the diversity of our field, but we must come together to realize it.

Learning to Learn

The sixth challenge is, How can we learn to learn about our methods and practice?

The field of conflict resolution has been criticized for being broad but not deep. The issue is whether work in this area is both based on sound theoretical thinking and systematically studied and evaluated in a manner that allows the field to grow. We believe this volume attests to the rich theoretical foundations of the field. However, much of the practice of conflict resolution is not evaluated, or poorly evaluated. This is a lost opportunity to learn from our collective work, understand the conditions under which certain tactics and strategies are more or less effective, and build on what is effective and discard what is not. This type of research is still uncommon despite its increase in the past ten years. (See chapter 44.) Systematic evaluation of conflict resolution practices needs to be conceptualized and implemented at the onset of intervention, not as an afterthought. Additionally, there would be much benefit from longitudinal studies examining the long-term effects of training and mediation programs.

Recognizing Our Global Cooperative Interdependence

A growing area of challenge looks at the following question: As occupants of a single planet, how can we become more deeply aware of our cooperative interdependence with all other occupants? In order for us to survive as a species and allow for the dignity and rights of all inhabitants to flourish, it is critical to expand our understanding of identity to include that of a global identity: to behave in ways that not only fulfill our individual interests but maximize our interests as members of a cooperative global community. Too often these are pitted against one another and viewed as an either-or situation. This is captured well by the commons dilemma (Hardin, 1968), where continued pursuit of individual interests over long-term communal interests ultimately results in the failure to fulfill individual interests and communal interests.

Clearly, much intellectual work is needed to better understand ways to resolve this dilemma and develop a strong global identity that connects us to an effective, cooperative, global community (Deutsch, Marcus, and Brazitis, 2012). As such, the scholarship and practice of understanding conflict becomes paramount to the enhancement of our interdependent, global community. More important, increased recognition of our interdependencies will contribute to more rather than less conflict. This calls for even greater efforts to develop and test theory that is informed by practice and, just as important, practice guided by theory.

Encouraging Innovation

Finally, How can we foster creative innovation in our thinking and our practice of resolving conflict constructively?

Betty Reardon (private communication) a renowned peace educator, has stated that “the failure to achieve peace is in essence a failure of the imagination.” In addition to studying what we already do, it is essential that we develop new methods and ways of thinking about conflict that move beyond our current approaches. As the nature of the conflicts that we face changes, so must our thinking and our strategies for resolution. This often requires adopting a novel point of view (see chapter 20 on creativity in this volume). We must continuously view our current understanding of conflict and conflict resolution as a beginning—the first few steps toward the much needed means for finding “a better way” of improving and enhancing human conflict interaction.

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Susan W. Coleman works with individuals, groups, or the whole system to resolve differences, develop people, and build common ground. In the past twenty-five years, she has worked with the United Nations worldwide, American Express, the government of Colombia, US Departments of State and Agriculture, and NASA, among others. She is currently a partner of C Global Consulting, a firm in New York City that specializes in conflict management, leadership development, and organizational change. Her articles include "Teaching Conflict Resolution Skills in a Workshop" (in E. Raider, S. Coleman, and J. Gerson, *Handbook of Conflict Resolution* , 2000, 2006); "International/Intercultural Conflict Resolution Training" (in E. Raider and S. Coleman, *Sage Handbook of Conflict Communication* , 2006), and, with D. E. Weaver, "Women and Negotiation: Tips from the Field" (*Dispute Resolution Magazine* , 2012). She holds a juris doctor (Hofstra University School of Law), master's in public administration (Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government), and advanced certifications in individual, group, and organization development (Gestalt OSD Center and Institute).

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Daniel Druckman is professor of public and international affairs at George Mason University and an eminent scholar at Macquarie University in Sydney. He is also a member of the faculty at Sabanci University in Istanbul and has been a visiting professor at National Yunlin University of Science and Technology in Taiwan, the University of Melbourne, the Australian National University, and the University of Western Australia. He has published widely on such topics as international negotiation, turning points, justice, nationalism, peacekeeping, nonverbal communication, and research methodologies and is the recipient of the 2003 Lifetime Achievement Award from the International Association for Conflict Management. He has also received

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Joshua Fisher is a postdoctoral research scientist at the Advanced Consortium on Cooperation, Conflict, and Complexity at the Earth Institute and a lecturer in the Negotiation and Conflict Resolution Program at the School of Continuing Education, both at Columbia University. He earned his PhD in conflict analysis and resolution from George Mason University for his work modeling the ecological correlates of armed conflict. In addition, he holds an MA in political science from Utah State University for work exploring the political economy of conflict resolution in East Timor in the period 1997 to 2001. His current research and practice focus on natural resource management and land use planning as tools for conflict prevention and conflict resolution with special focus on the Amazon Basin and sub-Saharan Africa. He also works on conflicts between extractive industry and indigenous groups. As a lecturer, he teaches two courses on environmental conflict resolution. Fisher has extensive field experience in Mozambique, Peru, the western United States, and Mexico on issues related to land use planning,

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John Gottman is world renowned for his work on marital stability and divorce prediction. He has conducted forty years of breakthrough research with thousands of couples. His work on marriage and parenting have earned him numerous major awards. He is the author of 190 published academic articles and author or coauthor of forty books, including the best-selling *The Seven Principles for Making Marriage Work; The Relationship Cure; Why Marriages Succeed or Fail* ; and *Raising an Emotionally Intelligent Child* , among many others. Cofounder of the Gottman Institute with his wife, Dr. Julie Schwartz Gottman, John was also the executive director of the Relationship

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Andy Greendorfer , received an MSW from the University of Washington and a BA in psychology from Sonoma State University and is a licensed social worker. He has been treating couples, individuals, and families in his Seattle office since 1985. As one of the twelve founding members of the Gottman Institute, he has provided training to clinicians working toward certification as a Gottman method therapist. In 2004, he authored a chapter in *The Marriage Clinic* , a clinical manual by Julie Gottman. Greendorfer and fellow Gottman Institute therapist Mirabai Wahbe designed and colead a two-day workshop, “Deepening the Gottman Method,” for couples who have completed the Gottman workshop. Together they coauthored a corresponding manual for the workshop. Through his thirty years of clinical practice, Greendorfer has assisted hundreds of couples in developing the skills necessary for healthy relationships.

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James J. Gross is professor of psychology at Stanford University and director of the Stanford Psychophysiology Laboratory. He earned his BA in philosophy from Yale University and his PhD in clinical psychology from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1993. He is a leading figure in the areas of emotion and emotion regulation and received early-career awards from the American Psychological Association, the Western Psychological Association, and the Society for Psychophysiological Research. He also has won numerous awards for his teaching, including the Dean’s Award for Distinguished

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Howard E. Gruber was professor emeritus of the University of Geneva (Switzerland) and adjunct professor at Teachers College, Columbia University. He obtained his PhD from Cornell University in 1950. He was professor of genetic psychology in Geneva, a chair previously held by Jean Piaget. At Rutgers University, he was codirector with Solomon Asch of the Institute for Cognitive Studies. His major field of work was studying the creative process, with special emphasis on intensive case studies of highly creative people. He authored some two hundred articles and such books as the much-honored *Darwin on Man* . He had been a member of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton and was awarded Guggenheim, Ford, and National Institute for Mental Health fellowships. He also received the Rudolph Anheim Award for his contribution to psychology and the arts. Gruber died on January 25, 2005, after a prolonged illness.

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Alexis Halkovic is a doctoral student in the critical social/personality psychology program at the Graduate Center, City University of New York. She has a strong interest in understanding structural injustice and the ways

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Eran Halperin is a senior lecturer at the new school of psychology at the IDC, Herzliya, Israel. He received his PhD from the University of Haifa in 2007 (summa cum laude) and completed postdoctoral training (through a Fulbright Scholarship) at the Department of Psychology, Stanford University, in 2008. He serves as an associate editor of the *International Journal of Political Psychology* and in 2012 was awarded the Erikson Award for early-career achievements in the field. His main line of research focuses on the role of emotions and emotion regulation in determining public opinion toward peace and equality, on the one hand, and war and discrimination, on the other. In addition, he is interested in the psychological roots of some of the most destructive political ramifications of intergroup conflicts (e.g., intolerance, exclusion, and intergroup violence). The unique case of Israeli society in general, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular, motivates his work and inspires his thinking. His recent work on these issues has been published in *Science* . In addition, in recent years, he has published articles in journals such as *Journal*

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Christopher Honeyman , a managing partner of Convenor Conflict Management in Washington, DC, has served as a consultant to numerous academic and practical conflict resolution programs in the United States and abroad. He is codirector of Rethinking Negotiation Teaching, a major project designed to revamp the teaching content and methods of negotiation worldwide. Previously he was director of an extensive succession of research-and-development programs of national or international scale, including Broad Field (2002–2005), Theory to Practice (1997–2002), and the Test Design Project (1990–1995). He

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Intervention (with Dean Pruitt, 1989). He coedited an issue of *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research* on mediator style (with James Wall, 2012) and an issue of the *Journal of Social Issues* on the mediation of social conflict (with D. Pruitt, 1985). He has served as an associate editor of the *International Journal of Conflict Management* and is on the editorial boards of *Negotiation Journal* and *Conflict Resolution Quarterly* . He has been a consultant and trainer in the areas of dispute mediation and conflict management for the Office of the Ombudsman at the National Institutes of Health, the Robert Wood Johnson Medical School, the New Jersey Cancer Institute, the New Jersey Court system, and Rutgers, Columbia, and Princeton universities. His current research focuses on the tacit knowledge that underlies mediator intervention decision making.

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Michelle LeBaron is a tenured professor on the University of British Columbia (UBC) law faculty and was director of the UBC Program on Dispute Resolution until 2012. She joined the Faculty of Law in 2003 after ten years teaching at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution and the Women's Studies program at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia. From 1990 to 1993, she directed the Multiculturalism and Dispute Resolution Project at the University of Victoria. She has lectured and consulted around the world on cross-cultural conflict resolution and has practiced as a family law and commercial mediator. Her current research focuses on using expressive arts practices —particularly movement and dance—to train mediators and inform intervention design. She holds a JD from UBC, an MA in counseling psychology from Simon Fraser University in Canada, and a BA from Chapman University in California. She was called to the bar of British Columbia in 1982. Michelle is the author of several books, including *Bridging Troubled Waters, Bridging Cultural Conflict* , and *Conflict across Cultures* . Her new book, *The Choreography of Resolution: Conflict, Movement and Neuroscience* , was published in 2013 by the American Bar Association.

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Mark Magellan received his master's degree in conflict analysis and resolution at George Mason University. He has experience mentoring at-risk youth using peer mediation in the after-school setting through the Youth Policy Institute. Moreover, he has used his training as a community organizer to work with local communities through collaborative problem-solving curriculums that encourage dialogue and perspective. He believes in the power of art and poetry to make a positive change in conflict resolution pedagogy and training. Finally, he is a contributor to Beyond Intractability and cocreator of the Collective Canvas initiative, which encourages students of conflict resolution to take ownership of their education and find their voice in the field.

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Victoria J. Marsick is professor of adult learning and leadership at Columbia University, Teachers College. She holds a PhD in adult education from the University of California, Berkeley, and an MPA in international public administration from Syracuse University. She codirects (with Martha A. Gephart) the J. M. Huber Institute for Learning in Organizations, dedicated to advancing the state of knowledge and practice for learning and change in organizations. She is also a founding member of Partners for Learning and Leadership, a group that works with organizations to design, develop, and implement strategic learning interventions.

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Alex Mintz is dean of the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy at IDC-Herzliya, Israel, director of its Institute for Policy and Strategy, and chair of the Herzliya Conference. He is also editor in chief of the journal *Political Psychology* and editorial board member of several other academic journals. He served as associate editor of the Yale-based *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (2004–2009) and as editor of the University of Chicago Press book series, Leadership and Decision Making in the International Arena. Mintz is the 2005 recipient of the Distinguished Scholar Award of the Foreign Policy Analysis section of the International Studies Association (ISA) and the 1993 recipient of the Karl Deutsch Award of the ISA. He has written several books dealing with US defense policymaking and has also published multiple articles in such top journals as the *American Political Science Review, American Journal of Political Science, International Studies Quarterly* , and *Journal of Conflict Resolution* . Currently he is working on a book, together with Carly Wayne, which introduces the Polythink concept and analyzes the effects of disjointed, fragmented advisory groups on elite group decision making and foreign policy formation in the United States.

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Bridget Moix has spent most of her career working on issues of peace and violence prevention within the national and international policy arena. She has also worked with community-based organizations in South Africa and Mexico. She is a member of the Religious Society of Friends and has worked with its organizations, including the Friends Committee on National Legislation, Quaker United Nations Office, and American Friends Service Committee on peace and conflict issues. She also worked with Oxfam America on Sudan and with the World Policy Institute. She now works with the Genocide Prevention Program at George Mason University’s School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, where she is pursuing her

doctorate, examining issues of how and why people choose peace in the midst of violence.

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Ezequiel Morsella is associate professor of social cognitive neuroscience at San Francisco State University and associate adjunct professor in the Department of Neurology at University of California, San Francisco. He received his doctorate in psychology from Columbia University. His research concerns the nature of basic unconscious and conscious mechanisms in human action production. His publications include “The Function of Phenomenal States: Supramodular Interaction Theory” *(Psychological Review* , 2002) and “The Unconscious Mind” (with John Bargh; *Perspectives on Psychological Science* , 2008). He is coeditor, with J. A. Bargh and P. M. Gollwitzer, of *Oxford Handbook of Human Action* (2002).

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* * *

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Susan Opotow , a social psychologist and scholar of injustice, is a faculty member in the PhD program in critical social/personality psychology at the Graduate Center, CUNY and the Sociology Department, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, CUNY. Her empirical studies investigate sociopolitical and psychological contexts in which the scope of justice—the extent of our justice concerns for others—widens or narrows. Her research examines how and when injustice and direct and structural violence directed at marginalized groups are rendered normal, acceptable, and just. She also studies the complementary, inclusionary process when the scope of justice widens to extend rights and resources more broadly within a society. She situates her research in conflictual contexts that include

environmental degradation, the postwar period (e.g., the US Civil War and World War II), and museum exhibits that focus on historical injustice. She is editor of *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* . Recent honors include Baruch College–Rubin Museum Faculty Fellowship (2012–2013), Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues Distinguished Service Award (2012), the American Psychological Foundation's Lynn Stuart Weiss Lecture Award (2011), and presidency of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (2009). She is a fellow of the American Psychological Association and three of its divisions and serves on its Committee on International Relations in Psychology (2010–2013).

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Michelle Pryce-Screen has worked as a nonprofit executive for the past eighteen years, leading and managing staff who deliver high-quality services to marginalized populations. She has worked in the fields of housing, reentry, substance abuse, mental health, education, employment, and health care. Most recently, she has used her extensive knowledge in the areas of social services and reentry to partner with the International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution at Teachers College and the Fortune Society to study the effectiveness of one of Fortune's innovative supportive housing programs. She received her bachelor's degree in sociology from Hobart and William Smith Colleges and earned master's degrees in social work and education from Hunter College in New York City.

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Yaron Prywes is a trainer and leadership development specialist with C Global Consulting. He has led conflict resolution trainings for business professionals and international civil servants in cities throughout the world, including New York, Geneva, Nairobi, and Addis Ababa. These trainings help increase participants' ability to manage conflict productively and negotiate skillfully. He also facilitated emotionally charged conversations for large groups of young adults who lost a parent to politically motivated violence in the United States, Argentina, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Nigeria, Ireland, Israel, and Palestine, in conjunction with the organization Tuesday's Children. These conversations deepened mutual understanding among participants, and resulted in concrete peace-in-action plans. He supports the professional development of leaders in a variety of industries with LeaderNation, his Web-based, 360-degree feedback tool. In addition, he frequently publishes in the leadership-coaching space and recently received an award from the Organization

Development Network for his article on the role of history in leading change. As part of his doctorate, Yaron empirically examined the relationship between coaching and goal attainment. His study revealed that coachees achieved 30 percent more of their goals relative to participants who did not receive coaching (after goal difficulty was accounted for). He is an adjunct faculty member and coach with the Center for Creative Leadership. He received his PhD in social-organizational psychology from Columbia University's Teachers College.

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Sandra V. Sandy is a senior research consultant for the Northside Center for Child Development in New York. She earned her PhD in social psychology from Columbia University and began her career at the New York City Board of Education where her research focus was on the social-emotional health and achievement of homeless children in the school system. As an assistant professor at Cornell University Medical College, she continued her research on homeless children, expanding the scope to include families living in New York City welfare hotels. In 1994, she joined the International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution at Teachers College, Columbia University, first as codirector of research and then serving as director of research. She is the creator of the Peaceful

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Gene Sharp , who has been called "the Clausewitz of nonviolent warfare," is senior scholar at the Albert Einstein Institution in Boston, Massachusetts. He founded the institution in 1983 to promote research, policy studies, and education on the strategic uses of nonviolent struggle in the face of dictatorship, war, genocide, and oppression. Before founding AEI, he held research appointments in Harvard University's Center for International Affairs for nearly thirty years. He holds a PhD in political theory from Oxford University, an MA in sociology, and a BA in social sciences from Ohio State University. Dr. Sharp is the author of several books on nonviolent struggle, power, dictatorships, Gandhi, and defense policy. These include *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (1973), *From Dictatorship to Democracy* (1993), *Sharp's Dictionary of Power and Struggle: Language of Civil Resistance in Conflicts* (2012), and *How Nonviolent Struggle Works* (forthcoming). His writings have been published in over forty-five languages. Sharp is convinced that pragmatic, strategically planned, nonviolent struggle can be made highly effective for application in conflicts to lift oppression and as a substitute for violence.

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Geneviève Souillac is senior university researcher at the Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) at the University of Tampere, Finland. Previously, she was senior associate professor of philosophy and peace studies at the

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Ervin Staub is professor emeritus and founding director of the doctoral program in the psychology of peace and violence at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. He is past president of the International Society for Political Psychology and of the Society for the Study of Peace, Conflict and Violence. His books include *Positive Social Behavior and Morality* (vols. 1 and 2); *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence; The Psychology of Good and Evil: Why Children, Adults and Groups Help and Harm Others;* and *Overcoming Evil: Genocide, Violent Conflict and Terrorism* , which won an award in 2012 from the International Society for Political Psychology for the best book published in political psychology in 2011 and in 2013 from the International Psychology Division of the American Psychological Association for fundamental contributions to psychology as a global discipline. He has edited a number of books as well, including *The Roots of Goodness: Inclusive Caring, Moral Courage, Altruism Born of Suffering, Active Bystandership and Heroism* (forthcoming). He has conducted many projects in field settings, ranging from working with teachers and parents to promote altruism in children, to seminars, trainings, and educational radio

projects in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Congo to promote psychological recovery and reconciliation. He received awards for lifelong contributions to peace psychology, distinguished contributions to political psychology, and distinguished scholarly and practical contributions to social justice and an international and intercultural relations prize. For other awards and downloads of articles, see www.ervinstaub.com

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Janice M. Steil received her PhD from Columbia University. She was trained as a social psychologist working with Morton Deutsch and has particular interests in the psychology of justice and gender. She began teaching that same year at the Derner Institute of Advanced Psychological Studies at Adelphi University, where she continues today. While at Adelphi, her research has focused primarily on the study of adult close relationships, particularly issues of power and intimacy in dual-earner marriages. Consistent with her interests in gender, she is a past associate editor of the journal *Psychology of Women Quarterly* . She is also the author of numerous publications on relationships, including her book *Marital Equality: Its Relationship to the Well-Being of Husbands and Wives* .

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Leigh L. Thompson joined the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University in 1995 and is the J. Jay Gerber Distinguished Professor of Dispute Resolution and Organizations. She directs the Leading High Impact Teams executive program and the Kellogg Team and Group Research Center, and codirects the Negotiation Strategies for Managers program. An active scholar and researcher, she has published over one hundred research articles and chapters and has authored ten books: *Creative Conspiracy; The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator* (5th edition); *Making*

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Mirabai Wahbe was one of the very first therapists invited to join the Gottman Institute Relationship Clinic in 1997. She is a Senior Certified Gottman Method therapist, Certified Couples Workshop Leader, and Master Teacher. She designed and coauthored with Andy Greendorfer a two-day workshop and manual, *Deepening the Gottman Method* , and they presented this opportunity to expand the

skills and concepts of the Gottman Relationship House twice yearly for many years. She is a contributing author to *The Marriage Clinic Casebook* , edited by Julie Schwartz Gottman. She has presented to a variety of audiences on the Gottman method, parenting concepts, recovering from depression, and childhood abuse. She has also been in extensive training with Virginia Satir and was a member of her Avanta Network. Training with Elisabeth Kübler-Ross over many years gave her experience in the process of grief, death, and dying, and she has been a resource to many in this process of life. She has been in private practice in Bellingham, Washington, since 1979, working with couples, adults, and teens on a variety of relationship, personal, and psychological issues. She has an MA in applied behavioral science.

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area of research examines how social networks influence human goal pursuit, performance, and emotional contagion in social, organizational, and international contexts. This has culminated in dynamic network theory and its methodologies, which have direct implications for the study of human conflict. For example, the network conflict worksheet allows researchers and practitioners to identify the direct, indirect, and peripheral players involved in specific conflicts. His research has been published in major outlets in psychology, organizational science, and public health. He teaches various courses in social and organizational psychology and has worked with numerous organizations, including the United Nations and Boeing Corporation.

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Development Review (2004) received the Outstanding Article Award. He earned master's degrees from Vanderbilt University and Columbia University and his doctorate from Columbia University.

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Cultural differences: aggression and violence responses to; Chinese vs. Western; Coleman Raider Filter Check Model on; negotiation bias related to; perception of fairness and; readiness for conflict resolution and issues of

Cultural fluency: building; capacities enhanced by; conflict and conflict resolution context of; description of; elements of cultural intelligence (CQ) related to; implications for conflict resolution pedagogy; implications for theory and practice; meaning-making processes and; neuroscience to better understand

Cultural framing of dialogue

Cultural imperialism: cultural reconstruction of “differences” under; definition of; double identity of culturally dominated groups under

Cultural intelligence (CQ): definition of; four elements related to cultural fluency

Cultural theories of aggression and violence

Culture: collaborative negotiation; comparing multiculturalism and; cooperation-competitive studies of Chinese; defining; as element of the communication process; human security by increasing cultural diversity; interrelatedness between conflict and; justice sustained by peaceful; power distance dimension of; of terrorist groups

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Cycles of humiliation

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Dayton Accords (1995)

The Decent Society (Margalit)

Decision fatigue

Decision makers: groups as; individual as

Decision making: constructive controversy and improved attitudes toward; constructive controversy and improved quality; PSDM model integrating problem solving and; destabilizing through dynamic adaptivity of; risk of; structuring constructive controversy for. *See also* Group decision making

Deep structure of power relations

Deescalation strategies

Defense and control mechanisms

Defense motivation of conflict resolution

Defense processing motivation

Delay of gratification

Deliberate discourse

Democracy/democracies: civil disobedience role in; conflict resolution techniques rooted in goals of; constructive controversy role in; historic evidence on willingness to negotiate with terrorism; power of constructive conflict as driving; reconciliation role played by fair institutions of; respect and recognition concepts of

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Destructive competition

Deutsch’s Crude Law of Social Relations

Development: adolescence; adulthood; ECSEL Program curriculum on childhood; function of conflict in early childhood; middle childhood; reinvent understanding on the continuing state of; self-control and discipline during childhood; social-emotional learning as part of; stages of development theory on

Dewey’s learning from experience

Dialogic communication: stage 1: preparation; stage 2: in the moment; stage 3: reflection

Dialogic paradigm of communication: on focusing on establishing conditions for communication; overview of

Dialogue: additional uses of; approaching communication through; Buberian; consideration as relationship, event, or context; creating new social worlds made from; different meanings of; *having a dialogue* form of; I-It relationships expressed in; I-Thou relationships expressed in; preventing and overcoming problems in communication during; problems in communication during conflict; as techniques used to create space for co-inquiry. *See also* Communication; Information processing

Dialogue processes: Public Conversations Project (PCP); sustained dialogue; world Café

Dictionary of Conflict Resolution (Yarn)

Dictionary of Power and Struggle (Sharp)

Difficult personality parties

Dignism

Dirty Harry (film)

Dirty tricks

Disadvantage group deprivation

Displacement: description of; pain of

Disposition (personality)

Distributive injustice: definition of; training to recognize

Distributive justice: definition of; equity, equality, and need principles of; theory of relative deprivation on

Distrust: calculus-based distrust (CBD); fundamental difference between trust and; identification-based distrust (IBD); relationships as containing elements of both trust and

Diversity: Brooklyn Friends School (BFS) use of psychoeducation to promote; human security by increasing cultural; unity-in-diversity identity

Divide-and-choose approach

Divorce: “four horsemen of the apocalypse” predictors of; mediation for; ratio of positive to negative SPAFF codes predictor of; summary of effectiveness evidence for prevention of. *See also* Domestic violence; Marriage

Domain theory

Domestic chastisement

Domestic violence: Gottman lab work on; how emotions interaction with; as largely underreported. *See also* Divorce; Violence

Domestic violence-emotions interaction: fear of humiliation in; role of anger in; role of fear in; role of guilt in; scenarios tracing the

Dominance legacy

Dominator model of society

Double-swing model

Dream Act

Dreams-within-conflict blueprint

Dual concern models

Dynamic network theory

Dynamical Systems Theory (DST): guidelines for altering the attractor landscapes of intractable conflicts; implications for conflict resolution training; overview of the

Dynamic network intelligence (DNI)

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Economic Community of West African States

Economic justice: framework for implementing; reconciliation and role of

Economic justice framework: description of; politics of deserving

ECSEL (Peaceful Kids Educating Communities in Social-Emotional Learning) Program

Effective actions

Efficacy: competencies required for; social learning theory on

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Egg drop exercise

Egoistical deprivation

Elias Castro School of Excellence

Emic conflict resolution research: methodologies used in; single case studies on qualitative; time series analysis: quantitative/qualitative

Emotional management: broaden-and-build model on positive; cosmopolitan communication virtuosity for; importance of learning; task-oriented learning-mastery orientation of. *See also* Social-emotional learning

“Emotion-Coaching” (Gottman lab)

Emotions: anger and hatred; Colman Raider workshop on dealing with anger and other; communication problems related to conflict and; confidence and warmth; dynamic network theory on social network spread of; fear; guilt; hot to intervene in conflict and manage; humiliation; interaction between conflict and; intractable conflict processes and; mirror neurons and; nature of; reflection role on affect and; three functions of; trust built from; understanding the power of

Empathic listening

Empathy: conflict role in childhood development of; gender differences in; listening with; training to increase

Employee stock ownership plan (ESOP)

Employees: organizational transformation for inclusion of; Praxis Consulting Group addressing inequality of; restaurant

Encoding-decoding paradigm of communication

Enga of Papua New Guinea

Entrapment

Environmental power: culture; deep structure; description of; hierarchy; inequitable opportunity structures; legitimizing myths; roles

Epistemic curiosity

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Equality principle

Equality Trust: description of the; promoting policies designed to reduce inequality gaps

Equity distribution principle

Equity principle

Erikson’s psychosocial stages in development

Escalation: bilateral sequences of; as control and defense mechanism; description of; intergroup conflict and; interpersonal conflict; sequences of unilateral

ETA (Spain)

Ethical dilemmas (conflict resolution)

Etic conflict resolution research: case analysis: quantitative; methodologies used in; structured focused comparison (SFC) qualitative

Evaluating conflict resolution initiatives (CRIs): action evaluation research initiative for; Comprehensive Peer Mediation Evaluation Project (CPMEP); framework for comparative case analysis; Negotiation Evaluation Survey (NES) for; process evaluation of intergroup encounter interventions; research on

Exclusion: intractable conflict and role of; moral

Expanding the pie solution

Experience: coaches and facilitators as catalysts for reflection on; Dewey’s learning from; informal and incidental learning model for reflection on; Mezirow’s “habits of mind” and critical reflection on

Experience surveys

Experiential learning, theorists of

Experimental research

Extraversion personality dimension

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Facebook

Facial affect coding system (FACS)

Facilitators. *See* Mediators

Fairness: cultural differences on how to perceive; egocentrism and allocation bias of; group decision making and interpretations of. *See also* Justice

Fall prevention negotiation

Fallibility: definition of; as underlying constructive conflict resolution value

“False conflict”

FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Columbia) [Colombia]

Fear: of future humiliation; interactions between conflict and

Feedback: Murray’s need theory of personality on need for; negotiation bias remedy through

Feedback mapping: Mozambique conflict and peace process; useful for understanding social systems

Female genital cutting

First Nations (British Columbia)

Fishbowl theory on hostage negotiation

501(c)(3) organizations

Five-factor model (FFM): on adult personality; examining conflict resolution using the; personality facet scales of the

Fixed-pie perception

Flexible attention deployment

Flexible thinking

Forgiveness: acknowledgment of suffering as part of; commitment to relationship impact on; many meanings of; power of private; as providing relief to those with PTSD; psychological spiritual healing through; reconciliation process moving toward; training to facilitate reconciliation and; treatment of PTSD role in. *See also* Victims/survivors

Four Fs (firm, fair, flexible, and friendly)

“Four horsemen of the apocalypse” divorce predictors

Framing: as cognitive bias; communication problems related to; cooperation-competition theory on constructive conflict resolution; dialogic communication preparation of cultural; how to improve women’s negotiation outcomes through; Iraq War decision making; moral behavior and role of

Fraternal deprivation

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Freudian stages of development theory

Frustration: aggression and violence as consequence of; comparing injustice to; description of; as sense of deprivation and injustice

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Gacaca (community justice process)

Gamaa al Islamiyya

Gays. *See* LGBTQ community

Gender: choosing a conflict resolution strategy and influence of; definition of. *See also* Sex

Gender differences: conflict resolution and; in empathy; evaluating and adapting conflict resolution style; negotiating boundaries and; negotiating contracts and; negotiation implications and applications; network access and; questions on negotiation not yet answered; self-construal and social role expectations and; social dominance orientation (SDO) and; strategies to improve outcomes for women. *See also* Men; women

Gender roles: conflict resolution style and; self-construal and expectations of

Gender wage gap: negotiating contracts; persistence of the

General Accounting Office (US)

General Electric

The General Strike (Crooks)

General System Theory (von Bertalannfy)

Geneva Conventions

Genocide: Holocaust; Rwandan (1994); Serbian ethnic cleansing. *See also* War

Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy

Getting to Yes (Fisher and Ury)

Gewaltfrier Aufstand (Ebert)

Global conflict resolution: global justice burden of; lessons from indigenous societies for

Global cooperative interdependence

Globegalization

Goal interdependence: Chinese cultural studies on responsiveness to; positive or negative; situational model of power and conflict and

Goals: antecedents to cooperative goals in Chinese society; constructive controversy requirement of cooperative; dynamic network theory on working together to reach common; group decision making for progress toward; self-regulation role in the pursuit of; of terrorist groups

“Good conflict”

Good Friday Agreement (GFA, 1998) [Northern Ireland]

Google+

Gottman Couples theory

Gottman lab: Bringing Baby home (BBH) workshop; Couples Together Against Violence (CTAV); discovery of reliable patterns of material interaction; “Emotion-Coaching”; Gottman Couples theory; intervention and prevention studies; Loving Couples Loving Children (LCLC); prediction and the replication of the predication work by; Sound Relationship House theory (SRH); study of gay and lesbian couples by; summary of evidence for intervention/prevention; trust and betrayal theory. *See also* Marriage

Gottman-Rapoport conflict blueprint

Gottmans’ conflict blueprints

Great October Strike (1905)

Greek-Turkish conflict. *See* Turkish-Greek conflict

Group boundaries: BART system on; definition and function of

Group conflict: BART system of; destructive process of; diagnostic framework of; evolution of intense violence from; examining the Pink Power organization case of; Lewin’s research on; Wells’s model of

Group decision making: behavioral; con-div group dynamic of; during conflict of War in Iraq; constructive controversy procedures for; interpretations of fairness during; Iraq War; large group intervention methods for; Native American value of consensus; polythink; power imbalance in; PSDM model on conflict resolution; purpose of; restabilizing through dynamic adaptivity of. *See also* Decision making

Group identity: description and types of; intractable conflict and oppositional; promoting open-minded processing about

Group relations: brief history of research on group dynamics and; large group intervention methods

Group roles: BART system on; description of

Groupthink: characteristics of; cohesiveness driving; conflict management process and role of; continuum of polythink and; description of; Iraq War decisions moving to polythink from

A Guide to International Negotiation (Raider)

Guided imagination

Guilt-conflict interactions

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“Habits of mind”

Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)

Handbook for Discourse (Van Dijk)

Handbook of Large Group Methods (Bunker and Alban)

Hatred-conflict interactions

Healing psychological wounds of violence

Heart Math emwave biofeedback device

Helsinki agreement

Heuristic processing: negotiation settings and systematic vs.; overview and comparison of

Heuristic-systematic model: on cognitive consequences of processing modes; on modes of information processing; overview of; on sources of bias

Hewlett Theory Centers

Hezbollah

High-power groups (HPGs)

Holocaust

Homophily of social networks

Homophobia

Honor ideologies

“Honor killing”

Hostage negotiation: airplane hijackings and; effectiveness of; fishbowl theory applied to; intervention techniques used during; media and public opinion during; with rogue states; role of trust and historical gestures during; stages and variables of; state engagement in; strategic options for engaging terrorists during; types of concessions made during; victims of. *See also* Terrorism

Hostage posting

Hot spots

Hot/cool model of willpower

Howard Beach incident

Huckleberry Finn (Twain)

Human and social polarities

Human Dignity and humiliation Studies

Human equality: definition of; as underlying constructive conflict resolution value

Human Judgment and Social Policy (Hammond)

The human relations paradigm of intractable conflict

Human rights: ideals of; UN Charter on; UN R2P (Responsibility to Protect) resolution on

Human rights practice: challenges to synergy of peace-building practice and; Columbia's ongoing violence and; concerns over "naming and shaming" strategy of; key differences between mediation and peace-building practice during; latest developments in international conflicts and; Northern Ireland peace agreement implementation (1998–2005) and; operationalizing peace with justice to further; Sierra Leone's immediate postviolence period (1999–2000) and

Human rights Watch

Human security

Humanization of the other

Humiliation: fear of future; human rights ideals being fueled by feelings of; interactions between conflict and

Huristic processing

Hurricane Katrina

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Iceberg principle of persuasion

Idea generation

Identification-based distrust (IBD): characterization of relationships on; description of; strategies to manage

Identification-based trust (IBT): actions that build; characterization of relationships on; description of; managing violations of

Identity: group; as source of integrative negotiation impasse

Ideological frames: honor ideologies and violence against women; pluralist; radical; unitary view

Ideology: destructive ideology versus constructive; Hitler’s; Internet websites promoting; intractable conflict and issues of; personal power framed by; Pol Pot’s; social dominance orientation (SDO) support of

I-It relationships

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Implicit power theories

Impression negotiation motivation

Impression processing motivation

Inclusion: Brooklyn Friends School (BFS) use of psychoeducation to promote; dynamic inclusivity and “deep coexistence”; using psychoeducational strategies to foster

Inclusively caring children

Incremental beliefs: extreme intergroup emotions and political action; negative trait judgments about out-group and political action

Incremental theory of groups: on emotional dimension of incremental beliefs; on judgment dimension of incremental negative beliefs; overview of the

Indigenous societies: applications to modern conflicts; examining the knowledge and practice of; harnessing their wisdom for global conflict resolution; peace systems of; reciprocity practices of; reflections on conflict resolution approaches by; value orientations of; Waorani (Ecuador)

Inducibility: cooperation-competition theory on role of; definition of; pathologies of

Induction

Inequality: and aggression related to sexualization of women; confronting privilege by challenging; examining conditions that induce persons of privilege to challenge; National Urban League report on US racial; policy changes to initiate or reduce; system justification of

Inequality gaps: Equality Trust promoting policies designed to reduce; organizational transformation and development to reduce; psychoeducational strategies to foster inclusion and reduce; racial. *See also* Privilege

Informal and incidental learning model: case example: after-action review (AAR); case example: on reflection after conflict; case example: reflection with the help of a trusted other; case example: using an action science facilitator to learn to handle conflict; encouraging dialogue and new ideas using; illustrated diagram of; overview of; reflection and critical reflection using the

Information processing: cognitive consequences of mode used for; dynamic network intelligence (DNI) on social networks; heuristic mode of; moderate positions and unexpected information; motives for; negotiation stage of exchanging information; promoting open-minded; sources of bias in; systematic mode of. *See also* Dialogue

Injustice: comparing frustration to; conditions causing persons of privilege to challenge social; in the course of conflict; distinction between oppression and; forms of; frustration over deprivation and sense of; implications for conflict resolution training; intractable conflicts with legacies of dominance and; “myths” that justify; as the source of conflict; training for knowledge of systematic forms of. *See also* Justice

Injustice forms: cultural imperialism; distributive injustice; moral exclusion; procedural injustice; retributive and reparative justice; sense of injustice

Innovation. *See* Creativity

Institute for Advanced Study (Princeton)

Institute for Survival and Beyond’s (PISAB) Undoing Racism (UR) training

Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (Georgetown University)

Institute of Cultural Affairs Strategic Planning Process

Instrumental reconciliation

Intact team building

Integration-adaptation model: accountability component of; accuracy in reading situation component of; adaptivity component of; awareness of situation component of; Boy Scouts of America (BSA) conflict with LGBTQ community examined using; overview of the

Integrative agreement products: type 1: compromise; type 2: logrolling; type 3: modify the resource pie; type 4: expand the resource pie; type 5: bridge the interests; type 6: cut the costs; type 7: compensation (nonspecific); type 8: superordination

Integrative agreements: Agreement Circumplex; compromise versus integrative; conflict management system producing; examined as creativity; flexible thinking and idea generation; interaction between conflict and creativity; mix of information needed for; providing time and space for; relationship between cooperation and creativity in; seeing the other's point of view; settlement versus resolution. *See also* Outcomes; Solutions

Integrative negotiation: description of; in difficult to resolve conflicts; five major stages of; promotion of; theoretical and empirical roots of

Integrative negotiation impasse: characteristics of negotiation environment and setting; characteristics of negotiation issues and; characteristics of the parties as source of; how negotiators can resolve

Integrative negotiation stages: 1: preparation; 2: building a relationship with the other party; 3: exchanging information; 4: inventing and exploring options; 5: reaching settlement

Intellectualization and minimization

Intense internal dynamics

Intentionalist paradigm of communication: on considering the listener when formulating a message; on listening to understand intended meaning; overview of

Interdependence: asymmetries related to degree of; positive or negative goal

Interests: defining; negotiation role of; to secure cooperation

Intergroup conflict: implications for training; implications for understanding and practice; overview of; resolving intractable; sources and dynamics of

Intergroup conflict dynamics: escalation; resistances to resolution and intractability

Intergroup conflict resolution practices: analyzing the conflict; confronting the conflict; overview of; resolving the conflict

Intergroup conflict resolution training: on analytical skills; on consultation skills; on group leadership skills; on intergroup skills; on interpersonal skills; overview of; personal qualities and

Intergroup conflict sources: group-level factors; perceptual and cognitive factors

Intergroup encounter interventions: description of; evaluation of

Internal conflict

International Crisis Group

International Center for Cooperation and Conflict Resolution (ICCCR)

International conflict: “bargaining in the shadow of the law” phenomenon in; International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments related to; Northern Ireland; Sierra Leone (1999–2000); Syria. *See also* Israeli-Palestinian conflict; Peace-building practice; War

International Criminal Court (ICC): human rights concerns of; indictments in Uganda and Libya by

International Institute for Sustained Dialogue (IISD)

International legal system: architectural development of; Geneva Conventions

International social network linkages

International Social Survey Program

Internet: online dispute resolution (ODR); social networks on the; websites promoting ideologies; “wild west” of the

Interpersonal conflict: escalating spirals in; self-regulatory failure in

Interpersonal conflict resolution: cooling strategies and techniques for; reflection; time-out

Interpersonal negotiation strategies (INS) model

Interpersonal relation dimensions: cooperation-competition; formal versus informal; intensity and importance; power distribution (equal versus unequal); task oriented versus social-emotional

Interpersonal scope

Inter-Tajik Dialogue (ITD)

Intractability: as powerful psychological barriers to conflict resolution; resistance to intergroup conflict resolution

Intractable conflict: components of; defining; Dynamical Systems Theory (DST) on; five paradigms for addressing; Mozambique conflict and peace process feedback mapping; ongoing global; “prevention orientation” approach to

Intractable conflict components: context; core issues; outcomes; processes; relationships

Intractable conflict intervention guidelines: 1: leverage instability; 2: complicate to simplify: mapping dynamic ecology of peace and conflict; 3: read the emotional reservoirs of the conflict; 4: begin with what is working; 5: beginnings matter most; 6: circumvent the conflict; 7: seek meek power; 8: work with both manifest and latent attractors; 9: alter conflict and peace attractors for the long term; 10: restabilize through dynamic adaptivity

Intractable conflict intervention paradigms: the human relations paradigm; overview on; the pathology paradigm; the postmodern paradigm; the realist paradigm; the systems paradigm

Intractable conflict processes: malignant social processes; pervasiveness, complexity, and flux; strong emotionality

intractable group conflict: direct conflict resolution to; implications and future directions of research on; incremental beliefs about; indirect social psychological approaches to; Israel-Palestinian conflict; Turkish-Greek conflict

Intrapsychic conflict and anxiety

IRA (Irish Republican Army)

Iranian US embassy hostages (1979)

Iraq Body Count

Iraq War: biased information processing: selective use and framing during; con-div group dynamic during the; decision-making dynamics during the surge (2007); failure to reappraise previously rejected alternatives during; groupthink dynamic in decision to invade Iraq (2003); lack of communication and confusion during the; lowest-common-denominator decisions and decision paralysis during the; McChrystal's *Rolling Stone* interview during the; moving form groupthink to polythink; policy implications of the decision making during; polythink process of withdrawal from Iraq. *See also* War

Iroquois Confederation

Irreducible Uncertainty, Inevitable Error, Unavoidable Injustice (Hammond)

Islands of agreement

Israeli-Palestinian conflict: Abraham Fund for Jewish-Arab Coexistence initiative to resolve; Air France flight rescue by Israeli government; cultural fluency used to better understand the; destructive versus constructive ideologies of the; emotional dimension of incremental beliefs; events to change collective memories and move toward shared view of history; increased levels of hope regarding end of; judgment dimension of incremental beliefs; normalization of hostility and violence; psychodynamic theory used to explain the; social media role in monitoring events of; symbolism and ideology issues of the. *See also* International conflict

Issue scope

I-Thou relationships

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Journal of Applied Behavioral Science

Journal of Homosexuality

Judgment and moral reasoning

Justice: analyzing the true impacts of retributive; conflict between two reasonable principles of; conflict over defining what is; distributive; economic framework of; *gacaca* (community justice process); global justice burden; operationalizing peace with; peace as requiring; peace-building process that commits to long-term peace and; reciprocity practice by indigenous societies for; reconciliation and processes of; scope of; solidarity and caring framework of. *See also* Fairness; Injustice

Justice frameworks: economic and politics of deserving; solidarity and caring

“Justifying,” as negotiation tactic

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Kamp Uden Vaaben (Ehrlich, Lindberg, and Gammeigaard Jacobsen)

Karma

Kidnapping. *See* Hostage negotiation

Kinetic power

Knowledge acquisition. *See* Learning

Kohlberg's moral development stages

Kosovo bombing issue

Kosovo Liberation Army

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Language: definitions of; dehumanizing trait of; used to describe conflict; examining interconnectedness of peace, conflict resolution, and; peace linguistics

Large group intervention methods: applications to peace building and legislative processes; that create the future; embedding new patterns of collaboration; methods for discussion and decision making; overview of; for work design

Large Group Interventions: Engaging the Whole System for Rapid Change (Bunker and Alban)

Layered personality

Leadership coaching

League of Women Voters

Learning: conflict management and social-emotional; constructive controversy and improved quality; experiential; informal and incidental learning model on reflection for; knowledge acquisition from conflict resolution research; to learn about conflict resolution; reflection on experience for; social context of

Learning by analogy

Learning Communities Project

LeBenevolencija

Legitimacy, socially constructed

“Legitimizing myths” of power

Leith Open Space

Lesbians. *See* LGBTQ community

“Letter from Birmingham Jail” (King)

Levesno lab

Lewin’s change process framework: driving and restraining forces; movement phase of; refreezing phase of; unfreezing phase of

LGBTQ community: Boy Scouts of America conflict with; honor ideologies and violence against

Libya

LIF PLUS

LinkedIn

Listening: dialogic communication with empathic; taking listeners perspective into account; trying to understanding intended meaning of message

Logrolling solution

Lome Agreement (1999)

London bombings

Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) [Uganda]

Lose-lose outcome

Loss averse

Love and belongingness needs

Loving Couples Loving Children (LCLC)

Low-power groups (LPGs)

Lufthansa flight negotiations (1977)

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Maalot School terrorism (Israel)

MACBE (motivation, affect, cognition, behavior, environment) model

Madrid terrorist attacks

Manila hostage crisis

Marginalization: moral exclusion or; psychological mechanisms for; selection of targets for; “structural” violence and

Marriage: couples’ conflict intervention; friendship as “emotional bank account” for; Sound Relationship House theory (SRH) on; specific affect coding system (SPAFF) measures of; trust and betrayal theory for emotional attunement in. *See also* Divorce; Gottman lab

The Marriage Clinic (Gottman)

The Marriage Clinic Casebook (Gottman)

Marriage intervention/divorce prevention: *The Art and Science of Love (ASL)* ; Bringing Baby home (BBH) workshop; Couples Together Against Violence; Gottmans' conflict blueprints; Loving Couples Loving Children (LCLC); proximal change experiments

"Marshmellow test"

Marxist doctrine

Maslow's hierarchy of needs

The Mathematics of Marriage (Gottman, Murray, Swanson, Tyson, and Swanson)

McChrystal's *Rolling Stone* interview

Media: coverage of terrorism by; nonviolent struggle coverage by the; political processes and freedom of the press by; social media as social networks

Mediation: Coleman Raider Mediation Model for; conditions for effective; contingent; definition of; efficacy of; factors determining use of; implications for training; implications for understanding and managing conflict using; key differences between human rights and; leadership coaching for organizational; outline for parents; problem-as-puzzle model of; "satisfaction story" of; short-term success in mediation (STSM); theory and research on; traditional, narrative, and transformative; whole school programs for

Mediator behavior: assertiveness; contextual interventions; as mediation factor; reflexive interventions; substantive interventions; tactical interventions

Mediator styles: evaluative; facilitative; problem-solving; relational; strategic

Mediators: behavior of; as catalysts for learning through reflection; characteristics of the potential; how gender affects style of; implications for; maintain realistic expectations; using multiple; negotiation biases of; skills required for intergroup conflict resolution; stressful social role of; stylistic orientation of; twelve stages of moves made by. *See also* Conflict resolution practitioners; Conflict resolution training

Mediators beyond Borders

Men: network access of; social dominance orientation (SDO) levels in. *See also* Gender differences

Men Organized against Rape

Mercy Healthcare system (California)

Messages: considering what the listener will take it to mean; listening to try to understanding intended meaning of; pay attention to the form of the; taking listener's perspective into account. *See also* Communication

Meta-emotion (Katz and Hooven)

MHS (mutually hurting stalemate)

Middle childhood development: description of; Erikson's psychosocial stages in development; role of conflict in; sense of self; stage theories of

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Mindfulness

Minimization and intellectualization

Minorities at Risk Project

Mirror neurons

The MODE

Modeling: self-regulation; social-emotional learning promoted by

Modify the resource pie

Mondragon (Spain)

Moral behavior, role of framing in

Moral community: empathy required to enlarge one's; intergroup simulations to experience a; justice principles of deserving often extended only to one's; training to enlarge the scope of one's

Moral courage

Moral development: of extraordinary moral responsibility and creativity; Kohlberg's moral development stages on; raising inclusively caring children with moral courage

Moral exclusion: definition of; individual and groups who suffer; psychological mechanisms of; selection of targets for; social conditions allowing; three central psychological questions regarding; training to recognize

Moral exclusion

Moral orientation

Moral reasoning and judgment

Moral theories on aggression and violence: moral exclusion; moral reasoning and judgment; norm violations; overview of

Moral values appeal

Morse code

Motivation: conflict resolution and multiple motives and; generating change agent’s; to improve understanding during constructive controversy; information processing and defense, accuracy, or impression; middle childhood development of; Murray’s need theory of personality on; self-regulation role in

Motivational orientation

Mozambique peace process: example of the utility of meek power in the; mapping the conflict and

Multiculturalism: comparing culture and; examining relationship to conflict and conflict resolution; increasing cultural diversity in today’s societies; meaning of conflict and resolution in context of; noteworthy applications of; as a social movement

Multiculturalism conflict management: accountability component of; accuracy in reading situation; adaptivity component of; awareness of situation; case study: Boy Scouts of America and multiculturalism; integration-adaptation model of

Multiple mediators

Mumbai attacks (Pakistan)

Murray’s need theory of personality

Musekeweya (New Dawn) radio drama (Rwanda)

Mutual respect principle

Mutual security principle

Mutual trust principle

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Naive conflict resolution strategies

Narrative mediation
National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights
National Fund for Social Enterprise (Mexico)
National Institute of Mental Health
National Institutes of Health Office of the Ombudsmen
National Public Radio
National Science Foundation
National Training Laboratory in Group Development (NTL)
National Urban League
Native American values
NATO
Nazi Germany
Need for power
Need principle
Needs theories: Burton’s human needs theory; Maslow’s hierarchy of needs; Murray’s need theory of personality
Negative self-transcendence
Negotiating boundaries: description of; gender differences in; legal entitlements

Negotiation: anchors, frames, and reference points of; Coleman Raider “Bare-Bones” Model of Stages of Negotiation; Coleman Raider reframing formula for; conflict resolution research on; contract; cooperation-competition theory implications for training; definition of; difficulty personalities and; examining gender differences in; facing dirty tricks during cooperative; integrative; judgmental biases during; multiple motives during; persuasion during; psychodynamic personality theory on irrational deterrents to; reducing ambiguity; research developments on; role playing during; social context of; strategies to improve outcomes for women; substantive content of training for; terrorists and hostage

Negotiation and Conflict Management Research (Kressel and Wall)

Negotiation Behavior (Pruitt)

Negotiation bias outcomes: damaged negotiation relationships; exaggeration of conflict/false conflict due to; failure to reach agreement even when mutually beneficial; loss of confidence; reaching agreement prematurely or in substandard way

Negotiation bias remedies: deliberate and structured interventions; naturally occurring

Negotiation biases: of cognition; cultural differences related to; information processing and sources of; of outcome and allocation; of process; remedies of

Negotiation boundaries: fall prevention; pregnancy and parental leave

Negotiation Evaluation Survey (NES)

Negotiation impasse: characteristics of the parties as source of; strategies for dealing with

Negotiation strategies: “chicken game” negotiation; Five factor model (FFM) predicting; for handling impasse; interpersonal negotiation strategies (INS) model; negotiation in order to prepare for an assault; normal; secret. *See also* Conflict resolution strategies; Persuasion

Negotiation tactics: “building a golden bridge”; “justifying” as

NEO-PI-R FFM questionnaire

Nepalese Maoists (Unified Communist Party of Nepal)

Network Conflict Worksheet: describing the system using the; illustration of the; other applications and caveats on using the; overview of the; transforming roles using the

Networks of effective action

Neuroplasticity

Neuroscience: on the brain and emotions; as conflict resolution resource

Neuroticism personality dimension

New Peoples Army (NPA)

New York City Resolving Conflict Creatively Program

New York Times

News Research Center Iraq War Casualties

9/11 attacks: Columbia’s antiterrorism policies justification by; debate over World Trade Center site following

Noncooperation

Nonkilling linguistics

Nonkilling Linguistics: Practical Applications (Friedrich)

Nonspecific compensation solution

Nonviolence value, definition of

Nonviolent actions: acts of protest; noncooperation; nonviolent intervention; in response to aggression and violence

Non-Violent Coercion (Case)

Nonviolent communication: implications for conflict resolution; research being conducted on

Nonviolent Communication (Rosenberg)

Nonviolent Communication: Companion Workbook (Leu)

Nonviolent intervention: description of; nonviolent struggle form of

Nonviolent struggle: definition of; efforts at planned adoption of; history and successes of; importance of; media coverage of; needed future explorations and research on; new scholarly and strategic attention on; nonviolent action for “wrong” objectives; Untouchables campaign (1924–1925). *See also* Acts of protest; Boycotts; Civil disobedience

Non-Western practices: how social relations are impacted by cultural differences and; violence and aggression against

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Normal negotiation strategy

Normalization of hostility and violence

North American Free Trade (NAFTA) talks

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Northern Ireland: British government negotiations with the IRA; former IRA in; Good Friday Agreement (GFA) of 1998; peace agreement implementation (1998–2005); “Troubles” of

Nunca Mas report (Argentina, 1986)

Nuremberg trials

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Observer (newspaper)

Occupy movement

Office of the Ombudsman (National Institutes of Health)

Online dispute resolution (ODR)

Open Space Technology

Open-minded processing: on group identity; on self-affirmation strategy

Openness personality dimension

Oppositional group identities

Oppression: cultural imperialism as; distinction between injustice and; nonviolent struggle against; structural; study on effects and risk of

Orbital frontal cortex

Organizational development (OD)

Organizational transformation: Praxis Consulting Group addressing inequality through; reducing inequality gaps through

Organizations: cooperation, open-minded discussion, and effectiveness surveys in Chinese; 501(c)(3); integration-adaptation model applied to; reducing inequality gaps in; shared ownership through hierarchical structure of

Other: arts-based approaches to understand the; dialogic communication preparation of; as element of the communication process; humanizing and developing positive orientation of the; incremental beliefs on negative trait judgments of. *See also* Victims/survivors

Outcomes: effective power and sustainable; integrative agreements as creativity; intractable conflict; lose-lose; negotiation bias and; negotiation stage of inventing and exploring options for; reactive devaluation of; strategies to improve women's negotiation. *See also* BATNAs (best alternative to a negotiated agreement); Integrative agreements; Solutions

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Palestinian-Israel conflict. *See* Israel-Palestinian conflict

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Paradigmatic persuasion experiment

Parental mediation outline

Participative Design

Partnership model of society

The pathology paradigm of intractable conflict

Peace: altruism born of suffering and; indigenous practices for; justice required as part of; mapping dynamic ecology of conflict and; peace-building process that commits to long-term justice and. *See also* War

Peace Education Program (Columbia University)

Peace linguistics: description and focus of; implications for conflict resolution; implications for education for using; interconnectedness of language, conflict resolution, and peace; LIF PLUS; peace-building teacher education use of; rise of nonkilling linguistics; THRIL technique

Peace systems: common indigenous practices for; description of; harnessing indigenous wisdom for global; Iroquois Confederation example of. *See also* War

Peace-building practice: accepting that sometimes sequencing is the best alternative; challenges to synergy between human rights and; Columbia; committing to long-term peace and justice; concerns over human rights' "naming and shaming" strategy; incorporating human rights experts as advisors during; key differences between mediation and; large group intervention methods applications to; Northern Ireland peace agreement implementation (1998–2005); operationalizing peace with justice to further human rights during; Sierra Leone's immediate postviolence period (1999–2000); Syrian conflict and. *See also* International conflict; Reconciliation; War

Peacebuilding Toolkit for Educators: High School Lessons (Milofsky)

Peaceful cultures and justice

Peer mediation

People's Front of Liberation of Palestine

Perceived power

Perpetuators. *See* Victimizers

Persistent intractable conflict

Personal power: authoritarianism; description of; ideological frames; implicit power theories; need for power; orientations of; other individual differences in; social dominance orientation

Personality: conflict resolution influenced by situation vs.; defense and control mechanisms of; definitions of; layered; research on how conflict is influenced by; social learning theory on

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Personality models: need theories; negotiating with difficult personalities; psychodynamic theories; social learning theory; social situations and psychological orientations; trait approaches

Personality theories of aggression and violence

Personality trait approaches: multitrait measures of personality and conflict; overview of; situation versus personality

Persons of privilege: “equity motive” experiments with; investigating how to help them confront injustice; prototypes used to facilitate reduce inequality gaps by; responsibility of

Perspective taking: adolescence development of; conflict role in childhood development of; constructive controversy positive impact on; as intervention for aggression and violence; middle childhood development of. *See also* Attitude change; Behavior change; Point of view

Perspective-taking paradigm of communication: overview of; on taking your listener’s perspective into account

Persuasion: conflict resolution context of; definition of; heuristic-systematic model of; iceberg principle of; moderate positions and unexpected information; motives for processing information for; paradigmatic persuasion experiment findings on; promoting open-minded processing for; as strategy for negotiating with terrorists. *See also* Negotiation strategies

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Pink Power organization: BART system used to examine the; joining Wells's levels and the BART system for examining; Wells's five levels of organizational analysis to examine

PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) [Turkey]

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Point of view: ability to see the others'; conflict resolution and importance of; developing a novel; shadow box experiments on. *See also* Perspective taking

Political instability: intractable conflicts and; leveraging instability as intervention for ending conflict

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Politics of deserving: dictating who is deserving; neglect of Hurricane Katrina survivors and

The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Sharp)

Polythink: conflict management process and role of; continuum of groupthink and; decision-making; description of; Iraq War decisions moving from groupthink to; remedies to

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

Positive emotions

Postmodern constructivism

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Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD): description of; how forgiveness can provide relief from; principles for treatment of; professional education required for effective

Potential power

Power: components of; conditions causing persons of privilege to relinquish their; as a dynamic; environmental; general versus relevant; group decision making and imbalanced; overview of the concept of; perceived; personal; pillars of support; potential and kinetic; primary and secondary; relational; seeking “meek”; sustainable outcomes and effective; top-down, middle-out, and bottom-up

Power components: environmental factors; personal factors; principles of power-conflict dynamics

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Power relations: environmental; between low-power groups (LPGs) and high-power groups (HPGs); personal; principles of power-conflict dynamics; as source of integrative negotiation impasse

Power-conflict dynamics: principles of; situated model of power and conflict

Practitioners. *See* Conflict resolution practitioners

Praxis Consulting Group

Presbyterian Church USA

Press. *See* Media

Primary power

Prisoner’s dilemma game

Privilege: challenging inequality and confronting; efforts to retain and justify; examining past politics of; responsibility through; why persons of privilege challenge unjust social arrangements. *See also* Inequality gaps

Problem identification

Problem solving: analogical reasoning used for; constructive controversy and improved quality; PSDM model integrating decision making and

Problem-solving approaches: critiques of different; evidence of better outcomes with; individual and social interaction perspectives on; overview of different; research that predicts use of

Procedural injustice: definition of; training to recognize

Procedural justice: description of process of; questions with regard to; values implicit in questions about

Program for Imaging and Cognitive Sciences (Columbia University)

Projection

The Promise of Mediation (Bush and Folger)

Protected trauma of conflict

PSDM model of conflict resolution: committing to a choice phase of; in conflict situations; on decision-making process; diagnosis of problem phase of; evaluating and choosing phase of; identifying alternative solutions phase of; illustrated figure of the; implications for training and practice; overview of the; on problem-solving process

Psychodynamic personality theories: on active unconscious; on conflict with another leading to intrapsychic conflict and anxiety; on control and defense mechanisms; on internal conflict; on irrational deterrents to negotiation; on the layered personality; overview of; on stages of development; summary and critique of

Psychoeducational strategies: Brooklyn Friends School (BFS) diversity and inclusion using; fostering inclusion over inequality

Psychological orientation: cognitive, motivational, and moral components of; description of; interpersonal relations dimensions of; social situations and

Psychologists for Social Responsibility

Public Committee for Democratic Processes (PCDP)

Public Conversations Project (PCP)

Public policy: the Equality Trust mission promoting policies reducing inequality; initiated to reduce inequality; large group intervention methods applications to legislative; nonviolent struggle to bring about

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Quaker community values

Qualitative research: methodologies used in; single case studies: emic; time series analysis: emic quantitative and

Quantitative research: experiments, surveys, and aggregate case studies: etic; focused comparison: etic; methodologies used in; time series analysis: emic qualitative and

Quasi-experimental research

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R2P (Responsibility to Protect) resolution [UN]

Racial inequality: Minorities at Risk Project on risk of; National Urban League report on US

Racism: Brooklyn Friends School (BFS) psychoeducation to reduce; Institute for Survival and Beyond's (PISAB) Undoing Racism (UR) training; metaphor of the airport automatic walkway for

Railway Labor Act (1926, amended in 1934)

Raising and Emotionally Intelligent Child (DeClaire)

Rational argument, as constructive controversy requirements

Reaction formation

Reactive devaluation

Real Time Strategic Change (or Whole Scale Change)

The realist paradigm of intractable conflict

Reciprocity: definition of; manifestations of; practice by indigenous societies; as underlying constructive conflict resolution value

Recognition concept

Reconciliation: altruism born of suffering and; creating complementary processes to address postagreement; definition of; instrumental vs. socioemotional; justice processes related to; moving toward and past forgiveness; multiple processes in; prevention of new violence and; principles and practices of; progressive nature of; psychological spiritual healing through forgiveness and; Rwandan *gacaca* (community justice process) of; Rwandan genocide (1994) interventions for; security issues during; training to facilitate forgiveness and; treatment of PTSD role in. *See also* Peace-building practice

Reconciliation principles: for establishing cooperation; establishing the complex truth; healing the wounds of all parties; humanizing the other and developing positive orientation to the other; processes of change of collective memories and toward shared views of history; understanding impact of violence on survivors, perpetrators, and bystanders; understanding roots of violence and avenues to reconciliation

Reconciliation processes: destructive ideology versus constructive ideologies; political conditions, democratic institutions, and reconciliation; progressively increasing acceptance of the past; public education and conflict and conflict resolution; raising inclusively caring children with moral courage

Red Army Fraction (Germany)

Red Brigades (Italy)

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Redesign work methods

Reference point of negotiation

Reflection: coaches and facilitators as catalysts for learning through; critical; dialogic communication stage of; emotions and affect role of; informal and incidental learning model for; interpersonal conflict resolution using; learning through; questioning the sustainability of Western peace systems

Reflection case examples: using an action science facilitator to learn to handle conflict; after-action review (AAR); on reflection after conflict; reflection with the help of a trusted other

Reflective practitioners: cooperation-competition theory implications for; description of; how to become a

Reflexive mediator interventions

Rehearsing self-regulation

Relational power: description of; situational model of power and conflict

Relational self-construal theory: gender differences in conflict resolution argument of; on gender-based differences in self-construal and social role expectations

Relationships: adolescence development of social; building one with the other party during negotiation; Chinese *guanxi* (relation system) of; as containing both trust and distrust elements; couples' conflict; cultural differences as factor in; Deutsch's Crude Law of Social Relations; developmental and multifaceted nature of; dialogue that focuses on the; expectations upon which we trust new; intractable conflict and role of; I-Thou compared to I-It; meaning making of communication as taking place in; mediation and improvement in; middle childhood development of social; Native American value of; as remedy for bias; social-emotional learning for developing; strengthen commonalities between parties to strengthen; sustained dialogue approach for building; trust elements used to characterize; types of conflict that include issues of. *See also* Social networks

Religious terrorist groups

Research. *See* Conflict resolution research

Research Center for Group Dynamics (RCGD)

Resistance, Politics, and the American Struggle for Independence (Conser, McCarthy, Toscano, and Sharp)

Resistance of the Heart: Intermarriage and the Rosenstrasse Protest in Nazi Germany (Stoltzfus)

Respect: democratic concept of; principle of mutual

Restaurant industry employees

Restaurant Opportunities Centers United

Retributive and reparative injustice: definition of; training to recognize

Retributive and reparative justice: analyzing the true impacts of; psychology of; societal functions of

Risk, decision making

Rockefeller Foundation

Rogue states

Role playing: Colman Raider workshop use of cultural differences; increasing empathy through; negotiation; self-regulation

Russian Revolution (1905)

Rwanda: *gacaca* (community justice process) in; genocide (1994) and reconciliation in; Musekeweya (New Dawn) [2004] radio drama in; providing public education about conflict and conflict resolution in; role of institutional democratic organizations in healing of; uneven justice processes as part of reconciliation in

Rwandan genocide (1994): interventions for reconciliation following the; war crime trials (2001–2010) following the

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Safety needs

SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks)

SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks)

Sandy Hook elementary School shooting (2012)

Scapegoating

School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) [Columbia University]

School shootings: Columbine High School massacre; Sandy Hook elementary School shooting (2012)

Schools: Brooklyn Friends School (BFS) psychoeducation on inclusion; Learning Communities Project for; peer mediation in; as place of white culture; structuring constructive controversy in the classroom; whole school programs for mediation

The science of Trust (Gottman)

Scope of justice

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Secret negotiation strategy

Security: dilemma related to; during process of reconciliation

Self: dialogic communication preparation of; as element of communication process; self-conception development of the

Self-actualization: needs related to; securing cooperation through appeal to

Self-affirmation strategy: description of; promoting open-minded processing about

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Self-construal: gender differences in contract negotiation; gender-based differences in

Self-control: early childhood development of; middle childhood development of

Self-efficacy: competencies required for; social learning theory on

Self-esteem: adolescence development of; constructive controversy enhancement of; Maslow’s hierarchy of needs on need for; middle childhood development

Self-fulfilling prophecies

Self-interest appeal: negotiation role of; to secure cooperation

Self-reflection

Self-regulation: delay of gratification and “marshmallow test”; essential preliminaries for; flexible attention deployment required for; hot reactions and the emotional brain during; modeling/role play/rehearsal of; motivation and persistence in goal pursuit role of; plans and implementation strategies for

Self-regulation competencies: affect; encoding; encodings; expectancies

Sense of injustice: activating the sense of; definition of; victims and victimizers

Sense of self

Serbian ethnic cleansing

Settlements. *See* Solutions

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Shadow box experiments: description and purpose of the; experiment one: interaction of social and cognitive actors; experiment two: comparing cooperative and individualistic orientations

Shame

Shared community: description of; as underlying constructive conflict resolution value

Shared views of history

Sharp’s Dictionary of Power and Struggle (2011)

Shining Path (Peru)

Short-term success in mediation (STSM)

Sierra Leone (1999–2000)

“Silent seething”

Simu-Real

Situated model of power and conflict: on cooperation, competition, and goals; implications for training

Slavery resistance

Social and human polarities

Social change. *See* Change process

Social Conflict (Pruitt and Kim)

Social dominance orientation (SDO): description of; emotions and; intergroup conflict related to

Social dominance theory

Social environment: as mediation factors; mediation used to improve

Social exchange theory

Social groups: mediation and improve environment of; as source of intergroup conflict

Social identity: social identity theory on; unity-in-diversity

Social Justice Research

Social learning theory: on aggression and violence; on personality

Social media: cyberbullying on; online dispute resolution (ODR); social networks created through

Social negotiation motivation

Social networking sites(SNS)

Social networks: charts on traditional vs. dynamic; conflict resolution strategies in; dynamic network theory on; dynamic network intelligence (DNI) on the; examining the structural linkages and; homophily principle of; increasing research on; international linkages; metrics used to describe; Network Conflict Worksheet; online dispute resolution (ODR); research on conflict in; social media as form of; spread of emotions through. *See also* Relationships

Social perspective cooperation

Social psychological approaches: direct conflict resolution; indirect conflict resolution; intractability as psychological barrier

Social psychological processes: attitudes (cathexis); inducibility; substitutability

The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation (Rubin and Brown)

The Social Psychology of Groups (Thibaut and Kelley)

Social role expectations: contract negotiation and gender differences in; gender differences in self-construal and

Social roles: BART system on group; environmental power and; gender differences during contract negotiation; gender differences in adapting to context of; gender differences in self-construal and expectations of; mediators' stressful; Network Conflict Worksheet used to transform network

Social situations: cognitive, motivational, moral orientations of; psychological orientation and. *See also* Conflict situations

Social-emotional learning: childhood period of; conflict management and; for developing relationships; early childhood development function of conflict for; ECSEL Program curriculum for; empathy; induction role in; modeling role in; perspective taking; self-control and discipline. *See also* Emotional management

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Solidarity and caring justice framework: description of; Occupy movement explained by the; rooting solidarity in (our) nature

Solutions: analogical reasoning using; bridging; cost cutting; creative; different integrative approaches to; divide-and-choose approach; expanding the pie; integrative agreements as creativity; negotiation stage of inventing and exploring options for; negotiation stage of reaching; nonspecific compensation; PSDM model focus on problem solving to find good; PSDM model phase of identifying alternative; training in inventing. *See also* BATNAs (best alternative to a negotiated agreement); Integrative agreements; Outcomes

Sound Relationship House theory (SRH): friendship and intimacy; illustrated diagram of; introduction to; manage conflict constructively; sentiment overrides; shared meaning system

South Africa: apartheid system of; The Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Soviet Union: breakup of the; nonviolent struggles against; Salt I and Salt II talks with; Soviet Union-United States talks (1985–1987)

Spanish-US base rights talks (1975–1976)

Specific affect coding system (SPAFF)

“Speech at Cooper Union” (Lincoln)

The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Strong (Wilkinson and Pickett)

Stages of development theory: of adolescence; of early childhood development; Erikson’s psychosocial stages in development; Kohlberg’s moral development stages; of middle childhood; on personality development; Piaget’s social cognitive childhood development

Standard Cross Cultural Sample

States: negotiation with terrorists by; rogue

A Step toward Violence Prevention: NVC curriculum

Stimulus control: description of; hot reactions from

Strategic Nonviolent Conflict (Ackerman and Kruegler)

Stress: conflict resolution management and controlling levels of; hot/cool model of willpower on impact of; physical impact of chronic; physical impact of emotional; as response to conflict

The Strike (Hiller)

Structural violence

Structured focused comparison (SFC) research

Structuring constructive controversy: in the classroom; concurrence seeking; for decision making; processes of; steps taken for

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Substitutability: cooperation-competition theory on role of; definition of; pathologies of

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SWAT (special weapons and tactics) teams

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Systematic processing: description of; negotiation settings and heuristic vs.

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Task-oriented learning-mastery orientation

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Tavistock Institute of Human Relations

Teacher education: language in peace-building; Peace Education Program (Columbia University); peaceful language implications for

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Teams: building; cooperative conflict; making effort by; T-group (training group) for

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Terrorism: airplane hijackings; definition of; failure of traditional diplomacy to stop; history of; media and public opinion regarding; during modern times; 9/11 attacks; by rogue states. *See also* Hostage negotiation

Terrorists: actions taken by; culture, psychology, values, and goals of; issue of trust when dealing with; negotiating with; political, religious, and criminal profiles of; strategic options for engaging; suicide terrorists; victims of

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Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Style Inventory

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Time series analysis: description of; emic quantitative and qualitative

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The Tipping Point (Gladwell)

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Toward a Nonkilling Paradigm (Pim)

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Transformative mediation

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Transparency, illusion of

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Trust forms: calculus-based trust (CBT); identification-based trust (IBT)

Truth: changing collective memories and moving toward shared views of history and; as essential for survivors; establishing the complex

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa)

Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement

Turkish-Greek conflict: Burton’s human needs theory developed during the; emotional incremental beliefs on; political action tendencies

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UN Economic Commission for Europe

UNESCO: Linguapax Program of the; study of indigenous conflict resolution approaches

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United Nations: UN Charter; UN Development Program; UN R2P (Responsibility to Protect) resolution; United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund

United States: approach to Syrian conflict by the; complementary movement pioneered at community level in the; National Urban League report on racial inequality in the; 9/11 and other terrorism attacks against the; SALT I negotiation process by the; SALT II negotiation process by the; Soviet Union-United States talks (1985–1987); Spanish-US base rights talks (1975–1976); US embassy hostages in Iran (1979)

Unity-in-diversity identity

Untouchables campaign (1924–1925)

Unwanted repetitive patterns (URPs)

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US embassy hostages in Iran (1979)

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Values: constructive conflict resolution; fallibility; human equality; of indigenous societies; nonviolence; reciprocity; shared community; of terrorist groups

Ventromedial frontal cortex (VMFC)

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Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Janis)

Victims/survivors: acknowledgment of suffering by; of betrayed trust; establishing the complex truth for; healing the wounds of all parties including; humiliation of; “identification with the aggressor” by; “myths” that justify injustice against; perpetuating the conflict and taking the role of; selection for moral exclusion; sense of injustice by; of terrorism; understanding impact of violence on survivors, perpetrators, and bystanders. *See also* Forgiveness; Other

Violence: bullying; coordinating attention to long-term structural changes and short-term; defining; Geneva Conventions limitations on war-related; group conflict evolution into intense; healing psychological wounds of; implications for practice related to interventions for; moral exclusion permitted by culturally sanctioned; moral theories on aggression and violence; nonviolent actions employed against; nonviolent vs. violent responses to; normalization of hostility and; reconciliation and the prevention of new; Seville Statement on Violence; structural; understanding impact on survivors, perpetrators, and bystanders; violence and resistance response to. *See also* Aggression; Domestic violence; War

Violence interventions: conflict resolution programs to change behavior; deescalation; perspective taking; self-reflection

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Volkan's tree model of medical prevention

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Wall Street Journal

Waorani people (Ecuador)

War: masculinized justifications for violence during; The realist paradigm of intractable conflict on; violence of civil wars; war model of communication. *See also* Genocide; International conflict; Iraq War; Peace systems; Peace-building practice; Violence

War without Violence (Shridharani)

Well's taxonomy of group conflict: applied to the Pink Power organization; five levels of; joining the BART system with; providing a framework for understanding conflict

What Am I Feeling? (DeClaire)

What Makes Love Last? (Gottman and Silver)

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White Privilege Conference

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Whole-Scale Interactive Events

Why Are All the Black Kids Sitting Together in the Cafeteria? (Tatum)

Willpower: delay of gratification "marshmallow test" on; description of; essential preliminaries for self-regulation and; how hot reactions and the emotional brain impact; how to enable

Women: adapting to expected context of social roles; aggression related to sexualization of; "black widows" suicide terrorists among; evaluating and adapting conflict resolution style preferences of; female genital cutting; greater empathy of; honor ideologies and violence against; "honor killing" of; negotiating contracts; network access of; preference for conflict resolution strategy by; questions on negotiation not yet answered about; social dominance orientation (SDO) levels in; strategies to improve negotiation outcomes of; wage gap experienced by. *See also* Gender differences

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Workplace: gender differences and contract negotiations; gender differences and negotiating boundaries in the

World Café

World Dignity University initiative

World Economic Forum

World Federation of Modern Language Teachers Association

World Health Organization

Z

ZOPA (zone of potential agreement)

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