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CRiSSMA
CENTRO DI RICERCHE SUL SISTEMA SUD E IL MEDITERRANEO ALLARGATO
RESEARCH CENTRE ON THE SOUTHERN SYSTEM AND WIDER MEDITERRANEAN

GUNTHER HAUSER



THE MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE

A Transatlantic Approach

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The Mediterranean Dialogue

A Transatlantic Approach

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE PROCESS FOR EUROPE

When Iron Curtain fell and Soviet systems in Europe collapsed, both EU and NATO set steps and measures to integrate new transformation states in Central and Eastern Europe as well as successor states of the former Soviet Union into the Euro-Atlantic stabilisation process. During the early 1990s, EU, NATO, and OSCE initiated respectively enhanced Mediterranean Dialogue processes as integral parts of cooperative approaches to security. These processes are based on the recognition that security in Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the *broader* Mediterranean region.

After Cold War, the Mediterranean region entered as security region to the centre of attention of European institutions. About eight million immigrants from Maghreb countries[1] live in EU member states, mainly in Belgium, France, Italy, and Spain. Twenty-two states comprising 350 million inhabitants with at least three monotheist religions on three continents are bordering the Mediterranean Sea. This region is characterised by manifold religious, cultural and economic pluralism. By economic terms, this region is of enormous relevance. The Channel of Suez links the

[1] Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia.

Mediterranean with the Red Sea, the Strait of Gibraltar links the Mediterranean with the Atlantic Ocean. About thirty percent of all vessels worldwide cruise this area.

The Mediterranean region belongs to the most important oil regions of the world. Industrial nations like Japan have been importing ninety percent of their oil from this region. Egypt is the most relevant producer of gas. Gas also is exported to Jordan, to Lebanon and to Syria. Huge oil and gas fields which are exploited by international enterprises are located in Libya. Some 65 percent of the oil and gas comsumed in Western Europe passes through the Mediterranean[2]. In particular, Southern Mediterranean states are of geostrategic relevance for Europe – relating to security, environment, resources and migration: "*The Mediterranean region is of strategic importance to the EU. A prosperous, democratic, stable and secure region, with an open perspective towards Europe, is in the best interests of the EU and Europe as a whole*"[3]. In the region of Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the security concerns terrorism, economic disparities, demographic imbalances, the potential for social and political instability, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In this region, too many old conflicts persist, from the crisis between Israel and the Palestinian Authority to the Cyprus problem or Western Sahara. However, there is no region that has a greater impact on European security than the region of MENA. So therefore, OSCE, EU and NATO have been engaged in this *broader* Middle East region.

[2] Mohamed Kadry Said, Assessing NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue, in: NATO Review, spring 2004.

[3] Common Strategy of the European Council of 19 June 2000 on the Mediterranean region (2000/458/CFSP), para 1.

THE CSCE/OSCE MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – its headquarters are located in Vienna – is the largest regional security organisation in the world with 55 participating states from Europe, Central Asia and North America. The OSCE is active in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation[4]. Its approach to security is comprehensive and cooperative in dealing with security-related issues including arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence- and security-building measures, human rights, democratisation, election monitoring, as well as economic and environmental security[5]. Decisions of OSCE participating states are based on consensus. OSCE participating states share historical, cultural, economic and political ties with countries in the Mediterranean region of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The 1975 CSCE Helsinki Final Act states that "*security in Europe is to be considered in the broader context of world security and is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean as a whole, and that accordingly the process of improving security should not be confined to Europe but should extend to other parts of the world, and in*

[4] Source: OSCE General Information, About OSCE, http://www.osce.org/general/, printed on 12 February 2005, 11:36 hours.

[5] Ibid.

particular to the Mediterranean area". At subsequent CSCE meetings, representatives of MENA countries were invited to present their standpoints on developments in the Mediterranean. Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia are currently partner countries of OSCE Mediterranean process – so-called *Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation* (MPCs). Representatives from Lebanon, Libya and from Syria are also embedded in this dialogue process. These meetings take place at the level of ambassadors. A number of specific *expert meetings* were also held on issues relating to the economic, environmental, scientific, and cultural fields. In 1990 and 1992, the CSCE participating states declared by the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and the Helsinki Final Act to strengthen the integration of Mediterranean countries in North Africa and the Middle East into the CSCE stability process. Since the 1994 Budapest CSCE Summit[6], regular meetings were initiated between the OSCE and the Mediterranean partners within the so-called *Contact Group*. Since 1995, annual Mediterranean Seminars have been organised by OSCE dealing with challenges of the Mediterranean, e.g. terrorism, poverty, youth unemployment, desertification, democracy and the rule of law as well as the freedom of media. The MPCs are also invited to relevant meetings in all the three dimensions of the OSCE, i.e. the politico-military, the economic and the human dimensions. In June 1998, the Permanent Council adopted a decision providing for representatives of the MPCs, on a case-by-case basis, to make short-term visits to the OSCE Missions. Some of the MPCs have also participated in election monitoring missions organised by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). Through this dialogue, OSCE has been in contact with

[6] Following the 1994 Budapest CSCE Summit conclusions, the CSCE was transformed into OSCE in 1995.

organisations where Mediterranean partners are linked with – like the African Union, the Arab League or the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). At the 2003 OIC Summit at Kuala Lumpur, OSCE General Secretary Ján Kubis was invited. OSCE is closely coordinating Mediterranean dialogue with e.g. NATO and EU creating a security network to promote "*security and cooperation in the region through a comprehensive process of enhanced political dialogue, economic cooperation and intercultural exchanges, as well as through the strengthening of democratic institutions and respect for human rights and the rule of law*"[7]. Additionally, in the framework of the *Platform for Cooperative Security* – adopted at the November 1999 Istanbul meeting of OSCE Heads of State and Government – the OSCE is promoting "*to strengthen cooperation between those organisations and institutions concerned with the promotion of comprehensive security within the OSCE area*". In autumn 2003, the OSCE Mediterranean Parliamentary Forum mechanism was inaugurated in Rome, as an input of the Parliamentary Assembly towards the promotion of the OSCE Mediterranean dimension in order to discuss issues related to security and stability in the Mediterranean.

[7] Source: Resolution on the OSCE Mediterranean Dimension, Rotterdam Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and Resolutions adopted during the Twelfth Annual Session, Rotterdam, 5 to 9 July 2003.

THE NATO MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE PROCESS

In 1991 NATO Strategic Concept, NATO member states "*also wish to maintain peaceful and non-adversarial relations with the countries in the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East*"[8]. Therefore, "*the stability and peace of the countries on the southern periphery of Europe are important for the security of the Alliance, as the 1991 Gulf war has shown. This is all the more so because of the build-up of military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies in the area, including weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles capable of reaching the territory of some member states of the Alliance*"[9].

Since 1991, NATO has been enhancing the dialogue with Southern Mediterranean countries as stated in the NATO Athens and Istanbul conclusions of 10 June 1993 and 9 June 1994[10]. The primary goal was to achieve mutual confidence-building[11]. The NATO Foreign Ministers concluded on 1 December 1994 to

[8] North Atlantic Council – Heads of State and Government, S-1(91)85, para. 12, Rome, 7-8 Nov. 1991.

[9] Ibid.

[10] North Atlantic Council – Foreign Ministers Meeting, M-NAC-1(93)38, para. 11, Athens 10 June 1993, and North Atlantic Council – Foreign Ministers Meeting, M-NAC-1(94)46, para. 29, Istanbul, 9 June 1994.

[11] North Atlantic Council – Heads of State and Government, M-1(94)3, para. 22, Brussels, 10-11 Jan. 1994.

"*direct the Council in Permanent Session to continue to review the situation, to develop the details of the proposed dialogue and to initiate appropriate preliminary contacts*"[12]. However in 1995, NATO initiated the non-permanent Mediterranean Dialogue with five Mediterranean partners: Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia. Later on in 1995, this dialogue process was extended to Jordan and to Algeria during the first half of the year 2000.

During NATO Summit in Sintra/Portugal, foreign ministers decided on 29 May 1997 "*to recommend to our Heads of State and Government to formally establish under the authority of the Council a new committee having the overall responsibility for the Mediterranean Dialogue*"[13]. The meetings have been taking place in a "NATO member states + 1" and "NATO member states + 7" format. The *Mediterranean Cooperation Group* was lauched by the NATO Heads of State and Government during their meeting in Madrid in July 1997[14]. Since 1997, an annual *Mediterranean Working Programme* has been established. It includes activities in the areas of information, civil emergency planning, science & environment, crisis management, defence policy & strategy, small arms and light weapons (SALW), global humanitarian mine action, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, as well as a *Mediterranean Dialogue Military Programme* (MDMP)[15]. Through participation in selected military exercises and related

[12] North Atlantic Council – Foreign Ministers Meeting, M-NAC-2(94)116, para. 19, Brussels, 1 Dec. 1994.

[13] North Atlantic Council – Foreign Ministers Meeting, M-NAC-1(97)65, para. 6, Sintra, 29 May 1997.

[14] North Atlantic Council – Heads of State and Government Meeting, M-1(97)81, para. 13, Madrid, 8 July 1997.

[15] Source: NATO Mediterranean Dialogue Including an Inventory of Possible Areas of Cooperation, http://www.nato.int/med-dial/upgrading.htm, updated 2 May 2003.

education and training activities, Mediterranean Dialogue countries could improve the ability of their forces to operate with those of the Alliance in contributing to NATO-led operations consistent with the UN Charter[16]. During the NATO Luxembourg Summit on 28 May 1998, foreign minister "*decided to designate NATO Contact Point Embassies in Mediterranean Dialogue countries to strengthen our relations with them. We welcome the progressive development of the different dimensions of the Dialogue and encourage partners in the Dialogue to take full advantage of all its possibilities, including the military dimension*"[17]. NATO has been focusing on enhancement of military relations with the concerned states. Three dialogue partners – Egypt, Jordan and Marocco – had been closely worked with NATO during IFOR/SFOR peace-support operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Also troops from Jordan and Morocco are involved in the NATO-led KFOR operation in Kosovo for reconciliation in that province. KFOR currently comprises 17.000 soldiers. In June 2005, Mediterranean Dialogue countries participated with troops in the field training exercise *Cooperative Best Effort 2005* in Ukraine (Egypt and Israel), as well as with rescue personnel in NATO's major submarine escape and rescue exercise *Sorbet Royal 2005* (Israel). The Mediterranean partners also have the possibility to observe NATO manoeuvres. So the Mediterranean Dialogue became "*an integral part of the Alliance's cooperative approach to security since*

[16] Source: Istanbul Co-operation Initiative, Policy document para 7b, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/docu-cooperation.htm, 9 July 2004.

[17] North Atlantic Council – Foreign Ministers, M-NAC-1(98)59, para. 8, Luxembourg, 28 May 1998.

security in the whole of Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean"[18].

The development of the NATO Dialogue process has been based upon five principles:

- The Dialogue is progressive in terms of participation and substance. This flexibility allows the number of Dialogue partners to grow and the content of the Dialogue to evolve over time.
- The Dialogue is primarly bilateral in structure. However, it also allows for multilateral meetings to take place on a regular basis.
- The Dialogue is non-discriminatory. All Mediterranean partners are offered the same basis for cooperation activities and discussion with NATO. Dialogue countries are free to choose the extent and intensity of their participation.
- The Dialogue is designed to complement and reinforce other international efforts to establish and enhance cooperation with Mediterranean countries. These include the EU's Barcelona Process and initiatives by other institutions such as the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
- Activities within the Dialogue take place on a self-funding basis. However, there may be circumstances in which financial support by NATO can be considered on a case-by-case basis, provided that it can be accommodated within existing NATO budgets[19].

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[18] North Atlantic Council – Heads of State and Government Meeting, Washington Summit Communiqué, NAC-S(99)64, para. 29, Washington, 24 April 1999.

[19] NATO Handbook Online, Chapter 3: The Opening Up of the Alliance. The Alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue, http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/20-01/hb0305.htm.

In science issues, dialogue partners can contribute to meetings under the authority of *NATO Committee of Science* as well as on seminars and conferences sponsored by NATO. At NATO School in Oberammergau/Germany, different courses are offered to Dialogue partners, e.g. about peacekeeping, civil emergency planning, arms control, responsibility of military personnel in the field of environmental protection and about European security cooperation. In the framework of the *Cooperative Science and Technology Sub-Programme*, scientists and researchers from Dialogue countries are invited to cooperate in joint projects with their colleagues from NATO countries. Moreover, three Dialogue countries have acquired observer status in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly: Morocco and Israel in 1994, and Egypt in 1995.

Shortly after 9/11, NATO launched military operations in cooperation with Mediterranean partners. Maritime operation "*Active Endeavour*" started in December 2001 in order to help to deter terrorist activities in the Mediterranean Sea. NATO does not own any combat forces itself. It is not a transnational army, therefore it has to rely on the soverign nations that make up NATO voluntarly placing their forces under NATO command.

Since 9/11 – 15 from 19 suicide hijackers were from Saudi-Arabia – and the Afghan and Iraq campaigns, the potential geographic space for security cooperation between NATO and Dialogue countries has expanded eastward. Since 2003, NATO has been engaged in peace operations in the *broader Middle East*. On 11 August 2003, NATO took command of 10,000 strong *International Security Assistance Force* (ISAF) in Afghanistan. There NATO plays the principal role in promoting security and the EU is playing a major role in financial assistance.

On 22 June 2004, the interim Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Alawi requested – in a letter sent to the NATO Secretary General –

NATO support through training and other forms of technical assistance. This letter was the first formal contact between the Alliance and the interim Iraqi administration. It requested Alliance assistance in developing the country's security forces after the transfer from the US-led coalition to Iraq on 28 June 2004, as well as other forms of technical assistance. During this time, NATO did not have a direct role in the international stabilisation force in Iraq. NATO already had been providing planning support to Poland when it took a leading role by commanding a multinational division in south-central Iraq, in the form of force generation, secure communications, logistics, movement coordination and intelligence[20]. The Iraq crisis caused significant tension within the transatlantic alliance. At the EU-U.S. Summit at Dromoland Castle/Ireland on 26 June 2004, U.S. President George W. Bush asked European allies to put disagreements over the war behind them and help the U.S. to rebuild Iraq. During this day, NATO ambassadors reached an initial agreement to respond positively to the request of the Iraqi Interim Government for assistance with the training of its security forces, in accordance with U.N. Security Resolution 1546 (2004). As NATO Secretary General emphasised, "*Allies are united in their full support for the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq and for strengthening of freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law and security for all the Iraqi people*"[21]. NATO is assisting with the training and equipment of Iraq's security forces. This mission is mandated by the United Nations. Training mission in Iraq is not part of the coalition effort respectively part of U.S.-led Operation

[20] Source: Iraqi government requests assistance from NATO, http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/06-june/e0622a.htm, 22 June 2004.

[21] Source: Statement by the NATO Secretary General, PR/CP (2004)0105, 26 June 2004.

Iraqi Freedom. Meanwhile, U.S. hopes for a larger NATO role in Iraq suffered a setback when Iraq war opponents led by France and Germany have prevented the alliance developing a wider role, and have refused to send their own troops, even on the training mission in Iraq. However, NATO's role in Iraq has been limited to a small training mission in Baghdad and logistics support to a Polish-led force serving with the U.S. coalition. NATO aims to provide training to about 1,000 senior Iraqi officers in the country per year, and to about 500 outside Iraq, as well as a significant amount of military equipment[22]. In September 2005, NATO stepped up its assistance to Iraq, by establishing a NATO Training, Education and Doctrine Centre outside of Baghdad.

In the Middle East, there is a "*time of change*": "*A time when new ideas and policies are being generated in order to remove misunderstandings and foster cooperation*"[23]. Through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) of June 2004, NATO has been searching to build new ties with interested countries from the *broader* Middle East region, especially the *Gulf Cooperation Council* (GCC). Till June 2005, four of the six GCC countries – Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – joined the ICI, while also Oman and Saudi Arabia have shown a great interest in it. Through ICI, Mediterranean Dialogue is also planned to be elevated to a genuine partnership by promoting greater practical cooperation, enhancing the Dialogue's political dimension, assisting in defence reform, military-to-military cooperation to achieve interoperability, cooperating in the field of border security, contributing to the fight against terrorism through

[22] Source: Iraqi Foreign Minister calls for continuing NATO support, http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2005/06-june/e0622a.htm, 22 June 2005.

[23] NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary General's speech in Jordan at the World Affairs Council, Amman, 13 January 2005.

information sharing and maritime cooperation including in the framework of *Operation Active Endeavour*[24]. Through ICI, troops of participating countries could also be prepared for NATO-led peace support operations. Within this framework, the UAE has been deployed troops to NATO-led KFOR operation in Kosovo.

In late 2004, NATO approached Israel when the Israeli Chief of Defence Staff was invited together with counterparts from Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania Morocco, and Tunisia to joint NATO Chief of Defence Staff meeting on 5 December 2004. NATO Secretary General there proposed to organise a NATO peacekeeping operation in Palestine to guarantee peace and stability – only if both Israel and Palestine agree and in accordance with a future peace treaty with Palestine or/and Syria. The World Jewish Congress called on NATO to grant Israel "*associate membership*". The WJC represents Jewish communities in nearly 100 countries. "*An associate membership can have many different faces*", explained WJC chairman Israel Singer[25]. This is not intended to lead to a full membership, but "*that would make Israel feel secure*", emphasised Singer: "*If Israel became secure in its approach, it would change the entire mix with regard to Israelis taking chances for peace, and the rest of the Arab world would look at Israel differently*"[26]. Israel could therefore help to bridge a gap between European and Middle East nations: "*NATO itself has changed. In that function Israel could play a major role tying the Middle East and Europe together*", explained Singer. A NATO official said the

[24] NATO elevates Mediterranean Dialogue to a genuine partnership, launches Instanbul Co-operation Initiative, NATO Update, http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/06-june/e0629d.htm, 29 June 2004.

[25] Source: WJC to call on NATO to grant Israel "associate membership", HAARETZ.com, 9 January 2005, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/52-4422.htm.

[26] Ibid.

NATO did not have a provision for "*associate membership*", this kind of membership does not exist in NATO framework. The Israeli ambassador in Germany, Shimon Stein, announced Israeli intention to enhance relations to NATO and EU, but not decide about membership. Israel would prefer the model of "*variable geometry*", not offering the "*same menu for all states concerned*"[27]. Stein also could imagine a model for Israel that is similar to NATO PfP partner Finland or Sweden. If Israel has reached a similar status, Israel could discuss full NATO membership. But this is a long way, explained Stein.

The *broader* Middle East has been a pivotal region for stability and security in the world. However, EU, USA, NATO, and OSCE focus their strategic interests and coordinate their assets in stabilising this trouble spot.

[27] Interview mit Botschafter Schimon Stein: Israel sucht Nähe zu NATO und EU, in: Handelsblatt.com, 28 January 2005, 14:19 hours, http://www.handelsblatt.com

THE EU MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE PROCESS

In November 1995, fifteen EU member states, eleven non-member Mediterranean countries – Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey – and the Palestinian Authority signed the Barcelona Declaration. Libya became observer status at certain meetings in 1999. On 1 May 2004, Cyprus and Malta joined EU. The Barcelona Declaration spelt out the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and determines a wide framework of political, economic and social relations between EU states and partner nations of the Southern Mediterranean. This Declaration outlines three major chapters:

- A political and security partnership aimed at creating a common area of peace and stability (*Political and Security Chapter*);
- an economic and financial partnership designed to establish gradually a common area of prosperity and free trade (*Economic and Financial Chapter*); and
- a social, cultural and human partnership to increase exchanges between the civil societies of the countries involved (*Social, Cultural and Human Chapter*).

In order to create a peaceful environment at the southern and southeastern borders of Europe, the EU promotes cooperation with Mediterranean partners to "*develop good neighbourly relations; improve prosperity; eliminate poverty; promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy, good governance and*

the rule of law; promote cultural and religious tolerance, and develop cooperation with civil society, including NGOs"[28].

This EU Mediterranean Dialogue process is compatible with the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue[29]. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was established during Barcelona conference (27-28 November 1995) and aims to create a zone of stability and of economic and social welfare in the Mediterranean (*Barcelona Process*). The partnership was similar to that forming with central and eastern European countries, but without any perspective of becoming member of EU or NATO.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership replaced the 1970s *Cooperation Agreements* through more far reaching *Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements* that the EU negotiated with the Mediterranean partner nations individually. The core elements of these association agreements are expanding the political dialogue, promoting regional cooperation among Mediterranean countries and establishing a Euro-Mediterranean free trade zone. The respect for human rights and democratic principles are an essential element of the Agreements and the architecture of each Agreement is such as to enable it to be suspended in the event of major human rights violations. Free trade is to be established in accordance with WTO rules over a transitional period which may last up to twelve years as regards tariff dismantling by the partner nations. Trade in agricultural products is to be *gradually liberalised*. Gradual liberalisation of trade in services is provided for starting from the GATS (*General Agreement on Tariffs in Services*). The Agreements provide for EU financial assistance for the partners

[28] Common Strategy of the European Council of 19 June 2000 on the Mediterranean region (2000/458/CFSP), para. 3.

[29] North Atlantic Council – Foreign Ministers, M-NAC-2(95)118, para. 12, Brussels, 5 Dec. 1995.

(except Cyprus, Israel and Malta). For the implementation of Association Agreements, two common institutions were established: the *Association Council* (Ministerial) and the *Association Committee* (Senior Official level).

The agreements with Tunisia from 17 July 1995, with Israel from 20 November 1995, with Jordan from 24 November 1997, with Morocco from 26 February 1998, with Egypt from 25 June 2001, with Algeria from 22 April 2002, with Lebanon from 17 June 2002 and the interim agreement with the Palestinian Authority from 24 February 1997 already went into force. Negotiations with Syria for signing an association agreement began in May 1998. Syria signed this agreement on 19 October 2004. With the conclusion of negotiations with Syria, the grid of Association Agreements with Mediterranean Partners has been completed.

With the other Mediterranean partner, Turkey, the European Community concluded a first generation association agreement in 1963[30]. As a result of this, a customs union with the EU entered into force on 1 January 1996.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership regional programmes operate in all three domains of the Barcelona Declaration, namely the political and security dimension, the economic and financial dimension and the social, cultural and human dimension. The first dimension comprises an enhanced regular political dialogue to establish a zone of peace, stability and security by promoting post-conflict rehabilitation including the encouragement of the peaceful settlement of disputes, prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), arms control including confidence-building measures promoting the signature and ratification by Mediterranean partners of all non-proliferation instruments

[30] After military coup – between 1980 and 1986 –, Turkey has been barred from this association agreement.

(including the NPT[31], CWC[32], BWC[33] and CTBT[34])[35] to create a zone free of WMD, enhanced cooperation in the combat of terrorism as well as organised crime and drug trafficking, promoting democracy, human rights and the rule of law as well as coordination in the subjects of migration, justice and home affairs, as outlined by the 1999 Tampere European Council[36]. The Mediterranean Dialogue "*should help to familiarise the Mediterranean partners with ESDP aims and instruments, with a view to their eventual, possible cooperation in ESDP activities on a regional, sub-regional or country basis*"[37]. However, "*some of the Mediterranean partners already work with the EU in peacekeeping activities (Balkans, Africa) under the UN aegis*"[38].

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[31] Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

[32] Chemical Weapons Convention.

[33] Biological Weapons Convention.

[34] Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

[35] The European Security Strategy "*A Secure Europe in a Better World*" was adopted on 12 December 2003 by the European Council. This Strategy identifies a number of threats for the next decade, one of these threats being the proliferation of WMD. Additionally, a European Strategy against the proliferation of WMD was adopted by the European Council on 12 December 2003. Therefore, the EU is concentrating its efforts in strengthening the international system of non-proliferation, pursuing universalisation of multilateral agreements and assistance to third countries. In October 2003, the High Representative, Javier Solana, has appointed Ms Annalisa Giannella, as his Personal Representative for non-Proliferation of WMD.

[36] Common Strategy of the European Council of 19 June 2000 on the Mediterranean region (2000/458/CFSP), para. 13.

[37] Source: Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Naples, 2-3 December 2003), Presidency Conclusions, 15380/03 (Presse 353), para. 31

[38] Ibid.

On 23 April 2002, the EU Foreign Ministers adopted an action plan for enhancing Barcelona process, a regional cooperation programme relating to justice and home affairs and an action plan to promote dialogue between cultures and civilisations – during their fifth EU Mediterranean conference in Valencia. Relating to education, there are close cooperations with the *Euro-Arab Business School* in Granada and *European Endowment* in Torino. Further intentions related to the establishment of the *Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly* (240 deputies, 37 countries) and the launch of new regional projects in the field of maritime safety and navigation by satellite (GALILEO) for the Southern Mediterranean partner.

This *Valencia Action Plan* contains a series of activities to reinforce all areas of the Mediterranean Partnership by also focusing on three specific issues:

– The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly – a consultative forum in the framework of the Barcelona Process[39];
– The future course of FEMIP;
– The Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue of Cultures[40].

The economic and finance partnership envisages the establishment of a complete free trade area and a joint welfare region by the year 2010 comprising 800 million people. Therefore, EU established the MEDA program (MEDA: **ME**sures **D'A**ccompagnement). MEDA was adopted by the Cannes

[39] This path was welcomed by the foreign ministers at Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Naples, see Presidency Conclusions, 15380/03 (Presse 353), para. 32.

[40] Source: Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Naples, 2-3 December 2003), Presidency Conclusions, 15380/03 (Presse 353), para. 5.

European Council in June 1995 to support Mediterranean partner countries to ameliorate economic and social standards. For the period 1995-1999, MEDA accounted for EUR 3,435 million, additionally the European Investment Bank (EIB) approved loans totalled EUR 4,808 million. For 2000-2006, MEDA is endowed with EUR 5,350 million, for 2000-2007, the EIB's Euromed II lending mandate is EUR 6,400 million. The EIB committed itself to contribute a further EUR 1,000 million from its own resources and at its own risk over the same period for transnational projects[41]. The EIB has lent EUR 14 billion for development activities in the Euro-Mediterranean Partners since 1974 (EUR 3.7 billion in 2002-2003)[42]. In 2003, the EIB launched the *Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment Partnership* (FEMIP), to support modernisation of the economies of the Mediterranean partner nations, while also promoting social cohesion, environmental protection and communications infrastructure. FEMIP is based on a closer involvement of the Mediterranean partners through the creation of a forum for dialogue (the policy dialogue and coordination committee). FEMIP is now lending approximately EUR 2 billion per year to the region[43].

The legal basis of the MEDA Programme is the 1996 MEDA Regulation (Council Regulation no EC/1488/96, MEDA I) which

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[41] Source: European Commission/External Relations, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – The MEDA Programme, http://europ.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/meda.htm, printed on 22 January 2005.

[42] Source: European Commission/External Relations, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Barcelona Process, http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/index.htm, printed on 22 January 2005.

[43] Source: European Commission/External Relations, The EU, the Mediterranean and the Middle East – A longstanding partnership, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/news/me04_294.htm, Brussels, 10 December 2004.

was amended in November 2000 (Council Regulation no EC/2698/2000, MEDA II). MEDA resources are subject to programming. Strategy papers covering the period 2000-2006 are established at national and regional level. Based on these papers, three-year national indicative programmes (NIPs) are drawn up jointly for the bilateral channel, and a regional indicative programme (RIP) covers the multilateral activities. The indicative programmes follow the 1996 Council guidelines. Annually adopted financing plans are derived from the NIPs and the RIP. The strategy papers, NIPs and RIP are established in lisaison with the EIB. The annual appropriations for financial commitments and payments of the MEDA line in the EU budget are authorised by the budgetary authority (EU Council and European Parliament) on a proposal from the Commission within the limits of the financial perspective. In the near future, there could be an option of a *Europe Mediterranean Bank* as proposed by Italian EU Presidency in December 2003[44]. The MEDA assistance is focused on reforms of the justice systems, modernisation of banking and financial sectors, reform of public administration (e.g. in Morocco, the *Mediterranean Bypass* (*Rocade Méditerranéenne*)), developments of regions like South Sinai, poverty reduction through local development, water resource management, agglomerations e.g. of Said and Sour in southern Lebanon and in Grand Beirut, and establishing and strenthening democratic institution-building in Palestinian territories as well as improvement of employability of young Palestinian refugees[45]. The

[44] Euromed Report – Issue No 71, "Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs", Presidency Conclusions, 12 December 2003.

[45] Source: European Commission/External Relations, MEDA: over EUR 700 million in 2004 to support the EU's Mediterranean partners, http://euro-

Mediterranean partners are also participating in European Community programmes such as LIFE or TEMPUS, dealing with the environment and higher education. In total, the EU is the largest donor of non-military aid to the Mediterranean and Middle East, in addition to the assistance given by the EU member states through their national programmes. In 2003, the EU transferred EUR 1 billion in grants and another EUR 2 billion in soft loans[46]. The EU is a major trading partner for every country in the region. It accounts for almost 50 percent of goods traded by them (imports and exports of EUR 141 billion in 2002) compared to 13 percent (EUR 38 billion) for the United States[47].

A crucial step towards in the creation of a *Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area* by target year of 2010 is the *Agadir Agreement*, a Free Trade Agreement signed between Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia on 25 February 2004. The *Agadir Agreement* is also supported with a EUR 4 million programme funded under MEDA. This South-South agreement will create an integrated market of more than 100 million people in the four countries involved[48]. The

pa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/news/memo04_276.htm, Brussels, 26 November 2004.

[46] Source: European Commission/External Relations, The EU, the Mediterranean and the Middle East – A longstanding partnership, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/news/me04_294.htm, Brussels, 10 December 2004.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Source: European Commission/External Relations, Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements: the Partnership is moving forward, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/news/memo04_275.htm, Brussels, 26 November 2004.

further "*will encourage WTO membership by all partners on the appropriate terms*"[49].

The priorities for MEDA resources are

– support to economic transition: the aim is to prepare for the implementation of free trade through increasing competitiveness with a view to achieving sustainable economic growth, in particular through development in the private sector; and
– enhancement of the socio-economic balance: the aim is to alleviate the short-term costs of economic transition through appropriate measures in the field of social policy.

The primary goals are to reduce youth unemployment rates partly of fifty percent or above, support measures fur sustainable socio-economic development and enhancement of regional and cross-border cooperation, promotion of private sector as the economic stability cell and tourism on the basis of the *Charter of Mediterranean Tourism*. This charter was adopted at the tourism minister summit at Casablanca in 1995. Mediterranean Dialogue countries are permitted to export their goods to EU member states duty-free. In the sector of environment, the EU Mediterranean Partnership envisages the creation of an integrated water management on the basis of the 1992 Rome *Mediterranean Water Charter* including waste water management, fisheries management, measures to avoid pollution and to prevent erosion. Water is a scarce resource. During the next 20 to 25 years, the main challenges for the Southern Mediterranean will be the development of the population and the climatic change. These central factors influence further factors, namely the urbanisation combined with pollution, the reduction of rural surfaces though urbanisation,

[49] Common Strategy of the European Council of 19 June 2000 on the Mediterranean region (2000/458/CFSP), para. 17.

erosion and desertification, growing lack of water and import of food.

Examples of projects financed by MEDA are structural adjustment programmes in Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan, the *Syrian-Europe Business Centre*, the social fund for employment creation in Egypt, rehabilitation of the public administration in Lebanon, rural development in Morocco and basic education in Turkey. Examples of loans signed by the EIB are projects to improve waste water treatment and management of water resources in Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Morocco; measures to reduce pollution and modernisation of traffic control systems at airports in Algeria; renovation of a train line in Tunisia; reconstruction of infrastructures and industry in Turkey following the 1999 earthquake.

The third social, cultural and human dimension includes the development of human resources, promoting intercultural and inter-religious dialogue, recognition of fundamental social rights, recognition and promotion of cooperation between non-governmental and autonomous civil groups (*civil society*), migration issues and combating organised crime and terrorism. Therefore the *Anna Lindh Foundation* for inter-cultural dialogue was established in Alexandria in 2004.

After rifts and shifts relating to deal with war against Saddam Hussein regime in March/April 2003, both EU and U.S. emphasised their commitment to mutually promote comprehensive cooperation with states in the *broader* Middle East region[50]. For the U.S., the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) is a key instrument, together with other bilateral

[50] EU-U.S. Declaration Supporting Peace Progress and Reform in the Broader Middle East and in the Mediterranean, Dromoland Castle, 26 June 2004, 10000/04 (Presse 186).

instruments. For the EU, cooperation is based primarily on its Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the EU-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Cooperation Agreement, the EU Neighbourhood Policy and other bilateral or multilateral initiatives, including the EU Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean and the Middle East, adopted by European Council in June 2004. The Strategic Partnership of EU has been focusing on the countries of North Africa and the Middle East, including the countries of the GCC, Yemen, Iraq and Iran. EU and U.S. also cooperate to fulfil the *G8 Plan of Support for Reform* goals to support democratic development, increased practical and financial support to enhancing human rights and efforts to significantly increase literacy skills, including through increased higher and basic education cooperation, and economic integration, intra-regional trade and expanded trade opportunities in global markets, through support, where appropriate, for accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Both EU and the U.S. are concerted in their approach to stabilise this region.

THE ROLE OF LIBYA

On the basis of a consensus among the 27 partners on its admission reached on the occasion of the *Barcelona III* Stuttgart conference of Foreign Ministers on 15-16 April 1999, Libya could in time become a further partner in the *Barcelona Process* following the lifting of U.N. Security Council sanctions against it and once it accepts the full terms of the *Barcelona Declaration* and the related actions. Since its participation in the Stuttgart conference as a special guest of the EU Presidency, Libya takes part as an observer in some of the meetings of the *Barcelona Process*.

United Nations sanctions were imposed on Libya in 1992 and 1993 on the basis of suspected Libyan implication in the explosion of the *Pan Am* aircraft over Lockerbie on 21 December 1988, killing 270 persons. The sanctions were suspended in 1999, and lifted on 12 September 2003. In 2003, the Libyan government took responsibilty of deadly bombing of civil airliners of *Pan Am* and French *UTA* in 1988/89 and already transfered compensation payments to victims[51]. The sanctions, which included a ban on military sales, air communications and certain oil equipment, had already been suspended by the UN Security Council in 1999 after Libya agreed to hand over two nationals for trial before a Scottish

[51] During attacks on a Pan Am Boeing 747 (Flight 103) via Lockerbie/Scotland on 21 December 1988, 270 passengers and crew members were killed, among them 189 US citizens. 171 people were killed when a bomb blasted a UTA DC-10 (Flight 772) via the desert of Ténéré on 19 September 1989.

court sitting in the Netherlands in connection with the bombing. The United Kingdom and Bulgaria cosponsered the resolution after Libya told the Council in August 2003 of its readiness to cooperate in the international fight against terrorism and compensate the families of those killed at Lockerbie, as demanded by U.N. Security Council resolutions 748 of 1992 and 883 of 1993. The lifting of the UN sanctions is a result of an agreement reached between the U.S., the U.K. and Libya on the Lockerbie issue. On August 2003, Libya sent a letter to the UN, by which the country

– accepted responsibility for the actions of the Libyan officials involved in the Lockerbie case;
– accepted payment of appropriate compensation; and
– renounced terrorism[52].

From the American standpoint, the Libyan regime is not the threat as it was when it closely collaborated with Soviet Union during Cold War. Here, cooperation also replaced confrontation. Libya meanwhile signed the twelve conventions to fight terrorism that are listed in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1273. Furthermore, Libya agreed with the U.S., the U.K. and the U.N. on 19 December 2003 during secret negotiations to reduce the limit of Libyan missiles range to 300 kilometres, to destroy all the weapons of mass destructions, to end all programmes to develop WMD and to allow international inspections to observe and survey these paths. Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi announced his readiness to take responsibility in the fight against terrorism. The U.S. and Great Britain have already received information from Libyan intelligence services about terrorists of Al Quaeda and other organisations.

[52] Source: European Commision/External Relations, The EU's relations with Libya, http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/lybia/intro/index.htm.

Libya and the EU are focused to enhance their relations. In June 2005, the EU started formal relations with Libya when establishing a Commission delegation office in Tripoli. There are several areas for potential interaction with Libya, and one of them is migration. In November 2002, the General Affairs and External Relations Council considered it as essential to initiate cooperation with Libya in this domain. The European Commission conducted an exploratory mission on migration to Libya in May 2003. The fisheries sector is another area of interest. Discussions on the prospects for a possible fisheries agreement between the EU and Libya have taken place.

Several EU member states have extensive trade relations with Libya. France, Germany, Italy, and the U.K. are Libya's four leading suppliers of manufactured goods, energy and food products and raw materials, amounting to roughly 50 percent of her imports in 2001. Moreover, Italy, Germany, Spain, France and Greece are Libya's top five export markets, absorbing about 78 percent of her manufactured goods, energy and food products and raw materials in 2001. Libya currently exports about 1.2 billion bbl/d of oil. Nearly all (about 90 percent) of this is sold to European countries like Italy (485,000 bbl/d in 2002), Germany (188,000 bbl/d in 2002), France (47,000 bbl/d in 2002), Spain and Greece[53]. After a nearly two-decade absence, U.S. oil companies were invited to return to Libya on 29 January 2005, when *Occidental Petroleum Corp*. – in partnership with *Liwa* of the United Arab Emirates – was the big winner in the *Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries* member state's first oil and gas licensing round since international sanctions were lifted[54]. More than 60 companies,

[53] Ibid.

[54] Occidental won a share of eight of the 15 exploration areas being offered in Libya's long-awaited EPSA-4 auction. The 15 areas awarded contain two to four

including most U.S. oil majors and many smaller independents, submitted bids in Libya's first exploration and production-sharing-agreement auction since 2000, also companies from Algeria, Brasil, Canada, India and Indonesia[55]. The high quality of Libya's light, sweet crude, ideal for gasoline production, and the relatively quick travel time to the U.S. – about half the time it takes Saudi crude to arrive at Gulf Coast refineries – add to the attraction[56]. Libya hopes its foreign partners and their investment dollars will help boost the country's oil production capacity to three million barrels a day by 2010. Years of sanctions and underinvestment have pushed Libyan production down to about 1.7 million barrels a day, well below its 1970 peak of 3.3 million barrels a day. Libya has 36 billion barrels of proved oil reserves – the world's eighth largest – and 1.3 trillion cubic metres of natural-gas reserves. The awards were based on two numbers – the percentage share of production the bidder offered to the Libyan state National Oil Corp. and the signing bonus the bidder was prepared to pay. U.S. oil companies return to the properties they were forced to abandon in 1986[57]. Libya is going to further enhance relations with Europe and the United States.

blocs apiece and cover 130,000 square kilometres, and have three billion barrels in reserves. Source: Karen Matusic, Big U.S. Oil Firms Return to Libya, in: The Wall Street Journal Europe, 31 January 2005, A10.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid.

THE EU AND TURKEY

Turkey applied for associated membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) in July 1959. After a delay caused by the Turkish military coup of 1960, the *Ankara Agreement* of association was signed in 1963. Article 28 contains a cautiously worded perspective of membership: "*As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community*". This agreement foresaw the gradual establishment of a customs union, which in accordance with details set out in the *Additional Protocol* of 1970 was to be finalised after a period of 22 years. After several delays, the customs union entered into force in 1996. On 14 April 1987, Turkey as a Euro-Asian country (95 percent of its surface is Asian) submitted an application for membership to the European Community (EC). It took the European Commission until December 1989 to produce an Opinion, approved by the European Council two months later, refusing accession negotiations on several grounds[58]. Due to economic and political reasons in Turkey, political disputes between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea and also situation in Cyprus, this application was

[58] Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, Turkey in Europe: More than a promise?, September 2004, p. 13.

refused. During this time, the EC prepared to establish a European monetary and security union by reforming Single European Act (SEA) heading towards Maastricht Treaty of European Union in February 1992. An application for membership of the EC submitted also in 1987 by Morocco was rejected out of hand as coming from a non-European country.

Turkey's relations with EU member Greece have continued to improve over recent years. Greece now supports Turkish integration process to EU. At Helsinki European Council of 10-11 December 1999, the EU Heads of State and Governments agreed that Turkey is a "*candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate states*" and concluded at Copenhagen European Council of December 2002 that, if it were to decide in December 2004, "*on the basis of a report and recommendation from the Commission,* (...) *that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria* (add.: political criteria specified at Copenhagen in 1993)*, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay*". At Brussels European Council in December 2004, European Council concluded to open negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005 because "*in the light... of the Commission report and recommendation, Turkey sufficiently fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria to open accession negotiations...*"[59]. So the "*shared objective of the negotiations is accession*", but "*these negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. While taking account of all Copenhagen criteria, if the Candidate State is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that the Candidate State concerned is fully anchored in the*

[59] Brussels European Council 16/17 December 2004, Presidency Conclusions, 16238/04, para. 22.

European structures through the strongest possible bond"[60]. If Turkey breaches seriously and persistantly "*the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union is founded, the Commission will, on its own initiative or on the request of one third of the Member States, recommend the suspension of negotiations and propose the conditions for eventual resumption. The Council will decide by qualified majority on such a recommendation, after having heard the candidate state, whether to suspend the negotiations and on the conditions for their resumption. The Member States will act in the IGC in accordance with the Council decision, without prejudice to the general requirement for unanimity in the IGC. The European Parliament will be informed*"[61]. In this context, there was no mention of a "*privileged partnership*" proposed by EU opponents to Turkish EU accession as an alternative to full membership – like the French Minister of the Interior Nicholas Sarkozy or the Bavarian *Christlich-Soziale Union* (CSU).

In its 6 October 2004 report the Commission noted the considerable progress made by Turkey in the areas of democracy and human rights. However, there were considerable deficits in the practical implementations, e.g. relating to violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms (like religion, so 20 million Alevites and 100,000 Christians were not recognised as religious minority)[62] and

[60] Ibid, para. 23, fourth point.

[61] Ibid, para. 23, fifth point.

[62] Turkey is member of the Council of Europe since 1950. Between October 2003 and October 2004, European Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg concluded breaches against European Human Rights Convention by 132 verdicts. Source: Austrian Institute for European Security Policy (AIES), Die politischen Kriterien von Kopenhagen und ihre Anwendung auf die Türkei. Eine Bewertung des Kommissionsberichtes vom 6. Oktober 2004, Arbeitspapier, November 2004, p. 7.

protection of ethnic minorities (12 million Kurds, about 20 percent of Turkish population, are not officially recognised as ethnic minority)[63]. Economically, even with growth rates (5 percent), Turkey will need about four decades to reach 75 percent of EU-15 income levels. Turkey will certainly profit from EU transfer payments, which, according to current rules, will count for 3 to 4 percents of GDP[64]. So implementation of the acquis will be a major problem for Turkey and entail costs that are intensified by the demands of structural adjustment. Costs arise through structural change such as higher unemployment especially in rural areas. Therefore, higher levels of pre-accession financial assistance will be necessary[65].

Relating to Kurdish population, Turkey has long worried that the U.S.-led war in Iraq would eventually result in an ethnically Kurdish province that was so independent that it could encourage unrest in Turkey's own neighbouring Kurdish areas. Turkish prime minister said political groups were organising a relocation of Kurds to the strategic, oil-rich region of Kirkuk from other parts of Iraq – more than 100,000 Kurds – according to Turkish reports – in an attempt to change its multiethnic character[66]. On 30 January 2005, many Kurds voted enthusiastically in order to preserve their current autonomy from the rest of Iraq, many Sunnis boycotted the elections. Kurds represent now about 26 percent of the deputies in Iraqi parliament, although Kurds are 15 percent of total Iraqi population. For Turkey, this fact is a challenge how to deal

[63] Wolfgang Quaisser/Steve Wood, EU Member Turkey? Preconditions, Consequences and Integration Alternatives, Arbeitspapiere No 25, Oktober 2004, Forschungsverbund Ost- und Südosteuropa (forost), München, p. 8.

[64] Ibid., p. 11.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Source: Alan Friedman and Frederic Kempe, Turkish Premier Takes Bush to Task Over Kurds, in: The Wall Street Journal Europe, 31 January 2005, A6.

with. Kurdish leader Masud Barzani emphasised if Turkish government claim Kirkuk and its oil-rich region, Kurds could possibly demand Diyarbakir and Arabs could demand Antakya – both in southeastern Turkey – from Turkey[67]. Barzani explained that in the long term the creation of a State of the Kurds is "*inevitable*"[68]. Kurds provide to establish their own state and government financed and backed up by a powerful oil industry[69].

Turkey is particularly concerned about the possibility of a better armed and organised PKK, or Kurdistan People's Party. Some 5,000 PKK guerillas are based in inaccessible mountains along the Iraqi-Turkish border, and have been on the offensive again since 1 June 2004, when they called off a five-year unilateral cease-fire[70]. From 1984 to 1999, the conflict between PKK and Turkish security forces have killed approximately 40,000 people[71], 2,4 million Kurds were expelled from their villages and live as refugees. Approximately 3,500 villages – populated by Kurds, Alevites, Armenians and Yecides – were destroyed[72]. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan demands more support of U.S. in combating PKK: "*We should not discriminate against different types of terrorist organisations. If we are giving our support to the war against terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq, then Turkey*

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[67] Jan Keetman, Kurdenstaat langfristig „unausweichlich", in: Die Presse, 5 February 2004, p. 7.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Source: Alan Friedman and Frederic Kempe, Turkish Premier Takes Bush to Task Over Kurds, in: The Wall Street Journal Europe, 31 January 2005, A6.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Source: Austrian Institute for European Security Policy (AIES), Die politischen Kriterien von Kopenhagen und ihre Anwendung auf die Türkei. Eine Bewertung des Kommissionsberichtes vom 6. Oktober 2004, Arbeitspapier, November 2004, p. 9.

expects the same response and cooperation against the PKK, which is located in Northern Iraq, and that means all the financial resources and access to training and weapons"[73].

Official Turkish government still denies genocide in 1915/16 when about 1 million Armenians and about 500,000 Assyrian Christians were killed by Osman regime in Anatolia. Still today, about 20 million Alevites and 100.000 Christians had not been recognised as religious minorities by the Turkish state. Also there are still tensions between Turkey and the Iraqi and Syrian government concerning distribution of water of Euphrate and Tigris rivers and the planned construction of 21 high dams and 17 water power stations to strategically control the water reserves to Iraq and Syria. However, Turkey would import many conflicts to EU when joining the European Union as a full member.

The EU member states are directly linked to Turkey through Turkish migration. About 3,8 million Turkish migrants are living in EU states, with the majority (2,6 million) in Germany, followed by France, the Netherlands, Austria and Belgium[74]. Most Turkish immigrants were unskilled workers from rural areas of Anatolia, having to overcome a double shock of moving from a country to city and from their homeland to a foreign environment. This in part explains the difficulties many of them encountered in integrating into the society of their host country[75]. Many immigrants did not succeed in their host nations, so "*behaviour is attributed to Islam and religious tradition*"[76]. Mr. Erdogan said: "*If*

[73] Source: Alan Friedman and Frederic Kempe, Turkish Premier Takes Bush to Task Over Kurds, in: The Wall Street Journal Europe, 31 January 2005, A6.

[74] Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, Turkey in Europe: More than a promise?, September 2004, p. 31.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Ibid., p. 32.

the EU is a union of democratic values, then Turkey will be part of it"[77]. He pledged again that Turkey would fulfil all EU membership requirements and therefore Turkey will intensify its relations with EU governments[78].

One diplomatic rift between Turkey and the EU concerns the island of Cyprus. Since 1974, Cyprus has been divided when Turkish troops invaded the north in response to a short-lived coup by Greeks. This *coup d'etat* by Greek army officers stationed in Cyprus to overthrow President Makarios aimed to unify the island with Greece. Turkish invasion was prompted by fears for their fellow Turks in the wake of a Greek coup. In 2005, about 40,000 Turkish troops were based at the northern part of Cyprus. Turkish political leadership has been refusing official recognition of Cyprus due to situation in internal politics. On 17 December 2004, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan agreed to sign a text extending his country's association agreement with the EU and ten new member states that joined EU on 1 May 2004 – including Cyprus. Erdogan emphasised that this act does not mean official recognition of its government to Cyprus. Before starting accession negotiations with the EU on 3 October 2005, the Turkish leader announced to sign this protocol regarding the adaptation of the 1963 Ankara Agreement extending customs union. Turkey still refuses to move towards recognition of the internationally accepted Greek Cypriot government. Ankara only recognises a breakaway Turkish Cypriot enclave in the north of the island and insists it cannot recognise the Greek Cypriot south until a peace settlement has been reached. Erdogan said Turkey was ready to cooperate in any U.N.-led drive to revive the Cyprus reunification process, which has stalled since

[77] Source: Alan Friedman and Frederic Kempe, Turkish Premier Takes Bush to Task Over Kurds, in: The Wall Street Journal Europe, 31 January 2005, A6.

[78] Ibid.

Greek Cypriots rejected the U.N. Kofi Annan plan to unify the island[79] in April 2004. Günter Verheugen, to this time EU enlargement commissioner, announced to work with the Turkish Cypriot authorities to boost the economy but this, so Verheugen does not mean that the north would be recognised as a separate state. Economic sanctions have been in force for years, leaving many Turkish Cypriots with a low standard of living[80]. In May 2004, Turkish Cypriots eased travel restrictions on tourists from EU member states, including the Greek Cypriots who cross from the internationally recognised south of the island to the breakaway Turkish north. A decree approved by the Turkish Cypriot cabinet on 21 May 2004 said citizens of EU member states can show identity cards instead of passports to enter the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Citizens of non-EU member states, on the other hand, are still required to produce their passports when coming to Northern Cyprus from the Greek Cypriot south of the island. The decree also allows authorised travel agents to organise tours from the south of the island to the north at any time of the day. However, it limits individual crossings to between 6 a.m. and midnight local time, though visitors can stay overnight in the north[81].

Turkey is now heading towards EU, but by becoming a full member of the European Union, Turkey has to fulfil several political criteria – including solving disputes in her neighbourhood.

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[79] The U.N. plan was accepted by 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots, and only 24 percent of the Greek Cypriots voted for this plan. Greek rejection means it cannot come into force. Source: EU pledges aid for Turkish Cyprus, BBC News World Edition, 26 April 2004, 16:28 GMT, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/36-60171.stm.

[80] Ibid.

[81] Source: Turkish Cypriots ease some travel restrictions, International Herald Tribune, 24 May 2004, 16.

THE EU RELATIONS WITH THE GULF REGION AND YEMEN

European Union relations with Saudi-Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are governed by a Cooperation Agreement signed in 1989 between the EC and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The EU relations with Iran, Iraq and Yemen are of bilateral nature.

In 1989, the European Commission and the GCC concluded a Cooperation Agreement under which the EU and GCC Foreign Ministers meet once a year at a Joint Council/Ministerial Meeting, and senior officials at a Joint Cooperation Committee as well as Regional Director's Political Dialogue. The primary objective of this Agreement is to contribute to strengthening stability in a region of strategic importance and to facilitate political and economic relations. The 1989 Cooperation Agreement contained a commitment from both sides to enter into negaotiations on a Free Trade Agreement between the EU and GCC. Therefore negotiations were initiated in 1990 but soon reached a standstill. Finally in 1999, the GCC made a significant gesture of their willingness to resume the negotiations by announcing their decision to create a customs union by March 2005.

The European Commission's cooperation with the GCC is focused on energy and economic issues. There is a regular expert's dialogue on energy issues which has led to the launching of workshops and international conferences. Furthermore, an

Economic Dialogue meeting was launched in 2003 with the objective of facilitating dialogue and better understanding in areas of shared interest.

In 1998, the European Commission and Yemen concluded a Cooperation Agreement under which the Commission implements a variety of economic and development cooperation projects with new commitments worth an average of more than EUR 20 million per year. The political dialogue that started in July 2004 represents an upgrading of the mutual relations. Both parties adopted verbally a joint-declaration formalising the dialogue. The EU assists Yemen in implementing its poverty reduction strategy and in strengthening democracy, human rights, and civil society, as well as technical assistance for World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations. The EU assistance programme for 2005-2006, with a total budget of EUR 26 million, is focusing on two priority areas: poverty reduction and reinforcing pluralism and civil society[82].

[82] Source: European Commission/External Relations, The EU, the Mediterranean and the Middle East – A longstanding partnership, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/news/me04_294.htm, Brussels, 10 December 2004.

THE ROLE OF IRAN

Based on the Comprehensive Dialogue initiated in 1998, the EU is focused on a full integration of Iran into the international community and towards a strengthening of EU-Iran relations through a comprehensive strategy, including the perspective of contractual relations, aiming at producing tangible results with regard to the following areas of concern: WMD, human rights, terrorism, the Middle East Peace process[83].

In June 2002, the EU agreed to open negotiations with Iran, which would cover these political aspects as well as a trade and cooperation agreement. This agreement should put Iran's trade and cooperation relations with the EU on a contractual basis. The negotiations were launched in Brussels in December 2002, although there has been no new negotiating round since June 2003. Termining its policy of *deterrent defence*, Iran is aiming to prevent Western – or more precisely U.S. influence – from spreading in the Middle East. The U.S. war on terrorism eliminated Iran's traditional enemies: the Taliban, Saddam Hussein, and insurgent groups that threatened Tehran from bases in Iraq. Ilan Berman, Vice President for Policy at the American Foreign Policy Council, sees the war on terrorism as a threat to Iran, identifying the U.S. as a powerful new adversary pursuing an aggressive anti-terror

[83] Final Report (approved by the European Council in June 2004) on an EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, para. 9.

campaign that includes Iran in the so-called "*axis of evil*". Iranians fear being geographically "*hemmed in*" by "*U.S. strategic forces which have been moved east*," Berman explained[84]. Iran has therefore been actively opposing to Middle East peace process and supported materially Hizballah – Lebanon's Shia Islamist party – and such Palestinian groups as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Iranian government also moved forward with nuclear programmes designed to deter and defend against perceived threats. Israeli secret services estimate that Iran will reach nuclear weapons capability by 2007. Within a year, Iran will be "*able to enrich uranium to weapons grade without any outside assistance*" when "*given their progress on gas-centrifuge technology*"[85]. The acquisition or development of nuclear weapons by the mullah-led Iranian regime would transform the whole region: "*If Iran goes nuclear, it is likely to trigger a wave of others in the region doing the same*"[86]. Israel is ambiguous about its putative nuclear capability. Arabs suppose that Israel would only use nuclear weapons as a last resort. These facts have "*reduced the pressure on Arab leaders to respond. But Iran would be a different story*"[87]. For Israel, a nuclear Iran is "*intolerable*". States like Saudi-Arabia could decide to develop nuclear bombs "*as either a deterrent or a political counterweight against Iran*"[88].

In U.S. point of view, Iran is main sponsor of terrorist group: "*We cannot let Iran, a leading sponsor of international terrorism,*

[84] Source: Iran Pursuing "Aggressive" Foreign Policy, Expert Says, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 17 August 2004, http://www.rferl.org/releases/20-04/08/258-170804.asp.

[85] Dennis Ross, The Middle East Predicament, in: Foreign Affairs, January/February 2005, pp. 61-74, p. 63.

[86] Ibid.

[87] Ibid.

[88] Ibid.

acquire nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them to Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East, and beyond"[89]. However, there is a strong need for "*serious, concerted, immediate intervention by the international community*". So the U.S. promotes "*to bring this issue to the U.N. Security Council, we are simultaneously pursuing other measures to bring a halt to Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons,... worldwide diplomatic efforts including with Russia, the supplier of Iran's Bushehr reactor, and improved enforcement against exports to Iran*"[90].

Iran asserts that it has the right under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to come within weeks of building a bomb. The U.K., France, and Germany are pleading with Tehran not to exercise the right it claims[91]. On 15 November 2004, the U.K., France, and Germany reached a nuclear deal with Iran (the so-called "*Paris Agreement*") by which Iran agreed to suspend its enrichment related and reprocessing activities, to be verified by the IAEA. Following confirmation of the suspension by the IAEA Board Resolution of 29 November 2004, the European Commission prepared to relaunch the Trade and Cooperation Agreement negotiations.

The EU has also established a Human Rights Dialogue with Iran, and a non-contractural Comprehensive Dialogue on issues including conflict prevention and crisis management, the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

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[89] John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, *The Bush Administration's Forward Strategy for Nonproliferation*, Remarks to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 19 October 2004, http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/37251pf.htm.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Henry Sokolski, Rethink nuclear nonproliferation, before it's too late, The Weekly Standard, 22 November 2004, Volume 010, Issue 10.

Following the humanitarian disaster resulting from the earthquake in Bam at the end of 2003, the Commission contributed EUR 8.5 million in emergency assistance[92].

Before his second inauguration on 20 January 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush announced that the U.S. might attack Iran if Iranian government does not change policy and intentions towards enhancing nuclear programme. To protect Americans, Bush intends to promote military attacks on Iran if Iranian government is not willing to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Inspections. The U.S. journal "*New Yorker*" reported on 17 January 2005 that secret U.S. commands spy for possible military targets in Iran. They tried to explore chemical and nuclear facilities in Iran. Israeli government announced its readiness to attack Iran's nuclear facilities in order to protect Israeli security interests, as it did to Saddam Hussein in 1981 by attacking the Iraqi reactor of Osiraq.

NATO General Secretary Jaap de Hoop Scheffer announced to NATO allies to formulate a common standpoint towards Iran and promoted multilateral diplomatic preventive actions. Relating to this situation, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan defended Iran against charges by the U.S. and other countries that Iran, which like Iraq borders Turkey, is embarked on a programme to develop nuclear weapons under the guise of nuclear-energy plants. Mr. Erdogan said Iran – Turkey's second-biggest trading partner after Russia – had assured his government it was

[92] Source: European Commission/External Relations, The EU, the Mediterranean and the Middle East – A longstanding partnership, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/news/me04_294.htm, Brussels, 10 December 2004.

developing nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes[93]. Iran therefore has no preconditions with regard to the IAEA. Iran denies having ambitions to build a nuclear weapon and claims its programme is for purely civil purposes.

On 16 February 2005, Iran and Syria heightened tension across the Middle East and directly confronted the Bush administration by declaring they had formed a mutual self-defence pact to confront the *threats* facing them. Syria before came under scrutiny over the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister and billionaire tycoon Rafiq Hariri on 14 February 2005. The declaration of this mutual defence pact came as the Israeli Foreign Minister, Silvan Shalom, predicted that the Iranian government would have the knowledge to produce a nuclear weapon within six months. Speaking in London, he accused Iran of preparing nuclear weapons that would be able to target "*London, Paris and Madrid*" by the end of the decade. As well as the removal of 14,000 Syrian troops from Lebanon in accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, the U.S. has called on Syrian government to close the headquarters in the capital of Hamas, the main Palestinian group responsible for suicide bombers; and to end its support for Hizballah, the Lebanese-based, anti-Israeli militia; and to block support for the insurgency in Iraq from within Syria[94]. In May 2005, Syria ended its 29-year military presence in Lebanon. One month later an anti-Syrian alliance has laid claim to victory in elections in Lebanon. The country's future now rests in the hands of Saad Hariri, the son of former Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri.

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[93] Source: Alan Friedman and Frederic Kempe, Turkish Premier Takes Bush to Task Over Kurds, in: The Wall Street Journal Europe, 31 January 2005, A6.

[94] Source: Ewen MacAskill/Duncan Campbell, Iran and Syria confront U.S. with defence pact, The Guardian, 17 February 2005; Bill Sammon, Bush urges Syria to move Lebanon troops, The Washington Times, 18 February 2005.

The U.S. government is focused on pressing the U.N. Security Council to introduce new sanctions against Iran and Syria. Relating to economy, Iran is eager to deepen relations to East Asia. During the last years, Iran has started to shift its trade towards the east; in 2004, it has completed two oil and gas deals worth approximately $ 100 billion with China. Iran is developing to an economic power trading with natural oil and gas resources. For the mullah regime, deterrence – also by nuclear weaponry – is pivotal to maintain its power. Also after the elections of June 2005, ultimate power in Iran rests with clerical bodies and the unelected supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

THE EU AND IRAQ

Under Saddam Hussein's 24-year regime, the EU had no contractural and very limited political relations. The Commission's role from 1991 has been restricted to implementing U.N. Security Council sanctions and providing humanitarian assistance. In Iraq crisis, EU member states were split. U.S. and British governments provided war on Saddam Hussein regime, so IAEA "*confirmed in the 1990s that Saddam Hussein had an advanced nuclear weapons development programme, had a design for a nuclear weapon and was working on five different methods of enriching uranium for a bomb. The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa. Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminium tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production. Saddam Hussein has not credibly explained these activities. He clearly has much to hide*"[95]. Bush emphasised that "*with nuclear arms or a full arsenal of chemical and biological weapons, Saddam Hussein could resume his ambitions of conquest in the Middle East and create deadly havoc in that region*"[96]. However, Saddam Hussein committed a

[95] So U.S. President George when he delivered "State of the Union", 28 January 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/print/20030128-19.html.

[96] Ibid.

"*crime against American security*"[97]. Although no weapons of mass destruction had been found in Iraq, U.S. and allies toppled Saddam Hussein regime "*in the face of 9/11*". When Baghdad fell on 9 April 2003, many Iraqis, intoxicated with a misconceived notion of liberty, took to the streets, looting public buildings. Coalition forces have been combating *guerillas* in a limited war.

On 9 June 2004, the European Commission adopted a Communication on EU relations with Iraq making proposals for engaging and promoting dialogue with the appointed Iraqi interim government and with Iraqi civil society. The EU has shown its determination to play a role in supporting reconstruction. At the Madrid Donor's Conference for Iraq in October 2003, the EU (European Commission and member states) and the accession countries pledged more than EUR 1.25 billion. The European Commission contribution to Iraq in 2003-2004, including humanitarian aid, was amounted to almost EUR 320 million. For 2005, further EUR 200 million were foreseen. The European Commission adopted on 4 March 2004 a programme setting priorities for reconstruction assistance to Iraq in 2004 of which the three priorities are: restoring the delivery of key public service boosting employment and reducing poverty; strengthening governance, civil society and human rights. The funds are distributed largely through the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq managed by the U.N. and the World Bank. A EUR 31.5 million package to support the elections has been provided in 2004, including EU election experts to work with the *Independent Electoral Commission* of Iraq and the United Nations

[97] Source: Gunther Hauser, Die Sicherheit Europas im Wandel transatlantischer Beziehungen, Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie Wien 5/2004, 113.

in Baghdad, and training of Iraqi election observers[98]. The Commission prepared an assistance programme for 2005 for which an additional contribution of EUR 200 million was to be made available.

The primary aim for Iraq is to install peace and stability after elections of 30 January 2005. Despite lethal insurgent attacks that killed at least 35 people, Iraqi voters turned out in large numbers for a historic election that pushed the country into the next phase of its transition from U.S. and coalition occupation to full sovereignty. The tournout was of about 60 percent, several points higher than the predicted 57 percent[99]. A 275-member parliament has been formed based on the election results. The new parliament had to chose the top executives of a temporary government and then to oversee the drafting of a new Iraqi constitution. The constitution was supposed to be completed before September 2005, in time for a referendum in October. In case of approval, a new round of voting in December 2005 would elect a permanent government. If referendums in any three of Iraq's 18 provinces reject the constitution, the process would have to start over again with another vote like the elections on 30 January 2005. The situation in Iraq is still insecure. More than 40 percent of Iraqi

[98] Source: European Commission/External Relations, The EU, the Mediterranean and the Middle East – A longstanding partnership, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/news/me04_294.htm, Brussels, 10 December 2004.

[99] Of Iraq's 14 million eligible voters, 8,456,266 cast ballots for 111 candidate lists. The Shiite-dominated ticket received more than 4 million votes, or about 48 percent of the total cast. A Kurdish alliance was second with 2.175 million votes, or 26 percent. Prime Minister Allawi's list was third with about 1.168 million, or 13.8 percent. Source: Shiites win most votes in Iraq election, International Herald Tribune, 13 February 2005, http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/02/13/africa/web.iraqvote.html.

population live in insecure western and central provinces of Anbar, Baghdad, Ninive and Salaheddin, largely in Sunni Arab regions. Especially the area north-west of Baghdad has been the focus for activity by heavily armed rebels. About 900 people had been killed by terrorists between the January elections and June 2005. Since March 2003, more than 25,000 Iraqi civilians, 6,400 Iraqi soldiers, 1,700 U.S. servicemen, 90 British soldiers and 95 servicemen from allied nations died in Iraq. 60 to 70 Iraqi resistance attacks are conducted every day[100]. Postelection Iraq is a country in search of a governing model – maybe similar to Belgium, Canada, Lebanon or Switzerland – that grants substantial autonomy to various regions. Iraq's key challenge in the months ahead was to craft a new constitution to balance its often-hostile factions and regions to hold the country together. Iraq is divided roughly between three main groups: the majority Shiite Arabs, at about 60 percent, and the Sunni Arabs and Kurds, at about 20 percent each. Voter turnout on 30 January 2005 appeared high in Shiite and Kurdish areas, but much lower in many Sunni areas. Many Sunni Arabs stayed at home on election day.

U.S. and coalition troops will be needed for years to come to help with security, and especially training Iraqi troops.

[100] Sourcs: Die Presse, 16 June 2005, p. 5: „*Statistisch nicht sicher*" Pentagon-Chef Rumsfeld gesteht Fehler ein; and Die Presse, 28 June 2005, p. 7: „*Der Aufstand im Irak könnte noch Jahre andauern*".

THE EU AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

Many factors determine the future framework and intensity of the Mediterranean dialogue, e.g. the success of the Middle East peace process, and the democratic and economic construction of Iraq. However, EU Mediterranean policy is also focused on the Middle East peace process, launched at 1991 Madrid conference heading to Oslo process two years later. A heavy crisis in Middle East peace talks led to the establishment of a EU Middle East special envoy in 1996. On 25 March 1999, the European Council adopted in Berlin its most far-reaching declaration relating to negotiations between Israel and Palestine. There, the EU expressed the permanent and unlimited right for Palestinians for self determination including the option for Palestinians to create an own state.

Representatives from the EU, the U.N., the U.S. and Russia formed a group known as "*the Quartet*" which began to shape international policy towards resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On 17 September 2002, "*the Quartet*" outlined their plan to reach a final peaceful settlement between Israel and Palestinians and adopted the EU proposal for a "*three-phase implementation roadmap*" to be realised till December 2005[101]. On 30 April 2003,

[101] Source: Mideastweb, Quartet Roadmap to Israeli-Palestinian Peace, 17 September 2002, http://www.mideastweb.org/quartetrm1.htm.

the parties to the conflict were presented with an international peace plan known as the *Road Map*, which the Quartet had drawn up in December 2002. Its basic tenets are as follows: The parties to the conflict are evidently incapable of resolving the conflict without outside help. What is therefore needed is a concrete framework and timetable setting out how the two-state goal is to be accomplished, a third-party monitoring mechanism, an international security component and democratisation of Palestinian institutions – only with reformed and democratic institutions, a Palestinian state alongside Israel can be viable[102].

In a speech on the Middle East given on 24 June 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush took up key elements of a *Seven-Point Plan* proposed by Germany, including the idea of a phased process and timetable as well as the call for a reform of Palestinian institutions. The new timetable envisaged the creation of a Palestinian state and a final status agreement within three years, by 2005.

At their informal meeting in Helsingoer/Denmark on 30-31 August 2002, EU Foreign Ministers approved the text of an *EU Road Map* drafted by the Presidency and incorporating key aspects of the German *Seven-Point Plan*. The EU thus endorsed the idea of a three-phase process for the period 2002-2005 as well as all other main points, including the appointment of a Palestinian Prime Minister. On 17 September 2002, the Quartet agreed that a Road Map based on the EU proposals should be drawn up. Following negotiations between *inter alia* the U.S. and the EU, agreement on the final text was reached at a meeting of the Quartet held in Washington on 20 December 2002 and attended by U.S. Secretary of State Powell, Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov,

[102] Source: Germany and the Middle East Peace Process, Last updated in February 2004, www.auswaertiges-amt.de, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin.

EU High Representative on CFSP Solana and U.N. Secretary-General Annan.

The Road Map specifies the steps for the two parties to take to reach a settlement. It "*is a performance-based and goal-driven roadmap, with clear phrases, timelines, target dates, and benchmarks aiming at progress through reciprocal steps by the two parties in the political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building fields, under the auspices of the Quartet...*"[103]. However, a "*two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will only be achieved through an end to violence and terrorism, when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against terror and willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty, and through Israel's readiness to do what is necessary for a democratic Palestinian state to be established, and a clear, unambiguous acceptance by both parties of the goal of a negotiated settlement...*"[104].

The first phase planned to end in May 2003 envisaged a comprehensive security reform by ending terror and violence and normalising Palestinian life and building Palestinian institutions, the establishment of an independent Palestinian election commission, the withdrawal of Israeli forces to positions it occupied before 28 September 2000, and for the Palestinians to hold "*free, fair and open elections*"[105]. The Quartet also proposed an *Ad Hoc Liaison Committee* to be formed to review "*the humanitarian situation and prospects for economic development in the West Bank and Gaza and launches a major donor assistance effort, including to the reform effort*"[106]. Phase two included the

[103] Source: Text of the Road Map, Introduction, http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive/2004/Feb/04/-725518.html.

[104] Ibid.

[105] Ibid, Phase I.

[106] Ibid.

creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders based upon a new constitution, "*leading to a final phase of negotiations between the two parties aimed at achieving a permanent solution*"[107]. Within Phase two, Arab states should restore pre-intifada links to Israel (trade offices, etc.), also it was planned to revive multilateral engagement on issues including regional water resources, environment, economic development, refugees, and arms control issues[108]. Phase two was planned to be finalised till December 2003. Phase three (2004-2005) envisaged negotiations between Israel and Palestine aimed at a permanent status solution in 2005, "*including on borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements; and, to support progress towards a comprehensive Middle East settlement between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and Syria, to be achieved as soon as possible*"[109]. These plans aim to end Israeli-Palestinian conflicts and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip – home to about four million Palestinians – that began in 1967. This occupation is planned to be ended through a settlement negotiated between the parties based on the principle *land for peace* and on U.N. resolutions 242, 338 and 1397. The Quartet agreed to intensify their efforts towards ending the violence and to achieve a settlement between Israel and its Syrian and Lebanese neighbours. The Road Map was approved through U.N. Security Council Resolution 1515.

Additionally, the *Arab Peace Initiative* put forward by Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah is based on the Road Map and was endorsed by the Beirut Arab League Summit of 28 March

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[107] Source: Mideastweb, Quartet Roadmap to Israeli-Palestinian Peace, 17 September 2002, http://www.mideastweb.org/quartetrm1.htm.

[108] Phase II of the Road Map, http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive/2004/Feb/04/-725518.html.

[109] Phase III of the Road Map, ibid.

2002. It recommended to recognise Israel as a neighbour "*living in peace and security*"[110].

As defence against terrorism, Israel began already in 2002 to construct a separation barrier along the northern periphery of the West Bank. The barrier consists in some areas of a fence and in others of a wall up to eight metres as well as trenches and a no-go area (totalling 50 to 100 metres breadth) on either side. The barrier follows a route predominantly east of the so-called *Green Line* (Armistice Line of 4 June 1967) and cuts deeply into the West Bank proper[111].

In his statement following the 2003 Aqaba meeting, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon referred to the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state within temporary borders, if the conditions for this are met. The Palestinian state should therefore, *inter alia*, be completely demilitarised. No Palestinian refugee will be permitted to enter the territory of the State of Israel[112]. Israel argues if Palestinian refugee return, the "*Jewish identity*" of Israel will be endangered. Due to the wars in 1948/49 and 1967, four million Palestinian refugees have been living in occupied territories and in neighbouring countries of Israel. At a summit held in Aqaba on 4 June 2003, Ariel Sharon, and Mahmoud Abbas – to this time newly appointed first Prime Minister of the Palestininan

[110] European Commission, The External Relations, The EU & the Middle East Peace Process, A Performance-based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Isreali-Palestinian Conflict by the Quartet (European Union, United States, the Russian Federation and the United Nations), Brussels, 30 April 2003.

[111] Ibid.

[112] Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Middle East Peace Summit at Aqaba, 4 June 2003, http://www.mfa.gov.il.

territories[113] – endorsed the Road Map in the presence of U.S. President George W. Bush. When on 29-30 June 2003 a number of Palestinian groups agreed to a unilateral cease-fire following lengthy negotiations – in which Egypt acted as mediator – between their represenatives and the Palestinian Authority, the way appeared to be open for the implementation of the Road Map. But till autumn, neither side had shown the necessary vigour in fulfilling the commitments they had made in Aqaba. Following a renewed outbreak of suicide bombings and Israeli operations against radical Palestinian leaders in Nablus and Gaza, the ceasefire was rescinded on 21 August 2003. By the end of 2003, progress on implementing the Road Map had reached a complete stillstand.

On 1 December 2003, an "*alternative Middle East peace plan*" was signed in Geneva. This plan was initiated by former Israeli Minister of Justice Jossi Beilin and former Palestinian Minister of Information Yasser Abed Rabbo. This *Geneva Initiative* envisaged the creation of a Palestinian state that comprises 98 percent of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Two states should be created with Jerusalem as the capital of both. In contrary, expelled Palestinian families should renounce their demand to return in their original homeland on Israeli territory. Closure of many Jewish settlements were also foreseen. This Geneva Initiative was rejected by Israeli government and by the radical wings of Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement and by extreme Palestinian organisations. In 2004, Arafat's death marked the end of an era. For Palestinians, he was an icon who succeeded in gaining international recognition of their national aspiration – supported at the beginning by Austrian chancellor Bruno Kreisky in the 1970s. For Israel, Arafat had always been a terrorist who was not able and prepared to end the

[113] Abbas (his nom de guerre: Abu Mazin) became the first Palestinian prime minister in March 2003.

60 year old conflict and truly accept coexistence. When Arafat died, Mahmoud Abbas was elected president of Palestine in December 2004.

The EU has been supporting the Palestinian Authority politically and economically for a long time. The European Commission plus member states are the largest donors of financial and technical assistance to the Palestinian Authority, providing over 50 percent of the international community's financing to the West Bank and Gaza Strip since the beginning of the peace process. Total community aid to the Palestinians since 1994 has been over EUR 2 billion in grants of which the largest part has been allocated to Palestinian institution-building and promotion of reform, good governance, tolerance and respect for human rights. EUR 187 million to the humanitarian aid was provided by ECHO; and EUR 581 million as humanitarian support was given through UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees) for assistance to the refugees, including food aid[114]. The Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, has announced the European Commission expects to make around EUR 250 million available in 2005 to support further steps towards the creation of a Palestinian state[115]. Currently the EU is also the biggest trading partner and major economic, scientific, and

[114] Source: European Commission/External Relations, The EU, the Mediterranean and the Middle East – A longstanding partnership, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/news/me04_294.htm, Brussels, 10 December 2004.

[115] Source: Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner announces EUR 250 million support to the Palestinians in 2005, Press Release IP/05/157, 9 February 2005.

research partner of Israel and a major political and economic partner to Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt[116].

The EU was also providing extensive support to the electoral process. EUR 14 million had been earmarked since 2003 and a substantial *EU Election Observation Mission* (over 277 observers from EU, in total: 800 international observers) had been deployed for the Presidential elections. On 10 January 2005, PLO chairman Mahmoud Abbas has been elected Palestinian President with more than 62 percent of the votes cast[117]. Abbas personifies "*the hopes of an electorate weighed down by the privations of occupation and the tragic toll of resistance*"[118]. He is also the man being counted on by the U.S., the EU and Israel to revive the peace process and to put an end to *al-Aqsa Intifada*. Officials on both sides confirmed that Mahmoud Abbas and his Israeli counterpart, Ariel Sharon, intended to meet shortly for the first summit since the collapse of negotiations between their predecessors, Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak, in 2000. The radical groupings who called for a boycott of the elections did not suceed. Before elections, the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip was an important step towards implementing the so-called *Road Map* – the international community's Middle East Peace Plan. Israelis and Palestinians prepared for a resumption of dialogue between their top leaders

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[116] Source: European Commission/External Relations, The EU, the Mediterranean and the Middle East – A longstanding partnership, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/news/me04_294.htm, Brussels, 10 December 2004.

[117] Mahmud Abbas obtained 62.32 percent of votes cast (483,039 votes), streets ahead of his nearest rival Mustafa Barghuti who won 19.8 percent (153,516 votes). Source: Indiainfo.com, 10 January 2005, 22:10 hours (IST), http://news.indiainfo.com/2005/01/10/1001abbas.html.

[118] Mahmud Abbas: Pushed to the forefront, Aljazeera.Net, 10 January 2005, 21:14 Makka Time, 18:14 GMT, http://english.aljazeera.net.

after a four-year hiatus as a long-awaited streamlining of the sprawling Palestinian security services was unveiled. On 26 January 2005, Israel announced to stop lethal attacks on militant Palestinian leaders. So Israel fulfiled a central Palestinian demand to achieve ceasefire. President Sharon announced also to be ready for direct contacts to Palestinian leadership. On 25 January 2005, both Israeli and Palestinian generals agreed to deploy further Palestinian policemen to Gaza strip. Israeli forces started to remove from Gaza and the West Bank earlier. EU offered EUR 70 million to president Abbas for training security personnel and for exportations of goods. Palestinian police took control over Palestinian territories on 28 January 2005 to avoid missile attacks against Israeli territory.

Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon declared an effective cessation of all acts of violence in the four-year, low-intensity war known as the *intifada* during their meeting in Sharm El Sheik on 8 February 2005. But there was an immediate reminder of the fragility of the declarations from the radical Palestinian group, Hamas. Hamas spokesman insisted that Abbas's declaration of a truce was not binding on them, but a unilateral declaration of the Palestinian Authority. Israel has made it clear that if attacks do continue and Abbas does little to stop them, Israel will resume its military activity. The two sides also agreed on some further measures of good will. Israel will free about 900 out of 8,000 Palestinian prisoners and meet with Palestinians to discuss the release of another 230 or so who have been in jail since before the Oslo Accords of 1993[119]. Israeli officials insisted that the declarations still left the two sides in a "*pre-Road Map*

[119] Steven Erlanger, On "new path," Sharon and Abbas call truce, International Herald Tribune, 9 February 2005, http://www.iht.com/articles/20-05/02/08/news/mideast.html.

situation". Sharon was too vulnerable with his plan to pull Israeli settlers out of Gaza to be able to deal with more controversy over illegal settlement and outpost construction in the West Bank. Therefore Israel is insisting that Abbas implement his obligations to destroy the infrastructure of terrorism in the first stage of the *Road Map* before Israel begins to implement its own obligations to stop new settlement activity and dismantle up to 50 outposts erected after March 2001[120]. Ariel Sharon and Mahmoud Abbas agreed to a mutual ceasefire at the Sharm El Sheik summit on 8 February 2005. The absence of an American mediator made this meeting seem, in a way, more important, because it was Cairo, not Washington, that had brought the sides together.

In February 2005, Israel's cabinet has backed Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's plan to withdraw soldiers and settlers from the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank. Ministers voted 17-5 in favour of the plan to remove settlers starting from 15 August 2005. This plan had already been approved by parliament[121]. Through this *Disengagement Plan*, Israel pulls out all its 8,000 settlers from 21 fortified enclaves in Gaza. Israel will maintain control of Gaza's borders, coastline and airspace. Four isolated West Bank settlements have also been evacuated. The withdrawal was planned to take about eight weeks. This was the first time that Israel has abandoned settlements in Palestinian territories.

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[120] Ibid.

[121] Source: BBC: Israeli cabinet backs Gaza plan, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk, 20 February 2005.

THE U.S. MIDDLE EAST PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE

The U.S. "has had critical interests in the Middle East for as long as it has been a global power. Securing the flow of the region's oil to the world economy has always been a central priority"[122]. Furthermore, the roots of global terrorism against U.S. citizens, allies and facilities are situated in this region. However, a stable and secure broader Middle East is of high priority and pivotal interest for the United States. In U.S. views, only close political and economic ties to the West and promoting political, economic and social reforms in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) can create stability and security in this region. For this purpose, U.S. launched the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) which is a Presidential initiative founded to support economic, political, and educational reform efforts in the Middle East. On 12 December 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced the creation of the MEPI. In light of the continuing war against terrorism, the Iraq crisis, and increased violence in Israel and the Palestinian territories, MEPI is an attempt to "broaden our approach to the region"[123]. This initiative is comprised of two essential elements:

[122] Dennis Ross, The Middle East Predicament, in: Foreign Affairs, January/February 2005, pp.61-74, p. 61.

[123] Jeremy M. Sharp, The Middle East Partnership Initiative: An Overview, CRS Report for Congress, Updated 23 July 2003, 1.

the existing Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the proposed Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA). MEPI consists of 87 programmes in 16 countries. Programmes conducted in support of the MEFTA will be sponsored through MEPI funding. The initiative strives to link Arab, U.S., and global private sector businesses, non-governmental organisations, civil society elements, and governments together to develop innovative policies and programs to decrease religious extremism, terrorism, international crime and illegal migration.

The U.S. proposed a plan of graduated steps for Middle Eastern nations to increase trade and investment with the U.S. and others in world economy. The first step is to work closely with peaceful nations that want to become members of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in order to expedite their accession – like Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Algeria and Yemen. The Generalised System of Preferences programme will be also used to provide duty-free entry for many products from designated developing countries, to increase trade linkages. As these countries implement domestic reform agendas, institute the rule of law, protect property rights (including intellectual property), and create a foundation for openness and economic growth, the U.S. would expand and deepen economic ties through Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs), Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), and comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). In combination, these projects will ultimately lead to a U.S. – Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) – imaginable by 2013.

MEPI is structured in four reform areas. In the economic pillar, MEPI policy and programmes support regionwide economic and employment growth driven by private sector expansion and entrepreneurship. The political pillar relates to enhancing democracy and the respect for the rule of law. In the education pillar, MEPI supports education systems that enable all people,

including girls, to acquire the knowledge and skills necessary to compete in today's economy and improve the quality of their lives. Finally, in the woman's pillar, MEPI works towards economic, political, and educational systems where women enjoy full and equal opportunities. Among the hallmark activities being conducted under the auspices of MEPI are the establishment of the Middle East Finance Corporation to assist small- and medium sized businesses in gaining access to needed capital and to create jobs bridging the job gap in the Middle East (economic pillar); a Regional Judicial Forum and Regional Campaign School to reform commercial codes, improve the climate for trade and investment, and strengthen property rights and also organise parliamentary training and election assistance/monitoring (political pillar); Partnership Schools that offer creative, innovative alternatives for quality and relevant education for children and serve as models for governments as they build schools in the future (education pillar); and regional micro-enterprise and business internships for women (woman's pillar). In May 2003, the U.S. – Middle East University Partnership Programme was launched. The objectives of this programme are to expand partnership between U.S. and Arab universities and their economic and civil society partners. The U.S. has agreed with Crown Prince Salman of Bahrain to establish a regional forum of judicial reform in September 2003. The three-day event brought together high-level government officials and non-governmental reformers active in the judicial arena from 15 Arab countries, the Palestinian Authority, the U.K. and the U.S. to discuss essential elements of sound judicial systems, like judicial role in human rights, efficiency of procedural systems and transnational judicial and legal cooperation in the fields of international crime, money laundering and corruption, the

enforcement of judgements in foreign countries, and the possible benefit of uniform statutes on foreign investment[124].

The U.S. administration has committed $ 129 million to MEPI ($ 29 million in fiscal year (FY) 2002 supplemental, $ 100 million in FY 2003 supplemental, $ 89 in FY 2004 and $ 75 million in FY 2005). In sum, the U.S. government has allocated more than $ 5 billion in assistance for countries in the Middle East for FY 2005 that began on 1 October 2004 and ended on 30 September 2005. This MEPI funding is in addition to the bilateral economic assistance the U.S. provide annually to the Arab world. The Deputy Secretary of State is the coordinator for MEPI[125].

Under the auspices of the *United States Agency for International Development* (USAID) and its predecessor agencies, the U.S. government has funded economic and social assistance programs in Morocco (since 1953), Egypt (since 1975), Lebanon (since the early 1950's), Jordan (since 1951), Gaza and the West Bank (since 1975), and Yemen[126].

The idea of remodeling the Middle East region has been mentioned on several occasions by both President George W. Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney. George W. Bush addressed the issue twice – in his State of the Union speech on 20 January 2004 and at the American Enterprise Institute on 26 February 2004. Dick Cheney mentioned it at the World Economic Forum in Davos on 24 January 2004. U.S. *Greater Middle East Initiative*[127]

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[124] Source: The Arab Judicial Forum, http://arabjudicialforum.org/

[125] Sources: U.S. Department of State, Middle East Partnership Initiative, http://mepi.state.gov/, and U.S. Earmarks $5 Billion in Foreign Aid to the Mideast in FY05, http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive/2004/Dec/14-506545.html.

[126] Jeremy M. Sharp, The Middle East Partnership Initiative: An Overview, CRS Report for Congress, Updated 23 July 2003, 3.

[127] The *Greater Middle East* refers to the countries of the Arab world, plus Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and Turkey.

was unveiled at the Group of 8 (G8) summit of major industrial countries at Sea Island/Georgia in June 2004, the security aspects of this initiative were discussed at the NATO Summit in Istanbul at the end of June 2004. It urges Arab states to promote democracy, human rights and economic liberalisation. The U.S. initiative is designed to foster a *virtuous cycle* of political, economic and security reform by attacking the root causes of poverty and terrorism. It proposes to address the *three deficits* highlighted by the Arab authors of the 2002 and 2003 *United Nations Arab Human Development Reports* (AHDR) – freedom, knowledge and female emancipation respectively empowerment:

– The proposal is based on the assumption that a population deprived of economic and political rights is prone to extremism, terrorism, international crime and illegal immigration. It thus intends to advance democracy through technical assistance for free elections, to support women's political emancipation and to provide general support for non-governmental organisations.
– The promotion of knowledge, which is the second objective of the proposal, has several aims, such as reduction of illiteracy rates, teacher training and educational reform.
– At the economic level, the plan proposes an approach that will *unleash the potential of the private sector* through micro-financing. It also seeks the creation of a Development Bank for the *Greater Middle East* and the creation of free trade areas[128]. The U.S. launched the *Middle East Entrepreneur Training* in the United States (MEET U.S.) to train new corps of business leaders for the Middle East and North Africa sponsored by the U.S. Department of State under the MEPI.

[128] Source: EuroMeSCo, The "Greater Middle East Initiative", http://www.euromesco.net, printed on 15 May 2004, 16:17 hours.

Today the Mediterranean region is in transition: the combined GDP of the 22 Arab League countries with a combined population of 300 million is less than that of Spain. Approximately 40 percent of adult Arabs – 65 million people – are illiterate, two thirds of the people concerned are women. Over 50 million young people will enter the labour market by 2010, 100 million will enter by 2020 – a minimum of 6 million new jobs need to be created each year to absorb these new entrants. If current unemployment rates persist, regional unemployment will reach 25 million by 2010. One-third of the region lives on less than two dollars a day. To improve standards of living, economic growth in the region must more than double from below 3 percent currently to at least 6 percent. Only 1.6 percent of the population has access to the internet, a figure lower than that of any other region of the world, including Sub-Saharan Africa. 51 percent of older Arab youths expressed their desire to emigrate to other countries, according to the 2002 AHDR, with European countries the favorite destination.

German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer was the first European politician to react publicly to the U.S. *Greater Middle East Initiative*. He proposed in his speech at the 2004 Munich Security Conference to gather the EU and NATO into a grand transatlantic initiative to reform the Middle East[129]. France and Germany were carefully distancing themselves from the U.S. initiative and calling on the EU to define a distint approach which should be complementary to the American proposal. Their joint position "*A Strategic Partnership for a Common Future with the Middle East*" envisaged a series of sequential Arab, European and American steps. They emphasised the cooperative nature of the original proposal and underlined the need to generate widespread

[129] Source: EuroMeSCo, European Reactions, http://www.euromesco.net, printed on 15 May 2004, 16:25 hours.

Arab inputs and ideas so that a *Charter for a Common Future* could be adopted.

Some European opinions reflected a feeling that the U.S. is taking advantage of the EU's instruments in the *Greater Middle East* area to advance its own strategic vision. They feared that the EU will end up with the financial burden while the U.S. keeps the strategic leadership. Some also pointed out the absurdity of having a common strategy for such a diverse region – from Afghanistan to Mauritania[130]. However, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the U.S. Middle East Partnership Initiative, and the multilateral reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate both the EU's and U.S.'s, and also the G8's commitment to reform the region.

[130] Ibid.

THE EU'S NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

For those countries that do not currently have the prospect of membership but which share borders with member states of the European Union – the Southern Mediterranean plus Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus – the EU has recently developed the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Through ENP, the EU is offering a more intensive political dialogue and greater access to EU programmes and policies, including the Single Market, as well as reinforced cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). This cooperation is based on a joint commitment to common values and common principles within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development. The level of ambition of the EU's relationships with its neighbours will take into account the extent to which these values are effectively shared.

The ENP reinforces the Barcelona Process and represents an essential plank in the implementation of the *EU Strategic Partnership* with the Mediterranean countries. Following a Strategy Paper, approved by the European Commission on 12 May 2004, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority have been the first of the EU's Mediterranean neighbours to agree Action Plans that make concrete the EU's offer under the ENP. These first plans – approved on 9 December 2004 – are the product

of negotiations with each state, and in each case the plan is specifically designed to reflect the specific interests of the country concerned[131].

[131] Source: European Commission/External Relations, The EU, the Mediterranean and the Middle East – A longstanding partnership, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/news/me04_294.htm, Brussels, 10 December 2004.

CONCLUSIONS

The role of the Mediterranean as a bridge is more evident than ever. Demographics, economics, and energy needs create an ever closer interdependence between Europe and the *broader* Middle East. Threats from this region – such as terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, and transnational organised crime – also affect both Europe and the U.S. and require a common response within a comprehensive security approach. This approach comprises political, economic, social, cultural and military cooperation with the states concerned to stabilise the *broader* Middle East region and to fight against current risks and uncertainties. Since the early 1990s, comprehensive security management is becoming essential political strategy. Security and (pre-)crisis management is forward defence. In cooperative multipolarity crisis is managed in order not to escalate. Terrorism is a primary threat for the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Terrorists try to get non-conventional weapons, also they could use highly sophisticated missile to bring down passenger planes at 15,000 to 25,000 feet. Non-state actors (like terrorists) are becoming major threats. The director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed El-Baradei, emphasised that there is "*the emergence of a nuclear black market, the determined efforts by more countries to acquire technology to produce the fissile material useable in nuclear weapons and the clear desire of terrorists to acquire weapons of mass*

destruction"[132]. One important objective of EU nations and the U.S. is to create a nuclear weapons-free zone in the *broader* Middle East.

However, EU's and U.S. primary goals are to fight mainly the roots of terrorism and violence in the *broader* Mediterranean region – like political and religious extremism combined with poverty, illiteracy, unemployment – by comprehensive political, economic, social and security programmes. The challenges for the Mediterranean region are also extreme growth of population and migration together with a high rate of unemployment, migration, and limited space to live. Many refugees – also from African trouble spots – try to reach European coasts, huge refugee camps are located e.g. in Fuerteventura, near Ceuta and Melilla, and at Lampedusa Island. The support of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries is also needed for effective border control, in Europe, European politicians discussed to build refugee camps in Libya or Algeria.

In the 1990s, EU, OSCE and NATO have developed a comprehensive network of vital partnerships with the countries of the *broader* Middle East to tackle these problems – within Mediterranean Dialogue processes. The U.S. has established the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) in 2003. In order to foster democracy and social stability to create peace and to fight risks, there is a need to put emphasis on mainly non-military security instruments and invest more in building effective multilateral security institutions. If Europe and the U.S. fail to make progress in the *broader* Middle East region and also to stabilise Iraq, the cause of regional reform in this country will be set back. European and U.S. political leaders now promote to avoid

[132] Source: Mohamed El-Baradei, Seven steps to raise world security, in: Financial Times, 2 February 2005, 13.

that Iraq is developing to a threat to its own people and its neighbours, to diminish nuclear risk from Iran and to strengthen ties between Israel and Palestine in order to stabilise the whole region. In order to contain today's threats and security risks, the U.S. administration "*wants to see Europe as a strong partner*"[133].

The best security strategy is based on: good economy, welfare, democratic political culture and formation and professional training of military and security people for crisis management. In the past, the Mediterranean Sea has been both a barrier and a bridge. It has been a region where different cultures and religions met sometimes violently, but also peacefully. And at all times there were intense trade relations between the shores of *mare nostrum*. Enhancing the Mediterranean Dialogues, and developing them into a coordinated genuine partnership, is one major step in this process of stabilising the region. It also opens a new chapter of transatlantic cooperation.

[133] Source: Judy Dempsey, U.S. supports Europe, NATO chief asserts, in: International Herald Tribune, 7 June 2005, p. 3.

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