Sustaining the New Wave of Pan-Africanism

Papers resulting from a workshop held at the Windhoek Campus of the University of Namibia, December 6-9, 2010

Sustaining the new wave of Pan-Africanism

Published in 2011 by The National Youth Council of Namibia (NYCN)

And The Nigerian High Commission in Windhoek

P.O.Box 60956

Katutura

Windhoek, Namibia

SUSTAINING THE NEW WAVE OF PAN-AFRICANISM

A collection of papers that were presented at the Workshop: 'Sustaining a New Wave of Pan-Africanism' at the University of Namibia (Unam) Windhoek, Namibia, December 6-9, 2010.

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FOREWORD

My name is Ibrahim Abou Sall. I was born in Haayre MBaara, in the province of Laaw in the Futa Toro, on the Mauritanian side. I taught history, respectively, in the departments of History at the Ecole Normale Supérieure (1980-1983) and the Faculty of Arts and Humanities at the University of Nouakchott (1983-1986) in Mauritania.

I have conducted research within teams comprising historians, anthropologists and sociologists from Africa, Europe, the United States of America and Central Asia, on the following issues:

- the relationship between religious leaders, especially Muslim, and European colonial administrations;
- the issue of agro-pastoral populations; and
- the territorial inheritance of African States, heirs of European colonialism.

My areas of special interest are the relations between aristocratic Muslim leaders and the French colonial administration; slavery in the countries of the Middle Valley of Senegal and issues of national identity in the neo-colonial states of Africa. The themes on which I have published articles are within these areas of special interest. My recent publication is: Southern Mauritania - conquests and French colonial administrations, 1890-1945, published by Karthala Publishing, Paris (France), June 2007, 815 pages.

The workshop on 'Sustaining the New Wave of Pan-Africanism' connected two areas in Africa that have been recently in view, namely Southern Africa and the Sahel – two areas affected by colonialism and Apartheid, in the process of decolonisation and opening up to the wider world. The youth workshop in Windhoek, Namibia, brought together young Africans from the Sahel and southwards, as well as from the Western Diaspora, regrettably none from the Eastern Diaspora – from Arabia, the Middle East and North Africa.

Such gatherings, bringing together young Africans in their diversity, are a necessity. I deem it an honour to have been asked to contribute this Avant Propos. May this publication reach the audience it deserves.

Ibrahima Abou SALL, June 2011

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SECTION I

1. In the beginning – Opening statements

Mandela Kapere

This international workshop on sustaining the new way of Pan-Africanism is organized jointly by the National Youth Council of Namibia (NYCN), with the Nigerian High Commission in Windhoek, Namibia, the Pan-African Strategic and Policy Research Group (PANAFSTRAG) and the Centre for Black and African Arts and Civilization (CBAAC), both in Lagos, as well as the Pan-Afrikan Centre of Namibia (PACON).
Fundamentally, the purpose of this international workshop is to bring young leaders from the African continent and Diaspora together with elders and veterans of the Pan-African Movement, so that together we forge a new way forward for Pan-Africanism in these times. It is obvious to many of us that there is need for something to be done about consolidating the Pan-African vision so that the youth of today can be inspired by the values and history of Africans. That is why the National Youth Council of Namibia, together with the Nigerian High Commission, PANAFSTRAG, CBAAC and PACON felt it important to have this international workshop.

Over the next three days we are going to be engaged in a number of pertinent issues for Africa and its Diaspora, looking forward for the direction of Pan-Africanism. Part of the work that we will be doing as young people, guided by our elders, is to interrogate the resolutions of all the previous Pan-African congresses as well as the resolutions of the Second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture (FESTAC 77) of 1977 held in Lagos, Nigeria. The idea is that one who thinks forward must be guided by what those who were there before us have done, what happened in the 1900s, what happened in subsequent Pan-African conferences, so that that becomes the basis of our understanding and then also the foundations from which we move on. I am tasked with the modest responsibility of welcoming all of you both to Namibia and to this occasion. I am hopeful and I am confident that at the end of this workshop we would have achieved our objective of setting the ground for what we hope would be the basis on which we will sustain an emerging Pan-African renaissance.

We are privileged tonight to have this gathering of local Namibian, African and international guests. We have received visitors from, amongst others, as far as the United States of America, from Nigeria, from South Africa, from Tanzania – young people and elders. So, I am delighted that all of you were able to travel to Windhoek for this occasion. I am going to ask my brother, High Commissioner Prince Adegboyega Christopher Ariyo of Nigeria, to also come and share with our colleagues here some of his thoughts on why the Nigerian Government, together with the National Youth Council of Namibia and others, are engaged in this process.

Mandela Kapere is the Executive Chairperson, National Youth Council of Namibia (NYCN). He was Director of Ceremonies at the opening session.

2. H.E. (Prince) Adegboyega Christopher Ariyo

Your Excellency, the Founding Father, the first President of the Republic of Namibia, the Chairperson, Secretary of the National Youth Council of Namibia, fellow Pan-Africanists and all my brothers and sisters that are here. Tonight I need to pay great tribute to one of the living icons of the liberation struggle of Africa, His Excellency Dr Sam Shafishuna Nujoma, who, I should say, is the kick-starter of this workshop. For and on behalf of the Nigerian High Commission, I wish to recognise our partners in this workshop initiative. These are the National Youth Council of Namibia, here present in the person of the Executive Chairperson Mr Mandela Kapere, the Pan-Afrikan Centre of Namibia and the Pan-African Strategic and Policy Research Group (PANAFSTRAG) and the Centre for Black and African Arts and Civilization (CBAAC). The workshop arose out of the dinner hosted by His Excellency, the Founding President of Namibia on August 02, 2010. General Williams of PANAFSTRAG had come to Namibia in search of connecting the Pan-African Parliament with Diasporian parliamentarians. An idea emerged from that dinner to convene a workshop in Namibia to look at the outcomes of the various African Conferences/Congresses and to look at PACON as a suitable role model for adoption in other parts of the African constituency – that is in Africa and also in the Diaspora. Thereafter, I held a working dinner for General Williams, to which I invited Namibian Pan-Africanists to attend. I encouraged General Williams to return to Namibia, which he did on October 18, 2010 to interact with Namibians and to make some presentations. This resulted in General Williams travelling to Swakopmund to interact with the Namibian Youth. He also made a presentation on Pan-Africanism at the University of Namibia (UNAM).

We are here because of the ancestors who went before us. There are not so many countries in Africa where you witness the type of workshop we are opening here this evening. Namibian, or South West African Pan-Africanists, were by all accounts more active than their counterparts were in many other parts of southern Africa, including South Africa. The genocide that took place here attracted the attention of the Universal Negro Improvement Association of Marcus Garvey. The upshoot of this is that in Namibia Pan-Africanism has a strong root, more so than in other countries. We are here to ensure that Pan-Africanism is alive and well in Namibia and we need to carry that torch to all other constituencies of Pan-Africanism.

This is the challenge for the Pan-Afrikan Centre of Namibia (PACON) which is located in Windhoek and was created as a result of a groundswell emerging from the Africa Day Conference of 1999. The new wave can only be carried by the Youth. We need young people to carry the torch and be passionate and do the thing because we are in an era, we are in the global economic meltdown. Fortunately, Africa has the natural resources to sustain the development of the world and we need the Youth of Africa to move and the Youth in Diaspora to move aggressively in order to achieve our new wave of Pan-Africanism, which is the economic independence for all of Africa and the Diasporan countries.
By way of information, the initiative to convene this workshop has as its Namibian patrons the Founding President as the Chairperson, the Prime Minister Right Honourable Nahas Angula as a patron, Mrs Saara Kuugongelwa-Amadhila, the Minister of Finance, as a patron and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Honourable Utoni Nujoma as a patron. We thank them for their support. The Nigerian High Commission in Namibia is pleased to be associated with this workshop and wishes you all good deliberations. Nigeria is now pushing this idea of Pan-Africanism forward.

H.E. (Prince) Adegboyega Christopher Ariyo is the Nigerian High Commissioner to Namibia.

3. Statement for and on behalf of Freedom Park, Tshwane, South Africa

Dr Mongane Wally Serote

It is indeed a privilege for me first to see President Nujoma, because when I see him and when I hear the High Commissioner speak about a long time ago, I see many leaders in Southern Africa who had a liberation movement, who singularly allowed us today to be here, because before it was not possible for us to travel or live in our countries. I, therefore, say to Your Excellency, it is important that this occasion today is organised especially for the youth in Southern Africa and in Africa. The Program Director has mentioned an organisation that I am proud to be part of, called the African Renaissance Organization of Southern Africa and that organisation really tried to open a dialogue about two issues in Southern Africa: What we must do as Southern African people to advocate and promote the concept of furthering Pan-Africanism within the global context. But also there is another very important theme which came from the Founding Fathers, such as President Nujoma, who consistently asked us to find a way to return to the source, in other words, to find a way to define ourselves as to who are we and what we are supposed to do with our situation and what it is that we should contribute to the human condition. It is in this context that I suggest what we are doing here today, is to spell out what we need to do. Our ancestors as far back as the 18th century, the Diasporic community, founded the concept of Pan-Africanism and the leaders of the liberation movement embraced that concept and went into partnership with the Diaspora and I think the High Commissioner already mentioned that people from those communities are here. It is very fortunate that they are here. The African Union has defined that it has six regions and, of course, the sixth region is the Diaspora wherever Africans are. In terms of this occasion, it is my wish that it should not be a one-off event. We should find a way to honour those who made sacrifices the freedom fighters who put their lives on hold for us, the leaders who sacrificed their freedom to ensure that we can be a free people. The question that we must ask today is, how do we honour them, not just in words but in actions and how are we going to sustain the concept of Pan-Africanism and how are we going to make it real for the ordinary person to voluntarily use that word or educated people whom we call ordinary people? What is it that we should do to embrace them? When we talk about returning to the source, that is what we mean.

Let me close by saying again, that for me it is a moving moment to be in the presence of President Nujoma. I have seen him on many platforms as a freedom fighter. I have listened to him carefully, as his words and actions shaped our future against the greatest odds in the world, when the whole world, which is a world power today, was opposing everything that we were doing.

I suspect, when I say that President Nujoma was also at the Bandung Conference, where the future of our continent was eventually shaped against the greatest odds. If they made progress during that time when there was no freedom, I do not understand why we cannot be able to do it when they actually delivered freedom to our doors and it is in our hands.

4. Maureen Hinda

Your Excellency, the Founding Father of the Republic of Namibia, Your Excellency the High Commissioner of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Your Excellences Ambassadors, distinguished representatives of Pan-African Cultural Institutions, ladies and gentlemen. Please allow me at the outset to convey our profound gratitude to the Government and people of Namibia, the Nigerian High Commission in Namibia, the National Youth Council of Namibia, the Pan-Afrikan Centre of Namibia, the Pan-African Strategic and Policy Research Group and the Centre for Black and African Arts and Civilization, from Lagos, Nigeria, organisers of this important workshop for the warm hospitality and for deciding to hold this workshop in this beautiful city of Windhoek, a city with an impressive history. It could not have come at a better time to discuss and act in the promotion of our African cultural traditions, when the values and Pan-Africanist spirit are taking centre stage at continental level and in the pursuance of the great initiatives of the Pan-Africanist movement and conferences/congresses of the 1900s as well as the ideals and visions of contemporary Pan-Africanists today.

The Pan-Africanist Movement, which started in the 1900s, won the reputation of being a pacesetter for the decolonisation of Africa and its Diaspora. It made significant advances for the Pan-African cause. It demanded the end of colonial rule and racial discrimination, opposing imperialism and it demanded human rights and equality of economic opportunity. The Manifesto given by the Pan-African Congress, which was the political and economic demands of the congress, was for a new world context for international cooperation. The context of Pan-Africanism in contemporary times stems from the fact that Pan-Africanism includes the intellectual, political and economic cooperation that should lead to the political and economic unity of Africans. The Pan-African alternative provides a framework for African unity and integration. The integration of Africa will be a source of inspiration and pride. It reassures us in our profound conviction that Africans have the capacity and the will to take their destiny in their own hands.

Paradoxically however, our continent is abundantly filled with huge cultural assets and resources, richness and heritage, yet at the same time these values and traditions are not used to their full potential and are also not fully transferred to younger generations. It was through the recognition of the value of African culture as an important social development tool, and the need for revival and renewal of our African culture of identity and cultural renaissance, that the first session of the African Union Conference of Ministers of Culture, held in Nairobi, Kenya, in December 2005, adopted the Charter for the African Cultural Renaissance. The Charter for the African Cultural Renaissance is a cultural tool which will empower member states to promote our spirit of Pan-Africanism as well as to strengthen their national policies and other cultural instruments, which will in turn contribute to the achievement of the continent's socio-economic and cultural integration, build sustainable peace and win the fight against poverty.

Since the adoption of the Charter, only two countries out of the total membership of the African Union have ratified it. These countries are Mali and Nigeria. As a way of accelerating the popularization and ratification process of the Charter, the African Union Commission developed the African Cultural Renaissance Campaign to advocate for the ratification of the Charter and for its implementation to commence at national and

regional levels as soon as possible. The African Cultural Renaissance Campaign was officially launched during the Third Session of the African Union Conference of Ministers of Culture, held in Abuja, Nigeria, in October 2010.

May I use this opportunity to advocate for the Government of the Republic of Namibia to accelerate the process of ratifying the Charter. During the just concluded Ministers of Culture Conference (2010) we were informed that significant progress has been realised for Namibia to deposit its Instrument of Ratification.

In the past decades the AU has been working towards the achievement of our continental unity through consolidating the institutional pillars of integration and building the human network of relations for the continent. By 2015 our aim is to have established the Regional Communities and by 2030 we expect to have achieved the integration of the entire continent.

Maureen Hinda is a member of the Board of the Pan-Afrikan Centre of Namibia (Pacon).

5. Statement for and on behalf of the Centre for Black and African Arts and Civilization (CBAAC), Lagos, Nigeria

Dr Tony C. Onwumah

Good evening, distinguished ladies and gentlemen. May I start by paying special tribute to the Founding President of Namibia. A lot of tribute has been paid to him this evening, but yet considering his enormous role in the freedom fight in this country, there has been no tribute paid to him that we consider superfluous or too much. I thus consider him as one of the greatest freedom fighters alive today. It is a privilege and honour to meet you in person and I am also delighted to present the best regards of Professor Tunde Babawale, who is the Director and Chief Executive of the Centre of Back and African Arts and Civilization, based in Lagos, Nigeria. I head the Research and Publications section of CBAAC, which is an acronym for the Centre of Black and African Arts and Civilization. The question here is: Why is it that my Centre is taking interest in co-sponsoring this international workshop? We recall that Pan-Africanism itself has hosted many conferences and congresses – the 1900 conference, the 1945 Congress, but not too many of us are aware of the 1956 Pan-African Writers Meeting held in Rome and the resolution of that particular conference. One of the later fall-outs of that conference was the First Black and African Arts and Culture Festival, held in Dakar, Senegal, in 1966. The 1966 Festival was a monumental success and it led to a yet greater and more successful festival, the Second World Black Festival of Arts and Culture, which was hosted by Nigeria in 1977 and then from all conceivable indications the second festival was an unqualified success because it brought Africans from all over the world in numbers that were unimagined, put them together to celebrate the beauty and quality of the Black African cultural heritage. The beauty of that festival was that it was not the kind of limited festival but it was indeed a very comprehensive international gathering of people of Black and African descent, who came to demonstrate pride, to demonstrate the beauty of black African arts and culture. But, more important, it was not limited to the glamour alone, but it had an intellectual dimension, because out of it CBAAC published an encyclopaedic publication on African culture. Since the 1977 festival had both the cultural aspect and an intellectual aspect, it renewed and rekindled interest in Pan-African brotherhood. It renewed and rekindled interest in the need for Black Africans, wherever they are found in this world, to act together as members of one family and at the end of that festival there was this new challenge: Do we allow the gains of such an important festival to be a mere flash in the pan, do we allow it to be a passing experience, or do we consolidate our communities which participated in that meeting? The meeting then resolved to keep all the materials that they brought to it in trust and hand it over to the Nigerian Government, with which I subsequently created CBAAC as a distinguished centre that since the inception of this organisation in 1978, has been holding many conferences, seminars, workshops and symposia, exhibitions, as the case may be, in different parts of the world such as in Brazil, Tobago, Abuja and Lagos. That is to show that the fire of Pan-Africanism is alive and that we are doing everything that is within our reach to keep it aglow and to keep it burning.

Now, the question is: What is this new Pan-Africanism we are talking about? My sister spoke so eloquently, emphasizing the need for economic emancipation. Yes, I agree entirely because it was (Kwame) Nkrumah who said we should seek political freedom. That attained, we now seek economic emancipation. Once achieved, our political freedom will

become more meaningful. I think we should go beyond that. The new Pan-Africanism we are talking about must have a multi-dimensional approach, because wherever we go the black man is treated as if he has no contribution at all to the pool of world culture and that is not true. We all know why we are where we are today. So, the challenge is that we must explore the economic dimensions, together with the political dimensions because our political independence will remain a mirage if our economy is not under our firm control. So we need a multi-dimensional approach, we need intellectuals, not just politicians, to show interest in the new wave of Pan-Africanism and indeed, one of my greatest joys this evening is that this program is talking about the youth, the leaders of tomorrow whether we like it or not. I was impressed by the talk about the need for the youth to get more involved, because the undesired treatment that Africans all over the world receive must be addressed and we need to reverse such an unfortunate trend. So, in CBAAC we are glad to be here and to say we will do everything in our power to keep the Pan-African fire burning.

6. Tendai Wenyika

Your Excellency, the Founding Father of the Namibian Nation, and he is not only the Founding Father of Namibia but is an inspiration for Africa's independence as a whole and my hero. Comrade Sam Nujoma, the Nigerian High Commissioner to Namibia, the Representative of the African Union, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Comrade Mandela Kapere – congratulations on your recent election – Pan-African revolutionaries and all supporters of Africa's social progress.

It is an honour for the Pan-African Youth Union to be here at this historic occasion to be part of a program of this nature, because it is a fact that Pan-Africanism has grown, people continue to be challenged between different schools of thought, between Pan-Africanism, nationalism, capitalism, communism, socialism, amongst the numerous "isms" that touch the status quo of Pan-Africanism. The Pan-African Youth Union would like to reaffirm our commitment towards the establishment of a strong Pan-African system that allows for the progress of Africa's economy, so that the economy of Africa is inherited by Africans, controlled by Africans, not only Africans but young Africans in particular.

As we deliberate and debate and engage throughout the week, we are here to learn from the fortunes and woes from past political experiences, from Pan-Africanists. There are some names that we learn about from our academic books that I never thought I would be given the opportunity to mingle with. So, we are here to learn. Not only are we here to learn, we are also here to acquire information and to disseminate it and take it back to the young people of Africa. For the Pan-African Youth Union this does not come at any better time, because in one week's time all the young people of the world are going to converge in South Africa under a Socialist banner for the 17th World Festival of Youth and Students (17WFYS), to fight and curb the spirit of capitalism. The fight against capitalism is not a new fight. Pan-Africanism itself is also anti-capitalist, because capitalism threatens the status of Pan-Africanism.

As a result I would like to thank you all for inviting us here. We would like to pay tribute to Comrade Nujoma and all the other Founding Fathers for their commitment – Comrades Julius Nyerere, Kwame Nkrumah, the Robert Mugabes, the Chris Hanis and also the Nelson Mandelas, Augustino Netos and all the leaders who laid their lives on the line so that we can enjoy this Africa that we claim to be ours today. We are going to take the second phase of the struggle forward, which is the economic empowerment of our people. We cannot remain content with political independence. Political independence does not define or bring meaning to the thousands of African people who perished. Political independence does not justify the lives that were sacrificed through armed struggles. Political independence does not justify the blood that was shed to water our freedom. Comrade Nujoma, your battle was not in vain, you have handed over to the next generation, a generation that wants to carry Africa forward. I thank you all for having us here and I look forward to successful and productive deliberations.

Tendai Wenyika is the Secretary General of the Pan-African Youth Union (PAYU).

7. Advocate Bience Gawanas

Allow me at the outset to convey our profound gratitude to the Government and people of Namibia, the Nigerian High Commission in Namibia, the National Youth Council of Namibia, the Pan-African Centre of Namibia (PACON), the Pan-African Strategic and Policy Research Group (PANAFSTRAG) from Lagos, Nigeria, organizers of this important workshop for the warm hospitality and for having decided to hold this workshop in this beautiful city of Windhoek, a city with impressive history and rich culture.

The Workshop on Sustaining the New Wave of Pan-Africanism could not have come at a better time, as the debate and actions on the promotion of our African cultural traditions, values and the Pan-Africanism spirit are taking centre stage at continental level and in pursuit of the great initiatives of the Pan-Africanist movements and conferences in the 1900s as well as the ideals and visions of contemporary Pan-Africanists today.

The Pan-African movement which started in the 1900s won the reputation of being a pace setter for the decolonisation of Africa. It made significant advances for the Pan-African cause. One of the demands was to end colonial rule as well as racial discrimination. It was against imperialism and it demanded human rights and equality of economic opportunity. The manifesto given by the Pan-African Congress was for a new world context for international cooperation.

The context of Pan-Africanism in contemporary times stems from the fact that Pan-Africanism includes the intellectual, political and economic cooperation that should lead to political and economic unity of Africa. The Pan-African alternative provides a framework for African unity and integration.

The integration of Africa will be a source of inspiration and pride. It reassures us in our profound conviction that our continent has the capacity and the will to take its destiny in its own hands.

Paradoxically our continent is abundantly filled with huge cultural values, richness and heritage, while at the same time these values and resources are not used to their full potential and are also not fully transferred to younger generations.
It was through the recognition of the value of African culture as an important social development tool and the need for revival, rebirth and renewal of our African cultural identity and cultural renaissance that the first Session of the African Union Conference of Ministers of Culture held in Nairobi, Kenya in December 2005, adopted the Charter for the African Cultural Renaissance.

The Charter for African Cultural Renaissance is a cultural tool which will empower Member States to promote our Pan-Africanism spirit as well as strengthen their national policies and other cultural instruments which will in turn contribute to the achievement of the continent's socio-economic and cultural integration, build sustainable peace and win the fight against poverty.

Since the adoption of the Charter, only two countries of the total membership of the African Union have ratified it (Mali and Nigeria). As a way of accelerating the popularisation

and ratification process of the Charter, the African Union Commission developed the African Cultural Renaissance Campaign to advocate for the ratification of the Charter and for its implementation to commence at national and regional levels as soon as possible. The African Cultural Renaissance Campaign was officially launched during the 3rd Session of the African Union Conference of Ministers of Culture held in Abuja, Nigeria, in October 2010.

May I use this opportunity to advocate for the Government of the Republic of Namibia to accelerate the process of ratifying the Charter. During the just concluded Ministers' of Culture Conference we were informed that significant progress had been achieved for Namibia to deposit its instrument of ratification.

In the past decades, the AU has also been working towards the achievement of our continental unity through consolidating the institutional pillars of integration and building the human network of relations for the continent. By 2015, our aim is to have established virile Regional Communities and by 2030 we expect to have achieved integration of the entire continent. The transformation of the OAU into the AU, the move towards the establishment of the United States of Africa, the establishment of the Pan-African Parliament amongst others are some of the considerable milestones in this process.

Our being here in Windhoek for these three days is to re-affirm our common commitment to pursuing the work started during the Pan-African Conferences, through joint collaboration and by creating a common vision and action to attain our continental integration through cultural promotion and economic self-sufficiency within the framework of Pan-African unity.
Allow me to take this opportunity to reaffirm the commitment of the African Union Commission to spare no effort in backing and supporting this initiative through the African Cultural Renaissance Campaign and other related programmes.
In conclusion, may I once again thank all strategic partners participating at this workshop for the collaboration and technical assistance for the realisation of such an important event.

Advocate Bience Gawanas is the Commissioner for Social Affairs at the African Union Commission.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

8. H.E. Dr Sam Nujoma

This conference comes at the right time, when some African countries celebrated their fiftieth independence anniversaries this year and following the UN General Assembly Declaration on December 18, 2009, proclaiming the year 2011 as the International Year for People of African Descent. I am therefore delighted that this workshop is taking place in Windhoek, Namibia, in line with that UN Declaration.

The ideology of Pan-Africanism has taken root on the continent of Africa and the Diaspora following the prominent work undertaken by its earlier proponents in the Diaspora led by William Du Bois, Marcus Garvey and others who resisted the ideology of white supremacy and asserted our rights to dignity, freedom and self-determination from the beginning of the 16th century during the advent of the trans-Atlantic slave trade.

It was the slave trade that produced the forced migration of just over 11 million people as slave labourers. Of those, fewer than 9.6 million survived the middle passage across the Atlantic to the Americas and the Caribbean Islands.

This loss of population and potential population was a major factor leading to Africa's subsequent conquest and economic underdevelopment while the human and other resources that were taken from Africa contributed to the capitalist development and wealth of Europe.

However, I can proudly state that, as early as the 18th century, the African peoples never accepted slavery and oppression and always resisted slavery. For example, people such as Toussaint L'Ouverture, the leader of the successful slave revolution from Saint Dominique, helped to establish the Republic of Haiti, the first country of African descent to gain its own independence as a symbol of the successful liberation and independence of the African people in the Diaspora.

During the 19th century when European colonial activities increased, culminating in the scramble for Africa and the onset of the era of imperialism, some people of African descent in the Diaspora, like Martin Delany and Edward Blyden, were advocating for a physical return to Africa. Blyden particularly inspired the Francophone Négritude movement, while Delany was the first to coin the phrase "Africa for Africans".

The first wave of Pan-Africanism on the African continent was borne out of the various Pan African conferences which were held at the beginning of 1900, with the most important one taking place in London and attended by prominent Pan-Africanists such as lawyer Henry Sylvester Williams of Trinidad and Tobago, George Padmore and W.E.B. Du Bois. After the death of Sylvester Williams in 1911, Du Bois took over from where Williams left and organized a series of Pan-African conferences from 1919 to 1927 in London, Paris, Brussels, Lisbon and in New York.

The 5th Pan-African Congress held in Manchester, England in 1945, was the most im-

portant of these meetings and was attended by African scholars such as Dr Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Chief Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Hasting Kamuzu Banda of Malawi and many others.

In subsequent years, African nationalists such as Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria, Ahmed Sekou Touré of Guinea, Modibo Keita of Mali, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Patrice Lumumba of Congo, Dr Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Amilcar Cabral of Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Principé, Dr Antonio Augustinho Neto of Angola, Samora Machel of Mozambique among other African leaders of the early 1960s kept the spirit of Pan-Africanism alive on the African continent. Among these prominent Pan-Africanists, we should single out Dr Kwame Nkrumah, who was a true Pan-Africanist and had a deeply rooted commitment to the unity of Africa.

Dr Nkrumah truly believed in the total liberation of the African continent. When Ghana achieved its independence from colonial rule in 1957, Dr Nkrumah said, “The independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” It is for this reason that Ghana became a beacon of hope that drew many from the Diaspora to Africa but also played an important role in building a new Pan-Africanism centred on the continent, which, on May 25, 1963, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, culminated in the founding of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

One of the aims and objectives of the OAU was to get rid, from the African continent, of the last vestiges of colonialism and apartheid minority white occupation. For that reason, the OAU established the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, which was based in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. The Liberation Committee was to render assistance such as military training and financial support to the national liberation movements fighting colonial rule and minority white regimes on the African continent.

Through the Liberation Committee, the OAU rendered and mobilised political, diplomatic and material support to all the freedom fighters, with training bases for those who were fighting against Portuguese colonialism as well as those who were fighting against the minority white apartheid colonialism in Namibia and South Africa.

The independence of Zambia in 1964 brought a new dimension to the liberation of Southern Africa. As a result, the white colonial settlers in Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa imposed economic sanctions against Zambia. In the true spirit of Pan-Africanism, when Angola and Mozambique achieved their freedom and independence in 1975, Presidents Kaunda of Zambia, Nyerere of Tanzania, Neto of Angola, Machel of Mozambique and Sir Seretse Khama of Botswana formed the Frontline States later joined by President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe upon his country’s independence in 1980; and resisted the machinations of the colonial settlers and apartheid forces.

Equally worth mentioning here, the Federal Republic of Nigeria under the leadership of General Murtala Mohamed became fully involved in the liberation struggle in Southern Africa and as a result, the Frontline States became known as the Frontline States and Nigeria.

In Namibia, our struggle for freedom and independence was part of the wider process

in the total liberation of the African continent from colonialism and foreign occupation. Dr Nkrumah even once said, "Only united Africa ... can give effective material and moral support to our Freedom Fighters in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Angola, Mozambique, South-West Africa (Namibia), Bechuanaland (Botswana), Swaziland, Basutoland (Lesotho), Portuguese Guinea and of course South Africa." Allow me, therefore, to add our Namibian experience and perspective to the liberation struggle of African nationalism and independence and its wider expression of Pan-Africanism.

The Namibian peoples have equally a proud history of resistance to foreign occupation. We have been inspired by our forefathers in the historic mission to liberate our country from foreign occupation. These are Captain Hendrik Witbooi, Jacob Marengo, Chief Kahimemua Nguvauva, Chief Samuel Maharero, Chief Nehale Lja Mpingana, Chief Mandume ja Ndemufayo, Chief Iipumbu ja Tshilongo and others who fought the wars of resistance against German colonialism, Portuguese invasion and South African minority white apartheid colonial occupation. They stood firm for the protection and defence of the motherland from European colonial invaders.

But it was not until a major milestone in the struggle for the liberation of our country in the form of a campaign against the forced removal of inhabitants of Windhoek's Old Location to Katutura that confrontation issued on December 10, 1959. On that fateful day, the police opened fire on a crowd of protestors, and in the aftermath killing 12 people and injuring 50 others who put up fierce resistance against the forced removal to Katutura, which was clearly an implementation of the apartheid policies of segregation and discrimination on the indigenous people of Namibia.

The events of that day reinvigorated our efforts to seek our freedom and independence by all means at our disposal. In the following years, the Namibian people became more militant and organised themselves better to face the apartheid machinery which was becoming more brutal and systematic in its repression.

SWAPO (the South West African People's Organization), which became the vanguard of our liberation, was founded on April 19, 1960 and initially started with the politics of resistance emerging out of concrete historical contexts of the migrant labour and the defiance campaign with the core objectives derived from Pan-Africanism, and with the clear purpose to liberate our country and unite all our people in its continued efforts to mobilise all Namibians irrespective of colour, tribe, ethnic origin or race to fight for the total liberation of our country.

In the wake of the shooting on December 10, 1959, many political activists such as the Secretary General of Ovambo Peoples' Organization (OPO), Comrade Jacob Kuhangua and Nathanael Mbaeva of SWANU (The South West Africa National Union) were deported to Ovamboland and Hereroland, so-called Native Reserves. In February 1960, since I was being arrested on numerous occasions, as the President of the then OPO, and we were spending too much money on bailing me out, before my fifth time of arrest, it was decided by the OPO leadership that I should leave the country to join those Namibians already lobbying at the UN for Namibia's self-determination. I had already petitioned the United Nations through letters also signed by Herero Chief Hosea Kutako and Nama Chief Samuel Witbooi.

I left the then South West Africa (Namibia) on February 29, 1960, crossing into the then Bechuanaland and from there, using the false name of David Chipinga, I travelled to Bulawayo, then on to Salisbury, now Harare, and on to Ndola in Northern Rhodesia now Zambia. Finally I arrived at Mbeya on March 21, 1960 in Eastern Tanganyika which was still a British colony. While in Mbeya, Tanzania, I requested oral hearing with the UN Committee on South West Africa in New York.

I arrived in independent Ghana in April 1960 and met President Nkrumah, among other African leaders. From Ghana I travelled to Liberia and arrived in New York in June 1960 and stayed for the rest of the year petitioning the UN for the independence of Namibia.
In early 1961, I returned to Tanzania, from where SWAPO joined with other liberation movements, the Pan-African Freedom Movement of Eastern, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA). While in Dar-es-Salaam, we were joined by Comrades Peter Mweshihange, Hifikepunye Pohamba and many others and started to mobilize for support from other African nationalists and received strong backing from Mwalimu Kambarage Julius Nyerere, the President of Tanzania.

We established SWAPO's Provisional HQ in Dar-es-Salaam and arranged scholarships and military training for SWAPO members who came to join our liberation struggle in exile. We attended numerous Pan-African and international conferences such as the All Pan-African Conference in 1960 in Ghana and the Third All African People's Conference in Cairo, Egypt, in 1961 followed by the formation of the Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on May 25, 1963.

Before the actual commencement of our guerrilla warfare for the total liberation, genuine freedom and independence of our country, the South African legal team led by Legal Team Judge de Villiers, at the International Court of Justice, made a statement claiming that we were in self-imposed exile and the SWAPO Central Committee decided that we challenge that claim. I was accompanied by His Excellency Hifikepunye Pohamba to Windhoek, as we decided to challenge the White Apartheid South African Regime's assertion that we were in self-imposed exile. We flew into Windhoek on March 21, 1966, and were arrested and deported 16 hours later.

The legal proceedings continued at the International Court of Justice and on July 18, when the final vote came, seven judges voted that Ethiopia and Liberia had a legal right and interest in condemning South Africa's violation of the mandate, and seven voted against. Judge President Percy C. Spender of Australia cast his vote in favour of South Africa at a tie-break.

The Front National Liberation (FNL) of Algeria, after their independence at the end of 1962, offered SWAPO to open an office in Algiers and when I visited Algiers, the FNL of Algeria under the leadership of His Excellency President Ahmed Ben Bella, offered to SWAPO two pistols and two Pepesa Sub Machine guns, which I carried from Alger to Cairo and from Cairo to Tanzania, as the first weapons with which we launched the armed liberation struggle on August 26, 1966 at Omugulugwombashe in Omusati Region, in Northern Namibia, when the torch of freedom was lit.

The armed liberation struggle in the mid-1970s and late 1980s with the independence of

Angola, led to a number of successive military battles and the intensification of the war by the combined Angola's FAPLA forces assisted by the Cuban internationalist forces, and the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) combatants, SWAPO's Military Wing until the decisive battle of Quito Quanavale in Angola, where the South African troops were militarily defeated, and forced to the negotiating table and the signing of the December 22, 1988 agreement in New York.

This agreement eventually led to the separate and subsequent signing of a cease-fire on Namibia, which I had the honour of signing on behalf of SWAPO of Namibia, with Pik Botha signing on behalf of Apartheid Minority White South Africa Regime. This culminated in the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, when we achieved our genuine Freedom and Independence on March 21, 1990 and the collapse of the white minority apartheid regime in South Africa, in April 1994, when the first democratic elections took place and were won by Comrade Nelson Mandela, President of the African National Congress (ANC), thus completing the total liberation of Africa.

Now that the continent of Africa is politically independent, what we need is to embark upon the second phase of the struggle for genuine economic independence to eradicate ignorance, hunger and poverty as the enemies of the African continent. That is the challenge facing particularly our youth. Africa holds all known space-age minerals such as natural gas, oil, coal, copper, uranium, diamonds, gold, and platinum, complemented by agriculture. Africa is also blessed with perennial rivers such as the Congo River in the DRC. In terms of economic potential, if the Inga Hydro-electric Scheme on the Congo River is fully harnessed, it can provide affordable electricity to the rest of Africa, with surplus for export to Asia or Europe.

For this reason, it is of great importance for our countries to spend more resources in the training of our youth, to enable Africa to produce our own doctors, mining engineers, architects, geologists, marine biologists, agriculturalists and scientists in all fields of economic endeavour to accelerate economic development for the benefit of the African people on the continent and those in the Diaspora.

In conclusion, to all those who came from America, the Caribbean Islands, Europe and all over the continent, welcome to Namibia and please feel at home.

With these few words, I declare this Pan-African Workshop officially opened and wish you all successful deliberations as well as a prosperous and happy new year 2011.

Long Live the Spirit of Pan-Africanism!

Long Live PACON!

Long Live the Republic of Namibia!

H.E. Dr Sam Shafishuna Nujoma is the Founding President of the Republic of Namibia and Father of the Namibian Nation, and Patron of the Pan-Afrikan Center of Namibia (PACON).

9. 'African Voices'

Panel discussion on the Sahel
The panel discussion took place at the Safari Hotel in Windhoek, after the reception which followed the Opening Statement of His Excellency Dr Sam Nujoma, in the evening of December 6, 2010.

The panellists were constituted as follows:

- Dr John Gai Nyuot Yoh (Southern Sudanese), Head of Southern Africa Liaison Office of the Government of Southern Sudan, Pretoria, South Africa, who chaired the discussion.
- Sabir Ibrahim (Darfuri), Financial Officer, Southern Africa Liaison Office of the Government of Southern Sudan, Pretoria, South Africa.
- Hagir Sayed Mohamed (Nubian from North Sudan), Khartoum, Sudan.
- Samba Diallo (Mauritanian), Nouakchott, Mauritania.

Dr Yoh: It is in our conventional understanding that the Pan-African Movement's struggle was against colonialists who occupied our land and subjugated us in the most brutal way any human being can be subjugated to – but to deal with the issues of Mauritania and Sudan, sometimes people misunderstood or do not understand exactly what the issues involved are. In the coming few minutes we will try to highlight from a Pan-African perspective why we are where we are now in Mauritania and Sudan. The case of Mauritania, I am sure everybody has heard about it, although nobody wants to talk about it, that is why it is one of the silent cases on the continent and that explains why Comrade Samba Diallo from Mauritania is here to share with us his story and I will give him a chance to highlight what the important points are. Meanwhile, let me introduce Samba Diallo from Mauritania, Comrade Sabir Ibrahim from Darfur in Sudan and Ms Hagir Sayed Mohamed, a Nubian originating from Northern Sudan, living in Khartoum, Sudan.

Samba Diallo: Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for allowing me to be part of this great workshop. I am from Mauritania, which few people know where it is located. When I state: "I am from Mauritania", people respond: "where is Mauritania?" So, I have also the same feeling about Namibia, I did not hear about Namibia that much. So, this workshop is not just about Africans meeting but also for us to learn from one another. So, I will be very brief in starting with the case of Mauritania and that Mauritania is a silent and hidden country, but that does not mean that there is only peace and that only right things are going on in that country. In this case, talking about Pan-Africans and Africans themselves meeting and talking about the future of what matters in their lives, this is the kind of discussion that is not welcomed in Mauritania. I will try to give a picture of Mauritania. Mauritania is a mixed race country. It has a minority of white Arabs coming from Yemen and the Middle East in general and others with an African background. So, the majority of course is people with African background, but the system and the government of course is in the hands of the minority Arabs and that makes it quite different and quite unique compared to other African countries. This minority in our country is supported by Arab regimes and by Arab movements in the Middle East or in Egypt, for instance, and that makes it a country which cannot define itself, whether it is an African country or whether it is an Arab country. These white Arab regimes all supported the oppression of Africans in Southern Africa during the time of apartheid. They claimed very clearly that they were

in support of the apartheid system and that it is a system that has the right to exist and that it is very okay for them to see a portion of the white colour oppressing blacks in that part of the world. Of course, I was a kid at that time and these things were going on. As a student or as a citizen we just had to cope with this, we just had to accept it. In Mauritania the Negro Africans were divided into two. The first group was the *Haritines*, the freed slaves and the biggest group is called Abeed, who are considered absolutely as slaves. So, it is an absolute right for a white Mauritanian to own a black African just as you own your phone and just as you own your shoes or whatever and you can treat him/her as you wish and what I am telling you now is not something in the history (books), what I am telling you is something happening right now. It is not 10 years ago; it is not five years ago, it is today. It is happening and the system is supporting this, of course. There is a clause in the Constitution that it is not allowed for a human being to own another human being, but there has never been a person arrested or charged. There has not been a case of a white person that has been arrested by the regime who owns the slaves. It is common for a white Mauritanian to take his slave to another African country and make him, for example, work for him or stand in his shop while this white guy is having fun somewhere. So, for me this is quite horrible, it is just something that makes me nervous. I cannot even talk about this, I cannot even make you feel how bad I feel when I see this and for me, having the chance to come here and to see Africans talking about themselves, Africans standing up, women and men standing up and talking about their future, it is a new thing for me. For you it might be something normal, but for me it is really something not seen at home. So, the idea of Pan-Africanism is not just something that we should talk about, but we have to think about millions of Mauritanians, black Mauritanians living in slavery, being oppressed every day only because of the colour of their skin, only because of the size of their nose. So, I think it is time to highlight this issue; it is time to say it is enough. It is time to say enough and it is time to say that we deserve better. We deserve more not just from other races or other tribes, but from anyone coming from anywhere. Of course, we have a lot of issues that link us as Africans, but there is little information on what is happening in Mauritania and what is happening to its people. Maybe in Sudan or somewhere else these types of issues are discussed, but in the case of Mauritania I think it is really a bomb actually waiting to explode. So let us take this issue seriously and let us be part of those who liberate this portion of people that are suffering because of what they are, and that is the oppressed in Africa. You have been oppressed in your home, you were oppressed in your continent and it is like that is normal. I think I just wanted to give you the picture of Mauritania and I give the chance to my colleagues from Sudan. I thank you very much.

Dr Yoh: I think one of the challenges of the Pan-African Movement is actually when the Movement moved home after the 1945 Congress, the questions that were raised by the Pan-Africans were who was African, what does it mean to be African, was it based on colour? We know that originally to be African was based on colour, but a compromise was reached when it became clear that there are areas in the continent populated by mixed races and we also have North Africa which was originally Black and which is now Arab. A consequence is that many Africans did not want to deal with the issue of race, partly because we were pre-occupied with our liberation struggles. So with the founding of the Pan-African Movement, when it comes to the role of the North Africans and the Indian Ocean Islands vis-à-vis the Pan-African Movement, it becomes a sentimental issue, it becomes a subjective matter.

The history of Sudan is the history of the Blacks. Sudan in different times had different names. At one point in time it was the Kushite Kingdoms that occupied the territory right from Ethiopia to the modern-day Mali. It was a huge land with different nations, with different groups, with different languages. It is this Sudan that brought law reform. We know that the Kushites occupied the territory that is now Ethiopia and Sudan in West Africa and it is the same people who later on occupied the territory that we know as Egypt today. In the later history they were moved into what is called Southern Egypt today and by the Christian era they occupied Sudanic kingdoms. It was those crises that led to what was later called an Islamic African clash. It has created a situation in Sudan where the territory began to shrink as well as the migration trend right from the first to second era of Christianity. It became regular that those same territories had wars. In the ancient history, the Kushite and the Pharaohs had a distinct history and then the Romans came. After the Romans came the Kushites who ruled for over 700 years, but then round about the 13th century, Amr Ibn Aas one of the generals of the Prophet Mohammed occupied Egypt, resulting in much of what we know today as Southern Egypt, which was occupied by the governments of the Pharaohs. By the 13th century the last Christian church was taken over. By the 16th century much of what is now known as Sudan was occupied by Muslims.

It took about 500 years for integration to take place. In the northern part of Sudan we have clans who were a mixture of this hybrid evolution. In Eastern Sudan there were many kingdoms. In Western Sudan was the Kingdom of Darfur which became part of what we know today as Sudan, in 1916. In 1821 the Ottoman Empire decided to send an expedition from Egypt to go in search of gold and slaves. This was when the Egyptians occupied Sudan from 1821 to 1881, when local leaders, led by a religious person named the Mahdi, decided to send away the Ottomans. The Mahdists ruled the country for about five years, but like the Ottomans, they had interest in slaves and that also led to some regions in the west and the south, the east and in the north of Sudan to collaborate with the British and that is how in 1898 the British and the Egyptians jointly conquered and ruled Sudan. In terms of its demographic profile, for almost four to five thousand years the population of Sudan became an African mix, where you had various tribes from West Africa, from Northern Africa and various tribes from what we know today as Southern Sudan. The different colonial powers in Sudan brought about something that Sudan did not entirely think about, that because of its multi-racial and multi-religious society, with some other remnants, the question of the identity of the country became problematic.
Who are the Sudanese – what does it mean to be a Sudanese? It was, therefore, not surprising that when Sudan became independent on January 1, 1956, nobody noticed it in Africa. The only country people know as the first independent country in Africa is Ghana, but actually the first African country to become independent on January 1, 1956 was Sudan.

But why did Africans and the Pan-Africanists ignore it? Because there was an identity crisis in Sudan. The leadership that took over power in Sudan in 1956 did not accept the notion that Sudan is an African country. To them Sudan was an Arab-African country and that is the core of the problem. It was then that the question was raised – what kind of country do we want if we want to become an independent country? For one, Sudan has very strange statistics – seven per cent of the Sudanese consider themselves African, pure African, and seven per cent of the Sudanese always passed as Muslims. So there

was permanent contradiction between Muslim Africans and about 39 per cent of the population who believed strongly that they were Arabs. Although they do not look Arabic, they believe so.

So, what does this mean? It means that in Sudan you can be a Muslim and Black, but someone will tell you that no, you are a Muslim and also an Arab and then you ask: okay, what does this mean, why should I be an Arab when I am not? That is why in Sudan we have a situation which we regard as hyper-inferiority complex, where you say because I speak Arabic, and the majority of us do, because I believe that one of my descendants was an Arab and because I am a Muslim, therefore Sudan must be Islamic and an Arab country. It is our belief that one can be a Chinese or a Nigerian Muslim but that does not mean he/she is an Arab. Why should it apply to us? So the question of identity crisis became our main problem.

The Constitution of the country, therefore, was drafted and inaugurated in 1955. The first to contest the status quo with weapons were the people of Southern Sudan and they fought from 1955 to 1972 when a peace agreement was signed. By 1983 it became clear that the state which was inherited from Britain and Egypt was actually run by a few people in Khartoum and following the footsteps of the South, the people of Darfur said no, this government does not represent us. The people of Eastern Sudan said this government does not represent us. The people from these areas were saying no, you are not Arabs and you must accept what you are. This is the crisis we are in in Sudan. Up to this moment we do not know who we are and that question has been with us for almost 180 years. In the south, in 1983 the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) came up with something new that says we believe that conflict in Sudan is no longer between Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan, because the north is no longer the unified north that existed. The real problem of the Sudan is that there is an identity crisis; people are not sure who they are. So what it actually means is a new order had to be negotiated and that is the basis of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which was signed in January 2005.

As a Pan-Africanist you will ask yourself if the majority of Sudanese are Africans, why the people of South Sudan should vote for an independent state. And then they will ask another question – Is the problem of Sudan a colonial problem or an internal problem? I want you to have this context in mind, because if you understand these dynamics, you would then begin to wonder, the final solution we are talking about, is it about colonialism or are we talking about a new kind of dispensation, where the issues relating to the colonialist state are not resolved? What do we need? Do we need to dissolve and destroy the colonialist state, create our own state and, therefore, do what we want or will we continue with the tired, the damaged and old set up?

Sabir Ibrahim: We have a message for the Pan-Africanists gathered here tonight, because it seems to me that we in Sudan have been the vanguard, in the forefront for too long. If you go to the refugee camps in Darfur and I urge you guys here to create a sort of committee to go to the camps to see how the people are living there, it is a catastrophic situation. Where are the Africans today and what are they doing about this situation in Darfur? In the African Union (AU) we are divided today into two or three groups on the Darfur issue, we live in a state of denial. We claim we do not know what is happening in

Darfur. In our media, who talks about Darfur? Do we leave the white people only to talk about Darfur? Some brothers and sisters, our fellow Africans, do not talk about Darfur, they do not have the time to go there and see what's going on there. The problem lies with the Arabs and their project of Arabisation and Islamisation in Sudan, Mali, Chad and Mauritania, pushing us all southwards, pushing us, taking our land, taking everything and we don't know when they will reach here in Namibia.

Hagir Sayed Mohamed: Good evening ladies and gentlemen. My name is Hagir Omer. I am a Nubian from Northern Sudan in Africa. It is an honour for me to be here. It is the first time for me to be in Southern Africa. I have spent almost a day and a half in Windhoek. I am amazed about what I have seen in Namibia. What Dr John Gai Yoh said about the crisis of identity is true. You will find in Sudan young black people, but they are having white minds and they are acting like whites. You see people who are very dark, but they are never proud of their colour, they are proud of their origin, they say they are Arabs but if they go to the Arab countries they will be considered as slaves due to their dark colour. It is very common to hear the word Abeed, which means slave in Southern Arabia, for example, in Dubai. It is easy to hear, "oh, that is 'Abid' slave". It is okay to be an African and a Muslim. Islam does not say that you have to be an Arab to be a Muslim; you just have to believe in it. For the radical Muslims, this is their new point of departure. What they are doing now is to support Arab fundamentalist groups coming from other countries which have radical Islamic views and any other radical thinking Muslims. Internally in Sudan, as a result of the separation, our brothers in the south will be African Sudanese, a Sudanese people living in their own land, but the northern part of the country will be a centre for Al Qaeda extremists, simply because of the problem of the loss of identity. Some Arabised Northern Sudanese will do anything to please the Arabs and the Muslims. What I think is that Sudan, especially the Sudanese in the northern part and the centre; they are in need of the Pan-Africanism movement to secure their identity.

Question: We have heard there are three crucial things that any Pan-Africanist must ask himself or herself, otherwise the new way we are talking about will not identify the actual problem. One, if you live in the United States or in Canada or China or in South Africa or Namibia or Sudan and you are a Pan-Africanist, you must ask yourself the following question – in the times of identity crisis internally in an African country, what is the role of the Pan-Africanist? If the Mauritanian African majority decided to fight against the Arab minority who are ruling them and enslaving them in the 21st century, what would be your position? Would you not blink an eye because the bigger picture is that they are pushing for a united state? If Sudanese, who are Africans, Muslims, almost one tribe, can kill themselves for over 20 years and we are not able to give them direction and then you go and tell them that you want to deal with specific issues, how do you deal with that because of the identity crisis? The second problem that we have, the majority of Muslims are in Africa and the majority of Muslims in Africa are truly Muslims. If you go to Darfur, 100 per cent are Muslims. They believe in Islam and they are peaceful Muslims. The problem we have is with political Islam, the Islam which says we run the country because we are Muslim. What do we do with that? It is an African issue. The last one is the dynamics of economic imbalances internally in our countries. Some communities control the economy of their country at the expense of the majority. How do we deal with that? If we define that the next way for Pan-Africanism is for us to consolidate our political independence through economic prosperity, do we compromise our economic vision? Because if

you do not do that you will end up in endless civil wars and the ideals and dreams of unity in Africa will never be.

Question: On the African continent we have come across a concept called the Maghreb ideal and we struggle to institutionalise it. What geographical area does it define, which people does it involve, what is the economic strength of those people, what are the social strengths of those people and what is Sudan and the other affected areas enjoying from that? We pose this question because we have also gone to the north, where we came across the concept of Maghreb civilisation and when we examined the Maghreb civilisation, we were not very sure how it defined itself.

Dr John Gai: Let me answer this, this is very crucial. I want all of you as Pan-Africanists to know the debate. The debate was – do we as Africans take a bold decision to define who an African is? The decision was taken by the Pan-Africanists Du Bois and Garvey and that is what created the problem, because Du Bois was more of a sophisticated kind of person and an intellectual, he did not mind for the African in the Diaspora to integrate into the societies where they were living, whereas Garvey was encouraging the Africans in the Diaspora to go back to the mainland. It was when the Pan-Africanist Movement was transferred from the West to the mainland that people like Nkrumah began to say that there is the need to redefine what is meant by African and that is where the question of the Arab in the north and the African in the south came forth. Later on they decided to define the continent in terms of sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa, because they wanted to sort out the identity issue and thus in May 1963 at the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the big debate over the identity of Africa took up much of the discussions, although the minutes of these debates were not shared publicly. It was agreed that a Pan-Africanist movement that is geographically defined, includes the north of the continent, the islands and the people of the mainland. If you are a Nigerian, a member of the African Union or an Egyptian, how do you define yourself? From 1993, for example, up to today, the Secretariat of the African Peace and Security Council is always dominated by Algerians or by Egyptians, the reason being that the African people are being blackmailed when it comes to North Africa, because the moment you mention the north African domination of this secretariat, they say, “Oh, you are segregating the Africans.” You know the role the Algerian revolution has played in motivating other African liberation struggles and some people wonder why we do not debate these symptoms and resentments. So the debate was not complete and that is why when the Namibians, Angolans and the South Africans took their self-government independence, the debate at the level of the Pan-Africanists was whether Afrikaners and Portuguese residing in these countries are Africans or not. The arguments were that if the Indians in Seychelles and the Comoros are considered African, why should the Portuguese and the Dutch not be?

Question: I am from Namibia. In August I had a conversation with a Chinese diplomat concerning their political involvement in Africa and we came to a point where we argued about their association with the regime in Khartoum. The Chinese diplomat asked me, “But why do you support the Saharoui?” I told him, “Because they are Black brothers and sisters.” And he asked me the question: “But what about the Western Sahara people,” then I said yes and he said, “But they are not Africans.” Then I said I support them based on the fact that my liberation movement that I support here had an association with the Polisario/Saharan Liberation Army, just like Polisario had cooperation with the Peoples

Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN). So, I want to hear from you, Western Sahara, as Pan-Africanists, should we support them or are they not Africans?

Samba Diallo: I guess it is a very interesting question. Western Sahara is somehow cut out partly from Mauritania and the other part from Morocco, so it is located between Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania. I am supporting the liberation of that area without consideration of issues of colour and race. Likewise the same principle applies with the Palestinian conflict with Israel. The issue has been affecting Mauritania a lot and the Mauritanian regimes have been supporting the Moroccan Army in launching force against the Polisario/Saharoui, but still the Saharoui are hanging on and they are not giving up. From the perspective of Africans, we should have a common view of the Sahara case and for me, from my own point of view; I think we should support them.

Dr Gai Yoh: If you are a revolutionary, justice and freedom do not have a colour. Supporting the Polisario is a matter of principle, the oppressing of the Saharoui people cannot go on. The colonial legacy of Sahara presupposes that it is unfinished business for Africans. If you are a freedom fighter, definitely you will think along those lines, as long as there are people somewhere in the world, oppressed or suppressed, you must stand with them. Naturally the question of Western Sahara is a legacy and ought to be concluded.

Question: Our media has denied Sudan and failed to address some of the issues we are talking about. The media has a very powerful influence on people's mind-sets and what people think about on a daily basis. I think to a certain degree the media shapes the minds of people on a daily basis with the news in the morning, the news in the afternoon and in the evenings and it is very difficult, from a media perspective, to form an African perspective, if most of the news that we feed our people comes from Europe, from CNN, from BBC, from Sky News. We are doing a great injustice to our people with regards to that. You even find major networks such as the SABC which one would think would have the capacity to go out there and do their own thing and bring this information over, fail to deliver the African viewpoint. We all know what CNN stands for and we know what they are doing, and yet that is the news that we are feeding our people. Having said that, what I have also realized is that having been in journalism for quite some time, I never knew about Sudan until last year. I did not know about the issues in Sudan, but I can show you news about being an African and some of the issues that the continent has been facing. So, that is the biggest problem that we have.

Question: I would like to mention John Pangech. When John was at the University of Namibia he was so dynamic that when we were on campus we no longer saw him as a Sudanese, but we were just young students that were working for a common, better Africa. John Pangech made an outstanding contribution to Namibian understanding of Sudan in general.

SECTION II

Namibian perspective in Pan-Africanism

10. Introductory Remarks

Professor Peter H. Katjavivi, MP

Ladies and gentlemen, we have three distinguished and highly experienced Namibian personalities selected as speakers for this session, and I now have the pleasure of introducing them to you. They are Professor Mburumba Kerina, Dr Zed Ngavirue and Mr Paul Helmut. They are all men of the world who have so much to contribute towards the enrichment of our session and Namibia in general on a subject such as the one before us. However, before calling them one by one, I would like to make the following remarks: As is commonly known, the history of the Pan-African movement has its origins among black expatriates living in Europe, the USA and the Caribbean. It was these black intellectuals who came together at the turn of the 20th century to give voice to the aspirations of black people around the world.

The key actors who are associated with the early initiatives of the Pan-African Movement are W.E.B. Du Bois; Marcus Garvey; George Padmore, etc. A number of important congresses were held by them to mobilize people in the African Diaspora in Europe and elsewhere in the world behind the banner of Pan-Africanism. In this connection, the 1900 London Congress represented an important milestone in the development of the Pan-African Movement.

The early founding fathers of the Pan-African Movement were later reinforced by newly arrived African students, who were studying in Europe and the USA. Thus, the 1945 Congress of the Pan-African Movement held in Manchester, UK, was attended by many African delegates, including George Padmore, Du Bois; Kwame Nkrumah from Ghana; Nnamdi Azikiwe from Nigeria; Jomo Kenyatta from Kenya, just to mention a few.
There is no doubt that the increasing number of African students in Europe and the USA during those years helped to awaken the attention of the world to the cause of African emancipation. These African students and their associates were able to highlight the plight of black people in Africa.

The campaign slogan: “For Africa’s freedom” gained momentum after the Second World War. However, it must also be acknowledged that the activities of the Pan-African Movement were also assisted by the more liberal political parties, labour, church and youth organizations, who tended to be sympathetic to the cause of freedom in Africa.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy to underline the fact that the history of the Pan-African Movement has a connection to Namibia. Perhaps, we would say that the impact of the Pan-African Movement was felt in Namibia from the 1920s. The man responsible for this was Marcus Garvey and his Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), which operated out of New York.

This black king campaigned vigorously for the freedom of black people all over the world and for the Return-to-Africa Movement. His message had tremendous impact in Namibia.

He had Namibian supporters in Lüderitz and Walvis Bay, who carried his messages to a number of our towns. Soon branches of UNIA were formed with active members in Usakos, Karibib, Okahandja and Windhoek.

Marcus Garvey never made it to Namibia. However, many of his followers were convinced that he would one day come to Namibia. As a result, some of the children who were born during that period – the 1920s – were named after Garvey, to symbolize the connection with this great campaigner.

It must also be stated that several Africans from Liberia, South Africa and elsewhere, who resided in Namibia during this period and thereafter, were involved in the movement for black political emancipation in our country.

It is therefore interesting to note that it was Liberia, together with Ethiopia, who took the issue of Namibia to the International Criminal Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1960, challenging South African rule of this country.

Today we can conclude that the victories of the Pan-African Movement began with Ghana's independence in 1957. This was followed by independence of many of the African countries in the 1960s.

This, in turn, led to the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), a continental organisation that stood for the unity of Africa and the total liberation of the continent. The OAU's Liberation Committee, based in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, had a clear mandate to free the rest of Africa from colonial and apartheid rule. Yes, we have moved from a dream to reality! With Namibian Independence in 1990 and the freedom of South Africa in 1994, the dream has come true.

Today Africa is pre-occupied with the drive to promote continental unity through its various institutions, including the African Union, its Commission and the Pan-African Parliament, of which I am proud to be a member, representing Namibia together with four other fellow parliamentarians.

Professor Peter Katjavivi, MP, is the SWAPO Party Chief Whip in the National Assembly of Namibia, diplomat and former Vice Chancellor at the University of Namibia.

11. Sustaining the new wave of Pan-Africanism

Professor Mburumba Kerina

My respect is extended to the facilitator of this historic conference in search of sustaining the new wave of Pan-Africanism and the way forward. I would also like to pay my special respect to Namibia's former President and Founder Comrade Dr Sam Nujoma.

I understand that our young and promising Minister of Foreign Affairs, Honourable Utoni Nujoma is one of the sponsors of our conference. May I encourage him to follow in the footsteps of his father.

There is no country in Africa today were the subject of gender equality is not a hot issue. The Namibian women have been pleading for a new position and a higher vocation. I am informed that our Minister of Environment, Honourable Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah is also associated with our conference. Your journey from Namibia to Tanzania and back home, and singular contribution in and outside Parliament has touched the majority of Namibians.

The venerated Franz Fanon, in his classical works titled "Black skin, White Masks" said: "… But society, unlike biochemical processes, cannot escape human influences. Man is what brings society into the being. The prognosis is in the hands of those who are willing to get rid of the worm-eaten roots of the structure."

In his selected speeches Vol. II, Nigerian General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida said the following: "Governance is necessarily a design or artifactual project; it proceeds on the basis of some constitutive ideas or principles, their concrete institutionalization in economic, political and cultural structures, and a general commitment to these ideas and institutions by the citizenry."

General Babangida states further that:

> Governance and development at this conjuncture of Africa's political and economic history are inseparable. They interact and interface in a dialectical way. Because of their shared concern, with institutions – building, democratization of political processes and structures, enhancement of system capacity, and the expansion through them of the options and choices open to the citizenry as they seek to meet and satisfy their basic needs.

This is the challenge facing Pan-Africanism and the way forward.
To my fellow petitioner, the Founding President of the Republic of Namibia and Father of our Nation, may I say the following: Comrade Dr Sam Nujoma, for your tomorrow you gave up your today for the realization of our freedom and independence. May God bless you.

The theory of Pan-Africanism was originally conceived by a West Indian Barrister, Henry Sylvester Williams. Dr W.E.B. Du Bois, an African-American scholar, developed the vision of the concept of transforming this dream into a reality as a basic ideology of African liberation.

Africa at that time, as is the case today, was confronted with the problems of colonisation and slavery. Dr Du Bois convened the first Pan-African Conference in London in 1900 to protest against colonialism and to serve as a beacon light in the struggle for African self-determination.

Between the years 1919-1945, Dr Du Bois organised intensively for the broadening of the Pan-African movement idea and its perspective. He formulated the programs and its strategies along the path of positive non-violent action in a strategy adopted by the late Dr Martin Luther King, Jr. in his American civil rights movements with the slogan: "I have a dream" that gave birth to president Barak Obama.

Dr Du Bois was invited to address the World Race Congress of leading anthropologists and sociologists in London whose subject was: "The American Race Problem". It was at the congress where he said:

> My plans as they developed had in them nothing spectacular or revolutionary. If in decades or a century they resulted in such world organization of black men as would propose a united front to European aggression that certainly would not have been beyond my dream. But on the other hand, in practical reality, I knew the power and guns of Europe and America, and what I wanted to do was in the face of this power was to sit down hand in hand with coloured groups and across the council table to learn of each, our condition, our aspirations, our chance for concerted thought and our dreams and action. Out of this there might come not race war and opposition, but broader cooperation with the white rulers of the world, and a chance for peaceful and accelerated development of black folk.

I think this statement sounds like symphonic music to the ears of Professor Andre Du Pisani.

Dr Du Bois later attended the Peace Congress at Versailles in France after the first world war, where his delegation insisted that the Allied Powers should adopt a Charter of Human Rights for Africans – especially to protect Africans who were colonized by Germany, e.g. German South West Africa, Tanganyika, etc., as a reward and recognition of the part they played in the battlefields of Europe.

Dr Du-Bois was accompanied by prominent Africans from many parts of Africa. Their delegation presented an important petition that dealt with the "State". It read:

The natives of Africa must have the right to participate in the Government as fast as their development permits, in conformity with the principle that Government exist for the natives, and not natives for the Government.

They shall at once be allowed to participate in local and tribal Government, according to ancient usage, and this participation shall gradually extend, as education and experience proceeds to the higher offices of the State, to end that, in time, Africa is ruled by consent of the Africans … whenever it is proved that the African Natives are not receiving just treatment at the hands of any state or that any state deliberately excludes its civilized

citizens or subjects of Negro descent from its body politics and culture, it shall be the duty of the League of Nations to bring the matter to the notice of the civilized world.
The text and the spirit of this resolution is reflected in the Fourteen Points of President Woodrow Wilson of the United States, which the American delegation presented to the peace conference at Versailles which was adopted by the League of Nations as part of the C-Mandate that included Palestine and South West Africa.
The intervention of the world war made it very difficult for Dr Du-Bois to continue with his mobilization work effectively for lack of funds.
However, by the grace of God, Dr Du Bois managed to convene Pan-African congresses in the following locations:

- 3rd Congress took place in Lisbon and London, 1923;
- 4th Congress took place in New York, 1927; and
- 5th Congress took place in Manchester in the United Kingdom, 1945.

The 5th Pan-African Congress was organised by a British West Indian, George Padmore. It brought together leaders such as Ras Makonen, Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta the Burning Spear of Kenya who was later imprisoned by the British on account of the Mau Mau peasant guerrilla war. Wallace-Johnson of Sierra Leone was present and with others became active members. Thus the Pan-African spirit was rekindled again.
When Ghana became independent under the leadership of Dr Kwame Nkrumah, a Pan-African conference was held in Accra, Ghana, under the name of "All African People's Conference" in 1958. Dr Nkrumah planted the Pan-African tree on the African Continent with the establishment of the Convention People's Party in Accra, Gold Coast (now Ghana), to advance the cause of independence and Pan-Africanism in order to mobilise the people of Africa for the realisation of the United States of Africa.

This is the dream bequeathed to our present-day leaders by the leaders of yesterday's Africa which our Founding President continues to remind us all the time.

On the independence day of Ghana, President Nkrumah declared that: "The destiny of Ghana is bound up with the destiny of Africa."

On the founding of the Organization of African Unity, the fire-brand revolutionary of Algeria, Ben Bella called upon Africans to "die a little more so that the remaining Africa can be free".

It is in this spirit that the Founding President of the Republic of Angola, Dr Augustinho Neto offered Angola for our freedom and independence for the benefit of our Namibian youth and learners, the role that Marcus Garvey played in our history, including his association with the late Chief Hosea Kutako's Chiefs Council and Chief Nikanor Hoveka and others, I reproduce excerpts from a book titled: *Herero Heroes* by famous scholar Jan Bart-Gewald for your future in-depth research:

United Negro Improvement Association – UNIA and the Otruppe
As the Herero established themselves on the lands of their ancestors, and turned their backs ever more on the missionaries, they did not only turn to the past for inspiration. They also found what they were looking for in the Africanist message being propagated

by the Universal Negro Improvement Association of Marcus Garvey. “In the aftermath of, and partly on account of the First World War, the UNIA spread around the world and throughout much of the African continent. Partly on account of the devastation that the Herero had experienced at the hands of the Germans, UNIA found a great deal of support among the Herero of central Namibia. Within two years of the movement’s introduction into the territory by West Indians, the majority of its positions of office as well as all the branches in central Namibia had been taken over by Herero, particularly those who were descended from the former ruling families.

In part, UNIA was organised as a paramilitary organisation, with its own ranks, uniforms and titles. It was in this aspect that the UNIA found a certain resonance amongst a substantial section of the Herero population, particularly amongst those Herero who had associated with, or served as soldiers and police in the German colonial military. After the collapse of the German military in Namibia, these men had established their own social support network based on the organisational structure of the German army. This supporting network became known as the Truppenspieler (English: play soldiers) to the colonial administration, and as the Otruppe amongst the Herero themselves. Thus, Herero men, as was the case in the UNIA itself, carried rank, held exercises, wore uniforms and sought to form a support system for members of their organisation. As with the UNIA, for certain regions of Hereroland there was an effective twinning between those in leadership positions in the Otruppe and those descended from the former leading families. Thus, for the Okahandja region, Alfred Maharero, one of the sons of the last Herero chief of Okahandja, held the office of Kaiser in the Otruppe.

Effectively thus, when the Herero chief Samuel Maharero died in 1923, the Herero had begun establishing new forms of organisation and governance, and had sought to withdraw from forms of direct dealings with the colonial society. However, this did not mean that Herero society had been forged into a unit. For this to happen a catalyst was necessary, a catalyst which would bring the disparate groupings that had begun developing on the reserves and towns of Hereroland into contact with one office in the UNIA. The funeral of Samuel Maharero, and the surrounding events, proved to be the catalyst for which the Herero had been waiting. Whilst the Herero involvement in the UNIA provided the organisational structures which were necessary for the establishment, for the first time in restoration of patriarchy in Herero society, and it was the first presentation of Herero society as the Herero believed it ought to be. In this representation of Herero society, there was a conscious drawing on the past for inspiration.

Samuel Maharero was a chief who had been installed when the Herero were still paramount over their own lands and destiny. He died in a period of time in which the Herero had lost control over their own lands and destiny. In his life Samuel Maharero carried the extremes of Herero existence: independence and colonial subjugation. His death forced the Herero to rethink and discuss his life and times and thus provided the Herero with the link back into their own past. The period of time, more than four months, that it took to get him buried, provided the Herero with ample time to discuss and anticipate his funeral. The build-up that climaxed in the funeral of Samuel Maharero led to the Herero discussing and analysing the causes of their downfall.

UNIA

In early 1922, a rather flustered missionary Kuhlmann explained to his superiors that the following words had appeared emblazoned in indelible tar paint on rocks at the side of a road leading into Omaruru: “Omaruru 5th February 1922. This land belongs to Michael (Tjisiseta). This land is not yours; it is the property of America and the Herero.”
As if this was not dramatic enough, one of the rocks was also adorned with a mural which depicted a hand gripping a flaming heart. The Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) had arrived in Namibia. The conflation of historical claims to the land with images and ideas of the UNIA clearly showed that the millenarian ideas engendered by the UNIA elsewhere in Africa had caught on here as well. The missionaries were quick to claim that the Herero were being “communistically manipulated” by outside forces operating from within the Herero reserves. But, though the movement had developed amongst immigrant communities in the south of Namibia, by 1922 UNIA had become the main unifying organisation amongst the African communities of the territory, and would remain as such until the death of Samuel Maharero in 1923.

In October of 1920, the Universal Negro Improvement Association was introduced to Namibia, when a number of West Africans and West Indians, working in Lüderitz, set about establishing Division Number 294 of the UNIA. Initially the movement was confined solely to West Africans and West Indians, and reflected their interests. We are given a better understanding of these matters in an article that appeared in the NegroWorld.

The driving force behind the UNIA, and its spread into Namibia society as a whole, was Fitzherbert Headly, a West Indian employed as a Chief Stevedore in Lüderitz harbour. In December 1921, whilst on a month-long leave, Headly travelled to Windhoek. Here Headly held meetings with Herero, Nama and Damara leaders. He was a charismatic man and extremely successful in his meetings with the Herero leadership of Windhoek. Consequently, a branch office of the UNIA was established in Windhoek. Hosea Kutako, who a few months previously had been appointed by Samuel Maharero as his successor and representative in Namibia; John Aaron Simon Mungunda, Hosea’s brother who had fought for the South Africans in German East Africa; Nikanoor Hoveka, the Ovambanderu headman in Windhoek; along with Headly and a number of other men submitted a new year’s greeting to the mayor of Windhoek in January 1922. In it, they announced the establishment of their organisation and demanded that the municipality assign them a stand to “erect a suitable hall for conducting our meetings in an orderly manner”.

With its red membership cards, red, green and black rosettes, newspapers, calendars and the promise of far more, the UNIA attracted the attention of the territory’s African inhabitants. The UNIA members believed that their contribution money would be used to purchase land for Africans. This linked up with Fredrick Maharero’s earlier visit to Namibia, during which he had collected money for the purpose of purchasing a farm for his father who wished to return to Namibia. By January 1922, it was claimed that an estimated 500 people had become members of the movement in Windhoek. In April 1922 a branch was opened in Lüderitz, and in October 1922 meetings were held in Karibib and Usakos, with the aim of opening further UNIA offices.

For the Herero however, UNIA continued to be the vehicle for their ideas and demands. By October of 1922, UNIA in central SWA had become dominated by Herero. When

UNIA sought to open offices in Karibib and Usakos, those sent to initiate the movement were Herero, John Hungunda (probably John Mungunda) and Theodor Hanbanue. A month later West Africans, who had initially dominated the movement, lost control of the Windhoek branch of the UNIA to the Herero royals. John Aaron Simon Mungunda, the brother of Hosea Kutako who had fought in Tanganyika, became president, and Clemens Kapuuo, the man who would succeed Kutako as chief of the Herero in Namibia, became secretary of the Windhoek branch.

A network developed that extended from Lüderitz and Keetmanshoop in the south, to Gobabis in the east, Tsumeb, Grootfontein and Otjiwarongo in the north, Swakopmund and Omaruru in the west and Okahandja and Windhoek in the centre of the territory. The regiments formed an organisation which looked after the welfare of its members, a social structure to replace the society which they did not have or were only marginally part of. Ideas within the administration were divided with regard to the Otruppe and ranged from outright rejection and demands for the outright banning of the movement, to benevolent mocking. Hans Joel, an Otruppe commander in Lüderitz, who had asked if he and his colleagues could be "allowed to play as soldiers, i.e. to drill as soldiers in the military", was informed that his application was refused and that "there are other forms of sport such as football and cricket in which you can indulge without being interfered with".

However, apart from these light-hearted exchanges, the administration was clearly worried by the sight of blacks in uniforms. In 1919 shopkeepers wrote to the administration asking whether they were permitted to sell military-style tunics to Africans. At the time there was a debate raging in the administration as to exactly what constituted resistance or opposition to the administration. After much deliberation it was decided that Africans could wear military tunics as long as they did not sport red flashes on their tunics, red flashes being the symbol of Otjiserandu, the red flag and the colour of the troops of Maharero. Already at this stage the fear of communist-inspired agitation had developed in Namibia; the outright rejection of the administration of the socialist red flag can only have served to legitimate it further in the eyes of the Herero who had returned from the mines in South Africa where the socialist movement was gaining ground. That is, the power inherent in the symbolism of the socialist revolution was also transferred to the red flag of the Otjiserandu, thereby giving it an even greater appeal to legitimation and universalism. Be that as it may, the militarism inherent in the Otruppe, its liberal use of universalistic symbols and its creation of a world that operated independently of the colonial administration, mirrored that of the movement created by Marcus Garvey – the Universal Negro Improvement Association, which swept across southern African in the early 1920s.

At this point I refer to the message of Dr Nkrumah to African youth, in which he said: "Today, more than ever before, Africa needs a dynamic youth movement having its own identity and free of the apprehensions and servility which are the price some other youths of Africa still have to pay for remaining in neo-colonial bondage.

> If the youth of Africa are to shoulder their future responsibilities with honour, they must themselves prepare the ground for a re-direction of the thinking of the youth from the ignoble necessity of compromise and adjustment to all that enslave them. They must find their own way of eradicating that mal-adjustment which finds expression in cynical attitudes or

insolent silence towards the ideals of those who seek to create a new personality for the African. The African youth must learn to shoulder the responsibilities of a people not only struggling to be free, but also making every effort to create and sustain their own institutions and to accelerate economic and social progress. The African people have a common destiny and a vested interest in peace.

Professor Mburumba Kerina is a Namibian veteran politician who was part of the process of petitioning the United Nations for the liberation of the then South West Africa, as well as naming the country Namibia.

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12. The impact of Pan-African ideas on Namibian politics

Dr Zed Ngavirue

This brief contribution serves to highlight a few Pan-African ideas and events which have had a direct bearing on Namibian politics.

As a point of departure, it is important to recognise the fact that the roots of Pan-Africanism itself can be traced back to several sources such as the struggle for freedom among the Blacks of the Diaspora as well as African primary resistance against colonisation.

The successful Haitian revolution (early 1790s), followed by the resettlement of freed slaves by the British (at Freetown, 1787), the Americans (in Liberia, 1821) and the French (at Libreville in the early 1840s) on the west coast of Africa, could not have been without influence on the Back-to-Africa movement and the idea of Africa for the Africans.

It is therefore remarkable that events and ideas in scattered, faraway places should have congealed into a force that made a lasting impact on an otherwise isolated, small country hemmed in by two deserts at the south-western tip of the African continent.

The following account bears testimony:

1. It has been pointed out that apart from the many reasons that compelled Hendrik Witbooi to declare war against the Germans in 1904, he was also encouraged by Stuurman, an Africanist from the Cape, who had successfully sold him the idea of "Africa for the Africans".[1]
2. One of the facts that are rarely mentioned in the history of the League of Nations is that the Pan-African Conference of 1919 was the first to propose the idea of a "Permanent Mandates Bureau" for the international supervision of the former German colonies. The Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations which resulted from this initiative is generally attributed to President Woodrow Wilson's stance against the annexation of the former German colonies by the victorious powers. President Woodrow's stand led to the creation of the mandate system as a compromise.[2]

   General Jan Smuts, whose plan to annex South West Africa (Namibia) to South Africa was thwarted by Wilson's opposition, came up with the architecture which others used to classify the mandates into categories of A, B and C. However, Smuts ensured that South West Africa fell into the C category that permitted the Mandatory Power to rule the Mandate as an integral part of her own territory.

   Nevertheless, it was the Mandates Commission, a body that resulted from an initiative of the Pan-Africanists, which checked South Africa's excesses in the South West Africa (Namibia) Mandate throughout the inter-war period.[3]
3. Of all the Pan-African initiatives that have had a direct bearing on Namibia, the establishment of branches of Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), first in Lüderitz and Windhoek, but later also in other towns, was the one that had the greatest impact on Namibian politics at the grassroots level.[4]

   First founded by Marcus Garvey in Jamaica in 1914, for the purpose of returning Negroes to Africa to form an empire there, UNIA became a significant movement

when its founder established himself in New York in 1917.

The founders of the Namibian chapter of UNIA in 1921 were Africans from Liberia, the Cameroons, Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast (Ghana).

However, UNIA's membership cut across different ethnic groups and it is also noteworthy that a man such as Hosea Kutako, who rose to prominence and others of his ilk became disciples of Marcus Garvey. The popularity of UNIA among ordinary Namibians at the time is borne out by the possession of the name Garvey by quite a few people born in the 1920s.[5]

As could be expected, the rise of such an influential African movement drew the attention of the colonial government as well as the German community and their newspaper, the *Allgemeine Zeitung*.

According to UNIA, the Germans criticized the movement, discouraging the link between Namibians and Liberia, to which UNIA's chief representative, Fritz H. Headly, replied: "... the Negroes that are domiciled in the Protectorate [SWA], have as much interest at stake into the Financial and Industrial development of the Republic of Liberia ... just as those Germans that are domiciled in different parts of the Universe, are interested in the development of the German Empire ...."[6]

It was with an obvious measure of relief that Government reports recorded the decline of UNIA, claiming that by 1925 the movement was "only kept alive by newspapers received from the Union [i.e. South Africa] and America which contained inflammatory articles".[7]
The head of the German mission church, Dr Heinrich Vedder's explanation for UNIA's decline was that the movement made false and fantastic promises, "... it gradually dawned upon them [the Namibians] that they had been deceived".[8]

What none of the above commentators mentioned, a fact which UNIA's followers in Namibia might not have been aware of, is that Marcus Garvey was imprisoned in New York in 1925 and later (1927) deported to Jamaica. These developments undoubtedly stymied Garvey's program, even though it stands to reason that in light of the balance of world power that existed at the time, UNIA's success would have in my case been limited.
On the other hand, it can be concluded that UNIA's activities can be counted among the precursors to the resurgence of African nationalism in Namibia.

Besides, Fritz Headly's position concerning the link between Namibia and Liberia has been vindicated – in 1960 Liberia and Ethiopia sued South Africa at the International Court of Justice on behalf of the people of Namibia.

4. After the Second World War, Pan-African solidarity with Namibia was first demonstrated by the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa and the Botswana chiefs when Jan Smuts introduced yet anew his plan for annexing Namibia at the United Nations. Both the ANC and the Botswana chiefs petitioned the UN against annexation.[9]

5. However, it is fair to argue that the independence of Ghana and the role of Dr Kwame Nkrumah in convening the first All-African People's Conference in 1958 turned Pan-Africanism into a practical instrument for both the liberation of Africa and plans towards unification.

More importantly, Dr Nkrumah's declaration that the independence of Ghana would be meaningless unless it was followed by the liberation of the rest of Africa, and his role henceforward, began to conscientise not only the Namibians from where UNIA left off,[10] but all the people of Africa. It is true that Nkrumah's declaration might be considered as a refrain of earlier Pan-African pronouncements by the founding fathers. For instance, closer to home his fellow West African, Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, whose own education and Pan-African background is quite similar to that of Nkrumah, once declared that: "If he who strikes the first blow [for political autonomy] does so sincerely for the benefit of the many, then the many, must rally round him, especially in time of distress." This is a practical way of demonstrating mutual aid as a factor of political evolution.[11]

Namibia, whose modern struggle for self-determination and independence must have been one of the longest to involve Africa and the entire international community, puts a premium on Pan-Africanism, rallying round the African Union (AU), with a firm commitment to the objective of continental unity. Her acknowledged contribution to peacekeeping efforts, among others, bears testimony to Namibia's abiding commitment.

Dr Zed Ngavirue is a veteran in Namibian politics, former diplomat and was the first Director General of the National Planning Commission of Namibia.

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13. Pan-Africanism in Namibia and the period of the liberation struggle

Paul Helmuth

First, I want to thank the High Commissioner of Nigeria to Namibia, Prince Adegboyega Christopher Ariyo for the work he has been doing in Namibia and for Nigeria. Nigeria has many connections with Namibia. Persons such as Professor Peter Katjavivi and Dr Iyambo Indongo, personal physician to the Founding President (Dr Sam Nujoma), were trained in Nigeria, as well as many others. There are a host of things that Prince Ariyo has done here, which of course Namibians do not know. There are nurses coming to Namibia to assist us, there are teachers, I think they are 32 in number, who are in Namibia.

Coming to our Pan-African Movement and congresses, specifically in Namibia we did not know much about congresses, especially myself, until I left Namibia. For one, I have to say, that our first guerrilla fighter was Hosea Kutako. This gentleman, who later was appointed as the Chief of the Hereros, was the first guerrilla fighter in Namibia, whom I call the Father of the Revolution here. Hosea Kutako fought the Germans and then he was arrested. He escaped and went to the Erongo Mountains. He spent most of his time there until the war ended and then he was appointed as the Chief of the Hereros. I want to underline that he was the first guerrilla fighter in Namibia before we took up the second guerrilla war in Namibia.

In 1947, Chief Hosea Kutako hired a lawyer, Oliver Tambo, to prepare a petition for the international organisation in New York. I was a soldier in the Second World War, as was Herman Andimba Toivo ya Toivo. Herman ya Toivo is one of the founders of our movement SWAPO of today. OPC meant Ovambo People's Congress. That is a congress. It was started in South Africa, Cape Town, on, I think, August 2, 1957. This was a movement by young Namibians who were working in South Africa.

We got encouragement from the first and sole Namibian student who was studying in the United States in those times – Mburumba Kerina. Professor Mburumba Kerina was introduced to the two ambassadors to the United Nations, the Ambassador of Liberia and the one of Abyssinia then, what we now call Ethiopia. They were the ones who encouraged Kerina through their document. They were the ambassadors of the only independent African states then, during the League of Nations. They introduced him to this document, which he took up. He was supposed to study Medicine, but then he switched over to politics. He was at Lincoln University.

I am talking about Pan-Africanism here, though Pan-Africanism was now a movement which was formed in 1900. Please read Facing Mount Kenya by Jomo Kenyatta. That is the book where I first encountered the name W. E. B. Du Bois and others such as the former President of Malawi Dr Kamuzu Banda, the first President of Ghana Kwame Nkrumah and then you have others who were then also studying in the United Kingdom. These are the people who met Du Bois and they were inspired by him. When they came to Africa, they started this movement to free this continent. That is the mandate they got from Du Bois.

It is very important now to go back to our own movement, the OPC, the Ovambo Peo-

ple's Congress. In 1957 the political leaders of the people in South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC), suffered harassment from the authorities there, the South African Apartheid Government, and being arrested. So, we young Namibians with our new organisation thought we had to change the name to OPO – Ovambo Peoples Organisation. Then later we thought no, this is only talking about the Ovambos. Where are the other people? It changed again in 1960 to SWAPO, the South West Africa People's Organisation.

We were inspired by the ANC, the first movement in this part of the world, an African nationalist movement, which had branches all over Southern Africa. It was formed in 1912. This is something that the youth have to learn – that the ANC was in South Africa and then also in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and also in Tanganyika (Tanzania). People of the world should know that we were inspired by the Africans in the Diaspora, through our own students who were studying in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. They met these people, such as Sylvester Williams, convener of the first Pan-African Conference in 1900. He was a barrister.

These are the people who inspired Africans to come and put up their liberation movements within the continent and one of them, who was the most active, was Kwame Nkrumah who liberated Ghana which used to be called the Gold Coast. Kwame Nkrumah was also one of the people who inspired the formation of the Organisation of African Union (OAU) in 1963. Our own former President, or the Father of the Namibian Nation Dr Sam Nujoma, was also part of this process. Kwame Nkrumah's proposal was shot down by some of the participants because they wanted to have a bank first, but Nkrumah wanted to set up a continental army. He was supported by the Prime Minister of Algeria, Ahmed Ben Bella.

Ahmed Ben Bella was a former North African soldier in the Second World War; hence he also supported Nkrumah, to say: "I am going to give Algerian soldiers to go and free South Africa, to fight and liberate the Africans from the Afrikaner, who they call Boers." There was also the Egyptian President Abdul Nasser, who together with Syria had formed what they called the United Arab Republic. Because of his work with Africans, Nasser was not liked by the West.

But we still had very strong support in North Africa from the Algerians. The SWAPO Secretary General, Ismail Fortune, studied leadership in the Soviet Union with the former vice president. The vice president was also taught leadership in the Soviet Union. When they were on their way to finish, they came to Egypt. Ismail Fortune, the Secretary General, went to the Algerian Embassy – he went to join the army in Algeria. He was fighting physically. When he came to Dar-Es-Salaam he found that the people in the office had become racial, because he was coloured. That is why he went to Algeria.

When he came back to Namibia, he was arrested. He was taken to South Africa where they gave him the choice of going to prison, or being a free man and work for them. He changed and started working for the South Africans.

Louis Nelegani was the vice president of SWAPO. The three were elected here in Windhoek in 1959, together with the Father of the Nation. The Father of the Nation was the

first president and the vice president was Louis Nelegani. The secretary general was Ismail Fortune and there were others.

The Pan-African movement itself originated from the United States from Mburumba Kerina, in correspondence with Herman ya Toivo. He encouraged Ya Toivo to form a party or a movement to cater for the Namibians who were working in South Africa, in Cape Town, one of those being me. Yes, we are the founders of this movement called SWAPO, which liberated this country and of course, Ya Toivo formed this movement but there were many things that happened. Ya Toivo was told to send (an audio) cassette with all the names of Namibians who were working in South Africa, which he did and then, of course, he bought a book and he cut the inside part and then put the cassette in there to be played at the United Nations. When the South Africans saw the book, they just looked at the title of the book and let it go. South Africa was saying Kerina cannot petition, that they were the authority and that they were the representatives of the people of South West Africa. When the cassette was played in the United Nations, Kerina was allowed to petition. He was petitioning now for Namibia. Then also he tried to get the United Nations to give us some scholarships.

I studied in the Soviet Union. Dr Indongo studied there as well. These were scholarships of UNESCO, but the Western countries did not want these scholarships to be given out until 1961 when the Soviet Union, through the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee and what we call now Serbia (Yugoslavia), gave these scholarships. Ten scholarships were given. When they were announced, the United States opened up its door to Namibians to go and study through what they called the Afro-American Institute, which was formed to cater for Namibians. All these people you will find are our leaders, who studied in the United States – Dr Hage Geingob and the rest, our Speaker Dr Theo-Ben Gurirab, they went to this movement. That was the reaction to the scholarships which were given to Namibians by then. We are a product of the Pan-African Movement then, which was changed into a congress later.

This is something that I have to say – Nigeria has played a role and continues to play a role until today through its High Commissioner to Namibia, Prince Ariyo. A lot of obstacles were in our way, but the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) which is now known as the African Union (AU), helped us. Though we did not get military support, we got the weapons and food and all other things – which made Namibia a free country today. The guerrillas could not eat grass, they could not fight with knives, they had to get weapons and through the Frontline States, that is now Zambia and then later Angola and then also Botswana – do not cut out those countries – they all helped us to come to where we are today, to be a free nation through an African movement. We have to thank these people for their effort and the money they spent. For instance, Zambia was bombed several times by South Africa. So we should acknowledge that we owe Africa and the African people for what we are today, otherwise we would not have been free if Angola was not free, because we had to go through Zambia and then come to Namibia through Caprivi and then go back into Angola again. Once we were in Angola, we could cross back into our territory at Caprivi or Kavango or wherever and we were assisted by civilians in both Angola and Caprivi. These are people who supported us by giving us information on the movement of the enemy.

These are things that have to be appreciated. The people of Africa and even our own people within the territory, who were neither armed nor trained, should be appreciated for their courage in helping the sons and daughters who were fighting for this country's independence.

But as I said, we have to thank Prince Ariyo for his contribution – he is a Pan-Africanist. He is one of those activists. For the High Commissioner of Nigeria to Namibia, I want to say this: what Prince Ariyo does for Namibia is rare for an Ambassador or a High Commissioner to go out of his way to do what Prince Ariyo has done for this country.
We also have to thank the Government of Nigeria for their contribution in support of the Pan-African workshop. This is something to be appreciated by all Pan-Africanists. When we are talking of Pan-Africanists, we are talking of all Africans wherever they may be, and Namibians especially should appreciate what the Government of Nigeria is doing in this country.

I have not heard of many countries that made a contribution as the one made by Nigeria.

Paul Helmuth, who is now blind, opened the Office of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in 1961 and also opened the SWAPO office in Stockholm, Sweden, in 1969.

14. The African condition as I see it

Job Shipululo Kanandjembo Amupanda

Introduction

I remember well my days of taking care of the goats at Omaalala village (Northern Namibia). I would write on the sand and on my body with sticks – often these would be stories of things I was not content with. This is to say that writing has always been part of who I am – so it will be.

That said this commentary – 'The African condition as I see it' – is best presented in four categories:

African history – Exploitation
Decolonisation – Africa on auction
Capitalist Africa – Deplorable human conditions
Securing the future – Towards African Socialism

African history – Exploitation

We know very well that the history of Africa has been that of systematic exploitation of both human and natural resources of the African soil. This was done, with a clear motive, to attain profit and material accumulation by enemies of the African people. We are all aware that Mother Africa has always been a subject of exploitation, desire, interest and conquest even before the Europeans met in 1885 to decide on how they would partition it among themselves. We also know that even before the dishing up of Africa among the Europeans, Africa experienced invasion by the likes of Christopher Columbus and many others who robbed us of our true history and undermined the very existence of our forefathers.

When the enemy brutally ruled the continent, our people were subjected to undignified treatment that robbed them of their very own definition of self, as well as the status of equality. They were clearly conditioned, taught, cornered and forced to reinforce the idea that they are inferior to their oppressors. This settler project (inferiority complex) was entrenched in Africans and operated across social, economic and political life. With their shattered concept of self, Africans were reduced to nothing but human resources (labour) which was essential for the settler's projects in his parent country. Anything that was given to them during those times was to ensure that they remain able to work for the settler and his children the following day. He had, at his disposal, religious leaders whose task was to ensure that the natives were properly regulated, indoctrinated to avoid revolts and vengeance against their capitalist merciless handlers. They mostly did not disappoint on their assigned duty, to ensure that the natives were made to understand that all is well, nothing is wrong with their society for God knows their condition. All they had to do was keep praying.

Be that as it may, Africans broke these colonial burdens and mobilised themselves towards dooming the bug. Such mobility and decisions to confront the exploitative political order took place not only on the mainland but also in the Diaspora. The praiseworthy

Marcus Garvey, speaking at Liberty Hall in New York, at the International Convention of Negroes in August 1921, said: "… we desire a freedom that will lift us to the common standard of all men … therefore, in our desire to lift ourselves to that standard, we shall stop at nothing until there is a free and redeemed Africa."

That history aside, let Independence take over. We know very well that independence did little to emancipate Africans from continued exploitation. For example, Africans working on African diamond mines continued to pay with their sweat and blood, just so that the rich aristocrats of London can fix countless diamonds onto their hats. The relationship between the coloniser and the colony continued unhindered. Groups such as the Commonwealth were formed.

We also know that African history has been and is still misrepresented to a point where it does not encourage and attract our children who are mentally exploited by the enemy. Horace Campbell, in 2008, argued that:

Today, African school children are no longer familiar with the stories of the struggles for independence. Instead, the Anglo American and other imperial media sources bombard our youths with stories that stimulate individualism, greed, insecurity and a longing for the glitz and glamour of western countries. This psychological bombardment has reached such proportions that most of our youth dream of leaving Africa instead of fighting to transform the conditions of exploitation.

I am afraid that Africa's history of exploitation is the history of today, dear friends. We are yet to emancipate ourselves. Africa is characterised by an inferiority complex that is both visible and invisible. We are trapped under exploitation still. After Independence, for example, it has been made clear to us that "white" is right and "black" is bad. The colour white represents peace and goodwill; black represents everything from evil, bad, illegitimate to unwanted. We know that being "blacklisted" is a bad thing; that the devil is always clothed in "black"; that angels are always clothed in "white". We have a lot to do if we are to undo the past that is manifest in the present.

Decolonisation – Africa on auction

At Independence, African expectation was that with self-determination, we were set towards achieving the blue sky. Legitimate expectation it was. The liberating generation, of the 1960s, was clear and understood these hopes and expectations. They worked very hard to deliver on the expectations of the citizens. They led people-driven economies and delivered free education and many other basic amenities. They had no idea that they would be either toppled by their own people who were intoxicated by the enemy (Patrice Lumumba, Kwame Nkrumah, et al) or that those succeeding them would put Africa on auction to the very same people against whom many had died fighting. Yes, those who raped Africa want to maintain their grip on her.

The subsequent generation became intimate with greed, corruption and constant looting of state resources. They, indeed, established the bourgeoisie class around the modes and means of production, thus castrating the African state both materially and ideologically. They have, as we know, unashamedly become bedfellows with the enemy.

Social ills continue in decolonised Africa, pandemics such as HIV/AIDS kill the African nation on a daily basis, with the African child seen wallowing in the mire with real prospects of growing and living in poverty. The succeeding generation failed in moral leadership. They failed to lead the African nation towards regaining the lost opportunities as well as their self-esteem. Therefore, new leadership must re-emerge to assume control and regain that which has sustained us over the years – yes, Pan Africanism and African Socialism.

Capitalist Africa – Deplorable human conditions

We need no sophistication in order to understand what capitalism is. For the purposes of simplification, we can look at what capitalism has done to African society. Capitalism has made the African nation a society of whiners and losers – a society deprived of love, care and compassion. The African nation has been changed into a society with clear and sharp differences between "us" and "them". A society under which, for example, a person wearing their hair in dreadlocks faces difficulty in securing a job because dreadlocks have no place in corporate identity and culture. What we see housing the African nation is a society without a dear soul and a society of exclusivity and every man for himself and God for the rest of us. Yes, Capitalist Africa.

Recently (late 2010), Hafeni Dioma Nashoonga, Henry Homateni Shimutwikeni and myself discussed the case of Namibia, the following is an extract from the discussion:

> Our economy cared very little for a common man on the street, men at an informal settlement and women at remote villages. Our political leadership cared very little for its polity, more so the youth that are in the majority. The leadership prioritised the Chinese and whites and elevated them above us just in the same way a sick person would prioritise and elevate taking tablets. The youth, led by the ungifted amongst them, have seen their condition worsen in all forms imaginable. Not only did unemployment rise from 36% to 51.2%, but the youth, majority of them black, were further exposed to thieving national leaders who moved the country from one scandal to another, always involving millions. The hopeless and unprotected youth, many of whom cannot afford education, were unfortunately role modelled by thieving national leaders and started stealing from society in the absence of alternatives. Do we blame them from learning from the best? This is what you get under capitalism and neoliberal economic policy which is what the country has been following. Our economy is dominated by large foreign enterprises, making it extremely difficult for new local entrepreneurs to break into the lines of production. The interest of these enterprises is to integrate us into the western economy for they know and understand the benefits better than we do. We have observed the growth of a small class of indigenous capitalists, protected by the leadership, who have common interests with their foreign counterparts. Leadership got drunk with money that is brought by power. Money, in capitalist Namibia, has been elevated above all principles, human dignity included, of our society and created contradictions in our society. There was/is little consideration of the human condition for the focus is to encourage capital accumulation for the individual few and the foreign investors. It would appear that leadership serves money and those that have it, giving practical meaning to every man for himself and God for the rest of us. Leadership fell in love with thoughts of miscarried economists such as Adam Smith, whose outlook is that the state must have a minimal role in the economy and let the market forces determine rewards (Smith called it 'the invisible hand of the

market'). While leadership is passed out by a vodka called Smith's Neo-liberal Economic Policy, the initiated Namibians such as ourselves know very well that the 'invisible hand' does not exist, hence they call it 'invisible'. What do we mean? Dear readers, the theory of our leaders and Smith means that the Government we have voted for must only get involved in the economy to build roads and infrastructures for the so-called 'private sector', fantasised to be responsible for development. FRIENDS, the private sector is not those in the villages or us students who need tuition fees; the private sector is those rich few with a profit motive for capital accumulation – we matter not. Leadership, at most, is on record for believing and subscribing to this thought. As is characteristic of global capitalistic failure, the private sector is unable and unwilling to provide for the socio-economic needs of Namibians, hence our call for an interventionist state which actively participates in the economy. So friends, our economic policy, neo-liberal, is really about whiners and losers and those that have money. Those of us that are never going to be part of the stock exchange are never thought about by the capitalists in charge of our economy. They plan for DeBeers, Rio Tinto, the Chinese and many other foreigners who are the so-called investors. Neo-liberal economic policy cannot address our problems; for all we know, it promoted greed, carelessness, thieving, patronage and brought contradictions in social relations relating to the modes of production. As such, we dream of equal society with limited institutions and scope for the oppression of one by another as far as the economic order is concerned.

Securing the Future - Towards African Socialism

The question of the ideological way forward for the African nation is probably the easiest question for us, given the general failure of the global capitalist project, as manifested in the recent crisis they are covering up as a "global financial crisis", while those of us that are thinking members of the African nation know very well that it is, indeed, the Global Capitalist Crisis. In the Alternative to Neo-liberalism in Southern Africa (ANSA) publication of October 2007, it is eloquently put that:

> Mainstream economists and most governments believed that neo-liberal policies based on market forces and international competitiveness would be the only way to solve this problem (development). However, such policies have failed as more people are sliding into poverty, unable to improve their livelihoods. There is thus an urgent need for an alternative development strategy, which can take various forms … from auto-centric capitalist development to socialist development paths.

The urgency is further expressed by Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez in his address to the International Encounter of Left Parties held in Caracas, Venezuela (November 27, 2009) that the capitalist crisis is jeopardising the future of humanity, "the people are clamouring" for greater unity of those willing to fight for socialism. I have written at length about African Socialism. In one of my essays, "African Socialism – a Nyerere Perspective", I stated that "socialism works in theory but not in practice", a commonly-held notion that remains to be scientifically proven, and a by-product of Social Darwinists' false consciousness. As Robert Cox (Critical theorists) submits, all theories exist to fulfil a purpose. The purpose of the Social Darwinists is "every man for himself and God for us all". To help and assist fellow youths who expressed that, I must write in an accessible language, Social Darwinism is a theory that very much underpins Capitalism, it maintains

that the rich get what they deserve and the poor also get what they deserve, therefore no one must be blamed – survival of the fittest – natural selection. Adam Smith and the likes have successfully harvested these thoughts with his "invisible hand of the market" rhetoric. He teaches the world to surrender the lives of the human person to the market. Theories of Capitalism and the like seek to suppress and eradicate Socialism in its totality. Capitalism has abducted, raped, impregnated and married Democracy to an extent where we no longer see the difference between the two.

"African Socialism," Julius Nyerere holds "is an attitude of mind … In a socialist society it is the socialist attitude of mind which is needed to ensure that the people care for each other's welfare." For him, this attitude distinguishes a socialist from a non-socialist and has nothing to do with the position of wealth. Further, we can have, albeit a rare phenomenon, millionaires in Socialist society – those who value their wealth only because it can be used in the service of fellow humans as distinguished from Capitalist millionaires who use wealth for the purpose of dominating fellow humans. Where do millionaires come from? Hard work, knowledge and good enterprise abilities? Mwalimu Nyerere holds that "while, therefore, a millionaire could be a good socialist, he could hardly be the product of a socialist society".

He further explains that "even when you have an exceptionally intelligent and hard-working millionaire, the difference between his intelligence, his enterprise, his hard work, and those of other members of society, cannot possibly be proportionate to the difference between their rewards. There must be something wrong in a society where one man however hardworking or clever he may be, can acquire as great a reward as a thousand of his fellows can acquire them."

Nyerere traces African Socialism from not anywhere else but African traditional society, where we took care of the community and the community took care of us in return. He refuted the commonly-held notion that Socialism makes people lazy as everything is provided for you. This is just another invention the Social Darwinist invented to de-bush for Capitalism. In African traditional society everyone was/is a worker. All members were/are required to work. Lazy people (idlers or loiterers) are highly condemned, as he asserts: "Loitering was an unthinkable disgrace." In Swahili, there is an old saying: "Mgeni siku mbili; siku ya tatu mpe jembe", the translation in English is: "treat your guest for two days; on the third day give him a hoe". In any case, your guest was in actual fact likely to ask for a hoe on the third day of their visit.

Philosopher Nyerere lectures: "For when a society is so organised that it cares about its individual, then, provided he is willing to work, no individual within that society should worry about what will happen to him tomorrow if he does not hoard wealth today. Society itself should look after him, or his widow, or his orphans. This is exactly what traditional African society succeeded in doing. Both the 'rich' and the 'poor' individual were completely secure in African society. Natural catastrophe brought famine, but it brought famine to everybody – 'poor' or 'rich'. Nobody starved, either for food or for human dignity, because he lacked personal wealth. He could depend on the wealth possessed by the community of which he is a member. That was Socialism. That is Socialism!" Capitalist Africa must therefore be advised to regain our former attitude of mind – our traditional African Socialism – and apply it to the new societies we are building for the African Nation."

SECTION III

Philosophical rationale

15. Pan-Africanism – some reflections on the way forward

H.E. (Prince) Adegboyega C. Ariyo

With the exception of Western Sahara, virtually all the countries in Africa today boast their own flag of sovereignty and independent political structures that represent their political independence. All the countries have systems of governance through which they are in position to shape the future of their people as expected by the Founding Fathers of Pan Africanism. However, the lot of many Africans has not improved. Indeed the economies of African countries are not controlled by Africans for Africans, despite the political independence attained in the last 50 years.

Since 2008, the media world has been awash with headlines about the state of hopelessness in Africa, the result of the calamitous events created by our self-centred activities. The cacophony of the headlines has been deafening lately because the cradle of self-centeredness is feeling the effects of the failure of a political system that has not placed correct value on common humanity. The bad press Africa has received has added on to our own failures to evolve a political and economic system in tune with our realities. Africa had been sucked into the vortex of the world development trajectory through colonialism. Africa had been exploited and looted to cover up the failings of this political/economic model. There are many compradors amongst us. They are the new millionaires, the upper classes of our societies. The African middle class has been reduced in size and 80% Africans in Africa and its Diaspora today live below the poverty line because we have allowed too many millionaires. African resources are being depleted every day to enrich a few Africans and many non- Africans.

All this calls for a change of the social contract amongst the people of Africa and their Governments.

Yes! There are many social systems in the world. Many have been tested and failed. The late 1980s saw the collapse of the Socialist system in Eastern Europe. We saw the Asian Tiger economic crisis of 1997, as well as financial crisis in USA in 2000, when the Clintonian economic bubble burst. Today (2010) there is the on-going world economic crisis which started in 2008. These suggest that both the capitalist and socialist economic systems have fundamental flaws in their conceptualisation and implementation, as social vehicles to ensure development.

Capitalism talks about competition bringing out the best with minimal use of resources. The advancement of a man depends on the uncontrolled use or deployment of human and natural resources by entrepreneurs. The resultant fruits of such activities are meant to be used according to the desires of the entrepreneur. Socialism proposed socialisation of the processes of human existence. You cannot compete without undercutting your competitor, so that you have advantage. Whether your method is fair belongs to the realm of morals. This was coded into the capitalist motion of might is right.

The wealthy and the so-called successful capitalist economies of the West were built with the sweat and labour of Africans, our fore parents. The exploited mineral wealth of Africans and the unfair prices for African agricultural products worked to our disadvantage. African raw materials are turned into finished products, and then sold to Africans at exorbitant prices to keep Africa down perpetually. Furthermore, the Africa network of transportation indicates that it has been developed largely to ensure that we do not trade with ourselves, so we do not create jobs for ourselves. We continue to create jobs for others through buying mostly goods made by them – products of their cultural development and social progress. Thereby strengthening their capacities to overpower us, in any engagement with them.

African leaders and youths have very serious questions to answer in order to chart a better future for Africa. Certainly we know that there are many hungry lions probing the world for means to sustain their self-centred sybaritic economy. Because of the current architecture of the world economy and the limitedness of what it is intended to accommodate and for who, there is need for Africa to chart a new "Africonomy" based on our historical evolution as a people. The African economy of old cared for all members of the community. African development should be based on our historical experience.
African Development must be based on a holistic understanding of what development means. It is used to denote what is new.

For this work, the New Concise Oxford Dictionary 2006 (Ed) p.392 suggested that Development is a noun which means:

(i) the process of developing or being developed;
(ii) a specified state of growth or advancement;
(iii) an event constituting a new stage in a changing situation.
Whereas the word "develops" is the verb that gave birth to the word development, meaning:
(i) grow or cause to grow and become larger or more advanced; and
(ii) start to exist, experience or possess, etc.

It seems that when we examine the meaning of the words develop and development and relate them to how they have been used in development studies, as they relate to Africa, there has been a deliberate attempt to impose a new process of development on Africa, which rejects the African past.

The understanding of what our past was is acquired with different lenses and wisdom, not with African lenses and wisdom. We study African history and social engineering from the perspective of the Western world. We look at our civilisation and assess the state of our being from other people's understanding of their civilisation and state of being. We tend to forget that there was a period in our history when we existed without any interaction with the Western world. What constituted our state of being then should have been what we should be developing, though mindful that there are new things, to which we are now exposed and must relate to, for us to develop.

Indeed before the destructive engagement with the Western world, which led to colonialisation and the brutal imperialist exploitation of Africa for Western economic development,

African development had reached such a level that many of our cultural relics that are now being displayed in museums in Africa and elsewhere in the world suggest pro-tanto African cultural superiorities.

There were many civilisations in Africa. These could not have been achieved without social, economic and political systems. Definitely these systems must have been at variance with the colonialists systems. Therefore the process of obliterating the African developed systems, and imposing new ways, then began. During the sad interlude that exposed Africa to the Western ways of doing things, Africa lost the kernel of her development and its humanity, as well as the sense of what development should be.

Whatever we do in the four paradigms of any organisational development (political, social, economic and cultural) the more humane our motives are, the more positive will be our development.

16. The Concept of African Unity – Cheikh Anta Diop

Almaz Haile

Introduction

Today, I feel honoured and privileged to present a paper on the Concepts of African Unity in Cheikh Anta Diop's writings.

First, we should pay homage and respect to the Founding Fathers and Mothers whose determination and courage enabled the attainment of African political independence. Their revolutionary ideals to unify Africans were hijacked by renegade reactionaries and mainstream nationals.

In the 60s, when most African countries attained their independence, some unfortunate countries like South Africa, Namibia, and Eritrea had to struggle for more than three decades to achieve their political independence.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU), founded in 1963, took a stand to defend the interest of ex-colonizers and their boundaries rather than reinforce the Pan-Africanist vision. Due to 50 years of neo-colonialism installed by foreign forces, Sub-Saharan African countries continue to bleed in order to nourish the North and their multinational companies. Post-independent Black African history is loaded with annexations, violations of human rights, wars, starvation and genocide.

Today, Sub-Saharan African countries are facing additional problems, those of ethnic purity, genocide, AIDS, the dismantling of families, the frustration of the younger generation and failed states. Some minority ethnic groups are being pushed out from their home lands, deported and killed, in favour of new settlers like in the Sudan (e.g. Darfur) and some suffer in silence like the southern parts of Mauritania, Niger and Mali.

It is our responsibility to educate and instruct our younger generation on the true history of Africa in order to preserve our identity. Diop's Nations Negres et Culture and his other writings are 55 years old and yet his predictions on African independence and post-independence era is unmistakable. Yet, C. A. Diop's writings are not well known in some parts of Africa. We believe that this brief introduction on C.A. Diop's writings and his vision on how to unite Black Africa will inspire African Youth, in all aspects of life.

Who was Cheikh Anta Diop?

Professor Cheikh Anta Diop was born on December 29, 1923 in Diourbel, Senegal. Diop belonged to a culturally and religiously strong Wolof family. He had a sound upbringing in his mother tongue Valaf, culture and tradition. As a child he went to a French primary and secondary school in Dakar. Like most young people of his age, Diop had to go to Paris, France, to pursue his higher education, as there were no universities in the French-speaking countries in West Africa. In 1945 he went to Paris in order to study Mathematics and Physics.

Diop arrived in Paris in 1946 when African students from the Diaspora and the con-

tinent were actively fighting against French colonialism. In 1947, a publishing house, the Presence Africaine was founded by Alioune Diop. This was a great achievement for the African intellectuals living in Paris. Presence African would play a major role in the publication of Diop's writings. Diop joined the African student's movement advocating for independence. In 1950-1953, he became the Secretary General of the organization "Le Rassemblement Democratique Africain".

In the 1950s, African intellectuals in Paris were divided in two groups. On the one hand, those who were alienated mainstream Africans, who imitated their colonizers, and on the other hand those who strongly opposed foreign occupation in Africa, and Diop belonged to the latter group. These minority African activists were a culturally, historically and politically conscious group, and fought bravely against all odds. Diop wrote extensively in the journal, La voix de L'Afrique Noire, published by Presence Africaine, and in 1951 he was one of the organizers of the first Pan-African Student's Political Congress held in Paris. His political, philosophical and cultural ideas brought him closer to writers like Aime Cesaire from the Caribbean, Richard Wright, W.E.B Du Bois from the United States, etc. Professor Diop studied Mathematics, Physics, Pre-history, History, Linguistics, Egyptology, Philosophy, Sociology and Anthropology. He accumulated an encyclopaedic knowledge of the natural and social sciences. His multi-disciplinary formation and rigor enabled him to demystify falsified African history. But his dissertation on the African origin of ancient Egypt was rejected by the Sorbonne.

In 1954 Nations Negres et Culture, Volume I and II, were first published by Presence Africaine, in Paris. In 1956, he participated actively in the "First International Congress of Black Writers and Artists", "Apport et perspectives culturels de l' Afrique Noire" held in Paris. In 1959, he as well participated in the "Second Congress of Black Writers and Artists" held in Rome. C.A. Diop categorically rejected Senghor's literary writings of Negritude, saying, "Senghor is a pure product of colonialism." Leopold Sedar Senghor was famous for his Nazi-type sayings, such as: "Emotion is Negro and reason Greek."

Diop scientifically proved that the origin of Ancient Egyptians – the Kemits were Black Africans. None of the so-called Africanists or Eurocentric scholars had enough knowledge of modern African languages and culture to oppose him. His multi-disciplinary background, knowledge and perseverance enabled him to demystify the falsified Black African history by Eurocentric scholars. Diop's relentless researches on Egyptology and Pre-history proved that Egyptian mummies had melanin and that the founders of Ancient Egypt – Kemits were Black Africans. His researches and knowledge restored Ancient Black African history to the level of world history.

In 1960, Diop defended his doctoral thesis at the Sorbonne. In Chris Gray's Concepts of History: C.A. Diop and Theophile Obenga (1989):

> "… Diop carried with him an overwhelming knowledge of Africa, Europe and Asian history, so that when he began his 'defence' all the black supporters were confident that Cheikh Anta would emerge victoriously, but the French jury at the Sorbonne was not prepared to give in without a fight. For some time they simply engaged in a 'dialogue of the deaf', hearing none of Diop's arguments but yet retreating all the while. The debates were long and animated. When the adversaries' counter-arguments

ceased to come forth Cheikh Anta stood with pride and dignity. He had defeated Europe's prized intellectuals, 'The French intelligentsia', on their own ground … The Sorbonne". (16, 17)

Nations Negres et Culture, de l'antiquite negre egyptienne aux problemes culturels de l'Afrique Noire d'aujourd'hui, Tome I et II, (1948-1954) were written during the intensive struggle against colonialism. In the 1954's preface, Professor C.A. Diop depicts the objectives of falsifying ancient African history.

"Pourtant toutes ces théories « scientifiques » sur le passe africain sont éminemment conséquentes: elles sont utilitaires, pragmatistes. Le bout est d'arriver en se couvrant du manteau de la science, a faire croire au Negre qu'il na jamais été responsable. La vérité, c'est ce qui sert et, ici, ce qui sert le colonialisme: » 14

The first chapter starts by questioning "Who were the Egyptians? Diop refers to different ancient scholars and philosophers including the Bible in order to highlight the Black African origin of ancient Egyptians or the Kemits. These two volumes depict the cultural, linguistic, historical, religious, philosophical and social ties of Kemet, with the rest of present-day Black Africa. His multi-disciplinary approach towards history on the one hand, and his knowledge of different African languages on the other hand, enabled him to analyse the genetic relationship between the Kemetic language and modern African languages. The last chapter is a dedicated research on comparative studies of Ancient Egyptian grammar and, comparative vocabulary of Ancient Egyptian and Valaf, his mother tongue. Diop's thorough research proves the genetic relationships between Egyptian hieroglyphic and African languages, the Valaf, Serer, and Soninke, etc. Diop, in Nations Negres et Culture depicts how ancient Egyptian hieroglyphs could be easily deciphered by using modern African languages. He firmly believed that comparative linguistic studies can be an important factor for the Unification and Re-construction of Modern African states.

"I realized that the cultural personality of a people, of any people, was made up of three interrelated factors. The Psychic factor. The Linguistic factor. The Historical factor.
I did not invent that notion. Others had outlined it before; I merely saw it to be a fact. Hence, my efforts were geared towards the restoration of Linguistic and Historical personality of Black Africans."9

In the words of Ngugi Wa Thiong'o (1987), Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature:
"Languages of Africa refused to die. They would not simply go the way of Latin to become fossils for linguistic archaeology to dig up, classify, and argue about [in] international conferences. These languages, the national heritage of Africa, were kept alive by the peasantry … During the anti-colonial struggle, they showed unlimited capacity to unite around whatever leader or party best and most consistently articulated an anti-imperialist position. The petty bourgeoisie (African) spoke Portuguese, French, English and (German to a degree) encouraging vertical divisions to the point of war at times." (23)

Professor Diop in his writings affirms the importance of the Cultural, Historical and Linguistic consciousness in order to elevate Ancient African history.

In the second volume of Nations Negres et Culture, chapter V and VI, Diop highlights the origin of African peoples from the Nile Valley to the western parts of Africa. His insistence on the teaching of African national languages is convincing. By transcribing his mother tongue, the Valaf, Diop proved that scientific theories and concepts of mathematics, physics, chemistry, and literary writings can be translated easily into any modern African language. Professor Diop took as an example M. Einstein's The Principles of Relativity, and translated it into Valaf, (from page 447 to 457) to prove that education in African national languages is possible in post-independence Africa. Diop wanted to spare post-independence African children from the pains of being educated in a foreign language. And yet, in 50 years of political independence, very few African countries have realized his prophecy. Diop had two major objectives: the restoration of African history and languages in order to advance our struggle to unite post-independence Africa.

In 1960, Diop returned back to his home country, the Senegal. L.S. Senghor had become the president of Senegal. Immediately after his return, Diop founded a new political party – "Bloc des Masses Senegalais". Diop was considered a dangerous person and in 1962, his political party was banned, and he was imprisoned for two months by Senghor's regime. Once out of prison Diop criticised Senghor's policies and founded another opposition party – "le Front National Senegalais", and was banned by the same regime. In 1963, the indefatigable Diop founded the radiocarbon laboratory, the IFAN, first of its kind in Black Africa.

In 1966's first Festival of Black Art, Diop was recognized as the most influential intellectual of the 20th century. In 1976 he founded another party – the RND, which was banned immediately. For two decades, Diop was persecuted by Senghor's regime. He could neither travel outside his country, nor teach inside his country. He continued his political opposition by firmly supporting the masses. Under Senghor's regime, Diop, an outstanding African genius, was banned from giving lectures at the University of Dakar for 21 years. In spite of the mainstream Western conspiracies, Diop amassed world-wide popularity and respect, both in the Anglophone and Francophone countries. With the arrival of Abdou Diouf in 1981, Diop's political party was legalized, and he was entitled to teach as Professor at the University of Dakar.

Professor Theophile Obenga, Diop's early disciple and comrade, is a Linguist, Historian, Egyptologist, Educationalist and Paleontologist. Professor Obenga wrote several books on Africa's pre-history, *L'Afrique dans l'Antiquite*, on Ancient Egyptians and the Bantu language (mainly the Mbochi) and philosophy. Like Diop, Obenga is a researcher, scholar and specialist of Black African origin of Ancient Egypt. In the 70's Diop and Obenga participated actively in a UNESCO project to write a general history of Africa held in Paris in 1971, Cairo in 1974, and Dakar in 1976. Both professors rejected the mainstream linguistic theories and successfully proved their research on the connection between modern African languages and Ancient Egypt.

In *Concepts of History: C.A. Diop and Theophile Obenga, C*. Gray highlights that Professor Obenga, Diop's life-time disciple and comrade, believed that "if there is to be profound and effective continental unity, a truly African history coming from African historians must be written first. He also agrees that by looking to ancient Egypt, Africa will find its true heritage." (16, 17)

In *Unité Culturelle de l'Afrique Noire*, (1960), Diop, analyses the origins of Black African and Indo-European family structures; (the domain of Patriarchy and Matriarchy in antiquity). His writing is known by the Two Cradle Theories. Diop emphasized the traditional South; Black African is matriarchal, sedentary, peaceful and tolerant with its ideological structure, success, weaknesses, and technical regression of a nation. In the matriarchal system, the man leaves his family to join his wife's family. In this system women are the owners of the house and sedentary agriculturalists and men are mostly hunters.
The Indo-European North is culturally nomadic. Nomadic culture is characterized by war, violence, conquest, individualism and xenophobia. In the patriarchal family structure the woman leaves her family and joins her husband's family and clan. In the Indo-European nomadic tradition women used to pay the dowry to the husband, as they do not have an economic role to play in society. In matriarchal society it is men who pay the dowry:
"If the Indo-European woman who pays her dowry does not buy her husband, the African man who pays the dowry does not buy his wife either."

Due to the intrusion of external factors like Christianity, Islam and permanent European presence in Black Africa, matriarchal societies are gradually giving away to patriarchal culture. In his well-documented and researched works, Professor Diop, without hate and any sense of superiority, re-established the cultural, linguistic and historical past of Ancient Black Africa.

J.H. Carruthers, in *Intellectual War Fare* says: "Diop's insistence on strictly scientific method should not obscure the overriding utilitarian use of that method. In other words, Diop's devotion to science was not for the sake of science. Much more important is the practice of taking the scientifically supported arguments into the arenas of politics, education and scholarly debate." (277)

Pre-Colonial Black Africa is Diop's most detailed book on historical African sociology. He analyses the traditional caste system, economies, and the notion of traditional nation state, state organizations, sciences, technology, education and medicine in Ancient Africa.

> *"L'ancienne organisation politique, économique et social de Afrique noire depuis 2000 ans, l'organisation militaire, administrative, judiciaire, l'organisation de l'enseignement, le niveau universitaire et technique, les usages et les fastes de la vie du cour, les mœurs et les coutumes tant de faits que l'on croyait a jamais perdus dans la nuit des temps, nous avons pu les ressusciter de façon saisissante, scientifique dans l'Afrique Noire Pre-colonial, pour tout l'oust Africain en particulier".*

In *Black Africa: Economic and Cultural Basis for a Federated States*, Diop insists on the historical consciousness and linguistic unity of Black Africa. He relentlessly wrote in order to awaken the African consciousness on our common historical and linguistic origin. He highlights that Ancient African Empire languages like Sarakolle in Ghana, Mandingue in Mali, Songhai in Kaoa (GAO), etc. were used for administrative and commercial purposes, until the arrival of European occupiers.

Geographical and economic unity becomes evident once the African is conscious of his/her historical and linguistic common origin.

"Nous pouvons construire un Etat Fédéral africain a l'échelle du continent noire sur la base de note unité historique, physique, économique et géographique, nous sommes obliges, pour parfaire cette unité national pour la fonder sur une base culturel autochtone modern."

Professor Diop criticises severely the post-independence policies in Africa, as the people cannot chose their own political and social systems, local political parties obedient to the west were imposed on the people. He continues by saying that except the Guinean leader, most African leaders succumbed to the level of servitude, to international financial, industrial intrigues. We should not forget that this book was written in the late 50s, and after 55 years African political system still remains the same.

In part III of *Black Africa: Economic and Cultural Basis for a Federated States*, Diop's vision on how to industrialise Black Africa and demystify the knowledge of chemistry is fascinating. Africa being one of the richest continents in terms of raw materials, he proposes to re-group the sources of energy in eight industrial zones. Diop exhausted his scientific knowledge on how to use Africa's richest zones and industrialize Black Africa. He takes as an example ex-Zaire, Angola, Zambia and their abundant sources of hydro-electric power, minerals and metals of all types used for the fabrication of heavy industry. In a very clear and convincing manner, Diop depicts how to install electro-metallurgy in general to treat minerals and sub-products. That the Atlantic coast could be used to install important centres of naval, automobile, aeronautic and agricultural machines, etc. He considers Guinea, Sierra Leon, Liberia as a "metallurgic region par excellence", as it is gifted with all necessary minerals to develop another centre for the construction of heavy industry. His detailed description on how to develop other zones like Mali, Senegal, Niger on the one hand and the Nilotic Sudan, the Great lakes, Ethiopia on the other, one could only conclude by saying that Diop was not only a visionary but had the mind of an African genius.

Diop goes beyond industrialisation, and proposes how to re-forest our desert and semi-desert areas and protect our tropical forests, which are constantly destroyed by avid multi-national companies, to install a re-cycling system from the very beginning of our industrialisation processes.

If the process of industrialisation is to work without hindrance, technically trained young Africans should take the responsibility. Diop had an enormous trust and confidence in the younger generation to industrialise and unite Black Africa. He concludes by saying that "first there should be cultural, historical and political unity of Black Africa".

In the words of J.H. Carruthers in Intellectual War Fare, (1999):

> Diop's persistent use of Kemetic worldview, language, social organization, and concepts of governance to explicate the culture of Africa has convinced us that Kemet is indeed the classical African civilization. Further more, his arguments about the prospects for viable African future, articulately puts forth in Black Africa: the economic and cultural basis for a Federated State, have caused us to lower our buckets into deep wells to find wisdom models for the reconstruction of a new African Civilization. 227, 229

Chancellor Williams, in The Rebirth of African Civilization, (1993) advises the younger generation:

> The problems they will face will be as complex and as baffling as any other ever faced by mankind in all of its long history. They will call for heroes of a new dimension, daring in thought, fearless in action, yet calm, patient and unyielding as they steadily, step by step, overcome the obstacles that can seem insurmountable, obstacles the weak and timid would not dare to attack. (249)

Finally, Diop asserts that successful participation of the state and the people will enable to industrialise Sub-Saharan Africa. He proposes the following 15 essential programmes as basic principles for a concrete action:

1. Restaurer la conscience de notre unité historique.
2. Travailler a l'unification linguistique a l'échelle territoriale et continentale, une seule langue africaine de culture et de gouvernement devant coiffer toutes les autres; les langues européennes, quelles qu'elles soient, restant ou retombant au niveau de langue vivantes de l'enseignement secondaire.
3. Elever officiellement nos langues nationales au rang de langues de gouvernement servant d'expression au Parlement et pour la rédaction des lois. La langue ne serait plus un obstacle a l'élection d'un député ou d'un mandataire analphabète de souche populaire.
4. Etudier une forme de représentation efficace de l'élément féminin de la nation.
5. Vivre l'unité fédérale africaine. L'unification immédiate de l'Afrique francophone et anglophone, seule pouvant servir de test. C'est l'unique moyen de faire basculer l'Afrique Noire sur la pente de son destin historique, une fois pour toutes. Attendre en alléguant des motifs secondaires, c'est laissé aux Etats les tempes de s'ossifier pour devenir inapte à la Fédération, comme en Amérique latine.
6. Opposer une fin de non-recevoir à toute idée de création d'Etats blancs, d'où qu'elle vienne et où que ce soit en Afrique Noire.
7. Prendre dans la Constitution les dispositions nécessaires pour qu'il ne puisse pas exister une bourgeoisie industrielle. Prouver ainsi qu'on est reellemet socialiste en prévenant l'un des maux fondamentaux du capitalisme. Qui pourrait, aujourd'hui, s'opposer décemment à une mesure préventive contre une classe encore inexistante en Afrique?
8. Créer une puissante industrie d'Etat. Donner le primate a l'industrialisation, au développement et a la mécanisation, de l'agriculture.
9. Créer une puissante armée moderne, dotée d'une aviation et d'une forte éducation civique, inapte aux putchs de type latino-américaine.
10. Créer les instituts techniques indispensables a un Etat moderne: physique et chimie nucléaires, électronique, aéronautique, chimie appliquée, etc.
11. Réduire les trains de vie et niveler judicieusement les salaires afin de transformer les postes politiques en postes de travail.
12. Organiser en coopératives de production les volontaires possédant des champs contigus, en vue de la mécanisation et de la modernisation de l'agriculture, et de la production sur une grande échelle.
13. Créer des fermes modèles d'Etat, pour élargir l'expérience technique et sociale des paysans non encore groupes. La collectivisation a la campagne rencontrera mille fois moins de difficultés chez nous que dans les pays européens, pour toutes les

raisons indiquées dans L'Afrique noire pre coloniale.
14. Repeupler l'Afrique a temps.
15. Poursuivre avec conviction une politique de plein emploi afin d'éliminer progressivement la dépendance matérielle de certaines catégories social.

(English)

1. Restore the historic unity of our consciousness.
2. Work for the linguistic and territorial unity of the African mainland: the aim is to create on African language for the culture and government of Africa. The European languages should be relegated to the level of living languages of secondary education.
3. Elevate our national languages the official languages of the government, in the parliament and in the drafting of laws. The absence of a foreign language would no longer be an obstacle for election and an illiterate from the masses of the people will qualify for election.
4. Look into an effective way of enhancing the representation of women in the public institutions.
5. Long live African unity within a federal form of government. The immediate unification of the Francophone and Anglophone Africa can serve as an indicator for this federated unity. This is the only way to put Black Africa on the right track towards its historical destiny, once and for all. Waiting too long would just generate a pretext that will permit the states to ossify and become rigid and unfit to be united in an African federation, as in Latin America.
6. Oppose any and all attempts at creating white states anywhere in Black Africa.
7. Take all necessary measures inscribing this in the constitution in order to prevent the development of an industrial bourgeoisie in the nation. This will prove us to be true socialists, who are opposed to the fundamental evils of capitalism. Who can today reasonably oppose a preventive measure against a class (capitalist) which is still non-existent in Africa?
8. Create a powerful state industry. Give priority to industrialisation, development and mechanization of the agriculture.
9. Build a powerful, modern army, with an air force and a strong civic education, in order to mitigate tendency of military coups like in Latin America.
10. Create special technical institutes that are fit for a modern state: nuclear physics and chemistry, electronics, aeronautics, applied chemistry, etc.
11. Reduce the cost of living and make wages more equal so as to transform political employment into work employment.
12. Organize production into cooperatives on voluntary basis with neighbouring fields for the purpose of the mechanisation and modernisation of agriculture toward large-scale production.
13. Establish model state farms in order to broaden the technical and social experience of farmers to other peasant groups who are not yet organised. The campaign to organise farmers into cooperatives will meet thousand times less trouble here than in European countries, for all the reasons stated in the pre-colonial Black Africa.
14. Repopulate Africa gradually.
15. Continue with determination the policy of full employment in view of phasing out the material dependence of certain social categories. (*Translated by B.F. Bankie and G. Diallo*)

Conclusion

Diop's commitment to the rebuilding of cultural, historical and linguistic unity of Black Africa from the African-centred worldview is a dominant theme in all his works. In his 40 years of activism, he persistently depicted the Black African origins of ancient Egypt or Kemet. His insistence on reforming African educational systems, that Africans should be educated in their mother tongues and from the African point of view is not yet accomplished.

Above all, Diop will be remembered and admired for his uncompromising principles. In all his works, he insisted on the importance of a culturally, politically and historically conscious younger generation to rebuild a strong Federal Black African State.

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17. Sisi kwa sisi

By Nsajigwa Isubha-Gwamaka
(A self-search work by an autodidact self-taught individual)

As the world marks the end of the first decade of the 21st century (by Gregorian calendar), there has been noticed lately in the black world an emerging spirit – zeitgeist – of interest in yesteryears' black activism, and with it Pan-Afrikanism.

Pan-Afrikan philosophy – those ideas and ideals that rallied black people "to will" to fight for Uhuru – sovereignty, starting with that of self-ruling politically then followed by self-determination too, in areas of economy, culture and soul – has to do the following for it to be effective in successfully incubating the new emerging black renaissance cycle.

First and foremost is the need to re-define Pan-Afrikanism from the point of view of "social living", rather than, as has been the case, from the ivory towers of universities (mostly detached from the everyday realities going on, on grassroots black Afrika).

Next, Pan-Afrikanism must now be defined in simple and plain terms/context to make it easily understood and easily identified to the common Afrikan folks who are not the universities' talented 10th class and caste. Sisi kwa sisi, as presented in the paper below, has emerged from the grassroots and its advocator is not a university degree holder.

Sisi kwa sisi has been conceptualized by galvanizing, in an eclectic approach, from diverse sources of the Afrikan people's "social living" experiences. Just pay enough attention to the black Afrikan's everyday living, and you hear the "us-ness", "we-ness" and communitarian thinking of the folks. It is thus right that we should develop our authentic "Afrikancentric" philosophy and not the other way round.

More so, it is a concept rightly grasped by minds of our black Afrikancentric thinkers/activists for social change, those who have committed class suicide to struggle collectively with their people towards our rightful black power and renaissance. The best examples include the likes of Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Almicar Cabral.

Thus Sisi kwa sisi work/concept is also an eclectic collection of the Pan-Afrikan thinking/aspiration from the best of our thinkers and intellectuals back in the 1960s and beyond. It is a way of paying tribute to them all, to their collective instructions, out of their collective struggles, as we seek to embrace the new wave of Pan-Afrikanism now.

Thompson Vincent Bakpetu then (1960s) analysed and found that Pan-Afrikanism in the second phase had not yet formulated a coherent philosophy from the cluster of ideas, which are legacies of the first phase and which are now intermingling with other ideas resulting from the experiences of the Afrikan leaders and the Afrikan people.

Ali A. Mazrui called for the latter-day thinkers to take slogans from Afrikan everyday social lives very seriously.

Dr Wally Serote observed just recently the need to connect the young intellectual think-

ers from the universities and those equally young thinkers/activists from the community. Sisi kwa sisi and its advocator come from the community, working with youth in the community.

Also drawing from the Lagos FESTAC of 1977, it was seen that there was a need to make the work of Afrikan thinkers/philosophers accessible to ordinary people.
It was also found then that there was an imperative to embark on systematizing and formalizing our concepts. That it is only then that we shall be able to take possession of the spiritual wealth encapsulated in our cultural heritage.

Also it was recommended that Afrikan philosophy needs to analyse fragmentary data with a view to arranging it into philosophical synthesis by conceptualising and formalising it. This is exactly what and how sisi kwa sisi came about – to fulfil these needs for a post-colonial Afrikan populace:

- The need to come out with a Pan-Afrikan brand that is simple for the youth to identify with;
- The need to brand Pan-Afrikanism in a way that the post-colonial youth all over black Afrika and its Diaspora can easily identify with, as they seek for an identity, their mission of life, a worldview and lifestyle.
- The need to term Pan-Afrikanism beyond ideology (political-ism) and make it a philosophy (hereby critical thinking and way of life), to the latter-day generation of potential social reformers/activists of post-colonial Afrika – to let Pan-Afrikanism, through its ideas and ideals, be a way of life for the multitude of Afrikan people.

The presenter believes that the brand sisi kwa sisi can galvanise (garveynise!) a new generation on the platform of Pan-Afrikanism, to effect social change for the better for Afrika.

Let the youth of today stand on the shoulders of the best of us, back in the 1960s and carry the struggle forward from that understanding. However, let them also be allowed a paradigm shift from their own understanding.

Let us bear in mind that Pan-Afrikanism has of now no option but to come back to the grassroots people of Afrika for them to relate to it, as it was in the days and age of Marcus Garvey during the Harlem renaissance times. Let the new Pan-Afrikan ideology (hereby philosophy/worldview and a lifestyle) be neo-Garveyism plus Diopianism combined.

Let project Philosophy return back to its roots, as in the days of Socrates – after all, as per one Antonio Gramsci, anyone can philosophize, not only those from universities alone. Let the born thinkers and the self-taught individuals of the philosophical category that the late Henry Odera Oruka pioneered; be incorporated in philosophical and other debates about Afrikan strategy for its liberation and renaissance.

Remember this by Bob Marley? “Babylon system building universities … deceiving the people continually … graduating thieves and murderers” (hereby black colonialists).

This presentation is also a tribute to the self-taught, non-degree holders, Pan-Afrikan black thinkers/activists who greatly impacted their societies and the black world as a

whole – Sekou Toure (in his early phase), Malcolm X, Dunduzu Chisiza, Marcus Garvey, Bob Marley and the Wailers, Peter Tosh, Patrice Lumumba, Samora Machel, Miriam Makeba, etc.

More so, let it unite the Field Negroes with counter black colonialist house Negroes.
Let it animate the Afrikan anarchists in search for a new system of governance for black Afrika, to replace this one we have that is hierarchical based colonial inherited and accommodated leviathan, that has been a dismal failure, is outright dysfunctional for us, in seeking our collective aspirations, producing for us failed states and its accompanying miseries all over. Let in its stead come out a circular-based one (drawing from Afrikan dance arena and sports, where the leaders act as the main protagonist characters) that would be placed at the same level with all of us, not somewhere above us.

Let the post-colonial Afrikan generation in line with Frantz Fanon's dictum, think (be allowed to think) anew to redefine Pan-Afrikanism on its own terms.

Let Pan-Afrikanism now answer Thompson Vincent Bakpetu's 1960 call and formulate a coherent (post-colonial) philosophy from the cluster of ideas, which are legacies of its first phase and which had intermingled with other ideas resulting from the experiences of self-ruling and its repercussions and reaction from the Afrikan leaders vis-a-vis Afrikan people.

Let Pan-Afrikanism now take very seriously, the power of brand slogans as aphorisms for mobilizing people for social change.

Let Pan-Afrikanism realize the need to make the work of Afrikan thinkers (then by philosophers) intelligible to the ordinary people.

In other words, let the new wave of Pan-Afrikanism pay attention to the following and do the **"re-"** prefix:

- The need to **RE**-define Pan-Afrikanism from the social living, "making it plain" (to use Malcolm X's words) for it to be easily understood and easily identifiable in simple terms, to the common black Afrikan folks at the grassroots;
- The need to **RE**-locate it to the grassroots, to the masses of black Afrikan people, for them to impart it, for it to have relevance to them, their everyday social lives; and
- The need to **RE**-juvenate, **RE**-plant it. Pan-Afrikanism to the latter-day youth.

Here a question (in Socrates tradition): Do Afrikan masses need Pan-Afrikanism, or is it Pan-Afrikanism that needs the Afrikan masses?

Again by Socrates elenchus: Does the youth need Pan-Afrikanism, or is it Pan-Afrikanism that needs the youth?

This all requires **RE**-thinking, thus Frantz Fanon's "think anew", to shift paradigms, whether we are talking about politics (as per Fanon himself), democracy (as per John Dewey), economy (as per George Ayyitey) or science (as per Thomas Kuhn and Ralph Waldo Emerson), religion (as per Malcolm X), educational research (as per Cheick Anta Diop) and culture (as per Okot P'bitek and Amilcar Cabral).

On politics – Fanon's dictum: "… every generation, out of relative obscurity must find its historic mission and either fulfil or destroy it". Thus let the youth of today, the post-colonial generation, while standing on the shoulders of the great ones of us, back in the 1960s and beyond, shifts the paradigm to redefine Pan Afrikanism in their own contemporary terms, informed by everyday social living realities.

On democracy – John Dewey's dictum: "… each generation needs to re-define democracy anew, in its own terms"! Let the young generation, look anew to re-examine all the (colonially inherited) constitutions we still have in black Afrika, to replace/come out with Pan-Afrikan centred ones.

On economics – George Ayyittey's call: " … let the young 'cheetah' generation re-examine the economic priority for development of black Afrika, and put the common people, the 'Atinga' back to the centre (not peripheral) of the development drama".

On science – Thomas Kuhn: "… each generation needs to shift paradigm to look anew to the old held up theories … let the younger generation realize at this time that the argument for the "transfer of technology" is a myth – that there is never transfer of technology between one nation to another, and that there is only transfer of technology between one generation to another within a nation!

And from Ralph Emerson: "…let each generation look at nature afresh, implying that let us reinvent the wheel if that be necessary!

On religion – Malcolm X: "each one of the younger generation has to think for himself, judge for himself, reach his own conclusion independently, and most importantly, forego – put religion in the pocket…"

On research – Diop: "… let the new generation be devoted with total commitment to do research (in the original meaning of the term) for Afrika, without guardianship!"

On culture – Okot P'bitek/Amilcar Cabral: "… the need to return to the roots, to our traditional past, re-examine it and use it as the basis of our building new modern societies…."

On development – Prof Leopard Kohr: … do development in an anarchist way, from scratch, at the grassroots, without aid! Let the youth realise this that "aiding" black Afrika to develop has been but yet another myth. Let black Afrika start from the beginning right up – on its own for that is how genuine development has painfully been achieved throughout history, including that of the now giant emerging dragon – China.

Thus all the new wave of Pan-Afrikanism has to do is "re"…re-define itself anew (for its own relevance), re-locate itself (back to the masses) and re-juvenate or re-incarnate itself (to be possessed by the new youth).

Following below is the proposed brand, sisi kwa sisi, its account on what it is and how it has evolved to meet the challenge, in making Pan-Afrikan philosophy relevant and thus effective in the emerging black renaissance cycle of our times.

Sisi kwa sisi - How the name came about.

Let me start introducing myself. I am Nsajigwa, (a traditional name whose Swahili meaning is. *M-baraka*, that is a "blessed person"), 46 years old, self-taught (new word, an autodidact) life-long student of philosophy and comparative religions in a free-thinking way.

Since pre-adolescence I would ask myself these questions alternatively: Why I am me, why me and who am I? And: where did I (and all of us) come from, where did the world come from? And of God, where too, did he come from, who created the creator?
I quickly came to discover myself as an Afrikan, socialised as "Mswahili"- A (Ki) Swahili speaking native of a geographical area marked as Tanzania. The next question came, what is it to be an Afrikan?

During my youth (in the late 1980s), like anyone during that stage of life, I was seeking for an identity. Those questions above intensified in my mind and in response, I became interested in everything Afrikan for I quickly realized that I am an Afrikan (due to the powerful forces of nationalism socialisation operating then in Tanzania).

Thus I was also inquisitive and was inquiring constantly on Afrikan politics (nationalism itself), economics, social psychology and eventually culture.

I started reading any book with information about Afrika. I listened to the radio news about the continent. I read a book: *False start in Afrika* by Rene Dumont. It fascinated me. I had the background of being an active member, during my secondary school days, in debating. I remember one particular topic: "Did the coming of Europeans help civilize Afrika?" Along the way I read Walter Rodney's *How Europe underdeveloped Afrika.* It radicalized me. I read A. M. Babu's insightful articles from *Afrika* now magazine (no longer in circulation); equally I read his book: *Afrikan socialism or socialist Afrika*? I read many more, also *Not yet uhuru* by Jaramogi Odinga Odinga and others in the Afrikan Writers' Series.

I also read Okot P'bitek's t*wo Song of Lawino* books, and *Okol*. The drama of the clashing of cultures – traditional Afrikan perspective (native culture) versus the Western Christian one (of the colonialists and colonists). It was tragic, bitter, yet insightful.

Later I would read books by the same author, his *Afrikan religion in Western scholarship*. It was an almost extension of his two songs above. It was equally insightful.

Then next I came across Ndabaningi Sithole's book, a semi autobiography in which "Afrikan nationalism" itself was well defined. In particular of interest was the hilarious and witty account of how the Afrikan perspective, on seeing a white man, evolved, from regarding him (with fear and trembling) as God himself, albeit – however a "god who eats corn" – to knowing/realising that he was just as a fellow human being, just like us blacks. I listened to the songs too, one particular (in Lingala/Congolese) went thus: "Nzambe nakomitunaka …"God, I keep asking myself … why all saints are depicted as whites while (why) the devil is always black?"

I listened to the Wailers led by Bob Marley, one of their numbers goes: "Them bellyful

(but we hungry)" … it made me think … who were "them" and who are "we"? This made me ponder, wondering why everywhere Afrikans, black people, even those living in the "developed world" were complaining, complaining about something … "The system". Black people here on the continent wanted "Uhuru". In the Diaspora they were crying for equality and belonging. Everyone was complaining … from our presidents to professors … men of letters (writers), to artists down to the common man … (the late Ugandan philosopher Okot P'bitek explained eloquently about this phenomenon, which Dr Ali Mazrui termed "dual dependence").

I continued the self-study reading, coming across Cheick Anta Diop's *Afrika origin of civilization - myth or reality*. That did put me on another level. Then I read his thesis on the "cultural unity of black Afrika", in comparing same, with those of ancient Egypt … that made me start my own (re)search and make comparisons too … from the books, and what I knew from observation/experience of social life/everyday living.

Then I read *Afrikan religion and philosophy* by John Mbiti. It was another breakthrough. Here was a portrait, a positive one, of an Afrikan belief system by an Afrikan, being different from that of Okot P'bitek's Western scholars, as well as Ndabaningi Sithole's European misconception.

And by way of movies, I followed Dr Ali Mazrui's "the Afrikan" Triple heritage film series. I got insights in different dimension. His analysis of looking at modern life in Afrika from a pluralistic multi-source "cultural hegemonic perspective" coincided with what I had been thinking, on my own, exactly same way (even if unsophisticated!).

From constant voracious reading, self-studying (much in the Malcolm X style). I found myself picking ideas eclectically, that I came to shape into a worldview that years to come (I mean now) would advocate a "thesis from the grassroots".

Of neo-post-colonial philosophy

New thinking, a worldview to guide our lives and actions for the new post-colonial generation is badly needed. A positive philosophy post "afro pessimism". The latter is the direct result of many promises, expectations and potentials that never got fulfilled, 40 to 50 years after political independence and the civil rights movement in the black world. Afrika's experience of self-rule has been that of "dark age" in modern times! (Worst epitomized in Henry Kyemba's book, *State of blood – account of Uganda under Idi Amin).* Many miseries and very few, if any breakthroughs. Instability and insecurity (political and otherwise) has been the norm/ruling. Poverty is real, diseases are rampant, and with it added the drug culture and all its side effects for the youth and finally HIV/AIDS arrived.

The last came the new "afrocide", and with it a combination of malaria and abject poverty, creating a trinity of death, killing Afrikans, as much as all civil wars and the middle passage Atlantic and Indian Ocean slavery combined.

18. Pan-Africanism – Rethinking key issues

By Chinweizu

There are several key issues in Pan-Africanism that need to be re-examined and clarified.

I shall here look into 10 of them:

I. Unity
II. Disunity or powerlessness – What is Black Africa's fundamental problem?
III. Collective security
IV. Socialism or Communalism?
V. The African nation?
VI. Racial privacy
VII. Which Africa?
VIII. Negritude, African Personality, Cultural unity
IX. The problem of names – Negro, African, Black, etc.
X. Pan-Africanist issues criterion

I. African Unity: the problem and its dimensions

One of the core objectives of Pan-Africanism, since 1958, has been African unity. The three key questions about unity are: unity for what? Unity of whom? And what type of unity? Let's consider them one by one.

Unity for what? All too often one gets the impression that Pan-Africanists are obsessed with unity for unity's sake. But as Chancellor Williams pointed out, "Not 'unity just for unity' but unity for great achievements" (The Destruction of Black Civilization, p.343). We therefore need to spell out the paramount objective to be achieved by any unity we are talking of. I would say that we need just enough unity to achieve the Black Power we need to guarantee our security and survival. Anything less is inadequate; anything more is superfluous. Black power is the only desirable objective of African Unity.

Unity of Whom? There is no agreement as yet on the constituency for the much desired unity. Some, like Dr Kwame Nkrumah, George Padmore and Cheikh Anta Diop, have advocated a unity of the entire continent of Africa, a unity that would include the Black Africans and the Arabs in the African continent. Some, like Nnamdi Azikiwe and Yoweri Museveni, have advocated a unity of all who now reside on the African continent – Blacks and whites, including the Arab and European colonial settlers. Yet others want the unity to be between the Black Africans and their Diaspora in the Americas; and still others want the unity, whatever its form or forms, to be between the Black Africans in Africa and the Blacks world-wide, excluding the European and Asian settlers on the continent. These differences need to be thoroughly debated and a consensus reached on this vital question.

What type of unity? On this there are divergent proposals, even though some claim that consensus has been reached, and that differences exist only over the means of im-

plementing it. According to Prof. Opoku Agyeman, "Africa's predicament has not been in regard to determining the nature and character of the needed unity, but rather in respect to the implementation of it" (*Opoku Agyeman, 2001 in Africa's Persistent Vulnerable Link to Global Politics*, San Jose: iUniversity Press, 2001, p.123).

However, please consider the following statements:

> This is my plea to the new generation of African leaders and African peoples: work for unity with the firm conviction that, *without unity there is no future for Africa*. That is, of course, if we still want to have a place in the sun. I reject the glorification of the nation-state, which we have inherited from colonialism, and the artificial nations we are trying to forge from that inheritance. We are all Africans trying to be Ghanaians or Tanzanians. Fortunately for Africa, we have not been completely successful. … *Unity will not make us rich*, *but it can make it difficult for Africa and the African peoples to be disregarded and humiliated. And it will therefore increase the effectiveness of the decisions we make and try to implement for our development* (Julius Nyerere, speaking in Ghana in 1997. Quoted in Kwesi Kwaa Prah. *The African Nation*, Cape Town: CASAS, 2006, p. 276).

"One must say that our first preoccupation (in foreign policy) has been and remains the creation of working African solidarity, with a view toward African unity, the necessity of which – now unanimously accepted – no longer seems necessary to prove" (Amadou Ahidjo, 1962. Quoted in *The African Nation*, pp.276-277).

"I think that Pan-Africanism should be concretized either in the form of regional States or one continental State, whichever is feasible" (Azikiwe, 1962, "The Future of Pan-Africanism" in J. Ayo Langley, ed., *Ideologies of Liberation in Black Africa*, 1856-1970, London: Rex Collings, 1979, p. 305).

"The Organisation of African Unity in 1963 stated its first purpose to be 'to promote the unity and solidarity of the African States'" (Nyerere, (1968) in Langley ed, *Ideologies*, p. 350).

"The ideal of African unity is premised on the notion that the emancipation, development and prosperity of people of African descent can be achieved only through the unity of the people" (Kwesi Kwaa Prah, *The African Nation*, p. 269).

There cannot be "one Africa that fights against colonialism and another that attempts to make arrangements with colonialism" (Frantz Fanon, quoted in *The African Nation*, p. 276).

> Our objectives must be the creation of an economic and politically federated continent. … If despite goodwill on our part, North African Arabs were to refuse a continental federation, then nothing should stand in the way of the formation of an exclusively sub-Saharan continental federation. … In such an eventuality, no one could accuse sub-Saharan Africans of being guilty of exclusivism, since their appeals to the North would have been refused (Chiekh Anta Diop. (1977); *Afriscope* Interview with Carlos Moore, in *Great African Thinkers*, ed. by Ivan Van Sertima, New Brunswick: Transac-

tion Books, 1986, pp. 260, 261).

A little reflection will show that the nature and character of the African unity mentioned in the above quotes is not the same. Nyerere, like Nkrumah, Azikiwe, the OAU and Diop, is talking of unity as state integration, the integration into a federation of the colonial states inherited at "independence"; Ahidjo is talking of solidarity of the states; Prof. Prah is talking of "the unity of the people" and not the integration of states; Fanon was talking of unity of purpose and action by the states. These few examples make clear that Prof Agyeman cannot be correct in claiming that the nature and character of the African unity desired has been agreed upon or settled.

Given these disparate notions of African Unity, the question of "what type of African unity" is still to be resolved. To help us move towards a resolution, I shall now attempt to elucidate the aspects and dimensions of the issue.

Here is a list of some different possible types of unity:

1. **Unity as state integration or political federation:** Examples of this include the USA, the EU, the former USSR, and the proposed US of Africa. African unity of this kind, being a union of states, would exclude those Africans of the Diaspora who have no states of their own. However, Cheikh Anta Diop has said: "Black communities must find a way to articulate their historical unity. The ties between black Africans and the blacks of Asia, Oceania, the Caribbean, South America and the United States must be strengthened on a rational basis" (Diop. *Great African Thinkers*, p. 246).

Now, if this type of unity is pushed to its global limit, as hinted by Diop in the above passage, it would require a global Federation spanning the Black African states of the Homeland and those of the Diaspora ranging from Fiji and Papua New Guinea all the way west to the Black Caribbean states like Jamaica and Belize. A geographically unwieldy and impossible union of states.

2. **Unity as solidarity of people based on distinctive racial, cultural, linguistic and historical identity:** Examples of this type include the solidarity between the Chinese in China and their global Diaspora; a solidarity based on their Yellow race, Han ancestry and Chinese culture, and effected on the basis of what they call "the mirror test" – if you want to know whether you are Chinese or not, look in the mirror and see. Another example is the racial solidarity of whites, a solidarity about which Chancellor Williams said: "Caucasians will wage frightful wars against other Caucasians, but will quickly unite, as though by instinct, against non-whites, not only in wars but in international politics. They have developed a kind of built-in solidarity in their relations with non-Caucasian peoples. This fact, as much as anything else, helps to explain their position as masters of the world" (Chancellor Williams. *Destruction*…, p. 298).

Pan-Africanism has paid hardly any attention to this type of unity. In fact, it is resisted by our racial integrationists who mistakenly denounce a racial criterion, a black "mirror test", as "racist".

3. **Unity through a shared ideology or religion:** Examples of this are the unity of the population of the USA through a Constitution that articulates a body of beliefs, i.e. the ideology of the USA; the organised State Shinto in Meiji Japan; Christendom; Dar-al-Islam; the Free World – unified by the doctrines of capitalism, free enterprise and anti-communism.

Unity of this sort, unity by norms and customs, rites and ritualised behaviour, is explained by Konrad Lorenz as follows:

The triple function of suppressing fighting within the group, of holding the group together, and of setting it off, as an independent entity, against other similar units, is performed by culturally de¬veloped ritual. … Any human group which exceeds in size that which can be held together by per¬sonal love and friendship depends for its existence on these three functions of culturally ritualised behaviour patterns. … From the little peculiarities of speech and manner which cause the smallest possible subcultural groups to stick together, an uninterrupted gradation leads up to the most elaborated, consciously performed, and consciously symbolical social norms and rites which unite the largest social units of humanity in one nation, one culture, one religion, or one political ideol¬ogy. … It is perfectly right and legitimate that we should consider as "good" the manners which our parents have taught us, that we should hold sacred social norms and rites handed down to us by the tradition of our culture. What we must guard against, with all the power of rational respon¬sibility, is our natural inclination to regard the social rites and norms of other cultures as inferior … The moral of the natural history of pseudo-speciation is that we must learn to tolerate other cultures, to shed entirely our own cultural and national arrogance, and to realise that the social norms and rites of other cultures, to which their members keep faith as we do to our own, have the same right to be respected and to be regarded as sacred (Konrad Lorenz, *On Aggression*, New York: Bantam, 1967, pp. 74-75, 78, 79, 80).

Our fidelity to the symbol implies fidelity to everything it signifies, and this depends on the warmth of our affection for the old custom. It is this feeling of affection that reveals to us the value of our cultural heri¬tage. The independent existence of any culture, the creation of a super-individual society which outlives the single being … is based on this autonomy of the rite making it an independent motive of human action (*ibid*., pp. 71-72).

For large groups, this is the most important source of the feeling of belonging together; but it has never even been recognised by Pan-Africanism. This type of unity is especially important in view of the fact that Black Africans are deeply divided by their strong adherence to the various religions and ideologies of their white enemies.

The need is therefore most pressing for a Pan-African ideology or religion that will bond the entire black race together. Kwanzaa is a beginning, and should be propagated throughout the black world.

4. **Unity through a hierarchy of organizations – economic, social, cultural, etc.:** This is the kind of unity which a conglomerate imposes on its units; an economic franchise imposes on its outlets; the unity of the Rotarians, Kiwanis, Boy Scouts Movement; it is also exemplified by how Wall Street unifies the economy of the

USA, and the City of London unifies the global economy of the British empire.
Lack of attention to this type of unity has meant that there have been no efforts to create Pan-African apex organisations to unify efforts and give leadership in the economic, social and cultural areas of life. No great consortium of banks with Pan-African reach and clout; no Pan-African equivalents of the Rotary Club or the Kiwanis; no pan-African hierarchy of religious outfits, etc. Yet it is hierarchic networks of these sorts that embody and operationalize unity.

Chancellor Williams correctly laments that, "The picture of several thousand black organisations, each independent and vying for leadership, is substantially the same picture of fragmentation and disunity in Africa that led to the downfall of the whole race" (*Destruction …*, p. 321). But the remedy for that situation is not one massive membership organisation, but the creating of hierarchized groups of these organisations to give them coherence and the potent force for united action under the control of the top-echelon organisations.

5. **Unity through joint activity:** This is exemplified by the unity of the members of a football team or league, of a sporting association. Of this kind of unity Chancellor Williams said: "the total membership is mutually and individually involved in activities which each feels is important and will be directly beneficial to him all in his own lifetime. … [This unity is achieved] almost unconsciously as people work together for mutual benefits to each other and the advancement of the [group] as a whole. Meaningful, practical activities [are] the cement which we call unity" (*Destruction …,* pp. 343-344).

Since 1958, Pan-Africanism has had a one-track mind, and has been obsessed with state integration. It has failed to promote joint and periodic activities like a youth movement with four-yearly youth festivals. Its Pan-African congresses have not been regularised to hold, say, every fifth year. Even its cultural festival, FESTAC, has been allowed to lapse. FESTAC should have been organised to hold every decade, and so give Pan-Africanists in the cultural field a festival to work towards every decade. These are the kinds of periodic activities that help to build solidarity and win and hold adherents to a movement.

6. **Unity as a functional bloc or league:** This is the kind of unity exhibited by blocs and alliances of states like NATO, the Arab League, the defunct Warsaw Pact, and the British Commonwealth. About the British Commonwealth, Azikiwe said: "The Commonwealth is bound by a complex system of consultation and cooperation in political, economic, educational, scientific and cultural fields, working through many Commonwealth organisations and through personal contacts, like the Prime Ministers' Conferences" (Azikiwe, 1962. "The Future of Pan-Africanism", in Langley ed., *Ideologies*, p. 310).

The unity Diop proposed for all the blacks when he said, "The ties between black Africans and the blacks of Asia, Oceania, the Caribbean, South America and the United States must be strengthened on a rational basis", is probably better embodied in such a league than in a geographically unwieldy federation of states scattered across the globe.
The lack of attention to this type of unity has been disastrous for Pan-African collective security. With everything concentrated on states integration through the continental, Black African and Arab OAU/AU, no attention has been paid to our need for our own

organised bloc of states, a Black African League or Black World League where matters peculiar to ourselves, matters of exclusive interest to ourselves, could be addressed without interference from our Arab enemies.

7. **Unity through one mass organisation with one voice:** This is the type of unity manifested in Garvey's movement, the UNIA; it is also proposed by Chancellor Williams when he suggests a "kind of massive organisation", "a nationwide organisation of Blacks only [with] an active membership so vast that it would go far beyond the accepted scientific criteria for determining the wishes of a whole people; [an] organisation that would, beyond all doubt, be the voice of Black America" (*Destruction…*, pp. 332, 342).

A mass organisation of this sort is probably best done through an organised religion or ideology, the type described in #3, above.

Pan-Africanists seem, thus far, to be fixated on types #1 and #7; they have not even explored the others. The failure of Pan-Africanism since 1958 to attend to and develop other types of unity besides state integration has not just been misguided. It has helped to weaken the effectiveness of Pan-Africanism. It has left it without a basis of appeal to the ordinary Africans whose interests are monumentally different from those of states and presidents.

In its obsession with states integration, it has expected a federation of states to do the job of a globe-spanning league of states for collective security as well as the job of popular solidarity; it has not explored the ways and means for organising people's solidarity.

Lack of solidarity organs

Of the missing types of unity, one whose absence is the most deadly is probably the lack of organs of popular solidarity. Lack of people's solidarity helps account for the absence of expressions of popular support by Black Africans for the South Sudanese, Darfurians and other victims of genocide, ethnic cleansing and colonialism perpetrated by the racist Arab settler minority government in Khartoum. There has been no wave of popular indignation or demonstrations against the Black African presidents in the AU who have been campaigning to prevent Bashir from being arrested and tried in Die Hague for his crimes against humanity.

Also conspicuously absent have been demonstrations of popular Pan-African solidarity with Zimbabwe in its long struggle against the neo-colonial sanctions and regime change campaign by the white imperialist powers.

Lack of popular solidarity organs manifests also in the American Diaspora's failure to support the Afro-Sudanese against Khartoum. When not totally indifferent to the plight of our endangered racial kith and kin, many in the American Diaspora have sided with the Arabs out of Islamic or anti-imperialist solidarity. And they have failed to mobilise the US government to stop the ethnic cleansing and genocide in Darfur. They have failed to use their power as American citizens to do what Chancellor Williams suggested, namely: "Influence American foreign policy and actions in regard to crucial matters affecting African

nations just as effectively as American Jews can influence this country's relations with Israel … This would be real Pan-Africanism" (Destruction p. 345).

I would suggest that pan-Africanism needs to distinguish and build these various types of organs of unity (these seven do not exhaust the types). Only when we have built a dense network of these seven types of institutions can we be said to have organised ourselves and achieved Black African unity.

II: Disunity or Powerlessness – What is Black Africa's fundamental problem?

What do we most need to cure – disunity or powerlessness?

It is mind boggling that the "independence" generation and its leaders focused on African disunity as the key factor in our condition, and did not raise the separate question of African powerlessness. It did not occur to them to ask: Was it simply disunity that defeated us and got us colonized, or was it more crucially our lack of the appropriate kinds and magnitudes of power? Yes, we were not united in the 19th century; but we were also powerless, particularly in the economic and military aspects that counted in a showdown with invaders. Disunity would be the key factor in our defeat only if we had many separate armies equipped with weapons of the same technological level as the European armies, and if we failed simply because our polities and our armies did not cooperate or coordinate. Nkrumah and his generation were obsessed with the adage that unity is strength. But they did not apply it correctly to our situation. They did not see that unity does not automatically result in victory. To appreciate this point, consider a tug-of-war contest between 10 kwashiorkor skeletons on the one side and a big and beefy Goliath on the other side. Of course, 10 kwashiorkor skeletons pulling together are stronger than any one of them, but not by much; but are they together strong enough to defeat a heavyweight muscleman in the tug-of-war? To stand a chance against the heavyweight muscleman, they have to first get well, put on some weight and then train hard for the tug-of-war; alternatively, they could recruit a sumo wrestler into their team or get at least one of themselves to pump iron and grow into a heavyweight muscleman.

Contrary to the premise of the unity argument, the size of our polities, and therefore the size of the army each could put on the battlefield, was not the decisive factor in our defeat. Our bigger polities, such as the Asante and Sokoto empires went down in defeat because their armies were inferior in weaponry and organisation rather than in numbers. And Menelik's Ethiopia, the only late 19th century African polity that escaped being conquered, did so, not because of its geographical size, but because it had upgraded the weaponry of its army and improved its organisation. The Ethiopian army, using breech-loading rifles and artillery, annihilated the Italian force at the Battle of Ādwa in 1896. Even if we were politically united in 1884, could we, with our spears and bows and arrows and flintlocks, have overcome the invading European armies with their rifles, artillery and maxim guns?

For some unexplained reason, the "independence" generation was allergic to explicitly raising the question of power, African power; and did not seem to realise the decisive importance of the enormous gap in technology and military organisation between European and Black African polities in the past few centuries. This obtuseness to the question of

power – economic as well as military power – has persisted for the last 50 years during which Pan-Africanists have harped on our need for unity, without explicitly mentioning our separate need to build our technological and military power. Because of this obtuseness, they have carried on as if uniting a vast landmass would be enough to overcome our technological, military and economic backwardness. They failed to see that a weak and disunited people is not made powerful simply by uniting; they must, above all, consciously build their power, not just their unity.

This error persists till today. At the summit of African intellectuals held in Dakar, Senegal, in July 2009, this misplaced focus on uniting into a vast territory was reiterated in President Abdoulaye Wade's cry that "we cannot be kept into a limited space" by African leaders who are holding on to petty little states. He lamented the weakness of Africans at a time when other people have pooled political power in vast territories like China, India, Brazil, Russia and the United States of America.

That this emphasis on territorial size is misplaced must be sharply exposed by the question: Will our emancipation from imperialist domination be effected simply by uniting our territories? Or rather by having a powerful member even within our present disunity? What do we need: territorial unification without enhanced power or enhanced power even without further territorial unification? If Nigeria made itself as powerful as Japan or Germany, and carried out its responsibility as the core state (i.e. the leader and protector) of the Black race, would continental union still be necessary for our emancipation from the world's contempt? Our African Unity enthusiasts need to recognise that if you want your side to win a high jump contest, you send someone who can jump eight feet; you don't send eight midgets who can each jump one foot, and then chain their feet together in unity.

Pan-Africanism desperately needs to shift its focus from African unity to Black African power. The root cause of our centuries of humiliation is not disunity but powerlessness. And, furthermore, continental union is not a prerequisite for building Black African power. Unity should be pursued only as a means to Black African power and not as an end in itself. Only unity of the type and extent that would yield Black African power is relevant to our defeating our enemies and redeeming ourselves from the world's contempt.

III: Collective Security

The question of the collective security of the Black race comes down to this: ***"How do we ensure that we shall never again be enslaved, conquered and colonised by anybody?"***
It is absolutely amazing, quite tragic and a great sin of omission, that collective security has not explicitly been a concern of Pan-Africanism since 1958. For a people all of whose woes for the past 2 500 years (since the fall of the Black Egypt of the Pharaohs to White Persians in 525 BC) have resulted from their inability to secure their borders and protect their lands, populations, societies, cultures, values, etc., achieving collective security should have been, and still should be, the paramount concern. Other than Nkrumah's repeated demand for an African High Command; and Azikiwe's mention, in 1962, of the need for some arrangements for collective security; and Haile Selassie's mention of that need in his 1963 address at the inauguration of the OAU, I have found in the records

no other treatment that has a bearing on the issue. Nkrumah, Azikiwe and Selassie did indeed raise the issue of collective security; however, they did so in an a-historical form, the wrong form.

The "Never Again" question

Consider a man who has just escaped, half mauled, from the den of a pack of hungry lions. If he is wise, his first order of business is to vow "Never again!" and ask how he strayed there in the first place, and then to take steps never again to make that mistake. If he does not do this, if he fails to learn from his harrowing experience, he is stupid and deserves to become the dinner for the next lion he chances upon. By failing to ask and answer that "never again" question, Black Africa's "independence" generation let Black Africa down and led us dangerously astray.

Unfortunately, since the "independence" generation did not have the ancestral sankofa orientation, the question of collective security was not posed in the correct historical form that would have allowed our past experience to point to an answer for the future.

The African High Command that Nkrumah urged did not go far enough in addressing the fundamental problem. It was limited to "an African High Command which could resist … acts which threaten the territorial integrity and sovereignty of African States" (*Revolutionary Path*, p. 345); it would "plan revolutionary war, and initiate action" so that Africa will be liberated soon (*Revolutionary Path*, p. 482). It was not a doctrine that posed or answered the comprehensive historical question of how we fell into a history of enslavement, conquest and colonialism in the first place, and how we could ensure that we never do so again.

Unity for security and survival

Since 1958, Pan-Africanism has made African unity its prime theme and project. Now, the usual motive for the voluntary unification of states is security and survival. However, Pan-Africanism has strangely been obtuse on the matter of security and survival for its constituency. I do not find Nkrumah, Padmore, Diop, Azikiwe and the other advocates of continental unification anywhere articulating (and I stand to be corrected) the argument that the paramount objective of continental unification is the survival and security of Africans. If they did, and thought the matter through, and had bothered to educate themselves on the nature of Afro-Arab historical relations of the last two millennia, they would be simply suicidal or insane to have proposed a unification of Arabs and Africans under one continental state. Not even Nkrumah, for whom unification seems like a panacea, (note his long catalogue of benefits that he said it would yield), saw it fit to include security and survival, whether explicitly or implicitly, among his reasons for advocating continental unification. In light of the articulated and demonstrated Arab ambitions in Africa for the last 1 500 years, any unification of Black Africans with the Arab settler colonialists in Africa would be as suicidal for Black Africans as a unification between mice and cats would be for the mice.

Our endangered situation

Consider this true story from Sudan:

> "The dispute over oil," Victoria Ajang begins, "first became an issue of life and death for me in 1983. That year the government began its programme to pipe oil from our

land in the south up to the north. Students in my town were quite upset about our resources being diverted by the government, and so they held a protest march outside the local school. But the government would not tolerate this.

"On a summer night, the government militia forces suddenly swooped in on our village. We were at home relaxing, in the evening, when men on horses with machine guns stormed through, shooting everyone. I saw friends fall dead in front of me. While my husband carried out our little daughter Eva, I ran with the few possessions I could grab. All around us, we saw children being (hit) in the stomach, in the leg, between the eyes. Against the dark sky, we saw flames from the houses the soldiers had set on fire. The cries of the people forced inside filled our ears as they burned to death. Our people were being turned to ash."

Victoria Ajang's story of what happened to her village illustrates what dangers they expose themselves to who do not take measures to ensure their security. They will be relaxing and entertaining themselves when their enemies make a surprise attack and destroy them. That is the situation Black Africans have allowed themselves to be in for 2 500 years and have foolishly refused to take measures to prevent.

An unasked question

Two vital questions should have been asked and answered in 1958 by the All-African People's Conference, namely: (a) "How do we set the rest of Black Africa free from colonialism?" (This, thankfully, was indeed asked and answered.) and (b) "How do we ensure that we shall never again be enslaved, conquered and colonised by anybody?" (This, alas, went unasked and remains unasked and unanswered till this day.) Rather than take up the second task, we were diverted into other things. In Nkrumah's own words: "Long before 1957, I made it clear that the two major tasks to be undertaken after the ending of colonial rule in Ghana would be the vigorous prosecution of a Pan-African policy to advance the African Revolution, and at the same time the adoption of measures to construct socialism in Ghana" (*Revolutionary Path*, p.125).

In their desire to establish a new social order – apparently without bothering about how it would protect itself from our enemies – Nkrumah set about building "scientific socialism" in Ghana; Julius Nyerere set about building African socialism (Ujamaa) in Tanzania; Kenneth Kaunda set about building African Humanism in Zambia; Felix Houphouet Boigny set about building capitalism in Cote d'Ivoire; and others set about building other systems in their countries, but nobody saw it fit to ask the paramount question of African collective security, namely: "How do we ensure that we shall never again be enslaved, conquered and colonized by anybody?" This question should have informed whatever new social order they set out to build, but it did not. What is the result today?

Consequences of lack of historical focus on collective security

Several very costly errors have flowed from this our lack of proper (sankofa) attention to our collective security.

a) Our quest for African unity has been misguided in three respects:
   a.i) We have sought to unite a territory – the entire African continent – that is far too large for our security needs.

a.ii) By not finding out who our historic enemies are, we have included our Arab enemies among those we seek to unite with.
a.iii) By not understanding our security requirements, we failed to seriously undertake industrialisation to build African power.

b) Even if we still recognise that they were our historic enemies during the centuries of the slave trade and colonialism, we have failed to realise that ***Europeans did not stop being our enemies with the ending of political colonialism [1957-1994]***. In our amnesia and foolishness, we have treated our historic White European enemies as our best friends, as our mentors in development and now as our so-called "development partners"; and we have treated our historic Arab enemies as our African brothers and allies, and thereby left ourselves totally unprepared for their enemy attacks, for example:
b.i) The AIDS bombing of Black Africa by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the USA took us totally unawares.
b.ii) For 50 years we have allowed the European imperialist institutions – the UN, and especially its IMF-World Bank-GATT/WTO troika, and our European "ex-colonisers" to tutor and guide us into maldevelopment and chronic poverty.
b.iii) For 50 years we have failed to recognise and collectively resist Arab colonialist expansionism and racism against Black Africans, as well as the persisting enslavement of Black Africans by Arabs.

For 50 years, for lack of an explicit and appropriate interest in our collective security, we failed to heed the fundamental strategic principle: Know your enemy and know yourself, and in a hundred battles you will never be defeated (Sun Tzu).

Had we sought to know our white enemies, what would we have learnt from our own sages who had already studied them? We would have learnt the following:

- The attitude of the white race is to subjugate, to exploit, and if necessary exterminate the weaker peoples with whom they come in contact (Marcus Garvey).
- In their relationship with the Black race, Europeans are psychopaths (Bobby Wright).
- White people were the natural enemies of Africans (David Walker in *David Walker's Appeal*, 1829).
- Black men and women, when will you cease to drift along the way which leads to the extermination of the Black race? (Nnamdi Azikiwe).

For 50 years, due to our lack of focus on our collective security, we have failed to attend to the task of building the power we need for our collective security.
For 50 years, due to our lack of focus on our collective security, we have paid a heavy price from AIDS, not just the millions that have died from it, but also the multi-generational consequences from the social dislocations caused by the death of parents and the abandonment of millions of babies as AIDS orphans.

For 50 years, due to our lack of focus on our collective security, we have also paid a heavy price from the economic war waged on us by the European powers that got us into their debt trap and impoverished us.

For 50 years, due to our lack of focus on our collective security, we have also paid a

heavy price in the millions killed or enslaved by the Arabs, and in the land they have seized from Black Africans.

'Pacifist morality' and our lack of security consciousness?

We must observe that it was not only the leaders who failed to ask the vital question about our collective security; the entire "independence" generation seems to have failed to do so. They were not suspicious of the colonial masters that had enslaved and conquered and exploited Black Africa for centuries; and even till now we are not suspicious of the Europeans and Arabs, which is why we give their NGOs unchecked access to our villages, without strictly monitoring them to make sure they are not subverting our society or culture. When a type of behaviour is rampant in a society, it is useful to look for an explanation in the culture. I think this suicidal lack of security consciousness is ingrained in our culture.

Cheikh Anta Diop, in his Two Cradles Theory, lists "pacifist morality" as one of the traits of the Southern Cradle cultures of which Black Africa is a part.
Nkrumah, in lauding the African Personality, said: "We have the gifts of laughter and joy, a love of music, a lack of malice, an absence of the desire for vengeance for our wrongs, all things of intrinsic worth in a world sick of injustice, revenge, fear and want" (*Revolutionary Path*, p.114).

These traits of the African personality are not virtues in the world as it is. The world requires a "warrior morality" not a "pacifist morality".

It was Steve Biko who observed, and correctly I think, that "we are not a suspicious race". Some might think that that trait is a virtue, but it is not. It might be a virtue in "pacifist morality" but it is a vice in "warrior morality". And the world we live in demands "warrior morality". To illustrate the warrior mentality that we lack, here is a story from Meiji, Japan:

In a Japanese Hospital

The last patient of the evening, a boy less than four years old, is received by nurses and surgeons with smiles and gentle flatteries, to which he does not at all respond ... He is both afraid and angry – especially angry – at finding himself in a hospital tonight: some indiscreet person assured him that he was being taken to the theatre; and he sang for joy on the way, forgetting the pain of his arm; and this is not the theatre! There are doctors here – doctors that hurt people … He lets himself be stripped, and bears the examination without wincing; but when told that he must lie down upon a certain low table, under an electric lamp, he utters a very emphatic *No!* … The experience inherited from his ancestors has assured him that to lie down in the presence of a possible enemy is not good; and by the same ghostly wisdom he has divined that the smile of the surgeon was intended to deceive ... "But it will be so nice upon the table!" coaxingly observes a young nurse; "see the pretty red cloth!" "No!' repeats the little man – made only more wary by this appeal to aesthetic sentiment ... So they lay hands upon him – two surgeons and two nurses – lift him deftly, bear him to the table with the red cloth. Then he shouts his small cry of war – for he comes of good fighting stock – and, to the general alarm, battles most valiantly, in spite of that broken arm. But lo! a white wet cloth descends upon his eyes and mouth, and he cannot cry, and there is a strange sweet smell in his nostrils, and the

voices and the lights have floated very, very far away, and he is sinking, sinking, sinking into wavy darkness ... The slight limbs relax; for a moment the breast heaves quickly, in the last fight of the lungs against the paralyzing anaesthetic: then all motion stops… (From Lafcadio Hearn, *Writings from Japan*, ed. by Francis King, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984, p. 164).

The people of the "independence" generation did not have the healthy suspiciousness that was displayed by that little Japanese boy! Nor have we acquired it till today.

Our tragedy

Why do I say it is tragic that we have not made collective security our paramount concern? Had we made collective security our paramount concern, it would have forced us to correctly answer the question: unity for whom? We would have investigated to determine those enemies from whom we need security; and that would have obliged us to examine the history of our relations with the Arabs and with the Europeans. And having ascertained that Arabs are our mortal enemies, we would not have sought continental union with them. This is one way in which our lack of clarity on the question of who our historic enemies are has cost us dearly.

Just consider the long war in Sudan between the Black Arabs who are entrenched in power in Khartoum and the Black Africans of South Sudan. Black Africa would have mobilised and won that war long ago if we had a doctrine and an organ of collective security. In which case the genocide in Darfur would not have arisen at all. By the same token, the enslavement of Black Africans in Mauritania by the White Arabs there would have been ended by the collective intervention of Black Africa. Furthermore, the current Arab campaign to seize a belt of Sahelian borderlands stretching from Senegal to the Red Sea would have been checked. Same with the Arab ambition to seize the entire Nile Basin, all the way south to Kampala.

This lack of definition of who our collective enemies are has also prevented us from being on our guard against the Europeans. Many of us do not even recognise that the Europeans are our enemies, despite their having enslaved and colonised and exploited us for many centuries. Because we are not on guard against them, we allow them to come and go unsupervised into our countries, which is how they came in and inflicted AIDS on us by using AIDS-infected vaccines to vaccinate 97 million Black Africans in an alleged campaign to eradicate smallpox.

So, what do we do now?

Breeding out pacifist morality traits

As Amilcar Cabral taught us, we need to struggle against our own weaknesses. As I have indicated, one of our weaknesses is our pacifist morality. It manifests as our unsuspiciousness, as our lack of malice, as an absence of the desire for vengeance for our wrongs, especially wrongs received at the hands of whites.

Diop pointed out that the most essential function which a culture must serve is survival (*Great African Thinkers*, p. 244). As we have seen, the pacifist morality of our culture has been maladaptive and has exposed us to many lethal dangers. We need to repair our

culture. We need to evolve a new African culture that breeds out the pacifist mentality and inculcates a warrior mentality in every four-year-old child. But can this change be effected? Yes, it can. Just consider what Shaka did, in just 10 years, with his reforms. In fact, on just one fearsome day, he wiped out cowardice from the Zulu nation. So, if we set about things correctly, we can change from a pacifist morality to a warrior morality even in one generation. That is a task for our education system.

We need to change our child-rearing methods and adopt some functional equivalent of the Samurai upbringing that produced that four-year-old Japanese boy. Then we should supplement that by emphasising martial arts and the game of chess in schools. We should then top it off by instituting compulsory military service for all 18-year-olds. The products of such a system are unlikely to have a pacifist mentality, or to be obtuse about collective security. It might be useful to indicate the basics of a Samurai education as a model of what we should functionally reproduce:

A Samurai upbringing

"But sons of samurai were severely disciplined in those days: and the one of whom I write had little time for dreaming. The period of caresses was made painfully brief for him. Even before he was invested with his first hakama, or trousers – a great ceremony in that epoch – he was weaned as far as possible from tender influence, and taught to check the natural impulses of childish affection. Little com¬rades would ask him mockingly, "Do you still need milk?" if they saw him walking out with his mother, although he might love her in the house as demonstratively as he pleased, during the hours he could pass by her side. These were not many. All inactive pleasures were severely restricted by his discipline; and even comforts, except during illness, were not allowed him. Almost from the time he could speak he was enjoined to consider duty the guiding motive of life, self-control the first requisite of conduct, pain and death matters of no consequence in the selfish sense. There was a grimmer side to this Spartan discipline, designed to cultivate a cold stern-ness never to be relaxed during youth, except in the screened intimacy of the home. The boys were inured to sights of blood. They were taken to witness executions; they were expected to display no emotions and they were obliged, on their return home, to quell any secret feeling of horror by eating plentifully of rice tinted blood-colour by an admixture of salted plum juice. Even more difficult things might be demanded of a very young boy – to go alone at midnight to the execution-ground, for example, and bring back a head in proof of courage. For the fear of the dead was held not less con¬temptible in a samurai than the fear of man. The samurai child was pledged to fear nothing. In all such tests, the demeanour exacted was perfect impassiveness; any swaggering would have been judged quite as harshly as any sign of cowardice.

As a boy grew up, he was obliged to find his pleasures chiefly in those bodily exercises which were the samurai's early and constant preparations for war – archery and riding, wrestling and fencing. Playmates were found for him; but these were older youths, sons of retainers, chosen for ability to assist him in the practice of martial exercises. It was their duty also to teach him how to swim, to handle a boat, to develop his young muscles. Between such physical training and the study of the Chinese classics the greater part of each day was divided for him. His diet, though ample, was never dainty; his clothing, except in time of great ceremony, was light and coarse; and he was not allowed the use of fire merely to warm himself. While studying of winter mornings, if his hands became

too cold to use the writing brush, he would be ordered to plunge them into icy water to restore the circulation; and if his feet were numbed by frost, he would be told to run about in the snow to make them warm. Still more rigid was his training in the special etiquette of the military class; and he was early made to know that the little sword in his girdle was neither an ornament nor a plaything. He was shown how to use it, how to take his own life at a moment's notice, without shrinking, whenever the code of his class might so order.[1]

1. "Is that really the head of your father?" a prince once asked of a samurai boy only seven years old. The child at once realised the situation. The freshly severed head set before him was not his father's: the daimyo had been deceived, but further deception was necessary. So the lad, after having saluted the head with every sign of reverential grief, suddenly cut out his own bowels. All the prince's doubts vanished before that bloody proof of filial piety; the outlawed father was able to make good his escape; and the memory of the child is still honoured in Japanese drama and poetry.

   Also in the matter of religion, the training of a samurai boy was peculiar. He was educated to revere the ancient gods and the spirits of his ancestors; he was well schooled in the Chinese ethics; and he was taught something of Buddhist philosophy and faith. But he was likewise taught that hope of heaven and fear of hell were for the ignorant only; and that the superior man should be influenced in his conduct by nothing more selfish than the love of right for its own sake, and the recognition of duty as a universal law.

   Gradually, as the period of boyhood ripened into youth, his conduct was less subjected to supervision. He was left more and more free to act upon his own judgment, but with full knowledge that a mistake would not be forgotten; that a serious offense would never be fully condoned; and that a well-merited reprimand was more to be dreaded than death. On the other hand, there were few moral dangers against which to guard him. Professional vice was then strictly banished from many of the provincial castle-towns; and even so much of the non-moral side of life as might have been reflected in popular romance and drama, a young samurai could know little about. He was taught to despise that common literature appealing either to the softer emotions or the passions, as essentially unmanly reading; and the public theatre was forbidden to his class.[2] Thus, in that innocent provincial life of Old Japan, a young samurai might grow up exceptionally pure-minded and simple-hearted.

   So grew up the young samurai concerning whom these things are written – fearless, courteous, self-denying, despising pleasure, and ready at an instant's notice to give his life for love, loyalty, or honour.

2. Samurai women, in some provinces at least, could go to the public theatre. The men could not, without committing a breach of good manners. But in samurai homes, or within the grounds of the yashiki, some private performances of a particular character were given. Strolling players were the performers. I know several charming old shizoku who have never been to a public theatre in their lives, and refuse all invitations to witness a performance. They still obey the rules of their samurai

education. (Extract from "A Conservative" in Lafcadio Hearn, *Writings from Japan*, pp.291-293)

If we learn from the Samurai upbringing, we cannot allow our children to be brought up on Channel O, and the like.

A change in our concept of security
Besides inculcating a warrior mentality in all Black Africans, we need to change our still-colonial concept of security.

The colonial notion of security was the security of the colonial state and enterprise from the people it came to exploit and oppress. This was the doctrine of security which conceived the colonial army as a back-up for the police, i.e. as an army to be used for riot control and punitive expeditions. This doctrine has been inherited by the neo-colonial states of Black Africa and has not been changed. (In Nigeria it was applied by the British to suppress the Aba women's uprising, and recently by Obasanjo to wipe out the restive peoples of Odi and Zaki Biam.)

In neo-colonial Africa, it has been noted that a small army, incapable of serving as an effective instrument of foreign policy, tends to "look inward" – to intervene in domestic politics; and that by and large, African forces are deployed only against their own people in their own countries. Furthermore, as Nyerere noted in 1961, "If an African state is armed, then realistically it can only be armed against another African state" (See Opoku Agyeman. *Africa's Persistent Vulnerable Link to Global politics*, pp. 18-23).

Can such internal security armies defend Black Africa against the Arab League, or Belgium or France or the UK, let alone against NATO?

Here is Azikiwe's suggestion for an African Convention on Collective Security:
"This should make provisions for the following: a multi-lateral pact of mutual defence…; an African High Command…; a doctrine of non-intervention in Africa, on the same lines as the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere. This doctrine should make it clear that the establishment or the continued existence of any colonial territory in the continent of Africa, by any European or American or Asian or Australian power shall be regarded not only as an unfriendly act, but as an act of aggression against the concert of African States;… a Pan-African Declaration of Neutralism (i.e. non-alignment) …" (Azikiwe, (1962) "Future of Pan-Africanism" in Langley, ed. *Ideologies*, pp. 321-322).

We need to develop this line of thinking. Security has to be against our external enemies: Arabs, Europeans and whoever else; and against enemy capabilities, existing and potential. Hence we will need to monitor enemy capacity as it changes, lest we find ourselves equipping ourselves to defend against obsolete weapons, and preparing for the last war, as it were.

Furthermore, our concept of security must be broadened well beyond military security to include economic, food, health and ideological security, since we have been under attack by the Arabs or the Europeans in all these areas. In fact, we need collective security of a total sort – security against all possible means of attack, presently known and potential,

and from all possible enemies.

IV: Socialism or communalism?

Several African leaders of the "independence" generation advocated or implemented what they called socialism. Prof. Prah reports that:

> By the mid-1960s, practically all African heads of state, with the exception of Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, Leon Mba of Gabon and V.S. Tubman of Liberia, had at one time or the other espoused African socialism. Consistently, such ideologues have put a distance between what they variously defined as African socialism, and 20th century Marxian socialist formulae, with the emphasis on class struggle. Tom Mboya anchored his definition of African socialism on the pre-industrial communitarian ethos of Africa. … In Tanzania under Julius Nyerere, populist socialism was described as Ujamaa socialism (The African Nation, pp. 80, 81).

The "African socialism" of many of these leaders was a prestigious misnomer for African communalism. Here is Tom Mboya's exposition of it; his is quite representative of expositions by Nyerere, Kaunda, Senghor, Mamadou Dia, etc.

"In Africa the belief that 'we are all sons and daughters of the soil' has always exercised tremendous influence on our social, economic and political relationships. From this belief springs the logic and the practice of equality, and the acceptance of communal ownership of the vital means of life – the land. The hoe is to us the symbol of work. Every able-bodied man and woman, girl and boy, has always worked. Laziness has not been tolerated, and appropriate social sanctions have developed against it. There has been equality of opportunity, for everyone had land – or rather, the use of land – and a hoe at the start of life. The acquisitive instinct, which is largely responsible for the vicious excesses and exploitation under the capitalist system, was tempered by a sense of togetherness and a rejection of graft and meanness. There was loyalty to the society, and the society gave its members much in return: a sense of security and universal hospitality.

These are the values for which, in my view, African Socialism stands. The ideals and attitudes which nourish it are indigenous, and are easily learnt, for they have been expressed for generations in the language of the soil which our people understand, and not in foreign slogans."

All African leaders who have written on this subject are agreed on these points. President Nyerere has said: "My fellow coun¬trymen can understand Socialism only as cooperation." And President Senghor of Senegal, speaking at the Dakar conference in December 1962, on the "African roads to Socialism", said: "Socialism is the merciless fight against social dishonesties and injustices; fraudulent conversion of public funds, rackets and bribes ..."

I have, I hope, given some idea already of the reason why Africans call these attitudes "African Socialism", and not just "Socialism" … There is a positive desire, arising out of what may start as a negative reaction, that whatever is of value in Africa's own culture and her own social institutions should be brought out to contribute to the creation of the new African nation.

I wrote earlier about the task of reconstructing the economy in the days after Independence. In the effort to do this, new values have to be established in place of colonial values and we have to decide what part the traditional African social and cultural structure can play in the country's economic development. Its main difference from the European structure, which was of course the one officially favoured during the colonial era, is that it is communal by nature. Most African tribes have a communal approach to life. A person is an individual only to the extent that he is a member of a clan, a community or a family. Land was never owned by an individual, but by the people, and could not be disposed of by anybody. Where there were traditional heads, they held land in trust for the community generally. Food grown on the land was regarded as food to feed the hungry among the tribe. Although each family might have its own piece of land on which to cultivate, when there was famine or when someone simply wanted to eat, he merely looked for food and ate it. …

When money was introduced, the African came to work for wages; but he still maintained contact with his native land as the only source of security to which he could look in old age or in sickness. He was secure in his mind that he could go back to his home and be taken care of by his people. It was a social security scheme, with no written rules, but with a strict pattern to which everyone adhered. If someone did not adhere to the pattern, and did not take on the obligations inherent in the system, he found that, when he next got into trouble, he received little or no attention.

He was expected to live harmoniously with others in his com¬munity, and to make his contribution to work done in the village….

The practice of African Socialism involves trying to use what is relevant and good in these African customs to create new values in the changing world of the money economy, to build an economy which reflects the thinking of the great majority of the people. …The challenge of African Socialism is to use these traditions to find a way to build a society in which there is a place for everybody, where everybody shares both in poverty and in prosperity, and where emphasis is placed upon production by everyone, with security for all. … In his booklet UJAMAA – *the basis of African Socialism*, Julius Nyerere brings out clearly the essential difference of African from European Socialism. He writes:
The foundation, and the objective, of African Socialism is the Extended Family. The true African Socialist does not look on one class of men as his brethren and another as his natural enemies. He does not form an alliance with the "brethren" for the extermination of the "non-brethren". He rather regards all men as his brethren – as members of his ever-extending family. 'UJAMAA, then, or "Familyhood", describes our Socialism. It is opposed to Capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the Exploitation of Man by Man. And it is equally opposed to doctrinaire Socialism, which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of Inevitable Conflict between Man and Man. (Tom Mboya, "African Socialism" in J. Ayo Langley ed. Ideologies, pp. 508-513.)

Nkrumah differed from all the others. Nkrumah, a self-declared Marxist, espoused Marxism, which is also known as "scientific socialism". He declared "Pan-Africanism and socialism are organically complementary. One cannot be achieved without the other." (*Revolutionary Path*, p. 127) Is that claim true? Nkrumah merely asserted but did not bother to demonstrate this dogma of his. Unfortunately, it is false, as false as his many

fallacious claims about what "only a continental union government" could achieve for Africans. It is like his opportunistic and Canute-like nonsense that "if in the past the Sahara divided us, now it unites us" (p.129). Marxism (Scientific Socialism) has as much organic or historical or cultural connection with Africa as Hinduism, Taoism or Shinto. Marxism in Africa, just like Christianity, is an alien, imperialist import. For either of them to be organically connected to Pan-Africanism, European cultural imperialism would have to be organically connected to Africa, which is not the case. As Prah pointedly asked: "What is the relevance of 'scientific socialism' to the notion of African unity?" (*African Nation*, p. 63). If it has no relevance to the objectives of Pan-Africanism or to African history and culture, how can it be correctly said to be organically complementary to Pan-Africanism? That Nkrumah was both a Pan-Africanist and a Marxist, is only a fortuitous coincidence in his intellectual life. It does not make Pan-Africanism and Marxism organically related in any way.

Furthermore, Ayi Kwei Armah has argued, correctly in my view, that:

Marxism, in its approach to non-Western societies and values, is decidedly colonialist, Western, Eurocentric and hegemonist. … Marxism, in its approach to the non-Western majority of the world's peoples, is demonstrably racist – racist in a preju¬diced, determined, dishonest and unintelligent fashion. Wes¬tern racists hold that Western art is art, but African art is primitive art. … What makes Western art civilized and modern is that it originates in the West; what makes African art primitive is that it originates in Africa. Racism is luxur¬iously illogical. That is partly why, for Marx and Engels, communism is modern, civilized and serious when it appears in Europe (even if it has only a spectral form). The same communist phenomenon, when it manifests itself in the non-Western world, is dismissed as primitive communism, even though it appears there not as a fuzzy liberal spectre but in human form – vigorous, pushing toward birth in societies familiar for ages with communism as a lost tradition and a real hope, often aborted, sometimes fleetingly realised. (*"Masks and Marx"*, pp. 41-42)

Since Pan-Africanism is anti-racist, anti-colonialist and anti-Eurocentric, Nkrumah cannot be correct in claiming that Pan-Africanism and a racist, colonialist and Eurocentric Marxism, *a.k.a*. "scientific socialism", are organically complementary and that one cannot be achieved without the other. That is tantamount to claiming that anti-racism and racism, anti-colonialism and colonialism, anti-Eurocentrism and Eurocentrism, must be achieved together in Africa.

In contrast to Nkrumah's "scientific socialism", the African socialism of the other leaders is derived from African communalism and therefore has a historical and organic link to African culture. As Nyerere explained:

> By the use of the word 'Ujamaa', therefore, we state that for us socialism involves building on the foundation of our past, and building also to our own design. We are not importing a foreign ideology into Tanzania and trying to smother our distinct social patterns with it. We have deliberately decided to grow, as a society, out of our own roots, but in a particular direction and towards a particular kind of objective. We are doing this by emphasizing certain characteristics of our traditional organization, and extending them so that they can embrace the possibilities of modern technology

> and enable us to meet the challenge of life in the twentieth century world (Nyerere, "Ujamaa is Tanzanian socialism" in J. Ayo Langley, ed, *Ideologies*, p. 546).

Nkrumah would have done well to follow Nyerere and to heed Azikiwe's wise counsel on ideologies:
"It is obligatory for us to adopt a tolerant scepticism in respect of alien ideologies and then examine impartially our aboriginal lore of good living. If we reacted otherwise, then we would be desecrating the legacy which our forebears bequeathed to us from past generations" (Azikiwe, "Tribalism: A Pragmatic Instrument for National Unity", in J. Ayo Langley, ed, *Ideologies*, p. 474).

We need to note that both Capitalism and Socialism are ideologies made in Europe to solve the peculiar problems of a modern European society in which two antagonistic classes confront each other, one having seized all the society's means of production leaving the other with only its labour to sell to live. Unless and until that situation is replicated in Africa – and that would be a disaster – these rival ideologies will remain inappropriate for Africa. After all, theories about the camel's way of life should not be applied to that of the whale.

It should be pointed out that the ancestral African political economy combined private ownership with communal ownership. As Kaunda described it:

> Our ancestors worked collectively and co-oper¬atively from start to finish. One might say this was a communist way of doing things and yet these gardens remained strongly the property of individuals. One might say here that this was capitalism. Collectively and co-operatively they harvested but when it came to storing and selling their produce they became strongly individualistic. They did not finish at that. When it came to sharing the fruits of their labour like meals, for instance, they shared them communally. Indeed, one is compelled to say a strange mixture of nineteenth-century capitalism with com¬munism. Yet, as is said above, this was original and the pattern essentially African (Kaunda, "Humanism in Zambia", in J. Ayo Langley, ed, *Ideologies*, p. 567).

African Socialism or African Communalism?
Why did these African leaders choose the tag "African Socialism" for what was actually African Communalism? I suspect that in the global climate of the 1960s which was dominated by the intra-European Cold War, they found it prestigious to attach a European label to their African-derived political ideology, hence the "Socialism"; but they also needed to distinguish their ideology from European socialism, hence the "African" in the name. But I think the time is past when we should seek to enhance the value of something African by making it seem a variant of something European. Our intellectual independence requires that we name things correctly and on our own terms. I will therefore use the term 'African Communalism' henceforth to describe what has been called 'African Socialism'.

Towards an Industrial Communalism
Nyerere, Senghor, Kaunda, Tom Mboya, Mamadou Dia and the rest of them began the process of formulating an ideology for building a political economy that would put in modern form the pre-colonial African political economy of agrarian communalism. The project remains uncompleted and should be continued from where these pioneers left

off. The challenge to work out an industrial upgrade of pre-colonial African communalism is before our intellectuals and should be taken up. As Nyerere put it:

> Who is to keep us active in the struggle to convert nationalism to Pan-Africanism if it is not the staffs and students of our universities? Who is it who will have the time and ability to think out the practical problems of achieving this goal of unification if it is not those who have an opportunity to think and learn without direct responsibility for day-to-day affairs ("The Dilemma of the Pan-Africanist"? in Langley, ed. *Ideologies* p.352).

We should then invite our students and academics to take up the challenge and provide us with the much needed 'Industrial Communalist Ideology' and thereby give us a framework of ideas with which to solve our problems, with which to define and pursue our interest in the world.

I would caution them not to be put off by Nkrumah's dictum that:

"Practice without thought is blind; thought without practice is empty" (*Consciencism*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964, p. 78). We should realise that Nkrumah's dictum is blind to the virtues of division of labour; it suggests that thinkers who are not also agitators should be regarded as having nothing to contribute. And that even a muddle-headed thinker who is an agitator is preferable to a clear thinker who is not also an agitator. Let those talented to think for us unabashedly do so. Let those who are talented agitators and political organisers do that unabashedly. And if we spawn any of those rare persons who combine first rate thinking with first rate organisational skills, we should be thankful and get them to contribute in the way Cabral and Nyerere contributed to Africa and Mao contributed to China, and Lenin to Russia.

For the benefit of those who take up the challenge, let me stress that they should conceptualise our situation in a comprehensive way, so that the ideology they come up with can help solve our problems comprehensively. Unlike Nyerere, Kaunda and others, who were trying to work out a communalist system, but who did not explicitly impose on their system the conditions for defending it in the world as it is today, those who set out to fashion a neo-communalist system would do well to consciously design it so it can achieve the Black Power necessary to protect it in this century. The mix of principles of ownership of the land and other means of production must be consciously such as to allow the setting up of giant industries. In principle, there should be no reason why a giant industry should not be communally owned by an entire village or town. Modes of ownership by communities should be invented to supplement and complement individual ownership. In addition, there is much to be learnt from the Industrialised systems of Sweden and Japan, and from pre-colonial Asante. According to Prof. Opoku Agyeman:

Collectivism is the predominant impulse in Sweden, in the sense that the system emphasises the sovereignty of collective well-being over individual private interests. In Japan, where society is similarly conceived in corporate terms, individuals 'are seen to benefit only through the elevation of the group as a whole'. In Asante, the welfare of the national society was placed well above calculations of individual self-interest and self-indulgence.

Prof Agyeman further elaborates:

The logic of the Japanese "capitalist" system places a heavy reliance on the private market. And yet Japan's market economy is not based on Adam Smith's notion "that a society benefits from the liberation of individual greed – each person seeking his own self-interest". In "socialist" Sweden the government's role has been to foster social uses of ownership, which is overwhelmingly private, to ensure the sovereignty of society's interests over private interests. … In "mercantilist" Asante, even though the public sector loomed larger than the private, no rigid antipathy to private enterprise existed. On the contrary, the private sector was nurtured by the state to generate wealth through the fostering of a breed of private entrepreneurs.

Socially responsible uses of the ownership of the means of production, private or public, is a demonstrable value in all three cases. In Sweden, while it is acceptable for a private owner of industry to create a fortune, this is conditional on the wealth being used in socially useful ways. In Japan, the private sector exudes social responsibility through a "corporate socialism" that confers such benefits as lifetime employment and egalitarian job practices. In Asante, private acquisition of wealth was encouraged but on condition that the riches were obtained by honest means and hard work and could be relied upon by the system for pecuniary assistance (Opoku Agyeman, *Africa's persistent Vulnerable link to Global Politics*, pp. 92, 90, 91).

The great challenge facing African thinkers, whether or not they are also political leaders, is to fashion an industrial communalist ideology to guide the political economy of an industrialized Black superpower. In this task, they have much to learn from case studies of pre-colonial African countries like Asante and Zulu; and also from non-African countries like modern Japan, Sweden, Cuba and China.

V: The African Nation?

Is there an African nation? Where is it? Are there African nations? If so, where are they? I submit that the African nation does not exist and has never existed. There is the African race, but it is not a nation. There are many African nations, but these are what we have learned to defame by calling them tribes. These so-called tribes were the true nations in pre-colonial Africa. What nowadays are called African nations, are not nations at all; each is just a country under the jurisdiction of a state. It is fashionable to call them nation-states, but that is at best a courtesy.

Why is it important to determine whether or not Black Africa is a nation? Pretending that Black Africa is a nation when it is not would be as delusional as leaning on a walking stick without noticing that it is made of ice. When things get warm the ice will melt and you'll be leaning on air. Alternatively, if a builder lacks cement blocks and, in desperation decides to call heaps of beach sand by the name cement blocks, he will soon find that he can't lay the heaps course on course like he could actual blocks. For lack of the factors that make a population cohere into a nation, the African nation, being a pseudo-nation, would disintegrate under pressure, just like an ice stick in warm weather. For example, suppose you had an army of the so-called African nation. And half your army were Black Muslims each of whom said in his heart: "I am a Muslim and I worship Allah and I follow

the way of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). I have no relationship with you, except that your skin is black. The lightest Arab is closer to me than you. If there were to be war between Muslims of any shade of colour and the darkest of black people, I will be on the side of Muslims."

If a Black African army is filled with such people, what chance has it of defending Black Africa from the Arabs? Such is the danger of fashionably pretending that there is an African nation when, in fact, it doesn't yet exist. We should all take to heart Nyerere's warning: "It is no part of transforming dream into reality to pretend that things are not what they are" (Nyerere, "Dilemma of the Pan-Africanist" in Langley, ed. *Ideologies*, p. 347).
Now back to the question: Is Africa a nation? In attempting to answer this question scientifically, rather than sentimentally, we would be helped by starting from the following statements from three different disciplines: Cultural anthropology, Historiography and Biology. Let's hear first from cultural anthropology, through Cheikh Anta Diop: "The cultural identity of a people (is) centred on three components – linguistic, historical, and psychic" (Diop, in *Great African Thinkers*, p. 268).

Also according to Diop, the psychic factor is the domain of poets, singers, storytellers. Note the example of the brothers Grimm who, by collecting German folk tales in their Grimm's Fairy Tales, laid the psychic foundation of German national identity; also note the role of the epic Kalevala in fostering national identity in Finland; also the role of the Mahabharata epic in fostering Indian national consciousness. Similarly, the Old Testament has been an indispensable anchor for Jewish identity; for the Japanese, the Nihon gi or Chronicles of Japan, which was compiled in 720 AD and the Kojiki or Records of Ancient Matters, which was compiled in 712 AD, with their collections of myths, legends, historical accounts, songs, customs, divination and magical practices of ancient Japan, have provided the psychic bedrock of Japanese national identity.

Let's next hear from historiography, through Jaques Barzun:

> What makes a nation? A large part of the answer to that question is: common historical memories; … a common language, a core of historical memories with heroes and villains; … a nation is forged into unity by successive wars and the passage of time. … It takes a national war to weld the parts together by giving individuals and groups memories of a struggle in common. Needless to add, nationalism can arise only when a nation in this full sense has come into being" (Jacques Barzun, *Dawn to Decadence*, pp. 775, 776,695, 435).

Finally, let's hear from ethology, the biological science of animal behaviour, through Robert Ardrey:

> A biological nation is a social group … which holds as an exclusive possession a continuous area of space, which isolates itself from others of its kind through outward antagonism, and which through joint defence of its social territory achieves leadership, co-operation and a capacity for concerted action. It does not matter too much whether such a nation be composed of 25 individuals or of two hundred and fifty million. It does not matter too much whether we are considering the true lemur, the howling monkey, the smooth-billed ani, the Bushman band, the Greek city-state, or

> the United States of America. The social principle remains the same (Robert Ardrey. *The Territorial Imperative*, pp. 210-211).

What Diop, Robert Ardrey, and Jacques Barzun together tell us is that a nation is made by shared language, historical memory of struggles carried out together, and a shared body of myths, legends, epics, songs etc., and it demonstrates its nationhood by outward antagonism and the defence of its common territory.

It doesn't take much reflection to grasp the fact that by these criteria, there is no African nation as yet, and there never has been. The African nation, though talked about in some Pan-Africanist circles, remains only an aspiration. The languages are diverse; there is no shared body of myths, legends, epics, songs, etc.; and the historical consciousness has never been fostered.

Unsurprisingly, we do not behave like a nation. We do not defend our joint territory. If there was an African nation already in existence today, it would have manifested its nationhood by collectively defending the portions of the common Black African territory that have been under attack by Arabs for the past half century, as in Mauritania and Sudan. In particular, a Black-African army would have gone to defend the people of Darfur from Arab attack since the ethnic cleansing began there. But the rest of Black Africa has left the Mauritanians and Afro Sudanese to their fate, as if they were aliens, and their fate did not concern the rest of us.

The behavioural test of territorial defence aside, the contrast between India, China and Arabia on the one hand, and Black Africa on the other, should highlight the fact that Africa is not and has never been one nation. India was politically unified in the 4th century BC and had shared a common culture for centuries even before that; China was politically unified in the 3rd century BC and has shared a common history and culture ever since. The Arabs became a nation through Mohammed when they finally, and for the first time, shared the same religion and political leadership, and then dispersed, in a burst of imperial aggression, from the Arabian peninsula and spread to occupy the lands from the Persian Gulf westward to the Atlantic coast of Morocco. Thus, the Arabs became a nation 14 centuries ago and have shared a common historical consciousness ever since then. In contrast, it was only in the 20th century, with the European conquest and colonisation of all of Africa, that Black Africans first began to think of themselves as one. And they have yet to be unified politically or culturally, let alone in religion.

Every one of these Black African countries of today is not a nation but a *noyau*, i.e. "a collection of individuals held together by mutual animosity, who could not survive had they no friends to hate". Every one of the Black African countries today is populated by people of many pre-colonial nations and is like a refugee camp into which the populations of many genuine nations have been herded by force.

What would it take to make nations out of these colonial concentration camps that the Europeans carved out in the late 19th century during their scramble to conquer Africa? And what would it take to make the African race into a nation? Lessons could be learnt from Ashanti, Zulu, India, and China. A shared struggle against our Arab enemies would be a good start for a common historical consciousness.

But is it much use trying to turn Black Africa into a nation this late in time? I don't think so. The tasks before us in this 21st century can be accomplished without Black Africa becoming a nation. Fostering Black African unity through various methods is more feasible and desirable. It would be much easier to turn SADC and ECOWAS into nations, into modern superpowers, than to start doing what India and China did three millennia ago by conquest.

VI: Racial Privacy

Some continentalist Pan-Africanists have claimed that a Pan-Africanism that excludes the Arabs is xenophobic toward Arabs, is exclusivist and guilty of Black racism. That is a false and mischievous claim that only serves the Arab interest. Those who make it either do not understand xenophobia or they are up to mischief. Let me show why.

The scarecrow of Black racism/xenophobia/exclusivism, etc.

Is it xenophobic to exclude your enemy from your family meeting? Do you even invite your best friend to a family meeting, let alone a proven enemy? There is such a thing as racial privacy. Just like family privacy, it should be inviolable. It entitles blacks to exclude non-blacks from organizations devoted to the liberation and welfare of the Black race. For those who do not know their history of Pan-Africanism, let me point out that this racial privacy principle is a founding tenet of Pan-Africanism as illustrated by the First Pan-African Congress in Paris in 1919, under Du Bois' leadership, when it made an appeal to the post WWI Paris Peace Conference to "give the Negro race of Africa a chance to develop unhindered by other races". And in 1920, the Garvey Movement, in its First International Convention, also declared: "We demand complete control of our social institutions without interference by any alien race or races." (DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF THE NEGRO PEOPLES OF THE WORLD)

In July 2007, I did a piece which, I was told, generated a lot of reactions on the Internet, including the charge of Black racism. It was titled: "USofAfrica, NO! USofBlack-Africa, YES!"

In calling for a United States of Black Africa, as opposed to the USofAfrica of Arabs and Black Africans that is being promoted by Gaddafi, I am merely insisting on Black African Unity in a form that excludes Arabs and thereby preserves our racial privacy and autonomy. Some blacks who are committed to the continentalist US of Africa project, with Black Africans as well as Arabs in it, have seen fit to charge that the concept of a US of Black Africa is exclusivist – is xenophobic to Arabs. But that is not true. It is simply an insistence on our black racial privacy so that we can pursue our Pan-Africanism unhindered by other races, and in particular without interference from our Arab enemies.

This principle of Black racial privacy that I am upholding was also upheld by Stokeley Carmichael and SNCC in the USA in the 1960s during the upsurge of the Black Power Movement there. It was also upheld by Steve Biko and the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa in the early 1970s. In the cases of SNCC and the BCM, the white liberal overseers of Blacks responded by accusing them of "black racism". But SNCC and BCM were not cowed; they refuted the charges and went ahead to organize as blacks-only outfits.

This charge of xenophobia when blacks want to organize themselves, by themselves and for themselves, is a variant of the usual charge of 'black racism'/exclusivism and what not. This is usually made by the white overseers who do not want blacks to break free from their white supremacist control. The new twist is that the enemy's charge, false though it is, is being made by black Africans who parade themselves as Pan-Africanists. Let me remind you that our white enemy's attempt to deny us racial privacy goes back all the way to plantation slavery days when the slave-masters lived in fear of rebellion by the slaves. To minimize rebellion, the masters did everything they could to prevent the slaves from getting together all by themselves, lest they plot rebellion.

Charging "black racism" when blacks want to exercise their right to racial privacy is an update of the slave-masters' ancient ploys. The charge is made plausible by the fallacious, hidden premise that an outfit that is black and mono-racial in membership is *ipso facto* racist or black supremacist.

But is a blacks-only association racist? No, it is not. Unfortunately, many of our Black African intellectuals have been brainwashed to think it is. This false doctrine is one of the greatest obstacles to Black African solidarity and unity. It sets us up to be manipulated by the white racists who dread to see blacks come together by themselves lest we organize to liberate ourselves from their white supremacist system in which Black Africans are trapped. The doctrine is a scarecrow with which liberal white supremacists delight to frighten independent-minded black Africans back into their racist mental control. To help us stop falling prey to this enemy trick, let us learn from how Steve Biko dealt decisively with the charge.

In the early 1970s, the young Steve Biko, in building his Black Consciousness Movement, developed the much-needed therapy for this our integrationist mania and our fear of being dubbed a black segregationist, black racist, separatist, exclusivist and what have you. Among other things, he correctly argued that integration was a false antithesis to segregation/apartheid, and that the correct antithesis was Black solidarity/unity. For the specific context of apartheid South Africa, he argued that:

> It is time we killed this false political coalition between blacks and whites as long as it is set up on a wrong analysis of our situation … (and because) it forms at present the greatest stumbling block to our unity. … The basic problem in South Africa has been analysed by liberal whites as being apartheid. … For the *liberals*, the thesis is apartheid, the antithesis is non-racialism, but the synthesis is very feebly defined. They want to tell the blacks that they see integration as the ideal solution. Black Consciousness defines the situation differently. The *thesis* is in fact a strong white racism and therefore, the *antithesis* to this must, ipso facto, be a strong solidarity amongst the blacks on whom this white racism seeks to prey (Biko [1987]. *I Write What I Like,* p. 90).

And Biko further observes, quite correctly, that:

> The concept of integration … is full of unquestioned assumptions. … It is a concept long defined by whites and never examined by blacks. … (It is one of the) concepts which the Black Consciousness approach wishes to eradicate from the black man's

> mind. … Black Consciousness is an attitude of mind and a way of life, … the realisation by the black man of the need to rally together with his brothers around the cause of their oppression – the blackness of their skin – and to operate as a group to rid themselves of the shackles that bind them to perpetual servitude (Biko, pp. 91-92).
>
> Biko, the Black Consciousness prophet, further argued that, in South Africa:
> As long as blacks are suffering from inferiority complex – a result of 300 years of deliberate oppression, denigration and derision – they will be useless as co-architects of a normal society. … Hence what is necessary as a prelude to anything else that may come is a very strong grass-roots build-up of black consciousness such that blacks can learn to assert themselves and stake their rightful claim (Biko, p. 21).

And Biko drives his point home thus:

> Those who know, define racism as discrimination by a group against another for the purposes of subjugation or maintaining subjugation. In other words one cannot be a racist unless he has the power to subjugate. What blacks are doing is merely to respond to a situation in which they find themselves the objects of white racism. We are in the position in which we are because of our skin. We are collectively segregated against – what can be more logical than for us to respond as a group? When workers come together under the auspices of a trade union to strive for the betterment of their conditions, nobody expresses surprise in the Western world. It is the done thing. Nobody accuses them of separatist tendencies. Teachers fight their battles, garbage men do the same, nobody acts as a trustee for another. Somehow, however, when blacks want to do their thing the liberal establishment seems to detect an anomaly. This is in fact a counter-anomaly. The anomaly was there in the first instance when the liberals were presumptuous enough to think that it behoved them to fight the battle for the blacks (Biko, p. 25).

Biko's full critique of integration should be required reading by all Black Africans today. This Black Consciousness therapy helped to produce a new breed of black freedom fighter in South Africa, the self-confident type, unconfused and uncrippled by fears implanted by false liberal doctrines like integration and non-racialism. It produced self-confident blacks who insisted on doing things for themselves and all by themselves, and who did not feel they had to prove themselves to whites. And this new breed proved decisive in the victory against apartheid.

Now, Biko's argument applies with equal force to the matter of integration between Arabs and their Black African victims in a USofAfrica.

Portrait of a Black Racist

Finally, let me ask: What would it take to be the black racist that white racists accuse separatist blacks of being? What would a black racist look like? For a blacks-only association to be racist, it would additionally have to be black supremacist in doctrine or practice, i.e. it would have to be a mirror image in black face of the KKK in the USA, or the Nazi Party in Germany or the National Party in Apartheid South Africa.

It would have to assert or seek to implement the superstition that there is a hierarchy of races; that the black race is inherently and inevitably (biologically or by theological or pseudo-scientific decree) superior to all other races; and that Blacks are the master race, ordained to rule all others. It would have to believe or declare the black equivalent of what Apartheid South Africa's Prime Minister, Hendrik Verwoerd, said: "I believe in the supremacy of the white man. … and I am prepared to maintain it by force."

Monoracialism does not say or imply any of the above. So the equation of black monoracialism with black racism is fallacious.

I do not know of any blacks who assert or have asserted such. Do you?

Black racial privacy is our right and duty, and it is not racist!

I urge you: Listen to Biko! Do not listen to our white supremacist enemies, Arab or European, or to their black megaphones in our midst. Do not listen to these pro-Arab Fifth Columnists, these traitors at the top, who are masquerading as Pan-Africanists. Listen to Biko; listen to Du Bois; listen to Garvey and listen very well: *Black Africans, like any other race, have a duty and a right to organize themselves, by themselves and for themselves, without interference from other races*. Only the enemies of Blacks would question that right. Racial privacy is not black racism nor Nazism nor fascism nor xenophobia. Insist on our racial privacy whenever it helps us protect ourselves. Don't be intimidated by this scarecrow charge that is based on the fallacy that a mono-racial black outfit is ipso facto black supremacist and therefore racist.

Like Garvey said: "Go ahead, Negroes, and organize yourselves! … To suggest that there is no need for Negro racial organization … is but to, by the game of deception, lay the trap for the destruction of [our] people. …" (*Philosophy and Opinions II*: 16) "Opposition to race independence is the weapon of the enemy to defeat the hopes of an unfortunate people." (African Fundamentalism)

VII: Which Africa?

For avoidance of doubt and deadly confusions, it is necessary for each Pan-Africanist to specify which Africans, and which Africa, is the constituency of concern. This is very important because the African continent is no longer racially homogeneous.

Many millennia ago, before the Ice Age, before raciation in Europe and Asia produced the non-black races, Africa, and indeed the whole world, was populated by blacks only. Even until the era when whites began to infiltrate and settle in Africa some four thousand years ago, Black Africa was co-extensive with Africa, the continent. And "Black Africans" and "Africans" would have been synonymous terms. For that era, it is not necessary to speak of Black Africans, as all Africans were black. But now, when white invaders – Arab and European – with their assorted non-black camp followers from Asia have settled in large chunks of the African continent, it has become important to indicate which Africans, and which Africa, one is committed to.

It is therefore necessary to talk of "Black Africa" or "sub-Saharan Africa" when referring to the territory still remaining in the possession of Black Africans.

Glibly talking of Africans without specifying whether the term is being used for the indigenous blacks or for whoever now lives on the landmass is sloppy, and has been a source of political confusion and potential disaster for the Black Africans.

Some Pan-Africanists object to the use of the term Black Africa. Some do so claiming that imperialists have imposed terms like "Black Africa" and "sub-Saharan Africa" to drive a wedge between the Black Africans to the south and their Arab African "brothers" to the north.

Of course that is just nonsense. *There are no Arab Africans, only Arab invaders of Africa*. The deep racial and cultural and political divide between the Arab settler colonizers now in North Africa and the indigenous Black Africans is no fiction, no invention of the imperialists. It is a deluded continentalist doctrine that prevents some from recognizing that long-standing fact of life. It is our duty to ourselves to recognise it. We gloss over it to our own peril, like the fool who insists that a python has become his brother by taking over part of his family compound.

Some others object to the terms "Black Africa" and "sub-Saharan Africa" on the grounds that, by so restricting our designation, we concede to the Arab invaders the northern part of our continent. They say the entire continent is ours and we must keep the designation to remind us of our duty to recover the enemy-expropriated lands.

That is a fine sentiment, but premature, since we are still losing land to the Arabs. The job we should undertake now is to stop any further Arab expropriation of our lands. When we stop losing more land to the Arab expansionists, and have recovered our entire continent, that would be time enough to drop the term Black Africa. For, by then, all of Africa would once again be co-extensive with Black Africa, making the qualifier superfluous. Until then, let the qualifier keep reminding us that we have a duty to recover the parts of our land seized by Arab and European invaders.

BLACK AFRICA

VIII: Negritude, African Personality, Cultural Unity

AFRISCOPE: Kwame Nkrumah had opposed his concept of 'African Personality' to the concept of 'Negritude.' Are both concepts antithetical or do they converge anywhere?

DIOP: They converge in the sense that both deal in generalities! We must get down to the facts, to the objective apprehendable realities (Great African Thinkers, p. 270).

Comment: Yes, Diop is right. We must get down to the realities, especially to the power realities. As far as the fundamental reality of Black Powerlessness is concerned, the Negritude and African Personality schools (as well as Diop's cultural unity school) are all alike in evading the crucial question of Black Power. Pan-Africanists of the Negritude and African Personality schools are wont to complain about things like skin bleaching and

hair straightening; about those who are addicted to European or Arab attire; about those who are addicted to Arab or European religions, languages or cultures in general. Unfortunately, they fail to notice that these anti-African manifestations are only the cultural symptoms of African powerlessness, symptoms of centuries of Black powerlessness; symptoms that can only go away after we have created enough Black Power to restore prestige to things African.

Cultural Pan-Africanism is fine, but it isn't the heart of the matter. The heart of the matter is Black Power. If you are incensed by disrespect shown to Blacks in their own country by Lebanese, Indians or Europeans, the remedy is not to be found in trumpeting the glories or the unity of African culture but in building Black Power. The Lebanese, or Indian or European, who is a business front for the local Black President, has no reason to respect his black customers. He knows he cannot be sanctioned by anyone for treating his customers or employees like scum. He knows the President is under his economic thumb, and therefore he can, with impunity, behave as disrespectfully to blacks as he likes.
Pan-Africanism today is about building a black superpower in Africa or it is about nothing. Any project that cannot be justified by its contribution to building this black superpower is not worth investing a moment in. Herein lies the gross inadequacy of the various strands of late 20th century Pan-Africanism – be it the Negritude of Senghor, the African Personality of Nkrumah, the Cultural Unity doctrine of Diop, or the continental union project of the OAU/AU. None addresses the vital question of building Black Power.

IX: The problem of names – Negro, African, etc.

We, the indigenous black population of the African continent, are a people without a name. We have been plagued by names bestowed on us by our enemies: to every one of these names, some of us do object, and with good reasons. We, or our homelands have, among other names, been called Negro/Black, Sudan, Zanj, Africa/African, and Moor. The name "African", though not objected to hitherto, has caused a lot of confusion, given the fact that it derives from the name of a continent some parts of which are now occupied by non-indigenous enemies of the indigenes, and some of these non-indigenes are even insisting that they too are Africans.

"Negro" and "Black", terms which allude to the black skin-colour of the indigenes, have a whole load of problems of their own. Strictly speaking, all black-skinned people, whether indigenous to Africa or elsewhere (like India, Australia, Papua New Guinea, or the Pacific Islands) qualify to be called Negro.

Let us now operationally define who we are. First, let's agree on the criteria for membership, for deciding those that belong in our group, and then we can choose a name-tag for our group.

What historical experiences apply to us and uniquely to us? First, our ancestors were indigenous to the continent called Africa and never voluntarily migrated out after the Ice Age.

Second: In the last 2 000 years, we were targeted for enslavement, on the basis of our black skin colour, by whites from West Eurasia – i.e. Arabs, Europeans, Persians, etc.

Anybody today, who has an ancestor for whom these two criteria both hold, belongs to the group we are seeking to name.

If the aforesaid population, the indigenous peoples of the African continent, had given themselves a collective name some 2 000 years ago, all these problems of defining ourselves wouldn't have arisen. But, alas, they didn't. It now falls on us to do just that. Let's suppose they'd called their land Zubanda, and themselves Zubandans. We today would be calling our homelands Zubanda, and ourselves Zubandans. And we would be advocating Pan-Zubandism, and a Zubanda League from which Arabs and Europeans in Africa would exclude themselves and be automatically excluded.

Now, before white settlers from Europe, Arabia, Persia, etc. came to Africa, Zubanda was co-extensive with Africa. But that is no longer the case. Today, Zubanda would, at most, be equivalent to sub-Sahara Africa.

Just as Indians are a people within Asia; and Gujeratis, Bengalis, Tamils, etc. are linguistic subgroups of Indians; and just as Chinese are a people within Asia, and the Cantonese, Hunanese, etc. are subgroups of the Chinese; so too would Zubandans be a people within Africa; and the Zulu, Amhara, Hausa, Igbo, Wolof, etc. would be subgroups of Zubandans. And neither the Boers nor the Arabs in Africa would count as Zubandans. Maybe we should seriously consider finding and adopting a name for ourselves from an indigenous African language; particularly a name whose meaning would be repulsive to Arab and European settlers in Africa. While we search for such a name, we have no option, I think, but to revert to the name Negroes, which our European enemies bestowed on us. It has the supreme merit of having been applied to Black Africans, and Black Africans only, both on the continent and in the Diaspora; it never included the Arabs, Europeans, Indians, etc., who have settled in Africa; and most importantly, none of them would welcome being called Negroes. So, this name is the only one that presently guarantees that they will voluntarily stay away from our organizations. So, in my view, until we come up with an isolating name from a Black African language – a name they will loathe to apply to themselves – Negroes it is.

X: Pan-Africanist issues criterion

What is a Pan-Africanist issue, and what is not? How should we decide?

There is a growing tendency to try to include in the agenda of Pan-Africanism all manner of fashionable issues that are being given wide publicity in the global media, regardless of whether or not they are germane to the mission of Pan-Africanism. Consider the following list put forward in 2009 by some Pan-Africanist youth in Namibia:

"New issues of the 21st century pose serious and important challenges for us all. These 21st century challenges include, amongst others, the consolidation of our democracy, the enhancement of freedoms and rights, the realization of economic transformation, the strengthening of family life, the protection of the environment, culture and the need for greater global interconnectedness. Above these all stands the challenge of providing a strong, results-based and socially liberating education system that secures a better future for generations to come." (*The Politics of Apologetics*, p.2.)

Other fashionable issues that pre-occupy some Pan-Africanists are: circumcision (male as well as female), homosexuality, patriarchy, the MDGs, Poverty Alleviation, Conflict Resolution, War crimes, Xenophobia, peace keeping, the NEPAD agenda, Gender issues, and democracy.

Which of these issues belong in Pan-Africanism and why, and which do not?
Must every issue generated by imperialist propaganda be adopted by Pan-Africanism?
Must issues generated in other societies be imported into the Pan-Africanist agenda?
If not, we must find criteria for deciding which of the issues about which the world is making a noise should rightly belong in Pan-Africanism, bearing in mind that the mission of Pan-Africanism is limited to liberating the Black World from domination by other parts of the world; that Pan-Africanism set out a century ago to liberate the Black race from imperialism, slavery, colonialism and racism. Pan-Africanism is not about curing all the ills and alleged ills in the Black World, let alone all the ills in the world. So it must rigorously choose and limit its agenda to those things which would help our liberation and thereby give us the autonomy to solve our self-defined ills to our own specifications and satisfaction.

And even after we have liberated ourselves, we cannot take on all the ills in the world; we cannot take on even all the ills in Black Africa. Nor can we cure such ills all at one go. So we must prioritize and focus on those that are most important for defending and advancing our interests, those that are most urgent and most amenable to solution at a given time.

Let me propose some types of issues that we should summarily rule out:

Imperialist issues: To import the imperialist proposed MDGs and the NEPAD agenda into Pan-Africanism would be to compromise it by accepting the objectives defined for us by imperialism. For example, poverty alleviation aims only to make poverty sufficiently tolerable to prevent revolt against the imperialist system that creates the poverty of our people. And that is not what Pan-Africanism is about. Pan-Africanism is for the abolition of the system that creates poverty in Pan-Africa, not for pacifying the poor with pittances and ameliorates.

Global human issues – such as climate change, world peace, global justice, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran. These have enough non-Africans to champion them: The rest of humanity can solve such problems as world peace while we focus on our peculiar problems. If a man's village is mustering troops to go to fight the next village, the fellow whose house is on fire has to excuse himself from village duty while he puts out the fire in his home.

We can't admit world peace into the set of Pan-Africanist issues. It would be a dangerous distraction, however much we might support and wish for world peace. In fact, the best thing we could do for world peace is to concentrate on building our own power so as to remove the standing temptation we present to the strong to attack us and thereby disturb our peace and thereby the world's peace. And here is a cautionary example: In 1966, out of internationalist anti-imperialist solidarity, Nkrumah made world peace one of his Pan-Africanist projects: that was how he opened himself to overthrow by the CIA by

leaving on a trip to Hanoi to help arrange for peace in Vietnam. That should be a pertinent lesson to us not to overreach ourselves, not to take on issues that are best left to others. We need to remind some Pan-Africanists that Palestine is not a Pan-Africanist issue. It is an issue between the Arabs and the Israelis, between two groups among our white enemies. As such, we should try to exploit their conflict to our own advantage, and if that is not possible, we should simply ignore it.

So too the so-called War on Terror between the Europeans and the Arabs. We have no business enlisting on either side of their 21st century revival of the Crusades. If we can exploit it to advance our interests, then we should do so; but if we can't, we should stay out of it, and start now figuring out how to exist in safety with the victor, whichever side it turns out to be.

Decoy issues: The issues of homosexuality and sexual preference are decoys. Back in 2006, I responded as follows to an African-American Afrocentrist who was aggressively campaigning against homosexuality:

You see, from the paramount framework of Building Afrikan Power, I can't quite see the Afrocentric relevance of these matters of sexual preference – whether homosexual, heterosexual, lesbian or whatever else – that obsess some Pan-Africanists. I can't see how any particular sexual preference helped cause our powerlessness; or how it can help or impede the building of Afrikan power. So, for me, these are irrelevant, and even decoy, issues that would keep us diverted from where we should be focused – Afrikan power.

This would also be my response to any Pan-Africanist who wants us to make an issue of and campaign against homophobia.

Now, can you imagine? You are at war. Your village is under attack; bombs are falling everywhere, bullets are flying about, killing people right and left; the enemy have broken through your defences; and are massacring your people house to house; and all that two Pan-Africanist "brothers" insist on doing is have a fight and debate over sexual preferences. Man, what would you do if you came upon them? I'd shoot them both as enemy agents trying to divert us from our battle so the enemy can complete his victory! Wouldn't you?

Here is a rule that might help us sort out the relevant from the irrelevant issues: *How does it help or hinder us in building the black power to defeat the imperialisms and colonialisms that are our enemies? If it doesn't do either, then it is not a Pan-Africanist issue.*

Ruled out by this criterion are: homophobia; abstract issues promoted by the lunatic feminazi (radical feminist) fringe like patriarchy, genital mutilation. To see that, consider the following questions:

How would the elimination of patriarchy help Black Africa defeat imperialism and end racism?

How would legalizing or banning homosexuality or homosexual marriage help Black Africa defeat imperialism and end racism?

How would abolition of "genital mutilation" help Black Africa defeat imperialism and end racism? Even democracy (i.e. multi-party electocracy) is not necessarily a Pan-Africanist issue.

For some decades now, multi-party electocracy has been promoted by the imperialists as something every society must practice. Somehow the whole world must admire and import this model from Europe. From their corner the Arabs are pushing sharia. Pan-Africanism must be particularly watchful lest it be pressured or beguiled into trying to remake Africa in the image of Europe and Arabia. As Frantz Fanon warned: if we want to create little Europes in Africa, we may as well ask the Europeans to do it for us. The mission of Pan-Africanism does not include remaking Africa to meet the European or Arab specifications for the good society. To do that would make Pan-Africanism an agent of the very cultural imperialism it set out to fight. We must therefore autonomously formulate our own ideas of the good society and seek to realize them, without smuggling in ideas that the white world would like to impose on the whole world.

So, first things first. If we don't have the power, we can't implement whatever type of society we choose to have in Africa. If we don't create enough power to guarantee our autonomy, we can implement only such reforms as the bigger powers advocate or tolerate. For instance, if we decide that African society must have hermaphrodite kings, we can only make it happen if we have the power to prevent non-Africans from stopping us. China today can decide to have whatever social system it likes, precisely because nobody can interfere and stop her. Same for the USA and the EU. So, our first and paramount task is to build the Black power to secure the autonomy we need to implement whatever we decide we like. Accordingly we must prioritize the building of Black power and postpone discussion of secondary issues till we have created the power to implement whatever we decide about them.

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19. Did Nyerere apostate socialism?

Nsajigwa Isubha-Gwamaka.M

The Arusha Declaration (1967) is the powerful blueprint of Julius Nyerere's philosophy of Ujamaa and self-reliance.

Nyerere's Ujamaa means socialism. However, it is not the scientific, Marxist brand, but a socialism based on African social living systems of the past that was communal based and oriented.

And by self-reliance, he said/meant for a poor country like Tanzania not to rely much on money as the means/engine of development, because we are poor and thus don't have same, but that we must rely instead on a volunteerism work attitude and spirit.

That we can be grateful to whomever "friend" who can give us assistance, however we should make the same the basis of our development. That that given assistance should only be supplementary and not (never) complementary.

That it is upon us by ourselves to chart our course of development. That at the end of the day we should have that pride and dignity of a MAN who has built his own house, rather than the lack of it, or one whose house has been built by someone else.

According to him, *"Ujamaa ni imani na utajengwa na wale wanaoamini misingi yake"* – that is African socialism is a faith, ideal, philosophy that shall be actualised by those who believe in it, its principles.

In fact that is where he differed with A. M. Babu and Shivji, who both seem to be arguing for a Socialist Africa rather than the other way round – African socialism. That was the basis of A. M. Babu's book *"Afrikan Socialism or Socialist Afrika?"*

Likewise Shivji's *"Class struggle in Tanzania" and his "Silent Class struggle"* in which he showed that there are classes in Africa, in the same Karl Marxian scientific context.

To Babu and Shivji, African socialism drawn from our communalism was but a myth. For them socialism is scientific, its principles must be applied anywhere – of course according to the circumstances too.

So Nyerere's socialism could be described as faith, monk-like and inspired religion, him being a Christian, combined with African communalist social living.

Egalitarianism was the basis of Nyerere's socialist ideal/philosophy – that all people are equal, leaders should serve their people rather than being their masters – thus the leadership code, and "villagisation", which was a community of believers working together for a common good – in this case to fight against the scourges of abject poverty, diseases and ignorance.

He lived to "serve others" – thus using his position not to demand or accrue personal

benefits for himself or his family, satisfied with a Spartan lifestyle – once saying during retirement from his presidency that Tanzanians shouldn't give him a lot of presents and gifts to make him too rich, which would close the door to heaven for him, as it was written that it is very difficult for the rich to go to heaven!

He lived to "share with others" what he had, thus allowing other black Africans to use Tanzania as the base for their search for liberation, likewise his tireless assistance for the cause of African liberation.

Even in old age, he kept saying he was reading and re-reading the Arusha Declaration – the basis for his socialism and had found no fault/mistake/pitfall in it, perhaps the only one being that it should now be written in Kiswahili.

He was kind of wondering why the new generation of leadership was fast embracing capitalism – neo-liberalism, this one which according to him we can't compete with in equal terms. He told the leadership that even if they decide now to "bury" socialism, they must still continue practicing self-reliance.

He wondered where the emerging rich entrepreneurs of Tanzania were getting their money from. He wondered if they were paying taxes properly.

Thus his jest to throw away socialism – give it to Americans, Europeans, etc. He wondered why those "giants" themselves were embracing the Arusha Declaration – the socialist leadership code, while we here were throwing it away.

Socialism to him was an ideal, a philosophy, an attitude of mind and a way of life – in his politics and in his private life of farming. It's from that worldview that he acted and reacted to the world.

Did he abandon socialism? No, personally not, but he made it open/optional for those who don't believe in it or its ideal. It is so stipulated in the Tanzanian Constitution as the ideal on which we are to build our country/nation/society. That even if they do abandon socialism, for whatever new "economism" that they are to adopt, they are obliged by necessity to practice self-reliance.

Even for those who were not socialist believers like him, he insisted again and again on nationalism and patriotism, especially from the leaders.

He warned leaders of emerging of classes in Tanzania, saying that they would create a social cancer.

He preached that the Arusha Declaration – with its socialist tenets and ideals embedded – was what gave HOPE to Tanzanians, and that should it be breached, hopelessness with all its accompanying side effects would set in.

He wondered why some ambitious persons want to "buy" (bribe) their way up to be members of Parliament or even to mount the Presidency itself, why? How would they "re-pay the debt" once they got there? Where would they get the money to do that? Which "busi-

ness" would they do at the State House? He said he himself had been there for 23 years and according to him, there was simply no "business" there.

He wanted/wished his party to continue still, to uphold its egalitarian-based Ujamaa principles. He said while the members of parliament had now decided to call themselves *"waheshimiwa"* literally meaning "those to be respected on high", i.e. Honourables, those in the party should continue seeing and calling themselves as "Ndugu" – that is Brethren and Sisters.

He was a bona fide teacher, true philosopher – showing and teaching by parables and by examples concerning what he believed in throughout his life. In one speech he said that in this time/age where socialism has collapsed all over the world, it would take only a mad man to defend its principles, thus he wouldn't do that himself – implying that personally he was still a believer.

He wanted/advocated throughout, for cooperation among all – as citizens and as Africans. He wanted the system/governance that serves the people – *"wananchi"* – the citizens. To him, that system is socialism or rather socialist-oriented.

No to the greedy, especially the leaders and yes to self-sacrifices of the leaders and the citizens alike. His last intellectual work was to translate into Kiswahili Plato's book, The Republic, which contains the leadership accounts on Socrates – the martyr of democracy and treaties on the ideal society and its ideal leadership.

"That the King has to be a Mwalimu, teacher, philosopher or a philosopher has to be the King." It appears that Mwalimu Nyerere himself was communicating with the future generation, to let them learn from him, in the same way as Plato and Socrates, to actualise the Ujamaa ideal.

It's little wonder then that Mwalimu Nyerere is looked upon as a saint – a candidate for canonization in the same way as Mohandas Mahatma Gandhi. Because of what he believed in and what he practiced based on that belief, Mwalimu should be seen as a philosopher, like Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry Thoreau or Felix Adler.

As a head of state, he tried to gravitate his policies towards egalitarianism and socialism. Yes, some mistakes were committed during the implementation of same. However, in the final analysis that didn't mean abandoning its ideals. It only meant maybe the methods of application or implementation were wrong, or that time was not yet ripe for them. However, to its tenet Mwalimu stood firm to the end.

For the sake of "critical analysis", let's supposedly "shift paradigms" so that we things the other way round, and say he abandoned socialism as he jested. What then did he become/embrace thereafter? Seeing his commitment to the end to the Arusha Declaration on which his egalitarianism principles were based, he remained a socialist to his end.

20. The Pan-African upwards trajectory

Dr Mongane Wally Serote

We can no longer speak about us and Africa, purely from an academic position. As African intellectuals, each minute that we use must be a means to find solutions for ourselves, for our continent, and to know how we will as people, contribute to the human experience in the 21st century, so that we can make the world a better place to live in. I therefore wish to suggest that it is absolutely important for us as Africans to settle the issue of our identity. We must place ourselves in the world, among other peoples, and know who we are.

While we are of Maghreb, Sudan-Sahel and Bantu Civilizations, we have criss-crossed these realities. We are at all times, consciously or unconsciously, creating their interdependence, interrelatedness and relationships. We have broken the barriers; we have been crushed into all kinds of other cultures including those from outside of the African Continent. We have created survival cultures and remained present against the greatest odds; and we have to know and understand this, because then, we are now entitled to invent our own definition of us, outside of what has been said about identity.

Thus far, African identity is what we choose it to be. If there is the African Diaspora, geography can no longer define identity for us. If for our survival we created our own informal economic network, which links the length and breadth of the continent, and straddles the world, knowing the impact of economic development on culture, which culture is forever dynamic, consisting of resources of our making and improvised to suit our needs and interests and to sustain us, the economic system will have to adjust to who we are. And lastly therefore, whether it is accepted or not, we are of the world, and history and culture will not only attest to that, but the inherent meaning in the politics, culture, economy and history of the concept of Pan-Africanism, which is not only a definition of who we are, but also a movement informed by a focus on action which sought to unite us, wherever we are, but also, which has as its strategic objective our freedom. Pan-Africanism is a find of the Diasporic Communities, and was not only embraced by Africans on the continent, but its statements were implemented and made a mobilising principle on the continent. Our identity therefore is Pan- Africanist and humanist.

Our Africanness is diverse. While we are bound by the concept *motho ke motho ka batho*, our past, our history tells and teaches us that language has been one of the almost lethal weapons against us. In one meeting of the South African Chapter of the African Renaissance (SACAR), when religion made it impossible for a meeting on the African Renaissance and Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS) to continue, a five-hour deliberation ended with a resolution: "… science, spirituality, and religion are tools which must be used to achieve the renaissance of the continent …". It is also in that meeting and as part of the resolutions that IKS was adopted as a vehicle with the potential to create dialogue, which is most essential and fundamental to the emancipation of Africans and the African continent, between the organic and conventional African intellectuals. Within the social category of IKS, language is one of its components. The African Union (AU), in its pragmatism has also resolved to recognise the boundaries on the continent as defined by Europe, but also it has, in its wisdom, sought to find the language of unity in

the languages of the continent through its language academy. It also seeks to find good governance, democracy, non-sexism, non-racialism – that is also what *motho ke motho ka batho*, a concept found in most African languages, implies. Concepts of NEPAD and lastly, the mobilisation of the masses through AU efforts and structures, all speak to the gains of the singular and collective efforts of the various liberation struggles on the continent. Those struggles span six centuries. That is many, many generations. Those centuries and those generations raise a matter which we as Africans must engage. It is that our relationships with others have never ever been opportunities for our growth, development and good. Our relationships with others have been most devastating. This is another issue of our identity. This is how all of those who have or who are relating to us know us to be. We have allowed others to relate to us in a most devastating manner; others have thought and planned to relate to us in a manner which sought to dehumanise us, as a justification to strip us of all rights, and for subjugation. In those six centuries of nightmare, we did claim our humanity and our right at, indeed, great cost to us. All of these as I have said are truths which speak through the six centuries of subjugation, which speak through generations of suffering Africans.

It is necessary to explore at some length the elements of what African identity is, what it means and why it is important to be lived and expressed.

It is a western academic concept to state that there was something called the slave trade, and that it happened largely, purely because of the number of Africans it affected, in Africa and that it did, if ever this is said, impoverish Africans into the 21st century although it began in the 15th century. In the 21*st* century the African intellectual must approach this matter from a completely different angle. It is not only to understand that it was a tragedy that must never ever repeat itself on the continent, but it is also to know that there is enslavement and enslavement, also emanating from the primary enslavement of Africans. The pillage of Africa by Europe and America is enslavement. Colonialism and apartheid as systems oiled and fine-tuned for the African continent, are systems of enslavement. Knowing this, the African intellectual must plan in the present and into the distant future for generations of Africans to give no respite for the possibility of any kind of enslavement to occur. It is slave mentality to react to the concept of the African Renaissance as a concept of Thabo Mbeki, and not be curious and suspicious about the origin of that thought which bedevils it because it is propagated by him, and also, not probe its intentions which he has defined as processes for the regeneration and rebirth of the African continent.

Our debate as Africans, our probing these statements, must be with the objective to verify and validate them, in doing so, define its intention as a rebirth, a regeneration. Is the question to be asked – if we had never heard of the concept – not: What does it mean? If it means the furtherance of Pan-Africanism within the global context and if it is promoted by Thabo Mbeki, what is the problem? What is the problem if it is aligned to the Nepad process, which insists that any and everywhere where investment happens, it must be proven that it does not conflict with any AU statutes, and also that it must be in consensus with the statutes which seek the development of Africans whether they be in India, Brazil and South Africa agreement on trade and South-South countries or Sino-African agreements? This in my view is the definition of an African Renaissance cadre, because it is a definition of a shift in the African paradigm.

The four pillars of the African Renaissance concept, viz peace, democracy, economic development and the African Peer Review Mechanism, on the continent, by Africans are a strategic objective with the vision for the regeneration and rebirth of Africa. This strategic objective is almost 16 years old, and it is a responsibility of African heads of state and other leaders who must at all times speak for the continent as a whole while also not forgetting their national requirements and priorities. But these national priorities must also be a responsibility of the peoples of the continent. They were ushered in when the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was replaced by the African Union (AU), and a new era and a new leadership, building on the past, guided by the present, and focusing on a liveable future for Africans, emerged and were leading for not only the unity of the continent, but so that the continent finds its new place in human affairs. In unity, African leaders take positions in the G20 meetings, in international matters, bilateral and multilateral discourses, propositions and resolutions. We must not forget the old adage that, "national policy defines foreign policy". If it is so, where would a concept of suspicion regarding the intentions of the African leadership arise from? The elite and the intelligencia are always suspect here. Let me hasten then to trace the root of this, for it is not my intention to be divisive.

How and where must the African identity be probed and formulated? In the past, that identity was forged within the five categories of IKS, which viewpoint and ideology were almost wiped off the memory of Africans, were it not for the role of African organic intellectuals, who, almost bare handed, gave birth to a variety of liberation movements in different parts of the continent. Informed by IKS, which forever was innovated, the liberation movement, whether in the Diaspora or on the continent, until 1994, emerged as volcanoes underneath the plans and intentions of Europe and America which began in the 15th century when enslavement was founded, and which were further consolidated at the Berlin Conference in the 19th century when Europe carved and divided the continent as their property, among themselves.

One of the five categories of IKS is liberatory processes. It is liberatory, for it is a collective thought emanating from Africa for African freedom and peace, and it is processes from which strategies forever emerged and must emerge which ensure that the revolutionary gains of Africa are never reversed or compromised. The challenge regarding this and other categories is that they exist in the minds of Africans, or that whatever is written or recorded about them, except in few cases and in exceptional circumstances, it is not Africans who have written or recorded them. There are these important records and archives available in Europe or America and not on the African continent. With moving time, we are risking to have permanent distortions about the history, culture and politics of our continent as our reality, if this state of affairs persists. Also, as President Nyerere said, we must find correct references so that we can probe and express authentic African history, culture and politics, within the concept and context of African processes. An example: the pretentious and foreign media in South Africa refers to the gains of the struggle for freedom as a "miracle" and the freedom fighters as a "lost generation". Question: Is there a primary school, a high school and a university on the continent that is African? This question again raises the issues of identity. Are the governments on the African continent based on objective African reality? Let me again assert: it is necessary to go to some length to explore the elements of what African identity is, what it means and why it is important.

Objective reality has thrust us into the global village. We enter this village as what and do what, for whom and with whom, given our history? Where must these questions be asked, by whom and why? If a myriad of African voices emerge to discuss the Chinese presence on the African continent, would they be coordinated; would they be ones which, not based on fear, ask the right questions; would they be informed by the truism that relations are a basis for opportunity if based on a principle of voluntarism and obligation emanating from principle, and a voluntarism seeking mutual opportunities from growth and development? How is this done? Does this characterise the African and Chinese relations? Can Africa look at itself beyond colour, height, language, religion and seek unity and therefore seek an objective view to relate to the world?

The 21st century, which is 10 years old now, is an African century. It is also a century of knowledge. It is characterised by the four African Renaissance pillars that I named above. Besides governments, where and by whom must a review be made to assess the 10 years? The African Peer Review Mechanism reports that emerge from about 23 countries of the continent – what do they say? Is what they say part and parcel of the African masses' consciousness or are they proof to the West that we are this and that and therefore deserve aid? Which African institutions, besides government and the foreign African media, must evaluate the reports singularly and collectively?

Let me raise another of the vital African questions: Where, in all that I have said, do the organic intellectuals stand? Is it necessary and urgent that the organic and conventional intellectuals must find a point of reference for dialogue and engagement? Is IKS part of this reference point, and also, is an African Renaissance programme and projects part of the equation? In raising this matter in this way, I must hasten to put in place the three focal points which must guide our entering and exploring IKS and its vital and catalytic use in developing people, which people are the developers of the universe. The three focal points in my view are: innovation, protection and promotion. Because IKS resides with organic intellectuals, and they preside over it, it is a basis from which the conventional intellectuals, who preside on Western knowledge and on whom it resides on the continent, can explore entry points with the objective to seek a common point of reference and a new discourse on the continent for invention and discovery and her prosperity. It is on the basis of this common point of reference and from the inventions and discoveries that Africa can enter the world in its own right, from its own unique contributions which can explore the vast resources that reside on the continent.

The promotion of IKS from Africa must be based on its quality products. The question which we must ask and answer then is: What must inform the quality of the products and what must the products express? Pan-Africanism, which must motivate African patriotism and also seek a humane expression within the human dynamic and diversity, must as always anchor on African knowledge and evolve from an interaction with other knowledge, and that is where its innovation begins and evolves, and it is for this reason that it must be protected, for to protect it is to protect the right of its practitioners to develop and to express their fundamental human right of self-expression on all platforms among peers. This requires, as the Afrikaners would say, a toenadering of the organic and conventional African intellectuals. It would be a process which emancipates and releases organic intellectuals from self-insulation, suspicion, secrecy and alienation from world activity, but also, it would be a process which releases conventional intellectuals from chauvin-

ism, alienation from themselves, and emancipation from Western culture which forever contradicts indigenous peoples all over the world. It will be from this new discourse and new activity that the regeneration and rebirth of the African and therefore of the African continent will begin. We will have begun a social revolution which will be anti-tribalism and anti-racial, as we criss-cross Maghreb, Sudan-Sahel and Bantu Civilizations. More important also, we will be forging a new identity based on our objective reality, which can resist the divisive strategy of the West against us.

SECTION IV

Views from the Afro-Arab Borderlands, with particular reference to Sudan

21. Mauritania and Sudan, who is Better in Arabisation?

Samba Diallo

Introduction

This paper is, first, an attempt to show how military rules in Mauritania and Sudan have sharpened the racial contradictions between African and Arab populations in the two countries. This has been undermining the possibilities for a peaceful progress towards real democratisation as is currently happening in many other African countries. Secondly, attempts will be made to present the views of the ruling regimes and political groups of the North of Sudan as well as those of the African Liberation Forces of Mauritania (FLAM) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Finally, I put forward some recommendations, which I hope will contribute to the struggle for peace and democracy in Mauritania and Sudan.

Mauritania and Sudan are situated geographically and culturally on the divide between Arabised Africans of the north and the Africans of the south. The interaction of these two groups breeds a complex cultural diversity as well as the ethnic tensions in the two countries. The original inhabitants of these areas were Africans. Black Mauritanians were one of the founders of the Empires of Ghana (600-1706), Mali (1706-1350; 1706-1350) and Songhai (1350-1585). The Sudanese were part of Ancient Egypt. When Egypt was destroyed they founded Nubia and Funj kingdoms, which survived up to the 19th century. The Arab influx into the area began following the emergence of Islam in Arabia in the 7th century. As northern Sudan was invaded via Egypt in 1820 by Muhammad Ali, Othman governor of Egypt, northern Mauritania was raided via Morocco by the Almoravid Berbers in the 16th century (D. Daxxel, 1989).

The Anglo-Egyptian colonisation of Sudan and France's colonisation of Mauritania did a lot to place political power under Arab control in the two countries.

The populations

Since independence, both nations have been suffering from massive economic and social problems created by violent political and sectarian regimes, ethnic tensions as well as the ecological catastrophes of the Sahel. With just 2.5 million people and 1 037 000 square km, the demographic situation in Mauritania is a taboo, as successive Arab regimes try to build the myth that the country is exclusively Arab. Therefore, the results of the exhaustive population census taken in 1976-77 or the one conducted in 1988 with help from the World Bank and the UN have never been published. Researchers usually depend on surveys made, respectively, by "la Societe d'études de dévelopement économique et social", a French research centre, and by "la Mission socio-économique de la Vallée du Fleuve Sénegal", an international group. The combination of the results obtained by these two institutions and statistical extrapolations suggest that 45% of the

population of Mauritania are black Africans, Fulani, Soninke and Wolof, 30% Arabo-Berbers and 25% black slaves (Haratine) (Bourgi & Weiss, 1989).

Sudan is Africa's largest country with over two million square km and 23 million people. The last census which gathered information about the size of the different ethnic groups in 1955-56 estimated that 40% were "Arabs" living mainly in the central regions of the North, 30% Nubians, Beja and Ingessana, living in the North, East and West plus 30% Nilotic groups of the Dinkas and Nuer in the South (Africa Watch, 1990). More than 50% of the people are Muslims, while the rest follow African religions or Christianity. Attempts to deny the cultural reality of the two countries by Arab regimes in both countries have put the existence of Mauritania and Sudan as sovereign nations at stake.

To rescue Mauritania and Sudan from imminent disintegration, the racial and sectarian issues, resulting from acute identity crisis, have to be solved. Such a solution should be based on the principle of national unity within the cultural diversities in the two countries. Equal treatment of the diverse groups by public persons and organs should be absolute (D. Daxxel, 1989). This presupposes real democracy within a federal form of government, which can house and permit the various communities to manage national, regional or local matters that affect them directly. In this way each group would contribute to the nation as a whole as well as gain from the contribution of the others. The Africans have no problem in respecting the Arabs to use and promote their culture at all levels, as well as maintain contact with the Arab World as long as this does not harm their vital interest. In return they demand the same from their Arab compatriots.

Given far-sighted national vision, socio-economic philosophy, political courage and ideological maturity, Sudanese and Mauritanians will be able to sit together and answer questions such as why there has developed a culture of dictatorship, racial inequality, chronic civil war, famine and economic underdevelopment. Once they answer these questions honestly, they would find that it is possible to agree on a lasting solution to the crises that have beset their nations since the two ethnic groups came into contact with one another. This is what both FLAM and SPLA have been advocating and fighting for since their inception in 1983. Both movements are national in character and democratic in scope. They consider federalism to be the most appropriate government system for cultural diversity as well as a guarantee against dictatorship. Due to its decentralist nature, real federalism is incompatible with dictatorships (W.S. Livingston, 1988). Otherwise, it will be somehow premature to talk about democratisation in Mauritania and Sudan. The repeated failure of democratic experiments in Sudan is proof enough (M. Khalid, 1987). Even architects of Apartheid, like F.W. De Klerk, have realised that racism and democracy are antitheses.

What role should the AU and Arab League play?

The AU (minus its Arab member states) and the Arab League should participate in any negotiation for a solution to the conflict in Sudan and Mauritania, because the conflict is connected to the whole issue of Afro-Arab relations. Thus, both forums should join hands in order to secure peace for future generations and their way of life or the confiscation of their lands will result in war. People were either murdered or illegally detained, while more than 200 000 were deported out of their country to refugee camps in Senegal or

Mali between 1989 and 1990.

Mauritanian Head of State Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya's terror campaign began in September 1986, when he overreacted to the publication by FLAM of the Manifesto of the Oppressed Negro Mauritanians in April 1986. More than a hundred black intellectuals were arrested, charged with fomenting national discord and sentenced to long-term imprisonment with hard labour in September 1986. Their only crime was to list up the injustices suffered by blacks under Arab rule, and to call on the authorities as well as other political forces for a national dialogue to address the root cause of these historical injustices before it was too late.

Taya was to accelerate his war on blacks in October 1987, when he mounted a massive purge and detention of African army personnel. Three black officers were summarily executed after being falsely accused of plotting to overthrow the regime. Four black political activists died of torture at Walata in 1988. Taya's anti-black campaign culminated in the 1989-90 deportation of black Mauritanians to Senegal and Mali following a border conflict with Senegal in 1989. This conflict is a direct result of the Mauritanian crisis which has begun to spill over to neighbouring countries. Again Taya launched a new operation to detain without charge or trial 4 000 blacks during the last months of 1990. Some 457 persons were murdered in government custody. The murderers were apparently celebrating in advance a promised victory by Saddam Hussein in Iraq in what he termed as "the mother of all battles". This speculation was made more valid when the government ordered the release of black political prisoners on the same day Saddam admitted his defeat (Bilaal, No. 2/1991).

Sudan under General Omar El Bashir

The political picture in Sudan under General Omar el Bashir, who seized power in Sudan on June 30, 1989, is as bleak as that of Mauritania, particularly with regard to the concentration of political power in the hands of one man who mobilises his own community to wage war on the other. What makes this one particularly dangerous is the fact that it is an admixture of raw military rule and fanatical Muslim fundamentalism that is committed to both the forced Arabisation and Islamisation of Sudan by the sword. This evil alliance has accelerated the civil war in South Sudan where it uses famine as a weapon of terror. Moreover, the disputed Shari'a laws are being implemented, free political activities banned and women are being intimidated and harassed in order to force them back to the kitchen (The Economic Intelligence Unit, 1991).

Military rule in Mauritania and Sudan

A military coup d'etat means that the armed forces of a country, relying on their virtual monopoly of the means of violence, assume control of the central government and that this seizing of power is accomplished in a sudden and rather unexpected fashion (S. Wiking, 1983). Governments can also be toppled as a result of direct foreign intervention, as happened several times in Tchad (the Republic of Chad), or popular uprisings like those in Sudan in 1964 and 1985, as well as civil wars as happened recently in Ethiopia, Somalia and Liberia. Mauritania has experienced two successful coups and two palace coups as well as several coup attempts, since the army deposed the country's first presi-

dent, Mokhtar Ould Daddah on July 10, 1978. Sudan was the first black African country and the second in the continent, after the 1952 in Egypt, to experience a military coup in 1958. This was followed by three more coups in 1969, 1985 and 1989, and several bloody coup attempts.

Background behind the coups

As early as in 1956, Cheik Anta Diop warned that unless "we took care" the African continent upon independence would go down the road of "South Americanisation" (CH.A. Diop, 1974). And again in 1977, he noted that the political instability of the continent had become a reality to the point that we couldn`t even talk about "balkanisation" since the Balkan regimes were stable, whereas in Africa we had a change of regime almost every week or month (ibid). Following the first coup in Mauritania in 1978, government reshuffles, palace coups and coup attempts were so routine that the Mauritanian ambassador to Qatar, Samba Jully, said that he had given up writing names of presidents or ministers when sending reports home as the concerned individual would likely have lost his job before the reports reached him. Orders to hang pictures of members of the Comite Militaire de Redressement National (CMRN) at the entrance of Mauritanian embassies, proved impossible to follow.

What are the reasons behind the coups?

Coups are usually staged in the name of economic reform and social justice, yet they seldom accomplish either. Most coups were nonetheless welcomed by the African citizenry whose lives were already so difficult that any change was viewed as an agreeable alternative. Such desperate attitudes have been the case in Mauritania and Sudan, where coups have always been met with jubilation, on one hand for getting rid of the old oppressors and on the other a hope that the new regime would do something to end the political nightmare it has just inherited from the demised regime(s). As David Lamb put it, "… power is merely transferred within an inner circle of cousins, friends and soldiers" (D. Lamb, 1983).

This is very true in the situation in Mauritania and Sudan, where army officers are recruited and promoted along ethnic and sectarian lines to preserve the status quo. This is what Cheik Anta Diop described as the lack of national leaderships which can set an example which would make coups more difficult. Thus, when the only organised force in the country – the army – ceases to respect the civilians in power, it will seize power for itself (CH.A. Diop, 1974).

However, the army takeover only perpetuates the same evils it pretended to eliminate, because the army has not been educated along patriotic and political lines. The army is neither disposed, trained, nor qualified to run a government. Its job should be to defend national sovereignty, carry out rapid emergency operations, construct bridges, roads and railways as well as save the environment, etc. African armies have become mere tools of civilian wielding power, for their very narrow interests. Without such army backing, apartheid-like minority regimes would have never survived in Mauritania or Sudan. So, instead of doing the dirty job for corrupt politicians, the soldiers do it for themselves to the exclusion of their rivals. It doesn't need much experience or intelligence to do a bad

job and do it badly.

In addition to the racial, sectarian and political factors behind the coups, foreign interests in Mauritania and Sudan often play a direct role in coups as well as their chances for survival. Jaafa Nimeiri's 1969 Sudan coup was said to be inspired and supported by Egypt, while Ould Taya's Mauritanian coup in 1984, was apparently executed with the help or at least a blessing from France.

This coup followed a visit to Mauritania by French President Francois Mitterand, who was escorted on a desert safari by the army chief of staff, Taya. Upon his return to France, Mitterand persuaded Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla over the telephone to join him at the Francophone summit in Burundi, thus Taya took the chance and jumped onto Haidalla's seat (Liberation, 1984).

The first coups

Saleck-Bouceif

As already cited above, Sudan's first military coup took place on November 17, 1956, whereas Mauritania's one occurred on July 10, 1978. The former was led by Gen. Ibrahim Abbud while the latter was led by Lt. Col. Ould Saleck. Both were chiefs of staff in their respective countries. The coup in Mauritania did replace the one-party regime of Mokhtar Ould Daddah, whose own "Parti du Peuple Mauritanien" had controlled political life since the country was created by France in 1960, while Abbud's coup came to fill the political vacuum following sectarian politicians' failure to agree on how to run Khartoum. The new military regimes followed the tradition of suspending the constitution, parliament, banning political parties and declaring a state of emergency. In Mauritania, a "Comité Militaire du Redressement National" (CMRN) was set up to run the country.

In Sudan, it was the politicians themselves who invited the army to take over. In Mauritania, the army claimed that it intervened in order to end corruption, to prevent economic ruin and division as well as to create democratic institutions. The new rulers declared that the armed forces were "the ultimate owners of national legitimacy" and the intervention resulted from "their belief in their responsibility". Despite the fact that the coup was essentially related to a desire to end Mauritania's involvement in the Sahara War, the intervention was not aiming at any radical change in Mauritania's internal affairs (S. Wiking, 1983). However, the army did genuinely want to withdraw from the Sahara dispute in which it was exhausted by the Algerian/Libyan backed Polisario Front. Polisario was able to raid the capital Nouakchott twice on June 8, 1976 and on July 3, 1977, as well as capture the mining town of Zouerate for several hours on April 30, 1977. Polisariso Secretary General, El Ouali, was killed while leading the first raid on Nouakchott.

Despite the defeat, the power position of the army increased enormously as a result of the war. Its numbers increased from 2 000 men in 1976 to 18 000 at the time of the coup in 1978. The army's share in GNP increased from 30% in 1976 to 40% in 1977. This increase came at a time when Polisario had effectively crippled mineral export from the port of Nouadhibou, thus depriving Mauritania of over 80% of its export income. Foreign debt increased from US$140 million in 1973 to 700 in 1978, while most development

projects such as the copper mine at Akjoujt, pastoralist schemes in the south, the oil refinery at Nouadhibou, etc. were practically put aside. The government was so broke that it had to borrow money from the local banks to pay its employees at the end of June 1978 (Piere Robert Baduel, 1990).

On the ethnic front, the Berbers who were reluctant to fight their brothers of the Sahara from the outset became more opposed to the war as it claimed more lives. Prominent Berber Mauritanian politicians such as Ahmed Ould Baba Miski defected to the Polisario. The Negro Africans, whose members made up the bulk of the armed forces, felt more and more that the war was an inter-Beydane (Arabo Berber) affair for which they had no reason to give their lives. More Berbers into the country meant increased racism against them (D. Daxxel, 1989). The deployment of 9 000 Moroccan troops in northern Mauritania together with French air cover from bases in Dakar in 1977, discredited Ould Daddah further.

It was under these circumstances that the army intervened. The first period was the post Ould Daddah's period. It did not last long as Ould Saleck was deposed in a palace coup by Colonel Ahmed Ould Bouceif in April 1979. The only political move Saleck took during his rule was to set up a national council which was supposed to prepare for a return to civilian rule. Black politicians boycotted the opening of the forum, because they were as usual under-represented. Out of 70 appointed members, only 10 were blacks. Bouceif was planning to revive alliance with Morocco and thereby start the Sahara War against the Polisario Front while crushing student strikes at home. But he died in a plane crash near Dakar on May 27, 1979. The strikes were staged by black students who demanded educational reforms so that African languages would be taught in schools on equal terms with the newly imposed Arabic.

Haidalla

Bouceif was succeeded by Col. Ould Haidalla from the Saharawi tribe of Rgeibat. His open support for the Polisario front was therefore attributed to this tribal connection. Haidalla's main problem was his lack of tribal base within the country to back his policies which swung more to the left than right. However, he managed to sign a peace treaty with the Polisario on August 5, 1979 after renouncing all claim on the West Sahara and recognising the Saharawi right to self-determination (A. Gerteiny, 1982). Haidalla also introduced educational reforms which recognised African languages to be taught in schools, he "abolished" slavery on July 5, 1980 and introduced Shari'a Law and established the Structure for the Education of the Masses in 1981. He further appointed civilian Sid Ahmed Ould Bneijara as prime minister between December 1980 and April 1981. Bneijara was sacked following a visit to Libya during which he signed a union treaty with Libya on 18 April 1981, apparently without consulting his chief (Pierre Robert Baduel, 1990).

Sudan

The "17th of November (1958) Coup" of Gen. Abbud was a handover by the then Prime Minister Abdalla Khailil of the Uuuma Party. The direct reason was said to be the danger of losing a vote of confidence in the parliamentary session to be held on November 17, 1958 (S.A. Kabalo, 1988). Abbud declared that it was aimed at saving the nation from

politicians' misrule (S. Wiking, 1983). Both Sadiq Al Mahdi and Sayyid Al Mirgani supported the regime on the understanding that the army would not stay in power longer than necessary (Africa South of Sahara, 1991). Abbud assured the country that his aim was the restoration of stability and sound administration, and the fostering of cordial relations with the outside world, especially Egypt.

The coup came amid deep political division within the ruling sects in the North and threats of separation in the South and other marginalised regions. Southern deputies boycotted discussion on the draft constitution in May 1958 because it excluded the option of federation. On June 16, 1972 Saturnino Lohure, the leader of the Federal Bloc, declared: "The South claims to federate with the North, a right that the South undoubtedly possesses as a consequence of the principle of free self-determination, which reason and democracy grant to a free people. The South will at any moment separate from the North if and when the North so decides, directly or indirectly subjection of the South" (Africa S. Sahara, 1991).

Thus, the civil war in the South was settled on the basis of regional autonomy for the three southern provinces. A regional People's Assembly for the South was established at Juba with representatives in the national people's assembly in Khartoum and an executive council. This brought peace and stability between the South and North for the first time. Confidence between the two regions was on the point of being established when Nimeiri launched a campaign to destroy his only significant achievement. He violated his own constitution by dividing the South into three regions, dissolving the regional assembly and government and transferring southern troops to the North. "In the course of his 16-year rule, Nimeiri had used and abused all ideologies; only religion was left for him. Thus, he conjured up his so-called Islamic laws and ambushed the nation with the September decrees" (M. Khalid, 1987).

Nimeiri's fall

In March 1985, Nimeiri was to announce new hard measures to keep relations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These measures led to the uprising in March and April 1985, which overthrew the dictator (S.A. Kabalo). Like the popular revolution in 1964, it was aborted by the intervention of the Generals. On April 6, 1985, Nimeiri was replaced by a Transitional Military Council (TMC) led by the chief of staff and defence minister, Gen. Swar al Dahab and composed of top officers (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1990). Nimeiri's regime was rapidly dismantled as the Sudanese Socialist Union and the hated Security Organisation were abolished. The generals claimed that they intervened to prevent bloodshed. However, "the truth of the matter about the fear of bloodshed is that if the people had taken over, they would have thrown the generals in jail and they would have been made to account for the crimes of the May regime" (J. Garang, 1987). Elections were held in the North in 1986 as the war continued in the South. Traditionalist parties returned to power just to repeat their old mistakes.

Over a three-year period the Umma Party leader, Sadiq al Mahdi, who had been prime minister between 1966 and 1967, led three coalition governments. The coalitions included all mainstream political parties in the country. On June 30, 1989, on the day that the cabinet was due to ratify the DUP-SPLA agreement for peace talks, there was a coup

by Islamic fundamentalist officers. The coup was led by Gen. Omar el Bashir, who immediately adopted a series of draconian measures (Africa Watch, 1990).

Racism in Mauritania and Sudan

According to Mauritanian and Sudanese laws it is illegal to discriminate against persons or groups because of their race or colour. While both countries have ratified the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (adopted on June 26, 1981), Mauritania has not ratified the main international treaties adopted by the General Assembly of the UN to protect human rights throughout the world, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted in 1966) and the Covenant against Torture and other cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted in 1984) (Amnesty International, 1990). By ratifying the African Charter both countries have undertaken to respect: The right to enjoy human and civil rights and freedoms without discrimination based on race, colour, language, sex, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that black people in both countries have been the victims of racial discrimination committed by successive Arab regimes, who have denied them not only the most basic cultural, social, political and economic rights, but the right to life and citizenship.

Mauritanian regimes have gone as far as to deny the existence of black people in the country. In an interview with Jeune Afrique on January 1, 1990, Ould Taya of Mauritania declared that, "Mauritania cannot be in the process of Arabisation as it is already an Arab country". In Sudan, "northern city-dwellers often depict the presence of people from the West and South around those cities as a 'black cordon' meant to suffocate the cities and dilute their racial purity, which is a conspiracy hatched by some weird foreign power, such as African governments, the Christian Church and even Zionism against Arabism" (Mansour Khalid, 1987).

Yet, each and every Arab regime that shoots itself into power will accuse its predecessor of endangering national unity. However, same regimes will describe any effort made by people of the South to improve their lot or react against northern racism, as anti-Arab "racism" (M. Khalid, 1987). The regimes cynically do exploit the war situation into which they have plunged their nations to justify the suppression of democratic rights. The northerners wish to have the monopoly of both racism and anti-racism at the same time. Whereas Arab regimes commit their crimes with a good conscience by misusing Islam and mobilising Arab support, African countries turn a deaf ear and blind eye (D. Daxxel, 1989).

Anyone who is in doubt about the official racism against black people in Mauritania and Sudan should just consider that:

1. All the 1 000 killed during a government organised massacre in Mauritania, or 700 massacred at el Jebelein in Sudan in 1989, happened to be black Africans. Blind killings of blacks have become routine in both countries.
2. There was not a single Arab among the 200 000 Mauritanian citizens who were deported to Senegal or Mali. In Sudan blacks have been driven away from their lands in the west by Arab settlers, supported by the Sudanese and Libyan governments

(Africa Watch, 1990).

3. While black Mauritanians were being driven out of their homes to refugee camps, Arab refugees from Senegal, Mali or West Sahara were welcomed into Mauritania, where they were given citizenship and resettled on land whose rightful owners were deported. Sudan has generously allowed refugees from Ethiopia free residence in Khartoum, while deporting its black citizens from the national capital.
4. Slavery is practiced exclusively by Arab Mauritanians and Sudanese on non-Arab citizens in both countries.
5. Upon the introduction of Shari'a laws in Mauritania and Sudan, respectively in 1980 and 1983, savage punishments like amputation and flogging have mainly been applied on blacks by exclusively Arab judicial authorities in the two countries.

The origin and effect of racism in Mauritania and Sudan

As was noted above, racism in both countries has its origin in the ways Arabs came into contact with black Africans. They came in various guises, as drought refugees, invaders, traders or missionaries. In reality all were after slaves and wealth for world domination. Black people had been enslaved on such a scale that the term black became synonymous to slave in Arabic. Systematic destruction of black culture and civilization became the order of the day wherever and whenever the Arabs gained a foothold in the "Dark Continent". They distorted and falsified black history and achievements while glorifying their own. Blacks were pushed to the bottom of the social, economic and political ladder. Moreover, the Arabs exploited a provision in Islam that allows the use of women captured during holy wars as concubines. This sexual exploitation of black women was not extended to black men for it was a one-way sexual process as the "master race" kept its own women "sacred" and secluded behind the walls of their homes. The outcome of these one-way processes was the millions of coloured populations that spearhead wars on black Africa from Sudan to Mauritania. To prove how Arab they were, the mixed populations made hatred of Africans a ritual, and tried to surpass the whites in raiding for slaves. They often become hysterical if reminded of their Bantu or "kaffir" blood (Ch. Williams, 1987).

The fact that Mauritania and Sudan are the only countries among the 21-member states of the Arab League who call themselves Islamic Republic or imposed Shari'a laws testifies to their desperate search for cultural refugee. It was this that led Mauritania into signing a union treaty with Libya on April 18, 1980. The fact that they did not even have a common border was not important. Likewise, Sudan has signed union pacts with both Egypt and Libya on a number of occasions; the last treaty was signed with Libya in March 1990. By contrast, neither of them has ever attempted to unite with any black African country.

These anti-black attitudes have created tensions along their common borders with black Africa as well as permanent internal civil strife, between the so-called Arabs and black populations in the two countries. This is what Newsweek referred to as "an undeclared war simmering at the western end of the line dividing Arab North Africa from the African sub-Sahara. After Mauritanian herders trampled the fields of Senegalese farmers hundreds of people were slaughtered in Mauritania and nearly a hundred in Senegal. About 300 000 more were displaced as black Africans fled or were driven south from Mauritania

and Arabic speakers rushed north from Senegal".

"In the conflict there is an Arab against African element which is very dangerous for the rest of Africa," commented US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Herman Cohen (Newsweek, 12.2. 1990).

Colonial rule

As Mauritania was colonized via Senegal, Sudan was colonised through Egypt. Whereas Africans had more access to modern education than their Arab compatriots, blacks in the South Sudan were deliberately isolated in accordance with the "Southern Policy" of the British, ostensibly to protect them from Arab abuse. By contrast, the French Governor of Mauritania, René Héctor Émile Chazal, not only allowed the Arabs to keep their former slaves, but encouraged them to hunt for more. He made an agreement with the Arabs in 1932 to regulate Tax on the slavery. The Arabs were required to pay tax on each slave they owned equivalent to one paid on five sheep/goats. At the time tax on such beast was 2.50 Francs, which meant that an Arab master paid on each slave 12.50 Francs (L. Hunkanrin, 1932). In addition, the Arabs were exempted from serving in the French army provided that they sent their slaves instead (Black Children Manifesto, 1989).

Divide and rule in Mauritania

In 1955-56, the French felt that "since it was necessary to set Africa free, it was preferable to split it up into mini-states, each of which would be forced to remain attached to the metropole" (Yves Person, 1982). As far as the artificial creation of Mauritania was concerned, the direct motive was to keep Algeria as part of France; sabotage plans to form a West African federation grouping southern Mauritania with Senegal and Mali; keep Morocco off by squeezing Mauritania there and fight Pan-Africanist political views harboured by Modibo Keita of Mali and Cheikhou Toure of Guinea and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. As a result, France decreed that the capital shared by both Mauritania and Senegal at St Louis be split up and moved away from the border. The Senegalese administration was transferred to Dakar, and the Mauritanian to an empty desert spot, where Nouakchott was to be built as the capital of Mauritania in 1958. There was not even water to drink, not to mention shelters or essential infrastructure. Dia Mamadou, the strong socialist prime minister of Senegal, who came from the border area, was gradually removed from power in favour of the pro-French president Léopold Sédar Senghor. In Mauritania power was transferred to the Arab Ould Daddah, who was pro-Arab but anti-Morrocan. In order to make sure that the Arabs controlled political affairs, the French went as far as to publicly warn the Arabs that if they did not mobilise themselves politically the blacks were going to win the 1958 elections and thereby seize power (Livre Blanc, 1991).

And in Sudan

The British were planning to form an East African federation made up of at least Uganda, Kenya and Southern Sudan. But the Kenyan Land and Freedom Revolution (Mau Mau) took the British by surprise and consequently destroyed their original plans of an East African federation. When they realised that they had to leave, the British were neither prepared to let Africans form their own federation, grant independence to South Sudan

or even press for a federal system in Sudan. The result was to hand it over to aggressive northern Arabs. This was apparently prompted by the desire to prevent Egypt from swallowing up northern Sudan. What the Arabs were not able to achieve via centuries of war, was handed over to them by the French or the British.

From colonial rule to Arab misrule

Thus, for the black populations in Sudan and Mauritania, independence was a transition from colonial rule to Arab misrule. Like Portuguese colonialism, the weaker and more backward colonists are, the more violent they would be. Commenting on the conflict in Mauritania in 1989, the two spiritual leaders of the Tidianya Muslim sect in Senegal, Cheikh Mountaqa Tall and Abdoul Aziz Sy noted that "the black people along the Senegal Valley had always lived as one community on both sides of the river as their homeland. Such was the case both before and during colonial rule, but now the Berber regime in Nouakchott has violated this historical right by cutting our people into two".

Discrimination in political life

Like Sudan, political power has been concentrated in the hands of the Beydane community, which has subjected the country's black population to gross human rights abuses and denied it equality of opportunity in every aspect of public life (Africa Watch, 1990). What is taking place in southern Mauritania is, in effect, an undeclared war, in which one community (Arab) is using the resources and power of the state against another (Amnesty, 1990). Blacks have been excluded from national, regional and local politics as well as in the armed forces. The tradition in both countries is to have three black ministers in every government. While the posts of sports, transport and public works are reserved for black Mauritanians, animal/mineral resources and public works have become the staple southern portfolios in Sudan. In Mauritania, local and regional governments in all black areas are put under aggressive Arab prefects and governors (Livre Blanc, 1991 & J. Markakis, 1990).

In foreign policy, both regimes make extra efforts to portray their nations as real Arab. This can explain the fact that while all Arab countries in Africa are represented at ambassadorial level in Khartoum and Nouakchott, the 47 black African nations are represented by only three and 10 embassies in Nouakchott and Khartoum, respectively. There are only two black ambassadors in the Mauritanian missions abroad, and I am not aware of the existence of any southern ambassador representing Sudan abroad. This is the way successive Arab regimes want to present their countries to the outside world. As Mansour Khalid puts it, "They don't want to see their countries from inside, as they are, but what the Arabs think they should be when looking at them from outside." Such foreign policies are nothing but an extension of conflicting foreign policies of different Arab regimes (M. Khalid, 1990).

Culture and racism in Mauritania

As the British let the Arab North impose Arabic on the South Sudan in 1953, the French conspired with the Berber North to do the same in Mauritania in 1959. Ould Daddah reinforced this cultural imperialism by his (Bantu) Arabisation Acts of 1966 by which Ara-

bic was imposed along with the French on all school children and made the first two years completely Arabised. Thus, from the age of seven the African child has to battle with learning two foreign languages, both reflecting foreign cultures. In 1979, the PPM published a circular declaring "Arabisation of Mauritania is a long-term objective that will lead to the full rehabilitation of our Arabic language and our culture" (Livre Blanc, 1991). Moreover, geographical cities and cultural symbols are being Arabised. All 13 regions in the country, except two, as well as all the districts and streets of the national capital have been given Arab names (Africa Watch, 1990).

How to impose one's culture on the Negro?

After qualifying the decision by African countries in the early 1960s to use Latin characters in writing their languages as a very dangerous historical precedence, Muhi Edin al Sabir, Director of ALECSO (Arab League Education, Cultural and Scientific Organisation) drew up a long list of strategic steps the Arab world should adopt in order to replace European cultural hegemony in black Africa with their own. They should:

1. collect and classify key books and documents on Africa and translate them into Arabic as well as write dictionaries;
2. make funds available to help African education institutions replace English and French with Arabic;
3. provide books and grants to Africans studying Arabic; and
4. help Africans write their languages using Arabic characters if it is impossible to make them learn Arabic, etc. (Muhidin Sabir, No. 56 October 1983).

It is to be noted that this man happens to be a Sudanese citizen.

Muslim or Arab names?

As a matter of fact, the so-called Muslim names are nothing but authentic Arab names that were in use long before the coming of Islam. Prophet Muhammad did neither change his name, nor did he order his followers to do so following their conversion to Islam apart from insulting names such as Abu Jahal or Abdu el Samse. As with the so-called Muslim names, Islamic or Christian heritage in Mauritania and Sudan are no more than what was collected around there by the invaders, who were not ashamed of attributing all that was good to themselves. This is a typical misuse of Islam for imperialist ends, for Islam is not the issue. It is just a pretext, or else black Mauritanians or Kurdish who are Muslims would not have needed to be killed by Arab regimes. As with all the other tragedies that had befallen them, Africans have primarily themselves to blame. Either they shy away from taking up the matter with the imperialists, sit down passively until it is too late, or actively participate in destroying their life base. Just look at what is going on in Sudan and Mauritania right now (2010), and yet no African leader would say anything.

Slavery and racism in Mauritania

Another aspect of racism in Mauritania and Sudan is classical slavery. In both countries, slavery is still rampant and is practised only on blacks by Arabs with active government support. Slavery was "abolished" several times in independent Mauritania, latest on July

5, 1980. Yet the Anti-Slavery Society's findings two years later as well as that of Africa Watch 10 years after the last abolition of slavery in Mauritania, point to the existence of a minimum of 100 000 full-time slaves plus 300 000 half slaves still being held by Arab Mauritanians. In his introductory remarks in the Anti-Slavery Society Report of 1982, John Mercer writes:

"The head of state from 1960 to 1978, Mokhtar Ould Daddah, kept slaves behind the presidential palace. The successive military committees which have controlled Mauritania since the coup d'etat in July 1978 have fluctuated between 'a return to tradition' – implying amongst other aspects, that there would be no relaxation of slavery – and the decree of July 5, 1980, yet again 'abolishing' slavery" (John Mercer, 1982).

Momamed Isa al Qadeeri, a Kuwaiti journalist, wrote in the Kuwaiti newspaper al Wattan on April 29, 1989, page 14: "At the end of my last visit to Mauritania, among the gifts given to me – which I strongly refused – by my Arab friends, was a black slave."

In its report titled: "Mauritania Slavery Alive and Well, 10 Years after the Last Abolition", Africa Watch notes that:

Abolishing slavery which is deeply-rooted in Mauritania is a difficult and long-term problem. Our criticism is not that the Mauritanian government has tried to eradicate slavery and failed, but that it has not tried at all. We are not aware of any significant practical steps taken by successive governments to fulfil the important responsibilities Mauritania undertook when it passed laws and ratified international agreements prohibiting slavery. Its persistence is largely explained by the fact that legislative enactments have not been accompanied by initiatives in the economic and social fields (Africa Watch, 1990).

And in Sudan

Here too slavery does not only exist but it is on the rise. Doctors Udhari Mahmoud and Suleiman Baldo published a report on the resurgence of slavery in Sudan in 1987. They write:

> Since 1986, slavery has returned in force, and is not seen by the perpetrators as illegitimate in the context of the present government war policy. The kidnapping of Dinka children, young girls, and women, their subsequent enslavement, their use in the Rizeigat economy and other spheres of life, and their exchange for money – all these are facts. The government has full knowledge of them. Indeed, the perpetrators of kidnapping and slavery have allies in the armed militias (Africa Watch, 1990).

The government in question was led by Sadiq el Mahdi, grandson of the legendary Mahdi who revolted against the abolition of slavery in the Sudan in 1888.

The revival of an old Arab practice

What makes slavery even more alarming is the new revival of an old Arab practice of forming large armies from slave communities. In Mauritania, thousands of slaves were forcibly recruited, armed and put under an Arab commandership, when patrolling African

villages in the south, where they massacred innocent people. Amnesty International (AI) reported on the use of slave militia in October 1990 that:

> The Haratines who have been settled on the lands of expelled blacks have been armed by the authorities and asked to organise their own defence. AI has been informed that some authorities are profiting from the subordination ties between masters and Haratines to enrol the latter in this militia. In general this militia does not simply defend itself when attacked, but undertakes punitive expeditions against unarmed civilians living in the villages. In some cases, Haratines who object to this gratuitous violence are threatened with reprisals by the security forces who escort them on these expeditions (Amnesty, 1990).

In this way, the Haratines are misused to perform a triple function: a) fight for the Arabs their war on blacks, b) generate division and hatred between the free Africans and the slaves, and c) till the stolen lands for the Arabs. This will reduce the chance for an African united front against a common enemy.

Racism in economic life in Mauritania

During colonial times, nearly all development projects were concentrated in northern Sudan, whereas most economic activities centred in southern Mauritania. After independence, the northern Sudanese continued and reinforced the same trend, while in Mauritania it was a total reversal. In order to make the South poor and thus dependent on the North, Arab regimes in Mauritania decided to:

- introduce Land Reforms Act no. 83.127 of June 1983 and 119/DB of 1988, used as a legal cover up to confiscate black people's farm lands along the Senegal River. As such the reform concerns only lands owned by blacks in the South.
- order the deportation of tens of thousands of black farmers along the Senegal river, to Senegal and Mali. Their farm lands were immediately distributed to Arab businessmen or settlers from the north.
- cancel plans to construct a tarred route linking Rosso with Selibaby via Boghe, Kaedi and Mbout.
- construct Mauritania's only paved road that links Nouakchott to Nema in the east in such a way that it would pass only at Arab areas. This project was so important that a ministry of the road was created. The present foreign minister, Hasni Ould Didi, was appointed Minister of the Road in 1974.
- transfer sugar industry plans from Kaedi where sugar cane is cultivated to Nouakchott in the desert
- hijack agriculture schemes planned for the South.
- burn down of the principal market in the capital in 1981, in order to drive black businessmen out. Thus, when it was rebuilt and opened in 1985, only four black persons were allowed to do business in the whole market. One of these four, Sisecko, was murdered inside his shop in 1986.

And in Sudan

When the world's largest agriculture scheme was being built in northern Sudan, the only development project, Zende, built by the British in the South was closed down by the

northern regime. Development plans in the southern Sudan, such as the Melut and Mongalla sugar industries, Ton Kengaf, Wau Brewery, Nzara and Mongalla textiles, remained on paper as development funds were embezzled in Khartoum. In 1974 Nimeiri and Egypt decided to construct the Jonglei Canal to link the upper Nile at Bor with the White Nile below Malakal. The project was to benefit only northern Sudan and Egypt (J. Markakis, 1990). When the Chevron Company discovered oil in the South in 1987, Nimeiri attempted first to change the regional boundaries so that the oil fields would be within the northern confines. When this failed, he decided that all the oil was to be piped out of the country from Port Sudan to deprive the South of any benefit connected to the discovery of black gold in black areas (J. Garang, 1987).

Democratisation in Mauritania and Sudan

According to African traditional constitution and customary law, the people are the first and final source of all power. Thus, the rights of the community of people are superior to those of any individual, including chiefs and kings. As such, the will of the people is the supreme law, and the rulers are under this law, not above it. It follows that rulers are the elected representatives of the people and the instruments for executing their will. Hence, government and people are one and the same, as the elder in each extended family is its chosen representative on the council. Decisions in the council are made by the elders (Ch. Williams, 1987). Therefore, major decisions of government – or the direction of policies behind these decisions – rest directly or indirectly on the freely given consent of a majority of the adult governed (S. Hook, 1988). All those who are affected by social institutions must have a share in producing and managing them (J. Dewey, 1942).

Mauritania

Measured against the above concepts, Mauritanians are yet to devise their own democracy. This absence of democratic experience is partly due to the fact that Mauritania is one of those great many African countries, referred to by Larry Diamond, where “the new ruling parties eliminated political competition, more or less quickly, and established one-party regimes” (L. Diamond, 1988). Loyal to this post-independence tradition, Mokhtar Ould Daddah soon abandoned the multi-party system which he inherited from France for a one-party regime. Thus, from independence in 1960 to 1978, Mauritanian politics was dominated by “Parti du Peuple Mauritanien” (PPM) of President Ould Daddah (Gerteiny A., 1981). Ould Daddah justified his suppression of democratic freedom and the subsequent concentration of power in his hands by exploiting the notion of nation building, national unity and sovereignty as well as a guarantee against Morocco’s territorial claims on Mauritania.

Thus, he carried out a series of constitutional changes between 1961 and 1965 to repeal the post of prime minister, create a presidential system and one-party dictatorship. Ould Daddah was able to merge the “Union des Originaires de la Vallée du Fleuve Senegal” which hitherto opposed detaching Mauritania from the Mali Federation with the colonial protégé “Union Progressiste Mauritanienne” to form his own PPM. The pan-Arabist Nahda was banned as its leader, Horma Ould Babana defected to Morocco from where he led a guerrilla war against Mauritania (Jean-Louis Balans, 1979).

Ould Daddah claimed that his goal was to secure national unity, territorial integrity and international recognition of the new nation. This would open the way for economic development of the country. To this end he was able to mobilise the nation towards national unity and to gain international recognition. Mauritania was admitted into the UN on October 27, 1961, after the USSR lifted up her veto. Once this was achieved and political power centralised around his person, Ould Daddah began to reveal his dictatorial and ethnically biased ideology. The regime used Mauritania's only daily newspaper, Chaab, and radio station to give false impressions about national unity, democracy and general development which it bestowed on the people.

In reality Ould Daddah was bent on undermining the very concept of national unity, by invading the black community with the racist Arabisation Acts of 1965. These acts provoked violent reaction on the part of black school children in January and February 1965. For the first time, both the army and bands of slaves (Haratins) were called in to deal with civil unrest. Officialisation of Arabic was neither constitutional nor were the people consulted on its sudden and arbitrary imposition. The clashes claimed at least six lives, while schools had to be closed down for the rest of the school year. Black intellectuals met and issued the Manifesto of the "19". They denounced the Arabisation laws as illegal and racist and called on the authorities to cancel them, set up an independent commission to deal with the national question and the issue of cohabitation between the African and Arab communities of the country. The regime's response to this call for a national dialogue was both irresponsible and violent. It resorted to blind repression against the authors of the document (Bilaal no.2, 1991).

On foreign policy, Ould Daddah rapidly moved Mauritania away from black Africa towards the Arab world. He pulled out of the "Union Africaine et Malgache de Coopération Economique" (UAM) in July 1965, and joined the Arab League on December 4, 1973 (Balans J.L., 1979). Unlike the OAU and its regional organisations, the Arab League and its sub-groupings are purely nationalistic blocks from which non Arabs are excluded. This policy shift towards the Arab world opened the way for an aggressive Arab scramble for Mauritania (D. Daxxel, 1989).

Having alienated the blacks, Ould Daddah set out to destroy his ethnic power base within his own Arab community. The Education of the Masses (SEM) was set up to mobilise people to relay policy initiatives and to serve as a channel of communication between the regime and the people. SEM is found at all government levels down to villages and neighbourhoods. The SEM was founded in 1981 by ex-president Haidalla. It is modelled on the Libyan Popular Committees. At the start SEM mobilised people to carry out local improvement projects, to eliminate illiteracy and to discuss their grievances, and needs, which then are passed over to local authorities. The SEM has been destroyed as the regime started to use it to make people spy on each other to the extent that it created mistrust within family, community as well as between different tribes and ethnic groups. The anti-black program of 1989 was organised and carried out by the leader of SEM, Rachid Ould Saleh.

And in Sudan

Like Mauritania, political power in Sudan has always been monopolised by narrowly based northern regimes, ever since independence in 1956. The main political parties

are the Umma and Democratic Unionist Party, respectively owned by the al Mahdi and al Merghani families, the Sudan Communist Party and the National Islamic Front. None of these has been able to widen its political scope to reach out and include marginalised ethnic, regional and social groups into its rank (M. Khalid, 1990). Mansour Khalid attributes this to northern politicians' lack of will to place their loyalty to a larger Sudanese community over other clashing loyalties which take account merely of one's region, cultural background or religious profession. The Umma and DUP exchanged power between 1956 and 1958 only to hand it over to the army's chief of staff Gen. Ibrahim Abbud. This was a living testimony to sectarian political failure. Abbud ruled the country until he was overthrown by a popular uprising in 1964. Here again came the traditionalist parties to seize power and repeat the same policies that brought their previous regimes down. Their hold on power was interrupted once more by Nimeiri's coup in 1969. Nimeiri appeared, at first, to represent the hope of the Sudan for national unity and social justice that could lead to real democracy.

Peace with the South

Nimeiri was the first Sudanese leader who appeared to have a vision of the Sudan that goes beyond the North, the first to recognise the North/South problem of Sudan, and to look for a peaceful solution to it. He thus negotiated and concluded an accord with the Anya Aya Liberation Movement in Addis Ababa in March 1972. It was agreed that:

1. The three southern provinces should merge into one single region with its own legislative and executive authority to deal with internal affairs.
2. There would be a power share in the central government.
3. English was to be the main language of the South, while Arabic remained of ficial.
4. Freedom of religion and regional control of education offered assurances of protection against enforced Arabisation.
5. A university was to be set up in Juba and African traditional laws would be re spected.
6. A special development plan for the South was to be financed from central government funds and foreign aid.
7. Southerners would be represented in the armed forces in accordance with their share of the total population, and 6 000 freedom fighters of the Anya Anya were to be absorbed into the armed forces (J. Markakis, 1990).

Nimeiri centralises power around himself

The Addis peace treaty opened the way for Nimeiri to build his own political base after having silenced northern parties. He transformed his Revolutionary Command Council into a mass political organisation called the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU). Sudan was proclaimed a Democratic Republic described as a socialist state founded on the alliance of the "people's active forces". A network of associations and committees was organised across the country which formed the SSU in January 1972.

Nimeiri's SSU assumed supreme political authority over all organs and activities of the state. The SSU was to provide a facade of popular representation for the military dic-

tatorship and an additional lever of political control. Sudan's first national constitution was proclaimed in 1973. The constitution gave Nimeiri an absolute executive power and power to veto pieces of legislation passed by the People's Assembly. Nimeiri's autocratic rule alienated his power base within the army as well as the technocratic officials, who were brought in to build up the regime because of their administrative competence and non-partisan background (Ibid).

Thus, he began falling back on the traditionalist politicians in 1977. Alliances with hitherto discredited sectarian parties, from the Umma to the Muslim Brothers, were struck. As Mansour Khalid put it, "Nimeiri sought power and possessed it regardless of which quarter provided his support". Increasing insecurity and ideological drought led Nimeiri to impose the draconian September (Shari'a) Laws in 1983. Like similar Shari'a laws imposed by a desperate military regime in Mauritania in 1980, there was nothing but terror (J. Garang, 1987). Religion was not the real issue; it was a tool for political ends, terror, intimidation as well as being chauvinist in application, as they were primarily applied on starving poor and non-Muslim black Africans.

Nimeiri provokes the creation of SPLA

In addition, Nimeiri abrogated the Addis Ababa Agreement by dissolving the regional government and assembly successively in 1980, 1981 and 1983. He further changed the boundaries of the southern provinces which he divided into three regions and ordered the transfer to Khartoum of southern soldiers (J. Garang, 1987). Thus he triggered the formation of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and its military wing SPLA in March 1983. Unlike the Anya Nya, SPLA is fighting for the total liberation of Sudan in order to create a new Sudan with which all Sudanese communities can identify and be proud of. The armed struggle in the South and popular uprising in urban centres brought Nimeiri down on April 6, 1985, while on a begging trip to the USA. The revolution was unfortunately aborted as traditionalist groups and Nimeiri's generals conspired just to repeat the scenario of 1964. One year later, Northern factions were ruling in Khartoum while the war in the South was raging and famine killing and crippling millions of Sudanese.

Again, sectarian parties in Khartoum failed to form any effective government, which together with the war in the South and law breakdown in the centre, the army showed up again to "save" the nation from her hopeless politicians. General el Bashir stepped into power on June 30, 1989. Like Nimeiri allied with the Communist Party in 1969 in order to take power, el Bashir has found an ally in the National Islamic Front. The power shift was met with some relief because of what Mansour Khalid described as a "sheer disillusionment with discredited regimes, which but a few years earlier had appeared to represent the ultimate salvation for the nation, that led the Sudanese to recreate the political nightmare of their past in order to rid themselves of the latest 'saviours'" (Khalid, 1990).

Mauritania

The Mauritanian government does not admit the existence of any ethnic problems in the country. The whole problem is with Senegal, where black "criminals" are being trained, armed and then sent across the river to raid in Mauritania! As for democracy, in a speech to mark the end of Ramadan on April 15, 1991, Taya announced that free elections would

be held on a new constitution, and opposition parties legalised before the elections later that year. In an interview with Le Monde on May 8, 1991, Taya said: “The new constitution would be prepared by the CMSN aided by jurists and that there was no question about involving opposition groups in the process. Because these are merely brawlers, exiled and jobless, who publish and distribute leaflets.” He said he had not introduced democracy earlier because the people were not politically mature enough. “You can’t just throw someone who cannot swim into the water,” (Le Monde 8.5., 1991). On June 11, Taya presented a draft constitution to be adopted in a referendum on July 12. The proposed constitution stipulates that Mauritania is an Islamic, Arab and African Republic whose national languages are Arabic, Fulani, Soninke and Wolof whereby Arabic is the official language. It envisages a powerful presidential system. The president is elected for renewable six-year periods. He appoints and dismisses the prime minister. Legislative functions shall reside with a senate and parliament (Project de constitution, 1991).

Sudan

General el Bashir was busy working on the creation of Islamic popular committees, which he hoped would work as a political facade and ideological base for his fundamentalist regime. The move was announced by Bashir himself on April 29, 1991 (Afrique Asie, 6/1991). The committees are to be modelled on that of Libya. Plans to unite Sudan with Libya by 1994 were underway. Unlike Taya, el Bashir recognised the existence of civil war in Sudan and sought Nigerian mediation to negotiate without preconditions with SPLA.

FLAM and SPLA

Historical injustice against Africans in Mauritania and Sudan led to the creation of SPLA and FLAM in 1983. Though originated in the South, where anti-black programmes surpassed those of South Africa, FLAM and SPLA have shown themselves to be national both in character and objectives. Both movements are committed to the total liberation of their respective nations and to the unity of their peoples and the territorial integrity of their nations. As such, they are fighting in order to eradicate racism, slavery, social and cultural chauvinism, as well as put an end to social and economic injustice so as to build new secular nations based on objective conditions. They advocate a federal system of government that would enable each region to exercise real power for its economic and social development and the promotion and development of their respective cultural values within their nations. They are determined to devise a political mechanism that will end the monopoly of power by any group of self-seeking individuals whatever their ethnic or social background, whether they come in the uniform of political parties, family dynasties, religious sects or army officers.

Both FLAM and SPLA objected to both military and union pacts with Arab countries, as that would necessarily be against the interest of one of the various communities of their nations. Domestic and foreign policies should reflect national realities to serve national interests. Sudan and Mauritania will thus contribute to fruitful Afro-Arab cooperation and solidarity which will set the example for good neighbourliness as well as South-South solidarity. Afro-Arab relations should not only be limited to the amount of petro-cash that

oil sheikhs spit into the pockets of African leaders, who in return lend lip service to the Palestinian cause. For a real democracy to be achieved FLAM and SPLA demand that:

1. the present regimes be replaced by interim governments in which each and every community is equally represented;
2. national constitutional forums be set up to work out appropriate forms of government, political and legal systems;
3. free elections be organised;
4. the state of emergency be lifted; and
5. SPLA demands the abolition of the so-called Islamic laws imposed by Nimeiri in September 1983, whereas FLAM demands the return to their homes of the 200 000 black Mauritanian deportees from Senegal or Mali, and setting up of an independent commission to investigate the death of 457 black prisoners in government custody in November 1990 to February 1991 and to bring the guilty to justice.

Recommendations to be considered in the search for democracy

These points were developed from Peter Woodward's paper titled: "Debate on democracy in Africa and its relevance to the Sudan", published by the London-based Institute for African Alternatives in 1988:

- A ban of old political activists, who have abused their power;
- Zoning of national offices so that the presidency, speaker of national parliament, president of the supreme court, prime minister and army chief of staff would be held in rotation among the different ethnic groups, as a constitutional imperative;
- A ban on foreign cash contribution to political parties;
- A demonstration of national support in achieving political position, a minimum of 30% supports in the major ethnic groups. Or the idea that Uganda was going to operate in 1971 (aborted by Amin's coup), which was that individual candidates be put up in two geographical constituencies and be required then to demonstrate a degree of support in both (Peter Woodward, 1988);
- The ethnic distribution in both Sudan and Mauritania is roughly 50-50. Ethnic share in all national organs should be at least 40%. Such system should also apply on men/women;
- Having a provision in the constitutions that defines the place of the army: To make it illegal for a civilian government to use the national army for police jobs, and in return, make military coups illegal under whatever pretext;
- National organs should use and promote major national languages equally, whereas regional institutions use their respective languages in such a way that cooperation amongst different cultural elements is promoted; and
- A regional treaty to define and regulate Afro-Arab relations along the Sahel region should be worked out.

Some may consider this to be both unrealistic and too expensive. But would it be more unrealistic and costly than the civil wars, political instability and dictatorship that have been haunting Mauritania and Sudan since their birth as nations?

Samba Diallo is a Mauritanian.





Three Sudanese and one Mauritanian










F
E
C



MY COUSIN MOHAMED

S. Anai Kelueljan

Listen!

You Mohamed and I

Are not brothers,
You're the son of my aunt
You're my cousin!

Long ago your Arab father came,
Also he came with the Holy Koran
And his traditional ways,
But without a mistress or a wife!

Your father came to live among friends,

Not his slaves,
For the Africans are always generous
And useful friends
Until they are offended by despising
Their traditional ways...

So despise his colour, or creed,
Your father was free
To surround himself with lovely maids,
And then he began to study
The existing tribes and clans,
And concluded that Arab
Was culturally and racially superior
To the African Man!

So, he proceeded to propagate Islam
Along with his traditional ways.
Islam and Arabism
The jihad (holy war) men thought invincible!

But all the Africans,
Those men who were charcoal black
From every tribe and clan
Came and assembled,
They fixed their vision on a gigantic idea
To survive collectively...

They said to themselves:
"If the Arabs have come to claim

This African Land,
No doubt they will have it pretty rough!"

But then,
Continuing their assault
The Arabs wiped out thousands of the African males,
And took the women as their slaves
With whom they freely mated!

This is the version of the story
Of conflict between the Africans and Arabs
The Arab historians do not tell.

And so,
You cousin Mohamed in the Northern Sudan
Are an offspring of my slave-aunt,
Who in her wretchedness stooped to conquer
By blood strength ...
A reality as large as the Imatong mountain!

You are no longer
A pure Arab, like your father,
You are the hybrid of Africa,
The generous product
Of many years of bloody wars
On the African Land
Your African Motherland!

My cousin Mohamed
Thinks he's very clever ...
With pride,
He says he's an African who speaks
Arabic language,
Because he's no mother tongue!
Again, he says,
It is civilised to speak Arabic!

Among the Arabs,
My cousin becomes a militant Arab
A black Arab,
Who rejects the definition of race
By pigment of one's skin.

He says,
If an African speaks Arabic language
He's an Arab!
If an African is culturally Arabised
He's an Arab!

My cousin claims
That Islamic religion is a property
Of the Arabs!
He says,
God revealed the Holy Koran in Arabic
And it cannot be translated
To other languages, because God has forbidden so!

He says,
Muslims must know Arabic
Because it is the language of the Holy Koran,
And the Holy Koran is the vehicle
For the Arab culture,
Because the Arabs are God-chosen people!

My cousin says
The Africans have no culture!
The Africans have no history!
The Africans have no religion!
The Africans have no language!
The Africans are uncivilised!
He says, it is his duty to extend
The Arab sphere of influence
Into Africa!

He claims that,
Egypt is already Arab!
Libya is already Arab!
Tunisia is already Arab!
Algeria is already Arab!
Morocco is already Arab!
Mauritania is already Arab!
Somalia is already Arab!
Djibouti is already Arab!
Sudan is already Arab!
and soon,
Western Sahara shall be Arab!
Eritrea shall be Arab!
And if God's willing,
Ethiopia shall be Arab!
Let the whole African continent,
Become an Arab continent,
So that its people can be civilised!

My cousin is deafened
By Orouba (Arabism)
To be an Arab is right!
To be a Muslim is right!

If an Arab/Muslim kills you during jihad,
He has secured his place in paradise!
If you kill him,
All the same, he goes to heaven
For furthering the Islamic cause!
In other words,
My cousin wins both ways!

His opponent has no alternative
But to submit!

22. The land question: Darfur's peace nemesis

Sabir Ibrahim

Introduction and historical background

The causes of the conflict in Darfur are complex and deep rooted, involving political and economic marginalisation, failing institutions (especially security and judicial institutions), environmental degradation, population pressure, and ubiquity of small arms as a result of regional conflicts, uncontrollable borders, and past arms distribution by the government to militias such as the Murahaliin.[1] A racial dimension introduced to the conflict in the 1980s, to support an ideology based on "Arab" supremacy, has sharpened into an ethnic divide in which the militias are predominantly pastoralists claiming an Arab identity and the rebels predominantly settled, or semi-settled, communities self-identified as "Africans". In this paper the author will shed some light on the history of land tenure, as the core of the problem in Darfur, and how the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in Abuja has addressed land grabbing in Darfur. What is the solution?

State formation in western Sudan is not new. In *State and society in Darfur*, O'Fahey (1980) introduces what he calls the three pre-historic states of Daju, Tunjur and Wadai (1500-1650 AD).[2] These states were considered pre-Islamic, referring to the fact that Islam did not spread to these remote parts of what historians still considered as ancient Sudan. These three states either co-existed or succeeded each other like in the cases of the Daju and Tunjur; and Tunjur and Wadia respectively. The existence of these states speaks of a vibrant political society, with a sophisticated system of government which ruled over diverse populations and a vast mass of land. These ancient African states had developed administrative structures with a semblance of bureaucracy, taxation and revenue levying systems and rules and regulations that governed the relationship between ruler and subject.

According to Shuqayr (quoted in O'Fahey, 1980)[3] Sultan Musa Ibn Suleiman who was the second ruler in the Keira dynasty (1680-1700) is said to have introduced a new system of granting land titles, i.e. estates, called *"hakura"* (Arabic, *plural hawakir*),[4] even though the earliest found documents dated to the time of Sultan Ahmad Bakur the third sultan in the Keira dynasty. The granting of *hawakir* by sultans was initially associated with the encouragement of *fugara* (religious teachers) to settle in Darfur and preach Islam. Merchants from the Nile Valley were also given estates in recognition for their valuable service to the state, which was mainly related to the promotion of trade with Egypt and Riverian Sudan. This was despite its connection with the process of the Islamisation of Darfur. In later stages the *hakura* system developed into a powerful tool for the consolidation of state power.

It seems that Keira sultans succeeded to a great extent to make land tenure a part of the administrative setup of the sultanate. Since not all lands were granted as estates, it meant that the older system of communal tenure continued to exist side by side with the hakura system in various places around Darfur. As far as tribal groups are concerned, the land they occupied effectively became synonymous with an administrative hakura. In other words, what used to be communal land has now come to be considered as an

administrative *hakura or dar*. Tribal homelands were named after the tribe, e. g. dar Zaghawa (land of the Zaghawa people) and Dar Rezeigat (land of the Rezeigat people). This development introduced a new function to the land other than its economic potential; it became a symbol of group identity. Since the region is open to hosting immigrants from neighbouring areas, it follows that newcomers have to access land through transactions with indigenous land-holding tribal groups only. That is exactly what nomadic camel pastoralist groups have been doing for the last 200 years or so.

Darfur has been left without much alteration to its traditional land use system. Limited attempts at modernizing traditional agriculture in the region were made in the Jebel Marra Rural Development Scheme and the Western Savannah Development Corporation that are considered environmentally as the most hospitable part of the region (south and west). On the other hand, North Darfur, which is the most arid part of the region, remained firmly entrenched in the traditional land tenure system inherited from prehistoric times and later altered by Keira Sultans.

As time goes by, there is a growing demand for more productivity in order to feed an ever increasing population. One of the problems facing many present African societies is that the communal form of land tenure they still cherish does not render itself easily for development. As one author puts it, “land-use planning, farm planning and the introduction of better farming systems are rendered difficult by this form of land tenure” (Webster and Wilson, 1980: 101). Keeping the delicate balance regarding land use becomes more difficult because customary land tenure systems have less elasticity to enable them cope with changing conditions. On the other hand, new changes can play an important role in turning an otherwise peaceful co-existence between groups into a hostile confrontation or even a full-scale war. For that matter, some researchers tend to consider ecology as an important factor that explains many conflicts in Africa today (Suliman, 1999). When there is a change in the environment the capacity of land to sustain people’s livelihoods shrinks. However, when that is combined with population increase a recipe for conflict is already underway.

Land ownership and peace

Six years ago, the Declaration of Principles for the Darfur peace agreement was signed by all the main parties in Abuja. This made reference to traditional land ownership and how it must be respected. But land is a very complicated issue and the controversies over land ownership cannot be resolved quite so simply.

There is a contradiction between traditional land tenure and ownership, especially the hakura system, and Sudanese land law. According to Sudan’s land laws, all unregistered land belongs to the state, which can allocate leases without reference to who is actually living on the land. These land laws have disadvantaged rural communities at the mercy of commercial farmers and state development schemes which have not brought benefits to the local population. In the Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile this was a major reason for people to take up arms and join the SPLA. In the case of Darfur there are few cases of major commercial farms or mechanised schemes, and in fact the largest rural development projects have promoted smallholder farming. Instead, the main challenge to traditional land tenure has come from migration, especially north to south migration on

account of desertification in northern Darfur, which has led to the widespread settlement of northern Darfurians on land in other parts of Darfur, and the immigration of Chadians including large numbers of nomads.

Environmental change and migration means that the hakura system must be applied with some flexibility. Traditionally, the concept of hakura is not equivalent to “tribal land ownership”. The idea of a tribal “dar” is different.

Each hakura was an individual grant of jurisdiction over land. The individual in question could often be a tribal leader in which case he exercised that jurisdiction on behalf of his people, or alternatively people would congregate in his hakura and thereby identify themselves with the hakura (e.g. the Birgid). The hakura system has historically included a principle of hospitality – newcomers are entitled to settle on free land provided that they respect the customs of their hosts. It also made a distinction between the native administration office holder, who adjudicates disputes over land, and the person who actually allocates the land.

One of the causes of Darfur’s conflict has been the inability of the land ownership and land management systems to cope with the demand for farms and pasture. The numbers of people and animals have grown while the land itself has become degraded through over-use and because of declining rainfall. Darfur’s land can certainly support many more people than the six million people who live in the region today. But for Darfurians to not only survive but prosper, the land must be used more efficiently than in the past. Experience of rural development the world over demonstrates that small farmers are usually the best custodians of the soil – and Darfur is no exception. Darfur’s developmental challenge is to enable its capable farmers and livestock owners to apply their skills to gaining a livelihood, without creating conflict and without degrading the natural environment.
The DPA is not a blueprint for social and economic development. But it does provide some important guiding principles that can enable Darfur to achieve sustainable development. At various points the Agreement makes reference to the need for land ownership systems and ecological management to ensure equitable development and avoid environmental degradation. It refers to policies to address the challenges of access to pasture and water and to overcome tensions arising from competition between farmers and herders.

But the DPA’s most basic principle is the rights and equality of Darfurians. For that reason, and in line with the 2005 Declaration of Principles, it has a clear bias in favour of traditional land ownership. This is asserted in two main ways. Paragraph 110 clearly recognises that hawakeer have legal standing and priority over other claims on land. This is a very important concession made by the GoS, which makes it clear that the Government is not free to grant whatever leasehold rights it desires over unregistered land.
The second main principle is the right of return of refugees and IDPs to their places of origin. This is asserted at a number of points in the DPA, for example Paragraph 108. In Paragraph 176, this right of return of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) is fleshed out by specifying that these people must be provided with protection including access to courts. Other provisions for the security of returning refugees and IDPs, such as the community police and the possibility of deploying integrated units in areas of return, must be provided.

While the right to return is deeply enshrined in the DPA, there may be instances in which it is simply not practical for an individual to take his or her piece of land back. For example, Paragraph 175 makes reference to major development projects that may be inconsistent with land legislation. Paragraph 159 reads: "All displaced persons and other persons arbitrarily or unlawfully deprived of rights to land shall have those rights restored to them. No person or group of persons shall be deprived of any traditional or historical right in respect of land or access to water without consultation and compensation on just terms." The correct interpretation of this paragraph is important. It is crystal clear that every Darfurian has his or her right to land restored. There is to be no large-scale transfer of land from one group to another. However, land use changes may occur, for example in order to halt environmental degradation or to make the best use of limited land resources. In some cases, individuals may not keep their previous farmland or their earlier rights of access to water, and in such cases they must first be consulted and then compensated. This is an important advance on what has sadly been the normal practice in Sudan, in which customary rights to land are swept aside when mechanised farms are set up or the authorities lay claim to land used by small farmers.

Restoring traditional rights to land will be a complicated business. There are bound to be disputes. Paragraphs 197-198 set up Property Claims Committees to adjudicate any disputes arising as people return to their lands.

One important land issue that will need to be addressed by the Property Claims Committees is women's right to land. In the traditional land tenure system of the Fur and other Darfur farming peoples, women have tenure of land in their own right. It is particularly important this aspect of customary land tenure is preserved as people return to their villages.

The issue of nomadic routes and land rights is addressed at several points in the DPA. While both GoS and Movements' negotiators recognised that nomads have always been part of Darfur's social fabric, and that they have the right to continue to practice their livelihoods, there was much controversy and disagreement over how this should be implemented in practice. The Movements argued that it would be enough to include a general provision for freedom of movement, while GoS representatives wanted every nomadic migration route to be mapped out in accordance with the recent work of state committees. In particular, the Movements' negotiators insisted that many problems had arisen in the last few years because certain nomadic groups had tried to open up new migration routes, cutting through farming areas and impinging on the land rights of other groups.
A compromise was agreed, which hinges on the words "customary" and "historic" – the nomads' rights to migrate with their herds are respected, but in accordance with the same old and well-established principles that grant farmland to settled communities. So Paragraph 158 asserts that the right to "traditional or customary livestock routes" is to be respected. Recognising that nomadic migration is a security issue of immediate relevance, the chapter on security arrangements also includes provisions for ensuring that nomads' security is ensured, and that they do not create security problems for the populations they move amongst. Paragraphs 288 and 289 require the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to draw up plans for the regulation of movement along "historic" nomadic migration routes. This falls under the ceasefire provisions, indicating that it must be done quickly, but also that the arrangements made by AMIS are only interim ones until a lasting

settlement of this issue is reached.

This means that, with immediate effect, "historic" nomadic routes should be opened up for the movement of nomads, under the regulation of the African Union Mission in Sudan. Next, the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation should consider "the locations and regulation of nomadic migration routes" (Paragraph 484(d)). And finally, Paragraph 158 indicates that Sudan's land laws must be reformed in order to take better account of customary land rights: "Tribal land ownership rights (hawakeer), historical rights to land, traditional or customary livestock routes, and access to water, shall be recognised and protected. All levels of government shall institute a process to progressively develop and amend the relevant laws to incorporate customary laws, practices, international trends and practices and protect cultural heritage."

This is a general requirement for overhauling the land laws and it is reiterated in Paragraph 162.

At this point, the negotiators in Abuja faced a problem. Darfur is part of Sudan and a basic principle of national sovereignty is that one set of laws should apply across the country. Residents of other parts of Sudan face similar problems over land ownership and there is a need for a comprehensive national approach to land law and land use planning – an approach that takes into account everyone's needs for land, the importance of good land use planning especially because of the problems of desertification, as well as customary land rights which vary from place to place. It would not make sense for Darfurians to have one set of laws while other Sudanese have another legal regime controlling land. Apart from anything else, there are many people of Darfurian origin living in other parts of Sudan, and if Darfurians were to be given a privileged land law status, the original inhabitants of other parts of Sudan might start demanding that too, which would disadvantage Darfurians residing there.

Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) as a benchmark

Fortunately, the CPA recognized this problem and established a National Land Commission specifically for this purpose. What the DPA therefore does is to establish a Darfur state Land Commission as the mechanism for protecting Darfurians' land rights, to coordinate with the National Land Commission. Paragraphs 163-169 detail Darfur's State Land Commission, its composition and powers. This will oversee all the land tenure questions discussed in this article, such as arbitrating disputes over land tenure, establishing and maintaining records of existing and historical land use, the application and reform of land laws, and recommending measures for land use planning. It should also ensure that women's customary land rights are not lost. Its head is to be a nominee of the Movements and its membership is to include representatives of all the groups that have interests in land ownership and use.

The Darfur states are also required to establish a Planning Authority for the purpose of land use management plans. At the insistence of the Movements' negotiators, who were well aware of how governmental land planning can violate the rights of ordinary people, the guidelines for land use planning and development are laid out in some detail in Paragraph 171. The three paragraphs that follow it place safeguards on how these plans are

to be developed, implemented, regulated and monitored. Among other safeguards, the state Land Commission is required to review the merits and legality of land use planning decisions. The head of the Land Commission will shoulder onerous responsibilities.

The issue of land ownership is certain to be one of the most important questions debated at the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC). While the DDDC cannot reopen the DPA for renegotiation, the clauses of the Agreement provide plenty of scope for Darfurians to find means of managing and resolving their land ownership challenges in a way that is satisfactory to all.

Conclusion

In conclusion, a couple of points should be addressed regarding the relationship between land tenure and conflict in Darfur. Firstly, customary land tenure in the region has developed over the years to the extent that talking about a single land tenure system in the region is no longer intelligible. Land use practices have been affected by environmental constraints, changes in economic conditions and governmental legislation; leading in turn to adaptive changes in customary land tenure arrangements.

Secondly, to explain the current conflict in the region, it is important to notice that conflict over land is part of a complex matrix of factors which can be classified into: (a) root causes that are mainly expressed by lack of development, and lack of democracy, (b) direct causes which include natural resource competition, competition by local and educated elite over political office, armed robbery, government treatment of people on tribal basis, the politicisation and restructuring of native administration, (c) catalytic factors include population increase both for people and animals, drought and desertification, market orientation, the Libyan-Chadian conflict, the Chadian civil war, international immigration, and the spread of fire arms.

Sabir Ibrahim is a Darfuri from Sudan.

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23. The historical origins of the Sudanese civil wars: The politics of gunboat diplomacy (1839-1983)

John G. Nyuot Yoh

The name “Southern Sudan” was used, officially, for the first time by the British government in Sudan in 1920, when they proclaimed that region as a separate entity before they changed their mind in June 1947 (Al-Affendi, 1990: 371-389). Before that date, Southern Sudan was known by different names. Writing about the civil war in Southern Sudan is indeed a war in itself, for one does not clearly know how, where and when to begin the story. The nature of the war itself is complex, brutal and though it went on for a long time, very little is known about it by outsiders, although one must add that a good number of works have been written on the topic by academics, travellers, missionaries and journalists.

The traditional school of thought on the Sudanese war holds the view that the war is between Arabs and black Africans, Muslims against Christians, Southerners against Northerners. To some extent this view is correct, but in reality it is more complex than that. Another school that has gained considerable following with regard to the civil war in the Sudan, states that the best way to understand that war is to trace its historical genesis, the relationship between the South and the central governments in Khartoum way back to the 1820s when the Ottomans, through their Viceroy in Egypt Mohammed Ali Pasha, decided to invade Sudan in pursuit of gold and slaves, and that is where this survey will begin (Gray, 1961; Shibeika, 1952; El-Bashir, 1979).

The Arabs, Ottomans and the Egyptians

Southern Sudan is the area of Sudan below the 13th parallel and comprises of Bahr-el-Ghazel, Equatoria and Upper Nile regions which is about 400 000 square miles. Southern Sudan has a population that is estimated between eight and 10 million of which major ethnic groups are the Dinka, the Nuer, the Azande, the Bari speaking, the Otuho-speaking, the Toposa-speaking, Luo-speaking, the Moru-speaking and the Maban-speaking. It is bordered by the Northern Sudan, Chad and Central Africa on the West; Zaire (DRC) and Uganda on the South, and Kenya and Ethiopia on the East (Wai, 1981: 1-2; Sanderson, 1981).

The first waves of Arab migrants from Fertile Crescent and Egypt into Sudan and the onset of the Islamisation of the country began in the 13th century in the Nubia, the Northern part of the Sudan. Almost at the same time, Muslim Sufi orders coming from the lands of the Fertile Crescent infiltrated most of the Christian communities of the kingdom. Between 1275 and 1276, the Egyptian government sent many campaigns to Nubia. In 1272 an agreement was reached between the newly established Ottoman authorities, under the al-Zaher Baybars in Egypt, and the Nubian Christian king Daoud, stipulating, among other things, that Muslims be allowed to carry out missionary work throughout the Nubian territories south of Egypt. King Daoud, the last Nobatia Christian monarch, was overthrown by his nephew Sayf al-Din Abdalla Barshambu, who converted to Islam and inaugurated the first Nubian Islamic kingdom by converting the Cathedral of Dungula into a mosque on May 29, 1317 (Hassan, 1967a; Yoh, 1999: 1-4). Progressively, the Muslim

faith began to take root in the kingdom as Arab merchants and Muslim clerics moved southward.

The Christian kingdom of Alwa finally came to an end in 1504 AD, when the Funj, a tribe from southern Nubia, migrated from the upper White Nile and established the Funj Sultanate with its capital at Sennar. The Funj were pagans, and consequently their era was a period of increasing Islamisation of Nubia (the present Northern Sudan proper) until the invasion of Sudan by the Turco-Egyptians in 1820-21 AD. The Arabs were very careful not to pick a quarrel with the more powerful Funj, lest they be chased back to Egypt. Instead, the Muslims applied a system of gradual Arabisation and Islamisation toward the Funj, just as they did with the Nubians (Yoh, 1999: 1-10; Lagu, 2000; Sanderson, 1981). Although Islamic by faith and Arabic-speaking for administrative purposes, the Funj Sultanate drew heavily upon older Nubian traditions, and in fact the geographical and historical coherence of the Funj elite depended on the institution of matrilineal kingship inherited from the states of medieval Christian Nubia. The old Sultanate matrilineal dynasty was overthrown in 1719, and in 1762, a clique of middle class warlords, known in the Funj Sultanate period as Hamaj, imposed one of their own as ruling wazir (vizier). By the turn of the 18th century, the Funj Sultanate had consolidated its authority in the country, and the whole region of northern Sudan had become Muslim territory. By the middle of the 19th century, almost all the activities of the Christian missions had ceased, with the exception of those of the Roman Catholic mission, which was established in 1848 in central and western Sudan. The situation, however, was different in the region that is today's Southern Sudan – a region inhabited by over 80 non-Arab African tribes speaking different languages. The people of this region, estimated today at eight million, were neither affected by the events in northern Sudan, nor did Christianity or Islam penetrate their land before the 19th century (Hassan, 1967a; Yoh, 1999: 1-4).

In 1820-21, the remnants of the Funj Sultanate fell to Mohamed Ali Pasha, Ottoman Khedive of Egypt, with no significant resistance. Mohamed Ali Pasha administration's main objection was to take slaves from Sudan on which he had to rely on in order to get wealth. He was also interested in gold and ivory trade. Despite the European governments' attempts to persuade the Pasha to eradicate slavery in his areas of control in Sudan, slavery became a big business there. When restrictions on the movement into Sudan from Egypt were lifted in 1853, slave traders moved quickly southwards ahead of the more slowly penetrating Khedive administration. In 1839 a Turkish Naval Captain led the invasion of Southern Sudan by the Khedive, and having crossed a total journey of 1 000 miles, reached Gondokoro (Rejaf Mountain near present-day Juba) in early 1841.
It was the first time in the history of that region that the route south along the river Nile opened, hence paving the way for the second opening up of Southern Sudan by Khadive Ismail in 1863. Within 15 years Khedive Ismail managed to add Southern Sudan to his domain, starting in 1863 by annexing Fashoda, the headquarters of the Southern Sudan's Shilluk Kingdom (renamed Upper Nile province in 1902). Khadive Ismail employed Sir Samuel Baker in 1869 to lead an expedition into the South, with orders to establish a series of stations, as well as to suppress slave trading. Although Baker succeeded in organizing Egyptian garrisons in the South, he failed to convince the slave traders to stop their trade, many of whom were secure in their forts away from the river. In 1874, Baker was succeeded by another Englishman, General Charles Gordon. In the South, Gordon established a provincial capital at Lado, near present-day Juba. As a governor of Equato-

ria Province (as the South was named by the Egyptians), he established more garrisons and improved to some extent the chain of forts along the river. Meanwhile, slave trade in the South continued to thrive (Gordon, 1963).

The Ottoman-Egyptian rule is recalled by many Sudanese – in the North as well as in the South – as harsh, with oppressive taxes, forced conscription to the army, and slaving expeditions that were imposed on the Sudanese people, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, none of whom was acquainted with the notion of a state or its human material demands (for details see Gray, 1961; MacMichael, 1954, vol. 1; Gordon, 1963).

The Mahdist state

In 1881 Mohamed Ahmed ibn Abdullah, a native of Dongola area in the Northern part of Sudan, wrote, from Aba Island near present-day Khartoum, to many tribal notables and chiefs claiming that he was the expected 'Mahdi' (Messiah). He called upon them to support and rally behind him. In 1885, the Mahdist's forces (Ansar) revolted against Egyptians as represented at the time by Governor-General Charles Gordon in Khartoum. The rebellion spread all over the western, northern and central parts of the country, bringing Muslim tribes together against foreign invaders for the first time. On January 26, 1885, the Mahdi's forces attacked Khartoum, Gordon was killed, and Khartoum was sacked. The leader of the revolt, Mohamed Ahmed, died on June 22, 1885. He was succeeded by Khaliffa Abdullah al-Tai"shi, who continued the war against the Egyptians. In order to bring the South under his rule, Khalifa launched in 1888 a second Mahdi invasion, but attempts to conquer Equatoria province were resisted by the local tribes, remnants of the Egyptian army and the Belgians from neighbouring Congo. Wherever it was possible, the Mahdi tried to convert Southern tribes into Islam, and legalized slavery. The Southern tribes fought against Ansar and compelled them in 1897 to withdraw from Equatoria when Belgians established their authority in the Lado Enclave. The Mahdist Islamic state flourished in the North until the establishment of an Anglo-Egyptian Condominium rule in 1898 in Northern Sudan, following the defeat of the Ansar at the Battle of Tushki on August 3, 1889. The Mahdist period (1885-1898) is remembered in the South as the beginning of the intrusion of Northern Sudanese Muslim governments in successive efforts to dominate Southern Sudan spiritually and politically. In Northern Sudan, the Mahdist state was seen as a time of glory and early nationalism born in the context of a renewed Islam (for further details on Mahdiyya see Holt, 1958; O"Balance, 1977; El-Bashir, 1979; Wai, 1981).

British rule

During the Scramble for Africa, the British, French and Belgium had a vested interest in Southern Sudan. As mentioned earlier, in 1892, the French led by Major Marchand occupied Bahr el-Ghazel and Western Upper Nile up to Fashoda (Kodok). By 1896 they had established a firm administration in these areas. Unfortunately, the French expedition moving from Djibouti via Ethiopia to the Baro and Sobat Rivers failed to link up with Major Marchand expeditionary force in Fashoda (Kodok). Specific French interest was to annex Southern Sudan to French Soudan (Mali, Senegal, Niger, Chad and Cameroon) in West Africa. France's colonial interests in Southern Sudan were eventually aborted by the eruption of Anglo-Franco conflict over South Sudan, known internationally as the

"Fashoda Incident" in Upper Nile. The Belgian occupied Western Equatoria up to Mongalla and established the "Lado Enclave" as part of the Belgian Congo (Zaire, DRC) until the death of King Leopold of Belgium in 1910, when the enclave was handed over to Britain (MacMicahel, vols 1 & 2, 1952; Daly, 1986).

The British colonial rule in Sudan administered the Muslim North and the South separately as a result of some geographical, political, cultural distinctions between the two regions of the then Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. For the British, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan was not a colony. The North was ruled in the British colonial policy pattern developed in the Egypt and the Middle East (West Asia).

On the other hand, the South was ruled through the indirect rule that was predominant policy in imperial Britain's African colonies devised by Lord Henry Lugard in the Northern Emirates of Nigeria in 1898. Thus, to ensure the effectiveness of separate administration, the British colonial administration enacted the Closed District Ordinance Act in 1920. In 1922, the Passport and Permit Ordinance Act was promulgated (Robertson, 1956; Madour, 1965).

In essence, these ordinances strictly chartered the trend for complete separate educational, socio-economic, political development as well as required strict code on the issue of passports and permits for travelling between the North and South Sudan. The immigration policy between the North and South was further consolidated by the issuance of Passports and Permits to the Arab traders in Southern Sudan (for details see Collins, 1983).

Prior to granting political independent to Sudan, the British colonial administrators were wondering of what to do about Southern Sudan. Most of them who knew quite well that the South and North are distinct ethnic groups and nationalities, who have social, cultural, linguistics, and religious differences, and hence would not agree on a suggestion to merge them into one nation. They were also aware of the historical animosities that were traced back to the period of the ivory and slave trade of the 19th century. Nevertheless, to their dismay, they were let down by the Civil Secretary in Khartoum and the British Labour government of Prime Minister Anthony Eden. As we shall see later, the decision of the Civil Secretary to unify the North and South in June 1947, contributed first to what many Southern Sudanese consider as a total sell-out and betrayal of the African people of Southern Sudan that precipitated the on-going chronic 46-year-old civil war that has been dragging on to date. Moreover, the issuance of passports and permits between the Muslim North and Southern Sudan seemed to have strengthened and protected the very existence of South Sudan cultures and heritage (de Chand, 1995; Lagu, 2000; Deng, 1995).

Furthermore, they strengthened the inter-state commerce and Trade Ordinance Act enacted in 1925. For instance, any Jallaba (Arab traders) doing business in the South must and ought to have proper permits to conduct business in South Sudan. Ironically the British administrators in the South did encourage Southern Sudanese to become merchants and producers. British policy was to keep African people of Southern Sudan discriminated against in all spheres of political economy. Had the British colonial administration provided equal opportunity in education, economics, management and administration as

well as social services today, the South would not have been in this current precarious situation of the past 46 years. During the 1970s-1980s when Southern Sudanese asserted themselves in business and education, the on-going civil war broke out again and thus disrupted the anticipated gains in these endeavours (El-Bashir, 1979).

Attempts were also made by the British colonial government to enact a language policy at the Rejaf Language Conference in 1928. The Rejaf Language Conference approved English as the official language and the indigenous Southern Sudan languages such as Dinka, Nuer, Bari, Latuka, Shilluk and Zande as lingua franca. Arabic language was rejected. Thus, the six ordinances coupled with the language policy were designed to maintain the South as a separate political entity from the Muslim North. On their administrative functions, colonial governors in Southern Sudan had very little to do with Northern Sudan and used to conduct official business with British East Africa (Collins, 1983).

As mentioned earlier, the establishment of Anglo-Egyptian rule on January 19, 1899 resulted in the British dominating the political life of the country and setting about pacifying the countryside and suppressing local religious uprisings, which created insecurity among the local officials, but never actually posed a major threat to their rule. The North was quickly pacified. In the South, resistance to British rule was more prolonged, and the new administration found itself caught in a fierce war with local religious leaders. Administration in the South was then reduced to keeping the peace rather than making any serious attempts at modernization (Collins, 1983; Daly, 1986).

While the British controlled the country, the “Christianization” of Southern Sudan, and its isolation from the influence of Northern Sudanese Muslims, became an administrative priority. The South was hence used by the British as a bargaining card vis-à-vis the Northern Sudanese and their Egyptian allies, both of whom were vying for influence in the South. One reason cited in favour of the British government’s decision to close the South to Muslim and Arab influence was to prevent a repeat of the earlier participation of the Northern Sudanese in the slave trade. Thus, Northerners were not allowed access to the South. The British also feared that the people of the South might end up being culturally assimilated into the Middle East by the Arabized Northern Sudanese. To the British, moreover, allowing the South to be Islamized would have opened the door for Islam to infiltrate East Africa. Of course, British administrators were aware that Islam was already spreading in the Sahel region (Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda); but the fact that the people of Southern Sudan had managed to resist Islamic penetration for over 500 years meant that they were indirectly preventing access to the sources of the Nile – one of the major British interests in Sudan – as much as they were preventing the Islamisation of the central and southern African regions (Yoh, 1999; Beshir, 1968; Sanderson, 1981).

The educational institutions in the south remained almost entirely in the hands of foreign missionaries. These were mainly the Catholic Order of the “Verona Fathers”, the Anglican Church Missionary Society (CMS), and the Missionaries of the American-based United Presbyterian Church. These three were the founders of western Christianity in southern Sudan. The Condominium Authority encouraged them to proselytize in the south through basic education in the vernaculars and some English. Consequently, the new elite that emerged in the south became eventually the leading echelon of the region. They were

all products of that system and identified themselves with Christianity (Beshir, 1968; Yoh, 1999; Sanderson, 1981).

As for economic development in the south, that was almost non-existent compared to the establishment of a more modern system in the north. Thus, by the end of the Second World War, the Southern Policy was formally abandoned by the British administration in the Sudan. In spite of that, the south was ill prepared for the independence of a united Sudan that lay only a decade away then.

North-South pre-independence politics

For most first-generation leaders of Southern Sudan, Sudan's independence was a result of a complex interplay of local and international circumstances in an age of national awakening over the world, but primarily of northern Sudanese nationalism and Anglo-Egyptian rivalry. Although southerners had virtually no part to play in the political manoeuver of the early post-war years, the south itself became an issue in this dispute. Northern Sudanese reacted against attempts to exclude Islam and Arabism from the south. They were sceptical, both of the needs to protect southern tribal societies and of British seriousness in trying to maintain some kind of social status quo. The majority of Southern leaders believe that Northerners regarded the south as backward, a field for them to exploit economically later as the other remote parts of the Sudan. They understood the British Southern Policy as intended to detach the south from the north, and regarded it as an example of a Machiavellian type of strategy. That is, "divide and rule", a policy they were to adopt at independence themselves (Beshir, 1968; Khalid, 1990; Deng, 1995).

Northern political opinions were centred on two religious sects: the Ansar and the Khatmiyya Sects. Their parties were divided over the issue of the future of Sudan. The Umma Party, organ of the Ansar Sect advocated independence, whilst Hiseb El Ashiga, (Brotherhood Party) patronised by the Khatmiyya Sect leader, advocated some form of link with Egypt. This was to advance the policy of the unity of the Nile Valley region, a dream some Egyptians maintained for the renewal of their Empire. The pro-Egyptian party later took the name, National Unionist Party (NUP). The two parties were united in insisting on keeping the two regions of the Sudan together. They concurred in this on a unitary approach to its constitutional development. The British advocated an independent united Sudan, largely to rob Egypt and its northern Sudanese allies of an easy issue. In 1947 a conference of British, northern and some Southern delegates ratified at Juba, capital of the southern Equatoria province, the decision that the future of the south lay in a united Sudan. Although in reality the British government had already taken decision for the merger of the two parts of the Sudan, southern delegates were brought in at their principal town simply to be informed and subsequently involved (Mahjoub, 1974; Khalid, 1990; Harir & Tvedt, 1994).

The Juba Conference, June 1947, is a landmark in the history of the Sudan, because southern and northern representatives met there for the first time to discuss the future of the south in the framework of a united Sudan. The conference put an end to the hopes of emerging southern political elite on ideas held at the time by some British officials in the south, that regionalism, federalism or an independent advisory council for the southern

Sudan should be the objective. On the other hand the conference also revealed the many apprehensions and fear of northern domination envisaged by southerners (Beshir, 1968; Wai, 1981; Wanyin, 1987).

The period 1947-1953 witnessed the establishment of self-governing institutions in the Sudan and the demise of direct British control. In 1948 a Legislative Assembly representing the entire country was established in Khartoum. Southern participation in that assembly was insignificant. There were only 13 southern members in the legislative assembly. No political party existed yet in the south then and tribal chiefs and British officials continued to act as its spokesmen. More importantly, the urgent economic and administrative developments needed to prepare the region for an eventual self-government and self-determination vis-a-vis the more developed north were not undertaken (Beshir, 1968; Collins, 1983; Harir & Tvedt, 1994).

On the other hand, following the Juba Conference, northern Sudanese took the opportunity to encourage the integration of the two parts of the country, north and south. They did so by promoting the teaching of Arabic, building of new mosques and encouraging northern traders to move into the south.

Both south and north were ushered into self-rule following the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of February 1953, which promised the Sudanese self-determination and the evacuation of all Egyptian and British troops within a period not exceeding three years. There was no doubt that the Southern leadership was less sophisticated and less prepared than the Northern leadership for the new task of self-government. In fact, the whole of the southern population was taken unprepared by the new social and political developments. The South was an immature political society; representative politics meant very little to the Southern average man. Even the politicians themselves were much identified with the family and tribal affiliation and more importantly by the extent to which they seemed to be against or for the central government policies in the South. By and large, on the eve of independence and while the Southern politicians were engaged in political bargaining in Khartoum with Northern politicians as well as Egyptians and the British, the average Southern Sudanese was engaged in circulating rumours about British departure and the fears of its aftermath. Add to this, it seemed that the Southern population had all along taken for granted whatever the politicians told them about North-South relations, real or imaginary (Albino, 1970; Khalid, 1990; Beshir, 1968).

A few weeks after the Torit military rebellion that broke out in the Southern town of Torit on August 18, 1955, Premier Ismail Al-Azhari, appointed on September 8, 1955, a commission of inquiry – officially known as the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the Southern Sudan during August 1955. The commission was headed by Tawfiq S. Cotran, a Christian Palestinian judge and police magistrate and long-time employee of the Sudan condominium government. It included Khalifa Mahjoub, a Northern Sudanese General Manager in the Equatoria Scheme Board, as well as Chief Lolik Lado, a Member of Parliament, from the Lokoya tribe, one of the Bari-speaking tribes, located in Liria district in the region of Eastern Equatoria. The commission was instructed by the government to investigate the causes and not the consequences of the mutiny. It was to carry out investigation in Juba town or in any area or areas that the chairman deemed appropriate. Its work was restricted on administrative inquiry on the causes of the mutiny. Under

no authority was it to investigate political or social aspects of the mutiny. The meetings and the hearings of the committee were to be public or secret depending on the circumstances under which the commission was working. The commission was also authorized to appoint two advisors, preferably officers from the Sudan Defence Force, SDF, with the approval of the defence minister (Yoh, 1995; Taqrir Lijnat Tahgig, 1956: 1-5).

Almost all the Southern politicians prior to and on the eve of the mutiny had tended to react to the events, more than actually participating in making them. Therefore, it is worth pointing out that the reasons described by the Cotran Report and the ones outlined below, would seem insignificant in the eyes of a sophisticated and mature politically socialized society, which the Southern Sudan was not one. It is within the context of the circumstances mentioned above, regarding the significance of the causes of the mutiny, that one may appreciate the importance of the findings of the commission of inquiry.

The causes of the civil war(s)

1. **British Southern policy:** In its report, the commission blamed and considered the British Southern policy to be one of the major reasons that had widened the political gap between the South and the North. As mentioned earlier, between 1920 and the 1930s for instance, several Ordinances and Regulations were issued to form what become known as the British Southern policy, all of which aimed then to: "build up a series of self-contained racial or tribal units based upon indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs" (Taqrir Lijnat Tahgig, 1956: 18-25; Beshir, 1968).

   British administrators in the South were empowered to prohibit Arabs and/or from the Northern provinces from entering the three Southern provinces whether to trade, hunt or for any other objective, unless they had obtained a special permit. Indigenous Southern languages were encouraged; English was proclaimed the Lingua Franca in the South and Sunday became the day of rest instead of Friday. Arabic names, customs and dress were officially banned. In the three Southern provinces Northern Sudanese traders were encouraged to leave the region, the reluctant ones being forced to do so. These measures were intended to restrict Egyptians, Northern Sudanese and other West African Muslims to undertake activities which in accordance with Colonial view would influence and negate the administration policy followed in the South. By 1940, these Ordinances and Regulations had far-reaching effect on the economic development of the South. On the educational plane, Christian missionaries were entrusted with the task of educating Southerners. In other words, the 1930 Southern Policy succeeded in closing off the South; thus, the Southern region began to develop as a separate entity both in political and economic terms (for more details see Handerson, 1965: 162-169; Shibeika, 1952; MacMichael, 1954, vol. 2; Yoh, 1999).

   The British Southern policy was therefore considered by the Northerners to be a contributing factor to the backwardness of the South. To the Southerners however, both the British and Northern Sudanese were responsible for political, economic and social underdevelopment of the South.

2. **The Egyptian involvement:** As mentioned earlier, the Cotran Commission was restricted to concentrate its investigation on administrative aspects of the mutiny; thus, it did not report on any political role played by the Egyptian or the British governments. However, the Egyptian involvement in the mutiny in particular was very important and deserves special attention. Traditionally, the National Unionist Party, NUP, since its formation in 1949, favoured some form of the Sudan's unity with Egypt. On the eve of independence, NUP's position on unity with Egypt gradually changed, leading eventually to an open antagonism between the NUP and the Egyptian government in 1954. Faced with this new reality, the Egyptian minister in charge of Sudanese affairs, Major Salah Salim, began to contact Southern Sudanese members of NUP. These links became known as early as June 1955 with the liberal party members covertly transforming this new alliance into an idea of unity of the South with Egypt! Employees of the Egyptian Irrigation Department, stationed at Malakal and Juba, started to distribute anti-Northern pamphlets, while Radio Cairo broadcast in Southern languages and criticized Premier Al-Azhari's Southern policies. The Egyptian-Southern new alliance was necessitated by two main developments: NUP-Egyptian relations had witnessed, as early as April 1954, a severe breakdown. Al-Azhari had tried to play down his party's rejection of unity with Egypt, but he had to announce openly his call for an independent Sudan in August 1954. Secondly, having lost a long-time ally the Egyptian government needed another Sudanese ally, through whom it could manoeuver against the British government in the matter of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations over the Suez Canal Zone. Thus, those Southern Sudanese politicians who had shown willingness to do business with major Salim were received well in Cairo (See Al-Ahram, 12 August 1955, 1/8; Sanderson, 1981: 341-346; Yoh, 1995).

   It is to be recalled that leading members of the Liberal Party were in touch with some officers in Torit, the seat of the Equatoria corps mutiny. During the months of June and July 1955, it was also reported that some leaders of the would-be mutiny had received prolonged visits from two Egyptian officials accompanied by prominent pro-Egyptian Southerners. There seemed to have been an Egyptian plan or scenario aimed at a mutiny in the South. The Scenario went like this: The troops of the Equatoria Corps who were scheduled to travel to participate in the ceremonies of the evacuation from the Sudan of British and Egyptian troops should be told that they would be killed while in Khartoum. If the Torit corps out of fear had rebelled, the scenario goes on, other Southern garrisons at Juba, Yambio, Yei, Malakal and Wau, with whom the plotters at Torit had established contact, would follow suit. Once the plot was carried out as envisaged, Cairo would demand that instead of pulling out, the British and Egyptian governments should airlift troops to the South in order to rescue the people of the region from what its press called "their Northern oppressors".

   In this way, Anglo-Egyptian evacuation would have been halted and new arrangements would have to be made. Major Salim's move could be considered as an attempt to use the South as an instrument in order to strengthen Egyptian influence in Sudanese politics. Ironically, the South had often been a pawn used by London against Cairo and Khartoum. Thus, the South became a last desperate action to redirect the Egyptian political objectives in the Sudan. However, like the British and

Al-Azhari, major Salim had tried to play politics; but again, the Egyptian involvement in the mutiny was not the main factor that ignited the bloody rebellion (Yoh, 1995: 84-85; *Al-Ahram*, 7 August 1955, 7).

3. **The Communist Element:** The Communist Element in the Mutiny was another cause reported by the Commission of Inquiry. The Sudan Communist Party, first called the Sudan Movement for National Liberation, was formally created in 1946, as an offshoot of the Egyptian Communist Party. The party later on developed an Orthodox, Moscow oriented wing led by Abdel Khaliq Mahjoub. In 1957 for the first time it contested elections through the anti-Imperial Front. The communist's penetration among the workers in the Zandeland and Moruland in Western Equatoria, started as early as December 1954.

   This communist infiltration was carried out by some Northern and some Egyptian officials working in the Equatoria Industrial Projects, namely the Nzara Cotton Mill. In this Cotton Mill, active union workers had translated several pamphlets which were written by Anti-Imperial Front members. These pamphlets were distributed among the local tribal leaders, government officials and even the local population. Some leaflets went as far as attacking the government policy of unequal pay for the Northern and Southern workers. At one point, some pamphlets called for a Southern local government within a united Sudan. It was reported that in January and February 1955, prominent Anti-Imperial Front officials visited Nzara and other parts of Equatoria, and while there recruited many Southerners. One of the well-known activists was a certain Benjamin Basara, assisted by an Egyptian medical officer in Maridi district (Taqrir Lijnat Tahgig, 1956: 114).

   The logical question that follows would be: Were the communist activities in Equatoria province instrumental in the outbreak of the August 1955 mutiny? In spite of their political activity and mobilization in Equatoria and among worker unions and intellectuals, there was no evidence which to suggest that the communists were influential enough to aggravate a general revolt in the South which led to the Torit mutiny. After all, the propagators of communist orientation in the South were Northerners. On the contrary, evidence suggests that the people of the South did not at that stage understand or care about Marxism or Leninism. Even the Southern intellectuals of the 1950s seemed not to care about abstract communist theories, although communist slogans such as "equal pay for equal work; and three parliaments in Juba, Wau, and Malakal", interested them. In other words, none of the veteran Southern Liberal Party members became a member of the Sudan communist party. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that the influence of communist propaganda among Southern elite did not overstep the workers' desire to raise their wages using communist slogans. The prevailing economic hardship, in addition to the existing political tension, were perhaps more pressing than the communist instigation against the government to cause the disturbances of August 1955. But perhaps the importance of the communist element in the mutiny lies in that communist ideas were propagated in Equatoria where the mutiny took place. In fact some of the future guerrilla officers in Western Equatoria were worker union leaders of the Nzara Cotton Mill (for details see Wai, 1981: 63; Yoh, 1995: 75-77; Taqrir Lijnat Tahgig, 1956: 114-115).

4. **The Sudanisation of government institutions:** The "Sudanisation" of the government institutions was yet another important reason given by the Cotran Commission, as contributing to being behind the Torit mutiny. In accordance with the Anglo-Egyptian Accord of February 12, 1953, which had officially consented to self-determination of the Sudan, the duties of the "Sudanisation" committee were to complete the Sudanisation of the administration, the police, the Sudan Defence Force or any other Government body. Appointed by the prime minister on February 20, 1954, the commission immediately began its work and by June 20, 1954, it disclosed that there were 1 111 British civil servants and 108 Egyptian officials in the Sudan government. Among them, about 2 000 civil servants opted for voluntary retirement from the service, having been guaranteed huge gratuities.
While admitting their educational limitations, Southern intellectuals nevertheless blamed the Northern-dominated government for the unbalanced results.
The results of Sudanisation confirmed the feeling in the South that the region was being cheated and that its lot in the future was to be dominated and exploited by the North (Wai, 1981: 56).

   Similar remarks went as far as accusing the North of trickery and hypocrisy: When Sudanisation was completed, only four junior posts of Assistant District Commissioner and two mamurs were given to the South. There was no excuse for this because a pro-Egyptian clerk at Juba provincial headquarters (a Southerner) was promoted and transferred to the North as a deputy governor (Albino, 1971: 3).
   At the other extreme, Northern politicians were obstinate in emphasizing that the British Colonial power was solely responsible for the results of the Sudanisation commission. The list could not simply include any Southerner since none of them was qualified and experienced enough for those posts. The blame for that however, does not rest with the Northerners; it rests with those responsible for training and educating the Southerners, the missionaries and the British administration (Said, 1965: 74).

   Nonetheless, some Northern Sudanese did acknowledge the Southern suspicions, nurtured over 50 years, that turned into hostility by the results of the Sudanisation: (a) the posts held by Southerners at the time were by far fewer and more junior to those held by Northerners, and as they lacked seniority, experience and qualifications, Southerners were not much affected by the Sudanisation. This was not only disappointing to the educated Southerners, but it was also looked upon as the changing of one master for another. (b) The Sudanisation Committee in the best traditions of British Civil Service, allocated the posts based on its principles, hence it was not the Northerners to be blamed, but the British who taught and ruled Southerners (Beshir, 1968: 72-73).

5. **The Nzara riots:** According to the Cotran Commission report, in July 1955, it was reported that the District Commissioner (DC) of Yambio and his assistant forced the tribal chiefs of the district to affix their signatures to a statement, written on their behalf, supporting the government's policy in the South. This telegram, sent in the name of 13 chiefs, had many repercussions.

   The dispatch of the telegram coincided with the presence of a Southern Liberal

Party member of parliament, Elia Kuze, who was at the time holding political rallies and meetings with his constituents. When he learned about the telegram, allegedly sent by the chiefs of his area, he grasped the opportunity and organized more public meetings in which he demanded the removal of chiefs who were supposed to have signed the message. In one of these rallies, a strong-worded resolution denounced the action of the chiefs and demanded for their deposition. In addition, the attendants denounced the DC's interference in politics. Informed about Kuze's reaction, the chiefs lodged a complaint to the District Commissioner against Kuze and his supporters. The DC concurred with their complaint and signed a court summons. Kuze, who was attending a liberal party conference at Juba, was detained by the police and sent back to Yambio for trial. Elia Kuze, along with Metre Mabo, Basonia Jambo, Singano Gabduro, Timothy Buati and Basia Yuku, were brought before the court on July 25, 1955. Their charge was based on section 441 of the Sudan Penal Code. Their accusation was "criminal intimidation". In fact, they were sentenced by the chiefs' court consisting, in part, of those chiefs whose deposition they had demanded. The chiefs argued that the accused had on July 7, 1955, at a political rally, resolved that the chiefs who signed the declaration of support for the government be removed from their offices. The chiefs found the accused guilty and sentenced each to (20) years imprisonment. The DC, who was present in the courtroom, explained to the chiefs that two years was the maximum sentence laid down by the law for such an offense. The sentences were thus reduced to two years each. While the court was in progress, and soon after the sentence was passed, a crowd of about 700 people spontaneously gathered outside the courtroom. The DC called in troops who having failed to persuade the crowd to disperse peacefully resorted to using tear gas. Amidst the confusion, two Northern Sudanese merchants shot at the crowd, killing eight and injuring 11 people (for some more details on Nzara strike see Taqrir Lijnat Tahgig, 1956: 96-105).

The trial was referred to by the Cotran Commission as a "farce and usurpation of the machinery of justice" (Taqrir Lijnat Tahgig, 1956: 104). Moreover, the trial had caused a great disappointment among Southern politicians and members of parliament because the District Commissioner's motive for the trial was simply to restore his own prestige and that of the 13 chiefs.

Secondly, some members of the court were themselves involved in sending the declaration; hence they were in fact sitting as judges in their own case.
Thirdly, the trial was contrary to the spirit and intention of the chiefs' court's ordinance which legislated for the trial of ordinary offenses, and was not to be used for the trial of political offenders.

Fourthly, it was, in the opinion of Southern MPs, unlawful to try a member of parliament by chiefs' court since government officials, including MPs, were exempt from its jurisdiction.

Finally, no consideration was taken by the court of section 7(3) of the chiefs' court's ordinance which provided that attention be paid to the age and character of the first offenders. The report of the commission of inquiry emphasised the fact that the DC himself interfered in politics in a way that was deplorable both in a moral and in an administrative

sense. A population which was passively anti-Northern was transformed, by such administrative meddling, into becoming actively so. The telegram of support for that matter, would not have created such excitement if it had been the spontaneous feeling of the people (Taqrir Lijnat Tahgig, 1956: 104-105).

One day after Elia Kuze's trial, July 26, 1955, disturbances broke out at Nzara, 16 miles from Yambio District, the industrial centre of the Zande scheme. The violence occurred when 60 Southern workers threatened to strike if they were not given more pay. Early in July, the management of the Equatoria Project Board had dismissed some 300 Southern workers. The dismissals were accompanied by the appointment of extra Northern staff. When the Board turned down the workers' request, a crowd of 250 workers from the weaving and spinning mills staged a demonstration. They were later joined by unemployed and other civilians, armed with spears, bows and arrows, swelling the crowd to a thousand. The strike got out of hand and looting began. Reinforcement consisting of five policemen, each with a tear gas bomb, and 11 Equatoria corps soldiers arrived from Yambio. Being too small in number to quell the demonstration, the soldiers panicked and opened fire, killing four and fatally wounding two. The Assistant District Commissioner, Mohamud Husein and lieutenant Mu'tasim Abdel Rahman were blamed for their inability to control the situation and according to the Commission report, they: "… were young in age and inexperienced and maybe they were frightened when they saw the huge crowd. Thus, they had to resort to unlawful tactics. In any case, whether the incident was carefully handled or not, the effect of the incident itself in the Southern minds was bad for they considered it as the beginning of war" (The August 1955 rebellion) (Taqrir Lijnat Tahgig, 1956: 116-120).

The effect on the morale of the Equatorial corps troops, having to fire on their fellow Southerners, appeared to have been considerable. According to the Cotran Commission Report, instead of investigating the cause of the Nzara demonstration, a further threatening ultimatum from Khartoum was circulated and broadcast on Radio Omdurman.

In addition to the direct causes discussed earlier, the Commission of Inquiry listed what it considered as minor or indirect grievances, which it classified as psychological, which also had far-reaching effects on South-North relations.

First, some Northern Sudanese, including high officials in the administration, referred to the Southern elite as half-educated. This attitude was condemned by the Cotran Commission: "Education is a relative term and largely a matter of opinion, but experience has taught time and again even nations with a long history of colonial rule that it always pays to gain the confidence of the intelligentsia whether they are fully educated, half educated or quarter educated" (see Taqrir Lijnat Tahgig, 1956: 8).

The conduct of calling Southerners half-educated had developed some sort of inferiority complex among the Southern educated class vis-a-vis their Northern counterpart; hence it augmented the cleavage between the South and North. Secondly, some Northern merchants, or "Jallaba", had often referred to Southerners as "abid" (slaves); this attitude, which was widespread in the three Southern provinces, had had great psychological effect on the Southerners, as it reminded them of the Northern Sudanese historical role in the slave trade in the 19th century. Thirdly, Northern Sudanese traders and some gov-

ernment officials were unwilling to mix with Southerners. In fact, throughout the South, Northerners had their own social clubs separate from those frequented by Southerners (Taqrir Lijnat Tahgig, 1956: 8-9).

A few months after the mutiny, visible effects on the Southern political scene were easily traced, especially in three Southern secondary schools and at Khartoum University. Following the suppression of the revolt, all the Southern secondary schools were transferred to Khartoum due to the insecurity in the region. One of these schools, Rumbek Secondary, became the centre of political activity, putting practically Southern parliamentarians under militant pressure. The school's presence in Khartoum had also helped in promoting the relatively united parliamentarians. Indeed, school wall papers such as Candor and Spark reflected what amounted to "a Southern regional viewpoint and a wider Southern political awareness of racial and cultural distinction from the North". The papers went as far as talking of a "Northern problem" which arose from failure of the North to face up to the question of identity: "Do we belong to the Middle East or Africa? If to Middle East, then there was no room for the South in such political community; if to Africa, there was great need for a major psychological adjustment on the part of the North" (see Albino, 1970).

In Northern view however, their belonging to the Middle East was not open to question: Arab Sudanese looked almost exclusively to Arab culture and the Arab world for their political aspirations and identification. It was natural that they should do so, since they were undoubtedly more Arab than African in their culture. Even nominally Islamicised African tribes with only a veneer of Arab culture were giving themselves Arab genealogies (Said, 1965).

Further radical views were also expressed at Khartoum University, where Southern Sudanese students had established newspapers such as Negro and Observer. These papers, in contrast to their Northern counterparts, tended to be militant and secessionist in approach. Attacks on "Northern political domination" and "forced Islamisation and Arabisation" of the South were blatantly expressed. Southern Sudan as a "potential separate entity" was widely propagated by the students. The Torit mutiny was considered as the "beginning of the liberation of the South" and the AnyaNya guerrilla force was referred to as "Southern Freedom Fighters", while the pro-government papers at the University simply referred to the AnyaNya as "mutineers". The effect of these views on the Southern urban community was of course an enormous hormone, considering that those who propagated these views later on became the leading figures in the Southern resistance movement. With secondary schools and the university students present in Khartoum, Southern politicians and parliamentarians became directly accountable to their constituents, as Southern urban opinion began to take shape in Khartoum. Add to this a considerable number of Southern secondary school students went to the military, police and teacher colleges (for more details on the students' activities see Albino, 1970).
The question that remained unanswered is: What was the symbolic significance of the Torit mutiny to the Southern Sudanese people? The mutiny became a symbol of "Southern solidarity"; a symbol of "rejection of an alien rule" be it British, Egyptian or Northern Sudanese. It was also associated with remembrance of the "beginning of the Southern cause" with all its legends of persecution, sacrifice and heroism. August 18, 1955 became a historic day in which Southerners remember the "Torit martyrs". The Flag of the

Equatorial Corps was several times adopted by the Southern liberation movements as the "Southern National Flag". Despite the differences over the causes of the mutiny, its political, social and economic significance among Southern Sudanese seemed to have developed into a living legend (Yoh, 1995: 101).

Post-independence Politics of 'Appeasement'

It is important to point out that the impact and the consequences of the Torit mutiny in local politics of the South and in the national political arena deserves some closer attention. It is often held that the outbreak of the mutiny was responsible for the subsequent deterioration of the North-South relations in the 1960s. In fact most of the Southern politicians, who were to form the leadership of the Southern militant organisations in exile, were either imprisoned or suspected of involvement in the mutiny. The investigation of their activities in post Torit mutiny politics is therefore of great significance for better understanding of the impact the mutiny had on the national politics. Thus, the evolution of the Torit mutiny into what became known as the "Southern problem" cannot be traced unless North-South relations after the mutiny are fully analysed.

Indeed, the formation of Southern militant groups had transformed the North-South political relations into a military confrontation. The evolution of the Torit mutineers into an effective fighting force can therefore be considered responsible for the delay of a peaceful solution to the Southern problem. Moreover, the weakness of subsequent coalition governments in the North in the 1960s also contributed negatively in solving the problem through democratic and constitutional means. Most of the Northern political groups of the time lacked a concrete and unified vision of how the problem could be solved.

One of the major negative repercussions of the Torit Mutiny on Sudanese national politics was that it almost paralysed effective political dialogue between the Southern Sudanese political groups and the central government, as well as casting doubt on the credibility of the Liberal Party and its members. This state of affairs was clearly manifest when the final phase of negotiations on independence between the condominium authorities and the Sudanese political groups were resumed in October 1955. Southern politicians found themselves powerless and unable to manoeuver or to push through the least of their demands. To put it differently, their alleged linkage to the mutiny leadership, and the alliance of some of them with Major Salah Salim, had become a real political impediment on the eve of the independence (See Yoh, 1995: 85; Al-Ahram, 28 July 1955: 1 and 9; Al-Ahram, 12 August 1955: 1 & 8).

It is generally accepted that the Southern region of the Sudan as a political "interest group" had started first as a reformist party, demanding among other things, rapid economic and educational development, before any decision could be taken on its political future. When this demand was not fulfilled, the South drifted to demand a federal status so as to avoid future political and administrative problems between the North and the South. Committed to achieve Federal status for the South, a group of Southern intellectuals, in December 1953, decided to form a political party which they called "the Liberal Party". The founders of the Southern Liberal Party, as it later became known, were Benjamin Langjuk, Buth Diu, Alfred Burjuok, Clement Mboro, Gordon Ayoum, Abdel Rahman Sule, Stanislaus Peysama and Benjamin Lwoke. By January 1954, the Liberal Party had

become a leading Sudanese party opposed to the National Unionist party, NUP, which was in control of the government. The First Liberal Party conference, which was attended by about 200 delegates, was held in Juba Hall on October 18, 1954. On the fourth day the conferees resolved: “that Southern peoples stand firmly for full independence and that a note would be prepared for submission to the Condominium authorities on Federal lines for a United Sudan”.

Indeed a letter to this effect was sent to the condominium authority (Wai, 1981; Taqrir Lijnat Tahgig, 1956; Albino, 1970: 28-35; Epril, 1974: 19-21).

As pointed out earlier the results of the Sudanisation Committee were published in October 1954, and the liberals threatened to boycott the national politics until something was done about the results. However, nothing was done about the commission report, nor did the Liberals execute their threat. In January 1955, the Liberal Party, together with the Southern members of the NUP, held a second conference, again in Juba, in which they advocated an independent parliament for the South in a form of Federal relations with Egypt and the Northern Sudan. Again, a third secret Liberal Party conference was convened on July 5-6, 1955, in Juba in which Federalism and the possibility of “use of violence against al-Azhari government” was discussed. However, when the Torit Mutiny broke out on August 18, the Liberal Party overwhelmingly denied any involvement of its leadership. In fact, the Secretary General, Buth Diu said that although he was concerned about the impending anti-Northern violence in the South, he felt helpless to do anything to stop it. Later on the party leader, Stanislaus Peysama recalled that while in Wau, he was warned that if the Southern parliamentarians returned to Khartoum for the new session, beginning on August 18, 1955, they would face violent action. Despite the lack of direct evidence implicating the Liberal Party leadership, a considerable number of them were detained in three Southern provinces. They included Clement Mboro, Elia Kuze, Stanislaus Peysama and many others. The 10-man delegation that was appointed by the Liberal Party’s July conference to present its views to the Northern parties in Khartoum, did not present their memorandum as the Torit rebellion took place in August (O”Balance, 1977: 36-38). Reporting on the situation in the Southern Sudan a few weeks after the mutiny, Collin Legum wrote: “The Southern MPs (Liberal Partisans) have not visited their constituencies since the troubles began. Whatever the cause it seems probable that they lack the confidence of their constituents and it is questionable whether they are in a position to express the feelings of the South on the major issues that will arise” (The Times, October 27, 1955).

The major issues referred to by *The Times* correspondent were the impending negotiations concerning the independence of the country. In fact, the Liberal Party’s activities were drastically limited in the aftermath of the Torit insurrection. Internally, changes in the leadership of the Liberal Party took place. Alfred Burjuok took over from Buth Diu as Secretary General and Benjamin Lwoke replaced Stanislaus Peysama as president of the party. In November 1955, in his capacity as the leader of the Southern Liberal Party, Lwoke wrote to premier Al-Azhari, informing him that the liberals could not accept that the present parliament has the legitimacy to decide the country’s future while there was still unrest in the South. His memorandum was ignored by the Umma Party and the NUP, who had already reached an agreement to go ahead with independence.

On December 18, Lwoke along with others were called upon by the Northern parties to attend a meeting in which parts of the proposed draft motion for independence would be discussed. The parts of the motion in question were the ones that would permit a future constituent assembly to give consideration to federalism. It is probable that most of the Southern leaders at the time were genuine believers in a federal status for the South. Yet, for others who were in favour of an independent South, a federation could have created a balance of power which, they hoped, could have facilitated the transformation of the South from a federal to an independent state without much loss of lives on either side. It was perhaps on those grounds that the Liberal Party accepted the independence of a united Sudan (Albino, 1970: 39-40; Beshir, 1968: 73).

On December 19, 1955, the parliament unanimously adopted an independence motion and resolved that: "the claims of the Southern members of parliament for a federal government for the three Southern provinces be given full consideration by the Constituent Assembly". The Northern political groups had therefore, agreed to consider a federal solution for the Sudan, and hence, on the strength of this promise, the Liberal Party's votes gave the resolution its credible and totally effective unanimity (Albino, 1970: 39). In other words, the North was understood by Southern parliamentarians to have made a pledge to work for some sort of federal relationship as a safeguard against what the South considered to be cultural assimilation, the monopoly of policy-making, of jobs, social services and economic development plans.

What the Southern Liberal Party considered to be "a gentleman's agreement" meant in practice forwarding the idea of Federalism to the constitutional commission which, as promised, was to be appointed by the Constituent Assembly. Indeed, parliament did appoint in September 1956, a national constitutional committee composed of 46 members, three of whom were from the South. The 43 Northern members opted for a strong, centralized and unitary system of government. Their Southern counterparts called for a federal constitution. They reminded their colleagues that the independence resolution had specifically promised full consideration of the Southern demand for a federal arrangement in the country. The Northern members in the committee turned down Federation on the basis that it was not feasible. Unable to convince the other 43 members of the committee, the three Southern members decided to boycott the meetings of the constitutional committee. However, their withdrawal did not stop the work of the committee which continued its deliberations and later on submitted its recommendations to the parliament in June 1958 (on the constitutional debate see Wanyin, 1987: 11-13).

The withdrawal of the Southern members from the committee revealed the Liberal Party's inability to influence the committee. In part its weakness arose from the divisions among its leadership, which in practice meant that Southern ministers were appointed and often dismissed and different factions were formed and dissolved without concrete justifications. A more significant cause was that the party did not have membership lists, a constitution, or a bank account of its own. Added to these, there were no party premises in any of the provincial branches. Informal meetings of the party were held at homes and in officials' clubs. The most serious problem however, was the leadership rivalry between Lwoke and Peysama, which had frustrated several Southern politicians and led some of them to join Northern parties. The last schism came in May 1957, when over half of the party members elected Peysama as the new president. Lwoke's wing reacted by calling

for a meeting in which he formed his own executive committee. As later developments would show, the rivalry between the two men was irreconcilable; none of the two leaders was able to establish his authority when the 1958 elections approached (Albino, 1970: 41).

It was because of the absence of trust among Southern politicians that Ezboni Mundiri, then a young graduate of Khartoum University, decided, along with others, to form a new party which he called the Federal Party. The formation of the Federal Party introduced a new factor in Southern politics; a more radical group was now actively involved in challenging the Liberal Party's virtual political hegemony. On June 30, 1957, parliament was dissolved in preparation for elections which indeed took place from February 27 to March 9, 1958. Of the 46 seats allocated to the South, 36 were new to the parliament. Most of the old Liberal Party leadership lost their parliamentary seats. Benjamin Lwoke lost his seat; Alfred Burjuok and Philemon Majok, both former Liberal ministers, lost in Bhar El-Ghazal province. Only Buth Diu and Stanislaus Peysama retained their seats. The results thus contributed to the emergence of a new radical, but young Southern leadership. The new Federalists grouped themselves into "a federal parliamentary bloc". The Bloc, under the leadership of Fr. Saturnino Lohure, incorporated what remained of the Liberal Party, Peysama became the patron; Lohure President, Elija Mayoum Vice President and Luigi Adwok the Secretary General. The first task awaiting the Federalists was the discussion of the Federal Constitution which they hoped would be passed by the new parliament.

The 43 members of the September 1956 constitutional committee had completed and submitted their draft report to the new parliament in May 1958. They recommended, among other things, that (a) the Sudan should become a unitary parliamentary democratic republic; (b) Islam should become the country's official state religion; and (c) that Arabic should become the official and national language. The Federalists rejected these recommendations and realising that they were not making any progress in influencing the debate, they walked out of the Assembly. With the Southern MPs out of the House, the Northern MPs then decided to submit the draft report to a 40-member parliamentary committee for study and for the submission of a report not later than November 17, 1958. Unable to accomplish its work because of disagreements between the Southern and Northern members over the question of Federation which dominated their discussions, the committee decided to bring back the draft to the House. Southerners in the committee refused to deliberate on any part of the draft constitution before the Federation question was resolved. Northerners on the other hand perceived Federation as a giant step which, they thought, might be used by the South to further their separatist tendencies (see Beshir, 1968: 78; Howel, 1978). Following several informal meetings between Northern and Southern parliamentarians, Southern MPs were persuaded to return to the Constituent Assembly, in order to explain their view regarding the draft constitution. This view was summed up in the following extract from the speech delivered by Fr. Saturnino Lohure, before the House on June 16, 1958:

> Mr President Sir, the South has no ill-intentions whatsoever towards the North; the South simply claims to run its local affairs in a United Sudan. The South has no intention of separating from the North for had that been the case nothing on earth could have prevented the demand for separation. South claims to federate with the North, a

> right that the South undoubtedly possesses as a consequence of the principle of free self-determination which reason and democracy grant to a free people. The South will at any moment separate from the North if and when the North so desires, directly or indirectly, through political, social and economic subjection of the South (Wanyin, 1987: 14; Wai, 1981: 71-77).

It was therefore during this period of uncertainty in the North and in the South and as a result of political instability that the army took over on November 17, 1958. With General Ibrahim Abboud's ascendancy to power, with the consent of at least one major Northern party, the South-North political dialogue entered a new phase. After only three years of independence, all the political parties in the country were banned.

The ascendancy of the military to power drastically transformed the North-South political dialogue from that of cooperation to confrontation; and by mid-1959, the legacy of the Torit revolt resurfaced on the national political scene. In December 1960, a plan to carry out a mass arrest of Southern MPs and politicians was revealed. To avoid imminent arrests, several Southern politicians, many of them having just been released from prison, decided to leave the country to the neighbouring countries bordering Sudan. The first group to leave for East Africa were Elia Lupe, Joseph H. Oduho, Fr. Saturnino Lohure, Ferdinand Adyang, William Deng Nhial and Samuel Renzi.

In 1962 another group fled the country; among them were Dominic Murwell and Ezboni Mundiri. Those of them who had settled in East Africa, made efforts to mobilize Southern university students abroad to help in propagating what they described as the Southern cause. These efforts bore fruit especially among those students who had gained church scholarships in England. Those students who accepted to take on new responsibility were Philip Pedak Lieth, Natale Olwak and George Kwanai, all of whom were to become influential in the Southern politics in exile (Oduho & Deng, 1963: 39-60; Epril, 1974: 92). Using Leopoldville, Zaire, as their headquarters, some Southern exiles formed in February 1962, a new political organisation which they called: "The Sudan Closed Districts National Union", SACDNU. Fr. Saturnino Lohure became the organisation's patron, Oduho was its president, Marko Rume the vice president, William Deng its Secretary General and Aggrey Jaden became the Assistant Secretary General. The new organisation was different in many aspects from traditional Southern organisations as they existed prior to the military take over. For one, it was militant in character; and its main goal was to liberate Southern Sudan from the Sudanese Central government, and to establish an independent sovereign state (Wai, 1981: 89-91; Howel, 1978).

In order to preach its new politics, the SACDNU leadership had to use Rome and London as the starting points, where both finance and media access were provided by their contacts there. In London for instance, the SACDNU leadership began publication of the movement's newsletter Voice of the Southern Sudan in March 1963. Again, it was in London that Joseph H. Oduho and William Deng managed to persuade the Institute of Race Relations to accept the SACDNU statement of policy for publication, titled the Problem of the Southern Sudan, a work written by Fr. Saturnino Lohure, who had to ask his colleagues to author the book since, as a Catholic priest, the Vatican would not allow him to do so. Having managed to establish the movement's mouthpiece, the leadership decided in October 1963 to rename SACDNU to become the "Sudan African National Union" or

SANU. Many attempts were made to use Uganda as the organization's base since it was closer to Southern Sudan but the Ugandan authorities found themselves caught between cross-pressures. On the one hand it wanted to help the South Sudanese political exiles, but it also wanted to maintain good relations with its neighbour, the Sudan. Thus, in October 1963, Joseph Oduho, the SANU leader, and several others were detained, but later released, by the Ugandan government for running an unofficial organization on its territory and for organizing attacks against the Sudan (O"Balance, 1977: 53-54; Wai, 1981: 90-93).

The AnyaNya Guerrilla Movement

The National Liberation Army, or the AnyaNya (venom of the Gabon viper or poisonous insect), was officially created on August 18, 1963, the date which marked the eighth anniversary of the Torit Mutiny. The proclamation announcing the creation of what later became the military wing of SANU was released in Kampala, Uganda. An AnyaNya general acknowledged SANU's efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Southern Sudanese problem. But he went on to say: "(O)ur patience has now come to an end, and we are convinced that only use of force will bring a decision … from today onwards we shall take action for better or for worse – we do not want mercy and we are not prepared to give it" (Wakoson, 1984: 127-155; Wai, 1981: 110-115).

The newly proclaimed AnyaNya chose to fight for the liberation of the Southern Sudan from Northern Sudan, with the ultimate aim of establishing a sovereign African state. The new rebel movement was composed mainly of Torit Mutiny regulars who had gone into the bushes of the Southern Sudan, and of soldiers of the same mutiny who had taken up jobs in East Africa. In the initial stages, the force was poorly armed; however, it did have some well-trained defected officers who had some skills of guerrilla warfare tactics and who had deserted the ranks of the regular Sudanese army. In the opening stages of its activities the AnyaNya resistance tended to be geographically and tribally based, where each tribal group operated in the area. Keen on their newly acquired authority, these guerillas were resentful of civilians and politicians alike. In fact, the politicians and later on some senior AnyaNya leaders had to give in and accept the AnyaNya as the only effective military wing of the Southern Sudan movement (See Wai, 1981: 92-93; Howell, 1978).

This in practice meant that the AnyaNya was recognised as an autonomous militant force. But then, some questions pose themselves: To what extent can the formation of the AnyaNya forces be attributed to SANU leadership? Did SANU practically control the AnyaNya force activities? And to what extent can AnyaNya be considered a military wing of SANU? Answers to such questions varied among SANU leaders, depending on how close each of them was to the AnyaNya military leadership at the time. For example, George Kwanai and Joseph Oduho, both leading figures of SANU, contended that the decision to form AnyaNya was taken by the SANU executive committee in February 1963. Thus, the AnyaNya was a military wing of SANU, and received its orders from it. At the other extreme, William Deng Nhial, who was SANU Secretary General, argued that the AnyaNya had formed themselves and it was later on that they approached SANU for endorsement. Whatever the truth may be, several indications reveal that SANU leadership tried hard to build the AnyaNya up into an effective military arm of the political lead-

ership in exile. The decision to "go for war", seemed to have been taken when the politicians in exile became convinced that the use of force had become the only alternative to a peaceful dialogue. However, it is worth emphasizing here that the SANU leadership never officially associated itself with the AnyaNya military activities despite the fact of its assistance (O"Balance, 1977: 63-65; Wakoson, 1984: 185-88).

'The October Uprising': Judging by the absence of reported violence, the military regime seemed to have apparently experienced little difficulties in the South, apart from some sporadic AnyaNya attacks on police posts. However, the period of military rule was notable not only for awakening Southern politicians to serious political work in exile, and indeed inside the country, but also because it witnessed the replacement of the old set of political leaders by new ones inside and outside the country.

Convinced that coercion was pointless, the military government decided in September 1964 to appoint a Commission of Inquiry. The commission was to investigate the causes of unrest in the South and to make recommendations with the intention of achieving internal stability in the country. The formation of the commission was seen as a confession of the government's failure to restore confidence both in the North and in the South. The appointment of the commission was also seen as the beginning of a long-awaited decision to open up a dialogue to explore ways and means to find a peaceful solution to the problem of the South (Alier, 1990: 26-28; Hassan, 1967b: 491-510).

The general political atmosphere in the country during the military rule was best described by Robert Collins who wrote:
"By 1962, however, numerous urban elements, including the intelligentsia, the trade unions, and civil servants, as well as the powerful religious brotherhoods, the Turuq, had become bored and disenchanted with the military regime.... Even the conservative religious brotherhoods grew restless when they were unable to carry on their former political activities. Moreover, the tribal masses and growing proletariat had become increasingly apathetic toward the government, for even if the parliamentarians were corrupt, they were at least exciting and colourful. Military reviews, parades, and heroic pronouncements were no substitute for the enthusiasm generated by party politics and the passions stirred by political action. The military government never provided an outlet for the political frustration of the Sudanese, and, in the end, the regime was overwhelmed by boredom and overthrown by the reaction to its lassitude. The means, not the cause, was the Southern Sudan" (Collins, 1966: 1-2).

On October 21, 1964, an open debate at Khartoum University on the Southern problem triggered off a series of demonstrations in the capital. The demonstrations gradually developed into a general popular uprising, and it included businessmen, government civil servants, the old traditional parties with their veteran leaders and other organizations throughout the country. Grouping themselves into the National Front, the traditional political parties and newly formed leftist and Islamist organizations demanded, among other things, withdrawal of the army from power, immediate resignation of the government; the restoration of the 1956 constitution and a solution to the problem of the South. The army did hand over power on the third day of the uprising after a student and two other demonstrators were killed and over 100 injured. A week later an interim government was installed (Hassan, 1967b: 491-510; Salih, 1971; O"Balance, 1977: 69).

The Round-Table Conference

Upon learning that the military government had been overthrown, William Deng wrote a letter from Geneva to Sir El-Khatim El-Khalifa, the care-taker prime minister of the Sudan. In his letter, Deng proposed a round-table conference, which should try to solve the problem of the South. The proposed meeting was to take place abroad or in Juba; and in addition to the conflicting parties, it was to be attended by African and Arab observers. The premier responded by accepting, in principle, the idea of convening a conference; and his reply to Deng's letter was widely perceived as a new beginning for a direct dialogue between the South and the North.

Apparently embarrassed by Deng's unilateral action, the SANU leadership in exile decided to convene its first convention in November 1964. Unable to defend his unilateral move before the conference, William Deng decided to go to the Sudan, and hence effectively defected from SANU. Rivalry over leadership, financial problems and sectional differences dominated the discussions of the convention. The tendency of forming self-proclaimed movements also threatened SANU with several splits. In such stalemate, it was difficult, if not impossible, for a fragmented SANU to enter into serious peace talks with the Central government (Alier, 1990: 29-30; Salih, 1971; O"Balance, 1977: 72).

Surprisingly, it was in Khartoum that the inside groups managed to form themselves into a "Southern Front" which in the weeks following the October uprising, had become the mouthpiece of the Southern opinion within the country. After several exchange of messages with Addis Ababa, Nairobi and Kampala, SANU leadership decided to put aside their internal problems, for a while at least, and accepted to attend the round-table conference, not at Juba or abroad as they previously envisaged, but in Khartoum. Inside the country, the Southern Front Party chose to coordinate its negotiation program with SANU. William Deng, with his group known as "SANU-William" also attended the conference. In addition to SANU and the Southern Front, Northern political parties attended the conference: the Umma Party, the National Unionist Party, the National Democratic Party, the Sudan Communist Party, and the National Islamic Charter; several minor groups both from the South and North also attended the conference. The conference was chaired by Vice Chancellor of Khartoum University, Professor El Nazeer Dafala; Arab and African observers also attended the conference from Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda (Alier, 1990: 30; Beshir, 1968: 166).

The proceedings of the conference were opened on March 16, 1965 with an inaugural address from the prime minister, Sir Al Khatim Khalifa, and speeches from heads of various political parties. In his opening address, the prime minister admitted the existence of what he considered to be cultural and historical differences between the North and the South. He concluded by appealing to his audience that the Sudanese problem was a typical African problem and that its solution could be a useful precedent for all Africa. The Northern parties' attitude was that the problem should be solved within the framework of a united Sudan. SANU and the Southern Front's stand was that any solution that did not embody recognition of the principle of self-determination for the South would not last. Deng's group demanded a federal status for the South. The conference continued its deliberations from March 16 to 29, but failed to reach any compromise on almost all the issues raised by the conferees. Taking advantage of an appeal by a Nigerian observer,

who said: “It is not the problems that face a nation that matter much, what really matters is how the leaders of the nation face these problems”, the conferees finally agreed and resolved to adjourn the conference for a period of three months when it would be reconvened by the government.

Secondly, they agreed to set up a 12-man committee to study and recommend constitutional, administrative and financial changes in order to regulate relations between the South and the Central government and to submit its report and recommendations to the government which would convene a second round-table conference. They also agreed on an interim crash programme for the South in order to facilitate the resettlement of Southern refugees, Southernise the administration, to equalize salaries between South and North and to establish a university in the South (for more details see Alier, 1990: 31; Albino, 1970: 104).

Although the conference had failed to find a solution to the problem, it did provide an opportunity however, for the two warring parties to meet, talk and listen to each other’s points of view. The conference never reconvened as envisaged, nor were any of its resolutions carried out. The deadlock between the two sides was so wide and obvious that none of them dared to call for a second round-table conference. In exile meanwhile, confusion and disunity among Southern politicians had by the middle of 1965, reached an alarming stage (Alier, 1990: 29-40; Salih, 1971).

Politics of confusion in exile

Immediately after the peace talks, the Southern political movement in exile broke up, due to personal rivalry, into two antagonistic groups, namely the “Azania Liberation Front”, ALF led by Joseph H. Oduho and George Kwanai; and the “Sudan African Liberation Front”, SAIF led by Aggrey Jaden. Efforts were made by Sudanese and East African church leaders to unite the two groups, and indeed they reunited in December 1965 under the name Azania Liberation Front, ALF. Joseph Oduho became the president and Jaden Vice President. Unfortunately, this unity did not last long, for a few months later Oduho dismissed Jaden from the vice presidency; and by August 1967, the later had managed to gain the support of a number of prominent Southern politicians (see Epril, 1974; Wai, 1981: 112; O‟Balance, 1977: 96-97).

On August 15, 1967, a national convention was convened at Angudri near the Sudan-Congo border. The meeting was attended by politicians and the AnyaNya representatives from all over the South. This was the first time that the SANU leaders and the AnyaNya officers met together; the later persuaded the politicians to stop their personal quarrels and focus, instead, on the “cause of liberating the South”. The participants agreed that all the political groups in exile would be dissolved and thereafter replaced by the “Southern Sudan provisional government”, SSPG. Bugu, in Yei district was designated the capital of the new government.

A government evenly divided among Southern ethnic groups was formed – Jaden became the president of the SSPG and his rival Joseph Oduho was offered the post of minister of communication. In order to rally AnyaNya support and to bring it under civilian control, the SSPG had to form a “Defence Council” consisting of a president, the

minister of defence, the commander-in-chief, chief of staff, and chief of intelligence. The work of the council was to direct, in coordination with the Regional Commanding Officers, all the military operations throughout the three Southern provinces. Another field where the SSPG tried to extend its power was administration of the "liberated areas". For administrative purposes, the South was divided into (9) nine administrative areas. Each area was governed by a commissioner, who would coordinate his work with his AnyaNya counterpart. Moreover, regional, provincial and district councils were formed. The AnyaNya was renamed: "The AnyaNya National Armed Forces", ANAF (Wakoson, 1984: 193-194; O"Balance, 1977: 97-98). Links with the Southern Front party were frozen. Efforts were made to implement some urgent provisions of the Angundri convention; however, it was not long before personality clashes resurfaced. In September 1968, Aggrey Jaden left his post as a president of the SSPG, and fled to Nairobi. It was reported that rivalry between "Equatorians" and "Dinka Clique" was behind his abdication. In the absence of Jaden, the vice president, Camillo Dhol, a Dinka, decided to call for another conference in March 1969, at Balgo-Bindo in Yei District. The conference passed all the Angundri resolutions and Southern Sudan was renamed the Nile State. The new government became the Nile provisional government, NPG, and Gordon Mourtat Mayen, a Dinka, became its president. Again, like SSPG, the new government was to carry out the war of liberation for Southern Sudanese national freedom and complete independence. It is worth mentioning here that most of those self-proclaimed Southern governments were never recognized internationally by any state.

The formation of the Nile Provisional Government introduced yet another phase of political disunity among Southern exiles. As a result, a number of political movements came into being, each proclaiming itself as the sole representative of the Southern Sudanese people. For example, on September 15, 1969, Emidio Taffeng, former commander-in-chief of SSPG, formed with the help of nine ANAF officers and six prominent civilian politicians, a separate "government" which he named "Anyidi Revolutionary Government". Back from Kenya, Aggrey Jaden became General Taffeng's Foreign Minister (Epril, 1974: 94-97; O"Balance, 1977: 99). Almost about the same time, near the Congo-Sudan border, an Azande secessionist movement was proclaimed by Colonel Samuel Abu John and Michael Tawili, calling itself "The Sue River Revolutionary government". The movement also renamed Southern Sudan as the "Suer Republic". Also, at about this time, Ezboni Mundiri formed a government which he called "The Sudan-Azania Government in East Africa" using Nairobi as the capital of his new government (O"Balance, 1977: 100; Wakoson, 1984: 200).

By the end of 1969, there were practically three governments in the South: The Nile Provisional Government, the Sue River Revolutionary Government, and the Anyidi Revolutionary Government. Added to these were the Sudan-Azania Government and the Azania Liberation Front of Joseph H. Oduho. The Southern exiles were therefore disorganised, fragmented and above all failed to organize themselves into a unified liberation movement.

Inside the Sudan, Southern political parties were more or less in a similar state of disunity. The major Southern political parties working within the country were the Southern Front Party and the SANU-William. The later was federalist in approach, while the former was secessionist in vision. In addition to these two organizations there were other minor

Southern groups, namely the Sudan Unity Party was founded by Santino Deng (not a relative of William Deng). As its name implied, it stood for a united Sudan, but had reservations about the establishment of an Islamic State. Diu and Peysama revived the old Liberal Party, but had a very small following among Southerners by the beginning of 1970.

The basic problem that seemed to have faced Southern political parties inside the country was that they were more engaged in fighting themselves more than acting as a unified front vis-a-vis Northern political parties. However, unlike the Southern exiles, the Southern politicians inside the country seemed to have been politically refined and had some sort of strategy for reaching an honourable solution to the problem of the South (See Beshir, 1968: 94; O"Balance, 1977: 76-78; Mahjoub, 1974: 75-77).

Political patronage among some of them was an important means of acquiring a post. It was generally agreed that many Southern intellectuals aspired to hold one important post or another. In this case ethnicity or tribal background was of great importance. To put it differently, one's closeness to the Northern ruling party was an important asset, as was the strength of one's tribal base. Patronage in the North depended on the manner in which each political party viewed the Southern problem. For instance, the significance of the Southern elite in the national politics was viewed by the Northern politicians in three different perspectives: that Southerners should be given independence and left to sort out the problems of governing themselves. This view was held by the Muslim Brothers or the National Islamic Charter, as they became known. Secondly, that they should be treated as self-seeking trouble makers from the "missionaries schools" unrepresentative of Southerners, should be excluded from politics, and if necessary suppressed. This view was perceived and propagated by the Umma Party. While they encouraged exclusion of the Southern politicians, they seemed to have no clear alternative. And finally that they should be brought into government, given posts of authority, especially in their own region; and they have vested interest in remaining an integral part of the Sudan. This view was propagated by the Sudan Communist Party (see Albino, 1970; O"Balance, 1977).

Much of the Southern Sudanese political life in exile seemed to have been characterized by lack of any form of organizational structure through which divisions among its antagonizing leadership could be resolved. Most Southern parties and movements did not have constitutions or if they were available, they lacked any prospect of enforceability. Internal divisions, at one point, had developed into a phenomenon of creating a series of political movements each, as mentioned earlier, claiming to represent the Southern separatist movement.

First of all, for various reasons, SANU and its successors did not have party offices or formal meeting places, nor were the various fronts, councils and provisional or revolutionary governments bureaucratized. In fact, these organizations remained largely informal groups of friends or political allies, subject of course, to the hardship of the political life of exiles.

Secondly, it was a fact that almost all the Southern politicians in exile were often in financial difficulties. Regulations governing financial accountability were non-existent or at least proved ineffective. This could be explained by the fact that many organisational

efforts were intentionally opposed as individual politicians were often ready to give up politics.

Thirdly, there were no mechanisms for regulating policies, decisions or solving questions relating to leadership and responsibility. Therefore, without agreed principles, Southern political organisations, both within and without the Sudan, were characterised by a high degree of individualism; this conduct led to arbitrary dismissals based of course on no accepted convention or rule. Finally, external financial aid and its distribution generated great resentment owing to the lack of official channels for controlling expenditure. This element of mistrust among Southern politicians caused continuous floor-crossing among individual Southern politicians who felt excluded from privileges of office and from benefiting financially. This was the case among some individuals who had no independent source of income. All these shortcomings had their negative effect on the South-North relations and it was impossible for the central government to make peace with such fragmented political groups (for more details see Albino, 1970; Wai, 1981; Epril, 1974).
The discussion of the Southern political organisation, weaknesses, and their consequent impact upon national politics, would be incomplete without pointing out problems and weaknesses of the AnyaNya movement. Among other things, the AnyaNya had at the beginning the following visible liabilities: lack of discipline, poor sense of structural organisation; little combat experience, inferior military equipment, shortage of external assistant, smallness of the educated elite; lack of support from neighbouring African states. Moreover, their knowledge of guerrilla techniques was limited. Added to these, there was a high death rate from disease, which also affected both the AnyaNya and the local population. However, the most overwhelming problem was tribalism and sectional differences, which often led to inter-factional fights within the movement.

The Addis Ababa Peace Agreement

In such a confused situation, and in an attempt to achieve unity among the Southern Sudanese leadership in exile, Colonel Joseph Lagu, then an AnyaNya commander in Eastern Equatoria region, began a very complex and difficult task of uniting, first the AnyaNya forces, and then the Southern politicians under his leadership. Lagu himself admitted the difficulties he encountered while trying to unite the Southern resistance movement: “The most difficult thing (sic) I faced in the bush was how to deal with the politicians. I just (sic) refused to cooperate with them … The fighters saw that my work was better and so they deserted the politicians” (Howell, 1978: 265).

In October 1969, having received allegiance of the most senior AnyaNya officers in the three Southern provinces, Lagu formed the AnyaNya High Command Council. The task of this council, he hoped, would be to control and direct the military operations and to acquire military equipment. In addition to this, the council would administer the civilian population in areas under the AnyaNya control. Colonel Lagu was aware that his immediate opponents were the politicians who had attempted, but failed, to gain effective control of the AnyaNya. Colonel Lagu began by dissolving various self-proclaimed governments using senior AnyaNya officers to achieve this end. In April 1970, Colonel Lagu managed to persuade General Emedio Taffeng to dissolve his Anyidi Revolutionary Government and joined him along with other senior officers (O"Balance, 1977: 135-141). Next, Colonel Lagu engineered a coup against Nile provincial government by winning over

the NPG's chief of staff, Colonel Fredrick Magott and appointing him commander of the Western Equatoria region. Convinced by his success in winning over supporters among Southern Sudanese intellectuals, masses and students, Lagu called for a conference in August 1971 in which Southern military and political leaders came together. The meeting marked the 16th anniversary of the Torit Mutiny of August 1955. The convention, held at "Owiny Ki-Bul" resolved the formation of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement, SSLM. The AnyaNya National High Command Council was also confirmed. Perhaps the most significant resolution of the conference was that all the Southern politicians, without exception, had dissolved their 'governments' and movements and unanimously approved Lagu's leadership. Joseph Lagu promoted himself to the rank of Major General. Despite General Lagu's attempts to campaign for African and international recognition of the SSLM, his efforts had failed totally. The 'Governing Authority' as General Lagu preferred to call his command, was approved and formed as follows (Epril, 1974: 99):

High Command:
Major General Joseph Lagu Yanga, C-In-C
Brigadier Joseph Akuon, Commander 2nd Brigade, Upper Nile
Col. Fredrick Magott, Commander 1st Brigade, Equatoria
Col. Emmanuel Abur, Senior Officer, 3rd Brigade, Bahr El Ghazal

High Civil Authority:
Elia Lupe, Chief Commissioner
Elisapana Mulla, Commissioner of Equatoria
Antipas Ayiei, Commissioner for Upper Nile
Dishan Ojwe, Police Commissioner
There was no commissioner appointed for Bahr Al Ghazal province until the Addis Ababa Agreement of February 1972.

Emissaries:
Mading Garang – London
Lawrence Wol Wol – Paris
Dominic Mohammed – Washington
Angelo Vogu – East Africa (Kampala, Uganda)
Job Adier – Addis Ababa (Epril, 1974: 99)

In Khartoum, the army waged a military coup whose leader was Colonel (later General) Jaafar Mohammed Nimeiri on May 25, 1969. It was then when the military took over power from the Northern politicians in Khartoum that peace talks between Khartoum and the Southern rebel movement became feasible. The two Sudanese military leaders, Nimeiri and Lagu, seemed to have been convinced by the practical difficulties involved in waging guerrilla warfare. They were perhaps more qualified than politicians, to reach a compromise. To this effect, president Nimeiri issued a policy statement on the evening of June 9, 1969, in which he said:

> The revolutionary government is confident and competent enough to face existing realities. It recognizes historical and cultural differences between the North and the South and firmly believes that unity of our country must be built on these objective realities. The Southern people have a right to develop their respective cultures and

traditions within a united Sudan (Alier, 1990; Wai, 1973).

Consequently Colonel Lagu officially responded by issuing his own policy statement on August 11, 1971, in which, among other things, he said:

> " … As far as the Southern Sudanese are concerned, it is well recorded in history that our attitude has always been to find a peaceful solution to the Southern cause. Therefore in conformity with this constant policy for a negotiated settlement that we have pursued during the reign of different and consecutive governments in Khartoum, we call upon General el-Nimeiri to meet the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement to determine conditions aimed at bringing a final end to war and atrocities in South Sudan" (See Grass Curtain, August 1971).

Although there was eventually talk of secession and independence, it was hard to regard the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement in the late 1960s as capable of achieving that goal. And although it was secessionist in ideology, and fought for its attainment using battles of "constitutional Federalism" since January 1956, the Southern resistance movement seemed to have contended with "Southern regional" recognition by the North as a first step towards total liberation of the South. When General Nimeiri did recognise the Southern Sudanese people as a distinct cultural group, the AnyaNya leadership was ready for a compromise. It seemed that it was not just "a regional government" which the South won in February 1972, but an important position within the country's political system which it had never previously held (see Alier, 1990; Lagu, 2000).

By September 1971, it was estimated that the AnyaNya strength was between 5 000 and 40 000 men and women. The AnyaNya sources put the number at 12 000 full timers with thousands more part timers or reserves. With Lagu's ascendancy to the top of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement, there seemed to be enough Southern solidarity behind him to make peace with General Jaafar Nimeiri. In fact, by December 1971, it had become clear to all sides of the Sudanese conflict that neither political integration by force, nor secession by insurrection was a genuine and feasible solution to the Southern problem. Having acknowledged this reality, the two sides to the conflict accepted and invited the World Council of Churches, and the All-African Conference of Churches and Anglican Church to mediate a peaceful settlement.

Their mission was to find a settlement within the framework of a united Sudan. The World Council of Churches and All-African Conference of Churches had helped in many ways. They provided the SSLM leaders with financial support for fares, accommodation, administrative services when attending conferences, and for legal and constitutional advice in person of Mr Dingle Foot. Indeed, between the signature of the Addis Ababa Agreement on February 27, 1972, and its ratification by the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement on March 28, the Anglican Archbishop of Jerusalem and the Superior General of Verona Fathers, both in Uganda at the time, exerted all their influence in favour of its acceptance by the Southern Sudanese. Neither federation nor a sovereign independent state in the South was provided for in the Addis Ababa Agreement. The South got instead, the revised version of the "March 1965 Autonomy" which the North had proposed to the Southern delegates to the round-table conference (for more details on Addis Ababa agreement see Stevens, 1976: 247-274). It was a compromise which could not have materialised

unless Northern as well as Southern politicians and military leaders realised that peaceful and open dialogue was the sole guarantor for any lasting peace in the country. The Addis Ababa peace had finally brought to an end a long period of hostility and military confrontation. It was hoped that the Accord would mark the beginning of a new spirit of cooperation, coordination and free dialogue between the North and the South. However that dialogue continued only for a short period, 1972 to 1983.

Indeed, it was hoped that the Addis Ababa Agreement would erase the "Torit Mutiny" legacy from the minds of Southern Sudanese (for more details refer to Yoh, 1995). However, it turned out that the legacy was destined to stay on, when a group of soldiers rebelled in the town of Akobo in March 1975, in protest against government's policy of transferring some former AnyaNya units that composed the bulk of the pre-Addis Ababa Agreement rebels, who were integrated into the Sudan army in 1972, to the North. Those who mutinied in Akobo organised themselves into a guerrilla force called AnyaNya Two. Their leader was Commander Vincent Kwany Latjor. Eight years later, another mutiny took place in May 1983, this time led by some senior ex-AnyaNya officers, Kerubino Kwanyin Bol and William Nyuon Bany in the towns of Bor and Ayod, protesting against the central government violation of the Addis Ababa agreement, and joined the 1975 Akobo mutineers, who were waging war against Nimeiri government from their bases in the Ethiopian border with Sudan. The Southern groups later on organized themselves between July and October 1983 under umbrella of Sudan People's Liberation Army/ Movement (SPLA/SPLM). Colonel John Garang De Mabior, PhD in economics, became the leader of the SPLA/SPLM until his leadership was challenged in August 1991, due to ideological differences within the movement between the unionists, led by Col. Garang, and separatists led by Dr Riek Machar, PhD in industrial engineering, and Dr Lam Akol, PhD in chemical engineering. The outcome was a bitter power struggle between these groups that resulted in the disintegration of the SPLA into several organisations, loss of hundreds of innocent lives and leading into the current complex stalemate (for some details on the current civil war since 1983, see Daly and Sakainga, 1993; O"Balance, 1977). President Nimeiri, who came to power in May 1969 through a military coup, committed three deadly political mistakes that led to his overthrow and the eruption of the third civil war in the country. First, he attempted in 1981 to redraw the North-South boundaries as they stood in January 1956, with the aim of annexing oil-rich Southern province, Bentiu in Western Upper Nile, and Northern Upper Nile agricultural rich province, Renk. Secondly, he re-divided the South in May 1983 into three mini regions with capitals in Juba, Malakal and Wau. And the third political suicidal step that General Nimeiri took was declaring the application of Islamic laws throughout the country in September 1983, including the Christian South (Khalid, 1990; Lagu, 2000; Alier, 1990).

Nimeiri was eventually overthrown by a popular uprising in April 1985. A joint military-civil government under Gen. Swar al-Dahab took over power. In May 1986, an elected civilian government took over the administration of the country under the premiership of Sadig al-Mahdi. Al-Mahdi tried along with allies in the North to reach peace with the SPLA of Col. Garang. In November 1988, Al-Mahdi's ally, Muhammed Osman al-Miraghani, the leader of Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) signed an understanding agreement with Col. Garang that called for a general conference to be held in 1989 between the SPLM and the other Sudanese parties. Before that conference could take place, an Islamist coup toppled Al-Mahdi's government led by Gen. Omar Ahmed Al-Bashir and Dr Hassan

Abdalla al-Turabi.

What follows is the confused situation that led to the current stalemate: Declaration of Jihad (holy war) on Southern rebels by the Islamist government; uncoordinated secret and open peace talks between the SPLA factions and the government in Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, in some European and American cities; other peace initiatives were led by Sudanese, non-Sudanese and by the OAU through IGAD; the eventual quarrel between al-Turabi and his students, mainly with his deputy Ali Osman Taha, over power and the distribution revenues of the oil wealth that are being extracted from the war-torn South among the ruling National Congress members, that clash led to al-Turabi's imprisonment; the emergence of the role of the oil industry in the war and peace politics in the country; the splits within the National Democratic Alliance, NDA, the umbrella grouping of the Northern Sudanese oppositions that are allied with Col. Garang's SPLA faction; and a host of other developments during the last 12 years, including the controversial issue of abduction of Southerners by Northern militia in Western Bhar El-Ghazal region (referred to by some as slavery) (Yoh, 2000; Garang, 1992; Lagu, 2000; Machar, 1995).

The current stalemate in the South

It is to be stressed that as a result of power and ideological differences between the Southern Sudanese secessionists and unionists within the SPLM, the movement underwent major changes. In August 1991, SPLA/M split into two main factions, SPLM mainstream under Col. John Garang and the SPLM-Nasir faction under Dr Riek Machar. In March 1993, the defectees led by Dr Riek Machar formed in Kongor, Southern Sudan, the SPLM-United that included senior commanders who defected from Col. Garang, plus those who were jailed by the SPLA leader between 1986 and 1990. They include Dr Lam Akol, Cdr. Kerubino Kwanyin Bol, Cdr. William Nyuon Bany, Joseph H. Oduho (who was killed in a surprise attack by Col. Garang's SPLA forces against Dr Machar's faction that was in a meeting in Kongor on March 27, 1993), and Cdr. Arok Thon Arok (Machar, 1995; Garang, 1992). Most of these men were top leaders of the SPLA military high command before they were either jailed or defected from SPLA. For example, Cdr. Bol was Col. Garang's Deputy; Cdr. Bany was chief of staff of SPLA, Cdr. Arok was the logistic supreme commander, and Oduho was the nominal leader of the political wing of the movement, SPLM.

In October 1994, following mass defection from SPLM-United, Dr Riek Machar held a convention in the Southern town of Akobo and formed a new organization that he christened "South Sudan Independence Movement/Army" (SSIM/A). Meanwhile, Dr Lam Akol took over the leadership of SPLM-United. Following his defection from Dr Machar's movement Cdr. William Nyuon Bany redefected back to Col. Garang's faction in late 1995, and attacked Dr Machar's positions in Upper Nile where he was killed in a battle in January 1996 near the village of Ayod. Meanwhile, Cdr. Kerubino Bol defected from Dr Machar's movement and formed his own SPLA-Bahr El-Ghazal Group in 1996 (Yoh, 2000).

In April 1996, Dr Machar signed a political charter with the Sudan Government of General Omar Al-Bashir, and later that charter was transformed into what became known as "Khartoum Peace Agreement" in April 1997. That peace agreement was also signed by

Dr Lam Akol, Cdr. Arok Thon Arok and Cdr. Kerubino Kwanyin Bol. Both Cdr. Bol and Cdr. Arok died in separate incidents between 1998 and 1999. Cdr. Machar eventually left Khartoum in January 2000, apparently after having realized that the peace agreement he had signed with General al-Bashir would not work and that the referendum on the political status of the South, whether to secede or remain part of the North, stipulated in the agreement that was supposed to be held in March 2001, will not be respected. Among the principle signatories to that peace agreement only Dr Lam Akol remains inside the country after three of them died. Cdr Kerubino Bol died mysteriously in Mankien, Unity State district under control of General Paulino Matip in November 1999; Cdr. Thon Arok died in a plane crash in Nasir in January 1998; and Samuel Aru Bol died of illness in Khartoum in November 2000. As mentioned earlier, Dr Machar left Khartoum and went back to Southern Sudan bushes, and renamed his organization, SSIM, to Sudan People's Democratic Front/SPDF in January 2000 (For more details see Yoh, 2000; Alier, 1990).

This paper, by PhD candidate in International Politics at the Department of Political Sciences, UNISA, Pretoria, and Research Associate, the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies, Amman, Jordan, was presented at a seminar titled: "Roll Back Xenophobia Campaign Media Seminar Series: The Conflict in Sudan" held at the South Africa Human Rights Commission, Houghton, Parktown, Johannesburg, South Africa, May 25, 2001.

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24. The Sudan conflict as I know it

Paternus Cleophace Niyegira

The history of the Sudan and that of Southern Sudan in totality goes far back to ancient times and it bears a long authority of command and commitment in human civilization for the current world. It was developed out of its enumerated consciousness, generosity, courtesy and its eloquence in terms of nature and the mental advance of the people's inner aspirations. The enumerated achievements resulted from the possession of a high level of consciousness as it was observed by Trotsky: "Consciousness grew out of the unconscious, psychology out of physiology, the organic world out of the inorganic, and the solar system out of the nebulae."

At the tender age of mankind's existence the Sudanese were able to influence the world with a new sense of managerial dimension in art, science and mathematics and the logical flow of construction and success.

Despite the new developments in the Sudan, taking into consideration the division between the North and the South, the history of civilization goes deeper into the early ages of the Nile Civilization and both have a common ground of culture and human civilization. The history of the Nile Civilization goes back to the study of the various social systems upon which the global arrangements are based.

The history of the Sudan is deep and can't be analysed in simple terms. It needs more than millennia to write about it. Due to this complexity and richness in its contents and value I find it wise to concentrate on its belief and religious system. This paper is committed to show the essence of the current conflict in the Sudan and how religion is the major source of this conflict.

This paper should be able to show how the current world together with its various socio-economic systems, socio-political and geo-political institutions, have misunderstood the source of the conflict in the Sudan and are thereby treating the wrong disease and giving a wrong assessment of the conflict, as well as a poor interpretation and analysis of the conflict. In order to arrive at a genuine understanding of this conflict, one must go to the origins of the Sudan's belief and religious systems since the birth of the cradle of civilization.

Religion in the Sudan cannot be discussed without the history of Egypt. One can sense that the belief system grew during the time of civilization.

As has been quoted from the Great Ages of Men – A History of the World's Cultures by Basil Davidson and the Editors of the Time-life books, page 33 of 'Civilization of the Nile': "The central fact about Egypt's origins was that even if many of its political and social ideas were taken from its near-eastern neighbours, its culture was basically African. And this culture was inseparably linked to the Stone Age peoples who populated the green Sahara during the long epoch of its fertility.

He went on:

> Habitable land first began to appear in the lower valley and Delta of the Nile probably about 10 000 years ago. Before that the river was immensely wide, bordered by marshland and swamps. As dry ground emerged from the dwindling waters, settlers pressed into it from the grasslands to the west. In the next few millennia they learned to grow annual crops and use a simple sort of plough. What these early Egyptians looked like, no one knows but they doubtlessly preserved certain characteristics of the peoples of the Sahara.
>
> It was believed after 3400 BC two small kingdoms emerged, one along the upper reaches of the Nile, the other along the silted meadows of the Delta. Some scholars believe that this advanced political life was the fruit of migrant leadership from the Near East. Others argue that it was entirely a local development, that the Nile farmers themselves, with their growing wealth and complexity of life, needed and so evolved a more embracing kind of rule. However, it arose with new civilization at once took a direction manifestly different from its contemporaries in lands to the east. Egyptian habits of thought and behaviour were, from the beginning, special to Egypt.

Their behaviours were connected to various events of their social life, as well as their economic systems. They created the belief that everything was influenced and affected by a supernatural force in which they associated every move and success as blessings from the ancestors. So under the strong belief they put their spiritual power into ancestral linkages and created a sense of praise and thanksgiving. All these were through the rulership and greatness of one they believed to have been a man of sagacious wisdom, with greater force to link between the past world and the living world. They believed that they had a strong person to lead them in the name of a King or great ruler.

Basil Davidson noted eloquently on the same topic that some three centuries later these two kingdoms were united under a ruler whom the records generally call Menes, and it was with Menes that the long line of Egyptian dynasties began. No more than 600 years later the mighty rulers of the fourth dynasty built the pyramids at Giza. The motives and means that made possible the remarkable achievements of the pyramids, the religious belief, political power, mathematical skill and mobilization of labour had already taken shape in pre-dynastic times.

These narrations by Basil Davidson are the greatest manifestation of the realities of their belief systems. It should be noted that the growth and advancement in their behavioural livelihood was the main factor and the result of their spiritual power. The early writings of the Egyptians and the great narration of the source of African descent are the indicators of their belief system, managerial skills and world civilization and religion.

These narrations, from various writers, give indication of the source of greatness and strong belief systems. Such efforts from this part of the world pose challenges to world knowledge, belief and scientific knowledge.

Christianity in this part of the world came into existence from the missionary enterprise of monks from Constantinople, and especially through one monk Julian, who arrived in the region of the old Kushite Kingdom in 543. The story of Julian's ministry among the

Nubians has been told with a wealth of detail by another monk, John of Ephesus, who had been sent by the Roman Emperor Justinian around the same time on a similar mission – to convert the Ethiopians. A century after Julian's arrival, Egypt was over-run by Moslem Arabs and Nubia was all but cut off from the rest of the Christian world.
Islamic belief from the early ages of its expansion has been through holy wars and conquest. This is how it has been since early times, when Islam entered in any society war was inevitable for its expansion.

Arab settler colonization in Africa started with the invasion in Egypt in 640 AD and persists today in Mauritania, Sudan and all of North Africa. *(Comparative Digests [3] Colonialism: Arab and Europe compared Black power Pan-Afrikanism (BPPA) Tract no 3 by Chinweizu © Chinweizu 2007).* In his paper Chinweizu quoted from *[Garba Dialo, Mauritania –The Other Apartheid (1993)]* and continues: "Afro-Arab relations in the Sudan and Mauritania have mainly been characterized by brutal wars, slavery, forced Islamisation and Arabisation, the systematic destruction of indigenous culture, values and civilization coupled with insatiable territorial expansion on the part of the [immigrant Arabs]."

All these historical writings are manifestations of how Islam and Arabisation is ever violent and embraces war, catastrophic human humiliation and hate of self-love to humanity. This has been associated with the fact that since the cradle of civilization Islam and Arabic ideology never existed in Africa. It came later and because these beliefs and ideologies were representations of another culture, the in-depth African conservation of their culture, Islam came as a destructive force.

Based on various early writings of Africans, observing the current trends in these conflicts more particularly in the Sudan, the above-mentioned characteristics were physically observed. The forced use of the Arabic syllabus, language and culture are manifest in the war zone.

It should be noted that the story of the Sudan conflict is nothing but forced Islamisation and Arabisation and because of Islam and Arabic culture, war and brutal conduct is the weapon for its expansion. Africans have to watch out because the plan is to create Arabic culture and Islamize all of Africa. Remember it is quoted that one is counted to be a Muslim and an Arab when he/she speaks Arabic. In various writings of Prof. Chinweizu on Afro-Arab relations he eloquently propounds the degradations and disparities of how a black person is seen by an Arab.

Under Pan-African thinking such as that of the Late Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere on the search for African Union/Federation, is the belief that youths of 21st century should concentrate on the Federation/Union of Africa South of the Sahara and North of the Sahara for geographical reasons. One can see from the writing of Basil Davidson, the Northern African states are Islamized and Arabised. The legacy of African religious and spiritual beliefs and the cultural life of the people in the Africa South of Sahara should be kept at all costs. The Islamic states of East Africa, the Zanzibar and Mombasa should be handled with great care and circumspection.

To conclude, the conflict in the Sudan is motivated by Islamisation and Arabisation. These forces are directed at the whole continent – that is its ultimate goal.

I do recommend that the African Union Panel on Darfur should seek various truths from socio-economic institutions and individuals who have in-depth understanding of the Sudan crisis, Islam and Arabisation, Arab policies and the relations between these cultures. The panel should go back into Sudanese history of the genesis of the conflict of the Sudan. The panel should also work together with the Pan African groups and various individuals who have worked and researched heavily in this area. More openness, debates and deliberate efforts must be engineered when we are discussing the Sudan question and other questions within our continent.

Paternus Cleophace Niyegira lived in South Sudan for a number of years.

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25. Sudan and Pan-Africanism

Hagir Sayed Mohamed

Sudan has never been in such dire need for Pan-Africanism as it is now. The fact is, the coming democracy in South Sudan will bring much trouble to the country, more than what was going on before. The forecasted separation will make it easy for Western countries, especially America, to spread their tentacles to obtain access to cheap natural resources. Sudan is disintegrating as a direct result of its identity crisis which exists between Arabism vs. Africanism (the erroneous concept of colour in the Sudan: a black people who conceive of themselves as white, consequently looking down upon black Africans). This is the main cause of the problems, which is what makes tribes fight each other. The feeling of some – that they are better/higher than others. This is what brought the hate. "The significance of the name 'Sūdān' is crucially important, because it bears very strong identity implications. The Arabised people of middle Sudan, generally speaking, tend not to recognise themselves as black Africans. As the State for the last five centuries has belonged ideologically and historically to this group, Sudan has ended up identifying with the Arabs more than with black Africa" (Dr Hashim, M.J. To be or not to be, Oxford, England, 2004).

The need for Sudan to develop a new awareness based on the premise of Pan-Africanism is reinforced by the fact that Sudan stands as a model for many countries going through such imbalance of the African vs. Arab identity – the so-called Borderland countries, that are bordering Black Africa from one side and Arabia on the other – Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Chad, Niger, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and Mauritania. "Sudan should be recognised as an Arabophone country of the black Africans. This fact must show in the discourse of the State whether in official statements, mass media, education, cultural aesthetics or economy. It should be propagated that it is to our honour that we are black Africans" (Hashim, M.J. To be or not to be, Oxford, England, 2004).

To understand the present situation we need to take a look at the history of Sudan from the intervention of the Arab till today.

Whether Sudan separates or remains intact, it is in considerable need to find its identity and live it. If Sudan separates, the South would fall under the hands of Sudanese aware of their identity, but the North will suffer loss of identity. The influence of the Arab-Islamic culture could create a new focus for terrorism.

If Sudan remains united there will be a need to deepen the sense of identity. Respect for the other's difference is the main base for the new Sudan and for a new period of growth and development.

"Sudan can make history once again by bringing the peoples and countries of Bilād al-Sūdān together with the peoples and countries of East Africa and Arabia in a commonwealth and a common market with an area on the Red Sea as a Free Zone with outlet lifelines to inland countries" (Hashim, M.J. To be or not to be, Oxford, England, 2004).

Features of the Foundation of the Sudanese state

The Arabs and the spread of Arab culture and Islam

The Arabs invaded Sudan in the 7th century led by Nafei bin Uqbah during the reign of Umru bin Al A'as to Egypt.

Historians unanimously agree that Umru bin Al-A'as sent to Sudan a military campaign under the leadership of Nafei bin Uqbah Al Fahri. This campaign was met by intense resistance from the Nubian people, and Nafi was unable to subdue the Nubians and occupy their lands in the Northern Sudan. However, the Arabs' attacks did not cease. They continued to attack the Nubian lands every year until the disposition of Umru bin Al-A'as from the reign of Egypt (Nubian History, p. 86).

The second campaign was during the era of Othman bin Affan, who sent an army led by Abdullah bin Sa'ad to the Nubian region in 652 H. The Arab army reached Dongulah despite the severe resistance of the Nubians. The fighting took place in the outskirts of Dongulah. The Arabs failed to occupy the capital town of the kingdom although they destroyed some buildings with stones thrown by mangonel (catapult) machines (Nubian history, p 86).
It seems that the Arabs incurred a lot of losses and the leader, Abdullah bin Abu Al-Sarh realised that he would not be able to subdue the people and occupy the capital. So, he put forward a truce to the Nubian king (Galidort). As mentioned by Arab historians, negotiations started and the two parties concluded an agreement known as (Paqt) (Nubian history, p. 86).

The Paqt was a real truce during which Islam spread slowly in the Nubian area and all over the Sudan.

The penetration of Sudan by Islam was a turning point and brought about significant cultural, economic and demographic changes.

There is no doubt that a decisive change has taken place in the course of the development of the state continuously extending to dominate the local populations and merging them into a frame of one comprehensive nationality on the basis of Nilotic cultural and central economic dominance. This tendency came into view with the appearance of Islamic factors during the period 642-1504 AD, between the occupation of Arab Muslims to Egypt and the rising of the Sultanate of Sinnar in the middle of Sudan. This transformation was deeper than any previous one because it was related to demographic changes including population removal and demolishment of entire towns such as Soba, which was entirely destroyed in 1504 AD, and on whose debris appeared new settlements in which new races of Sudanese origin, like Arabaji and Sinnar dwelled. These were not ordinary towns and centres, but barriers dominated economically, culturally and militarily (Khartoum Magazine, No. 12, p. 12).

With the gradual spread of Islam in the Sudan, the Arabs started to work towards building a strong economic base and succeeded in that. This domination was crowned by the destruction of the Soba kingdom which was disintegrating into small states. This led

to the spread of the Arabs, who influenced the economic and social life leading to their political dominance. Those developments led to the emergence of new social powers that found in Islam what expressed their vision of the world. Thus Islam formulated a new comprehensive ideology for them (Islam and Politics in Sudan, p. 19).

The Turkish Egyptian invasion and unification of the national feelings

Sudan before the Turkish-Egyptian invasion in 1820 was formed of many small kingdoms. The most important of these kingdoms were: Fonj Kingdom (1660-1874) which extended from the third cataract in the north to the boundaries of Ethiopia in the south, and from the eastern desert to Kurdofan in the west. Kurdofan Kingdom was composed of two kingdoms, Tegali Kingdom in the south and Musabba'at in the north. Al-For Kingdom (1660-1874), with Al-Fashir as its capital, extended from Widai in the west to Kurdofan and Bahr Al-Gazal in the south. There were also Negro tribes of African origin in the Southern Sudan, such as: Denka, Al-Nuwier, Al-Shuluk, Al-Zandi and others.

After the Turkish-Egyptian invasion and the destruction of these kingdoms, resistance in many parts of the country arose and enhanced the national feeling in the Sudanese. Many revolutions took place, such as Rajab Wad Bashir Al-Gool uprising in 1835, and the Mutiny of the Black Jihadiya in 1844 and 1865. The last mutiny was in 1865 in Kasala. There was also the Jallaba Mutiny. The most important of those movements was that of Suleiman Al-Zubeir.

The resistance started since the invasion in 1820 and continued in different forms and in different regions and by different social groups. The common feature of resistance was its persistence despite many failures under the severe repression of the system. However, despite the failure, the resistance was able to shake the standing of the system and made its absolute stability impossible (The modern history of Sudan, p. 145). The biggest revolutionary resistance against the Turkish-Egyptian rule was the Mahdi Revolution, which was initiated by Mohammed Ahmed Al-Mahdi in Aba Island and extended to Kurdofan, Darfur and many parts of the country. The resistance was crowned by the domination of the Mahdi Revolution all over the country in 1885. This revolution continued until the battle of Um-Debekrat in which the Khalifa Abdullah Al-Ta'ashi was annihilated. That was the end of Mahdist regime and the beginning of the Anglo-Egyptian intervention in the Sudan.

Anglo-Egyptian (Condominium) intervention in the Sudan

The resistance against Anglo-Egyptian imperialism started earlier and materialised in a number of religious movements such as the Al-Shukaba incident. Here a battle took place between Khalifa Sharif and sons of Al-Mahdi Al-Fadil, Al-Bushra and Abdulrahman on one side and the government forces on the other. The battle ended with the death of Al-Fadil and Al-Bushra. Ali Abdulkarim's movement started in 1921, but his call was nipped in the bud. Another uprising appeared in the middle of Sudan led by Abdulgadir Habboba in 1908 and was ended by his execution. All these movements were religious ones. There were also a number of tribal resistance groups such as:

Nuba movements: A resistance broke out in the Nuba Mountains in 1904 and continued

in its ups and downs until 1917. The government composed an army of 2 800 soldiers led by 31 officers to destroy that uprising. The end came in 1917 when the resistance leader gave himself up to the invading army and was executed.

Resistance of the southern tribes: The southern tribes started their resistance in 1901. The resistance broke out with the Nuweir tribal uprising, which was subdued in 1902. Zandi resistance was in 1903. Deinka resistance, which was the most dangerous one, was in 1919, led by Deinka A'liab. The tribesmen, numbering 3 000, attacked a police centre. The authorities dispatched an army supported by tanks and aircrafts and stopped that big uprising. Al-Fore tribe's resistance, led by Ali Dinar in Dar-Fore region continued until 1916 when Sultan Ali Dinar was killed.

The rise of modern national organisations: The Society of Sudanese Union was formed in Omdurman in 1920 by students and graduates of Gordon College. The founders were Obeid Haj Al-Amin, Tawfiq Salih Gibriel, Muhieldin Jamal Abu Seif, Suleiman Kisha and Ibrahim Bedr. The society practiced its activities in secret. This society is considered the beginning of the formation of modern organisations in the Sudan and a new victory in the form of organisation and resistance.

The Society of the White Banner: This society was formed on the debris of the Society of the Sudanese Union led by Ali Abdulatif, who was a fierce opponent of the regime. The movement lacked attractive programmes and did not inspire the masses, who expected an effective resistance movement calling for the expulsion of the imperialists. The movement had its strengths and weaknesses, which were dealt with in many studies. The gravest weaknesses were that its incidents occurred at different times without any coordination between them. The students' demonstrations were in June and July, the mutiny of military students in August, while the armed confrontation was in September. This lack of coordination and unity made it easier for the government to subdue the activities one after the other. The leaders were young, enthusiastic and impetuous. The evaluation of the movement as devoid of any programmes has some truths, but not all (The history of Sudan, p. 451).

The rise of modern resistance represented by the Society of the Sudanese Union and the White Banner was a significant development in the form of resistance in Sudan. This led to more powerful organisations which influenced the format of resistance which rested on the power of the educated in the country. The outcome of this was the Graduates Conference which was established in 1938 and which led to the Enlightening Movement in the country and was the first kernel for the rise of the new national organisations and political parties. Many of the leaders of the Graduate Conference were the power actors that led the political parties, which led the national movement that demanded for independence and the establishment of the modern Sudanese state in 1956.

The Establishment of Sudanese Modern State: The establishment of the modern Sudanese state was based on sectarian concepts and the political parties which came into being at that time. These parties continued to rule the country and could not find a way to solve the national crises, but remained in struggle against each other. Due to the domination of the sectarian parties and the withdrawal of the educated elite, the role of the traditional parties had the upper hand. At the same time, the state did not pay attention to the

importance of the development of economic issues in the country and left those regions to underdevelopment and marginalisation (the South, the East, Darfore, Kurdofan, etc.). With the development of political movements, and the appearance of groups of educated people, a new message came into being which raised the dialectic of centre and margin. This created polarisation between the centre and the margins, which affected the economic, social and cultural life of the country.

The Rise of the political parties: The political parties were divided into:

1. Political parties calling for independence. This group saw that confrontation with the British rule was useless and might delay the attainment of rights by peaceful means. The outstanding party of this group was the Umma Party represented by Abdulrahman Al-Mahdi (Al-Gaddal p. 484).

2. The Unity Parties: These comprised four parties (Brotherhood Party, Liberal Party, The Nile Valley Unity Party and the Union Party).

There were also some other parties like the Republican Party, established by Mahmoud Mohammed Taha who called for no compromise with Egypt or Britain and criticised those parties that called for cooperation with Egypt and Britain. There was also the Sudanese Movement for National Liberation that later became the Sudanese Communist Party, which called for the right to self-determination and introduced the slogan: the joint struggle between the Sudanese and Egyptian people; instead of: the unity of Nile Valley under the Egyptian crown.

The Sudanese political movement crowned its struggle by gaining independence which was declared from within the parliament on December 19, 1953. The declaration of independence was officially concluded and the Sudanese flag was raised instead of the condominium flag on the first of January 1956 and thus started a new phase in the history of the formation of the Sudanese state.

The military *coup d'etat* of 1958

After the first democracy the military government took over from 1958 till October 1964. During this term the Anyania movement was formed and led the war in Southern Sudan. The November 1958 Authority was the first military interference in politics. During this term many organisations such as the Union of Sudanese Christians and Sano Party, which was formed in 1962 and led the war and Round the Table negotiations in 1954, were formed.

October Government

The November 1958 government ended with a mob uprising on which was based a transitional government, which supervised the democratic elections in 1965. The students' symposium on the Southern Sudan Problem was the cause of the uprising. The "Southern problem" appeared on the surface at that time, and the first October Government under the leadership of Siralkhatim Al-Khalifa worked toward reassuring the southerners. Two southern members joined the government. The government worked towards seek-

ing the affection of the biggest southern organisation, Sano Party.

The government held the Round Table Conference, and Sano Party asked for separation of the South due to cultural, religious and ethnic differences. The government refused the Sano Party suggestions and the conference came to an end. A committee of 12 members was formed to continue the negotiations on March 29, 1965.

During the October Government era came the call for the Islamic constitution, and the dissolving of the Leftist Movement which led to the expulsion of its members from parliament. All these made the Southerners uncomfortable.

The May 1969 *Coup d'etat*

This was another relapse in the way of democracy. All the political parties were dissolved. There was a new development when the Minister for Southern Affairs, Joseph Garang issued the June 1969 statement, which discussed the Southern problem for the first time. This paved the way for the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972, which gave the South regional self-government. However, the government failed to keep its promise and this led to the break out of the war in 1983 under the leadership of John Garang, who established the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) for the liberation of Southern Sudan and which continued up to the third democratic phase.

The Third Democracy (1985-1989)

The different governments of the third democracy entered into negotiations with the SPLM, which was crowned by the Al-Mirgani-Garang agreement. However, the country was returned to military government by the Al Bashir government that assumed power in a military coup in June 1989.

The Salvation Government, June 1989

The June Government overthrew the democratic government and plunged the country into the biggest war under the Jihad slogan. The war covered new areas such as Darfur and Eastern Sudan. The government also entered into negotiations with SPLM. There was the Declaration of Kokadam between Ali Al-Haj and Lam Akol, and the Khartoum Agreement, according to which Ric Mishar joined the central authority. Many rounds of negotiations led to the Mashakos Protocol, which asserted the right to self-determination and led to the Nifasha Agreement, which decided on the choice of unity or separation.

Mashakos Protocol (June 8-July 20, 2002)

Some of Mashakos Agreement terms: As the government of the Republic of Sudan and SPLM met in Mashakos, Kenya, between June 18, 2002 and July 20, 2002, and they decided since the two parties desired to settle their disputes in a fair way by treating the causes of the dispute and by setting a frame for a government through which the division of power and wealth would be secured in a fair way, with the guarantee of human rights, that at the end of the transitional term of six years, there would be a referendum for the people of Southern Sudan under international supervision, to accept the system

of government established according to the peace agreement or to vote for separation.

Nifasha Protocol, June 8-July 20, 2002

Some of Nifasha Agreement terms: To find a settlement through negotiations to establish a democratic government that accepts on the one hand the right of the Southerners for self-determination and to make unity attractive during the transitional period and at the same time to observe the values of democracy, respect of human rights, individual liberties, mutual understanding, tolerance and the diversity of life in Sudan.

2- 5: The National Unity Government

2-5-1: The National Unity Government shall reflect the diversity and enhance the national unity and protect the national sovereignty and respect and execute the peace treaty during the transitional period.
2-5-2: The head of the state and Ministerial Council shall exercise certain executive powers.
2-5-3: The division of offices and ministerial offices shall be fair. The two parties shall agree to divide the national ministries in groups according to the agreed upon means of execution.
2-5-4: The two parties signing the peace agreement shall decide before signing, the representation of the SPLM and other political powers from the South in these groups.
2-5-5: Before conducting elections, the seats in the national executive power shall be assigned in the following manner:
a) The National Conference – 52%
b) SPLM – 28%
c) The other political powers in the North – 14%
d) The other political powers in the South – 6%
2-5-6: The National Unity Government shall be responsible for the administration and operation of the state, and drafting and implementation of policies according to the national transitional constitution.

The scenarios of unity and separation require study as there are many problems which would surface whether the choice is unity or separation.

Dialectic of Centre and Margin

Methodologically, this is the historical standing of the state encompassing a number of entities (before bourgeoisie, and capitalism) culturally variegated, ethnically distinct, religiously different and historically dissimilar, in the structure of the modern state. The hypothesis states that some of these entities generally dominate the management of the state and invest it by itself on different levels being the cultural components: language, arts, habits and traditions, faith and other social traits could become ideological weapons. Race and colour associate with class and the division of work, and the religious with politics, sectarian and linguistics. The result is then a complicated historical stand, with inclusive struggle – struggle of identities against other identities, struggle of established and variable norms and identity against those of another. This situation is called

the “Dialectic of Centre and Margin”, which is not necessarily based on geographical distance, but it amounts to substantial ethnical, cultural, political, economic and religious marginalisation. It might take different ideological dimensions in the same religion and develop by reproducing itself in the form of persisting crises. This situation may conflict with democracy and development and result in civil wars and identity crises.

After the formation of the modern state in the Sudan during the imperialism of the Turkish-Egyptian era, 1820/1885, there appeared the Arabic-Islamic entities due to their superiority over the other entities, and due to the direction of the imperialists to cooperate with these entities and in addition to the desire of these entities to cooperate to consolidate their situation. The colonisers supplied these entities with the tools of domination and excited their appetite through establishment of markets. Arab merchants spread in all parts of the country, exhausting the wealth of other regions for the benefit of their mother regions in the middle and northern Sudan through slave trade and exploitation of the slaves as servants, and other forms of trade, which enabled the formation of what can be called Arab Nationalism in Sudan. The Arabs in the Paqt treaty demanded from the Nubian slaves who were brought from the hinterlands. The slaves were not yet a cash commodity, nor were they wage-free labour in a capitalist system, as they would develop a little later. It was still traditional African slavery resulting from petty tribal feuds and wars. It was the Turco-Egyptian colonial rule that launched the era of mass slavery in the Sudan. They made it a state policy loaded with the whole weight of Arab cultural stigmatisation of the blacks (Dr M.J. Hashim, To be or not to be, Oxford, England, 2004). This continued during the Mahdi regime due to the demographic changes caused by its wars, ideology and domination of other entities. The oppressed, due to lack of political awareness, accepted the situation and the survival of the economy and became what they are today, marginalised (Abbakar Adam: A paper on identity 1999).

Struggle for identity

Arab Islamic culture dominated the political life in the country since the Arab invasion of Sudan. The alternating governments also pursued the same policies. The other ethnic entities tried to gain their rights. This led to the current situation of crises in Darfur, Eastern Sudan, Nuba Mountains and Angasana. They are struggling to revive their heritage and culture.

After independence, the traditional political parties (Umma Party, the National Union Party, and the Democratic Public Party) governed the country in coalition and separately between 1954 and 1958.These parties underwent many election campaigns and since they were newly formed and novices in democracy, their democratic experience was not very successful, a situation which led Abdullah Khalil, the Prime Minister and one of the Umma Party leaders, to invite the army to take over the government of the country on November 17, 1958.

During the term of the first democracy, the first military mutiny broke out. This was the Torit mutiny of 1955. This led to the surfacing of the Southern problem and the war broke out led by the Anyania movement. It officially took its name in 1963. The Torit mutiny was the base on which the Anyania army was built.

Some researchers see that many incidents led to the war. The unjust treatment of the southerners in the distribution of offices in government and military institutions in addition to the incidence of killing of some Southerners after the strike in the Anzara weaving factory in the district of Yambio on July 26, 1955, and the closed territories – all these together led to the breakout of the war.

26. The National Question in Sudan seen from a Pan-African perspective, as a justification for a united New Sudan

Cecil Gutzmore, Jalal Mohamed Hashim and Bankie F. Bankie

We write (in February 2011) as war rages in Darfur and in the shadow of the Southern Sudan Referendum and the impending split of The Sudan, as we knew it. This erstwhile largest country in Africa, now has only months left of life, after which its land mass will be juridically sundered, part of it becoming the new nation state of Southern Sudan. In principle, no one welcomes the further Balkanisation of our Motherland. Some have been minded to read these developments as determined by the operations of that dual force of imperialism/Zionism – always, of course, self-interested, exploitation centred and anti-African – moving here in the specific context of the discovery of and quest for the acquisition of and control over oil. Such readings, while by no means devoid of political merit and demanding proper attention and analysis, are dangerously partial and themselves also potentially anti-African.

This text is premised on an in-situ analysis leading to the conclusion that the problems of the Sudan and indeed the Borderlands in general will only be resolved when a critical mass of Africans south of the Sahara and Diasporan Africans know, understand, respect and apply the lessons of the actual history of Sudan.

This text is also premised on the understanding that the overwhelming majority of the people of Sudan are Africans. But many were subjected to a protracted process of forcible 'Arabisation', producing what might be termed Arabised "Africans" side by side with an equally protracted process of destruction and subjugation of indigenous African as well as African-Christian political, cultural and juridical entities. There has also been a broadly concurrent process of Islamisation involving the same attacks on African ancestral culture as done by Euro-Christianisation. The historically received image of Arabs as a 'Semitic' people has had enduring cultural and political effects, by no means only in The Sudan. Calling the people of Northern Sudan Arabs flies in the face of that historically received image, even as it speaks specifically to their now well-developed cultural and political consciousness, which entails something that might be recognised as confusion in matters of ethnicity and race and in the politics of self-perception. That image of Arabs has also impacted the Pan-African political project, certainly since the 5th Pan-African Congress (late 1945). Within that project it has been correct to identify with the Arabs of North Africa and beyond, as fellow victims of racist colonial imperialism, but quite incorrect to ignore historic Arab ideologies and practices incontrovertibly oppressive of Africans. It has been wrong also to deligitimate the contemporary struggles and utterances of Africans against such oppression as merely or potentially tools of imperialism. Nor have those involved in the post-1945 Pan-African project spent sufficient time mastering the issue of land holding and tenure in the Sudan and its role in land alienation away from Africans, as is currently taking place in Nubia, Northern Sudan, for example, thus generating the potential for social and military encounters up to and including civil wars. Based on these conclusions the question that arises – especially seen from the Southern African perspective – is: Did the pre-referendum and pre-separation nation-state of The Sudan represent, embody and advance the interests of the people of that country, and will the de facto successor state of Sudan prove different?

Civil wars are indisputable evidence of a state's failure to satisfy a significant section of its population. The current situation in The Sudan is the product of a long and destructive history during the penultimate phase of which some two-and-a-half million Southern Sudanese Africans lost their lives, with millions more displaced and dispersed. The civil war in Darfur is on-going (February 2011). The cause of the North vs South conflict as defined by Lagu and (John) Garang, was the attempted forced Arabisation of the Southern Sudanese. In fact, to state it thus is to underplay the level and nature of the oppression involved. The solution posed was the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, which envisaged the accession of Southern Sudan to full self-government on July 09, 2011 following the Referendum. It is undeniable that Zionism and Imperialism have an economic and political interest in that outcome. It is untenable to hold that as the sole interest at stake here.

With Southern Sudanese answering 'yes' to separation in the Referendum, Northern Sudan from July 09, 2011 will be known as Sudan. With the sundering of The Sudan and the emergence of an indisputable African Southern Sudanese nation state, the national question as applied to the post-July 09 Sudan demands to be addressed analytically and in a pro-people manner. Are the land and resources of this new geographical African entity (the former Northern Sudan) with its Arabised African population part of the patrimony of the Arab World, or do they belong within the constellation of the African Nation – so called? If the answer is "both", how and why? How is the Sudanese national question perceived within that new entity, within (a) the shrunken Sudan itself and (b) within the constellation of Global Africa (which, of course, encompasses Arabised Africans in the entire Northern Africa, as well Arabia) and (c) within what passes for the Arab world, which definitely perceives itself as incorporating all of Northern Africa as well as increasingly lands further south with Islamised polulation? Will the national question, which is much multi-dimensionally alive in Southern Africa around the land issue (Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa) and so forth, be resolved in Southern Africa before it is in Sudan and the Borderlands in general? Is there a link between the resolution of the national question in the Borderlands and in Southern Africa? Why is it that the African Union (AU) High Level Group has been either unable, or taken too long, to come to terms with the legitimate aspirations of the Southern Sudanese and Darfuri people, when both these peoples in their different struggles clearly articulate the aspirations of the Africans of the Sahelian Borderlands for an end to the oppression they have experienced from Arabised African formations of state of sometimes sub-state nature? Not that we have concluded that the solution in Darfur should be the same as that being arrived at in Southern Sudan. But in both these – and any other similar – instances Africans domiciled south of the Sahara and in the Diaspora must, minimally, recognise and be committed to the ending of real, historically rooted, oppression being experienced by fellow Africans in the Borderlands. If this means the break-up of states, so be it. Nothing in Pan-Africanism renders sacrosanct any particular African continental juridical entity, nor obliges African peoples experiencing oppression of a certain type to remain within such entities.

The answer to these and related issues in Sudan are at the core of the Sudan conundrum and will demand the attention of us all going forward.

27. Left perspectives in African nationalism

Bankie F. Bankie

"We are not racists. We are fundamentally and deeply against any kind of racism. Even when people are subjected to racism we are against racism from those who have been oppressed by it. In our opinion not from dreaming but from a deep analysis of the real conditions of the existence of mankind and of the division of societies, racism is a result of certain circumstances. It is not eternal in any latitude in the world. It is the result of historical and economic conditions. And we cannot answer racism with racism. It is not possible" (Cabral, 1973, p.76).

The Left is a broad category – from centrist social welfareism to communism. The Left in government ranges from the Communist Party in China to the Tripartite Alliance in South Africa.

By way of clarity, the Left in this context refers to socialism and places the means of production and distribution into the public domain, not for private distribution, except for work done, the sharing being based on the value of work done. The means of production are owned by the public, but there is some private ownership.

Seen in historical evolution, socialism has its roots in Europe. In other parts of the world, such as Africa, different systems evolved. The Socialist and Communist parties in existence draw from the socialist root. In France the autocratic monarchy was replaced by a Republican revolution. Adam Smith established the foundations of economic science, which has universal application. Others such as Sismondi, Saint Simon and Proudhon followed, elaborating a socio-political programme. The implementation of these ideas stratified society into classes, such as the middle class and the capitalists, creating a basis for socialist analysis. This included factors such as ethnicity, culture and other socio-economic indicators, as playing a significant role in a given social situation. This analysis advantaged those societies/ethnicities which had elaborated the analysis and disadvantaged those still in feudalism and underdevelopment.

C.L.R. James (1901-89), arguably the leading Black intellectual of the 20th Century, born in the Caribbean, had met the Soviet leader Leon Trotsky in 1936 in Mexico and discussed with him the need for an autonomous Black movement in the USA and worldwide. He left the Trotskyists movement in 1951.

The Left, based on its contribution to date, has a place in African politics, just as it features in every continent in the world. Those who would wish the death of the Left in west, east, central and southern Africa have a long wait coming. It is a fact that in certain parts of the African world, both at home and abroad, the Left has been marginalised, neutralised or co-opted. Initially, on the advent of the 'Independence' of African countries, the West practiced a policy of assassination and coups against leaders of the Left. This plus interference via the monetary policy of the Washington consensus (IMF/World Bank) in West and East Africa saw installed compliant regimes with their politics of compromise. What will further weaken the Left in Africa south of the Sahara and its western (Americas, Caribbean, Europe, etc.) and eastern (Arabia, North Africa, Gulf states and points east)

Diasporas, is if it is unable to engage in the major challenges facing us due to emasculation or, particularly in this case, out of fear of the unknown. This paper argues that the principal challenge facing the Left in Africa now is how to engage the decolonisation process underway in the Afro-Arab Borderlands.

What will render the Left inconsequential would be the absence of an organisational framework which unifies its struggle. This would be beside the absence of a political agenda. The Pan-African movement can serve as the forum of the African Left, as seen in Cameroon, drawing its lifeblood from the people's struggle for unity, democracy, social justice, equality and economic progress in different social settings in the Diasporas and on the continent south of the Sahara. The issue of organisation must be tackled first.
Even as the Berlin Wall was in place, voices on the African Left stated that race was a key component in social analysis. Such elements were expelled from the African National Congress (ANC). However, most in government toed the line from Moscow, parroting that only class was determinant in defining social issues. In the South African Communist Party (SACP), which was the dominant element in the ANC/SACP Alliance during the armed struggle, many were expelled from the ANC at the behest of the Communists in the SACP, because they insisted, with varying degrees of emphasis, that race was a key element in social analysis. Obviously, the consequence of this was to whiten the leadership of the Alliance. This ultimately affected policies, on issues such as land, of the emerging ANC-led government, which was voted into office in 1994. The Communists in Sudan, who retained amicable relations with the SACP, at least in 1971, were too centralised on Khartoum to be significant in the unfolding events in South Sudan and elsewhere in the country.

For some, when the Soviet variant of socialism suffered internal collapse, with the withdrawal of Russia from its frontline position in the Third World, serious challenges were thrown up. Take, for instance, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in Southern Sudan. Adwok Nyaba says:

> In all honesty the SPLM/A was not socialist or Left for that matter, although it raised socialist slogans. The Left is recognised by the manner it organises its means of struggle and the relationship between its leadership and the masses. The SPLM/A was militarist and that is why it is paying dearly in its political organisation and in the unity of its rank and file.

The SPLM/A was, in the language of those times, a progressive, Left-leaning African liberation organisation, similar to the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).

South Sudan had been at war with Khartoum from the eve of Sudan's self-government in 1956. Initially this war was waged by the Anya-nya peasant messianic movement led by Joseph Lagu – fighting with traditional weapons, which were aligned with Israel, the enemy of the Arabs. Whilst the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement of 1972 brought peace, by 1983 war broke out in earnest again due to the implementation of Arabistion/Islamisation schemes by way of the forced imposition of cultural practices such as Sharia law in the South. This new phase of the war was waged by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) led by the late John Garang, which was Soviet aligned. With the Soviets gone, with the changes in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, where was the SPLM

to draw its support, both in terms of logistics and diplomatic promotion, to maintain its struggle with the Khartoum government, the traditional enemy of South Sudan? The Islamic fundamentalist government of Sudan based in Khartoum is led not by white Arabs, but by a mixed-race/coloured group, who are Arabised, Islamised and denationalised, practicing a policy of genocide in Sudan. They oppress the African majority in the country, in alliance with the rest of Arabia, where they are accepted as inferior Arabs in the Arab League, defending its interests in an area which Jihadists consider an international front of their global war. Osama Bin Laden was based in Juba, fighting the Southerners.

Sudan is strategically located, straddling the line where Arabia meets black Africa. In Sudan, north of that line, are not white Arabs, but an Arabised and Islamised people of mixed race, who in the United States of America (USA) would be considered "Black" (i.e. "one drop"), living in the centre of the country, around Khartoum on the Nile River, which flows from its source in Uganda, through Juba, capital of Southern Sudan, onto Khartoum, thence through southern Egypt, Cairo and into the Mediterranean Sea. These people of north-central Sudan on the Nile, in the Southern African context, would be described as a "coloured" people. In Sudan the light brown complexioned people living in the centre of the country around Khartoum, detaining power, historically served as a buffer between white Egypt and black southern Sudan. This is how the last colonial arrangement, the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, distributed power within Sudan society, as they left the scene in 1956. The power centre in Khartoum was to stem the tide of African nationalism coming north along the Nile, the overwhelming majority of the population of Sudan being black Africans. This explains the root causes of the protracted war in South Sudan and the frantic attempt now to alter the demographics in Darfur and elsewhere, so that Africans will be thrown back southwards, in what has been a historical process of African retreat, since the time of the African civilisation of Kush in north-eastern Sudan, which preceded the black pharaonic civilisation in Egypt, before the arrival of the Arabs in Africa. This type of "decolonisation" process was sanctioned in arrangements made by Europe and Arabia, to better exploit African labour and minerals from Nouakchott on the Atlantic to Port Sudan on the Red Sea. This is the challenge posed in Sudan today. The issues are similar in Mauritania, where the colonials gave power to a Moorish minority, to rule the African majority. The method of decolonisation was the same in south and north Africa. Africans were to be hemmed in by Europeans in the south and by Arabs in the north, in a pincer arrangement in which they would be bound forever to serve external interests in order to survive and escape genocide.

It is important to remember that not all African Muslims are fundamentalist or support the use of violence to impose their will. There are many Muslims in central Sudan and the South who reject radical Islam and the policies of the Khartoum Government, which is widely supported in the Arab world due to its promotion of Islam in the Borderlands. Looking further west we find Mallam Aminu Kano, born in 1338 according to the Islamic calendar or 1920 AD, one of Nigeria's first delegates to the United Nations, a Hausa-Fulani from Northern Nigeria. Kano says: "Who enjoyed a reputation for being devout, came close to fitting that relatively rare breed of active Moslems who believe the Islamic ideal to be a secular state …"

Some of the moderates are progressive in supporting the African identity, which in the Sudan context refers to the enlightened position of the Late John Garang whose concept

of a New Sudan came to be identified with the unity of north and South Sudan, as well as the idea of fair play and free and fair elections. Given Sudan's African, as distinct from Arab majority, a free and fair election would mean an SPLM ruled Sudan. We are far from that given the geo-political location of Sudan on the Nile. However, there is a Northern Sector of the SPLM which has many Moslem members, some of whom are Pan-Africanists/African nationalists. Many of the Southern origin live in Khartoum due to work opportunities and the peace prevalent in the centre of the country.

It could be said that the Left has come a long way from where it was in say, 1957, when Ghana achieved self-government under the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) led by Nkrumah. Many now acknowledge that race is as significant as class, in any analysis of the African situation, especially when handling Pan-African issues.

The two major areas for settler decolonisation in 1957 were Southern Africa under Afrikaner/British settler colonialism, and the Afro-Arab Borderlands, in the Sahel and Sudan under Arab hegemony, running from Mauritania on the Atlantic eastwards to Sudan on the Red Sea. Whereas in 1957 the problems of Southern Africa were admitted by the international community, those in the Borderlands were not. Fifty years later, in the 21st century, the issues of Arab racism and hegemony in the Borderlands surface with a vengeance, why?

Arab slavery and hegemony in the Sahelian Borderlands predated the arrival of the Huguenots in the Cape, in Southern Africa, by a millennium. In the mid-twentieth century proletarian internationalism, as cooperation between the Left across borders is called, in an era dominated by two superpowers – the Soviet Union and the United States – was the quintessential ingredient in the decolonisation of Africa. After all, colonialism was administered from the Western metropoles of London, Lisbon, Paris and Brussels. Its end was hastened by the intervention of the Soviet Union, its allies in Eastern Europe and China.

In Africa, the context of China until it joined the United Nations in 1971 must be put into consideration. There was no way China would have entered into the world arena before finishing its cultural revolution. It is this Cultural Revolution in the sixties that consolidated the Communist in power after the defeat of the Nationalists, first in China and then displacing them in the world body. The current China stance is dictated by its economic power. This power has been acquired without eschewing its communist ideology with Chinese characteristics. It remains to be seen what will happen when China reaches the top of the world political and military order. China's actions in Sudan, particularly in Darfur, require close inspection and monitoring, providing benchmarks in its evolving relations with Africans.

Those who partook in the Fifth Pan-African Congress (PAC) in Manchester in 1945, such as George Padmore, W.E.B. Du Bois and Kwame Nkrumah, accepted the line of the Soviet Union, based on its internal need to keep in check its restive minorities, that race/ethnicity was not a factor in social analysis. One could say that Padmore was more circumspect in this regard. This was due to the time he spent in Moscow as a member of the Comintern, where he witnessed at close quarters how proletarian internationalism was tailored to Soviet international interests, as the South African Communist Party had

learnt much earlier. The SACP was unprepared in 1994 for the native Republic.

Walter Rodney points out that the Mozambican, Angolan and Guinean revolutionaries always insisted, as did C.L.R James, on the importance of context and the need to develop context in order to understand relevance. When Agostinho Neto or Samora Machel pronounced on race and class, Rodney stated: "… I think we must beware of being trapped into generalisations that are supposed to be valid for the whole of the Pan-African world …". On this issue the author shares Rodney's view that:

> To talk about Pan-Africanism, to talk about international solidarity within the Black world, whichever sector of the Black world we live in, we have a series of responsibilities. One of the most important of our responsibilities is to define our own situation. A second responsibility is to present that definition to other parts on the Black world, indeed, to the whole progressive world. A third responsibility, and I think this is in order of priority, is to help others in a different sector of the Black world to reflect upon their own specific experience (Rodney, 1999, p. 81).

Men such as Du Bois, Padmore and Makonnen worked with Nkrumah in the implementation of his Pan-African agenda, which led to the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1964. The OAU was a tool in the hands of African and north African Arab leaders. For the Arabs it served to enlist African support for the Arab causes of Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine, more than as a cultural identity.

After the Camp David Accords and the establishment of relations between certain Arab states in Africa such as Egypt and Isreal, the OAU and its successor the African Union (AU) became increasingly subject to Arab, as distinct from African, interests. It is from this period that the divide, north and south of the Sahara, became clearly discernible and the destinies of the two people no longer reconcilable, despite the strenuous efforts of Libya to hasten a Unites States of Africa. Arab members were not interested in the integration of the African Diasporas, on equal basis with continental governments, into the statist Pan-African structure – the AU. Certain Arab states took to underwriting/buying-into the expenses of the organisation, by paying state dues in the face of the indifference of some African states regarding their financial obligations to Africanism. A point was reached in late 2007 whereby Muammar Gadhafi of Libya sought to influence the AU by threatening to withdraw his support for it and rather turning to the West and Europe, knowing that this would cause severe financial problems, even the collapse of the organisation.

Makonnen had doubts about Nasser's intentions in Africa and favoured relations with Israel. Nasser's Egypt and Nkrumah's Ghana, in close socialist alliance, were the main proponents of African decolonisation, assisted by the Soviets. The OAU enshrined the concept of sovereignty and the inviolability of borders, with respect for the territorial integrity of states. Many Left leaning leaders in Africa, as late as the close of the 20th century, remained steadfast in their support of Nasser's Egypt, despite Egypt's signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel, and its murky involvement with Britain in the neocolonial dispensation for Sudan.

Whatever may have been Nasser's principle objective in Africa, many have argued that he was first a Pan-Arabist and secondly a Pan-Africanist. His leadership of the African

liberation struggle was strong, steadfast and outstanding, as has been recorded by Prof Helmi Sharawy. During his period Egypt continued its interference in Sudan by way of supporting Khartoum's policies in Southern Sudan, Darfur, Nubia, etc. through institutionalised marginalisation. Nasser facilitated the marriage of Nkrumah to an Egyptian woman, a tactic used by Arabia in the past to neutralise African nationalist leaders in Sudan. The rule of Ghana by the Convention People's Party (CPP) saw the establishment of Ghanaian embassies in Khartoum and Nouakchott in Mauritania. Nkrumah would have been aware of the oppression of black Africans in Sudan and Mauritania by people calling themselves Arabs or Moors. It is said that it was the 1966 Khartoum Roundtable on the future of South Sudan, at which Ghana was represented, which brought Nkrumah to the realisation of the need to support Southern Sudan. His government was overthrown shortly thereafter by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the USA. Amilcar Cabral states: (Nkrumah) ...was one of my best friends, I'll never forget him; and you can read my speech at his memorial – you see he told me, 'Cabral, I tell you one thing, our problem of African unity is very important, really, but now if I had to begin again, my approach would be different' (Cabral, 1973, p. 91).

Adwok Nyaba takes the view that most African leaders did not understand the genesis of the Sudan conflict. Arab diplomacy focused on wider issues, such as Palestine, concealing Arab internal contradictions with the captive black African peoples in their midst. Keep in mind the millions of unseen Black Africans living in the Maghreb States of North Africa, including Libya. It was therefore not surprising that the continental body, often described as Pan-Africanist, left to us by Nkrumah, that is the OAU, now the AU, reflects the view that Arabs could be and indeed are "brothers" – even as the Khartoum-based government was fighting a protracted war with African nationalism in South Sudan, in a war seen by the Africans of southern Sudan as a just war of decolonisation from Arab settler colonialism, in which they lost some two-and-a-half million lives.

It is probably from this period, if not earlier, that we note the Left's failure both in Africa generally and internationally to address the issue of Arab hegemony and racism, which position is still with us today. Most admitted privately what they were not prepared to speak up about in public, leaving us in the present predicament of lack of credibility and voicelessness. Residence in South Sudan teaches that at the point of contact in the Afro-Arab intercourse, Arabia is aggressive and expansionist, not hiding its interests. This is understood throughout the Arab world. However, in areas removed from direct contact, such as the west and southern African coasts, it is a different story. There Arab, particularly Egyptian, cordial diplomacy is legendary. Yet an Egyptian diplomat could be shifted from the Consulate in Juba, to the Embassy in Lusaka, Zambia. It is this duplicity that has confounded Africans, but such protocol is rule-of-thumb in the foreign ministries of the Arab world, when dealing with Africa. Africans have been slow to react to this duplicity. Many African leaders are amenable to bribery by their Arab counterparts, at the cost of their people's interests. Indeed the major sticking point in this changing scenario is the possibility of a reduction in Arab largesse.

The OAU played a major role in the decolonisation of Southern Africa, whilst it refused to be involved in the South Sudan issue, which was stated to be an Arab issue, for the proper consideration of the Arab League, which was disinterested. The Liberation Committee of the OAU ensured that the decolonisation process in southern Africa received

the maximum support of the organisation, including its Arab members. The Arab government in Khartoum, although at war with Africans in South Sudan, was generous in funding the anti-apartheid struggle. In mid-February 2008 the post-apartheid government of South Africa dealt in a cavalier fashion with a Darfurian freedom fighter seeking to enter South Africa, to explain the war going on in his country. He was locked up, his luggage confiscated and he was expelled on the next available flight, without being offered any explanation. This could best be explained as a deliberate act to deny South Africans first-hand knowledge of what is going on in Darfur and Sudan.

The road to compromise with settler colonialism in southern Africa was a long one. The African National Congress (ANC) had been formed in 1912. Later it was fused with the South African Communist Party. Shortly before South Africa attained majority government in 1994, the South African leader Chris Hani – a likely future President – was assassinated, being described as both a leading figure in the ANC and the Communist Party. The Anti-Apartheid Movement (A-AM) was a powerful international tool and played a leading role in the garnering of international support for the managed decolonisation process in South Africa. From personal observation the majority members of the A-AM in Europe were white, with very few Blacks present. So much so that some of us formed BEM, an African branch of A-AM, in London. There was no such humanitarian interest in the freedom struggle underway in Sudan by the marginalised majority.

In South Africa today, despite the role of President Thabo Mbeki in Sudan, and the responsibilities for South Sudan given to South Africa by the AU, South Africans in general remain ignorant of Sudan issues. Those who followed the transfer of power from the white settler colonial Afrikaner Nationalist Party to the ANC saw how the Left in that country worked with capital to create a new South Africa, so-called, with a mixed economy and lots of opportunities for venture and transnational capital, so that there was never a chance that the commanding heights of that economy would shift from the pre-1994 situation. Indeed local capital quickly stepped off-shore to safe havens such as Switzerland. The Kempton Park Talks leading to majority rule in South Africa, laid the ground rules for the peaceful coexistence and cooperation of the Left with organised labour and the centre-right, which formula remains in place today. In Namibia, self-government saw the introduction of a mixed economy, with respect for the social contract and property ownership, with assurances for public health and education, embedded in the Constitution.

It was therefore ironic that the government which emerged in South Africa, led by the Left, experienced some discomfort in handling settler colonial issues in the Afro-Arab Borderlands such as Darfur. This unease was felt to be a legacy of Soviet era relations, whereby the ANC had forged close international socialist working alliances, which ultimately led to the battle of Cuito Cunavale in Angola, where the progressive forces of Cuba, Angola, Namibia and South Africa defeated on the battlefield the racist minority Afrikaner regime of South Africa, which was in “constructive engagement” with the international right wing, which included the USA, UK, the Angolan rebel group UNITA and others. From observation the ruling Tripartite Alliance in South Africa (the ANC, the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions [COSATU]) has not shifted from its view that class is the main and principle determinant in analysing human relations. The Mbeki administration did adopt aspects of Pan-Africanism/African nationalism in its African Renaissance agenda, taking on board the Diaspora and championing countries

such as Haiti, whose role in contemporary African history had been largely ignored by the African Left in the past. However, the Alliance was unable to answer charges that Renaissance was more a moral fig leaf for the penetration of South African capital into Africa, through the agency of Shoprite, the Banks and the breweries, etc., to be followed by the vacuuming of mineral resources.

Whereas the world today is no longer in a duo-polar situation as during the Cold War, with power controlled by the United States of America and the Soviet Union, we are now in a period of the decline of the mono-power, the United States of America, where it is involved along with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the forced occupation of a sovereign state in north Africa, apparently as part of an enrichment scheme. The current global scenario is slowly shifting in our view to a multi-polar world, in which new conflict issues are emerging, such as decolonisation in the Afro-Arab Borderlands. We have seen terrorism become a matter of global concern, as well as Islamic fundamentalism and the preoccupation with the environment.

Closer to home the Darfur conflict is bringing to the surface an old problem, which has long been buried from global view, which was apparent during the long war in South Sudan, for those who were discerning. This is the issue of Arab hegemony, slavery, racism and abuse of human rights, led by Islamic fundamentalist governments such as that in Khartoum, which systematically seeks to Arabise and to change the demography of places such as Darfur, implementing genocide against the people of the area, such as the Fur, who are being forced off their land and are being replaced by Arabised West Africans, such as the Taureg. A similar Arab project is underway in Nubia, Northern Sudan, near the Egyptian border, where African Nubians, who have been living in the area for a millennium, are being removed in plain view of the world and Egyptian Arabs being resettled on their lands. Bear in mind that the conflict in the Afro-Arab Borderlands is as old as time, and that these issues were not publicised in the past. There will be new Darfurs spreading elsewhere in Sudan, as in the past.

From observation it appears that the difficulties that the Left experiences in South Africa, of openly supporting harassed Africans in the Borderlands, is an admission that in countries such as Sudan and Mauritania there is indeed a race issue, of such dimensions that just as South Africa needed the support of the Liberation Committee of the OAU to end apartheid, so in the Borderlands broad African solidarity and international support is necessary. From Mauritania to the Red Sea there is an issue of Arab hegemony and racism. After all, Africans lived on the Mediterranean coast, as Cheikh Anta Diop explained to us. If Africans have been pushed southwards as far as Darfur today – the issue is – what are Africans doing about it? There is unease when an apartheid-type figure such as El Bashir of Sudan is able, in late 2007, to undertake a state visit to South Africa, where he is accorded full honours. Would the ANC, in say the mid-1980s, have remained silent if P.W. Botha had undertaken a State visit to a Frontline state?

All Left/progressive forces in African society have to take on board the truths of the Sudan and struggle to put in place changes for the better. The Left, both African and international, has no choice but to get engaged, as it did in South Africa. If the Left stays on the side-lines as a spectator indifferent to racism and apartheid in South Kordofan, for instance, it ceases to be part of the solution and becomes part of the problem. The

progressives need to fight Arab hegemony and violent Islamic fundamentalism in Africa. Arab contradictions on African issues stem from Arab acquiescence to Arab hegemony as part of their historic tradition in Africa. This conduct we have also seen by former colonial powers in Africa. A distinction must be made between Arab Leftist ideas which are progressive and in line with progressive humanity, and the support of the Arab Left for Arab hegemony. Arab hegemony is imperial, it steals land and natural resources and it enslaves people. The Jallaba/Arabs of Sudan are in continuous expansionist mode within Sudan, so is Western hegemony no respecter of persons or resources – witness the invasion of Libya in the first half of 2011, which has the tacit support of the Arab League and NATO. But for the gallant fighters of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), Sudan under Tourabi/Bashir, would have overrun South Sudan and marched on Kampala, in the name of Jihad.

Arab racism and domination is not an issue for the alliance of liberals in the USA alone. It concerns African progressive forces too in Africa and its Diasporas. It is also a matter of concern for all right-thinking Arabs who are democrats and enlightened. Arab hegemony is active from Mauritania to the Red Sea. This is not new. As Chinweizu Chinweizu correctly stated, the Borderlands have been a war zone since the arrival of the Arabs in Africa. Africans were unable to admit and face up to this reality. The conflict is low-intensity, in the main, and generalised, with key combat zones such as south Sudan, which lost 2.5 million during its liberation struggle, and now Darfur, Abyei and Southern Kordofan. These conflicts did not start yesterday, as the international press would want us to believe, but have been intermittent moving southward, again since the arrival of the Arabs in Africa. Such conflicts are increasingly in the public domain, as the genocide in Darfur has received front-page coverage internationally. Whether this will continue remains to be seen, as Darfur in mid-2011 remains in flames, but is once again under reported.

It was reported that the Heads of State of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) meeting in Burkina Faso in mid-January 2008 had top of their agenda, as a security matter, the issue of the Taureg of the Sahel, where al-Qaida is active. In the face of a collective Arab challenge there should be a collective African response.

Groups such as the Darfurian freedom fighters fighting a war of survival deserve the support of the Left. A factor in that support will be the orientation of the group in question. Waging a liberation struggle requires support, both material and diplomatic. Military equipment is taken from the enemy. The people of Darfur support their liberation movements. Amnesty International reports that the IDP camps in Darfur around 2008 were flooded with weapons, with no shortage of youthful volunteers, ready to fight. In the camps a revolver can be purchased for US$25. In Sudan, as the late John Garang said, there will be no peace unless the claims of the entire marginalised are meet. There are projections that this may take 10-50 years. The current peace process in the South is part of a longer unfolding process, which the Anya-nya and the late John Garang set in motion. There is an ark of crisis of endangered African states, targets for Arab expansion and control as follows: Eritrea, Tchad, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Kenya, Central African Republic, Niger, Mali, Senegal and Uganda. So far the social turbulence seen in North Africa and Arabia does not indicate any significant change in Arab strategy in Africa. Egypt has not changed its stance on the Nile waters being vital to its interests. In Libya there has emerged a virulent anti-African element in the society which is not new but appears to

be gaining strength.

And what about the lands that were "lost" in the north of the African continent, such as Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco? The indications are that once majority rule has come to Sudan, then the pre-occupation of the new Sudan will by way of education on human rights and history, re-educating the people that Africa has its own culture, history and civilisation. And that the African origins of civilisation, currently excluded from the school curricula in North Africa, is a fact of history. The "lost" lands will not be recovered by war, but those now living in those lost lands will have to address the challenges of African culture, ideas and the Afro-Arab civilizational dialogue based on the moral legitimacy of Africa as a reality, with its own interests in the new information order.
Afro-Arab relations have always been "conflictual", with Africans on the receiving end, since the advent of the Arab on the Africa continent. The Left "progressive" forces need to engage this fact directly and not remain neutral and passive. The issues in play in this area are clear. The Left should not be afraid of confronting new situations, new challenges or unfamiliar terrain. In this period the Left should be vigilant and unbending in its core principles, as well as flexible in its approach.

1. The author expresses appreciation for the comments and reactions to the preparatory text of this paper, received from Prof. Adwok Nyaba.
2. This is the modified text of a presentation originally delivered at the 17th World Festival of Youth and Students (17WFYS), Pretoria, South Africa, December 2010.

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SECTION V

Pan-African issues at home and abroad

28. Reclaiming the values and institutions of Africa's heritage

Paul Tuhafeni Shipale

Abstract

In their search for solutions to the development problems of Africa, students of African development have often ignored linguistic and other socio-cultural resources (Prah, 1993). This paper focuses on the concept and philosophy of Afro-centricity as a paradigm based on the idea that African people should re-assert a sense of agency in order to achieve sanity as expounded by Molefi Kete Asante and Ama Mazama, central figures of the Temple School. As a paradigm, Afro centricity enthrones the centrality of the African ideals and values as expressed in the highest forms of African culture, and activates consciousness as a functional aspect of any revolutionary approach to phenomena. The paper also focuses on the seven bases for national unity which might be referred to as the civic promotion of African culture, attachment to subject place of Africans, defence of African cultural elements, celebration of centeredness, revising the collective text, acceptance of African diversity, and openness to the Diaspora, function to move Africa toward a common nationalistic agenda as the only way to reduce and minimize national antagonisms and regional disputes based upon stereotypes and false images of others.

Introduction

The theme of this paper is better highlighted by the fact that I found a letter at the desk of my Sub-editor, hand delivered by Mr Bankie F. Bankie to the premises of the New Era newspaper. The content in the brown envelope was basically a request or call to present a paper at the next Pan-African Strategic and Policy Research Group (PANAFSTRAG)/ Nigeria High Commission (NHC)/Pan-Afrikan Centre of Namibia (PACON)/National Youth Council of Namibia (NYCN) workshop in Windhoek to be held on December 6-9, 2010, under the theme: "Sustaining the new wave of Pan-Africanism", or alternatively to be a rapporteur. What I found interesting in the missive was a paper by one of my favourites, Professor Kwesi Kwaa Prah titled: "Keeping our eyes on the ball" in the form of a letter addressed to General Williams of PANAFSTRAG, who I had met in person. In such letter, the author articulates his thoughts which, according to him, have meandered and coursed through his mind in the wake of the meeting planned to elaborate and identify a platform for ideas which could eventually feed into the 8th Pan-African Congress.

The author asserts that such a meeting started off at a slow pace since the participants were a bit cagy in picking up momentum. The author then went on to propose a much smaller, more focused meeting where in-depth knowledge over a defined and specified area is deliberately favoured for the more definitive and earthbound answers needed for programmed and planned practice.

The author then went on to caution against near-compulsive vulgarization of the catch-

word and slogan of “black power” and the ideology of racial holism and suggested that it now is irrelevant in the African context to apply the slogan of 1966, by the likes of Willie Ricks and Stokely Carmichael aka Kwame Toure. Equally perplexing to the author is the frequency of the race talk as if racism was unique and exclusive to the black-white context. Then the author went on to explain that racism was directed by Hitler against European Jews and against the Roma people (Gypsies) and Slavs. Pakistanis and Indians in Britain, Arabs in France, Turks in Germany, Moroccans in the Netherlands, Spanish settlers and Amerindians in South America, Indians and Aboriginals in Australia, Native Americans, Mexicans and Hispanics in the USA, all face racism on a daily basis.

Racist attitudes have existed between Chinese and Malays and Indians and Chinese in South Asia. The Japanese (Wajin) have for ages despised the Okinawans and Ainu of Hokkaido and even the Burakumin or the Dalits in India and the central Asians in Russia, the Blacks in Africa systematically traded as slaves by the Arabs, or the slaves of the Romans who came from all over Europe and the Mediterranean including the Berbers, Greeks, Britons, Germans, Thracians, Gauls, Jews, Arabs, the Mamlukes warriors in Egypt, the Irish in England, the Circassian and Georgian women slaves from the North Caucasus in Turkish homes, the Nepalese workers from the old Khmer Empire.

Therefore to talk about racism as if it is the particular preserve of the relationship between Westerners and the people of African descent is at best ill-informed and at worst disingenuous. What we should focus on at this stage, to get off the ground and going, is a cultural movement which will provide in effect confidence and affirmation for our people with regard to our historical heritage and cultural patrimony. In other words, the reclamation of values, tenets and institutions of our African heritage. Because without reclaiming and repositioning ourselves with these bequeathments, there is no hope for our sustained advancement. By this we don’t mean rigging ourselves with the externals or superficialities of our heritage, nor do we mean the outer finery of African culture, but a selective and judicious reclamation of our substantial cultural patrimony, not an infantile and wholesale re-appropriation of every cultural habit from the past.

The five emerging minimum bases for continental civil society

1. There must be an active and genuine promotion of African culture as determined by symbols, motifs, rituals, education, scripts, proverbs, and ceremonies. Let me be clear about this necessity. The establishment of the United States of Africa will demand that people give allegiance to a much larger community than they have ever realized. This is true even though Europeans regularly consider all Africans to be of one country. We are at the historic crossroads where this has to become the African reality. A promotion of African culture from the simplest institutions to the most complex must be our objective every day of our lives. The state, therefore, must have at its disposal the most active propaganda cadre to affirm the value of African symbols, rituals, scripts, and so forth, that enrich the lives of the people and bring us together as one nation. If we examine the problems of disunity in any one of the states inherited from the Berlin conference we see that the source is often lack of proper appreciation of common objectives and consequently the minimizing of the roles of others. Every person in a continental African state must have his or her dignity protected; this should be the fundamental core of the political and juridical system.

2. There must be an emotional attachment to the subject-place of Africans in any social, political, economic, architectural, literary, or religious phenomenon with implications for gender and class consideration. There is nothing arrogant about this characteristic of the state, but there is something clearly meant to produce a citizenry ready to defend its homeland. No one should be permitted to marginalize any African in any situation. Our collective response to being placed on the periphery of world history must be total rejection of that position. We must always be prepared to reject the rejecters. There is a sense that some Europeans and Americans are comfortable with a weak Africa because it means a weak African people. This is no longer acceptable given the realities, economic and political, in these times. We must have a belief that we are in the centre of our own history. Let us begin with new maps of the world where all of the maps place Africa in the centre of the world. This is what every nation does anyway and now the continent will soon become one nation. So let the business people, and geographers, who are in cartography, produce what we need to teach the children of Africa. Let us create universities that are Afrocentric, not Eurocentric, where the central narrative from the past to the future is Africa. This would mean that the column of information standing at the centre of the hypostyle hall of knowledge in most African universities will no longer be headed by information about Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Julius Caesar, Alexander the Greek, Goethe, Dante, Milton, Joan of Arc, Victoria, Einstein, Hegel, Sartre, Napoleon, Stonehenge, and so forth. We must impose our own knowledge at the centre of our educational system. Our children must know Imhotep, Amenhotep, the son of Hapu, Duauf, Akhenaten, Hannibal, Hatshepsut, Hanno, the Sailor, Thutmoses III, Amadu Bamba, Wole Soyinka, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Nehanda Nyakasikana, Langston Hughes, the Pyramids in Kemet and in Sudan, W.E.B. Du Bois, Cheikh Anta Diop, Frantz Fanon, Menelik II, Sungbo's Eredo, Kebra Nagast, and so forth. There is no history and there have been no men or women any greater than the geniuses produced on this continent. There are no places any more sacred than those that have been hallowed by the deeds and presence of our own ancestors. Let our universities have students who come from feeder schools that teach the greatness of our collective history. Our men and women who have achieved a place in our memory because of their deeds must be shown to be those who believed in the centrality of Africans within their own narratives.

3. There must be an active defence of African cultural elements as historically valid in the context of art, music, education, science, and literature. The civic commitment of the citizen must be to the ideal African cultural elements. If you study art, education, science, literature, philosophy, or mathematics, first interrogate it from the standpoint of African culture. We must not be stuck in the past, but we must not forget the past, we must use it as a resource to insure civic commitment and to build our civil society. This is not to reject useful information from other sources, but rather to insure that in the national community we use all of the available knowledge in the world, beginning with that produced by our own thinkers and sages. Others do this and celebrate their philosophers; we are no less than others. The names of Imhotep, Merikare, and Khunanup must become commonplace among the masses of our people.
4. There must be a celebration of "centeredness" and agency and an uncompromising commitment to lexical refinement that eliminates pejoratives about Africans. Our intention must be to reshape language so that all negativity, gathered for 500 years, against Africa and Africans, is destroyed. This is a national citizenship drive. We must

assume that we can eliminate negative references to Africans as we can eliminate the fly. Each one teaches one. Each person becomes a model citizen. We will put the youth to work to obliterate all traces of negativity about Africa. They must see themselves in the service of something far greater than their own immediate lives. They celebrate centeredness by dreaming of greatness for the nation. Terminology introduced into the languages of Africa like primitive peoples, traditional religion, ethno-music, African Slave Trade, Pygmy, Hottentots, Huts, and jungle must be purged as a national effort at this dignity-affirming position. It is true that this continent has the earliest human beings, the earliest civilizations, but there are no primitives in this land. An effort to eradicate the definitions imposed on Africa by Europe will be a primary goal of the civil society. The use of terms like African Slave Trade must give way to European Slave Trade. Our music, religion, dance, and families need no qualifying adjectives that leave Europeans as an imposed universal. Theirs is no more universal than ours. Their dance is as ethnic as ours. Their music is as traditional as ours. Their religion is no more valid than ours. We are all humans and the role of the civil society in an integrated continental national state must be to drive out all forces that would make Africans and blackness pejoratives.

5. There must be an openness to include all of the achievements and contributions of African people as the collective gift of Africa to humanity. What this implies is that the African nation in its continental dimension is simply the core of a much larger African world. Those of us who were born outside of the continent and reside in thousands of places around the globe must be seen, as most of us see ourselves, as adding to the historical flow of African life. We have been moved away but we have never been detached as our poets have sang brilliantly of Africa in Jamaica, Haiti, Colombia, Costa Rica, Trinidad, Guadeloupe, Brazil, Surinam, Venezuela, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Uruguay, Ecuador, Peru, the United States, Canada, and islands too numerous to mention. It is not just that every time we look at ourselves in the mirror we see the imprint of Africa; it is also because our emotional and psychological attachment to our motherland has never been severed regardless of the brutality we suffered as Africa's children. The richness of the Diaspora in every department of human achievement is nothing more than an extension of the richness of Africa. We are African products, however mangled by circumstances and however misguided by Africa's enemies and as Africans we count our weaknesses and our wealth as African weaknesses and wealth. Our mothers taught us that blood is thicker than water. When we celebrate Arnaldo Tamayo and Guion Bluford, the first two Africans to fly in space, one as a cosmonaut from Cuba and the other as an astronaut from the United States, because they declared their Africanness, we celebrate ourselves. Their achievements must be placed alongside all other African achievements. What others have done, we can do; what others wish to do, we have done. This is the African condition. As in previous ages our inventors have added to the stock of human knowledge. When the sage inventors of our villages and towns created new ways to deal with lingering technical problems they were adding to the Pan-African repertoire of creations. Multiply the activity of men and women of science thousands of times and you have the creative energy of a massive block of human beings who made it possible for African communities to have farming implements and weapons of war. But these are not the only areas of creativity among our people. We have given to the world superior artists, creative novelists, competitive athletes in all sports, wise philosophers, incomparable engineers and space scientists, gifted mathematicians, impressive sailors who have

> rounded the earth alone, noble historians, and unselfish politicians. The grand names of our military leaders, Mena, Thutmoses III, Ramses II, Hannibal, Nana Karikari, Yenenga, Nzingha, Shaka Zulu, Toussaint L'Ouverture, Dessalines, Nanny, Nat Turner, Sundiata, Uthman dan Fodio, Mzilikazi, Lat Dior, Zumbi and a thousand others must be resurrected and remembered by our own historians. We must now embrace our mutual heritage and claim the entirety of our African nationality.

These five bases for national unity which might be referred to as the civic promotion of African culture, attachment to the subject place of Africans, defence of African cultural elements, celebration of centeredness, revising the collective text, acceptance of African diversity, and openness to the Diaspora, the function to move Africa toward a common nationalistic agenda. This is the only way to reduce and minimize national antagonisms and regional disputes based upon stereotypes and false images of others. If we take it as our responsibility to protect the least among us, the smallest ethnic units, the most threatened language, the people nearest to the brink of destitution, we will advance a new ethic in the historical book of life.

On the issue of Sudan as posed to me by my learned devoted Pan-Africanist, Mr Bankie, I once wrote:

> The struggle for unity is in the first instance not a territorial one; it is not a search for lebensraum. It is not territorial Africa, which is being freed and united. The struggle is about people. How on earth can we say 'our black colour is a benefaction, which Africans generally have', and truly expect that constructing a 'nationhood' of a people thus defined for the sake of our liberation would ultimately not exclude many Africans who are not 'generally black enough'? Chambi asked these rhetorical questions and I fully concur that the moment you start to divide Africa in terms of 'African' and 'Arab' or 'Black' and 'White' even the inclusion of the Diaspora won't be possible in this continentalist version which simply means a geographical expression and it is out of these concerns that I too find this conceptual definition of Africa exclusivist.

"I wonder where Frantz Fanon, who embraced the Algerian Liberation Movement in the so-called Arab Africa, would fit in such a definition," asked the Tanzanian critique and I too, once again agree with him since our first fighters were trained in Egypt and Founding President and Father of the Namibian Nation, His Excellency Dr Sam Nujoma had to travel all the way from Algeria carrying two machine guns and a pistol, with which we launched our armed liberation struggle on August 26, 1996.

George Padmore wrote long ago that Pan-Africanism was a clear alternative to tribalism, white racialism, black chauvinism, and reverse racism of any form. In his words, "Pan-Africanism looks above the narrow confines of class, race, tribe and religion."

Indeed, Pan-Africanism is not about racism as if it is the particular preserve of the relationship between Westerners and the people of African descent. That notion is at best ill-informed and at worst disingenuous, said the learned African scholar, Professor Kwesi Kwaa Prah.

29. Advancing the new wave of the reparation movement in the Western Diaspora

Morgan Moss Jr.

The National Coalition of Blacks in America (N'COBRA) states that Reparation is a process of repairing, healing and restoring a people injured because of their group identity and in violation of their fundamental human rights by governments or corporations. Those groups that have been injured have the right to obtain from the government or corporation responsible for the injuries that which they need to repair and heal themselves, for example, education, land, technology, etc. In addition to being a demand for justice, there is a moral basis for reparation – it is a principle of international human rights law. It is similar to the remedy for damages in domestic law that holds a person responsible for injuries suffered by another when the infliction of the injury violates domestic law. Groups that have obtained reparations include Jewish victims of the Nazi Holocaust, Japanese Americans interned in concentration camps in the United States of America during World War II, Alaska natives for land, labour, and resources taken, victims of the massacre in Rosewood, Florida and their descendants, Native Americans as a remedy for violations of treaty rights, and political dissenters in Argentina and their descendants. (N'COBRA information sheet)

N'COBRA is a mass-based coalition with the mission and purpose of obtaining reparations for African descendants in the United States and its territories for the genocidal war against Africans affected by the Transatlantic Slave Trade, Chattel Slavery, Jim Crow laws and the continuing vestiges of the Maafa. N'COBRA has since 1987 been the premier organizer and mobilizer for all sectors of the Black Communities into an effective mass-based reparations movement. N'COBRA serves as a coordinating organ for the reparations effort in the United States. In addition to its leadership role in the reparation movement within the United States, N'COBRA understands reparations as a just demand for all African peoples and joins with others in building an International Reparation Movement.

At this current phase of history, "advancing the new wave of the reparation movement", it is imperative that a key fundamental concept be examined and discussed. One of the key fundamental concepts that we should consider is the "Maafa". It was the "Maafa" that has historically created the continuing genocidal conditions inflicted against African people throughout the world. The concept "Maafa" is a Swahili term meaning "a terrible tragedy". It describes tremendous suffering, indescribable atrocities, disaster, calamities, catastrophes, and injustices against African people as a consequence of the Transatlantic Slave Trade System.

In all regions of Africa that Black Africans were transported, the African was involved in brutal war implemented by the White European aggressor, interested in exploiting the human and natural resources of the richest continent on the earth. Those Africans that survived the war became prisoners of war and were placed in detention camps and then transported to the Americas to be enslaved by their captors. It must be understood that all Africans began their ordeal as a slave by force and conquest.

It is imperative that all African people understand and internalize these brief historical facts just as the Jews or any other exploited group of people internalize their holocaust, and act on it. We African people must come to the collective reality of our “Maafa” and act on it.

Genocide is the deliberate and systematic destruction of Black people by White American socio-economic and cultural forces. America has created and implemented concepts that justify the annihilation of African people in America and then try to explain that it does not exist. For example, the CIA involvement in cocaine distribution in Los Angeles, California, in the early 1980s in which the profits were used to finance the CIA-backed Contra army in Nicaragua. This involvement of the CIA caused a proliferation of the distribution and sale of crack cocaine across the African Communities of America, causing serious devastation to our Black communities. The United States Government tried to downplay the CIA’s involvement in this incident by saying that this was an isolated situation and in fact this was not true.

Now that we have an understanding of the concept of the “Maafa”, it should help to understand the concept of genocide. As a result of the “Maafa” and the genocide against African People in America, “the new wave of the Reparation Movement” worldwide must step up the demand for Reparations as the National Coalition of Blacks for in America, N’COBRA, is advocating, as well as many other African organizations throughout the world.

The issue of reparations has sparked the interest of African People throughout the world, therefore, the question becomes what does this “new wave of the reparation movement” mean for the just cause of the redemption and salvation of African people? According to Dr Conrad Worrill, former Chairman for the National Black United Front (NBUF), when we talk about demands for reparations in America, we are talking about damages, compensation, release of political prisoners, and redress of those wrongs, so that the countries and the people that are suffering from vestiges of slavery and colonization will enjoy full freedom to continue their own development on more equal terms.
Advancing the “new wave of the Reparations Movement” is a continuation of the leadership of Sister Callie House who founded the National Ex-Slave Mutual Relief Bounty and Pension Association in the 1890s. Sister House organized a Black mass movement demanding reparations during the period of the 1890s to 1915. With Sister House working through meetings, literature, and traveling agents, the organization successfully developed membership across the South as well as Oklahoma, Kansas, Indiana, Ohio, and New York. The objective was to organize a demand throughout the Black nation which would force the United States to provide the needed and well deserved pensions they sought for the aging persons formerly held in slavery, their surviving spouses, care givers, and heirs.

The National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America (N’COBRA) was organized in America in 1987 following the tradition of Sister Callie House. Since 1988, N’COBRA has developed a number of strategies designed to gain reparations for African People born in America and also help advance the international efforts to win reparations.

The spirit and organizing work carried out during the Marcus Garvey Movement, the

leadership of the Honourable Elijah Muhammad and Malcolm X in the 1960s made the reparations demand through the Muhammad Speaks newspaper. The Nation of Islam under the leadership of the Honourable Louis Farrakhan remains an advocate of the reparations demand. The Republic of New Africa made a reparations demand in 1968, demanding payment of 400 million US dollars in slavery damages. James Forman, Director of International Affairs of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee in the 1960s interrupted church services at New York's Riverside Church to deliver his Black Manifesto demanding US$500 million in reparations from white synagogues and churches.

Since 1989, Congressman John Conyers from the state of Michigan has introduced legislation in the United States Congress calling for the US government to establish a commission to study the impact of slavery on Africans born in America and provide remedies in the form of reparations. This legislation is currently receiving wide reviews and support, primarily due to the work of N'COBRA and other reparations organizations and activists. Beginning in the late 1980s, the December 12th Movement, the Uhuru Movement, the Lost and Found Nation of Islam, the Republic of New Africa, and the National Black United Front have continued to organize around the demand for reparations. Former Alderwoman Dorothy Tillman's Chicago City Council legislation initiative has had a great impact and has aided in the current interest African people born in America now have in the issue of reparations. The following books: Randall Robinson, The Debt; Dr Raymond Winbush, Should America Pay?; and Dr Mary Frances Berry, former US Surgical General's book, My Face Is Black Is True, have all helped provide fuel to "advancing the new wave of the Reparation Movement".

Reparations simply means repair for injuries, harm and damages done to a group of people by a people, corporation, or government. As history has shown, we were made chattel property and worked for more than 300 years in America without pay or other compensation for the value of our labour. The white man and white woman stole and criminally appropriated the services and the value of three-hundred years of our labour and then passed it on through inheritance to their children. This process helped create the United States of America and this is fundamental to demands for Reparations.
We must continue to engage conversation and discuss these ideas in our efforts to dismantle our mental shackles. Every race and every ethnic group in the world protects their interests and African People should and must do no less.

What "advancing the new wave of the reparation movement" means, is that African people have not lost their memory of the historical atrocities inflicted on us, and that we will never forget what has happened to us, and the vestiges of slavery continue today. The demand for reparations must be intensified through serious organizing and activism no matter how many White and Black people are opposed to it. Contrary to what some people think, we must never forget what happened to us and how it continues to impact us today.

Reparations Now!

Morgan Moss, Jr. works with the International Commission of the National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America (N'COBRA).

30. Industrialisation the way forward to make Africa relevant in the world economic architecture in the 21st century

Ambassador (Prince) Adegboyega Christopher Ariyo

I should indicate that while working on this paper, my mind was preoccupied with the following questions: Why do we need to discuss the industrialisation of Africa? What are the African problems that make massive industrialisation of Africa a panacea to these problems? Has there been successful industrialisation programmes in the world that solved problems similar to the ones facing Africa? How prepared is Africa for the development of industrialisation strategies? What are the requisites to industrialise Africa? What can Africa offer to accelerate the pace of her industrialisation? What impact has the present continental arrangements made on the industrialisation of Africa? Are the present political, (policy) architectures and governance fragmentations in Africa problems affecting her industrialisation negatively? What strategy (strategies) can we deploy to industrialise Africa within the next 10 years?

Before I proceed with attempting to address the questions herein, let me state some fundamental principles of the reasoning from which I addressed the questions and logically the conclusions and recommendations in this paper.

Undignified position of Africa without Industrialisation

Cheik Anta Diop, the historian and politician, is recognised for his writings on the history of Africa.

Apart from establishing the centrality of Africa in world civilisation today, Diop stated the "black world" was the "very instigator" of "western civilisation" and modernity. In his *Civilisation or barbarism: an authentic anthropology* Diop investigated key questions about Africa's historical past, matters related to the laws governing evolution and social change in African societies, the characteristics of African states and social structures and a peculiarly African mode of production.

Diop was outstanding due to the originality of his investigations, his combination of theory and practice, writing on political and economic Pan-Africanism. He advanced the concept of federalism. He is remembered for his work of 1984: *Black Africa: the economic and cultural basis of a federal state*. He was of the view that Africa in turn, must not only draw from African sources but from the "common intellectual property of humanity" and thus achieve industrialisation and development.

In the words of Walter Rodney, another source of guidance in practical planning, the South where Africa belongs has been consigned to be hewers of wood and carriers of water. The developed world collects the raw materials from the South, adds value to it and sells it to the South at a rate that keeps the South in a state of poverty.

Adam Smith, a protagonist of capitalism, and Karl Marx, the apostle of socialism, as well as their followers, have pitched their tents as to which school we should follow to develop. Is it the capitalist or the socialist road that the world should follow? Honestly, the

exchanges (trade) that ensued from the activities of the two schools of thought have not paid Africa. Africa has become dumping ground for sub-standard goods. World trade has been perpetually skewed against Africa. The chances of Africa's prosperity, as it is now, could therefore be perpetually determined by the North unless we devise our own road map for our development. It is my belief that the desire and in fact the programme of all our Governments has been and is still essentially to raise the dignity of Africans to the exalted level they were before the adventure of the colonising forces, who destroyed our political, economic, social and cultural developmental processes and imposed their own developmental processes on us.

Sense of mission

There must be a sense of shared vision for Africa – never again to be subjugated in all spheres of life. I do not share the view that you don't have to re-invent the wheel. There is no shoe that fits all. That guru of Public Administration, Mary Parker Follet, canonically pronounced that the law of the situation must dictate what one should do. This has been elegantly coined "theory of here and now". All should agree that the "situation" of Africa is different from the rest of the world. Hence whatever we wished to do in Africa must never be guided wholesale by whatever theory or solutions that have worked in USA, Europe or even Asia. Some have colonised, exploited, misappropriated and looted resources from other countries (continents). African human resources have been used to develop other continents without payment and even now African trained personnel are working for the development of other continents. In Africa, not all of us have programmes to provide social certainties for our people. There is neither an all-round social security system nor even a social safety net for most Africans, whereas funding for this could only be secured through massive industrialisation.

Core dictum for Africa Industrialisation

Our economic, political, military, social and cultural advancement must be designed and informed by our African heritage and the need for social certainties for virtually all Africans. The current strategy in the world is creating a pyramidal society where to survive at all you must be prepared to do anything as long as you are not caught. The current globalising architecture that made many bankers and a few capitalists richer than the rest of us is not the way we should continue. Africa suffered the most, but because we are used to our poverty-stricken situation, our groans cannot be heard. We all grew from a communal background, where everybody was her/his brother's keeper. The colonisation, exploitation, and despoliation of Africa derailed our humane advancement as a people in all spheres of life. We must return to this.

Africa needs a completely domesticated policy and measures to improve her living standards. We must own our developmental programmes and execute them. Africa must deploy participatory and supportive relationships in all its activities, with the assured mechanisms that all Africans living and dead will be impacted positively as we all march along the road to achieve the stated mission of industrialising Africa in the 21st century. This process must not be through the imposition of ideas and processes developed in different socio-political and economic milieu.

Potential for industrialisation of Africa

Africa has about 16% of the world population, with 22% of the planet's dry land with sunshine for solar energy; the longest river in the world (6 670 km); the warmest climatic conditions; 13.5% of the world trade in ore and minerals; very significant percentage of world agricultural crops (maize, millet, wheat, rice, cocoa, coffee, palm oil, cotton, rubber, sugar cane, citrus crops, groundnuts, etc.); 10% of world oil and natural gas reserves; 6% of coal; 28% of uranium; 40% of gold. Fisheries potentials are unlimited for the continent. The hydro-electricity potential is very huge. Base metals are also available in large quantities. Tourism industry potentials are vast. African human resources are sufficient for the industrialisation of Africa. Virtually all construction work that is being done in Africa today is physically carried out by Africans. Indeed, this could be gleaned from the oasis of industrial activities in Africa. The point to note is that Africa should not be a beggar continent. As of now the industrialised world cannot do without African resources and market.

Africa Industrialisation: Definition

The word 'industrialise' (page 726 of the Concise Oxford English Dictionary 2006 edition) is a verb. It is to develop industries in an area on a wide scale. In the Oxford Dictionary of Economics by John Black, 2002, page 231-232, 'industrialisation' is a process of moving resources into the industrial sector. Industrialism is explained as a social or economic system in which manufacturing industries are prevalent. I would define the industrialisation of Africa as a process for the movement of African resources to develop industries across Africa on a massive and integrated scale to support the living of all Africans and support enhanced African dignity perpetually. In Africa there exist some industrialising concerns. Significantly, they are extensions of the western industrial establishments. These oases of industrial activities are not bringing the benefits of industrialisation to all Africans in good and fair measure. There is no synergy between the various industrial concerns in Africa in a programmatic manner to serve the collective interests of Africans. Yet, Africa has less than 2% of world trade because she is not industrialised.

Industrialisation in Europe

It would be recalled that Europe witnessed significant historical developments between the 14th and 20th centuries. There were wars amongst European nations. Very significant "expeditions" took place. The Christopher Columbus, Pester John, and the so-called civilising missionaries – supposedly came to spread religion and a more humane way to progress. However, the evidence now is that this was the commencement of the destruction of Africa's process of development, as well as exploitation and subjugation of Africa. Europe faced problems of unemployment, social insecurity, famine, and health (bubonic plagues, pneumonia, etc.). The British monarch was beheaded. There was an agrarian revolution. This was the era of enlightenment and the existing order then was subjected to questioning. The French Revolution and the storming of the Bastille took place. It was the age of enlightenment when the dogma of "freedom, liberty, and egalitarianism" became the canvass on which society should be ordered. Western European Governments had no option but to see how to meet the needs of their people and improve the quality of their lives. They had to mass produce products. The industrialisation of Europe was successful. Though, as we alluded to above, it was to a very large extent consequence

upon our cheap and forced labour, stolen raw materials, unfair trading, education and the innovative technological applications, as well as the will to survive and dominate the harsh cold climatic conditions of Europe. While so far we cannot rob any continent of human and material resources, we do have education and the technological know-how and innovation we could obtain at reasonable cost. Everything that warranted Europe to embark on industrialisation exists in Africa. Indeed, if the correct strategy and management system are applied, Africa would be an industrialised continent by the year 2020, whatever opposition we may face from other continents. We only need to be focused and adopt the correct strategies. Above all we must bond ourselves together as one with shared vision. We must make Africa the tree for Africa's living first, in order to be relevant to the world economic and political architectures.

Why we need to emphasise industrialisation now

We need to emphasise the industrialisation of Africa, because the evidence available shows that, Africa is lagging behind in all indexes of human advancement. I do not need to give statistics. Suffice, I hope, the fact that virtually every product of industrialisation that is now used to improve the quality of life for the living of Africans such as house goods, office appliances and machines, motor vehicles, heavy duty engines, ships, airplanes, railway engines and wagons, computer machines, TV, etc. is imported from outside Africa. In some cases, some of these products are assembled in Africa. The CKD (parts) come from outside Africa. In some African countries some ridiculous items like toothpicks, combs, pins, juice, food items such as rice, pasta, biscuits, drinking water, furniture, etc. are still being imported.

The summary of the above is that the fortunes of African economies are tied to the vagaries of the developments in the other economies in the world. The recent development in immoral activities in Britain and USA – sub-prime factor in the lending rate for mortgages that led to the meltdown of the world financial system – is a very good example. That we are providing jobs for other continents by persistently buying their products is very clear.

The implications of the lack of an integrated and focused African industrialisation programme.

Africa is not really producing what she is consuming. We produce what we do not consume. Until we produce most of what we consume, we shall continue to be dependent on other continents. Also, unless we are producing through industrialisation, the percentage of our participation in the world trade shall continue to be abysmally low (currently about 2%).

This will continue to adversely affect:

- purchasing power of our currencies which is the value placed on our productivity;
- pricing of our valued raw materials by other continents at very cheap prices dictated by them;
- the quantum of African raw materials needed for Africa's industrialisation that are inelastic, particularly those that are not agro-based;
- availability of jobs that would have been created for Africans if the products were produced in Africa;
- creation of an army of unemployed young and old people in Africa;

- political, social, economic, and security problems in Africa;
- stability in Africa;
- respect for Africa; and
- treatment of Africans with dignity.

The imperative of a new strategy for Africa's industrialisation

From our discussion above and based on a very careful study of the economic geography of Africa, one would easily be aware that:

- the raw materials being used to produce the products being imported to Africa listed above are obtainable in Africa;
- the technologies required are also at the reach of Africans;
- the conditions precedent for European industrialisation are now prevalent in Africa (high level of unemployment, poor quality of feeding, diseases, high level of social awareness and consequential need for government to perform and meet the living needs of their citizens);
- the under implementation and under-performance of various African development blueprints (Lagos Plan of Action, Abuja Treaty of 1991 and the New Partnerships for Africa's Development (NEPAD); development strategies approved by our leaders with the consent of extra-Africa powers, who have turned round to frustrate the actualisation of their laudable objectives;
- the level of socio-economic inequalities between Africans and the rest of the world as well as amongst Africans; and
- the increasing dimension of the socio-economic and political convulsion that Africa may face if there is no remarkable paradigm shift towards meeting the social expectations of Africans as well as the requirements for improving their standard of living. The above dictates that Africa has no choice but to embark on an integrated and focused massive industrialisation. This will involve the use of a new strategy.

Strategy for industrialisation of Africa

Various literature studies on the industrialisation of economies highlighted several strategies used to achieve industrialisation in many parts of the world. Some argued that Import Substitution (IS) would lead to industrialisation. Another school of thought claimed that engaging in export-focused industrial activities is a better way to industrialise, develop an economy and meet the needs of the people in the economy. Labour Intensive Economic Strategy (LIES) has been canvassed especially in agrarian societies with large populations. While it would be presumptuous of me to dismiss the educated strategies developed by more knowledgeable and trained minds on how to advance better living conditions for Africa in the 21st century, I have noted these strategies and learnt a great deal from them.

Chinese experience

Interestingly too, in 1978 when China started her surge towards industrialisation, she deployed all her efforts to meet two needs of the Chinese people. Beijing resolved to feed and clothe all Chinese. The story of China's rise to become the leading exporting country with over one trillion USA dollars of foreign reserves and the second biggest economy in the world started from these simple, focused and integrated industrialising activities to

meet the needs of all Chinese. Whatever the tactics the Chinese have adopted, which we have all allowed to be successful, the dignity of the Chinese has been enhanced. No power can talk down to China now. China has respect amongst the comity of nations. We are now in 2010. The state of being of Africans and the requirements of a decent living standard have changed. It is certainly not at the level of 1978. The lesson from the Chinese is that all economic activities must be people centred.

Taxonomy of African needs by 2020

It is only logical that I should call for taxonomy of African needs by the year 2020. This will translate to what we want every African to have, afford and enjoy by 2020. What status do we want Africans to have comparatively to other world citizens? In practical terms now, how do we ensure that all Africans have all the basic needs (water, shelter, food and clothes), medical facilities, jobs, television, personal computers, regular supply of electricity, security, etc.? Peace and stability in Africa, as well as social certainties for all Africans, are a sine qua non.

An African vehicle

The taxonomy will lead to the identification of what must be produced by Africans to meet the needs of Africans. Once the list is done, efforts should be deployed to how we produce them. As examples, I looked at creating means of moving goods, services and human beings from point A to B. I concluded that we do not have an African vehicle. We should decide to have an African vehicle. If the engine has to be in the middle or back or wherever, there is need to have a patented African vehicle. All materials used in producing vehicles are available in Africa. If we do not have all the technology, we must do the needful to get it. We must act promptly. Between the 54 Governments in Africa, a market of over 80 million vehicles could be created annually over a period of 10 years. In a study I came across in 1997, there were about 1 300 parts in a vehicle. The parts may have increased now given the electronification of vehicles. There are many universities in Africa where engineering in its entire sphere is being studied. Certainly they should be tasked and in liaison with African governments/entrepreneurs, produce prototypes of each part of an African vehicle. The mould for the parts would then be produced and the parts mass produced in various countries. Thereafter about five assembly plants may be set up based on the economies and political decisions of the Africa Heads of States. The industrialisation spinoff from the various industries that could come up as a result of producing an African vehicle in African countries would have tremendous beneficial effects on job creation for Africans and indeed other industrial activities. For example, the leather industries will be promoted and consequently all other industries that depend on usage of leather. The animal husbandry industry, rubber, petrochemical, glass industry, etc. would be positively impacted. As a result of the economies of scale (large-scale industries) and because the industries would be targeting the African market (900 million Africans), the final cost of production would be cheap and therefore Africans' purchasing power would have an effective and efficient spread that should improve their quality of life and consequently their dignity. It is assumed that we have resolved that we should trade amongst ourselves so that we can create and sustain jobs for our teaming population.

Feeding Africans

Feeding Africans should be a problem that our integrated, focused and massive industrialisation should address as a matter of urgency. We should stop accepting food aid in Africa. It is an insult to our being. If China with less than 1 million sq. km arable land could feed 1.3 billion people now, Africa should come up with a strategy to feed her population that will be below 1.3 billion by 2020. From latitude 23 north, down to the coast of South Africa, we have over 5 million sq. km of land that could serve as productive agrarian land to feed Africans.

The plains of Sudan could supply all the rice. Kenya could supply all the tea. Ivory Coast could supply coffee and cocoa. Nigeria, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda could supply cocoa, cassava, banana, plantain, and yam. Zambia and Zimbabwe could supply maize, millet, etc. South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Niger could supply cattle, sheep, goats. Congo Brazzaville, Gabon, Central Africa Republic could supply timber and other fauna products. Citreous fruits, Dates, olives, sugar cane, and dairy products could be produced by Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria and Morocco.

Industries should be established in an integrated manner to ensure that all these products are processed to meet Africa's needs and those of the rest of the world. If Africa could focus, in the main, on these two industries (food and movement) as well as the production of electronics including computers, I can assure that by the year 2020 Africa would have become an industrialised continent. Such a decisive strategy would have a positive impact on other industrial sectors.

Development of infrastructure

The above strategy would call for an immediate focus on the construction of the energy, transportation and communication infrastructures in Africa. All the hydro-electricity potentials will be targeted and necessary funding secured because the profitability of such investment would have been properly profiled. For rail and road transportation the links between West and East Africa, Nigeria through Cameroon to Windhoek, Aswan – Khartoum and Kenya – Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi are needed. The civil works for these linkages should have gas pipelines and water ways where possible. We need to implement the Yamasukuro Agreement on open skies for Africa.

Africa must own its educational development

The above plans call for an educational development strategy in Africa that would promote 50% of the annual budget of every African country to be devoted to educational developments. That way, African budgets would stay more in the economy of Africa, thereby enhancing the purchasing power of Africans. In the process a large volume of the African foreign exchange that is supporting other countries would remain in Africa and can be ploughed towards industrial activities. The high wage for African countries would be promoted because quality teachers and all the rest of them in schools and colleges would remain in Africa, and the quality of African education would also improve because quality teachers will stay in the industry once appropriate salaries are paid. More importantly too, is the provision of quality facilities to advance the African frontier of knowledge.

Africans should spend most of their annual leave in Africa.

Tourism should be enhanced as part of the educational programme and all African countries deliberately cause funds to be made available for their workers to take vacations. Leave must be spent in African countries. In the process the African tourism industry will grow and this would foster the development of African countries and their tourism industries. It would also promote the integration of Africa as well as businesses and industrial activities being jointly owned by Africans.

Knowledge-based industrialisation

African Industrialisation should be knowledge-based so that all African factors of production can be efficiently and effectively synergised to produce the requisite goods so that African economies meet the living needs of Africa in a sustainable manner. Africa will be less dependent on productive activities of other continents. By 2020, Africa's population could be about 1.3 billion. If we now encourage all Africans to drink tea (thrice in a day), eat plantains or products from plantain and banana twice in a day, eat fish or beef/lamb with greens every day, drink milk every day, etc. and fund this process, millions of the unemployed Africans will be employed and African countries producing these products will have ready markets for their products.

There is nothing that nature (God) has endowed us with that is not intended for our survival, prosperity and happiness. We only need to apply our intellect to put them to positive use.

Funding of Africa's industrialisation strategy

Funding of assembly plants for vehicles, industries for parts of vehicles, agro-allied industries, agricultural produce, and educational institutions for knowledge-based industrialisation of Africa as well as the production of electronics and computers for educational and personal use in Africa, could be done by Africans without recourse to external borrowing or finance from other countries. The sources of funding could be:

- pension funds for all African public and private workers;
- part of the budget for education that could be devoted to research and development;
- improved salaries that would ensure that every African worker would have sufficient savings after meeting basic needs, car and household goods;
- financial impetus for investment in capital market;
- taxes, royalties, custom and excise duties;
- collateralisation of African mineral resources as support for the creation of an "African Currency". The Yen, Chinese RMB, US dollar and Euro should form the basket of currencies against which the value of the African currency would be determined. All public expenditure in Africa would be calculated in this African currency. All payments for any export outside will be paid for in African currency. Happily, an African Central Bank is in the offing and the consequential monetary authorities will be established; and
- development of an African Industrialisation stock to be floated on a Centralized African Stock Exchange (CASE).

What Africa must do urgently

In many African-instigated blueprints for development many measures that should accelerate the pace of African industrialisation have been identified. I should seek your understanding to highlight for urgent attention, the following:

- Establishment of five African industrial development universities;
- Establishment of African research centres;
- Establishment of African management centres;
- Establishment of African training centres;
- Development of disciplined technicians to operate industries like petrochemical refineries, pharmaceutical factories, assembly plants, rolling mills and so on;
- Analysis of the critical products that will catapult Africa to the level of an industrialised continent;
- Agreement that no African shall be unemployed by the year 2020;
- Synergy of educational materials and curricula to meet the living (industrialisation, etc.) needs of Africa in 2020 especially in the Physical Sciences, mathematics, Information Technology (IT) and the Strategic Management of African industrialisation policy and project;
- Patenting of African motifs, cultural artefacts, mementoes, monuments, landscapes, fauna (including the usage of their images);
- Establishment of an overarching African Union department that will be responsible to AU Summit for the implementation of the African industrialisation strategy that this body may wish to recommend;
- Establishment of a ministry in charge of industrialisation in all African countries;
- Implementation of open air for Africa airlines;
- Africa must devise mechanisms to trade with itself;
- A continental organisation for standards to monitor the quality of goods and services should be established;
- Africa must cause a political/economic summit to ensure that Africa has a fair share of world trade – at least not less than 10%;
- Africa must review the hands-off economic/business activities by governments;
- There must be good governance and the cost of administering our political management must be drastically reduced;
- Expatriate quotas must be reduced to critical areas, Africa can supply the experts;
- Establishment of the African Currency (Cowry) with all the structures to back it up for efficient operation;
- Establishing mechanisms for fair engagement between Africa and the rest of the world; and
- The AU Summit should demand for a performance appraisal of each industrial concern to achieve effective and efficient realisation of African industrialisation strategy, programmes, procedure and processes as well as tasks suggested above.

31. Africa-China Relations: A Pan-Africanist Perspective

Himuvi Mbingeneeko

1. The evolution of Africa-China relations

The friendly relations that Africa and China enjoy today are believed to have evolved since the 9th Century AD. During ancient times Africans and Asians conducted trade, diplomacy, social and cultural affairs based on integrity, mutual benefit, friendship and solidarity. Historians reveal that seafarers could sail from mainland China all the way to the east coast of the African continent (Mbeki, 2001a & Mbeki, 2001b).
Proof of trade activities between Africa and China dating from ancient times are seen in the work of Louise Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas (1994). According Levathes (1994:35 quoted in Mbeki, 2001a), "frankincense from Somalia, as well as myrrh, used [for treating] women who had suffered a miscarriage …" could be bought in the western market of Chang'an in north China. Such reference demonstrates that contact between Africa and China is not a 20th century phenomenon.
In fact, several ancient African kingdoms that inhabited areas in present-day Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa had strong political and economic ties with China. During his trip to China in 2001, former South African President Thabo Mbeki recalled that such ties were built on equality, friendship, mutual respect and benefit, but unfortunately, this friendly relation was disrupted by "Western expeditions of plunder, slavery, wars of domination, [and] colonial rule" (Mbeki, 2001a). Since then the friendly relations that existed between Africa and China faded away down memory lane.

However, the relationship between the people of Africa and China was rekindled in the 1950s after Mao Zedong proclaimed the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, as well as at a time when many countries on the African continent were agitating for self-rule. China was one of the countries that extended assistance to the liberation movements that were spearheading the struggle against colonialism. After independence the liberation movements continued to work with China, especially those that emulated China's political and socio-economic models (Obiorah, 2008).

Since the 1950s, Africa-China relations transcended beyond inter-governmental affairs, as Diaspora Chinese traders based in South-East Asia as well as traders from areas such as Hong Kong and Taiwan are said to have developed trade links in Africa. By the early 1970s, traders from Hong Kong and Taiwan were known in many parts of Africa for their inexpensive textiles and consumer products. And by the late 1970s, Hong Kong and Taiwan traders established representative offices in Africa with a clear purpose of advancing their trade interests in various African countries (Obiorah, 2008).

Whereas Africa-China relations of the 1950s and 1960s were pinned on ideological grounds, especially ideologies of third world solidarity, the late 1970s saw a paradigm shift with the introduction of the "opening up policy" by the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. Throughout the 1980s, Africa-China relations became less and less defined by ideological solidarity. As China soldiered on with the "opening up policy" and communism suffered credibility with the end of the Cold War, Africa-China relations became more and more trade based.

This became apparent after the end of the Cold War when China adopted a "going out policy" which purpose was to find foreign markets for its products as well as secure reliable markets from which to import mineral resources for its rapidly developing economy (Qiang, 2010:58). Since more and more African countries became politically stable after the Cold War and also eager to develop their people's living standards, Africa became even more relevant for China's foreign policy, especially in the context of the going out policy alluded to earlier.

From the mid-1990s, Africa and China economic relations experienced sustained growth resulting in the deepening of the historic friendship between Africa and China. For instance, trade volume between Africa and China reached US$5.5 billion in 1998, which was six times the figure reached in 1979 the period when the opening up policy started (Qiang, 2010:59). Furthermore, trade between Africa and China became diversified. This economic growth had a positive ripple effect on other areas of cooperation between the two sides.For example, the 1990s experienced an increase in the number of high-level visits between the two sides. The former Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited six African countries in 1996. Other top Chinese leaders also paid visits to Africa and African leaders reciprocated. The friendly relations between the two sides saw them supporting each other on the question of Taiwan and the reform of international organisations. More African countries reiterated their support for the "one China policy" while China on the other hand welcomed Africa's calls for the reform of international organisations (Qiang, 2010:60).

2. Africa-China relations in the 21st century

The beginning of the 21st century saw Africa and China relations being raised to another level of cooperation. Greater cooperation was necessitated by Africa's eagerness to achieve certain set goals such as the consolidation of peace and stability, sustained economic growth, and the realisation of the Millennium Development Gaols (Qiang, 2010:60). On the other hand, China's sustained economic growth placed greater pressure on Beijing to expand external markets for its products as well as to secure its access to mineral resources needed for its massive industrialisation.

Both, Africa and China became conscious of the need to collaborate. Africa was not only impressed with the model used by China to lift millions of its people out of poverty, but was also aware of the capital owned by China that could be used to develop infrastructure on the continent. Equally, China was not oblivious of the "new Africa" that was all of a sudden "moving from the periphery" to the world's centre-stage and becoming the prize for another round of fierce strategic contentions (Qiang, 2010: 61).

In the eyes of Chinese leadership, Africa was increasingly becoming of strategic importance. As a consequence, Africa and China cooperation was taken to another level when it culminated in the Beijing Summit of 2000, which took place under the framework called, Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Through FOCAC, Africa and China formalised their historic relations into a result-driven mechanism based on long observed tenets of equality and mutual benefit that has characterised the two sides' relations. Therefore, the two sides and above all China believes that FOCAC represents a new strategic partnership that emphasizes political equality and mutual trust, economic win-

win cooperation and cultural understanding.

In the political sphere, African countries have reaffirmed their support for the "one China policy", while China supports Africa's calls for the reform of international organisations such as the UN Security Council, WTO, IMF and World Bank. The two sides hold regular consultations and adopt mostly mutual positions on international affairs. Under FOCAC, high-level visits involving heads of state and other high-ranking government officials are frequently taking place between Africa and China.

On the economic front, trade between Africa and China has increased immensely to the extent that China has surpassed Britain and France to become Africa's second largest trade partner after the United States. Trade between Africa and China is estimated to have jumped from US$12 million in the early 1950s to US$18.55 billion in 2003. According to Chinese government estimates, by June 2004 there were 674 Chinese companies doing business in Africa. At that time these companies had a combined investment value of US$1.509 billion (Nduru, 2005 quoted in Obiorah, 2008).
On the social front, Africa and China relations in the fields of education, health and culture increased to new levels. China committed itself to Africa's human resources development by providing scholarships and various study and training courses to African students and professionals. China also dispatched medical personnel, teachers, and agricultural experts to Africa. Greater interaction between Africa and China has led to greater movement of migrants between the two sides (Foreign Ministry of China, 2002 and Bodomo, 2009).

Since the first FOCAC summit in 2000 China has committed itself to helping Africa in tangible ways. During the FOCAC summit of 2006, President Hu Jintao committed China to eight specific measures in support of Africa's development. China promised then to double the amount of grant assistance; create a China-Africa development fund; build a conference centre for the African Union; cancel debts of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries; continue to open its markets for African markets; establish economic cooperation zones in Africa; and strengthen cooperation in agriculture, health, and education (FOCAC, 2009).

During FOCAC 2009, the promises of FOCAC 2006 were declared as having been achieved and a new set of eight measures for the period 2009-2012 was announced by the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. Through the new measures China committed itself towards assisting Africa by: establishing a China-Africa partnership to address climate change; enhance cooperation with Africa in science and technology; help Africa build up financing capacity; further opening up its market to African products; enhancing further cooperation with Africa in agriculture; deepening cooperation in medical care and health; enhancing cooperation in human resources development and education; expanding people-to-people and cultural exchanges.

While FOCAC represents indeed a new era of warm diplomatic relations between Africa and China, we are nevertheless forced to pause and reflect on the nature of Africa-China relations. Through the lens of the Western media, the world is made to believe that China is in Africa for its own interest and at the expense of the Africans. We are made to believe that China is another coloniser, here to loot Africa's resources. Notwithstanding what the

West says, it is no secret that Africa-China relations are unbalanced and we as Africans have to address this imbalance.

3. Africa-China relations: a Pan-Africanist perspective

Pan-Africanism as an ideology has over the years given Africans direction and purpose in their struggles against slavery, colonialism and imperialism. Dr Tony Martin, the prolific writer of Black History, recalled that Marcus Garvey's ideology of pan-Africanism was based on three simple concepts, namely, *Race first, Self-reliance, and Nationhood* (Martin, n.d.).

By *race first*, Garvey meant that Africans should fight selfishly for their racial self-interest, whether in literary, cultural expression, or writing of history. And by *self-reliance*, Garvey philosophised that Africans should rely on their own means of production. Whereas by *nationhood*, Garvey wanted Africans to build political power in order to reclaim the continent from its exploiters (Martin, n.d.). Oddly enough Garvey's philosophy can be used to define the parameters or framework of Africa's engagement with China.
Reading through the resolutions of the past Pan-African congresses, it is interesting to note that there is no mention of China. It is speculated that China remained off the radar of Pan-Africanism mainly because of two reasons. First, Africa and China have since ancient times maintained friendly and harmonious relations. Secondly, China has always accepted the fact that it is a poor country lacking sophisticated technology, thus not capable of conquering the world (Our Principled Position ... 1981).

Today, China is no longer a poor country. In fact, China is since August 2010 regarded as the world's second largest economy. It is a "China [which] is already a major driver of global growth. [Where] the country's leaders have grown more confident on the international stage and have begun to assert greater influence in Asia, Africa and Latin America" (Barboza, 2010). This is the China that Africa has to deal with in the 21st century.

China relations with Africa are conceptualised through political, economic, and social themes. At a political level the relationship is sustained by an exchange of high-level visits by leaders from both sides while cooperation in international affairs has been entrenched. On the economic field China has committed itself to supporting Africa in areas of trade, investment, debt cancelling, and infrastructure development. China has also committed itself towards helping Africa in the field of human resources development, science and technology, and cultural exchanges.

Having said this, how relevant is Garvey's prophesy to Africa-China relations? Starting with self-reliance, Garvey calls for African people to do things for themselves, especially in business and industry. China is a country that is on the lookout for markets for its cheap products and it has found in Africa such a market. The dumping of Chinese products has the potential of retarding Africa's efforts towards industrialisation. Therefore, Africa-China relations should complement Africa's industrialisation efforts as well as regional integration in order to increase intra-Africa trade.

Marcus Garvey's call for *nationhood* was made with the recollection that only an Africa which is strong can reclaim its dignity from alien exploiters. He was convinced that

"Strength" can only come through unity. Therefore, today Africa must adopt a common position with regards to its relations with China. Such common position will force Africa to develop a set of expectations when negotiating with China under FOCAC. Africa should realise that its relationship with China is a symbiotic one. Africa needs capital to kick-start its industrialisation. On the other hand, China needs natural resources for its fast growing economy.

With regards to *race first*, Garvey demanded that Africans should always put their race first. As part of its policy towards Africa, China is using cultural exchanges and the opening of Confucius centres in Africa and other parts of the world as part of its soft diplomacy. Many Africans in the world know China and they are becoming more and more aware of Chinese activities on the continent. Africans are studying Chinese culture and language through the Confucius centres. More and more Africans are dreaming of visiting or studying in China. On the other hand, mainland Chinese remain ignorant of Africa. Some commentators have called for African countries to counter China's soft power by opening up African cultural and language centres. Failure to do that could result in the *'Chinesation'* of Africa just like it was westernised by colonialism.

In conclusion

The unfortunate situation is that China is confidently dictating the ideological direction of the relationship between itself and Africa. One of the principles that inform China's foreign policy towards Africa through FOCAC is the dictum of "equal and win-win cooperation", but Africa's participation in FOCAC has been limited to listening and accepting China's generosity included in the eight measures associated with each FOCAC summit. There is no doubt that China brings massive capital into this relationship. But this does not and should not put Africa in a beggar position. Why? Because Africa has the mineral resources that China needs so badly, and secondly, Africa has close to 53 votes that China needs so badly when it comes to voting at international platforms.
The lack of clear interpretation or description or even prescription for that matter on how Africa should engage China from a Pan-Africanist perspective leaves the continent at the mercy of China's greed and generosity. A workshop such as this one should initiate a position paper that will be used by African leaders come FOCAC 2012.

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32. Imperialist Neo-Colonialist moves into Africa

Andile Lungisa

Given the complex and nebulous nature of the subject matter, this paper limits itself to examining the increasingly conflictual relationship between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America, and their encroachment on the African continent, which is evidently a strategic theatre of operations for both these protagonists. This encroachment, which the famed English writer Rudyard Kipling characterized as the "Great Game", on the African continent is unfolding in the context of historic decline of capital, coupled with diminishing hegemony of the United States as the world's only super power and the ascendance of China as its chief rival and candidate for future global dominance.

In the wake of the current global economic quagmire, China has emerged as a significant exporter of capital. Rather than investing domestically, the Chinese state and significant sections of the new industrial class are making substantial investments abroad, particularly to secure access to raw materials and industrial assets in the African continent. Beijing initiated a "Go Global" policy in 2000, leading to a rapid growth of outward foreign direct investment (FDI). Since the credit crunch took hold in September 2008, the outflow of capital from China has jumped significantly, taking advantage of falling share values, and the demand of many cash-strapped corporations for finance. China's state-controlled state banking system has been largely protected from the global financial turmoil, putting Beijing in a strong position to push overseas investment. China's main focus has been in mineral and energy resources for its huge industrial base. The strategy has been to take advantage of the current weak commodity prices in global markets by boosting certain strategic resource imports and converting some capital reserves into resources reserves. I now wish to discuss the Democratic Republic of Congo's relationship with China, which epitomizes the latter's general engagement with the African continent.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo is in the process of receiving US$9 billion of Chinese investment in what has been dubbed Congo's "Marshall Aid Plan", a reference to American refinancing of Europe at the end of World War II.

The Chinese are not concerned with rebuilding the economy in Congo after the destruction of the 1998-2003 war, in which more than five million people died, mainly from disease and starvation. The accord between China and DRC signed on January 28 is meant to provide China the much needed cheap resources for its booming economy – and the Congo elite greater opportunities to enrich themselves.

China's Export Import Bank, Exim, pledged finance for major road and rail construction projects and for the rehabilitation of its mining sector, badly damaged by years of war, corruption and neglect. According to reports, China has already dispatched 5 000 containers holding mining equipment to renovate mines involved in Katanga province. Oliver Kamatu, DRC planning minister, has said US$3 billion will go towards bringing mining back into operation and US$6 billion on infrastructure projects.

China's Sinohydro Corporation and China Railway Engineering Corporation have negotiated a deal giving them a 68 per cent share in a joint venture, with 32 per cent going

to state copper mining company Gecamines. The Chinese state companies have been granted rights to two large copper and cobalt concessions representing around 10.62 million tonnes of copper and 620 000 tonnes of cobalt. The DRC produced 500 000 tonnes of copper annually in 1989 at its highest levels of output.

The new infrastructure proposed will consist of 3 300 kilometres of road and 3 000 kilometres of railway. Mineral-rich Katanga will be connected by rail to the port of Matadi in the west and by road to Kisangani on the Congo River. Transport links to Zambia in the south will also be improved.

Two hydroelectric dams are proposed to facilitate mineral exploitation and export energy to take advantage of power-starved Africa, particularly Southern Africa. Most of the infrastructure construction will be carried out by Chinese companies and labour with very little benefit to the Congolese workforce or to the wider economy. Pierre Lumbi, infrastructure minister, reported to the DRC's parliament that the deal included the construction of several hundred clinics, hospitals and schools, but this is a small contribution to a country the size of Western Europe.

As with previous sell-offs of mineral rights in the Congo, the value of the concessions to China cannot be easily quantified. No tender process is in place to assess the assets. But Congo businessmen speculate that China will reap at least US$30 billion in profits.
The privatization program in the DRC, implemented by the Washington-dominated International Monetary Fund and World Bank after the end of the war in 2003, opened the door for dividing up the nationalized mining industry. Contracts were drafted that gave mining concessions away for as little as US$15 million when resources were valued at US$60 billion.

China's increased role in DRC has displaced the former colonial power Belgium, which has become highly critical of the Kabila government. Kabila has forced the Belgian government to close its consulates in Bukavu and Lubumbashi and withdrew DRC's Ambassador to Brussels and closed the consulate in Antwerp earlier this year. The Belgium diamond industry is said to be in horror over the move.

I would now like to turn to the other protagonist in this "Great Game" – the United States. The value of Obama's family background was recognised early in his bid for the presidency of the United States by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter and a key figure in the formulation of Obama's foreign policy. In August 2007, Brzezinski declared that Obama "recognizes that the challenge is a new face, a new sense of direction, a new definition of America's role in the world".

Brzezinski was among major figures in the US foreign policy establishment who saw in Obama a means of giving the United States a "new face" to the rest of the world, something they deemed critical after the blunders and setbacks to American imperialism under Bush.

Obama lived up to expectations in Ghana. He played on his African ancestry, just as he had emphasised his Muslim heritage the previous month in Cairo.
The image of the two Obama children walking out into the sunlight from the "door of no

return" at Cape Coast Castle, from which so many Africans did not return, was a carefully crafted photo op. Leaving this scene of so much human suffering, Obama said, "It reminds us that as bad as history can be, it's always possible to overcome."
This was meant to imply that no matter what Africa has suffered in the past, and no matter what the continent continues to suffer at the hands of the banks, corporations and Western governments, the responsibility – and the fault – rests with the African people themselves.

Obama brought an uncompromising message, spelling out in a more open way than George Bush dared to do during his visit to Ghana in 2008 that aid would be made available only in return for the implementation of policies that serve the interests of the US government and corporations – and that there would be less of it in future.
"Development," Obama told parliamentarians, "depends upon good governance. That is the ingredient which has been missing in far too many places, for far too long. That is the change that can unlock Africa's potential. And that is a responsibility that can only be met by Africans."

"Africa's future is up to Africans," he repeated.

The lecture also carried a threat. "We have a responsibility to support those who act responsibly and to isolate those who don't, and that is exactly what America will do," Obama declared. It was a message no pink-faced Western leader could have delivered without arousing resentment in Africa. The provision of aid has always been a political mechanism to force former colonial countries to pursue policies that serve the interests of the imperialist donors. But whereas Bush was obliged to make some token gestures, such as setting up the Millennium Challenge Account and increasing funding for Aids and malaria, Obama has used the kudos he derives from his ancestry to insist point-blank that African governments toe the US line.

Obama's insistence that Ghana and other African governments achieve "good governance" is a demand for more of the free-market measures that are already being imposed with disastrous results for the social conditions of the population. "Good governance" means privatising essential services such as telecommunications, water and power, as well as social services like health and education. It also means removing subsidies from small farmers and abolishing import controls.

Ghana has gone a long way down that route, which is why it has been favoured with visits from two successive US presidents. It is far from being one of Africa's poorest countries, but 70 per cent of the population in its northern regions live on less than a dollar a day. Life expectancy is only 58 years. Women often have to walk more than 3 km to find water, and it is seldom clean.

This situation is set to worsen dramatically. The recession has hit Africa hard. Ghana was among those countries granted debt relief in 2005, but with the value of its currency falling, it is rapidly sliding into debt once more. The government's response has been to impose an austerity budget in an attempt to balance the books.

Obama has shifted the emphasis of the "war on terror" from Iraq to Afghanistan and Pa-

kistan. But the place of Africa in US global strategy remains essentially the same. First, it is a vital source of strategic resources such as oil and gas, but also many key minerals. Second, a high proportion of the world's shipping lanes run close to Africa's shores. It follows that any American administration must make the establishment of US domination of Africa a priority.

What was not mentioned on Obama's Africa trip was the new US military command for Africa – Africom – established under the Bush administration. Previously US military operations in Africa were divided between the Middle East and the European commands. The decision to establish a separate African command represented an intensification of US strategic interest in Africa.

Currently, Africom's headquarters are in Germany. The intention is to find a base on the African continent, but the Bush administration could not persuade any African country to offer facilities. Obama could not raise such a politically sensitive issue publicly. In conjunction with his visit, however, Africom was carrying out a programme of activities, including the visit of the guided missile destroyer USS Arleigh Burke to Dar es Salaam in Tanzania and a seminar on "health and security" in Lusaka, Zambia.

This militarization of US foreign policy in Africa reflects America's inability to deal with the growing rivalry it faces by economic means alone. China has just surpassed the US to become Africa's main trading partner. America's trade with Africa was worth US$104 billion in 2008, a 28 per cent increase, but China's trade with Africa was worth US$107 billion, a tenfold increase over the last decade.

For the last part of this paper, I would like to discuss the China-US relations.

China officially ended its decade-long yuan-dollar peg in 2005, due to pressure from the Bush administration for more "flexible" exchange rates, but continued to maintain tight control over the currency in order to keep Chinese exports competitive. At the same time, the yuan's gradual revaluation of 20 per cent over the past three years generated enormous pressure on Chinese exporters, even before the collapse of the foreign orders in recent months. Amid escalating job losses and the prospect of social unrest, there are mounting calls within China for the government to devalue the yuan. By last November, 20 million rural migrant workers in China had already lost jobs, with new estimates pointing to 40-50 million more in early 2010. These figures do not include millions of unemployed urban workers. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao blamed the US for "excessive expansion of financial institutions in blind pursuit of profit" and "lack of self-discipline among financial institutions and rating agencies" for the present global economic crisis. While not naming the Obama administration, Wen declared: "Protectionism serves no purpose except to worsen and prolong the crisis."

The US-China tensions have raised fears that Beijing could dump its US assets of more than US$1 trillion, precipitating a devastating collapse of the dollar. It could provoke China into a sudden and dramatic reconsideration and readjustment of its exchange rate and foreign reserves management – up to and including its willingness to hold US sovereign bonds. It must be remembered that the dollar-yuan link [established in 1994] al-

lowed a real price system to arise in China and created a single economic fabric stretching across the Pacific. Before long, the whole region had adopted what has come to be known as the East Asian Dollar Standard. A significant proportion of Chinese goods are manufactured on behalf of US corporations, boosting their profit rates and temporarily sustaining the consumption of Americans despite the stagnation and in many instances decline in real wages. More importantly, China's expanding trade surpluses became a major source for buying US Treasury bonds, helping finance the US trade and balance of payment deficits. China and Japan alone hold a quarter of the US$5.8 trillion outstanding US government debt. The flow of cheap credit and low-price goods from Asia helped the Federal Reserve Board maintain a low interest rate policy, thus providing the basis for Wall Street to create ever bigger debt and credit bubbles and creating an expanding market for industries in China, including those owned by US firms.

The US and China are playing the "Great Game" in the same manner that former imperial powers (Tsarist Russia and Great Britain) played in an earlier historic epoch. The US strategy is to keep China off balance and to preserve the ever-growing mass of dollars from deflation and displacement. The US, must necessarily "ride the tiger" of China's rise, of China's holdings of US$2 trillion in dollar reserves and corporate bonds, of China's growing involvement in Africa for natural resources, hoping to either cement China's involvement in an international status quo that will continue to subsidize America's relentless economic decline in coming decades, or failing that, exploit the social fissures in Chinese society and have an opportunity to have a client regime in China.

China's strategy is to exploit the blunders and arrogance of the past and present US administration, and employ its relatively strong economic position to strengthen its geopolitical position, and thus accelerate the US's already diminishing hegemony.

There is an African idiom that asserts that "when two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers". In this instance it would appear that Africa will be one of the grasses to suffer in the "Great Game" of imperialists!

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SECTION VI

The Pan-African Congresses and FESTAC 77

33. Early formations of the Pan-African movement

Bankie F. Bankie

"The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the colour line." This was the analysis which announced the arrival of Pan-Africanism on the world stage at the threshold of the 20th century. At the beginning of the 21st century, the words a hundred years later ring true. Some would add to the colour line the preoccupation with the issues of class, others the issue of gender.

Race was and still is used as a basis for denying, in particular the Africans, the opportunities and aspirations of modern civilisation. Pan-Africanism as an approach to African unity and development was built around a series of meetings starting in 1900, with the Pan-African Conference held in London, UK, in 1900. Its flame has glowed and flickered up to the present day, such that Africans are often heard to inquire if Pan-Africanism is dead. These are the prophets of death. Some deny its worth, others hold it as a yardstick for African global progress.

It came from Africa; was taken out of Africa into the Caribbean and the Americas, wherein reaction to imperialism, colonialism and foreign hegemony, the seed was laid for a philosophical variant of African nationalism, which has long since moved out of the Western hemisphere and into the far corners of the global African presence as a liberation ideology. Indeed Pan-Africanism, or African nationalism if you will, is self-perpetuating and an inspiration to the Youth.

As a concept, Pan-Africanism knows no borders, is beholden to nobody and remains the highest expression of the African liberation ideal, being feared and hated by all those who wish mischief for Africans at home and abroad. It has become a reality in how we see the outside world and how that world sees Africa. Whatever opponents may say, Pan-Africanism is on the rise. It is a constant in African affairs – sometimes above and sometime below ground. Without doubt it will determine the future of Africans in a globalised world.

The objectives of the likes of the Late of Henry Sylvester Williams, who convened the First African Conference of 1900, were modest. Seen from the perspective of the 21st century, those objectives seem modest today, even conservative. However, it was that moderation which established one of the cardinal principles of Pan-Africanism. The movement is to secure for the African his rightful place in the world order. It does not seek to impose the African on the other peoples of the world. The first meeting's emphasis on modesty has served the Africans well.

The "Address to the Nations of the World", to which W.E.B. Du Bois signed, amongst others talked of: "… the Black subjects of all nations take courage, strive ceaselessly and fight bravely, that they may prove to the world their incontestable right to be counted among the great brotherhood of mankind'.

Some one hundred years later, Africans remain outside that "great brotherhood of mankind". Why?

Many would say it is precisely because of the "modest" approach of the Founding Fathers of the movement. Incontestably we learnt in the 20th century that might is right. This was the century when the large land masses – USA, China, Europe, and India – emerged and dominated the world stage. Although Africa was granted 'independence' in that period by the colonial powers – Britain, France, Portugal and Arabia – it was by then Balkanised and power was transferred to politicians who saw themselves as gatekeepers of these neo-colonies. Africa entered the 21st century as a tapestry of mini-states, collectively housed in the OAU, which became the AU – a loose association inspired by Pan-Africanism interpreted by its founding fathers, the likes of Kwame Nkrumah, Toure, Keita, Julius Nyerere and others.

The First Conference of 1900 concluded: "Let not the natives of Africa be sacrificed to the greed of gold, their liberties taken away, their family life debauched, their just aspirations repressed and avenues of advancement and culture taken from them."

Those who met in London in 1900 represented the African elites by then. The movement headed by Marcus Garvey was not elitist. Rather, it was a mass movement – bottom up, not top down. Both the Du Bois and Garveyist tendencies are in the movement today providing equilibrium to ensure continuity into the future.

The Pan-African Congresses 1-5 were driven by Dr W.E.B. Du Bois, an African American intellectual of humble origins who died in Nkrumah's Ghana, a member of the US Communist Party and a Ghanaian citizen, who repatriated to Ghana, working with Nkrumah, compiling the *Encyclopaedia Africana*, being a compilation of African personalities. After the First Conference, Pan-Africanism, according to Du Bois, "died for a generation". He resuscitated it after the First World War, which proves the point that Pan-Africanism never dies, like African nationalism, but continues, with various levels of intensity, depending on the circumstances of the time.

As the war ended, Du Bois travelled to France to be part of the peace process and to ensure that the rights of Africans were respected. By that time Abyssinia, Liberia and Haiti were self-governing African states – part of the international community of states. Du Bois was concerned about the fate of Africans in the former German colonies. From what we know of the experience of South West Africa, Du Bois' concern was justified. He foresaw a unity of the Africans emerging from the experiences of the war. One should note that Du Bois and Blaise Diagne accessed, if only in writing, people like President Wilson and Clemenceau. The upshot of this was the convening of the First Pan-African Congress of 1919. A noticeable feature, which has sustained as a characteristic of the movement, was that the western media paid due deference to the emerging Pan-African Movement. It was considered a strange manifestation of African political culture.

Du Bois claims that the Congress influenced the Paris Conference, which concluded the peace, ending the First World War. Some nine African colonies were represented by 12 delegates. The US had 16 and the Caribbean 21. Most were residents in France at the time due to the war. The US and colonial powers refused to issue special visas to the

participants. Congress' concern was for Africans and those of African descent and it addressed the issues of land, capital, labour and education. This Congress, like subsequent ones, sought, without success, to establish a permanent bureau for Pan-Africanism.

The Second Pan-African Congress: Du Bois worked comprehensively, deliberately and thoughtfully to establish the Pan-Africanist Movement, entering into contact with Africans far and wide. This Congress met in London, Brussels and Paris in August and September 1921. There were 113 delegates, of which 41 were from Africa, 35 from the USA, 24 from Europe and seven from the Caribbean. By this time the colonial powers were hostile to Africans defending their interests, as they were intent on the intensive exploitation of their colonies. Also, the Caribbean was in ferment and was pre-occupied with the assertion of African rights. Here, the movement was led by Marcus Garvey. Garvey was at differing times active in the Caribbean, Central America and North America. He promoted the Black Star Line, a capitalistic enterprise to repatriate Africans back to Africa. His movement placed less emphasis on modesty and more on self-reliance.

Around 1922, Garvey's movement, the United Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) opened offices in Lüderitz and Windhoek, being joined by the Namibian nationalists of the period. At the Second Congress there was a large white attendance by European Socialists. Congress came out in favour of equality of the races:

> That in the vast range of time, one group should in its industrial technique, or social organisation or spiritual vision, lag a few hundred years behind another, or forge fitfully ahead, or come to differ decidedly in thought, deed and ideal, is proof of the essential richness and variety of human nature, rather than proof of the co-existence of demigods and apes in human form. The doctrine of racial equality does not interfere with individual liberty: rather, it fulfils it.

Du Bois foresaw the arrival of an independent world in which Africa was one component amongst others providing the wisdom of this philosophical ideal. However, the outcomes of this Congress left Africans' hands out stretched in a begging posture. Its resolutions talked of civilisation as a pre-ordained right, rather than a product of armed struggle, which was to come much later. The outcome of the Congress, that is its petition, was published by the League of Nations as an official document.

The Third Pan-African Congress was held in London and Lisbon in late 1923. Paris was supposed to be part of it, but those arrangements fell through. The London meeting was small and was addressed by leading members of the Labour Party. The one in Lisbon was larger, with Lusophone Africa represented – the Liga Africana, which organised the event. The Liga of Lisbon was the director of the Portuguese Africa movement. Its outcomes were particularly addressed to the situation in the Portuguese colonies. These were:

- A voice in government;
- The right to land;
- Trial by jury;
- Free elementary education;
- Development of Africa for Africans;
- Abolition of slave trade and traffic in liquor;

- World disarmament and the abolition of war; and
- The organisation of trade and industry to the benefit of all rather than a few.

Du Bois notes that at the time 'the Pan-African ideal was still American rather than African, but it was growing …'. In order to expand its operations towards African population concentrates, Du Bois planned the fourth Pan-African Congress for the Caribbean in 1923.

The 4th Pan-African Congress: The 4PAC was held in New York in 1927, with 13 countries represented. Some 208 delegates from 22 US states attended, together with 10 foreign countries. Africa was sparsely represented by persons from the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Nigeria. The projects arising from this meeting were:

- Africans to have a voice in their government;
- Native rights to land and natural resources;
- Modern education for all children;
- Africa for Africans, for the benefit of Africa;
- Reorganisation of commerce and industry to benefit the many, not the few; and
- Treatment of civilised men as civilised despite differences of birth, race or colour.

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34. The Fifth Pan-African Congress of 1945

Bankie F. Bankie

The Fifth Pan-African Congress (5PAC) followed the previous congresses, before the Sixth Pan-African Congress of 1974 held in Dar es Salaam. In the public mind the 5PAC is considered to represent an historic juncture in the struggles of the Africans at home and abroad, for liberation and empowerment. It is important to keep in mind that the 5PAC did not take place in a vacuum and that it represented a milestone in the struggle of the Africans, due to its conjuncture in the modernisation of Africa. It marked a visible movement forward towards self-government. With the end of the war, clearly relations were changing between the metropolitan powers and the colonies.

By 1945 the Pan-African movement had come a long way, spanning approximately half a century, with W.E.B. Du Bois featuring at all the previous Pan-African congresses. Some 50 years after the 5PAC the question increasingly was being asked in thoughtful sectors of the movement: Pan-Africanism or Continentalism? Should unity be geographical, centred on the physical dimensions of the continent itself, or should it be based on where the movement originated – in the struggles of a people identified as Africans due to their cultural characteristics?

Some date the continental project from 1945 and note that the three principal architects of that project after 1945 were W.E.B. Du Bois, George Padmore and Kwame Nkrumah. In the self-governing Ghana they convened the first Pan-African meeting of substance, the All Africa Peoples Conference (AAPC) in Accra, Ghana in 1958.They formed the core of the Secretariat of the 5PAC.

Padmore spent a lifetime devoted to the emancipation and unity of Africans and those of African descent. He was born Malcom Ivan Nurse in 1902 in Trinidad in the Caribbean and was a boyhood friend of C.L.R. James, an eminent ideologue of the Pan-African Movement. Through his father, he was linked to Henry Sylvester Williams. He arrived at Fisk University in the USA and from there went on to Howard University in Washington, with the intention of studying law, to practice law in Liberia. In the US he joined the Communist Party – a move that resulted in him in 1929 being sent to the Communist International sponsored Second Congress of the League Against Imperialism, becoming a member of the Profintern (the Red International of Labour Unions). It was only in 1934 that he resigned from the Comintern due to disagreements over Stalin's Pact with France. He was uncomfortable with the Soviet position that the enemies of the colonials were not the imperial powers, but the fascist movements.

The year 1945 found Padmore in the United Kingdom. Together with colleagues, he called the Fifth Pan-African Congress. The venue decided by the Pan-African Federation was to be Manchester in the United Kingdom. Other members of the Federation were Ras T. Makonnen and Dr Peter Millard, both residents of Manchester. Some 200 persons attended the 5PAC, including W.E.B. Du Bois and Amy Ashwood Garvey, the widow (first wife) of Marcus Garvey. It was the first PAC to bring together many Africans and the first attended by workers and trade unionists, then attending the first conference of the World Federation of Trade Unions, as well as Blacks resident or temporarily in the UK. Due to

problems of travel related to the just ended war, the only African American present was Du Bois. The first session was chaired by A.A. Garvey and the remaining sessions were chaired by Du Bois. In the records he is described as the International President on the Pan-African Congress. Kwame Nkrumah was appointed Rapporteur of the two sessions on “imperialism in North and West Africa”, held on October 16 and 19, 1945. The resolutions issued from the discussions of the two sessions included political, economic and social issues.

The content of those resolutions are detailed by Marika Sherwood in “Kwame Nkrumah – the years abroad – 1935-1947”. At the political level the congress demanded nothing short of self-rule, which came to be known as “independence”, which was later found to mean not sovereign independence but neo-colonial rule, being political power without economic control. On the economic front Europeans exploited African resources, industrialisation was obstructed, Africans were impoverished, trade unions were prohibited and the economy was in the hands of merchants and capitalists, beyond the control of the Government. Finally, on the social level illiteracy, ill health, malnutrition and other social evils abounded. Based on these findings, Congress declared “that the complete and absolute independence is the only solution to the existing problems”.

Among the delegates were the likes of Hastings Banda, Jomo Kenyatta, Obafemi Awolowo, Ibrahim Garba-Jahumpa, Jaja Wachuku, Ako Adjei, Joe Appiah and others.
Nkrumah after the Congress was named the Secretary of the Working Committee, under Du Bois’ presidency, to give effect to the resolutions of the Congress, with the instruction to establish a headquarters, which would liaise with the emerging movements for self-government in the colonies. So Nkrumah’s work towards the decolonisation of Africa had begun. Du Bois later sent Nkrumah, as Secretary of the Pan-African Federation (PAF), a set of the 5PAC resolutions, which he had just presented to the United Nations. Padmore had been previously the International Secretary of PAF.

The accession of the African countries, which had been preceded by others in Asia such as India, followed after the 5PAC, with Sudan attaining self-government in 1956 and Ghana in 1957, with the Francophone countries in Africa accorded “Independence” in the 1960s.

Padmore in his book Pan-Africanism or Communism, published in 1956 on page 22 opted for the “creation of a United States of Africa”. Nkrumah returned to the then Gold Coast in 1947. Padmore made his first visit to the Gold Coast in 1951 and was a special guest at the Independence celebrations of Ghana in 1957. The same year he took up residence in Ghana as Nkrumah’s Advisor on African Affairs. In December 1958 the All African People’s Conference was held in Accra, bringing together the African freedom fighters. Some 300 delegates representing 28 countries attended the Conference, which elected Tom Mboya of Kenya as Chairperson and Padmore as Secretary-General.

Du Bois, who was born in 1868, after the 5PAC of 1945, became increasingly radical in his writings and speeches. In 1948 he became Vice-Chairman of the Council of African Affairs in the USA, a leading anti-colonial organisation in the US. In 1952 the US State Department refused to issue him a passport, effectively banning him from travel. In 1958 his passport was restored and he travelled widely overseas. In May 1959 he was award-

ed the Lenin Peace Prize in Moscow, joining the Communist Party of the USA in October 1961. In 1960 he was invited by Nkrumah to his inauguration as the first President of Ghana. The following year he accepted Nkrumah's invitation to move to Ghana and subsequently became a Ghanaian citizen. He died in Ghana in August 1963. Thereafter his wife, Shirley, moved to Egypt when Nkrumah's government was overthrown in 1966. Immediately after the 1945 Congress, Nkrumah was appointed the Founder and General Secretary of the West African National Secretariat, to realise "a United West Africa Independence". He also became a leader of "the Circle", a secret revolutionary organisation dedicated to establishing a Union of African Socialist Republics. In this period he was pre-occupied with West African unity. In 1947 Nkrumah left Britain for the Gold Coast. The party he formed, the Convention People's Party (CPP) won 90% of the vote in the 1951 general election and in 1957 he led the state, the former Gold Coast, to self-government as the new state of Ghana. The name Nkrumah is synonymous with the statement: "The independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent."

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35. Much Ado about What?

A Critique of the 6th and 7th Pan African Congresses

Sabelo Sibanda

"There has been only one Pan-African Congress in the history of the African world and it was held in Manchester, England in 1945 and called fifth because **we are used to counting jamborees as congresses …"** Naiwu Osahon.

Whichever way and by whatever barometer one may want to analyses and/or critique the Pan-Afrikan Movement; with its strengths and weaknesses, relevance and irrelevance, confirmations and contradictions and all such related ways of assessing its effectiveness, the Pan-Afrikan Movement is and has been undoubtedly the most fundamental avenue and tool by which to carry forth the aspirations of Afrikans, at home and abroad. From the days when the Afrikans were fighting against slavery to the days of colonialism and the liberation struggles, through the civil rights movement and now the most unfortunate days of neo-colonialism and selling out by so-called Afrikan leaders, the Pan-Afrikan Movement, whether called by that name or not, has and will continue to be the cornerstone of the true liberation of the Afrikan Nation and the freeing of Afrikan resources.

To properly critique the 6th and 7th Pan-Afrikan congresses it is a necessary starting point to briefly break down the basic concepts of what it is exactly that is meant by Pan-Afrikan Congresses:

"Pan Afrikan" in essence, talks of the unification of **all people of Afrikan descent**, the Global Afrikan Nation that is, regardless of where these people might be geographically located, namely Afrikans on the continent of Afrika and Afrikans in both the Eastern and Western diasporas. It entails addressing the aspirations of the Global Afrikan Nation in such a manner that the people at grassroots level are not exploited and left exposed, but have their interests fully catered for.

"Pan Africanism was created as a means of relieving Africans of the burden of European dominance …"[6]

All "Pan" efforts among African people must ultimately lead to a concept of a world union of African people, in spite of geography, religion and culture. [7]

"Congress" – a formal meeting of the representatives of different nations, constituent states, independent organizations (such as trade unions), or groups.

Within the context of a non-political gathering, an alternative name for a large national or international academic conference.[8]
In an effort to properly contextualize the congresses under discussion, there is need to balance Osahon's observation and conclusion with the interpretation of a Pan-Afrikan Congress above and what actually took place in Tanzania and Uganda, at the 6th and 7th Pan-Afrikan Congresses. The look at what transpired at the Congresses will also address itself to one of the main points of difference within the Pan-Afrikan Movement, namely

whether the ideological thrust of the movement is Pan-Afrikanism or Continentalism.

The 6th Pan-Afrikan Congress

June 19-17, 1974 marked the convening of the 6th Pan-Afrikan Congress in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. Most noteworthy about the representation at the Congress is that 30 of the then 42 independent African states sent delegations and there were also delegations of national liberation movements that were still fighting for independence. From the Diaspora there were delegations from the Caribbean, South America, Canada, Great Britain and the United States. In all 800 to 1 000 delegates are believed to have attended.[9]

Amongst the primary stepping stones for the 6th Pan-African Congress was the success of the 5th Pan-African Congress held in Manchester, England in 1945. The Manchester congress gave impetus to the liberation of a significant number of African countries and indeed the Pan-African Movement as a whole. Between 1945 and 1974 most Pan-African activity took place on the African continent and the Sixth Pan-African Congress resulted from the long-term actions, sometimes in concert, but often not, of three men: Julius K. Nyerere (1922-1999) of Africa, Adam Clayton Powell Jr. (1908-1972) of North America, and C. L. R. James (1901-1989) of the Caribbean.[10]

Sadly, the involvement of newly independent states, instead of being a source of strength, encouragement and direction to the Congress, proved to be divisive as a number of leading Caribbean Pan-Africanists were not happy with the role assumed by the governments, some of which were anti-people and inherently reactionary [11]. The fact that governments, liberation movements and civic society organizations were involved does in a way address the question as to whether this could really be classed a congress as these entities could be said to have been in a representative capacity. It has to be admitted, at the same time, that constitution alone is not enough as some of the governments were just merely playing “politricks” and not truly representing the aspirations of the people, which in essence nullifies the idea that it was really a congress but relegates it to a jamboree.

The very ill-informed Continentalist approach of the Organization of African Unity did a great dis-service to the 6th Pan-African Congress, as it still does to this day under the reconstituted African Union. The day that the Afrikan leaders chose to interpret Afrikan unity on the grounds of physical presence on the Afrikan continent as against the dynamics and realities facing the Global Afrikan Nation marked the total misdirection of a people. This unfortunate event led people to a position where they could easily see and identify the evils of European imperialism and colonialism and be forced to turn a blind eye to the obvious oppression by the so-called Afrikan brothers in the North. Little did the majority of Afrikan people really and truly appreciate that the so-called brother was nothing but an enslaver and killer of the Afrikan who, when attending the 6th Pan-African Congress, could have had another agenda designed at furthering his interest at the expense of the Global Afrikan Nation and the Pan-Afrikan Movement in general.

The compromise and the calamitous role played by the OAU, was evident in that:

> The OAU as a geographical compromise helped to diffuse the issue and blind Black

> Africa to the plight of their kith and kin racially marginalized and suffering severely in Northern Africa. With their membership of the OAU, the Arabs were allowed to attend the 6th Pan-African Congress in Tanzania in 1974, which they promptly disrupted by insisting that Africans do not need a global institution or league. To press their advantage home, they forced the congress to adopt Arabic as an official language.[12]

In so far as achievements and results are concerned, one has to agree with the sentiments of Osahon that the almost 1 000[13] or so people who are said to have attended the 6th Pan-African Congress were in the strictest of senses at a jamboree rather than at a congress. The same position albeit phrased somewhat differently, was echoed by the Organization of Pan-African Unity when it stated as follows:

> "… what could have been the most important Pan-African Congress and the first to meet on African soil was the Sixth Pan-African Congress. It was the largest and most diverse of these meetings. It was unwieldy and very little was accomplished. Too many Africans from different parts of the world and from within Africa itself came with different agendas. Not much was achieved except some good and bad conversations and an unfortunate fight over ideologies. The sixth Pan-African Congress that met in Tanzania … was a great opportunity misunderstood and killed by selfish, petty, amateur political hack who had no idea of what the concept of African unity could be."[14]

Even though the resolutions that were reached were not very much different from the 1919 Congress, one of the most positive things to come out of this Congress was the greater recognition of African women in the determination of the future and direction of the Global Afrikan Nation. Unlike the prior congresses there was a more prominent and visible role for the Afrikan women in areas that really mattered.

The 7th Pan-African Congress

It was on April 3 to 8, 1994 in Kampala, Uganda that the 7th Pan-African Congress was convened. President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni was appointed Patron of the Congress.

This congress was indeed a jamboree. Unlike the 6th Pan-African Congress that attracted representatives of clearly defined entities such as governments, liberation movements and civic society, the 7th Pan-African Congress attracted a host of almost 2 000[15] people, some of whom had no clearly defined constituencies and/or mandates.

Amongst the most critical lessons of the 7th Pan-African Congress, which factor will continue to be, by far the most difficult issue for the Pan-Afrikan Movement to contend with is that of responsibility for funding the movement and the events that are carried out under the auspices of the movement. Amongst the fundamental questions and considerations in this regard are the following:

1. Who should fund the movement and its events, in the absence of the people funding their own movement and events?
2. Is donor funding acceptable, if so does it matter who the donor is?
3. What is the impact of donor funding?
4. If donor funding is accepted, how does the movement protect itself from furthering

agendas which may not be in the interests of the Global Afrikan Nation but in the interests of the donor?
5. What role, if any, should African governments play in the funding of such congresses?
6. What role, if any, should non-Afrikan governments (this of course includes Arab governments in the North of Africa) play in the funding of such congresses?

The congress was, for all intents and purposes, funded by the Arab-led regime of Muamar Gadhafi, hosted by the Afrikan government of Yoweri Museveni who was chosen as the Patron of the congress but chose to be co-patron with fellow Afrikan Heads of State. It will always be a point of interest or maybe concern – if it was not so serious an issue, it would be downright funny that at the opening of the congress President Museveni found it necessary to categorically spell out that in his definition of an Afrikan he included Afrikans who live in North Africa who had migrated from other continents and have made their home in Afrika[16]. It is inconceivable that there could be a possibility that the Honourable President could not have known about the Arab oppression of Afrikans in North Afrika, the land that the Ancestors of Afrikan people lost to the Arabs, or could it be that it was Arab money speaking and not him?

Being the second Pan Afrikan Congress to be hosted on the Afrikan continent, it was an absolute shame and a cause for serious self-introspection on the part of every Pan-Afrikanist worth their salt that the 7th Pan-African Congress should fail, like its predecessor the 6th Pan-African Congress, to impact in any significant manner on the lives and realities of ordinary members of the Afrikan Nation.

If the lamentable position, captured in the postscript to the article entitled: "The 7th Pan-African Congress – The Uganda-Arab Anti-Black African Veneer" is anything to go by, and then future Pan-Afrikan Congresses will have to seek to be more relevant to the cause and interests of ordinary Afrikans. Unless they are patriotic to the Global Afrikan Nation, "Politrick-ians" and academics cannot safeguard the interests of the people as the people themselves. The said postscript reads as follows:

"No African leader attended the Arab-African 7PAC. Most African scholars and patriots avoided it. Naiwu Osahon who set the 7thPAC process in motion was not invited and did not attend. Nothing of significance came out of the Uganda (me too) band-wagon frivolities. In fact, the typical African does not know that the 7thPAC has been held in his name and Africans remain the underdogs of the world. We must reverse the trend and take back our leadership of the world.[17]"

Albeit highly ineffective and largely unknown to the Pan-Afrikan world and the world in general, recorded as major successes of the 7th Pan-African Congress was the creation of a permanent secretariat in Kampala, as well as the further recognition of women through the creation of the Pan-African Women's Liberation Organization. The secretariat, which was headed initially by Dr Tajudeen Abdul Raheem, as the Secretary General, has been accused of lack of accountability; lack of transparency, being partisan in as far as local "politricks" in Uganda is concerned and failing to be relevant to the aspirations of the Afrikan Nation in a neo-colonial environment. It would seem that there is somewhat of a disconnect between the Secretariat, the people and necessarily therefore the Pan-Afrikan Movement itself.

Conclusion

The sad conclusion to all this therefore is that 6th and the 7th Pan-African Congresses should be properly named jamborees which failed to take the Pan-Afrikan Movement forward. In as much as these jamborees came at a time when Pan-Afrikanism had significantly reacted with visible seriousness, with results to show, against European imperialism and colonialism, these jamborees served to further strengthen the hold and dominance of the Arabs over Afrikans, with the Afrikans watching and being happy clappers all the way to the cleaners and back. The jamborees totally failed to make any impact on the lives of ordinary Afrikans.

36. FESTAC 77 as a watershed in the Pan-Africanist struggle

Dr Tony C. Onwumah

Introduction

The Second World Black and African Festival of Art and Culture, popularly referred to as FESTAC 77, has a long and interesting history behind it. It is a history that is linked to some of the epochal events in the history of Black and African peoples. These are slavery, colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism. It would be recalled that, by the instrumentality of slavery, Africans from all parts of the continent were shipped to all the nooks and crannies of the globe where they were essentially hewers of wood and drawers of water. The misery, torture and agony of slavery are well known to historians and other chroniclers. Yet, the unsalutory consequences of slavery have not received sufficient scholarly attention. Slavery did not only entail the forcible use of Africans as farm hands and domestics. More fundamentally, it also targeted African cultures and world views which were pejoratively portrayed as inferior to the cultures of other races.

That slavery ended was not because the slave masters suddenly realized that the slaves were after all humans. The end of slavery and slave trade was not a mark of benevolence on the part of the enslavers. Rather, it was a response to a new logic created by the industrial revolution. It was a logic which rendered slavery as both anachronistic and unprofitable.

The collapse of slavery gave rise to colonialism. While under slavery, Africans were carried away to foreign lands where they were dehumanized and treated like any other domestic property of their owners, the story under colonial rule was different altogether. The colonial setting was such that Africans were dominated politically, economically, socially and culturally right on their own soil. Perhaps, the difference between slavery and colonialism stems from the fact that under the latter, Africans were not articles of trade that could be sold and bought by the highest bidder.

However, it is pertinent to note that Africans were not just helpless recipients of their fate as dictated by their enslavers and colonial masters. For instance, in Haiti and other parts of the Caribbean, there were many instances of slave revolts. On the continent, the likes of Ovoramen, Nana of Itsekiri, Ashantihene of Ghana, and Shaka the Zulu in southern Africa did not only resist foreign incursion and domination, but they also fought relentlessly to safeguard their cultures and all attempts to desecrate them.

Pan-African Congresses

From the above, there is demonstrable evidence that in many instances Africans fought hard to defend their cultures and territorial integrity. The series of activities that were geared towards projecting the image and dignity of Africans culminated in the hosting of the first Pan-African Conference in 1900. This served as an impetus to and triggered off a number of activities which had one purpose as goal, namely the emancipation of Africa from the shackles of colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism. Though not much has been written and said about it, the meeting of Black and African writers in Rome in 1956

was of special importance.

Realizing the need for a cultural dimension to the Pan-Africanist struggle, the 1956 meeting in Rome resolved that a black and African festival of arts and culture would be desirable. It was against this background that the first Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture was held in Dakar, Senegal, in 1966. The Dakar festival was successful and the organizers agreed that another version of the same festival be held in Nigeria 10 years later, in 1976. Due to some internal political problems in Nigeria, the festival could not be held as scheduled in 1976. However, it eventually was held in Nigeria in 1977 from January 5 to February 12. It is pertinent to state that the choice of Nigeria as host of the second edition of FESTAC was because she emerged as the star country at the 1966 festival in Dakar, Senegal. Indeed, the organizers were working towards establishing a tradition by which star countries hosted the next edition of the festival.

The Second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture was a significant improvement on the Dakar festival and could be rightly described as an unqualified success story. But first, it is necessary to understand the long title of the festival: Second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture. The view has been expressed that the second African Festival of Arts and Culture or the Second Black Festival of Arts and Culture would have sufficed. The lengthy theme was adopted to accommodate peoples in Africa who acknowledge that they are Africans, but not blacks and black people in other continents who are not Africans.

Be that as it may, FESTAC 77 was unique in many ways. It not only brought together Africans from all over the world in hitherto unimagined numbers, the scope of the festival was also broader than the previous one. It embraced dance, drama, cultural presentation, boat regatta, durbar and very significantly, a colloquium. All the events took place in Lagos from where they were beamed to the world by satellite. It was only the durbar that took place in Kaduna. In all, 59 black and African countries and communities participated in the festival.

The FESTAC colloquium, under the theme: ***The Arts and Civilization of Black and African Peoples***, requires some explanation. It introduced an intellectual dimension to the Pan-Africanist struggle. More importantly, it highlighted the contributions which Africans made and continue to make to the pool and extension of global knowledge. The colloquium interrogated and to a large extent corrected the erroneous impression that development in ancient Africa was externally inspired. Put otherwise, it challenged the impression that Africa was merely a recipient of the development efforts of other races and made little or no contributions at all to global growth and development.

The colloquium covered a broad spectrum of knowledge as represented in the following sub-themes:

1. Black Civilization and the Arts
2. Black Civilization and Philosophy
3. Black Civilization and Literature
4. Black Civilization and African Languages
5. Black Civilization and Historical Awareness

6. Black Civilization and Pedagogy
7. Black Civilization and Religion
8. Black Civilization and Science and Technology
9. Black Civilization and African Government
10. Black Civilization and the Mass Media

It is important to stress that the papers from the colloquium have been edited and published in 10 volumes under the title: The Arts and Civilization of Black and African Peoples.

The significance of FESTAC 77 is that, for the period it lasted it drew world attention to Africa. It created a platform where the rich and resilient culture of Africa was showcased in an unprecedented manner. It was also a unifying event for both continental and diaspora Africans who came together as one in the demonstration of the beauty of their culture. Of note is that it was a wake-up call, that Africans wherever they are found share a common destiny and heritage. A destiny and heritage shaped by a common experience of slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism. Of vital importance is that FESTAC 77 aroused a consciousness that the common challenges of Africa and her peoples worldwide require a united front. It also demonstrated that the contributions of Africa to world civilization are not just an expression of patriotism, but a verifiable reality.

Therefore, at the end of the festival, the organizers were faced with the resolution of an important poser. That is, to either make the gains of the festival ephemeral or to build on it and use it as a platform for the sustainable crusade and execution of the Pan-Africanist agenda. In their collective wisdom, it was resolved that the gains of the momentous festival should be built upon and reinforced. This resolution influenced the decision of the countries and communities that participated in FESTAC 77 to hand over all the materials that were used at the festival to the government of Nigeria. Some of the materials that were handed over include, but are not limited to, paintings, drawings, artifacts, artworks, books and publications, pictorial representation of Africa and the origin of man, the chain of African unity, specimen of African architectural technology video and audio tapes among many others.

To justify the confidence reposed in her, the then military government of Nigeria decided to create a centre to house the materials from which the objectives of FESTAC 77 would be pursued. As a result, by decree 69 of 1979 the Centre for Black and African Arts and Civilization (CBAAC) was established and charged with the underlisted functions.
Functions of the Centre

- The Centre shall be a multi-dimensional institution and shall, subject to this Decree, have responsibility for the promotion of public interest in Black and African Arts and Civilization and for the preservation of such creative work of value of:
- each participating country during the Second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Cultures 1977 (hereinafter in this Decree referred to as “the 1977 festival”) or similar cultural manifestations; or
- Of any other country or individual where such creative work has emanated from or pertains to the 1977 Festival or similar cultural manifestations, donated to the Centre either directly or through the International Festival Committee of the 1977 Festival or

hereafter donated to the Centre by any person or organization.
- In pursuance of sub-section (1) of this section, it shall be the duty of the Centre:
- To locate, identify and assemble for better preservation all recorded matter, published materials and museum artifacts relating to the 1977 Festival and to prepare an inventory of these works;
- To promote understanding and appreciation of Black and African arts and culture by involving the general public in its activities through lectures, discussions, symposia, exhibitions, performance and demonstrations of arts and crafts.
- To acquire from the zonal secretariat of the 1977 Festival/and any other source, creative records relating to past and future world, regional or national festivals of arts and culture of relevance to Black and African arts and civilization.
- To produce guides, catalogues, bibliographies, abstracts and indices to facilitate the use of the materials preserved at the Centre;
- To make the facilities of the Centre available to members of the public on such terms as the Board may, with the approval of the commissioner, determine:
- To organize exhibitions, displays and such other manifestations as are calculated to achieve the objectives of the Centre;
- To make appropriate arrangements for exchange, either by way of lending or by way of the gift of materials held at the Centre.
- To supplement the materials held at the Centre by acquiring copies of materials relating to the past and future, world, regional or national festivals of arts and cultures of relevance to Black and African arts and civilization.
- To safeguard the property of the Centre; and
- To provide such services as are usually provided by cultural resource centres.

The Centre achieves its set goals and objectives through research, publications, conferences, seminars, symposia, workshops and exhibitions.

Some of the programmes hosted by the Centre in recent times include the following: 2009 edition of its annual International Conference series with the theme: “Teaching and Propagation of African History to the Diaspora and Diaspora history to Africa’’ in Brasilia, Brazil, at the instance of the Brazilian Government through Brazil’s Special Secretariat for the Promotion of Policies on racial Equality (SEPPIR), in the office of the Presidency, Brazil.

The Centre hosted the third edition of its International Conference series at Casa del Papa Hotel Ouidah, Republic of Benin, November 4 -8, 2007. The theme of the conference was: “Global African Spirituality, Social Capital and Self Reliance in Africa”.
The Centre in collaboration with the Pan-African Strategic and Policy Research Group (PANAFTRAG) hosted the International Conference on “Advancing and Integrating Research and Studies in the Interest of Africa and the African Diaspora” held at the University of West Indies, Saint Augustine Campus, Trinidad and Tobago from November 7 to 11, 2006.

In line with its responsibility of spearheading research findings on African heritage, the Centre featured and participated actively at the second phase of the Rock Art Workshop project held on January 20-23, 2007 in Nairobi, Kenya.

In the same vein, the Centre hosted the Meeting of African Agencies and Organizations involved in the management and promotion of African Arts and Culture in Lagos, August 21-23, 2007. The summit attracted participants from the Regional Centre for Research and Documentation on Oral Traditions and Development of African Languages (CERDOTOLA).

In collaboration with the African Union Centre for Oral Tradition and History AU-(CELTHO), Trust for African Rock Art (TARA), Pan-African Strategic and Policy Research Group (PANAFTRAG) the Centre hosted a Methodology Workshop on African Rock Art in Niamey, Niger Republic, March 11-14, 2008.

Similarly, the Centre hosted a National Workshop on: "Cultural Rejuvenation for National Integration and Sustainable Development" from April 17 to 18, 2008 at the Peninsula Resort, Ajah, Lagos.

To effectively discharge its mandate, the Centre has collaborative relations with the underlisted institutions and agencies:

- International Federation of Library Association (IFLA)
- International Council on Archives (ICA)
- West African Museum Project (WAMP)
- International Commission for the Conservation and Preservation of Cultural
- Properties/Monuments (ICCROM)
- United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
- International Institute for Bantu Civilization (CICIBA)
- Group for Children in African Museums (GCAM)
- French Cultural Centre
- Goethe Institute
- Smithsonian Institute
- International Council of Museums (ICOM)
- Regional Centre for Research and Documentation on Oral Traditions and Development of African Languages (CERTODOLA)
- Globalization, Identity Politics and Social Conflicts Project (GIPSC)
- Pan African Strategic and Policy Research Group (PANAFTRAG)
- Kent State University, USA
- World Garifuna Organization, South America
- Book Aid International (BAI)
- British Council
- The Ford Foundation
- UNICEF
- Trust for African Rock Art (TARA)
- l'Institutet de Development et de'Echanges Endogenes (IDEE), at IDEE, Ouidah, Benin Republic
- National Association of Nigerian Theatre Arts Practitioners (NANTAP)
- Centre for African Theatre Arts and Film Production

- The Nigerian Postal Services (NIPOST)
- Special Secretariat for the Promotion of Policies on Racial Equality (SEPPIR), the Presidency, Brazil.
- Institute for Afro-Brazilian Studies (IPEAFRO). Palmeris Cultural Foundation, Brazil.

In addition, the Centre has 70 titles as its published work. It is also heart-warming that at the last summit of African Union (AU) Ministers of Culture, the Centre was recognized as a Pan-African Centre for the promotion and propagation of African culture and heritage. Finally, there is no gainsaying the fact that CBAAC is the greatest and most enduring legacy of FESTAC 77. It has showcased Black and African Cultures and could do more subject to the availability of funds and support from sister African countries.

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SECTION VII

Reports

37. Communiqué issued at the end of the workshop on: Sustaining the New Wave of Pan-Africanism, Windhoek, Namibia, December 6-9, 2010

Preamble

Recognizing the great Pan-Africanist struggles of the generations of yesteryears;

Acknowledging the contributions of the pioneers of Pan-Africanism;

Paying tribute to all Pan-Africanist women and men of all generations, known and unknown;

Expressing profound thanks and gratitude to the following institutions:

- The High Commission of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in Namibia;
- The Centre for Black and African Arts and Civilization, Lagos, Nigeria;
- The Pan-Afrikan Center of Namibia;
- The Pan-African Strategic and Policy Research Group, Lagos, Nigeria; and
- The National Youth Council of Namibia;

Appalled by the desertion of Pan-Africanist ideals, the rise of neo-colonialism and isolation of the masses;

Dissatisfied with the cheapening of African liberation ideals and the triumph of capitalism and neo-liberal politics and economics;

Offended by the inheritance and sustenance of colonial institutions;

Shocked by the emergence of Black colonialism;

Realising that socio-economic challenges are still tilted racially and against the African masses;

Noting, with regret, the lack of or slow harmonization of policies by African governments;

Inspired by the fact that Pan-Africanism is a tool of resistance against exploitation and domination;

Acknowledging the fact that Pan-Africanism is a tool for the sustainable development and advancement of Africa and the Pan-African world;

Pan-Africanist youth attending the above Pan-African Workshop resolved and formulated the following framework for a Pan-Africanist Youth Action Plan:

Leadership

1. Pan-Africanist oriented leadership training and re-training, at all levels
2. Absolute consideration of Pan-African perspectives in the African Union decision-making process

Education

1. Pan-Africanism should be taught at every level, formally, non-formally and informally
2. Using the media as an educational tool
3. Promoting Pan-Africanist self-knowledge within Africa and the Diasporas
4. Teaching history from a Pan-Africanist perspective, at every level
5. Pan-Africanist oriented teacher training
6. Advancing indigenous African research
7. Pan-Africanising information dissemination processes
8. Raising awareness through edutainment
9. State popularization of Pan-Africanism to the masses

Self determination

1. Pan-African youth organisations to work in concert, in Africa and the Diasporas
2. National youth organisations to have data bases of youth organisations in their countries
3. Taking ownership of the media
4. Reclaiming African spirituality and culture
5. Promoting multi-lateral business ventures and development projects within Pan-African world
6. Promoting cultural workers in all disciplines
7. Protecting, innovating and promoting indigenous knowledge
8. Creating and/or strengthening Pan-African youth structures
9. Structuring and/or strengthening Pan-African development institutions
10. Using Pan-Africanism as an economic tool
11. Financing Pan-Africanist activities and endeavours
12. Finding a Pan-Africanist solution and support to the conflicts in the Sudan, Mauritania and Western Sahara
13. Preventing the expansion into and hence re-colonization of Africa by old and new colonial actors in the guise of investment
14. Preventing new and further exploitation of Africa
15. Protecting small businesses from non-African, so-called investors
16. Encouraging better South-South cooperation based on mutual respect and mutual benefit
17. Promoting the industrialization of Africa
18. African policies, including investment policies to embrace and be guided by Pan-Africanist ideals
19. Ensuring food security and sovereignty
20. Ensuring political and economic sovereignty
21. Sustaining the environment while using renewable energies in the industrialization

of Africa
22. Developing and maintaining initiatives for self-reliance
23. Assertively inviting and attracting investment into Africa, from the Pan-African world
24. Creating a central Pan-Africanist youth mother body

Repatriation/Reparations

1. Facilitate for the process of seeking repatriations for Africans in the Diasporas
2. Accelerate for the realisation of the African Diasporas' membership to the African Union
3. Demand reparations for the enslavement of all African people
4. Demand reparations for the colonialisation of Africa

Conclusion

The youth attending the above Pan-African workshop would further have it noted that the following fundamentals have to be observed in workshops designed for the advancement and sustainability of Pan-Africanism:

1. That the value and equality of each partner to the process has to be recognized
2. That the youth must be allowed free open space to express their views and observations in the advancement of Pan-Africanism
3. That for there to be effective and properly representative results of such for a, there should be broad-based approaches which are rooted in the masses
4. That elders give due support and advice to the youth without seeking to impose themselves, their viewpoints and/or partisan political agenda
5. That there should always be openness, transparency and integration of ideas in program creation and formulation of objectives

38. Rapporteur's Workshop report with focus on Education

C. Ijahnya

Extract relating to Education

- Create a Pan-African Public Awareness and Education Programme with life-long learning objectives to impact formal, non-formal and informal delivery. This should be reflected in every country's budget, with strategic focus on Teacher Education and Training.
- Facilitate access to and popularise the work of Pan-African geniuses, such as Cheikh Anta Diop, across all education sectors.
- Research and document to make known the works of the Pan-African "unknown soldier" (e.g. Henry Sylvester Williams and the Pan-African meeting held in Chicago in the 1890s).
- Promote and support multi-disciplinary Pan-African scholarship.
- Higher Education to facilitate the new wave of Pan-Africanism.
- Domesticate and harmonise education policies.
- Elevate the status of teachers and university staff to reduce the brain drain.
- Development of Africology as a weapon – how the science of knowledge is produced.
- Consolidate our own structures and moving forward with an African-oriented curriculum, e.g. Zimbabwe's School of African Awareness has targeted teachers in training to ensure that they receive a Pan-African orientation and to enable them to inculcate core values of where we are going as African people.
- Identify people within our institutions, outside of government, Pan-Africanists, who can be brought in as guest lecturers, animators and so on in non-formal, informal and formal education

Formal

- Standardise educational systems to bring up the spirit of Pan-Africanism
- Develop a Pan-African curriculum to be taught at all African and African Diaspora schools
- Teach Pan-Africanism as a subject and make every African child aware of the concept
- Train teachers to teach African history and world history from an African perspective (reference to the UNESCO project on the general history of Africa to rewrite African history from an African point of view)
- Promote and fund indigenous African research
- Acknowledge African scholars and scholarship and make them accessible to the masses
- Establish African technical, industrial universities to facilitate availability of cadres for the industrialisation of Africa

Non-Formal

- Create a programme for Africanisation, especially for our leaders

- Accessing and using the resources available both at home and in the Diaspora
- Create a programme to address the invasion of Africa by Christianity and Islam and to reclaim African spirituality and culture
- Promote self-study through study groups
- Pan-African organisations to create media data bases and engage with the media
- Use the mass media to promote Pan-African values and policies
- Initiate Pan-African youth exchange programmes between African countries and within the African Diaspora
- Promote intra-continental tourism with the objective of improving self-knowledge
- Advance linguistic studies for liberation as ascribed by scholars such as Cheikh Anta Diop, who wanted to spare African children from being educated in European languages

Language

- Explore the relationships between different African languages recognising that African national languages are kept alive by the peasant class
- Encourage students to explore the politics of African Literature
- Translate all science, mathematics and technology books into African languages
- Translate the works of African geniuses and make them accessible to the masses

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