ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOKS



Routledge Handbook of African Security

Edited by James J. Hentz

ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF AFRICAN SECURITY

This new Handbook examines the issues, challenges, and debates surrounding the problem of security in Africa.

Africa is home to most of the world's current conflicts, and security is a key issue. However, African security can only be understood by employing different levels of analysis: the individual (human security), the state (national/state security), and the region (regional/international security). Each of these levels provides analytical tools for understanding what could be called the "African security predicament" and these debates are animated by the "new security" issues: immigration, small arms transfers, gangs and domestic crime, HIV/AIDS, transnational crime, poverty, and environmental degradation. African security therefore not only presents concrete challenges for international security but provides a real-world context for challenging conventional conceptions of security.

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- Part I: The African security predicament in the twenty-first century;
- Part II: Understanding conflict in Africa;
- Part III: Regionalism and Africa;
- Part IV: External influences.

This Handbook will be of great interest to students of African politics, human security, global security, war and conflict studies, peacebuilding, and IR in general.

James J. Hentz is Professor and Chair of the Department of International Studies and Political Science at the Virginia Military Institute. He is the co-editor of *New and Critical Security and Regionalism: Beyond the Nation State* (2003), editor of *Obligation of Empire: U.S. Grand Strategy for a New Century* (2004), and author of *South Africa and the Logic of Regional Cooperation* (2005) and *The Nature of War in Africa* (forthcoming). He is also editor-in-chief of the leading journal *African Security*.

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CONTRIBUTORS

Kwesi Aning is Director of the Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research (FAAR) of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Accra, Ghana. He obtained his PhD from the University of Copenhagen, Denmark and serves on several academic boards. He has extensive publications.

Maria Eriksson Baaz is Associate Professor and Senior Researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, and the School of Global Studies, Gothenburg, Sweden Nordic Africa Institute. Her research interests include gender and war; masculinity and militarism; gender and defense and police reform in post-conflict contexts. Her most recent book, co-written with Maria Stern, is *Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War? Perceptions, Prescriptions, Problems in the Congo and Beyond* (Zed Books 2013).

Daniel C. Bach is Director of Research of the CNRS (*National Centre for Scientific Research*) at the Emile Durkheim Centre for Comparative Political Science and Sociology, University of Bordeaux, and professor at Sciences Po Bordeaux. He is also an associate of the Trade and Law Centre in Stellenbosch. His latest publications in English include 'The European Union and Africa: trade liberalization, "constructive" disengagement and the securitization of Europe's external frontiers' (*Africa Review* 3.1.2011) and (co-edited with M. Gazibo) *The Neopatrimonial State in Africa and Beyond* (Routledge 2012).

Thomas Blevins is at the Virginia Military Institute, majoring in International Studies and Political Science. He has studied African affairs both at the Virginia Military Institute and abroad. This study abroad was a semester at Stellenbosch University in South Africa, and another semester studying Swahili in Zanzibar. The latter semester was awarded through a David L. Boren National Security Education Program scholarship. He is an Ensign in the United States Navy.

Morten Bøås is Senior Researcher at FAFO's Institute for Applied International Studies. He has published extensively on African politics, including in *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, *Third World Quarterly*, *African Spectrum*, and *Global Governance*. He is co-editor with Kevin Dunn of *African Guerrillas: Raging against the Machine* (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2007).

Stephen Burgess is Professor of International Security at the US Air War College. His three books are *South Africa's Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Indiana University Press 2005), *Smallholders and Political Voice in Zimbabwe* (University Press of America 1997), and *The United Nations under Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992–97* (Scarecrow Press 2001). He has published numerous articles and book chapters on African security and strategic issues.

John F. Clark is Professor of Politics and International Relations at Florida International University (Miami). A former Fulbright Professor in Uganda, he is author of *The Failure of Democracy in the Republic of Congo* (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2008), co-author of the *Historical Dictionary of Congo* (Scarecrow Press 2012), and editor of *The African Stakes of the Congo War* (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2002).

Kevin Dunn is Associate Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges. His publications include *Imagining the Congo* (Palgrave Macmillan 2003), *African Guerrillas* (with Morten Bøås) (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2007), *Politics of Origin in Africa: Autochthony, Citizenship and Conflict* (with Morten Bøås) (Zed Books 2013) and *Inside African Politics* (with Pierre Englebert) (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2013).

Ulf Engel is Professor of Politics in Africa at the University of Leipzig (Germany). He is also Professor Extraordinary in the Department of Political Science at the University of Stellenbosch (South Africa), Fellow at the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study (STIAS) and Visiting Professor at the Institute for Peace and Security Studies at Addis Ababa University (Ethiopia).

Pierre Englebert is Professor of African Politics at Pomona College, Claremont, California. His work focuses on development, the state, national integration, and separatism, with a regional emphasis on Central and West Africa. His books include *Africa: Unity, Sovereignty and Sorrow* (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2009) and *Inside African Politics* (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2013), a textbook co-authored with Kevin Dunn.

Belachew Gebrewold is Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Innsbruck/Austria, Lecturer at the UNESCO Chair for Peace Studies, Innsbruck/Austria, and Visiting Professor at Management Center Innsbruck/University of Applied Sciences. His main research areas are conflicts in Africa, and Africa in the international security system. His most recent publications include: *Anatomy of Violence* (Ashgate 2009), *Global Security Triangle* (Routledge 2010 (ed.)) and *Africa and Fortress Europe* (Ashgate 2007 (ed.)).

Sally Healy is an independent consultant and a Fellow of the Rift Valley Institute specializing in the Horn of Africa and East Africa. She worked for the UK's Foreign and Commonwealth Office as a research analyst and has recently led the work of Chatham House on the Horn of Africa (2007–2011).

Nicolas J. Lovelace commissioned as an Infantry Officer in 1988. Since 2000 he has been a Sub-Sahara Foreign Area Officer (FAO) having served in Botswana, Angola, Mozambique, Central African Republic, Chad and Côte d'Ivoire. He is a US Army War College Fellow at the Institute for Higher Defense Studies-IHEDN in Paris, France.

Terrence Lyons is Associate Professor at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution and Co-director of the Center for Global Studies at George Mason University. His publications include *Politics from Afar: Transnational Diasporas and Networks* (Columbia University Press 2012,

co-editor) and *Demilitarizing Politics: Elections on the Uncertain Road to Peace* (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2005).

Angela Meyer works on regional security cooperation in Africa, with a special focus on Central Africa, as well as on sustainable development, resource management and civil society involvement. She is founding member and Board Director of the Vienna-based policy research organization IDC and holds a PhD in International Relations from Sciences Po Paris and Vienna University.

Boubacar N'Diaye is Professor of Pan-African Studies and Political Science at the College of Wooster, Ohio, and a widely published author specializing in civil–military relations and security. His works pertain to military involvement in African politics, security sector governance, and democratization prospects. As Interim Chair of the African Security Sector Network, he is involved in various academic and advocacy endeavors to transform security establishments and institutionalize democratic governance in the security sector of African states.

Anthoni van Nieuwkerk is Associate Professor at the Graduate School of Public and Development Management at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. He manages the university's Centre for Defense and Security Management, teaches public policy and pursues research on foreign and security decision-making in the African setting.

Louis J. Nigro Jr. (1947–2013) retired as a member of the Senior Foreign Service in 2010 after thirty-three years of government service. His last posting in the Foreign Service of the United States was as U.S. Ambassador to Chad from 2007 to 2010. Before serving as Chief of Mission in Chad, he was Deputy Chief of Mission in Guinea, Cuba, and The Vatican. He also served previously at U.S. embassies in Haiti, Chad, The Vatican, and The Bahamas.

Cyril Obi is Program Director of the Social Science Research Council's African Peacebuilding Network (APN). He is well published internationally and serves on the editorial boards of several international journals. He recently co-edited a book on *Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petro-Violence* (Zed Books 2011).

J. Peter Pham is Director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC. He was previously a tenured Associate Professor of Justice Studies, Political Science and African Studies at James Madison University in Harrisonburg, Virginia, where he was also Director of the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs. He currently serves as editor-in-chief of the *Journal of the Middle East and Africa*.

Jessica Piombo is Associate Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). She is the author of *Institutions Ethnicity, and Mobilization in South Africa* (Palgrave Macmillan 2009), co-editor with Karen Guttieri of *Interim Governments: Institutional Bridges to Peace and Democracy?* (USIP 2007) and co-editor with Lia Nijzink of *Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democratic Decade* (Palgrave Macmillan 2005).

João Gomes Porto is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford. His most recent book, written with Ulf Engel, is *Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms, Institutionalizing Solutions* (Ashgate 2010).

William Reno is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Program of African Studies at Northwestern University. He is the author of *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone* (Cambridge University Press 1995), *Warlord Politics and African States* (1998) and *Warfare in Independent Africa* (Cambridge University Press 2011) and other publications on the character of warfare and the organization of armed groups in contemporary African conflicts.

Naila Salihu is Programme and Research Officer at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC). She obtained her Master of Philosophy Degree in International Affairs from the University of Ghana. She has authored and co-authored several book chapters, and articles on conflict, peace and security issues in Africa. She is currently a PhD candidate at the College of Management and Technology, Cranfield University, UK.

Timothy M. Shaw holds an MA from Makerere University; he has taught at universities in Nigeria, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. He is co-editor with Kevin Dunn of *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory* (Palgrave Macmillan 2000), which is being translated into Chinese and reissued by the publishers as a 'Classic'. He recently co-edited, with Fantu Cheru and Scarlett Cornelissen, *Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century* (Palgrave Macmillan 2012).

Hussein Solomon is Lecturer in the Department of Political Studies and Governance at the University of the Free State, South Africa. He is also Visiting Fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Research Associate of the South African Institute of International Affairs and is a member of the International Steering Committee of Global Action to Prevent War.

Ian S. Spears is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Guelph. He is the author of *Civil Wars in African States* (Lynne Rienner Publishers 2012), and co-editor with Paul Kingston of *States within States* (Palgrave Macmillan 2004). He has published articles in the *Journal of Democracy*, *Third World Quarterly*, *The Review of African Political Economy*, and the *International Journal*.

Maria Stern is Professor in Peace and Development Studies at the School of Global Studies (SGS) and member of the Steering Committee at the Gothenburg Center for Globalization and Development, Gothenburg University (GCGD). Her research interests include security studies, the security-development nexus, and the privatization of security. Her most recent book, co-written with Maria Eriksson Baaz, is *Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War? Perceptions, Prescriptions, Problems in the Congo and Beyond* (Zed Books 2013).

Ian Taylor is Professor in International Relations and African Politics and also Chair Professor in the School of International Studies at the Renmin University of China. He is also Professor Extraordinary in Political Science at the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa, and an Honorary Professor at the Institute of African Studies, China.

Paul D. Williams is Associate Professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University and a Non-Resident Senior Adviser at the International Peace Institute in New York. His books include *War and Conflict in Africa* (Polity 2011), *Understanding Peacekeeping* (Polity, second edition, 2010), and *Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions* (Oxford University Press 2013).

PART I

The African security predicament in the twenty-first century

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1
INTRODUCTION
African security in the twenty-first century

James J. Hentz

The purpose of this book is to help the reader understand Africa, with a particular focus on the security issues confronting twenty-first-century Sub-Saharan Africa. Africa, south of the Sahara, consists of forty-eight countries, so generalizations are difficult and possibly dangerous. After all, the distance between Cape Town, South Africa and Khartoum, Sudan (5,242 miles) is roughly the same as the distance between London and Beijing (5,291 miles). As Tim Shaw notes in Chapter 4, Africa has both fragile and developmental states, as well as a chartered member of the BRICS – South Africa. Nonetheless, all forty-eight countries belong to the African Union (AU). Almost all were colonized by European powers; most are the progeny of the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885.[1] The Organization of African Unity (OAU), the precursor to the AU, certified the Berlin rules under Article II, paragraph III of its Charter; resolution 16 of the OAU states that it: "solemnly declares that all member states pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence".[2] As Herbert Howe explains:

> Indeed, the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 established Africa's boundaries in part to avoid *European* conflict in Africa. The absence of antagonisms in Europe after 1918 among the major colonial powers – Britain, France, Portugal and Belgium – and the weak military capabilities of the colonies meant that colonial states in Africa did not fight each other.
>
> *Howe 2001: 32*

In fact, the political map of Africa is almost exactly the same as it was when most of its countries became independent in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The exceptions to the rule are Eritrea, which gained its independence from Ethiopia in 1993 and Southern Sudan, which gained its independence from Sudan in July 2011.

Since the end of the Cold War the countries of the continent have confronted many common challenges. The twenty-first century did not begin well. The 2005 *Peace and Conflict* ledger identified 31 out of 161 countries as being in danger of a serious conflict; 17 of them were African (Marshall and Gurr 2005: 2). There are more U.N. peacekeeping troops in Africa than on any other continent, as of 2006 seventy-five percent of all U.N. peacekeepers were in Africa (Knight 2008: 1); the U.N. has conducted nineteen complex peace operations since the end of the Cold

War, ten of them in Africa (Englebert and Tull 2008: 106). At the turn of the century, seven out of fourteen major conflicts worldwide took place in Africa (Grant, MacLean, Shaw 2005: 124) No fewer than 32 African countries have suffered at least one episode of non-separatist civil conflict since 1960 (Englebert, Chapter 13). It is home to most of the world's conflicts (SPIRA 2006: 109).

Why Africa matters

Of course, one could ask why we need to study or understand Africa's security challenges. It has, traditionally, been on the geopolitical backburner of the Great Powers. There has also been the sense that there is something particular and even deviant about Africa (Baaz and Stern, Chapter 14). One obvious answer is that if it did not matter, what explains the amount of international attention it has received, particularly since the end of the Cold War? In October 2009, the United States elected its newest Central Command – AFRICOM (Nigro and Lovelace, Chapter 24). Until then, responsibility for Africa was shared among, EUROCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM. Europe, traditionally more concerned with Africa than the Americas or Asia, in part because of its colonial legacy, remains active in Africa (Gebrewold, Chapter 23; N'Diaye, Chapter 27). China, the not-so-new suitor, may be the most active external power (Taylor, Chapter 22). The interaction between the Arab world and Africa is important (Solomon, Chapter 26). The importance of Africa, however, goes well beyond its rising geopolitical importance. The cover of *The Economist* on 3 December, 2011 stated, "Africa Rising". Sub-Saharan Africa, and its forty-eight countries, does not seem to threaten the security of the rest of the world. Since independence, African countries have rarely threatened each other; there have only been three clear instances of interstate war: Tanzania's invasion of Uganda in 1978 to overthrow Idi Amin, the Somalia and Ethiopian conflict in Ogden territory, 1977–1978, and the 2000 Eritrean–Ethiopian conflict. Other conflicts that might be considered in this category would include: Libya versus Chad in the 1980s, Ethiopia versus Somalia in the 1970s, Rwanda versus Uganda in 2002, and possibly South Africa's destabilization campaign of the 1980s.[3]

Intra-state conflict is a different story. As Elbadawi and Sambanis note, over the last forty years, twenty Sub-Saharan African countries have had a civil war (2000: 234). More importantly however, many of Africa's post-Cold War conflicts do not fit the definition of either a civil war or an interstate war. According to the widely cited Correlates of War Project, a civil war is defined as

> sustained military combat resulting in at least 1,000 deaths per year, pitting central government's forces against an insurgent force capable of effective resistance, determined by the latter's ability to inflict upon the government forces at least 5% of the fatalities that the insurgents sustain.
>
> *Henderson and Singer 2002: 179*

Yet Africa's conflicts often slip outside the formal definition of a civil war.

That leaves us with something different. Much of Africa's conflicts or wars have been labeled *new wars* (Kaldor 1999; Munkler 1998). What most of the *new wars* have in common is an understanding that the waning role of the state places them outside the category of classical war, either inter-state or civil war. Because the state is no longer the central factor in these conflicts, in the sense that it is being fought over, and because politics in the Westphalia nation-state system centres on the state, they are seen as occurring outside the realm of politics. *New wars* is a somewhat amorphous even ambiguous category of war. Not all scholars who are grouped into

this category even use the term *new wars*. But as a separate category, there are common themes that allow a body of literature to be grouped together. They tend to agree that: there are a group of post-Cold War conflicts that are fundamentally different from "old wars" and that they are mostly internal wars; the systemic effects of globalization is a primary explanation for why they are different; and these wars are not Clausewitzean, in the sense that they have no discernible political logic. Finally, for all these reasons, international relations theory has not been able to explain them.

The notion of *new wars*, although often a seriously flawed and amorphous category, does point us in the right direction. *Semper aliquid novi Africane* (There is always something new out of Africa) – Pliny the Elder. As I have argued elsewhere, we have as much to learn from Africa as Africa from us (Hentz forthcoming). This resonates throughout this book. The point then, is not so much that post-Cold War Africa has had a lot of conflict; it has, but rather what do we know about those conflicts, how do we make sense of them, and with what analytical tools? Not least of all, what lessons can we learn?

Themes

This book is divided into four sections with a total of twenty-seven chapters. There are, nonetheless, themes that thread their way through the entirety.

First, is the broad question of how we define *security*. This is a question that the broader field of *security studies* is debating. In this book, van Nieuwkerk (Chapter 11) notes that with the end of the Cold War, the strategic priorities of the major Western powers changed and thereby created the room to integrate security with political and economic development. This debate is best captured by a dichotomous framing – *national* security versus *human* security (Dunn, Chapter 15). What is typically labeled *national* security focuses on the security of the state. This perspective is usually the conceptual playing field of *realism*, with its strong complement of *realpolitik*. The focus is on why and how one state threatens another. In the post-9/11 world, of course, this has become something of a straw man. The so-called *War on Terror* is a state (or alliance of states) against a non-state actor. The growing interdependence among states, manifested in globalization, means that the hermetically sealed state of realism is more fiction than fact.

The issues, nonetheless, go deeper, particularly when dealing with the developing world, and most decidedly when dealing with Africa. The underlying assumptions of the *national* security school, and the *realist* lens it uses, is that states are the main actors, in that they are unitary actors, and that they interact in a Westphalia world. None of these assumptions necessarily hold true in Africa (Dunn and Shaw 2001). The most serious security threat is not from one state to another. In fact, while between 2002 and 2006 Africa had forty-two percent of the world's fatalities from organized violence; it had eighty-three percent of non-state fatalities. The African state is not a unitary actor; it is more likely to be a weak state which does not meet the criteria of a Weberian state. The Africa state system, while part of the international system and therefore impacted by the anarchical logic of international politics (e.g. during the Cold War), has a different anarchical logic shaping security needs. The African state system is different. In Herbst's words:

> the security dilemma – the notion that each state's effort to become more secure threatens another state – is rooted in a world where armies had to be massed on frontiers in order to protect territory. Thus Kenneth Waltz notes that, "contact generates conflict and at times issues in violence". Without having to compete for territory, Africans could devise rules by which all could become more secure.
>
> *Herbst 2000: 106*

The relations among Sub-Saharan states reflect a pattern influenced by a different form of anarchy:

> But anarchy means something different in a world populated by weak states . . . To recast Alexander Wendt, the issue is not what states make of anarchy, but that states must makes something of different forms of anarchy.
>
> *Hentz 2009: 194*

What Chapter 2 calls, "The African Security Predicament" discusses a melody of "new security threats". They include: bad governance, transnational organized crime, and terrorist threats. Subsequent chapters add environmental degradation (Shaw, Chapter 4; Dunn, Chapter 15) and disease (Shaw, Chapter 4). None of these security threats are associated with the threat of one state to the existential existence of another. These "new security threats" partially come from the changes in the international system since the end of the Cold War, most importantly, from the effects of globalization. They are also a product of and exacerbated by the nature of the Africa state. Spears (Chapter 10) lays out the logic of state formation in Africa. Africa's states, he argues, resemble seventeenth-century Europe. They are weak states, or what Englebert (Chapter 13) calls the "soft African post-colonial state". They have difficulty providing the necessary public goods to their citizens, the most important being security. Part of the problem has been the neopatrimonial character of the post-colonial Africa. Neopatrimonial rule can be defined by three characteristics: first, in contrast to the Weberian state, which is defined by impersonal and abstract legal-rational rule, the neopatrimonial state is defined by personal rule; second, the boundary between the private and the public is blurred and the state becomes the main means for accumulating power and wealth; third, politics are structured around vertical patron–client relationships, typically centred on a "big man". Chabal explains:

> What this means in concrete terms is that, despite the formal political structure in place, power transits essentially through the informal sector. Or, rather, it is the interplay between the formal and the informal that power is exercised on the continent. This form of governance, often dubbed neo-patrimonialism, rests on the well understood, if unequal, forms of political reciprocity which link patrons with their clients along vertical social lines.
>
> *Chabal 2005: 3*

As Bach (Chapter 16) argues, even regional relations are patrimonialized.

The place of Africa in the international system and the nature of the African state, therefore, has led to a shift in focus from *national* security to *human* security. This shift had global origins and global ramifications. Africa has been at the centre of its genesis and has been the most affected by its use in practice, and at the centre of this shift is the evolving norm of the *Responsibility to Protect* (R2P). This means that a state's sovereignty is increasingly interpreted as entailing a responsibility to protect its citizenry, and not just from an external threat. But as Bachmann and Gelot state: "However, the R2P envisages the delegation of this responsibility to the international community in cases where the state has 'manifestly failed' to protect the population" (Bachmann and Gelot 2012: 2), or as Engel and Porto note, a move from the politics of non-interference to non-indifference (Chapter 17). As Bachmann and Gelot point out, the protection of civilians has a long history, stretching as far back as at least Grotius and enlightenment thinkers. In their words, it

> mainly applied to how the character of war was seen in the modern period and particularly in the 20th century: as a war between sovereign states. Yet with an

> increasing international focus on civil wars, extended peace operations and an increasing numbers of humanitarian actors since the 1990s, the issue of protection gained a new topicality and needed to be reconsidered.
>
> *Bachmann and Gelot 2012: 5*

In principle, R2P and the concomitant shift to a *human* security framework seems consistent with the type of security threats, i.e. the "new security" threats, facing Africa. In practice, it is more complicated. Lyons (Chapter 12) cautions:

> Humanitarian assistance is often essential for large populations of vulnerable people to survive the violence and upheaval of civil war and state collapse. At the same time, however, such assistance provides resources that often allow authoritarian governments, insurgencies, and other armed groups to sustain themselves and thereby continue strategies of violence.

The above quote alludes to the weak Africa state, a common theme of the chapters in this book. The R2P norm has such traction in Africa, precisely because of the pervasive, if not universal, weakness of the Africa state. Englebert even refers to the "unique" nature of the post-colonial state (Chapter 13).

At its extreme, state weakness can lead to state collapse; as discussed in Chapter 6 by Hentz and Blevins. They note, however, that while state collapse always unfolds because the state is hollowed out, there is almost always a regional dimension. The nature of Africa's weak state, combined with unstable peripheries, engenders "conflict zones" such as the Mano River Basin, the Great Lakes region, and Darfur. Increasingly, Africa's security challenges are framed in regional terms. Also, solutions to those challenges have taken regional approaches, such as by the growing role of Africa's regional organizations (see chapters in Part III). External actors have, as well, promoted regional approaches (see Part IV).

Regionalism and regionalization (Bach, Chapter 16) is a prominent theoretical framing for understanding Africa, and had proven to be the prevailing pragmatic approach favoured by policy makers. Thus, for instance, Part III has a series of chapters looking at the different regional organizations in Sub-Saharan Africa, from the African Union (AU) to the subregions: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Obi, Chapter 18), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Burgess, Chapter 19), the Intergovernmental Agency on Development (IGAD) (Healy, Chapter 20) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) (Meyer Chapter 21). Under the umbrella of the AU, each sub-region has its own regional organization, which is increasingly expected to tackle its interdependent security issues. All of the new security threats noted above spill across the porous borders of Africa's weak states. By the very nature of the Africa state system, security is regionalized (Hentz forthcoming). But as the authors in Part III make clear, even as the subregional organization advances regionalism, it does so often in support of state sovereignty. They often take what is called the intergovernmental approach to regional cooperation (Meyer, Chapter 21). Thus the section on Africa's regions not only describes and explains how Africa in partnership with external actors is addressing security, it reveals the hold traditional security has on Africa in practice. Even as frameworks of analysis shift the focus from traditional security to new security issues and human security, state and regime security dominate the security agendas.

Africa has been described as marginalized and dependent. The colonial impact on Africa's development is a cornerstone of African studies. The Cold War had a mostly negative impact on Africa. In the twenty-first century, for all the reasons covered in the first three parts of this

volume, Africa has become more important to the international community than it was in the first fifty years of independence. It has also remained largely dependent on the international community, particularly for providing security. For instance, AU peace support operations are 98% funded by donor assistance (Engle and Porto, Chapter 17).

It is important to accept and explore African agency in shaping its security predicament. It is, nonetheless, impossible to ignore external influences. Even as the mantra "African solutions for Africa's problems" gains currency, Africa's security challenges are hardly purely home-grown. Nor are the challenges that one might delegate to specific African states or regions likely to be hermetically sealed. As Part IV demonstrates, external actors continue to play a central role in Africa's security.

Finally, as noted above, there is much new (and old) in Africa. The tension between the *sue generis* approach of many regionalists and the pursuit of generalizations by many international relations theorists can be reconciled by using old or accepted concepts in new ways. In a previous book I argued:

> The gulf between area studies and the field of national security is even greater than that between area studies and comparative politics . . . Thus, curiously, while international relations theory has built bridges to comparative politics, it has ignored the middle ground of regionalism, which meant in the context of this volume, not only a country expertise (comparative politics), but also an understanding of the international relations of the regions.
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> *Hentz 2004: 7*

The contributions to this book cross disciplinary boundaries and their orthodoxies. In the end, the whole of this book should prove greater than the sum of its parts.

Notes

1 The conference was attended by Germany, France, Great Britain, Portugal, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Russia, Austria-Hungary, the United States, Denmark, Sweden-Norway, the Netherlands, and the Ottoman Empire.

2 http://.chr.up.za/hr_docs/african/docs/ahsg/ashg4doc

3 The paucity of international war in Africa is a product of, and partially explains, the failure of the Westphalia project in Africa. In Charles Tilly's famous phrase: "states make wars; wars make states" (see also Holsti 1996: 29).

2
THE AFRICAN SECURITY PREDICAMENT

Kwesi Aning and Naila Salihu

Introduction

The security landscape of post-independence Africa is replete with conflicts and other security threats. In the post-Cold War era, African states witnessed high incidences of intra-state conflicts that resulted in several cases of state implosion. These internal conflicts, or "new wars", were characterized by a blurring of the lines between war, organized crime and large-scale human rights violations, which distinguished them from earlier conventional civil wars (Kaldor, 1999). However, in recent years, there has been a decline in armed conflicts, in Africa due to significant efforts by African and international engagements in conflict prevention, management, and resolution. The security landscape has changed. "While armed conflicts have been the single most devastating security challenge for the African continent, new and emerging security challenges are being superimposed on them – what might be termed 'old' challenges" (Aning 2011a: 149).

The old security predicament remains the perennial intra- and inter-state armed conflicts, which are underpinned by political violence, demographic change and youth bulge, food insecurity, and the ready availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) (Aning, 2008). The new challenges, which are deeply rooted in the old challenges, include the growth of interrelated trans-organized criminal activities, such as illicit drug trafficking, internet fraud, human trafficking, money laundering, exploitation and smuggling of natural resources, and terrorist networks (Aning 2007b).

Moving beyond violent conflict to other critical indicators of insecurity, such as socio-economic factors, demographic change, environmental degradation, and governance issues, will attest to the fact that Africa is in a seemingly never-ending security predicament. Major international indices for Africa are foreboding. For example, the 2011 Human Development Index had ten African countries as the lowest ranked (Guinea, Central Africa Republic, Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Chad, Mozambique, Burundi, Niger, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)) (UNDP 2011). Similarly, four African states, Somalia, Chad, Sudan, and DRC have once again topped the 2011 failed states index (Failed States Index 2011). The Global Peace Indexes of 2010 and 2011 also indicate that Sub-Saharan Africa remains the region least at peace. The region contains 40% of the world's least peaceful countries, with Sudan and Somalia at the bottom of the index, ranking 151 and 153 respectively. Analysts like Mohammed Ayoob alluded to this predicament over a decade ago, by linking conflicts and insecurity in the

developing world with the processes of state-making in terms of territorial consolidation and institution-building (Ayoob 1995). Other interrelated factors, such as the legacy of colonialism, have been adduced to explain the African security predicament (Adekeye 2010). Certainly, Africa's security quagmire can be traced to multifaceted and interlocking historical, political, economic, and socio-cultural factors. However, such security dilemmas are also deeply rooted in the weak nature of the Africa state and manifested by the lack of institutional capacity to respond to its numerous challenges. The tendency to violence or conflict in Africa has more to do with the nature of the African state and the attendant insecurities it creates than the good or evil nature of a given actor or the pathological predispositions of a given society or culture (Spears 2010: 3; Bayart, Ellis and Hibou 1999; Chabal and Daloz 2010; Chabal 2009).

This chapter explores the African security predicament in the twenty-first century. The first section analyzes the dynamics of Africa's contemporary security challenges from a human security perspective. The argument here is that there is a need to shift the focus in discussing these dilemmas, from a narrow state-centric or regime-centric approach to a much wider analytical lens that captures the wider, interlocking complexities of Africa's security challenges. Therefore, the second section analyzes regional and international efforts and strategies that have responded to these predicaments. The chapter's central argument is that the major contributory factors to Africa's security challenges are state and institution weakness.

Conceptualizing Africa's security landscape

Africa is a diverse continent of 54 states, whose security threats vary from country to country and from region to region. Usually, the presence of these threats is informed by the local dynamics, strategies and interests of the local actors (Ayangafac and Cilliers 2011: 11). The post-Cold War era has seen a paradigm shift from the traditional or state-centric conception of security to a more comprehensive conception of security, with the individual as the point of reference. The traditional idea of security, based on how states use force to manage threats to their territorial integrity, autonomy, and domestic political order from other states has failed to improve human security within states (Bajpai 2000: 3–4). The new security thinking argues that the militaristic conceptualization of security that dominated the Cold War era is too narrow for understanding today's security challenges (Buzan 1991a). In the post-Cold War era, threats to security emanate from the state and individuals within the state rather than factors external to the state. The need to broaden the concept to include political, economic, social and environmental threats has resulted in a paradigm shift, from a state-centred militaristic framing to an individuals or human security framework. This framework of analysis often combines human development and other basic human needs with traditional security issues, while emphasizing freedom from fear and freedom from want (UNDP 1994; King and Murray 2001: 592–3; Commission on Human Security 2003).

With hindsight, Africa's contemporary security or human security landscape presents a grim picture. Old security threats, such as violent armed conflicts and political violence that constituted the greatest threat to the security of states and peoples on the continent have been declining. On the other hand, new security threats, such as poor socio-economic conditions, recurrent sectarian violence, climate change, food insecurity and proliferation of illicit SALW, remain pervasive in many African states (Aning and Bah 2009: 29). The proliferation of SALW in particular, is both a consequence and cause of armed conflict in Africa and thus constitutes a real challenge to the quest for peace and stability. Their availability fuels robbery, violent crimes and armed conflict and they have thus been referred to as the continent's weapons of mass destruction. Out of the estimated 500 million small arms and light weapons in illegal circulation worldwide, 100 million

are found in Africa (African Union). The widespread availability of SALWs has contributed to massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Furthermore, it has become a factor in the development of a culture of violence that threatens, and in some instances has destroyed, the social fabric of many countries in Africa. They, as well, have contributed to the development of the phenomenon of child soldiers. SALW have, thus, undermined efforts at economic development, good governance and democratization (African Union). More civilians have died directly and indirectly as a result of the use of SALW than due to weapons of mass destruction (Africa Recovery 2001; Florquin and Berman 2005).

The new security predicament

Both the old and new security challenges often outstrip the capacity of the weak institutions of the African state to adequately respond. This chapter will critically examine some of the new security challenges: specifically, governance, transnational organized crime, and terrorism; each contributes to the twenty-first-century security predicament in Africa.

The governance predicament

The challenge of good governance is not new to Africa. Governance or bad governance has been one of the most critical aspects of the post-independence political history of African states. It has been the principal destabilizing factor on the continent. A democratic deficit and a lack of transparent governance has resulted in political violence often ending in military interventions and destructive intra-state conflicts (Aning and Bah 2009). Most especially, conflicts and the attendant humanitarian crises have largely been attributed to bad governance, developmental malaise, poverty, group inequality, resource competition, and weak and predatory institutions (Duffield 2001: 15–16). Structural causes of violence and conflict in Africa can be traced to discriminatory political arrangements and fragile dysfunctional and repressive institutions, in the face of a weak civil society counterforce (Musah 2010: 17). These structural causes breed conflict triggers, such as "institutional corruption, ethnic/religious intolerance and extremism, manipulation of constitutions and electoral processes, organized crime, environmental degradation and food insecurity; demographic pressures, falling educational standards and youth unemployment . . ." (ibid.). In addition, the governance deficit, not only in terms of bad governance or repressive policies but in the failure of governments to anticipate conflicts and deal with them effectively, contribute to the sub-regions' persistent political instability. Even where states are not involved directly in crisis situations, their responses to information on impending conflicts have often been slow (Aning, Addo and Birikorang 2004).

Despite the limitations inherent in Africa's political transitions, a significant number of countries have made the difficult transition from full-blown military/civilian authoritarian rule to various shades of multiparty democracies (Ukeje 2008). There followed expectations that African countries would follow the path of good governance to create the enabling environment for sustainable development and stability. However, these expectations have been short-lived, as most states and people on the continent are yet to experience the real dividends of democracy and good governance. With the exception of some countries, such as Mauritius, Cape Verde, Botswana, Seychelles, South Africa, Benin, and Ghana, most African states are at varying stages of institutionalizing democracy and good governance.

The general trend in Africa, however, is mixed. Some countries have improved in both sustainable economic opportunity and human development. Despite the decline in military dictatorships and one-party regimes, the majority of Africa's new regimes are not full democracies,

but mixed regimes that have a propensity for violent behaviour. Africa requires significant political change if this is to promote stable security through the promotion of emancipatory politics. In other words, security based on people, justice and change (Williams 2008). Democracy is not a simple palliative.

Even though military intervention has become less acceptable in contemporary African politics, there have been recent cases in Guinea in 2008, Mauritania in 2009, Niger in 2010, Mali and Guinea Bissau in 2012. The re-emergence of *coups* in the political landscape is partly attributable to attempts by incumbent leaders to manipulate constitutions and electoral rules to perpetuate their tenure in office. In some cases, there have been mass protests by the citizenry, with violent aftermaths stemming from clashes between state security apparatuses and protestors. For instance, recent attempts by President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal to run for a third term through an amendment to the country's electoral laws led to protests. Clashes between police and protesters left over 100 injured. This led to heightened tensions in a country, long lauded as a relative oasis of calm in a troubled West African sub-region. In some African states, elections have not been free and fair, leading to conflicts and tensions. Election-related violence has claimed several thousand lives and destroyed valuable properties and infrastructure in many African countries. The recent gory post-election violence in Côte d'Ivoire claimed an estimated 3,000 lives, and over a million were either internally displaced or forced to flee as refugees in neighboring countries. There were also reports of human rights violations and abuses, such as extra-judicial executions, ill treatment, arbitrary detention, excessive use of force, disappearances, and sexual violence, by both the state security forces and militias loyal to former president, Laurent Gbagbo, or to President Alassane Ouattara (Amnesty International 2011).

Africa was also surprised by a new wave of political change in North Africa, termed the Arab Spring or Jasmine Revolution. From December 2010, there were popular uprisings against some of the longest serving despotic rulers in some North African countries, namely Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. While Hosni Mubarak and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Egypt and Tunisia, respectively, bowed out amidst the protests, Libya's Maumar Gaddafi unleashed a violent response against anti-government protestors and civilians. Subsequently, a United Nations Security Council resolution (Resolution 1973) sanctioned the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces to use all means possible to protect civilians against the systematic violence of Gaddafi's regime (UN 2011). Gaddafi was eventually ousted by rebel forces, captured and killed.

The Arab Spring has had two-sided effects. On the one hand, despite the obvious questions of legality, they are remarkable instances in the continent's political history of ordinary people rising up against dictatorships to force the leaders out of office (Sturman 2011). On the other hand, the violence that ensued, especially the deadly conflicts in Libya, resulted in civilian casualties and the extensive destruction of infrastructure (Okyere and Abdallah 2011). Civilians figured in large numbers as victims – both casualties and refugees (International Crisis Group 2011).

The international community, particularly as reflected by Resolution 1973, has shed a light on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). NATO's intervention to enforce the resolution is commendable within the context of protecting civilians. However, the swift transition from the use of diplomacy to military force calls into question the real objective of the mission (Okyere and Abdallah 2011). Furthermore, the response of the international community to violent repression in other countries outside Africa differs significantly from the approach applied to Libya. This raises critical questions over whether this represents a new form of interventionism in Africa. If foreign intervention is motivated by the need to protect vulnerable populations from brutalities, (as the R2P norm encourages) or from the repression of their own despotic leaders, then the intervention in Libya smacks of a double standard (Okyere and

Abdallah 2011). The international community has not responded in a similar way in Yemen, Syria and Bahrain.

In addition, there are potential negative impacts of the Libyan crisis on the Sahel region, West Africa, and Africa, such as in the proliferation of SALWs. The Gaddafi regime is reported to have armed loyalists and recruited mercenaries from other African countries, such as Niger, Mali and Chad (Uppsala Conflict Database Programme 2011). For instance, the return to Niger of Tuareg fighters trained and equipped by Gaddafi raises serious concerns as to what new demands these groups may make of the fragile regimes in Niger and Mali (De Kock and Snyman 2011).

In the case of Mali we know the answer; it is widely reported that the return of hundreds of heavily armed Tuareg mercenaries, who had fought for both Gaddafi and the National Transitional Council (NTC) rebels had reignited the rebellion in Northern Mali. The Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) has been fighting for a separate Islamic state in the north, with a population reaching across the borders of Mali into neighboring Algeria and Niger (Townsend 2012). After months of attacks against the military and civilians by the Tuareg rebels, mid-ranking military officers led by Captain Amadou Sonogo staged a coup on 22 March 2012, following a mutiny by some segments of the army. The coup occurred barely a month before the country was to go the polls. The coup makers in Mali claimed that the government of President Amadou Toumani Toure was not providing enough logistical support to the army to stop the Tuareg insurgency. Subsequently, the separatist fight and the coup have thrown the country, which was in a democratic transition, into a political crisis and it has increased the country's vulnerability to security threats, especially by terrorist networks.

Little or no control has been exercised over the Gaddafi arms caches since hostilities broke out (ibid.). It is possible that weapons controlled by rebel forces could find their way into insurgent networks, such as al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) in the Sahel region (De Kock and Snyman 2011). For instance, even though the Tuareg rebellion has been credited with the recent destabilization in Northern Mali, there is a strong possibility that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has been behind insurgent activity in the region (Hirsch 2012).

The Arab Spring, despite its shortcomings, has brought about some regime change in the above-mentioned countries. The critical challenge now lies in how soon the new or transitional leaderships in these countries will be able to put in place legitimate institutions to ensure smooth transitions to constitutional democracy. In Libya, post-conflict reconstruction and development is a challenge. The country is awash with small arms and light weapons, which constitute a major threat to achieving sustainable peace and stability, even once a constitutional government is put in place. With so many non-state actors and idle ex-combatants wielding arms, insecurity and criminality is likely to linger.

The challenge of transnational organized crimes

Transnational organized crimes in Africa take several forms and includes drug trafficking, advanced-fee and internet fraud, human trafficking, diamond smuggling, forgery, cigarette smuggling, illegal firearms manufacturing, firearms trafficking, armed robbery and theft, piracy, money laundering, and oil smuggling (Aning 2008; 2010). These illegal economic transactions and concomitant corruption have turned Africa into a duty free port for organized crime (Le Sage 2011). With reference to narcotic trade, West Africa, in particular, has emerged as a major hub for transnational organized crimes such as drug trafficking, money laundering and oil bunkering. According to the UN Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC), fifty tonnes of cocaine pass through the sub-region annually (UNODC 2008). Since 2003, 99% of drug seizures on the continent have occurred in the sub-region. For instance, the West African maritime states, such

as Ghana, Cape Verde, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Nigeria, Guinea and Senegal, have been cited as major entry points for cocaine and have experienced increasing incidences of drug seizures (Winter 2007). Due to the concerted international response against drug trafficking, the coast of West Africa, because of porous borders, and weak states surveillance and law enforcement capacity, has now become the major transit point for drugs from Latin America into European markets.

Even though illicit economic activities, including narcotic-trade, are not new phenomena to Africa, the increasing activities of drug traffickers pose serious threats to human, national and international security in West Africa, and beyond. In the view of Aning and Bah, the drug menace is a strategic concern with long-term implications not only for the sub-region but also for Europe, the US and Latin America, and should thus be considered as a humanitarian issue (Aning and Bah 2009). Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan also captures this succinctly by arguing that "organized crime contributes to state weakness, impedes economic growth, fuels many civil wars, regularly undermines United Nations peace building efforts and provides financing mechanisms to terrorist groups" (UN 2005: 27). Organized crime in general impedes social, economic, cultural and democratic developments globally, with disproportionate effects on developing and fragile states in Africa. The threat and challenges of organized crimes in Africa is enormous because of the high presence of fragile states that serve as potential breeding grounds for such activities (Aning 2011c). While drug-trafficking networks may be able to penetrate and devastate the already weak political, economic and social structures, albeit in varying degrees across Africa, the real danger stems from the impact of drug money on public and private sectors and community institutions. This mainly arises from the interaction between the region's growing drug consumption and trafficking problems on the one hand, and pre-existing social, economic, and political vulnerabilities on the other.

Moreover, the extent to which external drug traffickers are able to form alliances with actors not linked to the official state system, particularly former or existing rebels or young challengers seeking social mobility in an exclusive system, creates a conflictual relationship with the state, thereby breeding political instability (Felbab-Brown 2010). In most African countries, there exists a variety of systems that underpin the growth of the criminal groups and their activities. These include familial, ethnic, cultural, and traditional elements. These systems are bound by a common cultural ethos and have important bearings on why criminal activities continue; in some cases with the knowledge and tacit support of the local community and the lack of strong intervention by law enforcement agencies (Vanda 2010: 155–156). Even some agents of the state, politicians, as well as members of their families or local communities play key roles in this illicit economy (Jourde 2011). There is also a multi-layered relationship and collaboration between traffickers, organized criminals and terrorist groups. Such collaboration often involves the provision of safe passage by rebels and terrorist groups for traffickers. The terrorists and rebel groups or criminals, in return, exact some form of taxation from the traffickers, either in cash or kind. The monies raised through the taxes are then used by the terrorist groups to finance their activities (Aning 2011b). The destabilizing effects of drug trafficking hinders the attainment of sustainable peace and stability globally and on the continent (UNODC 2010: 231).

The threat of terrorist networks

Closely linked or perhaps fuelled by transnational organized crimes are the growing activities of radical Islamists and terrorist groups such as AQIM, Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram[1] in Nigeria. The interconnected issues of political Islam and terrorism are of increasing concern for Africa, as these have begun to provide new dimensions to conflict both within states and

across sub-regions. Political Islam now serves as a medium for political mobilization in various forms (Aning 2007b). With particular reference to AQIM, a violent criminal group based in the Sahel-Saharan band,[2] its main activities in the form of hostage-taking, bomb attacks and terrorizing tourists and travellers, constitute an enormous challenge to regional as well as global peace and security (Aning 2009; Aning 2011b). AQIM emanated from Algeria's decade-long conflict with Islamists in the 1990s and it is the only significant militia force remaining from that struggle. It was created when the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) pledged allegiance to the senior leadership of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in January 2007. In December of that year, the group conducted simultaneous bombings in Algiers of the UN office complex and the Constitutional Court (Le Sage 2011). AQIM's sustained upsurge in kidnappings, attacks, and bombings in the Sahel in the past years has heightened concerns that it is gaining ground in West and North Africa. Indeed, it now has a substantial presence over vast stretches of the Sahel (Goita 2011). Their activities largely consisted of opportunistic kidnappings of tourists and workers of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in major cities across the Sahel. However, recent acts carried out by AQIM in the Sahel are increasingly a mixture of criminal and low-level terrorism (Goita 2011). These attacks have demonstrated a greater degree of sophistication and intelligence-gathering capability than in the past. For example, in September 2010, it conducted overnight raids in Arlit, Niger, and kidnapped seven employees and family members from the compound of the French multinational nuclear services firm, Areva. This attack points to a network of sophisticated information gathering (Goita 2011). AQIM is taking advantage of the inability of Sahelian states to exercise effective control over their territories. It now operates across a region of several hundred thousand square kilometres. More importantly, AQIM is able to advance its long-term strength and viability by integrating with local communities to gradually deepen its roots, increase its resource base, and develop operational strength (Chikhi 2010). AQIM's new Sahelian strategy could result in the eventual establishment of sanctuaries, mini Waziristan's in the region (Goita 2011: 2). Northern Mali, in particular, is becoming a major hub of terrorist activities. The region, once a popular tourist destination, is now avoided by foreigners (Goita 2011; Lohmann 2011).

Other terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria are a security concern. In Eastern and Central Africa, the most current terrorist scare is the activities of the *Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin* (or simply Al-Shabaab). Al Shabaab is an offshoot of Somalia's erstwhile Islamic Courts Union (*al Itihaad al Islamiya*), that controlled most of southern Somalia in the second half of 2006. Although the Somali government with the help of Ethiopian forces chased out the Islamic Courts Union in a two-week war between December 2006 and January 2007, Al-Shabaab has risen to prominence in the midst of decades-long instability in Somalia. The group is believed to have links with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. It has continued its violent insurgency against Somalia's transitional government and its Ethiopian supporters since 2006. Their motive is to impose Islamic Wahhabi rule in Somalia, with the express aim of expanding it to the rest of the Horn of Africa (National Counterterrorism Center 2011). The group has exerted temporary, and, at times, sustained control over strategic locations in southern and central Somalia by recruiting regional sub-clans and their militias and using guerrilla asymmetrical warfare and terrorist tactics against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and its allies (African Union peacekeepers, and nongovernmental aid organizations) (National Counterterrorism Center 2011). Al-Shabaab has undergone a dramatic transformation, from a small nationalistic youth militia, largely focused on driving out Ethiopia through conventional military means, to a hybrid movement that has increasingly embraced transnational terrorism and attempted to portray itself as part of the al-Qaeda global jihad (Wise 2011). For instance, it claimed responsibility for the twin bombings that killed more than 70 people in

Kampala, Uganda during the World Cup final on July 11, 2010. This marked the group's first major attack outside of Somalia (Hanson 2011). In October 2011, Somalia's northeastern neighbor Kenya, citing claims of attacks on its security forces and the abduction and murder of tourists and aid workers inside Kenya, sought the support of the United Nations, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states, the Arab League, and other Islamic states, to launch a military offensive in Somalia to deal with Al-Shabaab.

The increasing threat of Boko Haram in Nigeria has increased Africa's terrorist profile. Until recently, Nigeria's main security nightmares were widening poverty, violent crimes, lingering conflict in the Niger Delta, and the recurrent sectarian violence in northern and central parts of the country. While these security threats persist, the growing terrorist activities of the Boko Haram and other affiliate groups have become a major security threat. Nigeria has a history of Islamic extremism, particularly in the Muslim-dominated north. For example, in the 1980s Islamist militants belonging to the *Maitastine* movement became prominent in Kano, and other northern states, and were at the center of violent disputes with government forces (Institute for Strategic Studies 2011). Other groups such as the Muslim Brothers and the *Muhajirin* have launched attacks at different points in time. In 2003, the *Mahajirin* group launched its first attack in Maiduguri, the capital of the north-eastern state of Borno and soon began attacking government officials and police, often seizing weapons and ammunitions (IISS 2011). These militant groups often mobilized around common factors, such as endemic corruption by the country's leadership, injustice, deteriorating socio-economic conditions (especially in the northern areas), high unemployment, and the rejection of Western values, which in the view of such a group, had caused society and some clerics to abandon the tenets of Islam to embrace secularism (IISS). Partly in response to such demands Sharia was introduced in northern Nigeria.

In 2002, Boko Haram emerged in Maiduguri, and was led by Mohammed Yusuf, until his summary execution in 2009 (IISS 2011; Aning 2012). The aim of the group is to fully establish an Islamic state in Nigeria, including the implementation of Sharia courts across the country (Johnson 2011). Since then, the group has mainly engaged in small-scale attacks against government and security targets. It first made international headlines in July 2009 when it launched five days of intense attacks against westernized clerics and elites resulting in the death of more than 700 people in Maiduguri and forcing about 5,000 to flee. The extent of the violence showed that Boko Haram was capable of mobilizing thousands of people and was better trained and armed than government forces had thought (Johnson 2011). It also claimed responsibility for other high profile attacks, such as the suicide car-bombing of the UN building in the Nigerian capital, Abuja, in August 2011, the burning down of a hotel in Maiduguri, and the bombing of the national police headquarters in Abuja. Recent deadly attacks in the north-eastern states of Yobe and Borno recorded more than 100 casualties.

Although the activities of Islamist groups, such as the Boko Haram, are largely motivated by internal economic, political and religious grievances, the external repercussions on the entire sub-region and the continent matter. This is because the increased sophistication of Boko Haram's attacks may be partly explained by growing foreign support (Johnson 2011). The group is now believed to have about 300 fighters, with a wide network of about a 1000 supporters. Boko Haram may have linkages with al-Shabaab, AQIM and al-Qaeda (Johnson 2011). The danger then lies in the likelihood of these groups joining forces to launch wide attacks across the region in the face of weak surveillance systems. The group also remains a serious security threat in Nigeria, which is a regional power. Nigeria is already a highly polarized country with a deep ethno-religious divide. With nearly a quarter of the population living on less than $1.25 a day, the potential for inter-ethnic and religious violence remains high. Poverty and unemployment in the north, coupled with a population increase, and the government's inability to deal effectively

with non-state groups, could turn northern states into an ideal recruitment ground for extremists and provide a springboard for them to expand into the rest of the country. The Abuja attacks suggest that this is already occurring (IISS 2011).

Responding to Africa's security predicament: dealing with the governance challenge

The African Union (AU) has the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. This is done in collaboration with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs): the Economic Community of West African States, (ECOWAS), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in eastern Africa, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Together they are considered part of the overall African Peace and Security architecture (APSA). However, it is worth mentioning that although RECs, like ECOWAS, are subsidiary to the AU, their advantage in West Africa, as well their internal organization and institutional capacity, are often more advanced than those of the AU (Musah 2009).

The international community as well as regional and sub-regional institutions have been instrumental in fostering good and democratic governance on the continent. For instance, the AU adopted several mechanisms such as the Constitutive Act (2002), the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance in Africa, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), and the African Peer Review Mechanism, for promoting principles of democracy, good governance, and respect for human rights and human security on the continent. Other policy frameworks, such as the AU policy framework on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, recognized the issue of governance as their cardinal elements. At the same time, RECs like ECOWAS have established several comprehensive legal and normative instruments to guide their efforts in confronting new threats to both human and regional security on a more permanent and predictable basis (Musah 2009:17). Notable are the Protocols Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, and the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF). Civil society has also been identified as an essential partner for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa.

The AU and its RECs have embraced the culture of zero tolerance for unconstitutional transfers of political power. To this end, efforts of the AU, RECs, UN and the wider international community in promoting good governance practices in both stable and post-conflict countries on the continent have focused extensively on the monitoring and observation of elections. Due to tensions, and at times the violence associated with elections in Africa, such efforts contribute to ensuring the integrity of the processes and averting violent aftermaths (African Union 2009). In addition, the AU has put in place various organs and structures, such as the Peace and Security Council, and the Panel of the Wise, whose mandates include the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts including election-related disputes. Special missions have been deployed to various countries to mediate and negotiate peaceful settlements of post-election conflicts. For instance, during the recent post-elections crisis in Côte d'Ivoire in 2010, the AU and ECOWAS, embarked on numerous preventive diplomatic initiatives to solve the political stalemate. Though these efforts produced few tangible results, the unequivocal position taken by ECOWAS for Laurent Gbagbo to cede office was subsequently endorsed by the AU Peace and Security Council and the international community (specifically the UN and EU) and invariably weakened Gbagbo's claim to the presidency. International financial sanctions, particularly, the freeze by the West African Central Bank, greatly undermined Gbagbo's resolve to hold on to power, as his

access to resources for the payment of salaries to public servants and soldiers was curtailed (McGovern 2011; Aning and Salihu 2012).

The extensive focus on elections has not resulted in the complete eradication of election-related violence in Africa, and other pertinent governance challenges like the abuse of political incumbency, corruption, and political violence remain real challenges on the continent. Also, the failure of most African governments to pursue sound socio-economic governance through policies and programs that could bring about tangible socio-economic development to the ever growing population, particularly the youth, has significant impact on peace and stability in the region. Considering the destabilizing effect of the youth bulge together with other underlying economic, social, political and structural factors (Aning and Atta-Asamoah 2011), African leadership and institutions must pay particular attention to enhancing good governance on the continent.

Responding to the threat of transnational organized crimes

There have been several attempts at the national, sub-regional, and regional levels to stem the tide of organized crime in Africa, especially drug trafficking.

ECOWAS, in particular, has been instrumental on this front due to the fact the West African coast is increasingly a major player in the global illicit drug trade. In 1998, during the twenty-first Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government in Abuja, ECOWAS issued a declaration entitled "Community Flame Ceremony: The Fight against Drugs". Other actions taken by ECOWAS include the Decision on Establishing the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (or GIABA, 1999) (Aning 2011a). However, while many institutional frameworks exist, there have been few practical initiatives to implement them. The only exception is the activities undertaken by GIABA, which has been engaged in combating money laundering (ECOWAS Commission 2008). In spite of the lack of tangible achievements, the ECOWAS Commission has shown growing concern for the upsurge of drug trafficking, and other related crimes. To this end, at the thirty-second Ordinary Session, the Authority of Heads of State and Government in June 2007, the ECOWAS Commission was mandated to take urgent action. Subsequently, GIABA was authorized to determine the scale of the problem and to subsequently prepare an ECOWAS strategy. As a result of this preparatory work, two initiatives were undertaken: a civil society meeting on drugs was held in Abuja, Nigeria, on October 16, 2008, and the ECOWAS collaborative regional ministerial conference on drug trafficking and control was held in October 2008 in Praia, Cape Verde (conducted with the assistance of UNODC, the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA) and the EU). At the conference, the draft outcome document pledged "to accord drug control the priority it deserves and at the highest level of government as well as at the ECOWAS Commission" (ECOWAS Commission 2008). The ECOWAS Commission was also directed to establish structures to ensure the operationalization of the declaration. Although this declaration is yet to be fully operationalized, the most important aspect of the new ECOWAS approach is the responsibility of each individual state to address the issue of drugs. Thus the regional solution will be the result of efforts made at national levels. The challenge, however, rests in the low level of commitment by individual member states to their obligations of regional or continental institutions. Due to this low level of commitment, most regional and international decisions and resolutions add up to very little operational action or effective policy implementation. This may be attributed to several reasons, such as a lack of technical expertise in member states to follow through on state compliance. But more disturbing is the lack of political will to act. While the actual signing at the international level is usually done quickly, translating such laws into domestic legislation is

slow (Aning 2011a). As a result, both ECOWAS and AU initiatives have shown that regional policy is largely a reflection of national policies, which thus undermines the transnational cooperation that underlies these institutions. In addition, there are no oversight or monitoring frameworks to bring sanctions against non-compliant or free-riding states (Aning 2011a).

Likewise, the AU has taken a continent-wide approach through policies and initiatives to curtail the potential negative effects of transnational organized crimes in Africa. Even before the AU, its predecessor Organization of African Unity (OAU) had placed the problem of organized crimes high on its agenda, and the OAU Plan of Action on Drug Control was adopted in 1996 (OAU 1996; Aning 2011c). However, because of political instability in countries and regions, resource constraints, lack of political will, absence of a follow-up, monitoring and mobilization mechanisms, and inadequate institutional capacity, the Plan of Action could not be implemented. Subsequently, it was revised at the AU Ministerial Conference on Drug Control in 2002. The revised Action Plan was envisioned for the period 2002–2007. The following key areas of focus were identified: institution building and policy development; information, research, and networking; legal systems and implementation of laws; integrated drug-demand reduction; national law enforcement and control capacities; regional law enforcement and control measures; and international cooperation. In 2007, another Action Plan was adopted for the period 2007–2012. The core objective of the current plan of action is

> to reverse the current trends of drug abuse, trafficking, organised crime, corruption, terrorism and related challenges to socio-economic development and human security, and to achieve tangible improvement in the social and personal well-being of the people of Africa and the communities.
>
> *African Union 2007*

Response to terrorist networks

Governments and regional organizations across the region have taken various steps to respond to the rise of terrorist networks, albeit with little success. This is often done with the support of the international community. For instance, governments in the Sahel region despite their institutional and operational constraints, have taken some steps to respond to AQIM, but have failed to devise a strategy to counter AQIM's increasing sophistication and locally entrenched methods (Goita 2011; Ewi and Aning 2006). Also, some leaders in the region have been hesitant to acknowledge the mounting threat. Decisions are often made for short-term gains with little regard for long-term implications. Counterterrorism efforts in countries such as Mali, have been inconsistent, with often overly blunt security responses. Cooperation among neighboring countries is improving somewhat, but disagreements and challenges remain (Goita 2011). Similarly, attempts by the Nigerian government to enact a comprehensive anti-terrorism legislation since 2006 had suffered serious setbacks (Sampson and Onuoha 2011). Currently, the government is actively engaged in military operations to curb the scourge of the Boko Haram. The fight against Al-Shabaab appears arduous for the very weak Somali state.

At the continental level, efforts to combat terrorism have a long history. As far back as 1992, the OAU, during its 28th Ordinary Summit in Dakar, Senegal, adopted resolution AHG/Res. 213 (XXVIII), aimed at enhancing cooperation and coordination among member states in order to fight the phenomenon of extremism. Similarly, in 1994, at its 30th Ordinary Summit, held in Tunis, Tunisia, the OAU Assembly adopted the declaration AHG/Decl. 2 (XXX) on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations, which unequivocally rejected fanaticism and extremism, or the use of religion to commit acts of violence, including terrorist acts

(African Union). Since 9/11, several high-level meetings have been held and protocols adopted to prevent and combat terrorism. The AU as well as the RECs have increasingly become more engaged in efforts to counter terrorist activities on the continent. However, these organizations will have to provide more leadership to harmonize policies and institutionalize information-sharing and cross-border judicial cooperation (African Union n.d.). Obviously the international community is needed: UN, US, EU, and other donors in the form of communications capacity, and training to restructure and improve security forces and livelihoods within the region. Thus, cooperation with foreign governments is also essential for confronting the rising transnational criminal enterprises.

Conclusion

Africa over the years has been confronted with changing security threats. While old threats to security, such as violent armed conflict are on a relative decline, new threats are emerging. This chapter argues that the profound security challenge in Africa is state weakness. The African state despite the relative progress over the years remains fragile. As a result of weak institutions and the failure of governance and development, new security challenges with dire consequences for human security continue to emerge. Various efforts and initiatives are being taken at the state, regional and international levels, to address the challenges. However, constraints emanating from a lack of political will, institutional capacity, resource-financial, technical, logistical and operational capacity constraints, continue to hinder peacebuilding efforts on the continent. Therefore, there is a need for the continent to continue to develop democratic governance structures and strong institutions capable of responding in timely fashion to effectively address the growing non-traditional threats to security.

Notes

1 The official name of the group is the *Jama"atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda"Awat Wal Jihad* (or People Committed to the Prophet's Teaching for Propagation and Jihad). However, the group has become widely known by the local name *Boko Haram*, which in the Hausa language means, western education is unlawful or sin.

2 The Sahel-Saharan region stretches from north-western Chad through Niger and Mali to Mauritania. This region has the most porous borders in West Africa, and thus their close proximity to trouble spots in the Maghreb such as Algeria, Morocco, and the Middle East, and Persian Gulf, make the region most susceptible to terrorist infiltration, and the related destabilizing forces such as arms and human trafficking, as well as refugee flows from Sudan and Chad.

3

CONFLICT AND WAR IN AFRICA

William Reno

Imagine journeying to the past. In the present, Africa's wars present a picture of a bewildering array of militias and rebel groups fighting faction-ridden government armies engaged in a sort of gang warfare in places like Congo and parts of Sudan. Factional strife in Guinea-Bissau reflects struggles over the control of drug trafficking and its proceeds. Family and clan politics in Chad produces outbursts of violence and political instability. Central African Republic provides a terrain over which armed groups from the region range. Then the observer arrives in Africa at the start of the 1970s. Disciplined rebel offensives in Guinea-Bissau drive out Portuguese colonial forces and the rebels govern most of the countryside. By 1973, many foreign countries recognize the rebels as the legitimate government of that country. Nigeria's separatist Biafra rebellion has just been crushed after clashes between armies that resembled Second World War modes of fighting more than the activities of the many militias that later appear on this territory. Rebellion against minority rule in Rhodesia attracts considerable overseas aid and rebels use their liberated zones to present a vision of the politics of the future. International organizations and many foreign governments assist South Africans in their struggle against apartheid as this issue animates activists across the globe.

This chapter explains why warfare in Africa has undergone such extensive change in a relatively short period of time. The next section inspects the distinctive features of contemporary warfare in Africa. This consideration of the politics and social processes that shape the character of these conflicts sheds light on the relationships between the politics of zones of conflict and how leaders of armed groups define their goals, recruit supporters, and organize and sustain their fighting forces. The crucial feature that emerges in this survey is the growing centrality of patronage politics, both in the elite coalitions that rule the state and in the armed groups that oppose rulers, a central component of the explanation for change. This argument informs the following section in which closer examination of recent and on-going conflicts illustrates how the politics of patronage actually shapes warfare in Africa, even as numerous other agendas and motives at the level of the individual, armed groups and wider communities are involved. The final section explores the future of warfare in Africa. That section considers the sustainability of present trends and seeks out new ways of fighting that may be harbingers of more widespread change. But first it is to the distinctive features of warfare in Africa that we now turn.

The origins of distinctive features of warfare in Africa

Three principal features distinguish warfare in Africa, even if these features are not exclusive to the continent. They include the turn away from population-centric warfare on the part of many state and non-state armed groups. The second feature is the fragmented nature of state and non-state armed groups, and the third follows from the marginalization of most of Africa's conflicts from the mainstream of global economic and political channels.

Though civilians remain important as a source of recruits and supplies, contemporary wars in Africa are not population-centric in that most combatants do not fight to mobilize and administer the civilians in areas that they control. The exceptions to this rule are ethnic militias and home guards that are created in the context of general turmoil to defend particular communities, and some new ideologically driven rebels that may present a new wave of change in the future of warfare in Africa. For the majority of armed groups, the major objective is to control the resources and commercial networks that sustain patron–client systems of authority. Patronage serves as the basis of authority in many of Africa's most conflict-prone states. These are the countries where it has been in the rulers' interests to undermine the bureaucracies of their own states. Even though these rulers weaken the institutions that otherwise could promote economic development and produce more revenues, this is a rational response to rulers' fears that bureaucracies could harbor political rivals who pose serious and even lethal threats to their hold on power (Bates 2008). Africa's record of coups d'états and other unconstitutional changes of regime underscore the seriousness of this threat. Only in Sub-Saharan Africa have coups d'états remained widespread, though now more often from the lower ranks, remaining a threat even after the wave of democratic reforms that swept the continent in the 1990s (McGowan 2006).

Rulers who undermine their own bureaucracies find greater security in using their personal authority to reward supporters with access to economic opportunities. They still need formal recognition of sovereignty, but use the trappings of formal statehood to manipulate other people's access to markets to build political coalitions. Selective enforcement of laws against political opponents and use of the sovereign prerogative to invite foreign investors to exploit mineral resources, for example, helps rulers to coordinate the flow of resources in line with their personal discretion. In essence, rulers in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo (Zaire) and elsewhere in the decades after independence presided over the collapse of the bureaucratic elements of their states, yet remained in power by virtue of their control over personal networks of economic exchange. These networks eventually reached into illicit realms and their business partners came to include international criminals and shady operators who needed rulers who were willing to use the shield of sovereign authority to conceal their transactions (Bayart, Ellis and Hibou 1999). Once these networks were in place, it was not difficult for these rulers to bow to the pressure from foreign creditors in the 1990s to privatize remaining state enterprises, since these assets were simply distributed to partners in their elite coalition or simply withered away.

Thus when our time traveler in the chapter's introduction arrived in the past, seizing the bureaucratic arms of the state was the principal means to get hold of power. But in the present, control of the commercial networks and assets that sustain the ruler's patronage network is the principal means to hold power. Another way of thinking about this change is to conclude that in Africa's most politically unstable and impoverished countries, rulers had presided over the collapse of the state (defined in bureaucratic terms) as part of their strategies to promote the survival of their regimes. In this light it makes sense that rebels targeted centers of power; bureaucracies in earlier times and networks associated with patronage resources later.

The rise of patronage politics helps to explain why past decades have seen a shift in coups d'états away from army commanders and toward junior and non-commissioned officer ranks.

These officers complain that their bosses get rich though exploiting their subordinates with the ruler's consent due to their favored positions in the ruler's political networks. Like many civilians in the inner circles of the elite network, these junior officers may believe that they can seize critical patronage resources to create their own political networks. Seizure of state power would bring them a big step closer to this goal, since even in the most bureaucratically enfeebled state, the prerogatives of sovereignty can still be manipulated for economic gain. This is why the control and sale of timber concessions, "blood diamonds", and other mining concessions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola and Congo were preoccupations of government and rebel forces alike in those countries' conflicts. Administering civilians, while not entirely ignored by rebels and governments, would drain valuable resources away from the imperative of accumulating as much wealth as possible with which to attract new recruits and maintain the loyalties of existing fighters. Attention to administration also would bring the risk that particularly able subordinates who provided services and protection to civilians would become popular in these communities and might take this as license to launch their own bids for power. Thus, struggles for political power are focused instead on economic resources rather than on the people.

This patronage-centric logic of warfare accounts for the fragmentation of armed groups that is another feature of contemporary wars in Africa. Patronage resources are usually distributed across a number of channels, giving potential rivals multiple bases upon which to launch their own bids for power. Since the 1996 start of conflict in Congo, for example, the multiple peace agreements feature a bewildering array of armed factions. Darfur's rebel groups had split into dozens of factions by 2007, with little prospect for coordinated action among them (Tanner and Tubiana 2007). Even the injection of international humanitarian aid appears to play a role in fragmenting rebel group organizations. Local commanders discover that they can take credit in local communities for services that NGOs provide, and along with the skimming of supplies, can recruit their own following (Kuperman 2006).

Possessing state power confers a significant advantage in contemporary warfare in Africa. The state remains the seat of legal sovereignty, which is essential to give foreign business partners authoritative permission to operate in the country's territory. Businesses that deal with rebels lack this protection and do business with them at their own risk. Those businesses become targets of lawsuits in their home countries and attract attention from activists if governments pursue them for theft of resources in conjunction with their rebel partners. In most countries, subsoil mineral rights are vested in the state, so one needs control of the state to be able to manipulate the application of these laws to generate the resources needed to become a superior patron. Rulers of states also are in positions to use patronage resources to divide their rebel opponents, selectively buying off commanders and even encouraging subordinate commanders to set up their own rebel groups to undermine the coalition ranged against the state. Indeed, some rebel groups originate as the attempts of members of elite coalitions to negotiate better positions for themselves and their supporters in an existing state-centric patronage network. The threat to go to war against the state increases the costs of co-optation and if situated near an international border, raises the possibility that the politicians of a neighboring state might lend support to the rebel group. This is done to aid ethnic kin (when an ethnic community straddles an international frontier) or to disrupt other cross-border rebels or as a tit-for-tat response to the neighboring state's interference (Prunier 2004).

These prerogatives of state sovereignty are not used to consolidate the armed forces of these states. The armed forces of the globally recognized state with weak domestic institutions do not resemble the bureaucratic armies and security forces of the old colonial and apartheid states because rulers still see huge risks in delegating authority to bureaucracies, particularly those that wield violence. Thus when these states fight fragmented collections of rebels their own forces

tend to be dispersed across a range of armed groups of varying but usually low degrees of organizational capacity and discipline. This creates what Stathis Kalyvas terms symmetrical irregular warfare (2007), but one in which the state usually prevails, provided that its sovereignty still matters in international society. Sovereignty enables rulers of these states to perform better as patrons, to continue to divide and co-opt opponents, while using their privileged access to foreigners (whether foreign officials, legitimate businesses or shady operators) and their resources to sustain their positions at the apex of their political networks.

The third distinctive feature of warfare in contemporary Africa concerns the continent's diminished influence over the decisions of the globe's main economic and political actors and institutions, exposing its states to increasing interference from abroad. For example, sovereign states experience increased exposure to external restrictions on rulers' capacities to arrange their domestic affairs as they prefer. Rulers who undermine their own institutions and who distribute resources according to their personal preferences fail to meet basic criteria of "good governance" as foreign donors and creditors define it and face a growing list of conditions to access foreign aid and to participate in international institutions. Rulers who use their control over informal sectors, including illicit markets to bolster their control, are labeled as corrupt. In particular, US government officials link this corruption to an expansion of illicit drug trafficking across West Africa and the possibility that international terrorist groups would become involved in the region's drug trade (Wikileaks 2010). This link between illicit commerce, government corruption and security threats illustrates how other countries and international organizations had come to view the strategies that some regimes used to exercise authority as disruptive to international order. In parts of West Africa, this nexus of criminality and government collusion has led to the creation of what the Chairman of the African Union called "a West African Afghanistan" of organized crime networks and violent extremists (United Nations 2012).

Numerous actors in international society undermine the sustainability of patronage politics in Africa's poorest and most unstable states. One might imagine that this pressure could lead to the collapse rather than the reform of these states as struggling leaders are cut off from the resources that they need to control their clients. This development would benefit rebels and criminal organizations left to pursue their own fortunes, most likely in violent conflict with their competitors. But as states face more interference in domestic affairs, rebels suffer an even greater decline in their international standing. Alongside the declining capacities of Africa's worst-off states, this simultaneous marginalization reinforces tendencies toward symmetrical irregular warfare rather than a decisive shift in the balance of power either to states or to rebels.

Contemporary rebel groups are frozen out of most international diplomatic channels, aside from their periodic participation in internationally mediated peace negotiations. The situation for rebels was very different in the 1970s. The South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), for example, received recognition from the UN General Assembly as the "sole and authentic representative" of the Namibian people in their struggle for independence from apartheid-era South African rule (United Nations 1973). This diplomatic and political status reinforced what by then was SWAPO's dominant position, vis-à-vis rivals in the liberation struggle, having benefited since 1969 from official assistance from the Swedish government and the posting of a representative in 1971 to represent the rebel group to Scandinavian, West German and Austrian governments (Sellström 1999). Recognition and assistance from the UN and European countries came alongside military training and supplies from East Bloc countries, including East German assistance in tracking down internal dissidents (Andrew and Mitrokhin 2005). Mozambique's FRELIMO found refuge in Tanzania in the 1960s and the public support of that country's president, and organized a school to train cadres that was started with Ford Foundation funding (Sellström 2002, 41–45). Though Ford Foundation funding soon ended,

this rebel group received the approval of the Organization of African Unity's Liberation Committee, founded in 1963 to identify and direct support to anti-colonial rebel groups that had good prospects for establishing liberated zones and for effective military campaigns to challenge colonial rule.

These diplomatic and political channels were available to other rebel groups that could convince foreign observers that they were "sole authentic representatives" of particular communities. By the 1970s and 1980s western and Soviet bloc governments often assisted competing rebel groups. Nonetheless, rebels that could dominate these international channels were those that were the most effective at rooting out and eliminating dissident factions. External funding and other support helped rebel groups to maintain this unity, both through building up the group's capacities and through starving challengers of their own resources. Since foreign backers insisted that their favored rebels show clear signs of progress, rebels were under pressure to demonstrate their military preparation on the ground and to seize and govern their own liberated zones. African rebels of that era demonstrated some of the same tendencies toward fragmentation that became prominent later, but the structural incentives of that time pushed rebels toward population-centric campaigns—competing with the state to out-govern civilians—rather than the network-centric focus of future rebels. External support also favored hierarchical bureaucratic rebel organizations that were capable of carrying out these tasks, not the competing decentralized rebel groups that tended to dominate later conflicts.

The demise of colonial and apartheid rule ended the era of coordinated international support for African rebels. Nonetheless, many African rebels continued to receive support from neighboring states. Libya's ruler Moammar Qaddafi supported a stunning array of African rebel groups before his own bloody demise in his country's 2011 rebellion. But this and other assistance did require demonstrations of unity in rebel ranks and effective control on the ground. The lack of coordination of this aid—Qaddafi himself even supported competing rebel groups—also undermined rebel unity as subordinate commanders sought out their own backers.

The criminalization of African rebels in the eyes of the international community since the 1990s has played a major role in limiting their access to external resources beyond whatever they can acquire through illicit commercial transactions. Possibly this process has played a role in the decisions of rebels to pursue network-centric strategies in warfare rather than engage in the more difficult task of convincing (now more skeptical) foreigners that they are fighting for a just cause. Rebel criminalization in this context means the widespread acceptance of the view that African rebels fight for personal economic gain; that they loot and pillage because they think that this is a good way to improve their individual situations. An early statement of this view of African rebels appeared in Robert Kaplan's 1994 article in *Atlantic Monthly* in which he warned that conflicts in West Africa were "the symbol of worldwide demographics, environmental, and societal stress, in which criminal activity emerges as the real 'strategic' danger" as the breakdown of order unleashed armed predators to terrorize these societies (1994: 45). Mary Kaldor saw forces of globalization at work in wars that

> involve a blurring of distinctions between war (usually for political motives) organized crime (violence undertaken by privately organized groups for private purposes, usually financial gain) and large-scale violations of human rights (violence undertaken by states or politically organized groups against individuals).
>
> *Kaldor 2006: 2*

Economists privileged personal incentives, and identified the promise of loot for personal gain as a major factor shaping rebel motives and behavior (Collier 2000a).

The criminalization of rebels took a more concrete form with the development of sanctions regimes. This began with the growing awareness that commerce in resources such as "blood diamonds" was providing resources to rebels that engaged in massive violations of human rights. Rebels in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Angola were focusing on mining and selling diamonds to support their organizations, and they were committing numerous violations of international humanitarian law and war crimes. They also were fighting to control the resources that were integral to the support of the capital-based patronage networks that claimed the mantle of state sovereignty, on occasion recruiting the same legitimate and illicit firms that did business with the state to support them instead. The Fowler Report, released in 2000, detailed how Angola's UNITA rebels colluded with businessmen to mine and export diamonds in defiance of UN sanctions. This report highlighted the link between commerce and war in Africa. The report was the product of an investigative panel of experts that identified numerous individuals and firms involved in this commerce (United Nations 2000). Commerce in timber and other natural resources came under increased scrutiny too, and with the start of widespread conflict in Congo in 1996, concerns about the pillage of natural resources and its connection to human rights abuses took center stage in international responses to rebel activity in many of Africa's wars.

Since the turn of the twenty-first century, multilateral sanctions against rebels and state actors have appeared in most African wars. State officials, however, enjoy more means to evade and manipulate sanctions. Angola and Sudan, for example, both export oil and can threaten critics that they will seek other investors and customers for their oil. Once Chinese firms entered the market, this strategy of playing foreign rivals off one another became easier. Meanwhile, rebels remained an easier target for pressure, since any firm that did business with them would face much greater risks of retaliation from states and condemnation in the international community for engaging in criminal activities in collusion with rebels.

These developments have had dramatic impacts on the nature of warfare in contemporary Africa. The next section examines what this nature of warfare means for the conduct of war, and for the relationship between state politics and rebel politics.

The nature of contemporary warfare in Africa

Crises of patronage politics play significant roles in most contemporary wars in Africa. These conflicts reflect numerous proximate causes and involve an array of motives and goals among armed groups, such as the protection of one's family and community, personal ambitions or fears, grievances over land disputes with neighboring communities, local power struggles, and so forth. This contention occurs in the context of challenges to the central control of state regimes over the distribution of patronage and the manipulation of other people's access to economic opportunities. Their loss of central control over the distribution of patronage occurs through two principal mechanisms, the introduction of competitive elections and the sudden addition or withdrawal of resources. These problems are much less likely to appear in states like Ghana, Tanzania and South Africa where formal institutions and rules are much more dominant in the governance of these countries. They appear instead in territorially large "hard to govern" countries such as Mali, Niger, Chad, Sudan, Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), and the Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazaville) and elsewhere where conflicts have been endemic (Herbst and Mills 2006). These states have low institutional capacities, but more important for understanding the nature of contemporary conflicts are shocks and pressures that undermine rulers' capacities to monopolize the distribution of patronage resources. This loss of central control empowers ambitious members of these networks to grab resources to advance their fortunes or forces them to defend their positions; the start of network-centric warfare.

The link between patronage politics, political violence and elections is especially apparent in conflict in Chad. This country was among the many in Africa that underwent transitions to multiparty democracy in the early 1990s. This was particularly destabilizing in Chad and elsewhere that these political changes provided new opportunities for subordinate members of patronage networks. Competitive elections at first seemed to provide a framework for recognizing militias as political parties as a way to civilianize their leadership and bring them into the political process. Two rebel groups, the *Comité de Sursaut National pour la Paix et la Democratie* and the *Forces Armeé pour la République Fédérale* were recognized as political parties in the 1990s. This was what Andreas Mehler calls "politico-military entrepreneurship in its purest form", as leaders of political factions slipped in and out of the presidential patronage system, organizing new rebel movements to extract "violence rents" to finance the construction of their own patronage networks (2007: 207–208). The prospect of coalition governments attracted foreign donors who funded disarmament and resettlement programs, further contributing to the incentives for the political entrepreneur to threaten violence as a way to gain access to more resources and renegotiate their positions in the country's political networks (van Dijk 2007). Though Chad's politics was factionalized and violent well before the 1990s, the appearance of the institutional façade of formalized political competition shaped ongoing conflict as subordinate members of these networks identified new opportunities to advance their interests.

Political violence in Kenya illustrates the close link between elections and instability in patronage-based political systems. As in many other African countries, communal land tenure prevails in much of rural Kenya. This put decisions about individuals' access to land in the hands of local ethnic political bosses who could acquire access to more land if they and their supporters backed the right politicians. Once reforms introduced electoral competition starting with the 1992 poll, contending parties armed their followers in efforts to punish their opponents and reward their supporters with promises of access to more land (Boone 2011). Elections led to the displacement of about a quarter of a million people in 1992 and more than half a million displaced and a thousand killed in 2007 (Human Rights Watch 2008). The relative absence of violence in the 1997 election reflected the success of the ruling party's efforts to crowd out the opposition through monopolizing this distribution of patronage resources and to reduce people's choice at the polls through intimidation and electoral fraud. Kenya's electoral violence points to the more general problem of electoral choice in patronage-based political systems where formal institutions are weak. The more uncertain the outcome, the more violent the contention for supporters, with the focal point of the violence directed at the control of the main patronage resource base.

The association between patronage politics, competitive elections and violence appears also in Congo-Brazzaville in the 1990s. Electoral competition in 1992 energized contending factions in what had been a broad, if fractious coalition under the previous authoritarian single-party regime that used revenues from oil exports to reward supporters. The prospect that a separate faction could win control of the state and direct oil revenues for its benefit led politicians to arm youthful supporters in personal militias to fight in the three-way 1992 campaign. Violence surrounding this election and its aftermath killed about 2,000 people and displaced up to 300,000 more. The 1997 election was even more contentious, with 10,000 to 15,000 deaths (Bazenguissa-Ganga 1999: 38–40). The return of a dominant party by the 2002 elections succeeded in recentralizing control over patronage resources. The elimination of a viable alternative choice, as in Kenya's 1997 election, had the effect of reducing the incentives for politicians to arm followers to contend for resources directly.

Competitive elections are not the only shocks that upset the centralized distribution of patronage. Reforms in Mali that decentralized the country's administration initially appeared to

provide a means to co-opt ethnic Tuareg community leaders during an uprising that began in 2006. A sizeable proportion of the real rewards for this local control, however, came from Libya's leader Moammar Qaddafi, whose investments in local development projects boosted the political value of occupying local offices. Qaddafi also played a role in Mali's multiparty local elections, bankrolling candidates who he preferred in the increasingly expensive competition for votes. Qaddafi's regime also recruited young men to come to Libya to work. Since these foreign migrants were dependent upon their hosts' favor, some were recruited to serve in Qaddafi's security forces. This intermingling of political networks across the Sahara desert absorbed some of the leaders of earlier Tuareg rebellions against the governments of Mali and Niger.

The fall of Qaddafi's regime in Libya in 2012 upset this balance and empowered multiple contending political networks. Hundreds of thousands of migrants returned to their old homes, cut off from their old patron and unable to find new means of support. The presence of illicit commerce in smuggling and the lure of ransoms from kidnappings drew some of these migrants and members of politically marginalized communities to join with separatist militias. Others built connections to al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Maghreb on a pragmatic basis to pursue "violent upward mobility" with the benefit of the group's control over territory through which smugglers shipped cigarettes and illicit drugs (Bøås 2012: 125). This fragmentation of political power created the context for Mali's March 2012 coup and the collapse of central government control over the northern two-thirds of the country and the subsequent conflicts between rebel factions.

This is not to say that struggles to control patronage resources explain the totality of the conduct of warfare in contemporary Africa. These struggles do, however, weigh heavily in shaping the kinds of armed groups and agendas that occupy the field of battle. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, communal struggles to control land explain the origins and behaviors of a range of armed groups, from those of ambitious regional politicians who recruit armed supporters to contend in internationally mediated elections to local home-guard militias that are organized to protect communities from the predations of other armed groups. Many of these alignments are traceable to the strategies of former President Mobutu (1965–1997) in the 1990s as he faced severe declines in the resources that he could use for patronage and increasing pressures from the international community to democratize his regime. In response, he manipulated local conflicts over land to reward supporters and punish opponents, much as contending politicians did in Kenya. These cleavages and the focus on obtaining resources with which to buy the support of communities persisted from the start of widespread fighting in 1996, and through the war that led to the deaths of up to three million people by the mid-2000s.

An explanation of the character of contemporary warfare in Africa that privileges patronage does not exclude other influences such as the role of external intervention. The military forces of Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe and Angola intervened in Congo's conflict in the 1990s. The courses of these interventions and the behaviors of each army, however, reflected the nature of regime politics in their home countries. Where institutions were weak compared to the personal authority of the leader, as in Zimbabwe and Uganda, army commanders were more likely to be selected on the basis of political criteria rather than expertise, and their conduct in the field was more likely to involve commercial relationships with armed Congolese groups for mutual private benefit.

More generally, regimes that rely most heavily on the manipulation of people's access to economic opportunities and the distribution of patronage as the basis for exercising authority usually lack the political will or means to sustain militaries around bureaucratic hierarchies that are the foundations of military effectiveness. The border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998–2000 that featured defined front lines, heavy weaponry and mass maneuvers more in the image of the clash of national militaries than the more common pattern of symmetrical irregular

warfare provides a stark contrast that illustrates this rule. Regimes in both of these countries came to power in 1991 after long guerrilla war campaigns; on the part of the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front in Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front in Eritrea. As rebel groups, both were able to sustain tight discipline over field commanders through systems of political commissars and to isolate ambitious colleagues who challenged this bureaucratic centralization. This crucial difference in the nature of a regime's basis of political authority shaped the difference in how it fought in war.

In any event, most states in Africa, particularly the larger and more socially heterogeneous among them, have regimes that face considerable scarcities of resources, very weak formal institutions, and elite coalitions with histories of violent intra-elite competition. Thus it makes sense that rulers in these circumstances would adopt strategies that are hostile to building up bureaucratic institutions and instead would concentrate on fragmenting as much as possible the exercise of violence.

The future of warfare in Africa

Warfare in Africa will remain network-centric and will feature fragmented rebel and state forces so long as patronage politics and weak formal institutions prevail in the continent's worst-off and most unstable states. The persistence of an international regime in which warfare in Africa is seen as a criminal affair will do little to change this pattern of conflict, as this kind of engagement provides no rewards for ideological or programmatic motives for fighting. As one peers into the future of warfare in Africa, two broad developments suggest possibilities for the escalation of crises besetting patronage-based political systems. The first is the intensification of global economic and cultural exchange, which tends to be most disruptive in regions that are already unstable and lack effective government institutions. The second is increased external pressure on Africa's states to institute bureaucratic reforms. Recent developments show that these pressures, often accompanied with massive amounts of aid (relative to local resources) to address underlying structural factors that promote conflict, often produce disappointing results.

Two other developments point to the possibility of a decisive shift in the nature of future warfare in Africa. The first is the appearance since the mid-1990s of effective multilateral African interventions in conflicts in West Africa and more recently in Sudan and Somalia. The second is the appearance of more significant ideological components in the motivations and behavior of rebel groups. Violent religious extremists in Somalia, the Sahel region of Mali and Niger, and in northern Nigeria draw upon external financial contributions that reach beyond the narrow social confines of Diaspora community support. Some accept and even recruit foreign fighters into their ranks, signaling a further move away from the parochialism and marginality in global terms that characterizes so many contemporary conflicts.

Two developments that point to the intensification of current trends exacerbate problems of maintaining order and stability that face patronage-based regimes. Increases in global transactions of illicit drugs, for example, has wrecked havoc in Guinea-Bissau. The country's ruling party split into two factions with the introduction of multiparty rule and fought a civil war in the late 1990s. Then South American cartels began using the country as a transshipment point to supply the European market with cocaine and other illicit drugs. Narco-corruption fueled factional tensions as politicians fought turf wars over control of the proceeds from drugs. In 2009, members of the military killed President João Bernardo Vieira in the context of the struggle for control of the country's US$2 billion drug trade—more than twice the country's reported GDP. A military coup in April 2012 prevented the second round of a presidential poll that seemed likely to elect the Prime Minister who promised to reform the security forces (Anonymous 2012).

Political violence in places like Guinea-Bissau supports analyses that link political violence and rebellion with criminality. The appearance of drug shipments in impoverished West African coastal countries inject resources that incite scrambles among politicians, former rebel leaders, and other enterprising people who see in this wealth their own routes to power (Johansen 2008). In 2008 in Sierra Leone, for example, police impounded an airplane loaded with 700kg of cocaine, with a value equivalent to the entire annual expenditure of the country's government. In this case the traffickers were prosecuted and the drugs destroyed. In other instances, struggles to control this new source of wealth has destabilized already factionalized governments, raised the stakes of elections, and attracted members of security forces who would use their agencies and weapons to control this source of wealth for themselves.

Drug shipments through coastal West Africa appeared to decline after 2006–2007, but this may have signaled a shift toward the Sahel region where armed groups challenge government control (UNODC 2011). A possible connection between rebel groups in the Sahara and Sahel emerged with the November 2009 discovery in northern Mali of a partially burnt Boeing 727 that had traces of cocaine. In June 2012, the Chairman of the African Union wrote to the UN's Secretary-General that "the collapse of the army and the removal of all State structures has created the conditions for Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI), along with various organized crime networks, to control the entire North" (United Nations 2012).

Closer links between international drug trafficking and armed groups destabilize patronage systems because they challenge the ruler's monopoly over the distribution of economic opportunities. The diversification of points of access to resources in this political context gives license for junior partners to split from patronage networks to control these resources directly. Rulers also find that their inability to monopolize this distribution of economic opportunity diminishes their capacities to co-opt rebels and other armed groups, leading to more fragmentation and contention over the control of networks, intensifying a key characteristic of most contemporary warfare in Africa.

Overseas pressures on regimes to undertake further reform in some instances undermines centralized patronage networks and contributes to increased armed contention. Prior to the 2012 coup and disintegration of government control, Mali was held up as a good example of foreign-assisted democratization and state-building. Administrative decentralization and elections for local councils, however, created a new market for votes (Languille 2010). Huge increases in campaign expenses gave Libya's Moammar Qaddafi an entrée into northern Mali's patronage system as a provider of campaign funds and business opportunities. The collapse of his regime and the return from Libya of armed Malians and others across the Sahel contributed further to this fragmentation of political control. Foreign intervention and state-building projects in Liberia and Sierra Leone from the late 1990s in many years cost more than these countries' entire GDPs if peacekeeping and military training is taken into account. Yet reforms show clear signs of dispersing rather than ending struggles over resource networks.

The argument here is not that political liberalization is inherently destabilizing. Instead it is that liberalization disperses points of access to resources, which in patronage-based regimes is destabilizing. In countries with stronger institutions—in Ghana, for example—liberalization can further strengthen institutions. Where reforms have been undertaken as part of an indigenous political process, such as in Nigeria, they show greater signs of durability. The political establishment there has experienced some of the same problems of linkages between increased political violence and electoral and administrative reforms. But Nigerian officials have undertaken effective measures to depoliticize security forces, shrinking the military and professionalizing its officer corps. Responses since 2010 to attacks of the Boko Haram rebels in Nigeria's north exhibit relatively effective state control over the exercise of violence compared to the government's

record in the battles against local militias in the 1990s, a good indicator of the capacity of the regime to manage subordinate officials.

Indigenous reforms to strengthen bureaucracies in two of Africa's largest countries—Nigeria and Ethiopia—point to vectors of change in the future of warfare in Africa. Both of these countries have militaries that participate in conflicts beyond their borders. Nigeria's armed forces took the lead in regional peacekeeping forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone from the mid-1990s and in Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire in the 2000s. In 2004, Nigerian forces deployed to Darfur. Ethiopian forces acted unilaterally, most significantly on several occasions in Somalia from 2006. Ethiopia's high growth rates since the mid-1990s, doubling the GDP on the average of every nine years, and the country's large population base has increased Ethiopia's capabilities out of proportion to its neighbors. Though closely coordinating with many western countries, Ethiopia's government has increased its capabilities through policies that often directly contradict the advice of its non-African partners.

These developments in both countries create the possibility to act as regional hegemons, provided that their militaries continue to professionalize and economic conditions improve. This future scenario presents a continent of greatly varied state capacities, with islands of strong institutions and economic dynamism in a few large countries, and political instability and turmoil in surrounding regions. This will change the calculus of armed groups in zones of turmoil, as they will find large African neighbors for whom their conflicts are not marginal. Ethiopia's government must concern itself with developments in neighboring Somalia and South Sudan. These countries have very poor prospects for stability in the coming years and decades. Policy makers in stronger, more stable countries will seek out proxies that they believe will advance their interests and create political outcomes more to their liking. If stability is their patrons' preference, it is possible that rebel groups will again have to demonstrate competence in administering areas that they control as a condition for receiving external assistance, a sign of the return of population-centric warfare.

The reemergence of global ideological narratives among rebel groups presents another future scenario. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet bloc diminished the appeals of Marxism-Leninism as a narrative of rebellion and a blueprint for rebel organization (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). Now violent Islamist Internationalism appeals to rebel groups in the Sahel, including Ansar al Dine in Mali and al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Maghreb. Somalia's al Shabaab advertises its internationalist credentials too. Though these groups incorporate illicit commerce into their strategies and build upon local ethnic and other parochial tensions, they propose a political program beyond conquest of the resource base of the existing political system. They go to lengths to administer areas and people that they control. Both of these characteristics highlight the population-centric approaches of these groups. Though not immune from fragmentation, their ideological and programmatic agendas provide them with vehicles for recruiting and disciplining members across ethnic and other social divides. Their appeal to foreign financiers who wish to advance their political agendas reduces their global marginality, compared to most other rebel groups in Africa.

Violent religious extremists encounter considerable obstacles in this future scenario too. They intentionally narrow their bases for recruitment, excluding women, for example. They engage in sectarian battles that offend local communities against them. Those that live under their administration experience the harsh realities of inflexible theocratic governance that is intolerant of local custom. This does not rule out the possibility that other broad narratives will appeal to people who resent the rule of their corrupt and violent governments. Africa has a long history of state-building Islamic armed movements, from the jihads across the Sahel in the nineteenth century, the Mahdist state in Omdurman that resisted colonial intrusion for thirteen years to

1898, the twenty years resistance in Somaliland to British colonial rule in the early 1990s, for example. These armed religious movements combined broad-based nationalism with promises of the renewal of governance, a combination that contemporary armed groups may yet master.

In sum, the future of warfare in Africa is bound to be linked closely to the nature of governance in African states. The real signs of change in warfare will come with structural change in African governance. Then Africans in the future will look back on Africa of the twentieth century and the first part of the twenty-first century much as contemporary Chinese citizens look back on their country's history. A long period of decline, stretching over generations, created conditions for the collapse of state authority and the rise of warlords who competed for political authority. But as China shows, this condition is likely to be a temporary one.

4

HUMAN SECURITY VERSUS NATIONAL SECURITY IN AFRICA

Developmental versus failed states among the rest

Timothy M. Shaw

Introduction

Security around Africa has evolved, from the Second World War to the post-Cold War, as national, regional, continental and global economic, environmental, political, social and technological, let alone strategic contexts, changed. This chapter emphasizes contemporary threats and trends for both intra- and extra-continental state and non-state actors including: unlikely strategic alliances; resource curses/water wars/land grabs; regional conflicts and peace-building; informal and illegal trade; drugs/gangs/guns; gender; diasporic connections, such as transnational organized crime (TOC); and emerging cyber crime. It references debates over freedom from fear and want, the responsibility to protect norm (R2P), other global responses like Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and Kimberley Process (KP), the privatization of security and the Montreaux code for private security companies (PSCs), and the utility of the concept citizen security. Africa(s) present(s) lessons for analysis, policy and practise, both state and non-state, as well as local, regional and global. What can the study of African security contribute to disciplines like International Relations/Political Economy and Development and Security Studies?

Africa's states and economies, societies and diasporas, face a world in flux (Clark and Hoque 2012); one in which their collective impact is minimal. By contrast to their assumed marginality, their analytic challenge or contribution may be greater than their status in international politics might imply. Africa as a rising continent (Economist 2011) is increasingly divided into burgeoning developmental states and fragile states, as highlighted by the dichotomy between the 2011 reports from the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) (2011) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (2011), respectively.

This chapter suggests that as their diversity is increasing, so too is their potential for providing conceptual innovations for understanding security in a number of fields growing (Cornelissen, Cheru and Shaw 2012). As Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver have suggested, Africa poses challenges, but they go well beyond the security sector and are different than those authors suggest. The subtitle to their chapter on Sub-Saharan Africa is: "security dynamics in a setting of weak and failed states" (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 219). But not all of Africa's states are weak. Furthermore,

the continent's political economies, civil societies, and myriad diasporas are increasingly divergent. There are, for instance, at least several developmental states (Mbabazi and Taylor 2005, UNECA 2011), if not yet quite emerging economies. So the following quote from Buzan and Wæver constitutes a nice straw-man, as the continent's security is not separable from other sectors and its development direction is not uniformly regressive:

> The security problem in Africa since decolonization has been dominated by the widespread failure of postcolonial weak states . . . leaving the field open to other players . . . A more detailed explanation of the security dynamics among these actors . . . may be the key to knowing how "regional" security dynamics in Africa really work, and research along these lines looks like becoming increasingly necessary for understanding African security during the coming decades.
>
> *Buzan and Wæver 2003*

Buzan and Wæver, at once, are acknowledging the importance of other actors, while still focusing on the centrality of the state. Human security moves the reference point from the state to those other actors.

After a troubled first decade, human security (MacLean, Black and Shaw 2006) was more elusive than ever, discussed below. This chapter suggests that the growing impacts of the emerging economies on the global political economy may further its elusiveness. After a decade of the BRICS and almost twenty years of human security, the latter remains relevant but has to take into account burgeoning global inequalities as the middle classes concentrated in the BRICS impact global demand for commodities; hence the ever-present threat of the resource curse, especially in Africa. The division of Africa into developmental and fragile states exacerbates the challenges to human security (Brock, Holm, Sorensen and Stohl 2012).

Juxtaposition for African international relations

This chapter juxtaposes several relevant literatures (Cornelissen, Cheru and Shaw 2012). In so doing, it complicates simplistic, interrelated projections of exponential growth in the BRICS versus endless decline in the fragile economies of Africa. It also begins to examine the impacts of each on the other, as neither can be insulated from unanticipated consequences of the other, such as growing inequalities within and between African states and the growing costs of disregarding the global ecology. Meanwhile, as indicated in the final section below, the continent is quite central in the emergence of innovative, flexible, heterogeneous coalitions for global governance (Dingwerth 2008; O'Dwyer 2006): such as the Kimberley Process (KP) (www.pacweb.org and www.kimberleyprocess.com) and EITI, the former leading to the Diamond Development Initiative (www.ddiglobal.org). Africa can tell us as much about international relations as international relations can tell us about Africa.

This chapter first draws from the disparate literatures on developmental states and BRICS, on the one hand, and fragile states on the other, with a pair of particular foci: on China (Alden 2007; le Pere 2006) and India (Sidiropolous and Vines 2007; Vines and Sidiropolous 2008) amongst the former; and on fragile states in Africa amongst the latter (Brock, Holm, Sorensen and Stohl 2012; Cooper and Shaw 2009). The emerging economies, whether the five BRICS, VISTA or CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, South Africa), may be constituting the new global middle, between the established OECD industrialized economies and the new Third World of the LDCs, especially Africa's fragile states. The growing demand, especially from the large, booming economies of China and India, for energy and raw materials

like coal, copper, iron ore, etc., has begun to increase prices as well as concentrate attention on the emerging limitations of supply and reserves. Such possibilities have particular implications for fragile states with newly discovered resources, which may be least able to resist or manage such pressures, leading to enhanced opportunities for corruption, as well as flows of foreign exchange (Clark and Hoque 2012).

So, secondly, we juxtapose literatures drawn from security as well as development studies (Kurtz 2007). That on the political economy of conflict suggests that violence is more the result of greed than grievance (Collier and Hoeffler 2001). Similarly, the political economy of resources genre indicates that, as the demand grows, so conflict is likely to increase (Klare 2002). Such perspectives resonate with cautionary analyses of the impacts of the BRICS, especially China and India, on demand for and the price of energy (Shaxson 2007) and minerals. Also, it relates to emerging perspectives on the securitization of development and the privatization of security (Abrahamsen 2012; Wulf 2005). Such approaches are of particular salience to fragile states and those agencies – state and non-state, formal and informal, local to global – which seek to advance human development/rights/security despite state fragility. As Thomas Weiss suggests in his overview of contemporary military-civilian interactions:

> This, then, is the substantially altered post-Cold War and post-September 11 context: growing numbers of civil wars with heightened fragmentation and state collapse; an increasing demand for UN military and civilian services; a growing reliance by the world organization on military and NGO subcontractors; and a substantial normative change that emphasizes the rights of affected peoples and the legitimacy of UN decisions.
>
> *Weiss 2005*

Third, we contrast the generic BRICs/fragile states and political economy of conflict/resources literatures with the more explicitly African debate on African international relations (IR) (Cornelissen, Cheru and Shaw 2012; Dunn and Shaw 2001), which was animated by two review articles in major IR journals, on the two sides of the Atlantic: first, Douglas Lemke (2003) in *World Politics* and then William Brown (2006) in *Review of International Studies*. They questioned whether contemporary African IR is different and, if so, whether it challenges the comparative field of IR elsewhere. At decade's turn, there is a growth in analyses of non-Western or non-trans-Atlantic IR (Acharya and Buzan 2007; Tickner and Wæver 2009), which laments the presumed hegemony of the Anglo-American approaches, even if it has become divided, at least in IPE (Phillips and Wæver 2010).

In particular, Brown and Lemke query whether IR in Africa, which is reflective of fragile states, and is mainly non-state and informal, poses insights for transnational relations outside the continent. Does the general, comparative field need to evolve away from a lingering over-emphasis on formal inter-state relations towards belated recognition of non-state, both civil society and corporate, rather than cast the continent in the role of being different or exceptional? Traditional realist blinkers blind orthodox state-centric analysis to the richness of non-state African economic, social and strategic relations, with profound implications for empirical and analytical approaches, data collection and policy responses. As Lemke cautions:

> African international relations constitute the developing world activity most likely to be excluded from international relations research . . . Standard international relations research describes the interactions of official states . . . In contrast, Africanist international relations scholars describe interactions between and among a variety of types of

> international actors . . . In the developing world international relations are more varied than standard international relations research recognizes.
>
> *Lemke 2003*

African contributions to sustainable peace and development

Since the start of the twenty-first century, Africa of the developmental and fragile states have envisaged and effected an evolving regional architecture at several levels (Besada 2010), micro- to macro-regionalisms. These span varieties of insecurities: from immediate to longer-term, strategic to ecological, collective to citizen. They stretch from the African Standby Force/Peace Facility and AU Missions in Burundi, Sudan and Somalia through innovations like the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)(www.grandlacs.net) and Nile Basin Initiative/Dialogue (www.nilebasin.org), to the Maputo Corridor and trans-frontier parks (www.peaceparks.org). But as the continent contains more fragile and landlocked states than any other continent, in addition to a burgeoning minority of developmental states, its security challenges and responses are more diverse and disparate than others, symbolized by divergent developmental versus fragile/failed neighbours, like Botswana and Zimbabwe, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya and Somalia, Uganda and Congo, etc. Even where there seems be a regional concentration of developmental states, such as possibly in southern Africa, advancing security is difficult. As Laurie Nathan (2012) laments, SADC has not built on its anti-apartheid successes by establishing a security community in its region, around Africa's own BRICS – South Africa.

Fragile states and R2P

The development of the doctrine of human security (MacFarlane and Khong 2006) in the post-bipolar period constituted a concerted response to novel forms of conflict. It was defined by international organizations like the UNDP (1994: 22–40) to include some/all of community, economic, environmental, food, health, personal and political dimensions, in a rank order, to be determined by agency, case, community, region, etc. In reality, preferences/sequences were informed by analytic assumptions/approaches as well as national and/or personal interests. It was initially popularized by a set of mainly Northern middle powers like Canada and Norway, seeking a role in a post-bipolar era characterized by a multiplication of small states and a proliferation of conflicts – new wars? (Kaldor 1999). Many were small-scale and internal (Hoffman and Weiss 2006). Human security was particularly associated with the deliberations of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), whose late-2001 report was overshadowed by 9/11 that fall. The ICISS (2001) reformulated related concepts around humanitarian intervention into responsibility to protect (R2P):

> Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.
>
> *ICISS 2001*

But any optimism about the realization of ICISS's redefinitions faded rapidly as the US declared war on terrorism in the first half of the first decade of the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, its relevance and resilience have since become increasingly apparent in the second half of the decade, as the coalition got bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan and the US became increasingly

isolated. Unfortunately, US unilateralism made the articulation and implementation of human security and R2P more problematic, as is apparent in Darfur. Clearly, an inclusive global civil society is imperative if anti-war coalitions are to be animated and effective, such as it was around landmines and blood diamonds. The *WDR 2011* (World Bank 2011) maintained attention on the developmental costs of the conflict-security nexus, particularly with fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS) (www.wdr2011.worldbank.org).

In addition to applied difficulties, human security also encountered conceptual disagreements before the end of the 1990s: i.e. is it freedom from fear and/or freedom from want (MacFarlane and Khong 2006); that is, should it be narrower, more security-specific or broader, more development-related? These debates were articulated through twenty-one short essays in a special edition of *Security Dialogue* (Burgess and Owen 2004).

If the second half of its first decade was troubled (MacLean, Black and Shaw 2006), hopefully the second decade will be more promising for such conceptual and applied innovations, despite detractors in the UN. Certainly the UN Commission report (United Nations 2003) and debates around the UN Millennium summit in 2005, served to revive the standing of human security, even before the difficulties of the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions had become so obvious. Others, like UNDP (2012), the IDB and IBRD (World Bank 2011), are advancing the concept of citizen security in the new decade.

Kofi Annan, then UN Secretary-General, reiterated the broader formulation of human security with direct relevance to the misleading data generated by the narrow definition adopted by the *HSR 2005*: and with resonance for any consideration of the human security as well as human development implications of global health in the new century:

> The Secretary-General fully embraces a broad vision of collective security. The threats to peace and security in the 21st century include not just international wars . . . but organized crime and civil violence. They also include poverty, deadly infectious disease and environmental degradation.
>
> *United Nations 2005*

Symptomatic of the rehabilitation of R2P, as the Bush era expired, in early 2008 a coalition of larger, more progressive INGOs (Global Witness, ICG, Oxfam, Transparency and Refugees International), with governments in the human security network, supported the establishment of a novel Global Centre for R2P located at CUNY in New York (www.globalcentrer2p.org), with a board chaired by the ICISS co-chairs: Evans and Sanoun.

Not only does human security move the analytical goalpost, from the state to the individual, but as well, it opens the field for others – non-state actors – to engage in both defining what we mean by security and to help provide security.

Developmental states and good governance?

Not all states in Africa today, let alone the global South, are fragile. Some regimes have been able to manage their engagement with globalizations successfully, claiming and aspiring to be developmental states (Kyung-Sup, Fine and Weiss 2012). Such political economies are not limited to either Asia or large countries in major continents. Rather, there are such states in Africa (e.g. Botswana and Mauritius) (Mbabazi and Taylor 2005). Indeed, following the conceptual framework proposed by Thandika Mkandawire (2001), unlike Asia, Africa's developmental states may be democratic rather than authoritarian, with positive implications for good governance (UNECA 2011).

But, in the last decade of the last century, not only did conflict in Africa and elsewhere become more ubiquitous, it also became more complex. Thus relatively simple and safe peacekeeping operations became ever more complicated and dangerous, as well as problematic. Initial PKO strategic alliances with partners like INGOs (Weiss 1998) became more complex as such partners came to require enhanced security. Thus INGOs now recruit security advisors for such operations, typically from major militaries like the British army (Christian Aid 2004). Peace missions came to entail dealing with gangs of militias rather than just standing national armies. This has, belatedly, begun to be reflected in official analyses and responses (IPU/GCDCAF 2003; Small Arms Survey 2010; World Bank 2011). Some of these challenges derive from the growing conflict over global resources treated in the next section. We need to understand how the evolving international division of labor fosters new security challenges in the developing world – where most of Africa's states are situated – and how, in particular, it reinforces the move from national to human security.

BRICS and the political economy of resources in fragile states

The BRICS, especially the booming economies of China and India, have already impacted global demand and prices for energy, minerals, etc. (Shaw, Cooper and Antkiewicz 2007). If the established literature on the political economy of resources has salience (www.globalwitness.org), and if China and India in particular continue to grow at +/– 10% per annum, then inter- and non-state conflict over such scarce raw materials – e.g. rare earth minerals monopolized by China – may be unavoidable (Kaplinsky 2005; Kaplinsky and Messner 2008). The impact of such conflict may be especially intense in fragile states in Africa, as suggested in case studies of emerging oil sectors in some micro-states in West Africa by Nicholas Shaxson (2007), such as Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and São Tomé.

Given the rather optimistic scenarios for the continent at the start of the second decade of this century, a novel somewhat unanticipated challenge arises: given burgeoning national incomes, how can we transition from fragile to developmental states (UNECA 2011), as well as prevent regression? Global rebalancing/restructuring facilitates such a prospect, but public policy needs to be better informed (ACBF 2011; Hanson, Kararach and Shaw 2012), or growing inequalities will merely exacerbate insecurities. For instance, Boge et al. (2006) (www.bicc.de) nicely juxtaposed the literatures on conflict with those on corporate governance, especially codes of conduct. If the BRICS' roles in markets for raw materials continue to increase, then multi-stakeholder coalitions will proliferate (www.publishwhatyoupay.org) such as facilitated the development of EITI (www.eiti.org): six African countries are now compliant: Central African Republic (CAR), Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Niger and Nigeria – with another fifteen candidates pending.

Securitization of development and privatization of security?

An undeniable feature of globalizations around the century's turn has been that guns and their holders have been increasingly privatized (Wulf 2005). Even before the massive contracting-out of security in Iraq and then Afghanistan, divisions of labor had begun to be arranged for post-bipolar peacekeeping arrangements, in part as a responses to their growing complexity (Weiss 2005; 2007), and in part as a reaction to declining formal military budgets everywhere.

Despite continuing global and regional efforts, there is no effective global regime for the regulation let alone the reduction in small arms (Lumpe 2000), even with the International action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) encouragement (www.iansa.org), and with the ATT process

(www.controlarms.org). The annual *Small Arms Survey*, the latest being 2010 on "gangs, groups and guns", catalogues and analyzes the SMLW challenge to security (www.smallarmssurvey.org). Robert Muggah (2012) has recently put the transnational gang into perspective, and the World Bank (2011) and others have begun to focus on the developmental implications of transnational organized crime (TOC) (see Aning and Salihu, Chapter 2). Unless the plague of small arms is addressed, human development/security, will remain elusive.

The move from state-centric notions of security concomitantly increases the privatization of security (Abrahamsen 2012). This, in turn, naturally leads to concern about the securitization of development (*Conflict, Security and Development* 2004). If security and development are tied together, how do we keep from securitizing development? Should PKO expenditures count as ODA under OECD DAC rules? Such debates have been prevalent in Europe (Christian Aid 2004). One correlate is that civil–military relations (Weiss 2005) become ever more challenging as the civil dimension is no longer just parliamentary oversight but, rather, civil society evaluation. The military is no longer only made up of official state forces, but also private security companies (PSCs) and informal/illegal mafias/gangs (IPU/GCDCAF 2003). IBRD and OECD strictures about the maximum percentages to be allocated to the military in the South are but one dimension of the liberal peace, which is beginning to attract critical attention (MacGinty and Oliver 2007; 2009). Yet, some global companies and business schools are advancing innovative corporate responses to humanitarian disasters (Tomasini and Wassenhove 2009).

Uneven globalization and the elusive liberal peace

The growing problems confronting humanitarian intervention (Weiss 2007) at the turn of the century have generated increasing critical recognition. The revisionism of those critics of a liberal peace, like Roger Mac Ginty (2006), Roland Paris (2001) and Oliver Richmond (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2007 and 2009), centers on the incompatibility of standard neo-liberal economic and social prescriptions with the definition and establishment of a sustainable security environment; generic good governance does not necessarily facilitate a lasting peace. The orthodox Northern prescription, whatever the case, let alone history, is a western-style formal, multi-party democracy, and open liberal markets; i.e. simultaneous political and economic liberalization no matter the character, duration, or intensity of the violence.

Globalization has tended to intensify inequalities within and between states and regions. Inappropriate peace processes, like demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) may be highly problematic in such circumstances. People survive such difficulties by returning to informal sectors, which can be illegal and violent as well as global and developmental. Criminal violence around PKOs has escalated in the twenty-first century, with rape becoming an all too familiar strategy to advance masculinities (Parpart and Thompson 2012), compounding the spread of HIV/AIDS. Hence, the infrequency of successful peace negotiations and agreements and the frequency of returns to conflict, along with the *de facto* division of some states like Congo, Côte d'Ivoire and Somalia, and possibly, Uganda (Shaw 2006); or in the case of South Sudan *de jure* division.

Such unanticipated and unacceptable outcomes from peace-building and humanitarian interventions are exacerbated by the Northern international agencies involved, both inter- and non-state. These range from the intergovernmental establishments in the North such as the G-8/EU/OECD to major INGOs like Christian Aid, Oxfam, SCF and World Vision, to think tanks like Amnesty, International Crisis Group (ICG) and Overseas Development Institute (ODI). They typically include major military establishments like the Ministry of Defence in the UK, along with growing numbers and types of private military companies (Wulf 2005). Such

scepticism or revisionism arising from a particular problematic process reinforces the imperative of rethinking the canon of international relations; an imperative that is all too apparent from the vantage-point of Africa, the continent where most experiments around peace-building occur.

Insights from/for African international relations

Africa was the focus of international attention in 2006–2007 and again in 2011, for very different reasons: fragile versus developmental states, respectively. In the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century, Africa was highlighted because of global films, such as: *Blood Diamonds* and *The Last King of Scotland*. Symbolized by the special issue of *Vanity Fair* (Bono 2007), these African issues posed a range of global implications: from conflict diamonds at the alluvial mines in West and Central Africa, to Idi Amin's bloody rule in Uganda in the 1970s. Africa was also the center of intergovernmental attention in 2004–2005 around Britain's hosting of the G8, when Prime Minister Blair established an international Commission on Africa. It led not only to major deliberations and reports but also to media attention to Bono and Geldof around Live 8 concerts for the continent, etc. (Cooper 2007). Superstar attention to African and related development issues was symbolized by Princess Diana's association with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, which led through the Ottawa Process to a global regime, as well as to the award to the Campaign of a Nobel Peace Prize. It reinforces Andrew Cooper's (2007) extension of international relations to celebrity diplomacy: a distinctive, glamorous but not risk-free form of public diplomacy.

In contrast to the negative image of Africa in the middle of the decade, as the global economy was transformed by the BRICS (Cheru and Obi 2010), in the second decade of the twenty-first century, the continent's developmental states were highlighted, by the *Economist* (2011) and UNECA (2011). Such unprecedented, positive attention to Africa reinforces the claim of Lemke (2003) and Brown (2006) that the continent holds insights with relevance to the field of IR as a whole. This is so, because so much of its cross-border, transnational relations are informal, often illegal and thus are not counted in orthodox IR data. So a significant proportion of Africa's external trade is unrecorded, in part as, like other regions such as the new Central Asia and Central Europe, it contains a high percentage of landlocked states. Likewise, any calculation of violent deaths through conflict which ignores internal numbers would disregard the substantial death toll in, say, Congo's seemingly endless wars (+/– 5 million over the last decade), all of which have ubiquitous external connections.

Furthermore, Africa challenges traditional assumptions and definitions of inter-state diplomacy by drawing attention to informal, non- or semi-state communications, economic, ecological, social, strategic, and other relationships across borders (Cornelissen, Cheru and Shaw 2012; Dunn and Shaw 2001). Such relations constitute the core of contemporary interdependence or globalization, stretching to inter-continental migrations, diasporas, remittances, and symbolized by sales of phone-cards for diasporas in corner stores in the North and the proliferation of Western Union and Money Gram facilities.

We turn, in conclusion, to the imperative of human security. Or to cite the title of our new PhD at the University of Massachusetts in Boston: *Global Governance and Human Security* (www.crhsgg.umb.edu).

Conclusion: the imperative of global governance for human security in Africa

The fall-out from uneven globalizations (Clark and Hoque 2012) has generated not only a host of new issues, particularly concentrated on the continent but, also increasingly, a set of

heterogeneous global coalitions to treat them (Dingwerth 2008). This is particularly appropriate as the only world commission to be based in the global South and the only one to include MNCs as well as NGOs along with states was that on dams at the turn of the century, based in Cape Town (Dingwerth 2008), and analyzed by one of its animators, Sanjeev Khagram (2004).

The range of transnational, private governance security responses in contemporary Africa varies from the more successful, like the Ottawa and Kimberley Processes, to the less successful, like those concerning child soldiers and small arms (Hubert 2000; McRae and Hubert 2001; O'Dwyer 2006). The former was a function of the pioneering, extensive International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL); the latter of much more modest beginnings, in the analyses and advocacy of Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) and Global Witness, the latter being awarded the prestigious Commitment to Development Ideas in Action Award by *Foreign Policy* and the Center for Global Development in 2007.

Similarly, INGO roles/structures continuously evolve in strategic alliances with assorted militaries in PKOs (Weiss 1998). Hence, security and development has become something of a preoccupation of BOND in the UK and other EU networks around the emerging common security policy of the EU.[1] Might this lead to the securitization of development? Meanwhile, conversely, to reduce the flow of blood diamonds at source, the Kimberley Process led in 2008 to the creative Diamond Development Initiative (DDI), and an innovative World Bank network for artisanal and small-scale mining: Communities and Small-scale Mining (CASM) program (www.casmsite.org). The latter was established with DFID support in 1995 and it has organized annual conferences and other gatherings, such as in London in January 2007 on "From Mines to Markets: Conflict or Cooperation" (www.pacweb.org). The ICGLR and Enough Project have attempted to regulate supply chains from the Congo for high-tech products to maximize labor incomes and minimize corruption and coercion (www.icglr.org, www.enoughproject.org).

Don Hubert (2000: xviii) has provided one of the few comparative analyses of the more and less successful humanitarian coalitions (O'Dwyer 2006). He contrasted the Ottawa Process on landmines with no less compelling, yet less successful, campaigns on child soldiers, the ICC and small arms, which together suggest

> that a model for humanitarian advocacy is emerging with three broad dimensions. They are the pursuit of stringent standards with widespread but not necessarily universal support; political coalition building among NGOs, states and international organization; and negotiating environments that allow for voting rather than consensus decision-making, access for NGOs and the selection of a supportive chairperson.
>
> *O'Dwyer 2006*

So, further investigation into more and less successful public diplomacy or Track Two or Track Three diplomacy would require attention to the anthropology/history/psychology of such extensive, heterogeneous global movements. Thus the role of peak institutions like BOND (www.bond.org.uk) would be instructive, along with less extensive but prestigious groupings around NGO or EITI accountability (Dingwerth 2008; O'Dwyer 2006). Further, today sustainable peace-making involves judicious, strategic alliances between men in uniform or blue helmets, if not blue berets. Such relatively robust coalitions are likely to be necessary through the first quarter of the twenty-first century.

Notwithstanding the now established debate about the nature of human security (freedom from fear and/or want), by the start of the second decade of the twenty-first century its realization seemed to be ever more distant; hence the move towards privileging citizen security (UNDP 2012). Meanwhile, even if 9/11 led to an unjustifiable and unwinnable War on Terror, 7/7

generated serious reflections in the UK and other immigrant communities, including the Anglophone Commonwealth. By the end of 2006, it had established the Amartya Sen Commission on Respect and Understanding – "Civil Paths to Peace" (Commonwealth 2007), the latest in a series of UN and Commonwealth global enquiries. It responds more to 7/7 than 9/11; i.e. to home-grown British bombers who hardly reflect the assumption or realization of cosmopolitan societies. It reported to CHOGM in Kampala before the end of November 2007, in turn being endorsed by the Commonwealth's Munyonyo Declaration. This report could further the global retreat from US unilateralism and advance recognition that other less dramatic/coercive measures may yet be required/efficacious to advance human development/security (Willis 2009).

To return to the review article which triggered much of this welcome revisionism, Lemke (2003: 117) cautions that: ". . . political power is exercised by a variety of state and non-state actors in Africa. Because standard IR research theorizes about and collects data only for official states, much of Africa's IR are left out." Lemke (2003: 116) confirms that his intent is to bring back a range of authoritative, established yet unrecognized non-state actors who impact local and regional development and conflict even if they are not officially national: "My goal is to offer specific steps to improve IR research designs so that Africa and the developing world more generally no longer go missing."

Contemporary conflict and conflict analysis indicate, then, the imperative of a paradigm shift at all levels for all actors, including the academy and think tanks. This should include the juxtaposition of BRICS, developmental and fragile states, no matter how different or distant they may at first appear to be (Shaw, Cooper and Antkiewicz 2007). The standoff between competing notions of human security may yet be transcended by the adoption of that being advocated by UNDP in the Caribbean in response to TOC in association with both World and Inter-American Banks: citizen security (UNDP 2012).

Note

1 BOND is the UK membership body for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in international development.

5

TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM IN AFRICA

Evolving focus

J. Peter Pham

Introduction

As has been the case all too often in its modern history, how the African continent related to recent global terrorism and counterterrorism trends was determined by an exogenous event. Before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, by al-Qaeda on the United States, Africa seemed destined to remain at best peripheral to the strategic landscape, at least as most American policymakers perceived it (Pham 2011c). In the wake of 9/11, however, came a newfound appreciation of Africa's strategic relevance by many of the very same actors, now convinced that the continent was a "frontline" in the freshly declared "Global War on Terror" (Pham 2007a).

Largely forgotten by many of these decision-makers was the fact that Africa had been a theater for terrorist operations, including those directed against the United States, long before the 9/11 attacks. In 1973, Palestine Liberation Organization terrorists acting on orders from Yasser Arafat murdered U.S. Ambassador to Sudan Cleo A. Noel, Jr., and his deputy, George Curtis Moore, as well as the Belgian chargé d'affaires and two Saudi diplomats (Korn 1993). In 1998, there were the coordinated bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya which killed 224 people—including 12 Americans—and wounded some 5,000 others. These were just two of the more notorious acts of *international* terrorism. If one takes as a definition of terrorism the broadly accepted description offered by the United Nations General Assembly (1999) a year after the East Africa bombings ("criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes"), terrorism can be said to be widespread in Africa, although it has largely been a *domestic*, rather than transnational, affair—thus explaining perhaps the lack of attention until more recent times on the part of American and other Western counterterrorism officials.

How these starkly contrasting perspectives have evolved in the years since 9/11 as well as the current realities on the ground constitute the subject matter of this chapter. Without downplaying the political uses of violence, fear, and terror by internal dissidents and governments in African countries, this chapter will focus on terrorist phenomena which are actually or potentially transnational, whether in their inspiration or effect. After surveying the historical and strategic context for transnational terrorism on the African continent, it will review the groups that are currently some of the leading exponents of terrorism in Africa, and then proceed to examine the counterterrorism initiatives which have been set in motion in response to them.

Terrorism's long shadow over Africa

The first post-9/11 iteration of the *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, released a year after the attacks on the American homeland, raised the specter that

> weak states . . . can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.
>
> *The White House 2002*

Extremism, however, requires opportunity if it is to translate radical intentionality into terrorist effect. A leading African security analyst succinctly summarized the situation in the following manner:

> The opportunity targets presented by peacekeepers, aid and humanitarian workers, donors and Western NGOs active in the continent are lucrative targets of subnational terrorism and international terrorism. Africa is also replete with potentially much higher value targets ranging from the massive oil investments (often by U.S. companies) in the Gulf of Guinea to the burgeoning tourist industry in South Africa.
>
> *Cilliers 2003*

Africa's burgeoning hydrocarbon sector and the growing American interest in it illustrates this point well (Morris 2006). West African hydrocarbons are particularly attractive to American companies for a variety of reasons, not least of which is the higher marginal profit rates to be made per unit, both because of ease in extraction and transport and because, in the case of oil, the quality of the crude is particularly adapted to U.S. refineries (Cedoz et al. 2005). The strategic value to the United States of access to this supply is magnified when one considers the current Obama administration's goal is to "eliminate our current imports from the Middle East and Venezuela within ten years" (The White House 1999). Needless to say, if that is to happen, much of the gap between the country's current volumes of energy consumption and the advent of technologies being developed will likely be made up by additional imports from Africa, where proven petroleum reserves have increased by 40 percent in the decade, in contrast to the downward trends observed almost everywhere else (BP 2011). In 2011, for example, the United States imported 645,092,000 barrels of petroleum from African countries (15.6 percent of the 4,146,266,000 total barrels imported), a volume almost equal to the 679,649,000 barrels (16.4 percent of total imports) which came from states on the Persian Gulf (US Department of Energy 2012).

Thus, in the view of many American analysts, there is a very real terrorist risk to U.S. interests in the energy sector, among others—a risk that is increasing with time if one looks at its three constituent elements of threat, vulnerability, and cost.

Threat is the frequency or likelihood of adverse events. Sporadic attacks by a small group with largely local grievances, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), for example, nonetheless succeeded in cutting oil production by America's fifth-largest supplier, Nigeria, by an estimated 500,000 barrels per day, or approximately 25 percent, at the beginning of 2006 (Pham 2007c). While the group was labeled a "terrorist organization" by the Nigerian government, most analysts viewed it more as a criminal enterprise, albeit one which manipulated and benefited from a grassroots sense of marginalization (Peel 2010).

Be it as it may, it demonstrates the potential for a relatively small, but motivated group in just one corner of the African continent, to wreak havoc with global markets and the security interests of nation states.

Vulnerability is the likelihood of success of a particular threat category against a particular target. With a few exceptions like the more than 1,000-kilometer-long Chad-Cameroon pipeline, most hydrocarbon production in West Africa is on the littoral, either in delta regions like Nigeria's or in offshore fields like Equatorial Guinea's. If al-Qaeda could successfully attack an armed vessel of the U.S. Navy, like it did to the USS *Cole* in 2000, causing some $287 million in damage with just one explosive-laden speedboat, it does not require a great deal of security experience to imagine how much easier it would be to assault an oil platform or tanker manned by non-military personnel.

Cost is the total cost of the impact of a particular threat experienced by a vulnerable target, including both the "hard costs" of actual damages and the "soft costs" to production, the markets, etc. Although the price of a barrel of crude oil has softened somewhat recently, the global market is so tight that any shocks caused by cuts to production or supply would be devastating economically. Conversely, viewed from the perspective of the terrorists, the physical damage to the *Cole* alone was an extraordinary return on their investment, as would the global economic fallout from any successful maritime attack on the oil supply. In fact, from the point of view of the economic warfare strategy laid out by bin Laden, an attack on commercial targets in the water makes much more sense than any land-based disruptions. David Goldwyn, who served as assistant secretary of energy in the Clinton administration and more recently as the Obama administration's Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy Affairs, for example, testified at one Senate hearing:

> While the region's geological prospects are good, the risk of an oil supply disruption from the region is rising from internal and external sources. We are in no position to endure a serious oil disruption from the Gulf of Guinea today. The global oil market is stretched to capacity.
>
> *Goldwyn 2004*

In short, the combination of these three factors—threat, vulnerability, and cost—raises considerably the overall risk assessment in Africa, and this is just one sector.

Dating back to at least the period when Osama bin Laden himself found refuge in Sudan at the personal invitation of the *éminence grise* of Sudanese Islamists, Hassan al-Turabi, the leading strategists of Islamist terrorism have speculated about the potential opportunities to establish cells, recruit members, obtain financing, and find safe haven offered by the weak governance capacities and other vulnerabilities of the continent's states. In fact, it has been noted al-Qaeda's first act against the United States was its attempt to insert itself in the fight against the American-led humanitarian mission in Somalia (Bergen 2006). Moreover, one of the most eloquent reminders of the particular allure of the continent to terrorists came from an online magazine for actual and aspiring global *jihadis* and their supporters, *Sada al-Jihad* ("Echo of Jihad"), which took the place of *Sawt al-Jihad* ("Voice of Jihad") as the publication of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia after Saudi authorities shut down the presses of the latter. In its June 2006 issue, the publication featured an article by one Abu Azzam al-Ansari (2006) entitled "Al-Qaeda is Moving to Africa" in which the author asserted:

> There is no doubt that al-Qaeda and the holy warriors appreciate the significance of the African regions for the military campaigns against the Crusaders. Many people sense

> that this continent has not yet found its proper and expected role and the next stages of the conflict will see Africa as the battlefield.

With a certain analytical rigor, Abu Azzam then proceeded to enumerate and evaluate what he perceived to be significant advantages to al-Qaeda shifting terrorist operations to Africa, including: the fact that jihadist doctrines have already been spread within the Muslim communities of many African countries; the political and military weakness of African governments; the wide availability of weapons; the geographical position of Africa vis-à-vis international trade routes; the proximity to old conflicts against "Jews and Crusaders" in the Middle East as well as new ones like Darfur, where the author almost gleefully welcomed the possibility of Western intervention; the poverty of Africa which "will enable the holy warriors to provide some finance and welfare, thus, posting there some of their influential operatives"; the technical and scientific skills that potential African recruits would bring to the jihadist cause; the presence of large Muslim communities, including ones already embroiled in conflict with Christians or adherents of traditional African religions; the links to Europe through North Africa "which facilitates the move from there to carry out attacks"; and the fact that Africa has a wealth of natural resources, including hydrocarbons and other raw materials, which are "very useful for the holy warriors in the intermediate and long term". Abu Azzam concluded his assessment by sounding an ominous note:

> In general, this continent has an immense significance. Whoever looks at Africa can see that it does not enjoy the interest, efforts, and activity it deserves in the war against the Crusaders. This is a continent with many potential advantages and exploiting this potential will greatly advance the jihad. It will promote achieving the expected targets of Jihad. Africa is a fertile soil for the advance of jihad and the *jihadi* cause.

It would be a mistake to dismiss Abu Azzam's analysis as devoid of operational effect. Shortly before the publication of the article, the Islamic Courts Union, an Islamist movement whose leaders included a number of figures linked to al-Qaeda, seized control of the sometime Somali capital of Mogadishu and subsequently overran most of the country (Shay 2008). While intervention by neighboring Ethiopia in late December 2006 dislodged the Islamists, Somalia's internationally recognized but otherwise ineffective "Transitional Federal Government" failed to make much headway in the face of a burgeoning insurgency spearheaded by *Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen* (Movement of Warrior Youth, al-Shabaab), a militant Islamist movement that was declared a "specially designated global terrorist" by the U.S. State Department in 2008, a "listed terrorist organization" by the Australian government the following year, a "proscribed organization" by the British government in its early 2010 Terrorism Act, and a "listed terrorist group" by the Canadian government. Until very recently, al-Shabaab has dominated wide swathes of Somali territory and operated more or less freely in other areas not under their *de facto* control—with the exception of the autonomous Somaliland and Puntland regions in the north (Pham 2011g). Despite the setbacks that it has suffered of late, al-Shabaab nonetheless was formally accepted by Osama bin Laden's successor Ayman al-Zawahiri as an affiliate of al-Qaeda in 2012 (Bruton and Pham 2012).

Another al-Qaeda "franchise" has sought to reignite conflict in Algeria and spread it to the Sahel, the critical boundary region where Sub-Saharan Africa meets North Africa and where vast empty spaces and highly permeable borders are readily exploitable by local and international militants alike, both as a base for recruitment and training and as a conduit for the movement of personnel and material. In 2006, after years of decline during which they had been squeezed by intense pressure from the outside while beset by defections from within, members of the GSPC

formally pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda and began identifying themselves in communiqués as Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The link to al-Qaeda was confirmed by al-Zawahiri, then bin Laden's deputy, who, in the "commemorative video" the terrorist group issued on the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, declared:

> Our *mujahid* Sheikh and the Lion of Islam, Osama bin Laden . . . has instructed me to give the good news to Muslims in general and my *mujahidin* brothers everywhere that the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat has joined al-Qaeda organization.
>
> *Middle East Media Research Institute 2006*

The Egyptian militant hailed the "blessed union" between the GSPC and al-Qaeda, pledging that it would "be a source of chagrin, frustration and sadness for the apostates [of the regime in Algeria], the treacherous sons of [former colonial power] France" and urging the group to become "a bone in the throat of the American and French crusaders" in the region and beyond. Since its "rebranding" the group has been responsible both for a number of spectacular attacks, including an assassination attempt against Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika as well as assaults on the Algiers offices of the United Nations and several government ministries, and an expansion of operations southward into the Sahel (Pham 2011e; Pham 2011h; Larémont 2011).

While transnational terrorist challenges have been the preoccupation of America's policymakers, intelligence analysts, and military planners, most African governments are more concerned with the threat of "domestic terrorism" cases which rarely receive much attention in the Western media. The problem actually begins with the definition of terrorism. Most African states are parties to the former Organization of African Unity's Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999: art. 1 §3 a) which defines "terrorism" as:

> Any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number of group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated to:
>
> (i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or to abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or
> (ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or
> (iii) create a general insurrection in a State.

The emphasis is less on transnational phenomena and more on acts confined to national boundaries and involving neither targets nor agents abroad. As noted earlier, lack of both government capacity and social and economic opportunity, on top of political, ethnic, and religious tensions, makes many in Africa potentially candidates for radicalization. An example of this is Nigeria, where the religious question which has had Africa's most populous country dancing very close to the precipice since 1999 when twelve predominantly Muslim northern states (out of a total of thirty-six states plus the federal capital territory of Abuja) began adopting separate legal codes based on Islamic *shari'a* law over the objections of their own Christian and other religious minorities as well as other states in the federation. The resulting communal riots

have taken an estimated 10,000 lives and, unless the underlying social pathology is resolved, there is the risk of the country turning into *the* front line of a "clash of civilizations" between Islamist militancy and those who oppose it. While the underlying conflict in Nigeria—as elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa—is largely a "mix of competition for scarce resources, legacies of corrupt government and collapsing state institutions, and political entrepreneurs who compete with one another to arm marginalized youth to press increasingly radicalized agendas" (Reno 2004: 236), the sectarian terms in which it is cast risk embroiling Nigeria in a far wider conflict.

Current terrorist threats

At present, outside of North Africa, which has a slightly different dynamic, even before the tumult of the so-called "Arab Spring" there are three geographical areas of particular concern in Africa with respect to terrorist groups and their activities: the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and Nigeria.

The Sahel

In many respects, the belt connecting North Africa and West Africa, stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea and straddling ancient trade and migration routes, is an ideal environment for extremist groups with transnational ambitions. The region is strategically important for several reasons, including its role as a bridge between the Arab Maghreb and black Sub-Saharan Africa as well as its important natural resources, both renewable and nonrenewable. Moreover, the Sahel touches several countries—including Algeria, Nigeria, and Sudan—with serious security challenges of their own that could easily spill over their borders. In fact, some scholars have argued that the Sahara and the Sahel form "a single space of movement" which, for purposes of the geography of terrorism, "should be considered as a continuum, something that the territorial approach of states and geopolitics prevents us from understanding" (Walther and Retaille 2010: 11).

Following its "rebranding" as an affiliate of al-Qaeda in 2006, AQIM expanded southward from Algeria, using the prestige of its new association to recruit "a considerable number of Mauritanians, Libyans, Moroccans, Tunisians, Malians, and Nigerians", as its emir readily acknowledged in an interview he gave to the *New York Times* (The New York Times 2008). AQIM's shift beyond the limits of its Algerian origins is not just a geographical move, but also an operational transformation, with the group acquiring both new tactics and new allies to implement them. Evidence has subsequently emerged of AQIM's increasing involvement in the burgeoning drug traffic transiting the group's new operational areas in the Sahel, in addition to its well-honed kidnappings for ransoms (Champin 2010).

The potential for the Sahel region being the setting for an explosive mix of Islamist terrorism, secular grievances, and criminality was underscored in early 2012 in Mali where what started as a rebellion by disaffected Tuareg nomads led to the overthrow of state authority in three northern provinces with a combined territory the size of France and, following the marginalization of the separatists, the area falling under the sway of AQIM and several allied groups (Pham 2012b).

Horn of Africa

East Africa has been not only a region which hosted Osama bin Laden and the then still-nascent al-Qaeda in the early 1990s, but also the setting for the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi as well as of an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, and, simultaneously, on an Israeli commercial airliner in 2002—all carried out by the terrorist network (Pham 2007b). But it is Somalia's al-Shabaab which has been the primary terrorist threat in the region.

Founded in large part due to the efforts of Aden Hashi Ayro, a militant who had trained with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan prior to 9/11, al-Shabaab began its existence as one of several armed wings of an Islamist movement, the Islamic Courts Union, which gradually gained control over most of southern and central Somalia in early 2006. Following the route of the Islamic Courts Union by an Ethiopian military intervention in early 2007, al-Shabaab emerged as the spearhead of the internationally supported Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was then installed in Mogadishu for the first time.

Benefiting from the TFG's lack of legitimacy and general incompetence and corruption, al-Shabaab eventually managed to seize control of large sections of southern and central Somalia, including parts of Mogadishu, where it installed a brutal Islamist regime that, to the horror of many Somalis, carried out a number of harsh punishments on alleged malefactors even as it set up multi-million dollar rackets (Pham 2011g). Over time, the group has shifted its emphasis from a purely local focus on driving out foreign forces—first the Ethiopians and, subsequently, the African Union force propping up the TFG—to an increasingly transnational agenda, as evidenced both by its rhetoric and by a twin bombing in Kampala, Uganda, in July 2010, during the FIFA World Cup final match, which left 74 people dead and scores injured.

While the adoption of an effective counterinsurgency strategy by more recent commanders of the African Union force as well as al-Shabaab's own blunders have, since the beginning of 2011, led to the group being gradually pushed out of Mogadishu (Pham 2011f), the organization has also shifted its focus, with its longstanding formal proclamations of its adhesion to al-Qaeda being accepted by bin Laden's successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who enrolled it as a formal affiliate in early 2012. With the Kenyan military intervention in Somalia—itself a response to cross-border raids by Somali militants—and increasing ethnic and religious tensions within the former country between the ethnic Somalis and other largely Muslim minorities and larger population groups, there is increasing risk of al-Shabaab capitalizing on the disaffection to gain greater entrée than it already enjoys.

Nigeria

While the West African giant has demonstrated over the decades an almost legendary capacity to absorb violence, the reemergence in 2010 of the militant group Boko Haram and its increasing virulence—reflecting a major transformation in capacity, tactics, and ideology—has nonetheless been a cause for increasing concern, not least because its 115 separate attacks in 2011 left at least 550 people dead across northern and central Nigeria (Pham 2012a).

The group, which first received widespread attention for the armed attacks it launched against police stations and other public buildings in Nigeria's northeastern Yobe State in late December 2003, derives its name from the combination of the Hausa word for "book" (as in "book learning"), *boko*, and the Arabic term *haram*, which designates those things which are ungodly or sinful. Thus "Boko Haram" is not only the group's common name, but also its slogan to the effect that "Western education (and such product that arises from it) is sacrilege". After its initial offensive was repulsed, Boko Haram followers regrouped at a base on the border with Niger, which they dubbed "Afghanistan" after hoisting the Taliban flag, although they had no links with the Afghan militants. Over the next few years, Boko Haram carried out occasional assaults on police, who responded with raids and arrests. The back-and-forth continued until July 2009, when a security raid on a hideout led to reprisal attacks on police, which quickly escalated into a week of rioting which spread across four northern states. In response, security forces besieged and stormed the group's main compound and captured Mohammed Yusuf, who was beaten, interrogated, and finally shot—supposedly while attempting to escape—but not before more than

700 people were killed and numerous public buildings, including government offices, police stations, schools, and churches were destroyed. The group receded from public attention and a number of analysts argued that it was hopelessly fractured, if not altogether finished.

Far from being dead, however, the group underwent a dramatic transformation. Beginning with a string of attacks in late 2010, Boko Haram escalated until June 2011 when it launched what is believed to be the first suicide attack in Nigeria ever, using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) against the headquarters of the Nigerian Police Force in the federal capital of Abuja. Two months later, after having spent the interim carrying out more than a half dozen smaller attacks on government officials, establishments that serve alcohol, and churches, the group carried out another major attack, sending a suicide bomber with an explosives-laden car into the UN offices in Abuja. Twenty-five people were killed and at least 80 were wounded. This attack, the first by the group against an international target, as well as the video it subsequently released of the bomber offering praise to slain al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and referring to the UN as a "forum of all global evil", put Boko Haram squarely in the ranks of terrorists who have specifically targeted UN and other international agencies in more well-known zones of terrorist activity, including Afghanistan, Iraq, and Algeria.

The counterterrorism initiatives

Given the context sketched out above, it is not surprising that, in the wake of 9/11, the United States launched a number of security cooperation efforts across Africa, responsibility for which was gradually assumed by the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) after its creation in 2007 (Pham 2008; Pham 2011a; McFate 2008).

In late 2002, for example, the U.S. State Department launched the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), a modest effort to provide border security and other counterterrorism assistance to Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger using personnel from U.S. Army Special Forces attached to the Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR), a component of the Stuttgart, Germany-based US European Command. Funding for PSI was modest, amounting to under US$7 million in fiscal year 2004, most of which was spent on training military units from the four partner countries. U.S. Marines were also involved with certain aspects of the training and Air Force personnel provided support, including medical and dental care for members of local units as well as neighboring residents. The program's modest funding was stretched to provide non-lethal equipment including Toyota Land Cruisers, uniforms, and global positioning system (GPS) devices for participating military forces (Ellis 2004).

The first test of the units which had benefited from this training program came in early 2004 when a band of fighters from the GSPC were spotted moving in a convoy of Toyota SUVs and were waylaid by Algerian military forces in the deserts of northern Mali. While many of the fighters were slain, those who managed to escape were tracked by U.S. personnel who passed the information on to the parties to the counterterrorism partnership. As a result, Chadian forces, backed by Nigerian units, engaged the fugitives in northern Chad and wiped the party out, killing nearly four dozen terrorists. Subsequent investigations revealed that the dead GSPC fighters included nationals from several Sahelian states, confirming the PSI's underlying presupposition that there was a radical movement which bridged the harsh Saharan divide.

As a follow-up to the PSI initial success, as well as to overcome what the then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs, Theresa Whelan, called its "Band-Aid approach" (Miles 2005), the State Department-funded Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) was launched in 2005 with support from the Defense Department's "Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara" (OEF-TS). TSCTI added Algeria, Nigeria, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia to the

original four PSI countries. TSCTI, was, in turn, renamed the "Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Program" (TSCTP), when the newly created AFRICOM assumed responsibility for its military component in late 2007 and, subsequently, the program was redenominated the "Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership" (TSCTP). Funding was increased steadily from US$16 million in 2005 to US$30 million in 2006, with incremental increases up to US$100 million a year throughout 2011. TSCTP works with partner nations to provide training and support, with an emphasis on preventing terrorism, enhancing border and aviation security, promoting democratic governance, and building public support against extremism. The participation of Algeria and Morocco is significant since Algiers has voiced official opposition to the creation of AFRICOM and even Morocco, long one of America's closest allies, has expressed misgivings about being asked to host any part of the command (Anonymous 2007).

Military support for TSCTP comes through Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS), the regional War on Terror operation, responsibility for which devolved to AFRICOM after its stand-up in 2008 (in addition to the TSCTP countries, OEF-TS also includes Burkina Faso and Libya). What has been achieved in terms of military interoperability and capacity-building thanks to this program was put on display in May 2010 with a nearly three-week-long exercise, "Flintlock 10", which involved some 600 U.S. Special Forces personnel; 150 European troops from Belgium, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Spain; and 400 African troops from Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. Kicked off in the Burkinabé capital of Ouagadougou, the exercise consisted of activities and events in locations in several different countries throughout the region, including the establishment of a deployed Joint Special Operations Task Force to conduct real-time coordination with all participating nations and the creation of a multinational coordination center which served as the focal point for information sharing as well as the planning of synchronized operations. The center conducted academic training for all participants, culminating in a command post exercise involving instruction, scenario development, and a control group, to enhance the participants' ability to work collaboratively toward solving a shared regional crisis involving illegal activities which disrupt stability and security. The tactical portion of Flintlock 10 consisted of small-unit combined training and activities as well as Medical and Veterinary Civic Action Programs that provided the populations in rural areas with health information and medical care (Elliott 2010).

Meanwhile, the East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI), launched in 2003, was intended to provide TSCTI-type training and some equipment for counterterrorism units, as well as support for legislators and other senior-level decision makers involved with drafting and implementing laws against terrorist financing and money laundering, for states in that subregion. Since its inception, this State Department-administered program has disbursed more than US$100 million in funds to support programs in Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, although the partnership with Eritrea has largely fallen by the wayside amid charges that the regime in Asmara has supported insurgent groups in Somalia.

Alongside the predominantly Army-led initiatives on shore, the U.S. Navy has conducted a number of programs related to maritime security off the African littoral, some with significant counterterrorism aspects. To date the most significant naval contribution has been the Africa Partnership Station (APS), a part of the American Navy's "Global Fleet Station" initiative which is designed to provide a platform with the capacity and persistent presence to support training and other partnership efforts in parts of the world where access and sustainment have historically been challenging. Building on progressively more intense engagements dating back to July 2004, when the aircraft carrier USS *Enterprise* led a battle group of some thirty vessels from nine countries, including Morocco, in exercises off the western coast of Africa as part of worldwide

"Summer Pulse '04" deployment, APS is designed to promote maritime safety and security in Africa through a collaborative effort focusing, initially, on the Gulf of Guinea.

The maiden voyage of APS, which concluded in early 2008 and involved the six-month deployment of the amphibious dock landing ship USS *Fort McHenry*, accompanied by HSV-2 *Swift*, included eighteen ports of call in ten countries, during which US personnel provided shipboard training to more than 1,700 officers and sailors from partner nations in everything from small boat handling, port security, and maintenance to non-commissioned officer leadership and international maritime law. Working with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as nongovernmental organizations like the medical relief group Project HOPE, the *Fort McHenry* delivered one million high-nutritional meals, twenty-five pallets of medical, hygiene and educational supplies, along with hospital beds and other medical equipment valued at over US$100,000, donated through the Navy's Project Handclasp. During their port visits, sailors and other APS personnel used their liberty time to participate in some twenty-three community relations projects ranging from building tables for a school to painting a clinic.

During part of the *Fort McHenry*-led inaugural deployment of APS, the naval presence off Africa was also augmented by the *Los Angeles*-class nuclear-powered attack submarine USS *Annapolis*, which became the first U.S. submarine ever to make a visit to Sub-Saharan Africa, and the *Ticonderoga*-class guided missile cruiser USS *San Jacinto*. Altogether, the first APS cruise included visits to Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, and Togo. Subsequently APS continued with the two-month deployment in mid-2008 of the *Hamilton*-class cutter USCGC *Dallas*, which visited Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Senegal. In early 2009, in response to the increasing reach of Somali pirate attacks and the demand for greater maritime security engagement on the part of states on the eastern littoral of Africa, the *Oliver Hazard Perry*-class frigate USS *Robert G. Bradley* brought APS to Mozambique, Tanzania, and Kenya. The guided missile destroyer USS *Arleigh Burke* followed in July and August of the same year with theatre security cooperation exercises with Djibouti, Kenya, Mauritius, Seychelles, South Africa, and Tanzania. In 2010, the *Whidbey Island*-class dock landing ship USS *Gunston Hall* led APS's deployment to West and Central Africa, while the *Oliver Hazard Perry*-class frigate USS *Nicholas* led the initiative in East Africa. The fifth iteration of APS, which opened in January 2011, involved officers and seamen from thirty-four African, European, and South American countries in addition to U.S. Navy personnel, and included the dispatch of the *Bradley* to West African waters and her sister ship, the USS *Stephen W. Groves*, to those off East Africa.

In addition to these major initiatives aimed at building up partner capacity on a multilateral basis, a vast array of engagements regularly takes place between elements of the U.S. armed forces—now operating under the aegis of AFRICOM—and countries in the region. These bilateral efforts are aimed at reinforcing relationships and increasing interoperability, as well as addressing specific potential challenges in the theatre of operations. For example, more than one thousand U.S. Marines, sailors, and US Air and Army national guardsmen participated with Royal Moroccan Armed Forces personnel in "African Lion 2010" which took place south of Agadir in June 2010. The event, which was facilitated by U.S. Marine Corps Forces Africa (MARFORAF), is an annual exercise, now in its seventh year and the largest of its kind on the African continent. The most recent iteration included a command post exercise, intelligence capacity building, a field training exercise with live fire, peace operations training, aviation training, medical exchange training, as well as humanitarian civic assistance programs. The final exercise was the culmination of more than four months of planning, mass logistical movements and detailed coordination between U.S. and Moroccan diplomatic and military leadership. In the exercise scenario, several "enemy" mechanized units crossed into Moroccan territory. A joint

US and Moroccan task force was formed to repulse the intruders with a combination of air and ground capabilities, including helicopters, tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, mortars, combat engineers, and mobile assault platoons (Greenberg 2010).

Furthermore, each year more than one thousand African military officers and other personnel receive professional development at U.S. military schools and other training assistance through the State Department-administered International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. On an even broader scale, the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which in 2004 subsumed the Clinton administration's African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) as well as the Bush administration's earlier Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) Program, is training and equipping 75,000 military troops, a majority of them African, for peacekeeping operations on the continent (Franke 2007). Like IMET, GPOI is a State Department-funded activity, but its participants engage with the Africa Command which administers and supports the security cooperation program.

America's only official base and new operations

In testimony before the U.S. Congress in early 2008, AFRICOM's first commander, General William E. "Kip" Ward (2008), outlined his vision for the command:

> AFRICOM is pioneering a new way for a Unified Command to fulfill its role in supporting the security interests of our nation. From inception, AFRICOM was intended to be a different kind of command designed to address the changing security challenges confronting the U.S. in the 21st Century. We are integrating interagency personnel into our structure to improve both the planning and execution of our duties. By incorporating interagency representatives into our structure, we will provide better informed and more effective support to initiatives led by civilian Departments and Agencies, such as the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Through persistent engagement with our African partners and integration of this kind of [U.S. Government]-wide expertise into our structure, AFRICOM will improve support to U.S. policy objectives in Africa.
>
> *Ward 2008*

According to the general, "AFRICOM's number one theater-wide goal is to promote security and stability" within its area of responsibility in order to "deny terrorists freedom of action and access to resources, while diminishing the conditions that foster violent extremism". The largest preexisting commitment which the new command assumed perhaps gives some indications of the counterterrorism approach which AFRICOM as a whole might possibly take.

The Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), established in 2002 under the aegis of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) before being transferred to AFRICOM in 2008, is still the largest American military operation in Africa and is perhaps an exemplar of what one might come to expect out of AFRICOM's efforts to counter terrorism and build capacity. Headquartered at Camp Lemonier, a onetime French Foreign Legion post in Djibouti which, in May 2003, became the only U.S. base on the African continent, the approximately 2,000 sailors, soldiers, airmen, and Marines, as well as civilian government employees and contractors of CJTF-HOA have seen their mission evolve considerably since its initial inception as a kinetic anti-terrorism operation. As it is currently articulated, CJTF-HOA's mission has evolved into conducting "operations in the East Africa region to build partner nation capacity in order to promote regional security and stability, prevent conflict, and protect US and coalition interests" (U.S. Africa Command 2012).

Thus while U.S. special operations forces and other combat-oriented elements are present and actively engaged in fighting terrorism in the Horn of Africa, CJTF-HOA was given a separate mandate focused on a long-term approach aimed at denying extremist ideologies as well as individuals and groups the ability to exploit the vulnerabilities of the nations and societies in the subregion. To this end, CJTF-HOA's commanders have stressed the importance of interagency collaboration in its "area of interest" as the key to success in achieving U.S. strategic objectives as well as those of other members of the Coalition and other partners (CJTF-HOA 2007). Within this framework, CJTF-HOA's function is to be the defense element of the "3-D" approach to U.S. foreign policy (defense, diplomacy, and development), using civil–military operations, civil affairs, and military-to-military training to strengthen security and stability across its area of responsibility.[1] Hence its operational concept includes a number of measures to foster interagency integration, including close coordination with U.S. diplomatic missions throughout the subregion by posting of liaison teams at each of the embassies as well as a senior military advisor to the U.S. Mission to the African Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and the presence in CJTF-HOA's command element of a senior State Department officer as the Commander's foreign policy advisor and a veteran U.S. Agency for USAID officer as senior development advisor.

In addition to U.S. personnel, CJTF-HOA embeds military personnel from a number of Coalition partner countries, including, at various times, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, Kenya, Pakistan, Romania, Seychelles, Mauritius, South Korea, Uganda, Yemen, and the United Kingdom in its staff, involving them in all operational phases, including strategic and operational planning and execution. CJTF-HOA has carried out an extensive series of regional senior-level engagements on both a bilateral footing at the Minister of Defense and Chief of Defense levels and on multilateral bases as when, in September 2007, it organized East Africa and Southwest Indian Ocean (EASWIO) Maritime Security Conference and Port Security Seminar in Mombasa, Kenya.

CJTF-HOA has worked closely with African subregional institutions and, in fact, the recent inclusion of Rwanda in its activities is a purposeful attempt to align its area of responsibility with the frontiers of African subregional self-organizations, in this case the East African Community (EAC),[2] with which the Task Force collaborates in the biennial "Natural Fires" joint exercise. CJTF-HOA has moved beyond traditional bilateral security cooperation to work closely with the Eastern Brigade (EASTBRIG) of the African Standby Force, especially its coordinating element, strategic planning cell, and training organizations. CJTF-HOA has also cooperated with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) initiative to establish a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) for the IGAD countries.[3] According to Lange Schermerhorn (2005: 57), who served as U.S. ambassador to Djibouti and later as political advisor to CJTF-HOA, the establishment and ongoing mission of the task force

> acknowledged the potential for terrorism both within and infiltrating into the area, demonstrated a commitment to deal with it aggressively, and provided a focus around which the efforts of nations in the region could coalesce on a regional and cooperative basis, rather than on a bilateral basis.
>
> *Schermerhorn 2005*

In addition to training with partner militaries in the region, CJTF-HOA personnel have been involved in the building or rehabilitation of schools, clinics, and hospitals; conducted medical civic action programs (MEDCAPs), dental civic action programs (DENCAPs), and veterinary civic action programs (VETCAPs); drilled and refurbished wells for communities; and assisted in nearly a dozen major humanitarian assistance missions. Funding for humanitarian assistance

programs comes under the aegis of Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA), generally local contracts, and Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA), carried out by U.S. and coalition personnel, with the balance favoring the former.

A change in the operational modalities took place in October 2011 when President Barack Obama announced the deployment of about one hundred U.S. military personnel to central Africa to assist the armed forces of regional states in putting an end to the decades-long rampage of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). While the president emphasized that the Special Operations Forces teams deployed to Uganda and, subsequently, to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan, would serve as advisors to their host nations and "will not themselves engage LRA forces unless necessary for self-defense", the deployment nonetheless represented the first time since AFRICOM was created in 2007 that combat-equipped American troops have been sent to Sub-Saharan Africa to help quell an insurgency, albeit one officially designated as a "terrorist group" by the U.S. State Department (Pham 2011d).

Conclusion

The post-9/11 "War on Terror" was neither caused by Africa nor its unfolding controlled by the nations of the continent. Nevertheless it created an opportunity for the continent to come "to the fore" in terms of attention received and overall relevance in strategic discussions, arguably in a more sustainable manner than when the focus was primarily in terms of humanitarian crises and other "bad news" (Morrison 2005: 201). While that promise still holds out, the failure by and large of most African governments to take the initiative over the course of the last decade leaves the continent bereft of active agency with respect to the terrorism and counterterrorism agenda and increases the risk that, once the immediate danger has passed, that Africa will find itself again marginalized strategically.

Notes

1 CJTF-HOA's "area of responsibility" includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, and Sudan, although its "area of interest" also includes Burundi, Chad, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Yemen.
2 EAC's members are Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda.
3 IGAD's current effective members are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda, Eritrea having announced in April 2007 that it was suspending its participation in the subregional organization.

6

STATES, BOUNDARIES, AND REGIONAL COLLAPSE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

James J. Hentz and Thomas Blevins

Introduction

The problem with the analytical cartography of Africa is that scholars and policy makers use only one set of maps, those that are based on the blueprints of the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, which designed the modern African state system. The literature on failed states, and much of the antecedent literature, tends to focus on the states themselves and their patrimonial roots; leading to an analytical bias that privileges explanations of state collapse from the inside out. A second and essential dimension of collapse, regional instability – collapse from the outside in – is largely ignored.

This chapter adopts a *new regionalism approach* (NRA) for understanding state collapse in Sub-Saharan Africa.[1] At the center of the NRA are three challenges to traditional theoretical frameworks that seek to explain regionalism: (1) that a state-centric framework is too confining and that we must ". . . obviate the artificial separation of state and non-state actors" (Grant and Söderbaum 2003: 5); (2) that regionalization can either be intentional or unintentional and is driven by a multiplicity of actors (ibid. 2003: 7); (3) that regionalization and globalization are intricately linked (ibid). State collapse in Sub-Saharan Africa can only be understood by addressing these three challenges.

The historical dynamics driving regional conflict in the border-lands of Africa, such as the relationship of the center (state) to the periphery (region), increased population densities due to refugee movements, the location of portable resources, and trans-border trading networks (which are often tied to international networks), are responsible for state collapse and its contagion effects in Sub-Saharan Africa. In making an argument for an NRA framework for understanding state collapse, this chapter will focus on the first in the list, the relationship of the center (state) to the periphery (region).

Until the end of the Cold War, the Westphalia map served Western interests well in Africa, and saved the African elite from themselves; there were few attacks by one state on another. Today, Africa is stuck between Weber and Westphalia. They do not function as modern Weberian states, but they are, nonetheless, accepted as primary actors in the Wesphalian nation-state system. Sub-Saharan Africa is both made of states and of regions, suspending them between the obligations of Weber and Westphalia.

This chapter addresses the dialectics of state decay and regionalization in two parts. First, it describes the post-Cold War Africa syndrome as weak states in unstable neighborhoods.

Anecdotal accounts are used to illustrate the syndrome. It, therefore, accepts many of the state-centric explanations of state collapse in Africa. But the next section pushes beyond (and builds on) the traditional framework, by looking at the regional dimension of state decay and collapse in West and Central Africa. While in almost all cases of state collapse the colonial legacy of weak states looms large, there is also an outside-in dimension.

In the most spectacular cases of state collapse, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the process unfolded from the outside in (Hentz 2011). Although pressures from the outside can only collapse a state because it has already been hollowed-out, the hollowing out process itself cannot be explained without incorporating the regional dynamics. Finally, given the apparent endemic weakness of the post-colonial state in Sub-Saharan Africa, the most interesting question may be, why have not more states followed the path of Liberia and the DRC? The list of weak states is long, only a few have collapsed (Rotberg 2004: 1).

Two analytical housekeeping chores are necessary before we can address the syndrome of state collapse in Africa. First, state collapse is fundamentally different than either civil war or coups d'états. However, those events have, in many (possibly most) cases, contributed to the hollowing out of the individual states, which always precedes state collapse. This will be addressed in the following section, for now we need only be clear on the distinctions. Second, state collapse cannot be understood outside of its regional context. A narrow focus on the state alone will miss that dimension of state collapse.

In a civil war, the explicit purpose of the combatants is either to gain control of the government or to secede from the government and form a new state. The most famous example in Sub-Saharan Africa is the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970), when the republic of Biafra, formally Nigeria's eastern province, unsuccessfully tried to secede. The Angolan conflict (1974–2002) was a civil war, pitting the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA) against the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA) ruling party. In the Angolan case, collapse often seemed imminent. It was not until UNITA's leader Jonas Savimbi lost the October 17, 1991 election that it was demonstrated the war was over total state control. In the election, Savimbi received 40.07 percent of the vote, and the MPLA sitting President, Jose Eduardo dos Santos won 49.57 percent (Kambwa et al. 1999: 71). The electoral rules stipulated a runoff between dos Santos and Savimbi, but rather than risk electoral defeat, Savimbi returned to war.

Independent Sudan had two civil wars (or one civil war with a short break in it): 1956–1972 and then 1983–2005. The first civil war came to an end in 1972 with the signing of the Addis Ababa Treaty under the Nimeiri regime; the second civil war ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which included the right of the South to vote on independence from the North. In July 2011, the South formally broke with the North.

It is important to note, that whoever wins a civil war, the ability to project power would likely be enhanced, such as happened with Nigeria and Angola.

A coup d'état, unlike a civil war, is the replacement through force of arms of one head of government with another. In the decades immediately after independence, much of Africa was wracked with military coups d'états. Since 1957, Africa had over seventy successful military coups, and many other attempts (Edgerton 2002: 141). Because military coups d'états have played such a central role in post-colonial Africa, there is a vast literature on them, and some healthy debate about their causes and effects. What matters for our purposes are what Africa's coups d'états tell us about its political trajectory and the relationship between the government and the military. Coups d'états in the 1960s reflected the narrowing of political and economic opportunity. Kandeh argues that the use of state coercion that follows a military coup fragmented state power and dissociates it from the interest of society (Kandeh 2004: 17). Africa's coups, therefore, contributed to predation and in some cases subsequently state collapse.

State collapse is something completely different from civil wars or coup d'états. It is the total absence of effective government. Susan Strange foresaw this danger in 1996 when she warned, "The diffusion of authority away from national governments has left a yawning hole of non-authority, ungovernence it might be called" (Strange 1996: 14). Strange was talking about states in general; what sets Sub-Sahara apart, among other things, is the impact of the regional dimension.

The literature on Africa's collapse overwhelmingly focuses on the state (Reno, 1998; Rotberg 2004; Zartman, 1995), as does the study of conflict in Africa in general. Raymond Copson in his excellent survey states, "the root cause (of conflict) is with the African state" (1994: 74). The syndrome of state collapse, however, is better framed as a regional process; individual state collapse is the punctuation marks. The best example might be the recent plight of Côte d'Ivoire which, Robert Rotberg contended, was moving towards collapse (2004: 10). It was, however, part of the Mano River Basin conflict zone. Salehyan calls it the "West African Cluster" and it includes: Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, as well as Liberia and Sierra Leone (Salehyan 2009: 17). Fifteen years before, Côte d'Ivoire was held up as a shining example to the rest of Africa. It is a cautionary tale for two reasons. First, it too was a weak state, albeit hiding behind a relatively strong economy. Second, regional forces pressed in on the state, opening to the risk of state collapse.

Zartman correctly views long-term degeneration of the state as the catalyst of its collapse, a slow slide that cripples the state. Rotberg elaborates on the concept of a "failed state" defining it as "when they are consumed by internal violence and cease delivering positive political goods to their inhabitants" (Rotberg 2004: 1). Each case denotes a certain level of state failure, from a weak state *in situ* to the collapse of all organized national governance.

The state as an international unit of organization can be traced to the post-Thirty Years War settlement, the Peace of Westphalia. In this document, the idea of a nation-state possessed of internal control and external legitimacy was accepted. These states were created through a dynamic and violent process and this accorded them legitimacy and authority. Charles Tilly states that "war made the state, and the state made war" (1975: 42). While war shaped and organized most European states, a conscious decision to avoid war between colonial powers in Africa restricted the organic growth of state power within their borders. War did not make states; and states rarely made war with their neighbors.

When the African colonies were freed by their respective colonial rulers in the 1960s and 1970s, these colonial states were accepted into the international community. Furthermore, when the early African states banded together to create the Organization of African Unity (OAU) one of the prime points in the charter was "to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our states, and to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms" (Organization of African Unity 1963: 1). Herein was the respect for international borders and the indivisibility of these inherited states. These states, for the most part, were *de jure* rather than *de facto* states. Robert Jackson (1990) made this seminal distinction to describe Africa. *De jure* states are recognized externally as a state, but are unable to extend authority throughout the entire state, they lack *de facto* authority. The farther you move away from the center, the more this is apparent. State decay, however, was never inevitable, and certainly not universal. And while the patterns are similar across states, the political processes can vary.

Weak states and regionalization

Africa, through the old OAU (now the Africa Union), and in partnership with the collective will of the international community of nations, through the sacrosanct *sovereignty norm*, has reified the African state. But it is a particular kind of state. The quasi-African state typically had

international legal status but did not meet the functional acid test of statehood. In the extreme, many African states no longer had a monopoly over the legitimate use of force, but the weaknesses of individual states in Africa vary across the functions that modern states are expected to perform, such as having a named population, well-defined borders, national identity, and a night-watchman role. These expected functions can be dropped into three categories.

First, the state is sovereign and invested with popular authority. The sovereign power of the state often derives from the consent of the people, but with the creation of *de jure* states, the legal recognition accorded by de-colonization and the international community weakened the viability of that linkage. This is most easily expressed through a national identity and named population that link themselves in name and spirit with the state they inhabit.

The second responsibility is a guarantor of security through a monopoly on violence. A state that lacks the ability to enforce peace within its borders can hardly expect to maintain political stability. Many African states inherited small militaries and, with no motivation to expand colonial borders, maintained these small military forces to maintain law and order within their borders. This collective security guarantee is labeled the "night-watchman" role, as the state watches over all its citizens.

Third is the state as an organized institution that is able to provide services to the population at large. Whether through social services, judicial arbitration, or infrastructure creation and maintenance, the state is to provide public goods. If the judicial system is weak or perceived as corrupt and the state fails to maintain the infrastructure network, then the state is clearly failing in its responsibility as a public goods provider and institution. These institutions provide for the well-defined borders and their enforcement both domestically and internationally.

These three criteria, and how established they are, helps determine whether a state is weak, failed, or collapsed. African states vary in how well they manage their responsibilities to their citizens. But in Jeffery Herbst's words: "The fundamental problem facing state-builders in Africa . . . has been to project authority over inhospitable territories that contain relatively low densities of people" (2000: 11). In an ironic twist of fate, most of pre-colonial Africa did not go through the period of interstate war that helped shape modern day Europe, and ultimately the Westphalia state system. As Herbst explains, African states never had the incentive to subdue their hinterlands (2000: 21; see also Copson 1994: 94), because low densities of populations dispersed across large hinterlands made it difficult to tax individuals, a fundamental state function. It was hard to derive rents from agriculture (as in feudal Europe), because land had such a low value – people just picked up and moved. (Herbst 2000: 116). As Herbert Howe explains:

> Indeed, the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 established Africa's boundaries in part to avoid *European* conflict in Africa. The absence of antagonisms in Europe after 1918 among the major colonial powers – Britain, France, Portugal and Belgium – and the weak military capabilities of the colonies meant that colonial states in Africa did not fight each other.
>
> *Howe 2001: 32*

The problem, as Raymond Copson notes, is "At independence, many states inherited vast regions that had rarely been under effective control even in colonial times" (1994: 95).

The post-colonial state, at least during the Cold War, was merely a continuation of quasi statehood. As Herbst notes, the Charter of the OAU was a basic continuation of the Berlin rules (2000: 111). From the African perspective, the inherited borders were sacrosanct, and in fact, while there were some attempts at changing state borders, mostly via succession as in Biafra and the two Katanga crises in Zaire (DRC), the map of Sub-Saharan Africa looked essentially the

same at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Cold War standoff between the superpowers contributed to this.

Superpower support for quasi states in Sub-Saharan Africa made it possible for those states to use scarce foreign exchange for weapons purchases (Howe 2001: 77). There was, as well, an understanding between the Soviet Union and the U.S. that client states would not be allowed to invade neighboring countries (ibid.: 78). The weapons logically turned inwards. Thus, although the potential for spillover or regional contagion existed, it almost never happened during the Cold War. For instance, Jonas Savimbi and UNITA used Zaire as a rear base in their insurgency against the MPLA government in Angola, but the war did not spill over into Zaire.[2]

Beneath this veneer of statehood, the long process of state decay (or the hollowing out of the state) occurred. Under the cover of superpower patronage, it was already far advanced by 1989. The end of the Cold War catalyzed severe changes. The external pressures on Sub-Saharan Africa can be considered relatively uniform. Their effects on individual states within regions vary depending on how the hollowing out of the state proceeded. The collapse of the state is not sudden, but gradual. The collapse can be measured by distinct occurrences within the state. Zartman provides five "signposts" to collapse that mark the "descending spiral" of the state (Zartman 1995: 9):

1 Growth of regional power on the peripheries as the center engages in infighting. The "central power" is fighting itself for access to the state while local governance structures grab authority from the failing central government. The infighting prevents effective governance of the state, reduces the legitimacy of state institutions, and reinforces patrimonial behavior amongst elites.
2 The "central power" begins to lose the authority it seeks to retain because it struggles to maintain the support of the populace. The regime aligns with a loyal group (ethnic group, regional supporters, military) to govern. This "diverts allocations from the broader social sources of support" and focuses state survival on the loyalty of one group.
3 The government and central power disassociate, reducing competence of governance. The government fails to make "difficult choices" because the "central power" is struggling to maintain authority and legitimacy of governance. Thus the "mechanisms of government are inadequate to their challenges, or, the politicians themselves are incapable of biting the bullet". The focus on narrow bases of support turns the attention of the "central power" away from actually addressing underlying issues.
4 The "central power" loses the initiative, and is only able to respond to challengers and threats. Whether through violence or political reformations, the "central power" cannot guide the political agenda of the state. The loss of political initiative to guide the events of the state prevents any actual resolution of the problems, even if the central power wishes to do so.
5 The final signpost is the loss of the Weberian monopoly on violence. Local politicians, military units, or police and gendarme disentangle themselves from the government itself. The disentanglement consists of intimidation of local populations, bribery, extortion, and in the extreme, warlordism. Without access to the levers of coercion throughout the state, and lacking the initiative to address these issues, many states collapse (Zartman 1995: 10).

The end of the Cold War was the match to the African tinderbox. The confluence of two practices explains what happened. First a continuation and intensification of a process initiated during the last decade of the Cold War, the forced economic liberalization, commonly known as structural adjustment programs (SAPs). Second, was the subsequent interruption of financial flows. The SAPs and financial tightening was the wave of globalization that pushed many African states towards failure.

Achille Mbembe summarizes the effect of SAPs on Africa:

> Thus, these policies directly affect postcolonial African regimes on two levels: on the one hand, the material and social bases on which the regimes have rested until now and the imaginaries that sustain them; on the other, the way in which these regimes have secured legitimacy.
>
> *Mbembe 2001: 56*

Three things had happened. First, the political compromise between the rulers and their specific class of supporters, typically the urban class, was no longer sustainable. Second, the hegemony of the state apparatus had broken down (Mbembe 2001: 76). Finally, the sources of legitimacy and influence were lost (ibid.: 75–76). Ironically, since the liberalization dictated by SAPs comes from external actors once again, the source of legitimacy for the African state was exogenous. In effect, as Herbst has shown, the politics of structural adjustment left a void within the African state (1990). Furthermore, the cessation of most foreign aid withered the basis for neopatrimonial networks. The financial flows from external sources rather than per capita taxes meant many African leaders could not maintain the networks which ran the state.

State collapse in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

The cases of state collapse in Liberia and the DRC (Zaire) illustrate the points made above. Also, they are not only two of the most spectacular cases of state collapse, but are at the epicenter of regional dynamics driving further collapses.

On December 24, 1989, one hundred or so insurgents crossed from Côte d'Ivoire into Liberia. Charles Taylor, the head of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led them. Although the original purpose may have been to overthrow the Samuel Doe regime in Liberia and capture the state, the NPFL spawned the proliferation of warlord groups, as many as seven by 1997 (Ellis 1998: 154), which would pillage the country for at least seven years. Stephen Ellis explains:

> The actual sequence of events, depending as they did on the conjuncture of a variety of factors, occurred in a historically constituted society, one whose attitudes, beliefs and values were rooted in cultural patterns inherited from the past . . .
>
> *Ellis 1998: 169*

The American Colonization Society for the resettlement of slaves in the 1820s founded Liberia. It became independent in 1847, and was governed by an oligarchy of American-Liberian elite. The social stratification resembled that of the antebellum South in the United States. The hinterland of Liberia was seen as inhabited by "tribal people" (Ellis 1998: 169), such as the Mano and Gio in the north, Krahn in the northeast, and Mandingo in the west. Most importantly, the majority of the indigenous people lived in the hinterland (Al-Hassan 1999: 105). The American-Liberian elite took land from the indigenous groups and there were, in fact, a series of revolts against the settlers: the Dei Wars (1821–1822), the Grebo War (1875), the Gola Wars (1898–1899), the Kissi War (1903), the Kru War (1905), the Loma Wars (1905–1907), the Bassa War (1906), the Kpelle War (1911), the Sapo War (1912–1919) the Krahn War (1921) and Gio War (ibid.: 126). Nonetheless, under the True Whig Party, and with the implicit support of the U.S., the American-Liberian elite controlled the country.

In the classic Sub-Saharan situation, the True Whig Party had difficulty broadcasting authority into the hinterland. Under President Tubman (1944–1971), a sort of affirmative action program

for the hinterland, called the Unification Policy, was initiated. His successor, President Tolbert (1971–1980), expanded the program to include the military. The Unification Policy backfired. Land deprivation had already peaked by the late 1970s (Al-Hassan et al. 1999: 128). The Unification Policy led to rising expectations, particularly in the military where the non-American-Liberian elite were treated as second class. On April 12, 1980 Samuel Jackson Doe, a Krahn, overthrew the True Whig government of President Tolbert. Over the next decade, Doe disassembled the state, ethicized the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) with the Krahn, and destroyed any remnants of civil society. After a coup d'état attempt in 1985 at the height of state predation, the Doe government killed approximately 3,000 Mano and Gio civilians. Taylor was successful in overthrowing Doe because the state had been thoroughly hollowed out.

The DRC is a classic case of state collapse. In May 1997, the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (ADFL), led by the ex-Marxist Laurent Desiré Kabila, entered the capital city of Kinshasa. The ADFL marched east, from the South Kivu Province, and west clear across the vast expanse of Zaire. After almost a century of pillage under the colonial rule of King Leopold of Belgium and Mobutu Sese Seko who would rule Zaire from 1965 (after ascending to power with the help of the U.S.) until he was overthrown by the insurgency that started in the east, Mobutu's rise to power and ultimate decline is symbolic of the inability of the African state to broadcast authority to it hinterland. He came to power in the wake of secessionist pressures in the periphery, Katanga, and was forced out of power by the ADFL that marched to Kinshasa from that same general vicinity. The victory of the ADFL was hastened by the collapsing state:

> Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) in the 1990s, like Uganda in the 1970s, was a failing state under the brutal tyranny of Mobutu Sese Seko. The state no longer performed basic services, especially education, health care and the maintenance of basic infrastructure. Its people were worse off than at any time since independence.
>
> *Latham et al. 2001: 2*

The story of the DRC (Zaire) is well known, so only some of the highlights will be repeated here. Mobutu developed the classic neopatrimonial state (often in this case called a kleptocracy) (Reno 1998). It was purposefully and deeply anti-bureaucratic. He used control of the military, from whence he came, to control both the country's mineral wealth that was the fountainhead of his patronage system based in Kinshasa (Reed 1998: 153), and to control the separatist pressures that could deny him that wealth (Klare 2002: 209). He also used classic divide and rule techniques; he fostered and manipulated conflicts within local communities so that local strongmen would have to appeal for his personal assistance. One example stands out for its later ramifications. In 1981, Zaire passed a new citizenship rule concerning the Banyarwanda living in the North Kivu area of eastern Zaire. The Banyarwanda traced their heritage back to Rwanda, some were included in Zaire by the colonial partition of the Kingdom of Rwanda, and others migrated to Zaire later with Belgian encouragement. Without going into details, all the Banyarwanda in eastern Zaire were threatened with statelessness (Reed 1998: 143), and they became instrumental in Zaire's collapse.

As rich as Zaire was in mineral resources, Mobutu depended on external assistance, in particular from the U.S., to maintain his patronage network. The end of the Cold War was the beginning of his end. As with the Liberia's Unification Policy, Mobutu tried to stem the tide of change with internal reforms. In April 1990, he announced the end of the Second Republic. This ushered in a period of liberalization (Schatzberg 2001: 129), which as did *glasnost* and

perestroika in the former USSR, only served to weaken the state. Meanwhile, Zaire went from favored son status to pariah in the eyes of the U.S. The level of bilateral aid to Zaire went from US$823 million in 1990 to US$178 in 1993. Also, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank were no longer as willing to engage in the "ritual dance of debt relief" with Mobutu.

In both the cases of Liberia and the DRC, insurgencies that started in the periphery relatively quickly captured the capital; in both cases, they left a shell of a state in their wake. In both cases the remnants of various armies fractured into warlord armies: in Liberia, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) led by Prince Yourmie Johnson split off from Taylor's NPFL, and the AFL split into factions. In 1990, many Krahns and Mandingos fled to Sierra Leone and Guiana to form the United Liberation Movement for Democracy (Ulimo). Originally supported by a united Uganda–Rwanda front, in June 1999, the rebel movement in the DRC split into three groups. In fact, the Uganda- and Rwanda-backed forces battled each other deep inside the DRC (Callaghy et al. 2001: 3). There was also, as in the case with Liberia, a proliferation of militias fighting inside the DRC.

Outside-in collapse in Africa

If it were not for regional dynamics, Liberia and the DRC would be studied as either civil wars or possibly coups d'états, rather than as examples of the relatively new category of state collapse. These instances of collapse not only began in neighboring countries, but also have spread across borders to weaken or collapse contiguous states.

As Michael Brown notes, almost all internal conflicts involve neighboring states in one way or another (1996: 590) and in João Gomes Porto's words, "new conflicts tend to metastases to neighboring countries" (2002: 4). At first glance, the metaphor of contagion seems right. But, the problem with this picture is that it privileges the state by locating the disease within the individual states. In fact, the virus may be located within weakened states such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, or the DRC, but the region is the host and incubator. The disease is fatal because of the symbiotic relationship between state and region; the weak state and the region, or "bad neighborhoods" feed off one another.

The regional effects have two dimensions, one more easily captured by state-to-state explanations and the other part of, but transcending, state-to-state relations. First, state actions that matter include overt interventions and contagion logics that include: refugees, disruption of trade, communication, and production networks, arms shipments, base of operations and sanctuaries (Porto 2002: 28).

As already noted, Charles Taylor crossed into Liberia from Côte d'Ivoire. Taylor used personal ties with heads of state in both Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso to accomplish his ends (Ellis 1998: 161). State-to-state machinations, dated back to grudges held against Doe, obviously played an important role. But more informal regional dynamics fueled state collapse.

Taylor was able to fund his incursion by crossing into resource-rich Nimba country (Ellis 1998: 166). By capturing resource-rich enclaves, in this case beginning but hardly ending with, iron ore mines, the rebels jump-started their revolt. Ironically, the historic inability of African states to broadcast authority into the periphery was partially because the land was not valuable, and the populations sparse. But, it is the portable wealth of the peripheries that now fuel the conflicts. When he needed to, Taylor, through his support for Foday Sankoh and the United Revolutionary Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, gained access to that country's diamond wealth and the Kono diamond fields are in the hinterland of Sierra Leone, along the border with Guinea. Finally, the collapse of Liberia triggered coups d'états in neighboring countries, and Gambian soldiers in ECOMOG on July 23, 1994, overthrew President Sir Dawda Jawara.

The collapse of Zaire (DRC) was actually triggered by the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invasion of Rwanda, from Uganda. When the RPF advanced to Kigali in July 1994, virtually the entire Hutu government fled to Zaire, forming the FGOR (Former Government of Rwanda); their command structure and key troops virtually in place (Reed 1998: 136). Pressure from the FGOR and the Zairian Armed Forces (ZAF) made the Banyamulenge in Zaire's South Kivu province led by Kabila strike back, and with the aid of Uganda and Rwanda, advance toward Kinshasa. Kabila, who had carved out a niche among the Bembe in Eastern Zaire, got a jump-start by capturing mineral-rich areas in Zaire's hinterland. As noted above, Zaire had always struggled with the mineral-rich areas in its periphery: Shaba, rich in copper; Eastern Zaire, gold, coltan, and agriculture; and East Kasai, industrial diamonds. The last of these had established an independent monetary system and its own university (Reed 1998: 146). Again, ironically, riches in the periphery fueled the conflict (Moyroud and Katunga 2002: 168) and added to this twist of fate, the populations in the border areas mushroomed because of the flood of refugees from the Rwanda genocide.

The role of state actors did not end with the overthrow of the Mobutu regime. While Uganda and Rwanda turned against Kabila, because they wanted a buffer between themselves and the *Interahamwe* (Hutu militia along their borders) and ex-FAR forces, Laurent Kabila, and after his assassination in January 2001, his successor, Joseph Kabila, allied with Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad, and Sudan.

Alongside and beneath the state-to-state relations, subcutaneous regional networks fund conflict and collapse. In an important volume on transnationalism in Africa, Callaghy et al. argue that "We need not assume, however, that order is by definition a territory-wide or national phenomenon . . . order can also be a trans-boundary phenomenon, though not necessarily in zero sum relation to the state" (2001: 8). As Tony Addison notes, commerce requires less physical capital than production and is easier to exist in uncertain times (2000: 5).

Côte d'Ivoire's government officials and associates of Henri Konan Bedie made money from commercial deals with various Liberian factions (Ellis 1998: 164). Some Côte d'Ivoire officials reportedly owned rubber plantations in NPFL-held areas (ibid.: 164). Senior Guinea officials made diamond deals with Ulimo-k militia and Mandingo traders have been linked with Mali and Senegal (ibid). Western observers believe Guinea's Presidential Guard may have been involved in smuggling diamonds out of Sierra Leone (Howe 2001: 45).

The trans-border nature of the DRC collapse is even more complex than Liberia's, possibly because of its geographical position in the middle of the continent, bordering on eight states. In August 1998, fighting erupted again. Rwanda and Uganda supported different factions, each trying to protect its northwest frontier with DRC. By mid-1999, rebel movements controlled one third of DRC, and the rebel movement, *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie* (RCD) split into three groups. The border areas of Eastern DRC cannot be considered under its economic or military control. The FGOR formed an alliance with Hutu militia in Burundi. Uganda and Rwanda had proxies in the DRC.

The quadrangle comprising Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Congo, has four major trading routes (Mwanasali 2000: 140). The first carried agricultural and manufactured goods between Kampala and Bukavu (DRC); the second is for goods and people between the port-city of Bujumbura in Burundi and the port of Uvira (DRC); the third is between the Oriental Province of Congo directly to Uganda; and the fourth crosses Lake Tanganyika to port towns of Kalemie in Congo and Kigoma in Tanzania and between Lubumbashi in Congo and Dar-es-Salaam, via Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia (ibid.: 140).

The collapse of the DRC has allowed neighboring countries to control much of this trade, even as it originated in the DRC. The Uganda-backed faction of the *Rassenblement Congolais*

pour la Démocratie (RCD) had control over much of the gold and coffee-producing areas of Eastern Zaire. The Rwandan-backed faction of the RCD, while not in control of vast mineral resources, collected fees from local producers and Lebanese intermediaries, and controlled much of Kisangani's palm oil business, which was exported to Kigali via military planes (ibid.: 143). Rwanda and its RCD allies resorted to twinning Congolese and Rwandan cities (ibid.: 144). Finally, Rwanda planned to set up an export-processing zone along the DRC border (Howe 2001: 100). Regional actors, as well, in many cases gained control of customs duties etc. The RDC and their Uganda allies controlled the customs post at Kasindi in North Kivu.

Conclusion

A *collapsed* state is a rare and extreme version of a failed state. It almost resembles a "perfect storm" where historical and current events conspire to trigger collapse. In Sub-Saharan Africa, much can be attributed to the legacy of flawed colonial borders and to poor governance after colonial rule. Weapons from the Cold War blocs and economic liberalization programs from the West widened the fissures within the state.

This chapter adds an analysis of the outside-in dynamics of state collapse. There is, of course, much more to the study of state collapse. More attention needs to be made to the distinctions between civil wars and coups d'états and how they respectively shape the trajectory of specific African states and, in particular, conflict within and across those states. There is some excellent work being done on cross-border trading networks and, in particular, the role of portable resources in state collapse. This should be put in comparative context to see how they do (or do not) contribute to the "tipping point".

Of course, all of this has to be seen within the context of globalization. International financial linkages independent of state institutions allow many groups to convert raw materials into political power and military force. Non-state actors working outside state strictures, with an access to global markets, exacerbate regional security across Africa.

Notes

1 For a discussion of the *new regionalism* see Bach (Chapter 16).

2 There was a regional dimension to the Angolan civil war, nonetheless. The insurgent group in Namibia, the South West Africa Peoples' Organization (SWAPO) were contesting South African imperial rule in Namibia. SWAPO and the MPLA had a loose alliance, and South Africa supported UNITA.

7

PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA AFTER THE COLD WAR

Trends and challenges

Paul D. Williams

Introduction

Although the United Nations (UN) conducted one of its most costly and difficult Cold War missions in the Congo (1960–1964), it did not deploy another mission in Africa until 1988 when it sent peacekeepers to Angola to monitor the Cuban withdrawal. Since then, however, Africa has witnessed a huge increase in the number, size and complexity of peacekeeping operations. These operations proliferated in two senses: first, nearly twenty African states ended up hosting one or more of the approximately sixty different peacekeeping operations that were deployed between 1990 and 2009; second, a majority of African states became troop-contributing countries to one or more of those operations. Peacekeeping thus became a significant part of Africa's post-Cold War political landscape.

These peace operations were undertaken principally by the UN and regional organizations from within the continent. But in the 2000s, the European Union (EU) also became increasingly involved and on occasion even the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) provided logistical assistance. The missions themselves assumed various shapes and sizes from just a handful of observers to huge enterprises involving tens of thousands of soldiers, police and other civilian personnel. As instruments of conflict management they produced decidedly mixed results. On the positive side, peace operations helped shepherd transitions from war to peace in places such as the Comoros, Namibia, Mozambique, Burundi, Sierra Leone and Liberia. On the other hand, peacekeepers failed to stop mass killings in Rwanda, Angola, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and elsewhere, failed to stem the tide of conflict in Somalia, and sometimes abused and exploited the local people they were supposed to help protect. Among the central explanations for this mixed record were that some mission mandates were simply much tougher than others; some operations were given many more resources than others; and the UN and other organizations had to learn how to keep the peace in messy civil wars while on the job.

This chapter discusses peacekeeping in Africa by addressing two main questions: first, what were the major trends in peacekeeping operations on the continent in the first two decades after the Cold War?; second, what were the major challenges that these operations faced as they attempted to achieve a range of complex and multidimensional mandates in some of the world's poorest and most conflicted countries?

Trends in post-Cold War peacekeeping in Africa

The major trends in peacekeeping in post-Cold War Africa can be crudely summarized as a tale of two decades: the 1990s and the 2000s, which will be analyzed below. But in terms of sheer scale, the conflict management initiatives conducted by the UN and other non-African actors were considerably larger than most of those carried out by their African counterparts. Between 1990 and 2009, a total of twenty-eight peace operations were conducted by African institutions. These missions involved the deployment of just under 70,000 uniformed personnel: Organization of African Unity (OAU) missions accounted for approximately 300 of these; deployments by sub-regional organizations, principally the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), amounted to over 50,000 personnel; while over 18,000 were deployed as African Union (AU) peacekeepers. By way of comparison, during the same period, non-African organizations and actors, primarily the UN, conducted thirty-five peace operations on the African continent. These involved the deployment of approximately 200,000 uniformed personnel. Of these, approximately 157,500 were UN peacekeepers while some 41,200 were deployed by other actors (of the latter group, 32,000 came from the US-led UNITAF operation in Somalia, 1992–1993). In the twenty-first century, the UN's peace operations in Africa accounted for as much as 70% of its peacekeeping forces worldwide, eventually involved approximately 70,000 peacekeepers, and cost the organization in excess of US$32 billion (see Figure 7.1).

During the 1990s, peacekeeping operations in Africa were mainly conducted by the UN and some of the continent's own sub-regional arrangements, most prominently the ECOWAS.

The initial optimism that accompanied the end of the Cold War saw a raft of new UN operations begin between 1988 and 1992 in Angola, Namibia, Somalia and Mozambique. While the operations in Namibia and Mozambique went relatively well those in Angola and especially Somalia went badly. After nearly twenty US servicemen were killed in the so-called 'Black Hawk Down' episode in Mogadishu in October 1993, the United States led a general retreat from UN peacekeeping, especially in Africa (Bellamy and Williams 2010). The most immediate and direct




Figure 7.1 UN uniformed peacekeepers in Africa, 2000–2011 (31 January, annually)

casualty of this attitude was the UN mission in Rwanda, UNAMIR, which was left severely under-resourced with the consequence that the world effectively abandoned Rwanda's political moderates as well as its entire Tutsi population during the genocide of 1994 (see Melvern 2009; Dallaire 2003).

The UN's selective engagement with conflict management on the continent was mirrored by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which displayed a general lack of interest in peacekeeping. While the OAU established a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993 it did not conduct any significant military peace operations, although it did undertake a variety of small-scale observation and fact-finding missions, mainly in the Great Lakes region and the Comoros (see Table 7.1 and Williams 2011). In part because of the OAU's lack of peacekeeping capabilities and in part because of the UN's selective engagement, some of Africa's sub-regional organizations tried to pick up the slack, most notably the ECOWAS and SADC (see Table 7.2 and Berman and Sams 2001; Boulden 2003; Coleman 2007). However, this led them to engage in operations for which they were neither well designed nor ready to execute.

Not surprisingly, these operations suffered from numerous problems. First, many of them were not really examples of peacekeeping as it was understood at the UN. Rather, they were enforcement operations designed to help out friendly regimes who faced various insurgent forces, such as Samuel Doe in Liberia, Ahmed Kabbah in Sierra Leone, Laurent Kabila in the DRC and prime minister Pakalitha Mosisili in Lesotho. Katharina Coleman has called such missions 'solidarity deployments' and they have a long history on the African continent (2011: 526–32).

Second, some of these operations were conducted with dubious international legality. While the ECOWAS and SADC operations could be justified legally as collective defense operations under Article 51 of the UN Charter (i.e. helping to defend a state's *de jure* authorities

Table 7.1 Organization of African Unity peace operations, 1990–2002

Mission	*Location*	*Duration*	*Size (approx. max.)*	*Main task*
OAU Mission to Western Sahara	Western Sahara-Morocco	1991–unclear	Unclear	Fact-finding
OAU Military Observer Team (MOT)	Rwanda	1991	15	Observation
OAU Neutral Monitoring Group (NMOG 1)	Rwanda	1991–1993	57	Observation
OAU Neutral Monitoring Group (NMOG 2)	Rwanda	1993	70	Observation
Observer Mission in Burundi (OMIB)	Burundi	1993–1996	47	Observation
OAU Observer Mission in the Comoros (OMIC)	Comoros	1997–1998	20	Observation
OAU Observer Mission	DRC	1999–2000	43	Observation
OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (OLMEE)	Ethiopia-Eritrea	2000–2008	27	Observation
OAU Military Observer Mission in Comoros 2 (OMIC 2)	Comoros	2001–2002	14	Observation
OAU Mission to Comoros 3	Comoros	2002	39	Observation

Table 7.2 Peace operations conducted by African sub-regional organizations, 1990–2003

Mission	*Location*	*Duration*	*Size (approx. max.)*	*Main task(s)*
ECOMOG 1	Liberia	1990–1999	15,000	Enforcement
ECOMOG 2	Sierra Leone	1997–2000	7,000	Enforcement
MISAB	CAR	1997–1998	1,100	Peacebuilding
ECOMOG 3	Guinea-Bissau	1998–1999	c.750	Peacebuilding/ Enforcement
Operation Boleas (SADC)	Lesotho	1998–1999	3,850	Enforcement
Operation Sovereign Legitimacy (SADC)	DRC	1998–2002	15,500	Enforcement
CEN-SAD operation	CAR	2001–2002	300	Peacebuilding
FOMUC (became MICOPAX)	CAR	2002–	380	Peacebuilding
IGAD Verification Monitoring Team	Sudan	2003–2005	41	Observation
ECOFORCE (became ECOMICI)	Côte d'Ivoire	2003–2004	c.1,500	Peacebuilding
ECOMIL	Liberia	2003–2004	3,600	Peacebuilding

from insurgents) they were generally sold to the world as peacekeeping operations, which should not slide into enforcement activities without explicit authorization from the UN Security Council as stipulated in Article 53 of the UN Charter. Part of the uncertainty over this issue stemmed from the UN Security Council's tendency to demonstrate 'relatively little concern for ensuring the primacy of the Charter' and be 'remarkably unprotective of its own turf' (Boulden 2003: 29).

A third problem was the evident division these missions generated within the regional organizations themselves. In Liberia, the DRC and Lesotho, for instance, both ECOWAS and SADC broke their own internal rules for deploying military operations with small factions within each organization conducting the missions (Coleman 2007).

A fourth set of problems revolved around practical issues such as strategy, competence, deployment, management, logistics, and the provision of suitable materiel (Coleman 2007; Howe 2001; Adebajo 2002a). In Lesotho, for example, the intervening South African troops were initially surprised by the level of resistance and the resulting battle left much of the capital city, Maseru, in ruins, left thousands displaced, and killed over 100 people. Nigerian-led ECOMOG troops proved similarly inept when in September 1990 Liberia's President Samuel Doe was captured and subsequently killed while supposedly under their protection.

A fifth problem was the lack of professionalism and discipline displayed by some of these regional peacekeepers. Although most peace operations suffered some degree of misconduct by their personnel, ECOMOG troops reached new heights with their frequent summary executions of prisoners as well as looting and sexual violence carried out against the local populations. Indeed, Liberian civilians came up with an alternative name for the West African force: Every Car Or Moving Object Gone (Ellis 1999: 173; Howe 2001; Adebajo 2002b).

Overall, perhaps the most damning indictment of these operations was that they were not particularly effective in managing the conflicts in question. The SADC states which conducted Operation Sovereign Legitimacy in the DRC, for example, protected President Kabila from

foreign invasion but could not save him from one of his own bodyguards. Moreover, the presence of the troops from Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia fuelled rather than dampened the wider war. They also engaged in a wide variety of activities to exploit the DRC's natural resources (see, for example, UN Security Council 2002). In Liberia, ECOMOG only delayed Charles Taylor's bid to become president and thus arguably simply helped prolong the civil war.[1] In Sierra Leone, ECOWAS was again internally divided and proved unable to defeat the Revolutionary United Front rebels. Instead, in July 1999 it helped facilitate the deeply flawed and misconceived Lomé peace agreement before Nigeria's new government withdrew many of its troops and passed the peacekeeping baton to the UN. In Guinea-Bissau, ECOMOG did not alter the country's kleptocratic style of politics or the huge rifts between the political elites tied to the presidency and the armed forces.

During the 2000s, Africa's political landscape changed considerably with the establishment of the new African Union to replace the OAU, and the subsequent efforts to build a new continental peace and security architecture (see Williams 2011).

The first trend was that this decade witnessed a significant decrease in peacekeeping operations conducted by sub-regional arrangements. With the exception of ECOWAS, which conducted brief peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire before re-hatting its troops and handing over to the UN, and the Economic Community of Central African States' mission in the Central African Republic, African sub-regional arrangements stopped conducting peacekeeping operations (see Table 7.4).

This was connected to the second major trend, namely the major increase in the tempo of peace operations conducted by the new AU compared to its predecessor (see Table 7.3 and Williams 2009a). (However, it should be noted that the AU's tempo dropped considerably: it did not authorize any further missions between January 2007 and mid-2011.) The rise of AU peacekeeping took place under the twin mantras that the organization was moving from a guiding norm of 'non-interference' to one of 'non-indifference' and that it was thereby providing 'African solutions to African problems' (see Williams 2007a).

The use of 'African solutions' language became prominent for several reasons (for a critique see Williams 2008). First, it had deep historical roots in the anti-colonial struggle and the

Table 7.3 African Union peace operations, 2003–2009

Mission	*Location*	*Duration*	*Size (approx. max.)*	*Main task(s)*
AMIB	Burundi	2003–2004	3,250	Peacebuilding
MIOC	Comoros	2004	41	Observation
AMIS	Sudan	2004–2007	c.7,700	Peacekeeping/ Civilian protection
AU Special Task Force for Burundi	Burundi	2006–2009	c.750	VIP protection
AMISEC	Comoros	2006	1,260	Electoral monitoring
AMISOM	Somalia	2007–	4,300	Regime support
MAES	Comoros	2007–2008	350	Electoral support
Op. Democracy in the Comoros	Comoros	2008	1,350 (+450 Comoros)	Enforcement
UNAMID (paid for by UN)	Sudan	2008–	16,400 (13,500 African)	Peacebuilding/ Civilian protection

Pan-African movement which reflected the powerful anti-imperial sentiment that Africans should be able to decide their own futures without being dictated to by outsiders. Second, its supporters emphasized that Chapter VIII of the UN Charter encourages African regional organizations to take the lead in the peaceful resolution of disputes in their own neighbourhood. As noted above, some saw 'African solutions' as a necessary response to international disengagement from Africa after the Cold War: rather than waiting for the Western cavalry, Africans would devise their own peacekeeping action plans. Third, even if international attention returned to Africa – as it did – Africans would be unwise to rely upon external donors whose priorities were notoriously fickle and who were generally less interested in resolving the continent's conflicts than fighting their own 'war against terrorism' or securing access to African resources.

Four major conclusions stand out from the first seven years of AU peacekeeping. First, most AU peace operations depended on the contributions of a small group of committed African states, particularly South Africa (which was crucial to operations in Burundi and the Comoros and played a significant role in Darfur), Rwanda, Nigeria, and Senegal (which together provided the military backbone of the AMIS force), and Uganda (which stood alone in AMISOM for nearly a year before Burundian troops arrived). While Ethiopia eventually provided sizable contingents to UNAMID and to support the South Africans in AMIB, its most notable impact came through its military operation in Somalia in 2006, which served as justification for establishing AMISOM.

Second, AU operations relied upon external (non-African) assistance, primarily in the form of funds, equipment, logistics, and training. This dependence undermined the AU rhetoric of 'African solutions first' and meant that despite significant activity, there was no hiding the fact that the organization lacked sufficient funds, troops, police, materiel, strategic airlift capabilities (for both personnel and equipment), training facilities, management structures, and qualified staff to sustain even relatively small-scale peace operations on its own.

Third, the AU experienced difficulties agreeing on mandates for its peace operations, especially when the host state was a member of the AU Peace and Security Council or had friends on the council willing to support its position. This proved particularly important in two cases where primary conflict parties exercised significant influence over the terms of the mission mandate: Sudan in the case of AMIS (2004), and Ethiopia in the case of AMISOM (2006–2007).

Finally, with the exception of the operations in the Comoros, the AU's peace operations were conceived as interim measures until the UN could take over. While this might be understood as the sort of cooperation set out in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, it might also have encouraged the AU to be overly ambitious, taking on peace operations in extremely difficult circumstances before it had built the requisite security architecture.

A third trend during the 2000s was the increasing presence of EU peace operations conducted under the framework of its new Common Defense and Security Policy (see Table 7.4). These missions drew significant French and German support in particular and focused on the DRC and Chad/Central African Republic (e.g. Olsen 2009). In addition, through its Africa Peace Facility the EU proved significantly more willing to fund various African peacekeeping-related initiatives (see Pirozzi 2009).

The fourth major trend during the 2000s was the return of, and substantial increase in, UN peacekeeping operations on the continent (see Figure 7.1 and Table 7.5). The UN's resurgence did not start well as its missions in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the DRC (MONUC) both got off to very poor starts. While MONUC was unable to deploy in significant numbers until after President Laurent Kabila was assassinated in January 2001, UNAMSIL found itself suffering humiliation at the hands of Revolutionary United Front rebels until an intervention by British forces in May 2000 started to turn the tide of the war in favour of the UN and the legitimate government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah (Williams 2001). As demand for peace operations

Table 7.4 Non-UN, non-African peace operations in Africa, 1990–2009

Mission	*Location*	*Duration*	*Size (approx. max.)*	*Main task(s)*
UNITAF	Somalia	1992–1993	c.32,000	Enforcement/ Humanitarian relief
CPAG	South Africa	1994	33	Security Sector Reform
Operation Turquoise (French-led)	Rwanda	1994	c.2,500	Enforcement/ Civilian protection
CPDTF	Sierra Leone	1998	7	Police training
Operation Artemis (EU)	DRC	2003	1,500	Enforcement/ Civilian protection
EUPOL Kinshasa (became EUPOL RD)	DRC	2005–2007	c.30	Police training
EUSEC Congo	DRC	2005–2009	40	Security Sector Reform
EU Support to AMIS 2	Sudan	2005–2008	100	Technical support
EUFOR RD	DRC (CAR)	2006	c.1,250	Enforcement
EUPOL RD	DRC	2007–2009	39	Security Sector Reform
EUFOR Chad/CAR	Chad and CAR	2008–2009	3,700	Civilian protection

Table 7.5 United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa, 1990–2009

Mission	*Location*	*Duration*	*Size (approx. max.)*	*Main task(s)*
MINURSO	Western Sahara	1991–	237	Peacekeeping
UNAVEM 2	Angola	1991–1995	c.475	Observation
UNOSOM 1	Somalia	1992–1993	4,270	Peacekeeping
ONUMOZ	Mozambique	1992–1994	c.8,125	Peacebuilding
UNOSOM 2	Somalia	1993–1995	28,000	Peacebuilding/Enforcement
UNOMUR	Rwanda-Uganda	1993–1994	81	Observation
UNOMIL	Liberia	1993–1997	c.365	Observation
UNAMIR 1 and 2	Rwanda	1993–1996	5,500	Peacebuilding
OMIB	Burundi	1993–1996	47	Observation
UNASOG	Chad/Libya	1994	9	Observation
UNAVEM 3	Angola	1995–1997	4,220	Peacebuilding
MONUA	Angola	1997–1999	c.3,000	Peacebuilding
MINURCA	CAR	1998–2000	1,350	Peacebuilding
UNOMSIL	Sierra Leone	1998–1999	352	Observation
UNAMSIL	Sierra Leone	1999–2005	17,670	Peacebuilding/Enforcement/ Civilian protection
MONUC	DRC	1999–	c.18,600	Peacebuilding/Enforcement/ Civilian protection
UNMEE	Ethiopia-Eritrea	2000–2008	4,200	Peacekeeping
MINUCI	Côte d'Ivoire	2003–2004	75	Observation

Mission	*Location*	*Duration*	*Size (approx. max.)*	*Main task(s)*
UNMIL	Liberia	2003–	c.16,100	Peacebuilding/Civilian protection
UNOCI	Côte d'Ivoire	2004–	c.9,200	Peacebuilding/Enforcement/ Civilian protection
ONUB	Burundi	2004–2006	c.6,100	Peacebuilding/Civilian protection
UNMIS	Sudan	2005–	c.10,100	Peacebuilding/Civilian protection
MINURCAT	CAR and Chad	2007–	3,000	Civilian protection/Humanitarian assistance
UNAMID	Sudan	2008–	16,400	Peacebuilding/Civilian protection

in Africa increased, so did concerns of overstretch at the UN. This became more pronounced because Western troops were notable only for their almost complete absence from UN peacekeeping missions in Africa in the early twenty-first century. Most NATO and EU states were preoccupied either with the war in Iraq, the operations in Afghanistan, or both. In contrast, the numbers of Chinese peacekeepers in Africa swelled from fewer than forty at the start of the decade to over 1,600 by the end of 2009. However, the bulk of UN peacekeepers came from South Asian and African states, the latter growing in number especially fast, not least because of the significant efforts made by the US-led Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and its Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program (see Figure 7.2).

By 2005, the trickle of new UN operations in Africa had become a virtual flood with large expansions of UNAMSIL and MONUC as well as sizeable new operations deployed to Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Burundi and Sudan. By this stage, operations in Africa were accounting for over two-thirds of the UN's global peacekeeping commitments (Bellamy and Williams 2010). Yet it wasn't long before commentators suggested that UN peacekeeping, especially in Africa, had run




Figure 7.2 African uniformed personnel in UN peacekeeping operations, 2000–2010 (31 December, annually)

into yet another crisis. By the late 2000s, peacekeeping was said to have entered an era of strategic uncertainty not least because three crucial pillars on which it was based had begun to erode: a shared political vision of peacekeeping at the UN Security Council, a willingness of financial contributors to pay the rising bill, and a willingness of troop contributors, critically from South Asia, to deploy their personnel on more complex and potentially dangerous missions (Jones et al. 2009: 2).

Thus by the end of the 2000s, several conclusions were apparent. First, the UN was the preeminent peacekeeping actor on the continent, responsible for fielding well over 60,000 of the 73,000 peacekeepers in the ten operations ongoing at the end of 2009.[2] Second, African T/PCCs accounted for over half (some 35,000) of the UN's peacekeepers in Africa. Third, the earlier trend of African 'solidarity deployments' had reduced, although examples persisted in both Somalia and the Central African Republic. Finally, the much vaunted African Standby Force (ASF) had still not conducted an operation, with African states seemingly more keen to deploy their peacekeepers under a UN flag than an ASF banner.

Major challenges in post-Cold War peacekeeping in Africa[3]

Although no two peace operations are the same, some challenges appeared regularly across different missions. This section analyzes some of the most significant, using illustrations from various UN and non-UN peace operations. Particular use is made of examples from the MONUC operation in the DRC; partly because it dealt with the continent's largest war and partly because for most of the twenty-first century it was the biggest, most costly and, in many respects, most complicated peace operation conducted in Africa. As such it exemplifies many of the challenges faced by peacekeepers.

Difficult environments and complex conflicts

Peacekeeping is clearly more difficult in some environments than others. George Downs and Stephen Stedman have identified nine factors that can make the strategic environment more challenging (2002: 55–59):

1 a high number of warring parties;
2 the absence of a peace agreement signed by all major warring parties before intervention and with a minimum of coercion;
3 a high likelihood of 'spoilers' (see Stedman 1997: 5);
4 a collapsed state, i.e. a lack of functioning state institutions;
5 a high number of soldiers: cases with more than 50,000 soldiers are considered particularly difficult;
6 relatively easy access to disposable natural resources;
7 the presence of hostile neighbouring states or networks;
8 wars of secession (since these can frequently revert to all or nothing struggles);
9 the unwillingness of major or regional powers to engage in conflict management/peacemaking.

To their list should be added the fact that operations deployed in remote areas with harsh physical terrain and a lack of basic infrastructure faced huge logistical challenges. Based on their analysis of over a dozen peacebuilding operations, Downs and Stedman concluded that the four most important factors were the existence of spoilers, neighbouring states hostile to the peace

agreement concerned, the presence of disposable resources, and the presence of major power interest. While the first three reduced the chances of a successful operation, the last improved its chances. Indeed, without some sort of major power interest, Downs and Stedman advised international peacekeepers not to get involved (2002: 44, 58, 65–66). Many of the peace operations deployed in Africa had to contend with most of the factors on this list.

In general, four common characteristics of African conflicts stand out as posing particular challenges for peacekeeping. First, Africa's wars did not fit neatly within state borders (Williams 2011). Thus while the sinews of war in east, west and central Africa regularly stretched across political boundaries, peace operations were generally deployed to particular countries, or parts of countries. Peacekeepers were thus only ever able to deal with part of the problem confronting them. The UN's recognition of the cross-border nature of the conflicts across Sudan, Chad and the CAR and the deployment of related peace operations thus represented a welcome development.

A second complicating factor was the problematic nature of most of the peace agreements that peacekeepers were asked to support (Williams 2011). These agreements were often problematic in at least two senses: they did not address the complete range of incompatibilities driving the war and they were not fully comprehensive inasmuch as they were signed by a limited number of the warring factions and usually ignored unarmed groups altogether. This left peacekeepers operating in zones where the reoccurrence of warfare was a constant threat. In some cases the war had not stopped at all, in which case peacekeepers were viewed by some parties as hostile elements attempting to impose an unjust peace. The AU mission in Sudan after the Darfur Peace Agreement (May 2006), and the AU mission in Somalia after the Djibouti Agreement (August 2008) both suffered from this problem.

A third common problem was the large number of conflict parties. At various stages, peacekeepers in the DRC and Darfur, for example, were faced with approximately twenty armed rebel factions. Things were made even more difficult because many of these actors had unprofessional armed forces sometimes comprising of little more than militias, thugs, and criminals who rarely respected the laws of war or consistently followed chains of command. This raised the likelihood that armed groups would deliberately target civilians either because they were considered enemies or because they possessed resources useful to the belligerents.

A fourth problem was that the conflict parties often formed bewildering and shifting alliances which made it difficult for peacekeepers to know who to support. The splintering of rebel factions in both the DRC and Darfur were cases in point. Moreover, armed groups whose members relied upon warfare to generate their livelihoods had a vested interest in maintaining conflict and hence often resented the presence of peacekeepers.

Coordination among multiple peacekeepers

No single organization was equipped to deal adequately with all of Africa's conflict-related problems. Although the UN was the most important peacekeeping organization in post-Cold War Africa, it never had a monopoly on such activities. This proliferation of peacekeeping actors posed two principal challenges. At the strategic level it was often difficult to ensure coordination between these different actors over goals and methods. While most actors agreed in the abstract sense that greater coordination was necessary for effective peacekeeping, none of them liked to be 'coordinated' if this meant following another institution's agenda. Such strategic coordination was especially important during the planning stages for potential missions but was often notable only for its absence. The AU's inability to pay for its own peace operations meant that its relationship with the UN and other donor states and institutions (notably the EU) became

particularly complicated. Among other things, this generated a protracted debate over how to ensure African 'ownership' of operations that were paid for predominantly by Western states or the UN (as was the case with the AU missions in Sudan and Somalia).

At a more tactical level the multiplicity of actors posed challenges related to interoperability, not least the fact that commanding multinational peacekeeping forces was made more difficult because personnel from different countries had been exposed to different doctrine and training and used distinct equipment. The main attempt to overcome this problem was the establishment of various peacekeeping training centres and the effort to build an African Standby Force.[4]

Not enough soldiers

Peace operations in Africa were also commonly forced to operate with insufficient numbers of troops. It has always been standard practice for politics at the UN Security Council to generate authorized deployment numbers at the low end of the recommended spectrum. (Indeed, the same is probably true for all international organizations.) This was usually done to save on financial costs and in order to increase the likelihood that member states would be seen to meet these targets. This was a problem that dogged many peacekeeping operations. In the case of MONUC in the DRC it happened repeatedly. For example, although a UN report of March 1999 estimated MONUC would need more than 100,000 troops, it was granted fewer than 6,000 (Roessler and Prendergast 2006: 259). Similarly, in October 2004, UN Security Council resolution 1565 granted MONUC only 5,900 of the 13,100 additional troops it had requested, including denying the mission a brigade planned for the southeastern part of the country (Roessler and Prendergast 2006: 256). Again in 2006, the EU Reserve Deployment Force was deployed temporarily to the DRC in support of MONUC because the Security Council had declined the UN Secretary-General's request that MONUC be given an additional 2,590 troops to deal with security contingencies during the elections (Tull 2009: 218).

An additional dimension to this problem was the length of time it usually took peacekeepers to arrive in the field. For example, although MONUC was established in 1999 it did not deploy in significant numbers until mid-2001, in part because of Kabila's intransigence and in part because the UN did not foresee the lack of progress on the ground. Other notable examples included AMISOM taking nearly two years to reach *half* its authorized troop strength, UNAMID operating with some 10,000 uniformed personnel below its authorized strength *eighteen months* into its operations, and the fact that the 3,000 reinforcements authorized for MONUC in November 2008 took over a year to arrive.

Not enough Western soldiers

Particularly after the traumatic episodes in Somalia and Rwanda, most of the peacekeepers deployed in Africa came from the continent itself or from states in South Asia, especially Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. To take one recent example, when the latest crisis in northeastern DRC hit the international headlines in October 2008, MONUC was the largest peace operation in Africa comprising just over 18,500 uniformed personnel. Over half of them came from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Most of the rest came from Uruguay, Nepal and five African states (South Africa, Morocco, Benin, Senegal, and Tunisia). The permanent five members of the Security Council, in contrast, provided only 254 or 1.37% of this figure; 234 of which were from China. The important point here, however, is not that these soldiers were incapable of fulfilling the tasks assigned to them – many of them were good peacekeepers. Rather, it is to emphasize that the developing world took on far more than its fair share of peacekeeping in Africa.

In contrast, as noted above, Western states were reluctant to send their own soldiers on UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. In order to deflect criticism for this poor showing, these states emphasized their financial contributions to UN operations as well as the various training and assistance programmes they undertook to enable more African soldiers to carry out peacekeeping tasks.[5] Part of the rationale behind the call for more Western forces was their ability to conduct high-end military tasks and the fact that they generally brought with them important items of equipment as well as logistical and air support. Furthermore, greater willingness of Western states to deploy their own soldiers rather than simply write cheques would have sent a powerful message about their political commitment to missions in Africa.

When Western states did send their troops to Africa to carry out crisis management, they tended to do so outside UN command and control structures and for short periods of time (see Table 7.4). In the DRC, for instance, Western states conducted two military peace operations in support of MONUC's activities: Operation Artemis, which deployed around the embattled town of Bunia between June and September 2003; and EU Reserve Deployment Force, which provided support to the electoral process between April and November 2006. The sporadic appearance of these troops signaled that the DRC's conflict was not important enough to risk putting Western soldiers under MONUC command. It also fed perceptions of the existence of two classes of peace operations: missions where significant numbers of Western troops were present and missions where they were not. As one analysis put it, the DRC's war 'was . . . too gruesome and devastating for the West to ignore, but too difficult and too low a priority to address seriously' (Roessler and Prendergast 2006: 253). In this regard, the willingness of European states to deploy over 3,000 troops to Chad and the CAR as the precursor to the UN's MINURCAT operation – and keep many of them deployed after the handover to the UN mission – was a welcome, albeit rather brief, departure from this general trend.

Not enough police

For much of the post-Cold War period, a growing number of peace operations were tasked with strengthening the rule of law and therefore required the deployment of civilian police rather than just soldiers. The greater demand for police was reflected in the UN Security Council's resolutions for its African operations: over 6,400 police were authorized for UNAMID; over 1,400 for MONUC; over 1,200 for UNMIL; just under 1,200 for UNOCI; and over 700 for UNMIS. By mid-2009, however, not all these targets had been met, with notable vacancies in the UN missions in Darfur (some 3,000 police short) and in the DRC (about 600 short). The AU struggled even more to deploy police officers in its missions. A major part of the problem was that good police officers were usually in even greater demand by the world's states than good soldiers. As a consequence, many countries lacked spare policing capacity and those that had it were often reluctant to send many of their police officers abroad, especially into dangerous environments where legal and justice systems had been destroyed.

Complex mandates

Apart from relatively rare cases such as the operations in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and between Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), peacekeepers in Africa were asked to undertake a long list of more complicated tasks than simply monitoring a ceasefire or demilitarized zone. Put bluntly, they were often asked to help build institutions of liberal democratic governance in some of the continent's poorest, least developed and conflict-ridden states. The usual lists of tasks ranged from electoral supervision, human rights monitoring, civilian protection, ensuring the delivery

of humanitarian relief, providing security and order, strengthening the rule of law, and overseeing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) programs. These complex mandates did not always go down well with the troop-contributing countries. The Indian representative to the UN summed up the situation in mid-2009 by saying, 'Peacekeeping mandates have become too broad and too all-encompassing' (UN Security Council 2009: 13).

The central challenges related to these daunting mandates revolved around four issues. First, peacekeepers were sometimes given contradictory instructions. For instance, MONUC was mandated to support President Joseph Kabila's government and protect the country's civilians yet the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) were responsible for a significant proportion of the crimes committed against Congolese civilians. By 2009, MONUC was supposed to help the FARDC attack various rebel groups in the east of the country but then had to withdraw its support from key elements of the Congolese army when it was proved they were responsible for a large number of atrocity crimes committed against civilians. On other occasions governments withdrew their consent for operations. In early 2006, for instance, the new government in Burundi demanded the drawdown of UN peacekeepers ahead of schedule. Another example came in early 2008 when Eritrea withdrew its consent for the UNMEE force because Asmara felt that the UN was not enforcing the ruling of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission. In 2009, the governments of Chad and the DRC both asked the UN peacekeeping operations to withdraw, in both instances before they had completed their mandated tasks. In other cases, host governments placed significant constraints on the activities of peacekeepers as a price for granting continued consent. This was a major challenge for the AMIS and UNAMID operations in Darfur, Sudan. Indeed, one analysis concluded that peacekeepers should not cross what it called 'the Darfur line', that is, a peace operation should not be deployed where there is no real consent by the host state (Jones et al. 2009: 12). This challenge reflects the fundamental constraint placed on UN-led peace operations by the rules of the international system: they can only operate legally with host government consent.

The second challenge was the lack of clarity and ambiguity that often pervaded the texts handed down by the UN Security Council and other mandating authorities. As the head of the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations observed, not only were mission mandates 'more complex than ever' but 'there remains a lack of consensus on how certain mandate tasks should be fulfilled' (UN Security Council 2009: 3). Part of the problem was that peacekeepers were often told to 'assist' authorities and 'support' processes using 'all necessary measures' without being given further specific instructions or pre-deployment training on how to do this. Alternatively a related problem stemmed from different national contingents within a peace operation interpreting these general instructions to mean different things in operational terms or ignoring certain orders from their UN force commanders altogether.

A particularly tragic example of national contingents disobeying orders occurred within UNAMIR during Rwanda's 1994 genocide. In an internal letter written during the genocide, Canadian force commander General Dallaire told the senior officer of the Bangladeshi contingent that the mission's mandate allowed it to try to protect civilians in danger of massacre. 'Our orders from New York are quite explicit', Dallaire wrote:

> we are to conduct the evacuation of the expatriate community and to offer protection when feasible of Rwandese citizens. Within our peacekeeping rules of engagement we can use force to defend persons under UN protection and to prevent crimes against humanity. We must however balance the use of force with the requirement to protect our men.
>
> *Letter from Dallaire, 1994, copy in author's possession*

Nevertheless, members of the Bangladeshi contingent consistently ignored these orders, prompting Dallaire to issue the following complaint to UN headquarters in New York:

> The [Bangladeshi] contingent commander has consistently stated he is under national orders not to endanger his soldiers by evacuating Rwandese. They will evacuate expatriates but not local people. His junior officers have clearly stated that if they are stopped at a roadblock with local people in the convoy they will hand over these local people for inevitable killing rather than use their weapons in an attempt to save local people. This reticence to engage in dangerous operations and their stated reluctance to use their weapons in self-defence or in defence of crimes against humanity has led to widespread mistrust of this contingent among its peers in other units and amongst staff officers/UNMOs [military observers] at the headquarters when they are tasked to go with these men on dangerous missions.
>
> *Code Cable 1994: para.17 (see also Melvern 2009: 187)*

As it turned out, over the next few days members of the Bangladeshi contingent began to desert UNAMIR taking UN vehicles with them before UN Security Council resolution 912 officially withdrew most of UNAMIR, including their contingent (Melvern 2009: 194–195).

A third challenge occurred when conflict parties, usually rebel factions, viewed peacekeeping mandates as illegitimate. In the case of EUFOR Chad/CAR for instance, some rebel groups viewed the presence of an EU force as illegitimate because of its close association with France, which had a long history of providing military support for President Déby's corrupt and authoritarian regime in the name of maintaining stability. To make matters worse for the EU peacekeepers, Déby's government banned them from operating inside the country's refugee and displacement camps even though the primary purpose of their mission was the protection of civilians and the creation of conditions which would allow displaced people from both Chad and Sudan to return to their homes (Wiharta 2009: 102–103).

A fourth set of challenges stemmed from the sheer difficulty of the tasks peacekeepers were asked to undertake, especially with limited resources and according to externally driven and usually unrealistic timetables. Among them were mandates to 'strengthen the rule of law' and reform the 'security sector'. DDR also posed peacekeepers huge headaches over the years. It was hard enough to disarm former combatants when they were willing participants but attempting to do it by force as occurred in Somalia was a recipe for disaster. Demobilization was also difficult to achieve, especially when there were few employment opportunities available to help 'reintegrate' these combatants into society. Sometimes the entire process was met with hostility by local civilians who did not want to 'reintegrate' war criminals but instead wanted them punished. Consider the case of MONUC.

In the aftermath of Operation Artemis (2003) and the Bukavu crisis (2004), MONUC adopted a much more robust posture in eastern DRC. In 2005, it began a process of compulsory disarmament in Ituri province around the town of Bunia, disarming around 15,000 combatants by June. Some groups opposed forcible disarmament and in February 2005, fighters from the Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI) attacked and killed nine Bangladeshi peacekeepers. In response, Nepalese, Pakistani and South African peacekeepers, supported by Indian attack helicopters, pursued the FNI, killed between fifty and sixty belligerents and disarmed more than 140 with only two MONUC soldiers injured (Holt and Berkman 2006: 165). Similarly, in October 2005, MONUC issued a disarmament ultimatum to the Hutu *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR) – a militia associated with the genocidal regime that fled to Zaire in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and subsequently abused local civilians there.

When the FDLR refused to cooperate, MONUC used helicopter gunships to destroy between thirteeen and sixteen camps. Although this weakened the FDLR and restricted its freedom of movement it neither destroyed the militia nor forced them to disarm (Holt and Berkman 2006: 166–167). As a result, the FDLR continued to conduct its illicit activities, often in collaboration with the government's own armed forces, the FARDC.

The other major challenge was how to physically protect civilians (see Holt et al. 2009). Although many peace operations in Africa grappled with the problems of civilian protection throughout the 1990s, it was not until 1999 that all UN multidimensional peacekeeping operations in Africa included some explicit element of civilian protection in their mandates. Since 2003, the EU (notably Operation Artemis and EUFOR Chad/CAR) and the AU (notably AMIS) also gave some of their operations civilian protection tasks. But it is important to recall that these mandates always came with various caveats, usually that peacekeepers should only protect civilians 'under imminent threat of violence' and within their 'areas of deployment'. In addition, it was – quite rightly – left to force commanders on the ground to decide whether they had sufficient capabilities to carry out specific protection tasks.

Throughout the two decades after the Cold War, the majority of discussion and media attention centered on the many failures of peacekeeping operations, especially in Rwanda, Angola, Sierra Leone, Sudan and the DRC. Yet the news from Africa was not all bad. Even in truly dire circumstances the presence of peacekeepers usually made the overall situation better not worse. For example, after Ugandan troops had withdrawn from Ituri in the DRC in spring 2003, some 700 Uruguayan peacekeepers managed to protect approximately 15,000 civilians in Bunia airport and MONUC's sector headquarters (Holt and Berkman 2006: 160–161). Similarly, in 2005 the Pakistani brigade in South Kivu helped provide civilians with safe passage through the Kahuzi-Biega park and organized village defense communities to alert peacekeepers of imminent attacks, reportedly by banging pots and blowing whistles (Holt and Berkman 2006: 166). Even amidst the carnage of Rwanda's genocide, the beleaguered UNAMIR peacekeepers were estimated to at one time have protected approximately 30,000 people (Des Forges 1999: 689).[6] The basic problem was that there was only so much even well-resourced peacekeepers could do. They could not 'protect everyone from everything' nor could they 'operate without some semblance of a "peace to keep" or halt determined belligerents wholly backed by a state' (Holt et al. 2009: 12, 211).

Misconduct

A seventh challenge was that some peacekeepers abused the locals they were sent to help. In extreme cases this involved peacekeepers murdering locals – as in the case of Canadian peacekeepers in Somalia in the early 1990s. The more common problems involved the local perception that peacekeepers were unaccountable and immune from the law, corruption and the sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) of local civilians. These issues were important because such misconduct could 'put an entire operation at risk, severely hampering its ability to effect positive change in the host country' (Wiharta 2009: 115).

It was corruption and SEA which grabbed the media headlines. Corruption came in a variety of forms but among the most prominent examples in recent years were UN peacekeepers in the DRC illicitly trading in gold and other conflict trade goods, including arms, and AU peacekeepers in Somalia engaging in arms trafficking. In the DRC case, the allegations against Indian peacekeepers in particular apparently prompted Kabila's government to tell the UN Secretary-General that they should not be deployed to some parts of the country. This warning came in November 2008 just after the Indian government had offered to provide half (1,500)

of the temporary reinforcements authorized for MONUC by the UN Security Council (Wiharta 2009: 113).

In relation to SEA, there were numerous scandals involving peacekeepers raping and sexually abusing local women and children as well as engaging in human trafficking. Although such abuses occurred in peace operations all around the world, MONUC personnel were accused of more abuses than any other UN operation. In 2004 the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services conducted an investigation into the situation around Bunia in eastern DRC which concluded that the SEA of locals by peacekeepers was a regular occurrence and that MONUC management had turned a blind eye to the problem (UN 2005). The positive news was that these scandals prompted a major UN investigation into the issue led by Jordan's Prince Zeid and the subsequent setting out of the so-called 'zero tolerance' approach.

Conclusion

Peacekeepers were unable to change the nature of African wars but they did help alleviate some of their worst symptoms. They did this in spite of being given unrealistic deadlines and starved of adequate resources and personnel relative to the complexity and magnitude of the tasks at hand.

Peacekeepers also suffered from the fact that their missions were not always tied to a viable conflict resolution and peacebuilding strategy. Two particular weaknesses were the inability of most peacekeeping operations to tackle the local-level dynamics which lay at the heart of many of Africa's wars and their overly optimistic faith in the ability of power-sharing agreements and elections to usher in an era of stable peace. In one of the more thoughtful critiques of the MONUC operation, Séverine Autesserre observed how the mission's leaders relied too heavily on elections when they were 'a poor peacebuilding mechanism' and ended up framing 'local conflict resolution as an irrelevant, inappropriate, and illegitimate task for international actors' when in actual fact it was crucial to implementing peace agreements (Autesserre 2009: 272, 276). These conclusions could reasonably be leveled at many other operations as well.

It was also apparent that no single organization could handle the full spectrum of conflict management challenges facing the continent. The issue of (the lack of) strategic coordination thus cast a persistent shadow over the international landscape. During the 1990s the key relationships were between Africa's regional organizations and the UN. In the 2000s, however, the locus shifted to the crucial UN-AU-EU nexus as the latter two organizations began to play larger roles in peacekeeping on the continent. Throughout both decades the notion of 'African solutions to African problems' was a prominent but not always helpful fixture in international debates.

In more positive terms, the two decades after the Cold War witnessed an unprecedented improvement in the professionalization of the world's peacekeepers and the institutionalization of Africa's conflict management structures. Although some big problems remained, the UN missions established in the early twenty-first century such as UNMIL, ONUB, UNOCI, MINURCAT and MONUC reflected a qualitatively different order of professionalization than those established in the early 1990s such as UNAVEM, UNAMIR and UNOSOM. Similarly, although the AU tried to run before it could walk in the field of peacekeeping, it also made considerable progress, especially when considering the low baseline and the lack of interest displayed in peacekeeping by many of its members.

Finally, it is important to remember that even 'robust' peace operations with mandates to use force were not designed for war-fighting. Their purpose was not to achieve victory over particular enemies but to impartially uphold the principles and rules written into their mandate and the

peace agreement concerned. When belligerents genuinely committed to the peace process, peacekeepers helped make it stick. When belligerents remained belligerent, peacekeepers could do little but help alleviate some of the symptoms of war. When forced into such situations peacekeepers predictably drew hostility from all sides: governments complained they didn't disarm rebels; rebels complained they ignored government abuses; and civilians complained that they didn't protect them. In sum, the overriding conclusion from peacekeeping in post-Cold War Africa is that when groups wanted to fight, under-resourced peacekeepers were rarely able to stop them.

Notes

1 This operation also cost Nigeria an estimated US$5 billion and the lives of some 500 troops. See Malan 2008: 91.
2 Deployed in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), Chad/Central African Republic (MINURCAT and MICOPAX), the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), Liberia (UNMIL), Somalia (AMISOM), Sudan (UNMIS, UNAMID), Burundi (AU Special Task Force) and Western Sahara (MINURSO).
3 This section draws on Williams 2011: 192–202.
4 Five institutions in Africa are marketed as centres of excellence for peacekeeping training: SADC's Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare, Zimbabwe (opened October 1996); the Peace Support Training Centre in Kenya (established August 2001); the Peacekeeping School at Bamako, Mali (inaugurated March 2007); the African Centre for Strategic Research and Studies in Abuja, Nigeria (opened August 2004); and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Accra, Ghana (opened January 2004). They were funded almost entirely by external donors (and often staffed by seconded foreign personnel). In addition, one respected analyst concluded that none of them was really worthy of the label 'centre of excellence'. For details see Malan 2008: 103–107.
5 These included the G8's GPOI, Washington's ACOTA program, the French Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities programme, and Britain's peacekeeping training initiatives.
6 The difficulty with this figure is that many of these people were located within the Rwandan Patriotic Front zone. Consequently, the extent to which UNAMIR was responsible for saving them is not entirely clear.

PART II

Understanding conflict in Africa

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8

UNDERSTANDING AFRICAN GUERRILLAS

From liberation struggles to warlordism and international terrorism?[1]

Morten Bøås and Kevin Dunn

Introduction

War has unfortunately been all too common on the African continent, and as the majority of these conflicts have been internal and not between two or more national armies, insurgency groups have therefore come to occupy a large place in the history of African warfare (see Reno 2011). This is a history of warfare that often is misrepresented as the international media continue to feed us with horror stories about red-eyed, drugged monsters in the form of young men who seemingly kill without purpose or remorse (Bøås 2004). African conflicts undoubtedly contain some gruesome acts, but this does not automatically make them senseless orgies of violence. Violent conflict in Africa, as elsewhere in the world, is concerned with issues of distribution and belonging, and the political and social cleavages that such issues bring into existence. Few scholars have done more to help us understand this than Christopher Clapham. Indeed, it is fair to say that any piece of work published on the issue of African guerrillas published this century is deeply indebted to Christopher Clapham's (1998) seminal contribution to this topic.

Of course William Reno (1998, 2011) and others (e.g. Bøås and Dunn 2007) have contributed to the study of African guerrillas, but almost all contributions have been walking in the footsteps of Clapham, and there are good reasons for this. The analytical space that Clapham created is a good place to be. It is neat, tidy, functional and operational – it also easily allows for comparative studies. However, with hindsight, it is also about time that we started to ask some critical questions concerning the analytical landscape that most students of African guerrillas (these authors included) have worked within for almost two decades. One important question is has it become too functional? Can it help us to understand how people and place 'dance in the glory of monsters' to use the language of Jason Stearns (2011), and also how this 'monster' came about? Maybe it is about time that we start to deconstruct the 'house of Clapham' and thereby also our own work in order to move into more uncertain and unknown territories to unpack the ambiguities, the blurredness of these 'states of exception' where everything and everyone is in-between and betwixt: inside and outside of the state at the same time. The question is whether the traditional framework really allows us to fully come to terms with organisations such as Nigeria's Boko

Haram and Northern Uganda's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)? Does Boko Haram just represent another category that can be added to Clapham's original distinctions or is there more to Boko Haram and similar movements (e.g. al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda in the Land of Maghreb – AQIM) than international Islamic terrorism? Is LRA really an example of a warlord insurgency? It may very well be the case that the last is better understood as an armed social movement with a strong cultic element.

Another element well worth considering is that even if African guerrillas have come to occupy a central place in the history of African warfare, their success rate is quite slim. African states, even if often presented as weak and even failed, have been relatively good at defeating rebel movements, and over the last decade several African regimes have become much stronger in institutional terms and therefore increasingly better at utilising the state's technologies of control to contain and control such movements. The very fact that winning a military confrontation with the state is even less of a possibility today than some decades ago may very well also have changed the very conditions of armed resistance in Africa. New and emerging issues that therefore should be considered as we continue our studies of African guerrillas include the question of control of territory versus the control of populations, the evolution of rebel movements over time – from coherent movements to network-centred organisations, the path-dependency as rebel movements may reflect or even come to mimic the state they rebel against, and the degree to which transformative rebels should be seen as the very organic intellectuals of warfare.

What this chapter therefore sets out to achieve is first to present the analytical framework of Clapham (1998), and how more recent contributions (Bøås and Dunn 2007; Reno 2011) have further elaborated this framework. This is followed by a section discussing recent developments and organisational forms such as al-Shabaab, AQIM and Boko Haram, and asking if these movements' statements of allegiance to al-Qaeda should be understood as a strategy of branching or of branding. Finally, the chapter concludes with an argument that, while clearly still standing on the shoulders of giants in the field such as Christopher Clapham, also seeks to unpack the betwixt nature of contemporary African guerrillas as the old opposition between state and non-state seems less suited to come to terms with emergent forms of insurgency on the African continent.

Christopher Clapham and the study of African guerillas

As already mentioned, historically, African insurgencies have enjoyed a rather poor success rate, at least if only measured against the degree to which they have been able to overthrow and replace existing regimes. With the exception of the anti-colonial struggles, no African insurgency was ever successful until Hassan Habré's *Forces Armés du Nord* (FAN) seized state power in Chad in 1979. The second successful insurgency in an independent African state did not occur until Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) captured the Ugandan state in 1986. Africa's first secessionist movement did not succeed in Eritrea until after the combined forces of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) toppled the central government of Ethiopia in 1991. This was followed by the independence of South Sudan in 2011, but this was just as much an outcome of international negotiation as it was brought about by military victory. Yet, despite this poor success rate, the phenomenon of armed insurrection has become one of the dominant features of the African political landscape.

In examining the diversity of armed insurgencies in Africa at the end of the twentieth century, Christopher Clapham (1998: 6–7) distinguished between four broad groups of armed guerrillas. In his typology, the groups were divided between liberation insurgencies (such as the anti-colonial

nationalist movements), separatist insurgencies (e.g. the Eritrean People's Liberation Front and the Polisario Front), reform insurgencies (e.g. Museveni's National Resistance Army in Uganda), and warlord insurgencies (e.g. Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and Foday Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone).

Clapham's typology is extremely useful, but the question must also be asked if contemporary guerrilla movements in Africa any longer fit very well (if they ever did) with typologies based on traditional Anglo-American thinking about the political causes of conflict. Only the last of these four categories has been very prominent in recent discussions of African guerrilla movements. This is because the majority of recent insurgencies do not fit easily into the other categories. While Clapham's 1998 collection is still one of the very best attempts to study African insurgencies in a comparative manner, the external and internal environments of contemporary African insurgencies have changed significantly. The characteristics, dynamics, and contexts of African insurgencies are clearly not the same across time and space.

Elaborating Clapham

Over the last decade certain theories and explanations have gained currency. These include the labels of 'greed', 'new wars' and other related analytical strands and concepts. It is our general contention that these approaches tend to ignore long historical trends, diverse social forces, political motivations, and regional dimensions that have all contributed to the development of current African conflicts. We will therefore explore the changing global geopolitical context and the crisis of the African state. The view we will bring to the fore is that of contemporary African guerrilla movements as manifestations of a rage against the machinery of dysfunctional neopatrimonial states, providing political opportunities as well as basic survival strategies for those navigating the continuing crises of modernity.

It may be difficult to come to terms with these movements, their actions, and their motivations, but we are also convinced that the reality is much more complex than single-dimension approaches would like us to believe. Current mainstream debates often imply that all African wars are resource wars, fought not over political issues but in order to gain access to profits. This is what we call the 'greed kills' argument (see Collier 2000b; Berdal and Malone 2000; Klare 2001). Much of this literature argues that changes in the global economy have helped foster the rise of so-called 'new wars' (see Kaldor 2001; Duffield 2001). Changes in the global economy, particularly the increased interconnectedness of certain markets, have certainly provided new opportunities for African guerrilla movements. One of the most pronounced trends has been the ability of armed insurgents to access and exploit regional economic markets. In many cases, primary resources such as diamonds, gold, ivory, coltan, and other precious (and relatively easily transportable) minerals are the desired goal. These goods are frequently smuggled out of the conflict zone and entered into the regional and global markets via neighbouring territories. It should not be assumed that these actors are exclusively Africans, as regional and international businesses and economic elites play a significant role in these conflicts and benefit from the opportunities they provide (see Taylor 2005).

In some African conflicts, it has been argued that for some actors, the goal of armed conflict is not necessarily the defeat of the enemy in battle, but the continuation of fighting and the institutionalisation of violence for profit (Keen 2000: 25). Thus, the 'greed kills' literature often mistakenly assumes that theft and predation are the *reasons* for the guerrilla struggle. While we recognise the complex ways in which African guerrilla movements have been exploiting opportunities provided to them by changes in the global political economy, we reject explanations of African armed struggles that focus primarily on the supposed economic agendas of these actors.

Such a myopic focus may help explain how some conflicts are sustained, but it rarely tells us much about why conflicts start in the first place. It would be a mistake, for example, to assume that the recent wars in Central and West Africa started as competition over control of alluvial diamonds, coltan or other natural resources. In fact, in both Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the integration of extraction and marketing of natural resources to the conflicts only occurred once the conflicts were well under way. Nor does a 'greed kills' thesis explain why these incentives have come to play such an important part in recent wars: that is, the economic agenda research assumes the profit motive on the part of the belligerents without exploring why or to what extent political-military actors become profit-seeking, market-based entities. To understand this transformation, we need to take into consideration political, cultural and historical factors in addition to the economic dimensions of conflict. Obviously, economic agendas are an integral part of African wars, as elsewhere. But the desire to accumulate, while an important motivation, is not the only one. Even authors closely associated with the 'greed' thesis have later argued that to focus excessively on material explanations and greed-inspired motivations of actors may lead to one-sided explanations of conflict (see Berdal 2003; 2005). Making this variable the theory repeats the mistake from a few years ago, when ethnicity was presented as the decisive factor explaining war in Africa.

To understand the guerrillas of Africa, we need a more nuanced understanding of what the wars are about. These conflicts are deeply embedded in the history of the continent, not only in colonial history and the transformation to independent states, but in the totality of African history. In Africa, as elsewhere, recent and distant pasts relate in direct, although also sometimes in rather perverse, ways. Many of the events and relationships characteristic of Africa's recent history – including politics and political violence – are intimately entangled in peoples' perception of their social and ethnic identity. These perceptions of identity are social constructions; representations that change over time and are often distorted and manipulated, particularly as part of a discourse of domination emanating from those in power in successive colonial and postcolonial regimes (see Atkinson 1994).

The Liberian war is instructive in this regard as it has been portrayed as a primary example of Mary Kaldor's (2001) 'new wars'; drawing attention both to the economic motives and the global character of the conflict. Our argument is that there is little new about the Liberian war. The conflict is deeply entrenched in history, and the only way to fully understand the Liberian war is to come to terms with this history and the ramifications this history holds for current attempts to reconstruct Liberia. The Liberian war is not a new war, but the present manifestations of social conflicts that started when the first Americo-Liberian settlers arrived in the early eighteenth century. Thus, the Liberian civil war can best be understood as a violent expression of the tendencies, organisation and attitudes toward identity, society and class that have underpinned Liberia since its formation as a state. At the heart of the political, economic, social and armed conflicts that have shaped and scarred Liberian society over the past two centuries, is the question of how the Liberian polity should be constituted. The new war literature with its emphasis on economic motivations and global connections between local conflicts and international (often illegal) market-based actors helps us understand one important dimension of the Liberian conflict and the guerrilla movements who fought it. However, too much emphasis on this dimension may also lead scholars and policy-makers to neglect the ideational aspects of conflict. As the Liberian case illustrates, these are of immense importance to a full understanding of civil war, the actors within it, and its dynamics. This part of conflict can best be captured by a thoroughly holistic and historically grounded approach (see Bøås 2005; 2008).

Like Liberia, the violent conflict in neighbouring Sierra Leone has produced multiple interpretations of the cause of the conflict and the reasons for its marked brutality (see Kaplan

1994; Richards 1996; Abdullah 1998; Bøas 2001; Richards 2005; Fithen and Richards 2005). Attempting to provide a socially grounded approach to understanding the origin and character of the RUF, Ibrahim Abdullah (1998) focuses attention on socially marginalised youth. In particular, he regards the revolution of the RUF as a product of a rebellious youth culture in search of a radical alternative to the regime of the All People's Congress (APC) (see Abdullah 1998: 204). He pays particular attention in his analysis to lumpens – unemployed or unemployable youths (mostly male) who he regards as being 'prone to criminal behaviour, petty theft, drugs, drunkenness and gross indiscipline' (1998: 207–208). Given the impoverishment of the social, political, and economic options facing these youths, Abdullah asserts that many would opt for a radical alternative to the status quo: taking up arms against the established order. This is an important contribution to the debate about the war in Sierra Leone. Nevertheless, we find Abdullah's lumpen thesis problematic for numerous reasons. First, his use of the lumpen as an analytic category is troublingly monolithic. Second, he fails to establish a causal connection between lumpen social status and their supposedly inherent violent behaviour. Are we to assume that lumpens are hardwired to be brutally violent? Thus, while Abdullah does important work in underscoring the importance of youth culture and youth violence in African postcolonial politics, his analysis ends up raising more questions than it resolves. Why do some youths opt for the 'bush path to destruction' and others do not? What role does gender play, given that most youths opting for a violent alternative are males? What political factors are involved in shaping these youth cultures and sub-cultures? What explains the turn to horrific acts of violence, beyond simplistic lumpen explanations? Is the situation really just a 'wanton use of violence for the sake of violence' (ibid. 1998: 235), or are more complex dynamics at work?

Thandika Mkandawire has sought to address some of those questions, claiming that because African rebel groups are made up predominantly of youths from urban areas – and thus with urban gripes – roving in the countryside amongst unreceptive peasantry, they engage in 'extremely brutal and spiteful forms of violence' (Mkandawire 2002: 181). Mkandawire argues that there are two major sources of conflict in urban spaces: ethnic rivalries and intra-elite conflicts, which fuel a sense of relative deprivation (2002: 191–192). As these conflicts move to the countryside, he suggests the rural terrain is inhospitable to the agendas of these angry urbanites for two reasons. First, African peasantry tend to have direct access to labor and land, which tend to be the main elements of insecurity for peasantry elsewhere (2002: 193–194). Thus, the armed rebels have little to offer the peasantry. Second, the relationship between the state and the countryside in Africa has tended to keep the peasantry relatively autonomous and, thus, unreceptive to the urban-focused rebels' claims of oppression and exploitation (Mkandawire 2002: 193–198). In short, one socially marginalised group (urbanised youth) are operating in an arena populated by another, but distinctly different, socially marginalised group (the peasantry). His main argument is that, because they are in a hostile rural setting, these roving rebels inflict violence on local populations: 'they will tend to consider reluctant peasants as enemies or traitors, with death the usual penalty' (2002: 204).

While there is much that is attractive about Mkandawire's thesis, his argument about why rebels use violence against local populations in no way explains the forms and brutality of that violence, something he claims to address from the outset. Are we to resort to Abdullah's explanation that they are just ignorant and ill-tempered lumpen youths? More importantly, a number of the cases seem to undermine Mkandawire's central claim. Members of Uganda's LRA, infamous in Western media reports for their brutality, are not dispossessed urban elites disconnected from the local population. Rather, they were semi-stationary (roving across the Acholiland of northern Uganda and southern Sudan) with direct links with their local host population – and the brutal violence is aimed at the people they are reportedly fighting for.

They do regard their victims as legitimate enemies, but not for the reasons Mkandawire gives. Likewise, the cases of Casamance, Côte d'Ivoire, and Angola also seem to contradict many of his assumptions and arguments, first among them being the claim that 'the grievances that rebel movements claim to seek to address are often not salient in local political situations' (2002: 199). The case of the Banyamulenge in eastern DRC, the conflicts between agriculturalists and pastoralists in Ituri in the same part of DRC, the issue of land, labor and migration in the Ivorian conflict, or the continued tension between the Loma and Mandingo over the right to land and belonging in Lofa County in Liberia, only show all too well the insecurity of the African peasantry, the centrality of rural land conflicts in current civil wars, and how flawed one of the main assumptions behind Mkandawire's argument actually is. As sympathetic as we are to his desire to understand the extreme violence used in contemporary wars in Africa, his argument is unfortunately obscuring rather than putting the practice of violence in these cases into analytical perspective. Setting aside these problems, both Abdullah and Mkandawire underscore the importance of considering how socially and politically marginalised groups are drawn towards armed resistance to the state (see also Hoffman 2011).

Motivations and ideology

Motivations vary greatly between and within different African insurgencies, but over the past few decades, there has been a noticeable change away from ideologically informed movements. Early African armed guerrilla movements were largely characterised by their anti-colonial nationalism. The specific character of these movements varied across the continent, but the common thread connecting them was their anti-colonial agenda. Kenya experienced a sustained armed revolt from 1952–1957, while Cameroon experienced an armed rebellion from 1955–1960. In both of these cases, there was little outside support for the movements. Moreover, in both cases, the armed rebellions depended heavily on specific ethnic groups within the colony. In both cases, the rebellions were plagued by a lack of weapons and military skills.

In the late 1960s and 1970s, while a few liberation movements continued (most prominently in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe), several other armed insurgencies in Africa increasingly came to be characterised by their secessionist agendas. In Western Sahara and Eritrea, armed groups fought for territorial liberation against an annexing African state, Morocco and Ethiopia respectively. Nigeria was thrown into the brutal Biafra civil war when the southeast section of the country attempted to secede. Yet, there has been a striking absence of separatist motives among African insurgents (see Reno 2011). Historically, most armed guerrillas have been interested in capturing state power – either directly from the central government or regionally through the creation of an independent, autonomous territory. During the 1960s and 1970s, this political agenda was usually informed by a revolutionary ideological discourse often grounded in variations of Marxist-Leninism and/or Maoism, in combination with the influence of the Libyan gospel of the Gadaffi's Green Book. Taking their cues from contemporary Asian anti-colonial insurgencies, as well as Mao's successful revolution in China, these armed groups drew upon the emerging doctrine of guerrilla warfare. Among the nationalist groups, outright victory against the better-equipped colonial armies was unlikely, but sustaining guerrilla violence against the colonial state and its infrastructure was seen as a victory in itself. Unlike their predecessors, these armed guerrillas were able to take advantage of external supporters, both within neighbouring states and from the Soviet bloc. For the most part, these armed liberation groups fought protracted guerrilla wars – either in urban areas (e.g. Algeria) or more often in the rural countryside.

Yet, it may be wise to question the extent to which armed insurgents were actually driven by ideological commitments, or whether ideology provided a convenient rhetorical cover.

During the Cold War, it seemed that many armed groups espoused certain ideological commitments in large part to secure financial and military aid from like-minded forces. The rapidity with which many of these leaders dropped their ideological trappings at the end of the Cold War suggests the shallowness with which they embraced their causes in the first place. Ghana's Marxist-Leninist Jerry Rawlings and Angola's democrat Jonas Savimbi are two good cases in point.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, ideology as understood by Western political science has rarely been a motivation for Africa's armed guerrillas. As William Reno (2007) notes, today's armed guerrillas no longer brand themselves with words like revolutionary or resistance. Instead, groups adopt contemporary-sounding generic labels typical of development and human rights NGOs. As such, formal political ideas across a left-right dimension seem to be less relevant in Africa's armed struggles than other political motivations. The capacity of African guerrillas to adapt to changes in the global environment is illustrated by the ease with which they were able to change from the pattern of alliance during the Cold War to the global connections of business and crime in the globalised post-Cold War.

The crisis of the postcolonial state

One of the most important changes in the context of African guerrilla movements has been the current and on-going crisis of the African state. In recent years, the African state has entered an era of crisis – if not outright collapse in several places (e.g. Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia) – caused by multiple forces, such as the shrinking of the central government under structural adjustment programs and the increased marginalisation of Africa in the world economy. As a result, the Westphalian sovereign state model, inherited from colonialism and modified according to the needs of African ruling elites, is increasingly in severe crisis across the continent, though the manifestations of that crisis are varied and geographically uneven. Yet, the crisis of the state has resulted in something of a paradox. On the one hand, many African states are presented both as *failed* and *choiceless* (Mkandawire 1999; Herbst 2000). At the same time, control over the state is still much sought after and valued, as the experience from war in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire suggests. It may be that from the vantage point of Global Political Economy and International Relations theory that this state is *choiceless*, but from the perspective of its inhabitants this institution is still the main medium to negotiate order and social organisation. It is precisely this negotiation that creates the spoils of the state and decides upon its extraction and redistribution.

How should we then approach this state? Obviously we cannot assume some sort of sameness among African states. Like states elsewhere, African states are both unique in their contextualisations and embeddedness and part of much larger trajectories of state formations. We believe that Jean-Francois Médard's (1991; 1996) interpretation of neopatrimonialism allows us to further explore some of these underlying assumptions. In our understanding, neopatrimonialism should be considered a mixed type of rule combining to various degrees differentiation and lack of separation between public and private spheres. From a structural point of view such a state is differentiated, but from a functional perspective it is only weakly so. In short, bureaucratic and patrimonial norms co-exist in neopatrimonial states. This is a general characteristic of modern life, and we will find traces of it in all states. However, in the attempts to redress the colonial legacy of racially inherited privilege, the newly independent states of Africa may have created a special patrimonial path of redistribution, which divided the indigenous population along regional, religious, ethnic and sometimes even at family lines (see Mamdani 1996).

The success of African neopatrimonial states therefore relies on the ability of political elites to fulfil the expected vertical redistribution of resources through the patron–client relationship. What has happened in many African neopatrimonial states is a failure to deliver on the promises of the patronage system. Specifically, the capacity of ruling elites to maintain the vertical distribution of resources and reciprocity that the patron–client relationship relies upon has been undermined. As a result, there emerges both a crisis of legitimacy for the ruling elites and the perceived bankruptcy of the established state system. The first result is important for it establishes a target for the resentment and frustration felt in certain sectors of domestic society – that is, the legitimacy of existing leaders is undermined and their position of power becomes increasingly challenged. While this is often the traditional trajectory in the emergence of armed insurgents against the ruling elite, what has become significant in recent years is less the perceived illegitimacy of specific ruling elites, but the perceived bankruptcy of the state model itself.

Our point is simply that the state may no longer be seen as the primary objective of the insurgency. In the past armed struggles were aimed at seizing the reins of power – understood as control of the central government. However, with the crisis of certain African states, control of the state may no longer be the end game. Such cases would be an extreme version of Clapham's (1998) *warlord* category. The goal may not be to change state leadership, but to carve out and maintain a personal territorial fiefdom. Some movements with a strong enclave mentality (see Richards 2005) such as LRA, RUF or the Mai Mai of Eastern Congo may be placed in this category. However, the developments that have bounded these movements to specific localised territories may often be the result of the struggle rather than a deliberate strategy to carve out such a fiefdom in the first place.

The end of the Cold War and the new War on Terror

The end of the Cold War impacted more than just the ideologically encoded geopolitical landscape African guerrilla groups operated within. Perhaps more importantly than the perceived irrelevance of Leftist ideologies, the fall of the Soviet bloc meant the end of external backing for numerous African guerrillas. During the Cold War, many African armed groups benefited from direct and indirect support from either side of the Cold War. Such external support virtually vanished overnight, dramatically impacting several armed groups. For example, the evaporation of the Soviet threat in Africa meant that the United States no longer found it necessary to fund groups like Savimbi's *União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA) in Angola or the *Resistëncia Nacional Mocambicana* (RENAMO) in Mozambique. In both cases, these groups had to find other sources of funding, or seek a negotiated accommodation with the central government.

The collapse of the Soviet bloc also had some indirect and unforeseen effects on the African guerrilla movements. Most notable, the end of the Cold War meant that the international small arms market burgeoned, with cheap weaponry becoming readily available (Muggah 2002). There is little doubt that groups such as RUF in Sierra Leone, the various Liberian factions, and insurgency groups in eastern Congo, who came to control mineral-rich areas, used these minerals to tap into new international markets of guns and weaponry that appeared. Beyond accessing cheap weaponry, armed groups have also been able to take advantage of new advances in communication technology, most notably mobile phones and the internet. The increasing ubiquity of cell phones and satellite phones on the African continent has increased the ability of African guerrillas to communicate amongst themselves, on the battlefield, and to the international community. For a few groups, the internet has offered them another tool by which to communicate to the outside world. Websites are created, often by external supporters in

Europe or the U.S., in order to champion the cause of the rebel group, circulate their discourses and agendas more broadly, network with external supporters, and raise funds. For some movements, these communicative technologies have increased their ability to articulate a narrative of their struggle, challenging the central government's authoritative voice.

While it is still too early to make any definitive claims on how the American-declared War on Terror has impacted African guerrilla conflicts, we think it is important to recognise the powerful sway the U.S.-driven War on Terror now exercises over global politics. As such, the War on Terror has become a new frame by which policy-makers and scholars engage with contemporary African guerrilla movements. One of the most pronounced ways in which Africa has figured into the War on Terror is the U.S. and European Union's increased concern about failed states as breeding grounds for international terrorism. Yet, we believe this perception is built on a flawed understanding of state recession (see Dunn 2001; Bøås and Jennings 2005; 2007).

Before 11 September 2001, American and Western European security discussions paid little systemic attention to so-called failed or collapsing states. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, it seemed that Western powers had little interest addressing this phenomenon in Africa or elsewhere. Yet, the fact that al-Qaeda planned the attacks on New York and Washington from the safe haven of Afghanistan, considered to be a failed state, pushed the problem to the top of the security agenda in Western capitals, as evidenced by the declarations of the U.S. National Security Strategy (White House 2002) and European Security Strategy reports (European Union 2003) that failed states are one of the key threats confronting the U.S. and European Union, respectively. It is evident from these documents that concerns about state failure are essentially self-referential: failed states only matter insofar as they affect our security.

It is within this understanding of the world that much ado has been made about increasing global Islamic terrorism in Africa and the assumed connections between such groups in Africa. Particularly mentioned in this regard are al-Shabaab, AQIM and Boko Haram, and while it is true that all these three movements to different degrees have given vocal support to al-Qaeda, we believe that it is still of uttermost importance to recognise these groups first and foremost as representatives of local struggles. There is a very significant difference between branding as a survival strategy and actually becoming an operative branch of al-Qaeda. Branding as an insurgent strategy has local purposes, and depicts an image of the insurgency as much more powerful and omnipotent in a local context than what actually is the case. It is worthwhile to keep in mind that AQIM originated from Algeria, and in essence is a group of people who for all practical purposes had lost the civil war in that country. They turned to the region (e.g. Maghreb) and the global level (e.g. al-Qaeda) in order to survive, and not because they were powerful. Branding is therefore in this sense very much a weapon of the weak. With regard to the supposed connections between these groups, the issue of Boko Haram should make one wonder why such connections even are established.

Categorise this – Boko Haram[2]

There is a long tradition of Islamic radicalism in northern Nigeria, but organised armed struggle against the state is new. It first appeared around 2002, and the Christmas Day 2011 and 20 January 2012 Kano bombing attacks suggest that this struggle has entered a new phase. What we therefore, in brief, will attempt to do here is to put Boko Haram into context and lay out the evolutionary process from the first so-called Taleban groups that emerged in northern Nigeria at the turn of the millennium to the latter two distinct phases of Boko Haram. The first phase ended in 2009 with the capture and extra-judicial killing of Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf. The current

phase (which we may call Boko Haram II) started with a well-planned attack on the Maiduguri prison in September 2010 that freed hundreds of prisoners and has so far culminated in the multiple bomb attacks, on Christmas Day 2011 against churches and Christian worshippers, and the 20 January 2012 bomb attacks on police stations and other government buildings in Kano.

The Boko Haram that has re-emerged from the ashes of the death of its original leader is better organised than its predecessors, but also more of an avant-garde organisation than the original Taleban groups and Yusuf's Boko Haram. Whereas the Taleban groups and the original Boko Haram focused on a combination of preaching, recruitment and violent resistance against the state, the strategy of Boko Haram II is the spectacular drama of hyper-violence. The aim is to create a situation where its high-profile attacks provoke a combination of repression against Muslims and reprisal attacks against Muslims from the Christian population at large. The motivating belief for this approach is that as religious violence brings the Nigerian state to the very brink of anarchy, Boko Haram will emerge as the leader of the Muslim masses.

Boko Haram II is clearly dangerous, but an even greater cause for concern is the emerging rumours of collusion between Boko Haram and various so-called Big Men in politics and the state apparatus. This is not evidence of key players embracing Boko Haram's ideology, but rather yet another sign of the extreme measures that some among the Nigerian elite are willing to use to gain power, position and wealth. This argument suggest that the re-emergence of Boko Haram is connected to one of the main fault lines in Nigerian politics – the north-south divide – and the bitter conflict over positions, power and money that this cleavage creates. This is not in essence a religious conflict, as it evolves around everything from access to land and political positions to the distribution of oil revenues. However, it exists also within state institutions (the police and the military included) and within political parties, including President Goodluck Jonathan's own party, the People's Democratic Party (PDP). In fact, Jonathan himself has warned against the presence of Boko Haram supporters in his government and the country's security agencies. The question is what these Big Men stand to gain from assisting Boko Haram. Nigeria is, however, a country where Big Men have long tried to manipulate violent discontent for their own selfish purposes. This happened during the struggles in the Niger Delta, and it cannot be ruled out that certain individuals and groups who felt that they lost a power struggle when Jonathan became the PDP flag bearer have an interest in undermining the legitimacy of his presidency to make certain that he will not be allowed by the party to seek a second term. Thus, Boko Haram's spectacular comeback could be entirely home grown.

The opposing argument places Boko Haram in a regional context, insisting that a network must be in place that facilitates the flow of finance, arms and training between Boko Haram, al-Shabaab of Somalia and AQIM. This cannot be completely ruled out, but certain critical questions should be asked in this regard. Firstly, there is little credible evidence that AQIM has managed to move so far south of the Sahara. Secondly, there are indeed rumours about Boko Haram activists travelling to al-Shabaab camps in Somalia to learn how to make bombs and other terrorist tactics, and some may have actually made this long and difficult journey. However, why travel across the continent to learn these things when there are plenty of former combatants in the Niger Delta who are increasingly disillusioned by the amnesty and rehabilitation packages they have received and consequently may have few scruples about whom they share their expertise with as long as they get paid, even if they may have no appetite for Boko Haram's ideology?

Thus, what may be the defining features of emergent forms of insurgencies on the African continent such as Boko Haram is their very ambiguity. They clearly do not belong to any of the four categories, even if they may contain elements of all of them: in the case of Boko Haram there are elements of a Northern Nigerian liberation and/or separatist agenda, its critique of the

Nigerian state is also concerned with some sort of reform of the state, and parts of its modus of operation has warlordism style attached to it. However, as we have also tried to show, it is way too easy to sum this up as international Islamic terrorism. It is still first and foremost local and situated in-between the state, being inside and outside of the Nigerian state at the same time. To a certain degree this is unknown analytical territory, but it is these ambiguities that we need to start unpacking and in this process we may also have to deconstruct part of the Clapham framework in order to come up with new conceptualisations that capture also the emergent forms of insurgency organisation in Africa.

Conclusion

African guerrilla movements have always been both the creation of and a response to political realities and their institutional manifestations. What this entails is that traditional approaches to understanding African insurgents are increasingly unable to provide adequate guides or explanations. For example, traditional guerrilla theory as articulated by Mao and Cuban revolutionary theorists does not seem to have very much to offer when it comes to throwing light on the origins, worldviews and narratives of insurgencies such as the RUF of Sierra Leone, the LRA of Uganda, the Mai Mai of eastern Congo, or Boko Haram, AQIM and al-Shabaab. Far from behaving like classic African insurgencies such as the Ethiopian and Eritrean ones, these seem more to be manifestations of rage against the patrimonial machinery of dysfunctional states: a largely youth rebellion organised in social movements with a cultic element. At their root, contemporary African armed rebels seem to be struggling to provide political opportunities as well as basic survival strategies for those navigating the continuing crises of modernity.

The economic agendas literature (i.e. Berdal and Malone 2000; Collier 2000) may be useful in explaining how armed movement are sustained, but it does not tell us much about why conflicts start in the first place. To understand this transformation, we need to take into consideration political, cultural and historical factors as well. All current conflicts in African are deeply entrenched in history. The past and the present are connected in Africa as elsewhere, and the only way we can hope to understand this is to consider how current conflicts are an integral part of the total history of the area in question. Due to the privileged position of the state, both in theory and practice, examining who controls it and for what purpose is one obvious place to start our investigations. However, we need to keep in mind that almost all conflicts are local in character, and that not only material aspects matter, but also questions concerning belonging and identity. African wars are brutal, and the consequences in terms of human suffering are immense, but they are not incomprehensible. It is only our approaches that all too often make us avoid seeing the obvious: people take up arms because they are angry, scared, and see no other solutions or opportunities. We do not in any way attempt to justify the killings and abuses carried out by these movements, but we still make the argument that we need to understand.

Notes

1 Parts of this chapter draw on Morten Bøås and Kevin C. Dunn (2007) 'African Guerrilla Politics: Raging Against the Machine?', M. Bøås and K. C. Dunn (eds) *African Guerrillas: Raging Against the Machine*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers: pp.9–37.

2 This section draws on Morten Bøås (2012) *Violent Islamic Uprising in Northern Nigeria: From the 'Taleban' to Boko Haram II*, Oslo: Norwegian Centre for Peacebuilding.

9

RESOURCES AND CONFLICT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Jessica Piombo[1]

An abundance of natural resources should help countries to become economically prosperous. Yet across Africa, instead of leading to prosperity, abundant natural resources have often led to exploitation, expropriation, competition and conflict. The relationships are complex and operate at multiple levels from international to local. Africa's natural resources have been exploited by outsiders for centuries through the slave trade, the mercantilism of the colonial system, the expropriation by international business in the post-independence global "free trade" era, and the current scramble for Africa's resources by China, India and other new actors. At the state/national level, rulers have used resources to finance corrupt patrimonial regimes and have shaped their governing institutions to better control resource-rich regions rather than to extend governance across the entire territory. At the sub-national level, rebellions have been financed by access to trade in lucrative resources like diamonds and timber. Easily accessible resources have helped to extend wars, have changed the motivations of conflict from grievance to greed, have fueled regional wars (particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo), and have inhibited the resolution of conflicts (notable in Sudan and South Sudan where oil deposits straddle the borders between the two countries). Finally at the local level, communities have clashed over access to grazing land and water, and, in areas like the Niger Delta, local struggles against environmental degradation have evolved into regional struggles against the national government.

Yet these dynamics are not universal. Most countries in Africa have vast resource endowments – whether those take the form of mineral resources (including petroleum, diamonds, and mineral ores), agricultural resources (timber and other renewable resources), human resources (labor) or environmental resources like water. The countries that have experienced conflict related to their resources are outnumbered by those that have not. In some circumstances, the lack of conflict can be tied to the development of functioning state institutions and good leadership, as in Botswana, leading to positive developmental outcomes financed by resource revenues. In others, resource revenues enabled leaders to co-opt or coerce opposition and to create an authoritarian peace, as in the petro-states of central/western Africa. These different examples show that just as resources have been tied to conflict, they have also helped to produce peaceful outcomes, again through variable mechanisms.

This chapter will first review Africa's history of resources and conflict, and then review how abundant natural resources have altered the course of state building. The chapter will show that access to lootable resources has helped to create regimes that are even more personalized and

fragile than the "traditional" African state. Africa has had a different experience with state building than experienced in Europe and North America, and in certain countries, access to resources – whether those of the international community or those naturally occurring – led to further adaptations beyond the standard "late developer" form of state building. Here, the chapter will focus on the type of weakened and inverted state that access to natural resources helped to create in many African countries. The form of state building that many resource-rich countries have experienced is directly tied to the types of conflict that they experience, and this section reviews those dynamics. Finally, the chapter will conclude by focusing on conflict dynamics in two classes of resource-rich countries: petro-states and those with easily lootable commodities, such as diamonds. In the conclusion, the chapter highlights several sets of conflict dynamics related to resources that emerged from the preceding discussions: (1) the type of resource and its tendency to be associated with various types of conflict; (2) the impact of lootable resources on war duration; and (3) the ways that once appropriated, access to lootable resource revenues can alter the logic of the conflict, particularly the motivations of the parties waging war.

By "conflict" I refer to significant state and sub-state armed and violent disputes. These may take the form of regional separatism, challenges to the state or central governments, low-intensity conflict, civil war, and inter-state war. For the most part, this chapter will not discuss extremely localized small-scale conflicts that occur primarily at the village level, where communities come into conflict over access to natural resources like water, grazing rights, and agricultural land. When referring to resources, this chapter primarily focuses on non-renewable, mineral resources (oil, diamonds, copper, etc), with secondary focus on renewable agricultural resources like timber plantations. It will discuss environmental degradation as a byproduct of mineral extraction, but otherwise not focus on environmental resource conflicts such as those stemming from conflicts over international waterways (particularly the Nile), deforestation or illegal and unregulated fishing.[2]

Africa's troubled relationship with abundant natural resources

Africa has suffered various forms of the "resource curse" over time.[3] Between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, the continent's human resources condemned whole regions to exploitation for labor as the international slave trade captured, enslaved and sent millions of Africans to the New World. In the nineteenth century, natural resource exploitation by imperial powers led to the creation of colonial regimes designed to facilitate the expropriation of raw goods, rather than the development of internally dynamic systems that benefited residents in the colonial territories. Post-independence regimes have struggled with overcoming these legacies since the 1960s.

In the most recent manifestation of the resource curse, rapacious governments rely on the rents from exportable natural resources such as petroleum, minerals, and diamonds to provide easy access to revenue without taxation. Over-reliance on resources from these sectors creates ripple effects as the economy contracts and insulates the governments from being forced to develop accountable systems of good governance. In the most extreme cases, manifesting particularly in the "warlord" states of West Africa, some regimes have chosen to exert influence only over the geographic locations where resources can be found, intentionally restricting the scope of governance (Forrest 1998; Reno 1997).

Relating specifically to violent conflict, resources fundamentally affect the initiation, duration and cessation of conflict. While it is often thought that competition over resources initiates wars (Klare 2002), in most resource-affected African conflicts there has been a mix of greed and grievance in war initiation. Few conflicts have started over resources like diamonds, gold or timber; the more common form of resource that is fought over is access to environmental

resources like water, pastureland, and agricultural land. Many of the local-level conflicts that exist throughout Africa involve small-scale community disputes over land rights, grazing rights, mixed-use and access to land by agriculturalists and pastoralists, and small-scale conflicts over access to water. These rarely evolve into regional or national conflicts unless, as has happened in Darfur, national-level political groupings manipulate the local issues to become another outlet of their national competition. Environmental scarcity may factor into other conflicts, but rarely causes national conflict in, and of, itself. As a case in point, pressure to redistribute land from land-owning Tutsis to landless peasant Hutus was a contributing, though not primarily causal, factor in the Rwandan genocide. The national-level conflict between the Tutsi and Hutu was clearly the overriding factor in the genocide, but in the course of the genocide Tutsi lands were appropriated and redistributed. As one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, Rwanda had been facing environmental and food scarcity stressors, and that this provided added impetus to the larger order political and ethnic tensions (Percival and Homer-Dixon 1996; Uvin 1996).

What is much more common is how, once conflict begins for political reasons or over access to environmental resources, the presence of lootable resources then often changes the logic of the conflict. Hence, the most common conflict dynamic is that civil wars tend to become extended by the availability of resources that can be traded for arms, and civilians forced into indentured labor to extract these resources. Once combatants realize that they can profit from the sale of lucrative resources, the motivation for conflict can easily shift from grievance to greed. In this process, the basic logic of the conflict evolves, and often the conflict itself can last longer than if the resources were not present. This has allowed conflicts to extend long beyond the stage where they are supported by local communities.

Another pattern of conflict is for competition for resources to spawn secessionist movements, as areas with resource concentrations, like the copperbelt in southern Zambia, attempt to secede and control the resource themselves. This primarily happens with geographically concentrated resources that do not require heavy capital investment to extract, however. In other situations, particularly with the petroleum exporters, the nature of the industry makes it necessary to control the government in order to exploit it. In these countries, therefore, conflicts over resources often focus on state capture rather than secession. Angola has been particularly hard hit and experienced both of these; its thirty-year civil war was fueled by conflict between a ruling regime that financed itself through oil extraction (thus exhibiting the characteristic interest in maintaining control over the central state), and a regionally focused rebellion that at times seemed more concerned with controlling the northeastern diamond-producing region than with fighting for control over the entire territory. Regardless of the precise dynamics at work, across most countries, the resources that could have served as engines of growth have instead condemned many ordinary Africans to lives of exploitation and expropriation.

Regarding the type of resource and its relationship to conflict, Michael Klare (2002) focuses attention on whether the mode of extraction is capital-intensive (which he calls industrialized extraction) or labor-intensive. Labor-intensive resources are more easily captured and controlled by would-be rebels, and therefore are more often used to fuel wars than capital-intensive resources. Alluvial diamonds, those found in river beds, for example, feed conflicts more easily than diamonds found within mines. Resources that are capital-intensive are not easily controlled by sub-state groups, who may not be able to access the resource or if they capture the machinery to extract the resource, may not know how to operate it. The difference is easily captured when considering alluvial diamonds versus mined diamonds. Alluvial diamonds, like those in Sierra Leone and Angola, are easily extracted using cheap, unskilled labor. Groups that come to rely on such resources to finance the war effort focus on controlling the territory where the resource is found, but they do not necessarily need to keep positive relations with the population in the

area. When workers do not require skills to extract a resource, they are easily replaceable and considered expendable. Groups that finance their efforts through access to lootable, labor-intensive resources tend to coerce locals to work in the industry, coercing cooperation through intimidation and violence. Skilled workers in capital-intensive extractive industries are not so easy to replace, and therefore treated better.

By contrast, capital-intensive resources tend to be controlled by governments rather than rebels, and are less subject to capture. This is because these sites tend to be more heavily protected by the companies that have invested in them, and if they are overtaken by rebel groups, the groups often do not know how to run the machinery. Conflicts over capital-intensive resources tend therefore to focus on state capture, and control of the resource through control of the state. The rents that accrue to the owners of capital-intensive resources help them to finance militaries, which then further protect the regimes against rebellion. The MPLA in Angola is an example here, where the offshore and capital-intensive oil industry enabled the ruling party to wage war against the rebel UNITA for three decades.

There are second-order, indirect effects of resources on conflict, or more accurately, the potential for countries to experience conflict. These have to do with the effect of resource reliance on a country's economy and national politics. In many instances, countries with a few lucrative commodities have relied on primary commodity export and failed to move up the value added chain to manufactured products. As their national economies contracted around the export of one or two key items (oil, copper, timber, etc), they became extremely vulnerable to cycles in the product market. If the commodity was lucrative enough, the whole export economy contracted around it, such as occurred with Zambia around the copper market. Revenue from the commodity often stifled economic diversification, so that control of the resource became both economically and politically critical. Once this happened, the whole country would become vulnerable to booms and busts in the product market, while increasing the potential for violence over political power. In these countries, competition to control productive resources often led to instability and violent conflict.

Other countries with abundant natural resources found themselves suffering from the effects of resource extraction, particularly when the processes resulted in environmental degradation. Oil extraction, damming rivers, cutting down forests and overfishing, to give a few examples, often left local communities with compromised lifestyles and polluted environments, making it difficult to live in their traditional areas. This often could escalate into social mobilization against the industry, the government and eventually to violent confrontation with the state if local demands were not met – an evolution experienced in the Niger Delta in Nigeria since the late 1980s.

Still other violent conflicts may begin for political reasons and over time evolve into competition over resources, such as occurred in Sierra Leone in the 1990s and Angola over the course of the thirty-year civil war there. Access to extractive resources can extend fighting when other sources of revenue dry up, witnessed by the fact that the Angolan war lasted ten years past the end of the Mozambican civil war (2002 versus 1992). The combatants in Angola financed operations by access to oil and diamonds, while those in Mozambique relied on international support; when the Cold War ended and the patronage dried up, the Mozambicans were compelled to end fighting while the Angolans were able to carry on. In the DRC, a key evolution from the first to the second Congolese wars occurred when the country's regional neighbors realized that with intervention, they could extract gold and other resources from eastern Congo. This helps to explain, in part, the involvement of Rwanda and Zimbabwe in the second round of fighting after 2000. In Darfur, Sudan, the early phases of conflict (before 2004) were driven by both national-level maneuvers between the north and the south, and by conflict between

local communities over access to land. After 2004, with the independence of the southern region becoming more likely, the northern regime became interested in gaining control over Darfur in order to retain at least some oil fields. Most of the country's oil locations would fall within the territory of the new country, South Sudan, after independence in July 2011. No one would claim that any of these conflicts were solely about resource extraction, but there are undeniably strong influences that come from the resource dimension to these wars.

There are multiple processes at work that relate the presence of abundant natural resources to forms of conflict in Africa, and these relationships are more complex than the simple greed versus grievance arguments advanced by Paul Collier and others. The relationships between resources and conflict in Africa do show that most wars are economic at some level – people do have to see some perceived benefit to engage – but that resources rarely start wars on their own. Instead, state fragility is a key aspect in how resources affect conflict (Hutchful and Aning 2004).

Natural resources and inverted state building

In the standard accounts of state building in Africa, analysts argue that African states have been unable to extend control over their territories because they inherited systems that were skewed towards extraction: capital cities were located close to the coasts, while populations tended to reside farther inland, and transport infrastructure was designed to link sites of resource extraction to points of export, rather than facilitating movement within the country. These dynamics created governments physically distant from most of the governed, and a situation in which it was difficult to move around a country's territory. Governments relied either on resource extraction or on foreign assistance for their revenue, further attenuating the links between those in power and those not. As a result, newly independent regimes were unable to expand control and extend the state apparatus into the rural hinterlands of their countries, resulting in an "uncaptured peasantry" that lived largely outside the reach of the modern state. The nature of the political system created an urban bias that was further skewed towards those included within a clientelistic system: most rural dwellers remained outside the patron–client relationships that decided who received benefits from the state and who did not. Politics often reflected tensions between state elites who wished to extend their control and the peasants determined to preserve their autonomy (Hyden 1980; Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Herbst 2000).

Authors who have studied economic influences on state building, and particularly those who have examined natural resources and state building, see other dynamics at work. Unlike the classic theorists who describe a would-be nationalist elite that was unable to incorporate the entire territory into the ambit of state control, others argue that in some areas, state elites have *chosen* not to seek to control the entire territory of a country. Instead, the politically powerful focused their energies on gaining access to and control over commercial networks and the geographic areas where natural resources are located (Reno 1997). As part of this process, elites in these resource-rich countries intentionally subverted the development of strong, independent and capable bureaucratic institutions, because they threatened the use of state resources to finance the personalized networks that are critical to the survival of these rulers. In these accounts, state weakness was not accidental but intentional: emerging as the byproduct of the adaptive strategies of African leaders who attempted to build political systems that supported the maintenance of power.

In the oil economies, these processes were made easier by the location of oil deposits and the nature of the oil industry. Most clearly manifested in West Africa, the offshore location and capital-intensive nature of the extraction technology limited the degree to which rulers needed to control territory and populations in order to maintain control of and exploit the resource.

Unlike diamond or timber resources, which require control over specific areas within the country and some mobilization of labor to extract the resource, rulers in the West African petro-states focused on maintaining control over central governments, because that granted control of the oil contracts. In Angola, this meant that the ruling People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) historically focused on retaining control over the capital city of Luanda and the Cabinda territory, the area adjacent to the most productive offshore oil fields.[4] In Nigeria, competition centered on obtaining or maintaining control over the seat of national power (first Lagos, then Abuja), and allowing state institutions that should have integrated this vast country to wither. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, in contrast, with diamonds and timber as the main lootable resource, rival politicians competed for control of geographically distributed sites where diamonds and timber were located (Reno 1997).

In non-oil, resource-rich countries, elites focused on locations within the country where resources were extracted. In these countries, the pattern tended more towards state inversion and piecemeal control of the country's territory. When William Reno analyzed the "warlord politics" of Liberia and Sierra Leone, he argued that state leaders cared only to exert physical control over the lucrative timber stands and diamond fields, leaving most of the rest of the countries outside of formal state control. In Sierra Leone, therefore, once political marginalization and exclusion escalated into civil war, the most intense fighting focused on the diamond-mining fields in the Kono region. In Angola, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) fought the ruling People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) for central control, but in the relative détente over several decades created a regional regime in the eastern diamond fields (Hodges 2004). In these contexts states develop not as forces that integrate the territory into a national country, but as vehicles to resource control, extraction and profit.

In other countries, the regions where resources were concentrated witnessed the rise of separatist movements. In the copperbelt region of Zambia, for example, the Katangan separatist movement launched a full-scale rebellion in 1961. Since the early 2000s, the DRC has experienced waves of regional warlords who resist central control, and these are based in the eastern Ituri region where diamonds and gold are mined. Since the mid-2000s, Angola has faced separatism in the Cabinda province, the territory that sits adjacent to most of the offshore oil fields. This was not Angola's first experience with regional separatism: from the 1980s to the end of the war in 2002, UNITA had been as much focused on maintaining control over the eastern diamond region as it was on battling the MPLA for central control. In these and other cases, sub-national groups in areas with concentrated resources have sought to secede from the country and control the resource – and its revenue – themselves.

Unlike the traditional accounts of state building, where elites were unable to extend the state's control, adding an explicit attention to the influence of resources points to another set of dynamics, one in which state elites do not want to extend control. Instead, elites seek to control regional commercial networks, and the territories or resources needed to fuel those networks, rather than to create a traditional Weberian state. Elites do not seek to create a sense of nationalism, because if such a thing surfaced, individuals and those outside the ambit of governance may then demand the rights of citizenship, and attempt to force the government to alter its logic. The urban bias described by Goran Hyden (1980) and others may not be just a colonial leftover, but an intentional tool that helps to keep the country divided, and therefore more ripe for exploitation. Taxation is not necessary as long as foreign aid and natural resource exploitation provide sustenance, further reducing the imperative to create a comprehensive, capable administrative apparatus for the government.

The final result is state inversion, as Forrest (1998) labeled it, where access to resources (either natural or foreign aid) enables elites to create ultra-privatized states that fail to fulfill the traditional

sovereign functions of the nation-state. Rulers intentionally created these states, choosing to opt out of the traditional state. In the most extreme cases in West Africa, exemplified in Liberia and Sierra Leone during their civil wars, commercial networks supplanted state institutions as rulers hired foreign firms and mercenaries to perform services formerly the purview of state bureaucracies (Reno 1997). The political unit is fundamentally different than the nation-state that outsiders expect to see, and often, because it is exclusive and network-based, tends to ignite subnational and anti-state challenges more readily than states built on more encompassing criteria.

Because the blurring of public and private is even more extreme than in a classic neo-patrimonial state, in the resource-rich states where these dynamics surface, it becomes even more difficult to distinguish between state and non-state actors. War, when it breaks out, tends to be for personal gain, and ends up further withering the state rather than strengthening it. Rulers do not increase the tax base and create a sense of nationalism to wage war, they rely on their personal networks, financed by alliances with domestic and international capital, to maintain control over commercial assets. The primary actors, in these cases, are state actors that do not seek to integrate across the territory, sub-state groups that seek control over productive areas, and transnational corporations that are willing to deal with sub-state actors.

Lootable resources, state building, and conflict: examining the Democratic Republic of Congo

The historian Georges Nzongola-Natalaja (2002) labeled the second Congo war a war of "partition and pillage". It was a war of partition because during this second phase of conflict, Congo was divided into three sections. Joseph Kabila and the ADFL controlled Kinshasa and the south, waging war based off of the revenue gained from oil, diamonds, cobalt and other minerals. Jean Pierre Bemba and the MLC controlled the North and Equateur province, separated by rivers, ethnic groupings, and a decrepit transportation infrastructure that made it difficult for the ADFL to penetrate the region. Finally the RCD, financed by Rwanda, controlled the East, Central and the two Kivu provinces. Rwanda had initially supported and trained the ADFL in a move to help curb cross-border attacks by the exiled Rwandan genocidal regime in 1996–1997; by 2000, Rwanda intervened more to gain access to the diamonds and gold in the eastern region.

The patterns of conflict in Congo had been lain a century before "Africa's Great War", as the second Congo war has been called, because the Belgian colonial strategy centered on Katanga and the extraction of copper and other mineral resources. The colony was run through a trinity of the state, companies and the church. The colonial state provided uniform administrative structures but no national consciousness or political culture. International companies engaged in monopolistic capitalism and separated the country into agricultural and mining areas, engineering population transfers both within Congo and to Congo from neighboring countries, creating a distinct patchwork of ethnic groups with strong regional divisions. Finally, the church actively sought converts and undermined the traditional social and authority structures. Together, the three created a class structure superimposed over an ethnic mosaic, and an imperial bourgeoisie to act as intermediaries. When political organizations developed, they were regional rather than national in nature (Turner 2007). All of these were designed to facilitate resource extraction and reduce the potential for national rebellion against the colonial and mercantile interests.

Colonialism ended rapidly and without preparation in the 1950s. This process undermined state institutions and facilitated the creation of a rapacious personalized state as post-independence leaders continued the colonial patterns. In the early years, they used patronage to keep ethnic and regional imbalances under control, creating an institutionalized system of systematic pillage based on regional warlords that earned the label "kleptocracy". In this system, pillage became a

way of life, as a local class of regional "resource barons" became the real political powers beneath the façade of the official state. Laurent Kabila, who later led the ADFL to overthrow Mobutu, was one of these warlords in the northeastern region. At the individual level, ordinary Congolese traded in minerals to sustain their families. This laid the foundation for the regionalism and warlordism that became characteristic after 2000.

In this process of creating a tiered system of personal rule, the elite class intentionally hollowed out formal state institutions, replacing them with a political system that reshaped the formal institutions to promote personal control and resource extraction. They created a system parallel to the formal state which erected a tiered regime of trickle-down patrimonalism, fueled by access to rents from mineral resources. Each patron looked after a set of clients, who each had a further set of clients, and so on. In this fashion, they created a regionally specific political system, based on resource extraction and control. At the same time, the regions developed separatist leanings.

This entire system began to unravel towards the end of the Mobutu era as the end of the Cold War and the forced economic and political liberalization of the early-1990s began to take effect (Clark 2004; Turner 2007). Without access to foreign aid, and with extractive resources proving to be an unstable source of finance, the centralized patronage network faltered. By the early 1990s, Mobutu could no longer pay his army, so he regionalized the military and instructed them to generate their own revenue from their respective areas. This up-ended the trickle-down aspect of the resource distribution, so that the regional power holders had no reason to submit to central rule any longer. Thus the foundation for the 1996 rebellion was laid. Once the Rwandese began to train and equip the nascent ADFL to stop the Interahamwe and ex-Rwandan government from launching attacks from the forests of Ituri into Rwanda, the process took on a life of its own.

Within months, Laurent Kabila had overtaken the capital in Kinshasa, and began to set up his own kleptocratic system in early 1997. Four years later, Kabila was assassinated by a bodyguard, and a new era of conflict began, the second Congo War. This time around, the war regionalized, as various neighbors intervened to help both the government (ADFL, now under Joseph Kabila) and the rebels, who once again came out of the eastern regional networks. Angola and Zimbabwe intervened on behalf of the embattled regime: Angola intervened to prevent cross-border incursions and (at the time) to prevent UNITA from accessing Congo's territory, and in turn Kabila paid oil shares to Angolan elites. The Angolan forces, therefore, operated to protect the lucrative oil fields as much as to support Kabila's regime (Turner 2004). Zimbabwe was paid through shares in Congo's mineral sectors in the southeast and access to timber exports; this was important at a time when the Zimbabwean regime was struggling to survive (Rupiya 2004). Rwanda and Uganda both intervened to assist different rebel groups, and both specifically engaged to gain access to agricultural products, minerals, forest products, livestock and cash. Exemplifying the resource logic to the Rwandese intervention, when the Rwandan Patriotic Army entered the DRC during the second war, first they deployed to eastern Congo, then to mineral locations farther west (Kisangani and Orientale), and finally they airlifted right to Kinshasa, well before any of the local forces were ready for Kabila to actually be overturned (Turner 2007).

Turner (2007) has argued that there is a rationalism that underlies the war and the pillage. He sees it as a response to weakened, unsustainable states which can no longer feed the patronage networks that had allowed them to maintain a façade of normalcy. In the context of the legacies of these weakened states, intentionally weakened as an adaptive response to abundant resources, individuals who engage in further resource predation (and war) are merely exhibiting rational responses in their pursuit of individual livelihoods. Collectively, however, the end result is war, because not all can share the resources. On their part, international companies paid a "war tax" to the ADFL, so that they could continue operations during the war.

Throughout all these phases, resources were integral to the war effort. The Mobutu and two successive Kabila governments used their access to oil and mineral resources to purchase assistance and loyalty. The granting of shares in state-owned concessions enabled Mobutu to stay in power for far longer than his popular legitimacy would have provided, while Kabila used resources to pay for the services of Angola and Zimbabwe. On their side, the various rebel groups directly bartered resources for materials – ammunition, weaponry, fuels and services. They further used the resources under their control to purchase assistance and loyalty, exemplified when the RCD and MCL paid foreign patrons in mining concessions. The Congolese rebels also stored wealth in resources (diamonds and gold, particularly), and transferred/transported wealth by trading in these commodities, and finally when necessary, they liquidated them for cash, whether directly selling them to international companies or exporting them through smuggling networks.

The effects of the resources both extended and regionalized the war in Congo, while affecting the geography of the conflict itself. Rebels first would secure areas where resources were located, and then they would launch attacks on the capital city. In the latter phase of the Congo war, the RCD and MCL focused energy on controlling their resource bases, once it became clear that they were unlikely to defeat the ADFL in Kinshasa. The types of foreign patrons that become influential are also determined by the resource dimension – international companies in particular gained critical importance in this conflict. Finally, the prevalent use of private military companies to secure the capital in Kinshasa and the productive areas in the outlying regions was made possible by access to resource rents. In these ways, resources fundamentally shaped the conflict.

Oil, politics, and conflict

In the oil-rich states a different set of conflict dynamics emerges. Unlike the Middle East, where for decades, autocratic regimes were able to maintain power through the strategic distribution of oil proceeds, there is no pattern of oil and autocratic peace in Africa. A few countries have been able to build stable authoritarian regimes through the use and manipulation of oil proceeds, such as those found in Gabon, Cameroon, Algeria, Egypt and Libya. However a significant number of the sub-Saharan oil exporters, including Nigeria, Angola, the Republic of Congo (also referred to as Congo-Brazzaville), and Sudan, have all experienced conflict related to oil. Competition over access to and control over oil resources fueled large-scale civil wars in Angola and the Republic of Congo, while secessionist or regionally focused conflicts arose in the Niger Delta and the Cabinda region of Angola. Sudan's second civil war (beginning in 1983) was fueled in part by the discovery of oil in the late 1970s, and ongoing tensions over the border between the north and south are tied to the location of oil fields. Sudan's oil deposits just happen to be located alongside, though mostly just south of, the border between the north and south.

The African oil sector historically has been located offshore, where oil is derived from capital-intensive drilling platforms located in places where local strife rarely affects production. This only increased in the 1990s as the technology of oil extraction enabled "ultra-deep water" wells to become profitable. In Angola, for example, in mid-2001, onshore oil concessions contributed just 2 percent of national production (Hodges 2004). In these countries, petroleum drilling forms an enclave economy: governments gain access to oil income with relatively low cost, focusing on capital-intensive extraction, with economic activity occurring in a location that is geographically separate, and therefore inaccessible to the local population. These countries tend to have higher levels of corruption than others in Africa, since it is relatively easy for governments to hide how much oil is being produced and how much income generated from the general population. In Western Africa, many of the new discoveries are also located offshore, while the oil deposits in East Africa that are expected to be brought into production in the coming decades

are located onshore. This is likely to affect the influence of the enclave economy and the protection from local contestation that offshore oil enjoys.

Africa's five largest exporters have historically been Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, Egypt and Angola; if considering just sub-Saharan producers, the largest exporters have been Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. In 2011, the top five producers of crude oil were, in descending order: Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, the Republic of Congo, and Equatorial Guinea (British Petroleum 2012: 8). The continent's petroleum sector activities are primarily upstream (i.e., they extract raw petroleum and export to other countries for refinement), and until the early 2000s a relatively small set of companies were involved in extraction (Norbrook 2010). Most African countries operate state-owned oil companies in addition to a host of local oil companies, and all license exploration and extraction rights to the foreign companies rather than granting outright ownership of oil locations. Examples are the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) and Sonangol in Angola.[5] Downstream activities (most commonly, refinery output and other value-added products) are relatively low compared to the volume of crude oil exports: in 2009, for example, sub-Saharan countries exported 227.1 million tons of crude petroleum, compared to just 5.6 million tons of product exports (British Petroleum 2010: 21). The major refineries that do exist (in 2012) are located in South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and Algeria.

Most of Africa's oil flows into the global market rather than serving domestic or regional customers, and this is the source of the first level of conflict around the oil resource. Crude exports flow in large part to the United States, Europe and China. In 2009, 78 percent of Africa's oil exports went to the United States, China, and Europe (British Petroleum 2010).[6] With this much of Africa's oil being exported beyond the continent and given the global rise in oil prices, Africa is beginning to face an energy crisis of its own. Even countries that produce vast amounts of oil can still experience fuel shortages and extremely high prices, a fact brought to international attention in January 2012 when Nigeria experienced widespread unrest and resistance to a decision by the national government to cut the country's fuel subsidy. Nigerians had already adapted to a situation in which the national power grid was extremely unreliable, and the increase in fuel prices threatened their livelihoods even further. Given that Nigeria is Africa's largest oil exporter, one would expect the country to have an abundance of both fuel and energy.

All of the longstanding oil exporters demonstrate the classic economic problems associated with the resource curse: economic growth has been lower than non-resource-endowed African countries, income inequalities have become extreme, and non-oil sectors have contracted (particularly the agriculture and nascent manufacturing sectors). In Nigeria, Angola, the Republic of Congo and Equatorial Guinea, for example, oil constitutes over 90 percent of exports and between 60 and 90 percent of government revenue (Gary and Karl 2003: 12).[7] More recent growth in exports across the entire continent has been driven by oil: fossil fuels accounted for 65 percent of the total increase in export values in African countries between 2000 and 2005, while in the oil-exporting countries, since 1990 the share of fuels in the total exports increased by about 12 percentage points, to almost 90 percent (African Development Bank and the African Union 2009: 94).

Most foreign direct investment (FDI) to the continent now goes to oil and gas projects in Angola, Algeria, Sudan, Nigeria and Gabon (African Development Bank and the African Union 2009: 97). Given that oil is a non-renewable resource, that the oil industry employs few domestic laborers, and that oil profits accrue to the state rather than to entrepreneurs within the countries, the contraction of the economies and dominance of oil is problematic on multiple levels.

As oil becomes increasingly dominant in the economies of these countries, it fails to provide broader benefits in terms of increased jobs or complementary industries. For example, the oil industries in both Gabon and Angola employ very few locals, and there are minimal linkages to the rest of the economy in either country (Söderling 2006: 118; Hodges 2004: 150). Capital and

financial services to support the petroleum industries are often imported from abroad. Therefore not only do the fiscal impacts of the oil industry make economic diversification more difficult, the insular nature of the extraction process and the dominance of international companies means that developing oil industries rarely lead to ripple effects in the development of supporting economic sectors.

Regime leaders also resist attempts to broaden the base of support or liberalize politics, because they use the patron–client relationships to generate support, and attempts to increase government transparency and accountability threaten the maintenance of these networks. Once the economies contract, oil becomes the only game in town, and access to oil revenues only comes with possession of the central state.[8] Therefore, losing control of the state means being set adrift in an economic system with few or no opportunities outside the oil industry. In this scenario, control over the central state apparatus becomes even more important than in other economies, and controlling the central state for long periods of time therefore becomes the primary goal of incumbents. In their pursuit of power maintenance, rulers close the political system, militarize society, and further personalize political networks.

While they close the political system, the ruling elite in these countries head off potential opposition by co-opting emerging rival politicians and enmeshing them in patron–client relationships (Omgba 2009). This has been a pattern in Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Congo, Cameroon and Gabon. For the most part, the rulers have been able to effect these goals through manipulation, coercion and co-optation. It is rare for them to hold on to power through violent repression, however. "Bongo may have had a poor head for development economics", Ghazvinian writes,

> but there is no denying that he is one of the shrewdest and most skilled politicians in Africa, if not the world. Using a combination of strategic alliances with foreign leaders and an impressive ability to buy the loyalty of potential opposition figures at home, Bongo has managed to remain Gabon's president for nearly four decades, without resorting to brutality or violence.
>
> *Ghazvinian 2007*

The result is increasingly contracted economies and exclusionary governments that easily give rise to resistance and protest. In terms of political openness, in 2011 none of the petro-states were ranked as free by Freedom House, and only one (Nigeria) rated as "partly free". The rest scored as "not free". In terms of government performance, the Failed States Index classifies these states as failing, their public services scores all lay on the extreme of poor performance, and most fall in the bottom quartile of the World Bank government effectiveness. Because there are no institutionalized mechanisms by which citizens can voice dissent, such protest easily escalates into resistance, agitation and conflict.

The rulers of these states attempt to buy social peace by influencing the media and the intellectual community – societal opinion makers – to support the regime, and by providing some degree of public services to these and other influential communities. When they cannot co-opt resistance, these leaders attempt to repress it. The human rights records in each of these countries is relatively poor, and active resistance in the Niger Delta and Cabinda region of Angola have been dealt with harshly by the regimes in Nigeria and Angola, respectively. Respect for civil liberties and political and economic freedoms have been on the rise in Africa since the mid-1990s, yet the countries that show the most significant increases are those without oil or other valuable mineral resources (McFerson 2010). When they can, leaders suppress electoral competition or entirely legislate it away. For example, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, Gabon,

and the Republic of Congo were all *de jure* one-party states for significant periods of time. When they could not prevent opposition parties from forming and contesting elections, the rulers undermined the electoral process by purchasing votes or buying the voices of public opinion makers. They sustained this repression by buying off political elites and reinforcing their tactics with military strength.

Despite these strong links between oil and authoritarianism, corruption, and the insulation of the state from societal pressures, the oil industry does not necessarily make the African petroleum exporters more peaceful than other countries.[9] Four of the largest oil exporters have both been relatively authoritarian and experienced significant conflicts that range from low-level insurgencies to outright civil wars: Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Angola and Sudan. There is no set pattern for the type of conflict that they experience. Oil rents triggered conflict in the Niger Delta and the Republic of Congo, while they facilitated and lengthened conflict in Angola and Sudan.

In Nigeria, the insurgency in the Niger Delta began in the 1990s as a localized movement to protest environmental degradation in the mangrove swamps riven by overland oil pipelines. Over time, the movement developed into a multi-ethnic insurgency that pressed for an increased share of oil revenue and compensation for environmental destruction. "Oil bunkering", the illegal siphoning of petroleum from the miles of pipes that crisscross the delta, helps to finance the insurgents (as does ransom from kidnapped oil industry workers). Political power in Nigeria has historically been centered in the executive, but it has been one of the least politically stable countries, experiencing multiple rounds of coups, counter-coups, and short-lived civilian regimes. Nigeria is currently in its longest period of civilian rule (beginning in 1999), though because fiscal control is still centered at the national capital, the insurgency remains.[10]

In the Republic of Congo, a 28-year period of one-party rule under Dennis Sassou-Nguesso came to a close when multiparty elections were held in 1992. The elections were highly contested, as control over the country's patron–client network was at stake (Englebert and Ron 2004). Congo-Brazzaville then experienced four short conflicts (1993, 1997, 1998 and 2002), as elites vied for political power and access to oil rents outside of the new political system. Each of these was short, and the goal was state capture, rather than a push for regional autonomy or asymmetric revenue sharing as experienced in Nigeria. This was because while ethnic and regional rivalries factored heavily in the conflicts, the combatants desired to control the state and its access to oil profits. The oil industry in the Republic of Congo is entirely offshore, and the enclave nature protected it from the fighting. It also meant, however, that fighting focused in the capital city, Brazzaville, rather than penetrating into rural areas.

In Angola, in contrast, a long-running civil war was tied more directly to regional and ethnic rivalries, rather than competition to control the state and the oil empire it would bequeath. In this case, oil revenue helped to fuel the war, enabling it to persist past the end of the Cold War and the attendant reduction in foreign patronage. Southern Africa's parallel case of civil war, Mozambique, negotiated an end to its civil war in 1992, in large part because the combatants had run out of means to fund their fight. The comparison between Mozambique and Angola is instructive, because without mineral resource of any kind, in Mozambique the rebel movement did not have the ability to re-engage in conflict when it lost elections in 1992 (Alden 2001). In Angola, however, both the government and opposition had access to commodities that could sustain their war machines (oil for the former and diamonds for the latter). In this case the negotiated settlement failed when Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the rebel *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), refused to accept defeat in the transitional elections of 1992. Fueled by access to diamond revenue, Savimbi re-launched the war rather than cede power to Eduard dos Santos and the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA – People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola).

Unlike in the Republic of Congo, the Angolan civil war was not instigated by competition to control the access to oil revenue. Oil proceeds were critical, however, as they enabled the MPLA government to wage a brutal, destructive and unpopular war (Le Billon 2001; Hodges 2004). The MPLA enmeshed the Angolan military in a web of lucrative oil concessions, ensuring their loyalty and continued willingness to fight to support the MPLA regime. In a similar vein, access to diamond revenue helped the rebel UNITA to finance its war efforts. UNITA, however, had to rely on conscripted labor to extract the diamonds from the alluvial fields and diamond mines, rendering UNITA more vulnerable to population pressures, displacements and more reliant on coercion than the MPLA. The oil enclave economy was rarely affected by the conflict itself, while UNITA had to retain control over the diamond fields in order to maintain the ability to fight. This affected both the goals of the organizations and the patterns of the fighting.

Finally, reflecting the fact that while the combatants did wish to rout each other and claim leadership of the whole country, after a while the MPLA and UNITA settled into a somewhat stable division of power and territory delineated by their resource bases. Once this happened in the mid-1980s, most of the fighting occurred in the borderlands between the territories where each held sway. When attacks ventured farther, UNITA would aim to take the capital city of Luanda, while the MPLA would hit out at both the rebel headquarters and the diamond fields (Le Billon 2001; Hodges 2004).[11] Aside from the civil war, Angola also faces a secessionist movement in the far-northern Cabinda region, which is physically separated from the rest of Angola and is the location whose offshore oil fields generate approximately 70 percent of Angola's oil exports.

The last case of oil-related conflict in the countries surveyed in this chapter is the Sudanese civil war. Here, an extremely complex conflict between the northern and southern regions of the county began in the 1960s (the Anya Nya rebellion), died down by 1973, and erupted again in the early 1980s into a larger war that pitted a united south against the northern ruling regime. In the second phase of the war oil was a factor, though not the only one: while oil deposits had been discovered along the line demarcating the north and south in the 1970s, the conflict prevented the full development of an oil industry as few companies would risk the capital investment. What was critical to aspects of the conflict was that most of the oil deposits were located just south of the border between the north and south. Southern secessionism was revitalized by the knowledge of potential oil proceeds, even though actual development of the oil industry only began in 1999. Once exploited, the new oil industry further complicated an already complex conflict, and added an international dimension whereby self-interested third parties (companies and governments) aided the various sides in return for being granted lucrative oil concessions.[12]

Writing in 2002, as the final negotiations were beginning, the International Crisis Group argued that the

> expansion of oil development has complicated the search for peace, raised the stakes of the war and given both sides an increased commitment to the battlefield. Any equitable peace deal will require oil revenue sharing. The government enjoys a rapidly increasing defence budget since 1999 and improving relations with countries eager to develop lucrative oil contracts. Despite strong rhetorical support for religious fundamentalism, maintaining the unity of the country and keeping control of the oilfields is not its predominant objective, and with the development of the industry after 1999, oil rents did not directly impact the conflict, though they were part of the strategic calculations in why the north did not want to even allow the south to have a right to choose to secede, and why the Southern Sudanese were confident that they could be economically

viable when they achieve independence. Once the conflict began its final phase of negotiations in the early 2000s, the process of oil development complicated the process.

The relationship between oil and conflict in Sudan, therefore, represents a fourth distinct dynamic. While control over oil rent did not ignite this longstanding conflict, knowledge of the resource and the anticipated spoils helped to entrench the fighting and complicate the peace process.

Patterns in oil, governance, and conflict

From this review, it is clear that the sub-Saharan African oil exporters demonstrate a set of state–society relations that are deeply affected by a governing regime's reliance on oil rents. Access to oil revenue in an enclave economy undermines the links between state and society. Without the need to tax, the governments have no obligation to citizens. While this inevitably creates social unrest, most of the leaders are insulated from social pressure and discontent because of their close relationships with their militaries, who are part of the patronage networks, and because of the strategic use of oil revenue to co-opt opposition. This leads to a pattern of politics in which oil rents are distributed to specific groups and public goods provided on a selective basis, all in the effort to maintain political – and hence economic – power.

In these countries, control of the central state for long periods of time became the main and overriding goal of the incumbents. This is because the nature of the extraction technology (capital-intensive and requiring huge investments in exploration, platform development and pipeline construction) and the international political regime that requires contracts be made with representatives of sovereign states concentrates oil revenues at the national tier and in the central government. The enclave economy associated with oil production further focuses attention on maintaining control of the state and makes it easier to maintain such control through corruption and state inversion.

The end result of these dynamics is to make the attainment and retention of political power the ultimate goal in the oil exporters. Once in power, leaders attempt to stay there, so that several of the regimes are characterized by extreme longevity in the executive and further manipulation of governance to maintain that power. This manipulation leads to trends towards authoritarianism, militarization, and the further personalization of power as strategies to retain power.

Over time, these states become less able to process conflicts. Regimes become heavily invested in maintaining the status quo, and bureaucracies stripped of all independent capacity. When oil busts hit, and patronage resources are scrapped, these regimes become particularly vulnerable to popular uprisings from below. In these times, even those within the patronage networks may seek to realign them, and those outside of the networks are more likely to attempt to change the power regime altogether. In some ways, the Niger Delta is an example of a bottom-up challenge that successive regimes have been unable to quell. Over time, it has developed and evolved and become a much more significant challenge to the Nigerian state than it was in the early 1990s, when the movement was limited to a few mobilized, yet localized, ethnic groups demanding more rights (the Ogoni People's Movement, for example).

When conflicts break out, they are often centered around obtaining control of the central state. This means that conflicts where oil is a decisive factor will tend to be shorter than when other resources are present. If it becomes obvious that the insurgents cannot take the capital, they become more amenable to accepting concessions from the government (being bought off with

oil rents) as the successive combatants in the Republic of Congo demonstrated. When oil is present with other resources, as in Angola, then the dynamic shifts entirely and conflicts are likely to rage for longer. In these situations, the various groups are less vulnerable to international sanctions and economic pressures, as long as they can export their lootable resource.

This also points to a difference in the politics of oil that is related to whether the resource is located onshore or offshore. Onshore oil is more difficult to hide from public scrutiny (not impossible, of course), and is more vulnerable to local conflict. Many of the new oil fields that are under exploration are located onshore: within Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Ethiopia, for example. It is possible that the extractive industries in these countries may be less cloaked from the public and therefore less inimical to good governance, transparency, and democracy. The failed attempt to prevent the misuse of oil revenue in Chad does not provide a positive example, however. It remains to be seen how the new oil states will develop.

Conclusion

The cases in which resources have exacerbated or caused conflicts show that it is as much a crisis of governance as a problem caused by the resources themselves. Countries like Botswana, with strong, capable governments and leaders, have been able to use mineral resources to build up their countries, create comprehensive infrastructure systems, invest in education and healthcare, and provide a better quality of life than can be seen in other countries in Africa. In most other instances, however, poor governance and informal systems of rule have enabled power holders to utilize resources to finance patronage systems and allowed the resources to distort the economies of their countries. In these situations, rather than becoming engines of growth, resource endowments have led countries into cycles that contract the economy and, where the resources are lootable, tend towards violent conflict.

Internal conflicts related to resources are therefore more likely when the central government is weak and divided; when state institutions are weakened and made to serve private interests; when the central government is viewed to be (or actually is) corrupt; when the international community refuses to intervene to halt the conflict (whether diplomatically, militarily or with commercial sanctions); and when combatants are able to sell products to finance the conflict.

In the developed world, state mediation and market forces resolve the competition for resources; but in Africa, competition tends to evolve into conflict because strong regulating institutions are absent. These institutions were never developed in most countries because the colonial system destroyed or fundamentally altered indigenous polities and institutions, replacing them with artificial creations that post-independence leaders easily manipulated to serve personalized interests. Both colonial and independent rulers built states on extraction rather than governance, and have prevented the development of capable, well-trained and mission-oriented governments and civil bureaucracies. As minority groups have been systematically denied access to power and economic networks, opponents of the regime have no option but armed rebellion. If these rebellions break out in areas with lootable resources, the conflicts tend to become more protracted than in areas where combatants rely on foreign aid (in the Cold War) or local support.

When thinking about resources and conflicts, therefore, there are a number of dimensions along which one could discuss the relationships between the two. First, the type of resource – how it is extracted, how it is transported, whether or not it is renewable, and its local versus global importance – affect the relationship between the resource and its tendency towards conflict. Second, different types of conflict arise around different aspects of a resource. Conflicts may arise over competition to control the production and/or sale of a resource; conflict may develop over the scarcity of a resource as groups compete for access; and conflict may arise at various

levels from local to national to international. The nature of each of these conflicts will determine whether competition over resources escalates into violent conflict, and then how widespread will be the impact of that conflict. Third, resources may be directly related to a conflict in the sense that they may be the reason that groups begin to clash, or resources may be indirectly related, used to fuel conflicts that are about other issues. Here there is a hybrid: conflicts may arise over one set of issues tied to economic, political or social grievances, but over time as combatants extract and sell resources to fuel the conflict, the motivations may shift. Control over those resources, more so than the initial grievances, becomes the motivation for continued conflict.

Rebellions in Africa, as elsewhere, do not often begin as resource conflicts, but they easily become focused on resources once they arise. Thus we see a tendency for the motivation for conflict to evolve from grievance to greed and predation. This makes conflicts more intractable and spoilers more likely, as combatants begin to reap the benefits of trade in commodities like timber, gold, and diamonds. They are aided in these efforts by international companies willing to source their products as cheaply as possible, and arms networks that barter weapons for commodities. The factors fueling conflicts, therefore, exist at the local, national, regional and international levels.

In terms of policy implications, the most important insight is that when conflicts break out in countries with access to resources that can be easily traded, intervention is likely to be most successful if it occurs before the resource dynamics take hold. There might be a window when political, economic and social grievances remain the driving forces behind the conflict, and diplomatic interventions at this stage are likely to be more successful than militarized intervention after the combatants realize the economic benefits they can reap. Once the resource logic takes hold, and grievance evolves into greed (linked to globalized commercial networks), conflicts are likely to become more intractable, more prone to spoilers, and much more difficult to resolve. The countries that have avoided the resource trap, Botswana chief among them, prevented the worst of personalized rule and inversion of state institutions that have rendered other resource-rich countries so vulnerable to economic shocks and conflict. The development of quality leadership and strong state institutions become a key factor in helping to prevent the resource curse from further manifesting in Africa.

Notes

1 The views expressed in this chapter are the author's own and do not reflect official positions of the United States Government.

2 Environmental scarcity may exacerbate conflicts that arise for other reasons, such as can be seen in the Darfur conflict in Sudan. Environmental stressors have also created low-level conflicts between communities as they either compete for control over scarce water resources, or where pastoral and agrarian communities have been forced into closer contact due to the contraction of arable land. This is particularly notable in the Eastern African region. These forms of resource-based conflicts respond to a different set of drivers than can be found when competition for control over oil, diamonds and other large-scale resources ignites or fuels an ongoing conflict.

3 For a definition of the term "resource curse" see Ross (1999).

4 In 2001, the Cabinda oil fields accounted for 70 percent of Angola's crude oil production (Hodges 2004). Cabinda, which is geographically dislocated from the rest of Angola, has a separatist movement that, unsurprisingly, demands either complete independence or increased autonomy and a greater share of the oil revenues stemming from the region.

5 In 2007, the NNPC was ranked the eighth-largest oil company (in terms of reserves and production) and Sonangol the 24th. See www.petrostrategies.org/Links/Worlds_Largest_Oil_and_Gas_Companies_Sites.htm; the website is drawing from data provided by the *Oil and Gas Journal* (2008).

6 In 2010, total exports for West, East and Southern Africa (in million tons) were 232.7. North Africa sent 59 percent of its oil to Europe and 20.6 percent to the USA. Only 6 percent of North African oil went to China (British Petroleum 2010: 20).
7 The authors drew this data from the World Bank, IMF, CIA World Factbook 2002, the U.S. Department of State, and the US Energy Information Association.
8 This is due to the nature of the oil industry, in which international oil companies negotiate contracts directly with governments, and the international legal regime, which specifies that only a country's sovereign ruler can gain access to oil rents (Englebert and Ron 2004).
9 For a concise review of the relationships between resources and conflict, see Philippe Le Billon (2006).
10 The Niger Delta crisis also has strong overtones of ethnic rivalries and a generational revolt of youth against their elders. See Ifeka (2002), and CEDCOMS (2002).
11 For an accessible, concise account of Mozambique and its conflict cycle without resources, see Chris Alden (2001).
12 See, for example, Harman (2007) and Herbst (2008).

10

THE STATE SYSTEM AND AFRICA'S PERMANENT INSTABILITY

Ian S. Spears

Introduction

On the eve of Sierra Leone's independence in 1961, the *New York Times* observed that the new country was "a haven of temperate, civilized thought" (Bigart 1960: 15). Westerners remarked that the prospect of state breakdown at some future date was unimaginable. Three decades later Sierra Leone was at the bottom of the United Nations Development Programme's index of Least Developed Countries and had descended into one of the world's most brutal and depraved conflicts (UNDP 2001). Other regions in Africa were experiencing similar troubles. Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, Rwanda and Congo among others all succumbed to civil war in the post-independence era. In recent years, the number of conflicts in Africa has declined; but it is also true that once-stable states have become susceptible to breakdown and violence. Even states that were once regarded as relative paragons of order and stability, such as the Côte d'Ivoire and Kenya, have not proven to be different from other conflict-ridden African states. Perhaps most worrying of all, some states—Burundi and Sudan for example—are constantly on the verge of conflict. For all of Africa's diversity, it is hard to make the case that any one state or group of states is invulnerable to state breakdown. Nor is it clear that the international community is capable of helping Africa avoid conflict in future.

Africa's tendency toward instability is well documented. Recent scholarship has argued that African societies have "an inbuilt bias in favor of greater disorder" (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 162). But Africa's political instability was predicted decades ago. In 1966 Aristide Zolberg reflected on the fractured nature of countries in West Africa, and the one-party states created to counter this tendency (Zolberg 1966). Then in 1967, in an essay entitled "The Inevitability of Instability", James O'Connell argued that the combination of artificial colonial borders, economic uncertainty, and inexperienced politicians prevented incipient African states from consolidating their authority into viable and secure territories for their people to inhabit (O'Connell 1967: 181–191). Africans, of course, have proven to be capable of adapting to the circumstances in which they find themselves. But many countries have been unable to avoid instability and conflict. Unless the African state system is reconfigured in some way, states cannot be consolidated and instability will remain a permanent feature of the continent's political life. By examining briefly colonial and post-colonial eras, this chapter will explain why stability and peace in Africa will remain elusive.

State control, ungoverned territory, and conflict

States, according to Max Weber's familiar definition, are the political entities that have a monopoly of force in a territory. While many of the world's states approximate the Weberian ideal, in much of Africa the geographical territory extends beyond the government's grasp. The void between the territory controlled by the central government and the borders may be occupied by populations indifferent to the authorities or by militant insurgent groups. These "ungoverned territories" have recently generated concern among Western policy analysts insofar as they allow terrorist groups or other organizations which might jeopardize Western interests to operate with impunity (Rabasa et al. 2007; Whelan 2006). Because political borders seldom change to reflect the limits of government control and because it is in these spaces where challenges to the recognized rulers emerge, Africa will remain susceptible to perpetual conflict. To date, neither democratic elections nor negotiated power-sharing arrangements have rectified this problem. "Guinea-Bissau needs a state" lamented the International Crisis Group in a 2008 report on one of West Africa's most troubled countries. "This core weakness has been at the root of recurrent political crises, coups d'etat and the proliferation of criminal networks" (International Crisis Group 2008b: i).

Importantly, the fact that these territories are referred to as *ungoverned* does not mean that there are no governing structures. In different parts of Africa, rebel movements, warlords and unrecognized authorities control territory and sometimes even govern their inhabitants. Outside of Africa, groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka have at one time or another established parastatal organizations that were more capable of asserting control than the recognized governments of these same countries. What distinguishes these authorities—or, in their extreme form, virtual "states within states" or "counter-states"—is that they exist in opposition to, rather than at the pleasure of, the recognized governments. As long as these entities exist, they challenge the ability of central governments to enjoy peace or define themselves as viable states in the Weberian mold.

State formation in Africa

Ethnic diversity can be a force for peace. Paul Collier, for example, argues that "ethnic and religious fractionalization actually makes states safer rather than more dangerous", and large states—which presumably are more diverse—are "proportionately much safer than small states" (Collier 2000: 108). Similarly, John Mueller argues that there is nothing inherently violent about ethnic diversity. According to Mueller, "most people most of the time do not have much difficulty getting along and creating useful rules and patterns of conduct that allow them to coexist peacefully" (Mueller 2000: 63). Others emphasize that states are merely codified outgrowths of these rules and patterns. William Easterly writes that a "plausible story for the evolution of institutions in the West is that informal relationships and norms in networks gradually hardened into formal rules (which are still supported by informal relationships and norms)." For Easterly, the most effective routes to political development have been reforms "where the gradual introduction of formal rules *reinforced* the existing networks" rather than "tried to replace them" with rules that are foreign (Easterly 2006: 101). From this perspective, states are not so much entities or objects to be imposed by outside powers as much as they are extant patterns of behavior and power relationships which are formalized into rules and institutions.

The recognized states of much of the developing world, however, do not represent idealized images of natural harmony or codified forms of local organizations. In few cases in Africa, for example, can it be said that contemporary states resemble pre-colonial or indigenously formed

political organizations. The former colonial borders that divided Africa were suddenly, and almost entirely, created from above, and despite the fact that these borders divided the continent, the end result was, in almost every case, a significant increase in the size of the political unit in question. The large and troubled Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, is many times larger than the pre-colonial Kingdom of Kongo and almost seven times larger in area than Germany. African colonial borders also encircled many different traditions, no one of which could be accepted as truly national even by a majority of the population. In this sense, as Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg point out, "traditional and ex-colonial jurisdictions are usually in conflict" (Jackson and Rosberg 1986: 17). In the past fifty years, many of Africa's states have been held together through authoritarian or patrimonial rule or have broken down into conflict. It is difficult to conclude, then, that these large and diverse countries are safer or more stable than small ones.

For those who argue that states must somehow be built up from the ground, there is uncertainty about where this monopoly of force, legitimate or otherwise, could come from. In the post-independence years, African leaders learned quickly that they had few means to work with since what they had inherited was closer to a territory and an incipient bureaucracy than a Weberian state with a competent civil service and coherent political tradition. Indeed, Aristide Zolberg wrote that, precisely when they became aware of the immensity of the tasks before them, Africa's leaders were like executives frantically pushing the battery of buttons on their desks "only to discover that the wiring is nonexistent" (Zolberg 1966: 41; O'Connell 1967: 183).

For some students of Africa, the new leadership brought these problems upon themselves. Both Basil Davidson and Jeffrey Herbst argue that Africa's modernizing leaders saw their own rich history and diversity as "irrelevant and useless" (Davidson 1992: 102) to their post-independence needs. According to Herbst (2000: 99), they "turned their backs" on their pre-colonial past and took instead what they believed to be modern, even if it was foreign. Nor did they succeed in proposing an alternative vision for a post-colonial continent. Rather, they embraced the modern state along existing colonial borders as the only relevant form of political organization despite the fact that it was unlike most pre-colonial forms of political organization in Africa. For them, the modern state was not a *Western* creation (as some might see it now), but a *universal* form of political organization which was inherently desirable.

One might conclude, however, that African leaders had little choice but to accept colonial borders as they were; organizations such as the UN recognized only states. While African leaders were ostensibly free to consider other forms of political organization, in a world of states, the alternatives would have turned them into second-class citizens.

It is misleading, then, to argue that states in Africa and elsewhere have "collapsed". Most African countries have never had sufficient political infrastructure to sustain themselves without outside help. Since independence, African leaders have relied heavily on exogenously imposed conventions such as their juridical status in combination with one-partyism and patronage to sustain their rule. African leaders dispensed with efforts to draw upon the support of their people and instead relied on superpower-provided military aid. While Africa is commonly condemned for the venality of leaders, a reliance on authoritarian rule, patronage, and coercion was a lamentable but entirely rational response to the circumstances that African governments found themselves in during the post-colonial era.[1]

It is unfortunate that so many Africans have had to live in the absence of a well institutionalized state. This is because there is increasing consensus that states are necessary to advance development, avoid violent conflict, and provide order (Ayoob 2002: 40–41). The movement towards states allows us to, as Jared Diamond says, "encounter strangers regularly without attempting to kill them" (Diamond 1999: 273). Alternatively, mere quasi-states—the juridically

formed and empirically weak states that exist in most of Africa and much of the developing world—are incapable of providing the kind of positive sovereignty that communities in developing countries need in order to advance their own development (Jackson 1990).

Seeing Africa's problem as being one of a weak or absent state allows us to dispense with other explanations for violence. It is not the mere presence or absence of ethnic cleavages which prevents civil war. Rather it is the fact of an effective state which can secure ethnic groups, channel and respond to their grievances, and promote a common national identity. The idea that stateless people are more peaceful is a myth. Stateless communities may be less inclined to engage in war but they are often more likely to suffer from high rates of interpersonal violence and murder. As Charles Tilly has argued, while governments present threats to their own citizens which should not be discounted, Westerners now take for granted the relative safety that is accorded to citizens thanks only to the presence of well-institutionalized and effective states (Tilly 1990: 68). Similarly, despite an alarmist literature which purports to link the presence or absence of scarce resources to violent conflict, a more compelling explanation is again that conflict is related to the presence or absence of an effective state. Only states can manage and distribute resources in equitable ways or direct them to constructive ends. As Marina Ottaway has pointed out, states that are already well-functioning and democratic when resource exploitation begins tend to remain so (Ottaway 2006: 191–192).

In short, neither Africans nor the international community should overlook the value of states in promoting and managing political development. All of the good things that are said about large and diverse countries may be true but only if the states in those countries can, in turn, address the challenges which come as a result of their large territories. The problem is, as always, that African countries were created without the very means required to manage these challenges, and there is little indication that anyone has a realistic vision of how states (that is, the hopefully benevolent monopoly of power that underwrites them) can be created.

Colonialism's weak state legacy

Like European states, African pre-colonial states sometimes took the form of empires that were prone to engaging in wars of conquest and domination. "In this", writes Ngugi wa Thiong'o, "there is nothing peculiarly African. All relationships between communities in history have alternated between hostility and hospitality" (Thiong'o 2009: 18). The pre-colonial states of the Zulu, the Ashante, the Mahdist Sudan, Benin, the Yoruba kingdoms, Matabeleland, and the Lozi, however, were in the end all destroyed by the imposition of the colonial state. European colonial powers ruled through local leaders or kept in place those traditional leaders who continued to garner the respect of their populace. But the capacity of these individuals to defy the colonial power was limited. In this sense, the contemporary state system, based as it is on Africa's colonial borders rather than its pre-colonial states was a violation of Easterly's claim that states are, or should be, indigenous outgrowths of local institutions and patterns of behavior.

The sources of Africa's instability are not merely rooted in the structural weakness that came as a result of Africans being alienated from the pre-colonial state. The "scramble for Africa" was prompted by intra-European competition, but once the continent had been successfully partitioned, Europeans lost interest and did little to promote development within its vast colonial territories. Since there was little desire on the part of the colonial powers to engage in future wars of expansion on the continent, the colonial state in Africa generally did not serve the purpose that states did in Europe: that is, defend citizens in a given territory from threats from another state. Consequently, Africa did not receive the unifying "benefits" of war (Herbst 1990b).

No surprise, then, that even within their individual colonies, colonial rule left most Africans without either a greater sense of common identity or even a common affinity for the state.

On the contrary, colonialism worked in a variety of ways to advance the formation of subnational groups, reinforce divisions and, in some cases, undermine what, in the independence era, would become legally sovereign states. Many of the cleavages that exist in Africa have colonial origins. Much scholarship on identity formation in Africa, for example, has focused on the way in which various colonial practices led to the "invention" or restructuring of ethnic-linguistic groups. In Zimbabwe, early Christian missionaries inadvertently gave life to a Manyika identity by codifying local languages (Ranger 1988: 118–150). Similarly, Rhodesia's considerable linguistic diversity was reduced to four principal languages as a consequence of missionary activity, education programs, and labor and employment policies (Posner 2003: 127–146). More tragically, Belgian colonialism effectively "racialized" differences between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda (Mamdani 2001: 190). Not all contemporary conflicts are merely a result of these identities. Nonetheless, colonialism altered the geometry and size of identity groups which, upon independence, became politicized in the context of Africa's weak states and colonial borders.

While it is true that in much of Africa the colonial imprint was unremarkable insofar as large tracts of territory were ruled with relatively few colonial officials, sustaining colonial rule required European officials to identify cooperative groups and work with African leaders. Colonial powers were inclined to offer protection or other forms of preferential treatment to various groups within their colonies. To anti-imperialists, the practice was rightly characterized as *divide and rule* (Thiong'o 2009: 20). To the apparent dismay of these observers, however, this competitive colonialism embittered subjects toward their regional rivals, not toward the colonial power. Others point out that the disparities that emerged in these circumstances were as much a matter of ethnic groups using foreign rule to serve their purposes as of colonial powers exploiting ethnic groups (Horowitz 1985: 156–157). In Somali-inhabited regions of the Horn of Africa, for example, the British provided protection for some Isaaq clans against attacks by other clans during seasonal southerly migrations. In Zambia, the Lozi were also protected by the British.

The consequence was resentment among subjected peoples and pretensions of superiority among the agents of colonial rule (Horowitz 1985). In virtually all cases, however, political ambitions of privileged groups came to naught and, often to their chagrin, they were subsumed into the soon-to-be-independent states on the basis of the existing colonial borders. In the case of the Lozi, the kingdom of Barotseland was reduced to one of eight provinces of independent Zambia (Caplan 1970). In other cases these amalgamations turned violent. Somalis in British Somaliland initially opted for union with their southern brethren in Italian Somalia but were soon disillusioned by the experience and during the late 1980s rebelled against the regime in Mogadishu. Similarly, Eritrea owed its identity to Italy's colonization of northern Ethiopia. Rebel movements in Eritrea beginning in the 1960s and in Somaliland beginning in the 1980s engaged in long and violent insurgencies that helped bring down governments in their respective states.

More generally, when colonialism came to an end in the early 1960s there was often neither a state nor a sense of unity amongst their citizens. Nigeria's leaders reflected on their prospective country as a "British invention" and wondered whether their country could be anything more than a "geographical expression" (Meredith 2005: 8). Prior to independence, Belgian officials sought to contain ambitions among the Bakongo for an independent Kongo state. With independence, however, the Belgian military and white South African mercenaries supported a secessionist movement in Katanga that was put down only with UN intervention (Weiss and Carayannis 2004: 138). In Angola, no fewer than three insurgent movements emerged in the years prior to independence in 1975. Two of these movements, the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

(UNITA), were later enlisted by the superpowers in a proxy war which persisted for another ten years after the Cold War ended.

Africa's states began their independent existence as weak states and deeply divided societies. This did not change in the post-colonial era. The states themselves reflected neither a pre-colonial existence nor a summation of the institutional or political power on the ground. Subsequently, during the Cold War, regimes in many African states were able to extend their authority only thanks to the patronage resources and coercive power afforded them through foreign aid. It is perhaps not surprising that some of the largest recipients of superpower aid—Liberia, Somalia, Congo/Zaire, Ethiopia, and Sudan—collapsed with the end of the Cold War and, in some cases, remained among the most troubled countries on the continent. After fifty years of independence, it is still difficult to make the claim that Africa's states are stronger than they once were. In most cases, they have been only further undermined by internal and external forces.

Why state-building and conflict resolution fail

More troubling, however, is the prospect that Africa's states will remain weak for the foreseeable future. Here we can focus on two contemporary factors which can help us understand the failure to achieve stronger and more institutionalized states. First is the fact that those who are most interested in engineering humane political processes for Africa are often informed by an understanding of state-building quite different from state-building in Europe and North America. In reality, as Charles Tilly argues, the mafia-like gangs of early Europe did not start with the intention of making states, and no states emerged in the West as a conscious or deliberate effort to create them. Rather they were a by-product of efforts to deal with local rivalries and externally imposed forces and pressures, most notably war (Tilly 1975: 172). Rulers, writes Tilly, "willy-nilly started activities and organizations that eventually took on lives of their own: courts, treasuries, systems of taxation, regional administrations, public assemblies, and much more" (Tilly 1990: 75). Existing states and political structures merged into larger territories only when they were compelled to do so by some externally imposed threat. In the meantime, European leaders did not hesitate to challenge, disarm, or expel by force other rivals for political power (Tilly 1990: 69–70), and they did not hesitate to enlist local outlaws to counter enemies.

In this sense, aside from the contracting and expanding nature of European state-building processes, there is much less that separates the activities of Africa's most notorious regimes from that of Europe's own warlords and monarchs than one might think. Westerners may find distasteful the elimination of challengers to state power in Third World countries but it is not in fact different from the practices in much of the West during the seventeenth century (Prunier 2005: 105). It is reasonable to ask if there is not a more humane approach to the achievement of human security or to suppose that humans have somehow evolved from such venality towards more "civilized" or "rational" approaches to state creation. But at some point it must also be asked whether Third World states will evolve to the same strong entities and peaceful outcomes of the West when their developmental trajectories are so different. It must also be ascertained whether outsiders can now succeed at building states for others.

A second factor which keeps African states weak hinges on conflict resolution. In some cases approaches to conflict resolution risk reinforcing the very forces that keep Africa's states weak. Ethnic identity is often said to have been "invented" or "constructed" by colonialism and ethnic entrepreneurs; yet some contemporary efforts in conflict resolution both in Africa and elsewhere have continued to reproduce these identities and give them institutional life insofar as, intentionally or not, they invite participation on the basis of identity groups. An approach to conflict resolution—such as the "consociational" approach taken in Burundi—which

allows groups to advance their interests only on the basis of ethnic identity may only reify ethnic cleavages (Horowitz 1985: 575). Whether it is possible to draw disputants into peace processes on some other basis is not clear. But neither is it evident that encouraging ethnic groups to compete politically on the basis of these identities is a recipe for state consolidation (Ottaway 2007).

Conflict resolution efforts are also hampered by the fact that an apparent willingness on the part of belligerents to participate in post-conflict negotiations is mistaken for a desire to end violence and a capacity to rebuild the state. In fact, parties may engage in both conflict *and* conflict resolution because of the financial pay-outs that can benefit them. Instead of a viable state which can successfully channel and manage conflict, peace-building efforts frequently devolve into forums where the main players engage interlocutors solely for the purpose of securing more of the spoils of the peace process itself (Tieku, 2012). In Liberia and Sierra Leone, for example, rebel groups engaged in atrocities as a means of drawing international attention to their "cause" and gaining access to the state through inclusive peace processes (Hoffman 2004: 211–226). In Somalia, multiple and fruitless efforts undertaken to create an inclusive regime since the Siad Barre regime collapsed in 1991 have often induced elites to engage in endless "seat-banking". As one critic writes, "this inevitably causes rapid inflation in the number of seats in parliament and proposed ministries" leading not to a state but to "a bloated and utterly unsustainable administration" (Menkhaus 2002: 212). In Kenya, the post-2008 violence was managed by political inclusion whereby its cabinet was comprised of forty ministers and fifty assistant ministers in a 222-member National Assembly. "In other words", one critic pointed out, "more than 42 percent of the legislature will be in the executive. Clearly, other countries should not adopt this Kenyan model unless their desire is to discredit representative government" (Kiai 2008: 164). While such exercises may be expedient insofar as they buy short-term peace, neither of these cases can be seen as promising or sustainable avenues for long-term state-building. *Peace*-building may be a desirable objective but it must not be confused with *state*-building.

In his landmark book explaining the creation of "order in changing societies", Samuel Huntington argued that Americans have no idea how to create a government or a state in such challenging circumstances. The American policy maker, he claims, confuses the creation of a government with limitations on its power. "Confronted with the need to design a political system which will maximise power and authority, he has no ready answer. His general formula", states Huntington, "is that governments should be based on free and fair elections. In many modernizing societies this formula is irrelevant" (Huntington 1968: 7).

Huntington's thesis has at times been regarded as an endorsement for authoritarian rule. His argument is better seen as an endorsement of political institutions that can withstand the inevitable pressures that emerge in changing and divided societies. The institutions in any society need to be strong but only insofar as they must be able to manage and contain political forces which counter them. Political institutions which *reflect* and coincide with existing political processes are less likely to be authoritarian and much more likely to be sustainable regardless of the coercive forces that they can call upon. The contemporary Third World state system does, in fact, reflect the vast and diverse territories over which they preside. But rather than being indigenous outgrowths of local patterns which then expanded and contracted according to the rhythms and complexity of the community, contemporary African states are responses to the larger and more arbitrary territories that were handed to colonial leaders at the time of independence. It is no wonder that African governments resort to coercion or patronage networks to sustain themselves, or for their peoples to retreat into ethnic groups or smaller defensible state-like entities. And it is no wonder that, despite efforts to accommodate or coerce the vast number of peoples within

their territories, African states fail to manage the diversity within their own borders and thus remain subject to permanent instability.

Debates on conflict resolution continue to focus on state-building in countries as they are currently constructed. Because regimes are legally sovereign regardless of whether they can physically project their authority, governments may no longer concern themselves with whether some part of their territory is "ungoverned" or occupied by others. Their primary interest is their own security and their ability to keep insurgents at bay. They certainly do not concern themselves with the security of their citizens in any sort of comprehensive sense and, like their colonial predecessors, may seek only to keep the most formidable challengers from coalescing against them. The end result is that regimes have no real interest in making their states whole and possibly much to benefit from keeping them divided.

Why nothing will change

Herbert Weiss and Tatiana Carayannis write on the contradictory nature of the Congolese state, observing that, in light of the collapse of the Mobutu regime in May 1997, "at no time since the early 1960s was the Congolese state structure weaker than at this juncture. . . . Yet not a single significant Congolese leader or group mobilized in favor of splitting up the country" (Weiss and Carayannis 2004: 149, 153). Subsequently, in 1998, the authors reflect on the "de facto" division of the Congolese state, complete with "recognized borders between the Kinshasa and the rebel-controlled zones" which were, in turn, monitored by MONUC, the UN observer mission in Congo. Nonetheless, once again, the Congo showed no imminent sign of a more formal partition of the country. The DRC remained weak yet unable to reform itself in any way. Indeed, perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Congo's experience in recent years is that, despite its ongoing upheaval, the country has stayed intact. Why do such weak states persist in Africa and elsewhere?

First, for many in the international community the existing political grid, for all of its problems, remains an achievement to be celebrated rather than condemned. In a world of change, Africa's increasingly entrenched borders are a welcome force for stability, at least when it comes to interstate conflict (Zartman 2001: 66). Second, and consequently, unless it further consolidates their power, even the weakest regimes are reluctant to negotiate away territory and resources which the international community already recognizes as theirs. Finally, even if insurgencies have secessionist ambitions, most of them (and especially the smaller ones) can be provisionally tamed with promises of access to state resources (Englebert and Hummel 2005). In some cases, the status quo of state weakness serves insurgents and governments alike just fine.

The result is that, despite their profound weakness, political instability, and inability to provide for their own citizens, there is no indication that Africa's states are on the verge of breaking up in a way that would lead to the formal recognition of their component parts. Instead, the juridical states of Africa are here to stay and the countries of the continent appear to be permanently incapacitated and destabilized by their own inability to forge states across its vast territories.

Conclusion

For the foreseeable future, Africa will not be able to avoid some degree of instability and violence. Conflicts do emerge and subside, but the structural causes associated with the state are too deeply entrenched for conflict resolution experts or well-meaning leaders to manage. There are possibilities for other notions of sovereignty. Indeed, so-called states-within-states are both part of the problem and part of the solution (Kingston and Spears 2004; Pegg 1998). The more entrenched they are, the more they weaken the state. On the other hand, the stronger they are

the more likely it is that they will provide viable governance for citizens in areas under their control. Nonetheless, as long as the central government remains the channel through which international recognition is accorded and foreign aid is provided, ethnic groups and sub-state entities will continue to reproduce themselves as they compete for control of power and resources. Rebels who hold out in resource-rich regions beyond the reach of state authority will continue to deny the state the possibility of claiming absolute sovereignty.

So much of what has happened to African states since colonialism has reinforced internal divisions. Africa's arbitrary borders, colonial machinations, and Cold War scheming turned some African countries into "toxic states" (Bryden 2004: 100). Contemporary state-building and conflict resolution techniques either do not create a sufficiently legitimate or authoritative state or, on the contrary, further reinforce divisions and fail to bring all parties into sustainable governing institutions. Yet the unwillingness to seriously consider other forms of sovereignty or political organizations means that African states are unable to escape the consequences of these divisions. Consequently, African states remain paralyzed in terms of their ability to address the most fundamental issues of peace, conflict, and development. To the extent that these statements are true, no amount of time will allow Africa to avoid its recurring episodes of instability.

Note

1 In an article entitled "The Worst of the Worst", Ghanian economist George B. N. Ayittey claims that twelve of the world's most notorious despots are in Africa. See *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2010, pp. 90–91.

11
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN AFRICA

Anthoni van Nieuwkerk

Introduction

Healthy civil–military relations suggest professional and operational effectiveness of the security sector, enhanced by its sound management, accountability and democratic oversight. It is a condition experienced by many democratic polities, and sought by transforming ones. However, straightforward transitions are not obvious and require certain conditions to be present. Security sector reform can be practical tools for achieving such outcomes. Yet, in Africa, we find a paradox: sound civil–military relations and security sector governance are sought by reforming elites yet opposed by others for political and ideological reasons.

Indeed, recent studies demonstrate that security sector reform and transformation (hereafter SSR) faces an uphill battle in terms of acceptance as a legitimate tool for managing civil–military relations, leading one researcher to entitle her study of SSR in Africa "a bridge too far" (Hutton 2009). Reasons are varied. In a study of security sector governance challenges in West Africa, Bryden, N'Diaye and Olonisaken (2008) found that the opportunity for reform hardly exists in at least a third of the states in West Africa, and that some of the few attempts at SSR at the national level have not been internally driven but rather pushed by external supporters. They found in addition that there was limited political will by the leadership to embark on a comprehensive process of reform, and that participatory processes were rare and, consequently, collective ownership of reform was largely absent. They conclude: "These considerations do not paint a rosy picture for the development of legitimate, participative and sustainable reform processes across West Africa" (Bryden, N'Diaye and Olonisaken 2008: 21). In a similar vein, Bendix and Stanley (2008) found, after an analysis of SSR in Liberia and Sierra Leone, that there was no consistent approach to SSR, and that in practice the concept failed to live up to its innovative potential. They recommend that for its potential to be realized, the SSR dialogue needs to take voices and experiences from the global South into account, rather than merely reflect a donor perspective.

What is it about the concept and the practice of SSR that makes it such a seemingly controversial intervention, questionable for application to African countries and polities emerging from conflict or misrule? Under what conditions can SSR be successfully applied in Africa, or is the concept fundamentally flawed?

In this chapter we will examine SSR in Africa along several lines. We will start with the origins of the concept and move to a discussion of its more recent interpretations. Our conceptual

overview will touch on the relevance of SSR for international security – from the perspective of donors, recipients, multilateral development actors, and regional security organizations. The focus of the chapter is really on Africa and SSR. To that extent, it examines SSR successes and failures in reforming countries from various regions in Africa. The chapter closes with a reflection of the challenges associated with SSR in Africa, including the questions of political acceptance, donor dominance, the policy gap, and operational complexities (rough neighbourhoods, resource constraints and skills shortages).

Origins of the concept and its relevance to Africa

Security sector reform is a liberal concept largely used by Western donors in their attempts to restructure a recipient country's security sector, or improve its performance, especially as it emerges from conflict. The concept shows great promise – namely, the enhancement of democratic governance and oversight of the security sector, as well its efficient and effective management – but has been interpreted variably over time, resulting in conceptual diffusion. There is widespread suspicion of its underlying political motives, complicated in large part by the invasion by the North African Treaty Organisation (NATO) of Iraq and Afghanistan and the securitization of the concept via the United States War on Terror. As former British development minister, Claire Short has remarked, this has infected the debate on SSR with "deep ulterior motives" (Short 2010: 13). Indeed, at the heart of the debate over SSR is the question of whose security these SSR programmes are concerned with.

However it is useful to start with a brief review of the origins of SSR. As Nicole Ball (2005) points out, the Cold War era was marked by behaviour of global powers from the East and West whereby assistance to receiving countries was not meant to promote democratic governance but rather to foster strategic relationships with key allies. As we know, many of these allies were ruled by military governments or had governments dominated by military and security services. These features impacted negatively on opportunities for democratic governance, civilian oversight and development more generally. In fact, security for ruling elites and the regime was achieved at the expense of the security for citizens and communities – and often, the state itself.

By the late 1980s, the Cold War came to an end, and as the Soviet Union broke up, the strategic priorities of the major Western powers shifted towards political liberalization in Eastern Europe. As a consequence, space was created to integrate security into political and economic development, the reform of public institutions and attempts to change elite attitudes and behaviour in countries undergoing transition. In particular, they were encouraged by political and security actors (rather than development donors) to adhere to principles of democratic civil–military relations as a condition for NATO or European Union (EU) membership – at the time, a significant incentive.

Conceptually, SSR thinking was influenced by the emerging debates around an enlarged definition of security as well as the idea of human security. These debates essentially held that the protection of individuals was critical to national and international security, and that security required by citizens was not limited to defence or law and order but incorporated broader political, economic and social issues.

As the discussions of the relationship between development, governance and security took off, significant actors in the non-Western world added their voices and efforts in shaping the debates. In particular, the South African experience in the 1990s with transforming the security sector away from its militarized, authoritarian and oppressive apartheid past proved influential in shaping the debate.

These events pushed SSR onto the global donor agenda. It is generally recognized that SSR was championed, from the late 1990s onwards, by the United Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development (DFID) who also worked with the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to develop donor thinking on SSR. The UK focused initially on the military but more recently enlarged its focus to include security and justice reform.

In 2004, DAC members agreed on a policy statement and paper on SSR. In the policy paper, SSR is defined as

> the transformation of the "security system" – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance.
>
> *OECD 2005: 20*

According to DAC, the objective of SSR is

> to increase partner countries' ability to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance, transparency and the rule of law. SSR includes, but extends well beyond, the narrower focus of more traditional security assistance on defence, intelligence and policing.
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> *OECD 2005: 3*

Despite (or perhaps because of) these and subsequent policy developments (including substantial influence from the United States), terminological uncertainty remains. Security analysts and practitioners tend to use the concepts security sector reform, security system reform, security sector transformation, security sector governance and security and justice reform in a rather loose fashion, claiming that they all mean the same thing, which can hardly be true, as we will explore. Regardless, Ball (2010: 36) offers a concise summary of what she perceives the DAC approach seeks to encapsulate, namely attention to three "problems": ineffective and inefficient provision of security; the inadequacy of accountability and oversight in the security sector; and ineffective and inefficient provision of security and justice to people and the communities and the states within which they live.

Attempts to implement these policies on security sector reform have been of an uneven nature. Few would argue that SSR has been received with enthusiasm by "partner countries" or "recipients". There are several reasons for this. First, Western providers of security assistance continue to prefer train-and-equip programmes that tend to ignore the governance aspects of SSR. As Ball notes with reference to the US programme in Liberia in 2005 and Chad in 2007, traditional approaches to security assistance continues to dominate, often masquerading as SSR (Ball 2010: 37).

Secondly, there seems to be many answers to the question: whose security is at stake? From the perspective of external actors, two answers stand out. Development officials tend to focus on the security and justice needs of citizens in countries receiving development assistance. Development donors in general remain reticent about supporting reforms in the military sector. Then, officials concerned with security, including intelligence and counterterrorism actors, tend to focus on the security of their own countries and of its major allies. This generally involves strengthening the effectiveness of security bodies in recipient countries so that they can

carry out peacekeeping and counterterrorism functions. There is therefore a discernible tension between the development and security communities both at headquarters and in the field, which tends to impact negatively on their outputs – whether policy statements, handbooks or training courses.

From the perspective of national actors, much external assistance is directed towards national authorities; discussions about SSR occur with a relatively small number of political or security elites. Although there is a strong view that SSR is an externally imposed concept, a review of civil society activities around the world, also in Africa, shows that the principles of SSR – transparency, accountability, and inclusiveness – are widely supported. There is a broad understanding amongst Africans that effective security services and justice institutions that are accountable to elected officials and citizens are critical to economic and social well-being. Examples of such civil society initiatives include the African Security Sector Network (ASSN), the Arab Reform Initiative (ARI), the Southern African Defence and Security Management network (SADSEM), and others.

Mark Sedra (2010) offers a useful interpretation of the status of the SSR concept. He distinguishes two distinct approaches, both of which are on display in the African setting, as we will discover below. The difference between the two relates to their relative distance or closeness to the Western statist concept of security. Members of the orthodox school see the problem with SSR as the inability (or unwillingness) of donors to follow the model's Western, statist, principles. The core principles of the model can be fulfilled by expanding the capacity of donors to advance reform, and nurturing a more robust donor political resolve to apply that capacity. This school believes that the state is the only actor capable of meeting the human security needs of populations, and that SSR should focus on expanding its scope and capacity and reframing its relationship with the wider society. By contrast, members of the post-liberal state school reject the status quo approach to SSR. They argue that the SSR model, as currently constructed, is principally geared to advancing the security of external actors rather than reform recipients, a formula that needs to be reversed. They view SSR's preoccupation with the state and Western liberal principles as unrealistic and counter-productive. Programmes must rather be shaped around local contextual dynamics and perceptions of security.

From this discussion it appears a compromise is required in order to move SSR forward. SSR must become more nuanced, reflecting the variety of contexts, actors and threats present in most reform contexts; flexible, in order to accommodate different approaches depending on contextual conditions and available resources; and more politically attuned, grasping the need to engage political realities and seek to shape them rather than work above or around them.

Before the discussion turns to the SSR experience in Africa, we offer a diagrammatic presentation of the scale of potential for SSR. This diagram reflects current (early 2012) opportunities and potentials for reform or transformation in Africa in different situations and is depicted on a scale that distinguishes two broad categories: authoritarian states (subdivided into those experiencing violent conflict or failed governance) and democratizing states (subdivided into those undergoing mediation, making a transition to peace, and post-conflict societies). Incidentally, the literature carries a debate on whether this kind of categorization is meaningful at all, suggesting instead a categorization based on contextual analysis (see Wulf 2011; Hutton 2009). Regardless, in our reading of the literature the transition to peace category seems the most opportune period for SSR. In a complementary chapter on post-conflict rebuilding, Ball (2005) describes one of the peace building phases (the transition phase), as characterized by the establishment of a government, implementing reforms including socio-economic revitalization, and the promotion of societal reconciliation. Her list of priority peace building tasks is very much in line with the SSR agenda.

Authoritarian states			Democratising states	
Failed states	Conflict-torn societies	Societies undergoing conflict mediation	Societies in transition to peace	Post-conflict societies
		Conflict cessation: negotiations and cessation of hostilities	Peace building: transition phase	Peace building: consolidation phase
Unmanageable ←				→ Major potential
Somalia	DRC Sudan South Sudan Nigeria Chad Uganda Guinea-Bissau Mali	Madagascar Egypt Zimbabwe Libya Cote d'Ivoire Tunisia	Rwanda Burundi	Sierra Leone Liberia South Africa Mozambique Angola

Figure 11.1 Scale of potential for SSR, early 2012

Sources: adapted from Wulf 2004; Ball 2005.

SSR in practice: African experiences

In West Africa, a region infamous for unstable civil–military relations and endless coups d'état, the SSR story is one of overwhelming odds against meaningful change. In a perceptive study, Alan Bryden and colleagues (Bryden, N'Diaye and Olonisakin 2008) found that despite the democratization wave of the 1990s, security for virtually all the sixteen states of the West African region has meant securing a regime. They point out that the missions and practices of the security sector have typically reflected this purpose. Security apparatuses set up to guarantee comprehensive security and its efficient management, have almost always been ruthless and problematic for the state's political institutions and citizens. The study identifies four categories of states in West Africa ". . . according to the space available for (security) reform" (Bryden, N'Diaye and Olonisakin 2008: 330). States in the first category are struggling to make democracy irreversible and have been unable to focus on SSR. Mali, Senegal, Cape Verde, Benin, Ghana, and Niger are included in this category. Although Mali (until the 2012 coup) and Senegal seemingly made progress with the democratic governance project, the study points out that both suffer from cross-border trafficking issues, privatization of security, and resource constraints, giving cause for concern.

Nigeria, the Gambia and Burkina Faso have in common the absence of serious or sustained approaches to reform from the regimes in power. The study notes that reform-related activities happen in varying degrees in each of these states, in particular Nigeria which has embarked on several re-professionalization programs, largely with external support, yet all of these states share a limited knowledge base and weak oversight institutions. In addition, writing in early 2012, the Northern Nigerian body politic and security sector are being stretched to the limit by violence perpetrated by militant Islamic movements such as Boko Haram, whilst the Southern parts of the country suffer under militant groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (Isa 2010; Obi and Rustad 2011).

In a third category, states emerging from years of civil war are grouped together: Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea Bissau and Côte d' Ivoire. The study notes that despite major efforts at disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), little attention was paid to the need to carry out profound transformation of the overall security apparatus. Liberia is singled out as an example of a state in which locally driven reform efforts have been complemented by external assistance. However, in a critical assessment, Adedeji Ebo (2007) warns of the asymmetrical power relationship between local actors and donors. He argues that local ownership ought to entail donor support for programs and projects initiated by local actors rather than local support for donor programmes and projects – which seems to be the reality most of the time. In this view, local participation in externally driven initiatives is not synonymous with local ownership. In addition, Liberia's lessons include the realization of the dangers of outsourcing of SSR to foreign private sector companies, the need to distinguish between a state-centred and society-centred approach to SSR, the problem of a too-narrow SSR focus on the military and police, and the critical need for a collective national vision of security as the basis for any democratic and democratizing security review and process (Ebo 2007: 83–84; see also Smith-Hohn 2010). At the time of writing, the politics of the Côte d'Ivoire remained unpredictable following the dramatic and violent outcome of the disputed 2011 national election, where Outtara and Gbagbo both declared themselves as winners – and president. There is little doubt however that an incomplete and failed security sector reform process, combined with foreign meddling, contributed to the tragedy.

In the final category of West African states, there has been at best only cosmetic political change in the form of tightly controlled liberalization of the pre-existing authoritarian structure (Bryden, N'Diaye and Olonisakin 2008: 332). The resulting regimes in these states – Togo, Guinea and Mauritania – rely on a largely untouched security apparatus, conceived as the regime's repressive arm. The study notes that in each of these countries the security sector is personalized and tightly controlled by close family members or ethnic kin of the head of state. SSR is simply not on the cards as long as the political system is not radically reformed.

Despite the tense politics of the region, the authors found reason for optimism. They identify at least three highlights: a number of states with on-going SSR programmes, ". . . assisted for better or worse by external actors"; increasing recognition of civil society both as a source of expertise and as a key actor in situating security within a broader framework of democratic governance; and the role of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in brokering peace, in planning and executing peacekeeping operations and in the development of norms and standards for promoting democratic governance of the security sector (Bryden, N'Diaye and Olonisakin 2008: 325–236).

However, despite these positive signs, the overall impression remains bleak, with little apparent chance for the development of legitimate, participative and sustainable reform processes across West Africa. The reality is that the few attempts at SSR have been driven by outsiders, there is limited political will to embark on comprehensive processes of SSR, participatory processes are rare, and collective ownership of reform is largely absent.

Horn of Africa and East Africa

In the Horn of Africa, SSR is not only complicated, it is under present conditions a virtual non-starter. Why is this so? In describing the Horn of Africa as a security complex (invoking Buzan's familiar term to describe a group of states held together by shared rivalries), Berouk Mesfin (2011) argues that Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somali and Sudan can collectively be characterized as the most deprived and poorest region in Africa, if not the world. Furthermore, the Horn is the most conflict-ridden region in the world, with conflicts raging sometimes simultaneously within and between states. Due to a range of disasters, the Horn has the highest percentage of refugees and internally displaced people in Africa, a trend that reinforces future cycles of conflict. The nature of state power in the Horn is a key source of conflict – and by extension therefore, a key obstacle to SSR. The Horn's "quarrelsome neighbours" (Apuuli 2011) makes the vision of democratic governance of the security sector a mirage. In Mesfin's view, irrespective of the official form of government, regimes in the Horn are in most cases autocracies relying on ethnic loyalties. The military and security services ensure the hold on power of these militarized regimes. In order to hold on to power, and to hold the state together in the face of claims and attacks by other states and rebels, governing regimes build and maintain military forces of large dimensions. They spend a large share of national expenditure on the military in disproportion to their available economic resources and existing security threats. This excessive military spending has several knock-on effects, including heightened perceptions of mutual threat.

All in all, civil–military relations in the Horn are marked by ". . . a politicised, compromised and restless military with its proneness to usurp state power and resources" (Mesfin 2011: 14). This, Mesfin notes, represents a grave danger to fragile regimes as well as their political and security structures. At the time of writing, the momentous event in Sudan – the successful creation of the new independent Republic of South Sudan in July 2011 – is being overshadowed by reports of ongoing and intensifying violent conflict. South Sudan is at war with at least seven armed groups in nine of its ten states, with tens of thousands displaced, making the quest for SSR a difficult if not impossible task at present.

Neighboring Uganda presents a more nuanced picture of the potential for SSR. In recent years, President Museveni and external donors, in particular the UK, have embarked on a defence review (attracting favourable reviews from some European-based security sector research networks). However, a more critical perspective is offered by Mutengesa and Hendrickson (2008) in a study of security decision-making in Uganda. The study was undertaken in light of a growing tendency for non-statutory and non-state actors to play a prominent role in the Ugandan security domain. The latter was, and continues to be characterized, by various internal and regional security threats, and a range of socio-economic and political factors that acts to enhance insecurity.

The authors found two contradictory impulses in security decision-making. The first relates to the immense concentration of power in the Presidency, which gives rise to the monopolizing of key decision-making events, side-lining other relevant players in the process. The second impulse stems from the proliferation of irregular security actors in Uganda, most of which are state-sanctioned, but which enjoy legitimacy within local communities or ethnic groups. These are not subject to the same mechanisms for oversight and control as statutory bodies, and therefore tend to operate outside any policy framework, driven by parochial concerns. In general then, the study found that these contradictory sources of authority, combined with weak institutional decision-making machinery in Uganda, make it difficult to ensure accountable decision-making, particularly with regard to the promotion of a public security agenda.

The study makes a third significant finding relating to the Ugandan government's relationship with the donor community. Aid dependency, and in particular the specific set of macroeconomic

policies and accompanying poverty-reduction goals agreed with donors, sets the framework for all public policy decisions, including in the security domain. While donors have little or no direct involvement in security decision-making, the overall budget framework within which the security sector operates in practice determines what kind of policies are possible. Within these confines, the Ugandan government does not enjoy full sovereignty over security matters. Put together, these three impulses indicate the limits to the possibilities for advancing the democratic governance of the security sector.

Southern Africa

The fifteen member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) profess a common vision of regional integration, based on a shared liberation history and commitment to the evolution of common democratic governance principles and practices. Although primarily an economic integration project, SADC has created a comprehensive peace and security architecture, on par with that of ECOWAS, and in line with the African Union's expectations for a harmonized and integrated peace and security architecture (Van Nieuwkerk 2011). Despite this, SSR is not formally recognized as a policy priority. Yet, informally, the principles and objectives underlying SSR are implicitly accepted and applied by the majority of SADC members.

Unlike North or Central Africa, academic research and policy-relevant analysis are undertaken by a range of established Southern African institutions, of which four stand out: the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and the Southern African Defence and Security Management network (SADSEM). Their cumulative research output enables us to put forward two perspectives on the state of SSR in Southern Africa: South Africa as a successful case of SSR and the DRC as a failed case of SSR.

The status of SSR in South Africa

Ending apartheid minority rule in favour of liberal democratic governance remains a popular South African story, even if the gloss has worn off since the climatic turning point in 1994 – the year in which the ANC came to power. Seventeen years on, the South African body politic seems infected by cynical political practices, which in combination with the country's enduring poverty and inequality profile, threaten to undo the miracle transition. A broad perspective ought to allow us to identify the relative success of this transition, particularly in terms of its security dimension. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the South African state and society became increasingly militarized, but as the end of apartheid arrived, the 1990s became an era of demilitarization (Schoeman 2007). As argued by Sandy Africa, the seeds of transformation of the security sector were planted in the 1990s during the political transition that led to democracy. A favourable climate made SSR possible, including visionary and mature political leadership, the contributions of civil society activists, and the existence of functional and cohesive security entities (Africa 2011: 29; Nathan 2007: 98). Sandy Africa however provides a cautionary tale: her description of the political climate at the time of the transition is about a narrow window of opportunity. She notes, for example, that the suspension of armed hostilities between the apartheid government and the liberation movements was fraught with tension and suspicion. Complicated technical issues (indemnity, creation of transitional structures, violence by spoilers, a difficult DDR process) reminded all players of the high stakes – an unmanageable security sector and reform process could have wrecked the transition to democracy. Nevertheless, agreements reached during that time about the role of the security

sector opened the door to a longer-term agenda. The much-celebrated post-apartheid constitution has created a strong base for South Africa's SSR process. Africa lists the achievements: demographic representation, redressing racial and gender imbalances, the introduction of multiparty oversight institutions, the creation of an independent complaint mechanism and the promotion of the rule of law (Africa 2011: 30). To this one might add the conscious attempt to integrate the South African security sector (especially the military) into the security architecture of the SADC and AU.

All in all, the South African story is one of a successful attempt to redesign and transform civil–military relations from apartheid-style military control of society to democratic governance of the security sector. Laurie Nathan presents a useful case of inclusive SSR design in his description of the South African White Paper on Defence of 1996. The aims of the policy framework were: to bring defence policy in line with the new constitution and emerging democratic practices; to offer a high-level platform for the further transformation of the defence force; to forge national consensus on defence and in so doing, legitimacy on the policy and the defence force; and to serve as a confidence-building measure in Southern Africa. As Nathan (2007: 98–99) notes, the preparation and finalization of the white paper were time-consuming, complicated and often adversarial because of opposing interests of participating parties. Yet, it bore dividends: the white paper enjoyed public acclaim, it marked a decisive break with apartheid-era defence policy, it conferred legitimacy on the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), it was supported by all political parties, and it provided the platform for transforming the armed forces and civil–military relations over the next decade.

However, it must be noted that the effectiveness of the post-apartheid security sector has been uneven. In broad terms, the government and state are unable to provide human security which gives rise to the massive problems of crime and corruption; the intelligence services have been embroiled in the politics of the ruling party; government and the armed forces became involved in a controversial arms procurement scandal; the police is in drastic need of better management and policing skills; the criminal justice system remains in crisis; certain members of the security sector – correctional services, immigration – are not fully integrated; and policy frameworks require renewal and harmonization. Broadly, the question of South Africa's regional, continental and global role as a security provider (or peacemaker and peacekeeper, as diplomats prefer to describe it) and the resources required for its effective operationalization, remain a source of much debate in society.

Overall then, the South African security services – military, police, intelligence and criminal justice sector – currently enjoy greater legitimacy than they did under apartheid. But this is no longer adequate. The country's security sector has been politicized and is in drastic need of an overhaul. Political imperatives (essentially the abuse of state resources by elements of the ruling party) and timing, count against a smooth "second generation" SSR process. The experience of defence transformation in South Africa illustrates that major SSR is a protracted and complex endeavour – as Nathan (2007: 98) points out, the construction of the necessary policy frameworks took eight years – and that under relatively favourable conditions. The transformation of the security sector beyond the military is similarly an intensely political activity and time-consuming, requiring, in Africa's view, renewed leadership, creative ideas and a determined social pact between state and citizen to address the needs and role of the country (Africa 2011: 30). At the time of writing, separate foreign and defence policy reviews were under way in South Africa. Given these windows of opportunity, it is worth re-emphasizing the need for security sector decision-makers to understand current and future drivers of change, both nationally and externally, their impact on the country's national security and the need for thoughtful, integrated long-term responses.

The status of SSR in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The DRC, a country situated in central Africa but formally a member of the SADC, has experienced many decades of instability and violent conflict – the bitter fruit of its colonial experience, the impact of the Cold War, its mineral riches, and because of the excesses of personalized rule. As the International Crisis Group commented in 2006:

> Reforming the Congo's security services is a difficult challenge. Government structures remain weak and largely ineffective, in some regions almost non-existent. The Congo still hosts a confusing array of militia forces often backed by outside powers and interests, and its mineral wealth and weak border controls have allowed many of these to become in effect self-sustaining. The economy is in tatters, and ethnic and regional fault-lines are both many and deep.
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> *ICG 2006a: 1*

For years, even decades, the army, and to a lesser degree, the police did not exist to provide security for the public in any normal sense but were primarily predatory organs used by politicians and officers to pursue individual political aims and economic goals while perpetrating massive human rights abuses. Today's security system is a direct outgrowth of the structures set in place under colonial rule and maintained during Mobutu Sese Seko's dictatorship: an omnipresent, overstretched army with a weak police.

It is against this background that a tenuous transition to democracy unfolded with the creation of a transitional government in 2003 and national elections in 2006. As part of the transition, the international community sought to introduce SSR in the DRC. This was seen by many as a key priority for the DRC; yet, the lack of a broad national debate on SSR policy and programing priorities compromised the initiative. This lack of political will and the consequent weak start of the SSR project were due to the way impunity was entrenched in the political and military classes. The late Henri Boshoff noted that attempts to create a national Republican army with clear lines of command and control, as well as democratic oversight, challenged the power bases and income-generating sources of influential people (Boshoff 2009: 1). Subsequent efforts to implement an SSR initiative from 2003 onwards met with resistance and delays, partly because of on-going violence in the eastern DRC, the non-completion of the DDR process, the lack of political will on the part of the Congolese government, and competition between donor countries.

To examine the state of play in mid-2010, following the adoption in 2008 of a master plan for military reform by the DRC government and key donors, we draw on Philippe Asanzi's useful coverage of four key dimensions of the DRC security sector (Asanzi 2010). Regarding the defence sector, in 2003 the transitional government decided to create, through a process of *brassage*, eighteen brigades and one rapid reaction force. By the time of the elections in 2006, only fifteen integrated brigades had been formed. The *brassage* process was flawed due to poor conceptualization and limited financial resources. The cohesion and performance of the integrated brigades was weak and the military of the DRC (FARDC) was an ill-disciplined, ill-trained, divided and dysfunctional institution, associated with severe human rights violations. After the 2006 elections the reform of the military was obstructed by conflicting visions of the future defence structures between the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Staff. In addition, the defence reform process has been dogged by inconsistencies in the use of resources. Military commanders opposed the EU project, which sought to separate the chain of payment from the chain of command in order to stop the embezzlement of soldiers' pay by military commanders. In 2009, the new Minister of

Defence restricted the mission of the military to the defence of the territorial integrity of the state. A new master plan for reform of the military has since been developed, emphasising training and the rejuvenation of personnel, amongst others. In general, the defence reform agenda in the DRC remains a challenge due to political, financial and logistical factors.

Regarding the police, a prime objective of the transitional government, with the support of the international community, was to set up a police unit capable of securing the elections. A special unit – the rapid intervention force – was created to serve this purpose. After the elections, the focus of police reform shifted to the conceptualization of structures and functions of the Congolese national police. A consultative group was established which produced recommendations and drafted legislation. Since 2003, thousands of police officers had received training from various partner states including South Africa, Angola, France and Belgium. However, many challenges remain: police officers are not well paid and are often alleged to be involved in human rights violations. In addition the police still have military status and contain many former soldiers.

The intelligence agencies of the DRC have largely been excluded from the SSR processes by the government of the DRC. Due to overlapping mandates and tasking, the intelligence agencies often compete against each other. Further governance challenges lie in the lack of oversight as the president solely controls the intelligence agencies. The latter are perceived to be involved in human rights violations, especially against opponents of the ruling regime.

Reform of the judiciary as well as the penal sector had gained momentum in recent years, bolstered by EU and UN funding. In 2007, the government presented a plan that sought to resolve structural problems in the management of the judiciary, including human resource and financial management. Government had also initiated a series of draft papers aimed at restructuring the judiciary through the establishment of new jurisdictions. Several prisons around the country had been rehabilitated. Despite these measures, the Congolese judiciary remained plagued by many challenges such as corruption, poor remuneration, job insecurity and political interference.

Oversight mechanisms, especially parliament and civil society, have been unable to hold the executive to account, especially on sensitive issues such as the reform of the security forces and the unlawful conduct of members of the security services. Civil society has been actively engaged in SSR in the DRC especially in the areas of military and police reform. Despite this, it still faces challenges in terms of limited expertise and lack of cooperation from the government, if not outright hostility and alleged violence.

North Africa

The events of the Arab Spring during 2010 and 2011 have irrevocably changed the politics of Tunisia, Libya and Egypt but left ruling regimes in Morocco, Algeria and the oil kingdoms of Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia relatively unscathed. Yemen and Syria seem embroiled in violent uprisings with no end in sight. Although a mixed record, these unfolding dynamics offer a unique opportunity for democratic transformation throughout North Africa and the Middle East. With a better understanding of the opportunities and limitation of SSR in the African context, to what extent can it be applied to the transitional states of North Africa? The challenges are immense. The transition states of the region have inherited repressive, corrupt, and outsized security institutions with histories of acting with impunity – as Sedra (2011) comments, the Arab Spring can partially be considered a reaction not only to the excesses of individual dictators, but to the abuses and indignities citizens suffered at the hands of their predatory security establishments. There is no doubt that Egyptians, Tunisians and Libyans need to experience drastic change in their security establishments if they are to believe in the transition

and must be educated in the responsibilities of security institutions in a democratic polity: goals that are at the heart of SSR. In Egypt, the central issue is how to loosen the stranglehold of the security institutions over Egyptian society: a complex, long-term process requiring ". . . a great, great deal of stamina" (Aclimandos 2011).

Several incremental, problem-solving entry points are possible: countering corruption, promoting transitional justice and police reform, empowering civil society, and enabling democratic civilian control of the security sector. However, effecting SSR in North Africa is a risky affair, for obvious reasons. The legacy of the Western patronage of Arab dictatorships has ruined the credibility of Western-driven SSR. The role of the US military and intelligence services in the region was particularly problematic, and remains so, given its policy objectives, such as: counter-terrorism, containing Iran, access for naval bases, stabilizing Iraq, maintaining relations with Israel, and energy security (Sedra 2011: 11). If SSR gains a foothold in the region, it faces the problem of coordination. The experience of Western-driven SSR in the DRC shows that SSR interventions are often accompanied by competition, conflicting and even contradictory SSR programing. The US approach to SSR is rather different from the European approach and in addition, the impact on SSR funding of the unfolding Western public debt crisis still has to be calculated. Finally, SSR programs should be sensitive to the reality of regional differences. Reformers must be alert to the ever-present possibility of counter-revolution, or an escalation of violent conflict. The region appears to be splitting into two camps: the revolutionary (Egypt, Libya, Bahrain) and reforming (Tunisia, Morocco) states versus the counter-revolutionary states (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Syria).

Overall then, SSR will undoubtedly become a key ingredient in the long-term transformation of the politics and security of the North African region, but short-term, formulaic Western notions of SSR can hardly bring about the democratic management of its security sectors. If anything, the Western and US legacy has made its current role in SSR a poisoned chalice, best avoided altogether. The focus should rather shift to indigenous capacity in Africa to play a supporting role in the process. To this end, the newly created SSR policy framework of the AU and the various networks of SSR expertise can be called upon to close the gap – including bringing the Arab League into the SSR fold.

A continental approach to SSR?

The mandate for the development of a continental SSR policy framework was created by a decision of the African Union (AU) Assembly in February 2008 which "encourages the Commission to develop a comprehensive AU policy framework on SSR, within the context of the policy framework on post-conflict reconstruction and development . . . of 2006" (AU 2011). Three years later, having gone through an elaborate series of consultations, a final draft policy was finalized for consideration and adoption by the AU Executive Council scheduled for early 2012.

The August 2011 version of the draft AU policy framework on security sector reform contains thirteen sections addressing the following key themes: (a) rationale, scope and aims; (b) principles; (c) prohibitions; (d) key elements of SSR programming; (e) gender mainstreaming; (f) vulnerable groups and the rehabilitation of ex-combatants, veterans, refugees and internally displaced persons; (g) continental implementation strategies; (h) the role of African civil society in SSR; (i) relations with cooperating partners; and (j) AU Commission implementation mechanisms and development of guiding tools.

Many aspects of the draft AU policy framework are innovative, including a dedicated focus on gender and vulnerable groups. Three additional aspects of the draft policy are striking.

Firstly, it has opted for comprehensive and inclusive definitions. It describes a security sector as comprising ". . . individuals, groups and institutions responsible for the provision, management and oversight of security for the people and the state . . ." including ". . . primary security institutions, intelligence, public oversight and management bodies, justice and rule of law institutions, civil emergency units and non-state security bodies" (AU 2011: 5–6). It defines security sector reform (SSR) as

> the process by which countries formulate or re-orient the policies, structures, and capacities of institutions and groups engaged in the security sector, in order to make them more effective, efficient, and responsive to democratic control, and to the security and justice needs of the people.
>
> *AU 2011: 6*

It equates SSR with security sector governance, security sector transformation, security sector development, security sector review as well as security and justice reform. This strikes one as odd, given that these various concepts have specific meanings and foci.

Secondly, it calls for active – if not activist – implementation strategies (it requires regular review of the security sector at least once every ten years). Briefly, the four objectives of the draft policy are to: (1) provide a framework for members and RECs to undertake SSR processes; (2) provide a platform for SSR training and capacity-building; (3) guide SSR relationships between external actors and the AU, RECs and member states; and (4) serve to contribute as Africans to the global SSR framework of the UN. The draft's ten principles underscore this direct approach, by insisting that SSR processes form part of the emerging continental African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), as well as a broader democratization process, and by giving special attention to national ownership (including subjecting external support to nationally defined visions of security and SSR), the role of informal and customary security providers, gender, and coordination of assistance.

Thirdly, the draft carefully defines the limits to SSR. These include the prohibition of internal and external SSR activities which may impact negatively on member states' sovereignty, ". . . including the use of SSR to effect regime change in a member state" (AU 2011: 12), the use of children in armed forces, and the use of mercenaries. The draft policy also "deplores" the use of private military companies in SSR and requires the use of private security companies to conform to certain legal frameworks.

The heart of the draft policy is located in section D, which describes in some detail nine key (it also calls them fundamental and core) elements on which SSR programs must be based. Participating member states – regarded as the primary providers of peace and security – are expected to undertake security sector review and needs assessments every ten years, produce a national security strategy, ensure SSR programs are based on sound and adequate legal and security policy frameworks (could this be a contradiction or is it a question of proper sequencing of activities?), undertake comprehensive capacity-building programs, maintain equal partnerships with external actors and in fact conduct partnership analyses, commit to strengthening instruments for democratic oversight of the security sector, finance national SSR processes and fund the security sector on an annual budget basis – but may coordinate with other stakeholders to ensure sustainability of funding, develop and implement sector-wide and results-based mechanisms for the monitoring and evaluation of SSR processes, and finally, run an effective communications strategy to inform stakeholders (including the public) of developments in the SSR process.

Apart from the key role of member states, the AU and RECs have particular roles in implementing SSR. The draft policy expects the AU to perform a rather exhaustive list of

functions in rolling out the continental SSR strategy and the RECs are expected to play a supportive role via coordination, financial support, and in general, support to the AU.

Finally, the draft policy is alive to the requirement for carefully constructed relationships in the design and delivery of SSR processes. It recognizes the supportive role of stakeholders or players in the non-state sector and elsewhere and identifies three of these: African civil society, the UN, and cooperating partners (broadly, the donor community).

How successful will this policy framework on SSR be? There are different measures of success. In the short term, the collective adoption of the draft by the AU political leadership and member states will be an indicator of success. In the medium term, the translation of policy intent by implementing projects and programs flowing from the framework will be another measure of success. The extent to which Africans – states and civil society – will work together with external partners such as the UN or the donor community in implementing aspects of the policy, will be used as a further measure of success.

But ultimately, when governments adopt democratic measures to steer the security sector, and when members of the security sector are able to provide security to their people and states, confident of their governance structures, effectiveness and efficiency, and when in the process peace and human security are advanced, then one can speak of policy success.

Are African governments, officials, security sector members and societies at large in a position to meet these high expectations? The policy framework makes serious demands on the time, energy and resources of African states, the AU, RECs, and their leaders. Medhane Tadesse, in a critical analysis of the AU's Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) policy framework, puts his finger on the key weakness in the entire endeavour: the capacity of the state. He calls it the elephant in the room (Tadesse 2010). The argument is simple: how can weak or fragile states undertake complex security sector reform programs when states themselves are in need of reform, if not transformation? There are no easy answers, except to say that the African state (or legislatures and judiciaries) cannot be replaced or bypassed in terms of delivering human security. Where these are weak and being abused or marginalized by ruling elites, the objective will have to be to strengthen and recover their legitimacy.

Tadesse takes a radical view on the issue. He argues that an SSR policy framework for Africa (if it is not going to remain superficial) has to address the central question of the gap between the state and society. What is at stake, he believes, is the disarticulation of the state in Africa. Many states cannot deliver even basic security. SSR could help by creating strong states that can deliver. For him, SSR should be grounded in a fundamental rethinking of the state and the inherited (post-colonial) security institutions and concepts, which have been manifestly problematic under African conditions. Without prejudging outcomes, this kind of thinking might become necessary if SSR is to survive and grow in Africa. Such a rethink should not be confined to high-level bureaucrats, politicians or NGO experts and consultants. With peace and security at stake, nothing less than an open public discourse will do.

Conclusion

This chapter found that SSR is a liberal concept largely used by Western donors in their attempts to restructure a recipient country's security sector, or improve its performance, especially as it emerges from conflict. The concept shows great promise – namely, the enhancement of democratic governance and oversight of the security sector, as well its efficient and effective management – but has been interpreted variably over time, resulting in conceptual diffusion. However more critical is a widespread suspicion of its underlying political motives, especially as it has become clear that SSR is a front for some external players to shape recipients' security

agendas in their interest, and not necessarily to enhance a suffering population's access to human security or development prospects.

In Africa, there is a discernible tension between supporters of the orthodox school of SSR (the state-centric approach) and the post-liberal state school of SSR (the non-state sector and local ownership approach). Donors prefer the former approach whilst African actors involved in SSR support the latter. However, critically, both approaches suffer from a fundamental flaw, namely their inability to take fully into consideration the nature of the state in Africa. Weak, disarticulated and abused, the African state has become a tool of accumulation by ruling elites, and as such cannot serve as a base for meaningful SSR. Our survey of SSR experiences in the various regions of Africa supports this conclusion.

The chapter shows that SSR stands a better chance at success under certain conditions. Authoritarian rule, leading to fragile or failing states and in extreme cases, violent conflict and war, is not conducive to SSR. Societies emerging from conflict and entering a period of recovery, leading to the emergence of democratic rule, are more open to SSR. In particular, the transition to peace stage seems the most opportune period for SSR. This stage is characterized by the establishment of a government, implementing reforms including socio-economic revitalization, and the promotion of societal reconciliation. This has implications for introducing SSR during critical transitions in Africa, especially those experiencing people's revolutions. Tunisia, Libya and Egypt in North Africa, the DRC in central Africa, and Somalia and Sudan in the greater Horn region, all need to progress with transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule before SSR is fully introduced. Arguably, these countries are not yet at the peace building transition or consolidation phases, but rather at a prior moment in their transitions, namely conflict cessation (see Figure 11.1). In these delicate times the role of outsiders become critical because they can determine the security agendas for weak, fragile or broken states and in the process promote or badly damage prospects for comprehensive SSR. The role of the US for example in North Africa is under deep suspicion.

The African Union might take decisive steps to advance a progressive and comprehensive African-driven SSR policy framework, but as the discussion above noted, it might suffer from expecting too much from those expected to implement SSR, whether national actors, Regional Economic Communities, or the AU itself.

In conclusion, important lessons can be extracted from the South African experience of SSR, upheld by many as a model to follow. The reality is that each case of SSR needs to be understood in its own context. Local conditions, practices, resources and relations with external players will determine the extent to which an SSR agenda can be driven, and at what speed. In South Africa's case, although the country can rightfully claim to have fundamentally transformed its security sector, it should also be understood that the effectiveness of the post-apartheid security sector has been uneven. The South African government and state are unable to provide human security which gives rise to the massive problems of crime and corruption; the intelligence services have been embroiled in the politics of the ruling party; government and the armed forces became involved in a controversial arms procurement scandal; the police is in drastic need of better management and policing skills; the criminal justice system remains in crisis; certain members of the security sector – correctional services, immigration – are not fully integrated; and policy frameworks require renewal and harmonization. All in all, South Africa is in need of a security sector overhaul.

12

HUMANITARIAN AID AND CONFLICT

From humanitarian neutralism to humanitarian intervention

Terrence Lyons

Introduction

This chapter explores humanitarian assistance both as a source of support to war-torn societies and as a facilitator of conflict itself. It outlines how humanitarian aid played key roles in responding to complex emergencies in Ethiopia and Sudan in the 1980s and in Somalia and the Great Lakes region in the 1990s. In part in response to these tragedies, humanitarian organizations developed "Do No Harm" principles and the international community considered the principles that could justify humanitarian intervention. After the attacks on New York and the Pentagon in 2001, new challenges to humanitarian assistance developed as the lines between civilian and military interventions in weak states blurred and some worried that "New Humanitarianism" was becoming a tool to help win hearts and minds as part of a counter-counterinsurgency agenda.

Classic humanitarianism

Humanitarian assistance was conceived initially as the impartial, independent, and neutral provision of aid to those who suffered from natural disaster or war (Barnett and Weiss 2008). Henri Dunant's experience witnessing the aftermath of the Battle of Solferino shaped early thinking and the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross. This understanding of humanitarianism emphasized charity motivated by its own moral imperatives (Rieff 2002). In its pure form humanitarian assistance requires no additional rationale. As de Waal writes, "Humanitarianism is hugely self-justifying" (de Waal 1997: 4). Others, however, insist that humanitarian assistance should contribute to a larger goal of preventing wars and resolving conflicts (Ignatieff 2005). This tension has often been particularly strong in relation to Africa's conflicts, from the civil war in Biafra, to the Ethiopian famine, to state collapse in Somalia and Liberia, to the genocide in Rwanda, to massive deaths and displacements of populations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Darfur, and to the protection of civilians in Libya.

In Africa, untold numbers of lives have been saved by humanitarian agencies operating under extremely difficult, dangerous conditions. The consequences of conflict are horrific and victims' needs are great. But conceptualizing the provision of assistance as apolitical and neutral distorts how resources inherently shape conflicts. Ignoring the politics behind a humanitarian emergency either allows assistance to reinforce war dynamics or to feed victims one day so that they may die the next – creating the "well-fed dead". Conflict and humanitarianism are deeply intertwined concepts. Preventing humanitarian crises without eliminating the constructive and liberating aspects of conflict on the one hand, and preventing humanitarian crises without providing the resources that make conflicts more destructive on the other, remain fundamental dilemmas.

Biafra and the invention of modern humanitarian aid

The civil war in Nigeria (1967–1970) and the ensuing mass starvation in Biafra provide an early example of these challenges. In 1968 images of Biafran children with kwashiorkor and distended bellies caught the world's attention and seemed to represent an unambiguous example of suffering innocents. The call to action was powerful because one seemingly could assist the victims without reference to strategic calculations:

> Here was a non-ideological ideology of engagement that allowed one, a quarter of a century after Auschwitz, not to be a bystander, and, at the same time, not to be identified with power: to stand always with the victim, in solidarity, with clean hands—healing hands.
>
> *Gourevitch 2010: 1*

While many saw the Biafran famine as an apolitical humanitarian crisis, the resources such assistance provided allowed the secessionists to continue fighting. Indeed Smillie described the intervention as "an act of unfortunate and profound folly" that prolonged the war and contributed to the deaths of some 180,000 people (Smillie 1995: 104; Pérouse 2009).

Biafra helped launch the "humanitarian-aid business as we know it today" (Gourevitch 2010: 1). Some organizations, such as Oxfam, came to regard their assistance in Biafra and their deviation from the norms of neutrality as a mistake but others saw it as a model for politically engaged humanitarianism. In France Bernard Kouchner started the International Committee against Genocide in Biafra that then transformed itself into Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (Allen and Styan 2000). Biafra set the frame for humanitarian action and violent conflict and indicates where some of the enduring tensions consistently arise.

Complex humanitarian emergencies and the Ethiopian famine

The political implications and the potential for humanitarian aid to make conflicts more protracted became apparent in the 1980s and 1990s. Humanitarian activities could not be positioned outside the dynamics of violence and contentious politics. Particularly in the Horn of Africa, war, forced displacement, hunger and disease all contributed to a massive humanitarian crisis in which more died from famine than combat. Furthermore, such "Complex Humanitarian Emergencies" were not the result of drought but were man-made and essentially political or politicized crises. As Macrae and Zwi argued, "Humanitarian crises are intentionally created, and powerful political and economic pressures strive to ensure that they are sustained in order to achieve their objectives

of cultural genocide and political and economic power" (Macrae and Zwi 1994: 21). Apolitical humanitarianism may be possible following tsunamis or earthquakes but is impossible in the context of large-scale violence where actors made powerful by the conflict dominate and can manipulate access (Prendergast 1996). In war-torn states, the most powerful rather than most vulnerable typically get the largest share of humanitarian assistance.

The Ethiopian famine of the mid-1980s became a key case in the evolving understanding of humanitarian assistance and conflict (Gill 2010). The aid provided by Band Aid concerts and the royalties collected from the pop song "Do They Know It's Christmas" kept many Ethiopians alive but also allowed both the military government and insurgent groups to remain engaged in a bloody conflict. Humanitarian aid is fungible and resources spent on food and medical assistance to famine victims frees up other resources for military spending.

The regime in Ethiopia known as the Derg used famine as a weapon of war. The military government attacked marketplaces, for example, to prevent food from reaching areas in need and to consequently force the populations into displaced camps where they could be controlled and resettled (de Waal 1991). The market town of Hawzen, for example, was virtually obliterated in June 1988 as bombing and strafing killed an estimated 1,800 in a single day (Gill 2010: 61). The regime used forced relocation to depopulate Tigray province and other areas where the insurgents found support. Ethiopian officials were clear: "food is a major element in our strategy against the secessionist" (Korn 1986: 137). Providing humanitarian assistance in such a context required an understanding of the dynamics of the conflict or else risked exacerbating the very condition such aid was designed to alleviate.

Different humanitarian actors had different responses to the politics of hunger in Ethiopia. When faced with large-scale forced displacement, for example, the humanitarian community divided sharply over whether to provide assistance to alleviate suffering or to disengage and speak out on behalf of the victims. Some international non-governmental organizations (notably MSF) criticized resettlement and ended their work in Ethiopia while others (notably Oxfam and Save the Children) judged that humanitarian imperatives justified continuing assistance. A number of humanitarian organizations from northern Europe worked together through the Emergency Relief Desk and funneled humanitarian assistance from Sudan to rebel-held areas of Tigray and Eritrea without the authorization of the Ethiopian regime. This placed some humanitarian groups quite close to the rebel movements with whom they worked to distribute aid (Prendergast 1996). As in Biafra in the 1960s, Ethiopia in the 1980s highlighted how humanitarian assistance shapes conflict dynamics.

The post-Cold War world and humanitarian intervention: Somali and Rwanda

During the Cold War, superpower competition prevented the United Nations from playing an effective role in managing conflicts. In the 1990s, however, international interventions to end wars in Africa became more common. In some cases, such as Namibia and Mozambique, the warring parties signed peace agreements and requested the UN's assistance in implementing the settlements. Cases where the state had collapsed or where warring parties had not reached a ceasefire posed more difficult challenges and less successful interventions. These cases required a much more assertive kind of "humanitarian intervention" that could use military force to reach vulnerable populations. Roberts defined humanitarian intervention as "coercive action by one or more states involving the use of armed force in another state without the consent of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among the

inhabitants" (Roberts 2002; see also Weiss 2012). The tension between the use of armed force and the prevention of suffering is at the core of humanitarian intervention. Two tragic cases – Somalia and Rwanda – demonstrate how these policies respond to conflict.

Somalia

The politicization of humanitarian aid had a long history in Somalia. In the 1980s, Siyad Barre used humanitarian relief to reward his supporters and to keep refugees in camps in order to keep Somalia's irredentist claims to the Ogaden region of neighboring Ethiopia. The regime grossly overestimated the number of refugees (with the knowledge of a number of international donors and agencies) in order to maximize the amount of relief and for politically connected middlemen to exploit. Furthermore, Ogadeni refugees were recruited into Barre's army, providing troops in the civil war against rival clans in northwest Somalia. By the early 1990s Barre's strategy of divide and rule supplemented with brutal repression and scorched earth campaigns could no longer keep opposition insurgent groups at bay and his regime collapsed.

Following the demise of the regime in 1991, factional leaders, or "warlords" as they were known, created a massive humanitarian emergency. Looting was pervasive and key agricultural regions were attacked, displacing millions and destroying the market's ability to distribute food. Competing coalitions of clan-based militias fought for control over economically valuable land, particularly around ports and airfields where resources could be captured and trade "taxed" or looted. Humanitarian agencies were "captured" by whatever clan militia controlled their area of operation. Militia leaders demanded that their fighters serve as security guards and that their property be rented at high rates in exchange for the protection that was necessary to operate. These extortion payments to militia leaders were the price of doing business in the face of famine (Menkaus 2010: S324).

The resulting famine cost an estimated 300,000 lives and led to the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in July 1992. This limited deployment, however, could not end the fighting and the consequent famine. The Bush administration, defeated in the November 1992 elections, decided to take action and organized a military coalition to secure southern Somalia so that food and other humanitarian supplies could move. This US-led coalition (Unified Task Force, or UNITAF) entered Somalia in December 1992 and launched Operation Restore Hope. The mission was explicitly justified on humanitarian grounds and the fact that the great powers had little interest in Somalia was seen as evidence of the operation's non-political objectives (Clarke and Herbst 1997). Bush's speech announcing the intervention stated, "The people of Somalia, especially the children of Somalia, need our help. We're able to ease their suffering. We must help them live. We must give them hope" (Bush 1992: 2). This emphasis on children and suffering echoed the appeals for humanitarian assistance to the victims of the Biafran conflict in 1968 and the popular campaigns to raise money for Ethiopia in the 1980s. It did not, however, recognize the inevitable long-term political implications of humanitarian interventions and how a massive deployment of external resources would inherently transform the conflict in Somalia (Lyons and Samatar 1995).

In June 1993, most of the US forces withdrew and UNOSOM II replaced UNITAF. Mohamed Farrah Aideed, one of the most powerful militia leaders in Mogadishu, saw UNOSOM II as a threat to his power and attacked Pakistani peacekeepers. The ensuing effort to capture Aideed resulted in terrible casualties among Somalis and peacekeepers, including the tragic violence in October when seventeen US Army Rangers were killed in what is popularly known

as the "Black Hawk Down" incident (Bowden 1999). American forces quickly withdrew, as did the United Nations two years later.

The intervention in Somalia was presented and justified as a purely humanitarian operation to provide food to the vulnerable facing famine. Washington claimed that it did not favor any faction but intended to keep its focus limited and apolitical. The introduction of massive resources and external troops, however, inevitably shifted the political calculations of local factional leaders. Some argue that the US-led initiative succeeded in ending the humanitarian emergency while the UN operation failed to address the requirements of state building (Mandelbaum 1996; see also Clarke and Herbst 1997). But this distinction is not viable in practice and humanitarian aid always has political impact and may either exacerbate or help manage conflict.

For the humanitarian agencies on the ground, the introduction of troops transformed their operating environment from one of high insecurity but complete autonomy to one of temporarily improved security, but with much greater operational constraints (Menkhaus 2010: S325). After the withdrawal of UN forces in 1995, humanitarian actors had to negotiate access village by village. Over time, these negotiations became quite routinized and those humanitarian agencies that sought to be operational managed to work despite the lack of security. Most subcontracted food aid deliveries to local contractors, shifting the burden of operating in an insecure environment from the humanitarian agencies to Somali actors. Humanitarian assistance could be done without external military forces but not without political implications.

Rwanda

Somalia was portrayed by many in the policy community, particularly in Washington, as a cautionary tale against humanitarian intervention. As in Bosnia, Haiti, and in other cases of conflict in the early 1990s, the international community struggled to understand and put in place appropriate policies in response to the disorder that followed the Cold War. Washington worried that humanitarian interventions too often became entangled in local conflicts in areas of little strategic significance and hence reversed its early enthusiasm for the idea. Fears of "another Somalia" contributed to how Washington and New York perceived the dangers in Rwanda in 1994 and to the decision to withdraw UN peacekeepers in the face of genocide in that same year.

The 1994 genocide in Rwanda represented one of the most tragic instances where the framework of humanitarianism clashed with the imperatives of combating massive human rights abuses and genocide. The international community demonstrated complacency and indifference in the face of horrific acts of brutality (Barnett 2002). When Canadian General Romero Dallaire and other UN officials on the ground urged more forceful action, Washington and New York recalled the lessons they had learned in Somalia and refused to expand the mandate or the capabilities of the international peacekeeping force. Peacekeeping was impossible, the argument went, so long as there was no "peace to keep" and that the temptation to allow humanitarian imperatives create mission creep was the bigger danger. Fear of "crossing the Mogadishu line" and expanding a humanitarian mission placed sharp limits on what the United Nations could do (Walter and Herbst 1996).

While unwilling to engage in the violence and complicated politics of Rwanda, the international community responded quickly to the humanitarian crisis created by massive and rapid flows of refugees into eastern Zaire. An estimated 800,000 Rwandans crossed into Goma,

Zaire, over four days in late July and by the end of August the UN estimated that over two million Rwandan refugees had fled to neighboring countries (United Nations 1999). This seemed like a more straightforward humanitarian mission where the international community could fly in tents, food, and clean water and provide desperately needed assistance to vulnerable populations. Ex-Rwandan army soldiers and others implicated in the genocide (the *interahamwe*), however, were present within the large populations of displaced. These armed groups used the resources and protection of the refugee camps, to reorganize and engage in cross-border attacks into Rwanda. A number of prominent international NGOs concluded that they could not continue to work in a context where armed actors linked to the genocide were in control of the camps and the distribution of humanitarian assistance. The UN requested international peacekeeping troops to separate the civilians from the military units in the camps but none were volunteered (Stedman and Tanner 2003).

As a result of Somalia and Rwanda, humanitarian agencies understood the unintentional consequences that resulted from their operations in areas divided by conflict and distrust. Mary B. Anderson and colleagues formulated a "Do No Harm" approach to humanitarian activities. Those who operated in these contexts identified ways in which international humanitarian assistance given in conflict settings might be provided so that, rather than exacerbating and worsening the conflict, it helped local people disengage from fighting and develop systems for settling the problems which prompted conflict within their societies (Anderson 1999).

New norms for humanitarian intervention

In the aftermath of Somalia and Rwanda and with the continuing frustrations in Sudan, Liberia, and Angola, the international community began to reassess humanitarian intervention. Some proposed sharp limits on the use of force in pursuit of secondary, humanitarian objectives. In the mid-1990s the Clinton administration formulated Presidential Decision Directive 25. Somalia and the miscalculations in Haiti and Bosnia led Washington to be more "selective and more effective" in its peace operations and only to commit U.S. troops when it served U.S. national interests and would not place U.S. troops under UN command (Clinton 1994). National Security Advisor Anthony Lake explained that the president wanted to "save every child" but that "the reality is that we cannot often solve other people's problems; we can never build their nations for them" (Clark 1994: 2).

At the same time, however, a number of scholars and diplomats began to articulate a set of new norms to guide and legitimate humanitarian intervention. A group of Africanist scholars and policy makers proposed a "Sovereignty as Responsibility" framework. Sovereignty, the argument went, should no longer be seen as protection for abusive regimes but rather a charge of responsibility where the state is accountable to both domestic and external constituencies. By suggesting the sovereignty was derived from responsible behavior (defined in terms of protecting human dignity) rather than by power and control, the argument shifted from the rights of the potential interveners to the responsibilities of those "irresponsible" states that failed to protect their own citizens (Deng et al. 1996). These ideas were further developed and popularized by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty that labeled its framework as the "Responsibility to Protect" (Gareth and Sahnoun 2001; 2002). Under this doctrine, intervention by the international community was only warranted if civilians faced a threat of "serious and irreparable harm", as for instance genocide or massive ethnic cleansing. Short of these particular types of violence, however, consensus on responsibility and humanitarian

intervention broke down. Many leaders in Africa and other developing states criticized the report's explicit weakening of the norm of non-interference in a state's sovereign affairs and argued that humanitarian intervention had the potential to become a new form of neo-imperial use of force.

"New Wars" and "New Humanitarianism"

In the late 1990s and 2000s, many analysts began to emphasize the role of resources rather than ideology in shaping civil wars. In a popular article by Robert Kaplan, West Africa in particular was portrayed as a zone of state collapse, environmental disaster, and violence (Kaplan 1994). Paul Collier and colleagues at the World Bank emphasized a "greed and grievance" theory of civil war that suggested availability of resources explained where civil wars occurred better than levels of grievance (Collier and Hoeffler 2000). Violence and civil war in West Africa, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Keen noted, may benefit powerful, predatory groups and "war may be a continuation of *economics* by other means" (Keen 2000: 23). So called "blood diamonds", coltan, and tropical hardwoods, provided resources that armed groups used to sustain their violence. In some cases profits rather than political goals seemed to explain the activities of groups that blurred the lines between "rebel" and "mafia" (Ballentine and Sherman 2003).

These "New Wars" as some labeled them, seemed particularly brutal and civilians suffered the brunt of the violence (Duffield 2001; Kaldor 2007). The horrific costs are clear – four million lives were lost in the DRC between 1998 and 2005, according to one horrifying estimate (Coghlan et al. 2006). New Wars blur the distinctions between war (with an emphasis on political agendas), organized crime (emphasizing private, often financial, gain) and large-scale human rights abuses (undertaken by states or politically organized groups against individuals). The elimination of the boundary between civilian and soldier meant that these struggles often had extremely high casualties among non-combatants. In place of traditional hierarchical militaries, New Wars saw decentralized and autonomous bands of soldiers and the increased use of child soldiers. Humanitarianism needed to operate differently in response to these new conflict dynamics.

While many have focused on the roles played by high-value resources such as diamonds and coltan in shaping conflict dynamics in Africa, war economies are also deeply linked to humanitarian resources (Shearer 2000; Sharamo 2012). Populations in war zones develop complex coping mechanisms to gain access to resources needed for their survival at the same time as entrepreneurs benefit from black market operations and military actors use arms to engage in predation to sustain combat operations (Goodhand 2004a; 2004b). Insurgent groups and governments engaged in conflict can capture streams of humanitarian assistance as readily as high-value commodities and use these resources to sustain their conflicts.

In Liberia, Charles Taylor allegedly demanded 15 percent of all aid entering territory he controlled during the war. Some estimate that the percentage of aid looted in Somalia may reach as high as 80 percent (Fiona 2002: 39–40). Armed actors, including the government, insurgents, and a diverse range of freelancing militias, found ways to loot, "tax", or in other ways capture humanitarian resource streams in order to sustain their war strategies. Without accepting some form of a *modus vivendi* with those armed factions that controlled ports, roads, and access to displaced populations, humanitarian assistance to some of the world's neediest would be impossible. Humanitarian organizations had to hire guards and rent warehouses and in other ways provide funds to powerful militia leaders or else face attack and looting.

The recognition that resources shaped conflict dynamics led some humanitarian agencies and funders to propose larger and more transformative strategies to address the root causes of the conflict and the consequent humanitarian emergencies. By the 2000s, humanitarian assistance had been transformed into what some labeled "New Humanitarianism". While some retained the commitment to neutrality, many humanitarian organizations began to work more closely with states and try to address the root causes of disasters. Humanitarianism became more institutionalized and less of an emergency ad hoc response to heart-breaking crises. Humanitarian groups adopted expanded aspirations to address root causes of conflict at the same time as the removal of Cold War constraints made major powers more willing to engage in and fund humanitarian operations (Barnett 2005). New concerns about the security threats posed by failed states and ungoverned spaces expanded and received intense focus after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001.

The merger of the failed states and counter-terrorism agendas created a powerful new framework for humanitarian actors. The international community increasingly demanded greater coordination or coherence between its military, political, and humanitarian policies in such arenas. In Washington, this was labeled the "whole of government" approach and placed traditional development agencies such as USAID as a contributor to strategies dominated by military and political agendas. Humanitarian aid increasingly became securitized, a form of "soft power" that was designated a specific set of roles to advance "hard power" military policies.

Mark Duffield and others have pointed out how new humanitarian and development policies have merged with the search for stability. This stability, however, is premised on the kinds of neo-liberal forms of globalization that in fact sustain inequality and reinforce the very basis for conflict in the first place. "The aim of liberal peace is to transform the dysfunctional and war-affected societies that it encounters on its borders into cooperative, representative, and, especially, stable entities" (Duffield 2001: 11). Humanitarian approaches tend to emphasize the internal nature of conflict rather than the critical roles played by the international context and the imperatives of globalization and liberal economic order. New Humanitarianism envisioned a radical expansion of the development agenda to focus on societal transformation.

The return of the responsibility to protect?

The rhetoric of genocide and the calls for the international community to take action under the doctrine of Sovereignty as Responsibility were extremely high with regard to Darfur in the first decade of the twenty-first century, but little concrete action took place. Washington and other major powers adopted the Sovereignty as Responsibility language to enhance their own humanitarian credentials but were unwilling to take "responsibility-based" actions in the difficult case of Darfur (Bellamy and Williams 2005). The normative power of the ideal had been gravely damaged by the West's use of the language as justification of intervention in the War on Terror and alleged interests in seizing resources from oil-rich Arab states. Weiss, for example, concluded that the responsibility to protect project had reached a dead end, "the notion that human beings matter more than sovereignty radiated brightly, albeit briefly, across the international political horizon of the 1990s" (Weiss 2004: 135) At best the norm was weak and highly contested (Wheeler 2003; Chesterman 2004).

At the same time, however, the UN moved in the 2000s to endorse more robust Chapter VII authority to use "all necessary means" for the purposes of civilian protection in times of ongoing conflict (Bellamy and Williams 2011). Peace operations in Burundi, Liberia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Côte d'Ivoire, all had such authority, demonstrating a more robust response to the humanitarian imperatives of civilian protection. While debates raged over

the humanitarian goals and implications of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United Nations, the Africa Union, and African regional organizations moved forward with more expansive forms of humanitarian intervention in internal conflicts.

The post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire and the threats against civilians in Libya created new challenges to norms of humanitarianism and conflict. In Côte d'Ivoire violence broke out following elections in 2010 as incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo declared victory while ECOWAS and the UN declared challenger Alassane Ouattara the winner. The UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire refused to withdraw, even after Gbagbo demanded that it leave. The decision to recognize Ouattara was a significant move for many Security Council members more comfortable with traditional patterns of working with the consent of the incumbent regime. In April 2011, UN and French helicopters destroyed much of Gbagbo's weaponry and assisted Ouattara to assume power. The line between "civil protection" for humanitarian reasons and armed intervention to advance regime change clearly was blurred.

Soon after the use of military force in Côte d'Ivoire to protect civilians, domestic conflict escalated in Libya. By March 2011, Libyan leader Qadhafi faced open rebellion, particularly in the east. He vilified the opposition as "cockroaches" and threatened to "cleanse Libya house to house" (BBC 2011). As in the case of Côte d'Ivoire, the UN framed the challenges in Libya as protection of civilians to prevent a humanitarian disaster. Resolution 1973 called for "all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack". Ban Ki-moon issued a statement that underlined the historical decision and stated that Resolution 1973 "affirms, clearly and unequivocally, the international community's determination to fulfill its responsibility to protect civilians from violence perpetrated upon them by their own government" (Ban 2011). The links between the language of the authorization and the use of force in practice, not surprisingly, were full of difficult judgments and considerable controversy. The principle of the responsibility to protect, however, increasingly entered into the international discourse on how to respond to violence and the need for humanitarian protection.

Conclusion

Humanitarianism as an ideal, as a motivation for assistance, and as a rationale for military intervention weaves through Africa's conflicts over the past fifty years. The Nigerian Civil War and the images of starving children in Biafra set the template for humanitarian assistance, where many insisted that the suffering of innocent victims trumped the traditional practices of respecting sovereign autonomy. The use of food as a weapon and manipulation of famine as a strategy of war, as seen in Sudan and Ethiopia, demonstrated how dynamics of war and authoritarianism were intricately linked to complex humanitarian emergencies. The intervention in Somalia led many policy-makers to propose strict limits on the use of military force in pursuit of humanitarian objectives. In part as a result, the international community withdrew UN forces in the face of genocide in Rwanda. New norms of "Sovereignty as Responsibility" and the "Responsibility to Protect" suggested new criteria for making certain kinds of intervention legitimate but did not override the importance of national interest and the limits of what external humanitarian actors can do.

Many organizations working in conflict or post-conflict zones recognized that their resources could sustain warring parties, most notably in Somalia and in the Rwandan refugee camps in eastern Congo. Following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001, the United States and other major donors increasingly made rebuilding collapsed states and post-conflict peacebuilding part of an expanded agenda that blurred the lines between security and

humanitarian goals. The future of humanitarian intervention in Africa is uncertain, with the UN's willingness to use force against incumbent leaders in Côte d'Ivoire and Libya suggesting both the potential and the peril. It is clear, however, that humanitarian assistance and humanitarian intervention will remain fundamental components of both conflict and the potential for sustainable peace.

13
SEPARATISM IN AFRICA

Pierre Englebert

Introduction

This chapter presents an empirical overview of separatist demands and secessionist conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa, stressing their relative scarcity. It singles out two central variables that constrain the decision of African actors to seek secession: the rules of international recognition of new states (and the particular African doctrine in this matter) and the relatively unique nature of Africa's post-colonial states. It then reviews the continent's main secessionist insurgencies in light of these two dimensions. In conclusion, it discusses the extent to which the independence of South Sudan in 2011 altered these two variables and whether it might have precedent value for other African separatist movements.

Continental trends

Separatists seek a degree of disconnection from the state to which they belong, ranging from autonomy to outright secession. Movements that organize only for cultural autonomy, decentralization or federalism, typically articulate their demands in non-violent terms. Those that seek secession, aiming for full independence and sovereignty (even if they might settle for less in practice), are more likely to turn to violent conflict.

Although there have been some well documented high-profile cases of separatist conflict in Africa, the continent has generally experienced relatively fewer of them than most other regions of the world (Englebert 2009). Looking only at conflicts that triggered at least 25 casualties in at least one year, the exhaustive list of African countries that have faced separatist insurgencies includes Angola (Cabinda), Comoros (Anjouan), the Democratic Republic of Congo (Katanga, South Kasai), Ethiopia (Eritrea, Ogaden, Oromia, Afar), Mali (Tuaregs), Niger (Tuaregs), Nigeria (Biafra, Niger Delta), Senegal (Casamance), Somalia (Somaliland) and Sudan (South Sudan).[1] Of these, two have resulted in the creation of new sovereign states (Eritrea in 1993 and South Sudan in 2011), and one in the formation of a *de facto* state not recognized by any other country (Somaliland since 1991). Biafra, which seceded from Nigeria in 1967, was briefly recognized by Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Tanzania, and Zambia, but was defeated and reincorporated in Nigeria in 1970. Mali's Tuaregs unilaterally proclaimed the independence of Azawad in April 2012 but, at the time of writing, their territorial control and administrative capacity remained unclear. Only

Biafra, Eritrea, Ogaden, and South Sudan were qualified as full-blown wars by the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO). Altogether, 29% of conflict-years in Africa since 1960 were secessionist, compared to 84% in Europe, 47% in Asia, and 44% in the Middle East and North Africa. Only Latin America has experienced fewer separatist conflicts.[2] This pattern contrasts with the greater prevalence of non-separatist political violence in Africa: no fewer than thirty-two African countries have suffered at least one episode of non-separatist civil conflict since 1960.

Although the lack of separatist conflict correlates with a general proclivity for post-colonial nationalism in Africa (Young 2002), one cannot infer from it that there is no separatist desire at all among Africa's many sub-national communities. The Minorities-At-Risk (MAR) project identifies the following groups as having or having had "active separatist or autonomy movements in the past 25 years", not all of which, however, have risen to the level of conflict: the Tuaregs of Mali and Niger; the Diolas of Senegal; the "Westerners" (Anglophones) of Cameroon; the Ibo, Ogoni and Yoruba of Nigeria; the Baganda of Uganda; the Zanzibaris of Tanzania; the Issaq of Somalia; the Afars of Djibouti and Ethiopia; the Oromo, Somalis and Tigreans of Ethiopia; the Afars of Eritrea; the Cabindans of Angola; the Lozi of Zambia; the Ndebele of Zimbabwe; the "Europeans" and Zulus of South Africa; the Basters and East Caprivians of Namibia; and the Southerners, Nuba and "Darfour Black Muslims" of Sudan.[3] In addition, MAR lists the following communities has having harbored "separatist or autonomy" movements that persisted as "active political [forces] for at least 5 years in the past 50 years, but not in the past 25 years": the Ewe of Ghana; the Bamileke of Cameroon; and the Somalis of Kenya. No doubt a more sensitive assessment might have caught a few more groups like the Bakongo, Lunda and Mongo of the DR Congo; the Ijaw of Nigeria; or the Rwenzururu of Uganda.

Here too, however, non-separatist conflicts are more prevalent. At least 35 of the continent's 97 "minorities at risk" have engaged in non-separatist political violence since 1990. In addition, there is limited evidence that, even in the above-mentioned communities, a majority of people actually support separatist demands. Only 11% of Katangans voted for the party that would eventually lead their secession in 1960 (Gérard-Libois 1963); in Zambia, Daniel Posner (2005) has found that 74% of the Lozi he surveyed considered themselves Zambians first; Markus Hohne (2010) suggests that Somaliland elites initially preferred national unity to separation; public opinion in Caprivi appears to be in favor of the national government (Melber 2009); there is little popular support among the Ijaws and Ogoni for a Niger Delta Republic (Pegg 2004; Harnischfeger 2011); the Ewe's preferences for Ghana have been well documented (Nugent 2002); and even in Ethiopia, "not only Amharas and Tigrayans, but many Oromos and most of the peoples of south western Ethiopia think of themselves as Ethiopian, and have no secessionist agenda" (Clapham 2006).

For a continent of 49 states, most of which are youthful, heterogeneous, institutionally and militarily weak, but resource rich, this relative lack of separatism comes a bit as a surprise (Englebert and Hummel 2005). Given the failure of many African states to bring about security and development to their citizens, the potential appeal of sub-national identity, the frequent partition of ethnic groups across borders, and the localized availability of resources to sustain conflict, all of which are frequently associated with secessionism elsewhere, one could reasonably expect a greater African propensity for separatist conflict. Before suggesting some hypotheses for this paradox, two important variations on this overall observations must be noted.

First, there is a pronounced regional pattern, with East Africa, and particularly the Horn, bearing the brunt of the continent's violent secessionist activity. Ethiopia alone has faced four distinct and long-lasting secessionist insurgencies. Somaliland has broken up from Somalia and South Sudan from Sudan. The latter also faces insurgencies with occasional separatist accents in Darfur and the Nuba mountains. Moreover, East Africa is the only region that has had any

successful separatism, with the internationally recognized independences of Eritrea and South Sudan, and the non-recognized independence of Somaliland. Second, separatists conflicts are not randomly distributed over time. Setting Ethiopia and Sudan aside, most of them took place in the 1960s or the 1990s, particularly the first half of the latter. The 1970s, 1980s and 2000s witnessed much less activity, a variation not equally observed in other regions (Englebert 2009: 181–188).

Existing theories on the causes of separatist conflict shed little light on Africa's circumstances. They tend to point to economic inequality among regions, the presence of natural resources, poverty, lack of education, cultural heterogeneity, political transitions, state weakness and other forms of political violence, all of which apply to much of Africa, as facilitating separatism (see Boyle and Englebert 2008 for a survey). More interesting, therefore, is to focus on what might account for Africa's *lack* of separatism. Why do sub-national grievances not translate into secessionist agendas with greater frequency in Africa? What explains geographical and chronological variations with respect to separatism?

International factors: rules of recognition

The most commonly heard argument for Africa's separatist deficit calls attention to the inhibiting effects of the rules of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (Herbst 1989). Article 3 of the 1963 OAU Charter stipulates the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states and respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity. In 1964, the OAU made things even more explicit by adopting a resolution in which all member states "[pledged] themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence". The principles of non-interference, territorial integrity, and respect of colonial borders were reiterated in the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU), the successor to the OAU, in 2000. Although non-interference and territorial integrity are elements of international law common to all sovereign countries, the principle of intangibility of borders inherited from colonization, known in international law as *uti possidetis*, goes further and de facto makes past colonial status the basis of recognition of contemporary African states (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). Thus, with the possible exception of South Sudan (on which more below), any territorial entity unable to make a plausible claim for past colonial status does not have legal ground for recognition in international law.

While these rules do not apply to rebel groups, they lower the probability that a separatist movement would be recognized, without which little can be diplomatically achieved, and thus reduce the incentives to engage in separatism. In this respect, the OAU has set norms that have been more inimical to self-determination than elsewhere (Neuberger 1991: 107). They also might make it harder for separatists to obtain support from another state in their separatist struggles. For example, they make a case like India's military intervention on behalf of Bangladesh in its struggle against Pakistan legally all but impossible. In addition, it does not help would-be separatists that the rest of the world has delegated recognition of new African states to the AU. It is, for example, the position of the United States that it will not recognize Somaliland until the AU first does so. The effect of this kind of diplomatic practice has been to universalize the AU's restrictive rules of recognition. Hence, the United States recognizes Kosovo but not Somaliland.

Not only do AU rules limit the likelihood of separatism in Africa, they also tend to bias it towards specific colonially-related territorial forms. Thus, African ethnic groups are less likely to demand independence than regions with a colonial past. If they do so, they are more likely to couch their claims in terms of alleged colonial status. It is only after Eritrea shed religious and ethnic claims to independence in favor of stressing its distinct colonial legacy from Ethiopia that

its separatist struggle began to gain international traction (Iyob 1995). Although it is mostly an Issaq affair, Somaliland systematically highlights its former colonial status in lobbying for recognition. At one time or another, Barotseland, Cabinda, Casamance, Katanga, and South Sudan have all invoked distinct colonial administration in support for their claims.

Constraining as it is to self-determination movements, including secessionist ones, *uti possidetis* goes only so far in accounting for the lack of separatist challenges to Africa's weak states. First of all, it does not prevent non-African states from recognizing and helping rebels if they so wished. Second, it has not prevented separatist insurgencies like those of Eritrea or South Sudan from going on for decades without recognition. Third, African states and the AU are not particularly good at enforcing the rules they make. After all, however briefly, four African countries did recognize Biafra in the late 1960s. African governments are regularly interfering in the politics of their neighbors, including by supporting rebels (e.g., Uganda with the Sudan People's Liberation Army), fomenting coups (e.g., Libya under Qaddafi on many occasions), or direct intervention (e.g., Tanzania in Uganda in 1979, Rwanda in the DR Congo in 1996 and 1998, and, more recently, Ethiopia and Kenya inside Somalia). Therefore, the argument about AU rules takes us only so far in accounting for Africans' separatist reluctance.

Domestic factors: the state as common property

In order to understand the desire to secede, one must take into account not only the rules of the international system and the characteristics of would-be insurgents and their communities, but also the nature of the state they live in. Comparatively, African states are very generous in the degree to which they grant access to, and ownership of, themselves. The concept of "plural softness" developed by Benyamin Neuberger, is useful in this respect. The African state, he writes, is a "state of minorities" which does not have the will or capacity to fully enforce itself upon its constituent groups, finding instead ways to accommodate them by giving them access to itself (1991: 105). To a large extent, this plural softness derives from the exogenous and juridical nature of the African postcolonial state, created by colonialism and reproduced by diplomatic recognition (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). By locating the ultimate source of state authority outside the state and its populations, recognition-based sovereignty produces a socially neutral state which no single group owns and which is available to all for partial capture or appropriation. Hence, the genesis of the African state embeds in its DNA its availability as common property to all domestic groups.

This is not to imply that the elites of some specific groups do not at times appropriate the state. What it does mean, however, is that the latter is not usually defined in ethnic or other exclusionary terms, and that all its elites have equal grounds to claim sovereign power, especially at the local level. Titular groups, communities which lend their names to the state to which they belong, marking thereby their intended ownership of it and the junior status of the other communities it contains, are rare in Africa. The exceptions are the three diminutive former British protectorates of southern Africa (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) which are more ethnically homogenous than the modal African state, and Somalia, populated almost exclusively of Somalis (who are, however, sharply divided in clans).[4] Otherwise, topographical descriptions (e.g., Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea), names derived from geographical or natural features (e.g., Cameroon[5], Niger, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Zambia), and references to sometimes unrelated pre-colonial systems (e.g., Ghana, Mali, Zimbabwe) are more common across the continent and illustrate the plural softness of its states. Even when the colonizers gave their colonies ethnic names, such as the "Territory of the Afars and the Issas", post-colonial elites have preferred neutral referents (Djibouti in this case). No Croatia (land of the Croats), Serbia (land of the Serbs),

Afghani . . ., Kurdi . . ., Kazakh . . ., Turkmeni . . ., Paki . . ., and other "stans" (land of) in Africa. No equivalent dominant group either to the Khmer of Cambodia (where the Chinese, Vietnamese, Chams and numerous "Hill Tribes" are historical outsiders), the Bamar of Myanmar (a country named after this majority group, which the Shan, Karen and more than 100 other "ethnic minorities" have to endure), or the Viet of Vietnam. Not to mention China, France, Mongolia, Russia, Slovakia or the Czech Republic. African states are common property and their names reflect it. So does their language. Everywhere south of the Sahara apart from Tanzania (where Swahili plays a similar role), colonial languages are still official idioms and denote both the continued exogeneity and neutrality of the state.

James Fearon and David Laitin (1999) make a germane argument. They suggest that Africa's lesser relative preponderance of separatism could be due to the fact that African countries tend to have a plurality of smaller ethnic groups rather than large hegemonic ones. They find that having one dominant ethnic group is associated with separatism, as minorities consider it less likely that they could obtain a share of the state, given the existing domination of the majority, and are more likely therefore to pursue a separate path. Since African states are so heterogeneous, their constituent groups may be more likely to fight for control of the state than for escape from it, as they each have a decent chance of grabbing some share of power.

But, for the plural-softness argument to make fully sense, one needs to understand the African post-colonial state as a resource, the availability of which to its constituent groups makes their allegiance to the state rational. Even when the elites of one group dominate, state offices and state authority remain available for the elites of other groups, either through clientelistic access to the center or at the local level. Given the opportunities available to them in partaking in the state, and the limited likelihood of ever obtaining recognition on their own, few groups face significant incentives to secede. In this perspective, the few cases of African separatist conflict can be interpreted as (1) resulting from breakdowns of plural softness, or (2) posturing for greater local access to the state.

Exclusion and separatism

The few instances in Africa where the state has been defined in ethnic, religious or linguistic terms in a manner that creates quasi-private ownership of it for one or a few groups at the exclusion of others, have commonly led the elites of the excluded groups to seek secession. Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan account for all of these cases.

The Ethiopian state is largely "owned" by a minority composed of the Amhara and the Tigrinya (Ethiopia was not colonized and its historical formation, dating back centuries as Abyssinia, is more similar to that of non-colonized states in other regions). After defeating the Italian army in Adowa in 1896, its sovereignty was recognized by European powers and it began behaving like them, colonizing Ogaden and Oromia in the late nineteenth century (see Pateman 1998). After World War II, it was awarded administration over Eritrea, an Italian colony.

Ethiopia ruled these groups under Amharic and, to a lesser extent, Tigrinya administrative monopoly, giving them few opportunities to share in the spoils of power (with the exception of a brief moment in the 1990s when it attempted ethnic federalism). Even provincial governors tended to be Amhara. Amharic language was imposed across the country. In addition, the adoption of Orthodox Christianity as state religion made it even harder for the majority Muslim Ogadenis and Eritreans to participate.

Feeling more like colonized subjects than equal minorities, Ogadenis and Oromos began to agitate at the time other African countries started gaining their independence. The Ogadenis (who are ethnic Somalis) began their separatist insurrection in 1960. The Oromos, who represent

more than 30% of Ethiopia's population, launched their liberation movement "against the Abyssinian colonial rule" in 1973.[6]

Eritrea, which originally merged with Ethiopia under UN sponsorship as part of a new Ethiopian-Eritrean Federation in 1952, saw the progressive dismantlement of the federal arrangement and the exclusion of Eritreans from the instruments of self-rule. By 1956, the Eritrean assembly and constitution had been suspended. Amharic was imposed as the sole language of the state and schools, and Ethiopian civil servants and teachers were dispatched to Eritrea. The Eritrean flag was discarded in 1958, followed the next year by the imposition of the Ethiopian penal code. The Eritrean government was downgraded to an administrative unit in 1960. Eventually, in 1962, Ethiopia altogether abolished the federal system and proclaimed Eritrea to be its fourteenth province. Over the next thirty years, several movements waged a relentless war of independence from Ethiopia, which cost the lives of more than 60,000 fighters and culminated with the rebels' capture of Asmara in 1991 and the near unanimous approval of a referendum on independence in April 1993 (see Adam 1994; Iyob 1995; Pateman 1998).

The secession of Eritrea coincided with the takeover in Ethiopia of a Tigrinya-dominated rebel movement. Because the two insurgencies had collaborated in the overthrow of the Ethiopian regime, the new rulers agreed to the separation of Eritrea. This acquiescence of the stump state and the plausibility of the argument that Eritrea had been a separate colony made possible its recognition as a sovereign state by the rest of the world.

Although it was a colony, Sudan is somewhat similar to Ethiopia as its state was appropriated by northerners from the onset, and southern elites struggled in vain to find ways to be durably associated to its domination (see Johnson 2003). The north and the south were not linked before colonization by Egypt in the 1830s, and even then relations were largely limited to the supply of slaves by the south. The British administered the south separately until 1947, then implemented a "Southern Policy" that promoted English and Christianity in the region, increasing its distinctiveness from the northern rulers. Northern elites, who are Muslim and conceive of themselves as Arab, seized control of the state upon independence and endeavored to change the country in their image. Southerners were deprived of access to state office, even at the local level. By the time of independence already, only four of 500 senior administrative posts were staffed by southerners. Arabic language was imposed in the administration and, by the 1960s, the rulers began advocating for an Islamic state. The government opposed southern autonomy, fearing that it would interfere with efforts to Islamicize the country. The first southern rebellion, known as Anya-Nya, began almost simultaneously with independence in response to these exclusionary policies and spread across the south after 1963.

The Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 underlined the willingness of the rebels to consider a non-separatist solution to their predicament if they could be included in the state. The agreement gave the south local taxation powers and set up local sovereign executive and legislative institutions. It also provided for the integration of rebels into the national army. In essence, it shared the state. This arrangement broke down, however, when the north once again attempted to redefine statehood in a manner that made no place for southern elites. From the late 1970s onward, a process of Islamic radicalization took place in Khartoum, which led to the dissolution of the southern region and the application of Sharia law to the south in 1983. The impossibility for black Christian southerners to be the agents of a state intent on being Arab and Islamic partly accounted for their return to war, and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) was born. The SPLA pursued partly secession and partly reintegration into Sudan with regional autonomy. The southern rebels fought at least in part to convert Sudan back into a "normal" plural and soft African postcolonial state. The increased Islamic radicalization of the Khartoum regime deflated the inclusive half of the SPLA's strategy and favored the separatist option.

Somaliland was colonized by the British while the rest of Somalia was by the Italians. The two merged days after Somaliland received its independence in 1960. After three decades of abuse at the hands of southern-dominated regimes and in the wake of the complete collapse of the Mogadishu regime, Somaliland unilaterally reclaimed its separate independence in 1991. Here too, there was an element of "state ownership" at play. Southern clans like the Darrod and the Hawiye monopolized control over the state and dominated positions of authority and commerce, including in the north, marginalizing the northern Issaq. In 1981, Issaq exiles in London set up the Somali National Movement (SNM) and started an insurrection from Ethiopian territory, which led to the separation of Somaliland in 1991 (Adam 1994; Bryden 2004; ICG 2006; Shinn 2002).

Separatist posturing and access to the state

Most of Africa's other separatist insurgencies have been less successful and have had, upon closer scrutiny, more ambiguous goals. In several cases, access to sovereign institutions of the existing state (rather than separation from it) seems to have been a dominant goal.[7] In the Casamance region of Senegal, the *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance* (MFDC) has waged a rebellion on and off since 1982. The conflict began partly as a consequence of land expropriations by northerners; the increased hegemony of Wolofs in the state apparatus; economic disaffection of the region; and a rising sense of local identity derived from education, migration, tourism, and the discourse of the Catholic Church (Foucher 2007). That the leader of the MFDC—Augustin Diamacoune Senghor—was a Catholic priest in a Muslim country suggests the region's cultural alienation and desire for self-determination.

Yet, an analysis of the actions and demands of the MFDC leaders point to more ambiguous and less radical goals. In 1998, Diamacoune made clear that he was ready to give up independence demands in exchange for better economic and social development and, at its Banjul congress of 1999, the MFDC asked for the creation of a regional Casamance government, parliament, and judiciary, as well as "any other necessary institution" and its own budgetary powers. These demands show that the main goals of MFDC leaders have been to create and gain access to local sovereign institutions. It was the absence of such institutions to begin with and their incapacity to partake therefore into sovereign power, which led these elites to wage their insurgency. In this context, separatism was at least part posturing in order to support demands for better insertion in the state.

A similar logic has prevailed over the post-1990 insurgencies of the Tuaregs, semi-nomadic minorities in Mali and Niger which have been neglected if not repressed by successive regimes and developed an acute sense of grievance toward their respective governments. In Niger, the secessionist credentials of the Tuareg rebels were questionable and their demands focused more on sharing the benefits of statehood than extracting themselves from it. They wanted the establishment of a federal system, with a Tuareg administrative region endowed with its own assembly (where a majority of jobs would be reserved for Tuaregs), economic development, increased political representation and additional tax revenues from the mining activity taking place in their region. In the end, they agreed to much more limited concessions in the 1994 and 1995 Ouagadougou agreements, including "territorial collectivities" with elected assemblies and presidents and their own budgets (for more details, see Bourgeot 1994).

In Mali, there have been two distinct waves of Tuareg separatism. From 1990 to 2011, while the rebels invoked narratives of a Tuareg nation, their real demands were very similar to that of the Nigerien counterpart. The Tamanrasset Accord of 1991 and the National Pact of 1992 focused on regional autonomy, jobs in the national government, and resource transfers to the

region. By fighting the state, the Tuareg insurgents had obtained recognition of their status as local elite. Armed with this recognition, they demanded parcels of sovereignty under the veil of autonomy. They became part of the state and consolidated their local elite status in the process (for more details, see Seely 2001).

The fall of the Qaddafi regime in Libya in 2011 changed the dynamics of Mali's Tuareg separatism. The conflict had been largely dormant since the early 1990s, with occasional skirmishes, and many former fighters had been included in the national army or given local or national administrative positions. However, a significant portion of young unemployed Tuareg men continued to migrate to Libya where some were incorporated into Qaddafi's military. When Qaddafi was killed in October 2011, about 1,000–2,000 of these fighters made the trek back to northern Mali with heavy equipment (including truck-mounted rocket launchers) and ammunition, and a comparative advantage in violence. They resurrected Tuareg separatism by setting up the *Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad* (MNLA) and allied with Ansar Dine, a 300-strong Islamic fundamentalist group with links to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). They quickly overpowered Mali's anemic military, and captured the cities of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu, eventually controlling the northern half of Mali's territory. They issued a unilateral declaration of independence of Azawad in April 2012. However, as of June 2012, they were wrestling for effective control of the region with Ansar Dine, which sought to impose Sharia in the region, and had yet to establish any semblance of administration. Meanwhile, increasing numbers of northern Malians were making their way to refugee camps in the south.

Setting aside the MNLA insurgency, groups in this category usually find it a less onerous strategy to fight in order to demand effective plural softness than to break away and run a non-sovereign state for the foreseeable future. Even among the MNLA, some have argued that the declaration of independence might not mean formal separate sovereignty. Yet, discourses of autonomy and separation sustain these struggles for inclusion and provide narratives for the mobilization of supporters and fighters.

South Sudan and the future of African separatism

The overwhelming vote (98.83%) in favor of secession at the January 2011 South Sudan referendum and the subsequent accession of South Sudan to international sovereignty on July 9 mark a possibly momentous development with relevance to separatism elsewhere in Africa. While the independence of Eritrea was more an instance of late decolonization, South Sudan is the only genuine case of a sub-national region without a strong post-colonial claim breaking away from an existing sovereign African state and being recognized as sovereign by both the stump state and the international community at large. As the first instance of territorial reconfiguration in post-colonial Africa, Sudan is understandably perceived by many as having precedent value and as possibly changing the rules of the game for African regional elites who might dream of statehood but have so far reined in their ambition out of political realism. Its potential impact is certainly feared by incumbent regimes in the many African countries that harbor minorities and regions that crave greater autonomy.

Yet, the conditions that prevailed over the break-up of Sudan were so unusual as to be hard to replicate elsewhere, and it is unlikely that it will have much precedent value. As discussed earlier, possibly the most important factor in accounting for the decision of southern elites to seek secession was the degree of "ownership" of the state by the Arabicizing and Islamicizing northerners, a rare condition on the continent. In addition, from 2000 onwards, concerns in the Bush administration over the support of Khartoum for terrorist groups and the mobilization of US religious groups on behalf of the Christians of South Sudan weakened the Sudanese

government and led to the negotiation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which was concluded in 2005, with diplomatic backing from the US and other Western countries. The CPA's main emphasis remained on a united Sudan, with a focus on power-sharing, military integration, the de-Islamicization of the south, the establishment of autonomous southern institutions, and the fair sharing of oil revenues. Yet, it also provided for a referendum on secession (although southern leaders agreed not to campaign for secession, a promise they honored until the very last weeks). As we know now, the popular secessionist desire was overwhelming and swept the process, leading to South Sudan's independence in July 2011.

The conditions that prevailed on the path to South Sudan's independence were thus highly idiosyncratic. Domestically, Sudan was rather unique in the extent to which it made it all but impossible for southerners to participate in sovereignty. From an international point of view, it benefited from unusual circumstances which led to a more forceful US diplomatic involvement than most insurgents can hope for. This involvement was formally neutral with respect to separation, focusing instead on the process of the referendum rather than its results, but it ended up de facto favoring secession. Moreover, before getting there, southerners paid their dues by fighting for almost five decades to reach their goals. In short, the conditions that led the independence of South Sudan are not present anywhere else on the continent, and it is thus unlikely that it will elicit any significant imitation, much less open a Pandora's Box of continental separatism.

Finally, it bears stressing that, although the secession of South Sudan violates the principle of intangibility of borders inherited from colonialism, it does not violate other essential principles of the African Union. Particularly, it occurred with the assent of the stump state, as had also been the case for Eritrea. The legal implication is that colonial borders are still intangible *unless an existing state agrees to its own partition*, which is its sovereign prerogative. Otherwise, *uti possidetis* remains as a legal protection against attempts to impose boundary changes to African governments. From this point of view, South Sudan's independence does not represent a change of existing rules.

The continued non-recognition of Somaliland suggests the limited impact South Sudan has had on the African international system. Somaliland has a greater legal case for recognition, having been a separate colony of the UK until 1960 when it became independent as a sovereign state before merging with Somalia, a former Italian colony, in a matter of days. Thus, recognizing Somaliland would not violate the principle of respect of borders inherited from colonization. It is unlikely, however, on both ideological and practical grounds, that the Somali government will ever give its assent to separation, making broader recognition difficult. Yet, as chaos endures in Somalia, more and more countries seem to be warming up to Somaliland, which has hosted an increasing number of official visits from Western and African countries over the last few years, including the British Minister of International Development in 2011. For countries that might want to recognize Somaliland, the independence of South Sudan could then be a facilitating precedent. However, the very heavy international diplomatic investment in favor of state reconstruction in Somalia keeps the odds of recognition of Somaliland rather low. Should peace ever return to the rest of Somalia, Somaliland would lose much of the little leverage it has so far in calling for recognition. Thus, while South Sudan might act as a facilitator, circumstances are still very different and recognition might remain elusive.

Similarly, Ogadenis and Oromos are unlikely to derive much benefit from South Sudan's recognition. First of all, while Somaliland can at least invoke its own constitutional referendum in favor of secession, it is doubtful that a majority of Oromos would vote to separate from Ethiopia. Second, although it is highly authoritarian, the Ethiopian regime is a stable Western ally in the region, and a particularly important element in the Western strategy to pacify Somalia

and in the US struggle against terrorist groups in the Horn of Africa. Thus, external diplomatic support for the separatists, which was determinant in Sudan, is unlikely to happen in Ethiopia.

There does not appear to be a single other separatist movement in Africa whose conditions have been altered by the independence of South Sudan. France and the United States have both categorically rejected Azawad's declaration of independence. As discussed earlier, many so-called separatist groups are more intent on local access to state sovereignty than on actual secession. Others, like the Casamance rebels in Senegal or groups in Nigeria's Niger Delta, are by now closer to banditry than to political goals. Finally, separatist activism in Angola's Cabinda region or in the Caprivi Strip of Namibia has largely dwindled to insignificance over the last few years. These groups lack sufficiently coherent organization, agenda and capacity to capitalize on South Sudan's independence.

In general, therefore, the unique circumstances that have led to the independence and recognition of South Sudan are unlikely to be repeated elsewhere in Africa. Under current conditions, South Sudan should remain an exception. By partially lifting the taboo of the intangibility of borders inherited from colonialism, however, it will probably renew the fervors of some groups who see themselves as persecuted and at the losing end of national integration in some countries. Yet, the threshold of success and recognition has been set so high by the South Sudan precedent that it is unlikely to change the rules of the game.

Notes

1 Updated from Gleditsch et al. 2002. Western Sahara, which is partly a case of decolonization, directs its separatism at Morocco, a North African country.
2 Estimates based on data from Gleditsch et al. 2002.
3 Based on a data set released in 2009: www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp#quantitativemar
4 Congo and the DR Congo both derive their name from the BaKongo, not so much the states of that ethnic group (which is little more than a cultural reference in the former and a small minority in the latter) than the accidental consequence of colonialism, which anchored its conquest along the Congo river named after the people who lived where it meets the ocean and with whom colonizers had had centuries of previous interaction.
5 Cameroon derives from *camarões*, the Portuguese name for the shrimp which early colonizers found in abundance in its waters.
6 www.oromoliberationfront.org/OLFMission.htm
7 Only a couple of illustrative examples are discussed here. One finds similar dimensions at play at least in the cases of Barotseland, Cabinda, Anglophone Cameroon, Katanga, the Niger Delta, and South Kasai.

14

THE GENDERED SUBJECT OF VIOLENCE IN AFRICAN CONFLICTS

Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern

> When you enter the centre for military training you are civilian and now you must become, learn the tough spirit of a soldier. If you do not know that, some beating up is required. Some beating is required. [. . .] Those who are not able to make it, we call them the 'inept', also sometimes 'women' [. . .] A soldier is a soldier, he is not a civilian. Bullets are bullets. It is a war. We are not going there to kill ducks. It is war; you go to defend . . . [. . .] You can start maybe with 15,000 men; some will run away. They are not strong enough. Sometimes you will remain with 8,000. Those are the real/strong soldiers.
>
> *Male corporal, in the Congolese Armed Forces*[1]

Introduction

Armed conflict in Africa, like elsewhere, reflects and reproduces gender discourses and gendered subjects. Indeed, the last decades of feminist theory and gender studies scholarship has convincingly argued that warring is both produced through, and is productive of gender (Enloe 1990; 1993). For instance, gendered language plays a pivotal role in efforts to fashion capable and willing soldiers and combatants, as reflected in the citation above from a soldier in the Congolese army. Paying attention to notions of ideal (and 'failed') militarized masculinities is important for understanding why soldiers and combatants commit gruesome acts of violence against civilian populations. Similarly, understanding notions of femininity and masculinity is crucial for comprehending why women and men are often exposed to different forms of violence in conflict settings. Relatedly, the use of gendered symbolism (such as gendered representations of the Enemy Other) is vital to the politics of warring in diverse contexts; gendered symbolism is integral in efforts to mobilize support and train soldiers and combatants to engage in violent acts against enemy men and women. In short, gendered codings enable warring.

Research on the interconnections between gender and armed conflict is indeed vast and growing daily. Academic advances are mirrored in the policy world and the media as well. The inclusion of gender-based violence as an important arena into the highest level of global security policy at the United Nations attests to the steadfast arrival of 'gender' in consideration of security issues and the formulation of security policy globally.[2] Furthermore, the gendered aspects of conflicts in Africa (mostly in terms of a single focus on sexual violence) have become common

fare in media reports across the globe. In spite of this, mainstream research on violence and conflict in African settings appears largely oblivious to the question of gender (Hendricks 2011; Parpart and Thompson 2011; Mama and Okazawa-Rey 2008). Moreover, many of the assumptions about 'African' conflicts and gender reflected in the media, policy reports and even scholarly work produced in the US and Europe are derived from generalized theorizing about gender and militarization, war and peace, as well as from contemporary renditions of the familiar colonial library.

This chapter takes its point of departure in the above claims, and addresses the gendered subject of violence in recent African conflicts from an interdisciplinary perspective.[3] Far from providing a comprehensive overview of all scholarship that addresses gender and conflict/post-conflict African contexts, it has two distinct objectives: (1) demonstrating why and how gender matters in understanding complex dynamics of violence and conflict; and (2) providing a brief overview and discussion of existing research on gender, violence and conflicts in Africa.

The chapter proceeds as follows. We first attend to the concept of gender itself and explain how we define it. Additionally, we discuss the signifier 'Africa', and consider how 'African' conflicts are often dubiously represented as somehow distinct from other armed conflicts globally. Subsequently, we discuss in general terms how gender and war can be considered co-constitutive, particularly how gender enables warring. We then outline and offer a brief analysis of two major themes that emerge in research on gender, conflict and security in African settings: (1) wartime sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) (which tends to focus on women as victims, particularly of sexual violence); and (2) the role of women in armed struggles.

'Gender' in/and 'Africa'

Gender can be understood as a discursive practice,[4] whereby the masculine cannot be understood as separate from, and indeed is defined in opposition to, the feminine. Gender discourses inform identities (who we are, who we are supposed to be), activities (what we/institutions do) and symbolism (how we think) (Peterson 2003: 40). Gender codings (whereby associations with masculinity and femininity provide meaning) create a natural order of distinction whose logics serve as an overarching organizing principle for everyday life and the practice of all forms of politics – including war. When analyzing the dynamics of violent conflict, attention to these aspects of gender enables a move from only focusing on men and women, to focusing on the power of gender discourses – which have very real consequences for people in conflict settings (Stern and Nystrand 2006). Furthermore, gender discourses give rise to many different ways to be a man or a woman; similarly, there are many different attributes associated with masculinity and femininity in any given context. Crucially, the workings of gender are context-specific.

Most research conducted under the rubric of gender, conflict and violence in Africa (and elsewhere) tends to focus on women/girls. Moreover, much research and policy reports are informed by and reproduce familiar gender stereotypes, where women are represented as victims and peace-makers, while men are portrayed as perpetrators and the drivers of war. The notion of women as 'beautiful' and peaceful souls (Elshtain 1984) has underpinned many narratives of peace and war[5] and is reproduced in various – and opposing – contexts. While the association of women with peacefulness and purity, and men with warring and violence, informs traditional military discourses (wherein men are cast as the natural warriors and protectors of innocent women worthy of protection), it is also reproduced within feminism itself. Paradoxically, much of the varied feminist writings about the connections between gender and war rest on such assumptions about femininity. Moreover, a 'proper' feminist stance is often assumed to be inherently anti-militaristic and peace-promoting. Such conceptualizations of femininity are

common both in feminist texts emanating from the 'West' and in feminist or 'Womanist' (Ogunyemi 1985) writings produced in 'Africa'.[6] It is beyond the limited scope of this chapter, however, to outline and engage in a serious discussion of the various theories, ethics and politics of feminism. Rather, we take our point of departure in *gender* as an analytical and theoretical concept, with the primary aim to demonstrate how gender can help us to better understand the various and complex dynamics of conflicts.

Let us now briefly attend to the signifier 'Africa'. How do the general assumptions (even stereotypes) about gender and war manifest in writings on conflict and violence in 'Africa'? Or, put differently, what does the signifier 'Africa' *do* to our generalized assumptions about gender and war?

A basic assumption guiding this chapter is that gender and conflict do not work in any particular ways in Africa. Instead of adhering to the belief that there is something specific and distinct about 'African' gender discourses and practices, we contend that the workings of gender and conflict are always context-specific – yet 'context' is not predetermined to be geographically defined to a continent or even a state. The notion of 'warscape' is helpful here (Nordstrom 1997, 37). Gender informs conflict dynamics in various ways in different warzones and warscapes – in Africa as elsewhere.

The continuing universalization of the 'African' experience, state, mindset, or culture has come under much convincing critique in post-colonial writings. However, the idea that there is something particular and 'deviant' (Mudimbe 1988; 1994) about Africa is surely still both widespread and even promoted in various corners, and clearly evident in reporting on conflicts and violence on the continent (cf. Atkinson 1999; Dunn 2003; Duffield 1996). References to 'Africa' as a harbinger of particular forms of gendered conflict and violence are often informed by the associations that 'Africa' gives rise to within a familiar colonial lexicon.

When it comes to highlighting gender injustice, proponents of seemingly progressive politics perhaps unwittingly reproduce much colonial imagery in their depiction of gender relations in 'Africa' (where 'Africa' comes to stand for a particularly barbaric or backwards site that requires enlightenment from the more advanced North). Violence in African conflicts is often portrayed in the media (as well as in policy reports) as particularly brutal, bizarre and inexplicable (Atkinson 1999; Dunn 2003; Richards 1996; Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2013a; Moran 1995). Implicit in such portrayal lies a comparison to the more reasonable, ordered (masculine-coded), understandable violence in what are often considered to be more 'civilized' wars – wars that somehow make sense, unlike the nonsensical violence in African conflicts. As a number of post-colonial feminist critics have argued (cf. Mohanty 1991; Riley, Mohanty and Pratt 2008; Syed and Ali 2011) the representation of women in the South as particularly victimized by exceptionally brutal men – as well as the self-proclaimed mission to 'save the brown woman from the brown man' (Spivak 1988: 297) – has continued to inform contemporary 'Western' representations of, and interventions in various warzones (Riley, Mohanty and Pratt 2008).

The power and familiarity of these narratives can make research into gender and conflict in Africa particularly challenging and thorny. It calls upon researchers and practitioners to engage in critical self-reflection of how one's own readings and representations might be informed by and reproduce these narratives. As Parpart and Thompson (2011) conclude, we need to situate gendered experiences of war in Africa in their local contexts, while at the same time recognizing the ways in which these experiences resonate with narratives from all over the world.

Let us now turn to the main subject of this chapter, namely how gender informs conflict and war.

Gender as co-constitutive of conflict and violence

'The power of gender discourses is integral to the dynamics of warring – including the rationale behind killing and dying as well as the myths of sacrifice and belonging' (Stern and Nystrand 2006: 9). How then does gender enable warring (and therefore why do we need to pay attention to gender when studying conflicts in Africa)? In the following paragraphs we will provide a generalized overview based on research within the broadly defined field of feminist International Relations (see also Stern and Zalewski, 2009 and Parpart and Thompson 2011). Importantly, the below discussion should be understood as an overview providing *examples* of the *potential* workings of notions of 'ideal' and 'failed' militarized masculinities. Further inquiries into the *context-specific* workings of gender in particular warscapes would surely provide us with a deeper and perhaps much different picture.

The construction of soldiers and combatants

The construction of militarized masculinities is clearly central to contemporary warring – in Africa and elsewhere. Instead of seeing the military (or armed groups) as a venue through which boys can achieve their natural potential as men, most research on gender and war underscores how men/boys (and even women/girls, to be explained further below) learn to be 'masculine' and violent in militarized contexts through methods specifically designed to create willing and able soldiers/combatants (see e.g., Connell 1995; Ehrenreich 1997; Enloe 1990; 2000; 2007; Goldstein 2001; Higate and Hopton 2005; Parpart 2008; Pin-Fat and Stern 2005; Price 2001; Shepherd 2008b; Stern and Zalewski 2009; Whitehead 2002; Whitworth 2004). Through militarization, the ability and willingness to commit violence is often linked to certain forms of heterosexual masculinity, celebrating violent heroic achievement, and masculine-coded discipline and obedience. The zone of combat is seen as both a male (housing male bodies) and a 'masculine' domain. Militarization serves to mold soldiers along disciplined codes of behavior that designate deviance from the norm as inferior, feminine/effeminate and dangerous (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2010: 5).

Indeed, in many contexts, that which is associated with femininity is construed as corrosive of the required militarized masculinities. Hence, violence can be understood as also directed inwards toward the '"others within"; killing the "civilian and the woman in yourself" becomes necessary for soldiers in their attempts to live up to the myths of militarized manhood' (Whitworth 2004: 176; see also Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2009). This is reflected, for example, in the widespread use of the label 'woman' as an insult in military/combat training globally and in Africa (Elshtain 1987; Enloe 1990; Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2008; Goldstein 2001; Parpart 2008).

As alluded to above, militarized 'masculinity' can be seen as 'unsexed' in the sense that even women/girl soldiers are cast as 'masculine' (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007). Weber explains in her study of Eritrea and Southern Sudan as follows:

> Although the protocol of dehumanization ensuring obedience is highly gendered, it makes little difference if the recruit is male or female. The step of humiliation is often based on an effeminizing concept (you are a girl, a pussy, you will be fucked) which apparently works for men and women alike.
>
> *Weber 2011: 365*

From this perspective, it is not surprising then that women soldiers and combatants can be violent in similar ways that men are (see also African Rights 1995).

Creating good soldiers requires the construction of a credible ideal of masculine soldiering to which recruits can aspire. However, militarized (and mythologized) masculinities (and the attendant promises and entitlements associated with inhabiting these masculinities), rarely resonate with soldiers'/combatants' sense of self, lived experiences, or with the actual conditions of militarized men's lives. These lived experiences are instead often characterized by fears and traumas of combat, of betrayal and rejection, of failures to live up to the male provider role, etc. (Whitworth 2004: 166; see also Bøås 2007; Eriksson Baaz and Stern, 2009; Goldstein 2001; Utas 2008). These disappointments frequently manifest themselves in feelings of 'failed masculinity'. The fragility (and indeed impossibility) of fulfilled militarized masculinity therefore requires continual concealment through military institutional practices, as well as in the individual expressions of such masculinity, including efforts to perform and regain power, status (and masculinity). Violence – in various forms – tends to form an integral part of these efforts (Alison 2007; Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2009; Utas 2008; Whitworth 2004). In conclusion, understanding notions of 'ideal', and 'failed', militarized masculinities is essential in order to understand the workings of violence in all conflict settings.

However, it is important to keep in mind that while shaped in a global landscape, militarized masculinities are constructed in national and local contexts, and are often articulated in different ways, depending on the sections/parts of the militarized group/institution. For instance, militarization does not always rest on a rejection of all feminine attributes. For example, as Moran's (1995) work in Liberia demonstrates, violent forms of masculinity were also constructed through transgressing certain gender boundaries, not simply by a rejection of all feminine attributes. In short, the workings of gender and conflict are always warzone-specific.

Gendering the enemy

Gender discourses are not merely employed to create capable and willing soldiers and combatants, but they also shape images of the Enemy as 'Other', and thereby underwrite and legitimize violence committed against him/her. This frequently takes various forms. For instance, enemy men are habitually feminized and represented as weak and incapable in war rhetoric, thereby instilling a sense of superiority and courage in 'home' men. Furthermore, war propaganda frequently portrays male enemies as a dangerous threat to 'our women'. Often, seemingly contradictory discursive moves (portraying the enemy as both weak/feminized and a dangerous threat) occur simultaneously. For instance, nationalist language centering around the 'autochthones' (indigenous) (see Jackson 2006) in the DR Congo tend to promote images of evil, perverted Rwandese/Rwandophone men who 'brought rape to our country' and 'come here to rape our women'. At the same time, Rwandese/Rwandophone men are also frequently portrayed as feminized, as weak and sneaky, with unmanly traits in the DRC.

Similarly, representations of enemy women commonly take various forms in war rhetoric. Sometimes they are described as victimized by their own men and in need of being saved by 'our men' (Eisensteen 2007; Riley, Mohanty and Pratt 2008). However, enemy women are also often portrayed as inferior to 'home' women, as unworthy of protection, and as somehow deserving violence. Such rhetoric was, for instance, particularly dominant in the pre-genocide propaganda in Rwanda, where Tutsi women were described as arrogant whores and spies who thereby 'deserved' being raped and killed (Sharlach 1999).

Hence, the gendering of the enemy 'Other' – often articulated in contradictory ways – is vital to the politics of warring. Indeed, the mobilization of support and the preparation of soldiers and combatants to engage in violent acts against the enemy 'Other' depend, in part, on such gendered

symbolism. Gendered symbolism, however, while surely sharing traits in diverse contexts, is context-specific and warscape-specific.

Let us now turn to the second aim of this chapter: outlining and examining the major themes in research on gender and violence in conflicts in Africa.

Major themes in research on gender, conflict and violence in African conflicts

Research on gender, violence and conflict in Africa is diverse and includes a range of (interrelated) issues that are difficult to sort into neat categories. However, in the below section, we outline and discuss two main themes which emerge as particularly dominant:[7] (1) wartime sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) (which tends to focus on women as victims, particularly of sexual violence); and (2) the role of women in armed struggles/armed group in African wars.

Conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence

A frequent question posed in inquiries on gender and in armed conflicts in Africa has been on the effects of warring on women/girls. Various studies, emanating both from academia and policy oriented organizations, have demonstrated the many (devastating) ways in which conflict affects women's lives: forced displacement/situation in refugee camps, rape, forced prostitution/sex slavery, forced impregnation, single-headed households, loss of livelihood and land, mutilations and more (Horwood, et al. 2007; Moser and Clark 2001; Nordstrom 1997; Ohambe et al. 2005; Turshen and Twagiramariya 1998). Among these, conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) has dominated the research and policy agenda on gender and conflicts in African wars in recent years.

In the afterwake of the international recognition of the mass rapes during the armed conflicts in both Rwanda (1994) and Bosnia-Hergezovina (1992–1995), much policy and research attention has been paid to the scourge of conflict-related sexual violence. While the history of rape in war is as long as the history of warring itself, until recently it has been largely ignored. Rape was generally treated as if it were an 'unfortunate by-product' of warring (Seifert 1996), warranting little if any attention (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2013a).

Studies[8] on the effects of wartime sexual violence in African conflicts for women/girls have demonstrated that in addition to extensive physical and psychological injuries, especially following the most violent rapes, many survivors of rape suffer community rejection and stigmatization and are abandoned by their families. Sexual violence has also resulted in increasing levels of HIV/AIDS, other STDs and unwanted pregnancies. Moreover, it is manifested in increasing poverty and food insecurity emanating from physical and psychological injuries and fears which hinder women from working in their fields and selling their produce at the markets.

Additionally, there has been a renewed effort to analyze why sexual violence occurs in particular conflict situations. Most often, sexual violence has been framed as a weapon or strategy of war (Buss 2009; Diken and Laustsen 2005; Ertürk 2008; Horwood et al. 2007; Nordstrom 1997; Seifert 1996; Skjelsbaek 2001) as 'a military tactic, serving as a combat tool to humiliate and demoralize individuals, to tear apart families, and to devastate communities' (UN-Action against Sexual Violence: 3).[9] This explanation stands in sharp contrast to the previously dominant narrative (which still exists and is particularly prevalent in military institutions), namely the 'Biological Urge' or 'Substitution' story. This narrative locates the phenomenon of sexual violence in male biology, arguing that war suspends the social constraints that hinder men from being the sexual animals that they 'naturally' are/can be (Gottschall 2004; Paglia 1993;

Thornhill and Palmer 2000). The conceptualization of sexual violence as a strategy of war has been central for breaking with the view of rape as a tragic but inevitable outcome of war. However, perhaps because of the need for a policy-friendly platform through which to redress sexual violence within the high level of global security policy and the rejection of essentialist and deterministic arguments, the explanation of 'rape as a weapon of war' risks rendering a reductionist and universalizing theory of wartime rape, which could hinder us from paying attention to the particularities of conflict settings (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2010; 2013a).

Some researchers do point to the limitations of the 'rape as a weapon of war' explanation, drawing upon data/interviews from African warscapes among others (Wood 2009; 2010; Cohen 2011; Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2010; 2013a). This work examines (among other factors) variations in military discourses and strategies, and the composition and breakdown of military structures and hierarchies, and attends to the fact that military commanders do not always perceive rape as strategic (Cohen 2011; Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2010; 2013a; Goldstein 2001; Gottschall 2004; Wood 2009; 2010). This research argues that wartime rape is more complex (than a combat strategy to further military objectives) and that a reductionist understanding of rape as strategic (a tactic, or weapon) limits the possibilities of understanding the various factors that contribute to this violence. It must, according to these researchers, be analyzed in the particular context in which it occurs (or does not occur, see Wood 2009; 2010) and understood in relation to a multitude of other circumstances such as ideologies of armed groups, military structures and hierarchies (in particular weak vertical cohesion), conflicting civil–military relations and the workings of cycles of violence, as well as the politico-economic dynamics of the conflict (see Cohen 2011; Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2010; 2013a; Wood 2009; 2010).

Another explanation posits that sexual violence in conflict largely is a result of men's domination over women and/or motivated by the desires of man to exert dominance over women in patriarchal societies (Barstow 2000; Brownmiller 1975; Card 1996; Ertürk 2008; Seifert 1996; Stiglmayer 1994). According to this line of argumentation, societies marked by strong peacetime gender inequalities and violence against women experience higher levels of sexual violence in wartime. For instance, attributing the rampant sexual violence to a supposedly particularly arduous Congolese (African) patriarchal culture has been a common interpretation of sexual violence in the DR Congo, particularly in policy circles.[10] However, in addition to the problematic stereotypical assumptions often underlying such interpretations in African contexts, there is of yet little empirical basis for this theory (Cohen 2011; Goldstein 2001; Woods 2009; 2010). While conflict-related SGVB against women surely is linked to peacetime gender ideologies and gendered power relations (Mama and Okazawa-Rey 2008), many other factors are at play in conflict and post-conflict settings, which render simplistic explanations of wartime rape as a consequence of peacetime gender inequalities problematic.

As evident from the above, the majority of studies of conflict-related SGBV, both more generally and specifically in African settings, focuses on women as victims. The rubric 'Gender' in SGBV has largely come to signify violence against women, consequently conflating sex with gender. This obscures the many ways in which wartime gendered violence also affects men. While women undoubtedly are the main (non)survivors of rape in conflicts in Africa (as elsewhere), men tend to be more vulnerable to 'other' conflict-related violence, such as forced recruitment into armed groups and mass killings (Jones 2000; 2002; Carpenter 2006). Since men/boys are particularly targeted *because* they are men/boys (and are expected to fulfil common 'masculine' roles, such as soldier, combatant) this violence is also 'gendered'.

Moreover, it has been increasingly recognized, both globally, and in African settings, that men are also victims of sexual violence in conflict (Lewis 2009; Johnson et al. 2010; Sivakumaran 2007; 2008).[11] However, it is particularly difficult to assess the frequency with which men are

exposed to sexual violence because of the (supposed) extreme stigma attached to sexual abuse of males and the ensuing reluctance to report such abuse.[12] The stigma attached to male rape is often believed to be particularly strong due to the common disjuncture between (locally defined) masculinity and victimhood. Being a victim – especially of sexual violence – often symbolizes 'failed masculinity', which occupies a position of weakness associated with femininity (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2013a).

Let us now attend to the second major theme that emerges in research about gender, violence and conflict in Africa, namely the role of women in armed struggles.

Women in armed struggles in Africa

Much research on gender and violence in Africa has explored the role and situation of women in armed struggles. This field includes a range of inquiries, covering studies on women's role in the liberation struggles against colonialism in countries such as Zimbabwe (Lyons 2004; Staunton 1990; Parpart 2008), Mozambique (Urdang 1988; Arnfred 1988; McKay and Mazurana 2004, West 2000), Namibia (Becker 2003) and South Africa (Cock 1991; 1994) to women's participation in more recent insurgencies in countries such as Liberia (Utas 2005; Specht 2006), Sierra Leone (Coulter 2008; 2010; McKay 2004; 2007; MacKenzie 2009; 2010), Uganda, (McKay 2004; 2007; McKay and Mazurana, 2004), Sudan (Weber 2011), Ivory Coast (Badmus 2009) and the DRC (Verhey 2004; Schroeder 2005; Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2013b).[13] Much of this research is driven by a wish to address and counter the 'collective amnesia' (DeGroot 2000: 17) that often surrounds women's contributions in armed struggles in Africa (as elsewhere) and oppose the dichotomy of men as active and women as passive in war settings (Moser and Clark 2001).

This large body of research reveals a quite mixed picture, showing that women's experiences and positions in African armed struggles are indeed varied (Moser and Clark 2001; Meintjes, Turshen and Pillay 2002). It demonstrates that women play a range of roles in armed groups, from more traditional female (supporter) roles such as cooking, cleaning and in general 'serving men' to regular combat duties as foot soldiers and commanders of troops. Moreover, it also reveals a complex picture of women's positions as both victims and perpetrators of violence.

Much work on women in armed groups troubles familiar understandings about gender and war in a variety of ways. First, such research (also on more recent insurgent groups) challenges popular simplistic perceptions of why women 'end up' in armed groups, which tend to ignore women's agency by presuming they are always/mostly abducted and forcefully conscripted (see Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2013b). Instead, many studies of recent insurgency wars, such as those in Sierra Leone, Liberia and the DRC, reveal that women cite various reasons for joining armed groups. While many are forcefully conscripted, this is not the only story. Some also join out of 'free will' and cite factors such as commitment to the cause, escaping poverty and domestic abuse, seeking revenge, gender equality, economic motivations, fascination with combat, feelings of 'failed femininity',[14] etc. (see Coulter, Persson and Utas 2008 for an overview). Additionally, several studies demonstrate how being part of an armed group is connected to experiences of increased power, status and confidence for many women (McKay and Mazuranza 2004; McKay 2007; Weber 2011).

Secondly, much research challenges the familiar image of women as situated outside of violence (see earlier discussion). It features narratives of women soldiers and combatants as equipped with an equal propensity for violence as their male colleagues and as firmly embracing their role as competent soldiers in violent combat (Coulter 2008; Weber 2011; Eriksson Baaz 2013b). Such research sometimes also demonstrates the ways in which women are involved in

violent acts, including sexual violence against other women (Johnson et al. 2010; African Rights 1995).

Some studies even bear witness to how female soldiers are portrayed as more fierce and cruel compared to male combatants, by both civilians and fellow combatants (Utas 2005; Coulter 2008). Many warscapes feature stories of legendary women warriors, such as the 'Black Diamond' in Liberia (Utas 2005; Coulter 2008). However, it is important to treat such images and testimonies with great caution. Rather than being evidence of female combatants' particular cruelty or brutality, such images must be understood in relation to prevailing globalized and local constructions of femininity as incompatible with violence, making women's violent acts appear as particularly cruel and brutal (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007). In some contexts, such as Sierra Leone, they can also be understood in relation to images of women as being, by nature, wild and dangerous (Coulter 2008). Again, the workings of gender and violence are contextual.

However, while much research challenges the images of women as victims and as situated outside of violence, they also present a nuanced picture and bespeak how women are subject to both acts of discrimination and violence within armed groups. As Coulter (2008: 57) notes 'even in situations where one can talk about violence *of* women, as in the example of female combatants, one often finds violence *against* women as well' (italics in original).

For example, several studies from Uganda, Sierra Leone and Liberia show that many female combatants were subject to sexual violence, with the exception of female commanders in more senior positions and women combatants who were girlfriends of senior male commanders (McKay 2007; Coulter, Persson and Utas 2008; Specht 2006). Moreover, women who served as regular combatants were rarely accepted as 'real fighters' in the same way as male colleagues and they seldom enjoyed the same privileges (Coulter, Persson and Utas 2008; McKay 2007; Specht 2006).

Learning from these findings, there seems to be a quite marked difference between liberation struggles and more recent insurgency groups in terms of women's status and positions; women active in liberation struggles seem to have enjoyed more status and articulate sentiments of freedom and equality (Coulter, Persson and Utas 2008). This is often attributed to the socialist agenda of many African independence wars, such as those in Zimbabwe and Mozambique, where women's liberation formed part of the socialist agenda (Coulter, Persson and Utas 2008).

However, common for all types of armed conflicts and armed groups is that they evince women's frustrations and disappointments in the post-conflict period. Many studies have focused on processes of DDR and how these have worked to confirm the roles that men played in the war, while ignoring and excluding women (Coulter 2010; Coulter, Persson and Utas 2008; MacKenzie 2010; McKay and Mazurana 2004; Mazurana 2005; Mazurana and Carlson 2004; Schroeder 2005; Specht 2006). One aspect of this is the widespread practice that only combatants carrying a gun qualify for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), thus ignoring other vital roles and functions (Mazurana and Carlsson 2004). Moreover, many studies reveal how women often choose to auto-demobilize in an effort to avoid the stigma and shame attached to being a female combatant (Coulter, Persson and Utas 2008). However, women who have gone through DDR have often been subject to differential treatment. While men are offered various training opportunities and are encouraged to seek employment opportunities, women's options tend to be more limited, directed by efforts to re-integrate them into the domestic sphere, as daughters, wives and mothers (MacKenzie 2010; Weber 2011).

The difficulties of women in post-conflict settings exceed DDR processes and reflect a general process in which women are expected to return to their pre-conflict positions. Many studies demonstrate that the gains and power positions held during the armed struggles (discussed above) are seldom translated into altered gender roles or greater gender equality in

peacetime (Afshar 2003; Barth 2002; Hendricks 2011; Mama and Okazawa-Rey 2008; Meintjes, Turshen and Pillay 2002; Parpart and Thompson 2010; Weber 2011). Instead, women are forced to return again to the unprivileged power position linked to the domestic space of womanhood. Hence, female fighters often encounter particular difficulties in the post-conflict setting. Many attest to experiencing a sense of loss and regret, and to missing the empowerment and sense of belonging provided by wielding a gun. One demobilized EPLF fighter expressed her feelings after the war of independence as follows:

> Those days of war were the best time in my life. I cried when I learned about our victory. Now we have to face this reality. Everybody is alone, on her own. This individualism, all these problems of everyday life. You have to start thinking about really unimportant things, like how to dress your daughter and yourself, since the neighbors are watching and we are not allowed to walk in combat uniform any more, we are not allowed to parade in our uniforms during the victory parade. We have to wear traditional dress and behave like traditional women. Do you know that more than 80 per cent of marriages between fighters are now divorced. The men are all looking for traditional wives in the village, they don't want their female comrades any more.
>
> *Negeste, female former EPLF fighter, Asmara, Eritrea, April 1997, quoted in Weber 2011: 363*

Conclusion

The importance of challenging dominant assumptions about gender and Africa has run as a theme throughout this chapter. We have demonstrated how the familiar gender stereotypes of women/girls as victims/survivors and peacemakers, and men/boys as perpetrators (which tend to be particularly prominent in research on Africa) are simplifications that obscure a much more complex reality.

In particular, we have emphasized how discourses and experiences of 'ideal' and 'failed' militarized masculinities shape the complex dynamics of violence in specific warscapes. The emphasis on men and masculinities in this text is a reflection of one of its main aims: namely to show how *gender* matters in order to understand the dynamics of violence in war. This should not be read as suggesting that the large amount of research which focuses on women and conflict is redundant or unimportant, on the contrary. While a lot of research (much of which is cited in this article) has attended to the issue of the role of women in armed struggles, this area is by far still not 'exhausted'. Moreover, there are several other areas within the field of 'women and conflict in Africa' which, as of yet, have received very scanty attention, such as the role and experiences of women in state armed forces and in peace-keeping forces[15] and the role and contribution of women in peace-negotiations and post-conflict Security Sector Reform processes (see Hendricks 2011 for a good overview of neglected areas of research).

Finally, as noted earlier, it is important to note that in this chapter, we simply have provided an overview of how gender *can* work. Serious attempts to understand the workings of gender in warscapes must avoid commonplace formulaic approaches where gender in militarized contexts emerges as 'already known'. Particularly, they must avoid applying a homogenized concept of militarized masculinity assumed to be shared by military males globally (see Higate 2012; Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2011) Instead, further inquiries into the *context-specific* workings of gender in particular warscapes are sorely needed.

Notes

1 This quote also appeared in Eriksson Baaz and Stern (2008).
2 This is reflected in a number of Security Council Resolutions such as 1325, 1820, 1860, 1888. For a critical analysis see Shepherd (2008b) and Hudson (2010).
3 For a good recent overview of research on gender and security in Africa from an International Relations perspective see Parpart and Thompson (2011).
4 A discourse can be understood as historically, socially and institutionally specific structures of representations, partial, temporary closures of meaning (see Eriksson Baaz 2005). Discourses offer a view or story of reality, which appears as natural, objective, taken-for-granted, and which effectively limits our understanding of the world. The concept of discursive practice rests on the assumption that all social practices are discursive. Instead of separating discourse from practice, discourse must be seen as a practice: 'as long as every non-linguistic action is meaningful, it is also discursive' (Laclau and Mouffe 1990: 104).
5 See Stern and Zalewski, 'Feminist Fatigue(s)' (2009) for an overview.
6 For an outline and discussion of African feminism and conflict/security issues see Mama and Okazawa-Rey 2008; Hendricks 2011; and Kolawole 2002.
7 For a similar categorization see Hendricks 2011. One main (though still neglected) research area that will not be treated here due to the limited space is the role of women as peace-builders. For an overview of this literature see Hendricks 2011.
8 See for example, Amnesty International 2008; Ertürk 2008; Tosh and Chazan 2008; Pratt and Werchick 2004; Human Rights Watch 2002; 2009; Ohambe et al. 2005; Horwood et al. 2007; Ohambe et al. 2005; Pole Institute 2004).
9 www.stoprapenow.org/uploads/aboutdownloads/1282162584.pdf
10 Discussions with various international practitioners in the DRC between 2006 and 2009.
11 For instance, according to one survey conducted in the DRC more than 23 per cent of men surveyed reported having suffered sexual assault (for women the figure was nearly 40 per cent) mostly, but not only rape (see Johnson et al. 2010).
12 Sexual violence against men (like that against women) does not only include rape, but other forms of sexual violence, as well. For instance, civilian men and boys are sometimes forced to have sexual intercourse with kin (daughters, mothers, wives) publicly and men and boys are forced or subjected to other violent and denigrating sexual acts. Moreover, on a more general level, rape is an effective tool of humiliation and intimidation precisely because it is not only a violent act against the raped woman, but also against male family members. Through certain gender ideals dominant in most societies, rape in war is a particularly effective means of humiliating (feminizing) the enemy, or simply other men (cf. Connell 1995; Enloe 1990, 2000, 2007; Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2009; Goldstein 2001; Higate and Hopton 2005). Hence, even where men/boys are not being targeted directly, the logic of rape as a means of humiliation and punishment also rests upon its consequences for men and boys.
13 For a good overview of women in armed groups in Africa see Coulter, Persson and Utas 2008.
14 For example in the DRC, some women described joining the military as the last resort after being deceived by male partners and after having failed to succeed in expected markers of femininity, particularly the bearing of children (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2012b).
15 Existing research on gender and women in state armed forces in Africa is predominantly focused on South Africa. See Hendricks 2011 for an overview.

15

THE ENVIRONMENT AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA

Kevin Dunn

Introduction

This chapter explores the various ways in which the environment and environmental concerns relate to issues of security and insecurity in Africa. In recent years, there has been a conceptual shift around security, namely away from state-centric assumption and the narrow interests of state-leaders to more inclusive understandings of human security. At the same time, concerns about environmental degradation, climate change, and scarce resources became more pronounced after the end of the Cold War. Some observers made claims that conflict over scarce resources, such as oil and valuable minerals, as well as resources made scarce by environmental degradation, such as clean drinking water and arable land, were increasingly prevalent in Africa, and would only increase in the coming years. While offering a variety of interpretations and possible solutions, observers sought to understand what, if any, connections existed between the environment and conflict in Africa, and elsewhere. This chapter will briefly summarize the conceptual shift around security and human security, and then offers a discussion of the impending environmental crises assumed by some to be facing Africa. The chapter then turns to examine the multiple ways in which observers have claimed, and refuted, connections between conflict and the African environment.

A conceptual shift to human and environmental security

Traditionally, discussions concerning national security have been framed around the protection of the state from external military threats or from internal subversion of the established political order. Thus, security has been understood as national or governmental security, defined largely in militarized terms. In the case of Africa, as elsewhere, national security was more narrowly equated with government security in the sense of maintaining the existing regime in power. In recent decades, there has been a shift in how security is conceived, with the suggestion that security needs to include a range of other considerations. For example, Barry Buzan's *People, States and Fear* (1983) argued that security should be understood as including political, economic, societal, and environmental as well as military aspects. This has raised questions about who security is for, and what circumstances are determined to be threats to that security. Some observers have pointed out that there is a need to move beyond regarding the state as the primary, if not

exclusive, referent for discussions about security. It is, after all, but one form of social organization that changes over time and place. Many scholars and activists have argued that more appropriate referents of security are the biosphere and the individual, together linked within the concept human security.

Realist theorists emphasize the perennial problem of insecurity, caused in large part by the security dilemma produced by the anarchical nature of the international state system. This has led them to be critical of attempts to establish peace and security. Liberal theorists, on the other hand, remain more optimistic than their Realist counterparts and tend to promote institutions as a way of achieving international security. They argue that institutions help to decrease a state's uncertainty, and thus insecurity, by increasing information and transparency, reducing transaction costs and the possibility of cheating, while providing a focal point for coordination in the anarchical world. While they vary on the degree of their pessimism for states to cooperate, both Realists and Liberals tend to assume that conflicts are driven by material capabilities. On the other hand, Constructivists tend to focus on social relationships. Specifically, they tend to argue that social structures are constructed, not given, and are made possible by shared knowledge, material resources and practices. So while Realists assume that the security dilemma is an immutable fact of the anarchical system, Constructivists like Alexander Wendt (1999) have argued that it is a social structure produced by inter-subjective understandings that have historically developed, in part by defining interests in "self-help" terms. This has led Constructivists to examine the ideas and norms that have produced conflicts, and which might also be employed for conflict resolution and peace-building.

Critical security studies have provided a de-emphasis on the role of the state and sought to re-conceptualize security in general. This move builds on Robert Cox's (1981) distinction between problem-solving theories and critical theories. The former approach takes the prevailing system and its elements as given. Critical theories, by contrast, focus on the ways in which existing relationships and institutions have emerged and what can be done to change them. Critical security approaches question existing state-centralism, noting that states are extremely diverse in character and, more importantly, are frequently a cause of insecurity for their own populations. Critical security approaches tend to place the individual at the center of analysis, resulting in an approach termed human security. Thus, security is not just about threats, armies, and government policies dealing with conflict, but now encompasses broader concerns about health, drugs, political violence, livelihoods, and infrastructure. When human security is put at the heart of the analysis, a different set of security priorities becomes apparent.

In their 1994 *Human Development Report*, the UNDP defined the scope of human security to include seven areas: economic security; food security; health security; environmental security; personal security; community security; and political security (basic human rights and freedoms). This is notably different from the state- and regime-centric focus that traditional political science has used to frame the concept of security. For some scholars, the shift towards human security was problematic due to the expansive nature of the concept. As Roland Paris argued:

> Existing definitions of human security tend to be extraordinarily expansive and vague, encompassing everything from physical security to psychological well-being, which provides policymakers with little guidance in the prioritization of competing policy goals and academics little sense of what, exactly, is to be studied.
>
> *Paris 2001*

Other criticisms include the concern that the concept might cause more harm than good, in the sense that a human security approach may raise expectations and may be too moralistic to be

attainable. Some scholars have noted that the move away from state-centric approaches also downplays the important role of the state as a provider of security. Finally, the "Copenhagen School" of international relations theory has raised considerable concern about the process of "securitization" (Wæver et al. 1993; Wæver 1997; Huysmans 2000) in which politicians and policy-makers increasingly frame a wide range of social issues and practices through the lens of security. As Mark Duffield notes, "Security from this perspective is often less an objective condition and more the way in which professional groups compete for visibility, influence and scarce resources" (Duffield 2007: 3). Such arguments have definite salience around the contested issues of "environmental security".

Environmental insecurity in Africa: scarce resources and degradation

With the end of the Cold War, two related discussions gained greater prominence within the international community. As noted above, one involved the redefinition of security (Baldwin 1997; Booth 1991; Buzan 1991; Krause and Williams 1997). The other related discussion involved questions about how environmental change in particular threatened individual, state, and global security (Deudney and Matthews 1999; Myers 1989 and 1993; Ohlsson 1999; Dalby 2002 and 2009; Barnett 2001). These latter discussions have been structured loosely around the concept of "environmental security". But as we shall see later, there has been little consensus around these issues. What exactly does the concept of environmental security mean? What are the sources of environmental insecurity in Africa? What are some possible responses to these problems?

In general, it has been argued that conflicts emerge over environmental resources, especially as they grow scarcer. Some observers have focused on how contemporary conflicts have been driven by the desire to profit from access to scarce resources, such as diamonds and oil. Others have focused on how climate change and environmental degradation has heightened human insecurity and led to increased conflict in parts of the continent.

To take but just one example – that of land as a resource – one can note the ways in which scholars have examined the relationship between conflict and the environment in Africa. Of course, in a continent that remains overwhelmingly agricultural, land continues to lie at the heart of social, economic and political life in most of Africa. Yet, there also remains a lack of clarity regarding property rights in contemporary Africa, and land tenure continues to be deeply contested in much of the continent. It should be noted that land remains important not only for farming purposes, but also as a speculative asset. As such, it is a highly political, and politicized, environmental resource. As Calestous Juma observed, "the way land use is governed is not simply an economic question, but also a critical aspect of the management of political affairs. It may be argued that the governance of land use is the most important political issue in most African countries" (Juma and Ojwang 1996).

Citing such examples as Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Rwanda and Zimbabwe, the World Bank acknowledged in their 2003 report *Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction* that "deprivation of land rights as a feature of more generalized inequality in access to economic opportunities and low economic growth have caused seemingly minor social or political conflicts to escalate into large-scale conflicts" (Deininger 2003). Furthermore, in their work on Helping Prevent Violent Conflict, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) notes the significance of land-related sources of conflict. It notes that one of the primary causes of political destablization, population displacement, is often caused by land dispossession. It also suggests that scarcity of productive land and changes in land tenure systems are contributing factors to violent conflict. Moreover, it notes that any successful post-conflict resolution cannot be effective without

resolving land-related disputes and insuring demobilized ex-combatants are able to gain access to land (quoted in Huggins and Clover 2005: 4).

There are variations to the emphasis placed on the degree to which land insecurity is assumed to be a cause of conflict. Much, of course, depends on the specific case under examination. In some cases land scarcity can function as a structural cause of conflict in parts of Africa. Land can also be a proximate cause of conflict. In these cases, land disputes, tenure insecurity, or inequality in land access are combined with other grievances and factors that contribute to the outbreak of conflict and violence. Of course, land insecurity does not, in and of itself, necessarily lead to armed conflict. Not all countries suffering land scarcity or inequality in ownership or access to land experience conflict. As Huggins and Clover observe:

> Research suggests that the key determinant of whether violence will occur is not the extent of grievance in any given society, but rather the forms of social and political organisation which enable "boundaries" to be formed and people mobilized for violent ends.
>
> *Huggins and Clover 2005*

What becomes clear is that political entrepreneurs are often able to manipulate land issues to further personal gains. In Africa, and elsewhere, access to land is often interwoven with ethnic dimensions, as land use patterns and customary land tenure systems have historically had an ethnic basis, something colonialism institutionalized in many parts of Africa. This has meant that important issues around citizenship and migration – specifically, to claims of autochthony – come into play and can gain powerful salience.

Autochthony, literally meaning "emerging from the soil" implies localist forms of belonging, and its expressions have led to debates about the origins of candidates in election campaigns as well as violent struggles in rural areas where assertions about autochthony are used to justify land claims. As observed by Geschiere (2004: 237) "the recent drive towards political and economic liberalization has engendered a rapid intensification of struggles over belonging, an obsession with *autochtonie* and ever more violent forms of exclusion of so-called 'strangers,' even when they are citizens of the same country." This has sometimes undermined the whole notion of national citizenship (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2000). However, such controversies are not new phenomena on the African continent. Their origins are to be found in both pre-colonial practices and the ideas about the politics of place embedded in the colonial project. With a few exceptions, most African societies are multiethnic societies. In the pre-colonial era, the boundaries between indigenous African polities were relatively fluid and porous. Due to land being so abundant, and migration so easy, the preferred form of political protest was that of exit. The colonial imposition of citizenship, which essentially tied each person to a specific territorially bounded polity, greatly altered political and social life in Africa. After independence, citizenship laws increased in importance as the new African states now had to permanently define who legitimately lived within the border of its territory, and could therefore enjoy the privileges of belonging, and who did not.

Land issues become particularly vulnerable to the politics of identity and belonging (Hagberg 2004), especially where two or more groups have "shared" the land for a period of time. One important asset in such situations is the ability to stake your claim to land from the position of being autochthonous, e.g. as the "son of the soil", whereas your counterpart is presented as a "newcomer", an "immigrant" and a "stranger". In such a situation, claiming citizenship is of primary importance because although "citizenship does not entitle you to resources, it entitles you to enter the struggle for resources" (Mamdani 2002: 505). Recently,

due to a combination of political and economic factors, the compromise upon which co-habitation was built is increasingly unsustainable. The recent armed conflict in Côte d'Ivoire illustrates the saliency of autochthony claims in politicized struggles over land and citizenship (Marshall-Fratani 2006). Of course, claims to autochthony need not necessarily lead to violence.

In addition to focusing on the possible effect of scarce environmental resources might have on the outbreak of armed conflict, scholars have also been interested in examining how climate change and man-made environmental degradation is impacting human insecurity (Hulme et al. 2001). The UNDP's *Human Development Report 2007–2008, Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Changing World*, made five principal connections between environmental change and human security: (1) the link between climate, agriculture and food security; (2) the connection between water stress and insecurity as a result from changing rainfall patterns which will, among other things, reduce the amount of potable water available; (3) the connection between rising sea levels and exposure to climate-induced disasters, floods, hurricanes, and landslides; (4) the impact of biodiversity losses and ecosystem disruptions; and (5) the spread of diseases, such as malaria, especially in areas with limited public health capabilities.

With regards to climate change, Africa is the continent that has contributed the least amount of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere in terms of current flows and existing stocks. In 2007, for example, per head emissions of CO_2 for all of Africa stood at 1 tCO_2 (tons of CO_2) in comparison with a world average of 4.3 tCO_2, a US figure of 19.0 tCO_2, the EU15 (the fifteen countries in the EU at the start of 2004) with 6.9 tCO_2 and China with 3.2 tCO_2. South Africa is the one exception, with an average of 7.9 tCO_2/person in 2004, which is due to a high reliance on coal for electricity (UNDP 2007). Despite the fact that the global poor have not caused the emissions of greenhouse gases, they are the most vulnerable. As the 2007 UNDP Report states:

> In rich countries, coping with climate change to date has largely been a matter of adjusting thermostats, dealing with longer, hotter summers, and observing seasonal shifts. Cities like London and Los Angeles may face flooding risks as sea levels rise, but their inhabitants are protected by elaborate flood defence systems. By contrast, when global warming changes weather patterns in the Horn of Africa, it means that crops fail and people go hungry, or that women and young girls spend more hours collecting water. And, whatever the future risks facing cities in the rich world, today the real climate change vulnerabilities linked to storms and floods are found in rural communities in the great river deltas of the Ganges, the Mekong and the Nile, and in sprawling urban slums across the developing world.
>
> *UNDP 2007*

Many scientific predictions indicate that Africa will face increased environmental insecurity given the expected climate change impacts. Crop production will be particularly affected by increased temperatures, changes in rainfall, rising sea levels, and extreme events, such as floods and landslides, that will disrupt ecosystems. Temperatures are expected to increase across Africa, which will increase the risks of drought and increase stress on agricultural production. Given that a high proportion of the population across the continent relies on crops and livestock for their livelihoods, most Africans are very vulnerable to environmental changes. For example, Uganda's Department of Meteorology warned in 2007 that even a slight temperature increase could wipe out most of the country's coffee crop, which is essential to the country for generating export revenues (Toulmin 2009: 57).

Water remains an extremely important resource in Africa, for people, crops, livestock and energy generation. Changes in the availability of water will have substantial impacts on many aspects of life for both rural and urban dwellers across Africa. Rainfall is expected to decline significantly across most of Africa, including the Sahara desert. East Africa is expected to experience greater rainfall, but in torrential conditions that will increase risks of flooding and soil erosion. In some parts of the world, predicted changes in the climate may generate positive changes, such as some parts of Russia and Canada, which are expected to experience more favorable farming conditions over the next several decades. In Africa, by contrast, no region is expected to share in such benefits. Even where rainfall is predicted to increase, much of this is expected to be in heavier and more torrential conditions, leading to increased run-off and erosion. During 2007, Africa experienced its worst flooding in three decades, with more than one million people affected in twenty countries, including Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Ghana, Togo and Burkina Faso. Heavy rains and flooding destroyed homes and crops, leaving numerous communities extremely short of food and vulnerable to substantial health risks (Toulmin 2009: 58).

Desertification and deforestation are two more problems linked to environmental degradation. There is concern that deforestation, due both to climate change and over-clearing driven by economic pressures, will increase the size of deserts across Africa, leading to greater soil erosion. In many parts of Africa, forests are vital for local livelihoods, yet people's ability to manage, control, and even access these resources are often legally constrained. Moreover, African forests are increasingly becoming a global commodity, whether as providers of carbon services for addressing climate change, or as raw materials for timber, fuel or pulp (Toulmin 2009: 85). Some climate models predict that the Sahel region will be even drier in the twenty-first century, due to hotter temperatures and higher levels of evaporation, which will negate any benefits from increased rainfalls. But others have a more optimistic view of climate change in the Sahel, suggesting that agricultural conditions might improve over the next twenty to thirty years due to changing rainfall levels (Toulmin 2009: 15–30). Global climate changes will not just affect the human security of African rural dwellers, but will also significantly impact urban dwellers, with expected increases in heatwaves, flooding, pollution and the rise of sea level. Of course, those most at risk are the poor majority who already live in precarious situations with extremely limited access to water, sanitation and government services, especially regarding healthcare.

Despite the fact that Africa will likely suffer the brunt of problems associated with global climate change, it has been pointedly powerless to address these security issues in the global arena. In her work *Climate Change in Africa*, Camilla Toulmin (2009) points out that Africa's weak economic position is one reason for its powerlessness in global warming talks, yet its diversity is another. "With a rising number of oil- and gas-producing nations, as well as some of the poorest countries, their interests are too divergent for them to speak with a common voice" (Toulmin 2009: 8).

Competing approaches to environmental security

Within the field of environmental security, Krause and Williams (1997) make an important distinction between two approaches: *environmental security studies* and *critical environmental security studies*. The environmental security studies approach tends to focus largely on problem-solving, data collection, knowledge accumulation and policy relevance. In spite of the fact that most of the burden caused by environmental degradation will disproportionately affect Africa and other parts of the Global South, much of the literature on environmental security tends to privilege the concerns of the industrialized Global North. Specifically, the field tends to focus on how environmental degradation in the Global South will impact the security of Northern states,

an argument described by supporters and critics alike as "Malthusian" or "Neo-Malthusian" (Dalby 2002; Richards 1996). Thus, this approach is notably state-centric, policy prescriptive, and prioritizes the concerns of the developed world.

While those working from a critical environmental security studies approach are also concerned with scope and method, they are also concerned with engaging those working within the problem-solving camp over ontological and epistemological questions. Critical environmental security studies scholars tend to assume that the latter group begins with the false premise that global society is primarily a world of self-regarding states, some of which have more (political, military, technological) power and are more economically developed than others (Swatuk 2005: 209). We will examine each approach below.

Environmental security studies and Neo-Malthusian approaches

Much of the Neo-Malthusian argument within environmental security studies is concerned with illustrating connections between environmental degradation and armed conflict. Perhaps the most notable author attached to this approach has been Thomas Homer-Dixon, who has proposed that six kinds of environmental scarcity could potentially produce violent conflict: (1) greenhouse effect; (2) stratosphere ozone depletion; (3) degradation and loss of good agricultural land; (4) degradation and removal of forests; (5) depletion and pollution of fresh water supplies; and (6) depletion of fisheries (Homer-Dixon 1994). Homer-Dixon and others have argued that Africa will be particularly susceptible to these forces, given that African states lack "adaptive capacity" (Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998: 9). The claim is that economically poor states lacking both financial and human capital, and being ethnically diverse, are less likely to be able to manage severe environmental challenges.

Homer-Dixon strives to investigate the link between renewable resource degradation (particularly agricultural land, water, forests and fisheries) and violent conflict (1991, 1994, 1999). His work suggests three hypotheses linking conflict with environmental change. First, it is suggested that decreasing supplies of physically controllable resources would provoke inter-state "simple-scarcity" conflicts or "resource wars". For example, Michael Klare (2001) has asserted that competition and control over critical natural resources will be the guiding principle behind the use of military force in the twenty-first century. Second, large population movements caused by environment stress might induce "group-identity" conflicts such as ethnic clashes. Third, severe environmental scarcity would simultaneously increase economic deprivation and disrupt social institutions, namely the state, and cause "deprivation conflicts" reflected in civil strife and insurgency (Homer-Dixon 1999). For Homer-Dixon and likeminded thinkers, scarcity will be caused by increased demand due to population growth or increased consumption; decreased supply due to erosion, degradation; and/or unequal access and distribution (Homer-Dixon 1999: 280). It is Homer-Dixon's contention that scarcity will lead to resource capture by those with the means to do so, and environmental marginalization of those without.

It should be noted at the outset that the degree of causality given to environmental factors has varied across Homer-Dixon's published record. Indeed, Homer-Dixon has stepped away from making grand causal claims about the links between environmental degradation and violent conflict. In 1999, he concluded:

> environmental scarcity is not sufficient, by itself, to cause violence; when it does contribute to violence, research shows, it always interacts with other political, economic, and social factors. Environmental scarcity's causal role can never be separated from these contextual factors, which are often unique to the society in question.
>
> *Homer-Dixon 1999*

Other writers have been both more alarmist in their pronouncements and more grandiose in their causal claims. Robert Kaplan (1994), for example, epitomizes the alarmist approach with his claims that environmental degradation in Africa and elsewhere is directly linked to warfare and increased human misery. Kaplan and others are primarily concerned with the direct implications for the Global North, the "coming anarchy" in his terminology. Ironically, inhabitants of the developed world are portrayed as being simultaneously removed from the causes of these changes and potentially victimized by their effects, primarily through increased immigration, the contagion of diseases, and spreading social collapse.

These claims are highly contested by scholars. For example, there is a sizeable scholarly literature that suggests that environmental change rarely causes conflict directly and only occasionally does so indirectly (Kahl 2006). Scholars have pointed out that the reasons for war are usually independent of an environmental disruption, such as climate change. Thus, one should be cautious in inferring a simple relationship between increased environmental scarcity and warfare. Lietzmann and Vest, for example, have argued that environmental stress need not lead to direct violence, suggesting that it plays different roles along the "conflict dynamic": from a structural source, a catalyst, and a trigger (Lietzmann and Vest 1999: 40). The conflict in Darfur, Sudan has been offered by some as an example of a war driven by environmental conditions, namely the drought-related problems the region has suffered for decades (Katz 2000). Darfur has been regarded as "the world's first climate change war" as it was dubbed by a 2007 UN Environmental Programme Report. Yet, many scholars have been quick to point out that the origins of conflict are far more complex than this catchy epithet suggests. As Alex de Waal notes:

> In all cases, significant violent conflict erupted because of political factors, particularly the propensity of the Sudan government to respond to local problems by supporting militia groups as proxies to suppress any signs of resistance. Drought, famine and the social disruptions they brought about made it easier for the government to pursue this strategy.
>
> *de Waal 2007*

Yet, alarmist claims for a causal connection between environmental change and armed conflict continue to catch the attention of policy-makers and the general public. Some critics have been quick to point out, however, that environmental change doesn't necessarily have to lead directly to war for it to qualify as a security threat. As Camilla Toulmin has pointed out, "It is clear, however, that the more catastrophic predictions of temperature rises and rainfall failures could unleash major shortfalls in food and water and political upheaval in many regions" (Toulmin 2009: 13). The point many would make is that these considerations require us to rethink what we mean by security, who is being secured, and by whom.

Finally, numerous scholars working in Africa have been quick to point out that environmental change is not the same as degradation. African farmers and herders are not separate from "nature" nor should they be conceived in simplistic terms as "perpetrators" or "victims". In their edited collection *Lie of the Land*, for example, Leach and Mearns (1996) challenge various myths and half-truths that have shaped thinking and policy-making on the African environment over the last few decades. For example, Jeremy Swift has shown how arguments about desertification have rested upon questionable uses of data and a conflation of separate processes of change. He also notes that alarmist pronouncements regarding desertification and degradation have strengthened the power of national governments, development agencies and scientists alike (Swift 1996: 73–90). Similarly, James Fairhead and Melissa Leach (1996) have argued that the "forest islands" in the savanna of Guinea are not remnants of a wider forest cover, but have been created and

sustained through human action. They point out that the colonial science, which is often at the root of accepted understandings of the African environment, was based on biased assumptions, rather than scientific data. Their own research indicates that forests have not diminished, but have been promoted by the agency of Africans. Work such as this does not suggest that there are no serious environmental problems in Africa, but rather urges readers to be much more critical about environmental diagnoses, and the data on which they are based.

Critical environmental security studies

As the example of Homer-Dixon indicates, many scholars have chosen to frame debates about environmental security through a traditional state-centric approach. That is, focusing on how changes in resource endowment (scarcity or abundance) influence the possibility of armed conflict between or within states. Scholars working from what is dubbed a critical environmental security studies approach have questioned a number of the ontological and epistemological assumptions made by these scholars. These critics often question the appropriateness of linking environmental issues to national security practices (Dalby 1998, 2002, 2009; Deudney 1990; Barnett 2001; Gleditsch 1998). For example, Daniel Deudney (1990) raised three basic concerns. First, the structures developed to ensure *national* security, which are reliant on organized violence, secrecy, and technological expertise, are of little help as far as environmental problems are concerned, where solutions require transnational cooperation, openness and a fair degree of creativity. Second, national security discourses rely on portraying all things outside the autonomous, sovereign state as potential threats. This move is in fundamental opposition to the "whole earth" sensibility at the core of environmental awareness, and provides substantial challenges for transnational cooperation. Finally, the high level of interdependence in the contemporary world makes it highly unlikely that the cleavages of environmental harm will match interstate borders. This leads Deudney to observe that "Resolving such conflicts will be a complex and messy affair, but the conflicts are unlikely to lead to war" (Deudney in Conca and Dabelko 1998: 312).

As Simon Dalby has noted, matters such as ozone depletion, pollution and issues with a vaguely environmental connotation are now self-servingly positioned as part of international political discourse and policy initiatives (Dalby 2002: 95). Critics have pointed out that these approaches continue to marginalize conversations concerning rights, justice and access within understandings of environmental security (Swatuk 2005). For them, discussions of environmental insecurity are intimately tied to questions of environmental justice. As they contend, in highly and complex interconnected systems, the security of the whole depends upon its weakest links. Dalby argues "Climate change is also beginning to shift the geopolitical sensibilities from matters of protecting borders to thinking about global interconnections and the fact that affluence is making the poor and marginal insecure" (Dalby 2009: 12).

For critical environmental security scholars, there is a general disposition to problematize practices and institutions that are often considered "natural" and/or immutable. They also maintain that security requires a holistic understanding of the ways in which humans interact with "nature". Simon Dalby suggests that the concept of "environmental security" requires us to rethink both terms – security *and* environment. Traditionally, security has been understood in terms of making things stay the same and we have tended to take the external environment as a static given. As Dalby notes, "humanity is changing what was once understood as an external environment, and in the process changing its circumstances of life in ways that make what is being secured increasingly artificial. Our thinking needs to catch up to this new reality" (Dalby 2009: 4).

Addressing this new reality has led to creative thinking that often challenges some of the core assumptions about security made by traditional scholars and policy-makers. For example, Conca and Dabelko (1998) propose the notion of "environmental peace-making" which would require both the altering of the global state-centric strategic climate and the construction of post-Westphalian forms of governance that may ultimately tie states into cooperative agreements and practices to facilitating "learning". One manifestation of this move has been the idea of transboundary natural resource management, which has taken different forms in practice. Transfrontier conservation areas (TFCAs) focus on biodiversity conservation, such as the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park between Botswana and South Africa, and the Gaza/Kruger/Gonarezhou TFCA between Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Transboundary natural resource management areas (TBNRMAs) differ by focusing more on developing sustainable livelihoods, such as the Every River Has Its People Initiative involving 160,000 km^2 in Angola, Namibia and Botswana. There are also cases of informal networks of resource use across boundaries, spatial development initiatives (SDIs), and development corridors (Swatuk 2005: 222).

Transboundary natural resource management (TBNRM) has gained particular attention in Southern Africa, especially around the issue of water management. In the 1990s, the World Bank identified Southern Africa as a region where water scarcity could lead to violent conflict, though more recently they have suggested that it provides the opportunity for regional peace-building. Larry Swatuk has noted that TBNRM has functioned as much a discursive political site as policy program (Swatuk 2005). The constructed "peace parks" involve international actors, such as the World Conservation Union and Conservation International, and regional NGOs, such as the South African Peace Parks Foundation, who link to state institutions, parks and wildlife departments, who coordinate their actions via the Southern African Development Community (SADC), an interstate body devoted to integrated regional development. However, given South Africa's historical dominance of the region, many people in Southern Africa are skeptical of the peace-building motives said to be driving TBNRM. As Swatuk notes, the Southern African experience with TBNRMs "reveals a constructed landscape – the 'peace park' – the establishment of which mirrors vast power asymmetries within states, among states in the region, and between Africa and actors external to the continent" (Swatuk 2005: 225). Indeed, the example of the TBNRMs illustrates a central point made by critical environmental security scholars, namely that "biodiversity preservation" involves deeply political and contested issues.

This can be seen with regards to a final example, that of national parks in Africa. For many African states, national parks are increasingly important because of the foreign capital generated by tourism, particularly eco-tourism. In 2000, tourism and travel contributed 10 percent of the GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa, growing at a rate of over 5 percent annually in real terms (Christie and Crompton 2001). This has had a significant impact on how African lands and resources have been utilized, with the needs and desires of foreign tourists often prioritized over those of local Africans (Dunn 2008; Igoe 2004; Neumann 2002). In addition to the influence of these market forces, wildlife conservation and management policies in Africa have largely been shaped, if not outright dictated, by external non-state actors such as international environmental lobbying groups like International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) and the World Wide Fund for Nature (aka the World Wildlife Fund; WWF). These lobbying groups, development and environmental NGOs, and international organizations like the IMF and World Bank employ international conservation discourses that challenge the authority of an African state's ability to define the meaning and use of its own territory. In some ways, this is akin to the suggestions made by Hardt and Negri (2000: 35–37, 312–314) that

the "moral force" with which many NGOs operate in world affairs is substantially altering accepted discourses on modern sovereignty, particularly in the developing world. Claiming to represent those who cannot represent themselves (in this case, the flora and fauna), these NGOs claim that their mandate comes from global and universal human interests. Thus, they claim to represent a universal moral call that trumps state power. These NGOs, and their IFI and donor allies, often employ the discourse of Western conservation and "environmental security" to reconfigure modern sovereignty, circumscribe state power, and criminalize established practices of the local communities (Dunn 2008; Litfin 1993).

In conclusion, there remains substantial debate about the relationship between conflict and the environment. As this final example illustrates, there is a need to reconceptualize security beyond the narrow interests of the state and state-leaders, but doing so involves (and can obscure) serious political struggles. Thus, environmental security is both a very real phenomenon and a deeply contested political discourse.

PART III

Regionalism and Africa

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REGIONALISM IN AFRICA
Concepts and context

Daniel C. Bach

Introduction

Until the early 1990s such notions as rule of law, good governance and security were conspicuously absent from the mandates of Africa's regional and sub-regional organizations that were originally to focus exclusively on economic integration. This chapter traces the overall evolution of regionalism in Africa, from its initial emphasis on regional economic integration to its current focus on regional security. The following chapters in the book, after taking a closer look at the African Union, will then discuss the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).

Promoting collective self-reliance provided the initial rationale for regional economic integration in Sub-Saharan Africa, as symbolized by the commitments of the *Lagos Plan of Action* (1980) and *Abuja Treaty* (1991) to an African Economic Community. The related implementation of import-substitution policies within African states was grounded in the widespread perception among rulers, scholars, government officials, and experts that African states were trapped in a dependent relationship with the industrialized North. Furthermore, and most importantly, that relationship was considered to be both inherently unequal and self-perpetuating. Breaking the ties that bound African states to their ex-metropoles was depicted as *sine qua non* to economic development, especially due to trade relations that typically involved exporting primary products in return for manufactured goods.

Little progress towards regional economic cooperation – not to mention integration – has been achieved since those early days. Nonetheless, the mandate of regional economic cooperation schemes from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has expanded to include regional security as well as economic cooperation. The roadblocks that limited progress towards regional economic cooperation have been reinterpreted, more broadly, as the expression of governance and security problems.

The common association of regional integration with transferring components of sovereignty, as occurred in Europe, to a supranational entity, also cuts across the grain of post-colonial African politics. Until the end of the Cold War period, most African states were ruled by authoritarian military or single-party regimes that would reject any constraints on the enhancement of the

power and personal wealth of incumbent rulers. Non-interference into the internal affairs of member-states provided the overarching framework to which both regional organizations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had to abide. Post-colonial patronage linkages and Cold War alignments also, and most importantly, offered alternatives to raising regional security issues within sub-regional groupings. These were deeply divided, due to conflicting interpretations of what security should entail among member-states: emphasis on non-intervention into the domestic affairs of member-states went along with the *de facto* treatment of security as a no go area (Bach 1983).

Two decade later, Africa's eight Regional Economic Communities (henceforth the RECs) and the AU draw much of their legitimacy and the vast majority of their resources from their aspiring role as peacekeepers and agencies of restraint. The regional implications of violence and disregard for the rule of law within member-states are no longer minimized or overlooked. Awareness of the contagion effects of unstable conflict-ridden states in Africa has kept growing. Conflict can easily cross Africa's permeable borders, as exemplified by the Liberian conflict, the DRC conflict, and the Darfur conflict. Region-building in Africa, therefore, has become mostly and overtly focused on state (re)construction and sovereignty enhancement.

The redeployment of Africa's RECs and the AU into the field of peace and security contrasts sharply with the disappointing track record of these same inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) when it comes to their original mandate and stated goals, namely the promotion of economic integration, so as to ultimately promote a pan-African market. The following pages address this paradox. After a discussion of what has been termed *new regionalism*, we will look at the evolution of regionalism from its original economic focus towards holistic agendas, which treat regional security and governance as priorities.

Regionalism, regionalization and integration

What was initially labeled as "open" regionalism refers to the wave of regionalization that started gathering momentum in the late 1980s, as trade liberalization policies unleashed the expansion of cross-border networks and transnational interactions powered by non-state players. As the term *new regionalism* gained currency, it acted mostly as a metaphor for discussing issues and addressing debates that were side-tracked when referring to regional economic, political, or military *integration*.

The revival of regionalism was a global and largely unanticipated phenomenon. The *de facto* crystallization of trade and investment flows around the three core regions of the triad (the Americas, Europe and North-East Asia) owed much to the dynamism of non-state players. When states were a driving force, this went along with significant policy-shifts in the mandates and agendas of established regional inter-governmental organizations (Fawcett 1995).

While the implementation of the EU's Single European Market agenda (1986–1992) went on, in North America, negotiations towards the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) (1991–1994) were proceeding. As this momentum gathered stamina, the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994 stimulated fresh debates on regionalism as a master or servant of multilateralism (Hveem 1999). Some scholars depicted regional trade arrangements, particularly those permitted under Article 24 of the GATT, as a stepping stone to further international liberalization (Lawrence 1995; Vernon 1994), while others viewed trading blocs as a threat to the multilateral trading order (Thurow 1992; Bhagwati and Kruger 1995).

In Latin America and in Asia, trade liberalization provided the impetus for rejuvenated agendas and the emergence of such new organizations as Mercosur.[1] This ongoing wave of regionalism, also branded as "new" regionalism, was frequently associated with an acknowledgement of less state- and euro-centric patterns of region-building. The contribution of such non-state actors as

the diasporas or private firms was reassessed and heavy reliance on institution-building and rule of law, as in Europe, was no longer considered as the only viable path towards integration. Unlike what was being observed elsewhere, Africa would, however, depart from this overall trend: the European experience and its commitment to the pooling of sovereignties remained the model of choice.

Another legacy from these years is the now well-established analytical distinction drawn between regionalism and regionalization. Regionalism refers to cognitive or institutionalized (state-centric) projects, while regionalization points to processes and to *de facto* outcomes. More specifically, regionalism can proceed from ideas or ideologies, programs, policies and goals that seek to transform an identified social space into a formal regional institution. Since regionalism postulates the implementation of a program and the delineation of a strategy, it is often associated with institution-building or the conclusion of formal agreements. Regionalism can also relate to the production, invention or re-invention of transnational identities, a process concomitant with the delineation of mental maps and boundaries.

The distinction between regionalism and regionalization also offers a long overdue insight into the paradox whereby, as Axline already lamented in the 1970s, "most cases of regional integration are among Third World countries, yet research in this field has been dominated by theory based on the European experience" (Axline 1977: 83). Regionalism accommodates an extreme heterogeneity of configurations, ranging from those involving the material organization of transfers of sovereignty (regional integration) to cognitive and ideational projects (associated with the invention of regions and construction of identities within existing states). Regionalism can account for integration processes, but can equally serve to monitor disintegration, namely demands that challenge state sovereignty and border-lines. Unlike the notion of regional integration, regionalism can refer to agendas which, as the track-record of ASEAN illustrates, seek to promote region-building through sovereignty enhancement as opposed to sovereignty pooling (Higgot 1995: 361–363).

Regionalism also enables the analyst to keep away from an underlying assumption associated with the concept of regional economic integration, e.g. the confusion generated by its undifferentiated association with goals and processes (Warleigh-Lack, Robinson and Rosamund 2010).

Regionalization, on the other hand focuses on the build up of interactions which may or may not relate to an explicitly asserted or acknowledged formal regionalist project. Regionalization is a more encompassing notion than regionalism, since it takes into account processes and configurations where states are frequently not the key players. Regionalization may correlate with the implementation of the policies adopted by regional organizations or result from processes of cross-border economic interactions. Regionalization may equally, as mentioned above, involve a loss of state territorial control and the emergence of autonomous regional spaces. The dichotomy between regionalism and regionalization enables the analyst to account for configurations where, as is frequently the case in Africa, regionalism and regionalization contribute to shape distinct regional landscapes.

Thus, while regionalism is typically a top-down state driven phenomenon, regionalization envelops formal and informal processes, but with a strong bottom-up component. Regionalization can grow irrespective of state policies, and even at times, in opposition to their stated goals. In West Africa as in Asia, trade or migration networks do not have the ambition to build regional integration per se. They do, nonetheless promote regionalization. The Yoruba or Hausa trade diasporas in West Africa promote regionalization. The proceeds from the aggregation of the strategies of micro-economic agents promotes regionalization (Söderbaum and Taylor 2008). Regionalization can also be the outcome of corporate strategies by firms, ranging from small business ventures to the large multinationals, seeking to enhance their competitive position.

During the 1990s, Christopher Clapham observed:

> The model of inter-state integration through formal institutional frameworks, which has hitherto dominated the analysis of integration in Africa and elsewhere has increasingly been challenged by the declining control of states over their own territories, the proliferation of informal networks, and the incorporation of Africa (on a highly subordinate basis) into the emerging global order.
>
> *Clapham 1999: 53*

In West Africa, during that same decade, the spill-over effects of Charles Taylor's insurgency in Liberia had eventually destabilized the entire region. As analyzed by Hentz and Blevins in this volume, weak control over the borderlands of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire or Guinea contributed to shape the contours of a conflict zone that was beyond the reach of any of them. In Central Africa too, the Great Lakes region offered an even more powerful example – the Rwanda genocide of 1994 may have been the immediate trigger, but the conflicts in the eastern DRC were only the latest round of a long-running regional conflict.

Also, in Africa the movement and displacement of people has been both a product of and a cause of regional conflict. Refugee populations promote their own brand of regionalization as they seek shelter across the border-line. Their inflow may also, as Karen Jacobsen argues, create national security problems by importing the conflict from their homelands (2001). The US State Failure Task Force stressed along this vein that external factors, including refugee movements can also increase the risk of state failure (State Failure Task Force 2000).

Thirty-nine Sub-Saharan countries hosted more than one thousand refugees between 1990 and 1997. Almost all of these had been compelled to migrate by some form of conflict, ranging from political or ethnic tensions to rebel insurgencies or conflict with neighboring states (Jacobsen 2001). Twenty-eight countries hosted more than 20,000 refugees each. In Sudan, for instance, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA,), then a rebel group, recruited internally displaced Sudanese from refugee camps to fight the government forces (USCR 1997). Likewise, Guinea's and Côte d'Ivoire's rebel forces drew their recruits from Liberian refugee camps. It is after neighboring countries Rwanda and Burundi had experienced brutal civil wars, that the DRC encountered a large influx of refugees. As militants that had committed genocide in Rwanda hid among them, this prompted the Rwandan government forces and rebel groups to intervene in Eastern DRC.

As these instances illustrate, regionalization refers to the build up of interactions which do not necessary relate to an explicitly asserted or acknowledged regionalist projects. Regionalization can build up irrespective of state policies, and even at times in opposition to their stated purpose. The disconnection between state-centered regionalism and *de facto* regionalization can reach exacerbated proportions in such a context. In Eastern Asia, China's emergence as a regional hub for trade and investment has kept building up despite a highly unfavorable politico-institutional environment. As also observed in Africa, trade or religious networks can also shape regional spaces based on social interactions that cut across political frontiers without necessarily challenging the preservation of the territorial *status quo*.

Economic integration and its politics

In post-colonial Africa, the trajectories of regional organizations relate to a distinctive history, shaped by the legacy of three waves of institution-building. The first wave was a spill-over effect of the dissolution of the federations and common services established under colonial rule.

As most African federations were being dismantled on the eve of independence, their common services often survived, generally as IGOs meant to manage common assets. In two cases only, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the CFA Franc currency zone, the transformation of colonial arrangement into hegemonic regimes would result in unique instances of integration through "hysteresis".[2]

The rise of the second generation of regional organizations was largely driven by geo-political considerations, including when economic cooperation or integration were the stated objectives. Most of the groupings meant to promote regional economic integration combined aspirations for import-substitution industrialization (ISA) with strong inspiration from the (then) European Economic Community's constitutional approach to integration. Throughout the period of the Cold War, the politics of competing affiliations and patronage ties prevailed over the implementation of commonly stated economic goals. The politics of "bloc building" still represent a key aspect of present day regional politics in Africa, as the intractable problems of multiple membership (the so-called rationalization debates) show (Engel and Porto, Chapter 17).

Most of the regional integration organizations established in the 1970s and 1980s are still functioning, but their mandates, institutional architecture and acronyms went through drastic overhauls in the early 1990s. Unlike what was the case in other world regions, the revival of regionalism took an asymptomatic course in so far as, in Africa, the adoption of neo-liberal agendas went along with the endorsement of ambitious projects towards a constitutionalization of integration and the mutualization of sovereignties. The treaties of all the existing regional integration groupings were profoundly revised in the early 1990s and new acronyms were adopted to signal changing priorities: the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) of East and Southern Africa became the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA); in West Africa, the Communauté Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) was superseded by the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA); in central Africa, the Union Douanière et Economique de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC) was replaced by the Economic and Monetary Union of Central Africa (CEMAC), while in Southern Africa, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) morphed into a Southern African Development Community (SADC). These transformations went along with pledges towards the adoption of transfers of sovereignty and the enforcement of good governance and rule of law agendas. By the end of the 1990s, protocols establishing security management architectures had also been adopted by two key regional organizations (ECOWAS and SADC).

The revival of regionalism in the 1990s was also stimulated by the adoption of the Abuja Plan of Action. This continental blueprint prescribes the establishment of regional economic communities (RECs) that are to operate as building blocks towards an integrated African Economic Community (AEC) by 2028. By then, the AEC should involve the free movement of people and factors of production, a single domestic market, an economic and monetary union (with a single African currency) and a central bank. Today, eight regional groupings are officially recognized by the AU as RECs – the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); the ECOWAS, COMESA, SADC, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the East African Community (EAC).

The RECs and the African Union (AU), launched in 2002 following the revision of the OAU Charter, endorsed an approach to region-building that may be retrospectively described as a case of "thick" regionalism. Emphasis on institution-building and good governance within member-states is expected to contribute to the progressive transformation of the AU and the RECs into effective agencies of restraint. The new Constitutive Act (CA) has considerably broadened the missions of the AU, since it now incorporates the establishment of the AEC and the creation of

a sophisticated African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (Engel and Porto, this volume). APSA's ambitious agenda is also rooted in the assertion of a normative revolution: the substitution of a culture of "non-indifference" to the pre-existing emphasis on strict "non-interference" in the internal affairs of member-states.[3] As a result, the AU is the regional organization which, by world standards, today carries the boldest provisions allowing intervention into the affairs of its member-states. In accordance with these objectives, the transformation of the former Bureau of the OAU into a Peace and Security Council (PSC) aims at improving the conflict-resolution and peace-building capacity of the AU. The CA of the AU also provides for the creation of an Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), for the establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), and for a Pan-African parliament. The establishment of Free Trade Areas (FTAs) and customs unions within the RECs was originally meant to have taken place within, respectively, ten and twelve years following the adoption of the Abuja treaty in 1991. Two decades later, AMU, CENSAD and IGAD are nowhere near establishing FTAs. In the Maghreb, member-states of the AMU have not been able to meet for several years. In the Horn of Africa, IGAD is still primarily a political forum, while CENSAD is probably doomed to fade into oblivion with the death of its Libyan patron and financier, Muammar Gadhafi. While ECOWAS, ECCAS and the EAC have formally announced the establishment of their FTAs, SADC is yet to achieve this objective despite the formal claim (on its website) that the FTA was launched in 2008.

Current assessments of the state of regional economic integration in Africa, while celebrating the region's transformation into a "new frontier" for international trade and investment, also observe that region-building is severely hampered by what amounts to a collection of fragmented small economies (Janneh 2011; see also ECA, AU, ADB 2010). The regionalization of markets and policies still remains embryonic. There is a striking contrast between the dynamism of the so-called "informal" trade and the quasi-irrelevance (11%) of recorded intra-regional flows, compared to what is observed in Europe (72%) and Asia (52%) (ECA, AU, ADB 2010: 1–4). This reflects on the poor implementation of stated agendas, but also on the intrinsic limitations of approaches to regional integration that, as in Europe, should require significant transfers of sovereignty. Whereas the construction of Europe was dotted with a succession of hard-fought compromises that have resulted in the deepening of its institutionalization and a constitutionalization process, the RECs emphasis on institution-building and endorsement of the EU model has remained purely formal. The outcome is an *ad hoc* situation best described as a case of "thick" institutionalism due to a total disconnect between pledges and effective implementation, unlike the EU's effective institutionalization processes or ASEAN's explicitly assumed "lean" institutional blueprints.

The African (neopatrimonial) state and regionalization

The EAC is the only African regional economic grouping that has officially graduated from an FTA into a customs union. Even then, eight years after the initial adoption of the Customs Union Protocol, concrete steps towards implementation were still being awaited.[4] The track record the EAC, one of the most successful regional groupings in Africa, is a reminder that the ability of regional organizations to implement intrusive institutional agendas presumes that member-states concede to a reduction of national prerogatives and territorial control. Agreement to transfer and "pool" sovereignties in specific areas postulates a capacity and willingness to do so, an issue that refers *in fine* to the production and implementation of public policies that do not simply reflect upon the private interests of the ruler and his clients. As the following chapters in this section make clear, Africa's regional and sub-regional organizations were, until the reversal of the

(O)AU agenda in the early 2000s, exclusively focused on protecting and consolidating established regimes and interests.

The limited capacity of African regional organizations to implement their ambitious economic agendas cannot be simply attributed to the existence or absence of supranational decision-making processes or to a lack of political will on the part of member-states. Thick institutionalism enhances the adverse effects of the coexistence, within African regional and continental groupings, of thoroughly patrimonialized and predatory regimes, along with states within which neopatrimonialism is capped, regulated or ring-fenced (Bach 2012). Procrastination over the dismantlement of tariff and non-tariff barriers may result from openly acknowledged policy-orientations. It is an altogether different issue when a state, or its agents, falls short of implementing decisions that are legally binding.

Neopatrimonialism also nurtures and stimulates specific patterns of regionalization, in conjunction with the exploitation of cross-border opportunities. The blanket term of informal trade invites a focus on cross-border transactions that follow traditional routes and reflect upon natural or economic complementarities. These transactions are often of great significance to the populations living in the borderlands. What we have labeled "transstate regionalization" refers to the ability of transnational players to avoid or negotiate border enforcement policies, often through complicities within state bureaucracies (Bach 2004). The reach of transstate networks goes well beyond the borderland, although it is there that their activity gains greater visibility. Their dynamism builds upon the instrumentalization of opportunities generated by tariff, fiscal, monetary or normative discrepancies. Transactions can involve the transit of commodities (exploitation of disparities between producer prices on each side of the border), but also long-distance trade in products like alcohol, cigarettes or petroleum, or the circulation of more sophisticated items such as cell phones, computer equipment, vehicles, medicine, diamonds, endangered species, drugs, and of course arms. Transstate networks capitalize on the permeation of public policies by private interest. Variable geometry in interpreting national regulations is central to the profitability of such transactions, as Mahaman Tijani Alou's detailed analysis of the customs services in Niger illustrates (Tijani Alou 2011: 142–54).

Transstate networks cut across borders-lines and penetrate state institutions, but they do not seek to challenge the territorial *status quo*: it is the preservation of strong disparities across the border that stimulates what is presented, depending on circumstances, as smuggling, informal, unofficial, illicit or re-export trade. One of the outcomes is the emergence of spaces that are largely autonomous from the territorially defined regions that the RECs are meant to build. Indeed, transstate networks, like informal trade in general, revolve around social, religious or geo-ethnic affiliations as opposed to territorially based identities.

Transstate interactions can, in some cases, relate to institutionally driven policy orientations. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the opportunities associated with transit-trade were carefully nurtured by the entrepot states of coastal West Africa where policy-makers adopted enabling legal and fiscal frameworks. At the other end of the spectrum, the dissolution of some states into informality, as in the Horn of Africa, contributed to draw the contours of a radically different regional landscape. The preeminence of networks over policies was stimulated by the rich opportunities associated with the dividends of the frontier, not to mention those drawn from the "dividends" of violence and insecurity (Healy 2011).

Regional conflicts generate their own brand of regionalization whenever the spread of violence and insecurity contributes to nurture an alternative system of access to profit, power and protection (Keen 1998). Like the case of Somalia, the conflicts in and around the DRC also offer a near perfect example of the decisive influence of "transboundary networks, some illicit some not" (Carayannis 2003: 233).

Towards a "defragmentation" of African markets?

As the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis gained a new acuity in early 2012, Africa ranked second after Asia among the regions identified by international investors as dynamic and least affected by the effects of the global financial crisis (Invest 2012). Beyond the lure of commodities and natural resources, investors and businessmen emphasize the attractiveness of sustained growth rates, and the strong potential for market expansion generated by urbanization and the empowerment of new socio-economic categories. Investment flows into the continent have surpassed aid flows since 2006, and private investors have a clear focus on markets that have a regional potential as hubs. The outcome is fresh incentives to pragmatism that fuel defragmentation in the field of banking and finance (viz the success of the Ecobank in West Africa), through the adoption of measures designed to reduce of the cost of doing business (Common Investment Area within COMESA), the rehabilitation of infrastructures, and the establishment of corridors of growth combining public with private support (as successfully initiated by the Maputo Development Corridor over a decade ago).

More generally, Africa's improving terms of engagement within the global economy generate their own "structural" pressure towards the defragmentation of markets beyond national boundary-lines and the regional economic groupings within which they are meant to dissolve. So as to anticipate the intractable problems generated by the combination of multiple affiliations to RECs that might result in mutually incompatible Common External Tariff (CET) agreements, a newly established arena, the African trade forum, is now discussing the creation of a continental FTA. In Southern and Eastern Africa, South African ambitions to fulfill the country's potential as a regional hub and a gateway to the continent, underscore the country's support for the establishment of a tripartite (COMESA-EAC-SADC) FTA by 2014.

Conclusion

Since the early 1990s, the resolution of intra-state conflicts and the improvement of domestic governance are treated as integral components to the successful implementation of regional agendas in Africa. The engagement of the RECs and the AU into these areas proceeds from an attempt to redress and overcome what Hentz, Söderbaum and Tavares have described as the "Africa Paradox": while African states are committed to transfer sovereignty to regional organizations, many of the substantive components of sovereignty elude them (2009: 214).

The outcome is regional organizations that still aspire to the creation of security communities – the experience of the North Atlantic community (Deutsch 1957) acts as the model of choice – yet must focus on the treatment of violence and insecurity within their member-states. As already observed in the introduction to this book, insecurity in Africa remains primarily driven by domestic violence and its knock-on effects across borders. Conflicts over the delimitation of African boundary-lines are the exception, despite ongoing perceptions that the arbitrary establishment of most of these undermines their legitimacy. As a result of this specific context, the security dilemma of the RECs revolves around a difficult balancing act between their aspiration to enforce intrusive agendas and the propensity of the member-states concerned to confine such interventionism to the legitimation of the *status quo* and the enforcement of regime stability. This security conundrum was highlighted throughout 2012 by the complex negotiations that repeatedly delayed plans towards the deployment of a UN-backed ECOWAS military force in Mali. Helping to restore the authority of the Malian state over the Islamists' dominated northern part of the country required the prior clarification that this would not result in an international legitimation of the coup staged in March 2012 by the military junta

in Bamako – the chaos that ensued contributed decisively to the Islamists' and Tuaregs' successful takeover bid in the North. Under the pressure of international sanctions, the Bamako junta eventually had to concede the establishment of a government of national unity on 22 August 2012. It would still take two more months for the suspension of Mali's membership of the AU to be lifted. As the ECOWAS head of States announced on 11 November 2012 in their adoption of an integrated programme towards the deployment of an Africa-led international force, they acknowledged "the lead role of Mali" but stimultaneously cautioned that military and diplomatic initiatives would seek to restore constitutional order, as well as the unity and territorial integrity of the country. The linchpin of the "two-pronged" approach adopted by the ECOWAS was the commitment of the Interim President of Mali to announce shortly a roadmap towards the organization of free, fair and transparent elections (ECOWAS 2012).

For a number of ailing regional economic groupings, institution-building in the field of security has also opened avenues for the enhancement of their resources and legitimacy. In Central Africa a largely formal economic grouping, ECCAS has undertaken, since 2002, to carve a new role for itself in the world of conflict prevention and peacekeeping. In the Horn, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), now known as IGAD, has carved a niche for itself as a forum and an interface for UN, EU, and US sponsored initiatives over Somalia, the Sudan and the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia. In both cases, policy-making at the regional level heavily reflects upon politics within member-states and their ability to produce public policies, not least with respect to the conception of security as a common good. The African state, as Aning's chapter stresses in this volume, keeps providing the prism through which African security, including within a regional context, is best understood.

Notes

1 Mercosur, the "Common Market of the South", is an economic and political agreement among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay (which is currently suspended), and Uruguay to promote the free movement of goods, services and people among member states. It was established at the Treaty of Asunción in 1991.

2 Integration does not proceed from the transfer of sovereign competencies to a supranational entity, but from the continuation of arrangements dating back to the colonial period. At independence, the decision to continue pre-existing arrangements meant that accession to international sovereignty excluded currency (franc CFA zone) or external tariff and customs (SACU) management. These remained entrusted to respectively France and South Africa (Bach 2005:137–148).

3 The CA prescribes that the AU has "the right . . . to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity" (art. 4 section h). See also, the extensive discussion of R2P in Chapter 4.

4 "The State of Regional Integration in East Africa: Perspectives on Model, Pace and Future Trajectory", *Workshop of the Institute of Regional Integration and Development*, The Catholic University of Eastern Africa, Nairobi (Kenya), 26 September 2012.

17

THE AFRICAN UNION AND AFRICAN SECURITY

Ulf Engel and João Gomes Porto

Introduction

Against the backdrop of a decade of protracted high-intensity, often transnational conflicts and a decrease in human development across sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, Africa continues apace with the process of transformation of the norms and institutions governing the continent. This has led to new practices on the mutually constituted challenges of peace, security and development. It also alters the nature of bilateral relations within Africa and its global interactions. The transformation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU), launched in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002, expanded the sources of authority of the organization and created a fully-fledged AU Commission (AUC) that is substantially more powerful than the OAU's Secretariat had been. In addition to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (AHSG), the Executive Council and the Permanent Representatives Committee, the AU has created judicial, democratic and civil society pillars (the Court of Justice, the Pan-African Parliament and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council). The most important area of change, however, regards the establishment of a new peace and security architecture for Africa (APSA), which in conjunction with the recent African Governance Architecture (AGA) have focused the organization squarely on the prevention, management and resolution of violent conflict. This chapter provides an overview of this new architecture and its implementation and highlights some of its most pressing institutional, financial and political challenges.

The new African peace and security architecture: norms and institutions

With the transition of OAU (established in May 1963) to the AU in 1999/2002, not only was a set of new institutions created, but the new continental body also embraced a set of new norms to regulate the relations between its member states. Norms are understood here as inter-subjectively shared expectations about appropriate role behavior. There is a general consensus that the right to intervene in the internal affairs of member states constitutes a new quality in intra-African relations. This principle was stipulated in Article 4(h) of the *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, which was adopted on 11 July 2000 at the OAU's 36th summit held in Lomé, Togo. The AU continued to stress principles which already governed the OAU – sovereign

equality and interdependence among member states, respect of existing borders, prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among member states, and the non-interference by any member state in the internal affairs of another (AU 2000: 4). It also introduced "the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity" (AU 2000: 4; see also Baimu and Sturman 2003).

In the academic literature, this major innovation is discussed either as a turn from politics of non-interference to non-indifference (Kioko 2003; Williams 2007a; Mwanasali 2008) or as a change from emphasis on regime (or military) security to one on human security (Hutchful 2008; Abass 2010). Obviously this is related to a broader shift in international norms on interstate behavior in the context of the rise of the principle of R2P, i.e. the responsibility of states to protect citizens of other states in situations where their own governments are not willing or capable of doing so (ICISS 2001; UN 2004, UNDP 1994; see also Wheeler 2000; Slotin, Wesamba and Kebede 2009; Paris 2001; and on Africa, Murithi 2007). The norm of non-indifference within the AU is often taken for granted, overlooking the fact that this, as with any other position, is constantly renegotiated among member states (Witt 2012).

The decision to transform the OAU was accompanied by a firm resolve to expand the scope and capacities of the already existing continental security institution, the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, which was established in June 1993 (OAU 1993; Ibok and Nhara 1996; see Espegren 1999; de Coning and Solomon 2010; Muyangwa and Vogt 2003; OAU 1994; van Walraven 1999). At a summit on 9 September 1999 in Sirte, Libya, the commitment was made to transform the OAU into a new organization; on 11 July 2000 in Lomé, Togo, the legal-institutional framework for this new organization was adopted in the form of the *Constitutive Act of the African Union* (AU 2000; see also Powell 2005; Murithi 2005; Akokpari et al. 2008; Dokken 2008; Makinda and Okumu 2008; Franke 2009; Engel and Porto 2009; 2010; Besada 2010).

In order to enable the organization to carry out its new peace and security mandate, the AU on 9 July 2002 adopted *The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union* (AU 2002). Together with the Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP), which was adopted at the 2nd extraordinary summit of the Assembly held in Sirte (27–28 February 2004), this document has become the most important instrument of APSA's legal underpinning (AUC Chairperson 2004). The PSC Protocol specifies the series of new institutions and decision making procedures (also known as pillars) of the APSA: the Peace and Security Council (PSC); the Panel of the Wise; the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS); the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund. The Protocol entered into force on 26 December 2003. The new architecture was originally meant to be fully implemented by 2010.

Furthermore, in what is the first indication of the true continental nature of this architecture as far as its components are concerned, the PSC Protocol states that "the Regional Mechanisms (RMs) are part of the overall security architecture of the Union"– and it is here that the harmonization and coordination roles of the Union are first defined (see AU 2002: 6 on effective partnership). Indeed, the AUC Chairperson is specifically tasked with involving the RMs in the establishment of two of the pillars of the architecture, the CEWS and the ASF.

The PSC has the far-reaching task to "promote peace, security and stability in Africa", to "anticipate and prevent conflicts", to "promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities to consolidate peace and prevent the resurgence of violence", to "co-ordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism in all its aspects", to "develop a common defense policy" for the AU as well as to "promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect

human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law, as part of efforts for preventing conflicts" (AU 2002: 3).

The PSC comprises ten representatives who are elected for a two-year period, and five representatives who are elected for a three-year period (with an option for re-election) on the basis of regional representation. Decisions are guided by the principle of consensus. In cases where consensus cannot be reached, the PSC "shall adopt its decisions on procedural matters by a simple majority, while decisions on all other matters shall be made by a two-thirds majority vote of its Members voting" (AU 2002: 13). In contrast to the UN Security Council (UNSC), no member state has the right to veto Council decisions. While major PSC decisions – such as intervention – need to be authorized by the Assembly, in eighteen clearly demarcated areas the PSC enjoys the right to initiate debate and action (AU 2002: 7). The PSC also institutes sanctions in cases of unconstitutional changes of government.

It is key to highlight the importance that on a principled and normative basis, conflict prevention, that is the anticipation and early responses required to "contain crisis situations so as to prevent them from developing into full-blown conflicts" is assumed in the development of the architecture. The Panel of the Wise is an institutional innovation in preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. Its role is to advise the AUC Chairperson and the PSC, in particular, on issues of conflict prevention (AU 2002: 11). The members of this Panel shall be qualified by their outstanding past contributions to peace, security and development. Panel members are elected for a three-year period by the AU Assembly, based on a proposal by the Chairperson. At the request of the PSC or the Chairperson, the Panel "shall take such action deemed appropriate to support the efforts of the (PSC) and those of the Chairperson for the prevention of conflicts, and to pronounce itself on issues relating to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa" (AU 2002: 11).

As noted above, the PSC is first and foremost conceptualized as a collective security and early warning arrangement as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The *PSC Protocol* determines the establishment of a Continental Early Warning System meant to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of violent conflicts; it is tasked with gathering and analyzing information to enable the Chairperson, the PSC and other actors of the new APSA to prevent violent conflict in a timely manner (AU 2002: 1). The Protocol also prescribes that the observation and monitoring units of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are to form an integral part of the CEWS. Indeed, it states that the early warning system shall consist of the "observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms to be linked directly through appropriate means of communications to the Situation Room, and which shall collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the Situation Room" (AU 2002: 2).

For conflict management, and specifically for the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to Article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act, the Union is setting up an African Standby Force (AU 2002: 13). The ASF operates under the AUC Chairperson who will appoint a Special Representative and a Force Commander for every single operation. It comprises a military, a police and a civilian component. The ASF shall perform tasks regarding observation and monitoring missions; other types of peace support missions; intervention in member states; preventive deployment; peace-building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization; and other functions as mandated by the PSC (AU 2002: 3). In total, the ASF will have five regional standby brigades. Depending on the deployment scenario, these brigades should be ready for deployment within 14 to 90 days – scenarios 1–4 in 30 days, scenario 5 full deployment in 90 days with military component deployed in 30 days; and, finally, scenario 6 in 14 days. An unspecified amount of funds should be provided by member states and international donors to

the Peace Fund (AU 2002: 21). Under the former OAU Mechanism member states had to contribute five percent of their annual OAU membership fee to the Peace Fund.

The implementation status for APSA

More than ten years after its inception, the first empirical informed studies have been tabled on the various pillars of APSA, i.e. the Panel of the Wise (Nathan 2004; Abdellaoui 2009; Murithi and Mwaura 2010), the PSC (Cilliers and Sturman 2004; Williams 2009b; Sturman and Hayatou 2010), CEWS (Cilliers 2005; Engel et al. 2010) and the ASF (Cilliers 2008; Dersso 2010). Little research has been done on the Peace Fund. Implementation, efficiency, as well as horizontal and vertical harmonization of the five pillars differs widely. To fully utilize APSA, additional policy practices have emerged reflecting the different interests and levels of commitment of member states to the AUC's democracy and good governance agenda.

The debate on ASPA is dominated by contributions that share a strong interest in policy rather than in theory. In the few cases where there is an original academic, theory-building interest, reference is usually made to three distinct concepts. Firstly, the concept of security community, as originally formulated by Karl W. Deutsch and later adapted by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998) is being employed. Franke (2009), for instance, analyzes the APSA and the RECs in terms of the emergence of multilayered security communities. In a similar vein, Buzan (2003) has advanced theorizing on regional security complexes, a perspective that is still to be applied in detail to Africa. Secondly, in the tradition of liberal regime theory (see Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1997), some authors frame APSA as a security regime-in-the-making (Engel and Gomes Porto 2009; 2010), and the African Union as a security actor (Møller 2009). Thirdly, the emerging professional class of people working around the APSA is being discussed in terms of an epistemic community-in-the-making (Haas 1993; see also Engel and Gomes Porto 2010).

By 2009, the need to comprehensively assess and evaluate the implementation of the various pillars and components of the APSA was expressed by several donors, in particular the European Union (EU), by far the largest contributor to the APSA through the African Peace Facility. A team of largely independent African experts, nominated by the AU and led by Lt. General (rtd.) Louis M. Fisher (Botswana) was deployed in 2010 with the specific aim of assessing the progress made by the AU in the operationalization of the APSA and the specific contribution of relevant RECs and RMs (Fisher et al. 2010: 8). This report followed an internal audit of the African Union which was conducted in 2007 by a high-level panel under the leadership of former UN Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of UNECA, Adebayo Adedeji, which stressed that the highest organ of the Union, the Assembly, could show more leadership in developing the continent's integration agenda (Adedeji 2008). The panel also highlighted a variety of weaknesses in terms of accounting, staffing, performance standards and career development within the AUC. Understaffing is a serious problem in almost all sectors relevant to peace and security. The panel furthermore concluded that the RECs, as building blocks in the integration process, have been constrained particularly by "the overlapping memberships, insufficient inter-RECs co-operation, and a lack of coordination and harmonisation at the continental level" (Adedeji 2008: xxv).

For its part, the Fisher Report concluded that, while "the build-up of the APSA at the AU and the RECs/RMs has made varying degrees of progress and achieved a certain level of operational readiness" (ibid.: 8), issues of vertical and horizontal coordination (respectively between the AU and RECs and between the various APSA pillars) were identified as key. The authors note that "the level of coordination between the AU and the RECs/RMs has registered some progress, especially as it relates to the operationalization of two key components of the

APSA, the ASF and CEWS". They consider that the level of coherence in the development of these components is more advanced than other components (especially the Panel of the Wise and the Peace Fund), partly a function of "the fact that the ASF and the CEWS have clearly articulated roadmaps, thereby providing more structured basis for their operationalization" (ibid.). This assessment highlights the limited coordination between the other APSA components, particularly there was until 2013 no "direct linkage between the PSC, Panel of the Wise and similar structures in the RECs/RMs" (ibid.: 8).

The continental nature of the architecture, despite the PSC Protocol, a Memorandum of Understanding, which was signed between the AU and the RECs in January 2008, and the now deployed desk officers responsible for AUC liaison with the RECs, coordinated institutional relations and common positions on matters of peace and security are still in their infancy. The recent conflicting positions on the post-election conflict in Côte d'Ivoire, between the AUC/PSC and ECOWAS, reminds us of the imperative of fostering better relations between the regional and sub-regional levels. The Fisher Report is, in this regard, quite clear: it calls for an "improved partnership" between the AUC Chairperson and the Chief Executives of the RECs/RMs (ibid.: 10). It warns of the disjuncture between the PSC and similar organs at the RECs, with the consequence that "without proper coordination, implementing, PSC decisions will be significantly diminished, potentially undermining the credibility of the PSC" (ibid.: 64).

On horizontal coordination between APSA components, "the inter-locking system that is envisaged whereby the decisions of the PSC benefit from information and analysis from other components, such as the early warning systems at the AUC and the RECs, has been limited" (ibid.). Improving inter-departmental coordination and cooperation at the AUC itself is a major strategic issue, especially among the AUC departments of Peace and Security and Political Affairs, Social Affairs, Economic Affairs, etc. Beyond the AUC, "the AU should ensure greater synergy between the PSC and other APSA components. To date, there is limited evidence of cooperation between the various entities, a gap that needs to be plugged urgently" (ibid.: 11). This is particularly the case with the need for clarifying the relationship between the PSC and the Panel of the Wise.

Operationally, the PSC has been the most visible component of the emerging APSA. Between its inauguration in May 2004 and May 2013, it has held 376 meetings and briefing sessions on a wide range of issues, demonstrating the growing commitment of the AU member states to tackle conflicts on the continent, while also highlighting the fragility of the security situation in some of its members. The PSC has authorized the deployment of peacekeepers to Burundi (AMIB), Comoros (AMISEC), Sudan (AMIS) and more recently Somalia (AMISOM) and Mali (AFISMA). The deployment of peacekeepers in these theatres has exposed a major gap between the PSC's willingness to authorize such missions and the AU's ability to implement them. Shortages of resources – human, financial and material – has emerged as a major shortfall and the need for enforcement of the criteria for appointment of PSC members has been emphasized in terms of strengthening the credibility and legitimacy of the PSC.

In terms of conflict prevention and early warning, the collaboration between CEWS and the early warning systems of the RECs and donor partners to build capacity for the operationalization of CEWS has been successful, even if the CEWS is not, as of now, fully operational. A relatively clear definition of goals, i.e. the specifications of the system (steered by AUC through a consultative process), the ownership and capacity within AUC to align support to its own strategies and processes, a diversity of resources (programmed and flexible funds, partnerships, expertise), and donor partners "were able to engage CEWS at the operational level for discussions on CEWS requirements and multi-year commitments of key donors" (ibid.: 36).

The establishment of CEWS started in 2003, with a series of workshops through which the AUC developed with African and international consultants a *Roadmap for the Operationalization of the CEWS* (AU CMD 2008a). On 21 June 2006, the PSC reviewed the status of implementation of the APSA, urging the AUC to hasten the operationalization of the various pillars, including CEWS. From 17–19 December 2006 in Kempton Park, South Africa, the Commission convened a meeting of governmental experts on early warning for among other reasons, to review the CEWS roadmap. The results of this meeting were communicated to the member states through a report of the AUC Chairperson; the Executive Council finally endorsed the *Framework for the Operationalisation of the Continental Early Warning System* (25–26 January 2007).

At the heart of CEWS lies a hybrid model which combines quantitative and qualitative methods of conflict analysis. It is based on general structural indicators (the so-called Indicators Module) and is fed by dynamic open source information, which is collected automatically through the internet. Analysis is based on standard Strategic Conflict Assessment techniques (AU CMD 2008b). Although having experienced delays in the recruitment of key staff, the CEWS has already implemented an important part of the data and information gathering infrastructure and has begun producing standardized early warning analysis and policy response options. According to internal planning, CEWS will be fully operational by 2015. Coordination and harmonization with the early warning systems of the RECs, in particular ECOWARN of ECOWAS and CEWARN of IGAD, is being addressed.

In terms of conflict management, and specifically on the ASF, a *Policy Framework document for the establishment of the ASF and the Military Staff Committee* was adopted by the Chiefs of Staff (17–18 January 2004), by the African Ministers of Defense (20 January 2004), and subsequently approved by the Assembly in July 2004. The APSA evaluation notes that "efforts to operationalize the ASF has registered good progress although the degree of progress varies from region to regions. Progress in developing a multidimensional concept for the ASF is perhaps one of the most remarkable to date" (Fisher et al. 2010: 51). The military and police components have been put in place in all RECs/RMs. However, there are still some crucial gaps, especially in relation to the civilian component.

The implementation status of the five ASF brigades varies greatly (Cilliers 2008; Cilliers and Pottgieter 2010). By 2010 the most advanced region is East Africa, with EASBRIG. In this case, only the civilian component and the standby roster have not been established. The other elements are in place: framework documents have been agreed upon; a memorandum of understanding has been signed; planning elements; a brigade headquarters and centers of excellence have been identified; and units have been pledged by the member states. The regional brigades for West Africa, ECOBRIG, and Southern Africa, SADCBRIG, are on the way to reaching a similar status. In contrast, the ECCAS Brigade in Central Africa exits only in a rudimentary way, and NASBRIG in North Africa is embryonic at best. In some ASF regions, complex violent conflicts are unfolding, making it difficult to imagine operations of the standby brigades; for instance, within the EASBRIG region, with ongoing conflicts in Sudan and Somalia or between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Critical priorities include: adoption of binding legal instruments with member states for the employment of pledged troops; harmonization of membership of standby arrangements; improvement of staffing of PLANELMs at AU and RECs/RMs; strengthening ASF management; addressing logistics gaps as priority; and providing guidance and leadership for so-called centers for excellence (Fisher et al. 2010: 37).

The Panel of the Wise, which only was inaugurated in December 2007, did not play a visible role in the election-related conflicts in Kenya and Zimbabwe in 2008. However, a series of confidence-building missions has since been undertaken for several countries including Central

African Republic, Kenya and South Africa, prior to its recent elections, to name but a few. Additionally, the Panel has focused on developments in West Africa, Southern Africa and the Horn region. It has pronounced itself on the situations in Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Somalia and Darfur (ibid.: 166). In its conflict prevention role, and in particular as regards structural prevention, the Panel has undertaken a series of thematic meetings on election related conflicts, non-impunity, justice and national reconciliation, women and children in armed conflicts in Africa, and governance. Yet, further work is required to give the Panel a set of clear guidelines as to when and how to intervene, as well as with regard to other conflict mediation activities performed by the African Union (see Engel 2012). For instance, while the Panel is envisaged to be involved in conflict prevention, it is not clear at what stage of the prevention process it should intervene. In other words, does prevention mean preventing conflicts from happening or rather managing conflicts from escalating? As noted by Fisher et al., if prevention is understood as the former, then the Panel's role would be somewhat of the advocacy type, and if it is the latter, the Panel might be drawn into a direct mediation contrary to the role envisaged for it in the Modalities document (see Fisher et al. 2010: 168).

According to Murithi and Mwaura (2010), the Panel may play a variety of roles over and above advising the PSC and the AUC Chairperson. In fact, it may facilitate the establishment of channels of communication between the PSC/Chairperson and parties engaged in a dispute; carry out fact-finding missions in areas where the Panel considers there is a danger of conflict breaking out or escalating; conduct shuttle diplomacy between parties in conflict; encourage parties to engage in political dialogue; adopt confidence building measures and carry out reconciliation processes; assist and advise mediation teams engaged in formal negotiations; and assist the parties and other agencies in resolving disputes that may arise during the implementation of peace agreements.

Finally, in terms of financing the APSA, the AU is facing a difficult balancing act between high donor dependency on the one hand, and maintaining ownership on the other. Member state funds allocated to the Peace Fund have increased from five percent in 2007 to seven percent in 2011, still far from the envisaged twelve percent. With an operational AUC budget of just US$78 million (2011), most of APSA, as well as on-going AU peace support operations, are being funded almost entirely via donor assistance (98%), in particular through the United Nations and the EU's African Peace Facility (APF), which was initially provided with a volume of €250 million for the period 2003–2007 and then €300 million for 2008–2011 (see European Community 2010). Four-fifths of the APF are planned for spending in peace-supporting missions. In fact, the budget for the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which meanwhile has been transformed into the hybrid United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), to a large extent comes from the APF (to illustrate the dimension: UNAMID's total budget for the period July 2011 to June 2012 was US$1.69 billion).

Conclusion

While introducing the architecture and reviewing its status of implementation, this chapter has made clear that there are a considerable number of institutional challenges at various levels for the full operationalization of APSA. These include mainstreaming peace and security, especially conflict prevention, across the AUC, between the AUC and the RECs, as well as between AUC and member states. Within the AUC, levels of horizontal integration are at present sub-optimal; among the RECs, overlapping memberships and insufficient inter-RECs co-operation remains a constraint; between the AU and RECs, the principles clearly enunciated in the PSC Protocol (primary responsibility; subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage)

(AU 2002) still need to be translated into meaningful coordination and harmonization of joint policies. Some progress to this end has been made in cases of so-called unconstitutional changes of government, where the AU has developed a rather strict policy script which is being implemented with some degree of consistency (although the Arab Spring and disagreement on how to label the changes in Northern Africa bogged down the AU in this regard).

Nevertheless, significant policy and practical challenges continue to slow down the full implementation of the APSA. The collective euphoria and sense of possibility that characterized the 1999–2002 period has dissipated. Today, roughly one-third of the member states seem keen to fully implement the democracy and good governance agenda of the AUC and the Assembly; half the member states oscillate between indifference and light reticence; and finally there is a group of member states which cannot afford to step outside the culture of consensual decision-taking at the summit level, but which is then actively resisting the implementation of policies they fear could lead to regime change in their own countries.

This state of affairs has been demonstrated in the cumbersome process of ratifying the *African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance* (AU Assembly 2007), which summarizes and develops further the policy principles underlying the APSA. It was only in January 2012, five years after its inception, that the required number of fifteen countries had ratified the Charter for it to enter into force, while to date eleven other countries simply have refused to sign it. Against this background, the AUC has tried to reiterate the shared values on democracy, human rights and good governance among member states (AU Assembly 2011). In addition, it has tried to use the opportunity of the Arab Spring in 2011 to invite member states to sign and ratify the Charter. While the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt and the revolution in Libya posed a major peace and security challenge to the AU (AUC Chairperson 2011), on the initiative of the AUC Chairperson the PSC, on 26 April 2011, adopted a ministerial declaration on the state of peace and security in Africa in which it

> expressed its conviction that the uprisings in North Africa should be used as an opportunity for Member States to renew their commitment to the AU's democratic and governance agenda, give added momentum to efforts deployed in this respect, and implement the political and socio-economic reforms which are called for in every particular national situation.
>
> *AU PSC 2011: 3*

18

ECOWAS–AU SECURITY RELATIONS

Cyril Obi

Introduction

This chapter explores the nature and extent of security cooperation between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU). This is based on the important roles both organizations play at the sub-regional and regional levels with regard to conflict mediation and the management of Africa's peace and security. Particular attention is focused on Africa's evolving security regionalism with regard to the complex transformations taking place within the continent and its place in a rapidly globalizing post-Cold War world.

As noted elsewhere, ECOWAS has one of the most sophisticated peace and security mechanisms on the continent (Obi 2009: 119), and is an integral component of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) of the AU. What is perhaps remarkable is that while the AU acts as the anchor of Africa's peace and security, and ideally devolves certain responsibilities (and cooperates with) the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as ECOWAS, the latter in some respects had established its mechanisms before the former (Söderbaum and Tavares 2009: 71).

The point has also been made by several authors that ECOWAS–AU cooperation on peace and security has been problematic in some respects (Nieuwkerk 2011: 178–180; Tavares 2011: 167). While some scholars have focused on the ways sub-regional hegemonic states are able to use regional organizations to pursue national interests, others have been critical of weaknesses of the regional institutions and the poor coordination between complementary AU–REC peace and security mechanisms. More recently, some voices have been raised against French involvement in the Ivorian post-election crisis and the NATO intervention in Libya, in criticism against the vulnerabilities, and perceived manipulation of African regional institutions by global powers in pursuit of interventionist hegemonic interests (Mbeki 2011: 38; Mamdani 2012: 152–153).

Elaborating upon ECOWAS–AU relations, Titi Ajayi notes that although "the relation of subsidiarity exists between the African Union (AU) and the African RECs . . . the nature of this relationship is unclear" (Ajayi 2008: 7). This chapter explores this lack of clarity and the problems of coordination and harmonization of actions and policies as they affect these two organizations that share a common mandate underpinned by an evolving partnership for ensuring peace and security on the continent. Yet, grappling with the challenge of coordination and harmonization facing regional security institutions in Africa requires both an understanding of the conceptual

and structural basis of their security cooperation, their institutional capacities to deal with complex problems, as well as respond to pressing demands.

This chapter is divided into five sections: the introduction is followed by a theoretical overview of regional security cooperation in Africa; in the third section, the peace and security norms and mechanisms of the AU and ECOWAS are explored and analyzed; the fourth section critically examines the various dimensions of ECOWAS–AU security partnership, drawing largely on the case of Côte d'Ivoire; in the concluding section, the main arguments are summed up and some recommendations made for consolidating the ECOWAS–AU partnership in the context of Africa's peace and security architecture.

Security cooperation in the context of new regionalism: a theoretical overview

Söderbaum and Hettne explore the connections between regionalism, development and security in a globalizing world. Of note is their point that new regionalism is linked to globalization, and the role of the region as an international actor (Söderbaum and Hettne 2010: 14). With regionalization defined as "the (empirical) process that leads to patterns of cooperation, integration, complementarity and convergence within a particular cross-national geographical space", but providing for some flexibility in levels of regioness in terms of capacity and coherence, they argue that the security terrain provides a good platform for assessing regional levels of actorness. Pushing their argument further, both explore the "complex and intricate linkages between development and security", using the notions of development regionalism and security regionalism. While the former "means concerted efforts from a group of countries within a geographical region to enhance the economic complementarity of constituent political units in order to strengthen the total capacity of the regional economy", the latter "refers to attempts by states and other actors in a particular area – a region in the making – to transform a security complex with conflict-generating interstate and intrastate relations towards a security community characterized by cooperative external (interregional) relations and internal (intraregional) peace" (Söderbaum and Hettne 2010: 14–16).

In a related study, Söderbaum and Tavares (2009: 72–73) note that the regionalism–security nexus can be approached from different perspectives: as a regional security complex (Buzan 1991: 190), a regional order (Lake and Morgan 1997), regional peace and security clusters (Tavares 2008: 107–127), and the regional implications of local conflict (Söderbaum and Tavares 2009: 72), which connect to the role and need for regional cooperation. Thus, regions have emerged as actors in various parts of the world to address a felt need for regional response(s) to emerging threats, but posing challenges to the UN multilateral framework and other security mechanisms (Söderbaum and Tavares 2009: 73). This provides a conceptual background for understanding and evaluating the regional security cooperation in Africa, particularly the pivotal role of the AU and the RECs in this regard.

Africa's security regionalism: some perspectives

Africa's emerging security regionalism in the post-Cold War era has been an object of serious academic inquiry and theoretical debate (Francis 2006; Francis 2008; Engel and Porto 2010; Söderbaum and Tavares 2009). The development owes partly to the larger debate on the transformations in International Relations, particularly the place of Africa in the discipline, including the emerging scenarios linked to the impact of globalization on the continent (Wæver and Tickner 2009; Dunn and Shaw 2001: 2). The questions as to the regional

ramifications of intra- and trans-state conflict/threats and sub-regional and regional response(s) in Africa amounts to fully-fledged security regionalism, and whether the current trends reflect a movement in the direction of a security community are contested issues in on-going debates (Franke 2010a, 2010b; Nathan 2010; Williams 2010).

The various conceptual prisms through which Africa's efforts at a regional response to peace and security challenges owe largely to a changing post-Cold war security environment, the awareness and emerging consensus among African decision-makers and policy practitioners on the need for "African Solutions to African Problems", and the influence of "post-Cold War theoretical perspectives to international security: neorealist, globalist and regionalist" (Buzan and Wæver 2006: 6). Also noteworthy are some African perspectives that explore local knowledge, and indigenous cultures in the search for new solutions (Murithi 2005: 16–18).

Buzan and Wæver note that while the neorealist theoretical perspective is state-centric, the globalist "plays down the role of the state focusing particularly on its de-territorialization (by globalization), including transcending and redefining the concept of state territoriality and taking on board the role of non-state actors and transterritorial networks". They also note that the regionalist approach defines "the region as a locus of conflict and cooperation among states and a level of analysis for scholars seeking to understand security" (Buzan and Wæver 2006: 10). When considered with the argument by Söderbaum and Hettne, it is understandable why the region – in this case the AU, is a key actor to focus on in relation to security regionalism in the continent.

Debating regional security cooperation in Africa: optimists versus not-so-optimistic(s)

While those that point to "the deepening efficacy of the AU especially in matters relating to peace and security" focus on Africa's "new" regionalism and point to the "continent's emerging security architecture" (Franke 2007: 31–32), others critical of the celebration of Africa's evolving security cooperation point to the obvious problems, contradictions and weaknesses in the operationalization of APSA.

The "optimistic" perspective

Franke, drawing upon on a particular reading of Deutsch's notion of "security communities" notes "the remarkable progress AU member-states have made towards the creation of a multi-layered and poly-centric governance structure to manage their security relations" (Franke 2010a: 84–85; Franke 2009). He also argues that "theories like realism and neo-liberal institutionalism that allegedly expound a universal message fail to capture essential African realities and misinterpret both the motivations for and the evolutionary patterns of inter-state cooperation on the continent".

While noting the diversity of "logics of regionalism" in Africa, the "central role of hegemonic ambitions" in regional cooperation, and "a significant difference between the motivations for security cooperation at the regional and continental levels" (Franke 2010a: 92–93), Franke argues that a constructivist approach makes for theoretical flexibility that captures the essence of the collective "self-interested rationales for regional cooperation", while also noting the relevance of other theories. In his view, a constructivist approach opens up new insights for understanding the "inter-subjective factors such as collective identities – ranging from the simple sense of belonging based on common historical experiences and shared developmental ideologies to a determination for political unification according to pan-African ideals" (Franke 2010a: 95),

and it is also central to explaining inter-African state relations within the context of regional security cooperation.

The "not-so-optimistic" perspective

While the not-so-optimistic school of thought does not deny the growth of institutionalized security cooperation among African states and regions, it argues that Franke's position that the process has resulted in the formation of security communities – a la Deutsch, is flawed (Nathan 2010: 106; Williams 2010: 98). Reviewing Deutsch's theoretical postulation on security community as a "group of people which have become integrated" (Nathan 2010: 106, citing Deutsch), "where integration entails" (Nathan 2010: 107–108) "the attainment within a territory, of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population", and the ways he distinguished between "pluralistic and amalgamated security communities", Nathan argues that Franke's redefinition of the concept of security community "to mean zones of institutionalized security cooperation on the basis of shared values, norms and understandings" is theoretically problematic.

He faults the logic of Franke's claim, first on the basis of the way it subtracts from Deutsch's definition of security community as it relates to "peaceful change" (within the community), and substitutes this with the motivations for security among states, and second on the basis of its contradiction by the empirical reality of armed conflicts within African states (and regions) (Nathan 2010: 109–110).

Similarly, Williams is of the view that it is too early to conclude that "African states have formed a community", arguing that "contemporary African society of states can be understood as undergoing a period of significant turbulence precisely because disagreements over substantive values is evident" (Williams 2010: 99–100).

Both Nathan and Williams advance empirical evidence to back up their arguments against an overly optimistic reading of the evolution of regional security cooperation in Africa, noting that the emerging peace security norms, institutions and mechanisms still lack a strong consensus and remain contested. Nathan further argues that rather than security communities, the AU and RECs "are better understood as communities of insecurity, both because they have a formal commitment to addressing insecurity and because their relationships and domestic circumstances are so often marked by insecurity" (Nathan 2010: 112).

In responding, Franke takes on board some of the points made in relation to the existence of a security community, but still notes that inter-state "security cooperation in Africa is becoming closer and more sophisticated", arguing against the scepticism being expressed on the quality of regional security cooperation in the face of the challenges faced by the AU (Franke 2010b: 122–128).

Whose security?

The foregoing theoretical debates underscore the need for a flexible (and eclectic) theoretical framing that can navigate between the overly optimistic and not-so-optimistic perspectives, but pays close attention to the reality that transformation is neither a unilinear process, nor is Africa bound to replicate the trajectory of security cooperation in other parts of the world.

There is clearly a need for a radical reading of the (rather contentious) regional security partnerships on the continent, the place of the state and ruling elites in the processes – and how they pursue competing interests while engaging localization and globalization simultaneously

alongside the task of building a pan-African consensus around APSA, at various levels, and in terms of norms, identities, capacities and institutional coordination. This chapter recognizes the need to explore both the roles of competing personal, national and elite interests, African states, and African people, and the activities of hegemonic powers with strategic and economic interests in Africa. The fundamental issues remain: whose interests the ongoing African security cooperation process, norms and institution-building ultimately serve, and how this in expressed in the emerging ECOWAS–AU relations.

The ECOWAS peace and security architecture (ECOWAS PSA)

The journey towards a new generation of ECOWAS peace and security mechanisms commenced with the adoption of a revised ECOWAS Treaty in 1993, and the ECOWAS Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security in 1999. Founded in 1975, ECOWAS "began as a collective quest for self-reliance, economic cooperation and development" (Obi 2009: 120). This was based on an early recognition of a linkage between regional peace on one hand and national development, stability and security on the other. ECOWAS, on the basis of an earlier Protocol of Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD) and acting on an appeal from Liberia's President Samuel in the face of an invasion of the country by the rebel National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), decided to establish a Ceasefire Monitoring Group – ECOMOG (Obi 2009: 121). The challenges that ECOWAS/ECOMOG faced in mediating and intervening in the conflicts in Liberia and later on Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire are well known and will not be recounted here. What is important, is that ECOWAS drew upon the lessons from its mediation and peacekeeping involvement in these countries to establish its peace and security architecture.

These lessons influenced the 1993 Revised ECOWAS treaty and broadened the supra-nationality of the organization. The 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Peacekeeping and Security and the 2001 Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, and the Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons and most recently the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) formed the pillars of the ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture.

The 1999 Protocol, through three key institutions – the Authority of Heads of State and Governments, the Mediation and Security Council, and the Executive Secretariat – provided organizational support, improved decision-making and wider support for ECOWAS mediation and peacekeeping. Articles 6 and 7 of the Protocol mandated the Mechanism to deal with conflict prevention, management, peacekeeping, security, humanitarian support, peacebuilding, cross-border crime, proliferation of small arms and other relevant matters, and mandated it on behalf of the Authority, to take "appropriate decisions for the implementation of provisions on the mechanism" (ECOWAS 1999). The 2001 Supplementary Protocol was based on principles such as "every accession to power must be made through free, fair and transparent elections (Article 1b), and zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means".[1] It also provided clear guidelines for electoral laws, administration, monitoring, human rights, humanitarian law and the constitutional role of the armed forces within a democratic framework and laid down clear steps and sanctions for those found to be violating the provisions of the protocols. The president of the ECOWAS Commission was empowered to work with the Mediation and Security Council, deploy Special Representatives to trouble-spots, and also liaise with other peace and security organizations such as the Early Warning System and the Council for the Wise and Special Mediators (ECOWAS 2001; Yabi 2010: 8–9).

In order to strengthen the ECOWAS Peace and Security framework the Mediation and Security Council of ECOWAS on 1 January 2008, enacted the ECPF. Apart from being consistent with the evolution of ECOWAS's peace and security architecture, of which the ECOMOG experience was critical, the ECPF also contains fourteen components relating to conflict prevention, human security and aspects of peace-building, of which the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) is an important element (ECOWAS 2008).

Olonisakin identifies two critical gaps in ECOWAS peacebuilding, namely the "absence of a framework for translating normative instruments into operational tools" and its tendency to focus on "conflict and crisis management, but not on structural prevention of conflict" (Olonisakin 2011: 22). While its most ardent supporters point to successes in implementing home-grown regional crisis management, mediation and peacekeeping initiatives, and its demonstration of its zero-tolerance policy for unconstitutional changes in government in West African countries, others note the rather disturbing evidence of institutional weakness, poor coordination within ECOWAS, competing interests of member-states, inadequate financial, material and logistical resources, weak political will and lack of capacities that limit its ability to enforce decisions and tackle the emerging complex challenges facing the sub-region. The gap between rhetoric and actual practice underpins some of the contradictions that mark ECOWAS's multilateralism and partnerships with the AU, which have wider implications for the credibility and capacity of ECOWAS (Obi 2011: 147).

ECOWAS–AU security partnership

During the 2007 AU Summit in Accra, some steps were taken to ensure closer coordination between AU and its RECs, commencing with the decision to accredit REC liaison officers to the AU headquarters (Musah 2011: 157). This was followed in the January 2008 AU summit by the signing of a formal Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and RECs to facilitate "cooperation and collaboration between them in the implementation of the continent's peace and security agenda". The MOU was based on "principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage" (Musah 2011: 157–158), including nine areas of cooperation.

In a study on the APSA commissioned by the AU-PSD, the focus for evaluating AU–RECs/RMs' security cooperation is identified as follows: coordination (vertical and horizontal), sustainability, subsidiarity, coherence and partnership (Fisher et al. 2010: 8). The study also comes up with findings on the state of AU–RECs relations that largely reflect the state of ECOWAS–AU relations. It concludes that the level of coordination has registered some progress, particularly in relation to the Africa Standby Force (ASF) and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and similar mechanisms at sub-regional level, but not in terms of the relationship between the Peace and Security Council (PSC), POW and similar mechanisms at the sub-regional level. The study also notes the "disconnect between the PSC and similar organs in the RECs" (Fisher et al. 2010: 57), poor horizontal coordination between the various APSA components, which is further complicated by limited inter-REC coordination. Other findings include the impact of donor dependency on the sustainability of APSA (staffing and the implementation of decisions taken by the PSC), RECs/RMs' views as to the "lack of clarity on the application of subsidiarity in practical terms", fuelling the feeling that the "AU is not providing enough strategic guidance" and the inadequate level of coherence within APSA. Another important observation relates to the long-term implications of the various forms of partnership at the bilateral and multilateral levels for sustainability.

An important point relates to the ways competing national and sub-regional interests sometimes undermine coordination among the AU PSC and ECOWAS peace mechanisms,

which rather than cohere, tend to run parallel to each other (Interview, Ukeje 2012). It has been observed that "at the continental level, agreements are also a lot more difficult to attain and there are also regimes that seek to undermine any consensus on democratic standards" (Sperling 2011: 2). An illustration of weak coordination between the ECOWAS and AU was their different responses to unconstitutional changes of government in Niger and Guinea. When President Tanja of Niger illegally altered the constitution in 2009 to prolong his tenure by three years, ECOWAS acted quickly by suspending Niger from the organization in line with the 2001 Protocol. For its part, the AU did not react to the subversion of the constitution until Tanja was overthrown by the military in 2010 (Engel 2010: 10–11). The delay in the AU's response may have been as a result of Libya's influence due to its close relations with Niger. Engel also points to other variations and inconsistencies in ECOWAS and AU responses to unconstitutional changes in government. These include the exclusion of the ECOWAS but inclusion of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD) from the AU International Contact Group (ICG) set up to mediate in the crisis that followed the Guinea coup (ECOWAS was co-chair with AU), and the decision not to set up ICGs for the crises in Guinea-Bissau and Niger, but to use joint missions on a more or less, ad-hoc basis (Engel 2010: 11).

The case of Côte D'Ivoire

The problems facing ECOWAS–AU security cooperation were quite evident in the handling of the protracted Côte d'Ivoire crisis. ECOWAS's response to the failed coup against Gbagbo and the outbreak of civil war in early September 2002 was quick. An emergency summit was called on 29 September 2002 and an ICG comprising Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Togo, and the AU, was set up to mediate between the government and rebels. The mediation process yielded an initial ceasefire, as well as peace talks in Lomé, Abidjan and Dakar, but they were stalemated by the non-cooperation of the government and the rebel New Forces with the mediators.

ECOWAS, noting that the unfolding scenario was complicated by divisions among ECOWAS member-states, including support for the rebel New Forces by some states, particularly Côte d'Ivoire's northern neighbour, Burkina Faso (with French support), called on the AU and UN to reinforce the mediation process, and further advised that the matter be brought to the attention of the UNSC (Obi 2011: 141–161). A lot has been written on ECOWAS–AU–UN cooperation with regard to the Ivorian crisis and this will not be repeated here. What is relevant is the view that differences between the ECOWAS and the AU provided the opportunity for hegemonic powers in the UN Security Council, particularly France, to leverage their influence both through the passing of resolutions and direct intervention (alongside UN peacekeepers ostensibly to protect civilian lives), in favour of one of the parties to the conflict.

The November 2010 run-off elections in Côte d'Ivoire were held in the midst of growing tensions between the government and opposition, with the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in line with UNSC Resolution 1795 endorsing the results proclaiming Ouatarra the President-elect. Following incumbent Gbagbo's rejection of the election results, which declared his opponent the winner, ECOWAS called an extraordinary session of Heads of State and Governments also attended by Young-Jin Choi, the UNSG Special Representative to Côte d'Ivoire, and Mahama Ouedraogo, the Representative of the AU President, in Abuja. In a communiqué released on 7 December 2010, ECOWAS condemned Gbagbo's refusal to accept the results as announced by the electoral commission (CEI), urged him to do so and "yield power without delay" (ECOWAS 2010). It recognized Ouatarra as President-elect and on the basis of its 2001 Protocol, suspended Côte d'Ivoire from the organization. ECOWAS was to issue another

statement on 20 December, condemning Gbagbo's ultimatum to the UNOCI and urging French forces to leave Côte d'Ivoire, calling on him to "reconsider his confrontational stance towards the international community".

Although the ECOWAS actions were endorsed by the UN and AU, it later became apparent that AU–ECOWAS joint mediation had become problematic. This was after AU appointed mediators and an AU-mandated Panel of Five presidents failed to get Gbagbo to step down in line with ECOWAS, AU and UN-endorsed resolutions. Within ECOWAS, it was believed that while Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Senegal and Sierra Leone supported Ouatarra, Ghana, Togo and Benin showed "ambiguous neutrality" (ICG 2011: 17–18). Within the AU, Angola and South Africa were reportedly in support of Gbagbo, a suspicion that was fuelled by their support for a power-sharing solution to the post-election conflict. The differences between the ECOWAS and AU over who could do what, when, where and how, underscored their rather "troubled partnership".

This situation was serious enough to get the president of the ECOWAS Commission to make a rather undiplomatic accusation in February 2011 in Abuja that "certain countries have taken sides" noting that "the concern that we (ECOWAS) have is that apart from some geo-political interests by some countries, there are others encouraging Gbagbo not to leave". He then went on to openly accuse South Africa of sending a warship to the coast of the Abidjan to support Gbagbo, adding that "one is surprised that a distinguished country like South Africa would decide to send such a support at a time like this" (quoted in Udo 2011). However, South Africa was quick to deny the accusation, noting that the "SAS Drakensberg was a supply ship undertaking a routine training operation in West Africa" (IRIN 2011). The issue, however, was that at some point competing national and strategic interests, and inter-sub-regional politics, such as ECOWAS versus the AU, and West versus Southern Africa, became factors adversely affecting regional intervention in Côte d'Ivoire, and also impacted negatively on the regional security partnership. It is such competing interests, institutional competition and poor coordination between African regional organizations that undermine any real progress towards a continental "security community".

Conclusion: the dialectics of ECOWAS–AU partnership: what prospects?

The foregoing clearly illustrates some of the challenges facing ECOWAS–AU security cooperation. It suggests that although there is an emerging consensus and convergence of security cooperation within APSA, significant hurdles lie in the path of achieving the full potential of the ECOWAS–AU security partnership, with adverse implications for stability peace, security and development in Africa. Of note is the need to fully operationalize some components of APSA, harmonize the relatively more advanced aspects of ECOWAS's mechanisms with those of the AU, and act on the primacy of competitive over complimentary security regionalism.

Several critical steps need to be taken to improve the prospects of the ECOWAS–AU regional security partnership. First, is the need to clearly define the content and parameters of their security partnership to ensure that both the coordination and implementation gaps are effectively bridged. Second, is the need to further refine the APSA and address its capacity, resource, coordination and institutional deficits, and third, for African regional hegemons to prioritize reaching a consensus on common pan-African interests and progressive strategies of engagement in relation to a regional security "division of labour" (Interview, Ukeje 2012). There is also the concern that more attention and resources should shift from norm-setting to effective implementation (Interview, Okeke 2012).

The persistence of structural factors that fuel instability and socio-economic inequities within member-states, and the dependence of regional institutions on external funding, providing leverage for hegemonic international interests to take advantage of the incapacities of such institutions clearly undermine on-going efforts towards sustainable African security partnerships. This challenge is further complicated by the personal and national interests of some African leaders that both compete against, and override regional interests and decisions, alongside the marginalization of African citizens in the emergent regional formations and the activities of hegemonic external actors (including partners). These suggest that the prospects for sustainable and autonomous peace and security in Africa based on cooperation and the coordinated role of AU and the RECs, particularly ECOWAS, will ultimately depend on the will and ability of a new African leadership and elites to effectively address existing gaps, and democratically transform their national and regional institutions in ways that represent the aspirations of the majority of African peoples as the core and object of an emancipatory continental community founded on the principles of equitable and participatory people-centred development, justice and peace.

Note

1 ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance 2001.

19

THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC) AND SOUTH AFRICA

Stephen Burgess

Introduction

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a sub-regional organization that has succeeded in fostering security cooperation as well as economic development. However, SADC states have moved towards regional integration at a painstakingly slow rate and have not accepted the creation of a supranational organization. The reasons lie in the nature of the Southern African region and the resistance of the Group of Front Line States (originally Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana) to the hegemony of apartheid South Africa. The genesis of SADC can be traced back to its precursor, Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which was formed to counter apartheid South Africa's aggressive deeper regional hegemony. This tension continued into the post-apartheid period, inhibited regional integration, and caused disputes in the area of mutual defense and security. However, even as South Africa's relative strength was a regional handicap, it facilitated South Africa leadership, through SADC, at the continental level.

SADC has been a leading force in creating and sustaining the African Union (AU), the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), which have advanced continental cooperation over the past decade. Among SADC states, South Africa's leadership is underpinned by a GDP that is twice that of the other fourteen countries combined and by South African companies that heavily invest in SADC countries and the rest of Africa.[1] As Bach explained in Chapter 16, even if the formal regionalism of SADC was slowed due to intra-regional rivalries, South Africa's economic power and corporations advanced regionalization.

In 1980, the predecessor of SADC, the SADCC, was formed with the aim of strengthening political and economic resistance to South African hegemony and to enable Southern African states to engage in "soft balancing". Each of the SADCC states was charged with launching projects that were supposed to isolate South Africa economically, while promoting regional economic development. For example, Mozambique was charged with developing regional transportation to its ports from Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe, so as to lessen dependence on South African railway and road networks and ports. Although SADCC projects did not succeed in economically isolating South Africa, the organization provided the foundation for regional cooperation after the end of apartheid.

In 1980, the independence of Zimbabwe, with a semi-industrial economy and a well-trained military, strengthened SADCC's resistance against South African hegemony. In the 1980s, the exiled African National Congress (ANC) developed relatively close relations with the Mugabe regime that persisted after the ANC took power in South Africa in 1994 (Thomas 1995).[2] In the same decade, apartheid South Africa remained dominant in terms of hard power (economic and military), but the SADCC states were able to exercise soft power by enlisting the support of non-SADCC African States, the Soviet bloc, the Non-Aligned Movement; and eventually economic sanctions by the United States and West European states. The ANC-in-exile prepared for leadership by opposing the apartheid South African security state and actively participated as an observer in SADCC and the Group of Front Line States (Thomas 1995: 164). By the late 1980s, therefore, apartheid South Africa's regional dominance was being challenged by a combination of regional and global forces. This was partially because of African nationalist uprisings and insurgencies in its near abroad, such as Mozambique and Angola, and "soft balancing" by SADCC, US and European sanctions, and South Africa's diplomatic isolation. With the end of the Cold War and thus the end of Soviet backing for apartheid South Africa's insurgencies, coupled with the effect of economic sanctions, the South Africa elite decided that the time was ripe for a transition from apartheid to black majority rule. From 1989 to 1994, power passed from the apartheid regime to the ANC led by Nelson Mandela. One of the first actions of the "new South Africa" was to apply for membership in SADC.

SADC, South Africa and peace and security

With the imminent end of apartheid and the movement towards a new South Africa, the leaders of SADCC states decided to convert the organization into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, with the aim of regional integration. SADC was modeled on the European Community and African regional economic communities (RECs), especially the Economic Community of West African States. SADC set forth the goal of establishing a free trade area followed by a customs union and finally by a common market. It also moved towards more formal arrangements in mutual defense and sub-regional security. The newly formed SADC accepted South Africa's membership bid, and the country soon became an active and leading force in the organization (Hentz 2005a; 2005b).

From 1994 to 1999, most SADC (and African) states were attracted to South Africa, especially with Nelson Mandela as the president of the "new South Africa" and because of the "moral hegemony" that he had established with his opposition to apartheid and magnanimous reconciliation with the Afrikaner National Party (Kagwanja 2006: 159–186).[3] Mandela also provided SADC (and African) states with a model, as he steered the ANC away from its decades-old commitment to socialism and towards an acceptance of free market democracy and liberal internationalism (McGrew 2002: 267–269; Ikenberry 2008: 45–59). As a SADC member, South Africa quickly established a reputation for effectively using soft power. For instance, in the latter half of 1994, South African diplomacy helped to reverse a military coup in Lesotho, and ensured the success of the UN peacekeeping mission (ONUMOZ) in Mozambique through negotiations with the opposition Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO).

The addition of South Africa to SADC was expected to bring economic development to the southern African sub-region, which would also enhance security. After 1994, South Africa continued the non-reciprocal arrangements in the South African Customs Union (SACU) and the free and virtually unimpeded exchange of goods among SACU member states: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. However, South Africa was not willing to extend non-reciprocal benefits to other SADC states, in particular Zimbabwe, which might compete with

South Africa in specific sectors, and it continued to impose high tariffs on their exports. The Mandela government was concerned with preserving and creating South African jobs. It has inherited an extremely unequal economy; one where black South Africans had been not only disenfranchised, but kept from competing with whites on an equal economic footing. Unemployment remained stubbornly high throughout the post-apartheid era.

Officials from several SADC countries, nonetheless, demanded that South Africa invest more in their economies. South Africa was accused by several SADC states of offering too much support for domestic production, such as duty rebates on exports, which was hurting other economies in the region (Burgess 2000: 131–132).[4] In the 1990s, South African companies increased the intensity and scope of their investment activities in SADC states and across Africa. In 1997, an agreement was concluded between the members of SADC, providing for the liberalization of trade and the establishment of a Free Trade Area (FTA) by 2008. Full implementation of the FTA agreement would bring zero tariffs on trade between SADC nations and a common external tariff. The agreement indicated that SADC was moving towards the reduction of South Africa's dominance in the marketplace, by giving other economies a competitive advantage. Until the FTA became fully operational, a SADC reciprocity agreement meant that South Africa would pay tariffs on exporting certain goods to other SADC countries, while weaker economies in the region would be exempt from these tariffs on the South African end (ibid. 2000: 131–132).

With mounting security problems in Southern Africa and neighboring sub-regions, SADC member states decided to increase the security functions of the organization. The purpose and objectives of SADC's security leg were formalized through a communiqué following the 1996 SADC Summit Meeting in Gaborone and the Organ on Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation was launched. However, SADC got off to a rocky start in the area of peace and security, because of differences between President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, who had been the unofficial leader of SADCC and SADC, and President Mandela. Significantly, SADC originally decided to separate the political and security considerations from SADC proper by creating the separate structure. The first Chairman of the Organ was President Mugabe, while Nelson Mandela remained the head of SADC. Mugabe exercised decision-making largely by himself. Significantly, he refused to allow President Mandela to become one of the decision-makers. In response, Mandela and South Africa quietly worked to ease Mugabe's dominance of the Organ. South Africa, Botswana, Tanzania and Mozambique contended that the Organ should be primarily a peacemaking body, while Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia insisted on a military-oriented body that would be able to provide mutual defense (Brammer 1999: 21–22).

Another problem for SADC was its 1997 admission of the DRC (the former Zaire) as a member state, just after the conclusion of the 1996–1997 civil war in which rebel forces with support from Rwanda removed President Mobutu Sese Seko from power.[5] Although the DRC was a failed state, there was little debate within SADC regarding it becoming a member. SADC membership enabled DRC President Laurent Kabila, who along with the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour Libération de Congo (ADFL) had overthrown Mobutu, to call on SADC states to intervene to defend a fellow SADC state against a Rwandan- and Ugandan-supported insurgency that began in 1998.[6] Kabila had turned on his erstwhile allies, Rwanda and Uganda, and they in turn sought a buffer zone between their countries and the instability in the eastern DRC. Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia came to Kabila's rescue "in the name of SADC" which Mandela and other SADC leaders initially opposed. This led to a second, more severe civil war.

Zambia and other SADC states led negotiations with the various factions and countries in the DRC, leading to the July 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, which called for the immediate cessation of hostilities, the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force under Chapter VII

of the UN Charter, and the withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC. However, it took another three years until foreign forces withdrew and four years before a transitional government was established. Fighting in the DRC continued in the mineral-rich east, even after a number of "peace agreements".

South African and Botswanan forces intervened in Lesotho "in the name of SADC" in September 1998, at the request of the Lesotho government to put down a mutiny and restore democratic order. However, the SADC intervention led to rioting in the capital, Maseru, which intervening forces failed to quell and which led to widespread destruction. After restoring order, SADC forces withdrew in May 1999.

The interventions in the DRC and Lesotho revealed some of SADC's institutional weaknesses. In the wake of protests by South Africa and other member states about the perceived high-handedness of President Mugabe, SADC redesigned the Organ structure to engender collective decision-making – a "troika" – and began negotiating a mutual defense pact, measures which were intended to prevent unauthorized actions "in the name of SADC." SADC produced a strategic plan and framework for the Organ's policies, but with 128 strategic objectives implementation was slow. Also, SADC was restructured to provide greater coordinating authority in the secretariat in Gaborone, Botswana.

Perversely, SADC's restructuring resulted in a new, understaffed bureaucracy and gridlock. The secretariat was overworked and inefficient and had problems of leadership and capacity that did not improve during the restructuring process. SADC had an ineffectual secretariat, without appropriate human resources and management skills and with no center of gravity. There were SADC secretariat directors who did not have the skills and training to manage the functions of the secretariat. South Africa worked to develop the financial affairs mechanism for SADC; however, many of the projects, including security projects, languished.

SADC's interventions in the DRC and Lesotho hold in sharp relief its inaction throughout the Zimbabwean crisis. SADC and South Africa proved unsuccessful in dealing with the crisis in Zimbabwe. In 2000, Mugabe launched a campaign of seizing white-owned farms, which led to economic decline and economic collapse. In 2002, the United States and the European Union imposed sanctions on Mugabe and his inner circle. The Zimbabwe crisis stymied SADC as an international actor and alienated donors. External donors were hesitant to support SADC in a time of crisis in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It was, among other things, due to a failure of leadership by and within SADC.

South African leadership, SADC and the African union

In May 1999, Thabo Mbeki followed Nelson Mandela as President of South Africa. He, unlike Mandela, spent most of the apartheid years in exile, building ANC international connections. As president, he enhanced the soft power of SADC and Africa's continental institutions (Gevisser 2009). He was more versed than Mandela in the dynamics and personalities of SADC and Africa as a whole. Mbeki's connections, cosmopolitanism and ambition, as well as the foreign policy team that he put together, enabled South Africa to become more assertive in both SADC and in broader African affairs (Nathan 2005: 361–372; SADIRC 2003). One of Mbeki's first initiatives was the launching of the "African Renaissance", which proposed regenerating Africa's potential for social and economic development based on African reform efforts. He also led South Africa in taking a more active and leading role in SADC.

The leadership of South Africa, in partnership with SADC colleagues, in generating ideas and the diplomacy to implement them, led to the formation of new continental institutions: the African Union (AU), the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), the

African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and the African Standby Force (ASF) (Kagwanja 2006: 159–186). South Africa and other SADC states led the way in transforming the ineffectual Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU), which contained stronger institutions and promised greater activism in the provision of peace and security (Tieku 2004: 249–267; Engel and Porto, Chapter 17). In 2003, an African Standby Force construct was agreed to, with full operational capability forecasted for 2010.

The African Renaissance developed into the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) in 2002.[7] One of the cornerstones of NEPAD was the concept of African "Peer Review" Mechanism, in which African states would provide transparent reports on their own governance and submit to peer review. In exchange, states expected increased flows of aid and investment from the West and from multilateral financial institutions. NEPAD's peer review came into effect in 2004, and the first reviews took place mainly in SADC states. Through the AU and NEPAD, South Africa was developing a continental mechanism for standards of good governance and democracy, which would also apply to SADC states (Adebajo and Landsberg 2003: 171–204).[8]

South Africa's success in Africa seemingly outpaced its progress in the SADC region. Resistance in SADC to a more assertive South African leadership came from Zimbabwe, Angola and Swaziland, whose leaders were determined not to democratize. In 1992, the Angolan civil war resumed, and the government resisted South African and SADC efforts to help put an end to the conflict. In February 2002, Angola managed to put an end to the war by tracking down and killing União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) leader Jonas Savimbi. It continued to oppose South Africa's efforts to spread democracy, good governance and market liberalization and postponed democratic elections until 2012.

In Swaziland, the monarchy opposed democratization pressures from the South African government, SADC and civil society. King Mswati continued to run Swaziland as an absolute monarch and as his personal preserve. The opposition in Swaziland continued to be suppressed.

In the 2000s, the diplomacy of South Africa and SADC was assertive and somewhat successful in resolving much of the complex and turbulent DRC war, a conflict involving almost a dozen different nations and numerous guerrilla movements. The Sun City (South Africa) inter-Congolese dialogue led in April 2002 to a deal to end hostilities and form a transitional government of multiple factions. In July 2002, talks in Pretoria led to a peace deal between the DRC and Rwanda, which paved the way for the withdrawal of Rwandan forces from the DRC. Negotiations in Luanda, Angola in September 2002 led Uganda to agree to withdraw its forces from the DRC. In addition to its diplomacy, SADC states provided peacekeepers to the UN mission in the DRC (MONUC).

Diplomacy in Burundi also was successful through the efforts of SADC leaders – Julius Nyerere, Nelson Mandela, and Jacob Zuma. South Africa backed the peace agreement by the deployment of a protection force in 2001. South Africa and SADC countries contributed peacekeepers to an AU mission (2002–2004) and then to a UN mission (2004–2006); and monitored and guaranteed the peace-building process (Bentley and Southall 2005). SADC also provided peacekeeping troops for missions in Darfur and Comoros and deployed election support contingents to the DRC, Mozambique and Tanzania. The combination of skilful diplomacy and economic interests were demonstrated in the DRC with the SADC delegation's quick endorsement of the election of Joseph Kabila as DRC president in 2006, which elevated SADC's standing with the regime.

With South Africa leading the way, the SADC Mutual Defense Pact in September was signed in 2003. The pact was a major step forward in the wake of the 1998 intervention in the DRC "in the name of SADC". The Pact contained provisions on how SADC's mutual defense would

be invoked in order to avoid another internecine disagreement (which left SADC split down the middle over the second DRC civil war) (Khadiagala 2001: 131–158). However, the Pact did not make clear what SADC states were compelled to do and under what circumstances it was compelled to act (Schoeman 2005).

The ambiguity grew greater as SADC accepted Madagascar as a member, and then had to deal with a coup d'état there. SADC was breaking with its Front Line States pedigree of like-minded states and adopting a common security arrangement with a diverse set of actors, such as the DRC and Madagascar. It became somewhat unclear what the common values of SADC were in regard to regional security. Furthermore, the struggles in Zimbabwe continued to strain SADC's international credibility.

Mugabe's orders to seize white commercial farms for redistribution (mostly to families and cronies) led to a political and economic crisis and a downwards spiral, with hyperinflation starting in 2000 and worsening until 2008. Assaults on opposition party officials and white commercial farmers and the un-free and unfair March 2002 presidential elections led to European Union and US sanctions, and to Zimbabwe's suspension from the Commonwealth. Nonetheless, Mbeki opposed sanctions and argued that South Africa's "quiet diplomacy" would end the crisis. Mugabe remained in power, and Mbeki did not use South African power to remove him. In the meantime, Mbeki and other leaders prevented Mugabe and Zimbabwe from holding any leadership positions within SADC (Nathan 2005: 361–372).[9] The Zimbabwe crisis and Mugabe's undemocratic and economically disastrous behavior harmed the image of NEPAD, SADC and South Africa. In 2008, Zimbabwean parliamentary elections were won by the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), as were the first round of presidential elections. After massive repression and fraud in the second round, Mugabe stole the victory. Mbeki and other SADC leaders persuaded Mugabe and the opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangarai, to agree on a power sharing arrangement. Mugabe's grip on power remained unchallenged.

Resistance to South African pressures for change came from further afield in Africa, including Libya and Sudan. In 1999, Moamar Qadhafi and Libya initiated plans and provided funding for the AU, and soon afterwards South Africa had taken over the initiative and driven it in a more liberal internationalist direction, much to Qadhafi's dismay. The Sudanese military dictator, Omar el-Bashir, objected to South African and SADC's support of the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement and its criticism of Sudan's human rights abuses in Darfur. In addition, a number of African leaders outside of SADC sided with Mugabe and opposed SADC's pressure for change.

In May 2009, Jacob Zuma was elected president of South Africa and continued South African leadership in SADC and the AU, although with a more low-key style. South Africa has remained reluctant to use hard power and has continued to exercise soft power through multilateral leadership, especially in relation to Zimbabwe.

SADC and the Africa Standby Force (ASF)

Although South Africa and SADC states led in the founding of the AU in 2002 and the ASF in 2003, SADC was slow to make progress in developing its standby brigade. Starting in 2005, the SADC sub-region began making progress, when South Africa assumed the leadership of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (Cawthra 2005). South Africa used its chairing of the Organ to launch SADCBRIG and to secure parliamentary ratification of the SADC security protocol, which along with the SADC mutual defense pact, constituted confidence-building measures for Southern African states. A SADC command and control structure was devised, and the SADCBRIG included a working group of experts. The SADC chiefs of staff and ministers of defense adopted three policy documents in accordance with a

memorandum of understanding (Short 2005). Progress was made on SADCBRIG as part of the ASF, as well as with non-military structures (Cilliers and Malan 2005: 12–15). A framework and structure were put in place, with a command structure, planning element (PLANELM), and an early warning system in Gaborone. Personnel were put in place, and there were civilian police (CIVPOL) and civil society coordinating structures.

While joint exercises involving SADC forces have been mounted, the planning and operationalization of the SADCBRIG and other security measures have proven to be more problematic. SADCBRIG's lack of capacity has meant that a standby force was created, but there was not a system to manage it.

SADCBRIG has conducted joint exercises, achieved readiness status, and established satellite bases, although it is uncertain if the force is fully operational and has the necessary logistical capabilities. South Africa has developed its own logistics system, while several other states have Russian or Chinese systems. The SADCBRIG has nine countries, as opposed to the current fifteen SADC states, which could cause difficulties in decision-making and coordination. Certain SADC units are on short-term standby; while others are have longer arrangements. The SADCBRIG lacks light armor and helicopters. In SADC, the police have established a modalities framework, but SADC has had difficulties in factoring the police into the overall SADCBRIG framework. Finally, the fact that the SADC head of mission is the special representative of the military chief of staff, rather than the head of mission, answerable to civilian SADC heads of states and the SADC Secretary-General, has been a problem.

SADC's linkage with Addis Ababa and the AU is weak. First, there are not enough SADC security experts working at the AU peace and security commission. SADC needs better communications with the AU which would be carried out by personnel with military backgrounds who know SADC.

SADC and the SADCBRIG, with South African leadership, will be more effective if the level of commitment continues to increase. Given its financial contribution, South Africa is underrepresented at the AU in Addis Ababa. Nonetheless, it is better suited to play a greater role at the AU level than at the regional level, due to political obstacles in SADC. The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) may still possess the capability of leading a response to the outbreak of conflict, perhaps even intervening to stop genocide. However, the SANDF is not as effective a force as it was in the 1990s, having lost some of its technical capability, and South African troops have been over-committed to peacekeeping and other contingencies (le Pere and Tjonneland 2005). Paradoxically, as South Africa's stature in the continent is enhanced, its regional influence at times seems diminished.

SADC challenges and successes

Shepherding Zimbabwe through the transition from Mugabe's authoritarian rule to some form of democracy remains a major challenge for SADC. South Africa and SADC acted under the SADC security program and engaged the Mugabe regime with diplomacy from 2000 to 2008, and the unity government since 2008. Diplomacy helped to contain the Zimbabwe situation and end economic collapse. However, donors saw South African and SADC policy towards Zimbabwe (and the absolute monarchy in Swaziland) as ineffectual and became disenchanted with the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which South Africa had led in creating. The problem with Zimbabwe has been an "old boys' network" from the Frontline States and former liberation movements, including Mugabe and South African Presidents Mbeki and Zuma, which has ruled out more forceful action on Zimbabwe.

On a positive note, there has been broad agreement in SADC that the stabilization of the African Great Lakes region is important for regional stability. This has been matched by serious commitments to peace by South Africa and many of the antagonists in Burundi, the DRC, and Rwanda. Track II negotiations in South Africa played a role in the peacemaking process in the region. In particular, Burundi made a quantum leap towards peace, thanks to South African diplomacy and the peacekeeping troops it deployed there. In Burundi, the South African troops arrived first, then handed off to an AU mission, which then handed off to the UN. This blueprint proved capable of organizing and sustaining the peace and has been replicated elsewhere. The Burundian and DRC peace processes were successful largely due to South African leadership and SADC support. However, South African bilateral initiatives are cloaked in the "SADC mantle". If the DRC were to blow up, SADCBRIG would be the most willing and capable of arriving on the scene first, before the United Nations and the other regional stand-by brigades.

The membership of countries like Madagascar and Mauritius in SADC is important, because such "outsiders" are more likely to challenge the "old boys' network". It is possible that the DRC and Angola, which are less stable and democratic than other SADC states, are better off in SADC than out. The DRC is weak, with little central government control beyond the capital, Kinshasa, and with conflict continuing in the eastern part of the country. Also, the DRC is seeing the revival of the "predatory culture" of "Mobutuism" that has plagued the country for much of its history. Nonetheless, the DRC has been quite active in SADC and the Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security and has been a full participant in SADC councils. In sum, SADC needs insulation (as well as cooperation) from the DRC and other problematic states.

There has been a lack of coordination between the SADC secretariat and member states. SADC has formulated policy but has been slow at the implementation and development of its capacities, because it lacks a strong executive with the political will to influence member states. Instead, SADC is relegated to providing policy coordination, while the member states are supposed to implement policy. The SADC national committees are supposed to implement SADC policy, but they are largely ineffectual. The fundamental problem is that SADC still opts for decentralized projects, managed by member states, rather than a regional focus, a legacy of the institutional structure of the original SADCC (le Pere and Tjonneland 2005).

There has been a longstanding lack of capacity in the SADC secretariat, with only one person to respond to forty ministers and to manage relations with donors. It seemed that there was a deliberate strategy by member states to keep the SADC secretariat weak and under-staffed. In contrast, the poorer ECOWAS has been better staffed and administered. There is a lack of political will by the SADC heads of state summit to advance regional cooperation. There is not a neat fit between the norms and values of the SADC blueprint for regional cooperation and how Southern African states actually behave. States have committed to ceding some sovereignty, but they have not been willing to give up power. In SADC, the personality of heads of state still drives the process. This, of course, is not unique to SADC, as attested to by other chapters in this book.

Regional project resources are there, as donors and partners make funds available, but SADC lacks absorptive capacity. Funds have had to be returned by the SADC secretariat to the donors unspent. Protocols in the areas of trade, investment, finance, industry, and security have been slowly implemented, even as donors are offering funding and projects in each of these areas. The default approach is project management, development, and project building among states with common interests; for example, South Africa and Mozambique have been developing the Maputo Corridor, which is a much shorter route (than, for instance Durban), for shipping South African goods from the industrial heartland of South Africa, the Johannesburg/Gauteng region. In Southern Africa, there are other infrastructural nodes with development corridors and South

Africa investment. This is a de facto bilateral development project, which is given the SADC imprimatur, and is indicative of the "hub and spoke" model of regional development that prevails in Southern Africa (Söderbaum and Taylor 2003).

A SADC free trade area was agreed to in August 2008, with twelve countries joining, with plans for a customs union in 2010, followed by a common market by 2015 and a monetary union by 2016. However, non-tariff barriers continue to hamper trade expansion (TRALAC 2010). In contrast, South Africa and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) continue to advance regional trade integration. In some respects, SADC has been bypassed by new free trade agreements on the horizon. For example, South Africa and SACU are negotiating an accelerated African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and a free trade area with the United States. Free trade agreements between SACU and the EU, China, India, and Mercosur, are being negotiated. SACU provides a generous dispensation under its revenue sharing formula to Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland, but it does not provide incentives for the development of manufacturing industry. It is expanding to include Mozambique and other SADC states. The Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA) has made more progress toward free trade and a common market than has SADC. Significantly, in 2008, there was an agreement on joint SADC-COMESA (and SACU) membership – known as the African Free Trade Agreement.

The role of external funding so SADC can become a self-sustainable sub-regional organization remains crucial. SADC has remained overly dependent on external resources (a common problem with the RECs), with more than 80 percent of its funding coming from donors.

Conclusion

SADC has succeeded in fostering sub-regional cooperation in the area of security, as well as development and trade. It can take credit for helping to end much of the conflict in the DRC and the civil war in Burundi. It has also played a large role in African security with its support to and participation in the AU, APSA, and the ASF, as well as AU and UN peacekeeping forces. The SADC area is largely peaceful today; the remaining security challenges revolve more around struggles for power within SADC states than it does regional security. The reasons for SADC's success lie in the leadership of South Africa, the willingness of most states to cooperate, and the relatively strong states that exist in the SADC region (with the exception of the DRC).

SADC states have not been able to move on towards regional integration and the creation of a supranational organization. The reasons lie in the distrust that some states, such as Zimbabwe and Angola, have towards South Africa, with its industrial economy, relatively capable military and benign regional hegemony. The lack of integration can be seen in the SADCBRIG of the African Standby Force; it may be ready on paper but not on the ground.

Notes

1 South Africa's GDP was US$492 billion (Purchasing Power Parity) in 2008, while the GDP of the rest of the fourteen SADC states combined was $245 billion in 2005. In 2012, SADC member states were Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

2 Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the ANC were not allies until the 1980s.

3 The following SADC states – Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Malawi, as well as the island states of Mauritius, Madagascar, and Seychelles – were attracted to South Africa for a number of reasons. Only Zimbabwe and Angola and – to an extent – Namibia resisted South African benign hegemony.

4 There are those who view South Africa's economic and political advantages and current policies as a threat that will turn Southern Africa into a South African-controlled economic region. This seems probable, as South Africa's commitment to its fellow SADC member states appears to have dwindled, thereby reducing other SADC states to dependent economic clients.
5 The conflict centered on the eastern DRC was formally triggered by the aftermath of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. *Interahamwe – those who stand together* (escaped Hutus after the fall of the Hutu regime in Rwanda) and FAR (former armed forces of Rwanda) escaped into the eastern DRC, exacerbating an already long-running struggle fuelled by a competition over land, regional political power, and access to patrimonial resources in the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu, between *autochthones* ("indigenous" Congolese) and Kinyarwanda speakers (people who trace their heritage to Rwanda) living in eastern DRC.
6 The second conflict was triggered by the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) insurgency, largely in the beginning supported by Rwanda and Uganda.
7 At the February 2010 African Union summit, NEPAD was replaced by the Nepad Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA).
8 Adekeye Adebajo and Chris Landsberg characterize South Africa as a benign regional hegemon that established hegemonic stability.
9 In 2003, Mugabe was able to gain election to an African Union position representing Southern Africa.

20

IGAD AND REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE HORN

Sally Healy

Introduction: characteristics of regional insecurity in the Horn

The Horn of Africa distinguishes itself from other regions of Africa by the prevalence and longevity of its multiple conflicts. It has been the scene of two of Africa's longest wars, the thirty-year liberation struggle in Eritrea and the equally protracted war between North and South Sudan. In both cases, settlements to end the wars involved secession and the creation of new states, a radical solution that bucked the trend of diplomatic practice elsewhere in Africa. In neither case has this solution produced lasting peace and security. A host of unresolved issues – boundary demarcation, citizenship, trade and resource sharing – have ensured that political tensions and episodes of violent conflict continue to characterise relations between the former adversaries after separation.

In parallel with these major conflicts, Somalia represents Africa's most protracted and intractable case of state collapse that has defied international efforts at reconstruction for over twenty years. The break up of Somalia – in line with Ethiopia and Sudan – remains a serious prospect with Somaliland seeking international recognition as a separate state. The extended breakdown of state and government institutions in the rest of Somalia, combined with failed regional and international interventions, has nurtured violent extremism and attracted wider international involvement. Apart from the immense suffering of its own people, Somalia is a source of both traditional and non-traditional security threats to its neighbours in the form of terrorist attacks, piracy, uncontrolled migration, illegal arms and trade flows and environmental damage.

In short, the Horn of Africa displays a lethal combination of military-political interstate rivalry, best exemplified in relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea, alongside a host of transnational security challenges arising from state breakdown, of which Somalia is the most extreme expression.

The concept of a regional security complex (RSC) provides a useful theoretical anchor for discussion of the breakdown of regional security in the Horn of Africa. This is an analytical concept developed by Barry Buzan to describe sub-sets of power relations in the international system that operates with some autonomy from the overarching international power structures that give shape to global politics. Buzan and Wæver define a regional security complex as follows: "a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both, are so interlinked

that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another" (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 44). The Horn of Africa demonstrates all the characteristics of a security region in which most of the security interaction is internal, states fear their neighbours and ally with other regional states.

Such regions are defined by two key patterns of security practice: the balance of power and patterns of amity and enmity. In some cases RSCs constitute benign relationships and can develop into security communities. But this remains a distant goal in the Horn, which constitutes a conflictual RSC characterised predominantly by military-political inter-state rivalries. Berouk Mesfin has delineated the RSC in the Horn of Africa, highlighting the interaction between four major types of threats. These emanate from balance of powers contests, lingering conflicts between neighbouring states, intra-state conflicts with regional spill-over and conflict arising from transnational threats "caused, for instance, by the rise of radical Islam and informal networks, state fragility, demographic explosion, environmental degradation and resource scarcity" (Mesfin 2011: 3).

Underlying causes of conflict in the Horn include state fragility, poor and unaccountable governance and the challenges of poverty. Inequitable sharing of national resources and lack of representation in the structures of government lie at the root of many of the internal conflicts. Large communities have experienced economic marginalisation and political exclusion, often mirroring ethnic, religious and racial or clan fault lines. The region is also a cultural crossroads where North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa meet and where race, ethnicity and religion have all been mobilised for political ends. Because of its strategic location, external powers have frequently intervened in the politics of the Horn and exacerbated local conflicts.

Domestic unrest and intra-state conflict in the countries of the Horn can quickly translate into broader security challenges because of the long tradition of distrust and mutual subversion that characterises the region. There is a need, therefore, to link regional peace and security to internal conflict resolution and governance (Tadesse 2004: 8). Rebel groups have developed into transnational insurgency movements and have become prominent security actors in their own right. The multiplicity of clan-based rebel movements in Somalia has "intensified the differentiation between groups within the territorial state, and correspondingly undermined the basis for reconstruction" (Clapham 1998: 13). In contrast, successful rebel movements in Eritrea and South Sudan, backed by neighbouring states, have been responsible for the creation of new states. Similarly, in Ethiopia an insurgent movement with backing from Sudan has reshaped the politics of the country.

To a large extent militarised conceptions of security prevail in the region. Militarism is hardly a new phenomenon in the Horn, where large armies have a long pedigree and played an honourable role in resisting European colonisation at the end of the nineteenth century. The pastoral regions also have long traditions of mobile warfare that often extends across modern-day borders. The importance of military action for securing political goals has affected the process by which states in the region identify security threats and has resulted in a "pronounced lack of transparency in threat analysis as well as public discussion and ownership of national security issues" (Tadesse 2004: 7). Little attention is paid to broader concepts of human security and there is little experience of or confidence in integrated regional security measures. Governments that are unaccountable to their own citizens are equally suspicious of developing regional institutions that might constrain them. De Waal argues that "the history of militarisation in the region has become self-sustaining" and that some measure of democratisation is a precondition for sustainable regional cooperation (de Waal 2007: 187). This makes the work of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to advance regional security extremely challenging.

IGAD

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is the regional organisation of eight Eastern African countries tasked with the prevention, management and resolution of violent conflict in a region steeped in warfare. The characteristics of state fragility in the Horn of Africa have made the development of peace and security mechanisms both more urgent and more difficult than in other regions of Africa (Khadiagala 2008: 17). The use of force to achieve political goals remains the regional norm. Regime change is generally achieved through violent means and political grievances typically addressed through armed rebellion.

IGAD was founded in 1986 by the governments of six countries – Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and Djibouti – who signed up to form the Inter-Governmental Authority against Drought and Desertification (IGADD). The rationale for establishing IGADD was not overtly political. Its mandate was confined to functional co-ordination on environmental protection, food security strategies and natural resource management. UN agencies had been instrumental in its formation, hoping to promote a regional coordination agency that could better address the problems of famine and drought that had devastated Ethiopia and Somalia during 1984 and 1985 (Shaw 1995).

IGADD was founded just as a series of inter-related conflicts in the Horn were reaching a crescendo. Violent civil wars were underway in Uganda and Ethiopia and other debilitating conflicts were gaining momentum in Sudan and Somalia. The environment has been characterised as the very reverse of regional co-operation, involving an internationalisation of domestic politics as non-state actors entered into alliances with regional states to advance their cause (El-Affendi 2009: 7). Neighbours fuelled many of the wars: Ethiopia was backing rebel groups in Sudan and Somalia; Sudan and Somalia were backing rebels in Ethiopia. Accordingly, political relations among IGADD member states were at very low ebb and Ethiopia and Somalia had broken diplomatic relations. Nonetheless, the inaugural IGADD summit in 1986 was the occasion for a first (and almost last) meeting between President Siad Barre and President Mengistu Haile Mariam. It paved the way for the signing of a peace agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia in April 1988 that put an end to the Ogaden war of ten years earlier.

The IGADD member states were then as now extensively involved in each other's internal wars. The advancement of (regional) foreign policy through proxy forces in neighbouring countries was part of the "normal" pattern of relations, entrenching a system of mutual intervention that had proved highly resilient and survived radical political reconfigurations, including changes of regime (Cliffe 1999: 91). The regimes were also highly unstable. Within five years of its creation, half of IGADD's founding heads of state had been ousted. With the accession of Eritrea in 1993 its membership grew to seven. It remained one of the smallest African sub-regional groupings, but covered a vast territory of 5.2 million square kilometres and had a sizeable combined population of 174 million.

The new leaderships in Ethiopia and Eritrea were keen to exploit the opportunities for regional co-operation. Along with President Museveni in Uganda, they set about revitalising IGADD with a much more ambitious mandate, including regional security. There was a radical flavour to the new crop of leaders. Presidents Museveni, Meles and Issayas had all won military victories against the prevailing order and took pride in having overturned abusive regimes. They had no attachment to the stagnant kind of stability that the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) represented and felt that the OAU had failed the people of Africa by ignoring the problem of long and costly civil wars.

The decision to expand IGADD's mandate to include peace and security was taken at an extraordinary summit held in Addis Ababa in April 1995.[1] A ministerial committee was charged

with developing proposals for "increasing the capacity of countries of the sub-region in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, both inter and intra-state through dialogue" (IGAD 1996: annex). The new mandate was adopted in March 1996 at the Nairobi summit and the organisation was renamed the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

IGAD's ambitions were in tune with the spirit of regeneration in the mid-1990s that saw a shift in Africa from functional to security co-operation at the regional level (Adar 2000: 42). Considerable hopes were placed in the new crop of African leaders to tackle Africa's security and development challenges with more success than their predecessors. In the IGADD group, Museveni, Meles and Issayas were all associated with this progressive strand of thinking. The promotion of economic integration and the joint development of infrastructure were especially important for Ethiopia and Eritrea, which shared ambitious development plans and were still using a common currency. IGAD appeared to be an ideal vehicle for achieving security, development and integration.

The new 1996 IGAD Agreement included among its principles the peaceful settlement of conflicts, the maintenance of regional peace, stability and security, and the protection of human and people's rights. A new organisational objective was "[to] promote peace and stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and resolution of inter and intra-State conflicts through dialogue" (IGAD 1996: Art. 7g). Member states agreed to: (a) take effective collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation, peace and stability; (b) establish an effective mechanism of consultation and co-operation for the pacific settlement of differences and disputes; and (c) deal with disputes between member states within this sub-regional mechanism before they are referred to other regional or international organisations (IGAD 1996: Art. 18a).

The IGAD Secretariat was restructured to fulfil the new mandate and established a division responsible for peace and security. However, IGAD's institutional changes lagged behind real political processes within the region. By the time IGAD announced its new mandate, the short-lived peace amongst its member states that existed between 1991 and 1993 had broken down. Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda had identified the government of Sudan as a threat to regional security and were whole-heartedly engaged in military support to the Southern Sudanese rebels. In the words of one commentator "a new regional 'Cold War' was in full swing and, as befits proper Cold Wars, the United States was involved in this one too" (El-Affendi 2009). Next came the Ethio-Eritrean war of 1998–2000, which proved to be a major turning point. Thereafter governments were less predictable and decision-making (in Ethiopia) became more centralised and militarised.

IGAD's Peace and Security Strategy

The IGAD Secretariat has nonetheless persisted in attempts to develop a Conflict Management, Resolution and Prevention (CMRP) Strategy, a process that originally formed part of IGAD's five-year Strategy and Implementation Plan for 2003–2008. At the technical level the Secretariat continues to do innovative work on peace and security, largely funded by external donors. The most significant achievement has been the development of an early warning mechanism, the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), which is monitoring three areas of pastoral border conflict. CEWARN began in 2003 and has developed a methodology for collecting data on a range of socio-political indicators that serve as a monitoring and data analysis tool. It has highlighted widespread violence in the pilot pastoral areas but several operational shortcomings remain, chief among them the lack of an effective response component (Wulf and Debiel 2010: 19).

The development of IGAD's overall Peace and Security Strategy (IPSS) began in 2004 but has been plagued with delays and remains incomplete. The process was launched at a major conference in Khartoum in 2005 with follow-up workshops in Kenya (2007), Djibouti and Uganda (2008). These meetings involved strong civil society participation and included discussion of the most contentious conflict themes in the region: border demarcation; access to the sea for land-locked countries; trans-boundary water-resource management; cross-border cooperation and counter terrorism. The end product is known as the IPSS Plan 2010–2014. This has been initialled by member states but not finally endorsed by the top decision making institution – the IGAD summit of Heads of State and Government (Apuuli 2011: 350).

The overall aim of IGAD's strategy is overtly linked to economic development, with the stated goal to achieve sustainable peace and security for the attainment of economic integration and development in the IGAD region. Apuuli indicates four priority areas in the draft plan. It envisages a new CMPR protocol among member states (but not the expansion of CEWARN to politically sensitive conflicts); the strengthening of preventative Track 2 diplomacy; closer inter-governmental co-operation to address emerging common security threats (terrorism, piracy, organised crime) while closing down IGAD's short-lived Capacity-Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT); and strengthening co-operation in relief and disaster management, migration control and strengthening of border management (Apuuli 2011: 361–366).

The issue of governance – widely seen as the root cause of conflict in the Horn – does not feature in the draft IPSS. Nor is there any convincing sign of readiness to develop a more effective regional conflict-management regime. Earlier references to creating a "mechanism" for the pacific settlement of disputes appear to have been quietly dropped. Despite the obvious need for a better regional security framework in the Horn of Africa, the scope for the IGAD Secretariat to develop an autonomous conflict-resolution capability will remain limited. Its mandate and implementation capacity are weak and its resources limited. On past performance, it is doubtful that member states would embrace any new regional security mechanism that might restrict their own freedom of action.

This reinforces a long record of failure, starting with the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, where IGAD has been powerless to persuade the protagonists to normalise relations or to finalise a peace settlement. The intense mutual hostility between these two countries continues to poison regional relations and remains the key obstacle to developing a more robust regional security framework. The IGAD Secretariat has equally played no visible role in containing or resolving the serious conflicts of the last seven years in Darfur, in the Ogaden, in Mogadishu, in Kenya, in South Sudan or between Eritrea and Djibouti.

However there are two very important exceptions – namely IGAD's involvement in the Sudan and Somalia peace processes that both culminated in political settlements in 2004–2005.[2]

IGAD and the Sudan peace process (1993–2005)

The long civil war between North and South Sudan had the regional character that typifies conflict in the Horn. Since 1983, when hostilities resumed, the Ethiopian government had been a major sponsor of John Garang's Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). This support served as a counterweight to Sudanese support for rebels in Eritrea and the adjoining Tigray region of Ethiopia. The overthrow of the Mengistu regime in 1991 transformed political relations and created the conditions in which IGAD engagement began. Ethiopia's new government had been hosted in Khartoum as rebels during the civil war. On taking power in Addis Ababa they stopped assistance to the SPLA and expelled its leadership to Nairobi. Soon afterwards, an ugly conflict erupted among different Southern Sudanese factions, further

weakening the southern rebellion and precipitating a severe humanitarian crisis. Nigeria had tried unsuccessfully to mediate.

At the IGADD summit in September 1993, President Omar El-Bashir asked his neighbours to help end the conflict. IGADD established a standing committee on peace at heads-of-state level, with President Moi of Kenya in the chair. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea were well disposed towards Khartoum, while Kenya and Uganda had influence with the SPLA. It appeared, therefore, to have the ingredients for a well-balanced mediation. However, the deadly rivalry within the Horn was soon to resume, tilting the balance firmly towards the SPLA. In January 1994, Eritrea broke off relations with Sudan, accusing Khartoum of sponsoring an Islamist rebel group inside Eritrea. Uganda joined the hostile stance towards Sudan, which also had the active backing of the US. Ethiopia followed suit in 1995 after blame fell on Sudan for an attempt on President Mubarak's life at the Addis Ababa OAU summit.

The IGADD Committee continued its negotiations despite the collapse of the regional alliances that had prompted Bashir's request for their involvement. Kenya alone maintained its neutrality and organised proximity talks between representatives of the Sudanese government and the SPLA. In July 1994, IGADD negotiators drew up the Declaration of Principles calling for a secular state in Sudan and proposing that if this was not possible South Sudan could exercise the rights to self-determination under a referendum (Woodward 2004). Bashir refused to accept the Declaration of Principles but it remained on the IGADD table and later on became the foundation upon which the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was negotiated.

For the next two years, the focus of regional involvement shifted from the negotiating table to the battlefield. The Clinton administration supported the cause of the Southern Sudanese and provided US$20 million of US military assistance to its friends in the region, ostensibly to help them withstand the Islamist threat from Sudan (Washington Post, November 10, 1996). Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda – all of them fresh from winning their own civil wars – needed no further encouragement to enhance the military performance of the SPLA. Boosted by the support of its neighbours the SPLA recovered its strength and made substantial military progress.

With the IGAD peace process immobilised, Egypt and Libya tried to launch an initiative of their own that would ensure that the self-determination (and potential separation) of the South remained off the agenda. In 1997, Moi revived mediation efforts and persuaded Bashir to re-open negotiations on the Declaration of Principles. In May 1998 more international actors, now in the guise of the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF), stepped in to buttress the IGAD process and maintain its approach to settling the Sudanese conflict. After a fresh round of talks involving IGAD, the IPF and the UN, a breakthrough occurred and the Sudanese government agreed that the principle of self-determination would be upheld through a referendum.

No sooner had this vital concession been won than the entire regional alliance structure was convulsed by the outbreak of conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea in May 1998. The trigger for this was a mishandled border incident that escalated out of control, exposing serious underlying differences between the two former allies. In order to prepare for their own confrontation both Ethiopia and Eritrea abandoned their hostility towards Sudan and took immediate steps to mend relations with Khartoum. Military logic demanded at least a neutral presence on their western flank.

The IGAD peace process lost considerable momentum, but it was not abandoned. As Cairo and Tripoli sought to take advantage of IGAD inactivity, Western support for the IGAD process was stepped up (El-Affendi 2001: 581–599). The vehicle for this was the IPF which provided the basis for a strong negotiating partnership between IGAD and external actors led by the US, Norway and UK (Prendergast and Mozersky 2004). By July 1999, IGAD's Sudan peace process had secured donor funding and acquired an institutional home in the Kenyan Ministry

of Foreign Affairs. The new administration of President George W. Bush wanted to increase pressure on Khartoum. After the 2001 appointment of Senator Danforth as a Special Envoy to Sudan the US played a key role in driving IGAD's Sudan peace process (Natsios 2008: 77–93). The US and Sudan Peace Act of October 2002 contained an explicit threat of sanctions and left the Sudanese authorities little room for doubt over US intentions.

Kenya continued to lead the negotiations. By July 2002, General (Rtd) Sumbeiwyo had successfully negotiated the Machakos Protocol. This secured the crucial "one country, two systems" compromise in which the two sides agreed that Sharia law would be the source of law in the North, while the South would have its own secular administration. It also established the timing of the referendum on self-determination, to be held six years after the signing of the peace agreement. Further agreements were negotiated on security arrangements, power sharing and wealth sharing over the next two years, culminating in the signature on 9 January 2005 of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

Shifting regional alliances rather than new approaches to regional security accounted for the openings for conflict resolution in Sudan. Volatile regional relations often threatened to derail the process. External pressure also played a key part. Nonetheless, IGAD's institutional role proved crucial, firstly in framing the problem as a North-South issue and secondly in maintaining a semblance of continuity for the Sudan peace process as a whole. This long-term engagement enabled those involved to capitalise on opportunities to come to a settlement. Without IGAD's sustained involvement these would most likely have been lost. The bigger question, as yet unanswered, is whether the division of Sudan will, over the long term, be a source of greater regional security.

IGAD and the Somali peace process

The conflict in Somalia was very different to the conflict in Sudan and stemmed from the comprehensive collapse of state institutions. When Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991, fighting erupted over control of the capital and degenerated into conflict among multiple clan-based factions. As in Sudan, Somalia's IGAD neighbours were key stakeholders in the conflict. The emergence of Islamism as a political force in Somalia gave the conflict a regional dimension with implications for Ethiopia and Kenya, which both have sizeable Somali communities within their borders. It also excited the interest of the US and other Western powers concerned about the threat of international terrorism.

Ethiopia's desire to see the re-establishment of a government in Somalia stemmed from concerns about the activities of a radical Islamist group, Al Itihad al Islamia, which emerged in the early 1990s. It encouraged its followers to put aside their clan divisions and work for the reestablishment of Somalia as an Islamic state governed by Sharia law. Their vision was one that potentially embraced all the Somali peoples of the Horn of Africa, including the Somali communities in Ethiopia and Kenya. Ethiopia therefore had domestic as well as regional interests in a settlement in Somalia. During 1996–1997, Ethiopia forces destroyed Al Itihad camps in the Gedo region of Somalia, claiming that these housed Arab and Afghan mujahidin and terrorists linked to al-Qaeda (Tadesse 2002: 63). These military operations inside a neighbouring country attracted no adverse comment from IGAD, the OAU or the international community at large. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi nonetheless warned UN officials that "Somalia was becoming a major source of instability, with extremists and terrorists operating from there, the scope of which transcended the region" (UNSC 1997: para 26 S/1997/915).

On the political track, Ethiopia organised a major reconciliation for Somali factions in the Ethiopian town of Sodere. In January 1997, this produced a National Salvation Council, headed

by Abdulahi Yusuf, a long time ally of Ethiopia. However, the Aideed faction that controlled most of Mogadishu boycotted the Sodere process. This opened the door for a competing initiative launched by Egypt and the Arab League who jointly hosted a separate set of Somali reconciliation talks with Aideed and others in 1998. The resulting Cairo Agreement effectively undermined the Sodere peace process, ensuring the failure of both. The IGAD summit of March 1998 called for an end to "the proliferation of competing initiatives" (a reference to Egypt's activities) that served to undermine the peace process in Somalia (IGAD 1998).

The outbreak of conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea in May 1998 contributed to worsening conflict within Somalia, as the two sides sought out proxy partners. Eritrea was soon reported to be arming the Aideed faction while Ethiopia stepped up assistance to its own allies in Somalia.

In early 2000, Djibouti's new President, Ismail Omah Guelleh, launched the Somali National Peace Conference. It was held within the framework of IGAD, but included funding and support from external powers including Egypt, Libya and the Gulf states. Guelleh sought a new approach that involved traditional and civil Somali leaders rather than the warlords and faction leaders who had dominated previous Somali reconciliation meetings (Interpeace 2009). The Arta peace process concluded in August 2000 with the creation of a Transitional National Government (TNG) headed by Abdulqasim Salat Hassan. It had support from Islamists and much of the business community in Mogadishu and close ties with the Djibouti government. IGAD, the OAU and the UN recognised the TNG as the government of Somalia.

Within Somalia, support for the TNG was patchier. Neither the Somaliland authorities in the North West nor Abdulahi Yusuf in Puntland recognised the authority of Abdulqasim. Several of the major Somali warlords in Mogadishu were equally disaffected and turned to Ethiopia for support. Ethiopia's opposition to the TNG hinged on suspicions of its Islamist leanings, its support from the Arab world and the exclusion of many of its own long term allies among the warlords. By March 2001, the opponents of the TNG had formed a new organisation, the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC). It was headed by Abdulahi Yusuf and worked with Ethiopian support to undermine the TNG.

Thus far, IGAD had played no institutional role in Somali reconciliation beyond endorsing Ethiopian and Djiboutian initiatives. In the aftermath of the Arta process IGAD faced the uncomfortable prospect of two member states, Ethiopia and Djibouti, which were technically on good terms with each other, supporting opposing factions in Somalia. In January 2002, the IGAD Summit commissioned President Moi of Kenya to work with Ethiopia and Djibouti to bring the warlords of the SRRC into negotiations with the TNG. Thus began IGAD's Somalia National Reconciliation Conference, a Kenyan-led negotiation conducted with the financial support of European development funds. Unlike IGAD's Sudan peace process, which was going on in parallel, neither the US nor other Western powers were actively involved in the mediation process. Some saw the apparent absence of outside pressures as a hopeful sign, and thought the IGAD mediation process likely to yield positive results because of the enormous amount of time the Somali faction leaders spent bargaining with each other (Nyuot Yoh 2003: 92).

The negotiations began in October 2002 in the Kenyan town of Eldoret and dragged on slowly, particularly over nomination rights to a large parliament that would design a transitional charter and elect a president. No real progress had been made by August 2003 when the formal mandate of the TNG expired and thereafter Abdulqasim was treated like any other faction leader. Djibouti was sufficiently annoyed by this turn of events to leave the facilitation committee, but later agreed to return when Uganda and Eritrea joined it too. Eventually, a Somali parliament was appointed on the basis of clan representation and assembled in Kenya. In October 2004, it elected Abdulahi Yusuf as president of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). After two more months of wrangling a government was formed, led by Prime Minister Gedi.

From an IGAD perspective, the end of the negotiation and the creation of a government of Somalia under a new transitional charter appeared to be another successful venture in mediation.

Assessing IGAD's role in the peace process

Two IGAD settlements within three months appeared a remarkable accomplishment. But a closer examination of the circumstances in which the agreements were achieved points to a more nuanced judgment about IGAD's institutional role.

In origin, the IGAD peace initiatives in Sudan and Somalia were political initiatives, conceived and largely executed by one or more member states. They did not entrust the mediation to the IGAD Secretariat, which had neither the capacity nor the authority to lead the peace processes that were carried out in its name.

The peace talks required an organisational and logistical effort that was beyond the capacity of IGAD's modest secretariat in Djibouti. The two peace processes relied heavily on Kenyan diplomatic and organisational capacity. Kenya supplied the chief negotiator in each case: General Sumbeiwyo as mediator in the Sudan process and Ambassador Bethwell Kiplagat for the Somali process. Kenya's ability to maintain political neutrality was also vital.

The IGAD Secretariat successfully institutionalised donor support through the IPF. The willingness of external donors to finance the peace process was both a blessing and a burden and their involvement generated frictions over ownership and the imposition of spurious deadlines ("deadline diplomacy") tied to financing (IGAD 2007).

IGAD's nominal ownership of the peace processes helped to secure the exclusion of secondary actors from outside the region: principally Egypt, Libya and Yemen. IGAD's peacemaking activities helped to secure legitimacy for the organisation and build wider international acceptance of IGAD as the only appropriate forum for tackling conflict in the Horn (Francis 2006). In order to maintain this primacy, IGAD has needed to secure one of two things: either actual success in conflict resolution (as in Sudan); or the ability to align its peacemaking activity with the interests of powerful external actors (as in Somalia and the global War on Terror).

During the Sudanese and Somali peace processes IGAD member states engaged in war at the same time as organising for peace. In the early years of IGAD's Sudan peace process, military action by Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda provided a level of pressure that persuaded the government of Sudan to negotiate seriously with the South. Similarly, reports to the UN Security Council's Sanctions Committee on the Somali arms embargo record military assistance from Ethiopia to its allies among the Somali factions throughout 2003–2004 when the Somali National Peace Conference was in progress (Expert Group and Monitoring Group on Somalia 2003–2005). Later, Eritrea's assistance to Islamist opponents of the TFG scaled up, reaching a peak in late 2006 just before Ethiopia's intervention (Expert Group and Monitoring Group on Somalia 2006).

Member states have sought to direct IGAD activity, in pursuit of their own interests. As Medhane Tadesse has observed, "Quite often IGAD peace processes had become either one arm of the strategy of neighbouring countries or merely a symbolic cover for sub-regional ownership of political processes driven from elsewhere (notably the United States)" (Tadesse 2004: 6).

This undermines IGAD's capacity to maintain the neutrality required of a regional mediation body. Furthermore, the IGAD region lacks a clearly distinguishable lead country capable, by virtue of its superior size and strength, to play unchallenged the role of a hegemon as South Africa and Nigeria can in their respective regions (Mwaura, Baechler and Kiplagat 2002: 34).

Strengths and weaknesses of IGAD

As the Sudan and Somalia peace processes demonstrated, when the political conditions are rights, IGAD can provide an umbrella for peace negotiations that are locally owned but externally funded. In both cases the peace processes took place over a long period of time during which incremental gains were made. They involved not only the protagonists but also civil society and other non-state actors, as well as interested external players. IGAD proved a good forum for such complex and protracted negotiations and was able to capitalise to some extent on the strength of the social bonds that unite people in the Horn of Africa despite the often-hostile relations between their governments.

Member states have shown themselves to be innovative and willing to push the boundaries of what can be achieved through IGAD. On more than one occasion, practice has been ahead of the organisational mandate. IGAD had not yet framed its peace and security mandate in 1993 when the Sudan negotiations that culminated in the CPA began. Similarly, in January 2005, soon after the establishment of Somalia's TFG, the IGAD summit went beyond its formal mandate to authorise the deployment of a peace support mission to Somalia (IGASOM) consisting of 10,000 peacekeepers. Although this force never materialised it remains the foundation of the AMISOM force currently in Mogadishu under AU authority.

Those member states with the capacity to do so have frequently conducted war and peace at the same time and readily use force to achieve preferred outcomes. Most of the conflicts are overtly regional and military intervention across borders is increasingly commonplace. While this makes it difficult for IGAD to implement a regional security strategy, it constantly underscores the vital significance of IGAD as the forum in which all the conflict stakeholders are represented. IGAD has also proven its value as a political and diplomatic forum capable of decisively shaping African and wider international responses to events in the region. However manipulative or self-serving, its member states are making increasing use of IGAD to advance their goals, to legitimise and organise collective action and to galvanise international support from beyond the region.

IGAD is also beset by many weaknesses as a regional security body. The membership is small and lacks a clear hegemonic power to lead effective action (as Nigeria and South Africa can in ECOWAS and SADC respectively). Political, military and economic power is distributed unevenly among the member states, producing a relatively unstable balance of power between them. Many (but not all) are weak states, with weak institutions that do not provide a good foundation for regional integration schemes. They are remarkably dissimilar in their formal structures and systems of government as well as in less tangible measures such as common values. Even where there are very strong cultural and political similarities – Ethiopia and Eritrea being the best example – it has proved no protection against abiding conflict.

International organisations such as IGAD are part of the institutional machinery for propping up weak states. But the complete collapse of a member state, as in Somalia, has proved a real burden to the organisation. It is ill-equipped to deal with the networks of non-state actors and warlords that have emerged in Somalia and much of Sudan where state structures are weakest. It also struggles to deal with new realities such as the separatist administration in Somaliland. Alongside its small membership and limited capacity, IGAD faces problems of finance. All the members are poor countries and IGAD's project activity, including its formal peace and security programs, are highly dependent on donor financing. IGAD has experience of setting the agenda and leveraging assistance from others, but the poor state of the organisation's finances raises doubts about ownership and commitment in the longer term.

The use of IGAD to advance the national interests of key members threatens IGAD's impartiality and undermines its potential as a mediation and conflict resolution body. This is the case in Somalia where IGAD is so firmly associated with the TFG that it cannot take an independent role in the continuing conflict between the TFG and several other Somali political entities.

Eritrea's exclusion from IGAD since 2006 also undermines its effectiveness. Originally Eritrea announced the suspension of its own membership as a protest against IGAD's diplomatic support for Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia. However this self-exclusion has become an increasing liability, compounding Eritrea's diplomatic isolation and denying it a voice in key discussions. IGAD has orchestrated collective action against Eritrea (over its conflict with Djibouti and over alleged support to Somali insurgents) that has reached to the top of the international system and resulted in the imposition of UN sanctions. Eritrea announced in 2011 that it wished to end its suspension and return to active membership of IGAD – a request that is still under consideration but will be firmly resisted by Ethiopia.

Other forms of exclusion are the perverse consequences of external political processes, as when the Kenyan courts decided that President Bashir of Sudan could be arrested on the basis of his International Criminal Court indictment if he came to Kenya for an IGAD meeting. The poor quality of the political relations within and among member states, including the use of exclusion to punish member states, risks rendering IGAD entirely dysfunctional. This is a more serious risk where there is overlapping membership with a demonstrably more functional organisation in the shape of the East African community to which Kenya and Uganda already belong.

The Horn of Africa region has been especially susceptible to interventions by external powers and it has experienced the impact of both Cold War rivalries and, more recently, the global War on Terror. This has provided opportunities for regional powers to secure external support, making warfare in the region more lethal and conflicts more intractable. It has also created new instrumentalities, as Tadesse has observed, "Politically adroit national leaders have offered their services as allies in the fight against terrorism. Many of them (such as Ethiopia and Eritrea) have also tried to have their opponents placed on the index of terrorist organisations" (Tadesse 2004: 5). The impact of the externally driven War on Terror has given regimes additional scope to restrict democracy and human rights – which are widely seen as the key to improving human security and a foundation for regional security. IGAD has been able to attract funding and support precisely because of international concern for regional security partly based on an external perception of Ethiopia as a regional policeman, competent to deal with failed states (Somalia) or even rogue states (Eritrea, Sudan).

Conclusion

In conclusion, many difficulties stand in the way of IGAD playing an effective institutional role in advancing regional peace and security. However, international practice continues to favour regional arrangements to deal with the maintenance of international peace. IGAD has played an active role, leveraging support through the AU's Peace and Security Council and with the UN, both shaping and sharing responsibility for conflict management and peacekeeping. The institution is now firmly established as one of Africa's Regional Economic Communities and part of the African Union's emerging peace and security architecture. Regional insecurity in the Horn will continue to pose major challenges ensuring that IGAD as a political and diplomatic forum will retain its significance. But it will not be able to play a more productive institutional role in promoting regional security until a more benign set of political relationships is established within and between its member states.

Notes

1 Somalia was not represented because of the absence of a government.
2 The following two sections are based on my article 'Seeking Peace and Security in the Horn of Africa: the contribution of IGAD', *International Affairs*, Vol 87, no 1 January 2011.

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REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION IN CENTRAL AFRICA

What perspectives after ten years of peace and security operations?

Angela Meyer

Introduction

Central Africa, the area covered by the Great Lakes states, Chad, the Central African Republic (CAR) and countries bordering the Gulf of Guinea, is among the continent's most conflict-prone regions. Over the last twenty years, Africa's most protracted crises and conflicts, such as the ones in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi and the CAR, have taken place in Central Africa. In many countries, post-conflict security problems prevail. Security and stability hence remain considerably fragile.

Against this background, peace and security issues have become a more and more important priority. By reviving their economic cooperation and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in 1998, the Central African states have decided to give more emphasis to conflict resolution and prevention. In line with promoting the *Africanization* of peace and security solutions, a Central African peace and security architecture is being set up. Since 2002, two consecutive regional peace operations have been deployed to support the resolution of tensions and crises in the CAR.

This chapter assesses and analyzes the evolution of regional peace and security cooperation in Central Africa over the last ten years. The central focus is on the major problems challenging the effectiveness and efficiency of cooperation and its implementation. The first section provides an overview of the evolving role of ECCAS for Central African peace and security. A second section analyzes more precisely the regional operations of FOMUC and MICOPAX, deployed for a decade in the CAR as a regional response to rising insecurity and instability. A third section, finally, discusses the major challenges that affect the realization and effectiveness of the Central African regional approach to peace and security.

Angela Meyer

The Economic Community of Central African States: from economic to security cooperation

Re-focusing regional cooperation

Central Africa's proneness for conflict has been a central motive behind the progressive turning of efforts at regional cooperation from primarily an economic focus to more of a focus on security (see Bach, Chapter 16). As one of the two main regional communities in Central Africa, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) had initially been launched in 1983 as an economic initiative, under the Lagos Plan of Action.[1] Conceived as a pillar of the African Economic Community (AEC), ECCAS's central objective was to prepare within the region for continent-wide economic integration. At the beginning, ECCAS's member states were Gabon, Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and São Tomé and Principe. Angola switched from an observer status to full membership in 1999 and Rwanda withdrew in 2007.

From the beginning, ECCAS performed poorly, primarily due to the members' lack of commitment and support. Insufficient resources and capacities resulted in a series of bottlenecks and log jams. In the 1990s, the proper functioning and the implementation of policies and activities were additionally affected by the rise of political instability, violence, and conflicts, in many member states. The proliferation and intertwining of crises, as well as the engagement of some ECCAS members on opposite sides in the DRC and other conflicts, made economic cooperation almost impossible. Regional activities and policies within the community remained largely paralyzed for several years (Meyer 2006).

In February 1998, the decision at the member states' extraordinary summit held in Libreville to relaunch the community process resulted in a comprehensive revision of its agenda and in institutional reform. New priority was given to regional peace and security. The development of "capacities to maintain peace, security and stability, which are essential prerequisites for economic and social development" were therefore defined in June 1999 as one of the community's four main priority fields.[2]

Since the year 2000 and the adoption of the Protocol of the Central African Peace and Security Council (COPAX), ECCAS has progressively implemented the Central African peace and security architecture (see Engel and Porto, Chapter 17). Within this architecture, COPAX presents the central body for "political and military concertation between the ECCAS member states, in the field of peace and security promotion, maintenance and consolidation" (ECCAS 2000: Art. 2). According to Article 4 of the Protocol, COPAX's main functions cover:

- the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts;
- the implementation of activities for the promotion, maintenance and consolidation of peace and security;
- the reduction of sources of tensions;
- the reinforcement of confidence and defense and security cooperation among ECCAS member states;
- mediation activities in case of conflicts within or between member states, as well as with third parties; and
- joint initiatives to cope with issues of illegal immigration, displaced persons, former combatants and refugees, as well as humanitarian assistance.

To implement its mandate, COPAX can deploy civil and military observer and verification missions and take all necessary civil or military action to prevent, manage and solve a conflict. However, it acts upon the decisions of ECCAS's central policy-making organ, the Conference of Heads of State. Assisted by the Council of Ministers, the Conference forms the community's supreme authority for peace and security affairs.[3] It defines the community's policies and orientations, which also includes issues related to peacekeeping, consolidation, promotion and restoration of peace and security in Central Africa (ECCAS 2000: Art. 8). COPAX relies on three technical organs: the Defense and Security Commission (CDS), the Early Warning Mechanism (MARAC), and the Multinational Force (FOMAC).[4] CDS is ECCAS's technical planning and advisory body that is consulted by the Conference of Heads of State on issues related to peace and security, and in the eventuality of a joint military operation. It is composed of the member states' chiefs of staff and the commanders-in-chiefs of police and gendarmerie forces. MARAC is the main conflict prevention instrument. Built on a decentralized structure, with bureaus in ECCAS's member states, its aim is to collect and analyze data in order to detect possible risk factors. FOMAC, finally, is the Community's non-permanent multinational force for peace support operations (PSO). FOMAC's Standing Orders, adopted in June 2002, define it as "a force composed of national interservice, police, gendarmerie contingents and of civilian modules from member states of the ECCAS, with a view of carrying out peace, security and humanitarian assistance missions" (ECCAS 2002: Art. 2). This includes missions in the field of observation and monitoring, peacekeeping and restoration of peace, as well as peace building, disarmament and demobilization. Moreover, FOMAC shall also intervene in humanitarian disaster situations and for the enforcement of sanctions, and can be used for preventive deployment and policing activities, such as control of fraud and organized crime. FOMAC is deployed upon a decision by the Conference of Heads of State following the demand by one of ECCAS's member states, the United Nations (UN) or the African Union (AU), consistent with the subsidiary principle that underpins ECCAS's relationship with the AU (ECCAS 2002: Art. 26; AU 2007: Art IV–iv).

The strengthening of Central Africa's regional peace and security capacities is in line with the developments in other African regions and at the continental level. In accordance with the Protocol establishing the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreed to in 2007, the seven African regional economic communities (RECs) recognized by the AU (including ECCAS), are to contribute to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).[5] This MoU formalizes the cooperation "towards the full operationalization and effective functioning of the African Peace and Security Architecture", including the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) (AU 2007). In this perspective, MARAC is seen as one of the pillars of CEWS, and FOMAC as one of the regional brigades to constitute ASF.

State of advancement

Compared to other RECs contributing to APSA, notably the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), ECCAS's operationalization of regional peace and security capacities has been rather slow and often delayed. Problems are mainly technical and political in nature. They result from limited means and resources, as well as from a lack of political will and commitment to effectively realize what has been agreed to on paper. FOMAC's operationalization has long been slowed by financial and logistical difficulties.[6] However, and as Olaf Bachmann underlines, "ECCAS has been catching up rapidly since 2007" (Bachmann 2011: 37). Over the last years, a series of military

exercises have been conducted in view of certifying FOMAC as one of the five African regional brigades. In line with the overall roadmap set up by the AU, the most comprehensive of these operations has taken place from May 22 to June 10, 2010, in Angola, under the name of KWANZA 2010. This multidimensional manoeuver has gathered some 3,700 soldiers, police officers and civilian staff sent by ECCAS member states. It has conducted naval, air and ground exercises, in view of testing and demonstrating FOMAC's capabilities. The evaluation of this exercise has however been biased. For ECCAS and its member states, KWANZA 2010 has presented FOMAC as a living reality and as being henceforth able to carry out peace support operations within the Community and beyond.[7] According to ECCAS's former Secretary-General, Louis Sylvain-Goma, the exercise showed that 75 percent of the objectives set for the establishment of FOMAC have already been achieved.[8] Accordingly, the AU certified that FOMAC is ready to act as a peace force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions, which corresponds to the fourth of the six intervention scenarios defined (ICG 2011b). On the other side, the Central African exercise, as well as those conducted by other African RECs, have been criticized for insufficient preparation by the contributing states, including weak general planning and training of personnel and poor planning capacity across dimensions. Weakness also remains regarding communication and interoperability between the different components deployed. The civil component has been considered as too weak and largely underdeveloped (Bachmann 2011). In its Progress Report established in December 2010, the AU estimated that "the five regions/mechanisms and the African Union Commission (AUC) are able to deploy and manage a standby force but enhancements are still required in force composition, planning, procedures, training, communications and logistics before the level can be raised to Full Operating Capability (FOC)" (AU 2010:1).

Regarding the advancement of MARAC, major capacity building efforts have also been made, in particular since 2007.[9] Decentralized bureaus have been established in five of ECCAS's ten member states for the collection of data and the first analyses have started (ECCAS 2010). However, major weaknesses and problems challenge the mechanism's analytical capacities. In order to ensure that information provided on the national level will effectively contribute towards monitoring crises, conflicts and conflict risks within the region, the data collection, analysis and evaluation have to be carried out consistently across the region. This requires a joint catalogue of indicators for the early detection of potential threats, as well as a common language and understanding. Also observation priorities to guide the monitoring activities have to be determined and agreed upon. In a related point, a major challenge lies with the smooth transfer of data, from the detection of risks to the final reaction. As this data is likely to be sensitive, efficient cooperation and confidence among all elements of MARAC is key. This also requires a clear and approved distribution of responsibilities among local, national, regional, and continental actors and centers. As the functions of MARAC are limited to the detection of threats and warning, much seems once again to depend upon the willingness of the states to observe these alerts and take the necessary reactive actions.

Responding to the crisis in the CAR: a first challenge for regional security cooperation

Despite the fact that FOMAC's certification is still pending and the ASF's full operationalization has been postponed to 2015, ECCAS is already carrying out its first real multinational regional peace operation in one of its member states. In July 2008, the Community took over the command of the peace mission FOMUC, operated in the CAR since 2002 by the other Central African regional Community, the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa

(CEMAC). For ten years, the Central African states have been actively responding to the crises in the CAR. FOMUC and the now renamed MICOPAX mission (Mission de consolidation de la paix en Centrafrique),[10] thus manifest the new security focus of Central African regional cooperation. They, moreover, mark a significant turning point in multinational peace initiatives in Central Africa, from the international towards the regional level.

The crises in the CAR and the international community

The CAR, a former French colony located in a conflict-prone area, has experienced significant political instability since its independence in 1960. Whereas it has never witnessed a large-scale war like the DRC, repeated political unrest and a series of mutinies, rebellions and partly successful coups d'états contribute to a climate of instability. The coup attempts in January and March 2013 which led to President François Bozizé's overthrow once again demonstrated the weakness of state authority. While the government's power is concentrated on the capital of Bangui, large zones in the periphery are remaining out of state control. Especially in the northern and north-eastern parts of the country, rebel movements have emerged as a major challenge for the government. In some cases, whole areas have fallen under the authority of these groups, with a phenomenon of a state-within-a-state with alternative power structures emerging[11] (Spittaels and Hilgert 2009). In contrast, the insufficiency of state authority has provoked a state of anarchy and the complete lack of any form of – even makeshift – political leadership in other regions. A direct consequence of this limited state power projection is the rise of violence, aggression and criminal actions against the local population. Attacks on villages and kidnapping have caused the internal or international displacement of nearly eight percent of the 4.5 million inhabitants of the CAR.[12] Attacks on roads and commercial traffic, committed by heavily armed road bandits called *coupeurs de route* or *Zaraguinas*, moreover, impede the movement of people and goods, constraining economic development. Due to its proximity and its weak border control, the CAR is also affected by crises and tensions taking place in Chad, Sudan (Darfur) and the DRC. Remote rural and border areas are regularly used by foreign rebel movements as rear bases and for launching military attacks. Armed elements and small arms and light weapons are freely crossing the country's borders, increasing the risk for further turmoil. Another source of uncertainty and a new security risk is the recent violent regime change in Libya. Muammar Gaddafi exercised a profound influence on conflict management and power relations in the region and throughout the African continent. Acting as mediator between Chad and Sudan he, for instance, guaranteed a certain normalization of their relations with each other (ICG 2011c). Gaddafi's fall in 2011 and the end of Libya's power projection are beginning to reveal the weakness of regimes in the region. In particular, the changing power balance is already threatening Idriss Déby's regime in Chad. Along with limited territorial control and an uncontrolled proliferation of arms, weapons and fighters throughout the entire Sahel zone, these growing uncertainties and yet unpredictable changes potentially destabilize Central Africa, with direct consequences for the CAR.[13]

Political instability in the CAR inhibits the state's ability to take sovereign responsibility for maintaining peace and security. In the first decades following independence, the country's political stability and security was mainly influenced and partly guaranteed by its former colonial power, France. The apparent weakness and vulnerability of the CAR regime from the middle of the 1990s on can be related to France's decision to progressively reduce its presence and activities in the country, and instead opt for more indirect support (see N'Diaye, Chapter 27). Incapable of ensuring a satisfactory level of security and stability inside the country, the different

CAR governments have consequently had recourse to multinational assistance since 1997, first in the form of international and then regional peace operations.

After a series of mutinies in 1996, France actively supported setting up a multinational African peace force to monitor the just negotiated peace agreement between the governments and the mutineers. With French financial and logistical backing, the heads of state of Gabon, Mali, Chad and Burkina Faso agreed to mediate in the CAR crisis and to deploy a multinational peace force in January 1997. The Mission Interafricaine de Surveillance des Accords de Bangui (MISAB) had the mandate to monitor the implementation of the Bangui peace agreement and to supervise the disarmament of rebels and militias. MISAB was the first operation in a series of multinational interventions that have subsequently been deployed in the CAR over the last fifteen years. In April 1998, with France no longer willing to carry the burden of the operation alone, MISAB was transformed into a United Nations operation, the Mission des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine (MINURCA). The urgency to carry on the presence of international troops in the CAR was primarily given by the forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for late 1998 and October 1999. After four subsequent renewals of its initial three months mandate, the UN operation ended in February 2000.

FOMUC and MICOPAX

Whereas MISAB had been a multinational operation with no specific institutional backing, the FOMUC mission and the subsequent MICOPAX mission presented a significant turning point in Central Africa's regional cooperation. Deployed under the authority of CEMAC and ECCAS, respectively, these two missions marked an increase in active engagement by the Central African economic communities. FOMUC was agreed to by the Central African heads of state in October 2002, two years after the end of MINURCA; and at a time when security and stability remained volatile in the CAR.[14] FOMUC was deployed in Bangui after December 2002, with an initial composition of 380 soldiers from Gabon, Congo Brazzaville and Chad. Initially, the mission's mandate was to ensure security and stability by protecting the president against any form of rebellion and securing the capital and the airport. In March 2003, the multinational troops proved, however, incapable of preventing Patassé's former Armed Forces Chief of Staff, François Bozizé's seizure of power. The violent change of regime called for a comprehensive revision of the mandate. As the new president, Bozizé agreed to keep the troops inside the country. In particular, he was interested in thus addressing the challenge posed by the emergence of armed rebel movements in several parts of the country. FOMUC's responsibility was hence increasingly focused on securing the CAR and supporting the return of constitutional order and a durable peace through restructuring the national armed forces (FACA) and by promoting the transition process for national reconciliation. FOMUC was involved in arresting and disarming several rebel leaders (CEMAC 2005). Also, the initial focus on the capital was widened and contingents sent to the periphery. In 2006, two units of eighty troops each were dispatched to the cities of Bria in the north-east and Bozoum in the north-west of the capital in response to growing insecurity in these areas. When an additional contingent provided by Cameroon was deployed in March 2008 to the city of Paoua in the north-west of the country, the total number of troops was raised to 500.

From 2002 to 2004, France was the main provider of financial, logistical and technical support to FOMUC. With the creation of its African Peace Facility (APF) in April 2004, the European Union (EU) emerged as an important partner covering large parts of the operation's budget. Until 2008, some €33.6 million was contracted and some €29.4 million paid under APF

(European Union 2010). Nevertheless, France remained an essential player providing most of the logistical and military assistance.[15]

The decision in 2002 to run the mission under the aegis of CEMAC was motivated by the progressive disengagement of the international community from active involvement in African conflicts. Instead "African solutions to African problems" were increasingly encouraged and supported. The choice, however, of the mainly economic oriented CEMAC instead of ECCAS can primarily be linked to the fact that the latter was still in the middle of its restructuring when FOMUC was created in 2002. ECCAS, in fact, appears more appropriate, with regard to the new focus on peace and security since the end of the 1990s. The progress made since the ratification of the COPAX Protocol in January 2004 and the holding of a series of first joint manoeuvres,[16] therefore, led to the Central African Heads of State's agreement on their summit in Brazzaville in October 2007 to transfer the operation's authority to ECCAS. Then renamed MICOPAX, it officially replaced FOMUC in July 2008. In contrast to its predecessor, MICOPAX's mandate is larger and multidimensional. Until the coup in March 2013, its central goal has been to secure the CAR territory in order to protect the population from violence and crime, ensure free and secure movement on major roads, and allow for a resumption of economic activities and trade inside the country. The mandate has been based on four pillars: first, the consolidation of a climate of peace and stability in the CAR by assisting the government in restructuring its institutions and developing the political process. This includes assisting the country in establishing and maintaining the rule of law, public order and security and ensuring the security of the UN staff and civil population. Second, MICOPAX is to assist the country in promoting democratic principles and in fostering national reconciliation and dialogue. As a third and a fourth pillar, MICOPAX is responsible for promoting and monitoring the respect of Human Rights, as well as coordinating humanitarian aid and the fight against pandemic and endemic diseases (ECCAS 2008). Initially, the mandate foresaw a withdrawal of the troops by the end 2013.[17] Until 2012, MICOPAX's budget has mainly been financed through the APF, with the EU spending under the 9th and 10th European Development Fund (EDF) a total amount of €101.7 million on regional peace consolidation missions in the CAR (European Commission 2012a). Besides European support, the French influence remains considerable. By some observers, France is hence considered as providing an even stronger response to Central Africa's insecurity and instability than ECCAS member states (Elowson and Wiklund 2011). According to Romain Esmenjaud, "France's say remains preponderant in all decisions of the organization [and its] influence goes through different factors and mechanisms" (Esmenjaud 2011:14). This indeed is reflected by the fact that France's bilateral share in MICOPAX's budget, contributed in the form of materials such as military uniforms and vehicles, remains considerably high and has even slightly increased from 26 percent in 2011 to 32.8 percent in 2012.

The putsch in 2013 has significantly changed the situation. Whereas the planned withdrawal had already started in 2012, ECCAS's heads of state and government instead agreed in May 2013 to increase the number of troops from 700 to 2000, and to renew and revise the mandate and the budget, with possible contributions from ECCAS, the EU, France, the AU and the UN.

Assessment of the regional approach of peace and security in Central Africa

The actual security challenges in the CAR and most other Central African countries, as well as the current international and continental context, make strengthening regional cooperation in the field of peace and security appear as a relevant and promising approach. In Central Africa, insecurity

has a clear regional dimension. State borders do not limit violence and crises to one specific country. On the contrary, conflicts such as the ones in the DRC or the CAR clearly demonstrate how violence and tensions in one country more or less directly affect the situation in the neighboring countries, be it because of the permeability of borders to arms, weapons and rebels, the mutual interference of political leaders into their neighbors' internal affairs and crises, or the negative impact of single conflicts on the region's economic development. The pertinence of the Central African peace and security cooperation is moreover based on its alignment with the developments in the AU and the other RECs. Being integrated into APSA provides these initiatives additional importance and attention. It moreover binds them to a common schedule and framework. This is likely to give cooperation additional impetus, especially as the international community's support moves from a bilateral basis to the direct assistance of regional entities.

Major challenges for the Central African regional peace and security cooperation

Despite the relevance of a regional security approach, ECCAS's performance in fulfilling its new priority has been rather limited so far. As has been discussed above, the set-up of the Central African Peace and Security Architecture has been much slower compared to other RECs, such as ECOWAS and SADC (Bachmann 2011). Also, despite the now ten-year presence of multinational peace operations, the situation in the CAR is still unstable. Although temporary agreements could be reached with major rebel movements in the country, security has always been fragile. The coup d'état by the Séléka rebels against President Bozizé in March 2013 has been another demonstration of the state's continuous political weakness and vulnerability. Also it has challenged efforts made so far to consolidate the country's security. Finally, the socio-economic conditions in the CAR remain alarming and the massive humanitarian crisis largely hampers human sustainable development. Raising dissatisfaction and civil unrest are likely to facilitate the emergence of centrifugal subversive movements and fuel the risk of tensions, criminality and violence (Meyer 2010).

A set of partly interrelated problems and factors currently challenge the Central African peace and security cooperation and its performance.

Central Africa as a region

Compared to other regional communities in Africa, a major challenge for ECCAS is its central geographic position and the apparent lack of cohesion among the member states. Composed of ten states with a total population of some 140 million and stretched over an area of around 6,664,000 km^2, ECCAS represents a heterogeneous regional community. It groups countries as different as Angola in the south and Chad in the Sahel zone. Linguistically, ECCAS is divided between Anglophone, Francophone, Arabophone, Lusophone and Hispanophone countries, and hence covers all official languages spoken on the African continent. This complexity impedes the development of a sense of identity. ECCAS can appear as an abstract construction whose members also belong to other regional communities on the continent and have hence to split their commitments and contributions.[18] Economic benefits, such as preferential access to markets or harbors and attractiveness for investments, especially if communities form a free trade area (Schiff and Winters 2003) pull the member countries in different directions. The potential that multiple memberships may have for better addressing the trans-border and trans-region dimension

of insecurity is, however, mainly neglected. Situated at the crossroads of different conflict zones, the crises, armed conflicts and tensions in other countries beyond ECCAS's borders are likely to impact on the security of Central African states. The situation in the CAR, for instance, is directly affected by developments in Sudan. Nevertheless, an inter-regional approach to security, notably by deepening the cooperation between ECCAS and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) or the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) is not targeted.

The patchwork of Central Africa is moreover complicated having no clear regional leader that could play a comparable supportive role as the Republic of South Africa (RSA) or Nigeria for SADC and ECOWAS, respectively. The lack of a dominant power appears problematic for the role of ECCAS in regional security. As several observers have noted, in particular for southern and western Africa, a hegemon can be "an important element of successful conflict management and peace-keeping" and "serve as the 'fulcrum' of regional security co-operation" (MacAulay and Karbo 2008: 157). In Central Africa, especially Cameroon, Gabon, Angola and the DRC have from time to time claimed the leadership role. However, these ambitions have so far failed, partly due to internal reasons,[19] or to the problem of mutual mistrust within the community (ICG 2011b; Guicherd 2012). Similarly, the rising regional role of Chad is regarded with suspicion by its neighbours. According to some observers in Central Africa, "a single leader would face problems of legitimacy" (Awoumou 2008: 140). This in return makes some consider a shared leadership, for instance by the Yaoundé-Kinshasa-Luanda axis, as a more viable option (Awoumou 2008). For several ECCAS members, Central Africa's weak regional identity raises the attractiveness of other more dynamic regions. Rwanda, one of ECCAS's founding members, left the community in 2007 in order to intensify its cooperation within the East African Community (EAC). Also Angola's commitment in Central Africa is fragmented and divided between ECCAS and SADC (UNDP 2008).[20]

The intergovernmental approach of regional security cooperation

Similar to most African regional communities, regional cooperation in ECCAS is centered on the states. This intergovernmental approach also concerns the joint peace and security activities which are primarily under the responsibility of the Conference of Heads of State.

The major problem with this intergovernmental approach and distribution of power is that the progress and performance of ECCAS as a community and regional peace and security promoter largely depend upon the willingness of the states and their representatives to actively and financially support the process. Since the creation of ECCAS, the members' commitment has, however, been considerably limited, as demonstrated by the period of inactivity in the 1990s as well as the slow pace of development over the last years. Moreover, the absence of a regional driving force and the prevailing mistrust among states make the community particularly vulnerable to impasses and deadlocks. Despite ECCAS's revival in 1998, the member states continue to remain reluctant in implementing decisions and providing the necessary means and resources. Institutions and bodies on the supranational level are in return too weak to control, encourage, or even enforce the states' contributions, or to prevent and solve bottlenecks and deadlocks.

ECCAS's performance thus relies upon both contributions and encouragements from international partners. The international community's regular support questions the idea of African ownership (Bachmann 2011). It is also likely to reduce even further the member states' commitment: on the one hand, the foreign financial flow may be perceived by African states as an appropriate way to compensate their own failure to pay. On the other hand, by being

preponderantly financed by international contributions, operations like FOMUC or MICOPAX may be considered by Central African states as under the responsibility of their external partners, who in fact may have more control and influence over them. What Cedric de Coning notes about the situation of the AU, indeed also applies to Central Africa: "donors can determine the duration of a mission, and can influence a mission's mandate by placing terms and conditions on continued funding, or by withdrawing funding if they no longer agree with the scope of the mission" (de Coning 2002:53). The likely consequence is further reduced interest and commitment by Central African states.

ECCAS caught between interests

The weakness and vulnerability of ECCAS as a security community leads to the question about the motivations behind the set-up of a regional peace and security framework and the deployment of joint peace operations. Besides the awareness that insecurity in the region negatively impacts upon their own economic development and the region's attractiveness for foreign investments, Central African regional cooperation is also largely driven by political interests.

A first motive can be linked to the Central African governments' need to foster their legitimacy. As the case of the CAR exemplifies, insecurity and instability are closely related to the incapacity of government and state institutions to fulfill their sovereign responsibilities. This weakness is manifested by the state's inability to ensure social, territorial and political cohesion. The results are high levels of poverty and social fragmentation, limited territorial integrity, and the emergence of centrifugal movements that aim to control whole areas or even topple the regime. Limited legitimacy and social, territorial and political cohesion are important causes for political instability and bear the constant risk of violent regime change. Organizing summits, participating in decision-making processes, holding regional presidencies and hosting community institutions can be considered by political leaders as a way to conceal their weakness and fragility, and instead demonstrate their importance on the regional level, also towards international partners. According to some observers, this may explain the role of presidents like Omar Bongo from Gabon or Denis Sassou Nguesso from the Republic of the Congo, both main initiators of ECCAS's revival.[21] Whereas Bongo was eager to foster his ambitions as individual regional leader, Nguesso was interested in legitimizing his regime and position after the end of the civil war (ICG 2011b). In line with a "mutual instinct for self-preservation between presidents" (ICG 2011b 9), heads of state may also see ECCAS and its institutions as helpful in officially condemning rebellions and thereby providing additional support for their weak regime (Meyer 2010).[22] In a similar perspective, joint activities can also be perceived as an appropriate tool to realize particular interests and even exert influence on other states' politics. With regard to the fluctuating relations between Chad's Idriss Déby and the two former CAR Presidents Patassé and Bozizé, the participation of Chadian troops in FOMUC and MICOPAX may for instance raise the question of the mission as a Trojan horse. This argument has indeed been advanced by several observers. The International Crisis Group (ICG) underlines, in particular, the force's paralysis during Bozizé's putsch in March 2003 and the support the rebels received from FOMUC contributing states (ICG 2007).[23]

Regional security in Central Africa is thus primarily state-centric. However, in contrast to a neo-realist perspective, state security is not perceived as protection against other states. It much more expresses the governments' fear of being toppled by rebel movements within the country. Security activities thereby primarily aim to protect weak regimes and bolster their sovereignty (Meyer 2010). Such a narrow conception is however problematic. On the one

hand, it makes the states' commitment and willingness to support the regional process largely depend upon the governments' particular strategic interests. On the other hand, by not directly meeting the human security needs of the population, regional security cooperation does not sufficiently address the root causes of insecurity and instability. It is therefore questionable to what degree it can effectively contribute to any sustainable solution of the current threats and challenges.

Conclusion

The performance and impact of Central African security cooperation are mainly challenged by governance problems, both at the member states' and regional level. Whereas ECCAS's centralized institutional structure gives all decision-making power and responsibilities to the states, their governments only show limited political will to put into practice and to support joint initiatives. Their commitment seems to be rather ad hoc and largely dependent upon particular strategic interests of political elites, especially the quest to stay in power. Such an approach to regional cooperation, however, makes comprehensive and sustainable solutions for the precarious security situation of Central Africa difficult to find and implement. However, with the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya, the regional power balance is about to be redefined. It is likely that more partly frozen conflict lines will re-emerge, with a further impact on the situation in the CAR. This challenges any achievements made so far by FOMUC and MICOPAX.

The willingness of MICOPAX contributing states has been decreasing over the years. Frustration over results, as well as changing strategic priorities, made even states like Gabon that were one of the initiators and strong supporters of FOMUC, more and more reluctant. Also, Angola has never deployed the promised police contingent. Burundi, a strong supporter of the AMISOM mission in Somalia, which is providing more than 4,000 soldiers, has never sent any troops to the CAR (Guicherd 2012). Troops have showed less and less commitment, especially when it comes to moving into rebel-controlled areas (ICG 2011b). The developments and power change in the CAR in 2013 have however called for a prolongation of MICOPAX's mandate. Once again, much is depending upon the states' political commitment, as well as the international community's continuous support.

For regional cooperation in Central Africa to contribute to peace and security in an appropriate and sustainable way, promoting a twofold integrative approach appears to be a viable solution. First, local populations and the civil society as their representatives must be sufficiently involved in regional decision-making so that policies and activities directly contribute to improving their situation. Their engagement can indeed be crucial, especially to moderate the predominance of states and their interests within the process and introduce a complementary point of view and position. The role of the civil society in peace and security is more and more acknowledged at the Central African regional level.[24] Nevertheless, compared to other RECs, the possibilities and channels offered to these non-state stakeholders to influence the ECCAS's decision-making processes are limited. Also, whereas a significant difference between FOMUC and MICOPAX was initially seen in the introduction of a civilian component to the mission, the latter has not become fully operational as planned. If, without the direct involvement of the civil society, regional cooperation does not lead to a significant improvement of the population's security and living conditions, this may further imperil the region's fragile stability. Local people may be encouraged to protect themselves by forming self-defense militia, or even join rebel movements, which additionally challenges weak central authorities and makes whole areas ungovernable, such

as in the CAR (HRW 2007; ISS 2010).[25] Or their non-involvement may make civil society organizations turn against the regionalization process, which they consider as mainly influenced by the political elites' interests.

Second, an integrative approach to regional cooperation has to be built on strong coordination with the AU and other RECs. Strengthening inter-regional relations and collaboration is essential to ensure efficient partnerships and to reflect the trans-border and trans-regional dimension of insecurity.

A decade after the launch of regional peace and security cooperation in Central Africa, it remains to be seen to what degree such a comprehensive integrative regional approach is possible. A reorientation in this direction, however, appears crucial for overcoming the current problems and paralysis caused by intergovernmental governance and for paving the way towards a form of regional integration based on a principle of complementarity.

Notes

1 The "Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980–2000", backed by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), was drafted in April 1980 on a conference in Lagos, Nigeria, by African political leaders. Its major aim was to increase Africa's self-sufficiency. For this purpose, the plan envisaged the establishment of regional arrangements to promote economic development on the sub-regional level. In this perspective, ECCAS's initial mandate was to strengthen economic and social cooperation and self-sustained development "in order to achieve collective self-reliance, raise the standard of living of its peoples, increase and maintain economic stability, foster close and peaceful relations between member states and contribute to the progress and development of the African continent" (ECCAS 1983: Art. 4).

2 The other three priority fields, defined on the ECCAS ordinary summit in Malabo in June 1999 are the development of physical, economic and monetary integration; the development of a culture of human integration; and the establishment of an autonomous financing mechanism.

3 According to Article 10 of the Treaty establishing ECCAS, the Conference is to convene for ordinary sessions on an annual basis and for extraordinary sessions as needed. Up to now, this regularity has however not been respected and meetings have often been postponed. The last ordinary sessions took place in 2005, 2007, 2009, and in January 2012.

4 The abbreviations refer to the French names of these organs: Commission de défense et de sécurité (CDS), Mécanisme d'alerte rapide de l'Afrique centrale (MARAC) and Force multinationale de l'Afrique centrale (FOMAC). COPAX stands for Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité.

5 The MoU is established between the AU and the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), as well as the East Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM) and the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC), which are not managed by Regional Economic Communities. See: AU (2007: Art. 1, vii).

6 Interview with an EU representative in October 2010.

7 Translation by the author, from "Clôturant les travaux de la Conférence Kwanza 2010, Didier Etumba clame que 'La Fomac est une réalité vivante'!", L'Observateur (Kinshasa), Octobre 30, 2010 (by Luc-Roger Mbala Bemba). www.digitalcongo.net/article/71301 (accessed December 7, 2010).

8 Jean-Marie Nkambua, "Maintien de la Paix: La CEEAC se dote d'une force multinationale d'Afrique centrale (FOMAC)", L'avenir Quotidien, June 7, 2010.

9 This is to a large degree linked to the assistance provided by the European Union under the ECCAS Support Programme for Peace and Security in Central Africa (PAPS). PAPS has laid particular emphasis on assisting ECCAS in preparing the operation of MARAC, notably through the organization of workshops.

10 Peace consolidation mission in the CAR. The operation is also called Mission de Consolidation de la Paix du COPAX.

11 The Popular Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy/Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la République et la Démocratie (APRD) for instance has been occupying the territory between Ngaounday/ Bocaranga in the north west and Kaga-Bandoro/Kabo in the north (Spittales and Hilgert 2009).

12 According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, more than 192,500 people were internally displaced in January 2011. In addition, around 164,000 are living in refugee camps outside the country. See www.unhcr.org (accessed July 26, 2011).

13 Muammar Gaddafi played an active role in the CAR crises over the last ten years. He first sent regional troops under the aegis of CEN-SAD to support former CAR President Ange-Félix Patassé and prevent an invasion by Chad. After the regime change in the CAR in 2003, Gaddafi offered his support to the new president, François Bozizé, "who feared that Sudan would attempt to destabilize his country because of Khartoum's incursions in the northeast, in pursuit of Darfur rebels" (ICG 2011c: 3).

14 It can be assumed that again French interests stood behind the establishment of the force. Indeed, on the one hand, there had been a political change in France in 2002, with the comeback of a right-wing government favouring a more active role in Africa. On the other hand, Paris disapproved the ties that CAR President Ange-Félix Patassé had developed with Libya's Colonel Gaddafi and the deployment of troops from CEN-SAD, funded by Tripoli and partly under Libyan command, in March 2002 (Esmenjaud 2011; Mays 2011).

15 According to Romain Esmenjaud, who refers to information from a French diplomat, if one takes all expenses into account, including the logistical support offered by Boali [some 240 French troops still maintained in the CAR], the former colonial power still covered 60 percent of the budget of the mission in 2008 (Esmenjaud 2011: 14).

16 The main joint military exercises were "Biyongho 2003", organized in July 2003 in the region of Franceville in Gabon and "Barh-El-Gazel 2005" in November 2005 at Moussourou in Chad. Each manoeuvre included an initial planning meeting, a main conference and a debriefing.

17 The mandate however remains quite vague and fixes the mission's duration "until the horizon 2013" (jusqu'à l'horizon 2013) or "around 2013" ("aux environs de l'année 2013").

18 Overlapping membership is most evident in the case of the DRC that also belongs to SADC, the Economic Community of the Great Lakes (CEPGL) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).

19 Gabon's former President Omar Bongo has long tried to play the role of a regional leader. He has thus been a major driver behind the revival of ECCAS and the creation of FOMUC. These ambitions have, however, been undermined by those of Cameroon's President Paul Biya. Since Omar Bongo's death in June 2009, Gabon's ambitions as regional leader are less evident as the new President Ali Bongo is giving more importance to internal affairs. Angola's efforts to raise its importance in Central Africa primarily reflect its failure to play a more important role in southern Africa. They are subject to the country's competition with the Republic of South Africa over leadership in SADC, and follow the "big fish in a small pond" principle (UNDP 2008: 11). The DRC, whose geostrategic position, size, demographic weight and economic potential, would justify regional leadership, is still weakened by the post-conflict situation and the process of social, economic and political reconstruction.

20 The integration of Angola as a member in ECCAS has for long been challenged by repeated tensions with its neighbours, especially with the DRC over border disputes and the mutual expulsion of citizens. Moreover, Lusaka long disapproved the close relations between some Central African countries and France, and the influence that the former colonial power still exerts within the region.

21 The central role of these two countries in ECCAS and its creation is reflected by the fact that the headquarters is located in the Gabonese capital of Libreville and that the Congolese Louis Sylvain Goma has had three consecutive mandates as Secretary-General, which is more than foreseen by Article 21 of the ECCAS Treaty.

22 In March 2008, for instance, Déby invoked an extraordinary ECCAS summit in Kinshasa (DRC) and asked the other member states to officially denounce the failed rebel assault of one month earlier.

23 On the presumed more or less direct implication of some ECCAS member states in Bozizé's putsch, see ICG 2007: 16.

24 In January 2009, ECCAS Ssecretary-General, Louis Sylvain-Goma noted that "[t]oday, national security cannot be reserved for experts. It concerns all of us, as it is not only about ensuring state security but also the human security of populations. It is therefore natural that all are associated with the discussion

about priorities and means". Translation by the author of "Aujourd hui, la sécurité nationale ne peut être réservée aux experts. Elle est l'affaire de tous, puisqu'il s'agit non seulement d'assurer la sécurité de l'Etat, mais aussi la sécurité humaine des populations. Il est donc naturel que tous soient associés à la discussion de ses priorités et de ses moyens". In Discours d'ouverture du Secrétaire Général au séminaire sous régional sur la réforme des secteurs de la sécurité, January 14, 2009. www.ceeac-eccas.org/index.php?rubrique=documentation&cat=6&id=230 (accessed July 26, 2009).

25 This has, for instance, been the case for APRD.

PART IV

External influences

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CHINA'S ROLE IN AFRICAN SECURITY

Ian Taylor

Introduction

China has, in the past decade or so, emerged as an important contributor to United Nations peacekeeping operations, with Chinese peacekeepers serving in places as diverse as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, and Sudan. This is a major development in Sino–African relations and an important contribution to African security. Though China's stance on peace operations is closely tied to its attitude on state sovereignty, limiting the type of interventions that Beijing is prepared to sanction, Chinese policy in this regard is evolving. This study discusses why and how China's role in peacekeeping in Africa has played out and the likely directions this is to take in the future.

Since 1990, China has contributed over 7,000 peacekeepers to United Nations operations, and Chinese peacekeepers have served in places such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, and Sudan. In fact, China currently sends more peacekeeping troops abroad than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council. Wang Guangya, China's UN ambassador, has noted that "China is filling a vacuum left by the West. The major powers are withdrawing from the peacekeeping role. That role is being played more by small countries. China felt it is the right time for us to fill this vacuum" (*Washington Post,* November 24, 2006). The most remarkable feature of China's "flurry of UN peacekeeping" efforts in the post–Cold War era has been its focus on the "domestic political scene" of the countries where the Chinese contribute to peace operations (James 1993: 359). This study discusses why and how this has played out as China has become more and more involved in peacekeeping operations in Africa.

The evolution of China's involvement in peace operations

According to He Yin (2007), there have been four phases in the evolution of Beijing's attitude toward peace operations. The first phase, lasting from 1971 to 1980, was characterized by inactivity if not outright hostility with respect to such missions. The second phase reflected a gradual change in attitude from 1981 to 1987. The third, from 1988 to 1989, saw Chinese cooperate in some UN peace operations while issuing a fair number of challenges toward others. The fourth, from 1999 onwards, is marked by greater and greater Chinese participation in operations, despite some remaining reservations on certain issues.

In the first phase, China avoided playing any role in UN peacekeeping missions and did not even contribute to their costs. We should remember, however, that China was the object of the first US-led enforcement mission sanctioned by the Security Council in 1951. Thereafter Beijing saw all UN interventions as superpower chicanery aimed at weaker states within the international system. This suspicion—compounded by the memory of the Korean War—lasted well past the era of Mao. Indeed, in 1990, then Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated that Beijing's reluctance to support the enforcement mission in Iraq sprang from the fact that "the Chinese people still clearly remember that the Korean War was launched in the name of the United Nations" (quoted in Kim 1995: 423). Consequently, "most of such UN actions were seen as interference in countries' internal affairs and as the undesirable result of US-Soviet hegemonic power competition" (Wang 1999: 70). What is more, the PRC was emerging from the Cultural Revolution at the time, so issues of Chinese diplomatic capacity within the UN system cannot be underestimated.

Conversely, upon joining the United Nations, China was often accused of free riding from the international community and avoiding its global responsibilities as a permanent member of the Security Council. Indeed, China was charged with being a group of one, uninterested in contributing to world order but reaping all the benefits of it (Kim 1995). It was not until the 1980s that Beijing's overall attitude toward the UN began to evolve. Interestingly, however, when China did begin to play a more active role, some in the West feared that it would represent the more conservative, old-fashioned opposition to those in favour of the evolving form of peacekeeping that was more forceful and involved potential interference in the domestic affairs of recipient nations.

While the traditional peacekeeping initially favoured by China may still have its place after the Brahimi Report—for example, in conflicts like the Ethiopian-Eritrean border war—it would not really work in contemporary civil wars, as exemplified by Darfur. Given that Chinese foreign policy has long been predicated on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which includes a strong normative commitment to non-interference, Beijing's increasing willingness to play an active role in peacekeeping missions is indeed intriguing. It has certainly begun to shape an aspect of China's Africa policy hitherto ignored by most commentators.

Initially, upon entering the United Nations in 1971, China maintained its vehement opposition to all peacekeeping operations, refusing to take part in Security Council votes on resolutions pertaining to peace operations and going so far as to refuse to pay the yearly peacekeeping contributions expected of it as a member of the Security Council. Contributing troops to peace operations was certainly out of the question: "Based upon Mao's theory of just war, China viewed peacekeeping as an act of superpower 'power politics', a pretext deployed to justify US or Soviet intervention in the affairs of small states" (Fravel 1996: 1104).

To trace the evolution in Chinese thinking more specifically, in 1981, as China's modernization project was continuing apace, China voted in favour of such peacekeeping resolutions as an extension of the UN mission in Cyprus and also began to disburse its annual peacekeeping contribution. It thereafter supported every resolution on UN peace operations from 1981 to 1990 (Morphet 2000). This policy change sprang from the adoption of an "independent foreign policy of peace" *(duli zizhu de heping waijiao zhengce)* which the CPC inscribed into the PRC's revised constitution at the Twelfth National Congress in 1982 and reflected policymakers' awareness that China needed a stable and peaceful world in which to realize its plans for economic development and modernization:

> "Peace" mean[t] that China began to formulate its foreign policy from the viewpoint of whether it [was] beneficial to international and regional peace instead of [to the

> pursuit of] military superiority, while "independence" mean[t] that China began to formulate its foreign policy according to its national interests and the common interests of peoples of all the countries in the world.
>
> *Xia Liping 2001: 18*

This included maintaining 'equidistant' relations with the United States and the Soviet Union as well as a "more positive [attitude toward] UN affairs" in general (Pang Zhongying 2005: 90).

Equally, the policy allowed China to pose as a counterbalance to the superpowers in the name of the developing world, where peace operations were most likely to take place. However, Beijing was still "stak[ing] out a particularly narrow interpretation of the international community's right to intervene . . . predicated upon an interpretation of sovereignty as a virtually sacred right of states" (Carlson 2006: 221).

Yet as the 1990s developed, Beijing reluctantly began to accept the development of trends in international politics that militated against this hard-line stance. According to a *China Daily* article by Wu Miaofa of the China Institute of International Studies (May 29, 2007), China changed its tack for three key reasons. First, Beijing became conscious of the fact that UN peacekeeping operations were "an important means of maintaining international peace and security", for although "many of the long-standing conflicts [could not] be permanently resolved by peacekeeping efforts alone . . . peacekeeping [could] alleviate crises and provide strong support for developing countries suffering from a lack of allies as well as their own weaknesses". Second, Wu noted that a Chinese analysis of peacekeeping operations "carried out from 1948 to 2000 showed that a total of 54 missions concerning 52 countries mostly involved developing nations". Since "some developing countries also joined peacekeeping operations, including seven African, six Asian, and six Latin American nations", and since "quite a few commanders of peacekeeping troops were from developing countries", China was, in Wu's view, motivated to change its policy by its self-image as the de facto leader of the developing world. Finally, as one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, China reassessed its position in the international system and concluded: "despite undesirable aspects, the current international order [could] drive the growth of productivity; it remain[ed] a long-term task to build a new international political and economic order; [and thus] China should join other developing countries in pushing the international political and economic order in a more sensible direction. This included using the UN peacekeeping mechanism" (ibid.).

As China's economic and political clout continue to grow, Chinese policymakers are also gaining confidence, which enables them to commit to selective involvement in international affairs. Peacekeeping is no exception.

The Chinese are also interested in gaining experience by participating in the UN and its peace operations (He Yin 2007). In fact, Drew Thompson (2005) identifies several important benefits China derives from taking part in UN peace operations. First, participation enhances Beijing's authority not only in regions where Chinese peacekeepers operate but also on the UNSC and among other voting members of the UN as well, not least those representing Africa—who are thus all the more likely to continue providing useful support in times of difficulty. Second, China's reputation as a responsible world power is enhanced by involvement in peace operations; as "the most self-conscious rising power in history . . . and is desperate to be seen as a benign force" (*Christian Science Monitor,* June 27, 2007). Third, by participating in peace operations, China increases its strategic presence in regions, particularly within Africa, whose resources may prove crucial for meeting China's energy needs.

Furthermore, as noted earlier, China is also filling a prominent vacuum left by Western members of the UNSC who contribute financially to peace operations but generally shy away

from committing significant troop numbers. As Bonny Ling (2007: 48) notes, "This has undoubtedly enhanced China's strategic positioning at the UN, especially since peacekeeping is the single most high-profile element of any UN activities on the ground".

China took part in its first UNPKO in 1988, having joined the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (UNSCPO) shortly after UN peacekeeping forces had received the Nobel Prize for Peace (Staehle 2006). The following year it sent non-military personnel to observe Namibia's general elections, and in 1990, it sent five military observers to join the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East. Later, in 1993, Beijing approved the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), not only financing a good part of the operation but also sending in a military unit. These moves represented a "significant departure from [China's] past behaviour in multilateral diplomacy for collective security purposes" (Wang 1999: 76). In fact, "since the early 1990s, the Chinese . . . [have] consistently finessed the meaning of these principles [regarding sovereignty] in order to create a rhetorical space for [their] acquiescence in various 'Western'-sponsored UN operations" (Carlson 2006: 218) as a way to break out of the temporary diplomatic isolation encountered after Tiananmen Square in 1989 (Roy 1998: 147–148).

Nevertheless, China remained cautious in its attitude toward peacekeeping, restating its opposition to the use of force whenever it overrode the sovereignty of a state. Beginning in the mid-1990s, "Beijing saw problems as the lines between peacekeeping and peacemaking became fuzzier; as expansion was accompanied by civilian missions concerned with human rights, refuges, and inspections; and as these missions had less-than-complete support from host nations" (Gill 2007: 116); in the words of one Western academic, it "seemed that an era might be dawning in which Western governments, freed from the constraints of the Cold War, would use their armies to save strangers in places far from home" (Wheeler 2000: 172). Consequently, China's

> involvement in UNTAC was not repeated in subsequent missions. This was partly due to [its] attitude toward the principles of state sovereignty and its concern about the use of force in peacekeeping operations. These issues only served to highlight the emerging contradictions and ambiguities with regard to China's position on the nature of peace operations.
>
> *Pang Zhongying 2005: 91*

As a result, China opposed features of Operation Provide Comfort in Iraqi Kurdistan, UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Yugoslavia, Operation Turquoise in Rwanda, and Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti—all by abstaining on the Security Council resolutions to authorize or expand them (Carlson 2006: 224). China was clearly taking a rearguard action against contemporary peace operations insofar as they involved military enforcement, while supporting traditional peacekeeping operations. It was, for all intents and purposes, a stance against "mission creep", which China believed meant that "the United Nations was becoming an instrument of 'hegemonism'" (Gill 2007: 116).

In the run-up to the first Gulf War (1990–1991), Beijing was supportive of Chapter VII resolutions concerning Iraq, though it expended a great deal of energy working to take out recommendations specifying military force (Staehle 2006). When the UN did approve Resolution 678, entailing the deployment of all necessary means including military force, China abstained. However, as part of its effort to rebuild its international image post-1989, Beijing continued to support traditional peacekeeping missions such as the 1994 UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), which it saw as demonstrating the efficacy of traditional peacekeeping; as a Chinese commentary put it:

> The experience of ONUMOZ has proved that as long as the two parties to the conflict are sincere about resolving their problems through negotiations and unswervingly implement the agreements reached by the parties, it is highly possible for them, with the help of the international community, to end yesterday's suffering and open up a new vista.
>
> *quoted in Choedon 2005: 43*

However, China had more difficulty determining what to do when said parties resisted the implementation of peace agreements.[1] China has in general opposed deviation from Chapter I (Article 4 of which opposes the use of force "against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state") and Chapter VI of the UN Charter that requires from peacekeeping operations impartiality of the peacekeeping forces, the consent of the parties involved in the dispute, the use of means other than force to keep the peace, and the prior agreement to a ceasefire between the parties concerned. These remain the legal basis for China's support for peacekeeping operations, and, naturally, their violation forms the basis for Chinese opposition.[2]

Yet it should be noted that one of China's first peacekeeping roles in Africa involved support of the United Task Force (UNITAF) and its UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). UNOSOM was organized to monitor the ceasefire between warlords, despite the fact that they were still engaging in violence and that humanitarian assistance was under threat from looting and abuse by their militias.

It was the interception of humanitarian aid that led to the authorization of the UNITAF mission under Chapter VII. China supported UNITAF but made clear that it considered the situation exceptional, as anarchy was raging in the absence of any government in Mogadishu—a key point as far as it was concerned. Beijing's position was influenced by the fact that it "did not want to be perceived as obstructionist by casting vetoes on Somalia-related UNSC resolutions and hindering humanitarian assistance. This was especially true since it already had a bad image abroad, especially in the West, following the 1989 Tiananmen incident" (He Wenping 2007: 29).

Once UNITAF had completed its mission, Beijing supported UNOSOM II, again under Chapter VII and again on the grounds that Somalia constituted a temporary exception and that normal peacekeeping operations should be resumed as soon as possible. However, once fighting between UN troops and Somali militias began—culminating in the infamous Black Hawk Down incident—China backtracked. For instance, the *Beijing Review* asserted that "the torturous experience in Somalia has taught the lesson that peacekeeping must be limited to peacekeeping. The internal affairs of one country can be solved only by the people of that country. The efforts of the international community can only be helpful or supplementary" (quoted in Fravel 1996: 1114). Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Li Zhaoxing likewise stated that "the fundamental and effective way to settle the Somali question is by peaceful means. Resort to coercive military actions will only serve to complicate matters" (ibid.: 1113–1114).

Crucially, the Mogadishu debacle resulted in a de facto refusal by Washington to get involved in efforts to stop the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. While the United States and other Western powers have been (rightly) lambasted for resisting calls to intervene, criticism of China, which was equally resistant to getting involved, has been muted.[3] In fact, it was only in June 1994 that a multinational force was authorized under Chapter VII to stabilize the situation (although the French actually started deploying before the Resolution was passed). The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) did not reach the military numbers it required to deploy until much later. China abstained from the vote, even though the resolution authorizing the Chapter VII mandate emphasized the temporary and unique nature of the mission, on the

grounds that the mission did not have the approval of all parties involved in the fighting—granting the *genocidaires* an implicit veto on the vote to stop their butchering.

In May 1997, China agreed in principle to contribute to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). However, that same year, it was active in warning against the intrusion into the domestic affairs of African countries under the guise of peace operations; it backed the establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) but expressed concern that the military element of the mission might get drawn into issues that should by rights concern other UN departments. Wang Xue Xian, China's UNSC representative, stated at the time that "as a principle, the Security Council should not get involved in those activities which fall under the terms of reference of other United Nations bodies" and that "China had reservations on certain elements of the draft resolution and on aspects of the observer mission's mandate" (quoted in United Nations Security Council 1997).

China had similar concerns with the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), which aimed to stabilize and restructure the republic's military. In a vote to extend MINURCA's mandate, China's UNSC representative, Lin Chengxun, while supportive, observed that although

> the mission had played a great role and . . . demonstrated that the Security Council could do concrete work for African countries and people . . . reforms, especially the restructuring of the armed forces, [are] the internal affairs of a country. Therefore, the Council should not intervene too much in that area.
>
> *quoted in United Nations Security Council 1999*

The events in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999 particularly worried Beijing as NATO's air campaign served to flag for Chinese policymakers the dangers of non-UN-mandated interferences in domestic affairs. Beijing was absolutely against the NATO campaign, deeming the whole exercise deeply problematic if not ominous. Indeed, after the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was hit by NATO missiles on May 7, 1999, indignant, anti-Western nationalism proved difficult to contain. The view from China's capital was that the United States—the main organizer and contributor of the coalition—was bent on enforcing its vision of proper global order on the rest of the world, even if the attainment of this goal required armed aggression (Dreyer 2000: 3).

Yet the Kosovo campaign may have served as a positive catalyst for changes in China's policies, as "the shock of [it] and especially the embassy bombing compelled Chinese strategists to seek new ways to ensure Chinese influence over the methods and processes of international intervention" (Gill and Reilly 2000: 48). This shift helps explain China's support for a 1999 mandate for the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to implement a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program, support elections, and smooth the transfer of aid to the country (Staehle 2006: 41). UNAMSIL was authorized under Chapter VII to ensure the safety of its personnel and to defend civilians but acknowledged the rights and responsibilities of the government of Sierra Leone, which in turn fully supported the mission. Thus China was likewise more than willing to support it. Protecting the distribution of humanitarian aid and patrolling strategic locations within Sierra Leone were clearly compatible with China's stance on peacekeeping.

In subsequent missions, China collaborated on peace-support operations in DRC, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Burundi, and the Sudan (as we will see), since they all explicitly limited military force to the defence of UN personnel and civilians in impending danger and "interference" in domestic affairs was not an issue. In short, China agreed to peace-support operations with elements of peace enforcement, provided they were carefully restricted.

However, as the UNSC has adopted an increasingly broad interpretation of what constitutes a threat under Chapter VII, China's position has become increasingly complicated.[4] Beijing still insists on securing the blessing of the host country before authorizing operations based on human-rights infringements. Thus China unambiguously supported the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), which was created with Kinshasa's approval after the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in 1999. MONUC is authorized under Chapter VII to take the necessary measures to improve security in North and South Kivu and the Ituri district, where the UNSC has identified serious human-rights abuses. Importantly for China, the Congolese government was a key signatory of the original agreement for the cessation of hostilities in DRC and hence a willing host nation of MONUC—however limited in practical terms its reach may have been in the areas in question. China's position relied on the literal definition of "host nation" *(dangshi guo)* used in its Defence White Paper of 2002 (a revision of the 1998 White Paper), namely "the state that is a party" (Information Office of the State Council 2002). This definition suggests that the consent of all parties to UN involvement is not absolutely necessary, a qualification that is important "where state authority is either highly disputed or effectively nonexistent", as in the case of DRC (Gill and Reilly 2000: 44).

In stark contrast is the case of Darfur, where Beijing opposed initial efforts to involve outsiders in improving the security conditions. Thus, whereas the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) had functioned in southern Sudan since early 2005, it took considerable efforts—often in the teeth of Chinese opposition—for a mission to be sent to operate in Darfur. Initially, only a somewhat lacklustre effort by the African Union was allowed by Khartoum, with Beijing continually backing up the Sudanese refusal to allow a more intrusive and fully international mission. This continued even after it became clear that the African Union's ability to defend Darfurians was negligible, as Beijing continued to insist it would back peace-support operations only with an invitation from the host country.[5]

However, since late 2006 Beijing began to exhibit an increased willingness to engage with the international community on Darfur and started to apply pressure on Khartoum to modify its behaviour and engage in a political process for the peaceful resolution of the Darfur conflict. This change in policy by Beijing was mainly due to overwhelming international criticism of China's role in Sudan and the increasing reputational costs that Beijing was experiencing by being closely associated with Khartoum. Subsequently, Beijing voted for UNSC Resolution 1769 that created a hybrid United Nations African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). While it was the case that China at times went along with the Sudanese government's opposition to its full implementation, by mid-June 2008, Hu Jintao strongly urged Sudan to cooperate in allowing the deployment of peacekeeping forces into Darfur as part of UNAMID, clearly indicating that the limits of Chinese patience had been reached. Indeed, in a meeting with Sudan's vice-president, Ali Uthman Muhammad Taha, Hu was reported to have used unusually frank language in calling on Khartoum to try harder to settle the conflict in Darfur. This was in the context whereby 26,000 peacekeepers were supposed to have been deployed in Darfur, but no more than half that number had arrived on the ground by mid-2008, mainly due to intransigence by Khartoum. According to one report:

> Hu's comments and their prominent publication . . . are part of an increasingly open Chinese diplomatic campaign to persuade Sudanese leaders to cooperate more with international efforts to end the fighting in Darfur. . . . China has come under criticism from human rights activists for failing to pressure Khartoum forcefully enough [and] the official portrayal of [the] meeting was seen as a departure from China's usual style of quiet diplomacy and ritual proclamations of friendship.
>
> *Washington Post, June 13, 2008*

Thus there has been a clear movement in China's position on peacekeeping operations—one which has departed from the hard-and-fast defence of sovereignty and non-interference which is usually characterized as marking out Chinese foreign policy.[6]

Incongruity but also development

China has long been circumspect about intervening in other countries' affairs even when sanctioned by the United Nations and remains suspicious that the UNSC authorizes Chapter VII mandates too readily.[7] However, as Beijing has emerged as an economic superpower it has been compelled to embark on a change of direction in some aspects of its foreign policy. One such shift is from an absolute refusal to support peace operations under any circumstances to a permanent commitment to doing so. China is now a major contributor of UN peacekeepers, most of whom are in Africa (three-quarters of all Chinese personnel deployed under the UN serve in Africa). It also maintains two training facilities for peacekeeping personnel—one in Nanjing, in Jiangsu province, and the other in Langfang, in Hebei. In August 2007 it was announced that Major-General Zhao Jingmin would be appointed force commander for MINURSO, making him the first Chinese national to head a UN mission (*Xinhua,* August 28, 2007).

In many ways, Beijing has had international leadership pushed upon it. As China's economy has exponentially expanded and its trade profile has increased across the globe, expectations that Beijing would (and should) play a greater role in international relations has been almost axiomatic. Furthermore, in considering questions of domestic security, "China has gradually realized that peacekeeping missions can help to secure a peaceful international environment, which works in China's national interest as the country begins to build a sound external environment for its long-term economic growth and social development" (Pang Zhongying 2005: 97).

China's increased profile, particularly in Africa, has led to criticism—including charges of neo-colonialism—that Beijing's foreign policy makers are attempting to counteract. Acutely aware of its global reputation, China is taking part in peace operations as one way to project a more benign and even positive image. As Dai Shao'an, vice-director of the Peacekeeping Affairs Office of the Ministry of Defence, has put it, "wherever they go or whatever they do, [Chinese peacekeepers] always bear in mind that they are messengers of peace, representing China. . . . To win hearts and minds, you need to devote your own hearts and minds, and that is exactly what our peacekeepers are doing" (*China Daily,* July 24, 2007). A Chinese academic agrees that

> active participation [in peace operations] is a demonstration of China's commitment to the UN and its security functions as mandated by the UN Charter. It is not only useful for serving China's moral cause or fulfilling its international responsibility in the post–Cold War era. It also provides an arena in which China can learn to interact with the international community in ways commensurate with its status as a rising power.
>
> *Pang Zhongying 2005: 87*

Playing a role in Africa is particularly important for China, explains Elizabeth Economy from the Council on Foreign Relations, as it attempts to reassure the world that it is not motivated solely by its need for resources: "It has a number of reputational risks. Being seen as a force for peace and security is an important and good first step" (quoted in *Washington Post*, November 24, 2006).

Beijing is now steadily constructing a reputation for being at the forefront of conflict resolution in Africa—even if the numbers it actually contributes to various peace operations is small.[8]

In fact, China has been relatively successful in projecting a positive diplomatic image vis-à-vis peace operations in Africa, earning the praise of various African commentators. Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, for instance, commended China for supporting Liberia in its peacekeeping, asserting that "Liberians will never forget the friendship of Chinese peacekeeping soldiers" (*People's Daily,* February 1, 2007).

Interestingly, it was the Chinese who urged other nations to support the deployment of peacekeepers to Somalia during a UNSC mission to Addis Ababa in June 2006—"the first time [China] had taken the lead in the fifteen nation council in promoting foreign intervention to resolve a conflict thousands of miles from its own borders" (*Washington Post,* November 24, 2006). According to Chinese reports, African governments pressed China to raise the issue with the Council. However, Princeton Lyman—a former US ambassador with expertise on Sino–African ties—has a more prosaic view, namely that China is seeking to score diplomatic points by supporting vital regional allies such as Ethiopia, which had itself sent thousands of troops to Somalia to protect the official interim government (*Washington Post,* November 24, 2006).

Conclusion

It appears that an increasingly important aspect of China's African policy involves peacekeeping. Where it will lead remains open to question. The lack of strategic trust between China and many Western countries with regard to military involvement—including peacekeeping—around the world, not least in Africa, is problematic.[9] China is highly sceptical about the motives behind much Western interest in peace operations and understandably rejects US leadership at the UN and/or US interpretation of international relations.[10] China has always couched its concerns in terms of hegemony, and there is little evidence to suggest it will do otherwise in future. Indeed, following the NATO military strikes against Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999, one Chinese commentator wrote, that "Hegemonism and power politics are still developing, and there will be no peace under heaven in the twenty-first century" (*Liaowang,* May 17, 1999). Wang Jincun, a senior researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences similarly asserted in an article titled "Global Democratization—Camouflage of US Hegemony" that

> what deserves more attention is that the United States, not yet satisfied with its Cold War achievements, seeks to gain more advances through military means. . . . The military interference by the United States in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the bombing against Sudan and Afghanistan, and especially the ongoing air strikes against Yugoslavia serve as prominent examples.
>
> *Xinhua, May 27, 1999*

China remains resolute in its opposition to actions it perceives as interferences in the internal affairs of other states, and it will not assent to peace operations—let alone take part in them—without the agreement of the sovereign host government, however weak its rule may be.[11] Notes Tony Saich (2001: 275), "By and large, China is an empire with a Westphalian concept of the nation-state trying to operate in an increasingly multilateral world". This view of sovereignty has arguably often eclipsed China's perception of its responsibilities as a global power. Moreover, it has laid China open to charges of hypocrisy on the subject of non-interference.

For instance, in February 1999, China used its veto to prevent the continuation of the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) because the host country, Macedonia, had recently established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Yet in 2004, Beijing dispatched a large contingent of police officers to the US Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which likewise

maintained official ties with Taiwan. Such contradictions may be examples of the maturing of Chinese foreign policy.

The Chinese share the prevalent suspicion among developing countries regarding the motives behind potential interventions by foreign powers, especially the United States and ex-colonial powers. Thus they often take the position that, "in interventions carried out in the name of 'humanitarianism' . . . what the interveners themselves were concerned about [was] not humanitarianism per se but their own interests" (Qin Xiaocheng 2003: 168). Interestingly, in so doing, they echo Peter Baehr's claim that "'humanitarian intervention' is a misnomer. It would be far better to speak of the use of military force for (allegedly) humanitarian purposes" (Baehr 2004: 34). But such analyses—whether by Chinese or Western commentators—fail to generate insight into the rationale behind any given intervention. What is required in each case is an investigation into the claims that motivated the intervention and a methodical scrutiny of the endorsement of so-called humanitarianism. Both are sadly lacking.

A Chinese source, quoting a former deputy permanent representative to the UN, Shen Guofang, reminds us of Beijing's central tenet with respect to peacekeeping, namely that it should always observe "the principles of respect for state sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, fairness and neutrality, [and] non-use of force except for self-defence [as well as obtain] prior consent from parties concerned" (*People's Daily,* October 21, 1999). Ambassador Zhang Yishan, at the 2006 Session of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, reiterated that any UN mission must "fully respect the views of the parties concerned and strictly preserve neutrality" (*Xinhua,* February 27, 2006). Let us remember that the Chinese government once described the Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations as an attempt to create "a US-controlled headquarters of international gendarmes to suppress and stamp out the revolutionary struggles of the world's people" (quoted in Foot 1995: 239). While such rhetoric has been muted in the post-millennium, the suspicion that Washington seeks to use the UN as a vehicle to project its interests and policies is still held by Beijing—and resonates in many African capitals as well.

There are of course tangible rewards for the Chinese military in taking part in peacekeeping operations:

> The PLA and PAP [People's Armed Police] . . . directly benefit from involvement in UN peacekeeping operations. First, participation enhances training and skills that promote the modernization of the PLA and PAP. Second, deployment provides the opportunity to field-test equipment and methods, gain firsthand experience in the field, and assess the capabilities of other nations deploying or supporting the mission. Third, as China's gross domestic product rises, [its] share of UN contributions increases, arguing for greater involvement in operations and greater reimbursement for deployments from UN coffers.
>
> *Thompson 2005: 9*

Indeed, speaking at the closing ceremony of the four-day PLA Peacekeeping Work Conference in Beijing in June 2007, Major-General Zhang Qinsheng, deputy chief of the general staff of the PLA, revealed that

> active participation in the UN peacekeeping operations is . . . an important measure to display China's image of being a peace-loving and responsible big country and likewise an important avenue to get adapted to the needs of the revolution in military affairs in the world and enhance the quality construction of the army.
>
> *PLA Daily, June 22, 2007*

Thus it happily meets a key criterion of Chinese political engagement with Africa—namely that China is seen as a friend of the continent—which means that China's visibility in African peace operations is only likely to grow.

In sum, China's stance on peace operations is intimately bound up with its position on state sovereignty—both of which have, however, evolved over time (Sutter 2008: 117–118):

> China's attitudinal change to peacekeeping can be seen as part of the process of state socialization. . . . [P]articipation is an important learning or socializing process [for any] member of an international community. As this learning process continues, we should see a less passive and more active China that needs to craft its own strategies for participation in international affairs in the future.
>
> *Pang Zhongying 2005: 98*

According to Allen Carlson, "this process . . . aptly labelled 'norms diffusion' . . . led to the emergence within China of more open, flexible interpretations of sovereignty's role in international politics" (2006: 218). However, there are limits to Beijing's flexibility:

> Although China can be flexible in normative principles like state sovereignty and non-intervention. . . . [it] is aware that its flexibility regarding these norms may be a "double-edged sword". On the one hand, when properly used, flexibility can provide Beijing with more diplomatic options for dealing with international affairs, prevent unnecessary conflicts with other powers, and yield a favourable environment for its development strategy. On the other hand, when overexploited, it [does] not only jeopardize China's strategic interests regarding state sovereignty (especially the Taiwan Question) but also damages its image as a peace-loving power, especially in the eyes of the developing world.
>
> *He Yin 2007: 57*

Paradoxically, as the more Beijing becomes enmeshed in global activities, the more it perceives pressures that need to be managed. In fact, it could be argued that Chinese policy toward UN peace operations is largely decided by Beijing's evolving assessment of the global security situation in relation to its national interests as much as by new thinking on sovereignty:

> China's enhanced national strength and its improved status within the international environment provide [the] . . . resources and political currency that enable it to adopt an active policy on [UN peace operations]. The aims of such a policy are to sustain its core national interests—including the maintenance of its role as a responsible power, strengthening the UN regime, and sharing common concerns regarding peace and security.
>
> *He Yin 2007: 14*

Relatedly, we could argue that Beijing's increasing acceptance of international responsibility as defined by transnational actors like the UN and as reflected in Beijing's emerging status as a contributor to peace operations indicates broader changes in China's political economy. As the Chinese economy becomes more and more integrated into and influenced by the global capitalist system, the CPC is able to identify new, if indirect, sources of political legitimacy. This trend has spurred a "domestic hunger in China for global linkages [that has] brought down institutional

impediments to transnational relations and weakened the state's control over its citizens, resources, and sovereignty" (Zweig 2002: 268).

A peaceful international environment is attractive in this regard. Hu Jintao's concept of *hexie shijie* (*China Daily,* September 16, 2005) is grounded in the recognition that an interdependent, "harmonious world" is a precondition for China's peaceful development (see Yee 2008). This new understanding of the international milieu, which relies on flexible definitions of state liability and legitimacy, reflects not only the transformation in Beijing's international relations (Zhao Quansheng 1996) but also that of the Chinese state itself: "Such thinking serves as a guideline for China's active participation in international efforts and contribution to international peace and security", including UNPKOs (He Yin 2007: 54). While the Chinese remain leery of intervention, they now also accept it as part of the post–Cold War world order. In this sense, "China is no longer so much of an outlier when compared with other states in the international system" (Carlson 2006: 234). However, this "cautious acceptance and incremental evolution" in Beijing's attitude toward UNPKOs (Carlson 2006: 224) is a function of Chinese policymakers' attempts to control the terms of intervention, however imprecise they may be. This fact makes the study of Chinese contributions to peace operations on the continent particularly important.

Beijing is resistant to processes whose definitions of sovereignty are out of its control—particularly if they are being shaped by Western powers.[12] As Foot has pointed out:

> The nature of the international regime in question, especially its level of intrusiveness and the extent to which it might erode strategic independence, threaten political control, or actually enhance China's power, has influenced Beijing's compliance and involvement for reasons that have become familiar in studies of Chinese foreign policy behaviour.
>
> *Foot 2001: 14*

In short, Beijing is flexible on sovereignty so long as it is in a position to help define the terms of the debate but not so long as they are decided by Washington or by a General Assembly vote that it cannot veto. This stance was clear with respect to the Darfur issue.

In other words, the PRC is strongly against the establishment of new norms on such issues. As for international humanitarian law, "China complies as best it can when it is in its interest to do so but [otherwise] uses whatever techniques at its disposal to resist intrusion into its domestic arena" (Lee 2007: 452). On this score, "whether China is significantly different . . . from other countries is doubtful" (Peerenboom 2005: n. 18).

The reality of Chinese self-interest has important implications not only for China's involvement in peace operations in Africa but also, sometimes unfortunately, for African peoples—Darfurians being the most recent and graphic example. Controlling the terms of the debate on sovereignty in ways that protect Chinese interests remains key to China's stance on intervention and, by extension, peacekeeping. Thus, while China has moved away from absolute repudiation of peace operations to a more responsible point of view that allows limited peace operations, it continues to insist on the express permission of the recipient state or host government.[13] Given the instability of many African states, such insistence is highly problematic and in Sudan certainly delayed the sending of peacekeepers to Darfur long after they were needed.

Yet, responsibility for Africa's domestic conflicts lie more with Africa than with China, a fact that may have an interesting impact on the development of Chinese policies toward Sub-Saharan Africa in particular:

> As China becomes involved in volatile regions in its peacekeeping, Beijing will be drawn into conflicts and post-conflict situations and will be forced to think through a

> coherent policy regarding how such conflicts start and why. This will inevitably have implications for how Beijing regards the make-up of African states.[14]

In sum we might say that China's attitude toward peace operations has finally been normalized, such that "the contribution of personnel [to UNPKOs is] more of a routine action . . . than an exceptional policy move" (Carlson 2006: 230). How Beijing navigates the African milieu as its involvement in peace operations in Africa deepens will be of great interest to observers of African security.

Notes

1 Interview with Pentagon official, Washington, DC, United States, April 5, 2007.
2 Interview with Zhou Yuxiao, Chinese ambassador, Monrovia, Liberia, November 20, 2009.
3 Interview with British diplomat, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 15, 2007.
4 Interview with Pentagon official, Washington, DC, United States, April 5, 2007.
5 Interview with Chinese diplomat, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 15, 2007.
6 Interview with Zhou Yuxiao, Chinese ambassador, Monrovia, Liberia, November 20, 2009.
7 Interview with Shu Zhan, Chinese ambassador, Asmara, Eritrea, June 29, 2006.
8 Interview with military attaché, Western embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 15, 2007.
9 Interview with military attaché, Western embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 15, 2007.
10 Interview with Shu Zhan, Chinese ambassador to Eritrea, Asmara, Eritrea, June 29, 2006.
11 Interview with Zhou Yuxiao, Chinese ambassador, Monrovia, Liberia, November 20, 2009.
12 Interview with Shu Zhan, Chinese ambassador to Eritrea, Asmara, Eritrea, June 29, 2006.
13 Interview with Zhou Yuxiao, Chinese ambassador, Monrovia, Liberia, November 20, 2009.
14 Interview with Naison Ngoma, African Union official, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 15, 2007.

23

COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY VERSUS COMPETING INTERESTS

The EU's Africa policy on a balancing act

Belachew Gebrewold

Introduction

Military security alone has become increasingly inadequate. Thus, international cooperation tries to address different forms of security, such as military, economic, environmental, health, and political security. The European Security Strategy (ESS), adopting this inclusive approach to security, underlines five key security threats: terrorism, WMD, failed states, organized crime and regional conflicts. Linked to these, according to the ESS, there are four priority areas for cooperation: peace and security, governance and human rights, trade and integration, and development. This is envisioned in the EU security strategy as a comprehensive security (CS) approach, which consists of military intervention, supporting political reform, economic cooperation and development aid, and environmental issues, such as climate change and desertification. The objective of this chapter is to explore how comprehensive the EU's CS concept in Africa actually is.

There is tension between the CS approach and one more narrowly grounded in national security. Governance and human rights in Africa increasingly have been displaced by a growing counter-terrorism agenda. Abdel Hakim Belhaj, commander of anti-government forces in Tripoli before Ghaddafi was killed, said he was taken to Libya to be tortured in an MI6 (and CIA) operation in 2004, after being arrested in Bangkok on suspicion of terrorism (Gardham 2011). Because of Ethiopia and Kenya's role in the war against terrorism, the UK and EU are unwilling to criticize their democracy deficit, human rights violations, and elections-related violence. After Ethiopia's rigged elections in 2005 and 2010, the EU remained silent regarding any negative developments in the practical application of the legal and electoral framework. The electoral process fell short of international commitments for elections and transparency (EUEOM 2010). Moreover, the EU has also been serving as an instrument for former colonial powers to promote their own specific national concerns (Olsen 2009: 250).

To what extent is the EU's Africa policy a comprehensive security (CS) approach? Are there any systemic constraints to it? Is the EU willing and able to conduct its policy according to objectives and principles of CS? Does the EU have the power to put pressure on major actors, such as France and the UK, so that they adjust their Africa policies according to CS principles

and objectives? This chapter attempts to explain how factors in the EU, as well as in Africa, define and delimit the comprehensive security concept.

On the theoretical level, the chapter compares the concept of "comprehensive security" to the *realpolitik* of national interests, and it shows how national interests determine the fate of a CS approach. Then, it analyzes the various components of CS: socio-economic, military, political, and ecological security. The chapter also adopts a regional framing. From there, it continues with the intra-African and Euro-African determinants of CS, mainly focusing on the EU, France, and the UK. It concludes with a short summary.

Comprehensive security versus national interest

What is security? Which aspects of daily life belong to it? Among international relations (IR) scholars there is a debate over whether to widen what we mean by security. Stephen Walt in his article "The Renaissance of Security Studies", warned of disciplinary chaos if the concept of security was broadened to include non-military issues, such as: poverty, AIDS, environmental hazards, drug abuse, pollution, disease, child abuse, or economic recessions, lest security studies become academically irrelevant (Walt 1991: 213). According to Walt, such an approach would destroy the intellectual coherence of security studies and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems. Hence he suggests limiting security studies to strategic studies, e.g. military relations between states, nuclear issues, etc. (cf. Smith 1999: 72).

Realists equate security with military security. For offensive realists, security is about the accumulation of power by expanding and exploiting opportunities whenever they are present, since only powerful states are secure (Mearsheimer 2001; Zakaria 1998; Glaser 1997: 175–177). In contrast, according to defensive realists, states attempt to protect and preserve their own security (Jervis 1978: 186; Tang 2009: 588), and do not have incentives for expansion for fear of the security dilemma (Taliaferro 2000–2001: 129). They will, instead, attempt to maintain their relative position vis-à-vis others (Grieco 1988: 500). Security becomes equivalent to military security, i.e. defense of the nation's existence and its vital interests (Michael 2009: 687). Accordingly, security becomes a guarantor of national identity and maintains the existence of a national entity (Michael 2009: 688). Structural realists argue that states seek security because of the anarchic nature of the international system (Waltz 1979). Tang understands security from the point of view of survival interests. For him "a state's security environment is good when it faces a low probability of war and its chance of prevailing is high even if there is a war". Consequently, the regional or global security environment is good when the chance of war spreading is low (Tang 2004: 3–4). Realists, therefore, although they have differences among themselves, all focus on a country's military power in explaining security.

Liberals in IR theory have a more expansive framework for defining and explaining security. For Liberals security encompasses economic, cultural, and environmental wellbeing. States have to provide their citizens with welfare, culture, education, and economic growth (Maoz 2003: 25–27). This informs the basic concept of comprehensive security. This framework is increasingly used to understand security in the developing world.

Whereas developed democratic states usually expect security threats from outside, developing states experience security threats mainly within their boundaries (Frisch 2002: 162; Ayoob 1991). However, this external–internal division has become increasingly inappropriate for understanding the contemporary security threats and the causes of conflict. This is because, political, military or economic threats easily, rapidly and increasingly cross borders, or have some causes beyond national borders. Accordingly, since many challenges to states or individuals cannot be solved by individual states, collective security has become an important international agenda. Collective

security directly challenges the "Realist" or power politics approach to international relations (Howard 1981: 73–94). The international community, at least in principle, intends to deal with threats to international peace and security collectively, because a breakdown of the peace anywhere threatens the peace everywhere (Butfoy 1993: 490f). The CS approach builds on the liberal tradition, but goes farther.

From the common security approach, it is increasingly argued that state/military centric approaches ought to give ground to more holistic perspectives (Butfoy 1993: 502). Accordingly, the security concept is being increasingly expanded. "Instead of security for governments, let us consider security for the peoples of the world" (Falk 1987: 222). For Booth, security is more than survival (being alive); security is living (Booth 2007: 107). Security is survival-plus; the plus being some freedom from life-determining threats, and therefore the space to make choices (Booth 2007:102). Security is not only about freedom from immediate physical threats or direct violence. Security cannot be separated from sustainable environment, health, education, employment, freedom of expression, equality of opportunities, etc. (Biscop 2005: 7). It is about freedom from structural violence (Galtung 2003). Booth, therefore, suggests that security studies should be able to deal with the most basic questions of people, rather than maintain a state-centric position (Booth 2007: 169–170).

The Human Security Report (HSR) of the UN identifies the following human security threats: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security threats (UN 2009). Human security attempts to put more focus on the security of individuals and communities, by combining human rights and human development, rather than on states and traditional military capabilities (Kaldor 2007: 182). According to Kaldor, there are five principles which elucidate this human security approach: the primacy of human rights (economic, social, political and civil rights); a legitimate authority that enjoys the trust of the population; the bottom-up approach (partnership, local ownership and participation); a regional focus since in most cases severe insecurity is located in regional clusters; and multilateralism (commitment to work with international institutions, common rules and norms) (Kaldor 2007: 185–190).

Tension between realist national security and the EU CS approach to Africa

The tension between the "Realist" school, with its focus on state security, and the more expansive approach to security is evident in the EU's Africa policy. The EU stresses the need to develop a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention, which seeks to integrate policies and action in the fields of security, development and democratic governance (EC 2006: 4). This comprehensive security approach emphasizes a holistic approach to security exemplified by conflict prevention and civil–military crisis management (Rieker 2006: 510). In practice, however, the CS approach is constrained by traditional realist impulses, in particular traditions of national security.

The EU in its ESS 2003 emphasized the urgency of effective multilateralism, which means rule-based international order, supported by cooperating international organizations and actors, with the UN as its leading authority. As Butfoy suggests, security in the international system ought to be seen as a shared and multidimensional phenomenon. It should include local, state, regional and global scales, and include several issue areas including defense, economics, and the environment (Butfoy 1993: 502).

To what extent are the comprehensive security concept and national interests compatible in EU–Africa relations? Despite repeated declarations supporting a multilateral approach, in practice it faces serious challenges. There is competition among global players in Africa. Former colonial powers often cherish special relationships with their former colonies, regardless of their

governance records. Finally, as Sicurelli (2010: 27) suggests "the EU has a multi-layered identity rather than a unitary identity".

Olsen argues that the different forms of EU interventions are guided more by European and member states' realist interests than their concerns for Africa (Olsen 2009: 246). Even as the EU claims ethical motivations, some self-interested motivations such as global prestige drive policy (Gegout 2009: 231; Manners 2008: 46). As well, states steer clear of conflicts where they do not see strategic, economic or prestige interests (Gegout 2009: 234). According to Gegout's realist interpretation of the EU's motivations in Africa, the national interests would involve: (1) powers intervening to safeguard their own security; (2) to enhances their trade relations with third states; (3) to promote their own prestige; and (4) to promote peace through peacekeeping at a limited risk (Gegout 2009: 232).

The EU's goal in its ESS 2003 is to change the world into what it conceives as a "global common good" through crisis management, peacekeeping, state-building, reconstructing failing states, strengthening justice (human rights) and effective multilateralism (Aggestam 2008: 1–2). How genuine is the EU's self-perception as a force for good and for advancing the global common good? To what extent is the EU the most important power of the world for establishing principles and applying them to different realities guided by those principles (Manners 2008: 59–60)?

These normative principles do not seem to be of a major significance. Hyde-Price argues that the EU should craft "its foreign and security policies on the basis of the common interests of its member states rather than pursuing normative or 'ethical crusades'" (Hyde-Price 2008: 29). For Hyde-Price, a normative agenda is feasible only where vital interests are not at stake in a structural-realist (anarchic) world, a world where states are concerned with their security and survival: states do not pursue normative agendas at the expense of their vital national interests. Hyde-Price argues that an "ethical power Europe" is, first, hypocritical since the EU pursues strategies that favor European economic, strategic or political interests. Second, it would reduce the EU to a weak and ineffective actor in an international system of competition defined by self-help and anarchy. Third, an ethical power Europe would lead the EU on moral crusades (Hyde-Price 2008: 30, 43–44).

Are realist politics compatible with the normative values that Europe claims to put at the center of its Africa policy? How does it affect the EU's CS principles? The following section addresses the different components of EU's comprehensive security strategy.

The different parts of the EU's Africa CS strategy

CS means promoting the well-being of individuals against different forms of threats that emerge from economic collapse, scarcity, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, the destruction of nature, terrorism, crime and disease (Booth 1991: 313–326). As discussed above, peace and security, governance and human rights, trade and regional integration, and development constitute the stated priority of the EU's Africa policy. Military security is just one aspect of EU–Africa relations; peace and security are predicated upon the political economy of environmental sustainability and development.

The EU–Africa strategic partnership underlines that comprehensive security presupposes sustainable development, intercontinental, regional and sub-regional cooperation, integration into the world economy, and international trade. The EU would, thereby, support (sub-) regional integration and development strategies and programs of the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs). In 2005, besides asymmetric and flexible implementation of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with Africa's regional groupings, the EU expressed

its commitment to increase aid for trade to €1 billion per year by 2010 (Consilium 2005a). The EU is already Africa's biggest trading partner with 45% of Africa's foreign trade, accounting for €144 billion, which is five times bigger than intra-African trade, which is about €29 billion a year.

Whereas the EU's development aid to Africa in 1985 was €5 billion, in 2003 it reached €15 billion. From the 10th European Development Fund budget of €22.7 billion for the period 2008–2013, 90% is to be allocated to Africa (Consilium 2005b). Based on programs signed (€1.5 billion) between African regions and the EC (EU Commission) for the period 2008–2013, following the allocations are planned: for Eastern and Southern Africa (€645m), West Africa (€598m), SADC (€116m), and Central Africa (€165m). Until 2010, €1 billion was mobilized through the European Commission Food Facility, of which approximately €560m is destined for Africa. The EC has mobilized over €45m for Agricultural Research in Africa and African sub-regional research organizations.

In different African states, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Chad, Central African Republic, Sudan, Guinea Bissau and Somalia, the EU's comprehensive security includes military aspects. The EU has strengthened the security dimension of its comprehensive security in Africa since Operation Artemis (2003) in the DRC. In the EU-AU joint strategy, the security dimension of the comprehensive security consists of rapid, coherent and decisive actions of crisis management, combat in crisis management operations, humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, disarmament operations, support for fighting terrorism, tackling conflict resources; sustaining peace in post-conflict situations; linking relief, rehabilitation and development; security sector reform (SSR), disarmament, demobilization, reintegration (DDR); addressing the proliferation of small, arms and light weapons (SALW); supporting African peace-support operations; and cooperation in the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The lead principle of the joint strategy is, "African solutions for African problems".

In order to support "African solutions for African problems", in 2004 the EU created the African Peace Facility (APF) to provide African peace making and peacekeeping operations with the resources for which the African Union or the RECs are in short supply. In 2008, the EU and AU launched the EURO-RECAMP or AMANI AFRICA, which is an CSDP (Common security and defense policy) instrument for Africa, as a Partnership for Peace and Security to ensure coherent support for the functioning of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (see Engel and Porto, Chapter 17). The three major areas of cooperation are: political dialogue, operationalization of the APSA, and predictable funding for PSO (Peace Support Operations). Through the APF, this priority area has been allocated about €100m for capacity building, i.e. the operationalization of APSA. The AU and African sub-regional organizations' PSO have been provided with €600m. Similarly, for the Early Response Mechanism (ERM) an amount of €15m has been earmarked to finance preparatory stages or initial steps of mediation, and approximately €40m for contingencies (unforeseen needs).

The EU has established an institutionalized dialogue with ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) to prevent and manage crises, regional stability, peacekeeping, peace building, address proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and security sector reform. For the period 2008–2013, within the Regional Indicative Program framework, the EU made an allocation of €597m for ECOWAS. One focal sector consists of deepening regional integration and improving competitiveness and Economic Partnership Agreements, which accounts for 70 percent of the sum (€418m). For the second focal sector (consolidation of good governance and regional stability), 20 percent is allocated (€119m), and for the other non-focal sectors 10% is allocated (€60m). The ECOWAS plan to transform the moratorium on Small Arms and Light

Weapons (SALW) into a binding convention was supported by €10m as of February 2005 from the 9th EDF (Consilium 2005b; Vines 2005).

Since 1 November 2004, the Economic and Monetary Union of Central Africa (CEMAC) peace support operations in the CAR has been financed from the African Peace Facility (APF) by almost €44.5m (Consilium 2005b). The EU provided AMIS (African Mission in Sudan) with Senior Police Advisors; supported in-mission training of CIVPOL by a group of EU trainers; and supported the development of a police unit within the Secretariat of the AU. The EC supported the AMIS between 2004 and 2007 with a total commitment of €303m.

The EU contributed €25m to the AU to sustain its military operation in Burundi. For the Demobilization and Reintegration Program for the Great Lake Region, the EU contributed €20m, and €2m for a disarmament program in Congo Brazzaville. In 2003, the EU conducted a military operation *Artemis* in the DRC along with its €2.5m support to the DRC's transitional government the same year. It allocated €8m for the establishment of an Integrated Police Unit (IPU), and this project was carried on with a further budget of €4.4m for 2005. The preparation of the elections of 2006 in the DRC was supported by €9m (Consilium 2005b). The EU supported the Congolese transitional government with €80m between 2003 and 2006 in preparation for the elections of 2006.

In order to help secure the elections in the Comoros, the AU was given €8.5m from the EU's African Peace Facility. Similarly, since its deployment in 2007, AMISOM has been supported by the EU with an allocation of €35.5m from APF. A contribution of €4.75m coming from the Stability Instrument supported the strategic planning and management unit (SPMU). The EU adopted a support program for Somalia worth €215.4m. Between 2005 and 2009, the EU assisted the Somalis with €3,025,440 for humanitarian aid projects; and allocated €278 million of Development Aid between 2003 and 2008 for sectors including, governance, security, education, health care, etc.; and it has allocated €215.4m for those sectors for the period 2008–2013, including €35.5m for the African Union Peacekeeping Mission AMISOM (EC 2009). In April 2010, the EU established the EU military mission (EUTM Somalia) to train the Somali Security Forces.

The EU's support that could be considered part of the traditional focus on the military is impressive. However, the comprehensive security concept goes beyond the traditional distinction between external and internal security, and between civilian and military instruments (Rieker 2006). The political dimension of comprehensive security consists of normative principles considered to be universally applicable: democracy, human rights and the rule of law. On the basis of the Cotonou Agreement (2000) between the EU and ACP countries, states abusing human rights, violating democracy and the rule of law, or committing serious corruption, would be denied development aid. The Joint Strategy of 2007 between the EU and AU has reinforced these objectives. For the period 2008–2013, the EU has earmarked €2.7 billion for ACP states from the 10th European Development Fund for the so-called "governance incentive tranche". Within the framework of the African Peer Review mechanism (APRM), the EU has supported Africa in the area of electoral observation through the Electoral Assistance Fund and through the UNDP-managed Trust Fund to support the APRM Secretariat.

The environmental dimension of security has become an important component of development and security policy cooperation between the EU and Africa. The Cairo Declaration of the EU and Africa in 2000 underlined the protection of the environment as a key area of cooperation in the attempt to address the environmental consequences of conflicts within a comprehensive and integrated framework. The declared areas of cooperation include: the implementation of the UN Convention to Combat Desertification, sustainable use of scarce water and soil, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity, Agenda

21, the Kyoto Protocol, the Copenhagen Accord, and the African Common Position on Environment and Development.

According to the EU Strategy for Africa of 2005, the EU pledged to assist Africa to protect its environment: manage environmental diversity, stop desertification and improve sustainable land management, conserve biodiversity and counter the effects of climate change. The EU also fears that desertification and regional instability could cause migration northwards, especially to Europe (Sicurelli 2010: 126). Based on the Copenhagen priority context and Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA), the EU pledged capacity development for Africa. Under this initiative, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles and Tanzania were identified for enhanced cooperation (2009–2010). Five other African countries were selected for 2010. It provided €8m for the ClimDev Africa and for the AU Commission Climate change and desertification coordination. These projects are taking place not only within individual African states, but at regional levels as discussed below.

The EU has region-specific focal areas of cooperation. With North Africa, the key priority areas are fighting terrorism, energy security and migration. In 2000, 70 percent of the EU's African oil (€62.5 billion) was imported from Algeria, Libya and Nigeria. Algeria is a strategic ally in the fight against international terrorism; it cooperates with Interpol, Europol and NATO, and with individual states such as France, Spain, the UK, Germany, and the US.

Since 2002, the Sahel and Sahara regions have gained strategic importance for the EU and the US. The US, UK, Germany, France and Spain have been conducting anti-al-Qaeda military exercises in the Sahara in joint military exercises with Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria and Chad. Supported by the US and EU, in April 2010 Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger launched a joint military command headquarters in the south of Algeria to co-ordinate their efforts to counter al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's (AQIM) expansion into Chad, Mali and Libya.

In the southern African region, the EU is active in Angola in good governance, democracy, human rights, institutional reforms, MDGs, and demining. Senior Zimbabwean politicians have been sanctioned by the EU since 2002 through visa bans, resource freezes and arms embargoes. At the same time, the European Union has been the largest provider of support for Zimbabwe: €274m in 2009 for agriculture and food security, health and education, and implementation of the global peace agreement in Zimbabwe (Council of the European Union 2010). Mozambique has been provided €662m for macro-economic, infrastructure, agriculture, etc. for the period 2008–2013. Another important area of action for the EU in this region is the Program on Light Arms and Illicit Trafficking, to enhance legal controls over weapons possession and transfers.

The EU is active in East Africa. Based on the UN Security Council resolution 1907 (2009), the EU sanctioned Eritrea for its role in the Somali conflict. Kenya and Ethiopia are anchor states for the EU in the Horn of Africa. Though democratic records in both countries are poor, piracy, Islamic fundamentalism, and terrorism, coming from and through Somalia have underlined their strategic significance for Europe. In spite of post-2005 and 2007 election violence in Ethiopia and Kenya, respectively, the stance of the EU is to protect the relationship with these strategically important anchor states, however by doing so it compromises its own principles of democracy and the rule of law. Under the 10th European Development Fund, the EU and Kenya signed a Country Strategy Paper in December 2007 for the period 2008–2013, amounting to €399m budget, and with Ethiopia a total budget of €644m.

National security constraints to the EU's CS in Africa

Ex-European colonial powers pursue bilateral relations with their former colonies, regardless of their poor democratic or governance records. Since 2007, the Italian African Peace Facility (IAPF)

has allocated €40m budget mainly with its former colonies in the Horn of Africa. Portugal has established its Africa Program (PAMPA) in 2006 for crisis management, mainly for Portuguese-speaking countries. Belgium is engaged especially in the DRC (its former colony) in military cooperation activities through the Belgian Defense Ministry (Pirozzi 2009).

Most of the expenditures of the French Directorate for Military and Defense Cooperation with Africa, as well as its military interventions, take place in French-speaking Africa. The sentimental bonds linking Paris to Francophone Africa include the spread of French culture; the projection of French identity and values overseas; the desire to maintain France's status and influence in international politics; the fear of Anglophone encroachment in French domains in Africa; economic interests; and existing links between France and the national ruling elites of Africa (N'Diaye 2009; Hansen 2007; Kroslak 2004: 74; Martin 1995: 14).

Bernard Debré, French Minster of Cooperation (from November 1994 to May 1995) suggested that France should play an active role in the democratization in Africa, because it was reasoned that if Africans were left by themselves, they would be more unstable and institutionally weak (Martin 1995: 17–18). However, France has been attempting to secure power and influence through Africa on the wider international stage and to use European foreign policies in order to achieve its own overriding priorities, and to establish national grandeur (see N'Diaye, Chapter 27; Guyomarch et al. 2002: 106–107; Kroslak 2004: 64; Utley 2002: 134).

Through *Operation Artemis* of 2003 in the DRC, France showed itself an effective military actor, able to fulfill logistical requirements, including helicopters and transport aircraft (Olsen 2009: 255). In the DRC, France used EU capabilities to assert the power of the EU, to balance the US, to preserve its economic interest, to assert its international standing, to make up for its failure in Rwanda, and to preserve its zone of influence. By acting in the EU, it avoided the charge of neo-colonialism (Gegout 2009: 239). The French strategy is to overcome its comparative weakness vis-à-vis the US (see N'Diaye, Chapter 27). After the Rwandan genocide, France increasingly lost Rwanda (and other states in the region) to competing Anglophone influence (Gegout 2009: 238; Olsen 2009: 250).

France's military bases in Africa (Chad/N'Djamena, Central African Republic/Bangui, Senegal/Dakar, Côte d'Ivoire/Abidjan, Gabon/Libreville, Djibouti/Djibouti and Cameroon) have been valuable in the protection of France's wider commercial, military and strategic interests (Utley 2002: 130; Hansen 2007). The *Accord de Cooperation* includes arms transfers, and technological transfers and military-industrial cooperation, which often benefit dictatorial regimes. France protects friendly regimes in Africa from internal and external threats through interventions such as in Mauritania, Senegal, Congo, Gabon, Cameroon and Chad in the 1960s; Chad again, as well as Djibouti, Western Sahara, Central African Republic and Zaire in the 1970s; in the 1980s twice in Chad; in the 1990s in Rwanda; and Chad again early 2008. After the Rwandan genocide, France established safe havens for Hutus and protected the perpetrators of genocide from public scrutiny and accountability (Utley 2002: 130–132).

France is still an unconditional supporter of the Chadian President, Déby, whose regime ranked as one of the most corrupt in the world in 2007 (ranked 172 out of 179 surveyed countries); and in 2005 it was the most corrupt besides Bangladesh. The Zaghawa minority, less than three percent of the total population, dominates Chadian politics, largely because of French military support. The Chadian government survived the rebel attack in 2006 due to French support. President Déby violated the Chad Constitution in 2005 when he changed it to stand for a third term, and in May 2006 he won the election boycotted by the opposition. For France, however, it is a legitimate government that has to be protected from external aggression (Gebrewold 2010: 90). The idea of the "grandeur de la France" has been more important than human rights or good governance in Africa (Kroslak 2004: 61–68).

When Washington scaled up its ties with some African states through various high-ranking visits (Secretary of State Warren Christopher in October 1996, followed by Hillary Clinton in March 1997, Madeleine Albright in December 1997 and Bill Clinton in 1998), France reacted by pushing for multilateralism in Africa. However, when in 2002 the EU, and especially the UK, imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe, France took advantage of the hostility between Zimbabwe and the UK to advance its ties with Zimbabwe. In 2003, France invited Mugabe to the Franco–African summit of Paris, even as the EU and Britain sanctioned Mugabe. Similarly, the EU condemned the 2003 election campaign in Togo and refused to send election observers because of irregularities, while Paris sent election observers to Togo.

France was silent when former Niger President Mamodou Tandja changed the constitution, dissolved the parliament and the country's Constitutional Court in 2009, so that he could stand for election a third time and to remain in office beyond his December 2009 term limit. 76% of France's energy is derived from nuclear power, and Niger provides up to 40 percent of France's uranium consumption. Areva, the French-owned nuclear power company, operates two major uranium mines in Niger. In 2008, it produced 3,000 metric tons, around 7 percent of world output. It has also expanded its investment by US$1.5 billion in another massive deposit which begins production in 2012 and it expected to produce 5,000 metric tons of uranium a year. Areva's total sales in 2009 were €14 billion (US$19 billion). Niger's Uranium region was long under martial law because of a rebellion by the Tuareg (Meyer 2010).

Much of the corruption in Francophone Africa has been, at least, indirectly tied to France. In 2009, Transparency International accused Presidents Denis Sassou-Nguesso of the Republic of the Congo, Teodoro Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, and Omar Bongo of Gabon, of using public funds to buy luxury homes and cars in France. The lawsuit which was halted in 2009, was re-instated in November 2010 by a Paris court. According to Transparency International, the total value of the three leaders' estates in France is €160m. President Obiang owned vehicles worth more than €4 million, the late Bongo and his relations had thirty-nine homes, and Mr Sassou Nguesso and his relations held 112 bank accounts. Because of its support for undemocratic African rulers and its military intervention to secure their survival, France is still seen as an imperialist power (Charbonneau 2008: 93–148).

Great Britain's Africa policy has also been pulled in different directions. In 1997 Jack Straw, the UK's Foreign Minister, pleaded for an ethical foreign policy. In 1999, Tony Blair coined the idea of a doctrine of an international community. The UK intervention in Sierra Leone in 2001 was perceived by the UK as force for good (Dorman 2009: 127). Tony Blair established the Commission for Africa in 2005, and in 2007 he declared a "battle for global values".

However, British weapons were flowing to a variety of African states, including regimes that openly flouted democratic principles and human rights standards. In 1999, for instance, the UK granted 970 small arms export licenses including to Eritrea, Kenya and Zimbabwe, despite their democratic deficits (Williams 2004: 49). The Campaign against the Arms Trade estimated the British arms to Africa to have exceeded US$200 million in 2003. UK's Sandline International brought thirty tones of arms and ammunition into Sierra Leone in 1998, in contravention to the UN arms embargo of 1997. Similarly, Avient, a company run by a British businessman, supplied military assistance to the DR Congo air force during its civil war.

Between 2000 and 2004, the British arms sold to Africa reached a record level of £1 billion, even as the British government was emphasizing relieving poverty in Africa. More than £30 million of military equipment was sold to Angola; an export license was granted by the Department of Trade and Industry in 2004 to sell £3.6 million of military equipment to Malawi, one of the least developed nations in the world. Licenses for military exports since 2000 were granted to Eritrea, Ethiopia, Algeria, Sudan, Zambia, Uganda, Namibia and Somalia. £53m

worth of arms went to Nigeria (Barnett 2009). The UK is a leading producer and exporter of those arms (SIPRI 2007: 422).

Conclusion

To what extent is EU's Africa policy characterized by a comprehensive security approach? The EU is the most active external military intervener and the most important provider of development aid to Africa. Though the cooperation between the EU and Africa intends to include military, political, socio-economic and ecological aspects of security, an effective multilateralism and coordination of competing interests is still the biggest challenge to CS. There is tension between "ethical values" and the multilateralism essential to "comprehensive security", on the one hand, and national interests, on the other.

Africa is not a forgotten continent anymore. African countries with natural resources have attracted a considerable amount of global attention. What does this mean for sustainable peace and development in Africa? Engaging global actors is essential for comprehensive security in Africa. A security concept is not comprehensive as long as it is not pursued with effective multilateralism. It is important that the interests of the major global powers in Africa do not contradict the principles of comprehensive security. Otherwise in this system of competition Africa will remain the weakest member of the international system exposed to increasing violence, poverty, environmental degradation, and bad governance. Africa's problems are partially the byproduct of the contradicting interests among external actors and between Africa and those actors, a lack of policy coherence, and a questionable commitment to multilateralism among Africans, Europeans, and other global players alike.

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U.S. SECURITY POLICY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AFTER THE COLD WAR

Louis J. Nigro, Jr. and Nicolas J. Lovelace

Introduction

The security policy of the Government of the United States regarding Sub-Saharan Africa has developed since the end of the Cold War from a reactive, largely ad hoc approach to Soviet-inspired crises to a more strategic and proactive approach focusing on resolving regional conflicts and reinforcing regional stability, in partnership with African nations and regional international organizations.

U.S. security in Sub-Saharan Africa has become increasingly based on the strategic integration of the civilian and military elements of national power to achieve key foreign and national-security policy goals and has been characterized generally by an emphasis on three sets of strategic goals: promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law; promotion of sustainable economic and social development; and promotion of regional stability and the peaceful resolution of regional conflict. All three of these trends have been largely continuous and incremental over the three post-Cold War presidencies of Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama, despite differences in emphasis among them.

The U.S. Department of State determines U.S. policy for Sub-Saharan Africa, including security policy, and leads other U.S. agencies in implementing that policy. This inter-agency enterprise includes primarily the Department of Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Agency for International Development, but other agencies play key roles in their respective areas of responsibility and expertise, like the Departments of Agriculture, Justice, Commerce, Homeland Security, and Treasury; the U.S. Trade Representative, and the Centers for Disease Control, among others.

The strategy and policy of the United States regarding Sub-Saharan Africa has become an exemplar of the strategic integration of the civilian and military elements of national power to achieve key foreign and national-security policy goals, what the Obama administration has called Smart Power, (or sometimes the 3D approach – defense, diplomacy, and development) which has its roots in previous administrations.[1]

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first is a brief overview of U.S. African security strategies and policies during and since the Cold War. The second describes the roles of the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of Defense in implementing current U.S. strategy and policy regarding African security and some of the programs they employ in doing so.[2]

U.S. African security strategies and policies since the Cold War

U.S. Government (USG) policy towards Africa during the Cold War reflected the exigencies of the global confrontation between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its satellites and client-states and client-movements on the other. U.S. policy was perforce oriented toward crisis-management, generally reactive, largely ad hoc responses to Soviet-inspired crises (Cohen 2008; Anyaso 2011).

As de-colonization of Europe's former African dependencies developed, the USG made the strategic decision to engage actively with all the newly independent states, irrespective of their size or importance. In 1958, the Eisenhower administration created in the Department of State a new regional bureau, the Bureau of African Affairs, to manage the new relationships. U.S. diplomatic missions on the continent went from two (Liberia and Ethiopia) in 1958 to over forty by the late 1960s. The Kennedy administration in 1961 created both the U.S. Agency for International Assistance and the Peace Corps in response to the new challenges created by the newly independent states in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Both new organizations played major roles in U.S. engagement with the newly independent states, all of which were in need of economic and social development, especially in Africa. Most of the new U.S. embassies to African countries would eventually include both USAID and Peace Corps missions. Throughout this period the U.S. acted to counter instability created by Soviet support for state-on-state wars (e.g., Ethiopia vs. Somalia, Libya vs. Chad), insurgencies and civil wars created by national-liberation movements (e.g., Angola, Mozambique), and internal political violence (e.g., Congo-Zaire).

The Clinton administration

The Clinton administration focused USG policy attention on Africa. In 1993, only the Africa Bureau at the State Department and the Africa Office at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) were involved on a daily basis with Africa. By the administration's second term, virtually every U.S. Government agency had active, innovative Africa programs and staff, including the departments of Defense, Agriculture, and Commerce; the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation; and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (Morrison and Cooke 2001).

The Clinton administration promoted democracy programs in more than forty African countries, supporting elections, training legislators and journalists, and developing independent judiciaries. It provided substantial assistance to support South Africa's first democratic election and applied robust sanctions that contributed to the collapse of the military regime in Nigeria. The U.S. actively supported the Independent Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to hold those guilty of war crimes accountable. The Clinton administration's major economic development initiative was the passage of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in May 2000. AGOA sought to significantly increase U.S.–Africa trade and investment, by partnering with democratic African nations to the mutual benefit of the U.S. and African economies. AGOA's eligibility criteria recognized and rewarded countries that showed commitment to economic, social and political best practices.

The Clinton administration was active in conflict resolution, playing key roles in brokering peace in Mozambique in 1994 and Liberia in 1997, including support for United Nations peace-keeping operations in both instances. The United States provided over US$100 million worth of assistance to the Economic Community of West African States to conduct peacekeeping and humanitarian relief efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone.[3]

The United States conducted humanitarian relief missions in Somalia in 1992–1993 and in Rwanda and eastern Zaire in 1994. The Somali mission was marred by effective resistance from Somali warlords, which resulted in the departure of U.S. military forces from the humanitarian effort. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda prompted the administration to put conflict-prevention mechanisms in place, including the creation of the Office of the Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues; the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) program; the Africa Regional Peacekeeping Program (ARP) and the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI); the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS); and increased funding for the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program for African countries to professionalize their militaries.

The Bush administration

The George W. Bush administration surprised many by its heightened level of engagement and accomplishment in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in its willingness to greatly increase USG resources devoted to economic development, health, and conflict resolution.

The Bush administration encouraged and supported democratic transitions in many African countries, including Liberia, Mauritania, and Sierra Leone; it worked to strengthen democratic institutions in post-conflict countries, such as the DRC and Burundi; and it assisted civil society organizations across Africa in combating gender-based violence, trafficking in persons, and other human rights violations. By 2007, the USG was providing close to US$175 million for programs to promote just and democratic governance in African nations. The Bush administration's major health initiative was the 2003 President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), with a commitment of US$15 billion over five years to fight the global HIV/AIDS pandemic, with a strong emphasis on Africa. The United States also increased its funding to the Global Fund for AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis, which also focuses heavily on Africa, and established in the State Department the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator to oversee all international AIDS funding and programming. The major U.S. development initiative under President Bush was the creation in 2004 of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which provides countries that meet strict criteria – promoting good governance, economic freedom, and investment in their citizens – with large-scale grants to fund country-led solutions for reducing poverty through sustainable economic growth. The MCC forms partnerships with some of the world's poorest countries, most of them in Africa.

Several factors prompted the administration's diplomatic and security-policy activism in Africa. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on U.S. soil (preceded in Africa by transnational terrorist bombings of U.S. embassies in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi in 1998); the increasing flow of African petroleum to American markets; and the resulting recognition of Africa's strategic importance to core U.S. national interests are among the factors responsible for the increased U.S. engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The Bush administration took important initiatives in conflict resolution. In Sudan, U.S. diplomatic leadership brought the twenty-year civil war between north and south to an end with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and supported not only the United Nations and African Union (AU) peacekeeping operations there, but also two UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations to protect Sudanese Darfur refugees in Chad – a European Union force (2007–2008) was followed by a UN force (2008–2010). In the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Somalia, the United States backed ongoing UN and African Union efforts to end violence and restore stability to these troubled countries.

In 2008, the Bush administration created the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), the sixth of the so-called Unified Commands that are the operational vehicles of Defense Department

responsibility for the world's geographic regions.[4] Its mission, analogous to those of the other Unified Commands, is to protect and defend the national security interests of the United States by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations and, when directed, to conduct military operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development. In 2005, the U.S. launched the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI) as the U.S. contribution to the broader Action Plan for Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations adopted at the 2004 Group of Eight Summit. GPOI's primary objectives initially included training 75,000 peacekeeping troops and building regional capacity to conduct peacekeeping operations. Building sustainable, local and regional African peacekeeping training capacity subsequently was added as a key goal (Morrison and Cooke 2010; Goldwyn 2010; Van de Walle 2009).

The Obama administration

The Obama administration has both built on the foundations put down by its predecessors and made important original contributions of its own, thereby reinforcing USG diplomatic engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa (The White House 2012).

President Obama enunciated his policy towards Africa in a speech in Ghana in July 2009 in terms of five policy pillars. The first pillar was support for democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Sub-Saharan Africa. He pledged to work with African partners to strengthen democratic institutions, to protect democratic gains, and to counter unconstitutional changes in government.[5] The United States promoted successful post-conflict transitions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and helped Africa's most democratic countries – including Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Tanzania, and South Africa – continue with political and economic reforms. The USG pursued stronger partnerships with regional organizations such as the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the East African Community, and the Southern African Development Community, which have demonstrated a growing commitment to censuring unconstitutional seizures of power, promoting economic integration, and addressing regional security threats, for example.

The Obama administration's major development initiative is the US$3.5 billion Food Security Initiative, aimed at supplying new methods and technologies to African farmers, enhancing Africa's ability to meet its food needs, reduce its reliance on imported food, and their agricultural industries. The administration also continued working with African partners to maximize the opportunities created by AGOA and other trade preference programs. The Obama administration continued PEPFAR's fight against HIV/AIDS as well as malaria, TB, and polio, pledging more than US$63 billion to meet public health challenges throughout Africa.

Under the Obama administration, funding for U.S. security assistance has increased, primarily because of U.S. support for African peacekeeping and counter-terrorism initiatives, building on and refining trends from previous administrations. Security assistance for Africa continued to expand in response to widening regional conflict, continued political instability and a growing terrorist threat. The administration has shown that it is willing to use force in Africa to intervene to protect civilians as part of a U.N. Security Council Resolution, to rescue American citizens and foreign citizens using special operations forces, and to assist in the training of local national military forces to reinforce counterterrorism efforts.

The U.S. decision to implement a comprehensive strategy to address the violent and predatory Lord's Resistance Army in Central Africa and to continue funding for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership activities in the Sahel underline Africa's continued importance within the administration. The opening of an office of Security Cooperation in South Sudan

and the upgrading of the leadership of the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa are examples of the USG's commitment to security and conflict prevention, mitigation, and resolution in Sub-Saharan Africa. In Somalia, the U.S. supported UN and AU peacekeeping operations as well as international efforts to extend the authority of the legitimate government. The United States took strong initiatives in Sudan by renewing its diplomatic commitment to a negotiated peace in Darfur and by managing the largely peaceful process of separation of North and South Sudan, as provided for in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the United States continued to support UN, AU, and sub-regional efforts to bring peace and stability to eastern DRC and the broader Great Lakes region.

The roles of the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of Defense in implementing current U.S. strategy and policy for Africa

Current implementation of U.S. security policy for Sub-Saharan Africa is an interagency enterprise that reflects the 'Smart Power' approach to U.S. engagement with the world advocated from 2009 by Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, aimed at the strategic integration of civilian and military capabilities to achieve essential USG goals. A robust State-Defense partnership is the core of this approach, in which USAID and other civilian agencies (Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, Commerce, Agriculture, the Centers for Disease Control, the U.S. Trade Representative, and others) play important roles. The USG has a number of effective tools in its tool kit for policy formulation and policy implementation. The following are some of the most important examples from the State and Defense departments.

The Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State

The Department of State's Bureau of African Affairs (AF) is responsible for the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. The AF Bureau's Office of Regional Security Affairs (RSA) is responsible for formulating and implementing U.S. security policy in the region. RSA's activities directly support the implementation of two of the Obama administration's five pillars of U.S. Africa policy: preventing, mitigating, and resolving armed conflict; and assisting African nations to address transnational challenges.

RSA's key priorities are advancing a holistic approach to Security Sector Reform (SSR), to include the military, police, and the criminal-justice sector; professionalizing African militaries; improving civil–military relations; enhancing African peacekeeping capacities; improving maritime security; countering transnational threats (e.g., terrorism, narcotics, trafficking in arms); and promoting post-conflict stabilization. U.S. Sub-Saharan Africa security policy is implemented through the following funding sources: Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Non-proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Activities (NADR), and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE).

Increasing the capacity of African nations to contribute to peacekeeping operations has been a major U.S. focus that has produced important results. The GPOI-funded Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program has trained and equipped twenty-four African partner nations for peacekeeping operations and Africans are playing a greater role than ever in global PKOs. The ACOTA program has facilitated the training of over 165,000 African troops since 2005. Over 35 percent of the peacekeepers deployed on UN PKO missions are

Africans and over 45 percent of the peacekeepers deployed on UN/AU PKO missions in Africa are Africans. Seven Sub-Saharan African countries rank in the top twenty of contributors to UN PKO missions – Nigeria, Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, Ethiopia, South Africa, and Tanzania.[6]

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State

The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) is the Department of State's principal link to the Department of Defense. The PM Bureau provides policy direction in the areas of international security, security assistance, military operations, defense strategy and plans, and defense trade. The Bureau also: provides diplomatic support to the U.S. Department of Defense for basing, military exercises, and overseas operations; contributes to Defense and Political-Military Policy and Planning; and reduces threats from conventional weapons through humanitarian demining and small arms destruction programs. The Bureau directs over US$5 billion in U.S. military assistance annually to friends and allies through policy development, budget formulation, and program oversight; provides input on U.S. foreign policy objectives for Department of Defense planning and military activities; and manages a five-year Presidential initiative to expand the worldwide capacity and availability of peacekeepers. PM appoints State Department diplomats to serve as Foreign Policy Advisors (POLADs) to senior U.S. military commanders and their subordinate commands.[7] The Bureau is the State Department's leader on USG counter-piracy and maritime-security efforts, representing it on the National Action and Partnership Plan to Combat Piracy off the Horn of Africa and is the primary coordinator between the Departments of State and Defense on deployments, military exercises, and other operational issues regarding Africa.

Bureau of Counterterrorism, Department of State

The Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) leads the Department of State in the whole-of-government effort to counter terrorism abroad and to secure the United States against foreign terrorist threats. The predecessor organization to the Bureau of Counterterrorism was the Office for Combating Terrorism; the Office for Combating Terrorism became the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in 1985, and the Bureau of Counterterrorism in 2012.

The CT Bureau is responsible for setting policy and advancing implementation of the U.S. effort to counter terrorism and violent extremism. Its principal programs involve partnering with nearly every Sub-Saharan nation. It has functional responsibilities for both the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), the primary programs to support the long-term counterterrorism capacity building of member countries in the Sahelian and East Africa regions.[8]

Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State

The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is another key participant in the implementation of U.S. security policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, through its Office of Africa and Middle East Programs (INL/AME). INL/AME is actively engaged with sixteen countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, developing law enforcement and narcotics-related policy initiatives for African countries, and providing guidance to U.S. embassies there in implementing USG policies on international narcotics and crime. INL/AME's programs enhance African partner capacity to preserve justice and the rule of law, fight the production and

trafficking of illicit narcotics and the effects of drug addiction, tackle corruption, combat gender-based violence, protect and secure borders, build correctional systems that respect human rights and that counter radicalization, and provide basic security services for their people.[9]

The United States Africa Command

The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) was established in 2008 and charged with responsibility for U.S. military support to U.S. policy in Africa, including military-to-military relationships with 54 African nations. Before the creation of AFRICOM, the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) was responsible for conducting the majority of Department of Defense missions in Africa, in addition to its responsibility for Europe and Eurasia. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was responsible for the Horn of Africa region, and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) devoted maritime assets to waters between the African mainland and the island nations of Mauritius and the Seychelles. AFRICOM supports the U.S. Department of State in the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives in Africa. The Command also provides personnel and logistical support to State Department-funded activities. AFRICOM works closely with U.S. embassies in Africa to coordinate training programs to improve the security capacity of African nations (Buss 2011; Pham 2011a; Ploch 2009).

AFRICOM's mission is to advance U.S. interests by strengthening the defense capabilities of African states and regional organizations and, if necessary, conducts military operations, in order to deter and defeat transnational threats and to provide a security environment conducive to good governance and development. The Command supports U.S. national security interests by conducting a wide range of programs and activities that help African states and regional organizations – at their request – to meet their security and defense goals. Its strategic objectives are to ensure that terrorist networks and associated violent extremists do not attack the United States; assist African states and regional organizations in developing increased capacity to combat transnational threats such as terrorism, piracy, and the illicit trafficking of weapons, people, and narcotics; assist African states and regional organizations in developing the capacity to execute effective continental peace operations, and to respond to crises; and encourage African militaries to operate under civilian authority, respect the rule of law, abide by international human rights norms, and contribute to stability in their respective states (Francis 2011; Pham 2011b).

The establishment of U.S. Africa Command represents an effort to implement the integration of the civilian and military elements of national power to achieve U.S. strategic foreign and national-security goals in Africa, an effort that senior U.S. officials refer to as the exercise of Smart Power, especially through a robust State-Defense partnership, although critics have assailed it as another example of what some refer to as the militarization of U.S. foreign policy in recent years (Moeller 2011; Blanche 2011; Mills 2007; Morrison 2007; Gribbin 2008).

U.S. Africa Command conducts major joint exercises with partner nations to encourage the development of partner security capabilities and instill professional ethos among African militaries. AFRICOM personnel serve as trainers and examples of military professionalism during these exercises, which focus on humanitarian aid/disaster response; maritime interdiction operations; and deployment preparation and resupply operations for peacekeeping operations in Sub-Saharan Africa.

In the realm of counterterrorism, AFRICOM plays a critical and central role in both the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), the primary programs to support the long-term counterterrorism capacity building of member countries in northwest and East Africa. Both programs are led by the State Department, but are managed in close coordination with DOD

and AFRICOM, as well as USAID. DOD launched Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS) in 2007 to support TSCTP programming. OEF-TS adds both funding and essential staff to TSCTP, including military trainers and advisors.

AFRICOM is headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany, and has personnel posted to Offices of Security Cooperation in African host nations. Its staff is divided equally between military personnel and civilian employees of the Department of Defense, plus civilian employees of other USG agencies and contracted employees. AFRICOM's component commands are: U.S. Army Africa in Vicenza, Italy; U.S. Air Forces Africa in Ramstein, Germany; Marine Forces Africa in Stuttgart, Germany; Naval Forces Europe-Africa in Naples, Italy; Special Operations Command Africa headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany and Combined Joint Task–Horn of Africa in Djibouti.[10]

Major U.S. programs

Foreign Area Officers, Defense Attachés, and Security Cooperation Officers

U.S. military staffing for implementing USG security policy in Africa is provided in part by specially trained and regionally focused officers from across the military services. These Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) are competitively selected and trained, receiving language training, a post graduate degree, and regional immersion before being assigned for duty at a U.S. embassy.

FAOs can either be assigned as a Defense and Military Attaché in a Defense Attaché Office or as a Security Cooperation Officer in an Offices of Security Cooperation. Defense and Military Attachés in Africa, as elsewhere, serve as military advisors to U.S ambassadors and the primary interface between the Department of Defense and the host nation defense ministries, managing military-to-military arrangements and engagements. AFRICOM currently staffs Defense Attaché Offices in most U.S. embassies in Africa and some twenty Offices of Security Cooperation, and plans to increase the latter program.

International military education and training

The International Military Education and Training (IMET) program was created in 1976 to provide training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. Funding is appropriated from the International Affairs budget of the Department of State. The IMET program is an investment in ideas and people, which has an overall positive impact on the numerous students trained under the program. For a relatively modest investment, it offers a unique opportunity to establish lasting relationships with key foreign military and civilian leaders.

IMET's core goals are to further the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-to-military relations which culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation between the United States and foreign countries; and to increase the ability of foreign national military and civilian personnel to absorb and maintain basic democratic values and protect internationally recognized human rights. IMET achieves its objectives through a variety of military education and training activities conducted by DOD for foreign military and civilian officials, including: formal instruction involving over 2,000 courses taught at approximately 150 military schools and installations; on-the-job training; orientation tours for key senior military and civilian officials; and mobile education teams which take the curriculum to the host country.

The IMET program exposes students not only to the U.S. professional military establishment but also more broadly to democratic values, respect for individual and human rights and adherence to the rule of law. Emphasis is placed on how the U.S. military functions under civilian control.

Global Peace Operations Initiative

The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is a USG-funded assistance program intended to enhance international capacity to effectively conduct United Nations and regional peace support operations (PSOs), by building partner country capabilities to train and sustain peacekeeping proficiencies; by increasing the number of capable military troops and formed police units (FPUs) available for deployment; and by facilitating the preparation, logistical support, and deployment of military units and FPUs to PSOs.

GPOI was launched as the U.S. contribution to the broader Action Plan for Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations adopted at the 2004 Group of Eight (G-8) Summit. Its original goals included training 75,000 peacekeepers and building regional capacity to conduct peacekeeping operations; its program emphasis added assisting partner-country efforts to build sustainable, local and regional peacekeeping training capacity to its original train and equip goals. GPOI, whose funding is managed by the Department of State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, is guided by outcome-oriented considerations: actual deployments, effectiveness in PSOs, improvement of capacities, and self-sufficiency (Serafino 2007).

Foreign Military Financing and Foreign Military Sales

The Department of Defense's Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program provides grant funding to help countries purchase U.S. defense articles and services. FMF-funded purchases are made through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, which manages government-to-government sales, and, less frequently, through the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) system, which oversees sales between foreign governments and private U.S. companies. FMF does not provide cash grants to other countries; it generally pays for sales of specific goods or services through FMS or DCS. The State Department determines policy for FMF programs around the world, including Africa. The Defense Department is designated by statute as the implementing agency for FMF; its Defense Security Cooperation Agency routinely manages FMF programs.

The U.S. Department of Defense's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program facilitates sales of U.S. arms, defense equipment, defense services, and military training to foreign governments. The purchaser does not deal directly with the defense contractor; instead, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency serves as an intermediary, usually handling procurement, logistics and delivery and often providing product support, training, and infrastructure construction. The State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs sets policy for the FMF program, while the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), within the Defense Department, manages it on a day-to-day basis. FMS is based on countries being authorized to participate in the program and facilitated through a deposit in a U.S. Trust Fund or appropriate credit and approval to fund services (Serafino 2012).[11]

The Defense Institute of International Legal Studies

The Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) is an institute staffed by Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, and Coast Guard Judge Advocate Corps officers, as well as highly experienced civilian attorneys, managers, and support staff. The DIILS target audience includes foreign partner

military personnel and related civilians. DIILS seeks to develop and implement effective programs to build foreign partner legal capacity, including equitable, transparent, and accountable security sectors, civilian control of the military, human rights and representative, elected governments through mobile education teams, resident courses and other engagements. DIILS primarily implements IMET-funded courses in the United States or exports the training to the recipient country. DIILS is located in Newport, Rhode Island and has a staff of thirty highly specialized and qualified military legal professionals.[12]

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) was established to promote good governance and democratic values in African defense and security sectors, and to maintain long-term active communications with African leaders across the continent. ACSS conducts a comprehensive program of seminars, symposia, conferences, research and other academic programs, as well as through outreach activities in Africa and in the U.S. It supports U.S. foreign and security policies by strengthening the strategic capacity of African states to identify and resolve security challenges in ways that promote civil–military cooperation, respect for democratic values, and safeguard human rights. ACSS's core goals focus on: counter-terrorism, civil military relations, defense economics and resource management; building African military capacity and professionalization, respect for the rule of law, and civil–military relations; trans-national security challenges; peacekeeping; stability operations, and disaster relief; and promoting common understanding among U.S. and African leaders. ACSS is located at Fort McNair in Washington, DC, home of the National Defense University.[13]

Conclusion

The U.S. adoption of a 3D approach, or Smart Power, reflects the growing importance of 'new security' issues in its national security policy. U.S. policy for Africa had always demonstrated innovative strategies, but the post-Cold War context originally allowed it to de-emphasize hard security and, for instance, focus of promoting democracy. A plethora of new programs evolved, possibly peaking during the George W. Bush administration, advanced a wide range of priorities: human trafficking, drug smuggling, disease, and human rights.

The standing-up of AFRICOM in 2008 was the reification of a new conceptualization of security. It explicitly partnered with other U.S. agencies working in Africa. It was also a reflection of the post-9/11 security environment. Terrorism, and to some extent, access to oil – more traditional security concerns, shared center stage with 'new security' issues to shape the U.S.'s holistic approach to African security.

Notes

1 The Obama administration has defined 'Smart Power' as 'the intelligent integration and networking of diplomacy, defense, development, and other tools of so-called "hard" and "soft" power' (Armitage and Nye 2007; Nossel 2004; Nye 2011; Slaughter 2009).

2 The Department of State and the Department of Defense organize their efforts regarding the African continent and island nations on different geographic bases. The State Department's Bureau of African Affairs has responsibility for the 49 countries of Africa south of the Sahara; its Bureau of Near East and North Africa Affairs has responsibility for Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. The Defense Department's Africa Command has responsibility for all 53 countries of the African continent and island nations, except Egypt, for which Defense's Central Command has responsibility. This chapter follows

the State Department's organizational plan, addressing African nations south of the Sahara, including island nations.

3 The United States is responsible for funding 25.9 percent of the cost of all UN peacekeeping operations.

4 The other geographic Unified Commands are: U.S. European Command (EUCOM), responsible for Europe and Eurasia; U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), responsible for Central and Southwest Asia; U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), responsible for East and South Asia and the Pacific region; U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), responsible for North America; and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), responsible for South America and the Caribbean region.

5 For the rest of the president's speech, see on the White House website: www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-to-the-Ghanaian-Parliament/

6 For current information on the Bureau of African Affairs, see the State Department's website: www.state.gov/p/af/

7 For example, POLADS currently serve at AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, as well as its Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Special Operations subordinate commands, and the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa in Djibouti. POLADs are also assigned to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all the Service Chiefs, as well as other Defense Department agencies.

8 For current information on the INL Bureau, see the State Department's website: www.state.gov/j/ct/index.htm

9 For current information on the INL Bureau, see the State Department's website: www.state.gov/j/inl/index.htm

10 For current information on Africom, see its website: www.africom.mil/

11 Nina M. Serafino, *Security Assistance Reform: 'Section 1206': Background and Issues for Congress,* Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012.

12 For further information, see the DIILS website: www.diils.org/organization/defense-institute-international-legal-studies

13 For further information, see the ACSS website: http://africacenter.org/

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THE UNITED NATIONS AND AFRICAN SECURITY

John F. Clark

Introduction

The United Nations (UN) and its affiliated organizations are deeply implicated in the security of African peoples in a great variety of ways. Of course, the fundamental goal of the United Nations is to protect international peace and security. Yet the prevention and resolution of international, or inter-state, conflicts has proved to be one of the least important activities of the UN in Africa, although it has sometimes played that role there. Rather, two other categories of UN activities have come to dominate the organization's Africa operations. One is that set of activities that has to do with the development and human rights, especially the social and economic rights whose realization usually results from economic development. The other is that set of activities that has to do with people's welfare in the midst of civil war and related forms of social unrest, especially rebellion or secessionism.

Both of these sets of activities were initially quite peripheral to the main purposes of the UN Charter. The UN's purposes related to the first set of activities were originally captured in three short passages in the *preamble* to the Charter: "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small"; "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom"; and "to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples". An array of UN specialized agencies, commissions, offices, committees, and funds has sprung up one after another over the past sixty-five years to help the UN realize these difficult tasks.

The second set of UN activities related to internal dispute resolution was not envisioned by the founders, nor is it mentioned in the Charter, but it has gained prominence in Africa. Yet the resolution of domestic disputes and the protection of civilian populations during wartime have arguably become the single most important set of UN activities since 1960. The mechanism through which the UN has sought to resolve such domestic disputes is of course the international peacekeeping mission, composed of nationally volunteered forces dispatched to countries suffering domestic unrest or civil war. Such missions have enjoyed the consent of the states in which they have been deployed, though sometimes under pressure. The first ever UN peacekeeping mission was the United Nations Emergency Force, dispatched to Egypt in November 1956 to interpose itself between the hostile forces of Egypt and Israel following a cessation of hostilities after the

Suez Crisis of that year. This mission was broadly within the sphere of activities imagined by the founders, separating as it did two international belligerents. The second peacekeeping force created by the United Nations was the Organization (later, "Opération") des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC), launched in July 1960. This complex and fateful UN peacekeeping mission became the model for most of those that followed it, setting the precedent of intervening in what was essentially a civil war, albeit one stimulated by foreign (Belgian) intervention. A large majority of peacekeeping missions since this time, and especially since the end of the Cold War, have been missions sent to Africa for intervention in civil wars or related domestic disputes (see Chapter 7).

The range of UN security-related activities in Africa

Agencies of the UN are involved in a broad range of activities intended to make human beings more secure. This range of activities reflects the variety of sources of insecurity, which can usefully be divided into to three categories: (1) organized human violence, including international wars, civil wars, and other forms of organized civil violence, such as ethnic cleansing and even genocide, often led by the state itself; (2) ordinary crime of either civilians or irregular armed elements against unarmed civilians; and (3) the ravages of hunger and disease, as well as their causes, such as physical displacement, lack of shelter, inadequate access to medical services, lack of land, or lack of other economic means to meet the needs of human survival. Different UN subsidiary organizations are involved in trying to reduce the insecurity created by all of these scourges.

Of course, these sources of human insecurity have often come together in Africa, as they have everywhere in the human experience. The first Congo war (1960–1964) may have been sparked by the international intervention of Belgium in the country following a mutiny of Congolese soldiers, but it soon devolved into a multifaceted civil war, involving factions fighting each other, as well as the central government. Ten of thousands of civilians died in the resulting chaos over the four following years of sporadic fighting. Likewise, starvation accompanied the civil war in Nigeria (1967–1970), as secessionist Biafra was the victim of a government blockade and internal supply problems. Perhaps the most dramatic example of many sources of human security coming together at once, however, has been the complex of recent wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1998–present). These wars have involved international intervention in the country, civil war against the governments of Laurent Kabila and then Joseph Kabila, and regional warlordism. The result, according to the International Rescue Committee (2008), has been the deaths of over six million persons, mostly civilians. Relatively few of the dead have been combat casualties; a much larger number of deaths have resulted from the attacks of local militias and rebel groups on civilians. But the vast majority have died of hunger and disease as a result of displacement from their homes and land, caused by the fighting.

A surprising array of UN agencies has tried to treat these ills both separately and together, depending upon circumstance. To begin at the level of inter-state conflict, a few UN operations in Africa have functioned much as the early UN enthusiasts had anticipated. Specifically, some UN missions have tried to resolve *international* disputes between independent states, or between states aspiring to independence and those thwarting those ambitions. In the latter category, the first such mission after 1960 was the United Nations Transition Assistance Group, sent to Namibia in 1989 to oversee the Angola-Namibia Peace Agreement, signed in 1988. A rather different, and far less successful mission, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), was established by the Security Council in April 1991 to help organize a referendum in Western Sahara. The liberation group that has sought independence for that territory, the POLISARIO, has yet to see any referendum take place. Finally, in July 2000, the

UN constituted an international monitoring mission in the first category, not unlike the original UNEF. This mission, the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, had the purpose of occupying a neutral space between the warring armies of Ethiopia and Eritrea, following their bloody war of 1998–2000. The UN did not wind down this mission until 2008, by which time a relatively durable peace had been established by the two warring states (UNDPKO 2012a). The current United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (Sudan) (UNISFA) is also functioning—or trying to function—much like the UNEF mission, keeping the forces of Sudan and South Sudan apart.

UN missions to help resolve domestic disputes and/or to protect civilian populations during domestic disputes in Africa have been far more common. Twenty-four different UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, among other regional peacekeeping efforts, are discussed in Chapter 7. The traditional focus of the analysis of peacekeeping missions has been, appropriately, on their relative ability to restore the civil peace in the countries where they have operated (e.g., Adebajo 2011). Without the existence of civil peace, none of the other impediments to human security is likely to be tackled with any lasting success. While civil war or unrest rages, the best UN missions can try to do is to protect as many civilians from harm as possible, but these efforts cannot achieve durable success without a cessation of hostilities.

In turn, the single great dilemma of African peacekeeping missions in domestic disputes has been the powerful international norm in favor of neutrality. This norm was reasonably established by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld at the time of the establishment of the UNEF mission. In the context of that international dispute, the norm of neutrality between warring factions made perfect sense. The norm was reinforced by the desire to get the targets of UN peacekeeping missions to consent to their deployment, and to get the permanent members of the Security Council to authorize them, lest the unwanted dispatch of UN missions would become a precedent. Yet the necessity of formal neutrality has prevented most UN missions from meeting their implicit main goal of restoring order. The first UN mission to Congo only realized the goal of suppressing the secessionist ambitions of Katanga when it violated this norm (Clark 1994). Many subsequent UN peacekeeping missions have failed to accomplish much because they lacked the authorization—or because their civilian commanders lacked the nerve—to use force against aggressors in civil wars and against those attacking civilians.

Although the focus on whether peacekeeping missions within states succeed in restoring the civil peace is justified, peacekeeping missions can and have become involved in salutary related activities, some of which are mentioned in Chapter 7. In particular, a number of useful activities of armed peacekeepers are often implemented as domestic conflicts are winding down, and civilian authority is gradually being restored. Two of these are policing and disarmament. Six of the seven UN peacekeeping missions now on-going in Africa (all except the UNISFA mission in Sudan) involve police contingents, and the police unit of the African Union-UN mission in Darfur numbers over 5,000. In addition to providing interim policing of civilian populations during periods of conflict, these units also train local police officers for duty after the restoration of government authority. This activity tries to address the human insecurity arising from elevated crime levels and banditry that always prevails in post-conflict environments.

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs are a second major way in which the UN and related agencies attempt to reduce human insecurity due to crime in post-conflict environments. These programs are designed to demobilize and disarm ex-combatants, and then reintegrate them into society. As of 2007 (Hansen 2007), the UN and its various agencies had run twenty-four DDR programs since 1992, and most of these were in Africa. All of the UN peacekeeping missions to African states experiencing major conflicts, including Angola, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia,

Mozambique, and Sierra Leone, have been followed up with DDR programs, in some cases multiple programs. DDR programs have also been launched in countries that experienced conflict, but did *not* have UN peacekeeping missions, including Uganda and the Republic of Congo. The main elements of these programs have been to separate combatants from their former military commanders, to purchase their arms, to provide them with financial incentives to remain disarmed, and/or to provide them with training for civilian occupations. A diversity of different UN agencies (like UNICEF, in Liberia), and affiliated institutions such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the World Bank, have conducted DDR programs in Africa.

Yet another tool used by the UN to try to create the conditions for improved security is diplomacy. Although diplomacy is generally under-appreciated as a mechanism for resolving conflicts and restoring the conditions for security, it has been vital to UN operations in Africa. UN peacekeeping missions have always been headed by a designee of the UN Secretary-General (UNSG), called a "Special Representative of the Secretary-General" (SRSG). These agents of the UNSG had often served as the most important international authorities in negotiations between rebel groups and government officials in African conflicts. For instance, Dayal Rajeshwar (1976) engaged in intensive negotiations between the parties to the Congo conflict of 1960–1964, and his deputy, Connor Cruise O'Brien, played the key role in ending the secession of Katanga. Thirty years later, Aldo Ajello, an SRSG in Mozambique appointed by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali played an essential role in keeping the peace between the two formerly warring parties in that country (Synge 1997). The current Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, has eighteen special representatives, executive representatives, or special envoys posted to countries, regions (i.e., the Great Lakes and West Africa), or territories (Western Sahara) (UN 2012b). In addition to usually heading UN peacekeeping missions, these representatives negotiate constantly to try to resolve on-going conflicts or avert the renewal of conflicts. In some cases in the past, other officials of UN-related organizations have played similar roles. For instance, Federico Mayor, the former director-general of UNESCO, unsuccessfully tried to negotiate a cease-fire in the Republic of Congo in 1997 (Zartman and Vogeli 2000).

Although these often dramatic endeavors have gained the most attention, the most consistent and ubiquitous work of the UN addresses threats to security that arise from hunger, disease, and the underlying causes of these scourges. This work is in line with contemporary understandings of human security, as understood by such analysts as Beebe and Kaldor (2010: 4–7). Their approach considers all of the possible threats to human welfare, including exposure, hunger, disease, and abuse of those not in positions of public authority. They argue that "human security is about the everyday security of individuals and the communities in which they live rather than the security of states and borders" (2010: 5). Armed conflicts surely make the realization of security in this sense more difficult than it would otherwise be, but severe challenges to human security exist even in the absence of formal conflict. The remainder of this chapter addresses UN efforts to address these "everyday" security challenges.

UN agencies related to human security in Africa: activities and challenges

The threats to human security that are not generated by conflict or criminal predation are mainly produced by either poverty or non-criminalized violations of human rights. Accordingly, the UN programs that address these threats generally carry the labels of "human rights" or "development". There is a heavy overlap between the contemporary ideals of "human development" and human security. Whereas *national* development signifies, *inter alia,* economic growth and the expansion of infrastructure, *human* development refers to the process of achieving

individual level health, education, and welfare. Thus, it follows that the UN agencies engaged in the enhancement of human security are focused on advancing rights for various social groups and human development in general.

The number of UN agencies engaged in human rights and development activities has grown inexorably over the years. As of 2009 there were thirty-two UN "funds, programs, agencies, departments, and offices" engaged in these areas, grouped since 1997 under the umbrella of the UN Development Group (UNDG 2012a). Ten of these organizations are regional in scope and the other twenty-two are functional. Two of these agencies, the International Telecommunication Union (founded 1865) and the International Labor Organization actually pre-dated the UN itself, the ILO dating to the League of Nations founding. Another large set of organizations, including the FAO and UNESCO, were created in 1945 and 1946, along with the UN itself. The most important contemporary development organizations, like the UNDP, were created in the 1960s, whereas UN human rights organizations have evolved in different forms from the 1940s to the 1990s. The first UN agency dedicated specifically to the advancement of women (UNIFEM) was created in 1976. The most recent entirely new UN program is the Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), established in 1996. Among the thirty-two UN bodies in the UNDG are the regional commissions, including the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), discussed below. In 2003, the UN also established an Office of the Special Advisor on Africa headed by an Under Secretary-General to assist the UN Secretary-General in the Coordination of UN system support for Africa. All of the UNDG agencies have an important role in Africa, where human security is at its most fragile.

Surveying the mission statements of these agencies, one can identify at least ten different areas of activity related to human security. These areas of activity and the main UN development or human rights organizations with responsibility for each are listed in Table 25.1. All twenty-two of the UN functional agencies related to development have a *primary* mission that fits into one of these categories. Yet all also have additional or secondary missions that fall into other categories, as discussed below. Almost all are engaged in providing relief in times of natural or man-made disasters. Another way to divide up the UN agencies relevant to human security is by their target constituency. Most of these categories represent vulnerable constituencies, though others represent categories of individual who might serve to enhance human security better through UN assistance. The large majority of the agencies work with impoverished peoples, who are not listed separately. Most UN development and human rights agencies can be linked to their key constituencies, as shown in Table 25.2.

Having identified key activities and key constituencies for these UNDG agencies, one should hasten to add that most have multiple functions and serve multiple groups. In fact, only the more technical-oriented agencies like the ITU, UNOPS, and WMO have focused missions and narrow constituencies. Some were conceived to have a wide range of missions related to human security from the outset. Most notably, the UNDP works in all areas of human development, and serves all categories of those listed in Table 25.2. On the main page of its website (UNDP 2012a), the UNDP lists seven areas in which it works, in the following order: (1) Fighting poverty; (2) Building democratic societies; (3) Preventing crisis, enabling recovery; (4) Protecting the environment; (5) Halting and reversing HIV/AIDS; (6) Empowering women; and (7) Growing National Capacity. As we see, then, UNDP activities engage nearly all of the separate areas of human development listed in Table 25.1. "Building democratic societies" is a distinctive area of activity that relates to human security over the medium term; that is, as more actively people participate in governance, the more likely they are to strengthen their security. UNESCO is another UN agency active throughout Africa with a particularly broad mandate, though one whose connections to human security are somewhat more removed.

Table 25.1 Areas of human development activity and key UNDG agencies for each

Administration and coordination	UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS)
Anti-poverty	UN Development Program (UNDP)
	UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)
Crime	UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
Education, research, and science	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
	International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
	World Meteorological Organization (WMO)
Environment	United Nations Environment Program (UNEP)
Food, farming, and nutrition	Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)
	World Food Program (WFP)
	International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)
Health	World Health Organization (WHO)
	UN Population Fund (UNFPA)
	Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)
Housing	UN Human Settlements Program (UN-Habitat)
Human rights and gender	International Labour Organization (ILO)
	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
	UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
	UN Women
National development and infrastructure	UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)
	UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO)
	UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

Table 25.2 Key constituencies served by UNDG agencies and key UN agencies for each

Children	UNICEF
Educators and scientists	UNESCO, UNEP, WMO
Dissidents and activists	OHCHR
Farmers	FAO, IFAD
Homeless	UN-Habitat
Investors	UNIDO, UNWTO, UNCTAD
Minorities	OHCHR
Refugees	UNHCR
Sick and disabled persons	WHO, UNAIDS
Women	OHCHR, UN Women, UNFPA
Workers	ITU, UNCTAD

It is striking to what extent the mandates and activities of these agencies overlap. Much of this overlap is understandable, given the evolving needs of African societies, changing international sensibilities, and the natural linkages among different aspects of human development needs. Consider, for instance, the activities of UNICEF, and how these intersect with those of other UN agencies. According to its website, UNICEF has the following "focus areas": (1) Child survival and development; (2) Basic education and gender equality; (3) HIV/AIDS and children;

(4) Child protection; (5) Policy advocacy. These are surely reasonable focus areas for an organization devoted to the advancement of child welfare. An examination of the programs actually funded under UNICEF's focus areas shows that it works in at least seven of the areas listed in Table 25.1, including anti-poverty work, crime, education, nutrition, health, housing, and human rights/gender. This broad range of activities makes sense because all are important to the welfare, or human security, of children. Poverty, criminal predators, illiteracy, poor nutrition, poor health, inadequate shelter, and social indifference to human rights are all curses that affect the human security of children in Africa and elsewhere. Yet this means that UNICEF's first priority overlaps heavily with that of the UNDP; its second focus area duplicates some of the work of UNESCO; its third program intersects with many initiatives of the WHO and UNAIDS; etc. An analysis of the focus areas of many other UN development agencies reveals a similar commonality with the priority areas of many other agencies.

Another source of overlap of activities of UN agencies arises from the tendency of all institutions to take on more and more tasks that are only indirectly related to their original purposes. Take, for instance, the activity of UN-Habitat, a UN agency whose primary purpose is "to promote socially and environmentally sustainable towns and cities with the goal of providing adequate shelter for all" (UN-Habitat 2012a). Given this mandate, UN-Habitat is probably still within its mandate in its "water and sanitation" program. With its Youth Fund, however, which promotes "youth-led development", it strays further from its original purpose. Its "rehabilitation of road in southern Sudan" takes it even further from its core mission. This example could be repeated countless times in reviewing the programs of other UN agencies working in Africa, making the task of coordination, discussed in the next section, critical to the success of UN human development agencies.

If overlap of activities is one great challenge of the complex of UN development agencies, another great challenge is focus. With so many different and overlapping priorities, what should a given UN agency make its highest priority? The danger of pursuing many goals at once is that progress becomes difficult to perceive, let alone measure. The sense that the UN was spreading itself too thin and lacked focus grew steadily over the decades, as the scope and number of UN agencies expanded. This growing problem was quite meaningfully addressed with the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) at the UN in September 2000. All 193 UN member countries and all UN subsidiary organizations endorsed the goals, set to be achieved by 2015. The websites of all UN development agencies now makes reference to the MDGs, and most try to explain how their programs advance them.

The MDGs cover eight areas, seven of which are substantively relevant to human security: (1) end poverty and hunger; (2) universal education; (3) gender equality; (4) child health; (5) maternal health; (6) combat HIV/AIDS; (7) environmental sustainability. The last area for the MDGs, "global partnership", relates to the process by which the goals are to be achieved (see UN 2012a). All of the MDGs are highly relevant to Africa, whereas many of the goals listed were less important to other regions with high levels of development. The MDGs are admirably limited in number and surprisingly specific. In each category, there are anywhere from one to six goals, with global partnership having the largest number. For instance, the one goal listed under universal education is, "Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling"; the single goal listed under child health is, "Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate" (ibid.). These goals have served the purpose of focusing the efforts of UN agencies on achieving specific outcomes quite well, they have made the problem of coordination somewhat easier, and have made measuring the impact of the UN's work at least conceivable.

Another obvious challenge for the UN human development agencies operating everywhere, and particularly in Africa, is to deal with the great diversity of state contexts in which they operate. For better or worse, UN operations are organized mostly on a state-level basis, and programs are generally delivered in cooperation with the national governments (as long as states are not collapsed). Even where states are collapsed, as in Somalia, the UN mostly organizes its human security activities at a national territory-level scale. This inevitably leads to an uneven diffusion of such activities across Africa's continental population, and a great organizational challenge. As a result, some UN agencies have offices in every country on the continent (or almost all), some have offices in selected larger countries, or countries with special needs related to their mission (e.g., UNIDO), and others have a few offices scattered across the continent.

Within states, the various UN agencies are organized into "country teams". The size of the various teams is thus one interesting proxy for the scope of UN activities in various countries. Gabon has only seven UN agencies on its country team, and Gambia has only nine. Table 25.3 shows the number of various UN agencies composing the country teams of Africa's ten most populous states. The variation in numbers is striking. For the most part, the UN country teams are composed of representatives of the twenty-two UN agencies and affiliates noted in Table 25.1, though others are occasionally included. The country team for Ethiopia is particularly large because it includes some UN agencies that have regional offices according to the African Union, whose seat is Addis Ababa. Nairobi (Kenya) is also a sub-regional office for a UN information center and a general UN coordination office. The World Bank and/or International Monetary Fund (IMF) are included in some UN country teams, but not others, though both have a presence in all African countries. Interestingly, one organization formally outside the UN system is on the country teams for many states: the International Organization for Migration, founded in 1951. The IOM is part of the country teams for seven of the ten countries listed in Table 25.3.

Comparing the country teams for these ten most populous countries, one finds that four UN agencies, UNIDO, UN-Women, the World Food Program, and UN-Habitat, have offices in nine of the ten countries. The other eight UN agencies listed in Table 25.4 are present in all ten of the most populous countries. These key agencies are the most broadly implicated in the human security efforts of the UN across the continent, participating on the country teams of most African countries. The International Labour Organization has office is eight of the ten largest countries, but its activities have less impact on human security than the key agencies in Table 25.4. Likewise, the International Organization for Migration has offices in seven of them, but this UN-affiliate is far less central to meeting the needs of refugees than is the UNHCR. Eight of these agencies have offices in a large majority of individual African states; the others serve smaller states from sub-regional or multi-country offices.

Table 25.3 Number of United Nations funds, programs, agencies, and departments on UN country teams in Sub-Saharan Africa's ten most populous states[a]

Nigeria	17	Kenya	21
Ethiopia	25	Uganda	19
Democratic Republic of Congo	18[b]	Sudan	15[c]
South Africa	14	Ghana	13
Tanzania	20	Mozambique	19

[a] Does not include International Monetary Fund or World Bank; [b] Does not include the UN peacekeeping mission, MUNUSCO; [c] Includes the UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur; UNMIS mission ended in July 2011.

UN expenditures in various countries reflect the relative populations of various African states, their levels of development, as well as—inevitably—political considerations. The UN system's expenditure's budget for "operational activities for development" in 2008 was approximately US$18.6 billion, of which US$6.42 billion (39 percent) was spent for activities in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (UN 2012c). The range for the ten large countries listed in Table 25.5 was from US$38 million for (relatively developed) South Africa, to US$1.22 billion for troubled Sudan, where human security was complicated by on-going wars and violence. Seychelles had a national expenditure budget of less than US$1 million.

In 2008, the UN agency with the largest budget for SSA was the WFP, with an expenditure of US$2.24 billion, over one-third of the total UN budget. The next four most important agencies by expenditure were UNICEF (US$1.58b), the UNDP (US$1.25b), UNHCR (US$683 million), and the UNPFA (US$244 million), with the remainder divided up among all other UN development agencies and the ECA (only US$15 million).

The large number of UN agencies in Africa, and the broad, overlapping missions they have, speaks to the complexity of the human security challenges in Africa. Africans face distressingly

Table 25.4 Key United Nations and affiliated organizations in Africa

Organization	*Year founded*	*Regional and sub-regional offices*	*Total Africa offices*[a]
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)	1945	Accra[b], Addis Ababa, Cairo, Harare, Libreville	53
Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)	1996	Dakar, Johannesburg	52
UN Development Programme (UNDP)	1965	Dakar, Johannesburg	52
UN Educational, Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)	1945	Dakar, Nairboi	17[c]
UN Population Fund (UNFPA)	1969	Cairo, Johannesburg[c]	52
UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat)	1978	Nairobi[d]	1[e]
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)	1950	Dakar, Johannesburg, Nairobi	47
UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)	1946	Dakar, Nairobi	52
UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)	1966	Addis Ababa, Cairo, Pretoria	25
UN Women	2010[f]	Dakar, Kigali, Nairboi, Johannesburg	21
World Food Programme (WFP)	1962	Dakar, Kampala, Johannesburg	42
World Health Organization (WHO)	1948	Cairo, Brazzaville	54

[a] Includes North Africa; "offices" refers to country offices, not field offices; [b] Regional headquarters for Sub-Saharan Africa; [c] "National commissions" in all fifty-four countries; [d] Regional office for Africa and Arab states; [e] Program officers work from UNDP offices; [f] UN Women succeeds the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), established in 1976.

Table 25.5 UN Development budgets (in millions) for Sub-Saharan Africa's ten largest countries in 2008

Nigeria	$188	Kenya	$340
Ethiopia	$540	Uganda	$274
Democratic Republic of Congo	$566	Sudan	$1223
South Africa	$38	Ghana	$68
Tanzania	$174	Mozambique	$163

existential threats to their everyday welfare not caused directly by organized armed violence. The ultimate manifestation of these threats comes in the forms of hunger, disease, and physical injuries, including those caused by criminal activity. These ultimate sources of harm, in turn, have a great multiplicity of causes: low incomes; inadequate or unproductive farmland; inadequate shelter; inadequate access to vaccinations and medical care; high exposure to the risk of crime; social indifference to universally agreed norms of human rights, especially those accorded to women and children. Those directing or working for the UN development agencies have an intuitive sense of the connections among many of these social ills. The diversity and ubiquity of the causes of human insecurity, especially in contemporary Africa, makes the necessity of the successful coordination UN agencies paramount.

The control and coordination of UN agencies relevant to human security in Africa (and elsewhere) has evolved over the years. Since just after its inception in the mid-1960s, they assumed the role of the chief UN agency for the coordination of development activities (Murphy 2006). Some other UN programs, such as UN-Women (previously UNIFEM) and UN-Habitat, are essentially arms of the UNDP, and work from UNDP offices. In 1977 the UN General Assembly (through GA Resolution 32/197) strengthened the coordination of UN programs by creating the concept of country teams and also UN Resident Coordinators (RCs) (UNDG 2012b). This reform further strengthened the leading role of the UNDP, insofar as the RCs are employees of the UNDP, and most have a background of work for the UNDP. Since that time, an elaborate set of procedures for UNCTs and their RCs has evolved, including guidelines for annual reports, standards for system appraisal, rules for the mobilization of resources, and a "network" for the standardization of practices (UNDG 2012c).

In 1997, Secretary-General Kofi Annan instituted the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) in the UN Secretariat to coordinate the activities of thirty-two UN funds, programs, agencies, departments, and offices at the global level. According to its website, the UNDG "designs system-wide guidance to coordinate, harmonize and align UN development activities. The group strengthens the UN development system at the country level, prepares it to meet future challenges and ensures that operations are conducted in accordance with mandates from UN governing bodies such as the General Assembly" (UNDG 2012a). Again, however, this added layer of coordination did not disturb the central role of the UNDP in the system. The UNDP Administrator, currently Helen Clark from New Zealand, is also the Chairperson of the UNDG.

The latest tweak to the UN system of coordinating development efforts has been the "Delivering as One" initiative, conceived in 2006 and rolled as a pilot program in 2007 (UNDG 2012d). The initiative adopts as its overriding principle that UN development efforts should have one leader, one budget, one program, and one office (ibid.). Three African countries, Cape Verde, Rwanda, and Tanzania, are found among the eight states that volunteered to serve as pilots in 2007. The "Delivering as One" mantra now figures prominently on the websites of the

UNDP missions for all of these countries, and there is some evidence that UN programs have actually been further consolidated in them. Again, however, the leading role of the UNDP has been preserved in this process.

Another key area of UN activity relevant to human security, and heavily overlapping with UN development efforts, is humanitarian relief. In fact, many of the various UN agencies included in the UNDG, especially the UNHCR, the WFP, the WHO, and UNICEF, also provide humanitarian relief in case of natural disasters and other complex emergencies, and they are the main UN agencies that do so. Meanwhile, the link between humanitarian relief and human security is apparent. Moreover, the complex emergencies that provoke the need for humanitarian relief more urgently need careful coordination and planning than development activities. Accordingly, in 1971, the UN created the Office of the UN Disaster Relief Coordinator. As a result of a 1991 General Assembly resolution, this body's director became the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, and the authority accorded to him was increased substantially. In 1998 the Office took its current name, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and its mandate refined further (UNOCHA). The office continues to evolve in its mission, and it has become the central clearinghouse for appeals for humanitarian assistance and the response to those appeals in the case of natural disasters. To the extent that international donors have used the OCHA mechanisms, and funded appeals to it, it has succeeded in improving human security in Africa and elsewhere in the world.

Interestingly, the ECA has not played a central role in coordinating the UN's programs in Africa related to human security. Rather, its main missions are ones of regional integration and of global advocacy for Africa (UNECA 2012). The ECA also serves as a locus of information-sharing across Africa, as a source of technical support for various development and integration efforts, and as a generator of knowledge (especially through its annual Economic Report on Africa and other publications). The budget of the ECA, only US$15 million in 2008, is too small to have any direct impact on human security.

Conclusion: evaluating the impact of UN involvement on human security in Africa

As the above analysis shows, the range of UN activities in Africa that bear on human security is impressively broad. Moreover, this range of activities has grown wider over the ensuing decades since 1960 as the UN has set more goals in new and different areas related to development and tried to respond more comprehensively to global emergencies. After years of expansion and diffusion of its efforts, the UN sought to re-focus its ambitions in specific areas through the MDGs adopted in 2000. Finally, the ever-expanding scope of UN activities in Africa has necessitated the need for stronger coordination efforts among UN agencies working in development and humanitarian relief.

These parallel trends of the UN in Africa strongly suggest the need for an analysis of the impact of UN programs on human security. Critics of the UN system abound, of course (see, e.g., IO Watch 2012). UN peacekeepers have all too frequently been accused of violating the human rights of the very people whose welfare they have been sent to insure, and of engaging in various economic crimes; senior administrators in New York and elsewhere have been accused of gross incompetence and inefficiency; and cadres throughout the system have been charged with careerism, rather than a genuine interest in the welfare of the world's disadvantaged. Perhaps in response, accountability and assessment have become important watchwords of many UN agencies over the past two decades (UNU 2007). Meanwhile, members of the UN system itself

seem to thirst for a sense of achievement, as reflected in the adoption of the MDGs. Given the public worries about the effectiveness of the UN system, but also the great hope that millions around the world have for it, is there any way to assess the level of success of the UN system in enhancing human security in Africa?

Although the observation does not follow directly from the analysis provided here, it is extremely doubtful that any such assessment can ever be made. There are simply too many variables that impact upon the realization (or not) of human security in Africa for the influence of UN system programs to be isolated. For one, UN programs compete with both national programs and other, better-funded external sources of assistance. Consider, for instance, the activities of UNAIDS. UNAIDS is not a free-standing program of assistance to those effected by HIV/Aids, but rather a vehicle for the coordination of (ten) other UN bodies, including the WHO and UNFPA, most notably. For its two-year budget covering 2010–2011, UNAIDS mobilized and coordinated a grand total of only US$776 million through its ten UN bodies, whereas the organization used US$182 million of this sum for its coordination, advocacy, and staff at the global and regional levels (labeled "secretariat" in the budget plan) (UNAIDS 2012). Meanwhile, the United States spent US$15 billion for its Presidential Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR) program over the five years from 2003 to 2008, inclusive. This figure was increased to US$48 billion for the 2009–2013 five year period, or nearly US$10 billion a year. PEPFAR now has programs for thirty-one separate countries (including twenty African countries) and for three distinct regions (Central America, Central Asia, and the Caribbean), but the lion's share of the money has been spent in Africa. Clearly, PEPFAR far surpasses the UNAIDS effort in funding, and doubtless in impact, but this hardly means that UNAIDS is irrelevant. For one, UNAIDS is the definitive source of global information on Aids, a task that no national government could likely perform. For another, UNAIDS operates in every African country, unlike PEPFAR, with its more limited continental scope (previously even more limited than now).

Even the impact of individual programs in specific countries cannot usually be measured in any reliable way. Consider, for instance, some of the DDR programs that the UN and affiliated agencies have undertaken in Sub-Saharan Africa. One of the most rigorous studies of a DDR program, that in Sierra Leone beginning in 1999, concluded that "Perhaps the most surprising result, however, is that we find little evidence that UN operations were instrumental in facilitating DDR at the individual level. Nonparticipants in DDR do just as well as those who entered the formal demobilization program" (Humphreys and Weinstein 2007: 563). But then the authors go on quickly to add, "The results may suggest that other factors—measurable only at the country level—may have been far more important for determining the path of reintegration than the DDR programs that were implemented in Sierra Leone". In other words, the relative success of the program is more determined by its context, than by the nature of the program itself, or how it was implemented. Another scholar (Dzinesa 2007) who looked at five DDR programs in southern African states, including three run by UN agencies and two run by national authorities, reached no obvious conclusion about the relative qualities of the programs in question. Rather, again, their success depended more on the national context that the nature or quality of the programs themselves.

Third, there is a daunting epistemological problem in assessing the impact of public policy programs like the UN programs addressing human security in Africa: it is far easier to identify when such programs "fail" than when they succeed. The outbreak of war or the advent of famine is generally covered in the media and recognized by the international community. Meanwhile, small and incremental improvements in the quality of life usually go unnoticed. The Human Development Index (a composite index of the quality of life, combining literacy rates,

life expectancy, and incomes) scores for almost all African countries have improved substantially since 1980. For SSA as a whole, the index has improved from .365 in 1980 to .460 in 2010 (where 1.0 represents complete "human development"). If this improvement were to become the focus of discussion, there is no doubt that many national governments, African and extra-African, as well as many multilateral donors, would claim a share of the credit. Surely, though, the agencies of the UNDG have contributed in some measure to this positive outcome.

Finally, as in all of its activities in the world, the UN operates in Africa both as an autonomous actor and as an agent of the member states that constitute it. The various contributors to the UN's development activities have a considerable influence over how it has operated, despite a discernible degree of autonomy in the operations of UN development agencies. Thus, both the failures and successes of UN efforts to improve human security reflect both upon the contributors to (and manipulators of) the UN, as well as upon the UN as an agent of change.

In conclusion, the bulk of the evidence suggests that the UN has been a significant player in the protection of human security in Africa since 1960. The organization has sent peacekeeping forces into two dozen different African conflicts in an effort to protect civilians from harm. Although millions have died in these conflicts, especially the post-1998 Congo wars, the UN has periodically provided a presence that has checked the more predatory activities of some armed groups. Without this presence, the toll of suffering and death would have been even higher. Following Africa's many civil wars, the UN, through both DDR at the grassroots, and diplomacy at the top, has frequently contributed to the perpetuation and solidification of fragile peace arrangements. The UNHCR has preserved life for hundreds of thousands of refugees, many of whom went on to rebuild their lives. In those countries that have been spared conflict, the UN has quietly worked to empower the down-trodden and make life incrementally better for the impoverished. If Africa's traditionally dominant external partners, Europe and the United States, continue to decline in relative economic importance in the world, then the UN system will likely increase in relative importance. In that case, the organization must redouble its efforts to enhance the impact of its human security-oriented operations in Africa.

26

THE AFRO–ARAB SECURITY NEXUS

Hussein Solomon[1]

Introduction

In recent years much has been written on the role of emergent powers – China, India, Brazil – on the African continent. In a way this literature has transplanted previous emphases on the impact of colonial powers – notably, Britain and France – and great powers – notably, the United States – on the African continent. Comparatively far less however, has focused on the impact of Arab countries on the African continent. This is a particularly glaring oversight considering the fact that the two regions' interactions go back some fourteen hundred years when Arabs and Islam entered Egypt in AD 640 (Kokole 1984: 687). Over this period, the Arab world has cast a long and overwhelmingly malevolent shadow over Africa, particularly in the security sphere.

This chapter seeks to examine the historical context of the Afro–Arab security nexus pointing out the contemporary significance of this history. Moreover it also seeks to provide an overview of the role of Arab state and non-state actors on the African continent. For the purposes of conceptual clarity and given the Arab dominance of North Africa, we will examine the Arab region as geographically consisting of large swathes of the Middle East and North Africa. Given the constraints of space, this being a chapter rather than a book, far from attempting a comprehensive overview, the aim is to provide some insight on some key themes.

In the shadow of slavery

Despite the fact that the trans-Atlantic slave trade enjoys pride of place in much literature, the Arab slave trade of Africans was far more expansive and its impact far more deleterious. Mekuria Bulcha, for instance, has estimated that over 17 million Africans were sold to the Middle East and Asia between the sixth and twentieth centuries (Bankie 2004: 79). There are other substantial differences between the Arab slave trade and the trans-Atlantic one. European slave traders never chased and captured their own slaves but bought them from African chiefs. The *modus operandi* for Arab slave traders was to raid and kidnap villagers by setting fire to huts at night and capture those fleeing from the blaze (Okumu 2002: 37). Invariably many were burnt alive in the ensuing inferno.

The conditions under which they were kept were far more monstrous than the fate awaiting those slaves from West Africa who found themselves picking cotton in the American South.

Indeed, African males in Arab countries were often castrated to work as eunuchs. The luckier ones were pressed into military service and found a speedy death on some far-away front. African females often found themselves alternatively serving as domestic workers and sex slaves (Bankie 2004: 79–80).

In the history of the Arab slave trade of Africans, there were several "Spartacus" moments. One of the most serious of these occurred in AD 869 when a group of African slaves working the salt flats east of Basra in Iraq rose up in revolt against their inhumane conditions. After fouteen years of fierce fighting, the revolt was finally put down and their leaders' heads were paraded through the streets of Baghdad (Okumu 2002: 33).

The legacy of this slavery has cast a long shadow over Afro–Arab relations. Whilst European and American countries abolished slavery in the nineteenth century, the Arab slave trade has persisted into the twentieth century and beyond. Saudi Arabia only abolished slavery in 1962 and Mauritania in 1980 with reports that it still continues in countries like Mauritania and Sudan (Okumu 2002: 37). On slavery in modern day Mauritania, Garba Diallo asserts:

> our country was the last on earth to declare slavery illegal and the only state which still refuses to take any measures to end slavery. This is because the very foundation of the Mauritanian regime is based on de facto apartheid and slavery. Thus the regime has adamantly refused to legalize the anti-slavery SOS Slaves and the Mauritanian Association of Human Rights together with the Front for the Liberation of Africans in Mauritania (FLAM). The government regards those who work for democracy, human rights and the emancipation of slaves as enemies of the state.
>
> *Tamura 2008: 8*

The slavery legacy is a particularly poignant one in contemporary Darfur which has historically seen the enslavement of the indigenous Fur. As Arab Janjaweed militia, with the support of Khartoum's government, would attack villagers in Darfur they would taunt them with names like *abeed* (slaves) and *zerga* (blacks) (Lusk 2008: 169). Small wonder, then, that the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), one of the major rebel groupings in Darfur, issued their "Black Book" in 2002 which emphasized their non-Arab ethnicity and provided an account of Arab racism in Sudan (Lusk 2008: 170).

The legacy of the Arab slave trade has unfortunately also served to inculcate racist attitudes – especially in the way Arabs interact with Africans (Lusk 2008: 168). Commenting on the enslavement of Africans, the famous fourteenth-century traveller and historian, Ibn Khaldun stated ". . . therefore, the Negro nations are, as a rule, submissive to slavery because they have little that is essentially human and have attributes that are quite similar to those of animals . . ." (Okumu 2002: 37). Conversely as noted by Setsuko Tamura, ". . . many Africans today still consider Arabs as cunning, crafty, dishonest and untrustworthy, not least because their cultural and racial arrogance continues to revive painful memories of the rampages of Arab slave traders . . ." (Tamura 2008: 7–8). There is little hope of overcoming such racial attitudes given the inability to bridge such divides at the personal level. Many Northern Sudanese parents, for instance, will not let their children to marry into "slave families" (Lusk 2008: 169). At a macro-strategic level, many South Sudanese find it difficult to reconcile with Arab insensitivity to the treatment they were handed out by Northerners and their struggle for their dignity. The Arab League, for instance, regularly issued statements labelling South Sudanese rebels as "agents of the West" and "Zionist imperialists" (Yoh 2001: 23). It is important to recognize that al-Qaeda's own narrative is not so much different from that of the Arab League. In 2006 al-Qaeda ideologue Abu Azzan al-Ansari wrote an interesting tract entitled *Al Qaeda tattajih nahwa Ifrikya* [Al-Qaeda

is moving to Africa] where he labelled John Garang, the leader of the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) at the time, as an "infidel" and labelled the war crimes against the indigenous peoples of Darfur as a war against the "Crusaders" (Paz and Terdman 2006: 3, 5). Unfortunately these racist attitudes were to persist, given slavery's twin legacy – that of Arabism and Islamism.

The legacy of Arabism and Islamism

When referring to the Arabization and Islamization of Sub-Saharan Africa, Arab scholars generally adopt a romantic and positive tone. Helmy Sharawi strongly argues that the Arabic language together with Islamic teachers and Islamic sciences played a major role in the development of the African continent (Sharawi 2004: 46). In similar vein, Yusuf Fadl Hasan, argues: "The process of conversion was both slow and generally peaceful and in time Islam became an important agent of social cohesion which brought together Sudanese peoples of different racial, cultural and linguistic origins" (Hasan 1985: 35).

The historical record, however, points to a far more nuanced picture. Whilst Swahili, Tanzania's national language, has certainly borrowed much from the Arabic language (Hasan 1985: 32), in other cases, the local languages of the Borgo, Berti and Maal of Sudan were transplanted by Arabic and the sense of identity of these local communities were forever lost (Bankie 2004: 80). Indeed Kokole convincingly argues that the twin forces of Arabism and Islamism worked to disintegrate other social and tribal groups operating in the same space (Kokole 1984: 690). Tamura is even more blunt in his assessment:

> the contacts between Arabs and Black Africans have been largely asymmetrical, in which Arabs have penetrated Africa, enslaved Africans and imposed their religion (Islam) and language (Arabic). They have viewed themselves as superior, as the conveyors of a higher civilization and tended to be patronizing towards those considered as inferior.
>
> *Tamura 2008: 7*

The issue of Arabization is not merely a cultural issue, but one intimately connected to issues of power. The use of Arabization as an element of Arab power projection was clearly understood by the Arab League. In its September 1978 report, it noted with satisfaction the Arabization activities taking place in Djibouti, Kenya and Mali and urged that budgets be increased for further Arabization activities on the continent (Yoh 2001: 16). Arabization was also about access to power in countries like Sudan where the country's political mandarins all claimed Arabic descent (Al Medani 2010: 111). Lusk points out that Sudan is run by a clique of "Arab" people from the Ja'a'in, Shaigi and Danagla tribes, to the exclusion of the majority "black"[2] Sudanese (Lusk 2008: 168). Small wonder then that issues of Arabization reinforce the fault lines between the political elite and those who feel disempowered in countries like Sudan and Libya, Mauritania and Algeria. Small wonder, too, that when the new Government of South Sudan came into being it introduced English into the school curriculum and has generally adopted processes of de-Arabization as it seeks to assert its independence.

In similar fashion the historical record also demonstrates that the spread of Islam may not be as peaceful as Sharawi and Hasan would indicate. Whilst there have certainly been cases of the peaceful conversion to Islam as a result of Muslim merchants and the ulema (clerics) (Al Medani 2010: 115), there have also been conversions as a result of intimidation and outright violence. Under the influence of purist Wahhabist interpretations of the Qu'ran which was taking place on the Arabian peninsula, similar movements emerged in West Africa, and vast swathes of territory were conquered in the name of Islam during the eighteenth and early nineteenth

centuries. These include Ibrahim Mousa who led militant Islam in Vota Kalon, the Western most tip of Africa, Suleiman Bal who carried the Islamic flag into battle in Senegal, and perhaps the most famous of them all, Sheikh Othman Dan Foudy (Kokole 1984: 689), who greatly expanded the realm of the Sokoto caliphate throughout much of northern Nigeria (Hasan 1985: 39–40).

Not only, then, was the spread of Islam on the continent also violent but increasingly it was a kind of Islam which was intolerant to other faiths. One example of this occurred on 17 May 1985 when Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Qadhafi gave a speech at the opening of a Muslim centre in Kigali, Rwanda:

> First, you must stick to your Islamic religion and insist that your children are taught the Islamic religion, and you teach the Arabic language because without the Arabic language we could not understand Islam. Furthermore, you must encourage the children of Christians to embrace Islam and the doors of the Islamic centre, the Islamic school and Hospital should be opened to the children of Christians. You must teach the children of Christians that Christianity is not the religion of Africans, that is the religion of colonialism, that Islam is the religion of God. Christianity is the religion of the French, Belgians, Germans and American enemies. It is also a religion of Jews . . . Muslims must become a force to defend their religion. You must raise your head high in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Zaire. You must raise your voice higher and declare that Allah is great because Africa must be Muslim. Africa is not Christian. Christians are intruders in Africa. Christians in Africa are agents of colonialism. We must wage a holy war so that Islam may spread in Africa . . .
>
> *Yoh 2001: 20–21*

Given the necessary financial incentives, various African dictators – including Uganda's Idi Amin (Huliaris 2001: 6) and Central African Republic's Emperor Bokassa I – were quite willing to play to Qadhafi's agenda and to turn Muslims against Christians (Tamura 2008: 8). Given Africa's ethnic and religious diversity this was a sure way to promote further conflict. Given the inherent fragility of African polities, insecurity only increased across the length and breadth of the continent. Indeed, tensions between Muslims and Christians surfaced not only in Sudan but in Ethiopia and Eritrea as well (Tamura 2008: 8). The recent attacks by the Muslim cult, Boko Haram, in Northern Nigeria against Christians and more moderate Muslims is a continuation of these historical trajectories.

There is however, another dimension to this religious conflict and this relates to the thousands of students who have left Africa to further their Islamic Studies at such Islamic institutions of higher learning as Al-Azhar in Egypt, Al-Uzai in Lebanon, the University of Damascus in Syria and scores of such institutions in Saudi Arabia. It has been noted that most of these students upon their return to their respective countries are more radical than those who remained behind (Yoh 2001: 14). Indeed according to John Yoh:

> Most of the students from Africa who studied in the Middle East are accused of being behind the religious conflicts that have been going on in Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, and Tanzania. In fact, some reports in most West and East African media suggest that those students who studied in the Middle East are often recruited before their departure to their various countries into some radical religious group operating in guise, a humanitarian agency, causing inter-religious conflicts in Africa. It is this group of students that are considered to be the source of the so-called Islamic radicalism in Africa. Some of these groups are said to be connected with Islamic organizations operating in

> Africa under the guise of religious agencies, some of which were accused a couple years ago to be behind domestic conflicts and public insecurities in Zanzibar, Tanzania; Kampala, Uganda; Cape Town, South Africa; and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
>
> *Yoh 2001: 14–15*

It is important to recognize that the growth of radical Wahhabist Islam also caused tremendous tensions within Africa's Muslim community which subscribed to a more moderate Islam which was also open to traditional African customs and practices (Al Medani 2010: 115). Many African Muslims were Sufi in orientation. This form of the Islamic faith was more personal and more emotional, stressing the love of God as opposed to the fear of God. Moreover Sufi Islam co-existed with the richness of pre-Islamic folk customs (Viorst 1995: 48). The intrusion of Wahhabist inspired radical Islam in places like Somalia saw increased conflict between moderate Sufi orders and the radical Al-Shabaab Islamists. When Al-Shabaab Islamists, who viewed Sufis as apostates, desecrated the graves of Sufi saints, they chose to fight back under the banner of Ahlus Sunna wal Jama'a (Solomon 2011a).

The capture by radical Islamists of an African state not only had negative repercussions for the local citizens but was also felt much further afield. A case in point is Sudan following the 1989 coup which brought Omar el Bashir and the National Islamic Front (renamed the National Congress Party after 1999) to power. Peter Kagwanja notes that Sudan quickly became the epicentre of the militant Islamist world:

> providing shelter to Islamist fighters, including Abu Nidal, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Gama' al Islamiyya, Hamas, Hezbollah and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In 1991–1996, Osama bin Laden used his base in Sudan to consolidate his networks and to support terrorist groups in Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and other sub-Saharan countries. Khartoum not only provided aid and shelter to extremist groups such as the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia in Ethiopia, the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, and the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), but also covertly aided Gama' al Islamiyya's abortive attempt on President Hosni Mubarak's life in Addis Ababa in July 1995.
>
> *Kagwanja 2006: 75*

It is precisely for this reason that Somalia must not be allowed to fall into the hands of Al-Shabaab. Closely connected to the issue of radical Islamism, and its attendant terrorism, is the issue of funding.

Charities or terrorist funding?

It is incumbent on every Muslim to give a portion of one's earnings for some charitable purpose (*zakat*). It is also a religious duty to support charitable works through voluntary deeds or contributions (*sadaqah*). Whilst *zakat* is collected by the government, local mosques and religious centres in the Middle East, *sadaqah* is paid directly to the Islamic charity (Looney 2006: 1). This is, however, where the problem begins. According to Robert Looney because *zakat* and *sadaqah* are viewed as religious duties there has been little oversight of these activities. Moreover, the fact that donations have been made anonymously coupled with the opaque financial and operating structures of Islamic charities has created a perfect environment which terrorists can exploit (Looney 2006: 1). One indication of this comes from Somalia where one survey points out that 70 percent of Arab donors allowed the recipient complete autonomy to manage and disperse funds with little or no accountability (Oxfam 2011).

Recently leaked State Department cables to the whistle-blowing website Wikileaks illustrate American diplomats' frustrations with getting Arab countries to monitor these charitable donations. Indeed Saudi Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, who leads his kingdom's anti-terrorism activities was quoted as saying "if the money wants to go to terrorist causes, it will go" (Lichtblau and Schmitt 2010). A similarly fatalistic attitude was adopted by the Qatari and Kuwaiti leadership. This compelled the US officials to bemoan Islamic militants' "ability to generate money almost at will from wealthy individuals and sympathetic groups throughout the Middle East while often staying ahead of counter-terrorism officials" (Lichtblau and Schmitt 2010: 3).

The size of these charitable donations has been immense. Josh Martin estimates that since the early 1970s Middle East charities distributed US$110 billion, of which US$ 40 billion found its way to Sub-Saharan Africa, making Arab states the largest donor bloc to this region (Martin 2005: 1). There is, however, a strong belief that this figure of US$110 billion is too conservative. After all, the Saudi-based and funded Muslim World League alone has disbursed US$75 billion between 1962 when it was founded to 2002 (Looney 2006: 3).

More important than the amounts disbursed however, are the actual activities of these charities. Whilst many of these charities are involved in useful social welfare activities, providing schools and clinics to the poor, they can also contribute to political tensions by proselytising a radical Islamism which can undermine security in a given African state by exacerbating tensions between Muslims, Christians and Animists and between Wahhabi and Sufi-inclined Muslims. Salih, for instance, powerfully argues that ". . . some Muslim NGOs have been used as a vehicle for spreading political Islam at an accelerated rate combining faith and material rewards among the disenfranchized Muslim poor . . . becoming cronies to militant Muslim groups, including an emergent tide of indigenous African Islamic fundamentalist movements" (Haynes 2005: 1322).

In Somalia, for instance, the Saudi-funded al-Islah organization supports and runs numerous schools, health facilities and community centres. Whilst the organization is not violent itself, its long-term political goal is to establish a theocratic Islamic state not only within Somalia's borders but also in Somali-inhabited regions of neighbouring countries (International Crisis Group 2003: 13). At an ideological level, such a position hardly differs from the al-Qaeda-linked Al-Shabaab terrorist grouping in Somalia today. It should be noted that the diverse Sufi orders did resist al-Islah and its radical ideology "viewing it as a form of religious and cultural imperialism" (International Crisis Group 2003: 13). However these Sufi orders lacked access to the external funds of al-Islah which allowed it to propagate its Wahhabist creed and win over converts. Al-Islah received its funding from two Saudi entities – the Muslim World League and al-Haramain. The latter was designated by the United States as a terrorist entity on account of its financial ties to al-Qaeda (International Crisis Group 2003: 13).

More than just providing such organizations with money, Saudi and Kuwaiti backers are also alleged to provide them with protection through corruption. Peter Kagwanja asserts that funds from the Africa Muslim Agency (a Kuwaiti charity), the CIFA Development Group (a joint Tanzanian-Saudi investment venture) and the Saudi-based petroleum company Oilcom were used to bribe corrupt members of Tanzania's ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi party to turn a blind eye to the spread of Wahhabist Islam (Kagwanja 2006: 77).

Indeed throughout East Africa, security officials have witnessed the close relationships between some Gulf-funded Muslim charities and local extremist groupings which have been undermining the respective countries' security. Following the August 1998 Nairobi bombing, the Kenyan government banned five Islamic NGOs on account of their alleged sympathies and funding of local Islamic fundamentalists. Those banned included Mercy Relief International, the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Help African People, the International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO), and the Ibrahim Bin Abdul Aziz Al Ibrahim Foundation (Haynes 2005: 1324). In similar

vein, the European Intelligence Agency contends that Uganda's Islamist extremists are receiving support from the IIRO, the Islamic African Relief Agency, the World Islamic Call Society, the International Islamic Charitable Foundation, the African Charitable Society for Mother and Child Care and the Sudanese National Islamic Front (Haynes 2005: 1325).

The underlying point being made is that without Arab radical Islamist indoctrination and financial support emanating from the Arab states, Islamic militancy in Sub-Saharan African would not have been as severe a problem both in scale and magnitude as it is currently.

Hezbollah on the African continent

In the previous section we witnessed the role of Arab charities interaction with and financing local Islamic fundamentalist groups in Africa. Here we turn to the role of Middle East terrorist groups, in the form of Hezbollah (Party of God), on the African continent.

The globalization of terror is a reality. Lakshar-e-Taiba emerged to challenge New Delhi on the issue of Kashmir but increasingly its demands have expanded; its operations have gone global, while its list of enemies has grown. Similarly Al-Shabaab's activities are neither confined to Somalia nor to the Horn of Africa – rather its recruitment drive, financial activities, operations and influence have spread as far afield as Copenhagen, Cape Town and Minneapolis.

However, neither of these terror networks can compete with the operational range and depth that is Hezbollah in scope, magnitude and variety. There is abundant evidence which points to the fact that this Iranian-funded and controlled (Karmon 2009), Shia-Lebanese group has gone global – operating in and beyond the territorial confines of the Lebanese state. In February 2003, the then Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director George Tenet declared that "Hezbollah, as an organization, with capability and worldwide presence, is [al-Qaeda's] equal, if not a far more capable organisation" (Levitt 2005: 3).

Whilst Hezbollah's activities have spanned the globe from the Americas to Asia, it is in Africa where a far fuller range of activities are exposed. These include ideological indoctrination, military training, criminal activities, the setting up of local proxies, the destabilization of existing regimes and support for other, more odious regimes. As Major James Love notes, Hezbollah's tried and tested *modus operandi* is also used on the African continent to great effect. Fledgling Hezbollah cells use subtle infiltration techniques to gain access to an area without drawing attention. They gain the trust of the local populace by conducting charity fundraising activities and other social welfare programmes. This resonates very well amongst Africa's poor whose own politicians seem unresponsive to the needs of their citizens whilst they themselves accumulate wealth. Having gained the trust of the locals, the Hezbollah cell commences to recruit from the local population, allowing the cell to begin operations. Cells would not be able to operate without building a popular support base (Love 2010).

Hezbollah's support for local organizations in the form of radial Shi'ite cleric Shaykh Ibrahim Zakzaky's Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) also serves to destabilize existing regimes. This was graphically illustrated when IMN members audaciously attacked the motorcade of the Emir of Zazzau, Alhaji Shehu Idris, who was on his way to a security meeting in Kaduna where the IMN was under discussion. It subsequently emerged that IMN members were instructed on religious and military matters in Iran. Military training by Hezbollah has also been undertaken on the African continent itself. As early as 1996, Israel lodged a complaint with the South African government regarding the existence of five Hezbollah training camps in the country (Solomon 2011b: 53).

Hezbollah's support for Africa's rogue regimes is seen in their proximity to Liberia's warlord President Charles Taylor (Levitt 2005: 10) currently standing trial in The Hague, Zaire's

(now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) kleptocratic President Mobutu Sese Seko, as well as Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe regime. In all three cases it was not ideological conviction but rather the criminal enterprise around diamond smuggling which was the cement which bound these parties together. Consequently conflict diamonds from West Africa via Hezbollah-aligned Lebanese dealers found their way to Beirut, Antwerp, Dubai, and Mumbai. Similarly a Partnership Africa Canada report suggested Lebanese involvement in the smuggling of rough diamonds to Dubai and Mumbai. Whilst ruling apparatchiks drew benefits from this illicit trade, their people languished in poverty and their democratic aspirations were suppressed (Solomon 2011b: 52–53).

Meanwhile, Hezbollah received tremendous economic largesse from these criminal endeavours. Whilst exact figures are unknown, it is said to accrue tens of millions of dollars per annum. Some insight into this occurred on 25 December 2003 when a charter flight – UTA 141 – from Cotonou, Benin to Beirut crashed, killing all the passengers including senior Hezbollah members. They were carrying US$ 2 million in cash (Levitt 2005: 4–5). In recent years Hezbollah criminal activities have also encompassed drug-trafficking from South America to West Africa and from there into Western Europe (Wyler and Cook 2009). Money from Hezbollah's criminal arm then found its way to fund Hezbollah's terrorist operations. Hezbollah's coffers are also supplemented by a variety of charities and front organizations it has set up. One such is the Karballah Foundation for Liberation in South Africa (Levitt 2005: 7). It should be noted that in addition to this, Hezbollah also receives US$ 200 million per annum from Tehran (Holland and Dehally 2009).

Whilst understanding the financial imperative behind any terrorist entity, what is the larger game plan? Here we need to understand that Hezbollah is not so much an independent entity but part and parcel of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (VEVAK). The underlying objective behind Hezbollah's activities then seems to be an attempt by Iran to create multiple fronts from which to strike at Western (largely American and Israeli) targets in the event of a military strike on its nuclear facilities (Melman and Javedanfar 2007: 209). The existence of such an unconventional capability they hope would also serve to deter any such attack.

It would seem history is once more repeating itself. As in the Cold War, so too now, Africa's security is being compromized in the face of largely external power struggles.

Interventionism: between patronizing asymmetry and regime change

Arab states have attempted to intervene positively in Sub-Saharan Africa through development and conflict resolution initiatives. Soon after coming to power, Egypt's strong man Gamal Abdul Nasser pursued the notion of Afro–Arab solidarity. The avowed purpose of such solidarity was to improve the lot of Africans south of the Sahara. In reality, various African authors pointed to Nasser's notion of Afro–Arab solidarity as less about partnership and more about asymmetry (Tamura 2008: 11). Indeed Nasser's view of Egypt in Africa was equally as patronizing as the notion of "white man's burden". This is clearly evident in Nasser's *The Philosophy of the Revolution*, where he argued:

> Surely the people of Africa will continue to look to us – we who are the guardians of the Continent's northern gate, we who constitute the connecting link between the Continent and the outside world. We certainly cannot, under any condition, relinquish our responsibility to help to do our utmost in spreading the light of knowledge and civilization up to the very depths of the virgin jungles of the Continent.
>
> *Tamura 2008: 11*

Beyond the patronizing tone however, it must be noted that Nasser did provide scholarships for thousands of African students to study in Egypt. Whilst some pursued degrees in education, commerce and engineering which was a boon to the recently decolonized countries where such skills were scare, it is also true, as was mentioned earlier, that many others returned to their respective countries imbued with a radical Islamist perspective which undermined national unity, and therefore, security in the country.

More recently, the Emirate of Qatar has attempted to play the role of mediator in the ongoing carnage in Darfur in 2009. Some, however, have criticized Qatari efforts, pointing out that such attempts at mediation were more about Qatar attempting to gain influence in the region than real concerns about the plight of Darfuris (Rockower 2011: 3). Darfuri rebels were also wary of Qatar, believing that it could not play the role of honest broker on account of its very good relations with the two main wings of the Islamist movement in Sudan – President Bashir's National Congress Party (NCP) and Hassan al-Turabi's Peoples' Congress Party (PCP). Moreover, Julie Flint has pointed out that as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2006–2007, Qatar had abstained on the vote to create a UN peacekeeping force for Darfur in 2008 (Flint 2010: 33). Furthermore, it was Qatar which was the first Arab country to accuse the International Criminal Court (ICC) of interfering in the internal affairs of Sudan (Flint 2010: 33). Given the lack of trust the rebels had in Qatar being able to play the role of an impartial mediator, it was no wonder that the Doha mediation failed.

Arab intervention in the affairs of Sub-Saharan Africa took on a far more aggressive stance in the way Qadhafi's Libya interacted with Africa south of the Sahara. Qadhafi sought to propagate his version of Islam on the continent whilst at the same time isolating Israel and undermining those African governments perceived to be close to the West and Israel (Huliaris 2001: 5–6; Ogunbadejo 1986). Amongst those pro-Western regimes targeted by Qadhafi were Niger, Senegal and Burkina Faso. The *modus operandi* pursued by Qadhafi was to support a "liberation movement" within the country to topple the government which earned the ire of the Libyan leader. Thus, the successful August 1983 coup of Captain Thomas Sankara against the pro-Western incumbent, Jean-Baptiste Ouedrago, in Burkana Faso was financially supported by Qadhafi (Tamura 2008: 18). It was in Libyan training camps where Charles Taylor, leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and later warlord-president of Liberia recruited his initial military force to seize power in Liberia. Foday Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUFSL) was also the creation of Libyan training camps (Huliaris 2001: 6). Both these movements served to engulf the West African region in a protracted period of painful civil war.

Libyan involvement in the affairs of African states also took more direct forms. In 1978, for instance, Libya airlifted troops and supplies to Uganda to protect their proxy, Idi Amin of Uganda, from a Tanzanian invasion. This proved to be a dismal failure for the Libyans (Huliaris 2001: 6). In more recent times, Libyan actions have served to increase conflict dynamics. From the 1990s, for instance, Libyan pistols and automatic rifles found their way into Sudan's troubled Darfur region (Lusk 2008: 166). In more recent years, Qadhafi's Libya found itself once more supporting pariah regimes across the African continent. In March 2011, a Stockholm Institute for Peace Research (SIPRI) study found that Tripoli was supplying arms to Mugabe's Zimbabwe (Jeuck 2011: 1). Needless to say that these arms were used by Mugabe's thuggish security forces to suppress political dissent and undermine the human security of the citizens in this blighted country.

The future of Afro–Arab relations: beyond the Arab Spring

For the past 1400 years Arabs interacted with the African continent. On balance, this relationship was an asymmetrical one and one which cast a long and enduring malevolent shadow across

Sub-Saharan Africa. The twin legacies of slavery and Arabism and Islamism served to undermine security for ordinary Africans. This was further exacerbated by the advent of terrorism on the continent abetted by funding from the Gulf states and ideological indoctrination which further exacerbated tensions within African societies. In addition, the entry of Iran and Hezbollah on the African continent has not only increased the terrorist menace but has also served to enhance criminal activities, specifically narco-trafficking, on the continent. Moreover, Arab interventionism on the African continent has further served to intensify sources of insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Some, however, have argued that following the Arab Spring, the Arab world may well be exerting a positive influence over Sub-Saharan Africa (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies 2011). It has been asserted that following the popular uprisings which swept the corrupt and authoritarian regimes in Tunis, Cairo and Tripoli away, the democratic impulse has been strengthened on the continent. Indeed following the toppling of the ancient regimes in these three North African states, there have been protests in more than a dozen African capitals. Protestors demanded greater political pluralism, transparency and accountability (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies 2011: 1). These demands are certainly to be welcomed on a continent where 40 percent of Africa's states continue to be organized around authoritarian governing principles (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies 2011: 2). At the same time, one is unsure of the future trajectory of the Jasmine Revolution in North Africa and the Arab world. The Muslim Brotherhood seems to be strengthening its hand in post-Mubarak Egypt and the remnants of the extremist Libyan Islamic Fighting Group seem to be occupying senior positions in the National Transitional Council. If Islamists do come to power in much of the Arab world, we should expect the shadow of malevolence over Sub-Saharan Africa to continue.

Notes

1 The author would like to acknowledge the funding he received from the National Research Foundation (NRF) in pursuit of his research.

2 "Arab" and "Black" are placed in inverted commas on account of the fact that there was a tremendous amount of intermarriage between Arabs and indigenous peoples over the years and that these categories in Sudan are more cultural in orientation rather than ethnic.

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STILL "GETTING AWAY WITH IT"

France's Africa defense and security policy

Boubacar N'Diaye

Introduction

A generation ago, the provocative title of an article seemed to have aptly captured what was then an indisputable puzzle for students of Franco–African relations, and many lay Africans: "A certain Mystery: How Can France Do Everything That It Does in Africa and Get Away with It?" its author mused (Golan 1981). Then, only twenty years after it had granted political independence to most of its former colonial possessions, and at the height of the Cold War, France was indeed omnipresent in its former colonies on the continent and seemed to always have its own way, as Tamar Golan convincingly illustrated. France was indeed the unabashed *gendarme de l'Afrique* (Africa's policeman), as the cliché went. It pulled out military interventions as it saw fit, and its presidents, veritable overlords over Francophone Africa, carried on questionable, even unsavory, relations with their African counterparts. So in control of most of Francophone Africa was France that one of its Prime Ministers had no qualms proclaiming that merely "with 500 men" France could determine the fate of the continent (Marshall and Banégas 2005: 6).

But that was then, it might be argued. Much is supposed to have changed in the thirty years since, and indeed much has changed. Nevertheless, on December 5, 2011, listening to former Ivoirian President Laurent Gbagbo, the first head of state to be arraigned by the International Criminal Court (ICC), recount that he "was arrested under French bombs while his palace was surrounded by French tanks," it is conceivable that many, certainly those receptive to his side of the story, would be asking the same perplexing, mystifying question Golan had once posed. Perhaps many who observed France's decisive role in the dismantling of Colonel Kaddafi's regime and his own dramatic demise a few weeks earlier, in fact, did. These two events illustrate the unmistakable fact that France continues to play a major role in Africa's security affairs.

As several observers have noted and appreciated varyingly, so much has happened in the multifaceted relations between France and Africa over the last several decades, particularly in the area of defense and security (N'Diaye 2009; Chafer 2002; Gregory 2000; Ela 2000). Of course, the entire context in which these relations took place changed significantly. Most notable among countless developments and presumed change factors was in May 2007, the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as France's sixth Fifth Republic president and his vow to transform these relations. This promise was almost certainly so as to address some aspects of the widely shared criticism underlying Golan's damning question.

To chronicle and analyze Franco–African relations will require understanding of these changes, the forms they took, their causes and consequences, and their impact on the defense and security dimensions of these relations. It will entail, most certainly, examining also what has remained a constant in these relations: France's determination to remain relevant, indeed to remain in control, in the security dynamics of the continent while both France and African states struggle to adapt to their fast changing political, policy, and security environments. This new security environment is characterized by emerging or worsening security challenges African states are striving to tackle, individually, or collectively through the African Union (AU) and its RECs (Regional Economic Communities). These challenges compound Africa's chronic security crisis.[1] They are, among others:

- lingering praetorianism;
- mounting terrorism and related transnational criminality and maritime piracy;
- proliferation of small arms and light weapons (and in some cases weapons of war);
- struggle for the control of national resources;
- efforts at reforming dysfunctional security sectors, including by redefining the very concept of security in Africa's fledgling democracies.

This chapter examines Franco–African relations by focusing on France's role in framing, shaping, adapting, and steering the continent's defense and security framework in past years, and its continued efforts to remain consequential in how Africa (Francophone Africa in particular) addresses the above-enumerated security challenges.

The fundamental philosophical, political and cultural underpinnings of that framework, that is, the notion that France and its former colonies, by virtue of historical and human ties and the common use of the French language are bound together by a special relationship that warrants close cooperation and France's support and aid, remained constant. This argument is continuously reinforced by elites in France and in African countries even as it is being undermined by the arrival of new actors, such as China, and the United States, the latter now unrestrained by Cold War understandings. However, over the last half a century the defense and security framework itself has undergone a number of marked changes.

The changes Franco–African relations underwent are briefly discussed, with the focus on the characteristics of the defense and security framework that currently prevail and on how they too have been changing to adapt to new realities. The extent to which President Sarkozy transformed the framework and its workings is evaluated by briefly examining a few instances that tested his resolve to create a more legitimate framework for France's relations with Africa.

Post-colonial defense and security: the founding framework

France's involvement in and, to some extent, its shaping of Africa's security environment can be said to have started with its colonial enterprise, centuries ago, as it became necessary to pacify areas of the continent where more or less organized resistance to colonial domination had to be suppressed militarily (and the ambitions of its major rivals then, notably Great Britain, checked). That involvement continued throughout the colonial period during which armed, often brutal, force had to be used to maintain the subjugation of recalcitrant colonial subjects and impose the colonial order. As has been argued, the colonial authorities' philosophy and method of relying on, and their unrestrained use of, force as an instrument of governance framed much of the postcolonial state's character and relations with the governed (Young 2009: 33–34). It was, however, during the independence era, starting in the 1960s, when the colonial system proved

unsustainable, that France played a decisive role in designing for its own purposes the framework that was to define (Francophone) Africa's defense and security framework for most of the last fifty years.

As the end of the colonial relationship became inevitable, France set out to recast its relations with its former colonies in all areas, most markedly the area of security and defense, given the context of a raging Cold War. However, the soon to be independent colonial territories were thought of merely as junior partners in a grand security scheme to safeguard and perpetuate France's geopolitical and strategic interests on the continent. A foremost scholar of Franco–African relations argues that ". . . the French government's objective in creating African national armies at the time of independence was to build up units that could work closely with French units and effectively serve as branches of the French army overseas" (Martin 1995: 178).

It was in this international political context and single-minded determination that a number of defense and security agreements were signed on a bilateral basis with each newly independent state. Between 1960 and 1993, two dozens agreements were signed between France and most of its former colonies; Zimbabwe, a former British colony being added much later (Renou 2002: 10). Of course, the agreements were tailored to the relative geopolitical significance of a given country, but they all had some of the following, often in combination: a commitment of France to the defense and internal stability of the country; military cooperation, including the presence of French military advisors and technical assistants; and in a few cases the stationing of French troops on the territory of an African country. These agreements also entailed the obligation for African countries to buy French military equipment and weaponry and to sell strategic material exclusively or on a priority basis to France. The economic aspect of these agreements is sometimes overlooked, but as Guy Martin has consistently demonstrated, France's economic interests and its access, on extremely favorable terms, to the vast strategic mineral resources of African countries was a very strong motivation for them (Martin 1985). This priority access to Africa's valuable minerals resulted, in a perverse way, in France becoming highly – perhaps dangerously – dependent (ranging from 100% on uranium, 90% bauxite, to 31% iron ore) on these strategic minerals (Martin 1995: 171).

Some of these agreements had secret clauses and were construed to commit France to the survival of regimes as well as the personal safety of heads of states (Chaigneau 1984; Chipman 1989; 1985; Luckman 1982; Crocker 1969). In a few special cases, in addition to overt clauses that commit France to intervening to repel external aggression, and reestablish political order when threatened by domestic opposition whether armed or not, this included the determination, reiterated by French presidents, to intervene militarily if French interests so dictated, whether solicited by an African head of state or not. It was eventually revealed that, in many instances, undated, signed requests for French intervention were kept in the French embassy's safe to be acted on as necessary. Of course, France retained the ultimate say on whether or not to honor the request (Chaigneau 1995). Indeed, in numerous instances, France acted repeatedly either to protect or to save friendly regimes and occasionally to topple (or let topple) regimes that fell out of favor.

These opaque clauses and their impact on the perception most critics have of Franco–African relations were explicitly referred to by none other than President Sarkozy himself in his February 2008 speech in Cape Town, which was framed as the expression of France's will to write a new page of its relations with the continent[2] (more on this below). The relationship that prevailed was one in which France was entirely in control of a network of permanent military bases (referred to as *dispositif*): in Djibouti, Gabon, Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire, which it could use to intervene anywhere in Africa, and for reasons it alone determined. At the height of French military activism on the continent, there were a total of 15,000 troops in the late 1980s

(though down from their peak of 30,000 in the 1960s) (French White Paper 2008). Along with these troops are also pre-positioned equipment and armament to enable force projection (combat aircraft and helicopters as well as troop transport and electronic surveillance assets).

This situation has evolved for the military bases in Dakar and Côte d'Ivoire in recent years. France and Senegal negotiated, not without some unstated tensions, the closing of the Ouakam base near Dakar, at the request of the Senegalese government, symbolically to coincide with Senegal's fiftieth anniversary.[3] This left France with permanent military bases in only Gabon and Djibouti. Above and beyond the *dispositif*, France could also count on its external operations capabilities, which it has occasionally stationed and used in its former colonies on the continent, as well as in Zaire (now the DRC), in Chad, the Central African Republic (CAR), and in Rwanda (Hébert 2008).

These arrangements with its former colonies enabled France to weigh decisively in on security-related events on the continent throughout the four last decades of the twentieth century. Whether in 1964 in Gabon to restore power to President Léon M'Ba, victim of a coup d'état, or in 1979, to mount a military operation to overthrow an embarrassing emperor Jean Bedel Bokassa of the CAR, or carrying out *Operation Turquoise* during the Rwanda genocide, France did indeed do whatever it pleased "and [did] get away with it" as Golan would put it. In a few instances, such as in the Comoros and Zaire, France was happy to let mercenaries do the job.

Golan's take notwithstanding, Xavier Renou convincingly argued after taking unreservedly advantage of its former colonies in every respect, France may well have overreached in the interventions it carried in central Africa. In Rwanda, in particularly, it was accused of propping the Habyarimana regime to the point of abetting the 1994 genocide. According to Renou, this caused catastrophic outcomes in the region with large-scale human suffering and institutional collapse and a significant backlash both on the continent and domestically, forcing France to adjust: to these sentiments, to emergent financial constraints, to hard realities on the ground, and to new developments in the international system (Renou 2002).

The vagaries of the defense and security framework

Starting in the 1990s, France's impact on the defense and security agenda on the continent did evolve as a result of the convergence of all the factors Renou mentions, and on which there is a broad consensus on the part of observers of France's relations with Africa generally, and Francophone Africa specifically. The first overarching factor was of course the end of the Cold War in 1989. The ideological rivalry between the West and the Soviet block profoundly affected Franco–African relations. Indeed, it justified France unreservedly backing some of the most brutal and repressive regimes. The most notable was Mobutu's for whom France had to intervene militarily several times. However, Gabon's Bongo, Togo's Eyadema, Côte d'Ivoire's Houphouet-Boigny, and Burkina Faso's Compaoré, were other notable examples of France's diplomatic, political, and military support to authoritarian regimes in the name of preventing the spread of communism to Africa and for keeping a large voting block solidly on the side of the West in the United Nations arena.

Prior to their electoral victory the socialists had stridently decried the questionable relations that came to define Franco–African interactions in the defense and security area, starting with General Charles de Gaulle and culminating with President Valery Giscard d'Estaing's scandals involving Central African diamonds in exchange for political support for emperor Bokassa. In particular, the socialists scorned the shady, personalized relations between the Gaullist regime and nearly all African conservative regimes, concocted over the years from the Africa cell in the Élysée Palace by Jacques Foccart, an *éminence grise* to Gaullist presidents. The same personalized

relations and dealings continued, nevertheless, with President François Mitterrand's appointment of his own son, Jean Christophe Mitterrand, as the "Mr. Africa". This position of senior advisor for "African Affairs" is always reserved for the president's trusted inner circle members and entails the handling of delicate affairs better left secret. While aspects of these affairs involved shady dealings, such as recycling illicit money as was later revealed,[4] ultimately, they were also about high state-to-state security matters, such as regime maintenance in a typically coup prone environment.

As the Cold War logic receded, starting with the *La Baule* conference in June 1990, France began to rhetorically acknowledge the correlation between (abysmal) governance in African countries and France's ties with African regimes. President François Mitterrand's proclamation that henceforth France would tie its financial support to the democratization efforts to be undertaken in African countries amounted to a clear-cut departure from previous long-standing policies. Evidently, beyond mere financial support, it was the security and defense framework which guaranteed the stability, in some cases the survival, of many a francophone African regime that was at stake.

The speech shocked most Franco–African summit-going heads of states who had long relied on the unwavering backing of France, into a sober reevaluation of the new realities created by the collapse of the Soviet Union. What was to be labeled the "*La Baule Doctrine*" would have a reshuffling effect on the defense and security framework that obtained for the last thirty years. While the psychological effect was real (it sent the most entrenched authoritarian regimes scrambling to adjust to the new French edict), reality started also to set in for France itself as to the implications of the new policy in the new geopolitical environment dawning in the early 1990s.

The rhetoric imposed by the 1990s "democracy" and "good governance" discourse, took a life of its own and affected the perceptions and expectations of French and Africans alike (particularly a frustrated and impatient African civil society). What was missing in practice, though, was the political will of policymakers on both sides, to really create the conditions of radically transforming their defense and security compact and to adjust it genuinely to the imperatives of democracy both in the relationship itself, in domestic institutions, and in the behavior of the security sector actors involved.

Neither France, nor its African partners, actually envisaged a full overhaul, as Pascal Chaigneau reckoned (Chaigneau 1995: 51), and neither felt the need to purposely question the bases of their security arrangements even after the *La Baule* pronouncements. The new era of democratization would not change much of the security arrangement hatched thirty years earlier. This sums up the fundamental contradiction built into that arrangement.

The fact that immediately after the end of the Cold War a number of crises started to creep up in Francophone Africa (for example the Tuareg rebellions in Mali and Niger, and instability and large-scale violence in the Great Lakes regions) did not make matters easier, however. On the contrary, it helped to put the pursuit of good governance in general, (and more democratically minded defense and security relations in particular) on the back burner rather quickly. An illustration of this turnaround was that, at the Libreville and Bearitz Francophone summits the French government left no doubt that it was ready to backtrack on the *La Baule Doctrine*. Then Socialist Prime Minister Pierre Bérégovoy advised African heads of states that, given the choice between democratization, development, and security, they should first insure security (surely defined as regime or state security), their next priority should be economic development, and only then should democratization be a concern (Glaser and Smith 1994: 102).[5] Gaullist Jacques Chirac, who was to be elected to the French presidency in 1995 had no qualms stating in 1990, in essence, that Africa was not ripe for democracy.[6] Clearly, the *La Baule* spirit rapidly gave way

to *realpolitik* and the sober reevaluation of what was in the strategic and political interest of France and its partner regimes. In this case, being true to the *La Baule Doctrine* proved potentially too destabilizing for the perpetuation of France's postcolonial arrangements with its African partners. As Guy Martin has concluded, this only illustrates "the perennial tension between continuity and change in Franco–African relations" as France managed to maintain a deft "creative ambiguity" in its African policy pronouncements and actions (Martin 1995: 182).

In the mid 1990s, President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo succeeded in staying in power despite EU sanctions, thanks in part to France's support. The new political and economic realities of the post-Cold War era, as well as dynamics inherent to the French political system itself, including a redesign of France's security posture, resulted in institutional readjustments in French bureaucracy (merger of the Ministry of International Cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). These bureaucratic adjustments were supposed to impact the set-up and substance of the Franco–African relations, and not just in financial terms, though as Chafer notes, both in real terms and as a percentage of GDP, French financial assistance declined between 1994 and 2000 by 13.2 billion Francs, that is, a 27% drop (Tony 2002: 352). It should also be noted, however, that France remains the biggest investor in Africa, with nearly US$ 4.5 billion in investment in 2007, and despite a decrease in its share of French aid (from 59% in 2003 to 43% in 2008), Sub-Saharan Africa continues to receive the highest percentage of France's assistance to the developing world (Barrios 2010: 3, 4). While these economic considerations cannot but affect France's security policies, policymakers had to contend with other political parameters.

The "neither, nor" interlude

Paradoxically, the spread and deepening of Africa's numerous security crises and the rapidly changing and increasingly challenging global environment conspired to ensure that the overall Franco–African defense and security framework is not fundamentally altered, certainly not to the detriment of France's interests. These two variables also led France to design creative ways to "Africanize" and to "multilateralize" efforts to face the increasing number of crises in Africa, while adapting to a new financial stringency dictated by France's own difficult economic situation and the duties of its leadership in Europe. Furthermore, there was the separate impact of the French political phenomenon of *cohabitation* on the framework in the late 1990s, when the socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin shared power with the right-wing Gaullist President Jacques Chirac. As already noted, although French elites on both sides of the political divide are in agreement regarding the need to promote French interests and preeminence in Africa, traditionally, they have divergent views on the military interventions that have been a recurring phenomenon in French policy in Africa since the 1960s. The Socialists' approach, while not renouncing the prerogative to intervene in Africa, was in essence a "neither interference, nor indifference" (in short "neither, nor" proposition) when a crisis occurs (de Combles de Nayves 2000: 15). The caveat was that France should not intervene just to save a (typically conservative) political regime threatened by its political opposition, whether armed or not.

Upon coming to power, and doubtless acknowledging that business as usual in Franco–African relations was no longer defensible, President Chirac declared in 1996 that the era of military interventions was over, submitting, however, that France still had responsibilities toward and commitments to an Africa still facing security crises. To appreciate this statement it should be recalled, as Martin points out, that between 1986 and 1993 only, France had intervened militarily no fewer than ten times to rescue some of its staunchest allies threatened to be toppled by reinvigorated oppositions, to great financial cost (Martin 1995: 181).

Among the test cases of this *cohabitation* in foreign affairs and the French president's stated policy was the military coup in Côte d'Ivoire in 1999. Côte d'Ivoire has always been one of the key countries in the former French colonies (the *pré-carré*), with, for example, the second highest number of French nationals and French capital amounting to 60% of foreign investments (Bagayoko-Penone 2003: 604). Indeed French presidents made no secret about their determination to intervene in Côte d'Ivoire if needs be (Gaillard 1995: 288).[7] On Christmas Eve 1999, when a mutiny turned into a full-blown coup d'état, the divergence in the approaches of the partners in the *cohabitation* ended up paralyzing the French establishment and leading to the success of the coup. In this case, the logic of the Franco–African defense and security compact, which would have led to a French military intervention to save the regime of President Henri Konan Bédié (as President Chirac would have wished), was not followed, and there was no intervention. The reality was that the fate of Côte d'Ivoire was literally decided by a gridlock in the French political system. Of course, the aftermath of this coup and its long-term effects on the country,[8] and on French involvement in African security crises were dire (see below).

Chirac and the "new interventionism"

In 2002, the *cohabitation* ended with the electoral victory of the right, which gave it total control of the state apparatus. As already mentioned, insisting that France still had responsibilities toward and commitments to Africa, and that the continent was still vulnerable to security crises, President Chirac remained keen on reasserting the traditional powers of the Elysée Palace's "Africa cell" (indeed its lock) on African affairs. As Pierre Pascallon states, without fanfare, even with some subtlety, he "re-engaged" Africa. "Once again militarily involved in Africa . . . France seem[ed] to wish to take up the challenge of becoming the leader of the planet's most [crisis-prone] continent", a "new-interventionism" of sorts (Pascallon 2004), after the previous form showed its limits in the mid to late 1990s.

This new approach was rapidly tested in Côte d'Ivoire when a coup attempt-turned rebellion broke out on September 19, 2002. While President Chirac did not honor Ivoirian President Laurent Gbagbo's request to intervene on his side against the rebels (most likely because of Gbabgo's "socialist" leanings), France was soon sucked into a conflict it tried to manage as it best could, keeping in mind what was at stake: its important economic interests in this strategically situated country and the safety of its citizens numbering nearly 20,000. France limited its action to preventing the rebels from overrunning loyal forces and marching on the capital, Abidjan.

As the post-2002 French security policy was being rationalized and refined, the French military found itself forced to intervene once again militarily, in early November 2004, in Côte d'Ivoire. First, it destroyed the small air force after nine of its soldiers were killed in Bouaké in a governmental forces raid.[9] Shortly thereafter its military had to fend off crowds in the streets of Abidjan. This painful exercise only showed how anachronistic and utterly problematic French unilateral military interventions had become. In 2006, under the new Chiraquian approach, the French military intervened again in the Central African Republic from their military base in Boali to lend a hand to François Bozizé as he battled a low-intensity but highly destabilizing armed rebellion. Given the connections between the security situations in the CAR and Chad, France found an approach that would safeguard its interests in these two countries (preventing potentially hostile rebellions in countries that are not only strategically situated, but are also the repositories of important strategic minerals, namely oil and uranium).

Despite the November 2004 intervention in Côte d'Ivoire, France's approach to safeguarding its security interests had evolved toward systematically legitimizing its military involvements on the continent by multilateralizing them. This has entailed having them sanctioned by international

organizations such as the United Nations or the European Union, and having them formally approved by African continental or regional organizations such as the African Union or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Already in 2000, Shaun Gregory notes that "the key novelty in French policy has been multilateralism – and 'Africanization' of regional security . . ." (Gregory 2000: 442).

Africanizing and "multilateralizing" France's security agenda

This French approach was partly in reaction to the United States' policy (starting with the Clinton administration) of building African capacities so that African states can meet their own security challenges, in particular responding effectively to crises. To do this, the US had set up the likes of ACRI (African Crisis Response Initiative) later ACOTA (Africa Contingency Operations Training). France, too, needed to adapt to the multiplication of African crises in the same vein. Its solution was to set up, in 1997, RECAMP (*Renforcement de Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix*), in other words, to build Africa's own peacekeeping capabilities (through training, equipment and funding of African troops, and, if needs be, joint interventions with them). The goal is to eliminate the need for France to have to unilaterally deploy its troops and possibly spill the blood of its soldiers in order to quell violence, defend its interests, and protect its citizens.

Endorsed by the Franco–African summit of heads of states in 1998, RECAMP consists of two-year cycles of joint training and military maneuvers organized between France and various African regional organizations (ECOWAS, South African Development Community (SADC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)).[10] It was under a RECAMP concept that in 1999, for example, a peacekeeping force made up of contingents from a number of ECOWAS member states was sent to stabilize a crisis situation in Guinea Bissau, and later in 2002 in Côte d'Ivoire.[11]

Whatever its record since its inception, objectively, it is undeniable that RECAMP did constitute progress compared to the previous French approach. However, as argued elsewhere:

> RECAMP may improve the operational capacity of African militaries and even help crystallize the notion of common African responses to future crises, indeed the African Union has somewhat endorsed it. However, it certainly does not contribute to the elimination of dependency of African states, Francophone Africa in particular, nor does it do anything to eliminate the dysfunctions in the security sector that are the root of (or exacerbate) most of those crises.
>
> *N'Diaye 2009: 22–23*

The Europeanization of French interventions in African security crises started with the *Artémis Operation* in 2003, which deployed in the DRC's Ituri province at the request of the then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Anan. This request made to the French government was clearly an acknowledgement of the history of France's past interventions, on-going interests, and experience, in the DRC. Mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1484 as the lead nation, France deftly seized upon the mandate to involve its European partners and exercise leadership.

Concluding his critical assessment of operation *Artémis,* Kees Homan states, "*Artémis* was more a French operation with an EU cover, than an EU operation led by the French. Without French leadership the EU operation would not have happened" (Homan 2007: 3). That leadership would pay dividends years later when France singlehandedly pushed for operation European Union Force (EUFOR) Chad/CAR (a much riskier and more determinant intervention for its interests in its former colonies in Central Africa). EU members played their part in EUFOR with much

more conviction than *Artemis* (see below), as the European Union thought through its own worldwide security strategy. There is no doubt that this multilateralization had economic benefits in that it eased the financial burden France used to shoulder alone in pursuit of its security interests in Africa.

Dennis Tull concludes that the new approach to its (security) relations with the continent, discussed above,

> suggests that France intends to change its strategies and instruments in its Africa policy while maintaining for the time being the same goals as before, or at least not subjecting them to fundamental revision. In other words, the French government, at least under president Chirac, [pursued] a multilateral course that [enabled] it to take the leadership role within EU in relations with Africa, even as he concedes that reform oriented forces within the French administration [were] on the rise.
>
> *Tull 2005: 4*

This conclusion must be kept in mind as Chirac's successor faced a fifty-year special Franco–African relations legacy which he vowed to *transform*.

Taking on *Françafrique's* security bargain

When Nicholas Sarkozy was elected in May 2007, he inherited the colonial baggage of all his predecessors, particularly in the area of defense and security. As he likes to repeat, he belongs to a generation of French politicians who were born at the end of the colonial period and were not tangled in, or tainted by, personal friendships and dubious dealings with long-reigning African heads of states. However, as his Dakar speech betrayed, he is not immune to the disturbing paternalistic misconceptions and biases the average Frenchman holds of Africa and Africans (Renou 2002: 8–9). Furthermore, like all his predecessors, he inherited a set of relations and dynamics as well as political and security circumstances that were not of his making. As head of state for a country, in which, as Denis Tull states "[s]ince the establishment of the Fifth Republic, Francophone Africa is no less important to France's national self-perception and its position in international politics than the possession of the nuclear weapon", his policies could not escape these realities (Tull 2005: 1).

It was in his February 2008 Cape Town speech (already referenced) that he presented his conception of, and agenda for, Franco–African relations, particularly in the defense and security area. He was unambiguous. First, his presence in South Africa in and of itself was an illustration of President Sarkozy's intention to continue to assert France's presence on the continent and to build strategic partnerships with as significant an actor in African affairs as South Africa (pointedly a non-Francophone country). It was also an opportunity to address the pressing issue of French military interventions in African crises (in spite of the adaptation discussed above), illustrated only three weeks earlier by the role of French troops during *Operation Épervier* in the Chadian civil war.

In his speech in front of the South African parliament, he bluntly acknowledged that the agreements signed in 1960 were obsolete as "it was no longer conceivable, for example, that [France] be dragged into internal conflicts. Africa in 2008 is not Africa of 1960!" He went on to make four proposals about the future of defense and security agreements between African countries and France: (1) these must be revised and made to reflect the current and future strategic interests of both parties; (2) they must be based on transparency, and contrary to practices of the past, they must have no secret clauses, and the French parliament must be associated in

the process; (3) French military presence on the continent must aim at helping Africa's collective security architecture, and not be conceived as perpetual; and (4) France wishes to build a partnership between Europe and Africa in the area of security.

Again, one of President Sarkozy's *bona fides* has been his avowed disregard for, and willingness to move Franco–African relations beyond *Françafrique*. Renou, like many others before him, has characterized these relations as "Mafia-like relationships between heads of states" that cause, and result in, "the corruption of most of the institutional and para-institutional actors" involved (Renou 2002: 8–9). President Sarkozy's apparent determination to do away with this legacy was symbolized by the statement of the Cooperation Minister who promised to deliver the "death certificate" of the *Françafrique*.[12]

What has changed in this framework compared to previous periods? To what extent has there been merely a continuation of fundamentally the same approaches? A look at what France has done under his watch in a few instances where policy proclamations and stated intentions met hard realities in defense and security matters (and economic interests) in a number of Africa countries will help answer these questions.

As could have been expected, soon after his election and indeed throughout his presidency, a number of situations developed to test his determination. Among these are a crisis in Chad that threatened to bring down the regime of an important ally, the aggravation of the crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, the military coup against the first democratically elected president in Mauritania, and the exacerbation of terrorist threats in the Sahel, including Mauritania (against French citizens and interests in particular). While these can be examined only briefly, they illustrate the extent to which President Sarkozy altered Franco–African security relations as promised in his Cape Town speech.

The Chadian crisis

In August 2008, despite its denials, France participated actively, not only through supplying weapons and intelligence, but also by the direct intervention of it fighter planes, in saving Déby's regime from collapse, as rebels closed in on N'Djamena (Tull 2010: 2). France had pushed hard for the involvement of the EU through the set up of EUFOR under UN mandate (September 25, UNSR 1778). As Cristina Barrios notes, in EUFOR, France "has been willing to use the EU instrumentally when it suits its interests, such as during military interventions in Africa under the convenient EU label of multilateralism prestige" (Barrios 2010: 5). In this case, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the old logic of Franco–African relations prevailed, not the purported objective of ending military interventions in internal Africa crises to save a friendly regime. Another test case of President Sarkozy's approach was the Ivoirian crisis.

The Ivoirian crisis

The Ivoirian crisis started long before he ascended to power but came to a head under President Sarkozy's watch after the 2010–2011 post-electoral crisis. The crisis took a turn for the worse because President Gbagbo refused to accept his second-round defeat and the UN certified the election of Alassane Dramane Ouattara, Gbagbo's rival. While the international community unanimously called on Gbagbo to relinquish power, the ultimatum given to him by President Sarkozy did not go unnoticed. As the crisis worsened into a shooting war between protagonists of the post-electoral crisis, with civilians caught in between, President Sarkozy used the influence of France in the UN Security Council to draw yet another resolution to mandate its *Licorne* force to use force to protect civilians and prevent the use of heavy weapons.

This offered President Sarkozy the necessary cover to weigh heavily on the side of President-elect Ouattara, shelling the presidential compound and leading to the arrest of President Gbagbo, as French troops looked on. In this case, one can not escape the conclusion that France intervened the old fashion way to carry out its will, although in this case, it was under the banner of the UN as already started under President Chirac.

As the situation normalized, it did not escape observers that Presidents Ouattara and Sarkozy signed a new defense agreement to replace the 1961 agreement, guaranteeing the continued stationing of French troops in Côte d'Ivoire with clauses providing for the training and equipment of Ivoirian troops (Radio France International).

France's involvement in the post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, while conducted with the blessing of the UN, does not seem to depart that dramatically from the previous intervention President Chirac had ordered at the beginning of the crisis. President Sarkozy's approach was to be tested in yet another crisis, the 2008 coup that toppled the democratically elected president of Mauritania.

The crisis of democracy in Mauritania

On August 6, 2008, General Ould Abdel Aziz overthrew the president, after undermining him by manipulating his political opposition in parliament and suggesting that he was an Islamist. Given its official stance on democracy, it was expected that France would condemn the coup, as it did. In concert with the international community, France demanded the return of the deposed president and officially welcomed the speaker of Mauritania's National Assembly, Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, who was spearheading the unprecedented national resistance to the coup.

However, as the putsch leader felt the pressure from the international community and his domestic opposition amid a deteriorated security situation, he enlisted the help of ill-reputed lawyer Robert Bourgi, a well-known go-between in *Françafrique* circles and President Sarkozy's informal advisor, to change France's stance.[13] While on a visit to Niger, supposedly to promote democracy and transparency in Franco–African relations, none other than President Sarkozy himself joined in to help. As Cedric Mathiot put it, he disgracefully rewrote the story of the coup in Mauritania (Mathiot 2009). He surprised most by stating against evidence to the contrary (of which he must have been aware), that there was a consensus in Mauritania in favor of the coup. It turned out that, even as France was ostensibly putting pressure on General Ould Abdel Aziz and his junta, negotiations were going on with him to extract concessions for oil exploration licenses for TOTAL, the French oil company, and for the presence of French troops in the north of the country. In this case, it is undeniable that when President Sarkozy's proclaimed intention to do away with *Françafrique*'s practices met the reality of France's security considerations and economic interests in Mauritania, the latter won out handily.

France and the terrorist threat in the Sahel

France's relations with Africa have been undoubtedly affected by the terrorist threat in Africa, particularly that posed by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its affiliates in Northwest Africa. As of the completion of this chapter, six French citizens remain prisoners of various terrorist groups, who condition their release on the French government taking either some political or security-related decision or making the payment of a hefty ransom.

All the states in the Sahel region, the epicenter of the terrorist threat, are former French colonies, with a strong French presence through its military personnel, thousands of its citizens,

and businesses (Bouygues, Total, Bolloré, Areva, Orange Telecom, to name but a few). France has had important economic interests throughout the region, the most notable being the exploitation of uranium in Niger. France has also maintained a number of military advisors and instructors in most of the Sahel states (Hufnung and Lazard 2012: 3), although its military presence in the area and counterterrorist activities and operations markedly increased only after General Ould Abdel Aziz came to power.

In a few months, France was able to carry out what seems to be an antiterrorist strategy in the Sahel with Mauritania as a key conduit. It is widely believed that the aggressive stance Ould Adel Aziz's regime has taken against terrorism, and the various military campaigns against AQIM on Malian territory, were at the behest of his French mentors.

Given its strategy in the Sahel, which is to keep its visibility to a minimum while being able to project military power, France needed the eagerness that Mauritania's new authorities demonstrated. While reluctant to play too visible a role, particularly as the security situation worsens (the resumption of the Tuareg rebellion and kidnappings in Mali being cases in point) resulting from the Libyan crisis, there is no doubt that France will continue to be present in the Sahel. It will continue to need friends in the regions, and this reality is likely to trump other considerations.

The availability of weapons and intensification of their circulation in the Sahel region and beyond is directly related to terrorism and cross-border criminal activities. France's long-standing policy regarding the proliferation of weapons has not changed much. As Niagalé Bagayoko-Penone observed years ago, adopting a narrow conceptualization of arms transfer as pertaining only to "illegal" arms trafficking, France has continued to sell or supply its African partners with large quantities of weapons its own soldiers no longer use, in the form of military aid, while professing to support West African efforts to stem the importation of small arms (Bagayoko-Penone 2003). This approach is not likely to help reduce armed violence or terrorism.

Catching up with new concepts: security sector reform and security sector governance

In recent years, the movement to overhaul Africa's security systems has been one of the most consequential developments in the continent's relations with outside powers. After much hesitation, in October 2007, France jumped formally on the bandwagon of SSR and issued its statement committing it to pursuing SSR as a conflict prevention and resolution mechanism, as well as democratic consolidation for the continent. France granted that because of the fragility of most of its states, SSR was important for Africa and declared that:

> SSR activities are a key component of France's strategic action to promote or restore international stability within a bilateral, European and multilateral framework. As an EU Member State, France has taken a particularly active part in SSR missions, especially in French-speaking African countries.
>
> *République Française*

Shortly thereafter the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), an organization whose membership is made up largely by African states, followed suit. These moves are indisputably positive steps in the cooperation between France and Africa in the security area. They help overcome a deficit in France's approach to setting up a new framework for this cooperation. They will certainly need to be better conceptualized and sustained if they are to transform the relationship and partnership.

Given the above evidence and analysis, how should Africans appreciate President Sarkozy's implementation of his Africa policies? One expert's assessment is severe and even cynical in his advice to Africans:

> They should take Sarkozy's deceptive and insensitive talk of a *rupture* (departure) in France's Africa policy only as the same wine in a different bottle, in fact just as a pathetic façade for a hasty and self-interested redecoration of neo-colonialism. In the words of a former French diplomat with long experience of African affairs articulated during an informal tête-à-tête with the author of this commentary: how foolishly could any French president implement a genuine policy that would get France's *relations incestueuses* (incestuous relations) with Africa on a sounder footing, and, by default, risk losing a *chasse gardée* which was built by the sweat of de Gaulle and Foccart, and which still is both a psychological source of *grandeur* and a time-tested prize with immeasurable political, military, financial and economic benefits.
>
> *Mesfin 2008: 118*

This view is, however, contested, as others have detected unmistakable indices suggesting that some African leaders, whose countries are traditionally in the French *pre-carré*, are willing to turn to the Anglophone world and get out of exclusive relations with France.[14]

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to examine the checkered relations between France, a major world power, and African states, a sizeable number of whom are its former colonies. These relations, which started in the colonial era, have been framed in the post-colonial era by France's determination to remain a major actor on the continent and pursue unabashedly its interests, and its *rayonnement*, as its colonial empire came to an end. A number of defense and security-related agreements with most of its former colonies served this determination and provided a framework in which the relationship unfolded. These agreements allowed for the presence of French troops in some African states and other advantages, in return for French protection and guarantees.

The end of the Cold War and other major transformations in the international system, as well as budgetary issues, combined with Africa's own challenges, made this approach no longer acceptable or affordable and forced successive French presidents (who totally controlled African affairs) to renounce the most brazen interventionist policies, and adapt their relations with Africa to new realities. Scholars of Franco–African relations noted that their new approach was essentially to multilateralize and Africanize their interventions in African crises.

Following his 2008 Cape Town pronouncements, President Sarkozy undoubtedly has gone the farthest in pledging to do away with the manner in which post-colonial Franco–African relations, particularly in the defense and security area, symbolized by *Françafrique*, the butt of the most severe criticisms, were conducted. The evidence garnered from a few cases suggests that his objective has certainly not been achieved. The evidence from recent cases suggests that the question Golan asked in puzzlement remains relevant thirty years on, as a new president, socialist François Hollande, takes office.

Notes

1 Countless Africanist scholars have argued that Africa's crises find their roots in the crisis of the post-colonial state itself. I entirely share this view with regard to the security crisis. I will not, however, address this underlying determinant here.

2 Available at www.cellulefrancafrique.org/Le-discours-de-Sarkozy-au-Cap.html (accessed December 20, 2011).
3 See www.english.rfi.fr/africa/20100405-senegal-takes-back-french-military-bases (accessed January 14, 2012).
4 A 2010 French television series chronicles in astonishing details the dealings between French presidents and their African colleagues into the 2000s. See www.wat.tv/video/francafrique-raison-etat-derniere-392d3_2gtn9_.html (accessed December 23, 2011).
5 This advice given in private, eloquently characterizes the ambivalence, if not duplicity of the French authorities. It certainly helps to explain why not much has come from the so-called "Paristroika".
6 In a February 1990 television interview, only a few months before the *La Baule* conference, and as throughout the continent a deafening clamor for democracy was rising, then opposition leader Jacques Chirac made a convoluted argument asserting that because of their "tribal" structure and lack of ideological cleavages, multiparty democracy in African countries will lead to chaos.
7 See Gaillard (1995) Foccart Parle: Entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard, volume 1, 288.
8 For an analysis of antecedents to the coup and its aftermath see N'Diaye (2006).
9 This was during "Opération Dignité", the ill-fated attempt by President Gbagbo and his forces to retake the territory controlled by the rebels.
10 These are regional organizations of West Africa, Southern Africa, East Africa, and Central Africa, respectively. Military maneuvers were held in 1998, in West Africa (jointly in Mauritania, Mali and Senegal), in 2000 in Central Africa (Gabon), in 2002 in East Africa (Tanzania), in 2004 in West Africa (Benin), and in 2006 in Central Africa (Cameroon).
11 For an apt discussion of RECAMP, its nature, achievements and limitations, see Bagayoko-Penone (2003).
12 In an interview to *Le Monde* on January 15, 2008, shortly after his appointment as Secretary of State for Cooperation and Francophonie, Jean-Marie Bockel promise to deliver the "death certificate of Françafrique" and complained about the antiquated nature of the relations between France and certain African countries whose leaders he said squander the resources of their people and the resources France gives them.
13 According to Isselmou Ould Abdel Kader, a former Mauritanian government Minister who opposed the coup and was jailed for it, French diplomats and secret agents started to shift position on the coup and to actively help the coup maker's legitimation effort in April 2009, including training his personal security unit. One of the objectives, he contends, was to obtain the stationing of French troops in the north of the country without any involvement of the Mauritanian parliament. See "*L'Ancien Ministre Ould Abdel Kader livre un aperçu sur l'évolution des relations franco-mauritaniennes*", available at www.emjad.net/fr/spip.php?article993 (accessed November 12, 2011).
14 See "France's Former Colonies, 50 Years on" available at http://blogs.reuters.com/africanews/2010/08/23/frances-former-colonies-50-years-on/ (accessed January 12, 2012).

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