

PUṢPIKĀ

TRACING ANCIENT INDIA THROUGH TEXTS AND TRADITIONS

CONTRIBUTIONS TO CURRENT RESEARCH IN INDOLOGY

Volume 2

EDITED BY
Giovanni Ciotti
Alastair Gornall
Paolo Visigalli


puṣpikā



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PUṢPIKĀ

Tracing Ancient India, through Texts and Traditions

Contributions to Current Research in Indology

Volume 2

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL INDOLOGY GRADUATE RESEARCH SYMPOSIUM
(SEPTEMBER 2010, CAMBRIDGE)

Edited by

Giovanni Ciotti
Alastair Gornall
Paolo Visigalli



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Preface

Puṣpikā 2 is the outcome of the second 'International Indology Graduate Research Symposium' (IIGRS) held at the Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Cambridge, on the 23rd and 24th of September 2010.

The purpose of IIGRS is to provide young scholars with an international platform to discuss and share the results of their research on premodern South Asian cultures. All participants focus on textual sources, whether manuscripts, inscriptions, published editions, or oral recitations, in the language in which they were composed.

The papers offered here cover a great variety of topics related to the intellectual traditions of South Asia, which are examined from different disciplinary perspectives, such as intellectual history, linguistics, philosophy, literary criticism and religious studies.

The rich variety of topics presented at IIGRS was a source of inspiration for all those who participated. The symposium provided an open forum to discuss ideas and methodologies in a relaxed and friendly environment, where young scholars could experience presenting their own research in front of their peers and senior scholars. At IIGRS the latter category was represented by Dr. Whitney Cox, Dr. Eivind Kahrs, Dr. Federico Squarcini and Dr. Vincenzo Vergiani, whose contributions to the discussion of each paper were much appreciated.

Here follows the list of the contributors to *Puṣpikā* 2 along with a brief summary of the contents of their works:

(1) Simon Brodbeck, who offered a keynote lecture during the first day of IIGRS, here ("Refuge and Reform: Snakes, Gleaners, and *Niṣāda*s in

Early *Kāvya*") further elaborates on some of the issues he touched upon during his presentation. In particular, he engages with the topic of carnage as a means of imperialistic strategy for *kṣatriya* self-assertion. He gives a close reading of selected passages of the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*, by applying the categories of coloniality and post-coloniality.

(2) Giovanni Ciotti ("Like a Howling *Piśāca*: A Note on the Pronunciation of the *Ṛgvedasaṃhitā*") studies a specific aspect concerning the pronunciation of the *Ṛgvedasaṃhitā*. Using the data offered by the Vedic ancillary literature (*vedalakṣaṇa*), he casts some light on the traditional view about the pronunciation of the Veda, a feature of the text which Western scholarship has sometimes just marginally addressed.

(3) Elisa Freschi ("Does the Subject *Have* Desires? The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā Answer") suggests an answer to the question 'Does the subject *have* desires?' from the point of view of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā school. After a close reading of the relevant primary sources, she argues that in the Prābhākara view there can be no subject without desire.

(4) Alastair Gornall ("*Kāraka*s in *Cāndra* Grammar: An Interpretation from the Pāli Buddhist *Śāstra*s") explores the reception of *Cāndra* Sanskrit grammatical literature in 12th century Sri Lanka and investigates the ways in which Theravāda Buddhist grammarians used this literature to create a new system of Pāli grammar, the *Moggallāna* system. In particular, he focuses on how Pāli grammarians interpreted the treatment of *kāraka*s as found in *Cāndra* grammar.

(5) Robert Leach ("The Three Jewels and the Formation of the Pāñcarātra Canon") investigates the formation of the Pāñcarātra canon. Focusing on three texts belonging to the Āgamasiddhānta tradition, namely the *Jayākhyasaṃhitā*, the *Sātvatasaṃhitā* and the *Pauṣkarasaṃhitā*, he indicates a precise period—the 14th century—in which these texts were adopted as canonical also by non-Āgamasiddhānta Pāñcarātrikas, therefore marking a profound restructuring of the whole Pāñcarātra canon.

(6) Daniel Stender ("Preliminary Survey of Sanskrit Manuscripts of the *Bodhicaryāvatārā*") offers a thorough survey of the available manuscripts of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*. The article identifies the manuscripts that were used for the previous editions of the text and also locates the newly discovered ones, thereby facilitating future work on a revised version of the critical edition of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*.

(7) Małgorzata Sulich-Cowley ("*Asiddha* vs *asiddhavat* in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣyā*") investigates one of the key concepts characterising the architecture of Pāṇini's grammar, that of *asiddha*. Critically engaging with previous scholarship, she offers a new interpretation of the terms *asiddha* and *asiddhavat* and their function in the application of the rules in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*.

(8) Paolo Visigalli ("Continuity and Change in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.1-4") offers a close reading of the initial section of the sixth chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. In particular, he attempts to delineate the innovation of Uddālaka's discourse as compared with the preceding Vedic belief system.

We are grateful to those who helped bring this book to completion. Firstly, we would like to thank the authors for their contributions. Secondly, thanks must go to the Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Cambridge, for its logistic and financial support both for the organisation of IIGRS and for the publication of the present volume. In particular, we would like to express our gratitude to Dr. Eivind Kahrs, Dr. Vincenzo Vergiani and the faculty administrative staff. We also thank Oxbow Books for publishing this volume.

Cambridge 2013,

Giovanni Ciotti
Alastair Gornall
Paolo Visigalli

One

Refuge and Reform: Snakes, Gleaners, and *Niṣādas* in Early *Kāvya*

Simon P. Brodbeck

Introduction: Janamejaya, Aśoka, and Postcoloniality[1]

The *Rāmāyaṇa* tells of the war, in distant Laṅkā, between Rāma Dāśaratha of Ayodhyā and Rāvaṇa's demon hordes – Rāma was the victor, and Rāvaṇa's estranged brother Vibhīṣaṇa, who fought for Rāma, was installed as king of Laṅkā (*Rām* 6). The *Mahābhārata* tells that story too (*Mbh* 3.258–75), amongst others, and orders events such that Rāma's righteous war is followed by other bloodbaths: northwest of Ayodhyā, Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa massacre the inhabitants of Khāṇḍava Forest (*Mbh* 1.214–25; Hiltebeitel 1976); at Kurukṣetra, the Pāṇḍavas as advised by Kṛṣṇa preside

[1] This paper includes material presented at the Centre for Hindu Studies in Oxford (29 October 2009) and in the History Department of the Jawaharlal Nehru University in Delhi (13 January 2010), as well as at the IIGRS2 gathering in Cambridge (23–24 September 2010). I am indebted to my hosts and discussants on all those and some previous occasions; to Julia Leslie, Jim Fitzgerald, Alf Hiltebeitel, and James Hegarty for assistance; and to the Arts and Humanities Research Council for funding.

over a massacre of almost all *kṣatriya*s (*Mbh* 6–10); at Prabhāsa on the west coast, the Vṛṣṇis kill each other (*Mbh* 16.4); and at Takṣaśilā, in revenge for the assassination of his father Parikṣit, Janamejaya starts to kill all snakes, but then stops, after Āstīka's intervention, on condition that the surviving snakes behave themselves (*Mbh* 1.45–53). We also hear details of how other kings of the past, and Kṛṣṇa at other times, did sterling deeds licking various miscreants into shape (*Mbh*, *Hv*, *passim*).

In this paper I take an abstract view of these various events, seeing them, for the sake of argument, as depictions of a single process; and I begin to explore some of its contours and ramifications. This is royal *kṣatriya* business, conceived in terms of kings milking their wife the land (Bailey 1981; Hara 1973), protecting and growing their land, with weapons and armies, against others (sometimes other kings with armies); and in terms of constitutively iterated royal rites of expansive self-assertion, involving appropriation, the crushing of resistance, and the exploitation of resources thereafter. It is well-known business; imperial business. It can be conceptualised in terms of development, and perhaps as a kind of missionary work, finessed in terms of what is said to be best for the people in the places that it most directly affects. There is an ideological component in the representation of the process. I will look at some passages from the *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyaṇa* from a Marxist perspective, attending particularly to certain categories of person.

King Janamejaya calls off the snake massacre. Why didn't Janamejaya's snake massacre kill all snakes? It was intended to, but Janamejaya changed his mind about it, while listening to Vaiśaṃpāyana's story about the Pāṇḍavas, and called it off uncompleted (*Mbh* 1.50–56).

The cause of the ceasefire is variously given. According to the first presented account, it was because, long ago, the snake massacre was set up by the mother-of-all-snakes, Kadrū, who cursed her children to die in it, and by Brahmā, who, later petitioned by those children, specified that only the wicked snakes would die in it.

tad vākyaṃ nānvapadyanta tāñ śaśāpa bhujaṃgamān ‖ *Mbh* 1.18:7 ‖
sarpasatre vartamāne pāvako vaḥ pradhakṣyati |
janamejayasya rājarṣeḥ pāṇḍaveyasya dhīmataḥ ‖ 8 ‖

śāpam enaṃ tu śuśrāva svayam eva pitāmahaḥ |
atikrūraṃ samuddiṣṭaṃ kadrvā daivād atīva hi || 9 ||
sārdhaṃ devagaṇaiḥ sarvair vācaṃ tām anvamodata |
bahutvaṃ prekṣya sarpāṇāṃ prajānāṃ hitakāmyayā || 10 ||
tigmavīryaviṣā hy ete daṇḍaśūkā mahābalāḥ |

When the Snakes did not obey her command, she cursed them that they would be burned in the fire, when the Snake Sacrifice of the royal seer Janamejaya, the wise scion of Pāṇḍu, was to take place. The Grandsire himself, however, heard this all-too-cruel curse pronounced by Kadrū; and, although it went far beyond what fate had ordained, he and all the hosts of the Gods approved her word, for the good of the creatures, as he saw how many Snakes there were. They were powerful and mordacious, their poison was virulent … (*Mbh* 1.18:7c–11b, tr. van Buitenen 1973: 77)

brahmovāca |
bahavaḥ pannagās tīkṣṇā bhīmavīryā viṣolbaṇāḥ |
prajānāṃ hitakāmo 'haṃ na nivāritavāṃs tadā || Mbh 1.34:9 ||
ye daṇḍaśūkāḥ kṣudrāś ca pāpacārā viṣolbaṇāḥ |
teṣāṃ vināśo bhavitā na tuye dharmacāriṇaḥ || 10 ||

Brahmā said:
There are too many Snakes, they are harsh, terribly brave, and covered with poison. At that time I did not stop her [i.e. Kadrū], as I wished the creatures well. It is the eagerly biting Snakes, the mean and evil and virulent ones, that are doomed to die, not the law-abiding Snakes. (*Mbh* 1.34:9–10, tr. van Buitenen 1973: 95)

It seems unlikely that only wicked snakes were killed, until there was a ceasefire just at the point where there were no more wicked snakes to kill, so that by stopping there, Janamejaya would leave only dharmic snakes alive. We would more naturally imagine that some dharmic ones would have been killed before the ceasefire, and/or that some wicked ones would have survived it. So how does Brahmā's stipulation work?

Āstīka makes the surviving snakes solemnly promise, after the cease-fire, that they will never attack anyone who knows the story of how he saved them.

āstīka uvāca |
sāyaṃ prātaḥ suprasannātmarūpā
loke viprā mānavāś cetare 'pi |
dharmākhyānaṃ ye vadeyur mamedaṃ
teṣāṃ yuṣmadbhyo naiva kiṃcid bhayaṃ syāt || *Mbh* 1.53:20 ||

sūta uvāca |
taiś cāpy ukto bhāgineyaḥ prasannair
etat satyaṃ kāmam evaṃ carantaḥ |
prītyā yuktā īpsitaṃ sarvaśas te
kartāraḥ sma pravaṇā bhāgineya || 21 ||

Āstīka said [to the snakes]*:*
The brahmins and other folk in this world
Who, morning and evening, tranquil of mind,
Will recount this epic of Law of mine
Must never need be in fear of you.

The Bard said:
And serene they spoke to their sister's son [i.e. Āstīka]:
'Then this shall be true, we shall do the wish
You have wished, for we all are wholly pleased –
We shall do it willingly, sister's son!'
(*Mbh* 1.53:20–21, tr. van Buitenen 1973: 122–3)

So after the massacre, and in connection with certain public statements, there is to be a reform in the behaviour of the snakes. When combined with Brahmā's stipulation, the implication is that before this reform, all snakes might be wicked.

The referent of *dharmākhyānaṃ ... mamedaṃ* ('this epic of Law of mine') has usually been taken to be the story *of* Āstīka, i.e. the *Mahābhārata*'s *Āstīkaparvan* (*Mbh* 1.13–53; see e.g. Hegarty 2006: 45); but the word *ākhyāna* is used in preference to *parvan*, both here and at 1.53:23–6 when the *phala* is repeated, and in my view its referent should be taken also to be the dharmic tale *told by* Āstīka, i.e. *Mbh* 1.50 in miniature (the hymn of praise for Janamejaya and his rite, which wins Āstīka entry and an open boon) and, in fuller form, Vaiśaṃpāyana's whole discourse (*Mbh* 1.55–*Hv* 113; for the implied identity of Āstīka and Vaiśaṃpāyana, see Brodbeck 2009: 233–8; Brodbeck 2009b). The people who need not fear snakes

would thus be the same people included by the various *phalaśruti*s (e.g. 1.56:14–30) relating the benefits of Vaiśaṃpāyana's discourse.

King Aśoka calls off the Kaliṅga massacre. Compare Janamejaya's deeds with the situation sketched by Aśoka's thirteenth major rock edict (Hultzsch 1925: 207–12; Thapar 1961: 255–7). This edict specifically concerns Aśoka's massacre of the Kaliṅgans (referred to by Tāranātha as *nāga*s; see Thapar 1961: 36). After the ceasefire the good King Aśoka, the handsome one, beloved-of-the-gods, advertises across his realm that although the high death toll has saddened him deeply, he will resume killing if there is misbehaviour.

> [T]he Beloved of the Gods conciliates the forest tribes of his empire, but he warns them that he has power even in his remorse, and he asks them to repent, lest they be killed. For the Beloved of the Gods wishes that all beings should be unharmed, self-controlled, calm in mind, and gentle. (tr. Thapar 1961: 256; Hultzsch 1925: 209–10, lines *M–O*)

Fitzgerald discusses this edict in the introduction to his *Śāntiparvan* translation.[2]

> [I]t … contains a clear ultimatum directed at the 'forest tribes' of the empire. Those peoples are to accept the peaceful conquest of Dhamma (*dhammavijaya*), which is 'pleasant', or they can expect the same kind of travail the people of Kaliṅga suffered. … [N]ot only does the edict fail to renounce violence, it threatens it explicitly as well as implicitly. (Fitzgerald 2004: 118)

Inconclusive genocides recur in old Indian texts. This theme in the *Mahābhārata* has been discussed by Minkowski (1991: 396–400) and Fitzgerald (2002: 104–7, 115–19), amongst others. But the implication of Aśoka's edict is that Aśoka thinks having this inscription put up across his realm (in six locations, though interestingly not in Kaliṅga itself; Thapar 1961: 164) will be instrumental in causing the 'forest tribes' (*aṭavi*, *aṭaviyo*) to be better behaved – a textological implication equivalent to that which is made explicit in the *Mahābhārata*.

---

[2] There it is called the twelfth major rock edict.

Postcolonial text in ancient India. Kosambi takes the *Mahābhārata*'s 'snakes' to be human. He infers that the context is one in which plough agriculture was taking up increasingly more land;[3] practitioners of older types of economy would be made into refugees.

> The prime historical and social context of the document [i.e. the *Mahābhārata*] can only be change (in a comparatively restricted locality between the Punjab and the Ganges) from food-gathering to food-production; the redaction of the epic merely reflects the change.
>
> Nagas were food-gathering aborigines ready to change over. ... the name must indicate in a group many thinly scattered, linguistically and perhaps ethnically diverse, primitive tribesmen who had a snake totem or snake worship among other totems and worship. (Kosambi 1964: 36, 38; = Kosambi 2002: 357, 360–61)

The *Mahābhārata* showcases changes in land use. It depicts good *kṣatriya*s stripping land of its wild beasts; prior inhabitants must be tamed or perish. The burning of Khāṇḍava Forest by Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa is mythologised as an offering for Agni, but we naturally imagine a simpler explanation: the Pāṇḍavas have been given the outlying region of Khāṇḍavaprastha by their uncle Dhṛtarāṣṭra, and they must make it work for them, so they clear woodland by fire, kill what flees, then move in (*Mbh* 1.214–19).[4] Bhīma Pāṇḍava, a man like an elephant, son of the Wind, wins against a *rākṣasa* in a fight of pulled-up trees (*Mbh* 1.151:12–20). And there is economic growth; the Pāṇḍavas are soon famous on the high-class circuit – hosting a *rājasūya*, no less (*Mbh* 2.1–42).

The operation at Khāṇḍava Forest is replicated on a smaller scale by royal hunting expeditions, whereby dangerous beasts are killed in outlying regions and spoils of the chase are distributed, domesticating the locals and developing the land (Allsen 2006: 168–93, 197–201). Rāma's activities in the *Rāmāyaṇa*'s *Bālakāṇḍa* and *Araṇyakāṇḍa* can be similarly viewed:

---

[3] 'The extension of agriculture has been a normal activity throughout the sub-continent characterising Indian history in all periods' (Thapar 1978: 23). On the question of land use, see Lal 1986, Thapar 1997, and Rangarajan 2001 (the latter two discussing also the symbology of forest and settlement).

[4] Aśoka's fifth pillar edict says 'Forests must not be burned in order to kill living things or without any good reason' (tr. Thapar 1961: 264); Bhīṣma permits forest-burning in order to create pasture (*Mbh* 12.35:31).

Rāma goes to the wilds, kills demons, and is respected by those who remain.

These texts exemplify and explain various ideological moves through which subjects of development are more or less dehumanised, and the expansionist activity of their overlords is presented as a birthright or as manifest destiny ('Kingship alone is legitimate and its absence can only result in anarchy', Thapar 1978: 17). In the Indian story, one was reborn into this life as a just desert for activities in previous lives, which could theoretically legitimate any amount of discrimination and repression; and the same idea would encourage self-policing among the population, lest things get worse in the next life.

If the activity and ideology thus depicted were described as colonial, then the *Mahābhārata* would be a postcolonial text. We can read it as such, even though the prevalent tendency is to use the word 'colonial' for activities prosecuted by Europeans in recent centuries.[5] As the text presents it – with clear disquiet over their methods – the next thing that happened to the Pāṇḍavas, after they had risen to social prominence by bloody means, was they lost Indraprastha and had to live homeless in the forests themselves for many years. But Bhīma carried on pulling up trees and killing *rākṣasa*s (3.154:47–51), and the Pāṇḍavas later returned, many years ago, and killed many more people, and took over more or less properly; and Janamejaya carried it on.

---

[5] Cf. Pollock 1993: 77: 'A fundamental thing about orientalism is that it offers an extreme and often transparent instance of knowledge generating and sustaining power and the domination that defines it. How might we apply this insight of the orientalist critique [i.e. Said 1978 etc.] to precolonial forms of domination? Pared to the bone, orientalism is disclosed as a species of a larger discourse of power that divides the world into "betters and lessers" and thus facilitates the domination (or "orientalization" or "colonization") of any group. From this perspective, indigenous discourses of power – the various systematized and totalized constructions of inequality in traditional India – might be viewed as a preform of orientalism. Raising such a possibility, at all events, might encourage extending to premodern Indian cultures the problematics of power and domination necessary to help us interpret their products.' Pollock's impressions of his paper's likely audience notwithstanding, I am not sure how sound this extension can be when the direction of application is so clear.

I will explore some of the explicit and implicit textual explorations of the fall-out from such colonial or developmental activities. Overall the impression given is that resistance is futile, and this means the issue is addressed in ways we might not expect; but there are postcolonial voices discernable.[6] By keeping in mind Kosambi's notion of economic transformation, and by focusing on identity types, we can read the human consequences of such transformation, even where there is no sign of victimhood as such.

Stories of Gleaners

Padmanābha the snake. At the end of the *Mokṣadharmaparvan*, Bhīṣma tells Yudhiṣṭhira a story Nārada once told Indra in heaven (*Mbh* 12.340–53; Brockington 2000: 81–2; Hiltebeitel 2001: 19–20; Smith 2009: 666–7; Fitzgerald 2010: 102–7). A brahmin householder is bewildered by the plurality of soteriological options, and voices his concerns to another brahmin, his guest. The guest says he feels the same, and also says he has heard of a good snake called Padmanābha ('Lotus-Navel'), who lives in Naimiṣa, by the River Gomatī; he suggests his host go and find that snake, and ask *him* for advice. Next day, when the guest leaves, the host says goodbye to his people and goes off too, and travels to Naimiṣa. Another brahmin gives him directions, and he finds Padmanābha's house. Padmanābha is away pulling the sun's chariot, and his wife tells the visitor he will not be back for fifteen days. So the brahmin waits, fasting, in riverside woods.

Padmanābha returns and is received by his lovely wife, who tells him how good she's been while he was away, and why.

pativratātvaṃ bhāryāyāḥ paramo dharma ucyate |
tavopadeśān nāgendra tac ca tattvena vedmi vai || Mbh 12.347:10 ||
sāhaṃ dharmaṃ vijānantī dharmanitye tvayi sthite |
satpathaṃ katham utsṛjya yāsyāmi viṣame pathi || 11 ||

[6] Regarding the 'post-', it is notable that *Hv* 114 presents Janamejaya's descendants as living unidentified amongst weavers and brahmins, apparently having lost their kingdom.

> It is said that the paramount duty of wives is to be avowed to the husband; and I know that truly, O chief of the *nāga*s, because you've taught it to me. Since I'm dedicated to you who are constant in your duty, I am one who understands duty; so how could I discard the true path and travel the bad path? (*Mbh* 12.347:10–11)

She then says there is a brahmin waiting for him. Padmanābha is surprised; but his wife tells him to go and see him. Padmanābha says:

abhimānena māno me jātidoṣeṇa vai mahān |
roṣaḥ saṃkalpajaḥ sādhvi dagdho vācāgninā tvayā || *Mbh* 12.348:13 ||
na ca roṣād ahaṃ sādhvi paśyeyam adhikaṃ tamaḥ |
yasya vaktavyatāṃ yānti viśeṣeṇa bhujaṃgamāḥ || 14 ||
doṣasya hi vaśaṃ gatvā daśagrīvaḥ pratāpavān |
tathā śakrapratispardhī hato rāmeṇa saṃyuge || 15 ||
antaḥpuragataṃ vatsaṃ śrutvā rāmeṇa nirhṛtam |
dharṣaṇād roṣasaṃvignāḥ kārtavīryasutā hatāḥ || 16 ||
jāmadagnyena rāmeṇa sahasranayanopamaḥ |
saṃyuge nihato roṣāt kārtavīryo mahābalaḥ || 17 ||
tad eṣa tapasāṃ śatruḥ śreyasaś ca nipātanaḥ |
nigṛhīto mayā roṣaḥ śrutvaiva vacanaṃ tava || 18 ||
ātmānaṃ ca viśeṣeṇa praśaṃsāmy anapāyini |
yasya me tvaṃ viśālākṣi bhāryā sarvaguṇānvitā || 19 ||
eṣa tatraiva gacchāmi yatra tiṣṭhaty asau dvijaḥ |
sarvathā coktavān vākyaṃ nākṛtārthaḥ prayāsyati || 20 ||

> Due to the vice of arrogance that resulted from the station of my birth, my pride was plentiful; but my wilful anger has been burned by the fire of your words, good woman. And I don't see any dullness worse than anger, good woman. Snakes got a bad reputation through their characteristic anger.
>
> The brilliant ten-necked [Rāvaṇa] was overpowered by this vice, and so competed with Śakra; and he was killed in battle by Rāma. Hearing that a youngster had been abducted from the inner chambers by Rāma [Jāmadagnya], the sons of Kārtavīrya were moved to anger; and because of their offensive, they were killed. Powerful Kārtavīrya, who was like the thousand-eyed [Indra], was struck down in battle by Rāma Jāmadagnya because of anger.
>
> Having heard you talk, I have checked anger, this enemy of austerity and ruin of good fortune. And I extol myself in particular for having you as my all-virtuous wife, O constant long-eyed lady. I will go to where this twiceborn is staying; and

> when he's spoken, he won't leave with his purpose unfulfilled – he'll get everything he asks for. (*Mbh* 12.348:13–20)[7]

Padmanābha finds the brahmin, and the two introduce themselves. The brahmin is called Dharmāraṇya. Padmanābha makes sure Dharmāraṇya introduces himself first. Before asking the question he has come to ask, Dharmāraṇya asks what Padmanābha has seen on his trip away. Padmanābha extols the sun, and says he has seen a blazing figure approach, be received by, and merge into the sun; and that the figure was a person purified by performing the *uñcha* vow (this was revealed by the sun himself, in answer to Padmanābha's question; see below). Dharmāraṇya says that thanks to Padmanābha's words, even before asking the question he has come to ask, he has had it answered: he knows he must undertake the *uñcha* vow. And he takes his leave from Padmanābha and goes to find Cyavana Bhārgava, who initiates him into the *uñcha* vow.

The story is known because Cyavana told it to Janaka, who told it to Nārada. It is told to Janamejaya's great-great-uncle Yudhiṣṭhira, so the narrated events must have taken place long before Janamejaya's snake massacre. But Padmanābha's comments about snakes seem to match the situation after the snake massacre. Why not? Despite the fictional setting, the story is told by Ugraśravas the *sūta*, after the snake sacrifice.

Padmanābha says that because he was born a snake, he has a tendency to anger; he decries anger, and illustrates, through stories of others, how getting angry leads to one's downfall; he says the natural anger of snakes has led to them being despised, but that he himself has prospered by restraining his anger, thanks to his dutiful wife. We shall return to the dutiful wife, and to Jāmadagnya and Kārtavīrya. But what is the *uñcha* vow?

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[7] Compare and contrast Padmanābha and his wife with Yudhiṣṭhira and his on the occasion of their debate in the *Āraṇyakaparvan*. In *Mbh* 3.30, Yudhiṣṭhira, powerless and deposed, extols the virtues of forbearance and the suppression of anger in similar terms to Padmanābha; but he is a royal *kṣatriya*, and Draupadī suggests he is privileging a set of *dharma*s that is inappropriate for him (Malinar 2007).

The uñcha *vow.* The *uñcha* practitioner who merged into the sun is described by the sun:

> *eṣa mūlaphalāhāraḥ śīrṇaparṇāśanas tathā |*
> *abbhakṣo vāyubhakṣaś ca āsīd vipraḥ samāhitaḥ || Mbh* 12.351:2 ||
> *ṛcaś cānena vipreṇa saṃhitāntar abhiṣṭutāḥ |*
> *svargadvārakṛtodyogo yenāsau tridivaṃ gataḥ || 3 ||*
> *asaṃmadhūr anākāṅkṣī nityam uñchaśilāśanaḥ |*
> *sarvabhūtahite yukta eṣa vipro bhujaṃgama || 4 ||*
>
> This fellow gathered roots and fruits, and ate fallen leaves too; he was a steadfast seer, drinking water and eating wind. And verses from within the collections were recited by this seer, by means of which he has gone to the third heaven; his efforts built him a door to heaven. This seer, who was cheerful in mind, without expectations, and whose food was always gleaned or gathered, was harnessed to the welfare of all creatures, O snake. (*Mbh* 12.351:2–4)

Key here is the livelihood of gleaning, which goes with humility, landlessness, lack of material ambition, and yet also with the dutiful and generous fulfilment of one's role as householder and host. Gleaning is mentioned in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, as a livelihood anticipated for Rāma while he is in exile (2.21:2), and as the livelihood of a poor brahmin whom Rāma rewards with the gift of cattle (2.29:23; cf. *Mbh* 12.192:94). In the *Mahābhārata*, in addition to the stories of Padmanābha (12.340–53), Mudgala (3.246–7), Satya (12.264), and the story told by the mongoose (14.92–3; for these latter stories, see below), gleaners are mentioned occasionally in passing: Yayāti, after retiring from kingship, lived as a gleaner (1.81:13; cf. *Manusmṛti* 7:33); Bhṛgu says good gleaners go to heaven (12.184:18; cf. 12.235:22–3; 14.94:30–31); and at 13.27 a gleaner's guest describes the glories of the Gaṅgā. At *Mbh* 13.129:35–55 Śiva discourses on the topic of *ṛṣidharma* and distinguishes different types of gleaning *ṛṣi*s: froth-drinking Phenapas, thumb-sized Vālakhilyas who dress in bark and hides and glean like birds, Cakracaras who live on moonbeams, Saṃprakṣālas who store no food from day to day, Aśmakuṭṭas who break grain with rocks, Dantolūkhalins who break grain with their teeth, and Ūṣmapas nourished by flames or steam (cf. Hiltebeitel 2011: 609–13; *Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra* 3.1–2; *Manusmṛti* 4:2–12).

Fitzgerald's discussion of the *Mahābhārata*'s gleaners presents the gleaner as 'a brahmin family man … who is heroic because he voluntarily embraces poverty and suffering rather than compromise his brahmin *svadharma* when he cannot earn a living as a proper brahmin' (Fitzgerald 2010: 92–3; cf. Fitzgerald 2006: 275). This view follows *Manusmṛti* 10:101 and 112; it implies that gleaning would be a response to brahmin unemployment, and thus implicitly a symptom of bad kingship; and it is consonant with Fitzgerald's recent general approach – the *Mahābhārata* as we have it being a response to 'the fact that the Vedic "golden age" [of funding for brahmins] was never to return' (Fitzgerald 2010: 94 n. 18; cf. Fitzgerald 2006: 269–84). My interpretation resembles Fitzgerald's in that it treats the (textually constructed) phenomenon of gleaning in its (textually constructed) economic context, and as a response to a changing cultural situation. But Fitzgerald seems to reify and backdate the category of 'brahmin' (many Sanskrit texts do the same; cf. Hiltebeitel 2001: 19, 'the *Mahābhārata* was written by "out of sorts" Brahmans who may have had some minor king's or merchant's patronage, but, probably for personal reasons, show a deep appreciation of, and indeed exalt, Brahmans who practice the "way of gleaning"'). The brahmin category is under construction (Brodbeck 2009c: 138–43); gleaners, qua gleaners, are categorisable as brahmins, but might not have been had they had a different livelihood. Whatever established brahmins there might already be, the label is open to the opportune, and presumably always was.

The story of Mudgala. Vyāsa tells the story of Mudgala in the *Āraṇyakaparvan*, while the Pāṇḍavas are living in the woods (*Mbh* 3.246–7; Hiltebeitel 2001: 54; Fitzgerald 2010: 101–2). Mudgala lived in Kurukṣetra with his wife and sons, living like a pigeon, gleaning grains of rice, but he was able to feed the gods and all his guests. It seems he went off on a fortnight-long gleaning expedition once a month, and held open house for the other fortnight, especially at its beginning and end. This is called the *iṣṭīkṛta satra* (3.246:4–8; cf. 3.129:1). Mudgala fed even the brahmin Durvāsas, who started coming every month, naked, abusive, shaven-

headed, and emptying his cupboards every time.[8] For six months Mudgala was unperturbed (the power of his generosity is said to have multiplied his gifts, 3.246:9–10), and just went out gleaning again. Durvāsas declared that Mudgala was so perfected he would go to heaven in his own body; and the envoy of the gods came, and invited Mudgala aboard a celestial chariot. Mudgala asked the envoy where he would take him, and the envoy described various heavens, and said the one awaiting Mudgala is very lofty, but that heavens are impermanent.[9] Mudgala refused to mount.

ity uktvā sa munir vākyaṃ devadūtaṃ visṛjya tam |
śiloñchavṛttim utsṛjya śamam ātiṣṭhad uttamam || Mbh 3.247:41 ||

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[8] Elsewhere in the *Mahābhārata* Durvāsas, who is said to be a form of Śiva (13.17:61; 13.145), is famous for his time staying with Kuntibhoja and family (1.104:5; 1.113:33; 1.114:2; 5.142:19; 15.38:2), and for his time staying with Kṛṣṇa and Rukmiṇī (7.10:9; 13.143–5; 16.5:17; Dange 2001, cover picture). On both occasions he was an exacting, eccentric, but eventually boon-giving guest, interested most particularly in the subordination of female family members. At *Mbh* 3.80:81 he is commemorated for having given a boon to Viṣṇu, which would presumably refer to his stay at Kṛṣṇa's place. See also *Mbh* 1.app118 (Durvāsas as a ritual officiant); 2.7:10 (Durvāsas is in Indra's *sabhā*); 3.83:104 (Durvāsas is waiting to go on *tīrthayātrā* with Yudhiṣṭhira); 3.app25 (Duryodhana arranges for Durvāsas to visit the Pāṇḍavas in exile, hoping that he will curse them, but the plan fails); 13.27:6 (Durvāsas is there while Bhīṣma teaches Yudhiṣṭhira – and so also, presumably, when Kṛṣṇa takes over the narration and tells the story of Durvāsas's visit at 13.143–5, including his prediction of Kṛṣṇa's weak spot, which Kṛṣṇa later recalls at 16.5:17 shortly before dying); *Hv* app29E:136–43 (Durvāsas cursed Bhānumatī); *Hv* app31:2098–614 (Durvāsas cursed Haṃsa and Ḍibhaka). For studies of Durvāsas and Kuntī, see Scheuer 1982: 56–64; Bandyopadhyay 2007 (arguing that Durvāsas was Kaṃa's biological father; cf. Dange 2001: 93–4); Mehendale 2008 (arguing that he was not); more generally, see Dange 2001: 229–39. In Kālidāsa's *Abhijñānaśākuntalam* Durvāsas's curse is the cause of Śakuntalā's humiliation (Johnson 2001: 43–5). In the *Rāmāyaṇa* Durvāsas predicts Rāma's separation from Sītā (7.49–50), and is a proximate cause of Lakṣmaṇa's banishment and death (7.95–6; Rāma is in a private room with Kāla, the death penalty having been agreed for any who would disturb them, and Durvāsas comes and insists that Lakṣmaṇa report his arrival to Rāma immediately); he also appears with other *ṛṣi*s in the story of Ilā (*Rām* 7.81:5), and when Vālmīki testifies to Sītā's purity (7.87:2).

[9] Fitzgerald (2010: 101–8) discusses the discrepancy between this presentation of the *uñcha* practitioner's destiny and that of the Padmanābha story, in which the *uñcha* practitioner enters the sun, which would imply *mokṣa* (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 6.2:15–16; *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 5.10:1–6).

tulyanindāstutir bhūtvā samaloṣṭāśmakāñcanaḥ |
jñānayogena śuddhena dhyānanityo babhūva ha || 42 ||
dhyānayogād balaṃ labdhvā prāpya carddhim anuttamām |
jagāma śāśvatīṃ siddhiṃ parāṃ nirvāṇalakṣaṇām || 43 ||
tasmāt tvam api kaunteya na śokaṃ kartum arhasi |

Having thus spoken the hermit dismissed the Envoy of the Gods. He gave up his life of gleaning and took to complete serenity. He became indifferent to praise and blame; a piece of clay, a rock, and gold were all the same to him; and he was forever immersed in meditation with the pure yoke of insight. Through the yoke of meditation he gained strength, and having acquired an incomparable fortune he attained to the eternal and supreme perfection that is marked by Extinction [*nirvāṇa*].

Therefore, son of Kuntī, you too must not harbor grief … (*Mbh* 3.247:41–44b, tr. van Buitenen 1975: 705)

Mudgala was perhaps unlucky to be visited by Durvāsas. His hospitable livelihood was being made hard for him. Was the offer of heaven the offer of a good job in a new regime? Mudgala refused, choosing not to sell out, (then) voluntarily went under. In tandem on another level, there is the soteriological aspect; rejecting *pravṛtti*, he was the last candle before *nirvāṇa* of a karmic flame-chain, i.e. *mokṣa*, and songs can be made about it.

The *uñcha* vow could be what Padmanābha was away doing when Dharmāraṇya arrived. Dharmāraṇya was hungry only for knowledge, and (arriving in the wrong fortnight?) was not hosted by the family. If Padmanābha is a gleaner, he is the only one said to be a snake – a reformed snake, anger subdued.

The story told by the mongoose. After the Kurukṣetra war, Yudhiṣṭhira, like Aśoka, feels the sorrow of his slaughter (Sutton 1997; Fitzgerald 2004: 100–142; cf. Selvanayagam 1992). His position is also precarious; his nominal victory has come by unpopular means. Duryodhana makes last words for Saṃjaya the herald, and for the surviving troops, and his parents, and his friends, and the gossips (*vātikāṃś cābravīd*, 9.63:30; cf. *vārtikāṃś*, 'messengers', Meiland 2007: 386–7), saying that the Pāṇḍavas did wrong. All our narrators agree that they committed war-crimes. Effectively there is a fine paid in many ways, one of which is that Yudhiṣṭhira has to do an

inordinately munificent *aśvamedha* (*Mbh* 12.8–16, 34–6; 14.2–13, 61, 70–91), at the end of which, when the gifts are being distributed, he is publicly badmouthed by a mongoose (*Mbh* 14.92–3; Reich 2001; Hiltebeitel 2001: 78–9; Fitzgerald 2010: 98–101; Hegarty 2012: 7–13).

The mongoose ridicules Yudhiṣṭhira's bloody rite, and says his grandiose gifts do not match those made by a certain gleaner who used to live in Kurukṣetra – a practitioner of the *uñcha* vow – and his family. This poor but generous householder was visited, in a time of famine, by a greedy brahmin. He gave his own miserable portion of barley-meal to his guest, and then each member of his family surrendered theirs in turn – his loving wife, his good son, and his dutiful daughter-in-law (cf. *Mbh* 1.145–7). The visiting brahmin was revealed to be Dharma in person; he declared himself well satisfied (in this story the revealed identity stands in for the envoy of the gods), and produced a celestial chariot, and the family got in and went to heaven.

We see the virtues and possible rewards of remaining hospitable under grinding poverty. In place of Durvāsas, there is hidden Dharma. But perhaps by riding the chariot this family have just starved to death (Dharma as Yama); there are no lurid descriptions to tempt them as there are for Mudgala. Then the mongoose's intervention would be to remind Yudhiṣṭhira that there are folk starving in his realm. The following chapters (Reich 2001: 155–69) contain a two-part charter for *ahiṃsā* and vegetarianism (14.94, the story of Vasu's arbitration and condemnation,[10] and 14.95, the story of Agastya's victory over Indra on this issue), and then a karmic deconstruction of the mongoose's intervention (as required to free him, i.e. Anger, from a curse; 14.96). The detail of the mongoose's real identity serves, amongst other things, to underline the thematic link to the story of Padmanābha.

The stories of Satya and Trijaṭa. Gleaners are vegetarian – the sun's description of the *uñcha* practitioner mentions fruits and roots, and other

[10] There are other versions of this story at *Mbh* 12.324, 13.6:34, and 13.116:54–5. Vaiśaṃpāyana's commentary on the 14.94 version specifies that food offered in sacrifices and/or as gifts must have been lawfully obtained (14.94:23–33); thus, whether or not one shares Vasu's (false) opinion that animal offerings are legitimate, poaching, rustling, and scrumping are clearly forbidden. On Vasu, cf. now Baltutis 2011.

descriptions mention grain and the pigeon. The vegetarianism of gleaners is stressed by the story of Satya (*Mbh* 12.264; Ganguli 1993: sec. 12.272; Hiltebeitel 2001: 20 n. 78). Satya, gleaner, lives in the forest with his wife. He is a bit kinky; he makes her dress up in peacock feathers. A talking deer comes and asks to be eaten, and when Satya hesitates, it describes the glorious heaven that awaits Satya if he eats it. Satya gives in and agrees to eat the deer, but it reveals itself to be Dharma; it scolds Satya for his lapse, and sets him back on his previous diet, vegetarianism reinforced.

If wilderness is being transformed, then where there once were fruits and roots in season, there might only be stubble-fields and loose grains. Or perhaps pasture-land, with the possibility of some milk. Śamīka lives on the milk-froth that leaks from the mouths of suckling calves (*Mbh* 1.36:15), and in the *Mahābhārata* there is respect for this livelihood – that of the Phenapa *ṛṣi*s,[11] marked by the verb *uñch* at 13.129:37.

Honest gleaners can be rewarded by the gift of cattle (*Rām* 2.29:23; *Mbh* 12.192:94). This presumably does not happen to gleaners who eat deer. In the *Rāmāyaṇa* episode the gleaner seems keen for another livelihood, and Rāma plays with him:

tatrāsīt piṅgalo gārgyas trijaṭo nāma vai dvijaḥ |
ā pañcamāyāḥ kakṣyāyā nainaṃ kaścid avārayat ‖ Rām 2.29:22 ‖
sa rājaputram āsādya trijaṭo vākyam abravīt |
nirdhano bahuputro 'smi rājaputra mahāyaśaḥ |
uñchavṛttir vane nityaṃ pratyavekṣasva mām iti ‖ 23 ‖
tam uvāca tato rāmaḥ parihāsasamanvitam |
gavāṃ sahasram apy ekaṃ na tu viśrāṇitaṃ mayā |
parikṣipasi daṇḍena yāvat tāvad avāpsyasi ‖ 24 ‖
sa śāṭīṃ tvaritaḥ kaṭyāṃ saṃbhrāntaḥ pariveṣṭya tām |
āvidhya daṇḍaṃ cikṣepa sarvaprāṇena vegitaḥ ‖ 25 ‖
uvāca ca tato rāmas taṃ gārgyam abhisāntvayan |
manyur na khalu kartavyaḥ parihāso hy ayaṃ mama ‖ 26 ‖

tataḥ sabhāryas trijaṭo mahāmunir
gavām anīkaṃ pratigṛhya moditaḥ |
yaśobalaprītisukhopabṛṃhiṇīs
tad āśiṣaḥ pratyavadan mahātmanaḥ ‖ 27 ‖

[11] *Mbh* 1.3:48–50; 2.8:27; 5.100:5–6; 12.325:4; 12.336:14; 13.14:39; 13.76:19–26; 13.128:10–12; 13.129:36–8; Brodbeck 2009: 225.

> There came a sallow brahman then, by the name of Trijaṭa Gārgya, all the way up to the fifth courtyard without anyone stopping him. Reaching the prince, Trijaṭa said, 'Glorious prince, I am penniless and have many children. I must live by constant gleaning in the forest. Have regard for me.' Rāma replied to him jokingly, 'There are one thousand cows I have not yet allocated. You shall have as many as you can cover by hurling your staff.' In a frantic rush he girded up the rag around his loins and, brandishing his staff impetuously, he hurled it with every ounce of his strength. Rāma then said to Gārgya, seeking to placate him, 'You must not be angry, truly. This was only a joke on my part.' Then the great sage Trijaṭa along with his wife accepted the herd of cows and pronounced blessings on the great prince conducive to fame, strength, joy and happiness. (*Rām* 2.29:22–7, tr. Pollock 2008: 163–5)[12]

In conjunction with the story of Satya, this shows that if circumstances permit, *uñcha* may be abandoned in favour of pastoralism, but not in favour of hunting.

*Niṣāda*s and *Dasyu*s

Ekalavya and the niṣāda*s.* *Rākṣasa*s are monstrous and flesh-eating; *kṣatriya*s, who have a monopoly on human violence, tame them. Gitomer discusses Bhīma Pāṇḍava's *rākṣasa* affinities; 'Bhīma's entering into rākṣasa-hood is somehow able to transform bad rākṣasas into good rākṣasas' (Gitomer 1991: 305; cf. Sengupta and Purkayastha 2011: 155-7). *Kṣatriya*s also tame and receive tribute from lesser *kṣatriya*s; and they also tame *niṣāda*s, as Arjuna and Droṇa tamed Ekalavya (*Mbh* 1.123).

*Niṣāda*s are small, dark, dirty, wear deerskins, and live in the wilds, by hunting or fishing. Some are cannibals (*niṣādān puruṣādāṃś*, *Mbh* 2.28:44).[13] Their lives are expendable (as at the burning of the lacquered house, *Mbh* 1.136–7). They originate from an eponymous ancestor Niṣāda. The *ṛṣi*s who speak *brahman* killed bad king Vena, churned Niṣāda from the 'right thigh' of his corpse (*Mbh* 12.59:99–103), and told Niṣāda to 'stay

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[12] I have adjusted quotations from the Clay Sanskrit Library volumes, adding diacritics for the names.

[13] On *niṣāda*s in general and Ekalavya in particular, see Parasher 1991: 197–202; Shankar 1994; Goldman 1996: 7–12; Leslie 1998: 459–60; Leslie 2003: 27–47, 182–3; Brodbeck 2006, 2009c; Brodbeck 2009: 230–31, 261.

down' (*niṣīda*, 12.59:102, tr. Fitzgerald 2004: 309). Niṣāda's younger brother was the paradigmatic good king Pṛthu, churned from Vena's right hand (*Mbh* 12.59:104–31; Fitzgerald 2004: 130–35; cf. *Hv* 5:14–21). The friction between *niṣāda*s and royal business is clear; but there is also dependence, since if the *niṣāda*s and their ilk did not need to be kept down, what protective function would the good king exercise?

A young *niṣāda*, Ekalavya son of Hiraṇyadhanus ('Goldenbow'), comes to Droṇa's school, at which Pāṇḍavas, Kauravas, and others are learning martial arts. Droṇa rejects Ekalavya because he is a *niṣāda*. Ekalavya goes back into the woods, and using a model of Droṇa as his teacher he practises archery alone. He gets incredibly good, and Arjuna finds out, and tells Droṇa, and Droṇa comes and demands a tuition fee from Ekalavya, and Ekalavya promises to pay it, and Droṇa asks for Ekalavya's thumb, and Ekalavya severs and gives it. So Ekalavya is nullified, and Arjuna is the best archer in the world.

Ekalavya's promise to pay Droṇa's fee is like the promise made by the surviving snakes, to be harmless; it is like Padmanābha's renunciation of anger. Diplomatic tactics are used against Ekalavya, and he unilaterally decommissions his weapons. Satya would presumably have become a *niṣāda* had he started eating deer; and Ekalavya, now that he cannot shoot, may have to be a gleaner.

Kāpavya and Guha. Kāpavya (*Mbh* 12.133; Bowles 2007: 234–40, cf. 226–9) was the son of a *kṣatriya* man and a *niṣāda* woman. An expert hunter and gatherer,[14] he lived the *niṣāda* life in the forest, and dutifully fed and honoured his parents as they aged, and fed the brahmins and their visitors. He was elected by the *dasyu*s – rogues, bandits – to be their chief. That he was 'elected' (root *abhi-vṛ*, 12.133:10) is interesting given the political usages of the label 'non-democratic' in recent times, often to legitimate interventions safeguarding economic interests. Kāpavya made the *dasyu*s agree to a certain code of behaviour.

[14] The verb *uñch* is not used, but Kāpavya has 'honey and meat, and roots and fruits, and various other foods high and low' (*madhumāṃsair mūlaphalair annair uccāvacair api* | *Mbh* 12.133:7, tr. Fitzgerald 2004: 509).

kāpavya uvāca |
mā vadhīs tvaṃ striyaṃ bhīruṃ mā śiśuṃ mā tapasvinam |
nāyudhyamāno hantavyo na ca grāhyā balāt striyaḥ ‖ *Mbh* 12.133:13 ‖
sarvathā strī na hantavyā sarvasattveṣu yudhyatā |
nityaṃ gobrāhmaṇe svasti yoddhavyaṃ ca tadarthataḥ ‖ 14 ‖
sasyaṃ ca nāpahantavyaṃ śīravighnaṃ ca mā kṛthāḥ |
pūjyante yatra devāś ca pitaro 'tithayas tathā ‖ 15 ‖
sarvabhūteṣv api ca vai brāhmaṇo mokṣam arhati |
kāryā cāpacitis teṣāṃ sarvasvenāpi yā bhavet ‖ 16 ‖
yasya hy ete saṃpraruṣṭā mantrayanti parābhavam |
na tasya triṣu lokeṣu trātā bhavati kaścana ‖ 17 ‖
yo brāhmaṇān paribhaved vināśaṃ vāpi rocayet |
sūryodaya ivāvaśyaṃ dhruvaṃ tasya parābhavaḥ ‖ 18 ‖
ihaiva phalam āsīnaḥ pratyākāṅkṣati śaktitaḥ |
ye ye no na pradāsyanti tāṃs tān senābhiyāsyati ‖ 19 ‖
śiṣṭyartham vihito daṇḍo na vadhārtham viniścayaḥ |
ye ca śiṣṭān prabādhante dharmas teṣāṃ vadhaḥ smṛtaḥ ‖ 20 ‖
ye hi rāṣṭroparodhena vṛttiṃ kurvanti kecana |
tad eva te 'nu māyante kuṇapaṃ kṛmayo yathā ‖ 21 ‖
ye punar dharmaśāstreṇa varteran iha dasyavaḥ |
api te dasyavo bhūtvā kṣipraṃ siddhim avāpnuyuḥ ‖ 22 ‖

bhīṣma uvāca |
tat sarvam upacakrus te kāpavyasyānuśāsanam |
vṛttiṃ ca lebhire sarve pāpebhyaś cāpy upāraman ‖ 23 ‖

Kāpavya said:
You ought not slay a woman, nor one who is cowering, nor a child, nor an ascetic. A noncombatant man should not be slain, and women should not be taken by force. Under no circumstances should the female of any kind of being be slain by a warrior. Everything must be good for cows and brahmins; one should make war for their sake. But grain should not be trampled down, nor should anyone erect any obstacles to the plowing of the fields, nor where the Gods are paid honor, or the ancestors, or guests.

Of all beings, a brahmin deserves to be let go free. And any recompense that is to be made to them should be made, even if it is the whole of one's property. In all the three worlds there is no one who will save the man whose ruin they intone when they are furiously enraged. He who insults brahmins or approves their extinction will be ruined as surely as the sun will rise.

He who lives here looks to the benefits of doing so. Our army will attack any who will not remit to us as they are able.

> The rod of punishment has been ordained for the purpose of education, not for the sake of inflicting corporal punishment – that is the settled conclusion. Corporal punishment is taught by tradition to be Lawful for [use against] those who harm educated people.
>
> There are some who make their living by damaging the country; for that reason, they are likened to worms upon a corpse. On the other hand, those barbarians [*dasyus*][15] who would live in this world in accordance with the Learned Traditions of Law attain perfection directly, even though they are barbarians.[16]
>
> *Bhīṣma said:*
> They paid homage to Kāpavya's entire instruction, and they all took up that way of life and quit their evil ways. (*Mbh* 12.133:13–23, tr. Fitzgerald 2004: 509–10)

The tenor of some of Kāpavya's speech is redolent of Aśoka's thirteenth major rock edict. The emphasis on not obstructing agriculture is notable. So is the institutionalisation of brahmin privileges. This last is sometimes taken as evidence of the self-interest of an established authorial class; but it might be seen in connection with the assumption of brahmin identity by some peaceable inhabitants of newly developed land – and we can imagine some antipathy towards those seen to be collaborating with the new regime.[17]

This passage describes the regulation of non-brahmin behaviours, such that *dasyu*s may facilitate royal revenue without disrupting development. A similar scenario is evident in the *Rāmāyaṇa* in relations between the house of Ayodhyā and Guha, the 'overlord' of the *niṣāda*s (*niṣādādhipati*, tr. Pollock 2008: 233 etc.), who lives in an outlying realm, by the Gaṅgā. Guha is 'accompanied by his aged ministers' (*vṛddhaiḥ parivṛto 'mātyair*, *Rām* 2.44:10) and 'prepared to withstand even a vast army of four divisions' (*caturaṅgaṃ hy api balaṃ sumahat prasahemahi* || 2.45:7; cf. 2.80:8), but he

[15] For discussion of the translation of *dasyu* as 'barbarian', see Hiltebeitel 2005: 248 n. 25. On the more general issue, cf. Hiltebeitel in that note: 'The major trait of *dasyu*s that interests the *Āpaddharma* is that, although they can be wild and unruly, especially in their forests, they can be managed once a king recognizes that their wildness and unruliness can be of service if they run what are essentially protection rackets.'

[16] I have rejigged Fitzgerald's translation of verse 22, to correct what looks like an editorial syntax error.

[17] Cf. Sengupta and Purkayastha 2011: 156: 'the munificence of the king towards the *brāhmaṇa*s is actually also an investment whereby the state expands into areas with no clearly defined or organised state authority'.

tells Rāma that 'This land, no less than Ayodhyā, belongs to you' (*yathāyodhyā tathedam te*, 2.44:12); 'We are servants, you the master. Come, our kingdom is yours to rule' (*vayaṃ preṣyā bhavān bhartā sādhu rājyaṃ praśādhi naḥ* ‖ 2.44:14; trs Pollock 2008: 233–5). Guha affectionately renders assistance as requested by Rāma and, later, by Bharata (*Rām* 2.78–83). He seems to be a client king within an Ayodhyā empire – someone whose local power Rāma wants to prolong (at 2.46:59 Rāma gives him advice on how to retain it), but whose subordination must also be underlined.[18] Guha tells Bharata that he offered Rāma a variety of foodstuffs,

> *tat sarvaṃ pratyanujñāsīd rāmaḥ satyaparākramaḥ* |
> *na hi tat pratyagṛhṇāt sa kṣatradharmam anusmaran* ‖ *Rām* 2.81:15 ‖
> *na hy asmābhiḥ pratigrāhyaṃ sakhe deyaṃ tu sarvadā* |
> *iti tena vayaṃ rājann anunītā mahātmanā* ‖ 16 ‖
>
> But the truthful Rāma refused it all. He heeded the code of kṣatriya and would not accept it. 'It is not for us to take, my friend. Ours is always to give' were the words with which great Rāma entreated us, your majesty. (*Rām* 2.81:15–16, tr. Pollock 2008: 411)

The relationship between Ayodhyā and Guha is presented here as a fait accompli, but elsewhere – not least in the battle for Laṅkā – we see the diplomatic and military negotiations that might have been required in order to set it up.

Two Curses, and the Good Wife

Arjuna curses Aśvasena. When Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa feed Khāṇḍava Forest to Agni, one of the creatures they terrorise and kill is the wife of Takṣaka the snake (cf. Kāpavya's 'Under no circumstances should the female of any

[18] Cf. Trautmann 1981: 429: 'the course of ancient Indian history shows that the competitive advantage lay with the hereditary monarchies and against the once numerous *saṃghas*, which were gradually absorbed by the more expansionist kingdoms or (sometimes under conditions of conquest by imperial states) internally transformed into their like'.

kind of being be slain by a warrior'). Takṣaka is away in Kurukṣetra at the time, but his snake wife is in Khāṇḍava Forest with their son Aśvasena. Mother and son are trapped; and the mother responds by trying to swallow the son. Just then, Arjuna shoots her head off with an arrow; and Indra (who opposes the massacre) intervenes to distract Arjuna, and Aśvasena escapes. Arjuna curses Aśvasena as he escapes, and then starts fighting (his own father) Indra. Arjuna's curse:

śaśāpa taṃ ca saṃkruddho bībhatsur jihmagāminam |
pāvako vāsudevaś ca apratiṣṭho bhaved iti ‖ *Mbh* 1.218:11 ‖

Wrathfully, the Terrifier cursed the Snake – and so did the Fire and Vāsudeva: 'Thou shalt never find shelter!'. (*Mbh* 1.218:11, tr. van Buitenen 1973: 419)

Minkowski has noted that this scene sets up an ongoing family feud (Minkowski 1991: 397). In the Kurukṣetra war, Aśvasena tries to get his own back on Arjuna, fails, and is killed; and years after that, Arjuna's grandson Parikṣit commits a diplomatic faux-pas, and gets cursed by Śṛṅgin and killed by snakebite – the bite of Aśvasena's father Takṣaka. And Janamejaya begins his snake massacre in order to avenge his own father, Parikṣit.

Vālmīki curses the niṣāda. Compare the curse that Arjuna casts with the one Vālmīki casts at the beginning of the *Rāmāyaṇa* – the curse which was allegedly the first verse in the *śloka* metre of which these texts are mainly composed. Vālmīki sees two cranes mating, but a passing *niṣāda* kills the male, and the female weeps, and Vālmīki, moved, curses the *niṣāda*:

mā niṣāda pratiṣṭhāṃ tvam agamaḥ śāśvatīḥ samāḥ |
yat krauñcamithunād ekam avadhīḥ kāmamohitam ‖ *Rām* 1.2:14 ‖

May you find no peace, Niṣāda, for all eternity – because you killed the male of this loving *krauñca* pair when he was intoxicated by desire! (*Rām* 1.2:14, tr. Leslie 1998: 460)

Vālmīki's curse upon the *niṣāda* is variously translated: 'you shall not live for very long' (Goldman 2005: 47); 'mayest thou seek in vain for a

resting place forever' (Shastri 1962: 10; cf. Hara 1972: 121); 'Never more shall you come home' (Hammer 2009: 197). Arjuna's curse upon Aśvasena is practically identical: *apratiṣṭho bhaved*. The cursed one is to be deprived of *pratiṣṭhā* – foundation, support, or home. This fits the analogy between snakes and *niṣāda*s; and if we read Aśvasena and this *niṣāda* as representatives of their type, it fits the situation wherein hunter-gatherers are finding their economy increasingly unsustainable.

Lineal tensions in sexual reproduction. Consider the violent acts immediately preceding these curses. In one case the perpetrator of the violent act is also the pronouncer of the curse; in the other case the curse is cast upon the perpetrator of the violent act. In both cases an arrow is fired, and it kills. I understand these arrows in lineal terms.[19] In the *Mahābhārata*, Arjuna's arrow kills the snake-mother as she is trying to encompass her son. In the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *niṣāda*'s arrow kills the male crane.

Consider the royal lineal ideal, as we see it in Sanskrit texts. In each generation the king dies, and there is a new king: the son of the last king. This ideal, and most especially the difficulties that then attend the plurality of sons, is explored in the *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyaṇa*; not just for kings, it can apply to any business of the type 'so-and-so and sons' – minimally, the possession of a surname ('the hereditary principle pervades the political system, not just the kingship', Trautmann 1981: 425; cf. Brodbeck 2011: 93–4). The ideal is patrilineal and patrilocal. Girls are given away in marriage, by their natal family, to their husband's family; they then have sons under *his* family name. This is the kind of family that the gleaner has in the story told by the mongoose: his household consists of him, his wife, their son, and *his* wife. Any daughters would be living elsewhere, with their husbands' families. The families of Padmanābha, Mudgala, and Satya would by implication be the same kind of family, where wives are relative newcomers, and marital relations are to provide the local son.

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[19] The similar *Mahābhārata* scene, where Pāṇḍu kills the male of what looks like a mating pair of deer, plays with the same theme (*Mbh* 1.109, etc.; Brodbeck 2009: 171–6), though the character array is different in each of the three cases. In the Pāṇḍu story the male 'deer' plays a symbolic role comparable to that played by the *niṣāda* in the *Rāmāyaṇa* story, and the patrilineal king is cursed by the wild man.

At the other extreme a mirrored lineal paradigm can be sketched, whereby women are not given away, and men come along, inseminate them, and either stay or leave. In *this* paradigm, if a king were to rule the same realm as his biologically connected predecessor, he would perhaps be the son of that predecessor's co-uterine sister (cf. Vielle 2012, Fig. 2). But it is not clear that the same notion of 'being king' would apply under this paradigm.

Neither or both of these two paradigms are instantiated; they are crude ways of thinking about sexual reproduction. We generally have two parents, one the same sex as ourselves, one not, and we have brothers and sisters. But the patrilineal paradigm is obvious in regal discourse; in old Sanskrit texts and elsewhere, it is explored in some detail. In this paradigm sons would identify and be identified with their father's people rather than with their mother's. Thus Kāpavya would be more of a *kṣatriya* than a *niṣāda*.

Consider the two arrow scenes emblematically. In one case a (snake) mother is killed and fails to keep her son, and in the other a (crane) father is killed but the mother is left alive. Two lineal paradigms are in play here – or rather, one is at play with the other. The royal model, wishing for sons in each generation, would be inconvenienced were daughters-in-law to keep their sons in their own natal houses. That is what Yayāti's wife Devayānī seems to have done; she left her husband and went back to her father (*Mbh* 1.78:22–36; interestingly, she was from a brahmin family). In the curse scenes under discussion, Arjuna, the hero, kills the mother who tries to appropriate her son; and Vālmīki, the author, curses the *niṣāda* who kills the father. Thus although in one scene the killer is the 'goodie' and in the other the killer is the 'baddie', both scenes can represent the condemnation of the matrilineal paradigm, because a different parent is killed in each case.[20] The snake is parallel to the *niṣāda*, both are associated with lineal aberrancy, and the sorrow of the surviving female crane provides a ventriloquised rubber-stamp for the patrilineal judgement.

The matrilineal paradigm is a shadow. It is too natural, visible only as it is rubbed out. It is the feared snakebite that can kill a patriline, as Śṛṅgin's curse and Takṣaka's bite killed Parikṣit and threatened to kill Janamejaya's

[20] The tendency in Kashmiri commentarial tradition to re-configure the Vālmīki scene, such that it is the *female* crane that is killed by the *niṣāda* (Masson 1969), would disrupt this reading.

patriline, before the deal was done at the snake sacrifice (Brodbeck 2009: 217–66; Brodbeck 2009b).

The good wife. In his speech quoted earlier, Padmanābha says the taming of his dangerous snake heritage is due to his excellent wife. She has helped him conquer his wildness. We could envisage the wife as Padmanābha's moral tutor, but perhaps what has specifically enabled Padmanābha not to bite anybody is the fact that she is a good patrilineal wife, who was given away and is now devoted to him, and will give him a good son for his line. Surely the basis of the famous *pativratā* ideal – the perfect wife (Leslie 1989) – is lineal, and the devoted wife stands in the same symbolic position as the reformed snakes.

Padmanābha says that even if someone steals a youngster (*vatsa*, 'yearling', usually translated 'calf') from one's inner chambers, as Rāma Jāmadagnya did, one must not take offence; if one does, one may pay with one's life, as Kārtavīrya and his sons did.[21] The incident in question is narrated at *Mbh* 12.49:40–41 (the Kārtavīryas take the calf of Jamadagni's cow, so Rāma cuts off King Kārtavīrya's arms and takes it back), and is implied at *Mbh* 3.116:19–24 (King Kārtavīrya takes the calf of Jamadagni's cow, so Rāma cuts off his arms and presumably takes it back). I would interpret the *vatsa* as a boy produced by intermarriage between Jamadagni's family and Kārtavīrya's, and the quarrel as over which line gets the child.[22] Padmanābha implies that Kārtavīrya and sons should have let go of the calf without getting angry; and Padmanābha favours *pativratā* wifehood, so presumably the cow was a Kārtavīrya daughter.

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[21] At *Hv* 23:134–8 Kārtavīrya is specified as a descendant of Hehaya and of Yadu.

[22] For a comparable dynamic, see *Mbh* 1.165 (cf. *Rām* 1.50:16–54:7): Vasiṣṭha's Nandinī is being taken, and with her her calf; Vasiṣṭha says to her, 'this youngster of yours has been tied with a strong rope [by Viśvāmitra the *kṣatriya*] and is being taken away by force' (*dṛḍhena dāmnā baddhvaiṣa vatsas te hriyate balāt* ‖ *Mbh* 1.165:30). Nandinī seems to be Vasiṣṭha's daughter (Brodbeck 2009: 79–80); Vasiṣṭha is prepared to let her go, but a host of jungley peoples – presumably representing those who thwart patrilineal arrangements – prevent Viśvāmitra from taking her. The connection between this story and the story of Kārtavīrya is underlined by the fact that it was Vasiṣṭha who cursed Kārtavīrya to be killed by Rāma (*Mbh* 12.49:30–37; *Hv* 23:151–5); and intriguingly, the curse was prompted by the fact that his grove had been burned down by Kārtavīrya. Cf. also *Rām* 3.3:15; 3.66:6.

This interpretation receives support from the story of Aurva (*Mbh* 1.169–71), which represents the same events, but with the generic 'Bhārgavas' standing in for Jamadagni and sons. Here the quarrel is over treasure that was formerly given by the Kārtavīryas to the Bhārgavas, but that the Bhārgavas later withheld from the Kārtavīryas, and so the Kārtavīryas massacred the Bhārgavas 'down to the children in the womb' (*ā garbhād*, 1.169:18). The Aurva story focuses on a wife-of-a-Bhārgava who wants 'to propagate the line of her husband' (*bhartuḥ kulavivṛddhaye*, 1.169:20; trs van Buitenen 1973: 339), and hides an embryo in her thigh; it is Aurva, who defeats the Kārtavīryas and is seemingly a double of Rāma. There is no *vatsa* in this version, but we can read the treasure as human, and the quarrel as over the lineal placement of offspring.[23] The implication of Padmanābha's mentioning Kārtavīrya is that good snakes would let *nāga* women have sons in non-*nāga* lines, because they have good wives of their own.

Conclusion

There is more to be said about snakes in early *kāvya*, and gleaners, *niṣāda*s, *dasyu*s, brahmins, *kṣatriya*s, *ṛṣi*s, etc., and all the stories I have mentioned. I have suggested experimental interpretations to coordinate different aspects of *Mahābhārata* discourse.

Prioritising the *Mahābhārata* and the Khāṇḍava and *sarpasatra* scenes, I have imagined, in broad strokes, new identities (hence communities) in the wake of economic growth and developmental changes, particularly regarding land use and means of livelihood. Because this imagining is done from the text, it implicates the text's reciters and audience, who are integrated into the text through its detailed *phala*s and multiply framed structure (it is usually about what happened to a person when they heard a certain story), and who include all *ṛṣi*s at Śaunaka's *satra*s in Naimiṣa Forest, whatever their livelihood. But that includes me at Śaunaka's *satra*; so

[23] The story at *Mbh* 3.116, where Rāma Jāmadagnya is told by his father to kill his mother for unfaithfulness, could be read – with the similar story of Cirakārin at *Mbh* 12.258 (Fitzgerald 2010b) – in lineal terms, as if the unfaithful thoughts are thoughts of her own natal family and the possibility of having her sons be part of it.

I think also in terms of development and its wake in my world, centred on the British Isles, as organised from the foreign office and the home office, which I would imagine to be generic in type, about whose various enclosures, clearances, and massacres I know so few details, but supported by whose funding I work.

In discussing this theme I have come, towards the end of the paper, to the edge of a gendered perspective which needs to be more widely integrated. There was also the edge of a soteriological perspective with Mudgala, whose representation (along with so much more *mokṣadharma* distinctly framed) must also be a sociological move on the part of the text, but one that is hard to conceptualise (cf. Brodbeck 2007). Also hard to conceptualise is the relationship between early Sanskrit *kāvya* and its contemporary discourses, and the relationship between the *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyaṇa*. But though this paper works to some extent on stolen ground, it has linked some textual gobbets together in what I hope are useful ways.

Appendix: Kṛṣṇa, Bāṇa, and the Vṛṣṇis

To finish, I would like briefly to register the also-hard-to-conceptualise relationship between the *Mahābhārata* and the *Harivaṃśa* (Brodbeck 2011b), with regard to Kṛṣṇa's people, the Vṛṣṇis. Their self-slaughter in *Mbh* 16 is one of the massacres I mentioned at the start. The *Harivaṃśa* features several incidents, set before that massacre but narrated after it, in which Kṛṣṇa fights his in-laws, or those of his son or grandson. The fight with Bāṇa (*Hv* 105–13; cf. Couture 2003) is particularly lineally striking. Kṛṣṇa's grandson Aniruddha and Bāṇa's daughter Uṣas pair up, and Aniruddha goes to live with Bāṇa's people. So Kṛṣṇa and various family members go there, defeat Bāṇa and his army in battle, and bring the couple back to live with Kṛṣṇa's people. Here Kṛṣṇa is an enforcer of patrilocy.

The Vṛṣṇis became refugees after King Jarāsaṃdha of Magadha's royal civilising mission on the Yamunā; Kṛṣṇa led them to flee, and they settled in Dvārakā by the western ocean (*Mbh* 2.13; *Hv* 25:15–16; *Hv* 80–82, 84). This seems to have happened before Kṛṣṇa and Arjuna burned the

Khāṇḍava Forest, but perhaps not very long before (cf. *Mbh* 1.199:50; 1.213:42). Kṛṣṇa throws his weight behind the Pāṇḍavas' patrilineal efforts, and makes sure they win the Kurukṣetra war.

The Vṛṣṇis are presented as Yādavas, descendants of Yadu, one of Yayāti's sons by Devayānī. As mentioned earlier, she went back to her father; and Yadu disobeyed Yayāti, spurning his primogenitive patrilineal rights and duties (*Mbh* 1.70:33–40; 1.79–80; *Hv* 22:19–28). In the *Harivaṃśa* critical apparatus, in a different account of the origin of the Vṛṣṇis (*Hv* app18), the Yādavas are descendants of a non-crown prince of the Ikṣvākus, who went to live with his in-laws. And in a passage in the *Mahābhārata* critical apparatus (*Mbh* 1.app72) Bhīma Pāṇḍava is recognised as the daughter's son's daughter's son of a snake, which would make Kṛṣṇa's paternal grandfather (Śūra) a snake, since Bhīma's mother, Pṛthā Kuntī, is Kṛṣṇa's father's sister.

Kṛṣṇa supervises the massacre of the Vṛṣṇis, and Dvārakā is flooded. The last we hear of Kṛṣṇa's line is that his descendant Vajra is brought back from Dvārakā and finds a home in Indraprastha, near where Khāṇḍava Forest used to be (*Mbh* 16.4–8). We can imagine that Kṛṣṇa's descendants through this line would be reformed – after Janamejaya's snake sacrifice, even if not before.

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Two

Like a Howling *Piśāca*: A Note on the Pronunciation of the *Ṛgvedasaṃhitā*

Giovanni Ciotti

This paper offers a contribution towards a better understanding of what the brāhmaṇical tradition considers to be the correct pronunciation of the Vedas.[1] Furthermore, it will also give the opportunity to enter the highly complex and mostly unstudied field of *vedalakṣaṇa* and to look at certain dynamics through which some Vedāṅgas interact with one another.

Vedalakṣaṇa

Vedalakṣaṇa (lit. "characteristic of the Vedas") is the field of Brāhmaṇical scholarship that collects those language-related expertises that have been used in India for more or less the last three millennia in order to preserve

[1] It is worth remembering that Vedic recitation has been included in the "UNESCO Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity" since 2008.

and transmit, generation by generation, the Vedic Saṃhitās ("Collections [of hymns]"), in particular as far as their *form* is concerned.

In fact, the Vedic reciters are expected to master a gamut of topics, including the correct articulation of the Sanskrit speech-sounds (*varṇa*s) and pitch modulations (*svara*s), the modifications these can undergo in specific linguistic and recitational contexts (*sandhi*s, lit. "combinations"), and the mastering of complex recombinations of the words of the text (*vikṛti*s, lit. "[textual] modifications"),[2] which in fact are the mnemonic techniques devised for the preservation of the form of the Saṃhitās.[3]

Within this field there are hundreds of texts, of which a great number have been listed by Kota Parameswara Aithal in his [1991] *Veda-Lakṣaṇa. Vedic Ancillary Literature: A Descriptive Bibliography*. This work offers a comprehensive bibliography of almost all known manuscripts and editions of *vedalakṣaṇa* texts that are preserved in both Western and Indian institutions.[4] It is to be noted that the number of works listed reaches the impressive figure of 1,619.[5]

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[2] It goes without saying that in the Vedic context the term 'text' refers to both oral and written media.

[3] There are eight *vikṛti*s in which Saṃhitās can be recited. The one called *jaṭā*, for instance, prescribes a chiasmus-like rearrangement of the wording of the text. In fact, the *jaṭā* form of *Ṛgvedasaṃhitā* [ṚV] 1.1.1ab (*agním ìḷe puróhìtaṃ | yajñásyà devám* [...]) goes as follows: *agním ìḷa īḷe 'gním agním ìḷe | īḷe puróhìtaṃ puróhìtam īḷe īḷe puróhìtam | puróhìtaṃ yajñásyà yajñásyà puróhìtaṃ puróhìtaṃ yajñásyà | puróhìtam ítì puráḥ hìtam | yajñásyà devám devám yajñásyà yajñásyà devám* | etc. Note that the rising stroke marks the *udātta*, the falling one marks the *svarita*, whereas the *anudātta* is left unmarked. Hereafter, I do not mark the *svara*s in the Vedic quotations: once *sandhi* is split, their reposition would require lengthy explanations that are not suitable for both the size and goal of this article.

[4] There are of course lacunae in Parameswara Aithal's work, such as the 11 manuscripts containing Śikṣās preserved at the University Library, Cambridge (UK).

[5] The size of these works can vary from a few lines to hundreds of stanzas or pages of prose. Concerning the kinds of texts considered to be part of the *vedalakṣaṇa* field, Parameswara Aithal [1991: 1] writes: "These texts are of ancillary nature and generally classified under *Vedāṅga*, though only a few of them belong to the proper *Vedāṅga* known as the *Śikṣā-s*. They include *Prātiśākhya-s*, *Anukramaṇī-s*, works on accentuation (*svara*) and on different forms of modified recitation (*vikṛti*), and various kinds of indexes." Parameswara Aithal has not included in his bibliography the works on *chanda*s ("metrics"), the inclusion of which in the realm of *vedalakṣaṇa* is, in my

In his preface to Parameswara Aithal's volume, Albrecht Wezler stresses the importance of the *vedalakṣaṇa* texts for a better understanding of Vedic literature, which modern Western philologists should take into consideration during their investigations.[6]

About the definition of *vedalakṣaṇa*

At present, I do not know of any passage within Sanskrit literature where the compound *veda-lakṣaṇa* is explained. However, there are plenty of sources in which the term *lakṣaṇa* is commented upon in contexts related to Vedic recitation.[7]

In the primary sources, the sense of the term *lakṣaṇa* is rather fluid, ranging from that of "rule" to that of "system of rules".[8] The same term can

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opinion, justified by the the definition that the commentarial literature gives of the term *lakṣaṇa* (see § 2). In this article, on the other hand, I will not take into consideration texts such as the Anukramaṇīs, since they deal with topics that are not, strictly speaking, linguistically-related.

6 In particular, Wezler mentions Cardona's [1993] article in which the age-old issue of the accentuation system of the *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* is elegantly discussed on the basis of some passages taken from the Vedic ancillary literature (in particular, from the *Bhāṣikasūtra*).

7 Western scholarship has not dealt in any comprehensive manner with the topic of *vedalakṣaṇa*. Much of the important literature about Sanskrit pronunciation and recitation simply ignores the term (neither Varma [1929] nor Allen [1953] mention it at all). On the other hand, we have a few exceptions to the general trend such as, of course, Parameswara Aithal [1991] and also Suryakanta [1940 (1982)]. The latter scholar proposes a classification of the *lakṣaṇa* works into two categories: prescriptive *lakṣaṇa*s and nomenclatory *lakṣaṇa*s. Such a classification, however, is not supported by any direct statement in the primary sources.

8 A well-known definition of *lakṣaṇa* in this sense is found in the *Paspaśāhnika* on Kātyāyana's *vārttika* 18, where Patañjali clearly states that *lakṣaṇa* means *sūtra* ("rule"): *lakṣyalakṣaṇe vyākaraṇam* | vt. 18 || [*Paspaśāhnika*:] *lakṣyaṃ ca lakṣaṇaṃ caitat samuditaṃ vyākaraṇaṃ bhavati* | *kiṃ punar lakṣyaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ ca* | *śabdo lakṣyaḥ sūtraṃ lakṣaṇam* | (Abhyankar [1962: p. 12, ll. 15-17]) "Vyākaraṇa (means) lakṣya (and) lakṣaṇa." [Paspaśāhnika:] "This whole (consisting of) both lakṣya and lakṣaṇa becomes vyākaraṇa. But what is lakṣya and what is lakṣaṇa? Lakṣya is śabda 'the words' and lakṣaṇa is sūtra 'the rules'." (tr. Joshi and Roodebergen [1986: 173]).

be also used to indicate a specific textual category.[9] Furthermore, it is my opinion that there are passages in the primary sources where *lakṣaṇa* demarcates a specific field of study, or in other words a specific sub-domain of the various sets of rules pertaining to the form of the Vedas. Here, I mention two of these passages:

(a) According to Uvaṭa's *Pārṣadavṛtti* (ca. 12th century), a commentary on Śaunaka's *Ṛgvedaprātiśākhya* [ṚP], *lakṣaṇa* represents the sum of the knowledge of three Vedāṅgas, namely *śikṣā* ("teaching [on pronunciation]"), *vyākaraṇa* ("[grammatical] analysis") and *chandas* ("metrics"):[10]

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[9] An explicit occurrence of this use of the term *lakṣaṇa* is found in *Sāmavedasarvānukramaṇī* 7 where a list of titles of works about the *Sāmavedasaṃhitā* is introduced as follows: *sapta gānāni sāmnāṃ vai brāhmaṇā aṣṭa vai smṛtāḥ | daśa sūtrāṇi saptāpi daśa lakṣaṇam iṣyate || tata eṣāṃ svarūpaṃ tu kathyate 'tra samāsataḥ |* [...] (Suryakanta [1933 (1970): p. 1, ll. 3-5]) "The Gānas ("song") of the Sāmans are taught to be seven, the Brāhmaṇas eight. The Sūtras are taught to be ten, and the Lakṣaṇas seventeen. Their forms are briefly explained here." Despite the position of the word *api* in the sentence, one could consider to translate the last line of *Sāmavedasarvānukramaṇī* 7 as: "The Sūtras are prescribed as seventeen, and the Lakṣaṇas as ten". This would maintain the caesura but, later on, the text says: "[...] *sūtrāṇāṃ daśakaṃ smṛtaṃ*" and "*atha saptadaśa lakṣaṇaṃ*". A further problem here is the use of *lakṣaṇa* in the singular form: I argue this is a case of metrical license. As a matter of fact, at the end of the work, the correct grammatical form in the plural is then used: *ity ete saptadaśa tu lakṣaṇāni vidur budhāḥ* (Suryakanta [1933 (1970): p. 8, l. 22]) ("The sages knew these as the 17 Lakṣaṇas"). Note that, among the 17 Lakṣaṇas, we find both known and unknown texts. Instances of the former ones are: the *Ṛktantra*, the *Sāmatantra*, the *Puṣpaka* (= *Puṣpasūtra*), the *Nāradīya*[*śikṣā*], the *Gautamīya*[*śikṣā*], the *Lomaśikṣā* (= *Lomaśīśikṣā*), the *Rāvaṇīya* (= *Rāvaṇabhaṭṭ*), etc.

[10] The Vedāṅgas are a group of disciplines developed in order to engage with the Vedic Saṃhitās both from the point of view of the ritual practices in which the Saṃhitās are used and the language in which the they are composed. The Vedāṅgas are six, namely: *kalpa* ("ritual"), *jyotiṣa* ("astronomy"), *nirukta* ("semantic analysis"), and the three just mentioned *chandas*, *vyākaraṇa* and *śikṣā*. Although no certain dates are available, this sixfold division seems to be rather old, possibly coeval with the systematisation of the Vedic hymns into fixed collections. In this respect, one can assume that the Vedāṅgas, in particular those focusing on language, were, at first, tools employed for the systematisation of the canon and, later, tools employed for its conservation.

kimartham idam ārabhyate |
śikṣācchandovyākaraṇaiḥ sāmānyenoktalakṣaṇam |
tad evam iha śākhāyām iti śāstraprayojanam ||
prātiśākhyaprayojanam anena ślokenocyate | śikṣādibhir yat sāmānyenotsargeṇoktaṃ lakṣaṇam | (Shastri [1931: p. 21, ll. 7-11])

Why is this [work, i.e. the ṚP] begun?
The aim of [this] treatise is that the *lakṣaṇa* that is taught in general terms (*sāmānyena*) by *śikṣā*, *chandas* and *vyākaraṇa*, [is taught] in respect to this recension (*śākhā*).
This verse states the aim of the Prātiśākhya. *Lakṣaṇa* is that which is taught in general terms (*sāmānyena*), i.e. by a general rule (*utsargeṇa*), by *śikṣā*, etc.

evaṃ śikṣācchandovyākaraṇair yat sarvāsu śākhāsu sāmānyena lakṣaṇam ucyate tad evāsyāṃ śākhāyām anena vyavasthāpyate ity etat prayojanam asyāṅgasya | tathā cātharvaṇaprātiśākhya idam eva prayojanam uktam 'evam iheti ca vibhāṣāprāptaṃ sāmānyena' | asya sūtrasyāyam arthaḥ | sāmānyena lakṣaṇe yad vikalpaprāptaṃ tad evam asyāṃ śākhāyāṃ vyavasthitaṃ bhavatīti prātiśākhya-prayojanam uktam | (Shastri [1931: p. 23, ll. 7-12])

So that *lakṣaṇa* which is taught in general terms by *śikṣā*, *chandas* and *vyākaraṇa* for all the recensions [of the Vedas], is specified for this recension by this (*anena*) [treatise]: this is the aim of this work (*aṅga*) [of the Ṛgveda]. Similarly, this very aim is stated in the *Atharvaṇaprātiśākhya*: '*evam iheti ca*' '*vibhāṣāprāptaṃ sāmānyena*' (*Śaunakīyācaturādhyāyikā* 1.1.3-4).[11] The meaning of this *sūtra* is: 'That which is known from the general *lakṣaṇa* [as] an option (*vikalpa*), it is thus fixed in this recension: [this] is said [to be] the aim of a Prātiśākhya'.[12]

Thus, according to this definition, *lakṣaṇa* describes in general the features of Sanskrit according to the teachings of *śikṣā*, *chandas* and *vyākaraṇa*. On the other hand, the Prātiśākhyas specify those instructions that are particular to each Vedic recension, in this case to the ṚV. In a way,

[11] Possibly following Whitney [1862], Shastri [1931: 23] considers this quotation as forming only one *sūtra*, i.e. 1.2. The new numbering follows Deshpande [1997: 100-2], who translates them as "[this treatise] also [defines that the phonetic/phonological features of the words] in this [tradition] are such and such" and "[These phonetic/phonological features of the words] obtain optionally in a generic [grammar of Sanskrit]".

[12] Note that this definition of *lakṣaṇa* is followed in Uvaṭa's *Pārṣadavṛtti* by a further one. There *lakṣaṇa* is described as a more independent field, which includes topics that *śikṣā*, *chandas* and *vyākaraṇa* do not cover.

lakṣaṇa can be seen as some sort of curriculum that the Vedic reciter is expected to master. As we will see later, the interaction among the various Vedāṅgas is in fact fundamental in allowing the reciter to collect all the information he needs to deliver the Vedas in their prescribed, and thus correct, form.

(b) A further definition of *lakṣaṇa* is that it is in opposition to *nirukta* ("semantic analysis"), the fourth of the Vedāṅgas dealing with language matters. In fact, a conscious distinction between *lakṣaṇa* ("form") and *artha* ("meaning") of the Vedas emerges from the *vedalakṣaṇa* literature. An interesting passage that discusses this distinction is found in Viṣṇumitra's *Vargadvayavṛtti* (possibly, a partial commentary on Uvaṭa's *Pārṣadavṛtti*, see Shastri [1922: 15]):

> *vedābhyāso hi pañcadhā vihitaḥ | adhyayanaṃ vicāro 'bhyasanaṃ japo 'dhyāpanam iti |* [...]
> [...] *sa ca vicāro dvividhaḥ | arthato lakṣaṇataś ceti | tathā coktam |*
> *sthāṇur ayam bhārahāraḥ kilābhūd adhītya vedam na vijānāti yo'rtham |*
> *yo 'rthajña it sakalaṃ bhadram aśnute nākam eti jñānavidhūtapāpmā ||*
> *iti | tathā ca |*
> *lakṣaṇaṃ yo na vetty ṛkṣu na karmaphalabhāg bhavet |*
> *lakṣaṇajño hi mantrāṇāṃ sakalaṃ bhadram aśnute ||*
> *iti | tasmāt tāvat pūrvaṃ lakṣaṇam ucyate | lakṣaṇapūrvakaṃ hy arthaparijñānam | tathā coktam |*
> *svaro varṇo 'kṣaraṃ mātrā daivaṃ yogārṣam eva ca |*
> *mantraṃ jijñāsamānena veditavyaṃ pade pade ||* (Shastri [1931: p. 2, ll. 15-6; p. 3, ll. 8-17])

> For the practice (*abhyāsa*) of the Veda is fivefold: recitation (*adhyayana*), examination (*vicāra*), exercise (*abhyasana*), repetition by muttering (*japa*) and teaching (*adhyāpana*). [...] Examination (*vicāra*) is twofold: with respect to the meaning (*artha*) and with respect to the form (*lakṣaṇa*). In fact, it is said: 'He is the bearer of a burden only,—the blockhead who, having studied, does not understand the meaning of the Veda. But he who knows the meaning obtains all good fortune and, with his sins purged off by knowledge, attains heaven.'[13] (*Nirukta* 1.18) And similarly: 'He who does not know the *lakṣaṇa* of the *ṛc*s cannot

[13] The translation of this *Nirukta* quotation is from Sarup [1921: 18]. Its numbering follows Sarup [1927: 40]: according to Śāstrī [1931: 3], in fact, this is *Nirukta* 1.6. Note that this passage is itself a quotation within the *Nirukta*.

partake in the fruits of the sacrificial action. In fact, [only] the knower of the *lakṣaṇa* of the *mantra*s attains all good fortune.' Therefore, the *lakṣaṇa* has to be said first, for the comprehension of meaning [occurs only] once *lakṣaṇa* [is known]. Thus, it is said: 'Pitch modulation, speech-sound, syllable, mora, the deity and the ṛṣic way of [its] employment (*yogārṣa*) (?):[14] he who desires to know has to understand a *mantra* step by step (?)'.[15]

Here, it is openly stated that the focus of *lakṣaṇa* is the preservation of the form of the Saṃhitās. Understanding the meaning of the texts is a task for other disciplines that the reciter is also expected to master.

Chandas and the *Ṛgveda*

So far we have seen that *chandas* is an important discipline in which every Vedic reciter is expected to be well-versed. He should be able to recognise the various meters and to scan the lines in order to count their syllables.

The purposes of *chandas* are listed in numerous passages of brāhmaṇical literature. One of these is Sāyaṇa's introduction to his *Ṛgvedabhāṣya* (14th century) in which the domain of *chandas* is described as follows:

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[14] This verse is also found in other texts with some variant readings, in particular concerning the line *daivaṃ yogārṣam eva ca*. While commenting on *Pāṇinīyaśikṣā* 1, the *Śikṣāprakāśa* (see Ghosh [1938: 24]) attributes this verse to Śaunaka despite the fact that it is not found in the *Ṛgvedaprātiśākhya* and reads *viniyogārtham eva ca*. Ghosh however notes also a variant reading, found in the manuscript L of his edition, that is closer to the one of Viṣṇumitra, i.e. *viniyogārṣam eva ca*. Furthermore, Bhāskararāya's *Chandaḥsūtrabhāṣyarāja* reads *viniyogo 'rtham eva ca* (see Kanjilal [2000: p. 68, l. 23]) ("[ritual] employment and meaning", note *artha* as a neuter noun).

[15] The understanding of the two, i.e. *lakṣaṇa* and *artha*, is not mutually exclusive: on the contrary, they complete one another and it is the duty of the Vedic reciter to master them both. As Yāska states in *Nirukta* 1.18: *yad gṛhītam avijñātaṃ nigadenaiva śabdyate | anagnāv iva śuṣkaidho na taj jvalati karhicit |* ("What has been taken [from the teacher's mouth] but not understood [and] is uttered by mere recitation, that never flares up, like dry firewood on a non-fire.", tr. Kahrs [1998: 46]). The same passage is found in Patañjali's *Paspaśāhnika* (Abhyankar [1962: p. 2, ll. 15-16]) with the variant *adhītam* ("recited" according to Joshi and Roodbergen [1986: 42], "studied" according to Kahrs [1998: 46]) instead of *gṛhītam* ("what has been taken [from the teacher's mouth]").

tathā chandograntho 'py upayujyate | chandoviśeṣāṇāṃ tatra tatra vihitatvāt | tasmāt sapta caturuttarāṇi chandāṃsi prātaranuvāke 'nūcyanta iti hy āmnātam | gāyatryuṣṇiganuṣṭubbṛhatīpaṅktitriṣṭubjagatīty etāni sapta chandāṃsi | caturviṃśaty akṣarā gāyatrī | tato 'pi caturbhir akṣarair adhikāṣṭāviṃśaty akṣaroṣṇik | evam uttarottarādhikā anuṣṭubādayo 'vagantavyāḥ | [...] | tatra maganayaganādisādhyo gāyatryādivivekaś chandograntham antareṇa na suvijñeyaḥ | kiṃca | yo ha vā aviditārṣeyacchandodaivatabrāhmaṇena mantreṇa yājayati vādhyāpayati vā sthāṇuṃ varcchati gartaṃ vāpādyate pra vā mīyate pāpīyān bhavati | tasmād etāni mantre mantre vidyād iti śrūyate | (Müller [1890-2 (1966): p. 21, ll. 22-28])

So the *Chandograntha* (lit. "book on metres", possibly the title of a work) is also used, since specific metres are prescribed in various occasions. For it has been handed down: 'Therefore seven plus four metres [are recited] in the morning recitation (*prātaranuvāka*)'. The seven stanzas are: *gāyatrī*, *uṣṇih*, *anuṣṭubh*, *bṛhatī*, *paṅkti*, *triṣṭubh*, [and] *jagatī*. The *gāyatrī* has twenty-four syllables. The *uṣṇih* has four more, [i.e.] twenty-eight syllables. Similarly, *anuṣṭubh* and so forth can be understood one by one as having more and more [syllables]. [...] In this respect, without *Chandograntha* it is not easy to understand the distinction between *gāyatrī* and so forth that is obtained through [the knowledge of] the *gaṇa*s *ma*, *ya* and so forth.[16] Moreover, it is learnt that: 'The one who instigates a sacrifice or teaches by means of a *mantra* whose *ṛṣi*, stanza, god [and] Brāhmaṇa are not known, he either runs up against a post, is made to fall into a well,[17] dies or becomes more sinful. Therefore, for every *mantra* he knows all this'.

Going back to Uvaṭa's *Pārṣadavṛtti*, we find an example of what the Vedic reciter is expected to be able to do in order to classify the stanzas according to the right metre:

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[16] *Chandas* analyses each metre as a clusters of *gaṇa*s, i.e. groups of three syllables. *Ma* and *ya* are the technical names proper to two out of the eight possible *gaṇa*s: *ma* indicates a group made by three heavy syllables (molossus), whereas *ya* indicates a group made by one light syllable followed by two heavy syllables (baccheus). Note that not all the metres contain a number of syllables that is a multiple of three; therefore, there can be either one or two stray syllables for each metre. According to *chandas*, these constitute independent *gaṇa*s and are called *ga-gaṇa* or *la-gaṇa* according to their heaviness (*ga* = *guru* "heavy", *la* = *laghu* "light").

[17] Müller's edition reads *gartaṃ vā āpādyati*, which I have emended in *āpādyate*. Peterson's [1890: 210] edition gives the text as *garte vā pātyate*. as it is also found in Kātyāyana's *Ṛgvedasarvānukramaṇī* (see Sharma [1977: 1]); Durgasiṃha's commentary on *Nirukta* (see Bhadkamkar [1918: p. 738, ll. 16-7]) reads *garte vā patati*.

tathā sarvaiś chandovicityādibhiḥ piṅgalayāskasaitavaprabhṛtibhir yat sāmānyenoktaṃ lakṣaṇam | yathā ṣaṭsaptatyakṣarā cātidhṛtir bhavati | tathā tatraivoktam 'pādaḥ' 'iyādipūraṇaḥ' | evaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇe sati 'sa hi śardho na mārutam' iti cāticchandasy aṣṭāpadāyām aṣṭaṣaṣṭyakṣarāyāṃ ṛci saṃdehaḥ | kim iyam aṣṭaṣaṣṭyakṣarātyaṣṭiḥ pādānām avikarṣeṇa | āhosvit pādānāṃ vikarṣeṇātidhṛtiḥ | asmin saṃdeha idaṃ viśeṣalakṣaṇam ārabhyate 'sakhe ca sa hi śarghaś ca madhyamo varga ucyate' iti | evam asyāṃ śākhāyāṃ pādavikarṣeṇeyam atidhṛtiḥ | (Shastri [1931: p. 22, ll. 1-9])

Similarly, *lakṣaṇa* is taught in general by all [the treatises] such as the *Chandoviciti*,[18] etc. [and] by Piṅgala, Yāska, Saitava, etc. As [for instance] the *atidhṛti* is [a type of stanza] with 76 syllables, so in this respect it is taught that the filler of the metrical line is *iy*, etc.[19] Thus, from the point of view of the general rule, there is a doubt concerning the *ṛc* [beginning with] *sa hi śardho na mārutaṃ* (ṚV 1.127.6a), [which is] an *aticchandas* [stanza type] having 8 *pada*s and 68 syllables. Is this an *aṭyaṣṭi* stanza with 68 syllables without separation of words (*pāda*s)? Or [is this] an *atidhṛti* with separation of the words? Concerning this doubt, a specific rule (*viśeṣa-lakṣaṇa*) is composed, [which ends with] *sakhe ca sa hi śardhaś ca madhyamo varga ucyate* (ṚP 16.91). Thus, in this *śākhā*, this [case] is an *atidhṛti* with a separation of words.

The whole *sūtra* 16.91 of the ṚP is as follows: *tam indram pro ṣu suṣuma trikadrukeṣv ayā rucā | sakhe ca sa hi śardhaś ca madhyamo varga ucyate* ‖ ("[The stanzas beginning with] *tam indram*, *pro ṣu*, *suṣuma*, *trikadrukeṣu*, *ayā rucā*, *sakhe* and *sa hi śardhaḥ* [are examples of] the middle class [*i.e.*, of the seven long metres Atijagatī etc.]", tr. Shastri [1937: 123]). *Sūtra*s 16.79-86 of the ṚP give the list of the seven *aticchandas*, which are the intermediate class of stanzas starting from the *atijagatī* and ending with the *atidhṛti*. Thus the stanza beginning with *sa hi śardhaḥ*, which is the last given in 16.91, corresponds to the *atidhṛti*.

Note that the restoration of the right number of syllables is a process which directly affects the pronunciation of the text. Let us take into consideration the example (*sa hi śardho na mārutam*) quoted by Uvaṭa, i.e. ṚV 1.127.6:

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[18] *Chandoviciti* is an alternative title for Piṅgala's *Chandaḥsūtra*, i.e. the seminal text of the *chandas* discipline.

[19] *Pādaḥ* ("metrical line") and *iyādipūraṇaḥ* ("the filler [of the metrical line] is *iy*, etc.") are respectively *sūtra*s 3.1 and 3.2 of Piṅgala's *Chandaḥsūtra* (see Kanjilal [2000]).

sa hi śardho na mārutaṃ tuviṣvaṇir (a) | *apnasvatīṣūrvarāsv iṣṭanir* (b) | *ārtanāsv iṣṭaniḥ* (c) | *ādad dhavyāny ādadir* (d) | *yajñasya ketur arhaṇā* (e) | *adha smāsya harṣato hṛṣīvato* (f) | *viśve juṣanta panthāṃ* (g) | *naraḥ śubhe na panthām* (h) ‖

Let us now consider Van Nooten and Holland's [1994] metrically restored version of the same passage:

sa hi śardho na mārutaṃ tuviṣvaṇir (a) | *apnasvatīṣu urvarāsu iṣṭanir* (b) | *ā artanāsu iṣṭaniḥ* (c) | *ādad dhavyāni ādadir* (d) | *yajñasya ketur arhaṇā* (e) | *adha sma asya harṣato hṛṣīvato* (f) | *viśve juṣanta pantha-aṃ* (g) | *naraḥ śubhe na pantha-am* (h) ‖ (van Nooten and Holland [1994: 77])

The strategy followed by Van Nooten and Holland for their pursuit is that of dissolving the *sandhi* of the text. In particular, they have adopted a disyllabic scansion of certain vowels or of certain clusters made by a semivowel and a vowel. This procedure is in keeping with the various aims of *chandas*, among which one finds the normalisation of the number of syllables for hypometric and hypermetric lines. Generally speaking, in fact, each line of a stanza should have the same number of syllables. When this does not happen, one of the possible reasons might be that, in the recitation, some phonological phenomena have affected the speech-sounds by either modifying their features (e.g. $i + a \rightarrow y + a$) or by merging them into one single speech-sound (e.g. $i + i \rightarrow \bar{\imath}$). By dissolving these *sandhi* forms, it is possible to obtain, for instance, 8 more syllables in ṚV 1.127.6, thereby totalling 76 syllables, i.e. the number of syllables that is prescribed for an *atidhṛti* verse.

Iyādi pūraṇaḥ

The operation carried out by van Nooten and Holland is similar to the one prescribed by the *vedalakṣaṇa* literature and, in particular, by the texts dealing with metres. However, I argue that the metrically restored version given by van Nooten and Holland can be *phonetically* improved using further passages from the *vedalakṣaṇa* literature.

To support my stand, I discuss excerpts from the ṚP, the *Chandaḥsūtra* of Piṅgala (along with three of its commentaries) and the *Lomaśīśikṣā*.

(a) The ṚP contains the following *sūtra*s:

vyūhed ekākṣarībhāvān pādeṣūneṣu saṃpade ‖ 17.22 ‖

kṣaipravarṇāṃś ca saṃyogān vyaveyāt sadṛśaiḥ svaraiḥ ‖ 17.23 ‖

In the defective metrical lines, one should split single speech-sound up to the fulfilment (*saṃpade*) [of the metrical requirements] (17.22).[20] And, one should separate the consonant clusters (*saṃyoga*s) with semi-vowels (*kṣaipra*s) by means of the homogeneous vowels (17.23).[21]

This passage does not prescribe that, in the case of C*y*V (read: consonant-*y*-vowel), one should restore the metre by changing *y* into *i*, thus obtaining C*i*V. Instead, it states that "one should separate [...] by means of the corresponding vowels", i.e. a vowel *i* has to be inserted in C*y*V so to obtain C*iy*V. Van Nooten and Holland [1994] follow the C*i*V model for their metrically restored edition of the ṚV. Although this choice does not modify the syllabic computation, I argue that it does not reflect the articulation of

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[20] Shastri's [1937: 126] translation of *saṃpade* is "for the sake of perfection". In my translation, I follow Uvaṭa's commentary which states: *saṃpada iti kasmāt | ā itāyāmopa gavyanta indram | ity atra traya ekībhāvās tatra pūrvasyaiva vyūhena saṃpatsiddher uttarayor* [*vyūho* – GC] *na kartavyo bhavati* ("Why *saṃpadé*? In '*ā itāyāmopa gavyanta indram*' (ṚV 1.33.1a), there are three [conjunctions] made of a single speech-sound. In this case, thanks to the separation of the first [of the conjunctions] only, one should not separate the other two for accomplishing the fulfilment [of the metrical requirements]."). The *padapāṭha* of ṚV 1.33.1a is: *ā | ita | ayāma | upa | gavyantaḥ | indram* |. Thus, *ita* + *ayāma* and *ayāma* + *upa* are the other two conjunctions.

[21] *Kṣaipra* ("[a sound] that is quickly [pronounced]") is a term used for indicating *y* and *v* when they respectively substitute *i* and *u* – see ṚP 2.21 *samānākṣaram antasthāṃ svām akaṇṭhyaṃ svarodayam* ("A monophthong is changed into its own semivowel if it is non-guttural [i.e. *i* and *u*] and is followed by a vowel") and 2.23 *te kṣaiprāḥ prākṛtodayāḥ* ("These [semivowels, i.e. *y* and *v*] are quickly [pronounced] if followed by an unchanged [vowel]"). *Saṃyoga* ("conjunction") is a term specifically used for indicating consonant clusters – see ṚP 1.37 *saṃyogas tu vyañjanasaṃnipātaḥ* ("But a conjunction is an aggregation of consonants").

the speech-sounds that the traditional scholars prescribe for the Vedas. The pronunciation of C*i*V is in fact clearly different from that of C*iy*V.[22]

(b) According to the *vedalakṣaṇa* scholarship, the same rule works for the whole Vedic corpus. Piṅgala in his *Chandaḥsūtra,* the seminal work on *chandas*, states at *sūtra* 3.2:

iyādipūraṇaḥ ||

The filler of [the metrical line (*pāda*) 3.1] is *iy*, etc.

In order to understand the proper meaning of this *sūtra*, it is helpful to look at some of the commentaries on this passage.

• Halāyudha states in his *Mṛtasaṃjīvanī* (ca. 10th century, see Ayodhyānātha [1947]):

pādaḥ ity anuvartate | iyādiḥ pūraṇo yasya sa iyādipūraṇaḥ | ādiśabdena uvādayo 'pi gṛhyante | tatrāyam arthaḥ | yatra gāyatryādicchandasi pādasyākṣarasaṃkhyā na pūryate tatreyādibhiḥ pūrayitavyā | (Ayodhyānātha [1947: 37-8])

'*pādaḥ*' ("metrical line") is repeated [from the preceding *sūtra*]. That [metrical line] which is filled by *iy*, etc. is '*iyādipūraṇaḥ*'. By the word '*ādi*' ("etc.") also *uv*, etc. are understood. In this respect, this is the meaning: where in a *gāyatrī* stanza, etc. the number of syllables per line is not complete, it has to be completed by *iy*, etc.

• Yādavaprakāśayati explains in his *Chandovicitibhāṣya* (ca. 10th/11th century, see Sinharay [1977]) that *iy* can substitute *y* also when the latter has not been produced by *sandhi*:

sa ca pādo dṛśyamānair akṣaraiḥ śāstrīyāṃ sampattim anāpnuvam iyādibhiḥ pūraṇīyaḥ, yatra sandhinimitto yakāravakārayoḥ saṃyogo bhavati | yathā –

[22] I would like to point out that the phonetic rendering of the ṚV might not have been the focus of Van Nooten and Holland's project. In the introduction to their volume, in fact, they do not openly engage with this topic.

divaspṛthivyāḥ paryoja udbha tam iti | […] *kvacid asandhinimitto 'pi saṃyogo vyūhyate*[23] | *yathā – pratno hotā vareṇyaḥ iti* | […] (Sinharay [1977: 10])

And, where there is a consonant cluster with *y* or *v* caused by *sandhi*, the metrical line, which has not obtained [its] fulfilment in accordance with the treatises on account of [its] visible syllables, has to be completed by *iy*, etc. For instance: *divas pṛthivyāḥ pary oja* (→ *pariy oja*) *udbhṛtam* (ṚV 6.47.27a) […]. Sometimes, also a consonant cluster not caused by *sandhi* is separated. For instance: *pratno hotā vareṇyaḥ* (→ *vareṇiyaḥ*) (ṚV 2.7.6b) […].

• Bhāskararāya's *Chandaḥsūtrabhāṣyarāja* (ca. 18th century, see Kanjilal [2000]) extends the meaning of this *sūtra* to include not only the procedure of adding a vocalic epenthesis (C*y*V → C*iy*V), but also the conflation of vowels and 'dubious cases':

tataś ca pāda iyādibhiḥ pūrayitavyaḥ[24] *pramāpaṇīyaś cety arthaḥ* | *pūrtisādhanatā tv anyūnānatirekīkaraṇam* | *tena vihitākṣarasaṃkhyāto nyūnasyābhivardhanaṃ tato 'dhikasya hrāsanaṃ saṃdigdhasya nirṇayanaṃ ceti tritayaṃ pūraṇapadārthaḥ* | *iś ca y ca iyau aś ca aś ca au* | *iti dvau dvandvau akāraḥ kevala eka iti trayāṇāṃ punar dvandvasyādipadena bahuvrīhis tasya pūraṇapadena bahuvacanārthena*[25] *punar bahuvrīhiḥ* | *teneyādayo vikarṣā abhivardhanopāyā yasya savarṇadīrgha-saṃkarṣādayo nyūnīkaraṇopāyā yasya avasānādayaḥ sandehanirasanopāyā yasya sa iyādipūraṇaḥ* | *ūno 'dhikaḥ*[26] *sandigdhaś ceti pādaviśeṣaṇatrayam ākṣepa-labhyam* | *tenonaḥ pādaḥ iyādibhir vardhanīyo 'dhikaḥ pādaḥ hrasanīyaḥ sandigdhaḥ pādo nirṇetavya ity arthaḥ* | (Kanjilal [2000: 101])

Thus, the meaning is [that] a metrical line has to be completed with *iy*, etc. and made to scan [well]. Moreover, the accomplishment of [metrical] completion (*pūrtisādhanatā*) is the act of [making the metrical line] neither lacking nor exceeding [syllables] (*anyūnānatirekīkaraṇa*). Because of that, the meaning of the word *pūraṇa* is threefold: supply of the lacking [syllables], then diminution of the exceeding [ones] and removal of ambiguity according to the number of prescribed syllables (*vihitākṣara*) [for each verse]. [The compound *iyā* is formed of], two

[23] Sinharay's [1977: 10, fn. 5] edition reads *vyahyate* ("it is explained") and reports also the variant *bādhyate* ("it is removed") found in a two manuscripts. I propose to emend the reading with *vyūhyate* ("it is separated") for the same form appears later in the text and it seems to me a better choice given the context.

[24] The edition reads *pūrayitavya*.

[25] The edition reads *bahuvacanāntena*.

[26] The edition reads *ūnodhikaḥ*.

dvandva compounds – [i.e.] *iy* (*iyau*) [formed of] *i* plus *y* and *ā* (*au*) [formed of] *a* plus *a* – [and] one *a*, which is absolute (*kevala*).[27] In turn, the *dvandva* compound, [which is formed by] the three [items *i* plus *y*, *a* plus *a*, and the absolute *a*], [is made into] a *bahuvrīhi* compound with [the addition] of the word *ādi*. Then, this [*bahuvrīhi*, i.e. *iyādi*, is made into another] *bahuvrīhi* with [the addition] of the word *pūraṇa*, the sense of which is plural.[28] Therefore, the means for increasing [the number of syllables] are *iy* and so forth, which are dividers [of words]; the means for diminishing [the number of syllables] is the conflation into homogeneous (*savarṇa*) long [vowels] and so forth; [and] the means for removing doubts is the pauses (*avasāna*) [at the end of the verse][29] and so forth. [These are the means of] *iyādipūraṇaḥ* ["The filler of [the metrical line] is *iy*, etc."]. The three qualifiers of a metrical line, [i.e.] lack, excess and uncertainty, have to be understood as alluded to (*ākṣepa*) [by the *sūtra*]. Thus, this means that, through *iyā*, etc., a defective verse has to be increased, an extrametrical (*adhikaḥ*) verse has to be diminished [and] an ambiguous verse has to be clarified.

(c) Finally, according to the unknown author of *Lomaśīśikṣā*:

śūnyagṛhe piśācas tu garjate na ca dṛśyate |
evaṃ yakārā vaktavyā 'dhi-y-agnir jma' nidarśanam ||

Like a *piśāca* who howls in an empty house, but is not seen, so the *y* [semivowels] should be pronounced as in the example '[*a*]*dhi-y-agnir jma*' (← […] *adhi | agniḥ | jma* […]) (*Sāmavedasaṃhitā*, *kauthuma* recension, 4.8.3.17.1a).[30]

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[27] The attribute *kevala* indicates that the sound *a* has to be understood as not undergoing any *sandhi* phenomena. This implies that any word ending in *a* has to be understood as if *in pausa* (*avasāne*) once this is required by the metrical scansion. Later in the text, *avasāna* will be listed as one of the means for removing ambiguities.

[28] In other words, *iyādipūraṇaḥ* is analysed as:
$\langle\{[(i{+}y)_{dvandva} + (a{+}a)_{dvandva} + (a)]_{dvandva}(ādi)\}_{bahuvrīhi}(pūraṇaḥ)\rangle_{bahuvrīhi}$.

[29] The term *avasāna* is later explained as *avasānaṃ tat* […] *niyamitaṃ tat pādāntyatvavyāpyam* ("*avasāna* is prescribed [as] that which is reached at the end of a metrical line").

[30] This is some sort of floating verse in the *Lomaśīśikṣā*. Its position varies according to the various manuscripts I have consulted, which are: Add 1938 of the University Library of Cambridge (Cambridge, UK), BORI ms. n° 114/1879-80 of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (Pune, India). Furthermore, Kielhorn [1876 (1969)] reports it as the last one in the text whereas it is not found in the printed editions of the the *Lomaśīśikṣā* (Pāṭhaka [1889-93] and Tripāṭhī [1989]). Taking into account the obscure genesis of the Śikṣās as they are nowadays attested, it would not be surprising if this verse were a later addition from another text.

In this passage, the *piśāca* – a flesh-eating fiend – howling in the empty house represents the semivowel *y* that has to be articulated in the place of the interval (technically called *avagraha* "separation") occurring between the words *adhi* and *agnir*. The kind of analysis carried on in this passage suggests that, contrary to the treatises we have seen so far, the *Lomaśīśikṣā* engages with the word by word version (*padapāṭha*) of the Vedic text and not with its continuous version (*saṃhitāpāṭha*, i.e. the version recited during the rituals), which in this case would be *adhy agnir jma.* In other words, the *Lomaśīśikṣā* does not prescribe C*y*V → C*iy*V, but C*i*#V → C*iy*V.

Already Kielhorn [1876: 196], Varma [1929: 50] and Mishra [1972: 17] attribute, with different degrees of certainty, the *Lomaśīśikṣā* to the Sāmavedic tradition, but they do not quote any primary source to justify their claims. This affiliation seems anyway to be correct since the *Lomaśīśikṣā* is for instance included in the list of Lakṣaṇas ancillary to the *Sāmavedasaṃhitā* in the *Sāmavedasarvānukramaṇī* (see fn. 9).[31]

The form of ṚV 1.127.6

In light of the sources taken into consideration in the previous section, I suggest that, according to the *vedalakṣaṇa* teachings, the most proper form of ṚV 1.127.6 is the following:

sa hi śardho na mārutaṃ tuviṣvaṇir (a) | *apnasvatīṣu urvarāsuv iṣṭanir* (b) | *ā artanāsuv iṣṭaniḥ* (c) | *ādad dhavyāniy ādadir* (d) | *yajñasya ketur arhaṇā* (e) | *adha sma asya harṣato hṛṣīvato* (f) | *viśve juṣanta pantha-aṃ* (g) | *naraḥ śubhe na pantha-am* (h) ||

[31] However, according to Falk [1992: 156] it is impossible to trace any of the so-called Sāmavedic Śikṣās – namely the *Nāradīśikṣā*, *Lomaśīśikṣā* and *Gautamīśikṣā* – back to any attested Sāmavedic school or family, and it is plausible to infer that they were never used for teaching the Sāmavedic texts to the new generations of priests. If this is true, the purpose of these texts remains quite obscure. One may surmise that, since the Śikṣās deal not only with the language of the Vedas, but with Sanskrit in general, the *Lomaśīśikṣā* can be seen as a phonetic and phonological manual, possibly composed by a member of a Sāmavedic school or family, which aims at describing some general aspects of Vedic recitation.

To conclude, I would like to stress the importance of this example for the understanding of the relationship occurring between *chandas* and *śikṣā*, two of the Vedāṅgas that compose part of the field of *vedalakṣaṇa*. In order to obtain the proper form of the Vedic text, i.e. the form that is suitable for recitation, the teachings of these two disciplines have to be mutually integrated. In fact, *śikṣā* is the discipline that describes the articulatory features of the various speech-sounds. As a consequence, in order to be able to establish that the semivowels *y* and *v* correspond respectively to the vowels *i* and *u*, the Vedic reciter has to be acquainted with the articulatory properties of these speech-sounds. This information is found in the texts dealing with *śikṣā*, but not in those dealing with *chandas*. For instance, to quote the most influential of the Śikṣās, the *Pāṇinīyaśikṣā* (see Ghosh [1938]) states:

> *kaṇṭhyāv ahāv icuyaśās tālavyā oṣṭhajā vupū |*
> *syur mūrdhanyā ṛṭuraṣā dantyā ḷtulasāḥ smṛtāḥ* ‖ 17 ‖
>
> *A* and *h* are handed down as guttural [speech-sounds]; *i*, *cu*, (i.e., *c*, *ch*, *j*, *jh* and *ñ*), *y* and *ś* as palatal; *v*, *u* and *pu* (i.e., *p*, *ph*, *b*, *bh* and *m*) as labial; *ṛ*, *ṭu* (i.e., *ṭ*, *ṭh*, *ḍ*, *ḍh* and *ṇ*), *r* and *ṣ* as cerebral; and *ḷ*, *tu* (i.e., *t*, *th*, *d*, *dh* and *n*), *l* and *s* as dental.

In this respect, one should note that the Prātiśākhyas, which are the main form of textualisation of *vedalakṣaṇa*, list together all this information. This is what Uvaṭa describes as the restriction of the general *lakṣaṇa*. That *i* and *y* share the same point of articulation is learnt from ṚP 1.42 *tālvyāv ekāra-cakāravargāv ikāraikārau yakāraḥ śakāraḥ* ("*E* and the *c*-class (i.e. *c*, *ch*, *j*, *jh*, *ñ*), the *i*-class (i.e. *i*, *ī*) and *ai*, *y* and *ś* are palatals."). As a consequence, the reciter can correctly apply the instruction of ṚP 17.23 *kṣaipravarṇāṃś ca saṃyogān vyaveyāt sadṛśaiḥ svaraiḥ* ("And, one should separate the consonant clusters with semi-vowels by means of the homogeneous vowels"), since he understands that the term *sadṛśa* ("homogeneous") is used to refer to the *tālvya* ("palatal") feature proper to both *i* and *y*.[32]

[32] The ṚP does not define *sadṛśa*, i.e. it does not openly state which articulatory features are encompassed by this category. However, this attribute clearly resembles that of *savarṇa*: note, in fact, that the term *savarṇa* is used by Bhāskararāya in his *Chandaḥ-sūtrabhāṣyarāja* to comment on ṚP 17.23. As stated by Deshpande [1975], the term

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Abbreviations

ṚV = *Ṛgvedasaṃhitā*

ṚP = *Ṛgvedaprātiśākhya*

Primary sources

Chandaḥsūtra = Kanjilal [2000]

Chandaḥsūtrabhāṣyarāja = Kanjilal [2000]

Chandoviciti = *Chandaḥsūtra*

Chandovicitibhāṣya = Sinharay [1977]

Lomaśīśikṣā = see fn. 30

Mṛtasaṃjīvanī = Ayodhyānātha [1947]

Nirukta = Sarup [1921]

Pāṇinīyaśikṣā = Ghosh [1938]

Pārṣadavṛtti = Shastri [1931]

Paspaśāhnika = Abhyankar [1962]

Ṛgvedabhāṣya = Müller [1890-2 (1966)]

Ṛgvedaprātiśākhya = Shastri [1931]

Ṛgvedasaṃhitā = van Nooten and Holland [1994]

Ṛgvedasarvānukramaṇī = Sharma [1977]

Sāmavedasarvānukramaṇī = Suryakanta [1933 (1970)]

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savarṇa is used in the Prātiśākhyas to refer to those speech-sounds sharing the same point of articulation, whereas, within *vyākaraṇa* texts, it refers to those speech-sounds that share the same point of articulation and the same articulatory effort.

Śaunakīyācaturādhyāyikā = Deshpande [1997]

Vargadvayavṛtti = Shastri [1931]

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Three

Does the Subject *Have* Desires? The *Ātman* in Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā[1]

Elisa Freschi

1. Introduction

The starting point of this paper is the question posed in the title, namely; Does the subject *have* desires? In other words, are desires something *belonging* to the subject?

Several answers could be proposed:

(1) It is not the subject who desires, but a different entity (Sāṅkhya).
(2) Desire is a quality of the subject (Nyāya).
(3) The subject is essentially desirous.

[1] This paper has been written as part of a research project on Śālikanātha Miśra lead by the author and funded by the Faculty of Oriental Studies, University "Sapienza", Rome, from January 2009 to December 2011.

The first solution is the Sāṅkhya one, since Sāṅkhya authors postulate a conscious subject (the *puruṣa*) that is distinct from the psychic faculties to which desire is said to belong. In this sense, qualities such as desire might be said to be adventitious characteristics of the *puruṣa*, and there is no real connection between the two.

The second solution is the Naiyāyika one. Nyāya authors say that desires are qualities (*guṇa*) of the subject (*ātman*). Douglas Berger (Berger 2012) claims that such qualities are intrinsic to the subject because it is precisely through desire etc. that one infers the existence of the *ātman*. The seminal text of Nyāya, the *Nyāyasūtra*, states in fact that "desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, suffering and cognition are the inferential mark of the *ātman*" (*icchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhajñānāny ātmano liṅgam*, NS 1.1.10). But, in fact, Naiyāyikas also stress the fact that the *ātman* is different from its qualities.[2] Specifically, an *ātman* is conceivable even without desire, as, for instance, in the state of liberation.

The third solution is, I will argue, the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā one. There is no subject without desire.

In order to prove this statement, I will start with an introduction on the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā approach to the problem of subjectivity and desire, and I will then investigate further the theories about the subject in Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā. Before the conclusion, I will explain that one of the

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[2] The *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* (5.2.20) describes liberation (*mokṣa*) as consisting in the absence of all conjunctions regarding the self and in the fact that there is no [new] manifestation of it. Since there are no more conjunctions, the self remains completely isolated. This idea has been strongly criticised by theist and atheist schools alike, which compared the self's condition to that of a stone and suggested that it resembles hell much more than it seems to be desirable. A similar stress on the absence of qualities in the "pure self" is evident at the beginning of the *Ātmatattvaviveka* ("Discernment about the Reality of the *ātman*"), where Udayana (10th c.) lists the views opposing his own and seems to consider the idea that qualities constitute the very nature of the *ātman* as dangerous as the idealist perspective: "On this topic, this is what would contradict the [theory that there is an] *ātman*: the destruction [of everything] at [every] instant of time or the destruction (i.e., refusal) of [each] external object or the destruction of the difference between the qualities and the one who is endowed with them or the non-grasping [of any *ātman*]" (*tatra bādhakaṃ bhavat ātmani kṣaṇa-bhaṅgaḥ vā bāhyārthabhaṅgaḥ vā guṇaguṇibhedabhaṅgaḥ vā anupalambhaḥ vā iti*, ĀTV, p. 5).

consequences of conceiving the subject as desirous, as it is in the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā view, is the solving of the so-called conundrum of desire.

One of the dilemmas of every philosophical paper is that it has to presuppose a general understanding of the terms it wants to investigate. Such a preliminary understanding is the *conditio sine qua non* that makes possible any investigation. However, at the same time, this hampers the investigation because it is a presumption and because its users might not be aware of its philosophical burden. In this paper, terms such as "subject" and "desire" will be defined in a more specific way in due course and it will be shown eventually that the Prābhākara understanding of them might at times be strikingly different from the one common in contemporary Western thought. For the time being, suffice it to say that "subject" and any other term referring to it (such as "psychic") is used to refer to the "agent" (once again, an ambiguous term) of actions, acts of will and acts of cognition.

2. The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā approach

2.1 Methodological Premise

Generally speaking, Prābhākara authors elaborate their philosophical theories out of Vedic exegetical concerns. The theories about the subject can be divided into two groups. On the one hand, there are theories primarily based on Vedic exegesis and, on the other, there are those that are also common to Nyāya and/or other schools. I start by focusing on the first ones, for the second group occupies only a liminal position in Mīmāṃsā works. As my sources, I rely upon Śabara (before the V c.), the author of the first extant commentary on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, and then (in decreasing order of frequency and importance within my argumentation): Rāmānujācārya (XIV c. or later), Śālikanātha Miśra (VIII c.?), Prabhākara Miśra (VII c.?), and other (Bhāṭṭa) Mīmāṃsakas. I preferred Śālikanātha over Prabhākara because of the greater clarity of the former over the latter, and, for the same reasons, I preferred Rāmānujācārya over Śālikanātha. No

commentary is available for Rāmānujācārya's text and for the most relevant portions of Śālikanātha's one, but much information can be gathered by comparing them and by cross-references to further texts on the same topics. Methodologically, I will apply the principle of charity, that is, all else being equal, I will prefer the interpretation which makes a theory appear more sensible (or less absurd). This methodological approach is — in my opinion — to be preferred both because of intrinsic and extrinsic reasons. Among the former is the fact that Mīmāṃsā authors start their investigation by presupposing the validity of the Veda and then use all their skills to build a consistent system within this framework (see Freschi 2008a). Some of their theories may be extremely complicated, but the system they create is generally intrinsically sound. The probability that a theory is just preposterous and naïve is hence lower than the probability that we do not fully understand it. In fact, as non-Mīmāṃsakas we lack so much that was a necessary part of the Mīmāṃsā background (such as a thorough knowledge of the ritual and of its linguistic aspects). Given such distance from the Mīmāṃsā worldview, much of what will be found below has been reconstructed through a jigsaw of different sources and by filling in the gaps of what is not explicitly stated in the texts preserved but appears to be logically required by their arguments.

2.2 From ritual to subject

Let us now try to think in a Mīmāṃsaka way, namely by starting with the Vedic prescription that is the most quoted one in Mīmāṃsā texts, i.e., "the one who is desirous of heaven should sacrifice with the New- and Full-Moon sacrifices" (*darśapūrṇamāsābhyāṃ svargakāmo yajeta*). The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā school begins its investigations on the "subject" by discussing the role of the sacrificer (*yajamāna*, the one who has some Brahmans perform the sacrifice for his own sake), who is being instructed in this sentence. The contiguity of the concepts of *yajamāna* and subject is also evident from the Prābhākara interpretation of Upaniṣadic statements about the *ātman*. For instance, the well-known statement "the *ātman* has to be seen, to be heard, to be considered, to be meditated upon" (*ātmā vā are*

draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyo BU 2.4.5) is taken to refer to the agent of the sacrifice (see TR III §7.8.3, [1956 p. 40]).

Rāmānujācārya states that the above-mentioned prescription (*darśa-pūrṇamāsābhyāṃ svargakāmo yajeta*) refers to four levels:

(1) The desirous one (•*kāma*).
(2) The enjoined one (*niyojya*).
(3) The responsible one (*adhikārin*).
(4) The agent (*kartṛ*).

In Rāmānujācārya's words:

> For instance, the one who is desirous of heaven (*svargakāma*) is firstly connected [to the prescription] as the enjoined one (*niyojya*), insofar as he understands (*budh-*) that "I have to do (*kārya*) something I did not know about before (*apūrva*) [hearing this Vedic prescription]". Thereafter, [he is connected] as the responsible one (*adhikārin*) since [he realises that] "as the ritual act (*karman*) is an instrument to realise it (heaven), this act has to be performed by me for the sake of realising that". [...] [Lastly, one is connected] as an agent (*kartṛ*) when one performs it (the ritual act). Thus, the three stages (enjoined, responsible and agent) are the successive [conditions] of only one [type of person] (i.e., the one who is desirous of heaven).[3]

The level of the desirous one is inevitably the first, because one who is still not aware of oneself as a moral agent, will already recognise that one's desires are named. The level referring to the enjoined one is preceded by the desirous one, since one becomes aware of being enjoined because the prescription mentions as its addressee a desirous one. Hence, without desire the subject does not exist as such. As for the next stage, "responsible" translates the Sanskrit *adhikārin*, which refers both to the fact that one is eligible to perform a sacrifice (and the chief requirement is the fact of being desirous) and the fact that the eligible one is bound to perform it.

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[3] *tathā hi prathamaṃ apūrvaṃ eva mamedaṃ kāryaṃ iti boddhṛtayā niyojyatvenānveti svargakāmaḥ puruṣaḥ. sa paścāt tatsiddhaye tatsādhane karmaṇi mayānuṣṭheyam idaṃ karmety adhikāritayā.* [...] *tadanutiṣṭhan kartṛtayā. ity ekasyaiva tisro 'vasthāḥ krama-bhāvinyaḥ*, TR IV §4.10.4 [1956: 58]. For a more comprehensive analysis of this passage, see Freschi 2007.

From the point of view of the Veda, one can see how the Veda needs an agent in order for its prescriptions to be performed. And being an agent means being responsible, hence enjoined, hence desirous.

One might object that Rāmānujācārya is a late author and that he is, thus, not representative of earlier positions within the Mīmāṃsā school. However, a passage in Śabara's text also seems to hint at a similar interpretation and, perhaps more importantly, the same tendency may be detected in a Śrautasūtra text, that is, in one of the classes of texts which share a common prehistory with the Mīmāṃsā thought (see Freschi-Pontillo 2012, § 5). In fact, in the *Āpastamba Śrauta Sūtra*, desire is mentioned among the preconditions for one to be a sacrificer.[4] Śabara, in his commentary on the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*, spells out the connection with the prescription: "After the prescription (*vacana*) ['the one who is desirous of heaven should sacrifice with the New- and Full-Moon sacrifices'] has made the one who is desirous of heaven responsible [for the sacrifice], [it] says 'he should sacrifice'. In this way, the distinctive mark of the responsibility is established".[5]

Śabara's sequence has the prescription perform two functions, insofar as it makes the desirous one into a responsible person and then makes the latter into an agent:



(the injunction influences the process twice, acting on the two links)

4 "The sacrificer must be chaste, he must [be able to] give the ritual fees, he must [be able to] provide the ritual substances [and] he must long for the desires (i.e., the desirable outputs mentioned in the Vedic injunctions to sacrifice)" (*yajamānasya brahmacaryaṃ dakṣiṇādānaṃ dravyaprakalpanaṃ kāmānāṃ kāmanam*, ĀpŚrSū 4.1.2). The passage is mentioned in connection with Śabara's passage (see *infra*) in Yoshimizu 1997: 151, fn.5.

5 *svargakāmam adhikṛtya yajeteti vacanam ity adhikāralakṣaṇam idaṃ siddhaṃ bhavati*, *Śābarabhāṣya* (henceforth ŚBh) ad MS 6.1.3.

To summarise, desire is the motive of (ritual) action. Indeed, there cannot be (ritual) action without desire. Moreover, desire operates directly on the (ritual) agent to be. Without desire, the agent is not just inactive, but he or she does not even exist as a subject.[6] One might argue that one can *ontologically* be a subject without being phenomenologically aware of it and this topic will be discussed in full *infra,* §4.2. But this is not the kind of "subject" I am referring to. By "subject" I exclude, e.g., amoebas, which might exist as substances, but are not aware of it and I only refer to subjects who are aware that they are such. The *yajamāna* becomes aware of his existence as subject when he is enjoined by an injunction. And his/her[7] awareness of himself or herself as subject becomes possible exactly at the moment in which s/he recognises himself or herself as the desirous one to which the injunction refers (see Freschi 2012 for a full discussion of this point).

To sum up, if my interpretation is correct, before hearing the injunction the desirous one is not aware of himself or herself as a subject. S/he had desires, of which s/he might have had some sort of pre-conscious feeling. These desires, were still not the desires *of* someone, since no one could have claimed them as her or his own. The injunction initiates a move from a general desire (ontologically existent, but not phenomenologically linked to any subjectivity) to a desire perceived as pertaining to oneself, and from this to one's responsibility and, last, to one's awareness of oneself as a moral agent:

injunction

↓

desire → *my* desire → my responsibility → *I* decide to act

It might be worth stressing that "my" underlines a connection with an indefinite "me", and that it still does not imply a first person perspective.

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6 On the necessary link between subject-ness and desire, see Freschi 2012.

7 MS 6.1.13 makes it clear that *svargakāma* refers to both men and women, exactly because women desire as well. Their role in sacrifices is, by contrast, restricted because they lack personal wealth.

One feels that the desire pertains to oneself, although one has not yet a fully developed notion of oneself as a subject and (as explained above) one is hence not yet a subject. This means that the experience of desire predates the experience of oneself as a subject and that the latter happens only insofar as it has been promoted by the former.[8]

3. Is desire directly connected to the subject?

Now, one might ask whether desire is directly connected with the self or with an intermediate organ, such as the *ahaṅkāra*. It is noteworthy that this is an ontological question, whereas the above account of the subject rather focuses on the way it gradually relates to the sacrifice. In other words, the above account is not determined by an ontological concern. An ontological concern is, by contrast, easily detectable in Prābhākara texts about theories of the *ātman* shared by Nyāya and other schools (and about which, see *infra*, §§ 4.2 and 4.2.1). I will, therefore, first try to look for an answer to the question outlined in the title in the proper Prābhākara texts, the approach of which is not ontological, and later test it against the Prābhākara-Naiyāyika background of the ontologically oriented theories of the *ātman* shared by other schools.

3.1 Rebuttal of intermediate entities

In many Indian schools of philosophy the psychic organ[9] is described according to the Sāṅkhya view, i.e., it is made of *manas*, *buddhi* and *ahaṅkāra*. The first (*manas*) indicates just one's inner sense, the one which grasps pleasure or pain and all other inner sensations. The second one (*buddhi*), usually translated as 'intellect', indicates the intellectual faculty

[8] This interpretation relies on Rāmānujācārya's text quoted above and on its immediate context. It elaborates on it, trying to make explicit some of its implicit passages. For a fuller discussion, see Freschi 2012, Chapter 1.

[9] I use this label just in so far as it might evoke, *grosso modo*, the collection of faculties related with thought, will and inner sensation. No ontological commitment is meant.

(possibly akin to Kant's *Ich denke*). The third one (*ahaṅkāra*, literally meaning 'doing "I"') is the locus of proclaimed subjectivity, the stage in which one recognizes oneself as an "I".

Could this scheme also apply to Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā? Probably not, because the *ahaṅkāra* (just like any similar intermediate organ) is hardly mentioned in Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā literature and because of the role desire plays in the identification of the subject. In this function, desire relates immediately to the subject and this process does not involve any intermediate step. More generally, the account of the stages of desirous/enjoined/responsible/agent is (probably) not ontologically oriented. It describes the phenomenology of the *yajamāna* as it is experienced by Vedic listeners and probably also the individual arousal of one's awareness of oneself as a subject while listening to the Veda. In fact, as seen in the above § 2.2, the *yajamāna*-to-be becomes aware of herself or himself through the fact that s/he becomes aware first of desires and then of himself or herself as the subject of them and so on. This is a purely phenomenological description which would not make sense if seen from an ontological perspective (in ontological terms, how could the prescription "create" the subject it refers to?). Hence, it runs parallel to ontological descriptions. Consequently, ontological descriptions of how the psychic organ is constituted seem alien to this kind of account. In fact, they consider subjectivity as something already there and analyse it, rather than looking at the way it constitutes itself. Furthermore, they consider subjectivity "from the outside", as an object of study, whereas desire makes one aware of himself or herself as subject "from within", that is, as a person and not as an object.

3.2. Rebuttal of the quality/substrate model

Mīmāṃsā authors, in general, seem to refute implicitly the Naiyāyika model of an *ātman* which is in itself motionless and without qualities, and to which characteristics are attached during its saṃsāric existence. Among the Mīmāṃsakas, Someśvara (12th c.?), in his *Nyāyasudhā* (a commentary on Kumārila's *Tantravārttika*), opposes the distinction between mental acts

and actions, as well as the Naiyāyika claim that the former are only qualities (*dharma*) of their possessor (*dharmin*):

> By contrast, the idea that effort could be a *quality* of the soul has been refuted before.[10]

Someśvara could here be just opposing the idea that a mental act is different than an action, but his point might have a further implication, insofar as he might be opposing the idea of a "pure" subject, a *dharmin*, distinct from its qualities, as in the Naiyāyika model.

3.3 What kind of subject is a desirous one?

If the subject as conceived by Mīmāṃsakas is not separated from action, in particular mental acts, how can it be at the same time permanent, since actions are transient by nature? Does not permanence imply changelessness?

Although I have never read it explicitly in any Mīmāṃsā text, the solution might be that of conceiving a subject with a dynamic character. It would not be permanent in a static way, but *pravāharūpena* (in flux). The concept of a 'fluxing permanence' (*pravāhanityatva*) is formally defined in Gāgābhaṭṭa's *Bhāṭṭacintāmaṇi* as "having the form of destroying something of the same species [while being] mutually concomitant with the previous non-existence of something of the same species".[11] In less technical terms, it is a permanence of the underlying universal, while its concrete manifestations might be destroyed or might have not arisen yet. The concept is applied in Mīmāṃsā texts to meanings (*artha*). In fact, although the relation between a word and its meaning is said to be permanent (*nitya*), words are said to be in themselves permanent, whereas meanings are said to be permanent insofar as they are part of a permanent flux, so that a specific tree, for example, will not be permanent, but it will be substituted by further

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[10] *pumdharmas tu prayatnaḥ syāt sa ca pūrvaṃ nirākṛtaḥ* || 10 ||, *Nyāyasudhā* ad TV 2.1.1, p. 576, l.2. My emphasis.

[11] *pravāhanityatvaṃ sajātīyaprāgabhāvasamavyāptasajātīyadhvaṃsakatvarūpam* (p. 175).

trees, without interruption.[12] I am suggesting here that just like the universal character of tree-ness is enough to ensure the permanent relation between the word *tree* and its meaning, also the subject might be conceived as acting in various ways and changing, if only there is some undergoing continuity. I will address in §4.2 the problem of whether such continuity should have an ontological foundation.

4. Tests: Other occurrences of subject-theory in Mīmāṃsā

4.1. The subject as an agent of knowledge

Apart from the ritual context discussed above, another *locus classicus* for inquiries about the subject is, in Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, the epistemological discussion about the way an act of knowledge is apprehended. The Prābhākaras maintain that in every act of knowledge three items are grasped at once, i.e. the cognised object, the cognition itself and the cogniser. The theory is often referred to with the name of *svayamprakāśa* ('light for itself') and it is hence natural to compare it to the Buddhist Pramāṇavādic doctrine bearing the same name.According to the latter, each cognitive act grasps at the same time its object and itself, like a lamp, which sheds light on outer objects and on itself at the same time. Consequently, there is ultimately only cognition, which is self-aware insofar as it is essentially luminous. Its own-nature is a single act of awareness and it is

[12] Cf. 'Therefore [Jaimini] said: "The relation between word and meant entity is originary. Its knowledge is the teaching. And this is non-erroneous in regard to meant entities which cannot be perceived by the senses. Hence it is an instrument of knowledge, according to Bādarāyaṇa, because it is independent". "Originary" means intrinsic, not relying on a person, permanent. The phonemes are permanent, the meant entities are permanent in [their] flux. Hence, their relation does not depend on a person (i.e., it has not been created).' (*tad uktam — autpattikas tu śabdasyārthena sambandhaḥ. tasya jñānam upadeśo 'vyatirekaś cārthe 'nupalabdhe tat pramāṇam bādarāyaṇasyānapekṣatvāt. iti.* [MS 1.1.5] *autpattikaḥ — svābhāviko 'pauruṣeyo nitya ity arthaḥ. varṇānām nityatvād arthānāṃ pravāharūpeṇa nityatvāt sambandhasyāpauruṣeyatvam*, TR III §1.3 [1956: 22]).

only at a conventional level that such awareness is distinguished into a knower subject and a known object.

In contrast, the Prābhākara view distinguishes three elements within a cognition and claims that they are also ontologically distinct.[13] In this view, the three elements are understood in every single cognitive act, insofar as no cognition of an object is possible without a cognising subject and without a cognitive act itself. Nor is one only aware of the mere cognised object, without the frame of the cognition within which this is known. One knows a *known* object. This also means that, in the Prābhākara view, a cognition is a piece of knowledge only insofar as it is self-aware. It is not, as in Sāṅkhya, a mechanical act to which the conscious subject adds awareness.[14] For Buddhists and Prābhākaras, in order to count as knowledge, a cognitive act must be intrinsically conscious.

What about acts of cognition which are not self-aware? A cognitive act which is not self-aware could not be a case of knowledge, because it would necessarily lack the important component of being present to itself. But are such cases conceptually possible? An interesting example is discussed by Rāmānujācārya in the epistemological chapter of TR (TR I). Rāmānujācārya mentions a case where the recollection of silver arises in one's mind upon seeing something shiny on the beach. What one sees is actually mother-of-pearl but one does not recognise it as such. Instead, one only perceives its being shiny and is hence automatically reminded of silver. Thus, one thinks one is perceiving silver In this way, what eventually arises is an *incomplete* cognition, since it is a jigsaw formed of the present indeterminate thing one sees and the silver one remembers. However, this silver lacks the component of its being remembered (and not directly experienced), and for this very reason it cannot be a piece of knowledge. Now, one could ask, who is the agent in the case of such cognitions? And how is it possible that the cogniser, who is said to be necessarily involved in

[13] On this difference and on the Prābhākara theory in general, see Chatterjee 1979.

[14] In Sāṅkhya, the self, *puruṣa*, is in rest and hence all actions, including the acts involved in the process of knowing, are carried out by its unconscious counterpart, *prakṛti*. It is only at the end of the process that the knowledge so gained is reflected in the *puruṣa*, who thus becomes aware of it. The basic idea might be compared to that of a computer carrying out a complex calculation and having a person reading the output at the end.

all acts of knowledge, seems to be absent from such cognitive acts? Do memories arise only due to *saṃskāra*s 'traces left by previous experiences' and, hence, automatically, or is a knower nonetheless present? If s/he is nonetheless necessary present even in memories, why does s/he seems to be absent from the incomplete recollection of silver? In fact, the silver-component is driven out of the recollection free from the fact that it is a recollected item and that someone perceived it in the past.

Rāmānujācārya does not explicitly address these questions and the following is hence only my interpretation. In the case of a conscious recollection of silver, one would simultaneously be aware of oneself and of the act of recollection. By contrast, the recollection of silver evoked by a lustrous piece of mother-of-pearl seems to be necessarily unconscious, since if it were conscious, one would be able to distinguish it as a separate piece of cognition and one would not conflate the remembered silver with the apprehended lustrous thing. Does not its "incompleteness" exactly refer to the fact that it lacks the element of a knower and of an act of cognition?

If this interpretation is correct, such cognitions would arise independently of a subject, which would otherwise necessarily be included in the knowledge act. They arise due to *saṃskāra*s and are, hence, not acts of knowledge performed by an agent, but only results of the *saṃskāra*s' function. Hence, they can occur independently of an agent. Notice the impersonality of Rāmānujācārya's account:

> First of all, once there is a contact between the sense faculty and the object, the mother-of-pearl in general, with no specific characteristic grasped, is grasped in its general aspect, as "this". Thereafter, due to flaws [in the cognitive process], the silver in general, devoid of that part (the "this"- or "that"-part, i.e., its being or not present to the senses) [and] similar to it (mother-of-pearl), is remembered. In fact, it is commonly experienced (*dṛś-*) that out of seeing something the recollection of something similar [arises]. And this recollection, due to the fact that that part (i.e. the part regarding its being or not present to the senses) has been removed, has the same form of an experience. So far is uncontroversial for both of us (i.e., the Prābhākara *siddhāntin* and the *pūrvapakṣin* who upholds the view that recollection is an instrument of knowledge)
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> At this point, due to the fact that one does not grasp the difference either between what is being grasped and what is being remembered (i.e., between the vaguely perceived mother-of-pearl and the recollected silver) or between grasping

> and remembering, there is a specific behaviour (*vyavahāra*) based only on the grasping[15] of a form in general, and not on a specific idea [as it should be].[16]

Prābhākara is clearer on this point, since he stresses the fact that memories are usually just memories of an object and do not include the cognitive act of grasping that object. When they occasionally do include the cognitive act, it is because one has *inferred* the act of cognition (see Chatterjee 1979: 272).

Furthermore, it is also noteworthy that the Prābhākara view on the self-aware nature of cognition (named *svasaṃvitprakāśa* by Rāmānujācārya) is discussed also in the ontological chapter of TR (TR 2) in order to oppose the claim that the subject might be known through mind-perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*). The subject cannot be accessed through mind-perception, replies Rāmānujācārya, since s/he is intrinsically a knower (i.e., possibly, an agent).[17] Hence, one cannot make him/her into an *object* of knowledge and the only way to know about him/her is to know him/her as a *subject* of knowledge, a knower. In other words, the subject can only be grasped through his/her own activity of knowledge, insofar as this reveals its agent:

> In the same way, the self is not mind-perceptible, since [if it were so] there would be a contradiction between the agent's and the object's condition. The assertion "I know myself" is, by contrast, metaphorical. By contrast, when the objects are illuminated (i.e., cognised), [the self] becomes evident (lit. illuminated) as it is the substratum of cognition. Each cognition (*saṃvid*) is three times illuminating. The

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15 According to the common usage of Sanskrit epistemology, Rāmānujācārya uses three semantic fields to refer to the act of cognition: that of grasping (*upalambh-*, *grah-*), that of illuminating (*prakāś-*)/shining (*bhās-*) and that of knowing (*vid-*, *jñā-*). Since all translations here are merely instrumental to the general point of the article, I eliminated much of these metaphors and preferred a plain translation.

16 *prathamam indriyārthasamikarṣe sati śuktikāmātram agṛhītaviśeṣadharmakaṃ idam iti sāmānyena gṛhyate. tadanu doṣavaśāt tadaṃśavikalaṃ tatsadṛśaṃ rajatamātraṃ smaryate. loke ca sadṛśadarśanāt sadṛśasmṛtir dṛṣṭaiva. tac ca smaraṇaṃ tadaṃśa-pramoṣād anubhavasamānākāram. etāvat tāvad āvayor avivādam. tatra gṛhyamāṇa-smaryamāṇayor grahaṇasmaraṇayor vā bhedāgrahāt kevalaṃ sāmānyākāropalambhād viśiṣṭavyavahāraḥ. na tu viśiṣṭadhītaḥ*, TR I, 1956: 2.

17 The shift from "it" to "s/he" is meant to emphasise the subject-character of the subject, which cannot be reduced to an object, an "it".

knower's experience (*anubhava*) is necessarily present among the experiences of the knowable contents. Since otherwise there would be an equivalence (*an-atiśaya*) between what is intelligible (*saṃvid*) for oneself and what is intelligible for another.[18] And since it is so, it is congruous (*upapad-*) that [the self] is invariably cognised (*upalambh-*) together with the [knowledge's] contents (*viṣaya*). Indeed, the self does not appear separated from the contents nor do the contents appear (*bhās-*) [in one's intellect] if the knower does not. Therefore, that very cognition (*saṃvid*) (namely "I know myself") is a means of knowledge in regard to [its] content. Although [the person] is part of the result of that cognition (*saṃvitti*), as far as that very [cognition] turns the person into a content of knowledge, s/he is not an object [of cognition]. S/he is only an agent. The [Grammarians] who know what an object is [state] that the object is what is endowed with the result of an action inherent in something different [i.e., inhering in its agent]. Hence, [the self] is not mind-perceptible [since it is the agent of cognition, and not its object].[19]

Similarly, Śālikanātha also denies that the *ātman* is mind-perceptible, since it is always a subject of cognition and never an object. Interestingly, he then adds that the *saṃvid* (and not the *ātman*) is self-illuminating (TĀ ad 2, pp. 333-334). Thus, it is the active nature of the subject as knower (the *saṃvid*) which can be accessed by knowledge. And this knowledge cannot but be self-awareness, since any other type of knowledge would make the subject into an object of knowledge, thus violating his/her nature of subject of knowledge.

Both Rāmānujācārya and Śālikanātha mention no intermediate entity, such as *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra*, *antaḥkaraṇa*, in this connection, although one could expect the *buddhi* to be the real agent of knowledge, as in Sāṅkhya. In general, they tend not to speak of the *buddhi* as the knower. The subject

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[18] In other words, there would be no difference between what we know directly and what we apprehend from others. The first kind of knowledge is endowed in our awareness with the additional features of having been experienced by us.

[19] *tathā ātmā ca na mānasapratyakṣaḥ. karmakartṛbhāvavirodhāt. "māṃ jānāmi" iti vyapadeśas tu bhāktaḥ. kin tu viṣayeṣu prakāśamāneṣu jñānāśrayatayā prakāśate. sarvāpi saṃvit tritayaprakāśikā. avaśyaṃ jñātur anubhavo meyānubhaveṣv anuvartate. anyathā svaparasaṃvedyayor anatiśayaḥ syāt. viṣayais sahopalambhaniyamaś ca evaṃ saty upapannaḥ. na hy ātmā viṣayānanuviddho 'vabhāsate viṣayāś ca boddhary anavabhāsamāne bhāsante. tasmāt saiva saṃvid viṣaye pramāṇam. saiva puruṣaṃ viṣayīkarotīti tatsaṃvittiphalabhāgitve 'pi puruṣasya na karmatā. kartṛtaiva. para-samavetakriyāphalaśāli karmeti karmajñāḥ. ato na mānasapratyakṣaḥ*, TR II, 1956: 17.

seems to be at the front line, since what one experiences is nothing but its cognitive agency.

The *svasaṃvitprakāśa* account also shows the structural similarity of action and knowledge. In fact, in the Mīmāṃsā account, knowledge seems to be just one sort of action (see *supra*, §3.2 for Someśvara's explicit claim about it). As in the case of action, knowledge is not secondarily linked to a previously established subject. The subject is not an inert entity to which, at a certain point, the characters of action or knowledge are linked, as in Sāṅkhya and, to a certain extant, as in Nyāya. The subject himself or herself acts or knows. Consequently, s/he does not need any intermediate link between himself or herself and the action s/he undertakes. Unlike in Sāṅkhya, for instance, it does not need the faculties of action (*karmendriya*) to act or the *buddhi* to know. For Prābhākara authors, the psychic faculties such as the *buddhi,* if ever they are admitted to exist, are just the subject's instruments and do not change the unavoidable link between the fact of being a subject, and acting, knowing and desiring.

Outside the Prābhākara school, a similar conclusion might be achieved through Kumārila's stress on *ahampratyaya* as an argument to establish the existence of an *ātman* (see ŚV, ātmavāda 107-139). The *ahampratyaya* 'notion of the I' is used in order to infer the existence of the subject out of sentences such as "I know". The *ātman*, according to this view, is what appears as the *aham* 'I' in every cognition. This means that the conventional I of one's (spoken or unspoken) sentences, such as "I am running to the office", "I am making a cup of tea", etc., *is* the subject. Such arguments, no wonder, are strongly opposed by Vedāntins, who rather aim at establishing a self as sheer consciousness, well distinct from the conventional "I".

4.2 Śālikanātha on the ontology of the *ātman*

What about Prābhākara texts that directly elaborate on the ontology of the *ātman*? As already mentioned above, such passages are not very frequent in Prābhākara works. In fact, in the TR, which is a compact Prābhākara encyclopaedia of sixty pages (in the 1956 edition), there is no

mention at all of this topic. On the other hand, in the PrP several pages are dedicated to the ontology of the *ātman* in the *Tattvāloka* section (henceforth TĀ). Though even there, this topic, which is considered crucial in other schools, is treated in a concise manner (approximately 18 pp. out of 499 in the 1961 edition).

In the following pages I will analyse the TĀ in order to see whether its ontological approach radically contradicts the phenomenological one outlined above.

From the very beginning, the TĀ seems to seek a balance between the two opposite tendencies. In its second verse, the first hemistich is rather ontologically oriented, whereas the second one stresses the role of the subject as the agent of cognitions we can experience in everyday life:

> The self, distinguished from intellect, sense faculties and from the body, is all-pervasive and stable, different according to each field [of experience] (i.e., according to each empirical individual), it shines forth in the act of understanding of the objects.[20]

Further in the TĀ, the subject is repeatedly identified as the knower (*jñātṛ*)[21] and its necessity is demonstrated through epistemological arguments (such as the need for a reunification of different sense-cognitions and the possibility of memory).[22] Similarly, the empirical subject (i.e., the embodied *ātman*, see *infra*) is said to be an experiencer (*bhoktṛ*).[23]

Such emphasis on the subject as knower or as experiencer might, however, be interpreted as just instrumental to the ontological foundation of the *ātman*. That this is not the case is only suggested by the history of the Mīmāṃsā reflection on this topic, which originates from Vedic hermeneutic concerns and not from ontological ones. Historically, it is more probable

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[20] *buddhīndriyaśarīrebhyo bhinna ātmā vibhur dhruvaḥ | nānābhūtaḥ pratikṣetram arthavittiṣu bhāsate* || 2 ||

[21] 'The self is indeed the knower' (*jñātā hy ātmā*, TĀ ad 2, p. 320).

[22] '"I am touching now what I saw before": in such cases a single synthesiser is apprehended. And one acquires the recollection of sense-objects even once they have disappeared to the respective sense faculty.' (*yad aham adrākṣam tad aham spṛśāmīty atra pratisandhātaikaḥ pratīyate. smaraṇañ cendriyārthānāṃ tattadindriyāpāye 'pi yad upalabhyate*, TĀ ad 2, p. 319).

[23] *so 'yam ātmā bhoktā*, TĀ ad 2, p. 332.

that ontological arguments have been added in epistemology and ritual hermeneutics in order to firmly ground the subject's phenomenological role, than the other way around.

Later in TĀ (p. 343), Śālikanātha reinforces the ontological commitment. He says that the *ātman* is existent (*sat*), stable (*dhruva*), indestructible (*avināśin*) and uncaused (*akāraṇa*).

Why, then, is the ontological approach added to (or presented along with) the phenomenological one? Hypothetically, one might propose that Śālikanātha adds a further line of argumentation to the standard Prābhākara one, based on the Veda and, therefore, on the phenomenology of the subject and on its role in epistemology. This new line of argumentation is based on ontology and is inspired by the arguments of its interlocutors, mainly Naiyāyika authors. Consider, in the following sequence of arguments, how there is no interruption between the hermeneutical and the ontological approach, but the latter is marked by the usage of *ātman* instead of "agent" or "experiencer":

> (Vedic-based argument:) In regard to someone who [performs] no action, agency and the fact of being an experiencer would be [merely] *ad hoc* constructions. [But] an agent and an experiencer, presupposed by the [Vedic] sentence about the one having the sacrifice's weapons [which refers to the *ātman* as the sacrificer and as the one who will enjoy heavenly bliss],[24] must be determined, hence the mention of recognition has been put forth.
>
> (Nyāya-influenced argument:) And when this self has been recognised, consciousness (lit. "what consists of consciousness") is its characteristic. Nor does this (consciousness) arise at a certain point from it (the self) alone. For an effect whose [single] cause is always present would not arise [only] from time to time. [...] Therefore this self, which is the cause in which [consciousness] inheres, requires a [further] cause, one that is inherent to it.[25]

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[24] 'This sacrificer who has the sacrifice's weapons (the sacrifice's substances and tools), will go to the heavenly world quickly' (*sa eṣa yajñāyudhī yajamāno 'ñjasā svargaṃ lokaṃ yāti*). The sentence is discussed by Śabara, ŚBh ad MS 1.1.5. I could not locate a Vedic source for it. On *yajñāyudha*, see Mylius 1995, s.v.: "die 'Waffen des Opfers'; gemeint sind die Opfergeräte." Mylius further mentions many instances of this compound in the Taittirīya Saṃhitā, the Kaṭha Saṃhitā, the Kapiṣṭhala Kaṭha Saṃhitā, the Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā, the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa, the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa and the Baudhāyana Śrautasūtra.

In this regard, some [opponents] say: "[This required] cause inhering in the inherent cause is another activity, defined as knowledge, inherent to it (the self)".

[*Siddhāntin*:] "But this is incorrect, since this also should be followed by a cause inhering in its cause. Therefore let there better be a [cause] of consciousness only. And this is called contact of mind and self. And the cause inhering in this cause is the movement of the mind (which inheres in the contact of mind and self). And of this (movement) the effort, inherent to the self and other than the contact of self and mind, or the unseen [force] is the required cause inhering in its cause. And the effort and the unseen [force] are other than (i.e., different from) the contact of self and mind. Hence, it has to be considered that this succession of cause and effects has no beginning, like sprout and seed".[26]

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[25] According to the Nyāya school, there are three sorts of causes: 1. the *samavāyikāraṇa* 'cause in which [the effect] inheres', such as the two halves of a pot, in which the effect (the pot) inheres; 2. the *asamavāyikāraṇa* 'cause in which [the effect] does not inhere [since this cause rather inheres in the cause mentioned above]', such as the contact of the two halves, which inheres in them; 3. the *nimittakāraṇa* 'necessary condition', such as the potter. In Roy W. Perrett's words: "[T]he pot-halves or the threads are the inherent causes of the pot or the cloth because the latter effects inhere in the former causes. Note that for Nyāya the halves or the threads are not that out of which the pot or the cloth are composed. Rather the effects inhere in the cause so that, for instance, the cloth is not produced *out of* the threads but subsists *in* the threads" (Perrett 1998: 255). The translation "non-inherent cause" for *asamavāyikāraṇa* is appealing because of its simplicity and because of the straightforward opposition to the *samavāyikāraṇa* (wrongly) translated as "inherent cause", but it is essentially wrong, since the *asamavāyikāraṇa* does indeed inhere in something and the *samavāyikāraṇa* is the cause *in which* the effect inheres.

[26] The sprout and the seed are the Indian equivalents of hen and egg. *akriyasya kartṛtvaṃ bhoktṛtvaṃ ca kālpanikaṃ syāt. kartā bhoktā ca yajñāyudhivākyena ākṣiptaḥ samarthayitavyaḥ iti upayuktaḥ pratyabhijñopanyāsaḥ. yadā cāyam ātmā pratyabhijñāyate tadā yo 'sau cidātmā tasya dharmaḥ nāsau tanmātraprabhavaḥ kadācid udiyāt. sadā sannihitakāraṇakaṃ hi kāryaṃ na kādācitkaṃ bhavet.* [...] *tasmād ayam ātmā samavāyikāraṇabhūtaḥ kiñcid asamavāyikāraṇabhūtam apekṣate. tatra kecid jñānalakṣaṇaṃ vyāpārāntaraṃ tatsamavetam evāsamavāyikāraṇam āhuḥ. tat tv anupapannam iti. yatas tasyāpi kiñcid asamavāyikāraṇam anusaraṇīyam. tac ca varaṃ citer evāstu, tac cātmamanassannikarṣākhyam. tasya ca asamavāyikāraṇaṃ manasa eva parispandaḥ. tasyāpi ātmamanassannikarṣāntaram ātmasamavetaṃ prayatnam, adṛṣṭaṃ vāpekṣamāṇam asamavāyikāraṇam. prayatnādṛṣṭayoś cātma-manassaṃnikarṣāntaram eveti, anādir eṣā kāryakāraṇaparamparā bījāṅkuravad iti veditavyam*, TĀ ad 2, p. 329.

In the first part of the argument, the subject is declared to be intrinsically an agent and an experiencer. This point is confirmed also by the editor of the PrP, who comments on the above as follows:

> Through the recognition [the author] does not aim only at establishing the persistence of the *ātman*. Rather, he wishes to express also that it is established that the *ātman* is an experiencer. Fruition, experience, sensation share the same meaning. Sensation is also an action, since it is expressed by a verbal root. Ordinary people say that actions are expressed by verbal roots. Hence the *ātman* is established to be intrinsically an agent and an experiencer.[27]

There appears to be a contrast between this part of the argument and the statement immediately following in the TĀ, which is the one quoted above about the fact that consciousness is a quality of the *ātman*. In fact, the latter seems to imply that at least in principle consciousness is something added to the subject, whereas the Vedic-based argument pointed to a subject which is *intrinsically* an agent and a knower. Perhaps one might understand Śālikanātha's last point as a way to smooth the contrast. In fact, the (otherwise obscure) hint at sprout and seed might be meant to stress the fact that the connection of self and awareness has no beginning and is hence not just accidental. For the time being I can only solve the contrast by postulating a second level of influence on Śālikanātha's teaching about the subject.

To sum up, Śālikanātha (VIII c.?) dedicates several pages to the ontology of the *ātman*. These pages appear neither innovative nor particularly original, yet Śālikanātha must have deemed the topic important enough to include it in his PrP. By contrast, Rāmānujācārya (XIV c. or later) hardly uses the term *ātman* and does not discuss at all any ontological argument about it. That the topic of the subject interests him is proved, however, by the many pages concerning its hermeneutical and epistemological phenomenology.

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[27] *pratyabhijñāyā nātmanas sthiratvasiddhir evaikaṃ prayojanam abhipretam, api tv ātmano bhoktṛtvasiddhir api vivakṣitā. bhogaḥ anubhavaḥ saṃvedanam ity anarthāntaram. saṃvedanam api kriyā dhātuvācyatvāt, dhātuvācyā kriyeti laukikāḥ. ataḥ kartṛtvabhoktṛtvasvarūpa ātmā siddhaḥ*, editor's note on TĀ, pp. 329-330.

Why does Śālikanātha feel the need to add ontological arguments, probably borrowed from the Nyāya school? And why does not Rāmānujācārya feel the same need? What happened in the intervening period?

The following answer is tentative and it is based mostly on the method of investigating into the history of ideas (*Ideengeschichte*). It is easy to see that one of Śālikanātha's principal opponents, namely the Buddhist Pramāṇavādins, is altogether absent in Rāmānujācārya's work. In fact, Rāmānujācārya was active in South India and at a time when Buddhism was no longer a philosophical concurrent. Consequently, Śālikanātha might have felt the need to defend the *ātman* also from an ontological point of view, in order to resist to the Buddhist *anātmavāda*, whereas Rāmānujācārya was active at a time in which the existence of an *ātman* was common sense among philosophers. Thus, he could rather focus on its epistemological and hermeneutic phenomenology.

However, this cannot be the whole picture, since a philosopher, like Śālikanātha, cannot be thought to just respond to external inputs. On the contrary, he must have replied to the Buddhist objections by formulating an answer which used the principles of his system. In other words, Śālikanātha may well have felt the need to oppose the Buddhists, but he surely did it in a way that he felt was consistent with the rest of his system. Hence, did he adjust his system to accommodate the *ātman*-ontology, or should one presuppose an ontological background also in the works of his predecessors? If so, why is this ontological background lacking in his successors?

To sum up, there are two possible explanations for the presence of ontological discussions in Śālikanātha's discourse and for their absence in Rāmānujācārya (who usually closely follows Śālikanātha): (1) It was Rāmānujācārya who strongly exhibited the tendency to deal with the topic of subjectivity in a non-ontological way; (2) It was Śālikanātha who was the innovator in admitting ontology within the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā's investigations about subjectivity. It is difficult to advance a conclusive explanation, since the Prābhākara texts that were written during the time separating these two authors have been little, if at all, studied.

As a first assessment of the issue, one might note that the term *ātman* is almost absent in Rāmānujācārya's text, just like in the works of Śabara and Prabhākara referred to above and in many passages of Śālikanātha dealing with the subject. In all these cases, terms referring to the role of the subject as knower, experiencer and (ritual) agent are preferred (e.g. *yajamāna*, *jñātṛ*, *bhoktṛ*, *adhikārin*, *kartṛ* and *puruṣa*). The term *ātman* is, by contrast, only found in some specific passages authored by Śālikanātha Miśra. If I am understanding Śālikanātha correctly, the *ātman* lies beyond the *yajamāna*, etc. For instance, it is only once embodied that the *ātman* becomes an experiencer, and it is only thanks to the *manas* that it gets in touch with sensory perceptions. In itself, it has no direct link to action (including knowledge) and experience alike, it constitutes the bare precondition for these to happen. Since, however, Mīmāṃsā authors mainly focus on everyday experience as we know it, they are hardly interested in this precondition and rather focus on the subject in its empirical form, which is the only one that can be encountered. As stated by Śālikanātha:

> Wherever one grasps a quality of the *ātman*, there alone is the *ātman*.[28]

In other words, the *ātman* is grasped only through its qualities.

4.2.1 The subject and the psychic functions: *buddhi, ahaṅkāra, manas*

There is a related point regarding the connection between *buddhi* 'intellect' and the subject. In the TĀ, a Pramāṇavādin opponent states that the *buddhi* is to be equated with the subject insofar as it is a knower:

> And the self is the knower, the self is the intellect.[29]

This has a further, interesting consequence. Unlike the Vedāntic *ātman*, the Pramāṇavādic intellect is impermanent. The same intellect does not extend throughout one's life. If it seems it does, it is only insofar as all

[28] *yatra yatrātmano guṇa upalabhyate, tatra tatra tāvad ātmā vartata iti*, TĀ ad 2, p. 343.
[29] *boddhā cātmā bhavatīti, buddhir evātmā*, TĀ, ad 2, p. 326.

interruptions (be they caused by sleep or whatever else) do not hinder the previous intellect to produce a further one, which—being its product—closely resembles it:

> This self-luminous (intellect), which flows in the beginningless flux of causes and effects, does not attain the course of the synthesising cognition continuously since it is overpowered in cases such as sleep, intoxication and fainting.[30]

One would expect a sharp retort on the part of the *siddhāntin,* whereas he just states:

> As for what has been said, that the intellect continues to be present during sleep, etc., that also is not the point, because there is no instrument of knowing [about it].[31]

This doubt might be related to the *ahampratyaya* ('notion of an I') conception sketched above (end of § 4.1). If the self is tantamount to the "I" we experience, we have no way of knowing about its presence or absence when there is no "I", as in deep sleep.

A last point worth investigating is the link between subject and *ahaṅkāra.* The *ahaṅkāra* is the function through which the sense of an I is constituted. Hence, given that the subject is known as an "I" in the *ahampratyaya*, could not one say that what the Prābhākaras call "subject" is just the *ahaṅkāra* function? Śālikanātha discusses this point in the TĀ (ad 2, p. 327) and rejects it together with the idea that the subject is nothing but the body. The *ahaṅkāra*, in sum, is nothing but a physiological function, with ultimately no intellectual nature that could account for the existence or the experience of the subject.

The *manas* 'inner sense-faculty' is discussed in TĀ, especially on p. 332. Its depiction resembles the one common to other *darśana*s. In fact, the *manas* is said to be a substance (*dravya*) of atomic size (*paramāṇu-parimāṇa*), to be permanent (*nitya*) insofar as it does not depend on a cause

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[30] *sā ca svayamprakāśā kāryakāraṇabhāvenānādisantānavāhinī svāpamadamūrcchādiṣv abhibhūtatayā punaḥ punar anusandhānapatham nāyāti*, TĀ, ad 2, p. 316.

[31] *svāpādiṣv api buddhir anuvartata iti yad uktam, tad api pramānābhāvād asāram*, TĀ, ad 2, p. 319.

(*akāraṇa*), and to move quickly through the body, for it is only through its contact with one of the senses that the *ātman* becomes aware of a sense perception. The *manas* is thus one of the senses, responsible for inner perceptions of pleasure and pain and is co-responsible for outer perceptions of external objects. It is an epistemological instrument of the subject and has little connection with the "mind" as discussed, for instance, in contemporary Analytic philosophy, where the "Philosophy of Mind" is now a distinct branch of philosophy.[32]

To summarise, Śālikanātha does not seem to be particularly keen either on defending *buddhi* or *ahaṅkāra*, probably because they do not play any significant role in the Prābhākara theory about the subject.

5. The conundrum of desire

A related issue is that of the so-called conundrum of desire.[33] In fact, if desire is needed as a phenomenological trigger to make one become aware of oneself as a subject, should not it be all the more true that desire is the cause of every action?

The conundrum of desire is a well-known puzzle that seems to lead to a logical paradox. Below, I will show that the conundrum does not arise in the Mīmāṃsaka approach to desire, action and subjectivity.

The starting point of the conundrum is the seemingly obvious statement that all action is preceded by one's desire to undertake it, and by the also commonsensical statements that liberation entails the absence of desire. Hence, if:

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[32] Compare the meaning of *mind* in the many companions and introductions dedicated to this topic (Blackwell, Continuum, Routledge, etc.) or the content of the journal of Analytical Philosophy bearing the same name. In all these cases, *mind* refers to consciousness, mental events and to what pre-modern philosophy deems to be the function of the "soul" and today's reductionists consider to be the function of the "brain".

[33] On the conundrum see Framarin 2005 and its thorough review, Brodbeck 2010.

(1) Desire leads to action.
(2) Liberation is the absence of desires.
(3) Liberation has to be achieved (through actions).
Then:
(4) The absence of desires is achieved through desire.

This seems paradoxical. There are several ways to resolve the conundrum, for instance, by denying premise (3). Śaṅkara explains how liberation does not need to be "achieved" nor "realised". It occurs only through knowledge and this knowledge is in itself only an awareness and is not a cognitive act. One is liberated once one is aware of what has always been true. Consequently, there is no need for any action and, consequently, for any desire to undertake it. A similar solution is the one proposed by the Śaiva school of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), where liberation occurs through one's recognition of oneself as identical with the Supreme Lord. Also the Mādhyamaka denial of any difference between *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* could lead to a similar output.

Such solutions do not seem to be viable options for Mīmāṃsā authors, who generally oppose the view that liberation can be achieved through knowledge alone.[34] Let me, therefore, examine other possible ways out. In his essay on this conundrum, Christopher Framarin discusses one of the most common solutions, which solves the paradox by splitting the meaning of "desire". According to this view, desire is made of passion and will. In Indian terms, I might suggest a distinction between *kāma* 'desire, passion' and *icchā* 'will' (or *saṅkalpa* 'resolution'). One has to get rid of passion. By contrast, 'will' enables one to act and should not be eliminated. Here is the conundrum rephrased accordingly
If:

(1) ~~Desire leads to action~~ *icchā* leads to action.
(2) Liberation is the absence of ~~desires~~ *kāmas*.
(3) Liberation has to be achieved (through actions).
Then,
(4) The absence of *kāmas* is achieved through *icchā*.

[34] On this topic, see the debate between Mesquita 1994 and Taber 2007.

When understood in this way, consequence (4) no longer contradicts its premises.

Does this solution suit the Mīmāṃsā context? Apparently not, since the kind of desire mentioned in Mīmāṃsā texts, referring to desirous ones, seems to point to an interpretation of desire as "passion", rather than will or intention (*icchā/saṅkalpa*). Mīmāṃsā texts address people who are desirous of something as X-*kāma* (e.g. *paśukāma* 'the one who desires cattle', *putrakāma* 'the one who desires a son', *svargakāma*, 'the one who desires heaven'). More importantly, also the kind of desires mentioned, e.g. the desire for a son, cattle, happiness, rain and a village etc., seems to point to desire in the sense of "passion", or at least not to exclude it. Further, Kumārila implicitly refutes the distinction between desire and will while discussing the Buddha's absence of desires. In the Buddhist vs. Kumārila debate about the epistemic validity of the Buddha's words, the Buddhist side maintains that the Buddha was free of desires, i.e., passions, and Kumārila replied that, if so, he could not have been able to speak, since speaking implies the desire to express something.[35] The Buddhist side, as evident in Dharmakīrti, maintained that he was free of ordinary desires, but not of the resolution to act.[36] For Kumārila, however, the distinction was just sophistry. Therefore, how could a solution similar to the one rejected by Kumārila be used by the Mīmāṃsakas themselves to explain the conundrum of desire? Lastly, Mīmāṃsakas never accept anything extra-ordinary, unless they have strong evidence in favour of it.[37] Now, desire is commonly experienced, whereas the distinction between two orders of desires runs the risk to be an

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[35] 'And once he (the Buddha) has been established (*vyavasthā-*) as being devoid of desire (*rāga*), etc. and inactive, [his] instructions must have been composed by someone else without [proper] consideration (*pratyavekṣaṇa*)' (*rāgādirahite cāsmin nirvyāpāre vyavasthite | deśanānyapraṇītaiva syād ṛte pratyavekṣaṇāt* || ŚV codanā 137). A paper on the Buddhist-Kumārila controversy is under preparation by the present author together with Chiara Neri.

[36] On this topic, see Pecchia 2007-8 and Taber 2011. Dharmakīrti's treatment of the theme is closely linked to Kumārila's objections discussed in Kataoka 2003: 24-26.

[37] 'By the Mīmāṃsakas [...] now, as always, nothing is postulated, besides what is directly perceivable.' (*mīmāṃsakaiḥ tu punaḥ* || 98 || *idānīm iva sarvatra dṛṣṭān nādhikam iṣyate*, ŚV codanā 98d-99ab).

unwarranted presupposition, invented *ad hoc* in order to explain how the Buddha could be able to speak and to solve similar difficulties.

5.1 What happens in the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā context?

To summarise, the solution that postulates a distinction between passion and will does not apply to the Mīmāṃsā context in general. What could, then, be the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā solution to the conundrum of desire?

As already explained, the subject is identified due to fact that s/he is desirous. Desire is not a sufficient cause for one to undertake an action. By contrast, it is a necessary cause for a human being to understand an injunction. It is this alone that causes him or her to act. This is evident in the ritual sphere, but can be applied, according to Prābhākara authors, to all sorts of actions, insofar as they are performed in order to fulfil something which has to be done (be it studying, since one is a *brahmacārin*, or working, or eating, or having a family, etc.). Further, within Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, liberation is beside the point; the chief concern is to perform what one has to do (i.e., fulfilling one's *kārya* 'duty'). Even in the TĀ, the "ontological" chapter of the PrP, Śālikanātha only speaks of prescriptions as that which leads to liberation. Desire is needed in order to identify the enjoined one even when liberation is at stake:

> The prescription "The one who desires immortality should meditate upon the *ātman*" has to be postulated. The meaning of the sentence is that the enjoined one is the one who desires immortality and what has to be done by him has as content a meditation upon the *ātman*.[38]

These premises lead one to a radical rephrasing of the conundrum:

(1) ~~Desire leads to action~~ Desire enables the injunction to lead the subject to action.
(2) Liberation is the absence of desires.
(3) ~~Liberation has to be achieved~~ Liberation is a by-product.

[38] *amṛtatvakāmaḥ ātmānam upāsīta iti vidhiḥ kalpyate. amṛtatvakāmaniyojyakam ātmopāsanāviṣayakaṃ kāryam iti vākyārthaḥ*, TĀ ad 2, p. 343.

Thus, the paradox is neutralised since the desire is no longer the direct cause of action, but rather the cause of the identification of the agent-subject. Her being desirous constitutes the *conditio sine qua non* for her acting, but not its cause. The desire is here a precondition for the possibility of a subject and not just for its undertaking an action. In this sense the desire might be equated to the role of the mere existence of a subject. The existence of a subject is also needed in order to perform an action, but this does not lead into a conundrum. Furthermore, although desire is still present as a precondition, the goal is now the performance of what has to be done and the condition of absence of desire is achieved while performing what has to be done. Hence, there is no contrast between precondition and goal.

This shows that the conundrum in fact depends on the assumption that the first premise is true and that there is no desireless action. The belief that desire is the necessary and sufficient cause for action can also be found in David Hume's analysis of action (see, for instance, *Enquiry* 1999:293).[39] However, this claim is controversial. In the Indian world, Simon Brodbeck has, for instance, offered a very insightful discussion of Kṛṣṇa's injunction of acting without desire in the *Bhagavadgītā* (Brodbeck 2010). After an analysis of the will/passion interpretation, Brodbeck dismisses it and explains that Kṛṣṇa is *literally* enjoining a desireless action, which is hence not something inconceivable in the Indian world. In other words, the whole conundrum might not apply to all Indian authors and schools and seems not to apply at all to the Gītā context. The same holds true in the case of Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, where desire is not the cause of one's action and the emphasis is rather put on performing what one has to do. It might be interesting to note that Prābhākara authors in the Post-Classical period were often Vaiṣṇavas and sometimes quote verses from the Gītā in the closing stanzas of their Mīmāṃsā works. Therefore, the proximity of the two conceptions is probably no accident.

[39] This opinion is upheld by Framarin, who generalises Hume's influence (Framarin 2005: 144).

6. Conclusion

In the preceding pages I hope to have shown that the subject is conceived in Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā as intrinsically desirous. Hence, the subject is also intrinsically a moral subject and an agent. Possibly, as a consequence of these basic links, intermediate psychic faculties (such as *buddhi* and *ahaṅkāra*) become marginal in Prābhākara thought and are only confined to the rare ontological discussions about the constituents of the psyche. In other words, the very marginality of *buddhi* etc. in Prābhākara texts could be a further evidence of the fact that their conception of the subject is a phenomenological one.

If I were to render this phenomenological description in ontological terms, I would suggest that the subject implied in Prābhākara[40] texts is a dynamic entity, which exists insofar as it acts. It must however be remembered, once again, that Prābhākara texts do not explicitly describe the subject and they rather focus on how it relates to the sacrifice.

The necessity of desire as the trigger for one to become a subject should not be misconstrued as identical with the theory that all actions are undertaken because of desire. Prābhākaras rather think that desire makes one aware of the injunctions addressing him or her and that injunctions alone cause one to act.

Lastly, the ontological treatment of the *ātman* in Śālikanātha's *Prakaraṇapañcikā* raises further questions: is this ontology the presupposed background of the phenomenological approach current in other Prābhākara texts? Or has it been borrowed by Nyāya authors, due to the contingent problem of opposing the Buddhists? A tentative answer is that Śālikanātha spells out the ontological precondition for the phenomenological appearance of the subject.

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[40] And possibly also in Bhāṭṭa texts, as may be suggested by the usage of the *aham-pratyaya*.

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Four

Kārakas in *Cāndra* Grammar: An Interpretation from the Pāli Buddhist *Śāstras*[1]

Alastair Gornall

In all traditional Sanskrit grammars the goal of the treatment of cases is to relate semantics and morphology, ultimately enabling nominal inflection. However, the way in which this is done varies greatly. The nature of the treatment of case relations in the *Cāndra* grammatical tradition and its connection with the closely-related Pāṇinian grammatical tradition has received a fair amount of critical attention, though, due to the lack of editions of commentaries on the *Cāndra-vṛtti,* the inner-workings and mechanisms of the grammatical system have often remained obscure and subject to debate.[2]

[1] I am greatly indebted to the thoughts and comments of Eivind Kahrs, Vincenzo Vergiani, James Benson, Giovanni Ciotti, Paolo Visigalli, and Patricia Sauthoff. All errors that remain are, of course, my own.

[2] Cf. JOSHI and ROODBERGEN (1975: xvi-xix), DESHPANDE (1979), VERHAGEN (1992, 2001: 292).

In this article I explore an interpretation of the *Cāndra* treatment of cases in a highly sophisticated, yet almost completely neglected, system of Pāli grammar, the *Moggallāna* system. This grammatical literature is of particular relevance since it is largely based on the *Cāndra-vyākaraṇa* (CV), its *vṛtti* (CVV) and commentaries. Consisting of the *Moggallāna-vyākaraṇa* (Mogg), *Moggallāna-vutti* (Mogg-v) and the *Moggallāna-pañcikā* (Mogg-p), this system was composed in Laṅkā by Moggallāna Mahāthera in the aftermath of the *saṅgha* reforms of Parākramabāhu I in 1156. Moggallāna's pupil, Saṅgharakkhita, later composed a sub-commentary (*ṭīkā*) on the *Moggallāna-pañcikā* (Mogg-p-ṭ) as well as a handbook on case relations, the *Sambandhacintā* (Sambandh).

While this grammatical literature is written in Pāli, it represents the most comprehensive analysis available of a grammatical system that operates on *Cāndra* principles. In this regard, the *Moggallāna* grammatical tradition provides a unique opportunity to understand how 12th century Laṅkan grammarians understood the *Cāndra* tradition's treatment of cases.

1. *MOGGALLĀNA* AND *CĀNDRA*

Moggallāna's treatment of cases is largely based on a CV design and to various degrees a use of the *Cāndra* tradition permeates the *Moggallāna* system. For instance, even with only a superficial analysis of the grammars' *sūtra*s, R. Otto Franke found that 121 *sūtra*s out of Moggallāna's 813 are translated from the CV.[3] In addition, Franke demonstrated that many more *sūtra*s are fashioned from only part of a *Cāndra sūtra* or by amalgamating parts of a variety of *sūtra*s. For instance, Mogg.2.9 *dhyādīhi yuttā* = C.2.1.50 *dhigantarāntareṇayuktāt*.[4] Franke's research has also shown that Moggallāna has a tendency to follow the *sūtra* order of the CV and that he occasionally adopts sections of the CV wholesale into the Mogg. He presented a general concordance of these corresponding sections,[5] which I have adapted below with section headings and revised *sūtra* numbering:

[3] FRANKE 1902-3: 87.
[4] FRANKE 1902-3: 87.
[5] FRANKE 1902-3: 88.

Mogg.1.13-25 = C.1.1.6-16 (meta-rules [*paribhāṣā*]); Mogg.2.2-42 = C.2.1.43-96 (treatment of cases); Mogg.2.120-121 and 123-124 = C.2.1.38-39 and 41-42 (the elision of case endings after indeclinables and within compounds); Mogg.2.237-246 = C.6.3.15-26 (specifications for enclitic pronouns); Mogg.3.1-20 = C.2.2.1-49 (defining compounds and their functions); Mogg.3.74-85 = C.5.2.91-106 (substitutions for particles [*na*, *saha* etc.] in compounds); Mogg.4.96-113 = C.4.3.8-16; (some secondary adverbial suffixes, e.g. *-to*, *-ttha*/ *-tra* and *-dā* etc.); Mogg.5.1-13 = C.1.1.17-39 (suffixes for verbal derivatives [*khādi*]); Mogg.5.55-60 = C.1.2.66-77 (defining *-tavantu, -tāvī* and *-ta* in the sense of agent [*kattu*], object [*kamma*] or state [*bhāva*]).

The work of Franke, then, suggests a large dependence on the CV and, while this reliance is far from uniform, the sections that most clearly exhibit a *Cāndra* design are highly significant. For instance, the Mogg follows the CV in its treatment of case endings, compounds, verbal derivatives and, to some extent, in its treatment of verbal voices, all of which are important engines of grammatical theory. In addition, the Mogg adopts meta-rules (*paribhāṣā*) directly from the CV and therefore operates on *Cāndra* principles.

However, Moggallāna's use of the CV in the treatment of case endings appears more nuanced and complex when analysed through the Mogg-v and Mogg-p. From the concordance given below, it is apparent that Moggallāna does not accept all of the *Cāndra sūtra*s in his treatment of case endings and that many of the *sūtra*s he does not include in the *sūtra-pāṭha* he treats critically in the Mogg-v and Mogg-p:

A Concordance of the sūtras of the Mogg and CV Treatment of Case Endings[6]

Mogg	CV	Mogg	CV
2.1	1.4.148, 2.1.1	2.25	2.1.72
2.2	2.1.43	2.26	2.1.73
2.2 (v)	2.1.49	2.27	2.1.79
2.2 (v)	2.1.50	2.27 (v)	2.1.97
2.3	2.1.51	2.27 (v)	2.1.98
2.4	2.1.44	2.27 (p)	2.1.74
2.5	2.1.45	2.27 (p)	2.1.75
2.5 (v)	2.1.46	2.27 (p)	2.1.76
2.6	2.1.47	2.27 (p)	2.1.77
2.7 i	2.1.48	2.27 (p)	2.1.78
2.8 ii	2.1.49	2.27 (p)	2.1.80
2.9	2.1.50	2.28	2.1.81
2.9 (v)	2.1.52	2.28 (v)	2.1.87
2.10	2.1.54	2.29	2.1.82
2.11	2.1.55	2.30	2.1.83
2.12	2.1.56	2.31	2.1.84
2.13	2.1.57	2.32	2.1.85
2.14	2.1.58	2.33	2.1.86
2.15	2.1.59	2.34	2.1.88
2.16	2.1.60	2.35	2.1.89
2.17	2.1.61	2.36	2.1.90
2.18	2.1.62, 2.1.63	2.37	2.1.91
2.19	2.1.65	2.38	2.1.92
2.20	2.1.66	2.39	2.1.93
2.21	2.1.68	2.40	2.1.94
2.22	2.1.69	2.41	2.1.95
2.23	2.1.70	2.42	2.1.96
2.24	2.1.71		

It seems likely then that the *Moggallāna* system's reliance on the CV is wider and more pervasive than Franke's analysis of the *sūtra*s would suggest. However, R. Otto Franke did also predict a correlation between the Mogg-v and CVV. Using fragments of the CVV obtained by Bruno Liebich, Franke began to prove such a correlation between a few *sūtra*s of the grammars. For instance:

6 (v) = Mogg-v, (p) = Mogg-p.

M.'s Comm [Mogg-v]. zu II, 122 (*ekatthatāyaṃ*): *ekatthībhāve sabbāsaṃ vibhattīnaṃ lopo hoti bahulaṃ: puttīyati, rājapuriso, Vāsiṭṭho.*

C.'s Comm [CVV]. zu II, 1, 39 (*aikārthye*): *ekārthībhāve supo lug bhavati: putrīyati, rājapuruṣaḥ, Aupagavaḥ.*[7]

As a result of his initial discoveries regarding the intimate relationship between the *Moggallāna* and *Cāndra* traditions, Franke recognised the important contribution the *Moggallāna* tradition could make in understanding the *Cāndra* tradition:

> Diese Existenz eines Comm. von Moggallāna zu seiner Grammatik ist ein weiterer Grund, dessentwegen die Sanskritphilologie der Pāli-Philologie zu Dank sich verpflichtet fühlen dürfte…[8]

From my own analysis of the treatment of case endings, I can conclude that all *sūtra*s but two (Mogg.2.3 and Mogg.2.40) use the CVV as a framework.[9] Three *sūtra*s, Mogg.2.11, Mogg.2.16 and Mogg.2.21, could even be classed as translations as they exhibit almost no variation from the CVV at all:

Mogg.2.11 *patiparīhi bhāge ca*[10]	C.2.1.55 *pratiparibhyāṃ bhāge ca*[12]
patiparīhi yuttamhā lakkhaṇādisu bhāge c' atthe dutiyā hoti; rukkhaṃ pati vijjotate vijju, sādhu devadatto mātaraṃ pati, rukkhaṃ rukkhaṃ pati tiṭṭhati, yad ettha maṃ pati siyā, rukkhaṃ pari vijjotate vijju, sādhu devadatto mātaraṃ pari, rukkhaṃ	*pratiparibhyāṃ yuktāl lakṣaṇādiṣu bhāge cārthe dvitīyā syāt. vṛkṣaṃ prati vidyotate. vṛkṣaṃ vṛkṣaṃ prati tiṣṭhati. sādhur devadatto mātaraṃ prati. yad atra māṃ prati syāt. vṛkṣaṃ pari vidyotate. vṛkṣaṃ vṛkṣaṃ pari tiṣṭhati. sādhur deva-*

7 FRANKE 1902-3: 95. The square brackets are my own addition.

8 FRANKE 1902-3: 94.
'The existence of Moggallāna's commentary to his own grammar is another reason for which Sanskrit philology might feel indebted to Pāli philology.'

9 GORNALL 2012: 68-136.

10 '[The second pair of suffixes occurs after a nominal stem co-occurring] with [the particles] *pati* and *pari* when they are used to indicate [a characteristic (*lakkhaṇa*), change of state (*itthaṃbhūta*), distributive function (*vicchā*)], and a division (*bhāga*).'

rukkhaṃ pari tiṭṭhati, yad ettha maṃ pari siyā.[11]	*datto mātaraṃ pari. yad atra māṃ pari syāt.*[13]
Mogg.2.16 *sattamy ādhikye*[14]	C.2.1.60 *saptamy ādhikye*[16]
ādhikyatthe upena yuttamhā sattamī hoti; upa khāriyaṃ doṇo.[15]	*ādhikye 'rthe upena yuktāt saptamī bhavati. upa khāryāṃ droṇaḥ.*[17]
Mogg.2.21 *hetumhi*[18]	C.2.1.68 *hetau*[20]
takkiriyāyogge tatiyā siyā; amena vasati, vijjāya yaso.[19]	*tatkriyāyogye tṛtīyā syāt; annena vasati. vidyayā yaśaḥ.*[21]

It is possible to conclude therefore that whenever Moggallāna has used *sūtra*s from the CV he also used the CVV as a basis for his Mogg-v. Whether this reliance extends to the Mogg-p is difficult to determine since commentaries to the CVV remain unedited and are often incomplete.

Despite the lack of available Sanskrit commentaries, the internal evidence from the Mogg-p suggests that Moggallāna's appropriation of *Cāndra* literature was mediated by his teacher Sāriputta, who wrote the *Cāndrālaṃkāra* (CA), a commentary on the *Cāndra-pañcikā* (CP) of Ratnamati, itself a commentary on the CVV. Sanskrit manuscripts of the CP

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11 Mogg-v 1931: 48.

12 '[The second sUP triplet occurs after a nominal stem co-occurring] with [the particles] *prati* and *pari* when they are used to indicate [a characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*), distributive function (*vīpsā*), change of state (*itthaṃbhūta*)], and divison (*bhāga*).'

13 CVV 1953: 173.

14 'The seventh [pair of suffixes occurs after a nominal stem co-occurring with the particle *upa*] when it is used in the sense of *ādhikya* "more".'

15 Mogg-v 1931: 50.

16 'The seventh [sUP triplet] occurs [after a nominal stem co-occurring with the particle *upa*] when it is used in the sense of *ādhikya* "more".'

17 CVV 1953: 174.

18 '[The third pair of suffixes occurs after a nominal stem] in the sense of a cause (*hetu*).'

19 Mogg-v 1931: 53.

20 '[The third sUP triplet occurs after a nominal stem] in the sense of a cause (*hetu*).'

21 CVV 1953: 175.

are extant,[22] though an edition of the work has yet to be published.[23] A facsimile edition of parts of the CA has been recently published by Dragomir Dimitrov,[24] though it does not include the CV section on the treatment of case endings.

That Moggallāna utilised a commentarial lineage on the CV, which included Ratnamati's CP and Sāriputta's CA, is explicitly confirmed by a 15th century monk, Śrī Rāhula, who states in his *Padasādhana-ṭīkā* (Pds-ṭ), a commentary on a *Moggallāna* handbook, that Moggallāna had learned and memorised, among many other grammatical texts, 'the grammar and critical commentary composed by the Teacher Candragomin, [and] its *vṛtti*, commentary and sub-commentary composed by Jaḍḍugomi (?),[25] Ratnamati and Sāriputta the Grand Master (*mahāsāmi*)...'.[26]

Moggallāna and his pupils appear to have seen both Sāriputta and Ratnamati as authorities and sometimes refer to them in points of grammatical dispute. The reverence paid to Sāriputta as commentator on the *Cāndrapañcikā* ('*ratnamatipañcikālaṅkārakāra*' [lit. the author of the ornament of Ratnamati's extensive commentary]) is clear from the Mogg-p-ṭ (Mogg.2.6) where Saṅgharakkhita states that Moggallāna 'illuminates the basics points already taught by the teacher (Sāriputta).'[27]

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[22] Cf. SĀṄKṚTYĀYANA 1937: 43 nr. 295, OBERLIES 1989: 27-28.

[23] I am aware that Dragomir Dimitrov plans to publish a monograph on Ratnamati. This work will be useful for understanding the adoption of the *Cāndra* tradition by the Laṅkan *saṅgha*.

[24] DIMITROV 2010.

[25] Most Tibetan and North Indian source material states that the author of the *Cāndra-vṛtti* is Dharmadāsa. Therefore, the identification of the *vṛttikāra* with one 'Jaḍḍugomi' is particularly significant here. In addition, the description of the *Cāndra-vyākaraṇa* as a 'critical commentary' (*paccakkhānabhassa*, S, *pratyākhyāna-bhāṣya*) is also interesting. It perhaps refers to the fact that the *Cāndra-vyākaraṇa* is largely a reformulation of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* based on the recommendations of Kātyāyana's *vārttikas*.

[26] Pds-ṭ 1908:6, 8-10: *ācariyacandagomiviracite saddalakkhaṇe paccakkhānabhasse ca jaḍḍugomiratanamatisāriputtamahāsāmīppabhutīhi viracitesu vuttipañcikā-pañcikālaṅkāresu ca...*

[27] Mogg-p-ṭ B[e] 85: *duhādīnaṃ ty evaṃ ādo amhākaṃ paramagurunā ratanamati-pañcikālaṅkārādikārena nānākārasāratthavedaveditu mahāpaññāpāṭavānaṃ paññā-vantānaṃ sāminā mahāsāminā sambuddha-sāsanaratanavaropakārakena "idaṃ ettha vicāraṇīyaṃ"ty abhidhāya nānāmatantaraṃ ākaḍḍhiya bahuṃ sampaveditaṃ atthi,*

In addition, Moggallāna and his commentators also saw Ratnamati as a grammatical authority. For instance, Moggallāna justifies his rejection of a particular grammatical issue in Mogg.2.28 *pañcamy avadhismā*[28] by stating in the Mogg-p that 'it has been rejected by Ratnamati etc. (*ratanamatippabhuti*) [and, therefore,] we are not pressed for a refutation [of our own].'[29] The use of the term '*ratanamatippabhuti*' (lit. beginning with Ratnamati) is also important here since Moggallāna is not just appealing to Ratnamati but to a lineage beginning with him. In this regard, Ratnamati's commentary can perhaps be seen as the stimulus of *Cāndra* grammatical production within the reformed *saṅgha* in 12th century Laṅkā. Therefore, it is possible that like the Mogg and Mogg-v, the Mogg-p is also based on *Cāndra* grammatical literature and therefore preserves clues concerning the ways the *Cāndra* tradition interpreted the CV. In this regard, I illustrate below the way in which the treatment of cases is interpreted in the *Moggallāna* tradition as a possible means of obtaining an insight into the *Cāndra* treatment of cases. However, before turning to the *Moggallāna* tradition it is perhaps beneficial to first compare the treatment of cases in the Pāṇinian and *Cāndra* traditions.

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mayam pan' ettha ācariyenādhippetamattam evālamba-attham pakāsayissāma. (With respect [to the statement] '*for the* [*verbal bases*] *'duh' etc.*', saying that 'this here should be considered' [and] drawing out various altemative views, much has been taught by our teacher's teacher/supreme teacher, author of the *Ratnamati-pañcikālaṅkāra* etc., the master among the learned—who are skilled, have great wisdom and realise excellent knowledge of various types—the great master, the most eminent assistant, like a jewel, to the teaching of the Perfectly Enlightened One. Again here we will explain a supporting meaning that has simply been taught by the teacher.)

[28] 'The fifth [pair of suffixes occurs after a nominal stem] that is a limiting point (*avadhi*).'

[29] Mogg-p 1931: 68, 17-19: *ratanamatippabhutīhi yeva paṭikkhittā na amhehi paṭikkhepāya payatitabbaṃ.*

2. *KĀRAKA*S IN THE PĀṆINIAN TRADITION

In the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (A), *kāraka*s are abstract syntactico-semantic categories that mediate between the semantics and morphology of a case suffix.[30] This separation of semantics and morphology by means of *kāraka*s allows for variation in the phonological representation of underlying semantic structures in Sanskrit nominal inflection. For instance, as I illustrate below, it accounts for such sentences as '*grāmam adhiśete*' (he lies/sleeps in the village), where the second case suffix *-am* of '*grāmam*' is assigned as a *karman* (grammatical object) in the sense of a locative. The key idea in the A's treatment of cases is that there is no one-to-one correspondence between three modules, i.e. between semantics and *kāraka*s, *kāraka*s and morphological cases (*vibhakti*s) and, ultimately, semantics and morphological cases.[31] I have adapted Joshi and Roodbergen's representation of this principle as follows:

> (*a*) one and the same semantic characterisation may be linked to different *kāraka*-names,
> (*b*) one and the same *kāraka*-name may be linked to different semantic characterisations,
> (*c*) one and the same *vibhakti* may be linked with different *kāraka*-names,
> (*d*) one and the same *kāraka*-name may be linked with different *vibhakti*s.[32]

As part of the derivational process, then, *kāraka*s are linked with various semantic characterisations (A.1.4.24-55). There are six different *kāraka*s: *apadāna* 'stable point when there is moving away', *sampradāna* 'recipient; indirect goal', *karaṇa* 'instrument', *adhikaraṇa* 'locus', *karman* 'object; goal' and *kartṛ* 'agent'.[33] As mentioned, these *kāraka* labels may be assigned to more than one semantic characterisation and, likewise, a semantic characterisation may be assigned more than one *kāraka*. For instance, the

[30] For further reading on the topic of *kāraka*s, cf. CARDONA (1967, 1970, 1971 and 1974), DESHPANDE (1979, 1980 and 1991), JOSHI and ROODBERGEN (1975), KIPARSKY (1982) and MATILAL (1991).

[31] It is important to bear in mind that these three modules are etic, rather than emic, descriptions of the architecture of the A. They are not labelled as such in the A itself.

[32] JOSHI and ROODBERGEN 1975: xvi.

[33] KAHRS 1998: 51.

principal definition of *karman* (grammatical object) is A.1.4.49 *kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma* '[The technical term] *karman* denotes what the agent (*kartur*) most desires to reach (*īpsitatamam*) through his action'.[34] This rule is used to derive forms such as *kaṭam* (mat) in the sentence *kaṭaṃ karoti* (he makes a mat), where the second case suffix *–am* is assigned to the *kāraka* category *karman* in the sense of object, i.e. 'what the agent most desires to reach'.

However, the *kāraka* category *karman* can also be assigned other semantic characterisations, such as locus (*ādhāra*) by means of *adhiśīṅsthāsāṃ karma* A.1.4.46 (*ādhāraḥ* # 45, *kārake* # 23) '[The technical term] *karman* denotes [the locus or substratum] in relation to the verbal stems *śīṄ*-, "lie down, sleep", *sthā*-, "stay, stand", and *ās*-, "sit", all co-occurring with the preverb *adhi*'.[35] This rule is used to derive forms such as *grāmam* (village) in the example '*grāmam adhiśete*' (he lies/sleeps in the village), where the second case suffix *-am* is assigned to the *kāraka* category *karman* in the sense of locus (*ādhāra*). The semantic characterisation locus (*ādhāra*), though, primarily defines the *kāraka* category *adhikaraṇa*, by means of A.1.4.45 *ādhāro 'dhikaraṇam* '[The technical term] *adhikaraṇa* denotes the locus or substratum (*ādhāraḥ*)'.[36] This rule is used to derive forms such as *kaṭe* (mat) in the example '*kaṭa āste*'[37] (he sits on the mat), where the seventh case suffix *-Ṅi* is assigned to the *kāraka* category *adhikaraṇa* in the sense of locus. Therefore, while *kāraka* categories, such as *karman*, have a variety of semantic characterisations, their semantic characterisations may also be assigned a variety of *kāraka* categories.

After a *kāraka* category has been assigned a semantic characterisation in the derivational process, any of six morphological case categories (2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th cases) are then assigned to a *kāraka* (A.2.3.1-73). Again, a single *kāraka* may be assigned to a variety of cases and a single case may be assigned to a variety of *kāraka*s. For instance, the second (*dvitīyā*) case is assigned to the *kāraka* category *karman* by A.2.3.2

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[34] KATRE 1987: 88. For more detail, see VERGIANI, forthcoming.

[35] KATRE 1987: 88.

[36] KATRE 1987: 87.

[37] '*kaṭe āste*' before *sandhi* (A.6.178, A.8.3.19).

karmaṇi dvitīyā 'The second sUP triplet (*dvitīyā*) is introduced [when not specified otherwise] to denote the object (*karman*)'.[38] However, the third (*tṛtīyā*) case, as well as the second, is also assigned to the category *karman* under certain circumstances by A.2.3.3 *tṛtīyā ca hoś chandasi* 'In the domain of Chandas (*chandasi*) the third sUP triplet, as well as the second, is introduced to denote the *karman* of the verbal stem *hu-* "sacrifice"'.[39] For example, in the sentence '*payo / payasā juhoti*' (he offers milk), the word '*payas*' (milk) denotes the grammatical object and can either be in the second or third case. The third case, though, is primarily assigned to the *kāraka* categories *kartṛ* (agent) and *karaṇa* (instrument) by A.2.3.18 *kartṛkaraṇayos tṛtīyā* 'The third sUP triplet (*tṛtīyā*) [is introduced after a nominal stem] to denote the agent (*kartṛ*) and instrument (*karaṇa*)'.

Once a *kāraka* category has been assigned a semantic characterisation, and a morphological case has been assigned to that *kāraka* category, it is then possible for phonological representations of the morphological case categories to be assigned. For instance, '*am*', '*au*' and '*as*', representing singular, dual and plural, respectively, are the basic suffixes of the second case. Taking the derivational process of '*grāmam*' (village) as an example, the interrelation of the different derivational modules described above can be represented in the Pāṇinian system as follows:

1. Semantic characterisation: *ādhāra* 'locus'
↓[*adhiśīṅsthāsāṃ karma* A.1.4.46 (*ādhāraḥ* # 45, *kārake* # 23)]
2. Abstract syntactico-semantic structure (*kāraka*): *karman*
↓[*karmaṇi dvitīyā* A.2.3.2]
3. Morphological structure (*vibhakti*): *dvitīyā*
↓ [*sV-au-Jas--am-auṬ-CHas--Ṭā-bhyām-bhis--Ṅe-bhyām-bhyas--Ṅasi-bhyām-bhyas-- Ṅas-os-ām--Ṅy-os-suP* A.4.1.2]
4. Phonological representation: *am*[40]

[38] KATRE 1987: 138.
[39] KATRE 1987: 138.
[40] The headings of this four-fold framework are adapted from CARDONA 1974, KIPARSKY and STAAL 1969: 84, KAHRS 1998: 52, and HOUBEN 1999. My discussion of the A is indebted to the summaries in KAHRS 1998, and VERGIANI, forthcoming.

Through this flexible mechanism, the variation in the phonological representation of underlying semantic structures in Sanskrit nominal inflection is accounted for.

3. *KĀRAKA*S IN THE *CĀNDRA* TRADITION

In contrast to the A, the CV does not have a formal semantic module that defines the *kāraka* categories to which morphological structures are assigned. It treats the *kāraka* categories as semantically meaningful technical terms and relates morphological cases directly to them. In this way, it appears to lose the *kāraka* module as a mediator between semantics and morphology. In this regard, Joshi and Roodbergen state:

> Candragomin...links syntactic meanings, and, in some instances, non-linguistic features directly with case endings. Thus he can do without a *kāraka*-section proper, and confines himself to a *vibhakti* section...Moreover, since Candragomin leaves the syntactic meanings undefined, and relates the use of case-endings to *vivakṣā*: 'the wish of the speaker' (to present items in language as he likes)', it relieves him of problems, such as rule-ordering, conflict procedure, and adjustments due to the definitions. [41]

Joshi and Roodbergen's initial statement that the CV links semantics directly to case endings has become almost universally accepted. For instance, more recently Madhav Deshpande has reiterated this view and has stated that 'Candragomin dispenses with this intervening layer and links semantics directly with morphology'.[42] While Deshpande agrees with Joshi and Roodbergen in this regard, he has also illustrated that the treatment of case-endings in the CV is not as loosely regulated as Joshi and Roodbergen describe. He has shown that the CV is sensitive to rule-ordering and conflict procedure, and that the notion of '*vivakṣā*' is not meant to replace automatic operations.[43] In support of Deshpande, I illustrate below that Moggallāna shows that *vivakṣā* in the *Moggallāna* tradition—and therefore

41 JOSHI and ROODBERGEN 1975: xvi-xvii.
42 DESHPANDE 1992: 49.
43 DESHPANDE 1979.

by analogy also in the *Cāndra* tradition—is not a freelance principle that allows one 'to present items in language as he likes'.[44]

Since the CV lacks distinct semantic and *kāraka* modules, it appears to adopt *kāraka* categories that are designed to encapsulate many of the senses outlined in the semantic module of the Pāṇinian system. They are six-fold: *kriyāpya* 'object' (lit. reachable by an action),[45] *karaṇa* 'instrument', *sampradāna* 'recipient', *avadhi* 'limiting-point', *ādhāra* 'locus' and *kartṛ* 'agent'. Pieter Verhagen argues that, although these technical terms are designed to be semantically self-evident, it does not mean that the CV combines the semantic module and *kāraka* categories into a single module. He argues that one should implicitly distinguish between the semantic module and *kāraka* categories, despite the fact the semantic module is not explicitly defined. In this respect, Verhagen states:

> As the *kāraka* terms themselves are more obvious reflections of the semantic aspect of the categories, *Cāndra* grammar gives the impression of combining the semantic and *kāraka* level in one. I think that this is not the case; if we compare the formation processes (*prakriyā*) according to Pāṇini and *Cāndra* we find that the *kārakas* assume the exact same intermediate position allowing for bilateral mapping in (and from) both the semantic and morphological levels.[46]

Verhagen concludes that 'the *kārakas* occupy the same position in *Cāndra* grammar as in Pāṇini's original *kāraka* system.'[47] There is some evidence in the CVV that would support such a view. For instance, the CVV does acknowledge some degree of variation between semantic representation and *kāraka* categories. For instance, the CVV on C.2.1.43

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[44] It should be noted that JOSHI and ROODBERGEN (1975) and DESHPANDE (1979) viewed the CV and the *Cāndra-vṛtti* (CVV) as the product of the same author and, therefore, their observations on the CV often amount to readings of the CV in light of the CVV. However, it is now accepted that the CV and CVV were written by different authors, Candragomin and Dharmadāsa, respectively. For an overview of this debate, cf. VERGIANI 2009. Therefore, I use the expression '*Cāndra* tradition' instead of CV to indicate that, like Moggallāna, I am interpreting the CV through the lens of Dharmadāsa's CVV.

[45] In the CVV the term '*āpya*' (reachable) is glossed with '*vyāpya*' (pervaded).

[46] VERHAGEN 2001: 292.

[47] VERHAGEN 2001: 292-293.

kriyāpye dvitīyā (The second case is introduced to denote that which is reachable by an action) defines '*āpya*' (reachable) in the sense of '*īpsitam*' (desired), '*anīpsitam*' (undesired) and '*īpsitaṃ nāpy anīpsitam*' (neither desired nor undesired)[48] in an analogous way to A.1.4.49-51.[49] The CV too also acknowledges variation between *kāraka* categories and morphological cases. For instance, by C.2.1.87 *stokālpakṛcchrakatipayād asattvārthāt karaṇe*, the fifth case, as well as the third, is assigned in the sense of instrument (*karaṇa*) after the nominal stems *stoka* 'a little', *alpa* 'a little', *kṛcchra* 'difficult', and *katipaya* 'a few', when these do not denote a substance (*asattvārtha*). While it is difficult to come to definitive conclusions about the relationship between semantic representations and *kāraka* categories in the *Cāndra* system, I show below that the closely-related *Moggallāna* grammatical tradition viewed the *Cāndra* treatment of cases in a similar way to Verhagen.

In any case, throughout its treatment of case-endings, the *Cāndra* tradition clearly shows that it does not *formally* account for separate semantic and *kāraka* modules as in the A. By way of illustration, I return to the example '*grāmam adhiśete*' (he lies/sleeps in the village). In the CVV on C.2.1.49, the second case *-am* of '*grāmam*' is accounted for by the maxim '*vivakṣāto hi kārakāṇi bhavanti*' (for *kāraka*s are [used] according to the desire to express [them]). Through this statement, the CVV intimates that since there is a desire to express the grammatical object, i.e. that which is reachable by an action (*kriyāpya*), the second case is suffixed. Whether or not the grammatical object is employed in the sense of locus (*ādhāra*) as in the A is not stated. In this instance, then, the CVV does not define *kriyāpya* in terms of locus (*ādhāra*) and is certainly unable to do so in the same way the A is able to define '*karman*', *via* A.1.4.46 *adhiśīṅsthāsāṃ karma*. Joshi and Roodbergen interpret the lack of a formal re-cognition of an underlying

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[48] CVV 1953: 168, 21*ff*.

[49] For instance, the three main definitions of *karman* are: A.1.4.49 *kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma* '*karman* denotes the item that the agent most desires to reach (through his action)'; A.1.4.50 *tathāyuktaṃ cānīpsitam* 'also (*karman* denotes) that which is not desired to be reached (directly) (through an action)'; A.1.4.51 *akathitaṃ ca* 'also (*karman* denotes) that which has not been mentioned (when it becomes instrumental in bringing about an action).'

semantic module, separate from a *kāraka* module, as meaning that the sense of grammatical object in effect replaces the sense of locus:

> In this connection it is interesting to see how Candragomin accounts for usages like *grāmam adhiśete*: 'he sleeps in the village'...He accounts for them by appealing to the dictum *vivakṣāto hi kārakāṇi bhavanti*: 'as we know, *kāraka*s are (used) according to the wish of the speaker'. Whenever a speaker wants to express the idea of *vyāpya*, i.e. *āpya*: 'to be reached (directly)' instead of *ādhāra*: 'location'...he is free to do so.[50]

For Joshi and Roodbergen then a comparison between the A and CV could perhaps be represented as follows:

Pāṇinian	***Cāndra***
1. Semantic representation: *ādhāra* 'locus' ↓[*adhiśīṅsthāsām karma* A.1.4.46 (*ādhāraḥ* # 45, *kārake* # 23)] 2. Abstract syntactico-semantic structure: *karman* ↓[*karmaṇi dvitīyā* A.2.3.2] 3. Morphological structure: *dvitīyā* ↓ [*am-auṬ-CHas* A.4.1.2] 4. Phonological representation: *am*	1. Semantico-syntactic representation: *kriyāpya* ↓ [*kriyāpye dvitīyā* C.2.1.43] 2. Morphosyntactic structure: *dvitīyā* ↓ [*am-auṬ-CHas* C.2.1.1] 3. Phonological representation: *am*

At face value it would seem that Joshi and Roodbergen were right in their observation that by conflating the semantic module and semantico-syntactic (*kāraka*) module the CV had greatly limited the scope of variation in the phonological representation of underlying semantic structures.[51] However, as mentioned above, I will show that the *Moggallāna* system provides a different interpretation of the *Cāndra* treatment of cases.

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[50] JOSHI and ROODBERGEN 1975: xviii.

[51] For a further account of this reduction in variation, cf. JOSHI and ROODBERGEN (1975: xvi-xix).

5. *KĀRAKA*S IN THE *MOGGALLĀNA* TRADITION

The Mogg's treatment of *kāraka*s is essentially the same as the CV. However, Moggallāna changes the name of the *kāraka* category '*kriyāpya*' in the CV to '*kamma*' (object, S. *karman*). His *kāraka* categories are likewise six-fold: *kamma* 'object', *karaṇa* 'instrument', *sampadāna* 'recipient', *avadhi* 'limiting-point', *ādhāra* 'locus'' and *kattu* 'agent.'

The mechanism through which these categories relate to morphological structures is essentially identical to the CV. The Mogg accounts for the same level of semantic variation in its *kāraka* categories as the CV. However, it tolerates less variation between morphological cases and *kāraka* categories. For instance, the prescription of the fifth case in the sense of *karaṇa* (instrument) by C.2.1.87 *stokālpakṛcchrakatipayād asattvārthāt karaṇe* is rejected by Moggallāna and is dealt with under Mogg.2.28 *pañcamy avadhismā*.[52] However, Moggallāna does not posit a one-to-one correspondence between *kāraka* categories and morphological cases and still accounts for variation between them. For instance, by Mogg.2.18 *kattukaraṇesu tatiyā* (the third case occurs in the sense of agent and instrument), the third case can still express the sense of both '*kattu*' (agent, S. *kartṛ*) and '*karaṇa*' (instrument).

Just as in the CV, the lack of recourse to a formal semantic module as found in the A is often explained through the principle of '*vivakṣā*' (the desire to speak).[53] To highlight the different approach of the *Moggallāna* system to the A, it is useful to explore Moggallāna's treatment of the example '*grāmam adhiśete*' (he lies/sleeps in the village), represented in the Mogg-v by the canonical quotation '*paṭhavim adhisessati*' (he will lie on the ground). This quotation is taken from verse 41 in the *Dhammapada*:

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[52] 'The fifth [pair of suffixes occurs after a nominal stem] that is a limiting point (*avadhi*).'

[53] Alongside the discussion of *vivakṣā* in *Cāndra* grammar in JOSHI and ROODBERGEN (1975: xvi-xix) and DESHPANDE (1979), there is also a notable contribution by RADICCHI (2002). For more general studies on the concept of *vivakṣā* in grammar, cf. van NOOTEN (1983), RADICCHI (1994), and SCHARF (1995, 2002).

aciraṃ vat' ayaṃ kāyo pathavim adhisessati,
chuddho apetaviññāṇo niratthaṃ va kaliṅgaraṃ.[54]

Too soon this body will lie on the ground, bloated and devoid of consciousness like a useless log.

I quote the relevant passage of the Mogg-v below alongside the CVV to show that '*paṭhavim adhisessatī*' is a direct substitute for '*grāmam adhiśete*' as found in the CVV:

CVV 2.1.49: ***grāmam adhiśeta*** *iti vyāpya-vivakṣaiva. evaṃ* ***grāmam adhitiṣṭhati, vṛkṣam adhyāste****, dharmam abhiniviśate, trirātram upavasati, grāmam anuvasati, parvatam adhivasati āvasatham āvasatīti.*[55]

[For the example], '*grāmam adhiśete*' (he lies/sleeps in the village), there is only the desire to speak of that which is pervaded [by an action] (i.e. the grammatical object). Likewise, [there is only the desire to speak of the grammatical object for the examples] '*grāmam adhitiṣṭhatī*' (he stays at the village), '*vṛkṣam adhyāste*' (he sits at the tree), '*dharmam abhiniviśate*' (he enters into the *dharma*), '*trirātram upavasatī*' (he dwells for three nights), '*grāmam anuvasatī*' (he settles at the village), and '*parvatam adhivasatī*' (he lives on a mountain), '*āvasatham āvasatī*' (he dwells at the lodging).

Mogg-v 2.2: ***paṭhavim adhisessati, gāmam adhitiṭṭhati, rukkham ajjhāsate*** *ti adhisīṭhāsānaṃ payoge 'dhikaraṇe kammavacanicchā vatticchāto hi kārakāni honti.*[56]

[For the examples], '*paṭhavim adhisessatī*' (he will lie on the ground), '*gāmam adhitiṭṭhatī*' (he stays at the village) and '*rukkham ajjhāsate*' (he sits down at the foot of a tree), when there is the use of the roots '*sī*', '*ṭhā*' and '*ās*' [preceded by the pre-verb] '*adhi*', there is the desire to speak of the grammatical object in the sense of locus (*adhikaraṇa*), for *kārakas* [are used] when there is the desire to express [them].

When these two discussions are compared, it is clear that Moggallāna has used the canonical quotation '*paṭhavim adhisessatī*' as a substitute for '*grāmam adhiśete*'. Moggallāna's discussion is especially significant since he

54 Dhp 1855: 8, 7-8.
55 CVV 1953: 170, 21-23.
56 Mogg-v 1931: 38, 3.

reveals that he interprets the prescription of the second case here along Pāṇinian lines. For instance, while the CVV states that the second case is appointed in sentences such as '*grāmam adhiśete*' only when one wishes to speak of a grammatical object, Moggallāna makes it explicit that the grammatical object is used in the sense of locus (*adhikaraṇa*), i.e. he mentions a semantic module. His discussion directly refers to A.1.4.46 *adhiśīṅsthāsāṃ karma* and his recognition of semantic variation underlying the linguistic choice of *kāraka* categories can be seen as a more Pāṇinian interpretation of the mechanisms involved in the *Cāndra* treatment of cases.

That Moggallāna is providing a Pāṇinian-style interpretation of the CVV is made clear in the commentaries on this passage. For instance, the Mogg-p states:

> *adhipubbasīṭhāsānam ādhāre dutiyābhimatā paresaṃ, sāpīha kammavacanicchāy' eva siddhā ti dassetuṃ vuttaṃ paṭhavim icc ādi.*[57]
>
> Others (the Pāṇinīyas) approve the second case in the sense of locus (*ādhāra*) for the roots '*sī*', '*ṭhā*' and '*ās*' preceded by [the pre-verb] '*adhi*'. Here too (i.e. in this grammar), it (the second case) is appointed only when there is the desire to speak of the grammatical object. To show that it is said '*paṭhavim*' etc.

In the Mogg-p-ṭ, Moggallāna's pupil, Saṅgharakkhita, makes a further explicit comparison between the *Moggallāna* system and the Pāṇinian grammatical system:

> *atha adhisīṭṭhāsānaṃ kammaṃ ty ādinā* (A.1.4.46) *tena tena kammasaññaṃ vidhāya paṭhaviṃ adhisessatī ti ādo (tattha) tattha kamme dutiyā ti* (A.2.3.2) *dutiyā vidhīyate tehi tehi satthakārehi. sabbatth'ev'ettha lokassa kamma-vacanicchā ti kamen'etaṃ 'ññasaññāpubbakaṃ kammam upadassento āha adhi-pubba icc ādi.*[58]
>
> Now, the grammarians, having appointed the technical term '*karman*' by a (rule) such as A.1.4.46 *adhiśīṅsthāsāṃ karma*, appoint the second case in [examples] such as '*paṭhaviṃ adhisessatī*' according to A.2.3.2 *karmaṇi dvitīyā*. In each instance (*sabbattha*) here, showing that this grammatical object (*kamma*), which was previously a technical term of others, (is used) since the people (*loka*) desire

[57] Mogg-p 1931: 40, 24 *ff.*
[58] Mogg-p-ṭ B[e] 80.

to speak of the grammatical object, it is said "preceded by [the pre-verb] '*adhi*'" etc.

Here, Saṅgharakkhita explains that Moggallāna is contrasting the formal appointment of *kamma* in the sense of locus (*ādhāra*) in the A with the informal appointment through *vivakṣā* in the Mogg. In his Sambandh, Saṅgharakkhita makes it explicit that, even though the grammatical object is governed by *vivakṣā*, it still refers to the same semantic range as in the A. In doing so he quotes the additional examples from the CVV 2.1.49 given above:

paṭhaviṃ adhisessati, gāmam adhitiṭṭhati, rukkham ajjhāvasate, dhammam abhinivisate, rattim upavasati, gāmam anuvasati, pabbatam adhivasati, gharam āvasati, nadiṃ pibati, gāmaṃ carati ty ādīsv ādhāre kammavacanicchāyaṃ kamme yeva dutiyā.[59]

The second case occurs only in the sense of grammatical object (*kamma*) when there is a desire to speak of the grammatical object in the sense of locus (*ādhāra*), such as in (the examples) '*paṭhaviṃ adhisessati*' (he will lie on the ground), '*gāmam adhitiṭṭhati*' (he stays at the village) and '*rukkham ajjhāsate*' (he sits down at the foot of a tree), '*dhammam abhinivisate*' (he enters into the *dhamma*), '*rattim upavasati*' (he dwells for a night), '*gāmam anuvasati*' (he settles at the village), and '*pabbatam adhivasati*' (he lives on a mountain), '*gharam āvasati*' (he dwells at the house), '*nadiṃ pibati*' (he drinks in [from] the river), and *gāmaṃ carati* (he wanders in the village).

From the discussions above, it is clear that the *Moggallāna* tradition is aware of the intricacies of the Pāṇinian treatment of cases. In addition, the tradition acknowledges that the relationship between the formal semantic and *kāraka* modules of the A has been replaced by the intentions of a linguistic community. Importantly, however, Moggallāna shows that these linguistic judgements imply the same semantic range as that which is prescribed in the A. In this regard, the degree of semantic variation underlying *kāraka* categories would appear to be unchanged from the A, although Moggallāna, following the *Cāndra* tradition, rejects the formalism of the A.

[59] Sambandh 1891: 44, 4-7.

It is therefore possible to compare Moggallāna's treatment of cases with the A's as follows:

Pāṇinian	*Moggallāna*
1. Semantic representation: *ādhāra* 'locus'	1. Semantic representation: *ādhāra* 'locus'
↓[*adhiśīṅsthāsāṃ karma* A.1.4.46 (*ādhāraḥ* # 45, *kārake* # 23)]	↓ [*vivakṣā*: the desire to speak]
2. Abstract syntactico-semantic structure: *karman*	2. Abstract syntactico-semantic structure: *kamma*
↓[*karmaṇi dvitīyā* A.2.3.2]	↓ [*kamme dutiyā* Mogg.2.2]
3. Morphological structure: *dvitīyā*	3. Morphosyntactic structure: *dutiyā*
↓ [*am-auṬ-CHas* A.4.1.2]	↓ [*aṃ-yo* Mogg.2.1]
4. Phonological representation: *am*	4. Phonological representation: *aṃ*

The *Moggallāna* tradition, then, appeals to *vivakṣā* as a link between the semantic and *kāraka* modules, rather than formalising the two modules in his grammar. However, importantly, according to the *Moggallāna* grammatical tradition, the semantic and *kāraka* modules are not conflated. The *kāraka* module holds the same intermediary position as in the A and, while the semantic module is subject to *vivakṣā* rather than being formalised in the grammar, the senses conveyed by the *kāraka* categories also appear to be identical to the A. However, as shown above, in contrast to Joshi and Roodbergen's interpretation of '*vivakṣā*' in the CVV as meaning 'the wish of the speaker (to present items in language as he likes)'[60], Moggallāna provides a different, perhaps more orthodox, understanding of the term. His arguments accord with Madhav Deshpande's views that *vivakṣā* in the CV 'is not meant to replace the automatic operations of Pāṇini's grammar, but to indicate the source of input for voluntary operations.'[61]

The way Moggallāna interprets *vivakṣā* in his grammatical system is most clearly articulated in Mogg-v.2.28, where he rejects the Pāṇinian *sūtra*s A.2.3.34 *dūrāntikārthaiḥ ṣaṣṭhy anyatarasyām*,[62] A.2.3.35

[60] JOSHI and ROODBERGEN 1975: xvi.

[61] DESHPANDE 1979: 143.

[62] KATRE 1987: 146. '(Optionally), the sixth sUP triplet [as well as the fifth] are introduced after (nominal stems) co-occurring with synonyms of *dūra*- "distant, far",

dūrāntikārthebhyo dvitīyā ca[63] and the relevant portion of A.2.3.36[64] *saptamī adhikaraṇe*.[65] Moggallāna states that the cases governed by A.2.3.34-36 can be assigned instead in the sense of their own specific domain (*savisaya*, S. *svaviṣaya*), i.e. according to their own governing rules. With respect to this rejection, the Mogg-p states: 'Here, the linguistic community's desire to speak (*lokiyā...vacanicchā*) is the restriction. Therefore, one should not consider the possibility of the over-application [of a rule].'[66] Moggallāna, then, anticipates that some may interpret *vivakṣā* as a freelance principle that would allow 'the over-application [of a rule]', meaning that the application of a case-ending would be subject to the whim of the speaker. In this regard, he makes it explicit that '*vivakṣā*' in the Mogg-v is not a *speaker's* desire but the desire of a linguistic community, i.e. a common linguistic convention. On this point, Saṅgharakkhita states the following in the Mogg-p-ṭ:

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and *antika*- "proximate, near".'

In his translation KATRE does not translate '*anyatarasyām*' (optionally) and therefore I have amended it accordingly.

63 KATRE 1987: 146. 'The second sUP triplet (*dvitīyā*) and [the fifth as well as the third] are introduced (after nominal stems) synonymous with *dūra*- "distant" and *antika*- "proximate" [when they do not imply a substance].'

64 KATRE 1987: 146. 'The seventh sUP triplet (*saptamī*) is introduced (after a nominal stem) to denote the *adhikaraṇa kāraka* and [also after synonyms of *dūra*- and *antika*-].'

65 Mogg-v 1931: 67, 4-7: *dūrantikatthayoge pi savisaye va pañcamīchaṭṭhiyo siyuṃ*: *dūraṃ gāmasmā, antikaṃ gāmasmā, dūraṃ gāmassa, antikaṃ gāmassā ti. dūrantikatthehi tu sabbā 'va savisaye siyuṃ bādhakābhāvā*: *dūro gāmo, antiko gāmo tv evam ādi.* (Also in connection with [words] meaning 'far' (*dūra*) and 'near' (*antika*), the fifth and sixth cases should occur in the sense of their own domain (i.e. in the sense of limit (*avadhi*) and relation (*sambandha*)). For example: 'far from the village (*gāmasmā*)', 'near to the village (*gāmasmā*)', 'far from the village' (*gāmassa*), 'near to the village' (*gāmassa*). However, all [cases] should occur after [words] meaning 'far' and 'near' in the sense of their own domain, since there is no problem [in doing so]. For example: 'the far village', 'the near village' etc.)

66 Mogg-p 1931: 68, 15-16: *lokiyā c'ettha vacanicchā nibandhanan ti nātippasaṅgam maññate.*

evaṃ carahi taṃtaṃkārakavacanicchāyaṃ aññā pi vibhattiyo kasmā na ppayujjeyyun ti āha "lokiyā cetthā"ti ādi, ettha vibhattīnaṃ niyame lokiyā eva vacanicchā nibandhanaṃ kāraṇan ti attho.[67]

Since, in this case, [it is asked] 'why could not other cases also be used when there is the desire to speak of this or that *kāraka*?', [the statement] beginning '*lokiyā c'ettha*' is said. The sense is that, here, when there is a restriction of cases, only the linguistic community's desire to speak is a restrictive cause.

The Mogg-p-ṭ makes it explicit here that there is a restriction in variation due to the common linguistic convention and not due to an individual speaker's desire. This is, in fact, also the dominant interpretation of *vivakṣā* in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*[68] and Patañjali defines the term under A.5.1.16[69] *tad asya tad asmin syād iti.*

vivakṣā ca dvayī. asty eva prāyoktrī vivakṣāsti laukikī. prayoktrī vivakṣā. prayoktā hi mṛdvyā snigdhayā ślakṣṇayā jihvayā mṛdūn snigdhāñ śabdān prayuṅkte. laukikī vivakṣā yatra prāyasya saṃpratyayaḥ. prāya iti loko vyapadiśyate.[70]

The desire to speak is twofold, that pertaining to the user (*prayoktrī*) [of language] [and] that pertaining to the linguistic community (*laukikī*). The desire to speak pertaining to the user is when an individual utters soft, slippery words with a soft, slippery and smooth tongue. A linguistic community's desire to speak refers to the understanding of the majority. The linguistic community (*loka*) is what is meant by the term 'majority'.

Like Patañjali, Moggallāna understands that *vivakṣā* is not a freelance principle but a restriction based on the linguistic usage of a community. Therefore, Moggallāna does not replace the automatic operations of the A's *kāraka* section with voluntary ones, but replaces them with the restrictions imposed by common convention. This reliance on the intentions of a linguistic community fundamentally questions the A's formalistic approach.

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67 Mogg-p-ṭ B[e] 108.

68 SCHARF 1995: 72.

69 KATRE 1987: 518. 'The *taddhita* affixes listed prior to below occur after a nominal stem ending in the first sUP triplet to denote "may possibly be (*syāt*)", "of it (*asya*)", or "in it (*asmin*)".'

70 MBh II 2.342.26-343.3.

How far Moggallāna's almost Pāṇinian interpretations of the CVV reflect actual discussions in commentaries on the CV is unclear. However, until the commentaries on the *Cāndra* tradition are edited, Moggallāna's grammatical insights may provide the first clues on the deeper workings of the *Cāndra* tradition's treatment of cases.

6. CONCLUSION

This article has compared the general principles underlying the treatment of case-endings in the Pāṇinian, *Cāndra*, and *Moggallāna* systems, to highlight the sophisticated and nuanced discussions of linguistic issues in the Pāli grammatical tradition. In doing so, I have shown that a group of 12th century Laṅkan grammarians, who certainly modelled their grammar exceptionally closely on the *Cāndra* tradition and its commentaries, have interpreted the treatment of cases in their own system in ways that are often quite different from the usual understanding of how *Cāndra* grammar operates.

In contrast to the almost unanimous opinion of scholars who have worked on the *Cāndra* treatment of cases, the *Moggallāna* grammatical tradition appears to support Verhagen's view that 'we find that the *kārakas* assume the exact same intermediate position allowing for bilateral mapping in (and from) both the semantic and morphological levels.'[71] In addition, the *Moggallāna* grammarians support Deshpande's criticisms of Joshi and Roodbergen's argument that '*vivakṣā*' is 'the wish of the speaker (to present items as he likes)'. Such interventions by Pāli gram-marians in pan-South Asian debates only reinforce the importance of Pāli *śāstra* as source for understanding South Asian intellectual history.

[71] VERHAGEN 2001: 292.

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Five

The Three Jewels and the Formation of the Pāñcarātra Canon[1]

Robert Leach

General introductions to the Pāñcarātra literature commonly emphasise the exalted status of the so-called "three jewels" of the tradition, namely the *Jayākhyasaṃhitā* (JS), the *Sātvatasaṃhitā* (SS), and the *Pauṣkarasaṃhitā* (PauṣS). However, despite its ubiquity in oral traditions and in the secondary Indological literature, the claim that these three works are supreme in the Pāñcarātra canon is itself contained in only four of the published Saṃhitās, namely the *Pārameśvarasaṃhitā* (PārS), the *Īśvarasaṃhitā* (ĪS), the *Śrīpraśnasaṃhitā* (ŚrīprśS), and a late, interpolated section of the JS entitled *Adhikaḥ Pāṭhaḥ*.[2] Further, only the latter among

[1] Many thanks to Giovanni Ciotti, Alastair Gornall and Paolo Visigalli.

[2] This is among as many as 35 published Saṃhitās. Parampurushdas and Shrutiprakashdas (2002) list 34 of these (I omit the *Agastyasaṃhitā*, which is included in their list, but which is certainly not a Pāñcarātra text, as has already been pointed out by Smith 1975: 3-4). More recently, the *Prakāśasaṃhitā* has been made available online by members of the now defunct Sanskrnet project.

these works actually refers to the JS, SS and PauṣS as the "three jewels" (*ratnatraya*). In this brief article, I aim to show that the idea of the supremacy of these three scriptures emerged in South India within a Pāñcarātra tradition known as the 'Āgamasiddhānta', and that the textual evidence suggests that it did not gain acceptance among non-Āgamasiddhānta Pāñcarātrikas until as late as the 14th century. The acceptance of the claim of the supremacy of these three works by non-Āgamasiddhānta Pāñcarātrikas, I will argue, was part of a broader process by which "canonical" systems from distinct Pāñcarātra traditions were brought together and subsumed into a single tradition.

The following will consist of three parts. In the first I will address the scriptural passages which contain reference to the supremacy of the JS, SS and PauṣS. In the second I will present an account of the distinct traditions within the South Indian Pāñcarātra. This, I hope, will help contextualise part three, where I will address the integration of these distinct traditions into a single Pāñcarātra "system".

1. The Three Jewels

The earliest of the four texts which claim the superiority of the JS, SS and PauṣS is most likely the PārS. Rastelli (2006: 54, 98) cautiously assigns the composition of this work to the period 1100-1300 CE, favouring the earlier half of this time frame on account of the social and political upheavals which affected Śrīraṅgam, the PārS' likely place of origin, during the 13th century. However, bearing in mind that the composition of the PārS very likely occurred after the career of Rāmānuja (Rastelli 2003), we may tentatively suppose that the majority of this work is attributable to the period c. 1175-1223 CE.[3] As far as we know the latter date marks the first significant disruption to Śrīraṅgam temple polity in the 13th century – namely, the invasion of Śrīraṅgam by the Oḍḍas, the army of the Eastern Gaṅga King Anaṅgabhīma III, who purportedly reinstated Vaikhānasa ritual

[3] The traditional date of Rāmānuja's death, 1137 CE, is now widely regarded – see Carman (1974: 27) and Young (2007: 236) – as 30 or 40 years too early.

practices at the Raṅganāthasvāmin temple throughout the two year period of their occupation (Spencer 1978).

In the PārS' opening *adhyāya* the SS, PauṣS and JS are listed together and are said to confer both liberation and "enjoyments" (*bhoga*). This is in contradistinction to the "first teaching", called here the "secret tradition" (*rahasyāmnāya*), which grants liberation only.[4] We are told elsewhere in the first chapter that the three Saṃhitās were revealed for the benefit of those who had, from the time of the *tretāyuga*, given up the "supreme *dharma*" (i.e. the secret tradition), which refers only to Vāsudeva, and replaced it with a "mixed *dharma*" (*miśradharma*), which refers to other deities and fulfils other desires (*kāma*).[5] In the present age these people "long again for that abode [of Vāsudeva]", and so the three Saṃhitās are revealed, which are accessible to members of each social class (*varṇa*), and which combine a concern with worldly enjoyments (*bhoga*) as contained in the "mixed *dharma*" with the Vāsudeva-oriented soteriology of the "supreme *dharma*".[6] Elsewhere in the PārS, this supreme *dharma* or "secret tradition" is variously called *mūlaveda* and *ekāyanaveda*.

The SS, PauṣS and JS are also mentioned together at PārS 10.376cd, this time in the context of a classification of Pāñcarātra scriptures into three distinct groups, namely the divine teachings (*divyaśāstra*), the teachings of sages (*munibhāṣitaśāstra*), and the teachings of men (*pauruṣaśāstra*).[7]

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[4] PārS 1.16c-19b: *śrutvaivaṃ prathamaṃ śāstraṃ rahasyāmnāyasaṃjñitam ‖ divyamantrakramopetaṃ mokṣaikaphalalakṣaṇam | bhūyaḥ saṃcoditāt tasmāt tena lokahitaiṣiṇā ‖ śrutaṃ vistarataḥ śāstraṃ bhogamokṣapradaṃ hi yat | anuṣṭupchandobaddhena proktaṃ bhagavatā svayam ‖ sātvataṃ pauṣkaraṃ caiva jayākhyety evamādikam |.*

[5] In other words, desires for "enjoyments" (*bhoga*) rather than for liberation. See PārS 1.75: *... tatas tretāyugādiṣu | vikāravedāḥ sarvatra devāntaragocarāḥ ‖*; 1.79: *tatas tretāyuge sarve nānākāmasamanvitāḥ | vyāmiśrayājino bhūtvā tyajyanty ādyaṃ sanātanam ‖*; and 1.87 (see next note). The "changed Vedas" (*vikāravedāḥ*) at 1.75c and the "mixed *dharma*" mentioned at 1.87b both refer to the actual Veda.

[6] In addition to the above verses, see especially PārS 1.87-89: *parityajya paraṃ dharmaṃ miśradharmam upeyuṣām | bhūyas tatpadakāṅkṣāṇāṃ śraddhābhaktī upeyuṣām ‖ anugrahārthaṃ varṇānāṃ yogyatāpādanāya ca | tathā janānāṃ sarveṣāṃ abhīṣṭaphalasiddhaye ‖ sātvatādīni śāstrāṇi bhogamokṣapradāni ca | upadiśya tu divyāni śāstrāṇi tadanantaram ‖*.

[7] For this classification see especially PārS 10.336-345, and the parallel verses at ĪS 1.54-63.

Although this classification is already present in the SS (22.52c-59b), which was known to the authors of the PārS, the theory that the SS, PauṣS and JS alone among Pāñcarātra scriptures represent the *direct* revelation of God (*divyaśāstra*) is, as far as we can tell, here expressed for the first time.[8]

Like the PārS, the ĪS is included in the canonical list of scriptures found in the *Pādmasaṃhitā* (PādS) (1.1.99-114), but the ĪS is certainly the later text, probably not composed before the late 13th or 14th century (Matsubara 1994: 28-31). Numerous passages in the first chapter of the ĪS, a short history of the "descent" or genealogy of the Pāñcarātra scriptures (*śāstrāvatāra*), contain material which is apparently drawn directly from the PārS.[9] The author refers to the three texts SS, PauṣS and JS again as the "divine" (*divya*) teachings, which are proclaimed by Hari in the *anuṣṭubh* metre, and are in accordance with the "original Veda" (*mūla-vedānusāreṇa*).[10] A few lines later the text partially repeats itself with a verse, the first part of which is the same as PārS 10.376c-377b:

> *sātvataṃ pauṣkaraṃ caiva jayākhyaṃ ca tathaiva ca* ‖ *evamādīni divyāni śāstrāṇi hariṇā svayam* | *mūlavedānusāreṇa proktāni hitakāntyayā* ‖.
>
> Such divine teachings as the Sātvata, Pauṣkara and Jayākhya were taught by [the Lord] Hari himself, in accordance with the original Veda, for the sake of the well-being of others. (ĪS 1.64c-65)

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[8] See PārS 10.376c-377b: *sātvataṃ pauṣkaraṃ caiva jayākhyaṃ ca tathaiva ca* ‖ *evamādīni śāstrāṇi divyānīty avadhāraya* |. It should be pointed out that Rastelli (2006: 111*ff*) offers a different reading of the passage containing these verses. My own reading is in agreement with that of Vedāntadeśika in his *Pāñcarātrarakṣā* (40.3-7).

[9] The parallel verses, containing a few minor changes, between the first chapter of the ĪS and the PārS are as follows: ĪS 1.1 ← PārS 1.1; ĪS 1.2cd ← PārS 1.3cd; ĪS 1.3ab ← PārS 1.4cd; ĪS 1.12ab ← PārS 1.25cd; ĪS 1.16ab ← PārS 1.32ab; ĪS 1.19 ← PārS 1.57c-58b; ĪS 1.20-21 ← PārS 1.33-34; ĪS 1.22c-28 ← PārS 1.74c-80; ĪS 1.29c-35b ← PārS 1.59-64; ĪS 1.36b-38a ← PārS 1.65b-67a; ĪS 1.39b-40c ← PārS 1.54c-56a; ĪS 1.41-42 ← PārS 1.72c-74b; ĪS 1.43 ← PārS 1.56c-57b; ĪS 1.45c-47a ← PārS 1.84c-86a; ĪS 1.48-49 ← PārS 1.87-88; ĪS 1.50ab ← PārS 1.91ab; ĪS 1.50cd ← PārS 1.19ab; ĪS 1.54-63 ← PārS 10.336-345; ĪS 1.64c-65a ← PārS 10.376c-377a; ĪS 1.70ab ← PārS 1.90cd.

[10] ĪS 1.50-51a: *mūlavedānusāreṇa chandasānuṣṭubhena ca* | *sātvataṃ pauṣkaraṃ caiva jayākhyety evamādikam* ‖ *divyaṃ sacchāstra jālaṃ*…|.

A 'Śrīpraśna' is also mentioned in the canonical list of the PādS but, like both the PārS and the ĪS, the ŚrīprśS is almost certainly later than the bulk of this text. The chronology proposed by Raghavan (1969) places it as roughly contemporary with the ĪS, with the ŚrīprśS likely to be the later of the two works. As with both the PārS and the ĪS, the ŚrīprśS contains a large amount of material drawn from other texts. It reproduces a significant number of verses verbatim from the Kriyāpāda section of the PādS, and also shares parallel verses with the SS and the ĪS. In a similar manner to the PārS and the ĪS, the ŚrīprśS refers to the SS, PauṣS and JS as the "divine" scriptures in a passage which contains strong echoes of PārS 1.77 and ĪS 1.25, and which also refers to an original Pāñcarātra *śāstra* or *mūlaveda*.[11]

Finally we turn to the interpolated section of the JS entitled *Adhikaḥ Pāṭhaḥ*. This "additional text" offers the most substantial account of the "three jewels" theory, as well as an interesting and unique interpretation as to how the three texts relate to one another. The narrator explains:

> *pañcarātrasya kṛtsnasya vaktā nārāyaṇaḥ svayam | iti sarvatra vikhyātaṃ bhagavac-chāstragauravam || sāttvataṃ pauṣkaraṃ caiva jayākhyaṃ tantram uttamam | ratnatrayam iti khyātaṃ tadviśeṣa ihocyate || sāraṃ sāttvataśāstrasya rahasyaṃ prājñasaṃvnatam | ratnatrayam idaṃ sākṣād bhagavadvaktraniḥsṛtam || pravartitaṃ tathaivedam anyūnānadhikatvataḥ | anyānyāni tu tantrāṇi bhagavanmukhanirgatam || sāraṃ samupajīvyaiva samāsavyāsadhāraṇaiḥ | vyākhyopabṛṃhaṇanyāyād vyāpitāni tathā tathā | vyākhyāmūlanayenaiṣāṃ gauravaṃ sampratiṣṭhitam |.*
>
> Nārāyaṇa himself is the proclaimer of the whole of the Pañcarātra. The venerability of the teaching of the Bhagavat is thus known everywhere. The Sāttvata, Pauṣkara and Jayākhya are [collectively] the highest Tantra, called the 'three jewels'. Its particularity is explained here. The essence of the Sāttvata *śāstra* is a secret that is honoured by sages. This triad of jewels has come forth directly from the mouth of the Bhagavat, so indeed this [triad] is established as neither de-

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[11] ŚrīprśS 49.471c-473: *jagannmūlaṃ vāsudevaṃ mukhyataḥ pratyapādayat || tac chāstraṃ mūlavedākhyam ity api procyate budhaiḥ | adhyetṛbhedam āśritya śāstram etat tridhā rame || sāttvataṃ pauṣkaraṃ caiva jayākhyaṃ ca bhaviṣyati | athaitāḥ saṃhitā divyāḥ vadiṣyanti vipaścitaḥ ||*. – 'The teaching is designated with the name *mūlaveda* by the learned because it primarily expounded upon Vāsudeva [who is] the root of the world. Owing to there being differences among students, I delight [in the fact that] this teaching will become threefold: Sāttvata, Pauṣkara and Jayākhya. Thus, the learned will say these Saṃhitās are divine.'

ficient nor excessive. After the tantras established themselves (*samupajīvya*) [out of] the essence emanating from the mouth of the Bhagavat, they supplemented (*vyāpitāni*, literally 'pervaded') one another with a commentary (or 'explanation', *vyākhyā*), [that is] based upon a principle of strengthening (*upabṛṃhaṇa*) [the 'root text'], and in such a way [these tantras can be characterised] by their possessing both brevity [i.e. in the form of the root text], and detail [in the form of the commentary]. Indeed the venerability of these [texts] is established on the grounds of [this combination of] commentary and root [text]. (JS *Adhikaḥ Pāthaḥ* 1-6b)

As far as I am aware, this is the only passage in any extant Pāñcarātra text in which the relationship between the "three jewels" is characterised in this way. As we have seen above, the PārS, ĪS and Śrīprś S all indicate the common origin of the JS, SS and PauṣS in their references to an "original Veda" (*mūlaveda*). That which distinguishes the above account, however, is the idea that the three texts remain interdependent even after they have emerged from the same source (here simply "essence", *sāra*), and that each of them supplements the other in the manner of root text and commentary. Rastelli (1999: 54) explains their relation in this context thus: "Jede Saṃhitā beinhaltet einen Teil der von Gott verkündeten Lehre, und zwar in der Weise, dass eine die andere ergänzt bzw. eine den Stoff ausführlicher erklärt, welcher in einer anderen nur kurz angerissen wird".[12] In other words, none of these texts can be fully understood except when read in tandem with the others, since the three taken together constitute a single teaching (*śāstra*). The narrator himself explains this a few lines later:

mūlavyākhyānarūpatvād upajīvyaṃ parasparam ‖ tantratrayam idaṃ vidyād eka-śāstraṃ tathā budhaḥ |.

Owing to the form of root [text] and commentary, the three Tantras are mutually supportive, so the learned should know that this [threefold Tantra] is a single *śāstra*. (JS *Adhikaḥ Pāṭhaḥ* 11c-12b)

The *Adhikaḥ Pāṭhaḥ* is also unique among the aforementioned Pāñcarātra works in that it is the only one which actually contains the term *ratnatraya*. The prevalence of this term in the secondary Indological

[12] 'Each Saṃhitā contains a part of God's teaching in such a way that one completes the other. Where one explains some material in detail, in the other it will be described only briefly.'

literature therefore far outweighs its presence in the Pāñcarātra scriptures themselves, where it occurs only in this late, interpolated section of the JS. In fact, to my knowledge, the only other extant Sanskrit text of this period which contains this term in reference to Pāñcarātra scriptures is the *Pāñcarātrarakṣā* (PRR) of Veṅkaṭanātha – hereafter referred to as 'Vedāntadeśika', the honorific by which he is now more commonly known. This author belonged, at that time, to the Śrīvaiṣṇava community at Śrīraṅgam. In the PRR, as elsewhere, the "renowned" (*prasiddha*) scriptures called the "three jewels" are characterised by their having come forth directly from the mouth of God.[13]

The *Adhikaḥ Pāṭhaḥ* and the PRR, the only two extant works which employ this term *ratnatraya* to describe Pāñcarātra scriptures, were in all likelihood both written during the 14th century, the former in Kāñcīpuram and the latter in Śrīraṅgam. The *Adhikaḥ Pāṭhaḥ* was written, at least partly, to eulogise the Varadarājasvāmin temple in Kāñcī (referred to as *Hastiśaila* throughout). The general date of its composition is provided by Rajan (1981: 27), whose 14th century estimate is based on the correlation of architectural descriptions contained in the text with historical data concerning the construction of the temple building. Meanwhile, although the PRR is likely to have been written during its author's first stint as an *ācārya* at Śrīraṅgam,[14] Vedāntadeśika (whose traditional dates are 1268-1369) did spend his formative years in Kāñcīpuram, and his writings exerted considerable influence in this city during his lifetime as well as after his death (Raman 1975: 70*ff*, Hopkins 2002).[15] It is not therefore wholly implausible to suggest that the author of the *Adhikaḥ Pāṭhaḥ* might have been familiar with the PRR.[16] At any rate, if Rajan is correct in identi-

[13] PRR 47.6-7: *yathoktaṃ sākṣād bhagavanmukhodgatatayā ratnatrayam iti prasiddheṣu jayākhyasāttvatapauṣkareṣu...*

[14] In other words, during the period before the second sack of Śrīraṅgam by Muslim forces, in 1323. See Singh (1958: 100), and Hari Rao (1976: 116-117).

[15] Vedāntadeśika wrote a *stotra*, the *Varadarājapañcāśat*, in praise of Lord Varadarāja at Kāñcī, and was intimately connected with this temple in his early years.

[16] Of course this does not enable us to conclude that the author of the *Adhikaḥ Pāṭhaḥ* directly borrowed from the PRR, for (an)other text/s no longer available to us may also have characterised the JS, SS and PauṣS as *ratnatraya*. However, the influence of the teachings of *Viśiṣṭādvaitavedānta* are clearly discernible in the *Adhikaḥ Pāṭhaḥ* (see, for example, JS *ap* 109), and Vedāntadeśika was a very important figure in that *milieu*

fying the gateway (*gopura*) described in the *Adhikaḥ Pāṭhaḥ* with one added to the Varadarājasvāmin temple during the Vijayanagar period, it is fairly safe to assume that this interpolated section of the JS was composed during the second half of the 14th century, during the 1360s at the very earliest,[17] and is therefore almost certainly later than the PRR.

This would mean of course that the composition of the *Adhikaḥ Pāṭhaḥ* was also subsequent to that of the PārS and the ĪS. That the *Adhikaḥ Pāṭhaḥ* contains the claim that these two texts serve to elucidate, respectively, the PauṣS and the SS, further bears witness to its later composition. The author of the *Adhikaḥ Pāṭhaḥ* tells us:

> *tantre 'py aṣṭottaraśate pārameśvarasaṃhitā ‖ pauṣkarārthavivṛtyarthā vyākhyā-rūpā 'vatāritā | sāttvatasya vivṛtyartham īśvaraṃ tantram uttamam ‖ jayākhyasyāsya tantrasya vyākhyānaṃ pādmam ucyate |.*
>
> Also, among the 108 tantras, the *Pārameśvarasaṃhitā* was transmitted (*avatāritā*, literally 'brought down') in the form of a commentary (*vyākhyā*), [whose] purpose is the explanation of the meaning of the Pauṣkara [Saṃhitā]. The Īśvara [Saṃhitā] is the highest tantra [whose] purpose is the explanation of the Sāttvata [Saṃhitā]. The commentary on the Jayākhya Tantra is called the Pādma [Saṃhitā]. (JS *Adhikaḥ Pāṭhaḥ* 6c-8b)

Whilst the PārS (1.90-92b) and the ĪS (1.69c-71a) themselves claim association with, respectively, the PauṣS and the SS, the *Pādmasaṃhitā* (PādS) does not link itself to the JS in the manner described above. Indeed, it is tempting to conclude that this single verse in the *Adhikaḥ Pāṭhaḥ* has provided the basis for the claim, which has been perpetuated in a number of modern exegetical and scholarly works, that the PādS is "based on" or "derived from" the JS. This explanation appeals because although the first section of the PādS appears to have incorporated several passages from the

during this period.

[17] According to K.V. Raman (1975: 26) Kāñcī did not come under Vijayanagar dominance until the 1360s. The outer, western *gopura* of the Varadarājasvāmin temple (i.e. that which Rajan identifies as being described in the *Adhikaḥ Pāṭhaḥ*) is likely to have been built following Vijayanagar leader Kumāra Kampana's arrival in the city, sometime during, or shortly after, 1361. The earliest dateable inscription found on the plinth portion of the *gopura* belongs to Kampana and is dated 1374. On this see Raman (ibid: 54).

fourth chapter of the JS (Rastelli 1999a), in general the PādS owes little to the earlier work, and contains a wealth of information, especially on the subject of the construction of temples, which is wholly absent from the JS. It is indicative, indeed, that the JS' 20th *paṭala*, wherein the majority of this work's architectural detail is to be found, shares no significant data with the PādS, and describes a style of temple which is not referred to by the latter (see Rajan 1981). It is worth mentioning, in addition, that the status of the PādS as a "commentary" on the JS does not appear to have been accepted always by the traditions which have inherited and used these texts. For example, the 19th century Śrīvaiṣṇava author Alaśiṅgabhaṭṭa writes in his commentary on the ĪS, the *Sātvatārthaprakāśikā* (SĀP), that in fact it is the *Lakṣmītantra* (LT) that is the commentary (*vṛtti*) on the JS, and that the PādS is only consulted by the priests of the Hastiśailanātha (i.e. Vāradarājasvāmin) temple on those subjects (specifically "festivals etc.") which the LT does not cover.[18]

In the context of the *ratnatraya* the PādS is important for its presentation of an alternative scriptural hierarchy, not found elsewhere in the extant literature. At the very end of this long text, we encounter the claim that there are "five jewels", and these do not include the JS, SS or PauṣS:

> *tantrāṇāṃ caiva ratnāni pañcāhuḥ paramarṣayaḥ | pādmaṃ sanatkumāraṃ ca tathā paramasaṃhitā ‖ padmodbhavaṃ ca māhendraṃ kaṇva tantrāmṛtāni ca |.*
>
> Eminent sages name five jewels among the tantras: Pādma, Sanatkumāra, Paramasaṃhitā, Padmodbhava and Māhendra are the immortal tantras O Kaṇva. (PādS 4.33.204-205b)

We are faced here, at least ostensibly, with a somewhat puzzling situation. Whilst the author of the *Adhikaḥ Pāṭhaḥ* tells us that the PādS is a commentary on the JS, and is in use in the same temple in Kāñcīpuram as that text,[19] the PādS itself does not include the JS in its list of "five jewels", those scriptures which, we can presumably infer, the author of the above

[18] SāPr on ĪS 1.64-67: *idaṃ sātvatapauṣkarajayākhyatantratrayam… īśvarapārameśvara-lakṣmītantrākhyatantratrayaṃ krameṇa teṣāṃ vṛttirūpam | tatreśvarapārameśvarayor utsavādīnāṃ pauṣkalyam asti | lakṣmītantre tu tan nāsti | ataḥ 'anuktam anyato grāhyam' ity uktarītyā hastiśailanāthārcakaiḥ padmoktānām utsavādyācārāṇāṃ parigrahaḥ kṛta iti… |.*

passage considered superior within his tradition. Leaving aside for the moment the question of why the author of the *Adhikaḥ Pāṭhaḥ* might have made this claim on behalf of the PādS (I will discuss this question below), we must first attempt to explain why the JS is not included in this list.

There are, on the face of it, at least two possible explanations for its omission. The first is simply that the composition of this portion of the PādS was complete before the idea of the supremacy of the JS, SS and PauṣS became current.[20] Given that it appears quite probable that the PārS (the earliest extant text to list the JS, SS and PauṣS as the "divine" scriptures) incorporated passages from the PādS and is therefore later than the bulk of that text (Rastelli 2006: 58-59), it is certainly a possibility that the composition of this section of the PādS predated the idea of the superiority of the three aforementioned scriptures. However, we can be certain that the PādS' list of canonical scriptures (at 1.1.99-114) was added to the main body of the text at a much later date (as can be inferred from the inclusion within the list of demonstrably later works such as the ĪS and the ŚrīprśS), and this shows that additions were still being made to the PādS at a time when the theory of the supremacy of the JS, SS and PauṣS was already quite well established. Indeed, the fact that its list of "five jewels" occurs at the very end of the PādS might well suggest that this passage is itself a later addition.

The second possible explanation is that the author of the passage in question in the PādS belonged to a tradition within the Pāñcarātra which did not at that time accept the supremacy of the JS, SS and PauṣS. It is to the distinct traditions within the Pāñcarātra to which I shall now turn.

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[19] On the JS' and the PādS' association with Kāñcī see JS *ap* 13-14b: *hastiśaile jayākhyaṃ ca sāmrājyam adhitiṣṭhati | pādmatantraṃ hastiśaile… ‖ … kāryakāri pracāryate |*. On the JS' association with Kāñcī at the time of the composition of the ĪS, see ĪS 1.67.

[20] As is the case with much of the anonymous Pāñcarātra literature, the PādS is certainly not a homogeneous, singly authored work, and so it is difficult to establish its date. Rastelli (2003) claims that its date can be determined only in relation to other Saṃhitās, and places the bulk of its composition between that of the *Paramasaṃhitā* (ParS), from which it borrows, and that of the PārS. Her suggestion that it is subsequent to the *Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā* as well as to the lifetime of Rāmānuja would most likely place it towards the end of the 12th century, or shortly thereafter.

2. Divisions within the Pāñcarātra

The PādS is one of several Saṃhitās which divide the Pāñcarātra tradition into four separate traditions or 'Siddhāntas'. The other scriptural works which enumerate four Pāñcarātra Siddhāntas are the PauṣS (38.293-307b), the PārS (19.522-544), the ĪS (21.560-586), the ŚrīprśS (16.31c-35b), the *Bhārgavatantra* (BhT) (22.87-94b) and, according to Vedāntadeśika, the *Hayagrīvasaṃhitā* (PRR 8.5-8), the *Kālottara* (PRR 31.14-18), and the *Śrīkarasaṃhitā* (PRR 30.18*ff*).[21] PādS 1.1.80-82 names the four Siddhāntas as 'Mantra', 'Āgama', 'Tantra', and 'Tantrāntara'. At 1.1.86cd, the PādS claims that it belongs to the Mantrasiddhānta. This Siddhānta, the PādS tells us elsewhere (4.19.115d), is "foremost" (*agrimam*). Mantrasiddhāntins primarily worship a single form of god (*ekamūrti*, 1.1.80ab), which we are told (at 4.21.25c) is Vāsudeva.[22] The PādS asserts (4.21.28c-29) that

[21] Smith (1975: 296) convincingly suggests that the passage in the PauṣS which deals with the Siddhāntas is part of a later interpolation. Rastelli (2006: 190-191) suggests that we can assign its composition and inclusion within the PauṣS to a period prior to the composition of the PārS. The *Hayagrīvasaṃhitā*, quoted by Vedāntadeśika, is another name for the *Hayaśīrṣapañcarātra* (HP) (on this equivalence see e.g. Schrader (1916: 11) and Gonda (1977: 106)). This work, which is not available to me, appears to have its origins in North India, and several scholars (e.g. Rajan 1981: 34) favour an early date, perhaps as early as the 9th or 10th century. Since there is no mention of the four Pāñcarātra Siddhāntas in any other works dating from this period, or indeed from quite a lengthy period subsequent to this, we can suppose that this passage was also probably part of a later interpolation into the HP. The *Kālottara* referred to by Vedāntadeśika is listed by Parampushdas and Shrutiprakashdas (2002: 83), under "Unpublished Saṃhitās", as the '(Śrī) Kālottara-Saṃhitā'. Such a title does not appear in any "canonical" list given in a Saṃhitā. Each of the works listed above gives the same names to the four Pāñcarātra Siddhāntas with the exceptions of the PauṣS (32.35b, 38.293c-294c) which calls what is elsewhere known as 'Āgamasiddhānta' simply 'Siddhānta' and, according to Vedāntadeśika, the *Śrīkarasaṃhitā*. This latter work refers to the four Siddhāntas as the 'Vedasiddhānta', the 'Divyasiddhānta', the 'Tantrasiddhānta', and the 'Purāṇasiddhānta'. As far as I am aware, such a classification is not found in any other extant work. A *Śrīkara* is listed in the PādS (1.1.102b), the *Viśvāmitrasaṃhitā* (2.18d *and* 24c), and, according to Schrader (1916: 11), the *Viṣṇutantra*.

[22] As Rastelli (2006: 224-225) shows, according to PārS 19.529-539 the Mantrasiddhāntins do not always worship god as a "single form", they also worship him in his *vyūha* and *vibhava* forms. This is merely one example of conflicting

Mantrasiddhāntins should "visualise" (*dhyāyeyuḥ*) and worship Vāsudeva's image with Vedic mantras (*trayīmantra*). The Vedic origin of the Mantrasiddhānta is described at PādS 4.21.2*ff.* Here we are told that a group of 8000 *ṛṣi*s, led by Aupagāyana and belonging to the Kāṇva and Mādhyandina *śākhā*s (i.e. of the Vājasaneyin recension) asked Brahmā for a means to liberation (*mokṣopāya*), and in response Brahmā, "desiring to grant favours" (*anugrahakāmyayā*), initiated these *ṛṣi*s into the Pañcarātra "by way of the Mantrasiddhānta" (7c-8). Having been initiated into the *cakravārijamaṇḍala* (also known as the *cakrābjamaṇḍala*), the *ṛṣi*s are instructed to study the Kāṇvī and Mādhyandanī *śākhā*s, and to accompany the performance of Vedic rituals such as *somayāga* with visualisation (*dhyāna*) and worship of the Lord (*bhagavat*) (10c-11b).

The author of the PādS then tells us that Mantrasiddhāntins are those who are born into the lineage (*vaṃśa*) of Bhagavat worshippers founded by these original Vājasaneyin *ṛṣi*s, and that it is for this reason that they are called 'Bhāgavatas'. Once these Bhāgavatas have themselves been properly initiated, they are also qualified to perform the ritual worship of Viṣṇu in accordance with the "five times".[23] It is further stated (at 4.21.17c-21b) that only Bhāgavatas can perform worship for the sake of others (*parārthayajana*), though this rule is then immediately revised to enable an initiated non-Bhāgavata to do so if commanded by a Bhāgavata.[24]

This account of the Mantrasiddhānta is followed by a description of the Āgamasiddhānta. We have been told previously (1.1.80cd, 4.19.116-117) that members of this Siddhānta favour worshipping the four forms (*caturmūrti*) of god, namely the *vyūha*s Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. The author of this section of the PādS clearly regards the Āgamasiddhānta as an inferior tradition, and its inferiority is conveyed by the fact that its members do not undergo *dīkṣā* (see PādS 4.1.3-5b, 21.53),[25]

("internal"/"external") descriptions across texts which belong to different Siddhāntas.

[23] PādS 4.21.14-15: *yūyaṃ bhāgavatās tena jātā bhagavadarcanāt | bhagavadbhaktikaraṇād vaṃśajātāś caturmukha || nāmnā bhāgavatāḥ santo dīkṣayitvā yathāvidhi | yathoktaṃ karma kurvāṇāḥ prāpnuvanti paraṃ padam ||*.

[24] This immediate revision possibly indicates that the second, more moderate "rule" was incorporated into the text at a later time.

[25] The PārS, which does not describe the initiation rite, also appears to confirm (at e.g. 9.187-190, 13.114c-115, 15.14c-20, 18.116-117) that Āgamasiddhāntins do not undergo

and are therefore not qualified to perform certain rites (PādS 4.21.33-35b, 43-46, 53). Both passages that discuss the omission of *dīkṣā* refer to an 'Ekāyana'; in the first instance to *ekāyanaṃ vedam* (4.1.3c), and in the second instance to *ekāyanādhvan* (4.21.53d). This 'Ekāyanaveda' or "way of the Ekāyana" is the ritual teaching to which members of the Āgama-siddhānta adhere.[26] According to the PādS, the Pāñcarātrika 'Ekāyana' (this designation is shown to be synonymous with 'Āgamasiddhāntin' at 4.21.47ab), in contrast to the Mantrasiddhāntin is not permitted to use Vedic mantras, and recites the *dvādaśākṣara* mantra without the elements "seed" (*bīja*), "power" (*śakti*), "limb" (*aṅga*), "seer" (*ṛṣi*) and "metre" (*chandas*).[27] Further manifestly "non-Vedic" characteristics of this Siddhānta include the fact that its followers have no *gotra* (4.21.41ab), and that its "leading rite" or "rite of guidance" (*nayakarma*) is enjoined for all four *varṇas*, rather than only for the highest three (4.21.36c-37b).[28]

Among the Pāñcarātra scriptures which contain, or are said to contain, a hierarchical description of the Siddhānta divisions, only the PādS, the BhT (whose account appears to be based on that of the PādS),[29] and the ŚrīprśS give the highest status to the Mantrasiddhānta.[30] The PauṣS, the PārS, the ĪS

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dīkṣā. This information is taken from Rastelli (2006: 193-195).

26 PādS 4.21.36cd refers to *ekādhvan* as the tradition according to which the *saṃskāras* are performed in the Āgamasiddhānta. It seems reasonable, in light of line 53cd referred to above, to take this as a synonym for *ekāyanādhvan*. At PādS 4.21.47ab it is stated: *ekāyanaś caturmūrtiṃ pratigṛhya samarcayet* |. – 'The Ekāyana should worship having accepted the fourfold form.'

27 PādS 4.21.37c-39b. These elements are explained at PādS 4.27.216c-219. As Hanneder (1997) and Rastelli (2006) have shown, these last two elements serve to make Tantric mantras seem more Vedic. The Mantrasiddhānta as presented in the PādS incorporate these elements, whereas the Āgamasiddhānta does not. Rastelli (2006: 208) writes, "Es paßt sehr gut zu der PādS, deren Anhänger sich selbst auf vedisch-orthodoxe Traditionen zurückführen und die ihr Ritual als viṣṇuitische Modifikation des vedisch-orthodoxen Rituals betrachten" ('This fits very well with the PādS, whose followers trace themselves back to the Vedic-orthodox traditions and who regard their rituals as Vaiṣṇava modifications of Vedic-orthodox rituals').

28 See the discussion of this verse in Rastelli (2006: 196-197).

29 See BhT 22.87-93b, and BhT 24.19-20 (←- PādS 4.21.36, 37cd, 38ab), BhT 24.25-27b (←- PādS 4.21.53-54b, 38c-39b).

30 See e.g. ŚrīprśS 16.32-34b: *tantrāntare tv āgame ca siddhānte tantrasaṃjñike | teṣu pūjāpravṛttānāṃ dīkṣā nirbījasaṃjñikā || anyeṣāṃ dīkṣākaraṇe teṣām anadhikāritā | ato*

and, according to Vedāntadeśika, the HP and the *Kālottara* each name the Āgamasiddhānta at the top of the Siddhānta hierarchy.[31] Moreover, portions of these works, and sections of others which we must assume were authored by Āgamasiddhāntins, explicitly contradict several of the aforementioned descriptions of the Āgamasiddhānta which we find in the Mantrasiddhāntin PādS. Thus, for example, according to the PārS (1.67c-71), the Ekāyana-veda prescribes sacrifices such as the *aśvamedha*, and it contains all Vedic mantras, as well as teaching the *dvādaśākṣara* mantra (10.139). The SS (24.333, 25.53-54b, 95c-96b, 113d-115b, 253-257b etc.) and the PauṣS (42.145c-147b, 180) also prescribe the recitation of Vedic mantras for Ekāyanas. Likewise, the PādS' claim (at 4.21.43-46) that Ekāyanas are not qualified to perform the rites related to the construction of temples and the installation (*pratiṣṭhā*) of divine images therein, is contradicted by the SS (24.282-25.294) and the PauṣS (42.1-202b), and in passages borrowed from these works by the authors of the ĪS (e.g. 16.139c-287) and the PārS (e.g 15.14c-20).[32]

nirbīja ity uktā vidvadbhiḥ kamalekṣaṇe ‖ *sabījaṃ mantrasiddhāntadīkṣākramam udīryate* ‖. – 'For those engaged in worship according to the Tantrāntara, the Āgama and the Siddhānta called Tantra, the initiation is called 'without seed'. For them there is no entitlement to perform the initiation of others. Thus it is called 'without seed' by the learned, O lotus-eyed. [Conversely] the method of initiation in the Mantrasiddhānta is called 'with seed".

[31] The verses attributed to the HP or, as Vedāntadeśika names it, the '*Hayagrīvasaṃhitā*' in the PRR (8.5-8) read: *āgamākhyaṃ hi siddhāntaṃ sanmokṣaikaphalapradam* | *mantrasaṃjñaṃ hi siddhāntaṃ siddhimokṣapradaṃ nṛṇām* ‖ *tantrasaṃjñaṃ tu siddhāntaṃ caturvargaphalapradam* | *tantrāntaraṃ hi siddhāntaṃ vāñchitārtha-phalapradam* ‖. – 'The Siddhānta named Āgama grants liberation as its only fruit. The Siddhānta called Mantra grants to people liberation and magical powers (*siddhi*). The Siddhānta called Tantra grants the 'group of four' (i.e. the *puruṣārthas*) as its fruit. The Tantrāntara Siddhānta grants as its fruit the desired goal.' Vedāntadeśika (PRR 8.9) explains that the "desired goal" here indicates liberation (*apavarga*). The verses attributed to the *Kālottara* in the PRR (31.14-18) read: *anekabhedabhinnaṃ ca pañca-rātrākhyam āgamam* | *pūrvam āgamasiddhāntaṃ mantrākhyaṃ tadanantaram* ‖ *tantraṃ tantrāntaraṃ ceti caturdhā parikīrtitam* ‖. – 'The tradition named Pañcarātra is split into various divisions. The first is the Āgama, and after that there is the one called Mantra, the Tantra, and the Tantrāntara. Thus it is said to be fourfold'.

[32] For reasons which will have to await publication elsewhere, I am confident that SS 24.282-25.294, and possibly these two chapters as a whole, and the 42nd chapter of the PauṣS are later additions to these texts. The same can be said for JS 20.265-270, which

The fact that "internal" descriptions of the Āgamasiddhānta conflict with "external" descriptions of the same should not surprise us. For the textual evidence points to a climate of intra-Pāñcarātrika sectarianism in South India during the early centuries of the second millennium. Rastelli (2006: 186-187) draws attention to the fact that the warnings against "mixing" Siddhāntas which are found in the 19th *adhyāya*s of both the PādS' Caryāpāda and the PārS are contained within sections of these texts which deal primarily with the rites of "reparation" (*prāyaścitta*). Given that such rites are also prescribed, for instance, in the event of a *tantrasāṅkarya* i.e a "mixing" of *systems*, whether it be Vaikhānasa or Pāśupata (PārS 19.520, 549), the term "sectarianism" does not seem too out of place in a discussion of the Pāñcarātra Siddhāntas of this period. Indeed, the PādS (4.19.125c*ff*) explicitly states the equivalence between a *siddhāntasaṅkara* and a *tantra-saṅkara*.

The type of Pāñcarātrika who adheres to the Mantrasiddhānta is commonly referred to as a "mixed sacrificer" (*vyāmiśrayājin*) by Āgama-siddhāntin or Ekāyana authors who considered such worshippers to be inferior.[33] A good example of this typically sectarian attitude can be found in the PauṣS:

jñātvaivaṃ bhaktisāṅkaryaṃ na kuryād evam eva hi ‖ varjanīyaṃ prayatnena ya icched uttamāṃ gatim ‖viprā ekāyanākhyā ye te bhaktās tattvato 'cyute ‖ ekāntinaḥ sutattvasthā dehāntān nānyayājinaḥ | kartavyatvena ye viṣṇuṃ saṃyajanti phalaṃ vinā ‖ prāpnuvanti ca dehānte vāsudevatvam abjaja ‖vyāmiśrayājinaś cānye bhaktābhāsās tu te smṛtāḥ ‖ parijñeyās tu te viprā nānāmārgagaṇārcanāt |.

Knowing thus [i.e. that Puruṣottama is the 'inner ruler' (*antaryāmin*) of all gods], one should never perform mixed devotion. Indeed one who desires the supreme goal should avoid [that] with every effort. Those Brāhmaṇas that are called Ekāyanas are truly devotees of Acyuta. They who worship Viṣṇu as a duty [that is] without (worldly) fruit, worshipping no other [god], are Ekāntins who [will] exist in their true state after death. [In other words] at death they attain the state of Vāsudeva, O Lotus-born! And the others are mixed worshippers – they are considered to be devotees in appearance only. Those Brāhmaṇas are [easily]

contains a reference to mantras of the *ekāyanīyaśākhā*.

[33] The designation "mixed sacrificer" (*vyāmiśrayājin*) does not only refer to Mantra-siddhāntins. In the PārS, for instance, it is used more generally to denote *all* followers of the "mixed dharma" (*miśradharma*), which is the PārS' name for the Vedas.

recognised on account of their worshipping a multitude of inferior gods in various different ways. (PauṣS 36.259c-263b)

The division between the Āgamasiddhāntins or Ekāyanas and the "mixed worshippers" or the Mantrasiddhāntins appears to have been the most significant schism within the South Indian Pāñcarātra in the early centuries of the second millennium. The BhT (24.17-18) characterises these groups as, respectively, the "pure" (*śuddha*) and the "mixed" (*miśra*) Vaiṣṇavas.[34] Perhaps the most telling distinction between these traditions is the manner in which they position themselves with regard to the Veda. For while the Ekāyanas declare that the Ekāyanaveda is *superior* to the Veda, the Mantrasiddhāntins claim that their texts are "based on the Veda" (*vedamūlatā*). One of the earliest clear expressions of this idea within the scriptural corpus appears to be the declaration, found in both the PādS (1.1.91cd) and the *Viṣvaksenasaṃhitā* (8.5ab), that it is "rooted in *śruti*, and an authority like the Kalpasūtras" (*śrutimūlam idaṃ tantraṃ pramāṇaṃ kalpasūtravat*). The same verse is found in the later *Mārkaṇḍeyasaṃhitā* (1.38ab) as well as the *Śrīpuruṣottamasaṃhitā* (1.26cd).

Representatives of these two Pāñcarātra traditions are contrasted with each other already in Yāmuna's *Āgamaprāmāṇya* (ĀP) (169-171) and, as we have seen above, both traditions produced scriptural works which glorify their own tradition and undermine the other. Conversely, no extant work, as far as I am aware, identifies itself with the Tantra or Tantrāntara Siddhāntas.[35] In the following section I will show that this climate of sectarianism was succeeded by one of inclusivism and integration. A clear

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[34] The "mixed" Vaiṣṇavas, who are described as *traividya*, are here associated with the *aṣṭākṣara* mantra, and the "pure" Vaiṣṇavas, who follow the Ekāyanaveda, with the *dvādaśākṣara* mantra. Colas (1990: 26) reports that the Vaikhānasa work *Kriyādhikāra* also divides the Pāñcarātra into *miśra* and *śuddha* sub-groups and that, according to the *Yajñādhikāra*, the latter has no *vedamaryādā*.

[35] However, according to Vedāntadeśika (PRR 30.18*ff*) the *Śrīkarasaṃhitā* associates *itself* with the 'Purāṇasiddhānta'. The PRR (31.1-2) quotes this text thus: *etat purāṇasiddhāntaṃ śrīkaraṃ ca viśeṣataḥ | idaṃ śrīkarasaṃjñākhyaṃ bhogamokṣa-phalapradam ‖*. Vedāntadeśika (PRR 30.21-22 and 31.5-6) asserts that the name 'Purāṇasiddhānta' designates the 'Tantrāntarasiddhānta', and argues that it is precisely the Tantrāntarasiddhānta that is denoted by the particle *ca* in the above verse.

demonstration of this pattern can be found by looking through the prism of the idea of the superiority of the JS, SS and PauṣS.

3. The Formation of the Pāñcarātra Canon

As we have seen, three of the four Pāñcarātra scriptures which claim the superiority of the JS, SS and PauṣS also mention a "root-Veda" or an "original Veda" (*mūlaveda*) within the same context. In each instance, this "original Veda" designates the so-called 'Ekāyanaveda',[36] thus linking these passages, and therefore presumably the "three jewels doctrine" itself, with the Pāñcarātra tradition that is referred to in the PādS and the PārS as the 'Āgamasiddhānta'.[37] However, whilst the PārS and the majority of the ĪS are undoubtedly authored by Āgamasiddhāntins, the third work which associates the "three jewels doctrine" with the Ekāyanaveda, namely the ŚrīprśS, is almost certainly primarily a work of the Mantrasiddhānta. This is evident not only from the fact that substantial portions of this text borrow from or are based upon the PādS, as Padmanabhan (1969) has shown, but also from its frequent use of Vedic mantras[38] allied to its claim (at 16.34c-35b) that among the four Siddhāntas it is only members of the Mantrasiddhānta who are entitled to use Vedic mantras alongside those belonging to the Ekāyana. How, then, are we to interpret the inclusion of these 'Ekāyana' passages in the ŚrīprśS?

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[36] See especially PārS 1.32c-33b: *ity uktvādhyāpayāmāsa vedaṃ ekāyanābhidaṃ ‖ mūlabhūtas tu mahato vedavṛkṣasya yo mahān |*. – "Having spoken thus, he taught the Veda called Ekāyana, which is the main root of the great Veda-tree"; ĪS 1.19-20b (← PārS 1.57c-58b, 1.33ab); ĪS 1.24ab (← PārS 1.76ab): *mahato vedavṛkṣasya mūlabhūto mahān ayam |*. – 'This [Ekāyanaveda] is the main root of the great Veda-tree'; ŚrīprśS 2.38ab: *vedaṃ ekāyanaṃ nāma vedānāṃ śirasi sthitaṃ |*. – 'The Veda named Ekāyana is situated at the head of the Vedas'.

[37] I have referred to the claim that the SS, PauṣS and JS are the superior Pāñcarātra scriptures as the "three jewels doctrine" for ease of exposition, though it should not obscure the fact that these texts are not referred to as the "three jewels" in any extant Āgamasiddhānta source.

[38] These are listed by Padmanabhan (1969) in the appendix to the ŚrīprśS.

In the 16th chapter of the ŚrīprśS, the term 'Ekāyanaveda' is used to refer to the Pāñcarātra teaching in general. The verse in question reads as follows:

> *yathaiva karmakāṇḍeṣu dīkṣoktā yāgasiddhaye | tathaivaikāyane vede pūjāyāgādi-siddhaye ||.*
>
> Just as initiation (*dīkṣā*) is spoken of [as necessary] for the performance of sacrifice in the ritual portions (*karmakāṇḍa*) [of the Veda], so too [it is spoken of as necessary] for the performance of worship (*pūjā*) and sacrifice etc. in the Ekāyanaveda. (ŚrīprśS 16.20)

This verse provides the second instance in the ŚrīprśS (after 2.26-46b) wherein an association is drawn between followers of the 'Ekāyanaveda' and the rite of initiation (*dīkṣā*). Earlier works such as the PādS (4.21.51-53) and the PārS (13.114c-115) indicate, contrarily, that followers of the Ekāyanaveda do *not* undergo *dīkṣā*.[39] Of course, the passages from these works which address this issue do not use the designation 'Ekāyana' as a name for the Pāñcarātra in general, as is the case in the 16th chapter of the ŚrīprśS. The fact that the above verse (ŚrīprśS 16.20) occurs in a passage which identifies the ŚrīprśS with the Mantrasiddhānta (see especially 16.31c-35b), means that this is quite a clear example of a Mantrasiddhāntin incorporating the idea of the Ekāyanaveda into his own tradition's self-understanding. The same process also appears to be at work at ŚrīprśS 49.471c-473, which incorporates the apparently Āgamasiddhāntin claim regarding the superiority of the JS, SS and PauṣS. Although we cannot be sure of the "sectarian" identity of the author of this passage, it is quite clear that these verses are borrowed from an Āgamasiddhānta source. This is evident not only from the fact that, as mentioned previously, they strongly echo PārS 1.77 and ĪS 1.25, but also from the fact that the section of the

[39] A further clue, albeit one from outside the South Indian context, that the Ekāyana was recognised as a tradition or "lineage" which one is born into (rather than one that is joined through initiation) is provided by the Kashmirian Vāmanadatta, author of the so-called *Saṃvitprakāśa*. For in the closing verses of each *prakaraṇa* of this work (1.137c-138b, 2.61, 3.60, 4.98, and 5.52), Vāmanadatta claims that he is a Brahmin born into the Ekāyana.

ŚrīprśS in which they are found is replete with borrowings from Āgama-siddhānta sources.[40]

Why should the ŚrīprśS, a work which seems to have been authored byMantrasiddhāntins, incorporate these passages extolling the Ekāyana-veda? It appears that by the time of the composition of this work, the idea of the Ekāyanaveda had, in certain contexts, acquired an authoritative status among non-Āgamasiddhāntin Pāñcarātrikas. Already in Yāmuna's ĀP we encounter an example of a non-Āgamasiddhāntin (i.e. Yāmuna himself) accepting the validity of the Ekāyanaveda (or the 'Ekāyanaśruti'), and it should be noted that Vedāntadeśika, whose PRR may well predate the ŚrīprśS, followed Yāmuna in this respect.[41] Turning to the scriptural literature, this pattern is also evident in a section of the PādS which addresses the various *pañcakāla* observances incumbent upon the Pāñca-rātrika initiate. In the passage (PādS 4.13.66c-72b) which deals with the study of texts (*svādhyāya*), the initiate is instructed to study, alongside the various recensions of the three Vedas, the "original recension based on the Ekāyana" (*mūlaśākhām ekāyanasamāśrayām*). Although, again, the "sectarian" identity of the author of this passage is not absolutely clear,[42] his allegiance to the three Vedas and the respectful reference, for example, to "experts in the six limbs [of the Veda]" most probably indicates a non-Āgamasiddhānta background.[43] Certainly the remainder of this chapter

[40] See for example: ŚrīprśS 49.446cd ↔ ĪS 19.103ab; ŚrīprśS 49.448cd ↔ ĪS 19.93ab; ŚrīprśS 49.454abc ↔ ĪS 19.100c-101a; ŚrīprśS 49.457a ↔ ĪS 19.104c; ŚrīprśS 49.464-466a ↔ PārS 19.496-498a → ĪS 19.117c-119c; ŚrīprśS 49.475-476b ↔ PārS 15.928c-929 → ĪS 19.67-68b; ŚrīprśS 49.476c-479b ↔ PārS 19.545-547 → ĪS 21.582c-584; ŚrīprśS 49.481-483b ↔ PārS 10.329-331b → ĪS 23.45c-47; ŚrīprśS 49.486abc ↔ ĪS 19.121abc; ŚrīprśS 49.487a ↔ ĪS 19.123a. It is possible, of course, that the ŚrīprśS borrowed these verses from another work. It should also be noted that close variants of PārS 19.545-548b and 10.329-333b are quoted by Vedāntadeśika in his PRR (18.15*ff*; 40.8*ff*).

[41] See, for example, PRR 4.5-18 (← ĀP 169.7-170.11). The ŚrīprśS is not quoted by Vedāntadeśika, and thus may well succeed him.

[42] There are passages in the PādS which do appear to have been authored by Āgama-siddhāntins, most notably in the first chapter of the Caryāpāda. See especially PādS 4.1.3-9.

[43] See PādS 4.13.67-70b: *ṛco yajūṃṣi sāmāni bhidyamānāny anekadhā ‖ śākhābhedair mūlaśākhām ekāyanasamāśrayām | trayīmayīm adhīyīta sukhāsīnas samāhitaḥ ‖ anyais sārdham adhīyānaiḥ ṣaḍaṅgeṣu ca kovidaiḥ | adhyāpayīta vā śiṣyān śāstrāṇi vividhāni*

exhibits the kind of Veda-congruent Vaiṣṇava devotionalism which is more representative of the Mantrasiddhānta.[44]

That the PādS should contain a passage wherein an apparently non-Āgamasiddhāntin author invokes the Ekāyanaveda might appear somewhat surprising given that in this work's descriptions of the Pāñcarātra Siddhāntas (see especially 4.21.30-54b), the Ekāyanaveda is explicitly associated *only* with the Āgamasiddhānta. We must assume that these two sections of the PādS do not share a common author, and that the summary of the *pañcakāla* duties in PādS 4.13 is in all likelihood the later contribution to the text.[45] This is most likely the case because, in the *scriptural* literature, the non-Āgamasiddhāntin incorporation of the idea of the Ekāyanaveda is a strategy which is found primarily in the later works, including the ŚrīprśS, as we have just seen, and also the *Śrīpuruṣottama-saṃhitā*, to which I shall turn shortly.

Yamuna's acceptance of the validity and authority of the Ekāyanaveda may have been motivated, at least partially, by the prominence of Āgamasiddhāntins at the Raṅganāthasvāmin temple in Śrīraṅgam, where Yāmuna was an *ācārya*.[46] Can we advance similar explanations for the non-Āgamasiddhāntin acceptance of the Ekāyanaveda in such texts as the 13th chapter of the PādS' Caryāpāda, the PRR and the ŚrīprśS? In other words, were these works also produced in environments in which the Āgama-siddhāntins or Ekāyanas continued to exert a significant influence? This is not an easy question to answer, but since we know considerably more about the provenance and likely date of the PRR than we do about PādS 4.13 or the ŚrīprśS, I will address this issue in relation to Vedāntadeśika's work.

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ca || *itihāsapurāṇāni dharmaśāstrāṇi vā punaḥ* |.

44 See especially the injunction to perform the Vaiśvadeva ritual at home following the recitation of the *Jitaṃtestotra*. This act completes the performance of the five "great sacrifices" (*mahāyajña*), which should be undertaken according to one's Gṛhyasūtra. PādS 4.13.64 reads: *iti vijñāpya deveśaṃ vaiśvadevaṃ svadhāmani* | *kuryāt pañca mahāyajñān api gṛhyoktavartmanā* ||.

45 The Pāñcarātrika inclusivism conveyed elsewhere in the PādS (e.g. 4.2.87c-88) is also likely to belong to later additions to the text, since such strategies, as we will see below, are increasingly met with in the later literature.

46 Such an environment may also have persuaded Yāmuna that there were advantages in including the followers of the Ekāyanaveda in his description and defence of an "orthoprax" Pāñcarātra.

It is difficult to overlook the fact that, in his defence of the Pāñcarātra, Vedāntadeśika lends his support in particular to the Āgamasiddhānta. Thus, in the opening section of the PRR's first chapter, Vedāntadeśika establishes that the Āgamasiddhānta is the primary Siddhānta. In support of this he quotes (at PRR 6.4*ff*) PauṣS 38.293c-305, and (at 8.5-8) the *Hayagrīva-saṃhitā* (otherwise known as the *Hayaśīrṣapañcarātra*), both of which list the Āgamasiddhānta at the top of the Siddhānta hierarchy. Subsequently, at PRR 9.8-11, he quotes PādS 4.19.111c-113b, which lists the Mantra-siddhānta as the "first" Siddhānta, but in his succeeding commentary, Vedāntadeśika notes that this is a reversal of the sequence (*vyutkrama*) that is found in the PauṣS, and that this reversal is intended merely as a means of praising the Mantrasiddhānta.[47] In other words, the hierarchy found in the PauṣS is the canonical one. As if to emphasise this, Vedāntadeśika then claims, at PRR 9.13-14, that the PādS itself acknowledges the superiority (*atiśaya*) of the Āgamasiddhānta, and that this superiority is conveyed, according to the PādS, by the fact that the Āgamasiddhānta confers liberation alone.

These verses in the PRR are followed by a short quotation of PādS 4.19.117ab: "And in the Āgama [Siddhānta], wherein the renunciation of actions is described..." (*karmaṇām api saṃnyāsaḥ kathyate yatra cāgame*). Vedāntadeśika quotes this half-*śloka* in order to issue an important corrective as to its meaning. The "renunciation of actions" mentioned here refers, in fact, to the renunciation of "actions motivated by desire" (*kāmya-karma*) which is performed in the Āgamasiddhānta, says Vedāntadeśika, in accordance with the teaching of "pure renunciation" (*sāttvikatyāga*) that is propounded in the 18th chapter of the *Bhagavadgītā*.[48] In other words, according to Vedāntadeśika, Āgamasiddhāntins perform rituals relating to their own social class and stage of life etc. (*svavarṇāśramādi*), and also the daily and occasional rites prescribed in the Gṛhyasūtras of their own *śākhā*, but they renounce what the *Bhagavadgītā* (at e.g. MBh 6.40.2) calls the "fruits" of these actions. "Therefore", concludes Vedāntadeśika, "it should

[47] PRR 9.12-13: *atra āgamamantrasiddhāntayoḥ pauṣkaroktakramāt vyut-krameṇopādānaṃ siddhimokṣapradamantrasiddhāntaprāśastye tātparyāt.*

[48] PRR 9.15-17: *atra kāmyakarmaṇāṃ svarūpataḥ saṃnyāsaḥ. svavarṇāśramādiniyatānāṃ tu bhagavadgītāṣṭādaśādhyāyanirṇūtaprakāreṇa sāttvikatyāgaḥ. svaśākhāgṛhyokta-maryādayā ca sarvatra nityanaimittikādiparigrahaḥ.*

not be erroneously thought that in the Āgamasiddhānta all actions are renounced, for there is a great variety of specific actions [performed therein]."[49]

These verses are worth summarising because they strongly indicate that the Āgamasiddhānta was still a living tradition in the early part of the 14th century, when Vedāntadeśika composed the PRR. Moreover, this passage very much reads like a defence of the Āgamasiddhānta against a very specific accusation – namely, that of renouncing ritual action. Who, in the eyes of Vedāntadeśika, might have been "erroneously" suggesting that Āgamasiddhāntins do not engage in ritual action? Such an accusation is not, after all, included in the various objections against the Pāñcarātra which are listed in Yāmuna's ĀP. First of all, it should be noted that Vedāntadeśika's contention that Āgamasiddhāntins renounce only the desire which ordinarily motivates ritual action – i.e. they do not renounce ritual action *itself* – is supported by the PādS' Caryāpāda, from which the above half-*śloka* is taken, as well as by several Āgamasiddhānta sources.[50] Furthermore it is significant that the PādS, like the PauṣS and the PārS, does actually on occasion refer to this renunciation of "desire" as simply the "renunciation of action" (*karmasaṃnyāsa*).[51] In other words, there is scriptural support for Vedāntadeśika's aforementioned interpretation of PādS 4.19.117ab, not least in the PādS itself. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, then, this suggests that the accusation that Āgamasiddhāntins do not engage in ritual action might have come from somewhere other than the Mantrasiddhānta, the tradition to which the majority of the PādS belonged.

The most likely source of this criticism is perhaps the Vaikhānasa tradition. According to Gérard Colas (1990: 24-25), the Vaikhānasa

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[49] PRR 9.17-10.1: *ata āgamasiddhānte sarvakarmasvarūpatyāga iti na bhramitavyam, karmaviśeṣabhūyastvāt.*

[50] See for example PādS 4.19.116, immediately preceding the half-*śloka* quoted by Vedāntadeśika above, in which Āgamasiddhāntins are said to worship the four *vyūha*s. Elsewhere (e.g. PādS 4.21.34c-36), Āgamasiddhāntins are said to be devoted to the *pañcakāla* ritual system, and to worship God "without desire" (*nirāśa*). Among Āgamasiddhānta sources, see for instance PauṣS 27.4 and 38.28c-32, and PārS 15.14c-18.

[51] See for example PādS 4.21.35cd, PauṣS 38.32cd and PārS 15.16cd.

Samūrtārcanādhikaraṇa states that the Pāñcarātra "is esteemed by hermits (*vanastha*) and ascetics (*yatin*)", and several other Vaikhānasa works cited by Colas also include the claim that (in Colas' words) "while the Vaikhānasa cult is citadine, the Pāñcarātra is prescribed for far away places, outside towns, on a hill or a mountain, near a river or an ocean, in forests". Such descriptions of the Pāñcarātra as a renunciative tradition as opposed to an urban, temple-based cult must, of course, be assessed alongside the context from which they emerged. Elsewhere, Colas (1995: 117) addresses this issue when he writes of the opposition between "les deux écoles âgamiques, celles-ci s'affrontant pour obtenir le contrôle du rituel dans les temples de l'Inde du Sud."[52] Of particular relevance to the question we are addressing presently, Colas (ibid: 117-118) notes that: "À l'époque de Vedānta Deśika, les querelles entre les desservants de temple se réclamant de l'une et de l'autre école âgamique vishnuite ne cessent de croître et de s'étendre avec la prolifération des temples publics".[53] Further on, moreover, Colas (ibid: 119) suggests that Vaikhānasa authors may have been directing their criticisms at one Pāñcarātra group *in particular*, namely those who had abandoned their Vedic *sūtra*. "C'est peut-être cette partie de l'école pāñcarātra", writes Colas, "que les manuels des prêtres vaikhānasa visaient à stigmatiser."[54]

If Colas is correct, it would seem quite likely, then, that in his PRR Vedāntadeśika is defending the Āgamasiddhānta against criticisms which were coming from within the Vaikhānasa tradition. After all, the Āgama-siddhāntins or Ekāyanas are those Pāñcarātrikas who, according to both the ĀP (169.7*ff*) and the PRR (4.5*ff*), had "abandoned" the *dharma* of the triple Veda (*trayīdharma*) in order to follow the Gṛhyasūtras of their "own *śākhā*". Irrespective of the source of these criticisms, this discussion raises another possible explanation as to why Vedāntadeśika, who himself did not abandon allegiance to the "triple Veda" as the highest scriptural authority,

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52 'The two Āgamic schools [i.e. the Vaikhānasa and the Pāñcarātra] which clashed with one another in the attempt to gain control of ritual in the temples of South India.'

53 'At the time of Vedanta Desika, the quarrels between the temple priests claiming [allegiance to] one or other Vaiṣṇava Āgamic school continue to grow and expand with the proliferation of public temples.'

54 'It is perhaps this branch of the Pāñcarātra school which the manuals of the Vaikhānasa priests aimed at stigmatising.'

might have sought to defend the Āgamasiddhāntins, who had abandoned that allegiance. He may have sought to defend them not only because they held positions of influence at the Raṅganāthasvāmin temple in Śrīraṅgam, but also because they were the Pāñcarātrikas who were especially subject to external criticism. Viewed in this way, the success of Vedāntadeśika's *Defence of the Pāñcarātra* would have rested in large part on the success of his defence of the Āgamasiddhānta. For if criticisms of the Āgamasiddhānta could be used to denounce the Pāñcarātra in general, a successful defence of the latter could be built upon a persuasive vindication of the former.

If authors belonging to the Vaikhānasa tradition occasionally ignored the internal divisions within the Pāñcarātra and resorted to branding the Pāñcarātra in general as "non-Vedic" (*avaidika*), or as devoted only to the attainment of *mokṣa*, or as not concerned with temple worship etc.,[55] then Vedāntadeśika, like Yāmuna before him, also attempted to present a unified and coherent Pāñcarātra "system", adherence to which would not contravene allegiance to the Veda.[56] Thus, although the PRR, unlike Yāmuna's ĀP, does contain a number of descriptions of the Siddhānta divisions, as well as passages drawn from the scriptural literature which warn against "mixing" the Siddhāntas, Vedāntadeśika also attempts to minimise the importance of any internal "conflict".[57] Accordingly, as we have seen, in the presentation of the PRR the supremacy of the Āgamasiddhānta is not a "sectarian" issue, but one on which even the PādS, a predominantly Mantrasiddhāntin work, is in agreement. Indeed, it is precisely this depiction of a universally acknowledged hierarchy of Pāñcarātra Siddhāntas which is key to Vedāntadeśika's mitigating what is probably the most characteristic feature of Pāñcarātrika "sectarianism", i.e. the prohibition against the "mixing" of Siddhāntas. For it is in this context that he quotes,

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55 See Colas (1990) for a list of Vaikhānasa classifications of the Pāñcarātra.

56 See especially PRR 21.7*ff*, which asserts the validity and authority of Pāñcarātrika prescriptions for the installation and worship of the image of Viṣṇu when prescriptions for these rites are not contained in the Vedas (that is, other than for the Baudhāyana, Vaikhānasa and Śaunaka schools).

57 See e.g. PRR 11.18-19. Here Vedāntadeśika, having just quoted the PādS' (4.19.113c-128b) account of the Siddhānta divisions, falsely claims that the PādS and the PauṣS do not contradict each other.

without attribution, a passage which claims that Pāñcarātrikas are not only qualified to perform the rites of their "own" Siddhānta, they are also eligible for the ritual "systems" (*tantra*) of those Siddhāntas which are "lower" than their own. Thus, since the Āgamasiddhānta is at the top of the hierarchy, its members are also entitled to worship according to the systems prescribed by the Mantra, Tantra and Tantrāntara Siddhāntas. A Mantrasiddhāntin, meanwhile, is also qualified for the Tantra and Tantrāntara Siddhāntas, while a Tantrasiddhāntin is qualified in addition for the Tantrāntarasiddhānta. Likewise, members of each Siddhānta have the authority to worship in places which have been established by a Siddhānta "inferior" to their own. This means that, according to this account, Āgamasiddhāntins have the entitlement to worship in any Pāñcarātra temple, while Tantrāntarasiddhāntins appear to be restricted to worshipping in their own homes.[58]

How are we to interpret these claims, and the inclusion of this passage in the PRR? Vedāntadeśika does not name the source of these verses, and I have been unable to locate them in the scriptural literature. The most striking claim contained here is that members of the Āgamasiddhānta have the authority to perform all rites which are prescribed by the Mantrasiddhānta, and that they can execute this entitlement without being guilty of "mixing Siddhāntas", or of leaving their own Siddhānta and entering another. Could this possibly reflect and validate actual processes which were then taking place? In other words, *were* Āgamasiddhāntins affiliating themselves with the more Veda-congruent Pāñcarātra traditions, perhaps because the latter had by this time become the more dominant? Can this help explain why apparently non-Āgamasiddhānta scriptures begin to incorporate Āgamasiddhānta canonical systems, such as the idea of the Ekāyanaveda and the supremacy of the JS, SS and PauṣS, within their own? Although these questions are very difficult to answer at present, such a

[58] PRR 13.9-14.4: *punar apy uparyupari tantrasthitānām adho 'dhas tantrādhikāritvam uktam – tantrāntare tathā tantramantrasiddhāntavartmani | dīkṣitānāṃ krameṇaiva hy uparyupari yogataḥ | anyeṣām adhikāraḥ syāt tattatsaṃskārapūrvakam || kāraṇāgamasiddhāntaniṣṭhenānyais tribhiḥ sadā | arcanīyam athānyābhyāṃ mantrasiddhāntinā tathā || pūjanīyam athānyena tantrasiddhāntināniśam | svena tantrāntareṇaiva pūjanīyaṃ svake gṛhe | iti | atrāpy utkṛṣṭasiddhāntasthitenāpi apakṛṣṭasiddhāntasthāneṣu tattatsiddhāntaprakāreṇaiva pūjanīyatvam uktam.*

pattern may help explain why the culture of Pāñcarātrika sectarianism gave way to the synthesis of previously distinct groups.

This latter process is especially evident in the opening chapter of the *Śrīpuruṣottamasaṃhitā* (ŚrīpurS), another scriptural work which appears to have been composed at a relatively late date.[59] Here, the sage Vasiṣṭha presents the designations Pāñcarātra, Mūlaveda, Sāttvata, Tantra, Ekāyana and Āgama as synonymous terms,[60] and in explaining why each of these names is an appropriate designation for the Lord's teaching (*bhagavac-chāstra*), the author incorporates passages from both the PādS and the ĪS, including them alongside each other. In fact, much of the first chapter of the ŚrīpurS is an amalgam of verses borrowed from these two works.[61] I propose that this section of the ŚrīpurS can be understood as a conscious attempt to accommodate forms of self-understanding found within the more Veda-congruent Pāñcarātra traditions, as represented in the PādS, with those found within the Ekāyana tradition, and articulated in the ĪS, so that both are included within a single, homogeneous Pāñcarātra "system" (*tantra*).[62] The inclusion of a canonical list of Pāñcarātra scriptures, which is found at the end of the ŚrīpurS' first chapter, as well as in several other South Indian works including an interpolated section of the PādS, also derives from this same integrative strategy.[63] Accordingly, as in the *Adhikaḥ Pāṭhaḥ* to which I shall turn shortly, there is no mention of distinct

[59] Smith (1975: 274) suggests that the ŚrīpurS may post-date Vedāntadeśika.

[60] ŚrīpurS 1.11*ff.* See also ŚrīpurS 22.57c-59b (← PādS 4.2.87c-88, referred to above): *sa eva sūris suhṛt sāttvataḥ pāñcarātravit || ekāntikas (ekāṃtikas) tanmayaś ca deśiko dīkṣito 'rcakaḥ | gurur bhāgavataś caiva pūjakas sādhako hariḥ || bhaṭṭārakādir ākhyābhir ākhyeyaḥ kamalāsana |.*

[61] ŚrīpurS 1.3cd ← PādS 1.1.14ab; ŚrīpurS 1.6cd ← PādS 1.1.32ab; ŚrīpurS 1.10cd ← ĪS 1.18cd; ŚrīpurS 1.12 ← ĪS 1.19 (← PārS 1.57c-58b); ŚrīpurS 1.14-15 ← ĪS 1.24-25 (cf. PārS 1.76-77); ŚrīpurS 1.18-19b ← PādS 1.1.63-64b; ŚrīpurS 1.25-26 ← PādS 1.1.90-91; ŚrīpurS 1.27ab ← PādS 1.1.96cd; ŚrīpurS 1.28-29 ← PādS 1.1.97-98.

[62] See ŚrīpurS 1.29ab: *śatam ekam athāṣṭau ca tantre 'smin viditaṃ mayā |*. – 'In this system (*tantre 'smin*), 108 [Tantras] are known by me.' Cf. PādS 1.1.98ab.

[63] Shortly before enumerating 108 Pāñcarātra scriptures, the PādS' narrator Saṃvarta declares that "Nārāyaṇa himself is the proclaimer of all the Tantras" (1.1.88cd). This claim is also contained in other South Indian Saṃhitās which contain extensive lists of Pāñcarātra works, such as the *Viśvāmitrasaṃhitā* (2.14-15) and the *Bhāradvājasaṃhitā* (1.1-8a). Such claims, of course, openly contradict the PārS' assertion that only the three divine scriptures are directly revealed by God.

Pāñcarātra Siddhāntas in this work. As in the PRR (e.g. 3.7-12), however, the two distinct Pāñcarātrika modes of self-description sit rather uneasily alongside each other in the ŚrīpurS. Thus, the Ekāyana claim that "this is the main root of the great Veda tree – the *Ṛc* etc. are its trunk and branches",[64] is included beside the PādS' declaration that "this Tantra, rooted in *śruti*, is an authority like the Kalpasūtras. There is no teaching superior to the Veda".[65]

The only extant non-Āgamasiddhāntin scriptural source that contains an apparently original formulation of the "three jewels doctrine", then, is the interpolated section of the JS entitled *Adhikaḥ Pāṭhaḥ*. This 14th century work follows the PādS in invoking the memory of the sage Aupagāyana, said here to be a student (*adhīyāna*) of the Kaṇvī *śākhā* (109ab) and it also prescribes the "mixing" (*vimiśrita*) of Vedic and "divine" (*divya*) mantras (118). Having declared that the Jayākhya is superior among the "three jewels" (108ab), Lord Varada (*varadarāja*), the narrator of this section, asserts:

> *jayākhyenātha pādmena tantreṇa sahitena vai ‖ mūlavyākhyānarūpābhyāṃ samarcayatu māṃ sadā | na tantrasaṅkaro doṣas tantrayor anayor iha ‖.*
>
> Thus, one should always worship me according to the Jayākhya [Saṃhitā] *along with* the Pādma Tantra [i.e.] according to both forms – the root [text] and the commentary. Here, with regard to both Tantras, the defect is in *not* mixing the Tantras. (JS *Adhikaḥ Pāṭhaḥ* 111c-112)

Thus, the apparently Mantrasiddhāntin author of the *Adhikaḥ Pāṭhaḥ* has found a way of incorporating the teaching of the "three jewels" whilst ensuring that the PādS, a work which belongs to the Mantrasiddhānta, is, *practically* speaking, as essential as those texts. Where the "mixing" of one Tantra with another is normally discouraged as a "defect" or a "fault" (*doṣa*), in this instance the defect is said to be that of following the JS without also following its "commentary", the PādS. This case offers a good example, then, not to mention a more seamless process, of forming a single

[64] ŚrīpurS 1.14: *mahato vedavṛkṣasya mūlabhūto mahān ayam | ṛgādyāḥ skandhabhūtās te śākhābhūtāś ca yoginaḥ ‖.*

[65] ŚrīpurS 1.26c-27a: *śrutimūlam idaṃ tantraṃ pramāṇaṃ kalpasūtravat ‖ vedāc chāstraṃ paraṃ nāsti… |.*

"Pāñcarātra canon", of bringing together canonical systems from distinct Pāñcarātra traditions and subsuming them into a single tradition. This integrative strategy is a clear development from the Mantrasiddhāntin appropriation of the tradition of the Ekāyanaveda which we have met with in the ŚrīprśS. Indeed, unlike the *Adhikaḥ Pāṭhaḥ* and the ŚrīpurS, the ŚrīprśS contains no deliberate and sustained attempt to present the Pāñcarātra as a single, homogeneous system. The more fully developed integrative approach of the *Adhikaḥ Pāṭhaḥ* and the ŚrīpurS probably indicates that both of these works post-date the ŚrīprśS.

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Six

Preliminary Survey of Sanskrit Manuscripts of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*

Daniel Stender

The *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (henceforth "Bca") is the "passing over (*avatāra*, ~ introduction) into the course (*caryā*) of enlightenment (*bodhi*)", which can be rendered as "introduction into the course that leads to enlightenment".[1] The text is very popular among Buddhists, has been translated several times,[2] and is well known to Mahāyāna scholars and teachers, who have

[1] In Tibetan the title *byaṅ chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa* ("*Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra*") is commonly used alongside *byaṅ chub kyi spyod pa la 'jug pa* ("*Bodhicaryāvatāra*"). The former has been claimed to be the original title of the poem: "[…] the full title of his poem is *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra* (rather than the abbreviated form *Bodhicaryāvatāra*). This form is also supported by the Mongolian […]. Obviously, our poem is not an introduction to the life of *bodhi*, but to the career of a bodhisattva. The source of the abbreviated title is probably the author himself" (Lindtner 1998, p. 239). However, that the longer title is to be found in the Mongolian is not a sound argument, because Weller in 1950 found that the Mongolian title borrows from Tibetan sources, where it seems this longer title originates for reasons as yet unknown.

[2] Concerning the translations, cf. Gómez 1999, p. 330 sq.

extensively published on it. The author of the work, Śāntideva, a Buddhist monk and scholar of the Nālandā university, outlines the spiritual career of a Bodhisattva. In the beginning the text deals with the *bodhicitta*, the "thought of awakening", which is to be developed and then cultivated by the adept. The author then describes the stages of the "sixfold perfections" (*ṣaṭpāramitā*),[3] concluding in the *Prajñāpāramitā* chapter with a discussion about "emptiness" (*śunyatā*). This links the work with the Madhyamaka school of Buddhist philosophy.[4] The work is beautiful classical Sanskrit poetry, and a sophisticated and remarkable piece of Buddhist literature. Furthermore, it is an important text for understanding the relationship between Madhyamaka teachings and the Bodhisattva ideal, and for ascertaining the philosophico-metaphysical foundations of a Bodisattva's career.

The hitherto consulted manuscripts for the previous editions

In this section, I will try to find out which manuscripts of the Bca have been considered for the available editions.[5] The Sanskrit Bca[6] has been edited several times, independently and in combination with Prajñākaramati's commentary *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* (henceforth "*Bca-Pañjikā*"):

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[3] In contrast to the author Candrakīrti, for example, who represents the *daśapāramitā* system with the *Mādhyamakāvatāra*. That system adds *upāyakauśalya*, *praṇidhāna*, *bala* and *jñāna* to *dāna* (5,9-10 in the Bca), *śīla* (5,11 sq.), *kṣānti* (chapter 6), *vīrya* (chapter 7), *dhyāna* (chapter 8), and *prajñāpāramitā* (chapter 9). On the systems, cf. Eimer 2006, p. 107 sq.

[4] Cf. Seyfort Ruegg 1981, p. 82 sq., and Saito 1996.

[5] An earlier attempt to trace which manuscripts might have been consulted for the editions is Pezzali 1968, p. 50 sq.

[6] Unlike the shorter, most probably earlier Bca, which has survived solely in its para-canonical Tibetan translation and consists of 701.5 verses and 9 chapters including the *pariṇāmanā*, the text which has been preserved in its original Sanskrit counts 913 verses in 10 chapters, cf. Saito 1993 and Dietz 1999 for details.

Minaev 1889

The first edition of the text without the commentary was made by Ivan Pavlovič Minaev (1840-90)[7] in 1889 for the *Memoirs of the Eastern Section of the Imperial Russian Archaeological Society*. In the short introduction to his edition, Minaev gives some information about three manuscripts which were available to him. Two he borrowed from London, the first one (L^1) from the India Office:

> "7713. 2927. Foll. 1-25, 28-40, 42-55; palm leaf; size 12½ in. by 1¾ in.; Nepālī ornamental (Rañjā or Lantshā) character, very clear and regular, of A.D. 1399?; five lines in a page. [...] The colophon is: *samāptoyaṃ bodhicaryāvatāraḥ. kṛtir ācāryaśāntidevasya maṃjughoṣaprā* (sic) *sādāditi*. On the outer side of fol. 1 we find [...] *damvna* (*sic* for *dharma*) *9 samvat 519 mārggaśiraśuddhi*. Thus the date of completion may be *Mārgaśiras* in Nepal *saṃvat* 519 = A.D. 1399, or earlier. [B.H. Hodgson]".[8]

The second one (L^2) was obtained from the Royal Asiatic Society:

> "13. Bodhicaryâvatāra. In ten parichchhedas. 47 palm leaves. 12½ in. by 1¾ in. Five lines in a page. Old. The shape of the figures and some letter is very peculiar".[9]

The third manuscript at his disposal (M) was privately owned.[10]

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7 For biographical and bibliographical information, cf. Sclmeider 1934 and Bongard-Levin/Vigasin 1984, p. 82 sq.

8 Keith 1935, p. 1394. The supplement by F.W. Thomas lists the 30 manuscripts donated by Hodgson in the years 1838-45, cf. Waterhouse 2004, p. 249.

9 Cowell/Eggeling 1876, p. 13. This catalogue lists 79 manuscripts donated by Hodgson in the years 1835-36, cf. ibid. p. 1.

10 This manuscript was obtained by the public library of St. Petersburg after the editor's death, cf. Mironov 1918, p. 261 sq. (no. 281). It is a Nepalese paper manuscript consisting of 28 fols. 3 to 6 were written by a different hand. Minaev gives the information that the text generally agrees with L^2. *Saṃvat* 791 or 891 (A.D. 1671/70 resp. 1771/70) could be found as the year of the manuscript's completion (the Nepalese era starts October 20th 879 A.D., cf. Lienhard/Manandhar 1988, p. XXVIII).

Śāstrī 1894

The second edition of the text was made by Haraprasāda Śāstrī (1853-1931)[11] in 1894. Unfortunately, no information about the consulted material is given here. However, in an article on Śāntideva from 1913, Śāstrī mentions a palm leaf manuscript of the Bca in the Hodgson Collection of the Asiatic Society of Bengal that he has consulted.[12] Rājendralāl Mitra's catalogue of the Hodgson donations to the Asiatic Society from 1882 lists a palm leaf manuscript of the Bca, which presumably is the one mentioned by Śāstrī:

> "Old No. 815. - New No. B. 42. [...] Substance, palm-leaves, 11×2½. Folia 48. Lines on a page, 6. Extent in s'lokas 1,100. Character, Newárí. Date ? Appearance, old and smudgy. Verse. Generally correct".[13]

La Vallée Poussin 1898 and 1901-14

Three manuscripts of Prajñākaramati's commentary on the Bca are recorded by Śāstrī in the 1917 catalogue of the Government Collection of Sanskrit manuscripts in the archives of the Asiatic Society of Bengal:[14]

> "49. 3830. *bodhicaryyāvatāra pañjikā* [...] Substance, palm-leaf. Character, Newari. Date, N.S. 198=1078 A.D. In good state of preservation. With the first leaf and 26 others missing. Colophon: - *bodhicaryyāvatāre prajñāpāramitāpariccheḍaṭīkā samāptā. kṛtiriyaṃ paṇḍitabhikṣuprajñākarapādānāṃ*".[15]

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[11] See Law 1933 for obituary including a bibliography.

[12] Śāstrī 1913, p. 49: "Then it was published in the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society* by me. I had the advantage of collating a beautiful palm-leaf manuscript belonging to the Hodgeson Collection; in the Library of the Asiatic Society of Bengal".

[13] Mitra 1882, p. 47. These Hodgson donations appear again in Kāvyatīrtha 1904, p. 243 sq. (B. 42 on p. 251).

[14] Śāstrī 1917, p. 49 sq. Cf. Chakravarti 1959-60, p. 664, and Kimura's article on that collection (cf. Yuyama 1992, p. 7).

[15] It is noted in the catalogue that this manuscript had been lent to La Vallée Poussin, and the record had to be taken from Śāstrī 1893, where the whole transcript of fol. 213 up to the end could be found, cf. p. 246 sq. The colophon gives the information that this copy has been written in the Rāghavavihāra in Patan (*lalitapure*) during the reign of

"50. 9979. *bodhicaryyāvatāra. Bodhicaryāvatāra and the Pañjikā commentary* [...] Four seasoned palm-leaves. 20×2. Written in old Newari Character. I. Bodhicaryāvatāra with six lines on a page, faded, containing the colophon: - *bodhicaryyāvatāre dhyānapāramitā 'ṣṭamaḥ paricchedaḥ*. II. Two leaves with five lines on a page - one is marked on the left-hand side *aṣa 9* = 127 - the other without leaf mark contains the colophon *bodhicaryyāvatārapañjikāyāṃ dhyānapāramitāparicchedo 'ṣṭamaḥ*".

"51. 3829. *bodhicaryyāvatāraṭīkā* [...] Substance, palm-leaf, 12×2 inches. Folio, 109. Lines, 6 on a page. Extent in slokas, 2725. Character, Bengali of the 12th century. Appearance, fresh but worm-eaten in places. Complete. Written in a neat and small hand. Colophon: *bodhicaryyāvatāre prajñāpāramitāparicchedaṭīkā samāptā. kṛtiriyaṃ paṇḍitabhikṣuprajñākaramatipādānāṃ*".

The *Bca-Ṭīkā* actually is the same as the ninth chapter of Prajñākaramati's commentary *Bca-Pañjikā*. The former seems to have been transmitted independently, since it carries its own invocation and closing verses, as found in Louis de La Vallée Poussin's (1869-1938)[16] edition published in 1898.[17] Later, in the years 1901-14 the Belgian scholar edited again the whole extant commentary along with the *mūla* in seven volumes for the *Bibliotheca Indica* series.[18]

However, before Śāstrī's 1917 catalogue, it was thought that there were only two manuscripts of the *Bca-Pañjikā* in the Asiatic Society collection. In 1895, in fact, Śāstrī mentions a Nepalese manuscript from 1078 A.D. ending with the ninth chapter of the *Bca* commentary, and another one containing just the ninth chapter of the *Bca* commentary (= *Bca-Ṭīkā*), written in Maithilī script (cf. p. 7). These two manuscripts are the same mentioned in both La Vallée Poussin's editions (1898, cf p. 233, and 1901-14, cf. p. I). This discrepancy between, on the one hand, Śāstrī 1895 and La Vallée

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Śaṅkaradeva. The date of completion has been settled as Tuesday 31st of July 1078 A.D. (cf. Petech 1984, p. 47), which is a fairly early date for a palm-leaf manuscript.

16 On La Vallée Poussin, cf. Vielle 2010.

17 Vaidya's hypothesis that the *Bca-Ṭīkā* was composed before as a single text is quite tempting (1960, p. IX: "I, therefore, feel on sure grounds that Prajñākaramati first wrote his commentary on the 9th chapter, and added the same to first eight chapters at a later date"). This is because that would provide an explanation why Prajñākaramati has not commented upon the tenth chapter, the *Pariṇāmanā*.

18 Cf. Sieg 1908, p. 12, and Nobel 1928, p. 5.

Poussin 1898 and 1901-14 and, on the other hand, Śāstrī 1917 raises the question about the actual number of manuscripts available in the Asiatic Society.

It is evident that manuscript no. 51 of Śāstrī's 1917 catalogue – probably acquired between 1893 and 1895 – corresponds to the second item mentioned by Śāstrī 1895. This is in fact the one written in Old Bengalī and carrying the *Bca-Ṭīkā* only.[19]

On the other hand, if one observes the colophons of manuscripts no. 49 and no. 50 as reported in Śāstrī 1917, one can observe that the former contains only the ninth chapter of the *Bca-Pañjikā*, i.e. the commentary to the *Prajñāpāramitā* section of the *Bca*, whereas the latter contains the first eight chapters of the same text. It is therefore possible that manuscripts no. 49 and no. 50 had been kept together in order to form a complete instance of the *Bca* commentary until Śāstrī's 1917 closer examination.

In the *Bibliotheca Indica* edition (1901-14), La Vallée Poussin also gives the information that for Śāntideva's text he also made use of Minaev's previous edition together with two manuscripts from Paris, referred to as "Devanāgarī 78" and "Burnouf 98". Even if the label do not match exactly (the second one should be "Burnouf 90"), these items are presumably these two described by Filliozat in 1941:[20]

> "78. BODHICARYĀVATĀRA par Çāntideva. Marges, verso à droite: guruḥ, à gauche: bo. va. *Début*: namaḥ sarvabuddhabodhisatvebhyaḥ ‖ sugatān sasutān … *Colophon*, fol. 56 l. 3: iti bodhicaryāvatāra pariṇāmaparicchedo daçamaḥ ‖ çubham astu jagataḥ | samāptā bodhicaryāvatāraparikathā kṛtir iyam ācāryaçrīçāṃtidevapādānām iti ‖ çreyo stu jagataḥ sadā ‖ çubham astu sarvadākālaṃ ‖ namo buddhadharmasaghāya. […] Vol. relié, 56 fol. recto blanc, verso jaune, 265×108 mm., 7 l. - Devanāgarī. Vers 1836. - Prov. Népal. Coll. Hodgson. Don Soc As. 1840 - Anc. cote: S. dév 85".[21]

[19] The colophon of no. 51 reports "Bengali of the 12th century". Most probably, the script that is meant here, which has already been designated as Maithilī, is the one called by Roth "Proto-Bengali-cum-Proto-Maithili", cf. Dimitrov 2002, p. 32 sq.

[20] Cf. p. 63 sq. Both items could be found already in the earlier catalogue assembled by Cabaton in 1907, cf. p. 11.

[21] This one belonged to a bunch of transcripts which were sent in 1837 to the Société asiatique by Hodgson (cf. the list from 1837, where a Bca of 56 fols. could be found on p. 296), It was included in the library already in 1840. The different title, *Bca-parikathā*, which can be found here in the colophon, appears a few other times among

"79. BODCHICARYĀVATĀRA par Çāntideva. Fol. 1[a] sur papier collé: titre et nombre de fol. en devanāgarī et hindoustani. *Début* fol. 1[b]: namo ratnatrayāya. sugatān sasutān ... 1 ligne ajoutée audessus: namāmi buddhān ... *Colophon*, comme 78: ... daçamaḥ samāptaḥ. ye dharmmā ... bhadram astu sarvvajagatā ‖ çubhaṃ ‖ [...] 1 vol. relié, 55 fol. recto bis, verso jaune, 260×80 mm., 7 l. - Ecriture népalie. Dernière feuille: écriture grossière. S.d. (fin du XVIIIe ou début du XIXe siècle). - Prov.: Népal. Coll. Hodgson-Burnouf. - Anc. cote: Burnouf 90".[22]

Bhattacharya and Vaidya 1960

In 1960, Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya edited the Bca along with its Tibetan translation also for the *Bibliotheca Indica* series. In the same year Paraśurām Lakṣman Vaidya (1891-1978)[23] edited again the *Bca-Pañjikā* together with the *mūla* for the *Buddhist Sanskrit Text* series. Bhattacharya and Vaidya did not include further material, meaning that these editions predominantly assemble their text from the editions which had been published before.[24] Although it is frequently used in Indology and Tibetology, the Sanskrit text of Bhattacharya's edition is rather problematic.[25]

Summary

Apart from the palm leaf manuscripts belonging to the Government Collection of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, most of the above-mentioned manuscripts that have been used to create editions were acquired by Brian

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the Bca manuscripts, cf. below, Tokyo 261 and NAK 3/257.

22 This one was originally obtained by Eugène Burnouf (1801-1852). Although it could be found in the auction catalogue (cf. Burnouf 1854, p. 332, no. 90), this item was not sold in the auction of 1854 (cf. Yuyama 2000, p. 5 sq.), since it had already been sold in 1852 to the Bibliothèque impériale – the precursor of the Bibliothèque nationale (cf. Colas 1986, p. 285).

23 For a brief obituary cf. Bapat 1978.

24 That is also true for the bulk of the Indian editions which are considered to be mere reprints of those discussed here.

25 Mukhopadhyaya 1961, p. 287: "The late lamented Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya had barely completed his edition when death snatched him away from us. He had no time to revise it. [...] In such circumstances, as in natural, some mistakes have crept in".

Houghton Hodgson (1801-1894) in Nepal.[26] Hodgson began collecting manuscripts during his first appointment as Assistant Court Resident in Nepal at the beginning of the 1820s. During his second stay in 1824-43, he carried on acquiring manuscripts and made transcriptions, employing the Paṇḍit Amṛtānanda and a team of scribes.[27] All of these items were given to several libraries and to private scholars in Europe and India.[28] Out of the Bca manuscripts consulted for the editions above, it seems that only Paris 78 is a transcript, and that the others are original ones.

Unconsulted manuscripts

For this chapter I have collected references to manuscripts that have not been consulted so far.[29]

Original pieces

Cambridge

A paper manuscript of the Bca, written in Devanāgarī is kept in the University Library, Cambridge:

> "Add. 869. Paper; 66 leaves, 7 lines, 10¼×4½ in.; modern, ordinary Devanāgari hand. BODHICARYĀVATĀRA. This is the ninth section of the Açokāvadāna-mālā (see MS. Add. 1482)".[30]

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[26] Nepal is a rich storehouse for Sanskrit manuscripts because: "Die speziellen klimatischen Gegebenheiten dieses Himalaya-Landes sind überdies von solcher Art, daß dort mehr alte Handschriften den Unbilden der Zeit getrotzt haben als in irgendeiner anderen Region des Subkontinents [Furthermore, the specific climatic conditions of this country in the Himalayas are of such a nature, that there more ancient manuscripts have withstood the ravages of time than in any other region of the Indian subcontinent]" (Wezler 1986, p. 3).

[27] For a biographical sketch cf. Waterhouse 2004, p. 1-24.

[28] Cf. Hunter 1881 and Waterhouse 2004, p. 249 sq.

[29] Cf. Tsukamato/Matsunaga/Isoda 1990, p. 255 sq.

[30] Bendall 1883, p. 6. The manuscripts in this collection were procured by Daniel Wright, who was a surgeon at the British Residency in Nepal, from 1873 to 1876, cf. p. VII. A

Kolkata

There is an old palm-leaf manuscript of the Bca *mūla* written in Bengalī script listed in the catalogue of the Government Collection of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. However, as far as I can tell, this manuscript has not been used for any of the previous editions:

> "19. 8067. bodhicaryyāvatāra. [...] Substance, palm-leaf. 12½×1½ inches. Folia, 66. Lines, 4, 5 on a page. The 60th and the 62nd leaves are missing. Character, Bengali. Copied in Saṃvat 1492 = 1436 A.D. Appearance, old, discoloured and worn-out".[31]

Kyōto

The Kyōto University owns two other manuscripts:[32]

> "No. 72 (E 260) 66 leaves (last fol. numbered, wrongly, '67'), 6 lines, 25.7×8.3 cm, 'Saṃvat 1027' = c. 1907 A.D".

> "No. 73 (E 261) 60 leaves, 6 lines, 27.9×5.8cm [...] 10 Pariccheda-s, both complete".

Tōkyō

The Tōkyō University Library owns five other manuscripts:[33]

> "No. 260 (1) Bodhi-caryā-'vatāra. (2) Paper, 46 leaves, 6 lines, 13½×3 inch., Nepalese character [...] The pagination of 23 is missed out. (3) (47b2) iti bodhicaryyāvatāre pariṇāmanāḥ daśamaḥ palīcchedaḥ || samāptaḥ ||".

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brief listing of his donations can be found in Wright 1877, p. 316 sq., cf. also Weber 1877, p. 526 sq.

31 Śāstrī 1917, p. 21. On this item see Dimitrov 2002, p. 36, fn. 36.

32 Goshima/Noguchi 1983, p. 20. This collection was assembled by Ryōzaburō Sakaki (1872-1946) in Nepal, cf. p. I sq.

33 Matsunami 1965, p. 97 sq. An index of the sections of the manuscripts can be found on p. 352. This collection was gathered by the Zen monk Ekai Kawaguchi (1866-1945) together with J. Takakusu under the permission of Maharaja Chandra Shumsher, cf. Thapa 2004.

"No. 261 (1) Bodhi-caryā-'vatāra. (2) Paper, 70 leaves, 7 lines, 10½×4¾ inch. Devanāgarī, modern [...] (3) (70b6) iti bodhi-caryā'-vatāre pariṇāmanā-parichedo daśamaḥ samāpto 'yaṃ bodhi-caryā-'vatāra-parikathā śubhaṃ bhūyāt sarva-jagatām ‖".

"No. 262 (1) Bodhi-caryā-'vatāra (Two fragments of the •). (2) Palm leaf, (I) 17 leaves, (II) 43 leaves, number of lines variable, 10x2¼ inch.; (I) Siddhānta, (II) Nepalese character".

"No. 263 (1) Bodhi-caryā-'vatāra [only the beginning]. (2) Paper, 13 leaves, 6 lines, 12x2½ inch., Nepalese character [...] (3) (12a1) ‖ bodhicaryāvatare bodhicittāpramādo nāma caturthaḥ paricchedaḥ ‖".

"No. 264 (1) Bodhi-caryā-'vatāra. (2) Palm-leaf, 60 leaves, 5 lines, 10¼x2 inch., Siddhānta like Kuṭila".

Kathmandu, NAK

The National Archives in Kathmandu (Rāṣṭriyābhilekhālaya, NAK) stores several manuscripts,[34] all of which have been made available on microfilm by the Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project (NGMPP):[35]

			fol	**reel**
1/772	Palm	Np	7	B 23/5
3/91		Np	33	B 98/5
3/257	Pap	Np	126	B 98/8
3/297	Pap	Dn	47	A 121/9

[34] From 1970, manuscripts of the NAK have been microfilmed. And from 1975 onwards also private collections have been covered. The films are available in the NAK, duplicates of which can be examined in the Oriental Department of the State Library Berlin (SBPK).

[35] Cf. Saṃkṣiptasūcīpattram and Bṛhatsūcīpattram. In the shelf marks (first column), the number before the slash denotes one of the collections ("lagat") within the NAK: For lagats 1-3 (former Durbar, resp. Bīr library - Vīrapustakālaya), cf. Śāstrī 1905-1915, Grünendahl 1989, as well as Kaneko/Saito 1954. The stocks of lagat 5 (the mss. of Hemarāja Śarmā from the former Nepal National Library - Nepālarāṣṭriyapustakālaya) are catalogued in the *Sūcīpattram* (V.S. 2021-24, Purātattvagranthamālā 26, 27, 32, 41), cf. Grünendahl 1989, p. XVIII. Detailed information on the history of the NAK can be found in Dimitrov 2007, p. 117 sq., esp. fn. 16.

			fol	**reel**
3/663		Dn	47	B 98/9
3/723		Dn	304	A 915/7
4/1033	Pap	Np	54	B 97/7
5/185		Np	99	A 121/8
5/191		Dn	39	A 915/6
5/7727		Dn	129	A 134/5
5/7954		Np	46	B 97/9
6/3311	Palm	Np	11	A 1389/23
6/3313	Palm	Mai	19	A 1389/22

Kathmandu, Kaiser Library

The Kaiser Library in Kathmandu owns two manuscripts of the Bca, and these are also available as NGMPP microfilms:[36]

			fol		**reel**
124	Palm	Np	73	300 N.S.	C 14/2
127	Palm	Np	41		C 14/5

Manuscripts from Tibet

Ye 2009 lists seven precious old Bca manuscripts that have survived in Tibet:[37]

- One (6.2.1) was catalogued by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana (1893-1963) in the Ngor monastery.[38]

[36] Photographs of this collection are stored on the NGMPP microfilm reel nos. C 1/1 - C 124/6, cf. Dimitrov/Tamot 2007, p. 31.

[37] Cf. p. 231 sq. (6.2).

[38] "14 fols. (incomplete), 12×1⅔ in., Māgadhi script". Cf. Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1935, p. 37 (no. XXI-4-110). "Māgadhī" as a name for a script is used by Sāṅkṛtyāyana for Old Bengalī, cf. Bandurski 1994, p. 19. About the scholar and his travels, cf. Kellner 2010.

- Two of them (6.2.2[39] and 6.2.3[40]) were kept in the China Library of Nationalities (Zhongguo Minzu Tushuguan) in Beijing, but have been brought in 1993 to the Tibetan Museum in Lhasa.
- One manuscript (6.2.4[41]) has been catalogued in the Norbulingka palace.
- Two others (6.2.5,[42] 6.2.6[43]) have been catalogued in the Drepung monastery.
- Another manuscript (6.2.7[44]) was held by the Administrative Committee of Cultural Relics of the Lhoka district.

The Tucci collection in Rome does not contain any more manuscripts of Śāntideva's poem from Tibet.[45]

Reproductions

IASWR

The former Institute of Advanced Studies of World Religions (IASWR) at the State University of New York (SUNY) has microfilmed several Sanskrit

[39] "Palm-leaf, 23 fols (complete, 10 chapters), 6 lines, 22 × 2 in., Proto-Bengālī script". Catalogued by Sāṅkṛtyāyana at Saskya monastery, cf. the report from 1937, p. 24 (VI-VI-196) [not available to me, but cf. Tsukamato/Matsunaga/Isoda 1990, p. 257 (no. 18)]. This manuscript was examined by Lindtner in Beijing („very accurate"), and he noted variants, cf. Lindtner 1991.

[40] "Paper, 71 fols. (incomplete, fols. 8, 9, 31, 42, 50, 59 are missing, 10 chapters), 5 lines, Eastern Nāgarī script".

[41] "Paper, 38 fols. (incomplete, missing fol. 17), 8 lines, 29.9 × 6.3 cm, Gupta script".

[42] "Palm-leaf, 58 fols. (incomplete, fols. 27, 38, 39, 60 missing, 10 chapters), 5 lines, 30.2 × 4.9 cm, Gupta script […] Tibetan notes on the last folio: *sgu rum dpe gang gi rgya dpe*. From this we know that this manuscript comes from India and was formerly held in the sGu rum library of the Sakya Monastery".

[43] "Palm-leaf, 67 fols. (complete, 10 chapters), 5 lines, 29.1 × 5.4 cm, Dhārikā script".

[44] "*Caryāvatāra*, palm-leaf, 69 fols. (complete), 5 lines, 32.2 × 5.6 cm, script similar to Gupta, title on the cover: *spyod 'jug gi bzhung*".

[45] Cf. Sferra 2008.

manuscripts from Nepal. These photographs have been made available in a set of microfiches, a copy of which was sold to the Indological Department of Bonn University. Within these microfiches, two manuscripts of the Bca are found:[46]

> MBB-I-1 (microfilm number MBB-1971-1-1) is a palm leaf manuscript of N.S. 880 in Bhujimola script, 5×28 cm with 7 lines, 38 numbers of leaves, the 2nd one is missing, cf. IASWR 1973. Unfortunately, most of the photographs are blurred, which makes it hardly legible in large sections. The scanned card gives the information that the manuscript contains nine chapters up to the *Prajñāpāramitā*.[47]
>
> MBB-II-231 (microfilm number sheet and card not legible) is written in Nepalese characters, 6 lines on 42 fol. Some folios are not legible.

Nagoya

The Buddhist Library in Nagoya owns several microfilms containing Bca manuscripts from private collections in Nepal:[48]

> "CA 10-3. Bodhicaryāvatāre pariṇāmanta pariccheda: (Language) Sanskrit, (Script) Devanāgarī, (Material) Paper, Hartāla on b, (Size) 26x12¼ cm., (Leaves) ff.104 (1b-104b), ex.ff. 3, (Lines) *ll.*6".
>
> "CH 257. Bodhicaryā avatāra: (Language) Sanskrit, (Script) Devanāgarī, (Material) Paper, Hartāla on b, (Size) 22x12cm., (Leaves) ff.62 (1b-61b) doubled f.41, (Lines) *ll.*6 (f.1-54) *ll.*10 (f.55-last)".
>
> "CH 314. Bodhicaryāvatāre parikathā kṛtiyamācārya śrī Śāntideva pādānam: (Language) Sanskrit, (Script) Newa: Lipi, (Date of writing) SAMVAT written in letters "NANDA-ŚARA-KHACARE",[49] (Material) Paper, Hartāla on b, (Size) 31¾x11 cm., (Leaves) ff.65 (1b-65b), (Lines) *ll.*7".

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[46] Cf. Eimer/Paffen 1988, p. 146 On the remarkable collection of reproductions in Bonn, cf. Halm 1988. Duplicates of the NGMPP reels nos. B 97 and 98 are also available here.

[47] Chapter II begins on fol. 3r6, III on 7r4, IV on 9r8, V on 13v2, VI on 19r7, VII on 22v3, VIII on 30r1, and IX on 37r7.

[48] Cf. Takaoka 1981. Cited from Tsukamato/Matsunaga/Isoda 1990, p. 258.

[49] Probably "9-5-0", cf. Sircar 1965, p. 230 sq.

"DH 219. Bodhicaryāvatāre Prajñāpāramitā pariccheda: (Language) Sanskrit, (Script) Devanāgarī, (Material and form of MS) Paper, Hartāla on one side, Banded, (Size) 22¾x15cm., (Pages) pp.57, (Lines) *ll.*20".

NGMPP

The NGMPP holds several microfilm rolls in the State Library Berlin (Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin) with photographs of manuscripts from private collections:[50]

reel			fol	
E 910/10		Dn	76	
E 910/11		Dn	29	
E 1099/1		Np	65	1839 A.D.
E 1256/7		Np	26	
E 1518/5	Palm	Np	32	
E 1553/2		Dn	79	
E 1375/2		Dn	46	1937 A.D.
E 1375/3		Dn	86	
E 1484/13		Dn	9	
E 1700/9		Np	80	
E 1730/16		Dn	76	
E 1730/17		Dn	28	
E 1838/4		Dn	49	1816 A.D.
E 2511/1		Np	47	
E 3227/17		Dn	8	
H 3/3		Dn	6	
H 44/5			82	1924 A.D.
H 321/7		Np	63	
H 380/8		Np	17	1644 A.D.
H 1086/5		Dn	61	

[50] Reels carrying the siglum "E" have been filmed from private collections in Kathmandu, "H" from private collections in Patan, cf. Moriguchi 1989, p. VIII.

References

Bandurski 1994

Frank Bandurski: *Übersicht über die in Göttinger Sammlungen der von Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana in Tibet aufgefundenen buddistischen Sanskrit-Texte (Funde buddhistischer Sanskrit-Handschriften, III)*. In: Bandurski et.al.: *Untersuchungen zur buddhistischen Literatur*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1994 (Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden, Beiheft; 5), p. 9-126.

Bapat 1978

P.V. Bapat: *Professor Dr. P.L. Vaidya*. In: *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 1 (1978), p. 91 sq.

Bendall 1883

Cecil Bendall: *Catalogue of the Buddhist Sanskrit manuscripts in the University Library, Cambridge*. Steiner: Stuttgart 1992 (Verzeichnis der Orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland, Supplementband; 33 / Publications of the Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project; 2) [reprint of: Cambridge 1883].

Bhattacharya 1960

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Bongard-Levin/Vigasin 1984

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Seven

Asiddha vs *asiddhavat* in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*

Małgorzata Sulich-Cowley

Introduction

The *asiddha* principle employed by Pāṇini in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (A.) (5th-4th cent. BCE)[1] allows for the division of the text of the treatise into two parts: the *Sapādasaptādhyāyī* (comprising seven chapters and the first sub-chapter of the eighth chapter) and the *Tripādī* (comprising the last three sub-chapters). Pāṇini uses the term *asiddha* twice in his treatise in the rules A. 8.2.1 *pūrvatrāsiddham* ('[all the following rules are] suspended (*asiddha*, have not taken effect) with respect to the previous ones') and A. 6.1.86 *ṣatva-tuKor asiddhaḥ* ('[a single substitute of a preceding and a following phoneme is considered] suspended with respect to the augment tuK and the *ṣ*-substitution'); and once he uses the term *asiddhavat* – A. 6.4.22 *asiddhavad atrābhāt* ('from this *sūtra* up to the *sūtra* A. 6.4.129 *bhasya*[2] [including the domain of *bhasya,* the rules are to be applied] as if suspended

[1] CARDONA 1997(a): 260, 268.

[2] A. 6.4.129 *bhasya* ('[The operations introduced hereafter up to the end of the chapter apply to the presuffixal stem termed] *bha*').

[with respect to each other]'). There has been disagreement amongst recent scholars such as Bronkhorst, Kiparsky, Cardona and S.D. Joshi as to whether these two terms are synonymous or whether they mean two different things.

I will analyse what Patañjali (2nd cent. BCE),[3] Pāṇini's commentator, says about *asiddha* and whether he is right in his assumptions. In all three places Patañjali quotes Kātyāyana's (3rd cent. BCE)[4] *vārttika* (vt.) on the *sūtra* A. 6.1.86 – *ādeśa-lakṣaṇa-pratiṣedhārtham utsarga-lakṣaṇa-bhāvārthaṃ ca* ('[*asiddha* is used] in order to prohibit [the application of] a rule [conditioned by] a substitute (*ādeśa*) and allow [the application of] a rule [conditioned by] a substituend (*utsarga*)') – to explain the principles of *asiddha* and *asiddhavat*. Patañjali quotes this vt. again under two other *sūtras*, A. 6.4.22 and A. 8.2.1, on the vt.s 1 and 8 respectively, both of which read: *asiddha-vacana uktam* ('it has been explained in the *asiddha* rule'). Then Patañjali explains what he means by referring to the aforementioned statement. As can be seen, therefore, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* uses the same argument in all three cases irrespective of the fact that the term *asiddha* is used only twice. Patañjali ignores the fact that in the rule A. 6.4.22 *asiddhavad atrābhāt* the term *asiddha* is followed by the suffix vatI, which in this case denotes similarity. It seems that he considers both of the terms equal. He pays no attention to the form *asiddhavat* whatsoever. He does not even try to explain the use of the suffix. Later commentators accept that in all three rules the term should be understood as standing for *asiddhavat*, even in those two cases when Pāṇini himself uses *asiddha* only.

The so-called *asiddha* principle has been discussed frequently over the last thirty years or so as it seems to be one of the most important tools for the application of rules in the A.[5] The very term *asiddha* is difficult to

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[3] CARDONA 1997(a): 266.

[4] CARDONA 1997(a): 267-268.

[5] See for example: Banerjee, Rabi Shankar: *Concept of asiddhatva in Panini*, Sanskrit Pustak Bhavan, Calcutta, 1984; Bronkhorst, J.: '*Asiddha* in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* – a misunderstanding among the traditional commentators", Journal of Indian Philosophy 8:69-85 (1980); Bronkhorst, J.: 'Review of Some Theoretical Problems in Pāṇini's Grammar, by Paul Kiparsky'. Indo-Iranian Journal 27 (1984), pp. 309-314; Bronkhorst, J.: 'What is *asiddha*?' Annals of BORI 70 (1989 [1990]), 309-311; Joshi, S.D., and Kiparsky, P.: '*Siddha* and *asiddha* in Paninian phonology' in: Current

translate. It is the past participle of the verbal root '*sidhi* – 'to be accomplished, to take effect' and therefore it can be rendered as 'that which has not been accomplished, has not taken effect'.[6] It is important to mention that the term *asiddha* was not defined by Pāṇini in the A. and that is where the difficulties arise. It was either obvious for those who studied his grammar at the time or it was used in its basic meaning. As the Monier Williams dictionary definition is ambiguous, it is very difficult to define the term properly. Following the dictionary, *asiddhavat* would therefore mean 'as if it has not taken effect'. There is a great difference between understanding the *sūtras* as 'not having taken effect' or 'as if not having taken effect'. According to Patañjali's commentary, they 'have not taken effect' but, according to the later tradition, they are 'as if not having taken effect'. Which interpretation is right? Or maybe they are both wrong? I will present some arguments supporting the opinion that they are both wrong and that in fact those two terms are not synonymous.

Examples in the *Asiddhavat* Section

When we look at how the rules are applied in both the *asiddha* (A. 6.1.86, A. 8.2.1-8.4.68) and *asiddhavat* (A. 6.4.22-6.4.175) sections, we can see that there are major differences. It has been generally accepted that the *asiddha* principle establishes the order in which the rules of the A. are applied during the derivational process. In the whole of the A. the rules are applied depending on the derivational context, absolutely irrespective of their place in the treatise. This is not the case as far as the *asiddha* section is concerned. Contrary to the rest of the A. the *sūtra*s in the *Tripādī* section (A. 8.2.1-8.4.68) are applied during the derivational process in the order they appear in the A. In the *asiddhavat* section (A. 6.4.22-6.4.175) the application of rules is determined by other factors, most certainly not by their order. The argument can be advanced that this is the result of the

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Approaches to Phonological Theory, ed. Daniel A. Dinnsen. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1979. Pp. 223-250.

[6] I translate it sometimes as 'suspended' after Kiparsky and Cardona, my translation has not been determined yet.

formulation of the *sūtras* A. 8.2.1 *pūrvatrāsiddham* ('[all the following rules are] suspended (*asiddha*, have not taken effect) with respect to the previous ones') and A. 6.4.22 *asiddhavad atrābhāt* ('from this *sūtra* up to the *sūtra* A. 6.4.129 *bhasya*[7] [including the domain of *bhasya,* the rules are to be applied] as if suspended [with respect to each other]'). The words of interest are *pūrvatra* and even more so the word *atra.* According to Kiparsky[8] the latter term allows us to apply the rules in conflict in whichever order we choose. In my opinion, however, it is not entirely the case. If the term *atra* were to specify the domain in which the *asiddhavat* principle works, the expression *ā bhāt* would be superfluous. So it has to serve another purpose which is, as the commentators agree,[9] to describe the context in which the rule in question takes place. It is used to show that one rule can be suspended with respect to another only when they have the same conditions for operation. I think it is very difficult to deduce from this word that the order of the application of rules is left to our choice. There are other factors that determine which *sūtra* is to be applied first.

Let us deal with *ā bhāt* first. There could be two possible interpretations of this term. First, that the scope of this governing rule extends up to the rule A. 6.4.129 *bhasya* which introduces a new *adhikāra*, thereby ending the application of *asiddhavat.* The rule A. 6.4.129 says that from now on all the operations will take place on the stem termed *bha.* Another interpretation would allow the scope of the governing rule A. 6.4.22 to include the term *bha* as well. So all the *sūtras* that belong to the group governed by the rule *bhasya* (A. 6.4.129) are subject to the *asiddha* or *asiddhavat* principle. The term *ā bhāt* is absolutely necessary because otherwise the principle of suspension would extend outside the domain of *bha*, which ends in the fourth *pāda* of the sixth chapter and would apply to the rules that lie outside it, for example in the seventh chapter. This is not what is desired.

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7 A. 6.4.129 *bhasya* ('[The operations introduced hereafter up to the end of the chapter apply] to [the presuffixal stem termed] *bha*').

8 KIPARSKY 1982:105-107.

9 See for example *Kāśikāvṛtti* on A. 6.4.22: *atreti samānāśrayatva-pratipatty-artham /* and Kaiyaṭa on the *Mahābhāṣya*: *viśiṣṭo yo viṣayaḥ samāna-lakṣaṇas tan-nirdeśārtham / tena samānāśrayam asiddhaṃ vyāśrayaṃ tu siddhaṃ ity eṣo 'rtho vārttika-kārasyābhimataḥ /.*

What is more, both of the rules in question must belong to the so-called *ābhīya* section.[10] Otherwise, the 'suspension' does not work at all. Let us see, for example, the derivation of the form *abhāji* ('it broke', aor. pass.):

bhañj + lUṄ	
bhañj + CLI + *ta*	(A. 3.1.43 *CLI lUṄi*[11])
aṬ + *bhañj* + CiṆ + *ta*	(A. 6.4.71 *lUṄ-lAṄ-lṚṄkṣv aṆ-udāttaḥ*,[12] A. 3.1.66 *CiṆ bhāva-karmaṇoḥ*[13])
a + *bhañj* + *i* + 0	(A. 6.4.104 *CiṆo luK*[14])
a + *bha* (*ñ* → 0)*j* + *i*	(A. 6.4.33 *bhañjeś ca CiṆi*[15])
a + *bhaj* + *i*	
a + *bh* (*a* → *ā*)*j* + *i*	(A. 7.2.116 *aTa upadhāyāḥ*[16])
abhāji	

First the augment aṬ is added to the stem followed by the suffix CiṆ. The ending *ta* is further deleted by the rule A. 6.4.104. The problem starts with the deletion of the nasal consonant *ñ* by the rule A. 6.4.33. It is a *sūtra* belonging to the *asiddhavat* section. To derive the correct form *abhāji* with the phoneme *ā* we need to apply the rule A. 7.2.116, which prescribes the *vṛddhi* substitution of the penultimate phoneme *a* in a stem when the same is followed by the suffix marked with Ṇ or Ñ. The suffix CiṆ is such a suffix but, as the deletion of the nasal belongs to the *asiddhavat* section, it should be treated as if suspended. Therefore the phoneme *a* of the stem

[10] The section A. 6.4.22-6.4.175 is called the *ābhīya* section due to the expression *ā bhāt* used in the *sūtra* A. 6.4.22.

[11] A. 3.1.43 *CLI lUṄi* ('[The suffix] CLI comes [after a verbal stem] before the l-substitutes of lUṄ').

[12] A. 6.4.71 *lUṄ-lAṄ-lṚṄkṣv aṆ-udāttaḥ* ('[The initial increment] aṬ is inserted with high pitch [at the head of a verbal *aṅga*] before the l-substitutes of lUṄ, lAṄ or lṚṄ').

[13] A. 3.1.66 *CiṆ bhāva-karmaṇoḥ* ('[The aorist marker] CiṆ [comes in place of CLI] when denoting the action itself or the object').

[14] A. 6.4.104 *CiṆo luK* ('[The aorist marker] CiṆ is deleted').

[15] A. 6.4.33 *bhañjeś ca CiṆi* ('[The penultimate phoneme *n*] of [the verbal *aṅga*] *bhañj* ('to break') [is not optionally deleted] before [the aorist marker] CiṆ').

[16] A. 7.2.116 *aTa upadhāyāḥ* ('[The *vṛddhi* vowel *ā* comes in place] of the penultimate [vowel] *a* [before suffixes marked with Ñ or Ṇ]').

bhañj would not be penultimate; the stem would still have the nasal *ñ* which would constitute the penultimate phoneme. And as such the stem would not be able to undergo the *vṛddhi* substitution by A. 7.2.116. However, the *sūtra* A. 7.2.116 does not belong to the domain prescribed by the *sūtra* A. 6.4.22, the so-called *ābhīya* domain; it is outside this domain. Therefore the *asiddhavat* principle will not apply in this case. As can be seen from the above example, the conflict between the two *sūtras* has to refer to the rules that belong to the same domain of operation. If one of them lies outside it, the principle of suspension does not work.

Another question arises with respect to the word *atra*. Patañjali says that it specifies the domain. But the very form of the term *ā bhāt* restricts the domain already. What is the purpose then in using this additional expression? It is used to show that one rule can be suspended with respect to another only when they have the same conditions for operation (*atra*). A good example is the word *papuṣaḥ* ('of the one who has drunk', gen. sg.):

pa + *pā* + KvasU + Śas	(A. 3.2.107 *KvasUś ca*[17])
pa + *pā* + *vas* + *as*	
pa + *pā* + (*va* → *u*) *s* + *as*	(A. 6.4.131 *vasOḥ samprasāraṇam*[18])
pa + *p* (*ā* → 0) + *us* + *as*	(A. 6.4.64 *āTo lopa iṬi ca*[19])
pap + *us* + *as*	
papu (*s* → *ṣ*) + *as*	(A. 8.3.59 *ādeśa-pratyayayoḥ*[20])

[17] A. 3.2.107 *KvasUś ca* ('[In Vedic literature the suffix] KvasU also [optionally comes in place of the l-substitutes of lIṬ introduced after a verbal stem to denote the general past tense').

[18] A. 6.4.131 *vasOḥ samprasāraṇam* ('Vocalisation of the semivowel of [the suffix] vasU (=KvasU) [occurring as an *aṅga*-final of a *bha* stem] takes place').

[19] A. 6.4.64 *āTo lopa iṬi ca* ('[The *aṅga*-final phoneme] *ā* before [the initial increment] iṬ is deleted as well as [before *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes beginning with a vowel marked with K or Ṅ]').

[20] A. 8.3.59 *ādeśa-pratyayayoḥ* ('[The phoneme *ṣ* comes in place of a phoneme *s*] of a substitute or of a suffix [occurring after vowels other than *a*, after a semivowel *r* or velar stops even when there is an intervention by nUM, *ḥ* or sibilants in continuous utterance').

papuṣar	(A. 8.2.66 *sa-sajuṣo rUḥ*[21])
papuṣaḥ	(A. 8.3.15 *khaR-avasānayor visarjanīyaḥ*[22])

In this case the rules that are of interest to us are A. 6.4.64 and A. 6.4.131. The deletion of the final phoneme *ā* takes place only when the stem is followed by the suffix beginning with a vowel marked with K. The suffix KvasU is marked with K and it does begin with a vowel when it undergoes *samprasāraṇa*. On the other hand, the occurrence of *samprasāraṇa* for the suffix KvasU depends on the following case ending. Therefore the conditions for both of the operations are different. And because the conditions are different, the *samprasārana* is not treated as suspended with respect to the deletion of the phoneme *ā*. In other words, the *samprasāraṇa* of KvasU allows for the deletion of the phoneme *ā*, otherwise the correct result would not be possible.

Kiparsky in one of his articles (1982)[23] claims that the suffix vatI in the word *asiddhavat* is used in the same way as in other places in the A., for example in the rule A. 1.1.56 *sthānivad ādeśo 'naL-vidhau* – 'the substitute is to be treated like the substituend except for an operation depending on the original phoneme'. He uses this as an argument to support the view that *asiddha* equals *asiddhavat* and says that in the case of *asiddha* Pāṇini simply did not have to use the suffix vatI in the rule as it was obvious. In other words, Kiparsky agrees with the grammatical tradition, which does not see a difference between both terms and explains them both as meaning 'as if suspended/has not taken effect'. I agree with Kiparsky that Pāṇini could use the suffix vatI in the same way in the rule A. 6.4.22 as in A. 1.1.56. In my opinion, however, it does not prove that the terms *asiddha* and *asiddhavat* signify the same thing. On the contrary, it can prove quite the opposite. When we look at the rule A. 1.1.56, we can see that the substitution in question did take place, i.e. the substitute (*ādeśa*) has been

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[21] A. 8.2.66 *sa-sajuṣo rUḥ* ('The substitute rU comes in place of [a *pada*-final phoneme] *s* and also in the expression *sajus* 'with'').

[22] A. 8.3.15 *khaR-avasānayor vosarjanīyaḥ* ('The *visarjanīya* comes in place of [the *pada*-final phoneme *r*] before voiceless consonants (khaR) or at pausa').

[23] KIPARSKY 1982:106.

applied; and only for the sake of some operations do we still treat the substitute as if it were the substituend. In the case of *asiddhavat* we see the same thing; the operation has taken place but we consider it suspended. We treat it as if it has not taken place. The *sūtra* has applied, the operation has been performed but the result is treated as if it has not taken place. But the important thing is that it has actually taken place. In the case of *asiddha,* though, the operation has not taken place at all!

Let us analyse yet another example. This is the derivation of 2nd sg. impv. of the verb *śās* – to instruct.

śās + si → hi	(A. 3.4.87 *ser hy-apiti ca*[24])
(śās → śā) + hi	(A. 6.4.35 *śā hau*[25])
śā + hi	
śā + (hi → dhi)	(A. 6.4.101 *hu-jhaLbhyo her dhiḥ*[26])
śādhi	

What is of interest to us in this example are the stages of derivation needed to produce *śās + hi*. To derive a proper form we need to substitute both the stem *śās* with the form *śā* and the ending *hi* with the ending *dhi*. In this case the substitution *śās → śā* eliminates the context for the *hi → dhi* substitution because *dhi* can come in place of *hi* only when the preceding stem ends in the phoneme denoted by the term jhaL and the phoneme *s* is included in it. When the stem has been substituted by the form *śā*, the conditions for the *dhi*-substitution are no longer met. If, however, the ending substitution takes place first, the stem substitution cannot take place because it depends on the following suffix *hi*. That is why the rule A. 6.4.35, prescribing the stem substitution, is treated as suspended with respect to the suffix substitution prescribed by the rule A. 6.4.101.

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[24] A. 3.4.87 *ser hy-apP-iC ca* ('[The suffix] *hi* without the marker P comes in place of siP [substitutes of the l-member LOṬ introduced after a verbal stem]').

[25] A. 6.4.35 *śā hau* ('[The substitute] *śā* [comes in place of the verbal stem *śās* ('to instruct')] before [the suffix] *hi*').

[26] A. 6.4.101 *hu-jhaLbhyo her dhiḥ* ('[The substitute] *dhi* comes in place of [the suffix] *hi* [introduced after the verbal stem] *hu* ('to sacrifice') or those [verbal stems] ending in [the phoneme denoted by] jhaL (non-nasal consonants)').

The question might be asked as to why the order of the rules cannot be reversed. Why cannot the *dhi* substitution take place first and be treated as suspended and then the *śā* substitution? The explanation is provided by the rule A. 1.1.56 *sthānivad ādeśo 'naL-vidhau* – the substitute is treated as the substitutend except when the rule depending on the original phoneme is to be performed. Let us consider in the above example whether this rule can apply here and if so, to what effect. The ending *dhi* comes in place of the ending *hi* but it can still be treated as having the *hi* form according to A. 1.1.56 (*sthānivad-bhāva* rule). Therefore, there are the conditions for the application of A. 6.4.35 and *śā* can substitute *śās*. However, the reverse is not possible. The substitute *śā* cannot be treated as the substituend *śās* for the sake of the rule A. 6.4.101 because this very rule, i.e. the *hi* → *dhi* substitution, is merely the substitution of single sounds; it is the *aL-vidhi*. Therefore, because the *śā* substitution can apply whether the ending substitution has taken place or not, it takes precedence and applies first. Thus it has to be considered suspended. If the *sūtra* A. 6.4.35 were not treated as if suspended, the result would be this:

śās + *si* → *hi*	(A. 3.4.87)
(*śās* → *śā*) + *hi*	(A. 6.4.35)
**śā* + *hi*	
**śāhi*	

The reason why we can refer to the *sthānivad-bhāva* in this case is that it has not been prohibited. In the *vārttika* 3 on the *sūtra* A. 1.1.58 *na padānta-dvirvacana-vare-ya-lopa-svara-savarṇānusvāra-dīrgha-jaŚ-caR-vidhiṣu* ('[The substitute of a vowel] is not [treated like the substituend] with respect to the operations regarding a *pada* final, reduplication, the deletion before [the suffix] varaC, the deletion of [the phoneme] *y*, accent, homogenous phonemes, the *anusvāra* replacement, the long vowel replacement, the replacement by jaŚ (voiced unaspirated stops) and the replacement by caR (unvoiced unaspirated stops)') we read *pūrvatrāsiddhe ca* ('And also in the *pūrvatrāsiddha* [section]'). Had the *vārttika* read simply *asiddhe*, we could make use of it also in the *ābhīya* section. However, it

does not say so and in my opinion it implies that Pāṇini treated these two sections, that is the *Tripādī* and the *ābhīya* sections, differently.

As mentioned above, Patañjali does not use the term *asiddhavat* but always *asiddha*. Now, later commentators only, on the other hand, use the term *asiddhavat*. I am of the opinion that there is no reason to believe that Patañjali also understood the term *asiddha* as *asiddhavat*. Rather, he read the word *asiddha* in all three rules given above. Does it create any problems in the derivation of the form *śādhi* then? It most certainly does. The rules A. 6.4.35 and A. 6.4.101 are mutually exclusive. The application of one eliminates the environment of the other. If one of the rules is *asiddha*, it has not taken effect and therefore after the application of the other, it cannot be applied. What we need, however, in the example given is both rules, to be able to derive the correct form. *Asiddhavat* lets us do so because the first rule applicable – whichever it is – is considered only 'as if it has not taken effect', i.e. it has but the derivational process continues as if it has not.

The forms *āgahi* ('come!', 2nd impv. sg.) and *jahi* ('kill!, 2nd impv. sg.) are also very good examples:

āgam + LOṬ → siP	*han* + LOṬ → siP
āgam + ŚaP + *si*	*han* + ŚaP + *si*
āgam + 0 + *si*	*han* + 0 + *si*
(A. 2.4.72 *adi-prabhṛtibhyaḥ ŚaPaḥ*[27])	(A. 2.4.72)
āgam + *si* → *hi*	*han* + *si* → *hi*
(A. 3.4.87 *ser hy-aPiTi ca*[28])	(A. 3.4.87)
āgam + *hi*	*han* + *hi*
āga (*m* → 0) + *hi*	*han* → *ja* + *hi*
(A. 6.4.37 *anudāttopadeśa-vanati-*	(A. 6.4.36 *hanter jaḥ*[29])

[27] A. 2.4.72 *adi-prabhṛtibhyaḥ ŚaPaḥ* ('[The marker] ŚaP introduced after [the verbal stems] *ad* 'eat' etc. [is deleted]').

[28] A. 3.4.87 *ser hy-aP-iC ca* ('[The suffix] *hi* without the marker P comes in place of siP [substitutes of the l-member LOṬ introduced after a verbal stem]').

[29] A. 6.4.36 *hanter jaḥ* ('[The morpheme] *ja* comes in place of [the verbal *aṅga*] *han* 'kill' [before the suffix *hi*]').

tanoty-ādīnām anunāsika-lopo jhaLi K-ṄiTi[30])

āgahi *jahi*

If the *sūtras* A. 6.4.36 and A. 6.4.37 were not treated as if suspended, the result would be as follows:

āgam + LOṬ → siP	*han* + LOṬ → siP
āgam + ŚaP + *si*	*han* + ŚaP + *si*
āgam + 0 + *si*	*han* + 0 + *si*
(A. 2.4.72)	(A. 2.4.72)
āgam + *si* → *hi*	*han* + *si* → *hi*
(A. 3.4.87)	(A. 3.4.87)
āgam + *hi*	*han* + *hi*
āga (*m* → 0) + *hi*	*han* → *ja* + *hi*
(A. 6.4.37)	(A. 6.4.36)
**āga* (*hi* → 0)	**ja* (*hi* → 0)
(A. 6.4.105 *aTo heḥ*[31])	(A. 6.4.105)
**āga*	**ja*

The rule A. 6.4.105 *aTo heḥ* (the suffix *hi* is deleted after the stem ending in the phoneme *a*), could apply because after the deletion and the substitution of the stem respectively, both of the stems end in the phoneme *a*. However, when the preceding operation, namely the deletion of the nasal *m* of *āgam* is treated as if suspended, the rule A. 6.4.105 has no scope of application. The stem is considered to be ending in a consonant, therefore the conditions for the *hi*-deletion are not met and the correct form *āgahi* is derived.

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[30] A. 6.4.37 *anudāttopadeśa-vanati-tanoty-ādīnām anunāsika-lopo jhaLi K-ṄiTi* ('A nasal stop of [the *aṅga* of verbal stems] which are low-pitched when first introduced (*upadeśa*), *van* 'to like' etc. and *tan* 'to extend' etc. is deleted before [the suffixes beginning with] non-nasal consonants (jhaL) marked with K or Ṅ').

[31] A. 6.4.105 *aTo heḥ* ('[The suffix] *hi* occurring after [a verbal *aṅga* ending in the phoneme] *a* [is deleted]').

A similar issue is found in the derivation of the form *jahi*. When the ending *si* is substituted by *hi*, the *sūtra* A. 6.4.36 applies which prescribes the substitution of the stem *han* by *ja*. At this point A. 6.4.105 could apply deleting the ending *hi* because it appears after the stem ending in the phoneme *a*. This is not desired. However, the substitution *han* → *ja* is considered suspended and therefore the preceding verbal stem still ends in a consonants. The conditions for the application of A. 6.4.105 are not met. Thus we can derive the correct form *jahi*.

The rules prescribing the deletion of the phoneme *m* and the *ja*-substitution are treated as suspended so that the rule conditioned by those substitutions, namely A. 6.4.105, does not take place.

Examples in the *Pūrvatrāsiddha* Section

Let us compare the above examples to what happens with the rules within the *Tripādī* section. The example chosen is *paktavya* 'ought to be cooked' and the derivation is as follows:

pac + tavyaT

pa (*c* → *k*) (A. 8.2.30 *coḥ kuḥ*[32]) + *tavya*

In stage one of this derivation two rules can be applied: A. 8.2.30, prescribing the substitution *c* → *k* before a non-nasal stop, and A. 8.4.40 *stoḥ ścunā ścuḥ*,[33] prescribing the substitution *t* → *c* when in contact with a palatal stop. Thanks to the *sūtra* A. 8.2.1 and the *asiddha* principle, the only order acceptable is the one shown: first we apply the rule A. 8.2.30 and then the environment for the application of A. 8.4.40 disappears. Thus, we arrive at the correct form *paktavya*. However, if we accept that the term *asiddha* should be interpreted as *asiddhavat*, we could reverse the order

[32] A. 8.2.30 *cOḥ kUḥ* ('A velar stop (kU) comes in place of a palatal stop (cU) [at the end of a *pada* or before a non-nasal consonant]').

[33] A. 8.4.40 *s-tOḥ ś-cUnā ś-cUḥ* ('A palatal sibilant *ś* and palatal stops (cU) come in place of a dental sibilant *s* and dental stops respectively when those are in contact with them').

because *asiddhavat* does not require the rules to apply in order of their appearance in the treatise. We could, therefore, apply the rule A. 8.4.40 first and treat it 'as if it had not taken effect' with respect to A. 8.2.30. Afterwards, the rule A. 8.2.30 would apply, but as A. 8.4.40 is only 'as if not having taken effect' in reality it has, which means that we get both of the substitutions $c \rightarrow k$ and $t \rightarrow c$ resulting in the incorrect form **paccavya*.

The examples given above show that there is a difference in the way the rules are applied in both of the sections. In the *Tripādī* (A. 8.2.1-8.4.68) section the rules must be applied in order (there are very few exceptions to this and they are carefully thought out by Pāṇini) unlike the *asiddhavat* section (A. 6.4.22-6.4.175) where this is certainly not the case.

It is true that in some cases within the *Tripādī* section it does not make much difference whether we interpret the term *asiddha* as 'not having taken effect' or 'as if not having taken effect'; for example, when we derive the form *rājabhis* from *rājan* + *bhis*. The phoneme *n* is deleted by the rule A. 8.2.7 *na-lopaḥ prātipadikāntasya*.[34] After the deletion has been made, the ending *bhis* can be substituted by the ending *ais* because the preceding stem ends in the phoneme *a*. This substitution takes place on the basis of the rule A. 7.1.9 *aTo bhisa ais*.[35] This does not happen, however, because the rule deleting the final phoneme *n* belongs to the *Tripādī* section. Therefore, with respect to the rule in the seventh chapter it is suspended. In such a way, the deletion of the final phoneme constitutes the final stage of the derivation. In this case the interpretation 'as if suspended' would still yield the correct result. However, it is not always the case as I have shown previously.

In my opinion there is also one argument showing that *asiddha* is not equivalent to *asiddhavat*. Since rules in the *Tripādī* apply only in order of appearance, this forces Pāṇini to arrange the rules in this section in a particular manner. A very good example is the derivation of the form *amunā* (Instr. Sg. m./n. of the pronoun *adas* 'that one'). The inflectional process is as follows:

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[34] A. 8.2.7 *na-lopaḥ prātipadikāntasya* ('There is the deletion of the final phoneme *n* of a nominal stem').

[35] A. 7.1.9 *aTo bhisa ais* ('[The ending] *ais* comes in place of [the ending] *bhis* after [the nominal stem] ending in [the phoneme] *a*').

adas + Ṭā	
ada (*s* → *a*) + Ṭā	(A. 7.2.102 *tyad-ādīnām aḥ*[36])
ad (*a* + *a* → *a*) + Ṭā	(A. 6.1.97 *aTo guṇe*[37])
a (*da* → *mu*) + Ṭā	(A. 8.2.80 *adaso 'ser dād u do maḥ*[38] with A. 8.2.3 *na mu ne*[39])
amu +(āṄ → *nā*)	(A. 7.3.120 *āṄo nāstriyām*[40])
amunā	

The first stage is the addition of the instrumental singular suffix Ṭā to the pronominal stem *adas*.

The next stage is the substitution of the final *s* by the phoneme *a* according to the rule A. 7.2.102. Then the vowel *a* in a stem is substituted by the vowel *a* which comes as a result of the *s* → *a* substitution. In other words: *a* + *a* → *a*. This process is prescribed by the rule A. 6.1.97. Thus we achieve the stem *ada* followed by the suffix Ṭā. What results is the stem *ada* to which the instrumental suffix should be added. This is the moment when the *sūtra* A. 8.2.80 from the *Tripādī* section applies, prescribing the substitution *da* → *mu*.

The process of derivation mentioned above allows the substitution of the suffix Ṭā by the suffix *nā* on the basis of the rule A. 7.3.120 *āṄo nāstriyām*. The rule prescribes the substitution of the instrumental suffixes

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[36] A. 7.2.102 *tyad-ādīnām aḥ* ('[The phoneme] *a* comes in place of [the final phoneme of] the pronominal stem *tyad* ('that') etc.').

[37] A. 6.1.97 *aTo guṇe* ('[A single substitute comprising of the second of two continuous phonemes comes in place of a non-*pada* final phoneme] *a* and a *guṇa* vowel which follows it').

[38] A. 8.2.80 *adaso 'ser dād u do maḥ* ('[The phoneme] *u* comes in place of [the phoneme occurring] after [the phoneme] *d* of [the pronominal stem] *adas* 'that' when it does not end in [the phoneme] *s*, and [the phoneme] *m* comes in place of [the phoneme] *d*').

[39] A. 8.2.3 *na mu ne* ('[The morpheme] *mu* is not considered suspended (*asiddha*) with respect to [the instrumental singular ending] nā').

[40] A. 7.3.120 *āṄo nāstriyām* ('[The morpheme] nā comes in place of [the instrumental singular ending] āṄ [introduced after GHI stems] except for feminine stems').

when the stem is termed ghi (so-called when it ends in *i* or *u* [A. 1.4.7][41]), and when it is not feminine. Looking at our example, we can see that after the rule A. 8.2.80 has applied, and the phonemes *da* have been substituted by the phonemes *mu*, we arrive at the stem ending in the vowel *u*. The conditions for the rule A. 7.3.120 and the substitution of the instrumental singular suffix are met. However, the rule A. 8.2.80 is placed in the *pūrvatrāsiddha* section and as such is suspended/has not taken effect with respect to the rule A. 7.3.120. For the rule in the seventh chapter, the stem is still *ada* and as such does not meet the requirements of the operation. The problem was solved by Pāṇini by creating the negative *sūtra* A. 8.2.3 *na mu ne* which states that the substitution prescribed by the rule A. 8.2.80 is not suspended/has taken effect when the instrumental suffix is to be added. It is absolutely vital because otherwise the construction of a correct form *amunā* would be impossible.

If we accept the interpretation *asiddhavat* instead of *asiddha*, it would make no difference whether the negative rule A. 8.2.3 *na mu ne* is placed before or after A. 8.2.80 *adaso 'ser dād u do maḥ* because the order of their application would not be determined by the order of their appearance in the treatise. In fact, it would probably be placed after A. 8.2.80 in the A. as this is the usual order Pāṇini employs; he puts negative rules after, rather than before, those that prescribe the operations to be negated.

The other example to be quoted here is the past participle of the verb *lih* ('to lick') – *līḍha* ('licked').

lih + *ta*

li (*h* → *ḍh*) (A. 8.2.31 *ho ḍhaḥ*[42]) + *ta*

liḍh + (*t* → *dh*) (A. 8.2.40 *jhaṣas ta-thor ḍho 'dhaḥ*[43]) *a*

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41 A. 1.4.7 *śeṣo ghy asakhi* ('[The technical term] ghi denotes the remaining [stems ending in *–i* or *–u* which are not uniquely feminine as well as uniquely feminine stems not covered by the technical term nadī] with the exception of *sakhi* 'companion'').

42 A. 8.2.31 *ho ḍhaḥ* ('[The phoneme] *ḍh* comes in place of [the phoneme] *h* [at the end of a *pada* before non-nasal consonants (jhaL)').

43 A. 8.2.40 *jhaṣas ta-thor ḍho 'dhaḥ* ('[The phoneme] *dh* comes in place of [the phoneme] *t* or *th* [appearing] after voiced aspirated stops (jhaṢ) excluding [the phoneme *dh* of the verbal root] *dhā* ('to bear, support')').

liḍh + (*dh* → *ḍh*) (A. 8.4.41 *ṣ-ṭUnā ṣ-ṭUḥ*[44]) *a*
li (*ḍh* → 0) (A. 8.3.13 *ḍho ḍhe lopaḥ*[45]) + *ḍha*
l (*i* → *i*) (A. 6.3.111 *ḍh-ra-lope pūrvasya dīrgho 'Ṇaḥ*[46]) + *ḍha*
līḍha

The rule of importance is A. 8.3.13 *ḍho ḍhe lopaḥ* prescribing the deletion of the phoneme *ḍh* appearing before the phoneme *ḍh*. The problem is that the rule A. 8.4.41 *ṣ-ṭUnā ṣ-ṭUḥ*, prescribing the substitution *dh* → *ḍh*, belongs to the fourth subchapter of the eighth chapter and is therefore treated as nonexistent for A. 8.3.13. This *sūtra* would be superfluous if the order did not matter in the *Tripādī* section as it would have no scope of application. The formulation of the rule A. 8.3.13, namely mentioning the phoneme *ḍh* twice, shows that in this particular case the *sūtra* A. 8.4.41 is not *asiddha* with respect to A. 8.3.13. If the order of the rules did not matter in the *Tripādī* section, Pāṇini would not have had to use the phoneme *ḍh* twice; once would be enough. He is forced to do that though, as the rule 'creating' the phoneme *ḍh* in question is placed later in the treatise. It indirectly proves, in my opinion, that the term *asiddha* cannot be understood as *asiddhavat* because in the *asiddhavat* section the order of the rules makes no difference whatsoever.

Type of Operations

One more argument to be advanced is that the types of operations described in both the *pūrvatrāsiddha* (A. 8.2.1-8.4.68) and *asiddhavat* (A. 6.4.22-6.4.175) sections are different. First of all it is important to notice that they

[44] A. 8.4.41 *ṣ-ṭUnā ṣ-ṭUḥ* ('The retroflex sibilant *ṣ* and retroflex stops (ṭU) [come in place of dental sibilant *s* and dental stops (tU) respectively] when those are in contact with them').

[45] A. 8.3.13 *ḍho ḍhe lopaḥ* ('[The phoneme] *ḍha* [appearing] before [another phoneme] *ḍha* is deleted').

[46] A. 6.3.111 *ḍh-ralope pūrvasya dīrgho 'Ṇaḥ* ('A long vowel comes in place of a vowel denoted by aṆ (i.e. *a*, *i*, *u*) before a deleted [substitute] of [phonemes] *ḍh* or *r* when it immediately precedes it').

deal with different types of stems. Their domains of application are different. The *pūrvatrāsiddha* rules apply to the stem termed *pada* by Pāṇini defined as *suP-tiṄ-antam padam* (A. 1.4.14 – that which ends in nominal or verbal endings). It is a general *saṃjñā* rule meaning that a *pada* is a fully inflected word. However, this very term can apply also to some stems, such as the one ending in the phoneme *n* before the suffix Kya (A. 1.4.15 *naḥ Kye*) or an item before the suffix marked with S (A. 1.4.16 *SiTi ca*), or finally a nominal stem before the case endings excluding the strong ones (i.e. Nom. and Acc. Sg. and Du. and Nom. Pl., A. 1.4.17 *sV-ādiṣv asarvanāmasthāne*).

The *asiddhavat* section (A. 6.4.22-6.4.175) deals with other types of stems. In this section, the rules apply when the stem is termed *aṅga* and, in the latter part of the same section (A. 6.4.129 onwards), they also apply when this term is named *bha*. The term *aṅga* is quite wide and it describes that part of a stem that is before a suffix (A. 1.4.13 *yasmāt pratyaya-vidhis tad-ādi pratyaye 'ṅgam*). For example, when we derive the form *bhavati* starting from *bhū* + *a* + *ti*, first the root *bhū* is termed *aṅga* with respect to the suffix *a*, and then the form *bhava* is so termed with respect to the suffix *ti*. The *sūtra* A. 6.4.129 *bhasya* introduces another domain, the domain of the stem termed *bha*. It is defined by Pāṇini as *y-aCi bham* (A. 1.4.18 – it is an element before the suffix beginning with a vowel or the semivowel *y*). The term *bha* is also extended to such stems which end in the phoneme *t* or *s* before a suffix having the same meaning as the suffix matUP, i.e. possessive, (A. 1.4.19 *ta-sau matV-arthe*) and in the Vedic language onto the stems grouped in the *gaṇa ayasmayādi* ('made of metal' etc.) before any suffix.

The difference lies also in the operations those two sections prescribe. In the *pūrvatrāsiddha* section (A. 8.2.1-8.4.68), in most of the cases the *sūtras* describe phonological operations, substitution, making the phonemes retroflex and accented. Furthermore, the *Tripādī* section contains rules in which Pāṇini describes pronunciation of certain phonemes depending on the meaning of an expression. The *asiddhavat* section on the other hand describes the changes in presuffixal stems, deletion of phonemes, long substitutions, operations on infixes and the like.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I have argued that both *asiddha* and *asiddhavat* refer to two slightly different ways of ordering the application of *sūtras*. There are major differences between the two sections: A. 6.4.22-6.4.175 and A. 8.2.1-8.4.68. In the former the *sūtras* are applied irrespective of their position in the section, the order of their application is determined by other factors, whereas in the latter the *sūtras* apply in order of the appearance in the A. Moreover, in the *ābhīya* section (A. 6.4.22-6.4.175) the suspension applies only when two applicable rules share the same conditions for operation. This is not the case in the *Tripādī* section where such a restriction is not imposed.

One more argument I have advanced in favour of my hypothesis is the application of the *sūtra* A. 1.1.56 *sthānivad ādeśo 'naL-vidhau*, which can apply for the rules in the *ābhīya* section but is forbidden in the *pūrvatrāsiddha* section. In the *Tripādī* it is not allowed to treat the substitute like the substituend as it would obviously defeat the purpose of the *asiddha* principle. The fact that this is not the case in the *asiddhavat* section proves, in my opinion, that these two terms: *asiddha* and *asiddhavat* refer to two separate principles.

The possibility, which I find worth considering, is to determine whether actually in both cases it is the rule that is suspended. I would be inclined to think that in the case of *asiddhavat* (A. 6.4.22-6.4.175) it is actually the operation that is suspended after the rule has been applied. In such a way the operation is performed and it is the result of this operation that becomes suspended. After all the other necessary *sūtras* have been applied, we can see the result of the suspended rule there. In the case of *asiddha* (A. 8.2.1-8.4.68), however, it is the rule itself that is under suspension, which means that it is not used after all, unless the conditions for it to apply can still be met at a later stage of the derivation. This solution requires further investigation.

Abbreviations and Bibliography

A. = Pāṇini: *Aṣṭādhyāyī*

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(2) Sumitra Mangesh Katre: *The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini in Roman transliteration*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 2003 [1st edition: University of Texas Press, Austin 1987].

Mbh. = Patañjali: *Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣyam*, ed. by F. Kielhorn, 3 vols., BORI, Pune 1972 (3rd edition).

MPV = *Mahābhāṣya-pradīpa-vyākhyānāni*, ed. By M.S. Narasiṁhacharya, 10 vols., Institut Français d'Indologie, Pondicherry, 1983.

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Eight

Continuity and Change in *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.1-4

Paolo Visigalli

Eavesdropping might well be despised as a reproachful practice but its allure can generally be opposed only with strong resolve. The more so when we are deftly cajoled into indulging in it and our conciliatory disposition finds sanction in a sacred text.

What is characteristic of the Upaniṣads as a whole, and of *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (ChU) 6 in particular, is that we are offered the chance, as silent spectators, to intrude into a secluded circle and listen to dialogues whose nature is most secretive. Uddālaka and Śvetaketu, father and son, are ensconced in a highly defined environment whose narrow spatial boundaries are often conjured up by the recurrent use of strong deictic words.[1] They sit in the shadow under a specific *nyagrodha*, i.e. a banyan tree, whose actual roots and branches, and one fruit, are resorted to by Uddālaka, who uses them as stepping-stones, to illustrate the successive

[1] Cf., for instance, the frequent use of the deictic *asya*; e.g. ChU.6.11.1-2; 12.1. The emphasis on deixis is considered as a remainder of the 'oral nature' of the Upaniṣads; cf. in this regard OLIVELLE (1996: xxxii).

steps of his teaching and to rub his lesson more effectively into his pupil's mind.

This dialogic, almost intimate, scene is also enhanced by its grammatically heteroclite forms and vernacular formations; phenomena that have induced some distinguished scholars to argue that in ChU.6 we get glimpses of a late Vedic colloquial register.[2]

It is in these sequestered and 'cosy' surroundings and through the medium of a language open to infiltrations of everyday speech that one of the most famous Upaniṣadic teachings is being imparted.[3] Paul Thieme (1968: 722-23) has pointed out, in passing, the defining import of ChU.6. Considering it as marking a watershed in the development of Indian

[2] HOFFMANN (1975: 370) claims that ChU.6 represents 'a piece of late Vedic colloquial language' (ein Stück spätvedischer Umgangssprache); this observation has been taken up by WITZEL (1989: 109): 'One could, however, study colloquial late Vedic as comparable to Pāṇini's *bhāṣā*, notably some text portions found in ChU.6.'

[3] The infiltration of elements that tend to be collected under the somewhat vague heading 'Volkssprache' has been noticed at a phonetic, morphological, and syntactical level. Here are some instances for each group.

Phonetics: A Prakritic phonetic development possibly appears in *nibhālayase* (<*nismārayase*) (ChU.6.12.2 / 13.2). It was first suggested by TEDESCO (1943: 12-13); cf. further MAYRHOFER (1963: 482-83), KUIPER (1958: 309), HOFFMANN (1975: 370), and WITZEL (1989: 110 n. 33). ÖRTEL (1931) discusses other Prakritisms.

Morphology: KUIPER (1958: 308) considers *jāyata*, *apahārṣīt* (ChU.6.2.1 / 16.1) as unaugmented preterits that 'are no doubt to be paralleled with analogous forms of the epic idiom'. HOFFMANN (1975: 368-70) explains *upasīdathāḥ* (ChU.6.13.1.3) as 'a popular reconstruction of the imperative in *–tāt*, in order to build a separate form for the 2nd person'; cf. also MORGENROTH (1970: 39). Further, the word *vācārambhaṇam* (ChU.6.1. 4) has received special attention. DEBRUNNER & WACKERNAGEL (1957: 72) considers it to be a *tatpuruṣa* whose first member is he instrumental *vācā*; however, the first member of the compound seems better to be analysed as a nominative *vācā*; according to KUIPER (1957: 155), 'the substitution of stems in –ā for feminine root nouns is a well-known feature of popular Sanskrit and Präkrit'; cf. also KUIPER (1958: 306-8) and MAYRHOFER (1976: 180).

Syntax: the future *bhaviṣyati* (ChU.6.8.3) expresses a presupposition which is perceived as certain; cf. HOFFMANN (1975: 371) 'der wohl umgangssprachliche potentiale Gebrauch des Futurs' and KUIPER (1958: 309). For the epic language, some instances of the future used in this sense are collected by HOLTZMANN (1884: 35). Different and more complicated is the case of *aprākṣyaḥ* (ChU.6.1.3); cf. the discussion in THIEME (1968: 722 n. 1) and HOFFMANN (1975: 370 n. 25).

thought, he speaks of a 'significant swerve within the intellectual history' (bedeutender geistesgeschichtliche Umschwung).[4] Accepting his conclusions, I will build on them in an endeavour to further delineate this landmark shift. This will be done through a careful reading of ChU.6.1-4. The pertinent elements encountered on our path will be tested against the Vedic backdrop they derive and detach themselves from, in order to put them into perspective.

§1. To begin with, it is appropriate to summarise Thieme's view. According to him, the mental sea change voiced in ChU.6 is concretised in the new meaning taken on by *ādeśa*, the term which Uddālaka uses to denote his new doctrine. This term maintains the specific meaning, 'substitution' (*Ersetzung*),[5] which it used to have in the previous literature, but the nature of this substitution changes drastically. While in the earlier tradition *ādeśa* denoted a substitution operating on the basis of esoteric affinities, now it comes to mean a substitution operating on the strength of a logic-based reasoning. This is indicative of a paradigmatic shift: the former worldview, relying on the belief in magic, is superseded by a materialistic philosophy of nature whose attitude can roughly be defined as rational and proto-scientific.[6]

§2. The setting of ChU.6 is well-known. Having completed his traditional Vedic instruction, Śvetaketu comes back home swell-headed and arrogant. The son's pride in his own learning is silenced as his father

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4 THIEME (1968: 722).

5 KAHRS (1998: 178-83) is sceptical that *ādeśa* means 'substitution' in pre-grammatical literature; instead, he suggests for it the sense of 'specific instruction, specification'. However, Kahrs too agrees that the Vedic occurrences are the source of the later semantic specification of *ādeśa* in the sense of 'substitution' as employed in grammar.

6 THIEME (1968: 722): 'Die an die Wunderkraft übersinnlicher Wahrheit glaubende Magie mit ihren esoterischen Identifikationsersetzungen [...] wird abgelöst von einer an die Kraft der Vernunft glaubenden materialistischen Naturphilosophie – der Vorstufe des Sāmkhya'; cf. also THIEME (1966: 84-85).

questions whether he had been acquainted with the *ādeśa,* 'by which one can learn what has (hitherto) not been heard of (by oneself), can think of what has (hitherto) not been thought (by oneself), can apprehend what has (hitherto) not been apprehended (by oneself)' (ChU.6.1.3: *yena aśrutaṃ śrutam bhavaty amataṃ matam avijñātaṃ vijnātam iti*).[7] Śvetaketu knows nothing about this unheard-of rule of substitution (*ādeśa*) and requests his father to disclose it to him. Uddālaka agrees and starts to expound his wisdom systematically.

In the section under discussion, the progression of Uddālaka's speech follows a clear path.[8] Firstly, he sketches a cosmogony, showing how, from the primeval being (*sat*), the three basic evolutes (*tejas*, *āpas*, *anna*) came into being, engendered one from the other (ChU.6.2). Then, he moves on to describe how the three basic evolutes, after being entered by the living self of the *sat*, and after acquiring their distinct 'name and appearance' (*nāma-rūpa*),[9] become the three basic substances of the cosmos (ChU.6.3). Lastly, he shows that worldly phenomena, both at the macrocosmic (ChU.6.3.4-4.7a, *adhidaivika*) and the microcosmic (ChU 6.4.7b-7, *adhyātman*) level, are in essence a mixture of the three basic substances.

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7 This sentence, owing to its tempting transparency, has often been understood imperfectly. What is here foremost at stake, I believe, is not the acquisition of a rarefied mystical knowledge; instead, the stress is on how to get the key to the understanding of the world, with the empirical phenomena in the forefront; this *clavis universalis*, which is the unheard-of *ādeśa* taught by Uddālaka, will consist in the notion that the whole world, at its different levels, is made of the intermingling of the three basic evolutes (*tejas, apas, anna*) which emanated from the primeval 'being' (*sat*).

8 I take ChU.6.3.1 as a later interpolation, as it is widely assumed to be, and do not include it in my analysis; cf. FALK (1986: 125 n. 79), HANEFELD (1976: 146). In this regard, it is worth stressing that ChU.6 undoubtedly has a complex textual history, being a cobbled-on ensemble of bits of disparate origin. RENOU (1955: 91) identifies at least two sections on the grounds of the repetition of *vijajñav iti* (ChU.6.7 / 16); HANEFELD (1976: 142) argues that, from a 'mere formal standpoint', this text is made of two major sections (ChU.6.1-7 / 8-16) but an analysis of its contents shows a much more complex situation (Ibid. 168). Against Hanefeld's ideas and according to the traditional interpretation, I take 1-7 as expounding a rather organic teaching.

9 Cf. below §7.

§3. ChU.6.2.1: *sad eva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyaṃ* [...] |

> Nothing but being, my son, was here in the beginning – one only, without a second.

The opening of Uddālaka's cosmogony is indebted to the cosmogonic narratives of the Brāhmaṇas. Clear indicators of this dependence are the use of the imperfect to denote a remote, 'mythical' past[10] and the two adverbs – *agre*, which, in this context, typically refers to the primeval time before the creation,[11] and *idam*, which oscillates between the pronominal ('this [universe/world]') and the adverbial ('here', i.e. in this world) meaning.[12]

A divergent position is introduced and then immediately refuted:

> ChU.6.2.1-2: *tad dhaika āhur asad evedam agra āsīd ekam eva advitīyaṃ tasmād asataḥ saj jāyata* || *kutas tu khalu somyaivaṃ syād iti hovāca katham asataḥ saj jāyeteti sat tv eva somyedam agra āsīd ekam evādvitīyam* ||

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[10] An original narrative imperfect has partially been ousted in this function by the later emergence and diffusion of the perfect. WITZEL (1989: 139-55) shows how the diffusion and incidence of these two forms can help determine the chronology and geographical origins of a text; cf. also WITZEL (1987: 392 ff. / 2009: 295-96).

[11] RENOU (1955b: 82 n 2) observes that *agre* meaning 'à l'origine', 'originated in this sense in the cosmogonic hymn ṚV.10.129.3-4, appropriately next to the imperfect *āsīt*.'

[12] Cf. RENOU (1955b: 81-82) and HAMM (1968-69: 151 n. 10). In post-Brāhmaṇa literature, these three features – imperfect, accompanied by *agre* and *idam* – abound whenever 'un esquisse de cosmogonie' (RENOU, 1955b: 81) is being drawn. They also show a lasting vitality into later Sanskrit literature; see e.g. *Manusmṛti* 1.5, where, as several commentators have pointed out, there is a clear hint at ṚV.10.129: *āsīd idaṃ tamobhūtam aprajñātam alakṣaṇam | apratarkyam avijñeyaṃ prasuptam iva sarvataḥ* 'There was this world pitch-dark, indiscernible, without distinguishing marks, unthinkable, incomprehensible, in a kind of deep sleep all over', Tr. OLIVELLE (2004: 13).

> Now with respect to this (point)[13] some say: "Nothing but non-being was here in the beginning – one only, without a second. From that non-being, being was born". "But how, son, could that possibly be so?" He said. "How can being be born from non-being?". "On the contrary, son, nothing but being was here in the beginning – one only, without a second".

§4. We are in the fortunate position to know the source Uddālaka is arguing against; it is widely recognised that *asataḥ saj jāyata* is a quotation from Ṛgveda (ṚV) 10.72.2-3. An analysis of that source will help us identify the reasons of Uddālaka's refutation:

> ṚV.10.72.2c,d-3: *devánāṃ pūrviyé yugé ásataḥ sád ajāyata* ‖ 2 *devánāṃ yugé prathamé ásataḥ sád ajāyata* | *tád áśā ánv ajāyanta tád uttānápadas pári* ‖ 3
>
> In the earliest age of the gods the existent was born from the non-existent. In the first age of the gods the existent was born from the non-existent. After this (*tád*) the quarters of the sky were born: this (*tád*)[14] was born from her crouching with her legs spread.

This hymn deals with cosmogony in a way that seems to us rather odd and inconclusive. Instead of offering a clear grasp of the matter, the poet churns out different and self-contradictory explanations; he is not aiming at providing one consistent narrative, just the opposite. The thriving of irreconcilable viewpoints is intentionally sought after in order to generate the strong impression that nothing definite can be said of the 'fernstes Morgengrauen des Weltleben' ('the distant daybreak of cosmic life').[15] Modern readers are particularly puzzled by the inconsistency of the accounts on the origin of *sát*.[16] It is said to have been born from *ásat* (2d,

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[13] HAMM (1968-69: 151 n. 11) is wrong when he states that '*tad* surely refers back to *idam* in the previous sentence'. Here *tad* is used adverbially, as made explicit in my translation; similarly, THIEME (1966), HANEFELD (1976: 119), and OLIVELLE (1996: 149).

[14] The two *tád* refer back to *sát* in the previous line; cf. GELDNER (1951: 251).

[15] OLDENBERG (1919: 53); similarly, GELDNER (1951: 250) and O' FLAHERTY (1981: 37-38); cf. further ELIZARENKOVA's (1995: 142) pertinent remarks on another Ṛgvedic cosmogony (ṚV.10.129).

[16] Cf. for instance OLDENBERG's (1909-12: 275) uncertainty on this score.

3b), and then, in the very next hemistich (3d), this primordial non-existent is vividly rendered with the image of *uttānápad* 'one whose legs are spread',[17] depicting a woman in childbearing. The explanation we can give of this seeming contradiction may shed some light on Uddālaka's rejection of this Vedic cosmogony. It may be suggested that the difference in meaning that this pair of terms (*sat/asat*) show in the two different contexts (ṚV.10.72.2-3 / ChU.6.2.1-2) accounts for Uddālaka's blunt refusal (he does not feel bound to give any explanation for his dismissal of *asat* in favour of *sat*: for him, it seems to be almost a matter of course[18]).

In ChU.6, both *sat* and *asat* have a strong ontological status – therefore my translation with 'being' and 'non-being'. Indeed, *sat* is a highly refined abstract notion; nothing can be predicated of it except that 'it was' (*āsīt*) and that it was 'one only' (*ekam eva*);[19] 'non-being' follows suit. In this regard, it has been noticed that the passage under discussion is the only passage in Vedic literature in which '*asat* may be interpreted, with a fair degree of certainty, as *tò mḕ ǒn*', i.e. as the non-being in a fundamental sense.[20] Arguably, the status the two words have in ṚV.10.72.2-3 is rather different, and this difference is what allows the poet-seers to equate *ásat* and the figure of *uttānápad* without incurring in a logical-philosophical contradiction. One can argue that, in the Vedic hymn, the adjectival value

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[17] Following OLDENBERG (1909-12: 275), most translators take *uttānápad* as standing for *ásat* of the preceding line; cf. HILLEBRANDT (1913: 129), BROWN (1965: 29), GELDNER (1951: 251), HOCK (2007: 72 n. 1). The sense of *uttānápad* has been much discussed; for a survey of opinions, see O' FLAHERTY (1981: 38). OLDENBERG (*loc. cit.*) draws attention to the similar expression *uttānáhasta* 'whose hands are outstretched', an expression which has a counterpart in Avestan; see MELI (1996: 5 n. 1). KRAMRISCH (1956) reproduces some iconographic examples of *uttānápad*.

[18] I do not think one can subscribe to VAN BUITENEN's (1957: 104) opinion that 'Uddālaka, while doing away with *asat*, is quite aware of his originality as his justification shows'. On the contrary, the teacher is so much aware of the self-evident nature of the truth he has just expounded that, expecting it to be a truism also for Śvetaketu, gives no justification whatsoever. This point is aptly evidenced in EDGERTON's (1965: 171) translation: 'But how – surely you must see – could it be so, my dear?'.

[19] Cf. THIEME's (1966: 45) remarks and OLDENBERG's succinct yet insightful observations (1919: 52).

[20] ÖRTEL (1938: 321).

of *sát* and *ásat* (I therefore translated them with 'existent' and 'non-existent') is still at the forefront, whereas in ChU.6 they have acquired a substantive force, becoming full-fledged abstract nouns.[21]

Further, one could say that the weak ontological status of *sát* and *ásat* in the Vedic hymn is due first and foremost to a limitation inherent in the Vedic conceptual background itself: no rarefied *creatio ex nihilo* is conceivable in Vedic cosmogony, the underlying paradigm of the creation of the world being human (and animal) birth, as is graphically exemplified in the figure of *uttānápad*. As Geldner briefly points out, '*jan-* is the oldest expression to denote "to create". The image of birth will be always maintained with respect to cosmogony.'"[22] The whole range of verbs employed in a cosmogonic context, as is illustrated by Oldenberg,[23] make clear that the creation (no matter whether occasioned by a personal god, as Prajāpati, or an abstract *Ursubstanz*) is viewed as the passage of a pre-existing substance into another state, a passage in the course of which, however, there occurs no change affecting the substantial identity between the cause and its product. To use the much later and colder scholastic terminology, we can say that there is no substantial diversity between the material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) and its product (*kārya*).[24]

§5. Bearing in mind the newer and ontologically 'strong' meanings of *sat* and *asat*, Uddālaka could not but reject the Vedic position as blatantly untenable. Then, Uddālaka goes on describing the next step of the cosmogonic process:

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21 BRERETON (1999: 250 n. 11) too emphasises the difference between *sat* and *asat* in the Vedic hymns and in ChU.6; commenting on their adjectival force in ṚV.10.129 he argues that 'by the time of *Chāndogya*, the religious and literary contexts had changed and these terms had begun to develop a technical and abstract meaning'. Cf. further VAN BUITENEN (1957: 104) 'The habit of translating this *sat* itself as "Being", already in ṚV.10.129 is at best an error of anachronism'.

22 GELDNER (1951: 251).

23 OLDENBERG (1919: 167-74).

24 Cf. ÖRTEL (1933: 358-60).

ChU.6.2.3-4: *tad aikṣata bahu syāṃ prajāyeteti | tat tejo 'sṛjata | tat teja aikṣata | bahu syāṃ prajāyeyeti | tad apo 'sṛjata* [...] ‖ *tā āpa aikṣanta – bahvyaḥ syāma prajāyemahīti | tā annam asṛjanta* [...] ‖

And it (*sat*) thought to itself: "Let me become many. Let me propagate myself." It emitted heat. The heat thought to itself: "Let me become many. Let me propagate myself." It emitted water [...]. The water thought to itself: "Let me become many. Let me propagate myself." It emitted food [...]. (Tr. Olivelle).

It is at this stage that a most significant element in Indian cosmogonic narratives makes its somewhat concealed appearance: *kāma* 'desire'; it is its stealthy entrance on stage that perturbs the equilibrium and triggers off the process of creation. In this passage the agency of 'desire' may not appear as clearly as elsewhere, owing to the seeming (perhaps only for us) lack of 'emotional involvement' that a neutral verb such as *aikṣata* seems to convey.[25] Nevertheless, the fact that the substances, in turn, express their wishes (in the optative), seems to be reason enough to assume 'desire' as the actual if implicit cause of their resolve. A comparison with the cosmogonic narratives of the Brāhmaṇas will bring out the peculiar traits of the cosmogony narrated in ChU.6 and suggests an explanation for the low-profile role 'desire' seems to have in it.

Stripped to the bone, Brāhmaṇa cosmogonies follow a simple underlying pattern: the primeval entity, Prajāpati, the generator of all creatures, is overcome by the desire of emitting offspring; in order to do so, he heats himself up by means of *tapas*. Typically, the texts read: 'Prajāpati conceived the desire "may I emit offspring" [thus] he heated up himself with *tapas*' (*prajāpatir akāmayata prajā sṛjeyeti sa tapo 'tapyata*).[26] It is clear

[25] The sense of *aikṣata* here is not just 'to see' but 'to see with one's mind's eyes', 'to think'; cf. THIEME (1966: 46) 'Da nahm das Seiende wahr'; EDGERTON (1965: 171) 'It considered'; HAMM (1968-69: 151) 'Das betrachtete bei sich'. FALK (1986: 28-29) suggests that expressions that seem to appear interchangeably in cosmogonic sections such as *so 'manyata* and *so 'kāmayata* have the very same meaning. We might be tempted to add *aikṣata* to the group of synonyms and put our text on a par with the rest. Only an extensive exploration and comparison of the occurrences of these verbs would probably settle the question.

[26] See the references in GELDNER (1951: 360), *ad* RV.10.129.4. For *tapas* in cosmogony cf. KÄLBER (1976: 371-76). Cf. *MuchAdo about Nothing* (IV.1.39): 'She knows the *heat* of a luxurious bed'.

that in ChU.6, though desire (yet in a somehow subdued manner) and the cosmogonic verb par exellence (*√sṛj*)[27] are present, neither Prajāpati nor *tapas* are mentioned (unless we want to adopt the unlikely view of considering it as indirectly referred to, though in a different cosmogonic function, under the disguise of *tejas*, the first product of *sat*). The very first stage in the cosmogony of ChU.6 can be summarised as follows: compelled by desire, the primeval being (*sat*) emits the first evolute (*tejas*). Because of the absence of a markedly gendered masculine Prajāpati the cosmogony appears as a 'desexualised' and 'mechanical' process which merely involves substances. Passivity and 'the least possible amount of physical action' have been identified as the defining traits of cosmogonic narratives as they appear in the Upaniṣads, in sharp contrast to the highly active role played by Prajāpati in the Brāhmanas.[28] As I will show later in detail, the general impression of 'automatism' that characterises this cosmogonic narrative is to be understood in relation with the new doctrine expounded by Uddālaka.

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[27] As pointed out by OLDENBERG (1919: 168-71), *√sṛj* 'to release from oneself' ('aus sich entlassen') is used in cosmogonic narratives together with *nir-√mā*, 'to measure off from something (a material), (therefore to fashion, to produce).' We may add to these verbs also *nir-√takṣ*; cf. ÖRTEL (1933: 359 / 1938: 320). DELBRÜCK (1888: 457) perceptively defines the nuance conveyed by the *upasarga nir*: it indicates that 'the product is already present in the material from which it will be produced' ('das Kunstwerk steckt in dem Stoff, aus dem es herausgebracht wird'). Though Delbrück's observation is confined to *nir-√takṣ*, it can nevertheless be extended to include *nir-√mā*, and, generally, all verbs of creation used in cosmogonic narratives (*√jan* and *√sṛj* included).

Further, a remark concerning the sense of *√sṛj*; if understood in light of the Vedic notion of conception, *√sṛj* does not simply mean to 'emit' but 'to procreate'. As KÄLBER (1976: 351-55) has shown, according to Vedic ideas, the embryo (*garbha*) is already fully present in the male's semen (*retas*) and is solely transferred into the female (*garbhādhāna*), without her actual participation in its formation. This means that Prajāpati's ejaculation is already a kind of procreation.

[28] KÄLBER (1976: 372-73) identifies the roots of this lack of agency in the fact that Prajāpati's original status as the divine creator begins being obliterated in the Upaniṣads and thus he comes to be frequently equated with the 'unknowable, unalterable, impersonal *ātman*'.

§6. As mentioned above, *kāma* 'desire' is a trait which, variously inflected, is invariably present in Indian cosmogonic narratives; its irruption sparks the shift from unity to multiplicity. Its appearance in such contexts can be traced as far back as the tenth book of the Ṛgveda (10.129). As this hymn had enormous influence on later cosmogonic narratives, ChU.6 included, it is worth dwelling on it. In particular, I shall focus on the fourth verse in which *kāma* makes its appearance— ṚV.10.129.4a,b: *kámas tád ágre sám avartatádhi mánaso rétaḥ prathamáṃ yád ásīt.*

The interpretation of this hemistich is not straightforward and may lead to two renditions, depending on how we analyse and construe the first *pāda*. Construing *saṃ √vṛt-* (*sám avartata*) with *ádhi*, and thus intending it as a transitive verb with the sense of 'to come upon', 'to take possession of', several scholars take *tád* as its governed object. For instance, Macdonnel translates like this: 'Desire in the beginning came upon that, (desire) that was the first seed of mind.'[29] On the contrary, two other scholars (Thieme, Brereton) take *tád* as an adverb and therefore understand the verb *vṛt-* as intransitive. Consequently, *ádhi* is not considered as an *upasarga* of *saṃ √vṛt-* but as an independent particle. Thus, taking *ádhi* as a preposition governing the following ablative *mánaso*, Joel Brereton (1999: 253) translates as follows: 'Then, in the beginning, from thought there developed desire, which existed as the primal semen.'[30] In support of his translation Brereton claims that: 'although the construction crosses *pāda* boundaries [*ádhi / mánaso*],[31] it is more in accordance with Ṛgvedic diction to construe *mánasaḥ* as an ablative with *ádhi*', and points to a parallel phrase in RV. 7.33.11ab: *utá́si...urváśyā brahman mánasó 'dhi jātáḥ*, 'And you, Brahman, are born from the thought of Urvaśī' (254).

[29] MACDONELL (1917: 210).

[30] THIEME (1964: 67) too takes *tád* as an adverb and renders: 'a craving [for existence] originated there in the beginning, which [i.e. craving] existed as first as seed of the mind' ('Ein Begehren [nach Entstehung] bildete sich da im Anfang, das als Same des Denkens als erstes existierte'); in his translation, Thieme unaccountably omits *ádhi*. The rendering of this *pāda*, and therefore a right understanding of *ádhi*, seems to be the key to the interpretation of the whole hymn, and my entire interpretation relies on it. I am aware that, if *sám avartatádhi* were to be satisfactorily explained in a different way, my whole analysis should need to be reconsidered.

[31] However, JAMISON (2007: 241) shows that, in some cases, Vedic poets deliberately use the crossing of *pāda* boundaries as an expressive device.

Brereton's interpretation is however unconvincing, for two main reasons. First, *ádhi* preferably tends to occur as a postposition (as in the example adduced, in which, incidentally, there is no *pāda* crossing) rather than a preposition, although, as is well-known, Vedic poetic syntax is rather fluid. Second, and more cogently, it may be observed that in all its occurrences in the tenth book of the Ṛgveda in the sense of 'originate'[32] *saṃ-* √*vṛt* governs the ablative, without requiring the preposition *ádhi*. This can be proven by quoting the relevant passages:

ṚV.10.90.14b: *śīrṣṇó dyaúḥ sám avartata* |

From [his] head the sky evolved.

ṚV.10.121.7a,b,c: *ápo ha yád bṛhatīr víśvam áyan gárbhaṃ dádhānā janáyantīr agním* | *táto devánāṃ sám avartatásur ékaḥ* |

When the high (deep) waters came, impreganted with the All as an embryo, bringing forth fire, from that one [i.e. the embryo] evolved the life's breath of the gods as the only [which existed].[33]

In light of the above, then, it seems better to endorse the first interpretation. Now, a question arises, the answer to which will prove to be fundamental for the right understanding of the hymn: what does the pronoun *tád* in ṚV.10.129.4a stand for? In order to gain clarity on this point, we need to consider this verse together with verses 1-4a, because they constitute a closely knitted series of argumentation.

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[32] Cf. GELDNER (1907: 170) 'werden, entstehen'.

[33] Cf. THIEME (1964: 70) 'bildete sich der Lebenshauch der Himmlischen als der Einzige [der existierte]'. I take *gárbham* as predicative of *víśvam*, following GELDNER (1951: 348) 'das All als Keim empfangend', THIEME (1964: 70) 'die [Wasser] das All als Embryo trugen', and ELIZARENKOVA (1972: 262) 'carrying in themselves the whole as an embryo' (Вбирая в себя все как зародыш). Further, I take *táto* as referring to *gárbha*, an interpretation which is also accepted by ELIZARENKOVA (Ibid.): '... he arose *from this* as the only and vital force of the gods' он возник *из этого* как единая и жизненная сила богов (emphasis added).

ṚV.10.129.1-4a: *násad āsīn nó sád āsīt tadānīṃ nāsīd rájo nó víomā paró yát* |
kím ávarīvaḥ kúha kásya śármann ámbhaḥ kím āsīd gáhanaṃ gabhīrám ‖ 1
ná mṛtúr āsīd amṛtaṃ ná tárhi ná rā́triyā áhna āsīt praketáḥ |
ánīd avātáṃ svadháyā tád ékaṃ tásmād dhānyán ná paráḥ kíṃ canása ‖ 2
táma āsīt támasā gūḷhám ágre apraketáṃ salilā́ṃ sárvam ā idám |
túchyénābhú ápihitaṃ yád ā́sīt tápasas tán mahinā́jāyataíkam ‖ 3
kā́mas tád ágre sám avartatā́dhi mánaso rétaḥ prathamáṃ yád ā́sīt |

Then there was neither non-existent nor existent;[34] there was not air, nor the sky beyond it; what stirred? Where? In whose keeping?[35] Was there water – the deep chasm? (1) Then there was neither death nor non-death; there was no sign of night and day; that, alone, breathed, windless, by its own impulse; other than that there was not anything beyond (2). In the beginning there was darkness, hidden in darkness; a signless ocean[36] was all this; the germ, which was covered by emptiness, that was born as the one, through the power of heat (3).[37] Desire in the

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[34] There has been much controversy among scholars whether *ásat* and *sát* in 1a are to be taken as subjects or rather as predicates of an implied subject. In the latter case there seems to be two options: either to take them as predicates of *idám* 'this [i.e. undeveloped world]' (supplied from 3b) or of *mánas* 'mind' (supplied from 4b). This last interpretation is supported by *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* 10.5.3.2; it is also adopted by GELDNER (1908: 16 / 1909: 208) and BRERETON (1999: 254). However, it seems to me that OLDENBERG (1912: 346 / 1919: 53 n. 2) convincingly argues that 1a should be interpreted in its context: just like in 1b it is said 'there was not air', or in 2a 'there was not death', so in 1a *ásat* and *sát* should be understood as the subjects of the respective clauses ('nicht war das Nichtseiende noch war das Seiende damals'). Such a conclusion does not deprive *mánas* of its centrality in the hymn, however. As FALK (1986: 25-34) has taught us, this cosmogony (macrocosm) is intrinsically bound up with the psychic structure of man (microcosm) and is primarily a 'psychological cosmogony' ('cosmogonia psicologica').

[35] I adopt COLLINS' (1975: 272 n. 6) suggestion that here *kásya śármann* 'seem to refer to the power of constriction', to be interpreted as 'bondage' rather than 'protection'. THIEME (1964: 67 n. 1) offers two different interpretations of the passage.

[36] For a full discussion of the word *salilā́ṃ*, see THIEME (1961: 102-6). Questionable is ELIZARENKOVA's (1972: 408) remarks that *salilā́ṃ* (rendered with пучина, 'abyss') indicates 'waters representing chaos, opposed to the water that bears in it the cosmic embryo'. Among all the translations that I have consulted, only FALK (1986) intends a full stop after *āsīt* in 3a and translates thus: 'Oscurità c'era. Da oscurità celato un inconsaputo ondeggiare era tutto questo'.

[37] BRERETON's (1999: 252) translation of this verse is strained, principally marred by his refusal to recognise the clear relative-correlative construction; he intends *yád* and *tád* as temporal adverbs and translates thus: 'When the thing coming into being was

beginning came upon that (*tád*), which [i.e. desire] was the first seed of the mind (4a).

Let us focus on the verses 3c,d and 4a,b. In my opinion, these two hemistichs, closely interwoven formally in a chiasmic construction,[38] do not represent successive phases of the cosmogonic account as is generally admitted. Instead, they both refer back to the primordial time of the origins, thus severing any presumed temporal/causal link between 3c,d and 4a,b; this is corroborated by the following observations. According to both traditional cosmogonic narratives and logic, *kā́ma* (introduced in 4a) always precedes *tápas* (introduced in 3d), and not vice versa.[39] Accordingly, if a succession of cosmogonic stages is given at all, it would be more appropriate to consider 4a to describe a stage preceding the one in 3d. However, the hymn does not seek to provide a coherent cosmogony which can be articulated in subsequent stages. In this regard, consider the use of *ágre* in 4a, which suggests that the episode that is there referred to took place 'in the beginning'. Indeed, adverbs indicating a mythical past are deftly positioned in the first *pāda* of each verse,[40] thus giving the impression that each verse does actually refer to the same primordial stage, rather than depicting subsequent stages of the evolution of the cosmos. As Brereton (1999) has perceptively noticed, all verses up to 4a included, show a similar 'rewinding' structure; after describing the primordial situation before creation in the first hemistich, they give some new information in the second hemistich, only to slip back, almost fuelling a sense of exasperation, and start once again this sequence in the first *pāda* of the

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concealed by emptiness, then was the One born by the power of heat'.

38 The two imperfects (*ajāyata, avartata*) occur in the same position within their respective *pādas*, closed in by two genitives (*tápasas, mánasas*); the whole portion is locked in by *yád ásīt*. All translators render 4b as a relative clause with *yád* as the subject standing for *kā́ma*; the change of gender is explained by the attraction of the predicate *rétas*. I wonder whether it would not be more straightforward to see a relative-correlative construction in 4a,b; the formal symmetry with 3c,d would seem to support this interpretation.

39 I think RENOU (1956: 254) is wrong when he affirms that *kā́ma* follows *tápas*.

40 1a) *tadā́nīm*; 2a) *tárhi*; 3a) *ágre*; 4a) *ágre*; cf. BRERETON (1999: 252) 'Like the first lines of vss. 1 and 2, line 3a ends with an indicator of time [...] that once again places the verse back at the origins'.

next verse. I take *tád* in 4a as having the same referent as the relative/correlative clause of 3c,d, namely *ābhú*, the "germ";[41] this *ābhú* is also the *tád ékaṃ* in 2c.

Furthermore, this interpretation – which identifies only one main referent (i.e., 2c: *tád ékaṃ*; 3c: *ābhú*; 4a: *tád*) for all the verses – seems to be supported by the overall structure of the first half (1-4a) of the hymn. Indeed, these verses can be interpreted as attempts to answer the three questions posited in 1c: *kím ávarīvaḥ kúha kásya śármann*, 'what stirred? Where? In whose keeping?'. The first question is answered in 2c: *ánīd avātáṃ svadháyā tád ékaṃ*, 'that, alone, breathed, windless, by its own impulse'. The second one is answered in 3b: *apraketáṃ salilám sárvam ā idám*, 'a signless ocean was all this'. The third one is answered in 3c: *tuchyénābhú ápihitaṃ yád ásīt*, 'The germ, which was covered by emptiness'.

In conclusion, we can plausibly reconstruct the following cosmogonic narrative. In the mythical past before creation there was neither the existent nor the non-existent; there 'existed' only an embryo (*ābhú*), placed in the primordial waters, enwrapped in emptiness (*tuchyéna*). Within its covering, this embryo is said to live a maggot-like life, a form of quiescent existence on the liminary threshold between non-existent and full-blown life.[42] This life *in potentia* – this existence preceding actual existence – has its defining activity in breathing without wind.[43] This phantom of life is stirred by the action of *kā́ma*, which, coming upon the embryo, sets it into imperceptible motion; the embryo begins to breathe and to stir.[44] It is the entrance on

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[41] In this passage, the continuous text can be separated differently and thus yield *abhú* resulting from 'a' privative plus √*bhū*. The separation in *ābhú* is however to be preferred; cf. BRERETON's (1999: 253) brief discussion of these two possibilities.

[42] To put it in FALK's (1986: 25) suggestive words: 'Era di certo, ma poiché ancora il suo essere non s'era rivelato, doveva vivere di una vita sensibile, celata – quasi dormiente'. Ultimately, the symbolic image alluded to in this hymn, the egg immersed in the primordial waters, is similar to that employed in another famous cosmogonic hymn, RV.10.121.7.

[43] It is not superfluous to remark that breathing and blinking are Vedic expressions commonly used to denote life *tout court*; cf. e.g. ṚV.10.121.3. Therefore, breathing without actual wind seems to be a phrase that fittingly refers to an embryonic stage of existence.

[44] It is noteworthy that *ávarīvaḥ* 1c has been interpreted as a stirring that refers

stage of 'desire' that triggers off the appearance of *tápas*, in a causal rapport that is widely attested in the Indian tradition. Through hatching, *tápas* brings forth the embryo, making it come into actual existence (*ajāyata* 3d).[45] At this point the narration of the cosmogonic process stops, and the second half of the hymn shifts to other topics.

It is worth stressing that the cosmogony in RV.10.129 is a model for the cosmogony in ChU.6, inasmuch as it represents 'one of the oldest attempts in ancient India of a cosmogony deriving from a *philosophy of nature*, an approach which will reach a peak in the Upaniṣads.'[46]

§7. Let us go back to the conclusive steps of Uddālaka's cosmogonic narration.

> ChU.6.3.2-4: *seyaṃ devataikṣata hantāham imās tisro devatānena jīvenātmanānupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaravāṇīti ‖ tāsāṃ trivṛtaṃ trivṛtam ekaikāṃ karavāṇīti | seyaṃ devatemās tisro devatānenaiva jīvenātmanānupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākarot ‖ tāsāṃ trivṛtaṃ trivṛtam ekaikām akarot | yathā tu khalu somya imās tisro devatās trivṛttrivṛdekaikā bhavati tan me vijānīhīti ‖*
>
> Then that same deity thought to itself: "Come now, why don't I establish the distinctions of name and appearance by entering these three deities here with this living self (*ātman*), and make each of them threefold". So, that deity established the distinctions of name and appearance by entering these three deities here with

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predominantly to breath; cf. GELDNER (1951: 359). Further, it may be suggested that a semantic link connects together *kím ávarīvaḥ* 1c and *sám avartādhi* 4a. As was first pointed out by OLDENBERG (1919: 346), and afterwards generally accepted by most scholars, *ávarīvaḥ* is an intensive better to be derived from √*vṛt* than from √*vṛ*.
The use of verbal forms from the same root may be considered as an intentional device used to suggest a link between these two passages of the hymn; HILLEBRANDT (1913: 133 n. 2) too identifies this link but he interprets it differently.

45 *tápas* and embryo seem to depend on the image of a bird hatching her egg. THIEME (1964: 66) renders *tápas* '[Brut-]Hitze'; cf. also GELDNER (1951: 360): 'Im *tapas* steckt zugleich die Vorstellung des brütenden Vogels'.

46 THIEME (1964: 65): 'einer der ältesten Versuche altindischer naturphilosophischer Weltentstehungsspekulation, wie sie in den Upanischaden einen Höhepunkt erreicht'; emphasis added.

this living self (3), and made each of them threefold. Learn from me, my son, how each of these three deities becomes threefold. (Tr. Olivelle)

After the production of the three basic evolutes (*tejas, āpas, anna*) the creation is still incomplete. Condensed though it may appear, I think that a typical Vedic conception is here implied. According to a widespread Vedic paradigm, the first creation proves to be something of a bungled work brought about by the activity of an awkwardly operating creator who fails to endow his creation with the necessary equilibrium: his product is impaired either by the excessive similarity (*jāmi*) of its components or by their unbridgeable discontinuity (*pṛthak*). Stability is generally obtained as a consequence of a second creation (*visṛṣṭi*),[47] which is represented as a sacrificial act that marks the passage from a chaotic primary phase to a well-structured cosmos.[48] Applying this Vedic paradigm to our passage, we could say that, after coming into being, the three evolutes are still in a state of *jāmi* and need to be differentiated so that a cosmos may be shaped out of them. The primordial divinity achieves this by entering them and making them articulate (*vy-ā-√kṛ*) in name and appearance (*nāmarūpe*).[49]

The verb *vy-ā-√kṛ* deserves consideration. The meaning it shows in our text has been explained by Thieme as: 'to drive asunder, to give a specific form.'[50] We see that by 'driving asunder' the *devatā* (*sat*) performs a creative act, endowing that which was previously undifferentiated with 'name' and 'form'. In this operation one can legitimately see a far-off reverberation of Indra's demiurgic act directed against the power of resistance personified by Vṛtra, an act through which 'a world of mere potentiality became the world of reality.'[51] The *devatā* (*sat*) enters the three basic evolutes, provides them with name and form and, by mingling each of them with the other two, makes each one threefold, thus creating the

47 Cf. RENOU (1956: 254).

48 SMITH (1989: 54-69) gives a clear treatment of this mythical model.

49 For the rendition of *nāmarūpe* with 'name and appearance' cf. OLIVELLE (1996: 493).

50 THIEME (1982: 27) where *vy-ā-√kṛ* in ChU.6 is analysed within a redefinition of the meaning of the term *vyākaraṇa*. Referring to ChU.6, OLDENBERG (1919: 173) renders *vy-ā-√kṛ* with 'auseinanderlegen'; 'Er legt das Geschaffene aus einander, gibt so dem Ungestalteten Gestalt'.

51 KUIPER (1975: 109); cf. THIEME (1982: 23).

phenomenic world. At this point, Uddālaka goes on showing how his teaching can find an application on an 'empirical' level; he illustrates the validity of his cosmogony by resorting to examples which make evident how particular forms of the first of the basic evolutes (*tejas*) can be broken down into their constitutive elements.

§8. It will suffice to examine only the first example given by Uddālaka.

> ChU.6.4.1: *yad agne rohitaṁ rūpaṃ tejasas tad rūpam | yac chuklaṃ tad apām | yat krsṇaṃ tad annasya | apāgād agner agnitvam | vācārambhaṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyam trīṇi rūpaṇīty eva satyam ||*
>
> The red appearance of fire is the appearance of heat, the white, that of water, and the black, that of food. [Thus] the distinct/proper nature (*agnitva*) of fire has disappeared; the modification[52] is [merely] a verbal handle, a name – the actual reality is indeed the three appearances.

This is a very dense passage which has been interpreted in different ways. In particular, the latter half has been appropriately called a *crux interpretum*.[53] Harking back to Thieme's observations, I shall attempt to provide a more exhaustive interpretation of this passage. First of all, it is important to point out that in these lines two radically different cognitive modes (one could say epistemologies) are opposed. By deliberately challenging the received wisdom, Uddālaka prompts his son to recognise fire not as a unitary entity but as a composite one, which can be broken down into its three constituents, an operation which seems to rest on a preliminary observation.[54] Let us have a closer look at Uddālaka's words.

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[52] I share VAN BUITENEN's (1958: 296) view, who sees a clear link between *vikāra* (ChU.6.4) and the verb *vy-ā-√kṛ* (ChU.6.3), 'a process of *vikāra* , or the creation of names and forms'; so the specific and partial forms (*vikāra*) are the product of the 'driving asunder, giving a specific form' of the *sat*.

[53] KUIPER (1957: 155).

[54] With respect to this interesting aspect THIEME (1966: 46) comments that the white *rūpa* appears in the smoke, whereas the black one occurs both in smoke as well as in the burned things; cf. further HANEFELD (1976: 157), where he speaks of a 'theory relying on observing nature'.

The received wisdom that is here challenged is briefly yet, I believe, incontrovertibly evoked with the phrase *apāgād agner agnitvam* '[Thus] the distinct/proper nature (*agnitva*) of fire has disappeared'. Indeed, the expression *agner agnitvam* can be identified as one of the formulas commonly found in the Brāhmaṇas in which the genitive of a noun precedes its abstract (schematically: x-genitive x-*tva*). These formulas have been shown to introduce a 'semantic analysis' of the name under discussion,[55] i.e. a semantic etymologising which aims to elucidate the connection between name and entity – these two things being perceived as intimately connected.[56] Uddālaka's teaching breaks away from the tradition, for he rejects semantic etymologising as a valid means of knowledge. To this ancient means he opposes an observation-based cognition of worldly phenomena which is both exemplified and sanctioned through the above-sketched cosmogony. It is erroneous to assume an essential nature underlying the empirical manifestation of fire; a nature expressed by the abstract noun in *–tva*, which is known only to the initiated who uncovers it by means of a semantic etymologising. Uddālaka considers this knowledge as insufficient, because it is solely limited to the verbal level (*vācārambhaṇa*) and incapable of disclosing the actual nature of the phenomena. The truth (*satyam*)[57] is that the name 'fire' rests on the three underlying basic evolutes. The innovative core of Uddālaka's teaching is that the Brāhmaṇa semantic analyses are ousted by the power of an observation-based logic.

§9. To conclude, there are three main elements in ChU.6.1-4 in which a departure from the previous Vedic backdrop comes forth more clearly. First, we observe the difference in meaning and ontological status of *sat* and *asat* – from participles capable of a low degree of abstraction to full-fledged abstract notions (see §4 above). Second, unlike the most common

55 Cf. DEEG (1995: 58). About the origins of this phrase see ÖRTEL (1937: 32-33).

56 Cf. BRONKHORST (2001).

57 It would be interesting to try to ascertain the sense of *satya* in this passage; Uddālaka's definition may indeed run counter to the Vedic notions of *satya* [for which, see EDGERTON (1929a), THIEME (1982: 15-21), and SÖHNE-THIEME (1995)]. If this were the case, this difference could be considered as a further innovative feature of Uddālaka's doctrine.

cosmogonic narratives in the Brāhmaṇas, in ChU.6.1-4 the creator's agency fades into the background giving way to a process of creation viewed as the product of a materialistic philosophy of nature. The cosmogonic narrative seems to continue a model already present in ṚV.10.129 (see §§5-6 above). And third, Uddālaka rejects the semantic etymologising which is commonly used in the Brāhmaṇas as a reliable means of knowledge; in its stead, he replaces an empirically based logical analysis of phenomena (see §8 above).

There remains a last question: why does Uddālaka go as far as resorting to a cosmogony to expound his unheard-of teaching? I suggest that Uddālaka's conscious effort to provide a new method for comprehending reality, a tool which aims to oust the previous one, cannot but involve a new cosmogony. And this is for two reasons.

First, on a general level, cosmogonic narratives are of intrinsic importance; as it has often been noticed, cosmogonic myths have a paradigmatic value. They constitute the paradigm against which many aspects of reality, as is perceived by a given social group, are being continuously tested. To borrow Kuiper's words, 'the origin of the world constituted the sacred prototype of how, in an endlessly repeated process, life and this world renewed themselves again and again'.[58] It seems thus possible to suggest that the implementation of a new method of interpreting reality as the one which is introduced by Uddālaka demands a compatible cosmogony which sanctions and supports it. In essence, the evolution of the world as retold by Uddālaka has the purpose of founding and thereby conferring validity to the notion that all worldly phenomena can be broken down into three basic constituents; in a way, this mental operation of 'analysis' is just the reverse of the creative process of evolution.

But I think one can find an explanation rooted in a deeper layer which is in line with the general purpose of most of Upaniṣadic literature. As em-

[58] KUIPER (1975: 108); cf. further LINCOLN (1975: 121) '[...] the cosmogonic myth is the myth which establishes the order of the world and thus has important social, material, and economic ramifications as well as deep religious significance'. This myth owed its fundamental importance to the fact that every decisive moment in life was considered a repetition of the primeval process. Elaborated by Mircea Eliade (cf. e.g. *Le mythe de l'éternel retour*, Paris 1949), this assumption is applied to the Indian context, with significant adaptations, by SMITH (1989: 50-51).

phasised by Brereton, one of the 'broad themes' underlying much of the Upaniṣadic disquisitions is the aspiration to reach a unifying vision of life and of the world.[59] In contrast to the uninitiated laymen, those who truly know realise the meaningful unitary fabric underlying the separate phenomena and thereby become aware of the meaningfulness and essential unity of the whole. Uddālaka's teaching is a powerful tool for providing an integrative comprehension of the seemingly fragmented reality.

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[59] BRERETON (1990: 118) 'In general, each Upaniṣadic teaching creates an integrative vision, a view of the whole which draws together the separate elements of the world and of human experience and compresses them into a single form. To one who has this larger vision of things, the whole world is not a set of diverse and disorganized objects and living beings, but rather forms a totality with a distinct shape and character'. THIEME (1966: 84-85) expresses a similar view.

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