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Democratic Practice and Governance in Nigeria

Edited by Ebenezer Oluwole Oni, Omololu Michael Fagbadebo and Dhikru Adewale Yagboyaju

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13 Border management and Nigeria's national security

Willie A. Eselebor and
Okunade Samuel Kehinde

Introduction

This section explains what border management entails globally and what role it plays in national security governance, especially in a transitional democracy like Nigeria. While security may mean different things to different people and nations, the peculiarities of the localized contexts determine what is to be protected and left unattended. Two main strands of the conception of physical and human securities occupy the front burners of debate among scholars. The new ideas about security that indicate general notions, according to the United Nations Secretary-General, must be given a place instead of what is expected to be the standard of mere observations and experiment (United Nations, 2010).

Border management belongs to the domain of border security, an emerging dimension of security construction which remains unexplored in terms of how it affects both physical and human securities. It is against this background that key concepts like security, national security, border management and border security are clarified in this discourse. Further to our understanding of these terms is a detailed analysis of the trends and linkages, which calls into question whether securitization of borders is a public good or a barrier in the context of national security concerns.

Globally, it is assumed that border security can be viewed from the prism of insurgencies, terrorism, undocumented migrant flows, drugs and arms trafficking among other criminalities plaguing management and control of borders (Adeola and Fayomi, 2012). However, despite fortification and externalization of border controls, these emerging global threats are not abating (Zaiotti, 2011). The border and its construction, be it at the political, economic or social-cultural levels, play significant roles as a control mechanism. The present circumstance of the surge in migrant flows from war-torn Syria to preferred destinations in Europe captures the dynamics of the application of security (Pursey, 2015) as the question is for which purpose and why some countries are more preferred than others as a destination. It also calls into question why refugees from Syria are not interested in moving to Africa. According to the International

Organization for Migration (IOM, n.d.), border management effectively defines the territorial boundaries of a state that must be secured and made safe for the benefit of internal security, which in turn determines a nation's sovereignty and capacity to meet its statutory obligation to those who belong, relating to how prohibited persons and harmful substances may be stopped.

The end of Cold War heralded globalization, which has brought numerous gains but is not without its shortcomings (Straw and Glennie, 2012). Technology has supported advances in connectivity which have enabled criminal enterprises and terrorist activities to cross national borders with greater ease than previously experienced. This global phenomenon accounted for the 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States of America and continues to haunt the security architecture of most nation states. It has been rightly observed that what happens at the borders goes to determine the national security architecture of a state, which either makes or mars it (Okunade, 2017). This therefore makes it imperative for every state to uphold security of its borders and its management as a top priority.

Nigerian boundaries were delineated by the Europeans at the 1884/1885 African-Berlin Conference, and consist of 4,047 km of land and 853 km of maritime borders (Babatola, 2015). The sheer size and nature of these borders make it difficult for them to be policed and managed operationally by the relevant security agencies assigned the responsibility of protection. The porosity resulting from poor demarcation and poor manning presents serious challenges (Babatola, 2015). This has therefore paved the way for constant occurrences forming part of a climate of criminality across the Nigerian borders. The terrorist activities of Boko Haram since 2009 attest to the fact that the borders around North-Eastern Nigeria are hospitable towards cross-border attacks, more so where the security apparatuses have failed to contain the flow of small arms and light weapons.

The rationale for this analysis focusing on border management and Nigeria's national security is easily discernible from the fact that most of the troubled states of Nigeria are linked to international border routes of the Cameroun, Niger and Chad which are exceedingly porous and unmanageable. The surge in herder and farmer clashes in Benue, Taraba, Adamawa, Zamfara and other states, with over 1,300 recorded deaths (International Crisis Group, 2018), calls for concern. This is in addition to Boko Haram insurgencies in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states that share international boundaries with neighboring states such as Chad, Niger and Cameroon. The kidnap on February 22, 2018[1] of over 110 schoolgirls in Dapchi, Yobe State, a town in North-Eastern Nigeria which is about 75 km south of the border with Niger may not be unconnected with the near absence of adequate security in border management in Nigeria. The Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA) network is suspected to be operating

in the Benue valley in collaboration with Fulani herders from neighboring countries, an emerging fact confirmed by the Directorate of State Security (DSS) as a possible explanation for the massacre of 73 persons on New Year's day 2018 in Logo and Guma local government areas in Benue State.[2] This mayhem is still ongoing and has spread to Zamfara, Taraba, Adamawa, Plateau, Nasarawa and other adjoining states, calling attention to the heightened security alert in Nigeria.

This chapter aims at interrogating the border management strategies and their impact on Nigeria's national security. Derived from this aim are the following objectives that will inform the discursive analysis of the study:

1 undertake an analysis of national security failures linked to border management in Nigeria;
2 identify measures designed to combat emerging cross-border related threats;
3 proffer solutions for a safer border security architecture in Nigeria.

This section provides the background information including the historical evolution of borders, then clarification of key concepts, followed by national security challenges, analysis of security failures linked to border management and measures to counter same. The chapter concludes with some recommendations. A documentary research design using a case study approach through primary and secondary data with reports from the IOM, the International Crisis Group, as well as scholarly articles, books and recognised newspaper outlets was adopted. Various border security threats experienced in Nigeria and the practical steps taken by the government to tackle such – and most especially the insurgency of Boko Haram – were selected. This was strategic in revealing the activities of the sect and the counter force this phenomenon gets from the government. Data gathered were thematically content-analysed by breaking down the information to meet the objectives of the chapter.

Evolution of borders in Nigeria

The reality of the historical evolution of borders in Nigeria remained fluid and challenged by cross-cutting socio-cultural and other global dynamics leading to reconstitution and composition of territories. It is widely accepted that borders are spaces in which national boundary lines are diluted by other territorial and identity dynamics produced out of popular strategies (Newman, 2006). Border making is tied to national ethos, culture, language and, most importantly, identity and sovereignty. The paradigm shift may have been altered by forces of globalization, but the shaping of boundaries dates back to early history.

Currently, Africa is composed of 54 countries, which may increase over time; but the crux of discussion of the evolution of modern borders can

be traced to the partition of Africa during the Berlin Conference negotiations (November 15, 1884 to February 26, 1885).[3] The outcome of the conference represented the formal establishment of artificial nation states in Africa, which has yielded lop-sided economic and political systems that keep these states perpetually weak and backward.

This great epoch-making event was presided over by European imperialists – Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, Belgium, Italy and Spain – and the resulting borders have remained in place since independence, endorsed by the African Union Border Programme. Presently, Nigeria has to contend with security failures resulting from open and insecure borders with the mostly Francophone nations of Benin, Niger, Cameroun and Chad. There are about 84 recognized Points of Entry (PoE) and over 1,499 unrecognized border entry points (*Vanguard*, June 19, 2013). The dilemmas facing Nigeria are numerous and complex. Both the approved and unapproved PoE are major sources of security concerns in the context of border management. Herein lies the problem, which informs the justification for analysis of the trends and patterns of emerging challenges.

Clarification of key concepts

Concepts clarified in this section include security, border, border security, border management and national security.

Security

Ogunleye *et al.* (2011) define security as the freedom of citizens to engage in their day-to-day activities safely, peacefully and without harassment. It equally connotes all-round protection of citizens: individuals or groups, properties, and trade and commerce financed both individually and by government. Walt's definition presents security as involving knowledge of the root cause of challenges and of the use and control of well-equipped security agents to stop or at least combat the enemy in a war situation (Walt, 1991).

Achumba *et al.* (2013) summarize security into four dimensions: peaceful pursuit of economy that yields income for good living, pro-activeness of citizens, safety from criminal activities, as well as psychological terror. This definition indicates that security combats all threats – physical, economic and psychological. It does mean that there will always be threats which need to be combated as situations arise.

According to Eselebor (2013), two security schools of thought currently exist. They are traditionalist and non-traditionalist. The traditionalists continue to support the Cold War conception of security which centers on military and state-centric approaches. This shows that traditionalists in security studies equate the concept of security with military accounting and the use of force. The focus on military threats and the use of force

complement ideas of power and interest, rather than the tough-minded approach to foreign policy which seemed appropriate for the Cold War years (Garnett, 1996). The non-traditionalist school on the other hand, has gone a step further by broadening the meaning of security from just the military and use of force to include issues such as human, environmental, economic, social, feminist and other threats. While non-traditional security focuses on what could possibly endanger the survival of the individual (human security) as well as the state, traditional security's emphasis is centered on the state. The border in this discourse is about protection, stability and security of the state.

Borders

'Border' means different things to different people, but in classical literature, borders, boundaries and borderlands are used interchangeably (Mata-Codesal, 2007). They sometimes constitute multiple opportunities as well as security barriers. Whereas borders are vital to separate the physical boundaries of state territories, they are in daily practice even more important to the people living along the borders. In similar vein, demarcated or not demarcated, a border can engender positive or negative effects, which have implications for national security. A greater portion of borderlands in the African continent are not distinctly demarcated and hence show no guidelines, creating security threats. According to Kristof (1959:278), a boundary does not exist in abstraction, it owes its existence to man. That is, all boundaries are manmade. This assertion finds explanation from the partition of African borderlands resultant from the African-Berlin Conference of 1884/1885, where borders were artificially drawn without the consent and participation of the beneficiaries.[4] Kristof further identifies two types of borders:

1 Artificial.
2 Natural.

Oscar Martinez (1994:1–15) classified borders into four categories as follows: (a) alienated, (b) co-existent, (c) interdependent, and (d) integrated.

In the same vein, Richard Hartshorne (1933:115–228; 1936:56–57) believes that borders can be viewed from the perspectives of the following:

1 Antecedent.
2 Subsequent.
3 Super imposed.
4 Natural.

Most African borders are super imposed and that reality has not changed, despite the intervention from the African Union Border Programme. The

security dimension calls for global concern in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the United States of America. Top of the discussion presently is immigration, described as globalization discontent. Migrants generated through conflict-induced displacement, the surge of refugees and economic flows are now regarded as security risks by host nations, a perception that is now heavily politicized.

Border security

International law recognizes states on the proviso that the entity puts in adequate resources to keep its boundaries under strict surveillance to ensure citizens' protection; states are thus classified as strong, weak or failed. Border security can be defined and implied in this study as the statutory purpose of preventing unlawful changes to the state border regime, maintaining the border regime and the regime at border crossing points from violation.

Border management

Border management is a function of regime types in place for the purpose of maintaining border administration. It includes routine administration to be undertaken at the border and in border zones. Border management generally rests on governmental surveillance agencies like the immigration, customs and police forces to ensure a lawful flow of human and economic resources in the national interest, be it economic security or peace. This explains why customs officers in Nigeria go to markets and warehouses to impound smuggled prohibited goods. The number of agencies in border management is great, especially at border crossings, but a recognized border point is where you have the presence of Port Health, Immigration and Customs facilities. Other agencies such as the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC), Plant and Animal Quarantine, Standards Organization and Directorate of State Security Services (DSS), among others, play complimentary roles. Border management also involves ensuring that there is no trespassing beyond the state's boundary beacons delimiting the country's land space. It is therefore good if the security apparatuses are integrated and work cooperatively towards attaining stated objectives. It can also be bad, if it is non-responsive to the security needs of benefactors, including the individual, the society and the state at large.

National security

On the other hand, it is also important we delve critically into what border defense and border security mean. Segell (2005) in his argument

drew a clear distinction between these two concepts. Defense of the border, he said, rests statutorily on the nation's armed forces, especially against external aggression. This mandate is always carried out with the use of heavy military equipment and weapons such as tanks, aircraft, ships and a large number of troops. All of these became insignificant in the twenty-first century as conflict focus shifted from inter-state conflicts to intra-state conflicts, as largely witnessed in Africa, thus making the procurement of these items of equipment unnecessary. This paradigm shift took place as occupying states became inconsequential after the outcome of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990. The whole world came after Iraq militarily and the sovereignty of Kuwait was restored. Since then, states' urge for state invasion no longer exists. He argued further that globalization in face of inadequate territorial demarcation encourages a military challenge to organized crime and terrorism. The wake of globalization has therefore made border defense less important given the new dimension of security threats technology has brought, such as transnational organized crimes and terrorism which have a direct impact on the citizens and greatly undermine the security of the state. This is the experience of Nigeria. This is the more reason why a change in focus is essential from border defense to border security. This is the only way a state can adequately protect its citizens as well as the state, thus maintaining the national security in the process.

Border related security threats

A number of security threats and operational challenges face the border security and management agencies in Nigeria. These include:

1 **Narcotics –** Nigeria is a source, transit and receiving country for the narcotics trade in West Africa and this poses many challenges in policing borderlands, seaports and airports, where the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency lacks the capacity and technical ability to combat that same narcotics trade.
2 **Insurgency, terrorism and religious extremism –** The three identified challenges are treated as one, since they are most often connected in cross-border settings. Since 2009 when Boko Haram took center stage in irredentism, North-Eastern Nigeria has become their base of operation. This can be explained from the perspective that the states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe share a large expanse of borders with Niger, Chad and Cameroun. The asymmetric approach employed by the terrorists and extremists seems to benefit from the porosity of borders in this region, particularly and most importantly since the border security apparatuses have collapsed.
3 **Small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation –** Despite the moratorium on the import and export of SALW, the porosity of land

and sea borders has made it possible for traffickers to bring into Nigeria sophisticated arms and ammunitions used for heinous crimes like kidnap, armed robbery and terrorism.

4 **Transhumance –** In another development, the emerging threat of herder–farmer conflicts, claiming several lives in Nigeria since 2015, is an indication of infiltration through the Northern axis of borderlands from neighboring states. The herders are known to have attacked villages, police and military formations with sophisticated weaponry, made possible with the ease of access to arms and ammunitions from leaky borders.

5 **People smuggling and human trafficking –** People smuggling is an organized criminal activity with huge profits for the criminals involved, who facilitate the illegal cross-border movement of people who wish to migrate, often for economic reasons. Human trafficking is a heinous crime, based entirely on exploitative tendencies. It is a specific offense that preys on the vulnerability of victims, mostly women, children and other vulnerable groups. People smuggling and human trafficking constitute offenses, but the criminal enterprise is not abating, and Nigeria is a source, transit and destination country. The perpetrators are also linked to terrorism, the drug trade and smuggling of goods, small arms and light weapons.

6 **Prohibited goods smuggling –** There are other forms of smuggling, mostly related to prohibited goods and harmful substances. Some have to do with evasion of customs tariffs and duties payable. Goods commonly smuggled across the porous borders of Nigeria include second-hand clothing, poultry products, used cars, parboiled rice, pharmaceutical products and other consumables.

The state of borders in Nigeria

This section will review the literature on the Nigerian borders and their current state. It will touch on the various transnational criminalities that occur along the borders which make the borders an unsafe locale. Nigeria is situated within latitudes 4° and 14°N and longitudes 2° and 15°E, possessing a total area of 923,768 km^2 (356,669 square miles),[5] putting it at number 32 on the list of largest countries globally, and sharing a 4,047 km border with its neighbors, 773 km with Benin, 1,497 km with Niger, 87 km with Chad and 1,690 km with Cameroon, with a modest coastline of about 853 km.[6] Nigerian borders span many local governments in the country.

Former Nigerian Immigration Head, David Parrandang, averred that only 84 approved entry points exist in the country while there is a staggering number of over 1,400 illegal routes. This shows that the illegal routes outnumber the recognized approved routes by 1,316, among which are Ogun and Adamawa States with 83 and 80 respectively. This could be as a result of the huge flow of illicit activities that happen within the area and

across the borders into neighboring states. Okunade (2017) has pointed out that these routes keep increasing on a daily basis as a result of the clandestine activities as identified in preceding section. And as some are being foiled, new ones are opened up around the porous borders.

These activities, which have long existed and been carried out in the form of transnational crimes across the Nigerian borders, have to a great extent challenged the country's economic and national security. The modus operandi by which these activities are carried out continues to improve in a sophisticated way due to technological advancement, but unfortunately the Nigerian government has not been able to contain the change and stem the increasing rate of criminality, thus making the borders a free zone for their perpetrators to operate.

Eselebor (2013) opined that transnational crimes, even though on the increase, are quite civilized in practice, as they operate in syndicate states not adequately equipped to curb the menace of human trafficking, drug trafficking, contraband smuggling, smuggling of small arms and light weapons, cross-border armed banditry/robbery, oil theft/bunkering, financial crimes, advance fee fraud (e.g., '419' fraud), cybercrimes and credit card fraud and environmental crimes. These crimes have of late been compounded with the menace of insurgency and terrorism which are a far cry from the others earlier mentioned. This nefarious engagement has been adduced to be the greatest threat that has confronted the Nigerian government, to such an extent that it remains insurmountable and has turned the state into an ineffective actor.

This phenomenon is not a new occurrence in Nigeria as a mild dimension of it was witnessed in the 1980s in the form of the Maitatsine unrest in the North. This insurgent group remained formidable for the Nigerian government to tackle until they were able to suppress them. The emergence of Boko Haram was patterned along the same lines. At the latent stage, this was noticeable in their ideas and modus operandi but much later the pattern shifted sharply as they began to spread their tentacles by engaging international collaborations.

Leiter (2014) argued that the porosity of the Nigerian borders is the major factor that encourages the proliferation of illegal arms and insurgencies in the country. According to Abdullahi (2010), 70 percent of the illegal small arms in the West Africa sub-region is found in Nigeria. William Hartung, a renowned arms dealer, submits that arms deals thrive in Nigeria, and in west and central Africa, because of conflicts in Africa, which create the pivot for the arms trade (Leiter, 2014). The flourishing arms market in Africa explains the source of strength for the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, which makes it a perpetual threat to the nation's territorial integrity and national security. The inadequate border posts for surveillance are worsened by the ill equipped, poorly trained and poorly remunerated personnel who find it rewarding to compromise with the insurgents.

NBC News, a division of the National Broadcasting Company based in the USA, reported that current and former USA officials and arms experts have averred that a larger part of Boko Haram armory items were commandeered from overpowered Nigerian military stocks. The news report further credited a statement to a former USA Ambassador in Nigeria, John Campbell, admitting that: there are bad eggs/saboteurs who willingly gave access to Boko Haram to loot the Nigerian armories (Babatola, 2015). He concluded that the array of small and automatic weapons, mortars, grenades, car bombs and mines 'is all Boko Haram's soldiers need to carry out their brand of terrorism' (Babatola, 2015). In June 2013, the Nigerian military intercepted a consignment found to be loaded with arms and ammunition meant for delivery to the Boko Haram camps for the purpose of attacking, maiming and killing civilians (mostly rural dwellers), businesses, government institutions and security personnel. This class of arms and ammunition, such as anti-tank missiles, surface-to-air missiles, AK-47 assault rifles and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), were found to be used by mercenaries and rebel forces during the Libyan uprising and are gradually being routed into troubled zones for use by terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Boko Haram in Nigeria (Leiter, 2014). Such weapons were equally seized by the Cameroun government en route to the Boko Haram camps within the region. These weapons, mainly Russian-made AK-47s meant for combat by Boko Haram combatants, were presented by the Cameroon Defence Ministry official as being seized.[7] It was revealed in concrete terms that the insurgency in Libya has further opened doors for arms transportation to Nigeria through her neighboring borders (Leiter, 2014). Another online publication indicated that Cameroon officials had on Tuesday 20 May 2014 declared a cache of weapons which were seized close to the Nigerian border in April 2014 immediately after rescuing some kidnapped victims (Babatola, 2015).

Boko Haram, with the help of some of these weapons that have got to them, has being able to unleash terror, turning Northern Nigeria, especially the North-Eastern region into a turbulent region, by causing chaos and unjustifiable destruction of lives and properties there and in neighboring Cameroon. Adetula, (2015) opined that the activities of the sect must have been intensified by the manpower support they got from rebels from Libya. After the demise of Muammar Gaddafi and his regime in Libya, his loyal fighters were dispersed across Africa and Middle East. Some of the rebels were cited in neighboring Chad and Niger and for them to have got so close, there is every likelihood that some of them must have filtered into Nigeria to support the cause and operations of the militant Islamic group in the country. Adetula averred that the religious upheavals in some parts of Nigeria could have identified the country as a location for an international Islamist revolution to thrive (Adetula, 2015:12).

These attacks are being felt mostly in towns and communities situated along the borders in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, such as Bama, Baga,

Mubi and Gwoza in Borno state (*Business Day* newspaper, 2014)). The hills of Gwoza in the north-eastern part of Mandara Mountains, to the north of Cameroon through the Sambisa Forest Reserve, are being used as a base and launch spot by the insurgents. The unconventional war fought against Nigeria's state by the Boko Haram terror group has led to a huge humanitarian crisis witnessed in the form of casualties and massive displacement of persons both as internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Nigeria and across the borders into neighboring states as refugees (Leadership Newspaper, 2014).

The activities and attacks of Boko Haram, which have consistently been a challenge to Nigeria and her neighbors, gained a global awareness even though the Nigerian government did not envisage that its activities would deteriorate to that extent. Former Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan pointed out at the regional summit on security and terrorism in 2014 that the Boko Haram insurgency has assumed a global dimension antithetical to civilization and regional stability (Leadership Newspaper, 2014). At some point, the impudence and carnage unleashed by Boko Haram degenerated to an easy influx of arms from Libya. The porous nature of Nigerian borders made it easy for the sect to manage its logistics. These items were always smuggled in via donkeys, camels, cattle and heavy duty motor vehicles through the inadequately policed borders of the vast areas of Borno and Yobe States, the same way in which women, children, SALWs, second-hand clothing, poultry products, used cars, parboiled rice, pharmaceutical products and other consumables are smuggled into the country through the porous borders (land and maritime) all around the country but especially in the South-West.[7] At some point, these deadly attacks from Boko Haram dissuaded visitors and tourists from coming into the country (US Department of States, 2014).

A report from a Nigerian Newspaper in 2014 revealed the military prowess of Boko Haram as they routinely attacked police stations, military bases and heavily secured government structures without a counter force to stop and apprehend them (Mantzikos, 2014). This led to the kidnapping and abduction of nearly 300 Nigerian schoolgirls in a government secondary school at Chibok who were successfully driven away amid numerous military roadblocks that existed within the area. It was also stated that the Nigerian military personnel who should resist the incursion of the insurgents, show them the path to follow before and after attacks are carried out (Mantzikos, 2014). Only recently have the girls started to be released in small groups through facilitated negotiations. Therefore, the defense of the country's territorial integrity continues unabated.

Border management agenda in Nigeria

Threats to national security are often evaluated based on how much the national interest is being threatened (Adetula, 2015). This implies that

the security situation of a country is solely premised on its ability to foresee and prepare to manage or contain that situation. In other words, the existing security situation of a country goes a long way in determining the extent of response it gets from the government. In Nigeria, transnational criminality, and most importantly the terrorism witnessed through both the Boko Haram and the Fulani herdsmen lately across the Northern region of Nigeria, keeps staring the Nigerian government in the face even as it continues to threaten her national security. This does not imply that Nigeria has not responded to the threat. This is what makes it imperative to examine the government's responses to this dreadful phenomenon.

A good take off point is to examine the role the legislature has played. This is because, in any democratic system, actions that must be taken need to be backed by appropriate laws which provide the foundation for action or legitimacy for the response. In one way or the other, the Nigerian legislature (otherwise known as the National Assembly) has been involved in the fight against insurgency by taking measures toward stemming the situation. In the process, existing laws have been reviewed, while several relevant Acts have been passed. Some of these Acts are the Anti-Piracy Act, Anti-Terrorism Act, Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing (Prohibition) Act, and several others which can be found on the National Assembly website (Adetula, 2015). According to Adetula, though documents exist, there is no empirical evidence to show the impact these pieces of legislation have had on the threats. The critical issue is: How adequate are such laws?

Again, an effort has been made by the Nigerian government to improve the immigration and customs services for effective and efficient performance at the borders. These efforts are targeted at extensively training and re-training, installing detective equipment at seaports and airports, improving internal security and policing, improving intelligence gathering and analysis, cooperating with the Vigilante services in North-Eastern Nigeria for improved community policing, arrests, re-arrests and prosecutions of criminals supporting Boko Haram. All of these are meant to combat all forms of transnational organized criminality (Adetula, 2015).

Furthermore, as the situation deteriorated, the Nigerian government took a holistic step by adopting a militaristic approach involving all the security apparatuses in the country including the intelligence agencies. This led to the inaugurating of a joint task force and special forces for an onward deployment to the troubled North-Eastern Nigeria. This task, being a capital intensive one, had serious implications for the Nigerian budget. The defense budget was 100 billion naira in 2010, 927 billion naira in 2011 and was increased to 1 trillion naira in 2012, 2013 and 2014 (International Crisis Group, 2014). These funds were meant to procure sophisticated weapons and train personnel in combating and rescuing victims of Boko Haram, mostly women and girls, from their hide out. However, the media reported that military equipment and heavy weapons

were procured (Bamidele, 2018) but little or no significant achievement was witnessed despite the huge funds committed to this cause. What was witnessed was an increased humanitarian crisis in the North-Eastern region as many border communities were attacked and taken over by the insurgents in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. This led to massive displacement of people as internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees within the region and into the neighboring states of Chad, Cameroon and Niger. This shows that the Boko Haram was having the upper hand in the fight.

The Nigerian military suffered further humiliation when military bases both in the battlefield and in the cities were attacked by Boko Haram. During these attacks, combatants were dislodged while arms, ammunitions and heavy weapons were carted away by the insurgents. These occurrences challenged the technical capacity and the readiness of the Nigerian combatants to carry out military engagements against insurgents. It equally raises some doubt of the rating of the Nigerian armed forces in Africa. They are recognized for combat-readiness, mass mobilization and swift deployment potential, which are necessary for a successful peace keeping operation. It was averred that this humiliation was possible as a result of lack of equipment and training needed to tackle such guerrilla warfare. Funds meant for such purposes were misappropriated by top military officers and politicians.[8]

The Nigerian government resorted to negotiating with Boko Haram via 'back channels' of communication for the purpose of disarming and deradicalizing the terrorists (International Crisis Group, 2014), which was sustained into 2013.[9] They equally attempted a negotiation for an exchange of more than 200 Chibok girls for 12 Boko Haram commanders in custody (Mark, 2014). In mid-October 2014, an announcement of a ceasefire, which led to a peaceful release of the Chibok girls, was made by a government spokesperson but (surprisingly) in the succeeding week, Boko Haram launched an attack in which up to 60 additional women and girls were abducted (Sanchez and Aminu, 2014). The group denied participation in any negotiation, let alone a ceasefire agreement as initially declared by the government (Adamu, 2014).

The fight against Boko Haram drew the attention of the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS as the Boko Haram attacks filtered into the neighboring countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroon. As a result, the mandate of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) formed in 1994 to combat international crime was reviewed to accommodate counterterrorism, thus giving them the right to join the Nigerian forces in military operations against Boko Haram. Nigeria got more overwhelming support from the AU and ECOWAS as many African leaders agreed to the claim that Africa's stability hinges on Nigeria's security. A regional force was raised by heads of states and government of the African Union consisting of 750 troops to combat Boko Haram (Adetula, 2015). They were meant to join the existing MNJTF from Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin Republic to

work together with about 25,000 combatants of the Nigerian armed forces already fighting Boko Haram in the North-East.

In the current dispensation, the armed forces have recorded a number of achievements in the fight against the terrorist group. They have been able to recapture communities taken over by the group across the North-Eastern region and also cut off their sources of logistics supply (*The Nigerian Observer*, June 2, 2015). The armed forces have found a number of their hideouts and arrested members of the group but, all in all, the group do not seem to be overpowered yet as they still carry out guerrilla attacks. Continuous attacks had been carried out by the group. These include an attack on three military bases with guns and RPGs in the North-East in 2017. The first was the explosive attack carried out on June 17, 2017, killing 17 and injuring 34 in Maiduguri, while the second led to the total destruction of the base and the death of a soldier on July 4, 2017, and the third was a suicide bombing attack carried out by a woman in Maiduguri on July 17, 2017 (Amnesty International, 2017). A recent attack carried out on April 27, 2019 by the 'ISIS-affiliated faction of Boko Haram' on a military base in Mararrabar Kimba in Borno State led to the death of at least five soldiers while about 30 were declared missing three days after the attack (TheDefensePost, April 27, 2019).

Conclusion and recommendations

The fight against the scourge of Boko Haram continues to drag on despite the various efforts of government and the external support it has received. The aftermath of their attacks, witnessed in the form of massive displacement, continues to be a huge burden on the government as camps are being established for the purpose of providing basic daily needs such as shelter, clothing, food and security for the displaced persons. This phenomenon continues to exist as more attacks are being carried out by the deadly group. The Global Terrorism Index of 2015 ranked Nigeria the third worst hit terrorist nation globally after Iraq and Afghanistan. The successes witnessed in the fight against the group did not change the country's status in the ranking as the Global Terrorism Index of 2016 still ranked Nigeria third. This is partly because the war against Boko Haram is yet to be won. The support received from Chad, Niger and Cameroun through the MNJTF is capable of fighting the group to a stand-still but, as pointed out by Adetula (2015), the government, the military, the nature of the border and inactivity of the people have inhibited success. This is not because the resources required to prosecute the war against terrorism are not available but because these resources are being misappropriated by corrupt politicians and top security officers who are willing to sacrifice the lives of the military combatants for personal gains. Little wonder combatants show no zeal and commitment towards the fight against the deadly group.

For this to be adequately addressed, a holistic appraisal of the intricacies of the approach and modalities for effectively combating transnational organized threats, most importantly terrorism, requires more in-depth attention by the stakeholders. This can only be attained by government showing the needed zeal and renewed commitment to the cause of tackling border threats, most importantly the scourge of Boko Haram which has threatened the security of the Nigerian state to date. Corruption, which is a cankerworm in the Nigerian system, must be dealt with by the government. If not done, the rot in the system will linger on.

Again, as the world is moving away from the traditional form of security to the non-traditional form of security, which is all encompassing in terms of catering for the general well-being of the citizens and the state, the Nigerian government is to be encouraged to follow this path. Human security does not just speak to the security of the state, but in addition it is concerned about the populace living in peace and having access to the needed basic infrastructure that enables one to live a fulfilled life every day. The government should be more concerned about this by carrying out its core functions of providing basic daily necessities across the country, most especially in the Northern region of Nigeria, which is perceived to be the most marginalized and poverty-ridden region in Nigeria. If this is carried out, it can end this scourge for the long run rather than proposing an amnesty for insurgents which, in our opinion, is a way of the government shying away from its responsibilities which will never yield a positive result.

In addition, the role an effective regional–national synergy plays in the management of regional security cannot be over-emphasized. Nigeria needs to realize this fact and cherish this collaboration because without the external support much success cannot be recorded. Above all, the root causes of Boko Haram must be identified, and measures taken to deal with them. This is to prevent the offshoot of similar groups from different regions of the country. If all these can be adequately addressed, transnational criminality will be curbed and finally the perpetual threat to Nigeria's national security will be over.

Notes

1 www.npr.org/2018/03/11/592766452/in-dapchi-mourning-after-mass-kidnapping-of-schoolgirls.
2 www.dailytrust.com.ng/islamic-state-terrorists-behind-benue-killings-security-chiefs.html.
3 See Ahmad (2013).
4 Ibid.
5 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigeria#cite_note-643.
6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigeria#cite_note-65.
7 https://allafrica.com/stories/201810050142.html.
8 Academic: interviewed by Amy Pate and Bukola Ademola-Adelehin, August 13, 2014, Abuja, Nigeria. Civil society representative engaged in development and

humanitarian assistance: interviewed by Amy Pate, Kop'ep Dabugat, and Bukola Ademola-Adelehin, August 15, 2014, Abuja, Nigeria. Academic: interviewed by Chris Kwaja, August 21, 2014, Jos, Nigeria.

9 Jonathan later denied that talks were in process, saying all contact was 'indirect'.

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