

Routledge New Directions in Public Relations and Communication Research

Kevin Hora

Propaganda and Nation Building

Selling the Irish Free State

ROUTLEDGE

Many histories of the Irish revolution have recognised the vital importance of propaganda, but this is the first to carry the story beyond the creation of the Irish Free State. Equally conversant with the perspectives of political history and public relations, Kevin Hora has written an original, incisive, and often witty study which historians of modern Ireland will ignore at their peril.

David Fitzpatrick, *Trinity College Dublin, Ireland*

In this book, Kevin Hora reclaims propaganda for the public relations industry in Ireland, and, to a certain extent, legitimises its use. His study ranges across propagandists, symbolism, censorship, promotion and the specific audiences addressed by Cumann na nGaedheal and Fianna Fáil. He reviews, analyses, dissects and offers conclusions about the role of propaganda in the formation of the modern Irish state. This is a book which needed to be written. It is fascinating to read, breath-taking in its depth and largely benign in its assessment of the rationale behind the propaganda.

Ellen Gunning, *Director of the Irish Academy of Public Relations and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Dublin City, Ireland*

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Propaganda and Nation Building

This book examines the origins of Ireland in its first independent incarnation, the Irish Free State (1922–1937). It explores how contemporary public relations and propaganda techniques were used to construct an identity for this new state – a state which after enduring seven years of insurrection and civil war, became one of the most stable democracies in Europe. This stability, the book argues, was constructed not solely through policies enacted by governments, but through the construction of a Gaelic, Catholic and Celtic national identity.

By shifting the perspective to how nation building was communicated, it weaves an interdisciplinary narrative that initiates a new understanding of nation building - providing insights of increasing relevance in current world events. Avoiding a simplistic cause and effect history of public relations, the book examines the uses and effects of early public relations from a political and societal perspective and suggests that while governments were only modestly successful in their varied propaganda efforts, cumulatively they facilitated a transition from violence to peace.

This will be of interest to researchers and advanced students with an interest in public relations, propaganda studies, nation building and Irish studies.

Kevin Hora lectures in public relations and public affairs in Dublin Institute of Technology and Rathmines College of Further Education, and is a member of the Public Relations Institute of Ireland.

Routledge New Directions in Public Relations & Communication Research

Edited by Kevin Moloney

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Propaganda and Nation Building

Selling the Irish Free State

Kevin Hora

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Une histoire de la propagande porte donc sur deux objets: d'une part il s'agit de montrer qu'il a existé dans l'univers politique des phénomènes comparables (mais non identiques) à ce que nous appelons aujourd'hui de ce nom (et dans cette perspective, il faut cerner les caractères spécifiques de ce phénomène en fonction de chaque société ou groupe politique), et d'autre part, il s'agit de montrer, pour la période plus récente, comment la propagande actuelle s'est constituée, comment elle est devenue ce qu'elle est, par évolution ou par mutation.
Jaques Ellul, *Histoire de la Propagande* (2ième ed., Paris, 1976), p.5.

A history of propaganda thus involves two things: firstly, it is about showing that in the political universe there were phenomena comparable (but not identical) to what we give that name today (and from this perspective we must identify the specific characteristics of this phenomenon according to each society or political group), and secondly, it is about showing, for the most recent period, how propaganda was formed, how it became what it is, by evolution or mutation.

(Author's translation)

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Nomenclature

Irish language terms are used rather than their English translations where the person or object to which they refer is better known in the original or formal version (thus 'Amhrán na bhFiann' is preferred to 'The Soldier's Song'). A glossary of Irish-language terms is included in Appendix III.

With reference to departments of state, each is named in full on its first appearance, and in substantive form thereafter (thus: Department of Finance is subsequently abridged to Finance). Similarly, overseas legations and missions are referred to by the city of location.

Abbreviations

DÉ	Dáil Éireann
EPS	Estimates for Public Services
HC	House of Commons
HIS	Hoover Institution, Stanford University
HL	House of Lords
MAI	Military Archives of Ireland
MLP	Mudd Library, Princeton University
NAI	National Archives of Ireland
NAI D/	National Archives of Ireland Department (title of state department follows)
NLI	National Library of Ireland
SÉ	Seanad Éireann
SP	Stormont Parliament
UCDA	University College, Dublin Archives Department

Propaganda and Nation Building
Selling the Irish Free State

Introduction

I

The Irish Free State, a dominion of the Commonwealth of Nations, was established on December 6, 1922. By 1937, when Irish voters consigned it to history, it had survived partition of its territory, civil war, the Great Depression, economic war with Britain, poverty, mass emigration, and the stultifying effects of conservatism, moral, political, religious, social. It had also become one of Europe's few stable democracies. Two political parties dominated the state, sharing a common attachment to state-building and stability, though each journeyed a different path. Cumann na nGaedheal, in office from 1922–32, nursed the state in its formative years. Their adversaries, Fianna Fáil, held power from 1932–48, dismantling the state for one with the trappings, if not the name, of a republic. This book addresses the abridged history of Irish propaganda that halts abruptly with the end of the revolution and civil war period (1916–23). It explores how Free State governments and officials practiced propaganda for nation and state-building, and assesses attitudes towards propaganda, by identifying its uses, successes and limitations. Propaganda constructed national and state identity in the aftermath of a period of armed conflict, though the transition from bellicose to peaceful communication was uneven. Cumann na nGaedheal used propaganda to benefit the nation and state at home and abroad, while Fianna Fáil, thanks to a constitution that declared it not a political party but a national movement, adroitly re-imagined Louis XIV's apocryphal *l'état, c'est moi*. State propaganda of the period, looking mainly at totalitarian Europe, has earned a sinister, deceitful reputation. This book posits that official Free State propaganda was benign and constructive.

In 1922, however, the auguries were ill-starred. Ireland was divided. Two years previously, six counties in the northern province of Ulster opted out of devolved home rule from Britain, preferring to maintain links established by the 1801 Act of Union. The act had abolished the Irish parliament, shifting parliamentary representation to Westminster. The majority unionist, Protestant community in Ulster established a cultural and political hegemony over

Catholic nationalists, but not before official collusion in anti-Catholic pogroms led to Irish Republican Army (IRA) retaliation and near civil war.[1] In the remaining 26 counties, supporters of the new state vied for supremacy with intransigent republicans. Isolated from Britain and their northern brethren, southern unionists were caught in the cross-fire. The deployment of statecraft and propaganda in Ulster and the Free State suggests commonalities in their responses to social, economic and political issues. Both, baptised in blood, clung to heavily propagated notions of sacrifice and loss, creating more in common than either would have cared to admit: Fitzpatrick's meditative treatise on the coterminous existence of two Irelands is amply illustrative.[2]

The emergence of two states was a consequence of a late nineteenth century campaign to re-establish an Irish parliament. This had crept towards what seemed a conclusion in 1912 when the House of Commons passed the third Home Rule Bill, but, with war erupting before the House of Lords' moratorium expired, enactment was postponed. Immediately, unionist leaders exhorted Irishmen to demonstrate fealty towards Britain and defeat home rule by enlisting; nationalist leaders encouraged enlistment to secure home rule, insisting that partial independence would not dilute Irish loyalty. Both had large paramilitary forces, the Ulster Volunteers and the imitative Irish National Volunteers, from which about 250,000 men enlisted. High volunteer recruitment meant that Ireland was treated more benignly than Britain itself, where conscription was enforced from January, 1916.[3]

Irish public opinion opposed conscription, and the government trod warily, knowing that coercion would propagate unrest. Already, nationalists opposed to conscription were making their presence felt. Extremists in their midst held to the old Fenian adage that England's difficulty was Ireland's opportunity. On Easter Monday 1916, 1,200 members of the Irish Volunteers, a militant break-away from the Irish National Volunteers, and 200 members of the socialist Irish Citizens' Army, rebelled in Dublin city. Smaller pockets of insurrection erupted around the country. The leader of the rising, Patrick Pearse, a poet and schoolteacher, read aloud the proclamation of the Irish republic to a bemused crowd outside the General Post Office on O'Connell St, Dublin's main thoroughfare, and the tricolour of green, white and orange, symbolising a truce between the island's two traditions, was raised on its roof. As a military exercise the Rising was doomed: after six days of fighting the rebels surrendered unconditionally. Public opinion favoured the British administration in Dublin Castle, and the rebels were reviled for colluding with Germany. But the Castle squandered its advantage. The Lord Lieutenant, Lord Wimbourne, declared martial law, paving the way for courts martial of civilians. Some 3,400 people were arrested, and 90 rebels were sentenced to death. While only 15 were executed (a sixteenth, Roger Casement, was hanged in the Tower of London) the secrecy surrounding the trials, the rapidity with which sentences were carried out, and nationalist propaganda that James Connolly, dying from wounds sustained in the fighting, was carried to his execution on a stretcher and shot tied to a chair, generated anti-British sentiment. Britain

further miscalculated in branding the rebellion the Sinn Féin Rising, after a small, insignificant political party that had had no role in the revolt, though some of its members were coincidentally combatants.

From 1916 to the general election of 1918, Sinn Féin eclipsed the pro-Home Rule Irish Parliamentary Party as the dominant nationalist party. The legacy of the executed Easter rebels, coupled with the adulation given to survivors on their release from incarceration in Britain in 1917, and an anti-conscription stance (in which it found an ally in the Catholic church) enabled the party to win a landslide number of seats in the election. Keeping their electoral promise, the Sinn Féin MPs-elect convened an illegal assembly in Dublin, Dáil Éireann, on January 21, 1919 and declared an Irish republic. On the same day, an IRA ambush on a gelignite convoy ignited the War of Independence. Unlike 1916, republicans now fought a guerrilla war with well-armed 'flying columns' of IRA-men largely targeting their fellow Irish-men in the Royal Irish Constabulary. A propaganda war capitalised on international sentiment regarding the rights of small nations. The conflict lasted until July, 1921 when a truce paved the way for the Anglo-Irish Treaty that created the Irish Free State, an entity substantially more independent than Home Rule had promised. The Treaty proved divisive, separating those who saw it as an opportunity to gain incrementally more independence, and hard-line republicans whose all-island separatist vision it thwarted. The Treaty's most controversial aspect was the continued partition of the island, though a promised independent Boundary Commission mollified Treatyites that the border between north and south would be substantially altered in their favour, in time making reunification inevitable. Anti-treatyites placed little faith in optimism, and amidst rancorous Dáil exchanges in January, 1922, Treatyite Sinn Féiners formed Cumann na nGaedheal. Within months, they were pressed into action to suppress a civil war that threatened to stifle the state at its inception.

II

Irish historians approach the period with caution. They are, as Fitzpatrick observed, 'a notoriously disputatious lot'.[4] Attempting to appreciate the complexity of the Anglo-Irish relationship resulted in traditionalist and revisionist camps. Buttressed by living memory and a school curriculum that fostered a narrative of glorious struggle, traditionalists view Irish independence as the nation's pre-ordained right after eight centuries of oppression. Their views were largely unchallenged until the final third of the twentieth century when revisionists, impartially (traditionalists claim sterilely) reappraised 1916's legacy against the backdrop of the Northern Troubles, and blamed the renewed violence on the glorification of the gunman. Animosity between the camps arrested more animated explorations of history, delaying the plundering of new sources of material, the development of a philosophy in Irish historical method, the emergence of cliometrics, and welcome encroachments by scholars in complementary fields – sociology, political science and media,

for example. Only in the last twenty or so years has a new generation of historians distanced itself from the contestable politics of independence to explore the meaning and consequences independence prompted in other quarters.

Such historians have adroitly delineated pre-independence propaganda. Inoue, Novick, Kenneally and Walsh, among others, have established the prevalence of persuasive communication in Irish news and other media from 1914–22.[5] Novick's exploration of nationalist Great War propaganda provides a short but compelling analysis of the meaning of propaganda, drawing on contemporary and modern ideas.[6] Kenneally and Walsh have done sterling work in assessing the role of print media, and their appropriation by Castle and nationalist propagandists. Additionally, the reissue of Frank Gallagher's 'The Four Glorious Years' provides a stirring account of the propaganda war from one of its key prosecutors.[7] However, these works have focussed on propaganda during a time of conflict and as a weapon of conflict, stopping abruptly with the formal conclusion of hostilities.

This is unusual, given that the major propagandists of the period, Gallagher, Desmond FitzGerald, Piarais Béaslaí, Sean Lester and Bulmer Hobson for instance, were also propagandists in the new state. Their legacies rest on reasons other than their propaganda prowess. Lester's biography, written by his son-in-law, and former *Irish Times* editor, Douglas Gageby, glosses over his time as government propagandist as if it were a diversion on his path from journalism to diplomatic greatness as the last Secretary General of the League of Nations.[8] Gallagher's journalistic and literary writings may be better known than his career as de Valera's most trusted propagandist. Though Walker offers an astute short assessment, he deserves greater study.[9] FitzGerald may have the distinction of having been surpassed by his son, former Taoiseach, Garret FitzGerald. Hobson, though the subject of a major biography, is probably best known in school textbooks for being kidnapped by his own side before the Easter Rising.[10]

Recent works have begun to deal with some of the propaganda themes presented here. Morris's treatment of symbolism in the new state renders incalculable service to historians of propaganda. His assertion that 'far from being incidental to politics, symbols are intrinsic to it' bridges the gap between politically-motivated state-builders and citizens, on whose support they rely.[11] This idea is also in Dolan's work on commemoration of the civil war, which weaves public and private memorialisation to emphasise the shared experiences of politicians and the public in state-building.[12] Martin's work highlights propaganda's darker side: censorship.[13] His exploration of censorship on both sides of the border highlights politicians' uneasiness at the availability of published and broadcast material that, moral objections aside, was potentially seditious. His thesis, that the common concerns in both jurisdictions were congruent with censorship in Britain and the USA, does much to shift the view of Irish censorship as an insular, parochial concern, placing it in an international context of coercively inculcating civic values.

These treatments have been possible because of the shift in historiography from the mid-1990s. While cognizant of established histories which presented a narrative of Treatyites versus Anti-treatyites, later historians have begun to unpick the period's complexities, casting a critical eye on the nature of statehood, and its Irish manifestation. Garvin juxtaposes the administrative efficiencies of the Provisional Government (January-December, 1922) and succeeding Cumann na nGaedheal governments with republicans' 'romantic indignation'.[14] This transforms the debate on statehood and state-building from barely-contested revolutionary assumptions, (most commonly that England was the first nation state and Ireland, accordingly, the first colony)[15] to more nuanced perspectives. Implicitly, Cumann na nGaedheal needed to propagate ideologies at variance with republican ideals of heroism and sacrifice; these would later be the preserve of Fianna Fáil. Regan amplifies Garvin's views and suggests that after Griffith's and Collins' deaths, WT Cosgrave reconciled militarists and moderates on the pro-treaty side.[16] His depiction of the emergence of a ruling elite is compelling: the friendship of Kevin O'Higgins and Patrick Hogan, and their cultural commonalities with fellow Francophone, Desmond FitzGerald, depicts an educated, middle class, Catholic elite, in contrast to the unrefined stridulence of many of their fellow revolutionaries. O'Higgins and Hogan understood that 'Treatyite republicanism, militarism and aggressive nationalism posed real threats to their place within the new regime.'[17] The legal profession provided other members of the elite, including Patrick McGilligan and Kevin O'Shiel.[18] Against this backdrop, Cumann na nGaedheal's social conservatism and harshness – it was, after all, O'Higgins who advocated executions in every county during the civil war – is less the martial and legislative measures to secure a state, and more an emergent dominant elite.

Kissane explores official ruthlessness, observing that while the state was democratic, its constitution could be suspended when necessary.[19] During the civil war, military courts were authorised to impose death sentences. In October, 1931, at one fell swoop, Cumann na nGaedheal proscribed a dozen organisations, mainly republican or on the political left.[20] The groups threatened the state and its elite, and experienced propaganda's extremes – condemnation, censorship, proscription. In office, Fianna Fáil was similarly inclined, proscribing Eoin O'Duffy's fascistic Army Comrades Association, and, in 1936, having failed to achieve its voluntary dissolution, the IRA itself.[21] Ruthlessness extended to party politics also, and Meehan has documented Cumann na nGaedheal's heavy expenditure on electioneering advertising.[22] The party's naïve 1932 campaign demonised Fianna Fáil, hysterically conflating bolshevism and bullets, while Fianna Fáil's courting of mass approval provided stable foundations for sixteen years in power. The 'Fianna Fáil Leviathan' – the popular support mobilised during the campaign – contrasted with Cumann na nGaedheal's engagement with likeminded elites, which was no more effective than haranguing voters within earshot of a rickety soapbox.[23] It suggests subtle, yet critical, differences: where Cosgrave's party addressed public opinion formers, de Valera's addressed the public.

III

If Irish historiography has awkwardly accommodated three factions, practical and ideological difficulties have equally beset the historiography of propaganda. Modern public relations recognises propaganda as its forebear, but cautionary didacticism frustrates attempts to provide critical, unbiased histories. Most histories of public relations or propaganda have been written either by historians with no training in public relations, or public relations academics with little training as historians: the former tend to highlight its nefariousness, while the latter, eager to provide a veneer of respectability, tend to exemplify personalities or campaigns, reductively simplifying 'a complex and dramatic story by emphasizing novelty and a few colourful characters.'[24] Such approaches gloss over unsavoury elements: potted histories in textbooks best illustrate this. Vos' comments on the appropriation of history to legitimise public relations prompts a need for a forensic debate about the propriety or reliability of this kind of scholarship.[25] More factual exposition, clearly, is needed.

When Pearson observed 'There are no brute historical facts, only historians' interpretation of them' he intended it as an argument for a plurality of perspectives on public relations history. [26] But facts, merely existing, are devoid of inherent rationality or irrationality and are incontrovertible: one cannot argue (without calendrical sophistry) that the Irish Free State did *not* come into existence on December 6, 1922. One can, however, question the legitimacy of its creation, a proposition that has vexed traditionalist and revisionist historians, whose spats sometimes relegate rationality to marginalia. Irish academic history, especially the revisionist school, has been influenced from the 1930s by 'historians trained in British institutions'[27] (the verb itself could ignite a useful debate on historiographical *methods*), and it is unsurprising that much Irish historical writing has been refreshingly free from conceptual models, and more attuned to the 'reflective English historiographic style' employed by L'Etang.[28]

Watson is correct that it is only in recent times that public relations history has advanced towards the mainstream, with European authors, in particular, challenging Amerocentric orthodoxies. His praise for the critical approach to public relations historiography and its exponents is deserved – it *has* 'refreshed understanding of public relations by contextualizing it within social and organizational frames'. But he is too optimistic that this history has moved from the discovery stage to an advanced, analytical stage.[29] Some national histories outstrip others in the quantity or quality of research; others, like Ireland, have barely turned the sod. Lamme and Russell's blunt assessment: 'Simply put, no area of public relations history has been adequately researched' is a necessarily provocative interjection.[30] There has been over-reliance on too narrow a band of sources, often secondary in nature. There has been too little digging in state and institutional archives, and private manuscript collections; too little familiarity shown with parliamentary debates, epochal

ephemera and so on – the very sources, the historian, John H Arnold, writes, that can 'surprise, present bumps in the road that reveal new paths previously unconsidered.'[31]

Regrettably few sources on Free State propaganda are obligingly labelled as such and an inquisitive, sometimes intuitive, approach produced the surprises Arnold describes. State files from the Departments of An Taoiseach, Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Industry and Commerce yielded a treasure trove, supplemented by Oireachtas debates and private collections of protagonists' papers. Contemporary publications editorialised official propaganda; nevertheless, the *Irish Times, Irish Independent*, army and Garda journals provided examples of print propaganda. The *Irish Press*, while consulted, was not used. A partisan publication, owned and overseen by de Valera, it was a propaganda vehicle for Fianna Fáil, lacking the editorial integrity of the *Irish Independent* and *Irish Times*, which, while prone to partiality, were independently owned and spanned the entire period, unlike the *Irish Press*. Cinema footage from British Pathé was similarly helpful in providing visual examples of propaganda, supplementing the Irish Film Institute's newsreel, documentary and feature film collections.

When such rich sources exist, public relations historiography may be best served by focussing less on theories and more on the historical method. The image of the historian as detective is beguiling, if somewhat simplistic: a forensic investigator entrusted with gathering evidence, determining through an interrogative process which artefacts seem truthful and may be presented in evidence, and which are unreliable or mendacious. It is, however, for a jury to decide on the merits of the case. But, historians may revisit the court of opinion infinitely, each time retrying the evidence with different outcomes.[32] What remains constant is the premise that judgments are reached after a critical review of evidence that, having been painstakingly gathered, has been impartially presented – in this, perhaps, the role of the public relations historian should be that of the *amicus curiae*. This would allow them to decipher evidence to understand, firstly, what has been recorded and only then, *why* it is important.

This is not a rejection of Bentele's inclination towards a model and theory oriented approach over a fact and event oriented model, but an observation that a dominant philosophy in public relations historiography is not feasible, given the evolutionary differences among even close neighbours like Ireland and Britain, geographically, linguistically, and culturally proximate. Transporting models across national boundaries can create Procrustean solutions that cloud rather than clarify. Nonetheless, Bentele's functional-integrative strata model can be adapted, when sufficient detail permits, to various national historiographies. The Free State, for instance, loosely straddles the caesura between the fourth and fifth strata, and especially the consolidation and growth of public relations period, though with reference only to state propaganda and not commercialised services, which must yet be explored. Other theories advancing public relations historiography would also be better

served once a broader base of facts exist. Pearson synthesised a framework on public relations history into four categories: progressive, counter-progressive, new Left and new Right historians.[33] This is tightly bound to the US perspective and does not travel well. Vos' intellectually stimulating trinity of logics of historical explanation examines the area's emergence as a social institution, but is dependent on lessons from corporate America and a handful of headline personalities.[34] Limitations such as these strengthen Bentele's plea for the necessity to entrench public relations history in various societal forms and structures, a point amplified by Xifra: 'PR historiography must be embedded within a theoretical framework of social history, national histories, and world history.'[35]

National histories offer a suitable embarkation point, given that most nations use a master narrative to mythologise their origins and sustain feelings of national identity.[36] To illustrate, it would be instructive to review the content of history and English literature schoolbooks in early independent Ireland to see how national identity was propagated, with collateral reputational damage to Britain. Though their impact has been patchy, nonetheless there have been valiant attempts to write national histories of public relations and propaganda. Cutlip's voluminous history of American public relations is a blend of academic knowledge and industry insights.[37] Ewen's cultural history of public relations' influence in America is more reliable, but sceptical of its subject.[38] Colley's monograph on Irish public relations is noble but insubstantial[39] and compares unfavourably with Carty's scholarly survey of post-independent Ireland, with historical antecedents,[40] and doctoral thesis on Catholic Church public relations.[41] L'Etang's illuminative and deft history of the development of British public relations is underpinned by a sociological reading of her subject.[42] Each treatise has dealt with a single country, testament, perhaps, to the richness of information that exists, and which must be mined before conceptualising can begin. However, Raaz and Wehmeier suggest that single nation histories can be intensified by comparing another country without losing sight of distinguishing national characteristics.[43] Lamme and Russell's call for the history of public relations to begin with the practice itself blends neatly with national histories of public relations. They offer five motivations that precipitated public relations activity that are descriptive of Free State activity: 'The need or desire to raise money, to recruit others, to establish legitimacy, and to agitate against or to advocate for someone or something.'[44] The state needed to raise funds, to recruit a civil administration, to establish its legitimacy, to agitate against British interests, and to advocate for its own international recognition. This book aims to show how state propaganda laid the foundations for the modern Irish state.

IV

Any study of the history of propaganda faces difficulties in arriving at a definition, partly because most definitions postdate the phenomenon they

describe, but also because the varied scholarly perspectives produce an eclectic variety of offerings that foil attempts at precision. In the 1920s propaganda was a recognised practice of government and industry. Its use for perverse purposes by oppressive regimes before World War Two was the word's death knell. In 1934, Fritz Morstein Marx acidly observed that 'state propaganda in Germany relegates the electorate to the rôle of national echo.'[45] (Nessmann's study of propaganda in Germany and Austria from the late nineteenth century notes that 'public relations' was introduced to Germany in 1937.[46]) In the same volume as Marx, Zurcher decried fascist Italy's 'system of censorship and propaganda in terms of the prostitution of education, the warping and suppression of truth, the installation of false and dangerous doctrines and the evocation and aggravation of emotion which lead to social violence'.[47] Laswell called propaganda the 'technique of influencing human action by the manipulation of representations' which was 'reserved for the spreading of subversive, debatable or merely novel attitudes'[48] Notably, these authors were concerned with the rise of totalitarianism: absent from their analyses are examples of propaganda in democracies.

It is hardly the fault of contemporary commentators that their definitions paint a damning picture, when writers from the period give them their cues. Modern commentators propagate propaganda's disreputableness. Jowett and O'Donnell call it the 'deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.'[49] This leaves little room for congruency between the desires of the propagandist and audience, and could suggest, for example, that 'Dig for Victory' propaganda in Second World War Britain did not meet mutual governmental and civilian needs. It is, however, a rare definition that does not highlight propagandists' manipulative intent. McQuail posits that propaganda is a construct of the enemy, counterbalanced with evidentiary argument from 'our side', and associated with conflict between states or belief systems. It intimidates and oppresses, warping the edges of truthfulness to further propagandists' intentions.[50] Chomsky's harsh view equates propaganda with totalitarianism: 'State propaganda, when supported by the educated classes and when no deviation is permitted from it, can have a big effect. It was a lesson learned by Hitler and many others, and it has been pursued to this day.'[51] Marlin is more measured, examining descriptive, stipulative, persuasive, negative, neutral and favourable definitions, delving into the thoughts of Bertrand Russell, Harald Lasswell, John Grierson and Brendan Bracken among others, before proffering his own definition: 'The organized attempt through communication to affect belief or action or inculcate attitudes in a large audience in ways that circumvent or suppress an individual's adequately informed, rational, reflective judgement.'[52]

Many public relations writers approach propaganda with trepidation. Like a rakish uncle whom nobody in the family dares acknowledge, propaganda is an embarrassment to public relations. One exception is Moloney, whose

juxtaposition of 'democratic propaganda'[53] and ready acknowledgement that 'the modern state and mass communications are intertwined' are thought-provoking.[54] Grunig and Hunt, with a passing nod at its papal origins, locate propaganda within their press agentry model, where public relations has a propaganda function to 'spread the faith of the organisation involved, often through incomplete, distorted or half-true information.'[55] For the most part, no modern public relations textbook dares refer to propaganda unless by way of denigration, or with a mitigating apology for sins during periods of national duress. Thus, Edwards' description of British Great War propaganda: 'Truth, here, was not so critical but its sacrifice was justified in light of the need to win at all costs.'[56] Stephen Tallents' reputation as a propagandist of integrity ensures he needs no rescuing from infamy, but Fawkes is unnecessarily apologetic: 'Tallents, like many contemporary public relations practitioners in the UK and USA, learned his communication skills in propaganda efforts in the two world wars. The line between persuasion and propaganda was not seen as a problem'.[57] Nor should it be: problems surface when present-day commentators ascribe their ethics, values and nomenclature to historical antecedents. Other problems arise when temporally or culturally distant commentators misread complex historical phenomena. Kunczik, for instance, credits WB Yeats for giving 'the Irish nationalist struggle something to revive and admire, an Irish past.'[58] Whatever Yeats' credentials as a cultural nationalist – albeit in the Anglo-Irish, Anglophone tradition – he was a peripheral figure in the nationalist struggle.

The diversity among these scholars seems to add strength to the view that propaganda is inherently undemocratic. This need not be so. Dewey maintained that 'democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience.'[59] The emphasis on shared experiences is crucial to nation-building propaganda. Taylor argues that it was the Foreign Office in London, aware that reduced state propaganda had weakened Britain internationally, that advocated renewed diplomatic propaganda activity.[60] Catlin, citing propaganda's papal origins, dubs the propagandist a missionary,[61] and proposes that in a democracy, the people's mandated custodians of state instruments of force may not use propaganda from an authoritarian standpoint, but must instead stimulate voluntary and party political agencies to advocate on their behalf.[62] Marlin qualifies his definition by acknowledging that it does not overlook as propaganda ways of 'influencing others which anticipate that the propagandees will make use of their own reason and informed judgment to act in some way which the propagandist desires.'[63]

With this refinement, Marlin echoes French sociologist Jacques Ellul who, rather than seeing propaganda as a tool of manipulation, offered a treatment where the consolidation of ideas to promote desirable patterns became an approved civic activity. Ellul conceived the notion that propaganda needs educated masses; it does not keep them ignorant.[64] Dewey, too, expressed the view that educated elites could not dominate the uneducated masses:

> A society marked off into classes need be specially attentive only to the education of its ruling elements. A society which is mobile, which is full of channels for the distribution of a change occurring anywhere, must see to it that its members are educated to personal initiative and adaptability.[65]

The Ellulian view of state propaganda is so vast as to be incomprehensible: every activity, individual and communal, every state intervention, and, indeed, the very disposition of the populace, all attuned, create powerfully resonant propaganda. This can be achieved by the combined efforts of two forms of propaganda, collective sociological presuppositions (emotions and beliefs) and social myths (principally science and history, but encompassing myths of the nation and the hero, both prominent in the Free State).[66] Successful propaganda occurs when one or more of these myths becomes a civic orthodoxy, underpinning all rationalising.[67] Similarly, the propagandist's ability to couch messages in mythical terms engenders an impression of self-created meaning by the propagandised audience.[68]

Ellul presented four categories of propaganda, each encompassing an orthodoxical and heterodoxical proposition. Three are relevant to the Free State, the fourth, vertical (great leader) and horizontal (located within small social cells) is not significantly visible. He contrasts agitation propaganda, a forceful means of stirring resentment to revolution, with integration propaganda, a transformative type accommodating high levels of education and media literacy as it builds social cohesion. Marlin suggests the latter is difficult to achieve when agitation propaganda has been deployed,[69] yet revolutionary propaganda demonising Britain dissipated sufficiently after independence to permit cordial official relations. The nature of rational and irrational propaganda also challenges understanding of the practice: the latter conforms to the worst excesses of tyranny, but the former permits inclusion of rational messages, which strengthen as education levels – and thus, critical faculty – also increase.[70] In the Free State, agricultural propaganda aimed at improving cattle breeding was rational, scientific and, with a little mythologizing, hailed the modern farmer as the backbone of the rural economy. Finally, Ellul distinguished between political and sociological propaganda. Political messaging, visible throughout the period of the Free State sought to achieve concrete goals, usually of a party or government, while sociological propaganda 'gets to man through his customs, through his most unconscious habits' and, arising spontaneously without deliberate propaganda activity, is capable of homogenising society.[71] The most nebulous propaganda, it is no less effective for that.

Jowett and O'Donnell, not unreasonably, question the helpfulness of a characterisation so mercurial that anything can be propaganda.[72] There is, however, something compelling about propaganda transformed from a politicised, strategised activity to a quasi-civic autonomy, where propaganda activity stems from citizens themselves. This leads to orthopraxis: a condition

where the action, and not the individuals' value judgment of it, leads to the attainment of an objective. In the Free State, positive public attitude towards Catholicism, the national language, native sports and music, and unshakeable belief in the supremacy of Celtic culture over British, evoked what Ellul would describe as orthodox propaganda, but it was repeated public demonstrations of fealty to Catholicism, Celticism and Gaelicism that created orthopraxis.

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1 Influences on the development of Free State propaganda

I

Introduction

The proto-history of propaganda and public relations in Ireland presents fertile yet untilled ground for researchers. Untilled, perhaps, as the history of its development remains elusive. From the preaching of mendicant medieval monks to the propagandistic pamphleteering of Jonathan Dean Swift, to the emulation by republicans of eighteenth-century American and French revolutionaries, much remains to be explored. The two great political and social movements of nineteenth-century Ireland, the campaigns for free expression of faith by Catholics and transfer of land ownership from British landlords to Irish tenants, have been treated as propaganda episodes unique to the Irish experience rather than themes in a broader understanding of the history of organised communication, and particularly how Irish propaganda developed alongside that employed in other countries.

By the late nineteenth century, emigration patterns had firmly established Britain and the United States as the primary destinations for the Irish diaspora. At a familial level, examining emigration to Australia, Fitzpatrick has demonstrated how rich was the information that flowed between emigrants and those that remained.[1] At an official level, there was a more understated flow, facilitated by emigration, but also by diplomacy and happenstance. Thus, among Britain's First World War propagandists, Lords Northcliffe and Kitchener were both Irish-born, while an inter-war Winston Churchill enjoyed the counsel of Tipperary-born Brendan Bracken. Meanwhile, in America, George Creel advocated for and wrote on Irish separatism, and was personally acquainted with Michael Collins and Eamon de Valera. The latter's prolonged tour of the US from 1919 also brought him into contact with many prominent American propagandists.

Such points of contact may offer circumstantial evidence of similarities in the development of propaganda in the Free State. However, given the history of emigration from Ireland to the Anglophone world, it is more reasonable to deduce that linguistic and cultural understanding of Britain and the US inclined Irish

propagandists to take their cues from there, rather than to see Irish propaganda developing uniquely in splendid isolation. This chapter examines what propaganda was understood to mean in all three countries, from the turn of the century to the 1920s, and suggests that while Irish propagandists may have learned from both, their philosophy had more in common with the US than Britain.

II

America, 1900–1914

The art of steering heads

In the early twentieth century, American propagandists displayed an attachment to honesty and integrity, to allowing the public, aware of the sources of information, to think independently. There was, too, a determination to professionalise propaganda, to make it acceptable as a business and social function, by adopting psychology as its cornerstone. As the century developed, as radio and cinema offered new possibilities for mass communication, propaganda began to reach into the public sphere, driving it from the parlour to which it had retreated in the late 1800s.[2] From the mid-nineteenth century, America was exposed to organised publicity ranging from Phineas T. Barnum's calculated bombast, to the sophisticated 1896 presidential campaign.[3] The era also witnessed the emergence of corporations with the economic power to influence federal and state policies. Campaigning journalists George Creel, later the architect of America's Great War propaganda, Walter Lippmann, Ida Tarbell and Henry Demarest Lloyd (whose searing treatise on business malpractice culminated in his maxim that 'publicity is the great moral disinfectant')[4] publicised business malpractices, forcing corporations into publicly defending their misdemeanours. The first propaganda firm for hire, The Publicity Bureau, opened in Boston in 1900. By 1901, it claimed addresses in Boston, Washington and Paris, before closing in 1912.[5]

Prominent among early propagandists, Ivy Ledbetter Lee established his New York-based firm in 1907, following the dissolution of a 1904 partnership, Parker and Lee. A Princeton student of Woodrow Wilson, Lee was a modestly talented journalist who found propaganda through political campaigning.[6] He viewed propaganda as a social good, and a frank propagation of ideas. The public, he wrote, was entitled to know the identities of those parties responsible for information and for forming the narrative from which it was expected to draw conclusions.[7] Aware of propaganda's misuses, Lee attempted to tread the fine line between representing controversial clients including the Rockefeller family, railroad interests, and I.G. Farben, and disseminating truthful editorial material to the press. He disavowed the concealment of propaganda messages: of public utilities secretly buying newspapers, or of power companies commissioning the writing of textbooks for use in schools unbeknownst to the educational authorities.[8]

As propaganda commercialised, it drew on politics, sociology and psychology for credibility. Once intuitive, to gain acceptability and professionalise now it became cerebral: propagandists began to publicise their métier. The psychology of Gabriel Tarde, Gustave le Bon and Sigmund Freud crossed the Atlantic, and was appropriated to explain propaganda. Creel mentioned discussions on Freud and Jung in fashionable New York salons in 1911,[9] and in 1914 Ivy Lee stressed the importance of influencing crowd behaviour, observing that society's leaders had always taken advantage of the people's propensity to act on impulse. He observed four elements in the psychology of the masses: crowds did not reason; crowds were led by symbols and words; to be successful with crowds meant being believed in; and the problem of influencing crowds lay in producing leaders who could mould imaginations and shape wills.[10] Lee was influenced by le Bon and Gerald Stanley Lee (no relation), a pastor and polymath whose writings were imbued with religious references that resonated with this preacher's son from Georgia, who observed that this 'art of steering heads inside which has come to be the secret art of all the other arts, the secret religion of all the religions, is also the secret of building and maintaining a civilization and a successful and permanent business'.[11]

Lippmann regarded psychology as a framework for propaganda but disagreed with many psychologists. He felt their work, lacking political application, was all morality and no statecraft.[12] Freudianism offered more, and he adapted Freud's dream theory to espouse the supremacy of symbols, seeing the strategic use of images as the secret to power.[13] Unconscious casuistry misled individuals, who masked deep-rooted beliefs with superficialities, and were inclined to use symbols.[14] For Freud, dreams signified unexpressed anxieties and provided visual clues that permitted psychoanalysts to unlock the individual's unconscious. These symbols, Lippmann held, permitted access to the unconscious of the masses rather than the individual. American propagandists would use symbols to communicate with and, later, to steer the masses.

Britain, 1900–1914

Make men think … by making them feel

Unlike America's commercial focus, in Britain the state and public bodies were propaganda's primary instigators. Ingham credits an 1876 Post Office advertising campaign as the first organised governmental propaganda campaign. Two state publications, the *Board of Trade Journal* (1886) and the *Ministry of Labour Gazette* (1893) which provided facts and statistics to businesses were also important antecedents.[15] Established in 1905, the National Association of Local Government Officers informed the public about the activities and role of local government, and lobbied on behalf of its members; it also considered forming a 'Press Gang' to generate publicity in 1906.[16] The British Medical Organisation promoted increased awareness of cervical cancer among midwives and general practitioners in 1909,[17] while in

1912 the Insurance Commission, instructed by Lloyd George, employed lecturers to explain the 1911 Insurance Act to employers and workers.[18] Such activities were usually haphazardly undertaken by untrained civil servants, and it was not until the 1920s that official propaganda, using lessons from the Great War, professionalised.[19]

Although the Conservative Party established a Press Bureau in 1911, a perusal of parliamentary debates reveals that 'propaganda' was commonly uttered pejoratively. Its role in spreading ideas detrimental to society exercised parliamentarians: from 1900 to 1914 propaganda was dishonourably mentioned in debates on issues as diverse as the Boer War, Irish nationalism, and public school education. Only occasionally did popular movements elicit parliamentarians' respect. In 1908, Philip Snowden MP said of the suffragists:

> there was not in the country at the present time, with the single exception of the Socialist movement, a movement which was so vigorous and so active, which carried on such persistent and consistent propaganda, as that for the enfranchisement of women.[20]

Suffragism gained attention by campaigning against the government. Even Ivy Lee, a regular visitor to England, was impressed by suffragists' desire to create propaganda through action, even if the acts were extreme.[21] Echoing the psychology that was emerging in America, Graham Wallas observed that one suffragist had had 'serious academic training in psychology, and … the tactics actually employed were in large part due to her plea that in order to make men think one must begin by making them feel'.[22] Westminster may have disliked propaganda against it, but it was unavoidable in public discourse. Proscribing it was undemocratic: better to drown it under a deluge of official propaganda. British propaganda emerged from 'state propaganda and bureaucratic intelligence' with a public service ethos.[23] The Great War and Irish revolution would test this severely.

Ireland, 1900–1914

Educate English opinion about Irish needs

Propaganda in Ireland had no burgeoning industry as in America, and commercial publicity was the simple advertisement. Domestic official propaganda – meaning propaganda originating in London – tended to be low-key, although extraordinary events such as the Boer War were propagandised through recruiting campaigns and official press coverage. The two main political forces on the island, nationalism and unionism, elected members to an overseas parliament, and conducted propaganda in Ireland and Britain. Nationalists believed their propaganda for political independence had an international dimension in Britain. Unionists, however, saw such propaganda as domestic, and were rather better organised. Founded in 1885 to counter nationalist

propaganda for a separation from Britain, the Irish Loyal and Patriotic Union (ILPU) aimed to influence public opinion from its inception and, apart from the goal of electing unionist politicians, its aims of increasing Ireland's wealth and improving local government[24] were reasonably congruent with nationalism. Edward Caulfield Houston hoped that the ILPU would 'afford facilities to men of position and standing in Ireland to take their proper part in influencing public opinion'.[25] Having become the Irish Unionist Alliance, by 1898 it maintained a London office to distribute information in Britain. The busy office was, according to the organisation's secretary, C. A. Owen Lewis, engaged in gathering useful information and maintaining a file of the most influential English and Irish newspapers.[26]

By 1906, the Alliance was the pre-eminent unionist organisation in Britain. It welcomed the establishment of another unionist organisation, the Union Defence League (UDL), and advised the newcomer of its efforts, ostensibly to avoid activities overlapping. These activities focussed on disseminating messages using every available medium. It organised meetings and demonstrations throughout Ireland, and during the 1906 general election supplied over 130 speakers to public platforms in Britain. It also published its own journal, *Notes from Ireland*, sent to 'Members of Parliament, Editors of Newspapers, Reading Rooms and Unionists'. In addition, it supplied weekly articles outlining the unionist position to British newspapers, an area where it suggested the UDL could offer assistance by pressurising editors to publish the articles. While these endeavours were important, the Alliance stressed that its:

> principal work … with regard to literature is the publication and distribution of pamphlets and leaflets … written specially for the Alliance and … based upon facts … demonstrating the soundness of the Unionist position. … In this work the Alliance not only aims at reaching readers at home, but has also endeavoured to influence opinion in the Colonies.[27]

The attachment to factual information and democratic participation suggests a highly evolved type of propaganda, though bringing pressure to bear on reluctant editors smacks of a readiness to pursue more rugged methods of persuasion. Indeed, beneath the cordiality of its response to the UDL, the Alliance, exercising unquestionable territoriality, warned against interfering with its own subscriptions in Ireland and suggested treading cautiously when fundraising in Britain.[28]

The Unionist Association of Ireland (UAI), established in 1908, wrote in its first annual report of a successful campaign of public meetings in England and Scotland. The meetings featured illustrated talks with lantern slides depicting boycotted agricultural workers under police protection in Ireland, of victims of nationalist violence and country houses that had been shot at.[29] The propaganda, perhaps veering into scaremongering, demonstrated that lawlessness in Ireland could only be quelled by maintaining the Union, and the UAI claimed the meetings had helped strengthen British opinion in this

regard.[30] Clearly unionist propaganda, with its strong network of wealthy, influential members, was capable of campaigning in Ireland, Britain and throughout the Empire. It had to be: from the closing decades of the nineteenth century, propaganda by advocates of land ownership reform, home rule and cultural nationalism had presented forceful adversaries. That these adversaries espoused methods that were, according to each one's needs and status, legal or illegal, presented unionism with the difficulty of addressing their arguments in the correct public arena. The constitutional and law-abiding Irish Parliamentary Party nevertheless initiated unpopular and ungentlemanly debating procedures in Westminster, regularly filibustering, the better 'to educate English opinion about Irish needs'[31] when seeking home rule. The avowedly law-abiding Land League, advocating tenant ownership of farms, profited in propaganda terms from the plethora of agrarian crimes (cattle hocking, and assaults on landlords, their agents and minor Crown officials) perpetrated under its banner. Socially attractive and ostensibly apolitical organisations such as the Gaelic League and the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) give some indication of the diversity of the opposition facing unionism.

By the end of the first decade of the century, the constitutional, social and agrarian forms of nationalism were being overtaken by a new, separatist propaganda that was a mélange of cultural, political and republican ideals. In the vanguard were Sinn Féin, the Irish Volunteers and Dungannon Clubs. Thus in 1901, while the fourth Baron Clonbrock, Luke Dillon, was establishing a Galway branch of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Help Society, a benevolent fund for ex-servicemen and their families,[32] nationalist propaganda against Boer War recruitment was increasing. Drawing on eighteenth-century Irish republicanism, the Dungannon Clubs, founded in 1904, crystallised anti-recruitment propaganda, and became a focal point for extreme nationalism. The chief architect of the clubs, Bulmer Hobson, an Ulster Quaker, was also integral to establishing Na Fianna Éireann in 1909. The force behind Sinn Féin, Arthur Griffith's reputation as a propagandist rests on his output as a journalist and pamphleteer. His was not the visceral propaganda of demonisation or verbal legerdemain, but propaganda of the wordsmith, of crafted prose succinctly and persuasively delineating arguments. Informing his writing was an intellect capable of transforming dry facts into a potent argument. *The Resurrection of Hungary*[33] presented an economic argument for granting Ireland independence within the Empire, setting the tone for intellectualised nationalist propaganda that continued over the next two decades, most notably with Desmond FitzGerald. An admirer of Griffith's propaganda, FitzGerald credited him as the greatest influence on Irish nationalism. Griffith's newspaper, *The United Irishman*, was printed from 1899 to 1906, and renamed *Sinn Féin* until its suppression in 1914. Its small circulation may have led to an assumption, FitzGerald wrote, 'that it was not likely to have an effect on the country, for people always think that influence must be direct and visible. Whereas in the realm of ideas it is more frequently indirect and occult.'[34]

In contrast to Griffith, Patrick Pearse's writing was incendiary. Opening *The Murder Machine*, his searing critique of the education system in Ireland, he accused the English of never committing a useless crime, whether assassination, orchestrating a famine or executing a Sepoy by cannon fire – a reference to the fate of several native troops in the Indian Rebellion of 1857.[35] Yet, there was subtlety in Pearse's fiction, poetry and drama, though the content was manifestly Christian, Gaelic and preoccupied with sacrificing one's life for a greater good. Nationalist newspapers published many pieces of literature of dubious style and quality in the period, ersatz copies of Pearse's own impassioned writings, or the lyricism of Thomas Moore, then considered the national bard. Literature as social propaganda was already well known in Britain, evidenced in tales of derring-do in the style of Kipling and Rider Haggard, and the prosaic reportage of missionaries and proselytisers, and in Ireland, too, it was becoming more influential. The Gaelic scholar and future president, Douglas Hyde, collected folk tales and poetry in Irish, crossing swords with Trinity College, Dublin academics who regarded it as a peasant language with little to recommend it.[36] In 1893, he co-founded the language revival movement the Gaelic League with Eoin MacNeill, later president of the Irish Volunteers and Free State minister. Soon, it was not enough to admire ancient legends and profess interest in the language: the committed nationalist had to learn Irish also.

The founding of the Gaelic Athletic Association in 1884 also rendered service by inculcating a sense of Gaelic sporting identity. Sporting prowess and nationalism dovetailed neatly, with Celtic lore linking the contemporary sport of hurling with the mythology of the pre-Christian warrior and hurler, Cúchulainn, a figure revered by Pearse. Gaelic games were a manifestation of purity of spirit, and an exemplar of a sporting tradition that pre-existed British rule by millennia. Participation in sport became an assertive form of propaganda. The establishment of GAA and Gaelic League clubs was an organisational prototype for nationalists. Though mass movements had existed before, they had been neither so widespread, nor so embedded in communities. Nationalist propaganda reached a wide audience through dissemination of pamphlets, Griffith's newspapers, and, in an Ellulian sense, participation. It created a vibrant society that became the birthplace of more forceful organisations, with more branches of Sinn Féin, the Irish Volunteers and Cumann na mBan appearing before the Great War.

III

The US and the Great War

Propaganda in the truest sense of the word

America's entry to the Great War presaged a formidable propaganda campaign. Woodrow Wilson established the Committee on Public Information (CPI) under George Creel's chairmanship, with state and military propaganda

channelled through it. Creel later recalled that the committee produced 'propaganda in the truest sense of the word, meaning the "propagation of the faith"' – a reference to Pope Gregory XV's establishment of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith.[37] Like Ivy Lee, Creel knew that public opinion had to be informed with facts, not manipulative narratives.[38] But in wartime, transparency would imperil national interests, and an overly censorious regime would cultivate damaging rumours. Responsible secrecy trumped official censorship.[39] Creel's voluntary press code of self-censorship was criticised,[40] but the CPI's Division of News furnished 16,000 newspapers with a weekly war news digest that did not defer to the military's preference for silence.[41] The Division of Foreign Language Newspapers monitored the international press, and translated pamphlets for distribution domestically and internationally. The Foreign Press Bureau relayed 1,000 words daily by radio across Europe, Central and South America, and prepared material for international publication.[42] Indeed, the CPI only directly censored outgoing cable communications, which scarcely troubled the press.

The CPI incorporated a Division of Civil and Educational Cooperation which published pamphlets written by its own staff and 3,000 writers, mainly academics and publicists. Its reach was immense: the National Historical Board, with CPI prompting, promoted the study of the war in schools and communities, while several universities distributed the publications to faculty members and students. Schools received pamphlets with helpful teaching instructions, and the Boy Scout movement arranged distribution.[43] Over a dozen national organisations disseminated or taught the division's output, with 18 million pamphlets distributed by the end of 1917 alone. Perhaps even more effective, however, was the Division of Four Minute Men, 15,000 pillars of their communities who spoke at public gatherings for approximately four minutes on propaganda topics distributed weekly by the CPI.[44] Impressed with the venture, Major General William Biddle requested that speech notes be sent to training camp commanders.[45] A Junior Four Minute Men youth group, with school competitions, was also established.[46]

Creel recognised the value of cinema propaganda, and established the divisions of Film, and Foreign Picture Service which filmed military manoeuvres, sporting events, and liberty loan features. A coercive clause prevented producers selling films abroad unless buyers agreed to screen CPI productions[47] and the committee offered an advisory service to producers of patriotic films.[48] Creel's partiality to cinema came from his own practical experience: he had written film treatments for a Hollywood studio, and even acted in a Western movie, *The Heart of a Cowboy*, in 1909.[49]

In contrast to British and French efforts, many CPI employees were already journalists, propagandists or academics. Ivy Lee, representing the American Red Cross, worked closely with the CPI. Creel's military attaché was a young Major Douglas McArthur, while Charles Dana Gibson, Edward Bernays and Carl Byoir were among the talent whose experience steered American propaganda in a different direction to its allies, who often used atrocity

propaganda. Although Gibson, director of the Division of Pictorial Publicity, used emotive and manipulative images of German atrocities, Creel distrusted atrocity propaganda: if Germany proved one allegation false, it would discredit the CPI. Instead, supported by Generals John Pershing and Peyton March, the CPI officially denied unsubstantiated atrocity reports.[50] Despite differences in prosecuting the propaganda war with his American allies, Lord Northcliffe called several conferences on joint Allied propaganda but no formal co-operation emerged[51] until a later reciprocal arrangement was eventually instituted with France and Britain to exchange war photographs for propaganda use.[52] Perhaps the aristocratic tendencies of the British propaganda élite rankled in America – Creel snappily described Frederick Smith as 'a brilliant man, but with the true British gift of offensiveness'[53] – where propaganda was treated as an enterprise not merely an endeavour. Mirroring American propaganda's commercialism, the CPI was part-funded by its own activities, with the film division particularly profitable. Its final accounts showed $6.85 million granted from the President's Fund and Congress, and commercial earnings of $2,937,447 returned to the treasury. It appears that the CPI succeeded in propagandising the war by being run as an efficient commercial operation. It was a contrast to British propaganda.

Britain and the Great War

Amateur and professional, talent and charlatanry, the patriot and the arriviste

Negative connotations of propaganda in pre-war Britain contributed to a lack of preparedness when hostilities commenced. While Germany had experience of state propaganda, mainly in military bodies and its diplomatic service,[54] British responses were clumsy, with a Press Bureau established in August 1914 and a War Propaganda Bureau in September. Propaganda was hindered by governmental vacillation: under Asquith, the Home Office, Foreign Office and War Office, among others, shared responsibility for propaganda. It was only during Lloyd George's premiership that propaganda was centralised within a Department of Information, which, a mere nine months before the Armistice, eventually became the Ministry of Information. Ingham describes Britain's disorganisation in 1914, peculiarly glossing over Charles Masterson's involvement.[55] Yet Masterson, head of the War Propaganda Bureau, was a shrewd propagandist who quickly identified novel means of achieving propaganda.

The flamboyant Frederick Smith was unfortunate to be appointed director of the Press Bureau with responsibility for censorship. Personally ill-equipped for the role, and with no press experience, he held the directorship for seven weeks. From the outset, the nature of the office was in question, with Kitchener advocating censorship over material injurious to the war effort, while Winston Churchill, aware that in the absence of official information newspapers would report hearsay, preferred constant and reliable information that would 'keep the country properly and truthfully informed … of what can be

told, and what is fair and reasonable'.[56] By early 1915 the Bureau had improved, with a larger staff than Smith had enjoyed, as Robert Crewe Milnes outlined to the House of Lords: the Solicitor-General controlled the Bureau, assisted by Sir Frank Swettenham, an experienced Colonial administrator, and Sir Edward Cook, a newspaper editor and writer. Some fifty naval, military and civil assistants added to the complement, though their role seemed to be censoring press cables rather than disseminating information.[57] While Northcliffe argued against any official policy of secrecy, and won rights for correspondents to report from the front provided that the material would improve national morale,[58] it seems that press censorship was far more overt than in America.

American thinking suggested that propagandists mediated between leaders and the masses, but British propagandists were leaders in their own right. Following a stint in service behind the lines as a regimental recorder, Smith became Attorney General and, later, Lord Birkenhead. Politicians and novelists John Buchan and H. G. Wells, and press magnates Lords Beaverbrook and Northcliffe became prominent propagandists, with the latter becoming Director of Propaganda under Lloyd George. Buchan glossed over his wartime activities in 'the queer circumspect world of the Secret Service'[59] to which Masterson recruited him, observing Masterson's canny recruitment of novelists and artists to propagandise the war effort: 'I saw at close quarters the intricate mechanism which directed the War at home, one of the strangest mixtures of amateur and professional, talent and charlatanry, the patriot and the arriviste which history has known.'[60] Masterson's perspicacity saw fiction writing as a persuasive force, and Buchan's contribution to wartime propaganda was more tangible than he avowed: his novels *The Thirty Nine Steps*, *Greenmantle* and, in 1919, *Mr Standfast* provided Britons with a hero, Richard Hannay, whose explicitly British values were more remarkable for his ordinariness. In Wells' *Mr Britling Sees It Through*, the eponymous protagonist, whose surname may well parody the stereotypical little Englander, overcomes the death of both his son and a pre-war German acquaintance in the fighting with compassionate resolve. However enjoyable these books are, there is, of course, subtle falsity of purpose in such work, which ill contrasts with the latent propaganda value of literature produced for its own intrinsic cultural value.

Such subtle falsity contrasts with British atrocity propaganda, which, though exaggerated, was largely factual in basis. Posters and pamphlets on the execution of Edith Cavell and the rape of Belgian nuns created paragons while demonising the enemy. An odd exception came with reports of angels at Mons protecting the British army – the result of a fantastic appropriation of a short story by a serving Welsh soldier.[61] These kinds of exhortation may have worked in Britain, but the reaction of Irish nationalists suggests that it was not merely of little effect in Ireland, but served to galvanise anti-British sentiment. Greater subtlety was required, but the Easter Rising and subsequent unrest meant that Ireland became another arena for British warfare by propaganda which, regimented by government policy and perhaps even classism, lacked the freedom and authority of its American counterpart.

Three factions created war propaganda in Ireland: unionists propagated enlistment as a way of defeating Home Rule; constitutional nationalists promoted it to achieve this goal; and advanced nationalists propagandised a schism. Clonbrock, a Conservative peer, actively supported unionist recruitment in Galway.[62] His wife, Lady Clonbrock, was active in charitable work, harnessing the support of various Galway organisations and committees to send food and clothing to troops.[63] She was also involved in notifying serving or discharged servicemen to apply to either the Soldiers and Sailors Help Society, or the Galway War Fund Association for assistance,[64] receiving an OBE for her efforts in 1920. The Home Rule supporting Irish Parliamentary Party historically attracted few members with a military background. Few of its MPs were young enough to serve, and only six enlisted.[65] The IPP became the main nationalist organisation in Irish pro-recruitment propaganda. Its efforts to promulgate voluntary enlistment to secure Home Rule were, however, constantly undermined by Britain's desire to institute conscription, and separatists' determination to use it as a propaganda weapon.

Much of advanced nationalism's propaganda was, specifically, counter-propaganda. The Central Council for the Organising of Recruitment in Ireland (CCORI) and the Irish Recruitment Council (IRC) expended large sums in propaganda, drowning out advanced nationalist propaganda. Recruitment was a focal point for advanced nationalism, which re-trod the familiar route of anti-Boer War recruitment. A plethora of nationalist newspapers took an anti-recruitment stance. Balladry and poetry, which found a home in popular culture and the advanced nationalist press, were potent forms of anti-recruitment propaganda.[66] However, advanced nationalist propaganda was not merely press-focussed. It was the propaganda of action, and no propaganda was as effective as the doomed Easter Rising. The rebels could hardly have expected leniency, but the execution of the leaders, imposition of martial law, the prophylactic internment of 3,500 people, the enactment of the Defence of the Realm Act, and the threat of conscription was disproportionate. Britain turned support for defending Ireland against insurrection into precisely the propaganda that Sinn Féin and the IRB craved.[67] Capitalising on an upsurge in support, advanced nationalism engaged in electoral politics, and the Sinn Féin propaganda machine succeeded in having Count Plunkett, father of the executed 1916 rebel, Joseph, elected as MP for North Roscommon in 1917, seizing an IPP seat in the process.

The type of propaganda carried out by advanced nationalists varied. It was by times humorous, Christian, Celtic, rooted in the tragedy of British conquest and calling to mind the contemporary fate of Belgium at the hands of Germany. Outside Ireland, the support of freelance propagandists sympathetic to the cause was important, although the results were occasionally more vitriolic than was useful. Limerick-born Thomas St John Gaffney, a Germanophile and American diplomat in Munich, slandered Britain in a pamphlet written in German and translated into English:

> There is no crime that the English charge against the Germans in Belgium that the English themselves did not commit in Ireland. The murder of the innocent, shooting of women, children and priests, and open robbery and loot were of daily occurrence.[68]

Creel met the Sinn Féin leadership in Ireland in early 1919, and was impressed by their demeanour. They contrasted with his experience of Irish propagandists outside Ireland. 'For all their implacability, the Sinn Féiners were far more reasonable than the Irish-American group in Paris.'[69] It appears that advanced nationalist propagandists in Ireland were more adept communicators than overseas supporters, whose physical distance was also a psychological separation from subtlety.

IV

Post-war America

The fortress of our tradition

War taught American propagandists how to sell a message, and a wave of commercial propagandists and in-house departments followed. While Byoir, Pendleton Dudley and Tommy Ross, Ivy Lee's business partner, built respected agencies, the most influential post-war American propagandist was Bernays, whose propensity for self-aggrandisement and remarkable longevity overshadowed his rivals. His view of propaganda was less altruistic than Creel's or Lee's. 'The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element of democratic society', he wrote.[70] Politicians, according to Bernays, did not have to be the people's servants since pleasing the public was less important and less effective than swaying opinion. This could be achieved, not through open discourse, but by creating the conditions where personalities drove ideas, where group leaders were identified who could exert control within their own communities.[71] His thinking was influenced by Lippmann, who espoused an updated Platonism where society was composed of leaders, the masses, and the intelligentsia. The latter advised leaders and translated their decisions to the masses. Lippmann deliberately limited discourse between leaders and the masses, who were incapable of entering into public discourse because, he asserted, they lacked competence to fulfil their democratic function.[72]

Lippmann's de-democratising did not hold universal sway. Whether or not Roosevelt's 'New Deal' was a greater propaganda vehicle than the CPI,[73] the president had a greater grasp of propaganda than his immediate predecessors. Louis McHenry Howe, a long-time confidante, advised him on radio's propaganda advantages and former Paramount Washington correspondent Stephen Early was appointed presidential press secretary. Roosevelt broadcast over thirty fireside chats in which he addressed Americans directly, offering

empathy and leadership, and contrasting with Lippmann's ideology. His creation of the Farm Security Administration to combat agricultural poverty failed, but the photographic archive its staff gathered provided a compelling depiction of, and argument to eradicate, agrarian poverty.

While British and Irish propaganda emerged as a practical, little-theorised adjunct of political and social control, with propagandists tumbling accidentally into their roles, in America the propagandist's attributes were examined. Ivy Lee held that the ideal practitioner would have benefited from a liberal education, studied the effects of language on public opinion, been worldly-wise and attuned to current affairs, and been capable of professional detachment from his chosen field of publicity. Honesty, fairness and a predilection for understatement were a sine qua non.[74] But the difficulty facing propagandists was not in describing ideal attributes, but in finding the most apposite word to identify practitioners. The nomenclature for propagandists was as diverse as their practice. Lee preferred the term 'advisor in public relations', believing it to be more encompassing than publicity agent.[75] Bernays observed the confusion between propagandist and press agent[76] and in 1923 proffered public relations counsellor. Lee disapproved, tartly commenting to Harvard students that it took a man (he can only have meant Bernays) a whole book to justify the phrase.[77] He later joked to journalism teachers that a phrase by Gerald Stanley Lee 'Helping Millionaires to Think' was as good a description for the practice as any.[78] However, he did come round to Bernays' legalistic viewpoint, agreeing that similarities existed between the press agent's role in publicity and the conveyancer's in law. Both were technical, functional roles in professions with more learned, wiser depths. Public relations, however, had a broader onus of responsibility. If the lawyer's responsibility was to the client, the public relations advisor's was to the social conscience and common good, to improving civilisation and the world at large.[79] In short, the ideal propagandist had an understanding of how people thought and how this could be used.

The adoption of psychology as a basis for propaganda had fortunate circumstances, Bernays being Freud's paternal and maternal nephew. When the Great War eroded Freud's savings, Bernays promoted Freudianism and arranged American publication of Freud's work. Avuncular affection did not conceal Freud's dislike of publicity, or belief that American publishers' pandering to populism would dilute his work's importance. His reputation and erudition guaranteed publicity, but his intransigence prevented the impact Bernays desired.[80] Freudianism was to have offered propaganda a scientific rationale, but, dubbed a 'professional nephew' for his ceaseless references to Freud, Bernays used psychology manipulatively: 'while the esteemed analyst tried to use psychology to free his patients from emotional crutches, Bernays used it to rob consumers of their free will, helping his clients predict, then manipulate, the very way their customers thought and acted.'[81] Bernays' campaign for Lucky Strike cigarettes illustrates this. He hired a psychoanalyst who advised that cigarettes symbolised freedom. To attract female smokers,

he hired models to smoke in public; in the New York Easter parade, the models carried placards identifying cigarettes as torches of liberty. Symbolising spring and hopefulness, green, the brand's packaging colour, was designated the year's fashion colour: fashion editors and department stores were notified, and Bernays organised a Green Ball and Luncheon.[82]

The appeal of psychology in creating a rationale for propaganda campaigns was obviously compelling, and after the Great War Lippmann developed pseudo-environment theory. Psychoanalysis regarded the individual's external environment as an indispensable given, and enabled the individual to relate to it. Propaganda was concerned with the individual's conception of that environment, and how symbols could be used to direct the subconscious. For Bernays, likening the propagandist to the psychoanalyst, that meant understanding how individuals perceived their political environment, and how that perception could be more skilfully moulded by an adept persuader.[83] As the masses, incapable of speedy independent thought, needed rule by enlightened élites, Lippmann also formulated stereotype theory, another Freudian refinement: people interpreted their environment using predetermined cultural and psychological impulses, which propagandists could influence. Like the Freudian subconscious, a repository for potentially dangerous memories, stereotypes had a defensive function and were 'the fortress of our tradition … behind its defenses we can continue to feel ourselves safe in the position we occupy'.[84] The perfect stereotype was impressed upon the masses without realisation.[85] Bernays also saw the power of stereotypes: so embedded could they be, that they offered society's leaders spirited opposition.[86] To influence the masses, it would be necessary to influence their leader. Fundamental to crowd motivation, le Bon wrote, was the notion of the hero. Of greater importance than the leader's appeal was the raw emotiveness of the rabble-rouser, in making 'an abusive use of violent affirmations'.[87] In order to motivate a crowd, simplicity was required. Freud concurred, highlighting that a group had no critical faculty, and thought only in images which produced simple and exaggerated feelings.[88] European psychology created the recognition that, presented with imagery requiring no reasoning to interpret, a malleable American crowd was capable of attaining dogmatic homogeneity.

Post-war Britain

Official propaganda tends to be semi-official propaganda

Post-war propaganda was considered un-British and unsuited to democracy – a tacit acknowledgement that wartime propaganda had occasionally lacked candour.[89] Smacking of the underhand, it was an untrustworthy endeavour to which peacetime Britons could not be subjected. In the early 1920s politicians denounced propaganda as something practised against the state, particularly from Bolshevik groups and, until the Treaty, Sinn Féin. Parliamentary debates offer the optimistic naivety that official British propaganda was a

diffident last resort, and always practised honestly. While this may have been true domestically in relation to relatively safe or popular policies, it obfuscates the reality that until 1922 in Ireland, Britain carried out a propaganda war as active and wily as that against Germany. A propaganda division operated within Dublin Castle, suggesting that the war was more a propaganda struggle than an armed one: indeed, for nationalists, international press exposure was more likely to achieve independence than a fanciful guerrilla victory over Britain.

Censorship was a fundamental, proactive element of Castle propaganda. Replacing the Defence of the Realm Act, the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act of 1920 permitted stringent censorship and the forcible closure of newspapers for publishing material likely to cause disaffection, even when truthful.[90] British propaganda was frequently distorted and based on disinformation. Hamar Greenwood misled Parliament, denying that Crown forces were destroying creameries, the backbone of the Irish agricultural economy, in official reprisals. He corrected the record, though still demonised creameries, without proffering any evidence, as:

> the rendezvous of the Republican Army, from which orders to the local brigade are issued. One in particular has been actually an ambush for the destruction of the police. Many of them have been suspected by the police of having been the very centre of the plots now waged against them.
>
> … I said I had not a tittle of evidence of any creamery having been destroyed by the uniformed forces of the Crown. … Since that speech I have gone into the question, and … some creameries have been destroyed by the forces of the Crown. In some cases they were justified …[91]

Nationalism's *Irish Bulletin* was so successful the Castle sought to undermine it with its own *Weekly Summary*, [92] and once, clumsily, by forgery.[93] Officialdom unsuccessfully propagandised the execution of Kevin Barry, an eighteen-year-old medical student hanged for participating in an ambush during which a British soldier died. Ludicrously, police propagandists claimed that a clairvoyant had contacted his repentant spirit, which now exhorted his comrades to cease their wickedness.[94] Britain was fighting an increasingly unwinnable propaganda war,[95] and even the *Manchester Guardian* was sympathetic to Barry.[96] Nonetheless no expense was spared in fighting a rearguard action, with Dublin Castle, Army GHQ and the Irish Office in London contributing civilian and military personnel to a progressively desperate counter-propaganda effort.

Outside the conflict, officials remained reticent about acknowledging domestic propaganda, as evinced by Andrew Bonar Law's response to a query on the number of government departments practising it:

> Propaganda in the usually accepted sense is not carried out departmentally. A number of Departments, however, circulate information on some subjects connected with their Department, such as new regulations,

> dissemination of technical intelligence and kindred subjects, the cost of which is borne by the Department concerned.[97]

Echoing the psychology debate in America, the advertising pioneer Charles Higham differentiated between the practice of objective and subjective publicity in public affairs: the former sought to influence things; the latter, minds. While commercial propaganda required objective publicity, measured financially, educational campaigns were subjective: 'One is staking often a large amount of money on the hope of clearing an atmosphere, producing harmony of feeling or in altering a mental attitude. To do this effectively needs considerable courage, faith and psychological sense.'[98] Alfred Mond underscored propaganda's nefariousness in 1925: 'Propaganda is quite useless. Propaganda is persuading somebody to believe in something for your own benefit. Education is persuading somebody to believe in something for his benefit. We do not want propaganda, but we do want education.'[99] Less than a decade later, a dozen government departments employed forty-four publicists.[100]

Journalistic obsequiousness abetted governmental propaganda, which reached the masses without any directive influence or challenge. Beaverbrook was content for journalists to deferentially self-censor:

> It is often said by the cynic that it is the interest of the Press to oppose the Government. The very reverse is the truth. Opposition to the considered opinion of a Prime Minister is a course which the journalist would avoid if it were possible. Such a difference of opinion must involve a heavy burden of responsibility on the journalist. He must be very certain that he is right in assuming this critical attitude. The easier course is that of compliance with the established and presumably well-informed authority.[101]

Great man leadership was a class-conscious variation of Lippmann's thinking. Politicians propagated British identity as the nature of the empire evolved, masking propaganda as education: 'They believed stability and continuity … would come through education provided by propaganda. …. They sought to project a confident and prosperous UK through the Empire Marketing Board and the British Council. PR for them was mass communication of official messages.'[102] Governmental propaganda underpinned diplomatic and social affairs, focussing on educating domestic and Commonwealth publics about political decisions.[103] The British Council played a crucial role, endowing foreign universities with professorships, providing English books and journals to foreign libraries, granting scholarships to study in Britain, and sending the poet John Masefield, the pianist Myra Hess, and the quintessentially stereotypical British adventurer – diplomat, journalist, footballer and spy – Bruce Lockhart on overseas cultural tours.[104]

The idea of a settled state in which each citizen played his role for the public weal is exemplified by Scottish documentary maker John Grierson. Recruited to the Empire Marketing Board (EMB) by Stephen Tallents, his

first EMB film, *Drifters* (1929), promoted Scottish herring fishing in a powerfully unglamorous fashion. A philosophy graduate, Grierson found his vocation as a fellow of the Rockefeller Foundation. In New York, he became an acquaintance of Lippmann, and was impressed by the American's prescience of cinema's potential:

> I talked to him one day of the labour involved in following the development of the yellow press through the evanescent drama of local politics. He mentioned that one would do better to follow the dramatic patterns of the film through the changing character of our time, and that the box-office records of success and failure were on file.[105]

Altough funding bedevilled the EMB, *Drifters*' commercial success was a fillip, and Tallents found parliamentary support when Sir William Brass (future chairman of the British Film Institute) and William Lunn, the Secretary for Overseas Trade, praised cinema's propaganda potential, and EMB dedication to it.[106] (Of interest to the Free State, in 1929 Grierson recruited J. N. G. (Norris) Davidson.[107] Davidson, a Cambridge graduate and *Granta* editor, later became an Irish Tourist Association director, and tourism propaganda film producer. The EMB had other Irish links: it commissioned eminent Irish artists Sean Keating and Margaret Clarke to produce artistic posters of Free State produce, though the country had commonly a low priority.[108]) By the time Grierson and Tallents had moved to the GPO, official state support for publicity films was more substantial than the documentary movement they created acknowledged.[109] But not even the rise of Tallents and Grierson, with their innovative use of documentary and portrayal of the Everyman, made state propaganda entirely populist. By the late 1930s, propaganda activity was still sufficiently downplayed so that 'official propaganda tends to be semi-official propaganda'[110] and 'the general belief that Britain will somehow muddle through … continue[s] to present serious difficulties to the progress of official propaganda'.[111]

Ireland 1919–1922

Journalists out of fighting men and ambassadors out of journalists

From 1919, nationalist propaganda changed from being anti-British to seeking international recognition of the Irish Republic. The official organ of the Dáil, the *Irish Bulletin*, detailed British activities in Ireland in a way that appealed to neutral readers:

> The purpose of the daily 'Bulletin' is not to publish current news of events, but to present special articles and notes on current events and on various aspects of the political struggle, together with statements and summaries useful not only as propaganda but as permanent historical records.

> The utmost care is taken to check all facts and figures and ensure accuracy in every statement made. The tone aimed at is one of dignity and restraint without loss of forcible exposition.[112]

With ministerial responsibility for executing propaganda before and after the foundation of the state, FitzGerald saw benefits to befriending the press in London.[113] He observed that the British press exhibited reluctance to accept material, no matter how official its provenance: 'their experiences during the war has made them very chary of anything in the nature of propaganda'.[114] The inference that official war propaganda had soured press relations is inescapable, as is the notion that nationalists were keen to avoid that error. His treatment of the press worked, and newspapers expressed surprise following his arrest by Britain. One wrote that it had 'aroused wide-spread interest in journalistic circles abroad, where he is regarded as an outstanding figure in the national struggle'. Another referred to 'the very able chief of the publicity and propaganda side of the Sinn Fein organisation'. Henri Beraud of *Le Petit Parisien* wrote: 'All the journalists who have met him have liked him – even the English reporters'.[115]

During his ministry nationalist propaganda extended into Britain, with the assistance of the Irish Self-Determination League (ISDL), an organisation of Irish nationalists in England. Dominated by Sinn Féin, its propaganda activities included fundraising, public meetings and distributing the *Bulletin*. In America, the Friends of Irish Freedom carried out similar functions. France, too, was an important arena for nationalists, and much effort was invested in producing material in French. Having Francophone propagandists in George Gavan Duffy, Count Gerald O'Kelly and former Legionnaire Michael MacWhite helped. Domestic propaganda was translated into French, as, for example, when the self-titled 'Délégation du Gouvernement Elu de la République Irlandaise' issued a pamphlet quoting Irish episcopal Lenten pastoral letters, two of which compared Ireland's treatment by Britain with Belgium's treatment by Germany. Cardinal Logue, Primate of All Ireland, described:

> A military regime of a severity one finds only in the most despotic and unpitying governments; sentences absolutely disproportionate to alleged crimes; arbitrary arrests, *lettres de cachet* even more numerous than in ancient France; deportations like those which lately provoked a cry of reprobation and anger against the Germans during their military occupation of Belgium.[116]

The Bishop of Clonfert wrote: 'While the episcopacy and the clergy and the Belgian people made their protestation against the Prussian domination heard, they were heroes in English eyes; here, he who protests against a domination as brutal is considered a traitor.'[117] Although the tone and tenor contradicted FitzGerald's diktat on fact being paramount, emotive propaganda coming from a respectable third party was invaluable in officially secular but nominally Catholic France.

An exceptional thinker on propaganda, FitzGerald wrote in 1920: 'The chief business of the Propaganda Department is the collection, co-ordination and distribution of information.'[118] In the Dáil, he recalled propaganda's democratic function: 'Our propaganda during the war was based on democratic principles – what the people stood for was what we should advertise.'[119] Lester's papers show a focus on intelligence-gathering to source accurate, reliable information, and a formidable aptitude for using propaganda as an instrument of statecraft. They contrast greatly with Frank Gallagher, who worked with FitzGerald before the Treaty. Where FitzGerald was a consummate thinker, rationalising propaganda's effects, and Lester a skilled interpreter of propaganda and state administration, Gallagher was a street fighter, promoting nationalism with ferocious fundamentalism. From prison hunger striker to prolific writer of fiction, journalism and publicity material, he espoused propaganda as a persuasive, one-sided narrative, a mélange of fact and fiction, Catholicism and politics, imagery and symbolism: 'the creed for which he laboured tended to be self-righteously narrow and characterised by images and myths which were exclusive in their implicit denial of an alternative vision of Ireland and Irishness'.[120] He drew on Pearse's mystical and emotive writings, and became an indispensable ally of de Valera.

When attention turned from propaganda against Britain to developing Treaty propaganda to persuade citizens to accept the new state, vexatious circumstances arose. The factional divide which led to civil war robbed nationalism of coherence and, arguably, focus, necessitating a change of footing to accommodate the divide. An early report compiled by Frank Cremins on pro-Treaty propaganda made for dispiriting reading. There was 'hardly yet such a thing in existence as a live propaganda committee. Most of the members hardly know that they are on it, and there has never been a full meeting which has lasted more than five minutes.'[121] Anti-Treatyites fared little better. Captured IRA reports showed their difficulties in finding publicists. Propaganda was: 'Not satisfactory as yet, as it is difficult to get a disciplined person in charge of this Department as most of our dealings with publicity are such as would avoid threading in [sic] people's corns'.[122] The inconsistent execution of domestic propaganda in contrast to more easily executed propaganda against an external enemy is redolent of Britain's own uneasy shift from war to domestic peacetime propaganda.

American propagandists were likely to be university educated and former pressmen; in Britain they were drawn from elite society. In Ireland, FitzGerald, Lester, Gallagher, Béaslaí and Hobson had journalism careers before becoming propagandists, but were not all university educated. As Fitzpatrick notes, 'Griffith and de Valera made journalists out of fighting men and ambassadors out of journalists.'[123] Gallagher acknowledged the value of a press career to the propagandist: 'as journalists we knew the value of the printed word, and … we lived in a snowstorm of handbills and pamphlets, leaflets and posters'.[124] Gallagher was a propagandist of prodigious talent. His hunger strike diary from 1918 demonstrates a subtle awareness of the potential of the

staged propaganda event, and the international opprobrium that attached to Britain's stance.[125]

Harry Boland, a tailor by profession, is often overlooked, yet is a prime example of the autodidact propagandist, learning while his revolutionary and political career progressed. A competent orator, he was comfortable with the press, and demonstrated diplomatic capabilities by building coalitions of support among the maze of Irish-American organisations, and by preparing the ground for de Valera's arrival in 1919, when the two formed a doughty double act propagandising for the putative republic.[126] In contrast, de Valera's inability to avoid a feud with Irish-American leaders caused a 'bitter schism'.[127] Undoubtedly Boland had the innate skills of the propagandist, and his friendship with Creel served him well when, in a diplomatic coup, he arranged for Boland to meet with Wilson's private secretary in December, 1919.

There was nothing decorative about nationalist propaganda: even when couched as diplomacy: it was utilitarian, and constrained by budgets. Gavan Duffy wrote to FitzGerald enclosing a proposal for propaganda in France written by an anonymous 'Mr. M', who proposed the:

> establishment of a propaganda centre in … a small private house, which would be both residence and embassy, and would include the necessary accommodation for office work as well as reception rooms for the visits of all the people of Paris who count. At the present moment, a social effort to enlist the intellectuals and the politicians of influence would be very promising. I can easily get at them and they will be very ready to come; it will be for you to convince them. A Frenchman is very liable to be convinced after a good luncheon, while smoking a good cigar, a method not to be disdained in diplomacy.[128]

Subsequently identified as a M. Mael,[129] his proposals whetted interest and Diarmuid O'Hegarty instructed Gavan Duffy to outline how £5,000 might be spent in executing the proposals.[130] Gavan Duffy estimated that 10,000 francs (approximately £150) was required for an office, clerk, miscellaneous expenses and fixtures and fittings. He suggested doubling the figures if the Paris consulate was to be the main one for Europe, and advised that a salary of 30,000 francs (approximately £450) would be required to attract the right candidate.[131] He asked Dublin whether the consulate would include a permanent showroom for Irish goods which would be subsidised by manufacturers. Mael's plan included financial inducements for the French regional press, and contracts for novelists to write about Ireland,[132] but as Gavan Duffy was not specifically requested to include these in his report, he may have erred on the side of financial caution in calculating neither their cost not potential value. Ultimately, the proposals were never implemented; they were, perhaps, an indulgence that was too costly and too advanced for a fledgling state caught in the midst of an armed conflict.

V

Conclusion

The emergence of nationalist propagandists in the revolutionary period owes much to their rebelliousness and resilience: unlike American propagandists, whose evolution as a support for the political and commercial élite was well funded and resourced, or British propagandists whose position as a member of society's upper echelons came with the predisposition of noblesse oblige, in Ireland propagandists sprang from the necessity to instigate insurrection. Under-resourced and frequently on the run from arrest, they relied on guerrilla tactics as much in propaganda as they did in warfare: an ambush from behind hedgerows was more effective than pitched battle, and so, too, was the *Irish Bulletin*, the simple but devastatingly effective publication which reached its peak under Gallagher's editorship, while Mael's elegant drawing-room propaganda was more suited to an established state than a putative one. Rebellion created the political and military need to make most efficient use of resources, and both journalistic experience and political cunning placed nationalist propagandists at least on an equal footing with Britain's propagandists. Of course, transposing the values and norms of one context to another is fraught with difficulty, yet there is sufficient evidence to suggest that philosophically, Irish propagandists were more closely attuned to the type of propaganda espoused by Ivy Lee than that practised by official Britain. Whether this was a conscious decision, or simply the subconscious expression of demonstrating difference to Britain in all that they did, is moot. However, it remains that the supremacy of factual information attributable to a credible source showed up the limitations of British officialdom's win-at-all-costs mentality, and boosted the emerging new state's prospects for achieving independence and stability.

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2 Funding propaganda

I Introduction

Lamme and Miller Russell's identification of a desire or need to raise funds being a fundamental element in the development of propaganda rings true for the Free State. An impoverished emerging state, indebtedness to Britain, the cost of prosecuting a near year-long civil war, the need to build institutions to ensure the viability of the state, and the day-to-day costs of running the country took their toll on the public finances. Meeting those costs was a balancing act for successive Free State governments, and not always a delicate one. Between 1923 and 1927, Cumann na nGaedheal administrations with Ernest Blythe as Minister for Finance reduced government spending from £42 million per annum to £24 million – an act of economic self-flagellation designed to impress upon the world that fiscal rectitude would be the hallmark of a disciplined Irish state.[1] It was, it its own way, a form of self-righteous propaganda, but made it clear that fripperies like expenditure on state promotion were far down the list of priorities. Far from using propaganda as a way of generating much needed revenue, the state's propagandists were engaged in an interminable struggle to wrest even pitiful levels of funding from the state coffers.

II Funding unionist and nationalist propaganda, 1913–1923

Ten thousand pounds spent on rifles

In the revolutionary period before the founding of the Free State, nationalists recognised that a propaganda campaign against Britain could help achieve international recognition for a republic. Propaganda's usefulness as an insurrectionary and diplomatic weapon rendered it essential to nationalists, although the propaganda failure of the rebel republic's diplomats to secure recognition of statehood at the Paris Peace Conference made prosecuting war with Britain gain greater prominence. However, even the low cost of maintaining a volunteer guerrilla army, furnished with captured weapons and matériel, was an expensive pursuit. So, too, was the cost of international

diplomatic propaganda. Given their penurious position, no matter how strongly nationalist propagandists advocated publicising their cause, there was little prospect of it being handsomely funded.

In contrast unionist propaganda was more advanced and pervasive, and also better funded. The great unionist propaganda symbols, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), Orange lodges, the Ulster and British covenants, and the landing in Larne, in April 1914, of 25,000 rifles and 2,500,000 rounds of ammunition, accentuated unionist power. To unionists, propaganda was an essential investment, even when it took as its theme militancy and intimidation within Westminster.[2] Unionist propaganda actively pursued the mobilisation of Ulster and British society, even at the cost of unrest and dissidence, with the UVF's status as a private army a significant threat to Westminster. Within unionism, propaganda's practical tangibility – deed and message combined – was more valuable than mere exposition of the message: James Craig's brother, Charles, for instance, believed that 'ten thousand pounds spent on rifles would be a thousand times stronger than the same amount spent on meetings, speeches and pamphlets'.[3]

Nationalist and republican efforts rarely achieved anything like the expensive pageantry of unionism; the Irish Volunteers were a pale imitation of their northern counterparts, with poorer weaponry and uniforms, and inexperienced leadership. In December, 1913, with £70,000 invested in purchasing arms, the northern force could also count on £1 million in pledges, including £10,000 each from Carson, Craig and other northern notables, to indemnify members against any loss incurred in the service of Ulster.[4] Unionism's funding methods differed from those of nationalists and republicans. Where the latter chose, or were forced by necessity, to extract monies from donors in dribs and drabs, the former could rely on wealthy individuals whose donations and social status placed unionism on a superior footing. Wealthy landowners were prominent among UVF commanders, and they offered their estates for military drill.[5] This not only had financial value, but evoked an older propaganda appeal, with the UVF co-opting the spirit of their eighteenth-century anti-republican antecedents by training on landed estates across Ulster.[6] Unionist propaganda was better funded, and, at least initially, better organised than that of nationalists. But despite the riches at their disposal, and, at least initially, being better organised, unionists lost the propaganda war to nationalists and republicans, whose lesser resources necessitated conducting international propaganda more adeptly.

However, in order for nationalists and republicans to fund propaganda, it first had to fund itself; conveniently, fundraising as a form of political and cultural propaganda was a common pursuit among Irish visitors to the United States. The vast sums that could be elicited from expatriates and their descendants made the country a profitable locus for propaganda activities. Charles Stewart Parnell successfully raised almost £30,000 there for distress relief in 1880.[7] The perilous nature of the Gaelic League's finances persuaded a reluctant Douglas Hyde to conduct an American tour from November 1905

to May 1906: the £10,000 raised seems modest, but it provided the League with funding for five years, and propagandised Gaelic cultural identity in America. De Valera and Harry Boland conducted a more lucrative tour from 1919 to 1920, selling investment bonds to American subscribers. The first Republican bond raised about $5 million (roughly £1 million) from 250,000 subscribers. De Valera, alert to difficulties in meeting repayments, cannily pleaded liberty rather than profit as the basis for investment. While a second bond drive yielded a disappointing $600,000 (about £120,000), there was nonetheless substantial revenue available to the nascent republic. However, less than one fifth of the money made its way to Ireland; the remainder rested unused and inaccessible in American deposits and bonds.[8]

The monies allowed de Valera and Boland to engage in political largesse, and to spend heavily on propaganda. Boland loaned $20,000 (about £4,000) to the Russian government on a proviso of mutual recognition, an expensive but, in propaganda terms, potentially useful investment.[9] He also prevailed on J. C. Walsh's Benjamin Franklin Bureau to disseminate propaganda in America: the bureau spent $12,000 (about £2,400) buying the influence of opinion leaders in law and academia.[10] In all, the tour expended almost $1.5 million (about £300,000), the bulk of which, de Valera claimed, went on securing international propaganda. It was propaganda on a scale unknown to nationalists, and it would not be matched during the Free State period. But the tour enjoyed only qualified success: while the bonds returned a princely yield, and much propaganda was achieved, internecine feuding between Irish-American groups militated against greater success.[11]

Propaganda fundraising was profitable, too, in settings less grand than a trans-American pilgrimage. Griffith's National Council raised more money in 1906/7 from selling pamphlets than affiliation fees.[12] Unlike funding from America, money raised at local level was available immediately, while fundraising combined seamlessly with furtive opportunities to spread nationalist rhetoric:

> Céilidhes (Irish Dances) were always crowded. There one met only people who were all right, meaning separatists. Volunteer dances to collect monies for arms were supposedly for some imaginary club or literary society as they should have otherwise been suppressed. In between each dance were ballads, jigs, old songs and fierce recitations.[13]

Crucial to the success of this propaganda was the capacity to carry it out frequently and pervasively. Sinn Féin members were encouraged to exploit every opportunity for fundraising. Sports, social and religious events were particularly profitable, while even the police noted that Sinn Féin events propagandised and tugged at purse strings in equal measure.[14]

Funds raised from propaganda were not always spent on achieving more propaganda. Indeed, nationalists quickly concluded that the international press would report on the justness of their cause without direction or inducement, making expensive propaganda unnecessary. However, FitzGerald

swiftly recognised the naïveté of this: it was one thing to rely on a fair and free Irish press to give the nationalist agenda a public airing, and quite another when the same press was subjected to severe censorship. Under Lord Decies and, from August 1920, with the imposition of the Restoration of Order in Ireland act, newspapers were subjected to a voluntary code of censorship that was, in practice, obligatory. Gallagher's modus operandi to thwart censorship was as comedic as it was strategic: Decies was overwhelmed with an avalanche of unpublishable articles and distracted with conversation on horse-racing and taxation in the hope that covertly seditious material might slip through unnoticed.[15] For his part, FitzGerald understood the importance of building relationships with journalists. But this was an expensive pursuit, necessitating a publicity office in London, and publication and distribution of the *Bulletin*, and he reported that the costs of the London publicity bureau alone from November 1919 to May 1920 were £889 17s 10d, of which he himself had paid out £261 12s 10d.[16] The *Bulletin* was, arguably, the most important tactic of nationalist propaganda. Requiring little more than compiling statistics and reportage, printing and postal distribution to an influential, chosen readership of journalists, politicians and leaders of public opinion rather than a mass audience were the only costs. By March 1921 it was being issued to 200 English newspapers and public figures daily, and 300 others weekly;[17] by August, 900 individuals received it weekly.[18]

Populist propaganda was free to produce and disseminate, and especially difficult for the Crown authorities to stamp out. Anonymous cartoonists lampooned and lambasted Britain; street balladeers composed songs and new lyrics for well-known melodies; and authors and dramatists created fictive depictions supporting independence. While many balladeers were anonymous or pseudonymous, others came to prominence. Copies of the sheet music for Peadar Kearney's song 'Dora' (an acronym for the Defence of the Realm Act) sold for a shilling each, linking yet again propaganda and profit.[19] For nationalists, material that was free of charge and widely circulated was a boon. It facilitated revolution by redaction, as lyrics changed to suit the exigencies of the moment or location, as a version of 'Molly Malone' popular during the Great War suggests:

> In Dublin's fair city where the girls are so pretty
> I first set my eyes on sweet Molly Malone.
> As she wheeled her wheelbarrow
> Through the streets broad and narrow,
> Crying Sinn Féiners, pro-Germans alive, alive, O![20]

While such material was outside the control of nationalist propagandists, occasionally the publicity department of the Provisional Government endeavoured to secure publication in English, American and continental publications of unsolicited short stories and poems it had received.[21]

The end of the War of Independence, followed by tortuous negations for a treaty offering some form of self-rule, brought nationalist propaganda into a new arena. With the Anglo-Irish Treaty awaiting Dáil ratification, propaganda to ensure its public acceptance became a necessity. This had the effect of transforming the propaganda dialogue regarding Britain from one of overt hostility to one perhaps best described as uncomfortable co-dependence in jointly overseeing the final moves to a permanent peace. It also created the stark and sudden realisation that the experience of using propaganda to demonise the old enemy now had to be redeployed against a new and more troubling one: former comrades (including propaganda heavyweights in Gallagher and Harry Boland) fundamentally opposed to a peace settlement that did not provide for independence for the whole island, and left the British monarch as head of state. The Provisional Government's propaganda had inauspicious beginnings, struggling to come to grips with the new terms, and its propaganda committee contrasted poorly with the efficiency of pro-Treaty Sinn Féin, which organised a treaty committee that met regularly from March, filled the position of director of elections in each Dáil constituency, and engaged in determined fundraising: by August it had raised £34,500, and recommended the employment of a full-time, salaried director of propaganda for electoral purposes, whose central role would oversee all promotional activity.[22] The committee also estimated the cost of necessary propaganda materials, including 2,000,000 handbills covering twenty topics, at £350; 20,000 of four designs of posters at £250; 5,000 each of twelve booklets at £180, and 20,000 each of thirty-four-page leaflets at £330.[23]

Cannily, the committee was aware of propaganda's profitable nature. A minute from its Paper Sub-Committee, charged with producing the weekly publication *The Free State* reveals that 17,000 copies of issue no. 6 were printed at a cost of £60, yielding £96 6s 8d from the cover price of 2d and £51 11s 6d from advertising, giving a profit of £87 17s 2d.[24] The cover price suggests that about 11,560 copies were sold, which implies, even allowing for free copies given to journalists and influencers of public opinion, a significant surfeit. It is surprising, therefore that the committee, at its April 26th meeting, discussed increasing the print run to 20,000 copies, although the greater volume did permit economies of scale, with quotes ranging from £57 (0.68d per copy) to £68 12s 0d (0.82d per copy) – a decrease from the original cost of 0.84d per copy.[25]

At the same time, republican opponents of the Free State engaged in counter-propaganda. But their circumstances were even more impoverished than the Provisional Government's. Captured IRA documents from August to September 1922 indicate the problems they faced in editing a publication for dissemination among their troops. In the absence of an IRA-controlled publication one cost-effective method involved determining the identity of the editor of anti-Treaty newspaper, the *The Fenian*. The correspondent admonished: 'You should have known this long ago' and requested: 'Can you arrange to send plenty of Publicity to England and America? A Duplicator would do a least a copy of all publicity for each Command for you.'[26] Later

that month, another captured document suggested that the resources available to the IRA were diminishing: 'The girls are concentrating on the copious use of paint on walls situated in strategical [sic] positions in Dublin. It has found to be a very effective method of propaganda.'[27]

Reduced to daubing graffiti on walls and relying on a newspaper whose editor's identity was unknown to them suggests that republican propaganda teetered on the brink of financial and creative penury. One preferred, if unimaginative, fundraising activity – 'the simple expedient of raiding banks'[28] – could not be relied on to fund military and propaganda activities, and the Civil War had ground to a halt by May 1923 as the Free State army, with British army equipment, gradually overwhelmed republican resistance. With republicans defeated and now charged with maintaining law and order, Free State propaganda could finally be used for state-building. First, though, funds had to be found from public coffers on which there were many competing demands.

III Funding departments of state

Our best propaganda is to get on with the work

Free State propaganda expenditure was sometimes hidden within official budgets, as though indicative of uncertainty whether it was a wholesome practice, akin to the unofficial status of official British propaganda mentioned above. Two broad categories of expenditure are discernible: the state's official propaganda, carried out by the Publicity Department or its successor the Government Information Bureau, and informal propaganda executed by other departments. Official propaganda expenditure, particularly under Cosgrave's administrations, may be quantified with reasonable accuracy. It is harder to arrive at a figure for informal expenditure as state departments employed inconsistent accounting conventions, and had varying intent in conducting propaganda. Thus most departments contained an advertising subhead in their estimates for expenditure, the official projection of the cost of running the department for the next financial year. This subhead was most probably for day-to-day purposes such as issuing public information notices, and was not propaganda per se. The Department of Education, for instance, treated its advertising budget in an especially haphazard manner: advertising, dry cleaning and miscellanies clustered into one subhead, making it impossible to estimate how much was spent on promoting departmental activity. Advertising was viewed as having functional rather than persuasive purposes, but it did convey information and educate the populace. In Ellulian terms, any insignificance is lessened as even mundane advertising was part of the constant flow of information that sponsored self-generated national propaganda.

Figures for salaries from which the numbers of staff employed on propaganda duties might be discerned are equally difficult to determine. Although several departments engaged in propaganda, the estimates do not show salaries for designated departmental propaganda officers. Implicit is that

propaganda was carried out by civil servants in the ordinary course of their duties. Even in the Department of Agriculture, the most active department for domestic propaganda, there was no indication of a propaganda salary. One possible exception is the Department of Local Government and Public Health, which between 1930 and 1936 had an annual allowance of between £509 and £596 for the position of Intelligence Officer, though this is a broad term that could exist anywhere on the spectrum from gathering to disseminating information. Even the Publicity Department figures are opaque. In January 1924, FitzGerald confirmed that the department, housed in the Department of External Affairs, had eleven staff.[29] This seems extravagant, and the department was constantly under pressure to justify its expenditure. In a memorandum to FitzGerald, Lester detailed the salaries of the newly reorganised Filing and Indexing room staff, which employed four of the department's staff.[30] Two Established Copyists received weekly salaries of £2 11s 0d and £2 5s 0d, with an additional, unspecified bonus, and two temporary clerks received £4 19s 4d and £2 0s 0d per week respectively. The aggregate of these salaries amounted to about £631 annually, excluding bonuses. Lester warned that any rationalisation of staff would affect the department's operations. This may have been financial conjuring. By separating the duties of administrative staff from publicity staff it was possible to account for their salaries under a different budget. Certainly, in November, the Department of Finance believed only seven staff were employed on publicity duties, Lester (£1,000), Cremins (£607) and five administrative staff on total remuneration of £921. Lester's salary appears to have been high and, following his redeployment to External Affairs when the department was closed, his salary was reduced to £600 plus bonus. The figures were a far cry from an earlier estimate of £4,550 to run the department, of which only £550 was marked for salaries. The only staff then employed were Cremins, whose annual salary of £365 was augmented by a bonus of £14, and Eimar O'Duffy, whose annual remuneration was £260.[31]

The Publicity Department was prominent in developing the state's propaganda, but it was woefully under-funded, and skirmished perpetually with the parsimonious Finance Department. In the first year of the External Affairs estimate (1923), publicity received no mention.[32] For the next year, the department was allocated, in addition to salaries, £9,700 for publications and distribution, and £845 for travelling and incidental expenses. The overseas representatives, meanwhile, were allocated £2,390 for publicity services.[33] One year later, the latter allowance had disappeared from the estimates; the figure for publication and distribution was reduced to £5,250 and travelling and incidental expenses had fallen to £400.[34] Publication and distribution had exceeded its estimate in the previous year by some £2,390, indicating that while the department had miscalculated its needs, the drop in funding for this activity was actually £6,840. By 1925, with the department in the process of being wound up, the estimate had fallen to £3,043.[35] By 1926, the department itself had disappeared from the estimates.[36] When de Valera initiated the Government Information Bureau in 1934, housed within his own department, lower

salary costs were instituted. The 1935 estimates indicated that the bureau's director earned £904, while a junior executive officer and shorthand typist received £150 and £99 respectively.[37] With the civil service bonus added to their salaries, the total estimated salary cost of de Valera's department was £1,273. The 1936 estimate dropped to £1,238[38] before increasing to £1,274 in 1937.[39]

One of the largest expenses in External Affairs was the cost of administering overseas legations. The representatives, while not engaged in full-time propaganda, nevertheless promoted the state economically, culturally and diplomatically, and their salaries, at least in portion, represent a constant element of the state's propaganda expenditure. For the year ending March 1924, the estimate for their salaries and staff amounted to £22,353.[40] Salary costs dropped to £17,778 in the following year's estimates,[41] though they then increased gradually year-on-year as more legations opened. The estimates for the year ending March 1932, the last year for which Cumann na nGaedheal were responsible, were £38,410.[42] Thereafter, the cost of the legations increased dramatically under Fianna Fáil, the party's propensity for isolationism notwithstanding. In its first estimate, Fianna Fáil budgeted £51,446 for overseas representation,[43] reaching £57,527 in the 1937 estimate.[44]

Overt publicity was not the only expense that appeared on the ministry's charge. Official entertainment, a varying expense and difficult to assess in relation to its propaganda value, was an allowance for entertaining visiting dignitaries, and a definite effort in diplomatic propaganda. In its first year in the estimates, an inadequate allowance of £150 was made.[45] Joseph Walshe appealed for an increase:

> The Minister … is satisfied that a certain amount of judicious entertainment is desirable as it is through this medium that information as to trade and commerce is obtained, and business requiring care and tact is initiated in foreign countries. It must be remembered that our Foreign representatives are in many instances only able to make indirect approach to big commercial firms likely to become interested in Saorstát Éireann both as a market for foreign goods and as a producing centre and it is necessary both politically and commercially to keep the potentialities of the newly-born state in the public eye.[46]

In the next two years, the function received an increase to £750, followed by a decrease to £500.[47] Thereafter, the function gained greater prominence within the ministry's budget. Until 1934 entertainment never fell below £1,000 and rose to £6,730 in 1933.[48] This figure, intended to cover additional costs around the hosting of the Eucharistic Congress in Dublin, was an overestimate; the actual expenditure was £4,764 – still a considerable sum for diplomatic largesse.[49] As de Valera's regime settled into place this subheading was sharply reduced, indicating both congruency with Fianna Fáil austerity, and the insularism that differentiated his party from Cumann na nGaedheal.

External Affairs' difficulty in dealing with the conservative Finance Department may stem from bad book-keeping. Certainly, it gave the impression on occasion of not following the rule of applying for sanction from Finance before committing to expenditure. In 1925, it belatedly applied for sanction for £250 11s 10 ½d accrued over seventeen months on newspapers, photographs, pamphlets and publications it had supplied to journalists and the overseas representatives.[50] But Finance was also prone to pernicketiness, and drew Publicity's sting when it asked whether the princely sum of eight shillings to supply sheet music for a national anthem for the 1924 Olympics could not have been borne by the Olympic movement itself. Although there was at that time no official anthem and the popular ballad 'Let Erin Remember' was used, Publicity, aware that participation at the games was good propaganda, sarcastically replied that 'in the circumstances it was essential that a Government Department should call the tune – and pay the piper'.[51]

Finance queried not just the value of the Publicity Department, but also of External Affairs sections that had a propaganda function. Finance wrote to Walshe in February, 1923 querying the role of the overseas representatives. Walshe recognised the unvoiced question as to whether the state needed foreign legations, and wrote a detailed reply. He highlighted their role in achieving recognition for the state, and though unable to quantify in commercial terms the impact the legations made, he stated acerbically that 'even the most poverty-stricken have their representatives … scattered all over the world'.[52] He cited Denmark, which spent £300,000 on foreign affairs, and Austria, which spent £75,000 in its London office alone, and challenged Finance's penny-pinching:

> We have closed down five of our Continental offices, including one of vital importance, within the last six months. It is enough. Any further putting up of shutters can only lessen still further our dwindling capital of prestige. It would be regarded at home as political funk and abroad as the beginning of 'national obliteration'.[53]

The state's finances worsened, and the experienced FitzGerald was replaced by Patrick McGilligan as minister. As Minister for Industry and Commerce McGilligan showed interest in investing in policies that had a quantifiable yield, but speculative investment in propaganda, even where it had the potential to return a multiple of the original cost, became less likely. In June 1928 the government received a proposal from an American firm, Doremus, for an international propaganda campaign.[54] Doremus' European manager, J. Walker Smyllie, was an acquaintance of Ivy Lee,[55] and the proposal was sufficiently detailed for McGilligan and his ministerial colleague Patrick Hogan to meet Smyllie. McGilligan balked at an annual cost of 5,000 guineas, and recommended to Cosgrave that the proposal be rejected, or, instead, he could canvass Irish industrialists for financial support.[56] McGilligan's second option, consistent with Cumann na nGaedheal's free trade economic policy, could have initiated a

privately funded campaign. Doremus' proposals anticipated attracting capital to Irish enterprises, promoting bonds, trade and tourism, and achieving international press coverage.[57] Given the business benefits, a case could have been made for business representative bodies to subsidise the campaign. Doremus had excellent credentials that the government could lay before prospective partners. Owned by the Barron Estate, publishers of the *Wall Street Journal*, the Dow Jones ticker-tape service and other financial publications, it had offices in five American cities, representatives in eighteen European countries, and represented 650 banking and industrial institutions.[58] Alongside corporate clients, Doremus had represented the Swiss, Bolivian, Australian and South African governments, and current clients included the Italian, Cuban and Austrian governments. Doremus presented their campaign as an investment, regarding 5,000 guineas as a competitive figure. To place this figure in context, Ivy Lee's audited accounts for 1927[59] and 1928[60] show that his largest clients spent approximately $15,000 (£3,000) and $20,000 (£4,000) each year, contributing to total fee income of $249,145.91 (about £49,830) and $304,171.60 (about £60,834) respectively.

Doremus' figure scarcely seems excessive, even for a small state, yet McGilligan and Walshe felt the proposal was too expensive and time-consuming. In February, 1929, Walshe telegraphed Smyllie a curt 'Minister regrets impossible consider proposal this year'[61] later citing prudent financial management as the reason.[62] In 1932, following his election success, Smyllie contacted de Valera, whose private secretary Maurice Moynihan sought Walshe's guidance. Perhaps confusing guineas and dollars, Walshe advised that Doremus had 'blandly suggested £20,000 a year' in fees, an unnecessary sum given that 'our best propaganda is to get on with the work and to create facts of interest and value to the world'. Somewhat dubiously he asserted that state propaganda on tourism was outstripping the industry's ability to keep pace with the number of visitors. In international affairs, particularly Commonwealth relations, he acknowledged that competing with larger nations to stimulate press interest was unaffordable and although the state could not match British propaganda, the 'inherent justice of our position is its greatest propaganda asset'.[63]

Reluctance to finance propaganda was seemingly fuelled by a naïve, jingoistic belief that a gullible press would communicate the state's position to receptive audiences. That the state could scorn the need for propaganda was nonsensical. Between 1918 and 1919 Carl Byoir orchestrated a $23,000 propaganda campaign for the Lithuanian National Council, which sought American support for Lithuanian independence.[64] In 1930, Byoir recruited Carl C. Dickey from Doremus, where he had worked on the Pan-Am account, for a $50,000 tourism propaganda campaign for Cuba.[65] For some states, professional propaganda was essential investment in future economic wealth; in the Free State, propaganda was to be achieved with minimum investment and effort. Walshe's claim that the state could ill afford to compete with larger countries for propaganda suggests that officialdom had no faith

that investment in international propaganda could accrue greater prosperity, but held, rather, complacent confidence that the state's newsworthiness would.

External Affairs excepted, the Department of Agriculture was the principal department to engage in propaganda. Agriculture was the one of the state's main sources of employment and a major contributor to the balance of payments. Propaganda emanating from the department strove to improve agricultural practices that were antediluvian compared with other European countries, and to impress on foreign markets the quality of Irish produce. Agriculture was more attuned to the national interest and made a more obvious, immediate contribution to state and individual wealth than vague notions of diplomatic recognition and the delayed gratification of possible future wealth from trade and tourism. Consequently the department experienced little of the miserliness that dogged External Affairs. The estimates suggest a total figure of around £91,000 allocated to agricultural propaganda, the most common form of which was the dissemination of the departmental journal and advisory leaflets. The leaflets, available free of charge from the department, covered topics aimed at improving the efficiency of farming methods, crop yields and animal husbandry, disease control and self-sufficiency in the guise of home-curing bacon, beekeeping and preserving fruit. Only a small number of leaflets treated the marketing of agricultural produce, suggesting that their impact was felt in domestic rather than commercial practice.[66] Clearly, the leaflets had some definable impact as expenditure increased from £100 in 1926 (the lowest figure throughout the period)[67] to £950 in 1937.[68]

Simultaneously appreciating the potential of radio, Agriculture produced educational broadcasts tailored to the needs of an agrarian audience.[69] This deft propaganda veered into social engineering, and was redolent of Ellul's integration propaganda: improving farming practices generated state wealth and made the policy of self-sufficiency a shared objective. The department supported this endeavour with educational exhibits at agricultural shows, spending about £900 annually on exhibits and sponsored prizes from the 1930s. A budget to promote agricultural produce at fairs first appears in 1929, a not inconsiderable £1,320.[70] This figure rose significantly between 1934 (£2,300) and 1938 (£2,480), a consequence of Fianna Fáil's doctrinaire policy of agricultural self-sufficiency, and economic war with Britain (triggered when the party reneged on debt owed to Britain for the sale of land by landlords to tenants decades previously[71]) that closed off virtually the state's entire food and livestock export market. This dogmatism echoed Griffith's early nationalist propaganda of an economically self-sufficient state, and positioning Fianna Fáil as the friend of the small farmer, in particular, was a useful, if cynical, vote-gathering exercise. It was also economically unhelpful, an instance of a party-before-country philosophy. Self-sufficiency in wheat-growing was an impossible ambition: even if all the suitable land were under wheat the total acreage was still too small. Nonetheless, in 1936 £8,000 was spent on wheat propaganda to achieve an unattainable goal.[72] Although the estimate declined slightly in the remaining years of the Free State, it remained the

most expensive item of Agriculture's propaganda, dwarfing the annual £800 granted from 1935 to promote the Irish bloodstock industry abroad. Irish horses were prized in international racing and show-jumping, and this expenditure, coupled with state propaganda at the Royal Dublin Horse Show, gave a worthwhile export trade invaluable support. There is a sense, however, that Fianna Fáil misdirected funds, propagandising irrational self-sufficiency at the expense of commercially sensible investments.

The Department of Industry and Commerce engaged in sporadic propaganda, usually focussed on special events, and incurring quite high expenditure as a result. One such event, for example, exhibiting at the 1923 *Daily Mirror* International Fashion Fair in London, cost £1,000.[73] In 1929 and 1930 provision was made for modest expenditure on cinematograph films, but by far the biggest propaganda spending under Cumann na nGaedheal was £3,800 granted towards the publication of the *Official Handbook for Saorstát Éireann*. Edited by Bulmer Hobson and supported by a committee appointed by the Minister for Industry and Commerce,[74] the handsome volume recouped £1,000 in advertising.[75] Under Fianna Fáil, industrial propaganda virtually disappeared: only one year of the state's estimates shows an allowance for propaganda. In 1934, £4,700 was granted to exhibit state produce at the Chicago World Fair,[76] while the Irish National Exhibition in Cork and an exhibition at the Paris Fair received £3,000 and £450 respectively.[77] The figures may look impressive in isolation, but the scattergun approach to expenditure points to a department that had a very imperfect understanding of the need to propagandise constantly. The stop-start nature of the department's promotion of Irish industry and produce made it difficult for exporting firms and the state to achieve the country of origin effect, 'the close interconnections between the image of a nation and its economy'[78] that would psychologically bind positive consumer perception of the quality of their purchases and the state itself.

The decline in frequency of industrial propaganda was consistent with Fianna Fáil protectionism, which promoted industrial self-sufficiency through small, locally owned enterprises rather than concerns funded by foreign investment. Indeed, the party discouraged foreign investment with the enactment of the Control of Manufactures Acts 1932 and 1934 that prohibited newly incorporated manufacturing firms from having a foreign controlling interest without ministerial approval.[79] However, Fianna Fáil did not abandon industrial propaganda, but diverted funds to Gaeltachtaí, Irish-language speaking regions with limited industrial output. The Gaeltachtaí had few indigenous industries beyond traditional cottage industries and their selection for special propaganda support was in itself a vehicle for the party's own propaganda as the protector of all things Gaelic, and small voters, distinguishing it from Cumann na nGaedheal's mercantile and rancher middle-class following. Under the latter the Gaeltachtaí received scant attention, an indication of their relative unimportance to the state's industrial well-being. Under Fianna Fáil, large sums were granted to domestic exhibitions of

Gaeltacht produce, typically hand-knitted clothing, tweeds and lace. Hardly coincidentally, peak expenditure occurred at the start and conclusion of the Economic War, suggesting that positive propaganda was needed so the domestic market might replace the abruptly closed-off British market.

The last department with recognisable propaganda expenditure, Local Government and Public Health, conducted its propaganda discreetly, with monies expended hidden within its accounts. Coyness made the state reluctant to acknowledge propaganda promoting sexual health, even though it was plainly problematic. Howell's depiction of prostitution and venereal disease gives an insight into one facet of the problem, and he notes that the state rejected legislative regulation of the sex industry, preferring 'a moral regulation of sexuality marked by elements of Catholic social purity'.[80] Denunciation of prostitution and disease was nationalist, anti-imperialist and populist propaganda that continued within Free State discourse.[81] He and Riordan, though differing in their reading of the politics of sexual health, agree that the department was reluctant to become active in public awareness campaigns about sexual diseases. Riordan highlights the department's reluctance to engage in publicity, and preference for a more subtle educational scheme for medical officers and midwives.[82] She suggests that the department's rejection of an interdepartmental report on sexual health was done because it would 'prefer to continue in its own way, doing good by stealth'.[83] The department's propaganda reflected a moral decision to remain covert. It is unsurprising that no record of expenditure other than brief, general references to sexual health legislation appeared in its estimates.

IV Defending propaganda spending

£900 … for giving out government dope

Free State governments suffered a collective lack of administrative experience, with only Cosgrave having any prior experience in civil administration.[84] Establishing state departments with qualified ministers was difficult, and External Affairs was one of the last departments to be created. The delay was partly caused by the new government's inability to determine the responsibilities of a department that had never been part of domestic administration, and even the civil service, largely imported intact from the Castle administration, struggled to understand it. Finance advised the department to submit for its first estimate a round figure of £25,000 under two broad subheads covering salaries, and travel and incidental expenses.[85] Such imprecision from the pedantic Finance points to an inauspicious start for External Affairs and the Publicity Department which, although already in existence, did not appear in the estimates until the following year.

The Publicity Department was the ministry's most contentious division. Its location owed more to FitzGerald's presence as minister rather than any strategic propaganda consideration, and its existence was almost immediately

questioned: the department's inability to reconcile or plan its accounts did little to endear it to Finance. Planning the 1923/4 estimate, Walshe wrote that 'as the Publicity Department is probably about to be transferred to another Ministry it is extremely difficult to arrive even approximately at a figure'[86] – this less than a fortnight after he had requested the secondment of a civil servant from Finance for assistance.[87] The additional expertise did nothing to dispel the perception that External Affairs was unable to account for its expenditure. Indeed, the parliamentary Committee on Public Accounts found fault with a reporting mechanism that grouped domestic and international propaganda together, and ordered the department to clearly show its expenditure, which had included inter alia a special Irish supplement of the *Manchester Guardian* (costing £4,896 16s), and modest expenditure on a commemorative Griffith-Collins publication.[88]

The committee continued its forensic scrutiny in 1926. With the Publicity Department having being almost completely wound up in the previous financial year, the committee sought reassurance that public monies had not been wasted on publicity. Salaries, estimated at £3,043, had only cost £2,552. Publication and distribution of propaganda material cost £757 and travel and incidental expenses £67, despite having been budgeted at £5,250 and £400 respectively.[89] The committee was concerned that salaries had been paid to civil servants who had had no meaningful work to occupy them, and its chairman, Thomas Johnson TD, was unimpressed by Walshe's explanation: 'There is always a certain amount of what one might call invisible publicity work going on in our Department. It was considerably more intense while those officials were with us than now they are gone.'[90] Walshe's reply, though consistent with the nature of propaganda, suggested prevarication, and Johnson pressed further:

> [Johnson] I just want to bring out … that there were actual services rendered for the salaries paid. Without an explanation of that kind, one would imagine that you paid salaries although no work was done? – [Walshe] It is very hard to see this unless you have an actual money return for the work done. That is especially the case in our type of work and that perhaps is the reason why our office is so much attacked. Our work is not appreciated because we cannot hand it out in certain measurements, to show what is being done.
> [Johnson] I was rather waiting for you to explain that work can be done without publication and that is a point that has to be brought out? – [Walshe] In fact our Department could quite easily have existed during the time it has existed, and nobody in this country need have heard of it. Yet its work could have been, and in effect has been, of the greatest advantage to the State.[91]

Walshe had discovered the perennial problem of accurately measuring propaganda expenditure relative to results: the Publicity Department was

damned when it spent, and damned when it did not. The impression that External Affairs fought a hopeless battle defending a service that was misunderstood and undervalued is unavoidable. But the department's inability to follow accounting procedures and obey Finance's diktats gave opponents of the Publicity Department ammunition against it. As late as 1930, Walshe was grilled by the committee over the protracted tenure of a civil servant employed on publicity within the department, despite Finance's instruction that he be transferred to the department proper. Appearing before the committee in 1928, Walshe had defended the department's dilatory efforts, claiming it was slowly assuming an adequate staff and structure.[92] The matter was exacerbated by an overpayment of £26 to the civil servant, a trifling amount that nonetheless confirmed External Affairs' financial recklessness. Walshe, assuming the role of scapegoat for his minister (then McGilligan), offered contrition as his defence and received gentle admonishment from an unusually forgiving committee.

The committee appears to have been more severe than the state's auditor, the Comptroller and Auditor General, whose reports, while invariably finding fault with the department's finances, treated anomalies as peccadilloes requiring explanation and warned against future carelessness. Entertaining dignitaries, a legitimate propaganda activity, earned the auditor's mild disapproval as it seemed badly defined and open to abuses.[93] The Committee of Public Accounts, a more partisan body with members across the party political divide, queried the activity more vigorously. When Walshe defended it as 'any expenditure which is used for the purpose of interesting foreigners in the country'[94] he was informed that there was an 'outcry in connection with the expenditure on the Department of External Affairs … A great many people look upon it as a great waste of money.'[95]

In contrast to this negativity, the Department of the President of the Executive Council, which from 1934 housed the newly established Government Information Bureau (GIB), enjoyed benign relations with the state's financial overseers. The Comptroller and Auditor General's reports make no reference to publicity within the department, and only FitzGerald, as chair of the Committee on Public Accounts, challenged the GIB's establishment, though that may be seen as a continuation of his contretemps with de Valera over the GIB's funding and purpose, rather than seeking to protect the public purse.[96] Indeed, FitzGerald's rejection of de Valera's proposal for a vote of a nominal £10 to establish the bureau concerned the GIB's ill-defined nature:

> we are asked to vote £10. Actually we are asked to incur immediately an additional expenditure of £900 to £1,000 a year, and as the President has just said he cannot even tell us what additional staff and expenditure will be involved. … It looks as if the unfortunate people of this country are being asked now to give some unnamed amount … to provide the President with somebody nearby whom he can have to ask him leading questions all the time.[97]

FitzGerald was concerned with the partiality of the proposed Bureau:

> Here we are asked to establish a department for the purpose of saving the pockets of the Fianna Fáil people and to impose on the public in this country a tax in order to propagand the tactics of this Party.[98]

He was supported by Frank MacDermot TD, who slung a delightful barb across the floor of the Dáil at the anti-monarchist Fianna Fáil deputies that the bureau's director would 'receive as much as one of His Majesty's Ministers sitting on the bench opposite, and the Irish people are to be asked to find that money for the purpose of adding to the resources of Fianna Fáil publicity'.[99] McGilligan scorned the appointment: 'Someone is going to get £900 … for giving out Government dope'.[100] The support FitzGerald enjoyed indicates this was no personal vendetta. There was a need for supervising the GIB's spending. Unlike its progenitor, which learned to slavishly list its expenditure, the GIB hid spending from prying eyes: the state's estimates are silent with regard to it. It is inconceivable that a propaganda service could function with salaries as its only expenses, yet this is what the estimates suggest. Given the scrutiny that External Affairs received over paying salaries without visible propaganda work to show for it, it was scarcely even-handed to ignore annual salaries exceeding £1,000 in de Valera's publicity office.

De Valera's visions of state and party propaganda were frequently blurred. He had little need to account for the GIB's expenditure when its principal function was to provide his newspaper, the *Irish Press*, with information about his government. The newspaper had hubristic origins. When the New York Supreme Court ruled in 1927 that money raised on de Valera's 1919 bond drive should be returned to subscribers as no Irish republic existed,[101] his plea to investors for their bonds to establish a republican newspaper raised about £450,000. With extra funding secured from a fundraising trip with Gallagher in 1928,[102] de Valera established a holding company in Delaware, a state notorious for its lax regulatory regime. Investors received non-voting shares, while de Valera retained all 200 voting shares, placed in a holding trust to create an illusion of distance between the newspaper and himself. But as controlling director, with power over editorial and staffing policies, the arrangement meant that he controlled a propaganda triumvirate incorporating the GIB, and the state broadcaster, where he installed Gallagher as deputy director. It was an arrangement that could have led to a totalitarian state, yet produced nothing more than effective democratic propaganda, albeit undeniably opaque, until the arrangement was brought to light in a Dáil debate in 1958.[103]

V Conclusion

Their pre-independence experience that propaganda could be achieved for free disinclined politicians to invest in it. Propaganda that occasionally

yielded a profit produced a jaundiced view of propaganda that did not, and inculcated wary thriftiness. The revolution and Civil War were inherently newsworthy; no pressman with an eye to good copy and circulation figures would ignore well-packaged material. With peace, that changed. Cumann na nGaedheal never quite grasped that the minutiae of legislation and the ponderous work of state-building and diplomacy were newsworthy, but not front-page material. Their administrations questioned the value of propaganda, and even its validity in a democracy. Statecraft, not propaganda, would raise the state from its humble origins to pre-ordained greatness. Propaganda was thus unenthusiastically funded, as if self-promotion was unwholesome and unnecessary. This was a fundamental misunderstanding of propaganda, which, with legislation and social change, could have created the conditions under which democracy would thrive, revenue increase, and international recognition accrue. The influence of Finance, which unbendingly applied accounting standards, punished minor deviances and discouraged expenditure, was all too obviously felt.

Cumann na nGaedheal and Fianna Fáil differed on propaganda expenditure. For the former, it was a luxury the state could ill-afford to indulge; for the latter, it was a necessity the party could ill-afford to ignore. Under Cumann na nGaedheal, propaganda expenditure, for all that it was scant, focussed on promoting the state internationally, industry and agriculture. Fianna Fáil's problems stemmed from de Valera's obsession with publicity: the propaganda wilderness in which he and Fianna Fáil found themselves was purgatorial; salvation, the ascension into power, required direct communication with an acquiescent press corps. The creation of the *Irish Press*, his party organ, satisfied this propaganda requirement. Under Fianna Fáil, propaganda became an arm of the party, not the state. In neither instance was there any conception that propaganda expenditure was an investment that offered a multiple return on investment by way of increased taxation revenue and exchequer savings from improved civil and social conditions. The reluctance to fund propaganda, whether initiated by state officials or commercial enterprises, represented a missed opportunity to communicate strategically at home and overseas; worse, it retarded economic and social development.

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3 New media and propaganda

I Introduction

Revolutionary period nationalists favoured pamphlets, leaflets, posters, oratory, parades, ballads and poetry, cheap and effective participatory methods even for those peripherally involved in the struggle: civilians, non-combatants, and groups like Cumann na mBan and Na Fianna. The former were so effective at daubing slogans on walls that 'the whitewash brush was described as an instrument of the conscience of Ireland'.[1] The latter's Dublin battalion acquired a small printing press that produced anti-recruiting literature at the start of the Great War.[2] This was ideal guerrilla propaganda – cheap, easily produced, mobile and requiring little professional expertise. It was short-lived, fierce in content, liable to appear without warning, and replaceable. But a poster tied to a lamp-post, or a ballad sung locally were propaganda whose reach was not guaranteed. New channels emerged as the revolution gathered pace that transformed the reach of propaganda, bringing it to a mass audience. Techniques and broadcast values in cinema and radio developed so rapidly inside a decade that, by 1928, Bernays could call radio 'at present one of the most important tools of the propagandist', while:

> The motion picture can standardize the ideas and habits of a nation. Because pictures are made to meet market demands, they reflect, emphasize and even exaggerate broad popular tendencies, rather than stimulate new ideas and opinions. The motion picture avails itself only of ideas and facts which are in vogue.[3]

Bernays was dealing with a society where the political and business elite had experienced a more rapid acclimatisation to the new technology; in Ireland, the transition from familiar to unfamiliar propaganda channels was less assured. Neither Free State nor Ulster politicians directly controlled film or radio as they had older channels, and their proficiency in these troubling new channels was gained through trial and error.

II Film and radio in Ulster

To exert leadership with the living voice

Although Ulster politicians infrequently conducted film propaganda, they desired and facilitated it – with 122 cinemas in Ulster by the mid-1930s, its influence could not be ignored.[4] The cinema had long helped build unionist identity: in 1912, Craig had Carson filmed signing the Ulster Covenant,[5] while 1914 footage of Carson in a motorcar with an armed escort in Belfast epitomised political grandeur.[6] Other newsreels exhorted the civic unionist duty of voting,[7] while social advances boosted claims to greatness: footage of the Governor-General, the Duke of Abercorn, laying the foundation stone for Belfast law courts promoted prosperity and justice.[8] With footage of dignitaries and a parade watched by throngs of spectators, Pathé captured his wife's visit to open Derry's 1930 Civic Week.[9] Royal visits were popular cinema items, promoting a province cherished by Britain, and loyal in return.[10] It was most effective visual propaganda in an era where the actuality film lent a participatory element, and created a sense of communalism akin to Ellul's description of propaganda achieved through collective sociological presuppositions.

The sociology of Ulster after partition was such that unionists were forced to construct a British identity, distinct from the Free State. Newsreels imposed a standard of Britishness to emulate, but feature films created a more distinct cultural identity. With scenic panoramas and homely portrayals of ordinary folk rallying against outside threats, actor Richard Hayward's films helped create this identity, though it is impossible not to see elements in this of a developing siege mentality that would define loyal Protestantism as being perpetually *against* some threat (Catholicism or the Free State usually) rather than intrinsically constructive. Lyons noted that the seventeenth-century Protestant settlers who colonised Ulster took root 'under conditions of maximum insecurity' which 'became a permanent part of their psychology'.[11] *The Luck of the Irish*, in which Hayward starred, was part-funded by the Ulster Industrial Development Association and the Ulster Tourism Development Association.[12] Hayward's acting talents complemented his abilities as writer, singer, and preserver of Ulster heritage. Though a unionist, he learned Irish to sing ballads[13] and his films, while lauding Ulster, were popular in the Free State. However, Ulster's new identity came at the expense of nationalists and Catholics, who rarely featured prominently in films, except, as in *The Luck of the Irish*, as villains. These efforts at constructing unionist identity worked with domestic audiences, but international audiences, insensitive to Ulster's distinctiveness, viewed such films (and those from the Free State) as generically Irish.[14] Neither jurisdiction had more than a rudimentary film industry, and crossover between the two was inevitable: for instance, *The Early Bird*, also starring Hayward, was produced by Cambridge-educated Norris Davidson, later a film propagandist for the Irish Tourist Association,[15] implying

that distinctions between northern and southern cinema were somewhat overstated. Indeed, churches, religious groups and both administrations held similar views on censorship: the south's censorship regime was admired by northern clergymen preoccupied with moral concerns.[16]

Radio took its cues from Britain, where Reithian principles defined the BBC. However, Ulster radio had an inauspicious start, as a weak broadcast signal from Glasgow had to suffice until political stability was achieved.[17] Nonetheless, radio in Ulster commenced two years earlier than in the Free State. By 1927, there were 28,455 licensed radios in Ulster, and 21,795 in the Free State.[18] The numbers may have been higher, as the *Irish Times* reported efforts to prosecute unlicensed owners.[19] Listenership on both sides of the border increased as more powerful stations were built and radios became more affordable; a £100,000, 100-kilowatt station in the satellite town of Lisburn supplanted Belfast's old 1-kilowatt station.[20] By 1934, 59,992 sets were licensed in the Free State and 65,621 in Ulster,[21] where the figure grew to 105,569 by 1937.[22]

As listenership increased so did radio's power as a propaganda channel. A perusal of daily schedules reveals that radio was dominated by arts and entertainment. Nonetheless, programming catered for interest groups. Farmers enjoyed broadcasts on market prices, and an address by the northern Minister for Agriculture, Sir Basil Brooke, was lauded for 'this use of radio … to take the public into his confidence and to exert leadership with the living voice'.[23] When the Ulster Grand Prix motorcycle race was selected as the *Grand Prix de l'Europe*, live commentary was broadcast.[24] The BBC mission in Northern Ireland created an image of a 'unified homogeneous unit' although its efforts were born of the necessary caution that avoided contentious issues or over-representing nationalist or unionist interests – but still sporadically irked unionists.[25] The BBC faced an impossible task in the divided province. When it offered programming akin to that in other regions, nationalists cavilled at its Britishness; when it strayed from this, unionists complained. Consequently programming reflected rather than promoted cultural and societal norms.

Within the Stormont parliament, broadcasting merited hardly a murmur of debate, though the few occasions when it was discussed indicate constituency concerns: providing free wireless sets for the visually impaired, especially ex-servicemen, hints at one member's efforts to connect with voters.[26] Lieutenant Colonel Gordon took issue with the broadcasting times of weather forecasts (too late, especially for farmers) and news (too early).[27] John Milne Barbour, responding to a parliamentary question, intimated that the BBC concluded its service with a rendition of the national anthem when the BBC in Ulster supplied a complete evening's broadcasts and its material was not merely part of a larger schedule.[28] That the matter was raised at all suggests that radio was seen as a method of promoting loyalty in Ulster. It would, however, be erroneous to see parochialism in northern broadcasting: there were efforts to achieve cross-border co-operation. Colonel Wilhem Brase, director of the Free State's Army

School of Music, was guest conductor of the Northern Ireland Military Band for a performance broadcast from Belfast,[29] while the *Irish Times* reported that a joint programme of Belfast and Dublin artistes would mark the opening of the new Belfast station. T. J. Kiernan, head of 2RN, and his Northern Ireland counterpart discussed sharing programmes, while Vincent O'Brien, 2RN's Director of Music, conducted the BBC Northern Ireland Orchestra.[30] Radio propaganda was less concerned about creating northern identity, or distinguishing Ulster and the Free State, than film. Though elementary physics made radio waves no respecters of territorial boundaries, it is also possible that Ulster radio held Reithian principles, and offered programming for nationalists and unionists alike.

III Film propaganda in the Free State

One film, national in character, and more of a propagandist type … now seems to be a necessity

Among the earliest extant film footage of Ireland, Edwardian film-makers Mitchell and Kenyon's actualities portray contentment within the Empire: footage from Cork featuring British flags on buildings is subtly propagandistic, precisely because British symbols were popular with a quiescent populace.[31] Within fifteen years, the flag and all things British became reviled, and Cork a republican stronghold. An inkling of change came in the first Irish feature films. An American company, Kalem, produced lightly nationalistic melodramas portraying brave Irish communities overcoming injustice. Villains were customarily informers and land agents rather than Britons who, though outsiders, were honourable and fair.[32] The villain in *Willie Reilly and His Colleen Bawn* (1918) is British, but the instrument of his dastardliness is an Irish outlaw. The Protestant minister, and landlord whose daughter the Catholic Reilly loves, are non-sectarian, and justice prevails. This was aspirational propaganda aimed at dissolving religious discord.[33] Its roots lay in the republicanism of Theobald Wolfe Tone and the United Irishmen, the eighteenth-century movement whose 1798 rebellion with French aid was bloodily suppressed. Republicanism is visible, too, in *Knocknagow* (1918) where an absentee landlord's agent frames a rival for stealing. Combining romance and social injustice, *Knocknagow* popularised anti-Britishness,[34] heralding a politicised national cinema as Sinn Féin's rise to political prominence began to exercise the authorities.[35] *Knocknagow* also ideated republicanism: tenants and landlord join against the agent, violence is unbecoming, Catholics enjoy justice, and the common good prevails. There is a model of political and social governance apparent in films of this nature that encapsulates the changing environment in which Sinn Féin was increasingly active. To its populist appeal now were added 'the newly-enfranchised and socially excluded, all equipped with a more radical nation-code that appeared to profit the under-privileged and excluded altogether the problem of Protestant opposition'.[36]

Actualities and newsreels brought contemporary events to cinema audiences, speedily disseminating subversive material. As a political party Sinn Féin could make good use of channels of mass communication that other republican organisations could not. There were occasional similarities in the tone of newsreel and fiction films: reflecting the republican tenor of features, one of advanced nationalism's first significant newsreels was the 1913 Wolfe Tone commemoration[37] – an annual event celebrating the republican revolutionary. That year, showing how quickly advanced nationalists grasped cinema's significance, Thomas Clarke lauded its propaganda possibilities to John Devoy.[38] Thomas Ashe's funeral, depicting the lying in state, cortège and burial, became a template for nationalist funerals, and Collins stage-managed proceedings so that mourners regrouped at the cinema to view the newsreel in which they appeared.[39] The footage was provided by General Film Supply, founded by Norman Whitten and Gordon Lewis, who produced newsreels, promotional and army recruitment films[40] and, as nationalist sentiment rose, established the first Irish newsreel service, Irish Events.[41] Their green leanings were evinced by their same-day coverage and screening of the 1917 Sinn Féin *árd fheis*[42] and the June, 1917 release of 1916 internees.[43]

The propaganda efforts of the new state were frequently reactive. Were it not for requests for interviews from newsreel companies, few may have been conducted. It may be a consequence of not understanding the medium very well, and Free State politicians were reticent before the camera. The style of filming in the silent era was to capture politicians entering or exiting events, or posing self-consciously. With sound came the 'piece to camera' – and transitional problems. Lewis requested an interview with Cosgrave, which offered 'some valuable publicity'.[44] At his first spoken filming, Cosgrave clumsily essayed informality:

> The apparatus through which I am now speaking for the first time affords one very stimulating thought: that it gives no opportunity for the opposition to interrupt or to tend towards pessimism and therefore I have, on a very dull morning, the field almost entirely to myself.

Levity ended when he continued apocalyptically: 'The world today is full of great political and economic anxiety'.[45] More familiar with tried and trusted propaganda, the government secured a photograph of the filming in the next day's *Irish Independent*.[46]

External Affairs informed Cosgrave's office that a British Movietone News interview request was 'a very good one from the propaganda angle'.[47] When the firm's American office grew interested, External Affairs drafted speeches for Britain, on Anglo-Irish trade, and America, on transatlantic flights.[48] The department's position at the centre of the state's diplomatic network gave it a better view than other departments of Irish matters that were most newsworthy for foreign audiences. Fox, British Movietone's Irish representatives,

arranged a private advance screening of the films, recorded in March 1931. Despatched by Cosgrave to approve the print, John Hearne and Cremins found the film unsatisfactory; Cremins sent detailed editing instructions to Fox, and requested another viewing before state consent would be given for its release.[49] This is a rare example of the state attempting to direct editorial output of a news organisation outside the Civil War period. Whether that degree of control was seldom used because film companies were usually more in tune with official taste, or the state lacked the expertise and confidence is open to debate, though certainly, when it came to controlling media output through censorship, the state displayed no reticence. Nonetheless, it was much more muscular treatment than Paramount News cameraman J. S. Hodgson received when he was granted a personal tax concession enabling him to import film duty free.[50] Paramount seemed particularly favoured: when it filmed Cosgrave recording a broadcast for American radio, the studio light was so dim the recording was made in Cosgrave's home instead.[51]

Other newsreel companies also received special attention. Advised that the Fox Film Co. was sending a cameraman, Alfred Brick, to Ireland,[52] Lester informed the ministries of Justice, Defence, Industry and Commerce, Agriculture and, unusually, Army Intelligence,[53] where a Colonel Costello compiled a list of 'suitable items of Army doings that might be useful for Army publicity not alone in the U.S.A. but in Ireland and Great Britain'.[54] There is nothing to suggest what the programme was, though evidently Brick's trip was successful. From America, where he had attended a private screening, Smiddy reported that its content – a mix of touristic scenery, industry, politicians, the army and Garda Síochána – would give American audiences 'an impression of Ireland quite different to that which many of them have'.[55] Here was a form of propaganda that challenged lazy stereotypes of shamrocks and harps, of indolent, but charming peasants set against a picturesque vista. Instead, a narrative of industrial development asserted that the state was open for business (already Ford were manufacturing cars in Cork) and had achieved the political stability and domestic security to reassure foreign investors. It also countered lingering republican agitation among expatriates in America, who had turned out enthusiastically for Margaret Pearse a year earlier, when she denounced the Free State for having accepted less than the full independence for which her two sons had been executed.[56] Certainly, Mary MacSwiney's propaganda tour throughout almost all of 1925 was far less effective. One of the most constant American organisations in support of a republic, the Ancient Order of Hibernians, split along a noticeable gender line between the AOH proper and its Ladies Auxiliaries and passed a resolution denouncing her criticisms of the Free State.[57]

Fox returned in 1929, when its itinerary included political buildings, Cosgrave at home, the *Lusitania* memorial, the Garda and Air Corps.[58] International Newsreel Corporation, a Hearst company, also received enthusiastic treatment. In 1925 Lester facilitated contact between them and the Irish Tourist Association.[59] A year later, George F. Allison of the company's

London office contacted Lester requesting to shoot footage 'striving particularly for beautiful effects with the idea of showing Ireland in a peaceful and prosperous light'[60] – two themes the state was intent on achieving. Clearly the state was satisfied with International's films, as a request in 1929 to film the various corps of the army was forwarded from External Affairs to Defence.[61]

Apart from some enthusiastic amateurs and entrepreneurial spirits, the state had no burgeoning national film industry, although its history and culture attracted film-makers interested in Irish or Irish-themed films, and a few light-hearted comedies of dubious production value were shot.[62] While George Dewhurst, Denis Johnston, and Tom Cooper used local knowledge and contacts to make *Irish Destiny, Guests of the Nation* and *The Dawn*[63] respectively, more common was the appeal from interested film-makers for government funding or resources. Domestic film-makers received generally helpful responses, with the state recognising film's propaganda value. O'Kelly provided Isaac Eppel (the screenwriter for *Irish Destiny*) with a list of Belgian film manufacturing firms, and advice on contacting them.[64] Daniel Colohan (or Colahan), a self-styled field cinematographer, sought advice from Industry and Commerce on screening Irish-produced films through Irish societies in New York; the legation provided a list, but cautioned that most societies were unable to conduct screenings.[65] Undeterred, Colohan wrote to the Trade Commissioner in Paris, seeking information on the French market.[66] The legation queried his bona fides and Industry and Commerce proposed that while no introductions be made on his behalf, the legation could provide information.[67]

Capital assistance was less readily available. Carl Stearns Clancy, an Irish-American producer who directed the well-known comedian Will Rogers on location in the Free State, proposed filming travel comedies, romantic and epic historical dramas, legends and illustrated songs and poems in Ireland, and anticipated vast revenues. The Keith Vaudeville Circuit, he claimed, would screen films in its 442 cinemas:

> As these theatres run six or seven days a week, this means a booking of 3000 days per reel. Therefore ENCHANTING ERIN … could gross $225,000 on the Keith Circuit … In addition these ten reels should play in at least 6000 … picture theatres in America at a minimum average of $4.00 per reel per day.[68]

The production costs confounded officials. A single-reel film would cost $3,500 (about £700); a comedy $50,000 (about £10,000); a romantic drama $150,000–200,000 (about £30,000–£40,000); and an epic $350,000–500,000 (about £70,000–£100,000). Put into context, one epic film could cost up to 0.5 per cent of the state's annual budget. In return for the propaganda boost, Clancy merely required a five-year contract, profit-share and weekly salary. No matter how generous the return, his pitch spoke of wealth that the state lacked in its coffers and ambitions.[69]

If professional film-makers failed to arouse interest, amateurs and opportunists had no chance. In 1923, the London delegation notified External Affairs that J. J. Ash, a publicity agent, had proposed promoting Irish interests in Britain through film. Ash received a luke-warm response, as did J. R. Kemp of Jonray Films, also in London, who proposed propaganda films on which he would retain advertising revenues.[70] A glib rewriting of history was proposed by a Monsieur Chauvelot to O'Kelly, who synopsised the plot which revolved around the children of two fled nationalist assassins returning to Ireland from Australia. The assassins were to have been implicated in the 1882 murders of the Chief Secretary and Permanent Under Secretary of Ireland, Lord Frederick Cavendish, and Thomas Henry Burke, for which five nationalists had been executed. Horrified, O'Kelly reported:

> I suggested … he was about to write a most excellent British propaganda film against Ireland. He seemed quite undismayed and said he was prepared to change the plot to please me – or … anyone else … I am using all my best efforts to make him forego it, as I shudder to think what he would produce if given the slightest encouragement.[71]

Consistent across all of these applications is a state determination to maintain control over film representations of it. The state lacked a Grierson or Tallents to drive cinema propaganda, but it had an abundance of conservatism and no small anxiety over the medium's power if left in the hands of adventurers and entrepreneurs.

The Censorship of Films Act, 1923 represented more formal discouragement of film-makers. Signalling the state's moral intent, it may also have been an attempt to regain cultural and political stability.[72] The act focussed on cultural or moral expurgation, requiring the censor to scrutinise films for indecency, obscenity, blasphemy, or, more vaguely, contravening public morality.[73] The censor, James Montgomery, whose avowed guide was the Ten Commandments,[74] demonstrated a devotion to duty that was more than the prudishness of the religious fundamentalist, or the superciliousness that regarded cinema as fodder for impressionable minds. Montgomery's views aligned with official ideology. *Ourselves Alone, Beloved Enemy* and two versions of Liam O'Flaherty's novel about an informer during the War of Independence particularly rankled.[75] Arthur Robison's *The Informer* was a 'sordid show of Chicago gunmen, prostitutes and armed police … It would be funny if it were not mischievous. I refuse to issue a certificate for … such a libellous distortion'.[76] John Ford's version was eviscerated:

> A sordid & brutal travesty of the Black & Tan period. The prostitute and brothel tone … is very clever and artistic but … unfit for exhibition in this country. The issue of a cert. … might be taken as … approval of a gross libel.[77]

Beloved Enemy was the story of a love affair between a British aristocrat's daughter and the rebel leader, a dangerously close representation of gossip that during the Treaty negotiations Collins had conducted an affair with Lady Hazel Lavery, wife of Sir John Lavery, the Irish-born official Great War artist, whose portraits of his wife were used on Free State banknotes. Montgomery dismissed it succinctly: 'Tripe'.[78] *Ourselves Alone*, a melodrama in which the two main British characters both fall in love with a local IRA leader's sister, brought an objection to a fleeting glimpse of a woman's stockings and, regarding the Anglo-Irish War, was '"fairly fair" to the British but not to us … the hero is a Bayard of the RIC. The leader of the gangster IRA is an Oxford man from the big house. I'd reject it if I could.'[79]

Montgomery's imprimatur was essential, and ministerial approval helpful. Frank Aiken, as Minister for Defence, loaned the producers of *Guests of the Nation* military equipment as props.[80] *The Dawn*'s amateur cast included IRA veterans, who received army clothing, transport and equipment.[81] Cooper's film resonated with Fianna Fáil: its strap-line (in translation: 'For the glory of God and the honour of Ireland') was also used by the *Irish Press.* [82] Norris Davidson's review lauded the end product: 'The film is not propagandistic, it has no star to create, often its apparent understatement reveals something with dazzling simplicity.[83] The lack of planned propaganda supports Davidson. However, not having its fingerprints on the canisters, Fianna Fáil benefited from indirect propaganda. Like *Guests of the Nation*, in which a friendship develops between two captured British soldiers and the IRA men who are to be their executioners, republican ideology was the star. Domestic films were more polemic than foreign efforts which sacrificed detail for audience friendliness and stereotypes. In *Beloved Enemy* nationalist ragamuffins torment Merle Oberon's chummy army chauffeur in one scene, but British soldiers in *The Dawn* were brutes. However, the RIC were Irish, which mattered more than the uniform. Although the IRA killed more police than soldiers, the propaganda implied that the disestablished force was never the real enemy. When Ford's informer, Gypo Nolan, punches a constable it is a prelude to mirth, not an enemy vanquished, while his gift of £5 to help an Englishwoman return to Liverpool is a gesture intimating that ordinary Britons could be friends. Similarly, an old woman's reaction to the execution of two English soldiers in *Guests of the Nation*, and the emotions of their captor-executioners, established Irish compassion even to enemies. What emerges from these films is more than a passing nod to the republicanism of *Knocknagow* and *Willie Reilly*. Protestant and Catholic, policeman and nationalist could co-exist in a state where liberty, tolerance and the common good prevailed.

Censorship kept film's worst excesses at bay, but while smut damaged morality, sedition threatened stability. If censorship was inadequate, other powers prevailed. In 1930, the Dublin Film Society sought T. M. Healy's patronage.[84] Chary of an unknown entity, his staff asked Cosgrave's department for advice.[85] Acting on information from the Department of Justice,

Diarmuid O'Hegarty cautioned that the group included self-styled intellectuals with artistic pretensions, whose cinematic programme was disturbing – O'Hegarty denounced *Battleship Potemkin* as 'Bolshevist propaganda' and *Storm Over Asia* as 'a gross libel on the British Army'. He cautioned that Bolshevik agents used the group to disseminate films that cinemas would not screen.[86] Watching politically sensitive films was sufficient to mark a citizen as potentially dangerous, though the belief that the society's members were unwitting dupes of dastardly Bolsheviks fits with the commonly held view that cinema moulded malleable minds. It transpired that the group had already been under Garda surveillance, and O'Hegarty was provided with information on its members who included Harold Douglas, son of Senator James Douglas (and a future senator himself), and Lillian Dalton, daughter of a senior civil servant.[87] Respectability offered no defence against a state determined to control citizens' cinematic preferences.

Oddly, that control rarely extended to producing educational or motivational propaganda films, despite advocates in the administration urging such action. O'Kelly was one, though with melodrama undermining his pragmatism he suggested that the romanticism and apolitical nature of the 'Wild Geese' (Irish mercenary soldiers in European armies in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries) was an excellent topic.[88] In 1926, he extolled Belgian governmental film propaganda for industry and tourism: 'precisely the type of publicity from which I think Saorstát Éireann could draw the greatest amount of value'.[89] External Affairs acknowledged that a similar Irish film was a remote prospect, but with more information, it could discuss the matter with ministries dealing with tourism, commerce and agriculture.[90] O'Kelly synopsised the film, claiming that he could have shown an Irish equivalent 'on half a dozen different occasions in the last year'[91] – evidently seeing film's utility in select screenings, not general release. Lester informed O'Kelly later that year that approval in principle had been given for producing a state propaganda film.[92]

Abstract approval did not guarantee action, though a state-sanctioned film, *Ireland*, was eventually produced after a protracted process. In 1925, Smiddy requested propaganda films to give to the United States Bureau of Commercial Economics,[93] and External Affairs asked Industry and Commerce, and Agriculture for help.[94] The latter referred the department to Industry and Commerce,[95] who, in turn referred to earlier correspondence on railway propaganda.[96] External Affairs pressed Industry and Commerce again, but in copying several ministries inadvertently implied deliberate obstruction.[97] Industry and Commerce bridled at the error and blamed Finance for rejecting its proposals.[98] Mitigating the gaffe, External Affairs forwarded a memo from T. J. Kiernan at the London delegation: the Imperial Institute was building a collection of films, and the Empire Marketing Board wanted dominions and colonies to provide propaganda films to screen in cinemas alongside main features. External Affairs assured Industry and Commerce of its support.[99] With détente established, both ministries submitted a memorandum to the

Executive Council outlining the overseas representatives' clamour for films that would allow them to compete with publicity-conscious countries. They observed that state film propaganda was haphazard, orchestrated by private interests, or subject to budgetary constraints and urged that 'at least one film, national in character, and more of a propagandist type … now seems to be a necessity'. There were 'many advantages to be derived from this form of publicity … especially in relation to the development of tourist traffic and the promotion of trade' but for the home audience it was a way 'of educating the people to a better appreciation of the attractions of the country and of its economic possibilities'.[100] Arguments on cost were negated by anticipated exchequer revenues. Support was won from Agriculture, Fishing and the army by guaranteeing that their interests would be included.[101] The proposal was successful, but final sanction seems to have been delayed while Finance displayed customary reluctance to open the public purse.[102] Government records are mute until 1929, when Industry and Commerce told the President's Office that the film was ready for exhibition.[103]

Why the state hesitantly adopted film propaganda, and only in a minor way, may be explained by its inability to grasp what film propaganda entailed, and self-imposed isolation from European film organisations. The Dominions Office extended an invitation to the state to attend the 1926 International Cinematograph Congress, organised by the French National Committee of Intellectual Cooperation, to no avail.[104] In 1927, Education declined to attend a Swiss conference on school or educational films as it had 'no experience of the use of films of this kind'.[105] The International Institute of Education Cinematography in Rome also met with apathy. The Italian ambassador to Britain sought support for the body, funded by the Italian government, but operating under the League of Nations.[106] His communication, forwarded to External Affairs, cited the importance of 'cinematography as a practical method of instruction and as an instrument of culture, education and healthy propaganda'.[107] The document was passed to Education which, again, interpreted educational film as scholastic rather than propagandistic. Education was influenced by more than its own ignorance; the Dominions Office had already outlined Britain's position:

> educational use of the cinematograph is still in an early stage and … educational authorities hold divergent views as to the value of this method of instruction and the practicality of its employment. … His Majesty's Government … feel that it would not be practicable for them to undertake … any official responsibilities in connection with the proposal.[108]

Five months later, External Affairs, acting on Education's response, notified the Dominions Office of the state's unwillingness to offer support.[109] External Affairs, with its vestigial propaganda function, was more suited than Education to deal with propaganda. Indeed it had received the 1926 Imperial

Conference report on Empire-produced films, which contradicted the Dominions Office:

> The importance and far-reaching influence of the Cinema are now generally recognised. The Cinema is … a powerful instrument of education in the widest sense … and even where it is not used avowedly for purposes of instruction, advertisement or propaganda, it exercises indirectly a great influence in shaping the ideals of the very large numbers to whom it appeals. Its potentialities in this respect are almost unlimited.[110]

Education, untested in diplomacy, bowed to pressure. It was not until 1934 that the state ratified a League of Nations convention on customs exemptions on educational films – a convention overseen by the institute in Rome.[111]

IV Radio propaganda in the Free State

Something other than the usual banalities

When the 1916 insurgents broadcast word of their insurrection in Morse code on the shipping frequency – a broadcast received by few, if any – it showed remarkable foresight of the medium's power.[112] A decade later, following Dáil debates and reports, the Free State had its own station, 2RN, operating under the Postmaster-General and funded by a radio-set licence. Its genesis was marred by a whiff of scandal over Darrel Figgis TD's business links to an applicant for a broadcast licence; marked by the dogmatism of J. J. Walsh, the Postmaster-General, towards state control without funding; and hamstrung by Finance, 'which appeared most often in the guise of the Wicked Fairy'.[113] Modelled on the BBC, 2RN broadcast cultural and educational programmes, with factual news reportage. Walsh believed all content was propaganda, a view consistent with contemporary sentiment, when control over frequencies and content was paramount.[114] Broadcasting was, Padraig Ó'Máille TD told the Dáil, of immense value:

> In connection with the … national language and … modern languages, so necessary to commerce, there is no agency which lends itself so readily to the wide and cheap propagation of knowledge … In this way pupils may learn … principles of hygiene, of gardening, of fruit-growing, beekeeping, poultry-raising … Similarly … reasons for and the application of new laws, lessons on the institutions of government and civics generally might be widely disseminated in an attractive fashion.[115]

His remarks echoed the first interim report on broadcasting, which had suggested broadcasts of 'messages helpful to Agriculture and business generally … weather reports, market reports as to prices and supply, of lectures, educative or entertaining; and of communications of national interest and importance'.[116]

The importance of agricultural broadcasts was underlined by lobbying by the Irish Agricultural Society.[117]

The state took its propaganda cues from the necessity to reinstate social values following divisive conflicts. Although not couched in propaganda terms, radio was considered too important to leave to private interests. In the Dáil, Hogan said:

> If we let control of this … means of cultivating our national distinctiveness pass … into private institutions … these … will be more interested in producing dividends than in doing any good for … the nation. It is from that angle that I … approach this subject … cultivation of the Irish language, Irish music, Irish literature and Irish culture.[118]

In contrast, William Hewat TD believed it would be 'hard to get a broadcasting company to pay a great deal of attention to … propaganda, which … would not bring in any great amount of money'.[119] Walsh displayed antipathy towards radio as a propaganda channel, and 2RN operated as a cultural broadcaster.[120] The first station director, Seamus Clandillon, a civil servant with no broadcasting experience, was a noted balladeer and folk music collector.[121] The station's opening ceremony, with Douglas Hyde's address in Irish, followed by an evening mainly of traditional music, set the tone for an expression of nationality that transcended politics. Conflict had created a situation where effective propaganda opposed something; constructive propaganda was a novelty. Culture was more effective propaganda than politicised news, and radio became a propaganda channel despite Walsh's efforts. In providing lessons in civic spirit, promulgating what would later become de Valera's propaganda of self-sufficiency, and promoting a vision of the nation, 2RN was a propaganda medium that was more effective for not being politicised.

That changed somewhat when Michael Heffernan TD, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, appealed to Cosgrave to develop 2RN as a cultural, moral and social force:

> there has been a definite lowering of the ordinary standard of culture, civic virtue, honesty, etc. … In consequence … it is the practice at Elections to appeal to the crudest and most primitive feelings of the population. It is regarded as almost waste of time [sic] to endeavour to appeal to intelligence and reason by developing rational and logical argument. Appeals to emotions such as jealousy and cupidity have been found the most effective. The widespread use of Broadcasting would improve … civic virtues. It will help to inculcate a sense of citizenship and collective responsibility.[122]

Heffernan was also cognisant of successful radio propaganda in America and Britain:

> President Hoover attributes his very large majority to his ability to reach the female population with reasoned broadcast talks. During the recent General Election in Great Britain wireless broadcasting was availed of to a very great extent by the opposing parties. It enables the bulk of the population to hear the carefully prepared speeches of the leaders of the political parties. Their voices were not altogether drowned, as here, by the cross-road, soap-box orator, spouting vile calumnies when there is not a Press reporter present.[123]

Approval was given to erect a 60-kilowatt station to extend 2RN's reach.[124] Ironically, this benefited Fianna Fáil, who assumed power not long after the infrastructure's completion.

2RN had a restricted capacity to broadcast news: only government announcements could be broadcast before seven o'clock and, at the request of newspapers, descriptive news was not allowed.[125] The first news broadcasts were a reworking of evening newspapers and BBC material. It soon became apparent that a proper service was needed. Post and Telegraphs recommended employing an editor who would attend parliamentary sittings, yet remain in contact with the station to supervise news-gathering and reporting.[126] Johnson observed that the duties were full-time for a part-time position.[127] His Labour colleague William Norton TD deplored the miserly weekly wage of £4 for work which demanded 'knowledge of reporting … of journalistic work … of editing, and … Irish'.[128] Walsh countered that the duties were suggestions, and that the salary was aligned with regional newspapers' remuneration.[129]

Providing politicians with a propaganda outlet was frowned on, and Walsh was denied Council approval to broadcast the 1926 budget.[130] The furore surrounding his 1927 leak of Cumann na nGaedheal's post-election considerations increased nervousness among ministers and the station's employees over broadcasting political material.[131] It was not until 1931, for instance, that Post and Telegraphs requested that all press communiqués issued by departments of state should also be sent to 2RN.[132] In 1936, Kiernan circulated departments requesting that senior officials allow themselves be interviewed about their departmental work, and anticipated: 'A great deal of interest is certain to be roused … and much more general co-operation on the part of the public secured'.[133] He was undoubtedly right, but failed to persuade the heads of departments, who rejected the proposal.[134] Politicians' broadcasts which were uncontroversial adjuncts to their public positions were acceptable, but propaganda was not. Peadar Doyle TD took exception to the Government Information Bureau supplying 2RN with news of Oireachtas proceedings that favoured de Valera.[135] The then Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, Gerald Boland TD, denied that had happened, and claimed that policy dictated news should be broadcast without comment.[136] Still concerned that radio was being used unfairly, Mulcahy asked Boland's successor, Oscar Traynor TD, to quantify politicians' broadcasts from January 1935 to March 1937.

Table 3.1 2RN broadcasts by ministers and parliamentary secretaries, January 1935–March 1937[137]

Minister (M/) or parliamentary secretary (PS/)	*No. of broadcasts*	*Total minutes*
M/Agriculture	6	27.0
M/Defence	1	17.0
M/Education	2	30.0
M/Finance	3	30.0
M/Industry and Commerce	5	94.0
M/Lands	1	39.0
M/Local Government and Public Health	1	8.5
President, Executive Council	9	119.5
PS to President	1	18.5
Joint broadcasts between two ministries	2	38.0
Total	31	521.5

Table 3.2 2RN broadcasts by Dáil deputies, January 1935–March 1937[138]

Dáil deputies	*Total minutes*
C Breathnach	15.0
A. Byrne (twice)	17.0
W. T. Cosgrave	15.0
W. T. Cosgrave and C. Maguire	30.0
F. Fahy	5.0
J. Good	10.0
P. Kehoe	5.5
P. McGilligan	12.0
R. J. Rowlette	9.5
Total	119.0

Table 3.3 2RN joint broadcasts by ministers and Dáil deputies, January 1935–March 1937[139]

Ministers (M/) and TDs	*Total minutes*
President and P. McGilligan	60
M/Industry and Commerce and A. Byrne	16
Total	76

The breakdown of time allocated to solo political speakers is quite revealing, with government speakers having access to the airwaves for almost nine hours to the opposition's two. Although there were two joint broadcasts, debate was forbidden on such occasions. This may have reflected a preference for fact over discussion, or governmental unwillingness to have its propaganda diluted. The figures may suggest that Fianna Fáil were exerting a close control over 2RN, and were using their position in government for their own benefit. However, without knowing the precise nature of the broadcasts, that is rather a hazardous leap to judgment. It was, however, a far cry from the established practice of providing balance and allowing equal time to both sides when a contentious matter was raised and could not be avoided – ironically, instituted as a concession to Fianna Fáil after Walsh's post-election leak in 1927; or the preferred and most usual option of avoiding the need for a right to reply by first keeping the government out of the studio.[140] Pine suggests that keeping contentious political debate off the airwaves may have had the counter-intuitive effect of promoting a stable democracy, although the absence of debate contradicted Reithian tenets.[141] It also does not consider that de Valera, who used radio as 'a powerful medium by which he arrived, in person and metaphorically, in many Irish homes'[142] should have inaugurated increased ministerial time on the airwaves, yet still presided over a democratic state.

Traynor presented a memorandum to government in 1937 to relax restrictions on political debates. Kiernan, he wrote, had suggested acting before the next general election, and offered three proposals: a studio debate with one candidate from each party and a neutral chairperson (Kiernan's preference); a candidate from each party to broadcast on successive nights, and a randomly selected voter; or a prominent supporter to speak on behalf of each party. His departmental secretary preferred maintaining the prohibition but if it were to be dispensed with, suggested that invitations be confined to the main parties, who would select their speaker for broadcast on the same date and, ministers excepted, submit their scripts to the station's director for screening, with the government representative choosing the speaking order.[143] Despite strongly favouring the government, the proposals were never enacted, and political debate continued to be an omission of the programming schedule.

On assuming power, de Valera began changing 2RN's programming. Frank O'Reilly, Secretary of the Catholic Truth Society of Ireland, shared de Valera's insularism. He emphasised the importance of state control, and suggested radio could propagandise the state abroad better than diplomats, but his view of suitable programming was unimaginative and cautious:

> Nothing should be broadcast that is likely to give offence on any score – religion, politics, national susceptibilities, etc., – at home or abroad. The service should aim at creating friends for those broadcasting, for the broadcasting authority, and for the country. Speakers should be expository rather than hortatory. They should avoid the controversal [sic] manner.[144]

He noted that the current schedule was 'overburdened with propaganda and educative, as distinct from entertainment, items. These items are quite good, but they obtrude unduly in short programmes.'[145] Culture aside, quite what made 2RN propagandistic is unclear. Certainly, it had avoided political imbroglios after Walsh's 1927 difficulties. Perhaps O'Reilly was obliquely attacking the previous administration, especially P. S. O'Hegarty, Secretary in Posts and Telegraphs, whose disavowal of former IRA comrades was a running sore.[146] The appointment of Kiernan as director, John MacDonagh, brother of the executed 1916 rebel Thomas, as director of programming, and Gallagher, de Valera's long-time propaganda lieutenant, as deputy director presaged a republican drive for control; it gave 2RN leadership focussed on the realpolitik of radio as a propaganda channel, unlike Clandillon's administrative stewardship. Kiernan, a doctor of economics, brought statistical expertise to analysing programming output.

Though news output increased slightly following Gallagher's appointment, there had already been a shift towards political material, starting with a series of talks by politicians on the 1935 Budget.[148] The increased time for sport suggests that listeners desired content that, happily, also promoted national identity. Short stories and plays from new writers enhanced cultural propaganda. From 1935, bands largely replaced solo artistes playing traditional music, and the first broadcast of an Irish opera *An Cailín Bán* (The Fair Colleen) occurred in July.[149] What is missing from the statistical detail, however, is any indication of how much time was devoted to broadcasting in the national language. Watson's research into schedules found that for one week in 1935 (14–20 October) the total Irish language output of the station was

Table 3.4 Percentage of programme types broadcast, January 1935–March 1936[147]

Programme type	*Broadcast time 1935 (%)*	*Broadcast time January–March 1936 (%)*
Music (including recordings)	50.9	48.7
Advertising	15.2	14.2
News	7.6	8.3
Plays and variety	6.3	2.7
Talks and debates	7.1	10.8
Children	8.3	6.9
Sports commentaries	2.9	6.7
Religious services	0.6	–
Women's talks	0.6	1.0
Special transmissions	0.5	–
Schools broadcasts	–	0.7
Total	100	100

1.75 hours – about 4 per cent of total broadcast time.[150] If 2RN was giving listeners what they wanted rather than what was good for them, these figures are perfectly sensible. But the state and its agencies undeniably indulged in lip service to Irish, with propaganda attesting the triumphant march towards full language revivalism let down by the reality that most citizens cared no more for the language than was necessary to pass school exams or obtain employment in the civil service. Heffernan told the Dáil that 'special prominence' was given to programing in Irish, as befitted 'national characteristics',[151] while Boland referred to attempts to extend the use of Irish in more general ways in programmes.[152] What this amounted to, ultimately, was the token effort of interspersing occasional phrases in Irish into programmes that were otherwise entirely in English. Rather than being an innovative channel of educational and socially constructive language propaganda, 2RN fell into line with official orthodoxy and propagated a myth of linguistic revival.[153]

Kiernan took his duties seriously, and questioned the gratuitous use of radio for advertising. He instanced sports bodies receiving airtime before national events, and criticised coverage of religious events and broadcasts of ministerial speeches at factory openings:

> There is an important question of policy here involved. As our programmes become more lively, the value of these cloaked advertisements becomes greater. Where are we to draw the line? What policy should I follow?[154]

Kiernan's dilemma was whether radio could be used for commercial propaganda. A contract for advertising awarded to the Athlone Radio Publicity Co. had produced spectacularly poor results.[155] The advertisements were mainly for foreign products aimed at British audiences, which prompted Boland's observation that 'these undesirable features are incompatible with the Government's policy of economic and cultural national development and are generally derogatory to the national tone of the broadcasting programmes'.[156] Finance objected to ending the contract, as it would have increased 2RN's dependency on the exchequer.[157] It was a fight that Finance, unusually, did not win. The terms of the replacement scheme stated that only Irish products and enterprises be advertised[158] – propagandistic prestidigitation whereby state policy imitated Fianna Fáil values.

Although the state rigidly controlled radio, nonetheless entrepreneurs frequently applied for broadcast licences. John Charles McQuaid sent de Valera a copy of one proposal for a commercial radio station, broadcasting an 'ordinary type of entertainment' to complement 2RNs cultural and educational programming. Puffery aggrandised the benefit accruing to the state:

> It will … unite all the Irish scattered throughout the world, remind the travelling public of the beauties of Ireland and thus link up the old culture of Ireland with the modern world. The commercial station will

> establish a definite link with a leading Free State newspaper in order to circularise the world with true facts about Ireland and increase its circulation in the Free State.[159]

Given de Valera's ownership, the *Irish Press* may be inferred as the 'leading' newspaper. Industry and Commerce circulated a memorandum to Council with ministerial endorsement of the proposal. It noted the proposal's advantages in employment and industry, and rebutted Post and Telegraphs' opposition, arguing that the station would not broadcast political material, and government import regulations could 'nullify any commercial propaganda'.[160] This motivation was less because other nations would suffer advertising's ill-effects, but because Irish citizens, in the throes of economic war with Britain and accustomed to austerity, might clamour for foreign luxuries. External Affairs and Post and Telegraphs rejected the proposal: international agreements prohibited intentional cross-border broadcasting.[161] The latter saw no opportunity of obtaining a second frequency and dryly observed: 'the question arises as to which aspect of our broadcasting activities is the more important, the National programme intended for our own people, or the commercial programme intended to advertise non-Irish goods outside Ireland'.[162]

London solicitor Herbert Linley represented unnamed clients who, having sold their product using radio advertising, sought their own radio licence in 1934. Rebuffed by the British Postmaster-General, they sought to broadcast from the Free State, or on a ship registered there, anchored outside British waters.[163] Post and Telegraphs scuppered the idea.[164] A departmental memorandum on Florence Schlesinger and Rory More O'Ferrall's 1936 proposal noted that the promoters aimed to broadcast advertisements to Britain, which:

> besides being nationally bad in that it would give control of one of the most important of cultural agencies to a group whose aims are purely mercenary, would also involve a breach of international courtesy, if not of an international agreement.[165]

The same year, Raymond Postgate and Catherine Marshall proposed a station that would broadcast news to European countries accustomed to receiving propaganda.[166] External Affairs decreed it against:

> international comity to allow propaganda to be broadcast … which would … disturb the relations between the Government of any country and their nationals. Any country lending itself to the broadcasting of such propaganda would soon be regarded as a disturbing element in international affairs, and its dignity and prestige would be decidedly lowered.[167]

Broadcasting outside the state on foreign-owned stations was a challenge to inexperienced politicians. A Cosgrave broadcast rebutting de Valera's anti-state propaganda in the USA caused controversy when his denunciation was

so strident that the International Broadcasting Corporation censored the transmission. The *New York Herald Tribune* headline claimed 'WGL censors Cosgrave views on de Valera',[168] while the *New York Times* headline ran: 'Cosgrave message censored for radio; station WGL deletes cabled attack on de Valera's "insane campaign of 1922 and 1923"'.[169] It was a salient lesson that robust political debate was sometimes unsuitable for sensitive listeners, or broadcasters' libel lawyers. For a later broadcast into America that touched on international amity, Eoin MacNeill, writing Cosgrave's script, studiously avoid controversy: 'I did not specifically name either Kellogg or the League of Nations, because either would be sure to make some set blaspheme. Those that want the bouquet won't fail to reach for it.'[170]

Nonetheless, MacNeill's diplomacy irked the Columbia Broadcasting System, which had invited Cosgrave to speak on Irish–American relations. Casually emphasising the power of radio, CBS let it be known: 'Incidentally, our State Department has been fully appraised of this proposal … The Department professes a friendly interest.' Michael MacWhite in the US legation recommended acceptance, and Cosgrave agreed.[171] César Saerchinger, director of CBS's European Service, suggested Cosgrave deliver his address on St Patrick's Day, 1931.[172] Taking publicity seriously, Saerchinger requested copies of any official publicity material so that it might be used to publicise the broadcast in America.[173]

The state's naivety damaged relations. CBS, believing they had exclusive rights, were horrified to learn Cosgrave was giving an address on a rival network two days before them. The Washington Legation disapproved, especially as the original plan's novelty would have had a larger audience than two broadcasts so close together.[174] Cosgrave's office's response suggests that, unwise to media relations, he had been over-awed by CBS's rival, the National Broadcasting Company. Owned by the *Chicago Tribune*, NBC had despatched its London representative John Steele, artist and Wells Fargo heiress Clara Fargo Thomas, and the American minister to the Free State to meet him.[175] Mitigating Cosgrave's discomfort, his office reassured the legation that the NBC broadcast would be very general and would not affect the CBS broadcast. [176] This was misleading. While the CBS address was important, the NBC broadcast covered the 1932 Eucharistic Congress, the 1933 Chicago Fair, Irish–American ties, and incorporated Brase's arrangement of the national anthem.[177] Despite having annoyed CBS, and rejected the legation's advice, Cosgrave's broadcasts were successful. NBC expressed gratitude;[178] CBS had reason to feel aggrieved, but continued to forge ties with the state's representatives in America.[179]

This was a fertile country for radio, and the state's representatives adroitly used the medium. W. J. B. Macaulay informed External Affairs that radio station WNYC would broadcast a prime-time speech and asked whether he should say 'something other than the usual banalities which are so exceedingly non-controversial'.[180] Most speeches for American audiences emphasised the state's religiosity, culture and emergence from oppression, but

imparted little of interest. Low interest from home for the occasion[181] did not prevent Macaulay from writing a speech that, although delivered on his behalf, eschewed literary and cultural allusions in favour of economic and political propaganda.[182] His St Patrick's Day message, broadcast in 1933, was more traditional, though his ending was unusually direct as he noted the state's opportunity to show leadership in social reconstruction, and observed that de Valera's government was bringing modern industrial advancement.[183]

Close to home, there was something petty about de Valera's relations with the BBC, which enjoyed cordial professional relations with 2RN – Reith had been a member of the selection board tasked with appointing the station's first director,[184] while both stations had formal programme exchanges.[185] A BBC request to borrow 2RN facilities, and 'a first class speaker' of the state's choosing to broadcast from the 1935 Dublin Horse Show received a prompt response from Kiernan himself.[186] Kiernan had an open mind regarding working with the BBC: on receipt of a request to participate in its Christmas Day programme, he notified de Valera's office, enclosing the previous year's schedule when the state had contributed a three-minute piece, 'Men of Aran', and professed his preference for participating.[187] The invitation was rejected out of hand.[188]

V Conclusion

Political debates on the establishment of radio suggest that it was a medium to be feared were it outside state control. Radio did not belong to the people, but was to be guarded for and from them: with varying success, radio propagated government policy of the day. That radio could produce overt state propaganda was mildly repugnant to Cumann na nGaedheal, which established a strong cultural propaganda vehicle. Not so Fianna Fáil, which tightly controlled 2RN through key appointments and restrictions on advertising. The type of propaganda that emerged from 1932 onwards suggests that the airwaves were controlled to ensure maximum exposure for Fianna Fáil ideology. Less clear were attitudes to film, where a view prevailed that cinema was fodder for unquestioning minds. Having no obvious cultural reference point, it was unsurprising that this 'technologically-based modern medium … should be regarded with suspicion by those who sought to create a mythical Gaelic past'.[189] Highbrow preoccupations overlooked cinema's mass communication appeal. Control over film, though difficult as there was no state involvement in production or distribution, was achieved through censorship. Under Cumann na nGaedheal, this was a consequence of a moral imperative and religious influence. These mores continued under Fianna Fáil, who added carefully constructed notions of a self-contained identity that resonated with the party's own ideology.

New media were challenging forms of propaganda, necessitating innovation and flexibility from propagandists groomed in print. Radio emphasised the power of language and suited the austere de Valera, whose time spent in

America, where radio was pioneered, was useful preparation. Film required concentration on visual elements until sound allowed the powerful marriage of word and image. Both could have been used more frequently or expertly, but wariness, antipathy and financial restraints first had to yield. Both media were in their infancy, but so, too, were the careers of their Free State exponents, and although there were misadventures, state control, for all its severity and stifling of creativity, never led to the propaganda excesses experienced elsewhere in Europe.

Notes

1 R. M. Fox, 'How the women helped' in The Kerryman, *Dublin's fighting story. Told by the men who made it* (Tralee, 1947), p. 212.
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3 Bernays, *Propaganda,* pp. 83–4.
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4 Propaganda and nation-building

I Introduction

Who comprised the nation was a vexed question. Lyons described a state with Gaelic, Ulster Protestant, English and Anglo-Irish traditions jostling for attention, with the first pre-eminent. There was an 'instinctive recoil from anything that does not square with the idealized national stereotype'[1] – the Anglo-Irish were increasingly resigned to besiegement. Yet, the state sought to include them in a notional nation. It was not their fault theirs was a 'false unconsciousness' – it was their subservience to Britain's perfidiousness in using malcontent to divide and conquer that made them unaware of their nationhood; whether they realised it or not, Ireland had 'irrefragable unity as a society'.[2] With the self-assuredness of victory, the Free State propagated a definition of nationhood. But 'the "Irish nation" had from its beginnings faute de mieux to define Irish nationality in terms of Irish residence or birth'.[3] Incorporating diverse tribes in any other form was fraught with difficulty. From the nineteenth century, with their contesting visions of the nation, nationalists, republicans, unionists and Anglo-Irish had promulgated their own geniuses and traditions, while new fringe interests such as suffragism, labour, socialism and fascism attracted sizeable numbers of followers.

The Civil War rent asunder a nation cultivated to express a Gaelic, Celtic, Catholic identity. Cumann na nGaedheal had to propagandise to reunite Gaels at home and abroad, while accommodating sceptical Anglo-Irish brethren and unionists. Cosgrave's party was forced to cautiously propagate the political and social realities of the value of being Irish, and of the state itself. In turn, Fianna Fáil, where de Valera's view of parochial contentment and bucolic self-sufficiency held sway, perceived the nation as a tractable extension of party identity. Indeed, its constitution designated it a national movement, not a political party, suggesting that nation and Fianna Fáil were as one. In creating a Gaelic, Celtic, Catholic society, both turned to the Catholic church for support. To Cumann na nGaedheal, it lent moral authority in regime stabilisation and cultural legitimation.[4] As an expression of gratitude, the 'new politicians lost no time in making their personal piety publicly known, in enacting laws enforcing public morality along lines

pleasing to the Church and in associating themselves as representative of a Catholic state for a Catholic people'.[5]

Its institutions of education, health, parochial and pastoral care gave the party a ready-made propaganda conduit. In return, the party propagandised public obeisance and worship, notably funerals, the centenary celebrations of Catholic Emancipation and the Eucharistic Congress. Sporting prowess was endorsed by the Church and idealised as Christian living: sport and religion guaranteed a virtuous national life. By the time Fianna Fáil came to power, Church–party relations had ripened to a Church–state alliance propagating mutually desirable goals.[6]

II Propagating a religious identity

We are all mariners on the deep, bound for a port still seen only through storm and spray

For a state born out of the sacrifice of 1916, it is unsurprising that the obsequies of fallen heroes provided poignant, politically charged symbolism. Public and political participation in funeral rites evoked national and personal loss. There was, in the funerals of founders of the state, and of those who died before that freedom was gained, a coming together of citizens and politicians in an expression of loss and regret, commingled with public support for the nation for which blood had been shed. Funerals provided the state with the opportunity to celebrate the deceased's contribution to the nation. Instances of violent death allowed for condemnatory propaganda, so that the act of public mourning became a panegyric for the nation and the deceased, and an expression of repugnance towards the perpetrators. Free State authorities were far from innovators in this regard. Their manipulation of funerals as a public statement followed a well established pattern that was used to good effect in the revolutionary period.

When he died after admission to Dublin's Mater Hospital, Sinn Féin exploited Thomas Ashe's death for propaganda, commandeering his room as a shrine: 15,000 people, stewarded by Irish Volunteers, filed past his remains. Next day, Sinn Féin organised a cortège to the Pro-Cathedral, described by the *Irish Times* in detail: twenty priests preceded the hearse, which was flanked by a detail of Irish Volunteers and followed by Ashe's cousin, Patrick (the chief mourner), de Valera, other Sinn Féin leaders and republicans. Only then were the family accorded their place, followed by several thousand Irish Volunteers, marching bands, the Citizen's Army led by a uniformed Markiewicz, and finally, groups identified as Sinn Féin's women's wing and Boy Scouts (presumably Cumann na mBan and Fianna Éireann).[7] In the hierarchy of mourning, family grief was subordinated to establishing his nationalism and Catholicism: Ashe died for faith and country. Three years later, the funerals, just months apart, of Tomás MacCurtain and Terence MacSwiney brought more propaganda. Preceded by 200 priests, MacCurtain's cortège

numbered 20,000, including 8,000 Volunteers, mayors from Irish cities, and Griffith and MacSwiney representing Sinn Féin.[8] Even death abroad did not diminish propaganda. Though his death in Brixton Prison lessened its participatory impact in Ireland, MacSwiney's lying in state at St George's Cathedral, Southwark brought the propaganda war into Britain. As his body was removed from prison, family and a Dáil deputation including Count Plunkett and Cosgrave formed the cortège. The coffin, draped in a tricolour, was carried into the cathedral by a company of Cork Volunteers, relieved of their funerary duties by comrades from Dublin, in turn relieved by London Volunteers.[9] These deaths were manipulated for propaganda because so many others perished in prison at the hands of a firing squad or hangman. The execution of the 1916 leaders and, under the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act, Kevin Barry and nine other republicans, gave nationalism cause to rouse anger, but without the physical remains to foment deeper sedition: the Capital Punishment Act, 1868 directed interment within prisons where sentences were executed, a controversial decision in Barry's execution which saw the normally balanced *Irish Times* challenge Dublin Castle.[10] In propaganda terms, the remains of the deceased were as crucial to the struggle as munitions.

It was one of the tragedies of nationalism and the Free State that conflict provided frequent opportunity for funerary propaganda. The rhetoric of the Free State government on the death of three of its architects, Griffith, Collins and O'Higgins, demonstrates that their deaths, while detrimental to the state, were valuable propaganda against the state's enemies, many of whom also died as independence took root. Former comrades, their translation from nationalist to republican ensured their passing was officially neglected: Harry Boland's funeral was markedly ignored; the state's sole participation came in the form of a troop of soldiers who, encountering the cortège stood to attention while it passed.[11] Some historians speculate that this was a mournful gesture from Collins to his close friend,[12] but Fitzpatrick recounts a less comradely Collins during Boland's final hours.[13] Markiewicz' death while a *teachta dála* elect, coming so soon after O'Higgins' assassination, evinced official animosity against agitators who threatened insurrectionary recrudescence: Fianna Fáil claimed that the Dublin City Commissioners refused to allow her lie in state in City Hall and the Mansion House.[14] At her burial in Glasnevin Cemetery, the presence of nearby armed troops, and police detectives mingling among the crowd of nearly a thousand, suggested that the state feared republican propaganda and violence.[15] In an act of propaganda by suppressing information, the death of the first woman in the world to hold ministerial office inspired no parliamentary tribute when the Dáil next convened.

In contrast, the state idealised Griffith in death and denigrated those who opposed his ideals. The official announcement of his death declared:

> The Irish Government places on record its deep sorrow … and its firm determination to carry on the work of his life to the achievement which he so nearly realised.

> The nation joins in the grief of his widow and family, and prays that Almighty God may support them in their overwhelming trouble.[16]

The expression of sympathy may have been intended to evoke divine support for the turmoil befalling the country: if nation and family were joined in grief, trouble affected both equally. Collins placed Griffith in a pantheon of national martyrs:

> Only those who have worked him know what Arthur Griffith has done for Ireland: only they can realise how he has spent himself in his country's cause, and I have no shadow of doubt but that his end has been hastened by the mental anguish he has endured because of the actions of those who at this, the first time in the long and sorrowful history of our country when Ireland has the opportunity of becoming a nation, have acted as they have done and are doing still. The one bright spot in this fresh tragedy … would be for those who are against us, and who realise … what Arthur Griffith has done for Ireland, to be by his death brought to a better ideal of their own duty to the country which they profess to serve and love.[17]

Cosgrave's graveside panegyric praised Griffith as a patriot and democrat, testifying to his moral desolation caused by the Treaty's rejection; despair notwithstanding, Griffith strove to achieve national moral regeneration, and to build a united, free people.[18] The propaganda was steadfast: Griffith was the nation's true leader. His successors would not waver in completing his work.

For a nation grieving the loss of Griffith, the death of Collins, its most charismatic statesman, ten days later was a desperate blow. Again, the government quickly lionised its dead leader. The army extolled his courage: 'the Commander-in-Chief was wounded in the head. Despite this mortal injury, General Collins, who fought throughout the action, set a splendid example … He continued to fire from the ground until his strength failed, and he collapsed.'[19] The Publicity Department's communiqué addressed the nation directly:

> People of Ireland. – The greatest and bravest of our countrymen has been snatched from us at the moment when victory smiled through the clouds upon the uprising of the nation to which he had dedicated all the powers of his magnificent manhood.

Collins' legacy, it claimed, had led the nation to 'the triumphant end which had become almost a dream, and swept before it the domestic revolt which tried to pluck from your hands the fruits of that triumph – your unchallenged authority in the land'.[20]

A dubious *Irish Times* account of the skirmish, linking courage, fortitude, forgiveness and Catholicism, could only have been written with access to official sources:

> he fired away until he became too weak to clasp his rifle … Generals Dalton and O'Connell ran to his assistance, and recited an Act of Contrition into his ears. His life was ebbing fast, but he bore himself like a hero. 'Forgive them,' he faintly whispered: 'Let the Dublin Brigade bury me.' Then he died, surrounded by his heartbroken comrades, who tenderly placed his body on 'The Slieve-na-Mon,' while the ambushers, their foul work fully done, departed, carrying with them their dead and wounded.[21]

Mulcahy's oration dampened the enthusiasm of an *Irish Times* correspondent, who wrote of 'this shy, rather awkward stripling' set to replace Collins, grudgingly crediting him as having 'the mind of a poet and the spirit of a Red Branch knight', warriors in Celtic mythology.[22] Perhaps the back-handed compliment was retaliation for Mulcahy's repudiation of the newspaper's claims regarding Collins' dying words: 'Michael Collins never said … "forgive them," because his great big mind could not have entertained the obverse thought, and he knew those who sat around him … were too big to harbour in their minds the obverse thought'. His references to Collins' personality and their friendship would have pleased cabinet colleagues, who needed Collins, even in death, for the support his name would win. Mulcahy's finishing remarks glorified Collins as a Christ-like figure:

> We last looked at him in the City Hall and in the small church in St. Vincent's Hospital. And studying his face with an eager gaze, we found there the same old smile that met us always in our work. And seeing it there in the first dark hour of our blow, the mind could not help but travel back to the dark, storm-tossed sea of Galilee, and the frail bark tossed upon the waters there, and the strong, calm smile of the Great Sleeper in the stern of the boat …
>
> Men and Women of Ireland, we are all mariners on the deep, bound for a port still seen only through storm and spray, sailing still on a sea full of 'dangers and hardships and bitter toil.' But the Great Sleeper lies smiling in the stern of the boat, and we shall be filled with that spirit, which will walk bravely upon the waters.[23]

O'Higgins' assassination five years later rekindled memories of the conflict, highlighting the polarisation between the state and dissidents. His killers, Harry White, Archie Doyle and Bill Gannon, acted without official IRA sanction.[24] Cosgrave issued a communiqué:

> In this hour of national loss and … mourning, mindful of the steadfast and heroic figure who has been sacrificed, the Irish people will not falter.
>
> O'Higgins, in his dauntless courage and unflinching determination, has trodden the path blazed by Griffith and Collins even unto death. Another great defender of the Irish Nation has passed away.

> The Irish people may rest assured that the assassin's bullet will not succeed in terrorising this country. There are, and will be, men, enheartened by the noble example of the late Vice-President … ready to step into his place, and to maintain his high tradition of devotion to the welfare and safety of the nation.[25]

Responding to expressions of sympathy from France and America, Cosgrave wrote: 'Kevin O'Higgins has been struck down, but he has written "Forward" on his country's banner. His country will obey the call.'[26] Expressions of sympathy from British politician's wives to O'Higgins' widow appeared in the press. The wife of Leo Amery, Minister for the Dominions, denounced the 'mad act against your great and distinguished husband', while Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin's wife wrote:

> I wanted you to know that there are those over in England who admired your husband as a man and as a patriot, and for the work that he was doing to help to make his country happier. That he should have been the victim of a cowardly murder fills us with unspeakable horror.[27]

How personal correspondence could have ended up for public consumption without official connivance is uncertain. Nonetheless, it marked O'Higgins as an international figure and family man; that he was slain while going to church enhanced his posthumous reputation, and further vilified his assassins.

Cosgrave's graveside oration noted O'Higgins' inspirational and hard-working attributes,[28] but it was in the Dáil he paid his finest tribute:

> The crime … is grievous beyond words. We are bereft of a colleague loyal, steadfast, of rare ability; the nation is robbed of a statesman invaluable in council, of unswerving purpose, who knew not fear or weakness, a very exemplar of public virtue.
>
> This crime has not been committed by private individuals against Kevin O'Higgins. It is the political assassination of a pillar of the State … the fruit of the steady, persistent attack against the State and its fundamental institutions.[29]

Photographic reportage of Griffith's, Collins' and O'Higgins' funerals shows how they followed religious patterns and were stage-managed for propaganda. Funerary propaganda encompassed lying in state (Figures 4.1–4.3), cortège (Figures 4.4–4.6) and interment (Figures 4.7–4.9). The military guard at the lying in state of each indicates their importance to state security; O'Higgins, killed in peacetime, appears to have been the only one at which the guard did not bear long arms. Also, the presence of insignia on their collars and cut of their uniforms suggests that his detail comprised Gardaí – appropriate as his ministry encompassed justice. The troops flanking Griffith's coffin have rifles reversed in the formal drill position, *Ar Airm Aisiompaithe Lúig* (Rest on



Figure 4.1 Lying in state of Arthur Griffith
Source: Courtesy of the National Library of Ireland, Keogh Collection.



Figure 4.2 Lying in state of Michael Collins
Source: Courtesy of the National Library of Ireland, Independent Newspapers Collection.



Figure 4.3 Lying in state of Kevin O'Higgins
Source: Courtesy of the National Library of Ireland, Independent Newspapers Collection.

Arms Reversed). Although a candle obscures him, the position of the hands of the soldier to the right and rear of Collins' coffin seems identical to that of Griffith's guard of honour, and, almost certainly, he bore a rifle. The Civil War images suggest state willingness to use its army in a show of force to stamp out rebellion, and to gain popular acceptance from its association with Griffith and Collins. The image of the latter is rendered all the more poignant as it is his brother, Seán, who leans disconsolately across the coffin.

Figures 4.4–4.6 show crowds lining the funeral routes, with some men saluting or doffing hats as Griffith's cortège turns from City Hall onto Dublin's Parliament Street. The armed troops are again bearing arms reversed – the precision of their drill is subtle propaganda of discipline and purpose in the national army – while the first rank of mourners are clergy. Almost out of view, a horse-drawn carriage and motor car probably conveyed his family. Tricolours are visible on O'Higgins' and Collins' coffins, though the angle obscures Griffith's. In O'Higgins' cortège a priest, two monks and eleven altar boys were interposed between the hearse and a second vehicle, highlighting the faith of a politician assassinated on his way to church. The armed escort bears holstered side-arms; this, unlike his lying in state, was a military escort. The mode of conveying the deceased also offers strong propaganda. Griffith's and O'Higgins' remains were carried on horse-drawn hearses, as befitted statesmen. Collins' remains were carried on a gun limber and caisson, with a mounted artillery detail forming part of the escort. While



Figure 4.4 Cortège of Arthur Griffith
Source: Courtesy of the National Library of Ireland, Keogh Collection.



Figure 4.5 Cortège of Michael Collins
Source: Courtesy of the National Library of Ireland, Independent Newspapers Collection.



Figure 4.6 Cortège of Kevin O'Higgins
Source: Courtesy of the National Library of Ireland, Independent Newspapers Collection.



Figure 4.7 Interment of Arthur Griffith
Source: Courtesy of the National Library of Ireland, Keogh Collection.



Figure 4.8 Interment of Michael Collins
Source: Courtesy of the National Library of Ireland, Independent Newspapers Collection.

appropriate to his rank, it also propagandised that the state had quickly acquired a professional artillery corps; his funeral was as much a declaration of military might as it was mourning for the dead commander-in-chief. The crowd appears more still than for Griffith's cortège: there are no salutes from bystanders. This was, perhaps, a nation numbed with grief and fear of the cataclysm to come.

Figure 4.7 shows Griffith's coffin, draped in a tricolour, borne shoulder high in Glasnevin cemetery. Although Mulcahy delivered the oratory at Collins' burial (Figure 4.8, third from left) confirming him as his military successor, the *Irish Independent* photographed Cosgrave with speech-notes in hand, surrounded by troops and clerics, establishing him as Collins' *political* successor, and denoting an entente between state and church. At O'Higgins' burial (Figure 4.9), with the Civil War concluded, the *Irish Independent* photographed O'Higgins' uncle, Governor-General T. M. Healy, at the graveside. His presence suggests that the propaganda associated with O'Higgins' death could reflect on his reputation as a statesman, and the measure of independence the state had won. If Healy was present in a familial context, it is probable he would have stood with O'Higgins' widow and other family members. O'Higgins' was a less militaristic, more political funeral than those of Griffith and Collins, announcing an established nation in mourning rather than seeking to unite a nascent nation rent in civil war.



Figure 4.9 Interment of Kevin O'Higgins
Source: Courtesy of the National Library of Ireland, Independent Newspapers Collection.

Ulster funerary propaganda was quite similar in its pomp and propaganda. In 1937, Carson died, provoking scenes of public mourning in Belfast where his remains were brought from England on the destroyer HMS *Broke*. Pathé recorded the cortège, with a stirring voiceover that emphasised his legacy:

> To the young he is a symbol of loyalty victorious against long odds, but to the old who signed the Covenant with him, and who now watch him pass through the Belfast streets, he is the soldier, the statesman, the builder of modern Ulster. As the procession moves slowly … there are few signs of sorrow among the crowds. For of Carson can it be said as of few other men he died completely victorious.[30]

Craigavon was among the pallbearers and the Governor of Northern Ireland, Lord Abercorn, arrived at St Anne's Cathedral to represent the King. The narration and imagery leaves no doubt as to Carson's contribution to Northern Ireland. From the first scenes of the coffin on the destroyer's deck, to the naval and police guard of honour as the coffin, draped in a Union flag and carried on a gun-limber, is drawn through the streets, what is suggested is not merely his political legacy to the province, but his military one also. As Abercorn enters the cathedral, he passes floral tributes. Two are particularly striking, with the Red Hand motif of Ulster prominent. The cathedral excepted, there is no depiction of the religious symbolism or clerical participation prevalent in comparable Free State funerals, though the military and social motifs made it no less symbolic for unionists.

If Free State governments felt they shouldered the responsibility for directing a Catholic nation, they were fortunate that more joyful occasions than funerals presented propaganda opportunities: the 1929 centenary celebrations of Catholic Emancipation and the 1932 Eucharistic Congress were focal points of engagement with the church of the majority of the nation's citizens. Although not a state celebration, the emancipation ceremonies, organised by Archbishop Joseph McRory of Armagh, came at a fortunate time for Cosgrave's administration, keen to establish diplomatic ties with the Holy See, without forewarning the Irish Hierarchy. Both Cumann na nGaedheal and Fianna Fáil promoted themselves as the party of choice of Catholic voters, and bouts of pious one-upmanship were commonplace. Seán T O'Ceallaigh TD was among those in Fianna Fáil who averred that: 'We of the Fianna Fáil Party believe that we speak for the big body of Catholic opinion. I think I could say … we represent the big element of Catholicity.[31]

A list of donations for decorating Dublin during the Emancipation celebrations recorded five pounds from Fianna Fáil, and two guineas from Cosgrave. Donations from the departments of Education and Local Government totalled two guineas, while other politicians and the Governor-General gave £14 2s 0d.[32] Both parties had to propagandise the validity of their position regarding the Vatican. Fianna Fáil had the harder task: uninvolved in the state's contributions to the celebrations, and arguing, no matter how craftily,

against stronger Vatican ties contradicted its core values, although this was not unfavourable to the Hierarchy, loath to cede too much power to politicians.[33] Cumann na nGaedheal achieved more effective propaganda. It was not central to organising the week-long event, but state resources facilitated propaganda: the Garda Síochána provided policing and stewarding, the army and its bands were used for ceremonial purposes, the Post Office printed commemorative stamps, and 2RN broadcast events. Moreover, politicians were prominent participants in formal events. J. M. O'Sullivan, Minister for Education, gave an address in the Mansion House on St Patrick's Apostleship.[34] Canopy bearers for the Host (carried only by the island's four Archbishops) included O'Sullivan, Cosgrave, Michael Hayes TD (as Ceann Comhairle) and Senator Thomas Westropp-Bennett (Cathaoirleach of the Seanad). De Valera bore the canopy as Chancellor of the National University with academics, and would surely have preferred the propaganda of being among political adversaries.[35] The involvement of politicians and state bodies suggested that the instruments of the state were at the service of the nation, which performed admirably during the celebrations:

> The country's congratulations are due … not least – to itself. To have done a fine thing finely is … a tonic which strengthens the nation's confidence and self-respect. When we remember that only seven years ago lawlessness and disorder ran loose … the object-lesson in discipline, dignity and decorum which Dublin afforded yesterday must inspire every one of us with grateful and hopeful joy.[36]

But the nation was not just Catholic. Protestants, the *Irish Times* observed regretfully, were often disparaged, and denied their place in the nation:

> The culture of Irish Protestants is the more, not the less, Irish because it takes all culture for its province, and so follows the splendid tradition of those Irish missionaries who restored Christianity to Europe. In the breadth and sincerity of their aspirations for Ireland they yield nothing to the most patriotic of their Roman Catholic fellow-citizens. They glory in the Free State's proud position as a Dominion of the British Commonwealth. They pray for the time when Ireland will be a united country. They are thankful for every act of either Irish Government that promotes her peace, her welfare or her fame. Irish Protestants hope that the present celebrations will make not only a fulfilment, but … the beginning of a great reconciliation, the birth of a new fellowship.[37]

If, as it claimed, Protestants had 'watched the crowning rites of Centenary Week with no other feelings that those of sympathy and admiration',[38] then Cosgrave's administration had achieved an unexpected propaganda dividend.

Whether Cumann na nGaedheal or Fianna Fáil were the more ardent self-publicists mattered little to the church. Conspicuously, the Hierarchy's formal

statement of appreciation failed to thank Cosgrave's administration for providing state resources, but expressed gratitude to Dublin's poor for reverently bedecking their homes.[39] There were also statements that expressed a desire to maintain the Gaelic nation that had emerged before independence: Fr J. Clenaghan hailed the Gaelic League for recreating a 'sacred tongue' where every 'salutation was a blessing' and free from 'bad or godless literature'.[40] McRory made clear what was expected of the government: 'if there is a Parliament in Dublin today, it is due to the spirit of self-respect and patriotism and independence … nurtured and called forth by the Gaelic League'.[41] He admonished that 'in one part of the country Catholics were not yet enjoying their full fruits'[42] – a warning to politicians that their job of creating an independent Catholic nation remained unfulfilled. It also reminded Cosgrave's administration that only one power exercised authority on the entire island; the church made no secret that it was entirely displeased with Cumann na nGaedheal's machinations in Vatican diplomacy.

Promoting a Catholic nation continued three years later with the celebration of the Eucharistic Congress. Again, the state exercised little control over the organisation of the event. Responsibility for this lay with the Executive Council: in 1930, mindful of the precedent set by the Emancipation celebrations, it considered whether to issue a commemorative stamp, before concluding that as that had been a national celebration, rather than 'a religious event of international importance' as the Congress would be, it would be inappropriate to do so.[43] That was not entirely true, as 1932 was the sesquimillennial celebration of the arrival of the patron Saint Patrick and Christianity in AD 432, but it was, perhaps, a tactical withdrawal from engaging in politics with the bishops, after unsuccessful attempts to trump them in 1929. With Congress approaching, the Hierarchy was keen to ensure that the government's role would be no more prominent than needed. Frank O'Reilly, Director of Operations for the Congress, wrote to Walshe in early 1932:

> His Grace was very pleased to have the full co-operation of the Government in giving a suitable reception to the Cardinal Legate; but he instructed me to inform you … that he regarded himself as fully responsible for all arrangements, and he desires to get details of your proposals for his approval, before any instructions are issued.[44]

The state's dilatory response fostered this circumstance. Certainly, it was not until a month after this episcopal crozier-waving that the Executive Council appointed a sub-committee to oversee the state's involvement. By then, the Hierarchy had seized the initiative and the state faced the prospect of being marginalised at an event for which it was footing a significant part of the bill. Unhappy at the state's sloth, Walshe wrote to McGilligan in June informing him that following a meeting with O'Reilly and Fr Dan Moloney the organisers 'had not yet a proper appreciation of the part the State should take in the celebrations'. He suggested that the Papal Legate's arrival at Dun

Laoghaire and cavalcade to the Pro-Cathedral be in the hands of the state, and outlined seating plans for the cathedral that gave prominence to politicians: 'Ministers and Governor-General to be present in the Sanctuary or immediately outside it in front of the Bishops who occupy most of the benches'. Walshe planned that from Monday to Wednesday of Congress week the state be given due prominence:

> the position occupied by the State's representatives at the Congress Ceremonies should symbolize its true relation with the Church …
>
> A final decision … is immediately urgent, as … people connected with the Congress … would use any indecision now as a means of giving the State a minor place in the programme.[45]

Cumann na nGaedheal politicians were reluctant to put political wrangling before the Congress, but public perception of lavish expenditure during a recession also concerned the party. In 1931, Walshe wrote to Cosgrave at McGilligan's behest:

> Taking together with the general economic depression … and the religious atmosphere which should prevail during the Eucharistic Congress … it would be better to abstain from … ostentatious or elaborate entertainment. He therefore suggests that the only entertainment given by the Government should be an evening reception. This reception would take the place of the Government dinner on the evening after the Legate's arrival.[46]

The matter was raised at the Executive Council, and a response was communicated to the ministry: 'the Archbishop was desirous of having a garden party in the evening or afternoon of the opening day. If we confine ourselves to a single function, the choice or wishes of His Grace ought to get the most favourable hearing.'[47] Although Cosgrave was willing to defer to church requirements, the option of demurring could also have been a face-saver for the straitened state coffers.

Nonetheless, state spending on the Congress was generous. Some expenses, like refurbishing the state-owned Dublin Castle, had long-term value; a specially caparisoned troop of cavalry was a Fianna Fáil extravagance. Nobly, but naively, Cosgrave had called an early general election before the Congress to dispense with the unpleasantness of campaigning and concentrate on the occasion itself: he lost, and handed the reins to power to a Fianna Fáil party only too pleased to accept every propaganda boost the Congress would bring. De Valera requested a 'report on the advisability and cost of providing Dress uniform for the Cavalry troops who are to act as the escort of the Legate'.[48] Defence estimated £1,850, and de Valera authorised expenditure up to £2,000, with uniforms to be chosen by himself and Frank Aiken for the Blue Hussars.[49] The *Irish Times* described the uniforms: 'the Congress colours – bright blue tunics and breeches with gold facings, and gold plumes nodding from

their helmets'.[50] With the cavalry's visual impact and a cruciform military fly-over, Cardinal Lorenzo Lauri's arrival in Dublin was an impressive set-piece, described by Pathé as 'Pomp & pageantry & remarkable demonstrations of enthusiasm'.[51] Lauri's army escort was to convey him to the Pro-Cathedral for a service, after which it was intended:

> the mounted escort will accompany the Legate to his residence, and … to the State reception at the Royal Dublin Society. A Guard of Honour composed of … infantry and trumpeters will … pay compliments outside the building, and No. 1 Army Band will … play the Papal Hymn upon the entry of the Legate.[52]

The No. 1 Army Band was under Brase's stewardship, and although the mooted RDS reception was foregone for one in Dublin Castle, the cost of mobilising cavalry, air, infantry and band units was money well spent for Fianna Fáil. The army's propaganda use was extended to providing a guard of honour on the high altar during the celebratory mass in Phoenix Park.[53] The publicity created the impression of a force loyal to the nation, irrespective of parliamentary leader, and continued Cumann na nGaedheal policy of publicly using the army for nation-building propaganda.

Plans for using the RDS for the state reception were dropped once the Office of Public Works estimated preparatory costs of £4,000.[54] Dublin Castle, though needing £3,700 of remedial work and decoration, was a better investment.[55] It was state-owned and provided more salubrious surroundings than the largely agricultural settings of the Ballsbridge venue for the 3,715 guests, for whom catering costing £575 4s 6d. was provided. Though it was a significant sum, the reception publicised the state's participation in the celebrations: invitations were 'confined to distinguished foreign guests … and to representatives of all groups and sections in Ireland.'[56] Ordinary Irish people might well have been exhorted to join in public celebrations and worship, but Cumann na nGaedheal and Fianna Fáil had definite views on who among the people were the best exemplars of a Catholic nation. The *Irish Times* noted the 'Brilliant scene in Dublin Castle at night' and called it and the Blackrock College Garden Party, attended by 20,000 guests, 'two of the greatest social functions connected with Eucharistic Congress'.[57] The celebrations concluded with an open-air mass in Dublin's Phoenix Park, attended by 1 million people (for whom accommodation and transport had to be provided – a challenge the young state met), with a live broadcast of John McCormack singing 'Panis Angelicus'. 'For a moment', Brown writes, 'Dublin must have seemed the centre of Christendom and Ireland truly a part of a world-wide community'.[58] The efficiency and pomp of the celebration may even have quietly impressed the unionist political elite north of the border – a rare constituency indeed for Free State propaganda.[59] Moreover, the promotion of a Catholic nation by Catholic politicians showed that the people and their representatives were as one, and esteemed by the Holy See.

But it was de Valera who triumphed most: it was one of his most enduring triumphs as he led his once-estranged party back into the receiving embrace of Catholic orthodoxy.[60]

III The Tailteann Games

Our race had clung to the ideal of a distinctive place in the family of ancient peoples

Dating from pre-Christian Ireland, and last held in 1169, the year of the Norman invasion that presaged British rule, the Tailteann Games were a quadrennial festival of athleticism and culture. Restored from 1924 to 1932 as a celebration of the state's sporting, literary and creative endeavours, they idealised the modern nation in a propagandised reincarnation of its noble Celtic past. They were a showcase for a country united peacefully under stable, patriotic governments, who wooed tourists and investors, mainly from the diaspora. Though first mooted in 1922, the Civil War prevented the first Games being held until 1924. J. J. Walsh, the Games' impassioned promoter, considered them national property, and battled with government colleagues for state support. With ownership invested in the nation, transparency mattered to Walsh: 'The public are our shareholders and are entitled to every information.'[61] The purity of this sentiment was, however, frequently tested.

Staging the games was an onerous task when national sporting infrastructure offered no venue capable of hosting the myriad sporting and cultural events, many staged simultaneously. Croke Park, home to the Gaelic Athletic Association, was a shrine of Irish nationalism, and, as the scene of the 1920 Bloody Sunday massacre when British paramilitary police killed fourteen spectators and players at a Gaelic football match, was a patriotic choice. Though it hosted hurling, football, and track and field events, its suitability was never comprehensively assessed: it lacked, for instance, adequate capacity for spectators. Mulcahy advised Cosgrave that Croke Park was unsuitable for athletics and alleged that Walsh and the festival's organisers knew this.[62] But it seems other venues were not considered. Whether nearby Dalymount Park or Landsdowne Road were suitable is moot, though both hosted international soccer and rugby matches respectively. Perhaps un-Irish sports were incompatible with the festival, but that charge could equally have been levelled at the Royal Dublin Society grounds, the spiritual home of equestrianism with a most un-republican prefix, which hosted cultural activities. Walsh's GAA ties offer a clue. An erstwhile chairman of the Cork County Committee of the GAA, the opportunity to render service to the association in return for a venue may have proven decisive. That service extended to securing £10,000 in state grants for constructing stands at the ground.[63] Such largesse concerned Finance, who recommended that the grant be partially converted to a loan.[64] Walsh countered that all money for promoting the games, and all profits, were government property and subject to Finance's audit.[65] Disingenuously

ignoring the grant, he claimed the venue was given free of charge for the games. His casual explanation occasioned scrutiny, but no action, from the Committee of Public Accounts.[66] Croke Park appears to have been chosen without regard to the public purse and sporting requirements. Conceivably patriotism, GAA connections and the ground's propaganda value justified selection.

Lobbying government colleagues helped Walsh sidestep Finance's misgivings. De Valera, however, was an opponent whose motives were subject to vacillation and political posturing as he moved from support in 1922 through hostility to obstruction by the late 1930s. In 1924, he languished in prison. Fearing a Sinn Féin boycott would impair volunteer service for the games, and precipitate calamitous propaganda, Walsh pleaded with Cosgrave for an amnesty for republican prisoners. If he thought he could mollify republicans, he was wrong: their sentiment was not easily bought. On his release, de Valera issued a pamphlet promoting a boycott as the games had been an initiative of his Republican government. A critical *Irish Times* wondered what national purpose his boycott served, and criticised him for 'cutting an undignified figure'.[67]

Out of government until 1932, de Valera could mount nothing other than symbolic opposition, but his popularity necessitated strong counter-propaganda. Cosgrave's presidential message to the 1924 Games struck an appropriately positive propaganda tone on the theme of the nation:

> a nation was a people working out the whole scheme of civilisation and developing it in its own way, on its own lines, freely and not under external constraint, and consequently maintaining and fostering all that is good in its own traditions.

He presented the games as the continuation of a cycle, begun in the late nineteenth century, that inspired language and sporting revivals, political organisations and campaigns. Together, they 'were real culture movements, the beginnings of an all-round national regeneration'.[68] The *Irish Independent* hoped that the games would build the national reputation:

> We are reputed to be at once a sporting and a hospitable people. We have now the opportunity of proving our claim to both qualities, and it is to be hoped that we shall do so. For years the outside world has heard little of Ireland except reports of armed conflict and tales of bitter political dissension. It is time we ceased to have our daily lives and our social intercourse darkened by the shadows of these dissensions. The gun and the bomb have, we hope, definitely passed out of our lives; let us in the weeks that are coming prove we have more regard for the sports field than for the political platform.[69]

Poet, novelist and Senator Oliver St John Gogarty's paean to the games extolled the virtue of pushing the body to sporting extremes: 'Great athletes', he wrote 'are the best proof of a nation's well-being and good health'.[70]

Support from Irish America had helped nudge the games towards this point. In 1923, the Games Commissioner in the USA, F. O'Hanlon, recorded that the GAA, the Ancient Order of Hibernians and the Knights of Columbanus had offered assistance. The Friends of Irish Freedom, the Irish Republic Party and the Drama Guild of the Oranges (300 leading Irishmen outside New York) were supportive, though less enthusiastically. However, the press was keen to promote the venture:

> The Editor of the Gaelic American, Mr John Devoy, the Editor of the Irish World, Mr Lawler, and the Sporting Editor of the Irish Advocate, Mr O'Shea, all assured me personally of their desire to co-operate … I got in touch with New York's leading sporting writers and cartoonists … I feel fully assured that whenever publicity is required it will be forthcoming in the required quantity and … quality. I am enclosing some few cuttings to show that we have not been neglected in the way of publicity – but my judgment has, so far, been absolutely against any 'publicity drive'. My intention was … to set up … a really efficient machine to deal with the work we have on hand. That we are succeeding is evident from the attention the Press is now beginning to pay us. The Publicity Drive will come in good time.[71]

Murray Hulbert, acting Mayor of New York, was the US Chairman of the Games, while E. L. Doheny, President of Mexican Petroleum Co., was Treasurer and Chairman of the Finance Committee. O'Hanlon's positive findings were confirmed by David Burke, Commissioner to North America, who found interest in several US cities in supporting and sending athletes to the games.[72]

American athletes took the games seriously, although their greatest participation came when the games coincided with the Olympics being held in Europe. A review of newspaper articles for the three Games reveals that the greater portion of foreign competitors were American, English, Scottish, Canadian and Australian. Confining the sporting contests to native sports like Gaelic football, hurling and handball would discommode international athletes, so the organisers pragmatically bridged eclecticism and nationalist sensibilities, allowing 'all national games, and those that do not conflict with such'.[73] Cricket, rugby and association football, relics of British rule, and scorned as the preserve of southern unionists, were snubbed. Soccer's soubriquet, 'the garrison game', alluded to its origins as a British army favourite and propagandised its un-Irish tendencies.

The government intended to have the GPO, headquarters of the 1916 insurrectionists, restored in time for the 1928 games.[74] Such propaganda could unite the nation in commemorating the Rising and War of Independence and conveniently overlook subsequent internecine strife. The *Irish Independent* praised the organisers' resolve in sending a clarion call to the Irish nation abroad.[75] The newspaper grandiloquently suggested that the

organisers had identified an Irish identity that transcended differences within the post-bellum nation. Those sentiments were hardly plucked from thin air, given Walsh's belief that reviving the games 'was proof of the tenacity with which our race had clung to the ideal of a distinctive place in the family of ancient peoples' while he hoped they would bring 'glory to our Irish civilisation' and reaffirm distinctive culture internationally.[76] By 1932, the Easter Rising was once again appropriated for state propaganda with an exhibition held to coincide with the festival.[77]

The performance of a pageant, 'The Coming of Fionn', which interwove hurling and the story of the founding of the legendary band of warriors, the Fianna, boosted the cultural propaganda that Walsh desired.[78] In 1932, the centrepiece pageant depicted Queen Tailte, after whom the games were named, attended by warriors, bards, Brehons (Celtic judges) and druids.[79] Lest the evocation of paganism temporarily upset the nation's Catholic identity, the ceremony was officially opened by Cardinal McRory, deftly linking two dominant themes in Irish nationality. McRory praised the 'noble … patriotic thing that the Organising Committee are doing … in reviving the games of our forefathers. They will quicken our national pride … and they bring together the scattered millions of the Gaels'.[80]

Promoting arts and culture, W. B. Yeats, Lennox Robinson and George Russell formed the 1924 adjudication panel for literary endeavour by writers resident in Ireland; George Bernard Shaw, senators Andrew Jameson, Alice Stopford Green, and Gogarty subscribed money towards prizes. Gogarty, fresh from success at the Paris Olympics where his 'Ode on the Tailteann Games' took first place in the literary section,[81] won a prize for verse. When Stephen McKenna's translation of Plotinus won the non-fiction prize, the committee offered an unconvincing apologia for not having selected a more Irish work, but claimed that more worthy books fell outside their purview.[82] The 1932 awards included two winners with well-established republican credentials: Francis Carty won second place in fiction for his novel *The Irish Volunteer*, while, incongruously, in the same category Frank Gallagher won a special award for his hunger-strike memoir, *Days of Fear*. Under his pseudonym of David Hogan, Gallagher also won first place for his short story 'The Challenge of the Sentry'.[83]

The renowned tenor John McCormack performed and adjudicated at the inaugural festival, which included a bewildering array of bands, choirs, and soloists in military, civilian and traditional categories.[84] The *Irish Independent* drew attention to the performance of Irish operas: Sir Charles Villiers Stanford's *Shamus O'Brien*, Harold White's *Shaun the Post* and Molyneux Palmer's *Sruth na Maoile*. While opera contrasts with the perception of folk music being the bedrock of a cultural musical tradition, the nation also encompassed the esoteric, and opera propagated a veneer of high culture. Klein identifies at least nine other Celtic operas by Irish or Irish-based composers between 1903 and 1930, with one, *The Tinker and the Fairy*, being a collaboration between Dublin-based Italian composer Michele Esposito and

Douglas Hyde as librettist.[85] The choice of Sir John Lavery as adjudicator gave a sense of gravitas to the inaugural art competition. No national style of art emerged during the Free State period,[86] and it may be that the propaganda value lay in exhibiting 1,597 artefacts, including craft items, rather than defining a particular national style. The award of the supreme prize, the Tailteann Trophy, to Seán Keating, and other awards to Margaret Clarke and Power O'Malley, and out-of-competition exhibitions by Lavery himself, Paul Henry, Charles Lamb, Dermod O'Brien and Mainie Jellet, ensured that the public was left in no doubt as to the abundant talent in Irish art. Much the same group of artists dominated the 1928 exhibition, with Clarke and Keating again winning prizes.[87]

By 1932, chauvinism threatened the games as competitors were required to have Irish citizenship or ancestry. That had not previously been mandatory,[88] and had proven a source of discontent.[89] The move to genuinely Irish heritage, while limiting the games' competitive appeal, was in line with the organisers' original intentions, and was congruent with attempts to build international support for the Irish nation. For all the positive feeling demonstrated by politicians, the church and the press, the 1932 games failed to capture public imagination in sufficient numbers to break even. The standard of domestic sports, contemporary reports suggest, was below international competition, and top-class international athletes were needed to boost the games. Carefully constructed propaganda of a sporting nation did not bear on-field scrutiny. Some high profile competitors, notably Pat O'Callaghan, Olympic hammer gold medallist, raised the profile of Irish athletes, but the prospect of being roundly beaten by American and British athletes must have struck at Fianna Fáil's jingoism. There was, too, the nature of the sports themselves, which were not purely Celtic: golf, billiards, motor car racing, a rodeo exhibition in Croke Park in 1924,[90] and a Basque handball team in 1932, whose visit was reportedly propaganda promoting the region's quest for independence.[91]

De Valera, his dislike of the festival held in abeyance for political benefit, capitalised on 1932's disappointing results. Ever attuned to public opinion – he threw in the ball for a match between Irish hurlers and Scottish shinty players[92] – he slowly starved the festival of support. His administration's response to requests by the festival organisers for meetings and funding met with prevarication and obfuscation, until, eventually, an interdepartmental committee recommended postponement until 1941. The committee offered a higher grant than was sought, conditional on a government directorship, which the committee knew would be unacceptable.[93] Why he opposed the Games is unclear. Perhaps it was that, having been party to the initial suggestion, he viewed his subsequent marginalisation and the festival's early successes through a state of permanent pique. That Free State athletes would be defeated by overseas athletes with no Irish blood would have caused embarrassment. Worse, though, was the uneasy realisation that the popular events were foreign sports – motor racing particularly – and the Games, tied

to Dublin, lacked the verve to reinvent themselves every four years.[94] Perhaps it was simply that de Valera did not need the propaganda boost of the Games. He had attained power, won the support of the church, and could look forward confidently to building the nation he wanted.

IV Promoting identity in Ulster

A provincialism and obscurantism that are almost unthinkable

National identity in Ulster meant a unionist identity. The government there created a state that reflected the superiority of loyal citizens over subversive nationalists. It was thus, overwhelmingly loyal and Protestant. McDonagh, musing on the nature of people and place for unionists, concluded both referred to Protestant Ulster. Nomenclature for this place – Ulster or Northern Ireland – was unsatisfactory, but, as he dryly commented, 'One cannot very well write Protestant Supremacy upon a map'.[95] To maintain unionist dominance, political machinations removed nationalists from the political spectrum, first marginalising their representatives in Stormont and second through the twin methods of introducing a proportional representation electoral system (though Hennessy suggests this was intended to prevent Labour and Independent Unionists challenging Craig's party)[96] and gerrymandering constituencies to maximise unionist representation. All in all, the 'political system and local government, law and public order, industry and jobs, were so arranged and operated as to ensure an overwhelming predominance of power, pride, prospects and power for the Protestant community'.[97] The result was not only official disenfranchising of nationalists, but their self-disenfranchisement as they shunned the political system. For unionists, it created convenient propaganda: that nationalists did not contribute was public proof of disloyalty. There were, of course, exceptions, including 32-county unionists of moderate disposition, who regarded tolerance between the two traditions as the cornerstone of reconciliation. The poet W. R. Rodgers, a Presbyterian minister, was fondly called 'the Catholic Presbyterian' in some quarters,[98] while Fitzpatrick's biography of Frederick MacNeice, father of the poet Louis, delicately juxtaposes the complexities of this Protestant churchman, loyal Orangeman, protofeminist and ecumenist who not only denounced sectarian violence against his Catholic countrymen, but roused Protestantism to their defence.[99]

In both jurisdictions, propaganda against perceived threats to the nation was often effected through official channels. The case of the Irish language is a useful illustration. In the Free State, compulsory Irish in schools was promoted obsessively by language enthusiasts to halt the spread of Anglicisation. In the North, Craig was attacked in Stormont for withdrawing just £1,500 budgeted for teaching Irish in schools. Twelve thousand children were learning Irish in Northern schools, and a decision to treat Irish as a foreign language showed 'a provincialism and obscurantism that are almost unthinkable'.[100] Craig retaliated:

> What use is it to us here in this progressive, busy part of the Empire to teach our children the Irish language? What use would it be to them? Is it not leading them along a road which has no practical value? We have not stopped such teaching; we have stopped the grants … because we do not see that these boys being taught Irish would be any better citizens.[101]

The northern nation was predicated on remembrance: of their forefather's plantation from Scotland by Elizabeth; of the 1641 rebellion, aided by Rome; of the 1690 Battle of the Boyne, symbolic victory of Protestant over Catholic; and of the sacrifice of the 36th Ulster Division at the Somme. To the northern mind, these were practically current affairs. (Rodgers crisply versified Ulstermen's inability to relinquish the past: 'dogging/The fled horse of Irish history and the Boyne'.)[102] McIntosh notes the historical writing that made the past vivid for unionists, and created the stereotypical Ulsterman, suspicious of northern culture as a breeding ground for nationalist ideas.[103] Propaganda for provincial and political identity was a necessity if Ulster was to survive. As the Free State embraced Catholicism, so Ulster embraced Protestantism; as the south looked to pre-Norman times for historical legitimacy, so the north looked to glories under British rule. Commemoration and parades, especially those associated with the Orange Order, were a potent way of publicising the requirements of citizenship of Ulster: respect for tradition, belief in the unionist hegemony and, above all, loyalty.

V Conclusion

For all that their policies and political outlooks differed, the similarities between the nation-building propaganda of Cumann na nGaedheal and Fianna Fáil were remarkably similar. Both took as their central theme the creation of a Catholic nation, imbued with a strong sense of Celtic tradition and mythology. Cumann na nGaedheal laid the foundations for the recreation of a national, solidarity-inducing identity in the aftermath of the civil war. For the party, promoting the nation was inextricably linked to building a virtuous, religious and sporting society; from such attributes an industrious, law-abiding, democratic citizenry would evolve and its merits would be recognised at home and abroad. Philosophically it was not dissimilar to Grierson's and Tallents' propagation of the Everyman in British society, where propaganda was 'an empowering, educative agent which increases citizens' knowledge and decision-making capacity in a democracy', though in practice it was more akin to the American experience which took advantage of 'the susceptibility of the common people to the "herd instinct"'.[104] For Fianna Fáil much of the preparatory work in nation-building had been achieved and the party could concentrate on propaganda that ostensibly promoted the nation, but promulgated a vision of a nation fused with party doctrine.

Irish Catholics clung to their faith as a means of distinguishing themselves from Britain. In two decades of turmoil, faith was their only constant. But

just as it sustained, so too did it allow their conscious manipulation by the political and ecclesiastical elite. Propaganda to create an Irish nation succeeded in promoting a Catholic, Celtic and Gaelic nation. In this, it echoes Ellul's thoughts on propaganda's effectiveness as a collective of sociological presuppositions and social myths. The communal experience of public worship, either in mourning or celebration, integrated the nation far more effectively, it may be argued, than did war-time agitprop against Britain. It was sociological, too, in that it played on habits and customs, and the rituals of religion. In looking to the past for inspiration, and creating Christ-like figures of martyrdom, politicians of the Free State perpetuated a mythology to define the nation. Regrettably, that left Protestants, socialists and liberals adrift in the nation, as state legislation and policy fostered social conservatism, and a narrow interpretation of identity that would resonate with the herd.[105] While it did much to achieve a peaceful country, it nonetheless created an inflexible and conservative cultural homeostasis.

Notes

1 Lyons, *Ireland since the famine*, p. 67.
2 Oliver MacDonagh, *States of mind. A study of Anglo–Irish conflict, 1780–1980* (London, 1983), p. 18
3 Ibid., p. 17. Emphasis in the original.
4 Patrick O'Mahony and Gerard Delanty, *Rethinking Irish history. Nationalism, identity and ideology* (Basingstoke, 2001), pp. 133–4.
5 Tom Garvan, *1922:Tthe birth of Irish democracy* (Dublin, 1996), p. 191.
6 Ibid., pp. 148–9.
7 *Irish Times*, 28 September, 1917, p. 3.
8 Ibid., 23 March, 1920, p. 5.
9 Ibid., 28 October, 1920, p. 5.
10 Ibid., 3 November, 1920, p. 5.
11 Ibid., 5 August, 1922, p. 6.
12 Gabriel Doherty and Gabriel Keogh, '"Sorrow but no despair – the road is marked." The politics of funerals in post-1916 Ireland' in Gabriel Doherty and Gabriel Keogh (eds) *Michael Collins and the making of the Irish Free State* (Cork, 2006), p. 191.
13 David Fitzpatrick, *Harry Boland's Irish revolution* (Cork, 2003), pp. 324–5.
14 *Irish Times*, 16 July, 1927, p. 5.
15 Ibid., 18 July, 1927, p. 5.
16 Ibid., 14 August, 1922, p. 5.
17 Ibid., p. 5.
18 Ibid., 17 August, 1922, p. 5.
19 Ibid., 24 August, 1922, p. 5.
20 Ibid., p. 5.
21 Ibid. *Slieve-na-mon* was an armoured car.
22 Ibid., 29 August, 1922, p. 5.
23 Ibid., p. 6.
24 Terence de Vere White, *Kevin O'Higgins* (Dublin, 1986), p. 256.
25 *Irish Times*, 11 July, 1927, p. 7.
26 Ibid., 16 July, 1927, p. 5.
27 Ibid., 13 July, 1927, p. 7.

28 Ibid., 14 July, 1927, p. 7.
29 DÉ, 12 July, 1927, vol. 20, col. 757.
30 BP, Film 859.04.
31 DÉ, 5 June, 1929, vol. 30, col. 820–1.
32 *Irish Independent*, 1 June, 1929, p. 7.
33 Dermot Keogh, *The Vatican, the bishops and Irish politics 1919–39* (Cambridge, 1986), p. 144.
34 *Irish Times*, 19 June, 1929, p. 8.
35 Ibid., 15 June, 1929, p. 9.
36 Ibid., 24 June, 1929, p. 8.
37 Ibid., 22 June, 1929, p. 6.
38 Ibid., 24 June, 1929, p. 8.
39 *Irish Indepe*ndent, 26 June, 1929, p. 7.
40 *Irish Times*, 22 June, 1929, p. 5.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 NAI, D/Taoiseach, TSCH/3/S6005/4, 7 July, 1930.
44 NAI, D/Foreign Affairs, DFA/2/34/43c, 13 January, 1932.
45 NAI, D/Foreign Affairs, DFA/2/34/43j, 16 June, 1932.
46 NAI, D/Taoiseach, TSCH/3/S6005/6, 19 September, 1931.
47 Ibid., undated.
48 NAI, D/Taoiseach, TSCH/3/S6005/5, 6 April, 1932.
49 Ibid., 18 April, 1932.
50 *Irish Times*, 25 June, 1932, p. 2.
51 BP, Film 679.03.
52 NAI, D/Foreign Affairs, DFA/2/34/43b, 19 January, 1932.
53 BP, Film 679.19.
54 NAI, D/Foreign Affairs, DFA/2/34/43b, 5 February, 1932.
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61 NAI, D/Finance, S200/0002/28, 23 April, 1929.
62 NAI, D/Taoiseach, TSCH/3/S1592, 2 March, 1924.
63 NAI, D/Finance, FIN/1/293 undated.
64 NAI, D/Finance, FIN/1/741, 14 July, 1922.
65 Ibid., 17 July, 1922.
66 Ibid., 12 June, 1924.
67 *Irish Times*, 9 August, 1924, p. 1.
68 NAI D/Taoiseach, TSCH/3/S1592, undated.
69 *Irish Independent*, 31 July, 1924, p. 6.
70 *Irish Times*, 1 August, 1924, p. 6.
71 NAI D/Taoiseach, TSCH/3/S1592, 8 November, 1923.
72 Irish Times, 2 July, 1924, p. 4.
73 NAI, D/Finance, S200/0002/28, 19 December, 1927.
74 *Irish Independent*, 12 July, 1928, p. 10.
75 Ibid., 27 August, 1928, p. 6.
76 Ibid., 13 August, 1928, p. 8.
77 *Irish Times*, 22 June, 1922, p. 15.

78 Ibid., 18 August, 1928, p. 13.
79 Ibid., 24 June, 1932, p. 4.
80 Ibid., 30 June, 1932, p. 7.
81 Ibid., 2 July, 1924, p. 5.
82 *Irish Independent*, 11 August, 1924, p. 4.
83 *Irish Times*, 1 July 1932, p. 8.
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85 Axel Klein, 'Celtic legends in Irish opera, 1900–1930' in *Proceedings of the Harvard Celtic Colloquium*, xxiv/xxv (2004/2005), pp. 40–53.
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87 *Irish Times*, 6 August, 1928, p. 4.
88 Ibid, p. 6.
89 *Irish Independent*, 21 August, 1928, p. 10.
90 Ibid., 9 July, 1924, p. 7.
91 Ibid., 24 June, 1932, p. 4.
92 Ibid., 30 June 1932, p. 7. Now done by the referee, starting a game was often an honour for a cleric or public figure.
93 NAI, D/Taoiseach, TSCH/3/S8369, undated.
94 Cronin, Mike, 'Projecting the nation through sport and culture: Ireland, Aonach Tailteann and the Irish Free State, 1924–32' in *Journal of Contemporary History*, xxxviii (3) (2003), pp. 395–411. See pp. 410–11.
95 MacDonagh, *States of mind*, pp. 26–7.
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97 MacDonagh, *States of mind*, p. 138.
98 Michael Longley (ed.), *W. R. Rodgers: Poems* (Oldcastle, Co. Meath, 1993), p. 13.
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100 SP, 24 March, 1936, vol. 18, col. 640.
101 Ibid., col. 645–6.
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5 Securing the state through propaganda

I Introduction

Limited independence won, proving that the new regime had the vision and administrative nous to ensure the success of the state became essential. It was also basic governance, and propaganda demands necessitated that examples of good governance be used to stabilise the state. In this, the state's activities call to mind Lamme and Russell's assertion that propaganda serves to establish legitimacy for a venture. But humdrum intricacies of administrative procedures, no matter how essential, failed to excite the press to paeans of praise, and the preference of civil servants to commit themselves to the tenebrous margins of unseen power ensured that the service was never exploitable for propaganda purposes. Instead, images and artefacts had a role to play in building the state. The development of new coinage and the adoption of a national anthem and flag provided citizens with commercial and social embodiments of the state. First, however, the state itself had to be secured. The descent into internecine conflict, and the enduring animosity it engendered, forced Cumann na nGaedheal to create machinery of state that was coercive, yet, paradoxically, protective. A volunteer army existed, yet it was an amateurish ragbag: some troops had military service, many did not. It was also a split force with loyalties cleaved into pro- and anti-Treaty factions. Three police forces existed: the maligned RIC and Dublin Metropolitan Police, and, where the writ of crown law had yielded to insurrectionists, the Irish Republican Police. This chapter shows that propaganda for state security was crucial in building a functioning democracy and creating a peaceful state, cast in the image of the nation. An exploration of propaganda for the defence forces and An Garda Síochána indicates the importance that successive governments attached to security and defence.

II From war to peace: propaganda and the army

Every soldier in his brave and arduous task should be inspired by a vision of the new Ireland

The Civil War army of 50,000 troops was promoted as an instrument of the state, bound to secure its peace and deserving public support. Troops were idealised as courageous, loyal, Christian exemplars. But this masked painful realities: army propaganda was vigorously censorious, and frequently dishonest. Prosecuting the war led to accusations of brutality, most notoriously in County Kerry, where twenty-five anti-Treaty prisoners were slain in two incidents: the army claimed they died clearing mines, but a sole survivor gave the lie to official accounts.[1] Among civilians the army won a 'lamentable reputation' for commandeering more than its basic requirements.[2] Criminality, petty and serious, dogged it from war to peace. Contemporary newspapers reveal a litany of court proceedings against serving or former troops, whose service record enlivened court reports: betting fraud,[3] possession of narcotics[4] and a beating given by troops to a comrade caught molesting a young girl[5] typified general indiscipline.

When a national venereal disease pandemic, which claimed around 915 lives from 1918 to 1922,[6] threatened the army, medicine treated: propaganda prevented. The army's new medical service[7] deployed 800 personnel for weekly troop inspections.[8] Barrack disinfection posts which might put 'wrong ideas into the men's heads, and might even tend to encourage promiscuous sexual intercourse'[9] were eschewed in favour of treatment centres in Dublin, which halved patient numbers by 1925.[10] Officers and chaplains lectured troops on promiscuity's moral and physical dangers.[11] In the Curragh Camp, one of the army's principal garrisons, films accompanied lectures on the 'diseases more or less common in every army'.[12] Infected troops were treated sympathetically, recorded as suffering unspecified illnesses requiring specialist attention and returned to their units, rehabilitated.[13] Of course, secrecy also prevented unwanted publicity – the moral disinfectant that might have purged the ranks.

Lester's Civil War propaganda strategy was informed by studying the Bolsheviks and Spartacists: when harshly suppressed, revolutions failed; but festering disaffection toppled governments. After overthrowing Nicholas II, Russian revolutionaries had popular support, and controlled the treasury, army and press. But dissent fomented, and the minority Bolsheviks' propaganda secured four buttresses on gaining power: armed forces, a secret service, a nationwide political organisation, and a monopoly on producing propaganda. Their use of newspapers, journals, films, posters, and propaganda trains 'painted with symbolical figures and legends' which stopped periodically so expert propagandists could explain Communism impressed Lester.[14] In contrast, the Spartacists were beaten using military tactics and 'an intense, continuous and well-sustained flood of propaganda was poured prodigally all over the country … from posters, newspapers, leaflets to the

cinema. All the hoardings … the Government could command were covered with Government propaganda'.[15] Lester suffered no perturbation that the government 'worked up alleged atrocities on the part of the Spartacus (These were subsequently discovered to be either much exaggerated or wholly untrue)'.[16]

Nonetheless he was keen to obtain factual sources. Army Intelligence, unconcerned with propaganda, often ignored useful information and he advised Mulcahy that copies of intelligence documents 'could be reviewed by Publicity staff'.[17] Thereafter, military intelligence contributed handsomely to state propaganda.[18] Meanwhile, Collins suggested that documents captured with Sean T. O'Ceallaigh would discommode republicans if 'written up in the proper way'.[19] Similarly, the Publicity Department suggested that captured documents from republican propagandist Aodh de Blacam be leaked to smear him as a London-born shirker whose Anglo-Irish war service intimated self-preservation over courage;[20] de Valera was proclaimed the greatest prophet for making real his prophecies of civil war;[21] 'Irregulars', the state's official nomenclature for IRA anti-Treaty forces[22] were accused of hypocrisy and double standards. Erskine Childers' trial saw him:

> recognising the King when it seemed necessary whilst … he proclaimed that the only authority he recognised was the 'Government of the Republic'. Again, we find it solemnly put forward that there was not war, and yet that Mr Childers had been taken as a prisoner of war![23]

Censorship tested military capabilities, even though it was in the capable hands of Piaras Béaslaí, the army's Publicity Director with the rank of Commandant-General, and newsman and propagandist of note.[24] Béaslaí's censorship regime was notable for its general lightness of hand towards the press, with only stories concerning the army, the war or the political situation receiving full scrutiny, and then with the admonition that censors were not to rewrite material. As a quid pro quo, the press received copies of all official communiqués issued by the army's general command.[25] Lester was blamed for inadvertently misinforming the *Irish Independent* that censorship had ended,[26] but even by October 1923, errors abounded: in several commands, intelligence officers required newspapers to submit material for approval. The Director of Intelligence knew this was incorrect, but asked Mulcahy 'exactly how the matter of Press Censorship in Ireland stands at the moment'.[27] Partly, the difficulty lay in an unorthodox chain of command, with Béaslaí reporting through a civilian (Lester) to a political figurehead in FitzGerald.

The Publicity Department coerced newspapers into describing republicans as Irregulars. It criticised the *Sunday Independent* for condemning neither Collins' death, nor those responsible:

> There is no suggestion that the Irregulars are doing all they can to … destroy the motherland and to murder the best sons of the Irish National

> [Army], and soft talk … is calculated to leave the reader to believe that the Irregulars are only harmless playboys.[28]

Other propaganda damned Irregular destruction of communications systems, vandalism by prisoners, and assassinations as work of 'slaves who are too weak to recognise that their chains have been removed'.[29] General Eoin O'Duffy sarcastically lauded Irregulars' heroism in cutting telegraph wires or damaging railway tracks and bridges, actions that merely stalled their defeat, and alienated public support.[30] Such propaganda spread abroad, and MacWhite wrote from Geneva that the army was seen as:

> most praiseworthy by those who are qualified to speak on military matters. On the contrary, the rank and file of the Irregulars are held to be no better than bandits and brigands whereas their leaders are looked upon … as very bad losers who are led from one stupidity to another by their exaggerated ideas of their own importance.[31]

The army had its own journal, *An t-Óglach*, on sale to the public. In November 1922, it swiftly claimed Collins' legacy, and underlined the army's role in state-building. Its duty was:

> to leave the road clear for the great work of national reconstruction which Ireland desires. Every soldier in his brave and arduous task should be inspired by a vision of the new Ireland which we seek to build up – that Gaelic state which will express the highest ideals of our race in concrete form.[32]

Towards the end of the Civil War, Béaslaí, whose connection to the journal went back to its foundation in 1918,[33] recommended employing 'two capable men of journalistic experience' or freelancers to describe 'the wonderful work being done by the Army'. If the work was sufficiently good he could 'get the daily Press to quote it freely'.[34] J. A. Power, formerly of the *Irish Times* and the *Freeman's Journal*, was temporarily appointed in a civilian capacity to reorganise the journal.[35]

With the conflict's end, demobilisation beckoned. When some senior officers claimed republican ideals, decried the treatment of veterans, resigned, or stole weapons, the force's carefully constructed image was jeopardised as mutiny rumbled, and prospects of a coup d'état were ominously real.[36] Mulcahy bombarded the press with statements decrying 'outrageous departure from the spirit of the Army' by just two officers.[37] With Cosgrave ill, restoring order was left to O'Higgins, the hard man of the Executive, who spun the crisis as a misunderstanding caused by mishandled demobilisation orders, a disingenuous but audacious legerdemain. Political ranks closed against the mutineers; Labour supported the government, and Senator J. T. O'Farrell reminded mutineers 'that the Army was the servant, not the master, of the civil power'.[38] Official surefootedness ensured that the army never again threatened state security.

But events like the army mutiny coloured public perception of the peacetime army, and showed how quickly positive propaganda dissipated. *An t-Óglach* claimed that:

> When decayed and disgruntled politicians, and amateur journalists of the muckraking breed find the commonsense of the people elbowing them out of the limelight … the happy thought occurs to them: 'Let's throw a brick at the Army' … Soldiers … suffer … outrageous vilifiers in silence; they are forbidden … to take up the cudgels in the Press, even in their own defence.[39]

It called for propaganda to end civilian cavilling: 'For any business or service to flourish in this publicity age it must not only be useful to society, but prove its usefulness.'[40] The journal complained that the army was known for ceremonial duties, or mentions in Dáil debates, and quoted an American officer, Major A. G. Rudd, defining military publicity: 'a perfectly legitimate statement of facts concerning the army's work and mission provided by history and statistics and intended to disabuse the minds of those holding false beliefs of our service'. If army publicity was to succeed 'a number of our comrades throughout the country will have to considerably alter their viewpoint in this matter – or be made to alter it.'[41] Captain W. J. Brennan Whitmore (a future editor of *An t-Óglach*) proposed a new publication, the *Army Review*, which by:

> a judicious fostering of friendly journalists … should be encouraged with a view to giving the public more light on the work the Army have to do, without featuring the Army for propaganda purposes in the same way that Organisations such as the G.A.A. are featured.[42]

Power, now a captain, retained his newspaperman's acumen and rejected his colleague's worthy but dull proposals.[43]

A letter to an unidentified newspaper suggested that, as defence required quick mobilisation, the army should build roads for the common good. *An t-Óglach* took umbrage that war veterans 'shall degenerate into uniformed labourers, with their officers occupying the proud position of gangers'.[44] The *Irish Times* advocated that military pilots quit for civil aviation positions, a call that reduced the service to little more than a flight school.[45] Worse than being regarded as cheap labour, or a preparatory school for private enterprise, were arguments of dispensability. No Commonwealth country had more troops per capita. Michael Heffernan TD cited Canada's 8.78 million citizens served by 3,500 troops, and a reserve and militia of c.123,000.[46] A gendarmerie could have maintained security, but the army preserved sovereignty, and, by averring descent from the Irish Volunteers, prevented the IRA usurping this legitimisation.[47] The force was indispensable because it was an instrument of the state, as *An t-Óglach*, quoting General Hans von Seeckt, asserted: 'The army … is a striking embodiment of national unity and becomes one of the

strongest ties in the structure of the state … The army … emphasises the duty of the individual to subordinate himself to the whole, to the state'.[48]

Social events normalised perceptions of the army. General Séan MacEoin's wedding was a display of military strength at the height of the Civil War. Forming a guard of honour, his North Longford flying column, clad evocatively in their War of Independence trench coat uniform, legitimised the army as successors of the nation's liberators. An army band, buglers, infantry and artillery, symbolising a modern force, also attended. Griffith and Collins were among the guests, and O'Duffy was best man.[49] *An t-Óglach* carried frequent articles on military nuptials, featuring the marriage of Major General Dan Hogan to Elizabeth O'Flynn in 1924, with O'Duffy again best man,[50] and of Chief of Staff, Major General Peadar MacMahon to Annie Parkinson, daughter of celebrated racehorse trainer J. J. Parkinson.[51] The army's importance to the state's social fabric transcended military events. In a letter to *An t-Óglach*, the pseudonymous Seadna (Sidney) advocated engagement with civilians in sporting and social functions, and using the press for publicity.[52]

When Mulcahy created the Army School of Music in 1922[53] the *Irish Times* lauded his vision, and the work of Dr J. F. Larchet which would produce 'native bandmasters and native bands … a military asset and a source of pleasure and refinement to our people'. The army had secured the services of Wilhelm Brase, a prominent German bandmaster.[54] It was under the baton of Colonel 'Brassy', a quickly-acquired soubriquet, that army bands excelled. *An t-Óglach* praised the No. 1 Army Band: 'lingering remnants of the West British garrison may still sigh for the English soldier musicians, but, from the musical point of view, nobody any longer possesses the shadow of an excuse for lamenting the departure of the British bands'.[55] The *Irish Times* praised the band's classical performances,[56] and bands of the regional army commands played an important role in parades, commemorations and military tattoos in the centennial Catholic Emancipation celebrations (1929) and the Eucharistic Congress (1932). During Dublin Civic Week (1927) a military tattoo was the centrepiece of a performance including four brass and two pipe bands as a prelude to a feu de joie, and a performance of hymns by a 300-strong choir and the massed army bands under Brase's baton. With pageants, figure marching and mass drill, it was a massive undertaking.[57] The *Irish Times* enthused about the 1929 tattoo:

> In physique and bearing, in smartness and discipline, the troops … need not fear comparison with … any army of Europe. Furthermore … they are conscious of Dublin's regard, and that … will strengthen their esprit de corps and their sense of duty to the State.[58]

Although they cost £25,000–£30,000 annually, the Minister for Defence claimed the bands had done more to normalise the country than any other service.[59]

In contrast to glamorous celebrations, the militarism of Easter and St Patrick's Day parades, with the rare sight of military vehicles and aeroplanes,

conveyed state resoluteness to domestic enemies. In 1924 manoeuvres in Dublin's Phoenix Park, the Air Corps demonstrated formation and stunt flying, before a tactical manoeuvre of infantry, artillery, cavalry and air units.[60] Manoeuvres near Fermoy in 1925 disappointed one journalist (an antipathy to mud coloured his report)[61] but Pathé filmed manoeuvres in Wicklow later that month.[62] Peter Hughes TD, Minister for Defence, encouraged 1,400 troops at the 1926 Wolfe Tone commemoration to hold Wolfe Tone as their role model.[63] In 1928 as 1,200 troops paraded and the Air Corps provided a fly-over, Fitz-Gerald declared that the army expected values 'so radiant in Tone – love of country, willing and unfaltering service, discipline and courage, generosity and magnanimity'.[64] Although no republic had been won, the army linked the state to a formative republican tradition of the 1790s. By 1933, the commemoration had become a Fianna Fáil pilgrimage, with the army a supporting act to the new regime.[65]

The national language offered other propaganda opportunities. Mulcahy advocated an Irish-speaking battalion,[66] but army efforts bespoke the tokenism and linguistic bigotry that hindered a national revival. One Irish-speaking battalion in a force of 5,000 was hardly ardent revivalism, and by 1925 the battalion was already under-strength. Colonel Patrick O'Connor acknowledged that troops concealing their linguistic ability and the ill-disposition of some officers to the language, hindered recruiting the 300 troops the battalion needed.[67] Nonetheless, language propaganda continued. *An t-Óglach* welcomed increased use of Irish, boasting implausibly of the 'thousands of Gaelic speakers in the Army'.[68] It published an English–Irish glossary of useful words with a pronunciation key, and occasional Irish articles. Pedantry hampered efforts to expand the glossary, with a prohibition on publishing military terms until they had been definitively decided,[69] but the Army Council decreed that the first decoration to be conferred on troops was an emblem signifying the wearer's fluency in Irish.[70] By the 1930s, however, efforts to nurture Irish in the army had failed. With limited resources and casual attitudes to the language the army could not satisfy language zealots, and pretence at linguistic patriotism dissipated.

Enthusiastic endorsement of physical sports – Gaelic games, boxing, athletics and show-jumping – propagated idealised Celtic virility and sportsmanship. Chauvinistically, the Army Athletics Association confined troops to Irish games, specifically excluding soccer, rugby, cricket and hockey,[71] and in 1927 banned all sports proscribed by the GAA, prohibiting any player of those games from competing in championships of native sports.[72] Allowing middle-class officers to continue playing golf and tennis suggests a degree of unsporting jingoism directed at English games.[73] Golf, surprisingly, provided particularly useful propaganda: in 1924, the army defeated a press team in a challenge at the Hermitage.[74]

Inter-command competitions ensured many troops boxed, while ranking tournaments enhanced elite boxers' reputations, many of whom, as national champions, generated invaluable publicity. The army formed the backbone of

the 1924 Olympic boxing squad, when Sergeant Paddy Dwyer was denied a morale-boosting bronze as injury meant he forfeited a medal box-off. Appointing Scottish boxer Tancy Lee, a former British champion and Lonsdale belt winner, as civilian instructor indicates how seriously boxing was taken. Fitzpatrick's examination of a British army team visiting Ireland offers a tantalising view of how the army had matured. The ranking British officer, Captain Noel Chamberlain, praised their hosts for a warm welcome[75] and Pathé filmed both teams training.[76] The Irish army, including two national champions, lost the first challenge 4–3, but an army–Garda team reversed the score two days later for an honourable draw.[77] Chamberlain estimated over 3,000 attended, indicating that propaganda showing the state could trade blows on equal terms with its old foe had captured the public imagination.

Transcending class and politics, equestrianism was integral to the state's social infrastructure, and gave the army a discerning propaganda audience. Army showjumpers excelled internationally with a combination of prowess and Irish bloodstock, and the appointment of a Russian cavalry officer, Colonel Paul Rodzianko, as chief instructor.[78] A former Russian international showjumper, Rodzianko's command 'transformed … average riders to … the most successful international jumping team in the world in the 1930s'.[79] His successor, Major J. G. O'Dwyer, initiated a policy of only competing for prestigious international titles, reasoning that 'the Nations Cup, the Puissance and the big speed competitions get press coverage in many countries. Apart from prestige value, such press coverage should create a wider market for Irish horses.'[80] O'Dwyer's prescience paid off handsomely: while Pathé could record only the team's jump-off loss to France in the Aga Khan Trophy at the Royal Dublin Horse Show in 1929,[81] and third-place finish in 1931[82] in 1930, it was Switzerland, on Irish mounts, who won the trophy.[83] The Swiss responded to the state's congratulations that their cavalry units and 90 per cent of army officers rode Irish horses, facts External Affairs quickly publicised.[84] In a fillip to the domestic breeding industry, the team frequently turned down rivals eager to purchase their mounts.[85] The propaganda value of competing worked, and in 1932 the state agreed to ask its diplomatic missions to get information on international sports newspapers to assist the Blood Stock Breeders Association in their international sales efforts.[86]

For Fianna Fáil, party and state were indelibly linked, and the army was an extension of its own expression of political power. In 1932 the party faced the same challenge as Cumann na nGaedheal in 1922: would the army be loyal to parliament? The army had been purged of pro-Fianna Fáil republicans, so de Valera appointed Frank Aiken TD, the IRA's last Civil War Chief of Staff, as defence minister. It was a masterstroke: Aiken's soldiery was beyond doubt. Séan McEntee TD claimed harmonious relations existed between the government and army: 'So far as the Army was concerned the Government wished that every citizen would regard it as a truly national Army … to be cherished … proud of, honoured and sustained'.[87] However, Fianna Fáil paraded the army at party functions, trying to legitimise the

party with the public. Thomas O'Higgins TD accused Aiken of treating the army as a plaything:

> It was customary … that the President … or the Minister for Defence, or somebody representing them, would take the salute … but it was … beyond normal expectations to have Army units hurled helter-skelter all over the country … to pay tributes to members of a political party …[88]

Aiken's credible reply suggested that troops saluting politicians were saluting the people's government.

Restructuring the army reserve (General Reserve Classes A and B, a Dublin and Cork Volunteer Reserve, and a university-based Officer Training Corps) into a Fianna Fáil force, controlled by party supporters, was cunning propaganda. While O'Duffy's short-lived fascistic Army Comrades Association (ACA) provided paramilitary protection to Cumann na nGaedheal, Fianna Fáil recruited reservists, ostensibly against foreign aggression. Nine new reserve regiments, totalling 22,000 troops, would have their own history, marching song and, enhancing ties between the regiments and their communities, local volunteer administration. Dominated by Fianna Fáil, these local committees created partisan civilian control. Lemass saw value in providing alternatives to young men who might otherwise be tempted to subversion.[89] Yet the recruits included those who had taken up arms against the state, a concern to FitzGerald,[90] while Cosgrave believed that the reserve clandestinely rehabilitated republicans within the state's military structure.[91] Concerns, like the reserve, were short-lived: after a flurry of publicity, interest waned and it never achieved prominence.

III Propaganda and policing

As you are the guardians of the nation's peace be also the guardians of her honour

Policing in Ireland began with the Peace Preservation Act, 1814. Inside a decade, four provincial constabularies became a paramilitary Irish Constabulary engaged in quelling various strands of civil unrest: agrarian criminality directed at landlords; the 1830s tithe war when Catholics protested their obligation to financially support the Protestant church; the campaign to revoke the 1801 Act of Union; and the 1848 Young Ireland rebellion. It was the Constabulary's achievement in defeating the 1867 Fenian Rising that earned the prefix 'Royal' and the right to incorporate the Order of St Patrick's motif in its insignia.[92] The success of the RIC and its sister metropolitan police forces lay in its pervasive presence. By 1900, over 10,000 officers carried out routine policing duties and intelligence gathering for the administration[93] in about 1,600 barracks countrywide. The force reflected religious demographics, with about three quarters of its members Catholic and the

remainder Protestant. As separatism grew, the force was increasingly viewed by nationalists as a symbol of oppression. The Easter Rising, suppressed by 16,000 troops and 1,000 police, inspired further insurrection: after a period of low-key challenges to police authority, sporadic violence against the RIC increased, and the War of Independence broke out in 1919 when two officers were killed in an IRA raid on a gelignite convoy.

This conflict led to the RIC's demise. The IRA, having begun a campaign of assassinating policemen,[94] deployed well-armed guerrilla units to attack rural barracks. As the RIC retreated to larger towns, it was supplanted with the Irish Republican Police (IRP). Reluctant to commit troops lest it legitimise the insurrection, Britain recruited a new police force of 7,000 demobilised soldiers. Nicknamed the Black and Tans after their mixed police and army uniforms, the force gained a reputation for violence. Embarrassed, Britain recruited former army officers to form the Auxiliary Division to the RIC. Hopes that its 6,000 members' officer training would lead to better conduct were dashed as it, too, engaged in reprehensible actions that lost the propaganda war in Ireland, America and, crucially, in Britain.[95] The RIC played little part in these actions, but bore the brunt of republican assaults: the IRA killed almost twice as many police as British troops. The force was also subjected to intimidation and boycotts from the communities it policed.[96] While many members deplored the brutality of the new forces, by the time the war ended the RIC's reputation was irreparably damaged.

The Free State disbanded the RIC, but had no viable replacement. The IRP was badly trained and, lacking the IRA's cachet, attracted neither efficient nor committed recruits. A new force was needed, even as the state slid towards civil war. A parliamentary motion that the new force be named An Garda Síochána crystallised the force's function as an arm of the state at the service of the people.[97] O'Higgins stated his vision of the relationship between force and state in the Dáil, hoping that citizens would see 'these men are their officials and their servants, out simply to uphold the laws … made here by the people's representatives'.[98] It was always intended that the force be separated from politics. Membership of political organisations was prohibited because the force had to serve both government and state, without influencing the legislative process. Whether this included social and cultural organisations exercised parliament, and O'Higgins clarified the Dáil's intent 'to exclude members of the police force from joining political organisations or secret societies'.[99] O'Duffy, the force's first Commissioner, took impartiality as a prerequisite. Addressing Gardaí before despatching them to serve in polling stations during the 1923 general election, he advised: 'political opinions held by the various parties with whom you come in contact are not your concern. Your duty is clearly defined. Be, in the truest sense, servants of the people.'[100] O'Higgins was similarly outspoken, reminding the Dáil that Gardaí pledged service and obedience to the state, its constitution and government.[101]

Reinforcing Garda neutrality was important as the regime's political opponents, mainly Fianna Fáil, launched verbal attacks under Dáil privilege.

O'Higgins' party colleague, James Fitzgerald-Kenney TD, chastised Fianna Fáil for remarks which were 'another attack in the vituperative campaign … against this fine, well-ordered, well-disciplined, thoroughly efficient force'.[102] When Richard Anthony TD rose to pay tribute to Gardaí who had 'justified themselves before the public',[103] Fianna Fáil's P. J. Ruttledge TD, a future Justice minister, churlishly declined to follow suit.[104] In government, Fianna Fáil viewed the Garda mistrustfully and unfairly as Cumann na nGaedheal collaborators, and undermined the force in the 1930s in a show of tacit approval for the IRA.[105] In 1933, de Valera launched an offensive against the force, unceremoniously replacing O'Duffy with Ned Broy. Under Broy, the force hired seventy-nine new Special Branch Gardaí, mainly Fianna Fáil supporters, as a counterweight to the ACA. From 1933 to 1935, 570 recruits, overwhelmingly Fianna Fáil supporters, enlisted.[106] For Fianna Fáil, having supporters in influential positions, putting party before state, was essential to its own propaganda. But despite provocation, the Garda remained loyal to the state, standing firm against O'Duffy's fascism and an IRA emboldened by Fianna Fáil tolerance.

The Garda achieved internal propaganda through a series of journals, *Iris an Ghárda, Guth an Gharda* and the *Garda Review*. By 1929, the *Review* had 6,000 subscribers, the force's approximate strength.[107] The journals conveyed O'Duffy's idealised vision of the force – courageous, Christian, sporting, teetotal – and were a vehicle for the flamboyant, publicity-seeking Commissioner. Many issues contained photographs of O'Duffy, who felt it necessary to arrange publication of letters complimentary to the force addressed to him, and, superfluous save for self-promotion, his replies. [108] Frequent articles praising O'Duffy convey an impression that the journal existed for his aggrandisement and not the Garda's. That would be a pity, as the propaganda value of its articles, including tales of courageous performance of duty, and sporting, religious and cultural achievements, was incalculable.

Iris an Ghárda sought to ground the force in communities. 'The Civic Guard', O'Duffy said, 'have driven roots in the country, and people are cooperating with them'.[109] Articles by Gardaí were hyperbolic, even sentimental. A letter to the journal from Garda E. C. Millard was redrafted as an article exhorting Gardaí to realise that force had the 'power to put that happy smile back upon the faces of the people, by restoring order, making for the security of life and property, and … helping to restore confidence and hope in all the land'.[110] An article about 'Séan', an everyman Garda, read:

> Fellow Guards, Séan lives among you. His past may have been your own. As you are the Guardians of the Nation's Peace be also the Guardians of her Honour. You've routed England's soldiers; rout also her civilisation and her language. You have taught the generations to come how to die for Ireland; teach them now how ti [sic] live for Ireland.[111]

More calculating was propaganda surrounding murdered Gardaí. The force was unarmed, distinguishing it from the RIC. That was as much propaganda

as policy, giving Gardaí moral authority as defenders of the state, though during the Civil War republicans ruthlessly capitalised on their defencelessness, with seventy-nine attacks on barracks or patrols between November 1922 and March 1923.[112] O'Duffy created martyrs of murdered Gardaí to stiffen the force's resolve.[113] By 1931, ten funerals had provided propaganda opportunities. *Iris an Ghárda* editorialised the 1923 death of Sergeant Seamus Woods:

> are not the Garda Siothchana [sic] drawn from the foremost ranks of those sons of Ireland who risked their lives to free the land of their birth? Are the Gardaí not drawn from the people … and, as a contemporary writes … 'to molest them even in the smallest way is to commit an act against the civic spirit which it should be the pride of every Irishman to uphold.'[114]

The journal editorialised the 1924 death of Garda Patrick Halloran, shot by bank robbers; at his funeral O'Duffy, playing to the gallery during the oration, said Gardaí could be armed, if the people willed it.[115] The *Garda Review* editorialised the death of Superintendant Séan Curtin: 'the tenth time the hand of the cowardly assassin has fallen heavily upon the Garda'.[116] It reported his funeral, paraphrasing the officiating priest who sermonised that those who disobeyed the civil authority committed mortal sin.[117]

When O'Duffy met Colonel Walter Scott at a 1923 police conference in New York, the latter donated $1,000 to establish a fund for medals honouring Garda valour. Acts of heroism alleviated the gloom of posthumous commemoration, and Scott travelled to Ireland to present the first medal to Garda James Mulroy in 1924, at a ceremony attended by 4,000 guests. To maximise publicity, awards were made at the Commissioner's garden party at Garda headquarters, until de Valera discontinued the party; later presentations were made publicly at headquarters.[118] Presenting medals in 1930, Fitzgerald-Kenney lionised Gardaí for their courage, vigilance, and readiness 'to perform the highest act of Christian charity'.[119] The 1933 presentation was conducted by a less effusive Ruttledge and was overshadowed by questions of Garda loyalty to the Fianna Fáil government, less than a year in office. Ruttledge attempted to ease the tensions: 'Governments might come and Governments might go, but the Civic Guards would always remain loyal servants of the people and the Government asked nothing more of them.'[120] As the decade progressed and Garda loyalty to the state was assured, the ceremonies became celebratory once more.

The force was 98 per cent Catholic, despite Protestants forming 8 per cent of the population.[121] Clerics nationwide welcomed it, boosting approval from an occasionally hostile populace.[122] Establishing the force as Catholic began quickly. In 1923, the Garda Chaplain consecrated the Sacred Heart in a ceremony at headquarters, with O'Duffy assisting. Barracks nationwide replicated the ceremony.[123] *Iris an Ghárda* celebrated Garda–Church

relations, which would 'invest the Civic Guard with a new character in the eyes of the people … inspire … confidence in their own police force, and … give satisfaction and hope for Ireland's future to Catholics throughout the world'.[124] The establishment of a Pioneer Total Abstinence Association branch strengthened Catholic credentials. Pioneers wore a religious Sacred Heart pin (one of only two non-regulation emblems Gardaí could wear), pledged abstinence from alcohol and recited a daily prayer. By 1924, 1,000 Gardaí were pioneers, with more pledging temporary abstinence.[125] Garda action against illicit stills popularised the force[126] and elevated policing to a moral crusade. A cartoon in *Iris an Ghárda* depicted a poitín-maker arrested in the act of distilling. 'A Study in "Still" Life' suggests even informal reminders reinforced the Garda's moral obligations.[127] The reorganisation of the St Joseph's Young Priests Society (disbanded with the RIC) funded the seminary studies of policemen's sons.[128] Encouraged by O'Duffy, hundreds of Gardaí used their annual leave for self-financed pilgrimages, with 250 Gardaí accompanying him to Rome and a papal audience in 1928.[129] In 1930, the *Irish Independent* praised a Garda pilgrimage to Lourdes for its 'scenes of great rejoicing and devotion' – despite a midnight arrival, they were welcomed by the Bishop of Lourdes.[130] Celebrations for the centenary celebration of Catholic Emancipation and the 1932 Eucharistic Congress in Dublin saw the force demonstrate piety through participation and policing. O'Duffy revelled in his role as Chief Marshall on both occasions and, after the Congress, linked Garda conduct to the exhibition of faith they had policed. He told them: 'My own responsibility was a big one, and I would not have dreamed of acting in such a capacity were I not alive to the fact that I would have Gardaí behind me.'[131] It was, occasionally, unclear who benefitted most from the propaganda of piety.

A pretence was maintained that the Garda was an Irish-speaking force. *Iris an Ghárda* claimed that the Fáinne, a pin denoting fluency in Irish, was, alongside the Pioneer pin, as familiar as a sergeant's stripes.[132] O'Duffy, no native speaker, claimed in a letter to the *Irish Independent*, that 266 Gardaí wore the Fáinne, while over 3,000 had fair proficiency.[133] Critics rebutted his figures, with one correspondent to the newspaper claiming that Gardaí routinely concealed their bilingualism, even in the Gaeltachtaí.[134] Undeterred, O'Duffy ordered the purchase of a two-year Irish course on gramophone records using state funds and contributions from Gardaí.[135] Although learning Irish was a voluntary endeavour, compulsion was unavoidable as Irish was included in training. But there were difficulties in establishing an Irish-speaking force: many native-speaking recruits were unable to read or write Irish, and, while many Gardaí spoke Irish socially, at official level English was preferred. Moreover, once Gardaí learned that bilingualism guaranteed a transfer to a Gaeltacht along the impoverished western seaboard, proficiency rates declined.[136] As O'Duffy's dream of bilingualism faded, his paternalistic exhortations and calls on national pride became threats that Gardaí not bilingual by 1938 faced dismissal.[137] Yet it seemed that the measured approach

might be best. The *Garda Review* commenced a glossary of policing phrases in English and Irish.[138] Broy took a pragmatic approach, designating some divisions as Irish-speaking[139] and ordering a pay increase for Gaeltacht service: the Government Information Bureau announced that Gardaí would be paid in recognition of their service to the state in making Irish the working language of their division.[140] How successful this was is moot, and, as the 1930s unfolded, it was clear that official propaganda of the Garda's Irish-language capacity was showing signs of distortion.

Sport required no such untruths. Sporting endeavour was expected of Gardaí, and many excelled in the Tailteann Games and in club and county championships in Gaelic games. Participation promoted a sporting elite, making Gardaí accessible to citizens as spectators, or fellow contestants. Sport also helped O'Duffy bask in the reflected glory of Garda athletes. The first Garda sports festival, *Aonach an Gharda*, was held at Landsdowne Road stadium in 1926. Attended by a sizeable crowd, it was filmed by British Pathé.[141] The company frequently filmed Garda sports, generally Gaelic games and track and field, with prominence given to sports requiring physical strength such as the discus, tug-of-war and 35-pound over-bar throw. Garda boxers at headquarters were practically semi-professional, with less onerous duties than their peers.[142] Film footage of the boxers training shows high levels of fitness and technique,[143] as does their competitive record, with thirteen international team contests, two European police titles, fifteen national competitions and two Amateur Boxing Association championships won in the force's first decade.[144] While great feats were not expected of all Gardaí, they were expected to participate in sport for the benefits it brought their duties. *Iris an Gharda* exhorted that the sporting Guard would be 'a healthy and vigorous Guard, fit for duty in sunshine or in storm; he will participate in that indescribable pleasure … reserved for men who take part in the games of the Gael'.[145] The heyday for Garda sports, however, passed with the Free State. An ageing force, whose members had new, familial responsibilities, was unable to maintain the successes that helped promote it and win acceptance from citizens.

That the Garda was accepted by the nation, even amidst the conflagration of civil war and lingering enmities, was remarkable. More remarkable still, it was achieved with little more than a truncheon and a moral mandate. Cumann na nGaedheal created an image of the state with which citizens could identify, and institutions like the Garda were to the fore in this mix of propaganda and state-building. In the Garda, the state had an institution that saw itself as the state's defender against lawlessness and, even, godlessness. It demonstrated loyalty to the state, irrespective of the ruling party. Propagandising the Garda propagandised the state, and both were presented to the nation as exemplars to be admired and obeyed. Key attributes were propagated: civic-mindedness combined with a sense of duty and loyalty to the state; a sporting, healthy way of living; and the espousal of a Catholic, Celtic and Gaelic identity, however artificial it was. Seven years of war, with a death

toll approaching 7,500, gave the state bloody origins; An Garda Síochána, propagandised to win popular support, helped bring stability to the state, proving itself the guardian of the nation's peace, and her honour.

IV Selling symbols of state

Silent ambassadors of national taste

Repainting red, crown-embossed post-boxes green was imperfect camouflage, unsuitable for weightier symbols like a national currency, flag, anthem, official seals, postage stamps and more. Nationalist imagery displayed tricolours, mythical bestiary, shamrocks and round towers, but universally popular symbols were impossible to realise, with the national anthem a case in point. Written around 1907, 'Amhrán na bhFiann' was, until 1916, an innocuous Irish Volunteers' song, with the added complication that pro- and anti-Free Staters used it propagandistically. Alternatives were tainted by association with other political entities: the Irish Parliamentary Party had appropriated 'A Nation Once Again', and the King would never hear nationalists chorusing his divine safeguarding. Though Cumann na nGaedheal needed to promulgate national identity, it failed to legislate for an anthem, perhaps hoping that 'Amhrán na bhFiann' would be adopted by acclaim. Lester saw an anthem as 'a psychological factor of importance … at home and as one of the declarations of nationhood when used abroad'.[146] He suggested persuading institutions such as the Royal Irish Academy to request an official competition, or that eminent poets be asked to rewrite lyrics for 'Let Erin Remember', melodically stirring, but lyrically revelling in the misery of betrayal and subjugation. Cognisant that the nation's greatest poets included resolute Anglophones, he conceded 'a satisfactory translation into Irish' might suffice.[147]

Two years later, after Smiddy contacted External Affairs for sheet music and lyrics, Lester queried the anthem's status and was informed that 'Amhrán na bhFiann' was to be used domestically and abroad.[148] Coincidentally, eight days later, Osmond asked Cosgrave to confirm the anthem, but the Ceann Comhairle, Michael Hayes TD, declared the matter outside presidential competency.[149] The matter drifted until 1932, when a presidential memorandum stated that the government had informally adopted the music of the song for domestic use on 27 May, 1924, and for overseas use on 12 July, 1926, deemed the formal date of adoption, though this 'was not gazetted nor otherwise formally promulgated … It was simply put into effect'.[150] Informal adoption allowed Cumann na nGaedheal prise loose republicanism's grip on the song. Had it proven unpopular, or – worse – subversive, an alternative could have been adopted. Such surreptitious propaganda was less effective than Fianna Fáil's purchase of the song's copyright and swift adoption of an anthem they had long professed to admire. Nonetheless, Fianna Fáil hesitated to promote the anthem: twice O'Deirg, as Education Minister, rejected proposals to have it taught in schools.[151] A myth emerged that Fianna Fáil

changed the opening lyric to 'sinne fianna fáil', but Liam O'Rinn's translation of the original English lyrics predated the party. Despite Irish being the state's first language, there is no official Irish version.[152]

The insurrectionary tricolour of green, white and orange, symbolising a truce between republicanism and unionism, became the official flag. The Free State constitution, however, contained no reference to it, and Cosgrave rejected Osmond's calls to legislate for the flag, claiming establishment by usage.[153] Perhaps, like the anthem, the state preferred popular acceptance. Sport's partisan nature, exacerbated by partition, rendered this unrealistic. Ulster opposition to participating under the tricolour at the 1928 Olympics was particularly vehement. Many sports bodies enjoyed an all-island basis under the aegis of the Irish Olympic Council, which had registered the tricolour for the games. Northern sports administrators suggested St Patrick's flag (a gold harp on a blue background) as a compromise. The official IOC response, articulated by its president, J. J. Keane, attempted to sidestep politics: 'We see no reason why … a flag should make any difference to a man who wins for his country'.[154]

As the flag became an international matter, it was wise of governments to tiptoe around the issue, especially as sport, despite Keane's protestations, was politicised. The unfortunately named W. Cheater from Belfast, claimed that those 'he represented regarded the Free State Emblem as a rebel flag; and, of course, the Free State might regard the Union Jack as a rebel flag'.[155] His Ulster colleagues rejected the explanation that as the tricolour was registered with the League of Nations no other flag could be used. Oddly, the tricolour was not always the chosen flag for international sports events. In 1931, Thomas Mullins TD upbraided McGilligan over international matches 'where a foreign flag and a foreign anthem are used when a team claiming to represent Ireland takes part'.[156] This was a typical attack, with his Fianna Fáil antennae finely tuned to take umbrage at the slightest provocation. It suggests that, having adopted the tricolour because of its symbolism, and lodged it with the League of Nations, Cumann na nGaedheal was unwise not to publicise its adoption. However, in office, Fianna Fáil, too, were slow to propagandise the flag: a letter to the *Irish Independent* called on O'Deirg to raise its prominence in schools.[157] O'Deirg declined, and the flag's status meandered until it was enshrined in the 1937 Constitution.

Few propaganda symbols are as pervasive as those adopted by the masses for their own benefit, and issuing new coinage to communicate wealth was good propaganda for Cumann na nGaedheal. While the state would profit from the issue, a boon to hard-pressed public coffers, the decision was political rather than economic. Blythe claimed it would 'establish a separate and distinctive token coinage for the Saorstát. … we should have here a coinage distinctively our own, bearing the devices of this country'.[158] He was adamant that appropriate designs be adopted, and appointed an artistic committee chaired by W. B. Yeats (who observed that 'official designs of the Government, especially … postage stamps and coinage, may be described … as the

silent ambassadors of national taste'[159]) to oversee the selection, under strict conditions. Inscriptions were to be in Irish; most, if not all, denominations were to feature a harp; and representations of contemporary personages were forbidden.[160] Yeats' stewardship lent gravitas and cultural distinction. The committee canvassed the Royal Irish Academy, Royal Hibernian Academy and the Royal Society of Antiquaries of Ireland for suggestions,[161] before embarking on a design competition won by Yorkshire sculptor Percy Metcalfe, whose coins depicted native animals.

To stimulate interest, mounted collectors sets were sold[162] and nationwide exhibitions were planned, though a photographic booklet was abandoned.[163] The coins were launched in November, 1928, with Blythe hailing them as an indication of sovereignty proving the state's independence.[164] Negative reaction to the coins withered the positive publicity. In the Dáil Blythe was asked whether farmyard designs were suitable for the modern Gaelic state, and whether Christian symbols were preferable to the bucolic 'travesty on our country'.[165] The populace united in dismay: religious groups, concerned citizens, cultural nationalists, outraged republicans and unionists took offence. Yet the design held propaganda value: uniquely among the dominions, a national symbol replaced the king's head. The harp recalled Brian Boru, High King and vanquisher of the Vikings. The salmon, bull and wolfhound (florin, shilling and sixpence) featured in Celtic mythology. Other animals reflected agriculture's economic importance (horse, hen and pig, on the half-crown, penny and half-penny), or native fauna (hare and woodcock on the three-pence and farthing) and the *Irish Times* endorsed the collection wholeheartedly.[166] The inscription 'Saorstát Éireann' not 'Irish Free State' on the obverse further publicised the coins' national credentials.

V Ulster

Northern Irish symbols were a mixture of Celtic, Protestant, British and provincial motifs, often variously combined. Unionist symbols incorporated religious and historical themes, and Freemason-inspired Orange Order motifs.[167] After partition, 'God Save the King' remained the anthem while the same coinage and notes circulated among unionists and nationalists. Even the new Royal Ulster Constabulary retained the RIC badge of harp, shamrock and crown. Ulster had a readymade flag in the Union flag, a powerful symbol of Unionist identity representing enduring loyalty to the Empire.[168] A sizeable nationalist minority, preferring the tricolour, was excluded from that identity. The union flag had increased in popularity since the 1880s: unionists bedecked the Ulster Hall with it during the 1906 general election campaign[169] and Pathé footage depicts Protestant clergymen blessing the flag at a presentation of colours in 1916.[170] Retaining it as the provincial flag distinguished between loyal and disloyal. The flag flew on public buildings on days associated with the monarchy or Empire, and was not an administrative provocation to nationalists; Orange Lodges, public schools and private

buildings associated with unionism or Protestantism flew it more defiantly.[171] Republicans and nationalists in Ulster differed in their views of the tricolour, which technically was not illegal.[172] The Special Powers Act, 1922, however, allowed the RUC to prohibit displays that threatened disturbances of the peace, and this was widely used until the Flags and Emblems Act of 1954 established the union's flag's primacy.[173]

More than a military presence, the garrisoning of sixteen battalions in Ulster in 1922 was a reminder of the North's tradition of service.[174] Military commemoration idealised Ulster's Great War sacrifice, particularly the slaughter of the Ulster Division at the Somme, and galvanised unionist rhetoric: war heroes inspired contemporaries to defeat Home Rule, and future generations to preserve Ulster.[175] Communitarian celebration bound unionist society – churches, police, army, and loyal orders – in emotional memorialisation, without political prompting.[176] This ignored the poverty of many ex-servicemen across Ulster, where even well-supported sales of the British Legion's poppy failed to alleviate indigence.[177] Dawson Bates claimed obliviousness of 'any appreciable number of ex-Servicemen in the workhouses of Northern Ireland outside Belfast' and was chided that almost 400 resided in Ulster workhouses.[178] Glorifying the fallen, unionist governments overlooked the fall into poverty of survivors.

The RUC was a touchstone for loyal pride. Though intended to be one-third Catholic (assimilating 1,000 former RIC officers),[179] this was never achieved as nationalists shunned it and its sister forces, the A, B and C constabularies, the latter violently sectarian. Craig appealed to Catholics to join the police: 'we will welcome more and more the law-abiding citizens of the Catholic faith to enter our Constabulary Force in order to help us to keep law and order'.[180] The propaganda of tolerance was a fiction, and Catholics' failure to join became a stick to beat a manifestly disloyal nationalist community. Though Craig lauded RUC co-operation with military forces in 1923,[181] the unionist propagation of good policing was, to nationalists, coercion and complicity in murder and intimidation. The Special Powers Act permitted heavy-handed policing, and proscription of nationalist symbols and events. It was not merely an act of administrative coercion, but official propaganda rarely used against unionism.[182] Nonetheless, efforts were made to promote the police as part of civic life. A proposal, ultimately abandoned, was made to send a police detachment to the Ulster Pavilion at Wembley's British Empire Exhibition.[183] Similarly, sporting prowess was promoted. Stormont heard a request to send an RUC boxing team to the British Empire Games in 1934.[184] Aside from promoting the RUC, it was also a means of breaking from the Dublin-controlled Irish Amateur Boxing Association.

VI Conclusion

Proof of the success in securing the state was that no further armed conflict erupted after the Civil War ended, although the threat of strife simmered

constantly. The army mutiny, Fianna Fáil craftiness in moulding elements of the army and police in its image, and political uncertainties occasioned by O'Duffy's questionable political judgment could have occasioned conflict. However, in the army and the Garda the state had two institutions that regarded themselves as its defenders. That was no small achievement, and it facilitated maintenance of civil order in which democracy could function. Both institutions demonstrated their absolute loyalty to the state, irrespective of the party of government, perhaps because both were modelled on the overtly Gaelic, Catholic and Celtic nation, with republican values of inclusiveness and tolerance of traditions – largely unionist and imperialist – tacked on half-heartedly. Propagandising the institutions propagandised the state, and both were presented to the nation as exemplars of statehood. Civilians were encouraged to mimic their civic-mindedness and sense of duty and loyalty to the state, to hold in high regard their sporting, healthy way of living and espousal of a Gaelic, Catholic identity, however artificial it proved to be. They provided a tangible link to the revolutionary period, and the near cult-like adoration of pre-Civil War Volunteers, IRA and IRP – the bodies who had won independence, whose later recruits were imbued with a sense of reflected glory in those achievements, as was the nation at large. The quid pro quo for the army and Garda was that they would be supported and promoted by the state. The use of both for parades, concerts, sports, and religious worship propagandised idealised Irishness, winning support for the uniform and, in turn, the state. However, while public regard for them was achieved, political support was less forthcoming. They were treated as state possessions, to be deployed when a political situation required propaganda. Their identities were either subsumed into the state's identity, the better to monitor and control potentially fractious elements, or were denied their full expression by the creation of politically motivated parallel organisations. That both remained loyal to the state, particularly in the face of Fianna Fáil provocation, was the greatest propaganda they achieved in securing the state.

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6 Commercial propaganda

I Introduction

The economic outlook for the Free State at its inception was poor. The island's industrial base remained within the United Kingdom and, although the northern shipbuilding and linen industries were declining, their value to the all-island economy remained substantial. Hopes for partial reunification, leading to an anticipated subsuming of the northeastern corner, were dashed when reunification failed to materialise. Northern Ireland appeared wealthier, though this was illusory, and trade propaganda was heavily politicised. The Free State produced little: it had too few resources for heavy industry, and the industrial and agricultural revolutions that had transformed Britain had bypassed Ireland. Mulcahy bluntly acknowledged the absence of state industrial policy, which left industrial development adrift with neither rudder nor anchor.[1] The domestic market was too small to support indigenous enterprises, though a small number of brands were known internationally. However, exporters focussed on Britain's agricultural and alimentary needs, neglecting other markets. Propaganda campaigns in Britain, Europe and the United States show significant differences in ambition and successes.

To fulfil the basic services of a state, taxation on tradeable commodities, and corporate profits was needed. Cumann na nGaedheal and Fianna Fáil broached the problem of excessive imports over exports in ways reflective of their ideologies, not simply for economic reasons but cultural and chauvinistic also. The first decade saw efforts to improve the quality of agricultural produce, and drive industrial modernity through the establishment of semi-state companies, quasi-socialist yet commercial bodies enjoying market monopolies. Propaganda schemes for semi-states suggest that whatever economic reasons inspired their creation, their promotion owed more to nationalism than to creating consumer loyalty. Cumann na nGaedheal injected capital into agriculture and industry, and, with the Shannon scheme, facilitated modern machinery and equipment. Efforts to stage a belated industrial revolution were as worthy of propaganda as the sectors they developed. From the Fianna Fáil takeover, however, propaganda for commerce preferred cottage industries to factories, making a virtue of production practices that were antiquated and unviable without subvention.

II Trade propaganda in Ulster

£10,000 for putting placards on the dead walls in the United States of America

With many members who had commercial or industrial experience and interests, the northern parliament understood Ulster's mainstay industries, linen and shipbuilding. Both, declining, needed propaganda. John Milne Barbour proposed public funding to promote linen, a systemically important industry, in America. Private interests in Ulster pledged £2,000 annually for 1925 and 1926, and the administration granted up to £10,000. Unlike the Free State, where official control over disbursement of propaganda monies was sacrosanct, Barbour delegated the work to a New York-based committee.[2] Labour leader Samuel Kyle endorsed the proposal, noting that Joseph Devlin had proposed a similar scheme.[3] The scheme extended beyond 1927, with the New York committee, comprising local representatives of Ulster's linen manufacturers, actively engaged in a range of promotional activities: a monthly trade magazine, trade and consumer advertising, booklets and literature, window displays and press relations, while an educational programme was conducted in schools and colleges. Women's clubs and art exhibitions were also targeted.[4] By 1928 the scheme's success had encouraged the linen industry to include the dominions in future campaigns. Curiously, in reporting the success, Barbour stated that the US market, which purchased 47.6 per cent of all pre-war British linen, had declined to 42 per cent in 1926.[5] At best, the campaign slowed a decline. At worst, it hinted at failure so obvious that new markets were needed before the decline became terminal. Protestations of success failed to convince Devlin, who criticised Barbour for granting '£10,000 a year to advertise linen, and because he advertises linen linen is being sold, when he knows it is not being sold at all'.[6] Lloyd Campbell, too, while supporting Barbour's plan to promote linen in new markets, suggested all was not well despite expensive propaganda: if the industry 'could be brought back to its former state it would mean a very much larger circulation of money in the Province'.[7] Devlin maintained his attack on wasteful propaganda in 1929: 'They find £10,000 for putting placards on the dead walls in the United States of America … The linen trade is not improving; it is going from bad to worse.'[8]

By 1936 international propaganda seemed an ill-considered attempt to prevent the inevitable. Efforts turned towards the home market. Barbour admitted that though it was impossible:

> to assess with any degree of accuracy the value of the benefits accruing to the linen trade from these publicity campaigns, it is generally felt amongst the trade that … this money was instrumental in preventing a far heavier slump in linen exports than actually occurred.'[9]

Redefined, success meant not failing badly. In a new scheme to develop the home market, Stormont granted 15s for every £1 contributed by the Irish

Linen Guild, capped at £2,250.[10] Labour's John Beattie scoffed at the proposal: 'I know perfectly well that the competition in linen by many countries is meeting you at the doors. I do not think this propaganda is going to meet that competition.' [11] He was right.

Ulster's shipbuilding industry was not merely a world-class industry, it was integral to the loyalist, Protestant identity shared by the majority of Stormont's members, and gave reassurance of a continuing hegemony. The dockyards were Protestant-owned and sectarian. Pathé recorded the rejoining of the 'Lochmonar', which had split apart in 1927, giving Belfast docks a propaganda boost.[12] Four years later, the launch of the liner *Georgic* gave Harland and Wolff's dockyard a promotional fillip.[13] But this propaganda ignored reality. After frenzied shipbuilding during the Great War, new orders were rare. Like linen, shipbuilding was in terminal decline, and government promotion was virtually inconsequential: employment at Belfast's shipyards fell from 20,000 in 1924 to 2,000 in 1933.[14]

For lesser aspects of Ulster's commercial activities, trade fairs and exhibitions provided useful propaganda. Stormont provided £12,000 to exhibit Ulster's agricultural and industrial produce at the 1924 British Empire Exhibition at Wembley.[15] Participation was not entirely a commercial consideration: promoting the province's loyalism was also important. Campbell, while noting that the Ministry of Commerce had participated in at least eight Empire Marketing Board events in the previous year, surmised that exhibiting was about establishing that 'we all – Northern Ireland, Australia, Canada, and all the other units – are members of one great Commonwealth – the British Empire'.[16] Meanwhile, the state-sponsored Ulster Industries Development Association (UIDA) was the result of an inward-looking economic policy to consume more domestically, reduce imports and attract new industry.[17] The UIDA engaged in film propaganda, assisted by the Ministry of Commerce. Its most influential film, *The Star of Ulster*, promoted Ulster produce and the organisation's Star Associate scheme, with a six-pointed star representing its six counties.[18] The New Industries (Development) Acts of 1932 and 1937 facilitated UIDA efforts, but the latter itself required publicity.[19] As with so many official efforts to promote northern industry, the Acts were only modestly successful.[20]

III Agricultural trade propaganda

Working for the nation … in a spirit of enthusiasm and zeal

With a predominantly agrarian economy, albeit under-developed and under-resourced, the Free State naturally sought prosperity from the land, even in the throes of civil war. Lester requested publicity information from the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction to demonstrate that, despite fighting, agriculture was returning to normal.[21] He received information that suggested steady amelioration, which he publicised in the press.[22] The

return to normality was, however, a return to indifference to modern practices, and a lack of investment. A cow testing scheme, predating the state, was continued to breed out cows with low milk yields. Posters asked farmers 'Why keep poor cows?' and encouraged them to 'Grade up your cattle'.[23] Pathé filmed Cosgrave and T. M. Healy ostentatiously inspecting cattle during the 1923 Spring Show, including a close-up of an imposing bull to publicise the benefits of improved breeding.[24]

Improving animal husbandry, tillage, sugar beet, and egg production preoccupied Agriculture, though early propaganda lacked focus. Legislation to improve quality was publicised, as produce, particularly butter, was so inferior that permitting exports could have been ruinous.[25] The department continued its promotion of better farming practices, issuing instructive leaflets on various topics.[26] It also employed instructors to demonstrate modern farming methods, particularly effective propaganda at fairs and industrial shows. The establishment of the Agricultural Credit Corporation (ACC), which provided loans for marketing produce, also facilitated propaganda for farm improvements.[27] Hogan was adamant that agriculture's future lay in giving farmers capital to make their concerns profitable, and he was keen to propagandise the corporation as a patriotic endeavour, allowing the 'ordinary decent farmer' to get credit for improvements, and weeding out corruption by 'farmers trying to cod the banks and other mortgagees'.[28] The *Irish Times*, receptive to this propaganda, editorialised that if farmers 'show even a tithe of Mr. Hogan's enthusiasm in the conduct of their industry – if they recognise the necessity for honest dealing in their affairs and cultivate a spirit of independence in their attitude towards society – Irish agriculture will flourish'.[29]

Coincidental with the ACC's establishment was the creation of co-operative creameries. Presented as a means of reducing costs and improving prices, the scheme entailed the purchase and resale of privately owned creameries, and the closure of about 180 others. The *Irish Times* hailed Hogan's progressive vision for modernisation and quality improvements,[30] but Fianna Fáil disapproved. Hogan met criticisms by alluding to Fianna Fáil's narrow-mindedness and begrudgery. Had such a scheme been implemented in Denmark, he observed, it would be praised in the international press, but 'because it is done in this country everybody is out to find fault and show how much better he could have done it'.[31] He presented the scheme as another patriotic one: it would prevent foreign businesses 'wiping out the co-operative system and taking over part of the industry from the farmers'.[32] Far from running his ministry in soundbites, Hogan's legislation for improvements was quite potent propaganda. It promised governmental endeavour in providing capital and improving quality, and held out the possibility of future propaganda showing Irish produce to be the equal of British, European and Commonwealth rivals. It contained, however, an element of social engineering: consistent messages compelled farmers to adapt to new realities, and brooked no deviation.

Fianna Fáil encouraged greater production of wheat in order to reduce imports. While propaganda helped increased the acreage under wheat, it was

hindered by Finance's insistence on the cheapest possible campaign. Agriculture initially proposed a five-week, local newspaper campaign, costing £600.[33] Despite this being a pittance, Agriculture failed to satisfy Finance that it represented good value and was astounded when Finance proposed four cheaper options,[34] which it rejected.[35] Finance queried how Agriculture's proposal was better than its own[36] and delays meant the 1932 campaign never started. The fallout saw Finance responding angrily when Agriculture peevishly accused it of deliberate sabotage.[37] Nonetheless, by July 1933, when Agriculture sought sanction for a new publicity campaign, land under wheat had increased from 28,000 to 90,000 acres, though it remained under ten percent of the country's needs, far short of the desired 30 per cent.[38] McConnells Advertising Service was retained to conduct the £7,500 campaign which used posters, lectures by agricultural instructors, and distributed handbills and leaflets through schools and committees of agriculture.[39]

By 1935 more acreage was under wheat, and Agriculture communicated to Finance that its propaganda experiences had convinced them that 'a system of publicity on the lines of the present campaign is the most effective and … cheapest way by which the aims of the Government … can be secured'. The positive tone may have been an attempt to lessen Finance's pain at releasing another £8,000 for the campaign.[40] Finance wearily conceded that as the campaign was government policy, sanction could hardly be refused.[41] The press and poster elements were divided between two firms: O'Kennedy-Brindley received the £5,300 press contract, while McConnells continued to design and print posters at a cost of £1,200. Additionally, £1,200 was sanctioned for printing folders for educational propaganda.[42] Ever keen to reduce outlay, in 1936 Finance wondered why posters had to change every year.[43]

While the wheat campaign gathered momentum, cattle breeding had improved so much that Agriculture could take offence when the *Irish Independent* claimed that because of excellent breeding, the state had insufficient cattle for the German market, which preferred less refined breeds.[44] Agriculture complained to the editor, and the Government Press Bureau secured his commitment that all facts would be checked with that office before publication.[45] Castigating a newspaper for extolling quality seems perverse; however, it occurred during the Economic War, and propaganda that did not reflect Fianna Fáil policy was undesirable. The implication that Irish beef was a premium product robbed of its British market highlighted farmers' economic hardship. To encourage consumption, Agriculture established a free beef scheme for the needy, a simpler method than propagandising the benefits of produce that many found expensive.[46]

The Irish Dairy Shorthorn Breeders Association and the Saorstát Oat and Maize Millers' Association lobbied for increased milk and porridge consumption. The former claimed that a daily increase of one half-pint per person would sell 69,000,000 extra gallons. The latter blamed an oats surplus on advertisements extolling fruit for breakfast. Agriculture granted £2 for every £1 they contributed on propaganda, up to £1,500.[47] Finance naturally protested:

> The appeal to drink more milk and eat more porridge will hardly appeal to the women folk in these days of slimming. Moreover … in this age of machinery the same amount of physical energy is not required now as formerly … and the change in the nature of the work done is reflected in a change in diet. I do not think that … porridge will ever regain its popularity as a breakfast food. The milk dealers ought to be able to finance an advertising campaign of their own, judging by the price they charge for milk.[48]

In the 1930s, the nation consumed 100,000 tons of sugar annually, but the Carlow sugar processing plant provided only one fifth of that; the remainder was imported.[49] The creation of Comhlucht Siúicre Eireann (CSE) in 1933 provided state support, and gave farmers an outlet for their produce. Acquiring the Carlow plant and establishing three others sought to make the state self-sufficient. Unfortunately, making the fledgling industry flourish required a sacrifice: consumers would pay more for home-grown sugar than imports. More positively, it would create employment and keep money in the state, a Senate debate heard,[50] though there were fears that urban consumers, in particular, were subsidising agriculture.[51] To circumvent consumer unhappiness Fianna Fáil propagandised CSE as a patriotic endeavour. The *Irish Independent* reported Séan McEntee TD opening the Thurles plant in 1934:

> From a narrow selfish point of view … every individual … engaged in growing beet or working in the factory might feel that it would be better to import sugar and buy it … cheaper. They must … realise that by providing work for those who were idle and hungry, even at a slight extra cost, they were doing good national work, and … helping themselves.
>
> The Government asked every section to bear its share of the burden of these factories … They should remember that they were working for the nation, and should work in a spirit of enthusiasm and zeal.[52]

Whether it was the call to patriotism or profit, the state's enthusiastic promotion created an unintended problem: oversupply. In 1933, with just Carlow operational, farmers planted more acreage than contracted, while farmers without contracts also produced beet, which concerned the CSE.[53] In 1934 CSE was obliged to use propaganda dissuading farmers from growing beet. Even with three factories operational, the acreage grown was unsustainable.[54] Labourers were restricted to sowing only a half acre of beet, and CSE withheld contracts from farmers who had failed to meet previous contractual obligations. In the rush to promote a scheme benefitting a relatively small number of farmers, and rooted in naïve protectionist economics, the government paid little regard to practicalities, and reality thwarted its propaganda.

Like agriculture, the fishing industry could be transformed by increasing consumption. Fishermen and retailers would benefit, and state exposure to bad debts would be lessened: the Department of Fisheries estimated that state

loans to fishermen were £40,000 in arrears and, with £80,000–£100,000 not matured, more were likely.[55] Fisheries compared Irish consumption (13 lbs per capita per annum) with Canadian (24 lbs) and English (70 lbs), and decided 25 lbs was achievable, if a pilot scheme employing a sales organiser and a fish dresser and demonstrator in a handful of towns succeeded. The latter would 'give demonstrations … for propaganda purposes as to the best methods of handling fish'.[56] Fisheries suggested a propaganda campaign using leaflets in fishmongers advocating the nutritional value of fish, recipe leaflets, press notices of cookery demonstrations, and a postal frank. A handbook on the history and commercial nature of the industry was contemplated. Consistent with propaganda's social engineering role, Fisheries also recommended weekly instruction in schools on fish, with prizes for essay-writing. Meanwhile, fishermen and fish producers in major ports were to receive instructive magic lantern talks depicting 'scenes from go-ahead countries like Denmark and Norway, showing how fisherfolk there did their part in building up a national industry'.[57] Finance scorned the ideas. Its memo in reply supported increased consumption, but suggested that as demand existed, the problem lay in supply. Consequently, other than recipe leaflets, publicity was unnecessary.[58] Finance suggested that Fisheries investigate whether the home market could be stimulated without cost by supplying more fish to hospitals and public institutions.[59] Finance eventually sanctioned £1,000, with propaganda reduced to its suggestions, and the remainder for salary costs and administration.[60] Thus hobbled, success was unlikely. No fish dresser was appointed, and the sales officer, Captain Clayton Love, quit in frustration as his efforts to increase the number of retail outlets floundered. With no meaningful propaganda, the campaign's achievements were modest.[61]

IV Powering industry: propaganda for national resources

A head-line for a self-contained Ireland

Industrial prosperity needed energy sources, and with bountiful water and peat the state had vast resources. A hydro-electric plant on the river Shannon was contentious for its cost and need for foreign expertise, but engaging Siemens to engineer the scheme allowed the state to boast that it could attract such firms, and the works were heavily propagandised, quirkily, as a tourist attraction. This owed much to the expertise of J. C. Foley, president of the Cork branch of the Irish Tourist Association, on the board of the new semi-state, the Electricity Supply Board (ESB).[62] Great Southern Railways ran excursion trains to the works, and promoted the tourist attraction in the national press.[63] From May to September 1928, 60,000 visitors, including national and international figures, viewed the development.[64] The *Irish Times* praised the ESB's guided tours as entertaining, informative and indispensable for visitors.[65] In the summer of 1929, 80,000 people visited the works.[66]

As the scheme progressed, Thomas O'Connell TD raised the need to propagandise electricity:

> other countries … set up model houses … so that people will have an opportunity of visiting, examining and testing the various conveniences and labour-saving devices which are brought about by the installation of electricity … I am glad power is given to the Board to engage in propaganda of that kind.[67]

The ESB became a pioneering organisation in propaganda. In 1927, it became the first Irish organisation to appoint a public relations manager. This, conceivably, arose from a visit by the managing director to America where public relations was gaining acceptance in everyday use.[68] Under E. A. (Ned) Lawlor, an *Irish Independent* journalist with War of Independence credentials,[69] the ESB publicised the Shannon works, building public support and educating the populace in the proper use of electricity. The ESB differentiated between publicity, propaganda and education, displaying understanding of promotional techniques not always apparent in state institutions:

> A Public Relations Department … will keep the Press fully informed of the activities of the Board, and … engage on a broad campaign of publicity and electricity propaganda through newspaper advertisements, film advertisements, educational films, educational matter for the schools and colleges, lectures, etc.[70]

The board also intended to open 'showrooms through the country, so that when electricity is available in the towns and villages … inhabitants can go to see for themselves the practical applications of electricity to small industries and to home life'.[71] In tandem, a nationwide series of lectures brought information on the ESB and electricity to domestic and industrial consumers.[72] From October, 1927 to December, 1929 the ESB published a journal, *Siemens Progress on the Shannon*, detailing engineering and technical aspects of the project, and Pathé filmed construction work: one film showed Cosgrave laboriously winching the first electricity pylon, prettified with garlands, into place.[73] A second showed the mechanical plant in operation as the scheme progressed.[74] The company also had good fortune that one of the state's foremost artists, Sean Keating, documented the works in a series of iconic paintings exhibited in the Royal Hibernian Academy.[75]

As electrification advanced, the government announced plans to open a lightbulb manufacturing and sales enterprise, Solus Teoranta, with a public share offering to follow.[76] An effusive *Irish Times* report read like propaganda:

> this highly important key industry will give employment to over one hundred people within the first twelve months alone; and … with the exception of experts supplied for temporary periods, all employees will

> be nationals, and the company will be under the complete control of Irish Free State nationals.[77]

German advisors trained the plants' workers and production speed and quality developed quickly. In November 1935, the company exhibited its wares at the Permanent Exhibition of Irish Industries on St Stephen's Green, an upmarket Dublin location.[78] In December Lemass formally opened the factory.[79] The *Irish Times* published a photograph showing a neat, industrious and modern environment. The ESB Chairman, R. F. Browne, claimed that the state had broken the mentality of being a distributive economy for imported goods. The vice-chairman, J. J. Walsh trumpeted that the factory presaged 'an economic revolution as great as Arthur Griffith had ever anticipated'. It was, he enthused, 'a head-line for a self-contained Ireland'.[80]

Hydropower was not the only energy source available. In 1933, O'Deirg, temporarily deputising for Lemass as Minister for Industry and Commerce, informed the Dáil of government plans to develop peat bogs commercially, generating employment and facilitating industrial development.'[81] The scheme was to follow the department's modestly successful peat production publicity[82] and O'Deirg had a grand, if costly, vision: 'something like £10,000, for advertisement, publicity and organisation'.[83] In 1934, Lemass, back after his hiatus, announced a new marketing agency, the Turf Development Board (TDB) would oversee turf publicity.[84] Later, Robert Barton, in a 2RN broadcast, alluded to 'four thousand millions tons of turf awaiting the call of the nation to turn it to a useful purpose'.[85] Undoubtedly the coal shortage occasioned by the Economic War with Britain heightened interest in bogs, but Barton's nationalistic propaganda extolled turf's contribution to Irish life, while slyly denigrating Britain:

> Unlike coal mining, turf-cutting was … fitted for human beings, and by utilising turf instead of coal the public were not only assisting … to keep men of strength and courage in the country and employed in a manner … beneficial to them, but they were also promoting an industry … free from strikes, free from the heart-rending tragedies of the mines, and free from the degrading dirt and the slum life of a mining town.[86]

Barton's views brought unusually strong *Irish Times* support for de Valera:

> The housewife who buys turf not only reclaims a part of the land of Ireland from barrenness and adds to the country's wealth, but helps to reduce the figures of unemployment, and to keep men on the land who would otherwise drift into cities and swell the slum population. If all President de Valera's schemes for the development of national industry were as sound … few critical voices would be raised.[87]

Propaganda for prosperity rather than turf's intrinsic calorific benefits became a repeated refrain. Turf was a problematic fuel: its qualities relative to coal

and unsuitability for coal-burning grates were drawbacks that Henry Dockrell TD suggested could be surmounted by an education campaign.[88] On 2RN, Henry Kennedy, a TDB director, claimed 'using turf in your homes and commercial offices … will bring work and comfort to the population of our Irish bog-land districts'. He adverted to success in producing large quantities of turf and suggested: 'It remained now for the Irish public to play its important part in making the present development campaign a success.'[89] Consistent propaganda paid dividends. The *Irish Times* reported that the publicity campaign which had resulted in record turf use in urban areas, would continue.[90] An appeal to wealth creation in one advertisement praised turf as a clean, healthy fuel, concluding: 'Burn Turf, it gives employment, and every penny you spend on it is a penny saved to the nation, relieving taxation and conserving the resources of your country.'[91] The campaign also played on historical heritage. One advertisement depicting an Irish elk described how bogs were formed, and included a call to action:

> this treasure is ours to share to-day. Why should we reject this wondrous wealth that nature has stored up for us and laid to our hand? It's in our own interests to burn Turf. It's in the interests of Ireland and our fellow country-men, too.
>
> Burn Turf and give employment. Do not waste this great national heritage – turn it into wealth![92]

Mulcahy criticised the cost of the aesthetically displeasing advertisement.[93] Lemass countered that advertising was essential:

> There would be little possibility … of securing an increased sale of turf without advertising … I agree that we have now reached the stage when we will not be able to rely entirely upon the voluntary demand for turf in order to secure a sale for the quantities of turf produced, and that a certain element of compulsion will have to be introduced in some form or other. But until that stage of compulsion is reached we have no means of securing a sale for turf except by advertising …[94]

Political machination underpinned propaganda for prosperity. British coal met most of the nation's energy requirements; ending that dependency during the Economic War was canonical to Fianna Fáil, and Lemass was prepared to legislate for compulsion.[95]

The most novel propaganda made turf-cutting a test of skill akin to a sporting contest or artistic endeavour. Zuelow notes that boglands occupied a particularly negative place in the Irish psyche, calling to mind backwardness and poverty.[96] Pre-mechanisation, cutting and saving turf by hand was also backbreaking and labourious work, a monotonous necessity for existance that few saw worthy of celebration. Yet, the TDB organised its first annual turf-cutting championships in 1934, and, welcoming de Valera to the 1935 event,

the president of the organising committee, Major de Courcy Wheeler, acknowledged that it had came about at de Valera's request. The *Irish Times* described idealised, self-sufficient western Irishmen in traditional garb, speaking Irish as they worked, and paraphrased de Courcy Wheeler's propagandistic address, which strove to highlight the labour involved in turf-cutting, and exhorted other national industries to organise similar events, so that householders might better appreciate national industry. Despite positioning turf as a national industry, employment was, perhaps, more important. De Courcy Wheeler called for the unemployed to be given bogland so that they might enter the industry, and cautioned against mechanisation, which would displace jobs and cause an ancient craft to die out.[97] Highly romanticised, turf-cutting propaganda matched Fianna Fáil's industrial propaganda which aggrandised a spiritial connection between the means of wealth creation and the citizen who exploited it – despite small-scale exploitation's hopeless inefficiencies. It was propaganda to conceal economic hardship beneath a veneer of national pride.

V Selling the Free State brand

Publicity of any kind cannot be translated in terms of an immediate return

Official figures show that the UK was the state's most important trade partner, accounting for over 90 per cent of exports and, save for the Economic War when the figures show a decline of about 10 percentage points, around 80 per cent of imports annually.[98] With most exports bound for Britain, few saw benefits in investing in propaganda there. From London, James MacNeill unsuccessfully cajoled the Executive Council to participate in the 1924 British Empire Exhibition, to stimulate both industrial energy and productivity. He cautioned that abstentionism was a poor policy for good politics or good business.[99] At £30,000 for a 15,000–20,000 square feet pavilion, MacNeill's promptings went unregarded. He renewed his appeal a year later, regarding the offer of a site one quarter in size, for £8,000. Apart from American visitors who would purchase thousands of pounds worth of Irish produce, he told Blythe, the propaganda impact was considerable, though possible negative publicity was not to be disregarded. He impressed on External Affairs that abstaining would sour relations with the British administration, traders and consumers.[100] The cabinet maintained its decision not to participate, considering that an exhibition at home during the Tailteann Games would be more beneficial.[101] London continued to press for participation; the High Commission's Martin Eliasoff indicated that the organisers would provide space for just £1,000 when the City of London ended its exhibition in mid-May. He urged Agriculture and Industry and Commerce to:

> organise a reputable and valuable exhibit of Irish produce and manufactures … There is much need for effectively advertising good Irish

> produce here, and if no effort is made to use this means of advertisement there will not only be loss by default but loss by antagonism. Our political enemies and our trade competitors will not miss the opportunity of damaging our trade in its best market.

Non-participation would engender domestic disapproval: he cautioned that his analysis of the Dublin press indicated that commercial interests there disapproved of foregoing the propaganda boost.[102] Not even the danger of alienating Irish commercial interests worked: the opportunity was spurned when External Affairs declared that both Agriculture and Industry and Commerce considered the proposal impracticable.[103]

In fairness, the High Commission was distant from the state's daily administration, and advocating expensive trade propaganda in the throes of a civil war was conscientious, if optimistic. Within a few years, the need to promote exports saw consideration given to participating in the 1926 Grocer's Exhibition in Britain. The allocated stand had a frontage of seven feet, and Agriculture recommended an information display with literature from itself, Industry and Commerce and the Irish Tourist Association.[104] The exhibition was ill-starred: it transpired that no display stand was available, although distribution of leaflets was possible.[105] More successful was the 1927 British Industries Fair. Organised by the Empire Marketing Board, space was allocated free of charge and Agriculture sought sanction for a modest £100 in expenses for a 'representative exhibit of Irish butter, cream, eggs and poultry'.[106] This was a conveniently timed exhibition, as it overlapped with the Ideal Homes Exhibition, which the state also attended.[107] It proved to be a busy year for trade propaganda, as the state exhibited at another Empire Marketing Board fair in July. Industry and Commerce sought sanction from Finance for £100 to promote agricultural produce.[108] The state continued to exhibit at the British Industries Fair, with Lands and Fisheries undertaking propaganda in 1929, and at Empire Marketing Board fairs in Plymouth and Newcastle. Also that year, External Affairs received an innovative propaganda offer from Sir Alfred Reid, chairman of the British and Irish Steam Shipping Company, who offered the company's yacht as a showboat to promote Free State goods, and promised to cover the venture's costs. The High Commission advised that the 'publicity value of this rather unique scheme is really very considerable' and suggested that exhibitions in Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow, Swansea, Newport and Cardiff were desirable.[109] A modified proposal was accepted and McNeill notified Fisheries that the propaganda tour would run from Dublin, to Cork, Cardiff and Glasgow, finishing in Liverpool.[110]

At home, the organisers of the 1932 Cork Exhibition anticipated 1,250,000 visitors – a staggering figure for a country with a population of less than three million. Cosgrave's message to the exhibition, printed in its brochure, anticipated a grand event publicising Irish products in new markets and increasing awareness of economic development.[111] Lands and Fisheries suggested constructing a model Gaeltacht village for the exhibition. The estimated cost of

£12,000–£15,000 for four shops, twelve houses, a hall and a small round tower, it felt, could be recouped through admission fees and refreshments.[112] Sceptical, Finance recommended reducing the cost to £10,000, omitting unnecessary buildings and selling refreshments.[113] An internal memorandum criticised the model village as an affront to the dignity of the Gaeltachtaí, sarcastically commenting on the exhibition's natives-in-their-milieu nature: 'This way to the aborigines – sixpence'.[114] The fair failed to live up to the organisers' expectations, who attempted to put a brave face on their over-optimistic estimate of visitors, asserting that 360,000 visitors was 'bound to be of real advertising value to the state and exhibitors'.[115]

By the 1930s, the type of product being promoted changed subtly from agricultural produce to craft goods. The establishment of the Gaeltacht Depot brand promoted high-quality, crafted tweed, woollen and lace goods. These were usually the result of cottage industries rather than efficient industrial production, and were a means of achieving government policy of spreading wealth throughout Gaeltachtaí. These were impoverished rural regions, underdeveloped but, as the last bastions of the Irish language, successive governments strove to promote their economic development. A special commission on the future of the Gaeltachtaí had recommended in 1925:

> The provision of a complete system of education bearing on home life and farm management, and directed to the creation of settled and comfortable social conditions.
>
> The Commission considers that an endeavour should be made, by a declaration of the Government's policy in this matter, to move the people of those areas to a conscious sense of the necessity for self-help, self-reliance, and co-operation with the State, in the bringing about of that economic stability and social improvement which are necessary for the preservation of themselves and the language.[116]

Gaeltacht goods were exhibited at the British Industries Fair of 1933 and at the South London Exhibition in Crystal Palace in 1934. The responsible department, Lands and Fisheries, spent conservatively but wisely, and assiduous record-keeping denied Finance its usual opportunity to cavil. In 1931, the department requested sanction to spend 35 guineas at the Christmas Shopping Fair in Piccadilly Circus. Despite reluctantly agreeing, as was its wont, Finance was surprisingly astute: 'The Fair has a central location and the display … appears a sound and even necessary method of advertising the Gaeltacht goods'.[117] However, when Finance later had to sanction an extra £22 11s 7d, it requested that Lands and Fisheries account for trade in Gaeltacht goods to Britain.[118] Fortunately, the figures proved the benefits of promotion: sales of tweeds and knitwear from 1931 to early 1932 were £120 7s 2d. From then to September, the figure increased dramatically to £1,516 16s 0d.[119]

Exhibitions aside, pamphleteering and special editions of publications were cheaper and less labour-intensive, but reached important audiences. In 1925,

Industry and Commerce sought to publish 500 copies of a speech given by R. A. Whyte, the state's Chief Trade Officer in Britain, dealing with the state's trade with Britain:

> In view of the importance of Great Britain as a market for Saorstát products and the necessity for maintaining that market against well-organised competition from other countries, the Minister of External Affairs considers that it is essential to keep the products of the Saorstát well known in the British markets.[120]

Finance approved the proposal as 'quite good propaganda and more to the point than a good deal of publicity matter that has come before us'. [121] There may have been relief that readymade propaganda directed at opinion formers could cost only £7.

Not all publications had such a simple genesis. Kiernan informed External Affairs in 1926 that the London Chamber of Commerce had invited the state to advertise in two special Free State supplements to its journal, and contribute a trade-related article.[122] Lands and Agriculture drafted an article for Industry and Commerce to finalise. When the Dublin Chamber of Commerce submitted an article, Industry and Commerce considered its own input was unnecessary.[123] Dublin Chamber may have shared common ground with the state, but foregoing an opportunity to address business and opinion formers in Britain neglected the state's interests. That charge could not be made in relation to a *Financial News* supplement in 1931, to which McGilligan, then Minister for Industry and Commerce, submitted an article on new industry in the state. Other contributors included cabinet colleague Patrick Hogan TD, Minister for Agriculture, Joseph Brennan, chairman of the Currency Commission, R. F. Browne, chairman of the ESB, and J. P. O'Brien of the Irish Tourist Association. Cosgrave contributed a foreword.[124] The publication pleased the state and 1,000 copies were ordered for distribution to legations.[125]

European markets were comparatively unimportant, with neither the volume of exports that the British market absorbed, nor a large expatriate population. Nor was Europe Anglophone. It was also more advanced technologically, and agricultural produce, particularly Danish, was often of higher quality. Legations in Paris, Berlin and Rome made tentative trade propaganda efforts. O'Kelly provided entertainment to:

> business men, potential importers of Irish produce or manufacturers whom I have been trying to induce to deal direct with Irish firms. … Several … are journalists, one of whom eventually got into the 'Echo de la Bourse' a long article dealing with Irish economics … 'Echo de la Bourse' is the leading financial newspaper in Belgium and had hitherto been rather hostile … you will appreciate the value of this indirect method of approach.[126]

By 1924, haphazard trade promotion had formalised, and External Affairs sought sanction for 8,000 francs (about £120) per annum for O'Kelly who, dealing 'with French Government Officials, Journalists, Publicists and Merchants finds it necessary to be in a position to offer some small entertainment'.[127] Finance grudgingly sanctioned 5,000 francs (about £75).[128] By the end of the 1920s, the representatives, with business contacts cultivated, were aware of their potential as propagandists. O'Kelly suggested opening an Irish depot for goods in Paris, but correspondence from Industry and Commerce detailed unproductive talks with Irish firms, and unless he could canvass support, the proposal was unlikely to warrant further action.[129]

Europe's importance declined in the 1930s as the state looked towards America. A common language and large expatriate community helped, but American protectionism was a barrier. Impetus for trade could have been stimulated by aggressive business practices common in America, and several marketing and publicity firms touted for state business. In 1924, Henry F. Woods of F. Eugene Ackerman, a New York publicity firm, approached Smiddy with a proposal to promote the state in America. The eponymous Ackerman had served his propaganda apprenticeship on the CPI[130] and the firm would 'consistently furnish to the press of this country authoritative news showing the business, fiscal and cultural progress of the country and its plans for development in these directions'.[131] Woods' advice seems to have been disregarded, and in 1931 Percival White, principal of an eponymous marketing research company and a rising star in the field, contacted Industry and Commerce to arrange a meeting explaining how his firm could assist Irish exporters to the United States.[132] Macaulay met M. E. Luckstone of White's company, and produced a positive memorandum recommending market research for Gaeltacht industries, for which funds might be available.[133] But the vexed question of resources foiled Macaulay: no matter the financial return market research promised, investment in advance was a risk and prohibitive cost.

Personal links were exploited for propaganda, and Cosgrave's visit to America, as well as de Valera's fundraising excursions for the republic and *Irish Press*, must have given insights into business propaganda. The overseas representatives cultivated personal ties with Irish-American and other interests to publicise the state. Private visits by Free State businessmen also had potential. Limerick businessman Stephen O'Mara, appointed by the Executive Council to undertake an official mission to America investigating consular services and trade,[134] attempted to establish trade links with the help of Matthew J. Troy, an Irish-American lawyer. Troy proposed establishing the Irish Counties Association in New York, an umbrella organisation for thirty-two county organisations, with a women's auxiliary. Troy had met the Free State delegation in New York, and been well received.[135] O'Mara, too, had an interview and the legation recorded the purpose of his visit as 'the desirability of publicity from a point of view of trade, tourists, and political propaganda'.[136]

The problem with the personal touch was that it rarely yielded results, failing on grounds of cost, interest, or the over-enthusiastic ambitions of well-intentioned, but ineffective promoters. Of greater interest were large scale exhibitions, of the kind that had borne fruit in Britain. Distance and cost prohibited regular involvement, but participation in the Chicago World's Fair stirred unusual zeal. Macaulay set the tone for the state's participation, arguing against building thatched cottages at the fair: 'It is felt by the best class of Irish-Americans that exploitation of this kind of sentimentality has been overdone'. Among those whom he consulted for advice was Harry C. Phibbs, a Dubliner and well-known Chicago publicist. Professional counsel spurred Macaulay to recommend participation and, while awaiting approval, reserve space in the Travel and Transport building, believing it more cost-effective than building a pavilion. He saw, however, little possibility that propaganda would guarantee instant success: 'Publicity of any kind cannot be translated in terms of an immediate return; I think we should derive some little advantage commercially, and I am sure that we should benefit considerably by increasing our tourist traffic.'[137] An interdepartmental committee cautioned against participation on the grounds of trade alone, as American protectionism had caused exports to decline. The committee suggested that tourism and Gaeltacht goods might benefit from a £5,000 display. The ITA participated willingly, while Lands and Fisheries expressed an interest, and Industry and Commerce secured promises from manufacturers to participate if a national exhibit was organised.[138] Despite the committee's misgivings, sanction was given.[139]

The state's trade participation in the exhibition was muted as cultural propaganda assumed greater importance. The Department of Education supported the exhibition, and consulted with the National Museum's Adolf Mahr for advice: he devised an exhibition of recent national archaeological work. This incorporated museum exhibits, including 'new postcards recently issued by the Museum with propaganda prospectuses'; exhibits from sources other than the museum; and material from Irish Manuscripts Commission and Irish Folk Lore Institute.[140] Further enhancing cultural credentials, the Royal Hibernian Academy exhibited sixty-eight paintings by living Irish artists.[141] Propagandising culture and bloodstock exports, the Army show-jumping team travelled to Chicago.[142] Responsibility for organising the State's involvement during the fair fell on the trade consul to Chicago, Daniel McGrath, who took his propaganda role too flippantly for Finance's liking. McGrath sought reimbursement for a $40 membership fee of the Tavern Club, a celebrated haunt of press and publicists: 'As publicity I deemed it advisable to join the Tavern Club, which is much frequented by Press men and there I made contact that led to some excellent notices in local and eastern newspapers of our exhibit.'[143] Finance countered: 'One would imagine that special publicity of this sort was scarcely necessary in a centre like Chicago with a highly developed publicity sense, and that anything of real interest in the Irish exhibit would receive all the publicity which it deserved.'[144]

That Chicago had a highly developed publicity business suggests that competition for coverage made meeting journalists essential, not simply relying on presupposed inherent news value. It took Finance 17 months to agree to reimburse McGrath half the amount requested. He had, Finance said, benefitted personally from the membership.[145]

VI Conclusion

Spats over $20 demonstrate the dead hand of Finance when it came to investment in trade propaganda. The department had no understanding of propaganda's potential to generate high returns on modest investments but, rather than be guided by experts, it stayed steadfast to its role as guardian of the state's expenditure – a role it took to mean no unnecessary spending. Inconsistency in official propaganda, and inexperience of the state's propagandists, allowed the department to exercise more authority than it should have had. Where Cumann na nGaedheal propagandised the state as a modern, free trade economy, Fianna Fáil's predilection for doctrinaire protectionism favoured small producers and protected national industries, often semi-state monopolies, undoing much of their predecessor's propaganda. The state's reliance on the British market proved disastrous once the Economic War commenced. Despite efforts of the overseas representatives, export propaganda focussed almost exclusively on Britain, with Anglophone North America and Europe generally overlooked. Both parties share responsibility for this, and both propagandised along party ideological lines. Neither understood the strategic benefit deriving from an orchestrated propaganda campaign for any industry. Arguably, their differences, combined with a lack of guile and funds, prevented the emergence of a national style of industrial propaganda akin to that of the EMB, or the propaganda industry in the US.

There were, of course, industrial success stories that were sold to the press and investors as examples of how great the state's commercial advances could be. The Shannon scheme, CSE, Solus Teoranta, and ITB were modern, technologically advanced industries, while the ACC and the highly marketable Gaeltacht Depot brand funded or promoted quality standards. Yet, the state remained as economically imperilled in 1937 as it was in 1922, because, too often, official propaganda regarded industries or events in isolation, not as broader economic development. Agriculture, the one industry where the state could build strong country-of-origin propaganda with its reasonable claim to possessing potentially world-class credentials, was disorganised. It was not beyond the capabilities of officials to create lists of fairs and exhibitions, and to select those most likely to yield a propaganda dividend. Yet this simple planning was never done, and the state's involvement was hastily organised, limited in scope, lacked creativity of presentation, and mismanaged. The overwhelming impression of industrial and commercial propaganda is that opportunities were foregone. True, there were laudatory achievements, but how might those successes have been exponentially greater had strategy

replaced gusto, policy over-ridden ideology, and the role of the Department of Finance been reduced to simply writing the cheques?

Notes

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3 Ibid., col. 1678.
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5 Ibid., 10 October, 1928, vol. 9, col. 2270.
6 Ibid., 8 December, 1927, vol. 8, col. 4097.
7 Ibid., 6 March, 1928, vol. 9, col. 11–12.
8 Ibid., 26 February, 1929, vol. 10, col. 44.
9 Ibid., 14 October, 1936, vol. 18, col. 2002.
10 Ibid., col. 2003.
11 Ibid., col. 2005.
12 BP, film 736.17.
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15 SP, 1 April, 1924, vol. 4, col. 427–8.
16 Ibid., 6 March, 1928, vol. 9, col. 11–12.
17 Ibid., 6 November, 1929, vol. 11, col. 989–90.
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21 NAI, D/Agriculture, 92/2/1996, 1 March, 1923.
22 Ibid., 7 July, 1923.
23 NAI, D/Agriculture, 92/3/191.
24 BP, film 306.08.
25 DÉ, 26 January, 1927, vol. 18, col. 136–7.
26 Department of Agriculture Leaflets.
27 DÉ, 26 April, 1927, vol. 19, col. 1518–9.
28 Ibid., col. 1530.
29 *Irish Times*, 24 March, 1927, p. 8. See also 18 April, 1927, p. 6 for a similar treatment of Hogan's propaganda.
30 Ibid., 19 March, 1927, p. 8.
31 DÉ, 19 October, 1927, vol. 21, col. 253.
32 DÉ, 10 July, 1928, vol. 25, col. 154.
33 NAI, D/Finance, S003/0009/32, 11 January, 1933.
34 Ibid., 13 January, 1933.
35 Ibid., 24 January, 1933.
36 Ibid., 27 January, 1933.
37 Ibid., 16 February, 1933.
38 NAI, D/Finance, S046/0030/33, 27 July, 1933.
39 Ibid., 29 August, 1933.
40 Ibid., 11 January, 1935.
41 Ibid., 15 January, 1935.
42 Ibid., 12 December, 1935.
43 Ibid., 7 October, 1936.
44 *Irish Independent*, 26 October, 1934, p. 7.
45 NAI, D/Foreign Affairs, DFA/2/32/428: 20 November, 1934
46 NAI, D/Taoiseach, TSCH/3/S2361, 15 January, 1935.

47 NAI, D/Finance, S003/0001/34.
48 Ibid., 1 January, 1934.
49 SÉ, 16 August, 1933, vol. 17, col. 908.
50 SÉ, 17 August, 1933, vol. 17, col. 925.
51 Ibid., col. 943–4.
52 *Irish Times*, 3 December, 1934, p. 5.
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54 *Irish Times*, 11 April, 1935, p. 4.
55 NAI, D/Finance, S027/0040/27, undated.
56 Ibid., 21 August, 1923.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., 21 August, 1923.
59 Ibid., 6 September, 1923.
60 Ibid., 29 September, 1923.
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62 *Irish Times*, 3 August, 1927, p. 7.
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7 Tourism propaganda

I Introduction

Tourism became a well-established, prosperous industry in nineteenth-century Ireland. Travel writers, journalists, novelists and proselytisers mingled with leisure tourists, enthralled by scenic idylls or appalled by picturesque poverty. Hooper's excellent anthology of travel writing on Ireland includes fascinating, if not always complimentary, snippets from a variety of perspectives, alternately portraying a country of unparalleled beauty, grinding poverty or benighted Catholicism.[1] Propaganda, much of it originating from Britain, had created a vibrant pre-Great War tourism industry. Thomas Cook, the pioneering English travel impresario, was a regular visitor and brought his first tour of Americans to Ireland in 1895.[2] Four visits by Queen Victoria[3] were the perfect opportunity to promote sojourns in Ireland to wealthy British visitors, particularly once, in addition to natural resources of healthy waters, spa towns and scenery, essential tourism infrastructure began to develop. The Irish Automobile Club was founded in 1901, and the Automobile Association arrived in 1905 – in fact, there were 19,554 registered vehicles in Ireland when the Great War began.[4]

This, manifestly, was an industry ready-made for Free State propaganda, one that could bring vital revenues to the poorest parts of the country and promote national prestige abroad. A narrative, well-established since the mid-nineteenth century, established the state as a Celtic utopia, a land of ancient monuments and scholasticism, culturally distinct and rewarding to the intelligent traveller. It could hardly be more in keeping with the romanticised Gaelicism that imbued so much of the state's propaganda in other areas. But tourism's specific association with British visitors and the Anglo-Irish elite, who alone could afford holidays in Ireland, both casting an historically unflattering foreign eye on their surroundings, and benefiting locals only in low-value and inconsistent employment – as boatmen and gillies, for instance[5] – engendered a sense of squeamishness in officialdom. Dire financial circumstances wrought a miracle cure that officialdom had no choice but swallow. As Thomson notes, 'Cajoling English tourists into visiting the country that their army had recently ransacked expresses … the general

attitude of the Irish post-colony's new bourgeoisie towards the British bourgeoisie'.[6] Tourism began to be sold successfully abroad – but not before its worth had first been propagated at home.

II Elevating tourism as a national industry

Announcing to the world what miserable, unfortunate, God-forsaken wretches we are

Much antipathy existed towards tourism. Even the two ministers whose portfolio it came under showed little regard for it. State interest in tourism was stimulated by Lester's report of a 1924 Irish Tourist Organisation meeting which called for a national tourism promotion body.[7] McGilligan eventually established one, incorporated in 1926 as the Irish Tourist Association (ITA). He also introduced two Acts enabling local government funding of the ITA (conveniently evading exchequer expense) but otherwise showed little interest. His mandarins took their cues from him, baldly telling External Affairs that 'it is a mistake to think that the responsibility in Tourist Development matters rests with this Department'.[8] External Affairs had had the temerity to suggest that Cosgrave's office liaise with Industry and Commerce after the Cunard Line had requested that he issue an invitation to visit the state in the cruise line's travel publicity.

Succeeding McGillligan in 1932, Lemass, a minister accustomed to tightly controlling his department, paid little attention to tourism, once snapping in the Dáil that the 'Minister for Industry and Commerce has nothing to do with providing scenic attractions for tourists'.[9] However, by 1936 Lemass had instituted employees' holiday legislation to encourage Irish people to holiday at home. In 1937, his departmental secretary John Leyden, supporting ITA pleas for increased local government funding, advised Local Government that Lemass 'attaches great importance to the tourist traffic and it is thought very much more than is at present being done could usefully be done in the direction of propaganda and publicity'.[10] This was no Damascene conversion, but pragmatic policymaking. Arguably Lemass' interest was a reaction to the state's balance of payments: imports included earnings from foreign visitors; the more visitors, the greater the imbalance in the state's accounts. Thus, foreign visitors were neither encouraged nor discouraged, but domestic tourism was a virtuous duty, cleverly propagandised as workers' rights.

If the state's policymakers had scant regard for tourism, unsurprisingly it received withering comment elsewhere. Todd Andrews, an erstwhile ITA employee, described tourism as 'a shoddy business … more associated with national mendacity than with legitimate industry.'[11] The novelist Liam O'Flaherty wrote a damning satire of avaricious Irish stereotypes preying on tourists.[12] Politicians, too, regarded tourism with hostility or nationalistic myopia. Seamus Bourke TD disparagingly referred to tourists' depredations in a Dáil debate on preserving national monuments:

> souvenir hunting tourists have played havoc with some of our most valuable archaeological remains. In fact the souvenir hunting vandal has left a trail of destruction behind him almost as wide as that of the iconoclast army or the pillaging mob.[13]

Economic snobbery regarded tourism jobs as less desirable than industrial jobs. Aiken called them 'the worst form of employment'[14] – perhaps alluding to the servile nature of guiding and accommodating visitors the party apparently did not want in any case. Fianna Fáil rarely missed an opportunity to denigrate tourism, and when O'Deirg lamented 'no matter how we perfect our roads or our hotels we cannot perfect our climate … which will prevent the richer class of Americans and other foreigners from coming here'.[15] Tierney took him to task:

> The Fianna Fáil method of advertising our national wares reminds me of the beggars that one sees seated at the gates of oriental cities showing their sores to passers-by and looking for alms …. We cannot get anywhere … if a large proportion of our people spend all their time announcing to the world what miserable, unfortunate, God-forsaken wretches we are, and how rotten everything in our country is, including the weather.[16]

There was, granted, a lack of suitable infrastructure, particularly accommodation, partly a consequence of the IRA campaign waged against the country homes of the Anglo-Irish class that could have seen new life as hotels, but Fianna Fáil pronouncements were damaging and unhelpful party propaganda with tourism an easy target. The party was content to thunder invective from the side-lines; Cumann na nGaedheal, preferred to use money left by tourists to improve the product. John Good TD (the Businessman's Party) cited Judge Daniel Cohalan, one of Irish-America's foremost leaders, to advocate tourism propaganda. Cohalan claimed tourism represented:

> a gold mine for the Free State, and … it should be one of our first objects … to recognise the importance of encouraging tourist traffic and to do all we could to develop that traffic. …
>
> … monies left by tourists … percolate through to many of the poorer inhabitants of the cabins that are to be found on the south coast and in the western parts … They, as well as a great many others … have missed the tourists.[17]

William Davin TD noted that pre-war tourism had added £6,000,000 annually to the economy and suggested that money 'spent by tourists would be spent on food and other things which are produced by the farmers and distributed by other people, and consequently it would provide employment'.[18] Davin pleaded with Cosgrave to provide funds to improve Dun Laoghaire pier for tourists, and his Labour-infused views were compelling. Cosgrave, inclined to

agree, claimed financial prudence militated against investment. Cosgrave was over-cautious: though the state's coffers were bare, here was a viable industry whose raw materials required no development, and whose hotels, restaurants, and amenities were perfectly positioned for a propaganda campaign to encourage private investment.

III Attracting and providing for tourists

Americans, go where you are welcome! Ireland is a friend to everybody, even England

With their imperfect understanding of tourism, it is little wonder that politicians' promotional efforts for the industry drew on their experiences in delivering public services rather than publicity campaigns. Infrastructural developments were viewed as the best method of promoting the state. Good roads would attract visitors. Unfortunately, officialdom viewed transportation as a commercial, taxable endeavour. Although motoring tourists, commonly the wealthier kind of visitor, generated revenue, the road-building required to make motor travel comfortable eroded it. To compensate, Blythe vexatiously insisted that cars were luxuries suited to heavy taxes, including, until the late 1930s, tariffs on cars of visiting tourists.[19] Motoring visitors were prized because they distributed income around the state, adding garages and mechanics to the list of tourism beneficiaries. But bad roads and ill-equipped garages risked losing motoring tourists, and damaged tourism propaganda. Fr Thomas O'Dea, secretary of the Irish American Tourist Organisation, complained to External Affairs: 'A bunch of American tourists motored to Cork from Queenstown [modern-day Cobh] and that was enough. Roads rotten. They shipped their car to England that night by a boat leaving Cork.'[20] The effects of bad roads and customs-enforced delays on spare parts concerned Good:

> If a motor tourist … has a break-down and wants a part he will wire across to England for it. He gets a wire back saying the part … will take another two or three weeks to get it through the Customs … He will clear out of the country … with a very bad impression.[21]

To make motor tourism more viable, Blythe granted the Phoenix Park Motor Races £3,000, shipping heavy criticism from Fianna Fáil.[22] O'Deirg chauvinistically advocated 'developing functions like the Tailteann Games and the Horse Show, which have some connection with the country instead of things quite foreign to it like motor races'.[23] But O'Deirg's events relied on domestic audiences and merely circulated existing money. Still Aiken maintained the party line: the government's aim 'should be to provide for the comforts of their own people and not for the comforts of tourists. … If we do that then it will be all right for the tourists to come along'.[24] Blythe rebutted the criticisms forcefully:

> The country has certain attractions for motorists. It has roads that are not so crowded. If that factor were fully availed of we could make a great deal of money and give a great deal of employment. Some Deputy … said that we should think of the people before the tourists. We are not trying to attract tourists here for the benefit of the tourists; we are trying to attract them for the benefit of the people …[25]

Road improvements were critical to promoting tourism. In 1936 James Dillon TD requested that Lemass finance improvements: 'these roads, while having a very great value … for transport purposes, would also … attract tourists … and provide tourist facilities which do not at present operate, and they would become a material source of national revenue'.[26] The ITA proposed a scheme to link local government tourism funding to road improvements: the greater an authority's tourism contribution, the greater the exchequer grant it would receive. Unwilling to acquiesce entirely, Industry and Commerce, with Local Government and Public Health, proposed a compromise fund of £25,000 for councils that 'without any reference to the amount contributed for tourist advertising' voted a set uniform rate or the maximum rate allowable for tourism promotion.[27]

Another aspect of infrastructural development for tourism was air travel, though it was not seen as a tourist matter: expensive, untried and not trusted, Dáil references to it frequently came in communications debates.[28] The possibilities of air travel excited deputies, though constituency interests abounded, with scarcely a corner of the country not proposed as a site for the aerodrome and air service the state lacked the finance to develop.[29] In 1928 a committee on aviation reported to McGilligan that air travel required public finance, a disappointing outcome for a free trade administration with a poor record in funding transport. In 1930, Finance vetoed his proposal to spend £20,000 of the Air Corps military budget on developing civil aviation.[30] Ironically, when private capital became available, the protectionist Lemass was minister. His reluctance to allow foreign airlines operate within Ireland delayed air services; in February 1935, Osmond queried where was the service promised for 1934;[31] in November, Peadar Doyle TD asked whether Lemass would permit 'private or public companies worked in conjunction with existing services in Great Britain' to operate the service.[32] In response, Lemass granted a temporary licence to Olley Air Services as a precursor to a nationalised Aer Lingus and Aer Rianta.[33]

Infrastructure aside, politicians had special regard for sporting tourists. Heffernan asked if Kevin O'Higgins would preserve foxes from over-hunting as 'a great amount of money is brought into this country by people who indulge in fox-hunting'.[34] When a game preservation bill was eventually produced, William Kent TD suggested a government grant to restock game:

> what an advertisement it would be for the Tourist Development Association. Sportsmen would be so anxious to come into the country that

> they would be tripping over each other. … My point is that if we preserve fish and game … the golden harvest which we will reap from the fin and feather will be very considerable.[35]

Thomas O'Higgins TD supported the bill, noting that wild geese attracted hunters to Wexford, where 'accommodation has to be booked in advance … during the shooting season'.[36] Fianna Fáil's Martin Corry TD dissented. To him, private hunting reserves for English visitors were at the expense of Irish people, 'the mere commoner who owns a gun'.[37]

The state's overseas representatives assisted ITA campaigns in pursuing sporting tourists. From New York, Robert Lindsay Crawford contacted External Affairs on behalf of a sporting party organised by Ferris Greensleet of Houghton Mifflin, publishers of European guidebooks, and including the English writer John Drinkwater. Crawford requested that External Affairs 'appreciate the importance of this visit from a publicity point of view and the desirability of affording these visitors in fullest possible measure realization of the anticipations aroused by the *Angler's Guide to the Irish Free State*'. Industry and Commerce promised to expedite their customs duties on sporting equipment, while Lester notified the ITA, and indicated that the Minister would endeavour to meet Greensleet, who had read the guide.[38] Representations made in 1930 on behalf of John Rice, a New York-based Armagh native and horse dealer, who proposed bringing hunting tourists to Ireland, show awareness of the value of sporting tourism, and the benefits association with Rice would offer:

> It would entail employment … it would increase the demand for forage, etc., these people would require hotel accommodation … some of them would buy or rent houses the next season. Furthermore, an increase in the better class of tourist traffic might follow … I am making every effort to attract a more prosperous type of tourist, especially the sporting rich who would be of real value.[39]

It transpired that the ITA was already printing hunting propaganda for Rice. They averred that 'we whole-heartedly agree with … the value of such traffic and we should be only too glad to avail of any further suggestion which he is good enough to make' and offered copies of publicity photographs of Rice and the Ward Union Hunt to the legation.[40]

The Tailteann Games appealed not only to the sporting tourist, but were a spectacle with broad international appeal. They also generated revenue: 'the huge number of tourists who … patronise the games … are bound to spend a considerable sum of money', Davin claimed, that would 'find its way back to the farmers and to every section of the community that provides food for these visitors'.[41] Walsh expounded the desirability of repatriating emigrants and their money:

> It is of some importance to have foreigners coming here and spending money … At the same time … there are many Irish-Americans who, having made money, desire to return to the old land, settle down here, buy property, and help this country.[42]

Visitors represented short-term financial gain, but required more investment in services than expatriates, whose permanent return brought new capital. But the Games had a parlous existence. Their third incarnation was hosted one month before the Eucharistic Congress; coupled with de Valera's unease at linking Catholic Ireland with polytheistic Celtic lore, it spelled their demise after 1932.

In contrast, the Eucharistic Congress was an opportunity for the state to engage in pomp and ceremony, uniting the majority of citizens under Catholicism and a veneration of St Patrick. Like the Tailteann Games it was a spectacle, providing international publicity to a broad audience. There was a Catholic tradition of hosting masses in homes, with hospitality for officiating clerics and neighbours, a tradition with origins in the notorious Penal Laws – religious oppression of the eighteenth century. The state took the role of host, and concerned itself with preparations for receiving guests, and publicity before a wider audience. Deputies expressed concern at the lack of public transport, and the policing of liners required to supplement Dublin's hotel accommodation. Dáil debates regarded those who would attend as pilgrims, suggesting that exchequer gains were secondary to religious celebration and propaganda. Nonetheless, the government was sufficiently alert to the propaganda coup the Congress offered to approve Posts and Telegraphs' proposals to publicise the event in non-sectarian and neutral tones: a commemorative stamp, broadcast talks about the Congress, and a cancelling machine to impress 'Visit Ireland. International Eucharistic Congress. June 1932' on mail.[43]

The Congress was a mixed blessing. In 1930 the ITA, concerned that tourists expected in 1931 would postpone visiting until 1932, sought advice from the Berlin and Paris representations.[44] Berlin canvassed German tourism interests for their views and advocated promoting Hiberno-German relations and Irish scenery. The legation stressed the importance of the source of propaganda:

> The best publicity is that which is given in books and newspaper articles written by Germans who have visited Ireland. The type of person who is likely to make the journey to Ireland will probably be attracted more by such writings than by posters, circulars and press advertisements issued by agencies … Wireless talks fall into the same class of publicity and are given by the same type of person.[45]

German tourism companies offered mixed responses. The North German Lloyd Company anticipated problems:

> because of too limited general propaganda, Ireland is not generally known to the travelling public or not sufficiently attractive; in particular we regret to say that we have heard complaints … that the cost of staying in Ireland is inordinately high.[46]

The Hamburg America Line recommended package holidays, while the Weltreisebüro Union suggested placing a promotional article in its quarterly publication, and organising tours for German tourist clerks.[47] The ITA accepted the helpful advice and produced tourism itineraries and promotional material in German. In contrast Paris was unhelpful. After six weeks deliberation, O'Kelly casually observed that French people were more important to attract than Irish people living in France. He recommended publishing promotional material in French.[48] His perfunctory advice came only months after suggestions he had made to the ITA had been ignored; pique, conceivably, fortified indifference.[49]

External Affairs gained a prominent, yet accidental, role in tourism propaganda. With diverse propaganda experience, and a network of legations, it enjoyed a prominent international position. Its overseas representatives who provided a public face for the state saw how tourism fared in other countries, and advised how it might be skilfully and economically promoted. As the only point of contact within their host countries for the state, they willingly disseminated information to prospective tourists, and countered negative perceptions of Ireland as a tourist destination. Before the ITA opened overseas bureaux, the representatives were the only authorised point of contact for prospective visitors, and organisations seeking to profit from the state's tourism potential. Their propaganda provided eminent visitors with information and contacts for their travels. Smiddy, keen to entice wealthy, influential Americans, requested in 1926 that External Affairs send him copies of propaganda films dealing with Irish industrial, agricultural and social life that could be loaned to Irish organisations, universities and museums.[50]

It is plausible that the tourism industry was the architect of its own misfortune. The ITA continually sought improvements on high prices and poor service, but not all involved in tourism were ITA members: on one occasion, MacWhite sought to rein in misleading impressions given to American visitors. External Affairs alerted Industry and Commerce to the incorrect impressions which American visitors were getting from unofficial guides, some of whom were:

> telling American tourists how happy the country would be if only the English were back again. In order to counteract this undesirable propaganda it might be suggested to the Irish Tourist Association that they should establish a system of licences for Tourist Guides and that these guides should, as far as possible, have a national outlook, with a knowledge of places of historical and archaeological interest.[51]

J. P. O'Brien, the ITA's secretary and dynamo, replied as waspishly as good relations permitted. He noted the universality of unofficial guides, and concluded: 'While the Minister Plenipotentiary may be rightly annoyed … it should be obvious that their occurrence cannot be avoided, and it should be equally obvious that no Association can hope to control the opinions of hackney-car drivers'.[52]

Attracting wealthy tourists to the state was difficult, given that negative publicity, some warranted, abounded. Complaints about unclean hotels, overpricing and poor service were common, and one influential German traveller, novelist Lisbeth Dill, complained of her torrid stay.[53] Customs officers angered many travellers, with their inflexible attitude to taxing even personal effects, incompetence and slowness. Worse, newspaper reports of thefts from travellers at ports would, Johnson claimed 'do great harm to the country because … that statement will be repeated in the English and American Press, and unless it is repudiated … by a Minister … and given the same publicity … the country … is going to suffer a bad reputation'.[54] Cobh port was particularly problematic: complaints about poor landing and transportation facilities were common. A report sent to Cosgrave noted that a party of US bishops arriving there in 1928, unable to obtain a hire car or hotel, were forced to accept an offer of transportation from another passenger who had a car, but who himself was inconvenienced by his offer.[55]

Even ill-founded negative publicity was damaging. New York publisher J. W. Glenister informed External Affairs that New York travel agencies told him that 'occasionally stray bullets came from housetops. Another said that transportation facilities were terrible, trains were delayed for hours and some days the trains did not run at all.'[56] The *New York Times* quoted an American merchant, William Bedford:

> the land is not as cultivated as it was years ago, and there are not enough crops to support the inhabitants for thirty days … The young men won't till the land and the priests told me they have lost control over them since the Free State has been established.[57]

This was patent nonsense and slipshod journalism, yet on the same page an Associated Press report on the death of two children from malnutrition lent credence to famine rumours. The headline 'Situation improves in Irish famine area' was mischievous and sensational: the article chronicled poverty in provincial towns, but reported no evidence that starvation had caused any deaths.[58] Such bad publicity compelled the ITA to request that McGilligan conduct an interview with the American press.[59] Lester noted that, subsequently, an interview had been conducted on his recommendation.[60]

Despite these problems, the state was fortunate in receiving support from prominent personages. Glenister observed that a 1925 film shot in Ireland 'will do more to offset the anti Free State propaganda that has been put about over the press in this country [USA] during the past year'. Moreover, the

film's leading man, Thomas Meighan, was planning a series of newspaper articles on his time in Ireland.[61] The film, *Irish Luck*, was unremarkable, but its scenic locations and Meighan's endorsement were invaluable. A year later another American actor, Will Rogers, wrote:

> I have been in twenty countries and the only one where American tourists are welcomed wholeheartedly by everybody is in Ireland. And the funny part about it is, there is more to see there than in all the others put together. They don't owe us and they don't hate us. The lakes of Killarney is where Switzerland got their idea of lakes. Americans, go where you are welcome! Ireland is a friend to everybody, even England.[62]

Third-party endorsements removed the appearance of propaganda, but were orchestrated by the state: Smiddy introduced Glenister to Lester, and Rogers had an audience with Cosgrave.

The representatives, mindful of their trade roles, were alert to the possibility that tourists might become investors. Smiddy was keen to persuade the Great Southern Railways (GSR) and ITA to provide a Cunard Line photographer with free travel and accommodation 'so as to counteract the bad impression that most people have here of Ireland, regarding it still as a poor country, and as it existed in the middle of the last century'.[63] The Cunard Line twice issued special editions of its brochure on the Free State. Smiddy wrote the introduction for the second and requested photographs of Ardnacrusha (the Shannon scheme's hydroelectric plant), and new factories, including Ford's in Cork. But External Affairs did not allow commercial interests to blight diplomatic duties. Alert to economical propaganda methods, the GSR asked the Department of Transport and the Marine in 1928 whether the representatives could distribute its promotional literature in the USA, thereby avoiding tariff charges.[64] Industry and Commerce favoured the proposal, but External Affairs balked: though content to supply its representatives with commercial propaganda, to send it masquerading as diplomatic communications was unthinkable.[65] Nonetheless, the representatives lobbied hard in America to gain concessions, and, with the ITA, 'succeeded in arranging that future despatches of our literature will enter U.S.A. Duty Free, a privilege which is not enjoyed by most other European countries'.[66]

IV Modernising or social engineering? Tourism in the Gaeltachtaí

I would recommend as an experiment that two or three villages of the backward type … should be selected

Lippmann and Bernays regarded propaganda as social engineering, and the necessary imposition of political will on a populace unable to think independently. While there is little evidence that such practice was prevalent in tourism propaganda, a 1935 Department of Lands initiative, to which Industry

and Commerce contributed, suggests that it was not entirely unknown. Chaired by Seán Ua Móráin, (Lands Commission, Gaeltacht Services) the interdepartmental committee included representatives from Finance, Education, Local Government and Public Health, and the Office of Public Works. George Bourke represented the tourist development section of Industry and Commerce.[67] The initiative sought to increase Gaeltacht tourism by creating model villages. The public service requirement of linguistic ability in Irish as an employment criterion – itself an example of nationalist propaganda by social engineering – meant that teachers, in particular, were regular Gaeltacht visitors. Finance estimated that tourism revenue to Gaeltacht language colleges was over £23,000 in 1933.[68] The revenue mainly came from 3,144 teachers and others in 1933 and 3,633 in 1934. There was an obvious market for language courses for public servants and scholars as well as the casual tourist.

Ua Móráin made an economic appeal to circumvent Industry and Commerce's ambivalence: tourism would create much needed employment from 'building, road-making, the encouragement of amusements and natural outdoor sports such as shooting, fishing, etc'.[69] Interestingly, this proposal followed a Finance report circulated to the Executive Council two months earlier that refuted a previous Lands proposal for creating self-catering holiday homes in Gaeltachtaí. Finance accepted that 'the extension of holiday traffic must be regarded as the largest source of potential wealth for these areas' but was concerned that diverting language tourism revenues from ordinary locals who provided guest-house style accommodation and catering to new commercial beneficiaries could cause unrest.[70] Rates for board and lodging for adults ranged from £1.10s to £2 per week[71] – a significant amount in impoverished communities. However, Séan McEntee, the report's signatory, was keen on the possibilities that social engineering afforded:

> I would recommend as an experiment that two or three villages of the backward type … should be selected, all the houses raised [sic] to the ground and rebuilt … – the whole village being properly laid out, with a small square, trees and other amenities … and the houses on reconstruction to contain special additional living accommodation for visitors and to have water and electricity … A small social hall should also be provided and … the more enterprising inhabitants may wish to start a small general shop to cater for the visitors. The surrounding … roads should also be reconstructed and bathing and boating facilities provided … The experiment should not end, however, with the erection of the … village: An overhaul of the internal organisation is also necessary; the standard of cooking … needs to be raised and the necessity for the cultivation of a wide variety of vegetables brought to the people's notice. Every effort should be made to make the reconstructed area self-supporting in the matter of food, or at worst dependent only on the surrounding district, so that the greatest possible profit might be derived from the sojourn of the visitors.[72]

His enthusiasm contained many elements of Fianna Fáil dogma – self-sufficiency, local enterprise, retaining wealth in communities. But he was also pragmatic and required propaganda to attract visitors 'through the usual channels, press, poster and cinema, with the assistance of the Irish Tourist Association … I would suggest … that a booklet should be prepared and published giving up-to-date and accurate particulars concerning the areas'.[73]

Perhaps Lands had learned from Finance's report, and submitted a second appeal more likely to win support. An undated Gaeltacht Services report appended to the committee's March 1937 minutes assessed the suitability of two villages to host the scheme, indicating how far the idea had progressed. The parish priest, asked to assess parishioners, acknowledged the scheme's merit provided the villagers were not too backward to operate it. He was assured that families would have to demonstrate their suitability to host guests, and the report includes a list of suitable families.[74] By May, the Committee indicated that the cost of twenty houses, a hall and infrastructure would require funding of £28,000. Of this, £1,000 could be recouped from local authorities and £5,000 from a one-third contribution from each participating homeowner.[75]

Though supportive of Lands' second scheme, Industry and Commerce shied away from tourism propaganda. Committee minutes record that:

> Mr Bourke thought that advertising would scarcely be necessary after the first year as the visitors would give sufficient publicity to the areas in question. Mr O'Maoileannaigh pointed out that the number of tourists would depend on the work of the Committee. In reply to the Chairman, Mr Bourke said that the Irish Tourist Association would have funds available for advertising, provided rates were being paid for the area in question. He thought the Railway and Bus authorities would also co-operate in the matter.[76]

Later acknowledging that people would not participate in the scheme without a guarantee of increased numbers of tourists, Bourke said the ITA would co-operate, but would not distinguish between Irish-speaking and other tourists, and that they would advertise the areas and press for reduced rail fares, but suggested that local committees should also seek lower fares.[77]

This reluctance, and handwritten memos on Industry and Commerce files, attest to its lukewarm response to the scheme. One memo was an instruction to Bourke to raise the issue of contacting the ITA for its input. In fact, it was Leydon himself who suggested the ITA be consulted.[78] The final committee meeting recorded:

> Mr Bourke stated that he had been asked officially to obtain the views of the Committee, and in particular of the representative of the Minister for Finance as to the advisability of submitting details of the proposed scheme to the Irish Tourist Association for observations. It was agreed

> that it would be undesirable to discuss the matter with the Association unless and until the Minister for Finance gives a definite indication that a scheme on the lines recommended will be adopted. It was likely that in any event the Irish Tourist Association would be consulted before a scheme would be put into operation.[79]

Leydon had the final word on the committee's report, writing to Finance in July 1937: 'this Department has no observations to offer other than to suggest that the Irish Tourist Association might be consulted before any scheme of the nature referred to is put into operation'.[80] But the scheme was never pursued, and a note by Bourke states 'no fr [sic: further] action is necessary … as the whole question of development of tourist traffic will be dealt with under the new Tourist Traffic Development Bill'.[81] That bill, enacted in 1939, was arguably the true starting point of Lemass' interest in, and state commitment to, tourism promotion.

V Parastatal or industry voice? The Irish Tourist Association and propaganda

To safeguard the interests, and to promote the comfort and pleasure of tourists

Alongside state efforts to promote tourism, local tourism committees re-emerged which led to calls for a national organisation. The Irish Tourist Organisation meeting Lester attended called for an autonomous body, independent of state funding 'except such as could be afforded by the Publicity Department in the course of its ordinary work' and capable of co-operating with Ulster tourist organisations.[82] Though a foretaste of the entrepreneurial pragmatism that distinguished private interests from heavily bureaucratised state efforts, it was the state that created the ITA. One of the period's tourism pioneers, founder of the Berlin-based School of Tourism Research, Robert Glücksmann,[83] identified essential components for successful state tourism promotion:

> legislation bearing on tourist traffic and its organisation; the creation of a state department for the control and promotion of tourist traffic; the co-ordination of tourist promotion under the state; the voluntary subscription of funds towards the common object; and the centralisation of tourist promotion in the hands of the state.[84]

Establishing the ITA at arm's length from government, while partially meeting these ideals, suggests the state was perfectly content to allow the ITA develop ambitious objectives for tourist propaganda:

> To foster and develop Tourist Traffic in and to attract visitors to Ireland and to safeguard the interests, and to promote the comfort and pleasure

> of tourists therein, and to make known the advantages and amenities of the various districts as health resorts or watering places by advertisement or by other forms of publicity.[85]

While the association embraced tourism promotion, it extended its remit to include lobbying for the industry:

> To apply for, promote and obtain any Act of Parliament, Provisional Order or Licence … enabling the Association to carry any of its objects into effect … and to oppose any proceedings which may seem calculated … to prejudicially affect or interfere with the carrying out by the Association of any of its objects.[86]

The ITA was non-governmental, but it had political influence: its first chairman, James Moran, was a Cosgrave Seanad nominee; its vice presidents included J. C. Foley, a Cosgrave nominee to the board of the ESB, and Martin MacDonagh, a future Cumann na nGaedheal TD. Its board comprised Oireachtas and local authority members. Crucially, McGilligan supported it in its early years and Lemass, slower to embrace tourism, assured the association of support at its 1932 AGM, because its publicity boosted national propaganda. But its shrewdest political operator by far was its secretary, J. P. O'Brien. Appointed by Foley, who encouraged him to learn how other countries promoted tourism, O'Brien believed in state-supported tourism, and brought organisational, propaganda and lobbying skills to the ITA. Oddly, he had been an anti-Treatyite, but his heightened sense of nationalism saw tourism 'as a powerful vehicle for helping his countrymen to raise their status'.[87] He put together a small team that might charitably be described as contrarian – Todd Andrews, Sean Fitzpatrick, David Barry: anti-Treaty all, and in the case of Frank Ryan, still trying to bring down the state.[88] O'Brien built financial support for the ITA, soliciting monies from tourism enterprises and local authorities, creating a network of influential, wealthy supporters that was useful in lobbying for government support.

Without overtly conducting itself as a lobby organisation, the ITA was expert at this skill. Its directors' political affinities and its relationship with Industry and Commerce bestowed advantages whilst seeking governmental support. When its lobbying did not require state funds, the ITA was successful: it achieved the support of the state's overseas representatives in tourism promotion, while pressure on the Association of Municipal Authorities and General Council of County Councils resulted in improved local authority support. However, when O'Brien approached Mulcahy (then Minister for Local Government and Public Health) seeking funds for hotel improvements and credit facilities, Mulcahy demurred, until Finance denied the request. Tourism was not established as an industry that merited government support, and the department feared novelty – but not as much as it feared setting a precedent that would repeatedly entice tourism interests back for state

funding.[89] A renewed plea to Cosgrave fared no better: in his view by merging railways and creating bus routes the government had done its duty by tourism.[90]

While Cumann na nGaedheal's tourism propaganda encompassed economic development, and Fianna Fáil's boosted national pride, the ITA set about improving the product, and better accommodation standards was the cornerstone of its message. Concerned with saving public monies, McElligott disingenuously claimed that if the ITA increased the quality of hotels, instead of maintaining their 'reckless distribution of advertising literature', shipping companies would bring tourists unbidden.[91] But when the ITA pressed McGilligan and Blythe for a state system of hotel grading and inspection, McGilligan rejected the request on administrative grounds, observing that no country operated such a system.[92] Nonetheless, by 1937, the ITA was able to host the first national hotels conference for several years. *Irish Travel* trumpeted improvements over the decade: 65 new hotels, 350 with structural improvements, 78 with new bedrooms, 145 with new bedrooms and toilets, and 125 had installed hot running water in 4,250 bedrooms (only 200 bedrooms had this in 1925).[93] With half-hearted governmental support, the ITA had taken on the role of regulator and promoter, and its propaganda aimed at industry had yielded remarkable results.

The association conducted conventional publicity campaigns, too. Its 1936 Annual Report stated:

> Newspaper advertising and the supply of tourist literature were naturally our main forms of expenditure. Editorial publicity, photographs, radio talks, lectures, exhibitions, competitions, etc were availed of … Improved mailing lists and the general expansion of our organisation work in other countries have tended to render more effective the results of such work, so that … our publications and the output of our Publicity and Photographic Departments are being dispatched regularly to … transport companies, tourist agents, diplomatic and consular services, clubs, public libraries, hotels, trans-Atlantic liners and numerous other media …[94]

The major portion of ITA expenditure went on publicity. In 1936, O'Brien estimated that total tourism propaganda expenditure in the state amounted to £20,000. He outlined to the Industry and Commerce how the ITA alone would expend that figure, should the department facilitate an increase in local authority funding, and in November provided a more precise budget: the figures included £7,000 on newspaper advertising, £4,000 on publications and guidebooks, £2,000 on films and photography, while the remainder was earmarked for hotel inspections, and editorial publicity.[95]

ITA staff had filmmaking experience, and embraced the medium. Assistant Secretary David Barry was an amateur filmmaker, and Director Norris Davidson was a comparative veteran, having written and directed the 1930 thriller *By Accident* [96] and participated in the filming of *Man of Aran* with the

Empire Marketing Board.[97] The association took a broad approach to propaganda filmmaking: 'filming will not be confined to "tourist" material. Every phase of Irish Life and Industry will be captured briefly but in an interesting fashion, to make a comprehensive image of Ireland, old and new, practical, artistic and cultural.'[98] The distinction between propaganda and touristic films is important. If it were to promote a modern tourist industry, the ITA could not promulgate stereotypes of a backward peasantry and a country of industrial indolence, however romantically depicted. Dreamy romanticism appealed to a particular type of tourist but the discerning traveller wanted modernity and progress. The ITA eschewed what might be termed shamrocks and shillelaghs propaganda, which pandered brazenly to the worst stereotypes of Irish culture. Thomson regards ITA activity, perhaps a little unfairly, as a project to modernise the tourism industry to meet the demands of the British bourgeoisie.[99] Arguably, it reached beyond that to American and European travellers, as the clever dissemination of it films suggests: not always ideal for cinema audiences, the ITA arranged screenings on ocean liners, and used films as an accompaniment to publicity talks.

Radio offered mixed success as the limited range of 2RN reached only domestic tourists, although it was received in Britain and Northern Ireland.[100] 2RN broadcast *Irish Travel Topics* giving the ITA a useful forum,[101] though print media reached a wider audience. Aimed at tourists and the industry, the ITA published *Irish Travel* monthly. It advocated business principles, vigorous promotion and soliciting of government support, and blended a realistic tone with professional propaganda, defending Irish tourism against accusations of poor standards, without being blind to its shortcomings.[102] Attention to accurately reporting shortcomings in tourism meant that in attracting tourists it relied on perceptible honesty – a favourable position in propaganda practice. Publications specific to counties and leisure pursuits soon followed, enabling the ITA to provide a surrogate state tourist information service, and control the medium through which it disseminated its message.

The ITA perceived that the border, a physical, psychological fault line, did not trouble visitors, for whom the island was one destination. *Irish Travel* endorsed a tour guide to Ulster that stated:

> We trust that those who visit the North will also visit the South … that those who visit the South will travel to the North. There are four provinces of Ireland … and Ulstermen will be satisfied if the stranger to Ireland remembers … that there is no boundary to beauty. We are divided … into two governments, yet there remains only one Ireland.[103]

Later, *Irish Travel* reported that Craig had expressed satisfaction that 'Ulster was glad to pass on her tourists to the Free State, and he was equally sure that the Free State was equally glad to pass hers to the Six Counties'.[104] Co-operation flowed between the ITA and the Ulster Tourist Development

Association (UTDA), from whose propaganda the ITA was willing to learn.[105] When tourism was driven by commercial interests it was inclusive and pragmatic, and less prone to nationalistic posturing than was the government: Fisheries recommended that the *Angler's Guide to Ireland* should include detailed references to Northern Ireland but the cabinet decided ungenerously that 'only a brief reference to fishings in Northern Ireland should be included in the volume and that the title should be amended accordingly'.[106]

The state's attitude to the ITA varied. Although Industry and Commerce occasionally viewed it as a convenient dumping ground for tourism matters, the association was valued – provided it sought no more finance or influence than the state could provide. McGilligan's legislative support ensured funding was committed from local authorities, but denied state subvention. In manoeuvring towards the 1931 Act, McElligott felt that the ITA's main work was hotel inspection, and overseas promotion was unnecessary. He expressed scepticism of the association's 'widespread and even reckless distribution of advertising literature', concluding: 'I should like further evidence of the value of the work they have done and of the revenue they claim to have brought to the country.'[107] Lemass, who exercised greater personal control over his department than McGilligan, acknowledged the ITA's usefulness, but kept it outside government, as the inter-departmental committee on Gaeltacht tourism showed, and turned to domestic tourism only when the 1930s depression affected the state's finances.[108]

VI Tourism in Ulster

All Ireland prosperous, means the South prosperous and Ulster prosperous

Like the Free State, Ulster had an underdeveloped tourist industry: poor transport and hotels bedevilled attempts to capitalise on its attractions. The province's promotional body, the Ulster Tourist Development Association, founded in 1923 was, unlike the ITA, frank in its attempts to attract British tourists. Among its propaganda work it invited English, Scottish and Free State journalists to Ulster.[109] By 1936 it was estimated such propaganda would encourage 500,000 Scottish and Northern English tourists to holiday in Ulster.[110] Migratory patterns from the province created close ties with these regions, and the UTDA also propagandised the province in the USA and Canada, also popular emigrant destinations. Through its Film Publicity Committee the UTDA supported travelogues and documentaries, including *The Voice of Ireland* and *Ireland's Rough-Hewn Destiny.* [111] Various messages promoted the province's scenic and cultural attractions, but, like J. P. O'Brien, the UTDA's first chairman, Robert Baillie, was at pains to improve the quality of hotels and restaurants.[112] Constant endeavour aimed at 'educating their people at home, not only as to the necessity for hearty co-operation with the Association in bringing visitors to the province, but also as to the need for providing adequately for their comfort and entertainment when they arrived'.[113]

Sporting tourism was important, with motor racing particularly popular. Barely was the state in existence than Dawson Bates presented a bill to facilitate motor racing, which would increase tourist traffic and 'help hotel keepers, farmers, and others, and … bring money into the country'.[114] The ability of the province to host high-profile races increased throughout the 1920s. After the Royal Automobile Club held the Tourist Trophy Race in Ulster its success prompted Hugh Minford (Ulster Unionist Party) to observe that 'the race was of great importance … it advertises Ulster and brings people here who spend money'.[115] Pathé filmed races, promoting the province to international audiences, though the thrills of speed resulted in occasionally unglamorous footage including a street scene where houses were sandbagged for protection[116] and the wreckage of a car whose driver had ploughed into spectators, killing six and injuring ten.[117] Motor-racing aside, however, a perusal of Stormont legislation reveals not a single Act directly intended to facilitate tourism.

Baillie stressed that the UTDA was 'non-political and non-sectarian; it sought to benefit the province as a whole'.[118] Whether he included the three Ulster counties that were not part of Northern Ireland (Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan) or meant simply both nationalist and unionist communities is unclear, but this was a constant theme in his pronouncements: 'The development of the tourist traffic in Ulster was calculated to benefit all sections of the community and all parts of the province.'[119] This was not empty rhetoric as his view was reciprocated across the border. The island was sufficiently small for all corners to be accessible to tourists, making cross-border co-operation necessary. A delegation of UTDA representatives attended a 1928 ITA conference[120] and when the roles were reversed the following year, Craig held out the prospect of co-operation on tourism:

> Yes, all Ireland prosperous, means the South prosperous and Ulster prosperous. Let there be no doubt about that. We are gathered here today round an absolutely non-political table, heartily joining with our Southern fellow-countrymen in doing a little … to help the country of our birth.[121]

Cross-border tourism gave both jurisdictions a legitimate reason for political co-operation, albeit privately or through the civil services.[122]

Co-operation was necessary, if unfavourable reviews like those expressed by the *Sunday Express* editor James Douglas were to be consigned to the past:

> Why on earth should the train from Kingstown [modern-day Dun Laoghaire] to Dublin be intolerably antiquated whilst the train from Dublin to Belfast is dazzlingly modern? Why should Dublin terrify every visitor as soon as he steps ashore? Why does she neglect her front door? First impressions count.
>
> Belfast is not flawless. Its hotels are unworthy of it, although they use their vacuum cleaners and although they make the best of their defects.

> Yet I wonder why Belfast does not modernise its hotels. A great city ought to make its visitors comfortable. Dublin has burned its hotels. Belfast ought to do likewise.[123]

When the Free State hosted the Eucharistic Congress in 1932, the UTDA received £1,500 from the Northern Irish government and £750 from Belfast City Council to promote Ulster to tourists visiting Dublin.[124] A spirit of co-operation seems to have endured to the end of the Free State, with James Boyd, Baillie's successor, keen to highlight 'the happy relations that existed between his association and the Irish Tourist Association'.[125]

VII Conclusion

No department of state took direct responsibility for tourism. Industry and Commerce ostensibly promoted tourism, but devolved responsibility to the ITA, masking prevarication and disinterest with a semblance of support. Of the many state departments which played some role in developing tourism, External Affairs, with its network of overseas representatives, arguably had the most tangible achievements. But an inflexible civil service, most notably in circuitous communications channels and decisions on funding, made bureaucracy inevitable, and, with little ministerial engagement, equivocation was elevated almost to policy. This left the industry bereft of governmental leadership just as other European states, heeding Glücksmann's advice, began building their tourism industries with supports and subventions. There was also a degree of amateurishness in the state's propaganda methods, with over-reliance on the diplomatic legations. Though staffed with enthusiastic propagandists, they were more effective as channels through which the professional ITA could reach prospective visitors. More significantly, the reluctance of Industry and Commerce to engage in propaganda reduced tourism from state-level policy to private sector interest. Because the state did not understand tourism its propaganda was inconsistent, bureaucratic and confused, largely devolved to the ITA in a poorly defined parastatal relationship. There was a failure to distinguish between directing propaganda as an element of state policy and implementing propaganda as a practical, tactical consideration.

Excuses may be made in mitigation: the private sector had most to gain from an increase in tourism; the essential infrastructure of transportation networks and accommodation required investment beyond the means of the state; but it remains that the state did not do enough to propagandise an industry that could have led to job creation, increased national wealth, and enhanced international prestige. It was an industry that needed less investment and propaganda than attempts to create an industrial economy where none existed before. Perhaps for an emerging state, of greater significance than bringing in visitors was bringing the state to the international community, and tourism evoked negative thoughts of prying foreigners recording its

weaknesses and failings. How could an image of a modern, industrial state be propagandised, if visitors could see for themselves how false were protestations of progress?

Notes

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14 Ibid., 12 February, 1930, vol. 33, col. 75.
15 Ibid., col. 64.
16 Ibid., col. 67.
17 Ibid., vol. 9, 9 December, 1924, col. 2240.
18 Ibid., 12 December, 1924, col. 2583.
19 Ibid., 22 April, 1925, vol. 11, col. 53–4.
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21 DÉ, 22 April, 1925, vol. 11, col. 73–4.
22 Ibid., 12 February, 1930, vol. 33, col. 43.
23 Ibid., col. 64.
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26 Ibid., vol. 61, 30 April, 1936, c.1961.
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28 For examples see DÉ, 30 May, 1928, vol. 23, col. 2158, and 21 November, 1928, vol. 27, col. 464.
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30 Furlong, *Promotion of tourism*, p. 179.
31 DÉ, 20 February, 1935, vol. 54, col. 2066.
32 Ibid., 7 November, 1935, vol. 59, col. 598.
33 Ibid., 27 November, 1935, vol. 59, col. 1481–3.
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69 NAI, D/Industry and Commerce, TIC Series, 24212, 26 July, 1935.
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73 Ibid.
74 NAI, D/Industry and Commerce, TIC Series, 24212, 5 March, 1937.
75 Ibid., 7 May, 1937.
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78 Ibid., 23 June, 1937.
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88 Ibid., pp. 16–17. Ryan eventually died on a Nazi submarine, soliciting German aid to create an Irish republic.
89 Walsh, *Tourist industry*, p. 68.
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93 Walsh, *Tourist industry*, p. 109.
94 Annual report of ITA, 29 April, 1936, p. 4.
95 NAI, D/Industry and Commerce, TIC Series, 25114, 2 August, 1936, and 19 November, 1936.
96 Rockett et al., C*inema and Ireland*, p. 45.
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99 Thomson, *Not only beef*, p. 271.
100 Pine, *2RN*, p. 147.
101 Furlong, *Promotion of tourism*, p. 90.
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103 *Irish Travel*, ii (8) April, 1927, p. 166.
104 Ibid., v (9) May, 1930, p. 210.
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106 NAI, D/Taoiseach, TSCH/3/S3538, 15 January, 1924.
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8 'A transient ornament of statehood'[1]
External affairs and diplomatic propaganda

I Introduction

The Anglo–Irish Treaty's intricacies meant that the state's diplomacy was limited to commercial and consular activities, falling short of ambassadorial status. Still, a network of high commissioners, consuls, trade consuls, and ministers plenipotentiary and envoys extraordinary engaged in diplomatic propaganda, gaining international recognition for the state in friendly nations, the Commonwealth and the League of Nations. Diplomatic propaganda is not akin to public diplomacy, the targeting of foreign citizens with messages, or a Habermassian convergence of citizens communicating in a public sphere across national borders. Public diplomacy is more a mid-twentieth-century construct, though there is sufficient evidence to show that the concept was not entirely unknown before that.[2] There is some evidence, too, even though the word was absent from discourse, public diplomacy and the exercise of soft power were integral to the state's practice of propaganda. Diplomatic propaganda, however, recasts the diplomat's skills on the ground in advocacy, representation, negotiation, communication and cultural sensitivity as critical skills of the propagandist. Of necessity, it includes a form of invisible practice of propaganda, with affairs of state conducted away from public scrutiny, but Free State diplomats remained accountable to political masters and public opinion.

Analyses of the state's diplomatic relations have been vigorously inquiring, showing that the state used diplomacy to wend its cautious way in international affairs. They have, however, followed a well-trod narrative, assessing relations through the prism of politics and politicking, with diplomacy an adjunct, and propaganda glossed over. However, diplomatic efforts may be assessed not for their intrinsic political value, but for the propaganda they achieved. The state's actions were not merely efforts to achieve political freedom, but were sustained diplomatic propaganda creating a narrative that promoted international recognition. The state regarded the terms of independence from Britain as challengeable and impermanent: Commonwealth membership was an imposition that could be turned to an advantage. Turning von Clausewitz's maxim on its head, the politics of foreign affairs would be a continuation of war by other means.

II Selling diplomacy at home

Cultivate and instruct the public opinion of the World so that the independence of the State may be safeguarded

Diplomacy's importance went unappreciated domestically, where external affairs was often considered an indulgence for the small, new state with its myriad internal difficulties. Insularism held sway even among political representatives and civil servants, whose parochial nationalism or penny-pinching fiscal rectitude undermined diplomacy. With officialdom leading the charge, public scepticism likewise followed. In 1922, the state's foreign minister, George Gavan Duffy, preparatory to resigning office, led the charge to defend the service. He dashed off a memorandum to Cosgrave deploring his cabinet declaration that 'Foreign Affairs, other than commercial, would be a matter of no importance'.[3] Gavan Duffy's experience in Paris allowed him understand why the state's foreign policy was limited. The ministry was an anomaly, retained after the Treaty negotiations in anticipation of British duplicity (he had suffered the ignominy of being expelled from France after British pressure on the hosts[4]), but never part of the Provisional Government. Meanwhile, the new Dáil remained unrecognised abroad.[5] The diplomatic service suffered from poor quality diplomats, many of whom did not speak the native language of their posting.[6] Prospects for recruiting suitable diplomats were unpromising, and, with ill-concealed disdain, Gavan Duffy aimed a broadside at candidates 'in the Anglo–Irish tradition and who have taken no part in the National struggle, people who have spent a good many years away from home, often in the British Diplomatic Service'[7] – clearly the right political credentials trumped diplomatic experience.

A year later, in the Dáil, he criticised a limited view of foreign relations, quoting an unnamed source who had told him: 'once the Treaty is through, all the foreign affairs we will want will be trade'.[8] Figgis advocated abolishing the department. It was 'less a Department of External Affairs than a Department of Publicity' and the President, he held, was the only person competent to speak on foreign affairs.[9] In advocating that the ministry be held by the President, Figgis echoed a recommendation Gavan Duffy had made two years previously. (It was de Valera, mindful of the importance of international propaganda, who eventually merged the ministry and presidency.) Major Bryan Cooper TD thought the position could be an adjunct to presidential authority, with routine work executed by a deputy.[10] William Redmond TD concurred,[11] but Denis Gorey TD ('a true backwoodsman' according to Keogh[12]) thundered:

> I do not see why we want a Minister for External or Foreign Affairs. We are concerned with no foreign affairs. We have no colonies and have no interests to clash with any other nation. I think it is ridiculous to be playing with theatricals like this … To my mind … the Ministry of

> Foreign Affairs or External Affairs … will be known as a Ministry for finding a job for somebody.[13]

Deputies missed the point of diplomatic propaganda. Far from being merely a trade consideration, it had the potential to propagate the state's identity and claim for reunification internationally. It was both defensive and pre-emptive where Britain was concerned. Too often at home, external relations was myopically seen as a dimension of the state's relations with Britain alone; those who had practised diplomatic propaganda abroad understood its value.

Despite detractors, External Affairs had supporters, including Gavan Duffy, his brief ministerial tenure notwithstanding. He lauded British propaganda 'of sending out … persons of distinction in science, art, literature … to give lectures and to improve the contact with influential groups'. Mimicry would 'recover our prestige by active propaganda and publicity'.[14] He recommended notifying friendly countries of the state's emergence, so that they could despatch representatives immediately. While most would be trade consuls, some, like a promised French *attaché commerciale*, would have diplomatic and political powers.[15] He proposed establishing a specialist non-partisan parliamentary committee to help ministers with neither time nor knowledge to understand external relations. Anti-Irish propaganda was a concern, as was persuading Britain that the state maintained as policy an impermanent commitment to Empire affairs. To this end, he recommended creating a Secretary for Publicity who 'would be liaison officer between the Information or Publicity Department of the Government and the Department of Foreign Affairs'.[16] In a Dáil speech, he highlighted comity, defence and trade as fundamental reasons for external affairs: 'We require to make friends with foreign people, and to make ourselves known abroad, and to forge links of friendship that will last for our own protection and for our commercial interests.'[17] His views were congruent with those of FitzGerald, who viewed foreign affairs as a means of establishing friendly relations with states and gaining international recognition of Irish sovereignty within the Commonwealth.[18]

Unfortunately, many of Gavan Duffy's suggestions were implemented either slowly or not at all, and it was left to others to support the beleaguered department. Sean Milroy TD suggested that responsibility for trade consuls be transferred to Industry and Commerce, but otherwise the department was too important 'in raising the prestige of the Free State in world affairs to be abolished'.[19] Figgis' views gradually softened and he eventually saw merit in investing in international political relations.[20] William Hewat TD preferred gradual progress to incautious urgency: having sundered historic ties with Britain, the state was inclined 'to run before we have learned to walk'.[21] He was, however, optimistic that if the ministry could diminish 'our insular ideas and broaden the outlook of the country as regards foreign relations' it would be of great service to the country.[22]

The department drifted in administrative torpor until an exasperated Walshe devised plans to increase the number of consulates. His internal lobbying to secure cabinet support indicates the value he attached to diplomatic

propaganda. Succinctly contextualising Anglo–Irish relations within the international community, he advocated creating consulates in America, Germany and either France or Belgium.[23] Consulates propagandised the state's independence and sovereignty, further distancing it from Britain, whose consulates would no longer be required to provide services to Free State citizens. The position of representative to the League of Nations had particular significance in an Anglo–Irish context:

> The League Representative more than any other of our representatives abroad has an opportunity of getting the active good-will of all countries including Great Britain for the Saorstát, and of studying their methods of diplomacy. He has to defeat these methods with friendly correctness when they tend to manifest themselves in conclusions derogatory to the status of the Dominions.[24]

The state was often viewed as Britain's vassal at the League, and it required subtle propaganda to reinforce an independent identity, without overplaying slowly dissipating enmity. Treading a fine line between assertiveness and antagonism, the state frequently voted against British interests at the League to promote its singularity.

Three undated documents, probably intended to be viewed together, convey a spirited defence of the department, and an assertive policy toward Britain. 'What the Irish Foreign Office Earns' proffered a business argument that in the current year issuing passports and visas to Americans would realise almost £29,000 that would otherwise benefit Britain's treasury. The lobbying veered into blatant polemics:

> The party which advocates the suppression of the External Affairs Department can only be supported by those who believe in a policy of isolation and decay. A nation can no more exist without external relations than an individual can live independently of his fellow man.[25]

'The Status of the Saorstát Summarised' maintained that 'Conciliation and co-operation are the surest means of strengthening our position within and without the Commonwealth. That is the road to national prestige and prosperity.'[26] External Affairs observed that every state had a foreign affairs ministry to 'cultivate and instruct the public opinion of the World so that the independence of the State may be safeguarded in times of international crisis'. Motivating public opinion had helped the ministry to develop a 'relationship of complete equality' with Commonwealth and other states, while tireless industry in propagandising the state in America had resulted in the appointment of a Minister Plenipotentiary in Dublin.[27] A workmanlike approach characterised diplomatic propaganda in Anglo–Irish relations, and Walshe cautioned against the 'chicanery and bluff' Britain could employ to dilute commitments given at the 1926 Imperial Conference: 'Every despatch … has to be

subjected to the most rigorous examination so that no sentence may be allowed to pass which contains any implication contrary to accepted principles'.[28] While Walshe communicated the best possible internal propaganda, Cumann na nGaedheal diplomacy with Britain was assertive and constructive, propagating the pursuit of sovereignty.

Unusually, External Affairs embarked on a programme of domestic propaganda to persuade citizens of the importance of diplomacy. The work of overseas representatives, though reported in national newspapers, rarely intruded on citizens' daily concerns, which were far removed from international affairs. Domestic self-promotion when new diplomats were appointed to Dublin demonstrated the international esteem in which the state was held, and the press provided enthusiastic coverage. Pathé filmed the official ceremonies when MacNeill succeeded Healy as Governor-General, recording his motor cavalcade with cavalry escort, a wreath-laying ceremony and press photographs with his wife.[29] The succession of MacNeill to the office of Governor-General indicated the importance of his experiences in previous postings in the Indian civil service and, more importantly, as High Commissioner in London, then the state's most important diplomatic posting. When Frederick Sterling was appointed the first American Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to the state in July 1927, the *Irish Independent* reported that as well as an official greeting party, a military guard of honour and the No. 1 Army Band, thousands of well-wishers greeted him at Dun Laoghaire harbour.[30] Distinguished American visitors reinforced political, familial and social ties between the two countries. When US Secretary of State Frank Kellogg visited Ireland, he received the freedom of Dublin. The *Irish Independent* reported plans for his arrival: a military guard of honour, speeches from local government politicians, and a motor cavalcade to the Lord Mayor's residence where the ceremony would take place.[31] Pathé filmed his arrival[32] and External Affairs files contain two newspaper photographs showing an impressive array of bunting, a military guard of honour and a large crowd. [33] Evidently the state invested heavily in ensuring that the success of the event would yield positive publicity for its diplomatic efforts.

The arrivals of European diplomats, while not as momentous as their British and American counterparts, were no less keenly publicised. Germany raised its Dublin Consul, Dr Georg von Dehn Schmidt, to Chargé d'Affaires in January, 1930,[34] and to Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary in August.[35] The significance of the promotions ensured that the state would heavily publicise German–Irish ties domestically. Met at his residence by Walshe, he received a cavalry escort to the Viceregal Lodge where he presented his credentials to MacNeill:

> Flags flew from public buildings and miniature Free State and German flags fluttered from the radiator of the Minister's car.
>
> His drive to the Lodge from the Phoenix Park gate was lined with infantry, and as the car entered they presented arms. At the Lodge the

> Minister … was welcomed by Mr. McGilligan … who accompanied him to the Governor-General … Immediately afterwards a salute of 15 guns was fired …[36]

Similar pomp was accorded to Charles Alphand, the first French Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to the state. The *Irish Independent* printed a photograph of Walshe greeting Alphand at Dun Laoghaire[37] and an account of the events.[38] Pathé footage depicts a mounted escort, and MacNeill and Alphand posing at the Viceregal Lodge.[39] A significant change in protocol occurred when the Spanish consulate was upgraded to a legation. Plácido Álvarez Buylla presented his credentials to de Valera as President as he continued to publicly destroy the role of Governor-General, then held by compliant Fianna Fáil member Domhnall Ua Buachalla.[40]

As a semi-autonomous region Northern Ireland had no official diplomatic function, and no means of competing with Free State diplomacy. However, for unionists, the Empire was their world stage, and they played to the loyal Ulster gallery. Memories of recent rebelliousness to force a display of monarchical love were conveniently overlooked to create a unionist narrative that disregarded nationalists, and showed other members of the Empire how to demonstrate fealty to the Crown. Royal visits were taken as proof that the province was integral to the United Kingdom. At Stormont, Hugh McDowell Pollock confirmed an impending royal visit to approving members.[41] The Duke and Duchess of York's visit in 1924, so early in the new state's history, was a resounding propaganda success for unionism. Pathé recorded the royal couple's visit: 'A RIGHT ROYAL WELCOME. Duke of York and his charming Duchess "capture all hearts" in loyal Ulster during State Visit'.[42] Symbolism seeped through the film: troops were inspected, a wreath was laid at a war memorial, an outdoor religious ceremony was attended, and a large Union flag was draped over a balcony on which the couple stood. In 1928, Princess Mary visited Belfast dockyards to cheers from the largely Protestant workforce.[43] The pinnacle, however, was a visit from George VI and Elizabeth in 1937 to a Belfast whose streets were thronged with cheering crowds and bedecked with bunting.[44] Unlike the Free State, where visiting dignitaries and ambassadors showed the state's growing assurance in international affairs, in Ulster the Crown propagated a provincial narrative outwards.

III Selling the state abroad

Opportunities for making ourselves seriously felt by England

A haphazard deployment of variously titled representatives marked early diplomacy. Some postings were indispensable, others were patriots among the diaspora receiving a title in lieu of salary. The first Dáil despatched emissaries to Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, seeking not political but expatriate support. John Chartres served in Berlin, Gerald O'Loughlin in

Denmark, and informal representatives in Italy, Spain and Switzerland. By April 1922, MacWhite was in Geneva, Osmond in Madrid, Count P. J. O'Byrne in Rome, Smiddy in Washington, and Chartres had temporarily relocated to Paris.[45] In Chile and Argentina, Frank Egan and Eamon Bulfin were trade consuls without official recognition.[46] In Shanghai, William Craig-Martin, an expatriate businessman and friend of FitzGerald,[47] requested an appointment as an unsalaried trade commissioner.[48] He was appointed Honorary Consul two years later when McGilligan, endorsing him as a supporter during the Anglo–Irish War, noted the appointment would 'cost nothing and … provide a centre – distinct from the English Consulate – round which the Irish may group themselves'.[49]

Differentiation from Britain was a central tenet of Free State diplomatic propaganda and especially true of membership of the League of Nations. The state participated wholeheartedly: it was elected to the General Council in 1930 and Lester became its last Secretary-General, but membership began as a means of promoting the state's independence. Gavan Duffy understood that the League's Geneva headquarters were 'the real centre of convergence of international democratic effort, overt and concealed' and nowhere were there 'equal opportunities for making ourselves seriously felt by England'.[50] British propaganda was strong at the League, necessitating constant vigilance: Eoin MacNeill reported in September 1923 that the Japanese delegate had been corrected by his Irish counterpart for erroneously ascribing lesser status to Commonwealth members than to other states.[51] With premeditation, the state registered the Anglo–Irish Treaty with the League as an international rather than a Commonwealth document, intending to pressurise Britain to keep to the terms of the agreement – this was a key factor behind the state's muscular diplomatic propaganda in Geneva.[52] Despite British chagrin (or, perhaps, because of), the elevation of status was excellent diplomatic propaganda, visibly transforming the Anglo–Irish and Commonwealth relationship, as Thomas Johnson TD explained:

> we are a constituent part of that League of Nations, a State independent of other States, and … acceptance of this State into that League involves a great constitutional change not only for us but for Great Britain, and not only for Great Britain but for those other States in relation to Great Britain and in relation to Ireland.[53]

Representatives in European legations strove to make the state distinctive. Cornelius Duane wrote from Berlin that Germans had peculiar ideas about the state, and propaganda was needed to prove Irish people were not Anglophones of uncertain nationality.[54] He reasoned that similarities in the legal system, currency and language made the state 'nothing more than a province of Great Britain', while 'even to an intelligent German the significant story on the passport "British subject by birth"' was a conundrum.[55] In Brussels, O'Kelly found himself vexed by definitions of nationality and status. A

conscientious diplomat, he deplored the lack of accreditation that, despite his influential personal connections and frequent attendance as Irish delegate at prominent events, continued to imply that Britain's legation represented the state, an injurious misconception.[56] O'Kelly was an old-fashioned diplomat of the aristocratic type common in Europe, which may explain why he prized membership of golf, yachting and private clubs, including the *Cercle Gaulois* whose luncheons were attended by many of the diplomatic corps.[57] Tireless in promoting trade links, writing press material and engaging in diplomatic propaganda, his resources were nonetheless too limited to entirely overcome British propaganda.

In 1931, O'Kelly transferred to the new Paris legation, where he was joined by F. H. Boland, one of the first of a new generation of professional diplomats trained in the service. Countering British propaganda meant that O'Kelly spent much time rebutting newspaper editors. Particularly problematic was material supplied from British sources to French newspapers, and he queried whether part-time correspondents in Ireland could write reports for the Francophone press to 'counteract the influence of London on the continental public'.[58] Walshe agreed, but observed that 'Even "La Croix" is content to give Irish Catholic news as it has filtered through English Protestant channels.'[59] A dearth of writers fluent in French left O'Kelly reliant on translators, and he was advised instead to produce a monthly press review for Dublin. Much of that work, analysing the qualities and influence of the French press, fell to Boland. In 1933, Boland astutely noticed that a Belgian and French journalist simultaneously concluded that the state was teetering on the brink of civil war, a not unreasonable assumption given the uncertainty caused by the de Valera–O'Duffy dyad. Boland attributed it to a communiqué released by the British Embassy's press attaché, and pinpointed the 'degree of ignorance which allows the foreign editors to accept as gospel … Irish news … from London' as especially damaging.[60] He suggested that it would help French journalists become authorities on Irish affairs if Irish newspapers published their work.[61]

The state did enjoy an advantage over Britain in the Holy See. In 1930, Charles Bewley surmised that Ireland's presence threatened British interests:

> there may be something in a theory held by some of the diplomatic corps, one of whom said to me: 'England might have broken off relationships if it were not for the fact that Ireland is represented here; because … the Dominions might desire to be represented by the Irish Minister'.[62]

Britain disliked the legation's presence in the Holy See, Bewley claimed,[63] although the hostility must have been recent as McGilligan had noted British approval of the state's intent to formalise diplomatic relations with the papacy in 1929.[64] A self-interested Holy See appreciated the state's presence for its influence on English-speaking Catholics in Britain, America and the dominions. Bewley deduced that Holy See preferred that 'the more

Catholic Dominions may exercise an increasing influence in … the Commonwealth' and wanted to avoid hostilities that threatened papal influence.[65] A degree of interdependency existed between the Holy See and the state, but the former's more nuanced diplomats assumed an unassailably authoritative position.

The impact of the diaspora on American politics and society, and its intense activity from the revolutionary period, offered a tantalising glimpse of the financial and political support diplomacy might realise. Yet, establishing diplomatic links was fraught with Commonwealth difficulties. Canada had established an unexercised right to open a Washington legation.[66] Diarmuid O'Hegarty felt that a ministerial appointment to Washington would augment 'national dignity and be a manifestation to our people here that our status is what we claim it to be and not what the irregulars pretend'. Moreover, it would undermine Irish republican propaganda and prevent exploitation of Irish-American opinion 'by political adventurers'.[67] Before opening a legation, consultation with Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was a prerequisite.[68] The state presented the proposal as a means of reaching out to its expatriate population, and countering republican propaganda that threatened renewed insurrection – a state of affairs that damaged British interests too. A Washington legation, the state lobbied, would benefit the Commonwealth.[69] Eight months later, FitzGerald informed Dáil colleagues that an appointment had progressed from ambition to near-reality, and would boost the state's international prestige and sovereignty.[70]

Imperial conferences

New dignity to the status of our country

Carving an independent identity within the Commonwealth posed a threat to British interests and necessitated support from other dominions and the public. Under Cumann na nGaedheal the state was a reluctant, yet, once inside, committed member, displaying excellent diplomatic skills: 'Her representatives were in the forefront of every move to secure equality not only of status, but also of function. She strengthened greatly the fissiparous tendencies within the Commonwealth.'[71] Nationhood and Commonwealth membership were not mutually exclusive goals. Fianna Fáil governments used the international arena to castigate Britain: 'Ireland now stood upon its dignity, self-righteous upon a platform of fundamental national right.'[72] For Fianna Fáil, a dismembered state was a dismembered nation, and it withdrew in insular protest to lick the festering wound of partition.

Assertive propaganda did not make Cosgrave's governments hostile to Commonwealth interests or Britain. FitzGerald explained that Irish diplomats would 'challenge or question a statement made by a British representative' and this propaganda would effect gradual change in Britain's attitude.[73] Speaking at the state's first appearance at an Imperial Conference, Cosgrave promised co-operation 'with good faith and good-will', assuring delegates that

'We realise our responsibilities, and we are prepared to take over and shoulder the burdens which are common burdens.'[74] His words were supported by the actions of the states' delegates who, over the decade, earned a reputation as dogged negotiators with a firm grasp of detail, and an ability to persuasively put their case.

By the 1926 conference, the state's delegates were gaining experience in diplomacy, and identified four central policies that required skilful diplomatic propaganda: the role of the Governor-General, extra-territorial equality of dominions, the right of the Free State government to advise the monarch on its affairs, and appeals from dominion supreme courts to the Privy Council.[75] The state's official approach of promoting its diplomatic competence was paying dividends:

> The relations … between the Free State and British Delegations could not be more cordial, and … the wheels of Dublin's intercourse with London have run with remarkable smoothness.
>
> In the opinion of the Free State Government this happy condition of affairs can be prolonged indefinitely, with enormous benefit to both countries …[76]

Much of the propaganda concerned behind-the-scenes lobbying and press communication. Diligent preparation of briefing documents ensured diplomatic propaganda successes. Well-briefed delegates could 'keep their arguments before the Committee and … direct its proceedings. They had memoranda for everything … and the Committee often was glad to seize on their … solutions … as a basis of a final settlement'.[77] The Conference final report added 'a new dignity to the status of our country'.[78] Arguments presented by Fitz-Gerald for co-equal status, and by O'Higgins to remove anachronisms relating to the Governor-General and Privy Council proved persuasive. The outcome was positive, and the *Irish Times* commented that 'he would be a churlish Irishman, indeed, who did not recognise the debt that the country and the Empire … owe to its delegates'.[79]

The 1930 Imperial Conference saw a curious attitude from McGilligan. He had a positive disposition towards British officials, typified by genuine warmth in written exchanges with Leo Amery.[80] Yet he displayed combativeness in public announcements. In a broadcast from the conference, he insisted that the state's involvement came from necessity rather than a desire to associate with an old enemy, who had prevented 'every effort made by the people of Ireland to build up a national and economic life of their own'. The state's participation in the Commonwealth was only 'because she believed her national aspirations could be realised to the full within that group'. Though he finally spoke of the ties binding Commonwealth states, it was only after castigating Britons who would make the state subservient again, those of 'the class which for centuries had lived on the slave earnings of Irish peasants working on lands … torn from their ancestors'. Those people, with a well-organised press, sought to foment dissatisfaction 'amongst the small ex-unionist population of the Irish Free State'.[81]

Nonetheless, he acknowledged at the conference's end the strong, cordial ties between the state, the dominions and Britain.[82] Back home, however, this fuelled Fianna Fáil attacks. Fianna Fáil deplored official entertainment of dignitaries during the Conference:

> every enemy this country ever had in Britain; every anti-Irishman in London seemed to be there … Surely it is sufficient to know that we are not a free nation without having the added insult that where an entertainment or reception is held by the Minister everybody who helped to make this country a slave nation, a partition nation, seemed to be there as the guest of the Free State. The whole policy of the Minister for External Affairs … is based upon the assumption that this country being free it is right and proper that those who opposed this freedom in the past should now be welcomed as its friends.[83]

That, precisely, was policy: Fianna Fáil, with its anti-British conditioning, refused to credit it. It was because Cumann na nGaedheal played the diplomatic propaganda game with admirable adroitness, seamlessly incorporating lobbying and persuasive communication, that Fianna Fáil could unashamedly appropriate as its own work the freedom to manoeuvre for greater independence within a few years.

In Ottawa, in 1932, it was Cumann na nGaedheal that lobbed derision from the sidelines. The state saw Imperial Conferences as the last throes of imperial domination, but being newly 'partially independent, they would not let that upset them' and delegates had mellowed sufficiently by 1930 to accept British hospitality for the first time.[84] Such feelings dissipated when Fianna Fáil ascended to office. De Valera was so obsessed with controlling his delegates' negotiations in absentia, that they may have wished for his presence, if only to see whether his will would yield amidst the socialising attached to political diplomacy.[85] FitzGerald accused Fianna Fáil of megaphone diplomacy vis-à-vis withheld payments of the land annuities. Rather than apprise Britain of its intentions, Fianna Fáil pronouncements were made in speeches, which placed the delegates 'in a rather anomalous and undignified position'.[86] Compared with Cumann na nGaedheal's meticulous preparation, Fianna Fáil seemed deliberately amateurish and provocative, creating domestic publicity for themselves, but at the expense of a decade of hard-won diplomatic recognition. It was a distraction to the Conference, and Cosgrave accused Fianna Fáil of having 'treated the country to the degrading spectacle of their own humiliation'.[87] Senator Joseph Connolly, Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, wrote that the delegation returned home with nothing gained or conceded.[88] Only an optimist would have harboured hopes of persuading Britain to forego money it was owed. Connolly harboured a naïve predisposition towards British diplomats, crediting them with nefarious skills that seasoned observers might have thought merely quintessential:

> reared on the traditional history of British astuteness, subtlety and clever diplomacy, I was watching closely to try and detect any evidence of these … Perhaps it was due to my incompetence or that their adroitness or subtlety were so cunningly carried out that they escaped me, but my conclusion at the end of the month was that they did not exist.[89]

A belligerent Fianna Fáil returned empty-handed. The *Irish Times* accused the delegates of failure but blamed de Valera for curbing their authority:

> failure … to secure for the people the benefits which were ready to their hand was not merely deplorable; it was criminal. Let us be just to the delegates. They were given an impossible task. Over the long-distance telephone sounded the crack of the whip and the words of the master calling them to heel.[90]

No official propaganda could hide worsening economic conditions, and a perception that de Valera had miscalculated in discarding diplomatic propaganda for economic warfare. By May 1934, Anglo–Irish relations had plummeted, with de Valera's propaganda dictating that Britain was the aberrant party: 'Apart from the dispute with Great Britain, our relations with all States are friendly.'[91] Common sense, however, prevailed in the response to Ramsey McDonald's invitation to attend the king's jubilee celebrations. While the draft rejection was brutally unsubtle and offensive the official declination was more measured: the government and people rejoiced with Britons, but there would be 'grave misunderstanding if … any representative of our Government were to go to London to participate in the proposed celebrations'. Rejection made it clear that Fianna Fáil viewed creating a republic as essential to the 'well-being of our nation and permanent friendly relations with the people of Britain' and it seems a calculated attempt to further provoke.[92]

Oddly, de Valera was not wedded to the idea of a republic. As far back as 1928, Cumann na nGaedhael TD Hugh Law had remarked that de Valera:

> has in his heart somewhere the image of a perfect Republic … which, it may be, exists in Heaven, but most certainly does not … exist upon earth. In so far as the reality of the Free State falls short of that ideal, Deputy de Valera … is bound to quarrel with it. If it should ever happen that he achieves his idea, his political purpose, he will be as far as ever from his ideal, because no Republic that can be set up … can have that absolute independence which haunts his dreams. It does not exist in this world.[93]

De Valera's republican utopia was not the model that had evolved over centuries; it was a politically expedient form of government acceptable to Britain and unionists: 'The term republic for us connotes the idea of political independence rather than any particular economic or social system.'[94] Within three years, a new constitution would propagate a republic under camouflage.

It was impossible for de Valera to attend the 1937 Imperial Conference: the need for political consistency and maintaining popular support over-rode potential benefits. He excused his absence by portraying his annuities policy as one supporting the Irish people, to whom the money belonged[95] – a peculiar spin as Fianna Fáil collected the monies anyway. His defiance came after prolonged prevarication and even deputies remained uncertain of his intentions. The *Irish Times* quoted one anonymously: 'the Free State will be at the Conference, but not of it'[96] – impressive sophistry, even by Fianna Fáil standards. With a new constitution in the making, and the opportunity to sunder the state's Commonwealth link, Fianna Fáil relied less on diplomatic propaganda and more on easily propagated populism.

The Boundary Commission

Orange deputations … busily engaged in an effort to poison the electors against the Irish settlement

The partitioning of Ireland made inevitable diplomatic tension between the state, Britain and the portion of Ulster cut adrift – temporarily, nationalists hoped. The Anglo–Irish Treaty provided for a commission to revise the border with reference to popular views, and economic and geographic concerns.[97] There was a measure of imprecision in the article that opened the door to a sustained propaganda campaign to influence public opinion to, in turn, influence the three-man commission of Eoin MacNeill, Justice Feetham representing Britain, and J. R. Fisher representing Northern Ireland. The state's official propaganda vehicle, the North Eastern Boundary Bureau under Kevin O'Shiel, initiated propaganda in Britain, concentrating on material disseminated to the Irish, British and international press. O'Shiel felt this would impact on the British government and its chair of the Boundary Commission rather than on unionists, whose implacability rendered them immune to separatist propaganda.[98] Lester took a similar view, but cautioned that international opinion would not accept the state's case until it was a settled, peaceful democracy. Should the Commission adjudicate while civil war raged, 'a great measure of most unenviable publicity would be thrown on the state of affairs in the Saorstát'.[99] Indeed, a new Tory government in July, 1922 cast aspersions on the state's capacity for self-government.[100] With civil war over, Lester advocated a publicity campaign in America, shrewdly calculating that American opinion considerably influenced Britain. Pressure from America and the American press, he suggested, might deflect anti-Irish sentiment in Britain and be popular domestically. He suggested that a government minister pay an unofficial visit to America, or holiday there, to drum up interest and support.[101] The idea had some merit in creating soft news, and was a creative attempt at securing diplomatic propaganda.

James MacNeill, too, espoused indirect propaganda to win British public support, believing public opinion influenced British politicians more than

diplomacy. He recommended cultivating press support by building 'good business relations with newspapers dotted all over the country'.[102] Hugh McCartan, based in MacNeill's office,[103] detailed the Bureau's propaganda efforts by August 1924: some 8,453 copies of five pamphlets had been distributed to Westminster politicians, women's organisations, British, colonial and American newspapers and periodicals, labour organisations, liberal clubs and, curiously, Unitarian and Baptist ministers.[104] The pamphlets concentrated on the justness of the state's case, with an appeal to the British sense of fair play, persuading Britons that the state's case was based on stronger arguments than those propagated by pro-unionist newspapers and politicians. McCartan recommended that the Bureau be authorised to issue statements in its own name. In tune with British political events, he suggested taking advantage of a looming general election to canvass Labour and Liberal organisations for support.[105] McCartan found that the British provincial press expressed willingness to print his letters to the editor, but *The Times*, the *Daily Mail* and the *Observer* refused. Labour and Liberal publication departments offered him 'many valuable suggestions',[106] hinting that, even if formal diplomatic channels were not open, British parliamentary fault lines meant political common ground existed. The Bureau's final report paid tribute to McCartan's work during the election, for producing a weekly bulletin comprising facts rather than emotive discourse, and, especially, for the hundreds of letters to editors he had published in a two-year period.[107] His colleagues may not have recognised the phrase, but McCartan had orchestrated an impressive public diplomacy campaign.

The Bureau's propaganda implies that diplomatic propaganda took second place to public diplomacy. British and Free State diplomacy avoided fanning the flames of renewed conflict, treating each other as distinct entities bound by the ruling of an agreed authority. When reports surfaced that Belfast opinion held that no commission would sit, O'Shiel declared British and Free State determination to reach a resolution on partition.[108] A delegation of MPs visited Dublin, where it was fully occupied meeting delegations and pleased at the freedom accorded to it to do so.[109] The openness of the communication between politicians of both countries suggests that where both were committed to the Commission, persuasive diplomatic propaganda was unnecessary. That did not prevent the Bureau publicly castigating individual politicians like Lloyd George and Birkenhead as partitionists. Nor did it spare Craig and unionists the greater part of its counter-propaganda. The *Irish Independent* reported that the Bureau sought 'to counteract the propaganda of the Orange deputations, who are busily engaged in an effort to poison the electors against the Irish settlement'.[110] The Bureau accused unionists of using economic power to destabilise the Free State, an accusation the *Irish Independent* repeated:

> When the 'Morning Post' and 'Daily Mail' join forces with the Belfast Press, Lord Carson, Ian Macpherson, Mr. Lynn and Ronald McNeill to

> depreciate the credit of the Free State they are acting against the best interests of those they pretend to champion [i.e. southern unionists]. In doing so they prove conclusively the motivation behind their campaign is a purely political one.[111]

Northern propaganda seemed blind to the reality that Britain and the Free State believed a deal was achievable; perhaps such wilful blindness made the border permanent – neither amity nor reasonableness existed where defending Ulster was concerned. Craig averred that the Ulster spirit meant that 'we are one and undivided where the protection of our territory is concerned'.[112] Barely had Northern Ireland transformed vicious nationalist and unionist fighting to mere simmering resentment than Craig declared optimism that the peace and goodwill now evident would spread throughout all Ireland.[113] It was a falsehood, blithely propagandising that Ulster nationalists' rebelliousness against partition had waned. Unionists, Craig told Stormont, were 'unchanged and unchangeable' on the border question.[114] Unionist dogmatism propagated the border's permanence even while the Commission deliberated.

No propaganda was more effective than refusing to engage with the Commission, which forced Westminster to legislate to appoint Fisher to represent the North.[115] Craig deflected praise for nullifying the Commission to the 'spade work of my colleagues and of our representatives in the Imperial Parliament' who were entitled to 'the praise that is due to men who have stuck to their colours'.[116] Not all in Stormont agreed. Samuel Kyle diverted attention from the border towards Ulster's grim poverty, hoping to establish common ground on the island for worker's rights and agriculture.[117] Devlin accused the Minister for Labour of making 'wild and inflammatory speeches' and admonished that when 'speeches are made on public platforms to audiences easily aroused and amongst whom it is easy to create and foster bitter passion, the fewer of these meetings that are held the better'.[118] When the Commission resolved to redraw the boundary with minor gains for the Free State, the report was leaked, and unionist fury fuelled propaganda that outstripped Anglo–Irish diplomacy. Inter-governmental meetings in December 1925, too, failed to reach an agreement, and the temporary border became permanent.[119]

The Holy See legation – playing the religious card in the Economic War

Putting a spoke in the wheels of British propaganda

Formalising relations with the Holy See was valuable: an increased perception of legitimacy at home and abroad would ensue, while the exchange of diplomats would give the administration leverage with an independently minded domestic hierarchy, and influence over the anti-government Irish College in Rome.[120] Strengthening diplomatic ties had historical resonance for the nation. McGilligan cited papal succour for the fled northern Gaelic lords

after the Nine Years War (1594–1603), and support during the 1641 Rebellion, as precedents for closer bonds, and informed the Holy See that diplomatic relations would bring:

> very great satisfaction, not only to the Irish people here … but also to the millions of our race all over the world. It was the feeling of my Government that the Irish Free State should definitely give to the world this sign that the attachment to the things of the spirit which had been the outstanding characteristic of our people in the days of persecution continued to be the chief characteristic of the organised Irish State. It seemed … especially appropriate that this … should take place … when the Centenary of Catholic Emancipation was being celebrated …
>
> I hope every citizen … will regard this … detached from the passing quarrels and jealousies of our time and will welcome the Papal representative as the envoy, not only of the religious head of the vast majority of the Irish race, but also of the oldest and most glorious monarchy in the world.[121]

Fianna Fáil, welcoming closer ties, begrudged arrangements that neglected the whole island. O'Ceallaigh railed that it was humiliating that:

> diplomatic relations can only be re-opened in the name, not of the Ireland that the Popes of by-gone days knew, but of a partitioned country.
>
> We have the very centre of Catholicism, Armagh, the Primatial See of Ireland, cut out and excluded from any connection with the diplomatic relations … It is a humiliating position that … we have to acknowledge that it is England and England's Minister to the Vatican that is entitled to speak in the name of the Primatial See of this Catholic country … It is particularly odious, when sending a representative to the Vatican, that the representative will have to play second fiddle to the British Envoy there.[122]

O'Ceallaigh touched on an issue as symptomatic of Fianna Fáil's Catholic orthodoxy as it was embarrassing to Cumann na nGaedheal, whose diplomatic subterfuge made it vulnerable to criticism:

> You cannot send a Minister to the Vatican without the arrangement … that the Vatican sends a Minister here. … I would like to know … whether those who are very intimately and seriously concerned in this matter … were consulted, for instance, the Primate of All Ireland or the Archbishop of Dublin … Was any bishop or any priest consulted before the Minister made this arrangement. [sic] I would be glad if the Minister would be kind enough to inform us whether these people were consulted and, if so, whether they are satisfied with the arrangement. If they are, so far as the Church is concerned I have nothing further to say …[123]

Once the debates and tortuous negotiations were over, Charles Bewley took his cue from Dublin when presenting his credentials:

> My Government are especially gratified that the re-opening of diplomatic relations … should coincide with … the Centenary of Catholic Emancipation, and realise that the deep significance … is fully present in the mind of your Holiness. For is there any nation in the world whose history can show greater devotion to … Christianity than ours, or … whose history has been so determined … by its attachment to the Catholic Faith and to the Holy See.[124]

By protestations of devotion, and with public policy that was singularly Catholic in outlook, the state quickly settled into diplomatic relations with the Holy See, and began to reap the benefits of having a legation there. This was fortunate, for, when Fianna Fáil fulfilled its promise to withhold the land annuities, the move, while popular domestically, damaged the state's reputation. Bewley advised that in the Holy See the state was seen as the aggressor in the dispute, and counselled that counter-propaganda was essential.[125] He was satisfied that while there was no direct contact between Britain and the Papacy over the dispute, some unfavourable, unofficial reports after the Eucharistic Congress had filtered back to Rome. As the dispute escalated, the tenor of the state's propaganda became pronouncedly more damnatory of Britain. Bewley successfully persuaded Cardinal Pacelli, the Vatican Secretary of State, that Britain started the tariff war to provoke an Irish reaction, and accused Britain of bullying. At least in private audience, Pacelli accepted that, faced with the prospect of Dominions agitating for independence, Britain adopted hard measures 'as a matter of prestige'.[126]

Two months later, Walshe communicated instructions regarding future meetings with Vatican diplomats: Bewley was to stress that de Valera sought complete Irish independence, and would eliminate all forms of British control to achieve it. Though the aim remained a republic, he was to allow de Valera room to manoeuvre and emphasise his 'open mind with regard to State regimes in general'. Economically, Bewley was to promote de Valera's vision of self-sufficiency, full employment and the eradication of poverty according to Catholic principles and papal encyclicals.[127] By emphasising Christian doctrine, de Valera disadvantaged Britain, implying that Ireland produced better Catholics. This was further developed in a communiqué from Bewley, who countered anti-Irish propaganda in an article in the British publication, *The Tablet*, by informing Pacelli that the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster was listed among its proprietors. He told Dublin the tone of English Catholic opinion on Irish affairs could justify appropriate counter-action as the 'accumulation of instances of provocation on the English side should … have a gradual effect on Vatican opinion'.[128] Bewley propagated that British Catholics inclined to nationalism over faith and were less steadfast in religious observance than Irish Catholics, for whom faith and national identity were virtually inseparable.

By then, plans were developing for de Valera's state visit to the Holy See, which promoted good Anglo–Irish relations for its own ends. Bewley reported that Monsignor Ottaviani advised that the Vatican was chary of an Irish visit if relations with Britain remained tense. Ottaviani feared an overtly political visit would be problematic. Papal prescience may have fathomed the symbolism de Valera imbued in the visit, and Bewley reassured the Vatican while again peddling the propaganda of blame, that de Valera:

> would be very reluctant that anyone should connect his journey to Rome with political propaganda. I pointed out … that while the President had always done everything to avoid unnecessary bitterness, he could not guarantee what the British Government might do in the immediate future.'[129]

Communications with the Holy See show that official propaganda became more anti-British as the Economic War continued. In an early radio broadcast for North American audiences, de Valera explained that withholding the annuities was a response to British unwillingness to recognise the state's freedom, but referred to friendship to soften the dispute, blaming 'mischief makers' for misrepresenting state policy as antagonistic, when he sought 'the friendliest relations between Britain and Ireland' that would lead to 'mutual understanding and the readiness to be fair each to the other'.[130] A memorandum for the Washington legation outlined the state's arguments against the annuities. The government's position 'appears to have been misunderstood by a large section of the American press'. A word common to press reports, repudiation, was discomfiting: for the publicity savvy de Valera this was undesirable as it deprived the state of a moral argument and had connotations of welching. The memorandum stated that repudiation was to be considered 'incorrect and improper'.[131]

As the dispute grew in intensity, so did de Valera's propaganda. A broadcast in America castigated Britain for partition: 'Imposed by force, and maintained by subsidies, partition is the worst of all the many crimes committed by British statesmen against the Irish people during the last 750 years.'[132] Around the same time, Connolly was despatched to America on a propaganda mission. Repaying republican loans of the previous decade, which few subscribers had anticipated, gave the state counter-propaganda against British charges that it had defaulted on the annuities. Publicising state solvency, the repayments reinforced the propaganda that Britain had no right to the annuities.[133] Connolly later wondered with little modesty: 'Had I succeeded in putting a spoke in the wheels of British propaganda …?'[134] Within a week of returning to Ireland, he was sent to the World Economic Conference in London, where he orchestrated a publicity stunt: his speech criticising Britain was ruled out of order in the assembly. Consequently, rather than being lost amidst the thrum of debate, it was circulated to an eager press corps.[135] Despite the vehemence of de Valera's propaganda, it was, ultimately,

pressure from affected groups in both countries that forced the governments to negotiate a resolution, although O'Brien gives the Dominions Office credit for its swift action on a perceived softening of de Valera's stance.[136]

IV Conclusion

Within fifteen years of its foundation, the state had established legations in several European countries and America, been elected to the General Council of the League of Nations, become a valued member of the Commonwealth and catalyst for greater sovereignty of the dominions. By persuading domestic audiences of the need for concerted diplomatic effort boosting prestige and international status, the state became less inward-looking. The state was fortunate that Walshe fought doggedly for his department, whose ministers, FitzGerald, McGilligan and de Valera, brought different qualities: from the scholarly esoteric through industry-focussed to hands-on, absolute control. The successes of the legations are harder to assess. As trade legations, they enjoyed some successes, but trade remained stubbornly dependent on Britain. The confusing job titles and roles of the representatives made it difficult for them to breach the diplomatic barriers that bedevilled new states. Nevertheless, despite having only a small network of diplomats, stretched to the limits of their offices by under-resourcing, the state succeeded in establishing legations which became essential in promoting the state's interests abroad. The application of soft power was instrumental in achieving this recognition.

In promoting the state as independent of Britain, Cumann na nGaedheal and Fianna Fáil may have hyped Britain's threat, the latter especially. Britain became a bogeyman, an ever-present threat to independence and sovereignty. The state's diplomatic propaganda was focussed more on counter-propaganda against real or perceived British threats than on boosting the state's international presence. While cutting the Treaty ties that bound both states was achieved, and greater independence than was granted in 1922 secured, the diplomacy that led to that was, perhaps, indicative of a lack of confidence in the state that had emerged. Rather than define the state as what it was, diplomatic propaganda defined it as what it was not: British, a willing member of the Commonwealth, and satisfied with the Treaty. Cumann na nGaedheal attempted a long-term strategy of incremental change, through considered challenges to British authority in Imperial Conferences and at the League. This achieved much, and Anglo–Irish relations, while rarely evincing genuine warmth, were respectful and professional. Fianna Fáil diplomacy antagonised Britain, marginalising her in Irish affairs. For diplomatic propaganda to be effective, establishing common ground was paramount. Fianna Fáil churlishness propagated feigned indignation and arrogance: bluster masked the inadequate preparation for diplomacy that Fianna Fáil could not publicly voice.

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Conclusion

Any dispassionate view of the Free State would hold that propaganda was a common practice of officialdom. It would acknowledge, too, that whatever the economic and social conditions in 1937, it was a stable democracy, far removed from the violent uncertainty of civil war. The state enjoyed some propaganda successes in trade, tourism and diplomacy, while its instruments of defence and security were accepted by a Gaelic, Catholic, Celtic nation in whose image the state was cast. Its politicians were reasonably conversant in the nuances of propaganda as a concept and practice. With modest funding enabling their efforts, they adapted to new forms of media, and became adept at promoting the state, themselves and their parties.

Propaganda created the state twice over. It gave Cumann na nGaedheal the authority derived from public approval to prosecute war against refractory republicans in the state's name and as a Dominion. It then facilitated Fianna Fáil's dismantling of the Anglo-Irish Treaty and creation a softly-whispered republic from the blueprint of dominion status. With the exception of civil war propaganda, a belligerent adjunct to military activity, Free State propaganda was largely free from violent tones. It was not entirely free from vitriol: occasional spats between the two parties attest to that, but official propaganda concentrated on persuasiveness, and control over messages and channels of communication. This refined approach was redolent of Tallents and Grierson, and of Ivy Lee's assertion that propaganda was a fair means of communication.

Leaving party politics aside, Cumann na nGaedheal ministers' propaganda demonstrated belief that they acted in citizens' best interests. That those citizens might have been ignorant of the ministers' good intentions only added to the need to present them with persuasive information designed to win their support. While that information may have represented the desires of an elite identified by Garvin and Regan, nonetheless decisions to stimulate the economy and increase trade and tourism were taken to increase national wealth and prestige. Adopting national coinage, a flag and, however fudged the issue, an anthem, promoted identity and inculcated national pride. That the party, which enjoyed the support and approval of the Catholic church, should have soured that relationship over the opening of the Holy See legation, and been

pointedly snubbed during the Catholic Emancipation celebrations, suggests its propaganda was far from omnipotent.

Fianna Fáil propaganda occasionally strayed into less wholesome territory by venerating the personality of de Valera, but it was generally effected to promote party policies as benefitting citizens. Clearly, those policies differed from Cumann na nGaedheal's, but Fianna Fáil propaganda for wheat growing, turf-cutting and Gaeltacht industries used the same media channels and persuasive messaging as their predecessors. While they differed from previous governmental policies, nevertheless they sought to create prosperity and national pride. Of course, de Valera was a more skilled user, perhaps even manipulator, of the media for propaganda. His period as President saw a remarkable concentration of propaganda power under his control: the Government Information Bureau, 2RN, the Irish Press and, through the Ministry of Justice, censorial restrictions on film and published material gave his governments pervasive resources to promulgate policy to citizens. From 1932, official material on propaganda is hard to locate: record-keeping (contemporaneously, or later by way of expunging files) was either deliberately lax or excessively secretive. That would be sufficient to cast Fianna Fáil propaganda in an unflattering light, yet, while in Ellulian terms, it offered political propaganda compared with Cumann na nGeadheal's sociological, it was also rational and integrational, and never subversive of democracy.

One of the central tenets of propaganda, as Lester understood, was absolute control over the press, yet rarely did either party interfere with the freedom of the press. The civil war necessitated robust censorship, but the presence of many ex-journalists among the state's propagandists probably prevented worse. Access to politicians was granted to press, radio and film journalists and while some control was exerted over recorded interviews this was not unusual, and, indeed, prudent if misrepresentation was to be avoided. The state exercised power indirectly through censorship laws, but never threatened the principle of independent commentary. Despite propaganda being essential to both parties of government, it was in a competitive environment where citizens could choose between official information and freely expressed counterviews. The practice of official propaganda mirrored Ivy Lee's opinion that propaganda was merely the act of placing information from an identifiable source before the public.

Differences emerge between the two parties propaganda style. Cumann na nGaedheal had an exoteric view of propaganda: information was widely disseminated for the broadest possible audience at home and abroad. Fianna Fáil had an esoteric view, preaching to party supporters and building popular support from the electorate as a whole, while, Britain excepted, it was generally less concerned with foreign public opinion. Cumann na nGaedheal looked outwardly to build trade and diplomatic links, using Commonwealth membership as a means to achieve incrementally more independence from Britain. Fianna Fáil were more insular, looking to home markets when the Economic War cut off British markets. With FitzGerald driving early

Cumann na nGaedheal propaganda, the party's strategies were based on principles that were effective during the revolutionary period: attention to detail and accuracy in content were seamlessly added to gentlemanly notions of statesmanship. Fianna Fáil members were more accustomed to rough and tumble insurrectionary propaganda: their relations with Britain and other dominions were turbulent by design. Cumann na nGaedheal made a more successful transition from insurrection to government, but once in government neglected to keep its propaganda combative where necessary; Fianna Fáil, whose handling of the economy and international relations was less assured, used propaganda to create a domestic political powerbase. A clear contrast emerges: Cumann na nGaedheal formed capable governments let down by diffident propaganda; Fianna Fáil were capable propagandists let down by diffident governing.

These circumstances were not either party's fault solely. Finance's notoriously inflexible control over public expenditure created an administration-led approach to public policy that tallied costs and overlooked benefits. Its influence far exceeded its brief, and rendered other ministries subordinate. Propaganda, never understood by the department and rarely held in good odour, suffered badly as funds were grudgingly made available. For Finance, the process and not the end result was the ultimate goal of governing, as instances of obstruction over petty points of principle indicate. Only de Valera managed to check the department's book-keeping pedantry, forcing Finance's compliance by driving policy from cabinet. Finance's thriftiness, coupled with the inexperience of politicians and officials, prevented propaganda from becoming an integral part of statecraft. Politicians had to unlearn the habits of rebellion, when their propaganda focussed against something, and learn to use propaganda to build acceptance of policies and actions. Too much propaganda was reactive: responding to situations and circumstances precluded the good planning that might have built better departmental relationships with Finance. There seems to have been little regard for propaganda as a strategic function, and departments rarely projected a long-term view.

For all their differences, the Free State and Northern Ireland shared common ground in practicing official propaganda. Neither fully grasped propaganda's potency as a means of inculcating an undisturbed social order among a contented citizenry – a central tenet of Lippmann's. Perhaps the circumstances of their foundation, and the smouldering resentment of large numbers of citizens who were socially or politically cast to the margins within both jurisdictions, militated against any truly benevolent form of social engineering. Instead of creating propaganda that was acceptable to minorities, official propaganda seemed incapable of deviating from ill-defined or dogmatic courses. The moral prudishness that attached itself to film propaganda is illustrative: both jurisdictions bowed to doctrinaire Catholicism and Protestantism, and instituted censorship controls that, broadly congruent in mission and purpose, instituted state control over citizens' viewing habits. In trade, too, both jurisdictions displayed single-mindedness bordering on

obsession. The linen industry was a symbol of Ulster wealth, potency, and international prestige. No matter that by the early 1930s it had changed from the starched fabric of a successful economy to a bedraggled handkerchief flapping in capitulation, propaganda funding continued. The Free State had its equivalent in the money thrown into propagating cottage industries that were outmoded and inefficient, but central to Fianna Fáil dogma. Both propagandas were party political considerations that made heroes of the industries and their workers – Ellul's heterodoxical irrationality blended with social mythmaking.

One distinction between propaganda in the two states is that in the Free State propaganda made half-hearted attempts to include those who were not Catholic and nationalists, or simply neglected them. In Ulster, official propaganda was used as a weapon against nationalists and Labour, both threats to unionism. The composition of the principal parties in both jurisdictions may have influenced this: Cumann na nGaedheal and Fianna Fáil had few members who owed their political prominence to careers in industry or commerce, but many whose national record endeared them to ordinary voters, with whom strong affinity was propagated. Many unionists, however, were industrialists or landowners, far removed from the considerations of impoverished shipyard workers, and a swollen Protestant and Catholic underclass, dependent on state subsistence. Unionist politicians' siege mentality, and the propaganda it produced, suggests affinities with none but their own kind: Protestant, propertied and prosperous.

In the final analysis, only one concern matters: did the propaganda of successive governments serve the Free State and its citizens well? On the debit side of the balance sheet lie bare facts: the economy slumped, efforts to promote the Irish language and culture became increasingly ineffectual, and the insularism of the 1930s would take 30 years to surmount. A national culture was inculcated that unquestioningly lionised the revolutionary period and its principal actors, and it would take the fiftieth anniversary of the Easter Rising to spark a reassessment of the state and its origins. To the credit of both Cumann na nGaedheal and Fianna Fáil, their propaganda efforts were intended to promote the best possible view – admittedly, theirs – of nation and state. Extremism was moderated: official propaganda never sought to remove the freedoms of popularly-mandated political parties, and democratic stability emerged. The constancy of the state's political institutions, the acceptance of its citizens of its political status and parties, and the esteem in which it was held abroad are good measures of the success of propaganda. As an uneasy peace in Europe spawned totalitarianism, and an inexorable slide toward conflagration began, the steadiness of the Free State stands in marked contrast. Accordingly, the balance sheet suggests that official propaganda in the Free State was benign and benefited both state and citizen.

Appendix I
Chronology

1912	
April	Third Home Rule Bill is introduced in Westminster.
September	Unionists sign the Solemn League and Covenant in protest.
1913	
January	Ulster Volunteer Force is formed.
November	Irish Volunteers and Citizen Army are formed.
1914	
September	Home Rule Bill suspended before enactment. Irish Volunteers split.
1916	
April	Easter Rising takes place, mainly in Dublin.
May	Execution of rebel leaders turns public opinion against Britain.
1917	
January	Sinn Féin wins first Westminster seat: Count Plunkett is elected in Roscommon by-election.
1918	
December	General election: Sinn Féin pledges to create an Irish parliament and wins seventy-three seats.
1919	
January	Sinn Féin MPs create Dáil Éireann and declare the Irish Republic. War of Independence (also the Anglo–Irish War) breaks out the same day.
May	Dáil sends a statement to the Paris Peace Conference outlining Ireland's case for independence.
June	De Valera embarks on US tour. US Senate passes a motion calling for the Dáil delegation to the Paris Peace Conference to be heard.
November	First issue of the Irish Bulletin.

1920

January	First 'Black and Tans' recruited.
March	Tomás MacCurtain assassinated by Crown Forces.
July	First recruits join the Auxiliary Division of the RIC.
October	Terence McSwiney dies after seventy-four days on hunger strike.
November	Kevin Barry executed.
	Bloody Sunday: IRA assassinate eleven British intelligence officers, wound five and kill two Auxiliaries. Auxiliaries kill fourteen civilians at a football match in Croke Park. Three IRA prisoners shot escaping Dublin Castle.
	Kilmichael ambush: Largest confirmed Crown forces death toll in one engagement. West Cork IRA kill seventeen Auxiliaries.

1921

March	Dáil Éireann declares war on Britain.
June	James Craig becomes Northern Ireland's first prime minister.
July	Truce between IRA and Crown forces.
October	Treaty negotiations begin in London. Irish delegates include Griffith, Collins and Gavan Duffy; British delegates include Lloyd George, Birkenhead, Chamberlain and Churchill.
December	Anglo–Irish Treaty creates the Free State of twenty-six counties.

1922

January	Dáil ratifies Treaty, 64–57, after nine days of acrimonious debates.
	Dublin Castle, centre of British rule, is ceded to the Provisional Government.
May	Anti-Treaty IRA occupy and garrison the Four Courts in Dublin.
June	Pro-Treaty Sinn Féin wins a general election.
	Four Courts garrison issued with ultimatum, and bombarded when they fail to leave. Civil War definitively begins.
August	Harry Boland dies of wounds received in late July.
	An Garda Síochána replace the Civic Guard, itself a replacement for the RIC.
	Griffith dies.
	Collins dies in an ambush in his native County Cork. Mulcahy commands the army.
September	Cosgrave appointed President.
	Government establishes military courts and death penalty for taking up arms against the state.
October	Catholic hierarchy recognises the government as the lawful administration.
December	The Free State, Saorstát Éireann, comes into existence.
	Séan McHale TD is assassinated and Padraic Ó'Máille TD is wounded by IRA. The government extra-judicially executes three prisoners in retaliation

1923

January	Irish becomes a subject for examination in the Civil Service.
February	Anti-Treatyites assassinate the father of Kevin O'Higgins.
April	Frank Aiken becomes IRA Chief of Staff. Ceasefire begins ten days later.
May	Anti-Treaty IRA ordered to dump their arms. Civil War ends.
August	Cumann na nGaedheal forms a minority government. De Valera is arrested canvassing in Clare.
September	Free State joins the League of Nations.
November	Senator W. B. Yeats wins Nobel Prize.

1924

March	Army mutiny is suppressed.
April	Irish Boundary Commission is established to examine the border between North and South.
May	Jack Butler Yeats and Senator Oliver St John Gogarty win silver and bronze medals at the Paris Olympics for art and poetry respectively.
June	Ernest Blythe's austerity budget reduces pensions by 1 shilling per week.
July	Eoin MacNeill (Minister for Education) makes Irish a compulsory subject in schools.
August	Tailteann Games are held in Dublin.

1925

April	The Dáil passes a government proposal to construct a hydroelectric plant on the River Shannon. Siemens is contracted to carry out the engineering works.
November	Boundary Commission report is leaked.
December	Agreement reached that border will be unchanged.

1926

January	2RN begins broadcasting.
April	Census: Free State 2.97 million; Northern Ireland 1.56 million.
May	Fianna Fáil is founded.
July	A Coimisiún na Gaeltacht (Gaeltacht Commission) report recommends the creation of Gaeltachtaí.

1927

May	Agricultural Credit Corporation established.
June	General election: Cumann na nGaedheal win forty-seven seats, Fianna Fáil win forty-four.
July	Kevin O'Higgins is assassinated.
	Countess Markiewicz dies.
August	Fianna Fáil TDs take a Dáil Oath of Allegiance to the King, dismissing it as an empty formula.
	Electricity Supply Board established.

September	General election: Cumann na nGaedheal, sixty-two seats; Fianna Fáil, fifty-seven.
1928	
January	T. M. Healy stands down as Governor-General. James MacNeill replaces him.
July	The tricolour flies at the Olympic Games, despite suggestions to use a different flag as athletes from thirty-two counties represent the state.
August	The Free State signs the Kellogg Peace Pact
	Frank Kellogg, US Secretary of State, receives the Freedom of Dublin on a visit to the state.
September	The state issues its first banknotes.
December	The state issues its first coinage.
1929	
June	300,000 people attend public mass for the centennial celebration of Catholic Emancipation.
July	Censorship of Publications Act enacted.
October	The Shannon hydroelectric plant opens.
1931	
March	FitzGerald reviews the first St Patrick's Day parade in the Free State.
	T. M. Healy dies.
September	First issue of the *Irish Press*.
December	Statute of Westminster gives legislative autonomy to the dominions.
1932	
February	Army Comrades Association founded.
	Fianna Fáil win general election and form government.
June	Fianna Fáil withhold land annuities payments from Britian.
	Eucharistic Congress held in Dublin.
	Final Tailteann Games begin (ending in July).
July	Britain retaliates with trade legislation over land annuities dispute.
	Army Comrades Association renamed National Guard (nicknamed Blueshirts).
November	Repeated Fianna Fáil snubs force James MacNeill to retire as Governor-General.
1933	
February	General election: Fianna Fáil win the Dáil's first overall majority.
	Eoin O'Duffy replaced as Garda Commissioner by Ned Broy.
May	A bill abolishing the Oath of Allegiance passes in the Dáil.
August	National Guard proscribed.
September	Fine Gael founded.

1934	
January	Joseph Devlin dies in Belfast.
December	Coal–Cattle pact with Britain eases some effects of the Economic War.
1935	
February	Import and sale of contraceptives is made illegal.
October	Edward Carson is buried in Belfast.
1936	
May	Inaugural flight of Aer Lingus. The Dáil abolishes the Seanad.
June	De Valera proscribes the IRA.
July	Patrick Hogan TD dies in a car accident. Thomas Grattan Esmonde Osmond dies aged 40.
November	O'Duffy leads 600 Blueshirts to fight for Franco in Spain.
December	De Valera exploits the British abdication crisis to engineer the removal of the Governor-General from the Free State constitution.
1937	
June	General election and plebiscite on a new constitution: Fianna Fáil win the election and a vote in favour of a new constitution, Bunreacht na hÉireann.
December	The new constitution comes into force, replacing the Irish Free State with Éire.

Appendix II
Principal Free State and Northern Irish figures

Free State

Aiken, Frank (1898–1983), revolutionary, politician. Born Armagh, joined Irish Volunteers in 1914. Senior IRA commander in the Anglo–Irish War. Anti-Treaty combatant in the Civil War; as IRA Chief of Staff ordered ceasefire that ended the conflict. First elected to Dáil in 1923, appointed Minister for Defence in 1932. A confidante of DE VALERA, he held other ministries and played a major role in Ireland's contributions at the United Nations. Retired,1973.

Andrews, Christopher Stephen (Todd) (1901–1985), public servant. Interned during Anglo–Irish War, and went on hunger strike. Anti-Treaty combatant, was wounded and interned. Graduated from University College Dublin (1924). Senior public servant in tourism, energy, transportation and broadcasting. Published autobiography in two volumes, *Dublin Made Me* (1979) and *A Man of No Property* (1982).

Ashe, Thomas (1885–1917), revolutionary. Born Kerry, trained as a teacher, taught in Dublin. Commanded an Irish Volunteers unit during Easter Rising. Court-martial death sentence commuted to prison. Released in 1917 and re-arrested; sentenced to one year in prison. Began hunger strike when refused prisoner of war status. Died after forcible feeding.

Barry, Kevin (1902–1920), University College Dublin medical student. Hanged for involvement in an IRA arms raid in Dublin. Lionised in nationalist propaganda, his execution was condemned in Westminster.

Béaslaí, Piaras (b. Percy Frederick Beazley) (1881–1965), journalist, propagandist, author. Liverpool-born member of the IRB. Active in Easter Rising and Anglo–Irish War; IRA director of publicity. Elected to first Dáil, served as army press censor during Civil War. Quit politics in 1923 to devote himself to writing.

Bewley, Charles (1890–1969), Quaker, lawyer, diplomat, poet. Dublin-born, educated at New College, Oxford. Converted to Catholicism. Called to the Irish bar, 1914. Appointed Free State Minister to the Holy See (1929) before posting to Berlin where he became an outspoken supporter of Nazism.

Blythe, Ernest (1889–1975), revolutionary, politician. Born Antrim. Member of the IRB and organiser for Irish Volunteers. Spent large periods imprisoned, including the Easter Rising. Pro-Treaty; Cumann na nGaedheal Minister for Finance, and Posts and Telegraphs. Retired from politics, 1936. Remainder of career devoted to Irish language as publisher, theatre founder and director.

Boland, Frederick Henry (1904–88), diplomat. Educated Trinity College, Dublin and King's Inns; Rockefeller Research Fellow (1926–8); joined External Affairs, 1929, and posted to Paris. Assistant Secretary and Secretary, External Affairs (1938–1950), thereafter ambassador to the UK and United Nations.

Boland, Harry (1887–1922), revolutionary, politician. Born Dublin, participated in Easter Rising. Elected to first Dáil. Accompanied DE VALERA to America in 1919, took anti-Treaty side and was killed during Civil War. Close friend of COLLINS; brother Gerald was also a TD.

Brase, Wilhelm (Fritz) (1875–1940), German bandmaster, composer, first director of Army School of Music. Accepted a commission as Colonel in the Free State army, establishing four bands of outstanding quality. His orchestral score of the national anthem's original sheet music remains the official version.

Broy, Éamonn (Ned) (1887–1972), Garda commissioner. Kildare-born, served in Dublin Metropolitan Police from 1911. Assigned to British secret service in Ireland, from which he supplied information to COLLINS. Appointed Adjutant of the Free State Air Force before resuming police duties. Appointed Garda Commissioner, 1933; President of Irish Olympic Council, 1935. Retired from public life, 1938.

Clandillon, Seamus (1878–1944), broadcaster, public servant. Station director of 2RN (1925). Balladeer and traditional music scholar, he and his wife frequently sang on air, often to mask budgetary shortfalls.

Clarke, Thomas (1857–1916), revolutionary. Main IRB organiser of Easter rising, and signatory of proclamation of a republic. Executed for his part in the rebellion.

Collins, Michael (1890–1922), revolutionary, politician. Born Cork. Joined IRB in London. Easter Rising combatant. After internment became prominent in Sinn Féin, Irish Volunteers and IRB. Minister for Home Affairs, and Finance in first Dáil; IRA director of Organisation and Intelligence during Anglo–Irish War. Delegate to Anglo–Irish Treaty negotiations; Chairman of the Provisional Government created to establish the Free State. Commander-in-chief of Free State army in the Civil War. Killed in action in his native Cork.

Cosgrave, William Thomas (1880–1965), statesman. Dublin-born President of the Executive Council of the Free State. Fought in Easter Rising, death sentence was commuted to penal servitude. Minister for Local Government in first Dáil. Catapulted to prominence as acting chairman of Provisional Government following deaths of GRIFFITH and COLLINS. A stoic, steady hand, he

led the state until 1932 and opposition until retirement (1945). Son, Liam, was Fine Gael leader and Taoiseach.

Cremins, Francis Thomas (Frank) (1885–1975), civil servant, diplomat. Born Tipperary. Served under LESTER and FITZGERALD in External Affairs, before appointment as envoy to League of Nations (1934). Appointed Permanent Representative on Lester's appointment as Secretary-General.

Davidson, J. N. G. (Norris) (1908–1988), film-maker, broadcaster. Graduated from Cambridge, where he edited *Granta*. Worked under John Grierson at the EMB, and for Irish Tourist Association in film propaganda. Broadcast for RTÉ, the national public service broadcaster.

de Valera, Éamon (1882–1975), New York-born revolutionary, statesman. Senior surviving commandant of Easter Rising. Elected to Westminster and president of Sinn Féin, 1917. Elected president of first Dáil. Toured America for most of Anglo–Irish War seeking recognition and funds. Rejected Anglo–Irish Treaty and spent until 1926 in the political wilderness when he founded Fianna Fáil. Won 1932 general election; held office as President of the Executive Council and Taoiseach until 1948. Founded *Irish Press*. Two-term President of Ireland; retired, 1973.

Devoy, John (1842–1928), Fenian, republican, journalist. Emigrated to USA, 1871 (a condition of prison release for Fenian activities). Lifelong campaigner for an Irish republic as newspaper owner, fundraiser and figurehead. Architect of 'new departure' in Irish politics, blending land ownership reform and separatism. Initially welcomed de Valera, but quickly resented his interference in US–Irish politics. Visited Ireland, 1924. Buried Dublin, 1928.

Douglas, James Green (1887–1954), Quaker, businessman, politician. Treasurer of White Cross during Anglo–Irish War. Member of committee that drafted the 1922 constitution, Seanad vice-chairman, 1922–5.

Duffy, George Gavan (1882–1951), lawyer. Chesire-born, practised in Britain, called to Irish bar, 1917. Elected to first Dáil; delegate to Paris Peace Conference with O'CEALLAIGH. Signatory to Anglo–Irish Treaty. Minister for Foreign Affairs in Provisional Government; resigned from Dáil in 1923. Resumed law career; appointed to High Court 1936 (president, 1946); influential voice on drafts of Bunreacht na hÉireann.

Figgis, Darrell (1882–1925), writer, journalist, Sinn Féin activist. Chaired committee that drafted the Free State constitution. His lobbying on behalf of a group seeking a radio broadcast licence while he served on the Oireachtas broadcasting committee caused scandal. Died by suicide in London.

FitzGerald, Desmond (1888–1947), London-born poet, revolutionary, politician. Director of Publicity for first Dáil. Edited *Irish Bulletin*. Pro-Treaty Cumann na nGaedheal Minister for External Affairs, and Defence. Son, Garrett, was Taoiseach, 1981–87.

Gallagher, Frank (*pseud.* David Hogan) (1898–1962), journalist, propagandist, author. Cork-born, wrote for Irish Bulletin during Anglo–Irish War; imprisoned, he published a hunger-strike memoir 'Days of Fear'. Anti-Treatyite in Civil War. DE VALERA's most trusted propagandist, Gallagher

accompanied him to USA, 1928, and was *Irish Press* editor, deputy director of 2RN and twice director of Government Information Bureau.

Gogarty, Oliver St John (1878–1957), otolaryngologist, writer, politician, wit. Inspiration for Buck Mulligan in Joyce's *Ulysses*. Pro-Treatyite, captured by republicans but swam to safety in the river Liffey (to which he presented two swans in gratitude). Attended GRIFFITH at his death and performed autopsy on COLLINS. Co-organiser, Tailteann Games, 1924. Senator, 1922–36; implacable adversary of de Valera.

Griffith, Arthur (1871–1922), journalist, propagandist, political theorist, politician. Proposed a model of self-rule based on Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy. Sinn Féin founder. Imprisoned after Easter Rising, despite not participating. Elected to Westminster, 1917; elected to first Dáil; de facto leader of the republic during DE VALERA's US tour. Led Irish delegation during Anglo–Irish Treaty negotiations. Led Provisional Government when de Valera rejected Treaty. Strain of political responsibility and outbreak of Civil War contributed to his sudden death.

Hayes, Michael (1889–1976), politician, academic and revolutionary. Elected Ceann Comhairle of first Free State Dáil. Senator, 1938–1965. Professor of Irish in University College Dublin from 1951.

Healy, Timothy Michael (1855–1931), politician, King's Council, first Governor-General of the Free State. Elected to Westminster (1880); called to the bar (1884). Recommended for position of Governor-General by Birkenhead and KEVIN O'HIGGINS, his cousin. Retired from public life, 1928.

Heffernan, Michael Richard (1885–1970), politician. First elected to Dáil, 1923 for the Farmers' Party. Parliamentary Secretary to Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, 1927–1932. Stood for Cumann na nGaedheal, but lost seat, 1932.

Hobson, Bulmer (1883–1969), revolutionary, writer. Born Down of Quaker stock. Founded Ulster Literary Theatre; co-founded the extreme republican Dungannon Clubs. Kidnapped by IRB colleagues before Easter Rising because of his preference to keep Irish Volunteers as a deterrence. Gradually withdrew from politics. Senior civil servant until retirement in 1948.

Hogan, Patrick J. (1891–1936), Cumann na nGaedheal TD, served ten years as Minister for Lands and Agriculture. Killed in a car accident while a sitting TD.

Hyde, Douglas (*pseud.* An Craobhín Aoibhinn – the Pleasant Little Branch) (1860–1949), folklorist, linguist, first president of Ireland. Born Roscommon (where his father was a rector); native speakers kindled a love of Irish. Published several volumes of folklore and poetry; co-founded language revival movement the Gaelic League. Professor of Modern Irish in University College Dublin (1909–1932). Senator, 1925–6. Unanimous choice of the Oireachtas for the presidency (1938–1945).

Johnson, Thomas (1872–1963), Liverpool-born trade unionist, politician. First leader of Labour Party in the Free State. Senator, 1928–1938. Remained politically active until 1961.

Kearney, Peadar (1883–1942), Dublin-born songwriter, composed lyrics of national anthem. Active in Easter Rising, interned during Anglo–Irish War; played no further role in public life.

Kiernan, Thomas J. (1897–1967), Dublin-born author, diplomat. Ph.D. from London University. Secretary to Free State High Commission in London (1924), returning to Dublin as 2RN director. Ambassador to Holy See, Australia, West Germany, Canada and the USA.

Lemass, Seán (1899–1971), revolutionary, statesman. Fought under DE VALERA in Easter Rising, interned during Anglo–Irish War and Civil War. Elected Sinn Féin TD, 1925, founder member of Fianna Fáil, 1926. Appointed Minister of Industry and Commerce, 1932. Promoted state intervention to develop national industry, notably through state-owned commercial enterprises. As Taoiseach, 1959–1966, oversaw remarkable economic and international development.

Lester, Seán (1888–1959), journalist, propagandist, diplomat. Member of Gaelic League and IRB, a rarity for a Northern Protestant. Served in Publicity Department in External Affairs; appointed Irish delegate to League of Nations, 1929. League's High Commissioner for Danzig, gaining international stature for resisting Nazism. Served with distinction as the League's last Secretary-General.

Macaulay, William J. Babington (1893–1964), diplomat. Attended Sorbonne; served in British Naval Reserve in Great War. Transferred from British civil service to Free State. Appointed to Washington legation, holding various positions from 1925–34. Minister to Holy See, 1934–1941.

MacCurtain, Tomás (1884–1920), revolutionary. Member of Sinn Féin, Irish Volunteers and IRB. Elected Lord Mayor of Cork, January, 1920, murdered two months later. A coroner's jury returned a verdict of wilful murder against the RIC.

MacEntee, Séan (1889–1984), politician. Born Belfast, socialist, Easter Rising combatant, reprieved of death sentence. Elected to first Dáil, anti-Treaty combatant in Civil War. Founder member Fianna Fáil, appointed Minister for Finance, 1932 (first of eleven appointments to the office); also served as Minister for Local Government and Health, Industry and Commerce, and Health. Early radicalism gave way to later conservatism. Appointed Knight Grand Cross of the Pian Order.

MacNeill, Eoin (1867–1945), Celtic scholar, patriot. Born Antrim. Co-founded Gaelic League with HYDE. Professor of Early Irish History at University College, Dublin from 1908. Chief of Staff of Irish Volunteers' separatist wing. Opposed Easter Rising. Served as Minister for Finance, and Industries in first Dáil, and Education in Free State Dáil. Lost seat in 1927; left politics to concentrate on scholarship. Brother of JAMES and father-in-law of TIERNEY.

MacNeill, James (1869–1938), diplomat, Governor-General. Served in Indian civil service, returned to Ireland and joined Sinn Féin. Appointed the state's High Commissioner in London, 1923, and Governor-General, 1928–32. Brother of EOIN.

MacSwiney, Mary (1872–1942), republican. Sinn Féin activist, travelled to US, 1920, to testify before American Commission on conditions in Ireland. Elected TD for Cork after death of her brother, TERENCE. Opposed Anglo–Irish Treaty, imprisoned during Civil War. Withdrew support from DE VALERA when he founded Fianna Fáil. Rejected the state's legitimacy for remainder of her life.

MacSwiney, Terence (1879–1920), revolutionary, writer. Full-time organiser for Irish Volunteers in his native Cork. Elected to first Dáil, he also succeeded MACCURTAIN as Cork Lord Mayor on his death. Arrested five months later and sentenced to two years in jail, he began a hunger strike immediately, dying after seventy-four days.

MacWhite, Michael (1883–1958), diplomat. Decorated French Foreign Legion veteran. Returned to Ireland after Great War; appointed state's representative to League of Nations (1921). Instrumental in registering Anglo–Irish Treaty with the League. Posted to US, 1929, and Rome, 1938, first as minister and latterly ambassador. Retired from public life, 1950.

Markiewicz, Countess Constance *née* Gore Booth (1868–1927), revolutionary. Born London, educated on family estate in Sligo. Presented at court of Victoria. Studied art and married fellow artist Count Casimir Dunin-Markiewicz in London, 1900. Joined Sinn Féin and Inghinidhe na hÉireann, 1908. Second-in-command in Irish Citizen's Army during Easter Rising. A court martial death sentence was reprieved. First woman elected to Westminster, 1918. Appointed Minister for Labour in first Dáil. Opposed and campaigned against Anglo–Irish Treaty; joined Fianna Fáil, 1926; elected to Dáil, 1927, but died a TD-elect.

McElligott, James J. (1893–1974), revolutionary, civil servant. Assistant Secretary in Finance, 1923–7, Secretary 1927–1953, Governor of Central Bank, 1953–1960. Conservative economics and restrained public expenditure typified his career.

McGilligan, Patrick (1889–1979), politician, lawyer, academic. Cumann na nGaedheal Minister for Industry and Commerce, approved construction of a hydroelectric plant on river Shannon and created Electricity Supply Board. Also Minister for External Affairs. Assiduous tactician for increasing dominions' power at Imperial Conferences; co-drafted Statute of Westminster. Appointed Professor of Law, University College Dublin (1934). Attorney General, 1954–7.

McRory, Joseph (1861–1945), Tyrone-born Archbishop of Armagh and Primate of All Ireland (1928); Cardinal from 1929.

Mulcahy, General Richard (1886–1971), soldier, politician. Fought outside Dublin during Easter Rising and was interned. IRA chief of staff during Anglo–Irish War; Commander-in-Chief of Free State army after COLLINS' death. Minister for Defence, and Local Government in Free State, and Education between 1948 and 1957, during which he was Fine Gael leader.

O'Ceallaigh, Seán T. (*also* Seán T. O'Kelly), revolutionary, politician, President of Ireland. Fought in Easter Rising, despatched to Paris, Rome and

US, 1919–1922 to seek support for Irish republic. Founder member of Fianna Fáil. Served as Minister for Local Government and Public Health, Finance, and Tánaiste, 1932–1945. Succeeded HYDE as president, 1945–1959.

O'Deirg, Tomás (1897–1956), minor revolutionary figure. Came to prominence as Fianna Fáil Minister for Education, and Lands, serving two terms in both ministries.

O'Duffy, General Eoin (1892–1944), soldier, Garda commissioner, politician. IRA Director of Organisation in Anglo–Irish War, briefly succeeding MULCAHY as Chief of Staff (1922) before becoming Garda Commissioner. Led force to impressive policing, sporting and cultural achievements. Removed from office by Fianna Fáil (1933); turned to politics with fascistic Army Comrades Association. Briefly led Fine Gael, but fascist tendencies saw him lead a pro-Franco Irish Brigade to Spanish Civil War. Retired from public life on his return.

O'Hegarty, Diarmuid (1892–1958), revolutionary and civil servant. Secretary to first Dáil, and secretary to Irish delegation during Anglo–Irish Treaty talks. Secretary to Executive Council, he was COSGRAVE'S principal private secretary.

O'Higgins, Kevin Christopher (1892–1927), politician. Minister for Economic Affairs in Provisional Government, and Minister for Home Affairs (retitled Justice, 1924) in Executive Council. Civil War defence of executing captured republicans as a deterrent against assassinations of public figures led to the retaliatory murder of his father. Politically conservative, he oversaw the creation of An Garda Síochána, and alcohol and censorship legislation; played a distinguished role in Imperial Conferences. Assassinated, 1927.

O'Kelly de Gallagh, Count Gerald Edward (1890–1968), diplomat, count of the Holy Roman Empire, Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour (France) and Order of Christ (Portugal). Great War veteran despatched by GRIFFITH to plead Ireland's case at League of Nations, 1919. Free State representative in Belgium, and Minister to France. Retired from service in 1935; acted as special counsellor to Irish legation in German-occupied France. Resumed diplomatic career as chargé d'affaires in Lisbon in 1948.

O'Reilly, Frank (1884–1957), secretary of Catholic Truth Society of Ireland. Secretary of Catholic Emancipation Centenary committee; director of Eucharistic Congress (1932). Knight Commander of the Order of St Gregory the Great.

O'Shiel, Kevin Roantree (1891–1970), lawyer, civil servant, author. Born Tyrone, educated Trinity College, Dublin and King's Inns. Member of Irish Volunteers, but did not participate in Easter rising. Joined Sinn Féin, 1917; helped draft Free State constitution; liaised with League of Nations for state membership. Legal advisor to government, 1922–3; director of North Eastern Boundary Bureau, 1922–5. Civil servant until retirement in 1963.

Osmond, Sir Thomas Grattan Esmonde, 12th Baronet (1896–1936), diplomat, politician. Elected Cumann na nGaedheal TD, 1923.

Pearse, Margaret (1878–1968), teacher, politician. Sister of PATRICK and William. Helped found St Enda's school and ran it after their executions. TD, 1933–7; Senator, 1938–1968. Bequeathed St Enda's to the state as a memorial to her brothers.

Pearse, Patrick Henry (1879–1916), educationalist, writer, revolutionary. Called to bar but practised briefly. Established experimental anti-authoritarian school St Enda's in response to flaws in Irish education. Gaelic scholar and linguist; edited journal of the Gaelic League; wrote prolifically in English and Irish. One of seven signatories of the proclamation of Irish Republic, Easter 1916; simultaneously Commander in Chief of republican forces, and President of Provisional Government. Court-martialled and executed.

Smiddy, Timothy (1875–1962), economist, academic, diplomat. Close associate of COLLINS for whom he was economic adviser. Appointed Minister to USA, leaving his role as Professor of Economics in University College Cork. Later High Commissioner in London, and adviser to Fianna Fáil governments in 1930s and 1940s.

Tierney, Michael (1894–1975), academic, politician (TD and Senator). President, University College Dublin, 1947–1964. Married Eiblín, daughter of EOIN MACNEILL

Tone, Theobald Wolfe (1763–1798), father of Irish republicanism. Founding member of the non-sectarian United Irishmen. Sought French aid for a rebellion against British rule, and captured. Died by suicide awaiting execution.

Traynor, Oscar (1886–1963), politician. Easter Rising combatant, Civil War anti-Treatyite. Elected to Dáil, 1925. Fianna Fáil Minister for Posts and Telegraphs (1936–9); subsequently Defence and Justice. President of (association) Football Association of Ireland, 1948–1963.

Walsh, James Joseph (J. J.) (1880–1948) politician and sports administrator. Born Cork; sentenced to death after Easter Rising. Elected to first Dáil; arrested and not released until 1921. Founding member of Cumann na nGaedheal; Postmaster General 1922–4 (reconstituted as Department of Posts and Telegraphs). Driving force behind Tailteann Games revival; quit politics, 1927.

Walshe, Joseph (1886–1956), civil servant. Graduated University College Dublin (M.A., French). Entered Jesuits, but left pre-ordination. Recruited to republican legation in Paris, 1919. Appointed Assistant Secretary and later Secretary of External Affairs; appointed Ambassador to Holy See, 1946.

Northern Ireland

Barbour, Sir John Milne, first Baronet (1868–1951), politician. Born Antrim into a wealthy linen manufacturing family. Elected to Stormont, 1921. Appointed Minister of Commerce, 1937.

Bates, Sir Richard Dawson (1876–1949), politician. Organised 1912 Ulster Solemn League and Covenant. Member of Stormont Parliament, 1921–1949,

Minister for Home Affairs for all but the last six years. Overshadowed by CARSON and CRAIG, was a towering force in Unionist politics. Knighted, 1921, baronetcy, 1937.

Brooke, Basil, first Viscount Brookeborough (1888–1973), politician. Born Fermanagh, educated at Sandhurst, M.C. and Croix de Guerre in Great War. Entered politics, 1924, elected to Stormont, 1929. Protégé of CRAIG, who appointed him Minister for Agriculture; Prime Minister, 1943–1963.

Campbell, Lloyd (1868–1950), businessman, politician. Managing director of Henry Campbell and Co., a flax spinning enterprise. Unionist member of Stormont, 1921–9.

Carson, Edward (1854–1935), Dublin-born lawyer, politician. Cross-examination of Oscar Wilde in Marquess of Queensbury's libel proceedings typified his brilliance at the bar. As MP, led Ulster Unionists in Westminster from 1910. Advocated defeating Home Rule by illegal means if necessary. Succeeded in gaining a derogation from Home Rule for six counties of Ulster, which led to Northern Ireland's creation in 1920. Knighted, 1900, took a life peerage, 1921.

Craig, James, first Viscount Craigavon (1871–1940), stockbroker, Boer War veteran. Entered politics on return to Ulster, elected to Westminster, 1906. Second to CARSON in organising Home Rule resistance. First Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, 1921. Cordial in relations with Free State. Premiership typified by light-handed oversight of his ministers, allowing hardliners like BATES to legislate for a Protestant, Unionist hegemony. Made a peer, 1927.

Devlin, Joseph (1871–1934), politician. Elected to Westminster, 1902 as Irish Parliamentary Party MP after a career in journalism. Led Nationalist Party at Stormont from 1921.

Hayward, Richard (1892–1964), Lancashire-born actor and entertainer. Member of Orange Order; had ecumenical appreciation of Irish culture north and south.

Kyle, Samuel (Sam) (1884–1962), politician, trade unionist. Member of Northern Ireland Labour Party, elected to Stormont in 1925 and led a loose cluster of Labour, independent and nationalist in opposition. Senior trade union official in Free State, 1932; served five years in Seanad from 1943.

Appendix III
Glossary

Aer Lingus An anglicised rendering of *Aer Loingeas* ('Air Fleet') the national airline.
Aer Rianta Air Ways, a state-owned company overseeing commercial aviation and control of airports.
Amhrán na bhFiann *The Soldier's Song*, the national anthem.
An Cosantóir *The Defender*, the army journal.
An Garda Síochána Guardians of the Peace, the police force. In the singular, an officer is a Garda, in the plural, Gardaí.
An t-Óglach *The Volunteer*, a former army magazine.
Aonach an Gharda The Garda Festival, an annual police sports event.
Árd Fheis High Council, the annual conference of many Irish political parties.
Bunreacht na hÉireann The Irish Constitution.
Cathaoirleach Chairman, the chairperson of Seanad Éireann.
Ceann Comhairle Head Counsel, the chairperson of Dáil Éireann.
Comhlucht Siúicre Éireann Irish Sugar Company, a state-owned sugar beet processor.
Cumann na mBan The Women's Council, a female auxiliary to the IRA.
Cumann na nGaedheal Society of the Gaels, a political party and precursor of Fine Gael.
Dáil Éireann The Assembly of Ireland, the lower house of parliament, abridged to 'an Dáil' or 'the Dáil'.
Fáinne Ring. A circular-shaped lapel pin denoting the wearer's fluency in the Irish language.
Fianna Fáil Soldiers of Destiny, a political party.
Fine Gael The Tribe of the Irish, a political party. Formed after the merger of Cumann na nGaedheal, the National Centre Party and the National Guard.
Gaeltacht (pl. Gaeltachtaí) A region where Irish is the principal spoken language.
Guth an Gharda *The Garda's Voice*, a former Garda magazine.
Iris an Gharda *The Garda Magazine.*

Na Fianna Éireann Warriors of Ireland, a militaristic republican youth movement.

Poitín Poteen, an illicit spirit distilled from potatoes.

Seanad Éireann Senate of Ireland, the upper house of the Irish parliament.

Saorstát Éireann The Irish Free State.

Sinn Féin 'Ourselves', a political party.

Solus Teoranta Light Ltd, a state-owned light-bulb manufacturing and sales enterprise.

Tailteann Derived from *Tailte*, a mythological Celtic queen.

Tánaiste The heir to a clan chieftain or king. Now the title of the deputy prime minister.

Taoiseach Chieftain or leader of a clan. Now the title of the prime minister.

Teachta Dála Deputy to the Assembly, a member of the national parliament, abbreviated to the post-nominal 'TD' or rendered as the pre-nominal 'Deputy'.

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