POLITICAL SCIENCE REVITALIZED

FILLING THE JIGSAW PUZZLE WITH METATHEORY



Michael Haas

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dedicated to David Easton (1917–2014)

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Preface

While studying political science at Stanford and Yale in the early 1960s, behavioralism was the rage. As an undergraduate, I was first introduced to knowledge produced by behavioralists in a course taught by John Bunzel. As a graduate student, I was most influenced by behavioralists Robert Dahl, Karl Deutsch, Heinz Eulau, Robert Lane, and Robert North. At the same time, my undergraduate experience with Charles Drekmeier and graduate courses with Fred Watkins caused me to appreciate political theory. I accepted behavioralism with a certain grain of salt, and said so in 1966 as a conference paper, later published, with the title “A Neotraditional Plea to Some Political Behavioralists.” The thesis was that behavioralists were not really as scientific as they pretended and that traditional research in political science should not be forgotten, including policy-relevant research. I was joined by political scientist Ted Becker in some of the permutations of the essay (Haas 1967; Haas and Becker 1970a,b). When a behavioralist took exception to the critique, I then wrote “Three Types of Science” (1969) as a response in a major journal, arguing that every discipline should have room for theory, research, and policy applications.

But political science is now described as a “jigsaw puzzle” that nobody seems to want to solve (Sigelman 2006b, v). I perhaps should accept blame, because I was the first one to propose Sections while a member of a committee to rewrite the APSA constitution during 1970. Since my retirement from the University of Hawai‘i after some thirty-five years, I have been pondering how to provoke the profession into such a transformation. Now that is the aim of the present volume.

Behavioralism was opposed for good reasons by postbehavioralists, who stressed policy relevance at the time of the Civil Rights Movement and Vietnam War. But there was a nihilist streak among some postbehavioralists, who later turned to variants of postmodernism, poststructuralism, and constructivism to deny that any objective science of politics was possible. But more recently, the once-rebellious constructivists have rediscovered the value of some of the concepts of the behavioralists. The concept of “security community” of Karl Deutsch and associates (1957), for example, has been embraced as a viable concept by constructivists Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998), and many more examples are found herein.

Consequently, the worm may have turned back to the scientific pretensions of the behavioralists, albeit with much deserved self-conscious skepticism. To provide a guide in that direction, I authored *Polity and Society: Metaphilosophical Underpinnings of Social Science Paradigms* (1992). I was therefore chagrined when the book made no impact except for congratulations from the field of philosophy. The centrifugal directions of political science in the 1990s meant that a centripetal book was unwelcome.

Today, the situation is different. The American Political Science Association has gone beyond a century of existence. So has the nominally premier journal, the *American Political Science Review*. Although many political scientists published ecumenical essays in the one hundredth

volume of the *Review*, they did not bring the profession together but instead celebrated diversity and pluralism within the profession. The present volume, therefore, is designed to make such an effort—to find a way to integrate the pieces of the "jigsaw puzzle" into a coherent whole. In doing so, I borrow from a fleeting term in the writing of David Easton—the term "neobehavioralism."

Chapters in the present volume reflect my thinking over the years along the lines of neobehavioralism. What I mean by the term is that political scientists not only can link theory with research with policy but also try to integrate all three elements in any publication. I do not know whether political science can ever be a "science," and I accept criticisms in that regard, but I hope to prove that a political scientist can proceed creatively, modestly, and productively to expand horizons of the field while motivated by the fundamental quest to improve humanity and the planet earth. Before political science is or wants to be a "science," in my opinion, scholars must first create a symbiotic discipline.

I have cited the jigsaw pieces of some of my own writings as references in the present volume to provide examples of how a neobehavioralist can operate. The first chapter herein harks back to chapters in the book that I edited with Henry Kariel, *Approaches to the Study of Political Science* (1970). I once wrote an article on the need for sections in the profession, but after submitting the essay, I withdrew the item from consideration when sections were approved. Parts of that article now appear in chapter 2.

Parts II and III consists of chapters on paradigms, which were expanded from my *Polity and Society* (1992) in my recent *International Relations Theory: Competing Empirical Paradigms* (2016b). In the latter volume, I stress the relevance to international studies, but the present volume focuses more on other subfields of political science, though overlap is inevitable.

Using the trichotomy of Auguste Comte (1830–1842), international relations is mostly at the theological stage, mired in ideological thinking, while the rest of political science is largely at the empirical stage. The third (metatheoretical or paradigmatic) stage is advanced by the present volume.

Political science does indeed have several macrotheories (paradigms) that can form the basis for a truly theoretical science—theories, that is, with research and policy implications. To prove that political scientists have been doing research that could be integrated paradigmatically, I decided to cite relevant research from the literature of prominent journals for the years 2000, 2008, and 2016. Except for the Rational Choice paradigm, many authors seem entirely unaware of the larger paradigmatic implications of their recent research. Yet their contributions are far more numerous than those that have sought to prove rationality in political decision-making.

Part IV develops the essentials of neobehavioralism—multimethodology, cross-testing theory, and a set of neobehavioral principles. Readers are challenged to find a better way to integrate political science today.

Having written a book that spans many fields, I want to take this opportunity particularly to thank the input of David Easton, whose thinking has been aligned with mine for over fifty years even though we first met in 2013. The six political scientists cited above also deserve credit for steering toward theoretical science in disparate ways. Thanks also go to Jeffrey Berry for information that I obtained while writing was in progress, and especially for the encouragement of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Bill Crotty, and Patrick James. Bruce's paradigmatic vision, carried through in rigorous research, makes him in my opinion the foremost political scientist alive today. Steven Eson of the American Political Science Association also deserves credit for updating information in Table 2.3.

I provide no footnotes, preferring to put entre nous asides inside parentheses. I have tried to make the prose snappy, but jargon is always abundant in a theoretical book. The book is incomplete, not developing the paradigms to the fullest, because each one deserves its own more comprehensive book. The aim here is to provide a window into the future of political science.

Michael Haas
Los Angeles

Part I

THREE TYPES OF SCIENCE

Is political science a science? If political science is a science, then the discipline should have three symbiotic characteristics common to any other science. At one level, scientists make observations. engineer changes in the real world, and calibrate measuring instruments. At a second level, they search for relationships between two or more variables across several cases in order to establish generalizations that will serve as predictive guides to the future and to cases yet unexamined. Yet myriad generalizations do not cumulatively add up to higher and higher levels of scientific achievement until scientists consider macroanalytic explanations for empirical findings, smoothing out the idiosyncrasies of particular empirical investigations into parsimonious paradigms or metatheories concerning how the “real world” is organized.

The three types of endeavor are known as *applied (clinical) science*, *empirical science*, and *theoretical science*. They need each other to become a self-correcting activity.

Insofar as political science might be considered a science, theories should be used as covering laws to explain why significant phenomena are interconnected. Theories should inspire empirical research. Empirical tests of theories, using cases or data, should be undertaken to refine accepted

theories and to discard theories that are less explanatory. And the knowledge thus gained should be applied successfully to actual problems, making for a better world. Theory should not be idle speculation, in other words, but serve as a predictive guide leading to tests of hypotheses, whereupon theory can be corrected based on evidence. Meanwhile, better real-world outcomes would result as knowledge is applied.

Sometimes science involves inductive generation of hypotheses for testing from theoretical frameworks. At other times, data are collected, generalizations are determined, and then creative minds deduce macrotheoretical explanations to fit empirical generalizations. Deviant cases that fall outside existing generalizations and theories should stimulate efforts to find broader explanations so to encompass all phenomena within a single paradigm.

The present book is designed to present political science as a science, though one not necessarily paralleling the natural sciences. Part I, devoted to analyses of the state of the discipline of political science, begins in chapter 1 with an historiography that examines how political science emerged more than a century ago, tried to lead to a more scientific discipline, and has not yet fulfilled the original promise. Chapter 2 discusses the way political science has been organized into subfields, which are now much more diverse than in the early days of the discipline.

Parts II and III are devoted to theoretical political science, delineating metatheories (paradigms). Part IV urges political scientists to become neobehavioralists by returning to the vision that began the field by integrating all three types of science symbiotically.

Chapter 1

Political Science

A Contested History

The history of political science attests to shifting overemphases in one or two of the three facets of the scientific enterprise (theoretical, empirical, applied). Preacademic systematic political speculation, for example, was largely theoretical in the writings of the moral philosophers but clinically applied when they inspired policy changes and constitutions.

The intellectual history of political science can be described as changes in approaches to the subject, just as historiographies can be characterized as efforts to justify one emphasis over another (Dryzek and Leonard 1995). Hitherto, most histories of political science have been conventional (e.g., Almond 1996; APSA 2011). An objective way to show shifting foci over time is to content-analyze essays in the premier journal, the *American Political Science Review* (*APSR*), decade-by-decade, starting with the first year of publication. One such compilation, reconfigured from Lee Sigelman (2006b, Table 1.1), shows the relative share of theoretical (speculation about the essence of reality), empirical (efforts to achieve generalizations based on evidence), and clinical (applied) policy analyses.

A tabulation based on a somewhat different coding by John Wahlke (1978, 10) for 1968–1977 demonstrates that the preponderance of empirical studies was only challenged during the period of World War II, when the focus shifted to analyses of specific policies and normative considerations (Table 1.1). Theory building, which lags behind empirical studies, has increased in recent decades largely because of the advent of such trends as formal modeling and constructivism.

But a statistical snapshot does not provide the full story. Although the analysis of political philosophy as a response to the issues of the day has been labeled "historicism" (Easton 1953), many political scientists have ignored the diverse historical contexts in which the discipline arose and has responded over the years. Whereas some histories of political science emphasize endogenous developments (Hoxie et al. 1955; Crick 1959; Somit and Tanenhaus 1967; Waldo 1975; Berndtson 1987; Baer, Jewell, and Sigelman 1991; Freeman 1991; Blyth 2006; Dryzek 2006; Gunnell 2006), major trends have often reflected events or needs of the time (cf. Marks 2009), so the following review of the intellectual history of the field is somewhat different—by focusing on how the discipline responded to political conditions within various eras.

Table 1.1 Approaches to the Study of Political Science (in percent per decade)

Years	*Theoretical*	*Empircal*	*Clinical*	*Other*
1906–16	0.0%	82.1%	10.4%	7.3%
1917–26	**2.6**	**54.7**	**20.5**	**22.2**
1927–36	**4.9**	**61.8**	**9.1**	**20.3**
1937–46				

	7.5	**39.6**	**22.6**	**30.1**
1947–56	**7.8**	**64.7**	**8.2**	**19.2**
1957–66	**8.8**	**62.3**	**2.8**	**26.0**
1967–76	**16.9**	**67.6**	**0.5**	**15.0**
1977–86	**17.4**	**60.7**	**0.5**	**21.4**
1987–96	**24.0**	**55.3**	**0.3**	**21.2**
1997–06	**21.0**	**83.7**	**0.2**	**25.0**
Total	**14.2**	**60.6**	**4.1**	**21.1**

Source: Sigelman (2006b: Table 1)

ORIGINS

Although Aristotle has been identified as the “father of political science” (Corwin 1929, 570), histories of the field often leap to political philosophy during the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. Eric Voegelin, however, has traced

the discussion to the Middle East, Greece, the Mongols, Rome, Sumeria, and beyond in a six-volume compendium, *Order and History* (1956–1989) and an eight-volume *History of Political Ideas* (1998–1999), for which *The New Science of Politics* (1987) was intended as a prologue.

The first self-identified political scientist was Francis Lieber. After being imprisoned in Prussia for opposing the monarchy, Lieber immigrated to Boston in 1827. Educated broadly at the University of Jena, with a dissertation in mathematics, his main early academic achievement in the United States was to edit the *Encyclopedia Americana*. A public intellectual of the day, he was consulted by Alexis de Tocqueville. After twenty years as a professor of history and political economics at the South Carolina College, he was recruited by Columbia College in 1857. He then was asked to call his new position Professor of History and Political Science (Haddow 1939), though he was within the Department of Jurisprudence. Having served in the Napoleonic Wars and the Greek Independence War, he was well aware of the indignities of military operations. President Abraham Lincoln commissioned Lieber's most famous work—the *Lieber Code*—about war crimes (Lieber 1863). Lincoln was concerned that abuses committed by the Union army could erode support in the North for the war. Lieber codified existing international custom and treaty law, paving the way for the later adoption of the Geneva Conventions.

Lieber wrote about such subjects as civil liberties, constitutions, ideologies (individualism, internationalism, nationalism, socialism), juries, penal reform, political ethics, property rights, and protectionism, thus demonstrating that the burgeoning American democracy was a fit subject for dispassionate analysis. In 1865, internecine politics at Columbia resulted in a new title—Professor of Constitutional History and Public Law (Rozwadowski 1988). When he died in 1872, he had been the arbitrator chosen by México and the United States to resolve various issues between the two

countries. His speeches and writings, many clinical in orientation rather than examples of empirical or theoretical science, generated respect for a discipline that he singly coined into existence. Lieber brought a legal approach from his European education to America, and the initial study of politics was embedded within the fields of law, philosophy, and political economy.

The outbreak of the Civil War, for many observers, proved that American democracy had failed. Lincoln hoped that the victory of the North would provide a new birth of freedom for the country, but the devastation and loss of life was so overwhelming that the country's survival as a democracy was in question. According to the terms of the surrender of the Confederate States of America, the government in Washington was charged with the responsibility of transitioning states in the former Confederacy to compliance with constitutional principles, which soon consisted of Amendments 13, 14, and 15. State building in the defeated South was on the political agenda in Congress.

Accordingly, the academic community stepped forward in 1865 with the formation of the American Social Science Association (ASSA). To help the American state while advancing scholarship, ASSA was divided into five fields: (1) education and art, (2) health, (3) trade and finance, (4) social economy, and (5) jurisprudence.

Due to the so-called Compromise of 1877, occupying federal troops were withdrawn from the South. The social experiment to bring former slaves into the modern world was squelched. But the trade union and suffragette movements were pressing demands for reform on Washington. By this time, Germany had become the paragon state—with an efficient bureaucracy presumably untainted by political influence, universal male suffrage, and welfare policies that visionaries in other countries were seeking to emulate.

The field of political economy, though recognized in the early nineteenth century from the writings of Adam Smith (1776) and others, was an untenable marriage of two disciplines because many American classical economists felt that politics interfered with their models of the economy, thrusting those studying government into a second-class academic citizenship that the latter could not abide (cf. Gunnell 2006, 480). The result was the beginning of new academic units focusing on government and politics.

Herbert Baxter Adams started the Department of History and Political Science when Johns Hopkins University began in 1876. In 1883, he founded *The Johns Hopkins Studies in Historical and Political Science* as the first scholarly journal in political science.

In 1876, John William Burgess was appointed at a position in the Law School at Columbia, four years after Lieber died. Then, in 1880, Burgess was allowed to occupy the position vacated by Lieber, and he founded the first separate academic unit devoted solely to political science. According to Burgess (1916), “My first idea in regard to a School of Political Science in the U.S. came to consciousness during the horrors of our Civil War, and I resolved then to dedicate myself, should I outlive that struggle, to the work of promoting a better political education in our country.”

Harvard, Princeton, and other universities soon launched departments of government or political science, though not by a generally agreed original design (Morgenthau 1955, 436–37). They carefully taught courses about government that did not encroach on existing departments elsewhere in the social sciences.

The most famous research study of the day was published as *Congressional Government* (1885) by Professor Woodrow Wilson of Princeton University. His study of Congress explained that deference to seniority in Congress empowered committee chairs to rule regardless of public opinion or even presidential preferences. In other words,

Wilson “discovered” the fact that informal relations were key to an understanding of how politics operates. He was impressed not only by British parliamentary democracy but also by Germany’s separation between politics and administration (cf. Blyth 2006). The focus of political scientists at the time was on state building (Berndtsen 1987, 55) in the North as well as the South.

One reason for the new faculty of political science at Columbia University was to apply knowledge about politics in preparing students for careers in diplomacy, legislation, public administration, and law (see Table 2.1). As new papers were written in the field, the *Political Science Quarterly* (PSQ) was founded in 1886. The next journal of interest to political scientists was *Studies in History, Economics and Public Law*, which was launched in 1891 at Columbia.

In 1889, Edmund James of the University of Pennsylvania —“Penn”—tried to return to ASSA’s interdisciplinary spirit by founding the American Academy of Political and Social Science, including a journal, the *Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science*, which began publication in 1890. James sought to advance public policy through scientific research. Issues of *Annals* ever since have focused on specific policy questions, hoping also to invite political leaders to contribute essays. Initially, the “academy” consisted of Penn, Bryn Mayr, and Swarthmore. However, James left Penn in 1895, and the effort made less impact than originally anticipated.

As ASSA developed, the disciplines were too diverse to communicate through a common jargon. Economics broke away in 1885, recoiling from the biases of political science Social Darwinists, especially William Graham Sumner. Wilson’s institutional analysis exemplified the predominant mode of scholarship when the American Political Science Association (APSA) was formed in 1903. Wilson’s student, W.W. Willoughby (1904, 35), was seeking to launch a

discipline that would develop a science that would positively influence policy in a democratic direction. He believed that institutional analysis should be the model for research rather than the legalistic approach adopted by prior scholarly writing about politics (such as by Francis Lieber).

Then, in 1906, Willoughby, a professor at Johns Hopkins, founded the *American Political Science Review* (*APSR*) so that there would be a learned journal for the new academic field beyond the academic gatekeepers at Columbia and Penn. He also arranged to publish Proceedings of APSA meetings. In time *APSR*'s diversity overshadowed PSQ.

Canada was the second country to form a political science association (in 1913), followed by Finland (1935), China (1932), and India (1938). Britain and other countries did not found a political science association until after World War II, so the foundations of the academic field were primarily laid by American scholars. The International Political Science Association was established in 1949, aiming to link the various national bodies and encourage more.

During the period up to the end of the nineteenth century, American political scientists focused on the state, using institutional analysis. Wilson's concern that public opinion had no role because of the existence of fiefdoms in Congress was soon overwhelmed by a new concern—corruption in American politics.

Under unregulated capitalism, ruthless entrepreneurs Andrew Carnegie, Cornelius Vanderbilt, and John D. Rockefeller became so powerful that they could cause depressions, hire private police to shoot striking workers, buy politicians, and contribute money to universities. Although their donations helped to build up major universities (the University of Chicago for Rockefeller), their greed to amass wealth was demonstrated by firing workers and forcing those employed to work longer hours. A populist movement emerged in the Democratic Party, while a faction

of the Republican Party also appealed to the popular discontent, and the Progressive Movement was born.

THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT

The Progressive Movement was formed to bring greater democracy by restraining corporate dominance in the economy, which in turn was controlling Congress and bureaucrats within the executive branch. Political machines also arose in large cities to secure votes by handouts to voters, and even reputedly put a president into office (William McKinley). Progressives sought structural reforms—such as the initiative, the recall, and the referendum—to pursue the idealistic goal of perfecting citizen rule. The ascendency of Theodore Roosevelt brought about Progressive reforms of various sorts, greatly expanding the role of government, but Roosevelt had to contend with interests in his own party that supported big business.

A. Lawrence Lowell, the fifth APSA president, identified the "objective" of political science as primarily "moral, that is the improvement of government" (Lowell 1910, 14). He also indicated that the quest for political science was to "discover the principles that govern . . . political relations" (p. 15). According to retrospective historians of political science, the goal was to perfect democracy (Easton, Gunnell, and Stein 1995), which Gabriel Almond (1996) sanitized as "development and modernization" (APSA 2011, 26).

Although supporting Progressive aims, political scientist Arthur Bentley saw business influence in government as something inevitable. In *The Process of Government* (1908), Bentley's relatively turgid prose captured the empirical essence of the new political arena in Washington. His book's subtitle was *A Study of Social Pressures.* However, Bentley had little immediate influence in political science. After his doctorate from Johns Hopkins, he worked as a journalist in

Chicago with only a part-time teaching position at the University of Chicago. Then, in 1911, he retired at the age of 40 to a small town in Indiana to write a few obscure epistemological essays (Bentley 1926, 1932, 1935, 1941, 1954) while corresponding with John Dewey, whom he met while teaching at the University of Chicago along with many other thinkers of the day. Although continuing contact by mail led to a joint publication (Dewey and Bentley 1949), the Pressure Group paradigm presented in his major work gradually began to dominate political science.

A book with a more immediate impact was *Human Nature in Politics* (1909) by Graham Wallas, an English social psychologist and leader in the moderate socialist Fabian Society. Wallas believed that the adverse impact of the industrial revolution on workers required political change short of the communist thinking of Karl Marx.

Charles Merriam embraced the approaches of Bentley and Wallas as methodological templates for research in politics and as an insight for his own personal involvement in politics. Merriam, who in 1900 joined the University of Chicago after completing his doctorate at Columbia, became involved in Chicago politics, including his unsuccessful race for mayor in 1919, thereby learning the genius of Bentley's theory the hard way. Merriam thus understood that institutional analysis typified by Wilson's study of the locus of congressional power not only was incomplete without examining group politics but also needed to be expanded by identifying how voters make up their minds. His seminal book, *Non-Voting: Causes and Methods of Control* (1924), a study of groups that were not organized sufficiently to apply political pressure, prompted him to advocate voter education as an essential element for perfecting democracy (Merriam 1931, 1934).

World War I knocked Germany off the pedestal as the most admired state. Critical of the prior focus on state and sovereignty, Merriam sought to use statistics, imitate the

natural sciences, make predictions, and develop a better theory of democracy (cf. Blyth 2006; Gunnell 2007). Appointed in 1900 as the first political scientist at Chicago, he chaired the department for three decades from 1911, the year Bentley went into retirement, Merriam then recruited political scientists who sought to engage in empirical science with policy implications.

In his *New Aspects of Politics* (1925, 132), Merriam characterized the development of political science as going through four stages: (1) The era of political philosophy from Plato to 1850 was a priori and inductive in approach. (2) From 1850 to 1900, political scientists were comparative and historical in focus. (3) From 1900 to 1925, Merriam saw political science developing an interest in measurement and observation. (4) In what he called "the new political science," he posited that psychological approaches would emerge next. Merriam was impressed with the scientific progress of psychology under the banner "behaviorism" and used the term "political behavioristic psychology" to refer to his own focus, though such critics as Edwin Corwin (1929, 586–91) were skeptical.

Merriam's innovative approach was labeled the "Chicago School of Political Science." Heinz Eulau was once shocked on reading the assertion that the main thrust of behavioralism was "moral" (Haas 1970b, 13), whereupon he was reminded of the efforts of Merriam and particularly Harold Lasswell, to whom the book containing that assertion was dedicated. But he was right in another sense: The term "behavioralism" was not widely used until after World War II.

Lasswell, perhaps the most famous student of the Chicago School, focused on psychological aspects of politics (Lasswell 1930). Whereas Max Weber (1919) articulated the notion that politics is the study of power, Lasswell began to redefine the scope of political science in expansive Aristotelian terms to include the study of who gets what, when, and how (Lasswell 1936) and later who gets

influence, a term identifying eight components—power, affection, enlightenment, respect, rectitude, skill, wealth, and well-being (Lasswell 1951b,c). His “agglutinative hypothesis,” that those on top in the ranking on one value tend to be on top on all eight (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950), was decidedly oriented toward policy.

During the 1920s and 1930s, most political science departments were engaged in institutional or philosophical analysis without assembling data for purposes of generalization. The thrust of the Chicago School to engage in empirical studies of political behavior was slowly accepted as graduates left Chicago to populate and stimulate other political science departments (cf. Heaney and Hansen 2006). Gabriel Almond, for example, was hired at Princeton. V.O. Key went to Harvard. Columbia welcomed David Truman. Herbert Simon joined the faculty at Carnegie Tech. And Avery Leiserson ended up at Vanderbilt.

The Great Depression stimulated many intellectuals to believe that capitalism was outmoded. Although the New Deal of Franklin Delano Roosevelt may have saved capitalism by fulfilling the moral goals to which the Chicago School had long been dedicated, few political scientists were members of Roosevelt’s braintrust of twenty close advisers, who were mostly business executives, economists, or lawyers. One exception, Frances Perkins, had an M.A. in political science from Columbia. Another, Raymond Moley, who had a Ph.D. from Columbia, later became a critic of the New Deal.

In 1935, meanwhile, the Gallup Poll began to launch studies of political opinions, using a methodology of carefully formulated questions administered randomly to represent the entire population of the United States. Social psychologists at Columbia University were then able to initiate systematic studies correlating demographic characteristics with voter preferences (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944). Political scientists were thereby exposed

as failing to employ the simplest quantitative techniques to study an issue central to their concerns.

Due to the rise of Nazism, brilliant scholars from Europe moved to the United States. Although they possessed a liberal education that spanned many fields of inquiry, including philosophy, those interested in politics enrolled in graduate political science programs to achieve American doctorates. Their impact on the profession was thus delayed until after the war (cf. Loewenberg 2006).

WORLD WAR II

During World War II, many top political scientists were called upon to assist in the war effort (cf. Friedrich 1947; Freeman 1991). However, in Washington, they discovered that their social science colleagues in economics and psychology were listened to and acted upon, whereas the advice of political scientists was questioned. A major reason was that there was no scientific database or set of definitive studies to which political scientists could refer in making policy recommendations. Economics and psychology, in contrast, had advanced along well-established scientific lines. Political scientists could only debate and express preferences based on legal or moral grounds. They could not offer predictions based on solid evidence, though some worked on propaganda, notably Gabriel Almond and Harold Lasswell. The latter had developed a theory for studying propaganda based on the experience of World War I while still at Chicago (Lasswell 1927a, 1927b, 1949).

After the war, Almond utilized his experience in analyzing propaganda in a book that sought to answer why communism appealed to so many voters in Western Europe (Almond 1954). Lasswell continued his interest in propaganda even up to the 1970s (Lasswell, Lerner, and Speier 1979). But Lasswell was then more interested in developing the social sciences methodologically into a

“policy science” (Lerner and Lasswell 1951; Lasswell 1951a, 1971). Yet he was hired by the Yale Law School, not by the political science department at Yale, and his influence faded by the early 1960s.

Political science grew in postwar Europe and elsewhere as democratic regimes emerged (e.g., Easton, Gunnell, and Graziano 1991; Easton Gunnell, and Stein 1995). Coming out of the war, political scientists realized that the field needed reform. Systematic studies were needed. But the moral basis of political science was soon suspect in the United States.

PURGING ACADEMIA

The triumph of the Soviet Union throughout Eastern Europe and China within East Asia posed challenges to the world order in which the United States was the only capitalist superpower. While Communist parties were securing large percentages of the votes in France and Italy, the fear arose in the United States that some Americans were sympathetic to Marxist or Soviet influence and thus were somehow responsible for the rise of Communist power in the world. Both Democrats and Republicans were concerned, and investigations at Harvard and elsewhere sought to identify those who were using their positions to influence the younger generation with “radical” ideas. Some faculty lost their academic jobs (cf. Hochschild 2013; Macfarquhar 2013; Rosenfeld 2012). Perhaps the most famous faculty member to suffer discrimination for his views within academia was political sociologist C. Wright Mills, author of *The Power Elite* (1956). Mills was appointed to Columbia College but was not permitted to teach graduate students as a member of the Columbia University faculty.

In response, a new orthodoxy arose—that political science research must be value-free. Normative research nosedived (Table 1.1). When the word “should” was uttered during a

Ph.D. oral examination in 1961, John Bunzel of Stanford echoed the word querulously as if to stop such heresy. The moral quest carried over from the Chicago School was now gagged, as times were very different. What was soon called the “behavioralist revolution” began with the view that any specification of moral or policy implications was dangerous and unscientific. A common theme in the literature at the time was stability (Berndtson 1987, 56). As Rogers Smith (2004) later argued, the Cold War focused American political science on defending American democracy rather than critiquing its shortcomings in regard to diversity and inequality.

THE BEHAVIORALIST REVOLUTION

After World War II, Lasswell was among the first to urge political scientists to pursue empirical studies. His *Analysis of Political Behavior* (1948) tried to set the agenda, but the profession muddled along. Chicago School graduates did not yet constitute a critical mass to propagate a new approach. Borrowing a word from psychology, empirical scientists in the mold of the Chicago School were now calling themselves “behavioralists.”

Endless empirical studies did not impress the new behavioralists. David Easton (1951) called for a general theory of political science that would bring together normative and empirical theory. Pendleton Herring (1953, 968–72) wanted political scientists to deepen their analyses “from the symptoms to the causes” by pursuing theory. Easton, similarly, critiqued political science in his *The Political System* (1953) as afflicted by “hyperfactualism,” by which he meant that political scientists were piling up facts in study after study without integrating them theoretically. He urged comparative studies rather than individual case studies. Defining “politics” as the “authoritative allocation of values” (aware of Lasswell’s delineation of eight values in

1951), Easton tried to develop an input-output model for the political system as a starting point for theoretical speculation, following the structural-functional approach of Talcott Parsons (1951) in sociology.

Soon, Gabriel Almond applied structural-functionalism as a framework for systematic comparison across diverse political systems (Almond 1956; Almond and Coleman 1960). Although similar frameworks were developed for the study of international relations (Haas 1965a, 1974, ch9), none of the structural-functional frameworks ever developed into a serious metatheory. They were just approaches and frameworks, not deductive theories generating hypotheses to be tested or deriving predictions to guide policy. Their apparent aim, according to Easton (1965a), was to find the reason for equilibrium in political systems.

Almond, Easton, Herring, and Lasswell were supported in principle by political scientists who wanted to develop the discipline into the realm of theoretical science by developing metatheories that could be constructed and tested through empirical scientific studies in which theoretical concepts would be operationalized with reliable and valid statistical indicators. That was the essence of behavioralism.

The theoretical vision of Karl Deutsch, who had left Europe in 1938, was perhaps the most sophisticated. He developed a theory with cybernetic roots that he called the communication theory of politics (Deutsch 1953, 1954; Deutsch et al. 1957) and wrote about the “nerves” of government” (1966). Meanwhile, sociological theory was making inroads into political science.

Although Deutsch and the older behavioralists had not been schooled in statistics, they encouraged younger scholars to test hypotheses based on theories—that is, to engage in empirical science. Whereas Deutsch (1953) plotted variables in univariate graphs, the collection of data by the United Nations (UN) across countries on measures of

economics, health, and other variables provided vast databases for study. The counter-sorter had been developed as a machine that could place punch cards into one of twelve slots on each of many columns, such that a variable in one column could be rerun to determine the correlational relationship with another variable on another column.

Using the counter-sorter, political scientists at the University of Michigan decided to study voting behavior in the early 1950s (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954). The most empirical branch of political science at the time, the origin of the variables to be measured was not derived from an explicit metatheory (cf. Converse 2006). Although some may believe that a major difference between the old and new behavioralists was that Bentley and Merriam focused on groups (pressure groups, political parties), whereas the new behavioralists focused on individuals (Dryzek 2006, 488), the fact is that both Merriam and early Lasswell studied voters and leaders, respectively.

From the mid-1950s, younger scholars were inspired to become behavioralists by learning how to plot variables and even how to compute bivariate relationships. Soon, package programs for statistical analysis were disseminated to universities around the country. As computers became more powerful from the mid-1960s, bivariate correlations could be replaced by multivariate analyses, and behavioralists became increasingly sophisticated quantitatively.

By 1961, behavioralism had established a certain degree of hegemony in political science. Indeed, when Robert Dahl became president of the APSA, he delivered a presidential address entitled “The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest” (Dahl 1961a). The so-called traditionalists, he believed, had lost in the dialectical struggle to occupy center stage in political science.

John Kennedy became president in 1961, followed by Lyndon Johnson in 1963. Both were committed to using

government to correct social problems. Johnson's War on Poverty was associated with new, untested government programs. Social scientists were thereby encouraged to study how to alleviate poverty. Some behavioralists believed that objective, value-free political research which yielded predictions would fit the bill.

Meanwhile, Stanford's Robert North wanted to predict the onset of war by content-analyzing messages of leaders, a subject that he pursued collaboratively for many years, beginning with a Ford Foundation grant (cf. Zinnes, North, and Koch 1961).

In 1962, David Easton characterized the behavioralist creed in a volume on the "limits of behavioralism." The essence of behavioralist research was eightfold:

1. A search for regularities
2. Verification of generalizations through research
3. Refinement of research techniques
4. Quantification
5. Value-free research
6. Intertwining of research with empirical theory
7. Research as an objective guide to policy-making
8. Interdisciplinarity

Later, Easton (1991, 7–8) shortened the list to six elements, leaving out (4) and (8) while revising (7) to mean that pure theory should be developed before applying theory. In other words, he seemed more interested in using theoretical science as a guide to empirical science. Policy relevance lagged behind.

A further transformational event in the development of empirical political science came in 1965, when the National Science Foundation (NSF) for the first time classified political science as a discipline worthy of governmental support, following earlier grants to behavioralist political scientists by the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the

Social Science Research Council (Hauptmann 2006). The race was on for empirical political scientists to apply for grants, promising to make new discoveries through existing databases or to develop new ones. Those who won the grants could employ staff for the drudgery of data collection and analysis but, more importantly, had funds to support graduate students doing that drudgery to follow in their footsteps. Empirical political science now had the economic resources to overshadow traditional political science (Carey 1972; Rasmussen 1972).

Word spread throughout the political science profession that the subfield of political theory was obsolescing because not based on empiricism (Cobban 1953). Political theorists were understandably anti-behavioralist, especially followers of theorist Leo Strauss, who after his appointment in 1949 became a shining light at—of all places—the University of Chicago. Merriam had retired in 1940, and the department was reshaped into a more traditional mold thereafter, though Easton was still on the faculty.

Metatheories of the day, however, were underdeveloped. The behavioralist agenda to amass evidence along the lines of Easton's quest for a unified theory of political science led to even more hyperfactualism, not theory building. The behavioralist epistemology was inductive—tests of hypotheses were undertaken for middle-range theory (Merton 1949), which some expected would some day build toward higher-level metatheory. In the meanwhile, policy implications were taboo.

Ideally, empirical scientific findings could inductively develop into the framework of a theoretical science, whereupon the epistemology could reverse and become deductive: A metatheory would make predictions about phenomena not yet studied, hypotheses could be deduced from the theory, and testing of hypotheses could confirm or lead to improvements in the metatheory. Alas, behavioralist political science never rose above mid-level theories and

remained stuck in empirical science. Due to the positivistic strain within behavioralism, those who assembled databases often eschewed metatheory, believing that theory is inherently unobservable and therefore alien to empiricism.

The result in the 1950s was a backlash from traditionalists, who argued that behavioralists were pedestrian, shallow, and not relevant to the great issues of politics. Fierce battles raged within some political science departments (Merelman 2003).

Bermard Crick (1959), looking at American political science from an English perspective, argued that behavioralists were so busy seeking to perfect democracy through scientific means that they did not understand the contradiction—that seeking the normative goal of democracy deprived them of the objectivity required of any scientist (cf. Seidelman 1985). Other critiques of behavioralism emerged from political theorists (Smith 1957; Storing 1962; McCoy and Playford 1967), who were trying to salvage their besieged yet important craft from potential oblivion.

In 1966, James Robinson ratified the central thrust of behavioralism by editing the first issue of the *Annual Review of Political Science*, a journal with literature reviews on particular topics, such as community power, crisis decision-making, and international integration. But his last issue came out in 1975, when postbehavioralism had achieved dominance in the profession.

Meanwhile, David Easton (1966) was celebrating "alternative strategies in theoretical research." As the excesses of behavioralism's victory became apparent, the essay "A Neotraditional Plea to Some Behavioralists in International Relations" was presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association. James Rosenau, in the audience at the time, urged publication, and the title changed to "Bridge Building in International

Relations: A Neotraditional Plea" (Haas 1967). In essence, the essay said that traditional political science remained a productive pursuit, while behavioralist political scientists had not really advanced very far, should not disrespect their traditional colleagues, and that policy implications had unfortunately been forgotten by behavioralists.

Then, Sheldon Wolin (1969) wrote one of the most forceful defenses of the need for classical political theory in an essay with the Weberian title "Political Theory as a Vocation." When the neotraditional thesis was generalized to all political science, using the term "multimethodological" to sketch out a new vision for the field (Haas and Becker 1970a,b), the critique was that behavioralists were

1. interested mainly in general or regular properties,
2. discounted the utility and validity of impressionistic accounts,
3. imposed procrustean models upon reality,
4. invented a jargon that impeded communication, and
5. were unable to make useful policy recommendations.

But neither the neotraditional nor the multimethodological essays caught on, though one scholar much later oddly characterized the effort as "perspectivism" (Lapid 1989, 242). The critique was aimed at a synthesis between the two traditions, recognizing the value of each.

The neotraditional–multimethodological critique was later echoed by John Wahlke (1978), who observed that behavioralists were "prebehavioral" because

1. research was on a narrow range of research questions;
2. theory was largely ignored;
3. the focus was on micro-level phenomena, ignoring other levels of analysis;
4. the preoccupation was on attitudes, ignoring behavior; and
5. research had simplistic views about opinions.

POSTBEHAVIORALISM

Riots in the Black ghettoes of major cities in the United States and mass protests against Washington's intervention in the Vietnamese Civil War in the late 1960s soon overtook the profession. As streets were filled with protests over racial inequality and military involvement in Vietnam, the anti-behavioralist backlash morphed in the late 1960s into postbehavioralism, which questioned the relevance of behavioralist research to the major policy issues of the day. A new dialectic emerged—a generation more radical than when the traditionalists proclaimed opposition to behavioralism. Under the banner "postbehavioralism," there was an attack on political science "positivism" for studying patterns rather than policies (cf. Barrow 2002).

In 1968, APSA launched a new journal, later retitled as *P.S.: Political Science & Politics*, officially to provide such professional information as conferences, available fellowships and grants, and celebrations of achievements of APSA members (Kirkpatrick 1968). In actuality, *P.S.* was then used as an outlet for postbehavioralists (Lowi 1972, 20).

Postbehavioralists were opposing behavioralism as "scientistic." The main postbehavioral concern was that political science was not promoting needed political change through policy-relevant studies. A group known as the Caucus for a New Political Science was formed in 1967 to challenge the APSA establishment, seen as an old boy network of distinguished scholars primarily at private universities who had recognized one another as leaders on the frontiers of the discipline, and always ended up as members of the governing Council.

But postbehavioralists went beyond mere scholarly dissent. Meetings of the APSA, usually boring exercises, became alive, as Caucus members and others demanded the adoption of motions and resolutions (Freeman 1991, 30).

Whereas boycotts, teach-ins, and protests emerged across college campuses, shouting matches emerged to disrupt APSA proceedings as well as those of regional political science associations. Postbehavioralists particularly demanded that professional political science organizations should take a stand against the Vietnam War. While those who grew up during the anti-Communist purge of the late 1940s were still committed to a value-free discipline, the younger scholars had only a vague awareness of such a time. And many older members of the profession failed to realize why younger political scientists were so upset.

Particularly, after the Tet Offensive of 1968, the younger scholars realized that their friends and students were being drafted to defend a regime in South Vietnam that was not worth dying for—and some were indeed dying every day. Meanwhile, some political scientists who opposed the war lost their jobs in yet another purge, this time of “radicals” who were presumed to be fomenting campus unrest (cf. Parenti 2006).

In 1969, only eight years after Dahl proclaimed a victory for behavioralism, David Easton’s presidential address to the APSA approvingly codified the essence of the postbehavioralist revolution into seven points (Easton 1970, 512–13):

1. Substance must precede technique.
2. Scholars should go beyond the conservatism of merely stating empirical regularities.
3. Political science should study the real desires and needs of humanity.
4. All studies should be aware of their value premises and alternatives.
5. The role of intellectual scholarship should be to protect the humane values of civilization.
6. Knowledge must serve moral purposes.

7. Political science research must be relevant to the conflicts and struggles of the day.

Clearly, Easton agreed with the multimethodological thesis that behavioralism had gotten off track by forgetting that the profession should be relevant to public policy concerns, but he evidently had lost his enthusiasm for developing a theoretical science. Behavioralists had fallen out of touch by repudiating the policy science that Lasswell had been trying to promote for decades (cf. Farr, Hacker, and Kazee 2006).

Seeking to quell the unrest through reform of the discipline, Easton as president of APSA appointed a special committee in 1969 to revise the APSA's constitution. But the chair, Aaron Wildavsky, detested raucous postbehavioralists as "radical egalitarians." When a member of the Wildavsky Committee proposed that APSA adopt sections, which would excite interest beyond the "sacred cow" subfield categories used to organize panels at political science conventions, committee member David Apter insisted that there were no sacred cows in the profession, dismissed the idea, and no one else on the committee was interested in listening to the plea that other disciplines had exciting opportunities at conventions to cumulate knowledge within major subject areas by institutionalizing sections. The subtext was that the Caucus for a New Political Science was to be denied legitimacy. When Wildavsky finally presented a newly drafted constitution in 1971, the text had little relevance to the unrest in the profession, and he was booed while presenting the committee's report to the annual APSA convention's business meeting, which rejected the proposed changes.

In 1971, Heinz Eulau was nominated by the Governing Council to be the next APSA president, but he feared that he could be defeated by anti-behavioralist critic Christian Bay (1965), who was nominated by the Caucus in the first-ever contested election. Although Eulau won, the Caucus tried in

1972 to nominate another “insurgent” candidate for the APSA presidency—Hans Morgenthau. That same year, the Caucus for a New Political Science was first allowed to sponsor panels at the APSA convention as one of several “unaffiliated groups.” Finally, in 1975, the Caucus marshaled majority support to elect James McGregor Burns as president, though he was not really one of them. Not until the election of African American Matthew Holden, Jr., in 1998 did a truly postbehavioralist scholar receive the blessing of the establishment, which nominated him and was doubtless pleased that his views were then much more akin to the professional mainstream (cf. Holden 2000).

Meanwhile, Warren Phillips, asked “Where have all the theories gone?” (Phillips 1974). His plea was that students of international relations and political science were ignoring excellent opportunities to advance the discipline into a theoretical science. Whereas behavioralists sought an empirical science, and postbehavioralists were more policy oriented (clinical) in orientation, supporters of the theoretical science promoted by some postwar behavioralists had become orphans, without a movement, an organized group, or a section. Theoretical pursuits waned.

In August 1976, Samuel Patterson and John Turner of the APSA Council proposed that the 1977 Program Committee “explore the degree of interest in beginning to organize continuing sections” for the annual APSA program. The reasons for their request included a desire to provide greater clarity and continuity in the program and to permit scholars working in various subfields to participate more fully in defining the panel topics. As co-chairs of the 1977 Annual APSA Meeting, James Q. Wilson and Harvey Mansfield (1977), reluctantly and with some private misgivings, raised the question as to whether APSA should have “permanent, or semi-permanent, sections,” pointing to examples of professional associations in anthropology,

psychology, and sociology. Initially, they proposed eleven fields, but they ended up with fifteen topics for the program. Although APSA decided not to formalize a set of sections at the 1977 Annual Meeting, the program structure stabilized for a time.

One effect of the postbehavioralist rejection of behavioralist research was that APSA membership began a precipitous decline. To stem the tide of defections, in 1981, APSA finally decided to allow organized sections (Lasso 1998, 836). The sections, in turn, sponsored panels, taking the burden off program chairs. But sections, limited to a minimum of 250 members, soon developed their own establishments. The Caucus for a New Political Science finally became a Section.

THE MALAISE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

The acceptance of sections, rather than bringing about more respect for disciplinary diversity, produced a divided discipline. Whatever unity political science ever had was lost. By 1986, when Nelson Polsby revived the *Annual Review of Political Science*, as a locus for "significant developments," he admitted "there is no single main stream" in political science (Polsby 1986). The journal began with literature reviews on specialized subjects, not subfields, and no major theoretical paradigms were featured.

By then, bridges between behavioralists and postbehavioralists were much less travelled, if at all, but that was not a major problem. Pages of the *APSR*, filled with statistical tables in deference to behavioralist research, were increasingly incomprehensible to those focusing on traditional analyses as well as on public policy issues. But that was not the problem either.

Instead, Gabriel Almond (1988) blew the whistle on the profession in an essay "Separate Tables: Schools and Sects of Political Science." He pointed out that the problem was

not just a proliferation of sections or what was later called a jigsaw puzzle of scholarship (Sigelman 2006b, v). Instead, he identified a matrix of rival ideological and methodological divisions within the profession. In his edited book *A Discipline Divided* (1990), various contributors gave detailed analyses of major works with hard versus soft methodology, on the one hand, and leftist versus rightist ideology, on the other hand, a table with four categories (Table 1.2).

Almond felt that the various divisions within political science had developed their own dogmas, jargon, and methodological orthodoxies with no intention of coming out of their foxholes to debate or share with others. The idea of a unified paradigm of political science, earlier suggested by David Easton, had been abandoned (Laitin 1995, 454–56; Shapiro 2002). Nearly twenty-five years later, David Lake (2011) had the same judgment about the divisions within the subfield of international relations.

Yet politics is inherently divided ideologically, so both Almond and Lake appeared to have nostalgia for the days when a unified discipline was a professed goal. And they presented no remedy whatsoever.

In the late 1980s, the American Council of Learned Societies decided to ask members of seven disciplines to rate their satisfaction with the major journal in their field (Morton and Price 1989). The lowest rating was the appraisal by political scientists of the *APSR*. The consensus, according to a roundtable of scholars at the time, was that political scientists in one subfield were simply not paying attention to other subfields (Monroe 1990). A few years later, two sociologists decided to survey attitudes of members of thirty-two disciplines, finding that political scientists had the lowest opinion of their craft (Hargens and Kelly-Wilson 1994).

By 1989, political science had developed into three methodological "currents," according to Joseph Lapid (1989): (1) paradigmatism, (2) perspectivism, and (3)

relativism. The first current, concern for metascientific speculation, is rarely discussed today. The second current, a Nietzschean concern over unstated premises and assumptions that bias research, developed into postmodernism, poststructuralism, and what is now called constructivism. The third current, methodological pluralism, respected alternative epistemologies but questioned whether they might ever produce a convergence in knowledge.

Table 1.2 Almond's Divisions of Political Science

Methodology	*Ideology*	
	Right	*Left*
Soft		
Hard		

Source: Almond (1988).

The main reason for uncertainty about the direction of the discipline, in my opinion, was that political scientists were again reacting to the times. With the rise of Mikhail Gorbachëv in 1985, the Cold War was ending, but there was little clarity on what lay beyond. Then, when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, the world agenda refocused from security issues to the desire to bring about greater democracy, an improved world ecosystem, greater respect for human rights, globalized world trade, and many other issues that had been suppressed during the Cold War. Possibilities seemed endless for improvements in the human condition, and interests expanded to new areas of concern (Haas 2014d, ch12). But an effort to encourage paradigms in the book *Polity and Society: Philosophical Underpinnings of Social Science Paradigms* in 1992 was not placed on the new agenda.

The diverse view of political science continued throughout the 1990s despite the end of the Cold War, genocide in the Balkans and Rwanda, the American government shutdown in 1995, President Bill Clinton's impeachment in 1998, and

other unusual events. But the terrorist attack on 9/11 cut short that flowering of diversity. A “long war” of counterterrorism emerged instead.

In 2003, APSA began its centennial year by issuing a new journal, *Perspectives on Politics*, which was originally intended to “clarify the political significance of accumulated research” (Hochschild 2003, 1). The journal provides clinical analyses of particular issues or problems, review essays, and book reviews, recapturing some of the content that dropped out of *APSR* in the 1970s.

Also in 2003, APSA President Robert Putnam declared that the health of the profession was excellent. However, when he listed the “top 10 objectives of professional political science,” none referred to theoretical science, empirical science, or even applied (clinical) science (Putnam 2003, 248–50).

In 2005, Kristin Monroe, who had organized a symposium on political science in the journal *P.S.* during 1990, was instrumental in the “perestroika” movement, influenced by Gorbachëv’s call for a more open Soviet Union (Schram 2003). Her thesis, that political science should stop aspiring to be like the natural sciences (Monroe 2005), has been echoed several times, usually by those favoring interpretive over positivistic methodologies (Luke 1999; Kasza 2001; Smith 2002; Hill 2004; Primo and Clarke 2012).

But the perestroika movement also demanded a revival of contested APSA elections and acceptance by *APSR* editors of the principle of methodological pluralism. Of course, the need for a multimethodological political science had been stated three decades earlier (Haas and Becker 1970a,b), but attacks on the perestroika movement (e.g., Bennett 2002) prompted perestroikan sympathizers to respond that the new methodological pluralism was not a laissez-faire acceptance of “anything goes,” but instead a critical pluralism (Topper 2005).

Various “state of the discipline” essays in a centennial issue of the *APSR* at the end of 2006 celebrated one point—that the profession was more diverse than originally conceived. But no essay on political science as a theoretical science appeared in that 2006 panoramic issue.

Of one hundred essays in *The Future of Political Science* (King, Schlozman, and Nie 2009), only one celebrated theory, a word not even listed in the index: Kenneth Shepsle (ch96) complained that behavioralist methodologists “threw some babies in the bath water,” and decried the absence of “theoretical tools” and “explanation” in political science, though he did not cite any publication to either condemn or praise.

In 2009, a journalist interviewed extensively, concluding that there was a consensus that political science was not relevant to matters of public policy (Cohen 2009). Yet that same month, the National Survey of Student Engagement found that political science research was applied to policy problems to an extent better than most social science professions (NSSE 2009).

Although some excellent problem-driven research continues in the spirit of postbehaviorlism, perhaps now rechristened as “phronetic political science” (Schram and Caterino 2006; Flyvberg, Landman, and Schram 2012), many serious issues are ignored. Among the problems that need study is the growing problem of inequality resulting from the globalization of capitalism (e.g., Rechtenwald 2013). Another is the unaccountability of American leaders for torture and other war crimes (Haas 2009, 2010), which in turn have provoked a seemingly never-ending jihadist backlash (Johnson, Mora, and Schmidt 2016).

Nearly a decade after 9/11, minority members of the profession felt that their voices were not being heard as their numbers were increasing (APSA 2011, 27). The APSA then set up a task force to deal with the need of the profession to pay more attention to matters of ethnic,

gender, and racial diversity in matters of curriculum, personnel recruitment, and scholarly reviews (ibid.). Although APSA was formed by American political scientists, today the co-editors of the Association's *APSR* consist entirely of European scholars. Diversity, in other words, has increasingly been recognized, though theoretical integration has lagged far behind.

Michael Roskin (2012), writing the definitive essay on political science for *Encyclopedia Britannica*, conventionally defined the field as "the systematic study of governance by the application of empirical and generally scientific methods of analysis." In disagreement with Roskin's assessment, Senator Tom Coburn proposed in 2009 to cancel NSF funding to political science. One of Coburn's reasons was that an essay on human rights research listed the United States as one of the countries using torture (Cingranelli and Richards 2010, 404). A petition organized by APSA against the proposal in 2013 sought to counter the proposal, which has gained and lost traction ever since. Nevertheless, the full Congress soon restored the original program for political science (Tucker 2014).

CONCLUSION

The narrative thus far has focused on American political science. Nevertheless, political science has thrived around the world. Unlike the United States, where economics and political science separated, in 1895 the Fabian Society was responsible for founding the London School of Economics, which joined the University of London in 1900; Political Science was added to the name after World War II, though the acronym remains LSE. The British example set the tone for elsewhere in the Commonwealth, and other countries eventually liberated the study of politics from law schools. Journals followed, including a scholarly journal in India from 1939. Most new journals emerged after World War II

throughout the world. Traditional political science, emphasizing philosophy, was gradually infused with behavioralist scholarship, but there was no need for a postbehavioralist backlash within countries that never wanted to get involved in Vietnam.

Nevertheless, looking back over the fifty years from the triumph of behavioralism and the backlash by traditionalists, postbehavioralists, and others in the United States and elsewhere, the question should be asked whether any progress has occurred within political science as a social science discipline. The record shows that the development of empirical science has continued as quantitative studies pile up hyperfactually by behavioralist scholars using quantitative methods to test mid-range theory. Policy-oriented postbehavioralists, meanwhile, have made contributions to public policy. But the vision of a theoretical science, under attack shortly after 9/11 (Schram 2003), has been almost completely lost.

Polity and Society (1992) was designed to put political scientists back on track in the pursuit of theoretical science, but the time was not ripe. When David Easton coined the word “neobehavioralism” in an essay “The Future of the Postbehavioral Phase” (Easton 1997, 16–17; cf. Mendelson 1963), he had a similar idea, but his concept was not widely embraced.

Accordingly, the time has come to move beyond the endless dialectic of behavioralism and postbehavioralism as well as perestroikism. The debates and arguments have even become characterized as “mostly of banalities and platitudes” (Topper 2005, 183; Dryzek 2005, 2006).

The task of the present is to rekindle the spirit of political science along both humanistic and scientific lines involving theoretical (metatheories), empirical (testing propositions based on theories), and clinical (applying knowledge thus derived to public policy). All three pursuits should be respected by political scientists as part of a joint, integrated

pursuit. Contrariwise, research that narrowly pursues only one of the three agendas without consideration of the other two should be discouraged.

The present political science is one of mutual disciplinary isolation, a centrifugal effort in which narrow studies are applauded. The answer is to link existing research with paradigms, which in turn means that phenomena identified in several areas of political science should be brought under the same theoretical umbrella if they are analogous (isomorphic).

The term “paradigm” arrived in political science through the writing of Thomas Kuhn (1962). He, of course, was developing the term “paradigm” from Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953, 99), who used the term as a name for something perceived in the real world, thus inherently a concept referring to isomorphisms. Kuhn’s critics have challenged his reconstruction of the logic of science (Gutting 1980). Indeed, Imre Lakatos (1970) suggested that science progresses by finding new problems to solve (problem shift instead of paradigm shift), arguing that scientific progress instead emerges from “research programs” (Lakatos and Musgrave 1978). But research programs are inconsequential unless they have a paradigmatic framework in which to operate.

Although there are many meanings of the term “theory” (Rapoport 1958), the term “paradigm” (or metatheory) refers to a home in which several mid-level theories are linked together to explain a comprehensive phenomenon. The best well-known paradigm was developed by Karl Marx with his collaborator Friedrich Engels, as developed in chapter 3. They formulated several mid-level theories about why economic systems rise and fall, and the impact of technological changes on human consciousness within social classes—in other words, the relationship between matter and ideas. Other paradigms are described in later chapters.

The need to integrate the profession through paradigms is indeed quite obvious because so many specializations have emerged over the years. Only a paradigm-oriented political science can handle the task of enabling political scientists in one area of research to cross-fertilize with those in other research domains. Accordingly, the following chapter addresses the rise of academic diversity even beyond subfields, tracing how the six original subfields have been overshadowed, thereby providing the challenge known as the “jigsaw puzzle.”

Chapter 2

Subfields of Political Science

Why not abolish political science? To answer this question, there must be a conception of political science as a field that is fulfilling an important function in the world today. If political science is only an academic field that thrives on the fact that few disciplines choose to study governmental institutions, then political science could disappear to the extent that political sociology, political anthropology, political psychology, and other related disciplines absorb the content of the field (cf. Campbell 1969). To justify itself, political science should instead have a goal or a set of goals.

What, then, is the aim of political science? What purposes does the academic study of politics instrument? Here, again, many today are at square one, unable to determine why political science exists. Presumably, there can be as many answers to this question as there are political scientists. One approach to the question, therefore, is to examine how political scientists organize themselves—how the field is subdivided and how departments are staffed on the basis of criteria of various sorts. In other words, what is the structure of subfields within political science today? Because there is little evidence of a widely shared consensus on the subject, the gaze must go beneath the surface.

The dilemma regarding the aims and purposes of political science is not a matter for idle speculation. Many important decisions by political scientists presuppose that there is a consensus on what political science does, or at least on the nature of the subfields of political science. In an era of academic retrenchment, for example, it is important for departments of political science to have persuasive arguments for deans concerning the allocation of faculty positions when there are retirements, resignations, or other perceptions that there is a "gap" to be filled in staff. Deans may pay more attention to "we lack faculty in subfield X" than to arguments that "we need someone to replace A," as they may not wish to strike at the core of a department's minimum curricular requirements. When openings are authorized, it is likewise necessary to advertise the positions by indicating a preferred specialization, although a department will doubtlessly want the best person among a range of applicants in a variety of subfields. When compiling departmental catalogs and listing courses by number, it is considered tidy or attractive marketing to delineate subfields for the convenience of students. In some cases, student requirements are articulated to a subfield structure, including mandatory coursework. Subfields, thus, are premised on the view that political science is a broad field in which specialization and division of labor are necessary. A set of subfields, in turn, can tell us which objectives are being pursued by the profession as a whole. One way to begin the discussion, thus, is to look historically at the origin and evolution of subfields.

FIRST POLITICAL SCIENCE CURRICULUM

Insofar as the profession of political science lives up to the original goal of being a science, as stated by A. Lawrence Lowell (1910, 15) and others, the courses of study and subfields should be carefully designed for that end. Whereas

the previous chapter reviews the politics of the professions through such “revolutionary” changes as behavioralism and postbehavioralism, a survey of subfields over the years can reveal the core or interstices of the profession.

The place to begin is the three-year course of study laid down at Columbia by John Burgess. The legal approach was obviously dominant, but there was an interdisciplinary theme (Table 2.1). No subfields were involved, just courses for students. The intended students, for Burgess as for Lowell, were future political leaders.

Table 2.1 Burgess’s Curriculum, 1880–1887

Year 1	*Year 2*	*Year 3*
Physical and political geography Ethnology General political and constitutional history of Europe Political and constitutional history of the United States Political and constitutional history of England since 1688 Philosophy: History of political theory from Plato to Hegel Bibliography of the political sciences	History of Roman law to the present Comparative constitutional law of the principal European states and of the United States Comparative jurisprudence of the principal European systems of civil law Statistical science, methods and results	History of diplomacy Private international law Public international law Comparative administrative law of the principal states of Europe and of the United States Social sciences: Communistic and socialistic theories

Source: Hoxie et al. (1955, 305–6).

Various efforts to evaluate, review, and energize the curriculum have been undertaken over the years (Haines 1915; Hall 1922; Story 1926; Bates 1927; Corwin 1929; Reed 1930; Stahl 1937; Laves 1940; Wilcox 1941, 1947; APSA 1942, 1951, 1962; Mansfield 1947; Rockwell 1947; Fesler et al. 1951; Wahlke 1991), but the main debate has been over the proper goals for undergraduate instruction. A recent essay claims that the curriculum has changed little over the past century (Ishiyama, Breuning, and Lopez 2006), but does not identify that specific curriculum.

DEVELOPMENT OF SUBFIELDS

Courses over the years have paralleled subfields. Recruitment of new faculty to departments of political science has been to teach courses in those subfields, and programs at early APSA conventions were customarily organized by traditional standard categories. The same categories were also used in APSA's member directories. But what subfields and why?

Paul Reinsch (1904, 157–58), an early APSA president, identified seven "departments" within political science, though there were six subfields throughout most of the history of political science (Table 2.2). Two major fields were added after World War II—Methodology during the behavioralist apogée and Public Policy thanks to postbehavioralism. Several retitlings of subfields in the contemporary period are reflected on the current APSA website (*apsanet.org*). Only the subfield Methodology suggests that political scientists are serious about developing a science, but the separation of Methodology from the other subfields, however retitled, suggests that behavioralism is still an insurgent force. Traditionalists were clearly successful in avoiding the replacement of classical political theory by empirical political theory.

Table 2.2 Subfields of Political Science

Early Twentieth Century	*Mid to Late Twentieth Century*	*Contemporary*
Political theory	Political theory	Political philosophy and theory
Administration	Public administration	Public administration
Politics	Politics	American government and politics
Comparative legislation	Comparative government	Comparative politics
Comparative and historical jurisprudence	Public law	Public law and courts
Constitutional law	International relations	International relations
International law and diplomacy		Methodology
		Public policy

Sources: Reinsch (1904: 157–58); Haas (1970b, 8–13); curricula of major university departments.

Not all political scientists were satisfied with Reinsch's formulation. The Haines Committee, which worked from

1912 to 1916, would have simplified the subfields into (1) political theory, (2) American government, (3) elements of law, and (4) comparative government (APSA 1951, 8). Charles Haines (1915) evidently did not see the need to include international relations, which gained widespread support in the wake of the peace settlement after World War I.

Some debates over subfields reveal a continuing quest to standardize the professional focus. There has been a debate on whether the goal of undergraduate political science is to impart information or improve civic responsibility. Frank Bates (1927), for example, contrasted three competing approaches in undergraduate instruction: (1) descriptive, (2) functional, and (3) behavioralistic. Most courses at the time merely described institutions of government, one by one. Some political scientists instead wanted to describe functions of government that were in common across all institutions. Merriamites preferred to talk about political behavior as fundamental to politics in three aspects: (1) exercise of political authority, (2) rendering of political obedience, and (3) forms of social control by government.

Burgess got around to writing a textbook for the field in 1933. But instead of following the behavioral trend, his book harkened back to the nineteenth century: He organized his material into four sections with Roman numerals: (I) nationality and national culture, (II) the idea of the state, (III) individual liberty, (IV) forms of government.

To impress the federal government during World War II of the availability of political scientists to help the war effort, APSA supplied a list of eight subfields (U.S. War Manpower Commission 1945). Most were the traditional subfields that were standard in the 1950s, somewhat differently phrased, but one new subfield was Government and Business (Wahlke 1991, 50). Nevertheless, no such subfield ever developed after the war—just a course that was popular

among students in colleges of business administration until the subject migrated out of political science.

Before World War II, most political science was taught in a Department of History and Political Science. After the war, the two fields went their separate ways, so APSA sought to provide guidance to the new departments, some of which had very few faculty members. In 1951, *Goals for Political Science* was issued by a committee chaired by Gabriel Almond (APSA 1951). Perhaps to suggest courses more than subfields, there were seventeen categories within six subfields: (1) The political theory subfield was to offer courses in history of political theory, American political theory, and modern political theory. (2) Public administration was identified as a subfield. (3) The subfield later called "politics" was to be taught under a variety of courses—political parties, public opinion, state government, state and local government, municipal government, public finance, public policy, and government and business. (4) Foreign governments were listed instead of comparative government. (5) U. S. Constitution was suggested, but later was called public law. (6) International law, international relations, and U. S. foreign relations was the final set of suggested courses.

In the late 1960s, as behavioralism was seeking to transform the profession, several essays emerged to provide overviews of the profession through the six subfields. One example is Dwight Waldo's lengthy history of political science (Waldo 1975). Similar efforts to summarize developments by subfields appeared over the years (Haas and Kariel 1970; Greenstein and Polsby 1975; Freeman 1977).

Accordingly, there was considerable consensus in the mid-twentieth century that political science consisted of six subfields. The APSA Constitution said so, and many academic departments were so organized. Why so?

THE SIX TRADITIONAL SUBFIELDS

The notion of a separate political sphere of life possibly first occurred to an individual whose position of privilege and status was threatened by a power-seeking opponent—or vice versa. Whether we accept such a threat theory as an explanation for the dawn of political consciousness—which is counter to the more historically influential social-contract theory as advanced by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau—or embrace yet another alternative, political science as a discipline became possible only with the full realization that the idea of politics also implies the concept of a nonpolitical life (Elliott and MacDonald 1949, PtI). Consciousness of politics began when some speculated that the sphere of politics or of government was too broad (or too narrow) in relation to personal interests, values, or ideals. Similarly, the various definitions of politics and distinguishable subfields within the discipline of political science have been reformulated whenever normative dilemmas of various kinds have prompted a refocusing of perspectives. The introduction of new conceptual and theoretical orientations may serve to demarcate stages in the development of political science as an autonomous field of inquiry. Accordingly, the traditional six subfields are reviewed next.

Political Theory

The earliest writings on the subject of politics, such as the Code of Hammurabi and the Talmudic legends, bear a decidedly religious character. The operations of government were grasped in terms of laws, norms, and edicts of rulers. As long as government was conducted by elites who relied upon religious myths to justify their rule, it was virtually sacrilegious to reflect upon the desirability of various political arrangements. When a much smaller political unit, the *polis,* arose among the Greeks, a more secular orientation toward politics became manifest. Insofar as new

forms of government allowed a wider degree of popular participation, the study of politics could become self-conscious. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle found a ready audience for speculative discussions of the proper role of citizens vis-à-vis the state. The broad scope of politics in Hellenic Greece is traceable etymologically: The Greek *politikos* would be rendered as “social and political” in our own idiom.

The vast range of topics covered in Plato’s *Republic* (360 BCE) presents an even more vivid image of a lack of division between polity, economy, and society. It is perfectly understandable that the subject matter of politics, intertwined as it then was with economics and sociology, became an integral part of what we now refer to as moral philosophy. Although Aristotle (350 BCE) did in fact direct an extensive research project concerning constitutions, his research-oriented approach to politics was neglected by later thinkers, except for Polybius (c.140 BCE). In retrospect, political theory could be called the first subfield of political science, though the Greeks and Romans considered empirical theorizing about politics to be simply a part of philosophy. There was no need to recognize politics as an autonomous subject of inquiry.

Students of Plato and Aristotle lived in a world dominated first by the Macedonians and later by the Romans. Because of the decline of the *polis*, politics became very far removed from the ordinary citizen. Even in Rome, which developed and codified law in a truly original way, philosophic political speculation was virtually limited to a discussion of maxims and a translation of Greek thought into eloquent Roman prose. As Frederick Pollock hyperbolically asserts of the most notable Roman writer on politics, “Nobody that I know of has yet succeeded in discovering a new idea in the whole of Cicero’s philosophical or semiphilosophical writings.” Pollock (1890 [1960], 32–33) continues: [T]he scientific study of politics became extinct. It was a sleep of many

centuries that followed, broken only by half-conscious stirrings in the Middle Ages. There were brilliant attempts and notable precursors. But there was no serious revival of interest in the theory of politics until the Renaissance; and the definite new birth of political thinking, and its consecutive growth in forms adapted to the civilization of modern Europe, may fairly be dated from Hobbes, and at most cannot be put back earlier than Machiavelli.

Public Law

When articulate and self-conscious political speculation returned, the legacy of Roman legalistic conceptions provided a new lens for interpreting and ultimately resolving the contest between the papacy, the Holy Roman Emperor, and the power of rising national states. The legal principle that the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire each had jurisdiction over all of Christendom, though in two different spheres—known as the Doctrine of the Two Swords—socialized clerics and political leaders in the Middle Ages to the view that government is divinely ordained in secular matters. However, once the papal view that there are matters which cannot be touched by political agencies was accepted throughout Europe, a redefinition of such a division between politics and nonpolitics began to be seen as useful by ambitious rulers of France and in the Germanic states. The papacy attempted to preserve the power of the church, but such sanctions as excommunication were no longer so effective or meaningful after the Protestant Reformation. Because the rise of secular states was conceived in legal terms and justified by the concept of sovereignty, much subsequent thinking about politics had a legal frame of reference.

The main issues of the early modern period were phrased in terms of the rights, duties, and powers of rulers as well as citizens within particular states. Accordingly, the study of public law, under the label “jurisprudence,” could be

considered the second distinct subfield to emerge in political science, as Kenneth Vines (1970) has pointed out. Even today, in many countries, instruction on the subject of politics is obtained mainly in law schools, especially in the countries of Latin America. Early legalists saw the powers of rulers and of branches of government under constitutions as determined by weighing the principles of natural law against the specific provisions of legal documents. The original study of public law maintained a similar emphasis.

Comparative Government

A third subfield, comparative government, appears to have been stimulated more by the philosophic than by the legal tradition of political speculation. Within multistate Europe from the seventeenth century onward, different governments tried a variety of political arrangements. Some states were ruled by absolute monarchs; others, notably Holland and Venice, allowed for a degree of popular sovereignty. The examples of a wide range of public participation in government decisions encouraged John Locke (1688), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762), and especially Baron de Montesquieu (1748) to compare the merits and defects of various forms of government. In so doing, they advanced the cause of the aristocracy and the rising bourgeoisie against the prevailing absolutism of the divine-right monarchies. Such thinkers as Immanuel Kant (1781, 1795) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1756, 1760) even proposed that Europe should sponsor an international agency modeled on their own ideas of the most practicable form of government—the representative legislature. At one point, Locke was asked to write constitutions for newly colonized territories in North America, where monarchs could have only indirect control.

The de facto birth of American political science probably can be dated from the time of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, in which the experience of thirteen colonial and

independent governments was compared and assessed before selecting arrangements that would meet the approval of men of property and gentility. The *Federalist Papers* (1788) of Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison explicated that logic.

The comparative approach continued in the nineteenth century (Somit and Tannenhaus 1967, ch11), especially through the writings of Alexis de Tocqueville (1835, 1840), Walter Bagehot (1867, 1873), Leopold von Ranke (1824), James Bryce (1901, 1921), and John Burgess (1890). In the same century, the industrial revolution resulted in the emergence of a middle class much less cosmopolitan in outlook than the European aristocracy. Such a class tended to hold a more nationalistic conception of the problems of politics, and the comparative approach was replaced or supplemented by a fourth mode of analysis—politics.

Politics

The rise of capitalism led to the argument that special conditions within an industrializing state demand remedial legislation to free the entrepreneur from cumbersome legal restrictions. Because England industrialized earlier than other countries, a comparative mode of analysis was considered reactionary by Benthamite innovators. French capitalists wishing to promote the diffusion of English practices to their own country could not—for fear of being regarded as anglophiles—use the argument that a law was good if it worked in England. Bourgeois reformers in each land had to seek justifications in more nationalistic terms. The rhetoric was that a test for a good law was promoting the national interest. The utilitarian view of politics, in which means are weighed to achieve instrumental goals, tended to negate the concern among political theorists with ultimate goals, abolish the legal and jurisprudential image of natural law as the proper source for legislation, and nullify the once-popular comparative approach. National politics were to be

studied on their own terms. Political economy was one of the first forms that the movement assumed, and many countries influenced by French culture still emphasize political economy today. The favorite type of inquiry undertaken by the new breed of political scientists espousing the study of politics qua politics focused upon various group or informal forces marshaled to secure the passage of legislation. Captains of industry, who had definite needs to bring about governmental arrangements favorable to business interests, relied on such knowledge for their own purposes, though many political scientists viewed the group struggle from a muckraking point of view. One of the main questions was how to make government relevant to entrepreneurial development.

Because of the practical character of “how-to-do-it” research, many students of politics saw no purpose in maintaining formal ties with cognate subjects, such as economics, sociology, and history; thus, separate academic departments of political science began to appear. Arthur Bentley (1908), Woodrow Wilson (1890), A. Lawrence Lowell (1910), and Henry Jones Ford (1915) spearheaded the drive to replace the formalist character into which the comparative and legalist approaches had fallen with a more “realistic” treatment of the actual operations of governments. After all, contrary to the so-called literary theory of constitutions, legislators were more powerful than executives in the late nineteenth century, and they functioned amidst interest groups, political parties, and machine politics. Each national, state, and local government operated within a unique configuration of such forces.

Preferences for a more empirically based political science were much harder to bring to fruition in Britain. Part of the explanation may have been a lingering distrust of “dirty politics” on the part of those with an aristocratic background. English political scientists, for example, declined to follow up the implications of Walter Bagehot’s

example of conducting more research in the real world and less in the armchair (Bagehot 1867, 1873), thus freezing development of the field on that side of the Atlantic for many years.

Public Administration

The field of public administration may also be regarded as a product of the industrial revolution. Businesses viewed themselves as organizations aiming to satisfy a clientele and to use available scarce resources efficiently and economically. Accordingly, they felt that such a standard was particularly applicable to governments, whose role should be limited as far as possible, except to allow for a more prosperous economic system. But the tenets of Jacksonian democracy in the mid-nineteenth century considered every citizen equally qualified to carry out the functions of government, and public administrators were expected to be faithful to the party in power that gave them employment. Because the more technical character of capitalist society was viewed as necessitating some selectivity in order to ensure that efficient, competent persons would serve as public officials, Jacksonian democracy was perceived to imperil economic progress. Gradually, the concern with organization charts, a carry-over from the institutional approach of the static comparative government subfield, was superseded by the scientific-management movement (Gore 1970). Frederick Taylor's focus upon ways of increasing productivity led to schools of business at major universities (Taylor 1911).

However, the field of public administration, as initially conceived, arose largely because the sphere of the nonpolitical was expanded: Things administrative were conceived by such influential political scientists as Frank Goodnow (1900) to be analytically and empirically related to things political. Many departments of "government" date from this era, for such a label would denote the presence of

students both of politics and of administration. Later, when the artificiality of such a distinction was recognized, “political science” appeared to be a more appropriate term. Nevertheless, public administration and politics were regarded as modes of analysis distinct enough to be taught separately by persons familiar with the two different phenomena.

International Relations

A sixth subfield, international relations, emerged immediately after World War I. The failure of the European balance of power to prevent the war, the conscription of mass armies, and the beginning of the practice of total war meant that international events were perceived as being very close to the everyday activities of citizens. The old diplomacy, conducted in secret by persons of a more refined education, was repudiated in principle. The new norm was for more popular control of foreign policy, and a new diplomacy of open covenants began, albeit mass propaganda and publicity was also instituted to sell policies. From the standpoint of the ordinary citizen, the sphere of politics widened to include matters of foreign policy.

The goal of international relations scholars was to find ways to limit warfare as an instrument of statecraft. The pioneering of such prewar scholars as Paul Reinsch (1913) came to fruition when the subject matter of international relations was regarded as sufficiently comprehensive and distinct to merit the status of an autonomous subfield within political science. Many new courses were offered on diplomatic history, international law, and international organization. Separate departments of international relations were occasionally formed on the premise that international affairs can best be understood on a truly interdisciplinary basis. The first was Britain’s Aberystwyth University in 1919.

DISSATISFACTION WITH THE SIX SUBFIELDS

In the 1950s, the behavioralist movement began to pervade all the traditional subfields of political science, with exponents seeking to practice scientific canons of inquiry. Many departments that originally regarded behavioralism as a seventh field soon awoke to find that behavioralists were quite content to enter the six prevailing subfields, though in some cases the names were changed: Public law was renamed judicial behavior; public administration morphed into administrative behavior; and comparative government became comparative politics.

In 1962, a poll revealed that half of American political scientists were dissatisfied with graduate education (APSA 1962). An effort by an APSA committee to encourage consolidation of subfields into four would have transformed departmental divisions into (1) political theory, (2) American political institutions and processes, (3) comparative political institutions and processes, and (4) international relations, organization, and law. Those who taught public administration and public law, in other words, were deemed marginal to the profession, invisibly incorporated into the American government subfield. But that was before behavioralist scholarship emerged in both subfields.

By 1967, the Caucus for a New Political Science was able to hold panels at APSA conventions apart with the traditional six subfields. Postbehavioralists demanded a public policy subfield, more panels on female and minority issues, and other changes in the program as well as the profession itself (cf. Grubert and Sapiro 1979).

Never before was the subfield structure so thoroughly questioned. Frustration appeared in such essays as “One Swallow Does Not Make a Spring . . .” (Wengert 1969), and “Brother, Can You Paradigm?” (Walker 1972). In fact, the new constitution proposed by the Wildavsky Committee in

1971 would have abolished the traditional six subfields without any replacement. In 1972, APSA began to recognize “Unaffiliated Groups” of various sorts, though only if they met minimum membership requirements.

When the NSF began to categorize areas of specialization within political science in the mid-1960s, some sixty-five subfields were assigned a separate legitimacy. Indeed, Heinz Eulau (1969) explicitly celebrated the NSF’s reification of specializations in political science.

Meanwhile, during the early 1960s, the “baby boomers” began to transform American colleges and universities, which swelled in enrollment and thus created the need to hire more faculty. Political science felt the impact in several ways: Traditionally, political science graduate students were required to take two foreign languages, courses for a quarter or semester outside political science, and examinations in several subfields. At Stanford, written exams were required in four of the six subfields, making political science education so broad that Stanford graduates subsequently published in nearly all six subfields.

But expanding enrollment in the late 1960s meant pressure to graduate as many political scientists as possible, so requirements were watered down to the point that many doctoral students learned only about the literature surrounding the topic of their dissertation. Then, that crop of new political scientists in the 1970s began to teach their own graduate students within their narrow specializations, resulting in even more nearsightedness in regard to the profession as a whole. The jigsaw puzzle then emerged.

In his presidential address, Warren Miller (1980) suggested that the discipline’s subfields could be unified through broader research, but his agenda was not adopted by the profession at large. In 1981, a provision for Sections was finally adopted, and groups of likeminded scholars began to apply to establish what later have been called “cliques.”

As a result, current graduate students have tried to reinvent wheels because their thesis advisers are uniformed of basic works in the field. Graduate student presentations in poster sessions of political science conventions are particularly glaring. For example, one student at an APSA convention traced the acceptance of gay marriage across the United States unaware of the diffusion paradigms of Daniel Lerner (1958) and Marion Levy (1966). Another student proposed a shift from the balance-of-power perspective to a balance-of-influence approach without any knowledge of the book by Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan (1950) that went beyond the analysis of "power" to identify the eight parameters of the term "influence." A content analysis of foreign policy perceptions made no reference to similar content analysis work of Robert North and associates (e.g., Zinnes, North, and Koch 1961). But the most flagrant example is research on the so-called "democratic peace" that has been completely disconnected from a vast literature on democracy (Haas 2014a), a complex concept indeed that is repeatedly measured as a yes-no dichotomy despite the complexity (multidimensionality) of the concept. One result of two generations of ill-informed political scientists is the "jigsaw puzzle," especially the ignorance of metatheory.

PROLIFERATION OF SPECIALIZATIONS

Today, forty-two Sections have been formed (Table 2.3). Some represent the traditional six subfields, but most are narrower specializations. When the proliferation seemed excessive, APSA imposed a minimum limit of 250 members for any Section, though new Sections can start with 200 members and are given a few years to collect the requisite paid memberships. Sections, in turn, elect their own officers. Nearly all Sections have their own professional journals; most journals are sponsored by APSA, but others are

outside. Nevertheless, APSA recognized fifty-five “Divisions” in organizing the program for the annual meeting in 2016, some of which appeared to be subfields within Sections, though Formal Political Theory had no apparent Section home.

Table 2.3 American Political Science Association Sections

Number	*Title*	*Members*	*APSA Journal*	*Divisions*
1	Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations	**334**	yes	**28**
2	Law and Courts	**614**	yes	**26, 27**
3	Legislative Studies	**516**	yes	**22**
4	Public Policy	**841**	yes	**25**
5	Political Organizations and Parties	**445**	yes	**35**
6	Public Administration	**381**	*	**24**
7	Conflict Processes	**388**	*	**21**

8	Representation and Electoral Systems	305	yes	34
9	Presidents and Executive Politics	326	*	23
10	Political Methodology	545	yes	8
11	Religion and Politics	310	yes	33
13	Urban and Local Politics	282	yes	30
15	Science, Technology and Environmental Politics	272	*	39
16	Women and Politics Research	409	yes	31
17	Foundations of Political Theory	488	*	1–3
18	Information Technology and Politics	133	yes	40
19	International Security and Arms Control	349	*	18–19

20	Comparative Politics	**971**	*	11–14)
21	European Politics and Society	**285**	*	**15**
22	State Politics and Policy	**330**	yes	**29**
23	Political Communication	**424**	*	**38**
24	Politics and History	**454**	*	**7**
25	Political Economy	**471**	*	**6, 16**
27	New Political Science	**308**	yes	**42**
28	Political Psychology	**389**	*	**5**
29	Political Science Education	**272**	yes	10 (9)
30	Politics, Literature, and Film	**214**	*	**41**

31	Foreign Policy	**318**	*	**20**
32	Elections, Public Opinion, and Voting Behavior	**555**	yes	36–37
33	Race, Ethnicity and Politics	**494**	*	**32**
34	International History and Politics	**285**	*	**27, 43**
35	Comparative Democratization	**431**	*	**44**
36	Human Rights	**268**	*	**45**
37	Qualitative and Multi-Method Research	**676**	*	**46**
38	Sexuality and Politics	**150**	*	**47**
39	Health Politics and Policy	**166**	*	**48**
40	Canadian Politics	**151**	*	**49**

41	Political Networks	*	50
42	Experimental Research	*	51
43	Migration and Citizenship		52
44	African Politics Conference Group		53
45	Class and Inequality		55
46	Ideas, Knowledge and Politics		54
47	American Political Thought	*	dk

Key: dk = unknown
* = The Section has a scholarly journal outside APSA.
Source: American Political Science Association (as of December 5, 2016).

In addition, APSA has allowed seventy-eight Related Groups (Table 2.4), which must apply for that status on a petition with a minimum of fifty signatures of APSA members. Related Groups, in turn, are permitted a place on the agenda for APSA conventions. The list includes four "Caucuses," though the Caucus for New Political Science is instead classified as a Section.

The APSA has also tried to categorize and recategorize the subfields of political science through publications and on the Internet, though the categorizers have been anonymous. John Wahlke (1991) identified several APSA biographical directory classifications that have changed over the years, varying only slightly from the traditional six subfields. More recently, the APSA Website has opted for increasing diversity, identifying eighty-three "Specializations" (Table 2.5).

RATIONALE FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE SUBFIELDS

The malaise of political science, as described in the previous chapter, is in part a result of the centrifugal force of Sections, Specializations, and Related Groups. Looking behind the manifest content of the various labels used from time to time to designate subcategories of political science, there is a much larger question: What has the profession gained or lost? A review of the logic of the six traditional subfields and new constellation of organized interests is in order.

The rationale for the traditional six subfields is that they have been established over a long period of time, have organized the discipline reasonably well in the past, and are preferable to transitory formulations of the present. Six subfields is a more integrative and manageable number than an indefinite figure somewhere far beyond the teens. As indicated in the discussion above, academic departments formed subfields initially because every scholar has limited ability to cover the vast subject of government and politics.

Another reason for the traditional six subfields has been that the careerist goals of students also have required a division articulated to future occupational choices. An increase to forty-plus subfields is harder to justify in job-relevant terms.

Many political scientists are unhappy at the centrifugal impact of Sections on the profession, calling the current state of affairs as “overspecialization” (APSA 2011). Some nostalgically recall a period of greater unity. But there are several more practical and philosophical objections to the proliferation.

Table 2.4 American Political Science Association Related Groups

Aging and Politics Group	Committee on Viable Constitutionalism*	IPSA Research Committee #36 (Power)
American Enterprise Institute	Communitarian Network*	Japan Political Studies Group
American Political Thought	Comparative Urban Politics	Labor Project
American Public Philosophy Institute	Complexity and Public Politics Group	Latin American Studies Association
American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy*	Conference Group on Italian Politics and Society Conference Group on Jurisprudence and Public Law*	Latino Caucus in Political Science
Asian Pacific American Caucus	Conference Group on Taiwan Studies	Law and Political Process Study Group
Association for Israel Studies	Conference Group on the Middle East	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgendered Caucus McConnell Center for Political Leadership
Association for Politics and the Life Sciences	Critical Policy Studies	National Humanities Institute
Association for the Study of Nationalities	Disasters and Crises	Policy Studies Organization*
Association Française de Science Politique	Eric Voegelin Society	Politica: Study of Medieval Political Thought
Association of Chinese Political Studies	European Consortium for Political Research	Political Forecasting Group
Association of Korean Political Studies	Federalist Society for Law and Politics	Political Studies Association
Brazilian Political Science Association	French Politics Group	Political Studies Association of Ireland
British Politics Group	Global Forum of Chinese Political Scientists	Poverty, Inequality, and Public Policy Caucus*
Campaign Finance Research Group	Green Politics and Theory	Practicing Politics
Cato Institute	Iberian Politics	Project on the American Constitution
Center for the Study of the Constitution	Indigenous Studies Network	Publius: The Journal of Federalism
Center for the Study of Federalism	Institute for Constitutional Studies	Russian Politics Group
Christians in Political Science	Intelligence Studies Group	Slovenian Political Science Association
The Churchill Centre	International Association for the Study of German Politics Interpretive Metho-dologies and Methods	
Ciceronian Society	IPSA Research Committee #1 (Concepts and Methods) IPSA Research Committee	
Claremont Institute for the Study of Statesmanship and Political Philosophy Committee for Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy Committee for Political Sociology		
Committee on the Political Economy of the Good Society		

	#12 (Biology and Politics)	Society for Greek Political Thought Society for Romanian Studies Society of Catholic Social Scientists Southeast Asian Politics Group Walter Bagehot Research Council on National Sovereignty Women's Caucus for Political Science

Key: IPSA = International Political Science Association * = Did not present panels at the 2016 Convention.

Table 2.5 Areas of Specialization in Political Science

Advanced industrial societies	Federalism and intergovernmental relations	Political development
Africa	Feminist theory	Political economy
African American politics	Foreign policy	Political networks
Asian American politics	Gender politics and policy	Political parties and organizations
Australia	Health care policy	Political psychology
Bureaucracy and organizational behavior	History and politics	Political science education
Canadian politics	Housing policy	Political thought: historical
Caribbean	Human rights	Positive political thought
Central America	Immigration policy	Post Soviet region
Central Asia	Intelligence	Presidency
Civil rights and liberties	International law and organizations	Public finance and budgeting
Conflict processes	International political economy	Public law
Congress	International security	Public opinion
Constitutional law and theory	Judicial politics	Regulatory policy
Criminal justice	Labor policy	Religion and politics
Defense	Latino/a politics	Research methods
Developing nations	Leadership studies	Scholarship of teaching & learning
East & Central Europe	Legislative studies	Science and technology
Economic policy	Lesbian and gay politics	Social movements
Education policy	Life sciences and politics	Social welfare policy
Electoral behavior	Literature and politics	South America
Electoral systems	Middle East	South Asia
Energy policy	Native American politics	Southeast Asia
Environmental policy	Normative political theory	State politics
Ethnic and racial politics	North America	Terrorism
European Union	Northeast Asia	Trade policy
Evaluation research	Political behavior	Urban politics
Executive politics	Political communication	Western Europe
		Women and politics

Source: www.apsanet.org (2013).

Scholarly Marginalization

Political theory, a well-respected field despite behavioralist pressure for the profession to become more empirical, now has a home in only one out of the dozens of current Sections—the Foundations of Political Theory. Similarly, sidelined are the traditional subfields of public administration and public law, the latter now known as Law and Courts. Although Sections on Canadian Politics and European Politics thrive, the Comparative Politics Section is nevertheless the largest of all the Sections, competing only with the related Comparative Democratization Section.

Scholarly Balkanization

If some subfields have maintained their former integrity, others have been sliced into very small pieces. International relations has been subdivided into International Security and Arms Control, Foreign Policy, Human Rights, and International History and Politics. Methodology, which emerged in behavioralism as a seventh subfield, now is represented as a Section of its own (Political Methodology), but has two competitors—Qualitative and Multi-Method Research and Experimental Research. Public Policy, which emerged as an eighth subfield thanks to postbehavioralism, exists as a separate Section but clearly pervades the sections on Science, Technology and Environmental Politics and New Political Science; the latter has been retrofitted from an Unaffiliated Group to a Section. Except for subfields devoted to Political Science Education as well as Literature and Film, the remaining twenty-two Sections are heirs to what was once called the Politics subfield.

Positivist Nominalism

Perhaps the most serious criticism of the proliferation of Sections is that positivist nominalists have taken control of the profession by default. According to Hans Reichenbach (1963, 163), “What we observe as a causal law of nature is always the product of a great number of atomic

occurrences." In other words, the proliferation has canonized what David Easton (1953, 66–78) once called "hyperfactualism." The logic of positivist nominalism says that to learn more and more about reality, we must slice political science into smaller and smaller foci for study. Postbehavioralists, while spurning positivism as a methodology, thus have accepted nominalism as a disciplinary model.

For Jacques Barzun (1981), the attempt of the NSF and similar grant-giving agencies and foundations to encourage ever smaller specializations within American academic disciplines constituted a form of "imperialism" that seriously undermined the integrity of many fields, not just political science. Positivist nominalism represents the triumph of an entrepreneurial vision of political science in which individual pursuit of research grants is more important than the goals or the integrity of the discipline. The image of scholars as isolated cogs in a production line fits the NSF roster of specializations, and enterprising scholars soon learn to colonize newer subspecializations in order to gain recognition. Positivist nominalism is a factory-like acceptance of the academic world as an extension of an industrial and capitalist society that refuses to ask fundamental questions other than what funding agencies will or will not finance their research. Positivist nominalism can only ratify the power structure of the society in which it exists, eschewing a consideration for values, since the assumption is that there are few interconnected policy dilemmas.

An indication that a positivist nominalism has been accepted in an academic department is the extent of course proliferation and the degree to which scholars are isolated from one another's interests (Shapiro 2002). Courses often are titled and constructed so that only one professor can teach them, leaving students as colonized pupils. Positivist nominalism refers to constructive efforts at consolidation

and integration of knowledge as dilettantism. In the name of diversity, the change from six subfields to more than forty Sections is a postbehavioralist's dream come true.

Nevertheless, the development of more than forty APSA Sections recognizes what is truly happening in political science—vitality in the discipline. Newer specializations exist in the interstices of the sixfold framework, and the old labels are molds that have long since been broken. Many specializations attest to the fact that some entrepreneurial political scientists have established communities of interest across many academic departments, something especially facilitated by the ease of communication through email and the Internet. Sections emerged without a grand design, and in every case there is a profitable research journal to store the resulting knowledge in a more permanent form. In some cases, the Sections give awards and have meetings outside the APSA context. But that leaves political science as a collection of narrow specializations.

"State of the discipline" books are a good indicator of how to identify major trends (Table 2.6). But in 2006, when the *APSR* celebrated its centennial volume (Siegelman 2006a), the only subfields mentioned were comparative politics, electoral politics, foreign policy, and political theory.

Table 2.6 State of the Discipline Compendia in Political Science

Finifter (1983)	*Finifter (1993)*	*Katzelson and Milner (2002)*
The discipline and its scope and theory	Theory and method	The state in an Era of globalization
American political processes and policymaking	Political processes and individual political behavior	Democracy, justice, and their institutions
Comparative political processes and policymaking	Political institutions of the state	Citizenship, identity, and political participation
Micropolitical behavior: American and comparative	Nations and their relationships	Studying politics
International politics		
The uses of political science		

The profession, in other words has fallen victim to centrifugal forces. According to J. Tobin Grant (2005), the divisions in political science are more in terms of specializations and subfields than methodological.

AN AUTHENTIC ALTERNATIVE

Purposive activity aimed at liberating humanity is more urgent than abstract thought per se, but cannot occur without contemplation. Adherence to traditional categories that perpetuate the social order, without understanding teleological underpinnings, is what existentialists have called “inauthentic.” Thus, political science can have no inner logic of subfields until its practitioners agree upon a set of goals to achieve; the humanistic striving to attain goals can then define the profession in existentially authentic terms. Knowledge for the sake of knowledge, as Robert Lynd (1939) has so eloquently noted, is a waste for humanity. The world awaits solutions to urgent social and political problems. Rather than allowing politicians to peddle snake-oil remedies, academic scholars should be prepared to contribute to an uplifting of humanity.

What major goals might political scientists seek to advance? It seems to me that political scientists are in a position to establish an empirical, normative, and theoretical basis for more democratic polities, a more peaceful world, and for enabling political systems to achieve a greater level of development in which more individuals will reach their fullest socioeconomic potentialities.

Indeed, if political science does not seek solutions to political problems, what other profession will? Knowledge can be organized to achieve a more perfect political order, and the discipline could provide specific guidance on how to increase democracy in an organization or a political system, how to ensure that conflicts can be resolved more amicably, and how material comfort and psychological health can best

be promoted within a country's economic and educational institutions. Other goals, such as environmental survival, are found in the natural sciences but cannot be achieved without political action. All the goals just suggested pervade the six traditional subfields and the forty or more Sections but without explicit recognition. By making clear what the goals are, scholarly research can become more focused and less ivory towerish.

There are, of course, varying ideological views in political science. For some, the United States is already a "pluralist democracy," so not much effort is needed to perfect democratic institutions, while others identify serious civil liberties and civil rights problems. Some would promote peace through increased military spending, while others would seek arms control. Development can be viewed as aid to corporations so that they can invest capital in research and development; alternatively, development might be promoted by increased educational opportunities and economic assistance to the residents of urban ghettoes and poorer residents of less-developed countries and environmental improvement. Political science may not achieve consensus on goals, but dialog on identifying issues of major significance needs to be pursued. Instead of the traditional subfields and current specializations, new rubrics might be Democracy, Conflict and Peace, and Development. With those new subfields, political scientists would be united by goals and real problems. Such a pursuit is why metatheory—paradigms—matter. The jigsaw puzzle created by proliferation exists because political scientists have lost sight of the value of metatheory as a way to integrate knowledge.

Some political scientists achieve positions of power. Other political scientists try to have an impact upon policy, with varying levels of success and failure (Fearon 2014). A coherent body of knowledge is not always available for use to promote socially acceptable goals because political

science is not organized to do so. That was the problem that began the present chapter—the lack of goals within political science. The profession of medicine pursues goals. Why not political science?

CONCLUSION

The present volume has been conceived to initiate further momentum in the endless quest of scholarship as the servant of the noblest aspirations of humanity. Subfields and specializations can serve as tools for improving human life. Whether political science is organized by traditional subfields, recently identified Sections and Specializations, research questions focused on policy, or can be otherwise integrated into common quests, professional political scientists should realize that they are accountable to the world outside academia.

Parts II and III, the next sections of the book, are concerned with theoretical science—identifying major paradigms of political science that have the potential to unify the discipline, finally completing the jigsaw puzzle with a coherent picture of what operates within political reality. As the paradigms are presented, the reader will clearly have a vision of goals that motivate political scientists—government efficiency, democracy, methods for cooperation, and many more. Part IV seeks to bring consensus behind a neobehavioral future for political science in which theory, research, and praxis will seamlessly interact within a community that shares a common goal—a better life for humanity.

Part II

EARLIEST PARADIGMS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

A compendium of important events, leaders, and subfields is inevitably an incomplete history of an academic discipline. Knowledge generated by that discipline is a more fascinating history. To the present, no scholar has surpassed what David Easton presented in his landmark *The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science* (1953), wherein he critiqued the contributions of major political theorists as historicism (reductionism) and the proliferation of single case study empirical research as "hyperfactual." What is presented in part II is a very different kind of intellectual history, focusing on metatheories, otherwise known as paradigms. Easton tried to advance a version of what became structural-functionalism in his *A Framework for Political Analysis* (1965a) and *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (1965b). He later celebrated "alternative strategies in theoretical research" (1966). When he coined the word "neobehavioralism" in "The Future of the Postbehavioral Phase" (1997, 16–17), he decried that political science lacked a central focus (cf. 1990, 1991)—that is, lacked metatheory. The only major theory that he acknowledged, not necessarily approvingly, was what has

recently been called the Rational Choice metatheory or paradigm.

Political science has grown topsylike from study to study, mostly with an underlying commitment to promoting democracy and peace. Prebehavioralists, who developed political science from scratch, engaged in forms of analysis that in retrospect were paradigmatic. Some behavioralists hoped that political science would develop a unifying theory—a paradigm—if research were more scientific, but that quest, not fulfilled by the behavioralists, was largely abandoned by postbehavioralists. In a neobehavioral political science, paradigm development will become an extremely exciting enterprise.

Part II is devoted to a delineation—or perhaps a discovery—of major paradigms throughout the early history of political science. Accordingly, the term "paradigm" needs explication, as there are many types of theory and many uses of the word "theory" (Rapoport 1958). Most political scientists today deal with middle-gauge theory, having lost sight of the need for broad-gauge theory.

One example of mid-level theory is an effort to explain why or how coalitions of ethnic groups are formed to win elections, as a researcher may develop a formal or rational theory that the answer is entirely mathematical—that the size of the group determines which groups constitute a "minimum winning coalition." Thus, two ethnic groups that form just over fifty percent of the votes should, according to the theory of William Riker (1962), form coalitions. A broad-gauge view of Riker's theory is that coalition-building is one building block in the Rational Actor paradigm.

Metaphorical (paradigmatic) thinking is commonly used by nonacademics seeking to fathom political reality (Schlesinger and Lau 2000). Elsewhere I have provided a detailed argument for the utility of paradigms as vital to understanding how politics operates (Haas 2016b, ch3). Clearly, the scientific need to find evidence-based

explanations for particular phenomena is stifled if nonparadigmatic and ad hoc.

A “paradigm” or a “metatheory” can be defined as a prototypic behavioral situation, consisting of generic components. One component of a paradigm is a “conceptual scheme”—that is, a set of mutually exclusive, exhaustive categories. Metaconceptual schemes are not mere taxonomies or checklists, but are developed deductively to classify every important element within some aspect of reality. A second component is a set of hypothesized relations between the concepts. A paradigm, thus, contains a body of interconnected propositions that are organized in terms of a conceptual scheme, but ideally can be generalized far beyond the scope of an initial area of reality. But a theory is not an accepted paradigm until supported by a community of scholars who agree that the metatheory is indeed predictive (Kuhn 1962).

Those who develop theoretical science though paradigms seek to discover the inner logic of reality. The theory of minimum winning coalitions assumes that a basic rule of politics is to win elections, regardless of the policy consequences for the voters. But such a rule presumably flows from a major metatheory of political science—the Rational Choice paradigm. What distinguishes a mid-level theory from a paradigm is that the basic concepts of the former apply just to one level of analysis, whereas the latter applies to many phenomena besides ethnic voting coalitions, from individual decision-making to international and global strategic thinking. Paradigms find isomorphisms (similar patterns) across many levels of analysis.

For another example, the ideology of Marx*is*m seeks to explain every aspect of politics as a class struggle. But the Marx*ia*n paradigm, devoid of the ideological imperative, may be invoked to explain urban riots, war, and thus a wide variety of social phenomena. A Marxian explanation can even be applied to seemingly nonpolitical phenomena, such

as the change from baroque to classical music as a shift from royal sponsorship of the music of Franz Josef Haydn to the need of Ludwig von Beethoven to sell his music to audiences of the general public.

The main reason for seeking paradigms is that a single broad-gauge theory may be discovered to apply across all the subfields identified in chapter 2. Instead of myriad mid-level theories for microspecializations, the profession of political science can become recognized as integrated only with metatheory. Moreover, since the origin of many paradigms is outside political science, principally in sociology, the social sciences may finally work together across artificial boundaries that have separated them from the mid-nineteenth century.

Of course, a body of knowledge need not be organized analytically. But without theory, the practical and scientific import of empirical findings cannot be properly fathomed. Facts do not speak for themselves but beg to be pieced together in a coherent manner. Hence, the fugitive insights of hyperfactual behavioralists have mostly generated a fragmented corpus of studies.

What follows in chapters 3–6 is an exposition of traditional, behavioralist, and postbehavioralist, though they have often been retitled over the years to pretend originality while achieving discontinuity. Paradigms in the following chapters are demonstrated to span a variety of subfields of political science. The aim is to revive the quest for theoretical science within the field of political science. In each case, the paradigms are diagramed to show causality, though some are elaborated in more detail in the companion to the present volume, *International Relations Theory: Competing Empirical Paradigms* (2016b).

In addition, there is a subtle distinction within each causal sequence: Material elements are capitalized, whereas attitudes and opinions are in lowercase. The Marxian paradigm, for example, assigns priority to material factors,

whereas psychologically based paradigms will consist primarily of mental factors.

Although some paradigms may seem quaint to those unfamiliar with them, the fact is that ongoing research is unwittingly testing and even cross-testing them. The narrative in part III, contains references to articles and books that are relevant to all the paradigms explicated herein, even though authors may be unaware of their paradigmatic significance. In other words, paradigm development is ongoing today, though unrecognized by most political scientists. Now is the time for the shades to come off the eyes of the profession.

Chapter 3

Traditional Paradigms

Traditional political science accepted several paradigms, though later political scientists have been unaware of the assumptions and models implicit in their research. Those who later espoused behavioralism sought to break free from the conventions of the early period, which began with legalism and developed into paradigms with increasing sophistication, though they often reformulated traditional paradigms as their own.

LEGAL ENGINEERING PARADIGM

Early political scientists advanced the concept of “rule of law” from the legal profession as the basis for social engineering. Traditional legal analysis views government establishing norms by statutes, while deliberations within juries and judicial rulings are expected to uphold the law as a rational basis for minimizing or channeling societal conflict. The use of law to empower and proscribe involves social engineering—changing behavior by setting up rules with sanctions (cf. Calabresi 2016).

Perhaps the paragon case occurred when Moses went to the mountain to receive a set of moral principles for his people, soon emerging with something on stone tablets that

has never been revealed. But when he descended “he saw the calf, and the dancing” (Exodus 32, 19). He then threw the tables down and broke them. After he went back up the mountain, he returned with the Ten Commandments, a set of principles more appropriate to the defects in his people (Exodus 34, 1). In other words, the first norms are presumed to have referred to an ideal society, whereas the Ten Commandments are norms derived by analyzing a broken (imperfect) society. The commandments were intended to engineer a culture closer to an archetypal society by seeking to change norms, in part by stating them and in part by establishing a legal system to enforce them.

At a secular level, a similar idea was disseminated by Thomas Hobbes (1651), who examined the chaos of the English Civil War (1642–1651) and recommended adoption of the principle that the people should surrender any sense of rights and replace them with obligations to the state, which in turn could preserve the common goal of an orderly society. Different cultural views among various social groups in England, in other words, should yield to the unquestioned exercise of dominant power. Later, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762) thought that he had found an answer to the Hobbesian social contract—Athenian-type democratic rule under a tree. Rousseau identified self-governing small communities as the paragon case for democratic rule. John Locke (1688) also envisioned an ideal society, but one in which representative government would provide order without violating the basic human rights of life, liberty, and property.

Particularly among Anglo-Saxon political scientists, the spectacle of adversaries arguing syllogistically pro and con over issues in a courtroom or legislature assumes a nearly sacred character. The aim is either to outwit the opponent or, in the latter case, to persuade others of the wisdom of one’s position in transforming a troubled society into a more acceptable social order.

Legal analysis is typified by Francis Lieber (1863), who culled through diplomatic history and international legal customs to discover principles governing the conduct of warfare. Similarly, Walter Bagehot (1867) “discovered” the English constitution through an analysis of policies and practices of parliament.

The traditional study of law envisages the following components in the Legal Engineering paradigm, with arrows representing causes (Figure 3.1). Thus, when new social problems emerge, they are analyzed from a legal perspective. If old norms are ineffective, new norms are developed and encoded into law. The objective of new laws is to promote voluntary compliance, with the threat of enforcement in the background. Because attitudes are difficult to change, the effect of new laws is to change behavior, which in turn will affect how people think. The hope is that new norms will increase social stability; if not, the process is repeated, and alternative norms are encoded into law until stability is achieved. Locke and Montesquieu felt that constitutions with separation of powers would guard against tyranny. President Abraham Lincoln disseminated the *Lieber Code* so that the army of the North would defeat the South without alienating the peoples of the South by committing atrocities and other inhumane acts. After Lincoln, the Republican Party tried to shape the defeated southern states with what they called “Reconstruction,” which brought African Americans into positions of power. In 1877, military troops were withdrawn from the chaotic southern states, leading to racial segregation (Du Bois 1903; Henry 1938). The McKinley Tariff and similar laws were erected to engineer industrial development in the northern states by protecting “infant industry” (Taussig 1892). And Woodrow Wilson advocated the League of Nations as an institution to engineer peace by providing a continuous arena for open diplomacy (Hudson 1932).




Figure 3.1 Legal Engineering Paradigm.

The Legal Engineering paradigm, thus, is based on the presumption, often untested, that law can serve the goal of changing behavior. However, the belief that the death penalty can serve to deter heinous violent crime has never been proven (Baumgartner, De Boef, and Boystun 2008). Nevertheless, the adoption of international human rights treaties has been followed by improved human rights observance in many countries of the world, according to research by Beth Simmons (2009; cf. Payaslian 1996; Koh 1997; Hathaway 2002). Thus, the paradigm is widely applicable though was not perceived as such during the prebehavioral era of political science—or later.

INSTITUTIONAL POWER PARADIGM

Traditional political science also focused on the formal powers of institutions that emerge from legal documents—constitutions, court cases, and legislation. Institutional analysis consists of a description of the powers, functions, duties, and constitutional constraints upon the occupants of various bureaucratic and institutional positions in government. “Congress can do this and cannot do that” is a characteristic manner to express institutionalist statements, and the familiar graphic representation is an organization chart of agencies and subagencies, each connected by direct lines to subordinate and superordinate structures. By

examining power allocated within a country's constitution, one can assess whether the legislature or executive in one country is relatively more or less powerful than its counterpart in another country. The attraction of institutional analysis has been so great that such countries as France have drafted five different constitutional documents to redistribute power.




Figure 3.2 Institutional Power Paradigm.

But Woodrow Wilson (1885 [1901], 12) critiqued the focus on institutional power as "literary theory," clearly believing that such a paradigm (a word that he of course never used) was naïve. The fact that the English monarch possesses the power to veto a bill passed by Parliament yet chooses not to exercise such power contradicts the paradigm. Wilson instead sought to ascertain the real and effective locus of power in government. His principal finding, that there is an informal power structure in Congress which he discovered through conversations with informants, was an advance over formal institutional analysis.

Max Weber (1919), who indicated that the mother tongue of the sphere of politics is power, also urged the study of where power lies. Thereby, the study of actual power versus formal power became wedded within the same genre. A key element is to trace funding to various institutions. The influence of the U.N., for example, varies among Specialized Agencies, some of which are better funded than others. The causal model for the Institutional Power paradigm, thus, must reflect material resources as well as constitutional

capabilities and extraconstitutional power centers (Figure 3.2).

The activity of political parties has been far more influential than their extraconstitutional status would have suggested according to legal and institutional approaches. The rise of such pressure groups as chambers of commerce, suffragettes, and trade unions questioned formal institutional power analysis, which was superseded by another paradigm, which is described next.

PRESSURE GROUP PARADIGM

The most important paradigm in political science, even today, was developed over a century ago by Arthur Bentley. As an astute observer of politics, his *The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures* (1908) developed a paradigm to contest the Institutional Power paradigm. Bentley was suggesting a new focus of study—pressures by groups on political decision-makers that lead to policy outputs. His classic study was then followed by several pressure group studies (Munro 1928; Odegaard 1928; Herring 1929; Schattschneider 1935). The view was that politics is characterized by group conflict, with some interests prevailing over others apart from institutional powers and constraints (Figure 3.3).




Figure 3.3 Pressure Group Paradigm.

Later, Merle Fainsod (1940, 297–98) developed the paradigm by suggesting that a political equilibrium results from a “parallelogram of forces” impacting the political system. Such an image suggested that politics operated in a

manner similar to Boyle's Law of gases (P=T/V), recalibrated as P=TV in which the extent of pressure of each group might be measured by multiplying the temperature of interests (salience of the issue) multiplied by the volume of interests (lobbying funds and person-hours allocated by affected interests). Alternatively, the model might be similar to Newton's Law (F=MA)—that is, force equals mass times acceleration. One force within a parallelogram of forces, thus, would prevail when able to amass the greatest amount of pressure (in dollars or lobbying person-hours) reaching the largest number of key players—that is, before other pressure groups. But nobody took the "parallelogram" concept seriously as a concept to be measured quantitatively. The generals of Adolf Hitler, however, did when massive armies (the M) were dispatched by blitzkriegs (the A) at the beginning of World War II, according to the advice of Carl von Clausewitz (1832), who after all considered war the conduct of politics by other means.

The development of paradigms requires an increase in explanatory inclusiveness. Bentley's theory became mainstream political science as an advance over other paradigms because evidence was specifically collected in validation. The psychological approach of Harold Lasswell (1930) was absorbed into the Pressure Group paradigm to explain anomalous cases, where personality overrode pressures or the reverse.

Even those unfamiliar with Bentley and theory testing about pressure groups tend to use the term "forces" whenever describing the political environment in a city, a state, a country, or among countries around the world. They usually do so without reflecting that the term "forces" implies a paradigm about group or nation-state pressures.

HISTORICISM PARADIGM

A goal within the subfield of political theory has been to explicate various normative and empirical propositions contained in the writings of political philosophers. Often the analysis has been confined to exegesis. According to David Easton (1953), some political theorists have engaged in unabashed reductionism—that is, "historicism." The historical determinism of William Dunning (1902), George Sabine (1950), and others involved the use of optical images: Moral and intellectual views have been seen as mere reflections of their times, and new ideas are thus explained away as mirrors of self-interest or self-perception to solve problems in troubling times (Figure 3.4).

The genius of Thomas Hobbes (1651), for example, could be reduced to the fact that the turbulence of English Civil Wars in the seventeenth century called for a theory that would make the stability of authoritarian rule seem acceptable. The specific elements in the Historicistm paradigm are the perceived importance of types of social conditions, value prescriptions, and intellectual constructs, which in turn are merely representations of social reality based upon value preferences and climates of opinion. The paradigm is unremarkable because what is described is simply the social psychological concept of attitude formation. An attitude, after all, is "a relatively enduring organization of beliefs, feelings, and behavioral tendencies towards socially significant objects, groups, events, or symbols" (Hogg and Vaughan 2005, 150). Indeed, historicism was used to explain the intellectual history of political science in chapter 1.

However, political theorists have much more to contribute than fuel for historiographers. Whether they address objective conditions, true or imagined, they still provide normative challenges. After all, without a justification for democracy along ethical lines, political science might simply be the study of power from a Machiavellian perspective.

Moreover, political theorists can be observed from literary writers. Aristophanes (c. 425–405 BCE), for example, insightfully satirized Athenian politics, and bisexual Percy Bysshe Shelley (1812) urged the Irish to revolt from British imperial rule. In both cases, they prescribed remedies based on a dormant theory as well as propositions about how X causes Y (Haas 2014d, ch3). And Jacques Maritain (1957), whose philosophical writings contributed to the development of existentialism, articulated at least twelve testable propositions (Haas 2014d, 72).




Figure 3.4 Historicism Paradigm.

SOCIAL DARWINIAN PARADIGM

A second paradigm that gained acceptance in early political science was based on Darwinism, the biological theory that explains why some species survive and other die out. The term “Social Darwinism” was coined by Thomas Huxley (1860) in his review of Darwin’s published scientific findings. Huxley suggested that groups of similar humans, such as ethnic groups, will fail to reproduce if they are too weak to survive in a social struggle for existence. When the weaker ones die off, the resulting survivors ensure the survival of a hardier human race, superior to what came before. Some of the scenario at the time was thought to refer to survival from deadly diseases that can now be prevented by immune injections or cured with antibiotics.

Due to Huxley’s writing, Darwinism has been applied to politics and society by Charles Darwin (1871) and other thinkers, including John Burgess (Somit and Tannenhaus 1967, 3). Social Darwinism also analogizes the state as an organism that grows, adapts to new conditions, and

occasionally dies when conditions change without corresponding readaptation. Accordingly, some constitutions, countries, leaders, legal precedents, national groups, and political parties survive, while others fade away. The view that the fit survive, and the weak die out was developed by sociologists Herbert Spencer (1882), William Graham Sumner (1918), and political philosopher Friedrich Hayek (1944) into a social principle that there is an ongoing struggle for existence, such that the strong will dominate the weak for the human race to survive (Figure 3.5).

Human rights for the weak, thus, seem counter to the biological imperative. Social Darwinists also assume that some are much more intelligent, such that those with lesser brainpower will not be clever enough to survive. Although such extrapolation from Darwin's writings is clearly pseudoscientific and a major justification for racist policies, Social Darwinism continues to have strong supporters, albeit outside political science (cf. Hofstadter 1955).

There are two variants of Social Darwinism—libertarianism and triumphalism. *Libertarianism* advocates minimal government and opposes social engineering. *Triumphalism* wants to use the state for social engineering—to advance the fortunes of those who are judged to be successful while sometimes trampling on those who are considered unworthy (Haas 2012b, ch5). Social Darwinism provides some satisfaction for elitist ruling classes, who feel that their power is organically determined, taking comfort in the belief that they are the most "fit." However, Darwin never said that surviving species were better than those that become extinct. Sociologist William Ryan (1971) has called the Social Darwinist bias one of "blaming the victim." Applying Social Darwinism to economics, libertarians want fewer government regulations, while triumphalists favor tax reductions for the rich, otherwise known as "trickle-down" economics.




Figure 3.5 Social Darwinian Paradigm.

The most controversial aspect of Social Darwinism is the assumption that the poor do less well because they do not adapt themselves to everyday conditions, which are always changing. In addition, some Social Darwinists believe that certain ethnic and racial groups are genetically prone to success, while other groups are doomed to failure.

Libertarians see the struggle for existence as best achieved without government intervention. Under classical economics, the most competitive businesses prevail over the inefficient in a free, self-correcting marketplace; individuals and countries focused on pursuing their economic self-interest will succeed over those who do not. Milton Friedman (Friedman and Schwartz 1963) and Ayn Rand (1943) are among the most influential twentieth-century exponents of libertarianism, favoring governmental deregulation of economic and social life so that self-interest will prevail over sentimentality. They oppose government "handouts" for creating "dependency." In many respects, they are sympathetic to the views of anarchists and isolationists.

Triumphalist Social Darwinians want government to intervene so that groups with the most power and resources can establish dominance over others, such as by business subsidies and tax incentives. Writing before Darwin, Georg William Friedrich Hegel (1820 [1980], 209) argued that war keeps states fit. Adolf Hitler had a similar view: He considered Germans as the superior and virtuous race, and he sought to ride roughshod over other races, particularly the Jews, to establish a "natural" hierarchy of privilege—a "scientific racism" (Browning 2016, 57).

In other words, triumphalists load the dice so that those considered “fit” always win, hardly a paradigmatic claim with objective validity. For that matter, libertarians cheer whoever prevails as the winner, a self-fulfilling proposition.

Assimilationism—that is, requiring immigrant groups to drop their root culture in favor of the host culture—is a racist form of triumphalism on a cultural level (Ross 1914). Adolf Hitler carried the triumphalist ideology to an extreme in social engineering.

Since most in the United States are immigrants or descended from immigrants. those considering assimilationism as racist instead advocated amalgamationism—the view that everyone in the United States should adopt “American culture,” a combination of the best traits within all the immigrant cultures, and jump into the “melting pot” (de Crèvcœur 1782; Turner 1896; Zangwill 1909; Glazer and Moynihan 1963). The problem with amalgamationism was that the elites insisted on defining “American culture” so close to British culture (Huntington 2004; Schlesinger 1991) that the remedy was transparently assimilationist. And third generation Americans have been eager to rediscover their roots (Hansen 1937).

After Darwin applied his theory to humans, religious authorities resisted the idea that the human race may have developed gradually from nonhuman animals rather than being created by God. But they did not discount the possibility that those going to heaven are spiritually the fittest: Among religious Darwinians, the Jehovah’s Witnesses claim that only 144,000 will be admitted to heaven on Judgment Day. Those who obey certain religious maxims are thus more likely to enjoy a good life in heaven or, for Buddhists, reincarnation to become better persons in the next life, though they lack evidence to support their predictions.

When the Darwinian paradigm was applied to the rise and fall of states by Heinrich von Treitschke (1916 [1963], 13) and William Graham Sumner (1911), the view was that states should arm themselves to the maximum required in order to deter military conquest. What will happen is that the stronger will defeat the weaker states to the point where the major powers left standing will create rules to govern a balance of power and the Darwinian survivors (Morgenthau 1948; Kaplan 1957; Mearsheimer 2001; Chen 2013). Indeed, states should feel justified in defeating weaker countries to prevent them from gaining strength (cf. Thayer 2004).

An alternative Darwinian logic has been applied by scholars who find that Third World countries are more likely to engage in war than First World countries because of inferior domestic and foreign policies (Singer and Wildavsky 1996), excusing the fact that the international economic order dominated by the First World creates the inequality that underlies wars within the Third World. But the precariousness of the Darwinian balance of power has led some scholars instead to claim that empirically there are fewer wars when one country assumes Darwinian hegemonic superiority in the international system.

Today, the tension between libertarianism and triumphalism is considerable (Haas 2012, ch5). Both share the goal of enabling the human race to improve by marginalizing the inefficient and inferior, using Darwinian principles as a cover for elitism. In 2011, Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives John Boehner commented,

> For those who can compete and do well, fine. Some Americans can’t compete. I think we have a responsibility as a people to help those who can’t compete. But do we have a responsibility to help those who won’t compete? I would have serious doubts about that.

Although Boehner shed tears for the less fortunate, they are consigned to the fate of “natural selection.” Survival of the richest has long become the Republican Party’s official policy. Yet, according to a highly regarded journalist, leaders of both political parties in the United States practice Social Darwinism insofar as they appeal to the upper middle class and neglect the lower middle class and the poor (Frank 2016). Donald Trump then appealed to their grievances and won the presidential election in 2016.

Nevertheless, a Darwinian paradigm based on the concept of evolution may be making a comeback (Rennstich 2008; Gilady and Hoffmann 2013). Social Darwinism is another view of the class struggle.

MARXIAN PARADIGM

Karl Marx and his collaborator Friedrich Engels offered the first social science paradigm that purported to be based on empirical evidence. They were inspired by Georg Friedrich Hegel (1820) to think in terms of a continual progress of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis as a philosophy of history. But Hegel had in mind ideas, while for Marx the process was fundamentally driven by material reality.

Whereas Marx was the son of a lawyer in Trier, Engels was the son of a manufacturer in nearby Barmen. Both saw that the industrial revolution was unmercifully tearing apart the social fabric of Europe, leaving workers destitute. They inverted the idealist metaphysics of Hegel, whose sanguine philosophy was preparing the way for Prussia to form a larger German state on the principle that all history involved dialectical change, with stronger states prevailing over weaker states, a concept that later inspired Social Darwinism.

By focusing on material conditions underpinning intellectual change, the Historicism and Pressure Group

paradigms clearly borrowed from Marx and Engels (1848), who argued that capitalism arose from the internal contradictions of feudalism, and likewise socialism would develop when workers were fed up with exploitation under capitalism. The Marxian paradigm impressively applies to such phenomena as economic development, pressure group politics, and international conflict.

Business cycles (booms and busts) had not been identified as such when Adam Smith (1776) and David Ricardo (1817) penned their famous works. Factories required by capitalism were bringing large numbers of industrial workers under one roof. Wage laborers were producing goods, and then surrendering ownership of their labor to managers, who in turn were deriving profits by selling goods at prices far above the prevailing rate for wage labor. According to Marx and Engels, when workers realize that they will never share in the prosperity of the managers, that the economic gap between classes widens under capitalism because managers extract a surplus value (profit) from labor, revolution is predicted to be around the corner.

For Marx and Engels, economic transformation is inevitable and results from an interconnection of the sectors of the economy and the polity. The universal stages of primitive communism, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and eventually industrial communism reflect shifts in class dominance, struggles between rival classes in pursuit of self-interest, and thus economic development. Rather than an “invisible hand.” there is a very visible dialectical material struggle between the classes. Political changes occur in response to changes in the modes of production.

Engels (1880) regarded the paradigm as “scientific” because the theory involves real-world phenomena, not just abstract or utopian ethical concepts. Evidence collected from documents in the British Museum, as presented by Marx in *Capital* (1867), refuted the claim of Johann Rodbertus (1858) that worker unrest increases in periods of

economic decline—a thesis also articulated by Alexis de Tocqueville (1835, 1840). Marx, according to one of his interpreters, argued instead that economic "crises are always preceded by a period in which wages rise generally and the working classes actually get a larger share of the annual product expected for consumption" (Robbins 1940, 33). Workers are more likely to become conscious of exploitation in good times, when it becomes obvious that the lion's share of the benefits of prosperity belong to the capitalists, whereas in hard times, the capitalists and proletariat suffer alike. For Marx, worker unrest can result in revolutions and strikes in pursuit of self-interest. Economic conditions (near-poverty status for workers alongside capitalists' affluence) provoke worker unrest, mediated by an attitudinal element (class consciousness).

Marx reported that wages rise because capitalist expansion requires more laborers. Profits fall due to competition between firms, such that some firms are forced out of the market unless they cut wages to starvation levels. Capitalism will collapse because one capitalist will buy out another until the "expropriators are expropriated," leaving monopolistic control of markets instead of competition (Marx 1867 [1926], 837). In short, the principles of capitalist competition lead to a dead end of privately owned monopolies that can be taken over by a government controlled by workers. He did not anticipate that anti-trust legislation would later regulate monopolistic enterprises.

For Marxians, the inevitable progress of history consists primarily of economic changes, secondarily of specific decisions by the masses or a revolutionary cadre. Accordingly, "the ultimate causes of all social changes . . . are to be sought, not in the minds of men . . . but in changes in the mode of production and exchange" (Engels 1878 [1935], 300). Innovations in production change attitudes: "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence

determines their consciousness" (Marx 1859 [1904], 437). Marx believed that workers would easily grasp the reality of their exploitation and act accordingly: "It is not a matter of what this or that proletarian or even the proletariat as a whole pictures at present as its goal. It is a matter of what the proletariat is in actuality and what, in accordance with this being, it will historically be compelled to do" (Marx, c.1845 [1972], 105).

Vladimir Lenin, however, found that when wages did rise and industrialists became wealthier, the proletariat failed to support Communist parties in the early twentieth century. He then stepped to modify the paradigm (Figure 3.6). Noting that capitalists "bribed" the upper proletariat with higher wages, creating a middle class, and thus reduced their revolutionary consciousness, Lenin (1914, 1917a) departed from Marx by assigning a central role to a revolutionary vanguard (1914 [1935], 10) and to violence (1917b [1935], 21). Better attuned to material realities than the ordinary worker, Lenin hypothesized that a vanguard would fill the link between the existence of objective economic conditions and revolutionary consciousness. During World War I, leaders of Communist parties urged their members to refuse to fight on behalf of capitalist-dominated states. When workers became soldiers, Lenin (1914 [1935], 125) realized that capitalists had sought to "fool them with nationalism."

Another important contribution of Lenin is that capitalism postpones its demise by dominating poor countries; superexploitation abroad can ease the falling rate of profit at home, extending Marx's observation that capitalism got its start through primitive accumulation of capital accruing from "the discovery of gold and silver in America . . . and . . . the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black skins" (Marx 1852 [1972], 823). Just as internal markets would be saturated, colonial exploitation would reach an asymptote, so Lenin did not expect capitalism to survive much longer.

Lenin (1917a) postulated that there are four postcapitalist stages—a revolutionary government, a postrevolutionary government (now known as a people's democracy), a socialist state, and eventually industrial communism. He was willing to seize power to hasten the process toward socialism in Russia (Lenin 1917b), but his legacy turned out to be a system of state capitalism, not socialism. Once in power, the revolutionary vanguard betrayed Marx, who opposed dictatorial rule.




Figure 3.6 Marxian Paradigm.

Later, writing inside one of Benito Mussolini's prisons from 1929 to 1935, Antonio Gramsci noted that control of the instruments of mass communication had so caught the imagination of the public that the ordinary worker could no longer perceive events as accurately as Marx or even Lenin assumed, though he still considered that moral and intellectual elements are "tied to the existence of objective social conditions" (1957, 151). Gramsci's Marxian view that ideas and political arrangements are superstructures erected by ruling classes to preserve cultural hegemony is an idealist Historicist insight, whereas Marx and Lenin were material Historicists. Gramsci's thoughts, later identified as an application of constructivism, were not fully published until the 1950s but served as a foundation for Euro-Communism. Gramsci sought to explain why a capitalist-created hegemonic discourse has persuaded workers to vote contrary to their interests or, based on the analysis of Elisabeth Noeile-Neumann (1980), to become nonvoters. Another Marxian, Herbert Aptheker (1965), hypothesized that the urban riots of the 1960s in the United States were

evidence that the exploited masses were participating in revolutionary acts that were more political and economic than racial in nature.

But non-Marxist political scientists also found explanations for politics in the way money influences political decisions. Charles Beard (1913, 1923), in particular, viewed economic reality as a strong influence on the writing of the American constitution and the deal-making of politics. He argued that politics is a route through which wealth can be accumulated. The Progressive Movement that arose in the late nineteenth century sought to eliminate the influence of money in politics, whereas Charles Merriam (1924) and his students sought to advance a more representative democracy rather than accepting the Marxian paradigm. The Pressure Group paradigm of Bentley, which recognized the influential role of monetary pressures, was clearly a kissing cousin of the Marxian paradigm at a time when political scientists feared to be labeled as "Marxists" lest they would be caught up in the Palmer Raids after World War I or fired during the Cold War.

For Robert Dahl (1970, 106), sounding Marxian, "a number of resources are distributed in an extremely unequal fashion . . . and hence the degree of individual freedom and opportunity are markedly unequal in the United States." He then hypothesized that income redistribution would result from voting by the poorer elements of society. But redistribution by the upper classes has appeared an unlikely scenario.

Perhaps unwittingly, political scientists tested predictions of the Marxian paradigm during the heyday of behavioralist political science. Attitudinal data, for example, partially contradict Aptheker: Reformist ideology prevailed among the rioters, many of whom were more middle class in occupation and in group memberships (Kaplan and Paige 1968; Fogelson and Hill 1968). For Ted Gurr (1970), rioters were those who were motivated by "relative economic

deprivation”—that is, the comparison between their income and those at the top—consistent with the classical Marxian rather than the Rodbertian prediction. Gurr was writing during the economic upturns of the 1960s.

Nevertheless, trust in government declines during periods of economic downturns and is much less affected during upturns (Hetherington and Rudolph 2008). Moreover, perceptions of economic downturns and upturns have been demonstrated statistically to be more associated with a potential for political violence than perceptions of no change in economic gratification (Muller 1980, 75).

In measuring levels of economic exploitation, explicitly testing Marxian theory, Terry Boswell and William Dixon (1993) successfully predicted rebellions in times of economic crises across sixty-one countries in the 1970s (as predicted by Rodbertus), but the extent of inequality washed out as a predictor variable. Increasing income equality, nevertheless, is associated with greater economic growth, and inequality with economic stagnation (Oshima 1970; Haas 2014d, ch7).

Clearly, a peaceful world for the Marxists comes when capitalism has rationalized the world economy—that is, when all markets have been saturated—and nationalisms have been superseded by a world culture (Marx and Engels 1848 [1972], 350). Marx did not exclude the possibility that capitalism might bring world peace (Silberner 1946, 253–54). Accordingly, Istvan Kende (1971), compiled a list of about one hundred local wars fought from 1945 to 1970, concluded that most wars have involved armed forces from Western capitalist topdog states, thereby sharing Lenin’s pessimism that capitalism might ever become more peaceful. In a later study, Kende (1978) noted a general decline in wars, a reduction in direct participation, and an increase in the use of arms merchants and sub-imperial proxies of the same countries. A later study by three non-Marxists, using data over recent centuries, was consistent

with Lenin in finding that major power wars cluster in eras of economic upswings, whereas imperialist wars prevail in downswings (Boswell, Sweat, and Brueggemann 1989, 18).

One need not subscribe to Marxist ideological goals in testing the predictions contained within the paradigm. The prediction that workers would become a world proletariat has not been true in Western countries, where trade union influence has waned, but has recently emerged in China, India, and South Africa (Ness 2015).

The Marxist value commitment is to the satisfaction of basic human needs. Inevitably, the time will come when "the antithesis between mental and physical labor has vanished . . . and society can inscribe on its banners: From each according to his ability, to each according to his need," as Marx once stated in *The Critique of the Gotha Program* (1875 [1972], 187). Whereas Marx*ism* is a belief that the action program of advocating socialism to replace capitalism is an ethical imperative, the Marx*ian* paradigm challenges political scientists to refute the empirical (causal) claims of the paradigm. Accordingly, recent studies have demonstrated the internal contradictions in state socialism, both economic (Bunge 1999) and political (Rose, Michler, and Haerpfer 1998).

Marxian analysis remains alive if anyone will notice. Such modern writers as Alain Badieu (1998) Daniel Bensaïd (2002), and Onur Ulas Ince (2016), as well as the journal *Monthly Review* (1949–) have kept Marxian analysis going, though not within political science. Benno Teschke (2003) and Alexander Anievas (2014), who utilize the concept of "uneven and combined development" from Leon Trotsky (1930, ch1; cf. Matin 2007; Rosenberg 2013), are developing the Marxian paradigm into new avenues for research.

CONCLUSION

Karl Popper (1945), who inspired much of behavioralist political science, dismissed scientific socialism, the term used by Engels, as a pseudoscience. Popper regarded Marxian theory is a subset of the Historicism paradigm, which he also attacked as unscientific. Nevertheless, scientific tests of propositions from the Marxian and Historicist paradigms are possible. Prebehavioralist paradigms must be recognized for opportunities to test a wider range of empirical propositions than many competing paradigms.

All six paradigms are still alive. In some cases, they were later relabeled. The Institutional Power paradigm, for example, is at the heart of any study of politics (e.g., Campbell and Pedersen 2001). But the major challenge in traditional political science was the Marxian paradigm, which overshadowed all others in comprehensiveness.

The purpose in citing mid-level studies by Baumgartner, Beard, Boswell, De Boef, Boyston, Dixon, Fogelson, Gurr, Hill, Kaplan, Muller, Oshima, Simmons, and others is to demonstrate how tests of narrow propositions can support or refute causal connections predicted by metatheories. Political science will be a more consequential discipline when answers to itsy-bitsy questions finally inhabit the architecture of paradigmatic visions.

Chapter 4

BEHAVIORAL PARADIGMS

Traditional paradigms provided inspiration for research in political science up to about 1945. Although employed as ways of looking at reality, none of the paradigms sought scientific testing. Case studies flooded the literature of political science. The focus was on particular facts, rather than on relations between variables, operationalizing theoretical concepts, or on systematic comparisons across cases to test theories.

The paradigms of prebehavioral political science might have been among the first to be scrutinized in a scientific manner when systematic theory and methods began to receive more emphasis after World War II. Instead, the behavioral revolution after 1945 utilized newer paradigms, often reconceptualizing the earlier ones, while borrowing from other disciplines.

The Marxian paradigm continued but lost popularity when Russia instituted a repressive Soviet Union state. Social Darwinism was rejected when the welfare state arose, including the New Deal of Franklin Roosevelt, because the state was now protecting the most vulnerable, applying the Legal Engineering paradigm. But legal analysis and the Institutional Power paradigm had been challenged by the Pressure Group paradigm, which in turn was to morph into

the Interest Group paradigm (Truman 1951). And David Easton (1953) questioned the utility of the Historicism paradigm.

Founders of the behavioral movement stressed theory as essential to the scientific enterprise because otherwise research would be "hyperfactual," as Easton (1953) complained. Behavioralists presumably pledged not to pile up endless studies and instead to make theoretically useful interconnections in their research. Such behavioralists as Heinz Eulau (1963, 25–31) stressed middle-range theory—that is, propositions to test bivariate and multivariate relationships; he argued that broad-gauge metatheory—which would unify the discipline—would come later. James Rosenau (1966) referred to his work on foreign policy as a "pre-theory." Behavioralists, in other words, were aware that piling up endless studies was "hyperfactual," and they expressed confidence that theoreticians would later play an integrative role.

But there were other behavioralists, such as David Singer, who privately eschewed theory. He and others were committed to a positivist view that metatheory would necessarily involve untested assumptions and might beguile researchers by representing reality in terms of false analogies. In practice, many behavioralists advanced empirical science, but stopped before reaching the shore of theoretical science, drifting in empirical rowboats without oars, unable to dock at metatheory.

Recognition of *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962) by Thomas Kuhn to political scientists came somewhat later than the publication date. Kuhn argued that natural science disciplines had operated within the framework of major theoretical perspectives (waves, particles, etc.), known as paradigms, leaving most "normal" scientists conducting research consistent with the paradigm of the day, encountering occasional anomalies—that is, exceptions to the prevailing theory. Then, according to Kuhn,

along came a new paradigm that explained both “normal” findings and the anomalies. Kuhn’s history traced how the same process was repeated over time in the natural sciences.

One impact of Kuhn was to point out that political scientists recognized no serious paradigms within the discipline. Some felt that Kuhn’s implicit advice was to be skeptical of paradigms. Others believed that a major task within political science was to develop paradigms by locating analogous (isomorphic) phenomena. But the first efforts to develop metatheory fell far short, sometimes placing human thoughts in a “black box,” never to be examined, as noted in this chapter.

SOCIALIZATION AND COGNITIVE DELIBERATION PARADIGMS

Politics may be a game to many of the players, but ordinary citizens often regard the machinations of politicians with disdain and prefer true democracy—instructions from the people directly to those in government. Although public opinion polling began in the prebehavioral era, the methodology was not fully developed until the 1950s, following the lead of the Gallup Poll, which was founded in 1935. But political scientists were not the first to publish scientific voting studies. They were jolted by a study by Columbia University social psychologists Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Helen Gaudet (1944). Studying the 1940 presidential election, they predicted voter preferences from three fixed characteristics—religion (Catholic or Protestant), social class, and urban or rural residence—and therefore were unlikely to change during the election campaign. They believed that individuals who were both Catholic (predisposed to vote for the Democratic Party) and

rural (predisposed to vote for the Republican Party) would experience social "cross-pressures": Either they would not vote or influential persons in their community would sway them to vote one way or another (cf. Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1948; Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955). The paradigm of social psychologists was Socialization—social pressures exerted on individuals over a long period of time to conform to social norms (cf. Kelman 1965; Milgram 1974). Whereas the Historicism paradigm reduced attitudes to background characteristics and unexpected historical developments, the broader Socialization paradigm superseded the earlier paradigm by encouraging an exploration of which social influences were relevant (Figure 4.1).

Political scientists at the University of Michigan then challenged the Columbia social psychologists, also viewing voters through the lens of "psychological determinants of voting preferences" (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954, 8–9). But they believed that voters were more individualistic, able to make up their own minds. Initial Michigan voting studies identified three bases for voter choice—personal candidate characteristics, issue preferences, and political party identification, matters that rational voters considered during election campaigns. Their Cognitive Deliberation paradigm asserted that perceptual and attitudinal variables were much better predictors than such objective characteristics as economic class (ibid., 5, 13; Converse 1958; Campbell and Stokes 1959; Campbell, Converse, Miller, Stokes 1960, ch5; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1966).

Accordingly, Michigan political scientists reformulated the notion of cross-pressures: If a person is oriented toward a party, agrees with the party's platform, and likes the party's candidate (or vice versa), the expectation is that the vote will be congruent with these factors (Figure 4.2). Otherwise, there will be psychological cross-pressures within the individual, resulting in either nonvoting or deliberation on which basis for choice was judged more important. They

explained the process of resolving cross-pressures as the "funnel of causality" (ibid., 24–37).




Figure 4.1 Socialization Paradigm.




Figure 4.2 Cognitive Deliberation Paradigm.

Two in the Michigan group reanalyzed the data from the 1948 study by the Columbia social psychologists and drew an opposite conclusion (Janowitz and Miller 1952). The Columbia group responded that the Michigan group had been "careless" and had supported, not refuted, their Socialization paradigm (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954, 283n10). Both efforts represented some of the first cross-tests of alternative paradigms in political science.

Next, Ithiel Pool, Robert Abelson, and Samuel Popkin (1965) analyzed the 1960 and 1964 presidential elections. With William McPhee, a coauthor of one of the Columbia studies, assisting the analysis (ibid., 76n7), they made another critical test between the two paradigms. In 1960, the best predictors of voting choices were party loyalty and the issue of whether a Catholic should be allowed to become president; Kennedy's Catholicism appeared to garner more electoral votes than it lost (ibid., 114, 118). In 1964, the best predictor was issue orientation—namely,

voter preferences regarding arms control, civil rights, and social welfare (ibid., 165). They explained cases of conflicting pressures by using the balance theory of Robert Abelson and Milton Rosenberg (1958) and Fritz Heider (1958, 1959)—namely, that humans will choose the pressure that most validates their prejudices. The study, in short, tested social background variables along with cognitive deliberation variables, and emerged with a conclusion that supported the latter—the Cognitive Deliberation paradigm.

Although the Michiganders often used party identification almost as a surrogate for issue orientation, they found that party orientation slumped over time. In later studies, the Michigan group continued to seek explanations for the steady erosion of partisan loyalties (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1966; Converse, Clauson, and Miller 1965; Converse, Miller, Rusk, and White 1969; Miller, Miller, Raine, and Brown 1976; Miller and Levitin 1977). Philip Converse (1975) classified issues into “group benefits” and “nature of the times,” which resembled the Columbia group’s earlier distinction between position and style issues (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954, 184), but results were inconclusive.

Over time, those using the Michigan paradigm developed more sophisticated measures of candidate and issue orientation (Sniderman 1983). When issue orientation was redefined in terms of self-identification as liberal or conservative, rather than in terms of researcher-designated classifications, it was possible to deduce that voters think ideologically when they vote (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976; Holm and Robinson 1978; Levitin and Miller 1979; Kinder 1983). Voting was also predicted on the basis of retrospective evaluations of how satisfied voters are with the past performance of a candidate or the economy in general (Fiorina 1981). Later analyses have done little to modify the threefold set of factors in the original Cognitive

Deliberation paradigm (Bartels 2010), and the Socialization paradigm is still a reasonable alternative. However, neither the Columbians nor the Michiganders wrote about paradigms, a term not in use until years after they launched their studies. The concept of socialization was well known in psychology, whereas the term “cognitive deliberation” was not in currency until 1974 (Haas 1974, 356–67), if then. Paradigmatic labels came later.

FIGHTS, GAMES, AND DEBATES

One of the earliest efforts to pave the way toward paradigm development came when Anatol Rapoport, a mathematical psychologist, published *Fights, Games, and Debates* (1960). He presented the three terms in his title as Weberian ideal types—that is, models with their own rules of operation. Rapoport suggested that the social sciences could develop by finding isomorphisms between social phenomena that could be classified either as a fight, a game, or a debate. In other words, social scientists should pick one of the three models that seems most akin to whatever was being studied and then determine wherein reality differs from one of the three models chosen as a basis for comparison. The development of a referent model into a paradigm would require the collection of a vast amount of data to demonstrate that the laws of the paradigm are isomorphic in every respect to the laws discovered in the phenomena falling under the rubric of an analytical model. Then the model could either be corrected by research, and theory would progressively develop beyond the model to a new paradigm that would account for the anomalies.

Thus, three models could be used as templates for explaining political phenomena. By “fight,” Rapoport had in mind arms races, wherein mathematician Lewis Richardson (1960a,b) had developed highly sophisticated calculus-based equations to determine how the trajectory of arms

races kept pace with fear, grudges, and rivalry. The fight paradigm could also be analogized to the former Pressure Group paradigm, which was developed into the Interest Group paradigm in the behavioral era. Indeed, advocates of contending policies are often described in American political parlance as engaged in a “fight,” using the boxing analogy. Rapoport’s interest in debates was in how best to be persuasive, such as the Cognitive Deliberation paradigm described above dealing with voting. That left the game metaphor as the most innovative paradigm.

GAME PARADIGM

Some political scientists enthusiastically seized upon games, with winners and losers, as the basis for building theory about decision-making. Game theory, as developed by mathematicians John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1953), may be seen as appropriate when opponents possess something of interest to each other and need to negotiate to get the best deal. A settlement hinges on whether both parties find suitable options during bargaining. Various tactics are then used because negotiators are playing a game to win, with a win-win outcome the preferred option rather than a zero-sum (winner takes all) outcome. The outcome in a political game is conceived of as involving victory for the most resourceful player, sometimes bluffing during negotiations, rather than as a purely ratiocinative argument or bilateral debate over issues to find the normatively best solution to a problem, though each player carries on an internal debate over what strategy to follow (Figure 4.3).

In conditions of uncertainty, where the outcome need not be zero-sum, the Game paradigm was applied to the “prisoner’s dilemma”—that is, the decision to maximize a desired goal with minimum risk in a condition of information

uncertainty (Rapoport and Chammah 1965). The dilemma of the prisoner is that when two or more are arrested for a crime, police may ask prisoner #1 to confess for a lesser offense because prisoner #2 might do so first, leaving prisoner #1 with the maximum sentence. Police play a game to get a confession; prisoners play a game to minimize sentencing.




Figure 4.3 Game Paradigm.

When applied to nuclear deterrence by Thomas Schelling (1960), Rapoport (1964) was less enthusiastic, and Phillip Green (1966) cautioned that applying the Game paradigm to international relations between two nuclear superpowers was "deadly logic." Deterrence strategy operated during the Cold War to prevent a cataclysm, but the superpowers waged limited proxy wars instead to seek small-scale victories—games involving fights. Israel, a covert nuclear power, nevertheless, failed to discourage mini-rocket attacks from Lebanon and, later, from the Gaza Strip. A more thorough analysis of rational deterrence strategy is found elsewhere (Haas 2016b, ch7).

Glendon Schubert (1959, 1965), instead of depicting deliberation within the Supreme Court on legal precedents, presumed to find efforts of one justice to accumulate power vis-à-vis another in the manner of a game. He sought to find how "swing voters" operated within the Supreme Court.

William Riker (1962) applied the Game paradigm to the formation of minimum winning coalition majorities within legislatures during the years when both major American political parties had right- and left-wing factions. Similarly, Nathan Leites wrote *The Game of Politics in France* (1959), where passing laws involved finding a *dosage*—that is, the

minimum number of votes from parliamentarians to pass legislation. The same coalition building game applies to ethnic bloc voting in local elections (Haas 1986). Ticket balancing to attract ethnic groups in order to form majorities in state and local elections (say, an Irish candidate for governor with an Italian lieutenant governor running mate) is thus a game within a game (Haas 2016a, 100–1). The tendency of the Democratic Party during the first half of the twentieth century to nominate a president from a northern state and a vice president from a southern state, or from two border states, was once the most well-known ticket-balancing game in American politics.

Economists also introduced public choice theory. *The Theory of Committees and Elections* (1958) by Duncan Black as well as *The Calculus of Consent* by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962) attempted to make political decisions optimal between the needs of the economy and the needs of the people. But they also argued that the "rational ignorance" of voters exists because intelligent voting requires voters to engage in substantial research, for which most have no time; hence, the rational voter will ignore politics as much as possible and even refrain from voting. With ignorant voters outside the electoral process, the outcome is decided by those who are more intelligent. Such a "paradox of voting," as identified by Anthony Downs (1957, 1961; cf. Howard 1971), led to the conclusion that officeseekers must have clever ads and slogans, appealing superficially to attract those who otherwise would be nonvoters, rather than bore the masses with carefully articulated platforms.

In short, economists were seeking rationality, a quest that began long ago when capitalism first arose. And behavioral political scientists did pursue the full implications of the Game paradigm. Later, they would relabel public choice theory as the Rational Choice paradigm (see chapter 6).

INTEREST GROUP PARADIGM

Because pressure groups are more successful in controlling government policies than voters, some political scientists decided to develop Arthur Bentley's ideas into a more comprehensive paradigm (Bentley 1908). As a result, the Pressure Group paradigm morphed into the Interest Group paradigm, though more in the mode of a "fight" between competing interests than a "game."

After World War II, behavioralist microanalyses in the spirit of the Pressure Group paradigm were most interested in assembling case studies about group struggles. Behavioralist David Truman (1951) documented the rise of pressure groups, renamed "interest groups," by demonstrating how the power of one group stimulated another group to mobilize and exert power on behalf of a rival set of interests in the same realm of politics. He identified the process as validating a "disturbance theory." If such unmobilized masses as minority groups did not apply pressure when major decisions were made, they would be shortchanged. Earl Latham (1952), meanwhile, studied pressures and tactics of the Cement Institute on behalf of cement corporations. Similar studies then multiplied (Garceau 1958).

Merle Fainsod (1940) once suggested that a "parallelogram" of forces were applied by interest groups on government. He was referring to a concept from geometry applied by Isaac Newton to determine the impact of forces on a particle. In short, Truman was testing Fainsod's parallelogram, albeit qualitatively (Figure 4.4).




Figure 4.4 Interest Group Paradigm.

Meanwhile, economist Mancur Olson, Jr., (1965) further developed the Interest Group paradigm by asserting a bottom-up model—that individuals, based on self-interest, organize for collective action. Similarly, Gordon Tullock (1967) indicated that a new interest group forms whenever businesses become aware of the economic cost to businesses of rent-seeking behavior (state regulation in the public interest).

Truman's disturbance theory was later challenged. Robert Salisbury (1969) proposed an alternative, entrepreneur theory—that interest groups emerge when someone, such as a Martin Luther King, Jr., mobilizes resources in the manner of a business entrepreneur (cf. Lowery, Gray, and Monogan 2008). Salisbury's top-down approach to the formation of interest groups predicted that disturbance theory would explain how economic interests form lobbies, whereas ideological groups emerge when entrepreneurial talent is put to work on behalf of a cause. In other words, he inserted attitudes of individuals (calculations) into what was otherwise a mechanical paradigm.

Systematic evidence did not exist to validate Salisbury's hypothesis until Jeffrey Berry (1978) analyzed eighty-three public interest groups. He concluded that Salisbury's theory applied to most cases, though there were some outliers. However, no scholar has yet developed a theory to account for both the cases that fit Salisbury's prediction and those that do not.

In addition, George Stigler (1971) tested propositions relating to economic regulation similar to the parallelogram concept: The question was how much money could optimally be spent by an industry for legislative lobbying or by supporting candidates for office to avoid having that industry lose an equal amount of money due to regulations —in other words, applying cost-benefit analysis from public policy theory. Sam Peltzman (1976) and Gary Becker (1983) then generalized Stigler's approach. Studies along the same lines burgeoned in the field of political economy (Tollison 1988, 1991). For example, Howard Marvel (1977) explained that the British Factory Acts in the 1830s, long presumed to be in the public interest because they limited the working hours of women and children, actually favored steam-mill owners over water-mill owners because, unlike the former, the latter depended on stream flow.

There was a further development. The identification of the locus of power in any political system has always been a major focus within political science from the days of the Institutional Power paradigm. Applying the Game paradigm to local government, sociologist Norton Long (1958) referred to power structure in small communities as an "ecology of games," though testing of his concept did not occur until many years later (cf. Cornwell, Curry, and Schwirian 2003).

The Interest Group paradigm was thought to be normatively neutral, but there was a presupposition among most political scientists that a democratic equilibrium would result from a balance of forces impacting policy-making. James Madison's theory of the American Constitution was that different branches of government would inevitably be in conflict over the exercise of their power (consistent with the Institutional Power paradigm), such that the public interest would prevail over special interests (cf. Hamilton, Jay, and Madison 1788).

Applying the Interest Group paradigm to study multiple sources of influence in a community, Robert Dahl (1961b)

assembled information on how pressures were applied on the New Haven city government in making three specific decisions. Dahl felt that he could determine the city's power structure from the relative influence of groups in making decisions, and he was pleased that there was a pluralism of interests (cf. Dahl 1971), which he baptized as government by "polyarchy" (rather than "oligarchy"). In short, he found that three sets of contending interests jockeyed for influence within each of the three issue-areas.

Suspicious that the information Dahl collected was a con game by the New Haven power structure, G. William Domhoff (1978) later reviewed the information, cross-checked the same sources, and found that there was very little pluralism. Instead, a power elite was running the city; power was not as diffused as Dahl expected. Dahl then agreed that Domhoff had refuted his analysis of New Haven (Dahl 1979) while remaining committed to the ideal concept of polyarchy (Dahl 1989)—compromise among multiple interests within multiple issue-areas. But the interests of minority groups could be taken into consideration only if they organized.

Fainsod's parallelogram still remains to be developed with quantitative precision in political science. But the Interest Group paradigm remains popular (McFarland 2010).

FIELD PARADIGM

Both the Columbia (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954, 283n10) and Michigan groups (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954, 9) credited their voting behavior approaches to the Field paradigm of social psychologist Kurt Lewin (1951). The latter group explicitly stated that what impacted voting was "the strength and direction of the elements comprising a field of psychological forces, where these elements are interpreted as attitudes toward the perceived objects of

national politics" (ibid.). In other words, the Interest Group, Socialization, and Cognitive Deliberation paradigms might be considered to be special cases of the Field paradigm.

As used in the biological approach to psychology, the Field paradigm considers such elements as human intelligence to be influenced by two main factors—hereditary potential and environmental conditions: Intelligence is determined by the position an individual occupies with respect to a two-dimensional field—the extent to which chromosomes contain a potential for high intelligence and the extent to which an individual's social atmosphere is conducive to top intellectual performance.

The Field paradigm in social psychology depicts actors as surrounded by a series of informal and even subtle influences, defined in Euclidean space. Field analysis is essential in any effort to draw boundaries around the scope of one's assertions, saying for example that a set of findings applies to contexts A, B, and F, but not to C, D, E, and G (Figure 4.5). Field analysis would determine boundaries between contexts or issue-areas, thus enabling propositions to become delimitable through research investigations. The "ecology of games" concept of Norton Long (1958), as mentioned above, captures the essence of the Field paradigm. Fainsod's parallelogram also suggested a field of forces on decision-makers.

The task of a field theorist in political science is to discover which factors impacting individuals or nation-states are most crucial in particular types of situations (cf. Wright 1955, ch23). One behavioral application of the Field paradigm was the decision-making approach of Richard Snyder (1958; Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962). Although there is a delineation of many categories of issues, which are often regarded as a central aspect of Snyder's contribution, his underlying assumption is of an individual decision-maker whose occupancy of multiple roles is subject to influences that continually tax group loyalties,

constitutional prerogatives, information-processing capabilities, and psychological dispositions. Because role requirements and expectations may differ according to the type of issue, setting, and structural framework, one analytical challenge presented by the Field paradigm is to establish a taxonomy of mutually exclusive and exhaustive types of fields or issue-areas.

In international relations, several issue-areas have been identified—economic, environmental, food and nutrition, human rights, international security, international trade, migration, and refugees, Many are addressed by Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, though with overlap. In addition, Robert Dahl (1961b) had begun to identify issue-areas by studying decision-making in New Haven in three distinct issue-areas—party nominations, school policy, and urban renewal.




Figure 4.5 Field Paradigm.

Factor analysis is an ideal method for identifying fields by delineating correlated and uncorrelated domains. Through factor analysis, Hayward Alker and Bruce Russett (1959) located empirically distinct issues in UN voting, suggesting that different constellations of countries were united on different subjects. Factor-analyzing more than one hundred variables as attributes of nation-states, Rudolph Rummel (1972, 1977) hypothesized that countries most similar in attributes would be more cooperative, as his field had an attribute space and a behavior space (cf. Phillips 1974, 167–72). Similarly, employing factor analysis, observance of civil and political rights has been empirically demonstrated to be

distinct from attainments on economic and social rights (Haas 1994).

According to the Field paradigm, people make decisions in a context of competing influences. But principal components derived from factor analysis cannot think and act, so causal paths involving myriad influences are unclear. Field theory disappeared from consideration, as Warren Phillips lamented, when the primary exponent in political science—Rudolph Rummel—turned his concern to other matters.

DISEQUILIBRIUM PARADIGM

Fields of forces impact individuals, but the Field paradigm is vague on which fields have the greatest impact and why. Conflicts, heterogeneities, and the like are often viewed as complex problems that a group or an individual must solve, but how? Cross-pressures have upset the equilibrium of voters, who have often decided not to vote, but how do they emerge in the first place?

A variety of disciplines have used disequilibrium models. The Marxian paradigm focuses on inequality. The Social Darwinism paradigm assumes that changes in the environment favor some groups of persons over others.

In sociology, Émile Durkheim (1897) used suicides to index breaches in the “social equilibrium.” When a chiliastic religious sect predicted that the world would end on a particular date, but no such event took place, the cognitive dissonance theory of Leon Festinger (1957; Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter 1956) was advanced to account for the sect’s course of action in reconciling the failure of the prophecy. Anthropologist Gregory Bateson in collaboration with psychiatrist Jurgen Ruesch presented a view of psychological problems arising from asymmetries in communication (Ruesch and Bateson 1951). Bateson (1958) also examined the origins of tribal schismogenesis. An

unequal distribution of resources among members is regarded as an asymmetrical situation that is bound to lead to “strain” in a system, according to economic sociologist Neil Smelser (1962, 385), who found that the result is often civil violence.

Perhaps the most profound treatment of disequilibrium has come from psychologist Fritz Heider (1958, 1959), whose balance theory reported that individuals make assessments that are entirely negative or entirely positive, ending up with distorted views; ying-yang ambivalence is rare. His attribution theory, meanwhile, predicted that individuals tend to assign more weight to hereditary dispositional characteristics than to external influences on behavior. In other words, people tend to assume only one form of socialization in assessing others.

Within the subfield of comparative government, Fred Riggs (1964) argued that structural development (differentiation) is optimal when increasing capabilities of a government to regulate the political constituency are balanced with efforts to maintain an integrated, supportive populace. Too much emphasis on enlarging the ambit of governmental effectiveness can evoke revolutionary sentiments, whereas overattention to popular consultation might result in piecemeal governmental measures, rather than comprehensive and internally consistent planning by competent persons. Samuel Huntington (1968) then assembled case study evidence consistent with Riggs’s formulation, calling attention to the concept of “transitional democracies,” which he later indicated tend to undergo transformation, replacement, and transplacement (Huntington 1991). For Huntington, developing countries are unstable due to so many conflicting pressures while the population has unfulfilled rising aspirations.

When riots by African Americans broke out in American cities during the 1960s, many explanations were advanced. The evidence assembled by Ted Robert Gurr (1970) led to a

more subtle application of the Disequilibrium paradigm. He developed the concept of “relative deprivation” to account for why those who rioted were not the poorest Blacks but instead members of the middle class, as the latter perceived that their incomes were not keeping pace with the affluence of elites (cf. Morrison 1971).

In sociology, the concept of disequilibrium was developed by Elton Jackson (1962). Sociologist Johan Galtung (1964, 1971), following Jackson, argued that a state with a high rank on one power base but not so high in other categories will respond to “rank disequilibrium” by initiating war to rectify the asymmetric situation, and he provided a quantitative algorithm to test his theory. The more ambitious a country, according to Robert Axelrod (1970), the more likely there will be a clash over the national interests of another country. According to T.V. Paul (1994), weaker countries have often initiated war.

Kenneth Organski (1958), seeking to explain why Germany and Japan went to war in the twentieth century, proposed the concept of “power transition” as an equivalent disequilibrium explanation. What he meant was that both countries developed industrial power later than countries bordering on the North Atlantic, so they scrambled for colonies and military prowess to achieve the status of major powers. In the process of seeking recognition, they employed war. In other words, they scored high on some aspects of national power but were not accorded international respect, so they asserted their power through aggressive means, upsetting the worldwide balance of power (Figure 4.6).




Figure 4.6 Disequilibrium Paradigm.

Galtung and Organski were building on the Lasswellian concept of influence, in which power was only one form of influence, but the others were respect, rectitude, affection, wealth, well-being, skill, enlightenment (Lasswell 1971, 15). Lasswell had advanced the agglutinative hypothesis that individuals high on one influence pyramid would be higher on all others, whereas the Disequilibrium paradigm indicated that lack of agglutination by states would lead to war (Figure 4.6). Germany and Japan, scoring high on the material values, used power to gain respect but lost rectitude in the process (Organski and Kugler 1980).

Power transition theory, of course, was irrelevant during the bipolar Cold War, but is being revived in light of the economic rise of China today (Tammen et al., 2000; Chan 2008; Paul 2016). Whereas the Disequilibrium paradigm predicts inevitable conflict and even violence, the Integration paradigm was designed to avoid disharmony and war by bringing seemingly disparate countries and peoples together.

INTEGRATION PARADIGM

According to sociologist Robert Park (1926, 1939, 1950, v–ix), racial harmony cannot be achieved in a segregated society of ethnic and racial enclaves. He rejected the Social Darwinian paradigm, which pushed the doctrine of assimilation that created more racial hostility. Based on his experience in Hawai‘i, he argued, when there is more communication across ethnic lines, the social distance between groups will decline to the point that persons of different ethnic and racial backgrounds will associate on a humanistic level in schools, at work, on playgrounds, in

stores, and everywhere else (cf. Haas 2016a). Stereotypes will end as individuals get to know one another better (Figure 4.7). Park stressed social elements, whereas Gunnar Myrdal (1944) stressed economic factors as responsible for racial conflict. Park was going against the maxim that parents taught children—"Don't Talk to Strangers!" (cf. Allen 2004).

The Integration paradigm sought a "color-blind" society until the advent of affirmative action, which was launched to break the habit of hiring friends and acquaintance rather than better-qualified job applicants of diverse backgrounds (Anderson 2004). Multicultural educational innovations were also intended to enhance integration by providing more information about diverse cultures to classrooms so that stereotypes could be engineered out of personal and social life (Taylor 1989).

Although policies of integration have brought the races together in many areas of life (Hochschild 2005), several studies have reported that racial segregation still exists within cities as well as between cities and suburbs in the United States (Haar 1996). Meanwhile, opposition to welfare is motivated by anti-Black animus even though Whites predominate as recipients (Gilens 1999), and public opposition to immigration is due to the flood of Mexicans and others that has changed the landscape of many American cities and towns (Schlesinger 1991; Lee 1998; Huntington 2004).

The influence of fundamentalist Christianity in the United States has meant vilification of nonbelievers, sometimes called the "culture war" (Peterson 1981; Diamond 1988; Sharp 1999). Legislators then reflect different morality preferences of voters in their districts because the public is divided, not integrated (Mooney and Lee 2000).

At the international level, the failure of the League of Nations to integrate the globe diplomatically and thereby bring world peace prompted the application of the

Integration paradigm to international relations. During World War II, David Mitrany (1943) theorized that a massive proliferation of such nonpolitical functional organizations as the Universal Postal Union could eventually bind countries in a worldwide web of cooperation that would make war unthinkable. The Integration paradigm, in other words, revived the Institutional Power paradigm.




Figure 4.7 Integration Paradigm.

In 1946, Winston Churchill expressed the idea of a "United States of Europe" so that future world wars could be avoided, at least in that part of the world (cf. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Verdier 2005). The first new effort in the direction of Mitrany's functional idea, the European Coal and Steel Community of 1951, integrated a single industry across several countries within one supranational organization capable of making decisions that member countries could not veto.

European political science expatriates in the United States then sought to provide a pathway toward Churchill's goal. Karl Deutsch (1953, 1954) argued that social integration came before and sustained political integration. He and several colleagues qualitatively identified twelve attitudinal and material factors that historically supported "security communities" of groups of countries that kept the peace without economic or political entanglements (Deutsch et al.

1957) and in some cases, promoted the unification of such countries as Germany and Italy.

Ernst Haas (1958), refining Mitrany, argued that economic integration would develop if progress in multilateral organizations acquired the stature to persuade political leaders to deepen the scope of cooperation into supranational organizations. Whereas Mitrany wanted to keep politicians at a distance while functional intergovernmental organizations increasingly flourished, Ernst Haas's neofunctional idea was that political support is vital in any transition from inter- to supra-national institutions.

Whereas Karl Deutsch focused on material preconditions (cultural, economic, or social regionalization), Ernst Haas traced decisions by political leaders in creating organizations on functional (nonpolitical) matters—in other words, two very different approaches. Although initially skeptical of Deutsch's Social Transactionist form of analysis, Ernst Haas (1964) broadened his perspective after studying the International Labor Organization. He proposed preconditions involving the organization's leaders, who should be farsighted in planning, develop a common ideology, and then employ outside consultants to obtain consent by appealing to member countries without making extravagant promises (ibid., 126).

Along with his student Philippe Schmitter, Ernst Haas examined the case of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). The body began in 1961 with the aim of establishing a full free trade area among Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, México, Paraguay, Perú, and Uruguay by 1973 but collapsed before that date. The principal reason, they argued, was that LAFTA members were not at the same level of economic and political development (Haas and Schmitter 1964 [1966], 299). When LAFTA began, there was minimal consensus on objectives, and few powers were entrusted to an executive body. After

LAFTA started, particularistic instead of collective decision-making ensued, intermember transactions increased only modestly, and governments did not adapt to the new LAFTA rulemaking. Haas and Schmitter correctly predicted that LAFTA would fail, as it did in 1981.

However, sociologist Amitai Etzioni (1965), particularly critiquing Deutsch, sought to develop a more general approach, using organization theory, to the subject of political unification. First of all, he pointed out that nothing can happen until entrepreneurial international leaders emerge. Other preconditions to unification, he hypothesized, are geographic proximity among the member units, elite congeniality, and some previous economic interdependence. He agreed with Ernst Haas and differed from Karl Deutsch in arguing that value compatibility and we-feeling need not be present before unification: "[S]hared culture is not a prerequisite for unification but a requirement that has to be fulfilled before the process can be advanced" (ibid., 36). Whereas Deutsch felt that economic dynamism in a core area would encourage non-core countries to amalgamate, and Haas pointed to joint development of the Ruhr as the core area on which further cooperation was built, Etzioni suggested that non-core dynamism spurs core countries to leadership (p. 31). He agreed with Haas that countries must be internally democratic and economically developed, whereas most of Deutsch's successful cases occurred before the democratic and industrial revolutions.

For Etzioni, effective communications upward from member units to elites (representativeness) and downward communication from elites to members (responsiveness) facilitate unification. For egalitarian unions, which lack a dominant state, Etzioni agreed with Deutsch that horizontal communications can substitute for effective upward and downward communications. Concerning coercive power, he speculated that too much force jeopardizes a union.

Elsewhere, paradigmatic diagrams are provided on the many variants of the Integration paradigm at the international level (Haas 2016b, ch6), but isomorphisms at the domestic level were not recognized by theories of international integration. Only Deutsch was interested in communication between ordinary people; the other theorists tried to upgrade the Institutional Power paradigm for international relations to apply to elites and experts.

Then, after several publications on the subject, Ernst Haas (1975) during the postbehavioral era raised a white flag that his theory did not apply, because political leaders were not listening to suggestions from experts in the organizations, and were more interested in economic growth than political integration. He then abandoned the Integration paradigm. Because of the primacy of national political leaders in determining progress in supranational organizations, the Integration paradigm was being replaced by an old-fashioned Institutional Power paradigm, known as intergovernmentalism, which held that leaders of states make decisions for their countries in the national interest and yield state power only at their peril (Hoffmann 1965). For that matter, Deutsch (1966) also went on to other matters. Despite paradigmatic disputation, the term “integration” has nevertheless survived as a topic for research (Borzel 2016), albeit without paradigmatic pretensions.

SYSTEMS (METATASK) PARADIGM

Disciplines in the sciences, working in isolation from one another, often study the same phenomena but are unaware of similar advances in related disciplines. To overcome such duplication of effort, the concept of “general systems” was suggested by biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1950), who was influenced by the philosophies of Nicholas of Cusa (1440) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1704). He encouraged

scientists to think of science in global terms by abandoning esoteric disciplinary jargon and instead to develop terminologies that had common meaning across disciplines as well as theories that would have universal scope. All phenomena were conceived as consisting of webs of relationships among elements—that is, systems. The task of general systems theory was to identify common behaviors, patterns, and properties that would be similar (isomorophic) across all systems, moving toward a unity of science (cf. Miller 1965; Meehan 1968).

In sociology, Talcott Parsons, once termed the "grand metaphysician of contemporary sociology" (Gouldner 1971), suggested that the initial focus of general systems theory in the social sciences should be on identifying systems (structures) and then determining how four common functions are performed: (1) adaptation, (2) goal attainment, (3) integration, and (4) pattern maintenance (Parsons 1951). The task of social analysis, then, was to identify structures performing the four functions, whence the theory was called "structural-functionalism." All four functions, not necessarily in any particular order, were predicted to work smoothly in a social system at equilibrium. The term "dysfunction," then, applied to systems that did not have one or more of the functions operating to produce an equilibrium. "Economic theory," according to Parsons and economic sociologist Neil Smelser, is "the theory of typical processes in the 'economy,' which is a sub-system differentiated from other sub-systems of a society . . . [and] therefore is a special case of the general theory of the social system" (Parsons and Smelser (1956 [1965], 6). An edited book, *Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behavior* (Grinker 1956), demonstrated that the Systems paradigm could apply almost everywhere within the behavioral and social sciences.

Influenced by Parsons, David Easton (1957) focused on inputs and outputs as functions of all political systems.

Gabriel Almond (1960) further identified specific types of inputs (articulation, aggregation, socialization, recruitment, communication) and outputs (rule making, rule applying, rule adjudicating). Robert Holt and John Turner (1966), presenting an alternative, stuck to Parsons's four categories as the functions of all political systems.

One element present in political structural-functionalism is the feedback loop at the end of the set of tasks that initiates the restart (the inputs) of the political process. Easton's *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (1965b) presented a more detailed specification of inputs and outputs, giving feedback an honored place: (1) The status quo is jolted by changes in the social or physical environment, resulting in political "demands" and "supports" as inputs to the political system to solve the new problem. (2) Outputs (decisions) result after political actors compete to find solutions to the problem. (3) The outputs have certain outcomes, favorable or unfavorable, as they impact the environment. (4) Changes in the environment, the outcomes, generate new demands or supports; thereby, the political system receives and adjusts to the feedback. The Systems paradigm, in other words, posited a fixed number of generic tasks that are necessary for the persistence of a system and its operation at some optimal level (Figure 4.8).

In *A Framework for Political Analysis* (1965a), Easton diagrammed inputs going into the political system from civil society (public opinion, interest groups, political parties) and outputs coming out. The political system, thus, was a black box, though he admitted that the term "withinput" might apply to the black box (ibid., 114). Later, Almond changed the output functions to consist of policy-making and political performance but inexplicably dropped rule adjudicating (Almond and Powell 1988).

Almond and Easton were doubtless aware of the POSDCORB categories (planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, budgeting) used in the

prebehavioral era regarding administrative behavior (Fayol 1918; Gulick and Urwick 1936). James Mooney (1947) suggested that as technology becomes more complex, the number of tasks increases and the identifiable stages in an administrative process will be more detailed, more specialized, and of course more numerous.




Figure 4.8 Political System Paradigm.

Morton Kaplan (1957) pioneered in suggesting the utility of a cybernetic-based homeostatic analysis of international systems, focusing on how stability and equilibria are maintained. Departures from steady-state levels and the return to old levels, or the establishment of new equilibrium points, were central to his theoretical formulation, which delineated several alternative international systems based on their power structure as ideal types. In addition to specifying rules of the multipolar balance-of-power system, with five or so major powers, he identified rules for unipolar and bipolar systems as well as for a potential “unit veto system” in which every country possessed nuclear weapons and could deter every other country. The rules for maintaining equilibrium (peace), which he called “metatasks,” differed for each system.

Then, Richard Rosecrance (1963) identified several European-dominated international systems historically. Using quantitative data, another study asked which of several European and non-European international subsystems was most peaceful, concluding that unipolar systems were the most peaceful, whereas multipolar balance-of-power systems the least peaceful (Haas 1970a).

The main proposition of the Systems paradigm—that a system survives only when it performs all of the requisite functions or metatasks—calls to mind the image of necessary and sufficient conditions for the creation of water molecules from two distinct atomic elements. Although the idea of metatasks is best known in structural-functional applications within the subfield of comparative politics, even the most insistent critics of structural-functionalism employed the Systems paradigm. David Singer, for example, referred to data collection as a sine qua non in the research process, a remark that would be meaningless unless he had in mind a series of generic and indispensable tasks for conducting research (Singer and Small 1966, 250n17).

One research question that a metatask analyst wants to answer is what sorts of styles of function performance lead to which types of governmental outputs. Most metatask analysts used the term “style” to refer to how structures perform particular functions. Such a focus goes beyond the mere “system-survival” concern of Parsons to ask which structures are best suited for achieving functions that lead to particular political outcomes. But the primary “styles” referred to were merely “traditional” and “modern.”

Almond (1973, 4–7) took to heart criticisms of his structural-functionalism as ethnocentric and vague, seeking to find similar ways in which countries resolve political crises successfully, finding a “cure in history” (ibid., 22) through comparative studies. Still containing references to structural-functionalist vocabulary, he concluded on the “disappointing” note that there is “weakness in our capacity for prediction” (Almond and Mundt 1973, 649). Four years later, Almond (1977) confessed that perhaps matters of politics do not lend themselves so neatly to scientific methodologies, citing Karl Popper’s *Objective Knowledge* (1972). Having presented jargon before testing theory, Almond thus offered no satisfactory paradigm at all.

The Systems paradigm had pretensions to subsume all other paradigms and theories, but the promise was never fulfilled. In time, systems analysis became moribund in political science and the quest for paradigms virtually evaporated. Nevertheless, the view persisted that there are cross-temporal isomorphic stages of development in history.

STAGES-OF-DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM

Unlike the cyclical stages in theories of Almond, Easton, and Parsons, the Stages-of-Development paradigm is unilinear, focusing on the inexorability of progress, and may be traced to Anne Robert Jacques Turgot (1750), Marquis de Condorcet (1795), Georg William Friedrich Hegel (1820), Auguste Comte (1830–1842), and of course Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. The latter two subscribed to Hegel's notion that theses are challenged by antitheses, followed by syntheses in history, though Hegel focused on ideas, whereas Marx and Engels (1846) saw economic and technological change as the primary catalyst from primitive communism to feudalism, then to capitalism and beyond to a socialist and ultimately a communist stage of development.

To explain why the West was ahead of the rest of the world, Henry Maine (1883) identified a change from "status" to "contract" orientations, and Ferdinand Tönnies (1887) conceived of advancement from "community" to "society" (Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft). Then Émile Durkheim's *The Division of Labor in Society* (1893) traced the development from "primitive" societies to advanced industrial societies. Building on such foundations, sociologist Max Weber (1913) viewed history as the progressive rationalization of social systems.

During the industrial revolution of the late nineteenth century, such neoclassical theorists as Alfred Marshall (1890) noted that naked self-interest need no longer dominate economics. Then, during the Great Depression of the 1930s, Joseph Schumpeter (1934) introduced a psychological element by supplying an understanding of entrepreneurship, while John Maynard Keynes (1936) stressed the positive role of government, thereby leaving the door open to the new field of development economics for a postcolonial world.

After World War II, development economists urged bilateral and UN aid to “undeveloped” countries in order to put them on a secure path toward prosperity. Due to state control of the economy, the Soviet Union developed more quickly from a rural-based economy to a major industrial power than any other country in world history, so such countries as India were choosing socialism to gain prosperity as quickly as possible, while bilateral aid from Western countries cultivated capitalism within the Third World.

As an alternative to Marx and Lenin, economist Walt Whitman Rostow suggested that there were six stages of economic growth (1952, 1960). For Rostow, “pre-Newtonian” (1960 [1965], 4) attitudes must be delegitimated in stage I. Traditional society must be transformed in stage II so that the preconditions for economic takeoff can be achieved. Investment and growth must increase in stage III (the takeoff stage), whence stage IV (a self-sustained drive to maturity) will ensue. Stage V marks the age of a mature economy, and stage VI is the endpoint—the stage of high mass consumption, when of course a country could provide aid and investment to the remaining Third World countries. He defined “modernization” as “the transitional period when the preconditions for takeoff are created” (ibid., 12).

Rostow explicitly stated a value preference for the stage of high mass consumption (stage VI) and pluralist democracy (ibid., 165). One of Rostow’s main generalizations was that

“preconditions for take-off are created generally in response to the intrusion of a foreign power” (ibid.), thereby legitimating Western intervention into Third World economies, polities, and societies. In economic terms, he insisted that economic takeoff advances when one economic sector takes the lead, whereas in noneconomic terms, there is “a definitive social, political, and cultural victory of those who would modernize the economy over those who would either cling to the traditional society or seek other goals” (ibid., 58). For Rostow (ibid., 16), the key elements in going from one stage to another are “strategic choices,” equal in importance with the role of such economic factors as capital accumulation and investment, and embedded within the arrows of his diagrammatic conception (Figure 4.9). Evidently influenced by structural-functionalism, Rostow (1971, 3) later defined “political development” as “the elaboration of new and more complex forms of politics and government as societies restructure themselves so as to absorb progressively the stock and flow of modern technology which is, essentially, uniform.”

Expressing an intellectual debt to Rostow, sociologist Talcott Parsons teamed up with economic sociologist Neil Smelser to study economic development (Parsons and Smelser 1956). Relying on historian Frederick Lewis Allen (1952) and neoclassical economist Alfred Marshall (1890), they derived the imagery of an economy based on achievement rather than ascription and universalism instead of particularism. The Parsons-Smelser formulation was deduced from a more general theory of the “cycle of internalization of a value pattern in the process of socialization” (1951, 271).




Figure 4.9 Stages-of-Development Paradigm.

Parsons and Smelser posited that the goal of economic modernization is institutional change in the form of "structural differentiation" (Parsons and Smelser 1956 [1965], 278) into "functionally differentiated organizations" (ibid., 16). "Modernization" is then described as attitude change, in which economic changes do not occur until "dissatisfactions" upset an old equilibrium and "new ideas" reestablish an equilibrium (ibid., 273).

But when Third World countries achieved a more differentiated political system, as Fred Riggs (1964) discovered, the form of "differentiation" was bureaucratization. As their formulations were not based on field research, Parsons and Smelser did not address the many specific dilemmas of the Third World. Their aim was to argue that modern economies are "independent both of the previous 'exploitation of labor' and the previous 'capitalistic control'" (Parson and Smelser 1956 [1965], 272) because stockholders, not individual families, controlled most American corporations. When Japan showed that economic development could be accelerated by family-based subcontracting, Parsonian structural-functionalism and even Western development economics were called into question.

In the introductory chapter to *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (1960), political scientist Gabriel Almond defined "modern political systems" in Parsonian structural-functional terms as those with "structural differentiation." The more modern polities, he argued, have separate "legislatures, political executives, bureaucracies, courts, electoral systems, parties, interest groups, media of communication," each performing primarily one "function within the political system" (ibid., 18), whereas "traditional systems" have much less functional specificity (ibid., 19). Nevertheless, Almond agreed with Riggs (1964) that

“modern” political systems also contain “traditional” elements (Almond and Verba 1963, 5). To be “modern,” according to Almond (1956), a political system must copy the Anglo-American model, a view that he later regretted (1970, 290).

Earlier, Seymour Martin Lipset (1959; cf. 1994) found correlations that established “social requisites of democracy,” assuming that there was a developmental process from the requisites to the stage of democracy. Political scientists Cyril Black (1966) and Kenneth Organski (1965) then filled the void by identifying stages of political development, sometimes called “political modernization.” Robert Dahl (1971, 1989) went beyond, specifying various stages of democratic development.

Later, Almond (1987, 443) found fault with the Stages-of-Development paradigm, asserting that “the notion of a sequential order” is inconsistent with case studies discussed in *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (1971), a compendium edited by political scientist Leonard Binder and associates. Although the idea of stages remains popular in the social sciences (e.g., Blumer 1969), the Stages-of-Development paradigm was ultimately rejected, especially under the challenge of the Dependency paradigm.

DIFFUSION PARADIGM

An assumption in the Stages-of-Development paradigm was that knowledge of how to advance the economy is somehow disseminated. But if a country were to move from one stage to another, what is the impetus for change? For the Stages-of-Development paradigm, outside powers are essential to spur movement, thereby justifying imperialism or (with international aid and investment) neoimperialism. For Daniel Lerner (1958) and Marion Levy (1966), however, traditional society develops due to the indigenous diffusion of

economic practices and ideas from individuals with modern ideas living in urban centers. Change is not inexorable but instead requires a flow of learning from one geographic area to another as modern-thinking individuals inhabit traditional societies, overcoming resistance to change (Figure 4.10).

Daniel Lerner defined “modernization” as “a high capacity for rearranging the self-system on short notice” (1958, 51). He estimated that a country with a critical mass of twenty-five percent urbanization would develop sufficient literacy and media growth that industrialization would be readily accepted, and political participation would be at a high level (ibid., 60). Turkey, where he did field research, was his exemplar. However, a recent study of the same problem—diffusion of new technology—has pointed out that corrupt governments block “modernization” unless they receive payoffs (Bussell 2011).




Figure 4.10 Diffusion Paradigm.

Marion Levy was similar to Marx in arguing that modernization involved the adoption of more productive economic methods, such as role specialization and division of labor. Although he agreed with Rostow that foreign powers can be helpful in stimulating modernization, he argued that the Stages-of-Development paradigm was refuted because “stages” can be skipped (Levy 1966, 747, 750). Levy’s exemplars were Japan and the United States. Levy did not specify how “new ideas” could spread; he simply felt that new technology would be adopted as soon as results were perceived as profitable.

The Diffusion paradigm could be applied to more phenomena than societal, economic, and political

development. The increase in consumer spending for particular products now involves clever advertising in the media. Spreading information by word-of-mouth is highly effective, as when Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld (1955) reported that opinion leaders shape (diffuse) attitudes of voters. An international conference in which governmental representatives sign human rights treaties can be an occasion to begin diffusion. In a more recent study, diffusion of voting patterns within households has been found to occur sixty percent of the time (Nickerson 2008).

Another example of diffusion is the migration of people, not just ideas. Although higher welfare benefits in one American state than another have been identified as possible incentives for the migration of beneficiaries to more lucrative states, one study reveals no evidence to support such migration, though some state governments have lowered benefits compared to adjacent states (Allard and Danzinger 2000).

An effort to develop a Diffusion paradigm was launched in international studies during the twenty-first century (Solingen 2012). However, there was no linkage with the literature in sociology, an example of trying to reinvent the wheel that testifies to the loss of paradigmatic thinking during the intervening years.

There are at least three reasons why an idea, a law, or something else is diffused among governments—the desire for a competitive edge, mimicry, or coercion (Sherman 2008). Economic competition breeds innovation. Individuals mimic innovations to appear up to date with their peers. But the concept of coercion opens the discussion to dependency and neocolonialism.

DEPENDENCY PARADIGM

The origins of the concept of “dependency” may be traced to the fact that mercantilistic London considered British colonies as “dependencies” (Brewer 2016, 43). Colonists have long been provoked to rebel because they have been consigned to furnish cheap raw materials to the mother country while consuming the latter’s expensive finished products. Marx’s analysis of Britain’s impoverishment of India (1853a,b) followed the same narrative. Lenin (1917a [1964], 101) referred to “dependent countries, which, officially, are politically independent, but in fact, are enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic dependence,” for whom Argentina and Portugal were his exemplars.

Yet another progenitor, a contemporary of Lenin, was the American scholar W.E.B. Du Bois (1903), Harvard’s first African American PhD recipient, who demonstrated how White institutions developed to ensure that Blacks would rarely have their merit recognized. The White power structure, he claimed, was responsible for the dependent status of America’s Blacks, who lived apart within urban colonies. A fourth source is *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961), in which Frantz Fanon demonstrated that imperialism stripped colonized peoples of their self-respect; then, having persuaded the indigenous populations that they would “fall back into barbarism, degradation, and bestiality” (p. 211) without the aid of the colonial powers, the oppressors legitimated foreign domination. Fanon’s analysis attracted the attention of philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre (1967, 106), who wrote a lengthy preface to *The Wretched of the Earth,* including an exhortation for “European peoples . . . to wake up and shake themselves, use their brains, and stop playing the stupid game of the Sleeping Beauty,” seconding poet Allen Ginsberg’s plea in *Howl* (1959).

While Westerners were congratulating themselves on the inevitability of prosperity through “modernization,” Latin

American and other Third World countries were not progressing as anticipated. Whereas exponents of the Stages-of-Development paradigm blamed countries for not modernizing as they should, such theorists as André Gunder Frank (1967), Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto (1969), and Theotonio Dos Santos (1970) realized that the West was actually preventing independent countries from advancing by establishing neocolonialism.

André Gunder Frank, having expressed an intellectual debt to neo-Marxist Paul Baran's *The Political Economy of Growth* (1957) and the structuralist thinking of Raoul Prebisch (1962) of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America, opened the door to a different analysis. Whereas Prebisch believed that changes were required inside political systems to unleash economic growth, Frank observed external barriers. Both agreed that countries outside the core industrial powers should become more self-sufficient. Frank, moreover, found that Latin American economic growth was impressive during World War II, when First World economies were focused on supporting the war rather than investing in and controlling economies abroad (Figure 4.11).

Under the guise of development economics, the West was prescribing import substitution in Third World countries, with high tariff walls behind which less-developed countries were supposed to become industrialized. But in fact Western corporations bought out local corporations in the Third World to make them subsidiaries, thereby establishing neocolonialism. Rather than plowing profits from Third World subsidiaries into further development of the local economies, Western businesses withdrew their earnings to the metropolitan countries, thereby decapitalizing the Third World. To increase profits, Third World employees were subjected to harsh working conditions that would have been illegal in the metropolitan countries. And to ensure that such moneymaking would continue unmolested, First World firms paid off dictators in the developing countries to maintain

order, all of which was supported by Western governments. In other words, advocates of the Stages-of-Development paradigm had not done their field work. Similar to the snow job that descended upon Robert Dahl in New Haven to celebrate “democracy” in elitist New Haven, scholars of the Stages-of-Development paradigm foolishly believed their own propaganda.




Figure 4.11 Dependency Paradigm.

Frank (1972, 13) critiqued development economics, pointing out that the rural sectors are poor not because they lack “modern” attitudes but because they provide “the biggest sources of capital for the world metropolis.” Moreover, he pointed out, the alleged dualism between modern and traditional economic sectors is false because cities are well integrated into the countryside, and exploitation requires a traditional power structure to keep order. Frank and others, therefore, urged nationalization of foreign-owned corporations and natural resources; otherwise, dependency on the West would further impoverish the Third World.

However, Marxist critics of the Dependency paradigm questioned whether there is any superexploitation in the underinvested Third World, noting that capitalist development always extracts surplus values from workers, so even more exploitation is needed to bring about conditions for a true proletarian revolution (Fernandez and Ocampo 1974; Weaver and Berger 1984). Marx did not distinguish between local and foreign capitalism, as he was describing the world capitalist system as a whole.

Among critiques of the Dependency paradigm, the most devastating came from Guillermo O'Donnell (1978, 1986). According to O'Donnell, Prebisch's structuralism and Frank's Dependency paradigm gained such intellectual acceptance in Latin America that the result was a series of military coups to establish relatively closed economies in which government would erect trade barriers to protect inefficient infant industries, resulting in inflation.

In later years, Frank focused on the world crisis of capital accumulation within the framework of the Immanuel Wallerstein's world-system theory, which is the Dependency paradigm writ large. For sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, who began his research in Africa, "national development" is an oxymoron (1984, 180). Instead, hegemons constrain individual countries. In a multivolume series that began with *The Modern World-System: Capitalistic Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (1976), Wallerstein essentially rewrote Marx's history of capitalism with the benefit of the detailed research findings of economic historian Fernand Braudel (1949, 1967, 1972).

For Wallerstein, the world described by Braudel has always had cores and peripheries. Even within states there are core subregions and periphery subregions. The phenomenon of Third World dependency, thus, was a special case of a world destined to favor a few over the many. Wallerstein assumed that international conflict and war would be inevitable because the injustice of the world-system provokes anti-systemic movements.

Despite his pessimism, Wallerstein (1974) identified four "limited possibilities of transformation": (1) Oil-producing countries rose from Third World status by raising prices. (2) Most Third World successes have been by "invitation"—that is, when core countries found that it was in their interest to promote a periphery country to core status, as in the case of South Korea. (3) Self-reliant industrialization was the third,

albeit utopian, strategy. (4) And anti-systemic movements might grow. All four cases were examples of the transformation of semiperipheries—countries with industrial strength but insufficient capital to be insulated from the vicissitudes of the world economy.

Rejecting communism as well as the "'socialism' that claims to be a 'temporary' moment of transition towards Utopia," Wallerstein's socialism is "a realizable historical system which one day [will] be instituted in the world" (1983, 109–10). One aspect of capitalism is the "commodification of everything" (ibid.), so when there is nothing new to exploit and "political counterpressures thereby become more and more mobilized" (ibid., 91), the expected result is proletarian revolution. Consistent with Marx, Wallerstein expected that seeds for the proletarian revolution will increasingly appear worldwide.

Yet another aspect of the crisis of capitalism is cultural, as Wallerstein called upon the social sciences to develop a new "civilizational alternative" (ibid., 92), a project he left to others. Wallerstein (1984, chl7) approvingly referred to Sartre's philosophy of liberation, which in turn drew inspiration from Fanon, another of his favorite theorists. When capitalism fails, he predicted a more humane future.

But the world-system variant of the Dependency paradigm has become passé (cf. Moaddel 1994; cf. Wallerstein 1993). Cardoso, who became president of Brazil in 1995, advanced his country to First World status through denationalization without external "invitation" by the end of his term of office in 2002 and became a member of the so-called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa)—countries that do not easily fit into the core-semiperiphery-periphery trichotomy.

DECISION-MAKING PARADIGMS

Other behavioral efforts at theory building fell short of qualifying as paradigms because they did not develop isomorphisms beyond a single level of analysis. The most prominent were concerned with decision-making, which Richard Snyder (1966) candidly characterized as "pre-theory." The underlying assumption was that there is an action-reaction or challenge-response process whenever decisions are made in response to events, as in an arms race (Richardson 1960a; McClelland 1961; Toynbee 1934–1961). The early work on decision-making, beginning with Richard Snyder and associates (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962), assumed that reality consists of perceptions; physical events and material elements exist only as perceived by humans. One reviewer of their book *Foreign Policy Analysis* believes that the field "is still in its infancy; currently no coherent model or paradigm exists" (Stern 2003, 183). But preparadigms are still worthy of recognition: Only three prominent decision-making approaches were developed over the years—the Crisis, Irrationality, and Political Process preparadigms that might eventually become paradigms if developed into macroparadigms. The three overlap, since irrational elements are likely to emerge within the decision-making process during crises, and all decision-making occurs within the bowels of bureaucracies.

Irrationality Preparadigm

For Sigmund Freud, libido is the central source of motivation for irrational behavior (Freud 1921). He postulated that the desires of the libido are so strong that individuals must find a way to "reconcile" themselves with "reality," using the human will. The interaction between body (id) and mind (ego), for Freud, cannot achieve victory until humans engage in greater self-realization about the struggle, through psychoanalysis in extreme cases, which can be helped by developing a superego.

Writing after World War I had begun (1915 [1964], 288), Freud argued that war emerges when “primitive” tendencies prevail (ibid., 281–82). His remedy for avoiding war was “more truthfulness and upright dealing” between leaders and nonleaders of difference countries, as “anything that encourages the growth of emotional ties between humans must operate against war” (1933 [1964], 215). Freud expected that an inexorable “growth of civilization” would militate against war despite discontentedness with social change (1930).

Freud’s analysis stimulated psychoanalytic analyses of Woodrow Wilson, one coauthored with William Bullitt (Freud and Bullitt 1957), another by Alexander and Juliette George (1956). The former found Wilson suffering from conflict between feminine impulses and superego expectations that a leader should be masculine (Freud and Bullitt 1967 [1967], 81). The latter study concluded that his quest for self-determination of nations was an externalization of his frustration as a boy growing up with a dominating but likeable father, and his resulting personal insecurity made him too “emotionally charged” to consult with others (p. 119).

Much earlier, Carl von Clausewitz (1832 [1968], 103) felt that war arose from the “feeling of passion” in which “one side dictates the law to the other.” The tendency for some decision-makers to prefer violent methods when they are inappropriate led to Robert North’s focus on how perceptions of “hostility” distorted the cognitive processes of decision-makers in World War I (North 1967). The main premise was that views of an event are shaped by the “perception and emotional feeling” rather than “objective reality” (Nomikos and North 1976, 245–46). Both North and Clausewitz focused on mental causes rather than the Freudian focus on how mental and physical phenomena interact. Robert Jervis (1976), in turn, found many examples of misperception.

According to Charles Hermann (1972, 13), North's approach identified perceptions of decision-makers as the "screening process" that intervenes between event stimuli and response events (decisions). Hermann's approach was an application of the frustration → aggression approach (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mower, and Sears 1939). Hermann sought to discover intervening factors between the two concepts.

A recent forum on World War I in the journal *Foreign Policy Analysis* featured a half dozen essays, repeatedly citing "network analysis" as crucial for understanding prewar interactions (Vasquez, Diehl, Flint, and Scheffran 2011)—on who communicated with whom. Yet none cited Robert North's research, which focused on the irrational content of those communications within networks of interaction. Irrationality preparadigms, in other words, have been either forgotten or ignored.

Crisis Preparadigm

The possibility of a crisis leading to nuclear war stimulated behavioralist researchers to find a metric that could be utilized in government or the UN to stop a conflict from escalating into a crisis. That ambitious quest later bore fruit when several "early warning systems" were funded and successfully utilized by the U.S. government over the past fifty years (Andriole and Young 1977; Bueno de Mesquita, Newman, and Rabushka 1985). Currently, the U.S. military uses an Integrated Crisis Early Warning System to predict the behavior of other states, though prediction of the end of the Cold War is not a feather in its cap (O'Brien 2010).

Efforts to construct a Crisis paradigm began with Charles Hermann (1963), who was a major proponent of the view that normal decision-making differs fundamentally from decisions made to resolve a crisis. Presumably, irrationality is more likely to emerge in a crisis situation, but not necessarily if decision-makers are self-aware.

The most difficult task is to define “crisis.” When a questionnaire containing definitions of crisis was once administered to U.S. State Department personnel, the responses fell into a wide distribution (Lentner 1973). The term “crisis” can be applied to situations only if some persons do so and find agreement with others (Widmaier 2007). The Chinese translation of the term suggests that crises provide opportunities for action. But such opportunities are usually unwelcome.

For Hermann (1969), “crisis” is a situation in which three elements are present—high threat, considerable surprise, and short time to react. The danger of crisis, he argued, is “the probability of an extreme response” (ibid., 193). Relying on a term from psychologist Leon Festinger (1957), Hermann found that “dissonance” is the quandary between “accelerated commitment to take effective action toward a specific goal and . . . decreased expectation that a policy which advances a specific goal can be formed” (Hermann 1969, 151). Later, Hermann (1989, 359) distinguished between systemic international crises, actor-confrontations involving dyads (two countries in contention), and decision-making within individuals.

Crisis decision-making also has interested psychologists, who examine the mental process, and public choice economists (Drucker 1980; cf. Sweeney 2008). According to Russian neuropsychologist A.R. Luria (1932), physiological overload may be one element in a crisis, particularly when information inputs and somatic tensions exceed what a decision-maker can handle, resulting in malfunctioning of deliberations. With a shutdown in normal information processing, an individual is unable to cope with a crisis situation in a rational manner. During a crisis, the physical elements of human behavior prevail over mental capacities. Crisis, in other words, produces stress.

But political scientists have not been clear about the distinction between mental and physical phenomena. Luria’s

physiological overload may be a cause of stress, but Charles McClelland posited mental but not physiological phenomena—namely, that crisis exists when there is an increase in variety and volume of events (1961, 191) or increased coercive and violent events that threaten war (1972, 97).

McClelland's insight was the basis for collecting data on such events as diplomatic protests and threats on a daily basis to track possible escalations in conflict before they reach a point of no return and violence erupts. Stephen Andriole and Robert Young (1977) have measured activity, tension, and uncertainty as elements of rising crisis. Richard Beal (1979) pointed to the importance of event flow and event uncertainty.

Michael Brecher and associates (Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and Moser 1988; cf. Brecher 1979) assembled case histories of all international crises from 1918 to 1994 in order to determine factors accounting for escalation of crises into the war. They found that escalation was more likely over territorial issues and in protracted conflict situations. Among the most prominent indicators of how a threat can become a crisis is regime type: They found that dyadic conflicts involving two democracies were more likely to be resolved short of a crisis.

Political Process Preparadigm

Graham Allison's *Essence of Decision* (1972) identified two alternative explanations, both of which deal with how the political process operates. The first he called the *organizational* model in which top leaders solicit opinions of various experts—a "bounded rationality" model of policy-makers. The other model, which Allison evidently prefers, is called *bureaucratic*—the struggle of various bureaucratic units to determine how to respond to events, in which those with the greatest bargaining skill tend to prevail. His approach, in other words, is close to the Interest Group

paradigm involving pressures inside rather than outside the decision-making body.

Allison saw no way out of the parochialism of interagency bargaining. Similarly, Irving Janis (1972 [1982], 7) noted that group "members tend to evolve informal norms to preserve friendly intragroup relations and these become part of the hidden agenda at their meetings." The result is "groupthink," in which everyone involved in a decision will seek to please those at the top so that they can keep their positions (cf. Merton 1940). Due to the danger of groupthink, Alexander George (1972) urged "multiple advocacy," which of course would slow down decision-making to ponder more options (George 1980).

A similar formulation by Robert Billings and Charles Hermann (1998, 37) depicted a ten-stage process, which they diagrammed to demonstrate the complexity of how decisions are made. What is most important, they claim, is when the organizational process moves from one stage to another and the feedback from each decision. Failure to consider relevant facts or to postpone consideration of an ongoing problem, thus not getting unnecessarily bogged down, is perfectly rational but may result in an irrational outcome. The role of public opinion in the process also needs to be clarified.

Margaret Hermann (2001, Fig. 1–2, 2005) further elaborated the Political Process preparadigm with particular attention to decision units, including diagrams. Three decision units were identified—predominant leaders, single authoritative groups, and coalitions of agencies. Analyzing sixty-five cases, she and her coauthors found that predominant leaders tend to be expansionistic crusaders, single groups fall prey to groupthink, and coalitions are steered by pivotal members who can commit resources (Beasley, Kaarbo, Hermann, and Hermann 2001).

Studies of policymaking over time follow the sequential model (e.g., Brecher 1975): Decision-makers "disaggregate"

the process, do something incrementally to attenuate a problem, and then spend time on other matters, including situations that have higher priority. They return to consider options when problems increase in priority due to changes in the problem to be addressed, reviewing previous efforts on an ad hoc basis (whereas the Crisis preparadigm often assumes that decision-makers have no time to reflect on previous experience in order to respond with urgency). Sequential and dynamic decisions are usually incremental and tactical (Lindblom 1959), highly dependent on decision structure.

The Political Process preparadigm usually accepts the flow of deliberation as an equilibrium of sorts (ibid.; Wildavsky 1975). Legislative deliberation is a form of multilateral negotiations (Bailey 1950), whereas treaty ratification relies on a dichotomous up-or-down vote (Cohen 1957; Robinson 1960). However, with the exception of the concept of groupthink, the Political Process preparadigm has provided more explication than explanation.

Implications

Efforts to develop a paradigm for decision-making need more development. Some advocates of decision-making paradigms have encountered individual irrationality within the black box. They have demonstrated that the outcome of crisis decision-making and organizational dynamics has often been inadequate to meet various challenges. Analyses of decision-making needed to take a much wider context into account.

CONCLUSION

Although various paradigms made considerable inroads during the behavioral era, they have largely been abandoned. They may still inspire political scientists who are willing to link their research with those traditions, but students of the paradigm developers have instead preferred

to plod along with mid-range research, failing to construct paradigmatic edifices that the major theorists envisioned. Research continues within the traditions of the behavioral era, in other words, but has not been integrated into paradigms. As a result, fresh new paradigms have arisen, as revealed in chapter 6.

Although behavioralists gradually abandoned paradigm development, behavioral paradigms were superior to the paradigms of prebehavioral political science because they were tested empirically. A major reason why paradigm development lagged is the impact of the postbehavioral revolution, as discussed in chapter 5.

Chapter 5

POSTBEHAVIORAL PARADIGMS

Postbehavioralism was clearly anti-behavioral. Summarizing the critique in a single sentence, the attack was on behavioralist claims to seek objective knowledge without regard to the main policy issues of the day (Easton 1970, 512–13). The neotraditional and multidimensional pleas for behavioralists to balance theory, methods, and policy (Haas 1967; Haas and Becker 1970a, 1970b) were ignored, leaving behavioralism napping on serious policy questions, while metatheory was abandoned by behavioralists (Phillips 1974).

As mentioned in the previous chapter, several major scholars (Gabriel Almond, Karl Deutsch, André Gunder Frank, Ernst Haas) became disillusioned with metatheory or attended to other matters. And one scholar was unaware that his findings supported the Marxian paradigm of Karl Marx over Johann Rodbertus (Gurr 1970).

When postbehavioralism dawned, there were many issues to address: The American intervention into Vietnam's Civil War, starting in 1965, was considered disgraceful by many, particularly college students seeking to avoid being drafted to serve in the army. But there were other problems—mutually assured destruction by nuclear superpowers, backlash against affirmative action, one American president

assassinated and another forced to resign over criminal misconduct, skyrocketing oil prices and associated inflation, democratic countries covertly undermined (Chile, Dominican Republic), and other issues. Policy-relevant research exploded, but was grounded in ideological perspectives (Almond 1988, 1990).

There was a growing belief in some quarters that the "Enlightenment Project" had failed. "Critical theory," influenced in part by Antonio Gramsci, had emerged in Germany, seeking to account for Adolf Hitler's following and the failure of the proletarian revolution (Adorno and Horkheimer 1947), was imported by American political scientists to identify how systems of domination were entrapping the masses. The idea that government engaged in self-advertising was mirrored in the case presented by Vance Packard (1957) that commercial advertisers sought to get consumers to crave products that they did not need. Under the heading "poststructuralism," the quest began to expose the political underpinnings of the institutions constructed to appear apolitical and therefore legitimate (Edkins 1999).

Postmodernism, in addition, arose to argue that all knowledge is contextual, so the behavioralist quest for generalizations was misguided and America- or Euro-centric. Postmodernists were particularly attentive to concepts advanced by governments with hidden agendas, as codified by Jean-François Lyotard's *The Postmodern Condition* (1979). In *Speech and Phenomena* (1967), Jacques Derrida famously advocated deconstructing hidden meaning in texts, whereas Michael Foucault is most well known for his analysis in *Discipline and Punish* (1975) that mental institutions were actually designed to remove from society "deviants" who embarrass political leaders. Jürgen Habermas, through such tomes as *The Theory of Communicative Action* (1981), tried to argue the case for progress and against postmodernism, but he remained

within the critical theory tradition, which eventually morphed within political science into “constructivism” (cf. Wendt 1999). Meanwhile, Habermas’s awakening of the concept of civil society revitalized the Mass Society paradigm (Keane 1998), which behavioralists had tried to refute and instead has made a comeback in recent years. Efforts to defend classic political liberalism, meanwhile, were absent (Kloppenberg 1998).

Within international relations, Kenneth Waltz (1979) sought to refute behavioral research directions, advancing a new ideology, known as “neorealism,” based on the notion of defensive realism rather than Morgenthauistic offensive realism (Morgenthau 1948). Meanwhile, the “international liberalism” that supported international organizations as ultimate peacemakers was eclipsed by a “neoliberal” trend in which economic globalization and global governance were advanced on ideological grounds (Baldwin 1993; Harvey 2005). Another ideological aim was to advance democracy, as promoted by Francis Fukuyama (1992). The isms, nothing more than ideologies, were even christened as “paradigms” by some scholars, provoking harsh if unheeded refutations by David Lake (2011) and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson (2011; Jackson and Nexon 2013). The isms live on despite their irrelevance in the age of terrorism (cf. Rasmussen 2006).

Thus, ideologies flourished in the postbehavioral era. As action plans, based on a priori axioms that were never tested, isms had true believers and disbelievers. Paradigms identified in chapters 3 and 4 may also have had true believers (Marxists, classical economists), but at least the premises were capable of being refuted by assembling information, qualitative and quantitative.

Yet ideologies can be tested. Elsewhere, realism has been deconstructed into a testable Balance-of-Power paradigm (Haas 2016, ch7). And the premise in realism that wars are deterred through buildups of military strength was found inconsistent with data analyzed in two studies (Niou,

Ordeshook, and Rose 1989; Niou and Ordeshook 1990). Robert Latham (1997) has argued that liberalism provides a better understanding of the post-Cold War era than realism, but again ideology is the basis for the claim, not empirical tests.

The inadequacies of nearly all the various ideological strands at the domestic level have in turn been attacked by Colin Bird (1999). Even more malaise has been noted by leftist scholars, who have consigned themselves to endless critiques rather than advancing or codifying knowledge (Jacoby 1999; MacKenzie and O'Neill 1999), while right-wing scholarship has found a reasonable champion or two (e.g., Kekes 1998). But that scholars would find discourses on ideology more interesting than research, even to back up their views, provides evidence that the profession had become incapable of finding paradigmatic answers to serious problems in the wake of globalization.

There is nothing inherently unscholarly about being motivated by an ideology, which after all is a type of normative theory. Similar to everyone else, scholars have values. But giving advice on political policies is more art than science. When ideological views are assumed to be true without empirical support, there can be no scientific progress, and the clinical application of an untested ideology may go embarrassingly awry, as when the "democratic peace" served as a justification for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Smith 2007). According to the trichotomy of August Comte (1830–1842), apriori ideological contention is theological, not scientific.

Ideological rigidity has characterized the postbehavioral era in political science, especially in international relations. Gatekeepers (journal editors) have often played a role in maintaining the status quo. One journal editor, an exponent of the "democratic peace" ideology, refused to publish an early methodological critique, including the fact that the multidimensional concept of "democracy" was

inconsistently if rarely defined (Haas 1995), though the essay was published elsewhere (Haas 1997a). A political science editor recently refused to publish an essay to expose empirical difficulties of the Structural-Functional paradigm because the study was not a “test,” though a basic assumption of the paradigm was disputed with voting behavior evidence. Within political science, the disjunction between mid-level hypothesis testing and theory development has been decried (van Biezen and Saward 2008).

Nevertheless, empirical paradigms have begun to reemerge within political science, especially the Rational Choice paradigm. What David Easton (1997, 16–17) called the “neobehavioral” era was about to emerge phoenixlike in the twenty-first century, as chapter 6 indicates.

Part III

CONTEMPORARY PARADIGMS

According to David Easton, postbehavioralism doomed political science to lack a central focus, with little interest in developing metatheory; what he wrote in 1990 was still on his lips during conversation in 2013. Barbara Geddes (2003, 4) expressed a similar point eloquently in saying that "like elaborate sand castles, paradigms have been built with great effort and attention to theoretical detail only to be washed away by the tide of the next generation of graduate students, whose research batters away at the weak points of existing paradigms—as it should—until the theoretical edifice crumbles and disappears."

Behavioral paradigms indeed drifted into obscurity in the postbehavioral era while heirs of the behavioralists pursued "normal science" rather than developing metatheory. Empirical postbehavioralists mostly pursued policy-oriented case studies. The lines between the two camps have unfortunately widened over time, as Gabriel Almond complained (1988, 1990).

For the sake of the discipline of political science, surely now is the time to embark on what David Easton (1997, 40–41) called a "neobehavioral" era. One way to do so is to pursue empirical paradigms; another way is to integrate empirical research, with theory development and applied

(clinical) research. What follows is a modest effort to identify neobehavioral paradigms. Only three are actively being pursued—Rational Choice, Mass Society, and Community Building. In other cases they are just plodding along.

Paradigm development was not expected by behavioral political scientists until a cluster of mid-level theories was tested around at least one issue-area. The various tests were then supposed to be tidied up into coherent metatheories. But no deadline was set. And the quest for paradigms was evidently lost during the postbehavioral onslaught against empirical analysis.

Nevertheless, the profession generated so much knowledge that paradigms began to take shape in about 1992, when the book *Polity and Society: Philosophical Underpinnings of Social Science Paradigms* was published. That book presented alternative paradigms competing for favor with respect to several areas of research—civil strife, community power, development, ethnic and presidential voting, and international community and violence. The agenda of the book was to encourage researchers to use the same body of data to test not just one but several paradigms, thereby determining which were consistent with evidence and which should be discarded.

Unfortunately, most political scientists preferred to advance their own pet theories. There were a few exceptions, some of which are summarized in Chapter 11, which reviews cross-tests of disputed theories.

The present section of the book demonstrates that there are three major paradigms in political science which have very different theoretical formulations. Chapter 6 summarizes variants of the Rational Choice paradigm, which in a nutshell argues that politics can be explained by actions of self-interest, leaving morality aside. Economics clearly provides the foundation.

Chapter 7 is devoted to the Mass Society paradigm, which began in sociology as an alternative to the Marxian

paradigm. The paradigm critiques failure to achieve democracy and thus is an important addition to democratic theory, pointing out the reason why democracy is so difficult to achieve by probing the interstices of how the will of the people can be reflected in operations of government.

Chapter 8, also based on sociological research, covers the Community Building paradigm. The underlying premise is that people should build a sense of community so that they can live in harmony. The challenge is how to do so, with many variants.

Chapter 9 identifies theories that have not yet achieved paradigmatic status. They apply to one level of analysis only and await efforts to apply them at other issue-areas by locating isomorphisms. They have been developed beyond their incipient status during the era of behavioral political science, but not far enough.

All four chapters could be perceived as a “state of the discipline” on paradigms. But the purpose of reviewing such diversity in metatheoretical development is to find ways to locate ongoing research at mid-levels with homes within paradigms. Piling up endless mid-level theories, in other words, has produced a jigsaw puzzle. Individual research projects can now fit together within larger theoretical frameworks, and the narrative in each chapter demonstrates how.

Chapter 6

RATIONAL CHOICE PARADIGM

According to David Easton (1990), the only surviving metatheory in the postbehavioral era was the Rational Choice paradigm. Indeed, Arlene Tickner (2013, 634) believes that the Rational Choice paradigm is still the dominant metatheory in the United States. Although Herbert Simon (1955) published "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," few political scientists were then interested. Such scholars as Bruce Bueno de Mesquita raised the visibility of the paradigm during the 1980s, and the paradigm eventually found considerable support.

The Rational Choice paradigm (or Rational Actor paradigm) presents "formal" or "instrumental" rationality"—how means can be chosen most efficiently to achieve certain ends (Weber 1918 [1978], 24–25; Resnik 1987). Decisions are evaluated in terms of how well egalitarian, ethical, hedonistic, political, utilitarian, or status-based criteria are satisfied (Laiz and Schlichte 2016, 174). Whereas Jeremy Bentham (1823) favored an analysis of political options based on the economic gain for the largest number of persons, John Stuart Mill (1863) argued that there is more to life than economics—that human values trump economic values—but he was still a utilitarian. The Rational Choice

paradigm in political science, however, usually sides with Bentham over Mill (cf. Posner, 2014).

The Rational Choice paradigm rarely goes into the inner workings of the brains of decision-makers; the calculation process is "blackboxed," inferred from the outcomes of decisions. Thus, the paradigm looks at which means chosen by decision-makers most efficiently lead to desired ends. Those who want to refute the Rational Choice paradigm, therefore, must prove that choices by decision makers are usually irrational, miscalculations, or just wild guesses with too much uncertainty involved to be considered as "rational."

The Rational Choice paradigm is a multistory home subsuming several behavioral paradigms described in chapter 4, especially the Game paradigm (cf. McCarty and Meirowitz 2007). Rational choices were the basis for triumphalist Social Darwinism, the game-theoretic coalition strategy of William Riker (1962), pressures applied by interest groups (Truman 1951), the polyarchic model of Robert Dahl (1971), and the Field paradigm (Lewin 1951). The latter, of course, had sought to incorporate the Interest Group, Socialization, and Cognitive Deliberation paradigms. However, more variants have arisen since the behavioral era, so there is a need to start with the origin of the paradigm within economics.

CLASSICAL ECONOMICS RATIONALITY

The main question posed by classical economics is how a state may most efficiently pursue prosperity for the people who are governed. Many economists define "development" in terms of growth of output per head of population (Lewis 1955, 1; Meier and Baldwin 1957, 2).

Adam Smith (1776) and David Ricardo (1817) focused on material conceptions of development. In the tradition of natural law, they hoped to find universals. Both believed that government interference in the economy—the "Poor Laws," tariffs, and taxes—was irrational, resulting in higher prices, a lower propensity to save, and overpopulation. Their hypothesis was that the "invisible hand" in the competitive marketplace would serve as a better regulator of the economy than government. Accordingly, removal of political obstacles would result in economic development surging forward. Both Ricardo and Smith saw their paradigm as being in the interest of all people rather than any single class (Heilbroner 1953, 45; Meier and Baldwin 1957, 44), although clearly they emphasized the prosperity of the entrepreneurial class, which followed their rational prescriptions, resulting in a trickling down to a Malthusian survival of the laboring class as a necessary outcome of the economic process.

Ricardo was more systematic than Smith in spelling out what later became the Stages-of-Development paradigm (Figure 6.1): Saving enables enough capital to be accumulated so that some will be invested and some will be consumed, whereupon more workers can be hired. Technological innovations will provide for more division of labor, whence there will be an increase in productivity, more competition between firms, and prices will fall, stimulating sales. Wages and rents will then go up, but profits (the economic surplus beyond these expenses) can be ploughed back into further investment and the hiring of more employees to produce more goods. Since there are more jobs for factory workers, they will have more children, providing more competition among workers as well as a larger market of consumers. The Marxian paradigm, however, identified the "surplus" as inevitably exploitative, undermining faith in the logic of capitalism.




Figure 6.1 Classical Economics Paradigm

COST-BENEFIT RATIONALITY

Classical economics is usually revered as a macroeconomic paradigm. Cost-Benefit rationality, also known as instrumental rationality, is a microeconomic form of rationality that prescribes weighing costs and benefits of alternative decisions to reach desired outcomes (Figure 6.2). Risks are most likely to occur when the costs are highly likely to exceed benefits (M.L. Haas 2001). For example, evidence indicates that democracies provide lower risks in foreign investment than nondemocracies because constraints on executive power ensure that expropriation will be unlikely (Jensen 2008).

In *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision* (1974), psychologist John Steinbruner noted that top leaders cannot spend a lot of time pondering every decision; therefore, they seek to simplify their task by considering very few factors so that the challenge or problem will quickly get off their plate. Using the term the “analytic paradigm of decision making” as an equivalent to cost-benefit rationality, Steinbruner expected that the analytic decision would result from a direct calculation of alternative outcomes (p. 56) with the goal of finding an optimal or acceptable solution under given constraints (p. 64). Unknown factors are determined by “probabilistic inference” (p. 110).

For Carl von Clausewitz (1832 [1968], 103), it is “a fallacy . . . to refer the war of a civilized nation entirely to an intelligent act,” though the aim is to achieve an objective. In

effect, one side is bargaining with another (Reiter 2003) while internally calculating in terms of a "reflexive rationality" that must consider risks of various sorts (Rasmussen 2006). Thus, "trust" during negotiations may be defined to exist "when one party to [a] relation believes the other party has incentive to act in his or her interest or to take his or her interests to heart" (Cook, Hardin, and Levi 2005, 2).

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1981, 27) has insisted that "nations do not generally stumble into wars without adequate planning." Estimating expected utilities derived from going to war, negotiating, or opting for peace, he found that "Almost all initiators of international conflicts appear to have had a reasonable expectation of success" (ibid., 182). While research by Patrick James (1988, ch3) has supported Bueno de Mesquita, Kenneth Organski and Jacek Kugler (1980, ch3) have disputed his claim. Bueno de Mesquita admitted that he was trying to ferret out necessary but not sufficient conditions for war (1981, 4–5), and he found that wars are avoided when the cost of waging war is too burdensome (ibid., 183). His findings were confirmed in a follow-up study (Bennett and Stam 2000). A similar analysis has been performed on escalation of conflicts (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorik 1997).




Figure 6.2 Cost-Benefit Paradigm

An application of Cost-Benefit Rationality to civil war has been provided in *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict* (Ballentine and Sherman 2003). Parties seeking to oppose a government are limited by their economic resources vis-à-vis the state. Other examples in politics abound (Allison 1972; Wittman 1979; Gartner 1997; Wagner 2000; Smith

and Stam 2004, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1986, 1990, 1992).

VOTING RATIONALITY

The Socialization and Cognitive Deliberation paradigms were eventually overwhelmed by the Voting Rationality variant of the Rational Choice paradigm. One reason is that many surveys have found that voters are careless, flippant, and inattentive to information available during election campaigns. Economist Kenneth Arrow (1951) argued that democratic choice is difficult when preferences vary widely. Although the Cognitive Deliberation paradigm remained as gospel for many years among political scientists, economist Anthony Downs used game theory to develop a theory of "investment voting" in his *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957).

A student of Arrow, Downs had two interests (Figure 6.3). One was how voters make up their minds in the absence of perfect information. The other concern was with how political parties and candidates run elections.

Focusing on the former interest, Downs based his thinking in part based on Harold Hotelling's law that producers make products as similar as possible so that consumers can make choices based on only a few competing differences (Hotelling 1929). For Downs, the voter is far more rational than previous voting studies had assumed. Contrary to the Socialization paradigm of Paul Lazarsfeld (Downs 1957, 8n5, 298n3), Downs considered voting as an investment in which votes cast by individual self-interest might lead to collective rationality. Each potential voter first engages in a cost-benefit analysis: The purpose of voting is to advance "one's own greatest benefit," both in the objective "selfishness" sense and in the subjective sense, as "self-denying charity is often a great source of benefits to oneself" (ibid., 8). He

also conceded that the personality of a candidate or traditional family preferences for a political party might predispose a voter (Downs 1961, 195).




Figure 6.3 Voting Rationality Paradigm

Although Downs left voter deliberation in a black box, he (1957, 298–99) suggested that rationality can be found in nine decision rules used by each voter to decide how to vote: (1) Voters acquire little information before voting. (2) A citizen votes for the same party in one election as in prior elections. (3) Voters give more weight to party records than party promises. (4) Voters have little information about issues. (5) The most informed citizens, who vote most often, get the most payoff from elections. (6) Voters process information either in their role as income earners or as consumers, but not both. (7) Voters with a lesser payoff from elections defer to the judgments of others in making up their minds. (8) Voter participation varies with income because of the costs of acquiring information to reduce uncertainty. (9) Cross-pressured voters have lower rates of voting.

The second concern of Downs was how candidates win elections. According to Downs, a fully informed voter must take considerable effort to learn about ballot box choices, so a rational (parsimonious) use of time is not to get informed or even just slightly informed. As a result, political candidates will converge to the ideology preferred by the median voter with very little candidate divergence, leaving the principal appeal to political party identification for those

who are loyal partisans and personal characteristics for those who are not (cf. Foot and Schneider 2006). However, the model applies primarily to bipartisan polities; the situation is more complex in multiparty systems (Schofield and Sened 2006).

There is an apparent paradox in the median voter theory: Although the middle, working, and lower classes outnumber the rich, they do not ordinarily exercise their rational faculties to vote so that the rich can be taxed in order to ease their financial situations (Franko, Kelly, and Witko 2016). One explanation in the United States—appeals to racism—is a secondary factor in some European countries (Roemer, Lee, and Van Der Straeten 2007). But the use of racism is rational for elites: They have used the divide-and-conquer strategy for millennia.

However, there are three variants of issue-oriented voting. The Downsian model is known as *proximity* voting (closeness on the continuum). In *discounting* voting, voters believe that candidates will act closer to the status quo after election, so they support those whose positions are more emphatic. In *directional* voting, voters choose office seekers who lean in their direction. Research suggests synergy between all three—that voters use a combination of the three to guide them (Tomz and van Houweling 2008; Weber 2015).

Political scientists largely ignored Downs for nearly fifteen years. Then, William Shaffer (1972) cross-tested Downs's Voting Rationality paradigm with the Michigan group's Cognitive Deliberation paradigm, finding a better fit with Downs—a judgment later disputed (Fiorina 1976). In a critique of the Michigan study of the 1972 election (Miller, Miller, Raine, and Brown 1976), Samuel Popkin and associates (1976) claimed that Downs had superseded the Michigan paradigm.

Following Popkin, many scholars proceeded to redefine the Cognitive Deliberation paradigm in Downsian terms. But in a

computer simulation, Norman Frohlich and associates (1978) found that the Downsian model was only slightly better in predicting voting preferences than the Cognitive Deliberation paradigm.

Scholars then began to employ novel ways to analyze election data (Weisberg and Rusk 1970; Aldrich and McKelvey 1977; Rabinowitz 1978; Markus and Converse 1979; Page and Jones 1979; Poole and Rosenthal 1998; Enelow and Hinich 1984, ch9; Calvert 1985; Erikson and Romero 1990). Relative distance between voters' positions and candidates' positions appeared in statistical models (Markus and Converse 1979; Page and Jones 1979; Enelow and Hinich 1984, ch9; Erikson and Romero 1990), reminiscent of the Field paradigm.

But many issues might spur voters. Hispanics in 2004, for example, increased support for President George W. Bush for reasons of moral values and national security more than issues regarding economics and education (Abrajano, Alvarez, and Nagler 2008). Voter turnout in the elections of 1998, 2000, and 2002 did not increase among seniors or veterans when issue-specific campaign messages were stressed (Sides and Karch 2008). However, turnout decreased among supporters of a candidate if negative ads against that candidate were perceived as fair (Stevens et al. 2008).

Mathematical representation of the probability of voting (V) involved three concepts—perceived closeness of an election (E), the value placed on their citizen duty to vote (D), and the cost of voting (C). In other words, V = ED – C. Although several efforts were undertaken to test that equation, one did so with resounding results (Sigelman and Berry 1982), proving that the perceived cost of the effort to vote is decisive. And they did so by opening the black box—asking prospective voters "how much time and effort" voting asks of them.

Despite the cost, information obtained by voters depends on the sources consulted, in which the media play an important role (Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder 1982). Over the past five decades, the style of campaign ads has changed to emphasize candidate likeability and to provide more focus on issues—but only issues that media sources, protecting their own self-interest, will allow (Dunaway 2008). Meanwhile, campaign news coverage has become less useful for voters, focusing on the "horse race" (Gilens, Vavreck, and Cohen 2007). In part because voters (and pollsters) never have perfect information, the use of the Voting Rationality variant of the Rational Choice paradigm has not been fully supported by election data in recent studies (Bartels 2010; Achen and Bartels 2016; Tyson 2016).

Robert Erikson, Michael MacKuen, and James Stimson's (2002) volume *The Macro Polity*, building on a series of related studies of dynamic representation, "macropartisanship," presidential approval, and "public mood," developed a "system model" in which officeholders' policy choices both reflect and help to shape public opinion. Stressing the direct responsiveness of governmental policy to shifts in public sentiment, they found that public preferences shift chameleonlike when a Democrat replaces a Republican in the White House and vice versa (ibid., ch8); otherwise, public views are quite volatile (p. 272). Thus, theoretical explanations of public opinion continue to elude analysis.

The Downsian focus on candidate strategies continues as a focus in recent years. Incumbents have the advantage of being well known, and with regular financial contributors, so the question has arisen how their opponents can crack into incumbent dominance (Meirowitz 2008). High-quality incumbents deter challengers, while high-ability incumbents impress voters that they should continue in office (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2008). Challengers stressing popular party affiliations are more likely to get elected

regardless of the issues they raise; prior knowledge of a party's record on issues saves voters from viewing the election as issue-driven (Woon and Pope 2008; cf. Kam and Palmer 2008; Lazarus 2008). However, party preference assessment is a two-stage process: First, voters determine ideological affinity; thereafter, they determine which party will be in their economic self-interest (van den Brug, van der Eijk, and Franklin 2007).

When nonincumbents run, one winning strategy is for a candidate to ask the public to project bias onto the opponent, as when an anti-establishment candidate venomously portrays another candidate as an untrustworthy insider after carefully assessing the demographic impact of such a message (cf. Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). In other words, the use of a biased, irrational tone may be a rational campaign strategy. One reason for such ideologically based campaigns appears to be that globalization limits the ability of officeholders to achieve an impact on national economies (Hellwig 2008, 2015); those who claim that they can do so, however, will shift attention to the economic self-interest of the public. Moreover, evidence supports the view that repetitive stances on issues are more effective than issue complexity (Claibourn 2008).

Ira Sharkansky (2002), without trying to develop a paradigm, has identified something about governance and political action that resonates with what has been said above about voting: Politicians and political activities seek simplicity; they take shortcuts. One reason is the uncertainty of the outcomes of political actors, discouraging detailed planning of tactics within an overall strategy. For leaders, there is a temptation to leave details to subordinates who can be fired.

SELECTORATE RATIONALITY

Cost-Benefit and other forms of rationality predict outcomes in terms of utility maximization and ends-means rationality. But how do leaders try to stay in power? Machiavelli (1513) addressed that subject, and Selectorate Rationality seeks to open the calculation black box, even if just a little. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and associates have applied the Rational Choice paradigm to decisions by executives who want to stay in power. *The Logic of Political Survival* (2003) demonstrates the need for leaders, democratic or otherwise, to appease support coalitions (cf. Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 2001; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003). Much of the theory is similar to John Steinbrunner's notion that survival of the decision-making unit is central to what he calls the "cognitive and cybernetic paradigm," which seeks to eliminate complexity and uncertainty by focusing on just one paramount outcome (Steinbruner 1974, 56, 65–66, 78).

The term "selectorate" is used to identify those who support the leader. *Nominal* selectorates are the ones capable of supporting the leader, such as registered voters in a democracy or an army in a military dictatorship. The *real* selectorate, known as the "influentials," in fact choose the leader—for example, voters in a democracy and the Central Committee in a country run by the Communist Party. But more important still is the term coined by William Riker (1962)—the *winning coalition*, which Bueno de Mesquita identifies as the "essentials"—such as those who constitute the largest majority or plurality in an election or the royal council in a monarchy (Figure 6.4).

Everyone in the selectorate benefits from *public goods* created by the government, however led. But only members of the winning coalition gain *private goods* as rewards for their loyalty.

Because leaders continue in office as long as they please at least a minimum within their support coalitions, they

have the greatest prospect of survival in office if their winning coalition is small. In an autocracy, the autocrat enjoys the advantage of being able to reconstitute the selectorate, excluding opponents; the anticipated cost of defection from the winning coalition serves as a deterrent and maintains their loyalty. Accordingly, the regime type most likely to produce stability is autocracy—that is, until the autocrat alienates the coalition.

In a monarchy, the selectorate is small, and the winning coalition even smaller. Consequently, poorer monarchs are often overthrown by those excluded from private goods. Most members of the winning coalition will transfer their loyalty to a new monarch if they can keep their privileges.

Democratic leaders, however, are the least stable. The winning coalition is large, and the selectorate is even larger. To keep the winning coalition happy, public goods are more important than private goods. The cost of private goods to every member of the winning coalition—or to attract more members into the winning coalition—is often prohibitive. Accordingly, democratic leaders of competing political parties will offer different kinds of public goods to varying constituencies. One set of constituencies might consist of organized groups that advance such goals as education, health care, and national security. Another set of constituencies might be ethnic or racial groups—or gay/lesbian and women's groups. A third set might be small, medium, and big businesses. The leader will pick associates who are most likely to be loyal in delegating authority so that public goods handled by the executive branch officials will not become their own private goods, thereby lessening corruption.




Figure 6.4 Selectorate Paradigm

Bueno de Mesquita has supported selectorate rationality with cross-sectional and time-series econometric methods. Controlling for region and year, the size of the winning coalition has been identified as the best predictor of survival in office (Morrow, Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Smith 2008). The same findings hold for thirty-one types of public goods.

When legislators seek funds for their districts, the "law of 1/n" has been predicted to apply—public goods funding will go to each voting district (Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981). Evidence, however, does not entirely support the "law" (Primo and Snyder 2008; Primo and Clarke 2012). Nevertheless, district-specific funding is a feature of the single-member district electoral system; proportional representative systems spend more on welfare than on pleasing districts (Chang 2008).

But criticisms (Green, Kim, and Yoon 2001; Clarke and Stone 2008; Molinari 2000; Kennedy 2009; Choi 2016, ch3) resulted in a retest to confirm results (Morrow, Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Smith 2008). Later modifications in the selectorate approach, as suggested by Seung-Whan Choi (ibid., ch4), include the possibility that leftist leaders will vary the distribution of public goods over time by deficit spending to attract support from new constituency groups seeking employment at the risk of later inflation that will produce unemployment, while right-wing leaders will protect business interests by minimizing inflationary policies (56–57; cf. Alt and Lowry 2000). Choi also has found that countries with high levels of civil liberties provide public goods more consistently than countries with large winning coalitions, refuting an element of Selectorate Rationality. Another test concludes that democracies are more likely to provide a clean environment (curb air pollution as a public

good) than autocracies if they have considerable state capacity, high regime stability, and large winning coalitions (Cao and Ward 2015).

Selectorate Rationality might be interpreted to include symbolic payoffs—such as showing military muscle abroad to gain support from macho-oriented hawkish voters. However, when economic sanctions interfere with the ability of personalistic dictators to continue rewarding their supporters, there is a strong likelihood that the regime will increase repression (Wood 2008) or be deposed (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010). Sanctions against specific countries work best when prescribed by international institutions (Bapat and Morgan 2009; cf. Wood 2008) or are pursued by the major trade partner(s) of a sanctioned country (McLean and Whang 2010). The lesson of sanctions imposed against Saddam Hussein is that compliance could have been more effective if the UN took a bargaining approach (Rose 2005).

The rationality of the selectorate approach inevitably leads to a situation in which competing constituencies represented by different political parties may play a zero-sum game, as when one party represents a different class or race from the other, whereupon the rational solution is to provide public goods just widely enough to achieve a winning coalition from a group of constituencies. However, those not in the winning coalition could perceive alienation from the system. The application of Selectorate Rationality, in other words, may itself involve a Machiavellian or Social Darwinian approach to the public, a situation wherein one political party may provide so many public goods to the richest members of the winning coalition that societal inequality results (Boix 1998), ultimately boiling over into revolutionary displacement of a regime or the rise of insurgent populism (Betz and Immerfall 1998). Nevertheless, evidence exists that majoritarian political systems provide public goods in the former of lower prices

to all citizens because they are consumer-oriented (Linzer and Rogowski 2008).

Selectorate Rationality competes with the Interest Group paradigm in another respect. As Samuel Huntington (1968) once argued, based on a review of several studies, democratization may impede economic development because leaders must reward their followers with public goods that could otherwise be spent on economic infrastructure and investment. Recent case studies have validated Huntington's observation (Waldner 1999; Smith 2008).

Selectorate analysis can be applied to the deviant cases, in which political leaders are deposed by voters or insurgent movements. Although there are many examples for analysis (Kim and Bahry 2008), the surface has hardly been scratched. For example, right-wing authoritarian governments that had been promoting economic development might be deposed by leftist governments. But the latter may subsequently lose power because of the strength of the corporate economy created by the previous regime (Roberts 1999).

The need to appease selectors, however, may involve deceit. Rather than providing information about the risks of war, leaders will demonize enemies and sugarcoat predicted success (Scheussler 2015). Machiavelli is doubtless pleased that he fathered Selectorate Rationality.

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION RATIONALITY

The Interest Group paradigm presumes that organized groups apply pressure to achieve their goals. But how do they mobilize support—and do so effectively?

Sociologist Charles Tilly (1978, 69) defines “mobilization” as a process of accumulating and controlling resources “by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant in public life.” Several steps are involved (Figure 6.4). He posits five basic premises in the mobilization process: (1) Collective action costs something. (2) All contenders count costs. (3) Collective action brings benefits in the form of collective goods. (4) Contenders continuously weigh expected costs against expected benefits. (5) Both costs and benefits are uncertain because (a) contenders have imperfect information about the state of the polity; (b) all parties engage in strategic interaction (ibid., 99).

If a minority political party seeks to become a majority or an alienated public seeks to overthrow a regime, they must build support to gain the strength to achieve a shift in power. The task of building an organization can be considered as one in which impact is maximized while costs are kept low. Individuals are viewed as rational actors who engage in instrumental actions that use formal organizations to secure resources and rewards (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Those who join organizations do so for rational reasons, and the leaders of the organizations are rational in seeking to advance the goals of the organization, just as countries form alliances for rational reasons, including minimizing transaction costs and unpredictability in dealing with allies (Weber 2000a,b; Kim 2015).

Those who join social movements do so when the benefit of membership exceeds costs, such as membership fees and time spent demonstrating with the possible risk of being arrested or harassed. The goal of a social movement is to achieve a collective good. However, those who do not join but nevertheless receive the collective good are “free riders,” so those who join must have some goal besides the benefits from the collective good. Intense personal grievances may be one reason for joining, but not the only

reason to support a cause (Buechler 1995). Indeed, the role of norm entrepreneurs is to use charismatic or economic capital to persuade some persons to empathize with the grievances so strongly that they will join and make contributions, monetary and nonmonetary (Figure 6.5).

Thus, a supply-and-demand model can describe the flow of resources in and the results out. Success, in various degrees of goals sought, differs depending on the extremity of the problem and solution, the means employed, and the efficiency of the organization. The role of norm entrepreneurs is to attract media attention so that more members will join and more adversaries will be shamed into agreeing to the demands. Organizations seek self-preservation even more than the product that they seek, so steady resource flows keep the movement alive.




Figure 6.5 Resource Mobilization Paradigm

For Craig Jenkins (1983), there are five main propositions in the Resource Mobilization paradigm: (1) Actions of members and participants are rational. (2) Imbalances and conflicts of interest generate grievances and desire to change the distribution of resources. (3) Centralized and formally structured organizations are more effective in mobilizing resources and achieving goals than decentralized and informal social movements. (4) Group strategy heavily influences success. (5) The political climate, notably the resources of those being confronted to make policy changes, can prevent success.

Proposition 3, a statement of network theory, challenges the social capital theory that collective action is more likely from communities with dense interaction (Halpern 2005). In

a cross-test based on twenty-two cases of estuary policy, network theory was supported (Scholz, Bernardo, and Kile 2008; cf. Hero 2007).

Some organizations are easier to form than others. Those formed by identity, such as race or sexual orientation, have an easier task than organizations seeking specific reforms for particular places. To persist over time, interest groups and political parties have to sell their ideologies, a difficult task when vague ideas are disseminated. Becoming a formal member of a political party is more difficult than consistently supporting a political party because the member may have to devote resources to remain on the rolls of the organization. Communist, fascist, neofascist, and nationalist movements can originate and develop along similar lines (Johnston, Laraña, and Gusfield 1997), thus giving new insight beyond the Marxian, Integration, and Interest Group paradigms.

Nowadays, what are called “new social movements” rely on social media, which mobilize through communication cheaper and faster than through organizations with headquarters a leader, and regular publications. Their resource, in other words, is the time spent in communication and the cleverness of the message—the framing of the cause (Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994). Many new social movements respond to conflicts involving democracy and individual rights and are reactions to the colonizing intrusions of markets and states into modern society (Buechler 1995). Insofar as they operate outside institutional movements, they will be less effective against structures of power.

The success of presidential candidate Donald Trump in mobilizing voters from many types of persons during 2016 can be viewed as a new social movement to protest the political system itself, using anger and breaking social norms. A messianic message also found traction in the candidacy of Democratic Socialist Bernie Sanders, who

announced that he was trying to lead another kind of social movement—a “revolution.” Political candidates share the task of mobilizing voters, though they do so under different banners.

Often, the reward for joining a movement is to be a member with other members. Organizational membership relieves alienation even when the cause is not strongly held by the members. Those who join for psychological or social reasons rather than political objectives can quickly pull out and join a new organization. Leaders of organizations, thus, need to learn how to cultivate commitment if their movements are to survive. However, resources may not be as crucial in the success of a social movement as the ingenuity of the leaders of organizations in getting their message out to the media.

SOCIAL EXCHANGE RATIONALITY

Thus far, the Rational Choice paradigm has failed to consider how the black box (the brain) operates. Not so in social psychology. George Homans (1958, 1961), relying on assumptions in behavioral psychology, believed that individuals are motivated by personal goals and driven by desires buried deeply in their psyches. Because they cannot achieve all their goals, humans must organize their goal seeking to minimize the cost required to “satisfice” (instead of maximize) their goals by rational calculation from alternative options. Homans’s social exchange approach has focused on the psychology of instrumental behavior, whereas Peter Blau (1964) developed the social exchange approach more in line with traditional economic analysis.

For example, if a person invites a friend to join a nongovernmental organization, and the friend agrees, the result of the social exchange is a positive reward. If the

friend declines, then behavior is modified, and the two persons may no longer be friends (Figure 6.6).

According to Richard Emerson (1976), the *success proposition* is that rewarded actions tend to be repeated; unrewarded actions will be avoided. The *stimulus proposition* is that the more a particular stimulus pleases an important individual, the more the stimulus will be repeated. The *satiation proposition* is that the more an individual receives a certain reward, the less likely that the person will continue to be impressed by that same reward.

The basic assumptions of Social Exchange Rationality are that people involved in interaction seek to maximize goals, and the main goal is to be gratified by positive behaviors of others. Information about economic, psychological, and social aspects of human interactions is useful in considering the most profitable ways to receive positive "social capital" or "social credit" through interactions. Social credit is preferred over social indebtedness. Nevertheless, social interaction occurs within the context of cultural norms that provide boundaries for what can be said and done. The more deprived a person seeking a social goal, the more value will be assigned to means toward that goal. Individuals rationally calculate the best possible methods for achieving their goals.




Figure 6.6 Social Exchange Paradigm

The Social Exchange paradigm may be applied to business negotiations (Lambe, Wittmann, and Spekman 2001), interracial relationships (Kalmijn 1993), organizational productivity (Saks 2006; Elstad, Christophersen, and Turmo 2011), and many other situations in which humans seeks to

achieve goals through interaction. The application to diplomacy is obvious. The exchange of hostile diplomatic communications, for example, has been used to explain why World War I broke out (Zinnes, North, and Koch 1961; cf. North 1967).

IMPLICATIONS

"Rationality" can be been defined in different ways. The Rational Choice paradigm has metatheoretical status because logical decision-making applies at many levels of analysis, not just one. However, many variants await integration into a single model.

For example, three types of rationality have been invoked to maintain peace within the international system: Hegemonic Rationality is the belief that global regulation by a superpower is more likely to bring about world peace. Balance-of-Power Rationality, applicable in a multipolar system, emphasizes the need of major powers to band together to prevent the rise of a hegemon. In a bipolar world, Deterrence Rationality provides a logic by which one superpower can prevent another from becoming a hegemon. All three are discussed in more detail within *International Relations Theory* (Haas 2016b, ch7). One study, testing all three, has found that unipolar (hegemonic) international systems are more peaceful than bipolar, tripolar, or multipolar systems (Haas 1970a).

Trying to find rationality from irrational decision-makers, including voters, continues to confound researchers. The "rational" decision in game theory depends upon the decision rule chosen—Bayesian, Laplacian, maximax, maximin, or minimax—so there is no way to determine ultimate rationality unless all rules are evaluated with information on how a decision-maker actually deliberated.

Critics of the Rational Choice paradigm are legion. Mark Blyth (2003) has identified the emergence of constructivism as both opposition to Rational Choice and a repudiation of paradigmatic thinking. Donald Green and Ian Shapiro in *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory* (1994) have argued that those conducting empirical tests have used weak statistical methods which, when corrected, have disproved generalizations purporting to support the paradigm. Michael Taylor (2006) has decried the reduction of political choices to economic instead of ethical matters. Economist Bryan Caplan (2007) has demonstrated that voters are irrational in making political decisions about economics. Alex Mintz (2007b) ticks off a list of seven objections, and even believes that the Rational Choice paradigm is not what he calls "behavioral IR."

There are even more fundamental theoretical criticisms. What is "rational," after all, is culturally determined and a product of socialization (Bourdieu 2005). Neuroscience suggests that the brain does not function as the Rational Choice paradigm assumes (Connolly 2002). Altruistic decisions often defy rationality, though foreign investment is preferred in countries that respect human rights, notably in countries that provide educational opportunities, judicial safeguards, and workers' rights (Blanton and Blanton 2012). Government leaders are inherently constrained from rational decisions by the structure of power—the Institutional Power paradigm. Although prospect theory was developed as a contribution to a decision-making paradigm that pays more attention to risk taking (McDermott 1998; McDermott, Flower, and Smirnov 2008), the element of risk must be considered within rational deliberation.

The ideal-type Rational Choice paradigm promises to be the first paradigm to apply to almost any problem area of political science—any of the traditional subfields or the contemporary Sections. But that claim is disputed by several scholars, pointing to many problems addressed by

the discipline that do not lend themselves to rational choice analysis (Bates et al., 1998). Thus, other paradigms deserve consideration. But what are those paradigms, which have apparently been lost while the Rational Choice paradigm has become ascendant in political science? The rest of the following chapters, accordingly, may break new ground or revive what has strangely been dormant or deliberately ignored.

Chapter 7

MASS SOCIETY PARADIGM

The Rational Choice paradigm does not promote democratic development; the focus is on the elite, and the mass public is left out of rational calculations except insofar as they can be beguiled with public goods—the "breads and circuses" of satirist Juvenal (c.100). Although American democracy grew in part because of a vibrant civil society (de Toqueville 1835, 1840; Skocpol, Ganz, and Munson 2000), that characterization is now seriously questioned. American political scientists have long avoided the issue, preferring complacent acceptance of imperfections at the "end of history" (Fukuyama 1989, 1992).

One reason for postbehavioralism was dissatisfaction with how "democratic" systems operate in an undemocratic manner, merely providing the forms of *procedural democracy* while elites are in control. In *substantive democracy*, contrariwise, the will of the people gets implemented by government. Much of the postmodernist movement, especially Jürgen Habermas (1981), laid out a case for the Mass Society paradigm, which was originally conceived by some sociologists as an effort to correct alleged errors within the Marxian paradigm.

Accordingly, the Mass Society paradigm serves as a critique of procedural democracy without substance: Instead

of referring to a democracy paradigm, use of the concept of mass society has the virtue of identifying why democracies fail to live up to their promise. The Mass Society paradigm also reincarnates and expands the Disequilibrium paradigm from behavioral political science.

A “mass society” exists when the structure of government and society permits the few to derive the most benefits while blocking opportunities for the masses to have a say in government. The Pressure Group and Interest Group paradigms were premised on the belief that the best democracy exhibited Madisonian pluralism. Whereas Robert Dahl (1961b) believed that New Haven exhibited polyarchic pluralism, G. William Domhoff (1978) exposed the fact that elites really ran the city. More recently, those trying to salvage the American dream of democracy have espoused “neopluralism” (cf. McFarland 2007), but again have failed to address the inherent problems of representative government.

The origin of the Mass Society paradigm can be traced to sociologist Émile Durkheim (1893), who was concerned that the industrial revolution in Europe, which attracted single males to factories in the cities, had the effect of breaking up families and creating a mass of workers unprotected from employer abuse. Meanwhile, a ruling class emerged within democracies, according to Gaetano Mosca (1896).

Within the United States, research on the division between elites and nonelites in mass society has an origin in the economic interpretation of the constitution by Charles Beard (1913). In small towns where many earlier political scientists grew up, business elites wanted to control what the town did with their tax money. Sociologists Robert and Helen Lynd (1929, 1937) so described Muncie, Indiana. Similar studies were conducted at Newburyport, Massachusetts, (Warner and Lunt 1941) and Morris, Illinois (Hollingshead 1949; Warner 1949; cf. Hunter 1953).

Then sociologist C. Wright Mills's *The Power Elite* (1956) generalized local community power studies to the United States as a whole. He believed that macroeconomic decisions for the United States were being decided undemocratically. Mills axiomatized that the powerful are "those who decide" and, thus, those with "access to the command of major institutions" (ibid., 8–9). He contended that "the elite are not simply those who have the most" but that "they would not 'have the most' were it not for their positions in the great institutions [that] are the necessary bases of power, of wealth, and of prestige" (ibid., 9). Thus, Mills echoed the "agglutinative hypothesis" of Harold Lasswell (1951b,c) that those who are on the top of one pyramid of influence are on the top of all sources of influence.

If power were greatly diffused, the powerful could not coordinate their actions. Mills identified the "power elite" by its "psychological similarity and social intermingling . . . commanding positions and interests . . . [with] explicit coordination" (1956, 19) because they go to the same schools and continue to interact in later years. (ibid., 11, 20): "American government is not . . . a committee of 'the ruling class.' It is a network of 'committees' [including] . . . the corporate rich . . . the professional politician . . . [and] the high military" (p. 70).

In the tradition of Wilfredo Pareto (1916), Mills's empirical analysis began by identifying the richest Americans. His power analysis has been termed "positionism," a methodology disputed by Raymond Wolfinger (1960), one of the students involved in Robert Dahl's study of New Haven who attempted to refute the idea that power structures exist in local communities. Indeed, American political scientists rejected the Mass Society paradigm as too leftist during the early behavioral era.

There are several chokepoints in the democratic process, especially within civil society institutions (media, interest

groups, political parties). The Mass Society paradigm denies that the structural-functionalism of Gabriel Almond (1960) operates as described, so the key to understanding why democracy fails to operate is to examine the role of civil society.

CIVIL SOCIETY

The concept of civil society has a long history, beginning with Aristotle (Ehrenberg 1999). Because political officeholders disregard public opinion, considering the masses uninformed, they are instead guided by forces in civil society—the media, political parties, and pressure groups (Herbst 1998), consistent with the Interest Group paradigm. According to Mills, the main reason why the masses have been ignored by government is the failure of civil society to work on their behalf to pressure government. Mills depicted how "the democratic society of publics is being transformed into a society of masses" (1956, 300). Rather than the Durkheimian focus on the erosion of family, Mills was concerned that "the media have not only filtered into our experience of external realities, they have also . . . provided us with new identities and new aspirations of what we should like to be" (ibid., 314). He was clearly on the same wavelength as Antonio Gramsci (1957).

Voluntary associations are often too large to be accessible to the individual's influence, thereby leaving a gap between elites and the masses (Mills 1956:307). Politics—with its new reliance on Ivy League experts, whose authoritative views emerge from the media before the mass has time to reflect on events—has become "administration from above" over "atomized and submissive masses" (pp. 308–9; cf. Easterly 2014). For Mills (1956, 28), the pluralism depicted by political scientists in the Interest Group paradigm, with

various interests bidding for a slice of the pie, operates only at “middle levels of power” (cf. McFarland 2010).

Mills also observed that political parties were in bed with corporate elites to the detriment of ordinary people in the United States. Whereas the old, propertied Republican Party upper class was fading, he noted the rise of the “ripsnorting style as well as the money of the new [Democratic Party] upper classes” (1956, 33). Older elites would join the new or they would be displaced, Mills predicted. As a result, there was no public debate on a wide range of important issues (ibid. 335, 338). Recently, journalist Thomas Frank (2016), after interviewing members of the two major American political parties, reported that the demographic composition of party leaders is the same, and their outlook is a Social Darwinian lack of concern for the working class and those who are poor. Because neither party seeks to represent the interests of the poor or working class, instead appealing to the middle class, they do not provide a civil society link between government and the less affluent members of society. Even when politicians get support from less affluent citizens, they still represent elite interests (Butler 2014). And the legislature often allows the executive to make decisions that they cannot or will not (Ehrlich 2008), thereby abandoning their constitutional role. Accordingly, Gary Miller and Norman Schofield (2008) expected that the working class would gravitate to the Republican Party while businesses would increasingly side with the Democratic Party, and the presidential election of 2016 supported their prediction.

The Mass Society paradigm was further developed by sociologist William Kornhauser (1959), who found parallels (isomorphisms) between democracies and dictatorships. He noted that in totalitarian states, dominant institutions and values are carefully controlled by the elite; civil society is banned or heavily restricted to the point of self-restriction. Because separate institutions and value systems are viewed

as threats to elite dominance, they reward followers and punish those who adhere to other value systems until the latter are “atomized” (lack intermediate institutions) and “alienated” (lack a sense of community identity). Since totalitarian societies repress civil strife, leaders channel mass unrest toward internal and external scapegoats.

In nontotalitarian societies, Kornhauser found that the same factors occur as well, based on Durkheimian analysis: Rapid social change tears the fabric of a once close-knit society as family members move away from home towns to seek employment, abandoning traditional church affiliations and friendships in the process (Figure 7.1). If newcomers do not reestablish group ties, even when they are seemingly free to do so in pluralistic societies, they are available for mobilization by demagogues (Hitlers) to support acts of violence, as noted in the section on diversionary conflict below. Kornhauser implied that mass behavior can be the responsibility either of elites who hold too much power or of masses who “nihilistically” fail to take advantage of their freedom in pluralistic societies to form intermediate institutions for asserting political demands in legitimate institutional channels (ibid., 228, 237).

Kornhauser cited various examples in European history, but his most important exemplars were countries in Western Europe where voters supported Communist Party candidates immediately after World War II. He linked such voting to the vicissitudes of rapid social change, not to a desire for a larger share of the pie by workers. Since social change sometimes cannot be slowed, he noted that there are two ways out of mass society—the aristocratic and the democratic (p. 229). The aristocratic view, which Kornhauser attributed to Walter Lippmann (1956), would reserve more power in the hand of elites to maintain coherence in policy (Chomsky 1991). The democratic view would give more power to the masses.




Figure 7.1 Mass Society Paradigm

Kornhauser used the Mass Society paradigm to explain the rise of civil violence by the masses in industrial democracies. A decade later, Samuel Huntington (1968) used the same paradigmatic analysis (without attribution) to explain why Third World democratic countries supposedly needed authoritarian rule to suppress civil violence resulting from the dislocations of industrial development. However, studies on democratic blockage, political violence, and rapid change later failed to confirm his notions (Eckstein 1980, 155–57; Zimmermann 1983, 96–102, 105–18).

Robert Putnam (1993) has contrasted two types of politics along similar lines. *Clientelist* politics exists when civil society works for interest groups more than the public at large. *Civic* politics results in decisions that are in the general interest. The Mass Society paradigm is a scenario for the former type of politics because the latter is rarely possible in mass societies.

In sum, the focus in the Mass Society paradigm is whether intermediate institutions (media, interest groups, political parties) work to empower the masses—that is, whether civil society works for the common good. But even when a civil society exists, there is a "social trap," particularly when corruption is widespread: In corrupt polities, mass organizations are only effective if they engage in under-the-table deal-making (Murdie 2014; cf. Hall and Miller 2008; Boulding 2016), whereupon they tend to develop their own hierarchies and can become divorced from the membership (Piven and Cloward 1977; Rothstein 2005; Pekkanen 2006).

Then, as the leaders compromise to get reforms, members may become disaffected, believing that political parties are dominated by corporate interests (cf. Piattoni 2001; van Biezen and Saward 2008). The result is nonvoting (cf. Lawless and Fox 2015) and a reduction in political party registration and membership, resulting in more power and privilege accorded to elite members—the continuing party faithful (Scarrow 2015). Contrariwise, when individuals are connected to civil society, they are more likely to vote (Rudolph, Gangi, and Stevens 2000).

Topics addressed in politics must emerge on the political agenda. Moving an issue to that agenda—agenda setting—requires the resources of both economic and political capital (Green-Peterson and Walgrave 2014). As a result, such issues as global warming and inequality can be blocked from political action because of the power of agenda setters, including the media (Sparrow 1999; Baumgartner and Jones 2015).

Presidents and prime ministers often pursue private agendas and try to distract voters from what they are really doing (Druckman and Jacobs 2015). Within the U.S. House of Representatives, committee chairs hoard information about issues, from opponents and copartisans alike, to maintain control of the agenda (Wilson 1885; Monroe and Robinson 2008; Curry 2015). But when executives want to set the agenda for legislators, they either criticize bills before passage or insist on roll-call votes that will embarrass those who differ from them (Beckmann 2008), resulting in greater conflict between the parties that could be avoided (Lee 2008).

Since the U.S. Supreme Court lacks resources to handle every appeal, agenda setting is crucial to explain why some issues are never reviewed (Baird 2006). American courts seem so partisan today that they no longer are perceived to dispense impartial justice (Shapiro 2016; cf. Gates et al. 2016). Interest groups even get involved in confirmation of

lower court judges suspected of an ideological bias unlike their own (Scherer, Bartels, Steigerwalt 2008).

Media coverage often suppresses elite disagreements on issues, favoring one policy over another due to economic concerns of the giant corporations that own the media (Dunaway 2008; Groeling and Baum 2008). Even issues for which there is broad bipartisan agreement, resulting in legislation without fanfare, are ignored by the media because ratings improve when they feature open political conflict. The effect is for the media to encourage polarization rather than bipartisanship (Haas 2012, ch7; Harbridge 2015). There is clear evidence that the press deliberately fails to enlighten uninformed voters, who are left without the knowledge to evaluate issues regarding their self-interest (Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston 2007).

A polarized election campaign, in turn, serves to energize voter turnout (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008), refuting the contrary view (Converse 1964; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2006, xiii, 2008) that polarization is minimal because voters are not well informed. And the evidence is that the explosion of cable channels has bifurcated the public into those seeking escape from those eager for news, which in turn is ideologically divisive (Prior 2007).

The American electoral system, moreover, is slanted toward elites: Election Day is Tuesday, so workers will find difficulty going to the polls after work. Obscure requirements of voter identification also depress the vote. Voter turnout drops in nonpresidential election years, when organized interests can therefore exert more influence (Anzia 2014). In 2010, the Supreme Court decision on *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission* (558US310) not only allowed unlimited campaign spending by millionaires and billionaires but also empowered businesses to require employees to work for their favored candidates under the risk of being fired (Hertel-Fernandez 2016).

The construction of totalitarian mass societies by Maoist China, Nazi Germany, and Stalin's Soviet Union (Arendt 1951; Friedrich and Brzezinski 1956) has now been emulated by Byelorussia and Russia. The collapse of democracy in post-Communist countries of Eastern Europe has been blamed on the absence or weakness of civil society (Howard 2003), and strong single-party rule maintains authoritarian rule to suppress civil society (Brownlee 2007). A more troubling case is Singapore, a classic case of an illiberal democracy that is sustained by deliberate mass society—dominance by a single party, which prosecutes and jails opponents in opposition parties (Haas 1999, ch8, 2014c). The Durkheimian atomization of the working class has been reported in Robert Putnam's *Bowling Alone* (2000), which provided statistics on the dramatic decline of membership in interest groups and other voluntary organizations, as many American male and female workers have no time left in the day or on weekends for such activities after working at two jobs to make ends meet. Although Putnam also noted the mobilization of new interest groups on behalf of the elderly, the environment, and women, which have strength in numbers of members rather than in financial resources, the economy has increasingly relied on technical and exclusive knowledge. Hence, power has been relocated sideways to advisors and specialists.

CORPORATE CONTROL

If civil society is inadequate, then where is the locus of power in procedural democracies today? Evidence that power has shifted from politicians or even businesses to corporate managers was presented decades ago by James Burnham (1960), who decried that centers of power are almost invisible. G. William Domhoff's *Who Really Rules?*

(1978) has been broadened beyond New Haven to the United States as a whole (Domhoff 2010, 2013). Domhoff has identified how corporate elites penetrated the administration of President Barack Obama, whose efforts to promote community organizing of clusters of supporters throughout the United States in 2008 were abandoned after he took office for lack of public interest.

Meanwhile, as cities increase in population while the federal government cuts their budgets (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1978, 311), mayors are forced to attract businesses, which in turn make demands that adversely impact residents, particularly minorities (Hackworth 2007, 2016). Similarly, interest group purchasing of special legislation is identified by Amitai Etzioni (1988). Thomas R. Dye (2001) has argued that most political decisions result from a policy consensus inside the Beltway of Washington, DC. “Sausage-cutting” bargaining on Capitol Hill particularly annoys citizens because special interests receive more attention than the public in legislation (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002; Kobrak 2002).

Incumbents have the advantage in elections because, after they have made their peace with business interests, the latter will then generously fund their reelection campaigns (cf. Meirowitz 2008). Privatization of government functions since the 1980s has not only provided lucrative payoffs for politicians but also has made public accountability more difficult (Hamnett, Feigenbaum, and Henig 1998).

During the Cold War, Western countries tried to avoid the appearance of elitist rule by responding positively to protests by intermediate groups. The prime example was the success of civil rights movements on behalf of minorities, women, and the handicapped, which mobilized broad support that carried over to the gay rights struggle. Rather than openly challenging landmark legislation passed during the Cold War to ban discrimination, ensure worker safety, and regulate the environment, corporate elites today

quietly cripple governmental operations by bankrolling political officeholders to cut budgets for governmental regulatory agencies and to block new regulatory legislation (cf. Gonzales 2001, 2012). When an American fertilizer plant exploded in 2013, for example, the report was that inspectors had not visited the facility for twenty-eight years and that the budget only permitted such inspections at intervals of several decades (Hananel 2013).

Statistical evidence of greatly increased profits of corporations, enormous wealth of corporate elites, and the lack of wage growth among the middle class has been assembled in many publications (Hacker 2006; Frank 2007). The enormous cost of higher education has returned the pursuit of a college degree to an opportunity primarily for the daughters and sons of the wealthy (Mettler 2014). Although mega-media bias has been evident in reporting inequality and other matters (Gilens and Hertzman 2000), individuals are more likely to give credence to reports if they find corroboration in their daily lives (Bisgaard, Dinesen, and Sønderskov (2016). As a result, the media are increasingly distrusted.

The globalization of the world economy after the Cold War has empowered economic elites to amass extraordinary wealth beyond the borders of their countries, while plants in developed countries have closed as corporations relocated into Third World countries, thereby castrating trade unions of their former strength (Chaison 2014). In other words, essential intermediate institutions of civil society—trade unions—no longer have the resources to advance the interests of the working class, leaving them relatively powerless while corporate power cannot be contained by even the strongest nation-states (Bauman 1999). The paradigm’s argument that the public has been brainwashed to overlook inequality is supported by recent research (Hicks, Jacobs, and Matthews 2016), but again the authors

do not connect their finding with the Mass Society paradigm.

DIVERSIONARY CONFLICT

If there is a societal problem, such as large-scale unemployment, the Mass Society paradigm predicts that leaders may be terrified that they will lose power. Accordingly, they will embark on something immediately urgent, even a manufactured crisis, to divert the attention of the masses from their leadership inadequacy (Lebow 1981). The concept of "diversion" comes from Lenin (1914 [1935], 130), who characterized World War I as a strategy of capitalist leaders "to divert the attention of the laboring masses from the domestic political crises."

Similarly, sociologist Hans Speier, who left Germany when his research institute was shut down by the Nazis in 1933, noted that twentieth-century international conflicts were fought primarily along ideological lines, as neither profit nor glory can be derived from combat in the modern age. "In the history of capitalism," he argued, "risks and uncertainties have been unevenly distributed among the different sections of the population" (1952, 260).

In economic downturns, some classes thus will favor any policy that promises a return to economic normalcy. "Since armament creates employment, it can be presented and popularized . . . as an effective measure against unemployment" (ibid., 258). Thus, he depicted a situation in which technological unemployment marginalizes the masses, economic conditions deteriorate, scapegoats are found in other countries, and workers either accept or clamor for war to get back to work (Figure 7.2). The description clearly fits Germany leading up to World Wars I and II (Haas 1968). A study of decisions from 1950 to 2000 found diversionary behavior by leaders with lagging

domestic support (Foster and Keller 2014). Some attribute the wars of Vladimir Putin as diversions from a domestic economic slump (MacFarquhar 2016).

Such insight, now known as “diversionary theory,” has gained traction in political science (Lebow 1981; Levy 1989; James and Oneal 1991; DeRouen 2000; Pickering and Kisangani 2005; Foster and Palmer 2006; Tarar 2006; Nicholls, Huth, and Appel 2010; Davies 2012; Foster and Keller 2014; Jung 2014; Arena and Bak 2015). The March 2004 issue of *International Studies Review* devoted an entire issue to the subject. That diversionary war fits into the Mass Society paradigm, however, has never been acknowledged.



Figure 7.2 Diversionary Paradigm

Although evidence for a diversionary theory is rather thin (Foster and Palmer 2006; Arena and Bak 2015), that may be because all regimes types have not been taken into account: Mature democracies and consolidating autocracies are more likely to engage in diversionary violence than consolidating democracies and mature autocracies (Pickering and Kisangani 2005). However, a new wrinkle can be found today in Syria, where Bashar al-Assad released terrorists from prison so that he could accuse his democratic opponents of being terrorists, thereby creating the image that his despotic rule and merciless counterterrorism were indispensable (Filiu 2016). Similar chicanery has been undertaken elsewhere to attract external aid that will line the pockets of the rulers.

Few “diversionary” studies use attitudinal data. In a larger cross-sectional multivariate analysis for the years 1955 to 1960 (Haas 1974, pt3), attitudinal variables were used but

washed out. Nonetheless, the resulting causal model explained 90 percent of the variance in variables depicting a two-level conception of pathways to international violence: (1) Consistent with the Mass Society paradigm, developed and developing countries go to war if they are confronted by economic problems and ethnic diversity, whence they may go to war directly or else they will step up arms production and participate in armed conflicts later. (2) For the poorest countries, war is a simple function of high levels of military spending despite economic problems and ethnic diversity. Findings were similar in a later two-level (poliheuristic) study (DeRouen 2000).

Some studies have examined forms of internal conflict, such as riots, as correlates of war (Geller 1985); others have focused on rising prices and governmental repression (James 1988, ch5). Nevertheless, there is no consensus about whether internal conflict predicts external conflict. Results vary depending upon the research design (Haas 1965b, 1968; Stohl 1980). No relationship has been found between membership in civil society organizations and preferences for violent or nonviolent conflict resolution (Chapman 2008).

If some sort of turmoil is associated with decisions for war, the explanation needs to connect the turmoil to something within the decision-making process of leaders that prompts them to go to war. In a study of the United States during the Cold War, an absence of wars, high unemployment, and strong investor confidence were conditions in which voters were more likely to favor war over peace during the year of an ongoing presidential election (Fordham 1998). But war can also profit the war-making industry, which in turn always lobbies to use military force abroad (Camyar and Ulupinar 2015). Another example of mass society exists when leaders ignore opposition to war from the public, though evidence exists that civil society can act as a

restraint in some cases (Levy and Mabe 2004; Maoz 2004; Baum and Potter 2015).

TERRORISM

A major challenge in the world today is the unpopularity of democracy within the Middle East (Lynch 2016). The Arab Spring of 2013 involved young people in the region, empowered by information derived from Internet media, protesting the gap between government and the masses. Protests occurred in countries with few intervening institutions, either because they did not exist, involved too few persons aside from fundamentalist religious movements, or government considered their pleas as terroristic. Tunisia had intervening institutions and succeeded. There was a coup in Egypt when the political party with the most votes ignored minority views. And groups being fired upon decided to rely on outside patrons while engaging in civil wars in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen (Gerges 2016). Without a grasp of the Mass Society paradigm, the situation may never be properly understood.

The Mass Society paradigm can also be used to identify the alienated who commit acts of violence, including terrorism (Ahmed 2013). Within Arabic-speaking countries, the gap between authoritarian rulers and the ruled without effective intermediate institutions in the twenty-first century has meant that the people can only exert pressure in the streets. The rise of Islamist civil society groups to oppose authoritarian governments is an inherently unstable situation, prompting vigorous counterreaction (Berman 2003).

Terrorists have reasoned that authoritarian regimes in the Middle East are financed by Western powers, so they have diverted their anger in the form of terrorism toward the West (cf. Piazza 2008; Lipschutz 2008). Norms to oppose a

dominant force, in other words, can choose scapegoating and violence when democratic channels are blocked (Hassner 2011). But terrorism is not confined to individual countries but has become a worldwide phenomenon and may be viewed as an element within global mass society.

Durkheim (1912) suggested that religion can serve as a replacement for civil society. Pastors and priests provide answers in times ordinary and extraordinary. Today, when masses in the rural Middle East have flooded into the cities, they have found community by listening to Islamic preachers, and they later join jihadist movements when they cannot find the employment that they seek (Worth 2016).

The current sense of fear and unease about terrorism, when the helplessness felt by the masses is enhanced by the view that governments are ineffective, is nothing new: Terrorism, advocated by anarchists Sergei Nechayev (1869, quoted in Confino 1973) and Mikhail Bakunin (1873) during the last years of Tsarist Russia was a factor in bringing down the government's legitimacy. The incrementalist Provisional Government of February 1917 was viewed as detached from the real needs of the people, who instead jumped on the revolutionary bandwagon of Vladimir Lenin during October.

GOVERNMENT TERRORISM

Often neglected are the effects of mass society in fostering not just alienation but despair (Smith 2007a,b). Currently, economic deregulation has unleashed such abuses as the location of toxic industries in low-income neighborhoods. To crack down on crime resulting from economic hardship, police have targeted communities for monitoring even before crime has occurred so that they are ready when called into action; meanwhile, the "broken window theory" (Kelling and Wilson 1982)—that police should crack down on

small offenses to deter major crimes later—has resulted in violent action against nonviolent nonoffenders. Attacks on the homeless and supposed illegal immigrants add to the war on the most vulnerable. The “War on Drugs” has filled prisons to overcapacity. And domestic security operations have produced a state of near-martial law out of the sight of the middle and upper classes.

Meanwhile, politicians do nothing to ease the situation, more interested in reelection than problem-solving. Colin Hay (2007) even believes that politicians have accepted the Rational Choice paradigm: Although they put economic problems at the top of their political campaign appeals, they believe that global economic forces preclude solutions as government spending races ahead of revenue.

GLOBAL MASS SOCIETY

There is no world government, so states making decisions about exchange rates, pollution, tariffs, and other matters usually ignore the will of the people in other affected countries if not their own, a classic case of mass society. Small states, meanwhile, rarely play a role in decisions with global impact: Residents of small island states in the Pacific (Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Tuvalu) have been resettled as the sea level rises due to global warming caused by a century of pollution by industrial powers (Davenport 2015; Tomkiw 2015).

Insofar as international anarchy is the equivalent of mass society, many scholars have expanded the relevance of the Mass Society paradigm to the age of globalization, when the creation of a global civil society to check global developments is extraordinarily difficult (Comor 2001; Colás 2002; Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004). Globalization theories have developed in international relations (Haas 2016b, ch8), though without reference to the Mass Society paradigm.

Daniel Cohen (2006) has argued that the poor around the world have failed to experience the prosperity enjoyed by the capitalists because they are neglected, not because of exploitation (cf. Choi, Murphy, and Caro 2004; Dowlah 2004). Even more dispossessed are the indigenous peoples who lack influence while trying to preserve their cultures (Keal 2003). Global forces are much harder to influence through civil society than national power structures, and the apparent result is that inequality within countries has increased (cf. Hurrell and Wood 1999; Michael 2005; Nooruddin and Simmons 2009). In short, globalization has fueled an even larger mass society (Hellwig 2015; Galtung 1971). Nevertheless, two studies demonstrate that organized consumer boycotts and preferences can change industry practices (Dietlind and Michele 2013; Locke 2013).

Increasingly visible are transnational activists (De Mars 2005; Tarrow 2005). The development of global civil society is one of the most fascinating developments in the current international environment, offering the potential to stop wars (Meyer, Whittier, and Robnett 2002; Doh and Teegan 2003; Kaldor 2003). Indeed, the World Bank now has a formal mechanism for private complaints when projects based on their loans commit environmental violations (Buntaine 2015).

Global conditions are isomorphic with national conditions insofar as the masses have little influence on those with global power. Most of the analysis has been qualitative, focusing on case studies, yet unmindful of obvious relevance to the Mass Society paradigm.

IMPLICATIONS

The Mass Society paradigm lingers behind much research in political science but has not been appropriately recognized. Unlike the evolving Marxian paradigm, there are several

competing variants of the Mass Society paradigm. Such diversity invites cross-testing to winnow down those that predict correctly from those that are pushing ideology.

The Mass Society paradigm postulates how material realities impact ideas, which in turn leads to changes in material realities. Durkheim viewed industrialization as mentally and socially disruptive. Kornhauser saw alienation as a subjective phenomenon, and atomization as objective. Mills depicted the rich as an interactive community monopolizing economic and political power and excluding the masses. Huntington's concern was that rapid economic change and misguided promotion of democracy in the Third World produced attitudinal chaos, resulting in physical force (riots and revolutions), so only authoritarian physical crackdowns could ease the transition toward prosperity and eventual pluralism. Speier felt that the vicissitudes of industrial change produced worker malaise that could be relieved by governments offering to increase employment in anticipation of war with countries abroad that elites identified as foreign enemies.

Segments in mass society scenarios have involved material realities leading to attitude changes, which in turn have prompted governments to change material realities. Statistical and attitudinal studies, in other words, have to be juxtaposed along with qualitative case studies to test the paradigm. An article entitled "Foreign Policy Gaps Between Citizens and Leaders" provided evidence supporting the Mass Society paradigm—that there are attitudinal divergences between leaders and the masses in some but not all issue-areas, but the authors did not realize that they were supporting a paradigm (Page and Barabas 2000), as there was not a single reference to C. Wright Mills or the other Mass Society theorists. Paradigm development just has not been on the research agenda, whereas the profession continues to accumulate more isolated research gems that could be integrated paradigmatically.

Within sociology, one scholar (Hamilton 2001) has claimed that some of the minor claims of the Mass Society paradigm have been refuted. But evidence presented by political scientists keeps piling up (e.g., Couto 1999; Rosanvallon 2007), though they show no sign that they have ever heard of the paradigm.

During the 2016 American presidential election campaign, the Mass Society paradigm appeared to apply to the ability of Donald Trump to mobilize support from disaffected members of the White working class despite his contradictory statements on a variety of issues. His antagonism toward the political class was mirrored by Bernie Sanders, who also provided an apocalyptic view of current American problems. They both garnered support from voters who sought to “shake things up” because they felt unrepresented by the mainstream within their respective political parties, so there should be no surprise that they were anti-incrementalist (Manseau 2016). When voters in England voted to sever ties with the European Union that same year, the same conclusion was advanced—that the views of a neglected majority were ignored by the dominant political parties (Jack 2016).

In short, the Mass Society paradigm is now haunting the world. The Mass Society paradigm is a critique of pseudodemocracy. Presumably, reversal of the maladies will result in substantive democracy. But the next paradigm, which stresses community building, may be a better prescription for the ills of democracy. Indeed, the building of communities, at the global, transnational, intergovernmental, and national levels, may have rewards beyond achieving democracy.

Chapter 8

COMMUNITY BUILDING PARADIGM

Seymour Martin Lipset (1994) has stressed that a strong commitment to democratic norms is necessary to preserve democracy from backsliding into authoritarian rule. To transform procedural democracy into substantive democracy, civil society must be carefully constructed. Dictatorships may potentially be transformed into democracies if civil society is allowed. And the answer to global anarchy appears to be a robust global civil society. But how can civil society emerge and become so strong that the people have control over their lives and the popular will is respected? Although Resource Mobilization rationality, as described above, demonstrates the mechanics of building organizations, the Community Building paradigm focuses on how to attract likeminded persons to organize and stick together. Attitudinally, community building is prior to resource mobilization.

Whereas the Marxian paradigm tries to account for the overthrow of failed economic systems by mobilizing those exploited, ultimately reaching an apogée with communism, the Mass Society paradigm focuses on how rapid economic and social changes destroy community with adverse political and social consequences. Both paradigms treat

economic reality as the cause of societal problems. They also hope that efforts to bring the masses together will build a new order. Economic sociologist Neil Smelser (1962) expects group mobilization whenever there is social strain—that is, when individuals are societally blocked from seeking their highly valued personal goals (Cloward and Ohlin 1966; Piven and Cloward 1977).

Many scholars have sought to construct theories for bringing people together—to build communities with common norms that take collective political action (e.g., Nisbet 1990). Advocates of the Community Building paradigm have developed elaborate explanations for how and why mobilization efforts can build local and national communities, an element that is isomorphic with the quest to build international communities. The quest is not just on how individuals and countries can act cooperatively (Axelrod 1984) but how they can construct international communities to act collectively (Selznick 1992).

The term “community building” comes from sociologist Amitai Etzioni (2001), perhaps the only scholar to have done research at the group, national, and international system levels, with different exemplars. A successor to the prebehavioral Legal Engineering paradigm, which advanced law to change attitudes by focusing on behavior, the Community Building paradigm has sought to determine how to change attitudes through the rise of political and social movements.

The key concepts in the Community Building paradigm, as developed at the national level by Amitai Etzioni (1993), are external challenges, norms, responsibilities, society, social stability, social conflict, and peace or war. In a sense, the paradigm is the antithesis of Social Darwinism: Instead of social survival by those who are most successful in responding to change, social survival is the result of community building. The paradigm is an application of the

social constructivist view that ideas control actions in material reality.

Throughout much of the nineteenth century, the community-oriented development of peaceful norms regulating conduct inside and between nation-states was unprecedented: Movements to ban slavery, develop international law, and accord rights to women and workers were promoted to build community (Haas 2014b, ch3). Although resisted by vested interests, community-oriented norms ultimately prevailed in developing peaceful transitions that persist in the present. For Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward (1977), the ability for organizations to keep their members energized is essential to their success; elite divisions during a time of economic or political crisis then allow a breakthrough to occur, leaving a "residue of reform" (ibid., 34).

Many scholars have focused on "social capital" as a precondition for mobilization. The term was first defined by L.J. Hanifan (1916, 130–31) as "goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social intercourse among a group of individuals and families who make up a social unit" which makes possible cooperation that results in mutual support.

Alexis de Tocqueville (1835, 1840) attributed the success of democracy in the United States to the practice of citizens who talked freely with one another (without class distinctions) and participated in civil society organizations. More recently, Robert Putnam (1993, 167), redefined the term "social capital" as "features of social organizations, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions." His *Bowling Alone* (2000) then expressed chagrin that social capital was at a low level in American society.

David Halpern's *Social Capital* (2005) further explains how businesses, groups, individuals, and politicians thrive if they are embedded within supportive densely interactive social communities. A key element is trust—not the Rational

Choice form that stresses predictability, but instead the belief that people agree on fundamental ethical principles. At the international level, Karl Deutsch (1953, 1954; Deutsch et al. 1957) similarly felt that social integration of peoples was a precondition for successful political integration of states.

Depending on the type of community, there are several variants. One focuses on domestic mobilization; others seek to identify the dynamics of building international communities (cf. Shindo 2012; Milner 1992). In the latter case, the Community Building paradigm is the successor to the Integration paradigm that was popular during the behavioralist era.

MOBILIZATION OF DISSENT

Whereas Gustave Le Bon (1896) viewed conflict as disruptive and unusual, sociologist Georg Simmel (1908) carried the Hegelian dialectic beyond Karl Marx: He regarded conflict as a normal aspect of the social process, containing integrative functions in which opposed parties negotiate, thereby producing jointly supported progress (a new synthesis). Mobilization theorists have focused attention on how revolutions, riots, and political changes have emerged from dissent by building movements of protest (e.g., Ortega y Gasset 1930; Pride 1970). They seek to refute the Mass Society paradigm by explaining how social movements arise among those disenchanted with the status quo—that is, disadvantaged by imbalances in power—rather than atomized by social change, producing positive results (Gillion 2013).

There is a fundamental difference between power-oriented movements, which seek systemic change with little individual payoff, and participation-oriented movements, such as trade union formation, which provide tangible

benefits to members. Among participation-oriented movements, some are *value oriented*, wanting to make fundamental social changes, while others are *reform oriented* with an interest in establishing new norms within an existing society (Morrison 1971). The distinction is crucial to an understanding of the dynamics of mobilization, though most analyses blur the differences.

Frantz Fanon (1952, 1961) as well as Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton (1967) are perhaps the earliest to discuss a coherent theory of ethnic political mobilization—in colonial Algeria and the ghettoes of the United States, respectively. Understanding all too well how politics operates, colonists and ghettoites knew that through the acquisition of political power they might alleviate economic disparities. Other scholars have argued the same point under such labels as the "new ghetto man" and "pro-riot ideology" (Caplan 1970; Tomlinson 1969). Such a transformation—the end of racism—occurred when the Territory of Hawai'i, run in a racist manner by Whites appointed as governors, was succeeded by the State of Hawai'i, where a coalition of non-White groups could and did elect their own governors of several ethnic groups (Haas 2016a).

According to Ted Gurr (1970), those who lack some comfort, good, or service, especially when perceived in relation to others—feel relatively deprived—are more likely to protest. But if civil strife is a reaction to socioeconomic injustice and a resistance to the brainwashing that elite elements try to impose upon nonelites in order to delude them into believing that they are being treated fairly by society, then clearly not all victims of deprivation or injustice are aroused to mobilize protest (Jenkins and Perrow 1977). Only a few take the initiative; others follow—are mobilized.

When dissent is fundamental, mobilization is for revolution. For Vilfredo Pareto (1916), Julien Benda (1927), and Crane

Brinton (1938, ch2), a sure sign of successful revolution is the “alienation of intellectuals.”

The first systematic presentations of the mobilization process were developed by two sociologists. In *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Barrington Moore (1966) analyzed how the bourgeoisie allied with the landed gentry in England, France, and the United States, whereas bureaucrats allied with landlords in Germany and Japan; the three became democracies, the two dictatorships. In a series of studies summarized in *From Mobilization to Revolution* (1978), Charles Tilly described how revolutionary movements succeed by forging coalitions with a variety of organized interests, including intellectuals in the outgoing regime. Thus, groups seeking change must, to be successful, find allies among the elites, such as intellectuals.

Tilly, a student of Barrington Moore, has been called the father of twenty-first century sociology (Martin 2008). He has accommodated modifications to his theory throughout the years (cf. Rule 1988, ch6). Tilly (1978, 69) defined “mobilization” as a process of accumulating and controlling resources “by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant in public life.” While noting that recent migrants are unlikely to be involved in protest (Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975, 269), Tilly rejected “breakdown paradigms,” including the Mass Society paradigm, because they expect violence to be “a direct response to hardship, normlessness, or rapid change” (ibid., 252). On the contrary, Tilly (1969a, 11) traced the migration of discontented rural residents to cities in Europe, where political parties and trade unions formed while elites organized police forces to control crime and dissidence. Rapid social change supposedly destroyed or precluded intermediate organizations, according to the Mass Society paradigm, but for Tilly trade unions integrated migrants into the new political forms of the modern city during eras of rapid industrialization, proletarianization, and urbanization.

Tilly pooh-poohed the alienation and atomization thesis, arguing that trade unions provided a new sense of community for workers and a vanguard for action, evidently also accepting a semi-Leninist perspective.

Tilly used examples from several countries in his more discursive writing, but his main exemplars were the violent events of governments and challengers in France, Germany, and Italy from 1830 to 1860 (Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975), including an analysis of 11,616 persons arrested during an outbreak of revolutionary violence in Paris during June 1848 (Tilly and Lees 1974). Correlations revealed that collective violence was more associated with organized protest over specific deprivations than with generalized economic misery (Snyder and Tilly 1972), although his conclusion has been challenged (Halaby 1973). Tilly (1973, 447) observed that industrialization and urbanization are related to collective violence because of their impact on politics, not society, in "shaping the potential contenders for power, transforming the techniques of governmental control, and shifting the resources available to contenders and governments." The immediate determinants of collective action are "violations of established rights, the mobilization levels of different contenders for power, [and] the current costs of different forms of action," whereas violent outcomes are a function of "the presence or absence of counterdemonstrators, the tactics of repressive forces, [and] the length of time during which opposing parties are in direct contact" (Tilly 1978, 183). Large-scale violence evokes repression unless the mobilized group is extremely powerful (ibid., 115).

Tilly (1984, 11) also rejected the notion that "social behavior results from individual mental events." Political contention can lead either to peaceful acceptance of demands from challengers (usually trade union-linked political parties) for a redistribution of resources or to violence, when those in power call out the police (Figure 8.1).

Nevertheless, evidence to support Tilly's construction of the origins of collective protest and collective violence has been questioned by several scholars (Skocpol and Somers 1978; Zimmermann 1983, 378–83). Theda Skocpol (1979), in particular, has argued that the Chinese, French, and Russian revolutions occurred because the "dominant classes could not defend against peasant rebellions" or "cope with foreign pressures" (ibid., 49, 50), unlike the German and Japanese cases. One reason for recent violent nationalism is that local rulers, maintained by those at the center of power, insist upon crackdowns, which in turn have spurred mobilization of separatist Basque and Corsican movements (de la Calle 2015).

At the heart of Tilly's claim that social mobilization can produce societal pluralism is his concept of "resource mobilization," as discussed earlier in the chapter on the Rational Choice paradigm. The key to building community, however, is for *beneficiary constituents* to attract *conscience constituents* (Paulsen and Glumm 1995). For example, the Civil Rights Movement in the United States relied on turnout at protests by those who did not contribute funds to any organization, though many were networked with the mobilizing organizations (cf. Diani and McAdam 2003).




Figure 8.1 Community Building Paradigm

Another key element is "political opportunity," which refers to the receptivity or vulnerability of the political system to challenge. The concept refers to such elements as

broadening of political access (political pluralism), elite disunity, and ineffective repression capabilities. If an organized group forms a coalition with an elite faction, which needs political support to gain a majority, then concessions will occur through a mediation process (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). But the concessions may not be sufficient, so protest may continue (cf. Meyer 2004).

Rather than Tilly's complicated pathway, sociologist Herbert Blumer (1969) envisioned a consistent pattern within social movements involving four stages—social ferment, popular excitement, formalization, and institutionalization. Later, his formulation was revised (Mauss 1975; cf. Tilly 1978) by adding a fifth stage—decline due to failure or success.

The stages approach, similar to the analysis of revolutions by Crane Brinton (1938), requires a determination not only of when each stage is reached but also which preconditions lead to Blumer's five pathways. The emergence phase clearly consists of a triggering event, such as when Rosa Parks refused to move to the back of a Montgomery, Alabama, bus in 1955. Factions must then coalesce or the movement will not progress. Bureaucratization involves building the organization itself, which requires communication and funds.

Building a community means creating something relatively permanent. In *Ghetto Revolts* (1973), sociologist Joe Feagin and political scientist Harlan Hahn applied the concept of political mobilization to organized protests that morphed into riots. Citing Tilly's earlier work (1969a,b), they started with the premise that groups pursue their own interests. They then traced the political mobilization of African Americans during the 1960s with the migration of Blacks to the cities and the "concentration, for the first time, of very large numbers of [B]lack Americans in tightly bounded areas" (Feagin and Hahn 1973, 31–32): Segregation of Blacks from Whites promoted intraethnic communication

and “extensive social networks,” instead of the “accepted image of disorganized and atomized Black migrants.” Then, due to White discrimination and exploitation, Black communities developed both crime and political organizations. When White political elites, formerly divided on other matters, united to prevent Blacks from having “a share of urban power” (ibid., 37), Blacks tried “other methods in promoting their objectives” (p. 38). When legal redress proved ineffectual, because Whites would not enforce desegregation court orders, Black protest activity “began to take the form of mass marches, picketing, sit-ins, and other civil disobedience tactics” (p. 39). Rather than focusing on Black riots of the 1960s as random events, Feagin and Hahn pointed out the trigger for the riots—police violence at the behest of entrenched elites (p. 43; cf. Ryan 1971 [1976], 239; Rossi and Berk 1972). Modest successes served to mobilize more protests, and the result

> was often a bargaining process: demonstration, coercive government response coupled with some type of negotiations, on occasion, significant gains from the negotiations, then demonstration again . . . to force [W]hites into negotiations aimed at altering the distribution of power and resources . . . (Feagin and Hahn 1973, 39)

However, Douglas McAdam (1982) has argued that the successful outcomes, such as civil rights laws, may reflect the mobilization of the Black electorate more than skill in Black-White negotiations.

Today, success in mobilizing Black protests confirms the notion that their support from political parties is more likely to be a function of how well integrated they are into the structure of a political party or church rather than their educational level or mobilization efforts of political parties (Weilhouwer 2000). Among those in poverty, however, Blacks are more likely to have civil society connections than

Whites (Alex-Assensoh 1998). In short, there is no single "Black community" (Pattillo 2007).

In the Feagin-Hahn version of political mobilization, attitudes (desires for more resources, mobilization of support from members of groups, and opposition from other groups) play important roles. Downtrodden groups seek more resources to overcome mistreatment because they want a larger share of the pie, while rich groups want to maintain their larger slice. The poor use protest violence to make their point, and elites counter with repressive violence. For groups to gain more resources, they must organize and mobilize; elites use the apparatus of the state to organize and mobilize on their own behalf.

Political scientist Douglas Hibbs's *Mass Political Violence* (1973, ch6, 9) correlated data from 1948 to 1967 for 108 countries preparatory to a causal analysis. Similar to Feagin and Hahn, he found that regime coercion figured prominently as an explanation for civil strife. Other studies have concurred (cf. Zimmermann 1983, 118–28), although mere repressive capacity is not a correlate of civil strife (cf. Rule 1988, 26).

Despite many obstacles, the Civil Rights Movement in the United States achieved considerable success, not just in changing laws but also in producing a more inclusive political culture (e.g., Lee 2002). When sociologist William Gamson applied the concept of mobilization to civil violence in the United States in *The Strategy of Social Protest* (1975), he compared fifty-three groups that challenged the status quo from 1800 to 1945, excluding race riots, lynchings, and vigilantism. Results of his analysis were that violence occurred in only 28 percent of the cases, but "unruly" groups gained so much acceptance and new advantages that he concluded that violence was a tactic used primarily when it would succeed against a weak adversary (ibid., ch6). Other correlates of success were bureaucratization and centralization of power, absence of factionalism, single-

issue objectives, goals that were pragmatic (instead of asking in-groups to concede power), and large membership.

Gamson's study has been criticized on various grounds (Graham 1989, 340–41), including the fact that 72 percent of the challengers worked out their problems nonviolently. He could hardly infer motives of protest organizers from mere statistics of success and failure.

According to political scientist Hugh Douglas Graham (ibid., 341–47), co-editor of two editions of *Violence in America* (1969, 1979), mobilization in Europe differs from the United States, as authorities in the latter co-opted reformist movements. He then advanced an exceptionalist thesis—namely, that political culture in the United States is uniquely consensus oriented, something that proponents of the Mass Society paradigm have been trying to refute.

"Exceptionalism" is the view that generalizations about human behavior apply to all but certain cultures because of their unique characteristics. Daniel Moynihan (1965), for example, argued that Blacks are different from all other groups and that War on Poverty handouts would therefore be useless in eradicating poverty. As deconstructed by Carmichael and Hamilton (1967, 53), White exceptionalists assumed that Black problems occur because of problems in the Black community, not the White community. Graham's exceptionalism implied that there are no serious problems in the polity of the United States; he ignored the anomaly that even Black mayors had been largely unsuccessful in redistributing economic resources to the Black community (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984, 1990a,b) because of a calculated effort to cut funds to big cities, which once had been relying on federal programs for more than 40 percent of their budgets (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1978, 311; Hackworth 2007). Today, the White backlash to Black political mobilization continues in the United States (Abrajano and Hajnal 2013).

Criticisms of the dissent mobilization variant of the Community Building paradigm point to groups with limited resources that cannot bring about significant social change, though they can file civil rights complaints, and charismatic or fortitudinous individuals can make a difference in providing leadership for protests (Saunders 2005). Two studies indicate that those who are socially isolated are less likely to participate in mass movements (Oberschall 1973; Turner and Killian 1987, 300). In other words, the Mass Society paradigm may indeed explain why some mobilizations fail while others succeed: Insurgent groups are more likely to succeed if they are cohesive and integrated; parochial and fragmented groups cannot prevail (Stanilard 2014).

Yet within contemporary Africa, the concept of human rights has served to mobilize opponents of autocracies into bringing about democratic change (Schmitz 2006), so the content of issues raised may be as important as the dynamics of mobilization (Saunders 2005). Recent riots by Muslims over blasphemous actions by non-Muslims evidently occurred only in countries where civil liberties are protected and fundamentalist groups feel that their beliefs are not respected (Hassner 2011).

Different patterns based on the nature of cultural differences, grievances, and identity issues await further analysis (Jenkins 1983). Nevertheless, nonviolent protest is more common than riots (Gidron, Katz, and Hasenfeld 2002; Olzak 2006). Based on the behavior of minority groups from 1980–1999, irredentist support is highest if ethnic kin are in two different countries, whereas violent suppression of minorities increases the likelihood that they will seek secession (Saiderman and Ayres 2000).

Dissent cannot, of course, be mobilized in a totalitarian state. When groups have the power to mobilize against the government, often because they have the numbers, a situation of “contentious pluralism” exists (Guidry and

Sawyer 2003). Victory then requires learning the strategies laid out above.

INTERNATIONAL MOBILIZATION: REGIME BUILDING

In contrast with the mobilization of dissent, international mobilization is usually positive. Building communities to combat discrimination against minorities and workers may seem quite different from efforts to construct international communities, but the common theme is to unite peoples to seek something better, beyond a restrictive status quo. Diplomacy has been the main method for building international community rather than mass protests and organized social movements.

After World War I, the masses rallied in support of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points (Knutsen 1992, 189, 195), which called for a new global system of open negotiations to replace realpolitik (action to maintain a balance of power). Although community building at the international level can also involve protests over the existing order (Wallerstein 1984), most theorists focus on how peoples and states can be brought together to advance peace beyond the construction of alliances, which may forge power rather than community (cf. Weitsman 2004; Mouritzen and Wivel 2005).

During the behavioral era, variants of the Integration paradigm (functional, neofunctional, and social transactions) contended in trying to discern explanations for relative success in unification of states and the formation of European supranational organizations. Although scholarly discussion still recalls that era (Borzel 2016), new phenomena have been identified—regimes beyond formal institutional structures.

The traditional Institutional Power paradigm took for granted that constitutions of countries and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) allocated power to

different institutions. There is no basic document in Britain, yet Walter Bagehot drew upon custom to write *The English Constitution* (1867). Similar efforts to find a world constitution are now being undertaken by the study of regimes and "global governance" (Weiss 2009; cf. Wendt 2003).

Building a community spirit may enable an IGO to be successful, but few IGOs besides the United Nations and the European Union have much power. As a result of the disenchantment with the behavioral Integration paradigm, a new form of scholarship emerged: Political scientists began to focus on issue-areas, where they found "regimes"—that is, clusters of governmental organizations and NGOs operating in cooperation or even conflict with states regarding such matters as the world's environment, human rights, international trade, and regional security.

When Ernst Haas grew disenchanted with the Integration paradigm because economic goals eclipsed political goals, he embraced the concept of international regime (1975, 1983). Rather than building highly structured IGOs or bringing states together in amalgamated or pluralistic communities, a renewed interest in functional IGOs by David Mitrany (1943) also encouraged political scientists to focus on issue-areas of cooperation.

As defined by Stephen Krasner (1982), a "regime" is a set of explicit or implicit "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area." In the issue-area of human rights, for example, several IGOs operate along with such NGOs as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch; they impact world developments by shaming violators through boycotts and media coverage (cf. Murdie and Davis 2012; Peksen, Petersen, and Drury 2014; Friman 2015) and can even slow investment and repression in the countries shamed (Franklin 2008; Barry, Clay, and Flynn 2013). NGOs can sometimes be more effective than IGOs (Franklin 2008),

though the latter continue to play a positive role (Lebovic and Voeten 2006).

One of the most significant developments that made regime analysis possible is the decision of IGOs to allow participation not just by member countries and associate members but also by NGOs (Tallberg, Sommerer, Squatrito, and Jönsson 2013). Although only member countries have the right to have their votes counted in such bodies, decision-making in such forums are often made by consensus.

Accordingly, one task of identifying how to construct or broaden regimes has been to identify influences by actors (states, IGOs, NGOs) in each regime and the behavior, effectiveness, and outcomes of each regime. From the standpoint of international law, regimes provide global governance, though their impact is disputed because of what Krasner has regarded as the five most important variables—custom and usage, diffusion of norms and principles, expertise, political power differentiation, and self-interest.

Much of the early scholarship sought to identify regimes. The unacknowledged analytical tool used to dissect regimes into component parts has been the input-withinput-output schema of Gabriel Almond (1960) and David Easton (1953). The journal *International Organization* introduced the new focus in the Summer 1974 issue. Subsequently, special issues followed, with essays on oceans (Spring 1977), food (Summer 1978), security (Jervis 1982), and human rights (Moravcsik 2000). In some cases, the form of cooperation has been organizational, whether regional or international, but regime analysis also involves searching for informal methods of cooperation (Young 1986).

Principled “norm convergence” relevant to an issue-area has been identified as the key to identifying a regime; mere articulation of principles is insufficient (Coleman and Gabler 2002; Conca, Wu, and Mei 2006). David Detomasi (2006)

even has applied regime analysis to show how heads of major corporations cooperate in the financial realm—cooperation that led to a collapse in 2008, an example of transnational (as opposed to intergovernmental) cooperation.

A related concept is the "epistemic community"—formation of a community among knowledgeable individuals. The hypothesis is that international regimes best accomplish their objectives if they are energized and led by epistemic communities, which consist of knowledgeable individuals who inform technocrats about effective courses of action. According to Peter Haas (1992), epistemic communities have four unifying characteristics: (1) shared normative and principled beliefs as guides for action—in other words, ideological consensus; (2) shared causal beliefs derived from empirical analysis; (3) shared notions of validity—that is, criteria for determining when research is correctly supported; and (4) shared set of common practices associated with a set of problems serving the goal of advancing human welfare.

The concept of epistemic communities is similar to Mitrany's idea that experts can cooperate and achieve progress more readily than politicians. The main application has been regarding the environmental regime (Toke 1999; Meijerink 2005), with a focus on the European Union (Zito 2001).

The epistemic community consists not just of advisers but of individuals who have the power to make global decisions. Attendees at Bilderberg and Davos conferences, as hinted in chapter 7, include a "superclass" of development economists and investors who establish priorities (Sklair 2001; Huntington 2004; Rothkopf 2008; Kauppi and Madsen 2014; Tsingou 2014). Other transnational professionals include international civil servants (Sending 2014), international judges and lawyers (Madsen 2014), and social scientists who operate such organizations as Transparency

International (Kauppi 2014). One might also include journalists and owners of global media who frame the daily output of knowledge about events. Such invisible communities, which are claimed to iron out differences behind the scenes (Pak 2013), clearly form regimes.

Having identified regimes, scholars have sought a theory to explain how and why some regimes are formed and are effective, while others are not supported or are mere talkathons (Figure 8.2). Oran Young (1986, 1989), perhaps the most persistent regime analyst, has identified stages of regime formation—agenda formation, institutional choice, and implementation. He also has found three ways in which regimes are formed—self-generating or spontaneous regimes, negotiated regimes, and imposed regimes—though any particular regime may have two or all three origins. The self-generated regimes result from "converging expectations" (e.g., Zawahiri, Dinar, and Mitchell 2011), whereas the negotiated regimes involve a consideration of transaction cost minimization (Oye 1986). However, hegemonic powers can also create imposed regimes.

The expectation of stability in interaction means that efforts to monitor regime compliance will be minimal. For example, each round of trade negotiations under the World Trade Organization has institutionalized procedures for the next round; therefore, procedures at the next round were not reinvented, which would be costly because negotiators would have to stay at hotels some additional days and might even engage in contentious debates that would lessen prospects for successful outcomes. Regime design, therefore, is crucial (Thompson and Verdier 2014).




Figure 8.2 Regime Building Paradigm

More recently, Robert Falkner (2016) has indicated that multilateral regimes may be built from minilateral “clubs,” where a smaller set of countries find intense agreement and avoid free riders who sign agreements but fail to implement provisions in the agreement. His analysis was based on efforts to respond to global warming.

A crucial question is to determine what promotes cooperative activity in designing and expanding a regime. Some scholars, known as cognitivists, stress that regimes thrive because of real problems that need attention and because considerable learning takes place on how to improve the payoffs during diplomatic interactions of the regime negotiators (Wettestad and Andresen 1994; Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997). If positive interaction takes place within regimes, the process of developing and implementing “codes of conduct” will be enhanced. Continual interaction assures that critical information about the behavior of each participant in a regime will be transparently known to all others, so violations of conduct codes can be deterred, either through sanctions or the need to receive the rewards of cooperation (Keohane and Martin 1995; Dimitrov 2003).

Perhaps the most important question is how to promote regime effectiveness (Young 1999; Berkovitch and Gordon 2008; Bell 2011). Carrying forward the idea of “transaction costs,” stronger regimes (such as the trade regime, including both banks and the WTO) impose sanctions to deter defection from agreed standards (Ritter 2010). Weaker regimes, such as the effort of the ASEAN Regional Forum to create a regional security regime in East Asia, have been unable to mitigate conflicts involving China or the two Koreas. The difference is explained as the differential “payoff structure” of a regime. But the payoff ultimately is assessed through domestic politics, and there is disagreement on whether economic elements are crucial (Oye 1986; Lipson 2004; Berkovitch and Gordon 2008).

Those who support the Community Building paradigm expect regimes to persist even if ineffective (Keohane 1984), whereas those expecting costs to be determinative rely on the Rational Choice paradigm (Moravcsik 1999) to explain success.

Recent studies have offered different though compatible models of effectiveness. For Edward Miles and associates (2002), the most important independent variables are (1) the malignancy of the problem, (2) uncertainty of resolution, and (3) problem-solving capacity. The dependent variable, effectiveness, is defined in terms of whether goals are attained or the problem is solved. Mediating between the two variables is the level of cooperation, particularly as determined by the extent of information shared among the participants. According to Frank Biermann (2014), the key elements are (1) agency, especially agency beyond state actors; (2) governance architecture, from local to global levels; (3) accountability and legitimacy; (4) equitable resource allocation; and (5) governance systems adaptiveness.

In an investigation of compliance within international environmental regimes as a dependent variable, propositions recently tested involved such independent variables as power distribution of members, a settled legal framework (deep and dense), the extent to which the goals and rules are perceived as legitimate, and the expertise of participants within a well-organized regime framework (Breitmeir, Young, and Zürn 2007; Breitmeir, Underdad, and Young 2011). Although intermediate variables were not identified, they are evidently the role of NGOs in rule making, the role of norm entrepreneurs (“pushers”) and laggards, incentives to make decisions, and information generated by programmatic innovations.

When studies are bivariate exercises, without a multistage scenario, they miss the opportunity to establish causal connections by positioning some variables between

capabilities and outcomes. Paradigms depict multistage political and social processes of reality, whereas bivariate exercises can only establish links between two adjacent stages (X1 → X2 or X2 → X3). Although Edward Miles and associates (2002) reported that both independent variables had an impact on the dependent variables, mathematically that would be impossible: There can be no correlation between stage X1 and stage X3 if they are mediated by stage X2 variables. That's why the lost art of paradigm development must be recovered, as bivariate research is inherently trivial from a metatheoretical standpoint.

In contrast, Walter Baber and Robert Bartlett (2005, 2009, 2015) have developed an approach based on international law. They argue that citizens, by suing states for environmental violations and pressuring legislatures to pass laws based on their own personal experience, can build legitimacy for a global environmental regime.

Cynics of regime analysis argue that nothing happens within regimes unless the major powers provide funds and enforcement capabilities (Mearsheimer 1994/1995), a view supported in an analysis of the financial transparency regime (Sharman 2011). Similarly, Joseph Stiglitz (2016) has pointed out that the Euro has been in crisis because economic regionalization ran ahead of political regionalization, so there was no enforcement mechanism for deficit spending.

Susan Strange (1988, 342) has accused international financial regimes of being tools of American grand strategy. For others, regimes are dominated by Western perspectives, resulting in Third World marginalization unless the institutions take developing country perspectives into account (Halabi 2004; Dowlah 2004).

Regardless of motivations and power configurations, regime analysis focuses on how communities can be constructed and how they can operate with benefits to members. If some members engage in free riding or can

violate norms with impunity, the regimes will doubtless collapse. Regime analysis has not yet developed a full explanation, which would consider their social context, the role of political parties, and many other factors (James and Palen 2007). Moreover, there is a need to distinguish between the behavioral, cognitive, and regulatory elements before making comparisons (Stokke 2012). Such criticisms point out the need for additional concepts to be inserted into the paradigm for testing, one of which is an explanation for the nonexistence of regimes in such areas as small arms control (Dimitrov, Sprinz, DiGuisto, and Kelle 2007). Another challenge is how to link the analysis of "global governance" with regimes, conceptually and theoretically (cf. Overbeek, Dingwerth, Pattberg, and Compagnon 2010), a topic discussed briefly in the discussion on the Globalization preparadigm toward the end of chapter 9. Another problem with regime building is the focus on structure rather than building the supportive attitudinal foundation (e.g., Aggarwal 1998). That missing element is covered next.

COMMUNITARIAN COMMUNITY BUILDING

The term "communitarian" first arrived in the English language in 1841, with the establishment of the Universal Communitarian Association in England (Oxford English Dictionary 1971, 702). The organization favored socialism in an era before Marxism became popular, and then faded away. The central premise of the short-lived movement was that the just needs of society as a whole should prevail over rampant individualism. A second premise, which led to utopian movements, was that people who agree on cultural norms do not need government to create social harmony.

A communitarian tradition can be traced as far back as Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas (Phillips 1991, 137–139). The idea of building international community on a voluntary basis gained attention during the Middle Ages, when the Cluniac Order conceived of a Christian Commonwealth that would unite those of a single faith (Krey 1922; Bozeman 1960, ch8), an idea also promoted by Dante Alighieri (1313) and Émeric Crucé (1623), both proponents of world government.

Communitarian principles were the basis for such German critics of the French Enlightenment as Johann Gottfried Herder. Whereas the French Enlightenment sought to promote individual identity by pitting the individual against the state, and by having objective reason displace subjective cultural experiences, Herder believed that individuals achieve their identity through human relationships within a particular culture. Herder celebrated nationalism, and his ideal world was one in which all nation-states would respect one another. But Herder (1784–1791 [1965], 60) was rather vague about how to preserve autonomy. The similarity between Herder's opposition to the Enlightenment project and postmodernism is not coincidental.

After World War II, communitarian thinking returned to Western Europe, when social democracy arose as a distinct alternative to Marxism as well as liberalism (Berman 2006). Molly Cochran (1999) and Chris Brown (1992, ch2) have noted that communitarian thought is the opposite of cosmopolitanism—the belief that all humans are part of an undifferentiated world society, such that national identities will become irrelevant as international interactions transcend the nation-state (Beardsworth 2011; cf. Archibugi 2008). Communitarianism was also revived after the Cold War (Haas 1997b).

The communitarian view is that many social problems should be solved at the nongovernmental community level,

where norms of mutual respect and individual responsibility are upheld at personal and social levels. Empirical support in sociology for the paradigm may have begun with the famous small-group experiment in which cohesive groups were more productive than groups with much conflict and hostility (Pepitone and Reichling 1955).

The main thrust of the Community Building paradigm has been to stress the culture of belongingness (e.g., Krotz 2010). That military alliances are likely to bring about war through a common culture depends on whether they are formed offensively or defensively, as the latter can develop common norms regarding peaceful conflict resolution (Deutsch et al. 1957; cf. Risse-Kappen 1996; Johnson and Leeds 2011). More recently, Vincent Pouliot (2011) has argued that multilateral cooperation is an end in itself—a basic tenet of the communitarian view (cf. Milner 1992).

Charles Kegley and Gregory Raymond (1982, 1994) have demonstrated that international conflicts decrease when disputants establish common norms. Amitai Etzioni, who founded a journal named *The Responsive Community: Rights and Responsibilities*, has also given support to the need to develop a community-oriented alternative to the "me-ism" critiqued in Fred Hirsch's *The Social Limits to Growth* (1976). Etzioni (1962, 1964, 1965, 1993, 2001, 2004, 2008) has applied his communitarian views to both domestic and international affairs. Whereas Etzioni initially treated communitarianism as an "ism" and not as a basis for an empirical paradigm, empirical evidence does exist. Every "ism" can presumably be unpacked into an empirical paradigm, and the communitarian variant of the Community Building paradigm is no exception.

Several examples provide an illuminating account of how communities can be developed. The beginning of the Nonaligned Movement in 1955, for example, was due to the effort of India and Indonesia to hold a conference at Bandung to develop a set of norms that would enable the

Third World to become insulated from Western and Soviet pressures to dominate them through a bipolar division of the world. The effort was a reaction to the formation of the South-east Asian Treaty Organization that year. Another example came in 1959, after U Nyun became executive director of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE). Annoyed that Western countries sought to dominate discussions during the annual forum of the organization while ignoring priorities of the countries of the region, he developed a set of principles that he christened as the "Asian Way" (Haas 1989a, 4, 2013, ch2). The most basic norm was to instruct Western representatives to listen as observers until Asian countries had set priorities.

Other examples have been identified, particularly in the Americas, Asia, and the South Pacific (Nye 1971; Haas 1989a,b, 2013; Oelsner 2013), where political leaders have developed egalitarian operational codes, similar to the "community method" of Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold (1970). There is an identifiable causal pattern in which modest technical cooperation, pursued for joint economic gain, proceeds only after the development of a communitarian culture (Figure 8.3), contrary to Western-oriented integration studies that focus on legal agreements, stuck in the old-fashioned Legal Engineering paradigm (Lobell and Ripsman 2016). Today, the sense of political community in Asia and the Pacific is so firmly rooted in cultural affinity that economic collaboration has expanded and spillback has become impossible (Schubert 1978, 1985a,b; Haas 1989a,b, 2013; Rüland 2014).

Nevertheless, community building resulting in organizational consensus—a common culture or identity—has more recently been discovered as important within European regional organizations (Wendt 1994; Risse-Kappen 1996; Checkel 1999, 2007; Schimmelfennig 2003; Curley 2009; McKibben and Western 2014). For example, representatives elected to the European Parliament from

different countries vote along party lines; country divisions are almost nonexistent (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007). Those studying Africa have reported a similar connection between community-oriented norm development and conflict mitigation (Zartman 1967; Shore 1993).

At the national level, researchers have found that democracy is more firmly rooted if practiced at the local level than when imposed by constitutions and other top-down strategies. Accordingly, the rise of “mini-publics” in regard to environmental issues is causing a democratic resurgence (cf. Niemeyer 2011; Kimmo, André, and Maija 2014; Haas 2016b, ch11): What often happens is that new construction is proposed that has environmental consequences, whereupon a group protests, and their efforts raise consciousness among many others in the neighborhood to engage in dialog—a form of deliberative participatory democracy that spills over into increasing national or regional awareness of the political process that otherwise would be invisible.




Figure 8.3 Communitarian Paradigm

The application to nation building and state building is that authoritarian regimes can transform themselves into democracies only after the masses trust their leaders. Corrupt leaders are role models for a society riddled with crime, whereas an efficient political system that is responsive to the people can inspire trust and democratic consent (Rothstein 2005). However, democratic values cannot be imposed from the outside; they must develop indigenously (cf. Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990).

Although tension between nationalistic exclusivism, regional self-centeredness, and internationalism continues, all three can be viewed as arenas for communitarian principles. When economic conditions are comfortable, regional and international planning can flourish; during downturns, nationalism often prevails (Etzioni 2012; Rüland 2014).

IMPLICATIONS

The Community Building paradigm can be applied to many phenomena. For example, a recent survey of American college students by Calvert Jones (2014) found that experiences derived while studying abroad have reduced perceptions of threat, though heightening a sense of "enlightened nationalism" rather than building a sense of international community. Similar findings have emerged from international students in the United States who return home (Singh 1962).

The explosion of organizations formed by the Internet and social media prove that the task of building communities is easily achieved at the individual level through a variety of appeals, seeking rational and often irrational objectives (Rodgers 2003). Another line of research is to study which countries can and cannot join intergovernmental organizations, as the evidence is that conflictual countries are excluded (Donno, Metzger, and Russett 2015).

The Marxian paradigm was nostalgic about a loss of sense of community in the era before feudalism but felt that the task of recreating community required a workers' revolution —for Lenin, led by a vanguard. The Rational Choice paradigm imagines that communities form solely on the basis of self-interest. The Mass Society paradigm blamed social ills on the disruption caused by rapid social change. But they were amateurish in regard to how to build

communities. The Community Building paradigm has been constructed from exemplars to an extent not undertaken by the Marxian, Rational Choice, and Mass Society paradigms, which began as speculative formulations. Scholars advancing variants of the Community Building paradigm have identified isomorphisms across the spectrum of national and international cooperation, but few have been fully tested. The challenge for future scholarship is to determine which paths to constructing communities are successful and under what conditions.

One goal of the Community Building paradigm is to have community-oriented organizations make technical decisions in order to mitigate conflict rather than catering to the desires of political officeholders. According to a recent study, IGOs not only “generate, institutionalize, and maintain norms” but also “enforce or create norms that shape behavioral patterns for states” (Koch 2009, 434). Moreover, when the UN has been asked to assist in state making after a civil war, the result has been democratization (Doyle and Sambanis 2016), even though a later reversal occurred in the case of Cambodia.

Variants of the Community Building paradigm depend mostly upon the type of community desired. The main ontological basis for most community building paradigms is an interplay between ideas and material realities. Most emphasize attitudes and the building of networks and structures, though the latter largely play a role as dependent variables.

Jennifer Sterling-Folker (2000) has argued that the collective identity formation “pre-theory” of Alexander Wendt (1994) is simply a variant of the functional and neofunctional traditions, though constructivist analysis tends to be cynical, arguing that mobilizing leaders primarily attract support by framing and manipulation. Sidney Tarrow (2015) has developed a theory that “the advent of war is sometimes driven by social movements;

that movements often affect the conduct of war and sometimes change its directions; and that wars often trigger the rise and expansion of movements in their wake." But neither author seems aware that they are building theory within a longstanding paradigm that came from sociology.

The interest in building community has always been premised on the possibility that communities will bring local, national, and world peace. Efforts to counter global mass society, as mentioned in the previous chapter, have prompted transnational communities (O'Brien, Goetz, Scholte, and Williams 2000), but they have not yet been linked to the Community Building paradigm.

After the decolonization of Africa in the 1960s, academic writing sometimes focused on nation building—that is, forging a common loyalty among different ethnic, religious, or tribal loyalties within countries artificially carved out by colonial powers (Deutsch and Foltz 1963). However, the result of efforts to assist new countries to build nations was criticized as "nation destroying," since one ethnic group often tried to dominate and force other groups to assimilate (cf. Connor 1972).

Today, the interest has shifted to state making—creating institutions of governance (Waldner 1999). Some new states have failed to build national support, often because their foreign supporters have been perceived as illegitimate (Lemke and Carter 2016). Indeed, Western assistance in the Third World during the Cold War was often aimed at social control rather than building community (Grindle 1997; Chandler 2006).

Both nation building and state building might fall within the scope of the Community Building paradigm but have not yet generated sufficient theoretical prowess. State building by a foreign power or a foreign aid agency has been called "the new imperialism" (Stromseth, Brooks, and Brooks 2006), in the latter case because the aid or investment

often suits the needs of foreign-owned businesses operating in the Third World (Haas 1989a, 88).

Not all community building is peaceful. The basis to bind states together culturally can come from several sources, including religion (Warner and Walker 2011). The Crusades may be considered to have occurred because a new norm arose to justify violence against a rival power (Latham 2011), something now pursued in reverse within the Middle East (Alkopher 2005; Hassner 2011). Protestantism was a new norm opposing the Catholic Church.

The Community Building paradigm unfortunately lacks the coherence of the Marxian paradigm. Many scholars use different terms to apply to the same phenomena and offer varying findings based on disparate samples of cases.

Nevertheless, slightly modifying an epigram from French President François Hollande (quoted in NYT 2015) may be appropriate here: “History is written by those who commit and cooperate, not by those who calculate.” In other words, followers of the Rational Choice paradigm will not change the world. The Mass Society paradigm may evoke a strong commitment to achieve democracy. But those eager to convert from mass society to substantive democracy must cooperate by building community support along the pathways set forth in the Community Building paradigm. Fortunately, the study of diplomacy, long neglected, is now undergoing a resurgence (Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann 2015), though the paradigm usually assumed is found in the pretheories of decision-making, which are reviewed in the following chapter.

Chapter 9

OTHER PARADIGMS

The three preceding paradigms are the major ones in political science, applying to many levels of analysis with a literature far larger than presented. Efforts to develop older and newer paradigms have appeared in recent years; they are briefly described in this chapter.

DECISION-MAKING PARADIGMS

Perhaps eager to revitalize behavioralism, some scholars believe that the time has now come to focus more on decision-making (Hagan 2001; James 2007; Mintz 2007a,b; Walker 2007). A carry-over from the behavioral era, the foci on irrationality, crisis, and organizational elements continues, though with only incremental advances.

One development is to focus on stages of decision-making: Whereas Robert Billings and Charles Hermann (1998, 37) identified ten states, "poliheuristic decision-making" considers the process to consist of two stages (Mintz 2005; Oppermann 2014; cf. Barkin 2015). In the first stage, the decision-maker uses heuristics—simple tools of thought—to identify a matrix of acceptable options available, similar to prospect, schema, and other cognitive approaches (Axelrod 1973; Levy 1997; Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Keller and

Yang 2009). The second stage is the cost-benefit or evaluation stage to maximize expected utility (Arrow 1959). The poliheuristic approach has been applied to the Iranian hostage crisis (Brulé 2005), the bombing of Serbia to create an independent Kosovo (Redd 2005), and for how particular countries respond to foreign policy challenges (James and Zhang 2005; Sandal, Zhang, and James, James 2011).

Table 9.1 Decision-Making Parameters

Evaluative Phase	*Cognitive Elements*	*Affective Elements*
Agenda setting	Paradigmatic representation of the problem	Salience of the problem
Option formulation	Determining which options might be consistent with the paradigm	Somatic selection of options that feel right
Picking one option	Favoring the option most preferred by the paradigm	Somatic discarding of options that feel wrong
Implementation	Translating an option into behavior	Enduring the joy or stress of implementing an option
Policy review	Evaluating the effectiveness of an option	Pleasure or displeasure about how the option was implemented

However, the two-stage approach is clearly insufficient (Brulé 2008). The initial stage is agenda setting or problem setting—the process by which something is perceived as requiring decision-making in the first place. William Flanik (2011, Figure 7) not only subscribes to a tri-stage approach but also demonstrates how the components of mind (cognitive) and body (emotions) operate at all three levels (cf. Knecht and Weatherford 2006). A five-stage model may perhaps best summarize the parameters (Table 9.1). Prospect theory's focus on risk as an element in decision-making can then be connected to the possibility that those not mindful of risk are irrational (McDermott, Flower, and Smirnov 2008).

Whether there are two, five, or ten stages of decision-making, the Rational Choice paradigm has outshined previous efforts to develop a paradigm on how individuals make decisions. But not all decisions are the same, and

some are not rational due to organizational, psychological, and stressful dynamics. Advances in the Irrational, Crisis, and Political Process preparadigmatic theories are reported next:

Irrationality Preparadigm

A newer focus is on how information processing is potentially subject to neuropsychological elements that preclude rationality (Mercer 2010). Some recent studies have explored that influence (Fowler, Baker, and Dawes 2008; Hatemi and McDermott 2012; McDermott 2014), the latter with particular attention to aggressiveness and anger.

Since humans are not computers or robots, they must sweep away the inevitable affective (emotional) temptations before operating rationally. What is now known is that emotional parts of the brain often react first to stimuli that seem to require a response. Several types of affective considerations come to the fore, such as needs for power. For those who analyze the human ability to construct images that may or may not reflect reality, subjectivity leads to irrationality (Solomon 2014).

Leaders who enjoy cognitive complexity are more likely to act rationally. Voters affected emotionally by political campaigns tend to be turned off and fail to vote (Rudolph, Gangi, and Stevens 2000). Yet when the topic of genetic determinism comes to us, controversy rages, as in the pages of the June and December 2008 issues of *Perspectives on Politics*.

Psychologists continue to explore how irrational motivations distort decision-making. For example, a study of decisions in “high-velocity” firms discovered that executives prioritize keeping their power position by relying on persons of the same age who have adjacent offices (Eisenhart and Bourgeois 1988). Contrary to Robert Dahl’s concept of polyarchy, in which different power structures form for each

issue-area (Dahl 1961b, 1967), they found that executive power structure remains the same in issue after issue.

One aspect of the Socialization preparadigm—that ordinary persons rely on the opinions of more informed friends, leading to cross-pressures if their friends disagree (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955)—has recently been challenged: Response to disagreements among personal friends varies with personality traits (Lyons, Sokhey, McClurg, and Seib 2016).

The Irrationality preparadigm also explains why decision-makers choose conduct despite knowledge that the impact will be zero. An example is the use of economic sanctions or threats thereof despite evidence that they rarely change behavior of an adversary into a positive direction, can strengthen the influence of hardliners, and may even open replacement investment from another state (Drezner 1999; Cortright and Lopez 2002; Morgan and Bapat 2003; Drury and Li 2006; Early 2009; Whang 2011; Early and Spice 2015; cf. Davies 2012; Lektzian and Biglaiser 2014; Lektzian and Patterson 2015). The basis for such irrationality is affective and emotional satisfaction in "aliefs"—that is, affective intuitions about what should be the case (Holmes 2015; Morgan and Bapat 2003; Holmes and Traven 2015)—as a corrective to the simplistic desire + belief = action model (Fearon and Wendt 2002, 59).

Recently, the concept of "disgust" has been developed as distinct from "hostility" (Kam and Estes 2016). Disgust serves as a motivating force, calling for urgent corrective action. However, when citizens experience lack of governmental responsiveness, they often blame the political party that they dislike rather than the government bureaucracy. Although blaming might end when objective information is provided to explain the problem, many persons are not curious to refute their prejudices (Malhotra and Kuo 2008). Failure to engage in information search is more likely among those past sixty years of age, who tend to lack computer skills (Lau and Redlawsk 2018), and

among conservatives much more than liberals (Iyengar, Hahn, Krosnick, and Walker 2008).

Although Buddhists avoid negativism, seeking positive karma (Haas 2016a, ch6), Westermers evidently prioritize negativity over positive thoughts (Soroka 2014). Negativity, such as acceptance of conspiracy theories, is evidently rooted in paranoia, which Robert Robins and Gerald Post (1997) believe is a fundamental human perspective, not a symptom of psychological deviance. The two authors have traced how paranoid thinking has been associated with almost every disaster in history.

Voters who subscribe to fundamentalist “sacred values” perceive politics in terms of morality (Marietta 2008). If they then interpret issues from a normative perspective, which saves them the trouble of becoming informed of the facts or of contesting secular arguments, they will be more likely to vote. For example, if the world climate is deteriorating, they might believe that God’s will is operating and therefore human intervention to halt the process is profane.

In short, some decision-makers are rational, and others are irrational. The Irrationality focus is a series of insights but not a unified paradigm.

Crisis Preparadigm

Ad hoc crisis decisions are mostly game changing and strategic (Kuperman 2006, 542). Although decisions made during a crisis primarily focused on foreign policy during the behavioralist era, the application has broadened to all political crises. A summary of findings in the study of crisis management has been provided in a symposium by Bruce Dayton (2004) and a book written by Arjen Boin, and associates (2005). A steps-to-war model has also been applied to foreign policy crisis decision-making (Senese and Vasquez 2008).

One form of crisis comes in the form of natural disasters, such as earthquakes. Some countries collapse when they

cannot handle the situation (Righarts 2008), though other countries thrive. Richard Olson and Vincent Garwonski (2010) have proposed a 5C+A framework for comparative analysis. The Cs are capabilities, competence, compassion, correctness, and credibility; the A stands for action taken. After analyzing several case studies, they concluded that international disaster assistance often serves to point out the inadequacies of the government where the unfortunate event occurred. A similar analysis has been made of the response to pandemics (Sparrow 2016).

A study of the financial crisis of 2008/09 has revealed that failure to avoid the crisis has led to an overcautiousness that may result in a future failure. For that matter, International Monetary Fund bailout conditions, which deepen crises within recipient countries, seem to fall into a pattern of insanity—repeating the same policies with the same adverse effects (Stiglitz 2002, ch8; Vines and Gilbert 2004). In short, further development of a Crisis paradigm needs to include postcrisis behavior as well as crisis prevention modalities.

Mitigation of crisis situations has been the main focus. Trade interdependence may also play a role in how crises are resolved (Peterson and Venteicher 2013), as Norman Angell (1909) predicted. Case studies using poliheuristic analysis find that empathetic consideration of an opponent in the option selection phase of decision-making assures a more peaceful outcome to a crisis (Keller and Yang 2009). Contrariwise, use of public statements as threats often forces opponents into backing down (Tarar and Leventoğlu 2008). Domestic influences, such as opposition parties, may act as constraints or incentives for violent conflict resolution (Leventoğlu and Tarar 2009; Shea, Teo, and Levy 2014).

Unbiased mediators can also be used to defuse crises (Smith and Stam 2003; Touval 2003; Wilkenfeld, Young, Quinn, and Asal 2005; Crescenzi, Kadera, Mitchell, and Thyne 2011), though rarely when military conflict is involved

(Bercovitch and Jackson 1997). Conflict resolution often requires negotiations when the cost of an ongoing situation is high (cf. Ghosn 2010; Ramsay 2011). Crises are identified when the normal channels of government fail to operate as usual, but there can be problems in everyday decision-making, as discussed next.

Political Process Preparadigm

Noncrisis decisions are usually considered to be path dependent—that is, the past inexorably barges into the present, limiting options, with minor decisions sometimes yielding unexpected and major consequences (cf. Kuperman 2006; Pierson 2008). Continuity is the preferred option in most decision-making, but the price of regularizing the process may be unacceptable outcomes, so several studies have tried to identify where things might go wrong.

The second edition of Graham Allison's *Essence of Decision* (Allison and Zelikow 1999) identified two alternative types of political processes: The first, called the *organizational* model, depicts top leaders soliciting opinions of various experts—a "bounded rationality" model of policy entrepreneurs. For example, Third World countries have signed hundreds of investment treaties that adversely benefit their countries because they lacked expertise to evaluate the documents (Poulsen 2015).

The other model, which Allison evidently prefers, is called *bureaucratic*—the struggle of various bureaucratic units to determine how to respond to events, in which those with the greatest bargaining skill tend to prevail (cf. McKibben 2015). His approach, in other words, is close to the Interest Group paradigm involving pressures inside rather than outside the decision-making body. Policy entrepreneurs, such as national security advisers with strong academic credentials, can have a powerful organizational influence on chief executives (e.g., Macdonald 2015).

Nevertheless, Timothy McKeown (2000) has found that pressure groups and public opinion play a significant role, contradicting the idea of "bureaucratic neutrality." Gregory Huber (2007) provides an almost kaleidoscopic view, in which top bureaucrats struggle to find support in the legislature while maintaining some independence by partitioning responsibility to several subunits while trying to ensure that those down the chain of command are following through.

Because presidents are elected from national constituencies, unlike district representation by members of legislatures, two theories of presidential decision-making have arisen—the *opportunistic* versus the *constraints* approaches. In a study of executive orders from American presidents from 1939–1996, George Krause and Jeffrey Cohen (2000) spotted the opportunistic model in their early years in office, whereas constraints were evident afterward. Yet American presidents must often bargain with Congress, which might prepare bills that might be vetoed, by signaling acceptance or nonacceptance before a measure is finalized for executive approval. Analyzing 443 such bargaining situations from 1945–1992, Charles Cameron and associations (2000) discovered that presidents communicate their preferences with some ambiguity (known as the *coordination* model) more often than stating red lines (the *commitment* model), consistent with Richard Neustadt's *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents* (1990).

Unfortunately, legislators often set up a policy program designed for indefinite continuation, and then leave matters to bureaucrats, when in fact the programs need but do not receive review and recalibration; the result is a "policyscape" that exists with "deferred maintenance" (Mettler 2016). An example, cited above, is the case of the fertilizer plant that blew up in 2013 for lack of regularized federal inspections (Hananel 2013).

Ranan Kuperman (2006) has relabeled the cybernetic-organizational model as the “dynamic framework” and focuses on *sequential* decision-making: Decision-makers operate in a stream of ongoing episodes that may or may not require decisional intervention. An example is how the European Union has episodically dealt with the application of Turkey for membership and vice versa (Ozkecei-Taner 2006, 545). Comparative analyses of the bureaucratic and organizational components of decision-making may continue to develop the paradigm (cf. Palmer and Morgan 2006; Siniver 2008). Simulations are often a preferred method of analysis (Kuperman 2006, 544). However, except for the concept of groupthink, the Political Process preparadigm provides more explication than explanation.

Implications

A unified paradigm, combining all three elements, is needed to provide coherence to what are now disparate studies. A welcome contribution by Yaacov Vertzberger (1998) has attempted such a synthesis, which he calls the “sociocognitive approach.” Although he intends his theory as an alternative to the Rational Choice paradigm, his approach is incomplete and unfortunately has not yet attracted wide attention.

CULTURAL PARADIGMS

For Clifford Geertz (1973), “culture” is a system of meaning that organizes perceptions as well as norms (cf. Reeves 2004; Chabal and Daloz 2006). Except for anti-empiricists holding onto a priori ideological beliefs, the end of the Cold War has meant the irrelevance of isms, since differences between capitalist and socialist systems are no longer on the political agenda. Instead, globalization has become dominant. One form of resistance to globalization has been

to stress cultural elements in politics. But cultural analyses have been extraordinarily divergent.

The term “culture” is expansive. Richard Ned Lebow’s recent book *A Cultural Theory of International Relations* (2009) identified how four motives (appetite, spirit, reason, fear) have led to different methods for resolving conflict from the days of ancient Greece.

Unique differences between countries are sometimes explained on the basis of national culture (Gorer 1955; Morris 1956). Lewis Richardson (1960b) found that Chinese-speaking countries were the most peaceful, whereas Spanish-speaking countries were the most warlike, and Christian-Islamic wars occurred more often than one might expect on the basis of chance (pp. 230, 245). Although Richardson was not seeking to stereotype cultures, the cultural components of wars in some Third World countries have been emphasized by such anthropologists as Paul Richards (2005) as efforts to create group identities (cultures). After all, political power can sometimes be used to impose cultural conformity (Boyte 2003).

The concept of “rights” differs culturally between Western prioritization of individual sanctity from government intrusion to the Confucian belief that the right of socioeconomic security trumps civil and political rights (Perry 2008). But even within a single society, varying discourses on politics reflect different cultural orientations (e.g., Crowley, Watson, and Waller 2008). Even the past can be regarded as an abandoned culture, a time when life was supposedly better—or worse (Jaeger 2007).

Civil rights successes for minorities have resulted in an increased emphasis on cultural and ethnic identity. Minorities are more likely to have empathy with other minorities under threat (Sirin, Valentino, and Villalobos 2016).

Tali Mendelberg (2001) has argued that candidates running for office sometimes call attention to their biases by making

coded statements that “prime” listeners to tune into their implicit discriminatory messages, which are deemed more effective than explicit racial appeals because racist discourse is considered “politically incorrect.” In the southern states of the United States today, antipathy of Whites toward Blacks has been passed from generation to generation in locations where slavery was once practiced extensively (Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen 2016). Consistent with the theory of racial priming, which is debated in the March 2006 issue of *Perspectives on Politics*, some Americans will not vote for White candidates who openly associate with and court African American voters (Stephens-Dougan 2016).

However, cultural analysis sometimes can fall into the trap of reifying stereotypes, such as by inserting a racial background variable into a multivariate statistical study as if all members of one race were the same (cf. Benhabib 2002). Cultures are always in flux and have many nuances, elements that may appear paradoxical. Newer efforts to develop cultural paradigms have been to focus on Norm Development, Cultural Similarity, and Clash of Civilizations, as described next.

Norm Development Preparadigm

The practice of extracting cultural norms from observed practices is standard procedure among cultural anthropologists. Alexander Wendt’s *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999) has emphasized the way in which shared ideas and norms are socially constructed. Although there may be a view that “constructivism [is] the principal theoretical perspective on norms” (Acharya 2011, 95), there is a long history on norm development in anthropology and international law.

Examples of norm development are the spread of religious values, such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Christianity, Islam, and various sects, such as Scientology.

The Peace of God, promoted by the Catholic Church in the early Middle Ages, was a set of norms relating to the humane concept of the just war, which later formed a basis for a branch of international law. But Catholic Christianity made war on Islam, and Protestant Christianity challenged Catholic Christianity, and in both cases, the result was war because norms were perceived as in zero-sum opposition.

Similarly, the rise of the norm of nationalism played a positive role in bringing people together to share a larger sense of community within territorial boundaries. But Napoléon Bonaparte's effort to spread nationalism to peoples under monarchical despotisms meant war. The Concert of Europe, which developed after Napoléon, involved a set of aristocrats agreeing to prevent nationalistic uprisings, and their norms were used to suppress democratic uprisings. The Concert was an extraordinary breakthrough in international relations: For the first time, representatives of several states tried to build consensus with face-to-face diplomacy, developing norms and a commitment to follow those norms (Mitzen 2013; cf. Buzan and Lawson 2015). However, the Concert broke up when the anti-nationalist norm was rejected by Britain and France. Later, multilateral conferences were held in Geneva (1864), Berlin (1885), and the Hague (1899 and 1905) to engage in what retrospectively has been called global governance. Although colonized peoples were excluded under the League of Nations, the United Nations began with a commitment to abolish colonies. Because democracies were in the forefront of later IGOs, Alexandru Grigorescu (2015) reveals that decision-making rules were imported from democratic constitutions, thereby encouraging their export to nondemocracies.

The prebehavioral Legal Engineering paradigm, which envisaged changes in societal attitudes through the passage of laws and treaties, sought to reshape culture. Talcott Parsons (1961) assumed that no collection of individuals

living together in a community could be called a “society” unless they adhered to a common set of norms or a Gemeinschaft. His idea of international society assumed “normative interaction,” as in debates and pressures to adopt treaties.

Nevertheless, norm development does not always build an inclusive community. The way in which Adolf Hitler, a norm entrepreneur, sold Nazism to unite the German people was through a process of norm development. But Nazi norms failed to survive because they were essentially negative, creating the idea of a Social Darwinian order in which Germans were superior, all others inferior, provoking a military counterreaction when Hitler attempted to crush other countries.

The development of norms is crucial both to overcoming mass society and building community. The “security communities” of Karl Deutsch and associates (1957) were predicted to thrive if they could develop common norms based on such values as human respect, an example of communitarian norms (Acharya 2009a,b).

One prominent cultural perspective has been operational code analysis, which began in the behavioral era, thanks to Nathan Leites (1951) and Alexander George (1969). Stephen Walker (1990, 2011) refers to operational code analysis as a “neobehavioral” advance. Applications include the operational codes of particular decision-makers (e.g., Holsti 1970; Schafer, Robison, and Aldrich 2006; Schafer and Walker 2006), but the analysis could also include entire countries or regions. The inclusive culture of Hawai‘i, for example, is at sharp variance with that of the continental United States (Haas 2011, ch1, 2016a, ch1, 2017, ch1). The “Asian Way,” referred to above, is another example, similar to the “Pacific Way” (Haas 1989a,b, 2013, ch2). Having identified operational codes, however, the question remains how they were constructed to develop cultural similarity.

Cultural Similarity Preparadigm

Much research on race relations assumes that disparate cultures account for tensions. If, however, different ethnic groups share a common culture, the expectation is that racial harmony will prevail. Assimilationist policies aim at engineering cultural similarity, but they are resented when dominant groups try to impose their culture on subordinate groups. Integration, as described in chapter 4, celebrates diversity, not similarity. Under integration, members of different groups are expected to retain their root cultures while subscribing to an ethos respecting diversity. For example, the Aloha Spirit pervades Hawai‘i, mitigating cultural differences among immigrants from countries that have historically been at odds (Haas 2011, app., 2016, ch6). As soon as differing opinions are no longer perceived as disagreements but instead as opportunities to build an intercultural consensus, a more harmonious society can be achieved (cf. Ree 2014, Bourdieu 2005).

Some success in bringing about similar attitudes among different races has been reported among generational cohorts, which are socialized by the same events and therefore have similar reactions (Lyons and Alexander 2000). Thus, Scott Gartner and Gary Segura (2000) found that opinions regarding casualties resulting from America’s role in Vietnam’s Civil War were similar between Blacks and Whites.

The Cultural Similarity preparadigm explains why candidates who emphasize consensus tend to be the ones who perceive that they are favored to win. In contrast, according to a recent study, candidates believed to be underdogs will emphasize contentious and divisive issues (Dragu and Fan 2016). The study was clearly vindicated by the course of the 2016 presidential election in the United States.

At the international level, if two countries are similar or believe that they are members of the same culture, their relations should be more harmonious than other dyads in the international system. Cultural similarity could apply if two countries are allies, share the same form or government or religion, or develop a common cultural ethos during years of close collaboration.

During the Cold War, the world was divided into two economic blocs, capitalist and communist, with a Third World that traded largely with the capitalist countries. The United States maintained military bases throughout the globe, sometimes propping up dictators who promised to suppress communist insurgents. After the Cold War, Karl Marx's prediction of a world capitalist economy was finally realized. But rather than a world proletariat emerging to overthrow the capitalist system, Francis Fukuyama (1989, 1992) predicted that the dialectic was a trend toward increased democracies because there would no longer be a need to prop up dictatorships, and capitalism would work best within liberal democratic rule of law. He differed from the earlier claim by philosopher Alexandre Kojève (1947) that a "universal and homogeneous" state would incorporate elements of liberal or social democracy; Fukuyama instead envisioned a triumph of American-style capitalism.

Fukuyama's prediction was consistent with the conclusion of Clarence Streit (1939, 91) that fifteen democracies from 1830 had never gone to war with one another. However, Streit was in a long line of English-speaking theorists who wanted to bring world peace through Anglo-American hegemony, even if the method employed was imperialistic (Bell 2014). His *Union Now* proposed a world government that would consist only of democracies.

Meanwhile, several scholars found statistically that the most peaceful dyads around the world have democratic forms of government (Babst 1964, 1972; Small and Singer

1976, 67–68; Rummel 1983a,b). Some international relations theorists then sought to trace the idea of the "democratic peace" to philosopher Immanuel Kant (1795), who hoped that republics would band together to prevent empires from endless war, though he had in mind governments with a separation of powers between presidents and representative legislatures, whether democratic or not (cf. Doyle 1983, 209–15, 1986; Delahunty and Yoo 2010). In other words, they focused on procedural democracy, not the substantive democracy sought in the Mass Society paradigm (cf. Flanigan and Fogelman 1971).

Thereafter, a flurry of studies sought to validate the view that democratic pairs of countries are more peaceful than any other dyads, while other studies sought to dispute the finding (cf. Haas 2014a, ch5). For example, a statistical test of the Cultural Similarity preparadigm by Errol Henderson (1998), covering dyads from 1820 to 1989, found that religious similarity was associated with peaceful dyads (cf. Warner and Walker 2011), whereas both ethnic and linguistic dyads had the opposite effect. Pairs of democracies in his study had the most association with peaceful relations, a finding echoed by James Meernik (2005) but contested in dozens of studies (Haas 2014a, Table 5.2).

The paradigmatic argument, however, was incomplete: The mechanism or process linking a form of government, which cannot breathe, was supposed to impact decisions made by leaders of other countries in the event of disputes; in other words, both the disputes and the deliberation processes were blackboxed. Presumably, democratic leaders shared a common cultural understanding of how to make decisions with their opposite numbers (Souva 2004; Werner 2000).

Rather than engaging in case studies to prove those points, endless statistical manipulations arose instead (Russett 1993). The back-and-forth between studies trying

to prove and disprove the thesis (Haas 2014a) made clear that proponents were ideologically committed regardless of contrary findings (Russett and O'Neal 2001, 272), whereas detractors sought a more objective analysis. That the United States bombed democratic Cambodia while engaging in war rather than supporting an election in Vietnam under the terms of the 1954 Geneva Peace Agreement has been ignored by "democratic peace" ideologues along with more than one hundred other cases of democracies at war with other democracies (Haas 2014a, App).

One study, however, found that pairs of dictatorships were also less likely to go to war with each other (Bennett 2006), and another found that exceptions were personalist autocracies (Mattes and Rodríguez 2014). Some scholars even began to talk about a "capitalist peace" (Gartzke 2007). The argument that capitalist dyads are the most peaceful, another attempt to develop a Cultural Similarity paradigm, seems even more questionable, since capitalist countries have gone to war with one another for centuries. The underlying element of the "capitalist peace" is trade and the sanctity of commercial contracts, echoing the view of Norman Angell (1909) that an interdependent world will be more peaceful than one with tariff walls. But the ascendancy of right-wing populist parties has historically resulted in barriers to free trade (Kono 2008). However, if there is an ongoing military dispute between two capitalist countries, third parties trading mostly with one side will act as allies, while countries trading with both sides will be neutral (Aydin 2008). Cultural Similarity seems attractive as a paradigm to explain disparate phenomena, but the term "culture" is problematic. Situations of cultural dissimilarity, as in the behavioral Disequilibrium paradigm and the concept of "clash of civilizations," need to be integrated with the concept of Cultural Similarity so that there will be a single coin with two sides rather than numismatic diversity.

Clash of Civilizations Preparadigm

Margaret Mead and Rhoda Metraux (1965) once argued that "knowledge of the varieties of human social organization may be useful to planning for types of world order in which lethal conflict will be minimized" (p. 132). But when the Cold War ended, Samuel Huntington (1993, 1996) suggested that world conflict would be based on the variety of cultural norms throughout the world. The United States had been involved worldwide during the Cold War, but parts of Africa, the Americas, Asia, and the Middle East that had been integrated into the bipolar world were now free to assert their own roles in the world. In so doing, Huntington expected that they would revert to cultural and religious norms. Huntington's focus on cultural dissimilarity was an answer to Fukuyama's claim that democracy inexorably would spread and become a world culture (cf. Huntington 1991).

Huntington expected that civilizations with differing norms would inevitably disagree on international issues and therefore clash. Out of cultural dissimilarity would emerge "core state conflicts" between the major states of different civilizations (ibid., ch9). But even when Huntington colored a map of major civilizations, he had to use ten different shades, suggesting that the clash was not just one of Western versus non-Western countries, and he even classified Papua New Guinea as "Western"!

The Clash of Civilizations paradigm was a literary theory, not constructed from systematic quantitative analysis. Many critiques have emerged (e.g., Rose 2013). In a quantitative study before 9/11, "the probability of a civilizational conflict [was judged to be] low" (Midlarsky 1998, 485), a conclusion extended after 9/11 (Henderson and Tucker 2001; Fox 2004). But after those studies, some in the Middle East perceived a revival of the Crusades and have been fighting back ever since.

Differences between Sunni and Shiite versions of Islam may be interpreted either as religious or in terms of the realpolitik of countries with majorities accepting either version. Both Islamic sects, in turn, promote political views that "compete" with Western values (Adamson 2005).

Similarly, the "culture war" inside the United States involves religious believers who accept authoritarian, dogmatic, and Messianic messages in the *Bible* as their weltanschauung, while other citizens hold more secular views (Viteritti 2007; Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson 2008). Nevertheless, believers who become politically active tend to be much less dogmatic, having integrated themselves into secular civil society (Conger and McGraw 2008), so the impact of culture may be mitigated by community building.

Implications

Cultural analysis in political science has not yet developed a comprehensive paradigm. Except in the case of operational code analysis, the term "culture" has been applied very loosely, sometimes bringing out implicit prejudices within scholars. A combination of the elements identified above might raise cultural analysis to the level of a major paradigm, but what is more likely is that cultural analysis is needed within the three major paradigms of political science.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM

One explanation for culture clash is economic inequality, which in turn is due to a lag in economic prosperity for minorities and Third World countries. Development economics, and especially the Stages-of-Development paradigm, are considered failures. Trickle-down economics

has produced a widening gap between rich and poor, both in developed and developing countries (Sims 2005; Davies, Sandstrom, Sharrocks, and Wolff 2006). Yet some scholars still believe that culture, not the corruption inherent in mass society, impedes economic development (Murdie 2014; cf. Boulding 2016).

Within developed countries, the welfare state was designed to cushion the adverse effects of economic fluctuations on the poorer elements of society. But today's corporate elites, who have decapitalized their countries, want governments to cut budgets rather than pay taxes for profits retained overseas, squeezing possibilities for future human progress by making improved educational quality and college attendance more expensive. Within poorer countries, lacking a welfare state, there is no option left but human (bottom-up) development.

Consequently, a new economic development paradigm has arisen. Progenitors of the Human Development paradigm are three non-Western economists—Mahbub ul Haq, Amarya Sen, and Muhammad Yunus.

In 1973, economist—and game theorist—Mahbub ul Haq (1973) famously wrote that "22 industrial family groups had come to dominate the economic and financial life-cycle of Pakistan and that they controlled about two-thirds of industrial assets, 80% of banking and 79% of insurance assets in the industrial domain." He could have been considered an advocate of the Mass Society paradigm if he had not for a decade advised the UN Development Program, for which he developed the Human Development Index in 1990 and then wrote *Reflections on Human Development* (1995) to reorient economic thinking toward the view that serious development requires the development of educational and professional training. (The adjusted Human Development Index in 2011, e.g., ranked Norway on top and the United States fourth, but when adjusted for inequality,

Norway remained number one, and the United States fell to sixteenth [UNDP 2011]).

The World Bank, which was established to fund infrastructure for the benefit of industrial corporations, has gradually adopted the Human Development paradigm under the influence of such welfare economists as Amartya Sen, author of *Development as Freedom* (1999b). Although the latter book is often quoted as noting that no democracy has ever had a famine (Sen 1999a), the import of Sen's thinking has been to transform World Bank loans to support aid that increases human educational capabilities—what people can do and be. For Sen, reaching the most in human capabilities, rather than just income or possessions, determines a person's well-being. Sen has been said to revive the moral anthropology found within the writing of Adam Smith (cf. Walsh 2003, 2008). What has been found is that foreign direct investment to local provinces in at least one Third World country (Vietnam) has strengthened local autonomy vis-à-vis the central government (Malesky 2008).

The presumption of the UN Millennium Development Goals has been that those in poverty need aid and that wealthier countries, private humanitarian organizations, and IGOs (which wealthy countries fund) should provide that aid. But banker-economist Muhammad Yunus had a different idea, realizing that banks were reluctant to make small loans and would charge usurious interest rates to poor people (Yunus and Weber 2007). In 1976, he made a personal loan to forty-two women who were seeking to make bamboo furniture in the village of Jobra, Bangladesh. Soon, the loan was paid back. He then decided to repeat the experiment, using money from the government bank as his starting capital. The project was so successful that he set up Grameen Bank as a Bangladesh lending facility in 1983. The reason he selected women is that they have proved to be more responsible loan recipients than men at the local level.

Within two decades, Grameen Bank made $7 billion loans to seven million borrowers, mostly women (Bornstein 2005). Similar microfinancing banks have been established in at least one hundred Third World countries. Besides the economic benefits to the borrowers, microfinancing has served to empower women politically and thus fulfills many Millennium Development Goals without any public financing whatsoever.

The Human Development paradigm incorporates elements of environmental preservation, feminism, sustainable development, and welfare economics. “Sustainable development,” for example, stresses that basic human needs of the present should not compromise the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. Sustainable development can be broken up into environmental sustainability, economic sustainability, and sociopolitical sustainability. Advocates of the Human Development paradigm believe that future technological developments will not resolve future problems, so the onus is now to shift the focus of development to the principle of conservation.

Political scientists may be late to the paradigm, but their recent work is increasingly relevant. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Weizel (2005), for example, have argued that human development is imperative for democratization and economic progress.

Human development is impossible without human security —that is, freedom from fear and freedom from want. The process of developing human security is an essential element in the Human Development paradigm, whereas leaders of states tend to be concerned with “national security” (cf. Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1997). Accordingly, some IGOs and NGOs have increasingly focused on the need for securitization of society (Brown and Grävingholt 2016).

Systems theorist Urie Bronfenbrenner (1979) has identified four socially organized subsystems that support and guide

individual human development. The *microsystem* consists of family, school, and other influences closest to the child. The *mesosystem* is the way the family relates to the school. The *exosystem* influences are from media, politics, and social services. The *macrosystem* is the culture in which an individual grows up. All four, in his view, can advance or retard human development. Securitization involves all four levels.

The challenge for the Human Development paradigm is to move beyond the verbal foundation. More systematic evidence is required to supersede previous development paradigms, particularly since national development has been impeded by globalization.

GLOBALIZATION

On rising to power, Mikhail Gorbachëv (1987) recognized that the Soviet Union was being impoverished. Although his reforms were aimed at joining the global economy, he was arrested in a coup, but soon his successor Boris Yelstin lowered the Soviet flag and joined the capitalist system. The Cold War was over.

The collapse of the Soviet bloc entailed the universalization of capitalism, which occurred at a time of radical technological advances—the emergence of the Internet and other changes, some of which have led to a convergence in policies around the world (Drezner 2001). In addition, the United States was left standing as the only superpower with a global reach, though John McCormick (2007) made the case before problems of the European Union arose in the Great Recession that Europe was also a superpower.

The term “international system” became an oxymoron after the end of the Cold War. The term “international” refers to relations between nation-states, whereas units

other than nation-states that had earlier been playing a role now became far more significant in the global configuration. Nonstate actors, including regional governments inside states and international banks, began to engage in negotiations, known as “paradiplomacy,” evidence that the nation-state was being upstaged by transnational, intranational, and supranational institutions (Aldecoa and Keating 1999). Trends that were once national or international had become global, whence the term “globalization.”

Now, textbooks have been written on the subject (e.g., Scholte 2005). But no clear paradigm has yet emerged to integrate relevant theoretical advances.

Elements of globalization are found in the Marxian, Rational Choice, Mass Society, and Community Building paradigms. What is often described as “globalization theory” is very unclear.

According to Jens Bartelson (2010), the concept of “globality” began with the discovery of earth as a spherical planet during the age of exploration, but was conceptually divided by efforts to find boundaries between competing imperial claims to control the land and sea. A pope practiced global governance when he divided South America into the Portuguese and Spanish partitions. Before the advent of the European states system, the world was divided into empires. The nation-state then sought to displace a world of empires by developing international law. But today nation-states lack the sovereignty that once was claimed to be enforced by military means and Anglo-European-oriented international law. Indeed, there is a system of divided sovereignty between nation-states and international regimes (cf. Pavel 2014)—and even between private sector transnational governance and intergovernmental governance (Roger and Dauvergne 2016).

At least four “waves” of globalization theory have emerged (cf. Martell 2007, Table1). The first overemphasized the impact of the global spread of capitalism, as predicted by Karl Marx and heralded by Robert Reich (1991). “National economy” became an oxymoron, and corporations of modest size became transnational, including the mass media in spreading information. Those delighted with globalization were called “hyperglobalizers” (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton 1999).

The idea of a “world culture” and expected decline of the nation-state sparked a second turn in the theory among those who viewed the situation as a continuation of a longer internationalizing trend (Krugman 1996; Opello and Rosow 1999). The development of a new global civil society alongside global institutions has been identified in the Mass Society and Community Building chapters above.

In the third “wave,” a Hegelian synthesis was offered. Globalization has been characterized as a major world “transformation” (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, and Perraton 1999; Scholte 2005). Globalization has even been praised as inevitably bringing about global democracy (Archibugi, Held, and Kohler 1998). David Lake (2010) has suggested that a social contract is inherently taking place. Regarding the promise of prosperity for the Third World, which requires investment, international interdependence through world trade is insufficient (Rodrik 1999). Global regulation has been favored by industrialized countries (Urpelainen 2010), raising the question whether developing countries will ever rise to the level of the First World.

A fourth wave has been the negative reaction, especially after riots broke out in the streets of Seattle to protest the meeting of the World Trade Organization in 1999 (cf. Falk 1999; Cohen 2006; Bussmann and Schneider 2007). Some have phrased their criticism in the discourse of the Mass Society paradigm, as noted above. Others pointed out the resurgence of nationalism and increasing ideological

polarization because workers in the First World are losing out economically as their jobs move to developing countries (Cohen 2006; Walter 2010). Clearly, the benefits of globalization have not been spread uniformly (Fuchs and Kratochwil 2002; Reich 2012), thereby questioning the view that the “clash of civilizations” is really a cultural divergence or instead is rooted in economic reality (Hirst, Thompson, and Bromley 1996; Cohen 2006).

The myriad confluence of a superpower, rising major powers, and efforts of IGOs and NGOs may have created a complex new global anarchy (Laiz and Schlichte 2016), contrary to the promise of international regimes and global governance. The rise of China, in particular, has challenged Anglo-European claims to universality of a global order that they are trying to control (Chan 2009; Florini 2011).

Aside from many important studies of the international political economy (e.g., Homer-Dixon 1999; Klare 2001; Stiglitz 2002), the nature of war has changed from the classic interstate model to one in which the hegemon and allies seem powerless to control international terrorism as well as efforts to liberate minorities trapped inside nation-states. The “new wars” concept, though contested, has emerged because of the economic weakening of minor powers (Malešević 2008): The rise of new middle powers from the Third World (cf. Cooper 2011) and microaggression with impunity from major powers China and Russia have also resulted in the new global polity (cf. Gartzke and Li 2003).

Many developments suggest the need for a globalization paradigm: The weakening of minor powers has brought about a reversal of the democratization trend of the 1990s (Huntington 1991, 1993, 1996). Human rights progress has been reversed as the superpower engages in torture and other war crimes, thereby providing worldwide license for other countries and movements to do likewise (Haas 2009). Meanwhile, old and new industrial powers struggle for

profits in the world economy, and their economic greed has slowed efforts to arrest global warming (Dyer 2014; cf. Smouts 2003). Acute diseases have quickly spread worldwide, taxing global governance regarding disaster preparedness, especially within the weaker countries where they originate.

With globalization, there are more contacts between differing value systems. Samuel Huntington (1968) once expected that globalization would produce social change on a magnitude that would force secularization and other new forms of behavior to challenge traditional values, whereupon peoples would mobilize to maintain their identities, not as the world proletariat but instead as members of a united capitalist culture across borders. But Huntington (1993, 1996) changed his mind when the Cold War ended, predicting a clash of civilization on cultural grounds.

If globalization were to enable countries outside the West to gain increasing prosperity, then they would be empowered to seek changes in Western-imposed rules of international conduct. But no such challenge has yet emerged. The concept of the New International Economic Order during the 1970s (Murphy 1984) has been forgotten.

Meanwhile, pro-globalization Americans who pretend that they are not seeking hegemony (e.g., Nye 1990, 2004; Smith 1994) have been called out. According to Daniel Cohen (2006), there are seventy-five American transnational corporations, while Europe only has six, and the transnational media are spreading individualistic American culture to the dismay of other peoples. Cohen has pointed out that countries in the Middle East which had a secure level of prosperity before globalization are now starkly aware that they have been left behind (ibid. 79).

Insofar as globalization theorists construct the existence of global culture, global economy, global politics, and global society, paradigms previously applied to culture, economics,

politics, and society might be more useful than a separate globalization paradigm. Such a debate has been ongoing within sociology, including a forum organized by the *International Political Sociology* journal during March 2000. Several scholars have tried to develop a coherent paradigm (Luhmann 1984; Albert 2007; Kessler 2012). Niklas Luhmann, in fact, began his theory from the globalization approach of Talcott Parsons (1973, 1978), by extending the Structural-Functional paradigm of social systems to the international realm.

Meanwhile, globalization has in effect transported the Regime paradigm into a Global Governance paradigm. James Rosenau and Ernest Czempiel launched the concept in their *Governance Without Government* (1992), and the concept has gained increasing attention (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010; Johnson and Tallberg 2010). The term "global governance," thus emerged as the metaconcept that incorporates regimes, supranational organizations, and worldwide nongovernmental networks that provide government-like services for planetary problems in a way that no group of nation-states can handle (Weiss 2009, 257; cf. Lederer and Müller 2005; Cabrera 2011).

Global governance has several components, including intergovernmental and nongovernmental (transgovernmental) components, including networks and regimes (Roger and Dauvergne 2016). The International Chamber of Commerce, for example, provides global arbitration facilities (Dingwerth 2008), and there is a "global financial architecture" (Armijo 2002). Whether any components will ever operate democratically is the question asked by the Mass Society paradigm.

Global governance provides something beyond coercive power, according to Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (2005), who identify three other forms of power: *Structural* power involves the relationship between the standards set by transnational corporations vis-à-vis their employees.

Productive power is the ability to use media to brainwash images of reality. *Institutional* power is wielded by supranational institutions and the consolidation of regimes. Yet the concept of global governance is still rather vague (Finnemore 2014; Weiss and Wilkinson 2014; Murphy 2014), though carried on primarily by diplomacy (Mitzen 2013).

The need for a Globalization paradigm seems ratified by the existence of anti-global movements, which Immanuel Wallerstein (1984) once called "anti-systemic." Nationalism and demands of subnational groups for recognition are other examples of the adverse consequences of unwelcome globalization, sometimes resulting in a civil war (Mason 2003; Helleiner and Pickel 2004; Westbrook 2004).

Thus, a Globalization paradigm remains underdeveloped (Kamola 2013; Kornprobst, Pouliout, Shah, and Zaiotti 2008). Meanwhile, the "superclass" involved in global governance continues to operate, and global civil society tries to catch up in order to democratize a world that has gone out of control (cf. Kauppi and Madsen 2014).

CONCLUSION

The field of political science has been divided into so many specializations that the result has been an Ivory Tower of Babel. Subfields (sections, divisions, etc.) even have their own journals where conversations may be unintelligible for other subfields. Yet paradigms exist to provide a common theoretical discourse across subfields and specializations. The present chapter reveals many paradigms with the potential to bring unity to political science. First, the major paradigms need to be consolidated by finding isomorphisms, something that the Marxian paradigm has accomplished and is very much alive (McLellan 1979). Next, each causal link within the paradigms should be tested.

Then, paradigms should be cross-tested against one another.

When the quest for paradigms began during the behavioral era, major theorists encouraged their students to pursue mid-level theory as pieces of a jigsaw puzzle that might later be integrated into paradigms. But the profession currently is stuck at the middle level. Now is the time to launch a metatheoretical consolidation of knowledge into paradigms. Previous chapters have demonstrated the way to move forward to a political science that can become the envy of the social sciences. All the ingredients for the neobehavioral revolution are present, especially progress in paradigmatic theorizing.

Part IV

THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Having demonstrated the content of many paradigms and the way in which some of them can be tested, political science cannot continue to be mired in mid-level theories that are disconnected from one another. A new chapter in political science must begin, albeit a continuation of an agenda established more than fifty years ago that was interrupted by a fascination with other matters.

Propositions seeking relationships between independent variables and dependent variables abound in the field. Surely qualitative and statistical researchers are tired of endless tests of mid-level theory. The time has come to put together individual studies into a larger paradigmatic framework, either inductively from an aggregation of similar mid-level studies or deductively from paradigms. Unfortunately, most scholars may have been ignorant of the quest, expressed some fifty years ago, to construct macrolevel theory—paradigms. That time has arrived so that the field can advance beyond the appearance of disciplinary amateurism.

Chapter 10, accordingly, makes suggestions for improvements in how systematic research can be conducted in the future. Some of the ideas date back many years but

have been forgotten. Other ideas have never before been raised. The focus is on selection of the research problem, conceptual schemes, research designs, sampling, causal analysis, policy relevance, and some common fallacies.

Chapter 11 highlights cross-testing of alternative paradigms. Rather than proudly wearing the straightjacket of only one theory, political scientists need to test the predictions of two or more paradigms on the same body of information. Several examples, some already discussed earlier, are cited.

Chapter 12 provides the rationale for a new paradigmatic-based empirical approach. The term “neobehavioral,” which has been coined as the synthesis between behavioral and postbehavioral international relations, is defined in depth. The challenge is presented to the next generation of political science scholars to bring the field into full maturity.

Chapter 10

MULTIMETHODOLOGICAL POLITICAL SCIENCE

Some fifty years ago, a plea was articulated not only to build bridges between traditional and behavioral scholarship but also to improve nascent quantitative research (Haas 1967; Haas and Becker 1970a,b). Although not all those bridges have been crossed in the interim, new ones are needed today. Unfortunately, some political scientists have anguished over the "jigsaw puzzle," believing that the discipline has failed because scholars disagree (Almond 1988, 1990, 1996).

The present chapter goes beyond the original multimethodological plea, as the field has advanced considerably though not paradigmatically. Disciplinary pluralism is healthy insofar as dialog is promoted and intellectual closure is avoided. But philosophical argumentation is seldom won by any side in an ongoing debate, though some exclusivist scholars often refuse to talk to one another (cf. Wendt 1999, 90). Political science will succeed to the extent that new knowledge contributing to better understanding emerges despite debates about how knowledge can be derived.

What is critical is the research foundation. Both theoretical development and policy applications depend on sound

empirical analysis. As Raymond Aron (1966, 206, 1967) argued long ago, the quality of research is enhanced when multiple methods are taken into account (cf. Levine 2012), as the rest of the present chapter indicates.

PARADIGM DEVELOPMENT

Empirical work and theoretical speculation appear to require scholars with differing types of personal characteristics and propensities. But rather than chiding empiricists for not being theoretical, some responsibility lies with those theoretically inclined to engage in codifying accumulating knowledge by the use of paradigms (cf. van Biezen and Saward 2008).

Having presented several paradigms thus far, how can they be evaluated? Among the criteria for evaluating paradigms, Thomas Kuhn (1977, 320–39) suggests five:

1. accuracy (supported by empirical research),
2. consistency (absence of logical nonsequiturs),
3. breadth (applicability to problem areas beyond the original formulation),
4. simplicity (absence of anomalous cases), and
5. fruitfulness (heuristic suggestion of new research applications and studies).

Three more should be added:

6. wide acceptance of the paradigm within a scholarly community (for Kuhn, the most critical),
7. incorporation of both attitudinal and material elements (blackboxing is inherently insufficient), and
8. cross-testing of paradigms on specific questions.

Rather than presenting a scorecard for the paradigms presented herein on all the criteria, readers are challenged

to do so. Clearly, with so many variants of some paradigms, one task is intraparadigmatic conceptual consolidation. Multimethodological political science must continue to develop and cross-test paradigms—the subject addressed in the following chapter.

But to advance paradigms, research must be designed properly. Causality elements need to be identified. Research should have a policy payoff. And fallacious reasoning should be avoided. Each aspect of research is discussed next.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Although the first criterion for evaluating paradigms—accuracy—is already taken seriously within mid-level research, the design of research must be more rigorous than at present. The influential methodological textbook *Designing Social Inquiry* (King, Keohane, and Apter 1994), issued to calm postbehavioralist anger at behavioralism, has more recently been answered by *Rethinking Social Inquiry* (Brady and Collier 2004), one of several similar books reviewed in the January 2008 issue of *Journal of Politics*. Although what follows is not a summary of that symposium, the issues raised later in the chapter are presented to encourage broad multimethodological research projects.

Impetus for Research

Formulation of the research problem is the most important element of research. The question motivating research should be clear and important. Whether a study is descriptive, policy oriented, statistical, or theoretical, there are usually several alternative ways of studying a problem. Attention should be paid to making sure that the question or problem is clearly identified, with many alternative designs in mind so that the research agenda will grow. One

productive way to begin research is to identify a puzzle within a paradigm.

In addition, research problems should be selected with a view to interdisciplinarity (cf. James 2011). Most paradigms reviewed above have counterparts if not origins in sociology. Isomorphisms can easily be found between societies at the subnational, national, and international levels. Robert Axelrod (2008) has correctly suggested that other disciplines need to pay more attention to the wisdom in political science.

One reason for the construction of diagrams of the various paradigms herein is to demonstrate that no empirical theory is static. History must be taken into account. Change is inherent in paradigms, which are complex visions of how sets of concepts relate to one another over time.

Conceptual Schemes

Another important aspect of research, qualitative or quantitative, is to define the major terms. Fifty years ago, traditionalists complained that behavioralists were inventing an overly complex jargon. Today, those who engage in constructivist analysis have developed a special vocabulary with the aim of guiding researchers toward previously unidentified phenomena (cf. Flanik 2011). Words used in everyday discourse may have hidden assumptions that need deconstruction. Terms developed by political elites are even more likely to be constructed in order to provide a favorable reaction and an emotional resonance. For example, “global warming” has been redefined by those who oppose the idea as “climate change” because the first term is more evocative than the latter. Even the change from “pressure group” to “interest group” undertaken by David Truman (see chapter 4) softened the concept from something initially pitched as undesirable to a more neutral-sounding normality. A recent debate over American “waning

unipolarity" rests on the definition of "unipolarity" (Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth 2012).

Yet "democratic peace" researchers rarely see the need to define "democracy," preferring to use a number from a database that they trust, mostly Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2012). In other words, they assume that the concept of "democracy" is unidimensional and fail to test for multidimensionality in order to support their assumption. Nevertheless, many types of "democracy" have been identified by those who study the concept in detail—emerging, procedural, substantive, liberal, illiberal, economic, social, elitist, Herrenfolk, communitarian, consociational, participatory, pluralist, protective, consolidating, and sovereign (Bachrach 1959; Dahl 1967, 1985; Held 1987; Hudson 1995; Lijphart 1984; Mansfield and Snyder 2005; van den Berghe 1981; Zakaria 1997; Pickering and Kisangani 2005; cf. Kurki 2010). Twenty-six different indicators have been used to determine which countries are "democracies" within "democratic peace" research (Haas 2014a, Table 3.1), so results of individual studies are unlikely to be comparable. And when the various indicators of "institutional constraints"—what is called "procedural democracy"—have been separately analyzed as measures of "democracy," results have been inconsistent—that is, some studies have refuted others (ibid., Table 5.1). In one study, three quantitative measures of democracy, albeit still conceptually undefined, led to the conclusion that "the likelihood of war between democracies can depend upon the specific index of democracy employed" (Midlarsky 1998, 485). But again that study accepted numbers from databases without questioning how the numbers were constructed, including Polity. In fact, the Polity measure has been found to be bidimensional (Coppedge, Alvarez, and Maldonado 2008), meaning that what has been reported thus far is unreliable.

The main lesson to be learned is that variables are operationalizations of concepts. A concept must be fully understood before selecting a variable to operationalize the concept. A mass of variables, such as age, income level, or answers to questions on a survey can be easily quantified and placed into regressions, but they have no conceptual meaning in testing theory until they are first identified as operationalizations of concepts. Theory is about concepts, not variables.

A concept must first emerge from a conceptual scheme. Definitions have two components—the definiendum and the definiens. The *definiendum* identifies a class of similar phenomena. The *definiens* indicates how one member of a class can be distinguished from all other members.

Thus, “substantive democracy” is a form of government (definiendum) that differs substantively from other forms of government because views of the public rather than an elite form the basis for political decisions (definiens), whereas “procedural democracy” differs from substantive democracy in requiring only that there are constraints upon branches of government so that none are dominant while free and fair elections select officeholders, albeit the will of the people might be ignored. Based on the definition just supplied, any index of “substantive democracy” must determine whether those in office consistently enact legislation supported by a majority of the people as stated in objectively constructed opinion surveys. But no such analysis has ever been done by those claiming that to find the existence of a “democratic peace” (Barkawi and Laffey 1999; Barkawi 2015). Most “democratic peace” researchers have operationalized “procedural democracy,” so Singapore might qualify as a democracy in their databases, yet the island republic is one of the most anti-democratic in substantive if not totalitarian terms (Haas 2014c).

There is a further problem. Creating concepts in a “naturalist” mode assumes that social phenomena can be

studied in a manner similar to the natural sciences, opening the terrain to possible isomorphisms (Bevir and Kedar 2008). Anti-naturalists, however, believe that pinning the same concept from nature onto human phenomena may be a procrustean exercise.

Manipulation of variables without even stating concepts that they operationalize is anti-theoretical. Multimethodological political scientists will first design the conceptual framework with much care and then attempt to select possible indicators for concepts. But the determination of concepts is only one task in designing research.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Whenever scholars seek to test mid-level theory, results are dependent upon the procedures used. Voting behavior studies have been exemplary in design, but the design of "democratic peace" research was flawed from the beginning, with the rest of political science somewhere between. Several elements of research design need improvement:

Normal Distributions

Before using variables in regressions, they should be checked to determine whether they are normally distributed. Skewed variables can be collapsed into normal scales if necessary. Even though some statistical techniques allow dichotomous variables, collapsing a conceptual variable into a dichotomy defeats the goal of testing whether one measure truly varies with another.

Validating Indicators

Many measures of a concept are desirable and possible, but none should be used until their validity is first

demonstrated. Statistical measures can achieve *internal* validity if they are logically constructed from a well-organized conceptual scheme. *External* validity requires determining whether several alternative variables that operationalize the same concept are intercorrelated. Accordingly, multimethodological researchers will ideally select more than one indicator of each concept. If several operationalizations have internal validity but do not covary, then the researcher will have to concede that the concept is multidimensional and must be reconceptualized to reflect the diversity. Polling was inaccurate in the 2015 Brexit and 2016 American presidential elections, evidently because of overreliance on the estimation of "likely voters" out of the full sample of registered voters (Mercer, Deane, and McGeeney 2016).

Reliability Checks

Reliable measures are needed but difficult in noncomputerized content analysis. Several coders are needed to cross-check intercoder reliability. If the author is the sole content analyst, the coding should take place at two intervals of time so that intracoder reliability can be assessed.

For statistical data, various sources can be biased, so more than one data source should be used to represent the same measures. Researchers should also avoid data sources that are ideologically tainted, though most compilations are based on criteria that may not be completely obvious.

Qualitative studies often deal with historical accounts. When the evidence is primarily collected from documents or interviews, the authors may provide self-serving accounts. Additional documents and interviews are needed to determine reliability. Politicians often misstate facts, so a multimethodological researcher must become a fact-checker. The reliability of evidence should always be

questioned. Objectivity is not possible in a single study within the social sciences.

Selection of the Quantitative Technique

Several research methods can cross-check results. Factor analysis and cluster analysis have unique uses but may give differing results. Popularly used, logit analysis is only one form of regression. Experimental research, as in small group behavior research, can yield greater control over variables (Mintz and Geva 1993; Hudson and Butler 2010). Econometric methods and mathematical modeling can provide exact results (Reuveny and Li 2003). But no single research technique should be regarded as definitive. One should be used to check another.

Replication

Yet another problem is that studies purporting to find regularities are rarely retested before results are considered definitive. Flaws in research design are then rarely spotted or corrected. Yet data for replication are not widely available (Key 2016). The most careful effort to correct and retest findings appears in the monumental *New Explorations into International Relations* (2016) by Seung-Whan Choi, who reminds the field that rigor is sometimes more important than regularities. The issue of replication occupied most of the pages of the November 2016 issue of *International Studies Perspectives*.

Cross-Sectional versus Cross-Temporal Research

Currently, most statistical methods in use are cross-sectional, presuming that all variables have an impact at the same time. But most paradigms are cross-temporal. Paradigms assume that one element in a process leads to another. Searching for regularities at one point in time neglects history. Variables are often dumped into a

regression representing different years or time periods, losing the historical context. In multimethodological research, each link in a paradigm needs separate analysis.

SAMPLES AND SUBSAMPLES

Survey research is conducted nowadays through such sophisticated sample designs that experiments are possible, with questions varied to measure subsamples. Statistical studies, however, have often been limited to databases that may have missing data for a subsample of similar countries, thereby tainting findings.

Sampling Bias

Political science as a discipline began in the United States, and for many years, there were more American political scientists than all others combined. Theories developed to account for the peculiarities of the American political system are now being questioned as comparative studies have blossomed during the twenty-first century in Europe and elsewhere. Rather than assuming that area studies are an affront to the universalism sought by many Anglo-European scholars (cf. Berlin 1981; Rengger 2013), paradigms should be tested with diverse samples, taking subsamples into account. One compendium on war (Vasquez 2012), for example, barely mentioned Asia, where more wars were fought during the early part of the Cold War.

What if a subsample contradicts findings of the full sample (known as the fallacy of composition)? The finding that IGOs are more likely to “successful” if composed of democracies in one study was based on 293 cases (Pevehouse and Russett 2006). But the same finding does not apply across Asia, where none of more than seventy IGOs are composed entirely of democracies (Haas 2013); indeed, the most prominent failed organizations were dominated by

democracies (Asian and Pacific Council and South–east Asia Treaty Organization).

Thus, a vast hoard of findings that now seem reasonable to scholars with Anglo-European perspectives will be rejected as parochial in the future as more non-Western scholars publish in the field. Anglo-Europeans thus far have pretended universalization of their knowledge, often by failing to read what is produced about other parts of the world. With the increase in attendance at political science conventions from scholars in Asia, comments on conventional papers should be respected when they observe, “That does not apply to China” or to some other part of the world (cf. Brummer and Hudson 2015). Europe, after all, has half the population of China.

A multimethodological solution is to cross-test results with different subsamples of cases, regions, and time periods (cf. Fettweis 2006, 689). When there are small samples, the researcher has the advantage of in-depth understanding of individual cases so that findings can be assessed at both the general and specific levels. Multimethodological scholars can use a Q-factor analysis of the data in order to determine whether a sample is diverse enough to warrant generalizations (Haas 1994).

Case Studies

If statistical findings yield important results for many cases, then they should also apply in a single case. Indeed, generalizations based on carefully analyzed cases have more empirical grounding than statistical findings based on hundreds of cases. The multimethodological principle is to follow up multicase studies with illustrations for at least one case, and for case studies to inspire multicase statistical approaches. In single-case studies, the role of specific variables can be more clearly observed, and basic assumptions of a paradigm or paradigm-derived propositions can be validated (Gerring 2006).

In multimethodological political science, the same paradigm will be tested both quantitatively and qualitatively. In-depth understanding of how decisions are made, once the hallmark of political science, are now glossed over by those preferring to stare at numbers on home computers rather than go into the field to interview about actual situations. Fewer problems in quantitative analysis, thus, also apply to qualitative studies, which are much closer to the evidence. Frank Harvey and Michael Brecher (2009) have conveniently provided a useful textbook on both methods. Qualitative studies have much in common with anthropological and ethnographic research, which since 2002 has been reviewed in the *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*.

Dyad Samples

Classically, relations in the foreign policies between two countries have considered the context in which they operate. For example, one cannot analyze relations between South and North Korea without also considering relations with China and the United States (cf. Haas 2012a). The use of dyads in statistical analysis, especially "democratic peace" research, ignores the context and often presents artificial conclusions (Cranmer and Desmarais 2016; Poast 2016).

Deviant Case Analysis

Albert Einstein developed a new paradigm by pondering deviant cases in the then dominant paradigm. Within political science, the norm today is to put all sorts of variables and cases into a single regression and then identify which variables intercorrelate at statistically significant levels, serving as refutations or vindications of hypotheses unconnected with paradigms.

The virtue of deviant case analysis is to question whether the original hypotheses need reformulation to account for

outliers. Intensive case analysis, rather than blackboxing decision-making by using statistics, can yield more revealing results (e.g., Farnham 2003). Multimethodological researchers will benefit from deviant cases even more than confirmatory cases in building paradigms—especially cases outside Europe (cf. Acharya 2016; Inayatullah and Blaney 2004).

CAUSAL ANALYSIS

When a research study emerges with a finding that X is related to Y, often the subtext is that X causes Y. But causal analysis is much more complicated (Kurki 2008; Samii 2016). The agent-structure problem (Berger and Luckman 1966; Bourdieu 1979; Giddens 1976, 1984; Unger 2004) is less problematic when causation is diagrammed but still poses a conundrum regarding which way to draw causal arrows. The following are eight alternative renderings of a finding regarding a robust bivariate correlation:

1. *Sufficient relationship* (X → Y). The idea that peace or war can be predicted on the basis of a single variable is naïve.
2. *Necessary but not sufficient relationship* (A+X → Y). Although an improvement over the quest for a single precondition, the possibility that there are several preconditions requires ruling out all over possible factors, a tall order indeed.
3. *Intervening relationship* (X → θ → Y). There is a zero correlation between X and Y if there is an intermediate variable that connects the two. In a paradigm, the intermediate concept is specified, but a multivariate statistical study may not be equipped to do so.
4. *Exogenous relationship* (θ → X and θ → Y). If two variables are related only because they emerge as effects from a common source, then their correlation is spurious.

5. *Probabilistic relationship* (X → Y in a high percentage of cases). Deviant case analysis challenges researchers to develop a more inclusive theory.
6. *Reverse relationship* (Y → X). Two operationalized concepts may have an intercorrelation, but correlation is not causation, and only a time-lagged study can make that determination.
7. *Inverse relationship* (-Y → -Z). A positive correlation also means a correlation between their opposites, but raw statistical analysis cannot determine which is the more powerful direction of causation.
8. *Recursive or simultaneous relationship* (X → Y → X). The chicken-and-egg problem exists in nature as well as with humans.

POLICY RELEVANCE

A problem raised with hypothesis testing by postbehavioralists is the need to provide policy-relevant research. Although in fact the ultimate aim of the founders of political science was to develop research to advise policy-makers, they were cautious when scientific analysis in the field was in its infancy. Today, the problem is that theories lacking solid testing have been applied to policy with disastrous results. Projections from research known as "counterfactuals" can often be too dependent on the theoretical framework selected (King and Zeng 2007).

Empirical researchers need to consider how their research has been construed before trumpeting the findings (cf. Hurrell 2011). According to John Mearsheimer (1994/1995, 46), "policies based on . . . theories that do not accurately describe the world . . . are bound to fail" (ibid., 49). Although his observation is extremely insightful and persuasive, he bases his extraordinarily insightful policy

recommendations on realism, which is an ideology, not an empirical paradigm that has been thoroughly tested.

Perhaps the best example of how ideologically driven research leads to absurd policy is modernization theory. W.W. Rostow (1960) used qualitative historical analysis as the basis for jumping to the conclusion that foreign investment would bring "pre-Newtownian" countries, unaware of how to develop economically, out of their poverty. When applied to Latin America, the result was an intrusion of private sector capital that bought out local businesses, decapitalized the profits, and brought about the Dependency paradigm as an antithesis (Frank 1967, 1969). But the Dependency paradigm was merely a hunch based on a small number of cases. When the Dependency paradigm was applied as a "corrective," the result was even more economic and political turmoil (Ish-Shalom 2006).

The prejudice behind "democratic peace" research was revealed when Bruce Russett and John O'Neal (2001, 272) averred that they would "do what we can today to insure [sic] that the Kantian peace is strengthened when it now operates and spread it to areas still gripped by realpolitik." Policy-makers in the administration of George W. Bush bought the implication that democracies could go to war with nondemocracies in order to turn the latter into democracies, thereby making for a more peaceful world. Ergo, the disastrous invasion of Iraq in 2003 (T. Smith 2007; Ish-Shalom 2013; Barkawi 2015, 828). Although that dangerous implication was predicted (Haas 1995, 1997), one prominent "democratic peace" researcher refused to publish that warning. Then he later claimed surprise when the administration of George W. Bush justified the Iraq War as a crusade for democracy (Russett 2005; cf. Hughes 2013). In multimethodological political science, researchers should consider the paradigmatic, empirical, and policy implications before allowing research implications to

proceed down a dangerous path without scholarly consensus on the wisdom of policy recommendations.

FALLACIES

Apart from syllogistic mistakes, at least seven logical fallacies, some identified above, must be avoided. They have been omnipresent in political science:

1. *Post hoc, ergo propter hoc*. The fact that one event always seems to come before another does not mean that the first causes the second. Causation cannot be perceived and must be inferred, but no single cause can be accepted until all alternative causes are ruled out.
2. *Reification*. That an analytically constructed concept is isomorphic with something in the real world is an assumption that has plagued political science. Thanks to deconstruction and constructive analysis, scholars today are more careful than in times past to avoid reification.
3. *Sectorization*. The assumption that fields of study are watertight compartments is fallacious. The view that ideas and material substances are entirely separate phenomena, and "never the twain shall meet," invaded the social sciences when some believed that economics was assumed to be an entirely different realm from politics. Although that fallacy is now thoroughly discredited, the fallacy lives by default because political science today is divided into many subfields and ideological camps. The corrective is to embrace paradigms that span disciplines as well as specializations and subfields.
4. *Fallacy of composition*. Generalizations based on many cases do not always apply to all cases; subsamples may differ, a common criticism of Eurocentric scholarship. The failure to engage in subsample comparisons and deviant

case analysis serves to question almost all quantitative analysis in the field. The rush to find a law needs to be balanced with case studies and tests involving different subsamples.

5. *Attitudes differ from behavior*. Different research methods must be used in determining something attitudinal from something behavioral; ideas and material substances are not the same. For example, a survey of attitudes might include the self-reported income of respondent as a variable, and income might correlate with a set of attitudes, but proving that a person's income is a cause or an effect of that person's attitudes requires deeper analysis than a mere correlation.
6. *Cross-sections do not explain history*. Variables in a regression from a specific time period for several persons or countries do not permit inferences regarding paths and processes. Cross-temporal studies are needed to validate cross-sectional findings.
7. *Tautologies*. When terms are not defined, there is a danger that results of research will simply prove propositions embedded in the key term. For example, a recent study tried to prove that the existence of civil society institutions in democracies serves to discourage government decisions to launch war (Baum and Potter 2015). Yet procedural democracy is a form of government that supports civil society to check executive officials, so the study proved the obvious.

CONCLUSION

Multimethodological research can save the discipline from appearing amateurish. Research problems should be carefully designed so that several approaches to a research question are adopted. In the future, research questions should flow from existing paradigms so that clear

implications can be drawn. Research should be designed to have definitions of concepts that permit operationalizations in the form of indicator variables. The variables should be checked to determine whether they exhibit normal distributions, are valid indicators, and have been collected with high reliability. The nature of the sample should be taken into account before making universalistic generalizations. Causality needs to be investigated in order to build paradigms with care. Qualitative single case studies should be used to validate multicase statistical studies. History should not be ignored, so cross-temporal analysis is vital. A finding in one study should be replicated in parallel studies. The leap from theory to policy or research findings to policy should be suspect: For that reason, political science consultants about voting behavior are more respected than ideologically driven international relations op-eds.

Suggestions in the present chapter will be taken more seriously when the mindset of political science shifts beyond the “debates” over traditional, behavioral, and postbehavioral approaches. Scholarship does not improve by becoming insular, wedded to a single approach.

Multimethodological political scientists will use different types of evidence, qualitative and quantitative, before claiming that they have definitive findings. Accordingly, the following chapter illustrates how paradigms, even when not recognized by various scholars, can be put to cross-tests. And the final chapter explains how neobehavioral research is the cure to the jigsaw puzzle of contemporary political science.

Chapter 11

CROSS-TESTING PARADIGMS

Perhaps the best glimpse at how paradigmatic research is conducted is to examine the practice of testing whether data fit one or more predictions based on metatheories. Empirical narcissism exists when a study tries to prove that a pet theory is consistent with evidence, ignoring competing paradigms. Paradigmatic empiricism involves testing two or more paradigms on the same body of data to determine which, if any, predict correctly. Alternatively, a study might refute a basic assumption within a paradigm, thereby pointing out a theoretical dead end.

Several examples of cross-testing were identified during the discussion above. A few more are presented in the present chapter to demonstrate that neobehavioral political science has been ongoing, if still in the closet.

MARXIAN PARADIGM VERSUS RATIONAL CHOICE PARADIGM

Johann Rodbertus (1858), who thought that working classes are most likely to rise in protest during economic downturns, was a supporter of the Rational Choice paradigm. Karl Marx's *Capital* (1867) sought to refute Johann Rodbertus by assembling data to prove that most riots occurred in good times, when the gap between incomes of capitalists and

proletarians was most glaring. The Marxian paradigm is vindicated in Ted Gurr's book *Why Men Rebel* (1970), who wrote about race riots during the economic upturn of the 1960s, finding that those who rioted were not necessarily the poorest ghetto residents but instead involved those who perceived "relative deprivation"—a gap between their middle-class incomes and those of the rich (Kaplan and Paige 1968; Fogelson and Hill 1968). But Terry Boswell and William Dixon (1993) supported Rodbertus, based on a sample of sixty-one countries, and in their study inequality washed out as a contributing factor. Hence, the jury is still out on which paradigm is correct.

DECLINE OF THE LEGAL ENGINEERING PARADIGM

Laws are passed to change behaviors and ultimately attitudes about right and wrong. The basic premise of the Legal Engineering paradigm is supported in the analysis of Beth Simmons (2009), who found that human rights progress occurred in countries after they ratified human rights treaties. The thought that goes into signing and ratifying a treaty in concert with other countries is also central to the Socialization and Community Building paradigms.

Advocates of capital punishment argue that such a penalty discourages heinous crimes, serving to reverse engineer the propensity for violence. But there is no definitive study to support or reject the claim (Nagin and Pepper 2012). Similarly, the expectation and experience of incarceration are supposed to deter crime, but recidivism is rampant in some countries more than others (Fazel and Wolf 2015), and rehabilitation varies in effectiveness (Byrne, Pattavina, and Taxman 2015).

Civil rights legislation has served to increase racial integration, but attitudes of prejudice have not been

eradicated. Nevertheless, acceptance of gay marriage shot up after the Supreme Court ruled favorably (McClain 2015).

The Legal Engineering paradigm, in other words, is an area that continues to stimulate research, albeit often with negative findings. But the Legal Engineering paradigm appears to have been superseded by the Socialization paradigm.

LIBERTARIAN SOCIAL DARWINIAN PARADIGM

One claim by libertarian Social Darwinians is that the poor are more likely to rise from their fate if left alone by government; otherwise, welfare payments are alleged to encourage a condition of dependency: Government handouts socialize laziness, they claim. Yet evidence fails to support the allegation (Schneider and Jacoby 2003). Libertarians also support gay marriage, since they eschew government restrictions on private conduct. Acceptance of any ideology influences human behavior, according to the Socialization paradigm. Meanwhile, libertarian thinking continues to inspire politicians (Haas 2012b, ch5).

VOTING PARADIGMS

A major paradigmatic dispute in political science involves voting. Social psychologists launched voting behavior research with the finding that 95 percent of voting preferences were shaped by three socializing influences—religion (Catholic or Protestant), social class, and urban or rural residence (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudel 1944). Their Socialization paradigm was challenged by a Cognitive Deliberation paradigm that depicted voters deciding on the basis of “psychological determinants of voting preferences” (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954, 8–9)—namely, candidate

personalities, issue stands, and party loyalties. But then two political scientists reanalyzed the data used by the social psychologists and drew an opposite conclusion (Janowitz and Miller 1952). Subsequently, other opportunities have been seized for cross-testing, though issues have often been unique in subsequent elections. The tension between the two paradigms remains, keeping voting behavior research a fascinating enterprise to see which paradigm will ultimately prevail.

Meanwhile, both paradigmatic alternatives were questioned as the Voting Rationality paradigm gained favor. Two studies determined that rationality explained the behavior of voters much more than the Cognitive Deliberation paradigm (Shaffer 1972; Popkin, Gorman, Phillips, and Smith 1976), though that interpretation was later disputed (Fiorina 1976; Frohlich, Oppenheimer, Smith, and Young 1978; Bartels 2010; Achen and Bartels 2016; Tyson 2016). The paradigmatic dispute continues.

Meanwhile, ethnic bloc voting has been attributed to the act of constructing minimum winning coalitions among groups, central to the Voting Rationality variant of the Rational Choice paradigm. But two other paradigms present alternatives: The Assimilation paradigm expects that ethnic bloc voting will disappear as immigrant groups conform to the dominant culture, whereas the Integration paradigm expects a decline in ethnic bloc voting when immigrants move from monoethnic enclaves to polyethnic residences in the suburbs. In a study of ethnic bloc voting in Hawai’i, using decades of poll data for the dependent variable of voting choice, each paradigm received support in at least one of five separate tests (Haas 1986). What was crucial was the body of data used in each test. But no macrotheory has yet been constructed to account for all five results.

PRESSURE GROUP PARADIGM VERSUS COMMUNITY BUILDING PARADIGM

When the analysis of pressure groups was first identified as an alternative to the Institutional Power paradigm, most confirmatory studies were single case studies (Munro 1928; Odegaard 1928; Herring 1929; Schattschneider 1935). David Truman (1951), who preferred the term "interest group," championed "disturbance theory," finding in three cases that the formation of one pressure group stimulated others to form in opposition. Robert Salisbury (1969) then proposed an alternative, "entrepreneur theory," that interest groups emerge when someone, such as Ralph Nader, mobilizes resources in the manner of a business entrepreneur—the Mobilization of Dissent variant of the Community Building paradigm. The two paradigms were later cross-tested by Jeffrey Berry (1978), who analyzed eighty-three public interest groups, concluding that Salisbury's theory applied to most cases, though there were some outliers. The Community Building paradigm, in short, prevailed over the Pressure Group variant of the Rational Choice paradigm, though no new macrotheory was constructed to incorporate the deviant cases.

One variant of the Rational Choice paradigm predicts that a field of pressures from interest groups determines what government officials decide. Robert Dahl (1961b) assembled information in *Who Governs?* on pressures applied in three specific decisions made by the New Haven city government, hoping to determine the city's power structure from the relative influence of groups in making decisions, similar to the parallelogram concept of Merle Fainsod (1940). What he found was that a field consisting of different sets of interests applied pressure in each of the three issue-areas, and each interest group ended up with a slice of the pie, achieving "polyarchy." Suspicious of Dahl's thesis, G. William Domhoff (1978) later reviewed the information, cross-checked the same sources, and found that there was very little pluralism and that instead a power elite was running the city with

little regard for the public at large, a cross-test won by the Mass Society paradigm over the Pressure Group paradigm.

The parallelogram concept of Merle Fainsod (1940), which seeks to determine which groups are more effective than others in applying pressure, has been applied qualitatively in at least one case (Marvel 1977). But the explanation why one group might prevail over others would test whether material resources or perceived ethical legitimacy of the pressure accounts for the difference—in other words, the Resource Mobilization paradigm could be cross-tested against the Community Building paradigm.

The key to developing organizations that can pressure elites effectively has long been sought. Within the Resource Mobilization paradigm, network theory postulates that highly structured organizations are more successful, whereas the Cultural Similarity paradigm expects communities with dense interaction (social capital) to be stronger (Halpern 2005). In a cross-test based on nearly two dozen conflict situations, network theory was supported over social capital theory (Scholz, Bernardo, and Kile 2008; cf. Hero 2007). Social capital is a tricky concept, as religious affinity can be stronger than ethnic solidarity.

In one study, the Community Building paradigm could be interpreted as a better explanation of the effectiveness of international NGOs than the Resource Mobilization paradigm (Lebovic and Voeten 2006). Yet stronger democratic countries are more warlike than weaker democracies (Warner and Walker 2011; Meernik 2005; Haas 2014a, Table 5.2).

MASS SOCIETY PARADIGM VERSUS COMMUNITY BUILDING PARADIGM

Although one sociologist discounts the validity of the Mass Society paradigm (Hamilton 2001), political scientists have provided support (e.g., Couto and Guthrie 1999; Rosanvallon

2007). Evidence demonstrates that leaders and the masses have divergent attitudes and interests. In regard to foreign policy, the gap holds for most but not all issues (Page and Barabas 2000).

Basic to the Mass Society paradigm is the agglutinative hypothesis (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950), which predicts that anyone with a high value on one source of influence (say, the basic value of economic wealth) will have high scores on all other values and thereby elites have multiple resources for dominating the masses. Indeed, studies of the power structure in small towns have found qualitative insights to support the hypothesis (Lynd and Lynd 1929, 1937; Warner and Lunt 1941; Hollingshead 1949; Warner 1949), with the wealth of the elites as the base value. In an effort to test for agglutination, one study searched through the Human Relations Area Files to identify those with top holdings in the eight Lasswellian values across forty-nine indigenous cultures (Haas 2014d, ch6). The result was consistent with the agglutinative hypothesis; but rather than finding that the base value was economic or political, the base value turned out to be rectitude (moral prestige). Some cultures operated democratically (under Rousseauian trees) while others did not. In short, the Mass Society paradigm may only operate in large polities, whereas the Community Building paradigm has been touted to apply in smaller communities.

VARIANTS OF THE COMMUNITY BUILDING PARADIGM

For years, there was disagreement within the Community Building paradigm: Functional, Neofunctional, and Social Transaction variants had their followers. One study, based on twenty-two intergovernmental organizations seeking to provide Asia or the Pacific with security community protection against wars, decided to measure key variables from all three types of community building along with

control variables from the Rational Choice and Cultural Similarity paradigms (Haas 2013, ch7). The result was a finding that variables operationalizing all three variants of the Community Building paradigm made independent contributions to the success of security communities. Although Cultural Similarity also explained success, the "culture" was an ethos that developed after most organizations formed and thus not a precondition. The Rational Choice variable, support based on politicoeconomic self-interest, was entirely unrelated. Organizations formed with democratic countries in the leadership failed; most countries in the regions were nondemocracies and had developed a common ethos based on their experience as former colonies of the imperialistic democracies. The finding was yet another rebuke to those committed to the Anglo-Eurocentric "democratic peace" ideology (Pevehouse and Russett 2006).

The Community Building paradigm also prevailed over the Rational Choice paradigm in a study focusing on how to shame countries that are gross violators of human rights. The Community Building paradigm expects that such NGOs as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, because based on voluntary mobilization, will be more effective than IGOs, which are composed of countries that follow the dictates of their own separate national interests, as expected by the Rational Choice paradigm. What has been discovered is that media coverage stimulated by NGO advocacy can slow investment and repression in the countries shamed (cf. Franklin 2008; Murdie and Davis 2012; Barry, Clay, and Flynn 2013; Peksen, Petersen, and Drury 2014). Nevertheless, IGOs also play a positive role (Lebovic and Voeten 2006).

REJECTION OF THE BALANCE-OF-POWER PARADIGM

Realism as an ideology may be unpacked into the concept of Balance-of-Power Rationality, a variant of the Rational Choice paradigm. A fundamental axiom of realism is that advancing military readiness deters war by enabling a country to keep up its guard as other countries improve their coercive capabilities. Yet when that axiom was treated as a proposition, several studies found no supporting evidence (Niou, Ordeshook, and Rose 1989; Niou and Ordeshook 1990; cf. Vasquez 1997; Legro and Moravcsik 1999; Rathbun 2008; Sil and Katzenstein 2010).

Frank Wayman (1985), using statistical data on wars from 1815 to 1965, found that arms races (the failure option in the Deterrence paradigm) are more likely to lead to war than a Balance-of-Power politics of peace through strength. Realists may persist in their beliefs, but they would be more credible if they tested their assumptions.

Three paradigms have been cross-tested to predict war with alliance data (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1986, 1990, 171, 1992). The finding was that the Balance-of-Power and Hegemony variants of the Rational Choice paradigm were less predictive than expected utility measures as predicted by Cost-Benefit variant.

Ideologies clash in their expectations of what is needed to prevent war. One study, identifying twenty-one international subsystems, amassed fifty-three variables from two different data sources to determine which variant of the Rational Choice paradigm was the best predictor—Balance-of-Power (multilateral power configuration), Deterrence (bilateral systems), and Hegemony (unipolarity). Tripolar systems were also included in the analysis as a control. Conducting a smallest-space analysis that would uniquely provide four major clusters, one for each variant and the control variable, the conclusion was the unipolar systems have historically been the most peaceful (Haas 1970). The study demonstrates how scholars lacking ideological bias can disprove ideologists’ strongly held beliefs.

CHALLENGES TO THE SELECTORATE PARADIGM

According to evidence supporting the Selectorate paradigm, leaders have been demonstrated to maintain their tenure in office by providing public goods to maintain legitimacy and private goods to their most critical supporters (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 2001; Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003). But the paradigm seems contradicted in authoritarian developing countries, where demands of a rising middle class for more public goods conflict with the needs of leaders to maintain power by funneling private goods to their most important (corrupt) supporters (Huntington 1968). Since increased economic development creates more capitalist economic interests, which, in turn, hire more and more laborers to keep up production, experience has been that narrowly led regimes fall because there are too many interests to appease. The Pressure Group paradigm suggests that new economic elites will want to overthrow authoritarian rulers while also creating the scenario of the Mass Society paradigm to keep restive workers in check, thereby preventing a truly democratic regime from emerging (Roberts 1999). More exciting research is needed to reconcile rational decision-making of rulers, economic interests, and the masses.

DEVELOPMENT PARADIGMS

Political science has also entertained several competing paradigms to explain how Third World countries can enter the First World. The Classical Economics paradigm may have provided a scenario of how the First World rose, but

development economists tried to find a new paradigm as Third World countries struggled with little success after World War II.

Among the paradigms proposed were the Stages-of-Development paradigm (Rostow 1960), the Diffusion paradigm (Lerner 1958; Levy 1966), and the Dependency paradigm (Frank 1967). Yet the only success story was South Korea, which followed a path of its own, contrary to all the competing paradigms except for the World-System paradigm, which argued that the reason for Seoul's rise was Cold War politics rather than economics (Wallerstein 1976). No cross-testing occurred; instead, the basic assumptions proved false. Then the Human Development paradigm emerged as more humane (Sen 1999b), though systematic testing has yet to begin.

DECISION-MAKING PARADIGMS

One study, based on an analysis of thirty-two domestic and international decision studies, constructed causal models to test the Crisis and Irrationality variants of Decision-Making paradigms with the Cultural Similarity paradigm (Haas 1974, Part II). Results gave an almost perfect fit to the latter—that wars are more likely to avoided when the decision-makers talk to one another (negotiate) even if they experience crisis moods and are not entirely rational in their internal deliberations.

CONCLUSION

Cross-testing is political science at its finest. More examples could be cited. When results are clear cut, with tests supporting one paradigm over another, theoretical progress occurs. Indeterminate results suggest the need for deeper

studies. Anomalies should inspire paradigmatic reformulations and re-testing.

Some scholars pack predictions from every possible paradigm into a single unified theory for predictive purposes (e.g., Merrill and Grofman 1999). But multifactor predictions do not explain the essence of how politics operate: Statistical findings beg the question of what is really going on. Only paradigms provide a deep understanding.

Not every political scientist may accept cross-testing (e.g., Lake 2013, 580), possibly because they prefer their own narrow research agendas. Nevertheless, cross-testing has been occurring throughout political science, though most researchers have been unaware of the paradigmatic significance of their findings. That can now change, as the discipline enters the neobehavioral phase in its development.

Chapter 12

NEOBEHAVIORAL POLITICAL SCIENCE

Today, the field of political science remains divided between ideological pontification, hyperfactual hypothesis testing without operationalized concepts, and case studies with or without policy implications. Others engage in multiple regressions with neither paradigmatic significance nor policy relevance, and even those who solely deal with important policy issues focus on individual cases. All three types of science—theory, research, and policy analysis—are important, but the discipline will be revitalized when they are interlinked.

The discipline of political science is in real trouble when the phenomena to be studied are identified neither as policy problems, empirical puzzles to be solved, nor as theoretical challenges to be developed. Progress in advancing such goals as democracy and human rights can only occur after a problem is identified, concepts are specified and operationalized, and hypotheses are explored empirically, with qualitative case studies to validate results.

Postbehavioralism reigns over behavioralism, having prioritized policy research, yet political scientists are not appearing on television talk shows; their absence during the 2016 presidential campaign is perhaps the most brutal

commentary on the invisibility of the field. The chasm between the approaches signifies a disciplinary crisis, since the field no longer has coherence or even a mission. Stephen Walker (2007) has characterized the problem as "arrested development," but the "jigsaw puzzle" analogy still remains the most apt (Sigelman 2006a). If no new knowledge is worthy of being applied to the real world, lacking an empirical and theoretical foundation, the result will be increasingly boring conventions and papers and real-world political calamities ad infinitum. The solution is for both behavioralists and postbehavioralists to realize that an immature divided discipline needs to grow up and move on to a mature stage. Fortunately, European political scientists are much less divided than American political scientists, and they have had a greater impact on policy (Rothstein 2016).

Among various answers to the current crisis, the most obvious is neobehavioralism, a term first used by Wallace Mendelson (1963) in a comment on an early psychological analysis of judicial behavior with the aim of critiquing behavioralism itself. David Easton (1990) used the term, without providing a definition, when he expressed a hope that political scientists would rediscover the value of broad-gauge theory and move beyond the fragmentation of the discipline that followed postbehavioralism by entering a new "neobehavioral" era. In the first part of a book on foreign policy analysis, Stephen Walker (2011) sought to establish a theoretical foundation for neobehavioralism, by which he meant a framework that would combine several levels of analysis, using game theory and operational code research.

The term "neobehavioral," therefore, needs to be defined. To do so, there is a need to back up historically and define previous eras of behavioralism and postbehavioralism.

Robert Dahl (1961a) proclaimed a victory for behavioral over traditional political science. In so doing, behavioralists were repudiating the policy science that Harold Lasswell (1951b) had been trying to promote for decades. But by the

end of the 1960s, David Easton (1970, 512–3) codified the essence of the *postbehavioral* revolution as a rejection of behavioralism.

By 1990, Easton agreed with the neobehavioral-multimethodological thesis that behavioralism had gotten off track by forgetting that the profession should be relevant to public policy concerns, but he mourned the loss of enthusiasm for developing a truly theoretical science. But what did he mean by "neobehavioral" political science?

NEOBEHAVIORAL CREED

Today, the following definition applies: "Neobehavioral political science interconnects theory, research, and policy." In other words, research should integrate three elements—paradigms (metatheories), empirical research, and policy applications. For any research agenda to be neobehavioral, however modest, all three elements must be explicitly incorporated. Neobehavioralism transcends the behavioralist disdain for policy implications and the postbehavioralist rejection of hypothesis testing—and asks both traditions to pay attention to metatheory or paradigms. Although he does not label himself as a neobehavioralist, Jacek Kugler (2006) stands out in making possibly the most coherent plea for connecting theoretically oriented research with policy—agreeing with Easton.

As a discussant at conventions, presentations that leave out one or two of the three components should be encouraged to further develop their research in order to bring more scholars together. The caste system of three separate domains and even more isolated subfields is unhelpful to progress in political science by frustrating paradigm development, keeping research studies marginal, and avoiding asking important policy questions. The next

generation is eager to move beyond, and neobehavioralism offers them the first exciting challenge in decades.

In contrast with the tenets of behavioralism and postbehavioralism, as itemized in chapter 1, neobehavioralism involves a more intense commitment:

1. rediscovery of the richness of empirical and normative theory found in paradigmatic philosophies that seek an understanding of important phenomena,
2. construction of complex theoretical processes that precede desired and undesired phenomena, based on philosophical and social science theoretical writings.
3. search for empirical regularities only if relevant to theory and policy,
4. abandonment of hypothesis testing unrelated to theory or practical matters,
5. cross-testing of alternative paradigms to deepen (revise) or discard theories,
6. use of case studies to validate generalizations,
7. case study research to provide depth on policy matters,
8. use of multiple methods of research to cross-validate findings,
9. researcher awareness of value premises, guarding against leaping to erroneous ideologically-based conclusions,
10. literature reviews in areas wherein researchers are numerous so as to detect methodological flaws and researcher bias,
11. identification of substantive problems before the application of empirical techniques,
12. selection of policy problems that affect the real needs of humanity,

1
3. continuation of unbiased research so that results are not the result of secret artifacts in the study,
1
4. statements on public policy based on professional unanimity about carefully researched findings,
1
5. increased interaction between researchers working on the same problems in other subfields of political science, and
1
6. increased interdisciplinary research.

Philosophers throughout the ages have sought to understand human behavior, often to prescribe how political life can be ethical. So have social science theorists. If there is a puzzle in reality, such as domestic or international violence, the brute empirical approach has been to correlate such measures as income with levels of violence, from police shootings, terrorist attacks, race riots, military incursions, and wars. But such correlational exercises mean very little unless they test and correct paradigms.

Empirical research should look for theoretical explanations in philosophical and social science speculation, especially sociology, to guide data collection rather than just engaging in hypothesis testing. For those who have a favorite philosopher or social theorist, the components of their view of politics should be unpacked to facilitate testing.

The neobehavioral recommendation to engage in applied (clinical) political science may seem the most problematic, yet foundation funding has often been granted because of policy dilemmas (Anderson 2003). Behavioralists eschewed public policy, seeking to develop “pure science,” thereby provoking postbehavioralists to eschew proposition testing and instead engage in policy-relevant research. In a neobehavioral era, no such dichotomies are sustainable.

Today, concrete solutions to political problems are quite few despite the slanted reliance on ideologies, which are basically action programs (Lawson 2008). Recommendations of the "democratic peace" ideologists to impose democracy (e.g., Rummel 1983a,b; Muravchik 1991; Russett and Oneal 2001, 272; Slaughter and Ikenberry 2006; Traub 2008; McFaul 2010) was carried out to the detriment of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, yet they were made without consensus within the scholarly community.

No single scholar can attempt to engage in all phases of theoretical, empirical, and clinical research. There must be a community of scholars to fill in the gaps.

CONCLUSION

Advocacy of neobehavioral political science is a threat to those locked into the present mini-discourses. Sacred cows will resent what has been discussed earlier in the chapter, and they have their protectors. Gatekeepers of the discipline have grown up in a vocabulary that blurs distinctions that were formerly clear and a conception of the field that is incredibly narrow. But fifty years of mid-level theory, disconnected from paradigms, is enough!

For example, one recent comment on a draft essay by a journal editor from an American scholar was "You use the word 'paradigm' in a way that is more similar to the idea of a mid-range theory . . . ." Obviously, the commentator did not know that Kuhnian paradigms are empirical macrotheories. And two other American scholars, evaluating essays similar to those cited in chapter 11, recently denied that a test of a paradigm was either a test or had theoretical significance.

When the first comment was referred to a recent president of the International Studies Association, he observed, "We, unfortunately, live in a world of declining scholarship and

knowledge . . . .” The field has gone so far astray that metatheoretical inquiry has in effect been reduced to a subfield rather than permeating the discipline. Those who refuse to engage in paradigm testing have all but achieved the Gramscian goal of shredding the past to prevent scholars from reflecting on and advancing the true foundation of the political science profession.

Will empirical paradigms of political science ever be revived? Fifty years ago, that was the direction of the field. Today, when the field has gone astray in many respects, “neobehavioralism” is the answer.

Neobehavioral political science will bring together the profession on behalf of a common enterprise that began centuries ago and has all but been forgotten or wastebasketed. Neobehavioralism combines the best elements of both behavioralism and postbehavioralism with a focus on paradigmatic yet also policy-oriented research. Through a dialog involving paradigms, the discipline can come out of various closets. The profession is long overdue for revitalization—by growing up to become a major professional enterprise, and achieving the destiny sought from the beginning—a democratic, peaceful, promising life for humanity.

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