




Political Parties and Electoral Strategy

The Development of Party
Organization in East Asia

Olli Hellmann



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For Katie

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List of Abbreviations

BCC	Broadcasting Corporation of China
CKP	Creative Korea Party
COMELEC	Commission on Elections
CPC	Communist Party of China
CTV	China Television Company
DJP	Democratic Justice Party
DLP	Democratic Liberal Party
DP	Democratic Party
DPP	Democratic People's Party [South Korea]
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party [Taiwan]
DPP	<i>Dewan Pimpinan Pusat</i> (central executive board) [Indonesia]
GAD	Grand Alliance for Democracy
GDP	Gross domestic product
Gerindra	<i>Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya</i> (Great Indonesia Movement Party)
GNP	Grand National Party
Golkar	<i>Partai Golongan Karya</i> (Party of Functional Groups)
Hanura	<i>Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat</i> (People's Conscience Party)
ICMI	<i>Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia</i> (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals)
KAMPI	<i>Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino</i> (Partner of the Free Filipino)
KBL	<i>Kilusang Bagong Lipunan</i> (New Society Movement)
KCTU	Korean Confederation of Trade Unions
KDLP	Korean Democratic Labour Party
KICAC	Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption
KMT	<i>Kuomintang</i> (Nationalist Party)
LABAN	<i>Lakas ng Bayan</i> (People Power)
<i>Lakas-CMD</i>	<i>Lakas-Christian Muslim Democrats</i>
LAMMP	<i>Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino</i> (Struggle of the Patriotic Filipino Masses)
LDP	<i>Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino</i> (Struggle of Democratic Filipinos)

LFP	Liberty Forward Party
LP	Liberal Party
M/E	Membership/electorate ratio
M/V	Membership/voter ratio
MDP	Millennium Democratic Party
NAMFREL	National Movement for Free Elections
NCNP	National Congress for New Politics
NDRP	New Democratic Republican Party
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NKDP	New Korea Democratic Party
NKP	New Korea Party
NP	<i>Nacionalista</i> Party [Philippines]
NP	New Party [Taiwan]
NPC	Nationalist People's Coalition
NPP	New Progressive Party
NPRP	New Political Reform Party
NPUPP	Non-Party for a Unified People's Party
NUCD	National Union of Christian Democrats
PAN	<i>Partai Amanat Nasional</i> (National Mandate Party)
PBB	<i>Partai Bulan Bintang</i> (Crescent Star Party)
PBR	<i>Partai Bintang Reformasi</i> (Reform Star Party)
PD	<i>Partai Demokrat</i> (Democratic Party)
PDI	<i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Democratic Party)
PDI-P	<i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan</i> (Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle)
PDP	<i>Partido Demokratiko Pilipino</i> (Philippine Democratic Party)
PFP	People First Party
PKB	<i>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa</i> (National Awakening Party)
PKS	<i>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</i> (Prosperous Justice Party)
PMP	<i>Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino</i> (Force of the Filipino Masses)
PP	People's Party
PPD	Party for Peace and Democracy
PPP	<i>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</i> (United Development Party)
PR	proportional representation
PRC	People's Republic of China
RDP	Reunification Democratic Party
SNTV	Single non-transferable vote
TAIP	Taiwan Independence Party

TSU	Taiwan Solidarity Union
UDP	United Democratic Party
ULD	United Liberal Democrats
UMDP	United Muslim Democrats of the Philippines
UNDP	United New Democratic Party
UNIDO	United Nationalist Democratic Organization
UPP	United People's Party

Introduction

There is widespread consensus among experts of democratic transition that political parties play a significant role in the consolidation of democracy (e.g. Pridham, 1990; Sandbrook, 1996; Morlino, 1998). In the established democracies of Western Europe, political parties continue to perform a vital part in the political system – despite some scholars arguing that parties have lost many of their core functions to other organizations of interest representation.¹ Rather than being in decline, political parties are going through a dynamic process of organizational change and adaptation (Bartolini and Mair, 2001). If we distinguish three different elements – or faces – of party organization, it becomes clear that only the ‘party on the ground’ has become less important, while the ‘party in central office’ and particularly the ‘party in public office’ have in fact been strengthened (Mair, 1994; Katz and Mair, 2002; see also Webb, 2002).

Theories of party organization: structure vs. agency

Possibly reflecting the critical importance scholars attach to political parties as institutions in democratic politics, the literature on party organization, as various authors acknowledge (see, e.g., Müller, 1997; Harmel, 2002), is deeply divided over how to explain processes of party formation and change. Ultimately, as van Biezen (2003a: 179) points out, the conflict between the different approaches stems from disagreement over the question of ‘how much structure actually matters and how much room it leaves for parties as active agents’.

Moreover, theories that emphasize structure in order to account for different forms of party organization do not agree on whether to focus on either party internal or party external factors, or on a combination

of the two (van Biezen, 2005; see also Bartolini and Mair, 2001: 328–30). The ‘life cycle’ approach stresses internal factors, arguing that party formation and adaptation is best understood as an endogenous process of maturation that will always unfold in the same way. Probably the most widely cited theory that can be related to the ‘life cycle’ approach is Robert Michels’ well-known ‘iron law of oligarchy’, which claims that all parties that attain a certain degree of complexity will undergo a centralization of power in the hands of a small number of leaders. This is summarized in Michels’ famous dictum: ‘Who says organization, says oligarchy’ (Michels, 1962: 365). In a similar vein, Harmel and Svåsand (1993) argue that the ‘entrepreneurial issues parties’ found in Norway and Denmark all went through the same three phases of organizational progression, with each stage requiring particular types of leadership skills to deal with its special challenges.

Put in more general terms, the ‘life cycle’ approach shows how the type of party organization depends on the stage of the life cycle the party is at. Similar to living organisms, political parties are perceived to go through a process of maturation, with their organizational structures reflecting their current developmental stage. Just as a human being experiences different phases of physical development (baby, child, adolescent, adult), which are all associated with particular changes in the body, a political party is perceived to grow up along a universal path that can be divided into different segments. In other words, all parties on the same stage of development will be characterized by the same type of organization. By making this argument, the ‘life cycle’ approach emphasizes the impact of party internal factors when explaining different forms of party organization. For example, by disintegrating Michels’ iron law of oligarchy into measurable variables several authors have tested the impact of party membership size on intra-party participation and the distribution of power within party organizations (Tan, 1998; Lundell, 2004; Weldon, 2006).

In contrast, the second structuralist approach, the ‘period effect’ approach, gives sole attention to external factors. Based on the premise that political parties compete against each other in democratic elections under the same external circumstances, advocates of the ‘period effect’ approach argue that if a party is going to compete successfully with other parties, it needs to look and act like them. The underlying causal assumption is that under a certain set of contextual circumstances there is always a type of party organization that will yield the best results. Hence, similar to Darwin’s theory of evolution, political parties are perceived as finding themselves in a struggle for survival of the fittest,

adjusting to the environment in order to be as competitive as their opponents. Parties that do not follow the logic of competition will be punished by the electoral market. Although they might not share the same destiny as extinct species such as the dodo bird or the Tasmanian tiger, parties that refuse to adapt to the environment will eventually become politically irrelevant.

In sum, the 'period effect' approach sees different party organizations as a product of their environment. Parties competing under the same conditions are expected to adopt the same organizational features. However, proponents of this approach are still undecided on which context matters most in explaining party organizational structures. One group, nowadays particularly associated with the writings of Katz and Mair (1995), argues that political parties are converging towards a common type of party organization – the 'cartel party' type – since they likewise have to respond to universal trends that are observable in all modern democracies. Others, on the other hand, claim that whether the cartel party emerges depends on various factors at the domestic level (e.g., Young, 1998; Yishai, 2001; Detterbeck, 2005).

The third structuralist approach to party organization, the 'generation effect' approach, combines both internal and external factors. Largely based on the work by Panebianco (1988), the 'generation effect' approach distinguishes between the phase of formation and the subsequent phase of development. Regarding the formation of a party, the organizational configuration of a party is believed to be determined by environmental circumstances. The organization implemented will then empower one party internal faction over others, meaning that this dominant faction will do everything possible to defend the organizational status quo, from which it benefits disproportionately. As a result, the further development of a political party beyond the stage of formation will be heavily constrained by internal dynamics, as the dominant faction will resist organizational change, while other factions, disadvantaged by the organization's rules and regulations, lack the necessary power to overturn the organization by which they are disadvantaged. In other words, party organizations freeze the power relations that existed between actors at the stage of party formation. Thus, different types of party organization can be explained by the party's 'genetic model' – that is, the process whereby the party was formed:

A party's organizational characteristics depend more upon its history, i.e. on how the organization originated and how it consolidated, than upon any other factor. The characteristics of a party's origin

are in fact capable of exerting a weight on its organizational structure even decades later. Every organization bears the mark of its formation, of the crucial political-administrative decisions made by its founders, the decisions which 'molded' the organization. (Panebianco, 1988: 50)

To continue with the analogies from biology, the 'generation effect' approach would argue that the development of a political party is constrained by its genetic pool. Once established, political parties cannot evolve into a different 'species' as their genes will always limit the party's capacity for adaptation and survival.

In stark contrast to these three structuralist approaches, actor-centred theories of party organization stress that it is not environmental conditions or internal dynamics that shape the organizational structures of a party, but the deliberate will of those individuals acting within the party. Broadly speaking, actor-centred theories argue that party change can either be goal-motivated or power-motivated (Harmel and Janda, 1994). Goal-motivated change happens as a response to external 'shocks' (Wilson, 1994; see also Appleton and Ward, 1997). However, unlike the 'period effect' approach, actor-centred theories maintain that such shocks do not automatically trigger organizational changes. Instead, what constitutes a shock will depend on the party leadership's primary goal (Harmel and Janda, 1994: 269–71). Borrowing from the literature on coalition formation (see Budge and Keman, 1990; Strom, 1990; Laver and Schofield, 1998) the voluntarist approach to party organization usually distinguishes four different goals that can be held by the party leadership: (1) votes, (2) office, (3) policy and (4) intra-party democracy. The most obvious shock for vote-maximizers would be electoral failure. Office-maximizers, on the other hand, can receive a shock if external developments jeopardize their participation in government. The most significant shock to policy advocates, who are neither interested in winning votes nor in gaining access to office, would be related to the party's policy positions, while those leaders trying to maximize intra-party democracy would see any major alteration to the party membership as a shock.

Power-motivated organizational change, on the other hand, happens without an external stimulus. Instead, reforms to the party organization follow after a leadership change or a change of the dominant faction. A new leader is likely to alter the organizational structures he inherited from his predecessor for several reasons (Harmel et al., 1995: 5). First of all, different leaders have different abilities and orientations, and will therefore evaluate situations differently. Secondly, leaders will usually

want to leave their mark upon the organization, assuring themselves a visible place in the party's history. Thirdly, organizational reforms are an important strategy to consolidate the newly achieved power. And fourthly, leadership changes are generally destabilizing events. However, the extent to which leadership changes will actually result in party change depends on the extent to which the party is willing to follow the leader. In particular, the likelihood of organizational change is greater if leadership change goes together with a change of the party's dominant faction. At the same time, the emergence of a new dominant faction can itself be a source of significant party organizational change (Harmel and Tan, 2003). As with leadership change, the extent of reform is subject to several intervening factors. To start with, the greater the distance between factions and their organizational preferences, the more extensive the organizational change will be. Second, the ability of the newly dominant faction to fully enforce its organizational preferences rests on whether the change in the internal power distribution has resulted in the complete, rather than just partial, replacement of the dominant coalition. Third, we should expect more radical change if the dominant faction change coincides with a change in party leadership. In other words, 'the *combination* of leadership and factional change [...] creates opportunities for change that are greater than what either event would accomplish alone' (Harmel et al., 1995: 17; emphasis in the original).

To sum up, existing theories of party formation and change emphasize different factors in order to explain differences between party organizations. While the 'life cycle' and the 'period effect' approaches stress the importance of party internal and party external factors respectively, the 'generation effect' approach combines the two, arguing that environmental conditions determine party formation, whereas further development will be constrained by internal dynamics. Agential approaches to party organization, on the other hand, focus their attention on party and faction leaders as the main drivers of political party development. The main argument put forward is that different types of party organization will emerge, as actors organizing these parties differ in their goals and abilities.

Empirical research has not been able to solve the conflict between these different theories, as the evidence is far from clear in suggesting whether internal, external or agential factors matter most to explain different types of party organization. The divide in the literature thus seriously weakens our understanding of political party formation and change, as each of the theories seems to tell only part of the story. As a result, it becomes clear that the strengths of one approach are the weaknesses of another approach, and vice versa (see Table I.1). However,

Table 1.1 Theoretical approaches to party formation and change

	Life cycle	Period effect	Generation effect	Actor-centred
Theoretical claim	Maturation: party organizations are perceived to grow along a common path that can be divided into different organizational stages	Evolution: political parties are perceived to find themselves in a struggle of the fittest, adjusting to the environment in order to be as competitive as their opponents	Gene pool: established as the product of a certain environment, the party organization subsequently only offers a very limited number of possibilities for change	Party organizations are believed to be the outcome of actors' goals, abilities and strategies
Examples of explanatory factors	Organizational complexity (Michels, 1962); membership size (Lundell, 2004)	Technological innovation (Katz and Mair, 1995); political culture (Detterbeck, 2005); polarization of party system (Yishai, 2001)	Genetic process (Panebianco, 1988)	Faction and party leaders (Harmel and Janda, 1994); factions (Harmel and Tan, 2003)
Strengths	Stresses the importance of internal factors	Stresses the importance of external factors	Makes a distinction between the stages of party formation and change, thereby highlighting how party organizations can reproduce themselves over time	Stresses the importance of agential factors
Weaknesses	Neglects external and agential factors	Neglects internal and agential factors	Neglects the environmental changes around a party and agential factors	Neglects structural factors (internal and external)

so far, no attempt has been made to reconcile the different theories of party organization. This contrasts to many other fields within comparative politics, which, driven into theoretical deadlock by similar debates over the relationship between structure and agency, developed analytical frameworks that integrate factors from different levels of analysis, such as the study of democratic transition (Mahoney and Snyder, 1999).

A historical institutionalist perspective on party organization

To help us build a stronger understanding of processes of party formation and change, this book aims to integrate the various factors identified by the different theories of party organization into a more holistic perspective. To do so it will introduce into the current debates on party organization ideas developed by historical institutionalism.² Historical institutionalism is a useful approach by which to enhance our understanding of political party development because it acknowledges the explanatory relevance of all three types of factors found in the party organization literature – internal, external and agential factors. It thus shows that existing theories of party formation and change are not mutually exclusive but, in fact, mutually complementary. That is to say, just because the empirical evidence is often contradictory, there is no need to reject existing theories of party formation and change. Instead, we simply need to open up space for dialogue between them by showing how they can benefit from each other in developing a stronger understanding of party organization, and, on this basis, redefine the relationships between them.

Of all the different neo-institutionalist approaches, historical institutionalism is usually regarded as the only approach able to transcend the structure–agency debate (see, e.g., Koelble, 1995; Hay and Wincott, 1998). This is because historical institutionalism assumes a dialectical relationship between structure and agency: Agents are able to develop different strategic responses to the same structural context, while, at the same time, the structural context is strategically selective, favouring certain strategies over others. Because of the strategic selectivity of the context, actors need to orient themselves towards that context in choosing between potential courses of action. However, ‘while contexts present opportunities to actors, it is the conduct of those actors which determines the extent to which such opportunities are realized’ (Hay, 2002: 165–6). Whether contextual opportunities are realized depends, first, on access to resources such as capital, time

and knowledge. Access to these resources is often unevenly distributed though. Second, in order to act strategically actors must interpret their context. As perceptions of what is feasible, legitimate, possible and desirable will differ between actors, so will actors' responses to their contextual environment. In short, while the strategic selectivity of the context will throw up systematically structured outcomes over time, the outcome of any particular strategic calculation is unpredictable, because it depends on actors' resources and sets of ideas whether they are able to realize the opportunities provided by the context.

Translating these very abstract arguments into the language of the party organization literature, it becomes clear that, in order to transcend the structure–agency divide between the different theories of party formation and change, we should understand party organizations as strategic responses to the context in which political actors find themselves. Given that the defining characteristic of political parties is that they compete in public elections, the relevant context to consider is the electoral market. More precisely, political parties are to be understood as the organizational vehicles for the implementation of politicians' electoral strategies. Electoral markets favour certain electoral strategies over others, which is why we should expect a dominant type of party organization to emerge in a given electoral market. However, politicians who lack the necessary resources for the electoral strategy strategically selected by the electoral market or who interpret their surroundings in such a way that does not allow them to realize the opportunities provided by the electoral market can always develop alternative electoral strategies. This conceptualization of political parties as strategic responses to electoral markets thus brings together external and agential factors identified by the 'period effect' and the actor-centred approaches to party organization, respectively.

Historical institutionalism argues that, once established, institutions work like 'filters', selectively favouring some groups over others (Immergut, 1998: 20). Starting from the basic assumption that 'conflict among rival groups for scarce resources lies at the heart of politics' (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 937), historical institutionalists argue that the rules and norms within an institution will limit the number of ways in which political actors can combine their resources, and thus limit the number of options to resolve political conflict (Krasner, 1984: 228). By acting as a filter – favouring certain actors over others – any institution initially empowers a certain group at the expense of other groups. This is because the advantaged group designed the institution in this way. Moreover, the institution will then continue to disproportionately

distribute resources to this already powerful group, thereby allowing powerful actors to become even more powerful. The advantaged group will use its additional power to defend the originally implemented institutional order – from which it already benefits – against pressure for change from less powerful groups (Mahoney, 2000b: 521–3). In other words, historical institutionalists not only see conflict as a feature of formative periods but also as the underlying mechanism that sustains the institution over time (Peters et al., 2005: 1278). In a similar way to the ‘generation effect’ approach to party organization, historical institutionalism would thus argue that, because the organization’s uneven distributional effects strengthen the dominant faction in defending the status quo, party organizations are able to reproduce themselves despite the absence of external factors responsible for their original establishment. In developing this idea of ‘path dependency’, historical institutionalists believe that ‘history matters’, arguing that ‘the policy choices made when an institution is being formed, or when a policy is being initiated, will have a continuing and largely determinate influence over the policy far into the future’ (Peters, 1999: 61).

However, unlike Panebianco’s ‘generation effect’ approach, historical institutionalism would not consider party internal actors as unable to escape from the party’s historical past. Historical institutionalists argue that institutional change becomes possible if the power distribution between actors shifts significantly. This can happen as a result of external shocks or internal dynamics, for example through splits among institutional power holders. Such ‘critical junctures’ (Collier and Collier, 1991) open up space for agency, giving disadvantaged groups the opportunity to reform the institution in their own interest. Historical institutionalism thus roughly reflects the ideas of goal-motivated and power-motivated party change put forward by actor-centred approaches to party organization. However, more recently, historical institutionalists have moved beyond the concept of critical junctures, developing frameworks that can also accommodate *incremental* change, as opposed to abrupt, radical change. In particular, they have identified a number of strategies disadvantaged groups can follow to bring about change without having to wait for a critical juncture to open up (see Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). In line with historical institutionalism’s dialectical understanding, disadvantaged groups have to direct their change strategies towards the context, which is itself strategically selective.

Translating this again into the language of the party organization literature, we can thus see that to explain why party organizations reproduce and change, historical institutionalism combines different

levels of analysis into a comprehensive whole. To begin with, historical institutionalism acknowledges both the constraining effect of inter-factional conflict highlighted by the 'generation effect' approach and the argument made by actor-centred approaches that change becomes possible after external shocks and new dominant factions taking power. In addition, historical institutionalism equips disadvantaged factions with the strategic skills to deliver organizational change without the need for an external window of opportunity. Nevertheless, disadvantaged factions still need to take into consideration the opportunities and constraints offered by the external context when choosing their change strategies. In short, historical institutionalism sees party reproduction and change as a product of all three types of factors found in the party organization literature: internal dynamics, external structures and agential deliberation.

Reading the literature on party organization through the lens of historical institutionalism therefore shows that existing theories of party formation and change are not mutually exclusive. If we adopt a dialectical understanding of the relationship between structure and agency, as suggested by historical institutionalism, it becomes clear that existing theories of party organization are indeed highly complementary, as the strength of one approach can complement the weakness of other approaches, and vice versa. We can thus greatly strengthen our understanding of party formation and change if we redefine the relationships between existing theories of party organization using the meta-theoretical framework of historical institutionalism as the binding matrix. This is precisely the aim of this book.

In order to accommodate actors' ability to act strategically within a context that is itself strategically selective, the book will, first of all, develop a conceptualization of political parties as strategic responses to electoral markets. This original conceptualization will combine the three faces of party organization put forward by Katz and Mair (1995; see also Mair, 1994) with Kitschelt's strategies of party linkage (Kitschelt, 1995, 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007), using historical institutionalism as the 'glue'. Politicians, it will be argued, organize political parties as vehicles to implement their electoral strategies. Depending on their electoral strategy, they will push for a particular power distribution between the three faces of party organization. However, politicians do not choose their electoral strategies in a vacuum but within an electoral market that militates against some strategies, while facilitating others.

Secondly, because actors with different electoral strategies can also co-exist within the same party, the book will make the case that political

parties are best understood not as unitary monoliths but as ongoing power conflicts between strategically behaving individuals and factions. Once established, party organizations necessarily favour some internal actors over others, with advantaged groups working to defend the status quo against disadvantaged groups. By introducing into the debates on party change ideas developed by historical institutionalism more recently, this book will argue that organizational change becomes possible not only when external shocks disrupt the party internal power distribution, but also as disadvantaged groups proactively develop strategies to bring about change through gradual and incremental steps.

Case selection and research design

This book will apply this historical institutionalist perspective to study the development of political parties in the new democracies of East Asia.³ While there are numerous works analysing political parties in ‘third wave’ democracies in Eastern Europe (e.g., Kopecký, 1995; Lewis, 2000; Kostelecký, 2002), Southern Europe (e.g., Ignazi and Ysmal, 1998; Diamandouros and Gunther, 2001; Bosco and Morlino, 2006) and Latin America (e.g., Dix, 1992; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Levitsky, 2003) – and even studies comparing parties across regions (e.g., van Biezen, 2003b) – East Asian parties have so far been widely ignored by political party research.⁴ In expressing his difficulties in writing a review of political party theories that have been informed by empirical evidence from Asia, Hicken (2008: 80) aptly summarizes the state of affairs in the literature on Asian political parties:

When I was first asked to write this chapter I immediately sat down with a pen and paper and tried to list all Southeast Asia-focused works that have had a major impact on the study of political parties and elections in political science generally. The list was depressingly short. With a few important exceptions, very little work on South-east Asian parties and elections turns up on reference or reading lists outside of regionally-focused materials.

Although the literature on political parties in East Asia includes some outstanding pieces of scholarship, most of these are ‘thick descriptions’ of single parties or single countries that do not contribute to broader debates in the field of political party research. Admittedly, distinct from the regions that have so far been the analytical focus of political party research, East Asia only describes geographical borders,

not a common cultural and historical heritage. Nevertheless, the great heterogeneity across East Asian societies has not prevented political scientists from treating East Asia as a single region in comparative studies of democratization and democratic consolidation (see, e.g., Laothamatas, 1997; Hsieh and Newman, 2002; Cheng, 2003; Croissant, 2004). In other words, there is no reason to dismiss a comparison of East Asian political parties as not feasible. Rather, a systematic analysis of political parties in the new democracies of East Asia is long overdue.

The Marcos regime on the Philippines was the first to be washed away by the 'third wave' of democratization in February 1986. Subsequently, democracy was also installed in Taiwan (1986–92), South Korea (1987/88), Thailand (1992), Cambodia (1993), Indonesia (1999) and, most recently, East Timor (2002). However, the democratic system installed in Cambodia by the United Nations only lasted for a single national election, while Thailand, too, reverted to more authoritarian forms of government after a military coup in September 2006. In addition to these countries, the book will also exclude East Timor, since the young nation has had to rely on military assistance from other countries in order to keep peace during election times, which creates an electoral context very different from other 'third wave' democracies in East Asia.

This leaves four new democracies in East Asia: South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia. The empirical analysis will cover a time frame from the first free elections until the end of 2008. Therefore, the Philippines, which was delisted as an 'electoral democracy' by Freedom House in 2008 as a result of serious, high-level corruption allegations, the pardon of former president Joseph Estrada and a spike in political killings in the run-up to legislative elections (Freedom House, 2008), will still be included in the book.

The book will only consider political parties that have competed in the two latest elections and obtained at least 3 per cent of the votes in the most recent election.⁵ This cut-off point results in a total of 16 cases (see Table I.2). Choosing parties according to their electoral success and their age does not violate the rule against selecting cases on the dependent variable (see Geddes, 1990). Instead, it is an attempt to keep the number of cases manageable and select cases where party organizational change is actually *possible*. By doing so, we follow another crucial guideline of case selection, which emphasizes that irrelevant cases where the outcome has no real possibility of occurring should not be considered (Mahoney and Goertz, 2004). In other words, we should not include parties in the analysis that are simply too young to have experienced organizational change. Empirical data regarding the organization

Table I.2 Case selection

Country	Political party
South Korea	Grand National Party (GNP) United Democratic Party (UDP) ^a Korean Democratic Labour Party (KDLP)
Taiwan	Nationalist Party (KMT) Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
The Philippines	Liberal Party (LP) <i>Nacionalista</i> Party (NP) ^b Struggle of Democratic Filipinos (LDP) Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) Filipino <i>Lakas</i> -Christian Muslim Democrats (<i>Lakas</i> -CMD)
Indonesia	Party of Functional Groups (Golkar) Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P) National Awakening Party (PKB) United Development Party (PPP) Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) ^c National Mandate Party (PAN)

^a As of 2008, the UDP had only participated in one election. However, there was considerable personal continuity between the UDP and the party that had preceded it, the *Uri* Party, which is why it will be included in the analysis.

^b For the 2004 election, the *Nacionalista* Party joined President Arroyo's K-4 coalition and therefore no separate election results were reported for the party. However, as the NP still competed in the election, it fulfils the criteria of case selection.

^c The PKS participated in the first free elections in 1999 under the name Justice Party, but then had to change its name purely for legal reasons.

of the parties selected was gathered through rigorous systematic field-work between April and July 2008, interviewing political party officials and studying official party documents.

Within the wider historical institutionalist perspective the book will make certain assumptions regarding the relevant variables that constitute the electoral market. By comparing these variables across the four different countries we will look for 'patterns of constant association' (Ragin, 1987: 42) between the electoral market and the dominant type of party organization to emerge within each of the countries. Although acknowledging the intentionality of agency, the strategic selectivity of the context – in combination with learning effects on agents – will throw up certain regularities over time, which will enable us to systematically compare electoral markets and generalize about their strategic contours. In other words, the context will strategically select an electoral strategy, which will allow us to formulate and then test hypotheses

as to which type of party organization to expect as the dominant type within a given electoral market.

Through methods of within-case analysis (see Mahoney, 2000a, 2003), most notably process tracing and causal narrative, we will then explore how conflict over the best electoral strategy *within* political parties constrains the further organizational development of the party. In order to do so it will be necessary to identify the relevant party internal actors and their electoral strategies, describe them as either status quo or change agents and investigate how the latter choose their strategies to bring about organizational change within a context that favours certain strategies over others.

Before commencing the analysis, however, it needs to be said that the book does not aim to prove that there exists a dialectical relationship between structure and agency, as maintained by historical institutionalism. In fact, such a conclusion would never be valid, because 'ontological differences cannot be resolved or adjudicated empirically – since no interpretation of the evidence is itself ontologically innocent' (Hay, 2009: 262). Rather, the book only makes reference to the structure–agency debate in order to demonstrate why the existing literature is deeply divided over how to explain different types of party organization, and to develop solutions as to how this division can be overcome.

Structure and aim of the book

To sum up, the book intends to provide a historical institutionalist perspective on political party formation and change, to demonstrate that existing theories of party organization are not mutually exclusive but can be integrated into a single narrative. This will help us enhance our understanding of political party development, since, at the moment, the various theories only tell part of the story, without realizing their complementarity. The different factors identified by the literature as having an impact on party organization – internal, external and agential factors – become part of the same story if we adopt a dialectical understanding of the relationship between structure and agency, and acknowledge that agents direct their strategic actions towards both the institutions in which they compete against other actors and the wider external environment in which these institutions are embedded. In short, the book aims to highlight the value of historical institutionalism as a way out of the current theoretical deadlock.

In order to accommodate actors' ability to act strategically, the book will conceptualize political parties as strategic responses to electoral markets. Politicians, it will be argued, can develop different strategies to mobilize voters within a given electoral market, with each strategy requiring a different type of party organization for its implementation. Electoral markets are themselves strategically selective, meaning that they will favour certain strategies of voter mobilization over others. This means that we can make certain predictions about the type of party organization likely to emerge as the dominant type within a particular electoral market. Given that we are exploring political party development in the recently democratized societies of East Asia, the book will thus formulate a number of hypotheses about which variables constitute the strategic contours of electoral markets in *new* democracies. These hypotheses will necessarily be limited to new democracies only, because the 'third wave' of democracy provides a very different context for party formation than earlier waves of democratization.⁶

Moreover, the book will argue that, because politicians can develop different electoral strategies within the same context, conflict between different electoral strategies can also emerge *within* the same party. The party organization will thus favour certain party internal actors over others, because the advantaged actors designed the organization in this way. However, party change becomes possible if significant disruptions in the party internal distribution of power open up critical junctures that provide disadvantaged actors with the opportunity to redesign the organization in their interests. In addition, disadvantaged actors can follow different strategies to achieve incremental change. That is to say, actors' ability to act strategically does not only show in *inter*-party conflict but also in *intra*-party conflict.

This book will then apply these two conceptualizations of political parties – (1) as strategic responses to electoral markets and (2) as ongoing power struggles – to analyse party systems in the 'third wave' democracies of East Asia – a geographical region so far largely ignored by political party research. The book thus provides a rare systematic-comparative analysis of East Asian political parties, hoping that this will encourage scholars specializing in political parties in East Asia to contribute to more general debates in the field of electoral politics and party systems. In fact, the book will conclude with potential opportunities to do so.

In order to achieve these objectives, the book will be structured in six chapters. The first chapter will integrate the three factors identified by existing theories of party organization as having a causal effect on party formation and change – internal dynamics, external structures

and agential deliberation – into a single narrative. It will do so by conceptualizing political parties as strategic responses to electoral markets and ongoing power conflicts. These two conceptualizations will then be applied to analyse political party formation and change in the newer democracies of East Asia (South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia). In each of the four country chapters we will outline the structure of the post-autocratic electoral market, discuss how political actors develop different electoral strategies within this market and demonstrate how these strategies translate into party organization. Moreover, within each of the parties we will identify status quo and change agents, and look into the latter's strategies to bring about organizational change. The conclusion, finally, will evaluate whether historical institutionalism was able to provide a coherent narrative of political party development in East Asia and suggest some directions for future research – for both scholars working on political parties in general and specialists of East Asian politics.

1

Explaining Party Organization: Actors, Conflict, Context

This chapter will develop two new conceptualizations of political parties: as strategic responses to electoral markets that are themselves strategically selective and – acknowledging actors' ability to develop different strategic responses to the same context – as ongoing power struggles between internal factions following different electoral strategies. Through these two new conceptualizations it will become obvious that the three types of factors identified by the various theories of party organization – internal, external and agential factors – can be combined into a single narrative of party formation and party change.

Politicians and their electoral strategies

In line with one of the central assumptions of historical institutionalism – that actors can develop alternative strategic responses to the same contextual opportunities – politicians should be equipped with the ability to act strategically. The relevant strategies to consider when trying to account for party organizations are strategies relating to the electoral market. This follows from Sartori's influential definition of political parties, which identifies the participation in elections for public office as the defining property of parties, vis-à-vis other voluntary organizations:

A party is any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or nonfree), candidates for public office. (Sartori, 1976: 63)

This is to say, actors do not form a political party for the sake of establishing an organization. Rather, the party is primarily a vehicle to participate in public elections. As a result, the organization of the party is not

based on a separate organizational strategy, but will always be closely linked to the actors' electoral strategy. In other words, party organizations are vehicles to implement electoral strategies. Certainly, there are cases of political parties that have primary goals other than taking part in elections. However, these are exceptional cases, which means that the assumptions made in this chapter apply to the vast majority of political parties in the real world.

At the most fundamental level, we can distinguish two different strategies available to politicians to mobilize voters and link their respective party to the electorate: (1) programmatic principles or (2) clientelistic exchange circuits (Kitschelt, 2000).¹ Both of these linkage mechanisms are based on exchange relations between politicians and voters, who trade material incentives for political support. However, they differ in terms of the procedure these exchange relations adopt, as clientelism describes *direct* exchange relations, compared to *indirect* exchange relations. This property is captured by the classical definition of clientelism offered by Lemarchand and Legg (1972: 151–2):

Political clientelism [...] may be viewed as a more or less personalized, affective, and reciprocal relationship between actors, or sets of actors, commanding unequal resources and involving mutually beneficial transactions that have political ramifications beyond the immediate sphere of dyadic relationships.

While it has rightfully been pointed out that the patron in a clientelistic relationship can also be the party organization, rather than any individual within it (Hopkin, 2006: 409), the first question to ask in order to establish whether there is a direct exchange relation between the party/politician and the voters is: What type of good is being exchanged for votes (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007: 10–11)? If voters receive *private goods* in return for their support, this denotes a clientelistic relationship. Private goods are material benefits that are transferred only to the individual voter, such as money or other gifts, employment (both private or public)² or direct services (e.g., help with the authorities or health treatment).³ In contrast, if political parties or politicians promise to distribute *public goods* – goods that are desired by everyone in society and from whose enjoyment no one can be excluded (e.g., economic growth or a clean environment) – this constitutes proof of a programmatic electoral strategy.

However, distinguishing between clientelistic and programmatic strategies becomes more difficult when politicians campaign on the

allocation of *club goods*, which provide benefits for subsets of citizens and impose costs on other subsets. We are witnessing the distribution of club goods when citizens that are members of the particular group to which these benefits are allocated (e.g., the unemployed, war veterans or a certain geographical constituency) cannot be excluded from enjoying the materials, while citizens outside the group's boundaries can. In order to make a distinction possible between clientelistic and programmatic strategies under such circumstances, we should define clientelism as 'a selective distribution of benefits which is *not* justified in universalistic terms, that is, in terms of some recognizable ideology' (Hopkin, 2001: 117; emphasis added). In other words, club goods are allocated through programmatic strategies if this happens through 'the universalist legal codification of citizens' entitlements and obligations' (Kitschelt, 2000: 852). In contrast, if formal rules of entitlement are deliberately vague and ambiguous, this signals the existence of clientelistic links between politicians and voters.

We have thus so far distinguished three ways in which politicians and parties can mobilize votes – clientelism and two programmatic strategies, using either ideological platforms specifying the allocation of club goods or catch-all programmes promising the delivery of public goods. While these three strategies are based on the exchange of material resources for political support, we can identify further strategies based on alternative mechanisms. First of all, political actors may choose to distribute material goods only to elites – not to voters. The strategy is thus clientelistic in nature but the patron–client networks do not extend into the larger electorate. For instance, in many newer democracies of sub-Saharan Africa, political parties forge clientelistic relationships with traditional elites linked with ethnic communities, hoping that this will allow the party to make a credible claim to represent this particular segment of the population (van de Walle, 2003). Another example of this type of clientelistic strategy can be found in many post-Soviet polities, where political actors maintain personal clientelistic relationships with elite bureaucrats in the state, giving them privileged access to public resources (such as political finance and media coverage) and allowing them to bend the rules of the electoral game in their own favour (Gel'man, 2004). In a similar way to the African example, under such circumstances linkages between the politician and the voter are often made on ethnic grounds, however, using nationalist slogans appealing to the majority population, rather than targeting ethnic minorities.

Two further electoral strategies that do not distribute material incentives to voters in return for electoral support are charisma and coercion.

Charisma, in the classical Weberian sense, refers to ‘supernatural, super-human, or at least specifically exceptional powers and authorities’ (Weber, 1964: 358), meaning that politicians can mobilize votes simply through their personal skills and powers of persuasion. One particular variant of charisma is populism, where the charismatic leader claims that he embodies the popular will of ‘the people’ in their struggle against the corrupt elite (Hawkins, 2003).⁴ Electoral strategies are coercive when politicians make use of violence and intimidation in order to achieve electoral success. However, both these electoral strategies should only be considered secondary strategies: whereas charisma clearly has natural limits, suggesting that only a very small number of politicians can rely on charisma alone, the use of violence is very cost-intensive and carries great personal risk.

Having identified the principal strategies of voter mobilization, it is important to point out that these are *ideal types*. In the real world, actors are very likely to follow a mix of different strategies. However, it is usually possible to ascertain a dominant strategy in actors’ strategic sets, which can then be used to label these actors for analytical purposes.

Electoral markets in new democracies

Actors do not choose their electoral strategies in a vacuum, but, as historical institutionalism teaches us, the context around actors is itself strategically selective, meaning that it will favour certain strategies over others. In other words, when choosing between potential courses of action, actors will have to take into consideration the environment in which their strategy is to be realized. As social agents are knowledgeable and able to enhance their understanding of the context around them – and the constraints and opportunities this context imposes – their intentional conduct will produce systemically structured outcomes. In other words, we will not see a confusing array of strategies, but the context will select a certain outcome, thereby – in combination with the learning effect on agents – causing certain regularities to emerge over time.

However – and this is a very important point – although the outcome is strategically selected for, it is by no means inevitable. This is because, first of all, in order to realize the opportunities inherent in a particular environmental context, access to strategic resources is crucial. That is to say, although contextual factors facilitate the strategies of actors with access to these particular resources over the expense of those without access, the latter can develop alternative strategies – requiring different sets of resources – to deal with the problems posed to them by the

context. Secondly, in order to act strategically actors must interpret the context. As interpretations of the environment can vary between actors, actors' strategic responses will accordingly differ. In short, we can make certain predictions about the most likely outcome, but actors are always able to develop strategies that will deviate from this strategically selected outcome – either because they have access to different sets of resources or hold different sets of ideas through which they interpret the context.

Keeping these basic theoretical propositions in mind, the first thing to note about newer democracies, as a context for the formation and adaptation of political parties, is that they are strategically selective towards clientelism and catch-all programmatic appeals. The reasons for this lie in the sequence of democratization in the 'third wave', which has been very different from earlier waves of democratization. First of all, unlike in Europe, processes of national unification and industrial development did not precede political mobilization, nor have these processes necessarily been realized since (Randall, 2001). Consequently, electoral strategies aiming to mobilize clearly defined social groups through the programmatic distribution of club goods are likely to be unsuccessful, as social group identities will not translate into voting behaviour. Secondly, while the 'first wave' of democratization is best described as a gradual process, the democratic transitions in the 'third wave' have been relatively sudden, and have not left political parties enough time to formulate clear programmatic platforms and develop close ties to specific voter clienteles. However, time resources are less scarce for parties that have historical roots in an earlier democratic party system and were able to survive the autocratic regime as an underground resistance movement. That is to say, for these parties opportunities for the development of a programmatic club-goods strategy are much more accessible than for other parties (see van Biezen, 1998).

While the context in newer democracies thus generally militates against programmatic club-goods strategies, we need to look at structural factors at the polity level to decide whether the specific environment favours clientelistic or catch-all strategies. Contextual environments that are strategically selective towards clientelism are those characterized by a high level of poverty. The most convincing explanation as to why the poor are an effective target for clientelistic practices refers to income inequality as the causal mechanism (Robinson and Verdier, 2002; Brusco et al., 2004). A context of low socio-economic development favours clientelistic strategies over programmatic strategies, it is argued, because voters are likely to accept low-value rewards in return for their electoral support, while the upper class, paying for both

these rewards and the maintenance of the monitoring system, will only have to invest a small share of their own resources.⁵

Economic development, on the other hand, will make clientelistic transfers more expensive, as they will have to be paid for by a growing upper middle class, and will increasingly have to be targeted at a lower middle class. That is to say, payments will become more and more expensive to politicians. As a result, under conditions of high socio-economic development, the best strategy for political parties is to withhold the reward from the voter. Knowing that the party, even if it wins, is likely not to reward voters, voters are always better off defecting. Thus, viewed from a game theoretical perspective, establishing a clientelistic network in a relatively developed society is very difficult, because the initial game is very likely to result in one of the two sides defecting (Stokes, 2007).

However, this does not mean that, in a context of higher economic development, programmatic catch-all strategies targeted specifically at the growing middle class become the strategically selected outcome. In fact, if clientelism is established as a repeated game, it can be strategically selected even in higher developed societies. This is because reproducing the clientelistic exchange relationship over time will assure both sides that the respective other side will comply with the agreement. Put differently, if the dyadic relationship between the politician and the voter becomes institutionalized over time, this will help solve the prisoner's dilemma.⁶

More specifically, in newer democracies the environmental context will favour clientelism as a strategy of voter mobilization if the former autocratic regime used clientelistic means to gain electoral support from the population.⁷ Alternatively, if the regime did not hold elections, clientelism might have been an important mechanism in integrating the country's social elite into the autocratic power structure, which, as was outlined above, can also be employed as a strategy to mobilize voters in post-autocratic elections.

However, it will also depend on the type of democratic transition as to whether the clientelistic networks will be able to survive the end of autocratic rule (Kitschelt, 1995). In other words, when describing the context around parties in new democracies we need to ask two questions: (1) Who held power under the autocratic regime and (2) did these actors use clientelism to legitimize their power by distributing material goods to either the population or the country's elite? If the answer to the second question is 'yes', we then need to ask whether these actors were able to maintain their positions of power through the democratic

transformation of the political system, or whether the transition was triggered and controlled by the pro-democratic opposition from below, leading to a total ‘replacement’ (Huntington, 1991) of the regime. If elements of the autocratic regime were able to maintain their positions of power, we should expect them to use their access to state resources to sustain their patron networks and use them to mobilize voters in the newly introduced democratic elections.

The relevant contextual environment in which to make predictions about the electoral strategies to emerge in new democracies is summarized in Figure 1.1. However, it must again be noted that these are only *strategically selected* outcomes and that actors can always develop alternative strategic responses to the environmental context. In particular, we should not rule out the possibility of actors developing programmatic club-goods appeals targeted at clearly defined social groups – a strategic option that we would theoretically not expect in new democracies of the ‘third wave’.

Those actors that are able to realize the opportunities provided by the electoral market will try to design electoral institutions that further increase the context’s strategic selectivity towards their own electoral strategy – most importantly, the electoral system and laws on political funding. Electoral systems that facilitate clientelistic strategies of voter mobilization are those with smaller district sizes (Birch, 2007) and those that encourage competition between candidates of the same party (Hicken, 2007): while in single-member constituencies the number of votes that needs to be bought or altered (through electoral fraud) is




Figure 1.1 Electoral strategies – strategically selected outcomes in new democracies

smaller than in multi-member constituencies, intra-party competition creates strong incentives for candidates to cultivate a personal vote, with one way being to set up clientelistic networks. Moreover, the utility of clientelism also depends on the effectiveness and enforcement of laws that could punish the illegal aspects of clientelism, such as vote-buying or bribing election officials. This means that if clientelistic actors are in control of the transition process we should expect them to adopt single-member electoral districts or an electoral system that allows voters to select from among candidates within the same party. Conversely, programmatic actors should theoretically prefer larger constituencies and ballots that create incentives for candidates to follow party-oriented campaign strategies. In addition, they should be interested in a strong autonomous body to monitor the legality of campaigns and elections.

The organizational requirements of electoral strategy

Based on their particular electoral strategies, party internal actors will hold different preferences as to the organization of the party, since different electoral strategies demand different organizational structures for their implementation. At the most basic level, actors need to decide whether to implement formal regulations for conflict resolution. Politicians following a clientelistic strategy of voter mobilization will resist such a step because clientelism is built around particularistic relationships between individuals. Under these circumstances, collective decision-making mechanisms become unnecessary, and conflict will rather be resolved through the allocation of resources:

Because [clientelism] relies on material incentives and self-interest, it undermines the very essence of the organization using it: the political party [...] With self-interest as the link between voter and the party, and between politician and the party, sacrifices for the collective good of the party are unlikely to occur [...] [Clientelism] prevents collective decision-making by the voters and by the party. (Warner, 1997: 535)

Consequently, the formal party organization will be without a real purpose, instead acting only as a formal cloak around the clientelistic networks. There is no need to invest in the formal organization, as all functions usually attributed to political parties, such as the recruitment of candidates or the mobilization of supporters, can be performed by

the clientelistic machine. For the formal party organization this means that, similar to the classical 'cadre party' (Duverger, 1964), the different elements of party organization identified by Katz and Mair (1995; see also Mair, 1994) – the party on the ground, the party central office and the party in public office – will not emerge.

Electoral strategies relying on charisma or coercion have the same effect on party organization. As with clientelism, they do not require large investments into the political party as a formal institution. In the case of charisma, decision-making authority will flow naturally from the leader's personality (Panebianco, 1988), while parties following a coercive electoral strategy will only have to invest in an informal militant group.

Politicians following a programmatic strategy, on the other hand, will necessarily have to invest in the political party as an arena for collective decision-making and conflict resolution between diverse interests. This imperative follows from the fact that

the party must speak with a more or less single collective voice in order to create a measure of confidence among voters that it will pursue the policy objectives after elections it has announced before an election. (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007: 9)

However, how parties organize collective decision-making will depend on whether their programmatic strategy targets clearly definable social groups through the distribution of club goods or whether it is rather a catch-all strategy. If politicians aim to mobilize a distinct electoral clientele, they will assign a high value to constituency representation, and develop a policy platform that clearly reflects the interests of this constituency and specifies their entitlements to club goods. Consequently, ideological consistency and conformity are important keys to achieve the party's goal, which is why politicians following a narrow programmatic strategy of voter mobilization should be interested in strengthening the *party central office* in order to increase discipline among the representatives in public office.

If, on the other hand, politicians aim to appeal to the wider electorate, they should be interested in a powerful *party in public office*, because the parties' elected officials will need considerable freedom of action to prove themselves as managers of the public good. Hence, as in the case of electoral strategies targeting well-defined social groups, there is still a need for formal mechanisms of collective decision-making in order to articulate policy objectives, but these policy objectives will

be formulated in very general terms, making it necessary to take more concrete political decisions in parliament on an everyday basis.

The third organizational face, the *party on the ground*, can never be the most powerful organizational element within a political party, since it faces a collective action problem. As the historical example of the European 'mass party' (Duverger, 1964) shows,⁸ the strongest position the party on the ground can achieve is a symbiotic relationship with the party central office (Katz and Mair, 1995). Nevertheless, the party on the ground can be stronger or weaker, thereby influencing the overall distribution of power within the party.

There is thus a strong link between electoral strategy and party organizational design, which allows us to make certain predictions regarding the dominant type of party organization to emerge in a new democracy (see Figure 1.2). As electoral markets in young democracies will favour either clientelistic or catch-all electoral strategies, we should expect either parties without formal organizational faces or parties with the party central office as the dominant element as the strategically selected outcome. However, it needs to be noted that actors following a catch-all




Figure 1.2 Party organization – strategically selected outcomes in new democracies

electoral strategy may not be able to establish the party in public office as the dominant face. This is because, in new democracies, environmental uncertainty for political parties can be very high, given that voter loyalties are often only weakly developed, which reflects in high levels of party system fragmentation and electoral volatility (Mainwaring, 1998).⁹ Moreover, loyalties also tend to be underdeveloped *within* parties, leading to frequent inter-party conflicts (van Biezen, 2003b: 216). These conflicts are particularly damaging when they affect the stability of government coalitions, thereby jeopardizing parties' capacity to influence public policy outcomes. Therefore, under conditions of high environmental uncertainty, actors following a catch-all strategy might find it necessary to strengthen the party central office in order to increase party discipline.¹⁰

The question that remains to be answered is how to measure the power distribution between the three faces of party organization. In order to determine the power of the party on the ground we can look at the obligations and privileges that members have been assigned by the party (Heidar, 2006: 301). The formal obligations attached to party membership tell us a lot about the type of members the party is looking to attract. Scarrow (1994: 51) distinguishes five different forms of activities for party members: (1) statistic, (2) donor, (3) ideas, (4) volunteer and (5) candidate. It is reasonable to claim that the party on the ground will be weakest, if party members are only perceived as statistics. It will be more powerful if party members are recruited as important providers of money, ideas and free labour. Finally, the party on the ground will be strongest if, in addition, it is also perceived as a pool of potential candidates for public elections.

The party in central office can, in very simple terms, be described as the national headquarters of the party and consists of two different groups: (1) the party leadership and (2) the party bureaucracy (Katz, 2002: 98). It thus distinguishes itself from the party in public office, which encompasses those party members that hold office as members of parliament or cabinet ministers. In order to measure the power of these two organizational faces we can, first of all, look at how the party selects its candidates for public election (Katz, 2001). Given that competing in elections is usually the most important motivation for establishing a political party, the selection of candidates inevitably becomes one of the central objects of party internal power struggles (Gallagher, 1988). In order to operationalize candidate selection, scholars have in the past paid particular attention to the inclusiveness of the selectorate – that is, the group that is entitled to nominate the party's candidates. The

selectorate can range from the electorate as a whole to a non-elected party leader (Rahat and Hazan, 2001).

If the procedure of candidate selection can be placed at the highly inclusive end, we can certainly identify the party in public office as the dominant organizational face. This is because membership records administered by the party in central office will not play an important role in mobilizing support, and because the party on the ground will be atomized. However, it becomes more difficult to measure the distribution of power when party agencies are involved in nominating the candidates, because such agencies are usually composed of representatives from the different party faces. Consequently, we should supplement candidate selection with additional indicators: (1) the composition of central decision-making bodies and (2) the distribution of resources within the party (Katz, 1996). Concerning the latter, we need to ask which organizational face has responsibility for the allocation of financial resources.

The reproduction and change of party organizations

In line with one of the central assumptions of historical institutionalism – that actors can develop alternative strategic responses to the same contextual opportunities – political parties should not be seen as unitary actors but rather as collections of individuals and sub-party factions with often diverging electoral strategies. Following the idea of path dependency, we should expect party organizations to reproduce over time as they shape power relations between party internal factions through their ongoing distributional effects: party organizations disproportionately distribute resources to factions that are already powerful, because these factions designed them to do so. Consequently, advantaged factions will use their power to defend the organization against subordinate groups, thereby causing the organization to stabilize over time. More specifically, clientelistic factions will resist a formalization of decision-making norms, while programmatic factions will be interested in strengthening the role of the party as the principal arena for decision-making. Depending on whether programmatic factions follow a catch-all strategy or a strategy distributing club goods, they will work towards either a more powerful parliamentary party or a stronger party central office, respectively.

Moreover, party organizations are embedded into other sets of institutions with distributional consequences (such as the electoral system or political funding laws). If these institutions are designed to distribute

resources to the same groups – that is, the dominant faction within a given political party – they will increase the organizational stability of that particular political party even further. For example, strict political finance legislation will help programmatic actors uphold the formal party organization as the main channel for decision-making, while the absence of such legislation will strengthen clientelistic factions in their effort to control the outcome of decision-making through the covert allocation of resources.

Party organizational change becomes possible when the power distribution between party internal actors is radically altered. The trigger for such a radical redistribution of power can be either an internal stimulus, such as when the dominant faction weakens as a result of splits within its own ranks, or an external stimulus. It is very difficult to theorize about what constitutes an external trigger, as this will depend on the actors' perceptions of their environment (see Harmel and Janda, 1994). For example, clientelistic factions would consider environmental changes a shock if buying enough votes for electoral victory is made considerably more difficult. Actors following a narrow programmatic strategy, on the other hand, would view the erosion of their traditional voter groups as a shock, while those campaigning on catch-all appeals would be disturbed by environmental changes that undermine their efforts to portray themselves as capable managers of the state. Irrespective of whether the trigger for a reshuffle of the inter-factional power distribution lies external to the party or within the party, such 'critical junctures' (Collier and Collier, 1991) open up space for agency, giving disadvantaged groups within the party the opportunity to reform the organization in their own interests.

In addition, changes in the external environment around a political party can also lead to organizational change without disrupting the internal power distribution. First, broad changes in the socio-economic or political context can produce a shift in the goals or strategies pursued by advantaged actors within the party (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 16–17). In other words, advantaged actors adjust their electoral strategies to accommodate changes in the environment, which turns them from status quo agents into change agents, since their new strategy will require new organizational structures for its implementation. Second, change can happen as the advantaged groups fail to respond to external changes. As with any institution, party organizations need active maintenance; they regularly need to be recalibrated in response to changes in the environment into which they are embedded. Without such 'tending', they can be subject to 'drift' (Hacker, 2005) – the organizational

rules remain formally the same but their impact changes as a result of new external conditions.

However, disadvantaged groups do not have to hope for external transformations or splits within the dominant faction as the only drivers of organizational change. Rather, they can themselves develop strategies aimed at bringing about incremental organizational change. In the long run, smaller changes can then accumulate and create far-reaching change. Broadly speaking, there are three different strategies agents of change can follow to actively work towards organizational reform (see Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). First of all, they can openly mobilize collective opposition against the organizational patterns that disadvantage them, hoping that this will weaken powerful groups and allow for the replacement of existing regulations with new regulations ('displacement'). Secondly, change agents can work within the system, thus disguising their preferences for organizational change, and promote amendments or additions to existing organizational rules, thereby changing the ways in which the original rules structure behaviour ('layering'). Thirdly, change agents can exploit the ambiguities inherent in organizational rules – the hope is that, although rules remain formally the same, they will be interpreted and enacted in new ways ('conversion').

Following the fundamental assumptions of historical institutionalism, change agents do not make their strategic decisions in a vacuum, but take into consideration the fact that the context favours certain strategies over others. Change agents need to ask themselves two questions: Does the political context afford defenders of the status quo strong or weak veto possibilities? And does the enforcement apparatus for specific rules involve discretion or not? The most favourable context for a strategy of displacement is characterized by weak veto possibilities and low discretion; layering is most likely to be successful in a context of strong veto players and low discretion, and conversion is the strategy selected by contexts of weak veto players and high discretion.

Notwithstanding whether organizational transformation happens abruptly during critical junctures or slowly through the accumulation of smaller changes over time, it is impossible to predict the outcome of any process of change. All we can predict is that factions should be motivated to produce organizational changes that will best allow the implementation of their respective electoral strategy. As a result, the organization created should reflect the relative power of the differentially motivated actors within the party. In some cases, the power of the dominant faction may be so great that it will have the freedom to

design an organization that very closely reflects its particular electoral strategy. However, as historical institutionalists point out, institutions may not necessarily reflect the goals of any particular group, as they may be the unintended outcome of conflict among groups (Schickler, 2001). In other words, every case of party organizational change – and party formation as a matter of fact – requires us to identify the relevant actors, understand their electoral strategies and describe the power relations between them, before then tracing the chain of developments that led to the particular choice of organizational rules within the given environmental context.

Summary

Existing theories of party organization make contradictory predictions regarding political party development in new democracies. The 'life cycle' approach would expect political parties in young democracies to follow the same trajectory as parties in Western Europe did, developing from cadre parties to mass parties, and subsequently adopting the catch-all party type, followed by the cartel party type. The 'period effect' approach, anticipating that all parties adapt completely to the environment within which they are competing with other parties, would offer different predictions, depending on how this environment is defined. If one accepts that political parties are competing under increasingly universal conditions, one would argue that political parties in new democracies will make an 'evolutionary leap' (Smith, 1993) over previous stages of organizational development, and converge towards the cartel party type. If one thinks of factors at the polity level as having more explanatory power, one would argue that parties will adjust their organizations to changes within the closed electoral market. The 'generation effect' approach, on the other hand, precludes organizational change, arguing that parties are unable to escape their past. Finally, and in contrast to these three structuralist theories, actor-centred approaches would claim that any predictions are futile, because parties are the product of actors' individual goals and abilities.

Although offering contradicting views, this chapter has shown that the three types of explanatory factors on which these contradicting predictions are based can be integrated into a single narrative. In particular, the chapter has redefined the relationship between party external conditions, party internal dynamics and actor-related factors by adopting a dialectical understanding of the relationship between structure and agency. Based on the ideas of historical institutionalism, we

conceptualized political parties as strategic responses to electoral markets, which are themselves strategically selective – that is, they favour certain strategies over others. Because actors can develop alternative strategies to the same context, political parties are, in addition, best understood as ongoing power struggles between actors offering different strategies to mobilize voters within the given electoral market.

Broadly speaking, we can distinguish between clientelistic and programmatic strategies for voter mobilization, with the latter further differentiated as to whether the platform specifies entitlements to club goods or is aimed at delivering public goods. While the environmental context in new democracies of the ‘third wave’ strategically selects clientelistic or catch-all strategies, it depends on factors at the polity level as to which of these two will be the most successful in mobilizing voters. Generally, a context characterized by low levels of income inequality and/or a democratic transition largely controlled by an autocratic regime that made wide use of clientelistic incentives to legitimize its non-democratic rule will strategically select for clientelism as the dominant electoral strategy.

Electoral strategies are then closely linked to preferences for certain types of party organization: while actors following a clientelistic strategy for voter mobilization will resist a formalization of decision-making, actors campaigning on programmatic appeals will be interested in strengthening the formal party organization as the central arena for decision-making. More precisely, those campaigning on programmatic club-goods appeals will push for a centralization of power in the party central office, whereas actors with a catch-all strategy will try to strengthen the party in public office vis-à-vis the other elements of party organization. However, in new democracies environmental uncertainty for political parties tends to be relatively high, making it difficult to realize this latter option.

Conflict between party internal groupings following different electoral strategies is the principal mechanism through which the reproduction of party organization over time can be explained, as advantaged groups defend the distributional effects from which they benefit against subordinate groups. This conflict can lead to party change if the power distribution is disrupted – triggered either through environmental changes or through internal dynamics. Moreover, organizational change can happen as a gradual process, as disadvantaged groups possess the strategic ability to bring about organizational transformations by adding smaller amendments to existing rules or by exploiting the organization’s inherent ambiguities. When choosing their strategies, change agents

again need to take into consideration environmental constraints and opportunities.

The next four chapters will apply the two conceptualizations of political parties just developed – as (1) strategic responses to electoral markets and (2) ongoing power conflicts – to study the development of political parties in the new democracies of East Asia. Each chapter will outline the context in which actors make their strategic decisions, identify actors and their electoral strategies, describe them as either status quo or change agents, and categorize the latter's strategies to bring about organizational change. The analysis will show whether historical institutionalism can offer a more coherent narrative than existing theories of party organization, thus providing us with an improved understanding of why different types of party organization emerge in contemporary democracies.

2

South Korea

The party system that emerged in post-autocratic Korea reveals some parallels with the party systems in nineteenth-century Europe: the government is controlled by highly elitist parties, which – comparable to the classical cadre party – are characterized by a lack of formal organizational faces, while the minor Korean Democratic Labour Party (KDLP), established outside parliament, features a strong party central office. Moreover, similar to the European cadre party, the dominant elitist parties have gone through some considerable organizational change. However, as will be seen, they are not following the same path of development as their counterparts in Western Europe, but have, in recent years, adopted a particular type of organization, shaped by actors' strategic decisions within a specific environmental context.

The transition to democracy

South Korea was drawn into authoritarian governmental control in the early 1950s when the Korean War provided the pretext to demolish the democratic system that the Americans had installed after liberating the peninsula from 35 years of Japanese colonialism in 1945. However, regime cohesion was not very strong, as elite factions frequently attempted to overthrow each other through putsches, and short democratic interludes alternated with longer periods of autocratic rule. The central pillars of the regime were the military, the bureaucracy and – as a junior partner – large business conglomerates (*chaebol*). Operating within the legalistic frame of a pseudo-democracy, the 'bureaucratic authoritarian' regime (Im, 1987) tolerated opposition parties, but competition for political offices was subtly curtailed so that

Table 2.1 Socio-economic development in South Korea

	GDP per capita (US dollar)	Gini coefficient ^a	Degree of urbanization (in %)	Literacy (in %)
South Korea	4,467 (1988) 24,801 (2007)	0.400 (1998) 0.316 (2007)	74.4 (1990) 81.9 (2010)	95.5 (1990) 99.0 (2007)
Japan	33,632 (2007)	0.249 (2007)	66.8 (2010)	99.0 (2007)
United Kingdom	35,130 (2007)	0.360 (2007)	90.1 (2010)	99.0 (2007)
USA	45,592 (2007)	0.408 (2007)	82.3 (2010)	99.0 (2007)

^aThe Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality of the distribution of income. It is defined as a ratio with values between 0 and 1, with 0 corresponding to perfect income equality, while 1 corresponds to perfect income inequality.

Source: United Nations ESCAP (undated); United Nations Development Programme (undated); Hong (1996).

the elites' claim to power would not be threatened. The elites sought to gain legitimacy for their authoritarian rule by emphasizing the military threat posed by North Korea and – closely related – the need for economic development.

In particular, the regime's high economic efficiency proved to be a powerful source of legitimacy (see Table 2.1). Not only did the economic strategy of export-oriented industrialization lead to a general improvement of living standards, but profits were directly channelled to individual citizens through clientelistic networks connecting the regime with the electorate. The regime mobilized the financial resources necessary to nurture the clientelistic exchange of particularistic material gifts against political support through 'quasi-taxes', which large businesses – particularly the *chaebol* – were required to pay for preferential treatment in the allocation of state subsidies, public loans, import licenses and so on (Kang, 2002). Payments to voters were organized – either before elections as classical vote-buying or in between elections as irregular gifts (e.g., for weddings or funerals) – through the extensive party apparatus of the regime's Democratic Justice Party (DJP).

Interestingly, the regime was not alone in mobilizing voters through clientelism but the opposition, too, employed clientelistic linkage mechanisms to gain votes. However, given their relative lack of resources, opposition candidates could not engage as actively in the distribution of clientelistic rewards as the regime party's legislators (Park, 1988: 1057).¹ Hence, while 'ruling party candidates [often] spent more than

100 million won' to buy voters, the 'opposing party's candidates [only] spent several tens of millions' (Lee, 2001: 149).

As a result of this disadvantage, opposition politicians would, in addition, campaign on the demand for political democratization, which is why the opposition tended to enjoy strong support among more affluent, better-educated urban voters, while the regime gained the majority of votes in rural areas – a phenomenon that came to be known as *yochon yado* (villages for the government, cities for the opposition) (Kim, 1989: 487). Confirming the central assumption of the modernization theory (see Lipset, 1981), economic development had given rise to a new urban middle class, which was no longer willing to accept a restriction of its participatory rights. In particular, it was the intellectual segment of this new middle class that took the leading role in organizing the democratization movement. Moreover, students and intellectuals also played a crucial part in the politicization of the working class, by providing an opposition ideology, organizational networks and other resources (Koo, 1991).

Blue-collar workers were highly susceptible to demands for political reform, because the regime's programme for economic modernization was primarily based on cheap labour and repressive employment laws, causing the income gap between the urban working class and the rest of the population to widen accordingly. In 1980, when the Korean economy plunged into a deep recession, forcing the government to implement a rigid adjustment and stabilization programme, the working class again felt itself to be the big loser of these new economic policies, and – with the support of students and intellectuals – took its protest to the streets (Croissant, 1998: 176). Mass protests were facilitated by the fact that, by the early 1980s, the regime's scenario that North Korea was a permanent military threat had lost much of its credibility, thus undermining the propagandized need for political stability (Potter, 1997: 235).

Confronted with this apparent loss of legitimacy, the regime decided to hold 'nearly' free and fair elections for a new National Assembly in 1985, in which the newly formed opposition party New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) under the leadership of Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam won a surprising 29.3 per cent of the votes. The NKDP subsequently based its strategy on two elements: obstructive opposition in parliament and – in alliance with other pro-reform movements – mass public demonstrations (Cheng and Kim, 1994: 136). Eventually, the increasing political pressure forced the regime to invite the opposition to mutual talks on constitutional reforms. When these negotiations failed

after only a few months, the opposition camp mobilized large parts of the urban population. This left the regime with the choice of whether to return to more violent repression or to continue along the path of liberalization. However, political pressure from the United States, which in the 1980s abandoned its policy of supporting anti-communist regimes even against the will of their citizens, plus Seoul's hosting of the 1988 Olympic Games – which moved South Korea into the spotlight of international attention – benefited the soft-liners within the regime. Hence, in June 1987, the regime accepted most of the opposition's demands and resumed negotiations over constitutional reform.

Thus, the transformation of South Korea's military-bureaucratic autocracy into a political system with free and fair elections took place through a process of bargaining between the regime and the democratic opposition. By the mid-1980s, both sides were locked in an uneasy stalemate that could only be broken through a negotiated compromise (Saxer, 2002: 54–61). As a result of this, both regime and opposition actors were able to continue their clientelistic strategies of voter mobilization beyond the end of autocratic rule, as will be described in the next section.

The electoral market: leaders, factions and parties

The 1990s are commonly described by observers of Korean politics as the 'three Kims' era, as elections were dominated by three politicians with the same family name: Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil. The two largest parties in Korea today – the Grand National Party (GNP) and the United Democratic Party (UDP) – are the final product of strategic games played by these highly charismatic politicians.² Thus, although these two parties are only relatively new creations, it makes sense to trace their historical development back to the first free and fair elections, as their history of frequent mergers and name changes has been accompanied by a high degree of personal continuity. The third party that will be discussed is the KDLP, which was established in 2000.

The era of the 'three Kims'

Shaped by the particular transition to democracy, the immediate post-autocratic context in Korea strongly favoured clientelistic incentives over other electoral strategies. First of all, as to be expected in 'third wave' democracies, the conditions for the electoral mobilization of social classes based on programmatic platforms were bad. More

specifically, it was the virulent anti-communism of the outgoing autocratic regime that prevented socialist or social democratic parties from forming (Kang, 1998), while the ban on the formation of independent trade unions – which stayed in place until 2002 – meant that workers were not organized outside state corporatist structures. This made it very difficult to mobilize these groups. Secondly, both the old regime elites and the pro-democratic opposition successfully transferred the clientelistic networks they had been using in the regime's pseudo-elections into the new democratic arena. Although the process of export-led industrialization had resulted in a dramatic improvement of living standards for the general population, patron–client relationships had become embedded within social life and thus continued to play an important role in voters' electoral decision.

In addition, the institutional rules implemented to regulate electoral competition also facilitated the maintenance and expansion of patron–client networks. First of all, the designers of the new democratic rules refrained from passing strict political finance laws, so the 'cosy relationship between top business and political leaders' (Ferdinand, 1998: 193) would not be disrupted. Secondly, both the regime and the pro-democratic opposition were interested in implementing an electoral system based on a plurality formula and small constituencies, as this would make it easier to mobilize voters through clientelistic means. However, while the regime favoured two-member districts, knowing that its electoral support was more evenly spread across the country than that of the opposition, the opposition pushed for the introduction of single-member districts. In the end, the two sides agreed on the latter option, but only after the districts were drawn in such a way that they favoured rural over urban areas – and thus strengthened the former regime party (Brady and Mo, 1992).³

Despite a decrease in vote share compared to elections under autocratic rule, the DJP still emerged as the strongest party out of the 1988 elections. Opposition parties had formed around politicians who were likely to be strong candidates for the next presidential election. As the electoral market favoured clientelism over other strategies of voter mobilization, these were politicians who had been developing patron–client networks under authoritarian rule: the two leaders of the pro-democracy movement, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam, who formed the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD) and the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) respectively, and Kim Jong-pil, who had served as prime minister from 1971 to 1975, and who had now established the New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP).

When, in a surprising move in 1990, Kim Young-sam merged his RDP with the former regime party DJP to form the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), this heralded the era of the 'three Kims'. At the same time, the merger between the two parties meant the end of the democracy-authoritarianism cleavage. Instead, given that, at the elite level, the clientelistic networks of the three Kims were held together by personal ties established during high school – an important self-identity concept in Korean culture – the three political parties acquired a distinctive regional character based on the family roots of their respective leader (Kim, 2000): Kim Young-sam was from Yeongnam, located in the south-east of the Korean peninsula, Kim Dae-jung from Honam and Kim Jong-pil from the Chungcheong region to the north of Honam. This three-party constellation thus turned regional identities into the most important factor to explain voting behaviour in post-autocratic Korea (Sonn, 2003).⁴

Throughout the 1990s, the three Kims more or less shared the total national vote between them, something which was clearly reflected in the effective number of political parties (see Table 2.2). They were the all-dominating players in the post-autocratic party system and, before withdrawing from the political stage, established ten political parties between them: Kim Young-sam three, Kim Dae-jung four and Kim Jong-pil three. They saw their parties merely as functional vehicles to gain access to power, creating, dissolving, merging and renaming them as it suited their personal interests (Kim, 2000: 60; Heo and Stockton, 2005: 685). This strategic game the three Kims played with their parties

Table 2.2 South Korea: party system indicators

	ENEP ^a	ENPP ^b	Volatility
1988	3.87	3.34	–
1992	2.96	2.37	95.15
1996	3.51	2.83	77.25
2000	2.81	2.30	80.80
2004	3.17	2.32	51.35
2008	4.36	2.92	55.60
<i>Average</i>	<i>3.45</i>	<i>2.68</i>	<i>72.03</i>

^a Effective number of electoral parties in elections to the National Assembly. After 2004, when a second vote was introduced to elect a party on the closed party list, the number was calculated on the share of votes parties received in the single-member constituencies.

^b Effective number of parliamentary parties in the National Assembly.

Source: Author's own calculations based on Table 2.3.

translated into extremely high electoral volatility figures in the 1990s (see Table 2.2).

Below the Kims, faction leaders competed for the party chairman's favour, without ever acquiring enough power to seriously challenge the Kims. Given that the electoral market militated against programmatic strategies of voter mobilization, factions were mainly based on patron-clientelism, rather than shared ideological interests (Yun, 1994). Party leaders controlled factions through the allocation of resources and – as we will see later in more detail – through party nominations for public elections (Park, 2008). The three Kims had privileged access to resources, because they had the best chances of winning the presidency or, indeed, controlled the presidential office.⁵ This made the three Kims a top target for political donations from large businesses. For example, although Kim Dae-jung would not be elected into government until 1997, he still attracted a substantial amount of corporate – mostly undeclared – financial contributions (Thornton and Kovick, 2003: 282).

Resources were then channelled through factions to candidates in public elections in order for them to build and maintain clientelistic linkages to voters. Typical activities to strengthen the loyalty within these clientelistic networks ranged from offering condolences at funerals, to making gifts at weddings, to placing supporters in jobs, to

interceding with the police or courts for favorable treatment and in the case of legislators who are lawyers, pleading before the court on behalf of constituents; helping to obtain business licenses, permits, or registrations through administrative agencies; helping to get promotions and transfers in public or private agencies; providing assistance in obtaining bank loans or in securing relief funds and a wide range of compensations for accidents, planning and zoning projects, shoddy work by construction companies, industrial pollution, and so on; making financial donations and contributions, such as those to assist constituents with living expenses, children's school expenses, and local festivals; and helping to re-solve constituents' tax disputes with the revenue office. (Park, 1988: 1059)

To sum up, the early post-autocratic context in Korea favoured those actors who were able to transfer their patron-client networks into the new electoral market – the three Kims (see Table 2.3). Through the top-down allocation of resources, party leaders commanded absolute loyalty from factions within their parties. Factions then used these resources to mobilize voters by clientelistic means.

Table 2.3 South Korea: results for National Assembly elections

Party	1988		1992		1996		2000		2004		2008	
	V ^a	S ^b	V	S	V	S	V	S	V	S	V	S
DJP	34.0	41.8	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
RDP	23.8	19.7	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
PPD	19.3	23.4	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
NDRP	15.6	11.7	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
DP (1)	1.3	0.3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
DLP	–	–	38.5	49.8	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
DP (2)	–	–	29.2	32.4	11.2	5.0	–	–	–	–	–	–
UPP	–	–	17.4	10.4	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
NPRP	–	–	1.8	0.3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
PP	–	–	1.5	0.0	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
NKP	–	–	–	–	34.5	46.5	–	–	–	–	–	–
NCNP	–	–	–	–	25.3	26.4	–	–	–	–	–	–
ULD	–	–	–	–	16.2	16.7	9.8	6.2	2.8	1.6	–	–
NPUPP	–	–	–	–	0.9	0.0	–	–	–	–	–	–
GNP	–	–	–	–	–	–	39.0	48.7	35.8	41.1	37.4	51.2
MDP	–	–	–	–	–	–	35.9	42.1	7.1	2.1	–	–
DPP	–	–	–	–	–	–	3.7	0.7	–	–	–	–
Uri	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	38.3	53.1	–	–
KDLP	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	13.0	0.8	5.6	1.7
UDP	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	25.1	27.1
Pro Park	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	13.1	4.7
LFP	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	6.8	6.0
CKP	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	3.8	1.0
Other	6.1	3.0	11.6	7.0	11.8	5.4	11.7	2.2	3.0	1.2	8.2	8.3

^aShare of votes (in %) – in 2004 and 2008, votes for the party list.

^bShare of seats (in %).

Source: Croissant (2001); IFES Election Guide (undated).

Exit the charismatic kings, enter programmatic actors

Power only became more evenly spread within the major political parties once the Kims left the political arena (Park, 2008). When Kim Young-sam's term as president came to an end in 1997, his influence within his own party, the GNP, declined steeply, as he would no longer be able to distribute state resources and patronage to his supporters in return for loyalty. Instead, influential factions grouped around other presidential hopefuls, without, however, any actor being able to fill the power vacuum left by Kim Young-sam. Eventually, Lee Hoi-chang, who had served as prime minister under Kim Young-sam, emerged as the *primus inter pares* and the party's presidential candidate in 1997, although inter-factional rivalry remained high.

Similarly, as Kim Dae-jung's presidency was reaching the constitutional five-year limit, he began losing authority within the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP). After he resigned from the party chairmanship in 2001 (to focus his energies on his last months as president), this pitted the various factions against each other in a fierce conflict for power. However, unlike in the GNP, these factions were not all clientelistic in their voter outreach: a number of young, programmatically oriented politicians had emerged as a new force within the MDP. The most significant figures were Chun Jung-bae, Shin Ki-nam – both human rights lawyers – and Chung Dong-young, a former TV anchorman. All three politicians had been nominated by Kim Dae-jung as candidates for the 1996 National Assembly election to give the party a younger image. Not integrated into existing patron–client networks, the faction led by these politicians (commonly known in Korea as Chun-Shin-Chung) developed a programmatic catch-all strategy, stressing issues such as good governance, civil rights and environmental protection, while also advocating a softer approach towards the regime in North Korea and a more critical attitude towards the United States.

The Chun-Shin-Chung faction experienced a significant boost in power when the various clientelistic factions decided to implement (open and closed) primaries to nominate the MDP's candidate for the 2002 presidential election. While the reasons of the clientelistic factions for adopting such an inclusive method of candidate selection will be discussed later, it is sufficient to note at this stage that, in doing so, the clientelistic factions underestimated the strength of the Chun-Shin-Chung faction, which had rallied behind Roh Moo-hyun as its candidate. Roh successfully appealed to young voters in their 20s and 30s who had become increasingly disillusioned with the old style of Korean politics, particularly the regionalization of the party system (Walker and Kang, 2004). Roh, who was himself from the eastern region of Yeongnam – the electoral stronghold of the GNP – was able to bridge the regional divide by seeking nomination from the western-based MDP. Moreover, Roh's background – born to a poor farming family, he worked as a human rights lawyer under authoritarian rule – also appealed to young voters, embodying for many a break with the clientelistic pattern of politics.

Roh's supporters organized an online 'fan club' called *Nosamo* (literally, 'people who love Roh'). This website provided an opportunity to discuss political issues and a vehicle to raise campaign funds and mobilize voters. By using new technology, *Nosamo* succeeded in generating support for Roh from voters who would otherwise have had

little interest in the election. At its height *Nosamo* had a membership of 80,000 and helped to create a culture of voluntary political donations, which allowed Roh to raise over 7 billion won from 200,000 individuals (Yun, 2003: 222).

While this online organization provided Roh with crucial resources and votes, ultimately Roh was able to win both the MDP primary and the 2002 presidential election, because – facilitated by the end of the Cold War and the diminished threat from North Korea – the political discourse had broadened considerably, from one that was highly anti-leftist to one that accepted more progressive views (Steinberg and Shin, 2006). In fact, since the 2002 presidential election, studies of voting behaviour in Korea have been observing a decline of regional voting, while, at the same time, a new cleavage of generational differences seems to be emerging (see, e.g., Kim et al., 2008).⁶

Encouraged by their electoral success and disappointed by the weak support the MDP showed for the newly elected president, in 2003 the programmatic catch-all factions split away from the MDP to establish the *Yeollin Uri* Party (literally, Our Open Party). In addition to 42 of the MDP's 103 lawmakers, the *Uri* Party also attracted 5 legislators of the GNP, and was shortly after recognized by Roh as the new ruling party. Moreover, the *Uri* Party absorbed the National Reform Party under the leadership of Rhyu Si-min that had emerged out of *Nosamo*. The Rhyu Si-min group soon established itself as the dominant faction in the *Uri* Party: as the most fervent supporters of Roh they profited enormously from Roh's high popularity ratings during the early stages of his presidency – more so than any other grouping within the *Uri* Party.

In line with their programmatic strategy of voter mobilization, Roh and the *Uri* Party then set out to reform the political system. To do so they adopted a strategy of *displacement*, openly criticizing the democratic institutions in a coordinated alliance with civil society and labour organizations. The context at the time was favourable towards a strategy of displacement, as civic organizations had, since the 2000 election, been publicly blacklisting politicians as 'unfit' for office, which led to an atmosphere in which every politician who opposed political reforms was stigmatized as corrupt.⁷ This considerably reduced the veto opportunities of defenders of the status quo.

The reforms focused on two aspects of the political system. First, backed by the constitutional court, the *Uri* Party succeeded in reforming the electoral system in 2004, introducing a second vote for the additional party list of proportional representation (whereas before voters only received one ballot for both the district and list seats).⁸ Second,

the Uri Party successfully pushed for a comprehensive reform of the political funding system (see pages 61–62 for more details). While earlier reforms of political finance were mere window dressing, failing to curtail political corruption and vote-buying (Ferdinand, 2003), the new legislation passed by the Uri Party seemed to be more effective. In fact, the 2004 parliamentary elections were regarded as the cleanest elections in the country's history up to that point, with the number of reported vote-buying incidences dropping sharply compared to previous elections (Transparency International, 2006: 40).

The electoral reforms crafted before the 2004 elections enabled the entrance of further programmatic actors into the party system, most notably the KDLP (Gray, 2008: 117). The KDLP emerged out of the pro-democratic student movement, which had always been divided into two main streams: the National Liberation and the Political Democracy factions. The National Liberation's main political aim was the reunification of Korea and – strongly influenced by North Korea's *Juche* ideology – the realization of the autonomy of the Korean nation from US imperialism, while the Political Democracy faction were followers of traditional Marxist–Leninist ideas and thus put more emphasis on the liberation of the worker, as opposed to the liberation of the nation. Accordingly, both streams also differed in their strategies: whereas the National Liberation stressed participation in the regular political process and sought to build a 'united front' of all Koreans that would also include the middle class, the Political Democracy group took a class-based approach that only aimed at improving the position of the working class through organizing strikes and demonstrations. However, with the founding of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) in 1995, the Political Democracy movement slowly adopted a more participatory strategy, and soon joined the National Liberation's efforts to establish an independent progressive party that could successfully compete with the existing parties created by the three Kims.

Finally, cooperation between the two groups culminated in the founding of the KDLP in January 2000. While the KDLP defines its constituency as including farmers, small business entrepreneurs, the urban poor, women, the disabled, youth, students and concerned intellectuals, it is primarily a party that seeks to represent Korea's working class. The KDLP thus follows a programmatic strategy, targeting clearly bounded social groups through the distribution of club goods. The party's electoral breakthrough came in the 2002 local elections, in which it received 8.3 per cent of the votes. Then, in 2004, ten KDLP candidates were elected into the National Assembly, making the KDLP the country's

third largest party. However, analyses of the 2004 elections show that the party was not very successful in gaining the support of its core constituency as most votes seem to have been 'protest votes', thus suggesting that mobilizing the Korean working class is still a very difficult task (Lee and Lim, 2006: 328). In fact, the KDLP was unable to repeat its success in the 2008 elections, when it only won five legislative seats.

As the National Liberation faction had been the driving force behind the founding of the KDLP, it was initially the dominant faction within the party. However, the continuation of Kim Dae-jung's sunshine policy⁹ through Roh Moo-hyun – finally leading to an eight-point peace agreement between South and North Korea in October 2007 – made it difficult for the National Liberation faction to justify the KDLP's continuing strong focus on the relations with the communist regime in the north. Hence, the Political Democracy faction was strengthened, and, for the first time in the party's history, factional fissures became visible to the public when the party's nomination process for the 2007 presidential election turned into a race between Kwon Young-ghil from the National Liberation faction and Shim Sang-jeong from the Political Democracy faction. When Kwon won the nomination, several members of the Political Democracy faction, including Shim, left the KDLP to found the New Progressive Party (NPP).

Eventually, the more progressive language of the political discourse also facilitated the rise of programmatic factions within the former regime party, the GNP. Given its record of human rights violations, its close links with large businesses and its pro-American leaders, the GNP had become an easy target for criticism from other parties. However, none of the clientelistic factions within the GNP was able to offer a solution for how to regain control of the political discourse, as they were widely perceived by the electorate to be corrupt and self-serving. This paved the way for Lee Myung-bak to increase his power. Having only entered politics in 2002 – leaving his position as CEO of Hyundai to become the elected mayor of Seoul – Lee was not embedded into the traditional clientelistic networks that the GNP had spun in its electoral stronghold in the eastern parts of the Korean peninsula. He thus used his public image of an economic mastermind to formulate catch-all economic policies, promising a rising standard of living for all.

These promises struck a deep chord with the electorate, as the Roh government's failure to deliver jobs and economic growth meant that 'voters cared primarily about the economy and wanted a competent economic manager to shepherd it' (Kwon, 2010: 189). In other words, Lee's

ideas of how to manage the economy, much more than the material resources controlled by the dominant clientelistic factions, seemed to provide a very effective strategy of voter mobilization.

Being the most likely candidate in the GNP to take back the presidential office after ten years in opposition provided Lee with the resources to engineer political support within the party. In particular, Lee promised that, when elected, he would push for the construction of a canal, cutting diagonally across the country between Seoul and Pusan. The canal project, estimated to cost 50 billion US dollars, allowed Lee to 'buy' the support of legislators representing the rural hinterland behind the GNP's traditional stronghold on Korea's east coast (S. H. Kim, 2008). Lee thus emerged as a new power within the party, challenging the established clientelistic factions.

The *Uri* Party also witnessed a major reshuffle of internal power before the 2007 presidential elections. After President Roh's popularity dropped dramatically – leading to a series of humiliating defeats for the *Uri* Party in the 2005 by-elections – the Rhyu Si-min faction's power within the party decreased simultaneously.¹⁰ Finally, as politicians wanted to distance themselves from Roh as far as possible, to avoid jeopardizing their chances in the 2007 and 2008 elections, 80 out of 152 lawmakers of the *Uri* Party left the party to establish the United New Democratic Party (UNDP) in August 2007. Factions soon grouped around those politicians who had a good chance of winning the party's nomination as the presidential candidate: the aforementioned Chung Dong-young, Son Hak-gyu (the former governor of Gyeonggi-do who had joined the UNDP with a small group of progressive politicians from the GNP) and Lee Hae-chan (former prime minister under Roh Moo-hyun). Chung won the party's nomination, but was then defeated in a landslide by Lee Myung-bak.

Before the 2008 National Assembly election, the UNDP was merged with the Democratic Party (DP) – the successor of the MDP – to form the United Democratic Party (UDP), with Son Hak-gyu elected as its chairman.

Summary

The immediate post-autocratic electoral market in Korea benefited those actors who had developed clientelistic linkages to the electorate under autocratic rule: Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil. The three Kims held an uncontested monopoly of power within their respective parties. Most importantly, they each controlled rival clientelistic factions through the allocation of resources. These factions relied on the party leader's resources as material incentives for the mobilization

of voters. As this electoral strategy was thus clientelistic in nature we should expect the political parties of the three Kims to be characterized by the lack of formal organizational faces.

When Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung departed from politics, this left a vast power vacuum in their respective political parties. In Kim Young-sam's GNP, clientelistic factions around presidential hopefuls engaged in an intense struggle for the dominant position in the internal hierarchy, while Kim Dae-jung's MDP saw the emergence of a programmatic faction campaigning on a catch-all platform around post-materialist issues. The rise of this programmatic faction was facilitated by environmental changes, as the diminished threat from communist North Korea opened up space for a wider political discourse. The programmatic factions in the MDP succeeded in getting their candidate, Roh Moo-hyun, elected as president and, by joining forces with civil society organizations, passed a number of institutional reforms. This, in turn, paved the way for the KDLP to become the third largest party. The KDLP targets the working class and other marginalized groups in society through the programmatic distribution of club goods – something we should theoretically not expect in democracies of the 'third wave'. Eventually, the strengthening of programmatic factions in the MDP and the rise of the KDLP also reshuffled inter-factional power relations in the former regime party, the GNP, as Lee Myung-bak offered the most promising strategy to regain control of the political discourse – a catch-all strategy around economic growth and prosperity.

In line with their electoral strategies, we should expect the programmatic factions emerging in the two major parties to push for a formalization of decision-making rules within the party, while the clientelistic factions should be interested in protecting the status quo. And, in fact, the reforms of the political finance system undertaken by the Uri Party in 2004 can be seen as such a step, as an attempt to make the allocation of financial resources more transparent and the mobilization of voters through clientelistic incentives more difficult. Finally, the KDLP should adopt a party organization that features a strong party central office as a means to increase discipline among its legislators in the party in public office. The need for a high level of discipline in the parliamentary party can be assumed to follow from concerns about legislators' compliance with the party's guiding ideology.

The organization of political parties

The expectations just set are indeed accurate. As will be seen in the following sections, the parties of Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung served

merely as formal cloaks to cover their extensive patron–client networks, making it very difficult to distinguish between the three formal faces of party organization. This is still true for the two major parties today, but the emerging catch-all factions have successfully pushed for a formal regulation of candidate selection, making the process less dependent on money and other resources. In contrast, in the KDLP, where politicians follow an ideologically driven programmatic strategy of voter mobilization, the three faces of party organization are clearly distinguishable, with the party central office enjoying the most powerful position.

Party membership

Political parties in South Korea portray themselves as large membership organizations based on dense networks of local branches that cover the whole country. For instance, in his analysis of party institutionalization in neo-democratic Korea, Köllner (2003: 7) cites a longer passage from a GNP brochure, in which the party tries to convey the impression that its members are integrated into a complex organizational hierarchy, which gives every member the possibility of participating in the internal decision-making of the party:

The Grand National Party (Hannara Party) consists of the Central Party (Party Hq), 16 City & Provincial Chapters and 253 district parties each of which has a secretariat. [...] The city & provincial convention consists of 150 to 300 representatives. It performs such functions as electing representatives for the National convention, operating the committees of the Central Committee, choosing the chairmen of city & provincial chapters, deliberating on matters recommended by the district party, and submitting recommendations of every kind to Central Party. [...] The district convention consists of 100 to 150 representatives. It performs such functions as choosing the chairmen of district chapters, electing representatives for the National Convention, and submitting recommendations of every kind to Central Party.

Moreover, in order to reinforce the image of a strong rootedness in society, political parties usually report large membership numbers. While, in the mid-1990s Kim Young-sam's NKP (New Korea Party) claimed to have about 3 million members (Kim, 1998: 146), in 2008 its successor, the GNP, maintains to have a membership of 1,070,000. Similarly, the UDP purports to have roughly 1 million members. This more or less translates to a membership/electorate ratio of 2.6 per cent for each of

the major parties. However, in order to put these numbers into perspective, it is, first of all, important to know that Korean parties vastly inflate their membership figures when prompted by political scientists (Köllner, 2002: 11). Secondly, the criteria that define party members – vis-à-vis common voters – are so vague that it is almost impossible to clearly identify a formal party on the ground.

In order to establish criteria for party membership, parties usually refer to the Political Party Act, which states that any person older than 19 years (20 years up until 2005) may join a party – with the exception of public officials, which includes most teachers, and, up until 2000, trade union functionaries. In addition, membership fees are relatively low and generally not enforced. For example, the rules of Kim Young-sam's NKP (1995–97) prescribed that party members should pay at least 1,000 South Korean won (Kim, 1998: 145).¹¹ The NKP's successor, the GNP, charges 2,000 won per month, which members are, again, not obliged to pay, while the UDP does not specify a fixed sum, although members can make a voluntary contribution. In other words, joining either of these parties only requires the completion of a membership form.

Moreover, once members have joined the party, they do not receive any significant training from it. The NKP, Kim Young-sam's party, used to maintain a Central Training Centre at the national level to provide political education for party officials and activists, but, as Yong-ho Kim (1998: 148) points out, the effectiveness of these training programmes was highly questionable.

In order to understand this very broad conceptualization of party membership, it is necessary to look behind the formal criteria and regulations. In reality, the local branches of political parties in Korea are usually just the personal political machine of the assemblyman or candidate in the respective constituency.¹² The formal local party chapter serves as a cloak for the politician's personal network of supporters at the grassroots level. These networks are the true source of political identity for party members. People do not join the local party organization because they share the party's ideological positions or because they feel they belong to a distinctive social grouping. Instead, 'the district party is based [...] on personal and particularistic bonds between a political boss and followers' (Park, 1988: 1051). Hence, party members are usually recruited from among friends and relatives of the local political boss, or they join because they are otherwise socially connected to the boss, such as through school ties or regional provenance. Moreover, party membership networks are held together by the boss's provision of clientelistic benefits and favours in return for electoral support.

Most importantly, the local political boss will recruit members for electoral campaign purposes. Party members are usually dormant and will only become active shortly before elections. For example, one common sight in the streets of major Korean cities during national electoral campaigns is groups of supporters of the local candidate – all dressed in the party's colours – performing choreographed dances to the party's official pop song.¹³ This notion of party members as personal resources of the local candidate rather than the national party is further supported by the fact that the membership register is kept privately by the district chapter chair, not officially by the regional branch. The political boss thus has exclusive access to all membership data, which means that the party headquarters cannot communicate with the individual member without the boss's cooperation.

Outside the formal party organization, every legislator maintains other informal supporter organizations that do not function under the official banner of the party. These so-called *sajojik* (or *huwonhoi*) can, broadly speaking, take two forms: money machines or vote-getting machines. The former consist of donors who support the candidate by making regular financial contributions to his or her campaign coffers. The Korean political finance laws explicitly refer to the *sajojik* as one possible source of funding for candidates and contain a number of provisions that regulate their internal procedures. Most *sajojik*, however, are mainly comprised of supporters who have pledged to help the candidate by voting for him or her and by assisting with electoral campaigns. These vote-getting *sajojik* are usually organized around a common interest among the members (e.g., profession, hobby or religion) and can thus take very different forms. Some common examples include alumni groups, hiking clubs or baseball teams. Usually, the assemblyman does not directly influence the operation of the informal groups affiliated with him or her, and will only act as their sponsor and advisor. In the case of long-serving parliamentarians, the *sajojik* are characterized by a certain degree of stability, but they fail to achieve the same level of institutionalization as the personal vote-gathering machines found in neighbouring Japan (*koenkai*) (Chon, 2000: 77; also see Köllner, 2003: 8). Regarding membership, it must be noted that although there can be high personal overlap between the formal party branch and the *sajojik*, members of the latter do not automatically become formal party members.

It is therefore highly questionable whether we can speak of a 'party' membership in these cases, as voters join parties through their personal loyalty to the local assemblyman or candidate, who keeps the

membership register as a personal resource. The only major political party in South Korea that attaches higher *formal* requirements to party membership that make it possible to distinguish party members from ordinary citizens is the KDLP. In order to be granted full party membership, individuals must pay a monthly fee that ranges from 5,000 won for those without a regular income (i.e., students, housewives, senior or disabled citizens) to 10,000 won for everybody else. Moreover, in addition to signing a declaration saying that they will adhere to the party statutes, aspiring members need to attend an introductory lecture to familiarize them with the party's policies and decision-making structures. In contrast to the other major parties in Korea, the KDLP keeps a membership register at the party central office, with two full-time members of staff responsible solely for the maintenance of the register.

The KDLP also distinguishes itself from its competitors in that its members are organized into 150 genuine party branches across the country, each with local organization at the neighbourhood or workplace level. Unlike in other Korean parties, the local chapters are organized by the party as an organization, not by a local boss as his or her personal machine. Party members are active throughout the year, with the party's local chapters usually holding two meetings per week: one political meeting, in which current events and party-related matters are discussed, and – in the style of socialist parties in early twentieth-century Europe – one social meeting, where members come together for activities such as hiking tours. Moreover, although there is no institutionalized training programme for party members as such, local chapters can request ad hoc training sessions from the party central, which, according to the party's own information, happens very frequently.

As a result of these criteria and regulations, the membership figures published by the KDLP, as opposed to the blown-up figures of the other major parties, actually hold significance. As of 2008 the party claimed to have about 80,000 members, of which roughly 50,000 pay their dues regularly. However, only the latter group are regarded as full members who are given voting rights in the party's decision-making processes, which thus clearly distinguishes them from the ordinary voter outside the party (see next section for more details). In terms of membership strength the 50,000 members translate to 0.13 per cent of the total electorate – or 5.1 per cent of the party's electorate in 2008. Particularly the membership-electorate (M/E) ratio is relatively low when compared to the average M/E in the established democracies of Western Europe (see Mair and van Biezen, 2001: 9), but in the South Korean context of alarmingly high levels of political apathy this must be interpreted in a

different light, particularly if we remind ourselves that the KDLP is the only party that charges membership fees.¹⁴

We can thus conclude from this discussion that political parties in Korea recruit very different types of party members. In fact, it is safe to say that the two major political parties, the GNP and the UDP (and their historical parent parties), do not recruit members at all. Rather, members are the personal resources of local political bosses, who keep the membership registers and are the driving force behind all membership recruitment efforts. Loyalty between members and local bosses is usually based on the clientelistic exchange of material incentives or other personal relationships. The party on the ground thus remains hardly recognizable: members are merely passive subjects in the personal network of the local assemblyman or candidate, and they barely differ from the average voter outside the party in formal aspects, since membership obligations and rights are negligible. In contrast, in the KDLP, because party membership is attached to a number of demanding criteria, the party on the ground enjoys some considerable power. First of all, the fact that members pay fees regularly makes them a valuable financial asset to the party. According to the KDLP's own declaration, in 2007 about 50 per cent of the party's total income came from membership payments. Secondly, the fact that the KDLP holds regular meetings at the local level and organizes political training sessions for its members shows that the party perceives its membership as a pool of candidates for public election. This conceptualization of party membership follows from the KDLP's programmatic strategy of voter mobilization through the distribution of club goods: in order to increase the commitment to the party's ideology in the party in public office, potential candidates for public office are supposed to become socialized in the party's goals and policy positions.

Candidate selection

While the membership structure of political parties – except for the KDLP – has remained the same since the end of the authoritarian regime, there has been some significant change in the ways the relevant parties select their candidates for public elections at the national level. Fundamentally, the development of candidate selection procedures can be divided into a 'three Kims' phase and a post-'three Kims' phase. Although Article 31 of the old Party Law Act demands that 'the nomination of public post candidates by parties must be made in a democratic manner', the selection of candidates has only recently become more

inclusive. For more than a decade after the first free elections in the late 1980s, decision-making in all relevant parties of South Korea had been highly centralized. All control over the nomination of electoral candidates rested with the party leader (Kim, 1998: 151), and it is probably not an exaggeration to say that 'they ran the parties as if they were feudal lords' (Im, 2004: 189).

A thorough description of candidate selection during the 'three Kims' era can be found in Kim's (1997) case study of the 1996 National Assembly election. The usual practice in Korean parties then was to select a district party chair, who – almost automatically – became the party's candidate of that district in the coming election. In order to nominate the local party chairs, both Kim Young-sam's NKP and Kim Dae-jung's National Congress for New Politics (NCNP) established a kind of screening committee. These committees, composed of high-ranking party officials, reviewed both incumbents and newly applying candidates, and submitted their recommendations to the party president. The president then made the final decision on whom to nominate. In the case of the NCNP, while party leader Kim Dae-jung announced that he would not alter the screening committee's selection of district chairs, it was common knowledge that his intentions were carried out by close aides in the committee.

In other words, the selection of candidates was perfectly monopolized by the party leader. In fact, nomination for a National Assembly mandate could be bought from the party leader in return for a donation (Chon, 2000: 72). Besides corporate donations, this practice was the most stable financial resource for parties during the 'three Kims' era – particularly for opposition parties, as these lacked the power to influence government policies. The price varied according to the prospects of success: the higher one wanted to be ranked on the party list – used in addition to single-member plurality in Korea's parallel electoral system – the more one was expected to donate to the party.

Using the process of candidate selection as an indicator for the distribution of power within political parties during the 'three Kims' era, we can follow Thornton and Kovick (2003: 292) and offer the following summary:

This highly centralized leadership style has contributed to low levels of internal party democracy. Party members are dependent on the party leader for political advancement, and opposition or criticism of the party leadership is tantamount to political suicide. Loyalty to the party leader is often rewarded with 'safe' electoral districts.

The processes of candidate selection in Korean parties only became more formalized when the three Kims stepped down from the political stage. The first party to organize its nomination system according to more abstract regulations was the NKP. As discussed above, the withdrawal of Kim Young-sam in 1997 left a huge power vacuum within the party, which no other actor was able to fill. As the competing clientelistic factions could not agree on a single candidate for the upcoming presidential election, it was decided that the right of nomination should be left with the NKP's national convention.¹⁵ However, it must be noted that, although these rules marked a historical milestone – as it was the first time since the beginning of the democratic transition in South Korea that a presidential candidate was selected through competition among multiple aspirants – the voting did not fully meet democratic standards. In fact, the outcome was heavily influenced by the clientelistic allocation of resources (Lee, 2002). In other words, the rival factions only adopted a more inclusive procedure of candidate selection as a means to determine which faction would be able to 'outbuy' the other factions. Factions were perfectly aware that informal institutions would undermine the effect of formal decision-making rules.

Similar considerations also drove change to the rules for candidate selection in Kim Dae-jung's MDP. When the dominating leader departed the political arena in 2002, no other actor was able to take his place, which left the various sub-party groups with the question of how to decide on a new presidential candidate. As in the NKP, the clientelistic factions thus turned the nomination race into a practical test to see which faction was able to mobilize more support through their patron–client networks. More specifically, factions agreed on implementing a system that combined a closed and an open primary. Voting for the open primary would take place in several cities, and votes would then be averaged with the results of a vote among party members. Not only did this method allow factions to break their deadlocked negotiations but it was also meant to boost the party's popularity with the electorate: pre-election polls suggested that the GNP candidate had a respectable lead over any of the MDP front runners, and the implementation of a primary was seen as a means to change the negative public opinion toward the MDP (Lee, 2003).¹⁶ That is to say, the programmatic Chun-Shin-Chung faction, which ultimately benefited from the primary in getting its candidate Roh Moo-hyun elected as the MDP's presidential candidate, played a fairly unimportant role in this process of party change. Rather, the primary was adopted by the various clientelistic factions,

thinking that their patron–client networks would mobilize enough voters for electoral success. However, they had greatly underestimated the strength of the *Nosamo* movement that supported Roh Moo-hyun.

When the Chun-Shin-Chung faction split away from the MDP to establish the *Uri* Party, a very similar system was adopted to select candidates for the 2004 National Assembly elections. More specifically, nomination was based on the combined result of a closed and an open primary whereby both outcomes were weighted equally. To be able to participate in the primary, candidates needed the endorsement of the party's 'independent' screening commission. This commission was appointed by the party leadership, and consisted of party officials and popular personalities of Korean society (such as clerics, professors or writers). The GNP (as the NKP called itself after 1997) copied this system in an attempt to give itself a democratic façade. However, the party leadership made extensive use of the right to make so-called 'strategic' selections, according to which the leadership could nominate candidates without the need of a primary, if they felt that this was necessary to secure electoral victory. In fact, the GNP only held 15 primaries for a total of 228 nominations (6.6 per cent) (Kim and Kim, 2005).¹⁷ The selection of candidates was therefore still controlled by the party leadership.

However, methods of candidate selection underwent some considerable changes in the GNP as Lee Myung-bak increased his power vis-à-vis other party internal actors. His newly forged alliance with politicians outside the GNP's traditional stronghold put Lee in a strong position before the 2007 presidential elections, enabling him to openly demand a formalization of the nomination process, which thus far had not been formally institutionalized. Because the 'old guards' controlled most of the party members through their clientelistic networks, Lee had to shift decision-making outside of the party. Lee knew that, in order to win the party's nomination, the selectorate had to consist mostly of voters not integrated into patron–client networks operated by party leader Park Geun-hye (the daughter of former dictator Park Chung-hee) and her allies.

As there was a power stalemate between defenders of the status quo and Lee as the principal change agent, the result of the negotiations was a 'patchwork' of different methods. While the overall selectorate size was about 232,000 (representing 0.5 per cent of the total electorate), votes were not counted equally. Twenty per cent of the votes came from 'representative party members'. This group consisted of 4,800 members who were holding a public office either on the national, provincial or local level, and 41,000 regular party members who were appointed by these

office holders. Another 30 per cent of the vote came from 'other party members', whose vote was again split between members who had paid the regular membership fee for at least 18 months, and all other members. Moreover, an additional 30 per cent came from phone interviews conducted with randomly selected voters outside the party. As this 'citizen committee' was supposed to embody the average Korean electorate, this was done until enough representative votes from all age groups and both genders had been collected. Finally, in order to fill the last 20 per cent of the selectorate, the party commissioned three independent social-survey organizations to ask 5,500 randomly chosen citizens for their candidate preferences. It was this last component that helped Lee Myung-bak secure the party's nomination – while Park won the vote among party members, Lee came first in the public opinion surveys with a 8.5 per cent lead.

The UNDP – successor of the *Uri* Party – also changed its procedure to select its presidential candidate, albeit less drastically than the GNP. These reforms were initiated by the faction around Son Hak-gyu, who had joined the UNDP from the GNP only a few months earlier, and, consequently, did not have a strong power base within the party. Son thus followed a similar strategy to that of Lee Myung-bak in the GNP, namely, introducing public opinion polls as the main method to nominate the presidential candidate. Given that Son lacked the resources to steer the negotiations in his own interests, the outcome was – from Son's perspective – disappointing: a two-round process was adopted, in which the first round served to find the five top runners, who would then be allowed to participate in the second round. The selectorate in the first round consisted of randomly selected voters through an opinion poll (50 per cent of the total vote) and 10,000 randomly selected party members (another 50 per cent). In the second round an open primary was held, which counted 90 per cent towards the final result. In order to participate in the primary, voters could vote in one of eight multi-provincial primaries or they could cast their vote by sending a text message from their mobile phone. Only the remaining 10 per cent of the final vote, much less than Son Hak-gyu had been bargaining for, came from a public opinion poll – so Son finished second after Chung Dong-young.

In order to nominate candidates for the 2008 National Assembly election, the two major parties again revised their procedures of candidate selection. In the GNP, change was driven by Lee Myung-bak, who – having won the 2007 presidential elections – now had additional resources at his disposal to weaken the veto position of the clientelistic

factions within the party. In the UDP – the successor of the UNDP – the dominant programmatic factions perceived changes to procedures of candidate selection to be necessary, as the re-merger with the MDP had brought with it a sudden influx of clientelistic actors into the party. The challenge for both Lee Myung-bak and the dominant programmatic factions in the UDP was thus the same – how to make sure that clientelistic factions did not use their material resources to influence the outcome of the nomination process.

To deal with this challenge, both actors adopted the same strategy: they gave the right to nominate candidates to ‘independent’ screening committees. In both the GNP and the UDP this committee was nominated by the respective party’s executive committee. In the case of the GNP, the committee had 11 members – 6 from outside the party and 5 party members. Among the six outsiders were university professors, leaders of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and a former public prosecutor, while of the five insiders two were assemblymen and three party politicians without public office. Similarly, the UDP nominated six members from outside the party – two university professors, a lawyer, a medical doctor, a museum director and a poet – and four assemblymen from within the party. These independent screening committees provided the programmatic factions within each party with an effective mechanism to influence candidate selection in their own favour as the committees’ refusal to nominate candidates who had been found guilty of corruption and other illegal activities particularly affected clientelistic actors, who – in order to fuel their patron–client networks with resources – are generally much more likely to engage in corrupt activities than programmatic politicians. Thus, in the GNP, the independent committee denied nomination to a large number of Park Geun-hye supporters, many of whom then left the party to form the Pro-Park Geun-hye coalition. Similarly, in the UDP, the screening committee refused to nominate several old-guard bigwigs.¹⁸

The underlying logic for these recent reforms of candidate selection in the traditional parties, then, was that by giving the right to nominate candidates to party external bodies (public survey companies and independent screening committees) clientelistic factions would be deprived of the possibility of manipulating candidate selection through the strategic allocation of material resources. In other words, Lee Myung-bak and the programmatic factions in the UDP ‘outsourced’ decision-making to take particularistic exchange relationships out of the equation.

In the KDLP, in contrast, where the party membership is not penetrated by informal patron–client networks, the selectorate entitled to

participate in the process of candidate selection does not stretch beyond the party's boundaries. As informal institutions do thus not undermine the formal organization, the formal rules of candidate selection really constrain human behaviour and help us understand the value that the KDLP attaches to members. For example, to nominate the presidential candidate for the 2002 election the KDLP held a closed primary, without extending voting rights to the common citizen. Hence, members of the KDLP not only differ from non-members in their obligations, but also in their rights. The rules for candidate selection, in other words, help to establish the party on the ground as a distinct organizational element. This contrasts to the more traditional parties, where members only carry out voting instructions given by their respective patron.

Similarly, in order to nominate candidates for the plurality segment in legislative elections the KDLP holds a closed primary in each constituency. The composition of the party list is decided by the party's executive committee, but then needs to be approved by the vote of the whole party membership.¹⁹

To decide on the party's candidate for the 2007 presidential election, the KDLP again refrained from inviting common citizens to participate in the process of candidate selection, and held another closed primary. However, this time a two-round system was adopted, which stipulated that a second round of voting would be held if in the first round no candidate won an absolute majority of votes, with only the two top runners allowed to participate in the second round. In both rounds the size of the selectorate was about 50,000, equalling the number of members regularly paying the membership fee. Members could exercise their vote either in one of 227 voting stations across the country, or online on the party's website. Clearly, as in the other parties, this reform – the new requirement of having to obtain the majority of votes in order to win nomination – was the product of inter-factional conflict within the party, as the National Liberation faction and the Political Democracy faction had become increasingly polarized over the future course of the party. However, the reform was relatively modest, leaving members' right to decide on the candidate untouched.

To sum up, this section supports the earlier observation that the two major Korean parties lack a party on the ground. While, during the 'three Kims' era, candidate selection was decided only by the party leader, which meant that participatory rights could not be used to distinguish party members from ordinary citizens, the emerging programmatic actors have pushed very hard to move candidate selection outside of the political party – either by conducting public opinion polls

or by giving the decision-making power to independent screening committees. Decision-making was 'outsourced', as the clientelistic factions can influence internal voting through the patron–client networks that connect them to the grassroots 'membership'. In the KDLP, on the other hand, the process of candidate selection stays within the party boundaries. However, in contrast to what one would assume from the party's membership structure, the KDLP does not follow the classical mass-party model of candidate selection, which is usually associated with a hierarchical system of delegation. Instead, similar to more contemporary models of party organization, the KDLP has adopted closed primaries, following the principle of 'one member, one vote'. This weakens the party on the ground, as members are atomized and will thus have difficulties coordinating a serious challenge to the other two faces of party organization.

Distribution of resources and composition of party bodies

While candidate selection was one mechanism with which the three Kims kept factions under control in their respective parties, the distribution of resources was the other. In general, because of the great centralization of power in the hands of the Korean president, strong presidential candidates become a 'magnet' for financial contributions, particularly from the business sector (Park, 2008). Political parties and legislative candidates, on the other hand, do not attract nearly as much money through donations, as the National Assembly plays a rather reactive role in the law-making process. Because, in the 1990s, the three Kims effectively shared the national vote among them, business conglomerates saw them as the key actors able to secure the influence of business interests on government decisions, which meant that the *chaebol* focused their political donations almost exclusively on these three actors. The scale of these 'quasi-taxes' (Kang, 2002) becomes clear when one considers, for example, that the founder of Hyundai, Chung Ju-yung, told a newspaper in 1992 that he had paid President Roh Tae-woo 10 billion won annually.

Although public funding for political parties increased throughout the 1990s (Kwak, 2003: 127) and individual candidates continued to mobilize donations through their personal *sajojik*, these two sources were only able to contribute a tiny proportion of the skyrocketing costs of electoral campaigns. In clear violation of legal limits on campaign spending, the amount of money spent by political parties and candidates in past elections is staggering. For example, Roh Moo-hyun's 2002

presidential campaign is thought to have cost at least 145 billion won – more than that of US president George W. Bush in 2000. And as Roh Kwan-kyu, budget and accounting committee chairman for the MDP explained, ‘it would be extremely difficult to get elected within the legal amount of money that is allowed’ (cited in MacIntyre, 2003). Similarly, in the 2000 National Assembly elections, with an average campaign spending limit for a constituency of 131 million won, it was not uncommon for candidates to spend up to 2 to 3 billion won, particularly in highly competitive districts (Thornton and Kovick, 2003: 293).

As a result of these steep costs, unless a candidate was rich enough to spend large amounts of his or her own money, he or she had no choice but to rely on campaign funds provided by the party leader.²⁰ The financial resources mobilized by the three Kims were channelled through factions down to local legislators and candidates, who then used these resources to nurture their personal vote-gathering machines (on this and the following see Park, 1994: 182–3). Large sums were also spent on mobilizing voters for campaign rallies and, as a last resort, for vote-buying. Moreover, legislators also had to shoulder the costs of maintaining a district-level organization in between elections, which, in the early 1990s, were thought to be around 15 million won a month for government party assemblymen and 8 million won on average for opposition parliamentarians. Twenty to 30 per cent of this money was spent on strengthening clientelistic relationships with voters, for example by offering gifts or money on special occasions, such as weddings or funerals.

However, it was not only assemblymen and candidates who depended on the party leader for their political survival during the ‘three Kims’ era, but the whole party as an organization. This explains the short life span of Korean political parties throughout the 1990s, since parties only existed at the mercy of their leader, and were dissolved, merged or renamed according to the leader’s own interest. If the leader chose to leave the party, the party would simply die, as it had no value in itself. Although the parties of the three Kims were highly bureaucratized, the party bureaucracy would usually follow the party leader into his new party or cease to exist with the new one.²¹ The party central office was thus best understood as the ‘property’ of the party boss, solely employed to perform organizational and administrative tasks.

As a result of this financial dependency on the party leader, the three Kims also monopolized all decision-making responsibilities. In the parliamentary party, the unquestioned authority of the leader was further strengthened by the practice of nominating a large number of fresh

candidates who, when and if elected, were placed around a core of very experienced parliamentarians. These experienced lawmakers conducted the work in committees and the party's caucus according to the guidelines of the party leader. While more experienced parliamentarians were often bound to the party leader by decades-long political loyalty, the newly elected deputies were normally inexperienced, did not have their own political networks, and depended very much on the support of the party patron when it came to their political career (Croissant, 2002a). Finally – as an indicator of the party leader's decision-making authority and a factor that further reinforced his authority – the floor leader was not usually chosen by the Assembly members of the party but appointed by the party president.

The programmatic Chun-Shin-Chung faction that emerged in Kim Dae-jung's party in the late 1990s obviously had an interest in making the allocation of financial resources more transparent, as this would undermine the clientelistic factions' ability to both mobilize large sums of money through close relationships with business conglomerates and then use this money to foster patron–client linkages with the electorate. Therefore, after the Chun-Shin-Chung faction formed the *Uri* Party to support President Roh in his reform efforts, stricter political financing laws were crafted in 2004.

The first logic – that it would have to become more difficult for individual politicians to collect large corporate donations – led to two important changes in the legislation. First of all, a lower limit for financial contributions was set. The maximum amount money each assemblyman is allowed to collect each year decreased by half – from 3 billion won to 1.5 billion won – while the maximum amount each voter can donate a year was lowered to 20 million won, one sixth of the previous limit. Secondly, the new laws regulated unidentifiable money. The maximum amount for anonymous donations, per person and per donation, is now 100,000 won – lowered by one tenth – and donations larger than 500,000 won must now be transferred through cheque or credit card. However, although these new laws – enforced by the Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption (KICAC), which was established in 2002 – seem to have helped to reduce political corruption, they have not completely stopped the practice of illegal donations. As a former legislator explains, 'although the situation has changed slightly, even now [...] supporters donate funds under the table' (cited in Y. Kim, 2008: 386).

The second logic – that spending money on the clientelistic mobilization of voters would have to become more difficult – was also translated

into a number of new laws passed in 2004. For example, the Public Office Election Act now states that a politician should not provide any money, goods, foods, books, tours or transportation to constituencies. According to the newly added Article 26, if a politician violates the law, he or she must pay '50 times of the original price incurred' in fines. Moreover, anyone to report such wrongdoings to the authorities will receive whistleblower protection and a monetary reward of up to 500 million won. The National Election Commission has been aggressively enforcing these strict rules, which has led to a significant decline in reported vote-buying activities (Cho, 2005: 528; also see Kim, 2009: 140–45).

However, although these new political funding laws have made the allocation of financial resources more transparent, the party bureaucracy remains powerless as an organizational element. This is because individual politicians carry on being the main target for financial contributions, while political parties have so far not established any significant sources of income themselves. As discussed above, both public subsidies and membership fees are negligible when compared to the high costs of electoral campaigns.

Reflecting the bureaucracy's lack of control over financial resources, the party central office does not enjoy any representation in any of the parties' decision-making bodies. The members of both the GNP's and UDP's executive committee are all elected, and there are no designated ex-officio posts within these bodies.²² Similarly, no representative from the party bureaucracy has voting rights in the parties' National Assembly caucuses; these are comprised of assemblymen only, who will also elect their floor leader without interference from outside. Finally, in both parties – and in contrast to the typical Western European model – the general secretary has in the past always been a parliamentarian, appointed by the party chairman (in the case of the GNP) or the executive committee (UDP).

In stark contrast to the two major political parties, in the KDLP all financial resources are controlled and allocated through the party bureaucracy. Not only does the party central office administer the income from membership dues, but any KDLP politician is obliged to forward all donations he or she collects to the national party. In addition, legislators must hand over much of their assemblyman salary, so they do not earn more than the average Korean worker. What is more, the party's constitution declares that the party central office must be represented in all decision-making bodies. Accordingly, the supreme committee, the party's highest executive body, is composed of the party chairman, the leader of the parliamentary party, the general secretary, the chairperson of the policy committee and seven other

elected members. The general secretary, who – in contrast to other Korean parties – is usually a party bureaucrat, also participates in the meetings of the party's caucus in the National Assembly.

To sum up, during the 'three Kims' era all politically relevant resources were monopolized by the party leader. Both candidates and the political parties thus depended on the party leader for their political survival. Only when Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung left politics did resources in their respective parties become more evenly distributed among a larger number of politicians. This is largely because new political finance laws have made it more difficult for single politicians to monopolize the allocation of resources, which, in turn, means that legislators and candidates increasingly have to rely on their own sources of income, such as donations mobilized through their supporter organizations. They cannot turn towards political parties for cash, since the latter do not control any sources of income themselves. That is to say, financial resources in the major Korean parties are thus mainly concentrated in the parliamentary party. However, it is doubtful whether we can therefore conclude that the party in public office is the dominant organizational face. Instead, given that each individual politician controls his or her own resources, it does not seem to be justifiable to even speak of a *party* in public office. In contrast, in the KDLP, political resources are mainly located in the party central office, which is also empowered to participate in the party's decision-making process.

Summary

The immediate post-autocratic electoral market in South Korea clearly favoured clientelistic over programmatic electoral strategies. This followed, first of all, from the fact that, similar to other newer democracies of the 'third wave', the working class was difficult to mobilize for electoral means because of the virulent anti-communism and the repressive anti-union laws that accompanied the process of industrialization under the authoritarian regime. Secondly, both the regime and the pro-democratic opposition used clientelistic forms of electoral mobilization in the regime's pseudo-elections, and through a negotiated democratic transition were able to transfer their patron-client networks into the new democratic arena. These networks are deeply embedded in Korean mass political culture and have thus taken on a life of their own – independent of the conditions of low socio-economic development that allowed their establishment in the first place.

Politicians that controlled such networks became the dominant actors in post-autocratic electoral politics. In line with their clientelistic strategies of voter mobilization, their parties were nothing but formal

façades to hide the patron–client networks from the public eye. Very much like the classical cadre party in early democratic Europe, the formal party organizations remained underdeveloped and the three faces of party organization did not emerge. Party members did not differ much from common citizens in terms of their rights within and their obligations towards the party, the party central leadership monopolized candidate selection for public elections and the party central office was merely a passive bureaucratic body without any independent decision-making power.

These traditional parties did not contain any actors interested in organizational change, since the various factions competing for the favour of the party leader themselves followed clientelistic strategies of voter mobilization. Programmatic actors only first emerged in the MDP in the late 1990s. However, since these actors lacked the necessary resources to seriously challenge the clientelistic factions within the party, the emerging Chun-Shin-Chung faction, which positioned itself on a number of post-material issues, hid its preferences for organizational change and decided to wait for the right moment to move into open opposition. This moment came in 2002 when the dominant clientelistic factions made the strategic miscalculation to introduce primaries to nominate the party's presidential candidate. Facilitated by a broader political discourse – made possible by the end of the Cold War and a diminished threat from North Korea – the Chun-Shin-Chung faction was able to win both the MDP's primary and the presidential election. It then entered into an alliance with civic organizations, successfully following a strategy of displacement, which led to far-reaching reforms of political finance laws and the electoral system in 2004.

The more progressive language of the political debate also strengthened programmatic actors in the former regime party, the GNP. The promise of regaining control of the discourse provided Lee Myung-bak with the necessary resources to forge a party internal alliance against the clientelistic old guards. Benefiting greatly from his public image as an economic mastermind, Lee formulated catch-all policies based around economic growth and a rising living standard.

In both parties, the programmatic actors set out to formalize internal procedures, in an attempt to make the outcome of decision-making processes less dependent on the clientelistic allocation of resources. In particular, given that clientelistic factions controlled the largest share of party members through patron–client networks, programmatic actors pushed for candidate selection to be made outside the political party – by either public opinion polls or independent screening committees.

While these measures have not led to the emergence of a new type of political party in South Korea – as the three faces of party organization remain indistinguishable – it is safe to say that, in combination with the stricter political finance laws passed in 2004, political parties have become more institutionalized, with their survival less dependent on the will of individual party leaders.

This leaves the question of why the programmatic factions have not worked towards a political party type that is not only characterized by clearly distinguishable organizational faces, but – in line with the factions' catch-all strategies – a dominant party central office. More specifically, why have these factions not introduced a more demanding concept of party membership and helped the party as an abstract organization to establish its own sources of income? The answer to this question lies in the fact that individual politicians within these factions have developed their own supporter organizations, through which they can mobilize both labour for campaign-related activities and financial funds. Programmatic politicians had to set up such supporter organizations because the major political parties were unable to provide them with these resources. However, although these politicians are now in a position where they could reform party organizations to become a provider of such resources, they lack the incentives to do so, as this would involve pooling their own resources under the central control of the party as an abstract organization. In other words, the various supporter organizations controlled by each individual politician seriously undermine the need for a party on the ground or a party central office. All the party needs to provide are formalized rules for decision-making, so the party can speak with a single voice.

However, facilitated by the electoral reforms passed in 2004, the Korean party system has also seen the emergence of the KDLP – a party that radically breaks with the traditional pattern of Korean political party organization. In line with the party's programmatic strategy promising the distribution of club goods to clearly defined segments in society, the KDLP has invested heavily in a formal organization. This organization features a dominant party central office as a means to enforce ideological discipline among the members of the party public office. The party central office controls the party's financial resources and has considerable participatory rights in the party's internal decision-making procedures. Moreover, to increase party discipline even further, the KDLP actively recruits party members – not only as a source of income and free labour, but also as a pool of potential candidates. In return for these contributions, members are granted

significant participatory rights in the party's process of candidate selection. However, candidate selection is organized as a closed primary, which atomizes and thus weakens the party on the ground. Thus, unlike the socialist mass parties in late nineteenth-century Europe, the KDLP is not characterized by a symbiotic relationship between the party on the ground and the party central office. The latter, undeniably, enjoys the most powerful position within the party.

Although the constellation of party organizations in post-autocratic Korea is very similar to party systems in nineteenth-century Europe, with mass parties challenging the hegemonic position of cadre parties, this should not be understood as a case of 'history repeating itself' – and thus a confirmation of the 'life cycle' theory. Instead, party organizations in Korea are the product of strategic calculations made in a specific context that favours certain strategies over others. This becomes most obvious when considering the organizational changes that the two major parties have gone through in recent years. These parties did not follow the same path as the classical cadre party but have adopted a very particular organization that does not feature any formal faces and only provides very rudimentary regulations for conflict resolution. This organization is the product of the unique historical development of political parties in Korea, shaped by the conflict between strategic actors in a distinct electoral market.

3

Taiwan

Political parties in Taiwan share many similarities with contemporary parties in Western Europe, as the party in public office is clearly the dominant organizational element. However, as our analysis will show, each of the parties arrived at this stage not through an ‘evolutionary leap’, but through following a very distinctive path of organizational development, constrained by both the inter-factional conflict within them and the particular environmental context.

The transition to democracy

The change of the Taiwanese political system from a one-party state to a fully fledged democracy happened through a transformation guided from above (Tien, 1997: 124). The ruling *Kuomintang* (KMT, Nationalist Party) never lost control of the protracted transition process, while the pro-democratic opposition could only sit and watch as different groupings within the regime negotiated the new rules of the electoral game. Therefore, the clientelistic networks, which certain elements within the regime had built around local power brokers in order to mobilize voters in local level elections, survived the transformation of the political system. On the other hand, given the high level of socio-economic development achieved under the regime’s state-led programme of industrialization, setting up *new* patron–client networks in the post-autocratic electoral system is a difficult task.

The KMT imposed martial law on Taiwan in 1949 after the national government of China headed by Chiang Kai-shek was forced to flee the mainland from the advancing communist forces. Taiwan became the last fallback position for the Republic of China, leading to a sudden influx of 2 million party functionaries, state officials, soldiers and

entrepreneurs. The KMT, which after the defeat reorganized itself according to Leninist principles in order to emulate the Communist Party of China (CPC), soon began to 'colonize' the island by placing party cadres in all key positions of the state apparatus – including the military – and integrating society into a mass party organization (Dickson, 1993). All other parties were banned, and elections only held at the local level, while the distribution of seats in the national parliament was 'frozen'. The Taiwanese, who still constituted the overwhelming majority of society, were thus practically excluded from the political decision-making process.¹

The KMT legitimized its authoritarian rule by declaring itself to be the sole legal government of China, with the aim of temporarily rebuilding military force on Taiwan before retaking the mainland from the communists. Moreover, legitimacy also stemmed from the miraculous economic development that Taiwan enjoyed under KMT government (Roy, 2003: 104; see also Table 3.1). Much of this economic success can be explained by strong state intervention into the market (Wade, 2004). The KMT shaped the market by laws, regulations and fiscal policies, but also by becoming an economic actor itself, using its monopoly on vital inputs – such as steel, petrochemicals and heavy machines – to build an 'array of satellite suppliers and subservient downstream firms' (Cheng and Chu, 2002: 200).

However, when, in the late 1970s, it became clear that the international community was no longer willing to support the KMT's claim of sovereignty over China, the KMT suffered a severe blow to its credibility (Wachman, 1994: 135). At the same time, Taiwan's rapid industrialization had led to the emergence of a new middle class, which clearly

Table 3.1 Socio-economic development in Taiwan

	GDP per capita (US dollar)	Gini coefficient	Degree of urbanization (in %)	Literacy (in %)
Taiwan	7,981 (1990) 17,116 (2008)	0.312 (1990) 0.326 (2000)	74.1 (1989) 80.0 (2008)	94.0 (1990) 97.2 (2004)
Japan	33,632 (2007)	0.249 (2007)	66.8 (2010)	99.0 (2007)
United Kingdom	35,130 (2007)	0.360 (2007)	90.1 (2010)	99.0 (2007)
USA	45,592 (2007)	0.408 (2007)	82.3 (2010)	99.0 (2007)

Source: Department of Investment Services (undated); Government Information Office (undated); Tsai (1996); United Nations Development Programme (undated).

reflected the sub-ethnic division in society: 'As national politics was primarily reserved for mainlanders, [...] Taiwanese pursued *economic* advancement for social upward mobility' (Cheng, 1989: 482; emphasis added). The political demand of the growing middle class was clear: Taiwan should be governed by the Taiwanese majority, not by a small minority as a part of China.

Under the leadership of Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek, who succeeded his father in power in 1978, the KMT reacted to this loss of legitimacy with a strategy of 'Taiwanization', opening top ranks in the party and in government to sub-ethnic Taiwanese (Hood, 1997: 65). Consequently, the proportion of Taiwanese members in the KMT's central standing committee rose from 14.3 per cent in 1973 to 57.1 per cent in 1993 (Huang, 1996: 119–20). Over the years this sub-ethnic divide within the KMT gave rise to the formation of two larger factions: the Mainstream, including mostly Taiwanese, and the Non-mainstream, mainly a grouping of mainland-born politicians and children of mainlanders born on Taiwan.

Simultaneously, the regime decided to hold 'supplementary' elections on the national level in order to replace those parliamentarians who had either become too old to govern or had passed away. Marginalized in the party internal power game, members of the Mainstream faction started developing links with local factions to mobilize support in these and local elections (Hood, 1997: 109).² Local factions (*difang paixi*) are large interpersonal networks that are held together by *guanxi* – a term connoting social ties and connections (kin, patron–client bonds, friendship, neighbourhood, school and so on) (Bosco, 1992: 158). In return for their electoral support, local factions were given economic privileges, such as special loans by provincial banks, contracts for public construction projects and protection for illegal businesses (e.g., brothels and gambling dens) (Wang, 1994: 185).

The ban on political parties remained in force, but opposition candidates began to coordinate their campaign activities in the so-called *dangwai* movement (literally, 'outside the party'). However, there was disagreement over whether this was the best strategy to bring down the KMT regime, resulting in a split between radical and moderate groupings (Tsang, 1999: 12). Whereas the Formosa faction and other moderate groups advocated political change through elections, the New Tide faction was committed to push for democratization from outside the system. As the opposition still had hardly any influence over legislation, the resulting frustrations favoured the radicals within the *dangwai* (Cheng and Haggard, 1990: 68). At the same time, the regime perceived

the limited electoral success of the *dangwai* as a serious threat, which provoked a split within the regime between hard- and soft-liners, with the hard-liners initially holding the upper hand.

The more radical tactics of the *dangwai* – which were centred on social mobilization – were soon crushed by the regime hard-liners when a mass demonstration held in Kaohsiung on 10 December 1979 was put to a violent end by riot police, and most leaders of the radical faction within the opposition were jailed. This tipped the balance back in favour of the moderate forces in the opposition camp, which, in turn, advantaged the KMT soft-liners, who soon resumed the process of political liberalization (Cheng, 1989: 486–7). With the moderates in control, the *dangwai* again concentrated on institutionalizing a competitive electoral organization, eventually leading to the founding of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in September 1986. The KMT silently tolerated this move, before proclaiming the end of martial law and, only a few weeks later, the end of the prohibition against political associations. The first free and fair elections for a national parliament were held in 1991.

The electoral market: leaders, factions and parties

The strategic calculations made by the KMT's soft-liners turned out to be correct, as the party succeeded in staying in power until 2000. The electoral success of the KMT during that decade was to a large extent based on the Mainstream faction's clientelistic connections with local factions. On the other hand, both the Non-mainstream faction within the KMT, as well as the DPP, lacking similar clientelistic links, developed programmatic appeals. Most importantly, the DPP increasingly focused on catch-all issues such as good governance, attacking the KMT on its vote-buying practices. This played a vital role in bringing down the KMT government in 2000 and virtually eliminated clientelism as a strategic option for the mobilization of voters. Instead, both the KMT and the DPP are now dominated by factions campaigning on catch-all platforms.

A one-party dominant system

Some authors have described the process of democratization in Taiwan as a 'protracted transition' (Rigger, 2000), given that the KMT continued to dominate party politics for almost a decade after holding the first free and fair elections. In fact, throughout the 1990s, the effective number of parliamentary parties never exceeded 2.5, as the KMT successfully managed to maintain its absolute parliamentary majority.

Table 3.2 Taiwan: party system indicators

	ENEP ^a	ENPP ^b	Volatility ^c
1992	1.95	1.86	–
1995	2.51	2.42	16.70
1998	2.65	2.25	11.30
2001	4.12	3.47	28.60
2004	3.71	3.25	7.10
2008	2.30	1.75	23.30
<i>Average</i>	<i>2.85</i>	<i>2.50</i>	<i>17.40</i>

^aEffective number of electoral parties calculated on the share of votes in elections to the Legislative Yuan (for 2008 using the vote for the single-member constituency).

^bEffective number of parliamentary parties in the Legislative Yuan.

^cFor 2008, based on the vote for the single-member constituency.

Source: Author's own calculations based on Table 3.3.

Table 3.3 Taiwan: results for Legislative Yuan elections

Party	1992		1995		1998		2001		2004		2008 ^a	
	V ^b	S ^c	V	S	V	S	V	S	V	S	V	S
KMT	53.0	59.0	46.1	51.8	46.4	54.7	28.6	30.2	32.8	35.1	53.5	71.7
DPP	31.0	31.7	33.2	32.9	29.6	31.1	33.4	38.7	35.7	39.6	38.2	23.9
NP	–	–	13.0	12.8	7.1	4.9	2.6	0.4	0.1	0.4	–	–
TAIP	–	–	–	–	1.4	0.4	–	–	–	–	–	–
PFP	–	–	–	–	–	–	18.6	20.4	13.9	15.1	0.3	0.9
TSU	–	–	–	–	–	–	7.8	5.8	7.8	5.3	0.9	0.0
Other	16.0	9.3	7.7	2.5	15.5	8.9	9.0	4.5	9.6	2.8	3.1	3.2

^aThe share of votes for the 2008 elections is calculated on the absolute number of votes received by parties in the single-member constituencies.

^bShare of votes (in %).

^cShare of seats (in %).

Source: Rinza (2001); Lin (2002); Chen (2006); IFES Election Guide (undated).

Similarly, volatility remained at a relatively low level for a new democracy, indicating that voters did not switch their votes from the regime party to other alternatives (see Table 3.2). As a result, the DPP, as the main opposition party, failed to significantly increase its seat share during the elections in the 1990s and never posed a serious threat to the former regime party (see Table 3.3).

Turning our attention towards the intra-party level, we can observe that, from the beginning, a power-sharing agreement was institutionalized within the DPP to accommodate the different groupings: while the

moderates dominated the party's decision-making apparatus (the party chair and the central standing committee), the New Tide obtained a disproportionate share of posts in the party bureaucracy (Rigger, 2001a: 25). In order to diminish the influence of the New Tide, the moderate forces within the DPP merged with the Formosa faction, which had risen to high prominence after its leaders were pardoned and released from prison in the late 1980s.

Factional politics in the DPP were thus characterized by intense confrontation. Conflict between the two factions revolved mainly around the search for an efficient electoral strategy. Once the KMT followed through with its promise to lift martial law and hold free and fair elections, the issue of democratic reform lost its value as a vehicle for voter mobilization (Rigger, 1999: 148). It soon became apparent that the DPP had been nothing more than an 'umbrella' party for adversaries of the KMT regime. Whereas the New Tide followed a very narrow ideology, stressing the sub-ethnic cleavage and calling blatantly for Taiwanese independence from mainland China, the Formosa group took a much more moderate standpoint, and argued that self-determination could only be achieved through open debates and referenda (Chao, 2002: 108). Gathering most of the opposition's political celebrities, the Formosa faction thus combined a catch-all programmatic strategy with charisma. Both factions also differed as to their level of institutionalization: whereas the Formosa faction could be classified as a personalized faction, the New Tide was virtually a 'party within a party' (Arrigo, 1994: 161) with its own professional staff and a highly sophisticated organizational apparatus.

In the initial years after the DPP's founding, the Formosa faction prevailed over the New Tide. However, things changed when overseas advocates of Taiwan independence were allowed back into the country. Many of the returning exiles soon joined the DPP, thereby tipping the inter-factional balance in favour of the New Tide (Wachman, 1994: 118). This allowed the New Tide to launch a credible attack on the party's policy platform at the 1991 national party congress to 'persuade' the Formosa faction to make Taiwanese independence the principal policy goal. After several rounds of negotiations the two factions finally came to a compromise. The Formosa faction was allowed to renew its party leadership, while the New Tide's urge for national sovereignty for Taiwan became the DPP's official ideological line (Cheng and Hsu, 1996: 147).

Thus, the issue of national identity was introduced into the electoral arena, almost immediately developing into the most important factor by which to explain voting behaviour (Hsieh, 2002: 38). If the KMT

wanted to compete successfully with the DPP under the new democratic rules, it needed to take a stand on the question of national identity. This caused intense factional conflict within the former regime party. Whereas the conservative Non-mainstream held the orthodox view that the government in Taipei was the sole legitimate government of China, which had a duty to promote Chinese unification and nationalism, the Mainstream – although not ruling out the possibility of a unified China in the future – maintained that Taiwan was *de facto* independent (Hood, 1996). Although offering different answers on how to manage relations with mainland China, both positions were best characterized as catch-all strategies, as even the Non-mainstream took a rather pragmatic view, arguing that unification was best achieved through economic development and strengthening economic ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC) (Hao, 1996).

In addition, the Mainstream could rely on its close connections with local factions developed under autocratic rule to mobilize voters through clientelistic means (Hood, 1997: 109). Local factions were mobilized through vote brokers (called *tiau-a-ka* in Taiwanese), each of whom was responsible for buying only a relatively small number of votes. Most vote brokers were local politicians, criminal gang leaders, heads of voluntary associations or large business owners (Chin, 2003: 136).³ These clientelistic networks provided the Mainstream faction with a competitive advantage over the Non-mainstream, because vote-buying helped to solve the strategic puzzles posed by Taiwan's electoral system at the time – namely, single non-transferable vote (SNTV). Because SNTV encourages competition between candidates of the same party, larger parties face two problems (Lijphart et al., 1986: 158–9). First of all, the party will have to decide on how many candidates to nominate in a given district. Secondly, the party needs to distribute votes evenly among the candidates. Clientelism helps overcome these strategic challenges because it provides politicians with a measure of their strength in a given district and a mechanism to distribute votes among candidates.

Its extensive vote-buying practices – facilitated by the fact that laws regulating political finance were mere paper tigers (Ferdinand, 2003) – therefore allowed the Mainstream faction to increase its power *vis-à-vis* the Non-mainstream (Wu, 2001a: 64–5). Led by then president Lee Teng-hui, the Mainstream used this expanded power to move the KMT's policy platform towards a more moderate position on the Taiwanese identity versus Chinese identity spectrum (Fell, 2005a: 111). By doing so, the Mainstream disappointed many who wished to uphold the political

legacy of Chiang Kai-shek, and ultimately provoked the New Alliance, a faction of mainly second-generation mainlanders within the Non-mainstream, to split away from the KMT in order to establish the New Party (NP) in 1993 (Hood, 1996: 477). This firmly established the Mainstream as the KMT's dominant faction.⁴

While inter-factional conflict in the KMT thus escalated into a party split, friction between factions in the DPP decreased throughout the 1990s. This was largely due to the fact that the New Tide faction moderated its own ideology (Chao, 2002: 113). Faction leaders saw changes to the New Tide's ideological position as necessary, as they slowly came to realize that not only was the faction's independence platform completely out of synch with what voters wanted on this issue, but, most significantly, it risked provoking a military conflict with the PRC. The electorate penalized the DPP's far-left position on the unification–independence spectrum as early as 1991, when the party only won 29 per cent of the votes in the National Assembly elections (compared to 71 per cent won by the KMT).⁵ The finishing blow to the New Tide's radical position then came in the 1996 presidential elections, which were overshadowed by military manoeuvres held by the PRC in the Taiwan Strait, making it clear that Taiwanese independence could only be achieved by entering a major war. After these electoral setbacks, the New Tide began to redraft its independence policy, bringing it into line with public opinion (Rigger, 2001a: 126).⁶ That is to say, an external shock – military aggression from communist China – led the New Tide to broaden its electoral appeal beyond the small group of voters in favour of Taiwanese independence. This allowed the New Tide to maintain its powerful position within the party. In fact, until the dissolution of the Formosa faction in 2000, the DPP would be controlled by a balanced New Tide–Formosa coalition that was pitted against smaller factions, which had emerged in the early 1990s (Fulda, 2002: 331).

To sum up, while the neo-democratic party system in Taiwan was best described as a one-party dominant system, party internal politics were characterized by constantly shifting power constellations. In the KMT, the clientelistic Mainstream became increasingly powerful, thus sidelining the programmatic Non-mainstream faction, while in the DPP inter-factional conflict lessened over the years, eventually leading to a coalition between the two main factions, Formosa and New Tide, which both adopted a catch-all strategy of voter mobilization. However, to complete the picture, it should be noted that actors in the DPP, too, have developed clientelistic links to voters. In fact, similar to the Korean *sajojik*, politicians in Taiwan usually maintain supporter organizations

(*houyuanhui*), which are built around a common interest of their members, such as profession or religion. Moreover, most national legislators maintain so-called 'service centres' (*fuwuchu*), which commonly offer services to voters, such as legal advice, medical consultation and job-search assistance. However, while these practices can clearly be described as clientelistic, they do not compare to the systematic vote-buying machine developed by the KMT's Mainstream.

The emergence of catch-all politics

The Taiwanese party system began to shift when a second split occurred within the KMT – this time triggered by the emergence of the highly charismatic James Soong as a serious contender for power. Lee Teng-hui, once a close party associate of Soong's, had appointed Soong as the governor of Taiwan Province in 1993.⁷ Things became sour between the two when Lee perceived Soong's increasing popularity with the electorate as a threat to his own status and thus did not nominate Soong as prime minister in 1996, although Soong felt that, as the governor of Taiwan, he should have naturally been selected. Moreover, in 1998, the Lee government decided to abolish Taiwan Province as an administrative unit, thereby – deliberately, as Soong and his supporters believed – destroying Soong's power base. Finally, when Soong lost the KMT's nomination for the presidential candidate in 2000 against Lien Chan, who Lee endorsed as his successor, Soong left the party to stand as an independent and establish the People First Party (PFP) shortly before the 2001 Legislative Yuan elections.

Lee's powerful position within the KMT collapsed when Lien Chan only finished third in the 2000 presidential election, behind the DPP's Chen Shui-bian and James Soong. Rumours started spreading within the KMT that Lee had only favoured the unpopular Lien Chan to secretly support Chen Shui-bian, who otherwise would not have been strong enough to beat Soong. As a result, Lee had to resign from the party chairmanship to take responsibility for the devastating result, and Lien Chan was elected as his successor by the national party congress in June 2000. Immediately after assuming chairmanship, Lien Chan formed a reform committee to examine ways for the party to reform itself and make itself competitive in future elections (Tan, 2002: 158).

During that review, one strategic mistake that was identified was the KMT's problematic position at the ideological centre of the national identity spectrum. Under Lee Teng-hui, the KMT attacked both the DPP for pushing for independence, and the NP for advocating rapid

unification. It was felt that this contradictory tone lost the KMT votes on both sides (Fell, 2005a: 120). Moreover, the Mainstream's reliance on its clientelistic links with local factions for electoral mobilization had paved the way for organized crime to enter the Legislative Yuan and led to increasing levels of political corruption at the national level, mainly because local faction leaders were themselves nominated as candidates, rather than just serving as vote brokers (Yu et al., 2008). The DPP had turned the 'black gold' issue into an effective campaign weapon, portraying the KMT as a criminal and crooked organization (Fell, 2005b: 882).

It is thus safe to say that the devastating defeat in the 2000 presidential election resulted in a critical juncture in the inter-factional power relations, as, almost overnight, the Non-mainstream replaced the Mainstream as the dominant faction. In fact, many supporters of Lee Teng-hui left the party in order to establish the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). The Non-mainstream used its sudden increase in power to cut the party's clientelistic links to local factions (at least at the national level) and reintroduced many traditional principles into the party's policy platform. The KMT disposed of Lee's 'two-states theory', which held that Taiwan and the PRC enjoyed 'special state to state relations', and returned to the formula of 'one China, two political entities', advocating unification of Taiwan and the mainland in a Chinese confederation (Schubert, 2004: 541). This position was again best described as a catch-all strategy, as the new programmatic platform only set very broad political targets. The party's main aim over the next few years became that of creating an atmosphere of fear – fear of war and fear of economic downturn. For instance, in the 2004 presidential election, the KMT campaigned mainly on the message that 'the People's Republic of China would soon attack Taiwan because of dictator Chen' (Schafferer, 2006: 49).

While the KMT thus remembered its ideological roots, the DPP continued its ideological moderation. More specifically, after winning the presidency in 2000, the party made it clear that it wished to conserve the status quo in the relations between Taiwan and PRC, while leaving any decision about future changes to the Taiwanese population (Chao, 2003). In a similar way to the KMT, this campaign message was phrased in highly negative terms: the DPP accused the KMT of 'betraying Taiwan' (Shyu, 2008: 146). Furthermore, the DPP followed through with its electoral promise to pass stricter anti-corruption legislation, which included barring organized crime suspects from running in elections and cleansing farmers' and fishermen's associations of bad loans – an

important tool in the hands of vote brokers (Göbel, 2004: 10–11). While the success of these measures has been mixed, there is wide consensus that vote-buying has become less effective as an electoral strategy (Fell, 2005b: 890).

As to the factional configuration within the DPP, it can be noted that the Formosa faction slowly disintegrated, triggered by the decision of its long-term patron, Xu Xinliang, to run as an independent candidate in the 2000 presidential election (Fulda, 2002: 331). This left the New Tide pitted against a number of smaller factions, most of which had allied at the parliamentary level to form the Mainstream Alliance in order to support President Chen Shui-bian in the Legislative Yuan.⁸ Until the end of his presidency in 2008 Chen maintained a strong position of authority within the DPP. This was despite his approval rating dropping to a mere 16 per cent in mid-2006, amid a series of corruption scandals involving some of his close family members and aides. Most likely, several faction leaders – with Chen's knowledge – were also involved in corruption, giving Chen effective blackmail material.

Summary

As in any new democracy, the post-autocratic electoral market in Taiwan mitigates against programmatic strategies based on the distribution of club goods. Moreover, the high level of socio-economic development makes it difficult for politicians to develop clientelistic linkages with voters. Under authoritarian rule, only the Mainstream faction within the KMT maintained clientelistic networks to mobilize voters in the regime's quasi-elections. Given that the transition to democracy was controlled from above, the Mainstream succeeded in transferring these networks into the neo-democratic arena of inter-party competition. Not only that, these clientelistic networks were so successful in mobilizing voters that the Mainstream considerably increased its power in the party internal power struggle against the Non-mainstream, until it eventually became the dominant faction in 1993, when a large number of Non-mainstream followers split away from the KMT to form the NP.

Initially, inter-factional conflict was also intense in the main opposition party, the DPP. While the dominant Formosa faction targeted the median voter on the unification–independence spectrum, the New Tide was driven by a more radical ideology, calling loudly for Taiwanese independence. However, triggered by military threats from the PRC in 1996, the New Tide adopted a more moderate position, arguing that any changes in the relationships between Taiwan and the PRC should be left

to the Taiwanese people. This paved the way for a coalition between Formosa and New Tide, with both factions following a catch-all electoral strategy. In particular, under this two-faction coalition, the DPP shifted the focus of its electoral campaigns to issues of clean government.

The DPP's anti-corruption slogans played an important part in bringing down the KMT government in 2000, which, in turn, caused a critical juncture in the inter-factional power relationships within the KMT. Because the Mainstream's clientelistic connections with local factions were perceived to be responsible for the KMT's corrupt image among voters, the Mainstream's power collapsed literally overnight, allowing the Non-mainstream to re-establish itself as the dominant faction. The Non-mainstream strengthened the programmatic profile of the KMT by moving the party back to its traditional position on the unification-independence spectrum. This position was best described as a catch-all strategy, as it mainly criticized the DPP for jeopardizing economic growth through its anti-China policies. Meanwhile, the DPP came under increasing control by the New Tide as the Formosa slowly disintegrated. The DPP thus continued its course of programmatic moderation, which moved the party further away from the goal of Taiwanese independence.

We can therefore conclude that, as the party system changed from a one-party dominant into a multiparty system, the two major parties have come to be dominated by actors that follow broad catch-all strategies. Mobilizing voters through clientelistic appeals, on the other hand, has become very difficult due to more effective laws regulating electoral competition.⁹ In line with their catch-all strategies, we should thus expect both the KMT and DPP to have adopted party organizations that feature a strong party in public office.

The organization of political parties

The organizational development of political parties in Taiwan unfolded as expected from the changing inter-factional power relations within the parties. In the KMT, the Mainstream increasingly moved decision-making out of the formal party organization in order to be in a better position to manage its clientelistic relationships with local factions. This process was only reversed after the critical juncture following the 2000 presidential election, which re-established the Non-mainstream as the KMT's dominant faction. In the DPP, the two main factions originally had different ideas regarding the organization. However, as the New Tide broadened its electoral appeal, a consensus over the best type of party

organization emerged between the two factions. Because both major political parties have thus come under the control of actors following catch-all strategies of voter mobilization, they share many similarities with their counterparts in contemporary Western Europe. Party members only differ slightly in their rights and obligations from ordinary citizens, the procedures of candidate selection are highly inclusive – extending participatory rights to voters outside the party – and the role of the party bureaucracy is limited to the professional administration of the party's resources. This all translates to the party in public office being the dominant element of party organization.

Party membership

In Taiwan, as in South Korea, many party members do not join the party because they identify with the party's ideology or policy programme, but because they are recruited through the personal network of a politician within the party. The politician will then pay the membership fees, administer the membership ID cards and instruct the members how to vote in party internal elections. However, this form of 'party' membership – solely motivated through the interpersonal relationship between the member and the politician – is not the general case. While it is impossible to present figures that would reflect the exact share of members who are simply power resources in the hands of a political boss, a number of indirect indicators can help to achieve a rough estimate. First of all, the fact that there are several words in political Taiwan to describe this type of member – *rentoudangyuan* (literally, head members) or *koudaidangyuan* (pocket members) – thus distinguishing them from regular party members in a more Western European understanding, shows that they are not the general rule.¹⁰ Moreover, pocket members have usually been regarded more as a problem of the DPP rather than the KMT, simply because the KMT has a much larger membership, thereby making it more difficult for single politicians to have a large enough personal network of supporters that could influence party internal decision-making in his or her favour.

The KMT's membership figures have traditionally been relatively high. In an attempt to imitate the organizational structures of the CPC, the KMT, in the early 1950s, started building a mass membership foundation that would incorporate all sectors of society into the party. Members were organized into about 30,000 party cells in geographical and administrative units (down to village level) as well as at the workplace (such as

Table 3.4 Taiwan: party membership figures

	KMT			DPP			Total M/E
	M ^a	M/V ^b	M/E ^c	M	M/V	M/E	
1950	80,043	n/a	n/a	–	–	–	–
1975	1,448,106	n/a	n/a	–	–	–	–
1990	2,546,429	n/a	n/a	–	–	–	–
1991	2,570,904	42.1	17.8	24,546	1.2	0.1	17.9
1992	2,617,651	52.0	18.6	–	–	–	–
1995	–	–	–	49,674	1.6	0.4	–
2000	2,200,000	47.2	15.7	150,000	5.1	1.1	16.8
2005	900,000	28.2	6.4	400,000	11.5	2.9	9.3
2008	1,000,000	18.9	7.0	250,000	6.6	1.8	8.8

^aParty membership – real figures and estimates.

^bMembership/voter ratio.

^cMembership/electorate ratio.

Source: Wu (1997: 236); Guo et al. (1998: 195); author's personal communication with the political parties.

in government offices, schools, businesses and the transportation sector). Party membership size grew from 80,000 in 1950 to more than 2.6 million in 1992. Even after the introduction of free and fair elections, the membership level remained well above the 2 million mark, which translates into more or less 14 per cent of the total electorate.

However, after 2000 the membership figures dropped sharply (see Table 3.4). This was the result of stricter membership criteria implemented by the Non-mainstream faction. The Non-mainstream faction used the critical juncture caused by the devastating defeat in the 2000 presidential election to implement various measures aimed at excluding pocket members – or fake members (who only existed on paper) – from the party. Pocket members were mainly recruited through the clientelistic networks of the Mainstream faction and could thus be used as a power resource against the Non-mainstream. Therefore, when provided with the opportunity to reform the party organization in 2000, the Non-mainstream set out to cleanse the party membership from patron–client networks.

In order to do so, the Non-mainstream, first of all, introduced a regular membership fee of 200 New Taiwan dollars per annum.¹¹ Up until then, members had not been required to pay dues. Moreover, the Non-mainstream asked all party members to re-register their membership with the party. This required party members to pay their annual

membership fee at a local convenience store and then send the receipt together with the completed membership form to the national KMT headquarters. Collective receipts that listed more than one membership fee payment were not accepted. What is more, the national party conducted spot checks to make sure that the citizens who registered did indeed exist and had provided the correct contact details.

Although this system still contains some loopholes, recruiting pocket members has certainly become more difficult, as can readily be deduced from the smaller membership figures after 2000.¹² In other words, we can assume that the majority of party members nowadays join the KMT because they identify with the party and its values, and not due to their role as a client in a patron–client relationship. This works in favour of the Non-mainstream faction, which, through its programmatic platform based on the KMT's traditional goal of reunification with the Chinese mainland, can offer collective incentives to its supporters. These collective incentives, in turn, justify the enforcement of regular membership fees.

One party internal group that has traditionally been characterized by a high share of die-hard ideologists is the party's *Huang Fu-xing* division. This special branch consists mainly of military servicemen and veterans as well as their relatives, most of whom are mainland Chinese and still have strong feelings for China. The *Huang Fu-xing* had lost a large number of its members due to Lee Teng-hui's pro-Taiwan policy, but when the KMT returned to its more traditional position on the China question in 2000 many rejoined the party (particularly from the NP), bringing the membership figure of this particular sub-party grouping back to about 200,000 (*Taipei Times*, 2001).

In the DPP, because the party membership is much smaller, pocket members are a more serious problem. As can be seen from Table 3.4, even nine years after the party was founded, only 50,000 voters had registered as DPP members. Even before the 2000 presidential elections the figure had only risen to 150,000. The sudden increase to 400,000 after Chen Shui-bian's historical victory was, first of all, interpreted by DPP leaders as a sign that fears of persecution based on political affiliation still existed before the transfer of power. Moreover, as the DPP became the party in power, thereby gaining immense powers of patronage and government spending, the rapid growth of the party membership can also be explained by an increasing influx of pocket members. Established figures in the DPP suddenly found themselves close to real political power and many saw the recruitment of pocket members as an effective way to promote their own interests within the party (Rigger, 2001a: 65).

In other words, the ballooning of the DPP's membership size after 2000 must be taken with a pinch of salt, since a large number of members only joined because they were paid by politically ambitious bosses.

Given that the New Tide faction has traditionally been paying a lot of attention to the ideological commitment of its members (Rigger, 2001a: 28), thus creating a small and exclusive membership, the faction should be interested in combating pocket members. However, the New Tide's capacity for doing so is extremely limited, mainly for two reasons. First, as will be discussed below in more detail, the DPP is financially dependent on the membership dues paid for pocket members. This is in sharp contrast to the KMT, which has a number of more profitable sources of income, and whose membership fees only account for a small fraction of the party's overall budget. Second, a large share of the pocket members is recruited by local level politicians. Cracking down on pocket members could provoke these politicians to run as independents, thereby reducing the DPP's already small pool of candidates even further.

As a result, measures to get rid of pocket members have so far only been half-hearted. For example, in the late 1990s, the DPP reduced annual membership fees from 1,000 to currently 300 New Taiwan dollars, hoping that this would attract more genuine members, which would then, in turn, reduce the share of pocket members among the total membership. In 2006, the DPP passed a resolution stipulating that the party would expel people who 'buy' members, and that those who sell their names would not be able to join the party for two years. However, unlike in the KMT, this was not accompanied by any actions that would effectively help to identify pocket members, such as re-registering party membership in person. The dramatic drop of the membership size to 250,000 in 2008 thus seems to be unrelated to this measure, particularly since in the same year Wu Chin-tai, a member of the DPP's youth committee still complained that 'the old system of collective voting [of pocket members] will continue and the same old faces will run the party' (Wu, 2008).

Pocket members obviously do not enjoy any powers as party members, since their membership fees are paid by the respective boss, who will also instruct them how to vote in party internal elections. However, because the largest share of party members is not recruited through clientelistic incentives, it makes sense to also analyse party membership through the *formal* regulations. This reveals that the requirements to become a member in one of Taiwan's two major parties are relatively low. The only obligations that come with party membership are those of abiding by the respective party's statutes and paying

regular fees. In the KMT, membership fees are an insignificant source of income and should best be understood as a strategic move by the Non-mainstream faction to make it more difficult for the rival Mainstream to maintain its clientelistic networks within the party membership. However, the fact that the KMT regularly communicates with its members (through an electronic newsletter and a frequently updated news section on the party's website) provides training to the heads of the local branches (in election campaigning, vote monitoring and so on) and holds introductory seminars for new members, shows that the party values its members and sees them as more than just as a mere statistic. Similarly, the DPP sends a weekly electronic newsletter to its members and frequently communicates with the rank-and-file via e-mail and text messaging. Moreover, the party also has a training programme that includes presentations by senior party leaders on party ideals as well as educative sessions on party regulations and the party platform.

We can thus conclude that, although clientelism plays a rather unimportant role in the mobilization of voters in national elections, party memberships in both major Taiwanese parties are penetrated by patron-client networks. While in the KMT the programmatic Non-mainstream – after establishing itself as the dominant faction in 2000 – took decisive measures to cleanse the party of so-called pocket members, the DPP's dominant New Tide faction continues to tolerate them. However, it can still be assumed that, even in the DPP, most members join the party because of collective incentives and not through clientelistic networks. The formal criteria necessary for membership therefore carry significant consequences. Put in comparative perspective, it is probably safe to say that party memberships in Taiwan show very similar characteristics to party memberships in contemporary Western European political parties in terms of inclusiveness and size.¹³

This can be explained by the catch-all strategies followed by the two factions that have come to dominate the KMT and DPP, as the formulation of policies aimed at distributing public goods does not require the organizational encapsulation of distinct social constituencies through compulsory training programmes and regular party meetings. Rather, party members are primarily seen as a source of income – particularly in the DPP – and a pool of free labour. Concerning the latter it can be observed that, while DPP local branches enjoy a high degree of independence from the party central (Rigger, 2001a: 58), KMT candidates are dependent on the party central for the mobilization of campaign helpers among the membership. However, in order to fully determine the power

of the party on the ground, we should also take into consideration the procedures for candidate selection.

Candidate selection

In both larger Taiwanese parties the procedures to nominate candidates for public elections on the national level have gone through some considerable changes over the last two decades. The methods originally implemented were relatively inclusive. In the KMT, to pick candidates for the 1989 'supplementary' elections to the Legislative Yuan, the Non-mainstream, which – although increasingly losing power – was still the dominant faction, decided to hold a closed primary in each electoral district.¹⁴ The Non-mainstream based its motivation on two calculations. First, it was hoped that closed primaries would reduce the power of local factions within the party. As local factions played an important part in the Mainstream's vote-buying machine, forcing candidates to compete in party primaries meant that local factions could not demand to have their own men nominated in return for the mobilization of votes (Robinson and Baum, 1993). The Mainstream was therefore bereft of a crucial resource with which to buy votes from local factions. Second, the Non-mainstream calculated that conservative party members, particularly those grouped in the *Huang Fu-xing*, would be easier to mobilize than the less ideologically committed supporters of the Mainstream faction (Wu, 2001b: 108).

Similar projections also led to the implementation of a closed primary system in the DPP, with the dominant Formosa faction estimating a numerical advantage over the New Tide, based on the two factions' differing organizational structures. As Rigger (2001a: 27) points out,

[f]rom the beginning, the Formosa Faction was centred on personalities, not issues. [...] Aspiring politicians affiliated with Formosa because they wanted to partake of its political resources: its power in nominations for electoral and party offices, its contacts with political heavyweights, and its connections with local political networks capable of mobilizing votes and raising money. The faction did not impose much discipline on its members, nor did it require them to embrace a particular ideology of platform. The only obligation Formosa imposed upon faction members was to support its leaders in contest for power within the party.

The New Tide, in contrast, was characterized by a strong ideological identity. Admission to the faction was based on quality, not quantity.

Even grassroots-level activists were required to pay regular dues, attend meetings, and commit vast amounts of time and energy to faction activities. Hence, the Formosa faction could be sure to rally more support for their candidates within the party than the New Tide.

Conversely, in both the KMT and the DPP, disadvantaged factions opposed the rules of candidate selection implemented by the dominant actors. In line with its clientelistic strategy of voter mobilization, the KMT's Mainstream faction was interested in centralizing the nomination procedure. As mentioned above, local factions not only received material rewards in return for their electoral support, but local faction members were themselves nominated as candidates. To ensure that local factions would be allocated nominations the Mainstream thus had to remove the competitive element and move the selectorate towards the highly exclusive end of the spectrum. The DPP's New Tide faction, too, had an interest in concentrating decision-making within a smaller selectorate. More specifically, reflecting its ideological motivation and its numerical advantage among the party's bureaucrats (see above), the New Tide was interested in strengthening the role of the party central office in the process of candidate selection. In order to achieve these changes both the KMT's Mainstream and the DPP's New Tide adopted a strategy of *layering*. This was the most promising strategy, as the rules of candidate selection did not provide much scope for interpretation and because the respective status quo actors – the Non-mainstream and the Formosa faction – still held powerful veto positions from which to protect the organizational rules.

Driven by the Mainstream's strategy of layering, over the next years the KMT added smaller selectorates to its system of closed primaries, thereby allowing the Mainstream to increase its influence over the final outcome. For the National Assembly elections in 1991 and the Legislative Yuan elections in 1992, the KMT decided to select candidates by what the party called a 'revised' closed primary. In the new system, party members were still given a vote, but the outcome did not serve as the only foundation on which the central standing committee nominated the candidates. The evaluation by local cadres contributed 40 per cent in 1991, and 50 per cent in 1992 (Wu, 2001b: 109). Local cadres played a key role in negotiations with local factions, and their inclusion in the process of candidate selection thus increased the Mainstream's ability to strategically allocate nominations to local faction candidates.

The space for the Mainstream faction to further centralize candidate selection opened significantly when large parts of the Non-mainstream split away from the KMT in 1993 to establish the NP. Firmly established

as the new dominant faction, the Mainstream stopped encouraging local party branches to conduct primaries and scrapped the participation of local cadres. This effectively meant that all power to nominate candidates for the 1995 Legislative Yuan election and the 1996 National Assembly election rested with the central standing committee. The nomination of the central standing committee members, in turn, was very much centralized in the hands of the party chairman who, since the 14th party congress in 1993, appointed half of the members plus one, while the remaining members needed the approval of the central committee, which again was to be elected by the delegates in the national congress (Huang, 1996: 112). The success of the Mainstream's strategy to centralize candidate selection as a means to allocate nominations to local factions is easily quantifiable, as the percentage of KMT legislators with a local faction background increased steadily throughout the 1990s (Chen, 1996: 189).

Meanwhile, in the DPP, the disadvantaged New Tide also succeeded in attaching new rules to the existing system of candidate selection. In 1995 and 1996, the party selected candidates by holding a ballot not only among the 50,000 party members but, in addition, among 200 party officers – with both results contributing 50 per cent to the final outcome (Guo et al., 1998: 200–201). The newly added element strengthened the party central office, which was where the New Tide had more supporters than the Formosa faction. The New Tide succeeded in attaching this new selectorate to the closed primary, as the primaries held between 1989 and 1992 had obviously been plagued by vote-buying and the strategic deployment of pocket members, which, in turn, negatively affected the DPP's public image (Rigger, 2001a: 78; Fell, 2006: 185). The New Tide thus held a strong argument as to why the participatory rights of ordinary party members should be curtailed.

However, the DPP did not hold on to these newly implemented rules for long. As explained above, the disastrous 1996 presidential elections prompted the New Tide faction to moderate its ideological stance and adopt a broad catch-all electoral appeal. Accordingly, the New Tide's organizational preferences changed from strengthening the party central office to strengthening the party in public office. This meant that the 200 party officials had again to be excluded from the process of candidate selection. Facing similar problems as the would-be catch-all parties in Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s (see Katz, 2001), the New Tide had the choice of either pushing for a more exclusive selectorate or a more inclusive selectorate. Seeing that the first option ran

contrary to the democratic ideal and thus carried the risk of alienating voters, the New Tide opted for the latter solution. More precisely, the New Tide pushed for the bureaucrat vote to be replaced by public opinion surveys.¹⁵

The New Tide opted for public opinion polls for three reasons. First, experience with an open primary in the run-up to the 1996 presidential election had shown that far fewer ballots were cast than expected, meaning that the candidate nominated would not necessarily have mass appeal (Rigger, 2001a: 99). Second, public opinion polls were seen as an effective weapon against the influence of pocket members (Fell, 2006: 186). Third, public opinion polls favour those politicians with constant media exposure – in other words, members of the party in public office.¹⁶

Consequently, as the New Tide further increased its power within the party after the dissolution of the Formosa faction in 2000, the share of opinion polls was increased further – from 50 to 70 per cent of the total result. The New Tide has failed to implement an even higher share not only because of the resistance from smaller factions, but also because this would effectively disempower the party on the ground, which, in turn, could lead to a mass exodus of party members. As will be seen in the next section, the DPP relies on membership fees for its financial survival.

In the KMT, the Non-mainstream faction used the critical juncture after the humiliating defeat in the 2000 presidential election to adopt a very similar system to nominate its candidates for Legislative Yuan elections.¹⁷ For the 2001 election, candidates were chosen on an equal weighting of a closed primary and public opinion surveys. Before the 2004 election, the ratio was shifted to 70:30 in favour of public opinion polls.¹⁸ The Non-mainstream saw public opinion polls as an efficient way to undermine the Mainstream's power within the party. The basic calculation was that because many of Lee Teng-hui's followers had been recruited through local factions and thus were generally associated with organized crime, corruption and other illegal activities, they were unlikely to do very well in public opinion polls. In addition, as in the DPP, public opinion polls would increase the power of the party in public office – that is, the organizational face the Non-mainstream was interested in strengthening to better implement its catch-all electoral strategy.

The development of candidate selection in the KMT and DPP is summarized in Figure 3.1. As can be seen, both parties began with relatively inclusive selectorates, giving all party members the right to vote. Closed




Figure 3.1 Taiwan: inclusiveness of the selectorate

Notes: The different categories to measure the inclusiveness of the selectorate were codified as follows: (1) non-selected party leader, (2) selected party leader, (3) non-selected party agency, (4) selected party agency, (5) party members and (6) electorate.

primaries were implemented as the dominant factions at the time – the Non-mainstream and the Formosa, respectively – controlled the largest share of party members. However, as other factions developed strategies of layering in order to bring about organizational change, both parties then moved towards more exclusive methods of candidate selection. In the KMT, the Mainstream pushed for a more exclusive selectorate because its clientelistic strategy of voter mobilization required centralized control over the nomination process to strategically allocate nominations to local factions in return for electoral support. Thus, after the Mainstream established itself as the dominant faction in the KMT, the nomination of candidates was centralized in a party agency (central standing committee) that was half-elected, half-appointed by the party leader. Meanwhile, in the DPP, the New Tide faction, which followed a narrow nationalist ideology, pushed for the inclusion of the party central office in the process of candidate selection. This effort reached its peak in 1995, when nominations were based on an equally weighted vote by party members and party staff.

More recently, however, both the KMT and the DPP have returned to more inclusive methods of candidate selection. They now employ

a rather unusual combination of binding opinion polls and closed member primaries.¹⁹ In the DPP, the New Tide – surprised by military threats from the PRC – decided to broaden its programmatic appeals into a catch-all electoral strategy. Therefore, rather than strengthening the party central office, the New Tide now has an interest in boosting the position of the party in public office. In order to do so, the New Tide opted for binding public opinion polls, which, at the same time, undermined the effectiveness of pocket members in the candidate selection process. Based on similar strategic calculations, the KMT's Non-mainstream, after re-establishing itself as the party's dominant faction in 2000, copied this system in order to diminish the influence of the Mainstream's clientelistic networks over the final outcome of the candidate selection procedure.

Distribution of resources and composition of party bodies

While the two major Taiwanese political parties show many similarities with regards to the two organizational dimensions discussed so far, they differ substantially in their endowment with politically relevant resources – particularly financial resources. Whereas the KMT is commonly considered the wealthiest party in the world, the financial survival of the DPP has long been hanging from a very thin thread, and to this day the party has to operate under an extremely tight budget (Rigger, 2001a: 69). The KMT's financial superiority lies in its business operations, which the party set up in Taiwan after fleeing the Chinese mainland from the communist forces. These enterprises, including construction companies, financial institutions, computer companies, electrical appliance companies, newspapers and television stations, were run in close association with the state and prospered with the strong economic development in Taiwan. In the early 1990s, economists at National Taiwan University estimated that the KMT's accumulated assets were worth as much as 500 billion New Taiwan dollars (Baum, 1994: 64).

During the period of autocratic rule, the KMT central financial committee was in charge of managing the party's enterprises. However, when in 1993 the Mainstream faction under Lee Teng-hui became powerful enough to change this system, control of the KMT's companies was given to the newly established business management committee, which acted under the direct authority of the party chairman. This way, party-owned enterprises were separated from the day-to-day management of party finances, which allowed the Mainstream faction to use them for

their own political ends – both as vote-gathering machines and sources of financial resources (Matsumoto, 2002: 365).

With increasing democratization, the DPP turned the KMT's party assets into a major campaign issue, claiming that the former regime party had accumulated its property and wealth through illegal means (Fell, 2005b: 887). Facing growing public pressure before the 1996 as well as the 2000 presidential election, the KMT made the promise to reform its party assets and refrain from profit-making activities. However, it was only after the KMT lost power in 2000 and Lee Teng-hui left the party that serious steps were taken to dismantle the vast business empire. Thus, for example, in 2005 the KMT decided to sell three large corporations – China Television Company (CTV), Central Pictures Corporation and the Broadcasting Corporation of China (BCC). The party has, since 2006, also been trying to auction off the Central Investment Holding – one of the KMT's most controversial assets, which is worth around 20 billion New Taiwan dollars – but, according to the party's own statement, no acceptable bids have been received yet. It has to be noted, however, that the KMT only returned a small share of the profits made from selling party assets to the state. Instead, most of the money disappeared through undisclosed channels, probably flowing into the KMT's campaign war chest (Lu, 2010). As a result, it can be assumed that the KMT does not have to rely on more traditional fundraising activities for its organizational survival.

The DPP, in contrast, has to follow a strategy of diversification and currently depends on four primary sources of income: (1) government subsidies, (2) mandatory contributions from elected politicians, (3) membership dues and (4) private and corporate donations (Rigger, 2001a: 67–9). Public subsidies for political parties, introduced in 1997, are the DPP's main source of funding. However, as they depend on the party's electoral performance, they are not a very stable source of income. In presidential elections, parties receive 30 New Taiwan dollars for each vote obtained above the threshold of one-third of the votes required for election, while in legislative elections a subsidy of ten New Taiwan dollars per vote is paid for each vote obtained above the threshold of three quarters of the votes required for election. Only the former subsidy, however, is paid directly to the party. Moreover, parties that surpass the threshold of 5 per cent of national votes in the legislative elections receive an annual subsidy of 50 New Taiwan dollars per vote.

In addition to the public subsidy, the DPP requires its elected officials to pay a certain percentage of their income from the government to the party. The national president must contribute 8 million New Taiwan

dollars, the vice-president 5 million, the party chairperson 5 million, committee members 500,000, national legislators 300,000, local representatives 200,000 and party list legislators 100,000. However, as with public subsidies, this source of income will again ultimately depend on the party's electoral performance. The DPP thus also continues to rely on membership fees as well as private and corporate donations.

Yet, neither of these two latter sources of income benefits the party central office. First of all, as the party's own regulations stipulate, 90 per cent of membership dues are to be allocated to party branches, and only the remaining 10 per cent to the national headquarters. Secondly, in Taiwan's candidate-centred electoral system, candidates generally find it easier to raise funds than political parties (Kovick, 2003). What is more, the DPP statutes rule that those financial contributions raised by the local branch are to stay with the local branch. In other words, the party central office administers only a small proportion of the party's income, most of which is spent on covering the expenses of the central office itself. As a result, 'the party is almost totally without financial leverage to use in disciplining its candidates' (Rigger, 2001a: 69).

In other words, candidates can expect very little financial assistance from the party for their electoral campaigns. Rather, candidates need to raise the necessary funds themselves. Broadly speaking, donations come from two different sources: ordinary supporters and so-called *jinzhu* (literally, 'gold masters') (see Mattlin, 2004: 1039). Donations from the former can be as small as 100 New Taiwan dollars and are usually recorded on red paper on the campaign office wall. Financial contributions by *jinzhu*, on the other hand, are generally larger, undisclosed donations. While these are not necessarily illegal, the high costs of electoral campaigns in Taiwan – some believe that Legislative Yuan candidates spend more money on campaigns than candidates in US congressional elections (Ferdinand, 2003: 60) – have made DPP politicians highly vulnerable to corruption (Hsueh, 2007: 16–17).

Reflecting its lack of financial resources, the DPP party central office does not play an important role in party internal decision-making. In particular, it does not enjoy ex-officio representation in any of the central party agencies. The national congress, the highest decision-making body in the party, is composed of 150 delegates that are directly elected by local party members, and 150 nationally elected leaders representing the DPP in government. The national congress then elects a 31-member central executive committee, which, in turn, selects 10 of its members to serve on the party's central standing committee.

As discussed above, the party central office played a part in the nomination of candidates for the 1995 and 1996 elections. However, the New Tide faction was only able to negotiate an inclusion of party bureaucrats by arguing that this would make it more difficult to decide the outcome through the deployment of pocket members, which had seriously damaged the DPP's reputation in the past. In other words, the party central office has never had the power to impose discipline among the members of the party in public office beyond the stage of candidate selection – and even this mechanism only worked for a very short period of time.

In contrast, in the KMT, the national party headquarters control a very large share of the funds at the disposal of the KMT's candidates. For example, in the 2001 Legislative Yuan election, the KMT is said to have supported its candidates with 5 billion New Taiwan dollars – the DPP, in contrast, only subsidized its candidates' election campaigns by 100 million dollars (Schafferer, 2004: 46). This dependence of the candidate on the central party is further reinforced by the fact that the Taiwanese election law requires individual candidates to file a campaign spending report; in contrast, there are no restrictions as to the amount the party headquarters can spend. Furthermore, KMT candidates very much rely on the party central office for the mobilization of campaign workers and voters among the party rank-and-file, whereas in the DPP, where the membership register is maintained by the local branches, the party central office plays a much less important role in the organization of electoral campaigns.

However, the importance of the KMT's central office as an administrative apparatus does not translate into decision-making power within the party. Traditionally, the KMT operated according to a top-down Leninist hierarchy in which the higher bodies appointed those beneath them and all power originated from the chairperson. Hence, the chairperson would nominate all members of the central standing committee, who would then select the members of the central committee, who, in turn, appointed the delegates for the national assembly. While the first changes to these regulations were already implemented under the leadership of Lee Teng-hui in 1993 (see section on candidate selection above), more far-reaching reforms were only passed in 2001. According to the new rules, 900 delegates of the national assembly are elected by party members at the local level and another 600 are drawn from elected leaders and party officials (including committee and branch chairpersons). The national assembly will then elect the 210 members of the central committee, which then, finally, nominates the 31 members of the central standing committee. In other words, as in the DPP, there has

never been a provision that guaranteed party bureaucrats a seat in the two highest executive bodies of the party: their nomination always had to be confirmed by either the next highest or next lowest body in the party.

Moreover, in both the KMT and DPP, the party in public office enjoys a large degree of autonomy in regulating its own inner workings. First of all, the parliamentary caucuses of both parties elect their own leadership without interference from other bodies of the respective party. Secondly, no voting power is given to members of the party central office taking part in meetings of the caucus. And, thirdly, the parliamentary parties of both the KMT and the DPP make their own decision-making rules. This, in particular, concerns the regulations to enforce discipline among the legislators. For example, both parliamentary parties established a system of fines to penalize legislators for not attending important plenary sessions or for voting against the official party line.

We can thus summarize that organizational resources are highly centralized in the KMT, whereas in the DPP they are more evenly distributed among elected politicians, candidates and local branches. In the KMT, the party in public office largely depends on the central office for financial support and for communicating with the rank-and-file. In the DPP, on the other hand, candidates cultivate their own sources of income and have easy access to the party membership register through the local branches. However, the vital role of the KMT's bureaucracy in administering the profits generated through the party's business assets and in maintaining the membership register does not translate into formal decision-making power. Rather, as in the DPP, the party in public office seems to dominate over the central office.

This distribution of power between the party central office and the party in public office is perfectly in line with the electoral strategies followed by the main actors within each of the parties, as both the DPP and the KMT are now dominated by actors following catch-all strategies of voter mobilization. To implement their strategies aimed at the distribution of public goods these actors had to establish the party in public office as the dominant organizational element, with the party bureaucracy only serving as an administrative support unit without decision-making power. They were able to do so because environmental uncertainty for political parties is relatively low in Taiwan, as reflected in the low levels party system fragmentation and electoral volatility (see Table 3.2). The reform of the electoral system in 2008, which replaced SNTV with a segmented electoral system (allocating 65 per cent

of seats through single-member plurality and the rest through proportional representation), has reduced uncertainty even further (see also Jou, 2009).

Summary

When the KMT regime arrived in Taiwan it wanted to keep its autonomy from the local population. Thus, only one group within the regime – a faction of sub-ethnic Taiwanese called the Mainstream – developed clientelistic linkages with the electorate to mobilize votes in the regime's pseudo-elections. More precisely, the Mainstream forged clientelistic alliances with so-called local factions – informal groups based on social ties. These patron–client networks survived the top-down process of democratization and provided the Mainstream with an efficient mechanism to gather votes under the new democratic rules. In fact, clientelism was so efficient as an electoral strategy in dealing with the problems posed by Taiwan's SNTV electoral system that the Mainstream soon became the dominant faction in the KMT. In a process of layering in line with its clientelistic strategy of voter mobilization, the Mainstream initiated a number of reforms that would help the faction push decision-making out of the formal party arena. Most importantly, the Mainstream centralized candidate selection within the party's central standing committee and moved control over the party's business empire from the party bureaucracy to the party chairman.

For other actors, clientelism was not an option in mobilizing voters in the post-autocratic electoral market. This was because the regime's state-led development model had resulted in high levels of economic growth, which made it very difficult to set up clientelistic relationships *after* the establishment of democracy. As a result, other actors developed programmatic platforms to compete in the electoral market – mainly concerning the conflict of how to manage relations with the PRC. While the KMT's Non-mainstream advocated reunification with mainland China, the two major factions in the DPP, the Formosa and the New Tide, took a pro-Taiwan stance. However, the latter two differed in the radicalness of their campaign messages. Whereas the Formosa targeted the median voter, acknowledging that there was no alternative to the status quo in the relations between Taiwan and the PRC, the New Tide called openly for Taiwanese independence.

Initially, the Formosa prevailed over the New Tide. This allowed the Formosa to design a party organization with a strong party central office,

which facilitated the implementation of the faction's catch-all strategy. The New Tide, on the other hand, following a much stronger ideology, pushed for power to be concentrated in the party central office as a means to increase ideological commitment among the DPP's legislators. However, this proved to be a difficult task, not least because the party central office did not control any significant financial resources, which meant that it did not control any measures to enforce party discipline. The New Tide was only successful in negotiating a more powerful role for the party central office in the process of candidate selection. It did so by arguing that the closed primaries held up until that point facilitated the strategic deployment of pocket members as a means to influence the final outcome, which, in turn, negatively affected the party's reputation in public.

While inter-factional conflict was thus relatively intense in the early years of the DPP, polarization between the Formosa and the New Tide decreased after the 1996 presidential election. Shocked by military manoeuvres held by the PRC in the waters around Taiwan, the New Tide began to redraft its pro-independence platform into a catch-all strategy, arguing that any decision over the status of Taiwan should be left to the Taiwanese population. Under a coalition of Formosa and New Tide, the DPP increasingly emphasized post-material issues, such as good governance, in its electoral campaign, and attacked the KMT on vote-buying and other corrupt practices.

The new campaign strategy around the KMT's 'black gold' politics was an important factor behind the DPP's victory in the 2000 presidential election. Within the KMT, the loss of the presidential office led to a critical juncture in the inter-factional power relations, as the dominant position of the Mainstream faction simply collapsed. The Non-mainstream used this opportunity to reintroduce many of the KMT's traditional policies into the party programme, without, however, returning to the party's historical goal of seeking reunification with mainland China under any circumstances. Instead, the Non-mainstream's electoral strategy was mainly based on catch-all messages around economic growth and prosperity. Moreover, the Non-mainstream used the critical juncture to re-strengthen the formal party organization as the central arena for decision-making. In particular, the Non-mainstream cut through the Mainstream's clientelistic linkages with local factions by making it more difficult to 'buy' pocket members as a means to influence voting within the party, and by 'outsourcing' candidate selection, meaning that nominations can no longer be allocated to local factions in return for electoral support.

In short, both the KMT and the DPP have come to be dominated by actors following catch-all strategies of voter mobilization. In line with their strategies, these actors have established the party in public office as the dominant organizational face. This flows from the fact that candidates for legislative elections are mainly nominated through public opinion polls, which favour those politicians with the highest media exposure, and from the fact the party central office does not enjoy any ex-officio representation in the key decision-making bodies, which means that the party in public office decides on the allocation of financial resources. The third organizational face, the party on the ground, does not pose a challenge to the party in public office either, since the criteria for party membership are relatively undemanding.

The catch-all factions within the KMT and the DPP were able to establish the party in public office as the dominant organizational face, because environmental uncertainty for political parties in post-autocratic Taiwan is quite low. They did not, therefore, feel forced to strengthen the party central office to increase party discipline as a means to control external uncertainty. In fact, it can be argued that on the inter-party level the two major political parties have been exhibiting typical cartel behaviour. This can be exemplified by the reform of the electoral system in 2008, which replaced the single non-transferable vote system with single-member plurality, thereby considerably reducing the electoral chances of smaller political parties. In other words, similar to many contemporary parties in Western Europe, the two major political parties in Taiwan work together to keep environmental uncertainty at a minimum, which allows the parliamentary party to maintain its independence from the rest of the party.

In other words, both major political parties share central characteristics with the cartel party in contemporary Western Europe. However, despite these striking similarities between Taiwanese parties and their contemporary counterparts in Western Europe, this does not mean that the former took an 'evolutionary leap' as the 'period effect' approach would want us to believe. Rather, as our analysis has shown, each major political party followed its own distinctive path of organizational development, constrained by the inter-factional conflict within each of the parties and the particular environmental context.

4

The Philippines

Unlike in South Korea or Taiwan, the democratization of the political system in the Philippines was not driven by economic growth. As a result, the environment political actors face when developing electoral strategies heavily favours clientelism as a mechanism to mobilize voters. In a similar way to the classical cadre party in early democratic Europe, parties are therefore no more than formal cloaks around highly informal patron–client networks. Although parties are not showing any signs of institutionalizing more abstract organizations, this does not mean that they are trapped in their genetic background of origin. Instead, if we open up the black box of party organization, it becomes clear that they are not changing as they do not contain any actors interested in change.

The transition to democracy

The process of democratic transition in the Philippines can be characterized as a ‘replacement’, as it began as a society-led upheaval. This upheaval, however, required almost no violence, since parts of the armed forces sided with the reformist civilian groups (Wurfel, 1990). It has been argued that an overthrow was the only way to re-establish democratic rule, because the highly personalistic character of Ferdinand Marcos’s dictatorship meant that there were no collective interests that could be saved once Marcos relinquished office (Thompson, 1996). Hence, as there was little hope he could win competitive elections, Marcos refused to negotiate a democratization of the political system but held on to power as long as he could.

Marcos justified the declaration of martial law in 1972 with the need for peace and order – overplaying the strength of the communist insurgency – and the promise of economic growth. Congress was

shut down and the two traditional parties, the *Nacionalista* Party and the Liberal Party, soon withered, as their legislative functions were supplanted by presidential decrees and instructions. Thereby, Marcos put an end to the two-party cycle, which, since the end of the American colonial period, had ensured that the country's elites would alternate in government 'with almost mechanical regularity' (Thompson, 1995: 15). He thus barred the other elites from access to the government-distributed pork barrel, and – after initially implementing a number of auspicious reforms – his authoritarian rule lapsed into 'crony capitalism', which only nurtured family members and close friends with jobs in the state apparatus, operating licenses, state contracts and cheap credit.

As a result of Marcos's patrimonialist dealings, the Philippine economy deteriorated, real wages declined and rural poverty increased. This, and the increasing patrimonialization of the military, which seriously undermined its professionalization and fighting effectiveness, led to a dramatic growth of the communist movement. Faced with a severe loss of legitimacy, Marcos decided to liberalize the political system. Hence, in 1978, legislative 'elections' were held, and, in 1981, Marcos declared the lifting of martial law and called for presidential elections. Fraud and the absence of real opposition, however, robbed the electoral process of any legitimizing effect, and the dominance of Marcos's New Society Movement (*Kilusang Bagong Lipunan*, KBL) remained unthreatened. Moreover, the KBL bought electoral support directly from voters through clientelistic exchange mechanisms. In order to facilitate the monitoring of voters' compliance with the clientelistic agreement, Marcos introduced the *barangay* as the smallest administrative unit (100–500 people), with the *barangay* captain usually acting as vote broker (Wurfel, 1988: 131).

The legitimacy crisis worsened when opposition politician Benigno Aquino, upon returning from exile in the United States in 1983 to compete in the 1984 parliamentary elections, was shot at Manila airport. This clumsy assassination, evidently planned by Marcos's wife, Imelda, and her military allies, energized the existing opposition and politicized new sectors of society (Timberman, 1991: 126). The civilian coalition against Marcos – the Catholic Church, the middle class and the old economic elite – cooperated in forming a poll watchers group, NAMFREL (National Movement for Free Elections). Under the monitoring activities by NAMFREL, the pro-democratic opposition, led by the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO) and a coalition

between the *Partido Demokratiko Pilipino* (PDP, Philippine Democratic Party) and *Lakas ng Bayan* (LABAN, People's Power), performed relatively better.

In an effort to, again, demonstrate his political legitimacy, Marcos called a snap presidential election in February 1986. However, contrary to Marcos's strategic calculations, the reform movement united behind Corazón Aquino, widow of Benigno Aquino, as their single candidate. Only the Communist Party, various labour unions and peasant organizations chose to boycott the elections. When voting finished, Marcos was declared the winner, but NAMFREL and other poll watching organizations reported numerous cases of electoral fraud. Aquino responded by appearing before a Manila crowd of more than half a million to proclaim her own victory and to launch a campaign of civil disobedience. It was the involvement of the military, however, that tipped the scales, when a faction of young officers led by the defence minister, Juan Ponce Enrile, and the deputy chief of staff, Fidel Ramos, seized control of a building in the armed forces headquarters and declared their rebellion against Marcos (Wurfel, 1990: 119–22). Having no firepower, the rebels turned to the Aquino camp for protection. The event that followed went down in history as the 'people power' revolution, as tens of thousands of civilians followed an appeal over the radio by Cardinal Sin to support the rebels with food and human shields. With the refusal of the security forces to act against civilians, the United States intervened to persuade Marcos to leave the country for exile in Hawaii. Aquino was declared president and set about restoring the democratic constitutional structure.

Unlike the process of democratization in South Korea and Taiwan, that in the Philippines was not accompanied by socio-economic development. Although the economy has been slowly growing since the overthrow of Marcos, this growth has yet not reflected in a more even distribution of wealth (see Table 4.1). In other words, although the democratic transition can be characterized as a complete replacement of the authoritarian regime, we should expect the environment in the post-Marcos Philippines to be favourable to clientelistic strategies of voter mobilization, as the economic elite can use their relative financial strength to invest in the establishment of new exchange networks. This is encouraged even further by the low degree of urbanization, which helps to ensure that voters do not defect from the clientelistic game, as most voters live in small rural communities, which are easier to monitor for electoral compliance.

Table 4.1 Socio-economic development in the Philippines

	GDP per capita (US dollar)	Gini coefficient	Degree of urbanization (in %)	Literacy (in %)
Philippines	719 (1990) 1,639 (2007)	0.468 (1991) 0.440 (2007)	27.0 (1990) 66.4 (2010)	93.6 (1990) 93.4 (2007)
Japan	33,632 (2007)	0.249 (2007)	66.8 (2010)	99.0 (2007)
United Kingdom	35,130 (2007)	0.360 (2007)	90.1 (2010)	99.0 (2007)
USA	45,592 (2007)	0.408 (2007)	82.3 (2010)	99.0 (2007)

Source: United Nations ESCAP (undated); United Nations Development Programme (undated); Solon (1996).

The electoral market: leaders, factions and parties

In fact, studies of voting behaviour have shown that voters in the Philippines tend to support the candidate who is 'helpful to those in need' and 'establishes government programs for development' (Institute for Political and Electoral Reforms, 2004). The effectiveness of clientelistic strategies to mobilize voters has led observers of Filipino politics to describe the post-Marcos political system as 'elite democracy' (Bello and Gershman, 1990) or 'cacique democracy' (Anderson, 1988), based on the observation that the country is run by a small number of influential families. At the same time, there is hardly any pressure from the lower spheres of society. The large non-governmental organization (NGO) community has not been able to break the dominance of traditional elite clans (Eaton, 2003), nor have political parties representing the poor succeeded in playing a more significant role in the electoral competition (Quimpo, 2005).

Elections in post-Marcos Philippines – a family business

Most lawmakers in the post-authoritarian Philippines come from political clans – that is, they are tied to a family base whose members are currently holding or once held elective posts. In the House of Representatives, two out of every three congressmen are members of political clans.¹ The vast majority of these are second- and third-generation politicians with parents and grandparents who had in the past been elected into public office (Co et al., 2005: 50). In most cases they will also have multiple relatives who are currently in public office.

Democratic politics in the Philippines work according to the logic that – once elected into public office – politicians will seek to transform the public office into a private legacy for their family. Filipino culture puts strong emphasis on the family as the basic unit of society, with families often performing a broad range of economic, social and political functions. This *politica de familia*, conditioned by interpersonal reciprocity and social obligations, ensures ‘that the Filipino is more inclined to perceive the world in terms of how outside resources could be used to improve that status of the family in socio-economic terms’ (Roces, 2000: 188). As Wurfel (1988: 34) explains,

[t]he family has long been the center of Filipino society. As in most parts of Southeast Asia kinship is essentially bilateral; that is, ancestry is traced through both the mother’s and the father’s line. Effective kinship ties are maintained with relatives of both parents. A bilateral system gives a potentially huge number of living kin, especially as five to ten children are not uncommon even today in each nuclear family of each generation.

The Filipino constitution contains explicit provisions against political clans, opening the possibility for a law that prohibits political dynasties. However, such a law is unlikely to be passed in the near future. Similarly, the existing constitutional law that bans representatives from seeking more than three consecutive terms is not an effective obstacle either, since clans simply field other family members to replace those who face term limits, or – in other cases – the place of the incumbent is taken by a rival clan.

Elections in the Philippines, in other words, can thus best be described as ‘anarchic’ (McCoy, 1994) competition among dominant elite families. In order to be elected into office, politicians primarily mobilize their kinship networks and family assets. If they win, they will repay their family by using their legislative post to expand the family’s economic interests – for example, through loans, monopolies, tax exemptions, cheap foreign exchange or subsidies. In addition, legislators will strengthen their respective kinship network through the distribution of patronage:

Once in office, they pave the way for other relatives to be either appointed to the bureaucracy or elected to government posts. Within a few years, a newly elected legislator will likely have kin in local office, various government agencies, and state-owned corporations. Before long, the next generation takes over. (Coronel et al. 2004: 11)

However, while this explains the general reproduction of elite family dominance in the Filipino Congress, it can neither explain how these families became the elite in the first place nor why some political dynasties have disappeared while new ones have emerged. As Paredes (1994) points out, there has always been a Filipino upper class, whose position is based on combined economic and political power, but the composition of this class – the actual families that comprise it – is constantly changing. We must thus distinguish between different types of political clans, which use very different resources and strategies to compete successfully in the democratic game.

Traditionally, the national political oligarchy was composed of members of wealthy landowning families – particularly those involved in export agriculture – who emerged in the nineteenth century, such as the Aranetas, the Cojuangcos, the Jacintos, the Madrigals and the Yulos. Today, these families are much less powerful, as is indicated by the relatively small percentage of lawmakers in the House of Representatives who own agricultural land (Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 2004). However, because of their sheer wealth, the traditional landed elites are still a strong electoral force. Moreover, their plantations provide these families with an efficient machine to mobilize votes among their workers and tenants, while their hacienda organization can be used to conduct the electoral campaign.

The influence of landed families began to wane after 1945, as the Japanese occupation of the Philippines during the Second World War had disrupted the traditional economy, while the landowners' collaboration with the Japanese weakened their moral hold on the peasantry. A new type of elite swiftly moved into this power vacuum: local warlords. Political warlordism was the result of the proliferation of arms and the weakening of the central authority in the provinces at the end of the war. Famous families that rose to power through armed violence included the Lluch-Badelles clan of Lanao – though they were later eclipsed by the more violent warlord Ali Mohamad Dimaporo – the Remullas of Cavite and the Duranos of Cebu. Although warlordism in the narrow sense is nowadays limited to very few areas, particularly Mindanao, many clans still rely on violence and coercion in order to win elections – a phenomenon that has been described as 'bossism' (Sidel, 1999) and 'authoritarian clientelism' (Franco, 2001). During the campaign period election-related violence can range from intimidation and threatening people with bodily harm, to kidnappings and murder, as well as arson and bombings. It is not only candidates and their campaign staff that are targeted, but also their supporters and ordinary

voters. On election day itself, the threat and use of violence also extends to poll watchers and election officials, and it is no rarity to see burning voting stations.²

The 1960s saw the emergence of yet another type of political clan: the *nouveaux riches*. Unlike the traditional elite, these families – among them the Enriles, Puyats, Sarmientos and Silverios – did not have a base in landholdings, but had amassed wealth through industrial manufacturing. They then expanded their economic base after winning office, thereby gaining access to government credit and licenses and government-administered foreign aid and loans. In order to get an idea of how this business elite dominates electoral politics in the Philippines, one can look at the social composition of Congress. In 2001, on average, each member of the House of Representatives held assets worth 22 million Filipino pesos³ – according to the legislators' own reporting, and thus probably understated – while in the Senate the average net worth was 59 million pesos. In contrast, in 2000, the typical Filipino had an annual income of about 150,000 pesos (Coronel et al., 2004).

Finally, in the 1990s a number of new political dynasties were built simply on popularity. While, in the past, popular starlets from show business and sports had only been hired by established politicians to attract voters, celebrities increasingly realized that they themselves had the potential to win public office, thereby – in some cases – laying the foundation for influential showbiz clans. The most prominent among these are the Ejercitos, around movie star Joseph Estrada, the Revillas – actor Ramon Revilla has 80 children with different wives, many of whom hold public office – and the family of Robert Jaworski, a former basketball player and coach. Meanwhile, a number of more traditional political families have been trying to increase their own popularity by either marrying a celebrity⁴ or going into show business themselves.⁵

We can thus summarize that Filipino electoral politics are dominated by a small number of influential families, who use different resources to win elections. However, the differences between traditional landed elites, warlords, *nouveaux riches* and celebrities are not clear-cut. Rather, they all follow a mix of electoral strategies, primarily relying on clientelism, with charisma and coercion as complementary sub-strategies. Politicians develop clientelistic links with voters by sponsoring local community projects (such as street lighting or basketball courts) and offering supporters more direct material incentives (e.g., free medical care or scholarships) (see Kawanaka, 1998). Moreover, Filipino elections are marred by vote-buying, with

candidates purchasing votes from individuals or groups, or paying supporters of their opponents to abstain from voting (Teehankee, 2006).

Politicians can engage in illegal activities, such as the violent intimidation of voters or vote-buying, without having to fear legal consequences. This is because a dense web of corrupt practices connects elected politicians to public officials, which has led to the situation that 'members of the governing class are [...] exempt from the rule of law' (Rogers, 2004: 116). The historical origins of this clientelistic regime can be traced back to Spanish colonial rule, but under the presidencies of Estrada (1998–2001) and Arroyo (2001–10) this intra-elite clientelism took a new dimension, giving politicians even greater freedom to resort to fraud, coercion and violence as means to win elections (Quimpo, 2009).

Moreover, politicians not only use their connections to public officials to secure exemption from legal prosecution but also to 'buy' election outcomes. Some of the corrupt practices include stuffing ballot boxes with manipulated ballots, shaving results at the vote counting stage and replacing official results with bogus data. Possibly the most famous case of electoral fraud in the post-Marcos Philippines was the 'Hello Garci' scandal, triggered by a tape-recorded conversation that appeared in public in 2005 – allegedly between President Arroyo and the president of the electoral commission. In a frequently quoted segment a female voice expresses her concern about the electoral margin ('So, I will still lead by more than M., overall?'), while a male voice promises to work things out (see Hutchcroft, 2008).

Political parties as coalitions of family clans

Political clans do not control a political party each, but parties are usually coalitions of several powerful families (McCoy, 1994: 8). However, these coalitions are highly unstable, which is why it is difficult to establish personal continuity between the myriad of political parties that have emerged and died since the ousting of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. As clans enter into new coalitions with other clans, the old party will be dissolved and a new party will be founded in order to provide a formal framework – or organizational manifestation – for the newly forged coalition. We can thus summarize, in the words of Coronel and colleagues (2004: 7), that

[l]ooking at the history of the Philippine legislatures from the 1898 Malolos Congress, it would seem that families, not parties, are their

most enduring feature. Regimes come and go but the families remain. Political parties are formed and disbanded but the clans that make them up stay on.

The fluid nature of the Filipino party system – which is clearly reflected in the relatively high *effective number of political parties* and the high degree of electoral volatility (see Table 4.2) – is the result of the logic of party formation in the post-autocratic Philippines: political parties are established as families rally behind presidential candidates in large electoral coalitions (Ufen, 2008a). Political clans who support the winning presidential candidate can expect to be rewarded after the elections. The presidential system of the Philippines is one of spoils: the president can appoint his or her choices to more than 100,000 positions in the bureaucracy. Traditionally, these are given out to political supporters. Moreover, being a presidential ally also means access to government loans, contracts and other benefits.

For the provision of these public resources, the presidential candidate will expect electoral support. Families are themselves highly efficient political machines to mobilize votes and ensure that these votes are properly counted in the election process, but families also extend these machines beyond family loyalties – particularly if they are aiming for

Table 4.2 The Philippines: party system indicators^a

	ENEP ^b	ENPP ^c	Volatility
1987	–	6.34	–
1992	–	3.71	–
1995	4.69	3.53	–
1998	3.10	3.05	49.4
2001	–	4.84	–
2004	–	4.16	–
2007	–	4.76	–
2010	4.34	4.80	–
<i>Average</i>	<i>4.04</i>	<i>4.40</i>	<i>49.4</i>

^a The voting results provided by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) have often been incomplete in the past, hence for some years no indicators could be calculated.

^b Effective number of electoral parties based on the first vote in elections to the House of Representatives.

^c Effective number of parliamentary parties in the House of Representatives.

Source: Author's own calculations based on Table 4.3 and Teehankee (2002, 2006).

office at the national level (Machado, 1974). A congressman's political machine typically includes a network of *lider* at the village or *barangay* level. The *lider* can be either a *barangay* captain, a council member or any other influential person, such as a successful local entrepreneur or the head of a community organization. This *lider* in turn mobilizes a network of supporters for the candidate, who will help with the election campaign (for instance, by putting up posters and conducting door-to-door canvassing), serve as poll watchers on election day, and last but not least give their vote to the candidate endorsed by the *lider*. The *lider* usually gets paid for his or her work; in some cases he or she even receives regular monthly allowances from the congressman's payroll, while sometimes *leaders* are bought off by other candidates who offer bigger rewards.

The establishment of such political machines is facilitated by the electoral system – single-member plurality – used for elections to the House of Representatives, as the small size of districts helps candidates estimate the number of votes needed to win a mandate. Moreover, up until the 2010 election, 'write-in' ballots were used. These only listed the offices up for election, with voters having to fill in the names of the candidates they wanted to vote for in the blank spaces provided. Given that national and local elections in the Philippines used to be synchronized (up until 2010), asking voters to remember dozens and dozens of candidate names clearly encouraged a personalized style of electoral politics – particularly that of clientelistic relationships. In fact, an important function of the political machine was to distribute sample ballots already containing the names of candidates to voters at the local level. Without a dense network of *leaders* to perform this function, candidates were generally doomed to fail (Teehankee, 2002: 158).

As the influence of a family – and the effectiveness of their political machine – is usually limited to the local level and the family's own bailiwick, families who wish to win the presidency or a seat in either the Senate or the House of Representatives, have to enter into coalitions with families who dominate other geographical areas of the country. In return, the latter will expect their fair share of state resources. Political parties are thus, put simply, the formal manifestation of these temporary patron–client networks, in which access to state resources is exchanged for organizational support during elections (voter mobilization, campaigning, poll watching). Or in the words of Co and colleagues (2005: 82): 'Parties represent the mechanism for rendering and sustaining [the] exchange of political resources and support.' Thus, what Landé

(1965: 24) observed about Filipino democratic politics in the mid-1960s still holds true:

Candidates for national office need votes, which local leaders with their primary hold upon the loyalty of the rural electorate can deliver. Local leaders in turn need money to do favors for their followers, and this the candidate for high offices can supply [...] The result is a functional interdependence of local, provincial, and national leaders which promotes a close articulation of each level of party organization with those above and below it.

Moreover, parties not only serve as the formal framework for coalitions between political clans from different administrative levels, but a number of legal provisions also encourage these elitist families to establish political parties. For instance, being a member of a political party allows a candidate to extend the legal campaign spending limit, as parties are allowed to spend an additional five Filipino pesos per voter registered in the constituencies where the party is fielding candidates. Yet, most importantly, the electoral law stipulates that only the three strongest parties receive detailed copies of the certificate of canvass, which is based on the tally of election returns from the different polling precincts. Access to these documents provides a strong safeguard for the candidate, to prevent them being cheated in the vote counting process.

However, despite these reasons to establish political parties, the binding power of the coalition agreements between the different families is very weak, and boundaries between political parties are thus highly permeable. Candidates frequently run for several different parties at the same time; political clans – while affiliated with one party – often support candidates of other parties, and sometimes political party affiliation does not become clear at all.

After elections, winning candidates who supported a non-successful presidential runner will, in large numbers, flock to the party of the newly elected president. As Villanueva points out, '[p]oliticians change party identification as fast as they change their clothes' (1996: 180).⁶ However, the president will not distribute state resources exclusively to his own party; in order to build a broad coalition of support in parliament he/she will allow resources to flow to other parties. For instance, during her time in office, President Arroyo was the chairperson of three parties, which again shows just how little political

party boundaries matter as an organizing principle for the political process. Rather, political clans and the coalitions forged between them – often across parties – are the key to understanding Filipino politics.

However, this does not mean that political parties do not matter. In fact, several political parties have survived a number of consecutive elections – most notably, the Liberal Party (LP) and the *Nacionalista* Party (NP), founded in 1907 and 1945, respectively. Although increasingly losing significance, the *Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino* (Struggle of Democratic Filipinos, LDP) has been around since 1988, when it was formed from a merger between two parties closely associated with then president Corazón Aquino: *Lakas ng Bayan* (LABAN), the coalition that had supported Aquino in the 1987 presidential election, and a splinter group of *Partido Demokratiko Pilipino* (PDP), led by Aquino's brother, Jose 'Peping' Cojuangco. The political party that rallied behind Fidel Ramos in the 1992 presidential elections, *Lakas-CMD* (a merger between the *Partido Lakas Tao*, National Union of Christian Democrats [NUCD] and the United Muslim Democrats of the Philippines [UMDP]), also still exists – as does the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC), which was founded in 1992 as a grouping of smaller parties and members of the NP (Rodriguez wing). On the other hand, the electoral vehicle of Joseph Estrada, Force of the Filipino Masses (*Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino*, PMP), became largely irrelevant after Estrada's ousting in 2001, while Gloria Arroyo's KAMPI (*Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino*, Partner of the Free Filipino) merged with *Lakas-CMD* in 2008.

In other words, party banners are not wholly insignificant in Filipino electoral politics. Some political 'brands' have clearly established themselves in the electoral market and politicians are keen to keep them alive, as they have the potential to evoke positive emotional responses from the electorate (see Table 4.3). Thus, voters might see the LP and NP as the embodiment of the Filipinos' struggle for independence – first from the American colonialists, then from Japanese military occupation. Similarly, both the LDP and *Lakas-CMD* are closely associated with the 'people power' revolution against Marcos, as their long-time leaders – Corazón Aquino and Fidel Ramos, respectively – are widely perceived to have played heroic parts in reinstalling democracy. Politicians therefore value these party banners as a means to give themselves a democratic appearance, to portray themselves in public as upholding the historical legacies of these mass movements against autocratic rule.

Table 4.3 The Philippines: results for House of Representatives elections^a

Party	1987	1992	1995	1998	2001	2004	2007	2010
<i>Government Coalition</i>	29.5	0.5	4.4	–	–	–	–	–
LABAN	14.5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
PDP-LABAN	12.0	–	0.5	–	–	–	1.7	0.7
LP	8.5	–	2.5	6.8	9.0	12.0	6.6	15.6
UNIDO	8.0	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
KBL	6.5	2.0	0.5	–	–	–	–	0.4
GAD	5.0	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
NP	2.0	3.0	0.5	–	–	–	3.3	9.3
LDP	–	43.0	8.3	–	9.0	5.0	1.3	0.7
<i>Lakas-CMD</i>	–	21.5	49.0	50.5	36.0	40.0	38.0	–
NPC	–	17.0	10.8	4.1	23.0	23.0	11.6	11.5
LP-PDP	–	6.0	–	–	–	–	–	–
LDP/ <i>Lakas</i>	–	–	12.3	–	–	–	–	–
LAMMP	–	–	–	25.0	–	–	–	–
KAMPI	–	–	–	–	–	–	20.3	–
<i>Lakas KAMPI CMD</i>	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	39.9
Independents	11.5	0.5	3.4	0.9	4.0	2.0	1.7	2.6
Party list	–	–	–	6.4	9.0	10.0	8.7	15.2
Other	3.5	6.5	7.8	6.3	8.0	10.0	6.8	4.8

^aShare of seats (in %).

Source: Hartmann et al. (2001); Teehankee (2006); COMELEC (undated).

Summary

The post-autocratic environmental context in the Philippines clearly encourages clientelism, while militating against programmatic electoral strategies. Most importantly, the high level of income inequality and the low degree of urbanization increase the certainty that patron–client relationships will not fail due to either of the two sides defecting. The context thus gives an advantage to political actors with the necessary resources to establish a clientelistic network – that is, the country's economic elite. This elite derives its economic power from different sources – traditional landownership, large business, celebrity status or local monopolies of violence – but, irrespective of the source, actors will then use their access to government to enhance the wealth of their families even further. Politicians can use illegal means of voter mobilization (such as vote-buying or coercion), because – being connected with public officials through a dense web of corrupt practices – they are largely immune from legal prosecution. In addition, these connections also allow politicians to influence the outcome through

other fraudulent means, such as interfering in the vote counting process.

As a result, political parties are no more than electoral alliances between influential family clans, who use a mix of clientelism, charisma and coercion to mobilize voters. Political parties form as families rally behind strong presidential candidates. In return for their electoral support, these families receive access to public resources, which they can use to further strengthen their political machines. Actors following programmatic strategies of voter mobilization can only be found *outside* the relevant political parties and are thus excluded from our initial case selection. However, in order to paint a complete picture of the Filipino party system, the most notable example of these smaller programmatic parties, *Akbayan* Citizens' Action Party, will later on be discussed in a separate section.

The organization of political parties

As can be expected from the fact that parties are temporary alliances of families' clientelistic vote-gathering machines, party organization in the Philippines is best described as a mere 'smoke screen' to mask the exchange of political support for material resources. In a similar way to the classical cadre party in nineteenth-century Europe, Filipino parties are, first of all, characterized by a total lack of a rank-and-file membership. As a result, the small elitist circle of party leaders largely select themselves as candidates for public office, while access into these highly exclusive parties has to be bought with politically relevant resources. It follows from this that there is no clear separation between the three faces of party organization; the party in public office largely overlaps with the party on the ground, which therefore means that there is no need for a party central office outside the parliamentary party.

Party membership

As is clear from the previous discussion, the Filipino party system is largely comprised of parties that are essentially coalitions of influential families, providing a clientelistic network that links local political bosses at the *barangay* level to national politicians. Not surprisingly then, the membership base of these parties is almost entirely drawn from the politically active elite, particularly from powerful political clans (Velasco, 1999: 176). Or as Rocamora puts it, Philippine political parties are 'unabashed boys clubs' (2002: para. 13). In other

words, parties do not have ordinary members who join the party because of collective incentives, but the party membership overlaps with the party's pool of candidates, meaning that only those who can be expected to win a political mandate will be considered as party members.

Although Filipino political parties claim to have ordinary members, none of the major parties maintains a membership register that would list all the members with their personal details and contact addresses. What is more, there is no formal procedure that needs to be observed when applying for party membership, nor do parties hand out membership cards that would identify their members as such. In their constitutions, political parties merely list a number of criteria that members need to fulfil, ranging from very specific requirements, such as minimum age or Filipino citizenship, to very vaguely formulated conditions, such as expressing a belief in the respective party's ideology and objectives. Hence, what Filipino parties refer to as ordinary 'members' are nothing but loyal supporters who do not differ from common citizens in any respect. Membership figures provided by the parties are therefore without any meaning, as are references to 'members' in the parties' formal decision-making statutes. Moreover, these supporters are not loyal to the party itself, but are mobilized through clientelistic networks of leaders at the local level. If these local elites decide to join a different party, because the latter offers better material returns for their political support, the supporters will be transferred *en bloc* to the new party.

However, not only is it difficult – if not impossible – to distinguish ordinary party members from regular voters, but even on the elite level party affiliation is not always clear. During elections, due to the fact that the electoral law allows parties to nominate candidates who are not party members, confusing electoral slates of mixed party candidates are often created. And even after elections it is very difficult to identify the political party to which politicians belong, as party loyalty is generally very weak. Party defections are thus a daily part of political life in the Philippines.

Furthermore, the highly elitist nature of Filipino political parties is also reflected in the parties' local organizational structures. Although political parties are by law required to establish party chapters in the majority of the country's regions and, within each region, in the majority of provinces, towns and *barangays*, this legal provision is rarely enforced. Rather, the common practice is for the local party leader's residence or office to serve as the party's local branch (Leones and Moraleda,

1998: 310). In between elections the 'branch' will be dormant, and usually no full-time members of staff will be employed. Only shortly before elections will the branch become active and perform campaign-related functions. Labour-intensive campaign work that – in Western European parties – is usually carried out by party members on a voluntary basis, such as door-to-door canvassing, organizing mass events or posting campaign posters, will be delegated to local politicians' clientelistic networks. Clients perform this role as part of their promise of political support in return for material benefits.

Political parties in the Philippines, as an abstract organization, do thus not recruit members – either as financial assets (through the regular payment of membership fees) or as free labour. Given that parties only play a negligible role in voters' decisions in the election process, parties do not even seem to be interested in members as statistics, which could create a public image of parties as effective aggregators of social interests. Instead, the only feature that distinguishes party members from ordinary citizens is that they have been nominated by the respective parties as candidates for an upcoming election. The membership size of the major Filipino parties is therefore always limited to the number of nominations for public elections. As the next section will show, in order to gain access to this highly exclusive circle of party members, individuals have to provide politically relevant resources that make up for the lack of a mass party membership.

In short, the major political parties in the Philippines are characterized by a total absence of a party on the ground, as there are no criteria that clearly distinguish rank-and-file members from ordinary voters. Rather, we find all party members concentrated in the party in public office. However, even here it is very difficult to establish who is a member and who is not, as the boundaries between parties are highly permeable. It is thus very doubtful whether elected politicians identify as members of a party in public office. Instead, as discussed earlier, politicians are more likely to identify with their own political clan.

Candidate selection

In their constitutions, all major political parties in the Philippines make specific provisions regarding the selection of candidates for public election. In most parties the respective party's national convention is supposed to nominate the candidates (*Lakas*, LDP, LP and NP), while in the NPC the national central committee, the party's highest executive body, has the right to decide on the selection of candidates.⁷ However,

given the lack of a mass party membership, it is obvious that these formal regulations are nothing but a façade to portray political parties as democratically organized institutions that effectively mediate between society and the state. A more precise description of the level of internal democratization in Filipino political parties is provided by Leones and Moraleda (1998: 307):

Although most political parties may claim that almost all sectoral groups are well represented in their organizational structure and membership, the real influence – that is, in decision-making and control – remains largely with its elite-dominated higher organs.

In fact, party conventions in the Philippines – if they are held at all – have been compared to Roman orgies, which are organized by the party leadership solely to entertain the clients with ‘wine, women and song’ (Rocamora, 2001: 6). As was discussed earlier, national politicians need the support of local families in order to mobilize voters at the grassroots level. In turn, local politicians are dependent on national candidates and their parties for financial support. It is thus at the party conventions where these informal exchange agreements are celebrated, and politicians from lower administrative levels are rewarded for their loyalty towards the national elites.⁸

Candidates for national elections are, therefore, not selected by delegates to the party convention, as stipulated in most of the parties’ conventions. Rather, because of the total lack of a party on the ground, the party in public office selects itself. In other words, in order to be nominated as a candidate for a larger party, politicians need to gain access to the small elitist circle of party members. The selection of candidates is thus largely non-transparent and undemocratic, and will primarily be decided through horse-trading and bargaining (Co et al., 2005: 95). Factors that play an important role in these negotiations are the candidate’s past electoral performance, political machinery, popularity (name recall and public acceptance), geographical base and support, and financial resources (Rocamora, 1998: 6). The decision as to whether a candidate will be admitted to the party is made by the highest executive body in the party, which is usually comprised of high-ranking incumbent (or former) elected officials. Incumbents, on the other hand, will – as a general rule – be nominated automatically.

However, as Hutchcroft and Rocamora (2003: 278) point out, ‘it is the number of candidates that determines the number of parties, not vice versa’. That is to say, if a candidate is refused by one party, he or she

will simply establish another party or form a splinter group. The procedures for candidate selection are therefore not only highly informal, but – because of the volatile properties of the Filipino party system – they also fail to reduce the number of candidates. Nevertheless, as candidates will aim to be nominated by the party of a strong presidential candidate – in order to be included in the distributive coalition after the election – candidate selection still serves as a valuable indicator for the party internal distribution of power.

We can thus sum up by saying that in all major Filipino political parties the party in public office will simply renominate itself. However, elected politicians are not very loyal towards their party and they will generally try to join the party of the presidential candidate who they think is most likely to win. Presidential candidates, in turn, are looking for legislative candidates who are themselves strong candidates, so that after the election they will have broad support in Congress. Access to a party will therefore depend on the candidate's bargaining skills and politically relevant resources.

Distribution of resources and composition of party bodies

Party membership – and hence a nomination for public elections – can thus literally be bought from the party leadership. This has led Co and colleagues (2005: 101) to observe that, although 'there is no legal restriction to party membership, in practice the system excludes those who cannot afford to shoulder or attract sufficient campaign funds'. However, it must be noted that the resources candidates need in order to be admitted to the party are then not transferred to the party as an abstract institution, but are distributed to other individual politicians within the party in return for political support. As Rocamora (2001: 6) explains,

[t]o gain the support of lower level leaders in support of his/her nomination by the party, [and] to organize the campaign, candidates have to spend prodigious amounts of money. The higher up the ladder, culminating in the presidential candidate, the more you have to spend. Not just for your own campaign, but to finance those of party mates and other supporters running for lower level positions.

More specifically, it is common practice in Filipino parties for candidates at a particular administrative level to shoulder the campaign expenses of the political office immediately below them in the hierarchy. That is to say, the campaign expenses of *barangay* captains are funded by the

councillor, while the councillor's expenses are covered by the mayor, and so on, until the subsidy ladder reaches the candidate for president.

The political party itself has traditionally not been a major source of campaign funding in the Philippines. This is largely due to the fact that parties do not cultivate their own sources of income. Since there is no public funding available for political parties, most parties (LDP, LP, NP, NPC) largely rely on mandatory contributions from their elected officials. Private – including corporate – donations are almost exclusively paid to individual candidates, not to parties. The two main sources for candidates' campaign funds are ethnic Chinese businessmen and the 'grey' economy (Arlegue and Coronel, 2003: 231). The ethnic Chinese dominate the business sector, but because of their numerical minority status they are effectively barred from the political process, thereby leaving campaign financing as the only way in which they can safeguard their business interests. Grey contributions, on the other hand, come mainly from illegal gambling, prostitution and drug smuggling syndicates seeking the protection of the politician.⁹

Because the allocation of financial resources is handled through informal connections between individual politicians, Filipino political parties do not develop any significant bureaucratic structures outside of parliament. Usually, parties do not even have national headquarters, and the party central office tends to be located in the private office of the party leader. In between elections parties hardly employ any full-time staff, and even during campaigning periods many of the functions that we usually associate with the party bureaucracy will be performed by externally contracted media professionals (Velasco, 1999: 175). In other words, political parties in the Philippines not only lack a party on the ground, but also a party in central office. Those members of staff employed to coordinate the election campaign or fulfil other administrative roles simply serve the political ambitions of the party leadership – they do not themselves hold significant political resources and do not qualify as a distinctive organizational element within the party.

However, it would be wrong to conclude that the party in public office is therefore the dominant face in political parties in the Philippines, since it is very doubtful whether a *party* in public office even emerges. As just explained, political resources are not held by the party in public office but by individual politicians. This is the main reason why the party leadership in Congress cannot exert pressure on legislators to enforce voting behaviour along the official party line (Croissant, 2003: 82). Rather, the degree of cohesion in the party in public office

is very low, as is reflected in the frequent occurrences of party switching. Therefore, the most accurate description of Filipino political parties would be to say that the three faces of party organization are impossible to distinguish. The formal party organization is a mere illusion, created to hide actors' patron-client networks.

A different kind of party: *Akbayan*

There are no relevant programmatic actors in any of the major political parties who would have an interest in formalizing party internal decision-making. Given that access to the major parties is highly exclusive – depending on an individual's endowment with material resources – actors following programmatic strategies of voter mobilization have only emerged *outside* the established parties. However, even here opportunities for the programmatic mobilization of voters only appeared after electoral reforms in 1998, when an additional party list was introduced for elections to the House of Representatives. Under this system, up to 52 seats (20 per cent of total seats) are allocated through a separate ballot in a national constituency according to proportional representation. Parties must represent a distinct 'sector' in society; parties competing in the single-member plurality districts are not allowed to participate. Parties need 2 per cent of the total valid votes for the PR lists in order to gain parliamentary representation. They obtain one seat for every 2 per cent of the total votes, but can only hold a maximum of three seats. Thus, the aim of this system is clearly to keep parties competing in these elections small and fragmented.

A notable example of the many parties that mushroomed to compete for seats on this additional party list is *Akbayan*. *Akbayan* only won one mandate in the first election in 1998 but then continuously increased its number of representatives – two in 2001 and three in 2004 – before suffering a setback in both the 2007 and 2010 elections when it only won enough votes for two seats in the House of Representatives. In contrast to the major political parties in the Philippines, *Akbayan* has worked very hard to develop a programmatic platform, primarily targeting the socially marginalized with demands for far-reaching reforms of the political and social system.

Akbayan's programmatic strategy aimed at the distribution of club goods is clearly reflected in the party's organization, which is very different to the typical elitist party described in the sections above. To begin with, *Akbayan* is the only Filipino party with a central membership

register and a sophisticated membership ID card system. Although the party does not require its members to pay regular dues, membership is tied to a number of other requirements that clearly distinguish members from ordinary voters. Most importantly, new members have to attend a basic introductory seminar where they learn about the party's principles and structures. They are then assigned to a party unit – either based on geography or functionality – where members are expected to regularly participate in party activities. Typical activities of local party branches include supporting associated NGOs in their work, providing assistance to local communities (such as paralegal aid, education, basic healthcare) and helping to organize citizens' protests on issues close to the party's central principles.

In return for their voluntary labour, party members are given extensive participatory rights regarding internal decision-making. Hence, the selection of candidates for public election is not decided behind closed doors by a small circle of party leaders, as in all the major Filipino parties, but is organized in a highly democratic fashion. For instance, the composition of the party list for the lower house of Congress must be approved by the party congress, which consists of representatives from each of the party's local chapters. Nominations for local elections are decided by vote from all members in the respective local party branch.

Politically relevant resources are mobilized by the party, not by individual members or candidates. *Akbayan's* main sources of income are (in descending order of importance): foreign financial support for joint projects with NGOs (as direct foreign funding for political parties is illegal), local government programmes, contributions from public officials, fund-raising activities (such as concerts) and donations. Local branches are usually financially self-sufficient, while the party central office is responsible for funding electoral campaigns, membership training and education programmes.

Given the important role of the party bureaucracy in maintaining the membership register and mobilizing resources, representatives of the party central office are given ex-officio seats on the party's executive committee. Specifically, the executive committee comprises the party's Congress representatives as well as the party president, vice-president, the general secretary and five additional members who are elected by the party's national convention. The party central office thus clearly has more power than the party in public office, allowing it to strictly enforce discipline among the party's elected representatives.

Summary

From this analysis it can thus be concluded that political parties in the Philippines share many organizational similarities with the classical cadre party of nineteenth-century Europe. The most striking analogy is the difficulty of clearly distinguishing between the different elements of party organization. The party in public office largely overlaps with the party membership, since the only criterion to separate members from ordinary citizens is the party's nomination as a candidate for public election. The procedure for candidate selection is thus highly informal and obscure, with the party in public office usually nominating itself. Similarly, parties hardly maintain an organizational apparatus outside of parliament; general administrative functions and campaign strategies tend to be managed by party external professionals, who are hired at the expense of the party in public office.

This observation is clearly in line with the clientelistic electoral strategies followed by the major parties in the Philippines. Parties are merely formal cloaks for more informal alliances between political families, linking national politicians to local bosses through the exchange of political support for material inducements. These clientelistic channels serve as the main vehicle to mobilize votes, recruit candidates and allocate resources, while the political party's primary reason for existence is to provide a formal label for the clientelistic alliances between powerful families in order to coordinate electoral campaigning efforts. Moreover, the logic of party formation also has a legal dimension, as only the three strongest parties receive detailed copies of the official election results. Consequently, there is no need to develop a strong formal party organization, which means that the three faces of party organization – the party on the ground, the party central office and the party in public office – do not emerge.

However, while the environmental context favours a clientelistic strategy of voter mobilization, there are a few cases of political parties developing programmatic appeals, the most notable example being *Akbayan*. In a similar way to the classical mass party, *Akbayan* was established outside of government, with the aim of challenging elitist parties that use their access to state resources to mobilize voters through patron–client exchange relationships. *Akbayan's* programmatic platform, aimed at distributing club goods to peasants and the urban poor, made it necessary to develop a party organization that aggregates social interests through strong grassroots links and articulates these interests as policy proposals through a strongly disciplined party in public office. So far, however, this strategy has not translated into major electoral success and the Filipino

party system remains dominated by clientelistic parties without notable organizational foundations.

This is due to the fact that the neo-democratic environment in the Philippines heavily favours clientelism over other strategies of voter mobilization. Most importantly, high levels of poverty mean that voters are highly susceptible to clientelistic practices, while the dense intra-elite network between politicians and public officials means that anti-vote-buying laws and other campaign regulations are not enforced effectively. Actors developing programmatic appeals, on the other hand, face enormous difficulties. It therefore seems highly unlikely that mass parties will enjoy similar electoral success compared to communist and socialist parties in early democratic Europe. Rather – although the victory of Noyonoy Aquino in the 2010 presidential election can be interpreted as ‘political branding [...] supplementing more familiar modes of voter mobilization’ (Hedman, 2010: 33) and some authors have noticed small signs that the LP might ‘transform itself from its traditional past to a vehicle of new politics in the Philippines’ (Teehankee, 2009: 32) – political parties in the Philippines are likely to maintain their highly elitist character for the foreseeable future. However, this is not because they are trapped in their original genetic background, as the ‘generation effect’ approach would argue, but because no significant change agents, who could initiate organizational change, have emerged in any of the parties.

5

Indonesia

The post-authoritarian party system in Indonesia is dominated by political parties similar to the classical cadre party. These parties are heavily populated by elements of the *ancien régime*, who controlled the democratic transformation from above and were thus able to keep their influential positions within extensive patron–client networks. They face electoral competition from parties campaigning on programmatic appeals, which were established by actors opposing the regime. The most notable example of these parties is the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), which is based on a mass party membership and characterized by a strong party central office. However, despite the similarities to party systems in early democratic Europe, the case of Indonesia should not be viewed as evidence of political parties following the same path of organizational development as their counterparts in Western Europe. Rather, as will be shown, the recent rise of populist politicians might force the established parties to rethink their electoral strategies.

The transition to democracy

Classifying the end of Suharto's 'New Order' regime in Indonesia in May 1998 is not without difficulties. Although the collapse of the regime was initiated by student protests and mass riots, the pro-democratic opposition did not have any influence on the transformation of the political system. Rather, negotiations over the new rules of the political game took place almost entirely between soft-liner and hard-liner groups within the authoritarian regime, not between regime defenders and challengers (Malley, 2000: 153). As a result, the transition to democracy left the statuses of many elements of the authoritarian regime untouched, providing these elements with the opportunity to reposition

themselves under the new democratic rules by capturing existing parties or establishing their own parties.

Suharto, then a major general in the Indonesian army, seized power in 1967, through a stealthy *coup d'état* against the first president of Indonesia, Sukarno, who had abolished democracy in 1957 to rule under martial law. While the officially stated goal of the New Order was socio-economic development, political stability and security were declared as its necessary conditions (Vatikiotis, 1998: 33–5). The ideological centrepiece of this urge for harmony in such an ethnically and religiously diverse society as Indonesia was the national philosophy of *Pancasila*.¹ In accordance with *Pancasila*, only 40 per cent of parliament was openly elected, and multi-party politics were virtually banned by merging all opposition parties into two larger parties. The secular nationalist parties had to unite under the banner of the *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (Indonesian Democratic Party, PDI), while the Muslim parties were forced to fuse into the *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (United Development Party, PPP). The regime itself used Golkar (*Golongan Karya*, Party of the Functional Groups) as its electoral vehicle.² All public officials were required to join Golkar, which effectively turned every government office into a Golkar branch, thus providing the regime party with a highly efficient machine for voter mobilization (Liddle, 1999: 43).

Political power under the New Order was initially shared by three actors: President Suharto, the armed forces and the bureaucracy (Liddle, 1985). The regime also incorporated various social elites into its power structures – most importantly, ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs, local aristocratic families and Catholic activists (Sidel, 1998). At the heart of the regime lay a complicated system of clientelism, through which Suharto skilfully managed competing tensions between the elites, and which soon allowed Suharto to become the dominant player. Personal loyalty in Suharto's increasingly 'sultanistic regime' (Chehabi and Linz, 1998) was rewarded with promotions, business licenses, subsidies, loans and other gifts. This system worked extremely well, as the New Order regime delivered its promise of socio-economic modernization, hence producing enough spoils to be distributed among the elites.

In line with the arguments of modernization theory, however, through the success of its economic policies the New Order regime gave rise to a new middle class. Many members of this emerging urban middle class found it difficult to adjust from the collectivism in their villages to the individualism in big cities, such as Jakarta, and turned from their 'statistical' Islam towards more active religious participation in search for moral guidance and orientation.³ This growing Islamist movement

soon became a hotbed for political discontent that threatened the stability of the New Order (Hefner, 2000: 123–6). Suharto responded to this menace by announcing a new policy of openness, or *keterbukaan*. Moreover, he co-opted Muslim leaders, such as Amien Rais, into the regime through the establishment of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) in 1990, and by enacting a number of conservative religious laws.

Still, several influential Islamic leaders, including Abdurrahman Wahid, the head of Indonesia's largest Muslim organization, *Nahdlatul Ulama*, decided not to join the ICMI, and continued to publicly debate the need for political reforms. Meanwhile, the PDI, now led by Sukarno's daughter, Megawati, managed to win a historic 15 per cent of the vote in the 1992 legislative elections by appealing directly to the lower classes, who felt marginalized by the process of industrialization. However, as the regime soon moved to again end the era of openness, it took an external trigger to bring down Suharto. When the Asian economic crisis hit Indonesia in late 1997, students and the urban poor poured into the streets in their thousands, protesting against unemployment, food shortages and economic hardship, which they blamed on Suharto's patrimonialistic and nepotistic dealings. The most violent riots took place in Jakarta on 14–15 May 1998, mainly targeting properties and businesses owned by ethnic Chinese, leaving more than 1,000 dead.

At the same time, since there were no longer any economic rewards for supporting Suharto, many elites abandoned their support for the regime (Eklöf, 1999: 235). Of crucial importance was the decision by the armed forces to refrain from force against the students or the rioters in Jakarta. An essential parameter in these strategic calculations was the organizational weakness of the pro-democratic opposition. After a failed attempt by Amien Rais, who resigned from the ICMI in 1997, to unite his *Muhammadiyah* with Wahid's *Nahdlatul Ulama* and Megawati's PDI into a broad anti-Suharto alliance, it became clear that the opposition movement was riven by personal feuds.⁴ Hence, the ruling elite agreed to demands for democratization, and forced Suharto to step down, because '[t]here were few prospects of a serious overturning of the social order' (Aspinall, 2005a: 264).

The elites' calculations were supported by the socio-economic context in the late 1990s. Although the raw figures suggest that the process of late industrialization led to a relatively fair distribution of income, comparable to those of Western European countries (see Table 5.1), there are in reality wide disparities between different geographical areas, and pockets of poverty are also evident within more affluent provinces

Table 5.1 Socio-economic development in Indonesia

	GDP per capita (US dollar)	Gini coefficient	Degree of urbanization (in %)	Literacy (in %)
Indonesia	516 (1998) 1,918 (2010)	0.310 (1991) 0.394 (2007)	48.0 (2000) 53.7 (2010)	90.0 (2000) 92.0 (2007)
Japan	33,632 (2007)	0.249 (2007)	66.8 (2010)	99.0 (2007)
United Kingdom	35,130 (2007)	0.360 (2007)	90.1 (2010)	99.0 (2007)
USA	45,592 (2007)	0.408 (2007)	82.3 (2010)	99.0 (2007)

Source: United Nations ESCAP (undated); United Nations Development Programme (undated).

(World Bank, 2006: 36–7). Moreover, Indonesia is characterized by a relatively low level of urbanization. Together, these two factors create perfect conditions for the implementation of clientelistic strategies of voter mobilization.

The electoral market: leaders, factions and parties

The strategic calculations made by the former regime elites held true. As several observers of Indonesian politics point out, the first free and fair elections conducted in 1999 did not undermine elite statuses and interests, and many members of the old elite were able to reconstitute their positions of power in the new democratic environment (Robison and Hadiz, 2004). They did so mainly through clientelistic networks of local notables that had been nurtured through Suharto's sultanistic regime, by turning these into extensive vote-gathering machines. However, the connection with the electorate is, as will be seen, not made through the distribution of private goods, but rather through religious and other social identities.

The relevance of the historical party system

Studies of electoral behaviour in the 1999 and 2004 parliamentary elections observed clear voting patterns based on social identities. In particular, two cleavages along religious worldviews structured the party system (Ufen, 2008b). The first one divided secular parties – the strongest of which was the PDI-P (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan*, Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle)⁵ – from Islamic parties; the second cleavage cut through the Islamic camp, separating parties with

a moderate understanding of Islam – most importantly, Amien Rais's National Mandate Party (PAN, *Partai Amanat Nasional*) – from more traditional parties, including Wahid's National Awakening Party (PKB, *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*) and the autocratic regime's Islamic satellite party, the PPP. Golkar, on the other hand, seemed to bridge the divide between secularism and Islam, appealing to both modernist Muslims and secular voters.

However, political parties did not succeed in mobilizing social constituencies in the 1999 and 2004 elections by developing programmatic platforms that aggregated the interests of these specific social groups. Instead, parties relied on their historical links with parties that dominated Indonesia's first democratic party system in the 1950s (Mietzner, 2008: 439). This strategy worked particularly well for parties whose leader was able to make a credible claim to embody certain historical values. While the PDI-P was perceived as continuing Sukarno's legacy of socialist secularism under the leadership of his daughter Megawati, the PAN and the PKB benefited from the personification of religious traditions in their respective leaders – modernist Islam in Amien Rais, traditionalist Islam in Wahid. The PPP claimed succession to *Masyumi*, a major Muslim party in Indonesia's post-independence democracy, but without a charismatic incarnation of this link in the party's leader this claim was relatively weak.

Moreover, political parties mobilized social groups through clientelistic connections to local notables with a strong influence over the cultural, economic and public life in their respective community, who then either implicitly endorsed the party or explicitly instructed their followers how to vote (Sherlock, 2004: 22–3).⁶ The underlying logic was that, if voters see a party as well connected to the leaders of a particular social group, the party can be considered to represent the interests of that social group. That is to say, the major political parties in Indonesia followed a clientelistic strategy of voter mobilization. However, very few benefits trickled down to the voter through these clientelistic networks, as the phenomenon of vote-buying is almost unheard of in the Indonesian context (Hadiwinata, 2006). Instead, the link between political parties and voters was made through the practice among common people to adopt local notables as their *babak* (or father), based on religious or other social identities (see Cederroth, 2004). Therefore, as van de Walle (2003: 313) observed for African party systems,

it is more useful to think of clientelistic politics as constituting primarily a mechanism for accommodation and integration of a fairly

narrow political elite than as a form of mass party patronage. Most of the material gains from clientelism are limited to this elite. The stronger link between political elites and the citizenry is through the less tangible bonds of ethnic identity.

In other words, an important mechanism for voter mobilization during the 1999 and 2004 elections were intra-elite networks based on clientelistic exchange relationships between politicians at the national level and local notables. These networks had been cultivated during Suharto's autocratic rule and had survived the democratic transition. For example, while the PAN and the PKB were able to mobilize voters through the religious mass organizations to which they were affiliated, *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdlatul Ulama* respectively, Golkar could rely on a dense network of bureaucrats and local military officers as a vote-gathering machine (Tomsa, 2008: 41).⁷

Knowing about Golkar's organizational advantage, other political actors had blocked the introduction of a single-member plurality electoral system in the negotiations over the new democratic rules in 1998/9. It was feared that in single-member constituencies the regime party would have been able to fully maximize the voter-mobilization potential of its networks within the state's bureaucracy. The pro-democratic opposition therefore pushed for the adoption of proportional representation to elect the members of the People's Representative Council (King, 2000: 101–2). In the end, a compromise solution was reached: proportional representation in 27 multi-member constituencies at the provincial level, ranging from four to 82 seats.

Given that this electoral system produces relatively proportional results (Croissant, 2002b: 330), smaller parties have a good chance of winning parliamentary representation. What is more, many smaller parties have developed comprehensive programmatic platforms, thus setting themselves apart from the five major parties. The most notable example of a programmatic party is the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*), which was established under the name Justice Party (PK) in July 1998 by activists of the *tarbiyah* (Arabic for education) movement, a dense network of *Qur'anic* study circles on university campuses. While not openly pushing for an Islamic state or the adoption of *sharia* law, the party's platform focuses on the need to educate the masses on *sharia* through *dakwah* (inviting people to learn about the *Qur'an* and other Islamic sources), which implies that the PKS sees the incorporation of Islamic law into the constitution as a long-term goal (Baswedan, 2004). The party only achieved 1.8 per cent of the

votes in the 1999 elections, failing to achieve the 2 per cent electoral threshold that was legally required to compete in the 2004 legislative elections. The PK was thus not only reconstituted as the Prosperous Justice Party but, in order to broaden its electoral appeal, the new party downplayed its Islamic goals and, instead, campaigned mainly on *bersih* (clean, meaning non-corrupt, government) and *peduli* (caring, meaning concern for social welfare) (Mujani and Liddle, 2009: 582). This strategy of moving towards the distribution of public goods proved to be successful, as, this time, the PKS managed to win 7.3 per cent of the votes and 45 out of 550 seats, making it the seventh largest party in parliament.

Charisma, money and patron–client networks

We can thus summarize that, although the post-autocratic party system is structured by two cleavages along religious lines, only one major party, the PKS, has developed a programmatic platform to mobilize voters. This is because, in the particular post-autocratic context in Indonesia, there are other – more effective – strategies to win the vote of particular social constituencies. However, access to the necessary resources is highly restricted. First of all, a number of political parties benefit greatly from the fact that they can make a credible claim to safeguard the historical legacy of post-independence parties. This claim is particularly strong if the party is led by a charismatic leader. Secondly, several actors have been able to transfer clientelistic networks into the neo-democratic arena, which connect them to local notables, such as religious leaders or bureaucratic elites. These networks can be used to either reinforce the party's claim to represent a certain social constituency or, as in the case of Golkar, mobilize voters *across* the dominant cleavages. However, while successfully protecting patron–client networks throughout the democratic transition is one thing, maintaining them in a free electoral market is another. As will be seen, this has, in addition to charismatic leaders and elements of the old regime, led to the emergence of a third type of actor – wealthy businessmen. The conflict between these three different types of actors is the key to understanding the development of the major political parties in post-Suharto Indonesia.

In parties that rely mostly on stressing continuity with historical parties in order to mobilize voters, the internal distribution of power is highly skewed towards the party leadership. This is especially true for the PDI-P and the PKB, in which the parties' respective leaders, Megawati Sukarnoputri and Abdurrahman Wahid, 'have almost cult status and attract unquestioning, often fanatical, loyalty from many of

their grassroots supporters' (Fealy, 2001: 102). In the case of the PDI-P, this loyalty is largely based on Megawati being the daughter of Sukarno – the founder of modern Indonesia – and her active role in opposition against Suharto. However, Megawati's charisma only helped her maintain a position of undisputed power within the party as long as it provided a tool to gain access to public resources. In fact, after Megawati was defeated in the 2004 presidential elections by ex-general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono – and then decided to go into opposition, rather than join Yudhoyono's government – power fissures began to emerge within the PDI-P. However, party internal challengers did not succeed in toppling Megawati, and were often only left with the option of exiting the party themselves. For example, one group of Megawati opponents, around leading party executive Arifin Panigoro, established the so-called PDI-P Reform Movement in December 2005.⁸

Similarly, in the PKB, Abdurrahman Wahid virtually monopolized all power. Much of this power flowed from the fact that, as the grandson of the founder of *Nahdlatul Ulama*, Wahid enjoyed extraordinary support among modernist Muslims. As in the case of Megawati, it was only when Wahid was ousted as president in 2001 – thus losing access to public resources – that internal opposition grew stronger. Initially, party internal dissidents did not gain enough power to overthrow Wahid, as is reflected in the fact that challenges by Matori Abdul Djalil in 2001, and Alwi Abdurrahman Shihab and Saifullah Yusuf in 2004–5, had to be settled in court – rather than through party internal competition. Likewise, between 2006 and 2007, several local party chapters refused to follow directions from the leadership in Jakarta, but Wahid – ordering the closure of 40 party branches – remained in strong control of the party, prompting Saifullah to leave the PKB in January 2007 to join the PPP. It was only in 2008 that Wahid's power eventually collapsed, after his own nephew, Muhaimin Iskandar, having been ousted as party chairman, contested his dismissal in court and won. Subsequently, Muhaimin, who had risen to power through the *Nahdlatul Ulama*-backed Indonesian Islamic Student Movement, held a rival party congress that elected him chairman. This successful overthrow caused supporters of Wahid to split away from the party and establish the 'Gus Dur' PKB.⁹

In contrast, Amien Rais, the former leader of Indonesia's second largest Muslim organization, *Muhammadiyah*, still seems to play a strong role within his own party, the PAN. Although he relinquished formal control of the party after the 2004 election, Rais retained the influential position of chairman of the party's advisory council. Furthermore,

he ensured his influence within the PAN by pushing through the election of a close confidant, businessman Sutrisno Bachir, as new party chairman in 2005. Rais is also thought to have intervened in the 2010 chairman selection process, ensuring the appointment of Hatta Rajasa (*Jakarta Post*, 2010).

Although not dominated by a charismatic leader, the PPP, like the PAN, had for a long time been characterized by a relatively clear power distribution. From 1998 to 2007 the party was under the leadership of Hamzah Haz, an experienced but uninspiring career politician who had been active in politics since the early New Order days. Hamzah was able to fight off any serious challenges to his power – most notably when the popular preacher Zainuddin MZ saw no other choice but to defect from the PPP in 2002 to found the Reform Star Party (*Partai Bintang Reformasi*, PBR). However, in 2005, a group led by deputy chairman and cabinet minister Suryadharma Ali organized a huge informal gathering of hundreds of party executives from all administrative levels to voice their opposition to Hamzah. This severely weakened Hamzah's leadership, leading him to announce that he would not contest the chairmanship in 2007. The change in party leadership followed Hamzah losing his position as vice-president after the 2004 elections, while Suryadharma, in his role as minister of cooperatives and small-and-medium-scale enterprises in President Yudhoyono's cabinet, still enjoyed access to public resources.

In contrast to these four parties with historical roots in the 1950s party system, internal power has been much more evenly spread in the former regime party, Golkar, with no single politician being able to establish him or herself as the dominant leader.¹⁰ Rather, the ousting of Suharto left a power vacuum in the party, with several individuals competing for the position at the top. When then vice-president Habibie took over from Suharto in May 1998, Golkar was divided into two groups: one led by Habibie himself, consisting mainly of civilians closely linked to Suharto, the other a military faction critical of Suharto. The Golkar chairman election in July 1998 turned into an open contest between these groups, with Akbar Tandjung, the candidate of the Habibie group, winning over his opponent, and the military leaving Golkar – at least in terms of formal structure. However, soon after his victory, Akbar decided that it was time to distance himself from Suharto and Habibie. As the former chairman of the Islamic Students Association, Akbar benefited from a strong network of supporters within the party, and when Habibie withdrew his presidential candidacy for the 1999 elections – after his accountability speech had been rejected by parliament – Akbar became the dominant leader of Golkar.

However, Akbar's dominance was short-lived, as several affluent businessmen entered the party in order to be nominated as Golkar's presidential candidate for 2004. The most powerful of these were Aburizal Bakrie, chairman of the large Bakrie conglomerate, Surya Paloh, the media tycoon behind Metro TV and Media Indonesia, Agung Laksono, the founder of Adam Air and then speaker of the People's Representative Council, and Prabowo Subianto, Suharto's son-in-law. Despite these candidates' economic power, Golkar's presidential nomination, nevertheless, went to General Wiranto, who had risen to power through a distinguished military career under the New Order, eventually appointed army chief of staff in 1997. Similarly, the Golkar chairman election was also fiercely contested, with Wiranto supporting Akbar, but all other big players throwing their support behind Jusuf Kalla. Kalla, again an affluent businessman, had run successfully as vice-president for Yudhoyono and thus offered much better access to state patronage than Akbar.¹¹

While, in the political parties just discussed, internal factions thus group around individual politicians who control patronage and other politically relevant resources, inter-factional conflict in the PKS, in contrast, has reflected the party's search for a strategy to achieve its programmatic goal – the implementation of *sharia* law. For many years, the PKS had successfully managed this internal conflict behind closed doors, portraying itself in public as a coherent, unitary actor. As explained above, the PKS's principal objective is to install an Islamic government through *dakwah* – that is, educating the people on Islamic moral values, rather than enforcing *sharia* law from above. State and society are to be Islamized gradually, beginning with the individual, then moving on to the family, society and, finally, the political system (Aspinall, 2005b: 129). In line with this bottom-up idea of Islamization, the early PKS (or PK as it was called then) did not think it was important to gain political power as a means to achieve the party's goals. Thus, after the 1999 election, the PK did not accept a seat in Wahid's cabinet and also decided against participating in the subsequent Megawati government.

In other words, mobilizing large numbers of voters was not considered crucial and elections only had the function of an indicator, giving the PK an idea of how successful its programme of *dakwah* was in educating people about *sharia*. However, when the party was re-established as the PKS in order to fulfil the legal requirements to participate in the 2004 elections, the place of elections in its overall strategy started to change. The party's poor performance in the 1999 elections had revealed that the gradual process of Islamization had not progressed very far. One

factor identified by the PKS as slowing down this process was, according to a party spokesman, 'that people have a sort of phobia about the word *sharia*' (cited in Eliraz, 2007: 13). To dispel people's fears the PKS decided to demonstrate in practice what a government based on Islamic principles would look like.

The PKS, therefore, first, began to emphasize in its electoral campaign communication how Islamic moral values can lead to cleaner and better governance. Whereas the PK merely saw resistance to corruption as a good deed that every Muslim has to carry out, the PKS has now adopted this link between religious duties and the fight against corruption as its main campaign topic (see above). In other words, rather than just targeting a small group of voters who already supported *sharia*, the PKS aims to appeal to the wider electorate through the distribution of public goods, hoping that an increasing number of voters will realize that Islamic values can help to build a better political system for everyone. Second, after the 2004 presidential election, the PKS accepted three cabinet portfolios (agriculture, housing, youth and sport) in the new cabinet of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Thus, for the first time in its history, the party entered government.

However, while the party had so far shown a unified face in public, factional divisions started to become obvious in the run-up to the 2004 elections. Conflict arose over the question of how far to stretch the party's ideology as a means to gain access to governmental power. The two main rival groupings that emerged were the Justice faction, led by then-party leader Hidayat Nur Wahid, and the Welfare faction under the leadership of the party's general secretary, Anis Matta. While the Justice faction wanted the PKS to support Amien Rais as a presidential candidate, the Welfare faction argued that the PKS should put its weight behind Golkar-nominee Wiranto, who – although a less devout Muslim than Amien Rais – was considered as having much better chance of winning the election. In short, the PKS was split between idealists safeguarding the party's Islamic principles and more pragmatic forces, who were willing to abandon the party's core beliefs to gain access to power.

Summary

As 'third wave' democracies in general, the neo-democratic electoral market in Indonesia militates against programmatic electoral strategies promising the distribution of club goods. This is partly because the sudden breakdown of the Suharto regime did not leave political actors

enough time to develop a programmatic platform. Although the 1999 and 2004 elections saw clear voting patterns along religious cleavages, political parties did not mobilize these social constituencies through programmatic policies that aggregated the interests of these groups, but used different strategies. First, many parties simply relied on the personality of their respective leader to create the impression that they continued the historical heritage of parties that had emerged in post-independence Indonesia. Second, parties used clientelistic linkages to local notables with a strong influence over a certain constituency to give the appearance of representing that constituency.

The major political parties in Indonesia have thus been characterized by conflict between three different types of actors. The most powerful of these have been charismatic politicians, who embody the legacies of historical parties or social movements, such as Megawati Sukarnoputri or Abdurrahman Wahid. The second type of actors are elites who belonged to the close circle around Suharto's regime and succeeded in transferring the clientelistic connections they had been developing through decades of authoritarian rule into the democratic arena. Examples include Hamzah Haz, the long-time leader of the PPP, or Wiranto and Akbar of Golkar. Finally, the effectiveness of clientelistic links to local notables as channels of voter mobilization facilitated the entrance of wealthy businessmen into the electoral arena. The best-known examples are Sutrisno Bachir (PAN), Aburizal Bakrie, Surya Paloh and Agung Laksono (all Golkar).

Actors following programmatic strategies of voter mobilization, in contrast, are severely marginalized within the major Indonesian parties. Nevertheless, programmatic politicians have been able to set up their own parties, the most notable example of which is the PKS. The PKS originally targeted a very narrow group of conservative Muslims who were in favour of *sharia* law. However, the disappointing results in the 1999 elections, which threatened the party's survival, prompted the PKS to broaden its electoral appeal by shifting the focus to issues of anti-corruption and clean government. While, for many years, the PKS had succeeded in containing internal conflict, the party has recently become divided over the question of how far to push this catch-all strategy at the expense of the party's ideological foundations.

The organization of political parties

The dominance of charismatic and clientelistic strategies within the major Indonesian parties are clearly reflected in their organization, as all

internal decisions are made informally, while it is impossible to distinguish the formal elements of the party organization. In a similar way to political parties in Philippines, the Indonesian party membership largely overlaps with the party in public office and a party bureaucracy is almost non-existent. Actors invest heavily in the maintenance of intra-elite clientelistic networks, with the function of the formal party organization reduced to a mere façade. In contrast, the PKS, which follows a programmatic strategy of voter mobilization, developed an organization characterized by a symbiotic relationship between the party on the ground and the party central office. However, in line with the party's move towards a catch-all electoral strategy, the role of the party on the ground has recently been weakened considerably.

Party membership

In accordance with the amended Law on Political Parties, which was ratified in December 2007, a political party in Indonesia must have branches in 60 per cent of the provinces, 50 per cent of the districts in each province and 25 per cent of the sub-districts in each district. These requirements were put into effect, as it was feared that – in the multicultural society that is Indonesia – political parties could be used to promote racial, religious or ethnic hatred, or to encourage the secession of certain regions from the Indonesian state. In accordance with these legal regulations, all major Indonesian parties have established formal representative offices in most provinces and in many districts across the whole archipelago. For instance, Golkar, which, as the former regime party enjoyed a considerable head start concerning the construction of an organizational apparatus, claims to have 30 provincial branches, around 380 district and 3,900 sub-district branches.

However, in general, the quality of these offices and their ability to communicate with the people at the grassroots level is very poor. In fact, party branches are usually only organized as an empty shell in order to meet the legal requirements set out in the party law. In between elections Indonesia's party organizations wither away and party activities are almost non-existent (Johnson Tan, 2006: 107). Given the lack of interest national party leaderships have in organizing and maintaining a strong local organization, party branches have, in most cases, been 'hijacked' by local notables – such as wealthy businesspeople, well-connected bureaucrats, traditional noblemen or violent gangsters. The politicians then use the local party branch to contest for public offices at lower administrative levels, which through the process of decentralizing

administrative governance and fiscal governance – initiated in 1999 – have been attracting increasing attention as a way to gain access to public resources (Choi, 2004a; Hadiz, 2004).

Local party branches are thus highly independent from the central party (Buehler and Tan, 2007). This independence goes so far that, in order to mobilize support for the election campaign, candidates for national elections have to pay the party branches in their respective constituency for their loyalty. In other words, a dyadic patron–client relation connects the national politician to the head of the local party branch. The latter will then use this money to reimburse party workers for their services during the campaign (such as canvassing, putting up posters or participating in mass rallies). The payment is made either in cash (for their participation in rallies voters are often paid ‘cigarette money’, around 20,000–25,000 rupiah) or through other gifts, such as a free meal, vouchers for local transport or tickets to a music show.¹²

Ordinary party members, who would perform these campaign-related tasks on a voluntary basis – as is the common practice in most West European parties – do not exist in Indonesia. Political parties provide membership figures on request, but without a party membership register and a sophisticated system of membership ID cards, these figures are without value, since distinguishing party members from ordinary voters becomes impossible. The parties’ statutes merely list a number of very general requirements members need to meet,¹³ which do not include the payment of regular membership fees. Instead, party ‘members’ are paid by the party – or rather, the local politician – to put their labour force at the party’s service.

The only notable exception to this pattern is the PKS, which ‘has provided Indonesia with an alternative model of grassroots party building centred around recruitment’ (Fionna, 2008: para. 1). To start with, PKS members are required to attend weekly party meetings, which take the form of *Qur’anic* study sessions, covering the main topics of Islam: God, the prophet and Islamic regulations. Moreover, while there is no fixed membership fee, party members are expected to donate part of their income to the party through obligatory *infaq* – a donation beneficial to Islam, repeatedly mentioned throughout the *Qur’an*. As will be shown later, the PKS relies heavily on the financial contributions of its members. It is thus not surprising that the party actively engages in the recruitment of new members, such as through ‘open houses’ – *Qur’anic* study sessions open to non-members. The success of Islam as a recruitment tool reflects in the party’s membership figures: as of 2008, the PKS claims to have 2 million members, which translates into 24 per cent of

the party's electorate or 1.4 per cent of the total electorate.¹⁴ This is a relatively impressive figure – particularly if we consider that other major parties do not attach any requirements to party membership at all.

The PKS distinguishes six different levels of party membership. The two lowest levels are regarded as 'supporting' members (*kader pendukung*), while the four highest levels are called 'core' members (*kader inti*). Core members, who account for around 6 per cent of the total membership, enjoy more rights than regular members – most importantly, active and passive voting rights for party internal positions. In order to move up to higher membership levels members need to pass specific training programmes, which are assessed by different organizational echelons within the party. Thus, for example, while second-level membership is granted by the party branch at the district level, members applying for sixth-level membership need to be approved by the party's central executive council.

We can thus conclude that, in most of the major Indonesian parties, a party on the ground is non-existent, since what the parties describe as 'members' are indistinguishable from ordinary voters. Rather, party 'members' are recruited as clients through the clientelistic networks of local strongmen who have taken control of the party branches. Hence, in the Indonesian context, the real strength of a party is not measured by the sheer number of its offices and members, but rather by its ability to accommodate informal local power holders into the party's patronage network. In contrast, the PKS defines itself to a great extent through its mass grassroots organization with ideologically committed members. The intensive training programme members need to complete in order to be granted full membership rights shows that the PKS not only sees members as a source of income and free labour, but also as a pool of potential candidates for public election.

Candidate selection

All political parties in Indonesia make reference to the nomination of candidates for public election in their official statutes, but these procedural guidelines are usually very general, leaving ample room for interpretation by the party leadership. In fact, the actual practice of candidate selection in the major Indonesian parties is a very obscure process, with the final decision made by the highest strata of party elites behind closed doors (Haris, 2005). Even in the PKS, which differs considerably from the other major parties regarding its grassroots organization, the nomination of candidates for public elections is highly centralized at the top of the party.

Despite the haziness of candidate selection in the major political parties in Indonesia, observers of Indonesian politics have identified a number of factors that play a role in the nomination process. The most important of these appears to be control over financial resources. As Mietzner (2007: 251) explains,

[p]olitical parties in Indonesia [...] have in an increasing number of cases sold the nominations for legislative and executive office to wealthy individuals who had no particular connection to the party or its beliefs, but who could afford to pay large sums of money to the party.

For national legislative elections the prices for nominations are usually staggered according to the ranking on the party list, with high rankings that virtually secure election into parliament being significantly more expensive than lower positions that do not come with a similar guarantee of success. For instance, in 2004, candidates who wanted to be nominated for a place on the Golkar party list were asked to pay up to 100 million Indonesian rupiah (Tomsa, 2008: 64), while in the PPP and the PKB the price for a nomination is thought to have been between 200 and 300 million rupiah (Aspinall, 2005b).

Moreover, candidates are not only required to pay their respective party for the candidacy, but, in addition, candidates need to prove that they will be able to shoulder the financial costs of their own personal election campaign (Ufen, 2008c: 27). Given the explosion of campaign costs since 1999, this sum is much larger than the 'donation' to the party, resulting in a growing influx of wealthy businesspeople into the political parties, as is best exemplified by Jusuf Kalla and Sutrisno Bachir, the former party leaders of Golkar and PAN, respectively. Conversely, less affluent party politicians have found themselves increasingly marginalized, since the party itself does not usually provide campaign funding (Choi, 2004b: 342). In general, parties will only finance the national media campaign, while candidates are expected to fund the campaign 'on the ground'.

However, money is not the only factor that will decide who gets nominated for public election. Candidates will also have to demonstrate to the party leadership that they are able to mobilize voters in their respective constituencies. Broadly speaking, this involves proving two things. First, that one is well connected to local power brokers, such as religious leaders, key bureaucrats and traditional aristocratic elites. Second, that one has the support of the constituency's local party chapters,

which – as was discussed earlier – have in most cases fallen prey to the interests of local bosses and enjoy a high degree of autonomy from the party central. Both of these informal norms require the candidate to spin a dense clientelistic network across the constituency that can then be used as a vote-mobilizing machine. Finally, in addition, party leaders also take into consideration the candidate's popularity with the electorate, with parties making increasing use of public opinion polls in order to identify the candidates with the highest popularity rating (see Mietzner, 2009a). However, it has to be noted that these opinion polls are not a formalized procedure and the results are never binding.

As a general rule, it can be formulated that the better candidates score on these latter factors, the less they will have to contribute in terms of financial resources. In fact, parties usually reserve around 10 per cent of the places on the party list for big 'vote-getters', such as popular artists and showbiz celebrities, whose campaign costs will be fully covered by the respective political party. For instance, in the 2004 election the PDI-P recruited the actresses Desy Ratnasari, Marissa Haque and Dedy Sutomo, and singer Franky Sahilatua, while the PKB enlisted actors Rieke Dyah Pitaloka and Ayu Azhari, and Golkar nominated actress Nurul Arifin. This trend is interpreted by Ufen (2006: 18) as one indication of an increasing 'Philippinization' of the Indonesian party system.¹⁵

While this process is thus highly undemocratic, the nomination of the presidential candidate tends to be even more elitist: usually, the party leader will be selected automatically without any serious opposition. Only in parties that are not dominated by a single leader can the nomination process turn into a serious competition. The only significant example of such a case is Golkar, which – as was mentioned earlier – plunged into a power vacuum after the ousting of Suharto, leaving several strong contenders competing for the party's presidential nomination in 2004. However, this process was only democratic in a formal sense, as the race was in fact decided by whichever candidate 'bought' the support of the majority of local party chapters (Tomsa, 2008: 88).

In the PKS, too, the selection of candidates is highly exclusive, as the final decision lies with the party's advisory council. However, it is nevertheless possible to identify some important differences between the processes of candidate selection in the PKS and the other major Indonesian parties. First of all, the PKS advisory council enjoys indirect democratic legitimation as its members are appointed by the *majelis syuro* (consultative council), which, in turn, gets elected every five years by core members in the party congress.¹⁶ Without a formal concept of

mass party membership, leaders of other major political parties lack such legitimization. Secondly, the nomination of candidates in the PKS does not seem to be influenced by money, as, unlike in other parties, nominations cannot be bought from the party leadership (Manikas and Emling, 2003: 123). In fact, this would undermine the PKS's strategic goal of setting itself apart from other parties by positioning itself as a 'clean' alternative at the forefront of political reform. Finally, in choosing candidates, the PKS leadership is restricted by a number of formal regulations. Most importantly, in order to avoid public offices becoming the property of individuals, candidates cannot be nominated again for the same office after having served for two terms.

To sum up, the selection of candidates for national elections in the major Indonesian political parties is both a highly exclusive and highly informal process. As there is no party on the ground, candidates are recruited from outside the party. In order to be admitted as a candidate, politicians need to contribute financially to the respective party's electoral campaign, control an effective clientelistic network down to the grassroots level and – less importantly – score high in popularity ratings. In the PKS, on the other hand, where the membership is large enough to serve as a recruitment pool, the selection of candidates is the exclusive responsibility of an indirectly legitimized party body – the party's advisory council.

Distribution of resources and composition of party bodies

The previous section identified an important source of income for Indonesian political parties: the 'auctioning' of nominations for public elections. Once elected into parliament, legislators will then be asked to make regular contributions to their party – sometimes reaching up to 40 per cent of their salary.¹⁷ Moreover, cabinet members will be put under intense pressure to use their access to state resources to siphon off public money into party coffers, mostly by offering projects to businesses and individuals closely associated with the party. Two exemplary cases of this practice that became public were the Baligate scandal in 1999, when Golkar officials managed to extort 546 billion rupiah from the state-owned Bali Bank for questionable consultancy services, and the Buloggate scandal in 2000, in which then president, Wahid, was accused of diverting substantial amounts of money belonging to the national food agency, Bulog, to foundations close to the PKB.

Finally, parties also rely heavily on external contributions, particularly from businesspeople. These donations are usually handed to senior

party leaders, who often keep the money for themselves. Only during election time, when most party funds are pooled in a number of central accounts to coordinate the financing of the national campaign, do entrepreneurs use the official party treasury as their main entry point for donations. Party financing laws – setting a maximum limit for donations – exist, but violations are hardly ever punished (Hadiwinata, 2006: 106).

The financial survival of the major political parties in Indonesia thus strongly depends on the parties' candidates and representatives in public office. State subsidies for parties, it should be noted, are insignificant. Money, as the example of external donations shows, is generally not channelled through the party as an abstract organization, but through individual party leaders. This is supported by the observation that Indonesian parties are only weakly bureaucratized. Even Golkar, the former regime party, which had decades to establish a bureaucratic apparatus, only employs about 100 permanent members of staff in its headquarters. Rather, managerial and administrative functions are largely performed by external professionals without political links to the parties (Mietzner, 2007: 255). As Johnson Tan (2006: 107) explains,

due to the strong concentration of decision-making authority at the party centre and the magnetic role of party leaders, other arms of the organization do not develop: this is rational in that other parts of the organization are neither wanted nor needed.

The only party that deviates from this pattern is once again the PKS. Although – like other Indonesian parties – the PKS withholds part of the salary of its elected officials (25 per cent), the majority of funding comes from party member contributions (Manikas and Emling, 2003: 124). Furthermore, the PKS receives funding through *infaq* and *shadaqah* (voluntary charity for the cause of Allah) from non-members. Party politicians who receive such donations must transfer them to the official party treasury. Finally, the party also benefits from *wakaf* – property or land endowed for public use – a tradition highly encouraged through the teachings of Muhammad.

However, the importance of the party central office in administering financial resources does not necessarily reflect in the party's decision-making structures. The highest executive body in the PKS, the consultative council (*majelis syuro*), is elected by members of the party congress and does not have any ex-officio members, which means that party bureaucrats are not automatically entitled to a seat. The *majelis syuro*

then appoints the members of the central executive council (referred to within all Indonesian parties as the *Dewan Pimpinan Pusat* or DPP), which includes, among others, the party chairman, the secretary general and the treasurer. Again, these roles do not have to be assigned to party bureaucrats but the council is free to select members of the party in public office – and has in fact done so in the past. In addition, the *majelis syuro* chooses the members of the advisory council – responsible, among other matters, for the selection of candidates (see above) – and designates the *sharia* council, whose main duty is to ensure that the party's policies and party members' actions conform to basic Islamic laws and principles.

Initially, under the rules of the PK, the function of the *majelis syuro* was only advisory. The highest decision-making authority rested with the party congress, which not only held the right to elect the members of the *majelis syuro* but also the right to impeach members of the party's executive bodies, formulate party policies and decide the party's strategies for elections. However, when the party was reconstituted as the PKS in 2002, these powers were transferred to the *majelis syuro*. Zulkieflimansyah, a PKS legislator, justified this step with the need to make the party more effective by delegating decision-making to a smaller group of leaders (cited in Permata, 2008: 187). Put in more general terms, similar to the socialist and social democratic mass parties in post-war Western Europe (see Scarrow et al., 2000), the party in public office – in order to be able to follow a catch-all strategy of voter mobilization – had to free itself from the constraining grip of the party on the ground.¹⁸ The *majelis syuro* was thus installed as the highest party organ at the expense of the party congress.

However, it does not follow from this that the party central office is the dominant organizational face within the PKS. First, members of the party in public office do not necessarily have an advantage in getting elected to the *majelis syuro* and other party bodies. This is because the closely associated *tarbiyah* movement – out of which the PKS emerged – offers an alternative channel to gather support among party members. For instance, since 2005, the *majelis syuro* has been chaired by Hilmi Aminuddin – an Islamic intellectual and early member of the student *tarbiyah* movement. Similarly, the *sharia* council has been working under the leadership of Surahman Hidayat – a PhD graduate from al-Azhar University, an important centre for Islamic education in Egypt. Second, the parliamentary party group (*fraksi*) does not decide on its own rules and procedures, but disciplinary offences are investigated by the DPP, with the final verdict given by the *majelis syuro*. And third, the

fraksi leader does not get elected by the party in public office, but is appointed by the DPP.

We can thus conclude that in all major parties – with the exception of the PKS – the party in central office is only weakly developed. Resources are not mobilized by the party as an abstract organization, but the organizational survival largely depends on financial contributions by candidates for public elections. Under these circumstances, the function of the party bureaucracy is largely reduced to managing the funds for the national election campaign, leaving the party in public office as the only element of party organization. In the PKS, in contrast, the party central office – as a result of its important role in administering the party membership and allocating financial resources – is much more powerful. Not only does the party central office control the inner workings of the parliamentary party, but through the implementation of the *majelis syuro* as the highest party body the central office's position has also been strengthened vis-à-vis the party on the ground.

The 2009 elections – a stimulus for party change?

The results for the 2009 legislative elections contain a number of indications that the electoral market in Indonesia might be changing – and with it the way political parties are organized. Most significantly, the five core parties that emerged as the strongest players in the 1999 elections continued to lose votes – a trend that had already started in 2004 (see Table 5.2). The two biggest losers were Golkar and the PDI-P: Golkar's vote fell by 7.2 percentage points to 14.4 per cent, while the PDI-P dropped from 18.6 per cent to 14 per cent. The Islamic parties were also hit by a decline in vote share: the PKB only won 4.9 per cent of the vote (minus 5.7), the PPP 5.3 (minus 2.9) and the PAN 6.0 (minus 0.4).

The main reason why all these established parties performed worse in 2009 than they had in previous elections is that party identification based on religious and secular worldviews has been declining steeply. Despite earlier warning signs in the 2004 elections, parties did not shape their programmatic profiles but continued to rely on their historical connections with political parties in the post-independence party system (Tomsa, 2010: 147). This has contributed to a growing dissatisfaction with parties among voters, who are becoming increasingly aware of political parties' real agendas – as personal vehicles of power for their respective leader, without any ambition to aggregate and articulate voters' interests. Closely related to this, the effectiveness of traditional

Table 5.2 Indonesia: results for elections to the People's Representative Council

Party	1999 ^a		2004		2009	
	V ^b	S ^c	V	S	V	S
PDI-P	33.8	30.8	18.6	19.8	14.0	16.8
Golkar	22.5	24.0	21.6	23.1	14.4	18.9
PKB	12.6	10.2	10.6	9.5	4.9	5.0
PPP	10.7	11.8	8.2	10.5	5.3	6.8
PAN	7.1	7.0	6.4	9.6	6.0	8.2
PBB	1.9	2.6	2.6	2.0	1.8	0.0
PD	—	—	7.5	10.2	20.8	26.4
PKS	—	—	7.3	8.2	7.9	10.2
Gerindra	—	—	—	—	4.5	4.6
Hanura	—	—	—	—	3.8	3.0
Other	11.4	13.6	17.2	7.1	5.4	0.0

^a 38 additional seats were reserved for the armed forces.

^b Share of votes (in %) in elections to the People's Representative Council.

^c Share of seats (in %) in the People's Representative Council.

Source: Rüländ (2001); na Thalang (2005); IFES Election Guide (undated).

networks as machines for voter mobilization – including local government bureaucracies, Islamic social organizations such as *Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah*, and other networks of Islamic scholars and teachers – seems to have dropped dramatically. Results of post-election surveys show that very few voters were contacted directly by parties, village officials or religious leaders, which is evidently a sign that traditional patron–client networks are struggling to reach the electorate (Mujani and Liddle, 2010: 41).

Instead, the big winner of the 2009 election was President Yudhoyono's Democratic Party (PD, *Partai Demokrat*), which gained 21 per cent of the vote – an increase of almost 14 percentage points over 2004. The PKS was also able to increase its vote share, albeit by only 0.6 percentage points. Moreover, the elections saw the emergence of two new political parties: the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra, *Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya*), established by Suharto's son-in-law Prabowo Subianto, won 4.5 per cent of the vote; the People's Conscience Party (Hanura, *Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat*), which formed around ex-Golkar politician Wiranto, had the support of 3.8 per cent of voters.

These four parties were able to increase their vote share at the expense of the more established parties because they broke with the

more traditional mechanisms of voter mobilization. The three ex-army generals – Yudhoyono, Prabowo and Wiranto – played the populist card, positioning themselves as strong leaders who pledged to support ‘the people’ in their fight against the corrupt political elites. In order to communicate this message to the electorate, both the PD and Gerindra, backed by Prabowo’s wealthy brother, relied heavily on modern mass media advertising.¹⁹ Hanura, on the other hand, depended mainly on Wiranto’s extensive network of connections among retired and serving military officers, hoping to win votes by nominating candidates with a local profile.

However, in addition to his populist appeals, Yudhoyono’s electoral success was largely due to the government’s scheme of handing out millions in cash to poor citizens shortly before the election, supposedly as compensation for rising fuel prices (Mietzner, 2009b: 4). Thus, in almost textbook style, Yudhoyono acted as theories of populism would have expected him to act: ‘Once populists have taken power, they tend to use clientelism in addition to plebiscitarian linkages’ (Barr, 2009: 42). Yudhoyono’s cash scheme was clearly clientelistic in nature, as it was a nearsighted decision, and was not driven by ideological principles.

The PKS, on the other, clearly continued its trend towards becoming a catch-all party. One notable example of this strategy was a TV advert entitled ‘the party for all of us’, which featured different people from very diverse backgrounds explaining why they supported the PKS, including a young woman wearing t-shirt and jeans, and no headscarf (Hasan, 2009: 20). Nevertheless, the PKS failed to considerably increase its vote share because the party’s claim of being a cleaner alternative to the established political parties had been undermined by two factors (Mietzner, 2009b: 14). First, through remarkable success in local elections the party’s total number of legislators had ballooned to around 1,000, some of whom soon gave in to the temptations of corruption that come with public offices. Second, having participated in government, the PKS found it more difficult to portray itself as anti-establishment party that would deliver radical change.

Although Yudhoyono’s PD ‘has eschewed the politics of local patronage and of establishing electoral “vote-banks” through local village and neighborhood figureheads’ (Sherlock, 2009: 35), it has not provided Indonesia with a new type of political party. Rather, as with the established parties, the PD is little more than the extension of the personality of its leader.

The PKS, on the other hand, strongly resembles the classical mass party with strong roots in society and a powerful party central office.

However, given that the party seems to be broadening its catch-all appeal even further, it might undergo significant changes in the future. For example, during its 2010 party congress, the PKS decided to open the party membership and party executive positions to non-Muslims. The party leadership thus appears to be interested in weakening the party on the ground as a means to gain autonomy from ideologically committed grassroots members. Weakening the party central office, on the other hand, does not currently seem to be a viable option. Rather, bearing in mind the high level of environmental uncertainty for political parties, which is reflected in high party system fragmentation and electoral volatility (see Table 5.3), the PKS might have to retain a strong party central office as a means to strengthen discipline among its legislators.²⁰ Moreover, the Justice faction, which seems to play the part of safeguarding the party's ideological foundation – as opposed to the Welfare faction, which seems to be willing to adopt a much broader catch-all strategy – is likely to oppose a complete disempowerment of the party central office.

Yet, the bigger question is how the established parties will counteract their decreasing vote share. One possible strategy would be to develop programmatic platforms – a particularly viable option for those parties with historical roots in social constituencies. However, current party leaders are very unlikely to initiate such a shift. This is because a programmatic strategy would undermine their own power within the party, which is mainly based on charisma and extensive connections to local notables – both non-essential resources when mobilizing voters through programmatic appeals. It would thus require a radical redistribution of party internal power to remove current leaders from positions where they can block programmatic ambitions. This is,

Table 5.3 Indonesia: party system indicators

	ENEP ^a	ENPP ^b	Volatility
1999	5.10	4.68	–
2004	8.55	7.07	32.75
2009	9.49	6.21	34.58
<i>Average</i>	<i>8.22</i>	<i>6.32</i>	<i>33.67</i>

^a Effective number of electoral parties calculated on the share of votes in elections to the People's Representative Council.

^b Effective number of parliamentary parties in the People's Representative Council.

Source: Author's own calculations based on Table 5.2.

however, unlikely to happen in the near future, as most Indonesian parties suffer from a 'generational gap' (Mietzner, 2009b). Politicians who have the potential to lead the development of programmatic programmes are too young and inexperienced, and thus lack a strong enough power base to challenge the party leadership.

The second option for political parties to reverse their electoral fortunes would be to extend the existing patron–client networks down to the voter level, for instance through straight vote-buying. The context of high poverty and low urbanization would certainly facilitate such a measure and, in fact, vote-buying is rampant in local elections. However, in national elections – although these are usually followed by reports of candidates offering voters money or food in return for their support – there is no evidence that vote-buying is organized in the same sophisticated manner as, for example, in the Philippines. The most important reason why no systematic patterns of vote-buying have emerged at the national level is the electoral system: local vote-buying machines are able to deliver enough votes for electoral victory in small constituencies voting for executive positions such as governors, district heads (*bupati*) and mayors, but they lack the resources to make a difference in the large national electoral districts, where seats are allocated according to proportional representation (Aspinall, 2005b: 147). Hence, for now, the only effective way of delivering clientelistic incentives to voters is through the formal channels of the state administration, as the Yudhoyono government did before the 2009 election.²¹

In the meantime, without relevant actors able to mobilize voters through programmatic platforms or through the clientelistic distribution of private goods, the electoral market in Indonesia will favour politicians with strong charisma and the necessary financial resources for a national media campaign that can woo the masses with populist slogans. In relation to the organization of political parties, this means that the three formal faces will remain indistinguishable, as parties do not need a mass membership and campaign-related functions can be performed by external professionals.

Summary

As we would expect in a 'third wave' democracy, the sudden arrival of democracy in Indonesia did not leave actors much time to develop programmatic strategies for voter mobilization. As a result, the winners in the country's first two elections were those political parties with significant links to parties that dominated Indonesia's first democratic

party system in the 1950s. Parties established these links through the charisma of their leaders and through the clientelistic integration of local notables into extensive vote-getting machines. Accordingly, the immediate neo-democratic context favoured actors who controlled interpersonal networks of local power holders that had been nurtured under Suharto's autocratic rule. Moreover, as the maintenance of these networks requires significant financial resources, the context also facilitated the entry of wealthy businessmen into the political arena. It must be noted, however, that the patron-client relationships rarely reach down to voter level, but are primarily a mechanism to accommodate elites from the national and local level. In fact, the electoral system of proportional representation that has been adopted makes systematic vote-buying in national elections very difficult.

In line with the charismatic and clientelistic strategies of actors populating the major political parties in Indonesia, the dominant type of party organization that emerged after the collapse of Suharto's regime shares many similarities with the classical cadre party in early democratic Europe. Party leaders want maximum freedom in the management of their intra-elite networks and are therefore not interested in a formal party membership and a powerful party bureaucracy. Rather, the formal party organization only serves as a cloak to conceal the clientelistic dealings. All functions usually associated with political parties, such as the recruitment of candidates, the mobilization of funding and the organization of electoral campaigns, are performed by the informal networks within that cloak. As a result, the three formal faces of party organization – the party on the ground, the party central office and the party in public office – are indistinguishable. Instead, there is a strong personal overlap between the three faces, as party membership is restricted to actors who have the necessary resources to run their own electoral campaign, while functions usually associated with the party bureaucracy are mainly performed by external professionals.

However, the proportional effects of the electoral system have also allowed smaller parties following programmatic strategies of voter mobilization to establish themselves in the electoral market. The most notable example of such political parties is the PKS, which emerged out of the Islamic *tarbiyah* movement. Initially, the PKS (or PK as it was called in the beginning) did not pay much importance to elections, but saw them merely as a means to gauge the progress of its *dakwah* programme, which aimed at educating the masses about the value of *sharia*. The party membership was organized along similar structures to the *tarbiyah* movement: party members met for regular *Qur'anic* study

sessions and the payment of membership fees was justified through religious texts. Reflecting its strong ideological commitment, the PKS placed great emphasis on party discipline. Party members, to be granted full membership rights, had to pass specific training programmes, and the party central office was installed as the dominant organizational element, a means to enforce conformity among the members of the party in public office. However, sparked by the disappointing results in the 1999 elections, the PKS has increasingly been adopting a catch-all electoral strategy, emphasizing issues such as good governance and the fight against corruption. In order to implement this broader electoral platform the influence of die-hard Islamic activists had to be minimized. This was achieved by shifting decision-making powers from the party congress to the *majelis syuro*, and opening the party membership to non-Muslims.

Despite the similarities to party systems in nineteenth-century Europe – with dominant elitist parties facing competition from ideologically driven mass parties – the case of Indonesia should not be viewed as evidence of political parties following the same path of organizational development as parties in Western Europe. Rather, as has been shown, politicians constantly need to review their electoral strategies in a context that is structured through competition with other parties. The PKS broadened its electoral appeals after the devastating results in the 1999 elections, while the diminishing effectiveness of clientelistic vote-gathering machines means that other actors, too, might have to reconsider their strategies of voter mobilization, or, if they fail to do so, run the risk of being replaced by other actors. In other words, the party system in Indonesia will develop along its own path, shaped by politicians' strategies and the opportunities provided by the particular context.

6

Conclusion

The starting point of this book was the observation that the literature on party organizational formation and change is divided along the classical agency-structure spectrum. Moreover, within the structural strand, scholars cannot agree whether internal or external factors matter more in explaining different types of party organization. However, reading the literature through the lens of historical institutionalism shows that, although these theories make contradicting predictions as to which type of political party we should expect to emerge in new democracies, they are not mutually exclusive. In fact, if we adopt a dialectical understanding of the relationship between structure and agency, existing theories of party organization can be integrated into a more general narrative.

The key to uncovering the complimentary relationships between the three types of factors identified by theories of party organization – internal, external and agential factions – is to acknowledge that actors have the ability to develop different strategic responses to contexts that are themselves strategically selective. More specifically, given that the defining function of political parties is to compete in public elections, the organization of political parties is inseparably linked to strategies of voter mobilization. Consequently, as electoral markets favour certain electoral strategies over others, they will throw up a dominant type of party organization. However, politicians can always develop alternative electoral strategies – either because they do not control the necessary resources to follow the strategy favoured by the electoral market or because they interpret their surroundings through beliefs and ideas that do not allow them to realize the opportunities provided by the electoral market. Therefore, we should not rule out the possibility of different types of political parties emerging within the same party system.

Because actors can also adopt different electoral strategies within the same *party*, political parties are best understood not as unitary monoliths, but as ongoing power conflicts between strategically behaving individuals and factions. Once established, party organizations necessarily favour some internal actors over others, with advantaged groups working to defend the status quo against disadvantaged groups. However, these internal dynamics do not determine the party's further development. Organizational change becomes possible when external shocks disrupt the power distribution between factions or prompt factions to change their strategies. Moreover, disadvantaged groups have strategies at their disposal that they can use to work towards organizational change without having to wait for external shocks. The context will again favour certain strategies over others, meaning that some strategies are more likely to bring about organizational change than others.

The development of party organization in East Asia

These two conceptualizations of political parties – as strategic responses to electoral markets and as ongoing power struggles – allow us to produce a coherent narrative of political party development in the new democracies of East Asia. In fact, it is only if we accept that internal, external and agential factors all form part of the same story that we can make sense of the different types of political parties that have emerged in East Asia and the processes of change that have characterized some of these parties.

Party formation: electoral markets and electoral strategies

The dominant type of political party that emerged in the Philippines, South Korea and Indonesia was characterized by a lack of formal organizational faces. This was because the post-autocratic electoral markets in all three countries favoured clientelism over other strategies of voter mobilization. In the Philippines, the enormous income disparity meant that the country's economic elite could use its private wealth to set up clientelistic linkages with the impoverished mass of the population. In South Korea, despite a high level of socio-economic development, both regime and opposition actors were able to carry the clientelistic networks they had been developing under autocratic rule through the negotiated transition, providing them with an efficient mechanism to mobilize voters in the neo-democratic arena. In Indonesia, the complicated system of clientelism and patronage through which the regime

had integrated social elites into its power structures survived the democratization process, and political parties then used these interpersonal networks to create the impression that they represented certain constituencies in society. Thus, unlike in the Philippines and Korea, in Indonesia clientelism was a mechanism to accommodate political elites from the national and local level, as only a very small share of material gains trickled down to the voter.

In line with these clientelistic strategies, political parties only adopted very rudimentary organizations, which merely served as formal shells for patron–client networks. Because clientelism is based on the particularistic distribution of material benefits, a strong formal party organization was not needed. Very similar to the classical cadre party in nineteenth-century Europe, the three faces of party organization – the party on the ground, the party central office and the party in public office – remained indistinguishable. To begin with, members did not receive any formal rights and obligations towards the party, which made it very difficult to draw a clear boundary between the party membership and the general electorate. The constitutions of political parties in the Philippines, South Korea and Indonesia were very vague about the conditions they attached to party membership; they only listed general requirements (such as nationality, age and identification with the party's principles), and party members were not required to attend regular party meetings or pay regular membership fees. Moreover, no formal procedure was put in place that needed to be followed to join a party as a member: there was no application process, no ID cards were given out to party members and no centrally administered membership register was created by which to record the personal details of members. Campaign-related functions traditionally performed by grassroots party members on a voluntary basis, such as canvassing or attending rallies, were carried out by clients of the candidates for public election in return for material incentives.

The only formal criterion to identify party members was whether they had been nominated as candidates for a public election by the respective party – although in the Philippines even this criterion was not free from problems, as candidates often campaigned under the banner of more than one party. Nomination as a candidate for public election, in turn, had to be 'bought' from the party leadership with politically relevant resources. Given that these parties followed clientelistic electoral strategies, relevant resources included money, patron–client networks and (in the Philippines) militant organizations to intimidate the candidates and supporters of other parties. In South Korea and Indonesia,

where closed party list systems were used to elect national legislators, the higher one wanted to be ranked on the list, the higher the financial contribution had to be.

Conversely, this meant that the party itself did not constitute itself as a major source of financial support. Rather, candidates had to rely on their own resources or on resources distributed through interpersonal channels. In Indonesia, parties funded the national media campaign, but candidates had to finance the campaign 'on the ground'. In Filipino parties, the general pattern was for campaign expenses at a particular administrative level to be shouldered by the next higher political office, while in Korea candidates maintained their own political machines (*sajojik*) outside the political party, which were used to mobilize both supporters and donations. It follows from this that parties did not develop a strong party bureaucracy, as a bureaucratic apparatus was neither wanted nor needed. Functions usually performed by the party bureaucracy were carried out by externally hired professionals.

In short, since the post-autocratic electoral markets in the Philippines, South Korea and Indonesia were highly selective towards clientelism, the political parties that emerged were, on the whole, no more than formal cloaks around patron-client networks that were used to mobilize votes in public elections. As a result, when described according to their formal properties, these parties were characterized by the following organizational features: (1) there was no formal party membership that could be distinguished from the common electorate based on its rights and obligations towards the party; (2) the selection of candidates was highly centralized within the party leadership, with the party leadership usually nominating themselves; and (3) politically relevant resources were held by the politicians themselves, not by the party central office as an abstract institution. Accordingly, as in the classical cadre party of nineteenth-century Europe, it was possible to observe a large personal overlap between the three elements of party organization, making it impossible to distinguish between the party on the ground, the party central office and the party in public office.

The only post-autocratic electoral market in East Asia that was not selective towards clientelism was Taiwan. While the high level of modernization made it very difficult to set up new clientelistic networks from the ground up, only one faction within the KMT regime, the Mainstream faction, had developed patron-client linkages with the electorate to mobilize voters in the regime's pseudo-elections. The Mainstream faction, facilitated by a democratic transition controlled 'from above', succeeded in transferring these clientelistic networks into the

neo-democratic electoral market. Other actors, on the other hand, had to adopt programmatic strategies to win the support of voters. More precisely, actors positioned themselves on the question of how to develop Taiwan's relations with mainland China. The factions that came to dominate the two major parties, the KMT and the DPP, advocated rather moderate policies. Whereas the KMT's Non-mainstream wanted to achieve reunification with the Chinese mainland through economic growth and cooperation, the DPP's Formosa argued that any decision over Taiwan's future should be left to the Taiwanese people.

These catch-all strategies required an investment into the party as an abstract organization, since politicians needed a set of formal decision-making and conflict-resolution rules to help them articulate a common policy platform. More precisely, both the KMT and the DPP adopted organizations that featured a strong party in public office. As implementing catch-all electoral strategies often involves making complex decisions on a short-term basis, the party in public office needed a high degree of autonomy, without being restricted in its decision-making freedom by the extra-parliamentary party. Therefore, the role of the party central office was designed to be that of providing administrative support. Party bureaucracies were put in charge of managing the party membership and administering the party's income, but the party central office was not given any say in the internal decision-making process. In particular, the party central office did not receive automatic representation in the party's key executive bodies, while the party in public office was granted the right to elect its own leadership without interference from outside and establish its own disciplinary procedures.

Unlike the major parties in the Philippines, Korea and Indonesia, both the KMT and DPP actively engaged in the recruitment of party members. The two parties were mainly interested in accruing a large membership to create the impression that they had strong support in society. In addition, members were also seen as a source of free labour and, in the case of the DPP, financial resources. To compensate members for their contributions, the party on the ground was given voting powers in the process of candidate selection. However, by giving each member one vote through closed primaries, the party on the ground was atomized, thereby undermining its ability to launch a serious challenge against the party leadership.

To sum up, because both the KMT and the DPP were dominated by actors following catch-all electoral strategies, the party organizations that emerged in the immediate post-autocratic context shared many central characteristics with the dominant party type in contemporary

Western Europe: requirements for party membership were not very demanding, candidate selection was highly inclusive and the parliamentary party controlled its own resources and decision-making. All this amounted to the party in public office being the dominant face of the party organization. Actors were able to concentrate power in the party in public office because environmental uncertainty for political parties was relatively low. That is to say, there was no need to strengthen the party central office as means to increase party discipline in the parliamentary party.

While the emergence of actors campaigning on clientelistic appeals or on catch-all strategies is something we would expect in new democracies, political parties mobilizing voters through the programmatic distribution of club goods is something we would not. However, contrary to our expectations, the party systems in South Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia saw the emergence of political parties that targeted clearly defined social groups through ideological platforms. The KDLP aimed to develop linkages with the working class, the Indonesian PKS sought to represent the interests of conservative Muslims and, in the Philippines, *Akbayan* established itself as a voice for the poor. While this is certainly interesting, it has to be noted that the emergence of all three parties was greatly facilitated by the respective electoral system. The KDLP only became the third largest party in Korea after the 2004 electoral reform, the PKS benefited immensely from the system of proportional representation that was adopted to weaken Golkar's organizational advantage and *Akbayan* was founded to compete only for seats in the party-list elections institutionalized in 1998.

However, irrespective of what facilitated their emergence, these three parties provided the party systems in Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia with a different type of party organization. In line with their electoral strategies aimed at the distribution of club goods, they established the party central office as the dominant organizational face. This was necessary to enforce discipline among the members of the party in public office as a means to ensure their adherence to the party's ideology. The dominance of the party central office in the KDLP, *Akbayan* and the PKS flowed, first of all, from the fact that it was given control over all politically relevant resources. Not only did the respective party bureaucracies develop their own sources of income, but, in addition, it was agreed that all financial resources mobilized by party politicians had to be transferred to the official party treasury. Second, at least in the case of the KDLP and *Akbayan*, the party bureaucracy was allocated ex-officio representation in all central executive bodies.

This did not mean, however, that all executive bodies in the PKS became dominated by members of the party in public office. Instead, the closely associated *tarbiyah* movement provided alternative channels for career progression. Third, in all three parties the party in public office was denied the right to independently decide on its own affairs; all major decision-making powers (nomination of the parliamentary floor leader, disciplinary measures) were centralized in the parties' respective executive bodies.

While establishing the party central office as the dominant organizational face is one way to enforce discipline among the members in public office, discipline can be strengthened further if candidates for public election are recruited from the party's own membership, following years of party indoctrination. Therefore, in all three parties, new members were required to attend introductory seminars, where they were taught about the party's goals and values. Moreover, party branches were encouraged to maintain a high level of membership activity in between elections, and attendance of regular party meetings was even made compulsory in the PKS (in the form of weekly *Qur'anic* study sessions) and *Akbayan*, where party members had to work on local party projects as a substitute for not paying membership fees. That is to say, these parties did not only see their members as sources of financial support and free labour, but, in addition, they perceived the party on the ground as a pool of candidates for public elections, who had to be trained and educated in all aspects of politics. In return for their contributions, in all three parties, members were given participatory rights in the process of candidate selection. However, parties adopted different levels of selectorate inclusiveness. While the PKS and *Akbayan*, reflecting the model of delegation in the classical mass party, left the right to nominate candidates with an indirectly legitimized party body and the party congress, respectively, the KDLP implemented closed primaries to choose its candidates for public elections.

It is thus clear from this analysis that political parties in the new democracies of East Asia adopted very different organizations. That is to say, contrary to the arguments of the 'life cycle' approach, being 'new' did not force parties to organize in exactly the same way. Nor did parties in East Asia make an 'evolutionary leap' towards the contemporary type of political party found in the established democracies in Western Europe, as the 'period effect' approach suggests. Similarly, parties did not establish homogeneous organizational structures within the same polities, but the neo-democratic party systems saw the emergence

of different types of parties competing against each other. However, this does not mean that processes of party formation in East Asia resulted in a confusing array of party organizations, as the theoretical assumptions of actor-centred approach would lead us to expect. Rather, the environmental context clearly selected a certain type of party organization.

While existing theories of party organization thus struggle to explain party formation in the new democracies of East Asia, we gain a much better understanding of these processes if we see party organizations as instruments to implement politicians' electoral strategies. Politicians have the ability to develop different electoral strategies, while electoral markets favour certain strategies over others. That is to say, accounts of party formation must acknowledge the explanatory power of both agential and external factors.

Party change: organizational replacement and gradual transformation

Because political actors can develop different electoral strategies within the same context, conflict between different electoral strategies is not limited to the inter-party level only but can also arise at the intra-party level. Given that each electoral strategy demands particular organizational structures for its implementation, party internal divisions between different electoral strategies can turn into conflict over the party's organization. Accordingly, power conflicts between actors following different electoral strategies explain both how party organizations reproduce and how they change.

It thus becomes clear that the major parties in the Philippines and Indonesia have remained characterized by the lack of formal organizational faces because there are no relevant actors within these parties interested in formalizing internal decision-making. Although highly factionalized, Filipino and Indonesian parties only contain factions following clientelistic strategies of voter mobilization. There are no significant factions campaigning on programmatic strategies and therefore no change agents with enough power to push for organizational reform. This is not to say that clientelistic factions have not put into practice formal organizational procedures in the past; examples include party conventions held by some Filipino parties and the way in which former Indonesian regime party, Golkar, selected its candidate for the 2004 presidential election. However, in each of these cases the outcome was effectively decided by who was able to 'buy' the most support from lower

party levels. In other words, clientelistic factions knew that the informal distribution of material incentives through patron–client networks would undermine formal organizational procedures.

In contrast, the two major parties in South Korea have gone through organizational changes over the past few years that effectively cut through party internal patron–client relationships. This is because programmatic factions emerged within each of the parties, which, against the resistance from the dominant clientelistic factions, reformed the electoral institutions in which political parties were embedded and moved candidate selection outside the parties' boundaries. Programmatic actors first appeared in Kim Dae-jung's MDP. Having originally been nominated as candidates for parliamentary elections to give the party a younger image, these politicians were not integrated into the institutionalized patron–client networks that connected the more established factions to the electorate. They therefore developed a catch-all electoral strategy, positioning themselves on post-materialist issues such as good governance and a conciliatory attitude towards North Korea. While the programmatic faction initially hid its preferences for organizational reform, the primaries held to nominate the party's candidate for the 2002 presidential election provided it with the opportunity to move into open opposition. The dominant clientelistic factions decided to implement primaries, because the departure of Kim Dae-jung from politics had left a power void within the party, which no other actor was able to fill. However, thinking that primaries would be decided by which faction succeeded in 'buying' the largest number of votes, the various clientelistic factions underestimated the strength of the programmatic faction, which had rallied behind its candidate, Roh Moo-hyun. For many young voters in their 20s and 30s, Roh embodied a break with the more traditional style of Korean politics, which allowed him to win both the MDP's primary and the presidential election.

In order to create a context less favourable towards the implementation of clientelistic electoral strategies, the Roh government then pursued a strategy of displacement: in an alliance with civil society organizations, the proportional tier of the electoral system was strengthened and more effective political finance laws were passed. The external context facilitated a strategy of displacement, as the 'blacklisting' campaign of civil society organizations had weakened the veto position of status quo agents considerably.

Roh was also able to win the 2002 presidential elections on a post-materialist platform, because the political discourse in Korea had broadened, moving away from its previous anti-communist focus and

accepting more progressive views. This new discourse turned the former regime party, the GNP, into an easy target for other parties' campaign rhetoric. In a similar way to the MDP, the GNP had, since the withdrawal of its party leader, Kim Young-sam, been characterized by intense confrontation between smaller clientelistic factions. As none of these clientelistic factions were in the position to offer a viable solution on how to regain control of the political discourse, space for programmatic actors opened up. More precisely, this situation gave Lee Myung-bak the opportunity to increase his power within the party. As the former CEO of Hyundai, Lee enjoyed the public image of an economic mastermind, which provided him with the credibility to formulate catch-all policies promising a better standard of living. However, it was only after Lee brought together a coalition of marginalized legislators within the GNP, by pledging support to a multi-million canal project, that he amassed enough influence to demand a formalization of the party's candidate selection rules for the 2007 presidential election. After then winning the presidency, Lee consolidated his power within the GNP, giving him the opportunity to implement a new system of candidate selection for the 2008 legislative election. This new system transferred the power to nominate candidates to an independent screening committee, thereby depriving clientelistic factions of their ability to influence decision-making through their patron-client networks.

After re-merging with the MDP to form the UDP, the *Uri* Party adopted a similar system of candidate selection to that of the GNP, as the dominant programmatic factions saw this as a good way to cleanse the party of clientelistic actors who had rejoined the party through the MDP.

We can thus summarize by saying that the two major parties in Korea have become increasingly institutionalized in recent years. They now provide formal regulations for decision-making, which – coupled with the more effective political finance laws passed in 2004 – have made their survival less dependent on individual politicians. However, the different elements of party organization in the major Korean parties still remain indistinguishable. This is because programmatic actors had to develop their own supporter organizations (so-called *sajojik*) through which to mobilize both labour for campaign-related activities and financial resources. As these programmatic actors lack the incentives to now pool their own resources under the central control of the party as an abstract organization, the two major parties have thus far developed neither a party on the ground nor a party central office.

The organizational development of political parties in Taiwan has also been characterized by several significant changes. The catch-all

factions that dominated the KMT and the DPP in the early days of the transition process soon came under increasing pressure from factions following alternative electoral strategies. In the KMT, the Mainstream faction slowly expanded its power, as its clientelistic linkages with local factions proved to be a more efficient strategy to deal with the problems posed by Taiwan's SNTV electoral system than the Non-mainstream's catch-all strategy. To best facilitate the implementation of its clientelistic strategy of voter mobilization, the Mainstream was interested in turning decision-making into a more informal process. Thus, following a strategy of layering, the Mainstream pushed for the centralization of candidate selection in the party leadership, which would allow bargaining with local factions behind closed doors. Moreover, the Mainstream put the party's business empire under the direct control of the party leader, thereby circumventing formal channels of resource allocation.

In the DPP, the New Tide experienced a sudden increase in power when pro-independence advocates – who were allowed back into Taiwan after the lifting of martial law – joined the faction in the early 1990s. The New Tide had an interest in strengthening the party central office to ensure party discipline and conformity with the faction's rigid ideology of striving for Taiwanese independence, and because the faction held a disproportionately large share of posts in the party bureaucracy. However, the veto position of the status quo agents – the Formosa faction – was strong, since the DPP's party central controlled only a very small share of the party's financial resources, which made it difficult to sanction legislators and candidates for failing to comply with ideological guidelines. The New Tide only succeeded in changing the rules for candidate selection through a strategy of layering, by attaching a new selectorate consisting of party bureaucrats to the existing closed primaries. This was successful because the New Tide was able to show that the closed primaries opened the way for vote-buying and the strategic allocation of so-called pocket members, which had both caused considerable damage to the DPP's image among the electorate.

The military manoeuvres held by the PRC during the 1996 presidential election campaign, however, posed a serious shock to the New Tide's electoral strategy, as it became clear that independence could only be achieved through an armed conflict. As a result of this shock, the New Tide moderated its platform, bringing it into line with the preferences of the median voter. Consequently, the New Tide's organizational preferences changed from strengthening the party central office to establishing the party in public office as the dominant organizational face. It thus became necessary to once again remove the party central

office from the procedure of candidate selection. Instead, the New Tide pushed for the implementation of public opinion polls, which, as a method of candidate selection, not only strengthen the party in public office – as their higher media exposure means that legislators are likely to perform better – but also undermine the effectiveness of pocket members to influence the final outcome.

In the KMT, the Mainstream faction's power simply collapsed after a devastating defeat in the 2000 presidential elections. The Non-mainstream, which re-established itself as the dominant faction, used this critical juncture to reverse the process of informalization initiated by the Mainstream. First, aiming to destroy the Mainstream's patron–client networks within the party, stricter regulations for member registration were passed and a membership fee was introduced. Second, like the DPP, the Non-mainstream implemented public opinion polls to select candidates for public election. The objective was twofold: first, public opinion polls would make it impossible for the Mainstream to control the nomination of candidates through the strategic allocation of clientelistic incentives and, secondly, Mainstream members were likely to receive only low ratings in public opinion polls, since many of them were associated with corrupt and illegal practices. Finally, as in the DPP, public opinion polls would help to establish the party in public office as the dominant organizational face.

The Indonesian PKS has also gone through a process of organizational change. The party's poor performance in the 1999 elections made it clear that the PKS was still a long way from implementing *sharia* law through its grassroots education programme. While elections were initially not perceived as a crucial component in achieving the party's objective, the party leadership subsequently realized that mobilizing votes and winning political power could help to demonstrate what a government guided by Islamic moral values would look like. In other words, electoral success and participation in government were now seen as useful ways to convert people into supporters of *sharia* law, rather than the other way around. When re-establishing itself under the new banner, the PKS therefore developed a catch-all electoral strategy emphasizing issues such as clean governance and the fight against corruption, hoping that this would help to mobilize a larger number of voters.

In order to implement this catch-all strategy the PKS leadership had to free itself from the constraining grip of ideologically committed grassroots members in the party on the ground. It did so by installing the

majelis syuro as the highest decision-making body in the party – at the expense of the party congress – and by recently opening the party membership to non-Muslims. Ideally, reflecting its catch-all electoral strategy, the PKS should adopt a party organization characterized by a dominant party in public office. However, the high degree of environmental uncertainty for parties in Indonesia means that this option is difficult to realize. Moreover, inter-factional conflict also plays a role, as factions interested in preserving the party's ideological core might seek to prevent a transfer of power from the party central office to the party in public office.

In summary, the development of party organization in the new democracies of East Asia shows that political parties are not trapped in their genetic background, as the 'generation effect' approach would claim. First, as the example of the KMT in 2000 illustrates, parties can change as external shocks lead to a radical redistribution of power between party internal factions. Previously disadvantaged factions can then use such critical junctures to redesign the organization in their own interests. Second, external shocks can cause factions within the party to rethink their electoral strategies, which, consequently, translates into new preferences regarding party organization. This is what happened to the DPP's New Tide in 1996, when military threats from the PRC prompted the faction to move the focus of its programmatic platform closer to the median voter. Similarly, the PKS adopted a catch-all strategy when disappointing election results in 1999 threatened the survival of the party and revealed the ineffectiveness of its grassroots education programme. Third, organizational change can happen without an external stimulus, as disadvantaged factions possess the ability to develop strategies of incremental reform. For example, the KMT's Non-mainstream faction followed a strategy of layering to shift decision-making out of the formal party arena, while the Korean *Uri* Party used a strategy of displacement to reform electoral institutions within which party organizations were embedded. However, disadvantaged factions need to direct their strategies towards the context, as the environment favours certain strategies over others. Thus, the *Uri* Party opted for a strategy of displacement, as the civic organization campaigns had weakened the veto position of status quo agents considerably, whereas the KMT's Mainstream faction had to operate in a context with much stronger veto possibilities. Finally, the development of parties in Korea exemplifies how political parties can institutionalize if programmatic actors gain enough power to implement formal decision-making rules. Such an

increase in power can be caused by strategic miscalculations by the status quo agents – as in the case of the MDP – or changes in the party's environment – as in the case of the GNP.

In other words, to produce a coherent narrative of political party development in the new democracies of East Asia, we need to acknowledge the explanatory value of all three factors proposed in the party organization literature – internal, external and agential variables. While internal dynamics constrain agents' ability to change the organization, space for agency opens up if external shocks trigger critical junctures or provoke agents to change their electoral strategies. Moreover, disadvantaged agents can work towards an incremental transformation of the organization. However, they need to be aware that the external context will favour certain strategies of change over others.

Implications for the study of political parties – in Asia and elsewhere

Overall, it has become clear that no existing theory of party organization can adequately explain the development of political parties. We are not witnessing parties at certain stages along a universal path of maturation, as the 'life cycle' approach argues, nor have parties made an 'evolutionary leap' towards the cartel party, as advocates of the 'period effect' approach would expect. What is more, contrary to the prediction of the 'generation effect' approach there is no evidence that political parties are trapped in their genetic background. Finally, we are not observing an unstructured collection of political parties, as the actor-centred approaches to party organization would predict, as certain behavioural regularities clearly evoke the emergence of a dominant type of political party within particular electoral markets.

However, this does not mean that existing theories of party organization have to be discarded. Instead, reading the literature of party organization through the lens of historical institutionalism shows that existing theories of party formation and change are not mutually exclusive. If we adopt a dialectical understanding of the relationship between structure and agency, as suggested by historical institutionalism, it becomes clear that existing theories of party organization are highly complementary, as the different types of factors identified by these theories – internal, external and agential factors – can be integrated into a single narrative. In order to accommodate actors' ability to act strategically within a context that is itself strategically selective we have to conceptualize political parties as strategic responses to electoral markets

and, because actors with different electoral strategies can also co-exist within the same party, as ongoing power conflicts between strategically behaving individuals and factions. As the analysis of political party development in the new democracies of East Asia has demonstrated, these two conceptualizations help us develop a much more coherent narrative of party formation and change.

Moreover, the analysis identified a number of factors to describe the contours of electoral markets in new democracies. These factors constitute the context in which politicians choose their electoral strategies, and therefore help us make certain predictions about the dominant type of party organization to emerge in a given new democracy. First, the empirical evidence from East Asia confirms earlier findings that democracies in the 'third wave' of democratization militate against programmatic strategies promising the distribution of club goods. This is not to say that political parties aiming to encapsulate clearly identifiable constituencies cannot emerge in new democracies, but are very likely to stay marginalized in the political process. Instead, because of the generally abrupt nature of transition in the 'third wave', and the particular sequence of democratization and industrialization, politicians following clientelistic or catch-all strategies of voter mobilization can be expected to be more successful in gathering electoral support.

Broadly speaking, the structural environment selects for clientelism under either, or both, of the following conditions: (1) The outgoing autocratic regime legitimized its non-democratic rule through the clientelistic distribution of goods – either to social elites or the population at large – and had at least partial control of the democratization process, or (2) the level of economic development is so low that clientelism can be set up as a new game, without a high risk of either of the two sides defecting. Conversely, catch-all strategies are the strategically selected outcome if – under conditions of high economic development – (1) the democratic transition was controlled 'from below', completely removing the regime from power, or (2) the autocratic regime did not use clientelistic mechanisms to legitimize its non-democratic power.

It follows from this that we should recognize that new democracies are very unlikely to return to the 'golden age' of party organization, characterized by mass parties with strong roots in society and a strong party central office that ensures the aggregation and articulation of social interests. Instead, we should accept that mass parties were the outcome strategically selected by a particular historical context. In democracies of the 'third wave' we should expect the formation of parties that either share many similarities with the classical cadre party – if the electoral

market favours clientelism – or parties that look very much like those in contemporary Western Europe – if the electoral market favours catch-all strategies of voter mobilization.

Finally, the analysis of political party development in East Asia has shown that we are not witnessing the emergence of an ‘Asian style’ party, as some would expect (Neher, 1994). Culture certainly matters, and can explain certain aspects of party organization in East Asia; for example, it helps us understand why patron–client networks in South Korea group around school ties, how *guanxi* holds together local factions in Taiwan, how families – rather than individuals – have come to dominate electoral politics in the Philippines and why voters in Indonesia adopt local notables as their *babak*. However, the dominant type of political party that we find in many of the new democracies of East Asia is not a cultural product, but is simply the ideal instrument to implement clientelistic strategies of voter mobilization.

Clientelism turned out to be an effective strategy of voter mobilization for many actors in the East Asia neo-democracies, because clientelistic networks that had been developed under autocratic rule were successfully transferred through the democratic transition – or, as in the Philippines, because the low level of socio-economic development means that the economic elite can simply set up new patron–client networks. Actors who lack the necessary resources for the clientelistic mobilization of voters or whose beliefs and ideas do not allow them to realize the opportunities for clientelism provided by the context, have had to develop alternative electoral strategies. While factions in the major parties in Taiwan and Korea adopted catch-all strategies, the KDLP, the PKS and *Akbayan* set out to encapsulate certain social constituencies through the ideological distribution of club goods.

The variety of electoral strategies in the new democracies of East Asia thus shows that patron–client exchange relationships are not a cultural phenomenon. Moreover, electoral reforms and new political finance laws passed in Taiwan and South Korea in recent years demonstrate that programmatic actors can make the institutional context more hostile towards the clientelistic mobilization of voters. This is a possible scenario that might also unfold in the Philippines and Indonesia. In both countries the outlook for programmatic actors is not entirely gloomy: In the Philippines, Noynoy Aquino was voted into the presidential office in 2010 partly as a result of people’s belief in his ‘reformist’ credentials (see Thompson, 2010), while, in Indonesia, the diminishing effectiveness of intra-elite machines as a means to attract electoral support means that opportunities might open up for more programmatic strategies.

In other words, the strategic contours of electoral markets can change, if politicians open up strategic options that have so far not been explored by others.

Questions for future research

Stressing the importance of electoral strategies in order to understand processes of political party formation and change raises new questions for research. This is because our knowledge of electoral strategies is strongly biased towards the Western European experience. Based on decades of research, starting with Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) seminal work on cleavage structures, we have gained a deep knowledge of how politicians can use programmatic electoral strategies to mobilize social identities into political support. However, as the analysis of party organization in East Asia (also see McAllister, 2007), and indeed many other studies of electoral politics in newer democracies, have shown (Randall, 2006), the Lipset-Rokkan model has only limited applicability outside Western Europe. Newer democracies of the 'third wave' have followed very different historical trajectories, which have, in many cases, led to environmental contexts that militate against the programmatic strategies of voter mobilization.

As a result, in numerous neo-democracies, political actors have developed alternative strategies to compete within the electoral market. In particular, the linkage between the voter and politicians is often made through personalism – based either on the clientelistic exchange of material goods or the personal charisma of the candidate. Although the study of clientelism is a burgeoning field, which has produced very insightful work over the past ten years, more research is needed to fully understand the various dimensions of clientelism as an electoral strategy. In particular, it would be helpful to develop a theoretical model that conceptualizes clientelism in all its varieties and outlines factors that facilitate the establishment of patron–client networks. Given the widespread prevalence of clientelism in the newer democracies of East Asia – and also in many Asian societies that fall short of democracy – the study of East Asian politics can contribute greatly to such a theoretical framework. Moreover, research on electoral politics in East Asia can also help to unravel charisma as an electoral strategy – the long list of pop stars, movie actors and sports celebrities successfully entering politics provides a rich pool of cases.

This will not only help to improve our knowledge of electoral strategies in other democracies of the 'third wave', but the analysis of party

politics in more established democracies will also benefit from a deeper understanding of charisma and clientelism. In fact, several scholars expect political parties in Western Europe to increasingly supplement their catch-all strategies with secondary electoral strategies. One such complementary strategy that will help parties to differentiate themselves from the competition is charisma. Although recent empirical evidence suggests that political parties still have a more significant influence on voting behaviour than leadership appeals, it is clear that 'in an age of increasingly competitive elections, electorally appealing leaders may make all the difference' (Webb and Poguntke, 2007: 346). A second strategy political parties can use to separate themselves from the competition is patronage. However, unlike in the newer democracies of East Asia, patronage will not be directed at the electorate as a clientelistic mechanism of voter mobilization (since this will be difficult to realize in the highly developed context that is Western Europe), but will be used as an instrument of governance. Political parties will make increasing use of patronage to build organizational networks in the state (and semi-state) sector that will combine political loyalty with technocratic expertise. These networks will facilitate the implementation of public policies, thereby helping parties to boost their image as efficient managers of the state (Kopecký and Mair, 2006).

In addition, the study of political party organization in East Asia has shown that it is not only models of politician-voter linkage that are biased towards Western Europe, but that established models of party organization are also of limited relevance outside the Western European context. This is because existing typologies of party organization focus too much on formal regulations and rules, while ignoring informal norms that influence the distribution of power within a political party. However, as the development of party organization in East Asia shows, only when actors follow programmatic strategies of voter mobilization will they be interested in formalizing the power relations between them into formal rules. That is to say, in contextual environments that favour clientelistic over programmatic strategies, political parties will be largely informal organizations that consist of patron-client networks. The informal distribution of resources through these networks will always override formal rules, which thus constitute nothing but a façade that hides the clientelistic dealings from the public eye.

However, although party structures in the 'third wave' of democratization are in many cases non-bureaucratic and informal, such informality should not be conflated with weakness or lack of organization (Levitsky, 2001). Numerous parties maintain solid informal organizations that

are both extensive and enduring. In other words, ignoring the informal politics within many political parties in young democracies would reduce the analytical depth of any research into these parties, resulting in an inadequate understanding of how these parties actually operate (Erdmann, 2004: 75). However, although acknowledging the significance of informal party organization, the literature has not yet developed a classification that would allow us to capture the differences between clientelistic parties in the 'third wave' of democratization. The analysis of the distribution of resources within political parties in East Asia through existing typologies of party organization has hinted at the possibility that informal organization can operate according to different logics, and it would be fruitful to determine how these differences impact on the conduct of politics and the quality of democracy in general. The study of East Asian party systems, which are dominated by informal clientelistic party organizations, could again potentially contribute significantly to the development of such a classification of informal party processes.

The benefit of such a classification would not be limited to analyses of political parties in newer democracies but would also extend to more established democracies. As argued above, political parties in Western Europe are increasingly making use of patronage to mobilize voters. This, in turn, will have a profound effect on party organization. More precisely, it will accelerate a process that is already under way. First of all, political parties will be more interested in membership quality than quantity, with quality measured in terms of technocratic expertise. Secondly, the decreasing size of party memberships will make it necessary to open candidate selection to the wider electorate, thereby making it even more difficult to distinguish between party members and the common electorate. Thirdly, this will further weaken the party central office as the mediating link between the party in public office and the party on the ground, while the party in public office will be strengthened as the coordinating body in the growing patronage network. In short, the party in public office will further consolidate its position as the dominant party organizational face, until it could eventually become impossible to distinguish between the three formal faces of organization. Instead, the function of political parties could be reduced to no more than that of a formal cloak around interpersonal networks that connect the party leadership to appointed partisans at different levels of governance. In other words, models of informal party politics will also become increasingly valuable in the Western European context.

Finally, the analysis of political party development in East Asia has shown that not only do new democracies differ from more established democracies in terms of the linkages between political parties and voters, but the linkages between parties and the state are also very different. The study of the relationship between political parties and the state has attracted increasing research interest among scholars of Western European politics in recent years. This is based on the empirical observation that political parties have consistently moved away from society and become more entrenched within state institutions (van Biezen and Kopecký, 2007). However, most of the research so far has focused on the formal links between parties and the state, particularly on public funding for political parties and public regulation of party internal activities. In East Asia, financial state support for political parties is practically negligible, while laws aimed at regulating political party structures are usually very vague, providing parties with enough freedom to organize themselves as mere façades for informal patron–client networks. Consequently, the relationship between political parties and the state in East Asia is best described in terms of a third dimension, namely the extent to which parties penetrate and control the state and use public offices for their own advantage. Although acknowledged by the general party literature, this dimension has received comparatively little attention, simply because it is less relevant in the Western European context.

However, in many new democracies, rent-seeking behaviour by political parties is widespread and deserves detailed scholarly investigation. In particular, the analysis of political parties in East Asia has shown how parties use their access to public resources to fuel clientelistic networks – whether this is parties in Korea selling preferential treatment in the allocation of state subsidies and public loans to business conglomerates, or legislators in Indonesia channelling public money straight into party coffers. Studying East Asian party politics could therefore help to populate this third dimension of party–state relationships with data and provide valuable insight into how political parties can colonize the state. Considering that patronage is likely to play an increasingly important role in Western European electoral politics, this dimension could also gain greater significance in more established democracies.

In short, existing concepts in the field of party organization are only of limited analytical value outside the Western European context, because they are based on the notion that politics takes place primarily within formal institutions. This follows from the fact that political parties in Western Europe use mostly programmatic electoral strategies to mobilize voters. As with clientelism, programmatic strategies

describe exchange relations between politicians and voters. However, unlike clientelism, programmatic strategies stipulate the distribution of resources through formal policies. As a result, programmatic parties will need a formal decision-making apparatus to formulate these policies, while their implementation will be achieved through formal state channels. Many political parties in newer democracies, in contrast, have developed clientelistic strategies to compete in the electoral market. Clientelistic incentives are usually not distributed through public channels but through direct links between the politician and the voter. As a result, political parties populated with clientelistic actors do not need to adopt formal decision-making procedures, as outcomes are influenced through the strategic allocation of resources. Moreover, political parties will develop informal links with the state, rather than using formal channels, in order to funnel public resources into their clientelistic networks.

Therefore, in order to gain a better understanding of party politics in newer democracies scholars need to pay more attention to the informal dimension. In particular, we have to improve our understanding of clientelism – an electoral strategy so far largely ignored by the literature. Secondly, as clientelism prevents the emergence of formal party structures, we need to develop a framework that is able to capture informal party politics. Thirdly, since clientelistic parties will circumvent formal channels when dealing with the state, more research needs to be conducted into informal party–state relationships. Expanding our knowledge of these three dimensions will not only help us to develop better explanations for party formation and change in newer democracies, but – since patronage and charisma are also becoming more important in the Western European electoral markets – we will also be in a better position to analyse current trends of political party development in established democracies.

Notes

Introduction

1. Arguments presented in order to support the thesis of 'party decline' differ markedly in their level of generalization. Whereas some authors interpret the weaker role of parties in the political process as a universal trend (e.g., Schmitter, 1999), others insist on a more nation-specific approach (e.g., Reiter, 1989; Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995).
2. By highlighting the 'intermediate' character of institutions (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 2) – meaning that institutions reside somewhere between the state as an entity and individual behaviour – historical institutionalists would, without doubt, characterize political parties as institutions. As a result, they would not object to the study of political parties through the meta-theoretical framework of historical institutionalism.
3. This geographical term often causes confusion. *Northeast* Asia is usually defined as comprising the following countries: the People's Republic of China, the two Koreas, Japan and Taiwan. *Southeast* Asia encompasses Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia and Singapore) as well as Indonesia, the Philippines and East Timor. Together these two regions are termed *East* Asia.
4. Huntington (1991) distinguishes between three historic waves of democratization, which were separated by two reverse waves of authoritarian setback. The 'first wave' (1828–1926) had its origin in the American and French revolutions and slowly weakened after the coming into power of Mussolini in Italy. With the end of the Second World War the 'second wave' (1943–62) was initiated by the victory of the allied forces, but it came to an early end when military coups in Latin America brought down a number of democratically elected governments. Finally, the third and last 'wave' was set off by the fall of the Portuguese right-wing dictatorship in 1974.
5. This is not an arbitrary cut-off point: 3 per cent is a common legal threshold in electoral systems of proportional representation (PR). In fact, the average legal threshold of PR systems in Western and Eastern Europe is around 3 per cent (Birch, 2001).
6. Daalder (2001) offers a good description of the 'first wave' of democratization as a context for political party formation. For a discussion of how 'third wave' democracies differ in this respect, see van Biezen (2003b).

1 Explaining Party Organization: Actors, Conflict, Context

1. Kitschelt also lists *charisma* as a third electoral strategy. However, we will treat charisma as a secondary strategy and therefore discuss it later on.

2. The allocation of public employment in return for electoral support will be defined as *patronage*. Many other authors use *patronage* and *clientelism* interchangeably, but this analysis will keep them strictly separate.
3. When distributing private goods to voters, politicians or parties often make use of vote-monitoring measures to check whether voters comply with the exchange agreement – that is, whether they actually vote for the politician or party. These measures usually violate the principle of electoral secrecy. For instance, voters can be given carbon paper to record how they voted, or, in more modern societies, voters take a photo of their completed ballot with their mobile phone to send as a picture message to the vote broker. Another way is to give the voter a faked or stolen filled-in ballot paper before entering the polling station. The voter casts the filled-in ballot and gives the official ballot paper he or she received in the polling station to the vote broker waiting outside (Schaffer and Schedler, 2007).
4. However, it has to be pointed out that charisma is not the sole defining characteristic of populism. In fact, as Barr (2009) argues, once populists have taken power they often use clientelism, in addition to charisma, to strengthen their linkages with the electorate.
5. Other indicators of low socio-economic development often associated with the emergence of clientelism are a low urbanization rate – which makes it easier to monitor voters' compliance with the clientelistic exchange agreement – and low levels of education, which increases the chances that voters do not know about the illegality of vote-buying.
6. The prisoner's dilemma is a model in game theory to demonstrate the problem of cooperation versus conflict between two people. If both players cooperate, the individual payoff for each player will be higher. However, since neither player knows whether the other player will cooperate, rational choice leads both players to defect. The incentive to defect can be overcome if the game is played repeatedly, thus giving each player the opportunity to punish the other player for previous non-cooperative play. As Stokes (2007) argues for clientelism, modelling patron–client interactions as repeated games equips patrons with the ability to monitor constituents' votes, reward them for their support and punish them for defection. This explains how clientelism becomes institutionalized.
7. Whether the autocratic regime had been able to establish effective clientelistic networks will have depended on a number of other factors commonly identified in the literature as causes for clientelism – most importantly, the degree of state control over the economy (Wilkinson, 2007) and the degree of bureaucratic professionalization (Shefter, 1994). For matters of simplification these factors will be excluded from our analytical framework or otherwise the historical chain of causality would become uncontrollable.
8. The heyday of the European mass party was between the 1880s and the 1960s. Mass parties were characterized by a strong party on the ground. This powerful position within the internal power configuration resulted from various factors: (1) the sheer size of the party membership, (2) the fact that decision-making was organized in a hierarchical system of delegation, and (3) parties' reliance on members as sources of income and labour. However, at the same time, the party on the ground had to rely on the party central office

to coordinate the members' activities. After the Second World War mass parties came under increasing competition from 'catch-all parties' (Kirchheimer, 1964), prompting many to emulate the latter's organizational structures and curtail the influence of the party on the ground.

9. See Laakso and Taagepera (1979) on how to calculate party system fragmentation as the *effective number of electoral parties* and the *effective number of parliamentary parties*. Probably the most widely used method to capture electoral volatility was developed by Pedersen (1979).
10. This argument is in line with theoretical claims made in the general literature on organizations. Following the contingency theory, the environment surrounding an organization should be described according to its degree of uncertainty. The basic theory claims that organizations naturally resist unpredictability and will adapt to render the outcomes of their actions more certain (see Burns and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967).

2 South Korea

1. The opposition generated the resources necessary for a clientelistic strategy of voter mobilization through the private wealth of its candidates, private donations and by securing public infrastructure projects for its constituencies.
2. While the GNP is strongly linked to earlier parties under the leadership of Kim Young-sam (DLP and NKP), the UDP is the last link in a long chain of parties that harboured politicians loyal to Kim Dae-jung (PPD, DP, NCNP, MDP, Uri Party, UNDP). Kim Jong-pil's party, the United Liberal Democrats (ULD), on the other hand, lost nearly all significance in the 2004 National Assembly election, when it won only four parliamentary seats and even Kim Jong-pil himself failed to secure a mandate. As a result of this, three of the newly elected lawmakers left the party to form the People First Party (PFP), while the only remaining assemblyman decided to join the GNP in 2006.
3. In addition, one quarter of the seats would be allocated proportionally in one national constituency, including a seat bonus for the largest party. If one party won at least half of the popularly elected seats, it was automatically entitled to two-thirds of the seats on the national list; if it gained less, the strongest party was still awarded half of the national list seats.
4. Although these three regions only represent a part of the Korean electorate, a large number of voters living in other parts of the country in their third or fourth generation also tend to vote according to their family's regional roots.
5. Kim Young-sam was president between 1993 and 1998, before being succeeded by Kim Dae-jung, who held office until 2002. Kim Jong-pil served as prime minister under Kim Dae-jung between 1998 and 2000.
6. Interest in issues of a 'post-materialist' nature comes primarily from younger voters, whereas for older voters region still provides a powerful factor in establishing political partisanship. Commonly termed as the '386 generation', voters in their 30s have been found to hold much more progressive views on politics than people in their 50s and older, who experienced the Korean War and subsequent hardship (Kang, 2005; Lee, 2003).
7. For a discussion of the 'blacklisting' movement, see E. H. Shin (2003).

8. The seat bonus for the largest party was abolished before the 1996 elections. Moreover, the share of seats allocated through proportional representation had steadily been increasing over the years – from 15 per cent in the first elections to 19 per cent in 2004.
9. Kim Dae-jung won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000 for his sunshine policy of initiating dialogue between the rival Koreas. In particular, the policy was based on the idea that providing economic aid to the North without demanding immediate reciprocity would improve the political climate on the Korean peninsula.
10. Roh's approval rating dipped largely because of his perceived inattentiveness to the economy. Although South Korea experienced solid growth under Roh, this growth did not trickle down to the average voter, who became increasingly frustrated with rising household debts, high education costs and unaffordable real estate prices. Eventually, even Roh's young supporters abandoned him, driven mainly by the high youth jobless rate.
11. At current exchange rates, 1,000 Korean won equate to around 0.80 US dollars or 0.65 euros.
12. In 2004, an amendment to the Party Law Act abolished the requirement for parties to be based on a dense network of local party chapters. The main purpose of this amendment was to lower the expenses for political parties in order to reduce the need to accept illegal donations. However, local bosses have found ways to maintain the institutionalization of their personal networks without party funding. For instance, work that was previously done by full-time party staff is now often delegated to friends and family or to employees in the boss's own private company. In other words, the personal networks of supporters of assemblymen and candidates are now established as the parties' grassroots organization, as political parties only need to have official representation at the provincial level.
13. Usually, these campaign songs are light upbeat pop tunes – sometimes based on the melody of famous chart hits – which in their lyrics will constantly repeat the party's name and the party's number on the voting ballot as well as the key words of the party's pledges.
14. One indicator for political apathy in South Korea is the declining level of voter turnout. In the 2008 National Assembly elections turnout hit a record low of 46 per cent, down 14.6 percentage points from the 2004 elections and 11.2 per cent from the elections in 2000. For an analysis of recent public opinion surveys on Koreans' views on democracy and politics, see D. C. Shin et al. (2005).
15. This argument is supported by the fact that the selection of candidates for parliamentary elections – where the larger number of candidates provided plenty of scope for horse-trading between factions – remained highly centralized in a special committee of party leaders. Candidates were evaluated by criteria such as public visibility, loyalty to the party, connections with the top leadership and likelihood of victory (Park, 2000; see also Köllner and Frank, 1999: 96).
16. The measure proved so popular with the electorate that, shortly afterwards, the GNP, the successor party of the NKP, adopted the same system to select its presidential candidate – or rather, rubber-stamp a decision that had already been made.

17. The *Uri* Party, in contrast, held 86 primaries in a total of 229 districts (37.6 per cent).
18. For instance, prominent figures that were eliminated by the UDP's screening committee included former presidential chief of staff Park Ji-won, Kim Hong-up (Kim Dae-jung's second son) and Lee Yong-hee, a four-term lawmaker. Park was convicted of taking 100 million won in bribes from two local conglomerates, while Kim Hong-up was found guilty of receiving about 2.5 billion won from several companies in July 2002. Lee Yong-hee received a suspended jail term for taking bribes.
19. Moreover, in drawing up the party list, the leadership is bound by specific rules in the party's constitution, such as the requirement that the first candidate on the list must be a physically disabled person.
20. One example is the aforementioned founder of Hyundai, Chung Ju-yung, who contested the 1992 presidential election and came third behind Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung. However, in general, the number of businessmen-turned-politicians is very low, as the practice of 'quasi taxes' provides business elites with an effective alternative to influence politics (Kim, 2007).
21. For instance, the secretariat of Kim Young-sam's NKP was a large organization with three-tier offices on a geographical basis (the central office, the province/city offices and the electoral district offices), employing about 1,200 full-time staff. Kim Dae-jung's NCNP, which was in opposition then, had 300 party employees on its payroll (Kim, 1998: 150).
22. The executive committee of the GNP consists of nine members, all of whom need to be approved by the party congress. The ten members of the UDP's executive committee, on the other hand, are elected by all party members.

3 Taiwan

1. The term 'Taiwanese' in this regard refers to ethnic Chinese, who immigrated to Taiwan from the seventeenth century onwards, mainly from the coastal regions of Fujian and Guangdong. Today, slightly less than 85 per cent of the island's population are considered Taiwanese, whereas mainland Chinese account for approximately 14 per cent of the population (Copper, 1996: 12).
2. The Non-mainstream also maintained clientelistic connections to local factions. However, the Non-mainstream was very sceptical of local factions. Therefore, to limit local factions' power, the Non-mainstream only used these clientelistic connections to mobilize voters in local elections, not in national elections.
3. Heads of farmers' and fishermen's associations were the most powerful vote brokers because they were in charge of credit unions affiliated with these associations.
4. In fact, many observers of Taiwanese politics argue that after the 1996 presidential election the distinction between the two factions became obsolete. However, some scholars still use the distinction as an analytical tool even today (e.g., Fell, 2005a), as will this analysis.
5. Originally, the 1947 constitution of the Republic of China provided for a bicameral legislature. However, during the 1990s most of the parliamentary

powers of the National Assembly were transferred to the Legislative Yuan. Moreover, the National Assembly lost its right to elect the president when, in 1996, direct popular elections were established. In 2000, the National Assembly was transformed from a permanent constitutional institution into an ad hoc legislative body that would not be elected regularly but only on proposal by the Legislative Yuan. In 2005, the National Assembly was completely abolished.

6. This eventually led a group of die-hard radical independence advocates to leave the DPP in 1996 in order to establish their own party – the Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP).
7. When the KMT arrived in Taiwan in 1949 the administration that ruled Taiwan as a province of the Republic of China was left untouched. However, since Taiwan also became the last territory to be effectively ruled by the government of the Republic of China, this gave rise to an odd double administrative structure.
8. In July 2006, the DPP passed a resolution that dissolved all factions. Nevertheless, the previous factional affiliations of party members are thought to still play an important role in the party's internal politics.
9. At least this is true for the national level. In local elections, vote-buying continues to play an important role (see Mattlin, 2004).
10. The term 'head members' refers to the fact that members whose membership fees are being paid by powerful bosses are nothing more than pieces in the strategic games played by these bosses. Similarly, 'pocket members' is a term used to describe the common practice of bosses keeping 'their' members' membership cards in their own 'pockets' and only handing them out to the actual member before a party internal election.
11. At current exchange rates 100 New Taiwan dollars equate to around 3.10 US dollars or 2.40 euros.
12. However, it needs to be noted that the drop in membership figures was also due to the fact that membership records prior to 2000 were simply outdated as they included people who had died, changed residence or shifted party loyalties. The re-registration process not only helped to rid the party of pocket members, but it also updated the administrative records.
13. As a matter of fact, the total membership/electorate ratio in Taiwan is even higher than that of any Western European democracy in the late 1990s, with the exception of Austria and Finland (see Mair and van Biezen, 2001).
14. Although the results of the primary were not binding, thus leaving the party leadership with the final decision of whom to nominate, only 10 per cent of primary winners (including those for local executive elections) were refused nomination (Fell, 2006: 176).
15. The DPP conducts the public opinion polls through its own survey centre, which has eight full-time staff members. Respondents are offered a list of prospective candidates, and are asked to choose their first and second preferences. Party members are not surveyed. The results of the surveys are kept secret, even from the candidates, who are given only their own results and a summary of their competitors' results.
16. Moreover, the DPP redesigned the nomination process for the 2000 presidential election. Under the new rules, a candidate needed the endorsement of 40 party officials (including professional staff and elected officials). If more

than one candidate had received a recommendation, the party would have held a closed primary. However, as it turned out, only one candidate was recommended. In this case the party regulations only demanded a three-fifths approval by the national party congress, which, according to Fell (2006: 186), was merely a question of rubber-stamping Chen Shui-bian's candidacy.

17. The KMT not only copied the DPP's system to select candidates for parliamentary elections, but it also took on a very similar system for the nomination of its presidential candidate in 2004. According to the newly introduced regulations, a candidate must obtain the endorsement of 50,000 party members. If only one candidate meets the required benchmark, voting will be held at the party's national congress. Otherwise a closed primary and opinion polls will be used to find the winner. Yet, as in the case of the DPP, there was only one applicant, meaning that both parties only allowed delegates in the national party congress to participate in the decision-making process. The real decision was made behind closed doors and then merely rubber-stamped by the delegates' vote (Fell, 2006: 183).
18. The primaries, however, were not binding, meaning that the party leadership retained the right to remove primary winners that did not meet their approval (Fell, 2006: 182).
19. Binding opinion polls, which are not covered by the analytical framework by Rahat and Hazan (2001), should be settled halfway between open and closed primaries, since they take candidate selection outside the political party, while choosing the 'voters' through scientific sampling methods.

4 The Philippines

1. For instance, 80 per cent of the congressmen elected in 1987 could be classified as belonging to 'traditional clans' (Gutierrez et al., 1992: 25).
2. According to different press sources, 126 people were killed and 148 others wounded in violence leading up to and during the 2007 parliamentary and local elections. In the 2004 presidential elections, election-related violence claimed 189 lives. For figures on earlier elections, see Patino and Velasco (2004).
3. At current exchange rates 100 Filipino pesos equate to around 2.20 US dollars or 1.70 euros.
4. For instance, in 2002, Negros Occidental representative Julio 'Jules' Ledesma IV walked down the aisle with movie star Assunta de Rossi in a televised ceremony at his hacienda. Earlier, Batangas representative and now senator, Ralph Recto, wed popular movie actress Vilma Santos in 1992 – a marriage that helped catapult the third-generation legislator into the Senate. Other celebrity marriages of political clans in the House include those of Negros Occidental representative Carlos Cojuangco, son of San Miguel Corporation chairman Eduardo 'Danding' Cojuangco, to the late actress Rio Diaz, and that of Antonio 'Tonyboy' Floirendo to former Miss Universe and TV host Margie Moran.
5. Several politicians host talk shows on radio or television. For instance, Ilocos Norte representative Imee Marcos, daughter of Ferdinand Marcos, anchored an entertainment talk show on the popular radio station DZBB, and has

- made appearances in TV soaps and comedies. Renato Cayetano, who died in 2003, was elected to the Senate in 1998 mainly because he hosted a popular radio and TV talk show where he gave free legal advice.
6. For instance, immediately after the 2004 elections, 24 out of 210 legislators changed their party affiliation in the House of Representatives (Teehankee, 2006: 239).
 7. For instance, the constitution of *Lakas* stipulates that a party convention should be held at least every two years. However, in practice, the party claims that lack of sufficient financial resources has prevented the convention from meeting on a regular basis.
 8. For instance, Rocamora (2001: 6) received reports that during the *Lakas* convention in 1998 about 60 million pesos were distributed to the delegates in order to secure De Venecia's nomination as the party's next presidential candidate – 300,000 pesos to each member of Congress, 200,000 pesos to governors and 100,000 pesos to city mayors.
 9. For example, President Estrada was found guilty of accepting millions in pay-offs from *jueteng* operators (*jueteng* is a highly popular, illegal lottery game) in return for protection from legal prosecution. In 2005, Arroyo's husband, son and brother-in-law were also accused of having corrupt links with *jueteng* gangsters.

5 Indonesia

1. Literally the 'five pillars', or principles, of *Pancasila* comprises (1) belief in one God, (2) just and civilized humanitarianism, (3) a united Indonesia, (4) democracy guided by wisdom, through consultation and representation, and (5) social justice for all the Indonesian people.
2. As it was not regarded as a party in the legal sense, but rather as a 'functional group', Golkar was not restricted by government regulations on the conduct of parties. In contrast, both the PDI and the PPP were seriously constrained in their election campaigns. For instance, neither party was allowed to directly criticize the government or its policies, no campaigning was allowed in villages (where most people lived) and government permission was required for all rallies. Furthermore, party nominees for legislative office were screened by the regime for possible 'extreme left' (communism) or 'extreme right' (militant Muslim) connections or tendencies. And finally, neither the PDI nor the PPP were allowed to have branches below the district level.
3. Due to the particular pattern of Islamic conversion, Indonesian Muslims form a very heterogeneous community. First of all, it is possible to distinguish practicing Muslims from nominal Muslims: While *santri* are Muslims of a strict orthodoxy, *abangan*, although acknowledging an adherence to Islam, order their lives according to more indigenous precepts and practices. Moreover, *santri* can be further subdivided into modernists and traditionalists. Whereas modernists accept the validity of none but the primary texts of the Islamic tradition (the *Qur'an* and the *Hadith*, the traditions of the prophet Mohammed), traditionalists also look towards mysticism and ritual practice.
4. *Muhammadiyah* is the main organization that represents *modernist* Muslims. It was established in 1912, and now encompasses approximately 12 million

members. In line with its philosophy, namely to reconcile Islam with the modern world through education and welfare, *Muhammadiyah* is based on a broad network of educational institutions ranging from kindergartens to universities. *Nahdlatul Ulama* is the main *traditionalist* Islamic organization. Founded in 1926, it commands, at present, the support of some 30 million Muslims. Also active in education and welfare, NU runs the majority of rural religious boarding schools (*pesantren*).

5. The PDI-P was established as a splinter party from the PDI in 1998.
6. This strategy is most effective in rural areas where the influence of local figures tends to be higher. Moreover, the influence of certain types of notables will vary between regions. For example, in many areas of East and Central Java, the most important factor behind electoral success could be a good relationship the local *kiai* (Islamic scholar). In eastern parts of Indonesia, where Christians are most numerous, a close connection with the local church is critically important. Similarly, in some areas, political parties compete for the endorsement of leaders of particular ethnic groups. Finally, across the country, but especially in areas outside Java, government officials (including military officers) exert significant influence on voters.
7. In addition, political parties used coercion as a strategy of voter mobilization. Almost all political parties maintain a paramilitary wing (*satgas*), whose official function is to enforce internal party security. However, in the 1999 election *satgas* were also used to intimidate opponents and voters outside the party. *Satgas* members are often recruited among the unemployed urban youth and are usually rewarded financially. Before the 2004 election, the Indonesian Electoral Commission imposed severe restrictions on the mobilization of *satgas*, threatening parties with sanctions if they failed to control their supporters. As a result, coercion largely stopped being an effective electoral tool (Wilson, 2006).
8. Panigoro is the founder of MedcoEnergi, one of Indonesia's largest energy companies, which, according to *Forbes*, ranks among Indonesia's 20 richest.
9. Gus Dur is Wahid's nickname. As Wahid died in December 2009, the splinter group is currently led by his daughter, Yenny Wahid. In July 2010, the Supreme Court again confirmed the lawfulness of the 2008 PKB party congress, thus reaffirming Muhaimin as the PKB's legitimate chairman.
10. For a more detailed analysis of the inter-factional conflict within Golkar after the fall of Suharto, see Tomsa (2006) and Suryadinata (2007).
11. Kalla also ran as Golkar's candidate in the 2009 presidential election. Finishing only third with a disappointing 12 per cent of the vote, Kalla was replaced by Bakrie as the party chairman.
12. At current exchange rates 10,000 Indonesian rupiah equate to around 1.10 US dollars or 0.90 euros.
13. Golkar makes a distinction between members and cadres, claiming to have an overall membership of about 14 million. The eligibility criteria for ordinary members include, among others, age, literacy and acceptance of the party's platform, while cadres, in addition, have to pass a political education and training programme.
14. The calculation is based on results for the 2004 legislative election.

15. However, the success of celebrity candidates has been mixed. Of the candidates mentioned here, only Marissa Haque, Deddy Sutomo, Rieke Dyah Pitaloka and Nurul Arifin won a parliamentary mandate.
16. The advisory council is composed of one-third of the members of the *majelis syuro*, which usually comprises between 50 and 65 members.
17. For a more detailed discussion of topics raised in this and the next paragraph, see Mietzner (2007).
18. Having to share power with six other political parties in Yudhoyono's so-called *Koalisi Kerakyatan* (People's Coalition) repeatedly forced the PKS to support government decisions that were highly unpopular with its core constituency. For example, in early 2005, the party voted in favour of increasing the oil price by 35 per cent, which caused angry protests by PKS grassroots supporters, with some local branches demanding the party's withdrawal from government.
19. Between January and late March 2009, Yudhoyono's PD spent 5.1 million US dollars, more than any other party, on television ads, followed by Golkar, with 4.8 million (Mujani and Liddle, 2010: 42).
20. It is not surprising that the PKS supports a proposed doubling of the electoral threshold from the current figure of 2.5 per cent to 5 per cent, as this would make it more difficult for smaller parties to win parliamentary representation, thus potentially lowering environmental uncertainty.
21. In 2004, Indonesia adopted open list PR for legislative election, allowing voters to cast a single vote for a candidate as well as a party. Theoretically, this new electoral system should encourage competition between candidates of the same party and thus offer greater opportunities for the clientelistic mobilization of voters. However, in order to secure a mandate through personal votes candidates need to win by a large margin in their district. The open list element of the electoral system is therefore illusory, meaning that, de facto, the closed list system remains unchanged (Sherlock, 2009).

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